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**The Times**  
**DOCUMENTARY HISTORY**  
**OF THE WAR**

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**VOL. IX**





The  Times

# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOLUME IX

DIPLOMATIC—PART 3



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## P R E F A C E

THE contents of this volume fall into three groups. The first relates, as did the two previous volumes in the Diplomatic division of this work, to the outbreak of the war (pp. 1-63) ; the second concerns the rupture with Turkey (pp. 64-309) ; the third consists of the second *Belgian Grey Book*, a miscellaneous collection of despatches and reports dealing in part with these same two subjects, but by no means confined to them (pp. 310-501).

In the first group the chief item is Prince Lichnowsky's *My Mission to London, 1912-1914*, of which a special translation has been made (pp. 1-39). This belongs to the earliest period, although it was not published until the spring of 1918. The next two items, an article from the *North German Gazette* of October 12, 1917 (pp. 40-46), and a passage from Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag of August 19, 1915 (pp. 47-48), supply information respecting telegrams that passed between Berlin and Vienna in July, 1914. The disclosures are, of course, fragmentary, and more may be looked for. The original German text of the instructions embodying the demand for the surrender of Toul and Verdun (p. 49) has been supplied through the courtesy of the French Foreign Office. M. Sazonof's speech in the Duma of August 8, 1914 (pp. 52-55), is taken from a Russian official source which was not available when the first two volumes of *The Times Documentary History of the War* were prepared. The text of the German Emperor's telegram to President Wilson (pp. 56-58) is copied by permission from the facsimile in Mr. James W. Gerard's *My Four Years in Germany*. Mr. Bonar Law's letter promising support to Mr. Asquith's Government (pp. 59-

60), and certain official British statements (pp. 61-63), conclude this group.

Among the documents relating to the rupture with Turkey is the British diplomatic Correspondence (pp. 67-240). This has already appeared, for reasons explained at the time, in the second volume of the Naval division of this work ; but the text alone was printed, without the useful Table of Contents or the editorial notes and references now supplied. Of the *Russian Orange Book*, which deals with the same period and events, an English translation, with an Appendix containing M. Sazonof's speech of February 9, 1915, was issued in Petrograd by the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this is the version here reproduced (pp. 241-309).

The second *Belgian Grey Book*, which forms the third group (pp. 310-501), ranges over many subjects and a considerable stretch of time. The partial translation prepared by the British Foreign Office has been used so far as it goes ; the remainder has been specially translated. A few of the documents have been given already in the first two volumes of the Military division ; some of the others bear a date which, had they stood alone, would not have led to their inclusion here. But it is one of the aims of the Diplomatic division to present official publications in a complete form wherever this can be done without excessive repetition, and a strictly chronological arrangement is in any case unattainable.

A few errors have been found in the printed text of the official documents. Most of these are trivial and have been put right without remark. In one or two cases of greater importance the correction has been recorded in a note.

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## ‘MY MISSION TO LONDON, 1912-1914.’

BY PRINCE LICHNOWSKY (LATE GERMAN  
AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND).\*

### *My Appointment.*

IN September, 1912, Baron Marschall died, after having been at his post in London for only a few months. His appointment, which probably came about principally on account of his age and the desire of his junior officer to go to London, was one of the many blunders of our policy.

In spite of a striking personality and great reputation, he was too old and too tired to settle down happily in the Anglo-Saxon world, which was completely strange to him, and he was rather an official and a lawyer than a diplomatist and statesman. He at once strove zealously to convince the English of the harmlessness of our fleet, whereby naturally only the opposite effect was produced.

To my great astonishment, the post was offered to me in October. After several years' activity as an official in the Personal Section of the Foreign Office, I had retired to the country, there being no suitable post available for me at that time, and had spent my time between flax and turnips, among horses and in meadows, also in miscellaneous reading, and occasionally publishing political essays.

Thus eight years had passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna with the rank of Envoy. My last sphere of political activity had really been there, since in official work at that time there was no scope for activity, unless one was prepared to draft whimsical despatches with complicated instructions under the directions of a man who suffered from crazy delusions.

\* [*Meine Londoner Mission, 1912-1914.* Von Fürst Lichnowsky, ehemaliger deutscher Botschafter in England. (Originaltext.)' Druck und Verlag : Art. Institut Orell Füssli, Zürich, 1918. Preis 40 centimes.]

Who was really responsible for my appointment to London I do not know. Certainly not His Majesty alone, for I did not belong to his intimate circle, although he always received me graciously. By experience also I know that his nominees were usually successfully opposed. Herr von Kiderlen \* had really wished to send Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately showed unmistakable ill-will towards me, and tried to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg at that time manifested a friendly disposition towards me, and he had shortly before visited me at Grätz. Therefore I believe that they agreed on me because no other candidate was at their disposal at that moment. If Baron Marschall had not unexpectedly died, I should not have been called out of my retirement then, any more than in the many past years.

### *Morocco Policy.*

The moment was undoubtedly favourable for a new attempt to get on a better footing with England. Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition, and at the very least it had aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who had been long in Paris, said to me, 'Whenever the French began to forget *revanche*, you always kicked them violently to remind them of it.'

After having repelled M. Delcassé's attempt to come to an agreement with us in regard to Morocco, and having, before that, declared that we had no political interests there—an attitude which was in full accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy—we suddenly recognised in Abdul Aziz a second Kruger. To him, also, as to the Boers, we promised the support of the powerful German Empire—with the same display and with the same result. For both demonstrations ended as was inevitable—in retreat; unless, indeed, we were already resolved to undertake the world-war then. Neither could the distressing Congress at Algeciras alter this in any way, still less the fall of Monsieur Delcassé.

\* [Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.]



Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese, and later the Russo-British *rapprochement*. In face of 'the German peril' all other conflicts fell into the background. 'The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident, and such a war could not, as in 1870, leave either Russia or England unaffected. The worthlessness of the Triple Alliance had already shown itself at Algeciras, while that of the agreements which had there been concluded became apparent soon afterwards through the collapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not be prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief gained ground that our foreign policy was feeble and was giving way before the 'encirclement,' and that grandiloquent airs were followed by faint-hearted obsequiousness.

It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he liquidated our Moroccan inheritance and was content to accept as they were facts which could not now be altered. Whether, indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir *coup* I leave to the opinion of others. In Germany the incident was joyously acclaimed; in England, however, it had caused all the more disquiet because the Government for three weeks waited in vain for an explanation of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which was intended to warn us, was the consequence. Before the fall of Delcassé, and before Algeciras, harbours and territory might have been had on the West Coast, but thereafter this was no longer possible.

### *Sir Edward Grey's Programme.*

When I came to London, in November 1912, public opinion had calmed down concerning the Morocco question, since in the meantime an agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true that Mr. Haldane's mission had failed, since we had demanded a promise of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a compact which would secure us against British attacks and attacks with British support.

Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of reaching an agreement with us and, in the first place, made an attempt in this direction in the economic and colonial spheres. With Herr von Kühlmann, the capable and business-like Envoy, as intermediary, an exchange of views was

in progress concerning a renewal of the Portuguese Colonial Agreement and concerning Mesopotamia (the Bagdad Railway), the unavowed object of which was to divide the colonies in question, as well as Asia Minor, into spheres of interest.

The British statesman desired, after the old disputes with France and Russia had been settled, to reach a corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not to isolate us, but to get us to take part as much as possible in the concert already established. As he had succeeded in bridging the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, he wished also, as far as possible, to remove the Anglo-German, and, by a network of agreements—to which might well have been added eventually an agreement on the troublesome naval question—to secure the peace of the world, after our former policy had led to an association—the Entente—which represented a mutual insurance against the risk of war.

This was Sir Edward Grey's programme. In his own words: Without prejudice to the existing friendly understandings (with France and Russia), which pursue no aggressive aims, and involve in themselves no binding obligations for England, to reach a friendly *rapprochement* and understanding with Germany. 'To bring the two groups nearer.'

In England, as in Germany, there were at that time two schools of opinion concerning this matter—the optimists, who believed in the possibility of an understanding, and the pessimists, who regarded war as inevitable sooner or later.

To the former belonged Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the members of the Radical Cabinet, as well as the leading Liberal organs, such as the *Westminster Gazette*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Chronicle*. To the pessimists belonged especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading soldiers, like Lord Roberts, who preached the necessity for universal military service ('The Writing on the Wall'); further, the Northcliffe press, and the eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin (*Observer*). During my period of office, however, they refrained from all attacks and maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our behaviour in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had created amongst them the belief that some day it would after all come to war. The first school, exactly as



with us in Germany, are now accused of short-sightedness and simplicity, while the second are regarded as the true prophets.

*The Albanian Question.*

The First Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey, and consequently to a defeat of our policy, which had for years been identified with Turkey. When it became impossible to save Turkey in Europe, there were two possible ways of dealing with the inheritance: either we might announce our complete disinterestedness with regard to the delimitation of the frontiers in the Balkans and leave the settling of these to the Balkan peoples, or we might, on the other hand, support our 'Allies' and carry on a Triple Alliance Policy in the Near East, thereby withdrawing from the rôle of mediator.

From the very beginning I advocated the former solution; the Foreign Office, however, all the more decidedly supported the latter.

The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired that an independent Albanian State should be established, since Austria did not want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic, and Italy did not want the Greeks to get to Valona—indeed not even north of Corfu. In opposition to this, Russia, as is well known, was furthering Serbia's wishes, and France those of Greece.

My advice was to look upon this question as outside the scope of the Alliance, and not to support either the Austrian or the Italian claims. Without our assistance, however, it would have been impossible to establish an independent Albania, whose inability to maintain its existence could be foreseen. Serbia would have extended to the sea and the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have fallen out seriously over Greece, and the Italians, if they did not wish to fight France alone, would have had to put up with the extension of Greece to the north of Durazzo. The civilisation in the greater part of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south are entirely so, and during the Ambassadors' Conference delegations from the most important towns came to London, in order to secure annexation to Greece. Even in Greece as it is to-day there

are Albanian elements, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The incorporation in the Greek state of Orthodox and Moslem Albanians, who form the majority, was therefore the best solution, and the most natural, if you left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and Montenegrins. This solution was also favoured by His Majesty, for dynastic reasons. When in writing I supported the Monarch in this view, I received agitated reproaches from the Imperial Chancellor, who said I was looked upon as an 'opponent of Austria,' and he must prohibit such interference and direct correspondence on my part.

*The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance.*

Our proper course was to break at last with the fatal tradition of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and to recognise the mistake of identifying ourselves in the south with the Turks and in the north with the Austro-Magyars; for persistence in this policy, which we had begun at the Berlin Congress and had since pursued with zeal, was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and to a world-war, especially if there was a lack of the necessary skill among the leaders. Instead of coming to terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of the Sultan—whom, even in St. Petersburg, they did not want to remove from Constantinople—and of limiting ourselves to economic interests in the Near East by renunciation of all military and political interference, and contenting ourselves with the division of Asia Minor into spheres of influence, our political ambition was bent on dominating the Bosphorus. In Russia the notion sprang up that the way to Constantinople and into the Mediterranean lay *via* Berlin. Instead of promoting the vigorous development of the Balkan States, which, once liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with which we have had most satisfactory experiences, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish oppressors.

The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy, which had driven Russia, naturally our best friend and neighbour, into the arms of France and England and away from the policy of Asiatic expansion, was all the more apparent since a combined attack from Russia and France,



the *only* hypothesis which justified a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of our calculations.

Concerning the value of the Italian alliance, a further word must be added. Italy will want our money and our tourists, even after the war, with or without an alliance. That the latter would fail in the case of war was to be foreseen. The alliance was therefore *worthless*. Austria needs our protection in war and in peace, and has no other support. Her dependence upon us is based on political, national, and economic considerations, and the more intimate our relations with Russia, the greater this dependence becomes. The Bosnian crisis taught us this. No Vienna Minister since Count Beust has assumed such a self-confident attitude towards us as did Count Aehrenthal during the last years of his life. With a German policy conducted on right lines, and promoting our relations with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent upon us, even without alliances and compensations ; with a policy conducted on wrong lines, we are dependent upon Austria. The alliance, therefore, *served no purpose*.

I knew Austria too well not to realise that a return to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or of Count Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable. Little though the Slavs there love us, they wish just as little to return to a German Empire, even with a Habsburg-Lorraine ruler. They are striving for federalism within Austria on national lines, a state of things which would have even less prospect of realisation within the confines of the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of Austria, on the other hand, recognise in Berlin the centre of German might and *kultur*, and know that Austria can never again become the leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the Empire, but not an anti-German policy.

Since the seventies, the situation had fundamentally changed in Austria, as indeed in Bavaria. Just as in the latter there is no fear of a return to Great German particularism and old Bavarian policy, so in the former a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not to be expected. Our interests would, however, suffer by a political union with Austria, which, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only half-populated by Germans and represents



a kind of big Belgium, just as, on the other hand, they would suffer by a subjection of our policy to the views of Vienna and Budapest—thus espousing Austria's quarrels ('d'épouser les querelles de l'Autriche').

Therefore we had no need to take the wishes of our 'Allies' into consideration at all; they were not only unnecessary, but also dangerous, as they would lead to a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Austrian spectacles. The conversion of the alliance from a union formed on one single hypothesis for a specific purpose into a general syndicate, a community of interests in all spheres, was calculated to bring about the very thing which the original contract was intended to prevent—war. Such an alliance policy was, moreover, bound to alienate the sympathies of the young, strong, and aspiring communities of the Balkans, who were ready to turn to us and to open their markets to us.

The difference between the polity of a Ruling House and that of a National State, between the dynastic and the democratic idea of the State, had to come to a decision, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side.

King Carol told one of our representatives that he had concluded the alliance with us on the assumption that *we* retained the leadership; should it, however, pass to Austria, that would alter the foundation of the relationship, and, in such circumstances, he would no longer be able to continue the alliance.

Things were similar in Serbia, where, against our own economic interests, we supported the Austrian policy of strangulation.

We have always backed the horse whose breakdown could be foreseen—Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, William of Wied—and finally—the most fatal mistake of all—we made the great 'plunge' on Berchtold's stable.

### *The Conference of Ambassadors.*

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal conversation, in order to prevent the Balkan War from developing into a European War, after we had unfortunately, on the outbreak of the war,

refused the invitation of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness. The British statesman from the first took up the position that England had no interest in Albania and therefore did not desire to run the risk of war over this question. He only wished to mediate as 'honest broker' between the two groups and to remove difficulties. He therefore by no means took sides with the Entente, and during the eight months or so of the negotiations he contributed not a little towards the agreement through his goodwill and authoritative influence. We, instead of assuming an attitude analogous to that of England, invariably took up the standpoint which was prescribed to us from Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London; I was his 'second.' My task consisted in supporting his proposals. In Berlin the shrewd and experienced Count Szögyény was in control. 'Then the *casus fœderis* will arise,' was his refrain, and when I once ventured to question the correctness of this conclusion I received a serious warning against 'Austrophobia.' It was also hinted that I had an 'hereditary taint,' the allusion being to my father.

On all occasions—concerning Albania, a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and further, concerning the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania—we made the views of Austria and Italy our own; whereas Sir Edward Grey hardly ever sided with Russia or France. Rather did he, for the most part, take the side of our group, in order not to furnish any pretext, such as a dead archduke was to supply later on. Thus with his assistance we managed to entice King Nikita out of Scutari again. This question alone would otherwise have led to the world-war, as we should certainly not have dared to induce 'our ally' to give way.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, coolness and tact. When a question threatened to become involved, he drew up a formula for agreement which met the difficulty and always found acceptance. His personality won equal confidence from all the members of the Conference alike.

As a matter of fact, we had once again surmounted with success one of the many trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position to give effect to the



aims of Serbia. Albania was set up as a vassal state of Austria, and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Thus the outcome of the Conference was a new humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 and 1908, we had already opposed the Russian plans, although no *German* interests were involved. Bismarck knew how to lessen the mistake of the Congress by means of the secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question ; but the dangerous path which had been followed again in the Bosnian question was pursued still further in London, and later, when it led to the abyss, it was not quitted in time.

The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time found expression in the Russian press during the Conference, in the shape of attacks upon my Russian colleague and Russian diplomacy. His German origin and Roman Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accidental circumstance that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to me supplied material for the dissatisfied circles. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benckendorff has a number of qualities which go to make a good diplomatist : tact, polished manners, experience, a courteous demeanour, and a natural eye for men and affairs. He constantly endeavoured to avoid an uncompromising posture, and was, moreover, helped in this by the attitude of England and France.

Later on I once said to him : 'The feeling in Russia must be very anti-German.' He replied : 'There are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, but everybody is anti-Austrian !'

It remains for me to add that our *Austrophilie à outrance* (friendship for Austria through thick and thin) was not exactly calculated to loosen the Entente and to guide Russia towards her interests in Asia !

### *The Balkan Conference.*

n 1913.] At the same time<sup>1</sup> the Balkan Conference was sitting in London, and I had the opportunity of getting in touch with the leaders of the Balkan States. The most distinguished personality among them was M. Venizelos. He was at that time anything but anti-German ; he repeatedly came to see

me, and was particularly fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle, with which he appeared even at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and *savoir-faire* he could always secure sympathy. Next to him, a great part was played by M. Daneff, who was then Prime Minister of Bulgaria and confidant of Count Berchtold. He gave the impression of being a crafty and energetic man, and it is probably only due to the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, of whose homage he sometimes made fun, that he allowed himself to be drawn into the folly of the Second Balkan War and refused Russian intervention.

M. Take Jonescu also was often in London, and on these occasions visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bukarest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. His endeavour in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the very capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were frustrated by the opposition of Bulgaria is well known. Count Berchtold—and we, of course, with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should probably have succeeded, by pressure on M. Daneff, in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians, and have bound Rumania to us; she was definitely estranged from the Central Powers by Austria's attitude during and after the Second Balkan War.

### *The Second Balkan War.*

The defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War and the victory of Serbia, as well as the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted a humiliation for Austria. The idea of making up for this by a military *coup* against Serbia seems to have presented itself in Vienna soon after. This is proved by the Italian disclosures, and it may be presumed that Marquis San Giuliano, who characterised the plan very aptly as a *pericolosissima avventura* (extremely risky adventure), saved us from being involved in a world-war as far back as the summer of 1913.<sup>1</sup>

Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna initiative must, no doubt, have been known in St. Petersburg also. At all events, M. Sazonof openly declared

<sup>1</sup> [See. *diplomatic*  
PP. 393]



at Constanza—so M. Take Jonescu told me—that an Austrian attack on Serbia meant war with Russia.

In the spring of 1914, one of my staff, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky \* had declared that war would soon come. But, as I was always kept in the dark regarding important events, I looked upon this pessimism as unfounded.

As a matter of fact, ever since the peace of Bukarest it seems to have been the intention in Vienna to effect a revision of this treaty single-handed, and apparently only a favourable occasion was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bukarest could, of course, count upon our support. This they knew, for they had already been reproached more than once for their slackness. Berlin was, in fact, urging a 'rehabilitation' of Austria.

#### *Liman von Sanders.*

When I returned to London in December 1913, after a long leave, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our relations with Russia again becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey, not without apprehension, called my attention to the excitement about this in St. Petersburg: 'I have never seen them so excited.'

I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exercise a moderating influence in St. Petersburg and to help us in settling the quarrel. Sir Edward was very willing to do this, and his intervention contributed in no small measure to smooth matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg were turned to account in like manner on several occasions, when something was to be accomplished there, since our representative proved quite unfit for this purpose.

During the critical days of July 1914, Sir Edward said to me: 'When you want something done in St. Petersburg you regularly apply to me; but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse me your support.'

#### *The Colonial Treaty.*

The good and confidential relations I succeeded in establishing, not only in society and with the most influential

\* [German Ambassador in Vienna.]

personages, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with people generally at 'public dinners,' had brought about a marked improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward honestly devoted himself to the furtherance of this *rapprochement*, and his intentions were especially noticeable on two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the Bagdad Railway Treaty.

In 1898 a secret agreement had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt\* and Mr. Balfour which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, it had already at an earlier date thought of selling these possessions and thereby putting its finances in order. Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties, and which was of all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England.

This treaty was, no doubt, ostensibly to secure the integrity and independence of the Portuguese empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently it did not, according to the text, conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II. and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties.

Nevertheless, at the instance of Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor Treaty, confirming the old alliance, which had never lost its force—was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many awkward features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola as far as the 20th degree of longitude was allotted to us, so

\* [At that time German Ambassador in London.]



that we extended to the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe, which lie north of the Equator, and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, though vain, representations.

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed by the Likungo.

The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert the development of Germany's strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and Africa. 'We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development,' a member of the Cabinet said to me.

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian susceptibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economise our successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese Colonial possessions—the new formulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances that would empower us for the protection of our interests to enter the territories assigned to us. These conditional clauses were so wide that it was really left to us to decide when 'vital' interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England, we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realise the intentions of both parties.

The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, even before the treaty was completed or signed, referred to us English men of business who were seeking opportunities of investing capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty and desired British support. In doing so he

remarked that the undertaking in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin, under the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor,\* in which I took part, and at which certain further wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counsellor of Embassy, Herr von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our latest proposals also ; so that it was possible for the whole treaty to be initialled by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August 1913, before I went on leave.

Now, however, new difficulties were to arise which prevented the signature ; and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorisation for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.

Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only *if the treaty was published together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899*. England, he said, had no other secret treaties, and it was contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He could not, therefore, be a party to any treaty without making it public. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year at latest after the signature.

In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage,† who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the Colonies, because the Portuguese would then give us no more concessions.

The hollowness of this objection is clear, when one reflects that, in view of the intimate relations between Portugal and England, the old treaty had in all probability been for a long time just as well known to the Portuguese as our new

\* [Herr von Bethmann Hollweg.]

† ['The reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm.'—*The Times*, March 28, 1918.]



agreements ; and that, owing to the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

Consequently it was necessary to find another pretext for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe and was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy ! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions. In vain ! In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister continually made fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office persisted in the position it had taken up, and finally came to an agreement with Sir Edward Goschen \* that everything should remain as it had been.

So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages and was the result of more than a year's work, was dropped because it would have been a public success for me.

When in the spring of 1914, at a dinner in the Embassy at which Mr. Harcourt † was present, I happened to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to act : the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he, Mr. Harcourt, wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, he was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up and bring to a conclusion an affair which had been dragging on for so long.

When I reported to this effect I received an order, in terms more excited than polite, bidding me refrain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not go straight to Berlin in order to offer His Majesty my resignation, and that even then I had not lost my belief in the possibility of an agreement between myself and the leading personages. That was a

\* [British Ambassador in Berlin.]

† [Secretary of State for the Colonies.]

disastrous mistake, which was to be so tragically avenged some months later.

Slight as was the extent to which I then still possessed the goodwill of the highest official of the Empire—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of July 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war—to which I shall return later—he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf \* in Berlin, to obtain official permission at last, at the end of July. But as the Serbian crisis was by that time threatening the peace of Europe, the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. It also is one of the victims of this war.

### *The Bagdad Treaty.*

Concurrently [with the African agreement] I was negotiating in London, with the effective support of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Treaty. This aimed, in effect, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was scrupulously avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey, moreover, repeatedly declared that there was no agreement with France and Russia aiming at a division of Asia Minor.

With the assistance of a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions connected with the German undertakings were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession Sir Edward Grey had made to me personally was the extension of the railway to Basra. This point had been surrendered on our side in favour of the connection with Alexandretta : hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. Navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbour works at Basra, and acquired, further, rights of navigation on the Tigris, which up to then had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra became our sphere of interest (the existing British right of

\* [German Colonial Secretary.]



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navigation on the Tigris and the Wilcox irrigation works being left untouched), as well as the whole region of the Bagdad and Anatolian Railway.

The coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin Railway were recognised as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French, Armenia as the Russian. Had both treaties been concluded and published, a definite agreement would have been reached with England putting an end to all doubts as to the possibility of 'Anglo-German co-operation.'

### *The Naval Question.*

The thorniest question of all still remained, the question of the Navy. It is not always quite rightly judged.

The creation of a powerful fleet on the opposite coast of the North Sea, the development of the greatest continental military Power into the greatest continental naval Power also, was bound to be felt in England as, at least, an inconvenience. This cannot reasonably be doubted. In order to maintain the necessary lead and avoid sinking into dependence, and to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must possess if she is not to starve, she was obliged to undertake armaments and expenditure which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. Yet the British world-position was threatened, if our policy allowed warlike developments to seem possible. This possibility had come well within sight during the Morocco crises and the Bosnian question.

People had become reconciled to our *Fleet on the lines then laid down*. It certainly was not welcome to the British, and it constituted one of the motives, although not the only one, nor perhaps the most important, for England's joining hands with Russia and France; but on account of our fleet *alone*, England would no more have drawn the sword than on account of our trade, which, it is alleged, called forth her jealousy, and ultimately brought about war.

It was my conviction from the very first that, *in spite of* the fleet, it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and *rapprochement*, if we produced no new naval programme, and if we *pursued a policy indubitably pacific*. Also, I avoided all mention of the fleet, and between Sir Edward Grey and me the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey



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declared on one occasion at a meeting of the Cabinet: 'The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me.'

During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, suggested, as is well known, a so called 'naval holiday,' and proposed, for financial reasons, and also probably to meet the pacifist inclinations in his party, a pause in armaments for a year. The suggestion was not supported officially by Sir Edward Grey. He never mentioned it to me, but Mr. Churchill repeatedly spoke to me about it.

I am convinced that his suggestion was made in good faith, as trickery is no part of the Englishman's nature. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to be able to come before the country with a reduction of expenditure and to lighten the burden of armaments, which weighed heavily on the people.

I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to meet his views. What was to become of the workmen recruited for this purpose, and what of the technical *personnel*? Our naval programme was definitely fixed, and it would be difficult to alter it in any way. On the other hand, we did not intend to exceed it. But he reverted to the matter again, and maintained that the means spent on portentous armaments could be better used for other and useful purposes. I replied that this expenditure, too, benefited home industries.

I also succeeded, through conversations with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's principal private secretary, in removing that subject from the agenda without causing any ill-feeling, although it came up again in Parliament, and in preventing an official proposal from being made. But it was a favourite idea with Mr. Churchill and the Government; and I think that, if we had fallen in with his suggestion and with the formula of 16 to 10 for battleships, we should have given a tangible proof of our goodwill and materially strengthened and promoted the prevailing inclination in the Government to get into closer touch with us.

But, as I have said, it was possible to come to an understanding *in spite of the fleet* and also without a 'naval holiday.' It was in this spirit that I had conceived my mission from the beginning, and I had even succeeded in realising my pro-

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gramme, when the outbreak of the war destroyed everything that had been achieved.

### *Commercial Jealousy.*

The commercial jealousy, so much talked of among us, is due to an erroneous judgment of existing conditions. It is a fact that Germany's rise as a commercial power after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British commercial circles, which possessed a kind of monopoly with their industries and export houses. Nevertheless, the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which stood at the head of all European countries as regards British exports—a fact I always pointed out in my public speeches—had created the desire to maintain good relations with England's best customer and business friend, and had gradually driven all other considerations into the background.

The Briton is 'matter-of-fact,' he takes things as they are, and does not tilt against windmills. It was precisely in commercial circles that I met with the friendliest spirit and the endeavour to promote our common economic interests. It is a fact that nobody there takes an interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, no, not even in the French representative, in spite of his distinguished personality and his political successes. Only the German and the American Ambassador attracted public attention.

In order to get into touch with the important commercial circles, I accepted the invitations of the United Chambers of Commerce and also of the London and Bradford Chambers, and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. Everywhere I was received with marks of cordial respect. Manchester, Glasgow, and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I intended to go there later.

People who are not familiar with British conditions and do not appreciate the importance of 'public dinners,' and also those to whom my successes were unwelcome, reproached me with having done harm by my speeches. I believe, on the contrary, that by appearing in public and emphasising our common commercial interests I contributed in no small measure to the improvement of relations, quite apart from



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the fact that it would have been unmannerly and discourteous to refuse all invitations.

In all other circles also I had a most amiable reception and a warm welcome—at Court, in society, and from the Government.

### *The Court and Society.*

The King, though not exactly a man of special weight or education, but simple and well-meaning, with sound 'common sense,' was at pains to show his goodwill towards me, and was genuinely desirous of furthering my mission. In spite of the restricted power which the British Constitution leaves to the Crown, the King, by virtue of his position, can greatly influence the views both of society and of the Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyramid, and sets the fashion. Society, which is predominantly Unionist (Conservative), has always, the ladies included, taken a keen interest in politics. It is represented both in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons, and consequently in the Cabinet also.

The Englishman either belongs to society, or would like to belong to it. His constant endeavour is to be a man of good standing, a 'gentleman,' and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, delight to move in society and among beautiful and elegant women.

The British 'gentleman' of both parties enjoys the same education, frequents the same colleges and universities, engages in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits and spend the week-end in the country. There is no social cleavage between the parties, only a political one, which of late years has developed into a social cleavage in so far as politicians in the two camps avoid one another in society. Not even on the neutral territory of an embassy could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto Bills the Unionists have ostracised the Radicals. When, a few months after my arrival, the King and Queen dined with us, Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to remain in company with Sir Edward Grey. But it is not a difference of caste and education, as in France. They are not divided into two separate worlds, but belong to



the same world, and opinion about a foreigner is a common opinion, and is not without influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith or Lord Lansdowne is in power.

Difference of caste has ceased to exist in England since the time of the Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and the Whig oligarchy, in opposition to the Tory landed gentry, encouraged the rise of an urban middle-class. The difference is rather one of political opinions on constitutional questions or on methods of taxation. Aristocrats who joined the Radicals or popular party, such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, were specially hated by the Unionist aristocracy. One never met any of these gentlemen in the great aristocratic houses, except at those of their few party friends.

We were received in London with open arms, and the two parties vied with one another in amiability towards us. It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections, in view of the close relations that exist in England between society and politics, even when the great majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government.

Between Mr. Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire there is no such unbridgeable gulf as there is, for example, between M. Briand and the Duc de Doudeauville. It is true that in times of great tension they do not forgather; they belong to two separate social groups: nevertheless they are only parts of the *same* society—though on different steps—the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they have in most cases known each other from youth, and are also frequently related or connected by marriage.

Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George, man of the people, small solicitor and 'self-made man,' are exceptions. Even Mr. Burns, Socialist, Labour Leader, and self-educated, sought contact with society. In view of the endeavour, met with on all sides, to obtain recognition as a 'gentleman'—of whom the great aristocrat is still regarded as the unrivalled exemplar—the verdict of society and its attitude are not to be undervalued.

In no place, consequently, do an envoy's social qualifications play a more important part than in England. A hospitable house with friendly hosts is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man with

provincial manners and too restricted means would acquire no influence in spite of all his learning.

What the Briton hates is a 'bore,' a 'schemer,' a 'prig'; what he loves is a 'good fellow.'

*Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, on important occasions he used to say: 'I must first bring it before the Cabinet'; but the latter invariably fell in with his views. His authority was undisputed. Although he has no personal acquaintance with foreign countries, and, except for one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he had a mastery of all important questions, owing to his many years' experience in Parliament and his natural insight. He understands French, although he does not speak it. Elected at an early age to Parliament, he soon began to interest himself in foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became, in 1906, Secretary of State under Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, and has now filled this post for ten years.

Sprung from an old North of England landed family, which had already produced the well-known statesman Grey, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathised with socialists and pacifists. He may be called a socialist in the ideal sense; for he applies the theory even in his private life, which is characterised by the greatest simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had only a small *pied-à-terre* in London and never gave dinners, except an official one at the Foreign Office on the King's birthday. If, now and again, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or lunch in quite a small circle, with women servants to wait on them. He also avoided large functions and banquets.

Like his colleagues, he spends the 'week-end' regularly in the country, but not with large, fashionable parties. He usually stays alone in his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks in order to study birds, being a passionate lover of nature and ornithologist. Or he went to his estate in the north, where he fed the squirrels that found their way in through the window, and bred various kinds of water-fowl.



He was very fond of going occasionally to the Norfolk marshes in order to observe in their breeding-season rare species of herons, which nest only in those parts.

In his youth he was a famous cricketer and tennis player; his chief sport now is salmon and trout fishing in the Scottish waters in company with his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. 'All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it.' He has published a book on angling.

Once, when we were spending a week-end alone with him at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle, and returned in the same way to his cottage about thirty miles away.

The simplicity and uprightness of his character won for him the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be found in the sphere of home rather than of foreign politics. Lies and intrigues are alike foreign to his nature.

His wife, whom he tenderly loved, and from whom he was inseparable, died as the result of a fall from a carriage which she was driving herself. As is well known, one of his brothers was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could recite him from memory.

The calm repose of his British nature was not wanting in a sense of humour. Once when he was lunching with us and the children, and heard their German conversation, he remarked: 'I can't help thinking how clever these children are to talk German so well,' and was pleased with his jest.

Such is the man who is decried as 'Liar-Grey' and as originator of the world-war.

### *Mr. Asquith.*

Mr. Asquith is of quite a different stamp. A jovial man, fond of good living, a friend of the ladies, especially of the young and beautiful, he likes cheerful society and a good cuisine, and is seconded in all this by his cheery wife. At one time a leading barrister with a large income and many years' Parliamentary experience, then a Minister under Mr. Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and favourable to an understanding with Germany, he treated all questions with the serene equanimity and confidence of an experienced



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man of affairs whose good health and excellent nerve have been fortified by constant exercise at golf.

His daughters went to German boarding-schools and spoke German fluently. We soon became friends with him and his family, and were his guests at his little country house on the Thames.

Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign affairs, when important questions came up ; then, of course, the final decision rested with him. During the critical days of July Mrs. Asquith came to us repeatedly to warn us, and in the end was quite in despair over the tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith also, when I called on him on August 2nd in order to make a final attempt in the direction of a watchful neutrality, was completely broken down, although quite self-controlled. Tears were coursing down his cheeks.

### *Nicolson.*

In the Foreign Office the two most influential men, after the Minister, were Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell.

The former was not a friend of ours, but his attitude towards me was always perfectly correct and courteous. Our personal relations were of the best. He also did not desire war, but when we advanced against France, he undoubtedly used his influence in favour of an immediate participation on her side. He was the confidant of my French colleague, with whom he was in constant touch ; also he wished to relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.

As is well known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and he had concluded the treaty of 1907,\* by which it was made possible for Russia to turn her attention again to the West and to the Near East.

### *Tyrrell.*

A far greater influence than that of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State was exercised by Sir Edward's chief of the cabinet, or private secretary, Sir W. Tyrrell. This highly intelligent man had been to school at a German 'gymnasium' and had afterwards turned to diplomacy, but he had been

\* ['Convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet,' signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907.]

only a short time abroad. At first he embraced the anti-German policy which was then in fashion among the younger British diplomatists, but later on became a convinced supporter of an understanding. In this direction he also influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. Since the outbreak of the war he has left the [Foreign] Office and found a place in the Home Office, probably on account of the criticisms directed against him for his Germanophil tendency.

*Attitude of the [German Foreign] Office.*

The fury of certain gentlemen at my London successes, and at the position which in a short time I was able to make for myself, was indescribable. Vexatious instructions were devised to make my office more difficult; I remained in complete ignorance of the most important matters, and was restricted to the drawing up of unimportant, tedious reports. The confidential information of secret agents, concerning matters which I could not ascertain without espionage and the necessary funds, was never available for me, and only in the last days of July 1914 did I accidentally become aware, through the Naval Attaché, of the Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets in the event of war.\* Other important incidents which had long been known to the [Berlin Foreign] Office, such as the Grey-Cambon<sup>1</sup> correspondence, were kept from me.

<sup>1</sup> [Diplomatic, I, pp. 170-2.]

*In Case of War.*

Soon after my arrival I had become convinced that in no circumstances had we to fear a British attack or British support for any foreign attack, but that *in all circumstances England would protect the French*. This view I expressed repeatedly in despatches, laying great stress upon it and giving my reasons for it very fully, without, however, obtaining credence, although the rejection of the formula of neutrality by Lord Haldane and the attitude of England during the Morocco crisis were very obvious indications. And in addition there were the secret agreements already mentioned, which were known to the [Berlin Foreign] Office.

\* [The reference, presumably, is to the arrangement referred to in 'the Grey-Cambon correspondence.' See next sentence.]



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I was constantly pointing out that, in any war between European Powers, England, as a commercial state, would suffer enormously, and that for this reason she would do her utmost to prevent it; but that, on the other hand, she could never suffer a weakening or annihilation of France, because of the importance of maintaining the European balance of power, and of preventing German ascendancy. This Lord Haldane had told me soon after my arrival. All the leading people had expressed themselves in the same sense.

### *The Serbian Crisis.*

At the end of June 1914 I proceeded to Kiel by order of the Kaiser. A few weeks previously I had been given the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, a distinction conferred upon no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the *Meteor*\* we heard of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the Austrian throne. His Majesty expressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain. Whether the plan of pursuing an active policy against Serbia had already been determined upon at Konopischt I cannot be sure.

As I was uninformed about views and events at Vienna, I attached no far-reaching importance to this occurrence. Not until later was I able to establish the fact that among the Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. One of His Majesty's other guests on board the *Meteor* was an Austrian, Count Felix Thun. Although the weather was splendid, he had lain all the time in his cabin, suffering from sea-sickness. But when the news arrived he was well. He had been cured either by the shock or by joy!

When I arrived in Berlin I saw the Imperial Chancellor, and told him that I regarded the foreign situation as very satisfactory for us, since our relations with England were better than they had been for a long time past. I also remarked that a pacifist Ministry was in power in France.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg seemed not to share my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. I tried to reassure him, and especially laid stress on the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and, moreover, that such an

\* [The German Emperor's yacht.]



attack would never obtain the support of England and France, since both countries desired peace. I then went to Dr. Zimmermann,\* who was representing Herr von Jagow,† and from him I learnt that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed unmistakable ill-humour with Russia, which, he said, was everywhere in our way. Difficulties about commercial policy were also involved. Of course I was not told that General von Moltke‡ was pressing for war. I learnt, however, that Herr von Tschirschky§ had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna towards Serbia.

On my return from Silesia, on my way back to London, I spent only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia in order to put an end to an intolerable state of affairs.

Unfortunately I underestimated at the moment the momentous importance of the news. I thought that this time also nothing would come of it, and that, if Russia threatened, the trouble could easily be composed. Now I regret that I did not stay in Berlin and say at once that I would have no share in any such policy.

Subsequently I learnt that, at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5, the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result. So, at any rate, it is stated in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff|| received in London. Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna, to discuss everything with Count Berchtold.¶

I then received instructions that I was to induce the English Press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 'death-blow' to the Great Serbian movement, and, as far as possible, I was, by my influence, to prevent public opinion from opposing Austria. Recollections of the attitude of England during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, recollec-

\* [Under-Secretary of State.]

† [Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.]

‡ [Chief of the Great General Staff.]

§ [German Ambassador in Vienna.] || [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.]

¶ [Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.]

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tions also of the benevolent promotion of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and of Garibaldi—these and other facts made it so unlikely that support would be given to the projected punitive expedition against the murderers of the prince, that I deemed it necessary to give an urgent warning. But I also uttered a warning against the whole project, which I described as adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation should be recommended to the Austrians, because I did not believe in the localisation of the conflict.<sup>1</sup>

Herr von Jagow told me in reply that Russia was not ready; there would doubtless be a certain amount of bluster, but the more firmly we stood by Austria, the more would Russia draw back. He said that Austria was already accusing us of lukewarmness, and that we must not shirk. On the other hand, feeling in Russia was becoming ever more anti-German, and so we must simply risk it.

In view of this attitude—based, as I learnt afterwards, upon reports from Count Pourtalès \* to the effect that Russia would not move in any circumstances—which caused us to stimulate Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy, I hoped for salvation through English mediation, because I knew that Sir Edward Grey's influence in St. Petersburg could be turned to account in favour of peace. So I used my friendly relations with the Minister, and in confidence begged him to advise moderation in Russia, if Austria, as seemed likely, should demand satisfaction from the Serbs.

At first the attitude of the English Press was calm and friendly to the Austrians, because the murder was condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard insisting that, however necessary punishment for the crime might be, an exploitation of it for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly urged to show moderation.

When the ultimatum appeared, all the newspapers, with the exception of the *Standard*, which was always in low water and apparently was in the pay of the Austrians, were at one in their condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for a review, was not demobilised.<sup>1</sup>

At first I pressed for as conciliatory an answer as possible

\* [German Ambassador in St. Petersburg.]

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Diplomatic*, I, pp. 93, 156.]

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, I, p. 126.]



on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the situation.

The Serbian reply was in accordance with British efforts ; M. Pashitch had actually accepted everything, except two points, on which he declared his readiness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of Note <sup>1</sup> would have remained unanswered.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 74.]

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 112.]

<sup>3</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, I, p. 111.]

Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply <sup>2</sup> with me, and pointed to the conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then discussed his proposal for mediation, which was to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties. M. Cambon,\* the Marquis Imperiali,† and I should have met under Sir Edward Grey's presidency,<sup>3</sup> and it would have been easy to find an acceptable formula for the points in dispute, which in the main concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything might have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would have further improved our relations with England. I urgently recommended the proposal, saying that otherwise world-war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain. In vain ! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria, and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business, but left it to our Ally. I was told to work for 'localisation of the conflict.'

Of course it would only have required a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold content himself with a diplomatic success and accept the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. It would have been such a fine success.

<sup>4</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, pp. 151-2.]

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own.<sup>4</sup> We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it showed an extremely 'conciliatory spirit' on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be reduced to

\* [French Ambassador in London.] † [Italian Ambassador in London.]



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a vassal,<sup>1</sup> and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation and therefore would not tolerate it.

The impression became constantly stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude, in a question which after all did not directly concern us, was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonof,\* later on the positively humble telegrams of the Tsar,<sup>2</sup> the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano † and of Signor Bollati,‡ my urgent advice—it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred!

The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because they did not wish me to have the success of preserving peace in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey!

So, on July 29, the latter resolved upon his well-known warning.<sup>3</sup> I said in reply that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: 'If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.'

Soon after that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course,<sup>4</sup> we answered the Russian mobilisation—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.

### *English Declaration of War.*

Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. On the morning of August 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should in that case be willing to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even towards Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding.<sup>5</sup> Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Diplomatic*, I, pp. 157-8.]

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, pp. 437-443.]

<sup>3</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 156.]

<sup>4</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 193.]

<sup>5</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 360-5.]

\* [Russian Foreign Minister.]

† [Italian Foreign Minister.]

‡ [Italian Ambassador in Berlin.]

meeting of the Cabinet he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hastened straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.

Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question possessing no binding character, because our interview, as I had already reported, was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—used this news as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter,<sup>1</sup> Bonar Law's letter,<sup>2</sup> and the telegram from the King of the Belgians.<sup>3</sup> The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three, who resigned.\*

Up to the last moment I had hoped that England would take up a waiting attitude. My French colleague also felt by no means confident, as I learnt from a private source. As late as August 1 the King replied evasively to the French President.<sup>4</sup> But in the telegram from Berlin which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, they already reckoned with war against England.

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on August 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate: 'We don't want to crush Germany.' Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace through England.

Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left the King had sent his Equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me himself. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family lamented our going. Mr. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to say good-bye.

A special train took us to Harwich. There a guard of

\* [The members of the Cabinet who resigned were only two—namely, Viscount Morley, Lord President of the Council, and Mr. John Burns, President of the Board of Trade. The third Minister who resigned was Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the Board of Education.]



## PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S PAMPHLET

honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London Mission. It was wrecked not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff\* appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that he might perhaps remain there [in London]. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.

### *Retrospect.*

When now, after two years, I survey it all in retrospect, I say to myself that I realised too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates no representatives except those who report what their superiors wish to read. Freedom from prejudice and an independent judgment arouse opposition, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes excite hostility and uneasiness.

I had abandoned opposition to the mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as *Austrophobia* and as an *idée fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics or playing with documents, but serious business of the firm, there is no such thing as 'phil' or 'phobe' (likes or dislikes); there is nothing but the interest of the community. But a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to St. Petersburg a representative who at any rate reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonof was saying to us: 'Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français' (Drop Austria and we will drop the French), and M. Cambon† said to Herr von Jagow:

\* [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.]

† [M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin.]



‘Vous n’avez pas besoin de suivre l’Autriche partout’ (You need not follow Austria everywhere).

We needed *neither alliances nor wars*, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would safeguard an economic development for which there was no precedent in history. And if Russia were relieved of trouble in the West, she would be able to turn again to the East, and then Anglo-Russian antagonism would arise automatically without our interference—and Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than Anglo-Russian.

We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to trouble ourselves about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then have become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without labours of love on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be heresy. That has brought down vengeance upon me, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

### *Arrival.*

On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our Government had become responsible in opposition to my advice and warnings.

The report was designedly circulated from official quarters that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtalès, whose reports could be reckoned upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved ‘splendidly,’ and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.

‘What has Russia got to do with Serbia?’ this statesman said to me, after eight years of official activity in St. Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. At the Foreign Office I was told that it would in any case have come to war

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in 1916; then Russia would have been 'ready,' and so it was better now.

### *Question of Guilt.*

All official publications show—and the facts are not controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps constitutes a grave self-accusation—

1. That we encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference;

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement concerning the two points at issue could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply;

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way and Austria had not been attacked, we replied to Russia's mere mobilisation by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Tsar pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march; so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilised world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world-war.

### *The Enemy Point of View.*

Is it to be wondered at that our enemies declare they will not rest until a system which constitutes a permanent threat to our neighbours is destroyed? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were those people not right who declared that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war



as an end in itself and does not abhor it as an evil ; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers, the caste of warriors, who rule and fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian ‘gentleman’ ; that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the destinies of the people ? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that incident shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedom are valued among us when questions of military power come up against them ?

Cramb, a gifted historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion :—

‘ Träumt Ihr den Krieg [*sic*] ? \*  
 Träume wer träumen mag !  
 Krieg ist das Losungswort !  
 Sieg, und so klingt es fort.’

Militarism, which, properly, is a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude that would not be permitted by a democracy freed from military-Junker influences.

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialisation, and in spite of socialistic organisation, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratisation of Germany, will be achieved !—

*Bismarck.*

Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict as an end in itself. As a statesman he avoided new wars, the folly of which he recognised. He contented himself with bloodless

\* [The correct line is ‘ Träumt ihr den Friedenstag ? ’ The quotation is from Goethe’s *Faust* :—

‘ Dream ye of War [Peace] ?  
 Let him dream who may !  
 War is the watchword !  
 Victory, that is the refrain.’]



battles. After he had in quick succession vanquished Christian, Francis Joseph and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius, and Augusta. That did not satisfy him. Gortschakoff, deeming himself the greater man, had repeatedly annoyed him. He was opposed almost to the verge of war, and was even deprived of his railway saloon. Thus the miserable Triple Alliance came into existence. Finally ensued the conflict with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished by Alexander.

Political marriages for life and death succeed only in civil and not in international relations. They are the more hazardous if the partner is feeble. Nor did Bismarck ever intend an alliance of that kind.

But the English he always treated with forbearance ; he knew that this was wiser. He behaved with marked respect towards the old Victoria, notwithstanding his hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania ; to the cultivated Beaconsfield and the experienced Salisbury he paid court, and even that singular man Gladstone, whom he did not like, had really no cause to complain.

The ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of London ; but there was still time to turn back.

The thing that was above everything else to be avoided—a breach with Russia and with England—that we have successfully achieved.

### *Our Future.*

To-day, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, the English, the French, the Italians, the Rumanians, and the Americans ; that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can achieve a peace of compromise only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which, in any case, signifies for us a burden and weakness and the danger of new wars. Consequently everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be

won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.

Our future lies upon the water. True ; therefore it does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a turning aside from the future, from Imperialism, from world policy. 'Middle' Europe is the Middle Ages ; Berlin-Bagdad is a *cul-de-sac*, not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, to the world mission of the German people.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State ; only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to land us on the inclined plane of continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as an umbrella under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.

And what result have we to expect from the struggle of peoples ? The United States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia, and Oceania ; and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate them. France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely with Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

And in Asia, the Russians and the Japanese will expand with their limitations and their customs, and the South will remain to the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world-war

has destroyed the last possibility of making good the omissions of the past and founding a colonial empire.

For we shall not dispossess the sons of Jahve; the programme of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion, in British Imperialism, will be realised.

'Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.  
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,  
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.'



## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA IN JULY, 1914.

(Translated from the '*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*,  
October 12, 1917)

### POLITICAL REPORT OF THE DAY.

*Berlin, October 11.*

The English and French Press, as well as the enemy wireless messages, obstinately maintain that in the critical days of July 1914 the German Government suppressed a telegram from Vienna which, if communicated to London in time, would have prevented the outbreak of the world-war.

On the German side no telegram was suppressed, or even delayed. The archives of the Foreign Office in Berlin conceal no surprises of this kind. The essential outlines of the events of that date have long been exposed in the *White Book*<sup>1</sup> and also on other occasions from competent quarters. It is true that, in consequence of the subterfuges of our opponents, the negotiations of that period look as if they were confused and hard to grasp. The German attitude has, however, never been anything but frank and consistent, whereas the same cannot be said of the proceedings of our opponents. Thus Ribot no doubt promised, on June 1st of this year, to publish the Franco-Russian secret agreements which are of such eminent importance for a knowledge of the causes of the war. But M. Painlevé recently informed the French Chamber that, by the special desire of the young Russian Republic, this publication must not take place—a statement which the Russians deny.

The senseless charge that the German Government did not pass on an Austrian telegram of great importance is deduced from the utterances of the German Emperor to the American Ambassador on August 10, 1914.<sup>2</sup> The Kaiser said to Mr. Gerard, in similar terms to those in which, as is

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 123-163.]

<sup>2</sup> [See *post*, p. 57.]

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well known, he telegraphed to King George, that simultaneously with the proposal of the King of England that Austria-Hungary should content herself with the occupation of Belgrade and of a strip of Serbian territory as a pledge for the fulfilment of its demands, a telegram arrived from Vienna which conveyed the impression that Austria was ready to agree to a proposal of that kind.<sup>1</sup> This telegram was sent on to London, just as the King of England's telegram was sent on to Vienna. Already before this St. Petersburg had been informed in a similar sense. In these circumstances it might have been considered, on the evening of July 30, that the crisis would be got over.

Against the doubts which have been raised as to these facts by our opponents, we reproduce below the telegrams which were exchanged, and which were mentioned by His Majesty the Emperor.

When, on July 28, 1914, the war-fever was at its height in Russia, German mediation was exercised with more intense activity. As is known from the *White Book*, St. Petersburg was informed from Berlin<sup>2</sup> that Germany, despite the state of war which had arisen between Austria and Serbia, was continuously endeavouring to induce Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg in an incontestable manner and one which, it was hoped, would satisfy Russia, the object and the extent of her action against Serbia.

Moreover the German Government on the same day, without waiting for a suggestion from London to that effect, addressed proposals to Vienna for the basis of an understanding with Russia. The telegram from the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Vienna on the evening of July 28 ran as follows :—

‘The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austrian ultimatum, which is now to hand, indicates that Serbia has met the Austrian demands. The Imperial and Royal (Austro-Hungarian) Government will, therefore, no longer be able to maintain its former reserve towards our proposals for mediation and *those of the other* Cabinets.

‘On the other hand, M. Sazonof, in his last conversation with Count Pourtalès, has already admitted that Serbia must receive “the lesson she deserves.” Alto-

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 359-60.]

<sup>2</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 156.]



gether the Minister no longer maintained an attitude of such absolute rejection towards the Austrian standpoint as heretofore. It is accordingly permissible to infer that the Russian Government will likewise not decline to recognise that, the mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian Army having once begun, military honour, if nothing else, demands the advance into Serbia. That Government will, however, be able to reconcile itself more easily to this idea, if the Austro-Hungarian Government repeats in St. Petersburg the definite declaration that it has absolutely no thought of territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that the sole object of its military measures is a temporary occupation of Belgrade and other definite points of Serbian territory, in order to compel the Serbian Government completely to fulfil its demands and to provide guarantees for future good behaviour, to which Austria-Hungary, after the experiences she has had of Serbia, has certainly a right. The occupation, it should be added, was intended, like the occupation in France after the peace of Frankfurt, to be a security for the claim to a war indemnity. As soon as the Austrian demands were fulfilled, evacuation would follow.

‘Your Excellency will at once express yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold, and suggest that corresponding steps be taken in St. Petersburg. The object now is to find a means which will secure the fulfilment of Austria-Hungary’s aim, namely, to put a stop at its very source to the Great Serbia propaganda, and to prevent the outbreak of a world-war.’

It afterwards turned out that, at that time, Berlin and London took an almost identical view of the situation. On the evening of July 29, the German Ambassador in London reported by telegraph Sir Edward Grey’s mediation proposals, which were of a similar character to the German suggestions in Vienna. These English proposals were at once transmitted to Vienna, as the telegram of the British Ambassador in Berlin on July 30 (*Blue Book*, No. 98) shows.<sup>1</sup> The urgent manner in which the acceptance of the English proposals was recommended is plain from the speech of the Imperial Chancellor of November 9, 1916, in which attention is also

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 165.]



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called to the conciliatory Austrian reply (Austrian *Red Book*, No. 51<sup>1</sup>).

On July 29 it was realised in Berlin that the Russian mobilisation against Austria gravely imperilled the success of the German mediation. The Imperial Government therefore once more called the attention of the St. Petersburg Government to the steps which had been taken in Vienna with a view to settling the conflict between Austria and Russia, and at the same time entered a serious warning against hasty and dangerous measures.

This telegram of the evening of July 29, from the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg, was to the following effect :—

‘The Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier will, I presume, entail a corresponding measure on the part of Austria. It is difficult to say how far the stones thus set rolling can then be stopped, and I fear that the pacific intentions of M. Sazonof will then no longer be capable of realisation. In order still to avert, if possible, the threatening catastrophe, we are endeavouring in Vienna to get the Austro-Hungarian Government, in confirmation of its former assurances, formally to declare once more to Russia that it has no intention of making territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that the object of its military measures is solely a temporary occupation, in order to constrain the Serbian Government to future good behaviour.

‘If Austria-Hungary makes such a declaration, then Russia has attained all that she desires. For M. Sazonof has himself admitted to Your Excellency that Serbia must receive the “lesson she deserves.” In the event of our action in Vienna being successful, we expect that Russia will not bring about any warlike conflict with Austria.

‘Your Excellency will express yourself immediately to M. Sazonof to this effect.’

The formal Russian reply to this German proposal for mediation was the production of the so-called ‘Sazonof Formula,’<sup>2</sup> which maintained unaltered the presumptuous demands of Russia for intervention in the Austro-Serbian

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 282.]

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 1, p. 485.]

dispute and declined to postpone military measures. It is Sir George Buchanan, as is shown by the report of the French Ambassador, who is responsible for the irreconcilable and fatal attitude of Russia. (French *Yellow Book*, No. 113.<sup>1</sup>) Even Grey, who otherwise did nothing to deter Russia from her decision to make war, recognised the necessity of altering this formula in the sense of the German suggestions. Sazonof, however, was not concerned to effect an understanding. Russia's real answer to the Berlin proposals for mediation was general mobilisation.

A provisional reply from the Austrian Government to the German proposal of July 28 reached Berlin on July 29. This telegram from the German Ambassador in Vienna ran as follows :—

‘Instruction carried out. Count Berchtold thanks you for the suggestion. The Minister is prepared to repeat once more the declaration about territorial disinterestedness which he has already made in St. Petersburg and also through the Russian representative here. As regards the further declaration respecting military measures, Count Berchtold stated that he was unable to give me an immediate reply.’

On the same day (July 29) Sazonof had declared in St. Petersburg that Vienna declined to have any direct communication with St. Petersburg.<sup>2</sup> Before the exchange of telegrams, which was at once opened from Berlin, could clear up this obvious misunderstanding, as it could still be considered to be, there arrived on the evening of July 30 the final Austrian reply to the German proposal—a reply which in large measure took account of German desires and supplied the hoped-for basis for a pacific settlement of the Austro-Russian conflict.

The telegram in question from the German Ambassador in Vienna was to the following effect <sup>3</sup> :—

‘Count Berchtold has requested me to make the following communication :—In consequence of our suggestion, which has been accepted with thanks, instructions have been sent to Count Szápáry <sup>4</sup> to begin conversation with M. Sazonof. Count Szápáry is empowered to ex-

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 379.]

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 161.]

<sup>3</sup> [*Cf. Diplomatic*, I, pp. 176, 370; and 2, p. 131.]

<sup>4</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 279-80.] 44



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plain to the Russian Minister the Note to Serbia, which, it is true, has been overtaken by the state of war, and to receive any further suggestion which may yet be made by the Russian Government, and also to discuss with M. Sazonof all questions which directly affect Austro-Russian relations.

‘If the Russian Government should consider that they have reason to object to the mobilisation of eight corps, as a military measure exceeding what is required for the Serbian campaign, Count Szápáry has instructions, in the event of Sazonof’s adverting to this subject of his own accord, to say that, as against a Serbian Army of 400,000 men,<sup>1</sup> the concentration of this number of troops is in accordance with the military view of the situation entertained here.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 276.]

‘Count Berchtold will to-day ask the Russian Ambassador to come and see him and will speak to him in the same sense.<sup>2</sup> Further, the Minister will tell M. Schébéko that territorial acquisitions in Serbia are altogether remote from the intention of the Monarchy, and that its sole object is a temporary occupation of Serbian territory, in order to force the Serbian Government to comply completely with its demands, and to obtain guarantees for future good behaviour. The evacuation of Serbian territory by the Monarchy will take place in the same degree in which Serbia fulfils the conditions of peace.’

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 210-II.]

A few hours later the well-known telegram from the King of England<sup>3</sup> was received, once more in a clearer form giving expression to Grey’s proposal. It was at once sent on to Vienna. The Austrian reply to the German proposal of July 28 was likewise communicated to St. Petersburg and to London on the evening of July 30, in the latter case with the following addition by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs :—

<sup>3</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 359.]

‘This telegram refers to our earlier suggestion of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. It shows such a conciliatory attitude on the part of Austria that we hope England will press in St. Petersburg for



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an equally conciliatory attitude, and especially for the cessation of the Russian military measures.'

That this telegram, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary which are now being made in the English and French Press, did reach its destination is proved by the English *Blue Book*, in which No. 110<sup>1</sup> contains an inexact and incomplete reproduction of the Austrian reply.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 176.]

It is inexplicable how it can still be disputed that Germany did everything in her power to prevent the outbreak of war. The threads of a section of the negotiations of that time which have here been laid bare prove anew that on the part of Germany nothing was left untried in this respect, and that the Russian mobilisation alone prevented a peaceful settlement. This the Imperial Chancellor has already explained to the British Ambassador (on July 31), as No. 108<sup>2</sup> of the *Blue Book* proves.

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 175.]

While the efforts of Germany and the discernment of the Austro-Hungarian Government would certainly have prevented the threatening world-conflict by a pacific arrangement, London, if the English attempts in that direction had at that time a really serious intention in all English quarters, in nowise succeeded in deterring Russia from mobilising, a course which, as no one could doubt, must mean war; while the French Government, actuated by hopes of *revanche*, eagerly fanned the fire which was breaking out. Germany most zealously advocated in Vienna her proposals for mediation, which were similar to the English proposals, and did so with success. Will the English Press assert that London exercised similar pressure in St. Petersburg? The telegrams of July 30 and August 1 to Sir George Buchanan (*Blue Book*, Nos. 103 and 105)<sup>3</sup> create the impression that Grey shrank from sending proposals for mediation to St. Petersburg. What did Buchanan effect on the strength of these communications? The telegram which contains the Russian reply to the English proposals for mediation is missing from the English *Blue Book*, doubtless not without reason!!

<sup>3</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, pp. 169, 170.]

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SPEECH OF HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG,  
IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, IN THE GERMAN  
REICHSTAG, AUGUST 19, 1915.

(Extract.)

*(Translated from the 'Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,'  
August 20, 1915.)*

On the evening of July 29 [1914], the following report from the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg reached us here :—

‘Monsieur Sazonof, who has just asked me to call upon him, informed me that the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to the desire for direct conversations expressed from here. Nothing, therefore, remained but to fall back upon Sir Edward Grey’s proposal of a conversation of the four Powers.’

As the Government in Vienna had in the meantime declared itself ready for a direct exchange of views with St. Petersburg, it was clear that there was a misunderstanding. I telegraphed to Vienna to that effect, and at the same time took the opportunity of expressing again very decidedly my views on the situation as a whole. My instructions to Herr von Tschirschky ran as follows :—

‘The announcement of Count Pourtalès is not in harmony with the representation which your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I request you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with whom she has just entered upon a state of war. The refusal of any exchange of views with St. Petersburg, however, would be a grave mistake. It is true, we are certainly prepared to fulfil our duties as allies, but we must refuse to let ourselves be drawn into a world conflagration by Austria-Hungary through failure to follow our advice. Your Excellency will at once express yourself very earnestly and emphatically in this sense to Count Berchtold.’

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Herr von Tschirschky replied on July 30 :—

‘Count Berchtold observed that, as Your Excellency supposes, there must indeed be a misunderstanding ; but on the Russian side. Having already been informed of this misunderstanding by Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg, and receiving at the same time our urgent request to enter upon conversation with Russia, he at once gave Count Szápáry the necessary instructions.’



## TOUL AND VERDUN AS GUARANTEE OF NEUTRALITY.

*Telegram from the Imperial German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris.* [Cf. *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 161.]

*Berlin to Paris, 31st July 1914.*

(GERMAN TEXT: SUPPLIED FROM THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE.)

[See Explanatory Note appended on p. 50.]

Russland hat trotz unserer noch schwebenden Vermittelungsaktion und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmassnahmen getroffen haben, Mobilmachung seiner gesamten Armee und Flotte, also auch gegen uns, verfügt. Wir haben darauf drohenden Kriegszustand erklärt, dem Mobilmachung folgen muss, falls nicht Russland binnen 12 Stunden alle Kriegsmassnahmen gegen uns und Oesterreich einstelle. Die Mobilmachung bedeutet unvermeidlich Krieg. Bitte französische Regierung fragen, ob sie in einem russisch-deutschem Kriege neutral bleiben will. Antwort muss binnen 18 Stunden erfolgen. Sofort Stunde der gestellten Anfrage drahten. Grösste Eile geboten.

Wenn, wie nicht anzunehmen, französische Regierung erklärt neutral zu bleiben, wollen Eure Excellenz der französischen Regierung erklären, dass wir als Pfand für Neutralität Ueberlassung der Festungen Toul und Verdun fordern müssen, die wir besetzen und nach Beendigung des Kriegs mit Russland zurückgeben würden.

Antwort auf letztere Frage muss bis Sonnabend nachmittag 4—vier—Uhr hier sein.

BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

(TRANSLATION.)

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us, in spite of our still pending

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mediation, and although we ourselves have taken no measures of mobilisation. We have therefore declared the threatening state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilisation, unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must follow within 18 hours. Wire at once time when question was put. Utmost speed necessary.

If, contrary to expectation, French Government declares that it will remain neutral, Your Excellency will please declare to the French Government that we must demand as a guarantee of neutrality the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we should occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia.

Reply to this last question must be here before four o'clock on Saturday afternoon.

BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

#### EXPLANATORY NOTE SUPPLIED BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 382; cf. *id.* 2, p. 161.]

The first portion of the text—the first paragraph—has already been published in the *Yellow Book*.<sup>1</sup> It was communicated by Baron von Schoen at seven o'clock in the evening on Friday, July 31, to Monsieur Viviani. Thus the period of eighteen hours allowed to France to decide whether or not she would join Russia expired on Saturday, August 1, at one o'clock in the afternoon.

In the event (which was not realised) of France dishonouring her signature to the treaty of alliance with Russia, the German Ambassador was to communicate on the same day, Saturday, at 1 P.M., the second portion of his instructions, and demand, in addition to the abandonment of Russia, the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee of neutrality.

The period allowed by the German Government for the reply to this incredible demand would, in fact, have been only three hours, since it had to be given by 4 P.M. the same day.

[The demand respecting Toul and Verdun was made public for the first time by M. Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, on Friday, March 1, 1918, in the course of which he said :—

‘The men who [were] not satisfied with having brought on the most

## TOUL AND VERDUN

appalling of wars endeavoured, on the very day on which they deliberately made it inevitable, to dishonour us by a most cowardly complicity in the ambush into which they were leading Europe. I place this beyond dispute by disclosing a document which the German Chancellery, after drafting it, has kept carefully concealed in its most secret archives—you will soon see why. We have only recently become acquainted with this document, and its authenticity is beyond question. It bears the signature of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, and is dated July 31, 1914. It is known, notably from one of the documents published officially in the German *White Book*,<sup>1</sup> that on that day the Imperial Chancellor, when instructing Baron von Schoen to inform us of the declaration of a "state of danger of war" as regards Russia, had requested his Ambassador to ask us to remain neutral, and to allow us a period of eighteen hours in which to reply. What is not known, and what I now reveal, is that the telegram containing those instructions concluded with these words: "If the French Government declares that it will remain neutral, your Excellency will be good enough to declare to it that we must demand as a guarantee of neutrality the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we should occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia. The reply to this last question must be here before four o'clock on Saturday afternoon." That is how Germany desired peace at the moment when she declared war. That shows her sincerity when she maintains that we forced her to take up arms in her own defence. That is the price that she intended to make us pay for our turpitude, if we had had the infamy to betray to her Russia, our ally, and to repudiate our signature, as Prussia has repudiated hers by tearing up the treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.']

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 161, exhibit 25.]



[For later speech by M. Sazonof see *post*, p. 300.]

## SPEECH OF M. SAZONOF IN THE DUMA OF THE EMPIRE, JULY 26 (AUGUST 8), 1914.\*

GENTLEMEN, MEMBERS OF THE DUMA OF THE EMPIRE: At this trying moment, moment of responsible decisions, the Government draws power from the assurance of its complete harmony with the conscience of the people.

When the time arrives for history to pronounce its impartial judgments, its decision, I firmly believe, will not differ from the one which guided us: Russia could not evade the impertinent challenge of her foes. She could not renounce the best traditions of her history. She could not cease to be the great Russia.

Our foes endeavour to throw upon us the responsibility for the disasters which they brought on Europe.<sup>1</sup> But their fallacious aspersions cannot deceive any one who conscientiously follows the policy of Russia of last years and that of the last days.

It was not only since yesterday that Russia, conscious of the immense problems connected with her internal development and progress, gave manifold proofs of her sincere love of peace. It is solely owing to this love of peace that was prevented the conflagration which was ready to spread in Europe when in 1912-1913 the struggle arose in the Balkans.

The menace to the European peace was not in the Russian policy. The great Russia never placed her dignity in the vainglorious clatter of weapons, in the humiliation of other peoples' self-respect, in scorning the rights of the weaker ones. Still the quiet, peaceful strength of Russia was exciting the temper of her foes.

Is it necessary to remind you of all the attempts of Austria-Hungary to undermine the historic position of Russia on the

\* [Printed as an Appendix to the first Russian Orange Book (see *Diplomatic*, I, pp. 445-497), in an English translation thereof published officially by the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

Balkans? The hour has arrived when I can state right here without any reserve that it was owing to her efforts that the murderous difference between Bulgaria and her brotherly allies was successfully planned. (Movement in the hall.) Nevertheless, with God's help, the cause of uniting the interests of the orthodox peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, although subjected to severe trials, will not perish.

You know the motive of this war. Torn by internal disorders, Austria-Hungary decided to find an exit from them by means of some stroke, which would create the impression of her strength, while causing at the same time humiliation to Russia. For this purpose Serbia was selected, to whom we are bound by the ties of history, origin, and religion.

You are acquainted with the conditions under which the ultimatum<sup>1</sup> was presented to Serbia. By giving her consent to it Serbia would have become a vassal of Austria. It was evident that for us not to interfere in the matter would have been tantamount not only to renunciation on the part of Russia of the part she played for centuries as a defender of Balkan nationalities, but also to the recognition that the will of Austria and of Germany, which stands behind her back, is the law for Europe.

To this could consent neither we nor France nor England. No less than we, our valiant allies applied all efforts for the strengthening of peace in Europe. Our foes made a mistake in taking these efforts for signs of weakness.

And after the challenge made by Austria, Russia did not reject any of the attempts which could lead to the peaceful solution of the conflict. In this direction all our efforts and those of our allies were honestly tried to the end. You will convince yourself of this by seeing the documents which will be published and which state in consecutive order the progress of the negotiations.<sup>2</sup> We firmly stood upon one condition. Ready to accept any compromise which, without belittling her dignity, could be accepted by Austria, we excluded everything which could touch the autonomy and independence of Serbia.

From the very beginning we did not conceal our point of view from Germany. There can be no doubt that, had the Berlin Cabinet so desired, it could in proper time, by a single weighty word, check its ally in the same way as it did during

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 74.]

<sup>2</sup> [See first Russian Orange Book, *Diplomatic*, I, pp. 445-497.]



<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Dip-  
lomatic*, I,  
p. 145.]

the Balkan crisis. (Exclamations: 'True! True!') In the meantime Germany, who during the very last days, did not cease to display in words her readiness to act upon Vienna,<sup>1</sup> rejected one after another the offers made to her, and on her own side was proffering empty assurances. The time was passing; negotiations were not progressing. Austria subjected Belgrade to severe bombardment. This was an outrage organised by the Government, the natural continuation of the outrages on the defenceless Serbian population of Serajevo after the notorious crime of the 15th of June [June 28, N.S.]. The evident purpose of all of this was to gain time, to place us and Europe before the accomplished fact of humiliation and destruction of Serbia.

Under such conditions we could not help taking the natural steps of precaution, inasmuch as Austria had already mobilised half her army.

<sup>2</sup> [*id.*, p.  
440.]

When mobilisation of the army and of the fleet was declared by Russia, His Majesty the Emperor was pleased by His Imperial word to guarantee to the German Emperor<sup>2</sup> that Russia will not proceed to apply force as long as there is hope to reach a peaceful issue of the negotiations on the principles, full of moderation, which I have mentioned. This voice was not heeded. Germany declared war first against us, then against our ally. Having lost self-control, she commenced to trample upon the generally recognised rights of States, the neutrality of which was solemnly pledged by her own—among others—signature. One cannot help bowing down before the heroism of the Belgian people, who are struggling against the huge German army. (Impetuous applauses from all benches; the deputies rise up and enthusiastically greet the representative of Belgium, who is in the Diplomatic box.)

Germany's action could not but call forth the deep indignation of the whole civilised world, and first of all of the noble France, who, together with us, rose up for the defence of the trampled rights and justice. (Burst of applause on all benches; deputies rise up from their seats and join in an ovation to the French Ambassador; cheers for France.)

Is it necessary to say that the same sentiments animated England, who, as one man, shared the general sentiment of necessity to resist Germany in her design to place upon Europe



## M. SAZONOF'S SPEECH, AUG. 8, 1914

the heavy hand of her hegemony? (Applauses from all benches; deputies rising to greet the English Ambassador.)

Now the motive which started the war retreats before the significance which the war acquires for each of us and for our allies.

Germany declared war <sup>1</sup> against us on the 19th of July [Aug. 1, N.S.], and five days later her example was followed by Austria, <sup>2</sup> who gave as a motive for her decision our interference in her quarrel with Serbia, and also the allegation that we started hostile actions against Germany. This latter circumstance is stated to be the real cause of her war against us. The troops of the enemy entered the Russian soil. We are fighting for our country, we are fighting for our dignity and position as a Great Power. We cannot tolerate the sovereignty of Germany and her ally over Europe. The same motives are guiding our allies.

We are not indulging in vainglory. We know that there may be heavy trials in our path.

They are already discounted by our enemies. Not knowing Russia and scorning the lessons of her history, they count upon the possibility of weakening on our part. But the Lord, who did not forsake Russia during the most severe years of her history, will not now forsake our country, who, in her entirety, rallied around her Tsar in the general feeling of love and self-sacrifice.

With the humble hope of God's help, with the unshakable faith in Russia, the Government turns to you, people's chosen, with ardent confidence, convinced that in your persons is reflected the image of our great Fatherland, which is not to be made light of by our foes.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, p. 491.]

<sup>2</sup> [*id.*, p. 497.]

## THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND PRESIDENT WILSON.

*Telegram from the German Emperor to President Wilson,*  
August 10, 1914.

(From *My Four Years in Germany*, by JAMES W. GERARD, late  
Ambassador of the United States in Berlin.)

For the President  
of the United States  
Personally.

10/VIII  
14.

1.) H.R.H. Prince Henry was recieved by His Majesty King George V in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his conversation with H.M. the King, and repeated verbally on the 29th of July.

2.) My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir E. Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to be crushed England would interfere.

3.) On the 30th my Ambassador in London reported that Sir E. Grey, in course of a 'private' conversation told him, that if the conflict remained localized between Russia—not Servia—and Austria England would not move, but if we 'mixed' in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave measures. I.E. if I left my Ally Austria in the lurch to fight alone England would not touch me.

4.) This communication being directly counter to the

\* [The wording of the telegram is here exactly reproduced, with the Emperor's own erasures, corrections and underlinings, from the facsimile contained in Mr. Gerard's book. The transcript of the telegram printed in the text of the book is not in all respects exact.]

## THE KAISER AND PRESIDENT WILSON

King's message to me I telegraphed to H.M. on 29th or 30th<sup>1</sup> thanking him for his message through my brother, and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia—his Allies—from making any warlike preparations calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with H.M. the Cz. In the evening the King kindly answered<sup>2</sup> that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his Allies to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At the same time H.M. <sup>asked me</sup> ~~proposed~~ I should transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Servian towns and a strip of country as a 'main-mise' to make sure that the Servian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London,<sup>3</sup> quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides I had telegraphed to H.M. the Zar the same as an idea of mine, before I received the two communications from Vienna and London. As both were of the same opinion, I immediately transmitted the telegrams *vice versa* to Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.

5.) While I was preparing a note to H.M. the Czar the next morning, to inform him that Vienna, London, and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs I received the Telephone from H.E. the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had ~~mobilized~~ given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian Army, which was of course also meant against Germany, whereas up till then the southern Armies had been mobilized against Austria.

6.) In a telegram from London my Ambassador ~~by a mistake~~ informed me<sup>4</sup> he understood British Government would guarantee neutrality of France, and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to H.M. the King personally<sup>5</sup> that, mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if H.M. could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France, I would refrain from attacking her, leave her alone, and employ my troops elsewhere. H.M. answered<sup>6</sup> that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding; and as far as I can make out Sir E.

<sup>1</sup> [See telegram from Prince Henry in this sense, *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 358.]  
<sup>2</sup> [*id.*, p. 359.]

<sup>3</sup> [Cf. *ante*, pp. 40-41; also *Diplomatic*, I, p. 169; and 2, p. 360.]

<sup>4</sup> [Cf. *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 360.]

<sup>5</sup> [*id.*, p. 361.]

<sup>6</sup> [*id.*, p. 362.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead he declared England had to defend Belgian neutrality<sup>1</sup> which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds, <sup>news</sup> ~~knowledge~~ having been received that France was allready preparing to enter Belgium<sup>2</sup> and the King of the Belgians having refused<sup>3</sup> my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country's freedom. I am most grateful for the President's message.\*

WILLIAM I.R.

