


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THUCYDIDES

CHIEFLY FROM

THE TRANSLATION

OF

HOBBS OF MALMESBURY;

WITH THE VARIOUS

READINGS OF ARNOLD, GOELLER, HAACK, &c.

A NEW EDITION,

WITH NOTES AND A MARGINAL ANALYSIS.

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OXFORD:

HENRY SLATTER, AND JOSEPH VINCENT.

1841.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN presenting to the student the following corrected edition of Hobbes's version of Thucydides, the Editor begs to acknowledge his extreme obligation to the numerous and learned commentators and translators who have already expended their labours on the subject which he has ventured to take in hand; most especially to Dr. Arnold, Goeller, Mr. Bloomfield, to the treatise of Hermann on the Political Antiquities of Greece, and to Bishop Thirlwall's History of that country. If what he has undertaken should in any way serve to smooth the path of the reader, he will feel himself amply rewarded for his labour.

FEB. 1841.

THE
HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they warred against each other; beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot,¹ with expectation it would prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it; conjecturing so much, both from this, that both sides were in the height of their power, and well prepared for it in every way, and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction; some immediately, and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that had ever arisen among the Grecians or the Barbarians, for to a portion of them also it extended, nay, I might say, to the greater part of the human race.² For as to those that preceded this,³ and

Thucydides undertakes the history of the Peloponnesian war; a far more important war than Greece had ever known before.

¹ This passage is generally taken to mean, "beginning to *write* at the beginning of the war;" but it would appear better to render it, "beginning the narrative from the beginning of the war;" for it was most probably composed during his leisure in exile: and in various parts of his work he alludes to the end of the war, which references must either have been added after the body of the work was completed, or the supposition must be necessitated, that the work was composed after the war was ended; in which case, the latter interpretation would probably be the right one. That such is the correct rendering, is furthermore confirmed by the sense which the preface to the Ecclesiastical History of Nicephorus, closely copied from that of Thucydides, must necessarily bear.

² "For this was the greatest general movement which the Greeks had ever experienced; nay, it was shared by some of the Barbarians, and one may

those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them, through length of time, cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any evidence that (looking into times far past) I have yet met with to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

He then gives a rapid sketch of the country, now called Hellas, previous to the Trojan war; its earliest state was one of mere barbarism; its inhabitants were migratory tribes.

II. For it is evident, that that which now is called Hellas, was not of old constantly inhabited; but that, at first, there were often migrations, and every one readily deserted their own land, when compelled to do so by the violence of those who at any time chanced to be superior in number. For as there was no traffic, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear, either by sea or land; and every man so husbanded the ground, as but barely to live therefrom, without any stock of riches, and planted nothing, (because it was uncertain when another would invade them, and carry all away, especially, not having the defence of walls,) but reckoned that they would everywhere obtain such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day, they made little difficulty in changing their habitations. And for this cause, they attained to no strength, either in greatness of their cities, or in the other necessary supplies of war. But the richest districts were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia⁴ and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus (except Arcadia) and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, (whereby they were ruined at home,) and withal made them more exposed to the attacks of strangers. From hence it is that Attica, from its being for the longest period untroubled with sedition on account of the sterility of the soil,⁵ has been inhabited ever by the same people. And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece, by reason of sundry transmigrations,

almost say by a large proportion of all mankind." The structure is confused, for *μεγιστη δεη* refers only to *τοισ ελλησι*: in the subsequent part of the sentence, he means to speak only of the extent of the war, without reference to its magnitude.—*Arnold*.

³ Or, "these events;" i. e. the events of the Peloponnesian war, as Goeller explains.

⁴ The ancient name of Thessaly was *Æmathia*, according to the Schol. Cf. Virg. Georg. i. 492.

⁵ In this sentence, *εκ του* is to be joined to *ουσαν*, used for *ειναι*, according to the construction preferred by Goeller.

hath not in other parts received the like augmentation;⁶ for such as by war, or sedition, were driven out of other places, the most powerful of them, as a place of security, betook themselves to Athens; where, receiving the freedom⁷ of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, that Attica, being no longer able to sustain its inhabitants, sent out colonies into Ionia.

III. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth.] For before the Trojan war, nothing appears to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, all called by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, did this name ever exist at all. But individual tribes, as well others as also the Pelasgic, over the greatest portion of Greece, gave their own names to the countries where they dwelt.⁸ But Hellen and his sons being powerful in Phthiotis, and the inhabitants of other cities calling them in to their aid, these cities, because of their associating with them, began now individually to be called Hellenes; though it was long before it could become so prevalent as to extend to all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer; for though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not any where that name in common; nor indeed to any, but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first who bore the name. But in his poems he mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achæans: nor does he likewise use the word Barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seems to me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, in contradistinction to the other. Thus the various tribes of Hellenes, as many as were dispersed in various cities, and as understood each other's

Origin of the name Hellas. The Trojan war the first enterprise in which the combined forces of the Greeks were engaged.

⁶ This difficult sentence is thus rendered by Goeller: "Atque sententiæ a me propositæ hoc firmissimum argumentum est, ob migrationes in alias terras reliquam Græciam non perinde auctam esse, quod qui ex ista aut bello aut seditione exciderant potentissimi quique in Atticam tanquam sedes stabiles futuras se recipiebant."

⁷ They were admitted to the same privileges with free-born native citizens—a custom allowed only in the infancy of the state. Those who in latter times came to settle in Athens, (Μετοικοι,) though admitted by the council of Areopagus, and entered in a public register, never actually became citizens, (Πολιται.)

⁸ Literally, "from their own selves;" i. e. from their own names, supplied, or gave a designation, [to the country they inhabited.]

language, and who in after times were called by one common name, [i. e. Hellenes,] did never before the Trojan war, for want of strength and communication, enter into any action with their forces joined. But in this expedition they united, owing to their now greater acquaintance with the art of navigation.

The first beginning of civilization was the reign of Minos, king of Crete, who acquired a naval power and cleared the Ægean sea of pirates. Ancient robbery and piracy prevailed everywhere in the seas and in the main land of Greece.

IV. For Minos⁹ was the most ancient of all, that by report we know to have built a navy: and he held an extended sway over what is now the Grecian sea;¹ and both ruled the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians, and constituting his own sons there as governors. He, as is probable, did his utmost to clear the sea of piracy, to the end that his revenues might accrue to him with greater ease.

V. For the Grecians in former times, and such Barbarians as, in the continent,² lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, betook themselves to piracy,³ and went abroad under the conduct of their most powerful men, both to enrich themselves, and to support the needy; and falling upon towns unfortified, and scatteringly inhabited, rifled them, and made this the principal means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it somewhat of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed boldly, it is still esteemed an honour. The same is also proved by some of the ancient poets,⁴ who introduce men as everywhere alike questioning those who sail to their coasts, whether they be pirates or not; as a thing which neither those of whom they inquire deny with scorn, nor which those who were desirous to know make a subject of reproach. They also robbed one another within the main land; and much of Greece uses that old custom, as the Locrians, called Ozolæ,⁵ the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the

⁹ The scholiast remarks, that "by *three comparisons*" Thucydides shews the slender power of the times which preceded the Peloponnesian war: first, in the period before Minos; secondly, with that from his age to the Trojan war; and thirdly, from thence to his own times.

¹ Anciently called the Carian sea, and now the Archipelago.

² Asia Minor.

³ Mitford, vol. i. ch. 1. sect. 1.

⁴ See Homer. Odyss. iii. 72. and ix. 254.

⁵ In distinction to the other Locrians, called Opuntii and Epicnemidii.

fashion of wearing arms remaineth yet with the people of that continent, from their old piratical habits.

VI. Formerly they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced, and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed themselves, like the Barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the parts of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Now the Athenians were among the first that laid by their armour, and relaxing in their habits⁶ passed into a more refined kind of life. And such of the rich as were somewhat advanced in years, laid aside, upon the same delicacy,⁷ not long after, the fashion of wearing linen tunics⁸ and golden grasshoppers,⁹ which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair: from whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate kind of garment, and similar to what is worn at present, was first used by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things, and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the utmost equality with the commons. The same were also the first that, when they were to contend in the Olympic games, stript themselves naked, and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in

The Greeks always carried arms like the Barbarians.

The Athenians first civilized.

⁶ Ἄνει. τη διαίτη, i. e. "soluta, neque certis legibus astricta vivendi ratione." Bekker.

⁷ These words are differently interpreted by Dr. Arnold, who considers that *δια το ἀβροδιαίτων* explains the reason why they wore the linen dress, not why they left it off. He refers to a similar confusion in the end of c. 32. and interprets the passage in the text, "It is not long since they saw their elderly men of the richer classes leave off their linen under garments," &c.

⁸ The Lacedæmonian dress consisted principally of two parts, the *χιτων* and the *χλαια*. The first was a narrow kind of frock, without sleeves, coming down to the knees: the other was a sort of large square shawl, which wrapped round the left arm, then passed across the back and under the right arm, from whence it was crossed over the breast, and the end finally thrown over the left shoulder. Both this and the *χιτων* were of woollen. See Müller's *Dorians*, vol. ii. p. 266.

⁹ That is, head-bands, to keep the top-knot (*κρωβυλον*) in order, like our ornamental combs. The top of these *κρ.* was shaped after the resemblance of a grasshopper: a form fashionable, from the predilection which the Athenians had for what bore some affinity to themselves, who boasted of being *αὐτοχθονες*. These *grasshopper combs* are alluded to by Aristoph. *Equit.* 1331.

the Olympic games use girdles; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes proposed of fighting with fists, and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear girdles in the exercise. It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same mode of life that is now in force amongst the Barbarians of the present age.

The ancient towns were built for security at some distance from the sea.

VII. Now of the cities, such as are of late foundation, and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since greater abundance of wealth, have been walled round, and built close upon the shore,¹ and they [i. e. the inhabitants] have cut off [with walls] and occupied isthmi,² both for commerce, and for the better individual security against their neighbours.³ But the old cities, by reason of the piracy that then greatly prevailed, were built at a greater distance from the sea, as well those in the islands as in the continent, (for others also that dwelt on the sea side, though not seamen, yet molested one another with robberies,) and even to the present day they retain their inland situations.⁴

Robberies chiefly committed by the Carians and the Phœnicians.

VIII. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians: for by them were the greatest part of the islands⁵ inhabited. A testimony whereof is this: the Athenians, when in this present war⁶ they hallowed the isle of Delos, and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians,⁷ known so to be, both by the armour buried with

¹ Mitford, ch. i. sect. 2.

² There seems to be an especial reference to Corinth, famous for its strength (the Aero Corinthus commanding the isthmus) and its commerce. One of the latest cities refounded was Potidæa.—*Bloomfield*.

³ Thus Mitford truly observes, that in all times “the term *neighbour* and *enemy* have, in the language of politics, become nearly synonymous.” See *Rhet.* ii. 22. sect. 5.

⁴ This participle is in the masculine, as it refers to *πολιται*, to be understood from *πολεις*.

⁵ The Cyclades.

⁶ In the sixth year of the war. B. iii. c. 104.

⁷ The Carians having invented the crest of the helmet, and the handle of the target, and also the drawing of images on their targets, had therefore a helmet and a buckler buried with them, and had their heads laid towards the west.

them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. But when the navy of Minos was once established,⁸ navigators had the sea more free; for he expelled the pirates from the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own: by which means, they who inhabited the sea coasts, being now more enabled to retain possession of their wealth, dwelt more securely; of whom some, grown now richer than they were before, surrounded their towns with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power, they proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy.

Minos, by having put down the pirates, prepared the Greeks for the expedition to Troy.

IX. And to me it seems, that Agamemnon collected that armament, not so much for that he led with him the suitors of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tyndarus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know, with most certainty, the acts of the Peloponnesians, say, that Pelops, first by the abundance of wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in poverty, obtained such power amongst them, that, although he was a foreigner, yet he gave his name to the country.⁹ And this power was also increased by his posterity: for Eurystheus being slain in Attica, by the Heraclidæ,¹ Atreus, who was his uncle by the mother,² (and was then abiding with him as

Agamemnon, king of Mycenæ, first set on foot the expedition, which was on a larger scale than Greece had ever witnessed before.

⁸ Hermann (Pol. Antiq. sect. 6.) observes, that “of the tribes that claim particular notice for their early proficiency in naval affairs, the Tyrrhenian Pelasgi are involved in the greatest obscurity, both in point of time, race, and origin: rather more distinct, though remote, is the antiquity of the Carians and the Leleges, whose naval empire was destroyed by Minos king of Gnosus, about B. C. 1250, and who, from being possessed of all the shores and islands of the Archipelago, were confined by him to a narrow district on the coast of Asia Minor.” For further information, see the learned notes on this section in Hermann.

⁹ On this, Goeller observes, “ἐπων. σχειν interpretantur ‘nomen præbuisse.’ Loci ubi ἐχειν per *præbere* reddi potest, ita intelligendi sunt, ut ἐχειν accipias dictum pro ‘*continere, in se habere causam, et rationem sive ansam dare alicui rei.*’” Peloponnesus, it will be observed, was anciently called Apia. See Hom. Il. i. 270.

¹ On the return of the Heraclidæ, usually dated B. C. 1104, see the admirable and brief discussion in Hermann’s Pol. Antiq. sect. 15—19. And for more copious information, the first vol. of Thirlwall’s Hist. of Greece. See also note on c. 12. infra.

² Atydamia, the mother of Eurystheus, was Atreus’s sister.

an exiled person, from fear of his father, for the death of Chry-sippus,³) and to whom Eurystheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ, and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Eurystheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it, for fear of the Heraclidæ, and because he appeared possessed of ability, and paid attention to the common people,) obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and such other states as had been thus under Eurystheus, for himself: and thus the power of the Pelopidæ became greater than that of the Persidæ. To which greatness Agamemnon⁴ succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in naval power, made that expedition, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much from attachment as from fear. For it is clear, that he himself contributed most ships to that action, besides some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise mentioned by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient,) who, in the delivery of the sceptre to him, says, that he “o’er numerous isles, and o’er all Argos ruled.”⁵ Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition, we may conjecture what were those of the ages before it.

Mycenæ, though but a small city, of great power.

Sparta less and Athens greater than in proportion with their power.

X. Now seeing Mycenæ was but a small city, or if any other of those times seem but of small importance, let not any man, on so weak an argument, think the fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be. For if the city of Lacedæmon were laid desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples, and floors of the buildings, I think it would cause much unbelief in posterity long hence, of their power in comparison with their real renown. For although of five parts⁶ of

³ Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pelops, at the impulsion of their mother, slew this Chrysippus, who was their half-brother, viz. by the father, and for this fact Atreus fled to Eurystheus.

⁴ The son of Atreus, heir to the power of both houses, both of the Pelopidæ and of the Persidæ.

⁵ Hom. Il. ii. 612, and 208. The commencement of the following chapter is well rendered by Goeller: “Quod autem Mycenæ parvæ fuerunt et si quod aliud ejus ætatis oppidum nunc immemorabile videtur, infirmo illo argumento utatur, qui inde non tantam fuisse Trojanam expeditionem efficere velit, quanquam vel poetæ describunt, vel fuisse fama obtinet.”

⁶ Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, Elis.

Peloponnesus, it possesses two,⁷ and holds dominion over the rest, and also of many confederates without [the Peloponnesus,] yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited, after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the reality. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double of what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, [concerning the forces that went to Troy,] nor have in regard so much the external appearance of a city, as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed the greatest of those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who, being a poet, was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet, even thus, it comes short; for he makes it to consist of twelve hundred vessels: those of the Bœotians carrying a hundred and twenty men, and those of Philoctetes, fifty; indicating, as I suppose, both the greatest and the least; anyhow of the size of any of the rest, he makes in his catalogue no mention at all; now he had shewn that they who were in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes, that they who were at the oar were all of them archers. As for supernumeraries, it is not likely that many sailed with them, except kings, and such as were in chief authority, especially as they were about to cross the open sea, with their arms and equipments for war, in ships without decks, but built in the ancient manner, after the fashion of piratical vessels. So then if, by the greatest and least, one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men brought together, considering they were sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.⁸

Survey of
the fleet
sent to
Troy.

XI. And the cause thereof was not so much want of men as of money. For, from want of provision, they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped might both carry

Thucy-
dides
ascribes
the pro-
tracted

⁷ Laconia, Messenia.

⁸ The whole number of men, estimating the ships on an average to carry eighty-five men apiece, which is the mean between a hundred and twenty and fifty, amounts to a hundred and two thousand carried in these twelve hundred ships. Yet the author makes it a light matter in respect of the present war.

siege of
Troy to the
poverty
of the
Greeks.

on the war and also maintain itself there. When upon their arrival they had gained the upper hand in a battle, (which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their camp,) they appear not even then to have employed their whole power, but that for want of subsistence they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of the Chersonesus, and part to piratical depredations: hence, by their being divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years' resistance; being a match for those that in succession remained behind to prosecute the siege. Whereas, if they had gone furnished with stores of provision, and had, without the interruptions of foraging⁹ and tillage, with all their forces, and without intermission, carried the war through, they would easily have taken the city; since they were a match for the Trojans, even without their whole force, but only with such a portion of their army as on the several occasions chanced to be present: whereas, if they had pressed the siege, they had taken the place, both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only were they weak in matters that preceded this enterprise; but also this (which is of greater name than any before it) appears to be, in fact, beneath the fame and report, which, by means of the poets, has prevailed concerning it.

Greece
continues
for a long
time in an
unsettled
state; when
at length
it became
more
settled, it
began to
send out
numerous
colonies.
Bœotia
more an-

XII. Nay, even after the Trojan war, the Grecians still continued their transmigrations and sending out colonies, so that they could not by remaining at rest increase their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused much confusion, and in most of the cities there arose seditions, by which [those who returned] being exiled, they built cities for themselves in other places; for those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, being expelled from Arne¹ by the Thessalians, settled themselves in that country which is now Bœotia, but was then called Cadmeis. (But

⁹ Including piratical cruisers. Such is the common method of subsisting a besieging army; but, as Mitford observes, (i. 88.) "such a resource soon destroys itself. To have, therefore, a more permanent and certain supply, they sent a part of their army to cultivate the vales of the Thracian Chersonese, then abandoned by their inhabitants on account of the frequent and destructive incursions of the wild people who occupied the interior of that continent."

¹ In Thessaly, from which the city colonised in Bœotia (now Chersonesa) derived its name.

there was a certain portion of them before in this country, of whom also were they that went in the expedition against Troy.) Also in the eightieth year, the Dorians,² together with the Heraclidæ, occupied Peloponnesus. And with difficulty, after long time, Greece, having constant rest, and migrating no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians colonised Ionia, and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily, and also some other parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. But when Greece became more powerful, and had attained to greater wealth than before,³ in most of the cities

² The great family, or rather clan, which claimed descent from the hero Hercules, being expelled from Peloponnesus by the Pelopidæ, found an asylum among the Dorians, an Hellenian people inhabiting a mountain district between the chain of Æta on the one side, and Parnassus on the other. Here they found willing followers in their enterprise for the recovery of their former dominion in Peloponnesus: the Heraclidæ were to possess the thrones of their ancestors; but the Dorians were to have the free property of the lands which they hoped to conquer, and were not to hold them under the Heraclidæ. The invaders were also assisted by an Ætolian chief named Oxylus, and by his means they were enabled to cross over by sea from the northern to the southern side of the Corinthian gulf, instead of forcing their way by land through the isthmus. Their invasion was completely successful; all Peloponnesus, except Arcadia and Achaia, fell into their power; and three chiefs of the Heraclidæ took possession of the thrones of Sparta, Argos, and Messenia; while Elis was assigned to their associate Oxylus. The land was divided in equal shares amongst the Dorians, with the exception probably of some portions attached to the different temples, and which, with the offices of priesthood, belonged to the Heraclidæ, as the descendants of the national gods and heroes of the country. Meanwhile, the old inhabitants were either reduced to migrate, or were treated as an inferior caste, holding such lands as they were permitted to cultivate, not as freeholders, but as tenants under Dorian lords. These were the Laconians, or *περιοικοι*, of whom we shall find frequent mention in the course of this history; and some of this class, failing in an attempt to recover their independence, were degraded to the still lower condition of villains, or predial slaves; and thus formed the first beginning of the class of Helots, which was afterwards greatly swelled from other quarters. On the other hand, the Hellenian name derived its general predominance throughout Greece from the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus; the Dorians claiming descent from the eldest son of Hellen, and, while they gloried in their extraction, asserting their peculiar title to the Hellenian name above all the other tribes which had assumed it.—*Arnold*.

³ Or, "from the increase of revenues;" for our author intended, I think,

Attention was first paid to naval affairs by the Corinthians,

there were erected tyrannies, now that the revenues were increased, (for before that time, there were hereditary kingdoms with definite prerogatives.) And now the Grecians built navies, and became more assiduous in the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first galleys⁴ of all Greece. It appears, too, that Aminocles,⁵ a shipwright of Corinth, built four ships for the Samians. And from the time that Aminocles went to the Samians, until the end of this present war, are about three hundred years.⁶ And the most ancient naval battle⁷ that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Coreyræans,⁸ and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, and having intercourse with each other through their territory. Hence they were also wealthy in money, as appears by the ancient poets, who have surnamed this town the rich.⁹ And when the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates, and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money.

afterwards by the Ionians in the time of Cyrus and

After this, the Ionians, in the time of Cyrus¹ first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy, and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast.

to ascribe the rise of tyranny to the cupidity of ambition excited by the increase of wealth, and consequently of revenue.—*Bloomfield.*

⁴ *Τριηρεις*, triremes—ships of war of the galley kind, so called from three banks of oars with which they were furnished. They also carried sails, but generally lowered them in action.

⁵ A. C. 705. Herod. i. 163.

⁶ By this it appears that Thucydides outlived the war.

⁷ That is, regular engagement between fleets; for combats between single ships must have often occurred before. The cause of the war in question is narrated by Herodotus, b. iii. c. 33.

⁸ Herod. iii. 58.

⁹ *Οἱ δὲ Μυκῆνας εἶχον, εὐκτιμεῖον πολιεῖροι, Ἄφνειον τε Κορινθον.*—*Iliad.* ii. 569.

¹ Herod. b. i.

Also Polycrates,² who in the time of Cambyses tyrannized in Samos, possessing a strong navy, both subdued others of the islands, and having taken Rhenea,³ he consecrated⁴ it to the Delian Apollo. The Phocæans⁵ likewise, who were founding the city of Massalia,⁶ overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

XIV. These then were the most powerful navies, and yet even these, though many ages after the Trojan war, were possessed, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels of fifty oars, and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a short time before the Median war, and the death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that galleys in any number were possessed by the tyrants of Sicily,⁷ and by the Corcyræans; for these last⁸ were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the expedition of Xerxes. For the people of Ægina, and the Athenians, and such others as had them, possessed but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oared vessels; and that so lately, as but from the time that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, making war on Ægina, (the Barbarians too being expected,) to build those ships with which they fought; and even these were not decked throughout.

XV. Such then were the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval affairs, acquired by them no small power, both in revenue, and in

of his son Cambyses, also by Polycrates who was tyrant of Samos, and at a later period by the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans.

² Herod. b. iii.

³ Book iii. 104.

⁴ The mode in which this was done is mentioned, iii. 104; also Herod. b. iii. c. 34 and 122.

⁵ Inhabitants of Phocæa, in Ionia, who in the time of Tarquinius, dreading the power of Cyrus, came into the mouth of the Tiber, entered into amity with the Romans, and thence went and built the city of Massalia, in Gallia Narconensis, now Marseilles.

⁶ This is not to be understood as referring to the sea fight mentioned by Herodotus, b. i. c. 166, in which the Phocæans, having fled from Ionia to escape the yoke of Cyrus, gained what certainly ought not to be called a victory over the Carthaginians and Tuscans. Thucydides says, "the Phocæans who were founding Massalia;" that is to say, not the main body of the people who fled from the arms of Cyrus, but a colony which they had sent out fifty years earlier, and which did actually found Massalia long before the conquest of the parent state by the Persians.—*Arnold*.

⁷ Gelon and Hiero.

⁸ Of Corinthians, Ionians, and Phocæans.

Causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in any great action.

dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially such as had not sufficient territory) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, at least such whereby power might be acquired, there was none. And such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with an army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither leagued themselves with the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other. For it was chiefly in the war of old, between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians, that the rest of Greece was most divided, and in league with either party.

The Asiatic Greeks weakened by the Persians,

XVI. Various hinderances, too, occurred to other states in the way of their growth and increase. To the Ionians, when their affairs were in a thriving state, Cyrus and the Persian monarchy; who having subdued Cræsus, carried hostilities into all the country between the Halys and the sea-coast, and subjected their continental cities; as afterwards Darius, by the aid of the Phœnician fleet, did their islands also.

and checked in their improvements by the selfish and timid policy of the tyrants.

XVII. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, they forecasting only for themselves, for the security of their own persons, and the aggrandisement of their own families, ruled their cities as securely as they could, and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours: for, as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time every way hindered, that neither jointly it could do any thing remarkable, and by single states it was still less adventurous.

After the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, the Persian war followed, and Greece divided into two confederacies to resist the invasion; the one by the

XVIII. But when the tyrants⁹ both of Athens, and of the rest of Greece, where tyrannies were, were the most, and the last of them, (excepting those of Sicily,) put down by the Lacedæmonians, (for Lacedæmon, after its being occupied by the Dorians, who now inhabit it, though it had been longer troubled with seditions than any other city we know, yet has it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants. For it is unto the end of this war, four hundred years and somewhat more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government: and thereby being of power themselves, they also regulated the affairs in the other cities,)

⁹ Pisistratus and his sons, expelled from Athens by the Lacedæmonians under Cleomenes, A. C. 510.—*Herod.* v. 64.

[I say] after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon;¹ and in the tenth year² again after that, came the Barbarian,³ with the great fleet into Greece, to subdue it. A formidable danger being suspended over its head, the Lacedæmonians, as preeminent in power, took the command of the confederated Greeks; and the Athenians, at the coming of the Medes, having determined to leave their city, and packing up their goods went on shipboard and became seamen.⁴ When they had jointly beaten back the Barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as had revolted from the king, and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after, divide themselves into parties, one part with the Athenians, and the other with the Lacedæmonians; for these two cities appeared to be the mightiest, for one had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but a while; and afterwards, the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance,⁵ warred against each other, together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. Insomuch that from the war of the Medes to this present war continually, sometimes making truces with, and sometimes warring either one against the other, or against revolted confederates, they had well prepared themselves in warlike affairs, and were become more expert, because their practice was accompanied with dangers.

Lacedæmonians,
the other
by the
Athenians.

XIX. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries; but conciliating them, that they

The Lacedæmonians did

¹ Battle of Marathon, 490, A. C.—*Herod.* vi. 113.

² That is, the year 481 before Christ. This is to be understood, not of the battle of Salamis, but of the setting out of the armament, which, after wintering at Salamis, proceeded forward towards Greece. The battle of Salamis was fought the year after this setting out, 480.—*Herod.* vii. 37.

³ Xerxes' expedition and battle of Salamis, A. C. 480. The fleet consisted of one thousand two hundred galleys, and two thousand hulks of the round manner of building. Corn. Nepos in vita Themistoclis.

⁴ The Athenians being admonished by the oracle, for their safety against the Medes, to put themselves within walls of wood: Themistocles interpreting the oracle, they went into their galleys.—*Herod.* b. vii.

⁵ This variance began upon this, that Cimon having been sent for to aid the Lacedæmonians against the Helots, was sent back with his Athenians, out of distrust the Lacedæmonians had of their forward spirit: which the Athenians took for a disgrace.

not make
their con-
federates
tributaries.

might form their polity for their own advantage, conformably to oligarchy.⁵ But the Athenians governed, having gradually taken into their hands the galleys of the allied states, (except the Chians and Lesbians,) and imposing on all of them a certain tribute of money;⁶ by which means their own⁷ particular preparation was greater in the beginning of this war, than when, in their most flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remained unbroken.⁸

Thucy-
dides
shews how
negli-
gently men
receive the
fame of
things
past,
by the
example of
the story
of Hippias
the son of
Pisistratus.

XX. Such, then, I find to have been the state of things past, hard to be believed, though established on regular proof. For men receive the report of events, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination. For the vulgar sort of Athenians think, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their accomplices had that day, and at that instant, discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did desist from attacking Hippias, as a man forewarned; but desirous to affect somewhat,⁹ though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus, slew him near the temple called Leocorium,¹ whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical procession.² And likewise divers other things now extant, and which

⁵ This sketch of the comparative policy of the two great rivals, is further illustrated in the course of book i, &c.

⁶ "The Athenians, on the contrary, so administered rule as in time to get possession of the allied states, except the Chians and Lesbians, and to impose on all a certain rate of contribution."—*Bloomfield*.

⁷ Of the people of Athens itself, excluding their confederates.

⁸ This refers to the period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years' treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Bœotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself. See 108, 111, 115.—*Arnold*.

⁹ "To do something worth losing their lives for." "Not to run the risk of their lives, without having first done something worth the risk."—*Arnold*. Compare b. iii. c. 53.

¹ "The temple of the daughters of Leos," who, according to the tradition, had been sacrificed by their father, during a famine, as an offering for the lives of the people. The temple stood in the Ceramieus within the walls.—*Arnold*.

² The Panathenæa were solemnities in honour of Minerva, patroness of

time hath not involved in oblivion, are misconceived by the rest of the Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had each of them, not single but double votes;² and that they had a band of soldiers, called the Pitanitan, whereas there was never any such. So little diligent are most men in the search of truth, and embrace soonest the opinions ready formed to their hands.³

XXI. Now he that, by the arguments here adduced, shall think the things I have gone through to be as I have described them, and not rather believe that they were such as the poets have sung, adorning and exaggerating, or prose-writers have composed, more delightful to the ear than conformable to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and, by length of time, turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit;⁴ but shall think them here made out, on the plainest evidence that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men judge the present war, wherein they live, to be the greatest; but having retired from warfare, admire more those that were before it; yet if they judge of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned.

And it proves what was asserted in the first chapter, that the Peloponnesian war was more important than Greece had ever known before.

XXII. What particular words persons have spoken, when they were about to enter into the war, or when they were in it, were hard for me to remember exactly,⁵ whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at second hand. But as any man seemed to me to speak most agreeably to the

Athens, instituted by Erectheus or Orpheus, but renewed by Theseus in memory of his having collected all the Athenians who lived dispersed throughout Attica into the city of Athens.

² The passages in Herodotus which Thucydides is commonly supposed here to allude to are well known, vi. 57; ix. 53. Yet I agree with Müller, that the censure, if designed to touch Herodotus at all, was not meant for him particularly, but rather for Hellanicus and those earlier writers, whom Herodotus in this instance carelessly followed.—*Arnold*.

³ The account given in chap. 20. differs considerably from that given by Herodotus, who makes Hipparchus the elder; also respecting the government of Lacedæmon.—*Herod.* v. 55; vi. 56; ix. 53.

⁴ "So as to lose all credit."—*Gceller*.

⁵ "As for the several speeches that were spoken, it was hard to retain in the memory with exactness all that was said." Compare *Herod.* i. 215.—*Arnold*.

He then declares that he had spared no pains to arrive at the truth of all things recorded, being more desirous to instruct posterity than to amuse his contemporaries.

He insists more particularly on the superior interest of the Peloponnesian

matter at any time in hand, holding as near as possible to the sum of the meaning of all that hath been really uttered, so have I expressed it here.⁶ But of the deeds themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write what I heard from chance, or what I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those about which with all possible diligence I had made particular inquiry from others.⁷ But with difficulty was the truth ascertained, because such as were present at every action spake not all after the same manner, but as they were affected towards either of the parties,⁸ or as they could remember. To hear this history rehearsed, inasmuch as there are inserted in it no fables, will appear perhaps less delightful: but such as desire to look into the truth both of past events, and of those which (according to the natural course of human affairs) will hereafter be of the same or a very similar nature, will find enough herein to make them think it profitable;⁹ and it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession, than to be rehearsed as a work of temporary display.

XXIII. The greatest action before this, was that against the Medes, and yet that, by two battles by sea,¹ and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the calamities that befell to Greece were such, as the like, in the like space, had never been seen before. For neither

⁶ "And as to what was spoken in orations on either side, either when about to enter on the war, or when engaged therein, it were indeed difficult both to myself when present, and to others from whose information I received it, to remember the exact words which were employed; but as either side might seem to me to speak most to the purpose on any matter under determination, so I expressed it; keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of what was really spoken."—*Bloomfield*.

⁷ "But with regard to the facts, I have thought it unfit to state them upon any indiscriminate reports of others, or according to any mere notions or impressions of my own. In my own case, I have written not from my opinions, but from my personal knowledge of the events described; and where I have been obliged to rely on the authority of others, their testimony has not been carelessly admitted, but scrupulously weighed and examined."—*Arnold*.

⁸ "As they were inclined to favour either of the two parties."

⁹ "But for such as desire to gain a clear knowledge of the past, and thereby of the future also, which will surely, after the course of human things, represent again hereafter, if not the very image, yet the near resemblance of the past; if such shall judge my work to be profitable, I shall be well content."—*Arnold*.

¹ One at Artemisium, and the other at Salamis; and two by land, one at Thermopylæ, and the other at Plataea.

had there ever been so many cities stormed and made desolate, some by the Barbarians,² and some by the Greeks warring on one another³: (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants ;⁴) nor so much of banishment and slaughter,⁵ partly by the war, partly by sedition, as was in this. And those things which, concerning former time there went a report of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, prevalent in the greatest part of the world, and violent withal; eclipses of the sun, oftener than is remembered of any former times; great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which produced most damage and to a certain extent devastation, the plague. All these evils came together with this war, which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the truce, which, immediately after the conquest of Eubœa,⁶ had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should ever have to enquire how so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest cause, though least avowed, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear, urged on the war. But the ostensible causes of the breach of the truce by both parties and the going to war were these.

war to that of any former wars and then proceeds to state the real and supposed causes which led to it.

✓ XXIV. Epidamnus is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian gulf; bordering upon it, are the Taulantii, Barbarians, a people of Illyris. This place was colonised by the Corecyræans, but the founder of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Eratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and according to an ancient custom, called to this office out of the mother city; besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others of the Doric nation.

² Mycalessus is meant here, which was taken by the Thracians, vii. 29. *Haack.*

³ Plataea and Mitilene.

⁴ Or "had its inhabitants expelled, to make room for others." Instances of this were Ægina, Potidæa, Scione, and Melos. *Goeller.*

⁵ There is perhaps, especial reference to the cases of Coreyra and Mycalessus, though, indeed, both might be said to occur in a greater or less degree every where throughout Greece.

⁶ By the Athenians. It is a mistaken notion to suppose that the breaking of the truce was the cause of the war. Thucydides means to say, that when the war took place, the truce was at an end.

In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, as is reported, was by a war made upon them by the neighbouring Barbarians brought low, and deprived of the greatest part of their power.⁷ But that which was the last calamity before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the Barbarians, and both by land and sea pillaged those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, send their ambassadors to Coreyra, as being their mother-city, praying the Coreyræans not to overlook them perishing, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the Barbarian war. And this they intreated in the form of suppliants,⁸ sitting down in the temple of Juno.⁹ But the Coreyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effecting their purpose.

XXV. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Coreyræans, hesitated how to proceed in their present affairs,¹ and sending to Delphi,² they inquired at the oracle, whether they should deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians, as their founders and make trial what aid they should obtain from them. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it up, and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle, delivered up their city to them, (shewing that the first founder of it was a

⁷ "They were brought to a very low ebb by their factions, which had grown out of a war with some of the neighbouring Barbarians."

⁸ Either the Epidamnians had offended the Coreyræans, or the custom was in those times to take sanctuary, not only for crimes but for obtaining aid in extremities, tacitly disclaiming all other help save that of the gods, and those to whom they made supplication. Mitford infers from their taking the character of suppliants that "they felt they had no claim of merit from the mother country, especially as the government of Coreyra was aristocratical and theirs was now democratical."

⁹ This was the *posture* of the suppliants, from which, also, they arose on being raised by the person whom they addressed and who *thereby* was understood to grant their petition.

¹ "Were held in a strait what to do." *Bloomfield.*

² "The usual resource, says Mitford, of desponding states." Indeed religious helps and consolations are naturally resorted to by those in adversity: but here, probably, this step had been deliberately resolved on in the council, and the application to Delphi only made in order to procure religious countenance to measures of political expediency. *Bloomfield.*

The nobles of Epidamnus being banished by the commons enlist some of the neighbouring barbarians (the Taulantii) in their cause and harass the town.

The commons being unable to obtain assistance from Coreyra, against their banished nobles have recourse to

Corinthian,³ and declaring the answer the oracle had given them,) intreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. The Corinthians then undertook their defence, not only from the equity of the cause, (esteeming them no less their own, than the Corcyræans' colony) but also from hatred of the Corcyræans, who, being their colony, yet contemned them, and allowed them not their due honour in public meetings; nor in the performance of the sacrifice,⁴ entrusted the beginning to a Corinthian, as was the custom of their other colonies, but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time, in point of wealth, and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, despised them. Also they were elevated with pride at how much they excelled in shipping: and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaciens, who flourished in glory of naval affairs;⁵ which was also the cause, why they the rather provided themselves with a navy; and they were indeed not without power in that respect, for when they began the war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

XXVI. The Corinthians, therefore, having all these criminalities against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would, to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens; which succours, lest the Corcyræans should hinder their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians. The Corcyræans understanding that colonists and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was given up to the Corinthians, were extremely vexed; and sailing immediately thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent manner demanded of them both to receive those whom they had banished, (for these banished men of Epidamnus, had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, and claiming kindred, had on these pleas intreated the Corcyræans to restore them,) and to send away the garrison and inhabitants

the Corinthians, who promise to assist them.

The Corinthians send a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corcyræans to Epidamnus. The Corcyræans send 25 ships to Epidamnus and command the people to receive back the banished nobles.

³ This was perhaps necessary for them to do, in order to give them a claim to make the transfer. *Bloomfield.*

⁴ "Nor committed, (as did their other colonies) the leading part of the sacrificial rites to a Corinthian." *Bloomfield.*

⁵ "And sometimes they prided themselves on their naval preeminence and on the naval fame of the Phæaciens, the ancient inhabitants of Corcyra, or as became them who were the successors of the Phæaciens."

✓ On their refusal, the Corcyræans blockade Epidamnus.

sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their demands.⁶ Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended they were come to restore) and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and that all strangers might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they proceeded to lay siege to it.

✓ The Corinthians soon as they heard of the siege, send a colony to Epidamnus, and prepare a large force.

XXVII. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, made ready an army, and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made, for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go, should have equal and like privileges with those that were there before: and that such as desired to take part in the colony, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present time, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachms,⁷ might remain behind. And they were very many both that went, and that laid down their money. Moreover, they begged the Megareans, from fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid them with some galleys, who accordingly furnished out eight, and the citizens of Pale, in Cephallenia, four. They also requested galleys of the Epidaurians who sent them five, the citizens of Hermione one, the Træzenians two, the Leucadians ten, the Ambraciots eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasiens they requested money; of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys; and of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms.

✓ The Corcyræans send Ambassadors

XXVIII. When the Corcyræans heard of these preparations, they went to Corinth in company with the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with

⁶ In Thucydides' account of the disputes between Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamnus, we have more authentic information concerning the proper connexion between a Grecian colony and its metropolis than is perhaps elsewhere to be found; but we are without means of determining the exact import of the expressions—*παράδουναί την πολιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς*, and *ἡγεμονας ποιεῖσθαι*. *Mitford's Greece.*

⁷ Towards defraying the expenses of sending out the colony. These are the heavy or Æginetan drachmæ each of which was worth ten oboli; so that fifty of these amount to something more than eighty-three Attic drachmæ. *Arnold.*

them, and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had any thing to claim, they were content to have the cause judicially tried⁸ in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on, and they, then, should hold the colony to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were willing to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi; that as for war, they forbade it; but if they must needs have it, they should by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence, to seek out friends⁹ whom they did wish, altogether different from those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would withdraw their fleet, and dismiss the Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult on the matter; but before this it could not be right, that whilst they were pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would withdraw those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

XXIX. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since their galleys were manned, and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys and two thousand men of arms,¹ and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. When they had arrived off Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (where is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia,) the Corcyræans sent a herald to them in a small boat² to forbid their coming on, and in the mean time manned

to Corinth,
to propose
terms of
pacifica-
tion;

which are
rejected,
and a fleet
of seventy-
five ships
and a land
force of
two thou-
sand men
sent to Epi-
damnus. ✓

⁸ "They would submit to be judged."

⁹ "To gain friends of a very different nature from their present associates," that is, from the exiles of Epidamnus with whom they were then acting in concert. *Arnold.*

¹ Of these seventy-five galleys thirty were Corinthian, the rest furnished by the allies, of which it hence appears that the Eleans furnished seven.

² The Corcyræans meant by this to gain time and were anxious not to leave

✓ The Cor-
 cyræans
 with eighty
 ships en-
 counter
 the Corin-
 thians and
 defeat
 them.

✓ Epidam-
 nus taken
 on the
 same day
 by the Cor-
 cyræans.

their fleet; having repaired and made fit for service their old galleys; and furnished the rest with all things necessary. The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with no peaceable answer, but having their galleys already manned, to the number of eighty sail, (for forty attended the siege of Epidamnus,) they put to sea, and ranging themselves in line came to a battle, in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors, and destroyed fifteen galleys of the Corinthians. On the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus reduced it, on condition that they should sell the strangers³ and should keep the Corinthians in bonds till such time as they should otherwise be disposed of.

The Cor-
 cyræans
 sail to
 Leucas,
 afterwards
 to Cyllene,
 which is
 the arsenal
 of the
 Eleans,
 and burn
 it.

XXX. The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy⁴ in Leucimna, a promontory of Coreyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, sailed, and wasted the territory of Leucas, the colony of the Corinthians, and then sailed to Cyllene, the naval arsenal⁵ of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had, both with money and shipping, given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till while,

any thing undone to avert hostilities; yet they prepared for them with judgment and spirit.

³ Such was the condition, which however was afterwards violated, for they were slain.

⁴ The trophies for a victory by land were decked out with the arms they had taken—for a victory by sea, with arms also, and the wrecks of the enemy's vessels. To demolish a trophy was regarded as sacrilege, because they were always dedicated to some deity.

⁵ Most ancient cities were built away from the sea-coast, in order to be out of the reach of pirates. And the same policy was pursued, and for the same reason, in Spanish America, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus Sparta, Messene, Argos, Mycenæ, Thebes, Delphi, Sieyon, Megara, and Athens. On the growth, however of arts and civilisation, and the rise of commerce, these ancient sites were found inconvenient, and such as made them unfit to compete with modern ones on the sea-coast. And the only remedy for it was to build towns on that part of the coast which was nearest to them, to serve as posts and naval stations for the reception and transmission of the imports and exports, and all other commodities. Hence arose such places as Piræus, Nisæa, Nauplia, Gytheum, Lechæum, and, among the rest, Cyllene. These were, when possible, connected with walls. *Bloomfield.*

the summer yet lasted,⁶ the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers into Actium, since their allies were distressed, which, to protect Leucas and such other cities as were their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis: and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and army, lay over against them in Leucimna. Neither party advanced against the other, but after they had laid quietly opposite all the summer, they each, on the approach of winter, retired homeward.

The next summer the Corinthians send a force into Actium and Chimerium.

XXXI. All this year, after the battle and the one following, the Corinthians being vexed at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys, and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners, offering the inducement of pay, out of Peloponnesus itself, and out of all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans, having intelligence of these preparations, began to fear, and (because they had never been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates, either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians,) thought it best now, to go to the Athenians and to become their allies, and try if they could procure any aid from them.

A.C. 433. Olymp. 86. 4. The Corinthians make preparations for war at which the Corcyræans send an Embassy to Athens to ask assistance.

This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy, to that of the Corcyræans, might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. On the assembly⁷ at Athens being met,

The Corinthians send on their part to oppose the request.

⁶ This is the translation of *περιόντι* which Bekker and Goeller read; the other reading is *περιόντι* when "the summer came round."

⁷ The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which presided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by their authority and in their name. These were called *Prytanes*. This being too large a number for business, they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions presiding for a week: these were called *Proedri*. One of these *Proedri*, called *Epistates*, presided for a day, during which he was invested with the highest trust in the government, but never enjoyed the pre-eminence a second time. He kept the public seal, and the keys of the citadel and treasury: in the assembly of the people he ordered all proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the question and declared the majority.

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds: *ordinary* and *extraordinary*; of the first kind four were regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states had public audience. The latter were occasionally convened by the presidents or by the generals of the state. Some days before hand notice was publicly

A. C. 433. they proceeded to plead against each other, and the Corcyræans
 Olymp. 86. spake to this effect :

SPEECH OF
 THE COR-
 CYRÆANS.
 They apolo-
 gise for
 coming to
 apply for
 aid, when
 their con-
 stant po-
 licy had
 been to ab-
 stain from
 all alli-
 ances with
 other
 states.
 They then
 proceed to
 urge their
 request
 princi-
 pally on
 the ground,
 that it was
 the interest
 of others
 to hinder
 their naval
 power
 from be-
 coming an
 accession
 to the navy
 of the Pe-
 loponne-
 sians.

The Oration of the Ambassadors of Corcyra.

XXXII. "Men of Athens, it is but just, that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as we now do) and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league, some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear principally, that what they seek is profitable, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least, to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same. But if they can clearly prove none of these, then not to take it ill if their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make these sure to you, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to add them to the number of your confederates. But it has happened that our policy has been, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own selves. For having ever till now, been unwilling to be joined in league with any one, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter into league with others, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, has proved to be weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though we alone repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus, and the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to prove superior in the contest; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great, it is both necessary that we seek the succours both of you and whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we boldly cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.

given by the senate or council of five hundred upon what subjects they were to deliberate, but this was dispensed with on sudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning at the summons of the public crier, generally in the Pnyx, a place near the citadel, so called *δια το πεπυκνωσθαι τοις λιθοις, ή ταις καθεδραις, ή δια το πεπυκνωσθαι εν αυτη τους βουλευτας*, because it was filled with stones, or seats close together, or from the crowds of men in the assemblies. At the second summons they were compelled to attend.

XXXIII. "Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this supplying of our wants will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you will lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you will confer a favour, where it will be stored up in constant remembrance. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours: consider then, what rarer good luck, or what greater grief to your enemies can befall you, than that that power which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not happened to many at once. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it on those on whom they call. If any here think that the war wherein we may do you service will not take place, he is in an error, and sees not how the Lacedæmonians through fear of you, are already inclined to war; and that the Corinthians, having much influence with them, and enemies to you,⁸ first take us, in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not, through our common hatred, mutually withstand them, and that they may not miss being before hand in one of two things, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own selves. It must therefore be your part, we offering, and you accepting the league, to be before hand with them, and to anticipate plotting, rather than to counterplot against them.⁹

XXXIV. "If they say that it is unjust that you receive their colony, let them learn,¹ that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienated; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial

They then urge that the injustice of the Corinthians towards them, warrants the Athenians in giving them aid.

⁸ The causes of this are detailed in Mitford's Greece.

⁹ It is our part, therefore, to be beforehand, since we give and you accept the alliance, and rather to be the first to plot against them.

¹ Namely, "what it seems they know not, and are slow in apprehending." Bloomfield.

A. C. 433.
Olymp. 86.
4.

trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute² their charges rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced by their demands, and when they ask your aid, not at once and without hesitation to grant it. For he that hath to repent the least often of having conferred favours on his enemies will pass his life most secure.

✓ Nor would such aid be a violation of the treaty now subsisting between Athens and Peloponnesus.

XXXV. "As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians,³ ye will not violate them by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party may be allowed to join himself to either party he may think fit. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places in your dominion; and that they should exclude us from the league now before us, and also from all other help from whencesoever, and then should impute it to you as a fault that you grant our request; but we shall take it for a greater that you grant it not. For therein you will reject us that are invaded and be none of your enemies;⁴ and them who are your enemies and make the invasion, you will not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise forces in your dominions contrary to justice; whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to hire mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by openly taking us into your league, and aiding us. Many advantages, as we said in the beginning, we shew unto you, but this for the greatest, that the same persons are your enemies also, (as well as ours), which is the firmest bond of alliance, and these not weak ones, but able to hurt those who secede from them, and as we offer you a naval, not a land power, the declining of them is not the same; nay, rather your principal aim, if it could be done, should be, to let none at all have

² "Follow after."

³ The thirty years' truce entered into between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

⁴ It was thought by the Greeks disgraceful, to refuse the request of persons in peril and supplicants for aid. *Bloomfield.*

shipping but yourselves ; or, at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends, as are best furnished therewith.⁵

A. C. 433.
Olymp. 86.
4.

XXXVI. " If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken, let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength, will make his enemies fear ; and his confidence, having (if he rejects us) so much the less strength, will cause the less fear to enemies of strength.⁶ Let him also remember that he is now deliberating, no less concerning Athens than Corcyra ; wherein he forecasteth not the best (considering the present state of affairs) when he makes it a question, whether against a war at hand, and all but already on foot, he should join unto it, or not, that city which with most important advantages, or disadvantages, is made friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for the voyage along the shore to Italy and Sicily, that it can both hinder any fleet coming to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any going hence⁷ thither ; and is also for all other purposes most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, both with regard tot he whole and each particular, that ye may learn not to abandon us by this : for Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one, by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you will have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians ; whereas by making league with us, you will, with

But even if it should, the object of securing an ally so favourably situated in point of geographical position, and possessing so large a navy ought to outweigh all other considerations.

⁵ " And as it is the alliance of a maritime and not an inland power that is offered you, it is not equally a matter of indifference to decline it. Your policy should rather be to allow no one if possible to possess a fleet ; or if this cannot be, to attach the greatest naval power to your interest." *Arnold.*

⁶ " Let him be told, that the fear which has urged him to strengthen himself by our alliance, will be more formidable to his enemies than that confidence which, in refusing aid when offered, left him weak when his adversaries were strong." *Arnold.*

⁷ By ἐνθενδε is meant, not Peloponnesus, but Athens. It is observable that the Corcyræans seem to have guessed at the ambitious designs of the Athenians respecting Italy and Sicily, which, indeed, were so much the more excusable, since as their great political rivals were intent upon excluding them from Greece, so they endeavoured to make interest in what might be called new Greece ; and had this purpose been steadily pursued under the prudent guidance of Pericles, and not hurried forward to wild and Quixotic adventures by the democratical party, it might have been well for Athens, and indeed for Greece itself. *Bloomfield.*

A. C. 433. your fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians
Olymp. 86. alone."⁸
4.

Thus spake the Corecyræans ; and after them the Corinthians
thus :

Oration of the Ambassadors of Corinth.

SPEECH OF
THE CO-
RINTHIANS.
They begin
by stating
that the
general
bad char-
acter of
the Corcy-
ræans de-
prives
them of all
claim on
the assist-
ance of
any one,

XXXVII. "The Corecyræans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also, that we wrong them, and that they are unjustly warred on ; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say, to the end you may first more thoroughly know our demands, and that you may not from want of consideration reject their necessitous request. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from motives of prudence ; the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but deliberate wickedness ; as being unwilling to call any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by situation independent, affords them this power, that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent.¹ For going seldom forth against other nations, they admit into their harbours such as of necessity put in. And in this consisteth their specious pretext for not admitting confederates ; not because they would not accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone ; that where they were strong, they might oppress ; and when there should be none to observe them, they might have the more, and that they might escape the shame when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are) by how much the more unapproachable they are, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their honesty appear.

⁸ "You may learn from the following consideration not to abandon us ; namely, inasmuch as there are three naval powers in Greece ; and, if you allow the Corinthians to conquer us, two of these three will be united against your one." *Arnold.*

¹ "And their city too, independent by its very position, makes them judges in their own cause when they injure any one, rather than that judges should be appointed by the agreement of both parties." *Arnold.*

XXXVIII. “ But they are not such, neither towards others, nor towards us; for though our colonists, they have not only been ever in revolt, but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us; but we say again, that we did not send them forth to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and to be treated with fitting respect. Our other colonies any how both honour and love us much, and it is manifest that if we are agreeable to the greater part, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had any colour of reason to war against them. But even had we been in error, it had been praiseworthy in them, to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have pressed too heavily on their moderation. But through pride and wealth they have done us wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars, they never claimed; as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and still retained.

A.C. 433.
Olymp.86.
4.
and also
that they
were in the
wrong in
this pre-
sent quar-
rel;

XXXIX. “ They say now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment; with respect to which you ought not to think him worthy of credit who invites another to this, when he himself hath the advantage, and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he that before his trial makes the deeds agree with his words: whereas these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put up with it. And now hither they are come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get you not into their confederacy, but into their conspiracy: and to receive them for this reason, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you that never partook of their power, must impart unto them your aid; and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should communicate their power before-hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the consequences of them.

nor should
they dare
to ask for
aid to save
them from
punish-
ment in
their ad-
versity,
when in
their pros-
perity they
had stood
aloof from
all alli-
ances.

XL. “ Thus it appears that we come, for our parts, with well founded complaints; whereas the proceedings of these other

They then
urge that
it would

A. C. 433.
Olymp. 86.
4.
breach of the treaty with the Peloponnesians were the Athenians to assist the Corcyraeans.

are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall shew you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the treaty, that the states who had formed no alliance with any of the parties, should be at liberty to join either of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so, to the detriment of either; but only for those that having separated themselves from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise) that receive them; which ye will suffer, unless ye be persuaded by us. For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, that we must beat off them and you too. You would act most uprightly by standing out of both our ways; and if not, then by taking our parts against the Corcyraeans, (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyraeans you never had so much as a truce,) and not to constitute a new law of harbouring one another's rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion as to whether we ought to aid them; but plainly alleged, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once aid and receive the doers of wrong, it will be seen, that they will come over as fast from you to us;² and you will set up a law, not so much against us as against yourselves.

And it would be an ungrateful return for the benefits formerly conferred

XLI. "These are the just claims³ we had to shew you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as in turn to make use of you) we say, ought on the present occasion, to be granted us by way of requital: for when you had want of long ships⁴ against the Æginetæ, before the Median war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of

² "There will be found an equal number of your allies who will come over to us." *Arnold.*

³ "Grounds of right." *Bloomfield.*

⁴ So called from their long form as compared with the rotund one of vessels of burden, denominated *round ships.* *Bloomfield.*

the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men going to fight against their enemies, neglect all things but victory. For they think him a friend who serves them, even though before he had been an enemy, and him an enemy who stands in their way, though he may happen to have been a friend; for even their nearest interests men manage worse through eagerness of present contention.

XLII. "Which benefits considering, (the younger learning them from the elder,) be you pleased now to requite us in the like manner. And have not this thought, that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For advantage followeth those actions most wherewith we do the least wrong; besides that, the event of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frightening you, go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not sufficient to excite you to a manifest and decided hostility with the Corinthians: but it were rather prudent for you indeed to take away our former jealousies concerning the Megareans. For the last obligation done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on, by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service; for to do no injury to our equals is a firmer power than that addition of strength, which (puft up by present appearances) men are to acquire with danger.

A.C. 433.
Olymp. 86.
4.

Nor ought the Athenians to provide against the contingent danger of a war with Peloponnesus by committing an immediate act of injustice,

XLIII. "And since we are come into the same condition, in which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed, as he shall think good, against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you who have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours: but render like for like, remembering that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us, is our greatest friend; and he that opposeth us, our greatest enemy. And do not receive these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you will both do as is fit, and also advise the best for your own selves."

which would be in the end impolitic as well as ungrateful.

This was the purport of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

XLIV. Both parties having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans; but in the latter, they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the

After hearing these speeches, the Athenians finally resolve on

✓ A. C. 433. friends and enemies of the one, should be so of the other, (for
Olymp. 86. then if the Coreyræans should have required them to go against
4. Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians)
conclud- but made it only defensive, that if any one should invade Cor-
ing a cyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then
defensive alliance mutually to assist one another. For they expected, that even
with the Coreyræ- thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and
ans, were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a
navy, fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as
much as in them lay, desired to bring them into collision against
each other; that if need required, they might have to do with
the Corinthians and others that had shipping, when they should
be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie
conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

✓ and send
ten ships
to assist
them.

A. C. 432. of them were Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimon; Diotimus,
Olymp. 87. the son of Strombichus; and Proteas, the son of Epicles; and
1. had orders not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded
Corcyra, or offered to land there, or in some other place of
theirs: which if they did, then with all their might to oppose
them. These orders they gave that they might not break the
peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys
arrived at Corcyra.

Meantime
the Corin-
thians and
their allies
sail against
Corcyra
with 150
ships and
fix their
naval
camp at
Cheimerium.

XLV. With this design the people of Athens received the
Coreyræans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone,
sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders
of them were Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimon; Diotimus,
the son of Strombichus; and Proteas, the son of Epicles; and
had orders not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded
Corcyra, or offered to land there, or in some other place of
theirs: which if they did, then with all their might to oppose
them. These orders they gave that they might not break the
peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys
arrived at Corcyra.

XLVI. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made to-
wards Corcyra with a hundred and fifty sail, viz. of the Eleans
ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Am-
braciots twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of
their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of
the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which
they sent in; and over those of Corinth, was Xenocleides, the
son of Euthycles, with four others. After they had come to land
upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, sailing from
Leucas, they came to anchor at Cheimerium, in the country of
Thesprotis. In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from
the sea, the city of Ephyre, in that part of Thesprotis, which is
called Elæatis; and near to it, the lake Acherusia discharges
itself into the sea, and into that (having first passed through
Thesprotis,) the river Acheron, from which it takes the name.
Also the river Thyamis flows here, which divides Thesprotis

from Cestrine, between which two rivers, projects the promontory of Cheimerium. To this part of the continent the Corinthians came to anchor and encamped.

A.C. 432.
Olymp. 87.
1.

XLVII. The Corcyræans, understanding that they were advancing against them, having filled a hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, encamped in one of the islands called Sybota. And the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces were on the promontory of Leucimna, and with them a thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aid of many Barbarians; for those on this part of the continent have been at all times their friends.

The Corcyræans and Athenians with 120 ships encamp; the sailors at Sybota, the land force at Leucimna.

XLVIII. The Corinthians, after they were ready, and had taken aboard three days' provision, put off by night from Cheimerium intending to fight; and about break of day as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off into the open sea and sailing against them. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. On the right wing of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest of the line they themselves formed, being divided into three squadrons under three commanders, one under each. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had on their right wing the galleys of Megara, and of Ambracia; in the centre, other their confederates in order; and on the left, opposite to the Athenians, and right wing of the Corcyræans, they were themselves placed with such galleys as were the best sailers.

Both sides having prepared for action,

XLIX. The standard⁵ being on either side lifted up, they fought, having come to close quarters, having on both sides many men at arms⁶ on the decks, and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion, being as yet (as to their fleet) somewhat unskilfully fitted up. The battle was not so skilfully as hardly contested, bearing, for the most part, a great resemblance to a fight at land. For after they had once run their galleys up aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily separated again, but relied for the

they engage: the right wing of the Corinthians gives way, but the left wing is victorious.

⁵ Σημεια, images held up, as the eagle amongst the Romans.

⁶ These were doubtless, used for *boarding*; and the archers and slingers for distant annoyance. *Bloomfield.*

A.C. 432.
Olymp. 87.
1.

victory especially upon their men at arms on the decks, who kept up a close and steady fight, whilst their galleys remained without motion. There were not breakings through the line,⁷ but they fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill; insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder; in which the Athenian galleys, being always at hand where the Coreyræans were pressed, kept the enemy in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the previous orders of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was chiefly distressed, for the Coreyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them scattered in disorder to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went on land, burnt their abandoned tents, and pillaged their baggage; so that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Coreyræans had the victory. But on the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Coreyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Coreyræans were in distress, now aided them more openly, whereas at first they had abstained from making a direct assault upon any.⁸ But when once they fled outright, and the Corinthians pressed upon them, then every one fell to the business without making any difference any longer: and matters came at last to such a pitch of distress, that they engaged one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

⁷ The *dieplus* was a breaking through the enemy's line, in order by a rapid turn of the vessel, to strike the enemy's ship on the side or stern, where it was most defenceless, and so sink it. *Arnold*.

It is explained by the Scholiast, *charge and tach*. But that seems rather to designate the *ἐμβολή*. In the *διεκπλους* the purpose of the charge was not, as in the former case, to break away the oars in the hull, disable or sink any *one* ship; but to cut through the line and attack it in the rear, and so separate one part from the rest, that it might be attacked in detail, and overpowered. *Bloomfield*.

⁸ "At first indeed, abstaining from making a charge with the beak." Such is the sense of these words: no interpreter has attended to the true force of *ἐμβάλλειν*, which signifies "to assault with a beak," or of "*ἔργον*," which denotes battle. By *πας* is denoted every one, both Coreyræan and Athenian; and the words following are exegetical of the preceding, and signify that there was no longer any distinction between Coreyræan and Athenian. *Bloomfield*.

L. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, did not tow off, by lashing them on, the hulls of the galleys they had water-logged; but made after the men, rowing up and down to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many, taking up a large space of sea, after they were once mixed together in close contest they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, in number of ships, that ever had been before, of Grecians against Grecians. When the Corinthians had chased the Coreyræans to the shore, they turned to the broken galleys and bodies of their dead,⁹ which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land forces of the Barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done this they again re-united themselves and sailed against the Coreyræans; and they likewise with such galleys as they had fit for the sea, remaining of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the Pæan¹ had been sung for the charge, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys sent from Athens to aid the former ten, for fear lest the Coreyræans (as was the case) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to help them.

A.C. 432.
Olymp.87.
1.
The Athenians and Corinthians attack each other. The victorious wing of the Corinthians drives the Coreyræans to shore. The Corinthians bring their wrecks and dead to Sybota; they then sail out to meet the Coreyræans but are induced to return by seeing a reinforcement of twenty Athenian ships under Glauco.

LI. When the Corinthians therefore first descried these galleys, suspecting that they were from Athens, and more in number than they saw, fell back by degrees. But the Coreyræans (because these galleys were more out of their sight) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern, till at last some saw them and gave notice of their approach, and then they also retired. For by this time it was

The Coreyræans and Athenians anchor off Leucimna.

⁹ One may remark the pious care with which they attended to the preservation, or at least recovery for burial, of their countrymen; for the historian records their turning back for this purpose, after having chased the enemy to their shores. And having recorded this duty, he adds, "And after having done this, they again collected and made towards the enemy." Bloomfield.

¹ Pæan, a hymn to Mars in the beginning of a fight: to Apollo after the victory.

A. C. 432. dark, and the Corinthians turned about the heads of their
 Olymp. 87. galleys, and finished the engagement. And thus they parted,
 1. and the battle ended at night. The Coreyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucō, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogoras, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses and wreck, soon after they were descried, arrived at the camp of the Coreyræans, in Leucimna. The Coreyræans at first, (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they anchored there.

✓ The next day they offer the Corinthians battle,

LII. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens, and as many of Coreyra as were fit for service, sailed towards the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land, and arranged themselves in the open sea, remained quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both because they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and that many difficulties happened to them, both about the safe custody of the prisoners aboard, and also because being in a desert place, there were no means of repairing their ships; but they considered about the voyage homewards, how they could get there, lest the Athenians, thinking the peace already broken, in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart.

✓ but they only send out messengers to reproach the Athenians with having broken the truce.

LIII. They therefore thought fit to put some men on board a small boat without the herald's staff, and to send them to the Athenians to sound them: and having sent them, they spoke thus:

“Men of Athens, Ye act unjustly in beginning the war, and violating the treaty: for whereas we go about to punish our enemies, ye stand in our way, and bear arms against us. If therefore ye be resolved to hinder our going against Coreyra, or what place else we please, both put an end to the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.”— Thus said they: and the Coreyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war, nor break the peace; but we have come to aid these our confederates, the Coreyræans; if you wish therefore to go any where else, we hinder you not; but if against Coreyra, or any place belonging to it, we will not suffer you, as far as we are able.”

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians made ready to sail home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also, both took up the wreck, and the dead bodies, which were carried towards them by the current and the wind, which, arising during the night, dispersed them every way; and, as having had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in the Sybota of the islands. And each claimed the victory on these grounds: the Corinthians set up a trophy, because in the battle they had had the superiority all day until night, so as to get most of the wrecks and dead bodies, and had taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and rendered unserviceable about seventy galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had destroyed thirty galleys of the Corinthians, and had after the arrival of the Athenians, picked up the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by the wind: and because the day before, on sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern, and gone away from them: and because, when the Athenians had come, the Corinthians came not from Sybota out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed the victory.

A. C. 432. Olymp. 87. 1.
On receiving their answer the Corinthians prepare to return homewards having first erected a trophy on the Sybota of the continent while the Corcyræans also erect one at the Island of Sybota.

LV. The Corinthians sailing homeward, by deceit took Anactorium, situated in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, (which was common to them and to the Corcyræans) and having put into it Corinthians only departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans eight hundred that were slaves they sold, and two hundred and fifty kept prisoners, whom they used with much favour, that they might be a means, at their return, of bringing Corcyra into their power, the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus Corcyra survived the war with Corinth,² and the Athenian galleys returned back from it. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians; namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea, against the Corinthians, with whom they were at peace.

The Corinthians now return home, sell eight hundred Corcyræans and keep the remaining two hundred and fifty in bonds.

(*) LVI. Presently after this, it came to pass, that these following differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce war. For whilst the Corinthians were devising how to punish them, the Athenians having some suspicion of their hatred, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city situated in the isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians, but con-

(*) THE SECOND PREFACE TO THE WAR. Potidæa, becoming suspected, is commanded

² "Thus survived its dangers in the war with the Corinthians." Bloomfield.

A. C. 432.
Olymp. 87.
1.

V by the Athenians, to demolish a wall facing Pallene, to give hostages, &c.

At the same time Perdiccas, King of Macedon, labours to organise a confederacy against Athens in his own neighbourhood and tries to excite the Peloponnesian alliance to war.

federate and tributary to the Athenians,³ to pull down that part of the wall that looked towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away, and no more receive the Epidemurgi,⁴ [magistrates so called] whom the Corinthians sent every year; fearing, lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas,⁵ and of the Corinthians, they should revolt, and draw into revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

LVII. These measures against the Potidæans the Athenians had pre-contrived, presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, had been made hostile to them. And he was rendered hostile, because when his brother Philip and Dardas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon and intrigued how to bring about war between them and the Peloponnesians, and also endeavoured to make allies of the Corinthians,⁶ the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa; and likewise he practised with⁷ the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans to revolt with them. For if he could make these adjacent cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys, with a thousand men of arms under the command of Archestratus, the son of Lyeomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas) both to take

³ These were among those of the allies who did not furnish military or naval quotas to the Athenian alliance but a certain equivalent in money.

⁴ The term *Δημιουργοί* was a title applied to the chief magistrates of the Peloponnesus, expressive of their doing "the service of the people," or it signifies perhaps, "those who serve the people by governing them," as distinguished from those who serve the people in any inferior capacity. *Arnold*.

⁵ The line of the Kings of Macedon, from their founder Perdiccas, may be seen in Herodotus, viii. 139. They were reported to be descended from Temenus, and that one of the Heraclidæ, who at the return of his family with the Dorians obtained, possession of Argolis; and on the strength of this descent they were allowed to be Greeks, (Herod. v. 22.) but the Macedonian people were regarded as at best half Barbarians.

⁶ "Courtied their good will," or, "endeavoured to bring them over to his interest." *Bloomfield*.

⁷ "Held communications with." *Bloomfield*.

hostages⁸ of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not. A. C. 432.
Olymp. 87.
1.

LVIII. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration in their measures respecting them;⁹ and having also come with the Corinthians to Lacedæmon, they negociated with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to obtain their aid. When after long solicitation at Athens, they got no good, the fleet was sent away against them and against Macedonia without any alteration, and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa, to invade Attica, then at last they revolt, and, together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. And Perdiccas persuades the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and to make that one city strong: and to those that removed, gave part of his own, and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves for the war.

LIX. But the thirty Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, find Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible with their present forces to make war both against Perdiccas and the revolted towns, turn towards Macedonia, for which purpose they had been at first sent out, and taking up a position there, joined in making war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country with their forces from above.

LX. In the mean time, after Potidæa had revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing for the city, and considering the danger as their own, send to it both volunteers of their own city and of the rest of the Peloponnesians, whom they hired, amounting altogether to a thousand and six hundred men of arms,¹ and

⁸ i. e. "compel them to give hostages." *Bloomfield.*

⁹ Rather, "adopt a change of policy." The measures in contemplation would really have been a change of constitution. *Bloomfield.*

¹ The *heavy-armed*, *δπλαται*, wore a complete suit of armour, and engaged with broad shields, and long spears. The *light-armed*, *ψιλοι*, were designed

A. C. 432. four hundred light armed. Aristeus, the son of Adimantus, Ol. 87. 1. was their general, for whose sake most of the soldiers out of Corinth followed him as volunteers: for he had ever been a great favourer of the Potidæans; and they arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt in Potidæa.

but the Athenians being reinforced from home, conclude a hasty peace with Perdiccas (which he breaks immediately) and advance against Potidæa.

LXI. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing also of the forces that had gone hither under Aristeus, send forth against the places revolted two thousand men at arms and forty galleys under the command of Callias, the son of Calliades, with four others. These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, (who had just taken Therme,² and were now besieging the city of Pydna,) and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they entered into composition, and having made an unavoidable league with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus) they depart from Macedonia. Thence they came to Bercæa, and as they were marching away from it, they turned back and made an attempt upon it, but as they could not take it they marched towards Potidæa by land. There were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys seventy in number, sailed in company with them along the coast; and by moderate journeys they came in three days to Gigonus,³ and there encamped.

The Potidæans and their allies give them battle before Potidæa, and are defeated and driven into the city.

LXII. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near to Olynthus, and had a market kept for them without the city; the command of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas: (for he forthwith again deserted the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans.) The purpose of Aristeus was to have the army with

for skirmishes and fighting at a distance. Their weapons were arrows, slings, or darts.

² Thessalonica (now *Salonichi*,) the name of this town at a late period, was given by Cassander, the son of Antipater, who restored and enlarged it, in honour of his wife Thessalonica, the daughter of Philip.

³ The first days march seems to have been to Pella, the second to Therinæ, and the third to Gigonus. *Bloomfield*.

himself within the isthmus,⁴ therewith to guard against the Athenians if they should come, and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also that the two hundred horse under Perdiccas should remain in Olynthus, and when the Athenians advanced against them, should come on their rear, and enclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias, the Athenian general, and the others in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen, and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town, and they themselves removing their camp, marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy making ready to fight, they also did the like, and not long after commenced battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite to them, and advanced forwards in pursuit of them a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians were defeated by the Athenians, and fled into the city.

LXIII. And Aristeus, when he came back from the pursuit, was in doubt which way he should hazard taking, to Olynthus, or to Potidæa. At last he resolved, having drawn his soldiers together into the smallest space possible, to force his way by running into Potidæa, and he passed along with difficulty through their missiles by the pier through the sea,⁵ with the loss of a few, but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began, and the standards were raised up, those that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs⁶ off, and in sight) advanced a little way to their aid; and the Macedonian horse opposed

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

Aristeus,
the leader
of the Co-
rinthian
auxiliaries
escapes
from the
action into
Potidæa
with diffi-
culty.

⁴ Of Pallene.

⁵ The bottom of the sea-wall in the ancient sea-port towns was strengthened by a lock of breakwater of large stones, which at last left the line of the wall and was continued as a mole to narrow the entrance of the harbour. The walls of Potidæa reached down to the sea on both sides of the isthmus; and as the gates on the outer front of the town towards Olynthus could not be opened, lest the Athenians should force their way in with the fugitives, Aristeus was obliged to get along under the sea-wall upon this backwater, in order to be admitted at one of the gates on the inner front towards Pallene. In doing this he was exposed to the missiles of the Athenians, whose ships were blockading the town, and thus sustained some loss. *Arnold.*

⁶ About six miles.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

themselves likewise in order of battle to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gained the victory, and the standards being taken down,⁷ they retired again into the city, and the Macedonian horsemen to the army of the Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry engaged in the battle. After the battle, the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their allies there died somewhat less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias, their commander.⁸

The Athenians having erected a trophy, blockade Potidæa, first on the side of the land and after the arrival of Phormio with one thousand six hundred men from Athens, on the side of Pallene also.

LXIV. Presently on this the Athenians raised a wall before the city, on the part towards the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison, but the part towards Pallene they left unwall'd; for they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and to go over and cast up a wall in Pallene, fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when they were divided. When the people of Athens understood that Pallene had no works raised upon it,¹ not long after, they sent thither one thousand and six hundred men at arms of their own, under the conduct of Phormio, the son of Asopius, who arriving in Pallene, and making his approaches from Aphytis, led his army to Potidæa, advancing slowly and at the same time wasting the territory. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city, on that part also that looks towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides strongly besieged; and also from the sea, by the Athenian galleys that came up and lay before it.

⁷ The elevation of the ensigns was the signal for battle, and they were kept up while it lasted; the depression was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. The depression in this instance was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to Minerva, protectress of Athens.

⁸ The inscription in honour of the Athenians who were killed in this battle is now in the British museum.

¹ That Potidæa completely occupied the isthmus from sea to sea, so as to cut off all communication by land between an enemy attacking it on the side of Pallene, and one encamped on the outside of the isthmus is plain, not only from the narrative of Thueydides, but from the account in Herodotus, viii. 129. that the Persians when besieging the place on the side towards Olythus, endeavoured to get across into the peninsula of Pallene by passing over the usual bed of the sea, which an extraordinary efflux of the water had left for some hours dry. *Arnold.*

LXV. Aristeus seeing the city enclosed with a wall on every side, and being without hope of safety, unless some aid should come from Peloponnesus, or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and was willing himself to be one of those that should remain within. But when his counsel was not followed, being desirous to do what was next best to this,² and that affairs without might go on as well as possible, he got out by sea, unseen by the Athenian guard. And staying amongst the Chalcideans, he carried on the war with them, both with respect to all other matters,³ and also laid an ambush before the city of the Hermylans, and slew many of them; he also devised how he might obtain aid from Peloponnesus. But Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his one thousand and six hundred men of arms, wasted Chalcidea and Bottiæa, and took some of the small towns.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Aristeus escapes to the Chalcideans. Phormio completes the blockade of Potidæa, and ravages the Chalcidean and Bottiæan territories.

LXVI. These were the charges that were also made between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled with the Athenians for besieging Potidæa, which was their colony, and the Corinthians and Peloponnesians in it; the Athenians with the Peloponnesians, for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for having come hither, and openly fought against them in behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war was not broken forth openly as yet, and they still abstained from arms;⁴ the Corinthians alone having done all this.

The Corinthians being doubly incensed against Athens,

LXVII. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for the sake of those that were within, and also for fear they should lose the place, they could no longer rest; but straightway they begged their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and having gone themselves, they exclaimed loudly against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, though not openly by ambassadors, fearing the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alleging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles they

induce the Lacedæmonians to call a general congress of their allies at Sparta; wherein the Corinthians begin to urge the Lacedæmonians to declare war.

² “What was the next best thing to be done.”

³ “And remaining amongst the Chalcideans, he both settled other affairs of war with them, and” &c.

⁴ “Had yet kept their hands off each other.” *Bloomfield.*

A. C. 432. Ought. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the
Ol. 87. 1. confederates, and whomsoever had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council⁵ of their own state, commanded them to speak. Then presented every one his accusation, and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other great differences, laid open this especially: that contrary to the articles they were kept out from the Athenian markets and havens. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered all the rest first to incense the Lacedæmonians, came forward and spake as follows:

Oration of the ambassadors of Corinth.

SPEECH OF
THE CO-
RINTH-
IANS.
They com-
plain of
systematic
ambition
of the
Athenians,

LXVIII. "Men of Lacedæmon, your own honourable conduct as regards your management of public affairs and your behaviour in private, makes you the less apt to believe us, when we speak against others.⁶ And hereby you acquire indeed a temperate prudence, but have a greater degree of ignorance as to foreign affairs. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us mischief, yet from time to time when we told it you, you never gained information from it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake proceeded from our own individual interests. And hence it is, that you have called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now, when the evil is already upon us. Before whom, our speech must be so much the longer, as our accusations are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians, in some obscure and lurking way, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you, as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others, especially against our confederates, and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For otherwise they would never have taken

⁵ Of the Ephori, and those who had the sovereignty: that is, before the aristocracy. The Ephori were in number five, annually elected by the people from their own body, and designed to be checks upon the regal power. The whole administration was lodged in their hands.

⁶ "Renders you the more disposed to question any representations which are made to the prejudice of others." Bloomfield.

Corcyra, and held it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa, whereof the one is most conveniently situated for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought to the Peloponnesians a very great navy.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

LXIX. "And of all this, you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them, at the end of the Persian war, to fortify their city, and afterwards to raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that brings into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it, neglects the same, is most truly said to do it: especially if he aims at a character for virtue as a deliverer of Greece. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet, with any certain resolution what to do. For the question should not have been put, Whether or no we have received injury, but rather, how we are to repair it. For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it before hand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, in what way, and that it is by little and little that the Athenians make their approaches on their neighbours. And as long as they think they avoid being perceived, through your blindness, they are the less bold. But when they shall perceive that you being aware, overlook it, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that remain inactive and assist one not with your forces, but with threatenings; and you are also the only men that pull down the power of the enemy, not when it begins, but when it is doubled. You have, indeed, the character of being steady and sure, but yet it is more in fame than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Mede came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth before your contingent advanced to meet him as became you. And also now you disregard the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion than to invade them; and by having to contend against them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune.⁷ And yet we know that the Barbarian fell principally by his own fault, and that we in our war against the Athenians, by their own over-

and of the
supine ne-
glect of
Lacedæ-
monians
who now
as on other
occasions
had been
too slug-
gish to
check the
evil before
it was be-
come more
serious.

⁷ "To expose yourselves to hazard, by waiting till your enemy's power is far greater than it ever was before." *Arnold.*

A. C. 432. sights, more than by your assistance have survived their at-
 Ol. 87. 1. tempts. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of
 some, who, through relying on you, were unprepared to defend
 themselves. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out
 of malice, but only by way of expostulation : for expostulation
 is to be used with friends that err, but accusation against ene-
 mies that have done an injury.

But this
 supineness
 was ill-
 timed
 when it
 was op-
 posed to
 the restless
 activity of
 Athens ;
 and to
 illustrate
 this point
 the con-
 trast be-
 tween the
 two na-
 tional cha-
 racters is
 exhibited
 in detail.

LXX. “ Besides if there be any, we think ourselves to be
 worthy enough to give reproof to our neighbours, especially as
 there exist great differences, whereof you neither seem to have
 any perception, nor to consider what manner of men, and how
 different from you in every kind the Athenians are with whom
 you are to contend. For they love innovation, and are swift to
 devise, and also to execute what they resolve on : you on the
 contrary are only apt to save your own ; not to devise any thing
 new, nor in performance scarcely to arrive at executing what
 is necessary. Again, they are bold beyond their strength, ad-
 venturous above their reason, and in danger still hope the best :
 whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, you distrust
 even what your judgment most assures, and being in danger,
 never think to be delivered. They are restless, you tardy : they
 love to be abroad, and you at home. For they suppose by
 being abroad they may acquire something ; you, if you should
 go forth against the state of another, would think to impair
 your own. They, when they overcome their enemies, advance
 the farthest, and when they are conquered fall back the least ;
 and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the com-
 monwealth, as if they were those of others ; but their minds,
 when they would serve the state, are completely their own.
 Unless they succeed in what they have once planned, they ac-
 count so much lost of their own. And when they take it in
 hand, if they obtain any thing, they think they have accom-
 plished but little, in comparison of what they expect to win.
 If they fail in any attempt, they make up the deficit by a coun-
 terbalance of hope. For they alone, both have and hope for at
 once, whatsoever they devise, through their celerity in execution
 of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour
 and toil all their lives : what they have, they have no leisure to
 enjoy, being continually taken up in getting more. Nor holi-
 day esteem they any, but whereon they effect some needful
 matter ; nor think the ease of inactivity a less misery than labo-

rious business. So that in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves nor suffer others, is to say the truth. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

LXXI. "Now, notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, you still delay and think that quiet lasts longest, not to those who in their general conduct do what is just, yet manifest a mind unlikely to endure injuries; but placing equity in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive it by defending yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though you dwelt near a state whose form of government differed not from your own. But (as we have before declared) your customs are, in respect of theirs, antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many risks, many additional devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, have been from their great experience, more remodelled than yours. Here therefore put an end to your tardiness, and by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest, lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to their cruelest enemies, and lest we and others be driven through despair to seek out some other alliance.⁸ And we should do no injustice, neither against the gods, judges of men's oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them: for they do not break the league, who being abandoned, have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow up the business with earnestness, we will stay; for else we should act irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well on these points, and endeavour to lead the Peloponnesians through the contest in no worse condition than it was left to you by your progenitors."

The Corinthians conclude by solemnly urging the Lacedæmonians to exert themselves; and intimate that otherwise they may be driven to look out for other allies and to abandon their connection with Sparta.

LXXII. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be present at Lacedæmon, upon other business, when they heard of this oration, thought they ought to come before the Lacedæmonians, not to apologize for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to shew in general that it was not right for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but further time to consider. They desired to shew

An Athenian embassy happening to be at Sparta, the members of it justify the conduct of their country.

⁸ viz. that of the Argives. Schol.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

how great was the power of their city, to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already; and to the younger, for information of what they knew not: supposing that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness, rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they also, if there was no objection, desired to speak in the assembly, who bade them come forward. And the Athenians having come in, spake to this effect:

Oration of the Ambassadors of Athens.

✓
①
SPEECH OF
THE ATHE-
NIANS.
They urge
the claim
of Athens
on the
gratitude
and re-
spect of
Lacedæ-
mon, from
its great
services
in the
Persian
invasion.

LXXIII. "Though our embassy was not to this end, to argue against our confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great cry raised against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the charges of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges either of them or us) but that you may not easily be drawn away, to take the worst resolution, at the persuasion of the confederates, in matters of so great importance. And moreover, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you, that as to what we possess, we have it justly, and that our city deserves reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay, than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious to be continually producing them, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your share in the substance, so must we have ours, if that be any benefit, in the commemoration; and we shall make recital of them, not by way of deprecation, but of proof, and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the Barbarian at Marathon,⁹ but also afterwards when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle along with the rest, by sea at Salamis, which was the cause that prevented him sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste, city after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other

⁹ The Lacedæmonians were not present at the battle of Marathon, but arrived afterwards on the field. *Herod.* vi. 106, 120.

mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this he himself gave, for, when his fleet was overcome, and his forces were no longer what they had been, he went away in haste with the greatest part of his army. A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

LXXIV. "Which being so, and it being evident that the whole state of the Grecians depended on their fleet, we afforded it the three things of most advantage; the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred¹ galleys in all, our own were few less than two thirds, and for commander, Themistocles; who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait,² whereby he clearly saved the whole business; and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for it, more than any man that came unto you,³ and a forwardness we shewed, more adventurous than any other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city, and lose our goods, and even in that condition, not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them, to be useless; but to put ourselves into our navy, and undergo the danger with them, and that without anger against you for not having formerly defended us in like manner. So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you, than received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and that you might still keep them so, and when you were

¹ The fleet consisted of three hundred and seventy eight ships, (Herod. viii. 48,) of which the Athenians sent one hundred and eighty. *Herod. viii. 44.*

² Of Salamis.

³ After the battle of Salamis, the Greeks sailed to the isthmus to bestow the prize on him who had best acquitted himself. When the commanders gave in their billets, each of them had given the preference to himself, but most of them agreed to award the second place to Themistocles; clearly shewing that he deserved best of the states. Envy, however, prevented them from proceeding to a just declaration, and they left the point undecided. Deprived of those rewards which were his due, Themistocles immediately repaired to Lacedæmon, where he was well received. To Euribiades the crown of olive was indeed given, as first in valour; but on Themistocles, a second crown was bestowed for wisdom: and on his return homewards, he was conducted to the frontier of Tegea by three hundred chosen Spartans,—an honour never known to have been conferred by them before. *Herod. viii.*

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

afraid, not of our danger, but your own; for when we were safe ye did not come to help us; whereas we coming from a city no more in being,⁴ and putting ourselves in danger for a city for which there was but little hope, saved both you, in part, and ourselves. But if we had previously joined the Persian, fearing as others⁵ did, to have our territories wasted; or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, there would have been no occasion for you to have fought with him by sea, as your fleet would have been too small,⁶ but his affairs would have succeeded as he wished.

Then with respect to the charge of ambition brought against them, their dominion was at first gained, and afterwards it was a matter of self-preservation to maintain it.

LXXV. "Do we therefore, men of Lacedæmon, for our courage at that time, and for the wisdom of our plans, deserve to be regarded with such envy by the other Greeks? Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when you yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the Barbarian, came in, and entreated us to take the command of their own accord.⁷ So that at first we were forced to advance dominion to what it is, from the nature of the thing itself, chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted,⁸ and seeing you were no more our friends as formerly, but suspicious of and at difference with us, we held it no longer a safe course, relaxing our power, to put ourselves into danger; for the revolts from us would all have been made to you. Nor can any be blamed for ordering their affairs the best as regards the greatest dangers.

They ought not therefore to be blamed, but rather praised for abusing their

LXXVI. "For you also, men of Lacedæmon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to your best advantage: and had you, when the time was, by staying it out, become the objects of hatred in your command, as we know well you would have been no less grievous to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule vigor-

⁴ The Athenians, when at the coming of Xerxes, they betook themselves to their ships, left their city to the Persians, sending their wives and children to Ægina, Salamis, and Troezen. *Herod.* viii.

⁵ The Thebans.

⁶ They had only ten ships.

⁷ When Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, still following up the Persian war, through his own pride and insolence, drew upon himself the hatred of the confederates to such a degree, that the Lacedæmonians, calling him home put themselves under the direction of the Athenians. A. C. 476.

⁸ As the Samians. *Bloomfield.*

ously, or to have fallen into danger. So that, overcome by the most powerful motives, honour, fear, and profit, if we have both accepted the dominion delivered us, and relinquish it not, we have thereby done nothing to be wondered at, nor contrary to the manner of men. Nor have we been the first to do so, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us, as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the advantages, you now allege equity: a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve any thing by strength, ever so far preferred, as to divert himself from profit. Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural inclination of man, in desiring rule over others, are juster, than for power they need be. And therefore if others had our power, we think they would best make it appear whether we are moderate: and yet from our moderation, abuse has resulted rather than commendation.

LXXVII. “ For though in causes arising out of covenants with our confederates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws, equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we are nevertheless reputed contentious. None of them considering that others, who in other places have dominion, and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it; for they that have the power to compel, need not at all go to law. And yet these men having been used to associate with us upon equal terms, if they lose any thing they think they should not, either by sentence, or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence; for in that case also they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more angry at injustice than violence; for in the one case it seems they are cheated by their equals, and in the other compelled by their superiors: when they therefore suffered worse things under the Medes’ dominion, they bore it, but think ours to be rigorous; and with good reason, for to men in subjection, their present condition is always grievous. Insomuch that you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, would soon find a change of the love, which they bear you now for fear of us, if you should

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87.1.
power so
little. ✓

And their actual unpopularity is the natural accompaniment of sovereign authority, and would be experienced in an equal or greater degree by the Lacedæmonians if they should hereafter transfer the empire now held by Athens to themselves.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

do again as you⁹ did for a short period, when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only are your own institutions unsociable with regard to those of others, but also when any one of you goes abroad (to take any post of government) he neither uses those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece.

The Lacedæmons there-fore should not be goaded on by their allies to a precipitate declaration of war, but should try to obtain satisfaction by negotiation, for their alleged grievances.

LXXVIII. "Deliberate therefore on this a long time, as of a matter of great importance, and do not upon the opinions and the charges brought by others, bring trouble on your own selves. Consider before you enter, how unexpected the chances of war are: for a long war, for the most part, ends by bringing matters into great hazard, from which we are equally far off, and which part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And men when they go to war fall first to action, which ought to come in the second place, and when they have already suffered some misfortune, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace, nor violate your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness, that we will endeavour to drive back you who begin the war, in the same way in which you shall lead us."

Archidamus being in favour of delaying the war,

LXXIX. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmons had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians' answer, they put them every one out of the court, and consulted on the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on: but Archidamus,¹ their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as follows:

Oration of Archidamus.

urges the different nature as well as the

LXXX. "Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and those among you whom I see of the same age with myself (have the like;)² so that you cannot desire

⁹ Alluding to the tyrannical command of Pausanias.

¹ Archidamus II. successor of Leotyichides, and his grandson by his son Zeuxidamus, Zeuxidamus having died the day before his father.

² The construction is elliptical, after *ὄρω, ἐμπειρους* or *ἐμπειροτέρους* is to be supplied. *Schol.*

this war, either through inexperience, (as many do,) nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate on, will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians, and our neighbour states, our strength is of the same kind,³ and we can quickly be upon each one of them; yet against men, whose territory is remote, and who are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently furnished, as money both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece, besides, and who have many confederates paying them tribute; against such I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And, whereon relying, should we allow ourselves, without preparation to be borne with such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are weaker. And if we should apply ourselves to it and in turn prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are far behind them; for neither do we possess any in the treasury, nor are we wont with readiness to contribute from our own private resources.

LXXXI. "But, it may be, some rely on this, that we exceed them in arms, and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they stand in need of. Again, if we shall try to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour for us, when we are chiefly thought to have begun the dissension. As for the hope, that if we waste their country the war will soon be at an end, let us not be excited by that, for I fear we shall rather transmit the war to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the bold spirit not to entertain a slavish affection for their land, nor as men without experience, to be frightened at the war.

LXXXII. "And yet I do not advise that we should without regarding it suffer our confederates so to be wronged, and not

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
magnitude
of the
Athenian
power,
and that
the Pello-
ponnesians
could not
effectually
grapple
with it.

For the
naval su-
periority
of Athens
will render
nugatory
all their
attempts
to weaken
her.

Negotia-
tion there-
fore should

³ i. e. military rather than naval. Compare Arist. Rhet. i. 4. §. 9. *Arnold*.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
first be
tried, and
in the
meantime
they
should en-
deavour to
increase
their own
resources
and to
procure
foreign
assistance.

apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them; but only not yet to take up arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance: and in the mean time to make our preparations by bringing over to our side allies, both of Greeks and Barbarians; if from any part we can gain the assistance either of ships or money, (nor are they to be blamed, who being plotted against, as we are by the Athenians, call in to their aid not Greeks only, but also Barbarians for their safety,) and at the same time let us keep our own resources in readiness. If they listen to us when we send ambassadors, this would be best of all; if not, then when two or three years have passed by, being perfectly appointed, we may war upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation, and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having their territory unravaged, and taking counsel about the goods that still remain to them, and yet are unspoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better husbanded. Which we ought therefore to spare as long as possible, and not, by rendering them desperate, make them the harder to subdue. For if unprepared as we are, at the instigation of the confederates, we waste their territory, consider if in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against cities as private men may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some, taken up by all, the event whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be laid down.

And they
should be
above
dreading
the impu-
tation of
cowardice
or heading
the re-
proaches
levelled
at their
national
character,

LXXXIII. "Now let no man think it cowardice that being many cities, we go not presently and invade that one city; for they, also, have as many allies as we, who bring them in tribute; and war is not so much of arms, as of money, by means whereof arms are useful, especially when it is a war of landsmen against sea-men. And, therefore, let us provide ourselves with money, and not first raise the war by the persuasion of our confederates. And let us, who will be considered most accountable for all that happens, which ever way it be, consider somewhat about them at our leisure before hand.⁴

⁴ "As we shall have the main share of the responsibility, whether the issue be prosperous or the contrary: so we may fairly take time to consider before hand, which it is likely to be." *Arnold*.

LXXXIV. "As for the slackness and procrastination where-
 with we are reproached by the confederates, be not ashamed of
 it; for the more haste you make to the war, the longer you
 will be before you end it, in that you go to it unprepared. Be-
 sides we dwell in a city that hath ever been free, and well
 thought of. And this above all things is wise moderation: for
 by that it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good suc-
 cess, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we,
 when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight
 thereof, moved to undergo danger, more than we think fit our-
 selves; nor when they urge us with reproach, should we be the
 more dissuaded from our purpose. And these habits of order
 of ours, make us both good soldiers and good counsellors:
 good soldiers, because honour is closely connected with mo-
 desty, and valour is most sensible of shame:⁵ good counsellors,
 because we are brought up more simply than to despise the
 laws, and by severity more strictly than to disobey them.
 And also, that we do not, like men exceedingly wise in what is
 needless, find fault in fine words with the preparation of the
 enemy, but in action assault him not accordingly; but we think
 that our neighbours' intentions are like our own, and that the
 events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech: and there-
 fore we always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy,
 as against men well advised. For we are not to build our
 hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight
 of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference
 between man and man, but him to be the best, that is instructed
 in what is most needful.⁶

A. C. 432.
 Ol. 87. 1.
 to which,
 whatever
 were its
 faults, they
 were in-
 debted for
 their long
 enjoyment
 of an inde-
 pendence
 crowned
 with glory,

⁵ "Our habits of order and obedience make us both warlike and wise; warlike, because in such an orderly temper the main ingredients is a sense of shame; and with a sense of shame is most closely connected a manly spirit." *Arnold.*

⁶ "We are trained in opposition to what the Corinthians say of us, to think that the views and plans of others are much the same as our own, and that the accidents of war no ingenuity of eloquence can before hand exactly determine. Therefore we neither calculate on the blunders of our enemies nor on the favours of fortune, but our reliance is on our own wisdom. Nor again should we think with the Corinthians, that the character of the Athenians so differs from ours, as to make us unfit antagonists to them. One man is practically much the same as another; or if there be any difference, it is that he, who has been taught what is most needful, and has never troubled himself with superfluous accomplishments, is the best and most valuable."

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
which it
would be
madness
now to
hazard by
going to
war before
they were
thoroughly
prepared.

LXXXV. "Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us, of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day; but at leisure, which we have better opportunity than any others to do, by reason of our power. Send also to the Athenians about Potidæa, and send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they are ready to refer the cause to the arbitration of a legal trial: and one that offers himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given; and prepare also for the war, for in this manner you will take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy." Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all, and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner.⁷

Oration of Sthenelaidas.

Sthenelaidas, one of the Ephori, replies by briefly dwelling on the injuries sustained by the allies of Lacedæmon which it concerned her honour to revenge, by an instant declaration of war.

LXXXVI. "For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have said much in their own praise, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates, and to the Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes then, and ill against us now, they deserve a double punishment, because they are not good as they were, and are evil, as they were not. Now we are the same we were, and we will not, if we be wise, either overlook the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to aid them, for the harm they suffer is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor must we decide matters by words and pleadings, being ourselves injured not in words, but we must aid them with all our power and speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury, we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to those who are about to do injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lacedæmon, decree the war, as becomes the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the gods, proceed against the doers of injustice."

⁷ "Spoke thus in the presence of the Lacedæmonians."

LXXXVII. Having thus spoken, being himself an Ephor, he put it to the vote in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern which was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes by acclamation, and not with balls,⁸) and desiring to stimulate them the more to the war, by giving their decisions openly, he said, to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken, and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder: (and at the same time he shewed them a certain place:) and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side. So they arose and divided; and far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

The question is then put to the vote and the majority of the assembly decide that the treaty was broken and that war was to commence.

Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their opinion was, that the Athenians had done them wrong. Yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the vote again, that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent. This done, their confederates went home, and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had despatched the business they came about. This resolution of the assembly, that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years for which a peace had been formerly concluded, after the actions past in Eubœa.⁹

LXXXVIII. Now the Lacedæmonians had given their vote that the peace was broken, and that war was to be made, not so much persuaded by the arguments of the confederates, as from fear the Athenian greatness should still increase: for they saw that the greater part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

Their real dread being the overweening power of Athens.

LXXXIX. Now the means by which the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves were these:

Thucydides here interrupts his narrative to give a sketch of

¹ After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land by the

⁸ *Ψηφος*, properly lapillus, calculus. A little stone or ball, which he who gave his vote put into a box, either on the affirmative or negative side. The Athenians used beans white and black. From the above, it would appear, that in matters of great consequence the government of the Lacedæmonians was more democratical than is generally supposed.

⁹ B. C. 445, when Eubœa having revolted, was subdued by Pericles, c. 114.

¹ This sketch of the affairs of Greece from the siege of Sestos to the

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
 the origin and progress of the Athenian dominion from the Persian invasion to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. He first relates how the walls of Athens were rebuilt after the defeat of Marathonius.
 A. C. 478.

Greeks, had departed from Europe, and such of them as had escaped by sea, were utterly overthrown at Mycale; Leoty-chides, king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus, returned home. But the Athenians, with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as had already revolted from the king,² stayed behind and besieged Sestos, then held by the Medes, and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it, the Barbarians having abandoned it, and after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the state of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the Barbarians, fetched home again their wives and their children and such goods as they had left, from the places where they had been deposited, and set about repairing their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses, though most of them were fallen down, which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

XC. The Lacedæmonians hearing what they were about to do, sent thither their ambassadors,³ partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other should have walls; but principally, as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also the courage which they had shewn against the Persians; and they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing; not disclosing their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians, but pretending that if the Barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereunto to retire, and from whence

beginning of the Peloponnesian war, is a regular continuation of the History of Herodotus; and connects immediately with the 121st chapter of his last book. To follow the history in chronological order, a reader, after finishing Herodotus, should take up Thucydides at this 89th chapter, and read to the 117th inclusive: he should then go back to the 24th, and read on from thence to the 88th inclusive; after which he should proceed directly to the 118th. The digression about Pausanias and Themistocles, from ch. 128 to 138 inclusive, synchronizes with ch. 95—98 of the general sketch. *Arnold.*

² Of Persia.

³ "Came with an embassy."

to withstand the war. But the Athenians by the advice of A.C. 478. Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer, that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of, to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles desired them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away directly, but to detain them till they should raise the wall to a sufficient height to fight from;⁴ and that all the men in the city in the mean time should work at the wall, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice, that might advance the work, but pulling all down that might help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, and suggesting that he himself would do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon, he went not to the magistrates, but delaying the time, excused himself; and when any of those that were in office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, that he stayed for his fellow-ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly, and wondered they were not already come.

XCI. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles, through the friendship they bore him; but when others coming thence plainly accused him, saying, that the wall was being built, and that it was come to good height already, they had no alternative but to believe it. Themistocles, when he knew this, bids them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own people that were honest men, and who having informed themselves, would relate the truth. Which they also did. And Themistocles sends privily to the Athenians about the same men, that they should detain them, with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned. For by this time were arrived his companions, Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height. For he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, as it was written to them to do; and Themistocles coming to his au-

⁴ "The lowest height that would enable them to defend themselves with advantage." *Arnold.*

A. C. 478. dience before the Lacedæmonians, then said plainly, “that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within : and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians, upon any occasion to send ambassadors to them, they were to send thenceforward, as to men who understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city, and to enter into their galleys, he said they had decided on venturing to do it, without asking advice of them. And in all that they had consulted on in conjunction with them, they had appeared inferior in the advice they gave to none : and now at this time, their opinion is, that it is best, both for themselves in particular, and for all their confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in strength unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. “Therefore,” said he “either all the confederate cities must be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us.”

XCII. The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no shew of being angry with the Athenians, for they had not as they said, sent their ambassadors to the state to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them ; besides they were friendly to them then, for their readiness shewn against the Medes, yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed their design. And the ambassadors of either side returned home without any complaint.

And also how Peiræus was fortified, and the navy made principal object of public attention by the advice of Themistocles.

XCIII. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls ; and the structure itself shews the haste used in building. For the foundation consists of stones of all sorts ; and those in some places unwrought, as each brought them to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres, and polished stones were heaped together among the rest. For the circuit of the city was every way carried farther out, and therefore they hastened on the work, and took alike whatever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build the rest of the Peiræus, (for it was begun by him before in the year that he himself was Archon⁵ of Athens,) as conceiving the place to

⁵ The governor of the city for that year. The number of the Archons was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first of the nine was called Ἀρχων, by way of eminence, and sometimes Ἐπι-

have great advantages, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he indeed was the first man that durst tell them that they ought to pay attention to the command of the sea, and forthwith helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel, it was that they built the wall of that breadth about Peiræus, which is now to be seen: for two carts, carrying stones, met and passed upon it.⁶ And yet within it, there was neither rubbish⁷ nor clay, but it was made all of great stones, cut square, and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised only to half at most of what he had intended. For he desired to deter even the designs of the enemies; and he thought by the height and breadth that a few, and the less serviceable men, might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he applied himself to the shipping, because (as I think) he had observed, that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Peiræus was more useful than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed by land they should go down thither, and with their galleys resist any enemy whatsoever. Thus the Athenians were surrounded with walls, and applied themselves to repairing every other part of the city, immediately on the departure of the Medes.

XCIV. Meanwhile⁸ Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent from Lacedæmon, commander of the Greeks, with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus. With which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates, and making

νυμος, because from him the year took its denomination. The second was named *Βασιλευς*; the third *Πολεμαρχος*. The other six were called by one common name, *Θεσμοθεται*. To their department pertained all the civil and religious affairs of the state.

⁶ It was not unusual for the ancients to express the thickness of a wall by the *number of carriages* which could pass abreast along it, each being understood to require about eight feet. *Bloomfield*.

⁷ *Χαλιξ* signifies those lesser stones which are always made in quarrying stone and squaring it for use, and which were used by the ancients to fill up the interior of very thick walls, in which case the *Χαλιξ* was compounded with plenty of clay. *Bloomfield*.

⁸ Our author having mentioned by digression, the mode by which Athens was walled, now returns to the narration of those events which succeeded the battle of Mycale.

A. C. 478. war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium, which they besieged and won.

Owing to the unpopularity of Pausanias, the Asiatic Greeks and islanders, and the Greeks of the cities on the Thracian coast, withdraw from the Lacedæmonians, and choose the Athenians as the chiefs of their confederacy.

XCV. But Pausanias being now grown despotic, both the rest of the Greeks, and especially the Ionians, and those who had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came to the Athenians, requesting them for consanguinity's sake⁹ to become their leaders, and not to give way to Pausanias, if he should use any violence. The Athenians, accepting the motion, applied themselves, as neither about to permit them to be injured, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there, in such sort as should seem best to themselves. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him concerning such things as they had heard against him. For great injustice had been laid to his charge by the Greeks that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command in war. And it was his lot to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had gone over to the side of the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though he was brought to account for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquitted; for favouring the Medes had been especially laid to his charge, and this seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; to whom the confederates did

⁹ When the Ionians at the return of the Heraclidæ were driven out of Peloponnesus by the Achæians, after the Achæians themselves had been dispossessed of Argolis and Laconia by the Dorians and Heraclidæ, they sought an asylum at Athens, as the Athenians were themselves supposed to be of Ionian descent, and had formerly been called Ionians, and their country Ionia. Accordingly the exiled Ionians were admitted to reside at Athens as *συνοικοι*, or fellow-inhabitants; that is to say, they were not citizens, nor could they possess land in the country, but enjoyed the protection of the laws, and maintained themselves by trade or by mechanical occupations. Some years afterwards the greater part of them migrated to Asia Minor, under the auspices however of a certain number of Athenian citizens, who were the leaders, *ἡγέμονες*, of the colony, and who carried the sacred fire for the new settlement from the fire in the *prytanæum* of Athens, by which Athens became entitled to the appellation of mother state, *μητροπολις*, to the Ionian colonies; and the Ionians therefore, according to the law of Greece, were accounted kinsmen, *ξυγγενεις*, of the Athenians. See Herod. i. 146, 147. *Arnold.*

not give up the command, and they finding that, departed. A. C. 477. And after that, the Lacedæmonians sent no more, because they feared lest such as went out would prove the worse for the state, (as they had seen by Pausanias,) and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient to take the lead, and at that time their friends.

XCVI. When the Athenians had thus got the command by the confederates' own accord, for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then decreed which cities should contribute money for this war against the Barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first was appointed among the Athenians the office of treasurers¹ of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute, (for so they called this money contributed.) And the first tribute that was imposed came to four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

XCVII. Now using their authority at first in such manner, that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by the war, and administration of the common affairs of Greece between the Persian war and this, what against the Barbarians, what against their own rebellious confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced to come in contact with them in any particular matter, they advanced to such a pitch of power, (as I proceed to relate); which also I have written, and made this digression from my narration, both because this place has been passed over by all who have written before me, and they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus,² who has touched them in his Attic history, but has mentioned

BEGINNING OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

A. C. 477.

This part of Grecian history having been neglected or inaccurately written, Thucydides had an additional reason for giving a sketch of it, besides its relation to his own immediate subject, as shewing how the power of Athens became so great as to drive the Lacedæmonians into a war.

¹ The treasurers were called *ἑλληνοταμίαι*; the money collected, *φορα*, which in this case amounted to eighty nine thousand one hundred and twenty-five pounds. It was not kept at Athens, lest it should seem they claimed a peculiar property in it; but in the temple of Apollo, at Delos. Afterwards, however, Athens was deemed a more convenient place for keeping it, and it was therefore removed thither. The difficult point of adjusting the quota, each state was to furnish, was settled by Aristides to the satisfaction of all parties. The tax was soon afterwards raised to six hundred, then to thirteen hundred talents.

² Hellanicus, a famous Greek historian, born at Mitylene, who wrote an account of the founders of the most remarkable cities; died A. C. 411.

them briefly, and without exactness as to the times; and also because they carry with them a demonstration how the Athenian empire grew up.

A. C. 476. The Athenians were at first moderate and popular, but soon became arbitrary and oppressive to their allies and drove them to revolt, A. C. 466.

XCVIII. And first, under the conduct of Cimon,³ son of Miltiades, they took Eion, on the river Strymon,⁴ from the Medes by siege, and carried away the inhabitants captive. Then the isle of Scyros, in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Delopes, whose inhabitants they also carried away captive, planting therein a colony of their own. They likewise made war on the Carystians alone, without the rest of the Eubœans, and those also after a time yielded on conditions. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and reduced them by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which contrary to the ordinance, was enslaved; and afterwards, the others, as it chanced to each.

or, by allowing them to compound for their personal service in war by a payment in money, were enabled to maintain their navy, and thus keep the allies in subjection at the expense of the allies themselves.

XCIX. Amongst other causes of revolt, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and the refusal of any to follow to the war. For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil, which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so mild in their government as they had been, nor did they take part in the war upon equal terms, and it was easy for them to bring back to subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the cause; for through their declining to accompany the expeditions, the greatest part of them, that they might stay at home, agreed to pay a certain sum of money instead of ships,⁵ as much as it came to. By which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates, and they themselves were unprovided, and without experience with regard to war in case they should revolt.

Various exploits of C. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes both by land and water, on

³ According to Herodotus, b. vii. 107, Xerxes was king of Persia, when Eïon was taken; it is more probable, however that it was during the reign of Artaxerxes, his successor, A. C. 471.

⁴ This was the place which was so desperately defended by Boges. See Herod. vii. 107. It is called "Eion on the Strymon," to distinguish it from "Eion by Thrace," a Mendæan colony, which is mentioned iv. 7. *Arnold.*

⁵ The expedient of allowing the allies to *compound* for their quotas, in lieu of ships and men, is ascribed by Plutarch to Cimon. *Bloomfield.*

the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia; and on the same day the Athenians had victory in both under the generalship of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this happened the revolt of Thasus, upon a difference about the places of trade in the opposite parts of Thrace, and about the mine they possessed. And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island, and having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people to the river Strymon, to plant a colony in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis, they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Edonians; but advancing further, toward the heart of Thrace, were destroyed at Drabescus of Edonia, by the whole power of the Thracians, who were enemies⁶ to this town of the Nine-ways that they had founded.

A. C. 466.
the Athenian confederacy.
Battles of the Eurymedon.
Revolt of Thasus.
Attempt to colonise Amphipolis.
A. C. 465.

CI. The Thasians, in the mean time, being overcome in divers battles, and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica; which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and would have done it, but by an earthquake that then happened they were hindered. In which earthquake, their Helots,⁷ and of neighbouring towns the Thuriatæ and Ætheans, revolted, and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, who were brought into servitude in former times; whereby also it came to pass, that they were all called Messenians. Against these the Lacedæmonians had now

A. C. 464.
The Thasians now solicit aid from Lacedæmon; but the Lacedæmonians are prevented from sending it by the great earthquake of Sparta and the revolt

⁶ This was natural, as this was the second attempt of the Greeks to establish themselves here; the first was under Aristagoras of Miletus, and was defeated by the natives, and he himself destroyed, A. C. 498. Herod. v. 126. *Arnold.*

⁷ The Lacedæmonians employed the captives, taken in war, and their posterity in husbandry and the most servile works. They were called Helots, because the first of them so employed were captives of the town of Helos, in Laconia. They were always treated with the greatest severity; at times were wantonly butchered. See iv. 80. The earthquake here alluded to, was so violent, that according to Plutarch, it demolished all the houses in Sparta, except five. The Helots rose at once to destroy those Spartans who were not buried in the ruins; but Archidamus had given the alarm. The Helots then marched off, and besieged Ithome in Messenia, where they made a long and obstinate resistance.

of the
Helots.
Thasus
surrenders.

a war at Ithome. The Thasians in the third year of the siege, surrendered themselves to the Athenians, on condition they should raze their walls, deliver up their galleys, pay both the money in arrear, and for the future as much as they were wont; and give up both the mine and the continent.

✓ The Lacedæmonians apply to the Athenians for aid against the Helots, then becoming jealous of them, they send them home again. A great irritation against Lacedæmon is excited by this conduct amongst the Athenians.

CII. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, among other confederates, sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small force, under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege, seeming to require men of ability in that way, whereby they might perhaps have got the place by force. And from this expedition grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: for the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating spirit of the Athenians, whom moreover they esteemed of a contrary race,⁸ might at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some change, if they stayed; dismissed them alone of all the confederates, not disclosing their jealousy, but alleging that they had no further need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving they were not sent away on good cause, but only as men suspected, and taking it ill, and conceiving they had deserved better at the Lacedæmonians' hands, as soon as they were gone, left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies, the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath, and made the same league with the Thessalians.

A. C. 455.
END OF
THE HELOT
WAR.
The van-
quished
Helots are
settled by
the Athe-
nians at
Naupae-
tus.

CIII. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege, surrendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, on condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and that whosoever should be taken returning, should be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by an answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes.⁹ So they came forth, they, their wives, and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedæmonians, received them, and put

⁸ The Lacedæmonians being Dorians; the Athenians, Ionians.

⁹ Jupiter was called Ithomes, from a temple which he had at Ithome.

them into Naupactus, which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians, and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were pressed by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built for the Megareans the long walls from this city to Nisæa,¹ and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence chiefly grew the vehement hatred of the Corinthians to the Athenians.

Megara revolts to Athens; and Nisæa and Pegæ are occupied by the Athenians.

CIV. Moreover, Inarus, the son of Psammetchus, a Libyan, king of the Libyans, that border on Egypt, making war from Maræa above Pharos, caused the greatest part of Ægypt to rebel against king Artaxerxes;² and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who happened to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, and then left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the Nile, after they had made themselves masters of the river, and two parts of the city of Memphis, they assaulted the third part, called the *white fort*. Within were such of the Persians and Medes as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted among the rest.

A. C. 460. Egypt revolts from the king of Persia. The Egyptians receive aid from Athens.

CV. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Haliæ, and landing their soldiers, fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea, against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cœcryphalea³ and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war of the Athenians against the Æginetæ being on foot, a great battle was fought between them by sea, off the coast of Ægina, the confederates of both being there; in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys, landed their army and besieged the city under the conduct of Leocrates, the son of Strœbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over to Ægina three hundred men of arms, of those that had before aided the

Various hostilities between Athens and the Peloponnesians. Ægina is besieged by the Athenians; and the Corinthians to effect a diversion in its favour,

¹ The haven and arsenal of Megara.

² Concerning the revolt of the Egyptians from the Persian monarch, see Herod. iii. 12, 15, vii. 7.

³ Some island about Peloponnesus, whose situation is not now known; by some supposed to be opposite Epidaurus, at six miles distance.

A. C. 457. Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces seized the top of Geranea.⁴ And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence to the territory of Megara, supposing that the Athenians having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina; but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides, went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted, neither party conceiving they had the worst in the action. And the Athenians, (who, notwithstanding, had rather the better) when the Corinthians were gone away, erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reproached at their return by the elders of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared, and they also set up a counter-trophy, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians having sallied out of Megara, both destroy those that were setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the rest, got the victory.

and a part of their army cut off by the Athenians.

CVI. The Corinthians being overcome, retired; but a good part of them being hard followed, and missing their way, happened to enter the enclosed ground of a private man, which, being fenced round with a great ditch, had no passage out; which the Athenians perceiving, kept them in in front,⁵ with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers, killed with stones those that were entered. This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their army got home again.

LONG WALLS OF ATHENS BUILT. The Spartans assist the Dorians against the Phocians and their return home is

CVII. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phalerus, the other to Piræus. The Phocians also making war on Bœnum, Cytinium, and Erineum, towns that belonged to the Dorians,⁶ of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanax, son of king Pau-

⁴ A ridge of a hill, lying before the entrance into the isthmus.

⁵ i. e. at the place by which they had entered.

⁶ The Dorians at first possessed a small country on the north side of Phocis, called Doris or Tetrapolis from the four cities which it contained, whereof those here mentioned were three, Pindus being the fourth.

sanias,⁷ who was yet a minor, aided the Dorians with one thousand five hundred men of arms of their own, and with ten thousand of their confederates. And when they had forced the Phocians to give back the town on conditions, they went back again. Now if they should attempt to go home by sea through the Crissæan gulf,⁸ the Athenians going about with their fleet, would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geranea⁹ they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ; for Geranea was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always kept guarded by the Athenians, and at that time they perceived that they were about to hinder them in that point. They thought fit therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. And moreover there was this, that some Athenians privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to put down the democracy, and to put a stop to the long walls then in building. But the Athenians with the whole power of their city, and one thousand Argives, and the respective contingents of the other allies, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them; and they made this expedition, thinking that they would be in doubt as to what way they could pass through, and somewhat from a suspicion that they came thither to put down the democracy. There also came to the Athenians some horsemen of Thessaly according to a treaty, who in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians.

CVIII. And a contest taking place at Tanagra of Bœotia, the Lacedæmonians had the victory, but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians entering the territories of Megaris, and cutting down the trees before them, returned home by way of Geranea and the Isthmus. Upon the two and sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Bœotians overthrew them at Cænophyta, and brought the territories of

opposed by the Athenians who occupy the passes of Geranea.

They wait in Bœotia and intrigue to overthrow the democracy in Athens.

A general battle takes place at Tanagra where the Athenians are defeated, and the Lacedæmonians return home without opposition.

⁷ Pausanias was not king but merely the guardian of Pleistarchus, (Herod. ix. 10) whom his son Pleistoanax succeeded. Duker, on the authority of Plutarch, joins the title of king to Pausanias, but perhaps it would be better to follow Mr. Bloomfield in joining it to Pleistoanax.

⁸ Gulf of Corinth.

⁹ Geranea consisted of a *mountain range*, which stretched across the isthmus and obtained its appellation (like many other mountains) from its form, it bearing some resemblance to a crane's neck. *Bloomfield*

A. C. 455. Bœotia and Phœcis under their obedience, razed the walls of Tanagra, took of the wealthiest of the Opuntian Locrians one hundred as hostages, and finished their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions, that they should pull down their walls, should deliver up their galleys, and pay tribute for the time to come. The Athenians also under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, made a voyage about Peloponnesus, wherein they burnt the arsenal¹ of the Lacedæmonian navy, took Chalcis,² a city of the Corinthians; and landing their forces in Sicyonia, overcame in fight those that opposed them.

✓ Continuation and conclusion of the Egyptian war; which ends in the total defeat of the Egyptians, and the destruction of the Athenian expedition in Egypt.

CIX. All this while the Athenians and their confederates still stayed in Egypt, and many were the various changes in the war that befel them. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the king of Persia sends Megabazus a Persian with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia; and then was Megabyzus, the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces; who coming by land, overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drove the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally enclosed them in the isle of Prosopitis.³ There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel, and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground, and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and took the island with land soldiers.

✓ as also of a second expedition which was sent to relieve it.

CX. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost, after six years' war; and out of many, a few saved themselves in Cyrene, passing through Libya, but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except Amyrtæus⁴ who reigned in the fens, for him they could not conquer, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens are of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Libyans, and

¹ viz. Gythium.

² A city of the Corinthians in Ætolia, near the river Evenus. *Herod.* vii. *Strabo.* x.

³ Formed by the Bolbitine and Phatnitic mouths.

⁴ See *Herod.* ii. 140, iii. 15. These fens were between the Bolbitine and Sebennyitic mouths.

author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians and their allies moreover had sent fifty galleys more to Egypt, to relieve those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of the Nile, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest; and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped home again with what were left. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt. A. C. 455.

CXI. Moreover Orestes, the son of Echekratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians taking with them the Bœotians and Phocians, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the country as far as they strayed not from the army (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling) but could not take the city, nor did they succeed in any thing else of what they came for, but came back again without effecting any thing, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys, that lay at Pegæ, (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians) under the command of Pericles, the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia, and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as fought with them; and then forthwith took up some forces in Achaia, and putting over, made war on Cœnia, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged; nevertheless they took it not, but returned home. A. C. 454. The Athenians invade Thessaly without success. Victory over the Sicyonians gained by Pericles; (here first mentioned.) Achaia is united to the Athenian confederacy.

CXII. Three years after this was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years; and the Athenians gave over the Grecian war, and with two hundred galleys, part their own, and part their confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made an expedition to Cyprus. Of these, there went sixty sail to Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens, and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying, and a famine arising, they left Citium, and when they had passed Salamis, in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land, against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gained the victory in both, returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war, called A. C. 450. Athenian expedition against Cyprus; death of Cimon. A. C. 449.

the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered it to the Phocians.

✓ A. C. 447.

Revolt of
Bœotia
from
Athens.

CXIII. Some time after this, the exiles of Bœotia having seized Orchomenus, Chæronea, and certain other places of Bœotia, the Athenians made an expedition against these places which were hostile to them with a thousand men at arms of their own, and with the respective contingents of their confederates, under the conduct of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæronea, they carried away the inhabitants captive, and leaving a garrison in the city, departed.

✓ Battle of
Coronea.
The Bœo-
tians re-
cover their
independ-
ence

On their return, those exiles that were in Orchomenus, with the Locrians and the Eubœan exiles, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coronea, and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew,⁵ and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace, on condition their prisoners should be released. So the exiles and the rest returned, having again recovered their freedom.

A. C. 445.

Eubœa and Me-
gara revolt
from the
Athenians.
The Pello-
ponne-
sians in-
vade
Attica but
are pre-
vailed on
to retire.

CXIV. Not long after Eubœa revolted from the Athenians, and when Pericles had already passed over to it, with an Athenian army, news was brought him that Megara had revolted,⁶ that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except such as had fled to Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had brought to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward broke into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusis and Thriasia, under the conduct of Pleistoanax,⁷ son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and coming no further on, went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa, and totally subdued it; the Hestîæans they put quite out, taking their territory into

Eubœa is
reduced to
submission
by Peri-
cles.

⁵ Among whom was Tolmidas himself, and Cleinias the father of Alcibiades. *Wass.*

⁶ The revolt of Megara gave rise to that decree which excluded the Megareans from the ports and markets of Athens. See c. 139. They decreed further, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the generals of the state should swear at their election to make an incursion there twice a year.

⁷ Pleistoanax for this retreat was banished from Sparta, it being supposed he had been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory.

their own hands; but settled the rest of Eubœa, according to the terms they had made.

CXV. Being returned from Eubœa, a short time after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years, returning them Nisæa, Achaia, Pegæ, and Trœzene, for these places the Athenians held of theirs. In the sixth year of this peace, there was a war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene; and the Milesians being worsted, came to Athens and vehemently clamoured against the Samians; wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; whom, when they had put into Lemnos and set a guard upon them, they came home. But certain of the Samians, for some of them, not enduring the popular government, had fled to the continent, entering into a league with those who had the greatest power in Samos, and with Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and having gathered together about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over to Samos by night, and first set on the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such magistrates as were there, into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make an expedition against Miletus. With them also revolted the Byzantines.

CXVI. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use, (for some of them went to Caria, to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos,) but with the forty-four that remained under the command of Pericles and nine others,³ fought with seventy galleys of the Samians, whereof twenty were troop-ships, as they were coming altogether from Miletus: and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from

A. C. 445.
Thirty years' peace concluded between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.
Five years afterwards a war between Miletus and Samos leads to the revolt of Samos from Athens in which the Byzantines join.

Pericles sent against Samos. He defeats them and forms the siege of the town.

³ The Athenians chose ten generals every year, according to the number of the tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present instance, all sent on the same employ. Each in his turn was general of the day. They were frequently re-elected, and continued many years in commission, as it is obvious Pericles did.

A. C. 440. Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. With these, having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city, which they enclosed with a triple wall,⁹ and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles having taken with him sixty galleys out of those that were carrying on the blockade, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras and others with five galleys had already gone out of Samos after¹ the Phœnician fleet.

The arrival of reinforcements from Athens drives the Samians to submit, and to give up all their fleet to the Athenians.

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet, and falling on the naval camp, which was unfortified, destroyed the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame those that put out against them; and became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning, shut them in again with his galleys; and after this, there came to him from Athens, a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides,² Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos, thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a short battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege, they surrendered the city on terms; namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war, at stated periods.³ And the Byzantines also yielded, on condition that they should remain subject to them, in the same manner as they had been before the revolt.

The Byzantians submit also.

The thread of the history is resumed from c. 88.

CXVIII. Now not many years after this, happened the matters before related of the Coreyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever intervenient pretext of this war. These things

⁹ Of the three walls, the innermost was a wall of circumvallation, the second a wall of circumvallation connected with the former, so as to form, as it were, one thick wall, the interstices being converted into barracks. The third or outermost was one of contravallation for defence against the attacks of the islanders, outside of the city. *Bloomfield.*

¹ i. e. to bring it up to the aid of the Samians. *Arnold.*

² Not the writer of the History, but the son of Milesias, and the rival of Pericles. *Goeller.*

³ Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herself, Pericles was received upon his return with all the honours the people could bestow on him, and was appointed to make a funeral oration for those slain in the war.—ii. 35.

done by the Grecians one against another, or against the Barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war; in which time the Athenians both confirmed their government over the confederates, and had themselves attained to a great degree of power. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little, but as men that had ever before been slow to war, unless they were compelled, and also as they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them, till now at last when the power of the Athenians was manifestly advanced, and they had begun to attack their confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary to take the war in hand with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose, it was by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken, and that the Athenians had done unjustly. And also having sent to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, whether it would be better to go to war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory, and that he himself would be on their side, whether called or uncalled.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87.
A second assembly being convened and after having decided upon war, the Lacedæmonians consult the oracle at Delphi and receive a favourable answer.

CXIX. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they wished to put the question amongst them, whether they should make war or not. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present, spake last of all to this effect:

They then assemble their allies and propose to them the question of immediate war. The Corinthians speak in favour of war.

Oration of the ambassadors of Corinth.

CXX. "Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, for not having both decreed the war themselves, and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also, administering their private affairs equally with others, to consider before the rest, of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had dealings with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of

SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. The ambition of Athens is dangerous to every state alike, nor should the Peloponnesians

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
through an
excessive
desire of
remaining
at peace,
forfeit the
enjoy-
ments of
peace for
ever.

them; yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they will have a great deal more difficulty both in carrying down to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and in again receiving the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to be careless judges of what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to expect, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach unto themselves; and that this consultation concerns them no less than us, and therefore not to be afraid to change peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men when they receive injury, to pass from peace to war, and when a good opportunity presents itself, from war again to come to a reconciliation: and neither to be elevated with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury, through taking pleasure in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, will quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in the success of war grasps for more, has not reflected that he is puffed up by a deceitful confidence. For though many things ill-advised, come to good effect, against enemies worse-advised; yet more, though they appeared to be well-advised, have on the contrary fallen out but disgracefully. For no man comes to execute a thing, with the same confidence he premeditates it, for we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear.

✓ Their prospects of success, if they go to war are encouraging. Practice will enable them to rival the Athenians in naval skill, and their evident common interest in the

CXXI. "As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us, and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repelled the Athenians, we will also in due season lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number and skill in war; next, because we all go with equal obedience to whatever is ordered us. And as for a navy, wherein consists their strength, we shall provide it, both out of every one's particular substance, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia.⁴ For taking this at interest, we shall be

⁴ It appears from this passage and some following ones, (i. 143, and ii. 9,) that through some revolution not particularly mentioned by Thucydides, but probably a consequence of the thirty years' truce, not only Delphi was again brought under Lacedæmonian influence, but the Phocian people were gained

able to draw from them their foreign mariners, by offer of great wages: for the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic. Whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they can never attain to by teaching; but as to what they are superior to us in scientific skill, this advantage we must take away by our industrious practice. And the money to use for this purpose, we must all contribute. Else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not refuse to contribute to their own servitude; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies, and for our own preservation, and that we may not be deprived of this very money by them, and by these very means suffer injury.

CXXII. "We have also many other ways of war; as the exciting their allies to revolt, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory,⁵ and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than fixed plans, but of itself contrives most things upon the occasion. Wherein, he that complies with it, with most temper, stands the firmest; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Suppose we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory, with an equal adversary, we might undergo them; but now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us separately without trouble. And know that to be vanquished, though it trouble you to hear it, brings with it no less than downright servitude: which, but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one,

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
war will
induce
them to
furnish li-
beral sup-
plies of
money for
carrying
it on,

yet they
must not
suffer
them-
selves to go
to work
blindly
from mere
passion,
but consi-
dering the
great and
alarming
power of
Athens,
they
should
unite firm-
ly and
steadily to
reduce it;
and no
longer as
they alone
suffer it to
increase
without in-
terfering.

to the Lacedæmonian interest, or which would operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchical government. *Mitford.*

⁵ Though this be here said in the person of a Corinthian, yet it was never thought on by any of that side, till Alcibiades put it into their heads, when he revolted from his country.

A. C. 432.
O. 1. 87. 1.

were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished deserving it, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerated from our ancestors; for by them the liberty of all Greece has been restored; whereas we for our parts establish it not for our own; but, though we think ourselves justified in deposing tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us.⁶ Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not, by falling into that which has done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: which, because it has made many men miscarry, has obtained the opposite name of foolishness.

But to regret the past is useless. For the future, the oracle encouraging them, and all Greece sympathizing with them, and their cause being entirely just, they should enter on the contest without hesitation.

CXXIII. "But to what end should we cast blame upon what is past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by aiding the present, labour for the future. For it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour; and though you be now somewhat advanced in wealth and power, you must not therefore change the custom; for there is no reason that what was obtained in want, should be lost in prosperity. But we should proceed to the war with confidence, for many other causes, as also for this, that both the god hath by his oracle spoken to this effect, and promised to be with us himself: and also that the rest of Greece, some through fear, some through profit, are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the god, inasmuch as he encourages us to the war, deems violated by them; but rather you will lend your aid in opposition to that violation. For they do not break treaties who merely ward off attacks, but they who are the first to injure.

The common danger calls common efforts; and peace can only be permanently secured by immediate war.

CXXIV. "Seeing therefore that it will be every way advantageous to make war, and since in common we persuade you to the same, if indeed it be the safest course that the same measures should be profitable both to states and individuals, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans, who are Dorians, and besieged (of which the contrary used formerly to happen) by Ionians, nor the following up the liberty of the rest

⁶ *Τυραννον δε εωμεν εγκαθεσταναι πολιν.* Thucydides afterwards puts a similar expression into the mouths both of Pericles and of Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian assembly, and having in view something very different from reproach. ii. 64, iii. 37. *Mitford.*

of the Grecians. For it is a case that admits not delay, when some of them are already oppressed; and others, after it shall be known we met, and durst not right ourselves, shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now come to a matter of necessity, and that this is the best advice. And therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war peace is established, yet for love of ease to refuse the war, does not equally avoid the danger. Making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigns over some already, and the rest in intention—let us advance against it and subdue it, and let us not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.” Thus spoke the Corinthians.

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

CXXV. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, put the question to all the confederates present, in order, from the greatest state to the least; and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now though the war was decreed, it was impossible for them to take it in hand at once, because they were unprovided; it was determined therefore that every state should severally furnish themselves with what was necessary, and that there should be no delay; yet there passed not a full year in this preparation, before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.

The question being put, the allies vote for war; and proceed to prepare for it accordingly.

CXXVI. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians, with certain criminations, to the end that if they would not listen to them, they might have the greatest possible pretext for undertaking the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish⁷ the pollution⁸ of the goddess (Minerva). Which pollution was thus: there was one Cylon,⁹ an Athenian, a man who had been victor in the Olympic games, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and who had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarcan, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the god answered, that on the greatest festival day, he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having got forces of Theagenes, and

Meantime the Peloponnesians, to give their cause a better colour, pretend a zeal for religion, and call on the Athenians to drive out from among them “the accursed.”—Explanation of this term given in the story of Cylon.

⁷ Excommunication extending also to posterity.

⁸ Those guilty of pollution.

⁹ A. C. 620. This is the date assigned by the Oxford Chronological Tables.

persuaded his friends to the enterprize, seized on the citadel at the time when the Olympic games in Peloponnesus came round, with intention of taking upon him the tyranny; esteeming the feast of Jupiter the greatest, and having something to do with it himself, in that he had been victor in the Olympic games. But whether by the feast spoken of was meant the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest. For there is also among the Athenians the Diasia,¹ which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and celebrated without the city; wherein, in the concourse of the whole people, many offer sacrifices, not of living creatures,² but such as are customary to the natives of the country. But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, took in hand the enterprize; and when the Athenians heard of it, they came to the rescue with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel, besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away, and left both the guard of the citadel, and the whole business to the nine archons,³ with absolute authority to manage the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time most of the affairs of the commonwealth were administered by the nine archons. Now those that were besieged with Cylon, were, for want both of victual and water, very badly off; upon which Cylon and his brother escape privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed, and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar⁴ in the citadel: and the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, when they perceived they were dying in the temple, having raised them, upon promise to do them no harm, leading them away, put them all to the sword. Also they put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the venerable goddesses,⁵ as they were going away. And from this both they and their posterity, were called accursed and

¹ Diasia, a feast at Athens in honour of Jupiter, surnamed *Μειλίχιος*, the propitious. It derived its name *απο του Διου, και της ασης*, Jupiter and misfortune; because, by supplicating the deity, they obtained deliverance from evils.

² Images of living creatures made of paste. *Herod. ii. 47.*

³ Note, chap. 93.

⁴ Of Minerva.

⁵ Called by the Sicyonians *Εὐμενίδες*, favourable, because it was thought unlucky to mention their real names, *Ἐρινυες*, furies.

sacrilegious towards the goddess. Hereupon the Athenians A. C. 620. banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes,⁶ the Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians, when in a state of commotion, banished those of them that were alive: and also disinterred and cast forth the bones of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and their posterity is in the city to this day.

CXXVII. Of this pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city. Principally, as they pretended, as taking part with the gods; but knowing that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was by the ⁷mother's side connected with it. For they thought, if Pericles was banished, affairs with the Athenians would the more easily be brought to a prosperous issue. Nevertheless, they expected not so much that he would undergo this, as that they would bring him into reproach with regard to the city, as if his misfortune were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposed to the Lacedæmonians, not suffering the Athenians to yield, but exciting them to the war.

CXXVIII. In their turn, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish the pollution arising from the matter at Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians, when they had induced their helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, to rise and leave the sanctuary, leading them away slew them. For which they themselves think that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta.

Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of the temple of Pallas Chalciæcus, which was thus: after that Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian, was recalled by the Spartans from his charge in the Hellespont, and having been called in question by them, was acquitted of the charge of injustice, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again to the Hellespont in a galley of Hermione, as a private man, without the leave of the Lacedæmonians; to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negotiate with the king, as he had before undertaken, aspiring to the principality of Greece.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. But the real object of the Peloponnesians was to excite odium against Pericles, as he was of the family of "the accursed."

The Athenians retort by calling on the Lacedæmonians to drive out "the accursed" from among themselves. The curse of Tænarus; and the curse of Minerva Chalciæcus. This last leads Thucydides to give an account of the treason and death of Pausanias.

⁶ Herod. v. 70.

⁷ Agariste, grand-daughter of Megacles, son of Alcmaeon, (Herod. vi. 131.) whose family was principally concerned in the murder. Vid. Herod. v. 70. Arnold.

A. C. 478. Pausanias first corresponds with the king of Persia after the taking of Byzantium.

Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business arose from this: when after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium, when he was there the first time (which being in possession of the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates, he sent unto the king those relations of his whom he had taken, and gave out they had escaped from him. This he managed with one Gongylus, the Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent a letter to him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, it was thus written :

Letter of Pausanias to the King.

“ Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous of doing thee a favour, sends back to thee these men, whom he has taken prisoners in war, and I purpose, if the same seem also good to thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into subjection to thee: these things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If therefore any of these things do please thee, send some trusty man to the sea side, by whose mediation we may hereafter confer together.”

A. C. 478. Pausanias' proposals were readily accepted by Xerxes.

CXXIX. These were the contents of the letter. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea side, with orders to take the government of the province of Dascylis, and to dismiss Megabates, who was governor there before: and, moreover, commits to him a letter to Pausanias, to send over with speed to Byzantium, and to shew him the seal, and in the best way and most faithfully to perform, whatsoever about his own affairs he should, by Pausanias, be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in all other things done as it was bade him, sent over the letter, wherein was written this answer :

Letter of Xerxes to Pausanias.

“ Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: for the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea to me from Byzantium, the benefit thou hast done us is laid up in our house, indelibly registered for ever: and I am also pleased with what thou hast proposed. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised me. Neither be hindered by the expence of gold and silver, or multitude of

soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them A.C. 478. come: but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both."

CXXX. Pausanias having received these letters, as he was before much esteemed for his conduct at Plataea, became now far more elevated; and could no longer endure to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and moreover had his table served after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose, but in trifles he manifested beforehand what he intended in the future to put in execution in a greater degree. He made himself moreover difficult of access, and used such a choleric disposition toward all men indifferently, that no man could endure to approach him; which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

Which elated Pausanias extremely, and increased in him that arrogant behaviour which drove the Asiatic Greeks to put themselves under the supremacy of Athens.

CXXXI. When the Lacedaemonians heard of it, they for these very reasons called him home the first time. And when, being gone out the second time without their command in the galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege by the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonæ of Troas, practising still with the Barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose: then the ephori forbore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the *scytale*,⁸ commanding him not to depart from the officer; and in case he refused, the Spartans would denounce war against him. But he desiring as much as he could to avoid suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to clear himself of his accusations, returned to Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori put

He had been recalled therefore by his government, but going out again in a private capacity, and continuing his treasonable intrigues, he was recalled a second time and put under arrest, A.C. 477.

⁸ *Σκυτάλη*, properly a staff; here an instrument used by the Lacedaemonians for the close conveyance of orders to their ambassadors abroad. They had two round staves of the same size, whereof the state kept one, and the person abroad the other; when desirous of writing they wrapped about it a small thong of parchment, and having thereon written, took it off again, and sent only that thong, which, wrapped likewise about the other staff, the letters joined again, and might be read. This served instead of cypher. It seems Pausanias retained his staff from the time he had charge at Byzantium.

A. C. 477. into confinement, (for the ephori have power to do this to the king); but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth and submitted himself to trial, with such as had any thing to allege against him.

Still there was a want of satisfactory evidence against him; till one of the emissaries, whom he had employed in his correspondence with Persia, gave information to the ephori.

CXXXII. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies, nor the whole city, whereon they might confidently depend in proceeding to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings and at that present in great authority; for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, being king, and as yet a minor, Pausanias, who was his uncle, had the guardianship of him; yet by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the Barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he did not intend to be content with the state of things as they were. They considered the rest of his behaviour, in whatever he had deviated in his manner of life, from the customs established: among other things, this, that upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated, as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had himself, by his own private order, caused to be inscribed this elegiac verse:

Pausanias, the general of the Greeks, when he had destroyed the army
of the Medes,

Dedicated this memorial to Phœbus.

But the Lacedæmonians then forthwith defaced this inscription from the tripod, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated the offering. This therefore was numbered among the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather, from the condition he was now in. They had information further, that he had in hand some intrigue with the helots, and so indeed it was; for he promised them not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him, and co-operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon the impeachment of some of the helots, would they proceed in any strange measure against him, but kept the custom which they are wont to use towards each other, not hastily to give a sentence, that admits not of remedy, against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length, as it is reported, purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was betrayed to them by a man of Argilis, in time past his minion, and most faithful to him; who being terrified with the thought, that not any of those who

had been formerly sent had ever returned, having got a seal made like the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if he was mistaken in his opinion, or if Pausanias should ask for it to alter any thing in the letter, he might not be discovered,) and opened the letter, wherein, as he had suspected the addition of some such clause, he found himself also put down to be murdered. A. C. 477.

CXXXIII. The ephori, when these letters were by him shewn to them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias's own mouth; the man having designedly gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built a hut divided into two apartments by a partition, in which he hid some of the ephori; and Pausanias coming to him, and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him, for what he had written about him, and point by point discovered all the intrigue: saying, that though he had never exposed him to danger in his services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour, as well as many other of his servants, to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to rise and leave the sanctuary, entreating him to go on his journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.

CXXXIV. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way, and, knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was about to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him, what he came for: and when another of them had by a secret nod signified the matter through good will, he ran off to the temple of Pallas Chalciæcus, and got in before they overtook him. Now the sacred inclosure was hard by, and entering into a little building belonging to the temple, to avoid the inclemency of the open air, he there stayed. They that pursued him could not then overtake him, but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house, and watching a time when he was within, beset the house, and walled him up, and keeping guard there, famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost in the building, they carried him, as he was, out of the temple, yet breathing; and being taken out, he

About A. C. 467. By their instructions he then took sanctuary; and when Pausanias went to him and urged him to continue in his service, the ephori contrived to overhear the conversation.

The ephori proceed to arrest Pausanias, but he takes sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciæcus, where he is starved to death.

About
A. C. 467.

died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæadas,⁹ where they used to cast in malefactors, yet afterwards they thought fit to bury him in some place thereabouts; but the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterwards, both to remove the sepulchre to the place where he died, (so that he lies now in the skirts of the sacred ground, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar,) and also, as there had been a pollution of the sanctuary, to render two bodies to Minerva Chalcicœus for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same to her instead of Pausanias.

In the proofs of the treason of Pausanias matter was found to affect Themistocles; and Thucydides takes this opportunity to continue his digression so as to embrace the final fate of that illustrious person. At the time of Pausanias' death, he was already living in exile at Argos; but now being pursued by the Lacedæmonians and Athenian governments, he flies to Corcyra and thence

CXXXV. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution, required the Lacedæmonians in their turn to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.

The Lacedæmonians also by their ambassadors to the Athenians, accused Themistocles, that he also had Medized together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias, and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. And they being persuaded, (for he was at this time in banishment by *ostracism*, and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and from other places of Peloponnesus,) send certain men in company with the Lacedæmonians, who were ready also to pursue him, with command to take him wheresoever they could find him.

CXXXVI. But Themistocles having had notice of it beforehand, flees out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra, to the people of which city he had formerly been a benefactor¹. But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not shelter him there, for fear of undergoing the hostility both of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him to the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, by continual enquiry as to which way he went, he was compelled at a straight to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife, and by her was instructed to take their son, and sit down by the altar at the hearth. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired

⁹ A pit so called, near Lacedæmon.

¹ At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyræans had refused to join the cause of Greece. The Grecians, therefore, afterwards designed to fall upon them, but were prevented by the remonstrances of Themistocles.

him, that though he had opposed him in some suit at Athens,² to the protection of Admetus, king of the Molossians, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight: saying, that now being far the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger; whereas noble revenge is of equals on equal terms: and that he had been his adversary but in a matter of profit, not of life; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him for what, and by whom he was followed,) he would deprive him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him, bade him arise together with his son, whom he held as he sat: which is the most effectual kind of supplication that is.

CXXXVII. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians; and though they said much in order to obtain him, yet he delivers him not, but sends him away by land to Pydna, on the other sea,³ a city belonging to Alexander,⁴ because his purpose was to go to the king:⁵ where finding a ship of burden setting out for Ionia, he embarks, and is carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown to those in the ship) who he was, and for what he fled, and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say, that he had hired him to carry him away for money. And that to save him, there needed no more than this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather should serve for the passage.⁶ To which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea, off the fleet of the Athenians, he arrives afterwards at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, for he received there, both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also from Argos what he had secretly stored up: and having taken his journey upwards, in company with a certain Persian of the lower parts,⁷ he sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who had newly come to the kingdom; wherein was written to this purpose:

Letter of Themistocles to Artaxerxes.

“ I, Themistocles, am come unto thee, who of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that in-

² Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themistocles.

³ The Ægean sea.

⁴ King of Macedonia.

⁵ Of Persia.

⁶ Lest any of the crew might recognize him, or suspect who he was, and reveal it in the fleet. *Bloomfield.*

⁷ Lying to the Ægean Sea.

vaded me, have done your house the most damage; yet the benefits I did him were far more, after once I with safety, he with danger, had to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due to me," (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians' departure out of Salamis, and also about the not breaking of the bridge at that time, which he falsely ascribed to himself); "and at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. But I desire to wait a year, and then to declare to thee the cause of coming myself."

A. C. 466.
He dies in
exile, after
receiving
the most
liberal
treatment
from Ar-
taxerxes.

His cha-
racter.

CXXXVIII. The king, as is reported, wondered⁸ what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In the time which he waited, he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the country, and a year after, coming to the court, he became of great influence with the king, more than ever any Grecian had before; both for his former dignity, and the hope concerning Greece, which he promised to bring into subjection to him; but especially for the proofs he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy of admiration, far greater than other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or in addition to it, he was both of immediate emergencies, upon the shortest deliberation, the best discerner, and also of the future, what for the most part would be the issue, the best conjecturer. What he had in hand he was able also to explain to others; and what he was unpractised in, he was yet able to form a sufficient judgment of. Also he foresaw better than any, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And, to say all in few words, this man, by the strength of his natural genius and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men, to decide off hand what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick, he ended his life: some say he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia, in Asia, in the marketplace: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents⁹ a year, for bread, and Lampsacus for wine; for this

⁸ Mr. Bloomfield renders this sentence, "highly commended his plans and intentions."

⁹ £9687 10s.

city was in those days thought to be most abundant in wine, and the city of Myus for meat. His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his own wish, and buried in Attica, unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. Such were the ends of the matters about Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

CXXXIX. Such indeed were what the Lacedæmonians enjoined in their first embassy, and what they were in their turn bidden, touching the banishment of such as were involved in the pollution.

After this, they sent ambassadors often again to Athens, bidding them to raise the siege from before Potidæa, and allow Ægina to be free; but principally, and most plainly they put forward the decree, concerning the Megareans, which if they would abrogate, the war should not be made. By which act they were forbidden both the market of Athens, and all ports within the Athenian dominion.¹ But the Athenians would not listen to them, neither in the rest of their commands, nor in the abrogation of that act; but recriminated the Megareans, for having tilled the sacred ground, and that which was not marked out with bounds; and for receiving their slaves that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Rhamphius, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, "That the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had, if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws," the Athenians called an assembly, and propounding their opinions among themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth, and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1. ✓
Thucydides then resumes his story from c. 127.
After some fruitless negotiations, ambassadors are sent to Athens with the final demands of the Lacedæmonians, "that every Greek state should be restored to independence." Pericles urges them not to comply with them.

¹ Vid. Aristoph. Acham. v. 533.

"ὡς χρη Μεγαρέας

μητε γη, μητ' εν θαλασση, μητ' εν ηπειρω μενειν."

On the hatred of Athens to Megara, vid. Herod. i. 30, on the death of Tellus, *γενομενης γαρ μαχης Αθηναιοισι προς τους αστυγειτους*, (the Megareans, Müll. Dor. i. 201.) *εν Ελευσινι*: i. e. the battle was in Eleusis, against the Megareans, not against the Eleusinians; originally the Megara was a district of Attica, which, when the Heraclidæ returned, eighty years after Bell. Troj. they lost, and hence the Megareans were Dorians.

A. C. 432.
O1. 87. 1.

some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but that they should abrogate it. And Pericles, the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most powerful both in speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as follows :

The Oration of Pericles.

SPEECH OF
PERICLES.
He alarms
the pride
of the
Athenians
by dwell-
ing on the
insulting
tone of the
Lacedæ-
monian
demands,
and as-
sures them
the com-
pliance
now would
only pro-
voke fur-
ther trials
of their
patience.

CXL. "Men of Athens, I still hold the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men have not the same feelings in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events, and I see also that I must now advise the same things, or very nearly the same as before; and I require of you, with whom my counsel may have effect, that if we miscarry in aught, to render your aid to support what is either decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not attribute it to your own wisdom. For it often happens with the events of actions no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty: which is also the cause that when any thing happens contrary to our expectation, we are wont to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly, and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is manifest. For whereas it is said, [in the articles of the treaty,] that in disputed matters, we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the mean time, either side hold what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial themselves, nor do they accept of the same offered by us. They wish to clear themselves of their accusations by war rather than by words: and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to command. For they command us to arise and depart from before Potidæa, and to restore Ægina to the liberty of its own laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans: and they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concerning Megara, about which they principally hold forth that for the abrogation of it the war shall not take place; nor retain in your minds any feeling of self blame, as if a small matter moved you to the war: for even this small matter contains the trial and constancy of your resolution; wherein if you give way to them, you will hereafter have their commands laid upon you as to some greater matter, as men that for fear will obey them like-

wise in that. But by a stiff denial, you will make it evident to them, that they must hold intercourse with you hereafter on terms of more equality.

CXLI. "Resolve therefore forthwith, either to yield them obedience, before you receive damage; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think is best,) be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For the greatest and the least claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours, before judicial trial, by way of command, amounts to the same degree of subjection. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not likely to be less fully prepared than they, by hearing the particulars, you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour, without money, either individually or in a common exchequer. Besides, in long wars, and by sea, they are without experience; for the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short, through poverty; and such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because they would have to be absent from all that is their own, and maintain themselves on their own private resources; and be besides kept out from the use of the sea. It must be superabundant revenues, not forced contributions, that support wars, and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they feel confident that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they are by no means confident that they shall not expend before their object be gained; especially if the war, as it is likely, should last long. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same council, they can speedily perform nothing upon the moment: and having equality of vote, and not being of the same race, every one will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire most to take revenge on some enemies, and others least to hurt what is their own; and being long before they can assemble, they take the less part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to despatch their own private affairs. And each one thinks not that owing to his neglect he will injure the public welfare, but thinks that

A.C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.
He encourages them by pointing out their advantages over the Peloponnesians from their superior wealth and superiority and decision of counsels.

it is the duty of somebody else to look to that instead of him ; not observing how that by the same idea held by every one singly, the common welfare is jointly ruined.

CXLII. " But their greatest hinderance of all will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay ; but the opportunities of war are not wont to wait. As for their fortifying places here, and as for their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own, in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. And if they formed a fort here, though they might by excursions, and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory ; yet the thus building a fort would not be able to hinder us from sailing into their territories, and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies. For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea, than they have in sea service by use of the land. Nor will they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For you, though applying yourselves to it immediately from the time of the Persian war, have not yet attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen—whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it, by their being kept continually blockaded with numerous fleets—perform any thing of consequence ? Indeed, against a few ships they might venture, encouraging their want of knowledge by numbers ; but awed by many they will not stir ; and not by applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended to at idle times as a by-job, but requiring, rather, that whilst it is learning, nothing else should at the same time be done as by-work.

CXLIII. " But if they should even remove any of the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, by greater wages, go about to draw from us the foreigners employed in our fleet ; this indeed, if when we ourselves and the Metics went on board ship, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and, which is the strongest point, we have steersmen, and other men necessary for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that on account of the risk, not

A. C. 432.
Ol. 87. 1.

While their enemies' means of annoying them would be wholly inefficient, they would be unable to equal their naval skill ;

nor could they undermine

any of these foreigners would be willing to leave his own place of residence; and with less hope at the same time of [victory,] for a few days' high pay, take part with the other side. In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and has many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we will invade theirs by sea; and when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica, the damage done will not be found to be equal. For they, unless by the sword, can gain no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us there is other land, both in the islands and the continent: for the dominion of the sea is a matter of the greatest advantage. Consider but this; if we dwelt in the islands, who would have been less liable to attack? We must therefore now, forming our plans and ideas as near as we can in accordance with that kind of situation, lay aside the care of our fields and dwellings, and applying ourselves to guarding the city and to the sea; not for the loss of them, out of passion give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves; (for though we should give them an overthrow, we should have to fight again with as many more: and if we should experience any reverse, we should lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we become unable to lead expeditions against them, they will revolt:) nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men's bodies; for men acquire these, but these do not acquire men. And if I thought I should persuade you, I would advise you to go out, and destroy them yourselves, and shew the Peloponnesians that you will never yield them obedience for the sake of such things as these.

their naval power by tempting their foreign seamen to desert, in the hope of higher pay. Athens then was invulnerable, provided she did not forfeit her advantages by encountering the enemies' superior land force in the open field, from an impatience of seeing Attica laid waste by their invasions;

CXLIV. "There be many other things that lead me to expect victory, in case you do not at the same time that you are in this war strive to enlarge your dominion, and do not also add to it other dangers of your own seeking; for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their designs, but they shall be spoken of in a future discourse, during the prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: 'that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also desist from forbidding us and our confederates to dwell among them. For neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of

or by attempting schemes of conquest, rather than acting on the defensive. He concludes by urging a temperate but firm refusal to the demands of

strangers, is forbidden in the articles.² Also that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave to their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good. Also, that we will submit to judicial trial according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but will repel those that do.' For this is both just, and becoming to the dignity of this city to return as our answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity we must go to war; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less likely to fall upon us shall we have our enemies; and that out of the greatest dangers, as well to cities as to private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they supported the attack of the Medes, did—not only from resources inferior to what we now have, nay, abandoning even what they had—by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the Barbarian, and advance this state to the height it is now at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to repel our enemies by every means, and do our best to deliver the state, unimpaired and whole to those who come after us."

CXLV. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians, thinking he advised them what was best, decreed as he would have them; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in all particulars as he had spoken, and generally; that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to come to a decision concerning what they charged them with, upon equal and fair terms, by means of a judicial trial. So the ambassadors went home, and after these they sent them no more.

CXLVI. These were the charges and differences on either side before the war; which began directly after the business of Epidamnus and Corecra. Nevertheless, there was still intercourse betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the dissolution of the articles, and the pretext of their going to war.

² Vid. the note of Goeller, who would omit the word "εἰ," and interpret κωλυεῖ as a verb impersonal; equivalent to the Latin, "impedimento est."

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His opin-
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the Pello-
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During all
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of mutual
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BOOK II.

I. THE war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians begins from the time they had no longer intercourse one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it, they waged war without intermission. And it is written in order, by summers and winters,¹ as the several matters came to pass.

YEAR 1.
A. C. 431.
O1. 87. 2.
COM-
MENCE-
MENT OF
THE PELO-
PONNESIAN
WAR.

II. Now the peace, which, after the conquest of Eubœa, was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen; but in the fifteenth year, being the forty-eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis in Argos—Ænesias being ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus, archon of Athens, having still two months of his government to come²—in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the beginning of spring, three hundred Thebans and upward, (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylidas, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Bœotarchs,)³ about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Platea, a city of Bœotia, and a confederate of the Athenians. Naucledes and his associates, inhabitants of Platea, introduced them, and opened the gates to them, who for their own private ambition, intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with Eurymachus, son of Leontiades,⁴ one of the most powerful men of Thebes. For the Thebans, fore-

In the
fifteenth
year of the
truce,
A. C. 431.
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Naucledes
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had pre-
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negotiated
with Eury-
machus.

¹ This is said agreeably to the inartificial method of reckoning, which, having been introduced by the simplicity of ancient times, was still retained, and continued long after in use. According to this, the summer includes spring, and winter the autumn. *Bloomfield.*

² The Athenians began their years about the summer solstice.

³ Βοιωτάρχοντες. Of these there were eleven, who had in turns the absolute command of the Bœotians in their wars. The sovereignty of Bœotia was lodged in four councils, composed of deputies sent from all the cities which composed the republic, and who sat at Thebes. See iv. 92. v. 37, 38. In this union Platea was not included.

⁴ The man who deserted Leonidas; Herod. vii. 233. where that historian mentions the event here related.

A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. On entering the city they pile their arms and proclaim that "whoever chooses to enter into confederacy, according to the custom of the Bœotians, should pile his arms beside theirs." The Plataeans, in their first surprise, offer to treat with the Thebans;

seeing that there would be war, whilst there was yet peace, and the war not openly on foot, desired to preoccupy Plataea, which was always at variance with them. By which means they the more easily entered undiscovered, there being no watch as yet appointed. And piling⁵ their arms in the market place, they did not, as those that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adversaries, but resolved rather to make friendly proclamation, and bring the city into an agreement and friendship with them: (and the herald proclaimed, that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Bœotians, would enter into alliance with them, he should come and pile his arms with them,) supposing the city by this means would easily come over to their side.

III. The Plataeans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered, and had surprised the city, through fear and an idea that more had entered than indeed had, (for they could not see them in the night,) came to an agreement, and accepting the conditions, remained quiet: and the rather also, inasmuch as they had taken no new and violent measures

⁵ The Greek heavy-armed soldiers, whenever they halted on a march, immediately piled their spears and shields, and did not resume them till the halt was over. When they encamped any where, an open space within the camp was selected for piling the arms, and this naturally served also as a sort of parade for the soldiers. In a time of siege, when a large part of the population were on active military duty, their arms were kept constantly piled in some of the squares or open places in the town, that they might be ready on the first alarm. Hence the expression, to run—*ἐπι τα ὄπλα*, "to fetch the arms"—to hasten to the places where they were deposited, in order to arm oneself with them for battle. And so inveterate was this practice of piling the spear and shield on every occasion, that in reviews the ordinary "stand at ease" of a Grecian soldier was to get rid of his long spear and shield; and whenever they were addressed by their general they always left their arms piled, and attended him unarmed: a practice which was on one or two occasions made use of by tyrants to disarm the citizens, their foreign guards being instructed to carry off the spears and shields of the national infantry, while piled in the usual manner, during the time that the citizens in military order were attending unarmed in another quarter to a speech purposely addressed to them by the tyrant, that he might be enabled to effect this object. The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Plataeans to pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever they should be required either to march or to fight. *Arnold.*

against any man. But whilst these things were being treated of, they observed that the Thebans were not numerous, and thought that if they should attack them, they might easily have the victory. For it was by no means agreeable to the wish of the great body of the Platæans to desert the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter; and they united themselves, by digging through the common walls between house and house,⁶ that they might not be discovered as they passed through the streets. They also placed carts in the streets, without the cattle, to serve instead of a wall; and other things they put in readiness, as they severally seemed convenient for the present enterprize. When all things according to their means were ready, they advanced out of their houses against their enemies; watching their time whilst it was yet night, and a little before break of day, that they might not come upon them by daylight, when they would be more bold, and on equal terms, but when they should by night be more full of fear, and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly to a close contest.

IV. And the Thebans, finding they were deceived, formed themselves into a dense mass, and repulsed their attacks whenever they fell upon them. Twice or thrice they beat them back, but at last, when both the Platæans themselves fell upon them with a great clamour, and their wives and domestics also shouted and screeched from the houses, and threw stones and tiles among them, much rain having also come on during the night, they were afraid, and turned their backs, and fled here and there about the city: ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out, by which they might have been saved, (for this happened at the end of the month,⁷) and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in, insomuch that many of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which alone was left open, a certain Platæan closed, making use of the ferrule of a javelin instead of a bolt⁸ put into the bar, so that this way also their

but on discovering their number, attack them, slay some, and compel the others to surrender at discretion.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

⁶ For, from the materials and structure of most of the walls of private houses in ancient times, (consisting chiefly of clay or burnt bricks,) this would be no difficult task.

⁷ When the moon was not visible.

⁸ The *βαλανος* was a sort of pin or bolt inserted into the bar, and going

passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves over, and the greater part died; some came to an unguarded gate of the city, and with a hatchet, given them by a woman, without being observed, cut through the bar, and got forth: but these were not many, it being soon discovered: others again, dispersed in several parts of the city, were slain. But the greater part, and those especially who were collected into a body, threw themselves into a great edifice adjoining the wall, the doors whereof being open, they thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been a direct way through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were, by firing the house, or treat them in any other way. At length, both these and the rest of the Thebans that still survived, straggling about the city, agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Plataeans for them to treat according to their pleasure. And thus fared they who entered into Plataea.

The reinforcement from Thebes, having been delayed by the rain and the swelling of the Asopus, arrive too late.

V. But the rest of the Thebans that should have been there before day with their whole power, lest affairs should not prosper with those that had gone in, came to their aid, especially as they had heard by the way the news of what was done. Now Plataea is distant from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower on account of the rain which had come on the same night. For the river Asopus flowed deep, and was not easily passable; so that what by the wet, and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till some of their men were already slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood what had taken place, they laid plans against such of the

through it into the gates. When driven quite home, it could of course only be extracted by a key whose pipe exactly corresponded to it in size, so as to take a firm hold on it; and hence the key was called βαλαναγρα, or catch-bolt, from its catching and so drawing out the βαλανος. Στυρακιον appears to have been the iron spike at the end of a spear, by which it used to be fixed in the ground. Α στυρακιον was used in this instance instead of a στυραξ, that is, a small spike belonging to a javelin, rather than one of full size belonging to a spear or lance, because the larger one would have been too large to go into the βαλανοδοκη, or the hole into which the βαλανος was put. The effect of putting in this spike was exactly that of spiking the touch-hole of a cannon; it could not again be extracted, as there was no proper key to fit it. Some suppose the βαλανος itself to have been hollow, and to have resembled a very long thimble, so that the key was fitted to the inside of it, and inserted into it, being itself solid. *Arnold.* See also *Bloomfield.*

Platæans as were without : for there were abroad in the villages both men and household-stuff, as was likely, the evil happening unexpectedly, and in time of peace ; desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them in exchange for those of theirs within, if any were taken alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Platæans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done, and fearing for those without, sent a herald to the Thebans, whom they commanded to say, that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly, and to bid them do no injury to those without, otherwise they said they would kill all those men of theirs they had alive ; whom, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore to them. Thus the Thebans say, and that the Platæans swore it. But the Platæans do not agree with them that they promised to deliver back the men at once, but upon treaty, if they should agree ; and they deny that they swore it. On this the Thebans went out of their territory, and the Platæans, when they had speedily taken in whatever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. One hundred and eighty were taken ; Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had intrigued, being one of them.

The Platæans, in order to save their lands from plunder, engage to release their prisoners ; but after the Thebans are gone, massacre them all.

VI. When they had done this they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead, and settled the affairs of the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Bœotians then in Attica, and sent an herald to Platæa to forbid them to proceed to any farther measures with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should have consulted on the matter : for they were not yet informed of their being put to death. For the first messenger [of the Platæans] came away when the Thebans first entered the town ; and the second when they were just overcome and taken prisoners. But of what followed they knew nothing. So that the Athenians, when they sent, knew not what was done, and the officer arriving, found the men slain. After this, the Athenians, sending an expedition to Platæa, victualled it,⁹ and left a garrison in it, and carried out both the women

The Athenians, on hearing the news, seize on all the Bœotians in Attica.

They put a garrison into Platæa and remove the infirm men, women, and children to Athens.

⁹ It appears from ch. 5. that the Platæans had, on the retreat of the Thebans, brought in their furniture and moveables ; and now, it seems, with

and children, and also such of the men as were most un-serviceable.¹

The treaty being thus violated, both Athenians and Peloponnesians prepare for war, and endeavour to provide themselves with allies, both among the Greeks and among foreign nations.

VII. This action having happened at Plataea, and the truce being now clearly broken, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; both parties intending to send ambassadors to the king,² and to other quarters to the Barbarians, wheresoever they had hopes of success, and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own power. By the Lacedæmonians,³ besides those galleys which they had from Italy and Sicily, the cities that took part with them there were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more, that the whole number might amount to five hundred sail, and to provide a stated sum of money, and in other things not to stir farther, but to receive the Athenians, coming but with one galley,⁴ till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, diligently surveyed their present confederates, and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as Coreyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Zacynthus, seeing that if these were their firm friends they might carry on the war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus.

The approaching war excites a great sensation among all the people of Greece.

VIII. The designs of neither party were narrow, but they put their whole strength to the war; and not without reason: for all men in the beginning of enterprizes, lay hold of them with greater eagerness. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who from want of experience, by no means unwillingly applied themselves to the war. And the rest of Greece was in a state of suspense, the two principal states thus meeting one another in combat; and the assistance of the Athenians, they fetched the corn and whatever else was worth removing. *Bloomfield.*

¹ Unfit for military service.

² Of Persia, Artaxerxes Longimanus.

³ In this difficult passage, Mr. Bloomfield regards *navs* as the nominative; *τοῖς τὰ κεινων ἐλομενοις* is rendered in Goeller "in commodum eorum, quid ad illorum partes accesserint;" and this critic, with almost all the rest, makes the construction to run, "A Lacedæmoniis sociæ urbes, pro suâ quæque magnitudine præter eas, etc. alias conficere jussæ."—Dr. Arnold renders, "In addition to the ships already on the spot in Italy and Sicily, belonging to the allies of Lacedæmon, they were ordered to build others," etc.

⁴ To receive them as friends, if they came with but one ship at a time; a usual caution in such cases.

many prophecies were told, and many sung, by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to war, and in others.

There was also before this an earthquake in Delos,⁵ which in the memory of the Grecians had never been shaken before; and it was interpreted as, and seemed to be a sign of what was afterwards to come to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was eagerly inquired after. But men's affections made greatly for the Lacedæmonians; and the rather, because they gave out, that they would recover the liberty of the Greeks. And every one, both cities and individuals, exerted themselves as far as they were able, both in word and deed to assist them, and thought the business was there impeded, where he himself was not present. Such an angry temper had most men against the Athenians, some from a desire to be delivered from their government, and others from fear of falling into it. Such were the feelings and such the preparations with which they were excited to the contest.

An earthquake at Delos.

The Lacedæmonian cause was generally popular.

IX. And the confederates of either party, when they began the war, were these: the Lacedæmonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæians; for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, alone of all Achæia, took their part, but afterwards the rest did so likewise;⁶ and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians: of whom the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians supplied shipping; the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, horse: and the rest of the cities foot. And these were the confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The Athenian confederates were these: the Chians, Lesbians, Plateans, Messenians⁷ in Naupactus, most of the

⁵ Herodotus affirms (vi. 98.) that Delos was shaken a little before the battle of Marathon; “*Δηλος ἐκινήθη, ὡς ἔλεγον οἱ Δηλιοὶ, καὶ πρῶτα καὶ ὑστάτα μεχρὶ ἔμεν σεισθεῖσα.*” Now, as Herodotus lived (as is evident from vii. 133. 137.) in the Peloponnesian war, neither Thucydides nor Herodotus could have forgot it; in this difficulty, Dr. Arnold suggests that, as in c. 16, ἀρτι is used to describe what took place just after the Persian invasion, so here we must take ὀλιγον, with the same degree of latitude, to mean seventy years. Mr. Bloomfield considers the words, “ὡς ἔλεγον οἱ Δηλιοὶ,” to show that the story rested on the veracity of the Delians, and that Herodotus and Thucydides did not believe it.

⁶ As appears from vii. 34. *Arnold.*

⁷ The Messenians had a refuge given them by the Athenians at Naupactus.

Acaruanians, the Coreyræans, Zacynthians, and some other cities which were their tributaries in numerous nations, such as that part of Caria which is on the sea coast, and the Dorians⁸ adjoining to them, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace, all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera.⁹ Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Coreyræans supplied galleys, the rest infantry and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.

The Lacedæmonians and allies assemble at the isthmus, and Archidamus, having convened the principal officers, addressed them;

X. The Lacedæmonians, after the affair of Platæa, sent messengers forthwith throughout Peloponnesus, and to their confederates that lay out of it, for the states to have their forces in readiness, and to prepare such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, two-thirds of the forces of every city came to the isthmus at a day appointed.¹ When the whole army was gathered together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was general in this expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities, and such as were principally in authority, and most worthy to be present, and spoke unto them as follows :

Oration of Archidamus.

urging them to be confident on

XI. "Men of Peloponnesus, and confederates, not only our fathers have made many expeditions both within and without Peloponnesus; but we ourselves also, such of us as are elderly,

⁸ Those who were seated in the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus.

⁹ These two islands, being both Lacedæmonian colonies, would not willingly take part against their mother country, nor did Athens yet venture so far to shock the common feeling of Greece as to oblige them to do so. *Arnold.* Compare *Herod.* iv. 8.

¹ "Two-thirds of the soldiers of the state within the military age:" which appears to have been the contingent usually required of their allies by the Spartans for their invasion of Attica. The period during which the allies were required to serve on a foreign expedition, and so maintain themselves at their own expense, appears to have been forty days in the time of Philip, and apparently it was the same in the Peloponnesian war; for it is mentioned, that the longest stay of the Peloponnesians in Attica amounted to "about forty days;" but that ordinarily their provisions were exhausted at an earlier period; that is, the allies had been ordered to provide themselves with food for a less number of days than the utmost term for which their services could be demanded. Forty days also was the ordinary period for which the feudal tenants in modern Europe were required to serve, when the king called them into the field. *Arnold.*

are by no means unacquainted with wars;² yet did we never before set forth having a greater force than this present; and now, not only we are a numerous and mighty army that invade, but the state also is most powerful that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to shew ourselves, neither inferior to our fathers, and not to come short of the opinion conceived of our ourselves. For all Greece is excited at this commotion and is observing us; and, through their hatred to the Athenians, wish that we may accomplish whatever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army, and to have much assurance that they will not come out to battle against us, yet we ought not on that account to march the less carefully prepared, but of every city, as well the captain as the soldier, ought always to expect, as far as he is concerned, that he will have to meet some danger. For the accidents of war are uncertain; and for the most part the onsets begin from slight beginnings, and through passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, has beaten back the greater with more ease, because that through contempt they have been unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought to undertake the expedition with bold hearts, yet for action they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid; for that will give them both more courage to attack the enemy, and more safety in fighting with him. But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city most excellently provided in every way. So that we must by all means expect they will come to a battle: even if they are not already set out before we have made our appearance among them, yet they will give us battle when they see us in their country, wasting and destroying their possessions: for all men when before their own eyes, and under their immediate sight, they receive any unwonted hurt, fall presently into anger,³ and the less they consider with the more impetuosity do they assault. And this is likely to happen with the Athenians somewhat more than with others; for they think themselves more worthy to have the command of others, and to invade and waste the territory of their neighbours, rather than to see their neighbours waste

A.C. 431.
Ol. 87.2.
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cause, and
the zeal of
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pline.

² They had, about fifteen years before, partaken in the war with Athens, which preceded the thirty years' treaty.

³ "For all are angry when suffering any unwonted evil, to see it done presently and before their eyes." *Arnold*.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

theirs. Wherefore as we are to war against a great city, and to procure both to your ancestors and to yourselves a great fame, either good or bad, as shall be the event; follow whithersoever you are led, esteeming order and watchfulness above all things, and receiving with alacrity whatever is commanded: for there is nothing more imposing nor more safe, than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order."

Archidamus now makes a final attempt at negotiation; and sends Melesippus with proposals to Athens, but the Athenians send him away without granting him an audience.

XII. Archidamus having thus spoken, and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would be the more disposed to give in. But the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor admitted him to the common assembly: for the opinion of Pericles had already gained the superiority, to receive neither herald nor ambassador from the Lacedæmonians, when their army had once begun the expedition. They sent him back, therefore, without an audience, with an injunction to be out of their borders the self-same day; and that hereafter if they desired any thing with them, they should return every one to his home, and send their ambassadors thence. They send with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country, that no man should confer with him: who, when he came to the borders, and was to be dismissed, uttered these words: "This day will be the beginning of much evil unto the Greeks;" and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that they would not relent, then at last, having broken up his camp, marched on with his army into their territory. The Bœotians supplied their appointed portion of the forces and the cavalry, and aided the Peloponnesians in the expedition, but with the rest of their forces they went and wasted the territory of Plataea.

On his arrival at the camp, Archidamus advances into Attica.

Meanwhile Pericles advises the Athenians to remove their families and effects into Athens;

XIII. Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet collecting together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march, before they penetrated into Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, (who with nine others was general of the Athenians,) when he saw that the invasion was about to take place, suspecting that Archidamus, who chanced to be on terms of hospitality with him, either from private courtesy, or by command of the Lacedæmonians, to bring him into jealousy, as they had before on account of him commanded the banishment of the pollution, might after all leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, that though Archidamus had been

his guest, yet it should be the cause of no ill to the state, and even if the enemy did not waste his estates and houses, as well as those of the rest, that he would then give them to the commonwealth; and therefore he begged, that for this he might not be suspected. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand, the same things he had done before, that they should make preparation for the war, and carry their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle, but come into the city, and guard it; that they should also fit out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates, telling them, how that in the money that came from them lay their strength, and that most objects in war were accomplished by counsel and store of money. Further, he bade them be confident in that there, on an average, was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents, and that there was yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of coined [or stamped] money; (for the greatest sum there had been was ten thousand talents, wanting three hundred, out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the propylæa [or portals] of the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of Potidæa): and besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings, and all the sacred vessels belonging to the processions and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents.⁴ He mentioned in addition, that much money might be had out of the rest of the temples, which they might use: and if they should be deprived altogether of all their resources,⁵ they might even use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself; and he demonstrated to them that the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold, and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety, he said they were to make restitution of the like quantity again. Thus he encouraged them touching the matter of money. As to men of arms, he said they had thirteen thousand, besides the sixteen thousand that were employed

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.
and encourages them, by showing the extent of their resources. He promises to give up his lands to the state, in case they are spared by Archidamus.

⁴ The annual tribute amounted to £116,250, calculating the talent at £193 15s. The fund remaining in the citadel was £1,162,500. They had expended in public works £716,875.

⁵ Mr. Bloomfield renders, "be driven to very great straits," which seems to be the full meaning of the passage.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

for the guard of the city and upon the walls; for so many at first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy out of the very old and very young, and strangers that dwelt amongst them, as many as belonged to the heavy armed. For the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty-five furlongs;⁶ and that part of the circumference which was guarded, for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long walls and the Phalerian, was forty-three furlongs; and the length of the long walls down to Piræus, of which there was a watch only on the outmost, was forty furlongs; and the whole compass of Piræus, together with the Munychia, was sixty furlongs, whereof that part which was watched, was but half.⁷ He showed also, that they had of horsemen, counting archers on horseback, one thousand two hundred; and one thousand six hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred. All this and no less had the Athenians when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first commenced, and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he was wont to do, to show that they were likely to gain the superiority in the war.

Accordingly, the Athenians begin to remove their families and property into the city, and send their cattle over to Eubœa and the neighbouring islands. But this trans-plantation was very irksome to

XIV. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words, and fetched into the city their wives and children, and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over to Eubœa, and the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, as most of them had been accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.

XV. This custom was, from great antiquity, more familiar with the Athenians than any of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops, and the earliest kings up to Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had dwelt in separate towns,⁸ all of which had their own common-halls,⁹ and their governors; and, unless they were in fear of some danger, did not assemble together to the

⁶ Thirty-five stadia, about three miles and a half. The stadium being one hundred paces, four feet, four inches and a half.

⁷ The compass of the walls of Athens was about twenty-two Attic miles, or nearly seventeen English. The Attic mile consisting of eight hundred and five paces; the English, one thousand and fifty-six.

⁸ Δήμοι, little boroughs of Attica.

⁹ Πρυτανεία, guild-halls; places where those that administered the affairs of the state met.

king to take counsel, but every city administered their own affairs, and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars, as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus¹ against Erectheus.² But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who, besides his wisdom, was also a man of very great power; he not only established good order in the country in other respects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall, and one council-house, brought them all to live together in that which is now the city, and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their contributions to it³) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess, and call it Synœcia.⁴ That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. The proof whereof is this, that the temples of the other gods [besides Minerva] are all either in the citadel itself, or, if without, yet towards that quarter of the city; as that of Jupiter Olympus, and of Apollo Pythius, and of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in honour of whom the more ancient feasts to Bacchus⁵ were celebrated on the twelfth day of the month of Anthesterion,⁶ according to the Ionians, who are derived from the Athenians, and do still observe them; besides other ancient temples which are situated in the same part. Moreover they used for the most important purposes the fountain, which is now called the nine-pipes, the tyrants⁷ having so built it, but which was formerly, when the springs were open, called Calliroe, and which was near. And even up till the pre-

A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. them; because, although Theseus had politically united the different townships of Attica in one commonwealth, their inhabitants had still resided in them, and regarded them as their respective homes much more than Athens.

¹ King of Thrace; appointed priest of Ceres by Erectheus, against whom he afterwards made war. Herod. i. 30.

² Sixth king of Athens: he reigned fifty years; died A. C. 1347.

³ Dr. Arnold would render this, "all counting as belonging to it," and refers to Soph. Œd. Tyr. 222. *τελω εις αστους*, "I count as a citizen."

⁴ *Ξυνοικια*, dwelling together. This feast is called *Μετοικα* by Plutarch.

⁵ There were in Athens three feasts to Bacchus, whereof this to Bacchus in Limnæ (situated near to the city walls, and so called from some pools of water which were there) was principal; another was the rural; and the third the city feast.

⁶ This month fell about our January or February, and was the second of their winter quarter.

⁷ By these are meant the Pisistridae.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87.2.

sent time, from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites, the usage is to employ this water. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians up till this very time called the city.

XVI. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time in an independent mode of dwelling, in the country; and after they were collected into one body, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well those of the ancient time, as those who followed, till the Persian war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially, for that since the Persian war they had lately repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It grieved them likewise, and it was thought hard, besides their houses, to leave the things which belonged to their religion, which, from their ancient form of government, were become patriarchal, and to change their manner of life, and nought else than every man to forsake his own city.

This influx of the inhabitants is accommodated in the city, and afterwards on the long walls and in Piræus, but with difficulty and inconvenience.

XVII. After they came into the city, there were habitations but for some few, and a refuge with some of their friends or kindred. But the greatest part inhabited the empty places of the city, and the temples, and all the chapels of the heroes, saving in such as were in the citadel, and the Elensinian, and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicon^s also, under the citadel, though it was a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words—"Best is the Pelasgicon empty;" was nevertheless from the present necessity fully inhabited. And in my opinion this prophecy fell out contrary to what was looked for: for the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befel the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there: which war the oracle not naming, knew before hand, that it should one day be inhabited for no good. Many also established themselves in the turrets of the walls, and in whatsoever other place any of them could get. For when they were come in, the city had not room for them all: but afterwards they inhabited the long walls, having divided them out into separate parts, and in most parts of the Piræus. And at the same time they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying

^s Pelasgicon, a place by the citadel where the Pelasgians once fortified themselves against the Athenians, and for that cause there was laid a curse upon the habitation of it. *Paus. in Attic.*

their confederates, and fitting out an armament of an hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. And in this state of preparation were the Athenians.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

XVIII. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward, came first to Oenoe, a town of Attica, where they intended to make the irruption; and encamping before it, they prepared with engines and by other means to make assaults upon the wall. For Oenoe, lying on the confines between Attica and Bœotia, was walled, and the Athenians used it as a post for a garrison, when at any time war should overtake them. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much time about it otherwise.

The Peloponnesians besiege Oenoe, (when Archidamus lingers for some time in the hope that the Athenians would comply with the demands of the Lacedæmonians);

And for this Archidamus was not a little blamed; being thought, in the assembly, to have been wanting in vigour concerning the war, and also to have favoured the Athenians, in that he encouraged not the army to carry it on with alacrity. And the stay that happened in the isthmus, when the army was collected, and his slowness in the whole journey, gave ground for the accusation against him; but especially his delay at Oenoe: for at this time the Athenians removed themselves into the city, whereas the Peloponnesians thought that they, by marching speedily, might, but for his delay, have found every thing still without: so enraged was the army of Archidamus at his stay before Oenoe. But he, expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unravaged, would relent, and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause, as it is reported, held his hand.

XIX. But afterwards, when they had made attacks upon Oenoe, and tried all means, but could not take it, and the Athenians sent no herald to them, then at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans who entered Platæa, the summer and corn being now at the highest, they made their invasion into Attica; led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they wasted the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the plain of Thriasia, and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at a place called Rheiti, [the brooks]. After this, leaving the mountain Ægaleos on the right hand, they passed through Cropæa, till they came to Acharnæ, the greatest town in Attica, of those that are called the demi [boroughs]; and pitching there, both

but being successfully resisted, raise the seige and proceed into Attica. It being now near harvest, they ravage the country about Eleusis, Thriasia, and Acharnæ, in which last place they fortify their camp.

A.C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. fortified their camp, and staid a long time wasting the country thereabout.

They linger at Acharnæ, hoping to provoke the Athenians to a general battle.

XX. Archidamus was said to have stayed so long at Acharnæ, having placed his army in battle array, and not to have come down into the plain during this invasion: with this intention, he hoped that the Athenians abounding in number of young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not have endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; when therefore they met him not at Eleusis, nor at the Thriasian plain, he tried if they would come out against him, taking his station near Acharnæ. For the place also seemed to him commodious for the army to encamp in; and it was thought also that the Acharnians, forming a great part of the city, for they were three thousand men at arms, would not suffer what belonged to them to be destroyed, but would urge all the rest also to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter with less fear waste the plain, and come down even to the city itself. For the Acharnians, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the land that belonged to the others; but that with such an intent as this discord would arise in their counsels. Archidamus remained at Acharnæ.

The Athenians murmur against Pericles for keeping them within the walls;

XXI. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, had even some hopes that it would advance no further; remembering that Pleistoanax, also, the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon,⁹ when fourteen years before this war, he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again, and came no further; for which he was banished from Sparta, as being thought to have been persuaded by money to retire. But when they saw the army now at Acharnæ, only sixty furlongs from the city, they then thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted, as it was likely in their sight, (which the younger among them had never seen before, nor the elder but in the Persian war,) it appeared dreadful, and it seemed right to all, especially to the youth, to go out, and not to endure it. And assembling in small parties, they were at much contention, some to urge them to make a sally, and some to hinder it. And the dealers in oracles giving

⁹ See book i. 114.

out prophecies of all kinds, which each was inclined to interpret as suited his individual interest.¹ But the Achæarnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians, when their own lands were being wasted, most of all urged their going out. And the city was every way in a state of great irritation and anger against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them; but reviled him, because being their general he refused to lead them to the field; and imputing to him the cause of all the evil they underwent.

XXII. But Pericles, seeing them enraged on account of their present loss, and ill advised, and being confident he was right in his decision concerning not going out, neither called any council, nor assembled them at all, lest having met together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error: but looked to the guarding the city, and, as much as he could, to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the scouts of the army from entering, and doing hurt to the farms near the city. And there happened at Phrygia a small skirmish between one band of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Bœotians; wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse, till the Bœotians were aided by the coming of their men of arms, and then they were put to flight, and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain; whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day, without demanding a truce; and the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. The cause of this assistance of the Thessalians was an ancient league with the Athenians; and those that came to them consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, Paraliens, Cranonians, Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. The leaders of the Larissæans were Polymedes and Aristonns, men from each faction in their city. Of the Pharsalians, Menon. And of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

XXIII. The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Achæarnæ, wasted certain other of the boroughs between the hills Parnes and Brilessus.

Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred

¹ This seems to be the sense intended; it is rendered more literally by Dr. Arnold—"which they were severally eager to listen to."

A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. out, dis- lodge from Acharnæ and ravage the country about Parnes and Bri- lessus.

Meantime the Athenians send out a fleet round Peloponnesus.

The Peloponnesians return home.

The Athenians set apart money and ships to be used only in extreme emergencies.

The Athenians, having sent a fleet round Peloponnesus, attack Methone,

galleys which they had equipped,² and in them a thousand men of arms, and four hundred archers about Peloponnesus; the commanders whereof were Carcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteas the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes; who thus furnished, weighed anchor and sailed round [Peloponnesus].

But the Peloponnesians, when they had remained in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Bœotia, not the way they came in; but passing Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which the Oropians inhabit, subjects of the people of Athens; and when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded, and went every man to his own city.

XXIV. When they were gone, the Athenians established guards both by sea and land, such as were to continue to keep guard to the end of the war. And they made a decree to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel, and set it by, and not to expend it, but to carry on the war from the rest of their resources; and decreed the punishment of death for any man to move or put the question for disturbing this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city, and there should be an urgent necessity to repel them. Together with this money they likewise set apart a hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best, and captains over them, which were to be employed for no other use than the money was, and for the same danger, if need should require.

XXV. The Athenians who were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, and with them the Coreyræans with the aid of fifty sail more, and certain others of the confederates thereabout, among other places which they devastated in their course, landed at Methone, of Laconia, and assaulted it, as being but weak and few men within.³ But it chanced that Brasidas, the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts, and hearing of it, went to aid those of the town with a

² "The hundred ships which they were getting ready;" i. e. which they were getting ready when I last mentioned them, c. 17. *Arnold.*

³ 'Ανθρωπων οὐκ ἐνοντων is the phrase used by Thucydides in first speaking of Methone. In the very next sentence, he says that Brasidas ἐβοηθει τοις ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ. His meaning, therefore, was, that there were no Lacedæmonians in the place, and consequently no soldiers, the inhabitants being all unarmed Messenians and Helots. *Mitford.*

hundred men of arms; wherewith having hurried through the Athenian army, which was dispersed in the country round the place, having its attention directed towards the walls, he threw himself into Methone; and with the loss of a few of his men in the passage, both saved the place, and for this adventure, was the first of those engaged in the war that was praised at Sparta.⁴ The Athenians putting off from thence, sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days wasting the country, and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the hollow⁵ Elis, together with other Eleans thereabouts that came forth to defend it. But a great wind arising, and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked, and sailed round the promontory called Icthus, into the haven of Pheia. But the Messenians meanwhile, and certain others that could not get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and took it: and afterwards the galleys that had sailed round took them in, and leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again: and by this time a great army of the Eleans was come to succour it, but the Athenians sailed along the shore towards other places, and wasted them.

A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. which is relieved by Brasidas, who distinguishes himself.

The Athenians besiege Pheia, which is taken by the Messenians, but soon after abandoned.

The Athenians send thirtyships under Cleopompus to cruise off Locris.

They storm Thronium and defeat the Locrians at Alope.

They then expel the Æginetæ from their island, and the Lacedæmonians

XXVI. About this very same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris,⁶ which were to serve also for a guard about Eubœa. Of these, Cleopompus the son of Clinias was general; and landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast, and took the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages; and conquered at Alope the Locrians that came to aid it.

XXVII. The same summer the Athenians removed [forcibly] the Æginetæ, man, woman, and child, out of Ægina, laying to their charge, that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Ægina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their

⁴ That this implies some public tribute of praise is manifest; but by whom bestowed, whether by the kings or the polemarchs, or the ephori, and whether it was a distinction conferred annually on those who had most signalized themselves, I have not been able to discover. *Arnold.*

⁵ So called from the hollow form of the valley of the Peneus, of which this, the most northern of the three divisions of Elis, is mostly composed. *Bloomfield.*

⁶ That Locris where the Locri Opuntii and Epienemidii dwelt.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.
place them
in Thyrea.

own people; and not long after they sent out colonists to it. When the Æginetæ were thus banished, the Lacedæmonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in, and the occupation of the lands belonging to it to live on; both from being at variance with the Athenians, and for the benefits received from the Æginetæ during the earthquake and insurrection of their Helots. This territory of Thyrea is on the border between Argia and Laconica, and reaches to the sea side. So some of them had an habitation there, and the rest were dispersed throughout the remainder of Greece.⁷

Eclipse of
the sun.

XXVIII. Also the same summer, the first day of the month, according to the moon,⁸ (at which time it seems only possible,) in the afternoon, happened an eclipse of the sun; which after it had become of the form of a crescent, and some stars had appeared, came afterwards again to its former brightness.

Nympho-
dorus
brings
about an
alliance
between
the Athe-
nians, Si-
talces, and
Perdiccas.

XXIX. The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus son of Pytheus, of Abdera, whose sister was married to Sitalces, and who was of great power with him, their host,⁹ though before they considered him as an enemy, and sent for him to Athens, hoping by this means to bring Sitalces son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of Thrace consists of free states; and Tereus,¹ who took to wife, out of Athens, Procne, the daughter of Pandion, has nothing to do with this Teres, nor of the same part of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia, in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. (And the deed of the women concerning Itys was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion contracted this alliance of his daughter with this man at such a

⁷ These Æginetæ exiles were afterwards collected by Lysander after the battle of Ægos-Potami, and restored to their country. *Xenoph. Hellen.* b. ii. c. 2. s. 9. *Arnold.*

⁸ *Νουμηνία κατά σεληνην.* The first day of the month, according to the moon, in distinction of the month civil; for their year was lunar, yet was it so exact, as that the moon changed often on the first day.

⁹ *Προξενος*, i. e. the individual at whose house, and by whom public persons who came from Athens to Abdera were to be entertained.

¹ See the fable of Tereus and Procne in Ovid's *Metam.*

distance for mutual succour, than with the other, that was so many days' journey off as it is to Odrysæ.) And Teres, which is also another name, was the first who seized on the kingdom of Odrysæ. Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians brought into their league, wishing him to assist them in putting down the towns about Thrace, and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus, son of Sitalces, to be made free of Athens, and also undertook to end the war in Thrace.² For he would persuade Sitalces to send to the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targeteers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured for him the restitution of Therme.³ And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcidæans. Thus were Sitalces son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedon,⁴ made confederates with the Athenians.

XXX. The Athenians, being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palirenses, alone of all the Acarnanians, in possession both of the town and territory; having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Evarchus, they drove him thence, and joined the place to their league: from thence they sailed to Cephallenia, and induced it to come over to them without a battle. This Cephallenia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas, and has in it these four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samæans, and Pronæans. And not long after the fleet returned to Athens.

The Athenian fleet having taken Solium, Astacus, and Cephallenia, returns to Athens.

XXXI. About the autumn of the summer of this year, the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles son of Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, on their return home, (for they chanced to be now at Ægina,) hearing that the whole power of the city was gone to Megara, sailed and joined them.

The Athenians invade Megaris, and are joined by the fleet which had just arrived at Ægina.

² The war about Potidæa.

³ See b. i. ch. 61.

⁴ Macedon at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, both king and people being regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, before being admitted to join at the Olympic festival. See *Herod.* v. 22.

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place; the city being now flourishing and at its greatest height, and the plague not yet having come amongst them: for the Athenians of themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidæa; and the strangers that dwelt among them, that accompanied them in this invasion, were no fewer than three thousand men at arms more, besides other great numbers of light-armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year, during this war, the Athenians used to invade Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen, and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had taken Nisæa.

Atalanta fortified as a defence against the Loerian pirates.

XXXII. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalanta, (an island lying over against the Loerians of Opus,⁵ and before uninhabited,) for a garrison against the piratical plunderers, who passing over from Opus and the other parts of Locris, might injure Eubœa. These were the things done this summer, after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The Corinthians, having reinstated Evarchus tyrant of Astacus, on their way home attempt to gain over some maritime towns of Acarnania, also attack Cephallenia, in which they fail.

XXXIII. The winter following, Evarchus of Acarnania, desirous of returning to Astacus, prevails with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys, and one thousand five hundred men of arms to re-establish him; to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. When, having sailed thither, they had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the coast of Acarnania, but when they had tried and could not succeed, they set sail homewards. As they passed by the coast of Cephallenia, they touched there and disembarked in the territory of the Cranians, where, under colour of a certain convention, they were deceived, and lost some of their men. For the assault made on them by the Cranians being unexpected, they got off with difficulty and went homewards.

PUBLIC FUNERAL at Athens

XXXIV. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war, in this manner: having made a tent, they set out in

⁵ "The island on the coast of Loeri;" or as we should more naturally say, "off the coast." *Arnold*.

it the bones of the dead,⁶ three days before the funeral, and every one brings to his own what he thinks good.⁷ When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress coffins are carried along in cars, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men in each tribe by themselves.⁸ There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over, for such as are missing, who may not have been found among the rest to be removed. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred attend also at the burial, lamenting and mourning. They then put them into the public mausoleum, which stands in the most beautiful suburb of the city, (in which place⁹ they have constantly interred all that died in the wars, except those slain at Marathon, who, because their valour was thought far to outshine that of the rest, were buried there); and when the earth is thrown over them, some one, thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, makes an oration, wherein he gives them such praises as are fit; which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial; and for the whole time of the war,¹ whenever there was occasion, they observed the same. Over these first, the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles son of Xantippus, who when he came to the time of speaking, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit, so as to be heard to the greatest distance by the multitude about him, spake in this manner:

Funeral Oration made by Pericles.

XXXV. "Though most that have spoken formerly in this place have commended the man that added this oration to the law, as honourable to be spoken over those that are brought to be interred from the wars; yet to me it seems sufficient, that they who have shewn their valour by action, should also by an action have their honour, (as now you see they have, in this their sepulture

A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.
of the
citizens
who had
fallen in
battle in
the first
summer of
the war.

FUNERAL
ORATION OF
PERICLES.
Although
in his own
judgment
all words
in honour
of the dead

⁶ The custom was when a man died to burn him, and the burial afterwards was only of his bones, or ashes.

⁷ Offerings, incense, and the rites of burial.

⁸ For an account of the tribes, and their augmentation by Clisthenes, *Herod.* v. 66.

⁹ The tomb was in the Ceramicus, a public walk to the north of the city.—See Cic. ad Att. i. ep. 10.—Ceramicus signifies a pottery.

¹ By the first slain in the war, is understood either the first every year in the same war, or the several actions of this great war are counted as several wars, and the first slain in any of them had the honour of this burial.

A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. might well have been forborne; for either through the fault of the speaker, or the partiality or jealousy of the hearers, it would be hard for any speech on such an occasion to give satisfaction; yet still as the law has so willed it, he will endeavour to satisfy its call.

First, then, he briefly notices their ancestors and their own immediate fathers, the founders of their empire and their glory;

performed by the state;) and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one, to be believed according as he speaks well or ill.² For, to speak of men, preserving a due medium, is a hard matter; and especially about things in which a fixed persuasion of the truth is with difficulty established.³ The favourable hearer, that knows what was done, will perhaps think what is spoken, short of what he would have it and what he knows it to be; and he that is ignorant, will find some things through envy, which he will think too much extolled, if he hear aught above the reach of his own nature. For to hear another man praised, is endurable so long as each man shall think he could have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false.⁴ But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as far as I can.

XXXVI. "I will begin at our ancestors, it being a thing both just and becoming, that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in an oration of this kind: for they, without any variation of race, having been always the inhabitants of this land,⁵ by their valour, have delivered to us the same in a succession of posterity to the present time, in the state of liberty; and they indeed deserve commendation: but our fathers deserve yet more, for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own, they have acquired this our present dominion, and have also left the same to us that now are. Which in a great part also, we ourselves here present,⁶ who are even yet for the most part in the maturity of our age,⁷ have improved; and so furnished the city with every thing, both for

² "The virtues of many were perilled in one individual, for him to be believed both if he spoke well and if he spoke ill." The impression of the merits of the dead depending on the judgment and eloquence of the orator, their virtues might properly be said to be perilled in his person. *Arnold*.

³ "For it is hard to speak with exact propriety on a subject where, besides its other difficulties, it is hard to convince the hearers that what you say to them is the truth." *Arnold*.

⁴ "Whatever of the praises bestowed on others surpasses our own powers, we envy straightway and disbelieve."

⁵ See book i. 6.

⁶ Pericles here alludes to his having added Eubœa and Samos to the Athenian power. B. i. 114 and 116.

⁷ "Who are even yet for the most part in the vigour of life."

peace and war, and it is now all-sufficient in itself. The actions of war, whereby each particular thing has been attained, and the deeds of arms, both of ourselves and our fathers, by which we have with alacrity repelled war coming upon us, whether from Barbarian or Greek, being unwilling to enlarge upon them, amongst you that are well acquainted, I will pass over. But by what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government, and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall in the first place have laid open this, I will then descend to these men's praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand, and profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related.

XXXVII. "For we use a form of government, not formed by imitation of the laws of neighbouring states,⁸ nay, we are rather a pattern to others than imitating others ourselves; and this, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few, but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies, yet one man is preferred before another as to public charges, according to his reputation, as each is held in repute for any thing, not more because he belongs to a privileged class, than on account of his individual excellence; nor is he put back through poverty, for the obscurity of his condition, if he can do any good service to the commonwealth.⁹ And we live not only free in the administration of the state, but also one with another, as to any jealousy, touching each other's daily course of life; not offended at any man, for pleasing himself, nor assuming censorious looks, which though they inflict no injury, yet cause pain.¹ So that living cheerfully one with another, as regards our private intercourse, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public, by our obedience to those that are in succession our rulers and to the laws, and

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

Those principles are freedom, equality of rights, and a liberal spirit: no privileged castes engross all honours, no degraded ones are deprived of the benefits of equal law, no intolerance requires that every one's habits and manners should be conformed to its own model.

⁸ Hinting at the Lacedæmonians, whose laws were enacted by Lycurgus, in imitation of those of the Egyptians and Cretans.

⁹ *Μερος*, a part. Here meant to signify a part or family in the commonwealth. Again hinting at the Lacedæmonians, among whom none ever arrived at the supreme office, except they were of the family of the Heraclidæ.

¹ "And as to any mutual jealousy of each other's pursuits and habits, we are not angry with our neighbour for pleasing himself; nor wearing a look of offence, which though harmless in effect, is yet troublesome and painful." *Arnold*.

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

principally to such laws as are laid down for protection against injury, and such as being unwritten, bring down undeniable shame to the transgressors.²

Their life
is human-
ized by
joyous and
social festi-
vals.

XXXVIII. "We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour, by the institution of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year;³ and by the handsome entertainments of private men; by the daily delight whereof, we expel sadness.⁴ By the greatness of our city also, all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither; whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations than our own.

Nor are
they
anxious,
like their
rivals, to
involve
their re-
sources in
mystery;
nor do they
deem that
courage
can only
be ac-
quired by
a life of
misery or
toil.

XXXIX. "We differ also in the studies of war from our enemies in this; we throw our city open to all men, nor do we ever, by the banishing⁵ strangers, deny them the learning or seeing of any of those things which if not hidden, an enemy might reap the advantage by; not relying more on secret preparations and deceit, than upon our own courage in the action. And as to our methods of instruction, they aim at attaining manliness directly from their youth up with laborious exercise, and yet we that live remissly, advance no less boldly than they against equal dangers. For example, the Lacedæmonians invade not our dominion with the single forces of any one of their states, but with the aid of all. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground, against such as in their ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory. No enemy hath yet met our whole forces at once, both because we apply ourselves much to navigation, and by land also send many of our men into foreign countries. But when fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole. And

² Or as Gail paraphrases, "hurl on the head of transgressors, the vengeance of public opinion."

³ This was almost literally true; for we find by the Scholiast, who doubtless derived his information from some ancient writer, that there were sacrifices at Athens every day of the year except one. *Νομιζόντες* "using," a sense which Goeller confirms from Herod. iv. 117. "*φωνη νομιζουσι Σκυθικη.*"

⁴ Besides the vast number of festivals celebrated at Athens with pompous processions, costly sacrifices, and public games, the presidents in course offered up sacrifices every morning for the public good.

⁵ Spoken with envy towards the Lacedæmonians, who were deemed most inhospitable towards strangers.

yet though in careless ease rather than in studious labour, and with a valour arising rather from natural disposition than from laws,⁶ we are willing to undertake any danger, we have this advantage by it, that we faint not beforehand at the coming troubles, and in the action we appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling.⁷

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87.2.

XL. "And both in these respects our city is worthy of admiration and also in divers other things. For we study good taste, and yet with frugality; and philosophy, and yet without effeminacy.⁸ And we use riches rather for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation; and hold it not disgraceful for any one to confess poverty, but not to have avoided it by exertion, that rather do we consider disgraceful.⁹ Moreover there is in the same men a care, both of their own and of the public affairs, and a sufficient knowledge of public matters,¹ even in such others as labour with their hands. For we alone think him that takes no part in these matters to be a man, not that meddles with nothing, but that is good for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds; not accounting words a hinderance to action, but that it is rather a hinderance to action, to take in hand to perform in earnest what is necessary to be done, without the instruction of words before. For also in this we excel others; that we dare to undertake as much as any, and that we consider well what we

Further, Athens has united literature and philosophy with the highest martial heroism, and considers no citizen too ignorant to have an opinion on public matters.

⁶ "Courage arising from disposition and not from laws and institutions."

⁷ "If we are as brave as our rivals, and yet do not take so much pains to become so, we gain in consequence the united advantages of escaping toil and hardship by anticipation of being equally daring when the trial comes, and of combining enjoyments of another description, (taste and philosophy,) to which our rivals in their dull severity are wholly strangers." *Arnold*.

⁸ The orator here refutes a common opinion respecting the Athenians, that they were given up to luxury and sloth, dignified by the name of literary leisure.

⁹ "Wealth we employ where the occasions of real service need it, not in the mere ostentation of talking about it; poverty we are not ashamed to talk about, but we are ashamed to make no effort to avoid it;" or to put the antithesis still clearer, "wealth we cherish for practice, while we shun to talk of it; poverty we talk about without scruple, but in practice we shun it." *Arnold*.

¹ In Athens no man so poor but what was a statesman. So St. Luke, Acts xvii. 21, speaking of Athens, says, "All the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing." The true character of politicians without employment.

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

undertake; whereas with other men, ignorance makes them daring, and consideration dastards; and they may be most rightly reputed valiant, who though they perfectly apprehend both what is most dangerous, and what is agreeable, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we run contrary to most men as regards zeal for serving others, for we acquire our friends, not by receiving, but by bestowing benefits.² And he that bestows the favour is the more constant and firmer friend, in order to keep alive the obligation due to him by means of good will, [exhibited towards the person,] on whom he has conferred it.³ Whereas the friendship of him that owes a benefit is dull and flat, as knowing that he has to pay back the kindness, not as a favour but as a debt; so that we alone freely do good to others, not upon computation of profit, but in the confiding spirit of generosity.

Athens is
the school
of Greece;
and her
individual
citizens are
the most
accom-
plished of
the human
race.

XLI. "In short, it may be said, both that the city is in general the school of Greece, and that the men here have every one in particular his person disposed to the greatest diversity of actions, and yet with gracefulness and the happiest versatility. And that this is not now rather a boast of words upon the occasion than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions we have obtained, makes evident. For it is the only power now found greater in proof than in fame; and the only power that neither contains any thing to cause the indignation of the invader when he miscarries, as to the quality of those from whom he suffers, nor gives cause to the subjected states to murmur, as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration as displaying a power, not without testimony, but made evident by great arguments; needing neither a Homer to praise, or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, though the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened to us by our courage, all seas and lands, and set up eternal monuments on

² Mr. Bloomfield renders "acts of beneficence," which meaning Dr. Arnold confirms from the definition given of ἀρετη, in the Rhet. I. ix. s. 4. as δυναμις εὐεργετικη.

³ In this sentence, where the construction is particularly doubtful I have followed Dr. Arnold, and given the interpretation he prefers. Goeller joins δ' εὐνοιας with ὀφειλομενην thus, "the obligation arising from his good-will;" or the words may mean, as Dr. Arnold renders in his note, "the debt of gratitude due with every feeling of kindness from him on whom he has, etc."

all sides, both of the evil [we have done to our enemies,] and the good [we have done to our friends.] Such is the city for which these men, determined that it should not be taken from them, nobly fought and died; and it is fit that every man of you that is left, should be willing to undergo any dangers for the same.

Year I.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87.2.

XLII. "And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general, as well to shew you that the stakes between us, and them who have nothing of these things [that I have mentioned] in a like degree with us, are not equal; as also clearly to make known by sure proofs the praises of these men, over whom I now speak; of which the greatest part has been already delivered. For all that I have spoken in honour of the city, hath by these and such as these been achieved; for not among many of the Grecians would the fame appear on an equal balance with the actions, as it does in the case of these men; the present end of these men's lives seeming to me an argument of their virtues, which it at once manifested and confirmed with the last seal. For even over those who are in other respects inferior, it is just to hold forth [as a veil to their faults] the valour they have displayed against their enemies in defence of their country. For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the further enjoyment of his wealth, was thereby rendered effeminate, or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length,⁴ and to attain to riches, did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For their principal desire was not wealth, but revenge on their enemies, which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they were willing by undergoing it, both to revenge themselves on the one, and to aim at procuring the other; leaving the uncertainty of success to hope; but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon themselves in the action; and therein choosing rather to fight and die than to give way and be saved.⁵ They

All the honours that Athens possesses, have been acquired for her by such citizens as these; men, whose death attested their virtue, who, above the temptation that fear suggested, to enjoy their wealth by lengthening their life unworthily, preferred a glorious death to a shameful flight.

⁴ The hope respecting poverty, or, on the subject of poverty. Sub. *περι Bloomfield.*

⁵ Goeller takes this sentence thus, *ἐν ἀτρω*, i. e. *ἐν τῷ ἐργῳ*, in the battle thinking rather to be saved by brave resistance and supporting all the enemy could do, than by giving way. Dr. Arnold interprets preferably, "being minded rather to resist and die, than fly and save their lives."

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

Their example ought to stimulate us that remain, from observing the greatness of our country's power, to love it passionately, and to remember by what virtues such a power was acquired. For their mortal bodies, they have received an immortal monument in the country and in the memory of all; and this, as well as the knowledge that the loss of dominion far exceeds that of life, ought to make us willing, like them, to undergo the brief pain of an honourable death.

fled from shame, but with their bodies they endured the battle; and so in a moment, when their fortune was at its height, they were taken away from what was their glory rather than their fear.⁶

XLIII. "Such were these men, worthy of their country; and for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune; but you ought not to be less boldly minded against the enemy; not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may recount to you that know as well as he, the many advantages that arise by valiantly repelling your enemies; but rather day by day, having regard in your actions to the power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight: and by such men, as though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For having every one given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation, and a most conspicuous sepulchre, not wherein they are buried so much, as wherein their glory is laid up on all occasions, both of speech and action, to be remembered for ever. For to men of renown all the earth is a sepulchre, and not only does the inscription on their monuments in their own country testify [their virtues] but even in a foreign land an unwritten record of the mind rather than of any monument, remains with every one for ever. In imitation therefore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, be not sluggish to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal of their lives; but rather such men, as, if they live, run the chance of a change of fortune, and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of spirit, suffering joined with cowardice is more grievous than death suddenly coming upon him whilst he is in vigour and full of common hope.⁷

⁶ I have in this passage followed the punctuation and interpretation of Dr. Arnold. Mr. Bloomfield renders, "and after a short and quickly dreaded crisis of their fate, at the height of glory, not of fear, they yielded up their lives."

⁷ "For to a man of high and noble mind, distress and suffering combined

XLIV. "Wherefore I do not condole but rather I will comfort you the parents that are present of these men. For they know that they have grown up amidst manifold and various calamities; but theirs is a happy lot, who obtain a most honourable death, as these men have, or as you, a most honourable sorrow, and to whom the space of their existence has been so measured out, as not only to live in prosperity, but to die in it.⁸ Hard though I know it is to dissuade you from sorrow, for the loss of those whom the happiness of others (wherein you also yourselves formerly rejoiced) shall so often bring to your remembrance; for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted, but for the privation of a good we have been used to; yet such of you as are of the age to have children, may bear the loss of these, in the hope of more. For, as regards your own selves, the latter children will both produce among some the oblivion of those that are no more, and also doubly conduce to the good of the city, by hindering its becoming desolate and by adding to its safety. For it is not possible that they should give good and upright counsel, who do not, by exposing children to danger, run an equal risk with the rest. As for you that are past your prime, consider the greater part of your life, during which you were fortunate, as gain, consider too that this which remains will be short, and solace it with the glory of these.⁹ For the love of honour alone never groweth old, nor in the infirmity of age, does the amassing gain, as some say, give so much pleasure as the being held in honour.

Year 1.
A. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.
As for the
parents of
those that
are dead,
let them
console
themselves
with the
honour
their
children
have pro-
cured
them, and
endeavour
to repair
their loss
by a fresh
progeny;
or if this is
denied
them by
their age,
let the re-
mem-
brance of
the glo-
rious past,
console
them for
what yet
remains to
them of
life; inas-
much as
honour is
the true
solace and
support of
old age.
Let the
children
and
brothers
of the
dead

XLV. "As for you, as many as are here, that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you will have a difficult task of emulation. For every man is wont to praise him that is no more, so even that with an excess of merit, you will hardly get

with cowardice is far more grievous than death so speedy as hardly to be felt, when it comes to him in his unbroken strength, and while he can still cherish a lively hope of his country's final triumph." *Arnold*.

⁸ The following appears to be the sense of this passage. "For they know that their condition from their birth has been subject to manifold misfortunes; but that their lot may be regarded as fortunate, whose portion has been most full of honour; such as is their death, such as is your sorrow, and the duration of whose life has been commensurate with that of their happiness." *Arnold*.

⁹ Consider the greater part of your life, during which you were fortunate, as gain, consider too that this *which* remains will be short, and solace it with the glory of these.

Year 1.
A.C. 431.
Ol. 87. 2.

remember how hard a task they will have, even to equal the renown of those whose merit is now past the tooth of envy; let their widows support the excellence that befits them and consider it their glory to be as little the subject of public conversation as possible

The dead have now received the honour due to them in words; and further, their orphans shall be provided for by their country, which, as it holds forth the greatest rewards to merit, necessarily abounds in most citizens to deserve it.

an equal reputation, but still be thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but [the merit] which no longer stands in their way, is honoured with a good-will free from opposition. And if I must say somewhat of feminine virtue, for you that are now widows, I shall express it all in this short admonition. It will be your highest honour not to degenerate from the nature that belongs to you, and to give as little occasion for talk amongst the men, whether for good or evil, as ye can.¹

XLVI. "And thus have I said according to the law, all that I had befitting to say; and those that are here interred, have, by what has been done, been already honoured; and further, their children shall be maintained, till they be at man's estate, at the charge of the city,² which hath thereby set forth to them they have left, a most useful reward for deeds of valour like these; for where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest citizens. And now let each having lamented whom it behoves him [to lament] depart."³

XLVII. Such was the funeral made this winter, which ending, ended the first year of this war.

YEAR II. A.C. 430. Ol. 87. 3.

In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two thirds of their forces, as before, invaded Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of Lacedæmon, and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them.

They had not been many days in Attica, when the plague³

¹ For not to degenerate from your own nature, is a great glory, and (*of that woman the glory is great*) of whom there is a report amongst the men in the least degree, whether for good or evil. That is to say, that woman's glory is great, who is the least talked of by men, whether it be for her praise or dispraise. Compare Aristot. Rhet. I. v. 6. "Θηλειων δε ἀρετη σωφροσυνη και φιλεργια ἀνευ ἀνελευθερίας."

² The law was, that they should be instructed at the public expense, and when come to age presented with a complete suit of armour, and honoured with the first seat in all public places.

³ It is worthy of remark that the same year in which the plague broke out at Athens, Rome was visited by a similar calamity.—Livy, b. iv. c. 25. The effect on the two states was very different; the Romans immediately had recourse to religious rites and sacrifices to appease the gods; while the Athenians appear to have been completely demoralized. Lucretius gives a beautiful description of this plague, vi. 1139.

first began among the Athenians, said also to have broke out in many other parts, as about Lemnos, and elsewhere; but yet so great a plague and mortality of men, was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first, neither were physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of what it was, but died fastest themselves, as being the men who most approached the sick, nor did any other art of man avail. All supplications to the gods, and inquiries of oracles, and whatsoever other such means, as they used, proved unprofitable; in-somuch that at last overcome by the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.
The
Pelopon-
nesians
invade
Attica.
A plague
breaks out
at Athens.

XLVIII. It began, by report, first in that part of Æthiopia that lies above Egypt, and thence came down to Egypt, and Lybia, and to the greatest part of the territories of the king.⁴ It broke out in Athens on a sudden, and attacked first those that dwelt in the Piræus; so that they reported that the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their wells, for there were not as yet any fountains in that place. But afterwards it came up to the upper city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other,⁵ concerning the ground of this disease, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration [in the human frame,] speak according to his own knowledge; for my part, I will relate but the manner of it, and remark only such peculiarities as one may judge by, and by having some previous acquaintance with it, may not perhaps be ignorant of it, if it comes again; having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick of the same.

XLIX. That year, as it is agreed, happened above all [years] to be particularly free from disease, as regards all other complaints; and if any man was sick before, his disease turned to this; with regard to the rest, without any ostensible cause, but suddenly and being in perfect health, they were taken first with extreme heats in their heads, and redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly both their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their breath noisome and unsavoury. Upon this followed sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after, the pain, together with a strong cough, came down into the

Descrip-
tion of the
plague.

⁴ Of Persia.

⁵ Ἰδιωτης, "one who has never practised;" put in opposition to *ιατρος*. Compare Aristot. Eth. iii. c. 8. ἀθληται ἰδιωταις μαχοῦνται, and Thuc. vi. 72.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

breast; and when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit, and with great torment came on all the kinds of bilious purgation that physicians ever named. Most of them then had also an empty (or ineffectual) hiccup, which brought with it a strong convulsion, which in some abated speedily, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch, were neither very hot nor pale, but reddish, livid, and breaking out with little blisters and sores; but so burned inwardly, as not to endure the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them, nor any thing, but mere nakedness; rather indeed most willingly would they have cast themselves into cold water. And many of those that were neglected, did this into wells, being possessed with insatiate thirst, and whether they drank much or little was indifferent; the inability to remain quiet also, and the impossibility of sleeping, continually pressed upon them. As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment beyond all expectation; insomuch that most of them either died of their inward burning in nine or seven days, whilst they had yet some strength; or if they had escaped that, then the disease descending into the stomach, and great ulcerations taking place there, and an immoderate looseness coming on, the greater part were destroyed by it through weakness. For the disease, which at first had seated itself in the head, beginning from above, passed down through the whole body; and if any one survived the worst of it, yet seizing his extremities, it marked him there; for it fell upon their privy members, and upon their fingers and toes, and many with the loss of these escaped, and some with the loss of their eyes. Some, immediately upon their recovery, were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, that they neither knew themselves nor their acquaintance.

L. For this was a kind of sickness that far surpassed all expression of words, and both exceeded human nature in the violence with which it fell upon each one, and in this also, most especially, shewed itself to be none of the ordinary diseases. For all the birds and beasts that used to feed on human flesh, though many men lay unburied, either came not to them, or tasting perished. A proof of which was the manifest failure of birds of this kind, which were not then seen, neither about the carcasses, nor any where else; but the dogs, from their

being familiar with men, afforded a yet more clear proof of the effects.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

LI. So that this disease, to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had different from others, was in general such as I have shewn, and for other usual sicknesses, at that time none troubled any man; or if any did take place, it merged in this. Now they died, some for want of attendance, and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any, so to say, certain medicine that if applied would have helped them; for what did good to one, did harm to another; nor was there any frame, as regards strength or weakness, that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all, was the dejection of mind, in such as perceived themselves beginning to be sick, (for they grew presently desperate, and gave themselves over without making any resistance,) and also their dying thus like sheep, infected by visiting each other; for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forbore to visit them, through fear, then they died forlorn; whereby many houses were emptied of their inhabitants, for want of such as should take care of them. If they did approach them, then they died themselves, and principally those who laid any claim to virtue. For out of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto their friends, even when their kinsmen, wearied out with the lamentations of them that died, were overcome with the greatness of the calamity. But those that were recovered, had much compassion both on them that died and on them that lay sick, as having both known the misery themselves, and now being no more subject to the danger. For this disease never attacked any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy, and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope that they should never perish by any other sickness hereafter.

LII. Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses, but dwelling during the summer in stifling booths, the mortality was now without any appearance of order; and dying men lay one upon another, and men half dead rolled over each other in the streets, about every conduit,

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents, were all full of those that died within them; for oppressed with the violence of the calamity, and not knowing what would become of them, men grew alike careless both of holy and profane things.⁶ And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals were all now disregarded; every one burying as he could. And many for want of things necessary, because so many of their friends had died already, had recourse to shameless modes of sepulture. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him, would throw on his dead and set it on fire. And when one was burning, another would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again.

LIII. And in other respects also, the great licentiousness began in the city at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely, seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates; insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods even for their pleasure, as men that thought they held their lives and their wealth but by the day. As for trouble, no man was ready for any action of honour to take any, because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they arrived at it; but what any man knew to be delightful, and any how serviceable towards it, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, restrained any man. Not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that they all alike perished; nor the latter, because no man expected that he would continue alive⁷ till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought there was now over their heads some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.

LIV. Into such an affliction the Athenians fell, and thus were they oppressed; their men perishing by the disease within, and the enemy also laying waste their fields without. And during their affliction, as it was not unlikely they would,

Ancient
prophecy
concern-
ing it.

⁶ Ὀστώσῳ—civil, or human—"social duties," Mr. Bloomfield renders.

⁷ Βίους, second aor. particip.

they called to mind this verse, which the elders among them said had been uttered of old :

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87.3.

“A Doric war shall come, and a plague with it.”

Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not *λοιμος*, [the plague,] that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but *λιμος*, [famine.] But on the present occasion, as was likely, the opinion prevailed that the word *λοιμος* was the one that had been uttered. For in accordance with what men suffered, so they interpreted the verse. And I think, if after this there should ever come upon them another Doric war, and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There was also reported by such as knew, a certain answer given by the oracle to the Lacedæmonians when they inquired whether they should make this war or not, that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory, and that the god^s himself would take their parts ; and thereupon they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, than the sickness forthwith began, and never came to Peloponnesus, to speak of, but preyed upon Athens principally, and afterwards upon such other places as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.

The plague confined principally to Athens.

LV. After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champaign country, they fell on the territory called Paralos, as far as Laurium,⁹ where the Athenians have silver mines, and first wasted that part of it which faces Peloponnesus, and then that which is turned towards Andros and Eubœa. Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle.

LVI. Whilst they were yet in the plain, and before they entered into the maritime country, he made ready an armament of a hundred galleys to invade the Peloponnesus, and, as soon as they were ready, put to sea. In these galleys he took four thousand men of arms, and, in vessels adapted for carrying

An Athenian fleet of one hundred sail, with fifty Chians and Lesbians, sails

^s Apollo, to whom the heathens attributed the immission of all epidemic diseases. Vide i. 118.

⁹ The public mines at Laurium originally belonged to private persons, but were united to the public domain by Themistocles. A great number of slaves was employed in making them, and the revenue which they produced was very considerable.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.
to Epidau-
rus, Trœ-
zene,
Halias,
and Her-
mione.

horses, then for the first time made out of old galleys, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians also joined the armament with fifty galleys. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in the maritime district, and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, wasted much of the country thereabout, and assaulting the city, hoped to take it, but the affair did not succeed. Putting out from Epidaurus, they wasted the territories of Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione, all on the coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasixæ, a small maritime city of Laconia, and both wasted the territory about it, and took and pillaged the town itself; and having done this, came home; but found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.

The
Pelopon-
nesians
retire from
Attica,
after re-
maining
there forty
days.

LVII. All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the disease, both in the army and city, destroyed many, insomuch as it was said, that the Peloponnesians fearing the disorder, which they knew to be in the city, both by deserters, and by seeing the Athenians burying their dead, went the sooner out of the country. And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done before, and wasted the whole territory; for they continued in Attica almost forty days.

Agnon and
Cleopom-
pus march
against
Potidæa,
and return
after
having lost
one thou-
sand and
fifty men
in forty
days.

LVIII. The same summer, Agnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, joint commanders with Pericles, having taken the army which he had employed before, went immediately on an expedition against the Chalcidæans of Thrace, and against Potidæa, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they applied their engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but neither the taking of the city, nor any thing else succeeded, worthy so great preparation. For the disease coming amongst them also in this place, afflicted the Athenians mightily indeed, destroying their army, so that the Athenian soldiers which were there before, and in health, caught the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his one thousand and six hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcidæans; and Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having, of four thousand men, in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty by the plague. But the soldiers who were there before, stayed at the place, and continued the siege of Potidæa.

The Athe-
nian
people

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians, having their fields now the second time wasted, and

both the sickness and war falling on them at once, changed their minds, and accused Pericles, as if he had persuaded them to make war, and as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to come to an agreement with the Lacedæmonians, to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but who returned without effect. And being altogether at a loss to devise what to do, they vehemently reproached Pericles. And he seeing them angry at their present calamity, and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly, (for he was yet a general,) with intention to put them again in heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less fearful state of temper; and standing forth he spake unto them in this manner.

Year 2.
A.C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.
murmur
against
Pericles,
and talk
of making
conces-
sions to the
Lace-
dæmo-
nians.

Oration of Pericles.

LX. “Your anger towards me comes not unlooked for, (for the cause of it I understand,) and I have therefore called this assembly to remind you, and to reprehend you, if in any point you either are angry with me, or give way to your adversity without reason. For I am of opinion that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men than if the private men themselves were in prosperity, and the public wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarries in a flourishing commonwealth will much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and every one cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, should not every one strive to defend it? And not as you now, affrighted at your domestic misfortunes, forsake the common safety, and fall a censuring both me that counselled the war, and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I. And it is I with whom you are angry, one, as I think myself, inferior to none, either in knowing what is requisite, or in expressing what I know; and a lover of my country, and superior to money.¹ For he who possesses knowledge, and cannot clearly express it, is of no more use than if he had never thought it at all; and he that can do both, and is ill affected to his country, will not be equally likely to give befitting counsel. And if this quality also be added, yet he too, if corrupted by money, would for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if

Speech
delivered
by Pericles
in the
Athenian
assembly,
with the
intention
of appeas-
ing the
anger of
the people.

¹ Compare Aristot. Rhet. II. 1. 5. on the causes of an orator's being believed, φρονησις, ἀρετη, and εὐνοια.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me, somewhat above the rest, with injustice should I now be accused of doing you wrong.

LXI. "For though to such as have it in their own election, being otherwise in good estate, it were the height of folly to make choice of war; yet when they must of necessity either give way, and immediately be subject to their neighbours, or else save themselves from it by danger, he is more to be condemned that declines the danger, than he that stands to it. For my own part, I am the man I was, and remain unchanged; but you are changed; persuaded to the war, when you were unhurt, but repenting it upon the damage, and condemning the utility of my counsel, in the weakness of your own judgment. The reason of this is, because you are possessed already every one in particular, by that which afflicts you, but the evidence of the profit is as yet seen by none; and your minds, dejected with the great and sudden change that has befallen you, cannot constantly maintain what you have before resolved. For that which is sudden and unexpected, and which falls out most contrary to our reckonings, enslaves the spirit; which by this disease principally, in addition to what else has happened, is now come to pass in you. But you that dwell in a great city, and have been brought up in habits suitable to it, how great soever the affliction may be, ought to be willing to endure it, and not eclipse your reputation, (for men think fit no less to condemn those who through cowardice lose the glory they have, than to hate those who through impudence arrogate the glory they have not,) but laying aside the grief for your private losses, you ought to lay hold of and support the common safety.

LXII. "As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long, and we in the end never the nearer to the victory, let those arguments suffice by which I have often shewn at other times, that it [the toil] is not justly made an object of distrust;² and this I will make manifest to you moreover, touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem to have ever thought on, nor I touched³ in my former orations, nor would I have spoken of it now, inasmuch as it has too boastful an appearance, if I had not seen your

² *Αὐτον ὑποπτευομενον*, i. e. *τον πονον*, "that you are wrong in looking at it so anxiously and fearfully." *Arnold*.

³ *Ἐν τοις πρην λογοις (ἐχρησαμην.) Arnold*.

minds more than necessarily dejected. That though you deem your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world obvious for use, the land and the sea, you are of the one entire masters, both of as much of it as you now possess, and also of as much more as you shall think fit. Neither is there any king or nation, of those that exist in the present time, that can impede your navigation, with the fleet and strength that now belongs to you. So that you must not put the use of houses and lands, of which you now think yourselves deprived as of a mighty matter, into the balance⁴ with such a power as this, nor take the loss of these things heavily in respect of it; but rather set little by them, as but a light ornament and embellishment of wealth, and think that our liberty, as long as we hold that fast, will easily recover to us these things again; whereas subjected once to others, even what we possess besides is wont to be diminished. Shew yourselves not in either⁵ way inferior to your ancestors, who not only held this, got by their own labours, not left them, but have also preserved and delivered the same to us; for it is more dishonour to lose what one possesses, than to miscarry in the acquisition of it; and proceed against the enemy, not only with courage, but also with disdain: for a coward may have a bold and boasting spirit from happy ignorance, but he that is confident on judgment that he is superior to his enemy, also disdains him, which is now our case. For if fortune be equal, prudence, accompanied with the disdain of our enemies, renders daring more to be trusted, and it trusts less to hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, than to judgment drawn from present certainties, wherein there is a more sure foresight.⁶

LXIII. “You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city has got from her dominion, (in which you all exult,) and either not decline the pains, or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now concerning your liberty and servitude only, but also concerning the loss of your rule over others, and the danger you have contracted, from

⁴ *Κατα*, on a level with. *Arnold*.

⁵ That is, in preserving and in delivering down these possessions. *Goell*.

⁶ “And if Fortune be impartial, ability, with a high and confident spirit, is the surest warrant for daring; nor is its trust placed in hope, which is but the comfort of the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon present realities, whose anticipations are far more trustworthy.” *Arnold*.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

those to whom offence was given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over, if any one through fear at this present time, in his love for ease, would thus play the honest man; for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which appears indeed unjust for you to take up, but unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it, would quickly overthrow their state, even if they lived in a free city by themselves. For the quiet life can never be preserved, if it be not united with the active, nor is a secure slavery conducive to a reigning, but to a subject city."

LXIV. "Be not therefore seduced by men of this sort, nor angry with me, (with whom yourselves decreed this war,) because the enemy invading you, has done what was likely he would, if you were unwilling to obey him. And as for the disease, (the only thing, I say, that exceeded the expectation of all men,) it has come upon us beyond all that we expected, and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that, but unjustly, unless when any thing falls out fortunate above your expectation, you will also put that to my account. Evils that come from heaven you must bear necessarily, and such as proceed from your enemies valiantly; for so it has been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to impede: knowing that this city has great name amongst all people, for not yielding to adversity, and that it has acquired the greatest power that is known up to this present time, at the expense of so many lives, and so much labour in the war; the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry, (for it is the nature of all things to decay,) will remain with posterity for ever: how that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have sustained the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city: now this, though he that loves ease may condemn, yet the active man himself will emulate, and they that have not attained the like will envy. But to be hated and to displease, happens for the time to all who have thought themselves worthy to have the command of others; and he counsels aright that undergoes hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasts not long, and both a present splendour and an immortal glory hereafter is left behind. Since then you foresee both what is honourable for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure both

the one and the other by your courage now; and send no more heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor shew yourselves to be weighed down with your present ills; for they whose minds are least grieved, and whose actions most oppose a calamity, both amongst states and private persons are the best."

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

LXV. In such speech as this did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself, and to withdraw their thoughts from the present afflictions: but they, though for the state in general they were persuaded by his words, and sent to the Lacedæmonians no more, but rather stimulated to the war, yet they were every one in particular grieved for their several losses. The poor,⁷ because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses, and costly furniture in them in the country; but the greatest matter of all was that they had war instead of peace. Nor did they desist from their anger altogether, till they had fined him in a sum of money.⁸ Nevertheless, not long after, (as is the fashion of the multitude,) they made him general again, and committed the whole state to his administration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled, and for the necessities of the commonwealth they prized him more than any other. For as long as he was in authority in the city during the time of peace, he governed the same with moderation, and guarded it safely, and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, he also appears to have foreseen what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death.⁹ For he told them that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion, nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all, and in such other things besides, as seemed not to concern the war, managed the state according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What

Pericles is
fined, and
soon after-
wards
elected
com-
mander in
chief.

Death of
Pericles.

⁷ The people, because setting out with little, they were deprived even of this.

⁸ Plutarch says, authors are not agreed about the amount of the fine laid on Pericles; some making it fifteen talents, others fifty. According to Diodorus, it was eighty. The person who urged them on to fine him was Cleon.

⁹ Plutarch says he died of the plague.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

succeeded well, the honour and profit of it came most to private men; and what miscarried was to the city's detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this, that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude, and was not so much led by them as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no unbecoming arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but on the strength of his character durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them in fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name a democratical state, but in fact a government of the principal man. But they that came after being more equal amongst themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied themselves to give in to the humours of the people, even as regarded the management of public affairs. From whence, many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded, and also the voyage to Sicily, which was not so much from mistaking in their opinion those whom they went against, as from those who sent out the expedition not voting¹ afterwards the needful supplies to those that had gone the voyage. But through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army, and then also as to affairs in the city, were first involved among themselves in internal troubles. But being overthrown in Sicily, both with the destruction of their other forces, and of the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition, yet they held out three years,² both against their first enemies, and the Sicilians with them, and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus, the king's son, who took part with, and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet; and never gave in till they were overthrown, having fallen among themselves into private dissensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have proved superior to the Peloponnesians by themselves, in this war.

¹ Ἐπιγινώσκοντες, "voting, decreeing," as Dr. Arnold renders the word; a sense preferable to that of "knowing."

² This passage proves that Thucydides lived till the end of the war.

LXVI. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island lying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof are a colony of the Achæians of Peloponnesus, but confederates of the people of Athens. There were in this fleet one thousand men of arms, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral; and having landed, they wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.

LXVII. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus, of Corinth, and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagoras, of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and Polis, of Argos, a private man, as they were travelling into Asia to the king, to endeavour to persuade him to grant them money, and to share with them in the war, first come to Thrace, to Sitalces, the son of Teres, with a desire to induce him also, if they could, to forsake the league with Athens, and to make an expedition to Potidæa, where the Athenian army was now laying siege, and not to aid the Athenians any longer; and by his aid to make their way to the other side of the Hellespont, to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, where they wished to go, who would convoy them to the king; but the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus, the son of Callimachus, and Ameniades, the son of Philemon, then happening to be resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they might not go to the king, and, as far as their share was concerned, do hurt to the city, whereof he himself was now a member. Whereunto being persuaded, as they journeyed through Thrace, to take ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them before they got on board, by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameniades, with command to deliver them into their hands; and they, when they had them, carried them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians fearing Aristeus, lest escaping he should do them further mischief, for before also he was manifestly the author of all the business of Potidæa, and about Thrace, the same day put them all to death, unjudged, and desirous to have spoken somewhat: and threw them into pits, thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedæmonians, by the same practices with which they had began, as they had slain and thrown into

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

The Lacedæmonians, with one hundred ships under Cnemus, make an unsuccessful attempt on Zacynthus.

Certain Peloponnesian ambassadors, going to Persia to solicit the alliance of the king, are seized in Thrace by Sadocus, and delivered over to the Athenians, who put them to death without a trial.

Year 2.
A.C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

The Ambraciots attack Argos of Amphilochia, and are unsuccessful in their attempts on the city.

pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates, whom they took sailing in merchants' ships,³ about the coast of Peloponnesus.⁴ For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians, or neutral.

LXVIII. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciots, both they themselves, and having also raised many of the Barbarians, made an expedition against Argos of Amphilochia, and the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilocheus, the son of Amphiaraus, after the Trojan war; who at his return disliking the then state of things at Argos,⁵ built this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being pressed by calamities, they invited the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to dwell with them. And then they first learned the Greek language now used, from the Ambraciots that lived among them; but the rest of the Amphilochians are Barbarians. Now the Ambraciots in process of time drive out the Argives, and hold the city by themselves; whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians, who sent thirty galleys to their aid, and Phormio for their general. Phormio being arrived, they take Argos by assault, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common: and this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots, therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, afterwards, during the time of this war, make this expedition with an army partly of their own, and partly raised amongst the Chaonians, and other neighbouring Barbarians. And coming to Argos, were masters indeed of the field; but when they could not take the city by assault,

³ Ὀλκαδες. Ships of the round form of building; for the use of merchants, not for the use of war, as were galleys, and other vessels of the long form.

⁴ Vide Herod. vii. 137.

⁵ The Scholiast says, he found his mother Eriphyle put to death by his brother Alemaëou.

they returned, and disbanding, went every nation to his own. Such events took place in the summer.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
O1. 87. 3.

LXIX. In the following winter, the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio, who fixing his station at Naupactus,⁶ guarded the passage, that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crissæan gulf. And six other galleys, under the conduct of Melesander, they sent into Caria and Lycia, as well to gather tribute in those parts, as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates from taking their post on those coasts, and from thence molesting the navigation of such merchant ships as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phœnicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he had abroad, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of a part of his army.

Phormio with twenty ships is stationed at Naupactus.

Melesander slain in Lycia.

LXX. The same winter, the Potidæans, unable any longer to endure the siege,⁷ seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise from the siege, and seeing their victual failed, and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food, to eat one another, propose at length to Xenophon, the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, the son of Aristoelides, and Phanomachus, the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders who were appointed against them, to come to a treaty. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by lying in a cold and wintry place, and that the state had already spent two thousand talents⁸ upon the siege, accepted it. The conditions agreed on were these:—To depart, they and their wives and children, and their auxiliary soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes, and every woman with two; and to take with them every one a certain sum of money for his charges by the way. And under this treaty they came out of the place; and they went, some to the Chalcidæans, and others to other places, as they could get to. But the people of Athens both blamed their commanders for coming to terms without them, (conceiving that they might have got the city on whatever conditions they wished,) and

Potidæa surrenders.

⁶ Lepanto.

⁷ Socrates and Alcibiades were present at this siege.

⁸ £387,500. Diodorus says, that before Agnon left Potidæa, (see chap. 58,) more than a million talents had been expended in the siege; and this took place some months before the surrender.

Year 2.
A. C. 430.
Ol. 87. 3.

sent afterwards a colony to Potidæa of their own citizens, and fixed them there. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war written by Thucydides.

YEAR III. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The
Lacedæ-
monians
march
against
Platæa.

An em-
bassy sent
to meet
them.

LXXI. The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates did not make an incursion into Attica, but turned their arms against Platæa, led by Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Platæans sent ambassadors forthwith unto him, with words to this effect:—"Archidamus and you Lacedæmonians, you do neither justly nor worthy yourselves and ancestors in making an expedition into the territory of the Platæans. For Pausanias, of Lacedæmon, the son of Cleombrotus, having together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market-place of Platæa to Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates, and granted to the Platæans this privilege; that they should hold and inhabit their land and their city under their own laws; that none should make war against them unjustly, nor for the purpose of enslaving them; and if any did, the confederates then present should do their utmost ability to assist them. These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the contrary, for you are come with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your fathers and of our country, we bid you, do no damage to the territory of Platæa, nor violate those oaths; but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias."

Confer-
ence be-
tween Ar-
chidamus
and the
ambassa-
dors.

LXXII. The Platæans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: "Men of Platæa, ye say what is just, if ye would do as ye say. For as Pausanias has granted to you, so also be you free; and help to set free the rest, who having been partakers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war is only for the deliverance of them and others; of which, if you will especially participate, keep your oaths. But if this does not

please you, (as we have also offered to you formerly,) be quiet, and mind your own affairs, and take part with neither, receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of war, and this will be sufficient for us." Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they heard him, returned to the city; and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus, that what he had advised was impossible for them to perform, without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were their wives and children: and that they feared also for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands; or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it. But Archidamus, to encourage them, made this answer: "Deliver you unto us, Lacedæmonians, your city and your houses, shew us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered, and depart yourselves whither you shall think good, as long as the war lasteth; and when it shall be ended, we will restore unto you whatever we have received from you: in the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice you for your maintenance."

LXXIII. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and, having consulted with the people, made answer: "That they would first acquaint the Athenians with what he proposed, and if they could persuade them to consent, they would then accept the conditions: till then, they desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory wasted." Upon this he granted them so many days' truce as was requisite for their return, and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Plataean ambassadors were arrived at Athens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: "The Athenians say thus: That neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injury of any, nor will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us, by the oaths of our fathers, not to make any alienation touching the league."

The Plataeans send to Athens, and, being encouraged by the Athenians, determine to resist the Lacedæmonians.

LXXIV. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians, but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

before their eyes, and to suffer whatsoever else might befall them; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make this answer: "That it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians had required." When they had answered so, Archidamus the king first began to make a protestation to the gods and heroes of the country, saying thus: "All ye gods and heroes, protectors of Plataea, be witnesses that we neither invade this territory, wherein our fathers, after their vows unto you, overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in, at all unjustly, because they have first broken the league they have sworn: nor what we shall further do will be any injury, because though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused. Assent yet also to the punishment of the beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms."

Archidamus prepares to besiege Plataea.

LXXV. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war. And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisado about the town, that none might go out. That done, he raised a mound against the wall, hoping with so great an army, all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down beams from Cithæron, they built them in on all sides [of the mound], placing them like mat-work,⁹ to serve instead of walls, to keep the earth from falling too much away, and cast into it brushwood and stones and earth, and whatsoever else would serve to complete their end. Seventy days and nights continually they kept on heaping it up, distributed into parties to give each other rest, in such manner, as some might be carrying whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedæmonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities, and had the charge of the work. The Platæans seeing the mound rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which having placed on the wall of the city, in the place where the mound was heaped up, they built it within full of bricks, taken from the adjoining houses, demolished for that purpose; the timber serving to bind them together, that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and curried skins, both to keep the timber from the

⁹ So that the timbers crossed each other at right-angles. So the bodies of the murdered Coreyræans were piled in carts in the same way. IV. 48. *Arnold.*

shots of fiery arrows, and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mound went up as fast on the other. The Plataeans used also this device; they broke a hole in their own wall, where the mound joined, and drew the earth from it into the city.

Year 3.
A.C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians, when they perceived it, took clay, and ramming it into hurdles of reeds, cast the same into the aperture, that it might not give way like the earth, and be carried off. The Plataeans excluded here, gave over that plot, and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mound from within the city by guessing the direction, fetched away the earth again, and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, they were the less near finishing it, the earth being drawn away below, and settling on the part where it was voided. The Plataeans, nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further: they gave over working at the high wall against the mound, and beginning at both ends of it, from the low wall,¹ built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city, that if the great wall were taken, this might resist, and compel the enemy to make another mound; and by coming further in, to be at double pains, and to become more exposed on both sides to their missiles. The Peloponnesians, together with the raising of the mound, brought to the city their engines of battery; one of which, being brought up upon the mound, shook down a great part of the high wall, and put the Plataeans into great fear; and others to other parts of the wall, which the Plataeans partly turned aside, by casting ropes about them, and partly with great beams, which being hung by long iron chains from either end,² from two other great beams jutting over, and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart, and wherever the engine was about to light, they let the beam fall, slacking the chains, and letting their hands go; and it falling upon it with violence, broke off the beak of the engine.

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians seeing their engines availed not, and the counter-wall was raised against the mound,

The besiegers endeavour,

¹ That is, from the low or original wall, where the wall returned again to its original lower elevation. *Arnold.*

² Ἄπο της τομης, at the extremities, where the beam had been cut off. *Arnold.*

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
without
success, to
set fire to
the city.

thinking it impossible to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to blockade it by circumvallation. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it. For there was no way they did not think on to have gained it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought fagots of small wood, they cast them from the mound into the space between it and the wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled; and then they piled them up also as far into the city, as at that elevation they could reach: and throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before, made by the hand of man. For, as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attrition, owing to the winds, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one, and the Plataeans, that had escaped other mischiefs, wanted little of being consumed by this. For within, for a great space in the city, they could not approach it: and if the wind had been with it, blowing it on, (as the enemy hoped it might,) they could never have escaped. But it is reported that there fell much rain then, with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished, and the danger ceased by that.

The Peloponnesians having built a wall round Plataea, and left a portion of their army (with the Bœotians) to defend it, retire.

Four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women, are shut up in Plataea.