\* [The circumstances in which this telegram was written are explained in the following passage from Mr. Gerard's *My Four Years in Germany* (Hodder and Stoughton), p. 138:—'The State Department cabled me a message from the President to the Emperor, which stated that the United States stood ready at any time to mediate between the warring Powers, and directed me to present this proposition direct to the Emperor. I therefore asked for an audience with the Emperor, and received word from the Chief Court Marshal that the Emperor would receive me at the Palace in Berlin on the morning of August 10. . . . I explained to the Emperor the object of my visit, and we had a general conversation about the war and the state of affairs. The Emperor took some of the large telegraph blanks and wrote out in pencil his reply to the President's offer. This reply, of course, I cabled immediately to the State Department.']

## MR. BONAR LAW'S LETTER TO MR. ASQUITH

AUGUST 2, 1914.

*Extract from Mr. Bonar Law's Speech to Unionist Chairmen  
and Agents, at Hôtel Cecil, London, December 14, 1914.*

I am glad to have the opportunity of meeting representatives of our party throughout the country in order to put clearly before them the principle upon which we who are responsible for the party in Parliament have acted since this crisis arose. Before the war, as you well know, party differences were as acute as they have ever been in this country. Party passions were inflamed to such an extent that I saw no possible outlet which would not be disastrous to the country. In a moment the whole situation was changed. The war cloud which had been gathering over Europe, which for years we had looked upon with growing anxiety, suddenly burst, and we realised that we were face to face with the gravest danger which, as a nation, we had ever encountered. We realised also that that danger could only be overcome if national resources were utilised to the utmost, and we could act as a united nation. Though the Opposition plays a recognised part in our form of government, it has no official position. We recognised, however, that we represent a large proportion of the members of the House of Commons, and in the days of suspense, especially in the days between the time when war had actually broken out and the position of this country became clear, we came to the conclusion that we were bound to state plainly what our views were, and what action we were prepared to take.

On the eventful Sunday, the 2nd August, when the decision of the Government was still in doubt, a letter was sent to the Prime Minister on the joint authority of Lord Lansdowne and myself, in which we declared that in our belief it was the duty of this country to join her Allies, and in which we promised, in that case, to support the Govern-

*Times,*  
Dec. 15,  
1914.

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ment. There can be no harm in publishing this letter, and I think it might interest you to hear its exact wording. It was in these terms :—

*August 2, 1914.*

DEAR MR. ASQUITH,—Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture ; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.—Yours very truly,

A. BONAR LAW.

That letter formed the keynote of our subsequent action. In it we gave a definite pledge, and I do not think that any one will deny that we have kept that pledge, both in the letter and in the spirit.



## BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS.

### JAPAN AND THE WAR.

*Press Bureau, August 17.*

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for in that agreement. *Times, Aug. 18, 1914. [Cf. Diplomatic, 2, p. 295.]*

It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the Continent of Eastern Asia.

### EXCHANGE OF BRITISH, AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN SUBJECTS.

#### FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENTS.

*Foreign Office, October 8, 1914.*

Arrangements have been made for the reciprocal exchange of British and Austro-Hungarian subjects (civilians) at present detained in Austria-Hungary and the United Kingdom respectively. *Times, Oct. 9, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Government agree to facilitate the departure from Austria-Hungary of the following classes of British subjects :

1. Women and children.
2. Males outside the limits of military age, *i.e.* those under eighteen or over fifty.
3. Males of military age who are clearly unsuited for

military service or unlikely to serve, such as physicians, surgeons, clergymen, priests, and the medically unfit.

Austro-Hungarian subjects corresponding to these categories are now allowed to leave this country.

*Times*,  
Nov. 9,  
1914.

The following statement has been issued by the Foreign Office with regard to the exchange of British subjects in Austria-Hungary and Germany for Austro-Hungarian and German subjects in Great Britain and Ireland :—

Arrangements have been made with the Austro-Hungarian Government whereby women and children, male British subjects under eighteen and over fifty years of age, together with doctors, ministers of religion, and invalids even within these age limits, are allowed to return from Austria or Hungary in return for reciprocal treatment here. Inquiries are being made as to the number of Austro-Hungarian subjects in the British Isles of military age who have not undergone military service, and when these are completed proposals will be made for exchange of these persons for the same number of British subjects of a similar nature who are now detained in Austria-Hungary.

German women and children have been allowed to return from Great Britain to Germany since the war began, and British women and children have been allowed to return from Germany since September 14, according as suitable arrangements for their travelling could be made by the representatives of the United States Government and the military authorities. An agreement has also been made permitting the reciprocal return of the male subjects of both countries under seventeen and over fifty-five, and of doctors and ministers of religion. In spite of this agreement, which was completed on October 22, four very elderly invalid retired officers, two clergymen, and a doctor are still being detained at Bad Nauheim or Frankfurt, and several protests against their detention have been made through the American Embassies in London and Berlin. Proposals were made a month ago for the exchange of invalids by the British Government, and of persons who, owing to weakness or physical disability, were not likely to make useful soldiers, as well as of all persons who had not

## BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

undergone military training. These proposals have been refused.

It is difficult to make any exact statement concerning the condition of men detained in Germany. Hitherto they have been allowed a limited amount of liberty, and their treatment has been reported to be good, except in a few cases. Information has been received that they have now been interned. As to their probable treatment under these conditions it can only be stated that Mr. Chandler Anderson, a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States, who had visited the camps where Germans are detained in this country and had reported that he was most favourably impressed with the regulations for their treatment, is now in Berlin, and will no doubt use his best endeavours to secure for British subjects in detention in Germany as favourable conditions as those which prevail here.



## WAR WITH TURKEY.

### BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT.

*(Issued on the evening of October 31, 1914.)*

At the beginning of the war the British Government gave definite assurances that, if Turkey remained neutral, her independence and integrity would be respected during the war and in the terms of peace. In this France and Russia concurred.

The British Government have since then endeavoured, with the greatest patience and forbearance, to preserve friendly relations in spite of increasing breaches of neutrality on the part of the Turkish Government at Constantinople in the case of the German vessels in the Straits.

On Thursday, the 29th of October 1914, the British Government learnt, with the utmost regret, that Turkish ships of war had, without any declaration of war, without warning, and without provocation of any sort, made wanton attacks upon open, undefended towns in the Black Sea of a friendly country, thus committing an unprecedented violation of the most ordinary rules of international law, comity, and usage.

Ever since the German men-of-war, the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, took refuge in Constantinople, the attitude of the Turkish Government towards Great Britain has caused surprise and some uneasiness. Promises made by the Turkish Government to send away the German officers and crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* have never been fulfilled. It was well known that the Turkish Minister of War was decidedly pro-German in his sympathies, but it was confidently hoped that the saner counsels of his colleagues, who had had experience of the friendship which Great Britain has always shown towards the Turkish Government, would have prevailed and prevented that Government from entering upon the very

## WAR WITH TURKEY

risky policy of taking a part in the conflict on the side of Germany.

Since the war German officers in large numbers have invaded Constantinople, have usurped the authority of the Government, and have been able to coerce the Sultan's Ministers into taking up a policy of aggression.

Great Britain, as well as France and Russia, has watched these proceedings patiently, protesting against the many acts which have been constantly committed contrary to neutrality, and warning the Government of the Sultan against the danger in which they were placing the future of the Ottoman Empire. Vigorously assisted by the Ambassadors of Germany and Austria, the German military elements in Constantinople have been persistently doing their utmost to force Turkey into war, both by their activities in the service of the Turks and by the bribes of which they have been so lavish.

The Minister of War, with his German advisers, has lately prepared an armed force for an attack upon Egypt. The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their mobilisation, been constantly sending troops south preparatory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba and Gaza. A large body of Beduin Arabs has been called out and armed to assist in this venture, and some of these have crossed the Sinai frontier. Transport has been collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier of Egypt. Mines have been despatched to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba. The notorious Sheikh Aziz Shawish has published and disseminated through Syria, and probably India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Prueffer,<sup>1</sup> who was so long engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constantinople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the people to take part in this conflict. Aggressive action was certain to be the result of the activity of the numerous German officers employed in the Turkish Army and acting under the orders of the German Government, who thus have succeeded in forcing the hands of the advisers of the Sultan.

German intrigue cannot influence the loyalty to Great Britain of the seventy millions of Mohammedans in India and the feeling of the Mohammedan inhabitants of Egypt.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *post*, pp. 209, 215.]

They must look with detestation on misguided action under foreign influence at Constantinople, which will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the Turkish Empire, and which shows such forgetfulness of the many occasions on which Great Britain has shown friendship to Turkey. They must feel bitterly the degeneration of their co-religionists who can thus be dominated against their will by German influences, and many of them realise that, when Turkey is pushed into war by Germany, they must dissociate themselves from a course of action that is so prejudicial to the position of Turkey itself.

The Turkish Government summarily and without notice on Friday shut off telegraphic communication with the British Embassy at Constantinople. This is, no doubt, the prelude to further acts of aggression on their part, and the British Government must take whatever action is required to protect British interests, British territory, and also Egypt from attacks that have been made and are threatened.

The following despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople explains how the Turkish Government has continually violated its own rules of neutrality.

[Here follows Sir Louis Mallet's despatch to Sir Edward Grey of October 6, 1914, with its two enclosures.—Received October 19. For text, see *post*, pp. 190-197, No. 145 and enclosures.]



CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EVENTS LEADING TO THE  
RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH  
TURKEY.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
November 1914.*

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[Published as a British White Paper,  
MISCELLANEOUS, No. 13 (1914). Cd. 7628.]

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6	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	" 9	Retention of ships is causing excitement. An assurance that ships would be restored at end of war would have soothing effect . . . . .	93
7	" "	Telegraphic	" 11	<i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> reported to have entered Dardanelles . . . . .	94
8	To Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	" 11	<i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> must leave within twenty-four hours or be interned. To point this out to Turkish Government . . . . .	94
9	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	" 11	Turkey has bought <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> . Grand Vizier asks that British naval mission may remain . . . . .	94

# RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
10	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	1914 Aug. 11	<i>Breslau</i> is perquisitioning British ships at Dardanelles. British vessels are being detained at Straits . . . . .	95
11	To Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 12	If German officers and crews are returned to Germany at once, no reason to withdraw British naval mission . . . . .	95
12	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 12	Reports strong representations to Grand Vizier against detention, etc., of British ships. Minister of War is quite out of hand . . . . .	95
13	To Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 12	He should point out to Turkish Government that German ships must not be allowed to commit acts of war, and ask why British ships are detained . . . . .	96
14	Tewfik Pasha	..	„ 13	Declaration that Turkey is determined to maintain strict neutrality . . . . .	96
15	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 14	Minister of Marine has undertaken to hand over <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> to Admiral Limpus. No intention of sending ships outside Sea of Marmora till end of war . . . . .	97
16	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 15	Admiral Limpus and British officers replaced by Turkish executive officers . . . . .	97
17	To Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 16	France, Russia, and Great Britain will guarantee independence and integrity of Turkey if she remains scrupulously neutral . . . . .	97
18	Mr. Beaumont	Telegraphic	„ 16	Grand Vizier solemnly declares Turkey will maintain neutrality. His Highness admits Germany is trying to compromise her. <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> are now off Constantinople and are flying Turkish flag . . . . .	98
19	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 16	Mines have been laid in Dardanelles . . . . .	98



No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
20	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Aug. 18	Reports interview with Grand Vizier, who deeply deplored breach of neutrality in matter of German ships. His Highness said Germans were exploiting Turkish resentment at seizure of ships building in England. He gave assurance that Turkey will not side against allies	99
21	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 18	Sir E. Grey has told Turkish Ambassador Turkey has nothing to fear from Great Britain, and that her integrity would be preserved if she remained really neutral, sent away German crews, and did not impede British vessels	100
22	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 19	Presence of British Fleet at Dardanelles is wise in existing circumstances	100
23	" "	Telegraphic	" 19	Has obtained undertaking from Grand Vizier that British merchant vessels may leave. Despite this, they have been detained. Will protest again	101
24	" "	Telegraphic	" 20	Minister of Marine has proposed (1) abolition of Capitulations, (2) restitution of Turkish ships in England, (3) renunciation of any interference in internal affairs of Turkey, (4) handing back of Western Thrace, (5) restoration of Greek islands. He promised to open Dardanelles to British fleet if German crews did not leave when told to	101
25	" "	Telegraphic	" 20	More mines laid in Dardanelles	103
26	" "	Telegraphic	" 21	Porte gives assurance that British ships will not again be interfered with at Dardanelles	103
27	" "	Telegraphic	" 21	Germans and Minister of War striving to force on war with Russia. German garrisons reported to hold Dardanelles forts	104

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
28	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	1914 Aug. 22	To inform Turkish Government that if they promise (1) to dismiss German naval officers and crews, (2) to give all facilities to British merchant ships, (3) maintain strict neutrality ; allies will (1) agree to abolition of Capitulations as regards ex-territorial jurisdiction, (2) give written guarantee of Turkish independence and integrity .	104
29	Tewfik Pasha .	..	.. 22	Turkish Government will grant free navigation of Turkish waters to all merchant ships, and will replace German officers and crew by crew of <i>Sultan Osman</i> when latter reach Constantinople . . . .	105
30	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	.. 22	Turkish crew has now arrived. Has pressed Minister of Marine to replace German crews . . . .	106
31	" "	Telegraphic	.. 23	Further contingent of German officers reported to have arrived <i>via</i> Sophia . . . . .	106
32	" "	Telegraphic	.. 24	Reports stating to Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government will not tolerate Germanising of Turkish fleet. Grand Vizier declared Turkey had no such intention . .	106
33	" "	Telegraphic	.. 25	Reports receipt of written assurance that merchant vessels may ply without hindrance . . . .	107
34	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	.. 25	Message from the King to the Sultan expressing regret at necessity of detaining Turkish ships in England. Ships will be restored at end of war . . . . .	107
35	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	.. 25	Reports seizure of camels from Egyptians at Gaza . . . .	108
36	" "	Telegraphic	.. 25	Has made strong representation respecting seizure of camels. Grand Vizier denies all intention of attacking or intriguing against Egypt .	108

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
37	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Aug. 25	Reports further laying of mines in Dardanelles . . . . .	108
38	To Tewfik Pasha	..	„ 26	Sir E. Grey has taken note of assurances conveyed in his Excellency's note of 22nd August . . . . .	108
39	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 26	Reports arrival of further German sailors. Grand Vizier denies reported intention to close Dardanelles. Preparations in Turkish army and fleet proceeding. Situation most unsatisfactory . . . . .	109
40	Sir G. Barclay	Telegraphic	„ 27	500 German marines proceeding through Rumania to Constantinople . . . . .	110
41	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 27	Germans urging Turks to send <i>Goeben</i> into Black Sea, counting on attack by Russian warship. Now said to be 162 German officers in Constantinople . . . . .	110
42	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 27	Grand Vizier emphatically asseverates <i>Goeben</i> will never be allowed to enter Black Sea so long as she is manned by Germans. Sir L. Mallet replied that so long as Germans remained, Grand Vizier was not master of his own house. Grand Vizier declared that Turkey would never depart from neutrality, in spite of German machinations which he fully understood . . . . .	110
43	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 27	Grand Vizier declares his ignorance of reported arrival of German sailors, who had not been asked for by Turkish Government. Sir L. Mallet warned his Highness that allied Governments would be unfavourably influenced by continued violation of Turkish neutrality . . . . .	111
44	Mr. Cheetham	Telegraphic	„ 28	There is evidence that Turkey contemplates attack on Egypt. Turkish emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt. Reports Turkish military activity . . . . .	112



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
45	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Aug. 28	Still considers it improbable Turkey will make any forward move. Germans confident of hostilities. Reports German Ambassador's activity in circulating misleading reports respecting the allies	112
46	" "	Telegraphic	" 28	Area of Dardanelles, Constantinople, and Bosphorus will soon form German enclave. Probable arrival of German and Austrian guns for Straits defences	114
47	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	Telegraphic	" 28	Reports passage of German naval officers, men, guns, and artillery for Turkey	114
48	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 30	Does not regard situation as hopeless. Believes Turkish Government are aware of German aims. Has warned Grand Vizier of inevitable result of siding against allies. His Highness promised to send away German sailors	114
49	" "	Telegraphic	Sept. 1	Minister of Marine has assured Russian Ambassador that he will send away German sailors in a fortnight, and that 200 are leaving to-day	115
50	" "	Telegraphic	" 1	Grand Vizier gives solemn assurance that Turkey will maintain neutrality. Sir L. Mallet replied that until German sailors left His Majesty's Government would not be satisfied	115
51	" "	Telegraphic	" 1	Sulleiman-el-Burouni reported to be in Egypt fomenting revolution	116
52	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 1	To avoid misunderstanding Turkish Government should be informed of British patrol of Suez Canal, and that no advance into Sinai is contemplated	116
53	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 2	May he inform Turkish Government that <i>Goeben</i> will be treated as German ship if she enters Mediterranean with Germans on board?	116

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
54	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Sept. 2	May he announce publicly that Turkey has nothing to fear from British ships if she remains strictly neutral, does not interfere with British trade, and dismisses German crews ? . . . . .	117
55	" "	Telegraphic	" 3	May he let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves Dardanelles it will be treated as part of German fleet?	117
56	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 3	<i>Goeben</i> will be treated as German ship if she comes out of the Straits	117
57	" "	Telegraphic	" 4	Authorises statement proposed in No. 54 . . . . .	117
58	" "	Telegraphic	" 4	Approves proposal in No. 55 . . . . .	118
59	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 5	Reports Turkish intended intrigues in Afghanistan, India, and Persia .	118
60	" "	Telegraphic	" 5	Has discussed situation fully with Minister of Interior. Apparent improvement in situation. Has received assurance that Turkish fleet will not leave Dardanelles on any account . . . . .	118
61	" "	Telegraphic	" 6	Reports prospect of improvement in public opinion. Growing discontent at German influence . . . . .	118
62	" "	..	Aug. 19	Forwards copy of <i>note verbale</i> addressed to Turkish Government protesting against perquisitions made by <i>Breslau</i> on British ships at Dardanelles and detention of British ships . . . . .	119
63	" "	..	" 21	Transmits <i>note verbale</i> from Turkish Government expressing regret for incidents at the Dardanelles . . . . .	120
64	" "	Telegraphic	Sept. 6	Reports conversation with Minister of Interior respecting Turkish attitude. Has warned his Excellency against embarking on military adventure, and impressed	

# RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1914	upon him unwisdom of Turkish attitude. Minister said Turkey wished to remain friend of Great Britain. He proposed sale of two Turkish ships, when Turkish Government would send away all Germans . . . . .	121
65	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	Sept. 7	Further evidence that there has been no sale of <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> to Turkey . . . . .	122
66	Mr. Cheetham .	Telegraphic	„ 8	Turkish intrigues in Egypt. Reports attempt by Turkish naval officer to corrupt stokers and engineers of Khedivial mail steamers .	123
67	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	„ 8	Requests his views as to recall of British naval mission. Admiralty wish to withdraw Admiral Limpus and staff . . . . .	123
68	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	„ 8	Considers moment suitable to withdraw naval mission. Great discontent against Germans among Turkish naval officers . . .	124
69	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 9	Turkish Government have decided to abolish Capitulations. Reports verbal protest to Grand Vizier .	125
70	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 9	Note has been despatched to foreign embassies abolishing Capitulations. German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move. Minister of Interior denies any intention of hostility against foreigners . . . . .	125
71	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 9	All embassies will send in identic notes stating that abolition of Capitulations cannot be accepted	126
72	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 10	Reports amount of munitions of war so far traced as having been sent to Turkey. German reservists in Turkey instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops .	126



No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
73	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Sept. 10	Note abolishing Capitulations received. Identic notes of protest addressed to Turkish Government by all foreign representatives, including German and Austrian Ambassadors . . . . .	127
74	" "	Telegraphic	" 13	Reports military movements at Alexandretta where Germans are dominant . . . . .	127
75	" "	Telegraphic	" 14	German Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to disseminate report of revolution in India and application by His Majesty's Government to Japan for assistance . . . . .	127
76	" "	Telegraphic	" 15	Danger of Turkish fleet going into Black Sea and of entire closure of Dardanelles by mines. German and Austrian Ambassadors urging this step upon Turkey . . . . .	128
77	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 16	Sir E. Grey suggests pointing out to Turkish Government that so long as they maintain neutrality undertakings already given by His Majesty's Government hold good and reasonable concessions about Capitulations will be considered, but concessions cannot be expected whilst Turkey's irregular conduct in matter of German crews continues . . . . .	129
78	United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association . .	..	" 16	Reports case of detention of steamship <i>Reliance</i> at Dardanelles, and requests assistance in recovery of compensation . . . . .	129
79	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 16	Minister of Marine is aware of German intrigues. Sir L. Mallet has pointed out to him danger of sending Turkish fleet into Black Sea as long as German officers remain. Grand Vizier declares there is no intention of sending <i>Goeben</i> into Black Sea . . . . .	131

# RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
80	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Sept. 18	Consul at Basra reports intention of Vali to request commodore of British warship to leave Shatt-el-Arab and to seal wireless . . .	131
81	" "	Telegraphic	" 18	Has instructed consul at Basra that Turkish authorities have no right to interfere with wireless on His Majesty's ship . . .	132
82	" "	Telegraphic	" 19	Has informed President of the Chamber that it would be absolute madness to go to war with Russia. Sir L. Mallet has urged him most strongly against sending Turkish fleet into Black Sea. Party in favour of neutrality is growing. German officers and men continue to arrive. Turkish military movements from Erzeroum to the frontier . . .	132
83	" "	Telegraphic	" 20	Minister of War is the only firebrand. Party in favour of peace is daily increasing. Conversation between French Ambassador and Minister of Marine. Latter admitted that Enver had ordered fleet to go into Black Sea, but Cabinet had decided that two destroyers only should do so. Despite this assurance, <i>Breslau</i> and three smaller ships have just entered Black Sea . . .	133
84	" "	Telegraphic	" 20	Cabinet are all peaceably inclined except Enver. Sir L. Mallet has drawn attention of Grand Vizier to total disregard by Minister of War of Cabinet's decision that fleet should not enter Black Sea, and has pointed out that Constantinople and neighbourhood now form an armed German camp, adding that between 4000 and 5000 soldiers and sailors had arrived up to date. His Highness declared with violence that he would never allow Minister of War to supersede	

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1914		
85	Mr. Cheetham .	Telegraphic	Sept. 21	him. Has called attention to numerous cases of anti-British action, and to intrigues against Egypt . Turkish preparations against Egypt continue. Measures for protection of Egyptian frontier may become necessary .	134 135
86	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	„ 22	British postmaster at Constantinople has received information from subordinate Turkish postal official that foreign post offices in Turkey will be abolished on 1st October. Has instructed postmaster to return letter. Subsequently saw Grand Vizier and protested against discourteous manner of communication and against abolition of post offices. His Highness stated that similar communication had been addressed to all Powers. Sir L. Mallet considers that considerable modification of existing system should not be resisted .	135
87	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 22	Reports audience with the Sultan, to whom King's message, authorised in No. 36, has been delivered. Sultan expressed earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain .	136
88	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	„ 23	His Majesty's Government consider situation at Constantinople most unsatisfactory. Recapitulates grievances in general against Turkish Government, and instructs Sir L. Mallet to make representations to Grand Vizier .	137
89	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 24	Egyptian frontier has been violated by Arabs, who have been encouraged by Turks. To inform Grand Vizier and Khedive, adding that British military authorities consider breach of [the peace on Egyptian] frontier is imminent .	137



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
90	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Sept. 24	Has addressed note to Grand Vizier, recapitulating recent information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt, and pointing out conditional nature of assurances given by His Majesty's Government respecting status of Egypt (see No. 5). Turkish Government have doubtless been strongly urged to attack Egypt by Germans. It is circumstantially reported that Germans are making desperate efforts to force Turks' hands, but that their efforts are being strongly resisted .	138
91	" "	Telegraphic	" 24	Grand Vizier has denied intrigues against Egypt, but finally admitted pressure by Austria and Germany. He emphatically disclaimed any complicity in such intrigues. His Highness seemed more preoccupied with Balkan situation than with anything else, and said that Turkey could not refrain from attempt to regain what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued .	139
92	Mr. Cheetham	Telegraphic	" 25	Reports further Turkish preparations on Sinai frontier .	139
93	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 25	He should make best arrangements possible with regard to post offices, and should put on record that His Majesty's Government do not agree to abolition .	140
94	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 25	Has again pointed out most strongly to Grand Vizier fatal result of hostility towards Great Britain, and renewed protests respecting German crews of <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> . His Highness repeated his intention of maintaining peace. Has warned His Highness of dangers of a repetition of Arab raid across the Egyptian frontier. Difficult position of Grand Vizier, whose party is gaining ground .	140

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
95	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Sept. 25	Reports further Turkish military preparations in Syria, and arrival of two Germans there with consignment of explosives	141
96	" "	Telegraphic	" 26	Has informed Grand Vizier of information contained in No. 92 and No. 95, and has warned him of serious consequences if such preparations against Egypt continue. Has taken steps to enlighten prominent members of Cabinet with what is going on	142
97	" "	Telegraphic	" 27	Turkish destroyer has been stopped outside Dardanelles and turned back by British fleet. Dardanelles were thereupon closed by Turkish authorities. Turkish Government much perturbed. Has informed Grand Vizier of reasons of British action, and urged him to reopen Straits, and has again called his attention to Turkish action on the Egyptian frontier. Grand Vizier replied that there would be no more acts of aggression, and that there was no thought of attacking Egypt. Bedouins had been ordered to withdraw at once	142
98	" "	Telegraphic	" 27	Grand Vizier promises reopening of Dardanelles if British fleet move a little further off (see No. 97)	143
99	" "	Telegraphic	" 29	Germans endeavouring to induce Turkey to attack Russia in Black Sea. Umbrage caused by German Ambassador ordering <i>Breslau</i> to the Black Sea. Grand Vizier repeats request as to removal of fleet (see No. 98)	143
100	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 29	Turkish Minister of War has promised military stores and instructors to Emir of Nejd and Vali of Basra, telling latter that German and other emissaries have been	

# RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1914	sent to preach 'jehad' in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, and that Turkey was prepared to help Germany in return for support in Balkan War . . . . .	
101	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	Sept. 29	In reply to representations by Turkish Ambassador as to presence of H.M.S. <i>Odin</i> in Shatt-el-Arab, it has been pointed out that so long as Turkey does not observe rules of neutrality she cannot appeal to them . . . . .	144
102	" "	Telegraphic	" 30	Request for withdrawal of fleet (see No. 97) cannot be entertained until German officers and crews are repatriated . . . . .	144
103	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	Oct. 1	Reports from Basra of intention of Turks to block Shatt-el-Arab, and of departure of British man-of-war from Turkish waters . . .	145
104	" "	Telegraphic	" 2	Information as to movements of troops and stores with view to eventual attack on Egypt. This and movements of certain Germans brought to attention of Grand Vizier. Calls attention to possibility of counter-measures being required in Sinai peninsula . . . . .	145
105	" "	Telegraphic	" 3	Germans long working for closing of Dardanelles to be freer in Black Sea. Probability that they have mined entrance, the Turks not knowing position of mines . . .	146
106	" "	Telegraphic	" 4	Report from His Majesty's Consul as to demand by Vali of Basra that His Majesty's ships should leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours, and asking for instructions . . . . .	147
107	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	" 4	May inform Turkey that as soon as Turkish Navy ceases to be under German control British fleet will move away from Dardanelles . .	147



No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
108	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 5	Turkey bankrupt, and short of coal and provisions. Thinks that they do not desire to go to all lengths with Germany, but doubts their ability to prevent Germans taking matters in their own hands	148
109	" "	Telegraphic	" 6	Conversation of Military Attaché with Minister of War, who seemed to have ambitious schemes as to Arab world and Egypt, and denied intention of attacking latter country, though admitting that measures of precautionary character were being taken	149
110	" "	Telegraphic	" 6	His Majesty's Consul at Basra reports that Vali has orders to close Shatt-el-Arab and sea within 6 miles of shore to warships, and fire on them if they disobey	151
111	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 7	His Majesty's ships are not in Turkish waters, which only extend 3 miles from coast. Mohammerah does not belong to Turkey. His Majesty's Government reserve right to pass up and down the Shatt-el-Arab at all times	151
112	Sir L. Mallet	..	Sept. 22	Delivery of message from the King (see No. 34) at audience with Sultan, and conversation as to breaches of neutrality by Turkey and the departure of Admiral Limpus	152
113	" "	Telegraphic	Oct. 7	Grand Vizier says Vali of Basra instructed to avoid interference with His Majesty's ships in Shatt-el-Arab	156
114	" "	Telegraphic	" 7	Attacks on Russian frontier by Kurds and Turkish troops, and arrest of Russian consul. Grand Vizier has promised Russian Ambassador to take suitable action, but Sir L. Mallet doubts his ability to restrain military party under Enver Pasha, incited by Germans and Austrians	156

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
115	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 10	Sending of money to Syria, mainly to subsidise Bedouins. Movements of German officers supposed to have money with them. Carriage of dynamite to Beirout and troops to Aleppo . . . . .	156
116	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 11	Cannot give way to Turkish demands, especially as to Persian Gulf, beyond certain point, but agrees that His Majesty's Government must continue to avoid giving even plausible cause of offence to Turkey . . . . .	157
117	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 12	Note received from Porte, claiming that passage of His Majesty's ships to Mohammerah was breach of Turkish neutrality, and requesting that they should go to sea within eight days . . . . .	157
118	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 12	Reply of Porte as to preparations against Egypt (see No. 143) points out that these are only part of general precautionary mobilisation. No hostile intentions against any Power, but declaration that Egypt is in state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, and arrival of troops from India caused anxiety. Sir L. Mallet suggests reminding Grand Vizier that maintenance of status of Egypt is conditional on Turkish neutrality . . . . .	158
119	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 12	Turkish fleet has left Constantinople and entered Black Sea . . . . .	159
120	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 12	Departure of His Majesty's ships from Mohammerah now might be misinterpreted, though channel may be closed if they stay. Resistance of moderates to German endeavours to secure Turkish co-operation must not be weakened by any action on our part . . . . .	159

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
121	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 12	Has expressed surprise at receipt of note, as Mohammerah is a Persian port. Grand Vizier says there was no question of an ultimatum. He seems confident he can resist German pressure. Strict orders sent to Turkish troops not to cross Persian frontier . . . .	160
122	„ „	Telegraphic	„ 13	Vali has told consular officer at Basra that H.M.S. <i>Espiègle</i> must leave Mohammerah within eight days or be interned. <i>Dalhousie</i> has left . . . .	160
123	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 13	To tell Turkish Government (see No. 117) that His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss question of passage through Shatt-el-Arab when Porte strictly observe their neutrality violated with regard to <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> . Mohammerah not in Ottoman territory, and so presence of His Majesty's ships there does not concern Turkey . . . .	161
124	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	„ 14	Deliberate German and Turkish falsehoods officially circulated amongst Moslems in Aleppo district, leading them to believe German Emperor has embraced Islam and fighting for it against Russia . . . .	161
125	Mr. Cheetham	..	Sept. 30	Transmit[s] interrogatories regarding case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, of Egyptian Police, showing his relations with Germans, Turks, etc., and efforts at espionage and introduction of explosives into Egypt . . . .	162
126	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	Oct. 14	Turkish fleet has returned. As on a previous occasion, two German steamers have been convoyed, flying Turkish flag till inside Bosphorus . . . .	170



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No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
127	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 14	Moslem 'fedahis' sent to numerous Syrian towns and proceeding to Arabia and Egypt to incite Moslems against British. Many Aleppo sheikhs seem to have been gained over to side of Germany .	170
128	" "	Telegraphic	" 14	Large sums spent in corruption have secured control of Turkish Press to German Embassy, which emits stream of mendacity . . .	171
129	" "	Telegraphic	" 15	Agents sent to conduct anti-British propaganda at Basra and in Afghanistan. Distribution of gold amongst Bedouins. Boats, dynamite, and mines sent to various ports. Hostile preparations under German influence . . .	171
130	" "	Telegraphic	" 15	Possibility of Germans sending persons disguised as Indians to Egypt	172
131	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	Telegraphic	" 16	Bullion, armaments, and stores from Germany passing through Rustchuk for Constantinople . . .	172
132	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 16	Rifles and ammunition distributed amongst Bedouins at Jaffa. Wells prepared and horses and mules requisitioned. Expected move on Akaba . . .	173
133	" "	Telegraphic	" 16	German officers with money, guns, and ammunition arrived at Aleppo <i>en route</i> for Bagdad. Trucks of dynamite sent to Damascus and Alexandretta, where mines laid by officers of <i>Breslau</i> . . .	173
134	" "	Telegraphic	" 16	Minister of War, controlled by Germans, now supreme instead of Minister of Interior, who is practically powerless . . .	173
135	" "	Telegraphic	" 17	Mines are being sent to Basra .	174
136	Sir F. Elliot	Telegraphic	" 17	Bouhadi Sadil, two of whose accomplices were convicted in Egypt, has been found buying arms and ammunition for importation into that country . . .	174

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
137	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 17	As <i>Espègle</i> not in Turkish territorial waters attack on her would be wanton aggression. No present intention of her passing down Shatt-el-Arab, but we claim right of passage so long as <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> have free use of Turkish territorial waters . . . .	174
138	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	„ 17	Gold and war material received in Constantinople since end of September. Submarine and two aeroplanes reported to have left Rustchuk . . . .	175
139	„ „ .	Telegraphic	„ 18	Aeroplane and airmen left Beer-sheba. Telegram from Minister of War as to action of Commandant of Jaffa on approach of an enemy . . . .	175
140	„ „ .	..	„ 2	Transmits copies of note from Grand Vizier demanding closing of British post offices in Turkey; and reply (see Nos. 86 and 93) reserving all rights, but stating that operations will be suspended by offices . . . .	176
141	„ „ .	..	„ 2	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier asking if Turkey intends to carry out promises of Sultan and his Government to dismiss German officers and crews, and when this would be done . . . .	177
142	„ „ .	..	„ 4	Transmits copy of note denying right of Turkey to abolish Capitulations, reserving liberty of action, and warning Porte of dangers of new policy adopted . . . .	179
143	„ „ .	..	„ 4	Transmits copies of two notes complaining of the military preparations, which are evidently directed against Egypt, and of the failure of the Porte to reply to the first of these notes and to subsequent letters . . . .	180

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No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
144	Sir L. Mallet	..	1914 Oct. 6	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier welcoming the rules of neutrality drawn up by the Porte in so far as they affect wireless telegraphy, and demanding their application to the <i>Corcovado</i>	188
145	" "	..	" 6	Transmits copy of a note from the Porte communicating regulations as to belligerent warships in Turkish territorial waters, and copy of reply pointing out how little Turkish practice has conformed to these regulations, and expressing hope that new policy will be followed in future	190
146	" "	..	" 6	Transmits copy of note to Grand Vizier asking on what grounds Turkey objects to His Majesty's ships being at Persian port of Mohammerah, and requesting instructions to Vali of Basra to refrain from any measures against British warships	197
147	" "	..	" 6	Transmits copies of a note to Porte and of letter to Talaat Bey complaining of anti-British and unscrupulous campaign in press, which is permitted by the censor in spite of the friendly assurances of the Government	198
148	" "	Telegraphic	" 19	New Governor-General of Basra with naval and military officers (including Germans) and men, with ammunition, arrived at Alexandretta. Destination reported as Basra or Maan	202
149	" "	Telegraphic	" 19	Reports passage through Adana for Syria of officers and men (including many Germans) and of civilian officials	202
150	Mr. Cheetham	Telegraphic	" 19	Departure of Turkish staff officers and others from Smyrna to participate in Turcophile propaganda in India	203



No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
151	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 19	Reports movements of German and possibly also Austrian naval parties to Akaba, Persian Gulf, and Syrian coast ports . . .	203
152	" "	Telegraphic	" 21	Movements of troops at Alexandretta and Damascus towards south . . .	204
153	" "	Telegraphic	" 21	Possibility of <i>coup d'État</i> by Enver, backed by Germans, should be remembered . . .	204
154	" "	Telegraphic	" 22	Secret manifesto inciting Moslem soldiers to revolt against allies is being circulated at Beirut. Is attributed to Sheikh Aziz Shawish . . .	204
155	" "	Telegraphic	" 22	Copies of above-mentioned manifesto are to be smuggled into Egypt and India . . .	204
156	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 22	German officers on frontier bent on forcing matters. Arab raid possible at any moment . . .	205
157	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 22	Russian Ambassador thinks Turkey will declare war on receipt of first half of £4,000,000 to be provided by Germany. £1,000,000 already reported to have arrived. Virulent anti-British campaign in progress . . .	205
158	" "	Telegraphic	" 22	Press campaign aims at proving Great Britain is inflicting deliberate blows at Islam . . .	205
159	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 23	His Majesty's Government will regard mining of Shatt-el-Arab as an act of open hostility . . .	206
160	To Mr. Cheetham	Telegraphic	" 23	Turkish Minister at Sophia has gone to Germany to arrange, it is reported, for stirring up Moslem fanaticism in India, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunis . . .	206
161	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 23	Reports arrival of further consignments of munitions of war . . .	206

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No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
162	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 23	Reports arrival of large quantities of bar gold. Probably between two and three millions have now arrived . . . . .	207
163	" "	Telegraphic	" 23	Military movements at Aleppo. Arab raid possible . . . . .	207
164	" "	Telegraphic	" 23	Minister of Marine denies to French Ambassador intention of war with allies, but did not deny desire to regain Egypt. Germans are inciting religious fanaticism against British . . . . .	207
165	" "	Telegraphic	" 23	German and Turkish efforts to cause anti-British feeling at Haifa by such reports as invasion of India by the Ameer of Afghanistan . . . . .	208
166	To Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	" 24	To enumerate to Grand Vizier hostile acts of Turkey and warn him of inevitable result of any attack on Egypt or Suez Canal. Summarises Turkish acts of aggression, etc.	208
167	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	" 25	Turkish fleet at Kadikeui since 20th October . . . . .	209
168	Sir G. Buchanan	Telegraphic	" 26	Forty-two Germans and naval officers, disguised as tourists, said to have reached Aleppo . . . . .	210
169	Sir L. Mallet .	Telegraphic	" 27	Enver and others making every preparation for expedition against Egypt. Majority of Committee are, however, said to be against war. Halil has left for Berlin . . . . .	210
170	" "	Telegraphic	" 27	With exception of Enver, Turkish Government are seeking to temporise. Austrian Ambassador much annoyed at tardiness of Turkey. Turkish fleet has gone into Black Sea . . . . .	210
171	" "	Telegraphic	" 28	Porte regret they cannot take wireless messages for His Majesty's Embassy from England . . . . .	211

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
172	Mr. Cheetham	Telegraphic	1914 Oct. 28	Reported unsuccessful attempt of German officers to provoke attack upon Egyptian post at Kossaimo .	211
173	" "	Telegraphic	" 28	Two thousand armed Bedouins have invaded Egyptian territory .	211
174	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 28	To warn Turkish Government that so long as Germans remain Turkish ships will be treated as enemy ships	212
175	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 28	Further movements in Syria of German and Turkish naval officers .	212
176	" "	Telegraphic	" 29	Has made representations to Grand Vizier respecting Bedouin raid into Egypt, and has warned him of possible consequences	212
177	Sir G. Buchanan	Telegraphic	" 29	Russian gunboat at Odessa has been sunk and Theodosia bombarded by Turkish fleet .	213
178	Mr. Roberts	Telegraphic	" 29	Further details of attack upon Odessa	213
179	To Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 30	Russian Ambassador has been instructed to leave Constantinople. Unless Turkish Government will dismiss German crews within twelve hours Sir L. Mallet should ask for his passports .	214
180	Sir L. Mallet	Telegraphic	" 30	Russian, French, and British Ambassadors have asked for their passports .	215
181	Mr. Cheetham	..	" 20	Transmits further interrogatories of German spy Mors .	215
182	Count Benckendorff	..	Nov. 2	Communicates telegram from M. Sazonof. Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd has handed in telegram from Turkish Government, insinuating that Russian fleet took initiative in hostilities. M. Sazonof indignantly denied insinuation, and told Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that he would receive his passports on 2nd November .	219



# RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page.
183	To Sir F. Bertie „ Sir G. Buchanan „ Sir C. Greene	.. .. ..	1914 Nov. 3	<p> Informs of interviews between Sir A. Nicolson and Turkish Ambassador on 31st October and 2nd November. Transmits telegram communicated by his Excellency, in which Turkish Government express regret at incident in Black Sea, but state that His Majesty's Government have 'provoked' rupture of relations. Sir A. Nicolson strongly demurred to this expression in view of what had, in fact, happened . . . </p>	221
184	To Sir G. Buchanan „ Sir F. Bertie . „ Sir C. Greene	.. .. ..	„ 4	<p> Final interview between Sir E. Grey and Turkish Ambassador, who asked for his passports. It was again explained to Tewfik Pasha that unless German military and naval missions, and especially crews of <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i>, were dismissed, hostilities with Turkey must continue . . . </p>	223

## CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EVENTS LEADING TO THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

### No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.\**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

Turkish ships building in Great Britain.

Arrangements are being made with the firm of Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. for His Majesty's Government to take over the Turkish battleship *Osman I.* now building with that firm.

Please inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to take over the contract.

\* [British Chargé d'Affaires.]

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

### No. 2.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 4.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

Grand Vizier \* and Minister of the Interior † spoke to me with some vexation of the detention of Turkish ship, which they seemed to consider an unfriendly act as Turkey is not at war. Minister of the Interior referred to the very heavy financial sacrifices by which this ship had been paid for with money borrowed at a rate amounting to interest at 20 per cent.

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### No. 3.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 4.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 4, 1914.*

Grand Vizier to-day renewed assurances that Turkey intends to observe strict neutrality. Mobilisation had been decided upon only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Russia—attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Retention of German military mission meant nothing and had no political significance. He regarded them as Turkish employés who were doing good work, and, as they had offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse.

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### No. 4.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*  
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 2.

Your telegram of August 3rd.<sup>1</sup>

I am sure Turkish Government will understand necessity for His Majesty's Government to keep all warships available in England for their own needs in this crisis.

Financial and other loss to Turkey will receive all due consideration, and is subject of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government. You should inform Grand Vizier.

\* [Prince Saïd Halim Pasha.]

† [Talaat Bey.]

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 7, 1914.*

If Turkey remains neutral and Egypt remains quiet, [Cf. No. 90] and should no unforeseen circumstances arise, His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter the status of Egypt.

A report has reached me that it is being alleged that the annexation of Egypt is under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

You should emphatically contradict this to the Turkish Government, and say that we have no intention of injuring Turkey, and you should add an assurance in the sense of the first paragraph.

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No. 6.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 9, 1914.*

An official *communiqué* was recently published here which showed a distinctly hostile tone towards Great Britain. This *communiqué* dealt with the requisition of the Turkish warships by His Majesty's Government. The Grand Vizier has told me that Turkish Government had to pretend to the Turkish public, as the latter had subscribed towards the purchase money for the vessels, that they were taking a stronger line than really was the case. He said, however, that we should not attach too much importance to publications of this kind.

Public opinion is daily growing more excited, and I think that if His Majesty's Government were able to give an assurance that Turkey would have the ships, if possible, on the conclusion of hostilities, such an assurance would have a soothing effect.

I have received a most emphatic assurance from the Grand Vizier that nothing will induce Turkey to join Austria and Germany as long as he remains in power. His position is strong enough to give a certain value to this assurance.

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## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 7.

[Cf. No 9.] *Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 11.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.*

A report has reached me from Vice-consul at the Dardanelles, dated evening of the 10th August, that two large warships, thought to be the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, have entered the Straits, and that the German consul went to meet them. Arrival of these vessels at Nagara late on same evening was reported in a second telegram.

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No. 8.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 11, 1914.*

I learn that at 8.30 P.M. last night *Goeben* and *Breslau* reached the Dardanelles.<sup>1</sup> These ships should not be allowed to pass through the Straits, and they should either leave within twenty-four hours, or be disarmed and laid up. You should point out to the Turkish Government that these are the duties entailed upon them by their neutrality, and that His Majesty's Government expect that they will act up to their obligations.

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No. 9.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

[Reply, No. 11.] (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See No. 7. My telegram of 11th August.<sup>1</sup>

The Ottoman Government have bought *Goeben* and *Breslau*. Officers and men will be allowed to return to Germany. Grand Vizier told me that purchase was due to our detention of *Sultan Osman*. They must have ship to bargain with regard to question of the islands on equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way directed against Russia, the idea of which he scouted.

He formally asked that the British naval mission might be allowed to remain.

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## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 10.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 12.)* [Reply,  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.* No. 13.]

Following from consul, Dardanelles, to-day :

'The large German ship has just left for Constantinople.

'Boats from small German ship have perquisitioned our ships here, and destroyed Marconi apparatus on French ships under threat of sinking them.<sup>1</sup>

'We have protested, demanding disarmament or expulsion of German ships before night. <sup>1</sup> [Cf. *post*, p. 259.]

'It seems that they desire to force Turkey into war.'

Military authorities seem to have completely lost their heads. British ships are capriciously detained at Dardanelles, and port officials here are refusing to issue papers to outgoing vessels.

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No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

Your telegram of 11th August.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See No. 9.

If the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are returned to Germany at once and if the transfer of those vessels to Turkey is *bona fide*, so that they can only reappear as Turkish ships with Turkish crews, there seems no reason that the British naval mission should be withdrawn.

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No. 12.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 13.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 12, 1914.*

I saw the Grand Vizier this morning and made strong representations to him against restrictions of free passage of the Straits, which the military authorities are now imposing under various pretexts. I said they had been holding up passenger and grain ships in the Dardanelles, refusing to deliver papers to ships wishing to leave Constantinople, and ordering grain ships to return to Constantinople at their caprice.

The Grand Vizier admitted that the War Office had been

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

most high-handed in their action, in violation of international obligations.

It seems that the Minister of War has now got entirely out of hand, and I gather that he alone is responsible for the present situation. Matters are undoubtedly becoming serious, but a Cabinet Council is being held this afternoon, and I hope I may be able afterwards to report some improvement.

I should add that all foreign shipping is affected by the restrictions to which I have alluded above.

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No. 13.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

Your telegram of 11th August.<sup>1</sup>

You should at once point out to Grand Vizier<sup>2</sup> that Turkish Government must not permit German ships to commit acts of war in the Straits, and ask why British merchant ships are detained.

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No. 14.

*Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 13.)*

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et a l'honneur de communiquer ci-dessous à son Excellence le texte du télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir à l'instant de son Gouvernement :

'Pour ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur l'attitude pacifique que le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé d'observer dans les conflits actuels, je vous informe derechef qu'il est résolu de garder stricte neutralité.'

*Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,  
le 13 août 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey, and has the honour to communicate herewith the text of a telegram just received from his Government, which runs as follows :

'In order that there may be no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Turkish Government have decided to

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 10.  
<sup>2</sup> [See Nos.  
26, 62.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

observe in the existing struggle, I inform you forthwith that they are determined to maintain strict neutrality.'

*Turkish Embassy, London, August 13, 1914.*

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No. 15.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 14, 1914.*

Admiral Limpus has received promise from Minister of Marine that his Excellency will make crews for the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. This will take time, but nevertheless it will be done; and his Excellency has undertaken to hand over the two ships bodily to the British admiral.

Admiral Limpus informs me that a month will probably elapse before *Sultan Selim* (late *Goeben*) can be even moved by the Turkish crew; but the formalities of transfer may be complete technically in a day or two. Further delay in taking delivery from the Germans is unavoidable.

Minister of Marine declared there was no intention of sending the ships outside Sea of Marmora until the end of the war.

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No. 16.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 15, 1914.*

Admiral Limpus and all officers of British Naval Mission have suddenly been replaced in their executive command by Turkish officers, and have been ordered to continue work at Ministry of Marine if they remain. Although I have been given to understand by a member of the Government that they are still anxious to get officers and crew of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* out of Turkey, this will probably mean retention of mechanics and technical experts at least, which will create most dangerous situation here.

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No. 17.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 16, 1914.*

As soon as French and Russian Ambassadors are similarly instructed, you are authorised to declare to Turkish Govern-

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

<sup>1</sup> [See No. 20.]

ment <sup>1</sup> that if Turkey will observe scrupulous neutrality during the war England, France, and Russia will uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that may wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her.

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No. 18.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 17.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 16, 1914.*

This morning Grand Vizier assured me again most solemnly that Turkish neutrality would be maintained. That Germany was doing her utmost to compromise the Turkish Government he did not deny, and he went so far as to admit that there was a danger of provoking Russia if Turkey lent herself to German designs which it served Turkey's interests to acquiesce in. This ambiguous expression no doubt refers to the fact that a certain number of German experts will be left on the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, owing to the inability of the Turks to handle those ships themselves. It would have been an impossible situation for Admiral Limpus, if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps reason of his withdrawal from executive command may lie in this consideration.

The *Goeben* and *Breslau* are at present lying off Constantinople. The Grand Vizier has assured me that there is no intention of moving them from Marmora. They are now flying the Ottoman flag under nominal command of Turkish officer, and have been transferred. This at least is a good sign.

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No. 19.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 17.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 16, 1914.*

I have received the following telegram, dated the 15th August, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dardanelles :

'A new field of mines has been laid in the zone formerly sown with mines of observation type. It may be assumed that these latter had previously been removed.

'The new contact mines, to the number of forty-one,



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

were laid by the *Mtibah* from Kephez to Suandere in a double line. Seven were kept on the ship, and the twenty-four from the *Selanik*, which is proceeding to Constantinople, were also taken on board.

'The *Lily Rickmers*, a German ship which has arrived here, carries a wireless installation.'

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No. 20.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 18.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 18, 1914.*

I have been accorded most cordial reception upon my return to my post by the Grand Vizier, of whom I inquired whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee he would give that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would be used neither against Great Britain nor against Russia. I also expressed my surprise that the Turkish Government should be apparently entirely under German influence, and that they should have committed such a serious breach of neutrality as was involved by their action in the matter of the German ships.

His Highness said that he deeply deplored this breach of neutrality, which he could not deny. He begged me to give him time to get rid of German crews, which he promised he would do gradually, but, until arrival of Turkish transport with crews from London, Turkish Government had no crew to replace Germans.

His Highness added that he had protested against the action of the *Breslau* in boarding British and French ships at the Dardanelles, and he expressed the hope that I would not take too serious a view of that incident.

Situation is delicate, but I have great hopes that if His Majesty's Government will exercise patience, it may yet be saved; for Grand Vizier solemnly assured me that neither the *Goeben* nor the *Breslau* would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

His Highness said that seizure of Turkish ships building in England by His Majesty's Government had caused the whole crisis, and, as almost every Turkish subject had subscribed towards their purchase, a terrible impression had been made throughout Turkey, where British attitude had



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

been attributed to intention to assist Greece in aggressive designs against Turkey. Turkish population would have understood if Great Britain had paid for the ships, or if she had promised to return them when the war was over ; but as it was it looked like robbery. Germans had not been slow to exploit the situation, of which they had taken every advantage.

<sup>1</sup> No. 17.

His Highness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorised in your telegram of the 16th August.<sup>1</sup> He said that this would be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pass.

I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of Grand Vizier in these utterances.

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No. 21.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 18, 1914.*

I told the Turkish Ambassador, who had expressed uneasiness as to our intentions towards Turkey, that Turkey would have nothing to fear from us, and that her integrity would be preserved in any conditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutrality during the war, made the *Breslau* and *Goeben* entirely Turkish by sending away the German crews of these vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels.

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No. 22.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 19, 1914.*

In view of the possibility that a *coup d'État* may be attempted with the assistance of the *Goeben*, in co-operation with the military authorities under German influence, who exercise complete control, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the precaution of presence of British fleet at the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any mis-

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

understanding as to the gravity of the situation, notwithstanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier.

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No. 23.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 20.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 19, 1914.*

I saw the Grand Vizier on the afternoon of 17th August, and made strong representations to him with regard to the detention of vessels laden with cargoes consigned from Russian ports to the Mediterranean.

He promised to give immediate instructions that ships should be allowed to proceed.

The port authorities were undoubtedly instructed yesterday morning to permit seven ships loaded with grain and one with petroleum for the Mediterranean, and one ship with coal for the Danube, to depart, but this permission was cancelled later.

It appears from this as if the military party, supported by the Germans, were determined to reassert themselves, and that a serious conflict of authority has arisen.

I propose to see Grand Vizier, whom I was unable to see last night, as early as possible this morning, and to insist upon his carrying out of his promise with regard to laden ships.

If these are permitted to leave, only four ships will remain, and no others have arrived since yesterday.

Of these four ships only one is in a position to leave immediately, but their case is different to that of the nine ships mentioned above, of which the cargoes have never touched Turkish soil, and which are covered by treaties guaranteeing free passage of the Straits at all times, thus making their detention a far more serious matter.

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No. 24.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 21.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 20, 1914.* [Reply,  
No. 28.]

Minister of Marine \* came to see me to-day, and expressed his relief at being able to talk to me freely.

\* [Djemal Pasha.]

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

He put forward the following proposal :

Firstly, that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately. I pointed out the difficulty of this, and he suggested that the Minister of Finance \* should come and discuss the question with me.

Secondly, he demanded the immediate return of the two Turkish battleships acquired by His Majesty's Government at the commencement of the war. I told him that this was impossible, but that I would endeavour to obtain as good terms as possible for them, and that I hoped they would not be needed during the war, and would soon be returned to Turkey ; in the meanwhile they should be regarded as a loan from Turkey to a friend.

Thirdly, he asked for renunciation of any interference with the internal affairs of Turkey. This need not be taken seriously, and is, of course, an absurd proposal.

Fourthly, he asked that if Bulgaria should intervene against the Triple *Entente*, Western Thrace should be given back to Turkey.

Fifthly, he wanted the restoration of the Greek islands. I told him that this was impossible, and he finally agreed to the basis arranged just before the present war broke out.

His final proposal was that the Allied Powers should undertake to oblige the Triple Alliance to accept any agreements which might be reached with respect to the Capitulations.

Our conversation was of the friendliest description, and at its close the Minister of Marine asked whether I would sanction the chartering of a British oil-tank steamer now at Tenedos to convey oil from Constanza. I asked him the purposes for which this oil was required, and he replied that it was for use in Turkish destroyers. I said that I thought that such a request, when the German crews of the *Breslau* and *Goeben* were masters of the situation here, would greatly surprise His Majesty's Government, and he replied that he did not wish to create any suspicion in their minds, and would therefore withdraw his request, adding that any suspicion that the German ships would be allowed to attack our shipping was absurd.

\* [Djavid Bey.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

I said that, although I personally believed in the sincerity of his assurances, there seemed to be no doubt that the German admiral was now the master here. Minister seemed greatly surprised at this, but finally asked me to assure you that he would open the Dardanelles to the British fleet, if the German crews would not leave the two ships when he told them to do so.

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No. 25.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 20, 1914.*

Following from His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, dated 19th August :

'Passages were stopped this afternoon, while seventeen more mines were laid in a zigzag line along one side of the channel, which has been rendered extremely narrow. There is a heavy oil-steamer to pass to-morrow, and it may not be easy.

'Mines remain, but I suspect that there are more on board *Rickmers*.

'Weber Pasha, who has returned with other German officers, is believed to be on board the latter vessel.

'Several Hotchkiss guns have arrived and have been mounted on both sides of the Straits commanding mine-field.'

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No. 26.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 21, 1914.*

Your telegram of 12th August.<sup>1</sup>

Reply to representations received from Porte<sup>2</sup> expresses regrets for unfortunate incident of which British merchant vessels at Dardanelles were object, and gives formal assurances that similar acts shall not occur again. Explanation of detention of ships given in Porte's note is that in consequence of some mines having been detached from their moorings, authorities had prevented vessels from continuing their voyage until mines had been picked up, in order to avoid accidents.

<sup>1</sup> See

No. 13.

<sup>2</sup> [See  
No. 63.]

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No mention is made of real reason, which was wish of military authorities to requisition grain and other cargoes.

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No. 27.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1914.*

I was informed by the Grand Vizier to-night that he wanted all the support that the Triple *Entente* could give him, and that the sooner they could give a written declaration respecting the independence and integrity of Turkey the better.

A sharp struggle, which may come to a head at any moment, is in progress between the Moderates and the German party, headed by the Minister for War, and is meanwhile creating anarchy here.

Marshal Liman \* and the German Ambassador are recklessly striving to force the Turks into declaring war on Russia, in which case the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would presumably sail for the Black Sea. They are prepared to achieve this object, if necessary, by a *coup d'État*, making the Minister of War dictator.

It is said that the Dardanelles forts have German garrisons, and that the *Goeben*, which has been slightly damaged, will be repaired by the 2nd September, or possibly earlier.

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No. 28.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 22, 1914.*

Your telegram of 20th August.<sup>1</sup>

The demands made by the Turkish Government are excessive; we do not, however, wish to refuse all discussion, and you may therefore, as soon as the French and Russian Ambassadors have received similar instructions, address the following communication to the Porte:

‘If the Turkish Government will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant

\* Head of the German Military Mission in Turkey.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey during the present war, the three allied Powers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitulations, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which will satisfy modern conditions, is set up.

'They will further give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity.'

No. 29.

[Reply,  
No. 38.]

*Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 22.)*

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et, se référant à la conversation qu'il a eu l'honneur d'avoir avec son Excellence et dont il avait rendu compte à son Gouvernement par un télégramme en date du 18 courant, s'empresse de l'informer que son Altesse Saïd Halim Pacha vient de lui faire savoir par une dépêche responsive expédiée hier et parvenue à l'instant :

1. Que les ordres nécessaires ont été donnés à qui de droit pour le libre commerce dans les eaux ottomanes de tout navire marchand ;

2. Que le Gouvernement Impérial procédera au remplacement des officiers et équipage allemands par ceux du *Sultan Osman* dès qu'ils seront arrivés à Constantinople.

*Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,*  
*le 22 août, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey, and with reference to the conversation which he had with him, and which he reported to the Turkish Government in a telegram of the 18th instant, hastens to state that His Highness Saïd Halim Pasha has just replied in a telegram dated yesterday, and just received, as follows :

1. The necessary orders have been given in the proper quarter for the free navigation of Turkish waters by all merchant vessels ;



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

2. The Turkish Government will replace the German officers and men by those of the *Sultan Osman* as soon as they arrive at Constantinople.

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No. 30.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 23.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 22, 1914.*

I saw Minister of Marine, as the Turkish transport has now arrived, and asked him when the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would be repatriated.

He said that it depended upon the Grand Vizier. He was himself in favour of their repatriation.

I shall press the matter strongly, but do not know whether the Moderates are sufficiently strong to insist upon such a step being taken at once.

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No. 31.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 24.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 23, 1914.*

I hear that a further contingent of German officers has recently arrived *via* Sophia for service here.

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No. 32.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 25.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 24, 1914.*

The Minister of War has not yet recovered from his illness. I have made it absolutely clear to the Grand Vizier that there is evidently no reason for delaying transfer of ships now that changes have come, and I said that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate that the Turkish fleet, as well as the Turkish army, should be in the hands of Germany, warning His Highness that the British fleet would not leave the Dardanelles until His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the Turkish Government had loyally carried out the condition laid down, and until British merchantmen could navigate Turkish waters without either delay or molestation.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

It was therefore obvious that if there was any idea of manning the Turkish fleet with German officers and men it must be given up. The situation was already quite humiliating enough for the Turkish Empire, which was in peril of total ruin if the Turkish Government allowed the domination of Constantinople by Germany. The Grand Vizier assured me that the Turkish Government had not the slightest intention of Germanising their fleet; and while it is my impression that the forces in favour of the maintenance of strict neutrality by Turkey are slowly gaining, I replied that I should not be satisfied with less than the actual departure of the German crews.

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No. 33.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 25.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

I received yesterday a written assurance from Grand Vizier that merchant vessels will be allowed to go and come in Turkish ports without hindrance in accordance with treaties.

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No. 34.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 25, 1914.*

His Majesty the King desires that your Excellency should convey to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey a personal message from His Majesty,<sup>1</sup> expressing his deep regret at the sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty's subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire. His Majesty the King wishes the Sultan to understand that the exigencies of the defence of his dominions are the only cause of the detention of these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it being the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war, in the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by Turkey without favour to the King's enemies, as at present shown by the Ottoman Government.

# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 35.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 26.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

[See  
No. 36.] I hear from His Majesty's Consul at Jerusalem that forty camels laden with food-stuffs have been seized from Egyptians at Gaza.

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No. 36.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 26.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 35. Seizure of camels reported in my telegram of to-day.<sup>1</sup>  
I am making strong representations to Ottoman Government. The Germans, who are no doubt responsible for the activity now reported, are doing their best to embroil us with the Turks.

The Grand Vizier vehemently denies that it is his intention to attack Egypt in any way or to attempt any sort of intrigues there. In this, I think, he is sincere. He is forming a Moderate party genuinely in favour of Turkey remaining neutral.

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No. 37.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received August 26.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

His Majesty's Vice-consul, Dardanelles, reports that former channel on the European side of the Straits was further mined on the 24th August. More buoys have been placed in new channel on the Asiatic side, and that channel may now be followed. Passages were prevented on the 24th August by the work of laying these buoys, but they have been resumed from to-day.

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No. 38.

*Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.*

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1914.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 22nd instant.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 29.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

In reply, I have the honour to state that I have taken note that :

1. The necessary orders have been sent by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the competent authorities to allow free passage in Ottoman waters to all foreign merchant vessels.

2. That the Imperial Ottoman Government will replace the German officers and crew of the late *Goeben* and *Breslau* by those of the *Sultan Osman* the moment the latter arrive at Constantinople.—I have, etc.,

E. GREY.

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No. 39.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, August 26, 1914.*

Ninety German sailors passed through Sophia yesterday on their way to Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> I have protested strongly, but Grand Vizier is unable to control the situation, which is dominated by the German Ambassador and generals. Weber Pasha, who is in command at the Dardanelles, is said to be urging closing of the Straits. I have brought this to the notice of the Grand Vizier. His Highness most positively repudiated any such idea, and begged me to have patience, as this situation would not last, and he was gaining authority.

<sup>1</sup> [See  
No. 43.]

In the meantime, general mobilisation is proceeding feverishly, and preparations are being pushed on in the fleet. Eighty pounds' worth of surgical appliances, dressings, etc., were bought by doctor of the *Corcovado* to-day. I am informed that there is a 5-inch gun hidden by canvas at her stern. She still lies at Therapia. It is not likely that the two German men-of-war will come out of the Dardanelles, but there are grounds for thinking that German plan is to urge Turkey to attack Russia after France is beaten—about ten days hence, in their estimation. Straits would be entirely closed, and, according to the German Ambassador, quite impossible to force, since Germans have taken special measures to make them impregnable.

To sum up, the situation is most unsatisfactory, though not actually desperate.

No. 40.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 27.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Bukarest, August 27, 1914.*

Press to-day reports special train from Berlin, carrying 500 German marines, passed through Bukarest yesterday for Constantinople.

Official communication this evening states that this was not a military transport, but that men were workmen, mostly Germans, under the direction of several engineers and functionaries, on the way to Turkey *via* Bulgaria for work on Bagdad Railway.

Communiqué adds that in future foreign subjects will not be allowed passage through the country in groups of more than twenty, even if their individual passports are in order.

No. 41.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 27.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 27, 1914.*

German ships.<sup>1</sup>

There are grounds for thinking that Germans are urging Turks to send *Goeben* into Black Sea, where they would argue that she has a right to go as a Turkish ship. Germans would count upon Russian warship attacking her, and war would ensue, seemingly provoked by Russia.

Object of Germans is to create a diversion here, draw off some Russian troops and enemies from Austria, and embroil us at the same time.

There are, it is said, 162 German officers here and many reservists.

No. 42.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 27, 1914.*

My telegram of 27th August.<sup>1</sup>

Russian Ambassador is at present with Grand Vizier, whom I have just seen. I again impressed upon His Highness my apprehensions lest *Goeben* should make a raid. I expressed my conviction that, should Turkey be so unwise as to provoke

<sup>1</sup> [See  
No. 42.]

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 41.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, it would mean the end of the Ottoman Empire. To these observations on my part, His Highness replied that the *Goeben*, manned as she was with German crew, would never be allowed by the Turkish Government to enter the Black Sea. His language on this point was most emphatic, and I believe that he was sincere in what he said. I did not fail, however, to draw His Highness's attention to the fact that, if the Minister of Marine, the Minister of War, and the German Ambassador ordered the *Goeben* to go there, I did not quite see how His Highness was going to prevent it. If the German Emperor ordered the German Admiral to go into the Black Sea, it did not seem to me that the two Turkish Ministers could, even if they would, prevent the Admiral from obeying those commands.

Grand Vizier assured me most emphatically that my fears were entirely without foundation, but he did not give me any reasons to back up this optimistic opinion. His Highness was much upset when I rejoined that, so long as German crews remained, his Highness was not master of his own house, but at the mercy of the Germans, who had, to all intents and purposes, occupied Constantinople. His Highness admitted that Germans were urging Turkey to depart from her neutrality, and that they wished to embroil her with the Russians and ourselves, but he nevertheless solemnly assured me that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. He fully understood Germany's aims in this matter, and all Turkish Government were determined not to fall into the trap.

Grand Vizier is, I am sure, absolutely sincere himself. But none the less the situation is as I have described it in the preceding paragraphs.

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No. 43.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 27, 1914.*

My telegram of 24th [26th?] August.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to my inquiries, Grand Vizier stated that neither he nor Minister of Marine knew anything about the reported arrival of German sailors. They had not been asked for by the Turkish Government.

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 39.



I said that, if this really was the case, it furnished yet another proof of how completely Germany had obtained control here. German merchantmen were, to my knowledge, arming in the port of Constantinople, and it was obvious that the German sailors were to be put into these ships or on board the Turkish fleet. This being so, it was my duty to warn His Highness of the unfortunate effect that this continued violation of Turkish neutrality in favour of Germany was bound to have upon the Governments of the Triple *Entente*.

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No. 44.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, August 28, 1914.*

Ottoman forces are being mobilised in Hedjaz and further south, and existing military activity in Red Sea may thus be explained. About sixty Turkish officers arrived at Alexandria recently and passed through Egypt down Red Sea. Their destination was the Yemen.

Twelve thousand Turkish troops are reported in Jeddah region.

Signs are not lacking that, in case of war, an attack on Egypt is contemplated by Turkey. A few Turkish officers are now in the Delta. Steps have been taken to watch all those that are known. I learn from a good source that all information of Turkish mobilisation reported from Constantinople is correct. Meanwhile emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt, to stir up feeling against Great Britain. Activity at Gaza is reported, but it is uncertain whether this is more than raising of levies to replace regulars withdrawn from the north by mobilisation.

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No. 45.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 29.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 28, 1914.*

General situation here.

It is possible, though I consider it highly improbable, that Turks may make a dash out of the Dardanelles when

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

their fleet is better prepared. It is equally possible that Turkey may make some forward movement against Serbia or Greece on land. Nevertheless, I trust that you will not read my various reports to mean that I have abandoned last hope that neutrality will be maintained to extent of not actually attacking Russia in Black Sea. I still think that it is far from probable that Turkey will for the time being make any forward move.

News propagated by German Ambassador here this morning is that Germans are marching on Paris, and that they have decisively worsted the Allies. This message has without doubt come by wireless, as the Ambassador is in direct communication with German General Staff. This news will, I fear, tend to shake Turks still further, as they now confidently expect that Triple *Entente* will be annihilated. There is also no doubt that very active preparations are in hand, and that Germans here are confident of hostilities. Consignments of gold from Germany have arrived for German and Austrian banks, private German residents have sent away their wives, and quantities of medical stores have been purchased and put on board German ships.

I hear that German Ambassador is adopting tone of friendly commiseration for Great Britain, who, he asserts, will never assist Russia in any movement against Turkey. He has made the remarkable statement that his Government will now offer favourable terms to France, which she will certainly accept; that Germany will then wage a platonic war with England, whose heart is not in the struggle, and who will make terms to save her fleet; and that Germany and England will then combine against Russia.

German Ambassador's attitude seems to indicate great preoccupation as regards British fleet and as regards Russian advance in East Prussia, and a desire to make terms now in order to save Germany's resources for a final struggle with us under more favourable conditions. I have made it known privately in the proper quarter that under no conditions would Great Britain abandon her Allies, and that, whatever the present situation in the field may be, it is still but the beginning of a struggle from which we are firmly resolved to emerge victoriously.



No. 46.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 29.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 28, 1914.*

From information that has reached me, there is no doubt that in course of time the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Bosphorus will become nothing more nor less than a sort of German enclave. Sailors recently arrived from Sophia will be sent to Straits forts and more will follow. This is over and above German military reservists already allotted to garrison those forts.

I hear that, although Turks have not yet any ordnance of the more modern type for mounting in Straits defences, it is very probable that consignment of guns will arrive in the near future from Germany and Austria through Constanza.

No. 47.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.*  
*(Received August 29.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August 28, 1914.*

Special train full of German sailors with officers passed Sophia last night for Constantinople, making total passed about 600.

I am informed credibly that large consignment of guns and artillery material has passed through Roumania to Giurgevo and is now being brought across to Rustchuk.

No. 48.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 31.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 30, 1914.*

I and my colleagues still do not regard situation as hopeless, and are of opinion that we should go on as long as possible without provoking a rupture. I find it hard to believe that, when it comes to the point, Turks would declare war on Russia or on ourselves.

Eventuality of a general war is doubtless counted on by Germany with the object of diverting energies of Russia from the main object of European conflict. Germans may even argue that, in the event of Russians receiving serious



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

check in Germany, they might be induced to desist from struggle by bait of Constantinople.

There is no doubt that it is object of Germany to involve Russia and Great Britain in serious troubles here in the hope of general Balkan conflagration and of complications for us in India and Egypt. I heard to-day on good authority that it is admitted in Berlin that, if necessary, they will encourage a 'jihad' \* with this object.

I have strong impression that Turkish Government, with exception of its extreme chauvinists, are aware of Germany's objects, which I have not ceased to instil into them, and that time may cool their ardour for their German masters. I warned Grand Vizier this morning of inevitable results of siding with Germany against us, and said that our patience was not inexhaustible, and that consequences of allying themselves with our enemies would be serious. His Highness seemed to be impressed, and promised that German sailors should be sent away.

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No. 49.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 1.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

Minister of Marine called on Russian Ambassador last night and assured him that he was working hard for neutrality, that he would send away German sailors in fortnight, and that 200 were leaving to-day, truth of which we shall verify. He may only be gaining time.

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No. 50.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 1.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

I again discussed subject of Turkish neutrality to-day with Grand Vizier. His Highness evidently relies on Minister of Interior, who returns shortly. He assured me most solemnly that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. I replied that we should not be satisfied until the German sailors left, as Turkish neutrality had already

\* i.e., Holy War.

been so gravely compromised already. He reiterated with much vehemence that all German sailors should go.

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No. 51.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 1.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*  
 Sulleiman-el-Burouni, a highly placed senator, is in Egypt, probably in Cairo, engaged in fomenting revolutionary movement.

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No. 52.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1914.*  
 In order that there may be no room for misconception, you should inform Turkish Government that Egyptian Government are taking measures to patrol Suez Canal on both banks, and that this step is necessary to protect the safe and proper working of the Canal. You should add that no advance into Sinai, nor military operations in that region, are under contemplation.

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No. 53.

[Reply, No. 56.] *Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 2.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 2, 1914.*  
 I should be glad to learn whether British Admiral has instructions in case *Goeben* went into Mediterranean under Turkish flag. Should I tell Turkish Government that, so long as she has Germans on board, we shall regard her as a German ship and treat her as such, and that, before she goes out into Mediterranean, Admiral Limpus must be allowed to assure himself that there are no Germans on board?

I do not anticipate her going out, but should like to make it clear beforehand what our attitude would be in case she does so.

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## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 54.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received September 3.) [Reply,  
(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, September 2, 1914. No. 57.]

Am I authorised to make public statement that Turkey will have nothing to fear from British ships if she maintains strict neutrality and keeps peace during European conflict, if British trade is not interfered with, and if German naval officers and crews are sent out of the country?

No. 55.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received September 3.) [Reply,  
(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, September 3, 1914. No. 58.]

I should be glad to have discretion to let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves the Dardanelles we shall treat it as part of the German fleet, as it has German crews and officers on board.

No. 56.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd September.<sup>1</sup>

So long as German crews have not been sent away, *Goeben* will certainly be treated as a German ship if she comes out of the Straits. It was only on express condition that German crews would be sent away that we waived demand, to which we were strictly entitled, that ship should be interned until the end of the war.

No. 57.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd September.<sup>2</sup>

You may make statement you propose, but we cannot restrict movements of British fleet.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 58.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.*

Your telegram of 3rd September : <sup>1</sup> Turkish fleet.  
Proposal approved.

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 55.

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No. 59.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 5, 1914.*

I hear that Inspector from Constantinople of Committee of Union and Progress left Erzeroum on the 1st September for Persia, where he has previously lived. He was accompanied by three Persian revolutionists from Constantinople, one of them named Agha Mehemet Ali. They have ideas about Afghan and Indian Moslems, and also intend to stir up anti-Russian trouble in Persia.

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No. 60.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 5, 1914.*

I have to-day gone over the whole ground with the Minister of the Interior, who seems more inclined to be reasonable. I think there is an improvement in the situation.

Minister quite understands that *Goeben* will be treated as a German ship if she goes out. They assure me that Turkish fleet will not leave the Dardanelles on any account.

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No. 61.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 6, 1914.*

Surprises are always possible, but I feel fairly confident, from what I hear from many prominent people with whom I am in touch, that public opinion will change in our favour.

There is growing discontent among influential people, who are now beginning to realise that they are in German hands. This they resent, and they are openly declaring that they will not allow war.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

In view of all this, I think I can safely say that there are many signs of an improvement in the situation here.

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No. 62.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 7.)*

*Constantinople, August 19, 1914.*

SIR,—With reference to your telegram of the 12th August <sup>1</sup> See to Mr. Beaumont, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy No. 13. of a *note verbale* addressed by him to the Sublime Porte in the sense of your instructions respecting the perquisitions effected by the German cruiser *Breslau* off British ships in the port of Chanak and the detention of British ships in the Dardanelles.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 62.

*Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte, Constantinople, August 14, 1914.* [Reply, No. 63 (encl.).]

It having been brought to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, while in the neutral port of Chanak (Dardanelles), boats of the cruiser *Breslau*, flying the German flag, boarded and effected perquisitions on British ships, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to request that the Imperial Ottoman Government will not permit German ships to commit acts of war in Turkish ports or in the Straits, the neutrality of which is guaranteed by international treaties.

Mr. Beaumont is instructed at the same time to inquire on what grounds British ships have recently been prevented from leaving the port of Constantinople, and have been detained on arrival at the Dardanelles, in some cases for several days.

According to a telegram received to-day from His Majesty's Vice-consul at the Dardanelles, British ships are still being help up there, and His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to request that immediate orders may be sent to allow them to proceed:

No. 63.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 7.)**Constantinople, August 21, 1914.*<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 62.

SIR,—With reference to my immediately preceding despatch,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to forward herewith a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte, expressing regret for the incidents at the Dardanelles and offering explanations.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 63.

*Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.*

Le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note verbale que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 14 courant.