LXXVIII. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army, and dismissing the rest, inclosed the city about with a wall, dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it, out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus,³ they left a guard for one half of the wall, (for the other was guarded by the Bœotians,) and departed with the rest of their army, and were disbanded according to their cities. The Plataeans had before this sent their wives and children, and all their unserviceable men, to Athens. The rest were besieged, being in number, of the Plataeans themselves four hundred, of the Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to dress their meat. These were all when they began the siege, and not more, neither free nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the siege of the Plataeans carried on.

LXXIX The same summer, at the same time that this

³ On the nineteenth of September.

expedition was made against Plataea, the Athenians, with two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made an invasion against the Chalcidæans of Thrace, and the Bottiæans, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon, the son of Euripides, and two others.⁴ These coming before Spartolus, in Bottiæa, destroyed the corn, and expected that the town would have been rendered by the devices of some within. But such as would not have it so, having sent for aid to Olynthus before, there came from thence into the city for its protection, a supply both of men of arms and other soldiers. And these issuing forth from Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves in order of battle near the town itself. The men of arms of the Chalcidæans, and certain auxiliaries with them, were overcome by the Athenians, and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcidæans, and their light-armed soldiers, overcame the horsemen and light-armed of the Athenians; but they [the Athenians] had some few targeteers from the territory called Crusis. When the battle was now just begun, there came a supply of other targeteers from Olynthus, which the light-armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength, and also as having had the better before, with the Chalcidæan horse and this new supply charged the Athenians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with those who carried the baggage; and as often as the Athenians charged, the Chalcidæans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcidæans charged them, and shot at them. The Chalcidæan horsemen also rode up, and charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn their backs, and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidæa, and having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcidæans and Bottiæans, when they had set up a trophy, and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded, and went every one to his city.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
The Athenians undertake an expedition against the Chalcidæans and Bottiæans.

Attack Spartolus,

but are obliged, after losing four hundred and thirty men, (with Xenophon and his two colleagues,) to retire into Potidæa.

LXXX. Not long after this, the same summer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania, and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to

Cnemus, with one thousand heavy-armed men and

⁴ Phanomachus and Calliades.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
some
allies,
lands in
Acarmania
and
marches
against
Stratus.

send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania; saying, that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, (the Acarnanians of the sea coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest,) having easily gained Acarnania, they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephallenia, and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their cruises about Peloponnesus; and that there was a hope besides to take Naupactus.⁵ The Peloponnesians being induced, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet admiral,⁶ with his men of arms, in a few galleys immediately; and sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciots, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciots, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his one thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea, having escaped the observation of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the invasion by land. He had in his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of Barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, whom Photius and Nicanor led, who being of the families eligible to the authority, had now the annual government. With the Chaonians came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king.⁷ The Molossians and Antitanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharyps, their king, who was yet a minor. The Paravæans were led by their king Orædus; and under Orædus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdicas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last arrived afterwards. With this army began Cnemus to march, without staying for the fleet from

▪ The possession of Naupactus was of the greatest consequence to the Athenians, as it gave them complete command of the Crissæan gulf.

⁶ *Ναυαρχον ἐτι ὄντα*—the particle, *ἐτι*, yet, denotes that the office of admiral at Lacedæmon continued only for a limited time; at least, a few years later, for only one year.

⁷ The Thesprotians, according to Homer, were governed by kings. See *Odys.* v. 115. They had therefore either done away with regal authority, or some particular tribe of them were without kings.

Corinth. And passing through Argia, they destroyed Limnæa, a town unwall'd. From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania; conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would easily come over to their side.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

LXXXI. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by sea, did not join their forces, but guarded every one his own, and sent to Phormio, bidding him come to their aid. But he answered them, that since there was a fleet about to set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians, to the end that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other Barbarians in the middle; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on the right hand; and Cnemus, with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots, on the left: each army at great distance, and sometimes were not even seen by each other. The Grecians in their march kept their order, and went warily on, till they had got a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians, confident of themselves, and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, did not halt to encamp, but marching furiously on, together with the rest of the Barbarians, thought to have taken the town at the first attack, and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this, whilst they were yet in their way, and imagining, if they could overcome these, thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city, and when the enemies approached, fell upon them, both from the city, and from the ambushes at once; and being thrown into affright, many of the Chaonians were destroyed. And the rest of the Barbarians seeing these shrink, stayed no longer, but turned to flight. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far before, and, as they then thought, had pressed on to choose a commodious place to pitch in. But when the Barbarians broke in upon them in their flight, they received them, and joining both camps together, stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest

The Chaonians, rushing on before the rest of the army, fall into an ambuscade, and are defeated.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

of the Acarnanians, but used their slings against them, and troubled them much that way; for without their defensive armour, there was no stirring. And in this practice, the Acarnanians are held to be most skilful.

Cnemus
retreats
to the
Anapus,
thence
to the
Æniadæ,
where the
army sepa-
rates.

LXXXII. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army to the river Anapus, eighty furlongs from Stratus, and the next day fetched off the dead bodies upon truce. And Æniadæ having come to join them from friendship,⁸ he made his retreat thither, before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours: and from thence each went home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the battle against the Barbarians.

The Pello-
ponnesian
fleet sail-
ing to
Acarnania
is brought
to midway
by Phor-
mio, and
forms itself
into a
circle.

LXXXIII. In the mean time, the fleet of Corinth, and the other confederates, that was to set out from the Crissæan gulf, and to join with Cnemus to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with Phormio, and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the engagement took place at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set on them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea, but furnished rather for the land service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys, durst fight with theirs, that were seven and forty. Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them on the other, and that now when they went off from Patræ,⁹ in Achaia, to go over to Acarnania, in the opposite continent, that the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and that they [the Peloponnesians] had not escaped their observation by secretly anchoring during the night, they found they were then of necessity to fight, in the very midst of their passage over. The commanders of the fleet were such as the cities that set it forth

⁸ Or alliance, as the Æniadæ seem to have in alliance with the Lacedæmonians. Vid. I. 111.

⁹ Phormio was watching to catch them in the open sea, ἐν τῇ ἐδρυχωρίᾳ. They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea; in the midst of which, Phormio came up to them and engaged, κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμον. The sea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is a narrow sea, but it was open compared to the gulf within, and gave Phormio great advantage. By this action he obtained great glory, and Plutarch reckons it among the most remarkable exploits related by Thucydides.

had severally appointed ; but of the Corinthians these, Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians formed a circle of their ships, as large as they were able, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through ; with the prows of their galleys outward, and sterns inwards, and into the midst thereof, received such small vessels as came with them ; and also five of their swiftest galleys, to charge out, coming up [to where their aid was wanted] speedily, in whatsoever part the enemy should charge.

LXXXIV. But the Athenians with their galleys drawn up one after one in a column, went round them, and compressed them up together, by continually grazing as they passed, and making a show of immediately attacking them. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight, till he himself had given them the signal. For he expected that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land, but that the galleys would fall foul of one another, and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the midst ; and if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, that they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it would be in his own power, whenever he might wish, and would be most opportune at that time. When this wind came down upon them, and the galleys of the Peloponnesians being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled, with the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered them ; and when one galley fell foul of another, and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles, and through the noise they made, keeping off, and reviling each other, heard nothing, neither of the orders given, or of the directions of the pilots ; and for want of skill, unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galleys less obedient to the steersmen ; then, and with this opportunity, he gave the signal, and the Athenians charging, sink first one of the admiral-galleys, and afterwards they destroyed all, wherever they attacked them, and brought them to that pass at length, that not one applying himself to the fight, they fled all towards Patræ and Dyme, cities of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased them, and taken twelve galleys, and picked up and taken on board most of the men that were in them, sailed away

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
It is attacked and shamefully defeated by twenty Athenian ships under the command of Phormio.

Year 3.
A.C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

The Peloponnesians fly to Cyllene, where they are joined by Cnemus.

Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, are sent to act with Cnemus.

Twenty ships, sent by the Athenians to assist Phormio, are detained in Crete.

Phormio anchors with his twenty ships at Rhium of Molycrium.

to Molycrium; and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians, with the remainder of their fleet, went presently along the coast from Dyme and Patræ to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas, and with him the galleys from that place, with which this other fleet should have been joined.

LXXXV. After this, the Lacedæmonians sent unto Cnemus, to the fleet, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to be of his council, with command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first attempt at sea) very much against reason; and that it was not so much a defect of their fleet as of their courage: never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion; who being arrived with Cnemus, sent word to the cities about to provide their galleys, and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory; and to bid them send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready; because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys, but commanded him that had the charge of them to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, which was hostile to them, saying that he could gain it over to them. Which he did, to gratify the Polichnitæ, that bordered upon the Cydoniataë. Therefore, with these galleys, he sailed into Crete, and, together with the Polichnitæ, plundered the territory of the Cydoniataë; where also, by reason of the winds, and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.

LXXXVI. In the mean time, whilst the Athenians were detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of battle sailed along the coast to Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium near Molycrium, and anchored without it, with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians'

side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and this [space] makes the mouth of the Crissæan gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to anchor at Rhium of Achaia, with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus, where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain six or seven days one over against the other, training and providing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had suffered by it before; nor the other to enter the strait, because to fight within they thought to be the enemy's advantage; at last, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily, before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together, and seeing the greatest part of them to be fearful through their former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect :

Oration of Cnemus.

LXXXVII. "Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand, on account of the event of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For, as you know, we were inferior to them then in preparation, and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things, and our unskilfulness made us miscarry in some respects in our first sea-fight, so that the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice. Nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event. But we must think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of the valiant can never fail, and that they will not be likely, while valour is yet left, by pretending want of skill, to become cowards under any circumstances. And yet you are not so much short of their skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage, will not be without a memory also, to put what they know in execution, yet without courage no art is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confounds the memory, and skill without courage avails nothing. To their superiority therefore of skill, oppose your superiority of valour; and to the fear caused by your being worsted, oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

The Peloponnesian fleet, consisting of seventy-seven ships, anchors at Rhium of Achaia.

The commanders on each side address their men.

Address of Cnemus to the Peloponnesian army before the battle in the Crissæan gulf.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

fleet, and to fight on your own shore, with your aids at hand of men of arms: and for the most part, the greatest number, and best provided, get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this, will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, attend every man to his own duties, not deserting the place assigned him. And for us we shall order the battle as well as the former commanders; and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive the fitting punishment, and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit."

LXXXVIII. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, likewise, doubting that his soldiers were but faint-hearted, and observing they had consultations apart, and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told them, and predisposed their minds to an opinion, that there was no number of galleys so great, the attack of which they could not endure; and also most of the soldiers had of long time assumed this idea among themselves, that being Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians; yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their courage; and having assembled the Athenians, said thus:

Oration of Phormio.

Address of
Phormio
to the
Athenian
soldiers on
the same
occasion.

LXXXIX. "Soldiers, having observed your fear of the enemy's number, I have called you together, not thinking it right to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys, for that they were overcome before, and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof, as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them, they are now come up; wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea. But in reason the advantage must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not, and as touching the advantage of either side in skill, we may

better be bold now than they. And the Lacedæmonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, through the reputation they have, bring them to fight, for the greatest part, against their wills; for else they would never have undertaken a new battle after they were once so thoroughly overthrown. Fear not, therefore, any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would resist them unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them. For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they advance, more from confidence of their strength than of their judgment. But they that are much the fewer must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained. Which these men now considering, fear us more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskillfulness, and some also by timorousness, both which we ourselves are free from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf, nor go in thither; seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy afar off, or if he be himself over-pressed again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them, or turning to and fro at one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea-fight would of necessity become the same with a battle by land, wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the mean time, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily, and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. In the fight, consider of the greatest importance order and silence, as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea,¹ and repel these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts. And the contest is one of great importance to you, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies, or

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

¹ Ὅ ἐς τε τα πολλὰ των πολεμικων, Bekker; which is advantageous, both in most military actions, and not least of all in engagement by sea.

Year 3.
A.C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

to bring the fear of the sea nearer home to the Athenians. Again I recal to your recollection that you have beaten them once already ; and men once overcome will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before."

Phormio is drawn from his anchorage by a stratagem of the Peloponnesians.

XC. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed towards their own coast within the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing leading the way. In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys, to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along in that direction, within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs, and avoid the attack, but that these galleys might shut them in. Phormio fearing, as they expected, for the town, now without guard, as soon as he saw them putting to sea, against his will, and in extreme haste, went aboard, and sailed along the shore, with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore, which they most desired, upon one sign given, suddenly having turned their ships so as to front them, sailed every one as fast as he could against the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those, the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing, and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open space.² The rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, as they fled, rendered them unserviceable. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew ; and the galleys, some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty, and one they took with the men in her. But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them, and fighting from the decks recovered them again, after they were already being towed away.

Eleven Athenian ships get into the open gulf.

Some of the others are taken, and some rescued by the Messenians.

XCI. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory,

² That is, the mid channel of the Corinthian gulf ; wide in comparison with the narrow space between the shore and the enemy, where the other nine vessels were compelled to fight. *Arnold.*

and disabled the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys which had avoided them when they turned, and were got into the open space. These flying towards Naupactus, arrived there before the enemy's, all save one, and stopping under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak-heads, and put themselves in readiness for defence, in case the enemy should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were singing the hymn of victory, as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas being far before the rest, gave chase to one Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now there chanced to be out at sea a merchant ship, lying at anchor, round which the Athenian ship being first to sail, struck the Leucadian galley that pursued her, and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident the Peloponnesians began to fear, and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water, and hindered the way of their galleys, a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the distance was so small from which the enemy might attack them, and stayed for more company. And some of them through ignorance of the coast ran upon the shelves.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
O1. 87. 4.

Ten of the eleven ships get safe into Naupactus.

The eleventh, by a manœuvre round a merchant vessel, sinks a Leucadian ship, which is in chase of her.

The Peloponnesians (twenty ships) in pursuit back their oars, and some run ashore.

The Athenians attack and drive them into Panormus.

XCII. The Athenians seeing this, took heart again, and together with one clamour set upon them; who resisted not long, because of their present errors committed, and their disarray; but turned and fled to Panormus, from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed, and took from them six galleys that were hindmost, and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had injured by the shore, and tied astern of theirs. Of the men, some they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates, the Lacedæmonian, who, when the galley was lost, killed himself, and his body drove into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory, and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they injured by the shore; and the galley which they had taken

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

The
Pelopon-
nesians
retire
towards
Corinth.

Twenty
Athenian
ships
arrive from
Crete.

A detach-
ment sent
overland
from Co-
rinth to
Nisæa, to
man forty
ships and
attack
Piræus,
lands at
Salamis,
and storms
a fort
on this
island.

they consecrated [to Neptune] in Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crissæan gulf and to Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus; and the summer ended.

XCI. But before the fleet that had retreated into the Crissæan gulf and to Corinth was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas, and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians, in the beginning of winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make an attempt upon Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar, and that on very good cause, considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved, that every mariner, with his oar,³ his cushion, and thong,⁴ should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lies towards Athens, and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisæa, the arsenal of the Megareans which then were there, and sail presently to the Piræus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any expectation that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them. For they durst not have attempted it openly and deliberately; nor if they had had any such intention, could [the Athenians] but have been aware of it. As soon as it was resolved on they set presently forward, and arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisæa, and set sail, not now towards Piræus, as they intended, fearing the danger, and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them, but towards the promontory of Salamis, that looks towards Megara.

³ It may be hence gathered, that in the galleys of old there was but one man to one oar.

⁴ *Τροπωτήρ*. Dr. Arnold explains this of the thong used to fasten the oar to the row-lock (*σκαλμος*), or to the thole-pin (*τυλος*), as they used but one, as the boatmen still do in the Mediterranean, instead of letting the oar work between two pins, and thus requiring no thong. Another idea is, that it was a roll of rope; that was wound round the oar, to prevent it from slipping beyond its proper distance in the row-lock; so as to answer somewhat a similar purpose that the button, usually fixed to an oar or scull, does now. The *ὑπηρεσιον* appears the same as what Theocritus calls the *κωας*. Id. xxi. 12. "Μηρινθος, κωας τε, γερων τ' ἐπ' ἐρεισμασιν λεμβος."

Now there was upon it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys that kept watch, to hinder the importation and exportation of any thing to or from the Megareans.⁵ This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them; and being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also all other parts of the island.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

XCIV. By this time the watch-fires⁶ signifying the coming of enemies were lifted up towards Athens, and affrighted them as much as any thing that had happened in all this war; for they in the city thought the enemies had been already in Piræus; and they in Piræus thought the city of the Salaminians had been already taken,⁷ and that the enemy were all but instantly sailing into the Piræus; which, had they not been afraid, nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole strength of the city into Piræus, and launched their galleys, and embarking in haste and tumult set sail towards Salamis, leaving for the guard of Piræus an army of foot. The Peloponnesians, upon notice of those succours, having now overrun most of Salamis, and taken many prisoners, and much other booty, besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisæa. And somewhat they feared the more, for that their galleys had been drawn down into the water, after [having been laid up for] a long time, and were by no means water-tight. And when they came to Megara, they went thence towards Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, sailed home; and from that time forward looked better to Piræus, both by the shutting of the ports by booms, and by all other careful measures.

The Athenians sail to Salamis, and the enemy retire at their approach.

XCV. About the same time, in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces, an Odrygian, the son of Teres king of Thrace, made an invasion against Perdiccas the son of Alexander king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcidæans bordering on Thrace, upon two promises; one of which he wished to compel to be performed to him, and the other to perform

Sitalces undertakes an expedition against Perdiccas and the Chalcidæans.

⁵ Compare iii. 51. iv. 67. *Arnold.*

⁶ Fires lifted up, if they were steady and unmoved, signified the approach of friends; if waved to and fro, of enemies.

⁷ *την τε Σαλαμινα ἦρησθαι*, Bekker. *την τε Σαλαμινίων πόλιν ἦρησθαι*, Duker; and they in Piræus thought that Salamis was taken.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

His two
reasons for
undertak-
ing this
expedi-
tion.

himself.⁸ For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war, and for not restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, who was his enemy, which he never paid him; and Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them, that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcidæans of Thrace. For these causes, therefore, he made this expedition, and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip, with purpose to make him king of Macedonia, and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and Agnon, the Athenian commander. For the Athenians were also to have joined with him against the Chalcidæans, both with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.

XCVI. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he raises first those Thracians that inhabit within the mountains Æmus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Æmus he levied the Getæ and all the nations that dwelt within the river Ister, stretching along down to the Euxine sea. The Getæ and people of those parts are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scythians are, all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains, and are free states, all swordmen, and are called Dii, the greatest part of whom are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some followed as volunteers. He levied also the Agrians and Leæans, and all the other nations of Pæonia in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the Graæans and Leæans, nations of Pæonia,⁹ and to the river Strymon; which rising out of the mountain Scomius, flows through the territories of the Graæans and Leæans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward those of the Pæonians who are still subject only to their own laws. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Trierians make the bound of his dominion and the Tilatæans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius, and reach westward as far as to the river

⁸ *δύο ὑποσχέσεις*, Bekker. *δια δύο ὑποσχέσεις*, Duker; of two promises, wishing one to be performed to him, and the other himself to perform.

⁹ *μέχρι Γραίων Παιονών*, Bekker. *μέχρι Γραίων και Λεαίων Παιονών*, Duker; to the Graæans of Pæonia.

Osciis, which comes out of the same mountain as Nestus and Hebrus, a great and desert mountain adjoining to Rhodope. Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

XCVII. The dimension of the dominion of the Odrysians by the sea side, is from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, in the Euxine sea; and is, the nearest way, a sail of four days and as many nights for a round ship,¹ running continually before the wind.² By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the Ister eleven days' journey for an expeditious footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea.

Now for the continent; from Byzantium to the Leæans, and to the river Strymon, (for it reaches this way farthest into the main land,) it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey to accomplish the distance.³ The tribute from all the Barbarian nations, and from the cities of Greece, as much as they paid in, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalces, and made the most of it,) was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents⁴ yearly. And presents of gold and silver were brought him, that came to as much more; besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not only to him, but also to all the men of authority and Odrysian nobility who had power with him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give: as it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and

¹ *Νηι στρογγυλη*, a ship that uses only sails, of the round form of building, and serving for burthen, in distinction to galleys, and all other vessels of the long form of building, serving for war.

² Literally, "if the wind stands continually at the poop." Computing the day's voyage at 700 stadia and the night's at 600, it makes the length of the voyage about 5200 stadia, which are 556 English miles and a little more. By land, reckoning the day's at 200 stadia or 21 miles and three quarters, it would be 239 miles; it is really more than 280; which difference may be accounted for by the epithet *εὐξωνος*. This is Dr. Arnold's calculation. Mr. Bloomfield computes the sail at 280 miles, and the journey by land at 330; but surely that by sea must be much the greatest distance. For the computation of a ship's course at 1300 stadia in the 24 hours, vide Herodot. iv. 86.

³ (*ταυτη γαρ δια πλειστον απο θαλασσης ανω ἐγιγνετο*,) Bekker. (*ταυτη γαρ δια πλειστον απο θαλασσης ανω*) ἐγιγνετο, κ. τ. λ. Duker. But for the continent, from Byzantium to the Leæans, and the Strymon, (for here it is the greatest distance up from the sea,) for an expeditious man it is thirteen days' journey.

⁴ £78,940.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

go without. Moreover too according to their power they used this custom the more; for without gifts, there was nothing to be got done amongst them; so that this kingdom arrived to great power: for of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian gulf⁵ and the Euxine sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians: for there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but neither of Asia, that are comparable to them in this point, or that, as long as they agree, are able, one nation to another, to stand against the Scythians; but yet, however, in matter of council and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not to be accounted equal to other men.

Sitalces
invades
Macedo-
nia;

XCVIII. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army, and when all was ready set forward, and marched towards Macedonia. First through his own dominion, then over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Pæonians, over which he marched the same way that he himself had formerly made by levelling the forest, when he made an invasion against the Pæonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Pæonians, and on the left the Sintians and Mædi, and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus, in Pæonia. His army as he marched diminished not any way, except by sickness, but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace that came in uncalled, in hope of booty. Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than one hundred and fifty thousand men, whereof the most were foot, the horse being a third part, or thereabouts; and of the horse the greatest part was supplied by the Odrysians themselves, and the next most by the Getæ: and of the foot, those swordmen, a free nation, that came down out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.

XCIX. Being collected altogether at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas: for there are in Macedonia the Lyncestians and Helimiots, and other high-land nations, who, though they be confederates, and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that

⁵ The Adriatic sea.

which is now called Macedonia toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who came out of Argos, were the first possessors, and reigned in the same; having first by force of arms driven out of Pieria the Pierians, (who afterwards seated themselves in Phagres and other towns beyond Strymon, at the foot of Pangæus; from which cause that country which lies at the foot of Pangæus, and bends toward the sea, is called the vale of Pieria to this day,) and out of that which is called Bottia, the Bottiæans, that now border upon the Chalcidæans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Pæonia, near the river Axius, reaching from above down to Pella, and to the sea. Beyond Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia, as far as the Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore they drove the Eordians out of the territory, now called Eordia, (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca,) and the Almopians out of Almopia. These same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold them yet, as Anthemus, Grestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia, and was the kingdom of Perdiccas, son of Alexander, when Sitalces came to invade it.

C. The Macedonians, unable to stand in the field against so great an army, retired all within their strong holds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded; these were not many then, but were built afterwards by Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, when he came to the kingdom, who then also cut straight roads, and arranged all such other matters, both of war, as horses and arms, and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings⁷ that were before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first, which had been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him through friendship to Amyntas, the son of Philip, who

⁶ The kings of Macedonia are called ἀπογονοὶ Τημενου, by Herod. viii. 137. Temenus obtained the kingdom of Argos at the return of the Heraclidæ. See also Herod. v. 22. and ix. 44.

⁷ Herod. (viii. 139.) gives the names of these kings: 1. Perdiccas, the founder of the kingdom; 2. Aræus, (or Argæus;) 3. Philip; 4. Eropus; 5. Alcetas; 6. Amyntas; 7. Alexander; 8. Perdiccas.

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

was then in the army. They also assaulted Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the left hand of Pella and Cyrrhus; but within these, into Bottiæa and Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had not even an idea of making head against them with their foot, but, having sent for horses beforehand from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience; and where they charged none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen, and well armed with breast-plates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemy, they fought against manifest odds of number, and got into danger; so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

and after
a stay of
twenty-
two days
there, and
eight in
Chalci-
dæa,

CI. After this, Sitalces had a conference with Perdiccas touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey,) but had sent ambassadors to him with presents, he sent a part of his army against the Chalcidæans and the Bottiæans, wherewith having driven them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians, and all the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, were afraid he would have turned his forces upon them, and stood on their guard. And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely, the Panæans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersæans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose, by virtue of their league. But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidæan, Bottiæan, and Macedonian territories; and when he could effect nothing of what he came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus,⁸ his cousin-german, and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded

he retires
at the in-
stance of
Seuthes.

⁸ ὑπο Σευθου του Σπαρδακου, Bekker. του Σπαρδακου, Duker; he is persuaded by Seuthes, the son of Spardacus.

him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage, and money with her: and Sitalces, at the persuasion of him, after the stay of thirty days in all, whereof he spent eight at Chalcidæa, retired with his army with all speed to his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

CII. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was disbanded, the Athenians that were at Naupactus made an expedition under the conduct of Phormio, and sailed along the coast to Astacus, and disembarking, marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys, and four hundred more Messenians. With these he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places, all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Cynes, the son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought they should not be able to make war against the Æniadæ,⁹ (who only of all Acarnania are the Athenians' enemies,) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelous, flowing out of the mountain Pindus, and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and through the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Æniades, which also it surrounds with fens, by the abundance of water, maketh it impossible for an army to lie there in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinadæ lie just over against Æniadæ, hard by the mouth of Achelous. And the river being a great one, continually heapeth together the gravel; insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already, and the like in short time is expected by the rest. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbid; but also the islands themselves stand thick, and are as chains to connect the deposit one to another, in that they do not lie apart,¹ lying in and out, not

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

Phormio
expels all
doubtful
characters
from Stra-
tus, Co-
ronta, and
other
places,
and re-
stores
Cynes to
Coronta.

⁹ Vid. ii. 82. and i. 111.

¹ τῶ μὴ σκεδαννῆσθαι, may refer either to the islands, or to the deposit; when it may be rendered "on account of the deposit of the river not being scattered:" νῆσοι seems the natural nominative to γίνονται, but if τῶ μὴ σκεδαννῆσθαι be referred to the deposit, it might perhaps be preferable to

Year 3.
A. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.

in a direct line, nor so much as to give the water its course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert, and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo, by his oracle, did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmaeon, the son of Amphiaraus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother; telling him, that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him till he had found out, and seated himself in such a land as, when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen, nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted to him. Hereupon being in difficulty, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground heaped up by the river Achelous, and thought there was enough cast up to support life, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore seating himself in the places about the Cœniades, he reigned there, and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have received it, concerning Alcmaeon.

He sails to
Naupac-
tus, and
thence the
next
spring to
Athens.

CIII. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus in the very beginning of the spring, came back to Athens, and brought with them such galleys as they had taken, and the free men they had taken prisoners, in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended the winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.

take *συνδεσμοι* to govern the verb, and to render thus, "and chains are formed of the deposit from one to another, on account of the deposit not being scattered." The reading *το* instead of *τφ* is preferred by Dr. Arnold, who thus excellently renders the passage, "The islands serve to connect the depositions made by the river with one another, so that the soil should not be dispersed in the sea."

BOOK III.

I. THE summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and there set them down, and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy wherever there was an opportunity, and kept back the multitude of light-armed soldiers, from going out before the camp,¹ and infesting the places near the city. And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they returned, and were disbanded according to their cities.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
The
Pelopon-
nesians
invade
Attica.

II. After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians; which though they would have done before the war, (but the Lacedæmonians would not then receive them,) yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they stayed to have first heaped up the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls, and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnæans, and of the Mitylenians themselves, certain particular men, upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them, that the Lesbians were forced to go all to dwell at Mitylene;² that by the help of the Lacedæmonians, and their kindred the Bœotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt, and

The
Lesbians
revolt
from the
Athe-
nians.

¹ Τα δπλα, the open space where the arms were piled; and more generally the camp where the heavy-armed were quartered. *Arnold.*

² The effect of which would have been to make Mitylene the seat of government, and Antissa and Methymne municipal towns, with a local and subordinate, instead of a sovereign government of their own affairs. Compare II. 15. on the similarity of measures employed by Theseus in Attica. *Arnold.*

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

that unless some one presently prevented it, all Lesbos would be lost.³

The Athenians send ambassadors to command the Mitylenians to demolish their walls, and on their refusal send a fleet of forty ships against them.

III. The Athenians (afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot, and at the hottest) thought it a dangerous matter to add Lesbos, which had a navy, and was of strength entire, to the rest of their enemies; and at first received not the accusations, allowing the desire that they might not be true to have too much preponderance. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mitylene, and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves, and put an end to their preparation, then fearing the worst, they would have prevented them. And to that purpose suddenly sent out forty galleys made ready to sail round Peloponnesus, with Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two other commanders. For it had been reported to them, that there was a feast of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city, and that to the celebration thereof, the Mitylenians were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they should command the Mitylenians to deliver up their galleys, and to demolish their walls; and then to make war against them if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mitylene, which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league to aid them, the Athenians kept with them, and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the mean time, a certain man went from Athens into Eubœa by sea, and then by land to Geræstus, and finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mitylene three days after he set forth from Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis, as was expected, and for the rest they stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.

The Mitylenians having received information of this, make preparations to receive the enemy.

The Athenians arrive at Lesbos, and grant a truce to the inhabitants, who send

IV. When the Athenians, not long after, arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mitylenians what they had in charge, which when they did not hearken to, they presently fell to the war. The Mitylenians unprovided, and compelled to a war on a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight: but being driven in again by the

³ For an account of the origin of this war, see Aristot. Polit. v. 4.

galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley; desiring, if they could, upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island. When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mitylenians, amongst others, sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design, and had repented him after of the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Moreover they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedæmon, undiscovered by the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at anchor in Malea,⁴ to the north of the city; being without any confidence as to the success of the answer from Athens. And these men, after a difficult voyage through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedæmon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence.

V. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mitylenians and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for these, together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, had aided the Athenians,) prepared themselves for the war. And the Mitylenians, with the whole strength of the city, made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and came to a battle; wherein though the Mitylenians had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst trust to their strength, but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city, one Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who having been sent out before the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle, entered the haven in a galley, and persuaded them to send another galley along with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta; which they did.

VI. But the Athenians, much strengthened by the Mitylenians' inactivity, called in their confederates, who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than it was thought they would have done; and

⁴ This Malea, according to the scholiast, seems not to be the promontory of Malea, which lies to the south of Mitylene, but some other nearer place, on the north side of the city.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
messengers to Athens and to Lacedæmon.

The Mitylenian ambassadors having returned unsuccessful from Athens, war commences. The Mitylenians, after a doubtful battle, retire within their walls to wait for reinforcements from Peloponnesus.

The Athenians blockade Mitylene by sea.

Year 4.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 88. 1.

bringing their ships round to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and established their blockades at both the ports, and so quite excluded the Mitylenians from the use of the sea. As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much: and the Mitylenians and other Lesbians that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys, and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mitylene.

Asopius, being sent to Peloponnesus with thirty ships, attacks Œniadæ unsuccessfully, and is afterwards slain at Nericus.

VII. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys to Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Asopius, the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio for general into those parts. These, as they sailed round, wasted the maritime country of Laconia, and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself, with twelve galleys, went on to Naupactus. And afterwards having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon Œniadæ, and both sailed with his galleys about the mouth of the river Achelous, and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when they would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and sailed with his galleys to Leucas, and landed his soldiers on the territory of Nericus; but in going off, was, by those of the country that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison soldiers there, both himself and part of his company slain. And having afterwards, upon truce, received from the Leucadians the dead bodies, they went their ways.

The Mitylenian ambassadors plead their cause at Olympia, and Lesbos is received into the Peloponnesian confederacy.

VIII. Now the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that went out in the first galley having been referred by the Lacedæmonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end they might determine about them, together with the rest of the confederates, went to Olympia accordingly. It was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor.⁵ And when, after the solemnity, they were set in council, the ambassadors spake to them in this manner:

Oration of the ambassadors of Mitylene.

Speech of the Mitylenian ambassadors

IX. "Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians: for they that take into

⁵ He is said to have conquered in the pancratium first in Ol. 87. again in Ol. 88. and a third time in Ol. 89. He is mentioned also in Aristot. Rhet. I. 2. §13.

league such as revolt in the wars, and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason, when they that revolt, and they from whom the revolt is made, are mutually like-minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no fair cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger.

X. "For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any communion between city and city, to any purpose whatsoever, without a mutual opinion of each others' honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherways: for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions. As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Median war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business: yet we entered not such a league to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal; but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes, and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct councils, unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell, all but ourselves and the Chians, into their subjection; and we having still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable, when they had subdued those, whom together with us they took into league, but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest."

XI. "It is true, that if we were now all in liberty, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, but deal in equal terms with us, in all likelihood they will take it ill,

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
delivered
in the
general as-
sembly of
the allies
at Olym-
pia.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

our alone being on an equality, in comparison with the greater part that had already yielded to them : especially when by how much they are become stronger, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear, is the only band of faith in leagues ; for he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the advantage of strength, will abstain from making the attempt. Now the reason why we were yet left free, is no other, but because all that tended towards their dominion, appeared to be more obtainable by plausibility of language and by the method of policy, than by that of force. For therein they made use of us for an argument, that having equal vote with them, we would never have followed them to the wars, if those against whom they led us had not done the injury. And by the same policy also they first brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker, by stripping of all the rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength, and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added to yours, or to any other, it might have created them some danger. Partly also we remained free by our paying court towards their commons and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have shewed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out.

XII. "What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this, when we received each other without sincerity ? When, whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us, and when they had peace, we for fear courted them ? And whereas in others, good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear : so it was, from being bound more by fear than love that we remained their confederates ; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely, in some way or other, to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended, without staying in our turn to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them, and to prepare⁶ schemes in return, as

⁶ Mr. Bloomfield prefers the sense of "delay," which this word may bear, and renders it "to shew a return of forbearance ;" while Dr. Arnold trans-

they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

XIII. "Upon these pretensions, therefore, and causes, men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we have revolted; the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright and compel us to take some course for our own safety; which we would have done before, when, before the war, we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us into your league. And now, when the Bœotians invited us to it, we forthwith obeyed. Wherein we thought we should make a double revolt,⁷ one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free; and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the speedier aid, thereby the better at once both to defend those you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at this present: for the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed, and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have many galleys to spare, in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and land; but they will either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or will retire from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive that you shall herein, at your own danger, defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be (as a man would think) in Attica, but there from whence cometh the profit to Attica. Now the revenue

lates, "to threaten them continually with hostilities in return;" according to the force of *μελλησαι*, "to be going to do a thing."

⁷ "We thought to withdraw ourselves from the Greeks whom we were injuring, and from the Athenians who were meditating to injure us; that so we might at once escape doing wrong to others, and suffering it ourselves." Such seems the sense of the passage, as nearly as it can be given in English; for we cannot express the double meaning of *ἀποστησῆσθαι*, "to stand aloof from and decline doing a thing," and, "to revolt from the leading state of a confederacy." *Arnold*.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

they have comes from their confederates, which, if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt, and all that is ours will accrue unto them; and we shall be worse handled besides, than they who were slaves before [they revolted].⁸ But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, (the thing you most stand in need of,) and also easily overthrow the Athenians by drawing away their confederates; because every one will then be more confident to come in, and you will avoid the imputation of not assisting such as revolt from their league [unto you]. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.

XIV. "In reverence, therefore, of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are like suppliants, receive the Mitylenians into league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who, though as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own, shall bring a common profit to all Greece if we prosper, and a more common detriment to all the Grecians, if through your inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men, such as the Grecians esteem you, and our fears desire you to be."

The Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Athens by land and sea.

XV. In this manner spake the Mitylenians. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose the Lacedæmonians appointed their confederates there present, to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with the intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lies towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in of their fruits, and weary of making expeditions.⁹

⁸ So Dr. Arnold renders, and the reason of their fear is plain; because, not being yet enslaved, "they would seem to have revolted on much less provocation."

⁹ Mr. Bloomfield well remarks, it was not *war* they were weary of, but *campaigning*, as they had already made one campaign this season.

XVI. The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made from an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see they were deceived, as being able without stirring the fleet at Lesbos easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out one hundred galleys, and embarked therein generally both citizens, (except those of the degree of Pentacosimedimni,¹ and horsemen,) and also strangers that dwelt amongst them : and sailing to the isthmus, made a show of their strength, and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false, which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors ; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city, by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again ; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
The Athenians send one hundred ships round Peloponnesus: the Lacedæmonians abandon their attempt on Athens, and prepare a fleet for Lesbos.

The Athenians return home.

XVII. About the time that this fleet was out, they had the greatest number of galleys, at once fit for active service, and in fine condition.² But in the beginning of the war they had as many galleys, and even more in number. For one hundred attended the guard of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis, and another hundred were about Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidæa, and in other places ; so that in one summer they had in all two hundred and fifty. And this, together with Potidæa, was it

¹ Solon divided the people of Athens into four ranks: the first consisted of those who were worth five hundred medimns of liquid and dry commodities, equal to about a thousand drachmæ, or ten minæ per annum, and who were called Πεντακοσιομεδιμοι. The second, of those who had three hundred medimns, or were able to keep a horse, and who were called Ἴππαδα τελουντες. In the third were ranked those who possessed two hundred medimns, and who were termed Ζευγίται, from being able to keep a yoke of oxen to plough their land. In the fourth, all the rest, termed Θητες, who were not capable of bearing any office in the government, but who had a vote in all public assemblies. Vide Boeckh, vol. ii. p. 259.

² Goeller considers the construction to be νηες αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ ἅμα καλλεῖ ἐγένοντο, while Dr. Arnold joins ἐνεργοὶ to καλλεῖ, and renders "on active service, in fine condition." He considers the phrase ἐν τοῖς πλείοις to signify "some of the most numerous," as ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, "some of the first."

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

that most exhausted their treasure. For the men at arms,³ that besieged the city, had each of them two drachmas a day, one for himself and another for his man, and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first, and remained to the end of the siege; besides one thousand and six hundred more, that went with Phormio, and came away before the town was won. And the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money first consumed, and thus many galleys were employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

The Mitylenians make an unsuccessful attack on Methymne.

XVIII. About the same time that the Lacedæmonians were at the isthmus, the Mitylenians marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries, against Methymne, in hopes of having it betrayed to them; and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus; and after they had settled the affairs of those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnæans likewise made war upon Antissa; but beaten by the Antissæans, and some auxiliaries that were with them, in a sally that took place, they made haste again to Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the Mitylenians were masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with one thousand men of arms of their own city, who supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrive at Mitylene, and carry a single wall round it. And here and there castles were built on strong points. So that the city was every way strongly besieged both by sea and land: and the winter began.

WINTER. The Athenians send out one thousand fresh men under the command of Paches.

XIX. The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves and sent thither two hundred talents,⁴ of this their first contribution, and also despatched Lysicles and four others with twelve galleys, to levy money amongst the confederates.⁵ But Lysicles, after he had been to

The Athenians raise two hundred talents at home.

Lysicles being sent

³ Ὀπλιται; a man at arms had double pay for himself and for a servant. The drachma was worth about seven-pence three farthings. Pericles was the first that introduced the custom of paying soldiers at Athens. What sum they in general daily received it is difficult to determine, it being increased or diminished as occasion required.

⁴ £38,750.

⁵ Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες, κ. τ. λ. Bekker has altered the pointing of this

and fro, and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Mæander, in Caria, as far as the hill Sandius, was there set upon by the Carians and Anæitians, and; with a great part of his soldiers, was himself slain.

Year 4.
A. C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
to collect
money is
slain in
Caria.

XX. The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were yet besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians,) pressed now with want of victual, and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out, and if they could to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt were Theænetus, the son of Timidas,⁶ a soothsayer, and Eupolpidas⁷ the son of Daimachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards somehow or other, on account of the greatness of the danger, shrunk from it again. But two hundred and twenty, or thereabouts, voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner; they made them ladders fit for the height of the enemies' wall; the wall they measured by the layers of brick on the part toward the town, where it was not thoroughly whitewashed over; and divers men at once numbered the layers; whereof though some might miss, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just; especially numbering them often, and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied; and so by guess of the thickness of one brick took the measure of their ladders.⁸

The be-
sieged
Plataeans
plan an
escape.

XXI. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built: it consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea, and another outward, in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen feet; and that sixteen feet of space which was betwixt them, was disposed and built into cabins for the guards, which were so joined and continued one to another, that the whole appeared

sentence; in his edition it stands thus: Both they themselves then for the first time made a contribution of two hundred talents, and sent also to their allies twelve ships, with Lysicles and four others as commanders, to levy money.

⁶ Tolmidas.—*Bekker*.

⁷ Eupompidas.—*Bekker*. Τολμιδας, *Bekker*. Τιμιδας, *Duker*. Εὐπομπιδας, *Bekker*. Εὐπολπιδᾶς, *Duker*. Tolmidas and Eupompidas.

⁸ Vide *Livy* xxv. 23. "where one of the towers of Syracuse is measured in the same way." *Arnold*.

Year 4.
A.C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower of a just breadth to comprehend both walls, and reach from the utmost to the inmost front of the whole, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but it went through the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm of rain they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to watch under the towers, as not being far asunder, and covered beside over head. Such was the form of the wall wherein the Peloponnesians kept their watch.

A number
of them
mount the
enemy's
walls,

XXII. The Plataeans, after they were ready, and had watched for a tempestuous night of wind and rain, and withal moonless, went out of the city, and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to the wall of the enemy, who, amid the darkness, could not see them coming: and could not hear them, the wind making a blustering against the clatter that was raised by their approach. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms; and were but lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot,⁹ for the more steadiness in the mire. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders, and placed them to the wall; then twelve lightly armed only with a dagger and a breast-plate went up, led by Ammeas, the son of Corœbus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him went up, into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that carried the darts, for whom they that came after carried their targets at their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up, which targets they were to deliver to them when they came to the enemy. At length, when most of them were ascended, they were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers: for one of the Plataeans taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, which made a great noise in the fall,¹ and presently there was an alarm; and the army ran to the wall; for in the dark and stormy night they knew not what the danger was, and at the same time the Plataeaus that

⁹ See Virgil, *Æn.* vii. 690. "Vestigia unda sinistra" "Instituere pedis, crudus tegit altera pero." *Wass.*

¹ Δουπον ἐποίησε, *Bekker.* Ψοφον ἐποίησε, *Duker.* Sounded.

were left in the city came forth, and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite part to that where their men went over, that the enemy might turn their attention as little as possible towards them. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir from his own place of guard to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred² that were appointed to assist the watch, upon all occasions of need, went without the wall, and made towards the place of the clamour. And the beacons were raised, by which they used to make known the approach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Platæans likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy without meaning, and that the Thebans, apprehending the matter to be otherwise than it was, might forbear to send help till their men who were going out might have escaped, and attained some place of safety.

XXIII. In the mean time, those Platæans who having scaled the wall first, and slain the watch, were now masters of both the towers, and not only stood and guarded the passages of the towers so that no one should bring assistance through them, but also applying ladders from the wall to the towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot, both from above and below.³ In the mean time the greatest number of them having raised to the wall many ladders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite over between the towers, and ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without, and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then came they also down to the ditch, who were in the two towers, the last of their party making their way with difficulty. And by this time the three hundred that were to assist the watch came and set upon them, and had lights with them; by which means the Platæans that were on the further brink of the ditch discerned them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts. For,

Year 4.
A.C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
and succeed in effecting their escape.

² There is no mention of these three hundred where the author relates the laying of the siege; but it must be understood.

³ That is, from the part either above or below the turret either way.
Bloomfield.

Year 4.
A.C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.

standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Plataeans the less discernible; insomuch that even these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and great endeavours; for the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north; and the night being rather snowy, together with so great a wind as that was, had very much increased the water, which they waded through with scarcely their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.

Two hundred and twelve persons reach Athens.

XXIV. Setting out from the ditch, the Plataeans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand the temple of Androcrates,⁴ both for that they supposed they would least suspect they would turn the way that led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way which, by mount Cithæron and the Oakheads,⁵ led to Athens. The Plataeans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythræ, and Hysiaë, and having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons out of a greater number: for some of them returned to the city before the rest went over; and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Plataeans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Platea passed over the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.⁶

Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, contrives to enter Mitylene secretly, and encourages

XXV. About the end of the same winter, Salæthus, the Lacedæmonian, was sent in a galley to Mitylene, and coming first to Pyrrha, and thence going to Mitylene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And he told the magistrates that Attica would again be invaded,

⁴ See Herod. ix. 25.

⁵ See b. ii. 24. Herod. vi. 108; ix. 15.

⁶ These Plateans who escaped, were settled in Scione, when the Athenians massacred the Scioneans. V. 32.

and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming; and that himself was sent before both to let them know it, and at the same time to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mitylenians grew confident, and hearkened less to come to an agreement with the Athenians. And this winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year 4.
A.C. 428.
Ol. 88. 1.
the besieged by the promise of assistance from Lacedæmon.

YEAR V. A.C. 427. Ol. 88½.

XXVI. In the succeeding summer, after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty-two⁷ galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mitylene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica; to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mitylene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general, instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet too young [to command], and Cleomenes was his father's brother. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and had begun to grow again, and also whatsoever else had been left in their previous irruptions. And this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second. For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing their corn failed, they retired again, and were dispersed according to their cities.

SUMMER.
Forty-two ships sent by the Lacedæmonians to the assistance of the Lesbians.
Fourth invasion of Attica.

XXVII. The Mitylenians in the mean time, seeing the fleet came not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians on this account. And Salæthus himself, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city who were before unarmed, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians; but they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates, but holding assemblies by themselves, required the men in authority either to bring their corn to light, and divide it amongst them all, or else they said they would themselves make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians.

The Mitylenians forced to come to terms with the Athenians.

XXVIII. Those that managed the state, perceiving this, Conditions

⁷ They have been mentioned as forty, c. 16, and c. 25; the forty probably were collected from the allied states, and the two additional were probably the contingent of Lacedæmon itself, which was never considerable. *Arnold*.

Year 5.
A.C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.
of the sur-
render.

and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they alone should be excluded from the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army, with these conditions, that it should be allowed the Athenians to take what measures concerning the Mitylenians they might please, and that they should receive the army into the city, and that the Mitylenians should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business; and that Paches, during the time till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mitylenian. This was the effect of the composition.

Those who
had com-
municated
with the
Lacedæ-
monians
are placed
by Paches
in Tene-
dos.

But such of the Mitylenians as had principally practised with the Lacedæmonians, being in great fear when the army entered the city, could not keep themselves quiet, but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches, having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa, and brought over that town also, and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

The Pello-
ponnesian
fleet, after
cruizing
round
Pelopon-
nesus, at
Embatus
of the fall
of Mity-
lene.

XXIX. In the mean time those forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which should have made all possible haste, wasted away the time about Peloponnesus, and making small speed in the rest of their navigation, they avoid the notice of the Athenians at Athens before they touched at Delos. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconum, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mitylene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus, in Erythræa. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mitylene that they arrived at Embatus, where understanding the certainty, they went to counsel about what they were to do upon the present occasion, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, delivered his opinion to this effect:

Alcidas re-
jects the
advice of
Teutiap-
lus, and
also that of
some Io-
nians and
Lesbians
on board.

XXX. "Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mitylene, as we are, before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, inasmuch as they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded, and to the sea, where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong, not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore, if we fall upon them suddenly, and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left

there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city. And let us never fear the danger, but think this, that all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which if a commander avoid in himself, and discern and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success."

Year 5.
A.C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

XXXI. Thus said he, but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia, and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel, that seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume, in Æolia, that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence induce Ionia to revolt; whereof there was hope, for they had arrived not at all against the wishes [of the Ionians, or] of any one, and if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their greatest revenue, and if at the same time there should be a great expense caused to the Athenians, attacking them, it would be well,⁸ it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They thought besides, they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion, that since they had come too late for Mitylene, it were best to return speedily to Peloponnesus.

XXXII. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to Myonnesus of the Teians, and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus, and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anæa,⁹ and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty, to kill such as had not lifted up their hands against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians; but confederates to the Athenians by constraint. And that unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends; but many now friends to

He puts many of his prisoners to death. Remonstrance of the Samians of Anæa.

⁸ I have followed Haack and Bloomfield in thus trying to render this difficult passage. Bekker reads *ἀπτοῦς*, i. e. the Lacedæmonians; if *ἀπτοῖς* is read, the passage may be translated, "and if they (the Lacedæmonians) should incur great expense by remaining at their post, they expected they could persuade Pissuthnes to join with them in war;" that is, "the Lacedæmonians need not fear the expense, for the alliance of Pissuthnes would probably be gained, and thus the Persian money would soon amply reimburse them." The copious and most useful note in Dr. Arnold's edition should be by all means referred to.

⁹ On the Samians of Anæa, see iv. 75.

Year 5. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2. become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors, he was persuaded, and set the Chians, and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty. For when men saw their fleet they never fled from it, but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst cross over to Ionia.

Alcidas, chased by Paches as far as Patmos, escapes. XXXIII. From Ephesus, Alcidas went away in haste, and fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralos,¹ (which by chance were then in their course from Athens,) whilst he lay at anchor about Icaros,² and fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea, meaning with his will to touch no land till he came to Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches and the Athenians from divers places, and from Erythræa: for the cities of Ionia being unwall'd, were extremely afraid lest the Peloponnesians sailing by, though without intention to stay, should fall upon and pillage the cities. But the Salaminia and the Paralos having seen him at Icaros, brought the news themselves. And Paches thereupon made great haste after, and followed him as far as the island Patmos;³ but when he saw he could not reach him he came back again, and thought he had good fortune, since he had not fallen in with those galleys upon the wide sea, that the same were not compelled by being taken in some place near land to fortify themselves, and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

Paches takes Notium.

XXXIV. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited, after the town above⁴ was taken by Itamanes and the Barbarians that were brought in by a faction of their own. This town was taken nearly at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians. They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians and Bar-

¹ These vessels seem to have been the packets or yachts of the state.— Their force was small compared to that of ships of war, as they were chiefly designed for expedition. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who, besides receiving more pay, deemed it a greater honour to serve on board these vessels.

² Icaros, according to Bekker; commonly put Klaros.

³ Patmos, according to Bekker; commonly put Latmos, the island: but there is no mention of such an island by any of the geographers.

⁴ The city of Colophon, two miles higher into the land.

barians of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and then, with such of the Colophonians of the upper town as being of the Median faction entered with them, they governed the city at their pleasure: and the other part which went out from these, and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again, and Hippias was thereupon come to him, committed him to custody, but without bonds; and withal assaulting the wall on a sudden when they expected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and Barbarians as were within. And when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had promised. But after he had him there, laid hold of him, and caused him to be shot to death; and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had Medized. Afterwards the Athenians sent governors to Notium of their own, and having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

XXXV. Paches, when he came back to Mitylene, gained Pyrrha and Eressus; and having found Salæthus, the Lacedæmonian, hid in Mitylene, apprehended him, and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army, and with the rest stayed and settled the state of Mitylene, and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought convenient.

On his return to Mitylene he takes Salæthus, and sends him with the men at Tenedos to Athens.

XXXVI. These men, and Salæthus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Athenians slew Salæthus forthwith, though he engaged to do many things, and amongst others to get the army of the Peloponnesians led away from before Plataea, (for it was yet besieged;) but upon the rest they went to council, and in their passion decreed to put them to death; not only those men there present, but also all the men of Mitylene that were of age, and to make slaves of the women and children; laying to their charge the revolt itself, that they revolted, not being in subjection as others were: and moreover the Peloponnesian fleet which durst enter Ionia to their aid, contributed not a little to their vehemence. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a

Salæthus put to death on his arrival there.

The Athenians resolve to put all the Mitylenians to death, and send orders for their immediate execution to Paches.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

galley to inform Paches of their decree, with command to put the Mitylenians immediately to death. But the next day they forthwith felt a kind of repentance in themselves, and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that were there present, and such Athenians as favoured them, understood, they induced those that bare office⁵ to bring the matter again into debate: wherein they easily prevailed, as to them also it was well known that the most of the city were desirous that some should give them another opportunity to consult of the same anew. The assembly being immediately met, amongst the opinions of divers others, Cleon⁶ also, the son of Cleænetus, who in the former assembly had prevailed to have them killed, being both in all other matters of all the citizens most violent, and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth again, and said in this manner:

Oration of Cleon.

Speech of Cleon, in which he reproaches the Athenians with their inconstancy in repenting of their decree respecting the Lesbians.

XXXVII. "I have often on other occasions thought a democracy incapable of dominion over others; but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mitylenians. For from your own selves being every day without fear or suspicion of each other, you imagine the same also in your confederates, and consider not that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent on compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth, not to the winning of the affections of your confederates. Nor do you consider that your government is a tyranny, and those that be subject to it are so against their wills, and are continually plotting against you, and obey you not out of consideration of any kindness, which to your own detriment you may do them, but more because you exceed them in strength than from any good will. But the worst mischief of all is this, if nothing we decree shall stand

⁵ That is, the Prytanes who summoned assemblies in peace and on ordinary occasions, and the ten *στρατηγοί* who called them in war and under extraordinary circumstances. See ii. 59, and iv. 118; and for further information, Schomann, de Corint. Athen. p. 61.—*Arnold*.

⁶ The cruelty and baseness of Cleon's disposition is fully shewn in this speech. Cicero styles him a turbulent but eloquent Athenian. For a sketch of his character, abilities, and policy, see Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, vol. iii. c. 21. p. 185.

firm, and that we will not know, that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws not binding; and that a plain wit, accompanied with modesty, is more profitable to the state than cleverness with arrogance; and that the more ignorant sort of men do for the most part better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser. For these love to appear wiser than the laws,⁷ and in all public debates to carry the victory, as the worthiest things wherein to shew their wisdom; from whence most commonly proceedeth the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another; and so making themselves impartial judges, rather than rival speakers, govern a state for the most part well. We, therefore, should do the like, and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such counsel to your multitude, as in our own judgment we think not good.

XXXVIII. "For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the Mitylenians in question again, and thereby cause delay, which is the advantage rather of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas revenge, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows presently. I wonder also who he is that shall stand up now to contradict me, and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the Mitylenians are good for us, or that our calamities are any damage to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence, and strive to demonstrate that that which was decreed was not decreed; or, moved with lucre, must with some elaborate and specious oration endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the prizes to others, but the danger that thence proceedeth she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words and hearers of actions, beholding future actions in the words of them that speak well, as possible to come to pass; and as to actions already past, not considering that which has been performed in your sight as more to be trusted, than what was

⁷ See Aristot. Rhet. i. 15. §. 13. On the arguments of him who has the written law in his favour.—*Arnold*.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88.2.

heard from those who highly adorned them [i. e. the actions] in a speech. You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried advice; slaves to strange things in their turns, contemners of things usual. Most especially does each wish to be himself able to speak; but if you cannot, then rivalling those who do speak [you wish] not to appear behind them in following in your mind [what he says];⁸ and if any one utters any thing clever, even to precede it with your praise, and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And, to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are more like spectators, sitting to hear the contentions of rhetoricians, than men that deliberate about the state of a commonwealth.

XXXIX. "Endeavouring to turn you from this temper of mind, I say that the Mitylenians have, for one city, done us the greatest injuries. For those that have revolted through the over-hard pressure of our government, or have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon; but they that were islanders, and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our enemies, but only by sea; in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys: and they that were permitted to have their own laws, and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus; what have they done but conspired against us, and rather warred upon us than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffer some violence,) and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing

⁸ ἐς δε, κ. τ. λ. Goeller renders this, "if that be unattainable, you range yourselves in opposition against all who are speakers, for fear you should seem in judgment their inferiors." I have followed Mr. Bloomfield and Dr. Arnold, who thus paraphrases: "And it is the first wish of every man to be himself a speaker; if this cannot be, then, rivalling those who are speakers, you would fain each be thought not to have followed their lead, and gathered wisdom as at second hand from them; but if any thing be cleverly spoken, you would be thought to have anticipated the words in your admiration of them, being apt to be forward in catching theoretical truth almost before it is announced to you, but to be slow in foreseeing its practical consequences."

their own power. But these men would neither take example by their neighbours' calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us, nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery. But being bold against future events, and extending their expectations beyond their strength, though below their desires, have taken arms against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the victory, but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But prosperity is wont to turn those cities, to which it comes most suddenly or unexpected, to insolence. Whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained by men according to the course of reason, is more firm than that which cometh unhop'd for; and they, [i. e. men,] as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mitylenians than to the rest of our confederates; for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to contemn those who pay them attention, and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now, therefore, let them be punished according to their wicked dealing; and let not the fault be laid upon the few,⁹ and the people be absolved; for they have all alike taken arms against us. And the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer chance to join with the few, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. As regards your confederates, consider, if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence; seeing that if they prosper they win their liberty, and failing, they have nothing irremediable to suffer? Besides, that against every city we must be at a fresh hazard both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it: but mis-carrying, we add these enemies to our former; and at that time will have to war against our own confederates, when we ought to oppose the enemies we have already.

XL. " We must not, therefore, give our confederates hope

⁹ The nobles, or aristocratical party.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

of pardon,¹ either founded on means of persuasion, or purchased by money, as if their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly, but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I maintain, that you ought not to alter your former decree, nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire—pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As for pity, it is just to shew it on them that are like us, and will have pity again; but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great damage, while they for their well speaking will receive in return a liberal reward.² As for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter, rather than towards those that remain such as they were before, and not a jot the less our enemies. In sum, I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do that which is both just in respect of the Mitylenians and profitable for yourselves; whereas, if you decree otherwise, you will not gratify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay, though your dominion be against right, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against right punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may play the character of good and humane men without danger. But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment; nor be less sensible you that have escaped, than they that have conspired; especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without a pretext, persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to; as suspecting the danger his remaining enemy may create him. For

¹ *προσθηναι*, Duker: *ὀγκουν δεi προσθηναι*, Bekker. We must not therefore hold forth, &c.

² Meaning that the orators are bribed and hired to give counsel to the commonwealth, according to the desire of other states. Mr. Bloomfield well remarks *πιστην* is put *πισνον*, fretam. Goeller on the contrary renders "obtained by persuasion."

he that is wronged without any constraining motive [on the part of the person who wrongs him,] and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel, than if he were an enemy on equal quarrel. Be not then traitors to yourselves, but fancying, as nearly as you can, what you would have suffered, and how you would have prized above all things else to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly; not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forgetful of the danger that once hung over our own heads: and give not only unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest of our confederates a clear example, that they will be punished³ with death whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you will less often have occasion to neglect your enemies, and fight against your own confederates."

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

XLI. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him, Diodotus,⁴ the son of Eucrates, (who also in the former assembly most opposed the putting of the Mitylenians to death,) stood forth, and spake as followeth:

Oration of Diodotus.

XLII. "I neither blame those who have brought forward the business of the Mitylenians to be again debated, nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, *haste* and *anger*; whereof the one is ever accompanied with indiscretion, and the other with scantiness of judgment. And whosoever maintains, that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is wanting in understanding, or is serving some private interest of his own. Deficient in understanding, if he thinks that it is possible by any other means to judge about what is future and indistinct; interested, if desiring to carry a disgraceful measure, and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he endeavours to affright his opposers and hearers by a good calumnation. But they, of all others, are most intolerable, who impute [to the

Reply of
Diodotus.

³ See the Greek Theatre, p. 354, for a list of future tenses of this form, used in a passive sense.—*Arnold*.

⁴ This is the only place in history where Diodotus is mentioned. A brother of Nicias was named Eucrates, (*Lys. or. pro fil. Eucr.*) and the manner in which family names were usually distributed among the Greeks would favour the supposition, that the father of Diodotus may have been brother of Niceratus, the father of Nicias.—*Mitford*.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

orators] a false parade of their eloquence for the sake of money.⁵ For if they charge a man with no more than ignorance, when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the character of a fool rather than of a rogue. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place, he is still suspected, and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool, but also void of honesty. The commonwealth gets no good by such courses; for through fear hereof it will want counsellors, and the state would be for the most part best directed, if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking; for in that case they [i. e. the people] would be persuaded to the fewest errors. For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him, but rather to appear to have the best of the argument, on fair and equal terms; and a wise state ought not, either to add *unto*, any how most certainly not on the other side to derogate *from* the honour that he already possesses, who oftenest gives good advice; and not only forbear to punish, but even to disgrace the man whose counsel is unsuccessful. And then least, either would he that lighteth on good advice deliver any thing against his own opinion, out of ambition for further honour, and to please the auditory; and he that doth not, would [least] aim, by gratifying the multitude, by the same means⁶ to attach them to himself.

XLIII. "But we do here the contrary; and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet bearing him a grudge by reason of this uncertain opinion [that we have] of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth: and thus good counsel given suddenly is wont to be no less suspected than bad. By which means, as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must bring the people over to his opinion by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound advice, is forced to use deceit to get himself believed. So that it is the commonwealth alone, which by reason of these vain surmises no man can possibly benefit, by the plain and open way, without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he is in return for his trouble

⁵ I have followed Dr. Arnold in thus rendering this passage; he explains *ἐπιδειξιν*—*ἐπι χρημασι*, as "an harangue got up in order to be paid for it;" and points out that this passage alludes to Cleon's charge, c. 38. *κερδει ἐπαιρομενος*, κ. τ. λ.

⁶ That is, by means of oratory.—*Bloomfield*.

suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We therefore, that in the most important affairs, and amidst these jealousies,⁷ do give our advice, have need to foresee farther than you who look not far; and the rather because we stand accountable for our counsel, while you are bound to render no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you, when at any time your affairs miscarry,⁸ you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own, that were in fault as well as his.

XLIV. “For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction, in the business of the Mitylenians, nor to accuse any man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how great soever be their fault, yet I would not for that advise to have them put to death, unless it be for our profit; [nor yet would I pardon them,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the commonwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future, rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon contends, that it will be profitable for the future, if we hold out death as the penalty, in that it will keep the rest from rebelling, I likewise contending against him concerning that which is advantageous with regard to the future, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice, for the fair pretexts of his; for his speech agreeing more with justice, as regards your present anger against the Mitylenians, might quickly perhaps draw you to adopt it; but we plead not judicially with the Mitylenians, so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them, which way we may serve ourselves of them most to our advantage hereafter.

XLV. “I say therefore that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not only as great, but also far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope,

⁷ “In tali vestra animi sententia,” licet ita judicetis, Goeller translates; and so also Dr. Arnold, “while such notions prevail on your part,” that is, “such a suspicion of our motives.”

⁸ Dr. Arnold in this passage agrees with Goeller, and gives “meeting from time to time with some disaster, according to the various passions which may have made you incur disasters;” taking the construction, *προς ὄργην*, (*προς ἢν τινα τυχητε (σφαλεντες.)*) Mr. Bloomfield joins *προς ὄργην* with *ζημιουτε*, and at *ἢν τινα* understands *παραινειν*.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

men hazard themselves, nor did any man ever yet enter upon a danger when he thought he could not go through with his enterprise. And what city, when it would revolt, has ever taken the enterprise in hand, when it possesses a force, (whether it be furnished by themselves or by their confederacy with others,) in their own opinion inadequate [to the design]?⁹ And all have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can keep them from it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors; and it is likely that gentler punishments were appointed of old, even for the most heinous crimes; but that in course of time, [the statutes] being still transgressed, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet even this is transgressed. And therefore either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always lend boldness to necessity,¹ and the licence of wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [i. e. the middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But *hope* and *desire* [working this effect] in all estates; this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprise, that suggesting the success; are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are stronger in their influence than evils that are seen. Besides these two, fortune also assists to urge men forward as much as any thing else: for presenting herself sometimes unlooked-for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose; and especially cities, because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and every individual acting with the whole body is wont without reason to think too highly of himself. In a word, it is a thing impossible, and a token of great simplicity in any man to believe, that when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing, that either by force of law, or by any other object of fear, it can be diverted.

XLVI. "We must not therefore, relying on capital punishment as affording us security, decree any thing too severe

⁹ All the best editors, and Mr. Bloomfield, whose translation has here been followed, agree in making this passage interrogative.

¹ Compare Aristot. Rhet. i. c. 12. §. 15, on those who commit injuries.

against them, nor make those who revolt desperate, as if there were no place to repent, nor [any possibility] of as speedily as possible cancelling their offence. For observe, that at present indeed if any city, even one in revolt, should know it could not be successful, it would come to terms, whilst it were yet able both to pay us our charges for the present, and our tribute for the time to come; but the way that Cleon prescribes, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did, and continue to endure the siege to the very last, if to come to terms late and soon amount to one and the same thing? And how can it be but injurious to us, to be at the expense of long sieges, through their obstinacy in not coming to terms, and when we have taken a city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And in this very revenue lies the strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to injure ourselves by being exact judges in the punishment of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may for the future have our confederate cities in such a condition, as to avail ourselves of their ability as regards their tributé; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws, but by the careful forethought of our own actions. But we on the contrary, when we recover a city, which, having been free and held under our obedience by force, hath, as was probable, revolted, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them: whereas we ought rather, not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to look to it before it revolt, and to prevent even the intention of it; but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can.

XLVII. “ Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your cities, the commonalty are now your friends, and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt; whereby, when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mitylenians, which did neither partake of the revolt, and as soon as they were armed, willingly delivered the city into your hands, you will first commit injustice in killing such as have done you service, and you will effect a work besides, which the great men do every where most desire. For

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

when they have made a city to revolt, they will at once have the people on their side; you having foreshewn them by the example that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas, indeed, though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it,² to the end that the only party now our friend may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up with an injury, than justly to destroy those we ought not. And that same, both *justice and profit of revenge*, alleged by Cleon,³ can never possibly be found to exist together in the same [act of vengeance].⁴

XLVIII. "You, therefore, determining that this is the best course, not upon *compassion* or *lenity*, (for neither would I have you won by that,) but upon consideration of what hath been advised, be ruled by me and proceed to judgment at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to inhabit their city. For that will be both good for the future, and also at present a terror to the enemy; for he that consulteth wisely has greater advantage with regard to his enemies than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly."

The next day, repenting of their severity, they rescind their vote, and send another vessel, which arrives at Mitylene just in time to save the lives of the prisoners.

XLIX. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the two most opposed to each other, the Athenians were still in contention which they should decree, and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal: but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest if the other⁵ arrived first, they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mitylenian ambassadors having furnished this latter with wine and meal, and promised them great rewards if they got before the other galley, they rowed so diligently, that at one and the same time they both plied their oars and ate the meal kneaded with wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind

² Viger considers this expression as equivalent to *προσποιεῖσθαι μη*, "to pretend not," as *οὐ φημι* is "I say no," and not "I do not say." See chap. vii. sect. 12. §. 7.—*Arnold*.

³ See chap. xl. *πειθομενοι μὲν ἔμοι, κ. τ. λ.*

⁴ At *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, Goeller understands *τιμωρεῖσθαι*.

⁵ As *δευτερας* must refer to the first ship, it is generally agreed that it must be either used for *ἑτερας*, or that this passage is corrupt.

against them, and thus the former galley making no great haste as going on so monstrous an errand, whereas the latter proceeded in the manner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much, that Paches had just read the sentence, and prepared to execute what they had decreed, when after it came in the other galley, and saved the city from being destroyed. So near did the Mitylenians approach to the danger.

L. But those whom Paches⁶ had sent home, as the most blameable concerning the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death; being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also razed the walls of Mitylene, and took from them all their galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnæans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts they chose out and consecrated to the gods; and for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess them, of whom the Lesbians, having engaged to pay in the rent of two minæ⁷ of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves.⁸ The Athenians received also into their hands all such towns as the Mitylenians were masters of in the continent, which were afterwards subject to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

LI. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, made an expedition against Minoa, an island⁹ that lies before Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it, and made use of the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island, as being nearer, and no more at Budorus and Salamis, both that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried, nor send out

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

The men whom Paches has sent home are put to death.

The island portioned out to Athenians, and hired from them by the original proprietors.

Nicias takes and fortifies Minoa.

⁶ Of Paches no further mention is made by Thucydides, though in the reduction of Lesbos he had greatly benefited his country. Plutarch, however, mentions, that at his return he was called to account for his conduct during his command; and finding he was about to be condemned, he slew himself in court.—See Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. iii. p. 192.

⁷ £6. 9s. 2d.

⁸ It is evident these κληρουχοι did not continue to live in Lesbos, from all the subsequent story of the revolts in that island, in viii. 22, and from Xenophon Hell. i. 6, which shews that there was no population of Athenian citizens then residing there.—Arnold.

⁹ Strabo, ix. p. 391. makes it a promontory.—Duker.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

plundering cruisers, (as they had formerly done,) and also to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore, when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisæa, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the main land, he separated it with a wall also from the continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the shallows; for it was not far distant from the main land. And that being in a few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, he returned back with his army.

The Plataeans surrender.

LII. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Plataeans having no more food, and being unable longer to hold out, came to terms in this manner with the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but those within were unable to make defence. Whereupon the Lacedæmonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force, (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedæmon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians, and should agree mutually to restore such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Plataea, as having come in of its own accord, might not have to be yielded back,) but sent a herald to them, who demanded, whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald: and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Plataeans food for certain days, till the judges, which were five, should arrive from Lacedæmon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited, but calling them man by man, they asked of every one only this question: "Whether in any point they had done the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in the present war any good service?" But the Plataeans answered by suing to make their reply more at large, and having appointed Astymachus, the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon, the son of Aeimnestus, who had been heretofore the host of the Lacedæmonians, for their speakers, said as follows:

Oration of the Plataeans.

Speech
of the
Plataeans.

LIII. "Men of Lacedæmon, relying upon you, we yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal

manner of proceeding, and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others, (as now we do,) but of yourselves only; conceiving we should so most especially obtain fairness and impartiality. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you, the judges, will turn out partial; gathering so much, both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer, and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such as, if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves, and be easily confuted if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to take our chance after we have said what we can.¹ For, for men in our case, the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken, it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side; for if we had not known one another, we might have been profited by producing testimony in things you knew not. Whereas now all that we shall say, will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear not that you mean, because you have already condemned our services [towards you], as of less importance than yours [towards us], to make that a crime; but lest we are brought to a judgment already judged, to gratify somebody else.

LIV. “Nevertheless we will produce our reasons of equity both with regard to the quarrel of the Thebans, and moreover make mention of our services done, both to you and the rest of Greece, and make trial, if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory, ‘Whether we have any way done good in this present war to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, or not?’ If you ask us as enemies, we say, that you are not unjustly treated by receiving no advantage from us. If you ask us, considering us as friends, then we say that they rather have done us the injury, who made the expedition against us. But in the time of the peace, and in the war against the Medæ, we behaved ourselves well; for the one, we brake not first, and in the other, we were the only Bœotians that joined with you in attacking him for the delivery of Greece.² For

¹ Mr. Bloomfield renders this, “to venture somewhat by thus pleading;” but the interpretation of Stephens, given in Dr. Arnold, appears preferable, “Non prius periclitari quam aliquid dixerimus.”

² See Herod. vi. 108.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at Artemisium, and in the battle fought in this our own territory we were with you and Pausanias; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength. And unto you Lacedæmonians in particular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the Helots, and seizing of Ithome,³ we sent the third part of our power to assist you, which you ought not to forget.

LV. "Such then we shewed ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is true, we became your enemies afterwards, but for that you are to blame yourselves: for when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us, and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer at hand, while yourselves dwelt far off:⁴ nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor would have suffered at our hands any such grievous injury.⁵ And if we were unwilling to revolt from the Athenians, when you bade us, we did you no injury in it: for they both aided us against the Thebans, when you shrunk from it; and after this it was dishonourable to betray them: especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought and obtained their league, and been made denizens also of their city; nay, it was befitting to follow them in all their commands with alacrity. And with respect to what you, either of you, [i. e. Lacedæmonians or Athenians,] order your confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable, but you that lead to the evil.

LVI. "The Thebans have done us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon a religious holy day,⁶ had surprised our city; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing enemy; and therefore there is no fair reason that we should now be injured for them. For if you shall measure justice by your present benefit, and by their hostility, it

³ In the third Messenian war, A. C. 464. See Thucyd. i. 101.

⁴ Herod. vi. 108.

⁵ I have here taken Mr. Bloomfield's translation of this word, who remarks that it appears to be used idiomatically.

⁶ Lit. "A holy time of the moon or month:" a term sometimes applied to a whole month, as in V. 54., and sometimes to particular days in the month. — *Arnold*.

will manifestly appear, that you are not upright judges of justice, but respecters only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more profitable to you then, when you were in greater danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side when you invade others,⁷ yet at that time when the Barbarian came in to impose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that against our present offence (if we have committed any) you should set our forwardness then; which you will find both greater than our fault, and performed also in a season when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes' power, and when they were most commended, not who did what tended to assist the invasion for them [the Medes] in safety to themselves, but who were willing to dare what was most honourable, though with danger. But we being of that number, and honoured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction, as having chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But yet it is our duty ever to shew ourselves as having the same opinion, in the same case; and to think this alone to be what is really profitable,⁸ that while what is useful for the present occasion is obtained, we may reserve moreover a constant grateful acknowledgment of the virtue of our good confederates.⁹

LVII. "Consider also that you are held as an example of honest dealing to the most of the Grecians;¹ but if you shall

⁷ I have allowed this sentence to remain in the text, as though it is not to be found in the Greek, yet it seems to express what the speaker wished to suggest; lit. "For now you come on the objects of terror to others," &c.; on which account he desires it to be understood that the Thebans have joined the Lacedæmonians, as, when *they* were weak, they joined the Persians against them.

⁸ The obscurity of this passage arises from the mixture of two methods of speaking, the orator at first applying it generally, and then to himself, which cannot be preserved in a translation. Mr. Bloomfield renders, "And yet surely it becomes men to be found holding the same opinions in the same case, and to reckon that interest is nought else but this—when they hold the return of their kindness ever sure, as reposed in allies of integrity, and (when) their own present advantage is consulted."

⁹ An instance of the seventh topic of Enthymems, that from definition. See Aristot. Rhetor. ii. c. 23. §. 8.

¹ It does not appear by any thing in this war that the Lacedæmonians deserved any reputation for justice; on the contrary, they appear by this, and other actions, not to have valued justice at all, when it crossed their own interest or passion.

Year 5.
A. C. 427
Ol. 88.2.

decree concerning us otherwise than is just, (for this judgment of yours will be well known,) you that be praised [for your valour] against us that be not blamed, take heed that they do not resent that good men should undergo an unbecoming sentence, though at the hands of better men; or that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service, should be dedicated in their common temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter that Plataea should be destroyed by the Lacedæmonians, and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the Tripod at Delphi, should now entirely blot it out of all Greece to gratify the Thebans. For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes had prevailed, we must have perished then;² and now again we are overcome by the influence of the Thebans, who were before our greatest friends, and we have undergone two of the greatest hazards, one before of famishing if we yielded not, and another of a capital sentence.³ And we Plataeans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now rejected by all, and neither does any of those who were then our allies assist us, and we have cause to fear lest you, Lacedæmonians, our sole hope, should not be firm and steady towards us.

LVIII. "But we beseech you for those gods' sakes, in whose names once we made a mutual league, and for our valour's sake shewn in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us, and (if at the persuasion of the Thebans, you have determined aught against us) to change your minds, and reciprocally to require at the hands of the Thebans this favour, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest gratitude in recompence of a wicked one, and not to bestow pleasure upon others, and receive wickedness upon yourselves in exchange. For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to make the infamy of it disappear will be a work of difficulty. For being none of your enemies, but well-wishers, and such as have entered into the

² If ἀπωλλυμεθα the imperfect be read, the sense is "would have perished:" if the present ἀπολλυμεθα, it is "were ruined;" and perhaps this last is preferable, as Poppo remarks that Plataea was destroyed by the Medes, Herod. viii. 50.

³ Νυν δε θανατου κρινεσθαι, Bekker; θανατου δικη κρινεσθαι, Duker; and now to be adjudged *worthy* of death.

war upon constraint, you cannot punish us with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to grant us personal security, and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and holding forth our hands, (and it is the law among the Grecians not to put such to death;) besides that, we have from time to time been beneficial to you: for look upon the sepulchres of your fathers, whom slain by the Medes, and buried in this territory of ours,⁴ we have yearly honoured at the public charge, both with vestments and other rites;⁵ and of such things as our land produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land, and confederates use to do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by an unjust sentence you will do the contrary of this. For consider this: Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in friendly ground, and amongst their friends: but you, if you slay us, and of Plataea make Thebais, what else do you but leave your fathers and kindred deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory, and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians obtained their liberty; and make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes; and destroy the ancestral sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?

LIX. "These things are not for your credit, men of Lacedæmon, nor to violate the common institutions of Greece, and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service, for the hatred of another, when you have received no injury from us yourselves; but to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion,⁶ in consideration not only of the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that must suffer, and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly; to which we (as becometh us, and our need compelleth us to do) crying aloud unto the common gods of Greece, whom we all worship on common altars, implore that we may persuade you to; bringing before you the oaths sworn by your fathers, [we beseech you] not to disregard them; and also we become here suppliants at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out even

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

⁴ Herod. ix. 83.

⁵ For an account of this yearly festival, see Plut. in Aristid.

⁶ The construction is *φεισασθαι οίκτου, λαβοντας (αυτων.)* Goeller.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

to the dead, not to suffer us to be in the power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies; reminding you of that day, upon which though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking, which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after, for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans that we rendered our city, (for we would rather have died of famine, the most miserable of all ways of destruction,) but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in, and let us ourselves make choice of whatever danger may follow. Also we demand of you, men of Lacedæmon, not only that we Platæans, who have been most zealous in the service of the Grecians, should not be given up, out of your own hands, and your own trust, being suppliants too, into the hands of our most mortal enemies, the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians."

LX. Thus spake the Platæans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedæmonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said, that since the Platæans had had the liberty of a longer speech (which they thought they should not) than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to speak: and being bade to say on, spake to this effect:

Oration of the Thebans.

Reply of
the The-
bans.

LXI. "If these men had answered briefly to the question, and not both turned against us with an accusation, and also out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged, made much apology and commendation of themselves in things neither laid to their charge, and for which no one blamed them, we had never asked leave to speak, but as it is, we are bound to the one point to answer, and to confute the other,⁷ that neither the faults of us, nor their own reputation may do them good, but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this, that when

⁷ Compare Aristot. Rhet. ii. 25. §. 1. on the two methods of solving arguments.—*Arnold.*

we had colonized Plataea last of all the cities of Bœotia,⁸ together with some other places, which, having driven out the promiscuous nations we had then in our dominion, they would not, as was ordained at first, allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of all the Bœotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country, when they should have been compelled to their duty, they turned unto the Athenians, and together with them did us many evils, for which they likewise suffered as many from us.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

LXII. “But when the Barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Bœotians only also Medized not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves, and most detract from us. Now we confess they Medized not, because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same fashion then of all the Bœotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration, what form [of government] we were in, both the one and the other, when we did this. For then had we our city governed neither by an oligarchy, with rights equal to all, nor by a democracy, but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet, further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under by force, and furthered the coming in of the Barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when it had no laws, but was at the will of others. But when the Medes were gone, and our city had laws, consider now when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had gotten many places already, whether by giving them battle at Coronea⁹ and defeating them, we delivered not Bœotia from

⁸ The Bœotians were driven out of Thessaly by the Thessalians, and occupied the country of the Cadmeans, which was afterwards called Bœotia, about sixty years after the Trojan war. Thucyd. i. 12. It was not till a short time afterwards that they occupied Plataea, Orchomenus, and some other places, which had at first remained unsubdued; and that they drove out from thence the mixed people that had hitherto possessed them, Hyantians, Thracians, Pelasgians, and others, who are mentioned among the earlier inhabitants of Bœotia. See Strabo, ix. 2. p. 3.—*Arnold*.

⁹ See book i. 113.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist you in asserting the freedom of the rest, finding more horsemen and more provision of war, than any of the confederates besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our Medizing.

LXIII. “ And we will endeavour to prove now, that you [Platæans] have rather wronged the Greeks, and that you are more worthy of all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens, to obtain aid against us; against us then only you should have called them to your aid, and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest; especially when it was in your power [not to have gone with them,] even if against your will you had been brought into subjection by the Athenians, as the alliance had already been formed between you and these Lacedæmonians against the Mede, which you so especially hold forth; which was sufficient not only to have protected you from us, but which is the main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you still rather chose to follow the Athenians. And you say it had been a dishonourable thing to have betrayed your benefactors: but it is more dishonourable and more unjust by far, to betray the whole body of the Greeks, to whom you have bound yourselves by oath, than to betray the Athenians alone; especially when these endeavour to deliver Greece from subjection, and the others to subdue it. Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable, nor free from dishonesty; for, as you say yourselves, you brought in the Athenians to right you, as having suffered injury, but in truth ye became their assistants in injuring others. But yet it is rather dishonourable not to return a similar kindness, than [not to return] those which though justly due, yet cannot be repaid without injustice.

LXIV. “ But you have made it apparent, that even then it was not for the Grecians’ sake that you alone of all the Bœotians Medized not, but because the Athenians did not; yet now, you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the Grecians did, claim to be profited from those actions in which you shewed your valour for the sake of others. But there is no fairness in that; but as you have chosen the Athenians, so go through this trial with their help. And produce not the oath of the former league, as if that should save you now; for you have relinquished it, and contrary to the same, have rather

helped the Athenians to subdue the Æginetæ, and some others of those who joined in the oath, than hindered them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily, and having laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it as there did us, but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the blockade of your city, to quietness and neutrality. Who can, therefore, more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general than you, who have exhibited your valour to their ruin? And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent not really to belong to you,¹ and made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have to shew touching our involuntary Medizing, and your voluntary Atticizing.

LXV. “And for this last injury you charge us with, (namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace, and of sacred festival) we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For we had done unjustly if we had assaulted your city, or wasted your territory as enemies, of our own accord; yet when the leading men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to rid you of foreign league, and conform you to the common institutions of all Bœotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress rather than they that follow. But, as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates, and took us into the city as friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill-principled from being worse,² and that the good should have their rights: taking upon them to be moderators³ of your councils, and not to deprive the city of your persons; but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your

¹ “Not agreeable to your nature.”—*Arnold*.

² After *μαλλον γενεσθαι*, Dr. Arnold understands *χειρους*, and this seems preferable; it may be taken as if it were an adjective, thus, “that your lower sort of people should not be more than they ought to be,” i. e. more powerful.

³ *Σωφρονισταί*. This word perhaps used by Thucydides, in allusion to the magistrates at Athens so called, who were ten in number, and whose business it was to take care that the young men behaved with moderation and sobriety.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

kindred; and not to engage you in hostility with any, but to settle you in peace with all.

LXVI. "And for an argument that we did not this as enemies, we did harm to no man; but proclaimed, that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the common form of all Bœotia, he should come to us. And you at first came willingly, and, having made an agreement with us, were quiet; but afterwards when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit, without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, that is, neither attempt any violent measures in deeds, and then with words persuade us to go forth again, but contrary to the agreement assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much, (for they suffered by a kind of law,) but to kill, contrary to all agreement, those that held up their hands for mercy, whom you having taken alive, afterwards had promised to spare, was not this horrid cruelty? You committed in this business three crimes, within a short interval of time: first, the breach of the composition, then the death of our men that followed, and thirdly, the falsifying of your promise,⁴ to save them, if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in the fields. And yet you say we are the transgressors, and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo punishment. Not so shall it be, if at least these men adjudge what is right; but you shall be punished now for all your crimes at once.

LXVII. "We have herein, men of Lacedæmon, been thus prolix, both for your sakes and ours. For yours, to let you see, that if you condemn them it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better appear, and that ye may not be moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had, which though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their offence doth not agree with their former character. Nor let them be profited by their lamentation or your compassion, when they cry out upon your fathers' sepulchres, and their own want of friends. For we on the other side shew, that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them and their fathers, partly slain at Coronea, in bringing Bœotia to your confederation, and partly alive and now old, and deprived of

⁴ ψευσθεισαν ὑποθεσιν, Bekker. ὑποσχεσιν, Duker; and the falsifying the agreement which you had made to us, that you would not kill them.

their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity more belongs to such as suffer undeservedly; but on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends, they may thank themselves: for of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law has been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully, rather than judicially; in which point we shall now come short of requiring them; for they shall suffer legally, and not as they say they do, with hands upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon trial by agreement. Maintain, therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of the Grecians against these that have transgressed it, and give to us, who have suffered contrary to the law, the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you: but give an example to the Grecians, that you will set forth a trial not of words but of facts; which if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, long florid orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority as you have now, would, after briefly summing the case with regard to all criminals, so proceed to sentence, men would be less in search of fair speeches, wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions."

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

LXVIII. Thus spoke the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand well as regarded their own advantage, namely, whether they had received any benefit by them or not, in this present war, because, as they said, they had entreated them both at other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Median war to stand neutral; and also a little before the siege, the Plataeans had rejected their proposition of being common-friend to both sides, according to the same league, considering themselves, in respect of these their just offers,⁵ to be now discharged of the league,⁶ and

⁵ τῆ ἐαυτῶν, κ. τ. λ. These words, Goeller says, cannot be referred except to the Plataeans; in which case they should be rendered "and as they (the Plataeans) were now by their own free will without the pale of the league;" but they are referred to the Lacedæmonians by Dr. Arnold and Mr. Bloomfield.

⁶ The Lacedæmonians deemed the Plataeans to be ἐκσπονδοί. Those who were connected with them by political or social compact, were by the Greeks termed ἐνσπονδοί, by which they meant those with whom they had poured out wine to the gods, or with whom they had made a compact sanc-

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

The Plataeans are massacred by the Peloponnesians, the women sold for slaves, the city destroyed, and the lands let out to certain Thebans.

to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth, and having asked them again the same question, whether they had any way benefitted the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this present war or no; as they answered, no, led them aside and slew them, not exempting any. Of the Plataeans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; of Athenians who were besieged with them twenty-five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for an habitation to such Megaræans as in sedition had been driven from their own, and to all those Plataeans who survived, and were of the Theban faction. But afterwards pulling it all down from the very foundation to the ground, they built a house for travellers to sojourn at, near the temple of Juno,⁷ of two hundred feet in length each way, with chambers on every side both above and below; using for the purpose the roofs and doors of the Plataeans' buildings; and of the rest of the stuff that was in the city wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads, and dedicated them to Juno, to whom also they built a stone chapel of one hundred feet [in length.] The land they confiscated, and let it out to farm afterwards, on hire by the ten years,⁸ to the Thebans. To such a degree were the Lacedæmonians alienated from the Plataeans, especially or rather altogether for the Thebans' sake, whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Plataea, in the ninety and third year after their league made with the Athenians.⁹

Alcidas reaches Cyllene, where he is joined by Brasidas, with orders for the united force to make an attack on Coreyra.

LXIX. The forty galleys of the Peloponnesians, which having come to aid the Lesbians, fled, as has been related, through the open sea, chased hard by the Athenians, and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed to Peloponnesus, and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Am-
tified by this ceremony. Those who were bound by no compact, or who had forfeited their claim to the benefit of a compact once existing, they called *ἔκσπονδοι*, out of compact, or outlaws.

⁷ Concerning the building of this temple, see Plutarch—Aristides.

⁸ That is "on leases of ten years," as Mr. Bloomfield renders.

⁹ The city of Plataea, having after this remained in ruins for the space of forty years, was restored on the peace of Antalcidas, A. C. 387; and again destroyed by the Thebans three years before the battle of Leuctra, A. C. 374. Philip, according to Pausanias, rebuilt it after the battle at Chæronea, A. C. 338. According to Plutarch, it was rebuilt by Alexander when he got possession of Asia.

braciots, in [the haven of] Cyllene, with Brasidas, the son of Tellis, come thither to be a fellow-counsellor to Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined, with their fleet augmented, to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition, there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus, that they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

LXX. The sedition in Corcyra began on the coming home of those captives which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus,¹ and released afterwards by the Corinthians at the ransom, as was said, of eight hundred talents,² for which security had been given by their hosts; but, in fact, because they had been persuaded to gain Corcyra over to the Corinthians. These men, going from citizen to citizen, intrigued how to bring the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyræans, on audience of them both, decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates, on terms agreed on; but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host³ of the Athenians, and who had been principal leader of the people; him these men called to judgment, and laid to his charge an intrigue to bring the city to the servitude of the Athenians. He being acquitted, in return called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men, saying they had cut certain stakes⁴ in the ground belonging to the temples

¹ Book i. 55.

² Though two minæ were the ordinary ransom of a heavy-armed soldier among the Peloponnesians, Herod. vi. 79, yet, as in the time of Demosthenes a talent is mentioned as the ransom of an individual of no great wealth, two hundred and fifty of the wealthiest men in Corcyra might well pay a ransom of somewhat more than three talents each.—*Arnold*. Mr. Bloomfield and others, who think it an incredible great sum, though the MSS. are unanimous against them, consider *ὄδοηκοντα* the right reading, and suggests that the π'. 80, has been taken for ω'. 800.

³ The *προξενοί*, who entertained strangers, were generally appointed to that office by the king or the people, according as the government was monarchical or democratical; but if the individual did it of his own accord, he was called *ἑθελοπροξενός*.

⁴ *Χαρακας*, stakes, either for vine props, which are particularly called *χαρακες*, or for other profane use.—The sacred groves were regarded as peculiarly holy. The Athenians inflicted capital punishment on those who took the smallest piece of wood from the grove of the Heroes.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

both of Jupiter and of Alcinoüs,⁵ for every one of which there lay a penalty of a stater.⁶ And being sentenced to pay [the fine,] they took sanctuary in the temples, that the sum being great, they might pay it by stated portions at a time. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being then by the law excluded the senate, and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes, the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest, and armed with daggers, suddenly broke into the senate-house, and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty; but a few of Peithias's faction escaped to the Athenian galley that yet lay in the harbour.

LXXI. When they had done this, and called the Coreyræans to an assembly, they told them that what they had done was for the best, and that they should not now be in bondage to the Athenians. And for the future they advised them to be quiet, and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once; and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to ratify it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens, both to shew that it was fit for them to do what they had done, and also to dissuade such Coreyræans as were fled thither of the other faction, from doing any thing to their prejudice, lest some reaction should take place.

LXXII. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those Coreyræans whom they had there prevailed with; and sent them to custody in Ægina. In the mean time, on the coming in of a galley of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedæmon, those of the Coreyræans that managed the state assailed the commons, and overcame them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled to the citadel, and the higher parts of the city, where they collected and stationed themselves, and made themselves masters of the Hyllaic haven. But they [the nobility] seized on the market-place, where most

⁵ Generally written Alcinoüs, king of Coreyra, then called Phœacia, by whom Ulysses was hospitably entertained. Hom. Od. vii.

⁶ Probably the silver stater, or tetradrachm, and not the gold stater, which was equal to twenty drachmæ. See Boeckh. Econ. of Athens, p. 24. 33.—Arnold.

of them dwelt, and on the haven near it, on the side toward the continent.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

LXXIII. The next day they skirmished a little with missiles,⁷ and both parts sent abroad to the villages to solicit the slaves, with promise of liberty, to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons; and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent.

LXXIV. The next day but one they fought again, and the people had the victory, having the advantage both in strength of place and number [of men.] And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult even beyond their sex. The few beginning to fly, about the cool of the evening, and fearing lest the people should at the first attack take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire to the houses in circle about the market-place, and to the lodging houses,⁸ sparing neither any house of their own nor of another. Much goods of merchants were hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger of being destroyed. And they [the commons] having desisted from the battle, either party remained quiet during the night, and kept on the watch. When the people had got the victory, the Corinthian galley stole away, and most of the auxiliaries got over privily to the continent.

LXXV. The next day, Nicostratus, son of Diotrophes, an Athenian commander, comes up to give assistance with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian men of arms from Naupectus, and both negotiated a reconciliation, and induced them to an agreement with each other of condemning ten of the principal authors of the sedition, (who had presently fled,) and [to let] the rest dwell in peace, with articles both between themselves and with the Athenians, to esteem friends and enemies, the same as the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone, but the chiefs of the people persuaded him to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep

⁷ Ἡκροβολισαντο, skirmished with arrows, darts, stones, and the like missile weapons.

⁸ Thus Mr. Bloomfield renders this word. The οἰκίαι refer to the houses of the rich, and the ξυνοικίαι to those of the poorer citizens, where different parts of the building were occupied by different families.—*Arnold*.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

their adversaries from stirring, and they would send with him as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyræans. To this he agreed, and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies. But these fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux; but Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them, and spake to them, to encourage them; but when he could not prevail, the people (arming themselves on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention) took away their arms out of their houses, and would also have killed some of them, such as they chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hindered them. The others also, when they saw this, took sanctuary in the temple of Juno, in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise, and conveying them to the island that lies over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessities thither.

Alcidas
arrives
with fifty-
three ships
at Cor-
cyra,

LXXVI. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after the putting over of these men to the island arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where, since their voyage out of Ionia, they had lain at anchor,⁹ to the number of three and fifty. Alcidas had the command of these, as before, and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra.

engages
the Cor-
cyræans
(sixty
ships)
with
twenty,
and the
twelve
Athenians
with the
remainder.

LXXVII. The Corcyræans being in great tumult and fear, both of the seditious within and of the invasion without, at once made ready threescore galleys, and still as any of them were manned sent them out against the enemy; whereas the Athenians had advised them to allow them to go forth first, and then the Corcyræans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus scattered, two of them presently turned to the enemy, and in others, they that were aboard fought among themselves, and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyræans with twenty galleys only, the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salamina and the Paralos were two.

The Cor-
cyræans

LXXVIII. The Corcyræans having come up in disorder and

⁹ Dr. Arnold thinks this equivalent to *ἐς ἐφορμον πεμφθῆναι*, "going on a cruise."

attacking the enemy by a few at a time, were on their part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number, and lest they should be surrounded, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick, nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst against them, but charged one end of them, and sink one of their galleys: and when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then sailed about it, endeavouring to put them in disorder; which they that were placed against the Corcyræans perceiving, and fearing such another chance as befell them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid, and uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all together. But they retired, backing astern, intending that the Corcyræans should take that time to escape in; they themselves meanwhile going as leisurely back as possible, and keeping the enemy still ranged against them. Such was this battle, which ended about sunset.

LXXIX. The Corcyræans fearing lest the enemy, since they were victorious, sailing against their city, should either take aboard the men which they had put over into the island, or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men to the temple of Juno again, and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, durst not invade the city, but having taken thirteen of the Corcyræan galleys, went back to the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not to the city, no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright: and though also Brasidas, as it is reported, advised Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority; but only landing at the promontory of Leucimna, wasted their territory.

LXXX. Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those in sanctuary, and with the rest, how the city might be preserved, but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition, they manned thirty galleys, in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered. But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting their fields till about noon, went their ways again. Within night, the Corcyræans had notice by fires of threescore Athenian galleys coming towards them from Leucas, which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition, and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas,

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.
are worsted; but in consequence of the division opposed to them being called off to aid in repelling the Athenians, they get into port.

The Peloponnesians retire to the continent, and content themselves with wasting the country round Leucimna.

On being informed by signal of the approach of sixty Athenian ships, the Peloponnesians retire homewards.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

The democratic party at Corcyra, on the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet, proceeds to perpetrate the most horrible cruelties on the other party, which continue during the stay of Eurymedon.

had sent to aid them, under the conduct of Eurymedon, son of Thucles.

LXXXI. The Peloponnesians, therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, still keeping the shore, and having carried their galleys over the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not come in sight as they sailed round. But the people of Corcyra hearing of the Attic galleys coming in, and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought to the city those Messenians,¹ which before were without, and appointing the galleys which they had furnished to come about into the Hyllic haven, whilst accordingly they went round, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on, and also landed out of the same galleys all they had before persuaded to embark, and dispatched them.² And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary to undergo a legal trial; all of whom they condemned to die. But most of the suppliants, that is, all those who were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done there, killed one another in the temple: some hanged themselves on trees; every one, as he had means, made away with himself. And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his threescore galleys, the Corcyraeans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be enemies, bringing charges indeed [only] against those, who would have put down the popular form of government, though some were slain on private hatred, and some by their debtors, on account of money being owed them, [i. e. the creditors, whom they killed.] All forms of death were then seen, and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatever had happened at any time, happened also then, and more. For the father slew his son, men were dragged out of the temples, and then slain hard by; and some, immured in the temple of Bacchus, died within it. To such a pitch of cruelty did this sedition advance; and seemed so the more, because it was one of the first.

LXXXII. For afterwards all Greece, so to say, was in commotion; and dissensions arose every where between the patrons

¹ That came with Nicostratus.

² The common reading, ἀπεχωρησαν, "departed," is evidently corrupt; as they would never have spared these, and slain all others. The most probable correction appears to be ἀπεχρησαντο, as Dr. Arnold suggests; Goeller reads ἀπεχωρτο, the sense of which is the same.

of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few that desired to bring in the Lacedæmonians. Now in time of peace they could have had no pretence, nor would have been forward to call them in; but being engaged in war, the means were easily found by those of either side who wished to effect any change, both for the injury of their enemy's party, and for the advantage, at the same time, of their own.³ And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before, and shall be ever, as long as human nature is the same, yet they are more violent⁴ and more calm, and of different kinds, according as the several changes in the state of things come to pass. For in peace and prosperity, as well cities as private men are better minded, because they are not plunged into necessity of doing any thing against their will; but war, taking away the free supply of daily necessaries, is a violent master, and conforms most men's tempers to the present occasion. The cities, therefore, being now in sedition, and those that fell into it later, having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in varying their schemes, both in devising plans of assailing, and in the unheard-of cruelty of their revenges. The received signification of names they changed at their own judgment, to suit their deeds: for inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a specious fear; carefulness, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise universally, to be lazy in every particular. Inconsiderate passion was reputed a point of valour; but devising against another was held to be safety, being a specious pretext for averting his design. He that was fierce was always trusty; and he that opposed such a one was suspected. He that laid snares for another, if he succeeded, was a wise man; but he that could discover a plot laid, a more clever man than he: but he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of friendship, and

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

³ Mr. Bloomfield and Goeller consider *ξυμμαχίας* to belong to both the datives *κακῶσει* and *προσποίησει*. Dr. Arnold understands *ὑπαρχουσης*, and renders, "each party having an alliance at hand for the hurt of their adversaries," &c. This latter sense would seem more agreeable to what was above said about bringing in the Lacedæmonians or Athenians; and if this be preferred, perhaps the sentence ought to run *αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ συμμαχίας ῥαδίως ἑκάτεροις τοῖς νεωτ. τι βουλ. ἐπορίζοντο*. The opportunities of obtaining an alliance readily offered themselves to each party, &c.

⁴ *Μαλλον* hoc loco non est "potius," sed positum pro *χαλεπωτερα*.--Goeller.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto, that never meant it, was commended. To be kin to another was not to be so near as to be of his party, because these were ready to undertake any thing without scruple. For these societies⁵ were not made in accordance with the existing laws for utility, but for rapacity, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law,⁶ as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries,⁷ they received with an eye to their actions, if they were too strong for them, and not ingenuously. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconciliation, being admitted⁸ by either party with reference only to their present difficulties, were of force so long as they got no power from any other quarter; but upon the very first opportunity, he that first took courage, if he saw his enemy open to attack, thought his revenge sweeter through the confidence of the other, than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course, but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves moreover a mastery in point of wit. And men in general, when dishonest, more easily gain credit for ability, than when simple for honesty;⁹ and men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride in the other. The cause of all this is desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition, and from these motives arose the eagerness of those set on¹ conten-

⁵ Thucydides here refers to the *ξυνωμοσται* or clubs in Athens, established for the purpose of support in election to offices, or prosecutions; mentioned also in viii. 54. For an account of them, and a view of the character they afterwards assumed, see Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 70.

⁶ By oath.

⁷ If one party happened to obtain an ascendancy, and made fair proposals of reconciliation to its antagonists, these proposals were not received with a free and noble spirit, but with a constant jealousy and watchfulness of the conduct of those who made them.—*Arnold*.

⁸ Or "taken," as the expression seems here to signify, (so also Eurip. Iphig. Tauris 718.) not in the usual sense of "offered." *Arnold*.

⁹ In this method of rendering, which seems preferable, I have copied Dr. Arnold.

¹ Φιλονεικία, properly that spite which reigns in two adversaries whilst they contend, or eagerness in striving.

tion. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, by setting forth under decent titles, one the political equality of the multitude, the other the moderate aristocracy, though in words they seemed to serve the public good, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention. And striving by whatsoever means to overcome each other, both ventured on most horrible outrages, and went on their revenges to a still greater pitch, carrying out² without any regard of justice, or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own pleasure:³ and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence or with their own hands, when they should get power fully to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side at all observed religion, but those who chance to effect some detestable act under specious pretences⁴ were most commended. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions; either because they would not side with them, or for envy that they should so escape.

LXXXIII. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind, throughout all Greece, by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down and disappeared. And it was considered far the best course to stand diffidently against each other, with even their thoughts in battle array, as no promise was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to dissolve enmity. And being all of them more ready in their calculation to mistrust what was trustworthy, they rather calculated beforehand how to avoid a mischief, than were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success; for fearing both their own defect, and the subtlety of their adversaries, lest they should be overcome in words, and by the versatile cunning of the enemy's intellects, lest they should be themselves first plotted against [by their adversaries,] they therefore went boldly to work with them, with deeds. Whereas the others, through their contempt of them, thinking they

² Or enacting: so Mr. Bloomfield, "enacting punishments greater and greater." If *προστιθεντες* be read, it is "inflicting."

³ Lit. "by that which occasioned pleasure;" i. e. "which pleased either party."—*Arnold*.

⁴ Mr. Bloomfield translates, "by plausibility of words;" Heilmann renders, "Religio neutris ulla erat, sed speciosis nominibus facta obtigentes, si qui nefasti quid perpetrassent melius audiebant."

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

should be aware in time, and that they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain.

LXXXIV. In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first; and so were all others, which either such men as having been governed with pride, rather than sobermindedness, by those who [afterwards] afforded them an opportunity for revenge, were likely to commit in their retaliation; or which such men as wishing to be rid of their accustomed poverty, out of a passionate desire to possess their neighbours' goods, would, contrary to justice, resolve: or which men, not for covetousness, but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger, would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, having got now above the law, shewed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before righteous duty, nor lucre (whenever⁵ the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And men, when they take vengeance on others, think it right to do away with the common laws, concerning such duties as these,⁶ (from which laws all men retain a hope of safety in adversity,) and not to leave them in existence, against the need they themselves may have of them in danger.

On his departure,
the sur-

LXXXV. Such were the passions of the Corcyræans first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city. And Eury-

⁵ Goeller maintains, ἐν ᾧ can mean nothing but "dum," whilst, whenever, &c. Dr. Arnold refers it to "του μη ἀδικειν:" and gives, "they would not else have preferred gain to secure innocence, where envy would have lost its power of mischief."

⁶ περι των τοιουτων, i. e. περι του δσιου, and του μη ἀδικειν; to these at least it perhaps appears more natural to refer the words, than to suppose something further understood, such as "party quarrels." The sense of the passage is admirably given by Dr. Arnold as follows: "Men in their violence set the example of doing away with those common laws of humanity which all parties alike might have appealed to in their adversity, and by their own previous conduct put themselves out of the pale of these laws, when they themselves might have occasion to solicit their protection." As the genuineness of this chapter has been disputed, the student will find the point fairly and fully discussed in the note on it, at the end of the first volume of Arnold's edition.

medon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards such of the Corcyræans as had fled, (for there escaped about five hundred of them,) having seized their forts in the continent, possessed themselves of their own territory on the other side, and from thence came over and robbed the islanders, and did them much hurt: and there was a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth, concerning their return; and when they could get nothing done, having got ready boats, and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed a while after, to the number of about six hundred, into the island. Where, when they had set fire on their boats, that they might trust to nothing but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up to the hill Istone, and having there built themselves a fort, infested those within, and were masters of the territory.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.
vivors of
the aristo-
cratic
party seize
some forts
on the con-
tinent;
and after-
wards,
coming
over to
Corcyra,
fortify
Mount
Istone.

LXXXVI. In the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent twenty galleys to Sicily,⁷ under the command of Laches, the son of Melanopus, and Charæades, the son of Euphiletus: for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities, (except the Camarinæans,) which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedæmonians, but had not yet joined with them in the war; of the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities⁸ with Camarina. And in Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also for that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys, for they were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, on the pretence of their relationship, but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and also to try the possibility of making the states of Sicily subject to them. These arriving at Rhegium, in Italy, joined

Twenty
Athenian
ships,
under the
command
of Laches
and Cha-
ræades,
sent into
Sicily.

⁷ Before this time the Athenians had sent an expedition to Sicily, under the command of Lampon, to the assistance of the Catanæans; though no mention of this circumstance is made by Thucydides. On the causes of the present war, see Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. iii. p. 232. It is also alluded to in Aristoph. Vesp. 240.

⁸ See vi. 75. 82.—Arnold.

Year 5.
A. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.

with the confederates, and began the war; and so ended this summer.

WINTER.
The
plague
breaks out
again at
Athens.

LXXXVII. The next winter the sickness fell upon the Athenians again, (having indeed never totally left them, though there was some intermission,) and continued above a year after. But the former lasted two years; so that nothing more impaired their strength than this; for those that died of it, of men of arms enrolled,⁹ were no less than four thousand four hundred, of horsemen, three hundred, of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened at the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and in Eubœa, and also amongst the Bœotians and in Bœotia, chiefly at Orchomenus.

Earth-
quakes in
several
places.

The Athe-
nians in
Sicily
attack the
islands of
Æolus.

LXXXVIII. The Athenians and Rhegians that were in Sicily, made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Æolus, with thirty galleys. For in summer it was impossible to war on them for the scarcity of water [on the islands.] These islands are inhabited by the Liparæans, a colony of the Cnidians, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara, and thence they go forth, and till the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hieria. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion, that in Hieria, Vulcan exercises the craft of a smith:¹ for it is seen to send forth abundance of smoke in the day time, and of fire in the night. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi² and Messenians, but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come over to them, they put off again, and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter, and the fifth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR VI. A. C. 426. Ol. 88 $\frac{2}{3}$.

SUMMER.
The Pello-
ponnesians
intend to
invade At-

LXXXIX. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, in-

⁹ Also called ἐκ καταλογου, vii. 20.

¹ Lipara is by some represented to have been the place in which Vulcan exercised his art. See Virg. Æn. viii. 416.

² Σικελοι. There are in Thucydides mentioned Σικελοι and Σικελιῶται, whereof this latter is the name of the inhabitants of Sicily in general; the former are only those that were of that name anciently in Italy, and coming over to Sicily, gave that name to the island.

tending to have invaded Attica; but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened, they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time earthquakes being prevalent at Orobæ in Eubœa, the sea coming on from the part which then was land, and rising in a mighty surge, overflowed most part of the city, and partly submerged it,³ and partly subsided again; so that it is now sea, which before was land. And the people, as many as could not get before it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta,⁴ on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians' fort there, and of two galleys that were hauled up on dry land, it broke one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethos⁵ a certain rising of the water, but it did not flood the land. And a part of the wall, the town-hall, and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the earthquakes. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that the earthquake, where it was most strong, did there drive back the sea, and that the sea being drawn forward again on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake, such an accident could never happen.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.
tica, but
are de-
ttered by
an earth-
quake.

XC. The same summer, divers others, as they had each their own several reasons, made war in Sicily. So also did the Sicilians amongst themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians, or against the Athenians by the enemy. Charæades, the Athenian general, being slain by the Syracusians in battle, Laches, who was now the sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates, made war on Mylæ of the Messenians. There were in Mylæ two companies of Messenians, in garrison, which also had laid a certain ambush for those that came from the fleet. But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush, with the slaughter of many of them; and also assaulting their fortification, forced

Charæades slain
in Sicily.
Laches
takes
Mylæ, and
brings the
Messenians to
terms.

³ So as to cover it with water permanently. Mr. Bloomfield translates, "and part of the water formed a pool."

⁴ See book ii. 32.

⁵ A small island on the coast of Macedonia, about twenty miles in circumference. See Livy, xxviii. 5. and xxxi. 51.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

them on terms both to render the citadel, and to go along with them against Messena. After this, on the approach of the Athenians and their confederates, the Messenians came to terms likewise, and gave them hostages, and such other security as was requisite.

Demosthenes and Procles with thirty Athenian ships are sent round Peloponnesus. Nicias with sixty ships and two thousand heavy-armed men sails to Melos, and thence to Oropus; his heavy-armed march to Tanagra, and (in conjunction with a part from Athens) defeat the the Tanagreans and Thebans. Nicias returns home.

XCI. The same summer, the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, under command of Demosthenes,⁶ the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, the son of Theodorus; and sixty galleys more, with two thousand men of arms, to Melos, commanded by Nicias, the son of Niceratus. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians⁷ were islanders, and yet would neither be their subjects nor accede to their league, intended to bring them over to their side. But when on the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus, in the opposite continent;⁸ where having touched at night, the men at arms left the galleys, and marched at once by land to Tanagra in Bœotia. To which place, on a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city [of Athens] came also forth, with their whole forces led by Hipponicus,⁹ the son of Callias, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles, and joined them; and pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and lay there the night following. The next day they defeated in battle such of the Tanagreans as came out against them, and also certain succours sent them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain, and erected a trophy, they returned back, the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias, with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris, and wasted it, returned homeward likewise.

The Lacedæmonians found Heraclea.

XCII. About the same time the Peloponnesians established the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia, with this intention: the

⁶ This Demosthenes is, by the celebrated orator of the same name, ranked amongst the greatest men of his country.

⁷ Μηλιοι. The Μηλιεῖς mentioned in chap. 92, are not islanders, but a people of Thessaly, near the Melian gulf.

⁸ If this interpretation be correct, Thucydides must have very confused notions of the bearings of countries divided by the sea. Dr. Arnold therefore supposes, it is corrupted from Πειραικῆς, the name applied to the country of Oropus, ii, 24. but that at any rate it must mean "the border country," or "the country over the border," with reference to Attica.

⁹ The father-in-law of Alcibiades. See Boeckh. *Œconom. Athens*, ii. p. 242.—*Arnold*.

Melians in the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, ^{Yæet 6.} Hiercans,¹ and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians being ^{A C. 426.} afflicted with war from the Cætæans,² their borderers, intended at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful to them, they send to Lacedæmon, choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother-nation to the Lacedæmonians,³ sent their ambassadors likewise with him, with the same requests. For they also were much injured by the Cætæans. On audience of these ambassadors, the Lacedæmonians determined to send out a colony; both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians, and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very conveniently for their war with the Athenians, as they might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but short, against Eubœa; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the colonizing of the place. First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi; and the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent settlers thither, both of their own people, and of the neighbours about them, and gave leave also to any that would to go thither out of the rest of Greece, except to the Ionians, Achaians, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedæmonians; Leon, ^{Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon,} Alcidas, and Damagon: who having come there, built the city, ^{conductors of the colony;} which is now called Heraclea,⁴ from the very foundation; distant from Thermopylæ forty stadia, and from the sea twenty. Also they prepared dock-yards, beginning them close to Thermopylæ, by the pass itself, that they might have them more defensible.

XCIH. The Athenians when this city was colonized were at first afraid, and thought it was established especially against Eubœa; because from thence to Cenæum [a promontory] of Eubœa the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined, for they had no great harm by it. The reason was this: the Thessalians, who had the towns of those parts in ^{which fails completely.}

¹ Ἱεργς. These people are made mention of by no other writer. Perhaps so called, because they received the *primitiæ* sent to Apollo from the Dodonæi.

² See book viii. 3. where Agis attacks the Cætæans, *κατα παλαιαν ἐχθραν*.

³ Book i. 107.

⁴ Called also Trachinea, to distinguish it from other cities of the same name. See book v. 51.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

their power, and upon whose ground it was built, fearing lest they should have too powerful neighbours, did them great injury, and kept up upon them, who were but lately settled, a continual war, till they had worn them out, though they were very many indeed in the beginning; for being the foundation of the Lacedæmonians, every one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be firmly established. Chiefly also the governors themselves, sent thither from Lacedæmon, ruined their affairs, and dispeopled the city by frightening most men away, for that they governed severely, and sometimes also unjustly, by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

Demos-
thenes
with his
thirty ships
attacks
Leucas,
which he
is persuad-
ed by the
Messeni-
ans to
abandon.

XCIV. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garri- son soldiers in Ellomenus,⁵ of Leucadia, by ambushment; and afterwards with a greater force, and with the whole power of the Acarnanians, who followed, (all but the Cœniadæ,) and with the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen galleys of the Corecyreans, came against Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted, both without the isthmus and within, where the city of Leucas stands and the temple of Apollo, yet they durst not stir, being compelled to it by the number of the enemy. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to draw a wall to cut them off,⁶ conceiving that they might easily take it by a siege, and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so great an army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Ætolians, principally, as being enemies to Naupactus: and that if these were subdued, he would easily gain the rest of the continent thereabouts to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged, that though the nation of the Ætolians were great and warlike, yet their manner of dwelling was in villages unwalled, and those at great distances; and were but light-armed, and might therefore with no great difficulty be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophioneans,

⁵ A place mentioned by no other writer.

⁶ Ἀποτελιχίειν seems to signify, to draw a wall to cut them off from their territory, probably on both sides, as well from that within as without the isthmus.

and after them the Eurytians, which are the greatest part of *Ætolia*, reported to be of a most strange language, and to eat raw flesh; for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow.

XCV. But he, induced by the Messenians, whom he favoured, and especially because he thought, without the forces of the Athenians, with the confederates only of the continent, and with the *Ætolians*, he would be able to invade *Bœotia* by land, going first through the *Locri Ozolæ* to *Cytinium* of *Doris*, having *Parnassus* on the right hand, till he should descend into the territory of the *Phocians*, which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be brought over by force: and to the *Phocians*, *Bœotia* is the adjoining country.⁷ Putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the *Acar-nanians*, from *Leucas*, he sailed to *Solium* by the shore, and there having communicated his intention to the *Acar-nanians*, when they would not approve of it, because of his refusal to besiege *Leucas*, he himself with the rest of his army, *Cephalle-nians*, *Zacynthians*, and three hundred Athenians,⁸ the soldiers of his own fleet, (for the fifteen galleys of *Corcyra* were now gone away,) made an expedition against the *Ætolians*; having *Œneon*, a city of *Locris*, for the seat of war. Now these *Locrians*, called *Ozolæ*, were confederates of the Athenians, and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For bordering on the *Ætolians*, and using the same kind of arms, it was thought it would be of great utility in the war, to have them in their army; for that they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the country. Having lain the night, with his whole army, in the temple of *Jupiter Nemeius*,⁹ wherein the poet *Hesiod*, is reported by them that

⁷ The force of the ἡδὴ in this passage seems to be, "that *Bœotia* is the very next bordering district to *Phocia*; i. e. that *once* among the *Phocians*, he would easily get into *Bœotia*."

⁸ According to this, the number of *Epibatæ*, a service corresponding to our marines, on a trireme, was ten, for from C. 91, the number of the ships was thirty. The same proportion results from ii. 92. 102. as four hundred *Epibatæ* are described as the complement of forty ships; so also iv. 76. 101. *Herodotus* (vi. 15.) mentions forty *Epibatæ* to a ship, but this belongs to the earlier state of the naval tactics.—*Arnold*.

⁹ That is, both in the building itself, and sacred enclosure, or τεμενος, that surrounded it.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

He then sails to *Solium*, and thence to *Œneon*, from which place he sets out, and takes *Potidania*, *Crocylium*, and *Tichium*.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

dwell thereabout to have died,¹ (it having been foretold him, by an oracle that he should die in Nemea,) in the morning betimes he dislodged, and marched into Ætolia.

The Ætolians muster in great force to oppose him.

XCVI. The first day he took Potidania, the second Crocylium, the third Tichium; here he stayed, and sent the booty to Eupalium, in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, afterwards to invade the Ophioneans, (if they submitted not,) after having retired to Naupactus. But the Ætolians knew of this preparation when first resolved on; and when the army had entered their country, they united into a mighty army to make head; so that the farthest off of the Ophioneans, that reach out in the direction of the Melian gulf, the Bomians and Callians, came in with their aids.

Demos-thenes still advances, and takes Ægirium;

XCVII. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demos-thenes as before; and assuring him that the conquest of the Ætolians would be easy, bade him to march with all speed against the villages, and not to stay until they were all united and in order of battle against him, but to attempt in succession the place which came next to hand. He, persuaded by them, and confident of his fortune, because nothing had gone cross with him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians, that should have come in with their aids, (for his greatest want was of darters light-armed,) marched to Ægitium,² and coming upon it, he won it by force, the men having fled secretly out, and stationed themselves on the hills above it: for it stood in a mountainous place, about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Ætolians (for by this time they were come with their forces to Ægitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates, and running down upon them, some one way, some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight for a good while was nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians had the worst in both.

but his army being routed by the Ætolians,

XCVIII. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows and were able to use them, (for the Ætolians, because they were light-armed, were beaten back with the missiles,) they held

¹ Concerning the death of Hesiod, see Plut. in Diocl. Conviv.

² No mention of this place is made by any of the ancient geographers.

out. But when, on the death of their captain, the archers were dispersed, and the rest were wearied, having a long time continued the same labour [of pursuing and retiring,] and the Ætoli-ans continually pressing them with their darts, they at last turned to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue, and into places with which they were not acquainted, were destroyed. For Chromon, the Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Ætoli-ans pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them whilst they fled, overtaking them by speed, being swift of foot and light-armed. But the most of them missing their way, and entering a wood which had no passage through, the Ætoli-ans set it on fire, and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction, were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as survived with much ado got to the sea, and to Ceneon, a city of Loeris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men. These men were the very best out of the city of the Athenians that perished in this war: Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Ætoli-ans under truce, and were got again to Naupactus, they return with the fleet to Athens. But Demosthenes was left about Naupactus and those parts, being afraid of the Athenian people, for what had happened.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.
and Procles slain,
the survivors return to Athens.

XCIX. About the same time, the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily, sailing to Loeris, and landing, overcame such as came against them, and took a militia fort³ situated on the river Halex.

The Athenians sailing round Sicily, and in Loeris.

C. The same summer, the Ætoli-ans, having before⁴ sent their ambassadors, Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Euryt-anian, and Tisander the Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedæ-mon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus, because it was a harbour for the Athenians. And the Lacedæ-monians, towards the autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heraclea, the newly founded city of Trachis. The general of

The Lacedæmonians send three thousand heavy-armed allies under Eurylochus against Naupactus.

³ A station of the *περιπολοι*, or militia, a guard-fort. Comp. C. 115 and iv. 67. vi. 45. vii. 48.—*Arnold*.

⁴ That is, "before the Athenian expedition against Ætolia had taken place."—*Arnold*.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

The army
is joined
by various
tribes of
the Locri
Ozolæ.

the army was Eurylochus, a Spartan, with whom Macarius and Menedains went also along, Spartans likewise.

CI. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolæ, both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians the Amphissians cooperated with him most, as standing most in fear of the enmity of the Phocians. And they first giving hostages, induced others, who likewise were afraid of the advancing army, to do the like: the Myonians first, being their neighbours, (for this way is Locris of most difficult access,) then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Œantheans. All these went with him on the invasion. The Olpæans gave them hostages, but followed not the army. But the Hyæans would give them no hostages till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.

Eurylochus takes Œneon and Eupalium, but is repulsed from Naupactus by one thousand Acarnanians (who had come to assist Demosthenes.)

CII. When every thing was ready, and he had placed the hostages in Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched he took Œneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium, because they refused to yield. When they were come to the territory of Naupactus, the Ætolians being there already to join them, they wasted the fields about, and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycrium, a colony of the Corinthians, but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes, the Athenian, (for ever since the Ætolian business he abode about Naupactus,) having been pre-advertised of this army, and afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians, and with much ado (because of his departure from before Leucas) persuades them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys one thousand men of arms, who entered and preserved the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass, and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to hold out. Eurylochus, and those with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered, and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence not towards Peloponnesus, but to Æolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron, and to other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Ætolia. For the Ambraciots coming to them persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against

He then
retires to
Proschion.

Argos, and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, saying at the same time, that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the league of the Lacedæmonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assenting, and dismissing the Ætolians, lay quiet in those parts with his army, till the Ambraciots being come with their forces before Argos, he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.

CIII. The Athenians that were in Sicily in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league, and as many of the Sicels as being ruled by the Syracusians by force, or being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Inessa, the strong-hold of the Sicels, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusians; and they assaulted the same, but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat, the Syracusians that were in the citadel sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians, and charging, put a part of the army to flight, and killed not a few. After this, Laches and the Athenians made some descents upon Locris, and overcame in battle, by the river Cæcinus, about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus, the son of Capaton, came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

CIV. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition, as they pretended,⁵ of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before, not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple.⁶ But now they hallowed it all over in this manner: they took away all sepulchres of such as had died there before; and for the future made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor any woman to bring forth child in the island; but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other, they] should be carried over to Rhenea.⁷ This Rhenea is so little a way distant from Delos, that Polycrates⁸ the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea, and had the dominion of the

WINTER.
Proceed-
ings of the
Athenians
in Sicily.

The Athe-
nians
purify
Delos.

⁵ Thus Dr. Arnold renders it, and compares iii. 10. *αὐτονομοὶ δὴ ὄντες*, "for a similar use of *δὴ* for *δηθεν*, to shew that the statements given are not what the writer really believes, but such as were given by the parties themselves."

⁶ Herod. i. 64.

⁷ Comp. v. 1. on the further purification of Delos.

⁸ Herod. iii. 39, &c.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

other islands, when he won Rhenea, dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, having bound it to Delos with a chain. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the Delian games, a quinquennial festival.⁹ There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about. For they then came to see the games with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus.¹ There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities severally set forth dances.² That things were so is principally declared by Homer, in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:³

But thou, Apollo, takest most delight
In Delos. There assemble in thy sight,
The long-coat Ions, with their children dear,
And venerable bedfellows; and there,
In matches set, of buffets, song, and dance,
Both shew thee pastime, and thy name advance.⁴

That there were also matches of music, and that men resorted thither to contend, he again makes manifest in these verses of

⁹ For a long account of these games, instituted by Theseus, see Potter's Arch. Græc. b. ii. chap. 9.

¹ At the feast of Diana.

² Or rather, "got up," trained, "bands of dancers."

³ As there is a considerable difference made by Bekker in the verses taken from Homer in this section, it may be better to give a literal translation of them, as they stand in his edition: "But when in Delos, O Phœbus, thou art especially delighted in thy mind, there the long-robed Ionians assembled, together with their children and wives, at thy way; there in memory of thee, with pugilism, and dance, and *song, they delight* thee, when they appoint a contest. But come, may Apollo with Diana be propitious, and all ye farewell; and hereafter remember me, when any other wretched one of mortal men comes here, and inquires, 'O damsels, what man *was it*, the sweetest of bards, *who dwelt* here, and with whom ye were most delighted?' do ye all answer kindly, 'A blind man, and he dwells in rugged Chios.'"

⁴ This being the original version of Hobbes, I have allowed it to remain for its curiosity. The Greek, which Thueydides ascribes to Homer, is considered by Coleridge to have been the composition of one of the Chian "Rhapsodes," who were distinguished by the title of Homeridæ. "Cynæthus, one of this school, migrated to Syracuse, and acquired so great fame in that city as a poet, that the hymn to Apollo was attributed to him, (Schol. Pind. Nem. ode ii.) and it may be suspected that the well known lines in that poem, relative to the residence and person of Homer, are an instance of the fraud and the talent of him, or of some other Chian Rhapsode." See Coleridge's Introduction, &c. part ii. p. 50.

the same hymn. For after he has spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he ends the praise of the god⁵ with these verses, wherein also he has made mention of himself:

But well: let Phœbus and Diana be
 Propitious; and farewell you each one;
 But yet remember me when I am gone:
 And if of earthly men you chance to see
 Any toil'd pilgrim, that should ask you, Who,
 O damsels, is the man that living here,
 Was sweet'st in song, and that most had your ear?
 Then all, with a joint murmur, thereunto
 Make answer thus: A man depriv'd of seeing;
 In th' isle of sandy Chios is his being.

So much has Homer spoken in proof that there was a great meeting, and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time, have continued still to send dancers along with sacrifices; but the games and things of that kind had fallen into disuse (through adversity, as seems probable,) till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added the horse-race, which was not before.

CV. The same winter, the Ambraciots, according to their promise made to Eurylochus, when they retained his army, made an invasion against Argos, in Amphilochia, with three thousand men of arms, and invading Argea, took Olpæ,⁶ a strong fort on a hill by the sea side, which the Acarnanians had fortified, and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of justice, and distant from the city of Argos, also on the sea side, about twenty-five stadia. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos, and with the rest encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is called Crenæ, to watch the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, that they might not pass through to the Ambraciots without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Ætoliens, to come to them and be the general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Aristoteles, the son of Timocrates, and Hiero-

The Ambraciots make war on Argos, and take Olpæ.

The Acarnanians with part of their forces come to the relief of Argos, and with the remainder encamp at Crenæ, to watch the motions of Eurylochus.

⁵ Hæc significant, "fincin fecit hymno in Apollinem"—Goeller.

⁶ Now Forte Castro.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

Eury-
lochus
marches
from Proschion,
and forms
a junction
by night
with the
Ambraciots at
Olpæ.

Demosthenes
comes to
the assistance
of the Argives,
and having
taken
command
of their
army,
encamps
near
Olpæ, and
on the
sixth day
makes
preparations
for an
engagement.

phon, son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciots at Olpæ sent a messenger to the city [of Ambracia,] desiring them to come to their aid with their whole power; fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass through the Acarnanians, and so they either should be forced to fight alone, or else, if they wished to retreat, be unable to do it with safety.

CVI. But the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, when they understood that the Ambraciots were come to Olpæ, dislodging from Proschion, went with all speed to assist them. And passing over the Achelous, marched through Acarnania, which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now deserted: on their right hand they had the city of Stratus, and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phytiaë, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon, then through Limnæa; then they went into the territory of the Agræans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends; and getting to the hill Thyannus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it, and came down to Argea, when it was now night, and passing between the city of the Argives, and the Acarnanians that kept watch at Crænæ, came unseen, and joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ.

CVII. When they were all together, they sat down about break of day, at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And the Athenians, not long after, with their twenty galleys, arrived in the Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives; and Demosthenes, with two hundred Messenian men of arms, and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea before the hill on which stands the fort of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilocheians (for the greatest part of them the Ambraciots kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle, and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, general of the whole league. He, when he had brought them up near to Olpæ, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow, and for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day, both sides put themselves into array for battle. But Demosthenes (for the army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater) fearing to be encompassed, places an ambush in a certain hollow way, which was overgrown with brushwood, of both heavy and light-armed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred, which, in that

part where the enemies out-flanked them, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush, and be at their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes, with the Messenians, and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians, as they could one after another be put in order, and those Amphilo-chian darters which were present, made up the other.⁷ The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were ranged promiscuously, except the Mantineans: they stood together, most of them in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it, for Eurylochus, and those with him, made the extremity of the left wing against Demosthenes and the Messenians.

CVIII. When they were in fight, and the Peloponnesians with that wing overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming upon them at their backs, charged them, and put them to flight, so that they did not wait even to fight; and besides, through their terror, caused the greatest part of the army to run away. For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus, which was the best, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes did the greatest part of the work. But the Ambraciots and those in the right wing conquered those that were opposed to them, and chased them to the city of Argos; but in their retreat, when they saw the greatest part of the army vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpæ in safety; and many of them were slain, whilst they hurried to it out of array and disorder; save only the Mantineans; for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

CIX. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain) having taken the command upon him, and not finding how, if he stayed, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land, and also with the Attic galleys by sea; or if he should depart, how he might do it safely; brings forward a proposal to Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure, and for receiving the bodies of the slain. And they delivered to

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

Battle of
Olpæ.
The Peloponnesians
and their
allies are
defeated.

Eurylo-
chus and
Macarius
slain.
Demos-
thenes re-
fuses per-
mission to
depart to
the con-
federates
generally,
but grants

⁷ Lit. "The Acarnanians extended far enough to occupy all the rest of the line." Comp. i. 48.—*Arnold*.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

it to the
Pelopon-
nesians
and Man-
tinæans.

them their dead; and having erected a trophy, took up their own dead, about three hundred; but for their departure they would make no truce openly, nor to all; but secretly Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian fellow-commanders, made a truce with the Mantineans and with Menedæus, and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains, and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they could; with purpose to isolate the Ambraciots, and the multitude of mercenary strangers, and chiefly wishing to use this as a means to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those parts, as men that had treacherously regarded only their own particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as was in their power; and those to whom it had been granted consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

The Am-
braciots of
the city
march
towards
Olpæ.

CX. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciots from the city of Ambracia, according to the first message sent to them before from Olpæ, were already on their march, with all their power, through Amphilochia, ignorant of what passed here, wishing to join with those at Olpæ. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth to beset the ways with ambushment, and to preoccupy all places of strength, and prepared also to go to their aid against them with the rest of his army.

The Man-
tineans
and Pe-
loponne-
sians
desert their
allies.

Some of
the Am-
braciots
escape
into
Agræa.

CXI. In the mean time the Mantineans, and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather pot-herbs and fire-wood, stole away by small numbers, and as they went did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were got far from Olpæ, went faster away. But the Ambraciots and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops, seeing the others go quite away, rushed forward likewise, and ran outright, desiring to overtake those that were gone before: the Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without truce alike, and pursued the Peloponnesians, and one or two⁸ threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them, and for saying that a truce had been made with them, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciots only.

⁸ Thus Dr. Arnold understands τῆς, and compares Herod. iii. 140. ἀναβεβηκε δ' ἡ τῆς ἢ οὐδεις. Goeller takes it as signifying "a good many," following the Schol.

And there was much contention and difficulty in distinguishing which was an Ambraciot, and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them, and the rest escaped into Agræis, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans, and their friend, received them.

CXII. The Ambraciots out of the city [of Ambracia] were come as far as Idomene. Two high hills make up Idomene; to the greater whereof, they whom Demosthenes had sent before from the camp came first undiscovered on the following night, and seized it. But the Ambraciots got first to the lesser, and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes, after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof he himself took with him towards the pass,⁹ and the other [he sent about] through the mountains of Amphilochia. And next morning with the first twilight he falls upon the Ambraciots, yet in their beds, and knowing not what was the matter, but thinking rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them to speak to them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to make the sentinels unsuspecting; especially seeing their faces could not be discerned, it being yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciots to flight at the first onset, and slew the greatest part on the place. The rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Amphilochians well acquainted with their own territories, and armed but lightly against men in heavy armour, unacquainted, and ignorant which way to take, they fell into hollow clefts of the mountains, and into the places forelaid with ambushes, and perished. And having been put to all manner of shifts in their flight, some fled towards the sea, and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore, at the very time of the occurrence of the affair, swam to them, thinking in their present terror, that it was better for them to be destroyed by those in the ships, if they must [be destroyed,] than by Barbarians, and their most mortal enemies, the Amphilochians. The Ambraciots, worsted in such a fashion as this, came home a few of many in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians, having

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

Demos-
thenes
utterly de-
feats the
Ambraciot
reinforce-
ment at
Idomene.

⁹ Thus Mr. Bloomfield renders *ἐσβολῆ*, and refers to Herod. vii. 175. This sense also is given by Dr. Arnold, "the point where the coast road from Olpæ left the plain near the sea and entered the hills."

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.

taken the spoil of the dead, and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.

CXIII. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciots who fled from Olpæ to Agræis, to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead who were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciots that came from the city, he wondered at the number. For he knew nothing of of this last blow, but thought they had been the armours of those with them.¹ Then one asked him, "what he wondered at, and how many he thought there were slain?" For he that asked him the question, thought that he on the other part had been an herald sent from those at Idomene; and he answered, "about two hundred." Then he that asked, replied and said, "these arms here seem not [the arms of two hundred,] but of above a thousand." "Then" said he again, "they belong not to them that were in the battle with us." The other answered, "yes but they are, if at least you fought yesterday in Idomene." "But we fought not yesterday with any one; but the day previous, in our retreat." "But we yet fought yesterday with those Ambraciots that came from the city to aid the rest." When the herald heard that, and knew that the aid from the city had perished, he burst out into lamentations; and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way, without fulfilling his errand, and required the dead bodies no farther. For this loss was greater than in the like number of days happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written down the number of the slain, because it was said to be such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have taken it at the very first attack; but they feared now that if the Athenians possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours to them than the other.

Truce
between
the Acar-
nanians,
Amphilo-

CXIV. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians' part was taken on its

¹ That is, of those who had fallen with his division.

voyage to Attica. For those three hundred complete suits of Year 6.
 armour which are dedicated in the temples in Attica were A. C. 426.
 picked out for Demosthenes himself, and he brought them away Ol. 88. 3.
 with him. His return was also the safer for this action, after chians,
 his misfortune in Ætolia. And the Athenians that were in the and Am-
 twenty galleys returned to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and braciots.
 Amphilocheians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were
 gone, granted a truce to retire from Cœniadæ to those Ambracia
 and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius and to
 the Agræans, the Cœniades being gone over to the party of
 Salynthius.² And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians
 made a league with the Ambraciots for an hundred
 years, upon these conditions: "That neither the Ambraciots
 with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians,
 nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the
 Athenians. That they should give mutual aid to one another's
 country. That the Ambraciots should restore whatsoever
 towns or hostages they held of the Amphilocheians; and that
 they should not aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with
 the Acarnanians." And upon this agreement the war ended.³
 After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred
 men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the conduct
 of Xenocides, the son of Euthycles; who with much difficulty
 passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the
 business in Ambracia. The Co-
 rinthians
 send three
 hundred
 men to
 Ambracia.

CXV. The same winter the Athenians in Sicily landed and
 made an invasion into the territory of Himera, in conjunction
 with the Siciliots who had made an irruption upon the skirts of
 the same from the high lands. They sailed also to the islands
 of Æolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there
 Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, arrived
 to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the
 Affairs in
 Sicily.
 Pytho-
 dorus ar-
 rives with
 a few
 ships to
 supersede
 Laches.
 Sophocles
 is soon to

² Hermann's conjecture, *παρα Σαλυνθίου*, is adopted by all the best editions, and is far preferable to the accusative in the text, which I have rendered as well as I could. The sense then would be, "to which place," i. e. Cœniadæ, "they had also removed from Salynthius," according to Arnold.

³ The conduct of the Acarnanians on this occasion is deserving of much commendation. It tended much to maintain quiet among the Grecian republics, and to fix on them that character of benevolence and uprightness by which they were long honourably distinguished and respected throughout the Greek nation. See Polyb. b. 4.—*Mitford*.

Year 6.
A. C. 426.
O. l. 88. 3.
follow
with the
remainder
of the fleet.

Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusians were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet, intending not to endure it. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send to Sicily, conceiving the war there would the sooner be brought to an end, and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few galleys, and intended to send Sophocles⁴ the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the command of Laches' fleet, sailed in the end of winter to the fortress⁵ of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken; and being overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.

CXVI. The same spring, there issued the stream of fire out of the mountain *Ætna*, as it had also done in former times, and ruined part of the territory of the Catanæans that dwell at the foot of *Ætna*, which is the highest mountain in Sicily. From the last time that the stream flowed out before to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And it is said to have taken place thrice in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

⁴ For information about this general, who appears afterwards to have been banished, (iv. 65.) Goeller refers the reader to Lessing's *Vit. Soph.* pp. 24. 133. 165.

⁵ This fort was probably the same that is called in C. 99, *περιπολιον*: and by the fact that Pythodorus was defeated, it seems probable, that though Laches had taken it, yet he afterwards lost it; in which case *ἐπι* should be rendered, as in Mr. Bloomfield, "against."

BOOK IV.

I. THE spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse, and as many of Locris, went to Messena in Sicily, the citizens themselves calling them in, and took it; and Messena revolted from the Athenians. This was done chiefly by the Syracusians, who saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of war, might come with greater forces, and invade them from thence; but partly by the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians, and desirous to make war on them vigorously from both sides. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power; both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messenians, and because they were urged thereto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition, and were unable for the present to repel their attacks, for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces, but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messena, and more were being manned to lay in the same harbour, to carry on the war from that quarter.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
SUMMER.
Affairs in
Sicily.
The Syra-
cusians
and Locri-
ans take
Messena.
The Locri-
ans invade
Rhegium.

II. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent the forty galleys to Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, had already arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also, to provide as they went by, for the state of those Corcyræans that were in the city, and were pillaged by the exiles in the mountain: and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in

Fifth inva-
sion of
Attica.
Euryme-
don and
Sophocles
sent to
Sicily,
with
orders to
touch at
Corcyra.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

Demos-
thenes
being sent
with them,

the mountain; who, because there was a great famine in the city, thought they would easily be masters of the state. To Demosthenes also (who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately)¹ they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of these galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

urges Eu-
rymedon
and So-
phocles to
fortify Py-
los in Mes-
senia;

III. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles would have hastened to Corcyra; but Demosthenes desired them to put in first at Pylos, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they disputed about it, the fleet was driven into Pylos by a tempest that then arose by chance. And immediately Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, (alleging that he had sailed with them for no other purpose,) shewing how there was great store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it, and a great deal of the country about. For it lies from Sparta about four hundred stadia, in the territory that belonged once to the Messenians, and it is called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasion. But they answered him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if he wished to put the city to expense in taking possession of them. But there appeared to Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places; because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof,² speaking the same language the Lacedæmonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions from thence, and be also faithful guardians of the place.

but in
vain, until
the soldiers
being tired
of remain-

IV. When he could prevail neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies,³ he gave it over; till at last the weather

¹ Ὅντι ἰδιωτῇ. We are not accurately informed of the nature of the joint commands, so usual in the Athenian and other Grecian services. Thucydides sufficiently marks that there was a gradation, though the inferiors appear to have had some controlling power. The commission given to Demosthenes was of a different kind.—*Mitford*.

² ἀτρω may refer either to χωριον, or to Demosthenes: if the latter be preferred, it is, "of old attached to him."

³ Ταξιαρχοι. These officers seem to be nearly the same with captains of a company, as their command was over about one hundred men. There were also officers of a higher class, called by the same name, in number ten, one

not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers themselves, as they lay idle, a tumultuous kind of desire to wall in the place.⁴ And taking in hand the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out and brought such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar where it needed, for want of vessels, they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward, so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling; making all possible haste to be beforehand with the Lacedæmonians, and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to defend their territory. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
ing idle
begin to
build of
their own
accord.

V. The Lacedæmonians happened to be celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news, set lightly by it, conceiving, that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone, or easily take the place by force: they were somewhat also retarded by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in six days finished the wall to the land, and in the places where there was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it, and with the rest hastened on their course for Coreyra and Sicily.

The Lacedæmonians do not think it necessary to interrupt the building, which is finished in six days. Eurymedon and Sophocles leave Demosthenes at Pylos.

VI. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they heard of the occupation of Pylos, returned speedily home. For the Lacedæmonians, and Agis their king, considered this affair of Pylos to concern their own particular interest. And the invasion was withal so early (the corn being yet green) that the most of them were in need of victual; the army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder and more tempestuous than for the season; so as for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done; and this invasion was the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

The Peloponnesian army returns from Attica, after a stay of only fifteen days.

appointed by each tribe, whose business it was to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and punish military offences. But the former seems to have been those alluded to here. See Hermann's *Pol. Ant.* sect. 152. or Schœm. *Comit.* p. 315.

⁴ The recent editors here read *περιστασιν*, (instead of *περιστασιον*, as in the text,) which Goeller renders "mutata sententia." This Dr. Arnold doubts, and thinks the meaning to be "that the soldiers set to work, or came round on all sides, to carry on the fortification."

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
Simonides
takes Eion,
but is
obliged to
abandon
it.

VII. About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons, and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace,⁵ a colony of the Mendæans, that was hostile [to the Athenians] by treason; but was presently again driven out by the Chalcidæans and Bottiæans that came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.

The Lacedæmonians invest Pylos by sea and land, and send to recall their fleet at Coreyra.

VIII. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta,⁶ and of the next neighbouring towns, went presently to the aid of Pylos; but the rest of the Lacedæmonians came more slowly, being recently come from another expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylos; and also to their threescore⁷ galleys that were at Coreyra, which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylos

Demosthenes sends for aid to Eurymedon (who is at Zacynthus, on his way to Sicily).

unseen by the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus.⁸ And by this time their army of foot was also there, whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylos, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him, as the place was in danger of being lost. And according as Demosthenes' message imported, the fleet made haste.

The Lacedæmonians occupy the island Sphacteria with four hundred and twenty men, and intend to blockade the two entrances into the harbour.

The Lacedæmonians in the mean time prepared to assault the fort both by sea and land; hoping easily to win it, being built in haste, and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to their aid, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour, that the Athenians might not be able to come in and anchor. For the island called Sphacteria lying just before, and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the entries narrow; one of them, nearest to Pylos and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys to sail through; and the other, which lieth against

⁵ Not the Eion near Amphipolis, as that had belonged to Athens since the time of Cimou, i. 98; the situation cannot be fixed more precisely, than by saying, it was probably on the coast from the Strymon to the Axius.—*Arnold*.

⁶ *Oi Σπαρτιαται*: the word *Spartans*, used in an emphatical sense, meaning the noblest persons in the community.

⁷ According to Diodorus, forty-five.

⁸ Concerning Zacynthus, see Livy, xxvi. 24. It was formerly called Hyric, now Zante. See also book ii. 66.

the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood, and untrodden; in size, about fifteen stadia. Therefore they determined, with their galleys thick set, and with the heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. And because they feared as to the island, lest the Athenians, putting men into it, should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men at arms into the same, and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming would find the island hostile to them, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylos itself, without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their friends. And they themselves, in all probability, might by siege, without battle by sea, or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it, and that it was taken possession of but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men at arms, out of every band by lot; some also before had been sent over by turns; but they which went over now last, and were left there,⁹ were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots that were with them. And their captain was Eпитadas, the son of Molobrus.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

IX. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedæmonians about to assault him, both from their galleys, and with their army by land, prepared also himself to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the land, he set up a stockade close to them,¹ and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though inferior ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves with arms. And even these they took out of a cruiser of thirty oars, and a light boat of the Messenians, which came there by chance. And the men at arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part, therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the fortifications toward the land, on which side they were of most strength, and commanded them to defend the place against the land forces if they assaulted it; and he himself, with sixty men at arms, chosen out of the whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort

Demos-
thenes
makes pre-
parations
for de-
fence.
He posts
the greater
part of his
forces on
the land
side, and
himself
with sixty
chosen
men de-
fends the
shore.

⁹ "The recent editions read ἐγκαταληφθεντες, "taken in it."

¹ Or upon them, i. e. to cover them.—*Arnold*.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88.4.

to the sea side, in that part where he most expected their landing: which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay towards the sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought it would tempt them to be bold. For neither did the Athenians expect they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place to the sea-ward the less strong; and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, [they expected that] the place would be easily taken. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men at arms to keep off the enemy, if he could, and thus encouraged them.

Oration of Demosthenes to his soldiers.

X. "You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity desire to seem wise, and reckon every peril that now besetteth us; but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection, and much hope, and look for his safety by these means. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but require that the risk should be run as soon as possible. And yet if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages through fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For I consider the difficulty of their landing makes for us; which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impede them, they will land well enough. And the enemy will be the more formidable, inasmuch as his retreat will be difficult, if he be driven back by us; for whilst they are in their ships, they are very easy to resist, but when they have disembarked, they will be on an equality with us: their number, however, we need not be too much afraid of; for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few, for want of room to fight in. And their troops are not on the land; where, having equal advantages, they would be superior to us by numbers, but they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea.² So that I think their great

² The sense here assigned by Goeller is "which, of course, are subject to many accidents in the sea;" and so also Mr. Bloomfield. I prefer Dr. Arnold's paraphrase: "And we have not to do with an army on shore, superior in numbers, while it is on equal terms in other respects; but will

difficulties do but set them even with our small number. And for you, that be Athenians, and by experience of disembarking against others, know, (that if a man stand it out, and do not for fear of the roaring of the waves, or the menacing approach of a galley, give way of himself, he can never be forced back,) I expect that you should keep your ground, and, by fighting it out upon the very beach, preserve both yourselves and the fort.”

XI. On this exhortation of Demosthenes, the Athenians took better heart, and went down, and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedæmonians moved from their stations and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of three and forty galleys, in which was admiral, Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan; and he made his approach where Demosthenes had expected him. So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians dividing their galleys into small numbers, because they could not come near with many at once, and resting between, assailed them by turns; using all possible valour and mutual encouragement to drive the Athenians back, and gain the fort. Most eminent of all was Brasidas: for having the command of a galley, and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen, the place being hard of access, when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid, and tender of breaking their galleys, he would cry out to them, saying, they did not well for sparing their vessels, to let the enemy fortify in their country. And the Lacedæmonians he bade dash their galleys on shore and force a landing; and [begged] the confederates, that in requital of many benefits, they would not hesitate to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedæmonians, and running them ashore, to use any means whatsoever to land, and to get into their hands both the men and the fort.

XII. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he advanced to the plank for disembarking, but attempting to get on shore, was repulsed by the Athenians, and after he had received many wounds, swooned, and falling into the after-prow³ of the galley,

an army fighting from its ships; and ships at sea require many favourable accidents in order to act with effect.”

³ Thus Mr. Bloomfield translates this word, to which we have none that corresponds. It signifies, as the Scholiast explains, that part of either end

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

his buckler tumbled from his arm into the sea, which being washed to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come on land; but the place being hard to land in, and the Athenians standing the attack, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune so strangely changed, that the Athenians defended themselves from the land, and this too Laconic land, against Lacedæmonians in galleys; and the Lacedæmonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time they each had the highest reputation: these, that they were more especially land-troops, and most expert in battles of foot; and those, that they were seamen, and most excelled in their fleet.

The Peloponnesians resolve to attempt the fortress on the side towards the harbour.

Forty Athenian ships arrive from Zacynthus and anchor at Prote.

XIII. This day then, and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults, and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine for timber wherewith to make engines, hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looks into the haven; which though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the mean time arrived forty⁴ Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of those that kept guard at Nausactus, and four of Chios. And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms, and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth, not knowing where to cast anchor, they sailed for the present to the isle of Prote, being near, and desert, and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had prepared themselves, they put to sea again, with purpose to offer them battle, if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined, but remaining still on the shore, manned out their galleys, and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one.

An engagement takes

XIV. The Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the

of the vessel which is *παρεξ της εἰρεσίας*, "unoccupied by the rowers." In this case it must, from the situation of the vessel, have been aft the prow.

⁴ On the conjecture of *πεντηκοντα*, for *τεσσαρακοντα*, see Dr. Arnold's note on the word.

Lacedæmonian galleys, which were already set out, and opposed them, they charged, and put to flight. And in following the chase, which was but short, they injured many of them, and took five, whereof one with all her men in her; and they fell also upon them that fled to the shore; and the galleys which were but being manned were disabled before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys and towed them away empty, the men having betaken themselves to flight. Which the Lacedæmonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid from the land, and entering armed into the sea, took hold of the galleys with their hands to have pulled them back again; every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse, where himself was not present. So there arose a great uproar about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedæmonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory, and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land fight from their galleys. But at length having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedæmonians recovered their empty galleys, save only those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck, and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch on it, as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians, in the mean time, that were in the continent, and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylos.

XV. As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they thought fit, as the calamity was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp to determine, on view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done. These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men, and were not willing that they should run the risk either of suffering by famine, or of being conquered, being oppressed by numbers, concluded amongst themselves to make a truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned Pylos, if they also would be content, and to send

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
place, in
which five
Lacedæ-
monian
ships are
taken.

The Spar-
tan magis-
trates
being sent
to Pylos,
propose a
truce, and
send am-
bassadors
to Athens.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
The Athenian commanders accept the proposal.

ambassadors to Athens about coming to an agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could. The Athenian commanders accepting their proposition, the truce was made in this manner.

Articles of Truce.

XVI “That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up not only those galleys wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylos, and put into the Athenians’ hands, whatsoever vessels of the long form⁵ of building were any where else in Laconia.

“That they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land. That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians that were in the continent, to send over to those in the island a portion of kneaded corn, agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic chænices⁶ of meal, and two cotyles⁷ of wine, and a piece of flesh; and to every of their servants half that quantity.

“That they should send this, the Athenians looking on, and no vessel should sail to the island by stealth.

“That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding the island, provided that they landed not in it: and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.

“That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce was then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens.

“That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back. That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys, in as good condition as they had received them.”

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about threescore; and the ambassadors⁸ were sent away, who arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

⁵ This, as is well known, means “the vessels of war,” pulled with oars; those of a more round shape, that went with sails, called *δάλκαδες*, were used for mercantile purposes and transportation.

⁶ *Χοινίξ*, a measure of about three English pints.

⁷ *Κοτυλή*, a quarter of a chænix.

⁸ The name of the chief of the embassy, Archeptolemus, is not mentioned by Thucydides, but is given by Aristophanes, equit. v. 794.

Oration of the Lacedæmonian Ambassadors.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

XVII. "Men of Athens, the Lacedæmonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us, that our present condition is capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more, when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance. But the words we shall use, we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we thought to instruct you as men ignorant, but considering them as a suggestion of expedient counsel, [addressed] to men of knowledge. It is now in your power to establish your present good fortune to your advantage, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides; and to avoid that which befalleth men upon unwonted success, who through hope aspire to greater fortune, because the fortune they have already came unhop'd for. Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city and ours especially, upon experience, in all reason to be.

XVIII. "Be assured of this, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that which before thought we chiefly in our own hands to give. And yet we are not brought to this through decay of our power, nor through insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not with the power we had, as we thought it should, which may as well happen to any others as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive, that for the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity; and not think that war will so far follow and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in hand; but rather so far as fortune shall lead it.⁹ Such men also seldom miscar-

⁹ They are sound-minded men, who, following a safe system, hold their good things as winnings that may be lost again: (and when they lose also, these same men would conduct themselves more discreetly;) and who do

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

rying, because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success in the war, choose then principally to give over, when they are in their better fortune. And this you men of Athens have a fair occasion of doing so to us, and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry, as many ways you may, to have it thought hereafter that you gained your present successes merely by fortune. Whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands, without danger, to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

XIX. "The Lacedæmonians call you to a peace, and end of the war, giving you peace and alliance, and [desiring] that there should subsist between us much other friendship and mutual familiarity, requiring for the same, only those their men that are in the island; and thinking it better for both sides, not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered, they escape by force, or whether rather, being taken by siege, they be brought in your power. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one who retaliating on his enemy, and having got much the better in the war, binds him through necessity with oaths, and makes peace on unequal terms; but when having it in his power so to do if he please, through a regard to moderation, he overcome him¹ likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions. For in this case, his enemy being obliged not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to keep to the conditions agreed on. And men do this more towards those who are their enemies in a great degree, than to those who disagree with them but slightly; and naturally to those that relent of their own accord, men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak.

XX. "But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident be interposed, whereby we should be compelled, besides the na-

not think that war will suit itself to that scale on which they wish to meddle with it, but will go on even as its accidents may lead the way.

¹ *Αὐτο* is referred by Goeller to *ἐπεικεις*: who renders, "virtute animum inductus ad clementiam." The Schol. explains it by *το πλεονεκτικον, οἱ το μη ἀπ' ἴσου συμβηναι*. The reading however of *αὐτον* seems far preferable.

tional, to bear you individually an eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the advantages we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship; and whilst upon us, instead of any dishonour, misfortune has been moderately laid. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. For they make war not knowing which side began; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your hands, they will consider the obligation as yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedæmonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it, and you grant a favour rather than impose conditions. Wherein consider how many advantages are like to ensue, for if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will respect [or obey] us in the highest degree.”

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

XXI. Thus spake the Lacedæmonians, thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace, and had been hindered of it by them, and that being now offered, they would gladly accept it. But they having these men intercepted in the island, thought that peace already lay ready for them [to make] whenever they [the Athenians] should wish to make it with them, and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon, the son of Cleænetus, a leader of the people at that time, and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: “That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and be carried themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedæmonians would make restitution of Nisæa, and Pegæ, and Trœzene, and Achaia, (which they had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when the Athenians being in distress, and at that time in more need of peace than now, yielded them up into their hands,) then they should have their men again, and should make peace for as long as they both should think good.”

The Athenians require the surrender of Nisæa and other places.

XXII. To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alternate speaking and hearing might at their leisure make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon fell vehemently upon them, saying he knew before

The ambassadors demand a private conference; which

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
being re-
fused,
they quit
Athens.

that they had no honest purpose, and that the same was now manifest, in that they were unwilling to speak before the people, but sought to sit in consultation only with a few; and bade them if they had aught to say that was fair, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedæmonians, seeing that though it might seem good to make some concessions upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak of it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining, they should incur calumny² with their confederates, and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without performing their errand.

The truce
is at an
end.
The Athe-
nians re-
fuse to de-
liver up
the Lacedæ-
monian
ships.
Sphac-
teria
closely be-
sieged.

XXIII. Immediately on their return the truce at Pylos was at an end, and the Lacedæmonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians laying to their charge an assault made on the fort contrary to the articles, and other matters that appear of no great importance, refused to return them; insisting on this, that it was said the truce should be void, on the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedæmonians denying it, and protesting against this detention of their galleys as an act of injustice, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylos was on both sides renewed with all their power, the Athenians sailing every day about the island with two galleys, one one way, another another,³ (but they lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part towards the open sea, and that only when it was windy; and from Athens there came a supply of twenty galleys to help to guard [the island,] so that they were in all seventy.) But the Lacedæmonians pitched their camp in the continent, and made assaults on the fort, watching any opportunity that should present itself to save their men.

Affairs in
Sicily.

XXIV. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily adding to those galleys that kept guard at Messena the rest of the fleet which they had prepared,

² That is, for buying peace at the cost of the confederates' subjection; for the thing they durst not propound before the people was this, that by the amity of these two great states, the rest of Greece would be forced to serve them; which they touched also on obscurely in the last words of their oration.

³ Or, "that met and passed each other;" comp. i. 93. where a similar phrase is used with regard to the wall of the Piræus.

made war out of Messena, instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land; and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present, and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island,⁴ desired to try with them a battle by sea; for if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium, both with their land forces on the field side, and with their fleet by sea, easily to get it into their hands, and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium, a promontory of Italy, and Messena, in Sicily, lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying there at anchor against them, and from being masters of the strait. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messena, where Sicily is nearest to the continent, and is that which is called Charybdis,⁵ where Ulysses is said to have passed through; which, because it is very narrow, and that the sea falls in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and flows in a strong stream, has therefore, not without good cause, been esteemed dangerous.

XXV. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea fight about the passage of a certain boat, putting out to engage sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium; and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley, and went speedily each side to their own camp at Messena and Rhegium,⁶ and the night overtook them in the action. After this, the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians; and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to anchor at Peloris in Messena, and had their land forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and finding their galleys empty, fell in amongst them, and by

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
The Syracusians wish to take Rhegium.

Thirty Syracusian ships are defeated by sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian. The Athenians lose one ship, and afterwards another.

⁴ Sphacteria.

⁵ Charybdis is a part of the strait near to Messena, between it and Peloris.

⁶ The Syracusians had a naval camp at Messena; the Locrians had one at Rhegium, as their army was besieging the place. But immediately afterwards, when the Locrian army returned home, the Locrian ships crossed over to Pelorus, where the Syracusians joined them from Messena.

—Arnold.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Messenians, being weakened by an unsuccessful expedition against Naxos, are attacked by sea and land by the Athenians and Leontines: they repulsed the latter, but are driven back to their walls by the Athenians.

means of an iron grapnel that was cast on it [by the Syracusians on shore,] they also lost one galley, but the men swam out. On this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messena, the Athenians attacked them again, and lose another galley, the Syracusians getting their ships out into the open sea,⁷ and charging them first; so the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messena, having had the better in their passage by the shore, and in the sea fight, which were both together in the manner declared. The Athenians, on news that Camarina would by Archias and his party be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the mean time, the Messenians, with their whole power by land, and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidic city,⁸ and their borderer. The first day, having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sailed round with their fleet, and wasted the land in the direction of the river⁹ Acesines, and with their land forces assaulted the city. In the mean time, many of the Siculi mountaineers came down to their assistance against the Messenians: which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city, and charged upon the Messenians, and put them to flight, with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, the rest hardly escaping home. For the Barbarians fell upon them, and slew the most part of them on the road back. And the galleys putting in at Messena not long after divided themselves, and went to their several homes.¹ Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messena, as being now weakened, and assaulted it; the Athenians making the attempt with their fleet by the havens and

⁷ "This word is derivable either from *σιμος*, "snub-nosed," thus meaning "twisting themselves out;" or from *σιμον*, "ground with a steep ascent;" or from *σιμιον*, "a shore or beach."—*Arnold*. On this last sense, compare Wordsworth's Athens and Attica, c. 14.

⁸ Of those that were founded by the Chalcidæans of Greece, A. C. 759. There was also another town at the distance of five miles from this Naxos, which bore the same name, and was often called, by contradistinction, *Taurominium*.

⁹ Thus, "on the side of," Dr. Arnold renders *κατα*: and comp. iii. 7.

¹ Syracuse and Locris.

the land forces at the city. But the Messenians and certain Locrians, with Demoteles, who after their misfortune had been left there in garrison, sallying forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight, and slew many; but the Athenians seeing that, disembarked and marched to aid them: and coming upon the Messenians, now in disorder, chased them back again into the city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily invaded one another by land, without the Athenians.

XXVI. All this while the Athenians at Pylos besieged the Lacedæmonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch was exceedingly troublesome to the Athenians in respect to the want they had both of corn and water; for there was no fountain but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylos, and no great one. And the greatest number digged through the shingle near the sea, and drank such water as they were likely to find there. They were also pinched for room in their camp; and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns, some to stay ashore and take their victual, and others to lie off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done; for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island, and having nothing to drink but briny water. The cause whereof were the Lacedæmonians, who had proclaimed, that any man that would should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and any other food necessary for a siege, into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver; and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual; but especially the Helots, who putting off from all parts of the Peloponnesus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all, to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily; for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helots were by no means sparing in putting ashore, for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money, and the men of arms also watched at all the landing

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians at Pylos suffer from want of provisions and water.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

places in the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm were intercepted. There were also such as could dive that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them with a string bags filled with poppy-seed tempered with honey and pounded linseed; whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to send over food, the other that those that carried it should not escape their observation.

XXVII. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do, and feared lest stormy weather should overtake them in their siege; seeing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be impossible; for they would be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, even though it were summer; and again that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie at anchor in against them, but that either, they themselves giving up the watch, the men would by that means escape, or watching the opportunity of some foul weather would sail out in the same boats that brought them food. But that which they feared most was, that the Lacedæmonians seemed to have some strong assurance about it, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon, knowing himself to be the man suspected and disliked for hindering the agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon they that came thence, advising them (if they would not believe it) to send some to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said, whom he before calumniated, or saying the contrary be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians, seeing them rather inclined in their opinion to send out forces, that it was not fit to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men, and pointedly glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general through malice, and with language of censure; saying, it was easy, if the leaders were men, to sail with an armament, and take those

Cleon by
way of
bravado
offers to
take
Pylos,

in the island. And that he himself, if he had the command, would do it.

XXVIII. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter, he did not immediately sail, and seeing also he had censured him, desired him to take what strength he would, for all that concerned them,² and undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back, and said, that not he, but Nicias, was general, being now indeed afraid, and never having expected that he would bear to make way to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it, and gave over his command to him against Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness it. They, (as is the fashion of the multitude,) the more Cleon declined the voyage, and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to him, and cried out upon Cleon to sail. Insomuch that not knowing how to disengage himself of what he had said, he undertook the voyage, and stood forth, saying, that he feared not the Lacedæmonians, and that he would not carry any man with him on the voyage out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those targeteers that were come to them from Ænos, and four hundred archers out of other places; and with these, he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylos already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was heard with pleasure by the wiser sort. For they calculated that of two benefits they must needs obtain one; either to be rid of Cleon, (which was their greater hope,) or if they were deceived in that idea, then to get those Lacedæmonians into their hands.

XXIX. Now when he had despatched every thing that was needful with the assembly, and the Athenians had decreed him the voyage, having taken as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylos, presently put to sea. He made choice of Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers on land in the isle. For the army suffering much by the straitness of the

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

and is
taken at
his word
by Nicias,
and the
assembly
of Athe-
nian
people.

He joins
Demos-
thenes at
Pylos,
and sends
a herald
to the
Lacedæ-
monians
to propose
the surren-

² Thus Dr. Arnold renders these words, and so also Mr. Bloomfield.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
der of the
men in
the island.

place, and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle; and the island having been burnt gave him confidence moreover: for having been for the most part woody, and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, he was before afraid, and thought it rather the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army, when come on land. For the mistakes of the enemy, and their preparations, could not so well be discerned by them [the Athenians,] on account of the wood, whereas all the faults of their own army would be in sight; so that the enemy might set upon them suddenly, in what part so ever they pleased, because the onset was in their own choice. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedæmonians hand to hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great, it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another.

XXX. These things came into his mind, especially from the loss he received in Ætolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the shore of the island to dress and eat their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire, without intending it, to a small portion of the wood, and the wind afterwards rising, the greatest part of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident Demosthenes the better perceiving that the Lacedæmonians were more than he had imagined, having before, by the victual sent there unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprize, ([perceiving] that the Athenians were more anxious about it as a matter deserving their utmost care, and [perceiving] that he had greater ease in landing in the island,) and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also with those forces which he had required unto Pylos. When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent, to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without incurring danger, on the terms of being held in

easy imprisonment, till some agreement were made touching the main business.

XXXI. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men at arms, and advanced in a run towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedæmonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch were about thirty men of arms. The midst and evenest part of the island, and about the water, was kept by Epitadas, their captain, with the greatest part of the whole number. And another part of them, which were not many, kept the extreme part of the island towards Pylos, which place to the seaward was precipitous, and the least assailable by land. For there was also a certain fortified work there, which was old, and made of stones picked out and fitted,³ which they thought would stand them instead, in case of a compulsory retreat. Thus they were stationed.

XXXII. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard (upon whom they ran) in their resting places, and as they were taking arms. For they escaped their notice at their landing, as they [the guard] thought that those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had; being all that rowed, except only the Thalamii,⁴ and eight hundred archers, targeteers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid them, and as many besides, as occupied Pylos, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposed his army, and divided them by two hundred and more into different companies, and in some less, and seized on all the higher grounds, to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do, or against what

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

This proposal being rejected, the Athenians land eight hundred men on Sphacteria.

The advanced guard of the Lacedæmonians put to death. The Athenians land a light-armed force at day break.

³ And therefore unwrought, and not joined with mortar. Comp. c. 4.

⁴ Θαλαμιοί. There were three ranks of rowers amongst the Athenians; the uppermost called Thranitæ, the second Zeugitæ, and the last Thalamitæ or Thalamii. In the galley called a bireme there were no Zeugitæ; in a trireme were all three ranks; in a quadrireme and upwards, all the middle ranks were Zeugitæ: only the uppermost were Thranitæ, and the nethermost Thalamitæ.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

part to set themselves in battle, and be subject to the missiles of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be shot at behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be shot at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched they would have behind them the enemies, the light-armed, and such as were least well provided with arms,⁵ with arrows, darts, stones, and slings, whose strength consist in being at a distance, and who could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design, Demosthenes both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

Epitadas and his party are compelled, after a brave resistance, to retreat on their own garrison at the extremity of the island,

XXXIII. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain, and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went towards the men at arms of the Athenians, with intent to charge them; for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join in battle with them, nor any way make use of their skill: for both the light-armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not against them, but remained still. Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back, but turning they defended themselves, being men armed lightly, and that easily got before them by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough, by having been formerly desert; so that the Lacedæmonians in their armour could not follow them.

XXXIV. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another; but when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light-armed soldiers, seeing them less quick in repelling them, and taking courage chiefly from their sight, being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much, that they did not appear now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received any hurt at their hands, equal to what they had expected when they first landed, with their spirits enslaved, as having to fight against Lacedæmonians, con-

⁵ This word will bear two interpretations: either "the most helpless," i. e. "the least well armed," or "the most difficult to deal with."—*Arnold*.

temned them and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and the dust of the woods lately burnt mounted abundantly into the air, so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedæmonians' side, for their jacks⁶ now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown, stuck broken in them,⁷ so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them, for the greater noise of the enemy; but, danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves on any side by fighting.

XXXV. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order, to the fortification at the extremity of the island, and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground then were the light-armed soldiers much more confident than before, and pressed on them with a mighty noise. And as many of the Lacedæmonians as were intercepted in their retreat perished, but the most of them having fled into the fort, together with the watch there, put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following, could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place, but coming up against them from the front, sought only how to push them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the sun; one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedæmonians defended themselves easier now than before, because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks.

⁶ Πίλοι. A kind of quilted armour, or of stuff close beaten like felt. The word sometimes means "caps," or helmets, but the other sense is more applicable here.

⁷ Dr. Arnold thus explains the passage. "The missiles of the enemies had broken off in their bodies, when they were shot at;" referring βαλλομένων to the Lacedæmonians, as Goeller also does. Mr. Bloomfield, on the contrary, thinks it is to be understood of the Athenians, in a deponent sense. The passage a few lines lower, ἀποκεκλημένοι, κ. τ. λ. Dr. Arnold explains, "prevented, as far as their sight was concerned, from seeing any thing before them."

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
the leader
of the
Messeni-
ans leads a
force
round, and
takes them
in the
rear.

XXXVI. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians came and said to Cleon and Demosthenes, that they spent their labour there in vain, and that if they would deliver to him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers, to go round by such a way as he himself should find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedæmonians, that he might not be discovered; making his approach wherever the inclination of the cliffs of the island gave him access; in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch, and with much labour and difficulty he got round them unseen; and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. And the Lacedæmonians being now assailed with their missiles both before and behind, were in the same case, to compare small matters with great, that they were in at Thermopylæ. For then they were slain by the Persians having got round them by means of the path;⁸ and these now being shot at on both sides, could make good the place no longer, but fighting few against many, and being weak moreover for want of food, were at last forced to give ground, and the Athenians by this time were masters of all the entrances.

Cleon and
Demos-
thenes
offer them
quarter,
on condi-
tion of
their sur-
rendering
at dis-
cretion;

XXXVII. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that if they should give way in the least degree more, they would be killed by their army, stayed the fight and held in the soldiers, desiring to carry them alive to Athens, if perchance their spirits might be so much broken, and their courage abated by this misery, that on proclamation made, they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed that they should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them should seem good.

which pro-
posal is ac-
cepted,
after con-
sulting the
Lacedæ-
monians
on the
continent.

XXXVIII. On hearing thereof, most of them threw down their bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads, signifying that they acceded to what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the other. For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes, who was chosen

⁸ Herod. book vii. 216.

to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law,⁹ in case any thing should happen to the others. Styphon, and those with him, said they would send over to the Lacedæmonians in the continent, to know what they ought to do; but the Athenians letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent; and questions having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedæmonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: "The Lacedæmonians bid you take counsel touching yourselves, provided you do nothing dishonourably." Whereupon, having consulted with each other, they yielded up themselves and their arms; and the Athenians kept them that day and the night following with a watch. But the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone, and committed the prisoners in divisions to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedæmonians sent over a herald, and took away the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island was thus: there went over to the island in all four hundred and twenty men at arms; of these were taken away alive three hundred, wanting eight, the rest were slain. Of those that survived of the city of Sparta itself, one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was not a standing fight.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The prisoners are distributed among the Athenian triremes.

Number of the killed and wounded.

XXXIX. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two days; of which, for about twenty days, victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace, in the rest they were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth, and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain, Epitadas, had distributed it more sparingly than he needed. So the Athenians and Peloponnesians departed from Pylos, and went home both with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, senseless as it was, took effect; for within twenty days he brought home the men, as he had undertaken.¹

⁹ This manner of subordinating divers commanders to be chief in succession, was in those times much used. So in expeditions by sea, the *ἐπιστολεύς*, or *ἐπιστολιαφόρος*, was vice-admiral, or chief commander, under the *στολαρχός* or *στρατηγός*. See Xen. Hist. Græc. i. 1. 15; ii. 1. 5. etc.

¹ As to how little Cleon had really to do with the success of this un-

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88.4.

XI. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedæmonians would never, neither by famine nor other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able; and would not believe that those that yielded were of the same sort as those that were slain: and when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insult, if they of them which were slain were not valiant men?² he answered, that the spindle³ (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate, if it could know who was a good man: signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

The prisoners are brought to Athens, and kept there as hostages.

The Messenians of Naupactus send men to Pylos.

The Lacedæmonians negotiate without success for the recovery of Pylos.

XLI. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined that they should be kept in bonds till some agreement should be made; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took measures also for establishing the garrison at Pylos. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country, (for Pylos is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians) plundered Laconia, and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedæmonians, not having in times past been acquainted with ravage and such war as that, and because their Helots went over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not have it known to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylos, and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters: and the ambassadors, though they came often

dertaking, which was probably altogether obtained by Demosthenes, comp. Aristoph. Equit. v. 54.

² The drift of the question seems to be, "You, who have allowed yourselves to become the prisoners of us low people, cannot be those boasted *καλοι κἀγαθοι*, of whom we hear so much; the killed then we presume were all *καλοι κἀγαθοι*.—*Arnold*.

³ Some suppose the Spartan used this word contemptuously, in the sense of a spindle, or a "woman's weapon," but it would rather appear that *ἀτρακτος* was an ordinary Spartan word, to express what the other Greeks called *δίστος*.—*Arnold*.

about it, were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylos.

XLII. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians, with eighty galleys, two thousand men at arms of their own city, and two hundred horse, in vessels built for transporting horses, made an invasion on the territory of Corinth. There went also with them of their confederates, Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians. The general was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with two others. And setting out, they put in at day-break at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on that shore, above which stands the hill Solygeus, whereon the Dorians in old time took their station, to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Æolians, and upon which there stands now a village called Solygea. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twelve stadia, the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians having some time before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus; and five hundred garrison soldiers that were absent in Ambracia and Leucadia; all the rest of military age came forth to watch the Athenians, where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unperceived, and that notice thereof was given them by the signals [agreed upon]⁴ being raised, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchrea, lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and with the other half made haste to meet them.

XLIII. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two of them present at the battle,) with one squadron, went toward the village of Solygea, being unwalled, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. And first they made an onset on the right wing of the Athenians which was but just landed before the Chersonesus, and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and all of it hand to hand: and the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for these were ranged at the extremity of the line) sustained the charge of the Corinthians, and with much ado drove them back. But as they retired, they came

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians under the command of Nicias anchor off Solygea in the Corinthian territory, and land in the night.

The Corinthian commanders separate, Battus going to occupy Solygea, and Lycophron engaging the enemy.

The right wing of the Athenians forced to

⁴ This is implied by the article before *σημεια*: as Goeller remarks, "articulum addit, significans signa de quibus convenerat. Sic infra c. 111. το σημειον του πυρος."

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
retreat to
the ships,
where
they make
a stand.

The rest
of the
army on
either side
engaged.

The Co-
rinthians
are com-
pletely
routed,
and re-
treat to
the hill.

Loco-
phron
slain.

The Athe-
nians re-
tire on
seeing the
division
from So-
lygea and
the old
men from
Corinth
advanc-
ing
against
them.

up (for the place was all rising ground) to a stone wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down the⁵ stones at them; and after having sung the pæan, came again close to them; and the Athenians received their attack, and the battle was again hand to hand. But a certain squadron of Corinthians, that came in to the aid of their own left wing, put the right wing of the Athenians to flight, and chased them to the sea side. But then from their galleys they turned about again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought, being stationed against the left wing of the Athenians; for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygea; so they held out against each other a long time, neither side giving ground.

XLIV. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen which did them great service, seeing the other had none,) the Corinthians were put to flight, and retired to the hill, where they piled up their arms,⁶ and descended no more, but there rested. In this flight, the greatest part of those that were slain perished on the right wing, and, amongst others, Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner, neither much chased, nor retiring in much haste, when they were driven back, made their retreat up the hill, and there stationed themselves. The Athenians, seeing them come no more down to battle, spoiled the dead bodies of the enemy, and took up their own, and forthwith erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchrea, to watch the Athenians, that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle, on account of the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid: so did also the old men of Corinth⁷ from the city, when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when they saw all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys; carrying with them the booty, and

⁵ The stones, i. e. the stones with which the wall [*αἰμασία*] was built; and this determines the sense of the word in this passage.—*Arnold*.

⁶ See note on ii. 2.

⁷ It was said before, that all the Corinthians of military age were come forth, c. 42.

the bodies of their dead, all save two, which not being able to find, they left there. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands that lay near the shore, and from thence sent a herald, and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind.⁸ There were slain in this battle, of the Corinthians two hundred and twelve, and of the Athenians somewhat under fifty.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

XLV. The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon, in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs; where anchoring, they wasted the fields, and stayed all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys, and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzen, and there cut off the isthmus of Chersonesus, on which Methone stands, with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards plundered the territories of Trœzen, Haliæ, and Epidaurus; and when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

The Athenians sail to Crommyon, and afterwards to Methone, which they strengthen and garrison, and then return home.

XLVI. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylos with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war on those Corcyræans who were stationed upon the mountain Istone, who after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the territory, and much annoyed the city; and having assaulted their fortification, took it. But the men, all in one troop, escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their composition, which was this: that they should deliver up the mercenaries that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should abide by the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce, and transported them to the island of Ptychia, to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the chief men of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, [to Athens,] devise this against them. To some few of those in the island they secretly send friends, and instruct them to say, as if, forsooth, it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away,

Eurymedon and Sophocles arrive at Corcyra, and storm Mount Istone.

Terms of capitulation are granted to the garrison: which being violated, by the attempt of some to escape from Ptychia,

⁸ This is an instance of the piety of Nicias. Comp. vii. 85, 86.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

the men
are deli-
vered up
to the Cor-
cyraean
populace,
who con-
clude the
tragedy of
the sedi-
tion by
putting
them all
to death.

and to provide them a vessel, for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyraean people.

XLVII. When they persuaded them to do so, and having prepared for them a boat, as they rowed away, they were taken; the truce was now broken, and they were all given up to the Corcyraeans. And the Athenian generals contributed most especially to further this plot so as to make the pretext seem true, and that those who did it might lay hands on their enemies with less fear, by openly shewing that they did not wish that the men should be carried home by others, (because they themselves were to go to Sicily,) and should gain honour for those that should convoy them. The Corcyraeans having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain great edifice, from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time and made them pass through two files of men of arms ranged on either side, bound together, and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one chanced any where to espy his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went too slowly on, others were set to follow them with whips.

The Athe-
nians sail
for Sicily.

XLVIII. They had taken out of the building in this manner and slain to the number of sixty, before they that remained knew it, (who thought they were but removing them, and carrying them to some other place.) But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and bade them, if they would themselves kill them, to do it, and refused any more to go out of the building, nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyraeans themselves any purpose to force entrance by the door, but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered the roof, and pelted them with the tiling, and shot down arrows at them. But they guarded themselves as well as they could, and at the same time most of them slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangling themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room, and with [ropes made of] their own garments, rending them into strips. And having continued most part of the night, (for night overtook them in their sufferings,) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they all perished. When day came, the Corcyraeans laid them

one across another,⁹ in carts, and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they made bond-women. In this manner were the Corcyræans [that made war] from the hill¹ brought to destruction by the commons. And in this ended this far-spread sedition, for so much as concerned this present war: for of the other party,² there was no longer left aught of any importance. And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there, together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

XLIX. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus went forth on an expedition, and took the city of Anactorium,³ belonging to the Corinthians, and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent thither from all the tribes of their own nation. And the summer ended.

Anactorium taken by the forces at Naupactus and the Acarnanians.

L. The next winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion, upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedæmon. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language into Greek, and read them; wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedæmonians, the summing up of all was this: that he knew not what they meant, for although many ambassadors came, yet not one of them said the same things. If, therefore, they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian. But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own to Ephesus. And there having heard the news that king Artaxerxes,⁴ the son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about this time he died,) they returned home.

WINTER. An intrigue discovered, by means of the arrest of Artaphernes, between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia.

⁹ Φορμηθρον properly signifies, "after the manner that mats or hurdles are platted."

¹ Istone.

² That is, of the party of the nobles.

³ This city belonged to the Corcyræans and Corinthians in common; but a little before this war, the Corinthians carried away captives the men that were in it, and possessed it alone; and those Corcyræans wrought the sedition before related.

⁴ For information on this monarch, who was surnamed Longimanus,

Year 7.
A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
The Chians
are com-
pelled to
demolish
their new
wall.

LI. The same winter also the Chians demolished their new wall, by command of the Athenians, who had suspicions with regard to them that they intended some innovation, though they had made an agreement with the Athenians, and had obtained as firm security as they were able, that they [the Athenians] would let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter, and the seventh year of this war, the history of which Thucydides wrote.

YEAR VIII. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

SUMMER.
The Les-
bian exiles
seize on
Rhœteum,
and take
Antandros
by trea-
chery.

LII. The next summer, in the very beginning, about the time of the new moon, the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month happened an earthquake. At this time, the Mitylenean and other Lesbian outlaws taking post on the continent with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus, and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhœteum, and for two thousand Phocæan staters⁵ rendered it back again, without doing it any harm. After this they made an expedition against Antandros⁶ and take the city by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actææ,⁷ which were in the occupation formerly of the Mityleneans, but subject to the Athenians; but above all the rest, Antandros, which when they had once got, (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber; and mount Ida was situated close by,) they might easily issue from thence with other their preparation, and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Æolic towns in the continent. And this were those men about to prepare.

The Athe-
nians with
sixty ships
sail against
Cythera,

LIII. The Athenians, the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking also with them the Milesians, and some other of their confederates,

see Prideaux, Connect. part i. book 5: who considers it certain, that he is the Artaxerxes mentioned in the books of Ezra and Esther, and that the transaction mentioned in this chapter occurred in the fortieth year of his reign. He was succeeded by Darius Nothus.

⁵ This sum was above £1900 sterling. The Phocæan stater being worth about 19s. 9d. sterling.

⁶ A city of Troas, near which Æneas built his fleet, after the destruction of Troy. Virg. Æn. iii. 6. Now *St. Dimitri*.

⁷ Cities situate on the sea shore, or *Acte*, over-against Lesbos.

made an expedition against Cythera,⁸ under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrepes, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island on the coast of Laconia, over-against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, of the Periœci,⁹ and every year a magistrate, called Cytherodices, used to go over to them from Sparta. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time, to lie in garrison there, and took much care of the place. For it was the place where their merchant ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by pirates from the sea, in which quarter only was it possible that it should be infested. For [Laconia] stretches out to a great length into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

LIV. The Athenians having come to land with their army with ten of their galleys, and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took the town lying on the sea coast, called Scandea, and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cytherians, lying likewise on the sea coast. The Cytherians they found standing all in arms prepared for them; and a battle ensuing, the Cytherians for a little while made resistance; but soon after turned their backs, and fled to the higher part of the city; and afterwards came to an agreement with Nicias and his fellow-commanders, to permit the Athenian [people] to determine respecting them whatsoever they thought good, but death. Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cytherians before, which was also a cause that all that concerned the agreement was managed for them both the sooner and with the more favour, both for the present and for the future. For [had it been otherwise] the Athenians would have removed¹ the Cytherians, and that both because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay in that manner on the coast of Laconia. After the capitulation, the Athenians having received into their power Scandea, a town lying on the haven,

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

take its
two cities,
and com-
pel the in-
habitants
to surren-
der.
They then
ravage the
coast of
Laconia
for seven
days.

⁸ Now Cerigo. See Herod. book vii. chap. 235.

⁹ On the Periœci, see a brief and excellent account in Hermann's Pol. Aut. sect. 19. (p. 41. of English Transl.); and on their state amongst the Lacedæmonians, see further, sections 24. 28. and 48.

¹ The insertion of ἀν, as Goeller remarks, is needed here, as otherwise the sense would be repugnant to what is afterwards said in c. 57, about the removal of only a few of the inhabitants.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

and having established a guard for Cythera, they sailed to Asine, and most of the towns on the sea side. And going sometimes on land, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together.

The Lacedæmonians form a body of four hundred cavalry, and some archers.

LV. The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera, and expected also that they would make descents from their ships in the same manner in their territory, yet did not draw themselves up any where with their united forces to resist them, but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wherever there was need, and were otherwise also exceeding watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in any thing that regarded their political constitution: as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island,² and the Athenians having got Pylos and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy war, and one that did not admit of precautions, so that, contrary to their custom, they established four hundred horsemen,³ and some archers. And if ever they were backward in war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who considered whatsoever they attempted not, to be something short of what they thought to accomplish. And besides this, so many misfortunes in so short a time falling out, so contrary to their expectation, exceedingly affrighted them, and they were afraid lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island. On this account, they durst the less to hazard battle, and thought that whatsoever they should set on foot would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.⁴

A party of Lacedæmonian troops defeated near Cotyrta

LVI. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country, and disembarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both thinking themselves singly to be too small a number, and being dejected in

² Sphacteria, where their men were taken and carried to Athens.

³ It is to be remarked, that this force of cavalry, which appears now to be levied for the first time, must not be confounded with the three hundred *ἵππεις*, or knights, who formed the royal body-guard. For information on this point, as also upon the Spartan army generally, see Hermann's *Pol. Ant.* sect. 29. (p. 60. Eng. transl.)

⁴ Or, as Goeller translates, "gave them no longer a guarantee, or, inspired them no longer with confidence."

the manner mentioned. Yet one garrison which defended itself about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, frightened back by an attack the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whose arms were also taken. And the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again, and went to Cythera. From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera, and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argia and Laconia. The Lacedæmonians possessing this [city,] gave the same for an habitation to the Æginetæ, after they were driven out of Ægina,⁵ both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake, and of the insurrection of the Helots, and also, that being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless been always disposed towards their side.

LVII. While therefore the Athenians were yet coming towards them, the Æginetæ left the castle, which they happened to be then building toward the sea side, and retired up into the city above, where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with them one of those garrisons which the Lacedæmonians had distributed into the several parts of the country; and these though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter the town with them, though the Æginetæ entreated them, apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring to the highest ground, lay still there, as they deemed themselves too weak to give battle. Meanwhile, the Athenians came to land, and marching up forthwith with their whole army, take Thyrea, and burnt it, and sacked whatsoever was in it. The Æginetæ, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens; amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patrocles, the Lacedæmonian ruler, amongst them was wounded, and taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom, for safety's sake, they thought good to remove to some other place. These, therefore, the Athenians decreed should be placed in the islands,⁶ and the rest of the Cytherians should pay a tribute of four talents, inhabiting their own territory, and that they should put to death the Æginetæ, as many as they

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
and
Aphro-
disia.

The Athe-
nians
attack
and take
Thyrea,

and carry
the inha-
bitants to
Athens,
where they
are all put
to death.
Some of
the Cythe-
rians re-
moved;
the rest
suffered to
inhabit
Cythera,
on pay-
ment of a
tribute.

⁵ Vid. ii. 27.

⁶ Cyclades.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

had taken, (out of former inveterate hatred,) and put Tantalus in bonds amongst those Lacedæmonians that were taken in the island.⁷

Affairs in
Sicily.
Congress
at Gela.

LVIII. In Sicily, the same summer, was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinæans and the Geloans. But afterwards, the rest of the Siciliots assembling, by their ambassadors, out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves, if by any means they could come to an agreement; wherein, after many opinions had been delivered by men disagreeing, and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake to the assembly to this effect.

Oration of Hermocrates for Peace.

LIX. “Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city, nor of the most afflicted with the war, that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion, which seems to me to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous it is, to what end should a man, particularizing all the evil that exists in it, make a long speech before those that already know it? for neither does the not knowing of them necessitate man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert man from it, if he thinks he will obtain any advantage. But it falls out that to the one the gain appears greater than the danger; while the other prefers to undergo danger, rather than to endure any present loss. But if they should chance both to do these very things unseasonably, exhortations to peace are profitable; which very fact, if we be but persuaded of it, at the present time would be of the greatest value to us: for it was assuredly out of a desire that every city had to establish its own particular welfare on a firm footing, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning and discussing the matter, to return to mutual amity. And if it shall not turn out that we depart satisfied every man with what is fair, we shall be at war again.

LX. “Nevertheless, you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, will not be only for the advantage of ourselves in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, which is now the object of the machinations (at least in my opinion) of the

⁷ Sphacteria.

Athenians. And you ought to think that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders to peace than any words of mine; who having, of all the Grecians, the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and, by the fair title of alliance, plausibly to accommodate those who are by nature hostile to them to their best advantage. For if we enter into a war, and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army to aid those who call not on them, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges, and at the same time promote the increase^s of their dominion here, it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will some time hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet, and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
O1. 89. 1.

LXI. "But, if we were wise, we ought, acquiring each of us for his own state what does not belong to it, rather than impairing what we already have, to call in confederates, and undergo dangers; and to believe that nothing so much as sedition destroys both the individual states and Sicily; of which we the inhabitants are planned against by the Athenians as one body; and nevertheless are city against city separated among ourselves. Acknowledging which, we ought, man with man, and city with city, to return again into amity, and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily; nor should [the idea] occur to any one, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcidæans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. For they invade not these nations, because their race is different, from hatred of the one of them, but from a covetous desire of those blessings in Sicily which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved on being called to aid the Chalcidæans. For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcidæans, yet have they on their part been more forward to do them justice than by the league they were bound. Indeed, that the Athenians covet and meditate these things is to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are too willing to be subject. For it is the nature of man every where to command such as give way, and to be shy of such as assail. But all we are to blame that know this, and do not provide accordingly, and who do not each of us come here, considering this as all important, [viz] that all should settle well the object

^s Mr. Bloomfield renders this, "paving the way for."

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

of common fear. Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves. For the Athenians come not against us out of their own country as their station, but from theirs here that have called them in. And so, not war by war, but all our quarrels would be ended by peace without trouble. And those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, shall with fair reason depart without accomplishing their errand.

LXII. "And thus much, for the profit that will be found by advising wisely, as concerns the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing, or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter, or preserve the former, to both? or that it hath not honours, and eminence more free from danger? or whatever else advantage one might discourse of at large, as concerning those of war? Which things ye considering, ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man has a firm opinion that he shall perform some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him not take it ill that he fail, contrary to his expectation; knowing that many men, ere now, pursuing with vengeance such as had done them injury, and others, trusting by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have the first sort not only not avenged themselves, but also have not even preserved themselves; and to the other, instead of winning from others, it has fallen out that they have also left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, because an injury hath been done; nor is strength therefore sure, because it is confident. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most unstable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every man fears alike, we proceed against each other with the greater precaution.

LXIII. "Now, therefore, terrified doubly, both with the obscure fear of the uncertainty of what is to come, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and thinking that we have sufficient excuse in these hinderances, as to whatever may fall short in the projects we had severally conceived we should

effect, let us send away from the country the enemies that hover over us, and make, if we can, an eternal peace amongst ourselves; or if not that, then a truce, at least, for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us be certain of this, that following my counsel, we shall each of us have our cities free, whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall with spirit⁹ repay our benefactors, and retaliate on those who injure us. Whereas rejecting it, and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be, how to be revenged, but, even if we are very successful, we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not.

LXIV. "For my part, as I said in the beginning, representing this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies, as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish love of contention [do I hold it fit] to imagine, that I have an equally absolute mastery over my own wishes, and over fortune, which I cannot control, but, where it is reasonable, to make concessions. And so I claim the rest should do so as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be induced to make concessions, kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcidæan of another of his own race; or, in sum, any one [by another] of us, being neighbours and joint-inhabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Siciliots, who, as I conceive, will both war when it so happens, and again by common conferences make peace, by our own selves. But when foreigners invade us, we shall (if wise) unite all of us to encounter them, inasmuch as being injured singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so we shall not deprive Sicily of these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians, and of domestic war, for the present, and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty, and less the object of the plots of others for the time to come."

LXV. Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians

The Siciliots are

⁹ I have followed the suggestion of a distinguished scholar of the present day, in thinking that the word "spirit" comes nearest to the word in the text; perhaps "manfully" would represent it.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
reconciled
to one
another.
Pytho-
dorus
Sopho-
cles, and
Euryme-
don ap-
prove the
treaty, and
sail home-
ward.
On their
return
they are
punished
for having
quitted
Sicily.

followed his advice, and were brought to agree amongst themselves that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then had; and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantina, paying the Syracusians for the same a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians to them as were in authority, told them, that they wished to come to an agreement, and that they also [i. e. the Athenians] should be comprehended in the same peace; and the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenian ships departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely, Pythodorus and Sophocles, and laid a fine on the third, Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued all Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprizes, with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unlooked-for prosperity of most of their designs, thus ministering strength to their hope.

The demo-
cratical
party at
Megara
propose to
deliver up
their city
to Hippo-
crates and
Demos-
thenes.

LXVI. The same summer, the Megareans in the city [of Megara,] afflicted both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice,¹ and by their own outlaws from Pegæ, who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies, began to talk one to another how it was right to receive them home again, and not let their city, by both these means, be ruined. The friends of those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly than before, thought fit to lay hold of and follow up what was said. But the chief men of the commons, knowing that the people would not be able, by reason of the evils that oppressed them, to continue on their side, make an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcesthenes, commanders of the Athenians, wishing to deliver them the city, esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves, than the return of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed, that first, the Athenians should possess themselves of the long walls, (these were about eight

¹ Goeller cites a passage from Plutarch's Life of Pericles, to the effect, that it was customary for the Athenian generals during the B. P., on entering on their office, to swear, that they would twice every year make an inroad into the Megarean territory.

stadia in length, and reached from the city to Nisæa, their haven,) thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians from Nisæa, in which, the better to assure Megara to their side, there lay no other soldiers in garrison, but they; and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above; and they [the inhabitants] would the more easily come over to their side, that being effected first.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

LXVII. The Athenians, therefore, after all was done and said on both sides, and every thing ready, sailed by night to Minoa,² the island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms, led by Hippocrates, and took their post in a pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander, Demosthenes, light-armed Plataæans, and others called Peripoli,³ lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know concerning this same night. When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus: they had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty,⁴ with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates,⁵ to carry out a little boat of two oars, both pulled by one person, and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea side in a cart: and to sail out; and before it was day they used to bring it back again in a cart, and set it within the gates, that the Athenians who lay in Minoa might not know where to watch for them,⁶ no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which being opened, according to custom, as for the boat, the Athenians seeing it (for so it was agreed on) arose from their ambush, and ran with all speed, wishing to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to

The Athenians occupy the long wall,

² This island lying before the haven Nisæa, made the port, and the Athenians kept in it an ordinary garrison ever since they took it first, and could see all the haven and what vessels lay in it, but could not enter. According to Strabo, it was a promontory. See Thuc. b. iii. 51.

³ Those who did duty as militia in garrisons, or on the frontiers: for information on this service among the Athenians, see Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 123. (p. 239. Eng. transl.)

⁴ To get booty for the Athenians.

⁵ Not the gates of Megara, but the gates in the long walls near Nisæa, as appears by the narration.

⁶ Literally, "that their watching might be indistinct, or blind."—*Bloomf.*

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates, and was a hinderance to the shutting them; and they and the Megareans who took their part slay the guards that were at the gates. And first, those Plataeans and Peripoli, that were with Demosthenes, ran in, in the place where the trophy is now: and fighting as soon as they were within the gates, (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir,) the Plataeans overcame those that came to bring aid, and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after.

but are
foiled in an
attempt to
enter the
city.

LXVIII. After this, the Athenian soldiers, every one as they entered, went up to the wall, and a few of the Peloponnesians of the garrison at first made head, and fought, and were some of them slain, but the most took to flight in fear, inasmuch as the enemies had fallen upon them by night, and also the traitors of the Megareans were fighting against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them. It chanced also that the Athenian herald, of his own discretion, made proclamation, that if any Megarean would, he should come and ground⁷ his arms along with the Athenians. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer, but firmly believing that they jointly warred on them, fled into Nisæa. As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken, and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them, the rest, as many as were in the secret, said it was fit to open the gates, and to go out to battle. Now it was agreed on between them, that when the gates⁸ were open, the Athenians should rush in, and that they themselves would be easily known from the rest: for that they might have no harm done them, they would besmear themselves with ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety. For the four thousand heavy-armed Athenians, and six hundred horsemen, which, according to the appointment, were to come to them from Eleusis, having marched all night, were already arrived. When they were besmeared, and were now about the gates, one of those that were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest [that were not.] These collecting themselves together, came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight, (for that neither in former times, even when they were stronger than now, durst they do so,) or to put the city into so manifest a danger.

⁷ See note on ii. 2.

⁸ Of the city itself of Megara.

And said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be there.⁹ Yet they discovered not that they knew of the intrigue, but only persisted, as having given good advice; and they stayed at the gates, so that the traitors could not perform what they intended.

LXIX. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the city by assault, fell immediately to inclosing Nisæa with a wall, thinking that if they could take it before aid came, Megara would the sooner yield, (and iron was quickly brought to them from Athens, and masons, and whatever else was necessary,) and beginning at the wall¹ they had won, and throwing up a cross-wall towards Megara, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side of Nisæa; and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves with the stones and bricks of the suburbs; and having felled trees, and timber, supplied what was defective with a palisado; the houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought: the next day about evening the wall was within a very little finished, and then they that were in Nisæa, in fear, seeing themselves in want of victual, (for they had none but what they used day by day from the city above,) and without hope that the Peloponnesians would quickly come to relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies, came to an agreement with the Athenians on these terms: "to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money, having delivered up their arms; and the Lacedæmonians, both the governor, and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians." Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the city of Megara,² and taken Nisæa into their possession, prepared for what was further to be done.

LXX. Brasidas, the son of Tellis, a Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing

⁹ That is, in Megara, between themselves, before they fought with the enemies without the city.

¹ Viz. that part of the long wall which they seized.

² Not pulled them down quite, but only so far as not to be a defence to any part of the city itself, nor to join to the walls of the city.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Athenians invest Nisæa with a wall, and take it, and break off the long wall between that city and Megara.

Brasidas the Lacedæmonian

Year 8. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. advances to the assistance of Nisæa; but finding that it is taken, he proceeds with three hundred men, unperceived by the Athenians, to Megara.

an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be won, sends to the Bœotians, bidding them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, (a village of Megaris, so called, at the foot of the hill Geranea,)³ and marched himself with two thousand and seven hundred men at arms of the Corinthians, four hundred of Phliasiens, six hundred Sicyonians, and of his own, all that were as yet levied; thinking still to find Nisæa untaken. When he heard the contrary, (for he had set out towards Tripodiscus in the night,) having chosen three hundred men out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came, having escaped the notice of the Athenians that lay by the sea side, to the city of Megara, desirous, as he said, and intending also in good earnest, if he could have done it, to make an attempt upon Nisæa, but his greatest object was to get into Megara to secure it; and he begged [the inhabitants] to receive them, saying, he was in hope he should recover Nisæa.

The citizens refuse to admit him, upon which he returns to his army.

LXXI. But the Megarean factions being afraid, one, lest he should bring in the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons, out of this very fear, should assault them, whereby the city, being at battle within itself, and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to remain still, and look out for what might happen. For both sides expected that there would be a battle between the Athenians and those who came to succour the city, and that then they might with greater safety join the victorious party, according as each individual might favour either side. And Brasidas, not prevailing with them, went back to the rest of the army.

The Bœotian army arrives at daybreak, and engages the Athenians with equal fortune.

LXXII. And with the dawn the Bœotians arrived, having intended to come to the aid of Megara, before Brasidas sent, esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and being then with their whole forces at Plataea, but when they had received also this message, they were much more encouraged; and having sent two thousand two hundred men at arms and two hundred horse with⁴ Brasidas, they went back with the greater

³ Book i. 105.

⁴ The word *παρησαν* implies, that the Bœotians had reached Tripodiscus, as Mr. Bloomfield remarks; not that they sent the forces from Plataea, whence they had set out on receiving the message from Brasidas, to whom they committed the detachment.

part of their army. The whole army being now present together, not less than six thousand men of arms, and the Athenian men at arms being arranged in their ranks, about Nisæa, and the sea side, but the light-armed dispersed up and down the plain, the Bœotian horsemen fell unexpected upon the light-armed soldiers, and drove them in rout towards the sea. For in all this time till now, there had come no aid to the Megareans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side, that held long, wherein both sides claimed the victory. For the Athenians slew the general of the Bœotian horse, and some few others, and rifled them, having charged them close under Nisæa.⁵ And having these dead bodies in their power, they restored them on truce, and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with a decided result, but parting asunder, the Bœotians went to their own party and the Athenians to Nisæa.

LXXIII. After this, Brasidas and his army came nearer to the sea, and to the city of Megara; and having seized a place of advantage, stood still in battle array, thinking the Athenians would be assailants, and knowing the Megareans were on the look out for which side should have the victory; and they thought that matters stood well for themselves both ways; first, because they should not be the assailants, and voluntarily begin the battle and danger; since having manifestly shewn themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour: and by the same policy it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans; for if they themselves had not come and been seen, it had no longer been a matter of chance, but they had, without all doubt, been forthwith deprived of the city, as men conquered. Whereas now, if haply the Athenians themselves declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without fighting. Which also came to pass. For the Megareans, when the Athenians went out and drew up their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still, their [i. e. the Athenian] com-

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Athenians and Lacedæmonians both decline to commence an engagement.

⁵ The sense requires the dative, and not the accusative, which would mean "having charged (and driven) them to Nisæa." The reader should refer to Dr. Arnold's note, where this remark is borrowed.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

manders likewise, considering that if they should begin the battle against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprize was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they failed, must undergo loss in the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field, did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard;⁶ and so for a while they waited, and when nothing was attempted by either party, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisæa, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place whence they had set forth.

Brasidas admitted into Megara. He returns to Corinth. The Athenians return home. The exiles are recalled, and put to death one hundred of their enemies. An oligarchical form of government established.

LXXIV. Then, I say, such of the Megareans as were friends of the outlaws, taking more confidence, because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities: and when they had received them in, those that had intrigued with the Athenians, being now in great fear, they come to consultation. Afterwards, Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth, in pursuit of his former purpose of preparing the expedition towards Thrace. Now the Megareans in the city, when the Athenians also were gone home, all that had chief hand in the intrigues with the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipped away; but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recall them from Pegæ, having made them swear by great oaths, no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city their best advice. These, when they came into office, and held a review of the heavy-armed,⁷ having disposed the bands of the soldiers into divers quarters of the city, picked out of their enemies, and of those that seemed most to have cooperated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons: and having constrained the people to pass their sentence on them openly, when they were condemned, slew them; and established in the city the state almost of an

⁶ Dr. Arnold thus renders this difficult passage: "But in the enemy's case, that each should risk a part of the whole force of his state, and of the army then in the field, was a thing which they were naturally willing to venture."

⁷ Compare Xenophon. Hell. ii. 4. §. 8. where the same manœuvre is practised by the thirty tyrants, when they wanted to arrest some suspected persons at Eleusis.—*Arnold*.

oligarchy. And this change of government brought about by a few, through sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

LXXV. The same summer, when Antandros was about to be repaired by the Mitylenians as they intended,⁸ Demodocus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys, set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont, (for Lamachus, the third in that commission, had gone with ten galleys into the Pontus,) having notice of the preparation made in that place; and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there as it had done in Anæa⁹ over-against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea, by sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city, and received such as fled out of it; with these feelings they levied an army amongst the confederates, and sailed to it, and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recover the place again. And not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, much rain having fallen above in the country, and the stream of a land flood coming suddenly down, loses all his galleys, and came himself and his army by land through Bithynia (belonging to the Thracians who dwell in Asia, on the other side) to Chalcedon,¹ a colony of the Megareans, at the mouth of the Pontus.

Antandros retaken by Demodocus and Aristides.

Lamachus loses his fleet by a flood.

LXXVI. The same summer likewise, Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys, directly after his departure out of the Megaris, comes to Naupactus. For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the form of Bœotian government, and to turn it into a democracy, according to the government of Athens, intrigued with him and Hippocrates regarding the state of Bœotia: and these things had they prepared, induced thereunto principally by Ptæodorus, a Theban outlaw. Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphæ, (Siphæ is a city of the territory of Thespiæ, standing on the sea side in the Crissæan gulf;) and Chæronea, (which is subject² to Orchomenus, called heretofore Orchomenus in

Demosthenes sails with forty ships to Naupactus, in consequence of a correspondence with some Bœotians, who promise to put Siphæ into the hands of the Athenians.

⁸ Book iv. 52.

⁹ Book iii. 19. 32.

¹ Founded by a colony from Megara, under command of Argias, B. C. 675. Originally called Procerastis, now Kadi Keni. See Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 86.

² Or, pays duties to it. Compare ii. 15. and note there. See also, on this

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Athenians are to attack Delium.

Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Bœotia,) some others, of Orchomenus, were to surrender into their hands; and the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this, and were hiring soldiers out of Peloponnesus. This Chæronea is the furthest town of Bœotia towards the Phænotis of Phocis, and some Phocians also dwelt in it. On the other side, the Athenians were to seize on Delium, the temple consecrated to Apollo, in Tanagræa, on the part toward Eubœa; all this was to be done together upon a day appointed, that the Bœotians might not come together to oppose them with their forces united, but might be confused, and turn each to defend his own. And if the attempt succeeded, and Delium was fortified, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Bœotians for the present, yet those places being in their possession, and the country being plundered, and because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that affairs could not remain long in the posture they were; but that the Athenians, joining with such of them as rebelled, and the Bœotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid.

Hippocrates is to meet Demosthenes with a land force. Demosthenes makes war against Salynthius by way of a pretence, but makes preparations to proceed to Siphæ.

LXXVII. And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march against the Bœotians; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to levy an army of Acarnanians, and other confederates in these quarters, and to sail to Siphæ, as it was to be betrayed to him; and a day was fixed by them on which they were to do these things in concert. Demosthenes arriving, and finding the Cœniades had been forced by the rest of the Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederation, and having himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made an expedition first on Salynthius and the Agræans, and having brought over the other places thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to Siphæ.

Brasidas with one thousand seven hundred heavy-armed proceeds to Thrace.

LXXVIII. At the same time of this summer, Brasidas marching to the parts towards Thrace, with one thousand five hundred men of arms, when he was in Heraclea in Trachis, sent a messenger before him to his friends to Pharsalus, begging them to guide himself and his army through their territory; and

point, and on the Bœotian confederacy generally, Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 179. (p. 376. Eng. transl.)

when there were come Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, the public host of the Chalcidæans, to Melitia of Achaia,³ he marched on. There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa⁴ he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly in any way without a guide, but especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave, is a thing of which all Grecians are alike jealous; besides, the commons of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. Insomuch that if the government of that country had not been, as was the custom, an oligarchy⁵ rather than a commonwealth, he could never have gone on; for also then, as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others of a contrary mind to the former, who forbade him, and told him that he did unjustly in going on without the consent of the whole body of the nation. But those that convoyed him answered, that they would not bring him through against their wills; but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as being his friends. And Brasidas himself said, he came thither a friend, both to the country and to them; and that he brought arms not against them, but against the Athenians, their enemies. And that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, whereby they might not use one another's land: and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he, yet still he claimed not to be stopped from passing through their country. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed: and the same day he set forth from Melitia, he reached Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus; thence he went to Phacium; from thence into Peræbia, and from this point his Thessalian convoyers returned back, and the

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
His route
through
Thessaly.

³ Achaia Phiotis, the country here spoken of, was believed to be the earliest seat of the Hellenian race. Vid. Thucyd. i. 3. and Herod. i. 56. On the geography of Thessaly, it is well worth while to refer to Dr. Arnold's notes on this chapter; from whom the preceding remark is taken.

⁴ These words may also mean, as Mr. Bloomfield renders them, "a citizen of Larissa."

⁵ *Δυναστεία*, absolute government under one part: oligarchical, or perhaps monarchical, as Goeller renders it.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

Peræbians⁶ who are subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion, in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians, situated at the foot of Olympus, on the side toward Thessaly.

He arrives
at Dium,
whence he
proceeds
to Per-
diccas,
and then
to Chal-
cidice.

LXXIX. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him; and came to Perdiccas, into the territory of the Chalcidæans. For Perdiccas and those towards Thrace that had revolted from the Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear: the Chalcidæans, because they thought that the Athenians would invade them first, (and in conjunction with them the cities near them that had not revolted urged on the thing secretly,) and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels, but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians. And the ill success which the Lacedæmonians in these times had, turned out to them a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily.

LXXX. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their own territory Laconia⁷ most of all, they expected the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to plague them in return again; and the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcidæans were content to maintain the army, having called them thither to help [the Chalcidæans] in their revolt. And also, because they desired⁸ a pretence to send away part of their Helots, (lest they should take the opportunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylos, to revolt,) they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helots; (for at all times most of the measures of the Lacedæmonians were drawn up with an especial reference to keeping guard over the Helots.) They therefore caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars should select themselves, inasmuch as they (i. e. the Lacedæmonians) would give them freedom; making trial of them in this manner, and con-

⁶ On the Peræbians, consult Müllers Dorians, vol. ii. book i. c. 1. pages 30 and 31; and for an account of Thessaly, p. 23 of the same. (Oxford edit. of 1830.)

⁷ By incursions and foraging the country from Pylos and Cythera.

⁸ On this construction, compare ii. 3; and Matthiæ's Greek Grammar, 391. —Arnold.

ceiving that those who, every one for himself, deemed themselves worthy to be first made free, would from their daring spirit soonest also set upon them. And when they had thus chosen in preference about two thousand, they [the Helots] crowned themselves, and went in procession about the temples, as being freed, but they (i. e. the Lacedæmonians) not long after made away with them, and no man knew how they each perished. And then⁹ at that time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men,¹ along with Brasidas, but the rest of the army were mercenaries hired by him out of Peloponnesus. But Brasidas himself the Lacedæmonians sent out, because it was his own chief desire.

LXXXI. The Chalcidæans also longed to have him, as one who was both esteemed in Sparta to be in every way an active man, and who when he went out on foreign service did the Lacedæmonians very great service. For by shewing himself at that present time just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt, and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass, that if the Lacedæmonians pleased to come to terms, as also they did, they had towns to render and receive reciprocally, and had a respite of the war from the Peloponnesians. And also as regards the war, which was later in point of time, after what befell them from Sicily,² the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas shewed now, to some known by experience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedæmonians: for being the first that went out,

Year 8.
A. C. 424
Ol. 89.1.

⁹ These words, as Thirlwall remarks, (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii. p. 266.) seem to shew, that the massacre mentioned in the text took place on some different occasion than immediately before the expedition of Brasidas, as it is usually understood. Besides which he observes, that it would be improbable that the government would have ordered the massacre of the Helots at a time when it could use them advantageously in the foreign service, for which Brasidas was so scantily supplied with troops.

¹ Some refer the word ἀνδρων to the Lacedæmonians, but the mention in v. 34. of the Helots who fought with Brasidas, appears to support the sense given above. For an account of the Helots, their treatment, and for particulars as to the Crypteia, see Müller's Dor. vol. ii. c. 3. p. 45; or Hermann's Pol. Antiq. sects. 19 and 48.

² This is Dr. Arnold's explanation, who understands the words as meaning the disasters which the Sicilian expedition brought upon them. On this use of ἐκ, see his note on i. 64. and iii. 21.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Athenians declare war against Perdiccas.

Perdiccas, in conjunction with Brasidas, marches against Arrhibæus, with whom he holds a conference, contrary to the wishes of Perdiccas, who thereupon reduces the sum which he had contributed to the support of the army.

and having appeared in all points a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

LXXXII. Being now come into the parts towards Thrace, the Athenians on notice thereof declare Perdiccas an enemy, imputing to him this expedition, and bestowed greater attention on their allies in the parts thereabouts.

LXXXIII. Perdiccas, with Brasidas and his army, as soon as ever they came together, with his own forces, makes an expedition against Arrhibæus, the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a people of Macedonia, confining on his dominion, both for a quarrel he had against him, and also as desiring to subdue him. When he was arrived with his army and Brasidas, at the entrance of Lynceus, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibæus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedæmonians. For Arrhibæus had also made some advances by a herald, to commit the matter to Brasidas's arbitration. And the Chalcidæan ambassadors being present, gave him likewise advice, not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, that they might have him more prompt in their own affairs.³ Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedæmon, had spoken after the following manner; viz, that he would bring many of the places about him into the Lacedæmonian league. So that on this account Brasidas claimed the right of treating the more on an equal ground [with Perdiccas] about the affairs of Arrhibæus.⁴ But Perdiccas said, that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of their controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should shew him. And that it would be an injury, seeing he paid the half of his army, if Brasidas should take part with Arrhibæus; nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel, holds a conference with Arrhibæus, by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army before it made an irruption into the country. But from that time forward, Perdiccas, instead of half, gave but a third part of the pay of his army, conceiving himself to be injured.

³ Or, as Bekker reads, *μη ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδικκᾷ τὰ δεινά*. The ambassadors of the Chalcidæans instructed him not to free Perdiccas from apprehension, that they might be able to use him more readily for their own affairs also.

⁴ So that on this ground Brasidas thought himself entitled to deal jointly with Perdiccas in the matters of Arrhibæus, rather than leave him to manage them as he pleased.—*Arnold*.

LXXXIV. The same summer, directly after these events, a little before the vintage, Brasidas, having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcidæans, made an expedition against Acanthus,⁵ the colony of the Andrians. And there arose sedition about receiving him, between such as had joined with the Chalcidæans in bringing him thither, and the common people. Nevertheless, for fear of their crops, which were not yet got in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then, after they had heard, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And standing up to speak to the multitude, (for he was not uneloquent for a Lacedæmonian,) he spake to this effect.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
Brasidas
marches to
Acanthus.

Oration of Brasidas.

LXXXV. “Men of Acanthus, the sending of me and of this army abroad by the Lacedæmonians, has made good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians, which was, that we meant to make war for the liberty of Greece. But if we be come late, deceived in the opinion we had of the war there, [in which we expected] that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down, without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. For we are come as soon as opportunity permitted, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. But I wonder at your shutting me out of your gates, and if I have come unwelcome to you. For we Lacedæmonians have ventured this so great danger, of passing many days’ journey through the territory of strangers, and shewn all possible zeal, imagining that we went to such confederates as, before we came, had us present in their hearts,⁶ and were desirous of our coming. And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded, and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians’ liberty; not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because those whom I may go to will be the less willing to attach themselves to me; thinking it strange if you to whom

⁵ Situated near to mount Athos: according to some, a city of the Thracians; to others, of the Macedonians. See Herod. vi. 44. Taken by the Romans. Livy, xxxi. 45.

⁶ Mr. Bloomfield takes the same view of this passage, and renders thus: “as supposing we were coming to allies, and, before we were actually arrived here, should, at least in your minds, be arrived.”

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

I came first, having a flourishing city, and being esteemed wise, have not received us: for which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought⁷ either to be offering you liberty unjustly, or to have arrived weak, and without power to assist you against the Athenians, if they come against you. And yet against the same army I now have, when I went to take aid to Nisæa, the Athenians, though more in number, durst not hazard battle; so that it is not likely that the Athenians would send forth by a naval armament⁸ a force equal to the army they had at Nisæa.

LXXXVI. "I came not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians; and I have bound the Lacedæmonian magistrates unto me by great oaths, that in very truth whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws. And that we shall not hold you as confederates to us, brought in either by force or fraud; but, on the contrary, be confederates to you, that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me, especially having given you so good assurance, or think me unable to defend you, but also that you join yourselves boldly with me. And if any man be unwilling so to do, through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him most especially cast away that fear: for I came not to assist a side, nor do I think⁹ I bring you an uncertain and doubtful liberty, [which it would indeed be,] if neglecting the ancient forms of government here, I should enthral, either the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude. For to be governed so were worse than the domination of a foreigner. And there would result from it to us Lacedæmonians, not thanks for our labours, but instead of honour and glory, more probably blame; and

⁷ These infinitives depend upon ἐξω αἰτιαν, "I shall be charged with, &c." repeated from the preceding words, though with a different signification. —Arnold.

⁸ The word *στολφ* must be understood here, or it must be taken as an adverb, as Dr. Arnold understands it, who supposes that in this obscure sentence the point of the conclusion is left to be supplied by the reader, thus: "so that you cannot suppose that now, when they must come by sea, they will send against you such a force as they did then against me; and if not, we know they will not venture to meddle with us."

⁹ Dr. Arnold takes *νομιζω* to be used for *νομιζω χρηναι*, and renders, "nor am I minded to offer you a dim and doubtful liberty, by making the many," &c. See also the note in Thirlwall's Greece, vol. iii. p. 275. on this passage.

as to those charges¹ with which we assail the Athenians, we should appear to have incurred them in a more odious degree than those men, who never pretended to virtue.² For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud, than by open violence. For the latter makes its attacks by the right of power given us by fortune, but the other by the designs of an unjust principle. Thus do we employ great care and attention about matters that concern us greatly.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

LXXXVII. “But besides the oath sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have, is [from those men] in whose case the actions compared with the words afford a sure proof that the interest is as they have said. But if after these proffers of mine, you shall say, you cannot, and yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us; or shall say that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any; then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this place, that my counsel, which you refuse, was for your good; and will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to it: nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong; but have reason for it from two constraining reasons: one, with respect to the Lacedæmonians, lest, whilst they have your affections, and not your alliance, they should receive hurt from your contribution of money to the Athenians; another, with regard to the Grecians, lest they should be hindered from getting rid of slavery by your means: for otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we Lacedæmonians to set any at liberty against their wills, if it were not for some common good. Nor, on the other hand, do we covet dominion over you, but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if, bringing liberty to the other states in general, we should allow you to cross us. Deliberate well on these things, strive to be the beginners of liberty to the Grecians, to get yourselves eternal glory, to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most honourable title.”

LXXXVIII. Thus much spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, Brasidas persuades

¹ Ambition and desire to subdue other states.

² The desire to assert the rights of other states.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

the Acarni-
thians to
revolt from
the Athe-
nians, and
receive his
army.

Stagirus
revolts
from the
Athenians.

WINTER.
Demos-
thenes,
through a
mistake of
the days,
not being
seconded
by Hippo-
crates,
fails in his
attack on
Siphæ.

Hippocra-
tes arrives
at Delium
a day too
late, and
proceeds
to fortify
the tem-
ple.

after much had first been said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had alluringly spoken, and partly for fear of their crops abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians, having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him bind himself by the same oath which the Lacedæmonian magistrates took,³ when they sent him out, namely, that in very truth what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedæmonians, should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. And not long after Stagirus revolted with them, a colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

LXXXIX. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Bœotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians, and Demosthenes should have gone with his ships to meet him to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to Delium, having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward, Demosthenes sailed to Siphæ first, and having with him the Acarnanians and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, loses his labour, through the plot being revealed by Nicomachus, a Phocian, of Phanotis, who told it to the Lacedæmonians, and they again to the Bœotians: whereby the Bœotians joining in a body to bring aid to those places, (for Hippocrates had not as yet offered them any annoyance in their own several territories,) preoccupy both Siphæ and Chæronea. And the conspirators, knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further.

XC. But Hippocrates having raised the whole power of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them,⁴ and all strangers that were then there, arrives afterwards at Delium, when the Bœotians were now returned from Siphæ: and there stayed his army, and encompassed Delium, the temple of Apollo, with a wall, in this manner. Round about the temple and the shrine,⁵ they drew a ditch, and out of the ditch, for a wall, they

³ The word *ὄμοσάντα* might be referred to Brasidas; "the oaths which he swore, when the magistrates," &c. The point is further discussed in a note in C. Thirlwall's *Greece*, iii. p. 276.

⁴ For information about the Metics, see Hermann's *Pol. Antiq.* sect. 115, 116. (Engl. transl. Oxf. 1836.) and Boeckh. *Pub. Œcon.* i. p. 47; or Clinton's *Fasti*, ii. p. 389.

⁵ For further information on the difference of *τεμενος*, "the whole sacred inclosure round a temple;" *ἱερον*, "the whole building of the temple;" and

cast up the earth; and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the substance of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings; and by all means heightened the fortification, and, in such places as it was expedient, erected turrets of wood on the same, and also [where] there was no edifice of the temple standing; for the cloister that had once existed, had fallen down. They began the work the third day after they had set forth from home, and wrought all the day, and all the fourth and fifth, till dinner. And then most part of it being finished, the army came back from Delium, about ten furlongs, on their march homewards. And the light-armed soldiers went most of them directly away, but the men of arms piled their arms there, and rested. Hippocrates stayed yet behind, and gave orders about the establishing guards, and about the finishing what was yet left of the remainder of the fortification.

XCI. The Bœotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra; and when the forces were come in from all of the cities, and they understood that the Athenians were advancing homewards, though the rest of the Bœotian commanders, which were eleven,⁶ approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Bœotia, (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were almost in the confines of Oropia,) yet Pagondas,⁷ the son of Aioladas, being the Bœotian commander for Thebes, together with Arianthides, the son of Lysimachidas, and it being his turn to have the leading of the army, was desirous to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling them to him, every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he tried to persuade the Bœotians to march against the Athenians, and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Bœotians assemble at Tanagra. Pagondas, one of the Bœotarchs, urges them to engage the Athenians.

Oration of Pagondas to his soldiers.

XCII. “Men of Bœotia, it ought never to have so much as

views, “the shrine where the image of the deity stood;” see Duker’s learned note quoted by Arnold.

⁶ On the constitution of Bœotia, see C. Thirl. Hist. of Greece, i. p. 434; and Hermann. Pol. Antiq. sect. 179, for full information on the disputed point of the number of the Bœotarchs, and ii. 2. and note.

⁷ Book vi. 96.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

entered the thought of any of us, the commanders, that if we do not find the Athenians now in Bœotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Bœotia, and constructed a fortress in it, with intent to waste it, and are assuredly enemies in whatever spot of ground we find them, or whencesoever they have come and done the acts of hostility. But now if any man has thought [the other course] to be the safer, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence in them that are invaded alloweth not such deliberation concerning their own land as may be used by them, who, retaining what is their own, out of desire to have more, voluntarily invade the estate of another. And it is your ancestral right, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him, both on your own, and on your neighbours' ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians, who are besides borderers. For with all men, the being a match in power, with regard to the cities that are their neighbours, constitutes their freedom. With these then that attempt the subjugation, not only of their neighbours, but of states far from them, how can we do otherwise than run the hazard to the utmost? (We have for example, the relation that the Eubœans over-against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece stands in towards them,) and you must know, that others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories; but to us, if we be vanquished, one boundary will be laid down to all our land, about which there will be no dispute: for they will enter and take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than that of other people. And such as on confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, are wont to be bold in warring on those that remain still, defending themselves only in their own territories; whereas they be less ready to sustain the attack of those³ that meet them without their own limits, and who begin the war when the opportunity serves. We have experience hereof in these same men: for after we had overcome them at Coronea, at what time, through our own sedition, they held our country in possession, we established a great

³ This word is rendered by Goeller "sustinere;" while Dr. Arnold prefers the sense of "meddling with," or "laying hold of, in order to overpower."

security in Bœotia, which lasted till this present. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses; but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple they have fortified and unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, and trusting to the sacrifices which we offered him and which appear fair, to join battle against them, and let them see, that they may go and acquire what they covet, by invading such as will not fight, but that men, who consider it their noble right to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the land of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfought.”

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

XCIIL. Pagondas, with exhortations of this nature to the Bœotians, persuaded them to march against the Athenians; and making them rise, led them speedily on, for it was drawing towards the close of day; and when he was near their army, in a place from whence, by the interposition of a hill, they saw not each other, making a stand, he put his army into order, and prepared to give battle. When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Bœotians were marching up against them, he sends to the army, commanding them to put themselves in array, and not long after he came up himself, having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place, if any one should assault it, and moreover to watch an opportunity to come upon the Bœotians when they were in fight. But against these the Bœotians appointed some forces purposely to resist them. And when all was as it should be, they shewed themselves above the hill: where they sat down with their arms, in the same order they intended to be arranged in, being about seven thousand men of arms, of light-armed above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targeteers. Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and those of the same division as they;⁹ in the middle were the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and the rest that dwell about the lake;¹ in the left were the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twenty-

The Bœotian army advances, and forms behind a hill.

The Bœotian order of battle.

⁹ That is, “those who inhabited the same division (or, *μοῖρα*) of Bœotia with the Thebans,” as, for instance, the Paropasii, Therapnenses, and Petronii.

¹ The lake Copais.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
Disposition of the
Athenian
army.

five in file,² but the rest, every one as it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Bœotians.

XCIV. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout. Their horse they placed on either wing; but for light-armed soldiers, armed as was fit, there were none, nor were there any in the city. Those that joined in the expedition, being many more in number than their enemies, followed the camp, many without arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, they were not present there, except in a small number; and when they were arranged in their order, and now ready to join battle, Hippocrates, the general, came forward along the army of the Athenians, and encouraged them, speaking to this effect.

Oration of Hippocrates to his Soldiers.

XCV. "Men of Athens, my exhortation will truly be short, but with valiant men it has as much force as a longer, and is for a remembrance, rather than a command. Let it occur to no one, because it is in the territory of another, that we therefore are venturing this so great a danger that does not concern us. For in the territory of these men, you will fight for your own: and if we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the cavalry of these men, but that in one battle you shall both gain this territory and render your own more free [from subsequent invasions.] Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becomes the dignity both of the city, which, considering it to be his country, he glories to be chief of all Greece, and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Ænophytæ, under the conduct of Myromides, were in times past masters of all Bœotia."

The Bœo-
tians

XCVI. Whilst Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and

² Thus, at Leuctra, the Thebans were formed fifty deep, (Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4); and the Syracusans against the Athenians sixteen deep, which was the usual depth of the Macedonian phalanx; while the Athenians and Lacedæmonians usually formed but eight deep.—*Arnold*. On this point, as regards the Doric states, see Müll. Dor. vol. ii. p. 250. book iii. c. 12. (Oxf. transl.); and on the Athenian army, see Hermann. Pol. Antiq. sect. 152. (Eng. transl.); and on the Lacedæmonian, sects. 29, 30.

had advanced over half the army, but could proceed no further, the Bœotians now, for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation, sang the Pæan, and came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, and joined battle with them running. The utmost parts of both the armies never came to contest, both from one and the same cause; for some water-courses hindered them. But the rest engaged in a sharp contest, [standing close] and even pushing with their bucklers. The left wing of the Bœotians to the very middle of the army was worsted by the Athenians, who in this part bore hard upon the rest, and principally upon the Thespians. For inasmuch as they that were placed next them in the same wing gave back, and they [the Thespians] were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those of them that were slain were hewed down while defending themselves hand to hand. Some also of the Athenians themselves, disordered with enclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Bœotians were overthrown in this part and fled to the other part, which yet kept up the battle. But the right wing, wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians, and by little and little at first forced them to give ground, and followed on them. It happened also that Pagondas, whilst the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill, whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, thinking on their sudden appearing that a fresh army was advancing upon them, was put to fright, and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident, and by the Thebans who continually pressed them, broke their ranks, and betook themselves to flight; some fled toward Delium and the sea, some towards Oropus; others to the mountain Parnes, and others other ways, as each had any hope of safety. The Bœotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came to bring aid after the rout was already begun, followed, killing them. But night having come on while they were thus employed, the greater number of them that fled was the easier saved. The next day, those that were got to Oropus and Delium were transported thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium; which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
charge the
Athenians.

The left
wing of
the Bœo-
tians
routed.

The Athe-
nians at
last totally
defeated.

A garrison
left by the
Athenians
at Delium.

XCVII. The Bœotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left

Dispute
between
the Bœo-

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
tians and
Athenians
respecting
the giving
up the
dead
bodies.

a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra, and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made upon Delium. Meanwhile, a herald sent from the Athenians for the bodies, met with a herald by the way, sent by the Bœotians, who turned him back, telling him he could get nothing done, till he himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered what the Bœotians had given him in charge, namely, that they had done unjustly in transgressing the universal law of the Grecians, it being an ordinance received by them all, that the invader of another's country should abstain from all holy places in the same. That the Athenians had fortified Delium, and were dwelling in it, and were doing whatsoever else men are wont to do in places profane, and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice. That therefore the Bœotians, both in the behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking Apollo, and all the deities worshipped jointly there, did bid them to be gone, and to remove what they had out of the temple.

XCVIII. After the herald had said thus much, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Bœotians; denying, that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already, or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter. For neither did they at first enter into it with such intent, but rather to requite from it the injuries which had been done them. As for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other, than that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also, served with whatever rites they can, besides the accustomed ones. For also the Bœotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation by violence possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others, but now held them as their own. That therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it; and for the part they were now in, they would not go out of it, with their own good will, as being their own. That for the water, they meddled with it on necessity, considering which, they [the Athenians] had not appropriated it in a feeling of insolence, but that in their own defence against them, [the Bœotians,] who had invaded their territory first, they were compelled to use it. For whatsoever is constrained by war or danger, hath in reason a kind of pardon even with the god himself. For the altars, in cases

of involuntary offences, are a refuge; and they are said to violate laws, that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress. That the Bœotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places, for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive.³ And they bade him plainly permit them, [the Athenians], without departing from the Bœotian territory, (for that they were not now in their land, but in a territory which they had made their own by the spear,) but according to the customs of their forefathers, by making a truce to fetch away the dead.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

XCIX. To this the Bœotians answered, that if the dead were in Bœotia, they should quit the ground, and take with them whatsoever was theirs. But if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what was to be done;⁴ for they thought that Oropia, wherein it chanced that the dead lay, the battle being fought in the border, by subjection belonged to the Athenians, and that they [the Athenians] could not get possession of them in opposition to themselves, [the Bœotians,] nor would they, as they pretended, grant a truce for their [i. e. the Athenians] territory; but conceived it was a handsome answer to say, that if they would quit their ground, they should obtain whatsoever they required. Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

Final answer of the Bœotians. The Athenian herald returns without effecting his purpose.

C. The Bœotians having sent for darters and slingers from the Melian gulf, and with these, and two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and the Peloponnesian garrison that came out of Nisæa, and the Megareans, all which arrived to their aid after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium, and assaulted the fortress; and when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, which also took it,

The Bœotians take Delium, and make two hundred prisoners.

³ Lit. And that they who thought it right to restore the dead in exchange for temples, were far more irreligious than those [i. e. the Athenians] who were not willing to get back for the temples what ought not so to be exchanged.

⁴ In this reply, the Bœotians purposely confounded the position of the Athenians at Delium, which belonged to Bœotia, with that of their dead in the territory of Oropus, which they acknowledged belonged to Athens. On the further drift of their answer, see C. Thirlwall's Greece, iii. p. 283. whence the above remark is extracted.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

made in this manner: having sawed in two a great beam, they made it all hollow, and set it exactly together again in form of a pipe. At the end of it, by chains, they hung a caldron, and leaning into the caldron from the beam was conveyed down an iron bellows-pipe, and with iron was armed a great part of the rest of the wood. They carried it from a considerable distance to the wall in carts, to that part where it was most made up with the matter of the vineyard and with wood. And when it was close, they applied a pair of great bellows into the end of the beam next themselves, and blew. The blast passing closely confined through into the caldron, in which were lighted coals, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire; so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same, and betaking themselves to flight, the fortress was by that means taken. Of the defendants, some were slain, and two hundred taken prisoners: of the rest, the greater number, having got on board the fleet, was carried back home.

The Bœotians no longer refuse to give up the Athenian dead.

CI. Delium thus being taken on the seventeenth day after the battle; and the herald, who not long after came again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing aught of what had taken place, the Bœotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. In the battle there died, Bœotians, few less than five hundred; Athenians, few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates, the general; but of light-armed soldiers, and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number.⁵ Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, who had been with his army at Siphæ, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agræans, and four hundred men at arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already landed, and chased them back to their galleys; having also slain some, and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians, for the fetching away of their dead. About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, over-

Demosthenes makes an unsuccessful attempt on Sicyonia.

Sitalces dies, and is succeeded by Seuthes.

⁵ Strabo relates, that Xenophon owed his life this day to Socrates; for, having fallen from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him upon his shoulders, and carried him to a place of safety. Athenæus, as is observed by Casaubon, has shewn that this could not be the case. (Athen. v. 15.) See Mitford, c. xvi. sect. 3.

come in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him in the kingdom both of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace, as much as was before subject to Sitalces.⁶

CII. The same winter, Brasidas, with the confederates in Thrace, made an expedition to Amphipolis, on the river Strymon, the colony of the Athenians. The place whereon the city now stands, Aristagoras⁷ of Miletus had formerly attempted to found when he fled from king Darius, but was beaten away by the Edonians. Two and thirty years after this, the Athenians essayed the same, and sent thither ten thousand colonists of their own city, and of others as many as would go. And these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus. And again, in the twenty-ninth year after, Agnon, the son of Nicias, being sent out as founder, the Athenians came, and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine-ways. And they set forth from Eion, a town of traffic by the sea side, subject to them, at the mouth of the Strymon, five and twenty furlongs distant from the present city, which Agnon named Amphipolis, because it was almost surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it: cutting it off, therefore, with a long wall from river to river, he settled his colony in a place conspicuous both to the sea and land.

CIII. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, setting out from Arnæ, in Chalcidæa. Being, about twilight, come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe enters the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. The weather was stormy, and it snowed a little, which also made him the rather march, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city, (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians,) and others, that contrived this, induced thereto, some by Perdicas, and some by the Chalcidæans. But above all, the Argilians, being of

⁶ Book ii. 97, 101.

⁷ The death of Aristagoras (vid. Herod. v. 126.) Clinton fixes at B. C. 497; and the sending the 10,000 settlers at B. C. 465, at the distance of thirty-two years from the death of Aristagoras. This failed, taking place under the direction of Leagrus and Sophanes; (vid. Herod. ix. 75. and Thueyd. i. 100.) Agnon settled it B. C. 437, twenty-nine years after; by which year Herodotus had left Greece and gone to reside at Thurii, and hence he does not mention the name of Amphipolis. (Vid. Clinton. Fast. Hel. Appendix ix.)

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

Brasidas
marches
against
Amphi-
polis, and
is con-
ducted by
the Argili-
ans to the
bridge
over the
Strymon,
which he
forces.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
O1. 89. 1.

a city near it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered, and Brasidas arrived, (and they had also long before dealt underhand with as many of their own men as dwelt in Amphipolis, how the town might be betrayed,) both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, placed the army the same night before morning at the bridge of the river. The town stands further off⁸ than the passage of the river, nor were there walls extending down to it then, as there are now, but there was placed there only a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both because of the treason, and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge, and was at once master of whatsoever without the city the Amphipolitans had, that dwelt in the whole place.

He halts
without
the walls.

CIV. Having thus suddenly to those in the city passed the bridge, and many of those without being captured, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were cast into very great confusion at it; and the rather, because they were jealous one of another. And it is said, that if Brasidas had not been willing to permit his army to betake itself to plundering, but had marched at once to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was, that he pitched there, and fell upon what was without, and seeing nothing resulted to him by means those within, as he expected, lay still on the place. But the faction contrary to the traitors, being superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened forthwith, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town, sent to the other commander of the parts towards Thrace, Thucydides, the son of Olorus,⁹ the writer of this history, who was now about Thasus, (now the island is a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail,) requiring him to come and relieve them.¹ He, hearing the news, went thither in all haste, with seven galleys which chanced to

The Athenian party
in Amphipolis summon
Thucydides
from
Thasos.

He immediately
sails with
seven
ships.

⁸ Such is the sense assigned by Dr. Arnold, whose note on the localities the reader should consult.

⁹ This Olorus was a descendant, probably a grandson, of Miltiades: he married Hegesipyle, of the same name, and probably of the same blood, with the Thracian princess, the wife of Miltiades; and from this connection Thucydides probably inherited the gold mines mentioned in the next chapter.

¹ Thucydides imputes expressly no blame to his colleague; but the conduct of Eucles appears evidently to have been deficient, either in judgment or in vigour, or rather in both.—*Mitford*.

be with him at that time, his purpose principally being to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis, but if he should fail of that, then to be beforehand in taking possession of Eion.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

CV. Brasidas in the mean time fearing the aid of the galleys, to come from Thasus, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed the right of working the mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of influence amongst the principal men of the continent, hastened by all means to get Amphipolis, before he should arrive; lest otherwise, at his coming, the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates, both from the sea side and in Thrace, and secure them, should thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end, offered them moderate terms, causing to be proclaimed, that whatsoever Amphipolitan or Athenian of those in the town, would, might continue to dwell there, and enjoy his own, sharing an equal and like form of government. And that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone, and carry away his goods.

Brasidas issues a proclamation to the Amphipolitans.

CVI. When the great body of the people heard this, their minds were rather turned; and the rather, because the Athenians who dwelt amongst them were but few, and the larger part was a promiscuous multitude: and in the place there were many, the kinsmen of those that were taken without, and in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation reasonable. The Athenians thought so, because they would be happy to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest, and besides, not expecting aid in haste; and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger beyond their expectation, and besides to retain their city, with an equal form of government. Insomuch, that they who conspired with Brasidas, now openly maintained the offer to be reasonable, and seeing the minds of the body of the people were now turned, and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they came to terms, and, on the conditions proclaimed, received him. Thus did these men deliver up the city, and Thucydides, with his galleys, arrived in the evening of this same day at Eion. Brasidas had already got Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also, for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it would have been in his possession.

The gates of Amphipolis are opened to him.

Thucydides arrives at Eion.

CVII. After this, Thucydides established matters in Eion,

Thucydides for-

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
tifies Eion.
Brasidas
makes an
unsuccess-
ful at-
tempt on
it.
Several
cities
revolt to
him.
Perdiccas
comes to
his assist-
ance.

so as it should be safe, both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it such, as according to the terms made, as were willing to come to him from Amphipolis. Brasidas, with many boats, came suddenly down the river to Eion, to attempt to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river; he essayed also the same, at the same time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary. Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis, and by Braure, his own wife; and not long after, Gapselus also, and Æsyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas, also, directly after the taking [of Amphipolis,] came to him, and helped him in establishing matters there.

The Athe-
nians are
much
alarmed,
and send
out gar-
risons to
their con-
federate
cities in
the neigh-
bourhood
of Am-
phipolis.

CVIII. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear, especially because it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber, which is sent them for the building of galleys, and in revenue of money; and because, also, though the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not got that bridge, there being above for a great extent a great lake formed by the river, and towards Eion [the Lacedæmonians] being watched by their galleys, they could have gone no further, which it was now thought had become a matter of ease; and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. For Brasidas both shewed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech, that he was sent out to recover the liberty of Greece. And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what he undertook to do, and of his gentleness besides, were rendered extremely desirous of innovation; and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. For they thought they might do it boldly, being mistaken as to the power of the Athenians, to that degree² that afterwards it [i. e. the Athenian power] appeared, and making a judgment of it according to blind desire, rather than safe

² This is well explained by Dr. Arnold, that "the greatness of the Athenian power was the measure of the error of those who had looked for its downfall."

forecast. It being the fashion of men, with regard to what they long for, to yield to a rash hope; and what they do not accede to, with a despotic kind of arguing to reject. Besides, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Bœotians, and because Brasidas had said, not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them, that when he was at Nisæa, the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. But the greatest cause of all was because it gave pleasure for the present, and because they were about to make trial of the Lacedæmonians, for the first time eager and forward, they were desirous by any means to put it to the hazard. Which on their perceiving, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit; and he to Lacedæmon, with earnest request begged them to send him greater forces; and in the mean time prepared to build galleys on the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly because they more wished to get back their men taken in the island,³ and to end the war, did not furnish him.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

Brasidas
sends
home for a
reinforce-
ment,
which is
not sent to
him.

CIX. The same winter, the Megareans having recovered their long walls, held by the Athenians, rased them to the very foundation; and Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confederates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. This juts out from the king's⁴ ditch, [which was drawn] inwards, and Athos, a high mountain of the same, ends at the Ægean sea. Of its cities, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the ditch itself, on the part which looks to the sea towards Eubœa; the rest are Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion: these are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages;⁵ some few there are also of the Chalcidæans, but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene⁶ nations that once inhabited Athens and Lemnos; and of the Bisaltic and Crestonic nations and Edonians; and they dwell in small cities. The most of which

The Me-
gareans
retake and
demolish
their long
walls.
Brasidas
takes all
the cities
on the
Acte,
except
Sane and
Dion.