En réponse, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères s'empresse d'exprimer tous ses regrets à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté britannique pour le fâcheux incident dont furent l'objet quelques bâtiments de commerce battant pavillon anglais dans le port de Chanak ; la Sublime Porte est en mesure de donner les assurances les plus formelles que pareil fait ne se répétera plus.

Quant aux bateaux retenus à Chanak, des torpilles sous-marines s'étant détachées, les autorités Impériales ont cru de leur devoir d'empêcher ces bateaux de continuer leur voyage jusqu'au repêchage desdites mines, pour éviter de fâcheux incidents. Cette interdiction provisoire est donc le résultat d'une mesure générale que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de prendre afin d'assurer la sécurité de la navigation dans les eaux Impériales.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que les mines, ayant été repêchées, les autorités compétentes ont été invitées par le Gouvernement Impérial de lever l'interdiction de passage et de faciliter de leur mieux la navigation à tous les navires.

*Le 16 août, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

The Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs had the honour of receiving the *note verbale* which His Britannic Majesty's



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Embassy was good enough to communicate on the 14th instant.

In reply, the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs hastens to express great regret to the Chargé d'Affaires for the annoying incident suffered by some merchant vessels flying the British flag in the harbour of Chanak; the Sublime Porte are able to give the most formal assurances that such an act shall not be repeated.

As regards the vessels detained at Chanak, some submarine mines having become detached, the Imperial authorities thought it incumbent upon them to prevent those vessels from continuing their voyage until the said mines had been recovered, in order that annoying incidents might be prevented. This provisional prohibition is, it will thus be seen, the result of a general measure which the Imperial Government have been obliged to take with a view to ensuring the safety of navigation in Turkish waters.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, the mines having been recovered, the competent authorities have been requested by the Government to raise the prohibition of free passage, and to do their best to facilitate navigation for all vessels.

*August 16, 1914.*

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No. 64.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 7.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 6, 1914.*

Minister of Interior yesterday assured me that there was no question of Turkey going to war.

I used every possible argument to dissuade Minister of the Interior from leaping on a military adventure, reminding him that in the end Turkey would inevitably pay. I told him His Majesty's Government regarded Turkish fleet an annex of German fleet, and that if it went out into the Ægean we should sink it. He quite realised this, and said that fleet had no intention of leaving Dardanelles.

I went carefully over several infringements of neutrality of which Turks had been guilty, and I said that so long as a single German officer, naval or military, remained here I should consider Turkey as a German protectorate; that I

had been informed that Turkish Government attached no importance to written declaration which I and my French and Russian colleagues had made them respecting their integrity. I was greatly surprised at this attitude, but personally somewhat relieved, as to guarantee integrity and independence of Turkey was like guaranteeing life of man who was determined to commit suicide.

We sincerely desired independence and integrity of Turkey, but he must not imagine that Great Britain was afraid of Turkey, or that we feared to face alternative if forced upon us. Most ridiculous stories about insurrections in India and Egypt and approaching downfall of British Empire were being circulated broadcast, and were apparently believed by Minister of War. I hoped that Minister of the Interior was not under those and similar dangerous illusions.

Minister of the Interior said that he understood.

He then proceeded to state that Turkish Government now wished to sell us two Turkish ships outright. They wanted money badly, as the economic situation was desperate. I replied that I did not know His Majesty's Government's views, which I would inquire, but that, personally, I should be reluctant to inflict so mortal a stab on the wounded heart of the Turkish people, who were already suffering so much by temporary detention of their ships. Their purchase might give rise to another tempest of indignation.

Moreover, I doubted whether His Majesty's Government would readily pay several millions to a country which was entirely in German hands, and which was breathing out threats against ourselves and our Allies.

He replied that His Majesty's Government could make what conditions they liked if they bought ships; and that Turkish Government would send away all Germans. I said that I would reflect on proposal and repeat it to you.

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No. 65.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 7.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 7, 1914.*

There is fresh evidence that there has been no sale of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to Turkey. I learn on unimpeachable



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

authority that German Ambassador has twice sent down orders to customs for admission, duty free, of effects for His Imperial Majesty's ship *Goeben*. I have brought this to notice of Grand Vizier, and have reminded him that we do not recognise sale.

Should I not tell His Highness that His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that the sale is a genuine and legal one, before they can recognise the ship as Turkish? I think that this should be done, even if the German crews go.

I have said to both Talaat and Grand Vizier that if *Goeben* and *Breslau* leave Dardanelles they will be treated as German ships. They fully realise this, and have assured me that the ships will on no account leave.

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No. 66.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 8.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 8, 1914.*

Presence of numerous Turkish officers in Egypt is undoubtedly a danger, and measures against suspected individuals may become necessary at any moment. A Turkish naval officer recently left Egypt hurriedly for Beirout. A letter belonging to him has been found, in which it is stated that he has been doing his best to cause a strike amongst Moslem stokers and engineers of four Khedivial mail steamers, which are to be used as transports for our troops. The letter continues that he has not succeeded in his attempts, but that he will do his best to sink the vessels after the troops have embarked. It is worth noting that a strike on steamers in question has now occurred.

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No. 67.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 8, 1914.*  
British Naval Mission.

Before any decision respecting the recall of the mission is taken by His Majesty's Government, I wish to have your views on the subject. I am reluctant to take any step, however justified it may be, that would precipitate unfavour-

[See  
No. 68,  
note.]



able developments, as long as there is a reasonable chance of avoiding them. What effect do you consider that withdrawal of mission would have upon the political situation?

The Admiralty are of opinion that the position of the mission may become unsafe, and that it is already undignified. They therefore wish it to be recalled and attached to the Embassy until you can arrange a safe passage home for Admiral Limpus and the other officers. There is clearly ample justification for the view taken by the Admiralty.

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No. 68.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.\** (Received September 9.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 8, 1914.*

I have on more than one occasion told Grand Vizier that resentment is probable in England, especially in present circumstances, at the slight put upon British Admiral, and that, much as His Majesty's Government desire to remain on friendly terms with Turkey, such proceedings on the part of the Turkish Government cannot be indefinitely overlooked.

In many respects the situation seems to show improvement, but unless His Majesty's Government wish mission to remain indefinitely it seems to me that the present would be a suitable moment to withdraw it. The Turks could not regard this step as a grievance as it is obviously justified by their conduct. The mission are at present treated as non-existent, and their position is consequently both false and invidious. German hold on the navy is becoming stronger daily, and there is no sign of German crews leaving. As a matter of fact, far from being disadvantageous to us, this is becoming embarrassing to the Turkish Government, who are at last beginning to realise that the Germans are not an unmixed blessing. Great discontent reigns among Turkish naval officers, so Admiral Limpus tells me, as they dislike German officers, and they even hint that they would rather mutiny than serve under them.

I am of opinion that the time has come to withdraw the mission, and if this can be approved in principle, I will speak

\* This telegram crossed Sir E. Grey's telegram of September 8; see No. 67.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

to the Admiral, who feels his position acutely, and ask him to make the necessary arrangements.

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No. 69.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

Grand Vizier admitted this morning that the Turkish Government were going to abolish Capitulations.

I said that this information would greatly surprise my Government, whom I would at once apprise.

The Capitulations and conventions were not a unilateral agreement ; we had on a former occasion informed the Turkish Government that we were willing to consider any request they might put forward in a generous spirit, but I did not imagine that my Government would acquiesce in their total abolition by a stroke of the pen. We were now under martial law. Did he expect us to allow British subjects to be judged by court-martial, especially so long as army was in hands of Germans ?

His Highness made some ineffectual endeavours to defend his action, but I cut them short.

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No. 70.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

Minister of Interior told me to-day that note to Embassies on subject of the abolition of the Capitulations had already been despatched. German Ambassador had just called to protest. Earlier in the day the Italian Ambassador had informed me that German and Austrian Ambassadors were ready to associate themselves with us in protesting against the abolition.

German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move on the part of Turkey, and I think that he may be speaking the truth ; but every statement he makes must be received with caution. Nevertheless, statement by Minister of Interior,



to which I have alluded above, seems to bear him out in this case.

I have discussed the proposed abolition with the Minister of the Interior, and he maintains that they all feel that the time has come to emancipate Turkey from foreign shackles. But he disclaimed any intention of hostility against foreigners. He had already sent instructions to all Valis and police officials not to inflame people against foreigners, and he would give strictest orders that no foreigners should be taken before courts-martial.

I told his Excellency that I thought the action of the Turkish Government would inevitably lead to greater interference than ever in the internal affairs of Turkey. I could only regret that they should have acted so precipitately.

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No. 71.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 10.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

Abolition of Capitulations.<sup>1</sup>

It has been arranged that all the Embassies shall send in identic notes to-morrow, acknowledging Turkish note and pointing out that abolition of the Capitulations cannot be accepted, as consent of both contracting parties is necessary.

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No. 72.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 11.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 10, 1914.*

Consignments of warlike material from Germany traced up to date amount to 3000 rounds of projectiles for *Goeben*, battery of field guns with ammunition, several batteries of heavy howitzers, probably for field army use, and some thousands of rifles. More consignments are on the way. All German reservists who have not been able to leave Turkish Empire have been instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. No. 73.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 73.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 11.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 10, 1914.*

My telegram of 9th September.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 71.

Note abolishing all the Capitulations was received last night. All my colleagues, including German and Austrian Ambassadors, have to-day addressed identic notes<sup>2</sup> to the Sublime Porte stating that, while communicating to our respective Governments note respecting abolition of Capitulations, we must point out that capitulatory régime is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements, and contractual acts of different kinds. It cannot be abolished in any part, *a fortiori* wholly, without consent of contracting parties. Therefore, in the absence of understanding arrived at before 1st October between Ottoman Government and our respective Governments, we cannot recognise executory force after that date of a unilateral decision of Sublime Porte.

<sup>2</sup> [See *post*,  
p. 274.]

No. 74.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 14.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 13, 1914.*

I hear that Germans are now dominant at Alexandretta, and secretly suggest and control everything. From 7th September to morning of 12th September, 24 mountain guns, 400 horses and mules, 500 artillery troops belonging to service of 6th Army Corps, and large quantity of ammunition passed through Alexandretta, proceeding by railway to Constantinople.

No. 75.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 15.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 14, 1914.*

German Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to publish widely report of revolution in India, with addition that His Majesty's Government have asked Japan to assist, and that Japan has agreed, in return for free immigration into the Pacific Coast, a free hand in China, and a

£40,000,000 loan. I was warned in time by the Russian Ambassador, and instructed all consuls by telegraph to deny it, if published, and wrote to the Grand Vizier.

Nothing official has appeared here, but the agencies are publishing part of the story.

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No. 76.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 16.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 15, 1914.*

Fleet is now entirely in German hands, and Minister of Marine is powerless. Germans consider that Dardanelles are now impassable, and they are impressing this upon military authorities. It is said that, if the Turkish fleet moved into the Black Sea, Straits would be entirely closed by additional mines, which have just been sent there on the *Nilufer*.

Though I do not say that this *coup* will actually come off, danger is undoubtedly greater since news has been received of the recent successes of the Allies, as the Germans are all the more anxious to create a diversion. My impression is that majority of the Cabinet and the Grand Vizier himself are entirely opposed to any such adventure, and that they are doing their utmost to prevent it; but they are finding out, though they will not admit it, that they are powerless to stop matters.

Both I and my Russian colleague have received independent information that German and Austrian Ambassadors are making a determined effort to force the Minister of War to send the *Goeben* and the rest of the fleet into the Black Sea. Fifty transports have been ready for some time, and I understand that everything is prepared for the reception on board these vessels of a large number of Turkish troops.

Abolition of the Capitulations<sup>1</sup> is now the principal card in the hands of the peace party. They would, I think, be ready to defer discussion of abolition of judicial Capitulations if abolition of fiscal and commercial treaties could be agreed to forthwith by the three Powers.

I hear that 15 per cent. duties will be applied from the 1st October, but a law is at present under consideration exempting

<sup>1</sup>[See  
No. 77.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

existing contracts. As nothing is at present coming into ports, application of these duties is, as a matter of fact, of little consequence. The temettu\* also will be applied to foreigners.

No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 16, 1914.*

Your telegram of 15th September :<sup>1</sup> Abolition of Capitulations. <sup>1</sup> See No. 76.

I am inclined to point out to Turkish Government that, so long as they maintain neutrality, what we have said to them already holds good, and that we shall be prepared to consider reasonable concessions about Capitulations; but they must not expect concessions from us while their present irregular conduct in the matter of the German officers and crews continues. Perhaps we might also say that if they break the peace we cannot be responsible for the consequences; that we hope they will keep the peace, but whether they do so or not is their own affair.

No. 78.

*United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 17.)*

*Vienna Chambers, Bute Docks, Cardiff,  
September 16, 1914.*

SIR,—We are instructed by the owners of the steamship *Reliance* to seek your aid for the recovery of compensation from the Turkish Government for the detention of their steamer by the Turkish authorities.

The facts of the case are as follows :

On the 1st August last the steamship *Reliance* sailed from Nickolaief with a cargo of barley for Hamburg, and arrived off Constantinople at noon on the 3rd. The captain waited at Constantinople for orders from the owners of his steamer until the 6th, but he received no communication from his owners as the Turkish authorities had stopped the delivery of telegrams.

\* [Duties on profession; a direct tax.]



On 6th August the captain proceeded on his voyage and arrived off Nagara Point, Dardanelles, on the following day at 8 A.M. when he sent his permit to pass through the Dardanelles ashore in accordance with the usual practice and received a signal from the fort that the canal was 'blocked. This blocking signal was kept up on the 8th, 9th, and 10th August; on the latter date several Italian vessels were piloted out and the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* were piloted in by Turkish torpedo craft and anchored in Nagara Bay.<sup>1</sup> A German merchant vessel, the *General*, was also piloted in.

The captain of the *Reliance* daily saw the British Consul at Chanak, but the Consul was unable to obtain permission for the *Reliance* to pass through the Dardanelles.

On the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th August the *Reliance* remained off Nagara Point, and on these days Roumanian, French, and Italian steamers were piloted in and out, but no British ships were allowed to leave.

At 5.50 P.M. on the 14th August the captain received orders from Turkish officials to proceed to Constantinople and remain there until the cargo had been discharged. Several other British steamers that were waiting received similar orders, amongst them being the steamship *Hillhouse*, the steamship *Countess of Warwick*, and the steamship *Barrowmore*.

The captain proceeded to Constantinople and arrived there at 1 P.M. on the 15th August. On arrival he went ashore and noted protest against the detention of his steamer and also saw the British Consul. On the following day the *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived off Constantinople under the Turkish flag. On this day the *Reliance* was boarded by a Turkish officer who asked for the displacement of the vessel and for information as to the capacity for carrying horses and troops.

On the 18th the captains of all British ships at Constantinople were told by the British harbour-master, on instructions from the British Consul-general, that they were now allowed to proceed and were again to apply for permits. On the same day the captain of the *Reliance* obtained a permit and sailed from Constantinople and arrived again off Nagara Point at 8 A.M. the following morning (19th August), when he sent his second permit ashore, but the Turkish authorities cancelled the permit and ordered the *Reliance* to anchor. On the 20th August one Italian ship and the British ship *Ryton*, in ballast,

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

were allowed to pass through, and on the following day the steamship *Bullmouth* loaded with kerosene and three other steamers were piloted out. It was not until the 22nd ultimo at 11.40 A.M. that the *Reliance* was allowed to sail.

We respectfully submit that the Turkish authorities should be made to pay compensation for their action in detaining British ships, and on behalf of the owners of the *Reliance* we request that their claim of £640, being at the ordinary charter-party rate of £40 a day, for the detention of their steamer from the 6th to the 22nd August should be made against the Turkish Government by the British Ambassador at Constantinople.—We are, &c.

DOWNING & HANDCOCK.

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No. 79.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 17.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 16, 1914.*

Minister of Marine has assured me that he is quite aware of German intrigues, and that Turkish Government are not so innocent as to fall into the trap that has been laid for them. His Excellency admitted, however, that there had been an idea of sending the fleet to visit Trebizond, as he claimed that the Government had a right to do.

I pointed out, should they do so, as long as German officers were on board, there was bound to be a certain risk of some incident occurring, in view of well-known desire of Germans to provoke trouble between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency did not demur to this opinion, and said that he would at once see the Grand Vizier in order to stop it.

I have also seen Grand Vizier. His Highness said there was no intention of sending the *Goeben* into the Black Sea, and stated that the Minister of War must obtain the authorisation of the Cabinet before he could issue any such order.

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No. 80.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 19.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1914.*

Following telegram received from His Majesty's consul at Basra :



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

‘I am informed officially by Turkish commodore that a British man-of-war is lying near boundary line in Shatt-el-Arab, whole of which is within Ottoman waters. Vali intends to ask the captain to allow wireless apparatus to be sealed and to leave, as more than twenty-four hours have elapsed since ship entered the river. Vali knows that I am informing you.’

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No. 81.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 19.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1914.*

Following sent to Basra :

‘Turkish authorities have, of course, no right to interfere with wireless on men-of-war.’

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No. 82.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey: (Received September 19.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1914.*

Turkish military preparations.

In conversation with the President of the Chamber\* to-day, I said that if it was really Turkey's intention to go to war with Russia, I considered such a policy absolute madness.

President said that, even if Turkish fleet went into Black Sea, it would not be with any hostile intention towards Russia, with whom they were not going to war. I pointed out to him that Germany was pressing Turkey to send their fleet into the Black Sea with one object only, namely, that war might be provoked by some incident. I therefore urged him most strongly against any such action. He said that he was against it, and that he saw the force of my argument, to which I replied that as the Minister of War was supreme it was unfortunately no guarantee that it would not be done. President told me that the Cabinet had their own policy, which was to remain neutral, and that they were all alive to the aims of Germany. I pressed him hard as to what was the policy of the Minister of War.

I do not regard situation as hopeless. Party in favour of

\* [Halil Bey.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

neutrality is growing, but it would be unsafe to rely on their power to restrain war party.

I hear that 156 more mines and the minelayer *Ghairret* have been sent to Roumeli Kanak, on the Bosphorus. Turkish fleet went to Halki yesterday for review, and will probably remain there till next week, when the *Hamidieh* and *Messudiyeh* will be ready. German officers and men continue to arrive by train. It is probable that there are German reservists resident in Turkey who have been incorporated in Turkish army. Two hundred Germans arrived at the Dardanelles on September 17th.

Cavalry and horse artillery are reported to have moved from Erzeroum towards the frontier.

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No. 83.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 20.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 20, 1914.*

I believe that Minister of War is the only firebrand. Committee of Union and Progress is exercising a restraining influence. I think it is undoubted that party in favour of peace is daily increasing.

French Ambassador had a conversation yesterday with Minister of Marine. Latter assured His Excellency that Turkish Government were determined not to be drawn into war, to which His Excellency retorted that if this assurance was correct, it was difficult to understand why preparations to send Turkish fleet into Black Sea were being made. Minister of Marine replied that Council of Ministers had decided that two destroyers only should go into Black Sea and that the fleet should not go. He admitted that the Minister of War, who was generalissimo of the army and navy, had as a matter of fact ordered the fleet to go, but, as all orders had to pass through him as Minister of Marine, he had insisted that this order should be referred to the Council, with the result above stated.

As an illustration of the entire lack of control possessed by the Cabinet over the Minister of War and the Germans, if any further illustration is needed, I have to report that, despite this assurance from the Minister of Marine, the *Breslau* and three other smaller ships passed us this morning and

entered the Black Sea. My Russian colleague trusts that no incident will happen and proposes to ignore this proceeding.

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No. 84.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 21.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 20, 1914.*

I have just had an animated interview with the Grand Vizier, and I am convinced that he is sincere. Other Ministers are all peaceably inclined, with the exception of the Minister of War. So long as the latter remains supreme an incident may occur at any moment. I tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject of the *Breslau* entering the Black Sea. He vehemently disclaimed any intention of attacking Russia, and said that Turkish Government had a right to send their fleet into the Black Sea if they wished to. I reminded him that neither the *Goeben* nor the *Breslau* were Turkish ships according to international law, and said that if they left the Dardanelles we would most certainly treat them as enemy ships. He replied that I had told him this often before, and there was no question of the ships leaving the Dardanelles. I then said that information had reached me that Council of Ministers, in order to avoid risk of an incident, had come to the wise decision that the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* should not go into the Black Sea; and yet, on the very day on which this decision had been reached by the Cabinet, it was totally disregarded by the Minister of War, as His Highness was doubtless aware. This showed how much control His Highness now exercised. Constantinople and the neighbourhood formed nothing more nor less than an armed German camp, and we all, including His Highness, were at the mercy of Liman Pasha\* and the Minister of War. Many more German officers and men had arrived, and there must now be between 4000 and 5000 German soldiers and sailors here. Grand Vizier replied that he was determined to maintain peace, and that more adherents were joining the peace party every day. He would never allow Minister of War or any one else to supersede him. Speaking with the utmost energy and

\* General Liman von Sanders, Head of the German Military Mission.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

even violence he assured me that, in spite of appearances, which he admitted looked bad, nothing would happen.

I said that doubtless peace party was growing, but, nevertheless, Minister of War was pushing forward warlike preparations uninterruptedly. I was receiving constant information respecting British official war news being stopped, cases of requisitions, &c., and I knew as a fact that intrigues against Egypt were being carried on. If His Highness could stop these things, why did he not do so, and when would he be able to do so? His Highness gave me to understand that if a crisis did come there would be a means of stopping Minister of War.

No. 85.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 21, 1914.*

Information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt receives fresh corroboration. There has been no slackening of military preparation in Palestine and in Syria.

If Turkish preparations continue, it may become necessary to put patrols into Sinai and to support our posts in the peninsula. Action of forces in Egypt has been hitherto confined, as you are aware, to patrol of Suez Canal, but I think that Turkish Government should be warned that measures for the protection of the Egyptian frontier may become necessary.

No. 86.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 23.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

A letter was yesterday received by British postmaster from a subordinate official in the Turkish postal administration. In this letter postmaster was informed that foreign post offices in Turkey would be abolished as from 1st October next. I instructed British postmaster to return the letter, and to say that matter had been referred to his Ambassador.

This discourteous manner of communication was my first official information of any intention to abolish foreign post offices in Turkey. I accordingly saw Grand Vizier at once,

[Reply,  
No. 93.  
See also  
No. 140.]



and said that I resented the manner of communication, and had instructed British postmaster to return the letter. Post offices did not depend upon the Capitulations, and if Turkish Government wished to see the system modified, they should approach His Majesty's Government through the usual diplomatic channel. I warned him that His Majesty's Government would not allow themselves to be ignored in this manner, and I would not, unless by your instructions, consent to summary closing of British post offices on 1st October unless Turkish Government had given guarantees for safeguarding British interests. His Highness said that Great Britain was not aimed at specially. A similar communication had been addressed to all the Powers. I said I was indifferent as to view of the matter taken by my French and Russian colleagues, nor had I yet had time to ascertain what they thought. Grand Vizier assured me that until an understanding had been come to with His Majesty's Government nothing further would be done in the matter.

I would observe that, in my opinion, considerable modification of existing system cannot properly be resisted. If Russian and French Ambassadors agree, may I come to some arrangement on the lines of consenting to incorporation of the British post office as a section of the Ottoman post, if the latter will undertake to take over some of present British employes? I think we might also consent to use Turkish stamps.

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No. 87.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 23.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See No.

34.

<sup>2</sup> [See No.  
112.]

Your telegram of 25th August.<sup>1</sup>

Sultan received me yesterday in audience,<sup>2</sup> when I delivered the King's message. His Majesty expressed his earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain, and emphatically declared his firm intention of maintaining peace. He requested me to thank the King for his message. Full report follows by despatch.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 88.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1914.*

[Reply,  
No. 94.]

Political situation in Turkey.

His Majesty's Government regard state of things at Constantinople as most unsatisfactory. On behalf of His Majesty's Government you should speak in the following sense to the Grand Vizier :

British Government contemplate no hostile act towards Turkey by British fleet, and they have no desire to precipitate a conflict with her. But the fact that Great Britain has not taken any hostile action against her must not mislead Turkish Government into supposing that His Majesty's Government consider Turkey's attitude is consistent with the obligations imposed upon her by the neutrality which she has officially declared. German officers and men are participating increasingly in Turkish fleet and Dardanelles defences, and not only has Turkey failed to send away the German officers and crews, as she promised, but she has admitted more overland, and they are now in active control of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. The capital is undoubtedly now under the control of the Germans. If His Majesty's Government so desired, present state of things affords ample justification for protesting against violation of neutrality. Great Britain has not, however, so far taken action, as she cherishes the hope that the peace party will win the day. It should, however, be realised by the Grand Vizier and his supporters that unless they soon succeed in getting the situation in hand and bringing it within the limits of neutrality, it will become clear that Constantinople is no longer under Turkish but German control, and that open hostility will be forced on by Germany.

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No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 24, 1914.*

I hear that Egyptian frontier has been violated by armed mounted Arabs said to be encouraged by Turkish troops, and also that Hedjaz line is being reserved for troops.



British military authorities consider that breach of the peace on Egyptian frontier is imminent, whether with or without sanction of Turkish Government. You should bring these facts to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and of the Khedive, who is at present at Constantinople.

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No. 90.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 25.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1914.*

Turkish preparations against Egypt.

I have addressed a note to the Grand Vizier recapitulating information recently received on this subject. I reminded His Highness of the assurances which I had several times<sup>1</sup> given him, based upon your telegram of 7th August,<sup>1</sup> and I specially pointed out their conditional nature. Finally I warned him that the information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt would infallibly produce a most serious impression upon His Majesty's Government.

I later communicated the contents of my note to President of the Council, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Interior, and asked them what explanation they could give, whereupon they inquired why so many thousand Indian troops were being sent to Egypt by His Majesty's Government. To this I answered that it was essential to ensure the safety of Egypt and the protection of the Suez Canal, and that as the British garrison of Egypt had been sent to France, it was necessary to replace it by British Indian troops. This seemed to satisfy them.

I cannot believe that they are not alive to the disastrous consequences of going to war with us, or that they seriously can contemplate an expedition against Egypt. They have undoubtedly been strongly urged to send such an expedition by the Germans, and I think that they have allowed preparations to be made, partly to profit as much as possible by German connection and by allowing the Germans to think that they will act, and partly in order to be ready, if Great Britain sustains a serious defeat by land or sea.

Danger of the present situation is obvious, and developments are not improbable, and I shall see the Grand Vizier



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

this morning and endeavour to bring him to book. There is a circumstantial report that the Germans are now making desperate efforts to force the Turks' hands and to compel them to fulfil their part of the bargain, but that at the same time their efforts are meeting with considerable resistance.

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No. 91.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 25.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1914.*

I have informed the Grand Vizier that Austro-German intrigues to involve Turkey in an expedition against Egypt are within my knowledge. Grand Vizier denied that such intrigues existed, but he finally admitted that pressure was being exerted. He declared that he was firmly resolved to keep out of any such intrigue, any complicity in which he disclaimed with emphasis. I strongly urged His Highness to make his position clearer, for preparations at the Dardanelles showed that he was either guilty of complicity or that he was not master in his own house. He answered that his intentions were entirely pacific, and that he did not mean to engage in any quarrel with Great Britain.

His Highness seemed more preoccupied with the Balkan situation at the moment than with anything else. He said that Turkish Government would be unable to refrain from an attempt to get back what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued. No arguments of mine would induce him to change his attitude in this respect. He said he would be powerless to prevent it.

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No. 92.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 25.)* [Cf. Nos. 95, 96.]  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 25, 1914.*

Turkish preparations on Sinai frontier.

Two thousand men with stores passed Gaza on night of 18th September following coast towards frontier. Six more battalions are expected at Gaza. In that neighbourhood very strong and secret military preparations are being made on the frontier. Three battalions of Redif completely mobil-

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ised have marched to a place one day south of Jaffa on their way to the frontier.

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No. 93.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 25, 1914.*

Abolition of post offices.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [See Nos.  
86, 140.]

You should make the best arrangements you can with regard to post offices, but it must be on record that we reserve the subject for future settlement, and that we do not agree to their abolition.

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No. 94.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 25, 1914.*

Your telegram of 23rd September.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See No.  
88.

I have again seen Grand Vizier, and pointed out to him as earnestly as is within my power the fatal result to the Turkish Empire of persisting in a course of veiled hostility and petty intrigue against the British Empire. I recalled to him that time and again he had undertaken that the German crews of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* should be sent out of Turkey, and that not only had these promises been broken, but further German officers and men had actually arrived. This proved conclusively that he was either insincere in his assurances or that he was powerless. His Highness begged that I would credit him with the fact that for eight weeks he had kept the peace. He assured me that he had every intention of seeing to it that peace was maintained. I replied that it was not his good intentions that I doubted, but I did distinctly doubt his ability to control the situation. The Germans had evidently gained complete control. An incident might happen at any moment, and the most serious consequences might be involved. His Highness was evidently nettled at what I said, and angrily replied that he was determined to keep the peace, and that, in a matter of peace and war, he was absolute master. This I met by referring him to the serious character of the preparations at present on foot, and by pointing out that,



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

whether he wished it or not, a repetition of the Arab raid across the Egyptian frontier might lead to incidents which would involve him. His Highness said that Minister of War was returning to-day, and that he would at once ask what the preparations were to which I referred. He asserted with violence that no incident would occur.

I have also seen Halil Bey, to whom news of preparations against Egypt seemed to be unknown. He expressed astonishment to hear of them, and was evidently horrified at the idea of war with us. He promised to go and see the Minister of War at once.

Position of Grand Vizier is difficult, and, to maintain any kind of control, he is obliged to shut his eyes to much that is going on. I am still strongly of opinion that, unless some act of gross antagonism takes place, we should maintain policy of reserve and abstain from making categorical demands with which His Highness is not yet able to reply, continuing to devote all our efforts towards preventing Turkey from taking active part in hostilities which German and especially Austrian Ambassadors are urging. Main fact of the situation is that, in spite of great pressure, Grand Vizier has kept the peace, and that his party is gaining ground.

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No. 95.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 26.)* [Cf. Nos. 92, 96.]  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 25, 1914.*

On 22nd and 23rd September, 183 horses, 112 nizam, 2 officers, and 88 carts and carriages, all from Aintab, were entrained at Aleppo for Damascus.

Secret notice was given that in six days' time 120 railway wagons were to be in readiness to convey to Damascus troops arriving from Mosul *via* Tel Abiyat, and that in all from 25,000 to 30,000 troops were to be drafted from Mosul to Aleppo, of which at least half are destined for Hama or Damascus.

Two Germans connected with Bagdad Railway, one of whom is an expert in blasting operations and mine-laying, left Aleppo this morning for Damascus, the other telling his servant that they were going to Akaba. They had with



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

them 1600 dynamite cartridges and 1500 metres of detonating wires. They may, perhaps, be commissioned to lay mines in Red Sea as there has been talk of Turkish military designs regarding Akaba recently.

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No. 96.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 27.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 26, 1914.*

Grand Vizier has been informed of the information reported by Mr. Cheetham in his telegram of 25th September,<sup>1</sup> and in my telegram of the same date.<sup>2</sup> I warned His Highness that if these preparations against Egypt were allowed to continue, serious consequences would ensue. Minister of War was with Grand Vizier when I made these representations, and His Highness informed me that he fully realised the importance of the question, with which he was occupying himself. I have taken steps to enlighten influential people with what is being done as regards Egypt, and I have seen Minister of Interior and left a memorandum with him on the subject; I have also put the facts before other prominent members of the Cabinet.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 92.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 95.

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No. 97.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 27, 1914.*

An incident has occurred outside the Dardanelles. At 6 o'clock this evening I heard that a Turkish destroyer was stopped last night outside the Dardanelles and turned back by one of our destroyers. Upon this, Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits. When the news arrived, the Russian and French Ambassadors were with me, and we at once went to see the Grand Vizier. When I arrived the Grand Vizier was in a state of some perturbation. He said sudden action of British fleet had given rise to the belief that an immediate attack was contemplated. Having reassured His Highness that any such belief was unfounded, I said that it seemed to me highly desirable that the Dardanelles should be opened at once, for should the incident

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

become known, it would certainly create the impression that some desperate step was intended by Turkish Government. I explained to His Highness that we were naturally apprehensive lest Germans on Turkish destroyers might endeavour to torpedo or mine our ships, and that it was for that reason that British fleet had been instructed to prevent any Turkish ships from leaving the Dardanelles, so long as any German officers or crews remained.

Grand Vizier asserted that he, personally, favoured the reopening of the Straits, and he requested me to assure His Majesty's Government, in the most formal and solemn manner, that Turkish Government would never make war upon Great Britain. I said that if the accounts that I had received were accurate, Turkish action on Egyptian frontier required explanation, where they had already committed acts of war. He said that facts had been greatly exaggerated; that I might rest assured that there would be no more acts of aggression; that there was no thought or question of attacking Egypt; and that orders had been sent for the immediate withdrawal of raiding Bedouins. He added that mobilisation was general, and therefore included those parts of the Empire contiguous to Egypt. He has promised to send a formal answer to my representations on the subject.

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No. 98.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 27, 1914.*

My telegram of to-day.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No.

I have just received a message from the Grand Vizier that, if His Majesty's Government will move the fleet a little farther from the entrance to the Dardanelles, the Straits will be reopened. I said that I would ask for your instructions.

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No. 99.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received September 29.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 29, 1914.*

Dardanelles.

Germans are making capital out of closure of the Straits,



and I hear on good authority that great pressure is being exerted by them to induce Turkey to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Turks have, however, refused so far to fall in with this scheme.

Great umbrage has been caused to the Turks by fact that it was upon the German Ambassador's order that the *Breslau* went into the Black Sea the other day.

Grand Vizier is most anxious to reopen the Straits, and has again begged me this morning to let him know whether His Majesty's Government would not consent to move British fleet a little further off.

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No. 100.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.*

Information has reached His Majesty's Government that Turkish Minister of War telegraphed to Bin Saud, Emir of Nejd, several times towards the end of July that, owing to the imminence of war in Europe, arms, ammunition, and officers for training his Arabs were being sent to him.

Vali of Basra has been informed by Turkish Minister of War that thirty-two secret emissaries, including German officers, are on their way to preach a 'jihad' in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan; that arms and ammunition are being sent to Basra under German flag, and that Turkish Government are prepared to help Germany in return for assistance received during Balkan war.

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No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.*

Under instructions from his Government, Turkish Ambassador has reverted to the continued presence in the Shatt-el-Arab of H.M.S. *Odin*. Tewfik Pasha said that we would doubtless observe the rules of neutrality in other countries, since we had gone to war to defend the neutrality of Belgium. I informed him that, as Turkey had violated



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

the rules of neutrality on her own initiative, and so long as she persisted in her present unneutral attitude, His Majesty's Government did not admit that she could appeal to those rules.

In the event of your being approached on this matter by the Grand Vizier, you should state that His Majesty's Government will observe neutrality towards Turkey, if Turkey will do so towards us, and you should inform him of the reply which has been given to Turkish Ambassador.

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No. 102.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 30, 1914.*

Your telegram of 27th September<sup>1</sup> and subsequent telegrams. <sup>1</sup> See No. 97.

Dardanelles were closed unnecessarily by Turkish authorities, and there is no reason why they should not be reopened. Turkish Government are well aware that we have no intention of initiating any aggressive action against Turkey.

The watch maintained by British fleet outside Dardanelles cannot be withdrawn so long as German officers and men remain in Turkish waters and are in control of Turkish fleet. Until, therefore, the German officers and crews are repatriated, the request that the fleet should be moved cannot be entertained.

You should inform Grand Vizier.

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No. 103.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 2.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 1, 1914.*

Consul at Basra reports to-day that British man-of-war has left Turkish waters.

He had previously telegraphed that he heard there was an intention to block Shatt-el-Arab in order to prevent departure of British man-of-war, and I had already called Grand Vizier's notice to this report.

No. 104.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 3.)*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

Information continues to reach me corroborating reports of Turkish preparations against Egypt. Large transport camel corps arrived at Jerusalem yesterday, and I hear of transport of warlike materials, food-stuffs, and military stores on line Jenin-Nablus-Jerusalem, and also to Maan. Seven German military officers have been sent to Damascus and neighbourhood. This has stimulated preparations, and it is believed in Syria that Turkish Government has decided upon a movement against Egypt, Damascus division being assembled for advance by Akaba, Jerusalem division for that by Rafa. Inhabitants at Beirout and Haifa are being removed inland as a precautionary measure against any action which may be taken by British fleet when the advance on Egypt begins. It is reported from Haifa that localities along the coast are being garrisoned by newly arrived troops. I have brought the gravity of the existing situation to the notice of the Grand Vizier in the strongest terms in a further note, though I do not view any actual movement against Egypt as imminent at the moment. In my note I have informed His Highness that the measures now undertaken can have no reason except as a threat against Egypt, and that they can no longer be regarded as incidental to an ordinary mobilisation of troops in their peace stations, and I have stated that His Majesty's Government can only view any further preparations at Jerusalem or at Maan in a serious light.

In addition to above-mentioned military measures, movements of suspicious individuals have now been supplemented by those of a German naval officer named Hilgendorf, who is at present on his way from Damascus to Petra with a party of eight Germans. It is understood that they will be joined by a smaller party from Haifa *via* Amman, and that they are conveying a large supply of explosives. I have made representations to the Grand Vizier explaining that such hostile enterprises against Great Britain cannot be allowed in a neutral country, and that these people must be arrested.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Speaking generally, I am inclined to think that both in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, on the Black Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and elsewhere, the Turks intend to have their troops all ready for action at a favourable point should the general European situation afford a good opportunity. Should the German admiral take the *Goeben* into the Black Sea and attack the Russian fleet, or should things take an unfavourable turn for the Allies, Turkish troops would be in a position to cross the Egyptian frontier without much further delay. His Majesty's Government will doubtless consider what, if any, military measures are necessary for the strengthening of strategical points in the Sinai peninsula.

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No. 105.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 3.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 3, 1914.*

Closing of Dardanelles.

Germans have certainly long been working for the closing of the Straits, presumably with the object of obtaining a freer hand in the Black Sea. There is every reason to suppose that the Dardanelles are closed to shipping not only by administrative act, but also effectively by mines. From information that reaches me from a reliable source, it seems that these mines have been laid by the Germans, and that the Turks are unaware of their position.

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No. 106.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 4.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

His Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs as follows, dated 3rd October :—

‘ Warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

‘ I have received a letter from the Vali saying that your Excellency has been informed by the Turkish Government of the measures proposed to be adopted in Turkish waters with regard to foreign belligerent warships; he says that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Durna is closed to foreign warships, being inland waters just as much as Smyrna and



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

the Dardanelles. British men-of-war must therefore leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours. Vali ends by saying that he will have to apply strict measures if I cannot induce captains of His Majesty's ships to go outside Fao. I told the Vali that I was asking for instructions from your Excellency, and I informed His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah of the gist of Vali's communication.

'It is possible that H.M.S. *Lawrence* may also be in the river.'

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No. 107.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 4, 1914.*

Dardanelles.

It is the Germans who keep the Straits closed, to the great detriment of Turkey. If you concur, you may point out to the Turks that the British fleet will move away as soon as the German officers and crews leave and the Turkish navy ceases to be under German control. We should then have no fear of hostile action on the part of the Turks.

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No. 108.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 5, 1914.*

Turkey is now bankrupt. Supply of coal is, I am glad to say, cut off. Fresh provisions are not coming in, and there is some discontent in the navy and even in the army. Situation is doubtless very delicate, but Turks would be unlikely to go all lengths with Germany, at any rate until German success in the war seems more assured. I think that Turks are possibly less blind to their interests than is generally supposed, and I am still of opinion that situation may be saved. Time is now on our side, and I am strongly in favour of avoiding all occasion of conflict by temporising.

The question of reopening the Dardanelles is really no longer a practical one, for the Straits are now effectively closed by mines, and I am informed that their position is unknown to the Turks themselves.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Russian and French Ambassadors agree with me that our interests are not primarily affected by the closure, as the requisitioning and other measures taken by the Turks against our nationals had already stopped our trade. This is the line I am taking with the Turks. I think they will begin to realise the facts before long. Total cessation of imports is already causing anxiety to Minister of Finance, and Turkish Government will soon become aware that they are the chief losers. The Germans have closed the Straits from political motives, partly, no doubt, because they believe that, by closing the Straits and preventing the entry of the British fleet, it will be easier for them to induce the Turks to take action against Russia in the Black Sea; partly, no doubt, in order to injure the trade of the allies and to prevent communication by sea with Russia.

I think that self-interested designs of Germany are not unknown to the Turks, who are playing up to Germany, not with the intention of falling in with those designs, at any rate for the present, to the extent of making war, but in order to extract as much as possible from her. In the opinion of many people, Germans are now in a position to take matters into their own hands, if they think that German interests demand it. If, however, the 'Turks' game is such as I have outlined above, it is undoubtedly a dangerous one. As is only natural, Turkish Government profess their ability to check any attempt on the part of Germany to take matters into their own hands, but it is not quite clear how they would be able to prevent it.

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No. 109.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 6.)*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

Military attaché had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he derived the impression that His Excellency had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the future, and possibly measures are now being taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with Germany; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During the conversation,



Minister of War disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary Syrian garrison had not been reinforced. He said that, as in the case of other troops within the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary transport animals, &c., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said, depended on the political situation, for which he was not responsible individually; and it was quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even, perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking enterprises against the Suez Canal or elsewhere, but he admitted that proposals had certainly been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and he added that no troops, but only gendarmes, had been moved in the direction of Gaza. Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary against Great Britain, and in justification of this he pointed to the entrance of British men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, and to the presence of the British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military attaché said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of his Majesty's Government were concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by Turks, and Great Britain certainly had not the slightest intention of making any attack upon Turkey. It was quite ridiculous to suppose that the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt had anything to do with hostility to Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained her neutrality; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attaché said that Turks could not be surprised that Great Britain should be pre-occupied if Turkish troops were assembled farther south than Jerusalem or Beersheba on the one side, or Maan on the other.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 110.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

His Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows :—

‘Vali says that he must obey the orders which he has received. He has communicated a copy of these to me. They are to the effect that the whole of the Shatt-el-Arab and sea within six miles of the shore are closed to warships, as they are territorial waters. Any men-of-war disregarding this prohibition will be fired upon by the guns at Fao. These regulations will be enforced from to-morrow evening, Wednesday, 7th October. They are somewhat obscure, but they mean that H.M.S. *Espiègle* in the Karun and H.M.S. *Dalhousie* at Abadan will be interned, unless they leave before the time fixed. No other British man-of-war is this side of Fao. H.M.S. *Lawrence* is in the Shatt-el-Arab to the best of my belief. His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah has been informed of the above.’

No. 111.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 7, 1914.*

British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

H.M.S. *Espiègle*, *Odin*, and *Dalhousie* are not in Turkish waters. There can be no question of their being ordered out of waters which are not Turkish nor of their being interned by the Turkish Government. According to generally accepted principles of international law, Turkish territorial waters extend to 3 miles out to sea from the coast. Two of His Majesty's ships are being instructed to keep outside the 3-mile limit, while the remaining ship is being told to remain at Mohammerah, which does not belong to Turkey. Our long-established right to pass freely up and down Shatt-el-Arab at all times is not in question, and it must be recognised that we fully reserve that right.

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NO. 112.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 8.)*

*Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See No.  
34.

SIR,—Referring to your telegram of 25th August,<sup>1</sup> in which I was authorised to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, on the occasion of my reception in audience after my return from leave of absence, I have the honour to state that I was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty yesterday.

In view of the difficulty of conversing with His Majesty in an ordinary way, I prepared a written statement containing the message, and I read a separate statement of my own on the subject of the withdrawal of Admiral Limpus, having previously arranged with the Master of the Ceremonies, who was to act as interpreter, that this should be translated clause by clause as I read it. I enclose a copy of these statements which I read as arranged, subject to some slight modifications necessitated by the turn which the interview took.

His Imperial Majesty seemed not only fully to grasp the sense of the communication, to which he listened with eager attention, but responded to it immediately with great vivacity and vehemence, showing a considerable grasp of the issues with which his country is now confronted.

I was much impressed with the earnestness of His Imperial Majesty's repeated assurances of his desire and determination to maintain the ancient friendship between the two Empires and to avoid war with any Power.

A memorandum is enclosed recording what passed at my audience.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 112.

*Communication read to the Sultan by Sir L. Mallet on  
September 21, 1914.*

Mon Souverain m'a chargé d'exprimer à votre Majesté son profond regret de ce que les exigences d'une situation imprévue aient forcé son Gouvernement à détenir les deux vaisseaux de guerre destinés à la marine Impériale. Sa Majesté le Roi se rend compte des sentiments douloureux



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que cet acte a dû inspirer à votre Majesté, mais il espère que la décision prise par son Gouvernement de rendre ces vaisseaux à la Turquie à la fin de la guerre actuelle suffira pour la convaincre que leur détention ne fut motivée par aucune intention inimicale envers l'Empire, qui est lié avec le sien par une amitié plus que séculaire. C'est parce que cette amitié n'a jamais été rompue que mon Souverain espère que la Turquie ne fera rien qui puisse empêcher son Gouvernement de donner suite à cette décision, qu'elle gardera une neutralité stricte et absolue pendant la guerre actuelle, et que l'on ne tardera pas à mettre fin à quelques faits contraires à la neutralité qui ont provoqué quelque inquiétude au sujet de l'attitude du Gouvernement ottoman.

### (TRANSLATION.)

My Sovereign has commanded me to express his profound regret to your Majesty that the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances have compelled his Government to detain the two warships intended for the Imperial Turkish Navy. His Majesty the King is aware of the painful impression that this action must have made upon your Majesty, but he thinks that the decision of his Government to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the present war will suffice to convince you that their detention was due to no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to his by a friendship of more than a century. It is owing to the fact that this friendship has never been broken that my Sovereign trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and that there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish Government.

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### ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. II2.

*Statement by Sir L. Mallet with regard to Admiral Limpus  
on September 22, 1914.*

L'Amiral Limpus, qui, sous les auspices de votre Majesté, a rendu de si grands services à la marine Impériale, m'a prié



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

de faire part à votre Majesté de son regret de ne pas avoir pu déposer ses hommages au pied de son trône avant de quitter Constantinople. Votre Majesté n'ignore pas les circonstances qui ont nécessité son départ, du moment que lui et la mission navale qu'il présidait ont été rélégués à une position où ils ne pouvaient plus rien faire pour le bien de la marine ottomane. Rappelé par mon Gouvernement dans ces circonstances regrettables, l'Amiral Limpus s'est vu forcé de se rendre aux ordres de ses chefs et à quitter Constantinople dans un délai trop court pour lui permettre de demander une audience de votre Majesté.

(TRANSLATION.)

Admiral Limpus, who, under your Majesty's auspices, has rendered such great services to the Turkish navy, has begged me to inform your Majesty of his regret that he was unable to pay his respects to your Majesty before leaving Constantinople. Your Majesty is aware of circumstances necessitating his departure from the moment when he and the naval mission under his command were relegated to a position in which they could do nothing further for the welfare of the Turkish navy. Recalled in these regrettable circumstances by my Government, Admiral Limpus was obliged to obey the orders of his superiors and to leave Constantinople within too short a space to be able to request an audience of your Majesty.

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ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. II2.

### *Memorandum.*

The Sultan listened to my communication in silence until the Master of the Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words 'quelques faits contraires à la neutralité.' He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officers and crews on board the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. The 'captains' available in the Turkish navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

The German crews would be sent away in 'five or ten days,' and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak frankly, he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and his Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this more than once, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be supposed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey.

When, referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, I expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on my referring to the circumstances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the Admiral had left Constantinople without an audience. The Admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, the Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King, who would be gratified at receiving them.

Just before I took my leave, His Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace, rather lost than gained in force by the way in which the Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resentfully, worded.

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No. 113.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 8.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1914.*

British warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

Grand Vizier assured me this afternoon that Vali of Basra had been instructed to avoid all interference with His Majesty's ships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

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No. 114.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 8.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1914.*

There has been fighting during the last few days on frontier between Russian troops and Kurds supported by Turkish troops. Last night Russian Ambassador made strong representations to the Grand Vizier, and said that the Turkish Government must restrain the activities of their troops on the frontier. Furthermore, Russian Consul had been arrested. Replying to these representations, Grand Vizier assured Russian Ambassador, in writing, that the Consul should be released at once and that the fighting should cease. Russian Ambassador has certain information that Turks are being incited to fight by Germans and Austrians. His Excellency agrees with me that Grand Vizier is honestly exercising what influence he has in favour of peace, but it is doubtful if he has the power to restrain the military party under Enver Pasha.

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No. 115.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 11.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 10, 1914.*

It is highly probable that for some time past money has been sent to Syria mainly with the object of subsidising the



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Bedouins. It is also supposed that the Germans in Syria have had sums of money with them. The following is the number of German military officers known to be in Syria at present: Seven who went there some time ago, of whom Colonel Kress von Kressenstein is one, four who arrived 2nd October at Damascus, and five more who arrived there on 6th October. My information is to the effect that seven more may since have arrived at Alexandretta. Meanwhile, another party of Turkish sailors is leaving Constantinople overland for Bagdad and the Tigris. Information has just reached me from Damascus to the effect that Colonel von Kressenstein had gone to Maan to inspect, but only two military trains with details and stores had left in the last two days. West of the Jordan no movements had taken place. Two railway vans of dynamite had left Damascus for Beirut; 4000 Mosul troops had reached Aleppo, but were waiting there for the present.

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No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 11, 1914.*

It seems to me that the key of the situation lies in Constantinople. It would be fatal to give way to Turkish demands beyond a certain point, especially in the Persian Gulf, but, nevertheless, I entirely share your view that His Majesty's Government should avoid giving even a plausible cause of offence to Turkey. I think that our attitude during the past eight weeks has shown irrefutably that we desire to avoid a rupture with Turkey.

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No. 117.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

I have received note dated 11th October from Porte, of which following is substance:

[Cf.  
No. 121.  
Reply,  
No. 123.]

From information received by Porte, two British men-of-war have one after the other passed up the Shatt-el-Arab to anchor at Mohammerah.

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

According to Treaty of Erzeroum, the town of Mohammerah and its port belong to Persia, whilst Shatt-el-Arab is under Turkish domination.

This principle was re-affirmed by Turco-British Declaration of 29th July, 1913, which specifies that from Nahr Nazaille, above Mohammerah, frontier follows river to sea, leaving under Turkish sovereignty river itself and all the islands except ten, and modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah. This port and the anchorage thus formed an enclave in Ottoman waters which must be traversed in order to reach them. Consequently men-of-war in question have not respected Imperial territory in penetrating into her internal waters and have disregarded neutrality of the Porte, whose duty it is not to allow passage of foreign men-of-war.

On these grounds the Porte asks me to cause instructions to be sent to commanders of men-of-war in question to leave the port of Mohammerah within eight days and to go to sea.

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No. 118.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

My despatch of 4th October.<sup>1</sup>

I have received note from the Porte in reply to my note of 2nd October<sup>2</sup> respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt.

It says that military activity in Syria is common to all provinces of the Empire, and is natural consequence of mobilisation, having no other object than to put Turkey on a footing to defend her neutrality. Turkey's position being one of simple and legitimate precautions, it will be readily recognised that it would not be conceivable that she should change it in order to attack Egypt, which is one of her own provinces.

The Porte goes on to observe that, although I have on several occasions assured Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government have no intention of altering status of Egypt, yet declaration that Egypt is in a state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, who receive their exequaturs from the Porte, and above all arrival in Egypt of important

<sup>1</sup> Received on October 19. See No. 143.  
<sup>2</sup> [See No. 143 (encl. 2).]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

contingents from India as well as other acts, have attracted serious attention of Imperial Government and have created real anxiety.

Note concludes by reiterating to me assurance that Turkey has no hostile intention towards any Power whatever, and that military preparations have purely and exclusively defensive character.

I think that it would be right to remind Grand Vizier that I have always made it perfectly clear that undertaking not to change the status of Egypt was conditional on Turkey maintaining strict neutrality.

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No. 119.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 12.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

This morning Turkish fleet left Constantinople and steamed into the Black Sea.

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No. 120.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 12.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

I do not think that we could now leave Mohammerah without loss of prestige. In view of receipt of Vali's note respecting presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab, effect of moving His Majesty's ships at the request of the Turkish Government, once they were sent to Mohammerah, might have led the Arabs to misinterpret the action of His Majesty's Government.

I would not regard the note in the light of an ultimatum, though it is not impossible that Turks might close the channel, and thus prevent His Majesty's ships from going out, except in agreement with the Turkish authorities.

General belief is that Germans are at present applying considerable pressure upon the Turks to take part in the war, but that the Turks are so far resisting. My anxiety is lest the resistance which the Minister of War is encountering from the Moderates should be weakened by any act on our



part which could be interpreted as aggressive by the Turks. Enver Pasha is said to be in favour of immediate co-operation with the Germans.

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NO. 121.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 13.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 117.

My telegram of 12th October.<sup>1</sup>

I have informed Grand Vizier that I was surprised to receive His Highness's note, inviting His Majesty's ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days. I knew His Highness had no intention of creating difficulties, but it sounded almost like an ultimatum. Mohammerah was, as His Highness was aware, a Persian port. Grand Vizier replied at once that there was no question of an ultimatum. I explained His Majesty's Government's point of view, and he said that he was at present awaiting your reply to Turkish note.

In the course of ensuing conversation, His Highness seemed as confident as ever that he was able to resist German pressure, and he repeated that he was absolutely determined to avoid war in any case.

In reply to some observations of mine in regard to Turkish fighting recently reported in Persia, he said that strict orders had been sent that no Turkish troops were to cross the frontier.

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NO. 122.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 13.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 13, 1914.*

Consular officer at Basra telegraphs as follows:

'I have been notified by Vali that H.M.S. *Espègle* must be interned until the end of the war unless she departs from Mohammerah and the Shatt-el-Arab within eight days from the 11th instant. If she attempts to leave after the expiration of the said period, her passage through the Shatt-el-Arab will be stopped by force of arms. The *Dalhousie* departed several days ago.

'I have informed His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah of the Vali's communication.'

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 123.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 13, 1914.*Your telegram of 12th October.<sup>1</sup><sup>1</sup> See  
No. 117.

Your Excellency should make the following reply to the Turkish note protesting against the presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab :

'As regards the passage through the Shatt-el-Arab to and from the port of Mohammerah, His Majesty's Government maintain in principle the legitimacy of such passage, but express themselves quite ready to examine in a friendly spirit any representation that the Ottoman Government may make on the subject, if the Sublime Porte themselves strictly observe their neutrality, which they have gravely violated by continuing to retain the German officers and crews on the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, in spite of all assurances and promises to the contrary.

'His Majesty's Government are prepared to respond in a conciliatory spirit whenever the Ottoman Government shall have conformed, as a neutral, to the principles of international law prescribing the duties of neutral Powers.

'As regards the presence of British warships at the port of Mohammerah,<sup>2</sup> this is a matter with which the Sublime Porte is in nowise concerned, since Mohammerah is not in Ottoman territory ; Porte have, therefore, no right to request their departure.'

<sup>2</sup> [Cf.  
No. 146  
(encl.).]

No. 124.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 14.)*(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

Moslems in Aleppo district are reported to have been so inveigled and incited by German and Turkish deliberate official misrepresentations and falsehoods of every kind that masses seem to believe German Emperor has embraced Islamic faith, and that Germans are fighting for Islam against Russia.



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 125.

*Mr. Cheetham to Str Edward Grey. (Received October 15.)*

*Cairo, September 30, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two interrogatories<sup>1</sup> which I have received from the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, regarding the case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, a German employé of the Alexandria City Police, who was arrested on his return from leave, *via* Constantinople. He explained his return by stating that he had been excused from military service in Germany.—I have, etc.,

MILNE CHEETHAM.

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ENCLOSURE I IN No. 125.

*Interrogatories of Lieutenant Mors.*

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(I.)

Mulazim Awal Robert Casimir Otto Mors, Egyptian Police, examined, states :

‘At Constantinople I was acquainted with a German official who was formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo. This gentleman, whose name I must refuse to give, was in agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of military operations in Egypt, and as he knew that I knew Egypt very well, he conducted me to Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War. The latter questioned me on the military situation ; if it were true that the British had disarmed the Egyptian army, &c. I replied that I did not know, and thought it unlikely. I then left the presence of Enver, and he remained talking with the German official. I forgot to mention that he asked me if I would participate in operations in Egypt. I replied that I would only participate in open military action. I was afterwards informed by the German official that Enver had sent officers from the Turkish army to Egypt to prepare native public opinion for action in favour of Turkey. I also heard from the German official that one of Enver’s emissaries was an officer of the Egyptian army, but I did not know his name then. I must mention here that I understood from various things and from conver-

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. No. 181 and encl.]

[Cf. No. 181, encl., p. 215.]



sations that I overheard between the said German official and various people that he had the intention of sending printed matters and explosives to Egypt. I also understood that it was the Egyptian army officer who was charged with the transport of these things. We were held up in the Dardanelles for six days owing to the wreck of a cargo boat. On the second we were stopped there; the "Bash Reis" (boatswain) of the *Saidieh* brought me a small leather bag (which I recognised as being the property of the said German official), and told me that somebody on board had given it to him to give to the passenger in No. 7 cabin, viz., my cabin. At the same time the "Bash Reis" asked me if it belonged to me. I said "Yes," because I began to suspect that the contents of the bag were the explosives that I had heard about. I opened the bag and found it was half full of packing material; and on probing it I found there were hard substances underneath. I thought that if I said that the sack did not belong to me it might be handed over to the ship's captain, and it would then be discovered what the contents were, and an accident might even occur. I did not know at this time that the "Bash Reis" had guilty knowledge of the contents of the bag, and therefore told him that there was nothing in it. I then took it into my cabin to examine it, and found the two tin boxes which you seized. Whilst we were still in the Dardanelles—as far as I can remember it was the fourth day there—the Egyptian officer came to me and said in Arabic: "Are you not the passenger occupying No. 7 cabin?" I said: "Yes; why?" and he said: "Have you received the things?" ("Wasal-lak el shay?"). I replied: "Was it you who sent it to me?" He said: "Perhaps" ("Yimkin").

'I then said: "What have such things to do with me?" He said: "I cannot keep such things myself." I then asked him who gave them to him. He replied: "Fouad." I do not know who this Fouad is exactly, but it is possibly Ahmad Fouad at Constantinople, whom I have seen with the German official, and who is an intimate friend of Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, according to all reports. He then told me his name was Ahmad Hamuda, and that he had fought against the Italians in Tripoli. He showed me his card, on which was written: "Ahmad Hamuda, Officer of the Egyptian Army." I do not remember if the card bore his rank or not.

I saw Ahmad Hamuda Effendi after leaving Piræus, when he came and asked me what I had done with the tin boxes. I understood, from the way he put it, that he wanted to take them from me, but this is only an idea I had. I told him I had thrown them overboard. When we were anchored in the harbour, he again came and asked me to take his revolver ashore. I replied that I had my own revolver, and that I should be searched like everybody else. He then asked me if they would search his wife. I said: "Naturally; they have female searchers at the Customs."

'I had the intention of throwing the tin boxes overboard, but I was afraid that they might explode on striking the water. I therefore procured some cord with which I meant to lower them into the water. I never got a chance, and I was afraid that the propeller would catch the cord, and the steamer might be blown up or damaged.

'Another thing which deterred me was that I was afraid the boxes might float and be dangerous to shipping, so I postponed it until our arrival at Smyrna, where I telegraphed to the German official at Constantinople stating that two tin boxes with unknown contents had been handed to me, and I desired instructions. At Piræus I received a telegram telling me to throw them overboard, which, for the reasons I have just given, I again postponed.'

Q. Have you any witnesses to prove that the boatswain gave you the bag containing the tin boxes?—A. Yes, a certain Fortunato, the cabin steward, was present, and I gave him the bag with the packing after removing the tin boxes, asking him to throw the packing overboard. He did so, and returned me the bag.

On arrival in port here I gave the tin boxes to Mohamed Ali, the purser, and asked him to keep them with him until he had a chance to throw them overboard without being observed by the various launches. I also recommended him not to throw them from the deck, but to descend the gangway and drop them into the sea carefully after weighting them with a piece of iron. I told him they contained dangerous substances, and to be very careful. I noticed he seemed afraid, and told him if he did not wish to do it he should give them back to me. He said he did not mind doing it, and if



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

I wished he would pass them through the Customs for me without difficulty.

*Q.* Why did you select Mohamed Ali for the mission?—

*A.* Because I heard at Piræus that he was a Turkish agent.

*Q.* From whom did you hear this?—*A.* From a Turk at the German consulate at Piræus.

*Q.* How did you meet this Turk?—*A.* He was introduced to me by the German vice-consul.

*Q.* What is his name? *A.* I do not remember. He gave me his visiting card, and I destroyed it.

*Q.* How did you approach Mohamed Ali on the subject?—

*A.* I showed him the visiting card of the Turk, to which he said at once, salaaming with his hand, 'Ahlan wa Sahlan.'

*Q.* Where did you procure the map of the Suez Canal?—

*A.* It was given to me by the German official.

*Q.* Why did he give you the map?—I do not know. We were talking together, and he showed me the map. I admired it, and he told me to take it.

*Q.* Where did you get the cypher found with your effects?

—*A.* I invented it with the assistance of the German official, for correspondence with him at Constantinople.

*Q.* Where is the key to it?—*A.* I destroyed it.

*Q.* Can you tell me what it was?—*A.* It was to let him know if the Egyptian army had been disbanded; if there were difficulties for me here to enter the country; by what route I intended to return, etc.

R. MORS.

*Alexandria, September 28, 1914.*

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(2.)

*Inquiry into Mors's Case, held on September 28, 1914.*

*I. Mors interrogated.*

*Q.* Can you explain this telegram (telegram addressed to 'Prill, Bacos, Bulkely, Alexandria,' from Schneider)?—

*A.* No. You must ask the French lady who is staying with us ('il faut demander à Mademoiselle chez nous'), as it is a private telegram of hers. It seems to be asking news of her health.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Nos.  
133, 181,  
encl.]

Q. Who is Schneider?—A. I do not know.

Q. Who is Omar Fawzi <sup>1</sup> [*sic*] and Suliman Askari?—A. Two officers I met in Constantinople whom the German introduced to me.

Q. Where did you meet them?—A. At the hotel Tokatlian in Constantinople.

Q. What is the name of this German official?—A. I do not know.

Q. When was he in Cairo?—A. Two years ago.

Q. Was this your first visit to Constantinople?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you know this gentleman before?—A. No.

Q. You realise that your position is a serious one?—A. Yes.

Q. You refuse to give his name?—A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the name of the Turk whom you met in Alexandria?—A. I must refuse, but if you suggest his name I will tell you if you are right or wrong.

Q. Do you deny that the German official is Baron Oppenheim?—A. Yes; Oppenheim is at Berlin.

Q. Do you know Baron Oppenheim?—A. I have never seen, but often heard of him. He is over 50 years of age. According to Berlin opinion, he is merely a 'blagueur,' and of no importance.

Q. Did you see Ezzedin Fawzi in Constantinople?—A. No; he had left before I arrived.

Q. What did he do there?—A. I do not know. I heard from my sister-in-law that he had left for Constantinople. He was charged with my private affairs.

Q. Was not this rather a serious arrangement to make?—A. No; he was always a great friend of mine.

Q. Do you know his political opinions?—A. No.

Q. You appear to have had some previous knowledge of the preparation of explosives for use in Egypt?—A. I heard in Constantinople that something of the nature of explosives were to be prepared and sent to Egypt.

Q. What was the ultimate destination of these things?—A. I don't know. I was only three days at Constantinople.

Q. Have these explosives penetrated into Egypt?—A. I don't know. Perhaps other emissaries arrived in Egypt at the same time as I did.

Q. Who is Fahmy Bey?—A. Mohamed Bey Fahmy,

Master of Ceremonies in the Khedive's household, who arrived in Constantinople in the *Saidieh*.

*Q.* How did you get to know him?—*A.* He rented our house three years ago.

*Q.* Who sent you this telegram?—*A.* It was the answer to my telegram.

*Q.* Why did you send the first telegram?—*A.* To see if it were possible and advisable, in view of the reported state of things in Egypt, for me to return here, or if it would be better for my family to join me there.

*Q.* Is this the bag you brought with you?—*A.* Yes.

*Q.* Who sent it to you?—*A.* I do not know. The boatswain brought it to me saying it was for whoever occupied cabin No. 7. Probably Ahmed Hamuda gave it to him to give to me.

*Q.* Did you see Enver Pasha in Constantinople?—*A.* Yes. I had a conversation with him.

*Q.* How was it that you had this conversation?—*A.* The German official introduced me to Enver at the War Office.

*Q.* What did Enver Pasha say to you?—*A.* He questioned me as to the state of affairs in Egypt.

*Q.* Is the German official a German naval officer?—*A.* No.

*Q.* Did Enver Pasha express any opinions?—*A.* He said that he wanted a campaign against Egypt, should war break out, for which two army corps would be required.

*Q.* What did he want you to do here?—*A.* He asked me if I would help.

*Q.* What did you reply?—*A.* I agreed to do so in the event of a military expedition.

*Q.* Who gave you the idea that explosives were being prepared to be sent to Egypt?—*A.* I suspected the German officer, whom I saw with an Egyptian Effendi unknown to me.

*Q.* How did Ahmed Hamuda get to know you?—*A.* He came to see me on the voyage—in the Dardanelles, I think.

*Q.* Why did he trust *you*?—*A.* I do not know.

*Q.* Had you made no previous promises?—*A.* No.

*Q.* Whom did you see at the Piræus?—*A.* The consul, where I saw the telegrams and the Turkish gentleman who told me of Mohamed Ali, the purser.

*Q.* Why did you send this telegram?—*A.* Because I knew



something was being prepared, and suspected that the bag had some connection with it. Besides, there were several emissaries on board, and there had been many circulars in the hotels in Constantinople.

Q. Who were these emissaries?—A. I do not know, but I heard that Sheikh Shawish had said there were thirteen who had left.

Q. Will you explain how you knew of these preparations?—A. Through the German official and various people I met casually at odd times. The German official arrived in Constantinople from Berlin the day before me.

Q. Did Omar Fawzi speak to you of Egypt?—A. Yes; he said he had fought in Tripoli and had been to Egypt where he had many friends.

Q. Where did you meet the Turk at Piræus?—A. At the German consulate.

Q. Have you ever visited Tchiboukli Palace?—A. No.

Q. Why did you write Omar Fawzi's name in the piece of paper?—A. Because I had to meet him at the 'Petit Champs,' a restaurant in Constantinople, and I wished to remember.

Q. Will you explain what the code found in your tarbush was?—A. The references to cotton were information about troops, the best quality denoted British and the inferior Native soldiers. Kantars referred to the number of men. Certain phrases referred to the disarmament of Egyptian troops. 'Suis disposé,' I recollect, meant that I should return.

Q. When did you want to leave the country?—A. As soon as possible, for I understood that all Germans serving under foreign Governments had to resign.

Q. What did 'venez par le premier bateau' mean?—A. That things were in a dangerous state here.

Q. And No. 15?—A. 'Don't come to Turkey.'

Q. 'Ne venez pas—tout arrangé'?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. 'Venez de suite'?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. 'Bébé va mieux'?—A. I have forgotten—all this was made up hurriedly before I left Constantinople during the last half-hour when I was packing my luggage. I did not look at it again before I destroyed the key; it is now three weeks since I left Constantinople.



Q. How is it that you know some of the expressions and not others?—A. In view of what I have explained, it seems clear. Those referring to the ‘Santé de la famille’ refer to Turkish officers, but I cannot remember the details.

Q. Did it refer to their going to the Red Sea?—A. I don’t know, but I have an idea it was with a view to finding out what difficulties were placed in the way of Turkish officers in Egypt.

Q. Who was to have taken charge of the explosives here?—A. The agents of Sheikh Shawish.

Q. Who?—A. I do not know.

Q. Did you not know that the German official was going to give you these things?—A. No.

Q. How did you recognise the bag?—A. I saw it in the hotel at Constantinople and recognised the repair which I had seen at a restaurant in the hands of an effendi.

Q. How did you get to know so many people?—A. I met them casually at the hotel and the German Embassy, where I called and learnt that it was difficult to get to Egypt.

Q. How did you meet the German official?—A. I met him at the embassy.

## 2. Boatswain interrogated.

Q. Have you seen this bag before?—A. Yes. I first saw it on board the *Saidieh* in Constantinople on the 3rd September with a sailor called Ali, who asked me to give it to the occupant of cabin No. 7.

Q. Where was it given to you?—A. I think on deck. I told Ali that he had better give it to a steward in the first class, which he did. The next morning Mors asked me who had given me the bag.

Q. Why should Mors have asked you this? How was it that he connected the bag with you?—A. Because I told the steward to give it to him, and perhaps he told Mors so.

Q. When did Mors speak to you?—A. The next morning at about 8 A.M. He brought me the bag and asked me who gave it to me, as he wanted to give me a tip. I refused the latter as it was not I who brought the bag.

Q. Who gave Ali the bag?—A. He told me an Arab did so.

Q. Was the latter on the steamer?—A. I do not know.

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

### 3. *Mors and Boatswain confronted.*

Q. (To Mors.) Who brought you this bag?—A. This boatswain with the steward.

Q. Did you offer the boatswain a tip?—A. Yes, but he refused it.

Q. Why did you want to give it to him if the bag was not yours?—A. I accepted the bag for the reasons I have already given you.

Q. Why offer him a tip?—A. For the sake of my friend, and because I did not want the matter exposed.

Q. Who gave him the bag?—A. I do not know, but it must have been Ahmad Hamuda.

Q. (To the Boatswain.) Do you know Ahmad Hamuda?—A. No.

*Alexandria, September 29, 1914.*

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No. 126.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 15.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

The whole of the Turkish fleet has re-entered the Bosphorus.

The *Leros* and *Erissos*, two German steamers which have been convoyed from Sulina by the *Breslau*, sailed under the Turkish flag until they were inside the Bosphorus. The same thing was done on a former occasion, when two ships from Black Sea ports were similarly convoyed by the *Breslau*.

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No. 127.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 15.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

About 600 Moslem "fedahis," dressed in various guises, have arrived at Aleppo in batches during past fortnight, their head being an officer related to Ottoman Minister of War; 400 of these came from Smyrna, where they had incited Moslems against Greeks. At Aleppo they intrigued, with the aid of Committee of Union and Progress, with sheikhs against



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Great Britain. Discourses of a guarded anti-British tendency were pronounced in mosques. The last batch left Aleppo 12th October by rail. Parties of them have proceeded to Hama, Homs, Baalbek, Damascus, the Hauran, to incite sheikhs against Great Britain, and they are to continue their journey south by Hedjaz Railway, and to find their way into Egypt to incite Moslems there. Many of the principal sheikhs of Aleppo seem now gained over to side of Germany.

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No. 128.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 15.)* [Cf. 147, encl.]  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

With the object of spreading the belief that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam, the German Embassy daily emits a stream of mendacity and calumny, which is circulated throughout the country by the Turkish newspapers, all of those in the capital being in the pay of the German Embassy as a result of the large sums spent by it in corruption both in Constantinople and in the provinces.

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No. 129.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 16.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1914.*

Son of Kurdish chief Issa, who is stated to have influence in Mesopotamia, and who has been in Constantinople for instructions, is said to have left for Basra to work anti-English propaganda, and other agents, including Germans, are said to be on their way to Afghanistan on similar errand.

I learn that Zekki Pasha, commander of 8th corps, has lately received £5000 to distribute amongst Bedouins, and that as much as £35,000 in gold left here by train on 12th for Syria. Senator Abdurrahman is working among Bedouins at Maan and Muntaz Bey on the west by Beersheba and Jerusalem.

Party of Turkish sailors mentioned as having left here by train for Basra are now stated to be on the way to Akaba with consignment of metal boats. Another lot of boats is at Rayak, possibly on the way to Beirout. Quantities of dynamite have been sent to the coast towns of Syria, probably



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

to serve for mining purposes of land defence. This is in addition to sea mines which have been also forwarded. Numbers of 'working battalions' (soldiers as yet untrained), are road-constructing in southern Syria.

All above and previous reports in a similar sense show that there is very considerable activity being directed in a sense hostile to us, and this activity is being worked by German influence and agents in every conceivable direction. Probably Government as a whole have little control over these activities, but do not disapprove of them. As regards actual military preparations, German element has sufficient power to persuade the authorities on certain points. German press is directing movement, and has obtained despatch of numbers of German officers to Syria to superintend preparations and training of corps there for war, concentration of stores and supplies at suitable spots, preparation of lines of communication and defence of coast.

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No. 130.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received October 16.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1914.*

German plots have been so extensive that it is conceivable that they may introduce individuals into Egypt who, impersonating Indian soldiers, may cause mischief.

In substantiation of this I have to state that His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo has learnt that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on design and measurement supplied by German officers there.

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No. 131.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received October 16.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 16, 1914.*

Ninety-seven cases of bullion passed through Rustchuk yesterday for Constantinople, accompanied by six Germans. This consignment was preceded by 200 other cases. In the last three weeks many heavy cases and stores have passed through same town.

Armaments are believed to be sent through in the night.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 132.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

Local authorities at Jaffa have distributed 10,000 rifles amongst Bedouins, each with 100 cartridges, 5000 ten-shot to owners of horses and riding camels, and 5000 single-shot to owners of baggage camels. Bedouins have been employed to dig wells, and Germans to fit them with motor pumps; ovens have been built near frontier.

It is believed that Bedouins' next move is to be towards Akaba.

Horses and mules throughout the whole district are being requisitioned most energetically.

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No. 133.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

Major Omar Fevzi [sic] Bey,<sup>1</sup> son of Arimm Effendi, ex-Governor-General of Damascus, accompanied by five German officers, arrived at Aleppo 14th October from Constantinople bringing 25,000 liras. The officers passed for engineers, and are buying saddle horses to proceed to Bagdad *via* Ana. From Ana they are to take two batteries of guns, which, together with money and loads of rifles and ammunition taken from Aleppo, they are to deliver to Ibn-el-Reshid.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. No. 125, encl. 2; No. 181, encl.]

Railway trucks full of dynamite for Alexandretta and Damascus are expected to arrive from Constantinople. German officers of *Breslau* have already laid thirteen mines at Alexandretta according to report that has now reached me.

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No. 134.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

Minister of War, who is willing tool of Germans, is now supreme. Minister of the Interior was most influential Minister before mobilisation, but is so no longer. His position now is rather mysterious. Whilst taking advantage of

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

European struggle to carry through so-called emancipation of Turks from foreign control, he is not supposed to be in favour of war, which he thinks would end badly for Turkey. If this diagnosis is correct, he and others like him are more or less powerless at present, and, though they declare their ability and intention to stop military preparations, evidently are unable to check them.

[Reply,  
No. 159.]

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No. 135.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received October 17.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

Reliable information reaches me that mines are being sent to Basra, and will reach Bagdad in a day or two.

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No. 136.

*Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.* (Received October 17.)  
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 17, 1914.*

One Bouhadi Sadil has been discovered buying arms for importation into Egypt. He had already bought 700 Gras rifles and ammunition. I understand that two of this man's accomplices were recently convicted in Egypt.

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No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 17, 1914.*

Any attack upon H.M.S. *Espiègle* by Turkish authorities will be a wanton act of aggression, as she is not in Turkish territorial waters.