³ Sphacteria.

⁴ Xerxes, when he invaded Greece. Herod. vii. 21, &c.

⁵ The Greek and their own barbarian tongue. This explains the jest in the Birds of Aristoph. 1041; comp. also Herod. vii. 22.

⁶ Compare Herod. i. 57.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

yielded to Brasidas, but Sane and Dion held out against him; for which cause he stayed with his army, and wasted their territory.

Brasidas
marches
against
Torone.

CX. But seeing they would not hearken to him, he led his army at once against Torone of Chalcidæa, held by the Athenians. He was called in by a few, who were ready to deliver him the city; and arriving there while it was still night, and about break of day he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from the city. So that by the rest of the city of the Toronæans, and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But those who intrigued with him knowing he was to come, some few of them, having also privily gone forward out of the town, watched for his approach, and when they perceived he was come, they took in to them seven light-armed men, armed only with small swords, (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, only so many had the courage to go in, and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus,) who creeping through the wall towards the sea, and having escaped the notice of the watchmen on the tower in the highest part of the town, (for the town stands on a hill's side,) they got up and slew them, and broke open the postern gate towards Canastræum.

Seven of
his light-
armed
men intro-
duced by
some trait-
ors into
the city.

Brasidas
sends one
hundred
targeteers,
who rush
into the
city as
soon as the
gates are
opened by
the trait-
ors
within.

CXI. Brasidas this while, with the rest of his army lay still; having come a little forward, sends one hundred targeteers before, who, when the gates should be opened, and the sign agreed on be lifted up, should run in first. These men, when some time past, wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronæans within, who helped the men that entered to make the necessary preparations, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gates leading to the market-place opened likewise, by cutting asunder the bar,⁷ went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side; and then they held up the sign appointed, which was fire, and now received the rest of the targeteers by the gates that lead to the market-place.

Brasidas
with his
whole
army
enters the
city.

CXII. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and with a loud cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, ran forward at full speed. Some went directly in by

⁷ See note on ii. 4.

the gates, and some by certain squared timbers which lay at the wall, (which having lately fallen down, was now again in building,) for the drawing up of stones. Brasidas therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the city, wishing to take it from top to bottom^s and entirely; but the rest of the multitude ran dispersed everywhere without difference.

CXIII. When the town was taken, the greater part of the Toronæans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves at once to those that entered. The Athenians, (of whom there were about fifty men of arms sleeping in the market-place,) when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain on the place, some by land, some by two galleys that kept watch there, and get safe into Lecythus, the fort which they themselves held, having taken possession of a corner of the city toward the sea, hemmed off from the rest in a narrow isthmus. And thither also fled all such Toronæans as were affected to them.

CXIV. It being now day, and the city being thoroughly in his possession, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made to those Toronæans who were fled with the Athenians, that they might come back, as many as would, to their own, and inhabit there in security: to the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart from Lecythus, under truce, with all that they had, as it belonged to the Chalcidæans. The Athenians refused to quit; but a truce they desired for one day, to take up the dead: and he granted two. In which he fortified the buildings near, as did the Athenians theirs. He also called an assembly of the Toroneæns, and spake to them much the same as he had done before to the Acanthians, saying, "That there was no just cause, why either they that had conspired to put the city into his hands, should be the worse thought of, or accounted traitors for it, (seeing that they did not do it with an intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were induced thereto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city,) or that they who had not shared in it, should think that they them-

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Toronæans who favour the Athenians, and a part of the Athenian garrison, escape to Lecythus.

Brasidas proclaims an amnesty to the Toronæans who had fled with the Athenians, and to those who had remained in the city. He calls on the Athenians to evacuate Lecythus, which they refuse.

^s Thus it is rendered by Dr. Arnold, who compares Herod. vi. 18. 82. "An expression derived from the seizure of the citadel, always situated on the highest ground in ancient towns, and the consequent easy reduction of the whole place."

Year 8.
A. C. 424
Ol. 89.1.

selves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; for he came not to destroy either city or private man. But had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled to the Athenians, because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and reckoned that when they had made trial of themselves, the Lacedæmonians, they would shew as much good will also to them, or rather more, by so much as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only through want of trial. And he wished them all to prepare to be true confederates for the future, and from henceforward to look to have their faults imputed: for as to what was past [he thought] that they themselves [i. e. the Lacedæmonians]⁹ were not injured, but rather that they [i. e. the Toronæans] had been injured by others that were too strong for them, and therefore were to be pardoned, if they had in aught been against him."

Brasidas
assaults
Lecythus.

A wooden
tower falls,
and
frightens
the gar-
rison.

CXV. Having thus said, and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults on Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from the wall, though a bad one, and from such of the houses as had battlements. And for one day they kept them off; but the next, when the enemies were about to bring against them an engine, out of which they intended to cast fire on their wooden defences, and the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted, the Athenians having, on the top of a building, erected a turret of wood, and carried up many tubs and buckets of water, and great stones, and many men being also gone up into it, the building, charged with too great a weight, fell suddenly to the ground, and with a great noise: and those who were near and saw it, were grieved more than afraid; but such as stood further off, especially the farthest of all, supposing the place was in that part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea and to their galleys.

The place
falls into
the hands
of Brasi-
das, who
conse-
crates it
to Mi-
nerva.

CXVI. Brasidas, when he perceived them abandoning the battlements, and saw what had happened, came on with his army, and presently got the fort, and slew all that he found within it. But the rest of the Athenians, who thus abandoned the place, by their boats and the galleys were conveyed into Pallene. But Brasidas (for there is in Lecythus a temple of

⁹ This is Haack's explanation, which seems most satisfactory.

Minerva, and when about to give the assault, he had made proclamation, that he would give to whoever first scaled the wall, thirty minæ of silver for a reward) conceiving the place was won by other means than human, gave those thirty minæ to the goddess, for the use of the temple; and then having pulled down Lecythus, and having cleared the place of the rubbish,¹ he consecrated the whole place to be a sacred close. The rest of the winter he spent in arranging matters in the places he had already got, and in contriving the conquest of more. And the winter having ended, the eighth year ended of this war.

Year 8.
A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

YEAR IX. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 2.

CXVII. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians at the very beginning of the spring of the following summer, made a cessation of arms for a year, having considered with themselves; the Athenians, that Brasidas would by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, before that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and also, that if this suspension pleased them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time; the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians, fearing what they really did fear, would, on the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the more willing to be reconciled, and, with the restitution of their men, to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they held it of more importance to recover their men, whilst Brasidas's good fortune continued, since they were likely, if Brasidas was yet further successful and placed matters on an equality, to be deprived of them, but engaging them [the Athenians] on even terms, they would have a chance even of being victorious.² Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

CXVIII. "Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius it seems good to us, that whosoever will, may, without fraud and without fear, make use of it, according to the laws

SUMMER.
Conditions
of a truce,
entered

¹ Such is the sense given by Goeller; Mr. Bloomfield joins the verb with *τεμενος*, and renders, "forming it into a *τεμενος*."

² I have followed the interpretation given by Dr. Arnold in this passage; Mr. Bloomfield, on the other hand, renders it, "and having to contend with the Athenians on equal terms, there would be a hazard even whether they should get the better." The sense of the last words will vary, according as the *δε* is rendered by "but," as in the text, or by "and," as in Mr. Bloomfield.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.
into for
one year,
between
the Lacedæ-
moni-
ans and
Athenians.

of his country. This also seems good to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates here present, and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Bœotians and Phocians,² and to do their best to persuade them to the same. That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our several states; and that whosoever else will, may do the same, every one according to the law of his own country. If the Athenians will make a treaty, that each side shall keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, touching the same, think good thus: that those who are in Coryphasium,³ stay within [the mountains of] Bouphras and Tomeus, and those in Cythera, without having any dealings with the [allies of Lacedæmon,] either we with them, or they with us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the gate of Megara, from the temple of Nisus, leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straight forward to the bridge that leads over into Minoa. That the Megareans pass not the same highway, the Athenians retaining possession of the island which they took: neither having commerce with other. That the [Lacedæmonians]⁴ keep what they now possess in Trœzene, and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and have free navigation both upon the coast of their own territories and their confederates. That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall pass the seas not in a long ship,⁵ but in any other vessel rowed with oars, of burthen not exceeding five hundred talents.⁶ That the heralds and ambassadors that shall pass between both sides for the ending of the war, or for the adjustment of disputed matters,

² On the mention of the Phocians, who had been lost as allies to Athens since the battle of Coronea, B. C. 447. (i. 113.) and on the other articles of this treaty, see the long and useful note in Dr. Arnold. And on the provision about the free use of the temple, comp. i. 112.

³ See book iv. 3; v. 18.

⁴ Either this word, or *ἐκατεροις*, which Dr. Arnold prefers, appears necessary for the sense of the text. The agreement mentioned refers to the restoration of Pegæ, Trœzen, &c. by the thirty years truce, to the Lacedæmonians. Vid. i. 115.

⁵ Long ships were of use for the war, and therefore here excluded; yet they had leave to use vessels that went with the oar, so that they were of another form. Comp. also viii. 56.

⁶ Twenty-five tons.

may go and come without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land. That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another's fugitives, free nor bond. That you to us, and we to you, shall afford law according to the usages of our several states, deciding the controversies judicially without war. This is thought good by the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair, or of more equity than these, then go and declare the same at Lacedæmon. For neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, refuse to accede to any thing that you shall say, that is just. But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us. That this truce shall be for a year." Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

The people decreed it. The tribe Acamantis supplied the president⁷ of the assembly; Phænippus was the scribe; Niciades, overseer; and Laches moved, "that with good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms be concluded, according as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates agree:" and they consented in the general assembly⁸ of the people, "that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.⁹ In which time the ambassadors and heralds, going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the war. And that the commanders of the army and the presidents of the senate calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council touching the manner¹ of embassy, for ending of the war first. And the ambassadors present should now immediately before the people swear that they will remain in all truth in this truce for the year."

CXIX. The same articles the Lacedæmonians acceded to, and the confederates agreed to, with the Athenians and their confederates, on the twelfth day of the Lacedæmonian month Gerastion.

⁷ See note c. 31. b. i. and Hermann. Pol. Ant. §. 127. or Schœmann. Comitia, p. 15.

⁸ It being necessary that any measure to be decreed by the people should first be sanctioned by the council of the five-hundred: on whose powers, &c. see Hermann. Pol. Antiq. §. 125; and on the general assemblies, §. 128. et seqq.

⁹ The twenty-second of March, as Dodwell, quoted by Goeller, calculates.

¹ That is, as Dr. Arnold explains it, whether as a select commission, or whether to address their proposals to the whole people.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

There agreed to these articles and poured the libations, of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus the son of Echetimides, Athenæus the son of Pericleides, and Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaides. Of the Corinthians, Æneas the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. Of the Sicyonians, Damosimus the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus the son of Megacles. Of the Megareans, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. Of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas. Of the Athenians, the generals themselves, Nicostratus the son of Diotrophes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolinæus. This was the truce, and during it they were continually in discussion about a longer peace.

Scione revolts from the Athenians, and is visited by Brasidas.

CXX. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionæans say that they be Pellenians, from Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors, passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by the tempest, which happened to the Achæans, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. Brasidas, on their revolt, went over to Scione by night, with a galley of his own side that went before, but he himself followed aloof in a light row-boat, for this reason, if he should fall in with some greater vessel than his boat, the galley might aid him; but if a galley equal to his own met it, he reckoned that such a one would not direct itself to the smaller of the two, but rather to the galley, whereby he might in the mean time go through in safety. When he was over, and had called the Scionæans to an assembly, he said the same things as at Acanthus and Torone, adding, that they were most worthy to be commended, inasmuch as Pallene in the Isthmus being cut off by the Athenians possessing Potidæa, and being no other than islanders, they yet of their own accord came forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not through cowardice, till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good: a sign that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter to have their state ordered to their minds; and that he would verily hold them the most faithful friends to the Lacedæmonians, and also in all other respects do them honour.

The Scionæans receive him gladly.

CXXI. The Scionæans were elated with these words, and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that previously liked not what was done, as they that liked it, entertained a

purpose stoutly to undergo the war, and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands, and came about him, as they used to do to a champion that hath won a prize.² But he, leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over a greater army, with design, by the help of those of Scione, to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidæa, thinking the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island, and desiring to be before them: withal he had in hand an intrigue with some within, to have those cities betrayed. So he attended, ready to undertake an enterprise against these cities.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

CXXII. But in the mean time there came to him in a galley, Aristonymus for the Athenians, and Athenæus for the Lacedæmonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone, and these men related to Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians in Thrace approved of what was done, and Aristonymus assented to the other articles; but for the Scionæans, whose revolt, by computation of the days, he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, that the city revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were immediately ready to make an expedition against Scione. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time sent ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them, that they could not do so without breach of the truce; and, on Brasidas's word, claimed the city to belong to them, and were willing that decision should be passed about it by legal arbitration. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to the chance of judgment; but meant, with all the speed they could make, to make an expedition; being enraged that even islanders dared to revolt, trusting to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land. Besides, touching the time of the revolt, the truth was really rather in the way in which the Athenians asserted it was; for the revolt of the Scionæans was after the

Brasidas, on being informed of the armistice, refuses to deliver up Scione.

The Athenians, instigated by Cleon, resolve to take it by force.

² For an illustration of this, see Pind. Pyth. iv. 425. (quoted by Goeller.)

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

truce two days. Whereupon, being persuaded by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by force, and to put them to the sword. And forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for this.

Mende
also re-
volts;

CXXIII. Meanwhile revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; and somewhat there was also, which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendæans had also been the bolder, as seeing that the intentions of Brasidas were favourable to them; conjecturing also from the fact that he did not give up Scione, and, withal, the few³ were they which had brought about the revolt, who having once set about it, would by no means give it over; but fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude, contrary to their own inclinations, to the same. The Athenians being hereof directly advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both; and Brasidas, expecting that they would send a fleet against them, transports the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans into Olynthus in Chalcidæa, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men at arms, and three hundred Chalcidæan targeteers, and for commander of them all, Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Mende, joined with them in arranging their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet speedily with them.

and the
Athenians
prepare a
force
against
both
places.
Brasidas
garrisons
Mende
and Scio-
ne.

Brasidas
and Per-
diccas in-
vade Lyn-
cestis,

CXXIV. Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lynceus against Arrhibæus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of his Macedonian subjects, and such Grecian men at arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcidæans, Acanthians, and the rest according to the forces they could severally send. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms was about three thousand. The whole number of horsemen that followed, both of Macedonians and Chalcidæans, amounted almost to one thousand, and in addition to these, a great crowd of Barbarians. Having made an inroad into the territory of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field against them, they also sat down

and rout
the army
of Arrhi-
bæus.

³ That is, the aristocratical party: *τοτε* refers to c. 21. Dr. Arnold renders, "Since, at the time I spoke of, they formed their intentions of doing it."

opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side, being stationed upon a hill, and the ground betwixt them being a plain, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both; but afterwards the men of arms of the Lyncestians coming down with their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdicas led against them their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncestians to flight, many of whom they killed, and the rest escaped to the upper ground, and lay still. After this they erected a trophy, and stayed two or three days awaiting the Illyrians, who happened to be about to come to Perdicas upon hire, and Perdicas meant then to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibæus one after another, and to have sat still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on Mende, lest, if the Athenians sailed thither before his return, it should receive some blow; seeing besides that the Illyrians came not, was not willing to do so, but rather to retire.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

CXXV. Whilst they were thus at variance, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdicas, and joined themselves with Arrhibæus; so that now by them both it was thought good to retire, for fear of these, who were a warlike people, but yet for the time when to march there was nothing concluded by reason of their variance; and night overtaking them, the Macedonians, and the multitude of Barbarians, as it is usual with great armies to be terrified from unknown causes, being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and to be all but upon them, betook themselves to sudden flight, and went homewards. And Perdicas, who at first perceived it not, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their camps being far asunder,) to be gone also. Brasidas, early in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæus were coming upon him, contracting his men of arms into a square, and having received the multitude of his light-armed into the midst, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to dash out upon the enemy, when they attacked the army any where with missiles; and he himself, with three hundred chosen men, marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy fighting, if they came close up. But before the enemy approached, he

The Illyrians treacherously go over to Arrhibæus.

Perdicas and his Macedonians retire.

Brasidas prepares to make an orderly retreat, and addresses his men.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of the time gave him leave, with words to this effect :

Oration of Brasidas to his Soldiers.

CXXVI. “ Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, because you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians, and that those who come upon you are Barbarians and are many, that you were afraid, I should not at this time instruct you, and encourage you as I do. But now, against this desertion of our companions, and the multitude of the enemies, I will endeavour, with a short reminding and exhortation, to persuade you of what is of the greatest importance. For to be valiant in matters of war is to you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for number, seeing you are not come from such states where the many bear rule over the few, but rather the few over many, and have got the power by no other means than by overcoming in fight. And as to these Barbarians, whom through ignorance you now fear, you may learn both by the former battles fought against them with the Macedonians⁴, and also by what I myself conjecture, and know, having heard from others, that they will not be worthy of fear. For all those circumstances of the enemies that make a show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known, rather serve to embolden the other side; whereas against such as have certainly some strong point, those [only], who are previously unacquainted with it, would come upon them boldly. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make a terrible demonstration of attacking; for by the sight of their number⁵ they are fearful; and by the greatness of their cry, intolerable: and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to all this, when with such as stand these things, they come to blows. For, fighting without order, they will quit their place without shame, if they be once

⁴ This passage may be interpreted in another way, without understanding any prepositions, and may be rendered, “ from your former battles with the Macedonians of them, i. e. of their side;” meaning the Lyncestians who were Macedonians, (ii. c. 99.) not the Macedonians under Perdiceas. This is Heilmann’s interpretation, followed by Goeller and Dr. Arnold.

⁵ This expression, Heyne takes to be put for ὀψει πληθους, in accordance with which it is rendered in the text; while Mr. Bloomfield translates it literally, “ by the numerosity of their appearance.”

pressed, and seeing that flight or attack has with them an equal reputation of honour, it preserves their valour from being ever put to proof. And a battle wherein every one may do as he list, is able to afford them a more handsome excuse to save themselves. They trust rather in their standing out of danger, and terrifying us afar off, than in coming hand to hand with us, else they would rather have taken that course than this. And you see manifestly, that all that was before terrible in them, is in effect little but threatening by the show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have opportunity, in your order and places, you will both come the sooner to a place of safety, and will learn also against hereafter, that such rabbles as this, to men who endure their first charge, do but with delaying make a flourish of valour with threats from afar; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough, by following them close, to make a display of valour, where they may do it safely."

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

CXXVII. When Brasidas had made this exhortation, he led off his army. And the Barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing that he fled, and that they could catch and destroy him. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them, did so, and met them, which way soever they came on; and that Brasidas himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged close, and endured the first brunt, beyond their expectation; and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, they received and drove them back, and when they ceased, themselves retired, then at length the greatest part of the Barbarians kept off from the Grecians, that with Brasidas were in the open field; and leaving a part to follow them with missiles, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians who were flying, of whom, as many as they chanced with, they slew; and being beforehand, first got possession of the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was now coming to the strait itself of the way, they were encircling him, to have cut him off.

The enemy
attack
him, and
are re-
pulsed.

CXXVIII. He, when he knew this, commanded the three hundred that were with him, to run every man as fast as he

A party of
them oc-
cupy the

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.
only pass
into Mace-
donia, but
are dis-
lodged by
three hun-
dred of his
troops.

Brasidas
effects his
retreat,
and arrives
at Armissa.

Perdiccas
quarrels
with the
Lacedæ-
monians,
and seeks
the Athe-
nian alli-
ance.

During the
absence of
Brasidas,
a large
Athenian
force un-
der Nicias
and Nico-
stratus is
sent
against
Mende
and
Scione.

could to that one of the hills, which he deemed they could easiest get possession of, and try if they could drive down those Barbarians that were now upon the same, before the greater number that was now hemming them in, should join them [i. e. their friends] there. These accordingly fell upon and overcame the Barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the Grecian army marched more easily to it. For their party being put to flight from their⁶ hill, made the Barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further, thinking, too, that they were now at the confines, and had escaped. Brasidas, having now got to the hills, and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Armissa, of the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves being angry with the Macedonians, for retiring before them, whatsoever teams of oxen or baggage that had fallen off, (as was likely to happen in a retreat, made in fear, and in the night,) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they loosed and cut in pieces, and took the baggage to themselves. And from this time Perdiccas first esteemed Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards cherished a hatred towards the Peloponnesians, not in accordance with his usual sentiments on account of the Athenians, [inasmuch as he was accustomed to hate the latter]; and, being alienated from his natural interests,⁷ he sought means as soon as he could to make peace with these [the Athenians], and to be freed from the other.

CXXIX. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, finds that the Athenians had already taken Mende, and therefore staying there, for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene and give aid, he kept good watch on Torone. For about the time that these things passed in Lynceus, the Athenians, as they had been getting ready to do, sailed out for Mende and Scione, with fifty galleys, whereof ten were of Chios, a thousand men at arms of their own city, six hundred

⁶ Σφων is explained by Goeller to be "suum jugum," i. e. "jugum quod insederant."

⁷ I have rendered this, following Goeller's note, which connects the words as in the text. Others explain the genitive ξυμφορων, by ἐνεκεν, or ὑπο, and render, "impelled by the urgent exigencies of his private interests." The length of Dr. Arnold's note forbids my extracting it, but the reader would do well to consult it. Some read ξυμφορῶν, which would wholly alter the sense, and might be translated, "being relieved from the unavoidable calamities that pressed him," &c.

archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targeteers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diotrophes. These setting sail from Potidæa with their galleys, and putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched against the Mendæans. The Mendæans, with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that had come to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred men at arms, and Polydamidas their commander, happened to be encamped on a strong hill without the city. Nicias, with a hundred and twenty light-armed soldiers of Methone, and sixty chosen men at arms of Athens, and all his archers, attempting to get up by a certain path that was in the hill's side, was wounded by them in the attempt, and could not force his way. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, going another way farther about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was even quite disordered, and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited. So for this day, seeing the Mendæans and their confederates did not give way, the Athenians retired, and pitched their camp; and when night had come on, the Mendæans retired into the city.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

The Mendæans are encamped on a hill, from which Nicias and Nicostratus try in vain to dislodge them.
Nicias wounded.

The Mendæans retire into Mende.

CXXX. The next day, the Athenians sailing about to the part towards Scione, both seized on the suburbs, and all that day wasted their land, no man coming forth to oppose them; for there was also something of sedition in the city, and the three hundred Scionæans the night following went away home. The next day, Nicias, with one half of the army, marched to the confines, and wasted the territory of the Scionæans, and Nicostratus at the same time, with the rest, sat down against the city, before the gates on the higher ground, by the way they go towards Potidæa. Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendæans and their aids had their arms piled within the wall in this part,) sets his men in order for the battle, and urged the Mendæans to make a sally. But when one of the faction of the commons in the spirit of sedition maintained the contrary, that they would not go out, and that it was not necessary to fight, and was, on this contradiction, by Polydamidas dragged to him by the hand and beaten about, the commons, in great anger, at once took up their arms, and made towards the Peloponnesians, and such other with them as were of the contrary faction, and having fallen on them, put them

The Athenians sit down before the gates.
A sedition in Mende.

The democratical party drives Polydamidas and the Peloponnesians into the citadel.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

The Athenians get possession of the city, and leaving a force to besiege the citadel, march against Scione.

The Athenians drive the Scionæans from a strong position without the city, and commence their works. The Peloponnesians and Mendæans besieged in the citadel of Mende effect their escape, and arrive at Scione. Perdiccas makes a treaty of peace with the Athenians.

He prevails on the Thesalians to refuse a

to flight, partly with the suddenness of the charge, and partly through fear, the gates being at that time opened to the Athenians. For they imagined this undertaking was by some appointment made between them. So as many as were not forthwith slain, fled to the citadel, which was also in their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and close by the town) rushed into the city Mende, with the whole army, and ravaged it, as if having taken it by force, since it was not opened to them by agreement, and the captains had much ado to keep them from killing the men. After this, they bade the Mendæans use the same form of government they had done before, and give judgment on those among themselves whom they thought the principal authors of the revolt. Those that were in the citadel they shut up with a wall reaching on both sides to the sea, and left a guard there to defend it; and having thus got Mende, they advanced against Scione.

CXXXI. But the Scionæans and the Peloponnesians having come out against them, were seated on a strong hill before the city, which if the enemy did not win, he would not be able to enclose them with a wall. The Athenians having charged them with all their might, and beaten from it those who were thereon, encamped on the hill; and having set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the city. Not long after, whilst the Athenians were now at work about this, those allies that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch by the seaside, come by night, and escaping most of them through the camp before Scione, entered into that city.

CXXXII. As they were enclosing Scione with a wall, Perdiccas, having sent a herald to the Athenian commanders, concludes an agreement with the Athenians, through his hatred to Brasidas, about the retreat made out of Lynceus, having then immediately begun to treat of the same. For it happened also at this time, that Ischagoras, the Lacedæmonian, was about to march an army by land to Brasidas; and Perdiccas, partly because Nicias bade him, seeing he had made peace, to give some clear token to the Athenians that he would be firm, and partly because he himself was no longer desirous that the Peloponnesians should come into his territories, wrought on his hosts in Thessaly, having been ever intimate with the leading men, and so stopped the army and their preparations, that they

would not so much as try the Thessalians, [whether they would let them pass or not.] Nevertheless Ischagoras, and Ameinias, and Aristeus, themselves came on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedæmonians to view the state of affairs there. And also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in their youth,⁸ for the purpose of setting them as governors over the cities, rather than to commit the cities to the care of such as happened to be there before. And Clearidas the son of Cleonymus, he [i. e. Brasidas] appoints governor of Amphipholis, and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 2.

passage through their country to a Lacedæmonian force under Ischagoras. Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Arist-

CXXXIII. The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians, laying Atticism to their charge; and though they had ever wished to do it, yet now it was become easier, because the flower of their youth had fallen in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priestess, who having set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep after it, so that all was on fire and flamed out before she knew. Chrysis, directly, the same night, for fear of the Argives, flies to Phlius,⁹ and they, according to the law laid down in such a case, appointed another priestess in her room, called Phæinis. Now when Chrysis fled, reached to the eighth year of this war ended, and half of the ninth. Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed with a wall; and the Athenians, having left a guard there, went home with the rest of their army.

ens, join Brasidas. Clearidas made governor of Amphipholis, and Epitalidas of Torone.

The Thebans demolish the walls of Thespiæ. The temple of Juno at Argos burnt.

Scione completely invested.

CXXXIV. The winter following, nothing was done between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, because of the truce; but the Mantineans, and the Tegeatæ, with the confederates of both, fought a battle in Laodicium, in the territory of Oresthis, wherein the victory was doubtful, for either side having put to flight the wing of their enemies stationed over against them, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent off spoils to

WINTER. A battle is fought with doubtful success between the Mantineans and Tegeæans at Laodicium.

⁸ On this, see Müll. Dor. vol. ii. c. 12. p. 247. (Eng. transl.); and further, on the change such measures as this introduced into their system, and to what they led, vol. i. c. 9. p. 224. of the same work.

⁹ There were three towns of this name: one in Elis; one in the territory of Sicyon, now called *Staphlica*; one in Argolis, now *Drepano*.

¹ Comp. ii. 2. whence we learn she was priestess altogether for fifty-six years and a half.

Year 9.
A. C. 423.
Ol. 69. 2.

Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and a nearly equal battle, which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatæ lodged all night in the place, and erected their trophy then presently; whereas the Mantineans retired away to Bucolion, and set up a trophy in opposition afterwards.

Brasidas
makes an
unsuccess-
ful attempt
to scale the
walls of
Potidæa.

CXXXV. The same winter ending, and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidæa; for having come by night, he applied a ladder, and was up to this point undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders, when the bell had passed by, upon the unoccupied interval of wall, before he that carried it to the next returned.² Nevertheless, then, being at once perceived before they could scale the wall, he again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.

² “The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the sentinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to which the sentinel was to answer, in proof that he was at his post, and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme.”—*Smith*. Comp. the directions to the guard in *Aristoph. Birds*, 842; and also the report of the messenger, ver. 1159.

BOOK V.

I. THE summer following, the truce for a year, having lasted up to¹ the Pythian games, expired; during the cessation of hostilities, the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos, thinking that though they were consecrated, yet for a certain crime committed of old, they were not pure; because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purification of the island; in which, as I declared before,² they thought they did well by taking up the sepulchres of the dead. These Delians inhabited afterwards, every one as he arrived,³ Atramyttium⁴ in Asia, Pharnaces having given it them.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.
SUMMER.
The truce
between
the La-
cedæmo-
nians and
Athenians
ends.

II. After the truce, Cleon⁵ prevailed with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace, having with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms, and three hundred horsemen; of confederates more, and thirty galleys. And first having put in at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men at arms, of those that kept the siege, and sailed to the haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of Torone. And thence, having heard by deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his land army to

Cleon sails
for Thrace,

marches to
Torone,

¹ I have followed Dr. Arnold's authority, in giving this, which seems to be the most natural meaning of the words; the question is fully discussed in an Appendix to the second volume of his edition, and the other methods of rendering it enumerated and considered; among the principal of which is that of Müller, viz. "The truce was ended, and the war again renewed, up to the time of the Pythian games."

² Book iii. 104.

³ That this sense of the word is preferable to that of "felt an inclination," appears to be proved by a reference to viii. 23, quoted by Dr. Arnold.

⁴ See book viii. 108.

⁵ After the affair at Pylos, when in the height of popularity, Cleon's conduct was held up to public ridicule by Aristophanes, in the comedy of the Knights, in which he was much reviled. The effect produced on the minds of the people was extraordinary. He was accused of misapplying the public money, and condemned to pay a fine of five talents. See Aristoph. Acharn. v. 6. and Nub. v. 549.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

the city, and sent ten galleys about into the haven. And first he came to the new fortification, which Brasidas had raised about the city, wishing to take in the suburbs, making a breach in the old wall, that the whole was one city.

where he is
opposed by
Pasiteli-
das, whom
he makes
prisoner,
and cap-
tures the
town.

III. And Pasitelidas, the Lacedæmonian commandant, with the garrison there present, came into it to defend it, and resisted the Athenians that assaulted it. But being hard pressed, (and the galleys which were before sent about, having by this time sailed round into the haven,) Pasitelidas was afraid lest those galleys should take the town unfurnished of defendants before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side should win the wall, and he be intercepted between them both; and thereupon having abandoned it, he ran back into the city. But the Athenians in the galleys having taken the town before he came, and the land army following in after him at the first attack, and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans immediately in fight, and some, amongst whom was the commandant Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now coming with aid to Torone, but having learnt by the way that it was already captured, went back again, being about forty furlongs short of having come and prevented it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another at the fortification, and made slaves of the women and children of the Toronæans, but the men, and the Peloponnesians, and such Chalcidæans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent prisoners to Athens; and the Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed by them, the rest were got back by the Olynthians, being redeemed by exchange of man for man. About the same time the Bœotians took Panactum, a fort of the Athenians, standing in their confines, by treason; and Cleon, having settled a garrison in Torone, having weighed anchor, went thence by sea round mount Athos, as about to go to Amphipolis.

Brasidas
halts forty
stadia off,
having ar-
rived too
late to
assist the
garrison.
Cleon
erects
trophies,
sends his
prisoners
to Athens,
and then,
having left
a garrison,
sails for
Amphi-
polis.
Panactum
taken by
the Bœo-
tians.

Affairs in
Sicily.
Phæax is
sent to en-
deavour to
excite the
Athenian
allies in
Sicily to
make a war
against the

IV. About the same time, Phæax the son of Erasistratus, who with two others was sent by the Athenians as ambassador to Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with two galleys. For the Leontines, when the Athenians, after the making of the peace, were gone out of Sicily, had enrolled many fresh citizens, and the commons had a purpose also to make a division of the land. But the great men perceiving it, call in the Syracusians,

and drive the commons out; and they wandered up and down every one as he chanced; and the great men, on conditions agreed on with the Syracusians, having abandoned and laid desert that city, went to dwell, on condition of receiving the privileges of free citizens, in Syracuse. After this again, some of them left Syracuse on dislike, and seized on Phocææ, a certain place⁶ of the city of the Leontines, and on Bricinnæ, a fortification in Leontina; thither also came to them most of the commons that had before been driven out, and settling themselves, made war from those places of strength. On intelligence hereof, the Athenians send Phæax thither to persuade their confederates there, and, if they could, all the Sicilians jointly, to make war on the Syracusians, inasmuch as they were acquiring power, to try if they might thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phæax arriving, prevails with the Camarinæans and the Agrigentines; but the business finding a stop at Gela, he proceeds no further onwards to the rest, conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. So he returned through the Siculi to Catana, and having come also to Bricinnæ by the way, and there encouraged them concerning entering, he set sail, and departed.

V. In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he negotiated, as he went by, with sundry cities also of Italy, to enter into friendship with the Athenians, and also fell in with those Locrians, who having settled once in Messene, were afterwards driven out again; being the same who after the peace in Sicily, on a sedition in Messene, wherein one of the factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent out to inhabit there, and for some time Messene became the property of the Locrians. Phæax, therefore, chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own city, did them no hurt; for the Locrians had come to terms with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of the confederates refused to make peace with the Athenians; nor, indeed, would they have done it now, but that they were hard pressed by their war with the Itonæans and Melæans, their own colonists and borderers. And Phæax after this returned to Athens.

VI. Cleon, who was now gone from Torone, and come about

⁶ Or "quarter," as Mr. Bloomfield translates it, perhaps a suburb or fort in the town.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.
Syracusians,
who had
assisted the
Leontine
nobles in
desolating
Leontini.

He succeeds with none but the Camarinæans and Agrigentines.

He returns home-wards, and on his way falls in with some Locrian exiles from Messene, whom he treats well on account of some preliminaries of a peace having been arranged between the Locrians and Athenians.

He arrives at Athens.

Cleon, having

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.
taken
Galepsus
and at-
tacked
Stagirus,
remains
at Eion
waiting for
reinforce-
ments.
Brasidas
takes post
on Cerdy-
lium.

to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaults Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians,⁷ but could not take it; but Galepsus, the colony of the Thasians, he takes by assault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas to beg him to come to him with an army, according to the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to lead up as many mercenary Thracians as he could, he lay still in Eion, expecting their coming. Brasidas, on notice hereof, sat down over-against him on the Cerdylum; this is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing on high ground, beyond the river, not far from Amphipolis, and whence all that was about him was discerned, so that Cleon could not escape his observation, if he should rise with his army to go against Amphipolis; which he expected he would do, and in contempt of his small number, would go up with the forces he had then present. Moreover, he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and summoned all the Edonians, both horsemen and targeteers; he had also of Myrcinians and Chalcidæans, one thousand targeteers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for men at arms, the whole number collected together was at the most two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas sat down at Cerdylum; the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas their captain within Amphipolis.

Clearidas
occupies
Amphi-
polis.

Cleon
quits his
station,
and oc-
cupies a
hill before
Amphi-
polis.

VII. Cleon for a while lay still, but was afterwards forced to do that which Brasidas expected. For the soldiers being annoyed with their stay there, and calculating with themselves what command his would be likely to be, and with what ignorance and cowardice, against what skill and boldness of the other, and how they came forth with him against their wills, he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling that they should be dispirited by too long a stay in one place, dislodged, and led them forward. And he took the same course there, on which, having succeeded well with it at Pylos, he grounded his belief that he was a man of sense. For he expected not that any body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out he went up principally to see the place; and stayed for greater forces, not with the view of conquering with safety in case he should be compelled to fight, but that he might there-with environ the city on all sides at once, and in that manner

⁷ Book iv. 88.

take it by force. So he went up, and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and he himself viewed the fens of the Strymon, and the situation of the city towards⁸ Thrace; and thought he could retire again at his pleasure without battle. For neither did any man appear on the walls, nor come out of the gates, which were all fast shut; so that as he thought he had committed an error in having arrived without engines; for he [thought he] could have taken the city, as being without defendants.

VIII. Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians move, having come himself down also from the Cerdylum, enters into Amphipolis; and he would not suffer them to make any sally, nor to face the Athenians in order of battle, mistrusting his own forces, which he thought inferior, not in number, (for they were in a manner equal,) but in worth, (for such Athenians as were there, were pure;⁹ and the Lemnians and Imbrians who were amongst them, were of the very ablest,) but prepared to set upon them by a wile. For if he should shew to the enemy both his number and the armour, such as for the present they were forced to use, he thought that thereby he should not so soon get the victory, as by keeping them out of sight, and out of their contempt of the real condition they were in. Wherefore, choosing to himself one hundred and fifty men of arms, and committing the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set on them suddenly before they should retire; not expecting to take them equally isolated another time, if their succours chanced to arrive. And when he had called all his soldiers together, wishing to encourage them, and to make known to them his design, he said as follows.

Year 10.
A.C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

Brasidas
leaves
Cerdy-
lium, and
enters Am-
phipolis.

Oration of Brasidas to his Soldiers.

IX. “Men of Peloponnesus, as to what a country we are come from, how by valour it hath ever retained her liberty,

⁸ On the difference in sense occasioned by the various readings of $\tau\eta$ or $\tau\eta\eta$, the reader can refer to Dr. Arnold's note. The interpretation in the text seems to be the most natural, though at variance with the reading $\tau\eta$, which Bekker has edited; the most appropriate sense of which in this place would be, “near,” or, “bordering on.”

⁹ Dr. Arnold considers this equivalent to the expression in vi. 31. $\tau\omicron$ $\pi\epsilon\zeta\omicron\nu$, &c. i. e. that they were unmixed Athenians, in full manhood, no part of the force being either Thetes or Metics. Herod. i. 211. and iv. 135.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

and that being Dorians, you are now to fight against Ionians, of whom you were ever wont to get the victory, let it suffice that I have touched it thus briefly: but in what manner I intend to make the attempt, of that I am now to inform you; lest the venturing by few at once, and not altogether, should seem to be a measure wanting in strength, and so dishearten you. I conjecture now, that it was in contempt of us, and not expecting that any one would come out to fight them, that the enemy both came up to this place, and that now, having betaken themselves carelessly and out of order to view the country, disregard us. But he that best observes such errors in his enemies, and also with due regard to his own strength gives the onset, not so much openly, and in ranged battle, as in the way that is best for his present advantage, for the most part will attain his purpose; and these wiles carry with them the greatest glory of all, by which deceiving most the enemy, a man may do most benefit to his friends. Therefore, whilst they are bold without preparation, and intend, from what they appear to me to be about, to steal away, rather than to stay, I say, in this their looseness of resolution, and before their minds are more settled, I, with those I have chosen, will, if I can, before they get away, fall in on the midst of their army, running. And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to have already charged, and (as it is probable) to have frightened them, take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans, and all the rest of the confederates, and on a sudden setting open the gates, run out upon them, and with all possible speed come to close quarters, (for there is chief hope that they may be terrified by this means, seeing that they who come on after, are ever of more terror to the enemy than those that are already present, and in fight.) And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a Spartan; and you, confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the parts of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and obedience to his leaders; and that this day you either gain yourselves liberty by your valour, and so be called confederates of the Lacedæmonians, or else both [to be called] slaves to the Athenians yourselves; and, if you fare so well as not to be led captives, nor put to death, to be in greater servitude than before, and also to be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at stake: and I for my part will make it appear that

I am not more ready to persuade my neighbours, than myself to carry out my precepts in action.”

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

X. Brasidas having thus said, both prepared to go out himself, and also placed the rest that were with Clearidas by the gates called Thracian, to issue forth afterwards as was appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight when he came down from the Cerdylum, and again in the city, (which was open to view from without,) when he was sacrificing by the temple of Pallas, it was told Cleon, whilst Brasidas was ordering of his men, (for he was at this time gone off a little to look about him,) that the whole army of the enemies is plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet of many men and horses, as ready to come forth, appear under the gate. Hearing this, he came to the place, and when he saw it was true, not being minded to fight it out until his aids arrived, and thinking that he should be beforehand with them in retreating, he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat: and ordered them [in the army] as they went off, to draw off on their left wing towards Eion, as that indeed was the only thing that could be done. But when he thought they were long about it, causing the right wing to wheel about, and laying open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he led away the army himself. Brasidas, at the same time, having spied his opportunity, and that the army of the Athenians was in movement, said to those about him and to the rest, “ These men stay not for us, it is manifest, by the motion of their spears and of their heads; for where such motion is they are not wont to stay for the charge of the enemy; therefore open me somebody the gates appointed, and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them.” Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and which was the first gate of the long wall, which was then standing, and at full speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by the strongest part of the town,¹ there standeth now a trophy. And charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified both with their own disarray and at his daring, forces them to fly. And Clearidas (as was appointed) having issued out by the Thracian gates, was at the same moment coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden attempt, were

Cleon commences a retreat, but is attacked by Brasidas, who sallies out at the head of one hundred and fifty men.

Clearidas seconds him, and throws the Athenians into confusion.

¹ These words are capable of another interpretation, which Dr. Arnold gives, viz. “ the steepest part of the hill.”

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

Brasidas
is mortally
wounded.

Cleon
takes to
flight and
is slain.

The Athe-
nian army
is totally
routed,
and flies in
confusion
to Eion.

Brasidas
dies,

and is bur-
ied in
Amphi-
polis at the
public ex-
pense.

on both sides in confusion; and the left wing, which was next to Eion, and which indeed was marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of the army, and fled. When that was now going off, Brasidas coming up [along the line] to the right wing, is wounded; and the Athenians saw not when he fell, but they that were near took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it, and though Cleon himself forthwith fled, (as at first he intended not to stay,) and was intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, and slain, yet his men at arms having gathered themselves into a circle on the hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas, and did not shrink before that the Myrcinian and Chalcidæan horse and the targeteers, encircling and casting their javelins upon them, put them to flight. Thus the whole army of the Athenians, being now in flight and betaking themselves with much difficulty over the hills, and by several ways, all that were not slain upon the place, or by the Chalcidæan horse and targeteers, recovered Eion. But they who took up Brasidas out of the battle, having protected him from the enemy, brought him yet breathing into the city. And he knew that his side had got the victory, but expired shortly after. When Clearidas, with the rest of the army, were returned from pursuit of the enemy, they plundered those that were slain, and erected a trophy.

XI. After this, the confederates, following the corpse of Brasidas, all of them in their arms, buried him in the city at the public charge, before that which is now the market-place.² And the Amphipolitans afterwards having surrounded his monument with a wall, sacrificed to him as to a hero, honoured him with games and anniversary sacrifices, and attributed their colony to him as founder; having pulled down the edifices of Agnon,³ and having destroyed whatever monument might survive to the memory of his foundation, esteeming Brasidas to have been their preserver, and also at this time, through fear of the Athenians, courting the Lacedæmonians for a league; but as for Agnon, because of their hostility with the Athenians, they thought it would neither be expedient nor satisfactory that he should have the honours. The dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians; of whom there were slain about six hundred,

² There was a cenotaph to his memory erected at Sparta.—Aristotle alludes to the sacrifice to him. *Ethics*, v. 7. §. 1.

³ Who was their true founder. Vid. note on iv. 102.

and but seven of the other side, by reason that the battle did not take place in regular order, but rather from such a chance conflict and sudden alarm [as I have described]. After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went home by sea, and Clearidas and those with him settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.
The Athenians sail homewards.

XII. About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were leading an aid to the parts towards Thrace of nine hundred men at arms; and when they were come to Heraclea in Trachinia, they stayed there to settle such things as they thought amiss. Whilst they stayed, this battle happened to be fought, and the summer ended.

Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas arrive at Heraclea with seven hundred men.

XIII. The next winter, they that were with Ramphias went forward forthwith, as far as Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians hindering them from going on, and Brasidas, to whom they were carrying this army, being dead, they returned homewards: conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both because the Athenians had on this overthrow gone away, they themselves, too, being unable to perform any of the designs which he [i. e. Brasidas] had intended. But the principal cause of their return was this, that they knew at their coming forth, that the Lacedæmonians had their minds more disposed to peace than to war.

WINTER. They proceed as far as Pierius, where they are stopped by the Thessalians, and return to Lacedæmon.

XIV. Directly after the battle of Amphipolis, and return of Ramphias out of Thessaly, it fell out, that neither side did any act of war, but were inclined rather to peace, the Athenians, from the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little after at Amphipolis; and because they had no longer that confident hope in their strength, on which they relied, when formerly they refused the treaty, fancying, on their present success, that they should have the upper hand; also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest, emboldened by their losses, they should revolt to a yet greater degree, and repented that they made not peace after what happened at Pylos, when an occasion offered itself advantageously. And the Lacedæmonians on the other side did desire peace, because the war had not fallen out as they expected; in which they had thought they should in a few years pull down the power of Athens, by wasting their territory; and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the like whereof had never happened to Sparta before; because also their country was continually ra-

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

vaged from Pylos and Cythera, and their Helots continually fled to the enemy; and because they constantly expected, lest those that remained, trusting in them that were run away, should, in regard⁴ of the present position of affairs, raise some innovation, as at other times before they had done. It happened also that the thirty years' treaty⁵ with the Argives was now upon the point of expiring, and the Argives would not make another, without restitution made them of Cynuria; and matters stood thus, to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

XV. Considering therefore these things, it was by both parties thought good that the peace should be concluded, and especially by the Lacedæmonians, from the desire they had to recover their men taken in the island; for the Spartans that were amongst them were both of the leading men of the city, and all alike their kinsmen; and therefore they began to treat directly after they were taken; but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedæmonians knowing they would be more likely now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which they were to meet and consult about a peace for a longer time.

XVI. But when also the overthrow had happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and both Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who on either side were most adverse to the peace; the one, on account of his good success and honour from the war; the other, because he thought in quiet times his evil actions would more appear, and his calumniations be the less believed; then those that in the two states aspired most at the mastery, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, the king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of those of his time, were much the more desirous to have the peace go on; Nicias, because he was desirous (whilst as yet he had never suffered any

⁴ Or, acting on; literally, as Dr. Arnold renders it, "looking to," and influenced by.

⁵ Ampelidas and Lichas were sent to Argos to renew the peace, but the Argives, holding the Lacedæmonians to be no dangerous enemies without the Athenians, refused it. Cf. c. 22.

John To

defeat, and was in honour) to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the citizens rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that he had passed through his career without ever having made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought would result by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is a benefit that peace affords; and Pleistoanax had the same desire, because of the imputation laid on him about his return from exile by his enemies, and because he was always put forward by them so as to raise religious scruples among the Lacedæmonians, on any loss they received, that it befel them, on account of his return home contrary to the laws.⁶ For they charged him further, that he and his brother Aristocles had suborned the chief prophethess of Delphi, to answer the deputies of the Lacedæmonians when they came thither, for a long time, with this, that they should bring back the seed of the semi-god,⁷ the son of Jupiter, out of the strange country into their own: and if they did not, they should have to plough their land with a silver plough: and so at length to have made the Lacedæmonians, nineteen years after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of Lacedæmon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their kings, to fetch him home again, who lived in the mean time in exile in the mountain Lycæum, in a house, whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lacedæmonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw his army out of Attica.

XVII. Being troubled with this imputation, and considering that there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace, and also that the Lacedæmonians thereby recovering their men, he also should cease to give any hold to the calumniations of his enemies; whereas, while war was going on, they that were the leading men could not but be always subject to accusations on their losses, he was therefore very desirous of the peace. And this winter they came to a discussion, and by the Lacedæmo-

⁶ See book ii. 21.

⁷ Hercules, from whom Pleistoanax was descended. His great uncle was the famous Leonidas, whose pedigree is given by Herodotus, vii. 204. For a clear view of the two families of the Spartan kings, see the *Annales Antiquitatis*, p. 38. (Oxford, 1835.)

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

nians a preparation already making against the spring was held up before them to terrify them, for which orders were sent round to the cities, as if they meant to fortify some spot in Attica, that the Athenians might give them a more ready ear.

Peace is concluded for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians and their allies.

When after many meetings, and many demands on either side, it was at last agreed, that peace should be concluded, each party rendering what they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisæa, (for when they demanded a return of Plataea, and the Thebans answered, that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but rendered voluntarily; the Athenians said that they also had Nisæa in the same manner:) then the Lacedæmonians, calling together their confederates, and all but the Bœotians,⁸ Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, (for these disliked it,) giving their votes for the ending of the war, they conclude the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians with sacrifices, and swore it, and the Athenians again to them, on these articles.

Conditions of peace.

XVIII. "The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, have made a treaty, and sworn it city by city, on these terms:—Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will, to sacrifice in them, and to have access to them, and to ask counsel of the oracles in them, and to send their deputies to them, according to the custom of his country, securely, both by sea and land. The temple and shrine of Apollo in Delphi,⁹ and the Delphians, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory, according to the institution of the place.—The peace shall endure between the Athenians, with their confederates, and the Lacedæmonians, with their confederates, for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud and without harm.—It shall not be lawful to carry arms, with intention of hurt, neither for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates against the Athenians, nor for the Athenians and their confederates against the Lacedæmonians, by any art or

⁸ On this point, see Aristoph. Pax. 464, and on the unwillingness of the Megareans, v. 481.

⁹ That the Delphians should be independent, and not subject to the Phocians, was the general wish of the Greeks on religious grounds, (Xenoph. Vectig. v. 9.) and of the Lacedæmonians in particular, because the families of the leading citizens who formed the aristocracy appear to have been of the Dorian race. See Thucyd. i. 112. Boeckh. Pub. Œcon. ii. p. 146. and Müller's Dor. i. 192. ii. 184.—*Arnold*.

machination whatever.—If any controversy arise between them, let them employ law, and oath, in such manner as shall be agreed on.—The Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall render back Amphipolis to the Athenians.—The inhabitants of whatever city the Lacedæmonians render to the Athenians, shall be at liberty to go forth whither they will, with bag and baggage.—Those cities which paid the tribute, taxed in the time¹ of Aristides, continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws; and now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the Athenians, or their confederates, to bear arms against them, or to do them any hurt, as long as they shall pay the said tribute. The cities are these; Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. And they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedæmonians, nor of the Athenians. But if the Athenians can persuade these cities, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them, on their own wishing to be so, their confederates. The Micybernæans, Sanæans, and Singæans, shall inhabit their own cities, on the same conditions, with the Olynthians and Acanthians.—The Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, shall render Panactum² to the Athenians. And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedæmonians, Coryphasium,³ Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, and likewise what Lacedæmonians are in the prison of Athens, or in any prison of any place in the Athenian dominion; and let go all the Peloponnesians, besieged in Scione, and all that Brasidas did send into it, and whatever confederates of the Lacedæmonians are in prison, either at Athens, or any where else in the Athenian dominion. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall deliver whomsoever of the Athenians or their confederates they have in their hands, in the same manner.—Touching the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermyleans, and any other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall determine concerning them what they think fit. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, city by city; and the

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

¹ Which was the first time that the Athenians began to command the rest of Greece; for when, in the end of the Median war, the Lacedæmonians left that command, the Athenians undertook it, and taxed the several cities with tribute towards the war. The war ended, the tribute ended not. See note, book i. 96.

² See book v. 3.

³ Or Pylos.

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

oath they swear shall be the greatest that in each city is in use ; the oath that they shall swear, let it be this : I will stand to these articles, and to this treaty, truly and sincerely. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall take the same oath to the Athenians. This oath they shall on both sides every year renew, and shall erect pillars [inscribed with this treaty] at Olympia, Pythia,⁴ and in the isthmus ; at Athens, within the citadel ;⁵ and at Lacedæmon, in the Amyclæum.⁶ And if any thing be on either side forgot, or shall be thought fit on good deliberation to be changed, it shall be lawful for them to do it, in such manner⁷ as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians shall jointly think fit.”

XIX. This league begins the fourth day before the end of the month Artemisius, Pleistolas being ephore ; at Athens, the sixth day before the end of Elaphebolion, Alcæus being archon. These took the oath and sacrificed : of the Lacedæmonians —Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daitus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Lamphilus. Of the Athenians —Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

XX. This treaty was made in the very end of winter,⁸ and the spring then beginning, directly after the city feast of Bacchus,⁹ and full ten years had passed by, and some few days over, after the first invasion of Attica, and the beginning of this war. But now, for the certainty hereof, let a man consider it according to the seasons themselves, and not from the magistrates of the several countries, or from those who held any honour, (their names marking the distribution of the time with

⁴ The name by which Homer calls Delphi, and which seems to have been continued in use as a more solemn and sacred appellation.

⁵ Comp. ii. 15. and, in the same sense, Aristoph. Equit. 1090.

⁶ The temple of Apollo at Amyclæ.

⁷ This article displeased the confederates of Lacedæmon, because the articles might by this be changed without them.

⁸ It appears that Elaphebolion, amongst the Athenians, was the last month of their winter quarter.

⁹ Of these feasts there were three during the year ; for an admirable account of which, with the differences observable in them, see the Greek Theatre, c. iii. p. 99. (ed. 3rd.)

regard to preceding events,) thus rather preferring to trust.¹ For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who in the midst, or how he was, when any thing fell out. But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they are written, he shall find, as each [of these seasons] makes up half a year,² that to this first war belonged ten summers, and as many winters.

XXI. The Lacedæmonians (for it fell to them by lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed directly those prisoners they had then in their hands, and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to the parts towards Thrace, with command to Clearidas, to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to accept of the treaty in such manner as was for each of them accorded. But they would not, thinking it was not for their advantage. And Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcidæans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could not do it in opposition to them. And coming away soon after from the place, with those ambassadors to Lacedæmon, both to defend himself, if accused by those with Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, and also desiring to know if the terms of the peace might by any means be changed; when he found it firm, he himself being sent back by the Lacedæmonians, with command principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that, then to draw out all the Peloponnesians that were in it, immediately took his journey.

XXII. But the confederates chanced to be present themselves in Lacedæmon, and the Lacedæmonians required such of them as formerly refused, to accept the treaty. But they, on the same pretence on which they had rejected it before, said,

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

The Lacedæmonians deliver up their prisoners, and send orders to Clearidas to surrender Amphipolis.

He declines, and comes to Lacedæmon to justify his conduct, but receives positive orders to give up the place immediately.

Some of the Lacedæmonian confederates refuse to receive the treaty.

¹ I have endeavoured to render this difficult passage as literally as possible, for the sense is obvious, viz. that the years are to be counted by the summers and winters, rather than by placing reliance on the calculation by those who bore office any where at the time, such as archons, ephors, &c. The words will admit also of a different construction, thus, "from the names, which, from any honour, mark the calculation of time with regard," &c.; or again thus, as Mr. Bloomfield translates, "or from those, who, from any honour whatsoever, marked the numbering of the names of years in respect to preceding events."

² I have here followed Goeller as to the construction, and Dr. Arnold, who translates it literally, "Each summer and winter having the virtue of the year in half measure."

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89, 3.

The Lacedæmonians enter into an alliance with the Athenians.

that unless it were more fair, they would not accept it. And the Lacedæmonians, seeing they refused to listen to them, dismissed them, and by themselves entered with the Athenians into a league; because they imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace, (because they had refused it before, when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos,) and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians: and also conceived, that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir; for if it had been possible,³ [which it thus was not,] they [i. e. the rest of Peloponnesus] would turn to the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then present, and conferences having taken place, they agreed, and oaths were taken, and the league was concluded on in the terms following.

XXIII. “The Lacedæmonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for fifty years.—If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians, and do the Lacedæmonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedæmonians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred on by them both; and both cities shall again lay down the war jointly. And this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians, and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedæmonians shall aid the Athenians against them, in the strongest manner they can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by both, and both the cities shall again lay down the war together. And this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their strength possible. These things the same men on either side that swore to the other treaty shall swear to, and every year the Lacedæmonians, at their coming to the Dionysia at Athens, shall renew them; and the Athenians, at their going to the Hyacinthian feast at Lacedæmon; and either side shall erect a pillar [inscribed with this league], one at

³ Thus also Dr. Arnold explains this passage in a long and excellent note; “As the Athenian alliance would thus be closed against them, under which they would otherwise have ranged themselves.”

Lacedæmon, near to Apollo in the Amyclæum, another at Athens, near to Minerva in the citadel.—If it shall seem good to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians to add or take away any thing touching the league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly.”

Year 10.
A. C. 422.
Ol. 89. 3.

XXIV. Of the Lacedæmonians, these took the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinares, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This league was made not long after the treaty. And the Athenians delivered to the Lacedæmonians the men they had taken in the island; and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. And hitherto hath been written these ten years which this first war continued without intermission.

The Athenians give up the men taken in Sphacteria.

YEAR XI. A. C. 421. OLYMP. 89. 4.

XXV. After the treaty and league made between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians after the ten years' war, Pleistolas being ephore at Lacedæmon, and Alcæus archon of Athens, though there was peace to those that had accepted it, yet the Corinthians and some cities of Peloponnesus overthrew what was done, and presently arose another stir, of the confederates, against Lacedæmon. And the Lacedæmonians also, after a while, became suspected by the Athenians, for not performing some of the things agreed according to the articles. And for six years and ten months they abstained from entering into each other's territories with their arms: but the cessation from arms being but weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could; and, in the end, were forced to dissolve the peace, made after those ten years, and fell again into open war.

XXVI. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by summers and winters, as every thing came to pass, until such time as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates made an end of the Athenian dominion, and took their long walls, and the Peiræus. To which time, from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty-seven years.⁴ As

⁴ Twenty-eight, according to Xenophon. Hellen. book i. But the first

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

for the peace between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted as war, he will decide amiss. For let him look to the actions that passed as they are distinctly set down,⁵ and he shall find, that that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in which they neither rendered all nor accepted all, according to the articles; besides, with respect to the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and in other actions, it was on both sides infringed, and the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued no less in hostility than before; and the Bœotians had but a truce from one ten days to another. So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed it, a man shall find, counting by the seasons, that it came to just so many years and some few days; and that to those who were positive on any point upon the prediction of oracles, this alone fell out in agreement [with the prediction]. And I remember yet, that from the very beginning of this war, and so on, till the end, it was asserted by many, that it must be of thrice nine years' continuance. And through the whole time thereof I lived in the full vigour of my strength, and applied my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was an exile⁶ from my country for twenty years, after my charge at Amphipolis; whereby being present at the affairs of both, and especially of the Lacedæmonians, by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrel, therefore, and perturbation of the peace, after those ten years, and that which followed, according as afterwards the war was carried, I will now pursue.

SUMMER.
On quitting Lacedæmon the Corinthians go to Argos, and advise the Argives

XXVII. After the concluding of the fifty years' treaty, and the league which followed, and when those ambassadors who were sent for, out of the rest of Peloponnesus, to accept the said peace, were departed from Lacedæmon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities) having turned first to

and last he takes for whole years, which was not the case. Thucydides is more correct.

⁵ This may be also rendered differently, considering *ἐνυμβασις* to be the nominative case to the verb, "Let him consider what it (*ἐνυμβασις*) was made out to be by the actions."

⁶ What the sentence was which was pronounced against Thucydides, which he avoided by a voluntary exile, we are not told, as far as I know, any where. It seems quite as probable, to use Mr. Thirlwall's words, (iii. p. 288,) that he was condemned to death, as to exile.

Argos, entered into a discussion with some of the Argive magistrates, to this purpose, that since the Lacedæmonians had made a peace and league with the Athenians, their heretofore mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to the enslaving of the Peloponnesus, it behoved them to consider of a course for the safety of the same, and to make a decree, that any city of the Grecians that would, and that was free, and could and would give the like and equal judicial satisfaction on all points with theirs, might make a league with the Argives, for the mutual defence of each other's territory, and to assign them a few men, with absolute authority, to treat with; and that it should not be proposed to the people, so that if they could not persuade the multitude to it, they might not be known to have ever made such a motion; affirming that many would come into this confederacy out of hatred to the Lacedæmonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went homewards.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.
to take
measures
for the de-
fence of
the Pello-
ponnesus
against the
Athenians
and Lacedæ-
monians.

XXVIII. But these men of Argos, having heard them, and reported their proposition, both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives decreed the same accordingly, and elected twelve men, with whom it should be lawful for any Grecian to make a league; except the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, with neither of whom they were to enter into any league, without the consent of the Argive people. And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well because they saw the Lacedæmonians would make war upon them, (for the truce between them was now just expiring,) as also because they hoped to have the principality of Peloponnesus. For about this time, Lacedæmon had but a bad report, and was in contempt for the losses it had received, and the Argives in all points were in good condition, not having borne a share in the Attic war, but rather been in peace with both, and thereby got profit from it. Thus the Argives received into league all the Grecians that were willing.

The Ar-
gives ap-
point
twelve
commis-
sioners.

XXIX. First of all came in the Mantineans, and their confederates, through fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, which they thought the Lacedæmonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any longer to command; so that they gladly turned to the Argives, thinking it a great city, ever an enemy to the Lacedæmonians,

The Man-
tinæans
come over
to the
Argive
alliance,
and are
followed
by most of
the other
Pelopon-
nesian
states.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

and governed as their own by democracy. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also to be in perturbation, and to mutter amongst themselves that it was fit for them to do the like; conceiving that it was from knowing somewhat more than they knew, that the Mantineans had changed sides; and were also angry with the Lacedæmonians, amongst other causes, because it was written in the articles of the Attic treaty, that it should be lawful to add to, or take from the same, whatever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians, and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might have a purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring them into subjection. For in justice the power of changing the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the confederates in general. Whereupon the greater number fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

The Lacedæmonians send ambassadors to remonstrate with the Corinthians.

XXX. The Lacedæmonians perceiving this stir to have taken place in the Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it, and were going themselves to enter into the league with Argos, send ambassadors to Corinth to prevent what was about to happen, and accused them both of introducing the whole design, and of their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make from them, to the league of the Argives; saying, that they would therein infringe their oaths, and that they had already done unjustly, in refusing the treaty made with the Athenians; forasmuch as it was stated,⁷ that what the major part of the confederates should decree, unless it were in any way hindered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But the Corinthians, those confederates who had themselves also refused the peace, being now at Corinth, (for they had sent for them before,) in their answer to the Lacedæmonians, did not openly allege the wrongs they had received, as that they⁸ [the Lacedæmonians] had not got back for them, from the Athenians, Sollium, nor Anactorium, nor any thing else as to which they considered themselves aggrieved; but pretended they would not betray those towards Thrace, for

⁷ In the Peloponnesian league against Athens.

⁸ For this interpretation, which is undoubtedly the correct one, I am indebted to Mr. Bloomfield.

that they had, in particular, taken oaths to them, both when together with Potidæa they first revolted, and also others afterwards; and therefore they did not break the oath of their league, by not acceding to the treaty with Athens. For having sworn to them by the gods, they could not, in betraying them, keep true to their oaths. And it was said, unless some god or hero hinder it; this, therefore, appeared to them to be a divine hinderance. Thus they answered for their old oath: and for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer; that when they had taken counsel with their friends, they would do afterwards what would be just. And so the ambassadors of Lacedæmon went home. At the same time there chanced to be present also in Corinth, the ambassadors of Argos, who bade the Corinthians accede to the league, and that without delay. But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next sitting.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

The Argives urge the Corinthians to join their alliance instantly.

XXXI. Directly after this came to them an embassy, also from the Eleans, and first they made a league with the Corinthians; and going thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the declaration⁹ before mentioned; for they happened to be at variance with the Lacedæmonians concerning Lepreum. For the Lepreates having once warred on certain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleans into their confederacy, on condition to give them the moiety of their land, when they had put an end to the war, the Eleans gave to the Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an imposition thereon of a talent¹ to be paid to the Olympian Jupiter. This they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war, when, on pretence of that war, giving over the payment, the Eleans would have forced them to it again, but they had recourse to the Lacedæmonians; and the cause being referred to their decision, the Eleans afterwards, on suspicion that they would not have right from the Lacedæmonians, renounced the reference, and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless gave sentence, that the Lepreates were free from it, and that the

The Eleans, Corinthians, and Chalcidæans join the Argive confederacy.

⁹ The decree of the Argives, that any Grecian that would might make a league with them, treating with the twelve commissioners by them chosen to that purpose.

¹ Dr. Arnold refers to iii. 50. on the Athenian tax of Lesbos; see also iv. 57, on a similar one imposed on Cythera.

Year 11.
A.C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

Eleans did the injury; and because the Eleans had not stood to the reference, the Lacedæmonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. The Eleans taking this as if the Lacedæmonians had received their revolted city, and alleging the agreement,² in which it was said, that what every one possessed when they entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess when they gave it over, revolted to the Argives, as wronged, and entered league with them, as is before related. After these came at once into the Argive league, the Corinthians, and the Chalcidæans towards Thrace. The Bœotians also and Megareans threatened as much, but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so advantageous for them, who were governed by oligarchy, as the Lacedæmonian form of government, and being also attentively observed by the Lacedæmonians, they stirred no further in it.

The Bœotians and Megareans remain inactive.

Scione surrenders to the Athenians, and is given to the Platæans.

The Delians are restored to Delos.

The Phocians and Locrians go to war.

The Corinthians and Argives try without success to separate the Tegeans from the Lacedæmonian alliance.

The Corinthians prevail on the Bœotians to accompany them to Athens.

XXXII. About the same time of this summer, the Athenians took Scione by siege, slew all that were within it of man's estate, made slaves of the women and children, and gave their territory to the Platæans to possess; they also replanted the Delians in Delos, both from consideration of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also because the oracle of Delphi had commanded it. The Phocians and Locrians also began a war at that time against each other. And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went to Tegea, to cause it to revolt from the Lacedæmonians; conceiving it to be an important piece of Peloponnesus, and making account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become in any way enemies to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, grew less zealous, and were afraid that none of the rest would in this case come in. Nevertheless, they went to the Bœotians, and solicited them to enter into league with them and the Argives, and to act with them in all other respects. And the Corinthians further desired the Bœotians to go along with them to Athens, and to procure for them the like ten days' truce,³ to that which was made between the Athenians and Bœotians, not long after the making of the fifty years' treaty, on the same terms that the Bœotians had it; and if the

² This probably refers, according to Thirlwall, iii. 316. to the fundamental preliminary agreement mentioned in c. 17. *ξυνεχωρητο ὥστε*, &c.

³ Or it means, "a truce terminable at ten days' notice."

Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs, and make no more truces hereafter without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this request, the Bœotians bade them, touching the league with the Argives, to stay awhile longer, and went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days' truce; the Athenians answering, that if the Corinthians were confederates with the Lacedæmonians, they had a treaty already. Nevertheless, the Bœotians would not relinquish their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians both begged the same, and charged them with having so agreed on with them; yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratification.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

A ten days' truce is refused to the Corinthians, but an armistice is granted.

XXXIII. The same summer, the Lacedæmonians, with their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, made an expedition to the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans; partly as they called them in by occasion of sedition; and partly because they intended, if they could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had built and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians, towards the Sciritis of Laconia. And the Lacedæmonians wasted the territory of the Parrhasians; and the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody of the Argives, came forth to aid the Parrhasians their confederates; but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the Lacedæmonians, when they had made the Parrhasians free, and demolished the fortification, returned homewards likewise.

The Lacedæmonians march to Parrhasia, and demolish the fort of Cypsela.

XXXIV. The same summer, when those soldiers who went out with Brasidas, and whom Clearidas, after the making of the treaty, had brought thence, were returned from Thrace, the Lacedæmonians made a decree, that those Helots who had fought under Brasidas should receive their liberty, and inhabit where they wished; but not long after, they placed them, together with such others as had been newly enfranchised,⁴ in Lepreun, which lies in the confines between Laconia and the Eleans, with whom they were now at variance; fearing also lest those citizens of their own, who had been taken in the

The Lacedæmonians grant freedom to the Helots who had fought in Thrace under Brasidas. They also disfranchise those citizens who were taken in Sphacteria.

⁴ See Diod. Sic. book xii. p. 124; and Müll. Dor. vol. ii. book iii. c. 3. on the Helots generally, and on this particular point, p. 43; or for a more brief account, Hermann. Pol. Antiq. sects. 24 and 48.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

island,⁵ and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should, on apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they incapacitated them from holding honours, though some of them were in office already; and their incapacitation was of such a nature, that they should neither bear office, nor be capable of buying or selling; yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

Thyssos taken by the Dictideans. Suspicion excited in the minds of the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians.

XXXV. The same summer, the Dictideans took Thyssos, a town in mount Athos, and a confederate of the Athenians. The whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians; nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, to have each other in suspicion immediately after the treaty, in respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution first of Amphipolis and the other cities, had not restored them, nor had caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Bœotians, nor Corinthians, though they ever professed, that in case they refused, they would join with the Athenians to bring them to it by force; and had prefixed a time, though without a written agreement, within which such as entered not into this peace were to be held as enemies to both. The Athenians, therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, suspected that they had no upright intention, and thereupon refused to render Pylos, when they asked it back; nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island; and detained the rest of the towns they then held, waiting till the Lacedæmonians should perform the conditions on their part also. The Lacedæmonians, to this, alleged, that they had done what they were able to do; for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts towards Thrace, and from whatever else place was in their own power. But Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to surrender; that they would endeavour to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, and to get Panactum from them, and all the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia to be sent home; still they desired them to make restitution of Pylos, or if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helots, (as they for their

The Athenians refuse to restore Pylos.

At the desire of the Lacedæmonians, the Messenians and Helots are removed from Pylos and settled in Crænum.

⁵ Sphacteria.

part had drawn their garrisons out of Thrace,) and, if they thought good, to let a garrison of Athenians keep the place. After divers and long conferences held this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians, at the last, that they drew thence all the Messenians, and Helots, and all other Laconian fugitives, and placed them in Cranii, [a city] of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace, and free passage from one to another.

XXXVI. In the beginning of winter, (for now there were other ephors in office; not those in whose time the treaty was made, but some of them that opposed it,) embassies being come from the confederates, and the Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being already there, and having had much conference together, but come to agreement in nothing, Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephors that most desired the dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, entered into private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, exhorting them to hold both the same course; and advised the Bœotians to endeavour first to make a league themselves with the Argives, and then to get the Argives, together with themselves, into a league with the Lacedæmonians; for that they might by this means most avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the Lacedæmonians would prefer the friendship and league of the Argives, before the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athenians. For they knew the Lacedæmonians had ever desired to have Argos their friend on any reasonable conditions, because they considered that their war without Peloponnesus would thereby be a great deal easier. Wherefore they entreated the Bœotians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, to the end that if they could get Pylos for it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians with greater ease.

XXXVII. The Bœotians and Corinthians being commissioned by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedæmonians of their faction, with these points for them to deliver to their commonwealths, went back to their several cities; but two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having waited for, and met with them, on their departure, by the way, entered into a conference with them about a league between the Argives and the Bœotians, as there was between them and the

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.

WINTER.
The new ephori at Sparta hold secret communication with the Bœotians and Corinthians, and offer to throw off the Athenian alliance if the Bœotians and Argives will join them.

The Corinthian and Bœotian ambassadors are met on the road by two Argives, who propose an alliance between

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.
Argos and
Bœotia.

Corinthians, and the Eleans, and Mantineans already; for they thought, if it succeeded, they might the more easily have either war or peace, as the cause would now be common, either with the Lacedæmonians, or whomsoever else it should be needful. When the Bœotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased; for, as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedæmon had been sent to procure of the Argives. These men, therefore, of Argos, when they saw that the Bœotians accepted the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the Bœotians about it, and so departed. The Bœotians coming home, related to the Bœotarchs⁶ the news they had brought, both from Lacedæmon and from the Argives who met them; and the Bœotarchs were glad thereof, and much more forward in it now than formerly they had been, seeing that matters had fallen out as they wished from both quarters, not only that their friends in Lacedæmon desired, but the Argives themselves hastened to accomplish the self-same thing. Not long after this, the ambassadors came to them from Argos, to solicit the despatch of the business before propounded, and the governors of Bœotia commended the proposition, and dismissed them, with promise to send ambassadors about the league to Argos.

This plan is frustrated by the unwillingness of the Bœotian councils to form an alliance with the Corinthians against (as they suppose) the consent of the Lacedæmonians.

XXXVIII. In the mean time, the Bœotarchs thought fit first to swear oaths to each other, that in very truth they would, and the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and from Thrace, give mutual assistance on any occasion to them that should require it, and neither to make war nor peace without the common consent; and that the Bœotians and Megareans (for these two acted in concert) should then make a league with the Argives. But before this oath was taken, the governors of Bœotia communicated the business to the four Bœotian councils, in which the whole authority of the state consists; and withal presented their advice, that any city that would, might join with them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition, because they feared lest they should act in opposition to the Lacedæmonians in being sworn to the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. For the Bœotarchs had not reported to them the messages from Lacedæmon, how Cleobulus and Xenares, among the ephors, and their friends there,

⁶ See note, book iv. c. 91. and also note on ii. c. 2.

had advised them to enter first into a league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards to make the same league with the Lacedæmonians. For they thought that the council, even though they should not tell them this, would decree it no otherwise than they on premeditation should advise. And as the business was checked, the ambassadors from Corinth and Thrace departed without effect. And the Bœotarchs that were before minded, if they had persuaded them to this measure, to have tried to make the league also with the Argives, made no mention now of the Argives at all in the councils, nor sent the ambassadors to Argos, whom they had before promised, but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

Year 11.
A. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 4.
The Corinthian and Thracian ambassadors quit Bœotia without effecting any thing, and the Bœotians in consequence send no ambassadors to Argos.

XXXIX. The same winter, the Olynthians took Mecyberna, held with a garrison of the Athenians, by assault. After this, the Lacedæmonians, (for the conferences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians about what they had of each other's continued still,) hoping that if the Athenians should obtain back from the Bœotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylos, came on an embassy to the Bœotians, to request them to put into their hands Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they might get Pylos restored in exchange. But the Bœotians answered, that unless the Lacedæmonians would make a particular league with them, as with the Athenians, they would not do it. The Lacedæmonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the Athenians, because it being said in the articles, that neither party should make either league or war without the other's consent,⁷ yet such was their desire to get Panactum, to get in exchange for it Pylos, and besides, those who were eager to mar the treaty [with Athens] being desirous of the alliance of Bœotia, that they concluded the league with the Bœotians, winter then ending, and the spring approaching; and Panactum was directly pulled down to the ground. So ended the eleventh year of this war.

Mecyberna taken by the Olynthians.

The Lacedæmonians make a private alliance with the Bœotians on condition of their delivering up Panactum to the Athenians. Panactum is dismantled.

YEAR XII. A.C. 420. OLYMP. 90. 1.

XL. Immediately in the spring of the following summer, SUMMER. The Ar-

⁷ Thirlwall (iii. 322) remarks, that no such clause occurs in either of the treaties, and suggests that it was either implied in the last article of the treaty of alliance, c. 23, ἢν τι δοκῆ, κ. τ. λ., or in the provision made in case the territory of either should be invaded.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.
gives,
alarmed at
the aspect
of affairs,
send to
entreat the
Lacedæ-
monians to
enter into
a treaty
with them.

the Argives, when they saw that the ambassadors whom the Bœotians had promised to send came not, and that Panactum was razed, and that also there had been a private league made between the Bœotians and the Lacedæmonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the Lacedæmonians. For they thought that the Bœotians had been induced both to raze Panactum, and also to enter into the Athenian peace by the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians were privy to the same. So that now they had no means to make league with the Athenians neither; whereas before they expected, that if their truce with the Lacedæmonians continued not, they might, from the differences between the two parties, have joined themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at a stand with regard to these matters, and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeates, Bœotians, and Athenians, as having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedæmonians, and proudly imagining that they would have the lead in the Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and Æson, persons as they thought most acceptable to them, with this idea, that by concluding a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, as well as might be for their present estate, they might, however it might be concluded, at least live at quiet.

The Ar-
give am-
bassadors
propose as
a preli-
minary the
adjust-
ment of
the dispute
between
the two
countries
respecting
Cynuria,
which is
rejected.

Subse-
quently a
treaty is
made for
fifty years,
subject to
the appro-
bation of
the Argive
people.

XLI. Their ambassadors coming there, began a discussion with the Lacedæmonians concerning the articles on which the agreement should be made. And at first the Argives claimed to have the arbitration of the dispute referred either to some private man or to some city concerning the territory of Cynuria, about which they have always differed, as lying on the borders of them both, (it contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthene, and is possessed by the Lacedæmonians;) but afterwards the Lacedæmonians not suffering mention to be made of that, but that if they would make a treaty as they did before, they might; the Argive ambassadors induced them to grant these conditions, that for the present they should conclude a treaty for fifty years, but that it should be lawful, nevertheless, (if one challenged the other thereto,) both for Lacedæmon and Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, so that there were in neither city the plague or a war to excuse them; as once before they had done, when both sides thought they had the

victory.⁸ And that it should not be lawful for one party to follow the other, further than the borders towards Lacedæmon or Argos. And though this seemed to the Lacedæmonians at first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards (because they desired by all means to have friendship with the Argives) they came to an agreement on the terms they required, and put it into writing. However, before the Lacedæmonians would make any full conclusion of the same, they bade them to return first to Argos, and to make the people acquainted with it; and then if it were pleasing to them, to return at the Hyacinthian feast to swear it. So these departed.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

XLII. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromedes, and Phædimus, and Antimenidas, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Bœotians to render them to the Athenians, found Panactum demolished by the Bœotians themselves, on the pretext that there had been anciently an oath, on occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that neither part should inhabit the place, but that both should jointly have the right of pasturage there; but for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Bœotians had, they that were with Andromedes received, conveyed, and delivered them to the Athenians, and also told them of the razing of Panactum, considering it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a grievous matter, conceiving that wrong had been done them by the Lacedæmonians, both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down, and should have been restored standing; and because also they had heard of the private league they had made with the Bœotians, whereas they had promised to join with the Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as had refused it; moreover, they weighed whatever other points the Lacedæmonians had been short in, touching the performance of the articles, and thought that they had been deceived; so that they answered the Lacedæmonian ambassadors roughly, and dismissed them.

The Lacedæmonian commissioners who are sent to Bœotia find Panactum demolished, but receive the Athenian prisoners and deliver them up to the Athenians;

who are indignant at the demolition of Panactum, as well as at the treaty made between the Lacedæmonians and Bœotians.

XLIII. On such a difference as this arising between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, such also of Athens as desired to put an end to the treaty, forthwith urged on their measures. Amongst the rest was Alcibiades the son of Clinias,

Alcibiades takes advantage of this misunderstanding,

⁸ Herod. book i. c. 82; and Ovid. Fast. ii. 661.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

and sends
privately
to the
Argives,
urging
them to
come to
Athens at
the present
juncture
and make
an alliance
with the
Athenians.

a man, who was still a youth in years,⁹ (as he would have been considered in any other city, yet by the dignity of his ancestors honoured much,) who was of opinion, that it was better to join with the Argives, not on this account only, but also his opposition arose from high spirit and a love of contention, because the Lacedæmonians had transacted the treaty by the means of Nicias and Laches without him; whom for his youth they had neglected and not honoured, as for the ancient hospitality between his house and them was fitting, which his father had indeed renounced, but he himself, by good offices done to those prisoners who were brought from the island, had a purpose to have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first, alleging that the Lacedæmonians were not constant; and that they had made the treaty only to get the Argives by that means under their power, and afterwards to invade the Athenians again, when they should be destitute of their friends; and also as soon as this difference was on foot, he sends directly to Argos of himself, bidding them with all speed to come to Athens, as being thereto invited, and to bring with them the Eleans and Mantineans, to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving; and promising that he would help them all he could.

The Ar-
gives
joyfully
accede
to the
proposal,
and with
the Eleans
and Man-
tineans
send am-
bassadors
to Athens.
The Lace-
dæmoni-
ans also
send am-
bassadors
to explain

XLIV. The Argives having heard the message, and when they learnt that the Athenians had made no league with the Bœotians, and that they were come to a great quarrel with the Lacedæmonians, neglected the ambassadors they had then in Lacedæmon, whom they had sent about the treaty, and applied themselves rather to the Athenians, thinking that if they should have war, they should by this means be aided in the war by a city that had been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they directly sent ambassadors to Athens to make the league; and together with theirs, went also the ambassadors of the Eleans and Mantineans; thither also with all speed came

⁹ From several circumstances mentioned by Plato, Alcibiades is supposed to have been about thirty at this time. According to Diodorus and Cornelius Nepos, about three years younger. For a full account of him, see Plutarch, in Alcibiad.; Isocrates in his oration *περι ζευγους*. He stood, by the mother's side, in the relation of second cousin to Pericles, who also was his guardian. See the table of his genealogy at the conclusion of this work.

Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted to be friends with the Athenians, through fear lest in their passion they should make a league with the Argives: and at the same time to require the restitution of Pylos for Panactum, and to excuse themselves concerning their league with the Bœotians, as not made for any harm intended to the Athenians.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.
their conduct, and prevent an alliance between the Athenians and Argives.

XLV. Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear, lest if they should say the same before the people, they would draw to their side the multitude, and so the Argive league be refused. But Alcibiades devises against them a plot of this nature: he persuades the Lacedæmonians, and gives them his faith, if they would not confess that they had come with plenary power before the people, that he would get Pylos rendered; for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it, as much as he now [persuaded them] to oppose it, and that he would settle the rest of their differences. This he did, wishing to alienate them from Nicias, and that by accusing them before the people, as men that had no true and upright intention, nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league with the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans. And it came to pass accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to the question, whether they had full power of concluding, (contrary to what they had said in council,) answered no, the Athenians would no longer endure it, but gave ear to Alcibiades, who exclaimed against the Lacedæmonians far more now than ever, and were ready then, directly bringing the Argives and those others with them into the assembly, to make the league. But an earthquake happening, before any thing was concluded, this assembly was adjourned.¹

By a fraud practised on them by Alcibiades, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors fail in their object.

XLVI. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedæmonians had been deluded, and he himself also thoroughly deceived, touching their acknowledging that they had not come with full power to conclude, yet he persisted to affirm, that it was their best course to be friends with the Lacedæmonians, and to defer the Argives' business, and to send to the Lacedæmonians again to learn their intention; saying, that it was

Nicias, at his own request, is sent to Lacedæmon, to demand redress of grievances.

¹ Compare, on this superstition, c. 50. and viii. 6. (referred to by Dr. Arnold); and on a similar one, Aristoph. Acharn. 171.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

honour to themselves, and dishonour to the Lacedæmonians, to have the war put off; for they themselves being in a state of prosperity, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as they might; whereas for the other side, being in evil estate, it would be gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof he himself was one, to require the Lacedæmonians, if they at all meant what was upright, to render Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; and if the Bœotians would not enter into the treaty, then to relinquish their league with them, according to the article, that the one should not make league with any, without the consent of the other. They bade him to say further, that they themselves also, if they had had the wish to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Argives, who were then present at Athens, for that same purpose. And whatever they had to accuse the Lacedæmonians of besides, they fully instructed Nicias in it, and sent him and his fellow-ambassadors away. When they were arrived, and had delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all, that the Athenians would make league with the Argives and those with them, unless the Lacedæmonians would give up their league with the Bœotians, if the Bœotians accepted not the peace; the Lacedæmonians refused to renounce their league with the Bœotians, (for Xenares the ephor and the rest of that faction carried it thus,) but, at the request of Nicias, they renewed their former oath; for he was afraid he should return with nothing done, and be carped at, as after also it fell out, as appearing to be the author of the Lacedæmonian treaty. At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was effected at Lacedæmon, they grew presently enraged, and thinking they were wronged, (the Argives, and their confederates, being there present, Alcibiades bringing them in,) they made a peace, and league with them, in these words:

On the refusal of the Lacedæmonians to satisfy the Athenians, the latter make an alliance with the Argives.

XLVII. "The Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, for themselves, and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an accord for one hundred years without fraud or wrong, both by sea and land.—It shall not be lawful for the Argives, nor Eleans, nor Mantineans, nor their confederates, to bear arms for the purpose of harm against the Athenians, or the confederates under the command of the Athenians; nor for the Athenians and their confederates against

the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, and their confederates, by any fraud or machination whatever. And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans make league with each other for one hundred years, on these terms.—If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, shall go to Athens to assist them according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he have spoiled the territory, be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all those cities. And it shall not be lawful for any of those cities to give over the war against this city, without the consent of all the rest.—And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives, or of the Eleans, or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come to Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, to assist them in such sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians, and also to the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, and war shall be made against it by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city, without the consent of all the rest.—There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the dominions either of themselves, or of any of the confederates under their several commands, to make war in any place whatever, nor by sea, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, their passage be allowed.—To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which sends them shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive in the city that sent for them; and the like at their going away. But if they wish to use the army for a longer time, then the city that sent for them shall find them maintenance at the rate of three oboli of Ægina a day for a man at arms, and a light-armed soldier, and a bowman, and a drachma of Ægina for a horseman.² The city which

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

² Three oboli of Ægina equalled five Attic, and the drachma of Ægina ten Attic oboli; for the talent of Ægina consisted of a hundred Attic minæ, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent, in the proportion of one hundred to sixty. For further information on this point the reader may consult Hussey on Ancient Weights and Measures. It is remarked by Dr.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

sends for the aids shall have the leading and command of them, whilst the war is in their own territory; but if it shall seem good to these cities to make an expedition in common to any place, then all the cities shall equally participate in the command.—The Athenians shall swear to the articles, both for themselves and for their confederates: and the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and the confederates of these, shall every one swear to them, city by city, and their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several cities is used, and over most perfect offerings,³ and in these words: ‘I will stand to this league, according to the articles thereof, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by any art or machination whatever.’—This oath shall be taken at Athens by the senate and the civil magistrates, and administered by the prytaneis; at Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty, and by the artynæ,⁴ and administered by the council of eighty; at Mantinea it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the senate, and by the rest of the magistrates, and administered by the theori, and by the tribunes of the soldiers; at Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the magistrates, and by the council of six hundred, and administered by the procurators of the people, and by the guardians of the law.—This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis, and to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympian games; and by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens ten days before the great Panathenæan feast.⁵—The articles of this league and peace and the oath, shall be inscribed in a pillar of stone: by the Athenians in the citadel; by the Argives in their market-place, within the precinct of the temple of Apollo; and by the Mantineans in their market-place, within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. And at the Olympian games now at hand, there shall be erected jointly by them all a

Arnold, that “it shews the democratical spirit of these states that the archer, &c. should be paid alike; and thus at Athens the seaman received as high pay as the heavy-armed soldier.” Vid. iii. 17. and vi. 31.

³ Beasts offered in sacrifice.

⁴ On these officers and the demiargi, see Müll. Dor. iii. c. 8. (vol. ii. p. 145. of English translation.)

⁵ There were both a great and little Panathenæan festival, the former taking place every fourth year, the latter annually. See Clinton’s *Fasti Hellen.*

brazen pillar in Olympia [with the same inscription].—If it shall seem good to these cities to add any thing to these articles, whatever shall be determined by them all in common council, the same shall stand good.”

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

XLVIII. Thus was the treaty and the league concluded, and that which was made before between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians was notwithstanding by neither side renounced. But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league; nay, though there was made a league before this, between them and the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, that they should wage war, or be at peace with the same parties, yet they refused to swear to it; but said that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend each other, but not to take part one with another in invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates, and inclined again to the Lacedæmonians.

The treaty between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians still continues in force.

The Corinthians refuse to join the Argive confederacy.

XLIX. This summer were celebrated the Olympic games, in which Androsthene, an Arcadian, was the first time victor in the Pancratium. And the Lacedæmonians were by the Eleans prohibited the temple there; so as they might neither sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes, amongst the rest; because they had not paid the fine to them, which (according to the Olympic law) the Eleans had pronounced against them; who laid to their charge, that they had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum, in the time of the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two thousand minæ, which was two minæ for every man of arms, according to the law. But the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither, made answer, that they had been unjustly condemned, alleging that the truce was not published in Lacedæmon when their soldiers were sent out. To this the Eleans said again, that the truce was already in existence amongst themselves, (for they used to publish it first in their own dominion,) and thereupon, whilst they remained still, and expected no such matter as in time of truce, the Lacedæmonians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedæmonians hereto replied, that it was not necessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedæmon at all, if they thought that they [the Lacedæmonians] had already wronged them, but that they [i. e. the Eleans] had done this, [i. e. proclaimed the truce,] as not considering [themselves to have

The Olympic games celebrated, from which the Lacedæmonians are excluded.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

suffered wrong,] and that after that, they [the Lacedæmonians] had no longer carried arms against them.⁶ The Eleans stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would never be persuaded but that injury had been done them; but were nevertheless contented, if they would render Lepreum, both to remit their own part of the money, and also to pay that part for them which was due to the god.

L. But when they would not listen to it, they next required this, not that they should render Lepreum unless they would, but that then they should come to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, seeing they desired to have free use of the temple, and there before the Grecians take an oath in very truth to pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the Lacedæmonians refused that also, they were excluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games, and sacrificed at home; but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted to share in the festival. Nevertheless, the Eleans fearing they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a guard there of their younger men in arms, to whom were added Argives and Mantineans, of either city one thousand, and certain Athenian horsemen who were then at Argos, waiting the celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the assembly, lest the Lacedæmonians should come on them with an army; and the rather, because

Lichas, a Lacedæmonian, whipped on the course.

Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, had received some blows from the staff-bearers on the course, for that when his chariot had got the prize, after proclamation made that the chariot of the Bœotian state had won it, (because he himself was not admitted to the contest,) he came forth to the race, and crowned his charioteer to make known that the chariot was his own; this added much to their fear, and they verily expected some disturbance to follow. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians stirred not, and their feast thus passed over. After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians into their league, and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors chanced to be there also; and after much conference and nothing concluded, on occasion of an earthquake, they broke off the conference, and returned every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.⁷

The Argives try to persuade the Corinthians to join their alliance. The negotiation is cut short by an earthquake.

⁶ This interpretation is given by Goeller, whom Dr. Arnold also follows.

⁷ It is not to be supposed from this, that the Olympic festival took place

LI. The next winter, the men of Heraclea, in Trachis, fought a battle against the Ænians,⁸ Dolopians, Melieans, and certain Thessalians. For these nations being neighbours were enemies to this city, as built to the prejudice of their territory in particular, and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could, and also in this battle overcame them, and slew Xenares the son of Cnidis, a Lacedæmonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

Year 12.
A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1.

WINTER.
The Heracleots defeated.

YEAR XIII. A. C. 419. OLYMP. 90. 2.

LII. In the very beginning of the next summer, the Bœotians took Heraclea, miserably afflicted after the battle, into their own hands, and sent Hegesippidas, a Lacedæmonian, out of it, for his evil government. They took it, because they feared, lest whilst the Lacedæmonians were troubled about the matters of Peloponnesus, it should have been taken by the Athenians. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians were offended with them. The same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being a general of the Athenians, the Argives and their confederates acting in accordance with him, went to Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men at arms, and archers of Athens, and some of the confederates whom he took up thence, as he passed through the country with his army, both settled all such affairs by the way concerning the league, as was fit; and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to carry their walls down to the sea side, and purposed to raise another fortification himself at Rhium, in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and hindered him.⁹

SUMMER.
The Bœotians occupy Heraclea, which displeases the Lacedæmonians.

Alcibiades goes into Peloponnesus with a few troops.

He intends to build a wall at the Achæan Rhium, but is prevented by the Corinthians and Sicyonians.

LIII. The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives: the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in con-

The Argives prepare to invade Epidaurus,

at the end of the summer; Thucydides merely adds, that "the summer ended," because nothing further of any consequence occurred.

⁸ Æenia, a city in the bay of Thermæ, opposite to Pydnæ, and one hundred and twenty furlongs from Thessalonica. See Herod. vii. 123. Livy, xliv. 10.

⁹ This project aimed at no less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all its navigation through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already entire masters of the sea on the other side of the isthmus.

Year 13.
A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 2.

under pre-
tence of its
not having
furnished
a victim,
as it was
bound, for
Apollo
Pythius.

The Lacedæ-
monians march
to Leuctra,
but retire
on finding
the victims
not propi-
tious.
The Ar-
gives in-
vade Epi-
dauria
during the
sacred
month
(Car-
neius) and
ravage the
country.
The allies
of the Epi-
daurians
decline
to assist
them.

A congress
is held at

sideration of their pastures,¹ to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it; the Argives being the principal masters of the temple. But Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined, if they could, to take in the city, even without this ground of complaint at all, both that the Corinthians might not stir, and also that they might bring the Athenian succours from Ægina into those parts a nearer way than by compassing the promontory of Scyllæum. And therefore the Argives prepared, as about themselves to exact the sacrifice by invasion.

LIV. About the same time also the Lacedæmonians, with their whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory, towards Lycæum, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus their king. No man knew whither they were making the expedition; no, not the cities themselves out of which they were levied. But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage [of the border,] the tokens observed were unlucky, they themselves went home again, and sent word about to their confederates to prepare themselves to be again on the march after the next month, (it being now the month Carneius,² a festival of the Dorians.) The Argives, on their retreat, having set forth on the 26th day of the month Carneius, and marching³ during this, the same day, all the time continued invading and wasting Epidauria. And the Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them, whereof some excused themselves on account of the month, and others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and there stayed quiet.

LV. Whilst the Argives were in Epidaurus, embassies from

¹ On the word *βοταμιων*, I cannot do better than quote an extract from Goeller's note: "At quid tandem *ὑπερ βοταμιων* erit? Vertunt 'pascuorum nomine,' quanquam nullius auctoritate." The words by Dr. Arnold, also, are considered as perfectly inexplicable, and therefore the reading *ὑπερ παραποταμιων* is to be preferred; which, unless some further word, such as *χωριων*, is to be understood, must be rendered, "for the people by the river side."

² Their holy month, in which they kept a feast to Apollo. This festival was observed by most cities of Greece, but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the 13th of the month Carneius, and lasted nine days. Apollo was called Carneus, *ὅτι καιρομενος ὀραται νεος*. It was the same month as the Athenian Metageitnion, viz. August. For further information, see Müll. Dor. book ii. c. 8. vol. i. p. 374, of Engl. transl. of 1830.

³ This interpretation is preferred by Goeller, Arnold, and others, to that of "spending the day in celebration of the festival."

the cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantinea, where, in a conference amongst them, Euphamidas, of Corinth, said, that their actions agreed not with their words, forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians, with their confederates and the Argives, stood armed in the mean time against each other in order of battle. That it was therefore fit that somebody should go first to the armies from either side, and disband them, and then come again and dispute of peace. This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives from Epidauria. And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for all that agree; and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria. The Lacedæmonians also drew forth their army to Caryæ; but then again their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind, they returned. And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They had the assistance of one thousand men at arms of Athens, and Alcibiades their commander; but these hearing that the Lacedæmonians were returned from their expedition,⁴ and seeing now that there was no longer need of them, departed: and so passed the summer.

LVI. The next winter, the Lacedæmonians, escaping the notice of the Athenians, put three hundred garrison soldiers, under the command of Agesippidas, into Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives came to the Athenians, and expostulated with them, that whereas it was written in the articles of the treaty, that they should allow no enemy to pass through either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea; and said, they should be wronged unless the Athenians also would again transport the Messenians and Helots into Pylos against the Lacedæmonians. And the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote on the Laconian pillar,⁵ [under the inscription of the peace,] that the Lacedæmonians had not remained true to their oaths; and they transported the Helots out of Cranii,⁶ and put them again into Pylos, to infest the territory with carrying off plunder, but did

Year 13.
A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 2.

Mantinea, without any satisfactory result.

The Athenians withdraw the Argives from Epidauria.

A second congress held without settling any thing.

Epidauria again invaded by the Argives.

The Athenians send one thousand men under Alcibiades to oppose the Lacedæmonians, but the latter do not cross the frontier.

WINTER. The Lacedæmonians introduce secretly a garrison into Epidauria.

The Athenians replace the Helots in Pylos.

⁴ Such is the sense given by Dr. Arnold and Mr. Bloomfield, one apparently preferable to that of Goeller, "profectos esse ad bellicam expeditionem."

⁵ Which was erected for the articles of the peace to be written on.

⁶ In Cephallenia, where they had before placed them.

Year 13.
A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 2.

The Ar-
gives make
an unsuc-
cessful
attempt to
storm Epi-
daurus.

no more. All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle, but only ambushes and inroads, wherein were slain some on both sides such as it chanced. But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the war, thinking to have won it by assault, but returned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter, and the thirteenth year of this war.

YEAR XIV. A. C. 418. OLYMP. 90. 3.

SUMMER.
The Lacedæ-
monians under
Agis
march
against the
Argives.

LVII. In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedæmonians seeing that the Epidaurians, their confederates, were distressed, and that of the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted, and others were but on bad terms, and apprehending that if they prevented it not quickly, the mischief would spread still further, put themselves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their Helots, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. The Tegeates went also with them, and the rest of Arcadia, all that were in the Lacedæmonian league. But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were met together at Phlius. That is to say, of the Bœotians five thousand men at arms, and as many light-armed, five hundred horse, and an equal number of hamippi.⁷ Of Corinthians, two thousand men at arms; and of the rest, as each could send their contingent. But the Phliasians, because the army was assembled in their own territory, with their whole power.

Most of
their allies
wait for
them at
Phlius.

The Ar-
gives take
the field
against
them.

LVIII. The Argives having perceived, both at first the preparation of the Lacedæmonians, and afterward their marching on with a wish to join with the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates, and three thousand men at arms of the Eleans; and marching forward, meet the Lacedæmonians⁸ at Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seizing

⁷ "Foot-soldiers interspersed among the cavalry, armed with missiles, mentioned in Xenoph. Hell. vii. 5. §. 23; probably the same sort of troops called by Herod. vii. 158, ἰπποδρομοὶ ψιλοὶ. Their use is described in Cæsar. Bell. Gall. i. 48.—Arnold.

⁸ The Lacedæmonians, Tegeates, and some Arcadians, not the whole league, which was not yet united.

on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedæmonians, whilst they were single; but Agis dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the confederates, having escaped their observation. On knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning proceeded first upon Argos, and afterwards to the road of Nemea, by which they thought the Lacedæmonians and their confederates would come down. But Agis turned not the way which they expected, but having sent word to the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass, and came down to the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, marched another precipitous way; only the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to come down by the way towards Nemea, in which the Argives were encamped; that if the Argives should advance into the plain against the Lacedæmonians, these might set upon them at the back and make use of their horse. Thus having arranged his forces, Agis entered the plains, and spoiled Saminthos and some other [towns].

LIX. Which when the Argives understood, they came out of Nemea somewhat after break of day to oppose them, and lighting upon the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many. The Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians marched forward, as had been ordered them, toward Nemea, and found not the Argives still there, for coming down and seeing their country wasted, they put themselves into order of battle; and the Lacedæmonians on the other side did the same; and the Argives were intercepted in the midst of their enemies. For from the plain, the Lacedæmonians and those with them hemmed them in from the city, and above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and towards Nemea were the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had none present, for the Athenians alone, of all their confederates, were not yet come. Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates, did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was, but rather that the battle would be on advantageous terms, and that they had cut off the Lacedæmonians, not only in their own territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of Argos—Thrasyllus,

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.
Agis encamps at Methydrium, whence he privately decamps by night, and joins his allies at Phlius. The Argives occupy the road to Nemea in order to intercept him.
Agis comes into the plain of Argos by another road.
The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians proceed also by another road.
The Bœotians and Megareans descend by the road to Nemea, in order to attack the Argives in the rear.
Agis ravages Saminthos.
The Argives advance from Nemea, and engage the Phliasians and Corinthians.
The Argives and Lacedæmonians are drawn up in order of battle.
The Ar-

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

gives are enclosed by the enemy on every side. Thrasyllus and Alciphron (Argives) propose on their own authority terms of peace to Agis, who grants them a truce for four months, and draws off his army.

The Lacedæmonians murmur at him for thus evacuating the enemy's country.

The Argives are also dis-

one of the five commanders of the army, Alciphron, public-host of the Lacedæmonians—when the armies were all but ready to join, went to Agis, and negotiated with him to have the battle put off, forasmuch as the Argives were content and ready, both to give and accept of just and equal arbitration in whatever the Lacedæmonians should charge them with, and for the future to have peace with them by making a treaty.

LX. This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the generality; and Agis of himself likewise accepting their proposition, without either himself deliberating with the major part, and having communicated it only to some one of those who had gone on the expedition with him and were in command,⁹ made truce with them for four months; in which they were to perform the things agreed on betwixt them. And then directly he withdrew his army, without giving account to any of the rest of the confederates why he did so. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates followed Agis, according to the law, he being their general, but amongst themselves blamed him exceedingly, for that when there was a very fair occasion to fight, the Argives being enclosed on all sides, both by their horse and foot, they yet went their way, doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made. For this was in very truth the fairest army of the Grecians that ever had come together to this day; but it was most to be seen when they were all together¹ in Nemea; in which army the Lacedæmonians were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pel-lenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and these all chosen men of their several cities, and such as appeared a match not only for the league of the Argives, but for such another added to it. The army thus holding Agis in blame, departed, and were disbanded, every man to his home. The Argives much more blamed those of their city, who, without the consent of the

⁹ These Dr. Arnold considers to be the polemarchs, two of the ephors, (vid. Herod. ix. c. 76.) three *δμοιοι*, or equals, and the two *pythii*, (Herod. vi. 57.) Others also appeared to have belonged to the immediate council of the king, as the *συμφορεις*, (Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4. §. 14.) and the thirty, on which point see Müller. Dor. book iii. c. 12. (vol. ii. p. 255. of Engl. transl.)

¹ That is, going home; for till then they were never all together in Nemea.

multitude, had made the truce, they also supposing that the Lacedæmonians had escaped their hands, when they had such an advantage as they never had before; in that the battle was to have been fought under their city walls, and with the assistance of many and good confederates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrus,² (the place where they are wont to judge the causes that arise from a military expedition, before the soldiers enter the city,) but he flying to the altar saves himself, nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

LXI. After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men at arms, and three hundred horse, under the conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they still shrank for all this to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians) told them to be gone again; and though they desired to treat, would not present them to the people till such time as the Mantineans and Eleans (who were not yet gone) forced them to it by their importunity. Then the Athenians, Alcibiades being present as ambassador there, spake to the Argives and their confederates, saying, that the truce could not have been duly made without the assent of the rest of their confederates, and that now (for they were come in good time) they ought to fall again to the war; and did by their words so prevail with their confederates, that they all, save the Argives, immediately marched against Orchomenus,³ of Arcadia. And these, though they were left behind at first, being persuaded so to do,⁴ yet afterwards they also went. And sitting down at Orchomenus, jointly besieged and assaulted the same; desiring that it should belong to them, as well for other causes, as chiefly because hostages from Arcadia were there kept in custody by the Lacedæmonians. The Orchomenians fearing the weakness of their walls, and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief could arrive, as no one came to their aid, yielded up the town on condition of being received into the league; to give hostages for themselves to the Mantineans, and to surrender the hostages laid up in charge there by the Lacedæmonians.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.
pleased,
and stone
Thrasyllus, who
narrowly
escapes
death.

An Athenian force arrives at Argos under the command of Laches and Nicostratus.

Alcibiades prevails on the allies to march against Orchomenus.

The Argives at first refuse, but afterwards join the expedition.

Orchomenus surrenders.

² That is, in the dry bed of the Charadrus, a mere winter torrent which flows close under the walls of Argos, now called the "Rema."—*Arnold*.

³ There was another Orchomenus in Beotia.

⁴ As Mr. Bloomfield explains, "by the rulers and supporters of the aristocratical party just mentioned."

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

It is re-
solved to
march
next
against
Tegea.

The Ele-
ans quit
the army
in disgust.

The Lacedæ-
monians, angry
at the con-
duct of
Agis, re-
solve to
demolish
his house
and fine
him;

but are
prevailed
on to sus-
pend their
sentence.

They ap-
point a
council of
ten to con-
trol the
king in
war.

The Lacedæ-
monians are
summoned
to Tegea.

They
march to
Oresteum,
and thence
to Tegea,

LXII. The confederates after this, having already got Orchomenus, sat in council about what town of the rest they should proceed against next. The Eleans gave advice to go against Lepreum,⁵ but the Mantineans against Tegea. And the Argives and Athenians gave their vote to the Mantineans. But the Eleans taking it in evil part that they had not voted to go against Lepreum, went homewards; but the rest prepared themselves at Mantinea to go against Tegea, and some also of the Tegeans within the city had a purpose to put it into their hands.

LXIII. The Lacedæmonians, after their return from Argos, having made the four months' truce, severely blamed Agis, for that upon so fair an opportunity, as they deemed they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the state; for so many and so good confederates it would be hard to find together again at one time. But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was their indignation much greater, and they resolved directly, contrary to their own custom, under the influence of passion, to raze his house, and fine him in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmas.⁶ But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet; and promised that leading out the army again, he would by some valiant action cancel those accusations; or if not, they might then proceed to do whatever they thought good. So they forbore both the fine and the razing of his house; but enacted a law at that very time, such as had never been before among them; for they elected ten Spartans to be joined with him as counsellors, without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army from the city into the field. In the mean time came news from their side in Tegea, that unless they came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and their confederates; and that they wanted little of being revolted already.

LXIV. Upon this, speedy assistance is brought by the Lacedæmonians, with their whole force, both of themselves and their Helots, and such as had never been before brought by them.

⁵ As being in particular hostility with it.

⁶ On this, vid. Müll. Dor. book iii. c. 6. (vol. ii. p. 110. Engl. transl.) who considers these to have been Æginetan drachmas, and therefore about five thousand eight hundred pounds of our money, reckoning the Æginetan drachma equal to about fourteen pence.

And they marched to Orestheium in Mænalia, and first sent word to the Arcadians, such as were of their league, to assemble and follow their steps close to Tegea; and they themselves being come entire to Orestheium, thence sent back the sixth part of their army, in which was both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of matters at home, with the rest come to Tegea, and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia. They send also to Corinth, and to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, to come with their aids with all speed to Mantinea. But to these the message was sent at a short warning;⁷ nor was it easy for them, unless they came all together, and stayed for one another, to come through the enemies' country, which lay between, and barred them from the passage. Nevertheless, they made what haste they could. And the Lacedæmonians, taking with them their Arcadian confederates present, made an inroad into the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

where they are joined by their Arcadian allies.

They send notice to the Corinthians, Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, to join them.

The Lacedæmonians make an irruption into Mantinea.

LXV. The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they saw them, seized a certain place fortified by nature, and of hard access, and put themselves in battle array. And the Lacedæmonians at once marched towards them, and came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the elder men of the army⁸ cried out to Agis, seeing they were advancing against a place of strength, that he was intending to amend one fault with another; signifying that he desired to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was blamed for, with his now unseasonable forwardness. But he, whether it were on that exclamation, or from some other sudden apprehension of his own different from that,⁹ presently withdrew his army before the fight began, and having come to the territory of Tegea, turned [the course of] the water into the territory of Mantinea; touching which water, because into what part soever it had its course it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeates were at war. Now his wish was, by the turning of

The Argives are prepared to receive them; but the Lacedæmonians retreat, and divert a water-course upon the Mantinean lands.

⁷ At ὀλιγῶν subaud. χρόνου.—*Bloomfield*.

⁸ Τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις, "one of the council appointed to advise him, or one of the elder officers of the army."—*Mitford*.

⁹ The words, ἢ κατὰ το αὐτό, are referred by Dr. *Arnold* to "the original plans" of Agis, and not to the advice given him by the counsellor; and this interpretation, perhaps, will appear preferable.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

that water, to make those Argives and their confederates who kept the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose them,¹ that so they might fight with them in the plain. And by the time he had stayed about the water a day, he had diverted the stream: but the Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them, and knew not what to conjecture; but when after the retreat they were lost sight² of, and that they themselves remained still on the place, and did not pursue them, then began they anew to accuse their commanders; both for suffering the Lacedæmonians to depart formerly, when they had them enclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos; and now again for not pursuing them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves at their leisure, and betraying the army. The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat, but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain, encamped, as about to go against the enemy.

The Argives descend into the plain, and form in order of battle.

The Lacedæmonians also form as rapidly as possible.

LXVI. The next day, the Argives and their confederates put themselves into such order as, if they fell in with their enemies, they meant to fight in, and the Lacedæmonians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, and to the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceive the enemies to be all of them already in order of battle hard by them, and come down from the hill. Certainly the Lacedæmonians were more startled at this time than ever they had been to their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare themselves was exceeding short, and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his own rank; Agis the king commanding all, according to the law. For whilst the king³ has the army in the field, all things are commanded by him, and he signifies what is to be done to the polemarchi, they to the lochagi, these to the pentecontateres, and these again to the enomatarechi, who lastly make it known every one to his own

¹ This sentence Dr. Arnold explains, "He wished to bring down the enemy from the hill by (or 'in') their resisting the turning of the water."

² The Scholiast supplies *ἐαυτους*, while Goeller prefers understanding *αὐτους*, i. e. the Argives; rendering, "e conspectu eorum evaserunt," and compares Virg. *Æn.* iii. 291. "Pluacum abscondimus arces."

³ On the power of the Spartan kings when in command of the army, vid. Müll. Dor. book iii. c. 6. (vol. ii. p. 108. Engl. transl.)

enomotia.⁴ In this manner, when they would have any thing to be done, their commands pass through the army, and are quickly executed; for almost all the Lacedæmonian army, save a very few, are captains of captains, and the care of what is to be put in execution lies upon many.

Year 14.
A.C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

LXVII. Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritæ,⁵ who amongst the Lacedæmonians have ever alone that place by themselves: next to these were placed the Brasidean soldiers, lately come out of Thrace; and with them those that had been newly made free.⁶ After them, in order stood the rest of the Lacedæmonians, band after band; and by them of the Arcadians, first the Heræans, after these the Mænaliens, in the right wing the Tegeates,⁷ and a few Lacedæmonians in the extremity of it, and on either wing the horsemen. So stood the Lacedæmonians; opposite to them in the right wing stood the Mantineans, because the action took place on their own territory, and near them such Arcadians as were of their league; then the thousand chosen Argives, to whom the city had for a long time supplied training in matters of war at the public charge; and next to them the rest of the Argives, and after these the Cleonæans and Orneates, their confederates; and lastly, the Athenians, with their own horsemen, had the left wing.

LXVIII. This was the order and preparation of both the armies, but the army of the Lacedæmonians appeared to be the greater.⁸ But the exact number, either of the particular forces of either side, or in general, I could not exactly write; for the number of the Lacedæmonians, owing to the secrecy of that state, was unknown; and of the other side, because of the ostentation usual with all men touching the number of themselves, was disbelieved. Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedæ-

⁴ On the Spartan army, &c., see Hermann's *Pol. Ant.* sect. 29.

⁵ A band of the Lacedæmonians, so called, perhaps, from Scirus, a town of Arcadia. See Müll. *Dor.* book iii. c. 12. (vol. ii. p. 258. Engl. transl.)

⁶ Vid. c. 34, and note there.

⁷ Comp. Herod. ix. 26. where the Tegeans claim this post, before the battle of Plateæ.

⁸ From these words, Mr. Thirlwall (iii. p. 349) conjectures, that Thucydides was, perhaps, himself an eye-witness of the engagement; but as the same minute description occurs of the last naval battle in Sicily, where he could hardly have been present, it would appear more probable that he derived his information in both cases from those that were themselves eye-witnesses.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

dæmonians that then was there, one may see from a calculation of this kind. Besides the Sciritæ, who were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments; in every regiment were four companies,⁹ in each company were four enomotia, and of every enomotia there fought in the first line four; but they were not ranged all alike in depth, but as the captain of each band thought it necessary. But the army in general was so ordered, as to be eight men in depth, and the first rank along the whole length of the line, besides the Sciritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight soldiers.

The commanders address their troops.

LXIX. Now when they were ready to close, the commanders made exhortations of the following nature, every one to those that were under his own command. To the Mantineans it was said, that they were to fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude, that the former might not be taken from them after they had tasted it, and that they might not again taste of the latter.—The Argives were admonished that they were to fight for their ancient leading power, and that they should not now suffer themselves to be deprived for ever of the equal share of command they once had in Peloponnesus;¹ and that, moreover, they should now revenge themselves, in return for many injuries, on men who were their enemies and neighbours.—To the Athenians it was remembered, how honourable a thing it would be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior to none of them; and that if they once vanquished the Lacedæmonians in Pello-

⁹ Πεντηκοστὺες, companies of fifty, but more or less in them as occasion served; of these the ἐνωμοτία was the fourth part. By this account, every ἐνωμοτία had thirty-two, every πεντηκοστὺς one hundred and twenty-eight, every band or λοχὸς five hundred and twelve, the whole army besides the Sciritæ three thousand five hundred and eighty-four, and with the Sciritæ, who are six hundred, four thousand one hundred and eighty-four; to these Müller adds the three hundred picked men about the king, about four hundred cavalry in both wings, (iv. 55.) the reserve to guard the baggage, and those at the extremity of the right wing, about five hundred. Thus there would be four thousand seven hundred and eighty-four hoplites, (excluding the Sciritæ, and with them five thousand three hundred and eighty-four.) A sixth of the army had been sent back, which, if added, would make five thousand seven hundred and forty men, without the Sciritæ, whom Müller does not count. See, for further information, Dor. book iii. c. 12. (vol. ii. p. 248. Engl. transl.)

¹ See Herod. book vii. c. 148, 149. The ἡγεμονία refers, as Dr. Arnold remarks, to the mythical times of the Pelopidæ.

ponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured, and the larger by it, and that no other would invade their territory hereafter. Such exhortations were given to the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedæmonians, both by themselves individually, and also with their warlike strains, made exhortation amongst themselves, being valiant men, to remember what they already knew, as being well acquainted that a long actual experience conferred more to their safety than any short verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered.

LXX. After this followed the conflict, the Argives and their confederates marching to the charge with great violence and fury; but the Lacedæmonians slowly, and guided in their time by many flute-players, appointed there, according to their military discipline, not for the sake of religion, but that marching evenly, and by measure, their ranks might not be separated, as great armies, when they march against the enemy, are wont to be.²

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

Both
armies
advance
to the
charge.

LXXI. Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis the king planned a manœuvre of this kind. All armies do thus: in coming up to the charge, they are extended rather towards their right wing, and both sides with the right outstretch the flank of the left wing of the enemy; and this happens because every one through fear seeks all he can to cover his unarmed side with the shield of him that stands next him on his right hand, conceiving that the closeness of the closing of the ranks is the best sheltering. The beginning hereof is in the leader of the first file on the right hand, who ever striving to withdraw his unarmed side from the enemy, the rest from the like fear follow after. And at this time the Mantineans in the right wing had far encompassed the Sciritæ; and the Lacedæmonians on the other side, and the Tegeates, were come yet further round the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and considering the Mantineans to outstretch him too much, signified to the Sciritæ and Brasideans to move out away from them, [i. e. the Lacedæmonians,] and to equalize their left wing to the right wing of the Mantineans, and into this void space he commanded to come up Hippo-

Agis at-
tempts to
execute
a man-
œuvre,
which
being
frustrated
by the
tardiness
of Hippo-
noides and
Aristocles,

² Milton, in his *Paradise Lost*, book i. 578, has made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn his own poetry. On the flute-players, see Müll. Dor. book iv. c. 6. (vol. ii. p. 346. Engl. transl.)

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

noidas and Aristocles, two colonels, with their bands out of their right wing, and to fall in there, and fill up the breach; conceiving that more than enough would be still remaining in their right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger.

his left
wing is
routed.

LXXII. But it happened (since he commanded it in the very onset, and on the sudden) both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas were not willing to go to the place commanded, for which charge they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice, and that the enemy were beforehand with their charge; and when, since the bands did not come up to the Sciritæ, he ordered them [i. e. the Sciritæ] again to join them [i. e. the Lacedæmonians], [he found]³ that they could no more reunite themselves, nor close again the empty space. But the Lacedæmonians, though they had the worst at this time in every point, for skill, yet in valour they manifestly shewed themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, the right wing of the Mantineans put to flight the Sciritæ and Brasideans; and the Mantineans, together with their confederates, and those one thousand chosen men of Argos, falling on them by the breach, not yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedæmonians, and, encircling them, put to flight and pushed them to their carriages, slaying also certain of the elder men left there for a guard, so as in this part the Lacedæmonians were worsted. But with the rest of the army, and especially the middle part, where king Agis was himself, and those who are called⁴ the three hundred horsemen about him, they charged the eldest of the Argives, and those named the five cohorts, and the Cleonæans and Orneates, and the Athenians arranged next them, and put them all to flight, the greater part of them never waiting to strike a stroke, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians charged, directly giving ground, and some, for fear to be overtaken, being trodden under foot.

With his
right wing
Agis out-
flanks and
takes the
Athenians
in rear.

LXXIII. As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground, they began also to break on either side, and the right wing of the Lacedæmonians

³ In this passage, with a slight variation, I have followed the construction given by Dr. Arnold.

⁴ Being really foot; probably at first chiefs who fought in chariots, this being the early sense of *ἵππευς* and *ἵπποτης*, as we find from Homer.—*Arnold.*

and Tegeates had now with their surplus of number hemmed in the Athenians, so as they had the danger on all hands, being within the circle, penned up; and without it, already vanquished. And they had been the most distressed part of all the army had not their horsemen, who were there with them, been of assistance to them. And it fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing of his own army to be in difficulty, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans, and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go to relieve the part overcome. By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as together with them were worsted, whilst the army passed by and bore away from them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Mantineans with their confederates, and those chosen Argives, had no more mind now of pressing their enemies, but seeing their side overcome, and the Lacedæmonians approaching them, turned their backs. Of the Mantineans a great part was slain, but of those chosen Argives, the most were saved, the flight and going off being neither hasty nor long. For the Lacedæmonians fight long and constantly, till they have made the enemy turn his back, but that done, they follow him not far.

Year 14.
A.C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

He then moves to the succour of his left.

The Argive army is completely routed.

LXXIV. Of such a nature, and as nearly as possible in this way, was the battle, the greatest that had been for a long time between Grecians, and contested by the most famous cities. The Lacedæmonians advancing their line⁵ before the enemies' dead, forthwith erected a trophy, and spoiled their dead bodies; and their own dead they took up, and carried to Tegea, where they were also buried, and delivered to the enemy theirs, under truce. Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonæans, were slain seven hundred; of the Mantineans two hundred; and of the Athenians with the Æginetæ,⁶ two hundred, and both the captains. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians were never so distressed that any number worth mentioning perished; and of the Lacedæmonians themselves it is hard to know the certainty, but they were said to have died to about the number of three hundred.