You should inform Turkish Government that there is no present intention of her passing down the Shatt-el-Arab, but His Majesty's Government consider they have a right to claim that passage so long as *Goeben* and *Breslau*, with German crews and officers, have free use of Turkish territorial waters and the Straits.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 138.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

Since end of September following have reached Constantinople :

Six thousand nine hundred cases of Mauser ammunition, 540 cases of Mauser rifles, 13 trucks of war material, and about £800,000 in bar gold.<sup>1</sup>

Arrival of a submarine in sections is expected shortly, and I am informed that such a consignment, together with two aeroplanes, left Rustchuk on 8th October.

Two German ships were recently escorted from Sulina by *Breslau*, and are reported to have brought submarine. But there is no evidence at present to prove this.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *post.*  
pp. 232-3.]

No. 139.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 18, 1914.*

Aeroplane, three airmen, and several mechanics left Beer-sheba yesterday.

Governor left Jaffa with a view to allaying panic.

Following is résumé of a telegram from Minister of War to commandant at Jaffa which has come to my knowledge :

‘On the approach of enemy warships destroy boats and lighters, kill horses, break carriages, and destroy railway. Strictly guard telegraph. When surrender of town is demanded, ask for time to consult Jerusalem. If Jerusalem instructs you not to surrender, oppose landing of the enemy by force of arms. See no looting of town takes place, and find suitable place to shelter your archives. Explain above to the population and arm them, taking oath from them. At signal not to surrender send away women and children. Hoist flag on konak and barracks so as not to have other places bombarded. Break enemy’s flagstaff and remove insignia from the door of his consulate.’

# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 140.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 86.  
<sup>2</sup> See  
No. 93.

SIR,—With reference to my telegram of 22nd September<sup>1</sup> and your telegram of the 25th September,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes exchanged between the Grand Vizier and myself respecting the suppression of the British post offices in the Turkish Empire.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 140.

*Grand Vizier to Sir L. Mallet.*

*Constantinople, le 27 septembre 1914.*

M. L'AMBASSADEUR,—Pour faire suite à ma note du 9 courant, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite de l'abrogation des Capitulations à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> octobre, 1914, les bureaux des postes étrangères fonctionnant provisoirement dans l'Empire devront cesser leurs opérations à partir de cette date.

Je prie, par conséquent, votre Excellence de vouloir bien inviter les directeurs des bureaux de postes anglaises se trouvant en Turquie à agir en conformité des communications qui leur ont été faites par le Ministère Impérial des Postes et Télégraphes et dont copies ont été déjà transmises à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date 24 septembre, 1914.—Veuillez, etc.

SAÏD HALIM.

(TRANSLATION.)

*Constantinople, September 27, 1914.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—In continuation of my note of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the abolition of the Capitulations as from 1st October, 1914, the foreign post offices provisionally existing in the Turkish Empire must cease working from that date.

I accordingly request your Excellency to be so good as to request the directors of British post offices in Turkey to act in conformity with the communications addressed to them by the Imperial Minister of Ports and Telegraphs, copies of which have already been communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy on 24th September 1914.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 140.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 1, 1914.*

M. LE MINISTRE,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated 27th September, by which your Highness requests me to instruct the directors of the British post offices established in the Ottoman Empire to act in accordance with the communications which have been addressed to them by officials of the Imperial Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs with a view to their ceasing their operations from to-day onwards.

The fact that a measure of such importance affecting an official department of His Majesty's Government should have been adopted in virtue of an unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte, and that effect has been given to the measure in so precipitate a manner, compels me to formulate the most express reservations both as to the procedure followed and as to the principle underlying the question.

With a view to avoiding incidents of a public nature I have instructed the British post offices in the Empire to suspend their ordinary postal operations from to-day onwards. By so doing and by authorising a verbal exchange of views, in order to mitigate the inconvenience resulting from this suspension, I must not be considered to have prejudiced the question of principle. It will be for my Government to consider what further action shall be taken in the matter.—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 141.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note which I have addressed to the Sublime Porte referring to the repeated assurances which the Grand Vizier has given me that the German crews will be sent back to Germany, assurances which were confirmed to me by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on the occasion of my audience of His Imperial Majesty on the 21st ultimo, and inquiring whether the Ottoman Government



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

have the intention of fulfilling their undertakings, and, if so, on what date this will take effect.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 141.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—On the occasion of the audience which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan was graciously pleased to accord me on the 21st ultimo, I had the honour to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, my Sovereign, respecting the detention in England of the two Turkish vessels of war. I had previously communicated to your Highness the substance of this message, as your Highness will doubtless remember. His Imperial Majesty deigned in reply to charge me with his thanks to the King, my Sovereign, and whilst regretting that His Majesty's Government should have detained the vessels, which seemed unnecessary in view of the large naval supremacy of Great Britain, His Imperial Majesty said that he was unalterably determined to maintain the historic friendship between the two countries and on no account to depart from the neutrality which had hitherto been observed by his Government. Referring to a passage in the King's message, expressing His Majesty's regret at certain events which had seemed to impair that neutrality, His Imperial Majesty authorised me to inform the King that the services of the German admiral, officers, and crews of the German warships had been temporarily retained in order to train the Turkish officers and crews, but that the task was on the point of accomplishment, and that they would return to Germany within a few days' time.

I replied that these assurances—which I had also received repeatedly from your Highness—would not fail to give great satisfaction to the King, coming as they did from the lips of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan himself.

I now address myself to your Highness to inquire whether the Ottoman Government have the intention of repatriating the German officers and crews in accordance with the oft-repeated assurances of your Highness, which have now been solemnly confirmed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

If such is their intention, I should be grateful if I might be informed of the date on which their departure will take place.  
—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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NO. 142.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a note which I addressed to the Sublime Porte, protesting against the abrogation of the Capitulations.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE IN NO. 142.

*Note Verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.*

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy has received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make the following statement to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs :

His Britannic Majesty's Government expressly confirm the protest against the suppression of the Capitulations which His Majesty's Ambassador addressed to the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th ultimo.

The régime of the Capitulations being founded on synallagmatic instruments the Porte cannot abrogate them by a unilateral act. His Majesty's Government therefore reserve their full liberty of action as regards the measures which the Ottoman authorities may have taken or may take in violation of the Capitulations, and will demand due reparation for any prejudice which their subjects may suffer in consequence of such measures.

His Majesty's Government, desirous of maintaining the friendly relations which have hitherto existed with the Ottoman Empire, feel constrained to call the serious attention of the Porte to the consequences which may follow upon the adoption of the new policy upon which the Imperial Government would seem to have embarked.

It is not in the interests of the Ottoman Government to alienate the sympathy of Great Britain, which constitutes a



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

guarantee of present tranquillity and a pledge of future support.

*Constantinople, October 1, 1914.*

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No. 143.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Grand Vizier protesting against certain military preparations in Syria.

On the 2nd October I addressed a further note, copy of which is also enclosed, pointing out that no answer had been received either to my previous note or to two letters of the 25th and 26th on the same subject.—I have, etc., LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 143.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, le 23 septembre, 1914.*

ALTESSE,—Au cours de notre entretien d'hier matin, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire part à votre Altesse de l'inquiétude que m'inspiraient les nouvelles que je recevais de la Syrie au sujet des préparatifs militaires et des complots contre l'Égypte que l'on fait dans cette région. Aussi longtemps qu'il s'agissait de préparatifs semblables à ceux qui se sont faits partout dans l'Empire à la suite de la mobilisation générale, je n'en ai rien dit à votre Altesse, bien que l'on pût attacher une importance toute particulière à tout ce qui se faisait dans ce genre dans le voisinage de la frontière égyptienne. De même ai-je jusqu'à présent rejeté comme des racontars invraisemblables les bruits qui me sont parvenus de plus d'une source, et d'après lesquels on projetterait un coup subit contre le Canal de Suez dans le but d'en rendre impossible le passage, quoique je sache que les ennemis de la Grande-Bretagne aient mené des intrigues ayant pour leur but d'emmener le Gouvernement de votre Altesse dans des aventures aussi folles et même plus folles que cela. Cependant, je manquerais à mon devoir envers mon Gouvernement, et je puis ajouter envers votre Altesse, si je ne la mettais pas au courant des derniers rapports qui me sont



parvenus. Il résulte de ces rapports que les esprits des Bédouins sont travaillés par des agents provocateurs qui, encouragés par le Gouvernement ottoman, voudraient les exciter contre l'Angleterre. Les préparatifs militaires, qui jusqu'à un certain moment ne différaient pas dans leur caractère de ceux faits dans les autres provinces de l'Empire, se sont transformés dernièrement dans un mouvement vers le sud. On fait venir des troupes d'un centre aussi lointain que Mosul. Une activité générale règne partout, de Damas jusqu'à Maan. Une accumulation d'indices fait croire à mon consul à Jérusalem que l'on projette pour ces jours-ci même une expédition en règle contre l'Égypte.

J'aime à espérer que les rapports dont je viens de faire un résumé pour votre Altesse interprètent mal des faits qui en eux-mêmes sont indiscutables. Mais je répète que je manquerais à mon devoir si je ne faisais pas part à votre Altesse des graves préoccupations qu'ils m'occasionnent et l'impression qu'ils font sur le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et si je ne la mettais pas en garde contre les conséquences désastreuses qui résulteraient pour votre Gouvernement s'il suivait une voie si contraire à ses propres intérêts que celle de se faire le complice de l'Allemagne dans une attaque contre l'Égypte.

Votre Altesse se rappellera qu'au commencement de la guerre actuelle Sir E. Grey chargea Mr. Beaumont de lui déclarer que pourvu que la Turquie gardât une neutralité stricte et absolue pendant la guerre et tant que des circonstances imprévues ne surgissent pas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'avait aucun désir ni intention d'annexer l'Égypte ni de modifier son régime d'une façon quelconque. J'eus l'honneur de confirmer cette assurance à votre Altesse peu de temps après ma rentrée à Constantinople. Depuis lors, désireux d'éviter toute possibilité de malentendu avec le Gouvernement Impérial, j'ai à plusieurs reprises appelé l'attention de votre Altesse sur le caractère conditionnel des assurances données par Sir E. Grey. Or, je crois de mon devoir de déclarer encore une fois à votre Altesse que mon Gouvernement voit sous un jour des plus sérieux les violations de neutralité sans précédent commises déjà par le Gouvernement ottoman en gardant des officiers et des équipages allemands à bord des vaisseaux de guerre allemands et en prenant

dans son service plus tard beaucoup d'autres Allemands ayant le même caractère militaire.

Je ne trouve pas nécessaire en ce moment de récapituler les détails d'encore autres écarts de la neutralité commis par la Turquie en faveur des ennemis de la Grande-Bretagne. Je n'ai pas besoin non plus d'insister sur des conséquences qui pourraient en suivre, si pour mettre le comble à une situation tellement grave, mon Gouvernement acquerrait la conviction que le Gouvernement Impérial envisageait sérieusement une attaque contre l'Égypte ou qu'il se prêtait à des menées déloyales contre la sûreté du Canal de Suez ou contre le régime actuel de l'Égypte. Votre Altesse peut elle-même apprécier toute l'importance et toute la portée possible de ces conséquences.

Votre Altesse trouvera annexé à cette note un mémoire détaillant les faits qui peuvent être considérés comme le prélude d'une attaque contre l'Égypte.—Je profite, etc.

LOUIS MALLET.

(TRANSLATION.)

*Constantinople, September 23, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—In the course of our interview of yesterday morning, I had the honour to inform your Highness of the anxiety that the news which reached me from Syria in regard to the military preparations and plots against Egypt now going on in that province, was causing me. So long as it was a question of preparations similar to those made in other parts of the Empire, as a consequence of the general mobilisation, I did not mention the matter to your Highness, although special importance might attach to all such doings in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian frontier. Similarly, I have been able up to the present to reject, as improbable tales, the rumours which have reached me from more than one source, according to which a sudden blow directed against the Suez Canal was being planned with the object of rendering it impassable, although I am aware that the enemies of Great Britain are intriguing with the object of leading your Highness's Government into adventures as insensate, and even more insensate, than this. I should, however, fail in my duty towards my Government, and I may add also towards the Government of your Highness, if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge



the latest reports which have reached me. It appears from these reports that the minds of the Bedouins are being excited by professional agitators, who, encouraged by the Ottoman Government, are desirous of inflaming them against England. The military preparations, which up to a certain moment bore a similar character to those in the other provinces of the Empire, have lately changed into a converging movement towards the south. Troops are being brought from such distant centres as Mosul. General activity reigns everywhere from Damascus to Maan, and cumulative evidence leads my Consul at Jerusalem to the belief that an organised expedition against Egypt is in project for the next few days.

I trust that the reports, the contents of which I have just summed up to your Highness, put a wrong interpretation on facts which, as such, cannot be discussed. But I repeat that I should fail in my duty, if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge the grave preoccupation which they cause me, and the impression which they make upon His Britannic Majesty's Government, and if I did not place you on your guard against the disastrous consequences, which would ensue for your Highness's Government, if they were to follow a course so contrary to their own interests as that of becoming the accomplice of Germany in an attack upon Egypt.

Your Highness will remember that at the beginning of the present war, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. Beaumont to give you the assurance that, provided that Turkey maintained strict and absolute neutrality during the war, and so long as unforeseen circumstances did not arise, His Britannic Majesty's Government had no desire to, nor intention of annexing Egypt, nor of modifying her régime in any way whatsoever. I had the honour to confirm this assurance to your Highness shortly after my return to Constantinople. Since then, being desirous of avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding with the Imperial Government, I have repeatedly called your Highness's attention to the conditional character of the assurances given by Sir E. Grey. Now, I hold it to be my duty to declare once more to your Highness that my Government take the most serious view of the unprecedented violations of neutrality already committed by the Turkish Government in retaining German officers and men on board the German warships, and by subsequently taking into



their service numerous other Germans in a similar military capacity.

It does not seem to me necessary at this moment to recapitulate the details of still further departures from neutrality committed by Turkey in favour of the enemies of Great Britain. Nor need I insist on the consequences which might ensue if, to add the last touch to so grave a situation, my Government were to become convinced that the Imperial Government were seriously meditating an attack against Egypt, or that they were a party to disloyal intrigues against the security of the Suez Canal, or against the present régime in Egypt. Your Highness can judge of the whole importance and possible extent of these consequences.

I enclose in this note a Memorandum, enumerating in detail the facts which can be considered as indications of a forthcoming attack upon Egypt.—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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*Memorandum.*

D'un rapport en date du 18 courant, il résulte que les autorités déployaient tous leurs efforts pour exciter les tribus bédouines contre l'Angleterre, en la représentant comme l'ennemi de l'islamisme, et que 30,000 hommes appartenant à ces tribus étaient prêts à se soulever. Un rapport complémentaire porte que les instigateurs de ce mouvement sont Muntaz Bey, officier à l'armée ; Essad Choucair, député ou ancien député ; et un certain Beheddine Bey, aidés de plusieurs autres personnes et appuyés par les autorités locales tant civiles que militaires. Le rapport ajoute sans réserves qu'après le bruit qui courait, des tribus devaient s'armer tout de suite pour marcher contre l'Égypte.

Il résulte d'un autre rapport du 18 courant qu'un mouvement militaire de Damas vers le sud était attendu pour environ le 20 septembre ; que les troupes de Mosul étaient en route pour Damas ; que l'on préparait de grandes provisions de vivres ; que l'on avait rassemblé 3000 chameaux à Maan ; et que deux officiers d'état-major étaient rentrés d'Akaba après avoir étudié la possibilité d'un mouvement à travers le désert. Ce rapport se complète par un autre de la même date portant que l'on projetait d'envoyer un grand nombre d'hommes de

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Homs à Damas par chemin de fer, entre le 20 et le 23 septembre, et que l'on s'attendait à une grande concentration vers le sud. D'un troisième rapport reçu postérieurement il résulte qu'en-  
core 5000 chameaux avaient étéquisitionnés à Maan ; que tout le matériel roulant de la partie sud du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz se trouvait concentré à Deraa ; et que les troupes de Mosul étaient parvenues à Tel-Abiad près d'Alep.

Un rapport en date du 21 courant déclare qu'il y avait une accumulation d'indices établissant presque la certitude qu'une attaque contre l'Égypte sur une grande échelle aurait lieu dans un avenir très proche ; que les troupes marcheraient des deux côtés, par Akaba et par El-Ariche ; et que l'on préparait une grande quantité de choses nécessaire pour leur transport à travers le désert. Un autre rapport de la même date porte que des chameaux et des hommes sont arrivés de Homs à Damas ; que l'on s'attendait à l'arrivée de trente bataillons au courant de la semaine ; que le chef d'état-major de Damas s'était rendu à Maan ; et que des chefs des tribus bédouines étaient partis pour le sud après avoir conféré avec le Vali.

*Constantinople, le 23 septembre, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

From a report dated the 18th instant, it appears that the authorities were using all their efforts in order to excite the Bedouin tribes against England by representing her as the enemy of Islam, and that 30,000 men belonging to these tribes were ready to rise. A supplementary report states that the instigators of this movement are Muntaz Bey, an officer of the army, Essad Shoucair, deputy or former deputy, and a certain Beheddine Bey, aided by several other persons, and with the support of the local, civil, and military authorities. The report adds categorically that, according to current rumour, these tribes were to arm immediately in order to march on Egypt.

From a further report dated the 18th instant, it appears that a military movement from Damascus towards the south was expected about 20th September ; that the Mosul troops were on their way to Damascus ; that large stores of food-stuffs were being prepared ; that 3000 camels had been collected at Maan ; and that two staff officers had returned from Akaba after studying the possibility of a movement



across the desert. This report was supplemented by another of the same date to the effect that it was intended to send a large number of men from Homs to Damascus by rail, between the 20th and 23rd of September, and that a great concentration converging towards the south was expected. From a third report, which was received subsequently, it appears that another 5000 camels had been requisitioned at Maan ; that all the rolling-stock of the southern section of the Hedjaz Railway was being concentrated at Deraa ; and that the Mosul troops had reached Tel-Abiad, near Aleppo.

A report, dated the 21st instant, stated that there was cumulative evidence to show almost certainly that an attack against Egypt on a large scale would take place in the very near future ; that the troops would advance on both sides by way of Akaba and by way of El Arish ; and that a large provision of things necessary for their transport across the desert was being prepared. A further report of the same date stated that camels and men had arrived at Damascus from Homs ; that thirty battalions were expected to arrive during the week ; that the chief staff officer from Damascus had proceeded to Maan ; and that the chiefs of the Bedouin tribes had left for the south after a conference with the Vali.

*Constantinople, September 23, 1914.*

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 143.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—In my communication of the 23rd September and subsequent letters of the 25th and 26th, various military and other preparations in Syria, initiated by the Ottoman Government, were brought to the notice of your Highness, as likely to cause apprehension to His Majesty's Government.

To the representations made in these communications, no written reply has yet been received, and it appears that not only has the verification of the details already given been confirmed, but further news of a disquieting nature has now arrived. For instance, the transport of food-stuffs, military stores, and material of war to Maan continues. As this place



is in nowise a Turkish military centre in peace, and has no connection with a mobilisation of the Syrian divisions in their ordinary stations, but is, on the other hand, in proximity to the Egyptian frontier, His Majesty's Government would desire to be informed why it is considered necessary to make the preparations in question, which are evidently for the maintenance of a considerable body of troops, or for their transit further in the direction of Akaba.

2. Similar preparations are also apparently being made on the road Jenin-Nablus-Jerusalem, and the collection of a camel corps at the latter place was announced yesterday. These measures tend to show a projected concentration of troops on the limits of Syria to the west, and again in proximity to the Egyptian frontier.

3. The above steps have latterly coincided with the sudden arrival of Colonel Kress von Kressenstein and six other German officers, with the result that it is openly rumoured in Syria that the Jerusalem division is preparing to move towards Rafa and that of Damascus towards Akaba.

4. From Beirout arrive reports that the inhabitants are retiring inland, and from Haifa that the customs and railway staff have also been transferred from the coast. These measures are stated to be taken as precautionary steps against the hostile action of the British fleet, which is expected to ensue on the movement of Turkish forces against Egypt.

5. In view of all these circumstances, it is undoubtedly the case that it is fully believed in Syria that an offensive movement against Egypt is contemplated by the Ottoman authorities, and, although His Majesty's Government do not necessarily share this view, they cannot but regard any continuance of the military movement in anything but the most serious light.

6. Apart from recognised military measures, the movements of a German engineer belonging to the Bagdad Railway with a large consignment of explosives destined for an attempt on the Suez Canal has already been brought to your Highness's notice in my letter of the 25th ultimo.

Not only have the movements of this individual been confirmed, but the departure of a German naval officer named Hilgendorf is now also announced with the same purpose. This individual has left Petra with a party of eight

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

Germans, ostensibly on a shooting expedition, but with a large amount of stores, including explosives, and intending to meet another similar party journeying *via* Haifa-Amman.

As both these parties are acting from neutral territory with the avowed intention of committing acts hostile to Great Britain, it is incumbent on the Porte to secure their apprehension, coupled with an assurance that all necessary steps will be taken to put an end to any enterprises of this nature.

I have been repeatedly assured by your Highness and by other members of the Ottoman Government that Turkey is firmly determined to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality during the European war. To these assurances I have been unfortunately obliged to reply that the Ottoman Government have failed in several most essential particulars to maintain their neutrality, and I would now desire to point out, with all the emphasis at my command, that, if these preparations continue, only one conclusion can be deduced—namely, that the Ottoman Government are taking preliminary steps to send an expedition against Egypt and that they are conniving at the preparation of a plot against the Suez Canal on the part of German subjects, who are either in the Ottoman service or are acting independently.

I cannot too earnestly impress upon your Highness the absolute necessity of putting an end to this situation of uncertainty at the earliest moment possible, in order that those relations of confidence and sincerity may be restored between the two Governments which it has constantly been my object to foster.—I avail, &c.,                      LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 144.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Grand Vizier referring to the circular note<sup>1</sup> enclosed in my immediately succeeding despatch, recently received from the Sublime Porte, defining the rules which they propose to apply during the war in order to defend their neutrality, expressing my satisfaction that they should have adopted views in regard to the use of wireless in neutral waters, by belligerent merchantmen,

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<sup>1</sup> See enclosure in No. 145.



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identical with those of His Majesty's Government, and inquiring when they propose to dismantle the wireless apparatus on the *Corcovado*.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 144.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 2, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—I have received a *note verbale*<sup>1</sup> from the Sublime Porte dated the 28th ultimo defining the rules which the Government of your Highness propose to apply during the present war in order to secure respect for their neutrality and to enable them to perform what they recognise to be their duty as neutrals.

<sup>1</sup>[No. 145, encl. 1.]

I propose to reply to this circular in detail, but in the meantime I desire at once to express my satisfaction that the Imperial Government should have adopted views which, in so far as the installation of wireless stations on land and the use of wireless apparatus by belligerent merchantmen in neutral ports and waters are concerned, are identical with those of His Majesty's Government.

I have had the honour to discuss this question on frequent occasions with your Highness during the last few weeks, in special reference to the notorious case of the German vessel *Corcovado*,<sup>2</sup> amongst others.

<sup>2</sup>[See *post*, p. 228.]

The *Corcovado* has since the beginning of the war lain at Beicos, almost opposite to the British Embassy, and has, in gross violation of the laws of neutrality, which should have been enforced by the Ottoman Government, regularly received and transmitted, and still, so far as I am aware, continues to receive and transmit, wireless messages in such a way as to serve as a base of radio-telegraphic communication for the general purposes of the German Government.

In deference to the wishes of your Highness, I have hitherto confined my remonstrances to verbal representations, but in view of the circular note now received from the Sublime Porte defining the attitude of the Government of your Highness in regard to the question, I feel at liberty to address to your Highness a formal note asking, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the Ottoman regulations may be applied



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without further delay to the *Corcovado* and other vessels which still fly the German flag, or which flew it at the beginning of the present war, and that their wireless installations may be at once dismantled.

I feel convinced that your Highness will see the justice and the propriety of this step.—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 145.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes from and to the Sublime Porte on the subject of the Turkish regulations for belligerent warships in Turkish territorial waters.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 145.

*Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.*

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, en vue d'observer ses devoirs de neutralité pendant toute la durée des hostilités, porte les dispositions qui suivent à la connaissance de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre :

1. L'entrée dans les ports, rades et eaux territoriales ottomans est interdite aux navires de guerre des Puissances belligérantes, sauf pour cause d'avarie, ou à raison de l'état de mer. Dans ces cas, ils ne devront résider que le strict temps matériel nécessaire pour réparer lesdites avaries, ou pour attendre que l'état de la mer soit amélioré.

2. Tout navire belligérant qui demanderait à entrer dans un port ou dans une rade ottomans pour cause de ravitaillement en combustible ou approvisionnement, pourra y être autorisé à la condition d'en obtenir l'autorisation de l'autorité Impériale locale, après avoir établi les motifs de son arrivée ; de ne résider plus de vingt-quatre heures dans lesdits port ou rade et de n'être à la fois pas plus de trois unités du même pavillon dans le même port ou rade.

3. Les ports de Smyrne et de Beyrouth sont interdits auxdits navires, ainsi que les eaux intérieures dont l'accès est

[See  
No. 144  
and encl.]

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barré soit par des mines sous-marines, soit par d'autres moyens de défense.

4. Si le navire de guerre ne quitte pas les eaux ottomanes à l'expiration des délais prévus plus haut, le Gouvernement Impérial prendra les mesures qu'il jugera nécessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de prendre la mer pendant la durée de la guerre.

5. Les bâtiments de guerre sont tenus de respecter les droits souverains de l'Empire ottoman, de s'abstenir de tous actes contraires à sa neutralité, de ne point se livrer dans les eaux territoriales ottomanes à des actes d'hostilité, y compris la capture et le droit de visite.

6. Si des navires de guerre belligérants ennemis se trouvent simultanément dans le même port ou rade ottoman, il doit s'écouler au moins 24 heures entre le départ du navire d'un belligérant et celui du navire de l'autre belligérant ennemi, l'ordre de départ étant déterminé par celui des arrivées, à moins que le bâtiment arrivé le premier ne soit obligé de rester en raison des causes prévues plus haut sur No. 1. De même un bâtiment de guerre belligérant ne peut quitter un des ports ou rades ottomans que 24 heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce sous pavillon de son adversaire.

7. Dans les ports et rades ottomans non interdits les bâtiments de guerre des belligérants ne pourront réparer leurs avaries que dans la mesure indispensable à la sécurité de la navigation et ne pourront accroître, d'une manière quelconque, leur force militaire. Les autorités Impériales ottomanes constateront la nature des réparations à faire ; elles devront être exécutées le plus rapidement possible.

8. Lesdits bâtiments ne pourront s'y ravitailler que pour compléter leur approvisionnement normal du temps de paix. Toutefois, étant données les circonstances exceptionnelles de la guerre actuelle, les autorités Impériales pourront réduire cet approvisionnement, suivant les nécessités des lieux, au strict nécessaire pour suffire à se rendre dans un port étranger neutre le plus proche une première fois, et refuser tout approvisionnement en cas de retour une seconde fois de bâtiments d'une même nation belligérante.

9. Ces navires ne peuvent prendre de combustible que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays, ou de celui dont l'administration est confiée à leur Gouvernement, ou du



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pays allié, au choix de l'autorité Impériale locale. Les restrictions précédentes concernant les approvisionnements seront applicables au combustible.

10. Les règlements sanitaires, de pilotage, de douane, de port et des phares ottomans devront être observés et respectés par les bâtiments de guerre des belligérants.

11. Est défendu d'amener des prises dans un des ports ou rades ottomans (non interdits) sauf pour cause d'innavigabilité, de mauvais état de mer, de manque de combustible ou de provisions, auquel cas, autorisation devra être demandée aux autorités Impériales locales ; celles-ci l'accorderont après constatation de la cause précitée. La prise devra repartir aussitôt que ladite cause aura cessé ; l'approvisionnement en combustible et en provision se fera dans les conditions prévues pour les navires de guerre.

Aucun tribunal des prises ne peut être constitué par un belligérant ni sur le sol de l'Empire ni sur un navire dans ses eaux territoriales.

12. Est interdit aux belligérants de faire des ports et eaux ottomans la base d'opérations navales contre leurs adversaires ; d'installer sur le sol et dans les eaux territoriales des stations radio-télégraphiques ou tout appareil destiné à servir comme moyen de communication avec les forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer ; d'établir des dépôts de combustible soit sur le sol ottoman, soit sur des navires stationnés dans ses eaux territoriales.

13. Les dispositions qui précèdent ne dérogent en rien au régime des Détroits, qui reste le même, tel qu'il est établi par les traités internationaux.

14. Le droit international général est applicable dans toutes les questions non prévues par les dispositions qui précèdent.

*Constantinople, le 28 septembre, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a view to the observance of their duties of neutrality throughout the hostilities, brings the following regulations to the notice of the British Embassy :

1. Entry to Turkish ports, roadsteads, and territorial waters, is forbidden to warships belonging to belligerent



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Powers, except in the case of damage, or by reason of the state of the sea. In these cases they may only remain strictly the length of time actually necessary for the repair of the said damage, or to wait until the state of the sea has improved.

2. Every belligerent vessel, which shall ask permission to enter a Turkish port or roadstead for purposes of refuelling or revictualling, may be authorised to do so, on condition that the authorisation of the local Turkish authority is obtained, after having declared the reasons for her arrival; that she does not remain more than twenty-four hours in the said port or roadstead; and that there be not more than three vessels under the same flag simultaneously in the same port or roadstead.

3. The ports of Smyrna and Beirout are prohibited to the said ships, as are the inland waters, access to which is barred either by submarine mines or by other defensive means.

4. If the warship does not leave Turkish waters within the period provided for above, the Turkish Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary to render the vessel incapable of putting to sea during the war.

5. Warships are expected to respect the sovereign rights of the Turkish Empire, to refrain from all acts prejudicial to Turkish neutrality, and not to commit any hostile acts in Turkish territorial waters, including capture and the right of search.

6. If enemy belligerent warships happen to be simultaneously in the same Turkish port or roadstead, at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of one belligerent warship and that of the other enemy belligerent warship, the order of departure being decided by that of arrival, unless the vessel which arrived first be obliged to remain for reasons foreseen above in No. 1. Similarly a belligerent warship may only leave a Turkish port or roadstead twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant vessel under an enemy flag.

7. In non-prohibited Turkish ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may only repair their damages to such an extent as is consonant with the safety of navigation, and may not increase their military strength in any manner

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

whatsoever. The Turkish authorities will verify the nature of the repairs to be made; these must be carried out as quickly as possible.

8. The said vessels may only revictual up to their normal supply in peace time. Nevertheless, in the exceptional circumstances of the present war, the Turkish authorities may, in the first instance, reduce this supply, according to the requirements of the districts, to what is strictly necessary to reach the nearest neutral foreign port, and may refuse all supplies in the case of a second return by vessels of a like belligerent nation.

9. Such vessels may only take in sufficient fuel to reach the nearest harbour in their own country, or of a country the administration of which is entrusted to their Government, or of an allied country, at the discretion of the local Turkish authority. The preceding restrictions concerning supplies will be applicable to fuel.

10. The Turkish sanitary, pilotage, customs, port and lighthouse regulations must be observed and respected by belligerent warships.

11. It is forbidden to bring prizes into any of the (non-prohibited) Turkish ports or roadsteads, save in the case of impossibility of navigation, of roughness of the sea, lack of fuel or provisions, in which case permission must be asked from the local Turkish authorities; the latter will grant it after verification of the aforesaid cause. The prize shall be required to leave as soon as the said cause shall have ceased to exist; the taking in of fuel and provisions shall be carried out in accordance with the conditions laid down for warships.

No Prize Court may be established by a belligerent either on Turkish territory or on a vessel in Turkish territorial waters.

12. Belligerents are forbidden to make Turkish harbours and roadsteads a base for naval operations against their adversaries; to erect on land or in territorial waters any wireless telegraphy station or installation destined to serve as a means of communication with belligerent forces by land or sea; to establish dépôts of fuel either on Turkish territory or on ships stationed in Turkish territorial waters.

13. The above provisions in no way supersede the regulations governing the Straits, which remain as established by international treaty.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

14. General international law is applicable in all questions not provided for in the above regulations.

*Constantinople, September 28, 1914.*

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 145.

*Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.*

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy is in receipt of the *note verbale* of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 28th September, in which are set forth at length the rules laid down by the Imperial Ottoman Government with a view to securing proper respect for their neutrality during the present hostilities in Europe.

In the preamble to this *note verbale* the Imperial Ministry states that the rules contained in it have been adopted in order to enable the Imperial Government to discharge their duties as neutrals. The rules themselves indicate a conception of those duties closely in accord with the general principles held by His Majesty's Government. It is all the more, therefore, a matter of surprise to His Majesty's Embassy that the practice of the Ottoman Government should have hitherto been so entirely at variance with these principles.

Rule 1 prohibits the entrance into Ottoman ports of belligerent warships, except in case of damage or on account of the state of the sea, and requires their departure as soon as circumstances permit.

Rule 2 prescribes that no belligerent warship, even though authorised for special reasons to enter an Ottoman harbour, shall remain more than twenty-four hours. These rules were not applied by the Imperial Ottoman Government when they allowed the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* to enter the Dardanelles and to remain in Turkish waters for an indefinite period, on the pretext that a sale, as to the genuineness of which no evidence exists, had taken place.

Neither did the Imperial Ottoman Government apply to these ships the provisions of Rule 4, which requires that vessels which have exceeded a visit of twenty-four hours should be incapacitated from taking part in any hostilities during the war, as both these vessels, which remain under



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German control, are notoriously in a state of complete preparation to proceed to sea.

Rule 5, which prohibits the performance of acts prejudicial to Ottoman neutrality, including acts of capture and search, was violated in a flagrant manner by the *Breslau*, when it visited and searched British ships in the Dardanelles shortly after its arrival in those waters. The Imperial Government have never demanded any public satisfaction from the Government whose ship committed this indefensible outrage on their neutrality. By thus condoning the act of the *Breslau*, the Imperial Government failed signally in their own duties as a neutral.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have not applied the provisions of Rule 7, prohibiting foreign war vessels from increasing their military value in an Ottoman port, where they are only permitted to make such repairs as their own security demands and within the shortest possible period of time, nor the provisions of Rule 8, regarding the prohibition of all revictualling, &c., of belligerent warships returning a second time to the same Ottoman port. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* remaining, as has been said above, under German control, have been repaired under the auspices of the official representatives of the German Government, have put to sea under German command, and have been revictualled at German expense on returning from the various cruises in the Black Sea. By tolerating these violations of their own rules, the Turkish Government have again failed in their duty as neutrals.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have further neglected the obligation to prevent foreign warships from making an Ottoman port a base of naval operations against their enemies; from installing wireless stations on land or in territorial waters, to serve as a means of communication with the belligerent forces on land or sea, obligations which are clearly recognised by the adoption of Rule 12. The flagrant violation of this rule by ships like the *General*, the *Lily Rickmers*, and the *Corcovado* has not been checked by the Imperial Government. They have, indeed, departed from their duty as neutrals, not merely by tolerating the proceedings of those ships, but they have in some cases facilitated them by allowing German ships to fly the Ottoman flag, as a result of illegal and fictitious transfers. The special

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case of the *Corcovado* has formed the subject of a separate communication, to which His Majesty's Embassy trusts that an early reply will be returned.

Finally, Rule 13, which states that the status of the Straits is unaffected by the measures taken by the Imperial Government, has been violated by the Ottoman authorities themselves, who, in violation of a series of international acts, have interfered with the free passage of the Dardanelles by British merchant vessels.

In the presence of the facts set forth above, it is impossible for the Imperial Ottoman Government to maintain that they have hitherto observed that duty as neutrals, the performance of which the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs declares them to have had in view when drawing up the rules embodied in its circular note of the 28th September. If, after consecrating their recognition of these duties by an official communication, the Imperial Government should continue to tolerate the use of its territory by German ships and agents for purposes connected with the war, His Majesty's Embassy will feel itself constrained to protest with renewed vigour against what it cannot but consider a partial and unneutral attitude on the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government, and must reserve to His Majesty's Government complete liberty of action. If, on the other hand, the object of the communication is to prove that the Imperial Government are prepared to embark on a new line of action, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy will have the utmost satisfaction in taking act of an assurance in that sense and bringing it to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

*Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

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No. 146.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note I have addressed to the Grand Vizier on the subject of the measures the Porte propose to take against British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab, expressing the hope that no action be taken which might have serious consequences.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 146.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Basra stating that the Vali has written to him saying that the Porte have communicated to me the measures which they propose to take against a British man-of-war which is in the Shatt-el-Arab unless it leaves within twenty-four hours, and that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Gurna is inland water, like the Dardanelles, and closed to foreign warships.

<sup>1</sup>[Cf.  
No. 123.]

I am instructed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> to inquire on what grounds the Sublime Porte base their objection to His Majesty's ship remaining in Mohammerah, a Persian port?

In the meantime I would express the hope that your Highness will instruct the Vali without loss of time to avoid taking any measures against a British man-of-war which might have serious consequences at this critical period.

As a matter of fact, H.M.S. *Odin* left the Shatt-el-Arab some days ago, and I am not aware what British ship has taken her place.—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 147.

[Cf.  
No. 128.]

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

*Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

<sup>2</sup>[Cf. *post*,  
p. 230.]

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note addressed by me to the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 5th instant with regard to the hostile attitude of the Ottoman press towards Great Britain and British interests.<sup>2</sup>

I also enclose copy of a letter I addressed to Talaat Bey on the previous day on the same subject.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 147.

*Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.*

*Constantinople, October 5, 1914.*

YOUR HIGHNESS,—I have on several occasions complained to your Highness of the hostile tone of the Ottoman press



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towards Great Britain and British interests, and I have frequently represented to your Highness and to the Minister of the Interior the unfavourable impression which His Majesty's Government will derive of the sentiments of the Ottoman Government from the deliberate misrepresentations and the malicious accusations of the organs of public opinion.

Your Highness has assured me from time to time of your regret that the press should display so hostile a spirit towards my country and to the cause for which we have taken up arms, and owing to your Highness's intervention I most willingly admit that there have been short periods during which it has displayed a greater moderation in the volume and frequency of its abuse. Your Highness has also begged me not to attach too great an importance to the newspapers, which you have assured me do not influence public opinion to any appreciable extent, and are not therefore deserving of serious attention.

In ordinary circumstances I should have been in agreement with your Highness, except in regard to the extent of the harm done by these irresponsible writers, a matter of which I am incompetent to judge, but it must be remembered that the Ottoman Empire is now living under martial law, and that vigorous press censorship is enforced—apparently in the interests of Germany—which has rendered the publication of news from British sources difficult, and the public expression of opinion favourable to England impossible both at Constantinople and in the provinces.

The press articles of which I complain are, therefore, authorised and approved by the press censor, or in other words by the Ottoman Government, whose views they must be held to represent.

This state of affairs is the more grave, as one of the main objects which certain newspapers have had in view has been to misinform public opinion in this country as to the true character of British rule in India and British control in Egypt, and as to the attitude of the populations of those countries towards Great Britain.

It is, however, difficult to reconcile these hostile utterances with those of your Highness, who has always assured me of the friendly sentiments of the Ottoman Government

towards Great Britain, and of their desire and intention to maintain good relations with His Majesty's Government.

In these circumstances, I am at a loss to know what I should report to my Government, who will doubtless desire to know why the Ottoman Government permit the publication of inflammatory articles against Great Britain if their sentiments are well-intentioned. I would call your Highness's special attention to two articles which have appeared in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of the 16th (29th) September and the 19th September (2nd October). The first of these articles gives an entirely untrue account of the action of the British fleet outside the Dardanelles, which it accuses of preventing merchandise from coming into the port. The object of these accusations is to mislead public opinion with regard to the intentions of Great Britain, and to hide the real reason for the presence of the British fleet, which, as is well known to your Highness, is the retention of the German officers and crews.

The second article which I enclose \* not only misrepresents the motives which induced my Government to embark on the present war, but characterises England as the enemy of small nations, declares that she wishes to drive the Moslem Powers into a holy war against Germany, and traduces the character of British control in Egypt. Both articles are only examples of the innumerable utterances of a similar kind in which the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* and other papers indulge. I will not weary your Highness with other specimens in Turkish, but to prove how varied are the attacks made on my country and my Government with the express sanction of the authorities responsible for the press, I enclose a copy \* of a paper called the *Défense nationale*, a French organ which is specially distinguished for its virulent and calumnious attacks on Great Britain, and which, while purporting to represent authorised military opinion, is in reality, as your Highness is doubtless aware, produced by a person of non-Ottoman and non-Moslem origin and of most disreputable antecedents.

I venture to beg your Highness, who has laboured unceasingly and devotedly in the interests of peace, to give instructions to the responsible authorities not to allow the

\* Not printed.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

publication in future of articles so totally at variance with what your Highness has repeatedly declared to be the policy of the Imperial Government. I would at the same time beg of your Highness to secure publicity for the enclosed statement which I have prepared, the object of which is, as your Highness will see, to correct one of the most specific calumnies recently published.—I avail, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 147.

### *Statement.*

The statement made in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of the 16th (29th) September that the British and French fleets outside the Dardanelles have prevented the importation of merchandise into the port of Constantinople is an entire misrepresentation. The allied fleet has never in a single instance interfered with the export or import trade of this country.

The retention of the allied fleets in the neighbourhood of the entrances to the Straits is solely due to the continued presence of the German admiral, officers, and crews on the warships recently sold to Turkey, and to the officering of the rest of the Turkish fleet by Germans.

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ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 147.

*Sir L. Mallet to Talaat Bey.*

*Constantinople, le 4 octobre, 1914.*

MON CHER MINISTRE,—Sauriez-vous m'expliquer pourquoi la censure a supprimé une partie importante du discours prononcé dernièrement par l'Agha Khan ?

Je vous transmets une copie du discours sur lequel est marquée la partie supprimée. Voudriez-vous le faire imprimer dans les journaux ottomans ? Il n'est que juste qu'on publie dans un pays neutre toutes les opinions.

Je vous signale aussi un article qui a paru dans le *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* du 2 octobre, qui est mensonger et plein de malveillance pour la Grande-Bretagne.

Puisque la presse est censurée, je ne puis qu'en conclure que les sentiments d'Agha-olu Ahmed sont approuvés ou inspirés par le Gouvernement. Dans tous les cas, le Gouvernement est responsable tant que la censure existe. Dans les



circonstances, à qui dois-je croire? Car le Gouvernement parle avec deux voix différentes, mais toutes deux officielles.—  
 Bien sincèrement à vous, LOUIS MALLET.

(TRANSLATION.)

*Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

MY DEAR MINISTER,—Can you explain to me why the censor suppressed an important part of the speech recently made by the Agha Khan?

I enclose a copy\* of the speech, showing the part that was suppressed. Would you please have it printed in the Turkish press? It is only right that every opinion should be published in a neutral country.

I would also draw your attention to an article which appeared in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of the 2nd October, which is untrue and full of malevolence towards Great Britain.

As the press is censored, I can only conclude that the sentiments of Agha-olu Ahmed are approved or inspired by the Government. In any case, so long as the censorship exists the Government are clearly responsible. In the circumstances, whom can we believe? For the Government speak with two conflicting voices, both of which are none the less official.

LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 148.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

New Governor-General of Basra with six army officers, including two German officers, also six naval officers, including two Germans, and 150 Turkish sailors with three columns of ammunition, arrived at Alexandretta on morning of 18th October by railway from Constantinople. Their final destination is believed to be Basra. I am also informed that Maan is their true destination.

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No. 149.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*  
 (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

Within last few days following have passed through

\* Not printed.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Adana in direction of Syria : 450 gendarmes with 600 sailors, of whom 200 were German, 52 German naval and military officers, a commandant of police, 45 civilian officials, of whom two were German, 10 engines, and 3 or 4 automobiles, said to contain German officers.

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No. 150.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Cairo, October 19, 1914.*

I am informed that Bimbashi Gamil, staff officer in Turkish army, Khoga (Imam) Ali Haider, Khoga (Imam) Amin, and Khoga (Imam) Rustom, have left Smyrna in order to carry on a Turcophile propaganda in India.

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No. 151.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

It is pretty clear that naval parties are on their way both to Akaba and the Persian Gulf, as well as smaller groups to Syrian coast ports. There are plenty of German reserve mercantile marine officers available, in addition to *Goeben* and *Breslau* officers and others who have subsequently arrived. Although there is at present no actual confirmation of arrival in Constantinople of Austrian officers and sailors, this is regarded as also possible.

It is very likely now that consignment of mines has actually got as far as Maan.

At Akaba it is not impossible that floating mines may be let loose penetrating into the Red Sea ; in Persian Gulf defence of waterway will no doubt be prepared.

Consul at Damascus reports that fifty Germans arrived at Akaba quite recently. These are believed to be wounded from East Africa.

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## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 152.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1914.*

Battery of six guns which left Constantinople on 11th instant, and which I think were heavy guns, have, together with aeroplane, arrived at Alexandretta and left for the south.

Since 18th October there have been no movements of troops to or from Damascus. Some trucks of ammunition went round by rail to Nablus Sidi, and cases of rifles arrived from Aleppo.

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No. 153.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1914.*

It should not be forgotten that one of the elements in the situation that cannot be overlooked is possibility of *coup d'État* by Minister of War, supported by Germans.

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No. 154.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup>[Cf. No. 155.] A manifesto,<sup>1</sup> the authorship of which is attributed to Sheikh Aziz Shawish, is being secretly circulated at Beirout. Manifesto bears alleged signatures of ten representatives of Moslem countries under foreign rule. It incites Moslem soldiers to mutiny in their respective countries in defence of Islam, and bids them desert the Allies and join Germany. Whole tenor is fanatical and inflammatory.

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No. 155.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 22.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

I understand that several thousand copies of manifesto are to be smuggled into Egypt and India and other Moslem countries through Syria.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 156.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 22, 1914.*

German officers now on frontier seem bent on forcing matters. General Officer Commanding Egypt anticipates Arab raid at any moment at their instigation.

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No. 157.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

I have seen the Russian Ambassador again this morning. He is sure that, unless Turks mean to betray Germans, the possibility of which he does not exclude, they will make war on Russia on receipt of first half of a sum of £4,000,000 which Germany is providing.<sup>2</sup>

It is currently reported about £1,000,000 has already arrived.

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. *post*, pp. 232-3.]

Russian successes on Vistula will spur on Germans to further efforts here, but it is difficult to say whether it will increase or diminish chance of Turkish participation in the war.

Virulent attacks and propaganda against Great Britain seem to show Government are anxious to justify themselves in public estimation if war breaks out, and it may indicate that they mean to provoke war themselves, as they are aware that we shall not do so.

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No. 158.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

One of objects of press campaign here now is to prove that Great Britain is aiming deliberate blows at Islam, as such, and a statement is being circulated here that British Government are preventing pilgrimages from Egypt this year. One form of this statement is that a Fetva has been issued prescribing that as Egyptian Government cannot protect pilgrims there shall be no pilgrimage. It is insinuated that this Fetva has been extorted by British.

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## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 23, 1914.*

Mining of the Shatt-el-Arab.

Your telegram of 17th October.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 135.

The ancient right of free navigation of the river was solemnly affirmed as late as 29th July 1913, in Article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed on that day. It is a right which His Majesty's Government cannot allow to be nullified by the mining of the channel. They will be forced to regard any attempt to lay mines in the river as an act of open hostility and provocation to this country, and they must reserve to themselves the right of taking their own measures, if necessary, to maintain the freedom of navigation.

You should make a representation in these terms to the Turkish Government, and add a firm protest against the apparent intention of blocking the international waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, which offers the only means of access to the port of Mohammerah and the neighbouring Persian littoral.

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No. 160.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 23, 1914.*

I hear that Turkish Minister at Sophia has left his post for Germany. Reported object is to arrange with German Government for stirring up of Moslem fanaticism in India, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis.

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No. 161.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 24.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

Twenty projectors, 10 electric mines, 4 electric motors, 500 cases of Mauser ammunition have arrived *via* Rustchuk in addition to arrivals already reported previously.



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 162.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)      *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

Very large quantities of bar gold have recently arrived. Nearly a million's worth was taken to Deutsche Bank three nights ago under escort, and there is information that previous consignments have been similarly conveyed. It is probable that between two and three millions have arrived altogether.

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No. 163.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)      *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

German named Kellerman has just left Aleppo for Haifa or the south. Two thousand camels, 1500 water-skins, 400 bicycles, all canvas and canvas bags, together with food-stuffs, are being requisitioned in Aleppo.

Information goes to show that an Arab raid has been possible during last few weeks, and contingency has certainly to be watched.

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No. 164.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)      *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

Last night Minister of Marine sent me message to say that neutrality would be maintained by Turkish Government. He gave same assurances in categorical terms yesterday to French Ambassador, and said that Minister of Interior's views were the same. Ambassador said that it was reported that an agreement existed with Germany to go to war on certain terms being fulfilled. Minister of Marine denied this absolutely, and also declared that Turkey was not going to war. My French colleague then inquired what was meaning of preparations in Syria and of all the violent talk about Egypt. Minister of Marine replied that England was treating Egypt as if it belonged to her, whereas it formed part of Ottoman dominions. Turks were indifferent about India, Tripoli, and Tunis, etc., but Egypt was on their frontier, and they felt about it as French did about Alsace-Lorraine. They would do nothing officially, but would shut their eyes to

[Reply,  
No. 166.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

any agitation which was directed against English occupation of Egypt. Continuing, he referred to a proposal which he had made me a fortnight ago, to the effect that England and Turkey should now sign convention on lines of Drummond-Wolff Convention, providing for evacuation of Egypt by British troops at end of war. It is quite true he made this suggestion. I did not report it at the time because it was so entirely unpractical. This shows that Germans are turning all their attention to Egypt, and are inciting the Turks against us, so that we must expect to have a considerable amount of trouble on frontier.

Turkish newspapers are full of Egypt just now and of our high-handed proceedings. It is, *e.g.*, announced to-day that we have closed El Azhar mosque. There is no doubt that Germans are at bottom of this, and are inciting religious fanaticism of Turks against us.

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No. 165.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 24.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

United efforts of Germans and Ottoman Government at Haifa are being concentrated on arousing anti-English feeling amongst the Moslems; German consul is touring the district with this view. The worst offender is the Ottoman Telegraph Agency. Yesterday, for example, it announced that the Ameer of Afghanistan will start a Holy War, and that he is invading India.

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No. 166.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*  
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 24, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> See  
No. 164. Your telegram of 23rd October<sup>1</sup> gives the impression that Turkey considers sending an armed force over the frontier of Egypt as being in some way different from acts of war against Russia. You should disabuse the Turkish Government of any such idea, and inform them that a military violation of frontier of Egypt will place them in a state of war with three allied Powers.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

I think you should enumerate to Grand Vizier <sup>1</sup> the hostile acts of which we complain, and warn him that, if German influences succeed in pushing Turkey to cross the frontiers of Egypt and threaten the international Suez Canal, which we are bound to preserve, it will not be we, but Turkey, that will have aggressively disturbed the *status quo*. <sup>1</sup>[See No. 176.]

The following is a convenient summary of Turkish acts of which we complain, and which, combined, produce a most unfavourable impression. You might send it to Grand Vizier :

‘The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their mobilisation, been constantly sending troops south preparatory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba and Gaza. A large body of Bedouin Arabs has been called out and armed to assist in this venture. Transport has been collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier of Egypt. Mines have been despatched to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba to protect the force from naval attack, and the notorious Sheikh Aziz Shawish, who has been so well known as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against Christians, has published and disseminated through Syria, and probably India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Prüffer, <sup>2</sup> who was so long engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constantinople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the people to take part in this conflict.’ <sup>2</sup> [Sic, cf. *post*, p. 215; see also *ante*, p. 65.]

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No. 167.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 26.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 25, 1914.*

Whole fleet has been at Kadikeui since 20th October.

*Breslau* took seventy mines on board yesterday, and had steam up in company of mine-layers *Nilufer* and *Samsun*.

There is fairly sure evidence that no submarine has yet arrived in parts or otherwise.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 168.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 27.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October 26, 1914.*

Forty-two Germans, disguised as tourists, are said to have arrived at Aleppo. They are members of General Staff and of crews of *Goeben* and *Breslau*. It is believed that they have 150 mines with them. Some of the officers are bound for Bagdad and Basra, others for Beirut and Tripoli.

No. 169.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 27.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> [Djemal  
Pasha.]

Enver Pasha, Jemal,<sup>1</sup> and Talaat Bey are making every preparation for an expedition against Egypt, which is evidently now their uppermost thought. A majority of the Committee are, however, said to be against war, and are showing considerable opposition to the scheme. I am unable to vouch for this, but the news appears to be fairly well authenticated. Halil Bey \* started for Berlin this morning, and he is said to be about to negotiate with the German Government. It seems difficult to explain his journey on any other hypothesis than that the Turks wish to postpone any decisive action.

No. 170.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1914.*

It is now clear that, with exception of Minister of War, Turkish Government are seeking to temporise.

I have reliable information that on the 22nd October Austrian Ambassador urged immediate war on Minister of Interior and Halil. Both these officials maintained that it would be wiser to wait until the situation in Egypt and Caucasus cleared before moving, and suggested it would be time enough to move in the spring. They were not sure that, if they went to war, Italy might not join the Allies. Austrian

\* [President of the Chamber. See *post*, p. 233.]



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Ambassador retorted that spring would be too late, and that it was essential to Germany and Austria that Turkey should declare herself with them at once. His Excellency was clearly greatly dissatisfied at their attitude.

Enver Pasha, on the other hand, whom Austrian Ambassador saw subsequently, said that he was determined to have war, whatever his colleagues might desire. Turkish fleet would be sent into Black Sea, and he could easily arrange with Admiral Suchon \* to provoke hostilities.

Fleet has, in point of fact, to-day gone into Black Sea, so it is impossible to foretell what is in store.

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No. 171.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 28, 1914.*

Porte regrets that owing to pressure of military requirements they are unable to accept wireless telegraphy messages sent from England for His Majesty's Embassy.

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No. 172.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 28, 1914.*

I have received reliable information that some German officers unsuccessfully endeavoured to persuade commandant of Turk post to attack our post at Kossaimo, and that, on making further efforts with this object, they were arrested and sent to Beersheba. If true, story shows desire of Germans to precipitate matters.

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No. 173.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 28.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 28, 1914.*

Two thousand armed Bedouins are advancing to attack the Canal, and have watered at Magdaba, which is 20 miles inside Egyptian frontier, 26th October.

\* [Admiral Souchon—thus spelt—was the German admiral at Constantinople.]

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 174.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 28, 1914.*

It is reported that four Turkish gunboats are intending to proceed from Alexandretta.

You should warn Turkish Government that, as long as German officers remain on *Goeben* and *Breslau* and Turkish fleet is practically under German control, we must regard movement of Turkish ships as having a hostile intention, and, should Turkish gunboats proceed to sea, we must in self-defence stop them.

As soon as Turkish Government carry out their promise respecting German crews and officers and observe the laws of neutrality with regard to *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and free the Turkish fleet from German control, we shall regard Turkish ships as neutrals, but, till then, we must protect ourselves against any movements that threaten us.

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No. 175.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 28, 1914.*

On 26th October a special train left Aleppo for Jerablus with two German and four Turkish naval officers and 100 Turkish sailors, with large quantities of ship's tackle and accessories.

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No. 176.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 29, 1914.*

I have seen the Grand Vizier and informed him that, in spite of his assurances, the Bedouins had crossed the frontier and were in occupation of wells of Magdaba, 20 miles within Egyptian territory.<sup>1</sup> I reminded him of the warning which I had addressed to him on the receipt of instructions contained in your telegram of 24th October,<sup>2</sup> and asked him for explanation. His Highness replied that he had

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *post*, p. 233.]

<sup>2</sup> See No. 166.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

instructed Minister of War, after representations which I had made to him, on no account to allow movement of any force across the frontier. If it were true, he would give immediate orders for recall of Bedouins, but he did not believe accuracy of the information.

I replied that it was necessary at such a crisis that I should speak quite frankly, that it was a matter for public notoriety that there were divisions of opinion in the Cabinet, that his Highness was not master of the situation, and that, if Minister of War and extremists had decided upon an expedition against Egypt, his Highness could not prevent it. Grand Vizier replied that I was absolutely mistaken, and that, if it came to that, military party would not act without full assent of the Government. I said that in that case the time had come to put them to the test, and that unless expedition were immediately recalled, I could not answer for the consequences. As it was, I might at any moment receive instructions to ask for my passports, in which case Turkish Government would be at war with the Triple *Entente* at a time when German official communiqués admitted defeat on the Vistula.

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No. 177.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 29.)*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, October 29, 1914.*

Russian gunboat at Odessa has been sunk, and Feodosia bombarded by Turkish fleet. Turkish officers who were sent on shore to demand surrender of Novorossiisk were arrested by prefect and ship left without taking further action.

Above information just communicated by Russian Government.

[Cf. No. 178; also *post*, p. 234.]

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No. 178.

*Mr. Roberts to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 29.)*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Odessa, October 29, 1914.*

Before dawn this morning two or three Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa harbour and sank Russian gunboat

[Cf. No. 177; also *post*, p. 234.]



*Donetz*. French ship *Portugal* damaged; two of the crew killed, two wounded. Russian steamships *Vitiaz* and *Liazaref* and *Whanpao* damaged. Some loss of life was caused in the town itself by shell-fire.

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No. 179.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 30, 1914.*

In view of hostile acts that have been committed, Russian Government have instructed Russian Ambassador to leave Constantinople with all his staff.

Should his Excellency leave, you should yourself send in a note to the Sublime Porte to say that His Majesty's Government have learnt with the utmost surprise of the wanton attacks made upon open and undefended towns of a friendly country without any warning and without the slightest provocation, and that these acts constitute an unprecedented violation of the most ordinary rules of international law, usage, and comity. Russia has shown the utmost patience and forbearance in face of repeated violations of the rules of neutrality by Turkey, and in face of most provocative acts, amounting in reality to acts of hostility, and in this attitude of restraint her Allies, Great Britain and France, have co-operated. It is evident that there is no chance of a return to a proper observance of neutrality so long as the German naval and military missions remain at Constantinople, and such a situation cannot be prolonged.

Unless, therefore, the Turkish Government will divest themselves of all responsibility for these unprovoked acts of hostility by dismissing the German military and naval missions, and fulfilling their often repeated promises about the German crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and will give you a satisfactory reply to this effect within twelve hours from the date of the delivery of the note, you should ask for your passports and leave Constantinople with the staff of the Embassy.

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

No. 180.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. (Received October 31.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 30, 1914.*

Russian Ambassador asked for his passports this afternoon, and I and my French colleague have followed suit.

Minister of the Interior, in conversation with a neutral colleague this afternoon, practically admitted that Turkey had thrown in her lot with Germany.

I have had a very painful interview with the Grand Vizier,<sup>1</sup> <sup><sup>1</sup> [See *post*, p. 235.]</sup> who had been kept in the dark as to his colleagues' intentions, and who will doubtless be set aside to-night.

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No. 181.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey. (Received November 2.)*

*Cairo, October 20, 1914.*

Sir,—With reference to my despatch of the 30th ultimo,<sup>2</sup> <sup><sup>2</sup> See No. 125.</sup> I have the honour to submit copies of further interrogatories of the German spy, Robert Mors.—I have, etc.

(For Mr. Cheetham),

ROBERT GREG.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 181.

*Further Interrogation of Lieutenant Mors.*

[Cf. *ante*, pp. 162-170, 173.]

Mulazim Awal Robert Mors, recalled and re-examined, states :

'I arrived in Constantinople on the evening of the 4th September 1914, and put up at the Hotel Germania. I met M. Curt Prüfer<sup>3</sup> there, and he introduced me to Omar Fauzi [*sic*] Bey,<sup>4</sup> the Turkish staff officer who asked me to call upon him at the War Office. I did so on the 6th September. He questioned me on the state of Egypt and on the chances of success of a native rising in this country. He mentioned that the German diplomatic and consular officials had been expelled, and that

<sup>3</sup> [Sic, cf. *ante*, pp. 65, 209.]

<sup>4</sup> [Cf. No. 125, encl. 2, and No. 133.]



all German subjects had been arrested and were to be deported. He also asked me if I knew M. Dusreicher, who, he declared, had also been sent out of the country. He stated likewise that he had heard that the Egyptian army and police had been disarmed, and asked me if it were true, to which I replied that I thought it was very improbable. He then told me he had emissaries in Egypt fomenting trouble, to prepare the way for a Turkish invasion, and to compel the British to split up their forces. In reply to my inquiry, he explained that two bands of native marauders were to be organised in each Imdiria, to attack the railway, and commit outrages on the property of British subjects, etc. These bands were to be recruited from the malefactor class, and there would be a Turkish officer in every province to direct their operations. Each band would be composed of from ten to fifteen men, and when an important *coup* was contemplated in any Imdiria the two bands would unite, the idea being to oblige the British to scatter their forces all over the country. Fauzi Bey said he had a list of fifty Egyptian army and police officers, from whom he expected either active or passive assistance. Four strong bands of Bedouins were also being formed to operate in the Suez Canal zone, two east and two west. Each band was to be fifty strong. Fauzi Bey made a rough sketch of the Canal to explain to me the rôle of these Bedouins. He said the British had detached posts at intervals along the Canal. Two of the most isolated of these would be attacked simultaneously and, if possible, annihilated. The intermediate posts would then go to their assistance, whereupon the third and fourth troops of Bedouins would raid the weakened points and fire on the steamers in the Canal. The instructions given to the bands were to retire into the desert if the post attacked was strongly reinforced, and then to return and attack another post, etc.

‘Fauzi Bey asked me if I would help to carry out these plans, and suggested that I should assist a Turkish officer who was already in Alexandria to carry out these komitajis operations in that district. If not, I could take part in some way in the military operations to be undertaken in Egypt. I replied that, as an officer, I could have nothing to do with the komitajis part of his programme, which, from a German



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

point of view, was beneath the dignity of an officer, but that I was quite disposed to participate in military operations against Egypt on condition (1) I was granted the rank of officer in the Turkish army, (2) that the German Ambassador approved of my decision, and (3) that I was not required to start before my family arrived from Egypt. At this stage of our conversation a Bedawi sheikh arrived, and I rose to take my leave, but Fauzi Bey begged me to remain. The sheikh talked to Fauzi Bey on the Canal part of the programme, and I gathered from their remarks that it had already been discussed between them. I should mention that the sheikh on arriving asked the Bey if he could speak in my presence, to which Fauzi assented. They then discussed plans for destroying the embankment between the fresh-water canal and the Suez Canal, in order to cut off the drinking water supply of Ismaïlia and Suez. I asked the sheikh how he proposed to divert the fresh-water canal into Suez Canal. He replied that with 200 men and sufficient dynamite he could do it in thirty-four hours. Fauzi Bey interposed that he could easily have 1000 kilog. of dynamite if he required it. I asked the sheikh sarcastically if he meant to employ Bedouin or fellaheen on the job, to which he replied, somewhat nettled, that it did not matter which. The sheikh left us, and Fauzi Bey and I continued our conversation. I asked him how he was going to organise a revolution in Egypt without arms, and mentioned that the Arms Law had been vigorously applied since two years ago. He replied that he had a sufficient quantity of arms in the country, and in any case arms could be smuggled through with ease. I reverted to the subject of the fresh-water canal, remarking that I thought it an absurd project, to which he replied that he believed it quite practical and that the sheikh was a man of intelligence and sense. He went on to say that it was not the only means which he had with which to deal with the Canal problem. A wealthy Turk had presented the Government with a steamship which sailed under the Italian flag and was commanded by an ex-officer of the Turkish navy. This ship was to take a full cargo of cement from an Italian port and her manifests were to be made out for Massowa. The captain was to submit to any search by British warships without demur, and on reaching Port Said to steam at full speed down

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

the Canal. He was then to sink her by one of three methods, viz. : (1) To collide with a British ship ; (2) to provoke a British warship to sink her by ignoring signals ; (3) to sink her himself. Fauzi Bey told me he had a trustworthy Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer to take part in the operations there and to bear instructions to his agents. I afterwards spoke to Dr. Prüfer about Fauzi's Canal project. He did not seem to approve, but gave me the map of the Suez Canal. I met Fauzi again at the passport office as I was about to embark on the steamship *Saidia*. He only greeted me, and said he hoped to see me back soon. He is the officer whom I mentioned in my former evidence as having seen me at the quays and who may have overheard my cabin number.'

Q. Who are the police officers in league with Fauzi Bey ?—

A. He did not give me their names. I mentioned the names of several officers of my acquaintance, but after scrutinising the list he gave me a negative answer.

Q. Do you know the names of any of the army officers who figured on the list ?—A. No.

Q. Who were the officers despatched to Egypt in connection with the organisation of the komitaji bands ?—A. I do not know ; they left for Egypt before me.

Q. Who was the Bedawi sheikh who discussed the fresh-water canal project ?—A. I do not know his name. He was a man of about fifty years of age, with a full grey beard. He was about my height, but broad-shouldered and stout. He spoke educated Arabic without a Bedawi or Maghrabi accent.

Q. Who was the officer in Alexandria with whom you were to co-operate ?—A. He gave me no inkling as to who he was.

Q. Did Enver Pasha speak to you on the subject of military operations in Egypt, the destruction of the Canal, etc. ?—A. Yes, on the day before I sailed, when I called upon him with Dr. Prüfer and the officer of the *Lorelei*. He questioned me on public opinion here, whether the natives would revolt against the English if the Turks marched against Egypt, and suggested that I should see Fauzi Bey on the subject. I replied that I had already seen him, and I recapitulated what he had told me. Enver Pasha replied that there



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

would be certainly something for me to do in Egypt when the time came for action there if I was then still disposed to accept. He also asked me if I spoke Arabic.

Q. Did Fauzi Bey mention the name of the Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer?—A. No; but in the light of subsequent events I believe it was Hamuda Effendi.

Q. When you told Fauzi Bey that you were disposed to participate in military operations against this country, did he accept your offer?—A. Yes; but it was agreed between us that this should take effect after I returned from Alexandria with my family.

Q. Then why were you given the detonators to take to Egypt?—A. I do not know. I am convinced that Hamuda Effendi was the person designed for the enterprise connected with the detonators. I do not think that this mission was connected with the subject which Omar Fauzi Bey discussed with me. I think it must have been a secret between Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, Drs. Ahmad Fuad and Prüfer, and Hamuda Effendi.

Q. Have you no idea what Hamuda was to do with the detonators?—A. I knew they were for use with bombs to be manufactured in this country.

Q. How do you know that?—A. Because once I found Sheikh Shawish sitting with Dr. Prüfer in the latter's room at the Hotel Germania. They were copying in Arabic a receipt for making bombs. The paper from which Sheikh Shawish was copying contained directions, a list of the component chemicals, and a sketch of a bomb in the right-hand bottom corner. I heard them mention that it was to be given to the Egyptian officer, and Sheikh Shawish said to me in Arabic "Hua zaðit aryak."

Q. To what use were the bombs to be put?—A. I have no idea.

R. O. C. Mors.

No. 182.

*Telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff on November 2.*

M. Sazonof télégraphie en date du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre, 1914 :

'Le Chargé d'Affaires ottoman vient de me lire le télégramme suivant du Grand Vizir : "Vous prie de dire au



Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que nous regrettons infiniment qu'un acte d'hostilité provoqué par la flotte russe ait compromis relations amicales des deux pays. Vous pouvez assurer Gouvernement Impérial de Russie que la Sublime Porte ne manquera pas de donner à la question la solution qu'elle comporte et qu'elle adoptera des mesures propres à prévenir un renouvellement de faits analogues. Vous pouvez déclarer dès à présent au Ministre que sommes décidés à ne plus permettre à la flotte Impériale de passer dans la mer Noire et que nous espérons que la flotte russe, à son tour, ne viendra plus croiser dans nos parages. J'ai le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie voudra bien faire preuve en l'occurrence du même esprit de conciliation au nom des intérêts communs des deux pays."

' J'ai répondu au Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie que je donne le démenti le plus catégorique à ce qu'il venait de me dire au sujet d'une initiative d'hostilités à la charge de la flotte russe ; je lui dis que je craignais qu'il était trop tard pour négocier ; que pourtant si la Sublime Porte se décidait au renvoi immédiat de tout le personnel militaire et marin allemand, on y pourrait penser et que des pourparlers ne seraient pas impossibles pour une satisfaction que la Turquie aurait à donner pour l'agression illégitime de nos côtes et les dégâts commis.

' J'ai autorisé Fahr-Eddin à expédier un télégramme chiffré en ce sens, lui faisant pourtant observer que sa démarche ne changeait rien à la situation créée. Fahr-Eddin recevra demain ses passeports, et la réponse du Gouvernement ottoman pourra être transmise par l'organe de l'Ambassade d'Italie.'

## (TRANSLATION.)

M. Sazonof telegraphs on the 1st November 1914, as follows :

' The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has just read me the following telegram from the Grand Vizier : " I request you to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we infinitely regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the Russian fleet,<sup>1</sup> should have compromised the friendly relations of the two countries. You can assure the Imperial Russian Government

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *post*,  
p. 236.]

## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give the question such solution as it entails, and that they will adopt fitting measures to prevent a recurrence of similar acts. You can declare forthwith to the Minister that we have resolved no more to allow the Imperial fleet to enter the Black Sea, and that we trust that the Russian fleet, on their side, will no longer cruise in our waters. I have the firm hope that the Imperial Russian Government will give proof, on this occurrence, of the same spirit of conciliation in the common interests of both countries."

'I replied to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that I most categorically denied what he had just said respecting the initiation of hostilities by the Russian fleet; I told him that I feared it was too late to negotiate; that nevertheless, if the Sublime Porte decided upon the immediate dismissal of all the German military and naval officers and men, it might be possible to consider the question, and that discussion might not be impossible to reach some basis of satisfaction to be given by Turkey for the illegal act of aggression against our coasts and for the damage thereby inflicted.

'I authorised Fahr-Eddin to send a cypher telegram in this sense, but pointed out to him at the same time that the representation he had made in no way altered the situation. Fahr-Eddin will receive his passports to-morrow, and the reply from the Turkish Government can be sent through the Italian Embassy.'

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No. 183.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir G. Buchanan, and Sir C. Greene.*

*Foreign Office, November 3, 1914.*

SIR,—The Turkish Ambassador called on the 31st ultimo and inquired whether this Department could give his Highness any information regarding the telegrams which had appeared in the press on the subject of a Turkish attack on certain Russian ports.

Sir A. Nicolson informed his Highness of what had actually occurred in the Black Sea. Tewfik Pasha expressed surprise, and inquired what he should do in the extremely difficult position in which he now found himself. Sir A. Nicolson assured his Highness that His Majesty's Government would



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

treat him personally with all respect and consideration, and that he would be given notice if it became necessary for diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Turkey to cease.

On the 2nd instant Tewfik Pasha again called and communicated to Sir A. Nicolson the text of a telegram which he had just received from the Grand Vizier, a copy of which is enclosed herein.

Sir A. Nicolson replied, and he was sure that I would agree with him, that he strongly demurred to the statement in the last paragraph of the Grand Vizier's telegram, to the effect that 'His Majesty's Government had provoked a rupture of diplomatic relations.' It was absurd to state that we had done so in view of the indisputable fact that Turkish ships had bombarded the ports of one of our allies, and had burnt and sunk a British steamer lying peaceably in a friendly port. Furthermore, there were active, not to say feverish, military and other preparations directed against the Suez Canal and Egypt. If the Ottoman Government were as desirous as they asserted of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain they should at once dismiss the German naval and military missions.—I am, etc.,

E. GREY.

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### ENCLOSURE IN No. 183.

*Text of Telegram to be communicated to Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Saïd Halîm Pasha.*

Je suis très peiné de voir que, par suite de l'incident déplorable survenu dans la mer Noire, le Gouvernement britannique a décidé de rappeler son Ambassadeur à Constantinople.

Ainsi que je l'ai déclaré à maintes reprises à Sir Louis Mallet, je tiens fermement au maintien des relations d'amitié existant entre nos deux pays et je travaille toujours à ce qu'elles ne soit compromises en aucune façon.

Je regretterais donc beaucoup, si un incident, dû à des circonstances imprévues, était considéré par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique comme une cause de conflit entre les deux pays.

Par conséquent, j'aime à espérer que le Gouvernement



## RUPTURE WITH TURKEY

Royal voudra bien, en témoignage de son désir réciproque de garder intact les relations amicales des deux pays, mettre fin un moment plus tôt à la rupture des relations diplomatiques qu'il vient de provoquer.

*Constantinople, le 1<sup>er</sup> (14) novembre, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

I am much grieved that, in consequence of the deplorable incident that has occurred in the Black Sea, the British Government have decided to recall their Ambassador from Constantinople.

As I have many times declared to Sir Louis Mallet, I am deeply desirous to maintain the relations of friendship existing between our two countries, and I am working without cease in order that they may not be compromised in any way.

I should therefore much regret if an incident, due to unforeseen circumstances, were to be considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government as a cause of conflict between the two countries.

Consequently, I hope that His Majesty's Government will be willing, in witness of their reciprocal desire to maintain intact the friendly relations of the two countries, to put an end at the earliest possible moment to the rupture of diplomatic relations which they have just provoked.

*Constantinople, November 1 (14), 1914.*

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No. 184.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, Sir F. Bertie, and Sir C. Greene.*

*Foreign Office, November 4, 1914.*

SIR,—Tewfik Pasha called upon me this afternoon, and informed me that he had received instructions to ask for his passports, as His Majesty's Ambassador had already left Constantinople.

I expressed to Tewfik Pasha my personal regret at our official relations being terminated, as he had always acted in a loyal, straightforward, and friendly manner, and I had much appreciated the intercourse which we had had together

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

during the past few years. I informed Tewfik Pasha that if his Government wished that hostilities between the two countries should cease, the only chance was to dismiss the German naval and military missions, and especially the officers and crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. So long as German officers remained in complete naval and military control at Constantinople, it was clear that they would continue to make war against us.—I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

# DESPATCH

FROM

HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT CONSTANTINOPLE

SUMMARISING EVENTS LEADING UP TO

RUPTURE OF RELATIONS

WITH TURKEY,

AND REPLY THERETO.

[In continuation of 'Miscellaneous, No. 13 (1914)': Cd. 7628]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
December 1914.*

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[Published as a White Paper,  
'MISCELLANEOUS, No. 14 (1914)': Cd. 7716.]



DESPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT  
CONSTANTINOPLE SUMMARISING EVENTS  
LEADING UP TO RUPTURE OF RELATIONS  
WITH TURKEY, AND REPLY THERETO.

*London, November 20, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report on the circumstances which preceded and accompanied my departure from Constantinople on the 1st November.

On my return to my post on the 16th August, a fortnight after the outbreak of the European war, the situation was already such as to give ground for the apprehension that Turkey would be driven by Germany sooner or later to take part in it as her ally. The Ottoman army, under the supreme command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands, had been mobilised, and although the Government had declared their intention of preserving their neutrality, they had taken no proper steps to ensure its maintenance. They had, on the contrary, jeopardised their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Dardanelles on the 10th August.<sup>1</sup> Events have confirmed what I and my French and Russian colleagues constantly impressed upon the Grand Vizier and other Ministers at the time, that so long as the German admiral and crews remained on board the German warships, the German Government were masters of the situation, and were in a position to force the hand of the Turkish Government if at any given moment it suited them to do so.