Number of the slain.

⁵ I have preferred this sense to that given by Mr. Bloomfield, "publicly piling the arms of the enemies' dead," inasmuch as directly afterwards he says, "that they spoiled the dead."

⁶ That is, "the Athenian settlers in Ægina, sent there in the first year of the war." Vid. ii. 27. and vii. 57.—Arnold.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

Pleistoanax, who was advancing to the aid of Agis, returns on hearing of his victory. The Lacedæmonians dismiss their allies, and themselves return home.

Three thousand Eleans and a fresh reinforcement of one thousand Athenians come to the aid of the Argives, and circumvallate Epidaurus.

WINTER. The Lacedæmonians march to Tegea, where they send Lichas with proposals of peace to Argos, which are accepted.

LXXXV. When the battle was going to take place, Pleistoanax, the other king of the Lacedæmonians, having with him both the too old and too young [for legal military service], came out of the city to have aided the army; and he came forth as far as Tegea,⁷ but having heard of the victory, returned. And the Lacedæmonians sending out, turned back their confederates coming from Corinth, and from without the isthmus; and then they also went home themselves, and, having dismissed their confederates, (for now happened the Carneian festival,⁸) celebrated that feast. Thus by this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the Grecians, for they had been taxed both with cowardice, for the blow they received in the island, and with imprudence and slackness in other occasions; but after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, and for their minds, they were esteemed to have been ever the same they had been. The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being deserted, and, whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend it. Also three thousand men of Elis, and a thousand Athenians, besides those who had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid the Mantineans, all the allies directly marched to Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians were celebrating the Carneian festival: and assigning to every one his part, began to enclose the city with a wall, but the rest gave over; only the Athenians quickly finished the fortification of the point, whereon stood the temple of Juno, as they had been set. In it, from amongst them all, they left a garrison, and went home every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

LXXXVI. In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedæmonians, directly after they had kept the Carneian festival, drew out their army into the field, and having come to Tegea, sent certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There were before this time many citizens in Argos well affected to the Lacedæmonians, and who desired the deposing of the Argive popular government, and now after the battle, they were better able by much to persuade the generality to come to

⁷ A decree was passed at Sparta, that both kings should not be absent at the same time. Herod. v. 75.

⁸ For information on this, as well as on the other Doric festivals, the reader may consult Müller's Dor. vol. i. p. 373. (book ii. c. 8.)

an agreement than they formerly were. And their design was first to get a treaty made with the Lacedæmonians, and after that a league, and then at last to set upon the commons. There comes thither Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, entertainer of the Argives in Lacedæmon, and brought to Argos two propositions; one of war,⁹ if the war were to proceed; another of peace, if they would have peace. And after much disputing, (for Alcibiades also happened to be there,) the Lacedæmonian faction, who now openly dared to do it, prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace, which was this.

LXXVII. "It seems good to the council of the Lacedæmonians to come to an agreement with the Argives according to these articles:—the Argives shall re-deliver to the Orchomenians their children,¹ and to the Mænalians their men,² and to the Lacedæmonians those men³ that are at Mantinea.—They shall withdraw from Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there. And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus likewise, they shall be held as enemies both to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and also to the confederates of them both.—If the Lacedæmonians have any children of theirs in custody, they shall deliver them every one to his own city.—And for so much as concerns the offering of the god,⁴ they wished that the Epidaurians should take an oath,⁵ and that they themselves [the Lacedæmonians] would give it them to swear.⁶—All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free, according to their country's laws.—If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the Argives shall come

⁹ Goeller explains this expression thus, "Post καθ' ὅτι et ὅς, intelligendum est ἔσται, quemadmodum, si bellum mallent, futurum esset," &c.

¹ Hostages which they took of the Orchomenians.

² Hostages of the Mænalians.

³ Hostages of the Arcadians given to the Lacedæmonians, and by them kept in Orchomenus, and at the taking of Orchomenus by the Argive league, carried away to Mantinea.

⁴ Apollo, to whom the Epidaurians should have sent a beast for sacrifice, in name of their pastures, but not doing it, the Argives went about to force them to it.

⁵ An oath to send the beast for sacrifice hereafter.

⁶ It may not be useless to throw out the peculiarities of the Doric dialect: περι δε του θεου θυματος είναι λαμβανειν—διδοναι δε. Others suppose, that λην signifies θελειν, and according to this I have rendered it in the text. On this very obscure passage, the reader will do well to remark the conjecture adduced by Dr. Arnold, and his interpretation.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought most proper.—The confederates of the Lacedæmonians without Peloponnesus, shall have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and of the Lacedæmonians have, every one holding his own.—This composition is to hold good when they shall both have shewn the same to their confederates, and obtained their consent.—And if it shall seem good to the confederates to add or alter any thing, they shall send [messengers] home [for instructions].”

The Lacedæmonians draw off their army from Tegea, and soon afterwards make terms of alliance with the Argives.

LXXVIII. These propositions the Argives accepted at first, and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned from Tegea to their own home. But shortly after, when they had intercourse together, the same men⁷ again so managed, that the Argives, relinquishing their league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedæmonians in this form.

LXXIX. “It seems good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty years, on these articles:—That either side shall allow the other equal and like trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.—That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus do share in this league and alliance, being free both from the laws and jurisdiction of any other city than their own,⁸ holding their own land, and affording equal and like trials of judgment, according to the form used in their several cities.—That all of the cities, confederates with the Lacedæmonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the Lacedæmonians, and the confederates of the Argives in the same with the Argives, every one holding his own land.—That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be undertaken in common, the Lacedæmonians and the Argives shall consult thereof, and decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates; and that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, that it should be decided by legal means.⁹—That if any con-

⁷ The Lacedæmonian faction.

⁸ Or, as Mr. Bloomfield renders, “independent, and states in their own right.”

⁹ Or it may mean, “that it should be decided by them,” i. e. the Lacedæmonians and Argives; which Mr. Bloomfield prefers.

federate city be at contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think most indifferent; but the citizens of each particular city shall be judged according to the law of the same."

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

LXXX. Thus was the peace and league concluded, and whatever one had taken from another in the war, or had against another otherwise, they mutually put an end to. Now when they were together settling their business, they voted that the Argives should neither admit herald nor embassy from the Athenians, till they were gone out of Peloponnesus, and had quitted their fortifications; nor should make peace or war with any, without consent of the rest. And they both conducted all other proceedings with heat, and sent ambassadors from both their cities to the towns lying towards Thrace, and to Perdiccas, whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it; because he saw the Argives had done so, (and was himself also anciently descended out of Argos:¹) they likewise renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidæans, and took others besides them. The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to abandon the fortification by Epidaurus. And the Athenians considering that the soldiers they had in it were but few, in respect of the many others that were garrisoning it with them, sent Demosthenes thither to fetch them away. He, when he was come, and had exhibited for a pretence a certain gymnastic contest without the fort, when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates, and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

The Lacedæmonians and Argives jointly send ambassadors to Perdiccas and the Chalcidæans. The Argives call on the Athenians to retire from before Epidaurus. Demosthenes by a stratagem draws out the Argive and other troops from the fort, and shuts the gates. The fort is restored to the Epidaurians. The Mantineans make peace with the Lacedæmonians.

LXXXI. After the desertion of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood it at first, being too weak without the Argives, made peace with the Lacedæmonians, and laid down their command over the other cities.² And the Lacedæmonians and Argives, with a thousand men of either city, having joined their arms, the Lacedæmonians first, with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon more to an oligarchy, and then they both together suppressed the democracy at Argos; and an oligarchy was established

One thousand Lacedæmonians put down democracy at Sicyon, and also (in conjunction with one thousand Argives) at Argos. Sicyon, and also (in con-

¹ See Herod. book viii. c. 137.

² Which they had the leading of in Arcadia. See c. 33. 58. 61. and 67. referred to by Dr. Arnold.

Year 14.
A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.
junction
with one
thousand
Argives)
at Argos.

conformable to the state of Lacedæmon.³ These things passed in the end of the winter, and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

YEAR XV. A. C. 417. OLYMP. 90. 4.

SUMMER.
The Dic-
tidians
revolt to
the Chal-
cidæans.
The de-
mocrats
at Argos
overpower
the oli-
garchical
party.

LXXXII. The next summer, the Dictidians in Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidæans, and the Lacedæmonians ordered the state of Achaia, after their own form, which before was otherwise. And the commonalty of the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled themselves and recovered heart, having watched their time when the Lacedæmonians were celebrating their exercises of the naked youth,⁴ assaulted the oligarchical party, and in a battle which took place within the city, the commons had the victory, and some they slew, others they drove into exile. But the Lacedæmonians, while those of their party in Argos sent for them, went not for a long time after, yet at last they adjourned the games, and came forth with intention to give them aid; but hearing by the way at Tegea, that the oligarchical faction was overcome, they would no longer advance, though such as had escaped thence entreated them, but returning homewards, went on with the celebration of their games. But afterwards, when there came as ambassadors to them, messengers⁵ both from the Argives in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side, they concluded at last that those in the city had done the wrong, and determined to go against Argos with their army; but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. In the meantime, the commonalty of Argos fearing the Lacedæmonians, and again bringing on the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would turn to their very great advantage, raise long walls from their city down to the sea; to the end, that if they were shut out from the land, yet, with the help of the Athenians, the importation of things necessary into the city by sea might be of aid to them. And with this

The Lacedæmoni-
ans intend
to assist
their
friends,
but are
guilty of
procrasti-
nation.

The demo-
cratic
party send
to assist
of the Athe-
nians, and
build long
walls
down to
the sea.

³ See Diod. Sic. book xii.

⁴ *Γυμνοπαιδαι*, were solemn dances at Sparta, performed by naked boys. See Herod. vi. 67. and Müll. Dor. book iv. c. 6. (vol. ii. p. 340 and 353. Engl. transl.)

⁵ For this explanation, which appears preferable to that of Goeller, who takes *ἀγγελων* for *ἀγγελλοντων*. I am indebted to Dr. Arnold.

their building, some other cities of Peloponnesus were also acquainted. And the Argives with all their people, both themselves, and wives, and servants, wrought at the wall; and workmen and hewers of stone came for them from Athens. And the summer ended.

LXXXIII. The next winter, the Lacedæmonians, when they understood that they were building the walls, came to Argos with their army, they and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, and some intrigue they had beside, within the city itself of Argos. And Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, led the army. But the intrigues which were carried on in Argos, and which appeared to have been already mature, did not as yet succeed. Nevertheless, they took the walls that were then building, and razed them to the ground; and then after they had taken Hysiaë, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home, and were disbanded every one to his own city. After this, the Argives went on an expedition into Phliasia, which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws; for there the greatest part of them dwelt. The same winter, the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia,⁶ objecting that he had sworn the league of the Argives and Lacedæmonians, and that when they had prepared to conduct an expedition, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, against the Chalcidæans towards Thrace, and against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and him; and by his departure from his intention, the expedition was principally put an end to; he was therefore an enemy. And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

YEAR XVI. A. C. 416. OLYMP. 91. 1.

LXXXIV. The next summer, Alcibiades having sailed to Argos with twenty galleys, took thence the suspected Argives, and such as seemed to favour the Lacedæmonian faction, to the number of three hundred, and put them into the nearest of the

⁶ In this corrupt passage, unless the reader adopt the conjecture of Goeller, the best resource appears to be to follow Dr. Arnold in supposing that the genitive is equivalent to ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ: so that the translation would be, "they blockaded also in Macedonia Perdiccas;" literally, "Perdiccas belonging to Macedonia."

Year 16. islands subject to the Athenian state. The Athenians made an expedition also against the isle of Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own twelve hundred men at arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback, and of their confederates and islanders about fifteen hundred men at arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians,⁷ and were unwilling to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, to the Athenians; but rested at first neutral, and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it, by wasting their land, they entered into open war.

A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1. Lacedæmonian party. The Athenians undertake an expedition against the Melians. A conference is held between the Athenian ambassadors and the Melian magistrates.

The Melians make a proposal of remaining neutral, which is rejected.

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomenes the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, being encamped on their land with these forces, before they would at all hurt the same, sent ambassadors first to hold a conference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude, but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few, and they accordingly said as follows.

LXXXV. *Ath.* Since we are not to speak to the multitude, lest, as you pretend, when they once hear from us arguments persuasive, and not submitted to proof in a continuous oration, they should chance to be seduced, (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us to audience before the few,) make surer yet that point, you that sit here; answer you also to every particular, not in one set speech, but, at once interrupting us, as regards any thing that does not appear to be said to the purpose, pass your judgment. And first answer us, whether you like this proposal or not?—Whereunto the council of the Melians answered.

LXXXVI. *Mel.* The equity of rendering each other instruction in a leisurely manner is not to be found fault with; but this preparation of war, not future, but already here present, seems not to agree with the same. For we see that you yourselves are come to be judges of all that will be said, and that the issue of it, if we be superior as far as equity goes, and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war; and if we be persuaded by you, servitude.

LXXXVII. *Ath.* Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions of what may be, or for any other purpose than

⁷ See Herod. viii. 48. and Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 3. 9. A particular account of the origin of the colony is given by Plutarch, in his book *On the Virtues of Women*.

to take counsel upon what is present, and before your eyes, how to save your city from destruction, we will give over. But if for this point, we will speak.

LXXXVIII. *Mel.* It is reasonable and pardonable for men in our cases, to turn themselves, both in their words and thoughts, towards divers things:⁸ howsoever, this assembly is convened only on the point of our safety, and let the conference be carried on, if it be your pleasure, in the manner you propose.

LXXXIX. *Ath.* We therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences, (as that having defeated the Medes, our rule is therefore lawful, or that we come against you as being injured,) make a long discourse which will not gain belief; nor would we have you expect to prevail with us by saying, either that you took not our side in war, because you were a colony of the Lacedæmonians; or that you have done us no injury; but, agreeably to what⁹ we both of us do really think, [we would have] both effect that which is feasible; both you and we knowing that, in the estimation of man, justice is then only agreed on, when the necessity is equal.¹ Whereas they that have superiority of power, effect as much as they can, and the weak yield according to such conditions as they can get.

XC. *Mel.* Well, then, (for we must, seeing you have thus laid down for our discussion, profit in the place of justice,) we hold it expedient that you should not destroy what is for the general advantage; but that reason and justice should be allowed to him who is at any time in danger, and that one should be profited who tries to persuade even somewhat within the strict line of justice.² And the same most of all concerneth you, forasmuch as you would give an example unto others

⁸ The drift of this sentence appears to be, that it was both reasonable and pardonable for the Melians to have many suspicions, and to express them also.

⁹ The meaning appears to be, "let us each effect what we can, putting forth our real sentiments."

¹ Or this may mean, and preferably, perhaps, "in the opinion of men, that justice is then only considered to exist, when the power is equal;" that is, "that the definition, or idea, of justice, necessarily supposes an equality of power;" or *κρινεται* may mean, "is considered," or, as we say, "is thought of."

² The sense appears to be, "that it is for the common good that those who are from time to time in danger, should be allowed to talk of fairness and justice; and that any one who may prove his point, though not with exact evidence, should receive benefit by it."

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

for the greatest revenge that can be taken, if you chance to miscarry.

XCI. *Ath.* As for us, though it should be brought to a close, yet we are not in dread concerning the end of our dominion, for we fear not the sequel. For not they that command others, as do the Lacedæmonians, are to be dreaded by those that are vanquished by them, (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedæmonians,) but such as having been in subjection, have assaulted those that commanded them, and got the victory. But let the hazard of that be left to ourselves. But that we are here now, both to enlarge our own dominion, and also that our present conference tends to the saving of your city, this we will make manifest; for we would have dominion over you, without oppressing you, and would have you preserved to the profit of us both.

XCII. *Mel.* But how can it be as profitable for us to serve, as it is for you to command?

XCIII. *Ath.* Because to you obedience will fall as your lot, instead of suffering the most dreadful calamities; and we not destroying you, shall reap profit by you.

XCIV. *Mel.* But will you not accept of our remaining quiet, and be your friends, (whereas before we were your enemies,) and take part with neither?

XCV. *Ath.* No: for your enmity doth not so much hurt us, as your friendship would be an open argument of our weakness; and your hatred, of our power, amongst those whom we bear rule over.

XCVI. *Mel.* Why? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most part have been your own colonies, and some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same consideration?

XCVII. *Ath.* Why not? For they think that neither of them are wanting in means of justification; but that the one party survive in liberty by means of might, and that we do not advance against them through fear. So that by your being subdued, besides the extending of our dominion over so many more subjects, you would also confirm it the more for us over those we had before, especially being masters of the sea,³ and

³ Dr. Arnold considers the grammatical construction of these words as desperate, and suggests the ellipsis of *εἰ μὴ καταγέλαιτε*; condemning the

you islanders, and weaker (except you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued already.

Year 16.
A.C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

XCVIII. *Mel.* Do you think then that there is no safety in that which we propounded? For here again, (since making us leave the plea of equity, you persuade us to submit to your profit,⁴) when we have shewed you what is good for us, we must endeavour to persuade you to the same, if it happens to turn out to be good for you also. As many, therefore, as now are neutral, what will you do but make them your enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings, they must imagine that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon them? And in this case, what else [would you do] but make greater the enemies you have already, and to bring others on you as enemies against their wills, who would not else have had even the intention of becoming so?

XCIX. *Ath.* No: for we do not think that they are more to be dreaded as enemies, who inhabiting any where in the continent, will be long ere they so much as keep guard upon their liberty against us;⁵ but islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders angered by the compulsive nature of dominion; for these especially, by most giving way⁶ to a feeling of recklessness, would put both themselves and us into evident danger.

C. *Mel.* If you then to retain your command, and your vassals to get loose from it, undergo so great a hazard, would it not, in us that are still free, be great baseness and cowardice, if we should not encounter any thing whatsoever, rather than be slaves?

CI. *Ath.* No, if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms, that you may not incur the charge of dishonour; but rather a consultation upon your safety, that you resist not such as be far your over-matches.

interpretation of Goeller, who makes the genitive *ναυκρατορων* depend on *ει μη περιγενοισθε*, which he renders "cum superiores non fueritis."

⁴ Or it may be rendered, "persuade us to keep in view," or, "to listen to your notions of profit and expediency."

⁵ Or, as Mr. Bloomfield well renders, "who will make much delay in taking measures of safeguard against us, for the preservation of their freedom." Dr. Arnold, however, renders, *τω ελευθερω*, "owing to the liberty they enjoy;" meaning, that their enjoyment of freedom would render them more careless.

⁶ On the use of this word, Dr. Arnold well compares Herod. iii. 36.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

CII. *Mel.* But we know that matters of war sometimes have results more equal than according to the difference in number of the parties. And if we yield directly, all our hope is lost; but with vigorous action, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves up.

CIII. *Ath.* Hope, that is the consolation of danger, when such indulge in it as have abundant means, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not. But to such as set all they have at risk, (for it is a thing by nature prodigal,) it at once by failing maketh itself known; and known, leaveth no place for future caution.⁷ Which let not be your own case, you that are but weak, and have no more but this one stake.⁸ Nor be you like unto many men, who, though they may still save themselves by human means, will yet, when (upon pressure of the enemy) their apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones, as divination, oracles, and other such things, which with hopes destroy men.

CIV. *Mel.* We, too, think it (you well know) a hard matter for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on equal terms. Nevertheless we believe, that in fortune we shall be nothing inferior, from having the gods on our side, because we stand innocent, against those that are not just; and for what is wanting in us of power, the Lacedæmonian league will be a supplement, which is of necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity's sake and from honour, to aid us. So that we are confident, not altogether so much without reason as you think.

CV. *Ath.* As for the favour of the gods, neither do we think that we shall fall short in it, for we neither do nor require any thing inconsistent with the belief of mankind, as far as concerns the gods, or with their [i. e. men's] method of proceeding, as far as concerns themselves. For of the gods we think according to

⁷ I have left Hobbes's version of this sentence as I found it, for it represents the text well and forcibly; more literally it would be, "its true nature is known when they fail, and when any would even yet beware of it, as having been made known, still it does not fail." Others would take *ἐλλειπει* as "leaves," which sense Goeller denies; and the reader can, if he pleases, adopt the version of a scholar of the present day, "and it leaves them no opportunity of guarding against it again when it is known," inasmuch as it ruins them so utterly.

⁸ Literally, and well rendered by Mr. Bloomfield, "who are at a single turn of the scale."

the common opinion, [that they govern]; and of the human race [we think] that it clearly, always, and from an impulse of nature, everywhere rules that over which it gets the superiority. Neither did we lay down this law, nor are we the first that use it when laid down, but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so also we use it, knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same. So that forasmuch as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedæmonians, through which you believe they will help you through a sense of honour, we congratulate you on your ignorance of the depravity of man, but not your folly. For the Lacedæmonians, though in respect of themselves, and the constitutions of their own country, they are wont for the most part to be honourable; yet in respect of others, though one might have much to say as to how they conduct themselves, yet briefly one might best express it all thus, that most openly, of all whom we know, they hold for honourable that which is agreeable, and for just that which is expedient. And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd ideas of safety.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

CVI. *Mel.* Nay, through this same opinion we most place our reliance on their interest, that they will not wish, by betraying their own colony, the Melians, thereby to become distrusted by such of the Grecians as be their friends, and beneficial to such as be their enemies.

CVII. *Ath.* You think not, then, that what is profitable must not be separated from safety, but that that which is just and honourable must be performed with danger, which commonly the Lacedæmonians are least willing of all men to undergo for others.

CVIII. *Mel.* But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us rather than for any other; and that they will think that we are more assured unto them than unto any other;⁹

⁹ I have left the text as I found it, as it agrees with the ellipsis given by Goeller, of understanding ἡμᾶς before βεβαιοτέρους, and ἐς αὐτοὺς after it; it appears preferable, however, to supply κινδύνους, as Scholfield suggests, and to render, "that they will think that the dangers undertaken for our sake are more safe, i. e. less accompanied with great peril, than those undertaken for others." Mr. Bloomfield follows yet another course, and renders, "will think to be more trusty to us than to others."

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

because for action we lie near to Peloponnesus, and for affection are more faithful than others for our nearness of kin.

CIX. *Ath.* The security of such as are to war in conjunction with each other, seems to consist not in the good will of those that call others to their aid, but whether they excel much in the power of doing aught. And this the Lacedæmonians themselves are wont to consider more than any others; and, therefore, out of diffidence of their own forces, they take many of their confederates with them when they advance against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an island.

CX. *Mel.* Yea, but they may have others to send, and the Cretan sea is wide, through which to take another, is harder for those that are masters of it, than it is for those that desire to escape notice to save themselves. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against your own territory, or those of your confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trouble yourselves no more about a territory that you have nothing to do with, but about your own and that of your confederates.

CXI. *Ath.* Of these things, indeed, one may some time or other happen to you, as you also may find by experience, and not be ignorant that the Athenians never yet retired from a single siege for fear of others. But we observe, that whereas you said you would consult for your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said any thing which men might rely on, and think to be preserved by; the strongest arguments you use being but future hopes, and your present power too short with reference to the forces already arranged against you to obtain the superiority. You will therefore display a great error in judgment, unless, after bidding us withdraw, you will come amongst yourselves to some more discreet resolution. For you will not surely turn your thoughts on that shame, which in dangers that are both foreseen and that entail disgrace, for the most part undoes men. For many, when they yet foresee into what dangers they are borne, have nevertheless been so overcome by the force of the word, that that which is but called dishonour, by the power of a seductive name, hath allured them to fall willingly into real and irretrievable calamities, and so to draw upon themselves by their own madness a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune. Which you,

if you deliberate wisely, will guard against, and not think it shame to submit to a most potent city, and one that holds out reasonable conditions, as becoming confederates, and of enjoying your own territory under tribute; and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not display a vain love of contention in a bad cause; inasmuch as those are most likely to succeed, who do not yield to their equals, and behave themselves becomingly to their superiors, and towards their inferiors use moderation. Consider of it, therefore, whilst we stand apart; and have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country, which is to be prosperous or ruined in and by this one consultation.¹

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

CXII. So the Athenians went aside from the conference; and the Melians, after they had decreed pretty nearly the very same things which before they had replied, answered them in this manner.

Mel. Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what you have heard before; nor will we in a brief space of time overthrow the liberty of a city that hath now been founded for the space of seven hundred years. But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved it hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is, of the Lacedæmonians, we will do our best to maintain ourselves in safety. But this we offer; to be your friends; enemies to neither side; and you to depart out of our land after making a treaty, such as we shall both think fit.

CXIII. Thus the Melians answered; to which the Athenians, parting now from the conference, replied thus.

Ath. You are the only men (as it seemeth to us by this consultation) that think future things more certain than things seen, and behold things doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As you have risked

¹ Dr. Arnold remarks here, that the construction appears desperate with the reading of *ἔσται*; to which, if there be any nominative at all, it seems to be the whole sentence from *ἦν μίας, κ. τ. λ.* The translation in the text, as well as that of Mr. Bloomfield, refers the *μίας περι το βουλῆς*, understood, but it would appear better and more forcible to refer it to *πατριδος*, and to render, "the success or failure of which country, as it is one, will depend also on one council." The regular construction would be, *ἦν τυχεῖν και μη κατορθωσαι ἔσται*; but if the reading of Bekker be followed, it would be necessary to understand *εἶναι* after *κατορθωσαν*, unless the reader prefers changing *ἔσται* for *ἴστε*, with Goeller.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

The Athenians besiege Melos by sea and land.

The Argives invade Phliasia, and lose eighty men.
The Athenians at Pylos commit depredations on the Lacedæmonians.

War between the Corinthians and Athenians, on account of some private quarrel.
The Melians storm a part of the Athenian fortifications.

WINTER.
The Lacedæmonians set out on an expedition against Argos, but do not cross the frontier.
The Melians obtain another slight advantage over the besiegers.

and trusted most unto the Lacedæmonians, and to fortune, and hopes, so will you be most deceived.

CXIV. And the Athenians' ambassadors retired to their camp, and the commanders, seeing that the Melians made no submission, fell directly to the war, and dividing the work among the several cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own, and of their confederates, for a guard, both by sea and land, and with the greatest part of their army went home. The rest remained and besieged the place.

CXV. About the same time, the Argives making an inroad into Phliasia, lost about eighty of their men by an ambush laid for them by the men of Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And the Athenians that lay in Pylos, fetched in thither a great booty from the Lacedæmonians; notwithstanding which the Lacedæmonians did not war on them, not even for this reason renouncing the peace, but gave leave by edict only to any of their people that would, to carry off booty reciprocally from the territory of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war on the Athenians, but it was for certain disagreements of their own, and the rest of Peloponnesus stirred not. The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians, by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market-place,² and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both corn and whatsoever other useful supplies they could, and returned and lay still. And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer ended.

CXVI. The winter following, the Lacedæmonians with their army being about to invade the territory of the Argives, when the sacrifices made on the border for their passage were not favourable, returned. And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion, in regard of this design of the Lacedæmonians, apprehended some of them, and some escaped. About the same time, the Melians again took another part of the wall of the Athenians, they that kept guard there not being many. But when this was done, there came afterwards fresh forces from Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates the son of

² The market-place in the fortifications of the Athenians, where the food was served for the use of the soldiers, not the market-place of the Melians themselves.

Demeas. And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within some that intrigued to have it given up, they came to an agreement with the Athenians, on the terms, that they should decide what they pleased concerning them; and they slew all the grown up males whom they got into their power, and made slaves of the women and children, and inhabited the place with a colony, sent thither afterwards, of five hundred men of their own.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.
A rein-
forcement
arrives
from
Athens,
and Melos
surrenders.
The Athe-
nians put
the inha-
bitants to
death.

BOOK VI.

Year 16. THE same winter, the Athenians, with greater forces than they
A. C. 416. had before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon,¹ were de-
Ol. 91. 1. sirable again to sail to Sicily, and, if they could, wholly to
WINTER. subdue it. Being for the most part ignorant both of the great-
ness of the island, and of the multitude of people, as well
Greeks as Barbarians, that inhabited the same; and that they
undertook a war not much less than the war against the Pelo-
ponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight
days' sail for a ship of burden,² and though so great, is yet
divided by no more than twenty furlongs of the sea from the
continent.³

II. It was settled in old time thus: and these were the
nations in all that held it. The most ancient inhabitants in a
part thereof are said to have been the Cyclopes and Læstry-
gones, of whose stock, and whence they came, or to what place
they removed, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice which
the poets have spoken, and which every particular man hath
learned of them.⁴ After them, the first that appear to have
settled therein, are the Sicanians, as they say themselves; nay,
before the other, as being the aborigines of the island, but, as
the truth is found to be, they were Iberians, and driven away
by the Ligyans from the banks of the river Sicanus that is in
Iberia. And the island from them then came to be called

¹ Book iii. 86. 115.

² Concerning the compass of Sicily, see Pliny iii. 8. Strabo vi. p. 266. Writers do not agree in their admeasurements of the island. Cluverius took great pains to ascertain its dimensions, and carefully perambulated it, and the result of his inquiry was, that from the promontory of Pelorus to Lilybæum was two hundred and fifty-five miles; from Lilybæum to Pachynum one hundred and ninety; from Pachynum to Pelorus one hundred and fifty-four; in all, five hundred and ninety-nine miles.

³ The channel at the straits of Messina is scarcely three miles wide.

⁴ See Homer's *Odyssey*, book ix.

Sicania, which before was called Trinacria; and these two still inhabit the western parts of Sicily. After Ilium was taken, certain Trojans, escaping the hands of the Grecians, come in ships to Sicily, and inhabiting on the borders of the Sicilians, both the nations in one were called Elymi, and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phocians, who coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Africa, and thence into Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy into Sicily, (for there they inhabited,) flying from the Opicæ, having, as is most likely, and as it is reported, watched their opportunity on the strait, and having sailed over on rafts when the wind was favourable,⁵ and perhaps also by some other means. There is also yet to this day a people in Italy, called Siculi; and Italy itself got that name after the same manner, from a king of the Siculi, called Italus.⁶ Of these a great army crossing over into Sicily, overthrew the Sicilians in battle, and drove them into the south and west parts of the same; and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called Sicilia, and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred years after their going over, and before the Grecians came thither.⁷ And still now they possess the midland, and northern parts of the island. Also the Phœnicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides, having cut off for themselves the headlands on the coast and the little islands adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phœnicians abandoned most of their former habitations, and uniting themselves, dwelt in Motya, and Soloes, and Panormus, on the borders of the Elymi: as relying on their league with the Elymi, and because also from that part Carthage lies the least distance to sail from Sicily. So many were the Barbarian nations, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

⁵ This is the sense given by Goeller; but it may also be rendered more simply, with Dr. Arnold, "a wind setting down the strait;" instead of, "setting in the direction in which the voyager desired;" and hence, "favourable."

⁶ See Virg. *Æneid*. vii. 178.

⁷ The Greeks first appear to have interfered in Sicily when Dorieus, son of Anaxandrides, king of Sparta, sailed to found Heraclea there, and perished in a battle against the Phœnicians and Egestæans, (Herod. v. 46.) The next occasion of their visiting the island, was, as far as I can recollect, when they sent an embassy to Gelon before the battle of Salamis.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

III. But of the Greeks, first a colony of Chalcidæans, under Thucles, their conductor, going from Eubœa, founded Naxos,⁸ and built the altar of Apollo Archegetes, now standing without the city, on which the ambassadors sent to the oracles, as often as they sail from Sicily, are accustomed first to offer sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the family of the Heraclidæ, carried a colony from Corinth, and became founder of Syracuse, where first he drove the Siculi out of the island,⁹ in which the inner part of the city now stands, not now environed wholly with the sea as it was then. And in process of time, the city also that is without was joined to the other with a wall, and became a populous city.¹ In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidæans, going from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the Siculi, and after that Catana; but they that went to Catana chose Euarchus for their founder.

IV. About the same time arrived in Sicily also Lamis, with a colony from Megara, and first built a certain town called Trotilus, on the river Pantacius, and after this [removing] thence, and having lived a short time with the Chalcidæans at Leontini, when he was by them thrust out, and had built Thapsus, he died; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, who gave them up the place, built Megara, called Megara-Hyblea.² And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty-five years, they were by Gelon,³ a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city and territory. But before they were driven thence, namely, one hundred years after they had founded their own city, they sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus; ⁴ this Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city, and so together with them founded Selinus. Gela was built in the

⁸ A. C. 734.

⁹ Ortygia, an island part of the city of Syracuse, joined to it by a bridge.

¹ It extended twenty-two miles and a half in circumference, and was divided into five districts, Ortygia, Acradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It fell into the hands of the Romans, under the consul Marcellus, A. C. 212. See Livy, xxiii. Polyb. viii. Cic. in Verr. iv. c. 52, 53. Neapolis was of later foundation than the time when Thucydides wrote, as also were Hexapylum and Pentapylum.

² Trotilus, Thapsus, and Hyblean Megara, about A. C. 726.—*Arnold*.

³ On whom, see Herod. vii. 156.—*Arnold*.

⁴ Selinus, A. C. 626; Gela, A. C. 688; Acragas, A. C. 580.

forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, who brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entimus, who did the like out of Crete, jointly. (This city was named after the river Gela; but the place where now the city⁵ stands, and which was first walled in, is called Lindii; and the laws which they established were the Doric.) About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of Gela founded the city of Acragas, calling the city after the river Acragas, and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, giving them the laws of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates, who came from Cumæ, the Chalcidæan city in Opicia; but afterwards there came a multitude, and shared the land with them, out of Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa; and the leaders of the colony that founded it were Perieres and Cratæmenes, one of Cumæ, the other of Chalcis. And the name was at first Zancle, so named by the Sicilians, because the city is in appearance of the form of a sickle, and the Sicilians call a sickle *zanclon*. But these inhabitants were afterwards driven thence by the Samians⁶ and other people of Ionia, that in their flight from the Medes landed in Sicily.

V. Not long after this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, and settling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead of Zancle, called the place by the name of his own country from whence he was anciently descended, Messena. After Zancle was founded Himera, by Eucleides, Simus, and Sacon; the most of which colony were Chalcidæans; but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished party in a sedition, called the Myletidæ. Their language became a mixture between the Chalcidæan and Doric; but the laws of the Chalcidæans prevailed. Acræ and Casmænæ were settled by the Syracusians;⁷ Acræ seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmænæ almost twenty after Acræ. Camarina was at first founded by the Syracusians, very near one hundred and thirty-five years after their own city was

⁵ That is, the *city* peculiarly so called; the original city, in after-times, became the citadel of the enlarged town, as Dr. Arnold explains it, referring to a similar observation on Athens, ii. 15. He remarks also, that the name was given from Lindus in Rhodes, whence Antiphemus had come. Herod. vii. 153.

⁶ On this, see Herod. vii. 164; and on Anaxilas, Herod. vi. 23.

⁷ Acræ, A. C. 663; Casmænæ, A. C. 643; Camarina, A. C. 598.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

founded, Dascon and Menecolus being the conductors of the settlers. But the Camarinæans having been by the Syracusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time, having taken of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became himself the conductor of a colony, and founded Camarina again. After this again, having been desolated by Gelon, it was colonized the third time by him.

VI. So many were the nations, Greeks and Barbarians, that inhabited Sicily; and though it was thus great, yet the Athenians were very desirous to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their subjection, (which was the true motive,) but as having also the fair pretext of a wish to aid their kindred and new confederates. But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of Eggesta, who were at Athens, and earnestly called upon them thereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about certain agreements⁸ concerning marriage, and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And the Selinuntians having brought over the Syracusians to be their allies, reduced them to straits with war both by sea and by land. So

The Eggestæans send to desire the assistance of the Athenians against the Selinuntians and Syracusians.

that the Eggestæans putting the Athenians in mind of their league with the Leontines, made in the time of Laches and of the previous war, prayed them to send a fleet thither to their aid; alleging, amongst many other things, this as principal: that if the Syracusians who had driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerous, lest hereafter, some time or other, being Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians by reason of their affinity, and being a colony of the Peloponnesians, join with the Peloponnesians that sent them out to pull down the Athenian empire; that it were prudence, therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head against the Syracusians; and the rather, because for the defraying of the war, the Eggestæans would furnish money sufficient of themselves.

The Athenians send ambassadors to Eggesta, to

Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Eggestæan ambassadors, and of their advocates, they decreed to send ambassadors to Eggesta to

⁸ At γαμικῶν the Scholiast supplies συναλλαγμάτων.

see first whether there were in their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there was, and at the same time to learn on what terms the war stood between that city and the Selinuntians.

Year 16.
A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

inquire into the state of affairs.

VII. And ambassadors of the Athenians were sent into Sicily accordingly. The same winter, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their territory, and carried away the corn, having conveyed with them some carts [for that purpose]; placing also in Orneæ the Argive outlaws, and leaving with them a few others of the rest of the army. And then making a truce for a certain time, that the Orneatæ and those Argives should not wrong each other, they departed with their army home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six hundred men at arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their whole power, and joining with them, besieged the men in Orneæ during one day;⁹ but when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out, and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneæ to the ground, and went home; as also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their own and part of Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into the Methone, which is on the borders of Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the Lacedæmonians sent to the Chalcidæans upon Thrace, who held truces with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, and bade them aid Perdiccas; but they refused. And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

The Lacedæmonians invade the Argive territory, and settle some Argive exiles at Orneæ.

The Argives, assisted by an Athenian force, attack and ravage Orneæ.

The Athenians ravage the territories of Perdiccas.

The Lacedæmonians in vain urge the Chalcidæans to assist him.

YEAR XVII. A. C. 415. OLYMP. 90. 2.

VIII. The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Eggesta with them, and brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty galleys,¹ which they were going to en-

SUMMER.
The Athenian ambassadors return from Eggesta.

⁹ Aristophanes, perhaps, refers to this affair in the Aves. 398, if any thing beyond a pun is intended.

¹ " This supposes a drachma per diem to every seaman of a crew of two hundred men. For $200 \times 30 = 6000$, that is, six thousand drachmæ, or one talent. This was double the usual rate, but the distance of Sicily and the

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus are about to be sent into Sicily with sixty ships.

Nicias tries to dissuade the people.

treat the Athenians to send thither. And the Athenians having called an assembly, and heard both from the Eggestæan and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive, but untrue statements, this also touching their money, how they had great store ready, both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty galleys to Sicily, and Alcibiades the son of Clinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes, for commanders, with absolute authority to aid the people of Eggesta against the Selinuntians; and withal, if they had time to spare from the war, to plant the Leontines anew in their city, and to order all other the affairs of Sicily, as they should think most for the profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the people assembled again, to consult how most speedily they might put this armada in readiness, and to decree such things as the generals should further require for the expedition. But Nicias having against his inclination been chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the state had not well resolved, but affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter on a slight and specious pretence, stood forth, desiring to turn them from their intention, and advised the Athenians as follows.

Oration of Nicias.

IX. "Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation, and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily; yet to me it seems that we ought rather once again to consult concerning this very point, whether it be not better not to send it at all, than on so short a deliberation in matters of great importance, being persuaded to it by foreigners, to draw on ourselves a war which does not belong to us. For my own part, I have honour from a proposal of this kind; and for the danger of my person, I fear it less than others;² not but that I think him a good member of the commonwealth, that hath regard also to his own person and estate; for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper, for his own sake. But as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak any thing that is against my judgment for the sake of gaining to myself a pre-eminence of honour, but in that way only which I probable length of the service were thought to call for this addition, which was made also before, at the siege of Potidæa. Vid. iii. 17."—*Arnold.*

² On this passage Goeller remarks, "Alcibiadem oblique carpit."

apprehend is for the best will I advise. And although I am sure, that if I should counsel you to preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against your humour; yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to be achieved.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

X. "For I say, that you are leaving many enemies here behind you, and that you shew a desire to sail thither and draw others hither. You perhaps think that the treaty has some security in it, which you have made with the Lacedæmonians, which though as long as you stir not may continue a treaty in name, (for so some have made it, both of our own side and of the enemies,) yet if in any considerable force we chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew their attempts, as having at the very first made the peace, constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves. Besides, in this very treaty we have many things controverted; and some there be that have not even accepted this agreement, and they none of the weakest, whereof some³ are now in open war against us, and others,⁴ because the Lacedæmonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days, and so themselves are held back. But peradventure when they shall discover our power separated, (which is the thing we now hasten to do,) they will most readily join with the Sicilians in setting upon us, the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued very highly. It behoveth us, therefore, to consider of these things, and not to run into new dangers, when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we confirm that which we already have. For the Chalcidæans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet unreduced: and from others, in divers parts of the continent, we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egæstæans, being forsooth our confederates, and wronged, in all haste we must aid: though to requite those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer.

XI. "And yet, if we should reduce the Chalcidæans into subjection, we could also keep them down; but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many, and far off, we should have much ado to be able to rule them. Now it were

³ The Corinthians.

⁴ The Bœotians and Chalcidæans.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

madness to invade such, whom conquering, you cannot keep; and where, if not successful, you will not be in the same plight that you were before making the attempt. As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the Syracusians, than they are now; and this is that the Egestæans would most affright us with. For now the states of Sicily in several, may perhaps be induced, through favour to the Lacedæmonians, to come against us: whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would hazard an expedition against us, state against state. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that by the Peloponnesians theirs also would be subverted. The Grecians there will fear us most, if we go not at all; next, if we but shew our forces, and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us, and join with the Grecians here to invade us; for we all know that those things are most admired which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of them. And this (Athenians) is your own case now with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, whom because contrary to your judgment, with reference to the fears you had at first, you have overcome, you now, in contempt of them, are aiming also at Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies, but to be confident then only, when we have mastered their designs.⁵ Nor ought we to think that the Lacedæmonians set their minds on any thing else, but how they may yet, on account of the late disgrace, repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather, because they have so much, and so long, laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour. The question with us, therefore, (if we be well advised,) will not be of the Egestæans in Sicily, barbarians, but in what way we may energetically defend ourselves against the attacks of a city that is plotting against us in the way of oligarchy.⁶

⁵ This word is variously rendered; some referring it to the Athenians, as Goeller, "being masters of our own minds," or "accomplishing our own designs," as Mr. Bloomfield; the most eligible, perhaps, is the version of Dr. Arnold, who renders "subduing or getting the better of their minds," i. e. "by clemency, or by superior ability."

⁶ I have followed Dr. Arnold in this interpretation, who explains it as

XII. " We ought to remember also, that we have had only just now some short respite from a great plague, and war, and thereby are improved, both in men and money; which it is most meet we should spend here upon ourselves, and not upon these outlaws who seek for aid; to whom to tell a specious falsehood is useful, and who, contributing themselves only words, whilst their friends bear all the danger, if they speed well, make no fitting acknowledgment for the kindness; or if they fail in any way, make their friends perish with them. Now if there be any man⁷ here that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general, especially being yet too young to have charge in chief, shall advise the expedition, that he may have admiration for his expense on horses, and owing to his expensiveness, that he may receive some gain from his place, suffer him not to shew forth his private honour and splendour at the danger of the public fortune. Believe rather that such men do harm to the public, and consume also their private wealth; and that the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, and hastily to take in hand.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XIII. " And I, seeing those now that sit by and abet the same man, am fearful of them, and do on the other side exhort the elder sort, if any of them sit near those other, not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely; as fearing, that if they give their vote against the war, they should be esteemed cowards; nor to dote (as *they* do) upon things absent, knowing that by passion the fewest actions, and by precaution the most do prosper; but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now risking a greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other side, and decree, that the Sicilians within the limits they now enjoy in relation to us, (nor do we object to them,) and with liberty to sail by the shore, in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound their differences within themselves. And for the Egestæans, to answer them in particular thus; " threatening us, not with the loss of our conquests, but a change of government." Goeller takes the word oligarchy to mean an oligarchical party, and thinks that Nicias is alluding to Alcibiades and his favourers; perhaps it may be rendered, " plotting against us in the spirit of oligarchy;" under the influence of that feeling.

⁷ He glances at Alcibiades, whose passion for splendour was not to be subdued.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

that as at first without the Athenians they had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it; and that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our confederates, as when they shall fare ill, we must aid them, and when we ourselves require their assistance, cannot have it.

XIV. "And you, O president,⁸ (if you think it your office to take care of the commonwealth, and desire to be a good member of the same,) put these things to the question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to put the question again) that before so many witnesses it will not give cause for blame to infringe the laws,⁹ but that you may become rather a physician of your country, that hath taken evil counsel; and that he truly discharges the duty of a president, who labours to do his country the most good, or at least will not, as far as his intention goes, do it hurt."

Nicias is
opposed
by Alci-
biades.

XV. Thus spake Nicias; but the most of the Athenians that came before the assembly to speak, gave advice that the armament ought to proceed, and not to reverse the decree already made; yet some there were that said to the contrary. But the expedition Alcibiades the son of Clinias most eagerly pressed on, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at variance in other points of state affairs, and also because he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration; but principally because he wished to be general, hoping that through it he might subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens, and withal, if he succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. For, being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of horses, and in the rest of his expenses; which proved afterwards not the least cause of the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and form of life, and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy. And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every man,

⁸ For information on this office, see note on iv. 118. and the references given there.

⁹ On this point the reader cannot do better than consult Schoemann. *Comit. i. c. 11.* (p. 128. ed. 1819.)

privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of matters of state to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state. But he at this time standing forth, advised the Athenians to this effect.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Oration of Alcibiades.

XVI. “Men of Athens, it both belongs to me, more than to any other, to have this charge; and moreover I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as Nicias has attacked me [in this point]) to be worthy of the same. For those things for which I am so much cried down do indeed purchase glory to my progenitors, and myself, and to the commonwealth they confer profit also. For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above its real strength, by reason of the splendour of my attendance at the Olympian games; whereas before they expected it was warred down. For I sent down [into the arena] seven chariots, and not only won the first, second, and fourth prize,¹ but displayed also in all other things a magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. And such things as these, according to law, confer honour, and power also is conceived to exist upon sight of the thing done. As for my splendour in the city in setting forth shows,² or in any other matter, though naturally it procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers it appears strength itself.³ And not unprofitable is this folly of mine, when a man shall, at his private cost, not only benefit himself, but also the commonwealth. Nor is it wronging the rest that he should bear himself high on his own worth, and refuse to make himself fellow with the rest; for if he were in distress, he makes no man share equally with him in his calamity. Therefore, as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery, so likewise let them be content to be contemned of us when we flourish; or if they require equality, let them also give it. I know that such men, and all else that excel in the glory of any thing, are, as long as they live, dis-

¹ Probably in Ol. 89. A. C. 424.

² On these the reader will find much valuable information, in few words, in the Greek Theatre, p. 103. (3rd edit.); and the subject is fully discussed in Boeckh. Œcon. of Athens, vol. ii. p. 207. (Eng. transl.), for which latter reference I am indebted to Dr. Arnold.

³ I have endeavoured to render the reading of Bekker (*ἀύτη*) as closely as I could, but it is far from easy of interpretation; and that of *ἀύτη*, “this,” is much to be preferred.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

liked, principally by their equals, and then also by others with whom they are conversant; but with posterity they shall leave a wish to claim relationship of them, though there be none: and to the country which they may be of, matter for boasting, not as of strangers, or evil-doers, but as of their own citizens, and men that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. These being the things I aim at, and for which I am as an individual renowned, consider now whether I administer the commonwealth worse than any one else, or not. For having brought over⁴ unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus without much, either danger or cost to you, I compelled the Lacedæmonians to stake all that ever they had on the fortune of one day of Mantinea; by reason of which event, though they were superior in the battle, they do not even yet possess any firm confidence.

XVII. "And these things hath my youth and folly, which seems forsooth so unnatural, by the employment of befitting speech, managed with the power of the Peloponnesians, and, gaining confidence to my vehemence of disposition, induced them to do.⁵ And now do not ye fear it, but as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate, make you full use of both our services; and abrogate not your decree touching the voyage to Sicily, as though the power were great against which it is to be undertaken. For the number wherewith their cities are populous is but of promiscuous nations, and therefore they [the cities] easily receive changes in their forms of government, and easily accept new ones. And consequently no one, as for his own country, is either equipped with arms for the defence of his body, or, as regards the public resources⁶ of the

⁴ Or this word may mean simply "having brought together," i. e. into one common alliance, as Mr. Bloomfield explains it.

⁵ This passage, especially the latter part, admits of other interpretations; for information on which, if the reader is dissatisfied with the one I have given in the text, he can refer to the long and learned note in Mr. Bloomfield's translation. The word *ἐπεισε* may be joined to the ones immediately preceding, but the construction appears more natural otherwise. The sense of the passage is admirably expressed in Dr. Arnold's paraphrase. "So I dealt with the Peloponnesian power with all discreetness of speech, while my vehemence gained me credit, and won them to listen to what I had said."

⁶ Or rather, "the public works in the country," as Dr. Arnold explains, such as forts, stores of warlike weapons; and improvements, such as bridges, roads, &c.

country, furnished with usual defences. But what any of them thinks he may get by persuasion in fair speech, or snatch from the public by sedition, that only he looks after, with purpose, if he fail, to obtain and settle in another country. And it is not likely that such a rabble should either with one consent give ear to what is told them, or unite themselves for the administration of their affairs in common; but if any thing is said to please them, they will one after the other be easily induced to come in; especially if there be seditions amongst them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are neither so many men at arms as are boasted of; nor have the other Greeks appeared so many in number, as the several states have every one reckoned themselves to be; nay, even Greece hath much belied itself about them [i. e. the men at arms], and was scarce sufficiently provided with them in all this war past. So that the business there, for all that I can by report understand, is even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall have many of the Barbarians, who on hatred of the Syracusians, will join us in setting upon them; and if you consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder us at home. For our ancestors, having the same enemies whom they say we leave behind us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Mede besides, did nevertheless gain the empire we now have, by nought else than by the superiority of their naval power. And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now it is, though their power is ever so strong; for they are able to invade our land, even though we should not sail out to Sicily; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave behind us a navy sufficient to oppose theirs.

XVIII. "What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness? Or what can we pretend to our confederates for denying them assistance? whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them; without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league, that they should come hither with their aids, but that by troubling our enemies there, they might hinder them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby we, or whoever else has dominion, have got it, is by cheerfully succouring those who in succession called upon us for help, whether Greeks or Barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which race was fit to be as-

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

sisted and which not, we should add but little to our government of what belongs to other men, but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men are wont not only to defend themselves against him when he invades them, but also to anticipate him that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to settle for ourselves, how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is necessary for us to lay schemes to subdue those that are not under our dominion, and not to relax our grasp on those that are: because there is danger to ourselves of being ruled by others, if we ourselves do not rule others. Nor are you to regard quietness on the same footing that the rest of the states do, unless ye will also change your institutions and customs to a similarity with theirs. Let us rather make reckoning by enterprising abroad, that we shall increase our power at home; and proceed in our voyage, that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians, if we shall appear to disregard our present ease, by undertaking this our expedition to Sicily. Whereby also either by the addition of the states there to our side, we shall probably become masters of all Greece, or at least weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away, [if otherwise,] our galleys will afford it. For we shall be superior, as regards our naval power, even to all the Sicilians together. Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness, and to the stirring up of dissension between the young men and the old, divert you from it; but with the wonted order wherewith your ancestors, consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to the present height, endeavour you likewise now in the same way to further the power of the state. And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together, is that which does the greatest good; and that a state, as well as any other thing, will, if it rest, wear out of itself, and all men's knowledge will decay, whereas by exercise it will continually gain to itself skill, and will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, this is my opinion, that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be destroyed by the change; and that they of all men dwell most safely, that with most unity

observe the present laws and customs, though they may not be the best."

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XIX. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when they had heard him, together with the Egestæans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present, entreated, and reminding them of their oath, begged their help as suppliants, were far more earnestly bent on the expedition than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution by the same topics he had before employed, but thought he might perhaps turn them from it by the greatness of the necessary equipments, if he should impose them heavily, stood forth again, and said in this manner.

Nicias again addresses the people, commenting on the immense preparations which the war will require.

Oration of Nicias.

XX. "Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you violently bent on this expedition, may it fall out as we desire. Nevertheless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet stands. As far as I understand by report, we set out against great cities, not subject one to another, nor needing innovation, whereby they would with pleasure advance from a state of hard servitude to a change to a less irksome condition, nor such as are likely to receive our rule instead of liberty, and [against] cities that are Grecian too, and, for one island, many, as regards their number. For besides Naxos and Catana, (which two I hope will join with us, for their affinity with the Leontines,) there are other seven, furnished in all respects after the manner of our own forces, and especially those two against which chiefly we are going to sail, Selinus and Syracuse.⁷ For there are in them many men at arms, many archers, many darters, besides many galleys, and a multitude of men to man them. The Selinuntians have also store of money, both amongst private men, and in their temples; the Syracusians have tribute beside coming in from some of the Barbarians. But that wherein they exceed us most, is this, that they possess a plentiful supply of horses, and use corn of their own, not fetched in from other places.

XXI. "Against such a power we shall therefore need, not a fleet only, and with it a small army, but there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do any thing

⁷ The seven were, Syracuse, Selinus, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Himera, Messena.

Year 17.
A.C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

worthy our design, and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing; especially if the cities there, through fear, should now hold all together, and none but the Egestæans prove our friends, and furnish us with a cavalry to resist them. And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse, or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we are about to sail far from home, and are not conducting an invasion under similar circumstances, as when, amongst those who are your subjects here, ye were going as allies [to fight] against any one, where the means of bringing in necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends would be easy; but that we are going far off,⁸ and into a country of none but strangers, whence during four months of the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come.

XXII. "Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with us many men at arms, of our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects, and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can either persuade, or induce to join us by pay; and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist their cavalry; and we ought far to exceed them in shipping, for the more easy bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean wheat and barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships of burden, and bakers from the mills, partly compelled to serve on hire,⁹ that the army, if we chance to be weather-bound any where, may not be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must, as much as we can, provide them ourselves, and not rely on others. Above all, we must be furnished hence with as much money as we can. For as for that which is said will be supplied from the Egestæans, think it to be ready for the most part only in words.

XXIII. "For although we go thither with an army not only equal to theirs, (excepting¹ their men at arms for battle,) but

⁸ This word Mr. Bloomfield renders, "dependent upon;" I have followed the authority of Hermann, who translates it, "digressos."

⁹ These words admit various interpretations, but they seem to mean, "that though the bakers necessary for the expedition would receive pay, that yet, from the great number required, it would be partly necessary to impress some, that a sufficiency might be provided." Dr. Arnold quotes the version of Dobree, "pro servorum apud quemque numero."

¹ If *παλιν* means "except" in this passage, the sense must be, "except in

also in every thing exceeding it, yet so shall we scarce be able both to overcome them, and also to preserve our own. We must also think we are men who are going to settle some city in a foreign and hostile country, who either the first day in which they come to land, must be at once masters of the field, or if they fail, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Fearing which, and knowing that the business requires much deliberation on our part, and more good fortune, (which is a hard matter, being but men,) I would so set forth, as to commit myself to fortune as little as I may, and sail out in security, as far as we can judge from probabilities, in the matter of equipment. And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in general, and the safest for us that go on the invasion. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my place as general.”

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XXIV. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that he either would induce the Athenians by the multitude of the things required, to abandon the enterprise: or if he were forced to go, he might undertake the voyage thus with the more security. But they were not drawn from their desire of the voyage, on account of the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more eager to have it proceed; and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected. For he appeared to them to give good advice, and they thought that now surely there would be great security in the undertaking. And on all alike fell a vehement desire to go on the voyage. The old men, hoping to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so great a power could not miscarry; and those in the prime of life, through a longing to see a foreign country, and to gaze, being of good hope to return with safety. As for the common sort and the soldiers, they reckoned they would gain by it both their wages for the time, and also acquire for the state an increase in power, whence they might gain perpetual pay. So that through the vehement desire thereto of the multitude, even those whom the undertaking did not please, fearing lest (if they held up their hands

The Athenians, however, are determined on the expedition to Sicily.

the case of their heavy-armed,” (in which we most certainly are not only equal, but superior,) for otherwise the “except” would mean the contrary of what Nicias meant to say. Perhaps, however, it would be better to follow Mr. Bloomfield, who gives the word the sense of “especially” in this passage.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

against it) they should be thought evil affected to the state, were content to rest quiet.

Nicias states his opinion of the force required.

XXV. And in the end a certain Athenian² came forward, and calling on Nicias, said, he ought not to make pretences, nor delay the business any longer, but to declare already before them all what forces he would have the Athenians decree him. To which unwillingly he answered and said, he wished to consider of it first with his fellow-commanders; nevertheless, as far as he could judge at that moment, he said, they must sail with no less than a hundred galleys; whereof for transporting of men at arms, so many of the Athenians' own as they themselves should think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their confederates. And that of men at arms, in all, of their own and of their confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand, but rather more if they could, and other provision proportionable. As for archers both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it themselves, and take it with them.

The Athenians invest the commanders with discretionary powers.

XXVI. When the Athenians had heard him, they at once decreed that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching the number of the army, and the whole voyage, to do therein as should seem best to them for the Athenian commonwealth. And after this the preparations began, and they both sent unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness, and from the continued war, both as regards the number of the youth that had grown up [since the plague,] and in the store of money gathered together by means of the peace, whereby they made their provisions with much ease. And thus were they employed in preparation for the voyage.

The Mercuries at Athens are defaced.

XXVII. In the mean time, the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of Athens, (now these are, after the fashion of the country, the square pieces of workmanship, numerous both in the porches of private houses, and in the temples,) had in one night most of them their faces chipped, and no man knew who had done it. And yet, by great rewards out of the treasury for their discovery, they were sought for; and, moreover, the Athenians made a decree, that if any man knew of any

² From Plutarch (Nic. c. 12.) it appears this was Demostratus, an orator.—*Bloomfield.*

other profanation, he who wished might boldly declare the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact exceedingly to heart, for it seemed to be an omen of the expedition, and done, moreover, upon conspiracy for alteration of the state, and dissolution of the democracy.

XXVIII. Hereupon certain strangers dwelling in the city, and certain serving-men, revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the mutilation of some other images before, committed through wantonness and too much wine, by young men, and withal how in private houses the mysteries were acted in mockery;³ of which also they accused Alcibiades. And these things they that were most hostile to Alcibiades, because he stood in their way, so that they could not constantly bear chief sway with the people, and thinking that they would have the lead if they could thrust him out, took hold of, and exceedingly aggravated, exclaiming, that both the mockery of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries, tended to the deposing of the popular government; and that nothing therein was done without him, alleging for argument his other violations of the law with regard to the habits of his life, not in accordance with a popular form of government.

XXIX. He at that present time defended himself against the informations, and was there ready, if he had done any such thing, to be judged concerning it before he went the voyage, (for by this time all their preparation was in readiness,) and to suffer the penalty of the law, if indeed he had done any of these things, but if he was absolved, to resume his charge. Protesting against their receiving any accusations against him in his absence, and pressing them to put him to death then presently, if he had offended; and saying, that it would be more discreetly done, not to send away a man accused of so great crimes, with the charge of such force, before they decided concerning him. But his enemies, fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should have had the favour of the army, and lest the people who paid him attention, because the Argives and some of the Mantineans joined them in this expedition only for his sake, should be mollified, put the matter off and kept it back, by setting on other orators to advise that for the present he should go, and not retard the setting forward of the fleet, and that at his return he should have a day assigned him for

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Alcibiades, accused of sacrilege,

offers to submit to his trial immediately,

while his enemies persuade the people to refuse.

³ The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

his trial. Their purpose being upon further accusation, which they might easily contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to undergo his trial. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

The Athenians go on board their ships at Piræus.

XXX. After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates, and the ships of burden that carried their corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet, upon a day set, at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. But the Athenians themselves, and as many of their confederates as were at Athens, having on a day appointed come down into Piræus, at the break of day manned their vessels for the purpose of putting out to sea. With them came down (in a manner) the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants as strangers: the inhabitants to attend each such as belonged to them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some their children; filled, as they went, both with hope and lamentations; hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation, as being in doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering what a way they were to go from their own territory.

XXXI. And at the present moment, when they were now to leave one another with danger, fear and dread entered into them more than they had done before, when they decreed the expedition. Nevertheless, by their present strength, through the abundance of every thing before their eyes prepared for the journey, they took heart again in beholding it. But the strangers and the remainder of the multitude came only to view the sight, as being directed towards a worthy and incredible design. For this preparation, being the first that had sailed from one city only with a force of Greeks, was the most sumptuous and the most glorious of all that ever had taken place before it to that day. Nevertheless, in number of galleys and men at arms, that⁴ which went out with Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Agnon carried with him to Potidæa, was not inferior to it. For there went four thousand men at arms, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys out of Athens itself; and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him in the voyage.

⁴ Vide ii. c. 56, 58.

But they went not far, and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should have occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land soldiers. For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the captains of galleys, and of the city. For the state allowed a drachma⁵ per day to every mariner; the empty galleys⁶ which it afforded for the expedition, being of swift ones, sixty, and of such as carried men at arms, forty more. And the captains of galleys both put into them the most able petty-officers,⁷ and besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called the] *Thranitæ*,⁸ and to the petty-officers, gave bounties; and bestowed great cost otherwise, every one upon his own galley, both in the figure-heads and other rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament and also in swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the land forces, they were levied from excellent rolls,⁹ and every man eagerly endeavoured to excel his fellow with regard to his arms and the equipments that belonged to his person. Insomuch, that amongst themselves contention arose in the several offices over which each was appointed, and amongst other Grecians it was considered like an ostentation rather of their power and riches, than a preparation against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public as of private men that went the voyage, viz. of the public, what it had spent already in the business, and what it gave to the commanders to carry with

Year 17.
A.C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

⁵ Sevenpence three farthings.

⁶ Empty in respect of those that carried provision.

⁷ On the meaning of this word, in which I have followed Dr. Arnold, I would refer the reader to his long and learned note. It appears to mean a class of mariners superior to the actual rowers, probably including the *κυβερνητης*, or "steersman," and the *κελευστης*, or "boatswain," with others with whose offices we are unacquainted. On the duty of trierarch, the reader can refer to a brief and excellent account in Hermann's *Pol. Antiq.* sect. 161. (Engl. transl.); and for further information, to Boeck. *Pol. Œcon.* ii. p. 203. 319.

⁸ *Θρανιται*. There being three banks of oars one above another, the uppermost were called *Thranitæ*, the middlemost *Zeugitæ*, and the lowest *Thalanitæ*; whereof the *Thranitæ* managed the longest oar, and therefore, in respect of their greater labour, might deserve a greater pay.

⁹ Hermann (*Pol. Antiq.* sect. 67.) considers *οἱ ἐκ καταλογου* as equivalent to the heavy-armed, in contradistinction to the light-armed, or the *θητες*. See note on v. 8.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

them; and of private men, what every one had expended upon his person, and every captain on his galley, and how much each was yet about to expend, beside what every one was likely, over and above his allowance from the state, to prepare as provision for so long a warfare, and what any one, whether soldier or merchant, carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents. And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to go, for the strange boldness of the attempt, and magnificence of the show, than it was for the exceeding greatness of the army with regard to those against whom they went; and because it was up to this time the most distant voyage from their own country; and because it was undertaken with so vast future hopes, in respect of their present power.

XXXII. After they were all aboard, and all things were now laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; and they offered up the customary prayers before putting out to sea, not by separate ships, but all together, repeating the words of the herald; having mixed bowls of wine through the whole army, and the generals and the soldiers pouring libations from gold and silver cups. And all the remaining crowd from the shore, both of the citizens and whosoever else was there and wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had sung the Pæan and ended the libations, they put forth to sea. And having at first sailed out in a long file,¹ galley after galley, they afterwards made a contest in racing each other up to Ægina. Thus hasted these to arrive at Corcyra; to which place also the other armament of the confederates was assembling. Tidings were brought to Syracuse, concerning the setting out of the armament, from divers places; nevertheless it was long ere any thing was believed. Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were made, such as follow, on both parts, as well by them that believed the report touching the Athenian expedition to be true, as by others that affirmed the contrary. And Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, as one that thought he knew certainly the

The fleet gets under way, and sails towards Corcyra.

The Syracusians call an assembly.

¹ On this phrase Dr. Arnold observes, it may generally mean a long column of men or ships, or a long line. The notion of thinness or expansion being equally preserved in both a single rank and a single file, but usage has generally applied the term to the latter. The expression occurs also in ii. 90 where a note was inadvertently omitted, and in vi. 50, and viii. 104.

facts of the matters, stood forth and spake, and gave the following advice.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Oration of Hermocrates.

XXXIII. "Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be thought as well as other men to speak what is incredible; and though I know that such as be either the authors or relaters of matter incredible, do not only not persuade, but are also accounted fools; nevertheless I will not for fear thereof hold my tongue, as long as the commonwealth is in danger; inasmuch as I persuade myself, at least, that I speak knowing the truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do. The Athenians have set out to come, even against us, (which you altogether wonder at,) and that with great forces, both for the sea and land, with pretence indeed to aid their confederates, the Egestæans, and to replant the Leontines, but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and especially of this city of ours; considering that, if they gain this, they will get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will quickly be present, think how, according to your present means, you may with most honour keep them off, that you may neither be taken unguarded through contempt, nor be careless of the common weal through incredulity; and that such as believe it may not be dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they will not be more able to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them; neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage unto us. Nay, it will be much the better for us in respect of the rest of the Sicilians; for being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish or repulse them without obtaining what they come for, (for indeed I fear not at all lest they should obtain what they expect,) verily it will turn out the most honourable affair to us, and in my opinion, at least, not unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or Barbarians, which having proceeded far from home, have not prospered ill. Neither are these that come against us more in number than ourselves and the neighbouring cities; for surely we shall all hold together through fear. And if for want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it they leave to us, against whom they bend their counsels, though the greatest cause of their over-

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

throw should consist in their own errors. Which was also the case of these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the misfortune of the Medes, (though it happened for the most part contrary to reason,) on the pretext that they went only against the Athenians. And that the same shall now happen to us, is not without probability.

XXXIV. “ Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our forces here ; let us send to the Siculi, to confirm those we have, and to try to make peace and league with others ; and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily, to shew them that it is a common danger ; and into Italy, to get them into our league, or at least that they receive not the Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage, for even they are not without expectation of the same danger ; nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians should come against their city also. So that through apprehension that, if they neglect us, the trouble will come home to their own door, they will be willing, perhaps, either secretly or openly, or in some way, to assist us ; and of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they please ; for they have the most gold and silver, by which both war and all things else are the best expedited. Let us also send to Lacedæmon, and to Corinth, praying them not only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot the war there. But that which I think the best course of all, though through your wonted habits of inactivity you will least readily be persuaded to it, shall nevertheless be said. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all, yet if we, and most of the rest, would draw down into the water our whole navy, and with two months’ provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum, and the promontory of Iapygia, and let them see that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf, before they fight for Sicily, it would both terrify them the most, and also put them into a consideration, that we, as the guards of our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory, (for Tarentum receives us,) whereas they themselves have a great space of sea to pass with all their preparations, and it will be difficult for them to remain in their order because of the length of the voyage. And it [their line] would be easily assailed by us, coming up as it does, slowly and thin. Again, if lightening their galleys they shall come upon us with their fast-sailing vessels more close together, we

shall charge them already wearied, if indeed they should use their oars, or we may, if we please, retire again to Tarentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of victuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there besieged, or attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities, whether they will receive them or not. I am therefore of opinion, that, dismayed with this reckoning, they will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or, whilst they spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to explore how many, and in what place we are, they will be driven, by the time of the year, into the winter; or, deterred with our unlooked-for opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather, because (as I hear) the man of most experience amongst their commanders hath the command against his will, and would willingly lay hold of a pretext to return, if any considerable impediment were seen from our side. And I am very sure we should be reported amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are men's minds; and they fear more such as make the attempt first, than such as give out that they will do no more than defend themselves against those who attack them; thinking them [i. e. those who begin the attack] equally willing to encounter danger.² Which would be now the case of the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will not defend ourselves; deservedly contemning us, because we joined not with the Lacedæmonians to pull them down. But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness, than with the truth³ of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore principally to dare to do this; or if not this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war; and it should occur to the mind of every one, that contempt of the enemy is to be shewn in the vigour of actions, and for the present conjuncture, considering that to make ready our preparations, (which are then most sure and safe when accompanied with fear,) as against dangers,

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

² Or the word may be equivalent to *ισοπαλεις*, "a match for them," as the Schol. explains.

³ The words *απο του αληθους*, Mr. Bloomfield considers as a phrase for an adjective; i. e. "our true or actual force." Perhaps it might be more literally rendered, "than by our power calculated on true grounds."

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

would turn out the most useful plan. As for the Athenians, they come, and I am sure are already in the way, and want only that they are not now here."

XXXV. Thus much spake Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves, some contending that the Athenians would by no means come, and that what he said was not true; and others [said], and if they did come, what harm could they do them, which they would not themselves suffer in a greater degree? And others, altogether despising what he said, turned the matter into laughter; but some few there were that believed Hermocrates, and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was the chief man of the popular party, and at that time most powerful with the commons, having come forward, spake as followeth.

Oration of Athenagoras.

He is opposed by Athenagoras.

XXXVI. "He is either a coward, or not well affected to the state, whoever he be, that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad, as coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that report such things as these, and put you into fear, though I wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they think their ends not seen. For they that are afraid of any thing themselves, wish to put the city in terror, that they may shadow their own with the common fear. And this do these very reports now mean, not raised by chance, but framed on purpose, by such as always are stirring up such troubles. But if you mean to deliberate wisely, you will calculate the probabilities, making not your reckoning by the reports of these men, but by that which clever men, and men of great experience, (as I hold the Athenians to be,) are likely to do. For it is not probable, that leaving the Peloponnesians behind, and having not yet surely ended the war there, they should willingly come hither to a new war, no less than the former; seeing, in my opinion, they may be glad that we invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are.

XXXVII. "And if indeed they come, (as they are said to do,) I think Sicily more sufficient to despatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished; and that this our own city is itself much stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they neither bring horses with them, nor can get

any here, save only a few from the Egestæans; nor have men at arms so many as we, in that they are to come by sea. For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea,⁴ though they carried no men at arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessaries; which cannot be small against so great a city. So that I am so far from the opinion of these others, that I think the Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and an adjacent one to it to inhabit, and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able to escape from being destroyed every man of them; much less now, in Sicily, everywhere their enemy, (for it will unite against them;) and in their camp, fenced with their galleys⁵, they shall be cooped up; and from their tents and forced munition, never be able to stir far abroad by reason of our horsemen. In short, I think they will never be able to get a footing in the country; so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XXXVIII. “But these things, as I said before, the Athenians considering, I am very sure, will look unto their own; and our men talk here of things that neither are, nor ever will be; who, I know, have desired, not only now, but ever, by such reports as these, or by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear, that they themselves might rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it often, they may one day succeed; and lest we should be slow both to take measures beforehand to guard against it, before we are in the calamity; and, when we have perceived it, to proceed against it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but is ever taking upon itself seditions and contests, not so much against the enemy as against itself; and sometimes also is subject to tyrannies and usurpations. Of which I will endeavour (if you will second me) never to allow any thing more of the kind to take place among you. Which must be done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots,

⁴ Or, “that so great a voyage should be accomplished by them, even with unencumbered vessels.”

⁵ I have left the text in this place as I found it, as it has the authority of Bredow to support it; nevertheless, the reader had better follow the version of Dr. Arnold, “a camp pitched by men just landed from their ships,” and therefore necessarily ill provided. Goeller considers the word *στρατοπεδον* to mean “an army,” in this place; which interpretation Mr. Bloomfield follows, thus, “with an army, too, in dependence on their fleet.”

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

not only when I find them in the action, (for it will be hard to take them so,) but also for those things which they would and cannot do. For one must not only defend himself against an enemy for what he already is doing, but also be beforehand with his evil purpose; for if a man is not beforehand in guarding against him, he will be the first to suffer. And as for the few, I shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them, and in somewhat advise them.—For this I think will be the best course to divert them from their bad intentions. And, forsooth, (I have asked this question often,) you that are the younger sort, what would you have? would you now bear office; the law allows it not. And the law was rather made because ye are not sufficient for government, than to disgrace you being sufficient. But, forsooth, you would not be ranked with the multitude. But how is it just, that the same men should not be deemed fit to have the same privileges?

XXXIX. “Some one will say, that the democracy is neither a wise nor a just state, and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best government. But I answer, first, democracy is a name of the whole, oligarchy but of a part. Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure, yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude, upon hearing, the best judge. Now in a democracy, all these, both jointly and severally, participate equal privileges. But the oligarchy allows indeed to the multitude a participation of all dangers; but in matters of profit, it not only encroaches upon the multitude, but takes from them and keeps the whole. Which is the thing that you, the rich and the younger sort, affect; but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, now, O ye, the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, you are either the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know, or ye are the most wicked of all men, if knowing it, you dare do this.

XL. “But I say, inform yourselves better, or change your purpose, and help to increase the common good of the city, considering this, that the good amongst you, shall not only have an equal, but a greater share therein than the rest of the multitude; whereas, if you will needs desire more, you will run the hazard of losing all. Be rid then of such rumours as these, as [being brought] to men who perceive [your intentions], and will

not allow them. For this city, though the Athenians come, will keep them off, with honour to itself. And we have generals to look to that matter. And if any thing of these rumours be true, (as I do not think,) it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders, and cast upon itself a voluntary servitude. But taking direction of itself, it both will judge your words virtually as facts, and will not, by listening to what you say, be robbed of her present liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same actually to your discretion.”

XLI. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of the generals⁶ rising up, forbade any other to stand forth, but spake himself to the matter in hand, to this effect.

Speech of one of the Syracusan Generals.

“It is no wisdom neither for the speakers to utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how we may in the best manner, both every one in particular, and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they come. And if there should be no need, yet that the city should be furnished with horses and arms, and other habiliments of war, can do us no hurt. As for the care hereof, and the musters, we will look to it, and also to the sending men abroad to the cities, both to see how matters stand, and to do whatever else appears requisite. Somewhat we have done already, and what more we shall hereafter find meet, we will from time to time report unto you.” Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dispersed from the assembly.

XLII. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their confederates. And first the generals took a view of the whole army, and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor, and make their naval camp; and having divided them into three squadrons, to each general they assigned a squadron by lot, to the end that they might not, through sailing together, be in want of water, or harbours, or any other necessities, where they chanced to stay; and that they might in all other points be in better arrangement, and be the more easy to be governed, being appointed according to squadrons, each

⁶ The constitution of Syracuse at this time divided the chief military command between a board of fifteen.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

After a speech from one of the generals, the assembly breaks up.

The Athenians at Corcyra divide their forces into three portions, and send forward three ships to ascertain the disposition of the Italian and Sicilian cities.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

to his proper commander. After this, they sent before them three galleys, into Italy and Sicily, to know what cities in those parts would receive them; whom they appointed to come back and meet them, that they might know whether they might be received or not before they put in.

XLIII. This done, the Athenians, with all the following force, put out from Corecra and passed over to Sicily, having with them in all one hundred and thirty-four galleys, and two Rhodian long-boats of fifty oars a-piece. (Of these, one hundred were of Athens itself, whereof sixty were swift ships, the other forty for transportation of soldiers; the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians, and other the confederates; of men at arms they had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred from the roll,⁷ and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, for defence⁸ of the galleys. The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their subjects; of Argives there were five hundred, of Mantineans and mercenaries two hundred and fifty.) Their archers, in all four hundred and eighty, (of whom eighty were Cretans;) Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of light-armed Megareans, banished from their country, one hundred and twenty; and one vessel made for transportation of horses, bearing thirty horsemen.

The Athenian fleet then crosses the Ionian gulf, and coasts along to Rhegium, where they await the return of their three ships.

XLIV. Thus many were the forces that went over to the war at first. With these went also thirty ships of burden for transporting corn, wherein went also the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all tools of use for fortification. And with these thirty ships went a hundred boats by constraint, and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for trade, which then passed altogether from Corecra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to Tarentum, and such other places as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, the states there neither receiving them into any city, nor allowing them any market, having only the liberty of anchorage and water, (and that also at Tarentum and Locri denied them,) till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again, and settled their camp in the temple of Diana, (for neither there did

⁷ See note on chapter 31.

⁸ On the Epibate, see note on iii. 95. See also viii. 24. The word has probably a different meaning in viii. 61.

they receive them,) without the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. Being here, they made proposals to the Rhegians, begging them, as Chalcidæans, to aid the Leontines, Chalcidæans likewise. To which was answered, that they would take part with neither, but that whatever should seem fitting to the rest of the Italians, that also they would do. So the Athenians meditated on their Sicilian business, how they might carry it the best; and, moreover, awaited the return from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them, desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as their messengers at Athens reported.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XLV. The Syracusians, in the mean time, from divers parts, and also from their spies, had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium, and therefore made their preparations with all diligence, and were no longer incredulous; but sent round to the Siculi, to some cities, guards to keep them from revolting; to others, ambassadors; and into the stations of the Peripoli,⁹ garrisons; and examined the forces of their own city by a view taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or not; and ordered all things as for a war at hand, and only not already present.

The Syracusians make preparations to receive the Athenians.

XLVI. The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at Rhegium, and brought word, that as for the rest of the money which they promised, there was none, and there appeared only thirty talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged, both because this first had crossed their hopes, and because also the Rhegians, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines, and always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now were not willing. And though to Nicias this news from the Egestæans was no more than he expected, yet to the other two it was extremely strange. But the Egestæans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their treasure, had contrived the following artifice. They brought them into the temple of Venus, in Eryx,¹ and shewed them the offerings, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small

The three ships re-join the fleet at Rhegium, and bring intelligence that the Egestæans have in reality no resources.

⁹ Forts garrisoned by the Peripoli, or militia, the patrols of the country. See note on iv. c. 67.

¹ Eryx was a city near Egesta, and subject to it.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

quantity, which being but silver, made a splendid display from what was but of small value. Then they feasted such as came in the triremes in their private houses, and at those feastings brought all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, either from the city of Eggesta itself, or could borrow from any other neighbouring cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian, for their own. So all of them in a manner making use of the same plate; and much appearing everywhere, it caused great wonder to the Athenians from the triremes. And at their return to Athens, they spread about what vast wealth they had seen. These men having both been deceived themselves, and having persuaded others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Eggesta, were much blamed by the soldiers. But the generals proceeded to consult on the business in hand.

Nicias recommends that the fleet shall sail against Selinus, and obtain a peace either by force or negotiation, and then return home.

XLVII. It was the opinion of Nicias, that it was best to sail with the whole fleet against Selinus, for which purpose they were chiefly sent forth: and if the Eggestæans would furnish them with money for the whole army, then to deliberate further on the occasion; if not, then to require them to afford maintenance for the sixty galleys they had asked for, and staying with them, by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians to make peace with them; and then passing along by the rest of those cities, to make a show of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates, and so to sail away homewards, unless they could light on some quick and unthought-of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league, and not to put the commonwealth in danger by spending their own resources.

Alcibiades recommends the endeavouring to bring over as many of the cities as possible, and with them to attack Syracuse and Selinus.

XLVIII. Alcibiades said, it would not be well to have come out from Athens with so great a power, and then dishonourably without effect to go home again: but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse, and to make trial of the Siculi, to make some of them revolt from the Syracusians, and others to enter league with the Athenians, that they might thence draw men and victual. And first to induce the Messenians to join them, (as being seated in the passage, and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in, and also because they would have there a port and anchorage sufficient for their fleet;) and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were to have in the war, then to make an attempt on

Syracuse and Selinus; unless the one would agree with the Egestæans, and the other allow them to replant the Leontines.

XLIX. But Lamachus asserted that it was best to sail directly against Syracuse, and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city, whilst they were yet unfurnished, and their fear at the greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first; but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men re-collect their spirits, and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if they come upon them suddenly, while they expect it with fear, they would the more easily get the victory, and in every thing would affright them: both by their appearance (for then they would appear most for number) and by the expectation of their sufferings, but especially by the danger of a present battle. And that it was likely that many men would be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already got in, yet the army being master of the field, and sitting down before the city, would want no money; and that the other Sicilians would thus rather neglect leaguings with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, and would no longer continue undecided, as casting their eyes round to see who would have the better. And for a place to retire to, and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit to be made so, being deserted, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

L. Lamachus saying this, came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. But after this, Alcibiades with his own galley having passed over to Messena, and made some proposals to them about a league, and not prevailed, they answering, that they would not receive the army in, but allow them only a market without the walls, sailed back to Rhegium. And presently the generals having out of the whole fleet manned threescore galleys, and taken provision aboard, went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the coast to Catana. But the Catanæans receiving them not, (for there were some within that favoured the Syracusians,) they went on to the river Terias, and having stayed there all that night, sailed the next day towards Syracuse, having the rest of their galleys in a line; but ten they sent before to sail into the great haven, and to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from their galleys

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Lamachus
advises
them to
sail im-
mediately
against
Syracuse,
and seize
Megara as
a naval
station.

Lamachus
is brought
over to the
opinion
of Alci-
biades.
The two
command-
ers sail to
Naxos and
Catana,
whence
they send
forward
ten ships
to Syra-
cuse to re-
connoitre.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

sailing near the land, that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines in their own country, according to league and affinity; and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse should without fear go forth to the Athenians, as to their friends and benefactors. And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city and the havens, and the particulars of the region where they were to seat themselves for the war, they sailed away back again to Catana.

Alcibiades is admitted within the walls of Catana: his men break in privately at one of the gates. The Catanæans form an alliance with the Athenians, who remove from Rhegium and encamp at Catana.

LI. And an assembly taking place at Catana, though they refused to receive the army, they admitted the generals, and bade them to speak their minds. And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration, and the thoughts of the citizens directed to the assembly, the soldiers having secretly pulled down a little gate, which was but weakly built up, entered the city, and were walking up and down the market. And the Catanæans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, for fear directly stole out of the town, being not many; the rest concluded a league with the Athenians, and bade them to fetch the rest of the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians sailed over to Rhegium, and rising from thence, came to Catana with their whole army together.

In consequence of a message from the Camarinæans, the Athenians sail first to Syracuse, and thence to Camarina; the inhabitants of the latter place refuse to receive them. They ravage a part of the Syracusian territory. The Salamina ar-

LII. Now they had news from Camarina, that if they would come thither, the Camarinæans would join with them, and that the Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse, where not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina. And having touched at the shore, they sent a herald unto them; but the Camarinæans would not receive them, alleging that they had taken an oath not to receive the Athenians when they came with more than one galley, unless they themselves should send for more of their own accord. Having lost their labour, they departed, and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and had got some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming out and killing some stragglers of the light-armed, they returned again to Catana.

LIII. Here they find the galley called the Salamina,² come thither from Athens, both for Alcibiades, to command him to come home to make his defence against such things as were

² One of the Athenian state-vessels, (the Paralos was the other, see iii. 33. and viii. 73.) which were sent to summon persons accused, at that time beyond the seas. Comp. Aristoph. Av. 1422.

laid to his charge by the state, and also for some other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the mysteries, and some also concerning the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the forces were sailed, proceeded no less vehemently in their search about what had been done, both concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries, and making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, on the report of evil men, apprehended some of the most upright of the citizens, and cast them into prison. Choosing rather to examine the fact with all diligence, and find out the truth, than that any man, however good in estimation, being once accused, should escape unquestioned. For the people knowing by hearsay that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end; and also, that neither by themselves nor by Harmodius, but by the Lacedæmonians³ was it overthrown, were ever fearful, and received every thing suspiciously.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
rives at
Catana to
recall Al-
cibiades.

LIV. For the bold deed of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken through a chance occurrence of love, which unfolding at large, I shall make it appear, that neither any others, nor the Athenians themselves, say any thing accurate, either of their own tyrants, or of the fact. For Pisistratus dying an old man in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, (as the most think,) but Hippias, who was the eldest son, succeeded in the government.⁴ Now Harmodius being in the flower of his youth, and of great beauty, Aristogiton, a citizen of the middle condition, who was his lover, kept him. This Harmodius, having been solicited by Hipparchus the son of Pisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same to Aristogiton. He, vexed with jealousy, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him to him by force, began directly, as much as his condition would permit, to contrive how to pull down the tyranny. In the mean time, Hipparchus having again attempted Harmodius, and not prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in some secret manner, as if forsooth he did it not for that

³ Under the command of Cleomenes. Herod. book v. 64.

⁴ The point of seniority much disputed. See note, book i. c. 20. Ælian, and the author of the dialogue called "Hipparchus," make Hipparchus the eldest son of Pisistratus, while with Thucydides agree Herodotus, v. 55, Pausanias, x. 15, and Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* vol. i. Appendix, p. 236.—*Arnold.*

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

cause, to do him some disgrace. For neither was he, as to the rest of his government, burdensome to the body of the people, but he carried himself without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants practised virtue and wisdom to a great extent, and exacting of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their sacrifices worthily. In other points they were governed by the laws formerly established, save that these took care that some one of their own party should continually be in the magistracies. And amongst many that had the annual office of archon amongst the Athenians, Pisistratus also had it, the son of Hippias, who had been tyrant, of the same name with his grandfather, who also, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the temple of Apollo Pythius.⁵ And though the people of Athens, adding afterwards a greater length to that altar⁶ which was in the market-place, thereby effaced the inscription, yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these words :

“ This memorial of his rule, Pisistratus the son of Hippias
Dedicated in the sacred enclosure of Apollo Pythius.”

LV. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it by report more accurately than other men : and one may know it also by this ; for it appears, that of all the legitimate brethren,⁷ he only had children, as both the altar signifies, and also the pillar, which, for a testimony of the injustice of the tyrants, was erected in the Athenian citadel, in which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus, or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, whom he had by Myrrhine the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperochidas ; for it is probable that the eldest married first, and in the forepart of the pillar his name after his father's was the first ; not without reason, as being both next him in age, and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed do I think that Hippias could have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if his brother had died being in the power,

⁵ See book ii. 15.

⁶ Herod. book vi.

⁷ Pisistratus had four sons, of whom Hegisistratus was a bastard. See the Schol. to Aristoph. Vesp. v. 500.

and he himself had the same day set himself up; whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both through the customary fear in the people, and his diligent attention over the guard; and was not at a loss how to proceed, like a younger brother, to whom the government had not before continually been familiar. But to Hipparchus it happened, that being mentioned on account of his misfortune, he acquired for after-times the reputation of having been also tyrant.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

LVI. This Harmodius, therefore, who had denied his suit, he disgraced, as he had intended. For when some had sent a message to a sister of his, a virgin, to be present, to carry a basket in a procession, they rejected her again when she came, and said that they had never sent for her at all, as she was unworthy the honour. This was taken indignantly by Harmodius; but Aristogiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, all things were made ready for the execution of the design, only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the great Panathenæa, on which day only, such citizens as lead the procession might, without suspicion, be assembled together in arms.⁸ And they were to begin the deed themselves, but the rest were directly to help them against the guards. Now the conspirators, for their security, were not many; for they hoped that such also as were not privy to it (if any, however small the number, ventured the attempt) would be willing, as having arms too on this occasion, themselves also to assist in the recovery of their own liberty.

LVII. When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the place called Ceramicus,⁹ with his guard, and was ordering the procession there, how each particular of it was to go; but Harmodius and Aristogiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the deed. But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias, (for Hippias was very easy of access to all men,) they were afraid, and believed that they were informed against, and would presently be apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged, first upon him that had done them the

⁸ It was usual for citizens in different countries to go armed during the celebration of their festivals. See Polyb. iv. 35. Dionys. Halic. vii. 72.

⁹ There were two places of this name; one without, the other within the city.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

indignity, and for whose sake they had undergone all this danger; and, furnished as they were, ran furiously within the gates, and finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium,¹ without any regard of themselves, fell upon him, and under the influence of rage, the one through that of jealousy, and the other as having been insulted, struck and slew him. Aristogiton for the present, by means of the great concourse of people, escaped through the guard, but being taken afterwards, was not gently handled; but Harmodius was slain on the place.

LVIII. The news being brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but directly to those that were armed for the procession and were far off, so that he was with them before they heard of it; and having composed his countenance as well as he could to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place, and commanded them to repair thither without their arms. Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would say to them somewhat. But having commanded his hired guard to take those arms away, he then began directly to pick out of such as he meant to question, and whoever else was found amongst them with a dagger: for with shields and spears only were they accustomed to make the processions.

LIX. Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon a quarrel of love; and then, from sudden fear, followed this unadvised daring of Harmodius and Aristogiton.² And after this time the tyranny grew more grievous to the Athenians than it had been before. And Hippias standing now more in fear, not only put many of the citizens to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad, to see if he might get any security from them, if any change took place at home. He therefore afterwards, though an Athenian, and to a Lampsacen,³ gave his daughter Archedice unto Æantides the son of Hippocles, ty-

¹ A monument and temple erected to the daughters of Leo, Pasithea, Theope, and Eubule, who sacrificed themselves when an oracle had ordered, that to stop the pestilence some of the blood of the citizens must be shed. Cic. de Nat. Deor. iii. 19.

² The memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after held in the greatest respect. Their praises were publicly sung at the great Panathenæa. Their statues, in brass, were cast by Praxiteles, and set up in the forum. No slave was ever allowed to be called after their names.

³ A woman of Athens, a city flourishing for letters and civility, to a man of Lampsacus, a city infamous for barbarity and effeminacy.

rant of Lampsacus,⁴ knowing that they had great influence with king Darius. And her tomb is in Lampsacus, bearing this inscription: Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Archedice, the daughter of king Hippias,
who in his time,
Of all the potentates of Greece was prime,
this dust doth hide.
Daughter, wife, sister, mother, unto kings she was,
yet free from pride.⁵

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens, and was in the fourth deposed by the Lacedæmonians, and the exiled Alcæonidæ,⁶ went under truce to Sigeum,⁷ and to Æantidas at Lampsacus, and thence to king Darius, from whence, twenty years after, in his old age, he set out on the expedition to Marathon with the Medes.

LX. The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering all that it had heard and knew concerning them, were extremely bitter, and full of jealousy towards those that had been accused about the mysteries, and all appeared to them to have been done upon some oligarchical and tyrannical conspiracy.⁸ And whilst they were passionate on this surmise, many worthy men had already been cast into prison, and yet the proceedings did not appear likely to cease, but the people grew daily more savage, and sought to apprehend more still: whilst they were at this pass, a prisoner, who seemed most to be guilty,⁹ was persuaded by one of his fellow-prisoners to give information, whether it were true or not true, (for it is but conjectural on both sides, nor was there ever then or after any man that could speak certainly as to who they were that did the deed,) who brought him to it by telling him, that even though he had not done it, yet he ought [to give information,

A prisoner at Athens had charged many persons with having defaced the Mercuries.

⁴ See Herod. v. 117. Livy, xliii. 6. Now called *Lepseke* by the Turks.

⁵ The composition of Simonides, according to Arist. Rhet. i. 9. sect. 31.

⁶ A family descended from a noble citizen of Athens, named Alcæon, who, being in exile, solicited the Lacedæmonians to depose the tyrants of Athens. See Herod. v. 55.

⁷ A. C. 510. Where his natural brother Hegesistratus was governor, having been so appointed by his father. Herod. v. 94.

⁸ On this suspicion among the Athenians, comp. Aristoph. Vesp. 488.

⁹ According to Plutarch, this person was Andocides the orator, always thought to be of the oligarchical faction. The fellow-prisoner who persuaded him, one Timæus, his intimate friend.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

and thus] both save his own life by procuring immunity for himself, and deliver the city from the present suspicion. And that he would be more certain of his own safety by a free confession, than by coming to his trial if he denied it. Hereupon he accused both himself and others of the matter of the Mercuries; but the people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before, to think that they should not find out those who were conspiring against their sovereign multitude, presently set at liberty the accuser, and the rest with him, whom he had not impeached; but for those that were accused they appointed trials, and all that were apprehended they executed; and having pronounced death against such as had got away, they ordained a sum of money to be given to him that should slay them. And though it were all this while uncertain whether they that suffered were brought to punishment unjustly or no, yet the rest of the city had a manifest benefit for the present.

Alcibiades and the other accused accompany the Salamina as far as Thurii, where they make their escape.

LXI. But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took it extremely ill, through the instigation of his enemies, the same who had set themselves upon him before he sailed out; and seeing that they deemed that they had the truth about the Mercuries, the other crime also concerning the mysteries, whereof he was accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him for the same purpose of conspiracy against the people. For it fell out, moreover, whilst the city was in a tumult about this, that an army of the Lacedæmonians, of no great size, was come as far as the isthmus to manage some design with regard to the Bœotians. These therefore they thought were come thither, not on account of the Bœotians, but by his appointment, and that if they had not been beforehand in apprehending the persons, according to the information, the city had been betrayed. And one night they slept in their arms in the temple of Theseus¹ within the city. And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos were at the same time suspected of a purpose to set on the democracy there, whereupon the Athenians also delivered to the Argive democracy those hostages² of theirs which were placed in the islands, to be slain. And thus suspicion arose against Alcibiades from all sides; insomuch,

¹ There were two temples of Theseus; one in the middle of the city, near the Gymnasium; the other without, near the long wall.

² Three hundred in number, lib. v. c. 84.

that purposing to bring him to judgment, and to put him to death, they thus sent, as I have said, the galley called Salamina into Sicily, both for him and the rest with him, about whom information had been laid; but gave command to those that went, not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them, to make his defence; because they had a care not to give occasion of stir, either amongst their own or the enemies' soldiers; but especially because they desired that the Mantineans and the Argives, who they thought joined the expedition by his persuasion, might remain in the army. So he and the rest accused with him, in his own galley, in company of the Salamina, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thurii, they followed no further, but left the galley and were no more to be found; fearing indeed to sail to their trial upon the accusation. They of the Salamina made search for Alcibiades and those that were with him for a while, but not finding him, followed on their course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a vessel from Thuria into Peloponnesus; and the Athenians proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned both him and them to death.³

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Alcibiades passes into Peloponnesus.

Sentence of death

pronounced against him and his companions.

Nicias and Lamachus sail to Himera, which refuses to receive them; they take Hyccara, and deliver it to the Egestæans.

The infantry return overland to Catana.

LXII. After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily, having divided the army into two, and taken each his part by lot, sailed with the whole towards Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know if the Egestæans would furnish them the money; and also to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians, and learn the state of their differences with the Egestæans. And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily; which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of the Sicanians indeed, enemy to the Egestæans, and a sea town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the Egestæans, whose horse forces were there with them. Thence the Athenians with their land force returned through the territory of the Siculi to Catana;

³ Sentence of death was pronounced against Alcibiades, in what was called "a deserted judgment," *ἐρημη δίκη*. For when the person accused of a crime did not make his appearance, the Athenians without further trouble gave sentence against him, and this they called *ἐξ ἐρημης καταδικασθηναι*. On this point, see Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 144. (p. 287. Eng. translation.)

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
The fleet
sails round
to the al-
lies among
the Siculi.
Half the
forces
make an
unsuccess-
ful attack
on Hybla
Geleatis.

and the galleys sailed round bearing the captives. Nicias going with the fleet at once from Hyccara towards Egesta, when he had despatched with them his other business, and received thirty talents⁴ of money, returned to the army. The captives⁵ they sold, of whom there were made one hundred and twenty talents⁶ more. Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi, desiring them to send their forces; and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the territory of Gela, a hostile city, but took it not. And so ended this summer.

WINTER.
The Athe-
nians pre-
pare for an
attack on
Syracuse.

LXIII. The next winter, the Athenians immediately began to make preparation for their journey against Syracuse; and the Syracusians, on the other side, prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the Athenians had not presently, on the first fear, and expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got, as every day went on, more and more confidence; and because they appeared far from them, sailing to the further side of Sicily, and when having come to Hybla and tried to take it by force they could not, they contemned them more than ever; and required of their commanders, (as is the manner of the multitude when they have taken courage,) seeing the Athenians came not upon them, to conduct them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, who were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other insolence, asked them, whether they came not rather to found a colony with them in the land of another, than to restore the Leontines to their own land?

Stratagem
of the A-
thenian
command-
ers to draw
the Syra-
cusians as
far as pos-
sible from
the city.

LXIV. The Athenian generals observing this, and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the mean time, without impediment, going thither in the night by their ships, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for they knew they should not be able to do it so well if they disembarked in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many, would greatly annoy the light-armed, and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there: whereas thus they might

⁴ £5812 10s. sterling.

⁵ Amongst these was Lais the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl, who was carried to Corinth, where she made herself remarkable. Plut. in Nic.

⁶ £23,250 sterling.

possess themselves of a place where the horse could not do them any hurt at all worthy of mention, (now the Syracusian outlaws that were with them had told them of a place near the Olympieum, which also they seized;) I say, the Athenian generals, to bring this their purpose to effect, contrive as follows: they send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and, in the opinion of the Syracusian commanders, no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanæan, and said he came from Catana, from such and such whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well-wishers in that city. He told them, that the Athenians lay every night within the town, and far from their arms, and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed, betimes in a morning, they would come against the army, they themselves would shut out those near them, and set fire on their galleys, by which means the Syracusians assaulting the palisado, might easily win the camp; and that there were many of the Catanæans who were to help them herein, and those he came from were already prepared for it.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

LXV. The Syracusian commanders being also in all other respects confident, intended also to make preparation to go against Catana, though this messenger had not come, and did so much the more unadvisedly believe the man, and straightways having agreed on the day on which they were to be there, sent him away; and they themselves (for by this time the Selinuntians, and some other their confederates, were present) gave notice to the Syracusians to march out with their entire force. And when all their preparations were in readiness, and the day at hand on which they fixed to be there, they set forward toward Catana, and encamped the night following on the river Simæthus, in Leontina. The Athenians, when they understood they were advancing, rising with their whole army, both themselves and such of the Siculi and others as had come over to them, and going aboard their galleys and vessels in the beginning of the night, set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes, the Athenians disembarked at the place over-against the Olympieum, for the purpose of taking their camp; and the Syracusian horsemen, who had ridden up Catana before the rest, finding the whole force departed, came back to the foot and told them. Whereupon they went altogether back to the aid of the city.

The Syracusians, deceived by this stratagem, march against Catana.

Meanwhile the Athenians sail to Syracuse, and land near the Olympieum.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
They fortify their position before the return of the Syracusian army.

LXVI. In the mean time, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage, wherein it was in their own power to begin battle when they wished, and where both in and before the battle the Syracusian horsemen could least annoy them. For on one side there were walls, and houses, and trees, and a lake that fenced them; on the other side, steep rocks; and having felled the trees hard by, and brought them down to the sea side, they set up a palisado both before their galleys; and on Dascon they hastily erected a fortification, where it was most easy of access for the enemy, with stones which they picked up, and timber, and also pulled down the bridge of the Anapus. Whilst they were thus preparing, there came none to impede them from the city. The first that came to bring aid against them were the Syracusian horsemen, and by and by after, all the foot was gathered together. And though at first they came up near to the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against them, they retired again, and crossing the Helorine highway, stayed there that night.

The Syracusians take up their quarters for the night at Helorum.

The two armies engage.

LXVII. The next day, the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight, and drew up thus: the Argives and the Mantineans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half of the army which stood foremost was drawn up by eight in file; the other half at their tents, drawn up likewise eight deep, was cast into the form of a long square, and commanded to observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress, and there especially to come up to its aid. And in the midst of these, so arranged, they posted such as carried the weapons and tools of the army. The Syracusians arranged their men at arms, who were the Syracusians in their entire force, and as many of their confederates as were present, by sixteen in file,⁷ (they that came to aid them were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two hundred in all, and of the Camarinæans about twenty horsemen and fifty archers,) the cavalry they placed in the right side, being in all no less than twelve hundred, and near them the dartmen. But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down the army, from one nation to an-

⁷ See note on iv. 93.

other, to whom, and to all in general, he made the following exhortation.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Oration of Nicias to his Army.

LXVIII. “What need have I, O men, to make a long exhortation, when the battle is the thing for which we all came hither? For, in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to give you encouragement than any oration, how well soever made, if with a weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we choose, amongst so many and good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory? especially against those who come out to defend themselves in full levy, and not chosen men, as we are ourselves; and against Sicilians, who, though they contemn us, will not stand against us, their skill not being answerable to their courage. It must be remembered, also, that we be far from our own, and not near to any amicable territory, but such as we shall acquire by the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to theirs, you are to fight for your country; I say to you, you are to fight out of your country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away. For many horsemen will be upon us. Remember, therefore, every man his own worth, and charge valiantly, and think the present necessity and strait we are in to be more formidable than the enemy.”

LXIX. Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led it directly to the charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant, and the city being near, some of them were gone away; and some through haste came in running to bring aid; and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was the greatest number. For they were wanting neither in forwardness nor courage, either in this or any other battle, being no less valiant, so far as their skill could bear up, than the Athenians. But the want of this made them, even against their wills, to abate also somewhat of their courage. Nevertheless, though they thought not the Athenians would have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to defend themselves on a sudden, yet they resumed their arms, and came at once forward to the encounter. And first, the casters of stones, and slingers, and archers of either side, skir-

The Argives first, and then the Athenians, make the Syracusians give way;

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

mished in the midst between the armies, mutually chasing each other, as amongst the light-armed is wont to happen. After this, the soothsayers brought forth their sacrifices, according to the custom, and the trumpeters excited the men at arms to the charge. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country, and their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the future. On the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another, and make it their own, and not to weaken their own by being vanquished. The Argives and other free confederates, to help the Athenians to conquer the country they came against, and to return to their own with victory. And their subject-confederates came also on with great courage, principally for their present safety, which would be desperate if they overcame not, and also for the bye-reason, that by helping the Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

who are
totally
routed,
and retreat
to the city,
having
first sent a
guard to
Olympi-
eum.

LXX. After they were come to handstrokes, they resisted each for a long time; and it chanced that there happened some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning, together with a great shower of rain; insomuch that this also added to the fear of the Syracusians, who were now fighting their first battle, and not at all familiar with war; whereas to the other side, that had more experience, what took place seemed to be brought about by the season of the year; and their greatest astonishment proceeded from the so long resistance of their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians give ground, and after them the Athenians also had done the like to those that were arranged against them, then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently broken, and took to flight. But the Athenians pursued them not far, (because the Syracusian horsemen being many, and unvanquished, whensoever any men at arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them, and still drove them in again,) but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again, and erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied themselves in the Helorine Way, and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, still [though defeated] sent a guard into Olympieum, lest the Athenians should take any of the treasures there, and returned with the rest of the army into the city.

LXXI. The Athenians went not to assault the temple, but gathering together their dead, laid them on the funeral pyre, and stayed that night on the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, (of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty,) and gathered up the bones of their own,⁸ (of whom and their confederates there died above fifty,) and thus, having the spoils of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana. For it was now winter, and to make war there they thought as yet impossible, before they had sent for horsemen to Athens, and levied others amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over-mastered in horse; and before they had also both levied money there, and some more was come from Athens, and had acquired to their party certain cities, which they hoped after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto; and before they had likewise provided themselves with victuals and all other things necessary, as intending the next spring to make an attack on Syracuse.

Year 17.
A.C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
The Athenians sail away to winter at Naxos and Catana.

LXXII. And they indeed with this purpose sailed off to winter at Naxos and Catana: but the Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an assembly; and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not, in any other respects, second to any as to wisdom, and in war, both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, having stood forth, gave them encouragement, and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not so far inferior as it was likely they would have been, especially as they were fighting against the first of all the Greeks in skill; untaught persons,⁹ so to say, against experienced artificers. And that the number of their generals did them great harm, and the division of the command amongst many, (for they had fifteen generals,) and the want of order and obedience of the many. Whereas if there should be but a few and skilful leaders, and they would, by supplying armour to such as want it, get into readiness; and increase, as much as might be, the number of their men at arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason,

The Syracusians hold an assembly.

Hermocrates encourages them.

⁸ For the purpose, probably, of carrying them back to their country for burial there, as Duker remarks. Comp. on this point, Æsch. Agam. 440.

⁹ On this sense of the word, comp. Aristot. Eth. iii. 11. (p. 49. Bekk.) and also Thucyd. ii. 48.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

he said, they would have the better of the enemy ; valour being theirs already, and discipline in battle being added to it. And both of these would still grow greater : skill, by being practised with danger ; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, when joined to the confidence of skill. And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them, in very truth, to let them direct the army in what way soever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed, and all things would be put in readiness with order, and less tergiversation.

Hermocrates, Heraclides, and Sicanus are chosen commanders of the Syracusian army. Ambassadors are sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon. The Athenians through the treachery of Alcibiades fail to obtain admission into Messena. They fortify Naxos, and winter there. A trireme sent to Athens to fetch money and horsemen. The Syracusians build a wall, and put garrisons into Megara and Olympeum.

LXXIII. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised, and elected three generals ; him, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Execestus. They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as well to obtain a league with them, as also to persuade the Lacedæmonians openly in their behalf to make more vehement the war against the Athenians, thereby either to withdraw them from Sicily, or to make them the less able to send any additional aid to their army which was there already.

LXXIV. But the Athenian army at Catana sailed immediately to Messena to receive it by treason of some within, but the plot came not to effect. For Alcibiades, when he departed from his command on being sent for, being aware that he would have to become a fugitive, and knowing what was to be done, discovered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messena ; and these first slew such as were accused, and then, their faction making a tumult and being armed, obtained their object not to receive the Athenians. And the Athenians, after about thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also failing, and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxos ; and having fortified their camp with a palisado, they wintered there, and despatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen to be with them early in the spring.

LXXV. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall along their city, all the length of the side looking towards Epipolæ, including the Temenitis,¹ to the end, if in truth they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily inclosed, as when they

¹ The ground belonging to the temple of Apollo ; or rather, the statue of Apollo Temenitis, as Dr. Arnold renders it, who refers on the point to Cic. Verr. iv. 53.

were in a narrower compass. And they put a guard into Megara, and another into the Olympieum, and made palisadoes on the sea side, at all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with all the power of the city to Catana; and after they had wasted part of their territory, and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before, returned homewards. And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina, according to the league made before in the time of Laches,² to try if they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the Camarinæans had sent them those succours, which they did send to the former battle, with no great good will, and that now they would no longer be willing to aid them for the future, seeing the Athenians had the better in the battle, but would rather be persuaded to join with the Athenians upon the former league. Hermocrates therefore and others being come to Camarina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the assembly was met, Hermocrates desiring to be first in bringing charges against the Athenians, spake unto them to this effect.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

They also march to Catana, and burn the huts of the Athenians. Syracusian ambassadors sent to Camarina to oppose the Athenian embassy.

Speeches of Hermocrates and Euphemus.

Oration of Hermocrates.

LXXVI. “ Men of Camarina, we have not come as ambassadors hither through fear lest you should be affrighted at the present forces of the Athenians, but rather through fear lest their speeches which they are about to make may seduce you, before you have also heard what may be said by us. They are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed which you hear given out, but with that intention which we all suspect. And to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines, but rather our supplantation; for surely it holdeth not in reason, that they who subvert the cities yonder, should come to plant any city here: nor that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because Chalcidæans, for kindred’s sake, when they keep in servitude the Chalcidæans themselves of Eubœa,³ of whom these here are but the colonies. But they both took possession of the cities there, and attempt those that are here after one and the same fashion. For when the Ionians and the rest

² See iii. 86.

³ The subjection of Eubœa took place A. C. 445, under Pericles. See i. 114.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

of their confederates, their own colonies, had willingly made them their leaders in the war, to avenge them on the Mede, the Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, to some the not sending of their forces, to some their war among themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable criminations they could get, subdued them all to their obedience. And it was not, forsooth, for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head against the Mede; but the Athenians did it to make them serve, not the Mede, but them; and the Grecians to change their master as they did, not for one less wise, but for one more wise for evil.

LXXVII. "But in truth we come not to set forth among men who know it, in how many points the Athenian state acts unjustly, (though it be open enough to accusation,) but far rather to accuse ourselves; who, though we have the examples before our eyes, of the Grecians there brought into servitude for want of aiding each other, and though we see them now with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred, and aiding of their confederates the Egestæans, prepare to do the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better courage make them to know that we be not Ionians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, that changing, serve always the Mede or some other master; but that we are Dorians, and free men, come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country. Do we stand still till we each be taken city after city? when we know that that way only we are conquerable, and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other out with war, upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others, by using, as may seem most fit to each, some attractive words, they may have the power to do us hurt. And do we think that when our kinsman at a distance is first ruined, the danger will not come to each of us, and that he who suffers before, will suffer [only] by himself?

LXXVIII. "If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he, but the Syracusian that is the Athenians' enemy, and thinketh it a hard matter, that he should endanger himself for the territory that is mine, I would have him to consider, that he is to fight not more for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety; for that because I am not destroyed before, he thereby will not be destitute of my help, but

will have me as an ally to stand with him in the battle. Let him also consider, that the Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracusians for being enemies to him, but most especially, by pretence of me, to make themselves the stronger by his friendship. If any man here envieth, or also feareth us, (for the strongest are still liable unto both,) and would therefore wish that Syracuse may be worsted indeed, to make us more modest, but may still survive the contest, for his own safety's sake, that man conceives a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not possible that the same man should be alike the disposer both of his desires and of fortune. And if he should fail in his judgment, he might, deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to be able to envy my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to him that has abandoned me, and who has been unwilling to undertake the same dangers, which are not concerning mere names, but matters of great import. For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is his own safety any one would defend. And it was most fitting that you men of Camarina that are our borderers, and likely to have the second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this, and not as now have aided us so remissly. You should rather have come to us, and that which, if the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you would in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should now also have been seen equally to exhort us to, that in no respect we might give in. But, as yet, neither you nor any of the rest have been so forward.

LXXIX. “Perhaps through fear you mean to observe what you call an even course, both with regard to us and those who advance against us, alleging your league with the Athenians, which you made not any how against your friends, but against your enemies, in case any should invade you; and for the purpose of aiding the Athenians when they are wronged by others, but not when (as now) they wrong their neighbours; for not even the Rhegians, who are Chalcidæans, are willing to help them in replanting the Leontines, being also Chalcidæans. And then it were a hard case, if they, suspecting a bad action under a fair justification, are cautious without a reason,⁴ and you under a

⁴ On these words Goeller thus remarks: ἀλογως σωφρονειν, est “caute agere, ita tamen ut rationem agendi tuam non defendere possis.” Eodem sensu (not to be justified) ἀλογον aderat, i. 32.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

plausible pretence wish to aid your natural enemies, and help them that most hate you, to destroy your more natural kindred. But this is no justice; but to aid us [would be justice], and not to stand in fear of their preparation. Which if we hold together is not terrible, but is, if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be disunited, since neither when they came against us alone by ourselves, and had the upper hand in battle, could they yet effect their purpose, but quickly went their way.

LXXX. "There is no reason therefore we should be afraid, if we are all together, but that we should have the better will to unite ourselves in a league; and the rather, because aid will come from Peloponnesus, who every way excel these men in military matters. Nor should you think that your purpose to aid neither, as being in league with both, is either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves. For it is not so just in substance, as it is in the pretence. For if through want of your aid the assailed perish, and the stronger party [which is the assailant] become victor, what do you by this same neutrality but leave the safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil?⁵ Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged, and, at the same time, with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily, and keep the Athenians, your friends, as they call themselves, from an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that to demonstrate plainly to you, or to any other, the thing you already know, is no hard matter; but we pray you, and, moreover, if we shall not persuade you, we protest, that we are plotted indeed against by the Ionians, who have ever been our enemies, but are betrayed by you, who are Dorians as well as we. And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet in their own name only will they have the honour of it. And for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but even the authors of their victory. But if the victory fall unto us, you shall undergo the penalty for being the cause of our dangers. Consider therefore now, and take your choice, whether you will have servitude without the present danger; or saving yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master, and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting."

⁵ Or more literally, "what else do you do by this same absence from either party, but not aid the one side so that they should be saved, and not prevent the other from becoming wicked."

LXXXI. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him, Euphemus, the ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

Oration of Euphemus.

LXXXII. “ Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing the Syracusian has attacked us, it is necessary we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself mentioned, [in that he said] that the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. And it is true. For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some means or other how best to free ourselves from subjection to the Peloponnesians that are Dorians, more in number than we, and dwelling near us. After the Median war, having acquired a navy, we were thereby delivered from the command and leading of the Lacedæmonians, there being no cause why they should rather be commanders of us than we of them, save only that they were then the stronger. And when we were made commanders of those Grecians who before were under the king, we took on us the government of them, because we thought, that having power in our hands to defend ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponnesians. And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders, whom the Syracusians say we brought into bondage, being our kindred, not without just cause; for they came with the Mede against us, their mother city, and for fear of losing what they had, durst not revolt as we did, who abandoned our very city. But as they were content to serve, so they would have imposed the same condition upon us.⁶

LXXXIII. “ For these causes we took upon us our dominion over them, both as worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians; whereas they with the like promptness in favour of the Mede did us hurt; and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength against the Peloponnesians. And we do not make grand speeches, such as that seeing we alone have pulled down the Barbarian, therefore have right to command, as having put ourselves into danger more for the liberty of these men, than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides. Now to seek means for one’s own preservation is a thing unblamcable in all. And as it is for the sake of our own

⁶ See Herod. book viii.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

safety that we are now here, so also we find that the same will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain, from those very things which they accuse, and you as most formidable suspect us of; being assured that such as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an oration, yet afterwards, when the matter comes to performance, will then do as shall be for their advantage. We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder on fear; and that on the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our friends to settle matters safely here, and not to bring any one into subjection, but rather to keep you from it.

LXXXIV. “And let no man object that we be solicitous for you, who are nothing to us, considering that as long as you be preserved, and are able to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending forces to the Peloponnesians. And in this point you are very much to us; and for the same reason it is meet also that we replant the Leontines, not in subjection, as their kindred in Eubœa, but as powerful as may be, that being near, they may from their own territory harass the [Syracusians] in our behalf. For as for our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies without their help, and the Chalcidæan (whom having made a slave yonder, the [Syracusan] said, we absurdly pretend to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there, being without arms, paying money only; but the Leontines, and our other friends here, are the most profitable to us when they are most in liberty.

LXXXV. “Now to any man who has supreme power, or to a city that hath rule, nothing can be thought absurd, if profitable, nor any man a relation, who may not be trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, to suit the several occasions. But here it is for our benefit, not to weaken our friends, but to manage by our friends’ strength to weaken our enemies. This you must needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command over our confederates, as every of them may be most useful to us. The Chians and Methymnæans redeem their liberty with providing us some galleys: the most of the rest with a tribute of money in a somewhat more pressing manner. Some, again, of our confederates are absolutely free,⁷ notwith-

⁷ Such were the Cephallenians and Zacynthians among the islanders, and also the Messenians at Naupactus; the Plataeans, while their city yet stood;

standing that they be islanders, and easy to be subdued. The reason whereof is this, they are situate in places commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable, therefore, that here also affairs will be so ordered, as shall be most for our own turn, and most according to our fear (as we told you) of the Syracusians. For they seek the dominion over you; and wish, by uniting [to themselves] you through suspicion of us, themselves by force, or (if we go home without effect) by your want of friends, to have the sole command of Sicily. Which, if you join with them, must of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy for us to bring so great forces again together, nor will the Syracusians want strength to subdue you if we be absent.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

LXXXVI. “Him that thinketh otherwise the fact itself refuteth; for when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you held out before us was none but this, that if we allowed the Syracusians to subdue you, we thereby should participate of the danger. And it were unjust that you now should distrust the very same argument with which you would needs then persuade us; or that we should be held in suspicion because of the much strength we bring against the power of the Syracusians, when much rather you should give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here without you; and if becoming perfidious, we should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold them; both because of the length of the voyage, and for want of means of guarding them, because they be great, and provided after the manner of cities of the continent. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater power than this camp of ours, are always laying plots against you: and when they get an opportunity against any of you, will be sure not to let it slip. This they have already made to appear, both in their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we on the other side invite you to a far more real safety, and pray you not to betray that safety, which we both of us hold from one another at this present time, but to consider that they by

the Acarnanians, with the exception of the *Æniadae*, (see i. 3; ii. 102; iii. 7.) though these were afterwards subdued, iv. 77; the *Amphiloichians*, and at a subsequent period the *Samians*, viii. 21.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

their own number have way to you always, though without confederates, whereas to you the opportunity will but seldom offer to have so great an aid again with which to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when its coming could no more do you good.

LXXXVII. "But (Camarinæans) be neither you nor the others persuaded by their calumnies. We have told you the entire truth why we are suspected; and summarily we will remind you of it again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We say we command yonder, lest else we should be forced to obey any one; and we are freeing the cities here, lest else we should be harmed by them. Many things we are forced to be doing, because many things we have to beware of. And both now and before we came not uncalled, but called as confederates to such of you as suffer wrong. Try not, making yourselves judges of what we do, nor as censors to divert us, (which were now hard to do); but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for your own service, so far take and use it. And think not that the same is hurtful alike to all, but that it profits far the greatest part of the Grecians. For in all places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that thinketh he shall be wronged, and he that plotteth to do wrong, through the ready hope that the one hath of gaining our aid, and the ever-present expectation that the other hath of their own danger if we should come,⁸ are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against his will, the other into safety without his trouble. Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us that require it, and to yourselves. But do as others are wont to do; join with us, and instead of defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your turn once, and lay your plans in return against them, as they have done against you."

The Camarinæans

LXXXVIII. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinæans

⁸ Or, "that they will not be without danger or fear in running the risk," or, "that they will run the risk of being in danger, if we come." Dr. Arnold paraphrases thus: "both having a near prospect ever at hand, the one, of getting aid from us, the other, that, if we come, we are likely to put him in some jeopardy, are equally forced, the one to forbear against his will, the other to be saved with no trouble of his own."

stood thus affected: they bare good will to the Athenians, save so far as they thought they wanted to subjugate Sicily; and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they were not less afraid lest that the Syracusians, who were near them, should, though without them, gain the victory, they had both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the future rather to help the Syracusians, but in reality as sparingly as was possible; and withal, that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal answer unto both. So after deliberation had, they answered thus: that forasmuch as they, between whom there happens to be war, were both of them their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to neither.