So far as the Grand Vizier \* was concerned, the warning fell upon deaf ears, and it was at no time possible to persuade His Highness to admit that he would not be able to control developments to which he was himself opposed and which had not the approval of the whole Government. It is quite possible that he was sincere in this conviction, but he was fully alive to the precarious nature of his own position and

\* [Prince Saïd Halim Pasha.]

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *ante*,  
pp. 94,  
130.]

## SIR L. MALLET'S DESPATCH

to the fact that any real attempt on his part to run counter to the policy of Enver Pasha \* and the military authorities would have meant his elimination. This event would have brought matters to a head at once, which would have been contrary to the policy of the Allied Powers of postponing for as long as possible, if they were unable to avert altogether, the intervention of Turkey in the war, with the vast and complicated issues involved in the raising of the Eastern question, so that my rôle and that of my French and Russian colleagues, with whom I acted in complete accord throughout, was necessarily restricted to one of remonstrance and to an endeavour to expose and defeat the German intrigues.

In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was at once exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in the European war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries represented as groaning under Christian rule might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one great Power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great Power of the West. Such was the substance of German misrepresentations. It is a matter of common consent that Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, by political Pan-Islamism, and by a conviction of the superiority of the German arms, was from the first a strong partisan of the German alliance. How far his several colleagues and other directing spirits outside the Ministry entered into his views is to some extent a matter of speculation; but it may be taken as certain that the Sultan, the Heir Apparent,† the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey,‡ a majority of the Ministry, and a considerable section of the Committee of Union and Progress were opposed to so desperate an adventure as war with the Allies. At what moment Talaat Bey,§ the most powerful civilian in the Cabinet and the most conspicuous of the Com-

\* [Minister of War.]

† [Prince Youssouff Izzedin Effendi.]

‡ [Minister of Finance.]

§ [Minister of the Interior.]



mittee leaders, finally threw in his lot with the war party cannot be ascertained precisely. His sympathies were undoubtedly with them from the beginning, but the part which he actually played in the earlier stages is shrouded in mystery. I have reason to think that for some time he may have thought it possible, by steering a middle course, to postpone a decision until it was clearer what would be the result of the European war; and he may well have been anxious to gain time and to secure in exchange for Turkey's adhesion to the German cause something more solid than promises. These were tendered, indeed, on a lavish scale, but I am not aware that they were given in a form which could be considered binding. It is certain in any case that Talaat Bey's hesitations were overcome, and that he had definitely joined the conspiracy to bring about war this autumn some three weeks before the crisis was precipitated.

Whatever the views of individual Ministers or others may have been, the Turkish Government made no effort to emancipate themselves from German influence or to stem the tide of its progress. The material hold established by the introduction of the two German ships was on the contrary allowed to be strengthened. Not only did these ships remain under effective German control, but a strong German element was imported into the remainder of the fleet, even before the British naval mission, which had been reduced to impotence by order of the Minister of Marine,\* had been recalled by His Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from Germany as unostentatiously as possible, to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and at other crucial points. Numerous German merchant vessels, of which the most important were the *Corcovado*<sup>1</sup> and the *General*, served as bases of communication and as auxiliaries to what had become, in effect, a German Black Sea Fleet. Secret communications with the German General Staff were established at the outbreak of the war by means of the wireless apparatus of the *Corcovado*, which was anchored opposite the German Embassy at Therapia, and which was continuously used for this among other purposes throughout

\* [Djemal Pasha.]

<sup>1</sup> [See *ante*,  
p. 189.]



## SIR L. MALLET'S DESPATCH

the whole period under review, in spite of my urgent representations and those of my French and Russian colleagues. Other German ships played with the Turkish flag as they pleased, in order to facilitate their voyages or cloak their real character while in port, and a department was constituted at the German Embassy for the purpose of requisitioning supplies for the use of the German Government and their ships. All these things were tolerated by a complaisant Turkish Government, who appeared to be indifferent to the incessant encroachments on their sovereignty if not to welcome them.

On land, the officers of the German military mission displayed a ubiquitous activity. Their supremacy at the Ministry of War, combined with the close co-operation which existed between them and the Militarist party, made it easy to fortify an already strong position. Acting in conjunction with other less accredited agents of their own nationality, they were the main organisers of those military preparations in Syria which so directly menaced Egypt, and which became a serious source of preoccupation and a constant theme of my remonstrances.

The evidence of these preparations became daily more convincing. Emissaries of Enver Pasha were present on the frontier, bribing and organising the Bedouins. Warlike stores were despatched south, and battalions of regular troops were posted at Rafah, whilst the Syrian and Mosul army corps were held in readiness to move south at short notice. The Syrian towns were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. As an illustration of the thoroughness of the German preparations, I was credibly informed that orders were given to obtain estimates for the making of Indian military costumes at Aleppo in order to simulate the appearance of British Indian troops. Under directions from the Central Government the civil authorities of the Syrian coast towns removed all their archives and ready money to the interior, and Moslem families were warned to leave to avoid the consequences of bombardment by the British fleet. The Khedive himself was a party to the conspiracy, and arrangements were actually made with the

German Embassy for his presence with a military expedition across the frontier.

However difficult it would have been for the Ottoman Government to regain their control over the armed forces of the State after the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the insidious campaign carried on with their encouragement by means of the press, the preachers in the mosques, and the pamphleteers, is evidence that its most powerful members were in sympathy with the anti-British movement. I had, indeed, actual proof of the inspiration by Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha of articles directed against Great Britain. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion in favour of Germany and to inflame it against the Allies was set at work with the connivance, and often with the co-operation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople became German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria; they minimised everything favourable to the Allies.

<sup>1</sup> [See *ante*,  
pp. 198-  
202.]

The enclosures in an earlier despatch<sup>1</sup> will have shown to what depths of scurrility some of the more corrupt and unbridled of them descended in their onslaughts on Great Britain, and how unequally the censors of the press held the balance when exercising their practically unlimited powers. The provincial papers were no less enthusiastically pro-German; the semi-official telegraphic agency, which is practically worked by the Ministry of the Interior, was placed at the disposal of German propaganda. Through these agencies unlimited use was made of Turkey's one concrete and substantial grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, that is, the detention of the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadie* at the beginning of the European war. Other grievances, older and less substantial, were raked out of the past; and the indictment of Great Britain and her Allies was completed by a series of inventions and distortions of the truth designed to represent them as the enemy, not merely of Turkey, but of the whole of Islam. Attacks of the latter kind became especially frequent in the latter half of October, and were undoubtedly directly inspired by Germany. My urgent representations to the Grand



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Vizier and to Talaat Bey, both verbal and written, had hardly even a temporary effect in checking this campaign.

It may seem strange that, thus equipped and thus abetted, those who sought to involve Turkey in the European war failed so long to achieve their object. The reasons were manifold. As I have already indicated, the party which stood for neutrality contained men who, lacking though they were in any material means of enforcing their views, could not easily be ignored. By whatever various routes they may have been arrived at, the ideas of these men coincided with a body of less sophisticated and hardly articulate opinion which, however wounded by England's action in preventing delivery of the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadie*, could still not reconcile itself to a war with England and France. In my despatch of the 22nd September<sup>1</sup> I had the honour to report how frankly and how emphatically the Sultan himself voiced this feeling in conversation with me. There can be little doubt that the Grand Vizier exercised what influence he had in favour of neutrality. Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, whose influence in favour of neutrality was of weight as representing the Jewish element, and whose arguments in favour of peace were supported by the fact that Turkey was already absolutely bankrupt, and not in a position to embark upon war with the Allies, became towards the end so formidable an obstacle to the fulfilment of the German plan that instructions were sent from Berlin to force his resignation.

<sup>1</sup> [See *ante*, pp. 152-6.]

Again, seriously convinced as most prominent Turks appear to have been of the ultimate success of Germany, their confidence could not but be a little dashed by the actual course of events in the two main theatres of war; and the more thoughtful realised that even in the event of Germany being victorious, the fact of Turkey having fought by her side would not necessarily ensure any advantage to the Ottoman Empire. As for the Germans themselves, it was true, as I have said, that they could at any moment force Turkey to march with them, but to do so before every means of suasion had proved useless would obviously not have been politic. It was clearly only in the last resort that the Monarch whom Pan-Islamic pro-Germans acclaimed as the hope of



Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard as hardly distinguishable from a true believer, would run the risk of scandalising the Moslem world, whom he hoped to set ablaze to the undoing of England, Russia, and France, by using the guns of the *Goeben* to force the hands of the Sultan-Caliph. But the factor which more than any other delayed the realisation of the German plans, and which enabled me and my French and Russian colleagues to protract the crisis until they could only be realised in such a way as to open the eyes of the Moslem world to the real nature of the conspiracy, was the inherent tendency of Turkish statesmen to procrastinate, in the hope that by playing off one side against the other they might gain more in the long run.

However slender the chances in our favour, it was obviously my duty, in conjunction with my French and Russian colleagues, to support and encourage by all possible means those forces which were obscurely striving for the preservation of peace.

If this policy necessarily involved the acceptance of acts on the part of the Ottoman Government which, in ordinary circumstances, would have called for more than remonstrance and the reservation of our rights, and which it would have been easy to make the occasion of a rupture of relations, the patience displayed by the allies was justified by the results achieved.

Although unsuccessful in averting war, two objects of main importance were gained by delaying its commencement. On the one hand, the Allied Powers are now in a position to deal with the problem with a freer hand, and, on the other, Germany has been forced to show her cards and to act independently of a majority of the Turkish Cabinet.

Under the stress of events in the main theatre of the war, and owing to the vital necessity of providing a diversion in the Near East, Germany was constrained to intensify still further their pressure on the Turks. During the first three weeks of October their pressure took yet another form, and a new weight was cast into the scale by the importation into Constantinople, with every circumstance of secrecy, of large quantities of bullion consigned to the German Ambassador and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank.

## SIR L. MALLET'S DESPATCH

The total amount was estimated at some £4,000,000. This sum was far more than was necessary for the maintenance of the German military and naval establishments, and I have every reason to believe that a definite arrangement was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Ministers, including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a stated figure.<sup>1</sup> My information establishes the fact that a climax was reached about the middle of the third week in October, when it had been decided to confront the Grand Vizier with the alternative of complicity or resignation, and that only the Russian successes on the Vistula, or some other more obscure cause, prevented this plan from being carried out.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *ante*, pp. 175, 205.]

Whatever the exact history of the first three weeks of October, it is certain that on or about the 26th of that month the German conspirators realised that the pace must be forced by still more drastic measures than they had yet used, and that any further attempts to win over the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Government as a whole to their ideas and to induce them to declare war would be useless. On that afternoon an important meeting of Committee leaders was held, at which Enver Pasha was present, but which only decided to send Halil Bey, the President of the Chamber, on a mission to Berlin.<sup>2</sup> In the circles in which this decision became known it was regarded as a partial triumph for the Peace party, and as a fresh attempt to gain time for the sake either of mere procrastination or of securing more concrete offers from Germany. Be that as it may, Halil Bey never left on his mission, and it is believed that its abandonment was due to a more than usually blunt hint from the German representative in Constantinople. Whilst Constantinople generally was comforting itself with the reflection that nothing could well happen until after the four days' Bairam festival, beginning on the 30th October, two events of capital importance occurred.

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. *ante*, p. 210.]

On the morning of the 29th I received intelligence from Egypt of the incursion into the Sinai peninsula of an armed body of 2000 Bedouins, who had occupied the wells of Magdaba,<sup>3</sup> and whose objective was an attack upon the Suez

<sup>3</sup> [Cf. *ante*, 233 p. 212.]



Canal. On learning this news I at once proceeded to the Yali of the Grand Vizier, to acquaint him of the serious consequences which must ensue if the expedition were not at once recalled. His Highness received the intelligence with every appearance of surprise. He emphatically disclaimed all knowledge of it, and gave me the most solemn assurance that if the facts were as stated he would at once issue orders for the withdrawal of the invading party. He assured me once more that nothing was further from the intention of the Government than war with Great Britain. It was unthinkable, he said, that an expedition of this kind could have been organised by any member of the Government; and he felt certain that if anything of the kind had occurred, it could only have been a raid by irresponsible Bedouins. I told his Highness that I feared that he deceived himself. I reminded him of the various occasions on which he had given me similar assurances, and of the negative results of the instructions which he had given on previous occasions. I warned him of the disastrous consequences to the Ottoman Empire of a crisis which could not now be long postponed unless he and the friends of peace were prepared to take some serious stand against the conspiracy of which I was fully cognisant, to involve it irretrievably in the general war. On this, as on every occasion of my interviews with the Grand Vizier, I was impressed with his inability to realise the facts or to disabuse himself of the conviction, in spite of his many unfortunate experiences, that he would be able, in a really serious crisis, to exert his authority with effect.

The second event of capital importance was the attack on Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea <sup>1</sup> on the morning of the same day, the 29th October. It is now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German admiral on the evening of the 27th October, but it was not until after they had actually taken place, that is, on the afternoon of the 29th October, when news of the raid on Odessa was telegraphed to me direct by Mr. Consul-General Roberts, that my Russian and French colleagues and myself realised that the die had actually been cast and the crisis that we had so long feared and striven to avert had occurred. Immediately on receiving the news M. Bompard and I called on

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *ante*, pp. 213-14.]



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M. de Giers and decided to ask for authority from our respective Governments to confront the Porte with the alternative of rupture or dismissal of the German naval and military missions. On the morning of the 30th, however, I learnt from my Russian colleague that he had received instructions from his Government immediately to ask for his passports.<sup>1</sup> He had written to the Grand Vizier to ask for an interview, which His Highness had begged him to postpone until the following day owing to indisposition. The instructions of my Russian colleague being in a categorical form, he had therefore been constrained to address a note to the Grand Vizier demanding his passports; and I and my French colleague, acting on the instructions with which the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers had at my suggestion already been furnished to leave Constantinople simultaneously, should any one of them be compelled to ask for his passports, owing either to a Turkish declaration of war or to some intolerable act of hostility, decided without further delay to write to the Grand Vizier and ask in our turn for interviews to enable us to carry out these instructions. In view of His Highness's indisposition we had not expected to be received that day, but a few hours later the Grand Vizier sent us word that he would, nevertheless, be glad to see us, and notwithstanding the excuse which he had made earlier in the day he received the Russian Ambassador also in the course of the afternoon. My interview with the Grand Vizier partly coincided with that of M. de Giers, and preceded that of M. Bompard. It was of a painful description.<sup>2</sup> His Highness convinced me of his sincerity in disclaiming all knowledge of or participation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable. I replied that the time had passed for assurances. The crisis which I had predicted to his Highness at almost every interview which I had had with him since my return had actually occurred, and unless some adequate satisfaction were immediately given by the dismissal of the German missions, which could alone prevent the recurrence of attempts upon Egyptian territory and attacks on Russia, war with the Allies was inevitable. My Russian colleague had already demanded his passports, and I must, in pursuance of the instructions I

<sup>1</sup> [See *ante*,  
p. 215.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. *ante*,  
215.]

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had received, follow the same course. The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent. In reply to the doubt which I expressed as to the means at his disposal, he said that he had on his side moral forces which could not but triumph, and that he meant to fight on to the end. He did not, indeed, hint at a possibility of immediately dismissing the German mission, but he informed me that there was to be a meeting of the Council at his house that evening, when he would call upon his colleagues to support him in his determination to avert war with the Allied Powers.

The Council was duly held, and, as he had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favour of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey. But the powerlessness of the Sultan's Ministers to do more than vote in the Council Chamber was evident. The question of dismissing the German naval officers was discussed, but no decision to do so was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the expulsion of the military mission. In the interval the War party had sealed their resolution to go forward, by publishing a communiqué in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side.<sup>1</sup> Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *ante*,  
p. 220.]

It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German admiral's *coup*, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice.

The story of a Russian provocation was plainly an after-thought, and if the official report of the Russian Government were not sufficient to disprove it, I could produce independent evidence to show that the orders to begin hostilities were given at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the evening of the 27th October, as the result of a conspiracy hatched between the German representatives in Constantinople and a small and unscrupulous Turkish faction.

My Russian colleague left Constantinople without incident on the evening of the 31st October. My own departure was eventually arranged for the following evening, when I left



## SIR L. MALLET'S DESPATCH

for Dedeagatch, accompanied by my staff of sixty officials and their families, the British advisers in the service of the Turkish Government and some other British subjects also travelled with me. My French colleague and his staff left by the same train.

Owing to the wanton refusal of the military authorities at the last moment to allow the departure of a great number of British and French subjects who were to have left by an earlier train than that which had been placed at my disposal, the station was for some hours the scene of indescribable confusion and turmoil.

My protests and those of the French Ambassador were disregarded, and after protracted discussion, we agreed to leave matters in the hands of the United States Ambassador, who undertook to use all his influence to procure the departure of our fellow subjects on the following day. The "sous-chef de protocole" of the Sublime Porte and the "chef de cabinet particulier" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sent to bid farewell to M. Bompard and myself at the railway station, and two Secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry accompanied us to the frontier.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the assistance which I have received from Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador. During the last two days especially the difficulties arising out of the abnormality of the situation would have been immeasurably greater had it not been for his invaluable help and his untiring efforts on behalf of myself and my staff. We are heavily indebted not only to Mr. Morgenthau himself, but to every member of the United States Embassy. It is entirely owing to their exertions that the British and French subjects who were detained at the station on the night of my departure were allowed to leave on the following evening.

Before concluding this despatch I desire also to place on record my sense of the cheerful courage displayed by the British community in Constantinople, as well as in other towns, during the whole of this trying period. A large proportion of them have suffered severely in their business from the instability of the situation in Turkey. Many have suffered heavily and more directly by the military requisi-



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tions which from the beginning of August were carried out in an inconceivably arbitrary manner. By the suppression of the Capitulations all saw themselves deprived at a moment's notice of the secular privileges which had hitherto secured the persons and the property of foreigners against caprice and injustice. But they have one and all faced these adversities with a reasonable and manly fortitude.

Shortly after my return to my post, I recommended those British subjects who applied to me for advice to send home, when opportunity offered, those members of their families who had no particular reason to stay in the country.

A certain number left during the autumn, and many have left since. Those who have chosen to stay, or who have not been in a position to leave, remain under the protection of the United States Ambassador. As regards the British community at Bagdad, I instructed the acting British Consul-general at Bagdad, early in October, to charter a steamer for the conveyance to the coast of any British subjects who might wish to leave. A large number of British and British-Indian subjects availed themselves of this opportunity.

I cannot conclude this report without calling your attention to the zeal shown by the junior members of my staff, including Mr. Ovey, Lord Gerald Wellesley, Mr. Charles Lister, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Astell, and by Mr. Fuller, Archivist to His Majesty's Embassy, in the performance of their duties in the Chancery, as well as to the able and conscientious work of the members of the Dragomanate and Consulate-general.

The Chancery was greatly assisted by the voluntary help kindly offered to them by Judge Cator, the Rev. Canon Whitehouse, Chaplain to His Majesty's Embassy, and by Dr. Clemow, Physician to His Majesty's Embassy, as well as by Mr. Weakley, Commercial Attaché.

I need not do more than refer to the work of Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe Owen, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, whose information respecting the military preparations was often obtained with considerable difficulty.

I should like to place on record my high appreciation of the conduct of His Majesty's consular officers throughout the Ottoman Empire during the whole period of the crisis. They

## SIR L. MALLET'S DESPATCH

one and all performed their often difficult duties with zeal and discretion. I was especially indebted to Mr. Cumberbatch, His Majesty's Consul-general at Beirut, Mr. Heathcote Smith, acting British Consul-general at Smyrna, and to Mr. Palmer, Vice-consul at the Dardanelles, for the valuable information which they supplied.

I would wish to bring to your particular notice the services rendered by Mr. Ryan, Acting First Dragoman of His Majesty's Embassy. His ability, knowledge of Turkey, sound judgment and untiring industry were of invaluable assistance to me, and are deserving of your special commendation.—I have, etc.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 2.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.*

*Foreign Office, December 4, 1914.*

SIR,—I have received your Excellency's despatch of the 20th ultimo, in which you summarise the events since your return to your post on the 16th August last until your departure on the 1st November.

I have read with great appreciation and pleasure of the invaluable assistance rendered to your Excellency in the difficult circumstances of your departure by the United States Ambassador and every member of the United States Embassy, and I have already requested the United States Government to convey to Mr. Morgenthau the most sincere thanks of His Majesty's Government for the valuable services rendered by his Excellency on that occasion, and subsequently in helping the British community to leave Constantinople.

I have also been much gratified to receive your Excellency's testimony of the cheerful courage of the British community in Turkey under exceptionally trying circumstances, and I have noted with great satisfaction your Excellency's appreciation of the valuable services of the embassy and consulate staff, and of the members of His Majesty's consular service throughout the Ottoman Empire.

I desire also to convey to your Excellency my high sense of the marked ability, patience, and discretion shown by

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your Excellency in carrying out, in the face of great difficulties, the policy of His Majesty's Government. War was eventually forced by wanton and unprovoked hostilities of the Turkish fleet under German inspiration and orders, but it was the desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid a rupture with Turkey ; and your Excellency rightly directed all your efforts to encourage those influences at Constantinople that were moderate and reasonable. To your efforts it was at any rate in some degree due that the inevitable catastrophe did not occur sooner.—I am, etc.,

E. GREY.



IMPERIAL RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

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### NEGOTIATIONS

COVERING THE PERIOD FROM  $\frac{\text{JULY } 19}{\text{AUGUST } 1}$  TO  $\frac{\text{OCTOBER } 19}{\text{NOVEMBER } 1}$  1914

### PRECEDING THE WAR WITH TURKEY

*Translation of the Russian and French Texts*

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## APPENDIX

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## No. 1.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

The Grand Vizier told me confidentially that the Austrian Ambassador was endeavouring to induce Turkey to take concerted action with Austria, but he alleged that an actual proposal of that kind had not been made. The Grand Vizier added that he was convinced of the necessity for Turkey to keep out of the conflict. I learn through reliable sources that certain members of the Committee desire to induce the Government to join the Triple Alliance, but it is thought that the Government made it understood that its desire was to resign authority rather than to enter upon the path of political adventure. For all that, I am convinced that Turkey will not fail to take the first favourable opportunity which might with impunity further her own interests.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 2.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

The Grand Vizier, upon his own personal initiative, declared to the French Ambassador, who had come to inform him of the French mobilisation, that it was his intention to proclaim the neutrality of Turkey. The question will be discussed by the Council of Ministers.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 3.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

Pursuant to information which reached me of the decision to effect a complete mobilisation, I visited the Grand Vizier



## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

to-day, and interrogated him relative to the object of the same. He confidentially declared to me that a mobilisation would indeed be ordered, but he did not know what class of men would be called out ; that upon my visit to the Porte on the morrow he would give me more precise information concerning the calls ; and that the Porte was resolved to assemble an army of 200,000 men in Thrace and on the Bosphorus, apprehending a Bulgarian movement. He added that there was no intention to concentrate an army on the Caucasian frontier.

Communicated to Sofia and Bukarest.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 4.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

Judging from my discussion with the Grand Vizier, I conclude that the Porte, while observing neutrality for the present, is firmly resolved to be prepared for, either a modification of the Treaty of Bukarest in the interests of Bulgaria, or any other circumstance which may accrue to the profit of Turkey. There is no doubt that, fearing us, and suspecting, by reason of the calumnies of our enemies, that we will attack her, in her heart she desires the success of Germany. This feeling is strongly sustained by the efforts of the officials of the German military commission remaining in Turkey. This element is a highly undesirable one, as they are constantly inciting the Turks against us, but I suppose the Porte will not decide to send them away until the result of our struggle with Germany is made known.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 5.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 21 (August 3), 1914.*

To-day the Grand Vizier assured me that the Porte, in ordering a general mobilisation, will call to the ranks only

so many men as may be necessary to organise an army of 200,000 men in Thrace. The men called to the colours from Anatolia will be transported to Thrace, and will under no circumstances remain on our frontier. The same assurances were given the French Ambassador by Enver Pasha.

(Signed) GIER. S.

No. 6.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, July 21 (August 3), 1914.

From the explanations made to me by the Grand Vizier, and to the French Ambassador by Enver Pasha, it appears as though the latter advised the officers of the German commission of his readiness to release them if desired, but Liman von Sanders replied that Berlin had ordered them to remain in Turkey. There is no doubt that this order from Berlin was issued with a view to using Turkey for one or the other of its purposes, and to sow discord between her and us. I am convinced, however, that Enver Pasha, in spite of his assurances, fearing us, values the presence of the German officers.

(Signed) GIER. S.

No. 7.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, July 22 (August 4), 1914.

The Council of Ministers yesterday decided to preserve the strictest neutrality, and with this end in view, among other things, decreed that mines should be laid in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, reserving passage-way for commercial vessels under pilotage. This morning at ten o'clock the mines were laid.

(Signed) GIER. S.

No. 8.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, July 23 (August 5), 1914.

The Military Agent, in conversation with Enver Pasha, at my instance expressed his surprise that German officers still



## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

remain in the army. Enver Pasha replied that he was not holding the Germans, but had no real reason to ask them to leave, pending a clearing up of the political situation. It also would not be to the best interest of the army to forcibly remove them during such a trying occasion as a mobilisation. Personally, he does not doubt that the German Government, in leaving them in Turkey, is following its own ends, with a view to bringing Turkey into its sphere of influence, but that that purpose will not be accomplished, for the reason that Turkey will follow a course dictated solely by her own interests.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 9.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 24 (August 6), 1914.*

The Turkish Ambassador yesterday gave Mr. Nicolson<sup>1</sup> the most reassuring representations relative to the designs of Turkey. The latter will remain neutral, and will only take certain measures of precaution. I am inclined to believe that the Turkish Ambassador is really exerting all his influence at Constantinople to induce Turkey to preserve neutrality.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

<sup>1</sup> [Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.]

No. 10.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Constantinople, July 25 (August 7), 1914.*

The sequestration of Turkish Dreadnoughts has aroused strong indignation here against England.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 11.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.)

*Petrograd, July 26 (August 8), 1914.*

It is reported that the cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau*, having rounded Matapan, are apparently headed for the Dardanelles.

You will please, in concert with the French and British



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

Ambassadors, make the most earnest representations to the Porte, relative to the responsibility it would assume in permitting the passage of these vessels through the Dardanelles, and insist upon their leaving the Straits, or that they shall be disarmed, without carrying the matter to an open rupture.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

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### No. 12.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 26 (August 8), 1914.*

To-day the Grand Vizier assured me that he would under no circumstances permit the passage of the *Breslau* and *Goeben* through the Dardanelles, and that he would continue to observe the strictest neutrality. He requested me to telegraph this statement to your Excellency. Nevertheless, I consider the situation very grave, in view of the exceedingly impressionable nature of the Turks, and the strong influence of the war party, urged on by the Germans.

(Signed) GIERS.

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### No. 13.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 27 (August 9), 1914.*

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw to-day, continues to assert that he is observing complete neutrality. He denies that the presence of German officers violates that neutrality.

(Signed) GIERS.

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### No. 14.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July 27 (August 9), 1914.*

If the *Goeben* proceeds through the Dardanelles under the German flag, it will be left to Admiral Eberhardt to use all means within his power to bar its exit into the Black Sea,

## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

and to destroy the *Goeben*. Still, the Admiral will be instructed to avoid, except in case of extreme necessity, taking any action directly against Turkey.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

## No. 15.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) London, July 26 (August 8), 1914.

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has been instructed to insist upon the departure or immediate disarmament of the war vessels of belligerent powers which might pass the Straits, and likewise to renew energetic representations of the necessity for the observance of neutrality.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

## No. 16.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) Petrograd, July 28 (August 10), 1914.

Bear in mind that we do not fear Turkey's activities aimed directly against us.

While preserving an entirely friendly attitude in making your statements to the Turks, try to impress upon them the fact that in taking action which has not our sanction, they are jeopardising their existence, and that they are not in a position to do us serious injury.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

## No. 17.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, July 29 (August 11), 1914.

The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* are entering the Dardanelles. It is reported that they have been purchased by the Turkish Government.

(Signed) GIERS.

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 18.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, July 29 (August 11), 1914.*

Your telegram of even date received.

If the Porte declares that it has purchased the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, you will please, after consulting with the French and British Ambassadors, energetically protest against that act, as a violation of the neutrality of Turkey.

The 56th Article of the London Maritime Declaration of 1909,<sup>1</sup> which, although not ratified, was nevertheless adopted by all the Powers at the time of the last war, and which acquired the standing of a customary maritime law, considers the transfer, to a neutral flag, of an enemy's merchant ship after declaration of hostilities, as null and void. This applies with still greater force to war vessels.

The purchase by Turkey of German war vessels which were in undoubted peril in the Mediterranean basin has as its object a manifest aid to Germany, and the alleged calculations of advantage to Turkey have no juridical standing.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

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No. 19.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *London, July 29 (August 11), 1914.*

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has been instructed to insist, to the Porte, upon a strict observance by the Turkish Government of the provisions of international law, and upon the disarmament or departure of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

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No. 20.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 30 (August 12), 1914.*

The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* are still at Nagara. The cruisers, which were greeted by the Turks with enthusiasm,

<sup>1</sup> [See *Naval*, I, p. 470.]



are taking coal here from the Turkish authorities. Turkish torpedo boats are passing out to sea from the Dardanelles, and are reporting to the German vessels the result of their reconnaissance. The German sailors made a strict search of the French, British and Greek merchant vessels lying in the Dardanelles, and took a wireless telegraph outfit by force from the French steamer *Saghalien*, under threat of blowing up the ship.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 21.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 30 (August 12), 1914.*

The arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* changes the situation here, not to our advantage. From a military point of view it strengthens Turkey's preparedness for war, and viewed from a political standpoint it will undoubtedly have the most serious consequences, strongly raising the Turkish spirit, and it may incite them to the rashest excesses.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 22.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, July 31 (August 13), 1914.*

Having received information from the Dardanelles of the entry therein of German vessels, I entered a protest, in support of the French and British representatives, against violation of neutrality by Turkey. To my repeated representations to-day, the Grand Vizier gave me the answer that the purchase of the vessels had taken place at the last moment at Germany's proposal, after detention of Turkish Dreadnoughts by Great Britain. The Grand Vizier asserts that all the German crews are now already being removed, and replaced by Turks. The British Chargé d'Affaires has instructed Admiral Limpus to verify the actuality of the substitution. Limpus insists that not one German shall remain on the vessels.

(Signed) GIERS.

## No. 23.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 1 (14), 1914.*

It appears that the *Breslau* will come out to Constantinople this evening. I am informed that the *Goeben* is coaling at the Bay of Ismid. The British and French warships are stationed before the mouth of the Dardanelles. At 7 P.M. both the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* were still under the German flag.

(Signed) GIER.

## No. 24.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 1 (August 14), 1914.*

The Porte gave notice through a circular note of the issuance of its orders that wireless telegraph apparatus would be removed from foreign merchant vessels upon their entry into the Straits and restored to them after leaving the Straits. I protested, but in view of the existing situation here it is difficult to expect that the protest will achieve results.

(Signed) GIER.

## No. 25.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August 1 (14), 1914.*

This morning the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires read to me the following telegram from the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, setting forth that Turkey reaffirms her declaration of her intention to observe the strictest neutrality.

'That there may remain no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Imperial Government has decided to maintain during the present hostilities, I again inform you that it has resolved to observe strict neutrality. (Signed) SAÏD HALIM, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.\*'

(Signed) SAZONOF.

\* Translated from the French text.



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No. 26.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 4 (17), 1914.*

The *Goeben* and *Breslau* yesterday left Ismid to repair damages received: two shot holes on the starboard side of the *Goeben* and on the prow of the *Breslau*. Repairs will require about ten days. Thirty-eight wounded men were put ashore from the *Goeben*. Yesterday, two hundred men of the German crews were removed from both vessels. The remainder, according to assurances given by the Minister of the Marine, will be removed upon the arrival from England of the Turkish crew returning on the Turkish cruiser *Reshid*.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 27.

*Russian Minister at Athens to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Athens, August 6 (19), 1914.*

I learn from a confidential source that when the Greek Minister at Berlin represented to Herr von Jagow that the purchase by Turkey of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was an act unfriendly to Greece, the German Minister replied that as a matter of fact said purchase had never been made.

(Signed) DEMIDOFF.

No. 28.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 6 (19), 1914.*

Of the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* two hundred men have already been put ashore and replaced by Turks. According to the Grand Vizier, the remainder will be removed upon the arrival from England of a Turkish crew belonging to the latter's vessels detained there.

(Signed) GIERS.



## No. 29.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 7 (20), 1914.*

I must say that the situation here is of the greatest gravity for the reason that all affairs are in the hands of the military, who allow themselves licence in everything and are openly exerting themselves, under German pressure, to draw Turkey into a war with us. Djavid Bey, the Grand Vizier, and, to some extent, Djemal Pasha, oppose this, but I am by no means convinced that the last word rests with them.

(Signed) GIER.

## No. 30.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 6 (19), 1914.*

The Minister of Finance visited me to-day and expressed to me his conviction that it was possible to effect an agreement with the Powers of the Triple Entente. According to Djavid Bey, the Germans, especially within the last few days, have been lavish with promises, so tempting that they are hard to resist. The Minister thinks the Powers of the Entente ought to offer the Turks some benefits, even though less than those promised by the Germans, nevertheless sufficiently substantial, in order to restrain the Government from making an imprudent decision and to give the conservative members of the Cabinet an effective weapon with which to combat their warlike colleagues who are under German influence. Among such benefits might be counted the grant to Turkey of complete economic independence, and the suppression of the régime of [the] Capitulations. In response to my question as to whether, under such conditions, the German commission could be removed from Turkey, the Minister replied that the privileges which might be offered to Turkey could be conditioned upon the removal of the German commission.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) GIER.

## No. 31.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 7 (20), 1914.*

Djavid Bey to-day visited the French and British Ambassadors and repeated to them the proposal which was made to me yesterday. Djemal Pasha yesterday adopted the same vein in conference with Sir L. Mallet. The difference between the proposals lies in the fact that the Turks evidently did not conceal from my colleagues the fact that, in the first place, they fear us, and for that reason they would like to arrive at a written agreement; not a general one with the Powers of the Entente, but with each one separately.

With regard to the question of [the] Capitulations, my colleagues and myself find that their complete suppression will be difficult. Nevertheless I admit the possibility of curbing [*de restreindre*] their operation to a considerable extent. I would deem it quite possible to limit them by requiring guaranty of the inviolability of persons and dwellings of foreign subjects, and the assistance of consuls in court proceedings.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) GIER.

## No. 32.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August 8 (21), 1914.*

I requested the French and British Ambassadors to advise their respective Governments not wholly to reject the plans proposed by Djavid Bey. Although it is doubtful that an agreement can be reached with Turkey, still we hold that we should not rebuff the more moderate element.

Communicated to Constantinople.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 33.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Paris, August 9 (22), 1914.

Your telegram of August 8 (21) received.

M. Doumergue is in entire accord with your point of view. In considering the question of [the] Capitulations, according to the opinion of the French Ambassador at Constantinople as expressed by him to Djavid Bey, it is necessary to foreshadow [*prévoir*] certain transitional measures. M. Doumergue is in accord therewith, and is prepared to discuss a formula which may be submitted to the Turks.

Communicated to Constantinople.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 34.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.)

Petrograd, August 10 (23), 1914.

In a memorandum handed me by the British Ambassador, it is stated that his Government, while deeming the Turkish demands excessive, considers it preferable not to reject them, viewing them as material for negotiation.

England is ready to join with us and France in giving written guaranty that the inviolability and independence of Turkey will be respected by the three Powers, and that the treaty of peace shall contain no conditions conflicting with those principles.

Further, so soon as a plan shall have been perfected for guaranteeing the administration of justice in a manner to meet modern conditions, England agrees to waive territorial jurisdiction operating by virtue of [the] Capitulations.

In exchange therefor, the Turkish Government binds itself to give a written pledge to fulfil, during the present war, all obligations arising from neutrality, and in every way to facilitate the uninterrupted and unhindered passage of merchant vessels through the Straits.

In like manner Turkey will proceed at once to return all



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German officers and the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to their native land.

Having accepted the said proposals of England, I beg of you, all three acting in concert, to be guided by them in further negotiations with the Porte.

If these negotiations should take a favourable turn, we calculate that the only certain guaranty of Turkey's future action lies in the removal of all German military as well as naval officers from her territory.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

## No. 35.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Paris, August 11 (24), 1914.

Your telegram of August 10 (23)<sup>1</sup> received.

<sup>1</sup> [No. 34]

An identical note from the British Ambassador here was also received by M. Doumergue, who, accepting the proposals of England therein laid down, is giving conformable instruction to the French Ambassador at Constantinople. He is thoroughly in accord with your view that if the negotiations with Turkey should take a favourable turn, they should be followed up by an insistence upon a general removal from Turkey of all German officers and men.

Communicated to London and Constantinople.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

## No. 36.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, August 14 (27), 1914.

According to persistent rumours, the exit of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Black Sea will take place before long. From another source I learn that eighty German seamen and twenty mechanical engineers, dressed as common labourers, have arrived at Constantinople. In view of these facts, I had an interview to-day with the Grand Vizier, who cate-

gorically declared to me that he knew nothing of the arrival of the sailors. He gave his word that the *Goeben* would not leave for any point, and promised to again insist upon the prompt removal of all German crews from vessels. I believe the Grand Vizier is sincere, but his influence is greatly waning, and his final fall may come at any time. For that reason I freely admit the possibility of the departure of the *Goeben* into the Black Sea under German pressure, with crew part German, and flying the Turkish flag.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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No. 37.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 14 (27), 1914.*

A German Admiral is expected to arrive at an early date, for service as technical adviser in naval affairs. Twenty-seven German officers have already arrived for service in the Dardanelles forts.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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No. 38.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *London, August 15 (28), 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey expressed to me his anxiety concerning the situation at Constantinople. He told me that if Turkey decides upon war, she will have to suffer the most serious consequences thereof. He believes that the efforts now being made by Germany will soon call forth a step by Turkey which will prove that Turkey and Germany are openly answerable for the war.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

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No. 39.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 16 (29), 1914.*

During the past half of August, the efforts of Germany to draw Turkey into war and to excite Turkish public opinion against the Powers of the Entente have become more and more plainly apparent. The Wolff Agency is industriously circulating in Turkey a manifesto of the Sultan and a warlike order from the army \* of Enver Pasha, calling upon the army to wash away the shame of the Balkan war. Men of the navy and land forces from Germany are being brought into Turkey. On August 14, 150 German enlisted men arrived at Constantinople under the guise of artisans, and on the 15th as many as 800 German soldiers with officers passed through Adrianople on a special train. Information from Erzeroum is that fifteen German officers arrived there to superintend the erection of new forts. German reservists and volunteers who did not succeed in returning to Germany received orders to enter the ranks of the Turkish army.

(Signed) GIERS.

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No. 40.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 19 (September 1), 1914.*

The Minister of the Marine, who visited me yesterday, assured me upon his word of honour, that not one German sailor should remain in the fleet, asking me only to allow him some time—about two weeks—for their gradual removal. To-day he will send away the first German detachment by land. This gradual separation is alleged to be necessary for him to allow the Turkish sailors time to master the technical details of running the purchased vessels. Djemal Pasha expressed, at the same time, his deep conviction of the necessity for Turkey to remain strictly neutral, and not to make war with any one, in the Balkans or any other theatre of

\* [Should apparently read 'the warlike order to the armies of Enver Pasha.' The French reads 'le belliqueux ordre aux armées, etc.']



action. He alleges that he stubbornly carried this point in the Council of Ministers. Some caution on his part is necessary, however, for, although as Minister of Marine he is independent, he is still in a subordinate position, as commander of the second army corps. He said he had no information concerning the arrival of new detachments of Germans.

Communicated to Paris and London.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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No. 41.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 26 (September 8), 1914.*

I have reason to believe that the Porte proposes, at the earliest moment, to declare the accomplished suppression of [the] Capitulations [*déclarer . . . la suppression des capitulations comme un fait accompli*']. I consider it necessary beforehand to define, by mutual agreement with our Allies, our relation to such declaration. I also have information that, simultaneously with the order for suppression of [the] Capitulations, will be issued an irade by the Sultan for the abolishment of the International Sanitary Council.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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No. 42.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 27 (September 9), 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador transmitted to me, by instruction of the Austrian Ambassador, a statement to the effect that the latter in nowise approves the intention of the Porte to suppress the Capitulations, and that, in his capacity as dean [*doyen*] of the corps, he is ready to join in a general protest by all the ambassadors. This view is, according to the Margrave Pallavicini, shared also by the German Ambassador. I told the Marquis Garroni I saw no objection to joining in an identical note by all the ambassadors to the Porte pointing out that [the] Capitulations are a result of international

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agreement, and cannot be abolished by a single-handed act.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

(Signed) GIER.S.

No. 43.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, August 28 (September 10), 1914.*

On the 27th of this August, the Grand Vizier addressed a note to all foreign representatives, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, giving notice of the abolishment of [the] Capitulations, beginning October 1 (new style) of this year.

As your Excellency will observe by the above-mentioned note, the Sublime Porte claims [the] Capitulations as its own individual voluntary act, which may in a like manner be abrogated at its personal discretion.

This line of action by the Ottoman Government, in contravention of treaties concluded with Turkey by all the European Governments, and directly injuring the interests of the latter, called forth a protest from them, expressed in an identical note transmitted to the Grand Vizier on this 28th of August, a copy of which I also have the honour to present herewith.

I deem it my duty to add that, as I had the honour to inform you by telegraph,<sup>1</sup> a similar identical note was also transmitted to the Grand Vizier by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors. [1 Cf. No. 42.]

(Signed) GIER.S.

*Text of Note of Sublime Porte to Imperial Russian Embassy at Constantinople, of August 27 (September 9), 1914.\**

The Imperial Ottoman Government, animated by a spirit of hospitality and sympathy toward the subjects of friendly Powers, formerly determined in a special manner the rules to which foreigners should be subject on coming to the Orient to engage in business here, and communicated these rules

\* Translated from the French text.



to the Powers. In course of time these rules, which the Sublime Porte had promulgated upon its own exclusive initiative, came to be interpreted as privileges, strengthened and extended by certain practices, and maintained to the present under the name of old treaties or Capitulations. Meanwhile, these privileges, which on the one hand were at complete variance with the juridical rules of the times, and with the principles of national sovereignty, constituted, on the other hand, a hindrance to the progress and development of the Ottoman Empire, giving rise as well to certain misconceptions in the relations with foreign Powers; thus they form an obstacle to the attainment, by these relations, of the desired degree of cordiality and sincerity.

Overcoming all opposition, the Ottoman Empire continues to march in the path of regeneration and reform in which it was engaged in 1255 by Hatti-Hûmayoun of Gul-Hâné, and in order to secure for itself the position to which it is entitled in the family of civilised European people[s], adopted the most modern juridical principles, and did not depart from the plan of resting the edifice of State upon these foundations. The establishment of the constitutional régime shows how happily the efforts of the Ottoman Empire were crowned with success on its way of progress.

However, resulting from [the] Capitulations, interference by foreigners with the exercise of the judiciary power which constitutes the main basis of State sovereignty; limitation of legislative power upon the pretext that many of the laws could not be applied to foreigners; the fact that a criminal having made an attack upon the public safety escapes the application of the law for the sole reason that he is of foreign nationality; or again the fact that public procedure is compromised by the necessity of observing all sorts of restrictions and conditions in respect to the delinquent foreigner; and finally, the fact that litigation arising under the same contract permits a different mode of filing and procedure according to the nationality of the party;—all these facts, and other similar restrictive privileges, constitute an insurmountable barrier to any organisation of tribunals instituted for the purpose of assuring a perfect administration of justice in the country.

Likewise, the effect of [the] Capitulations which renders



foreigners free and exempt from taxes in the Ottoman Empire leaves the Sublime Porte powerless not only to secure the means necessary to provide for the accomplishment of reforms, but even to meet the current needs of the administration without having recourse to loans. Similarly, the obstacles interposed against the increase of indirect taxation result in raising the quota of direct taxation, and oppressing the tax-paying Ottomans. The fact that foreigners engaged in business in the Ottoman Empire and enjoying here all sorts of immunities and privileges are taxed less than the Ottomans, constitutes at once an evident injustice and an attack upon the independence and dignity of the State. The Imperial Government, in spite of all these obstacles, was pursuing its reformatory efforts with zeal, when the outbreak of a general war rendered the financial difficulties of the country extremely acute, endangering the accomplishment of every work begun or planned. Now, the Sublime Porte is convinced that the only means of salvation for Turkey is to accomplish that work of reform and development as soon as possible, as it is also convinced that all steps it will take in that direction will receive the encouragement of all friendly Powers.

It was upon the basis of this conviction that a decision was reached to abrogate, beginning October 1, 1914, the Capitulations which have to the present time constituted a bar to all progress in the Empire, as well as all privileges and tolerances accessory to the Capitulations or arising therefrom, and to adopt, as a basis of relations with all Governments, the general principles of international law.

While having the honour to announce the present decision, which, ushering in an era of happiness for the Ottoman Empire, will, therefore, I doubt not, be received with satisfaction by the Imperial Russian Government, I deem it my duty to add that the Sublime Porte, inspired in its decision only by the best interests of the Ottoman fatherland, does not cherish, in abrogating the Capitulations, any unfriendly feeling toward any Power, and that it stands ready to enter into negotiations with the view of concluding commercial treaties with the Russian Government, based upon the general principles of public international law.

(Signed) SAİD HALİM.

[Cf. No. 65.]

*Text of the Responsory Identical Note of August 28  
(Sept. 10), 1914.\**

I have the honour to acknowledge to Your Highness the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, wherein you were pleased to inform me of the decision by the Imperial Government to suppress [the] Capitulations in Turkey, beginning the 1st of next October.

I shall not fail to bring to the knowledge of my Government this decision and the considerations upon which it is based, but deem it my duty just now to call the attention of Your Highness, in contradiction of the opening sentences of your note, to the fact that the capitulatory régime as it operates in Turkey is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but a resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements and contractual acts of divers kinds. The régime cannot thereafter be modified in any of its parts, much less in its entirety be suppressed, without an entente with the contracting Powers.

In the absence, therefore, of a suitable agreement reached before the 1st of next October between the Ottoman Government and my own Government, I will find it impossible to recognise, from that date, the executive force of the one-sided decision of the Sublime Porte.

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No. 44.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 28 (September 10), 1914.*

To-day I pointed out to the Grand Vizier and to Djavid Bey that we could by no means tolerate the self-willed decision [*un décret arbitraire*] of the Porte; that by such an arrangement it had only succeeded in bringing the warring [*belligérantes*] Powers together in an identical note of protest against it. As a way out of the situation, I advised them, without loss of time and before measures were taken for suppression to enter into negotiations concerning [the] capitulatory regulations which might be modified, and those without which foreigners cannot live in Turkey. Both seemed strongly

\* Translated from the French text.



impressed with the identical character of our notes of protest. They explained that in order to avoid war they had been forced to satisfy public opinion to some extent, and alleged that through suppression of [the] Capitulations they had secured peace for a month at least. According to their statement, they had thereby aroused the indignation of the German Ambassador.

There is no doubt that the Turks are continuing to play a double rôle, and are endeavouring to derive as much benefit as possible for themselves from the European war.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 45.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, August 28 (September 10), 1914.

According to a communication from the Dardanelles, active strengthening of the forts there is going on under the direction of Weber Pasha and a newly arrived German high officer. Of the German soldiers brought to Constantinople, thirty artillerymen have been disembarked in the Dardanelles. The rest, according to the statement of a German soldier disguised in Turkish uniform, have been distributed among the forts along the Bosphorus. War supplies and artillery continue to arrive from Germany, and a new shipment of seventy-five car-loads is expected to arrive in a few days.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 46.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, August 28 (September 10), 1914.

A person who is in close touch with the Ottoman Ministers expresses the opinion that Turkey is bound to Germany by an agreement, which is supposed to have been effected mainly at the instance of Enver Pasha. This agreement does not, however, bind Turkey to an immediate declaration of war



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

against us, which explains the position they are now taking, notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Germans to hasten matters to a conclusion.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 47.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 28 (September 10), 1914.*

I learn through reliable sources that on August 23 (September 5), Enver Pasha received a letter from the German Ambassador pointing out that the German Government considered that the time had arrived for Turkey to fulfil her obligations as an ally of Germany. This might be postponed only till the Dardanelles were fortified. Without conclusively determining the line of action to be pursued by the Turkish war forces, Germany suggests that it might be directed to an attack on Egypt and a descent upon Odessa.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 48.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux and London.*

(Draft of an Identical Note<sup>1</sup> of the Powers of the Triple Entente.)\*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, August 28 (September 10), 1914.*

The régime of [the] Capitulations having been based upon reciprocal pacts, it does not belong to the Sublime Porte to declare its abrogation by a simple act of its own will.

The Russian, French and British Governments are nevertheless willing to examine at once, and in the most friendly spirit, the propositions which the Sublime Porte would deem necessary to address to them for the substitution, for the present régime, of a régime more in conformity with the general principles of international law. The said Governments could, in any event, proceed to this examination only

\* Translated from the French text.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *ante*,  
p. 127.]

## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

after having received from the Sublime Porte the assurance that it would observe strict neutrality in the present war, and that it would likewise abstain from all offensive acts against any State that is a neighbour of Turkey.

Communicated to Constantinople.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 49.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) Petrograd, August 28 (September 10), 1914.

Please warn the Grand Vizier that the appearance in the Black Sea of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* may give rise to complications. Trusting that the reasonable element in Turkey cannot desire this, we deem it necessary to give friendly warning of it to Prince Saïd Halim.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 50.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, August 31 (September 13), 1914.

Your telegram of August 28<sup>1</sup> received.

I warned the Grand Vizier that the appearance in the Black Sea of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* might lead to complications, the more so because the German officers on board those vessels would try to bring about such complications in order to draw Turkey into a war with us. The Grand Vizier answered me to the effect that he had no information concerning the departure of the vessels, and he did not see any reason for sending them into the Black Sea. I believe the Grand Vizier will oppose the departure of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Black Sea, but, unfortunately, his voice has no longer any decisive significance.

(Signed) GIER. S.



## No. 51.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 31 (September 13), 1914.*

I learn from trustworthy sources that the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors, after having united in an identical note of their Governments protesting against the abrogation of [the] Capitulations, now have already withdrawn from making any further objection to said abrogation.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 52.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, August 31 (September 13), 1914.*

To-day the British Ambassador informed the Grand Vizier that England had recalled Admiral Limpus and all British officers in view of the impossible situation created for the British naval commission in Turkey.

Communicated to London.

(Signed) GIER.S.

## No. 53.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, September 1 (14), 1914.*

Endeavouring by all possible means to gain the ascendancy in Turkey, Germany and Austria-Hungary turned their special attention to organs of the press at Constantinople.

The Embassy at Constantinople has information showing that the principal newspapers receive from the two Governments the following very considerable subsidies :

The *Ikdam* receives 2500 Turkish pounds ; the *Sabah*, the *Tanin* and the *Tasfiri-Efkiar* 2000 pounds each, and the *Terjuman* 500 pounds, from Germany ; while from Austria-Hungary the three first-named papers receive 1000 pounds each, and the two last-named 500 pounds each.

(Signed) GIER.S.



## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

No. 54.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 2 (15), 1914.*

I gather from my interviews to-day with Talaat Bey and Halil Bey that the Turks are beginning to realise that they were hasty in suppressing [the] Capitulations, and fear the consequences to arise after the close of the war. Both Ministers assured me of their desire to enter into an agreement with us.

They told me, privately, that they were ready to separate the economic from the juridical side of the question, delaying the suppression of the latter part of the régime for some time. They regarded economic freedom as of prime importance at present, in view of the impossibility, without it, [of] satisfying the demands of the Budget. They would like to see immediate action taken toward suspension of the economic regulations of [the] Capitulations, to which the Governments have not objected in principle. I feel, personally, that we should now meet them on this ground, as our refusal might play into the hands of the Germans.

(Signed) GIER.

No. 55.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 4 (17), 1914.*

Citing the alleged successful contest with the war party in the Cabinet, Djavid Bey yesterday expressed his assurance that the Powers of the Triple Entente could bring about a demobilisation of Turkey if they would make it conditional upon their consent to the suppression of [the] economic, as well as [the] juridical, Capitulations [*l'abrogation des capitulations tant économiques que juridiques*].

In view of the endeavour of the Turks after the retaking of Adrianople to place before Europe an accomplished fact from which they afterwards refused to recede; and in view of the fact that, without declaring war against them, the Powers at the present time have no means of exerting pressure upon them, I ask instructions, with the least possible delay,

concerning the attitude the Imperial Government would maintain toward the proposal of Djavid Bey, if it were renewed in the name of the entire Cabinet, and with a secret clause providing that the régime without Capitulations might be applied to foreigners only after the formulation of new rules effectually guaranteeing the inviolability of persons and dwellings of foreigners. (Signed) GIER.

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## No. 56.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) Petrograd, September 6 (19), 1914.

[No. 55.] Your telegram of September 4<sup>1</sup> received.

We would be ready to agree to the suppression of [the] Capitulations, with a clause providing that the new régime could be applied only upon the formulation of new rules giving sufficient guarantees, if the Ottoman Government will make a proposal covering the unconditional neutrality of Turkey; such guarantee might be furnished by demobilisation and the removal of all German military officers.

Communicated to Bordeaux and London.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

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## No. 57.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 8 (21), 1914.

To-day I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that the voyage to-day of the *Goeben*, even for a short time, into the Black Sea, did not coincide with his declaration that the Turkish fleet would not go there. I reminded him of my previous statement, that such a move might lead to incidents and results, the responsibility for which would fall upon Turkey. I did not fail to call his attention anew to the fact that the international position of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* under the Turkish flag could not be deemed correct. The Grand Vizier strove to justify himself on the score that the departure of one large vessel for target practice, alleged to be dangerous



in the Sea of Marmora, was not the departure of the fleet, and that he could only repeat the assurance that a general exit of the whole Turkish fleet would not take place.

His assertions, even if approved by the Council of Ministers, do not, however, constitute a serious guaranty, as the fleet, now in the hands of the Germans and under the immediate command of the Vice-Generalissimo Enver Pasha, can sail out even without the consent of the other Ministers.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 58.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 9 (22), 1914.*

In the face of the decision of the Council of Ministers not to despatch the fleet to the Black Sea, the German Ambassador nevertheless sent the *Breslau* there, and thereupon informed the Grand Vizier that the German vessels were only to a certain extent under Turkish control, and that they were destined to serve, not only Turkish, but principally German interests. The Ambassador, at the same time, promised that the German officers would not challenge the Russian fleet.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 59.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 9 (22), 1914.*

From information which has reached me, I conclude that the German and Austrian Ambassadors are strenuously endeavouring to arouse the Turks to action against us, but the Turks apparently fear an open rupture with us. At the same time, they fear that the fleet under the command of Germans may provoke a battle with the Russian fleet.

(Signed) GIERS.



## No. 60.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 9 (22), 1914.*

The text of a transitory law, affirmed by an irade of the Sultan, has been published, providing for the increase, beginning at midnight on September 30, new style, of customs duties to 15 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods which have heretofore borne 11 per cent., and to 12 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods that have borne 8 per cent. Articles of gold, silver and jewelry continue to be subject to the special reduced tariff now in force. Goods shipped prior to the publication of the present law will be subject to the tariff rates in force at the time they were shipped.

(Signed) GIERS.

## No. 61.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September 11 (24), 1914.*

You may confer with your colleagues as to the date subsequent to which the Porte may consider that the financial side of [the] Capitulations has lost its validity, it being desirable<sup>1</sup> to obtain a postponement of that date as far as possible.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

## No. 62.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 12 (25), 1914.*

The text of a transitory law has been published, extending the law of temettu<sup>1</sup> to foreigners engaged in mercantile business and in the crafts, and likewise to those engaged in any profession.

(Signed) GIERS.

<sup>1</sup> [See footnote, p. 129.]

## No. 63.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Identical Telegram of [the] Three Ambassadors.)\*

*Constantinople, September 12 (25), 1914.*

In another interview which we have just had—my colleagues of France and England and myself—with the Ottoman negotiator, the latter adopted a more conciliatory tone. Apparently, the Imperial Ottoman Government is better aware of the value of the consent of the Triple Entente Governments to certain modifications which it desires should be made in the capitulatory régime. Accordingly it appears disposed to give us concessions in the judiciary and penal domain of [the] Capitulations which it has abrogated with the rest, in exchange for the placing of our nationals and Ottomans upon an equal footing in fiscal matters, and for an engagement to enter into negotiations for commercial treaties with said Government, founded upon the principles of public international law, and designed to replace all commercial and customs regulations of the old treaties. As jurisdiction is that which most concerns our nationals, it guaranteeing the protection of their persons and property against arbitrary procedure, we intend to continue the negotiations so long as we can hope to secure the maintenance, as it operates to-day, of the judiciary and penal régime in force relating to foreigners, until such time as it shall have been modified with the consent of the Powers.

(Signed) GIERs.

## No. 64.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 13 (26), 1914.*

In view of the proposed stoppage of the international postal service in conjunction with the suppression of [the] Capitulations, I deem it desirable for the Ambassadors of the Entente to confine action to a joint note on October 1, new

\* Translated from the French text.

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style, if by that time we shall have arrived at no agreement with the Porte in respect to the question of [the] Capitulations.  
(Signed) GIER.

No. 65.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.)

*Petrograd, September 13 (26), 1914.*

Please inform the Ottoman Government :

\* The Russian Government confirms the protest which the Russian Ambassador submitted to the Sublime Porte on August 28 (September 10) last.<sup>1</sup> The capitulary régime having been founded upon reciprocal acts of agreement, it is not within the power of the Porte to abrogate it by unilateral action. The Imperial Government, therefore, protests against measures which the Ottoman authorities have taken, or are going to take, in violation of [the] capitulary stipulations, and declares its resolution from the present moment to demand, at the proper time, legal reparation for all damages sustained by its subjects through such action.

The Russian Government holds that it would not be true to the trustful friendship which very happily unites Russia and Turkey, did it not call the most serious attention of the Sublime Porte to the consequences of the line of political action in which it seems desirous to engage. The sympathy of Russia is at once a guaranty of tranquillity for Turkey and a most valuable promise of assistance, which it is not to the interest of Turkey to ignore.

Communicated to Bordeaux, London and Rome.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 66.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Constantinople, September 14 (27), 1914.*

According to entirely reliable information, the Austro-Hungarian Government charged its Ambassador to use every

\* Translated from the French text.



means at his disposal to call forth an action of the Turkish fleet against Russia. (Signed) GIER.

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No. 67.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 14 (27), 1914.*

A Turkish torpedo boat which had gone out into the Ægean Sea yesterday evening was stopped by a British warship which served notice that the British squadron had received orders not to permit the exit of any Turkish vessel from the Dardanelles, and to open fire in case of such an exit. The Turkish torpedo boat then returned to the Straits. The commandant of the Dardanelles, taking the British statement for a declaration of war, at once closed the Straits. (Signed) GIER.

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No. 68.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 14 (27), 1914.*

Having learned of the closing of the Dardanelles, the French and British Ambassadors and myself went at once to the Grand Vizier to protest alternately against such action.\* To our inquiry as to whether it had been done by order of the Government or upon the personal initiative of the commandant, the Grand Vizier replied that some time ago the commandant had been given general instructions to close the Straits in case of danger, and that, in this case, looking upon the British statement as a danger, he had deemed it his right to take such a step without apprising the Porte. I counselled the Grand Vizier not to uphold this decision of the commandant, and to take immediate steps to have the Straits opened. The Council of Ministers is considering the question at the present moment. In conversation with

\* [In the French text: '... nous nous sommes empressés, les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre et moi, de nous rendre successivement chez le Grand-Vizir pour protester contre cette mesure.']

me, the Grand Vizier complained that the British measures had first been made known in the Dardanelles, and affirmed to him only in a subsequent note of the British Ambassador, and in his opinion it was contrary to the previous declaration of England in which only the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were forbidden to enter the Ægean Sea. I told Saïd Halim that the Porte must shoulder the blame, as German officers had also been admitted to other vessels. (Signed) GIERs.

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No. 69.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 15 (28), 1914.*

Yesterday the Grand Vizier requested the British Ambassador to withdraw the British squadron to some distance from its alleged position at the very entrance of the Dardanelles, promising, in the event of compliance, that he would at once open the Straits. Sir Louis Mallet transmitted this request to London. It is of the highest importance to us that if a withdrawal of the British squadron to some distance is deemed admissible, the latter shall take place only upon the absolute condition of the admission of all decisive measures necessary to preclude the possibility of the entrance of any ship of an enemy into the Dardanelles. (Signed) GIERs.

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No. 70.

*Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, September 17 (30), 1914.*

The French Ambassador at Constantinople telegraphs that as a result of the subordination of the Turkish fleet to German command, the British Government has decided not to permit the exit of Turkish vessels into the Ægean Sea. After the British sentry-ship [*bateau-vedette*] stopped a Turkish torpedo-boat destroyer which was issuing from the Dardanelles, and gave notice of the decision, the commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits to navigation. In



response to the protest of the three Ambassadors, the Ottoman Council of Ministers stated that the Dardanelles would be opened if the British squadron were removed to Lemnos.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 71.

*Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, September 18 (October 1), 1914.*

The French Ambassador at London telegraphs that the British Government does not consider it possible to withdraw its ships to Lemnos, which would render it impossible to keep watch over sailings out of the Dardanelles.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 72.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 17 (30), 1914.*

Beginning to-morrow, our post-offices and those of Great Britain, in Turkey, will discontinue the receipt and delivery of mails, as has been done with the Italian, Austro-Hungarian and German offices. The British Ambassador and I will make protest against the single-handed decree [*décision unilatérale*] of the Porte, independent of the general protest which will be made in its turn.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 73.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 18 (October 1), 1914.*

Agreeably with my instructions, given in good time [*une disposition que j'avais prise d'avance*], our post-offices did not open to-day, and all moneys and mail matter remaining in the office sub-stations were delivered yesterday evening to our nearest Consular offices for safe keeping. The French and British Ambassadors and myself, in an identical note,



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protested against the one-sided decision of the Porte relative to closing the foreign mails. (Signed GIER.

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### No. 74.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 18 (October 1), 1914.*

Yesterday and to-day the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Halil Bey, came to me to negotiate relative to suppression of [the] Capitulations. As his own hypothesis [*son avis personnel*], he suggested that, upon our agreement to allow Turkey economic freedom, the Council of Ministers might instruct the administrative and judiciary authorities to withhold temporarily the execution of the irade for the suppression of [the] juridical Capitulations, and at such a time, he, Halil Bey, would organise a commission to formulate such a régime as might satisfy us. The French and British Ambassadors assenting, I answered him that our agreement to accord economic freedom to Turkey depended directly upon the preservation of [the] juridical Capitulations henceforth until the institution of an order of things that might be recognised by us as sufficiently guaranteeing the protection of the interests of our subjects. To-day Halil Bey informed me that he had succeeded in inducing the Porte to accept his proposal, and alleged that, upon his insistence, secret instructions had been sent to each Vali and judiciary institution not to put in effect the law suppressing [the] juridical Capitulations. Halil Bey proposes to invite Europeans now in the Turkish service to join the commission. There is but little hope, however, that the work of a commission, if one should be assembled, will lead to any favourable result. (Signed) GIER.

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### No. 75.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 19 (October 2), 1914.*

From absolutely reliable sources I learn that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared to the Grand Vizier that Turkey ought now to proceed against Russia. The Grand

Vizier replied that Turkey was ready to proceed, but did not know in what direction action should begin: whereupon, the Ambassador pointed out that the fleet should be used, its first task being to exert pressure upon Bulgaria and Roumania. This end might be attained by destroying the Russian fleet, or, if it should shun fight, by establishing Turkish domination of the Black Sea. The Grand Vizier objected that Constantinople would be in peril in case the Turkish fleet suffered in a battle with the Russians. (Signed) GIER.

No. 76.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 20 (October 3), 1914.*

The general situation in Constantinople for the past few weeks has developed itself in one direction—increased preparation of Turkey for war. The appearance of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* completely turned the heads of the Turks, a fact of which the Germans and Austrians were not slow to take advantage, finally to win Turkey over to their side. As you already know through my telegram of August 27,\* even a treaty was concluded between them.<sup>1</sup> Since that time, the Minister of War, appointed generalissimo of the army and navy, completely turned them over, the one as well as the other, to German hands. Turkey overflowed with German officers, men, weapons and ammunition. The Germans began with increased activity to prepare her for war with all the Powers of the Entente, fortifying the Straits and creating difficulties for all of us on the frontiers. The turning of all Turkey into an armed camp also had its effect upon the relations between the civil authorities and foreigners, and the duties involving upon the Ambassadors and Consuls to protect the interests of foreign subjects became very onerous. The increasingly bad situation of the Germans in the theatre of war to some extent sobered the more moderate Ministers, and they are apparently beginning to oppose the efforts of the Germans immediately to drag Turkey into hostilities. A struggle is on in the Council of Ministers between the con-

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. No. 46.]

\* [The French text mentions no date, but reads 'vous savez par mes télégrammes,' etc.]



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servative party and Enver, sometimes supported by Talaat Bey—a struggle wavering continually according to the tenor of the news received from the seat of war. In the country, which is without doubt being plundered for war purposes, great dissatisfaction is arising, and in the army discontent is growing against the German hegemony. But there is no one with energy enough to head the movement. This alarming uncertainty of the situation may continue until we shall have achieved complete success in the war, when the present Ministers will have the hardihood to liberate themselves from Enver and from the Germans. But the most probable outcome is that the Germans themselves will create an incident to precipitate Turkey into war. (Signed) GIER.

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No. 77.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, September 20 (October 3), 1914.*

According to reliable information I have received, the Porte has decided to abolish the Lebanon privileges at a very early date. (Signed) GIER.

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No. 78.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, September 21 (October 4), 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> [No. 77.  
Reply, No.  
81.]

Your telegram of September 20 <sup>1</sup> received.

Please support the insistence of the French Ambassador upon the preservation of the Lebanon statute.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

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No. 79.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Despatch.) *Constantinople, September 22 (October 5), 1914.*

A month ago the British Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, returned to Constantinople.



Shortly after his arrival, Sir Louis solicited an audience with His Majesty the Sultan. His Majesty gave the Ambassador an extraordinarily amiable reception<sup>1</sup> and told him Turkey desired to observe strict neutrality and did not cherish the slightest unfriendly design against any of the Foreign Powers, and that the German crews brought with the war vessels obtained from Germany might be sent away within a few days.

In response to this conciliatory declaration, Sir Louis Mallet, in his turn, informed His Majesty that he was authorised to state that at the close of the war the Government of Great Britain would return to Turkey the two Dreadnoughts which it has under detention.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 80.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Despatch.<sup>2</sup>) *Constantinople, September 22 (October 5), 1914.*

General mobilisation in Turkey, and the placing of the whole country upon a war footing [have] had the direct result of a transfer of authority from the civil officials to the hands of the military. This situation heavily taxed the energies of our Consular officers in the Ottoman Empire. Governmental requisitions called forth by mobilisation and carried out without regard to orderly procedure, and in violation of the rights of foreign subjects in Turkey, necessarily compelled the special attention of Consuls, and aroused them to action in defence of the victims. Protests which they made to the local civil authorities were of no avail, for the latter pointed out that all such measures were taken by order of the military authorities. These paid no attention whatever to the protests of the Consuls.

The suppression of [the] Capitulations by the single-handed decision of the Porte dealt a still heavier blow to the activities of Consuls in defence of their compatriots, making it impossible for them to give the latter direct protection and defend them from the uncurbed acts [*le régime arbitraire*] of the Turkish authorities.

<sup>1</sup> [See ante pp. 152-6.]

<sup>2</sup> ['Télégramme', the French version.]

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Under such conditions the activities of our Consuls in the matter of protecting the rights and interests of our subjects hardly amount to more than fruitless protests ; to the registration of cases of violation of rights and interests of their compatriots and reporting the same to the Imperial Embassy, so that, at the close of the war, when we will have to enter into negotiations with Turkey, there will be sufficient material in our hands to make a suitable showing for our demands upon the Porte [*pour présenter à la Porte des réclamations que ces cas comportent*].

Unfortunately it is only upon rare occasions that the Embassy itself succeeds in securing the restoration of rights of our subjects, for, admitting the readiness of the Grand Vizier upon some occasions to satisfy our demands, it must be noted that his orders have seldom, and not very scrupulously at that, been obeyed by the local authorities.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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### No. 81.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 22 (October 5), 1914.

<sup>1</sup> [No. 78.]

Your telegram of September 21<sup>1</sup> received.

The Ambassadors of the Entente Powers yesterday presented an identical note to the Porte relative to the necessity of preserving the Lebanon statutes. (Signed) GIER.S.

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### No. 82.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 26 (October 9), 1914.

An official German institution is in public operation here under the name of 'Station administration' (Etappen-Kommando), for making requisitions on foreign goods. On some receipts issued there is a mark indicating that the goods are requisitioned 'for the German Government.' At the head of the administration is a German naval officer, former commander of the German station ship [*stationnaire*]. There



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were two cases of seizure of cargoes belonging to Russian subjects. I made the proper protest to the Porte.

(Signed) GIERS.

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## No. 83.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 23 (October 6), 1914.

I learn through reliable sources that yesterday the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador advised the Grand Vizier that the allied German and Austrian Governments deem that the time has arrived for hostile action against us, and that the Turkish fleet should now be attacking the Black Sea coast. The Grand Vizier is alleged to have answered in an evasive manner, expressing the opinion that action by the fleet cannot have decisive results in the present state of affairs.

(Signed) GIERS.

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## No. 84.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 28 (October 11), 1914.

The Porte has decided to promulgate at an early date a law for the subjection of all foreign schools, whether secular or clerical, to governmental control. I will protest conjointly with the French and British Ambassadors.

(Signed) GIERS.

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## No. 85.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Constantinople, September 30 (October 13), 1914.

Through reliable sources I am informed that the Germans ordered and have already received ten Russian and ten Roumanian war flags for the Goeben. (Signed) GIERS.

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## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

### No. 86.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 2 (15), 1914.*

It has been transmitted to me from entirely reliable sources that the Grand Vizier, in answer to the insistent demand of the German and Austrian Ambassadors for prompt war moves against us, stated that the only obstacle to such a step was the difficult financial situation.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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### No. 87.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 3 (16), 1914.*

I learned from an authentic source that on September 28 (October 11), a meeting took place at the German Ambassador's, in which Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey took part. A special document even was signed, by virtue of which Turkey obligated herself to open hostilities against us upon receipt of a financial subsidy from Germany. The first instalment of the latter has been received.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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### No. 88.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 5 (18), 1914.*

According to reliable information which has reached me, another remittance of the money promised to Turkey for the attack she has obligated herself to make upon Russia will arrive in Constantinople from Germany on October 8. Thereupon, Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey will demand to know of the Grand Vizier whether he approves of immediate action, and, if not, they will demand his removal.

(Signed) GIER.S.

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## SECOND RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

No. 89.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 7 (20), 1914.*

In a few days entirely possible attack of Turkey upon us  
in connection with receipt by her of gold from Germany.

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 90.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 16 (29), 1914.*

In view of the receipt of private reports by telegraph  
alleging that Turkish torpedo boats sunk several vessels at  
Odessa, my French and British colleagues and myself offer  
to our Governments the suggestion that they declare to the  
Porte that it can take the choice between an immediate break-  
ing off of relations with us, or the immediate removal from  
Turkey of all German officers, as well as of the mission of  
Liman von Sanders, and of the navy.\*

(Signed) GIERS.

No. 91.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador  
at Constantinople.*

(Telegram.) *Petrograd, October 16 (29), 1914.*

The Turks opened hostilities against the unfortified port  
of Theodosia and the gunboat stationed at the port of Odessa.

Consequently, you will please take steps for the departure  
of our Consular officers, placing the protection of our interests  
in the hands of the Italian Ambassador.

In this connection you will inform the Porte that as a  
result of the said hostilities, you have been ordered to leave  
Constantinople with all of your subordinate officers.

Communicated to Bordeaux, London, Nish, Sofia, Bukarest,  
Rome, Athens and Cettinje. (Signed) SAZONOF.

\* [The French text reads 'aussi bien la mission de Liman von Sanders  
que les marins.']

## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 92.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 17 (30), 1914.*

Your telegram received at 3 o'clock in the night ; will carry out your instructions in the morning.

(Signed) GIER.

No. 93.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 17 (30), 1914.*

Urgent.—Reporting himself ill, the Grand Vizier could not receive me. I carried out your instructions by letter.

(Signed) GIER.

No. 94.

*Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Constantinople, October 17 (30), 1914.*

Urgent.—Just now I saw the Grand Vizier, who expressed to me his poignant regret for the attack of the Turkish fleet, affirming that it was entirely contrary to the orders of the Porte. He assured me that he would be able to set the Germans straight. To my answer that I had been instructed to leave and would have to obey orders, he responded that, understanding this, he would nevertheless address Petrograd directly in the hope of settling the affair. It is not his good will, but his authority, that I doubt, and I believe his fall, and that of Djavid Bey, are not far distant.

(Signed) GIER.

No. 95.

*Russian Ambassador at Bordeaux to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Bordeaux, October 17 (30), 1914.*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that as late as yesterday, upon receipt of news from the French Consul at



Odessa telling of the attack upon us by the Turks, he had reaffirmed his instructions to M. Bompard to act in co-operation with his Russian and British colleagues.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 96.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) London, October 18 (31), 1914.

Mr. [Sir Arthur] Nicolson told me that, according to the latest telegrams from Sir L. Mallet, M. Giers had demanded his passports, as did also the French and British \* Ambassadors, and they are leaving Constantinople.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 97.

*Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Bordeaux and London.*

(Telegram.) Petrograd, October 19 (November 1), 1914.

The Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires read to me the following telegram from the Grand Vizier—

‘Convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs our infinite regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the Russian fleet, has compromised the friendly relations between the two countries.

‘You may assure the Imperial Russian Government that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give an appropriate solution to this question, and that it will adopt all means necessary to prevent the possible recurrence of similar events.

‘You may at once declare to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we have decided not to allow the Imperial fleet further passage into the Black Sea, and that we hope that the Russian fleet, on its part, will not further come to cruise in our waters.

‘I have the firm hope that the Imperial Russian Govern-

\* [So in the Russian and French texts. The English version has ‘Italian’ instead of ‘British,’ an obvious error.]

ment will show in this affair the same conciliatory spirit that we do, in the common interest of both countries.' \*

I replied to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that I categorically denied that the hostile initiative was taken by our fleet. Further, that I feared that it is now too late, anyhow, to make any sort of negotiations. If Turkey had announced the immediate expulsion of all German soldiers and sailors, it might then still have been possible to enter into negotiations looking to reparation for the treacherous attack upon our coast and the damages caused thereby. I added that the communication presented by him in nowise affected the situation that had arisen.

Fahreddin Bey will receive his passports for departure to-morrow. (Signed) SAZONOF.

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No. 98.

*Russian Ambassador to Turkey to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Despatch.) *Petrograd, October 31 (November 13), 1914.*

Persistently pursuing their purpose of dragging Turkey into war with Russia, in the hope that, calculating upon the expected rising of our Mussulmans, they could strike us a severe blow in the Caucasus and draw off a part of our army from our western front, the Germans and Austrians exerted every effort to compel the Ottoman Government to adopt a line of action finally leading to war with us, and, consequently, with all the Powers of the Triple Entente.