And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways, and the Syracusians made preparation for the war among themselves. The Athenians being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi, to procure as many of them as they might to their side. Of whom, such as inhabited the plain, and were subject to the Syracusians, for the most part held off; but they that dwelt in the inland parts of the island, (whose dwelling-places⁹ had been ever before unconquered by an enemy,) except a few, forthwith joined with the Athenians, and brought down corn to the army, and some of them also money. Against those that did not join them, the Athenians made expeditions, and some they forced to come over, but as to others they were prevented by the Syracusians sending garrisons and aids. And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana, and re-erected their camp, formerly burnt by the Syracusians. They sent a galley to Carthage to procure amity, and what help they could from thence; and into Tyrrhenia, because some cities there had of their own accord promised to take their part in the war. They sent about likewise to the Siculi, and to Egesta, appointing them to send in all the horse they could; and made ready bricks and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary for the circumvallation, and every other thing they needed, as intending to take in hand vigorously the war early the next spring.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

through fear of the Syracusians resolve to assist them in future. But at present (on account of the recent victory of the Athenians) give an equal answer to both.

The Athenians at Naxos bring over many of the Siculi to their side.

They send ambassadors to Carthage and to Tyrrhenia, and make preparations for the attack of Syracuse in the spring.

⁹ Dr. Arnold well remarks, that this word is chosen preferably to *πολεις*, or even *κωμαι*, to denote the absolutely barbarian habits of these Siculi.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
The Syracusan ambassadors arrive at Corinth, and persuade the Corinthians to aid them, and also to send an embassy with them to Lacedæmon.

Alcibiades arrives at Lacedæmon, and addresses the Lacedæmonians; who, on hearing him, resolve to fortify Decelea, and send some troops to Sicily immediately.

The ambassadors of Syracuse, who were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as they sailed by, endeavoured also to persuade the Italians not to overlook or permit what was done by the Athenians, as being intended equally against them. Being come to Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid upon the title of consanguinity.¹ The Corinthians having forthwith for their own part decreed cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these to Lacedæmon, to help them to persuade the Lacedæmonians, both to make a more open war against the Athenians at home, and to send some forces also into Sicily. At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow-fugitives; who immediately, upon their escape, passed over from Thuria first to Cyllene, the haven of the Eleans, in a merchant ship, and afterwards went thence to Lacedæmon, sent for by the Lacedæmonians themselves under public security; for he feared them for his doings about Mantinea. And it fell out, that in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians, and Alcibiades, making all of them the same request, persuaded the Lacedæmonians. Now the ephors and magistrates, though intending to send ambassadors to Syracuse, to hinder them from coming to terms with the Athenians, being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades having stood forth, roused the anger of the Lacedæmonians, and incited them with words to this effect.

Oration of Alcibiades.

LXXXIX. “It is necessary that I say something first concerning the prejudice about myself, lest through jealousy of me you bring an unwilling ear to what concerns us in common. My ancestors having on a certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving you,² I was the man that restored the same again, and shewed you all possible respect, both otherwise, and in the matter of your loss at Pylos. Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, you, in the course of coming to an agreement with the Athenians, by managing the same through my adversaries, invested them with authority, and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in applying myself afterwards to the affairs of

¹ Corinth being the mother city of Syracuse, vid. vi. 3.

² See book v. c. 43.

the Mantinæans and Argives, or in any thing else that I opposed you, ye were injured, you were so justly. And if any man here were causelessly angry with me then, when he suffered, let him now be content again, when he knows the true cause of the same. Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let him consider that therein also he is offended without a cause. For we have been always enemies to tyrants, and whatever is contrary to a tyrant is called democracy; and from thence hath continued our adherence to the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it was necessary in most things to follow the present course; nevertheless, we have endeavoured to be more moderate in political affairs than suiteth with the now headstrong humour of the people. But others³ there have been, both formerly and now, that have incited the common people to the most evil resolves, and they are those that have also driven out me. And we have been the leaders of the democratical government, thinking it right, by what form it was grown most great and most free, and in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though such of us as have judgment do know well enough what democracy is, and I no less than another, (inso-much as I could [with justice] inveigh against it, but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new,) yet we thought it not safe to change it, when you, our enemies, were so near us.

XC. "Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what you are to consult of, and I, if I know any thing which yourselves do not, to suggest, hear it now. We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians; after them, the Italians; after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself. If these, or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we would have made an attempt on Peloponnesus, bringing with us the accession both of the Greek forces thence, and hiring many Barbarians, Iberians, and others of those parts, confessed to be

³ "Namely, the high aristocratical party; for Thessalus the son of Cimon (Plutarch. Alcib. 22.) was the person who accused him. Comp. also vi. 15. 28, 29." This, the opinion of Dr. Arnold, Mr. Thirlwall (iii. 407.) considers improbable, and thinks that the natural interpretation is to be found in viii. 67, where the demagogue Androcles is said to have been the man who had most share in driving out Alcibiades.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

the most warlike of the Barbarians that are now. We should also have built many galleys, besides these which we have already, (there being plenty of timber in Italy,) with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also with our land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land, taking the cities, some by assault and some by siege, we hoped easily to have conquered it, and afterwards to have got the dominion of all Greece. As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we should have conquered there, without what accrues to us here, would sufficiently have furnished us.

XCI. " Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is the design of the armament now gone, and which the generals who remain there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Understand next, that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly hold out. For the Sicilians, though unskilled, yet if they unite, may now even survive the contest; but the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten in battle, being also inclosed in by the fleet, will not be able to resist the forces of the Athenians already there. And if that city should be taken, all Sicily is had,⁴ and soon after Italy also, and the danger from thence, which I foretold you, would not be long ere it fell upon you, (and so let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only, but also of Peloponnesus,) unless this be done with speed; and do you send thither in ships such an army as being on board may row themselves, and landing, presently be ready as heavy-armed. And (which I think more useful than the army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there, and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good to make war more openly upon them here, that the Syracusians, seeing your care, may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send additional forces to their army. You ought likewise to fortify Decelca, in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most, is to know certainly what he most feareth, and to bring the same upon him.

⁴ Or this word may mean, as Mr. Bloomfield prefers, "hangs by it," "depends upon it."

For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most, as having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the advantages which yourselves shall reap and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal,⁵ will come most of it unto you, partly taken, and partly of its own accord. Of the revenue of the silver mines in Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they have from their land, or from their courts of justice, they will presently be deprived. And, which is worst, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in their revenue, and will care little for the Athenians, if they believe once that the war is waged by you to the utmost.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

XCII. "That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, (men of Lacedæmon,) it resteth only in yourselves: for I am confident, and I think I shall not err in my judgment, that all these things are possible to be done. Now I must crave this, that I be neither the worse esteemed for that having once been thought a lover of my country, I attack it now with the greatest enemies of the same; nor yet my words mistrusted, as spoken with the zeal of a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of them that drove me out, I shall not (if you take my counsel) fly your profit. Nor are you enemies so much, who have on any occasion hurt but your enemies, as they are, that have made enemies of friends. I love not my country as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it. Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine, but that I far rather seek to recover the country I have not. And he is truly a lover of his country, not that refuseth to invade the country he hath wrongfully lost, but that desires so much to be in it, that by any means he can, he will attempt to recover it. I desire you, therefore, (Lacedæmonians,) confidently to make use of my service, in whatsoever danger or labour, seeing you know, (according to the saying held forward by all,⁶) if I did hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend; and so much the more, in that I know the state of Athens, and but conjectured

⁵ That is, the whole stock of the country, both live and dead; such as cattle, slaves, sheep, farms, &c. as Dr. Arnold explains. Mr. Bloomfield refers it only to the slaves; and renders, "those by whom the country is cultivated."

⁶ *φύλαδων* is perhaps understood, as Mr. Bloomfield suggests.

Year 17.
A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

at yours. And considering you are now in deliberation upon matters of so extreme importance, I pray you not to hold back from undertaking the expedition both into Sicily and Attica, as well to preserve the great advantages you have there with the presence of a small part of your force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians, both present and to come; and afterwards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece; not forced, but voluntary, and with their good affection."

Gylippus is appointed commander in chief of the Syracusians.

XCI. Thus spake Alcibiades. And the Lacedæmonians, though before this they had a purpose of their own accord to send an expedition against Athens, but had delayed and neglected it, yet when he instructed them on each particular, they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving that what they had heard was from him that most perfectly knew it. Insomuch as they set their minds already upon the fortifying of Decelea, and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily for the present. And having assigned Gylippus the son of Cleandridas unto the Syracusians for chief commander, they bade him to consider, both with them and the Corinthians, how best, (for their present means,) and with greatest speed, some help might be conveyed unto them in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys at once to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve. And having agreed upon these things, they departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme returns from Athens, with a promise of supplies and horsemen.

And the galley also arrived at Athens, which the generals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians, upon hearing, decreed to send both the provision and the horsemen to the army. So the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR XVIII. A. C. 414. OLYMP. 91. 3.

SPRING. The Athenians in Sicily ravage the territory of Megara-Hyblæa, and also the corn fields near

XCIV. In the very beginning of the spring of the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily weighed anchor from Catana, and sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily; the inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out, and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here, they wasted the fields; and having come to a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not

taking it, they went again by the coast, part by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And having gone up to the plain fields, wasted the same, and burnt up their corn; and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them; and having set up a trophy, went all again aboard their galleys. Thence they returned to Catana, and took in victual; and then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the Siculi, and having brought it over to them on conditions, they departed, and in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessæans and the Hyblæans. Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the furniture, as horses were to be supplied them from Sicily; and thirty archers on horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.⁷

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.
the river
Tereas.
They then
return to
Catana,
whence
they
march to
Centoripa,
which
they oblige
to surren-
der.
Two hun-
dred and
fifty horse-
men, thirty
archers,
and three
hundred
talents of
silver ar-
rive from
Athens.

XCV. The same spring, the Lacedæmonians made an expedition against Argos, and went as far as to Cleonæ; but an earthquake happening, they went home again. And the Argives after this invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their own, and took a great booty from the Lacedæmonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents.⁸

The Lacedæmoni-
ans ad-
vance
against the
Argives as
far as Cle-
onæ.
The Ar-
gives in-
vade and
plunder
Thyrea.
The popu-
lar party
at Thespiæ
attempt a
revolution,
which is
put down
by the as-
sistance of
the The-
bans.

Not long after, the commons of Thespiæ set upon them that had the government, but did not obtain the superiority; but the Thebans having come to the assistance of those in power, they were part apprehended, and part escaped to Athens.

XCVI. The Syracusians, the same summer, when they heard that the horsemen were come to the Athenians, and that they were now about to come against them, conceiving that unless the Athenians got Epipolæ, a rocky ground, and lying just over the city, they themselves would not, even though they were conquered in battle, easily be inclosed with a wall, intended, therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a guard. For the rest of the place is high and steep, but sloping down to the city by degrees, and every thing within the city is [thence] wholly subject to the eye. And it is called by the Syracusians, Epipolæ, because it lieth above the level of the rest. The Syracusians coming out of the city with their whole power into the meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fellow-commanders had just received their office,) held a review of their men at

The Syra-
cusians re-
view their
troops, and
set apart
six hun-

⁷ £58,125.

⁸ £4,843 15s.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

dred
chosen
men, under
the com-
mand of
Diomilus,
as a garri-
son for E-
pipolæ.

The Athe-
nians land
their forces
unper-
ceived at
Leon, and
(having
sent their
fleet to
Thapsus)
march to
Epipolæ
before the
Syracu-
sians have
occupied
it.

The Syra-
cusians
rush to the
defence of
Epipolæ,
but are de-
feated with
the loss of
Diomilus
and three
hundred
men.

The Athe-
nians build
a fort on
Labda-
lum, the
highest
peak of
Epipolæ.

The Athe-
nians mus-
ter six
hundred
and fifty
horse.

They take
post at
Syca, and

arms; and first they had set apart six hundred men at arms, under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolæ, and to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of their service.

XCVII. The Athenians, the day following this night, having been already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces, and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, unperceived, and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is a chersonese, (or peninsula,) with a narrow isthmus, lying out into the sea, not far distant from Syracuse neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a palisado across the said isthmus, lay there quiet. But the land soldiers marched at full speed toward Epipolæ, and were beforehand in getting up by Euryalus before the Syracusians had perceived it, and could come to them from out of the meadow where they were mustering. Nevertheless they came on, every one with what speed he could; not only Diomilus with his six hundred, but the rest also. They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty-five furlongs, before they could reach the enemy: the Syracusians, therefore, coming up in this manner against them rather out of order, and being thereby defeated in battle at Epipolæ, withdrew themselves into the city. And Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce, and came down the next day to the city. But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again, and built a fort upon Labdalum, on the very top of the precipices of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, for a place to keep their utensils and money in, when they went forth either to fight or to work at the wall [of circumvallation].

XCVIII. Not long after, there came unto them from Eggesta three hundred horsemen; and from the Siculi, namely, the Naxians and some others, about one hundred; and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty; for whom they had horses, part from the Eggestæans and Catanæans, and part they bought. So that there were gathered together, in the whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca,⁹ where,

⁹ Tyca, or Tycha; it was a temple of Fortune, part of the city of Syracuse.

having taken up a position, they raised the wall in circle very quickly, so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who therefore coming forth, intended to have given them battle, and no longer to have neglected the matter. But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusian generals perceiving their own to be in disarray, and not easily to be drawn up, led them again into the city, save only a certain part of their horsemen, who, staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone, and straggling far abroad from their camp. But the Athenians, with one squadron of men at arms, together with their whole number of horse, charged the horsemen of the Syracusians, and put them to flight. Of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle of horse.

XCIX. The next day, the Athenians fell to work, some in building the north side of their circular wall,¹ and some fetching stone and timber, which they regularly laid down toward the place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall would come with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power against the Athenians any more, but it seemed fit rather in the way where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a counter-wall, which if they could but do, before the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their further building. And if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it, they might send part of their army to defend it, and pre-occupy the accesses to it with a palisado; and if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore they came out, and beginning at their own city, drew a cross wall beneath the circular fortification of the Athenians, and set wooden towers upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Syracusians were masters of the places near the sea; and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.
commence
their wall
of circum-
vallation.
The Syra-
cusian ca-
valry im-
pede their
opera-
tions, but
are at last
routed,
and some
slain.

The Syra-
cusians
build a
counter-
wall, in
order to
stop the
progress
of the
Athenian
works.

¹ Literally, to borrow the words of Mr. Bloomfield's excellent translation, "were building the wall at the north part of the line of circumvallation."

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

They leave a garrison to defend this wall, and retire with the rest of their army into the city.

The Athenians destroy the water-pipes of the city. Three hundred chosen Athenians attack and carry the counter-wall, which is demolished by the whole of their army.

C. The Syracusians, when they thought both the palisado and the building of their counter-wall sufficient, and considering that the Athenians came not to impede them in the work, as being afraid lest, if they should divide their army, the Syracusians should fight with them more easily, and also as they [the Athenians] were hasting to make an end of their own wall wherewith to encompass the city, left one squadron for a guard of their works, and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town; and having observed also, that about noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and that such as were remaining at the palisado kept but negligent watch, they appointed three hundred chosen men, and certain others picked out of the light troops and armed in full armour, to run suddenly with all speed to that counter-wall of the Syracusians. The rest of the army divided in two, went one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city; and the other with the other general to the palisado, next to the little gate. The three hundred assaulted and took the palisado; the guard whereof forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground, and with them entered also their pursuers, but after they were in, were beaten out again by the Syracusians, and some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then the whole army went back together, and pulled down the wall, and plucked up the palisado, the pales whereof they carried among them to their camp, and erected a trophy.

The Syracusians draw a palisado across the marsh, and dig a ditch, both of which are carried by the Athenians.

CI. The next day, the Athenians continued their circular wall building onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of Epipolæ looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the haven for their wall to come through the plain and marsh was the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again, and made another palisado, beginning at the city, through the middle of the marsh, and dug also a ditch at the side of it to prevent the Athenians from bringing their wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their work, as far as to the crag, assaulted the palisado and trench of the Syracusians again; and having commanded their galleys to sail about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syracuse, about break of day, went straight down into the

plain; and passing through the marsh, where the ground was clay, and firmest, placing over it boards (or doors) and broad planks, and passing over upon them, won both the trench and palisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morning, and the rest they took not long after. And here also they fought, and the victory fell to the Athenians. The Syracusians, those of the right wing fled to the city, and they of the left to the river. The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched at full speed towards the bridge;² but the Syracusians, fearing to be prevented, (for most of the horsemen were in this number,) set upon these three hundred, and both put them to flight, and make a charge upon the right wing of the Athenians; and when they fell upon them, the foremost squadron of the wing was also thrown into consternation. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the left wing of their own, and with the Argives, and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was separated from the rest and slain, with some five or six of those with them. These the Syracusians hastily snatched up, and carried into a place of safety beyond the river. And when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them, they retired.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

The Syracusians are routed, but rally and attack the three hundred chosen Athenians, who dispute with their left wing the passage of the river. They then attack the Athenian right, a battalion of which is seized with panic. Lamachus going to their assistance is slain. The Syracusians retire.

CII. In the mean time, they that fled at first to the city, when they saw these things taking place, took heart again, and re-arranged themselves against the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before, and also sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolæ; supposing to find it without defendants, and so to take it. And they took and demolished the outwork ten plethers³ in length; but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it through infirmity. For he commanded his servants to set fire on all the engines, and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall, knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves through want of men. And it fell out accordingly. For by reason of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were coming up to bring aid to the circular wall; and their galleys also, as

Those in the city issue from thence. A party of them attack the Athenian wall, but are compelled to retire by a fire kindled by order of Nicias. Another party attack the Athenians below, but are also repulsed. The Athenian fleet

² The bridge of the river Anapus.

³ Ten plethers, six hundred and eighty cubits; a plether containing, according to Suidas, sixty-eight cubits.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.
arrives
from
Thapsus.
The Syra-
cusians
retire into
the city.

The Athe-
nians
proceed to
blockade
Syracuse.

Many of
the Siculi
come over
to them.

The Syra-
cusians
treat with
Nicias
concern-
ing a capi-
tulation.

They dis-
place their
command-
ers, and
appoint
new ones.

Gylippus
and Py-
then arrive
at Leucas,
and cross
with four
vessels
to Taras,
whence
they pro-
ceed to
Thuria,
the inha-
bitants
of which
refuse to
join them.

it had been commanded, sailed down from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they and the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city; with opinion that they could no longer hinder them with the strength they now had from bringing their wall through unto the sea.

CIII. After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians their dead, under truce, and got back the body of Lamachus, and of the rest slain with him. And their whole army, both land and sea forces, being now together, they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall, from Epipolæ and the rocks unto the sea side. The necessaries of the army were supplied from all parts of Italy: and many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athenians, to whom came also three Penteconteri [long-boats of fifty oars apiece] from Tyrrenia; and in divers other ways matters went on according to their hopes. For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from Peloponnesus, no longer considered they could gain the superiority in war, but conferred, both amongst themselves and with Nicias, concerning coming to terms: for Lamachus being dead, the sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing was concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before) were proposed unto Nicias, and more discussed amongst themselves. And the present ill success had also bred some jealousy amongst them, one of another. And they dismissed from their command the generals under whose conduct these affairs happened, as if their harm had come either from their unluckiness, or from their perfidiousness, and chose Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias in their places.

CIV. Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedæmon and the Corinthian galleys were already at Leucas, purposing with all speed to bring aid to Sicily. But when terrible reports came to them, all agreeing in the untruth, that Syracuse was already quite enclosed with a wall of circumvallation, Gylippus had hope of Sicily no longer, but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen, the Corinthian, with two Laconic and two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the Ionic sea to Tarentum, and the Corinthians were to man ten galleys of their own, two of Leucas, and three of Ambracia, and come after. Gylippus

went first from Tarentum to Thuria, as ambassador, by his father's ⁴ right, who was free of the city of Tarentum, but not being able to attach them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along the coast of Italy. Passing by the Terinæan gulf, he was carried from the shore, (by a wind which blows with great violence there, when in the north quarter,) and driven into the main sea; and after another extreme tempest, brought in again into Tarentum, where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather, and repaired them. But Nicias, although he had heard that he was set out, contemned the small number of his galleys, which sentiment the Thurians also entertained; and he thought they sailed appointed rather for the intention of plundering, and as yet took no guard against them.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

They are driven by a storm back to Taras.

Nicias keeps no look out on the movements of Gylippus.

CV. About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians invaded the territory of Argos, they and their confederates, and wasted a great part of their land. And the Athenians aided the Argives with thirty galleys, which most manifestly broke the truce between them and the Lacedæmonians. For before they went out from Pylos on plundering incursions, and coasting round made descents into the other parts of the Peloponnesus rather than into the Laconian territory, and waged war with the Argives and Mantineans;⁵ nay, when the Argives had often entreated them but only to land with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted with them even the least portion of their territory to return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Læspodias,⁶ and Demaratus, they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera, and in Prasia and in other places wasted the country, and gave unto the Lacedæmonians a most justifiable cause to

The Lacedæmonians invade Argos.

The Athenians send thirty ships to Epidaurus Limera, and ravage Prasia.

⁴ Cleandridas, the father of Gylippus, had been guardian to Pleistoanax during the expedition against the Athenians, (see i. 114,) and on his return, having been accused and condemned of having received bribes from Pericles to lead back the expedition, went into exile to Thurium; of which city he obtained the freedom.—*Haack*.

⁵ The sentence Mr. Bloomfield prefers to connect with the *μαλλον* preceding, which alters to the sense as follows: "they carried on hostilities by making descents rather into the rest of the Peloponnesus, than into Laconia, or by carrying on war (as now) in conjunction with the Argives and Mantineans."

⁶ Mentioned also in viii. 86. See also Aristoph. *Aves*. 1568.

Year 18. fight against the Athenians. After this, the Athenians being
A. C. 414. departed from Argos with their galleys, and the Lacedæmonians
Ol. 91. 3. gone likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia; and when
The Ar- they had wasted part of their territory, and killed some of their
gives invade and men, returned homewards.
ravage
Phliasia.

BOOK VII.

GYLIPPUS and Pythen having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrîi. And having had more certain intelligence now, that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but that coming with an army, there was entrance still by Epipolæ, they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on their right hand, and adventure into the town by sea; or on the left, and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as many other as they could persuade to join their side, to go into it by land. And it was resolved to sail towards Himera; the rather because the four Attic galleys which Nicias (though he contemned them before) had now, when he heard they were at Locri, sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. Having anticipated this guard, they crossed the strait, and touching at Rhegium and Messena by the way, came to Himera. Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeræans, that they not only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with arms such of the mariners of Gylippus and Pythen as wanted them, (for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land,) and likewise sent to the Selinuntians to meet them at a place assigned, with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other of the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many; being much the more willing to come to their side, both because Archonidas was lately dead, who reigning over some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to the Athenians, and also because Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedæmon with a good will to the business. Gylippus taking with him of his own mariners and sea soldiers, for whom he had got arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeræans, heavy-armed and light-armed, in the whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians, with some few horse of the Geloans, and of the

Year 18.
 A. C. 414.
 Ol. 91. 3.
 Gylippus
 and Py-
 then sail
 to the
 Locri Epi-
 zephyrii,
 thence
 (after
 touching
 at Rhe-
 gium and
 Messene)
 to Himera,
 where
 they lay
 up their
 ships, and
 proceed
 overland
 to Syra-
 cuse.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

Gongylus
the Co-
rinthian
arrives at
Syracuse
before
Gylippus,
and en-
courages
the Syra-
cusians,
who go out
to meet the
expected
reinforce-
ment.

Gylippus
ascends by
Euryalus,
and
marches
with the
Syra-
cusians
against the
Athenian
wall.

He en-
camps at
Temenites,
and the
next day
ranges his
troops
before the
Athenian
wall.

Siculi, in all about one thousand, marched with these towards Syracuse.

II. Meanwhile, the Corinthians, with the rest of the galleys, putting to sea from Leucas, went to aid Syracuse, every one with what speed he could, and Gongylus,¹ one of the Corinthian commanders, though with one galley he was the last that set forth, arrived first at Syracuse, and but a little before the coming of Gylippus; and finding them ready to call an assembly about putting an end to the war, he hindered them from it, and put them in heart, relating both how the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, for general, sent to them by the Lacedæmonians. With this the Syracusians were re-confirmed, and went directly out with their whole army to meet him; for they understood now that he was near. He, having taken Geta, a fort in his way as he passed through the territory of the Siculi, and having drawn up his men in order, comes to Epipolæ, and getting up by Euryalus, where also the Athenians had got up before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven, save only a little next the sea; on this they were yet at work. And on the other side of their circular wall towards Trogilus to the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready on the place, and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger into which Syracuse was now brought.

III. The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus and the Syracusians, though somewhat disturbed at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them, saying, that if they would abandon Sicily within five days, taking with them what belonged to them, he was ready to give them truce. Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer. After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one against another; but Gylippus seeing the Syracusians in disorder, and not easily falling into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification. And Gylippus, seeing he came not up, withdrew his army to the

¹ Killed in the first onset, according to Plutarch.

height called Temenites, where they passed the night. The next day he drew out the greatest part of his army, and arranged them before the fortifications of the Athenians, that they might not send succour to any other place, but a part also he sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those they found within it. For the place was out of sight to the Athenians. The same day also an Athenian galley is captured by the Syracusians as it was riding off the harbour.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.
A detachment of his troops take Labdalum.
An Athenian trireme taken by the Syracusians.

IV. After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a single wall through Epipolæ, from the city in a cross direction² upwards; that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be no longer able to enclose them. And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to the sea, were come up again; and Gylippus (for some part of their wall was but weak) moving his army by night, went to assault it; but the Athenians when they perceived it (for they happened to be passing the night without the wall) went against him; which Gylippus perceiving, again led his men back. And the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part themselves, and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their confederates, fixing where each was to keep guard. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called Plemyrion, (it is a promontory over-against the city, which extending into the entrance of the great haven, makes narrow the mouth of the same,) which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For by this means their galleys might ride nearer to the haven³ of the Syracusians, and not, upon every motion of the navy of the enemies,⁴ have to come out against them, as now, from the extreme corner of the [great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea, seeing his hopes by land diminished, since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore

The Syracusians commence building a wall, in order to intersect that of the Athenians.

Nicias builds three forts at Plemyrion. Many of his men are slain by Syracusian cavalry stationed at Polichne.

² In this passage I have followed Haack, who takes the words by themselves, and renders *προς το ἐγκαρσιον*, "in obliquum;" which is also followed by Dr. Arnold, whose note is, "they began to carry a single wall up the hill of Epipolæ in a cross direction, i. e. to cross the line of the Athenian wall." Goeller, on the contrary, repeats the word *τειχος* after *ἐγκαρσιον*, and understands it of that cross-wall mentioned in vi. 101.

³ Viz. the lesser haven.

⁴ Either the Athenians or the Syracusians may be the nominative to the verb *κινωνται*: I have followed the Schol. and Dr. Arnold in referring it to the latter.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage, and where now also both the great vessels of burden and the swift galleys rode at anchor. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out also to fetch in wood, they were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusian horsemen who were masters of the field. For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry was posted in Polichne, close to Olympieum, to keep those in Plemyrion from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the Corinthian galleys, and sent out a guard of twenty galleys, with orders to keep on the watch for them about Locri and Rhegium, and the passage there into Sicily.

Nicias sends twenty ships to lie in wait for the expected Corinthian fleet.

Gylippus continues the wall.

V. Gylippus in the mean time went on with the wall through Epipolæ, using the stones laid ready there for their own use by the Athenians, and also continually drew out the Syracusians and their confederates before the same, and ever as he brought them forth, put them into their order; and the Athenians on the other side arranged themselves against them. Gylippus, when it appeared to him that there was a fit opportunity, began the battle; and being come to close quarters, they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates could make no use at all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and having taken up their dead under a truce, and the Athenians having erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army, and told them, that this was not theirs, but his own fault, who by arranging their line so far within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters; and that therefore he meant now to bring them on again; and wished them to consider, that for forces they were nothing inferior to the enemy: and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured, that being Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master, and drive out of the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

The Syracusians are defeated in an engagement.

A second engagement, in which the Athenians are defeated.

VI. After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought on the army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought that if the enemies were not willing to begin the battle, yet it was necessary for themselves not to allow the wall to be built past

them, (for by this time it wanted little of passing the point of theirs, and if it proceeded further, would give the enemy the power both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless he pleased,) did therefore advance forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, when he had drawn his men at arms further without the walls than he had done before, closed with them in battle, and his horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians, in the open ground, where the buildings of both the walls ceased. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left wing of the Athenians, which was stationed opposite to them, put them to flight; by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome likewise, and driven headlong within their fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians anticipated them in building up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so that both they themselves could no longer be hindered by them, and that they also [i. e. the Athenians] should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose the city.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

The Syra-
cusan
wall inter-
sects the
Athenian.

VII. After this, the twelve galleys that were behind of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, escaping the notice of the Athenian galleys that lay in watch for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained of their wall, up to the cross-wall.⁵ And Gylippus now departed to the rest of Sicily to gather an army, and to raise forces both for sea and land, and to join to his side all such cities as formerly either had not been forward, or had as yet wholly abstained from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth to procure new forces, to be transported either in ships of burden or transport-vessels, or in any other manner that might succeed, as the Athenians also were sending to Athens for the like. In the mean time the Syracusians both manned their navy, and made trial of themselves, as intending to make attempts with that force also, and in all other respects were exceedingly encouraged.

Erasinidas
arrives
with
twelve
ships from
Corinth.

Gylippus
traverses
Sicily
to raise
forces.

The Syra-
cusians
and Co-
rinthians
send mes-
sengers to
Lacedæ-
mon.

VIII. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing both the strength of the enemy and his own necessities daily increasing, he also

Nicias
sends a
letter to
Athens.

⁵ In this place, and perhaps also in c. 4, the reader would do well to follow Mr. Thirlwall, (Hist. of Gr. vol. iii. p. 418,) in considering *ἐγκαρσιον τεῖχος* as a merely relative term to mean the Athenian wall.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

sent to Athens, having sent also often at other times, upon the occasion of every action that passed; and now especially, as thinking himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great reinforcement unto them, there was no hope of safety; and fearing lest such as he sent, through want of power of speaking, or deficiency in memory, or through desire in what they said to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter. Conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation concerning what was really the truth. With these letters, and with their instructions what they were to say, the messengers took their departure; and Nicias in the mean time turned his attention to the well guarding of his camp, rather than entering into any voluntary dangers.⁶

IX. In the end of this summer, Euetion, a general of the Athenians, with Perdicas, together with many Thracians, having made an expedition against Amphipolis, took not the city indeed, but bringing his galleys about into the Strymon, besieged it from the river, taking his station at Imeræum: and so this summer ended.

X. The next winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, and both spoke what had been charged them from word of mouth, and answered to such questions as they were asked, and presented the letter, which the clerk of the city,⁷ standing forth, read unto the Athenians, certifying as follows.

Letter of Nicias to the People of Athens.

XI. "Athenians, you know by many other letters of mine what has passed formerly: nor is it less needful for you to be

⁶ That is, "he was more careful to preserve the army by acting on the defensive only, rather than to incur any voluntary peril." If, instead of reading ἡ δὲ ἐκομισίων with Bekker, the text of Goeller be preferred, the sense would be, "he busied himself about those dangers he voluntarily chose to undergo, and those alone."

⁷ Γραμματεὺς, of these there were three at Athens: one chosen by the popular assembly, whose business it was to recite before the people or assembly; and two appointed by the senate, one of whom was the keeper of the laws, another of public records. A brief and excellent account of these is given in Hermann's *Pol. Ant.* sect. 127. (p. 249. Engl. transl.) Further information the reader may find in Schoemann's *Comit.* p. 320, and references to other writers on the subject, in the note on the passage in Hermann.

informed of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it at this present time. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, Gylippus, a Lacedæmonian, came with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of the cities of Sicily; and in the first battle was overcome by us; but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving over our erecting a wall round the city, because of the multitude of our enemies, we now sit still, (for we cannot indeed have the use of our whole army, because the defence of our walls employs some part of the men at arms,) and they have built a single wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to inclose them with a wall, except we should come with a great army and carry that cross-wall of theirs by assault. And it has fallen out, that we who seemed to besiege others, are rather enduring this ourselves, for so much at least as concerns the land. For we cannot go far abroad by reason of their cavalry.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

XII. "They have also sent ambassadors for another army into Peloponnesus; and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both to solicit such to join with him in the war as have not yet stirred; and of others to get, if he can, both more land soldiers and further equipments for their navy. For they intend, as I am informed, both to assault our wall by land with their army, and to make trial what they are able to do with their navy by sea. And let it not appear extraordinary to any of you, that they are going to try by sea too, for though our fleet (which they also have heard) was vigorous at first, both for soundness of galleys, and entireness of the crews, yet our galleys are now soaked through with being so long at sea, and our men consumed. For we want the means to haul on land our galleys, and repair⁸ them, because the galleys of the enemy, which are a match for ours, and more in number, keep us in a continual expectation of assault; and are openly to be seen practising; and it is in their own choice to attempt or not, and they have more the power to dry their galleys at their pleasure, for they have not [as we have] to keep guard against others.

XIII. "Nay, this would hardly be possible for us, though we had many galleys spare, and were not constrained, as now,

⁸ Or simply "dry them;" as Goeller translates it, "naves subductas siccare." Mr. Bloomfield gives "careen them."

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

to keep watch upon them with our whole number. For should we abate, though but a little, of our watchfulness, we should want provision, which even now, having to pass so near their city, we bring in with difficulty. And hence it is that our mariners both formerly have been, and are now wasted; for, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, they are destroyed by the horsemen; and our slaves, now we are on equal terms, run over to the enemy. As for strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint, return presently to their cities; and others, having had at first their expectations raised by great wages, and thinking they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their expectation, and especially with their navy, partly take some pretext to be gone, that they may desert; and others, for Sicily is large, [and thereby gives them the power to do so,] convey themselves away every one as he can. Some there are also, who having bought Hyccarian slaves,⁹ have persuaded the captains of galleys to take them on board in the room of themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength.

XIV. "To you I write, who know how small a time any flect continues in the height of vigour, and how few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley, and how to manage the rowing.¹ But of all, my greatest trouble is this, that being general, I cannot put a stop to these doings, (for your natures are hard to govern,) and that we have not any quarter whence we can re-man our vessels, which the enemy can do from many places, but must of necessity have them from whence we brought both these we have, and those we have lost; for our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us. And if the enemy gains but this one thing more, that the towns of Italy which now send us provision, seeing what estate we are in, and that you do not help us, turn to them, the war will be at an end, and we shall be taken by siege without another stroke.

"I could have written to you other things more pleasing

⁹ Those whom Nicias, on the taking of Hyccara, made sale of himself.

¹ So Dr. Arnold also renders, "keep the rowing in order, or time;" giving the stroke, as we say. Goeller follows the interpretation of Portus, and renders the passage, "qui navis cursum incitare, et remis inhibere (to back, or hold the water,) didicerint."

than these, but not more profitable, seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here, when you go to counsel upon them; and besides, because I know your natures to be such, as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards, if things fall not out accordingly, you will call in question them that wrote it, I thought best to declare the truth for the sake of my own safety.

XV. "And now think thus, that though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably; yet, since all Sicily is united against us, and another army expected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are not enough for the enemy's present forces,) either to send for these away, or to send hither another army both of land and sea soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a little; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to stay here, because of a disorder of the kidneys. And I think I have a right to obtain this allowance from you, for I did you many good services in the conducting of your armies when I had my health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have furnished himself with his Sicilian aids; and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet, if you look not to it, they will get hither, partly by escaping your notice, as before, and partly by being beforehand with you."

XVI. These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present, till such time as others chosen to be his colleagues might arrive, they appointed, in addition to him, two of those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon, to the end that he might not be harassed with sustaining the whole burden alone in his sickness. They passed a vote likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athenians from the roll,² and of their confederates. And for fellow-generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eury-medon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away immediately for Sicily, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten galleys and a hundred and twenty talents of silver, to tell

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

WINTER.
This letter
is read at
Athens;
and the
Athenians
appoint
him two
coadjutors
for the pre-
sent, and
send Eury-
medon to
Sicily soon
afterwards
with ten
ships and
twenty ta-
lents of
silver.

² See note on book vi. c. 31.

Year 18. them also there that aid was coming, and that care would be
A. C. 414. taken of them.
Ol. 91. 3.

Demos- XVII. But Demosthenes staying behind, made preparation
thenes is to for the voyage, to set out early the next spring; sending unto
follow in the confederates, appointing what forces they should provide,
the spring with an and collecting from that very quarter [i. e. from Athens itself]
additional force. money, and galleys, and men at arms. The Athenians sent
The Athe- also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch that none
nians send ships to in- should go over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For
tercept the passage of the Co- the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them, and
rinthian and Lacedæmonian had brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily,
troops to Sicily. thinking that it was not inopportunately that they had sent
The Cor- thither those other galleys before, were now encouraged a great
inthians man twenty-five deal more, and both prepared themselves to transport men at
ships to arms into Sicily in merchant-ships, and the Lacedæmonians
oppose the might also prepared to do the like from the rest of Peloponnesus.
Atheni- And the Corinthians manned five and twenty galleys, that they
ans. might make trial of a battle against the fleet that kept watch
at Naupactus, that the Athenians might the less be able to prevent
their transport-ships from putting off, being employed in keep-
ing guard against the galleys that were stationed against them.

The Lacedæmoni- XVIII. The Lacedæmonians, as had been decreed on by
ans pre- them before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians
pare for an and Corinthians, upon information now of the Athenians' new
invasion of supply for Sicily, prepared likewise to invade Attica, to the
Attica in the spring. end that by making an inroad it might be prevented. And
They also, at the sug- Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Decelea,
gestion of and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedæmonians
Alcibiades, were inspirited principally because they thought the Athenians
prepare to having in hand a double war, one against them, and another
fortify De- against the Sicilians, would be the more easily pulled down;
celea. and because they conceived that they first had broken the
former treaty;³ for in the former war the injury proceeded
rather from their own side, in that the Thebans had entered
Plataea in time of peace; and because also whereas it was in-
serted in the former articles, that they should not carry arms
against such as would admit trial by legal arbitration, they
would not listen, but had refused such trial when the Athenians
called them to it.⁴ And they thought all their misfortunes had

³ The thirty years' truce, concluded A. C. 445. See i. 23. and 115.

⁴ See i. 145. And also what Archidamus says in i. 85.

deservedly befallen them for that cause, and in that manner looked upon the calamity at Pylos, and at all others that had happened to them. But when the Athenians, with a fleet of thirty sail, had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus and of Prasiæ and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylos had taken booty in the country about; and seeing that as often as there arose any disagreement touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedæmonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it; then indeed the Lacedæmonians, conceiving that the same fault that themselves had been in before had now changed about to the Athenians, inclined themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter they sent about unto their confederates to get iron; and they prepared also all the other instruments for building the fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in the ships of burden to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves, and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath written the history.

Year 18.
A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

YEAR XIX. A. C. 413. OLYMP. 91. 4.

XIX. The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever before, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates made an inroad with their army into Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus their king. And first they wasted the country about the plain, and then took in hand the fortifying Decelea,⁵ dividing the work amongst the army according to their cities. Now Decelea is distant from the city of Athens about one hundred and twenty furlongs, and about as much, or but little more, from Bœotia. This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of their city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica went on with their fortification, and they in Peloponnesus sent away the men at arms in the merchant-ships about the same time into Sicily. Of these the

SUMMER.
The Lacedæmonians invade Attica, and fortify Decelea.

The Peloponnesians send off a force to Sicily.

⁵ The occupation of some port in Attica had been advised by the Corinthians before the war began; see i. 122. On the effect this measure produced, see c. 27. The passage in Herodot. ix. 73, where Decelea is mentioned, has been referred to this period, but this is probably erroneous. The note in Bæhr's edit. of Herodotus will give the reader all the information on this point; the period it belongs to is probably the first invasion of Attica by Archidamus.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Lacedæmonians, out of the best of their Helots, and men made newly free, sent, in the whole, six hundred, and Ecritus, a Spartan, for commander. And the Bœotians, three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hege-sander, a Thespian. And these set forth first, and put out into the open sea from Tænarus in Laconia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, and part mercenary Arcadians, having appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from Corinth, and Sargeus, a Sicyonian, for captain. Now the twenty-five Corinthian galleys, that were manned in winter, lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus, till such time as those men at arms in the ships of burden had put off from Peloponnesus; for which purpose they were also manned at first, that the Athenians might not have their minds upon these ships so much as upon the galleys.

The Athe-
nians send
Charicles
with thirty
ships to
cruise
round Pe-
loponne-
sus.

XX. In the mean time also the Athenians, whilst Decelea was fortifying, in the beginning of the spring sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus, with orders, when he came to Argos, to ask of the Argives some heavy-armed forces to take on board his ships, according to the league; and also sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with threescore galleys of Athens, and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred Athenian men at arms from the roll, and as many of the islanders from each several quarter as they could get, providing themselves also from the rest of their subject confederates with all other necessaries for the war; but he had orders to join first with Charicles, and to help him to make war first upon Laconia, as he was coasting round it. So Demosthenes went to Ægina, and stayed there both for the remnant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles, till he had taken aboard the Argives.

Demos-
thenes
with sixty-
five ships
waits at
Ægina
until he
is joined by
Charicles.
Gylippus
and Her-
mocrates
persuade
the Syra-
cusians to
hazard a
naval en-
gagement.

XXI. In Sicily, about the same time of this spring, Gylippus also came to Syracuse, bringing with him, from the cities which he had persuaded to take part with him, as great forces as severally he could get from them. And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to man as many galleys as they could, and make trial of a battle by sea; and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of

the war which should be worthy the danger. Hermocrates also did not least contribute to persuade them not to dread making an attempt against the Athenians with their navy; who told them, that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary, or of very ancient standing, but were more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the Medes: and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them. For wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the advantage of power, but boldness of enterprising, with the same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies.⁶ He knew it, he said, certainly, that the Syracusians, by their unexpectedly daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more advantage in respect of their [the Athenians] being terrified by it, than the Athenians would cause them damage by their advantage in skill. He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy, and to draw back from it no longer. The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others, if any there were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea, and manned their galleys.

XXII. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land-soldiers by night, meaning to go himself and assault by land the fortifications in Plemyrion. Likewise the galleys of the Syracusians by appointment, thirty-five of them sailed up out of the great haven, and forty-five more sailed about out of the little haven, where also was their arsenal,⁷ with purpose to join with those within, and to go together to Plemyrion, that the Athenians might be confused on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys to oppose them, with twenty-five of them they fought with

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Thirty-five Syracusan ships sail forward from the great port, and forty-five from the lesser port. The Athenians man sixty ships to prevent their effecting a junction.

⁶ It would seem best to refer *σφας* to the Athenians, as in the text; and to render, "they would themselves also offer or hold out the same advantage to their enemies." Or referring it to the Syracusians, it would be, "they would occasion the same thing to their enemies." For these interpretations I am indebted to Dr. Arnold.

⁷ On this word, Goeller notes thus: *Νεωριον* was the whole space to build, repair, or place vessels in, when drawn out of the water, including also store-houses, etc.; whilst *Νεωσοικοι* were the covered places where the vessels that required most attention and care, such as the triremes, used to stand secured from the weather; these last were within the precincts of the former. *Ἐπινηριον* was the whole quarter where vessels were built and laid up, and *Ναυσταθμον* the place for anchorage.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

the thirty-five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those that were sailing about from the arsenal. And they fought at once before the mouth of the great haven, and held out against each other for a long time; one side endeavouring to force the entrance, the other to prevent them.

Gylippus with his land force marches to Plemyrrium and takes the three forts.

XXIII. In the mean time, Gylippus, (the Athenians in Plemyrrium being now come down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight of the galleys,) at the dawn of day, and on a sudden, assaults the fortifications before they could come back again to defend them; and carries first the greatest, and afterwards the two lesser: for they that kept guard in these, when they saw the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that fled from the one first taken, put themselves into boats and into a certain ship of burden, and conveyed them with difficulty into the camp; for the Syracusians in the great haven having had as yet the better in the sea-fight, they were pursued by one fast-sailing galley. But by that time that the other two forts were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were overcome, and the Athenians who fled from those two forts sailed by to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven's mouth, having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder, and falling foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians, who put to flight, not only them, but also those other by whom they had before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of the Syracusians, and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the men of three galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own galleys, three were destroyed. When they had drawn to land the wrecks of the Syracusian galleys, and erected a trophy in the little island over-against Plemyrrium, they returned to their camp.

The garrison escape to the Athenian camp.

The Syracusians are vanquished by the Athenians in a sea fight.

XXIV. The Syracusians, though such was their success in the battle by sea, yet they got possession of the fortifications of Plemyrrium, and set up three trophies, for each, one. One of the two last taken they demolished, but two they repaired and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these fortifications many men were slain, and many taken alive, and also goods and money,⁸ which in all were a great matter, were taken. For the

The Syracusians retain possession of the forts of Plemyrrium.

⁸ I have here followed Mr. Bloomfield, who has a note to the effect that both these senses are included in this word.

Athenians using these works for their store-house, there was in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants, and much unto captains of galleys; for there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other rigging; and three galleys drawn up on land. And this loss of Plemyrum was it that most and principally impaired the Athenian force. For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe, (for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys, impeded them,) and nothing could be brought in unto them but by fighting, and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

XXV. After this, the Syracusians send out twelve galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusian. Of which one carried ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to declare what hope they had now as to their affairs, and to excite them to a sharper war there. The other eleven went to Italy, on the intelligence of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenians' army; which also they met with, and destroyed most of them; and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready there, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went to Locri, and while stationed there, there came to them one of the ships of burden from Peloponnesus, that carried some men at arms of the Thespians; whom the Syracusians took aboard, and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara, took one of them, and the men that were in her, but could not take the rest; so that they escaped through to Syracuse. There was also a skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old docks, to the end that the galleys might ride within, and that the Athenians might not annoy them by sailing up and making assaults. For the Athenians, having brought to the place a ship of the burden of a thousand amphoræ, fortified with wooden turrets and bulwarks,⁹ caused certain men with little boats to go and fasten ropes unto the piles, and so drew them up with cranes; and some also the divers did cut off with saws. In the mean time, the Syracusians from the docks, and they from the great ship, cast missiles at each other, till in the end the greatest part of the piles the Athenians got up. But the greatest difficulty were those piles which lay hid;

⁹ Or this word may mean "coverings against fire or missiles," which would be constructed of raw hides, &c.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

They send one ship to Peloponnesus to entreat assistance, and with eleven others attack and destroy an Athenian squadron.

They are attacked by twenty Athenian ships, and lose one vessel.

The Athenians destroy the piles in the great harbour of Syracuse.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

The Syra-
cusians
send am-
bassadors
to the
Sicilian
cities.

for some of them they had so driven in, as that they came not above the water. So that it was dangerous to sail near them, lest that not foreseeing them, they should throw the ship upon them as upon a rock. But these also, for reward, the divers went down and sawed asunder. But the Syracusians again drove down other in their stead. Many other devices also they contrived against each other, (as was not unlikely between armies so near opposed,) and many skirmishes passed, and attempts of all kinds were put into execution. The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciots, and some Lacedæmonians, unto the cities about them, to let them know that they had won Plemyrion, and that in the battle by sea they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy so much as by their own disorder; and also to shew what hope they were in in other respects, and to entreat their aid, both of sea and land forces, for inasmuch as the Athenians are to be expected with another army, if they would send aid before it came, whereby first to overthrow that which they had now there, the war would be at an end. Thus they carried on the affairs of Sicily.

Demos-
thenes
joins
Charicles,
and ra-
vages the
Laconian
coast.

XXVI. But Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were got together, put to sea from Ægina, and sailing to Peloponnesus, joined with Charicles and the thirty Athenian galleys that were with him. And, having taken on board some men at arms of the Argives, came to Laconia, and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus Limeria; from thence going to that part of Laconia which is over-against the island Cythera, (where is a temple of Apollo,) they wasted a part of the country, and fortified an isthmus there, both that the Helots might have a refuge in it, deserting from the Lacedæmonians, and that also freebooters from thence, as from Pylos, might fetch in plunder from the territory adjoining. As soon as he had taken possession of the place, Demosthenes himself sailed on to Corcyra, to take up some of the confederates there, with intent to sail thence as speedily as possible into Sicily. And Charicles, having stayed to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens, and the Argives along with him went home.

He then
sails to
Corcyra
on his
way to
Sicily, and
Charicles
with his
thirty
ships
returns
home.
The Athe-
nians,
being

XXVII. The same summer also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred targeteers, of those called Machærophori, of

the race of them that are called Dii, who were to have gone with Demosthenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians resolved to send them back again into Thrace; for it appeared to them too expensive a matter to retain them only for the war [waged] from Decelea; for their pay was to have been a drachma¹ a man by the day. For Decelea being this summer fortified, first by the whole army, and then by the several cities, maintained with a garrison by turns, much damaged the Athenians, and weakened their estate, both by destroying their property, and consuming their men, exceedingly. For the former invasions having been short, hindered them not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time; but now, the enemy continually being posted there against them, and sometimes greater forces coming against them, and sometimes the ordinary garrison, from necessity, making incursions over the country and fetching in plunder, Agis, the king of Lacedæmon, being always there in person, and diligently² prosecuting the war, the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted; for they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest part were artificers; besides, they lost all their sheep and beasts of burden. And by the continual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to Decelea, and stationed on defence throughout the country, their horses partly became lamed in rugged grounds, being worn down also through incessant labour, and partly were destroyed by wounds from the enemy.

XXVIII. And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Eubœa by Oropus, the shortest way, through Decelea by land, they were now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost, about the promontory of Sunium; and whatsoever the city was wont to be provided with from without, it now wanted, and instead of a city was become as it were a fort. And the Athenians watching on the battlements of the wall in the day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at once, (except the horsemen,) part at the walls, and

¹ Comp. on this point Aristoph. Acharn. 159.

² That is, not as if it were a bye-business, not as something to be done by the way in addition to the principal point. The expression occurs also in i. 142.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
constantly
plundered
by the
garrison of
Decelea,
and ex-
hausted
by the ex-
pense of
the war in
Sicily as
well as at
home, lay
a new tax
on their
allies.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

part at the arms,³ were quite worn out. But what pressed them most was, that they had two wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so great as no man who heard it would have believed, till it happened. For [no one would have believed] that, being besieged at home by the fortification of the Peloponnesians, they would not only, even then, not have relinquished their attacks upon Sicily, but have also in the same manner besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens, and therein so much to have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the Grecians, both in power and courage, (who in the beginning of this war conceived, if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some of them that they might hold out two years, others three, no man more,) as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded, they should have gone into Sicily, and being every way weakened already by the former war, in addition to it have undertaken another not inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians. And being by these wars, and by the great detriment sustained from Decelea, and other heavy expenses that came upon them, in great difficulties for want of money, about this time they imposed on such as were under their dominion, a twentieth part⁴ of all goods passing by sea, instead of the tribute, thinking that by this means more treasure would come in to them. For their expenses were not now as before, but had become by so much greater, by how much the war also was greater, and their revenue besides cut off.

One thousand three hundred Thracians, who had come too late to join Demosthenes, are sent home under the conduct of Diotrephe.

XXIX. The Thracians, therefore, who came too late to go with Demosthenes, they immediately sent back, being unwilling to lay out money in such a scarcity; and gave the charge of carrying them back to Diotrephe, with command as he went along those coasts, (for his way was through the Euripus,) if occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy by their means. He accordingly landed them at Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some small booty; and going over the Euripus at evening from Chalcis in Eubœa, he disembarked again in

³ Οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὀπλοῖς ποιοῦμενοι, subaud. φυλακῆν, as Bauer suggests. Comp. also note on ii. 2.

⁴ This continued to the end of the war, Goeller remarks; which may be inferred from Aristoph. Ranæ, 336. For further information, see Boeckh. Pub. Œcon. ii. 38. 139. for which reference I am indebted to Dr. Arnold.

Bœotia, and led his soldiers towards Mycallessus, and lay all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, (distant from Mycallessus about sixteen furlongs;) and at dawn of day he fell upon the city, (which was not large,) and takes it: having come upon them who kept no guard, nor expected that any man would have come up and assaulted them so far from the sea; their walls also being but weak, in some places fallen down, and in others low built, and their gates also open through security. And the Thracians having fallen upon Mycallessus, spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people without mercy on old or young, killing all they could light on, both women and children, yea, and the labouring cattle, and whatever other living thing they saw. For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extremely blood-thirsty, equal to those that are most so of the Barbarians. Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other great disorder, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined; so that they likewise fell upon the school-house, (which was in the city, a great one, and the children just entered into it,) and cut them to pieces every one. And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also was it more unexpected and more dreadful.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
On their way they ravage the country round Tanagra, take Mycallessus, and put the inhabitants to the sword.

XXX. The Thebans hearing of it, came out to bring aid to them; and overtaking the Thracians before they were gone far, both took from them the booty, and chased them down to the Euripus, and to the sea, where the ships that brought them lay. Many of them they killed, of those most as they went on board, who were unable to swim; for such as were in the ships, when they saw how things went on the land, had thrust off, and lay without the reach of missiles:⁵ since, at least in the rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved themselves not unhand-somely against the Theban horsemen, which charged them first; but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, defended themselves well, and lost but few men in that action; but some also perished, being cut off in the city itself, whilst they stayed be-

The Thebans interrupt their retreat, and kill two hundred and fifty of them.

⁵ I have in this place followed the reading of Goeller and Arnold; for that of Bekker, ἐξω του ζευγματος, cannot be defended, as the only sense it can properly bear, as Dr. Arnold notes, "beyond the bridge," is inapplicable, as the erection of a bridge over the Euripus did not take place till a later period; and the sense Haack would give it, "beyond the reach of the landing-boards" (the ἀποβαθραι), would require ἐξω του ζευγυσσθαι.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

hind for pillage. In the whole, of thirteen hundred, there were slain two hundred and fifty of the Thracians; and of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, they destroyed of horsemen and men at arms, one with another, about twenty; and amongst them Scirphondas, one of the Theban governors⁶ of Bœotia. And of the Mycallessians there perished a part. Thus went the matter at Mycallessus, whose citizens underwent a calamity, that was, for the greatness of the city, no less worthy to be lamented than any that happened in the whole war.

Demos-
thenes
takes a
Corinthian
transport
at Pheia,
but the
men
escape.

XXXI. And Demosthenes sailing away then towards Coreyra, after his fortifying in Laconia, found a merchant-ship lying in Phia of Elis, in which the men at arms of Corinth were about to pass over into Sicily. The ship he destroyed, but the men escaped, and afterwards getting another ship, went on in their voyage. After this, Demosthenes having come to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard some men at arms, and sent to Naupactus for some of the Messenians. From thence he crossed to the continent of Acarnania, over-against him, to Alyzia and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athenians. Whilst in these parts, Eurymedon, sailing out of Sicily, meets him, who had been sent in winter, at the time before mentioned,⁷ with money to the army, who tells him, amongst other things, how he had heard when at sea, that the Syracusians had won Plemyrion. Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them, and related that the twenty-five galleys of Corinth that lay opposite to them, would not give over war, and yet delayed to fight; and therefore desired to have some galleys sent him, being unable with his eighteen to give battle to the twenty-five of the enemy. Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent twenty galleys more to those at Naupactus, the best sailers of those they had, with Conon himself; and employed themselves about collecting what appertained to the army, Eurymedon sailing to Coreyra, and having appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied men at arms; (for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him in the office of general;) and Demosthenes gathered together slingers and darters from the parts about Acarnania.

He is
joined by
Eurymedon,
(who is
returning
from Sicily
to Athens.)
Conon, the
governor
of Nau-
pactus,
receives
from them
a rein-
forcement
of ten
ships.

Eurymedon
proceeds
to Coreyra,
and Demosthenes
recruits in
Acarnania.

⁶ See note on book iv. c. 92. and ii. 2.

⁷ These words, undoubtedly the right explanation of the word *τοτε*, I have borrowed from a note of Mr. Bloomfield's.

XXXII. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, who after the taking of Plemyrion had departed to the cities about, having now persuaded them and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to Syracuse, but Nicias, on intelligence thereof, sent to such of the Siculi as had the passages, and were their confederates, the Centoripines, Alicycæans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to pass through, but to unite themselves and stop them; for that they would not so much as try to pass by any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had already denied them a passage through their territory. When the Sicilians were now marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had begged of them, put themselves in ambush in three several places, and setting upon them unawares and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them, and all the ambassadors, save one, a Corinthian; but he conducted those that escaped, to the number of fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

XXXIII. About the same time come also to their aid, the Camarinæans, five hundred men at arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them shipping to the amount of five galleys, four hundred darters, and two hundred horsemen. For now nearly all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but all the rest, who before stood looking on, united to assist the Syracusian side against the Athenians. Nevertheless, the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held back from immediately assaulting the Athenians; but Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the continent⁸ with the whole army to the promontory of Iapygia. From thence setting out, they touch at the Chærades, islands of Iapygia, and embark on board their ships some Iapygian darters, two hundred and fifty, of the Messapian nation, and having renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned there, and granted them those darters, they arrive thence at Metapontium, [a city] of Italy. And having persuaded the Metapontians, in virtue of their league, to send with them three hundred darters and two galleys, they took these with them, and sailed along the shore till they came to Thuria. Here they found the faction adverse to the Athenians had been lately driven out into a sedition; and because they

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

A reinforcement proceeding to the assistance of the Syracusians, is cut off (with the exception of one thousand five hundred men) by the Siculi occupying the passes.

Other reinforcements arrive to the Syracusians.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon sail to Iapygia, and thence to Metapontium and Thurium.

⁸ The continent about Acarnania, for there was Demosthenes; and at Corcyra was Eurymedon.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

They re-
main at
Thurium,
in the hope
of getting
assistance
from the
Thurians.

A drawn
battle off
Erineus in
Achaia,
between
the Co-
rinthian
and Athe-
nian fleets.

desired to muster their army here, that they might see if any were left behind, and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war, and (as things stood) to consider as friends and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians, they stayed in the territory of the Thurians, and transacted their matters.

XXXIV. The Peloponnesians, and the rest who were at the same time in the twenty-five galleys, which for the safe passage of the ships of burden into Sicily lay opposite to the galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle, and having additionally manned some more galleys, so that they had but few less than those of the Athenians, come to an anchor opposite Erineus of Achaia in Rhyptica. The place where they rode was like a half-moon, and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and other confederates of those parts, drawn up on the points of the promontory, and their galleys closed up the space between, under the command of Polyantes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians sailed up with thirty-three galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians at first lay still, but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they charged the Athenians, and the fight began. And for a long time they held out against each other; and [at last] three galleys of the Corinthians are destroyed, and of the Athenians, though none were entirely sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which having received the blow of the opposite beaks [of the Corinthian galleys] were torn up on both sides between the beak and the oars,⁹ by the Corinthian galleys, which had their beaks¹ made stronger for this same purpose. After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides challenged the victory, (though the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to renew the fight,) they at length parted, and there was no chase, nor a prisoner taken on either side; for the Peloponnesians and

⁹ Παρεξείρεσια, the space between the prow or the stern, in which there are no oars.

¹ *Epotides* were thick beams projecting from both sides of the prow, for the purpose of warding off the strokes of the enemy's beaks, as well as for the purpose of inflicting injury on the adversary. Dr. Arnold says they used to suspend their anchors from them, and compares them to the "cat-heads" in our vessels. Between them was the beak or rostrum, armed with iron or copper.

Corinthians fighting near the land easily saved themselves, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians were sailing back to Naupactus, the Corinthians directly set up a trophy as victors, because they had rendered more of the enemy's ships unserviceable; and thinking themselves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the Corinthians think they have the better, when they have not much the worse: and the Athenians think they have the worse, when they have not much the better. And when the Peloponnesians were gone, and their army by land disbanded, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as having conquered, distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians rode, about twenty furlongs. And the sea-fight thus ended.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

XXXV. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put themselves in readiness to accompany them with seven hundred men at arms, and three hundred darters, commanded their galleys to sail along the coast towards the Crotoniatis,² and conducted their land-soldiers, having first taken a muster of them all on the side of the river Sybaris, through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river Hylas, upon word sent them from the men of Croton, that if the army went through their territory it should be against their will, they marched down to the sea side, and to the mouth of the river Hylas, where they stayed all that night, and were met by their galleys. The next day embarking, they kept along the shore, and touched at every town, saving Locri, till they arrived at Petra, in the territory of Rhegium.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon conduct their forces by land through the Thurian territory to Croton, when they embark and coast along to Rhegium.

XXXVI. The Syracusians in the mean time, on intelligence of their coming on, wished to try again what they could do with their navy and with their new supply of land-soldiers, which they had got together for this same purpose, wishing to anticipate the Athenians before these should arrive.³ And they furnished their navy both otherwise, according as, from what they had learnt in the last battle, they saw they would gain some advantage, and also made shorter the prows of their galleys, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with beams to support them stretched to the sides of the galleys, both within

The Syracusians, having made various improvements in their ships, resolve to attack the Athenian fleet in the harbour.

² That district of Italy whereof Crotona was the capital.

³ Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

and without, of six cubits long, in such a manner as the Corinthians had armed their galleys at the prows to fight with those before Naupactus. For the Syracusians thought, that against the Athenian galleys not so strongly built as they, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy ahead as on the side, by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better; and that to fight in the great haven many galleys in not much room, was an advantage to them, because using direct encounter, they should break the foreparts of the galleys of their enemies, by striking with their own firm and thick beaks on their hollow and weak ones; and that the Athenians in that narrow room would want means both to go about, and to go through them,⁴ which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could, and for fetching a compass round, the narrowness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting by means of meeting directly with the prow, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters, was what they would now principally make use of; for in this would be their principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off, and little in compass, near their own camp, and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters, and the enemy, if they were any where pressed, could not choose, thronging together into a little room, and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another, which was indeed the thing that in all their battles by sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt, having not, as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire to, and to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set on them from the main sea, and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able; especially as Plemyrion would be hostile to them, and the haven's mouth not being large.

Gylippus attacks the Athenian wall on one side, and the garrison of Olympieum attacks it on the other.

XXXVII. The Syracusians having devised thus much over and above their former skill and strength, and being far more confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and navy at once. The land-forces from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp, on the side towards the city; and from Olympieum, the men at arms, all that were there, and the horsemen and light-armed of the Syracusians, came up to

⁴ On this word, see note on i. 49.

the wall on the other side; and directly after came sailing forth also the galleys of the Syracusians and their confederates. The Athenians, who at first thought they would make the attempt only with their land-forces, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion, and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls, against those that came from the city, and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters, that were coming in great numbers and with speed from Olympieum, and the parts without; others again went aboard their ships, and also went to give aid on the shore; but when the galleys were manned, they put off, in number seventy-five; and those of Syracuse were about eighty.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

XXXVIII. Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring, and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the Syracusians sunk a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted again; and the land-soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The next day, the Syracusians lay still without shewing any sign of what they meant to do; yet Nicias, seeing that the battle by sea was equal, and imagining that they would make the attack again, made the captains repair their galleys, such as had been at all damaged, and caused some ships of burden to be moored without those piles which he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres asunder, so that if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in, and again sail safely out at leisure. In performing this, the Athenians spent a whole day from morning until night.

A drawn battle between the two fleets.

Nicias forms a floating fortress.

XXXIX. Next day, the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again with the same attack both by sea and land, but began earlier in the morning, and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day now again, as before, in attempting upon each other without effect; before that Ariston, the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most expert master in the Syracusian fleet, persuaded the commanders of the navy to send to those in the city as had the direction of such things, and to order them to remove the market of what was for sale, and to bring it as quickly as they could to the sea side, and to compel every man to bring thither whatever he had fit to eat, and there to sell it, that disembarking the mariners they might at once enable them to dine by the sides of the galleys, and

The fleets engage a third time.

By a stratagem of Ariston, the Syracusians attack the Athenians unprepared;

Year 19. quickly again, unlooked for, assault the Athenians afresh the
 A. C. 413. same day.
 Ol. 91. 4.

XL. Being persuaded by this advice, they sent a messenger, and the market was furnished; and the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern⁵ towards the city, and disembarking dined there on the shore; but the Athenians supposing they had retired towards the city as worsted by them, landed at leisure, and, amongst other business, went about the dressing of their dinner, not expecting to fight again the same day. But the Syracusians suddenly going aboard, came towards them again; and the Athenians, in great tumult, and for the most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them. For awhile they kept off on both sides, and only watched each other: but soon after the Athenians thought not fit by longer dallying to overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to make the attack as soon as they could; and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and the fight began. The Syracusians receiving the charge, resisted it, and fighting as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with those of the Athenians, and provided with stronger beaks for the purpose, broke the galleys of the Athenians very much, between the heads of the galleys and the oars. They also annoyed the Athenians much by the darters from the decks; but much more those Syracusians who, sailing about in small boats, ran against the blades of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence.

XLI. The Syracusians having fought in this manner with the utmost of their strength, in the end got the victory, and the Athenians having turned themselves about, escaped between the ships of burden into their harbour; and the Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those ships, but there the yard-arms with dolphins,⁶ hung from the ships of burden over the entrances, hindered them from following any further. Yet there were two galleys which, elated with victory, approached them, but were both lost, one with her men was taken. The

⁵ Retiring with the prow still presented to the enemy; as we say, "backed water."

⁶ So called from their form: they were massy, made of lead, hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pullics; and when thrown into the enemy's ships, sunk or greatly damaged them. Comp. Aristoph. *Equit.* 760.

and after a long engagement succeed in driving them within their floating fortress, with the loss of seven vessels.

Two Syracusian ships are destroyed by the dolphins attached to the Athenian vessels.

Syracusians, having sunk seven galleys of the Athenians, and much injured many more, and of the men had taken some alive, and killed others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies, and had already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also fancied they should subdue the army by land. And so they prepared to assault them again in both ways.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

XLII. In the mean time, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive with the Athenian aids, about seventy-three galleys,⁷ with the foreign ones, and men at arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand; besides darters, as well Barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates to see no end of, and no deliverance from their danger, and that notwithstanding the fortifying in Decelea, another army should have come now, equal and like unto their former, and that their power should be so great in every way. And on the other side it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before. But Demosthenes, seeing how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into the same case as Nicias, (for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he fell not at once upon Syracuse, but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt, and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus, which if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for; for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak, and the city been enclosed with a wall, whereby though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did,) Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present time and on the first day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of to the uttermost this present fear caused by the army. And having observed that the cross-wall of the Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single, and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolæ, and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken, (for none

Demosthenes arrives in Sicily with a large force.

He determines on attempting the cross-wall of the Syracusians

⁷ As Dr. Arnold calculates; he left Athens with sixty-five, (c. 20); out of these he had sent ten to Conon at Naupactus, (c. 31,) had been since joined by Eurymedon's single ship and by fifteen from Corcyra, (c. 31,) and by two from Metapontum, (c. 33.)

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

without
loss of
time.

The at-
tempts of
Demos-
thenes on
the wall
being un-
successful,
he resolves
on making
an imme-
diate at-
tempt on
Epipolæ.
He sets
out by
night with
Euryme-
don and
Menander,
makes
himself
master of
Euryalus,
and suc-
ceeds for a
time in
throwing
the Syra-
cusians
into con-
fusion ;
but a firm
stand
being
made by
the Bœo-
tians, the
Athenians
fall into
confusion,
and are
com-
pletely
routed.

would stand against them,) hastened to take in hand the attempt, and thought it his shortest way to the despatching of the war. For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army, and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him, and the whole state. The Athenians therefore went out, and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus, and were the stronger as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympieum.

XLIII. After this, Demosthenes thought good first to make trial of the cross-wall with engines. But when on applying them they were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, and when assaulting it in divers parts with the rest of his army, they were driven back, it seemed right to him to waste time no longer, but having persuaded Nicias and the rest in office thereto, to put in execution his design for Epipolæ, as he before intended. By day it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in their approach, or in their ascent; having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of missile weapons, and whatever they might need of for fortification, if they overcame, he, and Eurymedon, and Menander, with the whole army, marched after the first watch to Epipolæ; but Nicias was left behind in the fortifications. Being come to [Epipolæ] at Euryalus, where also the former army went up at first, they were not only undiscovered by the watches of the Syracusians, but ascending, took the fortification of the Syracusians there, and killed part of the guards. But the greatest number escaping, ran directly to the camps, of which there were in Epipolæ three, lying under the outermost defences of the city, one of Syracusians, one of the other Sicilians, and one of the confederates, and carried the news of their coming up, and told it to those six hundred Syracusians who kept this part of Epipolæ at first, and who presently went forth to meet them. But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they defended themselves valiantly, put them to flight, and presently marched on, that by making use of the present heat of the army to finish what they came for, they might not be too late; and others going on, at their first attack took the cross-wall of the Syracusians, they not making a stand that

kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The Syracusians and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with him, came out to meet them from their advanced works; but because the attempt was unexpected, and in the night, they charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, chiefly as having already obtained the victory, and desiring also quickly to pass through all that remained yet unfought with, lest, through their remissness in following, they might again rally themselves, the Bœotians^s withstood them first, and charging, forced them to turn their backs and fly.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

XLIV. And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed, so that it hath been very hard to understand, even from either side, in what manner each thing happened. For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto himself; how then in a battle by night, the only one that happened between great armies in all this war, can a man know any thing for certain? For though the moon shone bright, yet they saw one another no otherwise than, as by moonlight was likely, so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were a friend or not. And the men at arms on both sides being not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the Athenians some were already overcome, others were advancing, in their first charge, unconquered. Also a great part of the rest of the army was already part got up, and part ascending, and knew not which way to march: for after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was in confusion; and it was hard to distinguish any thing for the noise. For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each other, and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts, for they had no other means in the night to express themselves; and the Athenians sought each other, and took for enemies all before them, though friends, and of the number of those that fled, and by often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction, all asking at once, they both made a great deal of stir amongst themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy; but they did

^s On these, Thirlwall remarks that they appear to have been the Thespians, who were brought from Loeri, (vii. 25); a part, perhaps, of the three hundred mentioned in c. 19. The rest probably came afterwards, (c. 50.)

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

not in like manner know the word [of the Syracusians,] because these being victorious and undistracted, were less unknown to each other; so that when they lighted on any number of the enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped, as knowing their watch-word; but they, when they could not answer, were slain. But that which hurt them most was the singing of the Pæan; for being in both armies much the same, it caused them much perplexity. For the Argives and Coreyræans, and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Pæan,⁹ terrified the Athenians on one side, and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side. Wherefore at the last falling one upon another in divers parts of the army, after that they were once disordered, friends against friends, and countrymen against countrymen, they not only terrified each other, but came to handstrokes, and could hardly again be parted. And being pursued by the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolæ, by which they were to go back, being but narrow, the greatest part of them threw themselves down from the rocks, and so died; and of the rest that got down safely into the plain, though many, and all that were of the old army, by their knowledge of the country escaped into the camp, yet of these that came last, some lost their way, and strayed over the country; whom, when the day came on, the Syracusian horsemen rode about and destroyed.

XLV. The next day, the Syracusians erected two trophies, one in Epipolæ at the ascent, and another where the first check was given by the Bœotians; but the Athenians received their dead under truce. And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their confederates;¹ but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain: for such as were forced to quit their bucklers, and leap down lightly armed from the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that escaped.

Sicanus
sails to
Acragas,
and Gy-
lippus
proceeds

XLVI. After this, the Syracusians having by such unlooked for prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, being in sedition, to bring that

⁹ It is worthy of remark, that there were two Pæans; the one *ἐμβατηριος*, on beginning the fight, and the other *ἐπινικιος*, on gaining the victory.

¹ Diodorus Siculus says, that two thousand five hundred were killed; Plutarch, two thousand.

city if they could to their obedience; and Gylippus went again to the Sicilian cities by land, to raise yet another army, as being in hope to take even the camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolæ.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

through Sicily to levy recruits.

XLVII. In the mean time, the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow, and present general weakness of the army. For they saw, not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying. For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause, this being the time of the year when men are most subject to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome; and also because all things else appeared desperate. To Demosthenes it appeared fit to stay no longer; but, as he had also meditated when he ventured against Epipolæ, when that design had failed, delivered his vote for going out of the haven, and not to delay, whilst the sea was yet possible to be crossed, and [he thought] they could effect this, at least by means of the additional galleys of the armament.² And it was more profitable, he said, for the city to make war upon those who fortify against them at home, than against the Syracusians, whom it was no longer easy to overcome; and there was no reason why they should in vain spend much money in lying before the city. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

The Athenians hold a council of war, at which Demosthenes and Eurymedon advise an immediate retreat.

XLVIII. Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to display their weakness in any thing he might say, or by decreeing their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege, for they would wear them out through the failure of their pecuniary resources, especially being already to a far greater degree masters of the sea with their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse that desired to betray the state into their hands, and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered him not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful

This advice is opposed by Nicias, and the army for the present remains stationary.

² That is, of the Athenian armament, referring to the ships arrived with Demosthenes; it may be however referred to the Syracusan force, in which case it would depend upon the verb *κρατειν*.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

what opinion to be of, and did yet continue to consider, nevertheless openly in his speech, he was against the withdrawing the army, and said, that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill from them, if they went thence without their decreeing it: for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done, rather than upon the report of calumniators, but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay, most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their dreadful condition, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals have betrayed the state, and come away for a bribe. That he would not, therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly, and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians, rather than run the chance of suffering the same in his own person, if it must so happen, at the hand of the enemy. And yet he said the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own; for paying much money to strangers, and laying out much also on forts,³ without and about the city, having also had a great navy a year already in pay, they must needs in some points be in difficulties, and in others they would be yet still more at a loss. For they have spent already two thousand talents,⁴ and are much in debt besides; and if they should fall off in the very least in their present course of expenditure, and give pay no longer, their strength would be gone, as being auxiliary, and not constrained to follow the war, as their own forces were. Therefore it was fit, he said, to stay a little and keep up the siege of the city, and not to go away, as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior.

XLIX. Nicias, in that he spake thus, persevered in his judgment as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely, and their want of money; and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians, and sent him word not to go; and withal, as being confirmed in his confidence in the fleet at least, in a greater degree than before. As for keeping up the siege, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it; but if they might not lead away the army without order from the Athenians, but must needs stay a time in Sicily, then he said they might go to Thapsus, or Catana, from whence by their land-forces

³ On these, see notes on vi. 45. and on iv. 67.

⁴ £387,500.

they might invade much of the country and procure themselves subsistence, and wasting the fields of the enemy, injure the Syracusians; and be able to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow, (which is to the advantage of the enemy,) but in a wide place, where their skill would be useful to them, and where they should not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In sum, he said he by no means liked to stay where they were, but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel with him. Nevertheless, on the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of unwillingness to oppose him, and procrastination in the business,⁵ and a suspicion withal, that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest; and thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence, and stayed upon the place.

L. In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse: Sicanus having failed in his purpose at Agrigentum, (for whilst he was yet in Gela, the party friendly to the Syracusians had been driven out;⁶) but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men at arms, who having been sent forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Libya. For having been driven into Libya, and the Cyrenæans having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitæ,⁷ besieged by the Libyans; and having overcome the Libyans, they went along the coast to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthaginians, where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days' and a night's sail over, and from thence they crossed the sea and came to Selinus. As soon as they were come, the Syracusians prepared to set upon the Athenians again both by sea and land; but the Athenian generals seeing another army join them, and their own affairs not bettering, but growing

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Sicanus and Gylippus return to Syracuse, the latter bringing a large reinforcement to the Syracusians.

On the arrival of this reinforcement to the enemy, the

⁵ On this feature in the character of Nicias, see the allusion in Aristoph. Aves 639. referred to by Wass.

⁶ Lit. as Dr. Arnold gives it, "the party for the Syracusians, for friendship to them." Such must be the sense, though the construction, he observes, appears unjustifiable. Goeller also so explains it, and adds, "Adjectivum cum præpositione vice fungitur adjectivi."

⁷ Comp. Herod. iv. 171.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Athenians
resolve to
evacuate
Sicily, but
are de-
tained by
an eclipse.

every day worse in all points, more especially as being pressed down by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before; and Nicias being now no longer against it as he was, except only that he was desirous that it might not be concluded in open council, gave order unto all, as secretly as was possible, to put forth from the harbour, and to be ready when the sign should be given. But when they were about it, and every thing was ready, the moon was eclipsed;⁸ for it happened to be full moon; and not only the greatest part of the Athenians, considering it as an evil omen, called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said, that it should come no more into debate, whether they should go or not, before they had remained the three times nine days, as the soothsayers had appointed. And the Athenians, though upon the point of going, still stayed for this reason.

The Syra-
cusians at-
tack the
Athenian
fortifica-
tions, and
obtain
some ad-
vantage in
a skirmish.

LI. The Syracusians also having intelligence of this, were encouraged to press the Athenians much the more, for that they already confessed themselves too weak for them both by sea and land, (for otherwise they would never have sought to have sailed away,) and besides they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to war against; but had rather there, with all speed, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their galleys, and practised themselves for as many days as appeared to them sufficient; and when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp, and some small number of men at arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates, and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men at arms, make them turn their backs and pursue them back into the camp; but the entrance being narrow, the Athenians lose both seventy of their horses, and some of their men at arms, but not many.

The Syra-
cusians
proceed by
sea and
land to
attack the
enemy.
The fleets
engage;
the Athe-

LII. That day, the army of the Syracusians retired; the next, they came out with their galleys, seventy-six in number, and the Athenians put forth against them with eighty-six; and being come together, they fought. Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemy, drew forth his own galleys in length more

⁸ On August 27th, A. C. 413.

toward the shore; and was cut off by the Syracusians, who had first overcome the middle of the Athenian line, from the rest in the bottom and inmost part of the haven, and was both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him were lost; and that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.

LIII. Gylippus seeing the navy of the enemy vanquished, and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army to the pier⁹ to kill such as landed, and that the Syracusians might more easily pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof they themselves were masters. But the Tuscans, (for they kept guard in that part for the Athenians,) seeing them coming that way in disorder, ran out against them, and charging the first of them, turned them and forced them into the marsh called Lysimelia. But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians to help the Tuscans, and for fear they should lose their galleys, fought with them, and having overcome them, pursued them, and slew some few of their men at arms, and also saved the most of their galleys, and brought them back to the camp; nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the men taken in them. And against the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship of burden, having filled her with fagots and wood for brands, and having set fire to them, wishing to burn them. The Athenians, on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for extinguishing the fire, and having quenched the flame, and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

LIV. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men at arms which they intercepted above near the wall, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the putting to flight those footmen whom the Tuscans drove into the marsh, and for those whom they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

LV. When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome

⁹ Harbours were divided into three parts, as far as related to their construction: one part was by the Greeks called *χηλη*, another *στομα*, a third *μυχος*. The *χηλη* was a jetty stretching out into the sea, for the purpose of breaking the violence of the waves. Comp. note on i. 63.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
nians are
defeated,
and Eu-
rymedon
slain.

Gylippus
leads down
a part of
his forces
to the pier,
who are
put to
flight by
the Tyr-
rhenians.

Eighteen
Athenian
ships de-
stroyed.
The rest
are saved
by the ex-
ertions of
the Athe-
nian army.
An unsuc-
cessful
attempt
made by
the Syra-
cusians to
burn the
Athenian
fleet.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

with their fleet, (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes,) the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart, and as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage. For having come against these cities, the only ones as yet that were for institution like unto their own, and governed by the people as well as themselves; and which had a navy, and horses, and greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government, by which means they might have been won over, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they were, even before what had lately happened,¹ in great perplexity; but now, when they were also vanquished by sea, which they would never have thought, they were much more dejected than ever.

The Syracusians resolve no longer to stand on the defensive, but to attempt the total overthrow of the Athenian force.

LVI. The Syracusians sailed presently about the haven without fear, and meditated how to shut up the mouth of the same, that the Athenians might not steal away without their knowledge, though they would; for now they studied, not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was, as regarded their present resources, far above theirs; and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates, both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter, (for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be brought upon them afterwards,) and they being reputed the authors of it, would be held in admiration, not only by all men now living, but also by posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy struggle, both for the causes shewn, and also for that they became victors, not over the Athenians only, but many others their confederates; nor again they themselves alone, but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard,² and of the business by sea performed the

¹ As Goeller explains it, "even before the late events;" i. e. before the last naval engagement.

² The sense of this is well expressed in the Latin version quoted by

greatest part themselves. For the greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered³ to Athens and Lacedæmon, came together to this one city.

LVII. For the following number on both sides, some against Sicily, and some for it, some to help to win, and some to help to save it, came to the war at Syracuse, taking part on either side, not so much through any respect to the right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians being Ionic, went against the Syracusians as Dorians voluntarily; with these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians, and the Imbrians, and the Æginetæ, that dwelt in Ægina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves; also the Hestians who colonized Hestiaea in Eubœa.⁴ Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects, and some as their free confederates, and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries, as the Eretrians, Chalcidæans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Eubœa; Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands; Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but supplying galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians, except only the Carystians, (but they are Dryopes,) and though they were subjects, and followed upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians. Besides these, there went with them Æolians, namely, the Methymnæans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money, but of galleys, and the Tenedians and Ænians, tributaries. Now here Æolians were constrained to fight against Æolians, namely, against their founders, the Bœotians, that took part with the Syracusians; but the Plateans, and only they, being downright Bœotians, fought against Bœotians upon just quarrel. The

Dr. Arnold: "Tanquam in manus sociis præbentes urbem suam, ut primas in bello partes suo periculo sustineat." From the sense of *προκοπτειν*, "to open a way for," Dr. Arnold renders the next sentence, "having in a large proportion facilitated the successes of the navy."

³ Lit. "which were collected at." Dr. Arnold explains the preposition, "which assembled to rally round the standard of Athens and Lacedæmon."

⁴ Lemnos had been colonized by Miltiades a few years before the battle of Marathon, (Herod. vi. 140;) Imbros, probably about the same time; the settlement of Ægina, as late as the Peloponnesian war, (Thucyd. ii. 27;) and that of Hestiaea, fourteen years earlier, A.C. 445. See i. 114.—*Arnold.*

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Rhodians and Cytherians, Doric, both by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cytherians, a colony of the Lacedæmonians, with the Athenians, against the Lacedæmonians that were with Gylippus; and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea; and the Corcyræans, being not only Doric, but direct Corinthians, followed against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one, and of kin to the other; which they did necessarily, (to employ a specious pretext,) but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, now so called in Naupactus, were taken along to this war, and the Messenians at Pylos, then holden by the Athenians. Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now of the rest, the joining in the expedition was rather voluntary. The Argives, not so much for the league as for their enmity with the Lacedæmonians, and their present particular profit, being Dorians, followed the Athenians, though Ionians, to the war against Dorians; but the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, men ever accustomed to invade any enemy pointed out to them, and now influenced by a desire for gain, regarded as enemies, as much as any, even those other Arcadians who went thither with the Corinthians; and the Cretans also and Ætolians were all mercenary; and it fell out with the Cretans, who, together with the Rhodians, were founders of Gela, took not part with their colonists, but came against them, contrary to their own inclination, for their hire. And some Acarnanians also joined them as well for gain, but more as confederates, for love to Demosthenes, and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians, constrained⁵ by similar necessity of seditious times,

⁵ Or, as Dr. Arnold renders it, "being overtaken in such necessities; necessities, which consisted in the seasons of faction, which then prevailed among them." *Τοιαύταις*, "such as to compel them to join the Athenians."

there joined with them in this expedition, the Thurians and Metapontians; of Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanæans; of Barbarians, the Egestæans, who also drew with them the most of the Sicilians; and without Sicily there went with them some Tuscans, on quarrels between them and the Syracusians, and some Iapygian mercenaries. So many were the nations that joined the expedition with the Athenians.

LVIII. On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinæans their borderers, and beyond them again the Geloans, and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Libya, but the Himeræans on the side that lieth to the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and the only ones who came thence to aid the Syracusians. These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily, all Dorians and free states; then of the Barbarians there they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athenians; but of Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helots, and the rest freed men,⁶ but the Corinthians alone aided them both with galleys, and with land-troops, and, for kindred sake [to the Corinthians], the Leucadians and Ambraciots; out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians, and Sicyonians on constraint, and of those without Peloponnesus, the Bœotians. To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added in every kind a greater number; for there was got together of men at arms, galleys, and horses, a great supply, and other forces in abundance. And in comparison with all the others again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may say, a force much more numerous, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.

LIX. So great were the succours assembled on either part, which were then all that were present there, and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the other. No marvel, then, if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already got, they could add the taking of the old Athenian army, so great as it was, and hinder their escape both by sea and land. Presently, therefore, they fall in

They block up the mouth of the harbour, in order to cut off the retreat of the Athenian ships.

The genitive absolute, "as they had been overtaken," is used for the case which should agree with the substantive.

⁶ On these, see note v. 34.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

hand with closing up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid across, and lighters and boats upon their anchors, and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary, in case the Athenians should hazard another battle, meditating no small design in any thing.

The Athenians in a council of war determine to abandon their fortifications, except a very small portion, and, going on board their fleet, to force (if possible) their way through the enemy, or, if defeated, to burn their ships and proceed overland.

LX. The Athenians seeing the shutting up of the haven, and understanding the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to counsel upon it; and the generals and commanders of regiments⁷ having met, and considered their present wants, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present, (for upon their resolution to sail out, they had sent before to Catana, to forbid the sending in of any more,) nor were likely to have for the future, unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their works above, and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the land-army, and to man every galley that they had, serviceable and less serviceable, and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they got the victory to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle, by land, (having first set fire on their navy,) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either Barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach before the enemy. As they had resolved on, so they did; for they both came down by stealth to the shore from their works above, and also manned every galley they had, and compelled to go on board every man of fit age, of any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was manned, to the number of one hundred and ten galleys, upon which they had embarked many archers and darters, both Acarnanians, and other strangers, and all things else they provided, according to their straitened means and the purpose they intended. And Nicias, when almost every thing was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual, desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together, and encouraged them first with words to this effect.

Oration of Nicias.

LXI. "Soldiers, Athenians, and other our confederates,

⁷ Compare note on iv. 4.

though the trial at hand will be common to all alike, and will concern the safety and country, no less of each of us than of the enemy; for if our galleys get the victory, we may every one see his native city again: yet ought we not to be discouraged, like men of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever after have a timorous expectation suitable to their misfortunes.⁸ But you Athenians, all of you that are here present, having had experience already of many wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war than one would think; and in hope that fortune will once also be on our side, prepare yourselves to fight again, in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see yourselves to be.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

LXII. “What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there, and against the preparation of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all, and, as well as our present means will permit, made them ready. For many archers and darters shall go aboard, and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in the main sea, we would not have used, because by hindering through the weight the working of the galleys, it would take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a land-fight from our galleys. We have also devised all contrivances necessary as to the structure of the galleys, and against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, by which we were most injured, to lash their galleys unto ours by casting on them iron grapnels, whereby (if the men at arms do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back again. For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a land-fight upon the water: and it will be the best for us, neither to fall back ourselves, nor to suffer the enemy to do so. Especially when, except what our men on land shall possess, the shore is altogether hostile.

LXIII. “Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost, and not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore. But when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make you part, unless

⁸ Compare the speech of Phormio, ii. 89.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

you have first beaten off the men at arms of the enemy from their decks. And this I speak to you rather that are the men at arms, than to the mariners, inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight above; and in you it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part with the land-men. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them not to be too much daunted with the losses past, having now both a greater number of galleys, and greater forces upon the decks. Think it a pleasure worth preserving, that being, up to the present time, taken, by your knowledge of the language, and imitation of our fashions, for Athenians, (even those of you that are not so,⁹) you are not only admired for it through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter of profit no less than ourselves; and as regards being feared by the nations subject, and protected from injury, more. You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion, cannot with any justice betray the same. In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who, as long as our fleet was at the best, durst never any one of them so much as stand against us, repel them, and make it appear, that your knowledge, even with weakness and loss, is better than the strength of another with fortune.

LXIV. "Again, such of you as are Athenians I must remind of this, that you have left behind no more such fleets in your arsenals, nor such able men at arms; and that if aught happens to you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home; and those who are left at home will be unable to defend themselves, both against those that shall go hence, and against the enemy that lieth there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what intent you came hither, and the other part which is at home shall fall into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them, be therefore valiant now, if ever, and bear in mind every one of you, that those of you that are to go now aboard are the land forces, the sea forces, the whole remaining state, and great name of Athens. For which, if any man excel another in skill or courage, he can never shew

⁹ Nicias here means the Metics; for information on whom, see note on iv. c. 90.

it more opportunely than now, when he may both help himself with it, and assist in saving the whole.”

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

LXV. Nicias having thus encouraged them, commanded immediately to go aboard. Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians meant to fight, by seeing their preparation; besides, they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels into their galleys. And as for every thing else, so also for that they had made provision. For they covered the forepart of their galleys, and also the decks for a great way with hides, that the grapnels cast in might slip off, and not be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylippus likewise, and other the commanders, used unto the soldiers such an exhortation as follows.

The Syra-
cusians
make pre-
parations
for the en-
counter.

Oration of Gylippus and the Syracusian Generals.

LXVI. “That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are to fight now also for further honour, men of Syracuse, and confederates, the most of you seem to know already, (for otherwise you never would so valiantly have undergone it,) and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we will make it appear to him better. For whereas the Athenians came into this country first to enslave Sicily, and then, if in that they should succeed, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and whereas already they had the greatest dominion of any Grecians, either present or past, you, the first that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were every where masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed, become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves, than they would have been if they had never thought so; and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come short also in courage beyond the true strength of their forces: and this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians.

LXVII. “Whereas with us it falls out, that our former courage wherewith, though inexperienced, we durst stand them, being now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the stronger, in that we have conquered the stronger, gives to every one of us a double hope. And in all enterprises, the greatest hope confers for the most part the greatest courage. As for their imitation of our preparations, they are things we

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

are acquainted with, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for them; but they, when they shall have many men at arms on their decks, contrary to their usual custom, and many, as I may term them, land-darters,¹ both Acarnanians and others, who will not be able, remaining stationary, to direct their darts, how can they fail to put the galleys into danger, and be all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion² not their own? As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing, if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against odds in number; for many in little room are so much the slower to do what they desire, and easier to be annoyed by our preparations. But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof we suppose we have most certain intelligence; for their calamities increasing beyond measure on them, and being forced by the difficulties which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate, not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may, that so they may either sail out by forcing their way, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

LXVIII. "Against such confusion, therefore, and against the fortune of our greatest enemies, now betraying itself into our hands, let us fight with anger, and with an opinion not only that it is most lawful against our enemies for all to think themselves justified, for the purpose of being avenged on their assailants, in glutting to the full the rage of their anger, but that also we shall gain revenge on an enemy, as is most commonly said, the sweetest thing in the world. And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well enough know, seeing they come hither into our land to bring it into servitude; wherein if they had succeeded, they would have brought upon the men the most bitter calamities, upon the women and children the most unseemly treatment, and upon the whole city the most ignominious name.³ In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be tender-hearted, or think it gain, if

¹ Ἀκοντισταὶ χερσαῖοι. Such as when on land could use their darts, but not when tottering on the water.

² That is, according to the motion of the galley, not steadfastly as upon land.

³ The name of subject.

they go away without putting you to further danger, for so they equally mean to do though they get the victory; but effecting, as it is likely we shall, what we intend, both to be revenged of these, and to deliver to all Sicily their liberty which they enjoyed before, but now is more assured, honourable is the combat. And rarest are those hazards, which from failure bring but little loss, but from success the greatest benefits."

LXIX. When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they directly put their men aboard, perceiving the Athenians to do the same. But Nicias, perplexed by their present state, and seeing how great and how near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from the harbour, and thinking, as in great battles it falls out, that, as regarded what was to be done, somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and that, in what was to be said, enough had not yet been spoken, he called unto him again all the captains of galleys, and spoke unto them every one by their father's, their tribe's, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that had reputation in any kind, not to betray the same; and those whose ancestors were eminent, not to deface their hereditary virtues; calling to their recollection their country's liberty, and the uncontrolled power of all men to live there as they pleased; and saying whatever else in such a pinch men are accustomed to say, who do not avoid using what may appear to any to be old and commonplace arguments, (and such as are adduced on all occasions nearly the same, touching their wives and children and paternal gods,) but all that they think serviceable in the present discouragement, they cry into their ears. And when he thought he had admonished them not enough, but as much as the time indeed would permit, he went his way, and drew out those forces that were to serve on land to the sea side; and drew them up so that they might take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby to be of the greatest service in confirming the courage of them that were aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus,⁴ (for those of the Athenian commanders went aboard,) putting forth from their camp, went immediately to the line of vessels that blocked up

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Nicias addresses a particular exhortation to each of the commanders. He ranges the land forces along the beach. The Athenians weigh anchor, intending to force the barrier;

⁴ The same mentioned in chap. xvi, though in some copies he is called Eudemus.

Year 19. the haven, and to the passage that was still left open, intending
 A. C. 413. to force their way out.
 Ol. 91. 4.

but are re-
 sisted by
 the Syra-
 cusians.

The battle
 com-
 mences.

LXX. But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with nearly the same number of galleys they had before, disposed part of them to guard the open passage, and the rest in circle about the haven, to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syracusian navy, Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded each of them a wing, and Pythen with the Corinthians had the middle battle. After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open the booms; but when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them from every side, they fought not at the lock only, but also in the haven itself; and the battle was sharp, and of such a kind as there had never before been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their galleys to any part, when the signal was sounded, was very great, and great was the plotting and counterplotting, and contention one against another of the masters. Also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their utmost not to be excelled by each other in any points of skill that could be used from the decks,⁵ and every man in the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass, (for they were the most galleys that in any battle fought in the least room, being little fewer on the one side and the other than two hundred,) they ran with the beak against each other but seldom, there being no means of retiring, nor of sailing through the enemy; but made assaults upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul. And as long as a galley was bringing up to another, they that stood on the decks used their darts and arrows and stones in abundance against her, but being once come close, the soldiers coming to handstrokes attempted to board each other. And in many places it so fell out through want of

⁵ These words admit of a different construction, and perhaps a preferable one, which Dr. Arnold gives, "and the soldiers (or marines) did all they could that the service on deck (*τα ἀπο πον καταστρωματος*) should not be outdone by the other service, i. e. the sailors."

room, that they which ran upon a galley on one side were run upon themselves on the other, and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced close aboard of one, and that the masters were necessitated at once to have a care, not in one place only, but in many together, how to defend on the one side, and how to offend on the other. And the great noise of many galleys falling foul of one another, both amazed them and took away their hearing of what their officers⁶ directed; for the officers gave their directions oftentimes and loudly on both sides, not only as art required, but out of their present eagerness; the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now, if ever, valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their country; and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how honourable a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape, and by this victory to augment every man the honour of his own country. Moreover the commanders of either side, where they saw any man without necessity to row astern, would call unto the captain of the galley by his name, and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend than the sea, which they had, through no little labour, been masters of? The Syracusians theirs, whether when they clearly knew that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to get away, they would nevertheless fly from the fliers?

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

LXXI. Whilst the conflict upon the water was still in suspense, the land-forces felt a vehement conflict and excitement of their affections; they of the place contending for increase of the honours they had already got, and the invaders fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear for the event, as they had never been in the like; and because of the varying and changeable nature of the sea-fight, they were necessitated also to behold it with varying and different feelings.⁷ For the spectacle being near, and not

⁶ Similar to the boatswains among us, their office was to direct the rowers.

⁷ In this most difficult passage, I have followed Dr. Arnold's explanation in taking the word *ἀνωμαλον* twice; thus, *δια το ἀνωμαλον της ναυμαχιας, ἀνωμαλον ειχον και την ἐποψιν αυτης*; and have given it the best explanation I could. In the long note in Goeller, the reader may find various other explanations and conjectures, all of which appear more or less unsatisfactory to him, and he gives none of his own.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

looking all of them upon one and the same part, any that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety: and they that saw them have the worse, not only lamented, but shrieked outright, and had their minds more subdued by the sight of what was done, than they that were present in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on every occasion, agreeable to their expectation, passed the time in a most miserable perplexity. For they were ever within a little either of escaping or of perishing. And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was equally balanced, at one and the same time, lamentations, shouts that they conquer, that they are conquered, and whatsoever of various kinds else a great army in great danger is forced to utter. They also that were aboard suffered the same, till at last the Syracusians and their confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them undoubtedly to flight, and pressing on them, chased them, with great clamour and encouragement among each other, to the shore. And the sea forces making to the shore, some one way and some another, except only such as were taken by being far from it, escaped into the camp. And the army that was upon the land, no longer now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence, all with shrieks and sighs, unable to sustain what befell, ran part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the rest of the wall; and others, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best way to save himself. And this was a consternation inferior to none of all that ever took place, and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to suffer before at Pylos. For the Lacedæmonians then, besides the loss of their fleet, lost the men whom they had set over into the island, and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were out of all hope of saving themselves by land.

and after
a long
struggle
the Athe-
nians are
routed and
driven
ashore.

The Syra-
cusians
erect a
trophy.

LXXII. After this severe battle, and many galleys and men on either side lost,⁸ the Syracusians and their confederates

⁸ Of the Athenian galleys, sixty were destroyed; of the Syracusian, eight, and ten rendered unfit for sea.—*Diod. Sic.*

having the victory, took up the wreck, and bodies of their dead, and having sailed away to the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wreck, but fell immediately to consultation how to be gone the same night. But Demosthenes coming to Nicias, delivered his opinion for manning what were left of their vessels, and forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet remaining, and serviceable, were more than those of the enemy. For the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. But when Nicias agreed to the advice, and they would have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard, as being not only dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upper hand any more. Whereupon they now all turned their attention towards making their retreat by land.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Demosthenes and Nicias wish to make another attempt on the barrier, but the crews refuse to re-embark.

LXXIII. But Hermocrates of Syracuse, suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous, that so great an army going away by land, and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired to the magistrates, and admonished them that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways, alleging what he thought best to the purpose, but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and cast up fortifications in the roads, and seize and guard all the narrow passages. Now they were all of them of the same opinion, no less than himself, and thought it fit to be done, but they conceived withal that the soldiers now joyfully taking their ease after a sore battle, it being also a feast, for it happened that this was their day of sacrifice to Hercules, would not easily be brought to obey; for through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, in the festival, turn their attention to drinking, and would expect any thing rather than to be persuaded at this time to take arms again and go out. But seeing the magistrates on this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates not prevailing, afterwards, of his own head, contrived this; fearing lest the Athenians should be beforehand with them in passing at their ease the hardest part of the way in the night, as soon as it grew dark, he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the

Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent the retreat of the Athenians that night.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Athenian camp, who approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians, (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence,) and bade them advise Nicias, not to remove his army by night, for that the Syracusians had beset the ways, but that by day, having made their preparations at their leisure, to march away.

The Athenians determine not to commence the retreat until the third day after the sea fight. The Syracusians and Gylippus block up all the roads, and station guards at the fords.

LXXIV. On this message they waited that night, supposing it had been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also; to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and be gone, leaving all things else behind them, save what was necessary as provision for their bodies. But Gylippus and the Syracusians with their land forces went out before them, and not only stopped up the ways in the country about, by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood drawn up to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they sailed to the harbour of the Athenians, and towed their galleys away from the shore; some few whereof the Athenians had burnt, as they meant to have done with all, but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to have driven ashore, they hauled off, and conveyed to the city.

The Athenians commence their retreat.

LXXV. After this, when every thing seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day⁹ from their fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead of their great hopes, they had endangered both themselves and the state; but also for the dolorous objects which presented themselves both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular in the leaving of their camp. For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief; and the living that were left behind sick or wounded, both excited

⁹ The third from the naval action, according to the phrase of Thucydides, and the usual manner of reckoning among the Greeks, who counted the day itself of an action the first, the next day as the second, and so forth.—*Mitford.*

much more grief among the survivors than the dead, and were more miserable. For betaking themselves to entreaties and lamentations, they brought them to a state of perplexity, pleading to be taken along with them, and calling loudly on whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades who were already departing, and following as far as they were able, and when the strength of their bodies failed that they could go no further, not without a few¹ obtestations by the gods, and lamentations, were there left behind; insomuch that the whole army, filled with tears, and irresolute, could hardly get away, though from a hostile land; and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future more than with tears could be expressed; but hung down their heads, and greatly blamed themselves. For they seemed like nothing else but the people of some great city starved out by siege, and making their escape. For the whole number that marched were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of whom, not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use, but also the men at arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want, and partly for distrust of their servants, (who before from time to time had gone over to the enemy, but at this time deserted in the greatest number,) and yet what they carried thus was not enough to suffice them; for there was no longer any supply of provisions in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of others, and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is somewhat wont to lighten it, in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather, because they considered from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed before, to what an end they had now come, and into how low an estate they were now fallen: for never Grecian army so differed from itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns, with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary omens: and whereas they came out seamen, they

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

¹ The word *ὄκ* Dr. Arnold repeats again before *ὄλιγων*, so as to make it, "not without many obtestations or entreaties." Mr. Bloomfield explains the text as it stands, "not without a few," namely, such as their strength would allow them.

Year 19. departed land-men, and relied not upon their naval forces, but
 A. C. 413. upon their men at arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great
 Ol. 91. 4. danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all to be tolerable.

LXXVI. Nicias perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that was in it, came up to the ranks and encouraged and comforted them, as far as for the present means he was able, and as he went from part to part, exalted his voice more than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation, and because also he desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might be.

Oration of Nicias to his afflicted Army.

LXXVII. "Athenians and confederates, we must hope still even in our present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater dangers than these are; nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of you in strength of body, (for you see in what a state I am from my sickness,) nor am thought inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of my own private person, or otherwise, am nevertheless now tossed by the waves of the same danger as the meanest of you. And yet I have passed my life with much reverence towards the gods, according to the law, and have conducted myself justly and unblameably towards men. For which cause my hope is still confident of the future, though these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our deserts,² do indeed make me fear. But they may perhaps even cease. For both the enemy have already had sufficient fortune, and the gods, if any of them have been already displeased with our voyage, have already sufficiently punished us. Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we; and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so their punishment also hath been tolerable. And we have reason now, both to hope for more favour from the gods, (for our case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred,) and also not to be too much cast down ourselves, seeing how good and how many men at arms you are, marching together in order of battle. But consider this, that

² Or it may be rendered, "and these calamities do not terrify me in proportion to their greatness."

wheresoever you please to sit down, there at once of yourselves you are a commonwealth, such as not any other in Sicily can either easily sustain if you assault, or remove if you be once seated. Now for your march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves, with no other consideration any of you, but that what place soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he win it, must be his country and his fort. March you must with diligence, both night and day alike, for our victual is short; and if we can but reach some amicable territory of the Siculi, (for these are still firm to us through their fear of the Syracusians,) then you may think yourselves secure. And a message has been sent forward to them; and they have been desired to meet us, and bring provisions. In sum, soldiers, know this, that it is necessary that you be valiant; for there is no place near, whither, being cowards, you can possibly escape and be saved. Whereas, if you escape through the enemy at this time, you may every one attain again whatsoever any where he most desires to see; and the Athenians may re-erect the great power of their city, though it be fallen. For men, not walls, nor the galleys destitute of those who man them, make the city.”

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

LXXVIII. Nicias, as he used this exhortation, went withal about the army, and where he saw any man straggle, and not march in his rank, he brought him about and set him in his place; and Demosthenes having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much to those soldiers under him. And the army advanced, arranged in a square, the division of Nicias leading the way, and that of Demosthenes following; and the men at arms received those that carried the baggage and the other multitude within them. When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against them on the bank; but these they put to flight, and having won the passage, marched forward. But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light-armed plied them with their darts in the flank. This day the Athenians advanced forty furlongs, and lodged that night at a certain hill. The next day, early, they marched on, and advanced forward about twenty furlongs, and descending into a certain champaign ground, encamped there, with intent both to get victual at the houses, (for the place was inhabited,) and to carry water with them thence; for before

The Athenians defeat a party of Syracusians at the ford of the Anapus.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

The Syracusians occupy Acræum Lepas. The progress of the Athenians is checked by the Syracusian cavalry and light-armed.

The Athenians attempt to force the position of the Syracusians on the hill. Being unsuccessful, they retreat to the plain.

The Syracusians endeavour unsuccessfully to take them in the rear.

The next day the Athenians advance five or six stadia, and then halt.

them, in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs together, there was little to be had. But the Syracusians in the meantime got before them, and cut off their passage with a wall. This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with steep and rocky banks, and it is called Acræum Lepas.³ The next day, the Athenians went on, and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great number both, pressed them so with their horses and darts, that the Athenians, after long fight, were compelled to retire again into the same camp; but now with less victual than before, because, by reason of the horsemen, it was not possible for them any more to straggle abroad.

LXXIX. In the morning betimes they dislodged and put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to the hill which the enemy had fortified, where they found before them the Syracusian foot embattled in great depth above the fortification, on the hill's side; for the place itself was but narrow. The Athenians charging up assaulted the wall, but being exposed to the missile-weapons of the numerous enemy from the hills, which was steep, so that they from above easily reached their aim, and being unable to force it, they retired again and rested. There happened at the same time some claps of thunder, and a shower of rain, as usually falls out at this time of the year, being now near autumn, which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this did tend to their destruction. Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of their army to raise a wall at their backs in the way they had come, but this the Athenians hindered, by sending against them part of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into the more champaign ground, passed that night there, and the next day went forward again. And the Syracusians, with their darts from every part round about, wounded many of them; and when the Athenians charged, they retired; and when they retired, the Syracusians charged; and that especially upon the hindmost, that by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army. And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them; and afterwards, having advanced five or six furlongs forward,

³ A lofty and precipitous place, to the west of Euryalus, now commonly called *Craniti*.

they rested in the plain; and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

LXXX. And at night it seemed good to Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their army, from the want already of all necessaries, and that many of their men, by the many assaults that took place of the enemy, were wounded, to lead away the army, after having lighted as many watch-fires as they possibly could, not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea, which was the contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, Camarina, and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as Barbarian, that way. When they had kindled many fires accordingly, they marched in the night. And, as usually it falls out in all armies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright and terror, especially marching by night, and in hostile ground, and the enemy not far distant, they fell into confusion; the army of Nicias leading the way, kept together and got far before; but that of Demosthenes, which was about the half or more, was both severed from the rest, and marched more disorderly.⁴ Nevertheless by the morning betimes they got to the sea side, and entering into the way called the Helorine [way], they went on, to the end that when they came to the river Cacyparis, they should march upwards along the river side through the heart of the country; for they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would meet them.

At night Nicias and Demosthenes draw off their forces; and altering their course, retreat in the direction of Camarina and Gela.

When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with piles. When they had forced this guard, they passed the river, and again marched on to another river called Erineus, for that was the way which the guides directed them to go.

They force the passage of the river Cacyparis.

LXXXI. In the mean time, the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared, and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus of having

The Syracusians murmur at Gylippus

⁴ On the subsequent operations of the Athenians, Mr. Thirlwall (iii. 452.) remarks, "that there is some obscurity in the description in Thucydides of the movements of the two generals after their separation; but it seems tolerably clear that they both pursued the Helorus road, and crossed the Cacyparis at the same point: but that Demosthenes was overtaken before he reached the Erineus, which Nicias crossed late in the same day on which his colleague surrendered; and was himself overpowered on the banks of the Assinarus."

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
for having
let the
Athenians
escape.
He sets out
in pursuit,
and about
dinner
time comes
up with
the di-
vision of
Demos-
thenes,
which he
surrounds
on every
side.

let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way which they easily perceived they were gone, and about dinner time overtook them. When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost, and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in, and forced them up into a narrow compass the more easily now, because they were divided from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was distant fifty furlongs in advance; for he led away the faster, because he thought not that their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose. But Demosthenes was both in greater and in more continual toil, because the enemy pressed upon him first, being last in the retreat. And seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed and brought, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had a way out, and abundance of olive trees, they were exposed from all sides at once to the enemy's missile-weapons. For the Syracusians assaulted them in this way, and not in close battle, upon very good reason; for to hazard battle against men desperate, was not so much for theirs as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat, because they were loth to be cut off before the end of the business, and also they thought even, by this kind of fight, to subdue and take them alive.

At the
close of
the day
the Athe-
nians
under De-
mosthenes
having
suffered
severely
surrender,
on con-
dition of
their lives
being
spared.

LXXXII. Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates all day long from every side with missiles, and saw that with their wounds and other annoyances they were already in great distress, Gylippus and the Syracusians, and their confederates, first made proclamation, that if any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at liberty;⁵ and the men of some few cities went over. And then afterwards they enter into terms with all the rest that were with Demosthenes, that they should deliver up their arms, and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds,

⁵ Or more literally, "if any one of the islanders wishes to come over to them on condition of having his liberty, he shall be received."

nor by want of the necessities of life. And they all yielded themselves, to the number of six thousand men, and the money they had they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets, and filled with the same four targets. And these men they carried at once into the city; but Nicias and those that were with him attained the same day to the river Erineus, which passing, he caused his army to encamp upon a certain ground more elevated than the rest.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
The prisoners are marched to Syracuse.
Nicias crosses the Erineus.

LXXXIII. The Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those with Demosthenes had yielded themselves, and willed him to do the like; but he, not believing it, makes a truce to send a horseman to inquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and word being brought back that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians, saying, that he was content to come to terms on the part of the Athenians, to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had laid out, so that they would suffer his army to depart. And that till payment of the money were made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated at a talent. But the Syracusians and Gylippus refused the conditions, and charging them, and hemming them in, plied them with missile-weapons, as they had done the other army, from every side, till evening. This part of the army was also greatly distressed with the want both of victual and other necessaries. Nevertheless, waiting for the quiet of the night, they were about to march: but no sooner took they their arms up, than the Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians finding themselves discovered, laid [their arms] down again, all but about three hundred, who breaking by force through the guards, marched by night any how they could.

The Syracusians overtake Nicias; who, on being informed of the capture of Demosthenes, proposes terms, which are rejected.

He attempts to escape by night, but is discovered.

LXXXIV. Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward; but the Syracusians and their confederates still pressed them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them from every side. And the Athenians hastened to get to the river Assinarus, being at the same time urged on every side by the assault of many horsemen, and of the rest of the multitude, and thinking they would be more at ease when they were over the river, and out of weariness also, and desire to drink. When they were come to the river, they rushed in without any order, every man striving himself first to get over; but the pressing of the enemy made the passage now difficult: for being forced to advance in

Nicias advances to the river Assinarus, where many of his men are butchered by the Syracusians and Peloponnesians.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

crowds, they fell upon and trampled one another under their feet; and falling upon the spears and utensils of the army, some perished immediately, and others being entangled one amongst another, floated together down the stream. And the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, (being a steep one,) plied the Athenians with their missile-weapons from above, as they were many of them greedily drinking, and in disorder amongst themselves in the hollow of the river. And the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them, and those especially that were in the river. And forthwith the water was corrupted; nevertheless they drank it, foul as it was with blood and mire, and the greatest part also fought for it.

Nicias sur-
renders to
Gylippus.

LXXXV. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river,⁶ and the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if any got away) by the horsemen, Nicias yielded himself to Gylippus, having more confidence in him than in the Syracusians; and he desired him and the Lacedæmonians to do as they wished with his own self, but to stop from slaughtering the rest of the soldiers. Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners; so the residue, except such as had hidden themselves, (which were many,) they carried alive into the city; and they sent also to pursue the three hundred who broke through their guards in the night, and took them. That which was gathered together of this army to the public, was not much; but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many; and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken, as those with Demosthenes were, on terms. Besides, a great part were slain; for the slaughter at this time was exceeding great, not less than any in all the Sicilian war. They were also not a few that died in those other many assaults in their march; nevertheless many also escaped, some then presently, and some by running away after servitude, the place of retreat to whom was Catana.

The pri-
soners
are thrust
into the
stone-
quarries.
Nicias and
Demos-

LXXXVI. The Syracusians and their confederates being gathered together, returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil, to the city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athenians and their confederates, they put them into the quarries,⁷ as the safest custody; but Nicias and Demosthenes

⁶ According to Diod. Sic. the number of the slain amounted to eighteen thousand men.

⁷ Λιθοτομιαί. The prison called by Plutarch and Diodorus Λατομιαί.

they killed, against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought it would be a noble prize of victory,⁸ if over and above all his other success he could carry home both the generals of the enemy to Lacedæmon. And it fell out that the one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest enemy, for the things he had done in the island,⁹ and at Pylos; and the other, through the same event, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners who were taken in the island set at liberty, by persuading the Athenians to enter into a treaty. For which cause the Lacedæmonians were inclined to regard him with good will; and it was principally in confidence of that, that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear, because they had had communications with him, lest being put to the torture, he might bring them into trouble, whereas they were now well off; and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes very near these, was he put to death, being the man that of all the Grecians of my time least deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery, on account of his strict attention to the performance of every virtue.

LXXXVII. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians treated them at first with great severity. For being in a hollow place, and many in a confined situation, first the sun, and then the suffocating air, as they were without a roof, annoyed them one way; and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, worked a change in them, and brought them (by reason of the alteration) into disease; especially doing all things, for want of room, in one and the same place; and the carcases of such as died of their wounds, or change of temperature, or other like accident, lying together there on heaps, the smell was intolerable, besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. For during eight months together they allowed them no more but to every man a cotyle¹ of water

⁸ Or the word may be rendered, more simply, "distinction;" according to the Schol. δοξάν, "*laudem, aut, opinionem hominum alii gloriosam.*"

⁹ Sphacteria.

¹ A small measure, about half our pint. It was the fourth part of the chœnix; so that the allowance was only half of that commonly given to a slave. Comp. Boeckl. Pub. Œcon. i. p. 123.—*Arnold.*

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

thenes are
put to
death.

The prisoners,
after
seventy
days of
suffering,
are all
(except
the Athenians,
Siceliots,
and Italiots)
sold
for slaves.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

by the day, and two cotyles of corn. And of whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may suffer, there was nothing which did not befall them. Some seventy days they lived thus thronged; afterwards, with the exception of the Athenians and such Siciliots and Italiots as had taken part in the expedition with them, they sold the rest.² How many were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly; but they were not fewer than seven thousand; and this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, and, in my opinion, of that we have heard of with regard to the Grecians, being to the victors most glorious, and most calamitous to the vanquished; for being wholly overcome in every way, and receiving small loss in nothing, their army and fleet, and all that ever they had, perished (as the saying is) with an utter destruction, and few of many returned home. And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.

² Plutarch, in his *Life of Nicias*, says, that some of them were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euripides than were even the people of Greece itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to Sicily, brought them any specimens or morsels of his poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high delight communicated them to their friends. It is said that several, who by this means earned their liberty, went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of their gratitude.—*Smith*.

BOOK VIII.

WHEN the news was told at Athens, they long disbelieved even the principal¹ soldiers that had escaped from the defeat itself, and brought certain news of it; [and would not believe] that all was so utterly lost, as it was; but when they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators that furthered the voyage, as if they themselves had never decreed it; they were angry also with those that gave out prophecies, and with the soothsayers, and with whosoever else had at first by any divination put them in hope that they should subdue Sicily. Every thing from every place grieved them; and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they were in, beset them round. For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in particular, and the whole city sustained, of so many men at arms, horsemen, and men in the prime of their age, the like whereof they saw was not left; but seeing they had neither sufficient galleys in their arsenals, nor money in their treasury, nor furniture for their galleys, despaired at that time of their safety, and thought the enemy out of Sicily would sail forthwith with their fleet to the Piræus, (especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy,) and that the enemy here would surely now, with double preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land, and be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to stand it out; and getting together materials and money where they could have them, to make ready a navy, and to make sure of their confederates, especially those of Eubœa; and to introduce a greater frugality in all matters of the state, and to elect a magistracy of the elder sort, who, as occasion should be offered, should pre-consult of the business that passed.² And they were ready,

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
The Athenians refuse at first to believe the account of the ruin of their army in Sicily. On being convinced of its truth, they are much disturbed, but resolve not to yield.

A board of government is appointed.

¹ Or, as Dr. Arnold renders, "the most respectable soldiers." So again in c. 89. Properly it signifies, "the most complete or perfect soldiers."

² On this board of magistrates, see Thirlwall, vol. iv. p. 3.

Year 19.
A.C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

in respect of their present fear, (as is the people's fashion,) to order every thing aright.³ And as they resolved this, so they did it; and the summer ended.

WINTER.
The whole
of Greece
is anxious
to have a
share in
the over-
throw of
Athens.
The sub-
ject states
of the
Athenians
are ready
for revolt.
The Lacedæ-
monians
resolve to
carry on
the war
with vi-
gour.

II. The winter following, on the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently roused; those who before were confederates of neither side, thought fit no longer, even though none should call upon them, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord, as having not only every one severally thought that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily, they would afterwards have come upon them also; but imagining withal, that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate; and such of them also as were confederates of the Lacedæmonians longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt, inasmuch as they judged according to their passion, nor did they leave them a chance,⁴ that the next summer they would be able to gain the superiority. But the Lacedæmonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily, with great power, having a great naval force now necessarily added to their own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring. And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to take in hand the war; calculating, if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as would have befallen them from the Athenians, if they had got Sicily, and also having pulled them down, to have the sovereignty of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

Agis
marches
from De-
celea to
collect
money.
He plun-
ders the
Æteans,

III. Whereupon, forthwith, Agis their king went out with a part of his army the same winter from Decelea, and levied money amongst the confederates for the building of a navy; and turning towards the Melian gulf, and (through the old⁵ grudge) having taken a great booty from the Æteans, he extorted money from them [for the ransom of it], and forced

³ Or, with Mr. Bloomfield, "the multitude was disposed to be orderly."

⁴ I have adopted Dr. Arnold's interpretation in thus rendering it. Mr. Bloomfield, for *αἰτίοις* reads *αὐτίοις*; and gives, "nor did they entertain a doubt" (in their own minds.)

⁵ See iii. 92.

those of Pthiotis, being Achæians, and the others in those parts who were subject to the Thessalians, the Thessalians complaining, and being unwilling to give him hostages and money; and the hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into the league. But the Lacedæmonians imposed on the states confederate the charge of building one hundred galleys, [that is to say,] on their own state, and on the Bœotians, each twenty-five; on the Phœceans and Locrians, fifteen; on the Corinthians, fifteen; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; and on the Megareans, Trœzenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians, ten; and put all things else in readiness, as about to take the war in hand vigorously, as soon as it was spring.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
Achæans
of Phthio-
tis, &c.
The Lace-
dæmo-
nians send
out requi-
sitions to
the allies
for the
building
of one
hundred
ships.

IV. The Athenians also made their preparations, as they had designed, having got timber, and built their navy this same winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium, that their corn-vessels might sail round in safety, and abandoning the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they passed by for Sicily; and in all other matters, where there appeared any useless expense, they contracted it all within the bounds of moderation, and especially kept a watchful eye upon their allies, that they might not revolt from them.