The solemn and repeated declarations of the Porte of its decision to observe strict neutrality during the European war, and simultaneously an increased general mobilisation ; the permission of the German war vessels *Goeben* and *Breslau* to pass through the Straits, and notwithstanding all promises and assurances to the contrary, the leaving on them of German officers and crews ; the admission of German soldiers into the ranks of the Turkish army ; the movement of Turkish troops to our own and the British frontiers, and the demonstrative appearance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea—in all these it is impossible not to perceive measures plainly directed

\* Translated from the French text.



at the Powers of the Entente, in the hope of calling forth from them hostile action against Turkey. Notwithstanding this, the diplomatic representatives at Constantinople of the Triple Entente directed every exertion toward restraining Turkey from taking any rash step, and raised energetic protests at the time, against any unlawful measures taken by the Porte.

On the other hand, even in the midst of the Ottoman Government circles disputes arose between parties; those falling under the influence of Germany and having profound faith in her ultimate victory, and the more moderate members who deemed it necessary to maintain a waiting attitude pending developments in the theatre of war.

Notwithstanding all of the persuasions, promises and even threats of Germany, the same indeterminate situation might have been maintained for some time, had it not been for the culminating stroke, delivered, as might have been expected, by the Germans themselves.

On the 16th (29th) of October, rumours were circulated in Constantinople of an alleged encounter between the Russian and Turkish fleets in the Black Sea. The source of these rumours was apparently a telegram from the *Vestnik* (*Official Messenger*), which, however, was not transmitted to me by the Turkish authorities.

I received the first authentic information of it through the dragoman of the Grand Vizier, sent to me in haste by the latter in order to verify the news, which he did not wish to believe. I was not in a position to communicate anything to him in the matter, although it was hard to doubt the possibility of a collision coming as a natural result of the political situation that had arisen. Shortly afterward my British colleague informed me of a telegram he had received relative to the bombardment of Odessa by Turkish torpedo-boats.

Anticipating an inevitable rupture of our relations with Turkey, I at once communicated the incident to Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador, and requested him to prepare to take measures, at the proper time, for the protection of our Consuls in Turkey. I did not doubt that the Embassy would get out safely, but was much concerned about the fate of our Consular representatives.

At 3 o'clock in the night I received a telegram from Your Excellency<sup>1</sup> instructing me, on account of an attack made<sup>1</sup> [No. 9



upon our Black Sea coast by the Turkish fleet, to leave Turkey with all Embassy and Consular officials, and the same night I communicated the matter to my French and British colleagues. At the same time, circulars of instruction were prepared and sent to Consuls, which, however, evidently were not forwarded to them, for on the next day the Embassy received the usual telegrams from them relating to current business which proved that they had not received my instructions.

On the morning of October 17 (30), I telephoned to the Grand Vizier asking him to appoint a time when he could receive me. Prince Saïd Halim responded that he regretted to say that because of illness he could not receive me. Thereupon I sent him an official note in which I gave a brief synopsis of the telegram I had received. In a private letter enclosed with the note, I expressed my regret at leaving Constantinople without bidding him adieu, and requesting the Grand Vizier to give me my passports and to take measures to facilitate the unhindered departure of our Embassy and Consuls from Turkish territory.

The Ambassadors of France and Great Britain wrote to the Grand Vizier in the same spirit.

The Grand Vizier requested me to come and see him at Yenikeui at three o'clock in the afternoon.

I found the British Ambassador with him, and he was present during the greater part of our interview. Leading me to an adjoining room, the Grand Vizier began to assure me that neither he nor the Government desired war; that his position was becoming stronger every day, and he begged me to help him realise his sincere desire not to allow matters to arrive at a rupture between us. I reminded him that for three months past I had admonished him and Talaat Bey of the danger threatening Turkey from the Germans, and had also warned them that the patience of Russia might, and must, reach a limit. That limit had now been reached, and I was now obliged, by reason of instructions received, to leave Turkey. I added that the Grand Vizier could at any time bring his requests to the attention of the Imperial Government through one or the other channel of communication [*par telle voie qu'il lui plairait*].

Prince Saïd Halim expressed his intention of telegraphing at once to Fahreddin to convey to the Imperial Govern-

ment his deepest regret at what had occurred. In taking leave, I again requested Saïd Halim to give his especial attention to the safety of our Consuls, whose fate would determine our attitude toward the Ottoman representatives in Russia. The Grand Vizier promised that the departure of the Embassy, as well as of the Consuls, should take place under the most favourable conditions.

On leaving the Grand Vizier, I met the Ministers in the reception-room, gathering for a council, after which, in the evening, there was to be a joint conference between the Cabinet and a committee of the 'Party of Union and Progress.' Djavid Bey, with whom I conferred for a few minutes, assured me that he was quite aware of the consequences which would follow a war with Russia; that he would use all means to prevent it, but that in case his efforts proved to be in vain, he would prefer to retire.

After me, Sir L. Mallet again went in to the Grand Vizier, and he was followed by M. Bompard.

I then went to the Italian Ambassador and requested him to secure a special train for us for Saturday evening. Marquis Garroni also availed himself of the opportunity, during his interview with Talaat Bey, to call his attention to the fact that Ottoman Consuls in Russia would be accorded the same treatment as Russian Consuls in Turkey. Talaat Bey again mentioned the arrests of the dragoman and imaum of the Ottoman Consulate at Batoum, and added that had it not been for this occurrence he might have shared our point of view, but he was now compelled first to inquire into the fate of Turkish Consuls in Russia.

Marquis Garroni then renewed his proposal to him that the Ottoman interests of Russia be confided to the care of Italy. In the event of such an arrangement, the Italian Embassies at Petrograd and Constantinople might be able conjointly to perfect plans for the return of Consuls to their native countries, to the satisfaction of both sides.

On October 18 (31), at 7.15 o'clock in the evening, occurred, under quite favourable conditions, the departure of the Imperial Embassy, the Consulate General and a majority of the members of the Russian colony, altogether about one hundred people.

(Signed) GIERS.



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

## APPENDIX.

SPEECH OF M. SAZONOF, RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE DUMA OF THE EMPIRE ON THE 27TH OF JANUARY (FEB. 9) 1915.

*Gentlemen, Members of the Imperial Duma :*

In view of the gravity of the historic times through which we are passing, I deemed it my duty to ask the consent of His Imperial Majesty to lay before you a general view of the present political situation.

Six months have passed since the time when, turning to you from this tribunal,<sup>1</sup> I pointed out why Russia, in the face of the gross attempts of Austria and Germany upon the independence of Serbia and Belgium, could not take any other course than the one she did take, standing up for rights that had been trampled upon.

<sup>1</sup> [See *ante*,  
p. 52.]

Summoned by her great-hearted Emperor to follow this, the only course worthy of her, Russia arose as one man, without any hesitation whatsoever, and, trusting to Providence, took up arms against the enemy who had forced war upon her. The government and the people, moved by one feeling and with a common consciousness of their great responsibility to their native land, acted in unison and with full accord ; and you, the representatives of the people, marked these historic times by the rare harmony with which, in burning words, you gave proof here of your oneness with the Government. (Cries of 'Bravo ! Bravo !')

But closely allied Russia did not stand alone, for our partisans, France and England, came forth with her, and they were soon joined by Japan.

During the past six months our brave troops, under the leadership of their Supreme Commander, have unceasingly performed prodigies of valour, weaving new laurels into the unfading garland of glory of the Russian arms. (Cries of 'Bravo ! Bravo !') Hand in hand with our Allies, our soldiers march forward with firm tread toward their goal, while we, proud of their valour and striving to aid them in the fulfilment of their hard task, await with tranquillity the hour of their final triumph.

Our antagonist, deceived by the hope of a quick and easy victory, continues to offer bloody sacrifices on the field of



battle, bending every effort and using every expedient to cope with us. To that end he scorns no means, and stops neither at the deliberate distortion of the truth nor at the most unfair and underhanded intrigues. (Exclamations: 'True! Right!')

First of all, in order to justify itself in the eyes of its own people for the heedless manner in which it brought on the war, the German Government shows all eagerness to mislead public opinion, declaring, contrary to the facts, that war was thrust upon Germany. Once more the old fable has been repeated, pretending that Germany, from the time of King Edward VII., was threatened with danger by a cordon of enemies. Meanwhile the peace-loving character of that wise monarch was known to all the world. The excessive thirst for power of the governmental circles in Berlin was long apparent to him, and he knew that only a *rapprochement* of Powers who were bound by a community of peaceful interests could give stability to the political balance in Europe. Agreements concluded or prepared by him had therefore only the object of defence in view. Germany's work, carried on with still more persistence during the past few years, had an entirely different purpose. I will not here touch upon her strenuous efforts to outstrip England in naval power, in which Germany rejected all overtures of Great Britain to come to an understanding covering that ground. Neither will I touch upon the continual encroachments upon the interests of France, as, for example, in the celebrated affair of Agadir; nor upon the thinly veiled ambition of Germany to subjugate the neighbouring neutral governments to her own will. But I will recall to you a series of signs which plainly enough betrayed the hostile attitude of Germany toward Russia. At the time when we, true to the traditions of centuries, were honestly maintaining the attitude of a good neighbour, we came to encounter, more and more, the opposition of Germany. As though actuated by a general prescription, German diplomacy began to work against us in the countries contiguous to us, and especially in those to whom we were bound by the most essential interests. At first this work was carried on guardedly enough, but it afterward grew more open. In the Scandinavian dominions distrust of Russia was instilled by Germans and their satel-

lites, in the hope of damaging our friendly relations with neighbouring nations.

In Galicia the so-called Ukraine movement was fostered with funds from Berlin for the purpose of carrying schism into the very heart of the undivided Russian people there.

In Rumania, German influence for years lay like a shadow upon the perception by our co-religionists of the interests binding us together: economic interests growing out of contiguity, and those of a political nature arising from the fact that so large a portion of our race was under the Austro-Hungarian yoke. Every effort is made to bring under German influence even Bulgaria, to whom we are especially bound by historic ties.

But most patent of all was the German intrigue with Turkey against Russia. I hardly need to remind you of how, the day after apparently trustworthy explanations were made to me in Berlin, the German Government tried to place before us the accomplished fact of the usurpation by German officers of the military authority at the Ottoman capital. From that hour the definitive enslavement of Turkey by Germany advanced with hastening strides. But I will reserve a more detailed reference to this matter until later; I only desire here to emphasise with what persistence Germany tried to enmesh us in the network of her political intrigues along our European frontiers; and the same in Asia.

In Persia, in plain violation of the spirit of the Potsdam agreement\* and of the solemn promises given us in connection therewith, the German agents committed themselves to increased activities in creating all sorts of difficulties for the pre-eminent Russian and British interests in that domain. We see the same sort of German intrigues in China and Japan, where Germany exerted every effort to arouse those realms against us—happily in vain.

That which has been said is enough to answer the question: Is there not more reason to speak of the attempted investment of Russia by Germany than to complain of the imaginary investment of Germany by the Triple Entente?

It is plain that all assertions of Germany to the effect that

\* [The 'Potsdam agreement' was the Agreement between Germany and Russia with reference to Affairs in Persia, signed at St. Petersburg, Aug. 19, 1911. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 105, p. 657.]



the war was not begun with her will have no foundation in fact, as authentic documents recently published furnish abundant evidence to the contrary.

To the list of calumnious stories which have been circulated by Germany with evil intent must also be added the accounts of alleged pogroms against the Jews, and wholesale murders of the Jewish population, by the Russian armies. I use the tribunal of the Duma absolutely to refute that slander. If the Jewish population suffered in the war zone, that circumstance unfortunately was inevitably associated with war, and the same condition applied in equal measure to all people living within the region of military activity. As for that, eye-witnesses agree in declaring that the worst ravages, as, for example, in our Polish districts and in Belgium and in Serbia, were the work of Austrian and German hands.

With particular assiduity the same slander is scattered broadcast from German official sources, with the evident purpose of arousing hostile sentiment against us in the United States of North America. But the sound common sense of the Americans will not allow them to be misled by such gross deception. I hope that our amicable relations with America will suffer no injury through German intrigue.

But there is still another purpose of Germany's contest with us, about which I consider it not out of place to speak a few words to you. That is its endeavours to bring about divergence of opinion, or even estrangement, among the Allies. To this end false reports are circulated ; first, of the alleged intention of one or the other of the Allies to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace ; then, of the unequal distribution of the war burden among the Allies. These fabrications find no acceptance anywhere. In Russia every one very well knows that our union with the Allies is unshakable, and that it grows closer every day. (Prolonged applause from all benches.)

Bound by common interest, we march to one goal—the crushing of the enemy's military power, to bring about an order of things which may allow Europe henceforth to enjoy the blessings of a lasting peace. (Prolonged applause from all benches.) The Allies are indissolubly bound together, and that bond was solemnly confirmed by the London agreement of August 23<sup>1</sup> of last year.

<sup>1</sup> [Sept 5  
New Style.  
See *Diplo-  
matic*, 2,  
p. 506.]



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To our common task each one of us puts forth his full strength. Our Allies paid the tribute of wonder to the efforts of Russia, who sent forth innumerable troops to the war and is successfully battling with three empires along a front of enormous extent. We, on our part, set an extremely high value upon the unexampled valour shown by our Allies, and we clearly realise the essential significance of their co-operation with us on land and sea. (Prolonged applause. Shouts of 'Bravo!')

I cannot forbear mentioning also the service given to the common cause by heroic Belgium, who by her sufferings and great deeds gained for herself immortal glory. (Applause from all benches.)

I am glad to take this occasion, here among the representatives of the Russian people, to express to our Allies our heartfelt gratitude for their sincere and effective co-operation. (Deputies arise from their seats and join in ovations to the French and British Ambassadors.)

Our present close union with them has a value which will reach far beyond the bounds of to-day.

Our reciprocal work in the domain of politics and war has been broadened in these days by new agreements of a financial and economic character. The significance of these agreements in their bearing upon the successful accomplishment of the difficult tasks before us will, of course, not escape your attention. The fully prepared result thereof is that Russia, as well as her Allies, organised the matter of their struggle with Germany in accordance with their unalterable resolution to carry it to a finish. (Voices: 'Bravo!' General applause.)

<sup>2</sup> [*ante*, pp. 241-99.]

From the recently published Orange Book <sup>2</sup> you were enabled to learn the details of the happenings on the Bosphorus preceding our war with Turkey. I must also emphasise here the treacherous rôle played therein by Germany.

Having invited into its service German instructors and thereafter the military commission of General von Sanders, the Turkish Government, of course, intended only to put its army on a stronger war footing, and to better secure itself against the 'Russian peril,' about which it had heard so many assiduous whisperings from Berlin. But Germany took advantage of its intromission into the Turkish army

gradually to turn it into a tool for its own political designs. The admittance of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into Turkish waters delivered Turkey definitely into the hands of Germany.

The actions of Turkey from the time of the *Goeben's* appearance in the Dardanelles must be regarded as having been effected by pressure from the German Government. The efforts of the Ottoman Government to relieve itself of responsibility for the attack made upon our shores could no longer serve to stay Turkey upon that fatal downward course upon which she was forced by Germany. I hope that occurrences on the Russo-Turkish frontier will open the eyes of the Turks and help them to realise that Germany's guardianship irresistibly leads to their destruction. These occurrences not only crowned our arms with fresh glory, but will hasten the hour of the solution of economic and political problems connected with Russia's free outlet to an open sea. (Cries of 'Bravo!' and vigorous applause from all benches.)

As you may convince yourselves by the documents submitted to you to-day concerning the introduction of reforms into Armenia, the Imperial Government during recent years has untiringly striven to alleviate the lot of Turkish Armenians, guided by the covenant of disinterested Russian statecraft as well as by the interests of our Empire. When they were convinced in Berlin of our inflexible design of effecting a reorganisation in Armenia, German diplomacy showed a readiness to share our labours, with a hidden motive to delay their proper inauguration. The Russo-Turkish agreement of January 26,<sup>1</sup> 1914, is a historic document, in signing which the Porte acknowledged our exceptional standing relative to the Armenian question.\* At the close of the war this exceptional standing will be utilised by the Imperial Government in a manner benevolent to the Armenian population. (Voices: 'Bravo!')

<sup>1</sup> [Feb. 8, New Style.]

Having unsheathed her sword in defence of Serbia, Russia was true to her traditional sentiments toward the sister nation. Only the present war gave us a true idea of the greatness of the Serbian spirit and welded the Russian

\* [The text of this agreement is to be found in the Russian Orange Book containing Diplomatic Documents on Reforms in Armenia, 26th November 1912—10th May 1914 (Old Style): Petrograd, 1915.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

nation to the Serbian with close bonds. (Voices: 'Bravo!' Applause.)

With a feeling of satisfaction I can speak of Montenegro, manfully battling with us for the common Slavic cause. (Applause.)

Our relations with Greece, a true and tried friend of our ally Serbia, are of the most cordial character. The efforts of the Hellenic people to put an end to the sufferings of their brethren who are still under the yoke of Turkey cannot but call forth the sympathy of the Imperial Government.

Relations with the Rumanian kingdom preserved the friendly character which they acquired after the visit of His Imperial Majesty to Constanza last June. The continuous manifestations sympathetic to Russia which took place during the whole autumn at the capital of Rumania itself, as well as in different parts of the country, emphasised at the same time the hostile feeling of the Rumanian people toward Austria-Hungary. (Cries of 'Bravo!')

Gentlemen, you probably expect from me an answer to the question which now occupies the minds of all, namely, what is the attitude toward the present war of those countries who are not at war, but whose interests, it would seem, should long ago have induced them to enter the struggle alongside of Russia and her Allies? Indeed, in those countries public opinion, sensitive to everything which is incorporated in the national ideal, long since expressed itself in that sense. But you will understand that I cannot touch more specifically upon this question in view of the fact that the Governments of those countries with whom we have friendly relations apparently have not yet arrived at a final decision. But it behoves them to give such decision, for they alone will be responsible to their fellow-countrymen if they fail to utilise the opportunity to effect the realisation of the long-felt national aspirations. (Movement. Cries of 'True! True!' Applause.)

Referring to the subject of non-warring countries, I cannot fail to remark, with sincere gratitude, upon the services rendered us by Spain and Italy, who took upon themselves the task, which was not a light one, of protecting our fellow-countrymen in countries hostile to us. (Applause.)

Nor can I forbear to speak of the care taken of Russian wayfarers in Sweden, through which lay the path of those

unfortunate victims of German violence. (Applause.) To this cordial treatment by the Swedes, all those returning Russians can bear witness, and I hope that it will serve as an additional reason for cementing our good-neighbourly relations, the development and strengthening of which we, upon our part, sincerely desire. (Applause.)

Regarding our fellow-countrymen now detained in Germany and Austria, I deem it my duty to assure you that the Imperial Government is taking all measures for the alleviation of their lot, and, wherever possible, for their return to their native land.

With regard to our prisoners of war : the Russian Government has undertaken steps for the betterment of their condition, and was among the first to respond to the humane suggestion of Pope Benedict xv. of the return, upon the basis of exchange, at least of those of our soldiers who are unfit for military duty, and whose retention in prison would simply be a cruel mental torture to them. It only remains to be hoped that the great-hearted suggestions of the Pope will be accepted by all warring Powers.

Before the outbreak of the war with Turkey we succeeded, though not without difficulty, in concluding the task, begun in the autumn of 1913, of fixing the Turko-Persian boundary from the Persian Gulf to Ararat, and thereby put an end to a dispute centuries old between Turkey and Persia, always threatening serious complications. Thanks to the labours of the arbitral powers, England and Russia, about 20,000 square versts\* of Persian territory was restored to Persia, to which Turkey had without any right laid claim, and part of which she had seized.

At the beginning of the hostilities with Turkey the Shah's Government hastened to announce its intention to observe strict neutrality. That, however, did not deter the representatives of Germany, Austria, and Turkey from starting an increased agitation in Persia in the hope of winning the Persians over to their side. With this end in view, appeals purporting to emanate from the supreme head of the Shiite clergy in Nedjef and Kerbel were sent broadcast, calling upon the Persians to join in a Holy War against Russia and England ; false accounts were given of German, Austrian, and Turkish victories, and suggestions made to Persians that the oppor-

\* About 8,800 English square miles.



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tune moment had arrived to repudiate Anglo-Russian claims upon Persia.

These intrigues were carried on with especial persistence in Azerbaijan, where the Turks had succeeded in gaining to their side, in this manner, a portion of the local Kurdish tribes. Even before the outbreak of the war these tribes, together with Turkish Kurds, and with the participation of Turkish soldiers, opened hostilities against us in the region of Urmiah and Khoi. After the war began Turkish armies, in direct violation of Persian neutrality, crossed the Persian boundary and, reinforced by multitudinous bands of Kurds, moved upon localities where detachments of our troops were stationed, in this manner bringing Azerbaijan into the arena of the Russo-Turkish War.

It is proper to remark here that the presence of our troops in Persian territory by no means involves a violation of Persian neutrality. Our detachments were sent to that country some years ago for the definite purpose of establishing and maintaining order in districts contiguous to our possessions, of high economic importance to us; also to prevent the seizure of some of these districts by the Turks, who openly strove to create for themselves there, especially in the district of Urmiah, a convenient base for military operations against the Caucasus. The Persian Government, not having the actual power to maintain its neutrality, met the Turkish violation of the latter with protests, which, however, had no results.

I must remark with pleasure that our relations with England in the Persian affair, more than at any previous time, rest upon a basis of full mutual confidence and sincere reciprocity. (Voices: 'Bravo! Bravo!') This circumstance serves as the best pledge of the successful solution of all, and even the most complicated, problems which may in future arise in Persian matters. (Cries of 'Bravo!')

The political agreements which we concluded with Japan in 1907 and 1910 have recently given an especially clear demonstration of their value, and have borne abundant fruit. In the present war Japan is on our side, and our relations are really those of Allies. (Applause.) The war which Japan declared against Germany led to the expulsion of Germans from the waters of the Pacific Ocean, and to the transfer to Japanese hands of the base of German operation in China,

the territory of Kiao-chau. Although the agreement of August 23<sup>1</sup> did not receive the signature of the Japanese Government, still, as the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance<sup>2</sup> contains the obligation of the contracting parties not to conclude a separate peace, in the present war the German Government cannot reckon upon concluding a peace with Japan before the conclusion of one with England, and consequently with Russia and France. (Cries of 'Bravo!' Applause.) The relations established between us and Japan likewise give us the assurance that those demands which the Japanese Government has now deemed necessary to make upon China do not contain anything contrary to our interests.

Regarding our relations with China in recent times: I can point with pleasure to their further improvement. Negotiations carried on at Kiakhta between our delegates and those of China concerning Mongolia make, it is true, slow but amicable progress, and I hope that when I have occasion again to lay before you a review of our relations with foreign Powers I may be able to report to you the favourable conclusion of these negotiations, and the signing of a tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty which shall satisfy the desire of the Mongolians of Outer Mongolia to be fully independent in their internal administration. Such a treaty would guard Russia's interests in that country; and there would also remain no rancour in the minds of the Chinese.

Gentlemen, in closing let me express one desire: Half a year ago, in the terrible hour of great decisions, the Government and the people, of whom you appear as the representatives, rallied closely around the Throne and stood together united for the defence of the common Russian cause. The harmony then displayed exalted and stirred us to high endeavour. So let us henceforth work hand in hand for the accomplishment of that which has been begun, and when the hour has come to square up the account of that which has been attained by the prowess of our glorious armies, may the Government find in the national representation the same unanimous assistance in the solution of the complex political problems before it, to the good and glory of Russia! (Cries of 'Bravo! Bravo!' Prolonged applause from all benches, passing into an ovation. Members of the Duma arise from their seats and follow the Minister, with long applause.)

<sup>1</sup> [Sept. 5, N.S.; see *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 506.]

<sup>2</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 504.]



## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

### INTRODUCTORY.

[TITLE-PAGE OF OFFICIAL BELGIAN EDITION.—‘Royaume de Belgique. Correspondance Diplomatique relative à la Guerre de 1914-1915. II. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79 Boulevard St. Germain; Londres, 18 King William Street, Strand. 1915. (Prix: 0 fr. 75.)’]

This Grey Book is divided into two Parts, and the Second Part consists of twenty Sections. The First Part complete, together with Section 10 of the Second Part, was officially translated into English, printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, and published as a Blue Book, price threepence, in 1915. This official translation is here reproduced for the portions to which it relates. The remainder of the Grey Book, comprising the Table of Contents and Sections 1 to 9 and 11 to 20 inclusive, have been specially translated for *The Times Documentary History of the War*.

The official Blue Book translation, which is entitled *The Second Belgian Grey Book*, Part 1 and Part 2 (Section 10), is introduced by the following Notes:—

### PREFATORY NOTE.

The first Grey Book,<sup>1</sup> published by the Belgian Government in the month of September 1914, contains the principal documents relating to the declarations of war made to Belgium by Germany and Austria-Hungary. (August 2nd and 28th.)

The second Grey Book contains in the First Part, besides certain documents relating to the war, the correspondence on the subject of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Turkey. (November 6th.)

The Second Part contains the protests addressed by

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 1-73.]

## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

the Belgian Government to the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments, up to the 1st of May 1915, against the violations of the laws of war and of The Hague Conventions.

### NOTE TO ENGLISH EDITION.

*The translation contains only those portions of the Book which are material to the position of Great Britain, namely, the whole of the first part, and Section 10 of the second part, which deals with the accusations brought against Belgium of having concluded a military agreement with Great Britain.]*

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## FIRST PART.

No. I.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, February 22, 1913.*

SIR,—In the course of the interview which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, formerly French Minister in China and Assistant to the Director-General of Political Affairs, he questioned me on the passing of our military law, its importance, its significance, its object, and its chances of success in Parliament.

I gave a suitable reply, remarking, with all necessary reservations, that the close relations into which Great Britain had recently entered with certain Great Powers did not leave her in the same position towards us which she had formerly occupied, although the existence of a free and independent Belgium continues to be a vital necessity for her policy. Our wish is, if possible, to prevent Belgium from again becoming the battle-field of Europe, as she has been too often in the past.

I added that it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army which should be strong enough to be taken seriously and which would allow her to fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her independence and neutrality.

‘That is excellent,’ M. de Margerie replied, ‘but are not your new armaments actuated by the fear that your neutrality might be violated by France?’ ‘No,’ I replied, ‘they are no more directed against France than against Germany; they are intended to prevent any one, whoever he may be, from entering the country. M. Poincaré has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violating our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back, the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French territory, either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff thought it more expedient, to advance to meet the Imperial armies.’



‘I cannot,’ I added, ‘doubt M. Poincaré’s word. I place every trust in his statements, and I am even bound to say that in my humble opinion, and I only speak now as a private individual, it seems to me that strategically it would be more advantageous to Germany to make use of Belgium as a road whereby a blow could be struck at the heart of France not far from the capital, than it would be for the armies of the Republic to go and attack the German frontier in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. But, as I have already said, we are not relying on any balancing of probabilities; besides what may be true to-day may not be so to-morrow, since new circumstances may arise, and our sole object is to prevent, so far as our strength allows, any violation of our neutrality.’

M. de Margerie showed sustained interest in our conversation as to the defence of Belgium. I have no doubt that he will repeat what I said to those whom it concerns.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

## No. 2.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, April 2, 1914.*

SIR,—The French Ambassador this morning communicated to me in confidence a conversation which he had had quite recently with Herr von Jagow after a private dinner at which he was the guest of the latter.

During a recent absence of M. Cambon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies met the French Chargé d’Affaires at an evening party, and, a few days afterwards, the Naval Attaché, and said to them that Germany and France ought to come to an understanding as to the construction and linking-up of the railway lines which those countries proposed to build in Africa in order that these lines should not compete with one another.

M. Cambon asked the meaning of these overtures. Herr von Jagow replied that the question was still under consideration, but that he, as well as Herr Solf, thought that an understanding between the two countries and also with

England would be very useful. 'In that case,' replied the Ambassador, 'it would be necessary to invite Belgium to confer with us, for that country is building new railway lines in the Congo, and in my view it would be preferable that the conference should take place at Brussels.'

'Oh no!' replied the Secretary of State, 'for it is at the expense of Belgium that our agreement would have to be reached.'—'How would that be?'—'Do you not think that King Leopold has placed too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develop this vast domain. It is an enterprise which is beyond her financial means and her power of expansion. She will be obliged to give it up.'

M. Cambon thought this view altogether exaggerated.

Herr von Jagow did not consider himself beaten. He developed the view that only the Great Powers are in a condition to colonize. He disclosed even what was at the bottom of his mind, arguing that in the transformation which was going on in Europe to the advantage of the strongest nationalities, as a result of the development of economic forces and means of communication, small States could no longer lead the independent existence which they had enjoyed up to the present. They were destined to disappear or to gravitate into the orbit of the Great Powers.

M. Cambon replied that these views were by no means those of France, nor, as far as he knew, those of Great Britain; that he still thought that certain agreements were necessary for the proper development of Africa, but that on the conditions set out by Herr von Jagow no understanding was possible.

On receiving this reply Herr von Jagow hastened to say that he had only expressed his personal views and that he had only spoken in his private capacity and not as Secretary of State addressing the French Ambassador.

M. Cambon, none the less, takes a very serious view of the opinions which Herr von Jagow did not hesitate to disclose in this conversation. He thought that it was in our interest to know the views with which the official who directs the German policy is animated in respect to small States and their colonies.



I thanked the Ambassador for his confidential communication. You will certainly appreciate its full gravity.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

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No. 3.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to lay before you the information which I have been able to collect on the question of the relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Ten days ago the attitude at the Ballplatz was very warlike. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and his principal advisers used very aggressive language. They appeared determined to give to the *démarche* about to be made at Belgrade a very energetic character and, foreseeing a refusal on the part of the Serbian Government to submit to all the conditions which were to be imposed, they showed no hesitation in admitting the necessity for armed intervention. Already the numbers of the eight army corps to be used for the invasion of Serbia were mentioned, and people talked of nothing less than applying to this kingdom the treatment formerly inflicted upon Poland by dividing her territory between the neighbouring states. It seemed that Count Berchtold intended at one blow to take his revenge for the successive checks which his policy has suffered during recent years. It was the practical application of the theory dear to those who have been preaching for long 'that the Serbian question must be dealt with once and for all.'

In the inner circles of the Austrian Government there does not appear to have been any protest against such designs, and if the same view had been taken at Budapest it would not have been impossible that the Emperor, in spite of his leanings to peace, should have ranged himself with the unanimous opinion of his advisers.

It is the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has twice visited Vienna, who tried to rein in these warlike ardours. As a

prudent and far-sighted statesman, Count Tisza pointed out the great danger which lay in the Austro-Hungarian Government committing itself lightly to such an adventure, and insisted vigorously on the adoption of a more moderate attitude.

Indeed, it seems very difficult not to come to the conclusion that an armed conflict between the monarchy and her neighbour would contain at least the germ of a European conflagration. It is true that the Austro-Hungarian press, which talks every day of war with Serbia as not only possible but probable, affects to prophesy that the war would remain localised between these two Powers. 'We should have the moral support of Germany,' they say. 'England and France will not be interested in the question, and Russia, far from intervening, will on the contrary advise Serbia to give us full satisfaction.' This reasoning is evidently the fruit of a very exaggerated optimism.

I cannot admit for a moment that the Serbian Government and the enlightened party in that country have any reason to reproach themselves for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, as many people here allege. On the contrary, I am convinced that this unhappy event must have produced a painful impression in Serbia, since people there were in truth very anxious to maintain good relations with Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, who goes away to-day on leave but declares himself ready to return to his post at the least alarm, declares that the Tsar's Government will invite King Peter's counsellors to accept every demand addressed to them in courteous terms, and having a direct bearing on the murder. The same course would be taken with respect to the dissolution of certain societies whose irredentist tendencies are too much accentuated. 'But,' says M. Schébéko, 'we should not allow Serbia to be made the subject of a general attack intended to discredit her.'

I have every reason to believe that M. Pashitch will follow the first part of this advice, but that he will show himself very determined if there should be any question of conditions which he could not fulfil legally or which would inflict a direct blow upon the national pride. In particular, so far as the dissolution of societies is concerned, it is worthy of



remark that the Serbian constitution, which is very liberal, guarantees the right of association, and in addition it is not a few societies only which take the reconstitution of 'Greater Serbia' for their political programme, but the whole population of the country cherishes this dream.

What is more, the Prime Minister at Belgrade certainly takes into consideration that the whole of the mixture of Jugo-Slavs who inhabit the south of the Monarchy is composed of Serbians, Bosnians, Slovenes, and Croats who are favourable to his cause. The latter, in spite of their difference of religion, are greatly dissatisfied with the régime to which Hungary subjects them, and the great majority of them, in spite of what is alleged here on the subject, extend their full sympathies to Serbia.

Apart from the possible intervention of Russia and the uncertain part which might be played by Rumania, there is in this state of things a very real danger for Austria-Hungary, and Count Tisza's moderating words show it sufficiently. Will his influence prevail to the last? Count Berchtold has just gone to Ischl to report to the Emperor; it seems that the present uncertain situation cannot continue for long, and that an early decision must be taken.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

#### No. 4.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

SIR,—The publication of the ultimatum addressed yesterday by the Cabinet of Vienna to that of Belgrade goes far beyond anything that the most pessimistic anticipations of which I informed you in my report of the 16th of this month had anticipated. Evidently Count Berchtold and Count Tisza, the responsible authors of this sudden blow, have come under the influence of the military party and the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The result of such a lack of moderation and discretion will inevitably be to attract the sympathies of the great mass of European public opinion to

Serbia, in spite of the horror caused by the murders of Serajevo. Even at Berlin, to judge by the Liberal papers, one has the impression that the Austro-Hungarian demands are considered excessive. 'Austria-Hungary,' says the *Vossische Zeitung* this morning, 'will have to prove the grave accusations which she brings against Serbia and her Government by publishing the results of the judicial inquiry held at Serajevo.'

Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann had assured us last week that they did not know the decisions taken by the Vienna Cabinet, nor the extent of the Austro-Hungarian demands. How can we believe in this ignorance to-day? It is improbable that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen should have made up their minds to such a step, the most dangerous stroke which their diplomacy has ever ventured against a Balkan State, without having consulted their colleagues at Berlin, and without having obtained the assent of the Emperor William. The fact that the Emperor has given a free hand to his allies in spite of the risk of bringing on a European conflict, is explained by the fear and horror which he has of regicides.

'What is Serbia going to do?' was the question which the majority of my colleagues were asking this morning. 'Will she turn to Russia and beg for her support by telegram?' If she does so, she cannot receive any reply before the expiration of the time limit in the Austrian ultimatum. Russia will be obliged as a preliminary to concert measures with France, and, very astutely, the Cabinet of Vienna has postponed the outbreak of the storm until the moment when M. Poincaré and M. Viviani are on their voyage between St. Petersburg and Stockholm. The threatening tone in which the Austro-Hungarian note is couched is all the more unfortunate because the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, I learn, had recently informed Count Berchtold that his Government would support the Austro-Hungarian demands with the Pashitch Cabinet if those demands were moderate.

To-day a new crisis has begun, recalling the crisis of 1909 after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The best we can hope is that it will not develop in a more tragic manner, in spite of the bellicose wishes of the Austrian General Staff, which are perhaps shared by that at Berlin. The best



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advice to give to Serbia would be to invite the mediation and intervention of the Great Powers.

(Signed)      BARON BEYENS.

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### No. 5.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SIR,—The situation has suddenly become very serious. It was obvious that an early *démarche* by Austria-Hungary to Serbia was to be expected. But the note delivered on the 23rd of this month by a representative of the Monarchy at Belgrade to Dr. Paccu,<sup>1</sup> Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, puts forward demands which are more excessive and imposes conditions which are harder than I had foreseen.

The press here is unanimous in stating that the conditions imposed on Serbia are not of such a nature as to wound her national pride and dignity and that, therefore, Serbia can and ought to accept them. But at the same time the press implicitly admits the rigorous nature of these conditions, since it expresses only a very faint hope that King Peter's Government will submit to them. Not to mention the humiliating declaration to be inserted in the Official Journal and the Order of the day to the Army, paragraph 5 would evidently constitute an excessive interference with the internal affairs of the country. It would amount to a complete delivery of Serbia to the suzerainty of the Monarchy.

Certainly, a refusal might have the gravest consequences from the international point of view. It may provoke a European conflict and cause enormous economic losses. In a few hours the purport of the Serbian reply will be known, but it is extremely improbable that it will be of such a nature as to give satisfaction. Besides, King Peter and his Government would provoke a revolution in the country if they showed any tendency to make such concessions. This fact must clearly have been taken into consideration at the Ballplatz, and it also appears as if such hard conditions had only been imposed because it was hoped that they would be refused,

because it was wished 'to have done with Serbia once and for all.'

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 6.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

SIR,—The situation has grown no worse since yesterday, but this does not mean that it has grown any better.

As unfavourable symptoms, mention must first be made of the language used at the Wilhelmstrasse to the members of the diplomatic body: The Imperial Government approves the *démarche* made by the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade, and does not consider it excessive in form. An end must be made of the murder plots and revolutionary intrigues which are hatched in Serbia. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann would not talk in this way if they had not received orders to this effect from the Emperor, who has determined in the interests of dynastic friendship to support Austria-Hungary to the last, and who is susceptible to the very legitimate fears inspired by outrages against royal personages.

It should, further, be remarked that the German press, with the exception of course of the Socialist papers, appears to have recovered from [the] first astonishment caused by the Austro-Hungarian note. It plays the part of chorus to the press of Vienna and Budapest, and contemplates coolly the contingency of war while expressing the hope that it will remain localised.

Finally, the view gains ground more and more among my colleagues—and I believe it to be well founded—that it is not so much a desire to avenge the death of the Hereditary Archduke and to put an end to the pan-Serbian propaganda, as an anxiety for a personal rehabilitation as a statesman which has induced Count Berchtold to send to Belgrade this incredible and unprecedented note. From the moment when his personal feelings and reputation are at stake it will be very difficult for him to draw back, to temporise and not to put his threats into execution.



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The favourable signs are less evident. However, they deserve to be pointed out. Not to mention European public opinion, which would not understand the necessity for taking up arms to determine a dispute whose settlement is undoubtedly within the sphere of diplomacy, it appears impossible not to notice the general movement of reaction and disapproval which manifests itself outside Germany and Austria-Hungary against the terms of Count Berchtold's ultimatum. The Vienna Cabinet, which was right in substance, is wrong in form. The demand for satisfaction is just ; the procedure employed to obtain it is indefensible.

Although Count Berchtold has skilfully chosen his moment to act—the British Cabinet being absorbed in the question of Home Rule and Ulster, the head of the French State and his Prime Minister being on a journey, and the Russian Government being obliged to put down important strikes—the fact that the Austrian Minister has thought himself bound to send to the Great Powers an explanatory memorandum, gives to those Powers, and particularly those of the Triple Entente, the right to reply, that is to say, to open a discussion and intervene in favour of Serbia, and enter into negotiation with the Cabinet of Vienna. If it is done at the earliest moment possible, a great gain in favour of the maintenance of European peace will result. Even a hasty military demonstration by the Austro-Hungarian army against Belgrade, after the refusal of the Serbian Government to accept the ultimatum, might, perhaps, not produce irremediable consequences.

Lastly, the three members of the Triplice are not in perfect agreement in the present dispute. It would not be surprising if the Italian Government should determine to play a separate part and seek to intervene in the interests of peace.

(Signed)      BARON BEYENS.

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No. 7.

*The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that Russia will not permit Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia,<sup>1</sup> to

<sup>1</sup> [Cf *Diplomatic*, I, p. 462].

whom, however, moderating advice has been given, counselling her to give way on the points of the ultimatum which have a judicial and not a political character. The Russian Government thinks that the situation is very serious.

(Signed) BARON DE L'ESCAILLE.

No. 8.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

SIR,—What I have to tell you on the subject of the crisis is so serious that I have decided to send you this report by special messenger. The reports which I have committed to the post, with a fear lest they should be read by the German *cabinet noir*, necessarily contained opinions of a much more optimistic nature.

Repeated conversations, which I had yesterday with the French Ambassador, the Dutch and Greek Ministers, and the British Chargé d'Affaires, raise in my mind the presumption that the ultimatum to Serbia is a blow prepared by Vienna and Berlin, or rather designed here and executed at Vienna. It is this fact which creates the great danger. The vengeance to be taken for the murder of the Hereditary Archduke, and the pan-Serbian propaganda would only serve as a pretext. The object sought, in addition to the annihilation of Serbia and of the aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs, would be to strike a mortal blow at Russia and France, in the hope that England would remain aloof from the struggle.

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which prevails in the German General Staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near—an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share.<sup>1</sup> Such a war, warmly desired by the military and pan-German party, might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again present themselves for some time: Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The

<sup>1</sup> [C  
lomatic, I,  
pp. 284-5.]



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*Wehrbeitrag*\* has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her military reorganisation. That strength will not be formidable for several years; at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency in guns of large calibre; but, apparently, it is this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels.

In the eyes of my colleagues as well as in my own, the existence of a plan concerted between Berlin and Vienna is proved by the obstinacy with which the Wilhemstrasse denies having had knowledge of the tenor of the Austrian note prior to Thursday last. It was also only on Thursday last that it was known at Rome, from which circumstance arises the vexation and dissatisfaction displayed here by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this note, which, owing to the excessive severity of its terms and the shortness of the period allowed to the Cabinet of Belgrade for their execution, is destined to render war immediate and unavoidable, was drafted without consultation with and without the active collaboration of the German Government,<sup>1</sup> seeing that it will involve the most serious consequences for that Government? An additional fact, which proves the intimate co-operation of the two Governments, is their simultaneous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia. After the request for an extension formulated by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna had been refused yesterday at the Ballplatz, here, at the Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Jagow evaded similar requests presented by the Russian and English Chargés d'Affaires who, in the name of their respective Governments, claimed the support of the Berlin Cabinet for the purpose of inducing Austria to grant Serbia a longer interval in which to reply. Berlin and Vienna were at one in their desire for immediate

<sup>1</sup> [But  
No. 52 (p.  
383).]

\* ['Defence contribution']—a levy on property to meet the non-recurring expenditure for the increase of the German army enacted in 1913. Cf. *Diplomatic*, I, p. 267.]

and inevitable hostilities. The paternity of the scheme, as well as of the procedure employed, which are, on account of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, is attributed here, in the diplomatic world, to a German rather than to an Austrian brain. The secret had been well guarded, and the execution of the scheme followed with marvellous rapidity.

It should be observed that, even if the secret aim of the statesmen of the two empires is not to make the war general and force Russia and France to take part, but merely to destroy the power of Serbia and prevent her from carrying on her clandestine propaganda, the result is the same. It is impossible that that result has not been perceived by the far-seeing rulers of the German Empire. On either of these assumptions, the intervention of Russia would appear inevitable; they must have deliberately faced this complication, and prepared themselves to support their allies with vigour. The prospect of a European war has not caused them an instant's hesitation, if, indeed, the desire to evoke it has not been the motive of their actions.

Diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia have been broken off since yesterday evening. Events are developing rapidly. It is expected here that the Serbian King, together with his Government and the army, will withdraw to the newly-annexed territories, and allow the Austrian troops to occupy Belgrade and the country abutting on the Danube, without offering any resistance. Then, however, arises the painfully acute question: what will Russia do?

We too must put this disquieting question to ourselves, and hold ourselves in readiness for the worst eventualities, for the European war, of which people were always talking on the agreeable assumption that it would never break out, has now become a threatening reality.

The tone of the semi-official German press is more moderate this morning and suggests the possibility of a localisation of the war, only however at the cost of the *désintéressement* of Russia, who is to content herself with the assurance that the territorial integrity of Serbia will be respected. Is not the aim of this language to give some satisfaction to England and also to German public opinion, which, in spite of yesterday's Austrophile demonstrations in the streets of Berlin, is still pacific and alarmed? In any event the *dénouement* of the



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crisis, whatever it may be, is apparently to be expected soon.—  
I am, etc., (Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 9.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

SIR,—As I foresaw, the Serbian Government's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note has been found insufficient by the representative of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at Belgrade. General Baron von Giesl left immediately with all his staff: mobilisation has been ordered on both sides, and war appears imminent.

The very severe terms of the above-mentioned note, the refusal to enter into any discussion upon them, and the brevity of the period given, seem to show clearly that the position arrived at is precisely that which was desired here. It is evident that the action undertaken by the Austro-Hungarian Government had been fully approved in Berlin. Some persons go so far as to maintain that Count Berchtold adopted this course under both the encouragement and the pressure of the German Government, who would not shrink from the danger of a general conflagration, and would prefer now to come into conflict with France and Russia, where preparations are insufficient, whilst in three years these two Powers would have completed their military reorganisation.

Yesterday the Austrian papers reproduced a *communiqué* published by the telegraphic agency of St. Petersburg,<sup>1</sup> to the effect that Russia could not be indifferent towards the events which had supervened between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Yesterday, on the other hand, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires made an official *démarche* at the Ballplatz with the object of gaining an extension of the time limit for Serbia, and received a polite refusal.

These facts in themselves do not enable us to predict with absolute assurance that the Tsar will take up arms on Serbia's behalf. On the other hand, however, it seems very difficult to assume that Russia will remain as a passive spectator of the crushing of this Slavonic state.

At Belgrade, where an unqualified submission would very

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, I, p. 462.]

probably have provoked a revolution and endangered the lives of the Sovereign and his Ministers, the object will have been to gain time. It is to be supposed that the reply handed by M. Pashitch to General von Giesl made important concessions as regards a large number of the conditions demanded, especially in relation to those referring to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the possibility of arriving at a compromise need not be despaired of if the Powers, animated by a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace, made all possible efforts to attain that result. It is highly desirable that this solution should be found. Unfortunately, however, the very resolute attitude of Austria-Hungary, and the support accorded to her by Germany, permit of but faint hopes on this head.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 10.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

SIR,—The contradictory opinions which I have gathered to-day in the course of my conversations with my Colleagues, render it difficult for me to form a precise opinion on the situation as it presents itself at the end of the third day of the crisis. I thought that it would be safest to speak to the Under Secretary of State himself, but I did not succeed in seeing Herr Zimmermann until 8 o'clock in the evening, and immediately on my return to the Legation (without even having time to take a copy of it, for I wish that this letter may go by the last train this evening) I am sending you a memorandum of our conversation.

The Under Secretary of State spoke to me as follows :—

‘It is neither at our instigation nor by our advice that Austria has made the *démarche* which you know of to the Cabinet of Belgrade. The reply has not been satisfactory, and to-day Austria is mobilising. She will carry the matter through. She cannot draw back without losing all her prestige both within and without the Monarchy. It is now a question of existence for her, to be or not to be. She must cut short the audacious propaganda which



aims at her internal disintegration, and at the rebellion of all her Slavonic provinces in the Danube Valley. She must also avenge in a striking manner the assassination of the Archduke. For that a severe and salutary lesson must be administered to Serbia by means of a military expedition. A war between Austria and Serbia cannot then be avoided.

'England has asked us to combine with her, and with France and Italy, with a view to preventing the extension of the conflict and the breaking out of hostilities between Austria and Russia, or rather the British proposal contemplates a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute so that it may not spread to other nations. We have replied that we desired nothing better than to aid in circumscribing the conflict by making representations in that sense to St. Petersburg and Vienna, but that we would not press Austria not to inflict an exemplary punishment on Serbia. We have promised our support and assistance to our allies, if any other nation puts obstacles in the way of this. We shall keep our promise. If Russia mobilises her army, we shall immediately mobilise our own, and war will then become general; it will be a war involving the whole of central Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Turks will be unable to resist the temptation to take part in it, one against another.

'Yesterday I said to M. Boghitschewitsh (the former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, who was highly esteemed at Berlin but who was unfortunately transferred to Cairo; he is on a short visit here) that the best advice that I could give to his country, would be not to oppose Austria otherwise than by a pretence of military resistance, and to conclude peace at the earliest possible moment by accepting all the conditions demanded by the Cabinet of Vienna. I added that if a general war breaks out and results in a victory for the armies of the Triple Alliance, Serbia will practically cease to exist as a nation, she will be erased from the map of Europe. She had better not expose herself to such a risk.

'In the meantime I do not wish to conclude this

## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

conversation on too pessimistic a note. I have some hope that a general conflagration can be avoided. We are informed by telegraph from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof is more disposed to consider the situation calmly. I hope that we shall be able to dissuade him from intervening in favour of Serbia, whose territorial integrity and future independence Austria is determined to respect, once she has obtained satisfaction.'

I represented to Herr Zimmermann that according to certain of my colleagues who had read the Belgrade Cabinet's reply, this was a complete capitulation to the Austrian demands, to which satisfaction had been given subject to merely formal limitations. The Under Secretary of State replied that he had no knowledge of the reply, and, moreover, that nothing could prevent a military demonstration by Austria-Hungary. Such is the situation.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

## No. II.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, July 27, 1914.*

I have received your report of the 25th inst.<sup>1</sup> Please <sup>1</sup> [No. 5.] telegraph what stage the mobilisation has reached and when hostilities may be expected to begin. Your colleague in Berlin writes on the 26th <sup>2</sup> that in his opinion Germany and <sup>2</sup> [No. 8.] Austria-Hungary have taken stock together of all the consequences which might follow from the ultimatum addressed to Serbia, and have decided to go to any lengths. We ought to be properly informed with a view to our own course of action.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

## No. 12.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

SIR,—Events are moving so rapidly that one must be on one's guard against making predictions, especially too favourable ones, in case they are falsified by facts. It is more



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

profitable to seek to unravel the causes of the present crisis in order to understand its development, as far as possible, and forecast its conclusion.

<sup>1</sup> [No. 8.]

This is what I tried to do in my report of the 26th July.<sup>1</sup> The opinion which I expressed in the first part of it still seems to me the soundest. I am bound, however, to submit to you to-day a divergent opinion because it comes from a man who is in a position to form a good judgment on the situation, the Italian Ambassador, with whom I had a conversation yesterday.

According to M. Bollati the German Government, whilst agreeing in principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity of striking a blow at Serbia, was ignorant of the purport of the Austrian Note, or, in any case, did not know that it was couched in terms so violent and so unusual in the language of diplomacy. At Vienna, as at Berlin, they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of the official assurances recently exchanged between the Tsar and M. Poincaré on the subject of the full preparedness of the two armies of the Dual Alliance, was incapable of engaging in a European War and would not dare to launch herself upon so formidable an adventure—disquieting internal situation; revolutionary intrigues afoot; military equipment incomplete; means of communication inadequate; all these reasons must force the Russian Government to be an impotent spectator of the execution of Serbia. The same low estimate is taken, not indeed of the French army, but of the spirit which prevails in Governmental circles in France.

The Italian Ambassador believes that a great mistake is being made here as to the steps which the Government of the Tsar will decide to take. According to him, the Russian Government will find itself forced to the necessity of making war, in order not to lose all authority and all prestige in the eyes of the Slavs. Inaction, in the presence of Austria's entry into the field, would be equivalent to suicide. M. Bollati has given me to understand that a European War would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people has no interest in the destruction of the power of Russia, who is Austria's enemy. They need at the present moment to remain quiet and aloof (*se recueillir*) in order to solve at their leisure other problems which are of more urgent concern to them.

The impression that Russia is incapable of meeting the strain of a European War prevails not only within the circle of the Imperial Government but amongst the German industrials who specialise in the production of material of war. One of these, whose opinion carries the greatest authority, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, has assured one of my colleagues that the Russian artillery is far from being good or complete, whilst that of the German army has never been of a finer quality. It would be madness, he added, for Russia to declare war on Germany under these conditions.

The Serbian Government, taken by surprise at the suddenness of the Austrian ultimatum has, nevertheless, replied before the expiry of the time-limit, to the demands of the Vienna Cabinet, and has agreed to give all the satisfactions asked for. Its answer has been badly presented, in too voluminous a text, accompanied by too many corroborative documents ; it constitutes a bulky document, instead of being in short, precise form. It would appear, nevertheless, to be very conclusive. It has been communicated to all the Cabinets interested—yesterday morning to that of Berlin. How comes it that no German newspaper has published it, whilst they almost all reproduced an Austrian telegram declaring that the Serbian answer is quite inadequate? Is not that a new proof of the inflexible resolution, formed both here and at Vienna, to go ahead, at whatever cost?

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

### No. 13.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. le Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

[Reply,  
No. 14.]

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, July 28, 1914.*

Be so good as to telegraph if measures have already been taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Keep me informed by telegraph of all that you may learn on this subject.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 14.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29,<sup>1</sup> 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> [So dated  
in the  
French  
text.]

I take the opportunity offered me of a safe channel to transmit to you impressions which I would not trust to the post.

The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia has been judged by public opinion to be an event tending dangerously to compromise the peace of Europe. This is the way in which the Cabinet at Vienna responds to the attempts at conciliation made in London and Petersburg; it breaks down the bridges behind it, so as to prevent all possibility of retreat. There is a fear that this declaration of war may be considered by the Tsar as a challenge.

Hostilities are bound then to commence, but they might be of short duration, if Germany would consent to use her influence upon her ally, or if, on their side, the Serbs would yield to the advice given them, and would retire before the invader, without giving him the opportunity to perpetrate any useless bloodshed. By occupying Belgrade, without striking a blow, Austria would have at the same time a moral and material satisfaction and a pledge—both which things would permit of her not showing herself too obdurate. An intervention might then perhaps take place with some chance of success.

Unhappily these are only suppositions inspired by the desire to prevent a European catastrophe. But here is a fact, which might possibly influence the measures taken by the Cabinet of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey declared yesterday to Prince Lichnowsky <sup>1</sup> that if a European war broke out, none of the six Great Powers would be able to keep out of it. At the same time the German papers announced that the British Fleet had been put on to a war footing.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Dip-  
lomatic*,  
I, p. 125.]

It is certain that these warnings will dissipate an illusion which every one at Berlin, both in official circles and in the Press, found a pleasure in creating for themselves. Articles in papers, published during these last few days, even after the opening of the conflict, breathed the greatest confidence in the neutrality of England. There can be no doubt that

the Imperial Government had reckoned upon it, and that it will have to modify all its calculations. As in 1911, the Berlin Cabinet has been deceived by badly informed agents ; to-day, as then, it sees England, in spite of all the advances, in spite of all the diplomatic caresses with which Germany has been lavish these two years past, ready to go over to the camp of its enemies. The reason is that the British statesmen are well aware of the dangers which the absolute hegemony of Germany on the European Continent would entail for their country, and they attach a vital interest, not from sentimental motives, but from considerations of the Balance of Power, to the existence of France as a Great Power.

The German papers to-day at last publish the answer of Serbia to the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government, with the Austrian commentary. Its late appearance is to a large extent the fault of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires ; he had omitted to have the document typewritten in order to send copies to the Press. The impression which it will make in Berlin, where people persist in looking only with the eyes of Austria and where, up till now, with a quite inexplicable compliance, they approve everything which Austria has done, will be practically *nil*.

In your telegram of the 28th inst.<sup>1</sup> you ask me to keep <sup>1</sup> [No. 1] you informed of the measures taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Happily, up till now, we have not to do with mobilisation, in the strict sense. But, as a military attaché said to me yesterday evening, every State before mobilising takes within its territory certain preparatory measures, without exciting attention—recall of officers and men from furlough, purchase of horses for the artillery and ammunition wagons, which are not completed unless war breaks out, preparation of shells, ammunition, etc. There can be no question that these measures of precaution have been taken in Germany. It is no less necessary to keep a cool head, than it is to be on the alert. We ought to do nothing rash ; to recall, at the moment when desperate efforts are being made to preserve peace, three classes of our army would seem here to be premature, and there is a risk of its producing an unfortunate impression.

(Signed)

BARON BEYENS.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 15.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

I have to advise you that the negotiations which had taken place at St. Petersburg between the Austrian Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs have been broken off for two days. Mobilisation is proceeding on both sides. The rupture appeared imminent, but after a long and friendly conversation, which took place yesterday between the Russian Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a basis has been found for the resumption of negotiations.

(Signed)

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 16.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

SIR,—My reports of the last few days have sufficiently shown that I was not successful in getting precise information as to the intentions of Russia, with regard to which country the Austro-Hungarian press moreover observes, by order, a complete silence. I was wondering whether the Government of the Tsar would not maintain an expectant attitude and would ultimately intervene only if Austria-Hungary made what was in their eyes an extravagant use of the victories she was about to gain.

At last, yesterday evening, I succeeded in gathering from a sure source some authentic data.

The situation is almost hopeless, and the Russian Ambassador was expecting at every moment to be recalled. He has made one last effort which has succeeded in warding off the immediate danger. The conversation of His Excellency with Count Berchtold has been long and absolutely friendly. The Ambassador and the Minister have both recognised that their Governments had given orders for mobilisation, but they parted on good terms.

On leaving the Ballplatz, M. Schébéko repaired to M. Dumaine's, where Sir Maurice de Bunsen was also present. This interview was profoundly moving, and the Russian Ambassador was congratulated warmly by his colleagues on the success which he had gained so cleverly.

The situation continues to be grave, but at any rate the possibility of resuming negotiations has been given, and there is still some hope that all the horrors and all the ruin which a European war would necessarily cause may be avoided.

I am astounded to see with what recklessness and at the same time with what egoism people here have rushed upon an adventure which might have the most terrible consequences for the whole of Europe.

I commit this report to a compatriot recalled to military service, and I take the opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, of telling you that, whether rightly or wrongly, the Austrian post has the reputation of being indiscreet. Under these conditions, and in view of present circumstances, you will be good enough to excuse me if I sometimes find myself obliged to write less openly than I should like to do.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

#### No. 17.

*The Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,—On arriving this morning at St. Petersburg I went to see the French Ambassador; M. Paléologue spoke to me to the following effect:—

'The mobilisation is general. So far as France goes, it has not yet been notified, but there can be no doubt as to the fact. M. Sazonof is still negotiating. He is making the utmost efforts to obviate a war and has shown himself ready for all concessions. The German Ambassador has also, personally, worked his hardest in the direction of peace. Count de Pourtalès called on M. Sazonof and entreated him to use his influence with Austria. The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to him more than once: "Give me some means



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of doing so: cause some word of conciliation to be addressed to me, which makes it possible for me to open conversation with Vienna. Tell your ally to make some concession, however small, to withdraw those points only in the ultimatum which no country could possibly accept.' The German Ambassador has always replied that his country was no longer able to give any counsels of moderation to Austria. It is probable that at Vienna it is not admitted that the German Empire is lending to its ally anything but an unconditional support.'

'More than once,' continued M. Paléologue, 'the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count de Pourtalès "Have you any communication to give me from your Government?" The German Ambassador was obliged to answer on each occasion in the negative, insisting over again that the initiative must come from St. Petersburg. At last M. Sazonof asked for an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, and told him that he accepted everything, either a conference of Ambassadors at London or the conversation "of Four," undertaking not to interfere in it, and promising to adopt the opinion of the other Powers. Nothing had any effect; Vienna has consistently refused to discuss: Austria has mobilised eight army corps; she has bombarded Belgrade. Italy, it appears, is to be expected to maintain an attitude of reserve.

'The Russian patriotic press and the military element are both maintaining a notable calm. It would not appear to be the case that any pressure exerted upon the Emperor by his military entourage has determined the attitude of the Russian Government. Confidence is felt in M. Sazonof. It is the extraordinary attitude of Germany which is preventing the efforts of M. Sazonof from having any result.'

I have also just had a talk with the British Ambassador. He tells me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the intentions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of the mobilisation of the British Fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not yet been instructed to make any communication of this kind to the Pont des Chantres. The instructions of the Ambassador are to explain to St. Peters-

burg that if Russia desires the support of Great Britain, it must carefully avoid even the appearance of any aggressive step in the present crisis.

It is no secret to any one that the Russian means of mobilisation are much slower than those of Austria. Bukovina is named as the point at which the Russian Army might attempt to enter upon Austrian territory.

(Signed) COMTE C. DE BUISSERET-STEENBECQUE  
DE BLARENHIEU.

No. 18.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,—I have just had a long conversation with M. de Margerie. He is very much disturbed by the situation. Baron von Schoen had promised to communicate the reply given to the overture made in Vienna. He has heard nothing. Nevertheless touch is being maintained everywhere between the Chancellories; conversations are going on everywhere, but without result.

M. de Margerie gave me the following military information, which I telegraphed to you immediately: Germany is putting her army upon the footing of *Kriegsgefahr*; that implies a notable aggravation of the measures already taken. Russia has taken important decisions in the matter of its railways. All this does not amount to *mobilisation* in the strict sense, but it comes near to it.

I asked M. de Margerie what the French Government were going to do; he would answer nothing further than that they would not mobilise before Germany, but certain measures might be deemed imperative.

Time does not allow of my writing more. We are being besieged by Belgians recalled to Belgium, by those who seek various kinds of information, etc.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 19.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,—The *Neue Freie Presse* of this evening publishes a telegram from Berlin which, coming immediately after the announcement of general mobilisation, has produced a great sensation. It says that Germany has asked Russia for explanations as to the motives of her mobilisation and that she demands an answer within twenty-four hours.

I went to the British Ambassador's, whom I found very much astonished at the double news. He had no information tending to confirm the latter statement. His Excellency had had this morning a conversation with the second Departmental Chief in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which the latter had given him the same comparatively reassuring explanations which Count Berchtold had given the evening before to M. Schébéko, declaring especially that the general mobilisation decreed in Austria-Hungary had no aggressive character against Russia.

The question now is, is Germany in her turn going to mobilise? If that were so, the situation would take a turn of extreme gravity, since this measure would, I am assured, be immediately imitated in France.

At the Embassy of the French Republic the prevailing impression this evening is pessimistic, and the staff are making arrangements with a view to a speedy departure, which appears to these gentlemen more and more probable.

I write you these lines in great haste, in order to be able to entrust them to a compatriot who is leaving for Belgium to-night.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 20.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

SIR,—I take the opportunity of a safe channel in order to write to you and give you certain confidential information as to the latest developments.

At 6 P.M. no answer had yet come from St. Petersburg to the ultimatum from the Imperial Government. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann went to the Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have represented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty-four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. I telegraphed it to you immediately.

The official and semi-official papers, the brief pronouncements of the Emperor and of the Chancellor, and all the official proclamations which are to appear, will seek to throw the responsibility of the war upon Russia. In governing circles there is still an unwillingness to doubt the good faith of the Emperor; but it is said that he has been got round and skilfully led to believe that he had done all that was necessary for the maintenance of peace, whilst Russia was resolved absolutely on war.

I wrote to you that the Ambassador of the Tsar had not received any official confirmation of the general mobilisation in Russia. He was informed of it at 1 o'clock yesterday by Herr von Jagow; but having received no telegram communicating the news to him, he formally threw doubt upon it. Is it possible that Count Pourtalès took for a complete mobilisation what were only preparatory measures of war? Or can it even be that this mistake has been voluntarily made in Berlin? One loses oneself in suppositions.

It was impossible for Russia to accept the German ultimatum presenting as it did so short a time limit, one almost insulting, and the obligation to demobilise, that is to say, to cease all measures preparatory to war, both on the Austrian and on the German frontiers, at the very time when Austria had mobilised half her forces. As for the Government of the French Republic, they had no intention of returning any answer to Germany, not being bound to give account of their conduct to any save their Allies—so the French Ambassador expressed it to me.

With a little good-will on the side of Berlin, peace might have been preserved and the irreparable catastrophe pre-



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<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 279-80.]

<sup>2</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 1, pp. 437-43.]

vented. The day before yesterday the Austrian Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof that his Government were willing to discuss with him the basis of their note to Serbia;<sup>1</sup> that they undertook to respect the territorial integrity of their adversary, that they did not even cherish any ambition to regain the Sandjak, only they would not allow any other Power to take its place in dealing with Serbia. M. Sazonof replied that on this basis it was possible to come to an understanding, but that he preferred that the negotiations should be conducted in London under the impartial direction of the British Government rather than at St. Petersburg or at Vienna. At the same time, the Tsar and the German Emperor were exchanging friendly telegrams.<sup>2</sup> The German Government seem to have arranged this scenario in order to lead up to the war, which they seek to render inevitable, but the responsibility for which they desire to throw upon Russia.

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

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No. 21.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

SIR,—In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday evening with M. de Margerie, he said to me: 'The situation is certainly very grave, but it would not be considered hopeless if we could have more confidence in the attitude of Germany. The British proposal, by virtue of which the Great Powers would engage to demobilise under certain conditions has been warmly accepted by France, Russia, and Italy; Austria would come into line, but the Berlin Cabinet gives no answer.'

The military measures which Germany has taken against Russia are much less severe and less complete than those taken against France. One asks why. I said again to-day to Baron von Schoen: 'Are you trying to fasten a German quarrel upon us? Relations between the two countries have been good for a fairly long time and there is no incident between us. That being so, why does your Government act in this

fashion, if it has no *arrière-pensée*? Why have you yourself been ostentatiously packing up for several days?’

M. de Margerie, to whom I had made the communication prescribed in your telegram of the 1st August (see *First Grey Book*, No. 16)<sup>1</sup> has repeated to me what the French Minister told you as to the intentions of the Government of the French Republic with regard to us.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 23.]

M. de Margerie said to me yesterday evening that it was part of the programme of the French Government not to decree mobilisation before Germany had done so, but that the neighbour on the East was taking measures which were equivalent to a state of mobilisation without pronouncing the word, and that under these conditions the dangers were becoming too great for them to refrain from acting without delay. ‘All Europe would laugh at our *naïveté*,’ said he in conclusion of this friendly conversation.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 22.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to confirm my telegram of to-day:—

‘I have executed the instructions contained in your telegram of yesterday. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for this communication, of which he has kept a copy and taken note (see *First Grey Book*, No. 16).’<sup>2</sup>

I learnt to-day, by the indiscretion of a General Officer, belonging to the Emperor’s Household, that Luxemburg would be occupied to-night. Whether it was a question of the Grand Duchy or of our Province, I was not able to elicit clearly. The Grand Duchy was occupied to-day. Will our Province be occupied to-night? If the news is official to-morrow morning, I shall immediately protest to Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. I shall call their attention to the disastrous consequences of such an action, but I shall wait for your instructions before asking for my passports. I telegraphed to you in my state of uncertainty:

<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 23.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

‘Rumours portending danger to us. I consider that the Belgian Army ought to be ready immediately for all eventualities.’

(Signed)      BARON BEYENS.

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No. 23.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

SIR,—I had the honour to receive this morning your telegram of August 1st. (See *First Grey Book*, No. 16.<sup>1</sup>) I immediately communicated with the Imperial and Royal Department for Foreign Affairs, and at 1 o'clock, after having read to the Minister the note with regard to our neutrality<sup>2</sup> which you have addressed to me, I handed a copy of it to His Excellency, which he was good enough to acknowledge.

Count Berchtold expressed his astonishment at Holland having also mobilised. He seemed unable to understand what reasons could have induced the Government of Queen Wilhelmina to take this precautionary measure at the present stage.

(Signed)      COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 24.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, August 2, 1915.*

SIR,—The die appears to have been cast and the universal war seems to have become inevitable. Germany has ordered mobilisation, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me an hour ago that Russian patrols had crossed the frontier of the German Empire.

The news, which came yesterday afternoon from Berlin, and the article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* have produced a great sensation. The Tsar is reproached in lively terms in that he asked the intervention of the German Emperor in favour of the maintenance of peace, giving his word that the

mobilisation would not take place, and then proceeded all the same with this operation, whilst attempting to keep it secret.<sup>1</sup> Viennese papers declare that such a way of acting is unworthy, that it is playing the part of a traitor, and it is now proclaimed more loudly than ever that if the war becomes general Russia alone will be to blame.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Diplomatic*, I, pp. 438, 440.]

Following upon the assassination of M. Jaurès, a rumour was spread here yesterday evening that a revolution had broken out in Paris and that the President of the Republic had been killed. The French Ambassador, whom I saw at 11 o'clock, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who received me at 1 o'clock, had had no confirmation of this news, no doubt circulated by those who hoped that the French Socialists would oppose the war. On the contrary, the news has come that France in its turn has mobilised.

Vienna is very much preoccupied about the decision which England will take. From the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, I imagine that, after having kept up their efforts for conciliation till the last minute, the English Government will maintain at the outset a waiting attitude. This is what Count Berchtold also told me to-day.

Public opinion here counts much upon England standing completely out, and the newspapers are continually publishing articles calculated to corroborate this view. I am afraid that on this matter they labour under too many illusions. The Ambassador said to me the day before yesterday: 'No one in England can yet say at this moment what we are going to do. We shall be guided by events, but we should not allow France to be crushed without intervening.'

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 25.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 5,<sup>2</sup> 1914.*

I was received this morning at 9 o'clock by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me: 'We have been obliged by absolute necessity to address to your Government the

<sup>2</sup> [Aug. 4, according to fuller account in No. 51.]



request of which you are aware. For Germany it is a matter of life and death. In order not to be crushed, she has first to crush France and then turn against Russia. We have learnt that the French army was preparing to pass through Belgium, in order to attack our flank. We are bound to forestall it. If the Belgian army abstains from blowing up the bridges, allows us to occupy Liège, and retires upon Antwerp, we promise, not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the life and property of its inhabitants, but also to pay you an indemnity. It is only with the utmost anguish (*la mort dans l'âme*) that the Emperor and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this decision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to make in the course of my career.'

I answered that the Belgian Government could only return to this proposition the reply which they had made without hesitation. What would you say of us, if we yielded to a similar threat on the part of France? That we were cowards, unable to defend our neutrality and to live in independence. All Belgium will approve the action of its Government. France, in spite of what you say, has promised to respect our neutrality, if you respect it.

In return for our loyalty, you make Belgium the field of battle between France and yourselves. Europe will judge you, and you will have against you England, the guarantor of our neutrality. Liège is not quite so easy to take as you imagine.'

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when pressed by me, acknowledged that we could not have replied to the German demand otherwise than we had done, and that he understood our answer. He repeated more than once the expression of his grief that it had come to this. 'It is,' he said, 'a question of life and death for Germany.'

I answered that a people, like an individual, cannot live without honour. I then declared myself ready to leave Berlin with my staff.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not wish to break off diplomatic relations with us.

I said: 'It rests with my Government to make a decision, and I await their orders before asking you for my passports.'

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

*The Belgian Minister in London to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 5, 1914.*

SIR,—You will perhaps be interested to know the views of the French Embassy on the situation, and I think it is worth while for me to give you a summary of the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Monsieur de Fleuriau, Councillor of the Embassy:—

The French concentration begins to-day, and has been arranged to take place behind the covering troops which are massed upon the frontier. The Generalissimo is absolutely decided, if necessary, to allow the troops of the first line to be crushed, in order to leave time for the army to take up the positions which have been assigned to it in the strategic plan, in which the Generalissimo does not intend to make any modification. Only the event of the British army not co-operating would oblige him to extend the French left. That is why M. Cambon is exerting himself at the present moment to obtain from the British Government a speedy decision as to the despatch of a British expeditionary force to the Continent. This would require from twelve to fifteen days to be in a position to take part in the military operations. Everything is ready, the Councillor of Embassy repeated to me, for the transport of British troops to the French ports, and thence to the Belgian frontier. 'But we must act quickly, because it would never do for the British to arrive after it is too late.'

M. Cambon, in an interview which he had yesterday with Sir Edward Grey, begged him to note that England had decided to go to war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. 'But how will you carry on war,' he said, 'if the German fleet, as appears very likely, refuses battle and remains in the Baltic? You ought then to send the expeditionary corps to the Continent immediately.'

Sir Edward Grey did not answer, but perhaps the decisive refusal of Germany to respect Belgian neutrality will give the Cabinet in London food for thought, and will enlighten it as to German tactics, which consist in acting with an overwhelming rapidity and in adopting the most daring plans.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

I learn that Sweden and Norway have promised Russia, France, and England to remain neutral.

My telegram of to-night asserted that it was Germany which had declared war on England. This information was first telephoned to me from the Foreign Office and then confirmed by a circular letter. But shortly afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs took pains to rectify this version, which represented the matter somewhat incorrectly, and he supplied me with the following communication :—

‘ A summary refusal having been given by the German Government to the British demand for an assurance concerning the respect of Belgian neutrality, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports, and the British Government has announced to the Imperial Government that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 P.M. on August 4th.’

I have summed up this second version in my telegram of to-day.—I remain,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 27.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 5, 1914.*

SIR,—I have handed in to Sir Edward Grey Belgium’s appeal<sup>1</sup> to the three Guaranteeing Powers. Great Britain will naturally answer it warmly. Sir Edward will read to-day in the House of Commons a despatch of this morning from Sir F. Villiers containing the text of that appeal. The fine resistance of Belgium, said the Minister to me, will render easier the task of the British Cabinet with regard to public opinion. Great Britain will help you with all her might. Sir Edward Grey told me that you had asked him to assure the provisioning of Antwerp by way of the Scheldt, and that he had for that reason asked the Dutch Minister to come to see him soon, to whom he will explain that for Belgium this is necessary under the circumstances, and that he did not expect any difficulties concerning the free passage of mercantile

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 43.]

vessels. In any case the British First Lord of the Admiralty \* has told Sir Edward Grey that Belgium could rely on it that the British fleet will keep good guard at the mouth of the Scheldt.—I remain,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 28.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 6, 1914.

I have urged at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that French military action should be accelerated. I was answered that considerable forces have already gone ; several detachments are already in Belgium.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 29.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 7, 1914.

I have the honour to confirm the fact that Parliament has voted £100,000,000 war credits and a levy of 500,000 men.

The French and Russian Ambassadors have come to congratulate the King's Minister on the heroic conduct of the Belgian Army, which, by delaying the advance of the Germans, compelled them to modify their original plans, and allowed the enemies of Germany time to concentrate their forces for the general defence.

The despatch of the Expeditionary Force is being actively prepared. The first transports with provisions and ammunition will leave for France on Sunday, August 9th. The troops will then be embarked, and it is expected that by the end of next week, that is, about August 15th, the 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Force will assemble on French soil ; according to what I have been told by the French Ambassador

\* [Mr. Winston Churchill, M.P.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

the landing is to be effected at four different points, after which the troops are to be assembled.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Dip-  
lomatic*, 2,  
pp. 422-  
31.]

The Prime Minister analysed yesterday in the House of Commons<sup>1</sup> the Blue Book which I had the honour to send you on August 6th. He has branded the insidious proposals made to Great Britain by Germany with a view to obtaining her neutrality.

‘Besides matters concerning France and Holland,’ said Mr. Asquith, ‘they wanted us to barter away to the Imperial Government our obligations towards Belgium, and that without her knowledge. Had we accepted those *infamous* proposals, what reply could we have given to-day to the moving appeal which that country has addressed to us, when she asked us in these last few days to guarantee her neutrality? I do not envy the man who can read with an unmoved heart the appeal of the King of the Belgians to his people. Sir, Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. Had we listened to Germany and betrayed our friends and our duty, what would now be our position? In return for our dishonour we would have received promises from a Power which not only has violated its own promises but asks you to do the same. We are going to fight, first of all in order to fulfil our international obligations, secondly in defence of the small nations. The country will understand that our cause is just, and I ask the House to vote a credit of £100,000,000 and to increase the army to 500,000 men.’

The House voted the war credits and the men in the same sitting.

Public opinion has moved at last and the change has come in a most startling way. Europe had realised that a small nation has given an example of honour and honesty without considering the consequences. The adherents of peace at any price were beaten. Then, people learned that the enemy had crossed the frontier, that fighting had begun, and that the Belgians had resisted the German colossus. The speech of our King was read, every one at last realised the seriousness of the situation, and even the most pacific Englishman has scrutinised his conscience. He said to himself, ‘Can we abandon a nation which gives us such an example of loyalty?’ Then came the news of the German atrocities and of the heroic defence of Liège. That was decisive. The whole of

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England asked for war, and was no longer satisfied with the naval support which the Cabinet favoured at first. The sending of the Expeditionary Force was demanded. The Government waited to be given that order by the people. It obeyed. Two Ministers who differed resigned office, and their resignations were immediately accepted. Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and mobilisation was ordered.

To-day the admiration of this country for Belgium has no limit. In the military clubs the health of the brave Belgians is drunk, newspapers of all shades praise our nation. We are receiving numbers of congratulatory letters and telegrams. If the King came over here, he would be carried in triumph through the streets of London.

I have opened a subscription for the families of the Belgian soldiers, and for the sick and wounded of our army ; Her Grace the Duchess of Vendôme is its Honorary President, and I shall hold the funds at your disposal.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 30.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

SIR,—The President of the Republic has done me the honour to announce that he conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liège. I thought this a good opportunity for seeing him, and have asked for an interview in order to thank him. He received me, and the interview lasted three-quarters of an hour, and only ended when the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked to speak to him.

He did not want to accept my thanks, declaring that it was he who had to thank me and to congratulate me. I did not hide from him my view that France owed to us the value of four days' delay in the German mobilisation. He is convinced of that. I pass over all the flattering things which he said to me about our country and our valiant army.

The French Army is in Belgium ; but those are only the vanguard ; before four days are passed the bulk of the



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

French Army will be at our side. He expects that the French Army has already joined battle with the Germans on our territory. The English will also be soon at the front ; they need about four more days. A hundred thousand men will land and will be joined by another fifty thousand.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

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### No. 31.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 10, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> [No. 30.]

The day before yesterday I asked for and obtained an interview with the President of the Republic to thank him for having conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liège. I have sent you account of that interview.<sup>1</sup> I could not take a similar step to-day on the occasion of the Military Cross being conferred on the King. I, therefore, abstained.

M. de Margerie has just told me that the Austrian Ambassador will leave Paris to-night. It is not yet announced, in order to avoid demonstrations. M. Doumergue told him during the day that as the explanations given by his Government concerning the movements of troops towards the French frontier were not considered satisfactory, M. Dumaine had received orders to return to Paris. Count Szécsen answered that, in these circumstances, he asked for his passports.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

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### No. 32.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please communicate the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

‘The necessities of the defence of Antwerp give the military authorities an incontestable right to remove

strangers from the fortified district. A great number of foreigners and even of nationals have consequently been asked to leave the place where Austrian and Hungarian subjects have been able to remain. Nevertheless, the Consul-General did not telegraph on the subject either to the Austro-Hungarian Minister or to me. I am told by the Military Governor of Antwerp that the Consul-General was warned to be prepared to leave the fortified district (but not Belgium), just as were his compatriots in his district. At his own request he was conducted to the Dutch frontier, and he was accompanied by an officer whom he thanked.'

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 33.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, August 18, 1914.*

SIR,—I had the honour to speak to Count Forgach about the alleged hardship inflicted on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium. Our conversation was conducted in a friendly manner, and the words of His Excellency can be summed up as follows :—

'Our Consul-General at Antwerp arrived here a few days ago. He says that he has been sent in a discourteous manner, and under disagreeable circumstances, to the Dutch frontier, with many Germans and Austrians resident at Antwerp. The military Commander of the fortress seems rather to have lost his head. We have received from our Minister at Brussels a report concerning those events which seems to confirm the statements of Herr von Sponer.'

I think that the regrettable incident can, fortunately, be considered as closed.

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 34.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 21, 1914.*

The British Minister has been authorised to make the following declaration to the King :—

‘His Majesty’s Government will give during the war all possible military support to Belgium and, after the war, its diplomatic support. The example of patriotism given by the Belgians has impressed us all and will never be forgotten. At the conclusion of peace, the Government will do its best to get for Belgium compensation for the sufferings through which she had passed.’

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 35.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 22, 1914.*

All measures have been taken to secure that no Austrian subject should be molested. The President of the Council has himself asked the Austrian Minister to let him know of any regrettable incident so that the guilty might be punished.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 36.

*The Russian Minister in Belgium to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Antwerp, August 27, 1914.<sup>1</sup>*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you of the following :—

‘His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to order me to declare to His Majesty the King that at the end of the war, Belgium may count on the fullest diplomatic support of Russia.’

(Signed) PRINCE KOUDACHEFF.\*

\* [Prince J. Koudacheff. The Russian First Secretary of Embassy at Vienna before the war, mentioned in *Diplomatic*, 1 and 2, was Prince Nicholas Kudacheff (or Koudacheff)].

<sup>1</sup> [Reply, No. 38.]

No. 37.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 28, 1914.*

SIR,—The day before yesterday, Mr. Asquith announced to the House of Commons that at the next sitting an address to His Majesty the King will be moved, asking him to transmit to the King of the Belgians the sentiments of sympathy and admiration with which the House has been inspired by the heroic resistance offered by the Belgian army and nation to the brutal invasion of its territory, and the assurance that Great Britain was determined to support by every means the efforts of Belgium to defend her independence and the public law of Europe.

Yesterday, in fact, Mr. Asquith delivered a speech in the House in which he rendered signal homage to the Belgian King and Nation. Never has similar praise of a foreign State been heard in the English Parliament. The Prime Minister added that Belgium can count on Great Britain to the very end.

Mr. Bonar Law, in the name of the Opposition, and Mr. Redmond, in the name of the Irish Nationalists, spoke in the same sense.

In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Crewe, in the name of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne, as spokesman of the Unionists, warmly praised Belgium and her King.

Time does not allow me to sum up these speeches, the tribute of England's gratitude to a country which has rendered an inestimable service to Great Britain and to the whole of Europe.

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 38.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Minister in Belgium.*

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27,<sup>2</sup> in which Your Excellency kindly informed <sup>2</sup> [No. 36]



me that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, had asked Your Excellency to assure my august Sovereign that, after the war, Belgium will be able to count on the diplomatic support of His Government.

I thank Your Excellency for that gracious communication.  
(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

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No. 39.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

*Antwerp, August 29, 1915.*

SIR,—Under date of August 26, the Vice-Governor of Katanga telegraphed to the Minister for the Colonies that on August 22nd the Germans attacked the harbour of Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake Tanganyika.

My colleague, M. Renkin, addressed, on August 28th, the following instructions to M. Tombeur :

‘ In view of the direct attacks by the Germans against the colony of the Belgian Congo, and specially against the harbour of Lukuga, the Government instructs you to take all necessary military measures for the defence of Belgian territory.

‘ You may therefore authorise the entry of British troops into Belgian territory, accept the offer of a free passage for Belgian troops into Rhodesia, and undertake in co-operation with British troops, or by means of Belgian troops alone, any offensive action required for the defence of the integrity of our colonial territory.

‘ Identical instructions have been addressed to the Governor-General of the Congo, at Boma, regarding a possible co-operation with the French troops on our frontier in the Basin of the Ubanghi for similar defensive measures.’

I have communicated to the ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia the telegram of the Vice-Governor of Katanga and the answer sent to him.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

(Cf. *First Grey Book*, No. 57.<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, p. 54.]

No 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 30, 1914.*

The Viennese newspapers, especially the *Neue Freie Presse*, publish alleged accounts by German and Austrian subjects expelled from Belgium, stating that our population committed the greatest atrocities against them under the eyes of the Belgian authorities. A man called Weber is alleged to have been massacred by the mob at Antwerp, whilst at Ostend the baker Bichof is alleged to have been beaten to death, and his hands and feet cut off.

The Government protest indignantly against these accusations, and formally deny that outrages were committed on the persons of German or Austro-Hungarian subjects. With the exception of the breaking of the furniture of some coffee-houses, the perpetrators of which have been severely punished, no German or Austrian property has been damaged.

Please ask the Spanish Government to transmit our protest to the Austro-Hungarian Government.<sup>1</sup>

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

<sup>1</sup> [See No. 55.]

No. 41.

*The Belgian Minister at Luxemburg to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Antwerp, August 30, 1914.*

SIR,—You asked me for an account of the conditions under which I was obliged to leave my post at Luxemburg, although the most friendly relations still existed between the Grand Duchy and Belgium.

On Saturday, August 8th, at 3 P.M., M. Eyschen came himself to hand to me the letter of which I enclose a copy, together with a copy of a letter which he had received from Herr von Buch, the German Minister (see *First Grey Book*, No. 66).<sup>2</sup>

Saying how much he regretted to have to perform such a mission, the Minister of State asked me to let him know my intentions as soon as possible.

I immediately addressed to His Excellency the answer given below :—

<sup>2</sup> [Diplomatic, 2, p. 61.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

*'Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

'SIR,—Your Excellency has just given me notice that the German military authorities demand my departure.

'Whatever the courtesy with which the communication was delivered, I must bow before a wish which is nothing but the expression of force.

'Your Excellency's letter says that the military authorities advise me to travel by railway rather than by motor-car. I conform to that suggestion, and I am prepared to leave Luxemburg to-morrow, at the hour which will be indicated to me, and to go by train to Coblenz, provided however, that from there I may be authorised to return immediately to Belgium by whatever route may seem possible, and that diplomatic immunities be guaranteed to me whilst on the territory of the Empire.

'I cannot cease to take an interest in the fate and security of the numerous Belgians who inhabit the Grand Duchy, and I ask Your Excellency kindly to take measures for their protection, as well as for care of the building of the Legation.

'It is especially painful for me to have to leave the territory of Luxemburg without having offered my most respectful homage to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess in acknowledgment of the kind reception which the Sovereign to whom I had the honour of being accredited has always been pleased to give to me. I hope that Your Excellency will kindly express my regrets.

'Taking the opportunity of repeating to you, Sir, my most sincere thanks for the very friendly way in which you have, in all circumstances, been at pains to facilitate my mission,—I remain, etc.,

'(Signed) COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY.'

Having again seen Herr von Buch, M. Eyschen came back to tell me that the Officer then Commanding Luxemburg could not give any undertaking except for the journey from Luxemburg to Coblenz, and that in that town it would fall to General von Ploetz to instruct me as to what I shall have to do. Such an answer did not seem satisfactory to me, and I declared that under these circumstances I would remain at my post whatever should happen.

Thereupon it was decided to ask at Berlin for instructions.

On Sunday, August 9th, at 9.30 A.M., M. Eyschen came personally and brought me a passport conforming entirely to the wishes which I had expressed. It was signed by the German Minister, and by the General Commanding the 8th Army Corps. A saloon carriage was put at my disposal, and the train which I was asked to take was to leave at 12.18 P.M.

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess kindly sent to the station her Chamberlain and Secretary, M. de Colnet d'Huart, to bid me farewell ; he told me that he was sent to transmit to me as well as to my wife the farewell of the Grand Duchess, and to assure me of the very sincere way in which Her Royal Highness sympathised with our feelings. There were also at the station M. Eyschen and Major van Dyck, A.D.C. of the Grand Duchess and commander of the armed forces.

The line being blocked by military trains, the journey proceeded slowly, but without any incident. At Trèves, an A.D.C. of the General commanding the town came to ask me very politely whether I had any wish to express. The same happened at Coblenz. I was brought by a special train to Cranenburg, the last station of the German railway system on the line Cleve-Nimegue.—I remain, etc.,

(Signed) COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY.

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No. 42.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.*

*Antwerp, September 4, 1914.*

SIR,—The German and Austrian press is spreading through the whole world the most misleading rumours concerning the attitude of the population of our large towns towards the German and Austrian subjects resident in Belgium at the beginning of the present war. A considerable number of them are said to have been molested, women and children to have suffered the worst outrages ; at the cemetery of Antwerp the German graves are said to have been plundered.

The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, after having published these alleged acts of hostility on the part of our population in



the official and semi-official press, have invoked them as a justification, the one for the atrocities committed by the German troops in our country, the other for its declaration of war against Belgium.

In order to throw full light on those allegations the Royal Government has ordered the most minute inquiry into the subject, and this has been carried out with the greatest impartiality by the Court of First Instance at Antwerp.

You will find enclosed the report addressed by the *Procureur du Roi* on this subject to the *Procureur-Général* of the Court of Appeal.

As you will see, the population of Antwerp has pillaged certain coffee-houses and shops belonging to Germans and Austrians, but it has not committed any act of aggression against their persons and no damage has been committed on German graves, which remain at present as well looked after as before the war.

Please bring this report to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited and communicate it to the press.—I remain, etc.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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*Enclosure to No. 42.*

*Court of First Instance at Antwerp. No. 81,909.*

*Antwerp, August 25, 1914.*

*To the Procureur-Général.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you this report on the events which occurred on August 4th and 5th last, after the population had learned of the determination of Germany to invade our territory, concerning which there recently appeared in the *Kölnische Zeitung* an account wholly at variance with the facts.

At the news of the imminent invasion, the population became very much excited, and its irritation was increased by the fact that German and Austrian subjects had always been treated in our town with the greatest regard and the greatest friendship. The anger of the people was such that in the afternoon of August 4 huge bands of demonstrators began to move through the different parts of the town,

singing the *Brabançonne*, and hooting in front of the shops and houses occupied by German subjects.

The demonstrators, among whom were many young people, began by pulling down German flags in various places, including the German school in the Rue Quellin.

Towards night the bands constantly increased in numbers, and soon a considerable number of small retail shops and public-houses owned by Germans were pillaged, the windows smashed, and the furniture thrown into the street and trampled upon.

Certain evil-doers did not miss the opportunity of appropriating the belongings of other people.

The police and the civic guard intervened as promptly as possible and order was soon re-established ; but the demonstrations had broken out so suddenly, and simultaneously at so many different points, that it was physically impossible to prevent a certain amount of destruction and even some thefts.

Numerous arrests were, however, made, and I felt it my duty to ask for warrants of arrest in all cases which seemed in the least serious. The breaches of the law were made at once the object of a thorough investigation, and the guilty persons brought before the competent courts with as much despatch as possible.

I got in touch with the President of the Court of my department in order urgently to arrange for extraordinary hearings, so as to be able to secure prompt suppression.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a complete list of cases sent for trial, both those which have been tried and those in which the investigation has not yet been completed.

In certain serious cases, the Court has rightly considered it its duty to show severity against certain hooligans who were fishing in troubled waters.

For the reason given above it was impossible for the representatives of public force to determine the identity of the pillagers, as on the arrival of the police or civic guard, they at once plunged into the crowd.

With the exception which I shall specify below, no one has been beaten or wounded, and all foreigners have remained absolutely unharmed as far as their persons are concerned.

The only wounded are two Belgian subjects who were spectators of one of the demonstrations of August 5th.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

At the corner of the Rue Artevelde, a coffee-house leased to a German was attacked by a band of rioters when suddenly five or six revolver shots were fired from the interior of the establishment. A certain Isenbaert and a certain Simons, Belgian subjects, the two spectators mentioned above, were struck by the revolver bullets, one in the right arm, the other in the head ; the latter was not a serious wound, the bullet having passed between the skull and the scalp. The perpetrator of that crime was himself also a Belgian subject, a certain Meeus, brother-in-law of the German lessee.

Mr. Justice Denis is charged with the investigation of the case of Meeus.

As to the violation of the cemetery, there is only one cemetery at Antwerp, namely, the great necropolis of Kiel, which lies about five kilometres away from the place where the riots occurred.

As appears from the Report No. 900 of the Ninth Section, enclosed herewith, no damage was done to the graves of the Germans or to those of any others who were there buried. The graves of the German subjects have remained completely intact, and are still at the present moment kept in repair and decorated with flowers as they have always been.

It ought to be noted that the damage done in the public-houses has been, as a rule, only partly to the prejudice of the German tenants. As a matter of fact, almost all these premises belong to brewers, as in most cases does also the furniture of the business part of the public-houses. So true is this that several civil actions for damages and indemnities have already been brought by the brewers before the jurisdiction of the Court of my Department.

Attorney-General,  
(Signed) JACOBS.

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No. 43.

*The Belgian Minister at Constantinople to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Constantinople, September 7, 1914.*

SIR,—Since I had the honour of announcing to you my return to Constantinople on 16th August, I have addressed

to you no political despatch, finding myself without any means of transmitting one to you.

I entrust the present letter to a special messenger of the French Embassy, in the hope that it will reach you.

On my return here, I found the situation very strained. The incident of the *Goeben* had just taken place.

The German Ambassador,<sup>1</sup> all-powerful here, to the extent that the Ottoman ministers fairly frequently hold their Council meetings at his house, used all his efforts to push the Turks into an imprudent step, which might provoke war with the powers of the Triple Entente.

At this moment, Talaat Bey and Halil Bey, President of the Chamber, had just left for Sofia and Bukarest with the object, they said, of settling the question of the islands with Greece. But the real aim of their journey was to feel the ground with a view to constituting a compact group (*un bloc*), which might engage in war against Russia.

They were soon able to assure themselves that this attempt had no chance of success, and it was at that moment that I had the honour of telegraphing to you that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were beginning to hope that the complication of a war with Turkey would not supervene.

Since then the situation has gone through different phases and more than once has looked dangerous.

Baron de Wangenheim, and especially General Liman von Sanders, are doing all they can to incite the Turks to war, and they have succeeded in creating here an absolutely German atmosphere in Ottoman circles.

A week ago a rupture appeared probable. The Government not only did not send back the German crews of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, but hundreds of sailors and artillerymen were seen arriving from Germany, to serve both in the naval forces and in the batteries guarding the Straits.

The moment therefore appeared near, when the sense of national dignity would oblige the three Allied Powers to put a limit to the provocations of Turkey. Their Ambassadors then began to prepare for departure, and I had the honour of informing you of this by telegraph, adding that in the event of my receiving my passports myself, I proposed to entrust the protection of the Belgians residing in Turkey to the Ambassador of the United States.

<sup>1</sup> [Baron von Wangenheim.]



But in consequence of energetic representations made on August 30th to the Grand Vizier, the situation has seemed to clear up somewhat. His Highness is personally in favour of peace. The same may be said of several members of the Cabinet, amongst others Djavid Bey, who sees the abyss into which the finances of the State will be hurled.

Unhappily the power of Enver Pasha is still very great, and he would like to launch the country into the maddest adventures at any cost.

The mobilisation which has taken place under his orders far surpassed in rigour that which took place during the Balkan War. This time, nobody is excepted between the ages of 20 and 45. Requisitions have assumed a character of a veritable spoliation. The military authorities not only require the provisions to be delivered to them which are found in the shops of private owners or at the Customs House, but also goods of every kind, from motor-cars to ladies' toilet articles.

Numerous boats coming from the Black Sea and going past on their way to the Mediterranean, have been stopped at the passage [*au passage*] and unloaded by force.

These proceedings, which the Minister of a foreign Power has not hesitated to term piracy, in a note which he addressed to the Porte, have, as their result, made trading ships desert the Bosphorus.

I learn that the receipts of the customs at Constantinople have diminished by more than 75 per cent. As to tithes, they will amount to practically nothing, according to what I was told by a member of the Council of Debt. On the one hand, the harvest has been gathered in under adverse conditions, in consequence of lack of labour; on the other hand, the military authorities have seized a mass of agricultural produce, before there was opportunity for the tithe to be levied.

It will be possible for the September coupons of the Public Unified Debt to be paid, but that will probably not be the case with the following coupon, and, for the first time since the Decree of Muharram, a suspension of the service of the Public Debt will be seen, whilst the deficit, according to the British Delegate on the Council of the Debt, will reach the figure of £T.16,500,000.

It is not surprising that under these conditions Djavid

Bey, as Minister of Finance, is exerting himself to stop the Government on the fatal incline, down which German influence and the chauvinism of Enver Pasha wish to drag them.

For the moment, it is especially war against Greece which is contemplated. As I was told yesterday by an Ambassador, the Hellenic Government are well aware that they can no longer hold without question all that was assigned to them by the Treaty of London. The European situation has changed and they will have to make some concessions. Athens would be willing to make concessions with regard to the government in Chios and Mytilene ; for instance, it would be prepared to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan over these islands. But the Turks, in accordance with their system of bargaining, are now formulating on this head such demands that it seems difficult for an understanding to be reached.

There are, nevertheless, various reasons which lead one to believe at present that Turkey will not decide to open hostilities against Greece.

Turkey could not attack Greece by sea, since England has given it to be understood that if the *Goeben* or the *Breslau* comes out of the Dardanelles, the British squadron has orders to sink them.

As to a campaign on land, that would need the consent of Bulgaria, and certain signs seem to indicate that there is little disposition at Sofia to yield an assistance which might involve the country in grave complications.

All the Ambassadors at Constantinople are, in fact, convinced that a rupture between Turkey and Greece will inevitably lead to a war with the three great allied Powers.

To sum up, the danger has diminished, but it is far from having disappeared. The Powers of the Triple Entente are doing their best to remove it, but German influence may bring things to such a pass that the dignity of the three allied countries will be compromised.

Finally, if war breaks out, this will mean political, as well as economic, ruin for Turkey, since the persons most competent to speak are of the opinion that the Turkish Army is incapable of taking the field.

(Signed)

BARON MONCHEUR.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [So signed in the French text.]



No. 44.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to the President of the French Republic.*

(Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

The great victory which the allied army has just gained, thanks to its bravery and to the military genius of its leaders, has given us profound joy.

In addressing to you my warmest congratulations I speak for the whole Belgian people.

We keep an unshakable confidence in the final success of the struggle, and the abominable cruelties which our people has suffered, far from intimidating us, as was hoped, serve only to increase the energy and ardour of our troops.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 45.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.*

(Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

I wish to congratulate you very cordially on the superb conduct of the English troops in the battle of the Marne. In the name of the Belgian nation I express to you our profoundest admiration for the dauntless courage of the officers and soldiers of your army.

God will certainly help our armies to avenge the atrocities committed upon peaceable citizens and against a country whose only crime has been that it refused to be false to its engagements.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 46.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

The magnificent victory which the troops of Your Majesty have just gained fills us, both the Belgian people and myself,

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with sincere admiration for the courage of the Russian soldiers and the talent of their leaders. It is with all my heart that I address to Your Majesty my warmest congratulations.

The cruelties which the country is suffering so unjustly do not at all deject it, and its ardour grows at the thought of the innumerable armies of Your Imperial Majesty advancing triumphantly, uniting their efforts to those of the victorious troops of the friendly Powers who are fighting valiantly in France.

(Signed) ALBERT.

No. 47.

*The President of the French Republic to His Majesty  
the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.) *Bordeaux, September 14, 1914.*

I return Your Majesty lively thanks for the congratulations which you have been good enough to address to the leaders and soldiers of the French Army. Our troops are proud of fighting side by side with the valiant armies of Belgium and England for civilisation and for liberty. When the hour of remedial justice strikes no one will be able to forget what Your Majesty and the admirable Belgian people have done for the triumph of the common cause.

(Signed) RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

No. 48.

*His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Ireland to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.) *London, September 14, 1914.*

I thank you most sincerely for your kind telegram and for your appreciation of the services of my troops. I earnestly trust that the combined operations of the allied forces in co-operation with your brave army, whose heroic efforts are beyond all praise, will meet with continued success and will free your much-tried country from the invader.

(Signed) GEORGE V.



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No. 49.

*His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tsarskoy-Selo, September 14, 1914.*

Touched by the congratulations of Your Majesty, I thank you very cordially, and take pleasure in calling to mind on this occasion that in the present contest it was Belgium who first opposed a heroic resistance to the invaders. The noble attitude of the Belgian people and of its valiant army, led to glory by its King, has evoked the admiration of the whole world. As a testimony of this admiration, which I share with all Russia, I beg Your Majesty to accept the Cross of Chevalier of my Military Order of St. George, which is not given to any but the brave.

(Signed)      NICOLAS.

No. 50.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berne, September 16, 1914.*

SIR,—It was on the evening of August 27th that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, after making use of certain not very lucid phrases as to acts of barbarity alleged to have been committed upon Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium, announced to me the rupture of our relations.

What was the determining motive which led to this change of attitude in regard to us?

Was it the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Minister of War has placed at the disposal of the German military authorities a certain number of siege guns of 30·5 calibre, mounted on motors, constructed in the works of the 'Skoda' Society at Pilsen (Bohemia) and served by Austro-Hungarian gunners?

Was it the desire to have ground for an eventual demand, to be put forward at the conclusion of peace, for a war indemnity?

Was it the feeling that they must satisfy public opinion, which had been strongly excited against us by the extremely violent language of the press?

Was it finally a yielding to pressure exercised by the German Embassy?

I imagine that it was a combination of all these motives which provoked this decision.

I have been assured from a good source that a certain number of the guns, whose manufacture I mentioned in one of my reports last winter, without being then able to give the precise figure of their calibre, have been sent to France and Belgium.

In one of the conversations which I had had with Count Forgach, the latter had spoken to me of numerous Jewish tradesmen and diamond-cutters from Galicia having been completely ruined in consequence of their summary expulsion from the *Place* of Antwerp [*la place d'Anvers*].<sup>1</sup> His Excellency had not concealed from me that certain demands for compensation would be advanced on this head.

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. No. 32, 'the fortified district.']

The Austrian journals have not only published numerous letters, duly signed, coming from travellers who complain of having undergone bad treatment in Belgium, but they have reproduced all the German accusations with regard to cruelties and atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated by our people during the course of the conflict. It is evidently the disagreeable realisation of the wrong they have committed in violating our neutrality, and the lively desire, if not to efface, at any rate to weaken, the bad impression produced by those proceedings against the rights of peoples, which have prompted this particularly bitter campaign against us.

'We thought the Belgians possessed of a high civilisation and culture, and now we see they are worse than Serbians, worse than the negroes of the Congo.' This is the dominant note. Further, with reference to the violation of our neutrality and on the subject of the political side of the question, the most serious papers, such as the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Fremdenblatt* itself, have published articles containing arguments which are absurd and childish. They could do this all the more easily, because no one was in a position to reply to them, or, at least, foreign papers which would have refuted their arguments could not cross the frontiers of the Monarchy.

Naturally the public confidently accepted all they read in regard to us, and the result was a malevolent and hostile disposition towards the Belgians, which has been shown also



in the circle of the Police Prefecture of Vienna. Certain high functionaries of this administration distinguished themselves in this respect. Before the declaration of war had been presented to us, countrymen of ours who had just arrived in Vienna, or those whose immediate circumstances obliged them to pass through the capital, were summoned to the police, were questioned, were watched or interned, either under the suspicion that they were spies, or because they were considered as being of age sufficient for military service in their country. Nevertheless, so far as I know, no grave abuse has been committed and none of our compatriots has been really ill-treated. Thanks to the efforts of our Consul-General with the Police Authorities, and thanks to my representations at the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, three men who had been interned were released, but kept under supervision.

After having announced to me that relations were broken off, Count Berchtold expressed to me in a very kind way his personal regrets, adding that after the end of the war he would be pleased to see me once more occupy the same post, if the Royal Government wished to appoint me to it.

In conformity with your telegraphic instructions I put myself into communication with the Spanish Ambassador, who had already undertaken the protection of Russian and Serbian subjects, and who hastened to undertake the defence of our interests as well.

I also addressed to our Consuls-General and Consuls a circular in which I thanked them in the name of the Royal Government for their whole-hearted co-operation. I told them that they could keep their archives for the time being, while at the same time they were to put themselves into communication with their Spanish colleagues, and I expressed the hope that they would continue, even in their private capacity, to take an interest in the lot of our countrymen who resided in their districts.

Since a faster train service had been organised to the Swiss frontier from the 1st of this month, a saloon was put at my disposal and attached to the train which left Vienna on the 3rd at 10.30 P.M. I left with my daughter and with M. and Mme. de Raymond, accompanied by their three children and a governess. We reached the Swiss frontier at Buchs

on the 5th at 7.30 A.M. Free tickets had been handed to us, and the transport of our luggage took place under the same conditions.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) COMTE ERREMBAUT DUDZEELE.

No. 51.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Hove (Sussex), September 21, 1914.*

SIR,—I had the honour to address to you on the 4th August<sup>1</sup> (see No. 25) a telegraphic summary of the conversation I had had the same day with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after having received the telegram by which you informed me of the ultimatum of the German Government and the reply which the Government had made to it.

<sup>1</sup> [Aug. 5 according to No. 25.]

The mission which you entrusted to me immediately after my return to Belgium prevented me, as you know, from sending you a detailed account of this conversation, and now that it is ended I am anxious to carry out this duty.

Your telegram was brought to me on the 3rd towards 8 P.M. By the time I had deciphered it, it was too late for me to go to [the] Wilhelmstrasse. I resolved to postpone until the following morning the verbal explanations which it was my duty to demand from Herr von Jagow on the subject of the German Government's unjustifiable action. Early the next day I telephoned to him asking him to receive me as soon as possible. He replied, asking me to go immediately. At 9 o'clock I was shown into his room. The Ministry was still empty.

'Well, what have you to say to me?' These were his first words as he hurried to meet me.

'I have to ask you for explanations in regard to the ultimatum which the German Minister handed on Sunday evening to my Government. I suppose you have some reason to give in explanation of such action.'

'An absolute necessity forced us to present that demand to you. It is with mortal grief that the Emperor and his Government have had to resign themselves to doing so. To



myself it is the most painful resolution and the most cruel thing I have had to do throughout my career. But the passage through Belgium is for Germany a question of life and death. She must be finished with France as quickly as possible, crush her completely so as then to be able to turn against Russia, otherwise she herself will be caught between the hammer and the anvil. We have learnt that the French Army was preparing to pass through Belgium and to attack us on our flank. We must forestall her.'

'But,' I answered, 'you are in direct contact with France on a frontier of 200 kilometres; why, in order to settle your quarrel, did you need to turn aside and pass through our country?'

'The French frontier is too strongly fortified, and we are obliged,' he repeated, 'to act very quickly before Russia has had time to mobilise her army.'

'Contrary to what you think, France has given us a formal promise to respect our neutrality, provided that you respect it too. What would you have said if, instead of making us this promise of her own accord, she had presented to us the same summons before you, if she had demanded a passage through our country, and if we had yielded to her threats? That we were cowards, incapable of defending our neutrality and unworthy of an independent existence?'

Herr von Jagow did not reply to this question.

'Have you,' I continued, 'anything with which to reproach us? Have we not always correctly and scrupulously fulfilled the duties which the neutrality of Belgium imposed upon us with regard to Germany as well as the other guarantee Powers? Since the foundation of our kingdom have we not been loyal and trustworthy neighbours to you?'

'Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct.'

'And so, in recognition of our loyalty, you wish to make of our country the battlefield for your struggle with France, the battlefield of Europe; and we know what devastation modern warfare brings with it! Have you thought of that?'

'If the Belgian army,' the Secretary of State replied, 'allows us to pass freely, without destroying the railways, without blowing up the bridges and tunnels, and if it retires on Antwerp without attempting to defend Liège, we promise

not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the lives and property of the inhabitants, but also to indemnify you for the loss incurred.'

'Sir,' I replied, 'the Belgian Government, conscious of its duties towards all the guarantors of its neutrality, can make no reply to such a proposal other than the reply which it has made without hesitation. The whole nation will support its King and its Government. You must recognise yourself that no other reply was possible.'

As I urged him to speak, Herr von Jagow, in the face of my persistence, ended by saying: 'I recognise it. I understand your reply. I understand it as private individual, but as Secretary of State I have no opinion to express.' And then he repeated the expression of his grief at having come to such a point after so many years of friendly relationship. But a rapid march through Belgium was for Germany a question of life or death. We in our turn should understand that.

I answered immediately: 'Belgium would have lost her honour if she had listened to you, and no nation, any more than an individual, can live without honour. Europe will be our judge. And besides,' I added, 'you will not take Liège as easily as you think, and you will have to meet England, the faithful guarantor of our neutrality.'

At these words Herr von Jagow shrugged his shoulders, an action which could be interpreted in two ways. It signified: 'What an idea! It is impossible!' Or, perhaps: 'The lot is cast, we cannot go back.'

I added, before retiring, that I was ready to leave Berlin with my staff and to ask for my passports. 'But I cannot break my relations with you in this way,' cried the Secretary of State; 'perhaps there will still be something for us to talk over.' 'It is for my Government to take a decision about that,' I replied; 'it does not depend upon you or me. I will wait for their orders to ask for my passports.'

As I left Herr von Jagow after this painful interview, which was to be our last, I carried away the impression that he had expected something else when I had asked to see him, some unforeseen proposal, perhaps the request to allow the Belgian army to retire in security to Antwerp after having made a show of resistance on the Meuse and having, on the invasion of the



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country, formally defended the principle of her neutrality. After my first words, the face of the speaker seemed to me to betray a feeling of disappointment, and his persistence in telling me not to break our relations yet strengthened this idea which I had had from the start of our conversation.—I am etc. (Signed) BARON BEYENS.

No. 52.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Hove (Sussex), September 22, 1914.*

SIR,—In continuation of my report of yesterday, I have the honour to present to you the account of the conversation I had on the 5th August with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I add to it an account of the return journey to Brussels of the Belgian Legation [*Mission du Roi*] at Berlin.

On August 5th, in the morning, I received the telegram, in which you directed me to ask for my passports and informed me of the departure of the German Minister from Brussels. I went immediately to the Wilhelmstrasse, where I was received by the Under Secretary of State, to whom I made known your instructions.

Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute necessity for us—a question of life or death (*sein oder nicht sein*). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible in order to be able then to turn against Russia.

Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in the speech which he had delivered the evening before in the Reichstag,<sup>1</sup> of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the Lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr von Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me.<sup>2</sup>

I replied nearly in the same terms that I had used the evening before in my discussion with Herr von Jagow; if France had been ready first and had demanded a passage of

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 353-7.]  
<sup>2</sup> [See No. 51.]

us on the same conditions as Germany, we should have made the same reply to her. If, in a cowardly way, we had yielded to her threats, you would not have had enough words of contempt and anger to throw in our faces and we should have deserved them, since we should have failed to keep our word and have violated our engagement to remain neutral, which had been received by the founders of our independence. 'You must recognise that we could not have acted in any other way without forfeiting our honour, and you could not imagine for one moment that the Belgian Government would throw itself to the ground before the feet of the German Government and would give up to it the keys of our cities and our fortresses. Have you anything with which to reproach us? Have we not been good and loyal neighbours, desirous of maintaining with you, as with the other nations bordering on Belgium, the most cordial relations? For 80 years no cloud has arisen to darken our relations. And to-day how do you recognise the friendship and the confidence of the Belgian people which is now nearly a century old? By the intention of making its territory the field of European battle and devastation.'

Herr Zimmermann simply replied that the department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilisation had been issued by the Emperor, all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispensable operation of war. 'I hope,' he added with emphasis, 'that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end of the policy of alliances which has led to this result.'

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first,<sup>1</sup> that Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did not know beforehand the *text itself* of the ultimatum, addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum

<sup>1</sup> [See No. 8 (p. 334).]



from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war. As to the hope expressed by Herr Zimmermann that this war would be the last, it is necessary to understand him as speaking on the assumption of a victorious campaign by Germany. The Under Secretary of State, in spite of the visible fear which the coalition of his country's enemies caused him, is too good a Prussian to have had at that moment any doubt of final victory.

He was not able to promise me that I should be sent by way of Holland; he feared that the military authorities would have me taken to Denmark. Before leaving the Department I urged upon Dr. Zahn, Director of the Protocol, with whom I had always maintained the best relations, that I should not be obliged to take a route so out of the way as that of Denmark. Herr Zahn assured me that he would do his best and he kept his promise. In fact when Count von Mirbach, Councillor at Law, brought me my passport at 3 P.M., after having expressed to me his regret at having to undertake such a mission, he told me that a special train would be ready to take me the following morning with the English Ambassador to the Dutch frontier.

I had only a few hours left to finish my preparations, to dismiss my servants, and to entrust the archives of the Legation to the care of the Spanish Ambassador, who had been authorised by his Government to undertake the protection of Belgian interests during the war. I recommended the Councillor and the Secretaries to hold themselves in readiness to depart the following morning at 7 A.M., and I appointed the Legation as our meeting place.

On the 6th August at the hour named, M. Peltzer, Major and Madame de Mélotte, M. Adrien Nieuwenhuys, M. Jacques Davignon, M. and Madame Rothé and myself, accompanied by two Belgian servants, left the Hotel [mansion] of the Jägerstrasse in motor-cars sent in part by the Department for Foreign Affairs. The roads which led to the Lehrter Bahnhof, where we were to join the train, were guarded by mounted police. There were few people about in the streets at that hour of the morning and our journey did not give rise to any demonstrations.

The special train which was placed under the orders of a Colonel of the Reserve, whose attitude towards us was very courteous, was provided with a dining car. Before our departure Count Botha von Wedel, Minister Plenipotentiary, came and greeted the British Ambassador and myself in the name of the Under Secretary of State, and inquired if we needed anything. The journey took place slowly on the line Stendhal-Hanover-Minden, with long stops in order to allow the passage of trains full of reservists. At the first stations the population watched our journey without animosity, perhaps because they were unaware of our identity. At Minden on the Weser our identity had obviously been divulged, for an assembly of curious people, mostly women, approached the dining car in which I was chatting with Sir Edward Goschen. They shouted patriotic songs for our benefit, put out their tongues, and shook their fists with accompanying words to which we paid no attention.

The German train took the Ambassador to the Hook of Holland where he embarked for England. The staff of the Belgian Legation and myself got out at The Hague. At the Dutch frontier, which we crossed on the 7th at 8 A.M., we were able to obtain papers; they informed us of the events at Liège. After passing twenty-four hours without any news, in an anguish of patriotism which you will easily understand, the telegrams giving an account of the heroic resistance of General Leman and of our soldiers made our hearts beat with joy and pride. Our travelling companions belonging to the British Embassy warmly expressed their admiration for the conduct of the Belgian Army.

At the Hague we found my colleague, Baron Fallon, at the station, to whom I had been able to telegraph in the course of the journey. He gave us a most cordial reception, as likewise did Prince Albert de Ligne, and brought us the latest editions of Dutch papers filled with news concerning the defence of Liège. Thanks to his extreme obligingness, the two railway companies which own the line as far as the Belgian frontier, without any charge put at our disposal special trains which took us, one to Rotterdam and the other to Antwerp. We arrived at Brussels at 6 P.M.

In conclusion, I am glad to bring to your notice the intelligence and devotion with which I was assisted by the members



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of the Legation in the course of these difficult days. You know already of the indefatigable zeal shown on all occasions by M. Peltzer. The two secretaries, the Military Attaché and the Chancellor, have rivalled him in calmness and sang-froid. I must give special praise to the courage shown by the ladies of the Legation. It was an encouragement and a consolation to us.

The few hours which were left me before my departure did not allow of my taking with me our Consul-General at Hamburg. He would not have been able to reach Berlin in time, as the line was crowded by military trains. I should have been glad to spare him the fatigue and weariness of returning by way of Denmark.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) BARON BEYENS.

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### No. 53.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

SIR,—In diplomatic circles for the last three days, a more decided uneasiness has prevailed with regard to the possibility of a declaration of war by Turkey.

The Grand Vizier continues to affirm in the most persistent fashion Turkey's intention of remaining neutral. The Sultan expressed himself in the same way in the course of the audience which he granted yesterday to Sir Louis Mallet.

But, as I was told yesterday by an Ambassador whose judgment in the matter is the less suspect since he does not belong to the Triple Entente, it is no longer the Sultan or the Grand Vizier who governs; it is not even Enver Pasha; it is Germany. She rules with a high hand not only the Porte, but the Army and the Navy, into which she has sent hundreds of officers.

The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* fly the Turkish flag, but the crews have not even discarded their German uniforms. On the Dardanelles and on the Bosphorus the cannon of the forts are manned by German artillerymen.

Turkey is no longer anything but an instrument of war

at the disposal of Germany, and she will make use of it on the day she finds it to her advantage to do so.

It is true that the Turkish Army is much too weak to make any effective diversion against Russia. But Rumania seems on the point of taking up an attitude hostile to Austria, this she could only do after assuring herself of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. Perhaps in Berlin there is a desire to influence the decisions of Rumania and Bulgaria by causing them to fear an attack on their weak side, that is to say, their coasts, which they could not defend against a bombardment by the Turkish fleet.

On Sunday and yesterday the *Breslau* and *Goeben* in succession had gunnery drill in the Black Sea. These goings and comings have helped to raise apprehensions here.

On Sunday morning Sir L. Mallet once more declared quite frankly to the Grand Vizier that if these two units went out into the Ægean Sea the English fleet which is at the entrance to the Dardanelles would sink them immediately.

(Signed) BARON MONCHEUR.

No. 54.

*Telegram communicated on 25th September by the American Consul at Antwerp to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*<sup>1</sup>

*Sept. 24 for Legation Brussels, circular twenty-third.*

At the request of the German Government and on the understanding that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatever to make, you may bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article II of the Congo Act of February 26, 1885, relating to the neutralisation of the Colonies lying within the conventional free-trade zone. The note points out that chapter three of this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation.\*

(Signed) BRYAN,  
*Secretary of State, Washington.*

\* [This is the text of the original document, as given in English in the Belgian Grey Book.]

<sup>1</sup> [See N 58; cf. N 66; also *Diplomati* 2, p. 54.]



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No. 55.

*Baron A. Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, September 30, 1914.*

SIR,—I have not neglected to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram of August 30 last (see No. 40) relating to the alleged bad treatment of which, according to the *Neue Freie Presse*, Austrian subjects had been victims at Antwerp and at Ostend.

The Minister of State has just informed me that the Embassy of his Catholic Majesty at Vienna has on the 11th of this month handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the protest of the Belgian Government.—I am, etc.,

(Signed)      BARON A. GRENIER.

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No. 56.

*Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Minister in France, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Bordeaux, October 11, 1914.*

SIR,—The President of the Republic summoned me this morning and received me in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me in effect :—

‘I have during the night and this morning received many telegrams from M. Klobukowski informing me of the grave situation in which Belgium is placed. It has caused me great emotion and sincere regrets. I have also learned that a Cabinet Council, at which General Pau and the English general were present, has declared that in view of probable attacks by the German forces the Belgian Government and its army must leave the national territory. King Albert has expressed a desire to receive for himself, his Government and his Army the hospitality of France. He has named the port of Havre, adding that the Army will continue to co-operate in the joint action of the Allies.

‘The Government of the Republic required no deliberation

on this matter, since at the first word we were unanimous in affirming our sentiments of affection and admiration for the noble Belgian people and in declaring that the widest hospitality would be offered to them in France, leaving them their full independence and sovereignty.

'I wish to assure King Albert without delay and I beg you to lend me your assistance in conveying the following cipher telegram to His Majesty :—

“His Majesty, King Albert, Ostend.

“I am informed of the decision made by the Belgian Government. The Government of the Republic is profoundly moved by it and will immediately take the necessary steps to assure the sojourn in France of Your Majesty and his ministers in full independence and sovereignty. I am anxious to say personally to Your Majesty how proud France is of offering you, until the hour of our joint victory, hospitality in the town which you have chosen, and I beg you to accept the assurance of my unalterable friendship.

“RAYMOND POINCARÉ.”

The President of the Republic and M. Delcassé have omitted nothing to assure me of their sympathy in the misfortunes which are falling so unjustly upon Belgium. M. Poincaré laid much emphasis on the measures which will be taken in order to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the country.

During the day I had an opportunity of being received a second time by the President of the Republic, who had charged M. William Martin, the Chief of the Protocol, with the duty of going at once to Havre in order to look into the question of making provision for Their Majesties, the Ministers, and the high functionaries of the Belgian State. I had an opportunity of conferring several times with the Chief of the Political Direction. Everywhere I found a welcome full of sincere grief, completely sympathetic and absolutely devoted.—I am, etc.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 57.

*His Majesty King Albert to the President of the French Republic.*

*Ostend, October 12, 1914.*

M. LE PRÉSIDENT,—I am profoundly touched by the hospitality which France is ready to offer so cordially to the Belgian Government and by the measures which the Republic is taking in order to secure our full independence and sovereignty. We await with unshakable confidence the hour of joint victory. Fighting side by side for a just cause our courage will know no yielding.

I beg you, M. le Président, to accept the assurance of my unalterable affection.

(Signed) ALBERT.

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No. 58.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le Havre, October 21, 1914.*

Please have recourse to the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador in order to forward to the German Government the following telegram :—

Under date September 25th, the United States Consul at Antwerp sent a telegram (see No. 54) according to which he was authorised to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, with regard to the neutralisation of the Colonies within the conventional free-trade zone. The note drew attention to the fact that this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is disposed to accept such a neutralisation.

The Belgian Government cannot explain how this note, which was sent on August 22nd to the Ambassador of the United States at Berlin, did not reach him until September 25th.

Under date August 7th the Belgian Government put itself into communication with the French and British Governments to propose to them the neutralisation of the conventional

basin of the Congo,<sup>1</sup> and, in the meanwhile, gave to its agents the order to observe a strictly defensive attitude. It desired, in fact, that the war should not be extended to Central Africa. <sup>1</sup> [See *Di- lomatic*, 2, p. 54.]

The British and French Governments could not be parties to this proposal<sup>2</sup> by reason of the acts of hostility which had already at this time been committed in Africa. In particular German forces had attacked British Central Africa and British East Africa. <sup>2</sup> [See *Di- lomatic*, 2, pp. 66.]

At the same time the Belgian Government was advised that the German Colonial forces had from August 22nd been attacking the port of Lukuga, on Lake Tanganyika.

The Belgian Government in consequence draws the attention of the Imperial Government to the fact that it was they who had taken the initiative in hostilities in Africa, and had thus opposed the realisation of the desire of the Belgian Government concerning the application of the above-mentioned Article 11.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 59.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, October 23, 1914.

In consequence of the Russian successes the Germans are increasing their pressure on the Porte with the object of bringing about war.<sup>3</sup> The Porte still gives the Ambassadors assurances of peaceful intentions, but pushes forward its preparations for war. <sup>3</sup> [Cf. No. 60.]

(Signed) BARON MONCHEUR.

No. 60.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Constantinople, October 31, 1914.

SIR,—I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 23rd of this month<sup>4</sup> that Germany was increasing her pressure on <sup>4</sup> [No. 59]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

Turkey to go to war, as her armies are experiencing reverses in Poland as well as in France.

Since then events have been very much hastened.

The day before yesterday, October 29th, the English Ambassador came to see me and warned me that according to reliable information troops of Beduins, led by German officers, had crossed the Egyptian frontier, and that if the news were confirmed a *casus belli* with Turkey would be the result.

But on the same evening we learnt the still more serious fact of the attack on Russian troops and ports by a part of the Turkish fleet, commanded, of course, by German officers.

According to the unanimous opinion of diplomatic circles the *coup* was prepared and executed by the Germans without the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and perhaps even of the Turkish Naval Minister, Djemal Pasha, with the object of forcing the Government, several members of which had a well-marked repugnance to war, to decide on it.

From that moment there was no longer any hope of maintaining peace here, and I telegraphed to you on the night of the 29th-30th that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were preparing for departure.

Yesterday, October 30th, they went separately to the Grand Vizier to demand their passports. Prince Saïd Halim was in a state of extreme agitation and seemed to be in despair at the turn that events were taking. He repeated with emphasis to the Ambassadors that he did not desire war, and there is reason for believing that he spoke in good faith.

To-day at 2 o'clock the Ambassadors had not yet received their passports, and a persistent rumour was even going about this morning that all hope of some arrangement was not lost.

But this was not possible. To make good the outrage committed on Russia by ships flying the Turkish flag, it was not sufficient for the Porte to make excuses and to disavow the action of the German admiral who was in command. The Powers of the Triple Entente would further require that the German crews and, in general, all officers of this nationality belonging to the German mission to Turkey should be sent back. Now the Young Turk Government, even if it desired to have recourse to this measure of safety, would lack the

courage and energy necessary to execute it. It is caught in the German wheel and will remain there.

I have just telegraphed to you that the Ambassadors are leaving this evening whether they have received their passports or not. The French Ambassador has postponed his departure till to-morrow evening for reasons of personal convenience.

The press has received an order to publish a *communiqué* designed to mislead the public and to make it believe that Russia commenced hostilities. This manœuvre will have been dictated by Germany, and it recalls that which was employed to make France appear responsible for the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Here the city is very quiet. There has been no demonstration against foreigners. There is rather a feeling of consternation which prevails among many Turks who do not share the ideas of Enver Pasha and his chauvinistic followers.

It is probable enough that this fresh war will have no considerable development, at least for a long time. The Powers of the Triple Entente are very much occupied elsewhere and will not make any very great efforts here.

As I have often written, England and Russia, who did not desire any new complications from the East, have here shown extreme patience for three months. But if they could have known that peace could not be maintained it would have been preferable to send an ultimatum to Turkey on the arrival of the *Goeben* in the Dardanelles last August. Since that time, in fact, the entry to the Straits, on the side of the Black Sea as well as the Ægean Sea, has been very much strengthened by new batteries manned by Germans, and by a whole system of mines. And in other respects we must recognise that, thanks to the sacrifices which are ruining the country and thanks to the millions which have come from Germany, the army is much more strongly organised than at the outbreak of the European war.

It is therefore probable that the European fleets will not attempt at present to force the Straits. From this point of view it is very regrettable that in the Russian Black Sea Fleet there is no unit equal in strength to the *Goeben*.

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 30th of this month that in accordance with the instructions you trans-



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

mitted by telegram on the 9th August to M. Leclercq, I would remain at my post unless the Porte handed me my passports.

In view of the irregularity of telegraphic communications, I thought it advisable to return to this question in my telegram of to-day, and I asked you to let me know by courier if you adhere to your instructions of the 9th August.

I do not think that the Porte will hand me my passports unless the Germans, who, I repeat, rule everything with a high hand, consider that my presence here offers danger from the point of view of information that I might supply to the Allies.

But, in reference to this question, I think I ought to let you know that a German who is connected with the Embassy of his country at Constantinople has here evolved the opinion that the Belgian Government, having left Belgian soil, is no longer considered existent by Germany, and that in consequence, the Embassy, in order to remain faithful to its theory, must prevent the Porte from sending his passports to the representative of a Government which no longer exists.

I should not be able to stay here with dignity if my maintenance were based on such a theory.

I must, nevertheless, add that up to the present nothing in the behaviour of the Sublime Porte towards me indicates that it has adopted the point of view attributed to the German Embassy.—I am, etc.,

(Signed)      BARON MONCHEUR.

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No. 61.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Moncheur,  
Belgian Minister at Constantinople.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le Havre, November 1, 1914.*

In view of the existing tension you will judge whether it is not desirable, through our Consuls, to advise our countrymen residing in Turkey to go to the coast towns where they will have an opportunity of embarking.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

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## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

No. 62.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. van Ypersele  
de Strihou, Belgian Minister at Bukarest.*

(Telegraphic.) *Le Havre, November 6, 1914.*

The Turkish Minister has asked for his passports.<sup>1</sup> Notify <sup>1</sup> [See No. 65.] the Belgian Minister at Constantinople either directly or through the Rumanian Legation to do the same and to leave Turkey with his staff and the consular officials.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 63.

*Jonkheer de Weede, Minister of the Netherlands, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Le Havre, November 7, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the Government of the Queen has authorised me, in accordance with the request of the Turkish Minister, to look after Turkish interests in Belgium during the rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Turkey. —I am, etc.

(Signed) JONKHEER DE WEEDE.

No. 64.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Belgian  
Ministers in Foreign Countries.*

*Le Havre, November 9, 1914.*

SIR,—The French Government has informed the Belgian Government of the state of war existing between France and Turkey, and in these circumstances the presence at Havre of the Turkish Minister with the Belgian Government became delicate. Understanding the situation in which he was placed by the course of events, His Excellency Noursret Sadoullah Bey took the initiative by asking for his passports and by



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

putting Turkish interests in Belgium under the protection of the Minister of the Netherlands.

Under date November 6th I sent to His Excellency the passports which he had asked for, and remarked that, according to the interpretation of the Belgian Government, the rupture of diplomatic relations in no way implied a state of war between the two countries.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople has received instructions to ask for his passports and to leave Turkey. The care of Belgian interests in Turkey has been entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

(Signed)     DAVIGNON.

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No. 65.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to  
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Melin, November 16, 1914.*

<sup>1</sup> [See No. 62.] SIR,—On Saturday, the 7th of this month, at 4 P.M., I received a telegram from my colleague at Bukarest,<sup>1</sup> informing me that the Turkish Minister in Belgium having asked for his passports, you ordered me to do the same and to leave Turkey with my staff and the officials of the Belgian Consular Service.

Since receiving your communication, made through M. van Ypersele de Strihou, I went to the Ambassador of the United States in order to make all arrangements for the protection of Belgians remaining in Turkey.

On his advice I telephoned to the Porte to ask if the Grand Vizier could receive me. On receiving the reply that His Highness was at a meeting of the Council, I sent the same evening to his residence on the Bosphorus a letter setting out the reasons why I was asking for my passports and informing the Porte that in leaving Constantinople with my staff I left Baron de Hubsch and Baron Marghetich [*MM. le Baron de Hubsch et Marghetich*], attached provisionally to the American Embassy, to help M. Morgenthau in protecting my countrymen and their interests.

Passports were sent to me twenty-four hours later in an envelope of the Sublime Porte, but without any accompanying letter.

I left Constantinople on Tuesday, November 10th, at 7 A.M. The American Ambassador sent me his motor-car, and, in spite of the early hour, he came to say good-bye at the station. The Grand Vizier had sent his Chief Secretary to salute me on the departure of the train.

My colleague of the Bulgarian Legation having previously warned his Government of my passage through Bulgarian territory, the Sub-Prefect came to salute me at the frontier station in the name of M. Radoslavof. At Dedeagatch the authorities also waited upon me, acting under superior orders, and facilitated my departure in the most obliging manner. From Dedeagatch I telegraphed my thanks to M. Radoslavof.

The French and English subjects at Constantinople, whose protection is also entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States, highly praised the efficient way in which he has taken their interests in hand. He has already shown much energy and decision in this respect.

It is entirely due to him that several English subjects whom Enver Pasha wished to hold back as hostages were able to leave the country. Consequently, I am certain that our colony will be well protected.

The Legation is closed, but I have left the staff of kavasses, just as has been done in the other Embassies and Legations. This is essential for the protection of the house and its contents. The American flag has been hoisted.—I am, etc.

(Signed)      BARON MONCHEUR.

No. 66.

*The Minister of the United States of America to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, November 16, 1914.*

MR. MINISTER,—I am in receipt of the following telegram from my Government, which I am directed to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge :

'At request of German Government, and on understand-



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ing that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatsoever to make, you may bring to attention of Foreign Office the fact, that on August 22nd German Government addressed a Note to American Ambassador referring to Article 11 of the Congo Act, February 26, 1883, relating to neutralisation of colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The Note points out that chapter three of this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation.'—I avail myself, etc., (Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.\*

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. also No. 58.]

(See No. 54.) <sup>1</sup>

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No. 67.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Brand Whitlock, Minister of United States of America.*

*Le Havre, December 5, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excellency of the letter of November 16, referring to the neutralisation of the Conventional Basin of the Congo suggested by Germany.

The proposal of the German Government, which was dated August 22nd, was notified to us by the Consul-General of the United States at Antwerp on September 25th.<sup>2</sup>

Your Excellency has learned by reading the *Grey Book* the steps which the Belgian Government has taken with a view to maintaining the neutrality of the Congo. (See *First Grey Book*, No. 57.)<sup>3</sup> You will find herewith a copy of the telegram regarding this matter which I addressed on October 21st to the Imperial Government through the Spanish Government (see No. 58).—I am, etc.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

\* [The Belgian Grey Book gives the original English text of this document.]

## SECOND PART.

PROTESTS BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST  
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR AND ESPECIALLY  
OF THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS.

## SECTION I.

GERMAN ACCUSATIONS IN REGARD TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE  
BELGIAN CIVIL POPULATION.

No. 68.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at The Hague, London, Paris, and Madrid.*

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the press that the Belgian Government indignantly protests against the assertion of the Wolff Bureau that the inhabitants of the district of Liège have taken part in the fighting, that others have lain in ambush and shot German doctors who were attending to wounded men, and that wounded men have been cruelly treated.

Belgium is scrupulously observing The Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War,<sup>1</sup> of which she was a signatory. The Government has reminded the population that civilians must abstain absolutely from the use of their arms against the invaders, and that only the army and militia forces which fulfil the necessary conditions have that right and duty.

<sup>1</sup> [For its text see *Military*, p. 472.]

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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No. 69.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Antwerp, August 18, 1914.*

SIR,—Be so good as to request the Minister of Foreign Affairs kindly to communicate the enclosed protest from the Belgian Government to the Imperial German Government.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ENCLOSURE TO NO. 69.

*Note.*

Belgium, which desired peace, has been compelled by Germany to take up arms and legitimately to defend herself against an attack that was unjustifiable and contrary to the solemn engagements of treaties. She considers it a point of honour to carry on the struggle loyally and to observe all the Laws and Customs of War. From the moment of the entry of German troops into her territory the Belgian Government has had posted in every commune, and the newspapers have published every day, orders forbidding non-combatant civilians to commit any act of warfare against the troops and the military invading the country. The information on which the German Government believes it can rely to justify its assertion that the Belgian population is contravening the laws of nations and is quite unworthy of respect, is certainly false. The Government enters the most earnest protest against the truth of the allegations which have been advanced, and against the odious threats of reprisals.

If some particular act which is contrary to the laws of war were to be ultimately established, it would be proper in order to appreciate it justly to make allowance for the legitimate state of nervousness which the cruelties committed by the German soldiers have provoked among the Belgian people, a people which is thoroughly honourable, but vigorous in the defence of its rights and in its respect for humanity. Long indeed would already be the list of these atrocities, of which we are collecting the first, were we now to publish it.

Whole regions have been ravaged, and abominable crimes committed in their villages.

A Committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice is drawing up a catalogue of these horrors with scrupulous impartiality.

The following may be quoted as examples illustrating the state of mind and the conduct of various German troops:—

(1) A troop of Uhlans occupying Linsmeau was attacked by some infantry and by two policemen employed as sharpshooters. A German officer was killed. The German soldiers thought that the officer had been attacked by civilians. This

is absolutely incorrect ; the Belgian officers knew that the German officer had been killed by their men, and they had given the burgomaster of Linsmeau the order to bury the German officer. This point was specially investigated at the inquiry, and it was established beyond all possible doubt that the inhabitants of Linsmeau scrupulously abstained from any act of hostility. The burgomaster of Linsmeau vouched for this over and over again to the officer in command of the German troops.

But in vain. The village was invaded in the evening of Monday, August 10th, by a great number of Uhlans, followed by artillery, and machine-guns.

They opened fire on two farms and six or seven houses, and destroyed and burnt them down. They forced all the male inhabitants of the village to leave their houses and give up their arms. They did not find one that had recently been fired. Nevertheless, they divided the men into three groups. The men of one of these groups were tied with ropes. Eleven of these peasants were placed in a ditch, where they were found with their heads battered in by the butt ends of rifles. All of them were dead. The others were made to walk between horses into the country under the constant threat of being shot. They were finally released with the threat that the village would be completely destroyed if any of them left his house at night.

(2) During the night of Monday, August 10th, great numbers of Uhlans went to Velm. The inhabitants were asleep. The Germans, without any provocation whatever, fired on the house of M. Deglimme-Gevers, then broke in and destroyed the furniture, and stole what money they could find.

They set fire to the barn, the crops, the agricultural implements ; six oxen and the poultry were burnt to death. They took away M. Deglimme-Gevers' wife half naked to a distance of over a mile from the house, let her go, and then fired on her but did not hit her. They took the husband in another direction and put three bullets into him. He is now in a dying condition.

The same Uhlans also sacked and burnt the house of the level-crossing watchman.

(3) At the agency of the National Bank at Liège, German



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

troops have seized 400,000 francs' worth of unstamped five-franc notes which ought not to have been stamped except by order of the Directors of the Bank in Brussels. The die was at the printer's. The German authorities ordered the notes to be stamped, and they are now using them.

(4) The following communication was addressed from Haekendevez, on August the 14th, 1914, to the officer in command of the 1st D.A. at Cumplich:—

Record of information which has been collected in regard to the conduct of German cavalry at Orsmael and Neerhespen on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of August:—

(1) Facts sworn to by the farmer Jef Dierickx, of Neerhespen.

An old man of the district has had his arm cut into three parts longitudinally, and was then hung up by the feet and burnt alive.

Certain persons in Orsmael have had their sexual organs removed; young girls and children have been violated.

A wounded rifleman-cyclist who had been made prisoner was hanged, and the Belgian soldier who was looking after him was put up against a telegraph-post along the road to Saint-Trond and shot.

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No. 70.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, October 6, 1914.*

SIR,—I have duly executed the instructions contained in your letter of August 18, and have requested the Minister of State to communicate to the German Government the protest of the Belgian Government against the inhuman behaviour of the German troops. His Excellency has just told me that the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin had informed him that immediately after receiving this communication he had forwarded it to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) BARON GRENIER.

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No. 71.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

*Havre, December 30, 1914.*

SIR,—The German authorities have repeatedly accused the Belgian civil population of having everywhere organised in a systematic and odious way armed resistance to all the operations of the German troops in Belgium. The Commission of Inquiry, in several of their reports, entirely demolished the fantastic stories which the Germans have tried to make foreign countries believe, with the object of justifying their own misdeeds. But the German Government has gone further; it has had the effrontery to maintain that the Belgian Government itself had organised this resistance on the part of the civilian population.

The Emperor of Germany declared this *urbi et orbi* in his telegram to President Wilson<sup>1</sup>: 'They (the Allies) have not only made use of abominable weapons of war (dum-dum bullets) but the Belgian Government has openly stirred up the whole civilian population which had been long preparing for the struggle, and in which even women and priests took part.'

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Military*,  
p. 201.]

Afterwards details were supplied. The German Legation at Bukarest sent to the press in August last a communication relative to the destruction of the town of Louvain, which says: '*The Belgian Government had long ago organised a rising against any enemy that might invade their territory. They had arranged stores of arms, where each rifle bore the name of the citizen for whom it was destined.*

... This attack (at Louvain) was all the more odious since *it had clearly been prepared beforehand* and took place at the same time as the sortie from Antwerp. ...'

Not long ago the German press raised this question again.

These accusations must not remain unanswered, however absurd they may seem at first sight to any impartial person. As early as August 18 I requested the Spanish Government to protest against them in Berlin. I sent you a copy, on August the 21st, of the Note sent to the German Government.<sup>2</sup> I called attention to the circulars and placards which had been posted in all the communes of Belgium at the beginning of hostilities in order to deter the inhabitants from

<sup>2</sup> [See *anti*  
pp. 399-  
402.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

any act of hostility against the enemy. The reproduction of these circulars and posters issued by our Ministry of the Interior and by our communal authorities might still at this moment be useful in certain countries.

The Minister of the Interior has on this subject sent the Note of which I enclose herewith a copy. In it you will find all the information necessary for giving a formal denial to the German accusations.

I leave it to you to decide when to publish such denials. Circumstances will guide you as to the best use you can make of the information contained in the note transmitted to me by M. Berryer.

I should be obliged to you if you would inform me what action you decide to take. (Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 71.

### *Note.*

To justify their misdeeds in Belgium, and to excuse in the eyes of the civilised world their infamous attack on a Power so manifestly peace-loving as Belgium, Germany is now seeking by every means to spread abroad the vilest calumnies against our country.

After having violated our neutrality with the most brazen cynicism, she is now trying to send down to history the absurd fable that our country had already taken sides against Germany before the beginning of the war.

The whole of the diplomatic history of our country is an answer to this calumny.

It may nevertheless serve a useful purpose to recall what care the Government devoted to the maintenance of the strictest neutrality down to the very eve of war, *even to the moment* when that neutrality was about to be violated by one of the Powers that had formally guaranteed it.

On Saturday, August 1, 1914, M. Berryer, Minister of the Interior, addressed the following telegram to the Governors of the Provinces :

‘In the midst of the events that are developing, Belgium is determined to defend her neutrality ; it ought to be respected, but it is the duty of the nation to take whatever measures to that end the situation may require. It is

therefore important that the population should co-operate with the Government by avoiding *any manifestation that might be of a nature to bring the country into difficulties with one or other of its neighbours*; thus the Burgomasters should at once take steps to forbid all meetings that might have the object of *showing sympathy or antipathy for one country or another*. It is also important that, in accordance with Article 97 of the municipal law, the Burgomaster and aldermen should prohibit any cinematograph exhibition which represents military scenes likely to arouse passion and to provoke popular excitement dangerous to the public order. Please take immediate steps to have these instructions carried out without delay.

‘PAUL BERRYER,

‘*Minister of the Interior.*’

Effect was at once given to the appeal of the Minister of the Interior. The Burgomasters hastened to take measures in accordance with the instructions contained in his circular. On Sunday, August 2, some hours before the ultimatum, M. Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice, the King’s Attorney in Brussels, had the newspaper *Le Petit Bleu* confiscated for definitely taking sides with one of the belligerents, in this case France.

All the laws of warfare have been violated by Germany. She does not now even seek to excuse herself, but, realising that certain laws of humanity cannot be broken without incurring universal reprobation, she is again having recourse to calumny. Vaguely, and without any shadow of proof, she declares that the murder, pillage, and incendiarism of which she has been guilty are justified by the participation of the Belgian civilian population in acts of hostility.

And to make such a general statement credible without proofs, she alleges the existence of a regular system, organised by her adversaries, and in so many words accuses the Belgian Government of having armed the civilian population and of having incited them to take part in the struggle. In order to refute this facile allegation, which, if only superficial minds would accept it as true, would have the advantage of relieving the accusers of all necessity to produce specific proof, it suffices to give the real facts. On August 4, when war had been declared on us, and the enemy had already set foot on our soil, the Minister of the Interior, M. Berryer, sent an explicit



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

circular to the 2600 communes of the country concerning the duties of the authorities and the attitude of the civilian population. The following is an extract :

‘ According to the laws of war, acts of hostility, that is, any resistance and attack by arms, or the use of arms against isolated soldiers of the enemy, or direct intervention in fights or skirmishes, *are never permitted to those who do not belong to the army or the Garde Civique, or to volunteer corps under military law, obeying a recognised head and wearing a visible distinctive badge.*

‘ If the population of a territory that has not yet been occupied by the enemy spontaneously takes arms on the approach of the invader without having had time to provide itself with a military organisation, it will be deemed a belligerent body if it carries arms openly and conforms to the laws of war.

An isolated individual who does not belong to any of these categories, and who commits an act of hostility, would not be considered a belligerent. If made prisoner, he is liable to be treated more severely than a prisoner of war, and might even be put to death.

‘ The inhabitants are still more earnestly enjoined to abstain from acts that are prohibited even to soldiers : these acts are more particularly the use of poison or poisoned arms, the treacherous killing or wounding of individuals belonging to the army or nation of the invader, the killing or wounding of an enemy who, after giving up his arms and depriving himself of the means of self-defence, has surrendered unconditionally.’

The first German authorities to penetrate into the town of Liège must certainly have read the notices which had already been posted by the Burgomaster of that city, M. Kleyer, on August the 5th, which are identical in terms with the circular of the Minister of the Interior.

The text of a poster which the Burgomaster of Brussels, M. Max, had posted on the walls of the city is subjoined as another example :

### CITY OF BRUSSELS.

#### *Fire-Arms.*

The laws of war *forbid the civil population to take part in hostilities*, and as any infringement of this rule may

be the cause of reprisals, many of my fellow-citizens have expressed a desire to get rid of the fire-arms in their possession. *These arms may be deposited at the police stations, where a receipt for them will be given.* They will be placed in safe custody at the central Arsenal at Antwerp, and will be returned to their owners at the end of the war.

ADOLPHE MAX,  
*Burgomaster.*

Everywhere communal authorities took the same precautions, either by proclamations addressed to the population or, what was even better, by providing that all arms should be deposited at the town halls or police stations.

Moreover, one of the first measures taken by the Germans in the occupied regions was to repeat this same order with the addition of threats of capital punishment.

Nevertheless, this measure of extreme prudence, which exposed defenceless victims to the rage of the invaders, has with incredible bad faith been itself used as a weapon against us. It is the lowest depth of ignominy.

A *communiqué* from the German Legation at Bukarest, printed in the *Indépendance Roumaine* of the 21st August (5th September) 1914, charges the Belgian Government not only with having given the civilian population instructions with a view to resistance and with having organised beforehand a rising against any enemy that invaded our territory, 'but especially with having organised depots of arms where every rifle bore the name of the citizen for whom it was intended.' Does not this last detail prove to demonstration that the arms referred to were those which had been collected from private individuals and were intended to be returned to them? In arsenals it is not usual to mark the arms beforehand with the names of the soldiers who are to bear them. . . .

By such contradictions and absurdities falsehood stands unmistakably revealed.

While the Belgian communal authorities were thus, in accordance with the instructions of their Government, taking the most efficacious measures for preventing the civilian population from giving way to their instinct to repel by any means a powerful and ferocious enemy who was threatening their homes, the Minister of the Interior was at pains



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daily to repeat semi-officially through the channel of the press of all parties throughout the country, in large type in a conspicuous position, the following recommendations :—

### TO THE CIVIL POPULATION.

The Minister of the Interior recommends all civilians inhabiting a district in which the enemy makes his appearance :

Not to fight ;

Not to use insulting language or threats ;

To stay indoors and to shut the windows so that it cannot be said that there has been any provocation ;

If the soldiers occupy a house or isolated hamlet for the purpose of defence, to evacuate it, so that it cannot be said that shots were fired by civilians.

Any act of violence committed by a single civilian would be a veritable crime contrary to the law and punishable by imprisonment, because it might serve as a pretext for sanguinary repression, pillage, and the massacre of innocent persons and of women and children.

Finally, shortly before the capture of Antwerp on September 30, 1914, when that part of the country which had not yet been invaded seemed to be in danger, the Minister of the Interior once more sent out a circular in French, Flemish, and German to all the communes, so that nobody should be ignorant of, and that the German authorities themselves might know, the recommendations which had been issued by the Government to the communal authorities and to the civil population.

This has not prevented the German papers from saying again quite recently that everywhere and always in Belgium (the definiteness of this statement should be noted) the civilian population have borne arms against German soldiers, and that, since the beginning of the war, the Government has done nothing to prevent them.

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## SECTION II.

ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE CASH OF THE HASSELT BRANCH  
OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM.

No. 72.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Kindly send the following protest of the Board of Administration of the National Bank of Belgium to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, begging him to forward it as a matter of urgency to the Imperial German Government.

The Board of Administration of the National Bank of Belgium have just learnt during their meeting to-day, August 12, 1914, that German troops have seized the cash of their branch at Hasselt, amounting to more than two million francs.

The Board of Administration of the National Bank protest energetically against this violation of the law of nations, as defined in article 53, paragraph 1, of The Hague Convention of October 10, 1907, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. This article<sup>1</sup> runs thus:

'An army of occupation shall only take possession of cash, funds, and realisable securities, the reclaimable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depôts of arms, means of transport, stores, and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State, which may be used for military operations.'

The protest of the Board of Administration is based on this incontrovertible fact, that the National Bank is a purely private institution in the form of a joint stock company, the capital of which is owned by private individuals.

In consequence, the Board of Administration of the National Bank claim immediate restitution of the sum improperly seized at their branch at Hasselt.

THE GOVERNOR, VICOMTE DE LANTSHEERE.

I beg you to insist very strongly on the legitimacy of this protest.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Military*,  
p. 484.]



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## SECTION III.

### PROTECTION OF GERMAN BUILDINGS IN BELGIUM.

No. 73.

*The Minister of the United States of America to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 18, 1914.*

SIR,—The German Government requests me, through the medium of the United States Legation at The Hague, to take the necessary steps for the protection of German buildings in Belgium.

May I ask you, Sir, to have the necessary instructions given to the competent authorities in order that public buildings, such as banks and other establishments known to belong to firms or individuals of German nationality, may be specially guarded, in order to prevent their becoming the object of attacks directed either against persons or against property.—I take this opportunity, etc.

(Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.

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No. 74.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr.  
Brand Whitlock, Minister of the United States of America.*

*Antwerp, August 23, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated the 18th inst., relating to the protection of German buildings in Belgium.

Public buildings such as banks and other establishments, known to belong to firms or individuals of German nationality, have been kept under the desired supervision since the beginning of hostilities. The Government of the King would be glad to learn that the German armies in Belgium give the same care to our inoffensive subjects and their property as we give to German property and to those German subjects who have remained in Belgium.

Instead of that, the German army has in many places committed abominable misdeeds, against which the Government

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of the King, taking their stand on the Fourth Hague Convention of the 18th October 1907, of which Germany is a signatory, has protested to the Imperial Government through the medium of the Spanish Embassy at Berlin.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency a copy of this protest,<sup>1</sup> and to request that it may be forwarded to the Government of the United States.

<sup>1</sup> [See No. 69.]

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

## SECTION IV.

## BOMBARDMENT BY ZEPPELINS.

No. 75.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, St. Petersburg, The Hague, Rome, and Washington.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 25, 1914.*

During the night of the 24th-25th, a dirigible balloon of the Zeppelin type flew at a low altitude over the town of Antwerp and dropped in succession eight bombs of great explosive force. The Police inquiry showed that there were ten killed, all innocent civilians, of whom four were women, and eight wounded, some of them mortally. The material damage is considerable. This bombardment constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.<sup>2</sup>

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

<sup>2</sup> [See *Military*, p. 480.]

No. 76.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Powers in Belgium.*

*Antwerp, August 26, 1914.*

The Belgian Government has the honour of acquainting the Legations of the Foreign Powers in Belgium with the facts set forth in the enclosed note, which constitute on the part of the German authorities a violation of Article 26 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*



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ENCLOSURE TO No. 76.

*Antwerp, August 25, 1914.*

The Court of First Instance,  
sitting at Antwerp.

*To the Procureur Général.*

SIR,—I have the honour to submit a report on the grave events of last night.

M. Baucarne, advocate, M. de Duve, of 65 rue du Péage, and my colleague, M. Michielsen, agree in declaring that a Zeppelin dirigible airship came over the town from the direction of the manœuvre ground. It dropped successively bombs of great explosive force:—(1) on a glass house belonging to the Minerva factory; (2) on a house in the rue Lozane; (3) rue Verdussen; (4) rue de la Justice; (5) rue des Escrimeurs; (6) rue Léopold; (7) rue des Douze-Mois; (8) rue du Poids Public.

The evidence above mentioned shows that this itinerary is probably correct. M. Michielsen declares that, after having reached a certain point, the airship returned in the same direction whence it came.

The damage done is of two kinds.

Several people were killed and wounded. The material damage done is considerable.

*In the 8th section*, M. Léon Peeters and his wife, Sylvie Hurnaux, living at 29 rue Verbissem (*sic*) were slightly wounded. At 40 rue des Escrimeurs, a servant was killed and another one dangerously wounded.

*In the 2nd section* (Poids Public), the number of victims is very large. This is the list:—

- (1) Van Catthem, Jean-Jacques, policeman, *dead*, 112 Marché aux Chevaux.
- (2) Jensen, Jean-François, *dead*, 20 Poids Public.
- (3) De Bruyn, Jeanne-Marie, innkeeper, 4 Poids Public, *dead*.
- (4) Van Ecke, Arthur, dock labourer, 4 Poids Public, *dead*.
- (5) De Backer, Pierre, dock labourer, 20 Canal Falcon, *dead*.