The Athe-
nians be-
gin to
build
ships, for-
tify Su-
nium, and
abandon
their La-
conian for-
tress.

V. Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, and acting in no other manner than as if they were preparing for the commencement of the war, there came to Agis this winter, about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Eubœans. And he, accepting the motion, sent for Alcamenes the son of Sthenelâidas, and for Melanthon, from Lacedæmon, to go as commanders into Eubœa; whom, when they were come to him with about three hundred freed men, he was now about to send over. But in the mean time came the Lesbians, also desiring to revolt, and by the means of the Bœotians' favouring their cause, Agis was persuaded to change his former resolution, and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Eubœa, and assigned them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Eubœa, for their governor;⁶ and the Bœo-

The Eu-
bœans
treat with
Agis con-
cerning a
revolt,
and also
the Les-
bians.

⁶ On the powers of the Harmostes, I am sorry not to be able to give the reader any information, nor to refer him to any treatise except that of Krueger, which I have not myself, and which probably is not in his reach. He will however remark, that the creation of these officers, as well as of the Epistoleis and Navarchs, was contrary to the spirit of Lycurgus's enactments;

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

The
Chians
and Ery-
thræans
treat with
the go-
vernment
at Lacedæ-
mon on
the same
subject.
Tissa-
phernes, a
Persian
satrap,
sends to
solicit the
alliance of
the Lacedæ-
monians.

Ambassa-
dors also
arrive from
Pharna-
bazus, who
desire that
a fleet may
be sent to
the Hel-
lespont.
The Lacedæ-
monians give
the pre-
ference to
the suit of
the Chians
and Tissa-
phernes ;

tians promised them ten galleys, and Agis other ten. Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of Lacedæmon: for Agis, as long as he was about Decelea with the power he had, had the power in his own hands to send what army, and whither he listed, and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this time the confederates did rather (as I may say) obey him, than the Lacedæmonians at home; for having the power in his hands, he was immediately dreaded wheresoever he came. And he, indeed, was now managing matters for the assistance of the Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythræans, they also desiring to revolt, turned not to Agis, but to the Lacedæmonians in the city, and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant to king Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in the districts on the coast [of Asia Minor]. For Tissaphernes also was desirous of gaining the alliance of the Peloponnesians, and promised to give them pay. For he lately had exacted of him by the king, the tribute accruing in his own province, for which he was in arrear, because he could not exact it out of any of the Greek cities, by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians to receive his tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king, and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes,⁷ who was in rebellion against him in the parts about Caria. The Chians, therefore, and Tissaphernes, were engaged in managing this business jointly.

VI. Calligetus the son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras the son of Athanagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished from their own cities, and abiding with Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same time to Lacedæmon, sent by Pharnabazus to procure a fleet to be sent to the Hellespont, and that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt from them, for his tribute's sake, and might of his own interest draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king, just the same things that Tissaphernes was desirous of doing. Now both those from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, there was a great contest among those at Lacedæmon, between the one side that per- and from the restrictions at first imposed upon them being eluded, and from the greatness of the temptations these offices offered, they may be considered as contributing to the causes of the decay of Sparta.

⁷ See b. i. 115. and iii. 31.

suaded to send to Ionia and Chios, and the other, that would have the army and fleet go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedæmonians, for the most part, were far most inclined to accede to the overtures of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades favoured their suit, being hereditary guest and friend, in the highest degree, of Endius, an ephor: whence also that in respect of that tie of hospitality, the family of Alcibiades received the Laconian name [of Alcibiades]; for Endius⁸ was surnamed "the son of Alcibiades." Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians sent first Phrynus, a man of those parts, to Chios, to see if the galleys they had were so many as they reported, and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be; and when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said was true, they received both the Chians and Erythræans directly into their league, and decreed to send them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from what the Chians said, no less than sixty already. And of these, at first, they were about to send out ten, with Melancredas for admiral; but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, instead of Melancredas they sent Chalceus, and instead of ten galleys, they set about making ready five only in Laconia. So the winter ended, and nineteenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

Year 19.
A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
and having ascertained that the report of the Chians relative to their fleet, &c. is true, they determine to send forty ships thither, and make an alliance with the Chians and Erythræans. On account of an earthquake the commander is changed, and five ships are immediately equipped instead of ten.

YEAR XX. A. C. 412. OLYMP. 92. 1.

VII. In the very beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed them to send away the galleys, and feared lest the Athenians should perceive what they were doing, (for all of them had gone on the embassies privily to them,) the Lacedæmonians send away to Corinth three Spartans, to bid them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos, as the rest. The number of the galleys of the league which were then there being forty, wanting one.

SUMMER.
The Lacedæmonians send to Corinth to urge the Corinthians to transport the ships over the isthmus and sail for Chios.

VIII. But Calligetus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios, nor would deliver the money, twenty-five talents,⁹ which they

The allies assembled at Corinth, determine to sail first

⁸ The name of Endius's father was Alcibiades, to whom Clinias being guest, for that cause gave the name of Alcibiades to his own son.

⁹ £4,843 15s.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
to Chios,
then to
Lesbos,
and lastly
to the Hel-
lespont.

had brought with them to pay for their setting forth, but intended to go out with another fleet afterwards by themselves. But Agis, when he saw the Lacedæmonians meant to send first to Chios, resolved not on any other course himself, but the confederates assembling at Corinth went to counsel upon the matter, and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the five galleys in Laconia; and then to Lesbos, under the charge of Alcamenes, whom Agis also had intended to send; and lastly, to go into the Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, should have the command. And they concluded to carry over the isthmus, first the one half of their galleys, and that those should at once put to sea, that the Athenians might have their thoughts fixed more upon those than on the other half to be transported afterwards. For they determined to make the voyage in that sea openly, contemning the weakness of the Athenians, in respect that no naval force of theirs of importance had as yet appeared. And, as they had resolved, they directly carried over one and twenty galleys.

They also
determine
to send
half their
fleet first.

Through
the delay
of the Co-
rinthians,
the affair
reaches
the ears
of the
Athenians;
who send
to Chios
and de-
mand
ships, as a
pledge of
the fidelity
of the
Chians.
Seven
ships are
sent to
Athens
by the
Chians.

IX. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling to go, before they should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian festival, then come. Hereupon Agis was content that they for their parts should, as they said, observe the Isthmian truce, but that he should take the fleet upon himself as his own. But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and a delay taking place in the matter, the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the intrigue of the Chians, and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, and accused them of it; and the Chians denying the matter, they commanded them, for a surety, to send along with them some galleys, according¹ to the league: and they sent seven. The cause why they sent these galleys, was the many not being acquainted with the intrigue that was carried on, and the few and conscious not being willing to undergo the enmity of the multitude, without having strength first, and their not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedæmonians, because they had so long delayed.

¹ So Haaek takes the words, ἐς being used for *κατα*. Goeller joins them to the preceding words, and renders, "naves quæ pignoris loco essent, eos in societate mansuros."

X. In the mean time, the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the Athenians (for the truce had been proclaimed to them) came and saw; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent to them. After they went thence, they took measures directly that the fleet might not set forth from Cenchræa undiscovered. And after the festival was over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chios, under the conduct of Alcamenes. And the Athenians, with an equal number at first, came up to them, and then drew out into the main sea. But seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another way, the Athenians also retired; for the seven galleys at Chios, which were part of this number, they durst not trust, but afterwards, having manned thirty-seven² others, they gave chase to the enemy as they sailed by the shore, and drove them into Peiræus, in the territory of Corinth; this Peiræus is a desert haven, and the most extreme upon the confines of Epidauria. One galley that was far from land the Peloponnesians lost, the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athenians charging them both by sea with their galleys, and by their men landing, there was a great and disorderly tumult, and they greatly injured most of the galleys upon the shore, and slew Alcamenes their commander; and some they lost of their own men.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
The Athenians, after the Isthmian festival, attack the Peloponnesian fleet sailing from Cenchræa, drive it into Piræus of Corinthia, disable most of the ships, and slay Alcamenes, the commander of the fleet.

XI. And the Athenians having separated from their enemies, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of the enemy, and with the rest they station themselves at a little island not far off, in which also they encamped, and sent to Athens for further aid. For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys, the Corinthians the next day, and not long after the other inhabitants thereabouts. But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place would be laborious, they knew not what course to take, and once they thought of setting the galleys on fire; but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land, and

The Athenians keep watch over the disabled ships.

² Poppo, with great probability, takes these words to mean, "having manned afterwards others, so as to be in all thirty-seven;" and in this interpretation Dr. Arnold acquiesces: as also Thirlwall, in vol. iv. p. 9, note; who observes, "it is safer to adopt this interpretation, (viz. that the Athenians strengthened their squadron with sixteen additional galleys, so as to make up the number of thirty-seven,) than with Krueger to strike out the words *και τριακοντα*, though, as he observes, they may have crept into the text from c. 15. and if omitted would leave the context perfectly intelligible and probable."

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
Thermon
is sent to
assist the
Pelopon-
nesians.
The Lace-
dæmo-
nians, on
hearing
of the
disaster at
Peiræus,
refuse to
send five
ships to
Chios, as
they had
intended.

guard them with their land-forces stationed by them, till some good occasion should be offered for their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a Spartan. But the Lacedæmonians having been first advertised of the departure of these galleys from the isthmus, (for the ephors had commanded Alcamenes, when he put to sea, to send word by a horseman,) were desirous at once to have sent away the five galleys also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him Alcibiades; but afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the galleys having taken refuge in Peiræus: which so much discouraged them, in that they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they purposed now, not only not to send away those galleys of their own, but also to call back again some which had already put out to sea.

After-
wards
however
Alcibiades
prevails on
Endius
and the
other
ephor to
let him
and Chal-
cideus sail
with the
five ships.

XII. When Alcibiades saw this, he persuaded Endius, and the rest of the ephors, again not to shrink from the voyage, alleging that they would make haste and be there before the Chians should have heard of the misfortune of the fleet; and that he himself, if he could reach Ionia, could easily persuade the cities there to revolt, by declaring to them the weakness of the Athenians, and the diligence of the Lacedæmonians, wherein he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other. Moreover to Endius he said, that it would be an honour in particular to him that Ionia should revolt, and the king be made confederate to the Lacedæmonians by his own means, and that it should not be the performance of Agis; for he happened to be at difference with Agis.³ So having prevailed with Endius and the other ephors, he put to sea with the five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedæmon, and made all haste in the voyage.

The Pelo-
ponnesian
fleet ar-
rives at
Corinth
from
Sicily,

XIII. About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which having aided Gylippus in that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia, and roughly handled⁴ by twenty-seven galleys of Athens

³ No mention is here made of the cause of the difference between Agis and Alcibiades. Plutarch informs us, that the latter had been intriguing with Tenidæ, the wife of the former, and had a son by her, called Leoty-chides. See Life of Alcibiades; and Xenoph. Hist. of Greece, iii. 2; and cf. Thirlwall, vol. iv. p. 10.

⁴ Or it may mean, as Duker renders it, "vexatæ," harassed, interrupted.

that watched thereabouts, under the command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as should return out of Sicily; but all the rest, saving one, having got away from the Athenians, sailed into Corinth.

XIV. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, took prisoner every one they met with by the way, to the end that notice might not be given of their passage; and touching first at Corycus in the continent, where they also dismissed those whom they had apprehended, after conference there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the Chians suddenly and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment: but the few had so ordered the matter beforehand, that the council chanced to be assembled at the same time; and when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same, and told them that many other galleys were coming to them, not stating also that those other galleys were besieged in Peiræus, the Chians first, and afterwards the Erythræans, revolted from the Athenians. After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenæ, and made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent, and there fortified Polichna, lest they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying and making preparation for the war.

XV. This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians; and they conceiving that a great and evident danger now encompassed them, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city had revolted, would be no longer quiet, through their present fear, decreed that those one thousand talents,⁵ which through all this war they had been desirous to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages to stir it, should now be used, and therewith not a few galleys manned; and they decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
after having lost one ship in a severe encounter with the Athenian fleet.
Chalcideus and Alcibiades arrive at Chios, to the surprise of all except the oligarchical party, with whom they had previously corresponded.
Chios and Erythræ, and subsequently Clazomenæ, revolt from Athens.

The Athenians, on hearing of the revolt of Chios, resolve to use the one thousand talents set apart from the beginning of the war for emergencies.
They send

⁵ £193,750. See b. ii. 24. The reader will doubtless observe that there is no mention made of the hundred galleys that were also reserved. Krueger thinks that they had been employed, either in the fourth year of the war, or on the occasion mentioned in iii. 16, as perhaps is most probable, or in the Sicilian expedition. For further information, see Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. p. 12.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Strombichides with eight ships to Chios, and soon after twelve more, under the command of Thrasycles.

They also resolve to fit out thirty other ships.

Strombichides arrives at Samos, and thence sails to Teos, which he is obliged to leave on hearing that Chalcideus with twenty-three ships is in pursuit of him. Some land forces of the Erythræans and Clazomenians being admitted by the Teans, proceed to demolish a wall which the Athenians had built at Teos.

of Strombichides the son of Diotimus, eight galleys, of the number of those that besieged the enemy at Peiræus; which having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now returned; and shortly after also to send Thrasycles to help them with twelve galleys more, which also departed from the same guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peiræus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the bondmen that served in them their liberty, and the bonds to those that were free. And instead of all those galleys that had departed, they made ready others with all speed in their places, and sent them to keep guard upon the galleys of the Peloponnesians, and thirty more they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great was their diligence, and nothing was of light importance that they undertook with regard to the sending aid to Chios.

XVI. Strombichides in the mean time arrived at Samos, and taking into his company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos, and entreated them not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty-three galleys from Chios, and to join him also the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans. But Strombichides having been advertised of it, put forth again before his arrival, and standing off at sea, when he saw the many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos; but they followed him. The land forces the Teans not at the first admitting, after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. And these stayed quiet awhile, awaiting the return of Chalcideus from the chase; but when he stayed somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians towards the continent; wherein they were also helped by some few Barbarians that came down thither, under the leading of Stages, deputy-lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

XVII. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios;⁶ instead of whom they manned with mariners of Chios both those and

⁶ As Mr. Thirlwall (iv. p. 13.) well observes, "for the security of their partisans there, supplying their place with Chians, who were probably so chosen as to weaken the disaffected party, and serve as hostages." On the treaty, also, in the following chapter, see his remarks in p. 13, 14.

twenty galleys more, and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For the wish of Alcibiades, who was well acquainted with the principal Milesians, was to anticipate the fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus, and to bring over these cities to their side first, and so to acquire the honour of the deed for the Chians, for himself, for Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) for Endius, who set them out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt, with the forces of the Chians only, and of those galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these for the greatest part of their way passing undiscovered, and arriving, not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasicles, who now chanced to be present with those twelve galleys from Athens, and followed them with Strombichides, caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them at the heels with nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lade, an island over-against the city. Immediately on the revolt of Miletus, was made the first league between the king and the Lacedæmonians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as follows.

XVIII. "The Lacedæmonians and their confederates have made a league with the king and Tissaphernes on the following conditions:—Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth, and his ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the king's:—Whatsoever money or other profit has proceeded to the Athenians from these cities, the king and the Lacedæmonians are jointly to hinder, so that the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money nor any other thing.—The king and the Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without consent of both parts, it shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the Athenians, neither for the king, nor for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.—If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. And if any shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the king."

XIX. This was the league. Directly after this, the Chians manned ten galleys more, and went to Anæa, both to learn what became of the business at Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand with his

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades arm their sailors and leave them at Chios.

They arrive at Miletus and cause it to revolt.

The Athenian fleet on its arrival at Miletus is obliged to anchor off Lade.

An alliance concluded between the king of Persia and the Lacedæmonians.

The Chians sail to Anæa with ten ships. They are chased by Diomedon

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

with sixteen Athenian ships, and lose four of their vessels.

The Athenians sail for Samos.

The Chians induce Lebedus and Eræ to revolt.

The twenty Peloponnesian ships

blockaded in Peiræus

break through the block-

ading squadron,

and take four Athenian ships.

Tissaphernes goes to

Teos, and completes the demolition

of the wall.

Diomedon also arrives there

with ten ships from Athens,

and concludes a treaty with the Teans.

He makes an unsuccessful attack on Eræ.

An insurrection of the commons of Samos,

aided by the Athenians.

army by land, they went thence to the temple of Jupiter; and being there, they descried sixteen galleys more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon, after the putting to sea of those with Thrasicles, on sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them empty the Athenians took, the men having got away on shore; the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the Athenians went away again towards Samos. But the Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet, and with the land-forces, caused first Lebedus to revolt, and then Eræ. And afterwards returned both with their fleet and land forces, every one to his own home.

XX. About the same time, the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus which the Athenians had formerly chased into Peiræus, and against which they now lay with a like number, suddenly sailed out, and having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys, and going to Cenchrea, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time there came also unto them from Lacedæmon, for commander, Astyochus, who was now admiral of the whole fleet. When the land-forces were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came thither with his forces, and he too having demolished the wall, as much as was left standing, went his way again. And not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten galleys of Athens, and having made a truce with the Teans that he might also be received, he put to sea again, and sailed along the shore to Eræ, and assaulted it; but failing to take it, departed.

XXI. It fell out about the same time, that the commons of Samos, together with the Athenians who happened to be there with three galleys, made an insurrection against the great men, and slew of them in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred more, and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses, (the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty,) they administered the affairs of the city from that time forward by themselves, no more communicating any part of it to the landholders,⁷ nor permitting any of the common people any longer to intermarry with them.

⁷ The nobility of Samos, so called, for that they shared the land amongst them. Information on this class of persons the reader will find in the third

XXII. After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun, persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even without the Lacedæmonians, with their single forces, and desiring to make as many partakers of their danger as they were able, made an expedition by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos, which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedæmonians, namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence to the Hellespont. And withal, the land-forces both of such Peloponnesians as were present, and of their confederates thereabouts, went along with them to Clazomenæ and Cyme; these under the command of Eualas, a Spartan, and the galleys of Deiniadas, one of the Pericœci.^s The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first; and there they leave four ships, and the remainder went to Mitylene, and caused that city also to revolt.

XXIII. Now Astyochnus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, having set forth, with four vessels, as he intended, from Cenchrea, arrived at Chios. The third day after his coming thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos with twenty-five galleys of Athens; for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens afterwards. Astyochnus putting out to sea in the evening of the same day, and taking with him one galley more of Chios, sailed toward Lesbos, to help it what he could, and arrives at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressus; where he hears that Mitylene was taken by the Athenians, at the very first assault. For the Athenians coming unexpected, entered the haven, and having beaten the galleys of the Chians, disembarked, and overcame in a battle those that stood against them, and won the city. When Astyochnus heard this, both from the Eressians, and from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus, which having been left there before, as soon as Mitylene was lost, fled, and three of them chanced to meet with him, (for one was taken by the Athenians,) he continued his course for Mitylene no longer, but having caused Eressus to revolt, and having armed the inhabitants of it, he sends them and the heavy-armed soldiers he had aboard toward Antissa and Methymna by land, under the conduct of

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
Two hundred of the aristocracy slain, and four hundred banished.
Samos declared independent by the Athenians.
The Chians with thirteen ships proceed to Lesbos, and bring over Methymna and Mitylene to revolt.
Astyochnus arrives from Cenchrea at Chios with four ships.
Twenty-five Athenian ships under Leon and Diomedon arrive at Lesbos, and retake Mitylene.
Astyochnus, on hearing of this at Eressus, sails towards Methymna; but being disappointed in all his attempts at Lesbos, he sails for Chios.

chapter of Hermann's Pol. Antiq. on "The Development of the Different Forms of Government among the Greeks:" the whole of which chapter is well worthy his attention. On this particular point, see sect. 60.

^s For information on this class, see note on iv. 53.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Six Peloponnesian ships arrive at Chios from Cenchrea. The Athenians sail to Clazomenæ, take their fortress, and bring back the inhabitants to their city.

The Athenians at Lade make a descent at Panormus, and slay Chalcideus.

Leon and Diomedon conquer the Chians in three battles, and ravage their country.

Eteonicus; and he himself, with his own galleys and those three of Chios, sailed thither along the shore [toward Antissa and Methymna], hoping that the Methymnæans, on sight of his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re-embarked his land-forces, and returned to Chios. And the land-forces that were aboard and should have gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this came to them six galleys to Chios of those of the confederate fleet at Cenchrea. The Athenians, when they had re-established the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent, and brought them all back again into the city which is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; for they got away to Daphnus. And Clazomenæ again returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

XXIV. The same summer, those Athenians that with the twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lade before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander, that came out against them but with a few; and, having sailed across the third day after, set up a trophy, but the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were not masters of the land.

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea, from the isles called Oinussæ, which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, forts which they held in Erythræ, and from Lesbos. They that were aboard were men at arms of the roll compelled to serve in the fleet.⁹ With these they landed at Cardamyle; and having overthrown the Chians that came out against them in a battle at Bolissus, and slain many of them, they ravaged and desolated all the places of that quarter. And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight; and the Athenians made spoil of their territory, which was well furnished in every way, and which had undergone no ravages from the time of the Median war till then. For except the Lacedæmonians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of, that had joined temperance to prosperity; and the

⁹ The Epibatæ were usually taken from the Thetes, or fourth class, (vi. 43.); on their number in each ship, see note on iii. 95; and on the meaning of *ἐκ καταλογου*, see note on vi. 31.

more their city increased, had the more managed the administration thereof with an eye to safety. Nor ventured they now to revolt, (if any man should think, that in this act at least they regarded not what was the safest,) till they had many and strong confederates, with whose help to try their fortune; nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens (as they themselves could not deny) to have their affairs, after the calamity in Sicily, brought altogether to an extremely bad condition. And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in aught, they erred with many others, who in like manner had an opinion, that the state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown. Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some within took in hand to bring over the city to the Athenians; which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred not, but having received Astyochus into the city, with four galleys that were with him from Erythræ, they devised how, in the most gentle way they could, either by taking hostages, or some other way, to put an end to the conspiracy. Thus stood the business with the Chians.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Astyochus
arrives at
Chios with
four ships.

XXV. And from Athens, in the end of this summer, a thousand five hundred men at arms of the Athenians, and a thousand of Argos, (for the Athenians had put heavy armour upon five hundred light-armed of the Argives,) and of other confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight galleys, reckoning those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironidas, came to Samos, and crossing over to Miletus, encamped before it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men at arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus, and some auxiliary foreign force with Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself being also there with his cavalry, and fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Argives, who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the rest, and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy, as being Ionians, and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians overcome, and no less than three hundred of their men were destroyed; but the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians, and then beaten back the Barbarians and other multitude, and not fought with the Milesians at all, (for they, after they were come from the chase of the Argives, and saw their other wing defeated, retired into the town,) sat down with their arms, as being now masters of the

An Athenian and Argive army arrives at Samos, and crosses over to Miletus.

The Milesians, aided by some Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes, engage and rout the Argives; but the Peloponnesians and Barbarians are routed by the Athenians, who encamp near the city.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

field, close under the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that on both sides the Ionians had the better of the Dorians; for the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians, and the Milesians the Argives. The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being on an isthmus, prepared to surround the town with a wall; supposing, if they brought over Miletus, the other cities would easily join their side.

A Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet under the charge of Theramenes arrives at Eleus, and the commander at the solicitation of Alcibiades resolves to proceed to the succour of Miletus.

XXVI. In the mean time, it was told them about twilight, that the fifty-five galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by, and only not already come. For there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates, to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, twenty galleys of Syracuse, and two of Selinus, and the galleys that they had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus the admiral, and they put in first at Lerus, the island over-against Miletus. And being advertised there, that the Athenians lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of Iäsus, to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibiades coming on horseback to Teichiussa, of the territory of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys had come to an anchor for the night, they were informed by him of the battle; for Alcibiades was present in it, and had taken part with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes; and he exhorted them, unless they meant to destroy what they had in Ionia, and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed, and not to suffer it to be surrounded with a wall.

XXVII. According to this they concluded to go at break of day and relieve it; but Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Lerus of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues desiring to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself, nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy, and with what addition to their own, sufficiently, and at leisure made ready, they might do it: he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness, contrary to reason hazard battle; for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way on a fit occasion; but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a greater baseness if they should be worsted; and that the state would

in that case not only incur dishonour, but also fall into extreme danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit,¹ with their strongest preparation, willingly, no, nor urged by utter necessity, to begin the attack, how then without constraint to seek out voluntary dangers? He therefore commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded, and their land-forces, and what utensils they brought with them, but to leave behind what they had taken from the territory of the enemy, that their galleys might be the lighter; and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should offer. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was esteemed a wise man, not then only but afterwards, nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory imperfect, dislodged from before Miletus, and from Samos, the Argives in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

XXVIII. The Peloponnesians setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus, and staying there one day, the next day they took with them those galleys of Chios, which had formerly been chased together with Chalcideus, and meant to have returned to Teichiussa to take aboard such utensils² as they had taken out of the vessels and left on shore. But when they were come, Tissaphernes came to them with his land-forces, and persuaded them to sail against Iäsus, where Amorges his enemy then lay.³ Whereupon they assaulted Iäsus on a sudden, and (they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the Athenians) took it. The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes, to carry him, if he would, to the king, as he had order to do; Iäsus

The Athenians retreat to Samos, the Argives return home. The Peloponnesians assault and take Iäsus, and take Amorges prisoner.

¹ Lit. "to which it was scarcely possible;" i. e. which scarcely admitted. The sense is well conveyed by Dr. Arnold, vol. iii. p. 371. note ⁹. "For after its late disasters, the state could hardly venture to act on the offensive of its own free will, even when its force might reasonably promise success; or even when driven to do so from utter necessity; how then could it, without any such necessity, rush upon a self-chosen danger."

² Or, as Dr. Arnold explains it, "the masts, sails, and tackling which had been left on shore, as usual, in expectation of an engagement." Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 1. §. 13.

³ Or, "kept or maintained his ground," as Dr. Arnold renders.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

they pillaged, wherein, as being a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great quantity of money; the auxiliary soldiers of Amorges they received, without doing them hurt, into their own army, for they were for the most part Peloponnesians; the town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free as bond, on agreement with him to receive a Daric stater⁴ a head; and so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent away Pedaritus, the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent thither to be governor of Chios, by land as far as Erythræ, and with him the auxiliaries that had belonged to Amorges, and made Philip governor there, in Miletus. And so this summer ended.

They make
Philip go-
vernor of
Miletus.

WINTER.
Tissa-
phernes
threatens
to reduce
the allow-
ance
which he
has made
to the
Pelopon-
nesian
sailors.

XXIX. The next winter, Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into Iäsus, came to Miletus, and for one month's pay (as was promised on his part at Lacedæmon) he gave to the soldiers, through the whole fleet, after an Attic drachma⁵ a man by the day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but a three-obol-piece,⁶ till he had asked the king's pleasure; and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma. Nevertheless on Hermocrates, general of the Syracusians, speaking against the measure, (for Theramenes was but slack and yielding as regarded the pay, as not being admiral, but only sailing to deliver the galleys that came with him to Astyochus,) it was agreed, that for every five ships,⁷ they should have more than three obols a man. For

⁴ £1. 12s. 3½d.

⁵ Seven pence three farthings of our money.

⁶ Three pence halfpenny farthing. This diminution of their stipend proceeded from the counsel which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes, as is hereafter declared.

⁷ The original note of Hobbes on this passage is as follows: "If they had been five galleys less, that is, but fifty, as they were fifty-five, their pay had been four obols a man, at three talents to the fifty galleys for a month. Qu. How many men paid in a galley? it seems but eighteen." This interpretation of Hobbes appears erroneous: the words *παρα, κ. τ. λ.*, Mr. Bloomfield renders, "by five ships' pay;" in the text I have followed Goeller, who translates them, "in quinas naves." In the following most obscure sentence, two conjectures have been adopted to elucidate a suitable sense; the first, to enclose the word *πεντηκοντα* in brackets, as corrupt; the second, to retain it, and instead of *τρια* to read *τριακοντα*; which is done by Palmer, (I quote from Arnold,) who gives, "nevertheless be agreed to give over and above five ships' pay for every fifty-five, or to pay for fifty-five as if they were sixty; for thirty talents a month was the regular pay for sixty ships, reckoning the rate at three obols a man." And this, if any conjecture were allowed, would appear the best explanation; retaining the text as it stands,

to fifty-five galleys he allowed three talents a month; and to as many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion, pay was to be given.

Year 20.
A.C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

XXX. The same winter, the Athenians that were at Samos, for there were now come in thirty-five galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders, having gathered together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios, as all the rest, concluded, having obtained every one his charge by lot, to lie off Miletus with a fleet; but against Chios to send out both a fleet and land-forces. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys, and part of those one thousand men at arms that went to Miletus, which they carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers, according to their lot went to Chios, and the rest remaining at Samos with seventy-four galleys, were masters of the sea, and made the voyage to Miletus.

The Athenians at Samos send a fleet and an army against Chios, and a fleet to cruise against Miletus.

XXXI. Astyochus, who was now in Chios, requiring hostages because of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes, and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes were mended, gave over that business: and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus, and ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum, but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomenæ; here he summoned those within to yield, with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus; and Tamos, the deputy-lieutenant of Ionia, offered them the same. But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault on the city, being unwallèd; but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself carried to Phocæa and Cyme, but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathussa, Pele,

Astyochus, on hearing of the reinforcement under Theramenes, desists from taking hostages of the Chians. He makes fruitless attempts on Pteleum and on Clazomenæ. He sails to Phocæa and Cyme.

I know no other explanation, but that of Dr. Arnold's, which I would advise the reader to follow: "for every five ships a higher rate of pay per man was fixed on; for up to fifty-five ships, (the actual number of the fleet,) he was to give [for every five ships] three talents a month; and to the seamen generally, in proportion as the ships at sea exceeded the present number, the same rate was to be allowed also." Should the reader be dissatisfied with the above explanation, and with the but scanty information I am able to give him on one of the most difficult passages in Thueydides, I would refer him to the original note in Dr. Arnold's edition, or to Goeller, and to the lengthy note in Mr. Bloomfield's translation, only cautioning him that these last two alter the text from that of Bekker's edition.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

and Drymussa, islands that lie over-against Clazomenæ. After they had stayed there eight days because of the winds, spoiling and destroying and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay without the city, they went afterwards to Phocæa and Cyme, to Astyochus.

At the latter place he receives ambassadors from the Lesbians proposing a revolt.

He wishes to assist them, but being opposed by the Corinthians and other allies, he returns to Chios; where he is joined by Pedaritus, whom he in vain tries to persuade to assist him in bringing about the revolt of Lesbos.

Astyochus sails to Corycus of Erythræ, and the Athenian fleet anchors near his, but out of sight.

In consequence of Pedaritus informing him that there is a plot for the betrayal of Erythræ,

XXXII. While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came to him, desiring to revolt again from the Athenians; and as for him, they prevailed with him, but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were unwilling to join, because of their former ill success there, he put to sea and sailed for Chios: whither, after a great tempest, his galleys, some from one place and some from another, at length arrived all. After this, Pedaritus, who was now at Erythræ, coming from Miletus by land, came over with his forces to Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers who were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcideus, and were left there to the number of five hundred, and armour to arm them. Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Astyochus communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt; for that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians. But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him he would let him have none of them.

XXXIII. Whereupon Astyochus taking with him the five galleys of Corinth, a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought with him, went towards Miletus to take the office of admiral, having greatly threatened the Chians, that, in very truth, he would not come to their aid if they needed him. And having touched at Corycus in Erythræ, he stayed there the night; and the Athenians themselves also, sailing from Samos to Chios with the armament, took their station on the other side of the hill, by which only they were separated from the enemy, and neither party knew that the other was so near. Astyochus, upon a letter having come to him by night from Pedaritus, signifying that certain Erythræan captives, dismissed from Samos, were come to Erythræ with design to betray it, went directly back to Erythræ; so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus also sailed over to him; and having narrowly inquired

touching these seeming traitors, and found that the whole matter was but a pretence, which the men had used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them and departed, one to Chios, the other as he was going before, towards Miletus.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
he returns thither ; but finding it to be a fabrication, he departs for Miletus, and Pedaritus (who had joined him) proceeds towards Chios.

XXXIV. In the mean time, the army of the Athenians coming round about by sea from Corycus, at Arginus, lit on three ships of war of the Chians, which when they saw, they presently chased. But there arose a great tempest, and the long vessels of Chios with much ado escaped into the harbour. But of the Athenian galleys, such as followed them furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of Chios ; and the men that were aboard them were part taken, and part slain ; the rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phœnicus, under the hill Mimas ; from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos, and there prepared for fortifying.

The Athenians lose three ships, which run ashore in chasing the Chian fleet.

XXXV. The same winter, Hippocrates setting out from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, with two others, and with one galley of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidos ; this city was now revolted by means of ⁸ Tissaphernes : and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus hearing of it, commanded that (the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of Cnidos) the other half should post themselves about Triopium, and catch the merchant vessels⁹ that put in there as they came from Egypt ; this Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidos, lying out into the sea, and consecrated to Apollo. The Athenians, on advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos, took the six galleys that kept watch at Triopium ; but the men that were in them escaped to land. After this, they went to Cnidos, which they assaulted, and had almost taken, being without wall : and the next day they assaulted it again ; but being less able to hurt it now than before, because they had fenced it better during the night, and the men also were got into it that escaped from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded and wasted the Cnidian territory, and so sailed away to Samos.

Hippocrates arrives at Cnidos from Lacedæmon with twelve ships. Six ships remain at Cnidos, and six being sent to Triopium, are taken by the Athenians. The Athenians assault Cnidos ; but the inhabitants, assisted by the crews of the Peloponnesian ships, resist successfully. The Athe-

⁸ Or, "owing to," "at the instigation of;" the sense requiring *ὑπο* instead of *ἀπο* ; for, as Goeller remarks, it is manifest the city was friendly to the Peloponnesians, and hostile to the Athenians.

⁹ These belonged to the Athenians, as they imported corn in great measure from Egypt, which was now partly in revolt from Persia.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
nians
return to
Samos.
The Pello-
ponnesians
make a
fresh treaty
with Tissa-
phernes.

XXXVI. About the same time, Astyochus being come to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had now plenty of all things for the army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iäsus, and the Milesians undertook the war with a good will. Nevertheless the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes seemed defective, and not so advantageous to them as to him. Whereupon they made new ones, Theramenes being yet present, which were these.

XXXVII. "The agreement of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates with king Darius and his children,¹ and with Tissaphernes, for league and amity, according to the articles following:—Whatsoever territories or cities belong to king Darius, or were his father's, or his ancestors', against those shall neither the Lacedæmonians go to make war, nor any way to annoy them; neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, exact tribute of any of those cities; neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon, or any way annoy the Lacedæmonians, or any of the Lacedæmonian confederates.—If the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates, shall need any thing of the king, or the king of the Lacedæmonians, or of their confederates, what they shall persuade each other to do, that if they do it, shall be good.—They shall, both of them, make war jointly against the Athenians and their confederates; and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do it jointly.—Whatsoever army shall be in the king's country, sent for by the king, the king shall defray.—If any of the cities comprehended in the league made with the king, shall invade the king's territories, the rest shall hinder them, and defend the king to the utmost of their power.—If any city of the king's, or under his dominion, shall invade the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates, the king shall make opposition, and defend them to the utmost of his power."

Thera-
menes,
having
delivered
the fleet to

XXXVIII. After this treaty was made, Theramenes delivered the galleys into the hands of Astyochus, and putting to sea in a fly-boat, is no more seen.² But the Athenians who were

¹ Namely, Cyrus and Artaxerxes.

² Dr. Arnold suggests that this may mean, that being afraid to be called in question at Sparta for his undue compliance with Tissaphernes about the pay, he went off in the course of his voyage, and never returned home

now passed over with their army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the landward, and that had also a harbour for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been overcome in divers former battles, and being otherwise, not only not mutually well affected, but jealous one of another, (for Tydeus and his accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept by force under an oligarchical form of government,) for a time stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned, not conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength, nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochochus. And when he would not listen to them, Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedæmon, complaining of the wrong he did them. Thus stood the affairs at Chios with regard to the Athenians. Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the fleet of the enemy at Miletus; but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter them, they returned to Samos, and lay still.

XXXIX. The same winter, about the solstice, weighed anchor and sailed from Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty-seven galleys which, at the procurement of Calligetus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, were made ready by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes, a Spartan. With him the Lacedæmonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council³ with Astyochochus, whereof Lichas,⁴ the son of Arcesilaus, was one. These had commission, that when they should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general care to order every thing to the best, they should send away these galleys, either the same, or more, or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they so thought fit, and to appoint Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, who went with them, for commander. And that the same eleven, if they

again. The more natural meaning seems to be, that "he was lost at sea," as Mr. Thirlwall, vol. iv. p. 22. explains it, referring to the same sense in Xenoph. Hell. i. 6. §. 33. describing the death of Callicratidas.

³ The same precaution had been taken with Cnemus, ii. 85, with Alcidas, iii. 76, and also with Agis, v. 63, as Goeller remarks; who afterwards appears to have been uncontrolled, viii. 5. See Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 45.

⁴ Vide v. 50.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Astyo-
chus, de-
parts.

The Athe-
nians cross
over from
Lesbos to
Chios, and
fortify
Delphi-
nium.

The
Chians
and Pe-
daritus
send to
Astyochochus
for aid;
and on his
refusing it,
Pedaritus
sends a
letter of
complaint
to Lacedæ-
mon.

Twenty-
seven ships
are sent
from Lacedæ-
mon for
the service
of Pharnabazus,
commanded
by Antisthenes,
and having
on board
eleven
commis-
sioners.

Year 20.
A.C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

On the
voyage
they take
and burn
three A-
thenian
ships off
Melos.

They then
(through
caution)
prolong
their
voyage by
sailing to
Crete, and
at last ar-
rive at
Caunus.

The
Chians
again
apply to
Astyochus
for assist-
ance;

but he
considers
it of more
import-
ance to
join the
Lacedæ-
monian
fleet at
Caunus,
and sails
in that di-
rection,

thought it meet, should remove Astyochus from his office of admiral, and ordain Antisthenes in his place: for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus. These galleys holding their course from Malea through the main sea, and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten of the galleys of the Athenians, whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. And after this, because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos should give notice of their coming to those in Samos, (as also it fell out,) they changed their course, and went towards Crete; and having made their voyage the longer, that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus in Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, in order to be conveyed to that place by them.

XL. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding their former repulse, and that Astyochus was still backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help them, being besieged, and not to suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea, and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians having many slaves, the most indeed for any one state, except that of the Lacedæmonians, whom also, for their offences, they the more ungently punished because of their number, many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran over presently to them, and were they that, knowing the territory so well, did it the greatest mischief. Therefore the Chians said he must help them, whilst there was hope and possibility to do it, Delphinium being still in fortifying, and unfinished, and greater defences being cast up, both about their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to assist them.

XLI. But in the mean time came a message from Caunus, that the twenty-seven galleys and the Lacedæmonian counsellors are at hand. Astyochus therefore esteeming the conveying in of those galleys, whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe passage over of those Lacedæmonians, who were to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred before all others, directly gave over his journey for Chios, and sailed towards Caunus. As he went by

the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being unwall'd, and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the greatest verily in man's memory, and plundered it, the inhabitants being fled into the mountains; and overrunning the country, made booty of all that came in his way, saving of freemen; but those he dismissed. From Cos he went by night to Cnidos; but found it necessary, by the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to sail directly, as he was, after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for those twenty-seven galleys that were coming from Peloponnesus, the same to which Astyochus himself also was sailing. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Melos of their coming, and Charminus was lying in guard against them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia: for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus.

XLII. Astyochus, therefore, desiring to anticipate the report of his coming, went as he was to Syme, hoping to find those galleys somewhere out at sea. But a shower of rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their course in the dark, and disordered them. The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet about the island; and thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with fewer than the twenty galleys, supposing these had been the galleys they were watching for from Caunus. And at once charging, sunk three of them, and much hurt others, and were superior in the fight, till such time as (contrary to their expectation) the greater part of the fleet came in sight, and they were enclosed on every side. Then they betook themselves to flight, and with the loss of six galleys, the rest escaped into the island of Teutlussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this, the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidos, and those seven and twenty galleys that came from Caunus having joined them, they went altogether to Syme; and having there erected a trophy, returned again, and lay at Cnidos.

XLIII. The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme; and neither went they out against the navy in Cnidos, nor the navy there against them, but they took up the

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
having
plundered
Cos Me-
ropidis in
his way.
On arriv-
ing at
Cnidos, he
is per-
suaded by
the Cni-
dians to
sail in pur-
suit of the
Athenian
squadron,
which is on
the watch
for the
twenty-se-
ven ships
from Pello-
ponnesus.
He arrives
at Syme,
and de-
feats a part
of the
Athenians,
who lose
six ships.

He is join-
ed by the
reinforce-
ment of
twenty-
seven
ships, and
having
erected a
trophy at
Syme re-
turns to
Cnidos.

The Athe-
nians ar-
rive at
Syme after
the de-
parture of

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

the Peloponnesians, and having fetched off the tackling of their ships return to Samos. The Peloponnesian commissioners hold a conference with Tissaphernes at Cnidos. Lichas demands that a new treaty shall be made; at which Tissaphernes is angry, and retires in disgust.

The Peloponnesians, at the invitation of some of the Rhodians, sail to Rhodes, and cause it to revolt from the Athenians.

The Athenians sail thither, but arrive too late.

rigging⁵ of their galleys which was at Syme, and having put in at Loryma, the town in the continent, sailed away to Samos. The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being at Cnidos, was now in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted; and withal, those eleven Lacedæmonians conferred with Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching what had already taken place, if there was aught that did not please them, and also concerning the war in future, how it might be carried in the best and most advantageous manner for them both. But Lichas was he that considered what had been transacted most nearly, and said, that neither of the treaties was made properly, neither that formed by Chalcideus, nor that by Theramenes. And that it would be a very hard condition, that whatsoever territories the king and his ancestors possessed before, he should now demand to possess the same; for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and Thessaly, and the Locrians, and all as far as Bœotia; and the Lacedæmonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty, would bring upon them subjection to the rule of the Medes. Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn up, or at least not to use these, nor (said he) did they at all want pay on such conditions as these. But Tissaphernes chafing at this, went his way in cholera, and concluded nothing.

XLIV. But the Peloponnesians, on some communicating with them from the chief men of Rhodes, purposed to sail thither, because they hoped it would not prove impossible with their number of seamen, and army of land-soldiers, to bring that island over to their side; and withal supposed themselves able, with their present confederates, to maintain their fleet without asking money any more of Tissaphernes. Presently therefore the same winter, they put forth from Cnidos, and putting in at Cameirus first of the territory of Rhodes, frightened the commons out of it, that knew not of the business; and they fled, more especially also as the city had no walls. Then the Lacedæmonians called together both these, and those from the two cities Lindus and Iëlysus, and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them, and were seen in the main sea too

⁵ See note on chap. 28.

late, though not much. For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to Samos, but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and made war against Rhodes from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians but levy money amongst them, to the sum of thirty-two talents;⁶ and otherwise for four-score days that they lay there, having their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
They carry on war against Rhodes, from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.

XLV. In this time, and even before the going of the Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus, and battle at Miletus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyocheus having received letters from them from Lacedæmon to put him to death, (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise appeared untrustworthy,) retired to Tissaphernes, first for fear, and afterwards to the utmost of his power with him hindered the affairs of the Peloponnesians; and being in every thing his instructor, he not only cut shorter their pay, insomuch that from a drachma⁷ he brought it to three obols, and those also were not constantly paid; advising Tissaphernes to tell them how that the Athenians, men of a long-continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three obols to their own, not so much for want of money, but that their mariners might not, some of them growing insolent by superfluity, disable their bodies by spending their money on such things as would weaken them, and that others might not quit the ships nor leave the arrears of their wages to pay for a substitute;⁸ and also gave counsel

Alcibiades having, through fear of assassination, quitted the Lacedæmonian army and fled to Tissaphernes, gains great influence over him, and does great injury to the Lacedæmonian cause,

⁶ Six thousand two hundred pounds sterling.

⁷ Six oboli, or seven pence three farthings.

⁸ I have given the sense most suitable to the context that the reading of Bekker appeared to me to be capable of bearing; they may indeed be rendered differently, as Goeller translates, "Neve pars naves descrant, debita adhuc parte stipendii non in pignus relicta:" but this seems hardly so suitable, and necessitates the supposition that the Athenians gave but a part of the pay at a time, and kept back the remainder as a pledge for the sailor's return; which is not said directly in the text, the drift of which seems to me to be, that they gave smaller pay, that the sailors might not be able to leave what was yet owed of their wages to procure substitutes; which would be readily done, had it been at the rate of a drachma a day, instead of being, as it was, only at three obols; and therefore what was owed them would be but little, and hence substitutes would not readily be found, nor the sailors desert. If the *οὐχ* is omitted, the sense is, "or others abandon their ships, leaving their arrears of wages as the only security for their return; for, in the case of

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of the galleys, and to the generals of the several cities, (save only those of Syracuse,) to give way unto him in this point. For Hermocrates, the general of the Syracusians, was the only man that in the name of the whole league stood against it. And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back himself, and answer them in the name of Tissaphernes, and say, namely to the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the Grecian states, and preserved by foreign auxiliaries, to expect nevertheless that others for their liberty should not only venture their persons, but maintain them with their purses. And to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not to be willing to bestow as much or more now upon themselves. And told them that Tissaphernes, now he had made war on his own resources, had reason to be sparing; but when money should come down from the king, he would then give them their full pay, and assist the cities as should be fit.

by advising
Tissaphernes
not to put
an end to
the war,
but to let
the Peloponnesians
and Athenians
wear out
each
other.

XLVI. Moreover he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war; nor to desire, by fetching in the Phœnician fleet which he was making ready, or by affording pay to more of the Greeks, to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one: but to let the two hold the dominion divided, that the king, when one side troubled him, might be able to bring the other against it. Whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will be unable to find any by whose aid to pull down those that hold it, unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself. But that the danger would be less expensive, (he being but at a small part of the cost,) and that he himself also would remain in safety, to wear out the Greeks one against another. He said further, that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the others, for that they were less ambitious of power by land; and that the reason and end for which they were warring tended more to the king's purpose: for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves, as touching the

their having higher pay, the men would get permission to go on shore, and desert their ships; while the captains would be led to suppose that the arrears of their pay would be a pledge for their return.

dominion by sea; and for the king, as touching the Grecians in the king's territories. Whereas the Lacedæmonians on the contrary were come to set them free. And it was not likely that they who were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians,⁹ would not (if they should ever overcome the Athenians)¹ deliver them also from the Barbarians. He gave counsel, therefore, first to wear them out both, and then, when he had deprived the Athenians of as much as he could, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country. And Tissaphernes had a great purpose to do accordingly, as far as by his actions can be conjectured: for hereupon he gave himself up fully to trust in Alcibiades, as having been his best counsellor in these affairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages well, nor would suffer them to fight by sea; but pretending the coming of the Phœnician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings, and abated the vigour of their navy, before very strong; and in all other matters, too plainly than to be able to escape observation, was backward in giving his assistance in the war.

XLVII. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the best course; but partly also to make way for his own return to his country: knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day come, that he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this, to make it appear unto them that Tissaphernes was his friend. Which also came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with him, the captains of galleys and principal men there, partly upon Alcibiades' own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them, that they should remember him to the best sort, and say that he desired to come home, and join with them in directing the affairs of the state, so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil persons, nor yet of the multitude that cast him out; and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend; but chiefly of their own

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Alcibiades communicates with the officers of the Athenian army at Samos, and proposes to them to return to Athens, and also to use his interest with Tissaphernes in their favour, on condition of their establishing an oligarchy at Athens.

⁹ Or rather from them (the Athenians) who were Greeks.

¹ As the text stands, the words may perhaps be rendered, "if they should not fail to root out them, (the Athenians.*)" It would be better however to follow Goeller in cancelling the double $\mu\eta$.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

His pro-
posals are
favourably
received
by all
except
Phryni-
chus;

accords had their minds inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

XLVIII. This business was set in motion first in the camp, and from' thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos, and had conference with him; and when he held out [hopes] of bringing to their friendship, first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in case the government were taken from the people, (for then, he said, the king might the better rely upon them,) they that were of most power among the citizens, who also were the most distressed, entered into great hope, both to gain to themselves the ordering of the state at home, and to get the victory also over the enemy. And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves; and to the multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades might be recalled, and the popular form of government abolished, the king would turn their friend, and furnish them with money. And the multitude, though they were grieved with this proceeding at the present moment, yet for the great hope² they had of the king's pay, they stirred not. But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration anew, and with more of their accomplices, of the things spoken by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy, and worthy to be believed: but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not; but thought (as the truth was) that Alcibiades cared no more for the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it, but only by altering the government that then was, to be called home by his associates. And he said, they were especially to be careful about this, that they should not run into sedition or dissension; and [he thought] that it was not likely³ that the king (the Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and having no small cities within his dominions) would attach himself to the Athenians, whom he trusted not, and would trouble himself for their sake, when he might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him hurt. As for the confederate cities, to whom, forsooth, they had held out

² Mr. Bloomfield well renders, "because of the readiness of the hope held out of pay from the king."

³ "That it was not easy for the king, attaching himself," &c.

oligarchy, in that they themselves also would not be ruled by a democracy, he said, he knew full well, that neither those who were already revolted would the sooner return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby; for they would never be so willing to be in subjection, either to the few, or to the people, as they would be to have their liberty, under which form soever of these they might chance to be. But would think that even those who are termed the gentry, if they had the government, would give them as much trouble as the people, being contrivers and authors to the people of those mischiefs out of which they were most profited themselves; and that if the few had the rule,⁴ then they should be put to death unheard, and more violently than by the former, whereas the people is their refuge, and moderator of the others' insolence. This, he said, he was certain that the cities thought, in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves. And that therefore, what was propounded by Alcibiades, and at present doing, he by no means approved.

XLIX. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander and others ambassadors to Athens, to negotiate concerning the return of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the democracy there, and the procuring for the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

L. Now Phrynichus knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for the restoring of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would embrace it; and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief, (in regard he had spoken against it,) as one that would have hindered the same, betook himself to this course.⁵ He sends secret letters to Astyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was yet about Miletus, and told him that Alcibiades was ruining their affairs, by procuring the

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

who, on finding that the rest are determined to follow the advice of Alcibiades, and are about to send ambassadors to Athens to treat of a change of government, gives secret information to Astyochus of the

⁴ More literally, "and that it was in their power, (i. e. in the power of the oligarchies,) that the people should die without a trial," &c.; that is, that the allies knew that the nature of the oligarchical was even more tyrannical than that of the democratical government, and that under such a form violence and injustice was most practised. Dr. Arnold takes the word differently: "as far as the aristocracy were concerned," as if there was nothing but the aristocracy in the commonwealth.

⁵ The following device of Phrynichus is alluded to in Aristoph. *Ranæ*, 701.

Year 20. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. negotiation carrying on between Tissaphernes and the Athenians. Astyochns reveals the treachery of Phrynichus to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades writes to the officers at Samos, requiring them to put Phrynichus to death. Phrynichus sends a second message to Astyochns, offering to assist him in destroying the Athenian armament at Samos. Astyochns again informs Alcibiades; but before a letter from him can reach Samos, Phrynichus has removed all suspicion, by informing the Athenians of a projected attack on their fleet, and advis-

friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians, writing in plain terms the whole business, and saying that it was pardonable in him to contrive some evil against his enemy, though with some disadvantage to his country. Astyochns had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibiades, especially as he was not now equally in his power, and going up to him to Magnesia, and to Tissaphernes, related to them what message he had received from Samos, and made himself the impeacher, for he attached himself (as was said) to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, and gave information both in this, and in divers other matters, which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement was made, he was not so stout in opposing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sends letters directly to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done, and requiring to have him put to death. Phrynichus, perplexed with this discovery, and brought into the greatest danger indeed, sends again to Astyochns, blaming what was past, as not well⁶ concealed, and promised now to be ready to deliver to him the whole army at Samos, to be destroyed; writing from point to point (Samos being unwalled) in what manner he should do it; and saying, that since his life was brought in danger through them, they could not blame him, though he did this or any other thing, rather than be destroyed by his most deadly enemies. This also Astyochns revealed to Alcibiades.

LI. But Phrynichus having had notice beforehand of the injury he was doing him, and that a letter about this from Alcibiades was all but come, he anticipates the news himself, and declares to the army, that whereas Samos was unwalled, and the galleys anchored not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the camp; that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city, and in all matters to stand upon their guard. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done. They then fell to walling, whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled in; but not long after came letters from Alcibiades, that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purposed to set upon them. But now they thought

⁶ Or it may mean, as Mr. Bloomfield renders, "as in honour it ought to have been."

not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather, that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he was trying out of malice to fasten it upon Phrynichus, as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them before, by having sent the same information.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
O1. 92. 1.
ing them
to fortify
Samos
without
delay.

LII. After this, Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; for though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet present was greater than that of the Athenians, yet, if he were able, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him; especially after he had perceived the dissension of the Peloponnesians in Cnidos, about the league made by Theramenes; (for it [i. e. the dissension] had happened about this very time, [when Alcibiades was persuading Tissaphernes,] ⁷ and when the Peloponnesians were in Rhodes,) wherein that which had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the coming of the Lacedæmonians was to restore all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Lichas, in that he said, it was an article not to be suffered, that the king should hold those cities which he or his ancestors at any time before had holden. Alcibiades, therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to gain the favour of Tissaphernes.

Alcibiades
urges Tis-
saphernes
to be a
friend to
the Athe-
nians.

LIII. The Athenian ambassadors, sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the people, summing up briefly the many points of their business, and principally this; that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the victory of the Peloponnesians. Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal, that it would be a horrible thing he should return by forcing the laws, and the Eumolpidæ ⁸ and Ceryces ⁹ bore witness

Pisander
with his
colleagues
arrives at
Athens;
and, after
a stormy
discussion,

⁷ Such appears to be the sense of this passage, which Goeller explains as follows: "jam ea dissensio acciderat hoc tempore, cum, hoc ipso tempore, quo hæc suasit Alcibiades, in Rhodo essent Peloponnesii."

⁸ *Eumolpidæ*, a family descended from Eumolpus, the author at Athens and Eleusis of the mysteries of Ceres. This family had the chief authority in matters that concerned those rites.

⁹ *Ceryces*, heralds in war; ambassadors in peace.—*Suidas*. They pro-

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

against him concerning the mysteries for which he fled, and called upon them in the name of the gods not to bring him back, Pisander, at this great opposition and contradiction, stood forth and took aside, one by one, those that were against it, and asked them whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with money by the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any other hope to save the state, but by persuading the king to come round to their side? And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain terms he said to them, "this therefore we cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation, and bring the offices of state somewhat more into the hands of a few, that the king may rely upon us; and deliberate at this time, not so much about the form, as about the preservation of the state; for if we dislike the form, it will be in our power to change it again hereafter. And let us recall Alcibiades, who is the only man at present that can bring this to pass."

prevails on
the people
to send
him with
ten col-
leagues to
make the
best terms
he can
with Alci-
biades and
Tissa-
phernes.
Leon and
Diomedon
sent out in
the room of
Phryni-
chus and
Scironi-
das, who
are re-
called.

LIV. The people hearing of the oligarchy, took it very ill at first; but when they had been clearly shewn by Pisander, that there was no other way of safety in the end, partly for fear, and partly because they grounded their hopes on a change in the government, they yielded. And they passed a decree, that Pisander and ten others should go and treat, both with Tissaphernes and with Alcibiades, as to them should seem best. Withal, on the accusation of Pisander, against Phrynichus, they discharged both Phrynichus and Scironidas his fellow-general from their command, and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and said he had betrayed Iäsus and Amorges, was only this, he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. And Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations,¹ (which were in the city before, for obtaining of places of judicature and of command,) exhorting them to stand together, and to take joint measures about deposing the democracy; and when he had made all other arrangements with regard to the affairs in hand,

nounced all formal words in the ceremonies of their religion, and were a family descended from Ceryx, the son of Mercury.

¹ On these, see note on iii. 82.

so as to be no longer detained, puts to sea with those other ten, to go to Tissaphernes.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

LV. Leon and Diomedon arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes. And finding there the Peloponnesian galleys drawn up to land, they disembarked, and overcame in battle such of the Rhodians as came out against them; and then put to sea again, and went to Chalce, and carried on the war thence [i. e. from Chalce] rather than² from Cos; for from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy, if it should put off from the land, in any direction. At this time there arrived at Rhodes, Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, telling them that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished, and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, matters at Chios would utterly be lost. And it was resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus, in the mean time, with the whole power, both of his own auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy, part whereof he won, and got possession also of some galleys that were drawn on land. But the Athenians issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians, and then also the rest of the army about Pedaritus was overcome, and he himself perished, and many of the Chians, and many arms were taken.

Leon and Diomedon join the fleet and cruise against Rhodes, and thence to Chalce. Xenophontidas arrives from Pedaritus to require the immediate assistance of the Peloponnesian force stationed at Rhodes. Pedaritus attacks the Athenian fortifications, and is slain.

LVI. After this, the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly than before, and great famine was in the city; and Pisander and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement. But Alcibiades (for he was not altogether sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear rather of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as also he had been taught by Alcibiades, to wear out both sides) betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should come to no treaty, by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seems to me that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing: Tissaphernes for fear; and Alcibiades, for that when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to come to an agreement, even though the offers were never so great, he was unwilling to have the

Chios closely besieged. Pisander holds a conference with Tissaphernes, which is broken off by the treachery of Alcibiades.

² In the last edition of Bekker, η is inserted before $\epsilon\kappa$; a conjecture of Palmer's, which appears necessary to the sense; as Chalce, whither we are told they retired, was nearer Rhodes than Cos.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Athenians think he could not persuade him to it, but rather, that he was already persuaded and willing to come to an agreement, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he was also present, made unto them such excessive demands, that though the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been attributed to them that the treaty went not on. For they demanded, first, that all Ionia should be surrendered; then again, the adjacent islands, and other things; which when the Athenians resisted not, at last, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word, he required that they should suffer the king to build a navy and sail up and down by their³ coast, wheresoever, and with what number soever of galleys he himself should think good. Upon this, the Athenians would treat no longer, but, esteeming the conditions intolerable, and thinking that they were deluded by Alcibiades, departed, and went away in a rage to Samos.

Tissaphernes makes a third treaty with the Peloponnesians.

LVII. Directly after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus, desiring both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and also (as soon as he should have agreed to new articles, such as he could get) to give the fleet their pay; and not to fall directly out with them, being in fear, lest, if they should be in want of maintenance for so many galleys, they should either be forced by the Athenians to fight, and so be overcome, or the galleys being emptied of men, the business might succeed with the Athenians according to their own desire without him. Besides, he was afraid, lest looking out for maintenance, they should make spoil in the continent. In consideration and foresight of all which things, as he desired to counterpoise the Grecians, having sent for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay, and now made the third league as followeth.

LVIII. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas being ephor in Lacedæmon, agreement was made in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their

³ I have followed the text in thus rendering it, but the reader should be cautioned that neither, as Goeller remarks, can *ἐαυτων* be used for *αυτων*, nor would it be likely that such a demand could have been made; he would therefore do well to follow Goeller and Arnold in reading *ἐαυτου*, i. e. "his own land."

confederates on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hiramenes⁴ and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king, and of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.—That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king, shall be the king's still; and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he shall think meet.—That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall not invade any of the territories of the king to harm them; nor the king the territories of the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates.—If any of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall invade the king's country to do it hurt, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall hinder it; and if any of the king's country shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates to do them hurt, the king shall hinder it.—That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on, maintain the present fleet till the king's fleet arrive.—That when the king's navy shall be come, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall have it in their own power to maintain their own navy themselves, if they please; or if they wish to receive maintenance from Tissaphernes, he shall afford it; but that the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, at the end of the war, shall repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him.—When the king's galleys shall be arrived, both they and the galleys of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, shall make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall seem good. And if they wish to give over the war against the Athenians, they shall give it over in the same manner.”

LIX. Such were the articles. And after this, Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phœnician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever else he had undertaken, desiring to appear at least making preparations.

LX. In the end of this winter, the Bœotians took Oropus by treason, having in it a garrison of Athenians. There assisted also in the plot certain Eretrians, and some of Oropus itself,

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Tissaphernes prepares to bring up the Phœnician fleet. Oropus taken by the Bœotians and Eretrians.

⁴ Probably the same man (I quote from Dr. Arnold) mentioned in Xenoph. Hell. ii. 1. §. 9. who had married a sister of Darius. Mr. Bloomfield thinks a woman is meant, the widow of Pharnaces, who still held his government, as in the case of Artemisia, queen of Caria. Herod. vii. 99. The children of Pharnaces are Pharnabazus and his brothers, who probably shared with him the satrapy of Dascylium.

Year 20.
A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

The latter sail to Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. The Peloponnesians however choose rather to succour Chios. On their voyage thither they fall in with the Athenian fleet, and retire to Miletus. The Athenians return to Samos.

SUMMER. Dercylidas is sent to the Hellespont. The Chians, commanded by Leon their new governor, engage the Athenians in a sea fight.

who were then contriving the revolt of Eubœa; for the place being directly opposite to Eretria, it was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. The Eretrians, therefore, having Oropus in their hands already, came to Rhodes, to call the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios, now distressed; and putting to sea with their whole fleet, sailed from Rhodes. When they were come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the main sea, going from Chalce, and as neither side sailed against the other, they arrive, the one fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus; for the [Peloponnesians] saw they could no longer pass to relieve Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter, and the twentieth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR XXI. A. C. 411. OLYMP. 92. 2.

LXI. The next summer, in the very beginning of the spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent by land to the Hellespont, with a small army, to work the revolt of Abydus, (a colony of the Milesians;) and the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. Now whilst Astyochus lay in Rhodes, they had received into the city of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon, a Spartan, who came along with Antisthenes, as lieutenant,⁵ and with him twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anæa, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a certain place of strength, and their ships having put forth, thirty-six galleys against thirty-two of the Athenians, they fought. After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not the worst, when it began to be dark, they retired again into the city.

Abydus
and Lamp-

LXII. Presently after this, Dercylidas being now arrived

⁵ I have thus rendered the word, in accordance with the opinion of Krueger, (quoted by Goeller,) that this is the title of an inferior naval officer among the Spartans, like the *ἐπιστολευς*, which he confirms from Xenoph. Hell. i. 3. §. 17. where Hegesandridas is called *ἐπιβατης Μινδαρου*; on which passage Schneider says, *ἐπιβ.* "est generatim quicumque nave vehitur." Dr. Arnold supposes it to be a species of deputy, who accompanied him to take any separate service that might be required.

from Miletus by land, Abydus in the Hellespont revolted to him and to Pharnabazus; and two days after revolted also Lampsacus. Strombichides having intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios, with four and twenty sail of Athenians, some of which were transports for soldiers which conveyed his heavy-armed. And when he had overcome the Lampsacens that came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an unwalled town, at the very first assault, and made prize of all the goods they found, and of the slaves, he placed the free men there again, and went against Abydus. But when that city neither yielded, nor could he take it by assault, he crossed over from Abydus to the opposite shore, and in Sestus, a city of Chersonesus, (possessed heretofore by the Medes,⁶) he placed a garrison for the guard of the whole Hellespont.

LXIII. In the mean time, the Chians and those at Miletus became somewhat superior at sea; and Astyochus having heard what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those galleys with him were gone away, took heart. And Astyochus going along the shore to Chios with two galleys, fetched away thence the galleys that were there, and with the whole fleet now together went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came not out against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it was about this time, and even before, that the democracy was being put down at Athens. For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors that had been with Tissaphernes were come to Samos, they both strengthened their affairs yet better in the army, the Samians also urging the principal men to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy, although it had happened that they themselves had risen up against each other that they might not be ruled by an oligarchy. And withal, the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not [unite with them], to let him alone; (for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy;) but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business from a relapse, and withal to sustain the war, and to contribute money, and whatsoever else was needful, with alacrity, out of their private estates, as they were toiling for none others than themselves.

Year 20.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
sacus revolt to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus.
Strombichides retakes Lampsacus, but failing in his attempt on Abydus, establishes a garrison at Sestus

Astyochus sails with his whole force to Samos; but on finding that the Athenians do not come out to meet him, he returns to Miletus.

Pisander and his colleagues arrive at Samos and confirm their party.

It is resolved to act without Alcibiades.

⁶ Comp. i. 89. and Herod. ix. 115.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
Pisander
and half
the am-
bassadors
proceed
towards
Athens,
with orders
to over-
throw de-
mocracy
in the
subject
states at
which they
touch dur-
ing their
voyage.
Diotre-
phes over-
throws the
demo-
cracy at
Thasus.
The Tha-
sians pre-
pare for a
revolt

LXIV. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the ambassadors presently home to transact the business there, with command to set up oligarchy in all cities they should touch at by the way; the other half they sent about, some to one part of the subject states, and some to another. And they sent away Diotrephes to his charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace. He, when he came to Thasus, put down the popular government. And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians fortified their city, as needing no longer an aristocracy with the Athenians, but expecting liberty every day by the help of the Lacedæmonians. For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athenians; and these with all their might intrigued with such in the city as were for their purpose, to receive galleys into it, and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for them just as they would have it, that the city was set up again without their danger, and that the popular government was deposed that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasus it fell out contrary to what those Athenians thought who erected the oligarchy; and so in my opinion it did in many other places of their dominion. For the cities having now gained wisdom and boldness in their proceedings, sought a direct liberty, and preferred not before it that deceitful and specious⁷ independence introduced by the Athenians.

Pisander
and his
colleagues
arrive at
Athens,
where
Androcles
and others
of the de-
mocratical
party have
lately
been as-
sassinated.

LXV. They with Pisander, according as had been decreed, entering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies; and having from some places obtained also an aid of men at arms, they came to Athens, and found the business for the greatest part despatched by their associates before their coming. For certain young men combining themselves, had not only murdered Androcles privily, a principal leader of the popular government, and one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades; whom they slew for two causes, for the sway he bare amongst the people, and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return, and get them the friendship of Tissaphernes; but had also made away with divers men unfriendly to their design, in the same manner.

⁷ Or, as Mr. Bloomfield well renders, "that hollow shade of independence:" the term being applied to flesh which has an ulcer underneath, and therefore unsound at bottom.

They had withal an oration ready made, which was to be delivered in public, to this effect, that there ought none to receive wages but such as served in the war, nor to participate in the government more than five thousand; and those such as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the commonwealth.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

LXVI. And this with the most carried a good show, because they that would set forward the alteration of the state were to have the managing of the same. Yet the people and the council of the bean^s met still, but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit. Nay, all that spake were of that number, and what was to be said had been before considered by them. Nor would any of the rest speak against them for fear, and because they saw the combination was great; and if any man did, he was quickly made away with by one convenient means or other, and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted against any that were suspected. But the people were so quiet, and so afraid, that every man thought it gain to escape violence, though he said never a word. Their hearts failed them because they thought the conspirators more than indeed they were: and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city, and for that they knew not one another, they were unable. For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it, to bemoan himself to any one else, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired. For he must either have found one whom he knew not to whom to tell his mind, or one he knew and trusted not, (for those of the popular party approached each other every one with jealousy,) as being a partaker in the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy; and those were they that caused in the many that want of confidence, and by strengthening the jealousy of the popular party one against another, conferred most to the security of the few.

LXVII. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were with him having come, fell in hand presently with the

Pisander
obtains the
appoint-

^s The senate or council of five hundred, made by lot, in which lot they used white and black beans. On the election by lot, as most general at Athens, see Hermann's *Pol. Ant.* sect. 149; and on the senate, sect. 125, seqq.; and on the general assemblies, sect. 128, seqq.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
ment of
ten per-
sons, who
are to
make a
draught of
whatever
form of
govern-
ment they
think fit,
and to
present it
to the
people.
An as-
sembly is
held at
Colonus,
in which
Pisander
proposes
the esta-
blishment
of a coun-
cil of four
hundred.

remainder of the business. And first they assembled the people, and delivered their opinion for ten men to be chosen with power absolute, to make a draught of laws, and that these should write down and deliver their opinion at a day appointed, before the people, touching the best form of government for the city. Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to Colonus;⁹ which is a temple consecrated to Neptune, without the city, distant about two furlongs off. And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this, that it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion he pleased, imposing great punishments upon whomsoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating the laws,¹ or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded, that not any magistracy of the form before used, might any longer be in force, nor that any should receive pay from it, but that five prytanes should be elected, and these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three others. And these four hundred entering into the council-house, should have absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best, and to summon the five thousand as oft as to them should seem good.

LXVIII. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander, who was also otherwise openly the forwardest to put down the democracy; but he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon,² a man for virtue not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man, both to devise well, and also to express well what he had devised; and though he came not into the assemblies of the people, nor willingly to any other debates, and the multitude had him in jealousy for the opinion

⁹ Hudson, quoted by Goeller, remarks, that the ordinary places of assembly were the Forum, the Pnyx, and the theatre of Bacchus; the extraordinary, the Piræus, Colonus, and Munychia. For further information, see Schoemann. Com. Ath. i. 3. p. 52 and 57.

¹ The proposer of any law or decree which opposed any law already existing, was subject to a *γραφη παρανομων*, which any one might bring against him within one year. For a brief but clear account, see Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 132; for a more elaborate, Schoem. Com. Ath. ii. 2. p. 159.

² "Son of Sophilus, one of the first who opened a school of oratory at Athens, and, according to Suidas, the tutor of Thucydides; he was condemned for going on a treasonable embassy to Sparta. Vid. c. 90."—*Arnold*.

they had of the power of his eloquence and talent; yet when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of justice or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to help him most. The same man, when afterwards the government of the four hundred fell to pieces, and was put down by the popular form of government, appears, of all up to my time, to have pleaded best for himself against his condemnation to death, in defence of these charges, when called in question for having assisted in establishing that form of government. Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, and that more eminently than any other, because he feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus; and thought, in all probability, that he would never return to live under the government of the few; and this man, when he had once undertaken the matter, with regard to affairs of peril appeared the most sufficient to be relied on. Also Theramenes the son of Agnon, an able man, both for elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew the democracy. So that it is no marvel if the undertaking took effect, being by many and wise men conducted, though it was a great one; for it was a difficult matter to deprive the Athenian people of their liberty, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, having not only not been subject to any, but also for more than the half of this time been wont to rule over others.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

LXIX. When the assembly, after it had passed these things, no man contradicting, was dissolved, then afterwards they brought the four hundred into the council-house in this manner. The Athenians were continually, partly on the walls, and partly stationed in the camp,³ in regard of the enemy that lay at Decelea. On the day appointed, therefore, they suffered such as knew not their intent to go away as they were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy, they quietly gave order, not to go to the camp itself, but to lag behind at a certain distance, and if any should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and not to suffer it. They to whom this charge was given were the Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Ægina whom the Athenians had sent thither to

The four hundred force their way into the senate-house, and having expelled the five hundred take their seats.

³ On this word, Goeller thus notes, "ὄπλα non sunt 'arma,' sed statio militum ubi arma posuerunt sive castra."

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

inhabit,⁴ as came on purpose to this action with their own arms. These things thus ordered, the four hundred, with every man a secret small sword, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece,⁵ (whom they used for occasions of assassinations,) came in upon the counsellors of the bean,⁶ as they sat in the council-house, and commanded them to take their salary⁷ and be gone, which also they brought ready with them for the whole time that was behind,⁸ and paid it to them as they went out.

Alcibiades
is not
recalled.

LXX. And when in this manner both the council quietly went out and made no opposition, and the rest of the citizens made no movement, but remained quiet, the four hundred being now entered into the council-house, created prytanes⁹ amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance upon the offices of government. But afterwards, receding far from that course, which in the administration of the state was used by the popular form of government, saving that because of Alcibiades they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the commonwealth imperiously. And both slew some, though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and imprisoned some, and sent others to places abroad; and also sent heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was at Decelea, signifying that they wished to come to a reconciliation with him, and that now he might better treat with them than he could before with the inconstant people.

A herald
is sent to
Agis with
overtures
of peace.

Agis gives
an unfavourable

LXXI. But he imagining that the city was not yet in quiet, nor that the people would so soon deliver up their

⁴ See book ii. 27.

⁵ This seems to be the import of the historian's phrase. He calls them Ἕλληνες νεανισκοί; thus marking that they were different people from the ordinary armed attendants of the Athenian magistracy, who were always Barbarians, generally Scythians.—*Mitford*.

⁶ See note on c. 66.

⁷ The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a drachma, or seven-pence three farthings, a day; which, considering the difference in the value of money, &c., may perhaps be considered equal to about three shillings at the present time.

⁸ Boeckh, quoted by Goeller, understands this of the salary for the rest of the year yet remaining; Krueger, of that which was due for the part of the year already passed: the first sense is perhaps the most suitable to the words of the text.

⁹ See Hermann, Pol. Ant. sect. 127.

ancient liberty, but rather, that if they saw him approach with great forces, they would be in tumult, not yet believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave no answer regarding coming to terms to those that came from the four hundred; but having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the guard at Decelea, and those new comers, to the Athenian walls, hoping that they would be more readily brought to submit according to his desire, through their confusion, or perhaps at the very first assault, in respect of the tumult that in all likelihood would take place both within and without the city. For as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them. But when he came near, and the Athenians made no disturbance at all within, and had with their horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men at arms, and of their light-armed, and of their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near, and got some arms and bodies of the slain; then learning the true state of affairs, he withdrew his army again, and himself, and such as were with him before, stayed in their place at Decelea; but as for those that came last, after they had stayed some few days in the country, he sent them home again. After this, the four hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse, sent ambassadors to Agis anew; and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors also to Lacedæmon, about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
answer;
and having
obtained
reinforce-
ments from
home, ad-
vances
from De-
celea to
the walls
of Athens,
but is
repulsed.

LXXII. They likewise sent ten men to Samos to give encouragement to the army, and to instruct them, that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state; and that they who had their hands in it were five thousand, and not four hundred only; notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of their expeditions and continual employment abroad, never assembled to consult upon any matter of how great consequence soever, so numerous as to be five thousand there at once.¹

A second
deputation
is sent to
him; and
by his
advice
they send
an em-
bassy to
La-
cæ-
mon to ne-
gotiate a
treaty.
Ten per-
sons are
sent to
encourage
the army
at Samos,
where oli-
garchy has
lately ex-

¹ This argument was altogether false, as even the fact asserted was untrue: for in some cases, as when an individual citizen was made the object of a public decree, six thousand votes at least were required, (see Herm. Pol. Ant. sect. 130;) and the argument itself was sophistical, for the five thousand were under the influence of the four hundred, and the four hundred again under the influence of a very few.

Year 21. And having in other things instructed them how to make the
 A. C. 411. best of the matter, they sent them away immediately after their
 Ol. 92. 2. present government was established, fearing (as also it fell out)
 periened a severe check. lest the seafaring multitude would not only not continue in this
 oligarchical form themselves, but (the mischief beginning there)
 would depose them also.

LXXIII. For in Samos there was a commotion about the
 oligarchy already, and this that follows happened about the
 same time that the four hundred were set up in Athens. Those
 Samians that had risen against the nobility, and were of the
 people's side, changing their party when Pisander came thither,
 at the persuasion of him, and of those Athenians in Samos that
 were of the combination, conspired together to the number of
 three hundred, and were about to set upon the rest, as being the
 popular party; and one Hyperbolus, a base fellow, who, not
 for any fear of his power or reputation, but for wickedness of
 life, and dishonour he did the city, had been banished by
 ostracism, they slew;² abetted therein, both by Charminus,
 one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that were
 amongst them, having given them their faith; and together
 with these they committed other facts of the same kind, and
 were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side; but they
 having got notice thereof, made known the design, both to the
 generals Leon and Diomedon, (for these being honoured by
 the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly,) and also to
 Thrasybulus³ and Thrasyllus, whereof one was captain of a
 galley, and the other captain of the men at arms, and to such
 others as they thought stood always in the greatest opposition
 to the conspirators; and begged of them, that they would not
 see them destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians,
 through which alone their dominion had till this time kept
 itself in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to the soldiers,

² This was the person whom the ostracism made in some measure famous, and who made the ostracism quite infamous. He is said to have been the last person against whom it was ever used. He succeeded Cleon in being leader of the populace. (Aristoph. Pac. 687.) For information concerning him, see Hermann. Pol. Ant. sect. 164; and on the object and the most noted victims of the ostracism, see the same work, sect. 111.

³ Thrasybulus, whose name now occurs for the first time, acts a very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this history; but the glory of his life was in ridding Athens soon after of *thirty tyrants* at a blow.—Smith. See Corn. Nepos.

and exhorted them one by one not to suffer it, especially to the Paralians,⁴ who were Athenians, and all that belonged to the crew, free men, who had always before been hostile to oligarchy, even before it had been established. And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left them certain galleys for their guard. So that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upper hand, and of the three hundred slew thirty; but three of the chief authors they banished, and burying in oblivion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a democracy.

LXXIV. The Paralos, and in it Chæreas, the son of Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the Samians and the soldiers despatched presently away to Athens, to carry the news to them of what was done; for they knew not yet that the government was in the hands of the four hundred. When they arrived, the four hundred cast some two or three of these of the Paralos into prison; the rest, after they had taken the galley from them, and put them aboard another ship for the reception of troops, they commanded to keep guard about Eubœa. But Chæreas by some means or other getting presently away, seeing how things went, came back to Samos, and related to the army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost; as that they punished every man with stripes, and that none could oppose the doings of those that bore rule; and that their wives and children at home were abused; and that they had an intention further to take and imprison all that were of kin to any of the army who was not of their faction, to the intent to kill them, if they of Samos would not submit to their authority. And many other things he told them, adding lies of his own.

LXXV. When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such of the rest as were partakers of it; yet afterwards, being hindered by such as belonged to neither side, and being warned by them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their galleys to assault them, they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus, the son of Lycas, and Thrasyllus, (for these were the principal authors of the change,) wishing now openly

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

Chæreas is sent in the Paralos to Athens.

The ship is seized by the four hundred on entering the harbour, some of the crew imprisoned, and the rest sent in another ship to cruise off Eubœa.

Chæreas makes his escape to Samos, and relates what has happened.

The fury of the soldiers against the oligarchical party is restrained with difficulty. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus bind all

⁴ The crew of the Paralos, on which see note on vi. 53. and iii. 33.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
the sol-
diers, and
Samians
who are of
a military
age, by
oath, to
support
demo-
cracy, and
resist the
four hun-
dred.

to change the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligarchical party, the greatest they could devise, that in very truth they would be subject to the democracy, and agree together; and also that they would zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, and withal be enemies to the four hundred, and in no respect send ambassadors to them. The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age, and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers. For whom and for themselves they made account there was no [other] refuge of safety, but that if either the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must needs perish.

The army
at Samos
depose
their com-
manders,
and choose
others.

LXXVI. So they fell into contention at this time, one side compelling the city to a democracy; the other, the army, to an oligarchy. And presently the soldiers called an assembly, wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as they had in suspicion, of their charge, and chose others, both captains of galleys and commanders, in their places, of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise and with this, that they had no cause to be dejected for the city's revolting from them; for they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken them, who were not only the greater part, but also every way the better provided. For they having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities subject to them to pay in their money as well now as if they were to set out from Athens itself. And that they also had a city, namely, Samos, no weak one, but even such a one as, when it made war against them, wanted but little of taking the dominion of the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of the war was the same as it was before; and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in the city. And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiræus both formerly by means of their being posted at Samos; and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they shall again be brought to that pass, that those at Samos shall be better able to bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle, and worth nothing, which was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city, and

that they had lost nothing [in losing them], who had neither any more money to send them, (but the soldiers furnished themselves,) nor yet good direction, which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that in this point they erred who were at Athens, in that they had abrogated the laws of their country, whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves, and endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise. So that such of them in the camp as should give good counsel, were as good as they in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their confederate. And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they might find both cities and territory.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

LXXVII. When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly, and encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was necessary for the war. And the ten ambassadors who were sent to Samos from the four hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already, stayed still there.

The ten ambassadors sent from Athens proceed no further than Delos.

LXXVIII. About the same time also the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves, that Astyochus and Tissaphernes overthrew the state of their affairs: Astyochus in refusing to fight, both before, when their own fleet was stronger, and that of the Athenians but small, and also now, whilst they were said to be in sedition, and their fleet divided; and in expecting the Phœnician fleet, a mere report and not a reality, to come from Tissaphernes, they would run the risk of being ruined by delay; and Tissaphernes also, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of his, but also impaired theirs, by not giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually; and that they therefore ought no longer to delay, but to hazard battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

The Peloponnesian sailors at Miletus murmur against Astyochus,

LXXIX. Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur, and had in council resolved to fight, especially after they were informed that Samos was in a tumult, putting forth with their whole fleet, to the number of one hundred and twelve sail, with order given to the Milesians to march by land towards the same place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians

who sails to Mycale, with the intention of engaging the Athenian fleet.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

The Athenians retire at his approach; but being joined by Strombichides and his fleet, they sail to Miletus, (whither the Peloponnesians have retired on hearing of the expected addition to the enemy's force,) and endeavour in vain to draw the Peloponnesians into an engagement.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus send Clearchus with forty ships to Pharnabazus.

Thirty of them (with Clearchus) are driven back by a storm.

Ten, under the command of Elixus, reach the Hellespont, and revolutionize Byzantium.

being come out from Samos with their fleet of eighty-two galleys, and riding now at Glauce, of the territory of Mycale, (for in this part toward Mycale, Samos is but a little way from the continent,) when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, retired again to Samos, as not esteeming themselves a sufficient number to hazard their whole fortune on the battle. Besides, they stayed for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid, (for they saw that they from Miletus had a desire to fight,) with those galleys that went from Chios towards Abydus; for they had sent a messenger to him before. So these retired to Samos; but the Peloponnesians putting in at Mycale, there encamped, as also did the land forces of the Milesians, and others of the country thereabouts. The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived out of Hellespont, and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these galleys, sailed to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, wishing to fight; but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to Samos.

LXXX. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of galleys, more especially as Tissaphernes supplied it badly, sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys, (according to the order at first from Peloponnesus,) to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for, and promised to pay them, but also Byzantium had despatched a messenger to them, concerning a purpose to revolt. Hereupon these Peloponnesian galleys having put out into the main sea, to the end that they might elude the observation of the Athenians as they passed by, and being tossed with tempests, part of them, (which were the greatest number,) and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again; (but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land, and had the command there;) and part under the charge of Elixus, the Megarean, (which were ten sail,) went safely through into the Hellespont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose

them, and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts; and there followed a short sea-fight between them, of eight galleys to eight, before Byzantium.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

The Athenians send a reinforcement to the Hellespont.

The Athenians at Samos send Thrasybulus to recall Alcibiades,

LXXXI. In the mean time, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who, after he had changed the form of government, had ever clung to his own opinion, to have Alcibiades recalled, at length, in an assembly, persuaded the greater part of the soldiers to the same; and when they had decreed for Alcibiades, both his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos, accounting it their only means of safety, to bring over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the private calamity of his own exile; and speaking much of the business of the state, gave them no small hopes of the future, hyperbolically magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to the end that both they who held the oligarchy at home might fear him, and so the combinations⁵ might be the more dissolved, and also those at Samos the more honour him, and take better heart unto themselves; and withal that the enemy might become, to the greatest degree, at enmity with Tissaphernes, and fall from their present hopes. Alcibiades, therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him, that as long as he had any thing left, if he might but trust the Athenians, they should never want for maintenance, no, not even though he should be constrained at last to convert his own bed into money; and that he would fetch the Phœnician fleet now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians, but to the Athenians. And that then only he would rely upon the Athenians, if he himself [i. e. Alcibiades] would return back to him, and become sponsor for them.

LXXXII. Hearing this, and much more, they chose him presently for general, together with those that were before, and committed to them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of being saved themselves, and being revenged of the four hundred, for any good in the world; and were ready even then, on those words of his, contemning the enemy there present, to set sail for Peiræus. But he, though many pressed

whom they choose as their commander.

Alcibiades refuses to

⁵ Or, clubs; on these, see note on iii. 82. They are mentioned also before, in viii. 54.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

lead them
imme-
diately to
Athens,
but goes
first to in-
form Tis-
saphernes
of what
has been
done.

it, by all means forbade their going against Peiræus, being to leave their enemies so near; but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tissaphernes first, and to despatch such business with him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey accordingly, to the end that he might seem to communicate every thing with him; and for that he desired also to be in more honour with him, and to shew that he was general, and a man capable to do him good or hurt: and it happened to Alcibiades, that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

The Pello-
ponnesians
at Miletus
murmur
against
Astyo-
chus.

LXXXIII. When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus heard that Alcibiades was returned, whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, were now much more at enmity with him. For it fell out, that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before Miletus they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment; and, besides that he was hated by them before this because of Alcibiades, he was now much more hated. And the soldiers now meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another the same matters which they had noted before: and some also men of value, and not the common soldier alone, recounted this withal, how they had never had their full stipend; that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; and that unless they were either brought to battle, or removed to some other place where they might have maintenance, the men would abandon the fleet; and that the cause of all this was Astyochochus, who, for private lucre, gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes.

The Syra-
cusian and
Thracian
seamen
threaten to
slay him.

LXXXIV. Whilst they were recounting such matters, there happened also a tumult of the following kind about Astyochochus. For the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, since for the most part they were freemen, with so much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer, but also threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the sailors under himself, and lifted up his staff against him.⁶ When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed all at once, and were running upon Astyochochus to have struck him; but foreseeing it,

He es-
capes to
an altar.

⁶ The staff, *βακτηρια*, was, among the Grecian generals, a mark of distinction, as among the Roman centurions the "vitis," or vine-rod.

he fled to an altar, and was not stricken, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took the fort in Miletus, built by Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it, and cast out the garrison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by the Syracusians, well approved of; but Lichas liked them not, saying, it behoved the Milesians, and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, to obey Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and, till such time as the war should have been well despatched, to pay him court. And the Milesians for this, and other things of this kind, were offended with Lichas; and afterwards, when he died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedæmonians then present would have had him.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
The Milesians destroy a fort erected by Tissaphernes. This conduct approved by all except Lichas, who dies soon after.

LXXXV. Whilst they were quarrelling about their business both with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus came in from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet, and takes the command on himself; and Astyochus departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent, as ambassador, one of his own attendants, a Carian, named Gaulites, one that spake both the languages,⁷ both to accuse the Milesians about the fort, and also to make an apology for himself; knowing that the Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him, and that Hermocrates went with them, who was about to shew how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt with both sides. For he was continually at enmity with him about the payment of the soldiers' wages; and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the Syracusian fleet, namely, Potamis, Mison, and Damarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him, being an outlaw, than before; and accused him, amongst other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not have it, had openly taken up enmity against him. So Astyochus, and Hermocrates, and the Milesians, sailed off to Lacedæmon; but Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

Mindarus is sent to supersede Astyochus in the command of the fleet at Miletus. Astyochus, accompanied by Gaulites, a Carian, proceeds to Lacedæmon. Some Milesians, and Hermocrates, (who is also superseded,) go there also to accuse Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes charges Hermocrates with bribery.

LXXXVI. And those ambassadors of the four hundred, who had been sent out before to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos, now, whilst Alcibiades was present, and an assembly being called, they tried to speak. But

The ambassadors from the four hundred arrive at Samos.

⁷ Both Greek and Persian.

Year 21. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. Alcibiades with difficulty restrains the soldiers from proceeding to the Peiræus.

He dismisses the ambassadors with a message to the Athenians, calling on them to depose the four hundred.

the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out to have them put to death, for that they had deposed the people; yet afterwards, with much ado, they were calmed, and gave them hearing. And they gave this message, that the change had been made for the preservation of the city, not to destroy it, nor to deliver it to the enemy; for they could have done that before now, when the enemy during their government made an irruption. That every one of the citizens should be sharers in [i. e. be of the number of⁸] the five thousand in their turn. And their kinsfolk were not, as Chæreas had laid to their charge, abused, nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own; but though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed them not, but raged still, and declared their opinions, some in one sort, some in another, most agreeing in this, to sail to the Peiræus. And now Alcibiades appeared to be the principal man, and not inferior to any one in doing service to the commonwealth. For when the Athenians at Samos were very eager to invade themselves, (in which case most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont,) [he appeared to be] the man that kept them from it. Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude but himself. He both made them to desist from the voyage, and by reproof turned off from the ambassadors those that were on their own particular account incensed against them; whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: that he opposed not the government of the five thousand, but bade them to remove the four hundred, and to establish the council that was before of the five hundred. That if they had frugally cut off any expense, so that such as were employed in the war might be the better maintained, he did much commend them for it. And, withal, he exhorted them to stand out, and give no ground to their enemies: for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope for them to come to an agreement; but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos, or the other at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal. There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of

⁸ For this sense, manifestly the true one—for it would be absurd to say *each* of the five thousand was to partake of the government, as they *all* would partake of it, and besides this sense in *μετεχειν* would require *των πραγμάτων* after it—I am indebted to Dr. Arnold's excellent note.

the Argives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos, to assist them. These Alcibiades commended, and appointed to be ready when they should be called for, and so dismissed them. These Argives came with those of the Paralos that had been before ordered by the four hundred to sail about Eubœa in the galley for the reception of troops, and to convey Læspodias,⁹ Aristophon, and Milesias, ambassadors from the four hundred, to Lacedæmon; who, as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors, and delivered them, as principal men in deposing of the popular government, to the Argives, and they themselves returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley they then were in to Samos, and brought with them these ambassadors from the Argives.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
He dis-
misses
kindly
some Ar-
give am-
bassadors,
who had
come to
offer their
services to
the popu-
lar govern-
ment at
Samos.

LXXXVII. The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the time that the Peloponnesians were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades, and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phœnician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him; saying, that he would substitute Tamos his deputy-lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet whilst himself was absent. This matter is differently reported; and it is hard to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus, and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hundred and forty-seven sail of Phœnicians were come forward as far as Aspendus; but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design (as he formerly intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces, (for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better, but rather worse payment than himself.) Others, that having brought the Phœnicians as far as Aspendus, he might extort money from them for discharging them; for even without so doing¹ he never meant to use their service. Some again said it was because of the outcry against him that had reached Lacedæmon, that it might² be said that he was not abusing

Tissa-
phernes
goes to As-
pendus,
but does
not bring
the Phœ-
nician fleet
to join the
Pelopon-
nesians.

⁹ He had been in command before: see vi. 105.

¹ As Goeller renders, "nam etiamsi pecunias a Phœnicibus nullas accepisset, nibilo magis tamen iis usus esset, sed reverti jussisset."

² The literal sense of *τφ λεγεσθαι*, (which Bekker gives,) "by its being said," being inapplicable to the context, I have ventured to render it as if it were *του*, which Dr. Arnold reads.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

them, but that he was plainly gone to the fleet that was really manned. For my own part, I think it most clear, that he brought not those galleys in, that he might wear out the Greeks, and delay the decision of the contest. Consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither, he made neither party the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have been sure to have done it. For if he had brought them to the Lacedæmonians, in all reason he had given them the victory, who were stationed opposite them with a navy already rather equal than inferior to that of their enemies. But that which detects his intention most, was the pretence he alleged for not bringing the fleet in; for he said they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be got together. But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business, by not spending much of the king's money, and by managing the matter itself with less. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and was with the Phœnicians; and by his own appointment, the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedæmonian, with two galleys, as to take charge of the fleet.

Philippus is sent with two triremes to join the Phœnicians.

Alcibiades with thirteen ships sails to join Tissaphernes at Aspendus.

LXXXVIII. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a safe and great benefit; which was, that he would either bring those Phœnician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians; knowing, as is likely, long before, the intention of Tissaphernes, that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he could, to procure him the ill-will of the Peloponnesians, for the friendship shewn to himself and to the Athenians, that he might thereby be the more necessitated to take their part. So he put to sea, holding his course direct for Phaselis and Caunus upwards.

On the return of the ambassadors to Athens, some of the oligarchical party change their sentiments.

LXXXIX. The ambassadors that were sent by the four hundred being returned from Samos to Athens, and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades, how that he exhorted them to hold out, and not give ground to the enemy, and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army, and to overcome the Peloponnesians; whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented, and would gladly, if they could have done it safely, have quitted

the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their meetings apart, and did cast aspersions on the government, and had for their ring-leaders some of the heads of the oligarchical party, and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes³ the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates⁴ the son of Scellias, and others; who, though they were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet fearing, as they freely said, the army in Samos, and Alcibiades most especially, and those who were gone on the embassy to Lacedæmon, lest they [i. e. the ambassadors] should, without the consent of the greater part [of the oligarchical faction,] do the state some harm, they did not indeed declare that they wished to be free from the government falling into the power of so very few, but said that the five thousand ought to be established in reality, and not in name, and that the government ought to be appointed on a greater equality. And this was indeed the form pretended in words by them; but the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that, by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly overthrown. For at once they claimed, every one, not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook the results. But the greater power of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not likely to last, was it that most evidently encouraged them; and thereupon they every one contended, who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

XC. But those of the four hundred that were most opposite to such a form of government, and the principal of them, both Phrynichus (who had been general at Samos, and was then at difference with Alcibiades) and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the popular government, both in the greatest manner, and for the longest time; and Pisander and

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

Pisander and the other leaders of the oligarchicals send to Lacedæmon to negotiate a peace.

³ This Theramenes was deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians, after the taking of Athens by Lysander, (A. C. 404,) when they demolished their long walls, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards nominally one of the thirty tyrants; by whom he was put to death.

⁴ Mentioned in Xenoph. *Hell.* i. 4. §. 21. seqq. He perished, with five others of the generals, by the result of the trial which followed the battle of Arginusæ: see also, *Aristoph. Av.* 126; and *Plato, Gorgias*, p. 472.—*Arnold.*

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

They also
proceed
with the
erection of
a fortress at
Peiræus.

Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they set up the oligarchical government, and afterwards, when the state at Samos changed into a popular form, sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon, and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and were building a fort on what is called the Eetioneia; but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos, and that they saw not only the great body of the people, but also some others of their own party, thought trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedæmon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus, with ten others, with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries, both at home and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the Lacedæmonians on any tolerable conditions whatsoever or howsoever; and in this time went on with the building of the fort on Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The intention of this fort, as it was given out by Theramenes and those with him, was not to keep out those in Samos, in case they should attempt by force to enter into the Peiræus, but rather at their pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia is a pier of the Peiræus, close unto which is the mouth of the haven; and therefore they built this wall so to another wall, that was built before to the continent, that a few men stationed within it might command the entrance. For the end of each wall was brought to one of the two towers that stands upon the very mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the continent, as of the new which was built within it to the water. They built also an open ground gallery, an exceeding great one, and close to the wall within the Peiræus, and themselves kept possession of it, and constrained all men, as well to bring thither their corn, which they had already come in, as to unload there whatsoever should come in afterward, and to take and sell it from thence.

The am-
bassadors
return
without
success
from Lacedæmon.
Therame-
nes accuses
the oli-
garchical
party of
building

XCI. These things Theramenes murmured at long before; and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedæmon, without having come to any agreement for them all in general, he gave out, that this fort would endanger the ruin of the city. For at this very instant there happened to be riding at Las, on the coast of Laconia, forty-two galleys, (amongst which were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and some Sicilians,) set out from Peloponnesus at the instance of the Eubæans, bound

for Eubœa, and commanded by Agesandridas, the son of Agesander, a Spartan; which Theramenes said were coming, not so much towards Eubœa, as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia, and that if they did not at once guard against them, they would be ruined before they were aware. And there was some idea of the kind among those that were accused, so that it was not a mere slander of words. For their principal design was to retain the oligarchy, with dominion over their confederates; but if they failed of that, yet, being masters of the galleys and of the fortifications, to have subsisted free themselves; if barred of that, then, rather than themselves to suffer death for the others under the restored democracy, to bring in the enemy, and without either navy or fortifications to come to any agreement, on condition of retaining the city, if there was immunity at least secured for their own persons.

XCII. Therefore they went diligently on with this fortification, wherein were wickets and entries, and back-ways for the enemy, and desired to have it finished in time. And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before, and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedæmonian embassy, was by a certain watchman⁵ wounded treacherously in the market-place, when it was full, as he went from the council-house, and not far from it fell instantly dead; and he that struck the blow escaped; and that one of his accomplices, an Argive, taken by the four hundred and put to the torture, would confess the name of no man of those named to him, nor any thing else, saving this, that he knew many men used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch, and at other houses; then at length, when no disturbance arose from this, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many other, either of the four hundred or out of that number, as were of the same faction, proceeded more boldly to the matter in hand. For now also the fleet being come about from Las, and lying at Epidaurus, had made incursions over Ægina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged, that it was improbable that those galleys, holding their course for Eubœa, would have put into the bay at Ægina, and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had come being summoned for the objects which he himself had been always denouncing; and that therefore there was no possibility any longer to sit still.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
their fort
for the
purpose of
admitting
the enemy's
fleet.

Phrynichus is assassinated.

The forty-two Peloponnesian ships appear at Ægina.

⁵ Or rather, by one of the patrole, or militia; see note on iv. 67.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

The sol-
diers in the
Peiræus
imprison
Alexicles.

And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches had taken place, they fell to the matter in hand in good earnest. For the soldiers that were in the Peiræus, employed in fortifying Eetioneia, (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his band with him,) seized on Alexicles, a commander of the soldiers under the four hundred, and one who was very much inclined to the other side,⁶ and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. And others also assisted them, and Hermon too, a commander of the guard posted at Munychia; and what was of the greatest consequence, the great mass of the heavy-armed was thus inclined. As soon as the news hereof was brought unto the four hundred, (who chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council-house,) they were ready all of them, except as many as liked these measures, presently to have taken arms, threatening Theramenes and his faction. He, to defend himself, said he was ready to go with them, and to help to rescue Alexicles; and taking with him one of the commanders, who was also of his faction, went down into the Peiræus. To help him went also Aristarchus, and certain horsemen of the younger sort. Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they thought the Peiræus was already taken, and him that was laid hold of slain; and in the Peiræus they expected that the power of the city was all but come upon them. At last, the more elderly men stopping them that ran up and down the city, and who were hastening to arm⁷ themselves, and Thucydides⁸ of Pharsalus, the city's host, being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met, and crying out unto them, not to destroy their country, when the enemy lay so near waiting for an advantage, with much ado they were quieted, and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes coming into the Peiræus, (for he also was a general,) as far as shouting went,⁹ made a show of being angry with them; but Aristarchus, and those that were of the contrary side, were extremely

A tumult
ensues,
which is
appeased
by Thucy-
dides.

The sol-
diers, with
the con-
sent of
Therame-
nes, de-

⁶ Goeller and others read *ἐραιπους*, "the partisans of the four hundred."

⁷ Lit. "to the arms," which were kept piled up during the present time in the different open parts of the city; see note on ii. 2.

⁸ There are four Thucydides on record: 1st, the son of Milesias, the rival of Pericles; 2nd, a Gargettian of that name; 3rd, the one here mentioned; 4th, the historian.—*Hudson*.

⁹ For this extremely neat translation of the phrase in the text, I am indebted to Mr. Bloomfield.

angry with the multitude. Nevertheless the soldiers went all together on with their business, and repented not a jot of what they had done. Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought this fortification were made to any good end, and whether it were not better demolished. And he answered, that if they thought good to demolish it, he also thought the same. At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers, and also many others of the Peiræus, and fell to digging down of the wall. Now the exhortation that they used to the multitude was in these words: that "whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, ought also to set himself to the work in hand." For, notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the name of the five thousand, and not to say plainly, "whosoever will have the sovereignty in the people," fearing lest in truth they should be [of the five thousand,] and so a man by speaking to some or other of them might do hurt to the business through ignorance. And for this cause it was, that the four hundred desired neither to let the five thousand exist, nor yet let it be evident that they did not exist. For to make so many participant of the affairs of state, they thought was a direct democracy, but to have it doubtful, would make them afraid of one another.

XCIII. The next day, the four hundred, though in a state of disturbance, yet met together in the council-house; and the soldiers in the Peiræus, having set at large Alexicles, whom they had before imprisoned, and quite razed the fortification, came into the theatre of Bacchus in the Peiræus near to Munychia, and there having laid down their arms, held an assembly, and presently, according as they had resolved, marched into the city, and there laid down their arms in the Anaceum.¹ To this place came to them certain men elected by the four hundred, and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of a moderate temper, both to be quiet themselves, and to restrain the rest; saying, that they would both appoint and declare the five thousand, and that out of these such should be chosen in turn to be of the four hundred, as the five thousand should think good; and entreating them by all means, that they would not in the mean time overthrow the city, and

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
demolish the
fortifica-
tion.

The four
hundred
send a de-
putation to
the sol-
diers, pro-
mising to
proclaim
the five
thousand,
and to
appoint
the four
hundred
by turns
out of
them.

¹ The temple of Castor and Pollux, who were called Ἀνακτες. In this place slaves were exposed to sale.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

The soldiers agree to hold an assembly.

force it into the hand of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men at arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew milder than before, and feared most the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed by them, that an assembly should be held for coming to a union, in the temple of Bacchus,² at a day assigned.

Intelligence is brought that the forty-two Peloponnesian ships are off the coast of Salamis.

XCIV. When they came to the temple of Bacchus, and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came news that Agesandridas, with his forty-two galleys from Megara, was sailing along the coast of Salamis; and now there was not one of the multitude but thought it the very same thing that Theramenes and his party had before told them, that those galleys were to come to the fortification, and it now seemed that it was demolished to good purpose. But Agesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast of Epidaurus, and thereabouts; but it is likely, that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians, he stayed in those parts with hopes that he might be able to come up at some fitting time. But the Athenians, on the contrary, as soon as it was told them, ran presently with all the power of the city down to Peiræus; less esteeming their domestic war, than that of the common enemy, which [war] was not now far off, but even at the haven.³ And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched the rest, and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

The Athenians prepare to resist the enemy.

The Peloponnesians sail to Oropus.

The Athenians send a squadron to Eretria, which (through the treachery of the Eretrians) is defeated by the Pelopon-

XCIV. But the Peloponnesian galleys, being now gone by, and passed round the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasiæ, and put in afterwards at Oropus.

The Athenians, with all speed, constrained to make use of unpractised forces, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and desirous with all haste to give assistance, to make good their greatest stake, (for Eubœa, since they were shut out of Attica, was all to them,) sent a fleet under the command of Thymochares to Eretria. Which arriving with those galleys that were in Eubœa before, made up the number of thirty-six sail; and they were at once constrained to hazard battle. For

² See note on c. 67.

³ More literally, "inasmuch as a war from their [foreign] enemies, greater or of more importance than their domestic war, was not far off, but at the port." In this passage, either the η must be struck out, or an ellipse of $\omicron\upsilon$ must be supposed.

Agesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus, when he had first there dined. Now Oropus is distant from Eretria about threescore furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began to man their vessels, supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near unto the galleys; but it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not from the market, (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly, before they were ready, and force them to come out and fight just as they might chance to be, nothing was there to be sold,) but from the houses in the extreme parts of the city. There was besides a signal set up at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athenians, putting forth with so scanty a preparation, and fighting before the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for some short time, but afterwards they turned their backs and were chased ashore. Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, were worst off, being slaughtered by them of the town; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved themselves; and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, after they had taken two and twenty Athenian galleys, with the men, whereof some they slew and some they took prisoners, erected a trophy; and not long after, having caused all Eubœa to revolt, save only Oreus,⁴ (which the Athenians held with their own forces,) they settled the rest of the business there.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.
nesians,
with the
loss of
twenty-
two ships.

Eubœa
revolts.

XCVI. When the news of that which had happened in Eubœa was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest affright that ever they had been in before. For neither did the disaster in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other as yet, so much affright them as this. For now, since the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys, nor men to go aboard, when they were in sedition amongst themselves, and when it was not certain when they might come to a civil contest, then in the neck of all arrived this so great calamity; wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Eubœa, from which they had received more advantage than from Attica; how then could they but in reason be dejected? But most of all, and most

The Athe-
nians are
thrown
into great
confusion
by the in-
telligence
of this
defeat.

⁴ See i. 114, and Liv. xxviii. 5. Now called *l'Orco*.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

nearly it troubled them, lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage, and come immediately into their Peiræus, now empty of shipping, of which they thought but little wanting that they were there already. And had they been more adventurous, they might easily have done it, and then they would either have increased the division in the city, by anchoring off it, or if they had stayed there and besieged it, they would also have compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia, to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy; and in the mean time the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and all places even to Eubœa, and, as one may say, the whole Athenian empire would have fallen into their power. But the Lacedæmonians, not only in this, but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours, the one swift, the other slow, the one adventurous, the other timorous,⁵ the Lacedæmonians gave them great advantage, and especially benefited their naval supremacy. This was evident by the Syracusians, who being most like them in temper, warred best against them.

They equip
twenty
more ships,
convene
an assembly
on the
Pnyx, and
depose the
four hundred,
delivering up
the government
into the hands
of the five
thousand;
they also

XCVII. The Athenians, upon this news, made ready notwithstanding twenty galleys, and called an assembly, one then presently in the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times;⁶ in which, having deposed the four hundred, they decreed to give over the sovereignty to the five thousand, of which number were all such to be as supplied arms;⁷ and from that time forward, that no man should receive any pay for any magistracy, with a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary, to be held for an execrable person. There were also divers other assemblies held afterwards, wherein they elected law-makers,⁸ and enacted all other things concerning

⁵ On these traits in the character of the two rival states, comp. the speech of the Corinthian ambassadors, i. 70.

⁶ Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 19, 20, mentions that, in his days, assemblies, called by the Athenians *κυριαὶ ἐκκλησίαι*, were wont to be held in this place. Vid. note on c. 67.

⁷ That is, was capable of providing himself with heavy-arms, or could serve as a hoplite. On this passage, Goeller refers to *Aristot. Pol.* vi. 4. 3. and ii. 5. 2. On this revolution, see Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. iv. c. 28. p. 70.

⁸ Persons to model the constitution; corresponding to the *ἐσυγγραφεῖς* appointed by the aristocratical party in c. 67. *Arnold.*—These must not be

the government. And now first, (at least in my time,) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state most aright; which consisted now of a moderate union and blending, both of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes past, made the city again to raise her head. They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, and those that were in exile with him; and sending to him, and to the army at Samos, urged them to fall vigorously in hand with their business.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2. 4
decreed the
recall of
Alcibi-
ades.

XCVIII. During this change, Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew themselves privately to Decelea; Aristarchus alone (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers) took with him certain archers of the most barbarous,⁹ and went with all speed to Œnoe. This was a fort of the Athenians, in the confines of Bœotia, and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received, when their men retreated from Decelea, by the garrison of Œnoe) some volunteers of the Corinthians, and some Bœotians whom they had called in to aid them, were now besieging it. Aristarchus, therefore, having laid his plans with these, deceived those in Œnoe, and told them, that the city of Athens had in all points come to an agreement with the Lacedæmonians, and that they were to render up the place to the Bœotians, for on these terms they had come to the agreement. Whereupon believing him, as one that had authority over the soldiery, and knowing nothing, because besieged, upon security for their safe passage, they gave up the fort. And the Bœotians received Œnoe, which was taken in this manner; and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens ceased.

The sup-
porters of
oligarchy
quit
Athens.

Aristar-
chus, by a
stratagem,
prevails on
the Athe-
nian gar-
rison to
abandon
Œnoe to
the Bœo-
tians.

XCIX. About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom Tissaphernes, at his going to Aspendus, had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus, did it; and seeing neither the Phœnician fleet nor Tissaphernes came to them; and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and confounded with the ordinary Nomothetæ, (for an account of whom, see Herm. Pol. Ant. sect. 131): for on this, as well as upon other occasions, special Nomothetæ, their number unknown, were appointed; a difference explained by Schoem. Com. Ath. ii. c. 7. p. 270.

Mindarus
sails from
Miletus for
the Helles-
pont with
seventy-
three
ships.

⁹ Probably some of those servants of the state at Athens called *τοξοται*, who were almost Barbarians, and sometimes were called Scythians. See Herm. Pol. Ant. sect. 129.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

also another, one Hippocrates, a Spartan, who was at Phaselis, had sent a message to Mindarus, the admiral, that the fleet was not to come at all, and in every thing Tissaphernes abused them; seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was willing, upon gaining their fleet, for his own part also, as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within his own province to revolt from the Athenians; then at length Mindarus, hoping to obtain more benefit from him, with good order and sudden warning, that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of it, setting forth from Miletus, sailed towards the Hellespont with seventy-three galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part of Chersonesus. But tossed by a stormy wind, he was forced to put in at Icarus, and after he had stayed there, through rough weather, some five or six days, he arrived at Chios.

He is
obliged to
put in at
Chios.

Thrasyllus
sails from
Samos,
and be-
siegues
Eresus.

C. Thrasyllus having been informed of his departure from Miletus, himself also directly put to sea from Samos, with five and fifty sail, hastening, lest he should be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there, he appointed watchmen in Lesbos, and in the continent over-against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his knowledge; and he himself going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of meal, and other necessaries, intending, if they stayed there long, to go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eresus was revolted from Lesbos, he purposed to go thither with his fleet, if he could, to take it. For the most potent of the Methymnæan exiles had conveyed over, as volunteers to their party, about fifty men at arms out of Cyme, and hired others out of the continent; and with their whole number, in all three hundred, having for their leader Anaxander, a Theban, chosen in respect of their relationship to the Thebans,¹ first assaulted Methymna; but beaten back in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against them from Mitylene, and again in a battle without the city driven quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eresus, and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with all his galleys, and to assault it. But Thrasybulus also had come there before

¹ For the Lesbians and Bœotians were both Æolian nations. Comp. iii. 2. —*Duker.*

him, with five galleys from Samos, when he had been informed of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eresus, and lay before it at anchor. Hither also came two galleys on their way homewards from the Hellespont, and the galleys of Methymna; so that they were in all threescore and seven sail present, with the troops out of which they made their preparations, intending with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eresus by assault.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

CI. In the mean time, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys,² and had received of the Chians three Chian tassaracostes³ a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios, and kept not far from the shore, that they might not fall in with the galleys at Eresus. And having Lesbos on the left hand, sailed to the continent; and putting in at the haven in Carteria, belonging to the territory of Phocæa, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cyme, and came to Arginusæ,⁴ in the continent over-against Mitylene, where they supped. From thence they put forth late in the night, and came to Harmatus, a place in the continent over-against Methymna; and after dinner sailing quickly along the coast by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and the other towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnight to Rhæteum: this now is in Hellespont. But some of his galleys put in at Sigeum, and other places thereabouts.

Mindarus arrives at Rhæteum unperceived by the Athenian fleet at Eresus.

CII. The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestus, knew that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont by the fires, by those which their own watchmen put up, and by the many which appeared on the enemy's shore, and therefore the same night, in all haste, as they were, kept the shore of the Chersonesus, and sailed along towards Elæus, desiring to get out into the wide sea, and to escape the fleet of the enemy; and went out unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydus, (though these had warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on to watch them narrowly that they went not out,)

The Athenians at Sestus, endeavouring to sail out into the open sea, are chased by Mindarus, and lose four of their ships near Elæus.

² Or rather, with Mr. Bloomfield, "having taken provision for two days."

³ A tassaracoste seems to have been a coin amongst the Chians, and the fortieth part of some other greater coin; but the exact value is not known.

⁴ According to Strabo, Arginusæ were small islands near to the continent. The town was probably opposite the islands, as in the case of Sybota. See i. 47. 50.—Arnold.

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

but in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus, who immediately chased⁵ them, they could not all escape, but the most of them escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, but four that were the hindmost of the fleet were taken near Elæus; whereof the Peloponnesians took one with the men in her that had run herself on ground at the temple of Protesilaus, and two other without the men, and set fire on the other one abandoned upon the shore of Imbros.

Mindarus, after besieging Elæus one day without success, sails off to Abydus.

CIII. After this, they besieged Elæus the same day with those galleys from Abydus which had united themselves with them, and with the rest, being now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, they sailed away to Abydus.

The Athenians proceed from Eresus for the purpose of defending the Hellespont.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, were carrying forward at their leisure the siege of Eresus, when now they knew they were gone, immediately left Eresus, and hastened to the defence of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians, that having ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians; and they came to Elæus a day after [the Peloponnesians,] and come to anchor there, and thither from Imbrus they procure those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy; and here they spent five days in preparation for the sea-fight.

They arrive at Elæus.

An action is fought off Cynossema, in which the Athenians are completely victorious.

CIV. After this, they fought in the following manner. The Athenians went by the shore, having their galleys arranged in file towards Sestus; but the Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydus. And as they were certain of fighting, they drew out their wings in length: the Athenians along the shore of Chersonesus, beginning at Idacus, and reaching as far as Arrhianæ, threescore and sixteen galleys; and the Peloponnesians, from Abydus to Dardannus, fourscore and eight galleys.⁶ In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the Syracusians; in the other, Mindarus

⁵ It is absolutely necessary to follow Goeller's correction of *ποιοιμενον*, or Haack's of *ποιοιμενων*, as the common reading is at variance with the sense.

⁶ According to Bekker: the Athenians in some other editions are represented as having sixty-six; the Peloponnesians, eighty-six.

himself, and those galleys that were swiftest sailers. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right; and the rest of the commanders every one the place assigned him. Now the Peloponnesians pressed on to give the first onset, and with their left wing to overreach the right wing of the Athenians, and keep them from going out into the open sea, and to drive those in the middle to the shore, which was near; the Athenians, who perceived it, where the enemy was desirous to cut off their way out, put forth the same way that they did, and out-went them; and the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time beyond the point called Cynos-sema.⁷ By means of this, that part of the fleet which was in the midst became both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet; and the sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos-sema prevented what took place on the further side of it from being seen.

CV. The Peloponnesians therefore charging this middle part, both drove their galleys to the dry land, and being far superior in fight went out after them to assault them on the shore. And to help them, neither was Thrasybulus able, and those who were with him from the right wing, for the multitude of the enemies that pressed him; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema, and because also he was prevented from it by the Syracusians and the others who were ranged against him, no fewer in number than themselves. Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one galley, some another, began to be somewhat disordered in a part of their fleet. And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys were stopping,⁸ sought now no more to go beyond their flank, but at once turned upon them, and fighting, put them presently to flight. And having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians of that part that had the victory as were scattered abroad, some they shattered, but the greatest number they put into affright unfought. The Syracusians also, who, too, chanced themselves already to be giving ground to those with Thrasyllus, when they saw the rest fly, fled all the more.

⁷ Called, by Diodorus and others, the Sepulchre of Hecuba. See Eurip. Hecuba, 1270.

⁸ As Goeller renders, "cum animadvertissent hostes cursum inhibere."

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

CVI. This defeat being given, and the Peloponnesians having for the most part escaped, first to the river Meidius, and afterwards to Abydus; though the Athenians took but few of their galleys, (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat,) yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received by little and little, and also because of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves, or to think that the enemy was worth aught with regard to naval matters. They took however of their adversaries' vessels, eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia two, and two of Bœotia; of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one apiece. Of their own they lost fifteen. When they had set up a trophy in the promontory where the Cynos-sema is, and taken up the wrecks, and given truce to the enemy to fetch away the bodies of their dead, they sent away a galley to carry news of the victory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming of this galley, hearing of their unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their recent calamities in Eubœa, and after their sedition, and conceived that their estate might yet be able to hold out, if they applied themselves to the business courageously.

A trireme is sent to Athens with intelligence of the victory.

The Athenians sail to Cyzicus, which they reduce.

CVII. The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in Sestus, having hastily prepared their fleet, sailed to Cyzicus, which was revolted; and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from Byzantium, riding under Harpagium and Priapus, sailed against them, and having also overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took the vessels. Then coming to Cyzicus, being an unwall'd town, they brought it again into their own power, and levied a sum of money amongst them. The Peloponnesians in the mean time, sailing from Abydus to Elæus, recovered as many of their galleys formerly taken as remained whole. The rest the Eleusians had burnt. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Eubœa, to fetch away the fleet that was there.

They send Hippocrates and Epicles to bring their ships from Eubœa.

Alcibiades arrives at Samos, with thirteen ships.

CVIII. About the same time also returned Alcibiades to Samos with the thirteen galleys from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had diverted the Phœnician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians, and that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians, more than he was before.

Thence manning out nine galleys in addition to those he had, he exacted a great sum of money of the Halicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. And having done these things, and having established a governor in Cos, it being now almost autumn, he returned to Samos.⁹ And Tissaphernes, having heard that the Peloponnesian vessels had sailed from Miletus into the Hellespont, having turned back from Aspendus, hastened towards Ionia. The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are Æolians) received into the city men at arms whom they brought from Abydus by land through mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them by Arsaces, a deputy-lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces having feigned a certain war, not declared against whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians, (who had planted themselves in Adramyttium, when they had been turned out by the Athenians on account of the purification of Delos,¹) to go with him to this war; and when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he observed a time when they were at dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers, murdered them with darts. And therefore, for this act's sake, fearing lest he might do some unlawful deed against them also, and for that he had otherwise imposed upon them what they were not able to bear, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

CIX. Tissaphernes, understanding that this was the act of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus² and that at Cnidos, (for in those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner,) and conceiving that he was an object of great enmity to them, and fearing lest they should do him some other hurt,³ and withal being vexed that Pharnabazus should receive them, and with less time and cost speed better against the Athenians than he had done, resolved to make a journey to them to the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandrus, and to defend himself, as best he could, against the charges brought against him, as well concerning the Phœ-

Year 21.
A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

Having equipped nine more, he fortifies Cos, and then returns to Samos.

The Antandrians, with the assistance of some troops from Abydus, expel their governor Arsaces.

Tissaphernes, alarmed at this and the other revolts instigated by the Lacedæmonians, proceeds to the Hellespont for the purpose of becoming reconciled to them.

⁹ On the assassination of Alcibiades, B. C. 404, and the various reasons that have been assigned for it, see Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. iv. c. 31. p. 196.

¹ See book v. c. 1.

² See chap. 84.

³ For the reasons why Tissaphernes was thus afraid, see ch. 78, &c.

Year 21. nician fleet as other matters. And first having come to
A. C. 411. Ephesus, he offered sacrifice to Diana.⁴
Ol. 92. 2.

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the one and twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.

⁴ Here breaks off abruptly the History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly to have been made by another hand.—*Smith*.

THE END.



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