- (6) Ramaekers, Hubertine - Edouard - Marie, 13 Poids Public, *dead*.
- (7) Van Vooren, Josephe-Marie, 69 Marché aux Chevaux, mortally wounded.
- (8) Gaethof, Pierre-Jean, policeman, 36 rue du Jardinier, wounded.
- (9) Devos, Marie-Thérèse, housewife, 20 Poids Public, wounded.
- (10) Coeymans, Léon, innkeeper, 1 Poids Public, wounded.
- (11) Peynenberg, Jacques-Germain, printer, 38 Canal Falcon, wounded.
- (12) De Poeter, Georges, 1 Poids Public, wounded in the right foot.
- (13) Wilsenen, Sophie, 4 Poids Public, slightly wounded in the hip.
- (14) Windey, Auguste, 4 Poids Public, loss of right eye.
- (15) Luyckx, Eulalie, 6 Poids Public, wounded.
- (16) Roulandts, Julia, 24 rue du Bassin, wounded.

The material damage in the 8th section is :

38 and 40 rue des Escrimeurs : the entire roof and the attics destroyed, windows broken, furniture and household utensils damaged. 34 and 36 rue des Escrimeurs, windows broken.

Palais de Justice : numbers of windows broken.

Rue de la Justice : at no. 13, a lower room damaged ; no. 15 etc., doors and windows broken ; at nos. 15 and 8 the lower rooms have been damaged ; rue Mertens, no. 14 etc., windows broken ; rue Willems, no. 9 etc., windows broken ; rue Torf, rue de Mey, rue Montebello, rue de l'Harmonie, windows broken ; rue Verdussen, no. 20 etc., windows broken, doors and windows damaged ; rue Albert von Bary, no. 1 etc., windows broken ; rue Longue, rue Lausanne, no. 242 etc., windows broken, doors and windows damaged ; avenue du Marcgrave, no. 188, three blocks damaged ; rue Karel Ooms, no. 40, windows broken and walls cracked ; rue Karel Ooms, no. 45, windows broken (Minerva).

The damage done by the airship in the 3rd section can be summed up as follows :

A bomb exploded in the rue Léopold, close to the rue Guillaume Tell, breaking all the windows of the china shop at the



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corner of the rue Guillaume Tell, all the windows of the second floor, and destroying a large quantity of goods in the shop, the windows of the café Shakespeare, at present occupied by refugees from the province. Nobody was wounded.

Another bomb exploded in the rue des Douze-Mois, partly demolishing no. 11, where one person was slightly wounded, and whence at about 4.45 A.M., a woman was rescued, who complained of internal pains and was sent to the Institute Saint-Jean-Berchmans, Place de Meir.

Damage was also done to nos. 19, 7, 28 of the same street.

The Botanical Garden was found to have suffered important material damage, notably among the glass houses and frames of the Botanical Museum; this damage was caused by the bomb dropped near the rue Guillaume Tell, or perhaps by another bomb which, according to certain witnesses, was dropped in the Botanical Garden itself, quite near to the wall of the Sainte-Elizabeth hospital.

(Signed)

ANGENOT,

*Deputy of the Procureur du Roi.*

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### SECTION V.

No. 77.

#### DESPATCH OF AN OFFICIAL MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
to the Belgian Ministers Abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

SIR,—The Government of the King has decided to send a Special Mission to Washington, charged with the duty of bringing to President Wilson's knowledge the present painful position of Belgium, and to give him precise information concerning the damage and the nameless atrocities of which German troops have been guilty since they entered Belgium.

The Mission, which is composed of M. Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice, and of MM. Sadeleer, Hymans, and Vandervelde, Ministers of State, will have no other purpose, and will not in any circumstances touch upon the question of possible mediation by the Cabinet of Washington in the conflict which is now dividing Europe.

The Mission will visit London, and will ask leave to pay its respects to King George and Sir Edward Grey, whom it will thank for the valuable help given by England to Belgium.

I have notified the object of the Mission and its composition to the Ministers of France, England, and Russia accredited to the Government of the King.—Receive, etc.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 78.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*London, September 1, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the speech made by M. Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice, in the course of the audience which His Majesty the King of England graciously accorded to the Belgian Mission which is on its way to the United States.

(Signed) COMTE DE LALAING.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 78.

YOUR MAJESTY,—When Belgium was confronted with the choice of sacrificing her honour or of incurring the perils of war, she did not hesitate. She resisted a brutal attack committed by a Power who had constituted herself one of the guarantors of her neutrality.

In this critical situation the immediate and resolute intervention of the great and powerful England was an inestimable help to our country.

Charged by H.M. the King of the Belgians with a mission to the President of the United States, we have considered it to be an imperative duty to break our journey in the capital of the British Empire in order to bring to your Majesty a respectful and warm expression of the gratitude of the Belgian nation.

We have never forgotten that England presided over the birth of Belgian independence. She had confidence in the wisdom and loyalty of our country.

We have striven to justify that confidence by remaining



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strictly faithful to the part assigned to us in international politics. In 1870 the Government of Queen Victoria, of illustrious memory, intervened spontaneously with the belligerent Powers to assure respect for the neutrality and integrity of Belgium.

To-day the personal testimony addressed by Your Majesty to our Sovereign, the solemn and impressive declarations of Your Majesty's Government, the noble language uttered in Parliament by the representatives of every party, the valiant help of the British forces on land and sea have revived our gratitude and strengthened the determination of the Belgian nation to defend her rights.

Compelled to make war for the protection of her institutions and her hearths, Belgium has desired to observe in her armed resistance those principles which international conventions and the dictates of conscience impose on every civilised nation.

Our adversary, after invading our territory, has decimated the civil population, massacred women and children, carried off into captivity inoffensive peasants, killed the wounded, destroyed undefended towns, burnt churches, historical monuments, and the celebrated library of the University of Louvain. All these facts are established by conclusive documentary evidence which we shall have the honour to place before the Government of Your Majesty.

In spite of so many sufferings, Belgium, whose experiences have constituted the very personification of violated right, is resolved to fulfil to the end her duties towards Europe.

Whatever may happen, she will defend her existence, her honour, and her liberty.

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No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. Havenith, Belgian Minister at Washington.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, September 8, 1914.*

On September 4th the Germans attacked Termonde. A violent struggle took place on the 5th at Capelle-au-Bois and Breendonck. Breendonck Fort took part in it. The Germans

were repulsed with a loss of two thousand men, five hundred of whom were killed and were buried by us. Our losses were insignificant. Termonde was occupied and a force of the enemy advanced towards Ghent, which is threatened. You have received the reports of the Commission of Inquiry, dated the 25th and 31st of August. Since then a large number of localities situated in the triangle Vilvorde, Malines, Louvain, an extremely fertile and populous district, have been given over to pillage, partially or totally burnt; the inhabitants have been scattered, while a number of people, among whom were women and children, were arrested and shot without trial, without any apparent motive, with the simple object of inspiring terror. This occurred particularly at Sempst, Weerde, Elewyt, Hofstade, Wespelaer, Wilsele, Bucken, Eppeghem, Wackerzeele, Rotselaer, Werchter, Thildonck, Boort-Meerbeek, Houthem, Tremeloo, Tistelt, Gelrode, Herent. At Wavre, which was unable to pay a contribution of three millions, fifty-six houses were burnt. A great part of Cortenberg has been burnt. In order to excuse these acts, the Germans allege that they encountered armed resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

According to conclusive evidence no provocation could be proved at Visé, Aerschot, Louvain, Wavre, and in the localities situated in the triangle Malines, Vilvorde, Louvain, where burnings and massacres took place several days after the occupation.

This telegram is intended for Mission.

(Signed)

DAVIGNON.

No. 80.

*The Belgian Minister at Washington to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Washington, September 18, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that the President received on Wednesday the Belgian Commission which has come here to explain to him the lamentable condition to which Belgium has been reduced as a consequence of the barbaric and savage deeds committed by the German armies. Enclosed herewith is the text of the speeches made by M. Carton de Wiart, and Mr. Wilson, together with that of



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the answer sent to the message of the Emperor of Germany. A comparison of the last two documents permits us to conclude that the sympathy of the President of the United States of America is entirely with us.

Mr. Wilson was at pains to emphasise the high esteem he has for the King ; none of the expressions of respect he used exists in the telegram which he addressed to the Emperor of Germany.

At the beginning of his address, the President said, ' Permit me to say with what pleasure I receive you as representatives of the King of the Belgians, a people for whom the people of the United States feel so strong an admiration and friendship, a King for whom they entertain so sincere a respect, and to express my hope that we may have many opportunities of *earning* and *deserving* their regard.'

The last sentence in Mr. Wilson's speech is also very interesting. He speaks of warm friendship, and of an understanding between his country and ours, based upon mutual respect, *admiration*, and *cordiality*. ' You are very welcome here,' he said, ' and we are much honoured by your having chosen us as the friends to whom you could submit any question of vital importance to yourselves, with confidence that your action would be understood and received in the same spirit in which it was conceived and acted upon.'

I regard the result of the Mission as a very great success.

The members of the Mission yesterday laid a wreath on the tomb of George Washington at Mount Vernon, and left the city this morning.

(Signed) HAVENITH.

### ENCLOSURE I TO NO. 80.

EXCELLENCY,—His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, has charged us with a special mission to the President of the United States.

Let me say to you how much we feel ourselves honoured to have been called upon to express the sentiments of our King and of our whole nation to the illustrious statesman whom the American people have called to the highest dignity of the Commonwealth.

As far as I am concerned, I have already been able,

during a previous trip, to fully appreciate the noble virtues of the American nation, and I am happy to take this opportunity to express all the admiration with which they inspire me.

Ever since her independence was first established, Belgium has been declared neutral in perpetuity. This neutrality, guaranteed by the Powers, has recently been violated by one of them. Had we consented to abandon our neutrality for the benefit of one of the belligerents, we would have betrayed our obligations toward the others. And it was the sense of our international obligations as well as that of our dignity and honour that has driven us to resistance.

The consequences suffered by the Belgian nation were not confined purely to the harm occasioned by the forced march of an invading army. This army not only seized a great portion of our territory, but it committed incredible acts of violence, the nature of which is contrary to the Law of Nations.

Peaceful inhabitants were massacred, defenceless women and children were outraged, open and undefended towns were destroyed, historical and religious monuments were reduced to dust, and the famous library of the University of Louvain was given to the flames.

Our Government has appointed a judicial Commission to make an official investigation, so as to thoroughly and impartially examine the facts and to determine the responsibility thereof, and I will have the honour, Excellency, to hand over to you the proceedings of the inquiry.

In this frightful holocaust which is sweeping all over Europe, the United States has adopted a neutral attitude.

And it is for this reason that your country, standing apart from either one of the belligerents, is in the best position to judge, without bias or partiality, the conditions under which the war is being waged.

It is at the request, even at the initiative of the United States, that all civilised nations have formulated and adopted at The Hague a law regulating the laws and usage of war.

We refuse to believe that war has abolished the family of Civilised Powers, or the regulations to which they have freely consented.

The American people has always displayed its respect for justice, its search for progress, and an instinctive attachment



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for the laws of humanity. Therefore it has won a moral influence which is recognised by the entire world. It is for this reason that Belgium, bound as she is to you by ties of commerce and increasing friendship, turns to the American people at this time to let it know the real truth of the present situation. Resolved to continue unflinching defence of its sovereignty and independence, it deems it a duty to bring to the attention of the civilised world the innumerable grave breaches of rights of mankind of which she has been a victim.

At the very moment we were leaving Belgium, the King recalled to us his trip to the United States and the vivid and strong impression your powerful and virile civilisation left upon his mind.

Our faith in your fairness, our confidence in your justice, in your spirit of generosity and sympathy, all these have dictated our present mission.

### ENCLOSURE 2 TO NO. 80.

*Remarks addressed by President Wilson to the Belgian Commission at the White House, on the afternoon of Wednesday, September 16, 1914.*

EXCELLENCY, GENTLEMEN,—Permit me to say with what sincere pleasure I receive you as representatives of the King of the Belgians, a people for whom the people of the United States feel so strong a friendship and admiration, a King for whom they entertain so sincere a respect; and to express my hope that we may have many opportunities of earning and deserving their regard. You are not mistaken in believing that the people of this country love justice, seek the true paths of progress, and have a passionate regard for the rights of humanity. It is a matter of profound pride to me that I am permitted for a time to represent such a people and to be their spokesman, and I am honoured that your King should have turned to me in time of distress as to one who would wish on behalf of the people he represents to consider the claims to the impartial sympathy of mankind of a nation which deems itself wronged.

I thank you for the document you have put in my hands, containing the result of an investigation made by a judicial

committee appointed by the Belgian Government to look into the matter of which you have come to speak. It shall have my most attentive perusal and my most thoughtful consideration.

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when I take it for granted the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed, their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed. The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in all such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which, like this, has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I need not assure you that this conclusion, in which I instinctively feel that you will yourselves concur, is spoken frankly because in warm friendship and as the best means of perfect understanding between us, an understanding based upon mutual respect, admiration, and cordiality. You are most welcome, and we are greatly honoured that you should have chosen us as the friends before whom you could lay any matter of vital consequence to yourselves in the confidence that your course would be understood and met in the same spirit in which it was conceived and intended.

#### ENCLOSURE 3 TO No. 80.

#### *Reply to the Message from the German Emperor.\**

I received your Imperial Majesty's important communication of the 7th, and have read it with gravest interest and concern. I am honoured that you should have turned to me for an impartial judgment as the representative of a

\* [The text of this reply is taken from *The Times* of Oct. 12, 1914; the Grey Book gives only a French translation from the English. For the text of the Emperor's message, see *Military*, I, p. 201.]



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people truly disinterested as respects the present war and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth.

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when I take it for granted the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.

The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass, the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter of all such matters, will supply.

It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I speak thus frankly because I know that you will expect and wish me to do so, as one friend should to another, and because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relation, will commend itself to you as a true expression of sincere neutrality.

WOODROW WILSON.

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### SECTION VI.

#### CIVILIAN PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

No. 81.

*The Minister of the United States of America to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, September 29, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward to Your Excellency herewith a copy of a communication I have just received from the German Governor-General concerning Captain Menne.

(Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.

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ENCLOSURE TO No. 81.

The Government-General in Belgium.

*Brussels, September 26, 1914.*

I beg to make the following request to Your Excellency:—

Through the medium of the Consul of the United States, news has been received at Magdeburg, that Captain Menne is at Antwerp as a prisoner of war, having been taken prisoner on September 9, 1914, and that he is accused of having sent civilian prisoners from Aerschot to Aix-la-Chapelle. He is required to prove that he acted under superior orders.

I take the opportunity of informing you that it was, in fact, a matter of a service order, for instructions have been issued to the troops, once for all, to send civilian prisoners to Germany in the interest of their own safety; for owing to the constant and sometimes rapid changing of the General Staffs, prisoners cannot be handed over regularly nor their cases inquired into regularly and continuously.

I should therefore be grateful to Your Excellency if you would bring this communication to the knowledge of the Belgian Government in any way that seems convenient.

I think, then, that I may safely regard the affair as now closed. I should, nevertheless, be grateful if Your Excellency would obtain confirmation on this point in the interest of Captain Menne.

(Signed)      BARON VON DER GOLTZ.

No. 82.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Brand Whitlock, Minister of the United States of America.*

*Antwerp, October 2, 1914.*

SIR,—On the 29th September, Your Excellency kindly transmitted to me a note from the Imperial German Government relating to Captain Menne, who was made prisoner on September the 9th, and is at present detained at Antwerp.

According to this note, the Belgian authorities asked him to prove that the acts of which he is accused were committed under superior orders. The note replies to the effect that the



matter in question was that of a service order, instructions having been given, once for all, to send civilian prisoners to Germany in the interest of their own safety.

It is important to give the actual facts.

Captain Menne, of the Landsturm battalion quartered at Aerschot from August the 31st to September the 9th, 1914, is accused of, 1, having, at Aerschot, from August 31st to September 9th, 1914, in occupied houses or their outbuildings, or on the public roads, stolen various objects by means of weapons and violence or threats, to the prejudice of numerous inhabitants of the town; 2, or at least of having co-operated directly in the perpetration of the aforesaid crimes, or lent for their perpetration such help that without his assistance they could not have been committed; 3, of having, without the order of the constituted authorities, otherwise than is allowed by the law, permitted or ordered the arrest or detention of private individuals; of having arrested and detained numerous inhabitants of the town, subjecting them to bodily torture, acts provided against by Articles 462, 471-434-38, 65 of the common penal code.

The principal count in the indictment refers to the pillage which went on for several days at Aerschot; numerous objects were taken away by train to Germany. This pillage began before the arrival of Commandant Menne; it continued during his command.

This pillage constitutes a violation of the penal laws.

It is, moreover, a flagrant violation of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Articles 23 (g), and 28).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Military*, I,  
pp. 479-  
80.]

The second count in the indictment refers to the treatment undergone by the non-belligerent civilian population of Aerschot. The able-bodied men were shut up in the church; the women in a neighbouring establishment. Commandant Menne required that all men between 18 and 45 years of age should be removed to Germany, and this removal was carried out under grievous conditions.

This arrest and this removal constitute a violation of the penal laws.

They are, moreover, a flagrant violation of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War (Article 50).<sup>2</sup>

Citizens who have not taken any part in the hostilities,

<sup>2</sup> [See  
*Military*, I,  
p. 483.]

and who are not belligerents, cannot be arrested in a body and punished collectively for alleged individual acts in which they have taken no part, and for which they cannot under any pretext be held collectively responsible.

The Belgian Government takes this opportunity of protesting once more against the procedure systematically followed in Belgium by the commanding officers of the German troops, who, without inquiry or hearing any protest, arrest inoffensive citizens wholesale, shut up men, women and children, and then send able-bodied men far away from their homes to Germany, under the cruelly ironical protest that it is done 'in the interest of their own safety.'

Such conduct is contrary to the most elementary laws of humanity.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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NOTE.

In consequence of existing circumstances, the authorities have not been able to pursue their inquiry concerning the events which occurred at Aerschot.

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No. 83.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, November 2, 1914.*

SIR,—On October 2nd last, the Belgian Government earnestly protested through the medium of the Embassy of the United States to the Imperial German Government, against the orders given to the commanders of the enemy forces in invaded Belgium, to send able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 into captivity in Germany.

At Aerschot, at Diest, at Louvain, and in many other places besides, the arrest and imprisonment of these men have been carried out in particularly painful circumstances. These proceedings constitute a flagrant violation of Article 50 of the IVth Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War.<sup>1</sup>

I have the honour to request you to resort to the good

<sup>1</sup> [See  
Military,  
p. 483.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

offices of the Government of His Catholic Majesty in order to learn what reception this protest has met with from the Imperial Government.

It would also be very useful to us to know whether Germany is still keeping civilian prisoners who have been carried into captivity, and, if so, their approximate number and the names of the leading individuals among them.

The protest of the Belgian Government was transmitted by the Legation of the United States, because the latter had sent us a note from the Berlin authorities asking for explanations on the subject of the commanding officer at Aerschot, who had been arrested and charged with responsibility for the criminal acts which had been committed by his order.

I should be glad to receive a reply as early as possible.

You will find enclosed herewith a copy of the despatch of October 2nd.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

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No. 84.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, December 17, 1914.*

SIR,—The Minister of State has just sent me, and I have the honour to enclose herewith, a copy of a letter addressed by the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin to the German Secretary of State concerning the treatment to which the subjects of belligerent countries, and particularly our compatriots, are subjected in Germany.

In communicating this report to the Marquis of Lema, M. Polo de Bernabé informed him that the steps taken by him have had, at least for the time being, the desired effect, by inducing the military authorities to apply with less severity the orders given. The Ambassador adds, however, that he does not think they will be positively suppressed; those authorities being of opinion that the only way to obtain good treatment for the Germans in France and Russia is to be rigorous with the French and Russians in Germany, and this in spite of the opinion of the Foreign Office and of Professor Zittelmann, who have drawn attention to the danger of this

practice. The Spanish Ambassador concludes by recognising that the reports, no doubt exaggerated, prevalent in the country as to the bad treatment to which the Germans in enemy countries are subjected have excited public opinion, which demands severe measures in order to put an end to this state of things.

(Signed)      BARON A. GRENIER.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 84.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,—I have just read that the military authorities have taken more severe measures than those which were in existence up till now with regard to the subjects of enemy countries residing in Germany, and which render their life impossible.

Knowing as I do your enlightened views, I have no doubt you will agree with me that these *chicanes*—forgive the word, but I cannot find a more diplomatic one—may have an unfortunate counter-effect on the Germans settled abroad, who are infinitely more numerous than the foreigners settled in Germany, and I beg you to point out to whoever is responsible the practical uselessness of the measures adopted and the dangers they involve. The existing arrangements are especially painful for Belgian subjects who are prevented from returning to their country, where, moreover, life would be difficult for them because of the state of war; they are therefore forced to remain in Germany, and the obligation to present themselves twice a day at the police station, not to leave the district of their residence, and to remain shut up from 8 P.M. till 7 A.M. amounts to imprisonment in disguise.

I beg you, therefore, kindly to point out to the military authorities the expediency of reconsidering the utility of these measures, which, though not amounting to cruelty, constitute an intolerable torment, and make it for many of them an impossibility to earn a livelihood, as well as the consequence which the measures will not fail to involve.

(Signed)      POLO DE BERNABÉ.



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 85.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, January 15, 1915.*

SIR,—On November the 2nd last I sent you a copy of the protest addressed by me on October 2nd to Germany, through the kind offices of the Legation of the United States at Brussels, against the deportation and detention outside Belgium of numerous civilians arrested in our country by the German military authorities.

I begged you to have recourse to the good offices of His Catholic Majesty in order to ascertain what reception this protest had met with from the Imperial Government.

I also asked you to endeavour to obtain a list of civilians detained in Germany. As a matter of fact, some lists of civilians have reached us since then, mixed up with lists of prisoners of war.

But Germany has never, to my knowledge, replied to our protest against the violation of Article 50 of the IVth Hague Convention, nor put forward any justification whatever for her inhuman behaviour towards numerous civilians detained abroad without any definite accusation having been brought against them.

I beg you to renew the effort with the help of the Spanish Government to obtain an answer from Germany, while reiterating our protest to Berlin.

The report you sent me on December 17th and its enclosure did not escape my attention; but if they allow us to suppose that the treatment of the Belgians in Germany has been somewhat ameliorated, thanks to the importunity of the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin, they do not contain any justification for the detention of our own fellow-subjects, or any reply to our protests.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, January 28, 1915.*

SIR,—In my letter of the 15th of this month, I asked you to renew at Berlin through the medium of the Spanish Government our strong protest against the deportation of Belgian civilians to Germany.

The German Government transmits to the French Government from time to time lists of prisoners of war who have died in Germany. There are often names of Belgian soldiers among them. Quite recently one of these lists contained the following names of five Belgian civilians, with the subjoined particulars :—

Dodemont, Urbain, born February 10th, 1839, at Visé (province of Liège), died on August 28th, 1914, heart failure ; buried at Tanneberg near Saales (Alsace).

Feyaerts, Franz, died September 3rd, 1914, in the Münster Camp Hospital ; buried at Münster ; abdominal bullet wound.

Labeye, Eugène, born at Visé, near Löwen (Brabant), died September 15th, 1914, in the detention camp, hut 3. Buried at Münster. Palpitations of the heart.

Lecremier, Guillaume (père), born at Hallembaye (Belgium) died August 24th, 1914, of old age ; buried at Münster camp.

Wuigts, Felix, died September 17th, 1914, at the prisoners' hospital, from wounds received in the war ; buried at Münster camp.

I beg you to communicate this information to the Spanish Government in order that they may send it to their Ambassador at Berlin. He will be able by means of it, to recall to the Imperial Government, and to add weight to, the note that he will not have failed to send to them.

The laws of war prohibit the collective repression of acts committed by the civilian population against an army (Article 50 of the IVth Hague Convention, 1907).<sup>1</sup> Suppose, what has never been proved, that civilians had fired on German troops in Belgium, the military authorities had not the right to deport innocent people wholesale. This, how-

<sup>1</sup> [See *Military*,  
p. 483.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

ever, they have done. It is evident that the five civilians whose names are given above had not personally attacked the German troops, otherwise they would have been shot. And yet two of them were deported, in spite of wounds which have caused their death, and two others were of an advanced age, since one has died of old age and the other at the age of seventy-five.

These instances not only prove violation of the laws of war, but they bring out quite clearly the inhumanity of the military authorities in Belgium.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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No. 87.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, March 30, 1915.*

SIR,—Baron Fallon has transmitted to me the copy of a note from the Auswärtiges Amt to the Spanish Ambassador, dated February 28th. You will find its text enclosed herewith.

I beg you to request the Spanish Government to transmit to Berlin the enclosed note in reply to this last communication, the receipt of which will, without doubt, have been notified to you at Madrid before this present letter reaches you.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE I TO No. 87.

Embajada de España, Berlin.

Auswärtiges Amt ; Nr. 11 b 4936/26299.

*Note Verbale.*

TO THE SPANISH EMBASSY,—In reply to the verbal note of the 22nd of this month, the Foreign Office has the honour of informing the Royal Spanish Embassy as follows :—

All Belgian subjects who are neither criminals nor suspected persons will receive permission to return to Belgium. They will require a permit issued, outside Germany by the

German Consuls, and in Germany by the Stellvertretende General-Kommandos. Moreover it will be necessary for them to be provided with a passport in accordance with the regulations of the Imperial decree on passports, dated December 16th last. Belgians coming from abroad will need a special identification paper [*légitimation*] issued by the German Consuls.

BERLIN, *February 28th, 1915.*

## ENCLOSURE 2 TO No. 87.

### *Note.*

The Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land signed at The Hague by the Representatives of Germany and Belgium, on October 10th, 1907, and ratified later by these two Powers, contains the following articles<sup>1</sup> :—

*Article 1.*—‘The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the present Convention.’

<sup>1</sup> [See *Military*,  
P. 472.]

*Article 3.*—‘A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.’

The Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land referred to in Article 1 of the Conventions contain in Article 50<sup>2</sup> the following stipulation :—

‘No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible.’

<sup>2</sup> [See *Military*,  
P. 483.]

On October 2nd, 1914, the Belgian Government, taking its stand on these texts, sent to the Imperial German Government, through the kind offices of the Minister of the United States at Brussels, an emphatic protest against the systematic removal in Belgium and deportation to Germany of civilians innocent of all participation in the war.

This protest has been several times recalled and brought to the notice of the Royal Spanish Government.



On February 28th last the Imperial German Government sent to the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin a note which has been communicated to the Belgian Government, to the effect that all Belgian subjects, *who are neither criminals nor suspected persons*, will receive permission to return to Belgium.

If we may congratulate ourselves on this result, due to the effective efforts of the Government of His Catholic Majesty, we cannot fail to point out that the note of the Auswärtiges Amt is a complete admission of the violation by Germany of law and of international conventions. The Belgian Government notes that the thousands of Belgians now being sent back to their homes were neither criminals nor suspected persons, and were therefore inoffensive citizens. These unfortunate people were torn away from their families, of which they were often the sole support, were deported to Germany, and were treated like the vilest criminals throughout the journey and during a detention of six months or longer.

The Belgian Government is again compelled solemnly to renew its former protests, and to denounce with the utmost energy proceedings which constitute a flagrant violation of Article 50 of the IVth Hague Convention, and which are a defiance of the most elementary laws of humanity.

On the strength of the very information which the Imperial Government has itself supplied in communicating the lists of Belgian prisoners of war, into which have crept many names of civilians, the Belgian Government is in a position to affirm that the improper acts exposed above have been committed against Belgian civilians of all ages, and of every district in Belgium. In certain localities, almost the entire male population was taken into captivity. A great number of civilians have died in prison. The appended list enumerates twenty-eight of these. The names and the information which accompany them were supplied by the Imperial Government itself. Five men died of senile debility; two others were 76 years old. One woman, Mme. Léonie Denorme, was 'brought dead' to the infirmary of Schneidemühle. And without doubt many other unfortunate innocent persons have succumbed under similar conditions.

The responsibility for these acts will fall upon the Imperial German Government.

## ENCLOSURE TO THE NOTE OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

*Civilians taken prisoners in Belgium, interned in Germany, and there deceased.*

Beukelaers, Jos., died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 14-9-14, from the effects of arterio-sclerosis ; buried at Soltau.

Cals, Henri, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 7-9-14, from the effects of senile debility ; buried at Münster camp.

Delaure, Edouard, died at Münster camp, on 15-10-14, from the effects of senile debility ; buried at Münster camp.

Denorme, Léonie, brought dead to the infirmary of the prisoners of war camp at Schneidemühle ; buried there.

De Prinz, Alfred, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 3-10-14, from the effects of chronic bronchitis ; buried at Soltau.

Dodemont, Urbain, born at Visé (Liège) on February 10th, 1839 ; died at Münster camp on 28-8-14.

Elsen, Louis, died at the infirmary of the prisoners of war camp at Münster, on 3-11-14 ; buried at that camp.

Feyaerts, Franz, born at Rotselaer in 1862 ; died from the effects of an abdominal bullet wound, at Münster camp, on 3-10-14 ; buried at that camp.

Hye, Felix, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp on 29-10-14, from the effects of arterio-sclerosis ; buried at Soltau.

Kaes, Corneille, of Louvain, 7 Place de la Station ; born in 1857 ; died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 19-9-14, from the effects of bronchitis ; buried at Soltau.

Kraap, Bonaventure, of Louvain, born 31-8-1846 ; died of senile debility, on 15-9-14, at the infirmary of Soltau camp ; buried at Soltau.

Labeye, Eugène, of Visé, died at the infirmary of Münster camp, on 15-9-14, from the effects of an attack of apoplexy ; buried at the said camp.

Legrenier, Guillaume, died at the infirmary of the prisoners of war camp at Münster, on 24-8-14, from the effects of senile debility ; buried at the said camp.

Masenau or Masenon, Octave, died at the infirmary of the camp at Soltau, on 16-9-14, from the effects of bronchitis ; buried at Soltau.



- Merkens or Meskens, Damian, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 8-9-14, from the effects of . . ., buried at Soltau.
- Mertens, Jacob, died at the infirmary of Münster camp, on 11-9-14, from the effects of senile debility; buried at the said camp.
- Minnen, Louis, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 20-10-14, from the effects of pneumonia; buried at the said camp.
- Schots, Charles, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 13-11-14, from the effects of pneumonia; buried at Soltau.
- Tourlonte, or Tourlouse, Henry, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp (shot for rebellious behaviour); buried at Soltau.
- Van Den Houdt, Philippe, died at Münster camp, on 2-10-14, from the effects of pneumonia; buried at the said camp.
- Van Hoegarden, Joseph, died at the infirmary of Münster camp, on 25-10-14, from the effects of pneumonia and dropsy; buried at the said camp.
- Verhoeven, Joseph, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 28-10-14, from the effects of an attack of apoplexy; buried at Soltau.
- Vermeir, François, of Oppuers; born on 15-10-1841; died, on 15-10-14, from the effects of arterial rupture.
- Vermeiren or Vermeit, François, died at the infirmary of Soltau camp, on 19-9-14; buried at Soltau.
- Vervoort, Alphonse, died at Münster camp, on 13-10-14, from the effects of pneumonia; buried at the said camp.
- Vilour, Théodore, died at the infirmary of Münster camp, on 16-10-14, from the effects of hæmorrhage; buried at the said camp.
- Wereck, Amélie, died at the infirmary of Schneidemühle, on 16-11-14, from the effects of a wound in the head.
- Wuygts, Felix, born at Wesemael, on 5-7-1845; died at Münster camp, on 17-10-14; and buried there.

## SECTION VII.

## USE OF 'DUM-DUM' BULLETS BY THE GERMAN ARMIES.

No. 88.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the  
Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

*Ostend, October 10, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to send to you herewith a note containing the protest of the Belgian Government against the use of the so-called 'dum-dum' bullets by the German armies.

I should be glad if you would transmit this note to the Government to which you are accredited.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

## ENCLOSURE TO No. 88.

*Memorandum.*

The Belgian Government has the honour to bring to the notice of the signatories of the Hague Conventions the under-mentioned facts which constitute on the part of the German military authorities a violation of the Conventions signed by the Imperial German Government on October 18th, 1907.

The Commission of Inquiry in session at Antwerp has on several occasions had medical certificates submitted to it proving that wounds have been inflicted on Belgian soldiers by bullets of the 'dum-dum' type.

Bullets of this kind were found in the German lines on the battle field of Werchter.

The reports of the Commission have already drawn attention to these facts.

Now a graver fact has just been notified: The Minister of War has sent to the Commission a box of cartridges containing a series of dum-dum bullets among other ordinary bullets. These cartridges were found on the 'Hanoverian Oberleutnant von Hadeln,' who was taken prisoner by our troops at Ninove, on September the 24th last. These cartridges have been submitted by the Commission for examination to an expert armourer of Antwerp, whose report is as follows:

'The box with the green label that you sent me (20



Patronen, No. 403, für die Mauser selbstlade Pistole cal. 7.63 Deutsche Waffen- und Munition-Fabriken, Karlsruhe) was intended to contain filled cartridges. One of every three racks in it contains expanding dum-dum bullets taken from special boxes bearing a yellow label. These bullets are rendered expanding in the process of manufacture: they cannot be made so by hand.'

The Belgian Government herewith lodges a vigorous protest against the use of such cartridges, with the Powers which signed the Hague Conventions.

No. 89.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, March 31, 1915.*

SIR,—I send you herewith a note which I ask you to transmit to the Spanish Government, begging them to forward it to the German Government. (Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 89.

*Note.*

State Inspector Tombeur, commanding the troops on the Eastern Frontier of the Belgian Congo, has sent to the Belgian Government a sample of cartridges containing expanding bullets of the model used for sporting purposes, which were found on the positions occupied by German troops on November 20th, 1914, at the fight of Kasa Kalowe (S.W. of Lake Tanganyika). This document has been handed to the President of the Commission of Inquiry on the Violations of the Laws of War.

M. Tombeur has furthermore notified the Belgian Government that two non-commissioned officers of our colonial forces who were killed during the night of February 25th-26th, in the course of a skirmish with a patrol of Germans between Impala and Lukuga, were hit by expanding bullets, known as dum-dum. The wounds caused by the bullets were such that at first sight they seemed to have been inflicted by thirty-seven millimetre shells.

In consequence of this, the Belgian Government has

requested M. Tombeur to protest to the German commander against the use by the troops under his command of bullets which are forbidden by international conventions. He has been also instructed to inform that officer that any German or native soldier captured by the Belgian troops on whom unlawful weapons of this nature are found will be brought before a court-martial and tried as a common criminal.

## SECTION VIII.

### EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES WHO HAVE NO REGULAR MILITARY ORGANISATION.

No. 90.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Ostend, October 12, 1914.*

The Vice-Governor of Katanga telegraphs that the Germans are employing against the troops of the Belgian Congo natives led by their chiefs and entirely uninstructed in the Laws and Customs of War. As black troops which have not been properly trained and are not under the command of white officers are capable of committing the worst excesses, the Belgian Government protests against their employment.

Please bring this protest to the knowledge of the Spanish Government, and request that the German Government may be informed that the Belgian Government, in accordance with the rules of international law, refuses to treat as belligerents hordes of negroes led by native chiefs.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 91.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, October \* (sic) 13, 1914.*

SIR,—I have duly carried out the instructions contained in your telegram of the 12th of October last concerning the

\* [Presumably an error for 'November'; see date of the enclosure.]



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protest of the Belgian Government against the employment by the Germans in the Congo of undisciplined black troops which have received no military training and are not under the command of white officers. The Minister of State has just sent me, and I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, a copy of the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Berlin to the verbal note by which the Spanish Ambassador was instructed to notify our refusal to treat as belligerents hordes of negroes led by native chiefs. On the pretext that communications with countries beyond the seas are interrupted, the Foreign Office declares that it is unable to give any information on the subject.

(Signed)      BARON GRENIER.

### ENCLOSURE TO No. 91

*Auswärtiges Amt to the Spanish Embassy.—Reply to the Verbal Note of October 14, 1914, concerning the alleged employment of natives by Germany against the Belgian Congo.*

The Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs regrets not to be in a position to give any information concerning the alleged employment of natives against the Belgian Congo, as the authorities within whose purview the matter lies have no news in regard to it. Moreover, there is no possibility of obtaining any information on the subject, since the Powers actually at war with Germany have interrupted all communications with countries beyond the seas.

*Berlin, November 8, 1914.*

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## SECTION IX.

### VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

No. 92.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Ostend, October 12, 1914.*

More than forty Belgian military doctors have been made prisoners and taken away to Germany, while numerous Belgian wounded in Belgium are in want of necessary atten-

tion. Moreover numerous Belgian military doctors are being kept unemployed in the fortified places of Liège and Namur.

Kindly have recourse to the intervention of the Spanish Government to have our protest against these proceedings, which are contrary to the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, forwarded to Berlin. (Signed) DAVIGNON.

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No. 93.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, December 15, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose herewith:—

1. A copy of the declaration made by Doctor Stainforth, Surgeon-General of the fortified place of Antwerp;
2. A copy of a supplementary note from Second-Lieutenant Fierens of the Reserve.

It follows from these documents that the military doctors who remained at Antwerp hospital after the evacuation of that fortified place were sent to Germany, in defiance of the international conventions relating to the subject.

I should be glad if you would bring this urgent matter to the notice of the Spanish Government, and point out to them that by the terms of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Geneva Convention of July 6th, 1906,<sup>1</sup> doctors and hospital staffs cannot be treated as prisoners of war.

Please also insist on the liberation of Surgeon-General Stainforth and his assistants from Antwerp.

The condition of things which I have just related is not unique. Doctor Henrard of Brussels, according to trustworthy information, is interned at Halle, as is his wife also (the latter is separated from her husband and cannot communicate with him). Dr. Henrard has been interned since October 11th with Dr. Van Assche of Brussels, and is reduced to inactivity.

Be good enough to request the intervention of the Spanish Government in order to obtain the release of these doctors, also in accordance with the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1906 and of The Hague Regulations of July 29,

<sup>1</sup> See  
*Military*  
p. 465.]



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<sup>1</sup> [See *Military*, I, p. 479.] 1899, and October 18, 1907,<sup>1</sup> respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land which confirm the regulations of the Geneva Convention. (Signed) DAVIGNON.

### ENCLOSURE 1 TO NO. 93.

I, the undersigned, Stainforth, surgeon-general of the fortified place of Antwerp, who remained at the military hospital after the bombardment of the city, make declaration that I have been detained at Antwerp at the disposal of the German Headquarters, together with the Principal Medical Officers Hoevoet and Van Ex and numerous doctors and dispensers, as well as my orderly, Private Hector Bequaert, of the 7th Regiment of the Line.

After making several attempts to find out what fate the German authorities had in store for us, attempts which had no result, I yesterday, the 20th instant, in company with the principal medical officers named above, paid a visit to the Commandant, General Von Badenhausen, with the object of obtaining passports to rejoin the Belgian Army in France; he has summoned us to receive his reply on Monday next the 23rd inst. at 9 A.M. If the reply should be favourable, we should be glad if our Government would inform us where we are to go.

ANTWERP, November 21st, 1914.

(Signed) DOCTOR STAINFORTH,  
Surgeon-General.

### ENCLOSURE 2 TO NO. 93.

*Supplementary to the Note sent in by Surgeon-General Stainforth, Director of the Medical Service of Antwerp.*

After escaping from the military hospital on the day of the arrival of the Germans at Antwerp, I lived successively in five different houses in the town with kind-hearted patriots and friends, always keeping in touch with the military medical officers, Dr. Chevalier Van Havre and Dr. Wattry, to whom I confided my intention to leave Antwerp and rejoin the Ministry of War at the first opportunity.

I heard through these gentlemen that our doctors and dispensers of a rank below that of major were being forced to continue their work at the hospital (the principal German medical officer having the rank of major) and that the others

(officers of higher rank) were obliged to hold themselves at the disposal of the German Headquarters.

All our doctors and dispensers, who complained bitterly of the lack of courtesy on the part of their German colleagues (the latter, according to Dr. Wattry, not content with being rude, stole the surgical instruments) showed a strong desire to rejoin our front. I promised to hasten my departure, and on November 20th I had an interview with General Stainforth, who gave me the note of which this one is the sequel.

On November 23rd, at 9.30 A.M., the General let me know, through Dr. Clotten, that the doctors and dispensers had just been received at German Headquarters and that an orderly officer of the German General had told them roughly, in the name of his Minister of War, that they were to be at the Central Station at 7 A.M. next day, November 24th, and that they would be sent to Heidelberg (Germany).

They were made to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged that they had received this order, and that if they did not obey they would be treated according to the laws of war. One of our doctors asked for some explanation, and was told in reply that the order was sufficiently explicit and required no explanation.

I left Antwerp an hour later in possession of my General's note and other papers which I had concealed in my bandages. I left the town by means of false passports and took the tram from Merxem to Bergen-op-Zoom. I arrived in Holland five hours later, without having experienced too many difficulties at the frontier.

I took one day's rest in Holland, as I was suffering a good deal of pain from my wounds, and then went to our Legation at The Hague, where Prince de Ligne handed me, together with a proper passport, a diplomatic bag for the Foreign Office at Havre.

Passing through London, where I reported myself to the officer in command, M. Maton, I arrived at Havre on December 2nd.

HAVRE, *December 4th, 1914.*

(Signed) FIERENS,

*Second-Lieutenant of the Reserve of the  
2nd Chasseurs à Pied.*



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 94.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, December 18, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that independently of the doctors of whose unjustifiable imprisonment I informed you through my telegram of the 15th of this month there are many others whose names have just been transmitted to me, and who are being kept as prisoners of war in Germany in violation of Articles 9 and 12 of the Geneva Convention of July the 6th, 1906.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Military*, I,  
p. 463.]

They are : Dr. Corbey, regimental surgeon ; Drs. Henri Wermer, Gérard, Richard Erpicum, auxiliary surgeons, who are detained at Stendal (Prussia) ; assistant surgeons Govaerts, Berte, Evrard, and auxiliary surgeon Goemans, detained at the camp of Altengrabow (Prussia) ; assistant surgeons Destrée and Boland, detained at Wittemberg.

These medical men are not looking after any wounded.

I hear from an authoritative source that French medical officers have been set at liberty.

I beg you will spare no effort to have our medical officers similarly released. Not only were they made prisoners contrary to Article 9 of the Geneva Convention, but they have a right to demand, as they do, that they be sent back to their own army, because it is proved that their services are not indispensable ; Article 12 of the Geneva Convention is explicit on this point.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

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No. 95.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, January 8, 1915.*

SIR,—I hastened to carry out the instructions contained in your letter of December 15th last, concerning the release of Surgeon-General Stainforth, of his assistants from Antwerp, and of Drs. Henrard and Van Assche.

I have been careful to take the same steps on behalf of the other doctors enumerated in your letter of December 18th last.

The Minister of State tells me, and I have the honour to inform you, that he has instructed the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin by telegram to demand the release of our compatriots in virtue of the provisions of Articles 9 and 12 of the Geneva Convention of July 6th, 1906.

(Signed)      BARON GRENIER.

No. 96.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, January 9, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed by the French assistant-surgeon Sevaux to the Director of the Belgian Army Medical Service, which was transmitted to me in a communication from the Minister of War on December 29th last.

As you will see, the German authorities refuse to apply to the Belgian doctors the rules laid down by the Geneva Convention.

Be good enough to have recourse to the kind offices of the Spanish Government in order to transmit to the German Government the protests of the Belgian Government concerning the non-observance of the Geneva Convention, and especially their refusal to allow the Belgian medical officers Miest, Ricard, and D'Haese to rejoin the Belgian army.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 96.

*Dr. Sevaux, Assistant-Surgeon 1st Class, of the 45th Regiment  
of French Infantry, to the Director of the Medical Service  
of the Belgian Army.*

*Lorient, December 14, 1914.*

I have the honour to send you the following report in the name of the Belgian medical officers Miest, Ricard and d'Haese, prisoners at Magdeburg (Prussia), whom I left on December 1st, 1914.

These doctors remained with the Belgian wounded during



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the fighting which took place round Namur. They were employed in that city till about September 20th.

On that date the military authorities asked their consent to go to Germany in order to look after the Belgian prisoners, declaring that it was for them a question of humanity and appealing to their consciences.

The 'Garnisonarzt' of Namur, Dr. Shilling, promised them they should be free, should receive proper board and lodging, and should be paid according to the corresponding rank in the German army.

These doctors were sent to Magdeburg. They are still there. They are in fact, if not in theory, prisoners. There is at Magdeburg a camp of Belgian and French officer prisoners. Drs. Miest and d'Haese have never been employed in attending their compatriots. They are being systematically kept away from any medical duty. Their food is that given to the officers who are prisoners, that is to say, very indifferent. They sleep on pallets. Drs. Ricard and d'Haese receive 62 marks. Dr. Miest 141 marks. This pay is not what they ought to receive according to the Geneva Convention.

The German authorities have proposed that they should return to Belgium, but they consider that this would be desertion. They wish to return to the Belgian army, and are surprised to see their colleagues, French medical officers, departing from time to time, while it seems desired to keep them indefinitely at Magdeburg.

They have done me the honour to ask me to transmit their complaints to you. They beg you respectfully to do what is necessary to secure that the Geneva Convention shall be applied to them, since the Belgian medical officers ought to be released as well as the French medical officers.

(Signed) DR. SEVAUX.

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No. 97.

*The Belgian Minister at Berne, to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Berne, January 25, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that sixty-four officers and men belonging to the Belgian Army Medical

Service were liberated by the German authorities and passed through Berne on the 22nd of this month. I went to the station, accompanied by Messrs. de Raymond and de Diesbach, to greet our compatriots and to place ourselves at their disposal in case they should have need of anything.

I have just heard that seven officers of the Army Medical Service are passing through, who should arrive from Germany this afternoon.

(Signed) BARON DE GROOTE.

## SECTION X.

GERMANY ACCUSES BELGIUM OF HAVING CONCLUDED A MILITARY UNDERSTANDING WITH ENGLAND.

No. 98.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, October 19, 1914.*

SIR,—The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has recently published an article with the object of gaining credence for the view that in 1906 England had, in view of a Franco-German war, endeavoured to involve [entraîner] Belgium in the Triple Entente.<sup>1</sup> This article has been commented upon in *The Times* of the 14th October.

You will find enclosed a note refuting the allegations of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause it to be inserted in one of the principal newspapers in the country to which you are accredited.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 98.\*

*Note.*

*The Times* of the 14th October reproduces a long article from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* commenting on the discovery made in the archives of the War Office at Brussels

\* [A different translation of this enclosure will be found in *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 350-2.]

[Cf. 'Anglo-Belgian Relations,' *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 314-352.]

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 314.]



of a document entitled 'Intervention Anglaise en Belgique,' and of a memoire addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, purporting to prove that in April, 1906, the Chief of the Staff, on the initiative of the English Military Attaché, and with the approval of General Grierson, had elaborated a plan of co-operation between the British Expeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army in the event of a Franco-German war. This agreement would probably have been preceded by a similar arrangement concluded with the French General Staff.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* also reproduces certain passages from a report of the Minister at Berlin written in December 1911, with regard to another plan of the Belgian Staff, in which the measures to be taken in the event of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany are examined. Baron Greindl pointed out that this plan only took stock of the precautions to be taken in the single case of an aggression by Germany, whereas in view of its geographical situation, Belgium might equally well be exposed to an attack from France or from England.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* draws from this discovery the strange conclusion that England intended to draw Belgium into the war, and at a certain moment contemplated the violation of Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express with regard to the discovery of these documents, viz., that the publication of our military works is maimed and arranged in such a manner as to give to the reader the impression of the duplicity of England and of an adhesion on the part of Belgium to the policy of the Triple Entente in violation of its duties of neutrality. We ask the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to publish *in extenso* the result of their ferretings in our secret papers. This would furnish a new and striking proof of the loyalty, the correctness, and the impartiality which, for eighty-four years, Belgium has brought to the discharge of her international duties.

It was quite natural that Colonel Barnardiston, the military agent at Brussels of one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, should on the occasion of the Algeciras crisis make inquiries of the Chief of the Belgian Staff as to the measures which it had taken to prevent every violation of this neutrality.

The Chief of the Staff—then Lieutenant-General Ducarne—replied that Belgium was in a position to repel an invasion from *whatever quarter it might come*.

Did the discussion pass these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in a conversation of a private and confidential character, reveal to General Ducarne the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow in the event of this neutrality being violated? We doubt it, but what can be solemnly affirmed, and the contrary cannot be proved, is that neither the King nor his Government have ever been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war.

Further, by their words and their actions, they have always shown so categorical an attitude that every supposition that they would depart from the most strict neutrality has been removed *a priori*.

So far as concerns the despatch of Baron Greindl, of the 23rd December 1911, it has reference to a proposal for the defence of Luxemburg, due to the personal initiative of the Head of the First Division of the War Office. This proposal was entirely private in its character, and had not been approved by the War Office.

There is no ground for astonishment if this proposal had in view, above all, an attack from the side of Germany, since the great German military writers, and especially von Bernhardi, von Schlieffenbach and von der Goltz spoke openly in their treatises on the Next War of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the beginning of hostilities, the Imperial Government, by the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Foreign Secretary, did not seek empty pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. It justified it on the ground of military interests.

Since then, faced with the universal reprobation which this act has aroused, it seeks to mislead opinion by representing Belgium as having been subject to the Triple Entente from a time preceding the war.

These intrigues will deceive no one. They will turn to the shame of Germany. History will testify that that Power, after having bound herself by treaty to defend the neutrality



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of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it without even being able to find a pretext to justify herself.

No. 99.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the  
Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, December 4, 1914.*

SIR,—Germany having discovered a note on the interview which took place in 1912 between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, returns to the alleged Barnardiston secret, and endeavours to show that the aggression of Germany against Belgium was justified because the latter had herself failed in her duties of neutrality by negotiating a military agreement with England.

I have thought it my duty to oppose a new *démenti* to this assertion. You will find enclosed a communication on this subject.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 99.

*Note.*

[Cf. *Dip-  
lomatic*, 2,  
pp. 318-  
320.]

In its number of the 26th November, the *Kölnische Zeitung* writes:—

‘We were compelled to violate Belgian neutrality because Belgium had not observed her duties of neutrality. The truth of this forcibly appears from two incontestable documents. There is the one published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, proving that there existed between Belgium and England a secret agreement for the co-operation of the military forces of these two countries in the struggle against Germany.

‘On the other hand,’ adds the *Kölnische Zeitung*, ‘it follows, from the report of the confidential conversation between Messrs. Jungbluth and Bridges, that the English intended to disembark in Belgium, in any case, even if their aid was not solicited by Belgium.’

The thesis advanced by the German press thus consists in justifying the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium, on the ground that Belgium herself, by negotiating with England a military agreement against Germany, had failed in her duties of neutrality.

This is a false thesis, contradicted by the facts and by the very documents which the German press cites.

When on the 13th October the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published for the first time the secret Barnardiston document, we challenged it to prove the existence of a military agreement between Belgium and England. This challenge has not been taken up, and the photographic documents which it publishes<sup>1</sup> have no value as to this point. One would seek in vain to infer from them that Belgium had not observed the obligation of the strictest neutrality.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2 pp. 331-41.]

What, in fact, happened in 1906? Colonel Barnardiston, military attaché to the British Legation, went at the end of January to the head of the first department at the War Office, and had an interview with him.

Colonel Barnardiston asked General Ducarne if Belgium was ready to defend her neutrality. The reply was in the affirmative.

He then inquired as to the number of days necessary for the mobilisation of our army.

'It takes place in four days,' said the General.

'How many men can you raise?' continued the military attaché.

The General confirmed that we would mobilise 100,000 men.

After having received this information, Colonel Barnardiston declared that in the event of the violation of our neutrality by Germany, England would send to Belgium 100,000 men to defend us. He further pressed the question that he should know whether we were ready to resist a German invasion.

The General replied that we were ready to defend ourselves at Liège against Germany, at Namur against France, and at Antwerp against England. There then followed several conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the military attaché on the measures which England would take with a view to giving effect to her guarantee.



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In devoting himself to this study, the Chief of the Staff only performed his most elementary duty, which was precisely to study the dispositions calculated to enable Belgium to repel, either alone or with the aid of her guarantors, a violation of her neutrality.

On the 10th May, 1906, General Ducarne addressed to the Minister of War a report on his interviews with the British military attaché. In this report it is observed on two occasions that the despatch of English help to Belgium would be conditional on the violation of its territory. Further, a marginal note of the Minister,\* which by an excess of perfidy the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* does not translate, in order that it may escape the majority of German readers, establishes incontestably that the entry of the English into Belgium would not take place till after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

The course of events has sufficiently proved that these precautions were justified. These very natural conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the British military attaché merely demonstrate the serious apprehensions entertained by England on the subject of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium.

Were these apprehensions legitimate? To be convinced on this point, it is sufficient to read the works of the great German military writers of the period—von Bernhardi, von Schlieffenbach, von der Goltz.

Were the conversations of General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston followed by a convention or an *entente*?

Germany will herself furnish us with an answer by a document which she has caused to be published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 25th November. This document,<sup>1</sup> which refers to an interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, furnishes a striking testimony that the conversation on the fulfilment of the guarantee by England had had no results in 1912, and was at the same point at which it had been left six years before, in 1906.

No document could justify in a clearer manner the loyalty with which the Government of the King fulfilled their international obligations.

\* The note is in the handwriting of General Ducarne and not of the Minister (see No. 101).

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 339.]

Colonel Bridges is reported to have said that, on the occasion of the last occurrences [*lors des derniers événements*], as we were not in a position to defend our neutrality ourselves, the British Government would have disembarked immediately, even if we had not asked for assistance.

To which General Jungbluth is said to have replied immediately: 'But you could not disembark in our country without our consent.'

Is there any reason for attaching so much importance to the views of a military attaché which, as we could prove, have never been shared by the Foreign Office? Did he admit the thesis, false in our view although supported by some authors, that, in the event of a violation of neutrality, the intervention of a guarantor is justifiable, even in the absence of any appeal from the guaranteed? We do not know. One thing is certain, that the military attaché, when faced with the objection of the General, did not insist.

Was Belgium bound to communicate these conversations to her guarantors? As to the first, Colonel Barnardiston was not authorised to contract an engagement any more than General Ducarne was authorised to take note of a promise of assistance. The incriminated conversations had, moreover, a purely military character, they could have no political bearing, they never formed the subject of deliberation by the Government, and they were not known to the Department of Foreign Affairs till a much later date.

So far as concerns the interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, was it necessary to inform the Powers that the latter had given expression to an opinion which the Belgian Government would not admit any more than the British Government would, and against which General Jungbluth had immediately protested, without his interviewer thinking it necessary to insist on it.

The alleged justification of Germany turns against her. In his speech of the 4th of August,<sup>1</sup> in his interview in the morning with the English Ambassador,<sup>2</sup> the Imperial Chancellor declared that the aggression against Belgium was to be attributed only to strategic necessity. The cause is understood.

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 356-7  
<sup>2</sup> [*Diplomatic*, I, 209.]



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

No. 100.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, December 15, 1914.*

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of the 4th December last with reference to the allegations of the German Government regarding an alleged Anglo-Belgian military agreement, I have the honour to direct your attention to the publication in *The Times* of the 7th of this month of the account of the conversation which took place between Sir E. Grey and Count de Lalaing on the 7th April 1913.

I enclose, for your information and use, a translation of the English *communiqué*.—I am, etc.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 100.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

*Proof of British Sincerity.*

With reference to statements implying that Great Britain ever contemplated a violation of Belgian neutrality, the Foreign Office issues for publication the following record of a conversation with the Belgian Minister on April 7th, 1913. It was sent to the British Minister in Brussels and a record was communicated by him to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time :—

‘SIR,—In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

‘The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

‘I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I

did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.—I am, etc.

(Signed) 'E. GREY.'

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No. 101.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, January 13, 1915.*

SIR,—In my despatch of the 4th December<sup>1</sup> I had the honour of sending you a denial of the accusation made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* against Belgium, to the effect that the latter country had deviated from her duty of neutrality by negotiating with Great Britain a military agreement directed against Germany. [No. 99]

In this *communiqué* I said that a marginal note made by the Minister of War<sup>2</sup> established the fact that the entry of British troops into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. [See ante p. 450.]

At the time when I prepared the *communiqué* I had been unable to obtain a copy of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* containing a photograph of this document. I only had before me the German translation of the Ducarne Report made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and reproduced by the German papers. This translation omits the most important phrase in the document, which says 'that the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

our neutrality had been violated by Germany.' It is true that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in a later portion of its article prints this phrase in French, letting it be understood that it is merely a marginal note. But now it appears, as is shown by the photograph, that the phrase forms part of the Report of General Ducarne, that it was written by his hand, and that its proper place is marked by a reference mark.

In these circumstances it appears to me necessary to call the attention of the various Governments and of readers to the falsification of the Ducarne document by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. I should be obliged if you would be kind enough to obtain the publication of this *communiqué*, which is in the form of a newspaper article, in one of the newspapers of your capital. It is unnecessary for you to make it the subject of a communication to the Government.—I am, etc.,  
(Signed) DAVIGNON.

### ENCLOSURE TO NO. 101.

#### THE BARNARDISTON AFFAIR AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has a singular way of perusing, reading, and translating documents. German learned criticism when carried away by the heat of argument loses all sense of cold objectivity. Guided by its desires, it sees, or fails to see; it inserts phrases in the text or excludes them; it transposes or invents.

\* \* \*

The Barnardiston affair is a remarkable example of this.

On the 13th October the *Zeitung* mentioned the discovery which German searchers made in the offices of the Belgian General Staff, and the Ducarne Report, which sets out the interviews of Barnardiston with certain Belgian officers.

It then stated that this report was part of a dossier (*Mappe*) bearing the title 'Intervention Anglaise en Belgique,' and it endeavoured to show that from the details of this report it followed that a 'convention' had been concluded between Belgium and Great Britain.

An answer was immediately made that the report and its details did not allow of this incorrect conclusion, that there were interviews but that there was never an agreement.

On the 25th November the *Zeitung* again took the matter up and published facsimiles of the documents. We no longer hear of the title 'Intervention Anglaise en Belgique': a new title appeared. According to the *Zeitung*, which had suddenly become clairvoyante, the famous report had been enclosed in a wrapper (*Umschlag*) with the inscription 'Conventions anglo-belges.'

This second discovery, made just at the right time, and at a moment when the *Zeitung* found itself in a position to make no reply, appeared sufficiently strange. How was it that this inscription which, being placed at the top, ought to have attracted attention at the very first moment, was not seen on the 13th October, and could only be seen on the 25th November?

\* \* \*

Suspicious people then examined the documents more closely. They compared the photographs and the translations, and it was seen that some of the versions were akin to forgeries.

We understand that the *Zeitung* maintains that the Barnardiston affair was not limited to pourparlers. It makes out that there was an agreement, and this is how it goes about to show to its kind readers that it is right.

The photograph of the Ducarne Report contains the following phrase:—

'My visitor (Barnardiston) emphasised the following points: (1) Our CONVERSATION WAS absolutely *confidential*.'

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has wonderful eyesight. It stated:—

'Herr Barnardiston betonte: 1° dass unser ABKOMMEN absolut vertraulich *sein sollte*.'

It turned the word 'conversation' into 'convention.' It made Barnardiston say that our CONVENTION *would be* absolutely confidential.<sup>1</sup>

How can it then help succeeding in its claims? Voltaire required two lines to hang a man. But Germany has made progress since then. To curse a people three letters in a word are sufficient. A 'conversation' became [*devient*] 'convention.'

Could there be a more patent or more shameful forgery?

\* \* \*

<sup>1</sup> [See *Di-  
lomatic*, i  
p. 23, foot-  
note, for  
British  
comment  
on this  
point.]



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

But that is not all. In the photograph of the official record of the report erasures and additions are visible. When General Ducarne was reporting the suggestions or the first *démarche* of Barnardiston he perceived that he had omitted to mention at the very beginning the hypothesis on which the interview was based. He wrote five lines in the margin, and by two signs he marked the place where the addition ought to figure in his letter.

Alas, this addition troubled the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*! The actual words were [*Elle dit, en effet*]: 'the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.' What could it do to diminish or remove the effect of this? It was quite simple. In its translation the *Zeitung* does not mention the addition. But to give an appearance of perfect loyalty it quotes it in its comments. This is the art of detaching words from their context.

Subordinates go on to complete and perfect the manœuvre. They proceed to publish a mutilated text, and so make people think that the addition was perhaps a subsequent note made possibly by somebody other than the author of the Report.

And that is how history is written in Germany!

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No. 102.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the  
Diplomatic Representatives of Belgium.*

*Havre, February 13, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour of sending to you herewith the completed translation of a note published by *The Times* on the 27th January last, in which Sir E. Grey replies to the explanations given by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg to the American Press on the question of the British attitude in the present war and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.—I am, etc., (Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO NO. 102.

*Sir E. Grey's reply to the Chancellor.*

[Here follows, in a French translation, Sir Edward Grey's reply to the German Chancellor, dated January 26, 1915, the

English text of which will be found in *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 388-392. The final paragraph of this reply, as there given, is not included in the French version printed in the *Grey Book*.]

No. 103.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the  
Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, March 4, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour of sending you herewith the protest of the Government of the King against the declaration of the German Chancellor that Belgium had abandoned her neutrality since 1906 by concluding an agreement with Great Britain. I would ask you to communicate this protest to the Government to which you are accredited and to give it as much publicity as possible.—I am, etc.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO NO. 103.

*Communiqué.*

On December 2nd, 1914, the Chancellor of the German Empire declared before the Reichstag that 'on August 4th we had already certain indications of the fault committed by the Belgian Government, but I had not yet at my disposition any formal proofs in writing, though the British Government was aware that such proofs existed. Now, by means of certain documents discovered at Brussels, which I have caused to be published,<sup>1</sup> it has become clear how, and in what measure, Belgium had abandoned her neutrality in favour of England. The whole world now realises that when our troops on the night of August 3rd-4th moved into Belgian territory, they were setting foot on the soil of a State which had long ago abandoned its neutrality.'

Belgium is justly proud of her traditions of honour and correct action, and cannot pass over this campaign directed against her honour by a Chancery which has made untruthfulness its regular method, without branding the attempt with a well-merited stigma. Hard though the sufferings of the present hour may be, the Belgian people regards honour as a thing precious and immutable.

<sup>1</sup> [For these publications see *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 314-325.]



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Belgium never allowed her patrimony of national uprightness to be lessened. It was the resolve to keep that patrimony intact which dictated her decision on the night of August 2nd,<sup>1</sup> and the impartial historian will repeat the fact to future generations still proud of their moral integrity.

There is a campaign on foot to distort historical truth before the eyes of the nations, and no means are too base for employment in it. Once more the Belgian Government must speak out, and so speaking must address its declaration to every land where Right and Honour are still worshipped.

At the outbreak of the war, the crime perpetrated against Belgium was obvious, and the interest of Germany in avowing it seemed evident—she was trying to exercise a sort of moral pressure on her victim. The violation of international law was avowed by the Imperial Chancellor from the very tribune of the Reichstag.<sup>2</sup> At that moment things went so far that money was offered in compensation for lost honour to the nation that Germany was trying to fascinate! As if honour could be bought back by gold! But necessity knows no law: 'Not kennt kein Gebot!' It was said that every act was permissible—even the act of beating down by a lightning-stroke a nation that it was necessary to crush. Once more the course of war has demonstrated that one initial crime infallibly brings about a series of subsequent crimes.

No sooner had our soil—that soil whose inviolability had been guaranteed by Germany—suffered invasion, than part of the invading army began to disgrace itself by the systematic perpetration of arson, rape, and murder on a harmless people, with incredible details of cruelty, theft, and pillage. And while this flood of unparalleled barbarism was being let loose on Belgium, no act of Belgium could be found to justify the invasion: the spoiler himself confessed it.

This situation of affairs showed up in a most unfavourable light the Empire which, in order to conquer France, had set itself to torture unoffending Belgium. The moral position was odious, and Germany had to get out of it at all costs. On the one hand the martyrdom of innocent Belgium was disturbing the conscience of the whole world. On the other hand, there were nations which this menacing triumph of brute force exposed to a similar fate, though they had no concern with the war. They were asking themselves, and

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 31-32.]

<sup>2</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 356.]

with good reason, the most agonizing questions as to their own future security.

A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military Attachés and two Chiefs-of-the-Staff of the Belgian Army.<sup>1</sup> In order to transform these reports into documents which would justify Germany's conduct, it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could be made to appear decent. And thus Germany, when she had crushed a people that had remained scrupulously neutral, could pretend that she was enacting (though she might not have known it at the moment) the rôle of the minister of avenging justice.

Undoubtedly this idea had its advantageous points—if it could be successfully carried out. Moral guilt could be heaped upon the Belgian people—a people whose loyal and vigorous resistance had caused the failure of the first plans of the German General Staff. They were in arms for honour alone, and they were to suffer their final outrage: it was not enough that they were sacrificed—they were to be dishonoured also. Thus it came to pass that, with a shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German Chancery gave out that a convention had existed, by which Belgium had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on those ignorant of the facts, German honesty suppressed, when the *précis* of the above-named conversations was published, the clause in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded had reference only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had already been violated.<sup>2</sup>

The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only answer that they deserve—they are a tissue of lies, all the more shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have studied the original documents.

But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:—

(I) The report of certain interviews which took place

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, PP. 331-341.]

<sup>2</sup> [See No. 101.]



between Lieut.-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views as to the way in which England could help Belgium in case the latter were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a hypothetical case, viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.' The translation in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* of November 25th omits this clause, the phrase which gives its exact scope and significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne's report contains the words 'the officer with whom I spoke insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.' For the word '*conversation*' the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* substitutes the word '*convention*.'<sup>1</sup> Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that our 'Convention' would be absolutely confidential!

<sup>1</sup> [See also *Diplomatic*, I, p. 23, footnote.]

Such proceedings need no comment.

(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the same subject in April 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression, could only take place with our consent.' The British Military Attaché raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium, without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter was a necessary preliminary.

The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no 'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no conclusion arising from these conversations was ever brought before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.

## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of them is either garbled or suppressed.

In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government, faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of infamy—which so far is his only legitimate conquest. It also takes the opportunity of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is obvious, that :—

(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the smallest size, had entered Belgium.<sup>1</sup> No trustworthy evidence can be produced to contradict this affirmation.

<sup>1</sup> [See also *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 349-350.]

(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help made by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her guarantors.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 43.]

(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for that defence.

Belgium, the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehoods. She has faith in the justice of the World. On the day of judgment the triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour.

(See No. 106.)

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### SECTION XI.

#### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY SENT BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY TO BELGIUM BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

No. 104.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

*Havre, October 20, 1914.*

SIR,—Be so kind as to send the following declaration to the Government of His Apostolic Majesty through the intermediary of the Spanish Legation:—



'When the Belgian Government replied to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, they were unaware of certain facts that would have modified their answer, or rather that would have made them take the initiative in a rupture of diplomatic relations. For according to a proclamation by the German Lieutenant-General who styles himself Governor of the Fortress of Liège, 'the big motor batteries sent by Austria have proved their excellence in the fighting round Namur.' These fights took place before the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Belgium, which was based primarily on the military co-operation of Belgium with France and Great Britain. If the Belgian Government had had knowledge at that date of Austro-Hungarian participation in the attack on Belgium, they would immediately have recalled the Belgian Minister accredited to Vienna. The Austrian declaration of the 28th of August declared that Austria-Hungary had been compelled to break off diplomatic relations and considered herself *from that moment* in a state of war with Belgium.

'It was thus while peace was still undisturbed, and the two countries were still maintaining diplomatic relations, that Austrian artillery attacked and destroyed the forts of Namur.'

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(See *First Grey Book*, Nos. 77 and 78.<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> [*Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 67-70.]

No. 105.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, April 5, 1915.*

SIR,—The Minister of State has just sent me, and I have the honour to transmit to you, a note addressed on the 6th of February last by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to the Spanish Embassy at Vienna, in reply to a communication from M. Polo de Bernabé concerning the Austro-Hungarian batteries which were put at the disposal of the German army at the siege of Namur.

The Marquis of Lema adds that this document, which accompanied a letter from the Ambassador dated the 11th February, reached him after a delay that he is unable to explain.

(Signed) BARON GRENIER.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 105

*Note*

The Belgian Government having pointed out that, when they replied to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, certain facts were unknown to them, and that in particular they were unaware that previous to the declaration of war by the Monarchy on Belgium Austro-Hungarian batteries had taken part in fighting around Namur, the Imperial and Royal Government desire to point out that at the moment of declaring war on Belgium they were themselves in an analogous position.

Thus the Imperial and Royal Government had not at that moment been informed authoritatively that, already, long before the beginning of the present war and unknown to Austria-Hungary, which was one of the States which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, Belgium had entered into negotiations with other of the guaranteeing Powers with a view to military co-operation of Belgium with Great Britain and France, negotiations which, as is shown by documents recently discovered by the German authorities in the Belgian archives, finally resulted in the conclusion of arrangements of a military nature directed against Germany. It was undoubtedly these tendencies, absolutely contrary to the spirit and tenor of the treaties of April 19, 1839,<sup>1</sup> which led the Belgian Government to decline the proposals which Germany had made to them in order to obtain free passage through Belgian territory for German troops—proposals which were provoked by the hostile attitude of Belgium and dictated by the urgent necessity for the German Empire's self-preservation—and thus to force Germany to make war on Belgium. It is precisely by proceeding in this manner that the Belgian Government gave ground for the use in the operations against the Belgian fortresses of the Austro-Hungarian batteries, which from the beginning of the complications that led to the war had been placed at the disposal of Germany by the Monarchy.

It is apparent from the above that the Belgian Government themselves provoked the act for which they now endeavour to place responsibility on the shoulders of the

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 487.]



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Imperial and Royal Government. This Government is accordingly entitled to repudiate this unfounded reproach and to state, in its turn, that Belgium acted in a manner contrary to the duties devolving on her in her capacity of a permanently neutral State.

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No. 106.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, April 20, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to send you herewith the reply of the Belgian Government to the note of the Imperial and Royal Government which you sent to me in your report of April 5. I should be glad if it could be sent to its destination through the good offices of the Spanish Government.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

[Cf. enclosure to  
No. 103.]

ENCLOSURE TO No. 106.

*Note.*

By a note bearing the date February 11, the Imperial and Royal Government pleads the discovery in the Belgian archives of documents revealing an alleged Anglo-Belgian military understanding directed against Germany, in order to justify the participation of the Austro-Hungarian artillery in the destruction of the forts of Namur at a time when Belgium and Austria-Hungary were at peace. It declares that it was these tendencies, contrary to the spirit and tenor of the treaties of 1839, which led Belgium to decline the German proposals, which were provoked by the hostile attitude of Belgium and dictated to Germany by the care for her own safety. It adds, finally, that the use of the Austrian guns, which from the beginning of the hostilities had been placed at the disposal of Germany, against the forts of Namur, was due to this hostile attitude of the Belgian Government, and that the Imperial and Royal Government is entitled to point out that Belgium has acted in a manner contrary to the duties devolving on her in her capacity of a permanently neutral State.

The Imperial and Royal Government therefore endeavours to justify its having engaged in hostilities against us in time

of peace by asserting that we had failed to carry out the duties of neutrality by negotiating with England a military agreement aimed against Germany. This calumnious accusation, which the Belgian Government deeply resents, had no influence whatever on the declaration of war which Austria-Hungary addressed to Belgium on August the 28th, 1914. Indeed, even if the culpability of the Belgian Government had been proved, it would still be pertinent to ask how that would justify an attack which was made two months before the discovery of the incriminating documents.

But the Belgian Government, which for more than eighty-four years has scrupulously observed its international obligations, emphatically denies the accusation of the German chancellery that it has betrayed them. If the Imperial and Royal Government had read the documents found in the archives of Brussels, it would have convinced itself that these documents did not prove the crime of which the Belgian Government is accused.

These documents are two in number.<sup>1</sup>

The first is a report addressed by General Ducarne, chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the Minister of War on the conversations he had had in the beginning of the year 1906 with Colonel Barnardiston, British Military Attaché. These conversations dealt with the pledge of England to guarantee Belgium's neutrality. At the beginning of their conversation General Ducarne mentions the hypothesis assumed by Colonel Barnardiston. 'The entry of English troops into Belgium would take place only after the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany!'

This hypothesis, namely, the previous violation of Belgian neutrality, is sufficient in itself to exonerate the Belgian Government from the wrongful act imputed to it by Germany, on the assumption, of course, that the documents are not mutilated, and that they are not made to say what they do not contain, as has been done in the translation published by the *North German Gazette*.

The violation of the neutrality of Belgium on the eastern frontier being a contingency which numerous signs showed to be threatening as far back as 1906, the elementary duty of the Belgian General Staff was to study a scheme of help to be sent by England to Belgium as guaranteeing Power, under

<sup>1</sup> [For their text, see *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 331-41.]



this hypothesis, to repel an attack by Germany. The fact that this contingency has occurred, with a brutality which no one could have conceived, shows that these preoccupations were justified. Moreover, Colonel Barnardiston, who was merely Military Attaché, had not the authority necessary to contract an engagement, any more than General Ducarne, an official of the War Office, was qualified to take official cognisance of a promise of help. It lay with the Government alone to conclude a convention with a view to fulfilling the promised guarantees. Not only has no such convention ever been concluded, but the conversations on which the accusation is based have never been made the subject of deliberation by the Government.

The second document relates to a conversation on the same subject, which took place in April 1912, between Military Attaché Bridges and Lieutenant-General Jungbluth. In the course of this conversation General Jungbluth observed to Colonel Bridges that an English intervention on behalf of Belgium would be possible only with the consent of the latter. The British Military Attaché objected that England would perhaps be led to exercise her rights and her duties as one of the guaranteeing Powers of Belgium, without waiting for the latter to call in her aid. That was a personal opinion of Colonel Bridges; it was never shared by his Government, and this conversation clearly shows that the intervention of England could not have taken place before the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. This second document would in itself destroy any suspicion that a convention had been concluded in 1906, as a result of a conversation between Ducarne and Barnardiston. As a matter of fact Colonel Bridges did not in 1912 even make any allusion to the conversation of Colonel Barnardiston in 1906, and it is evident that if a convention had been concluded six years before, the speakers, in broaching this subject, could not have failed to refer to it.

The Imperial and Royal Government is clearly wrong in ascribing the German aggression to the hostile attitude of Belgium. Until August 2, 1914, the date of the ultimatum, no difference had arisen between the two countries, their relations had not ceased to be cordial, and Germany had alleged no grievance against us. It is clear, from the evidence

of the official documents already published and from the speech delivered by the Imperial Chancellor on August the 4th,<sup>1</sup> that Germany had nothing with which to reproach Belgium, and if their troops have attacked her, it is for the purpose of reaching France by the quickest and easiest road, so as to strike a decisive blow as soon as possible. 'We were forced,' the Chancellor said in his speech on August the 4th, 'to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.'

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Diplo-*  
*matic*, 2,  
pp. 353-7]

To declare war on Belgium, the Imperial and Royal Government have invoked every kind of pretext except failure to fulfil the duties of neutrality, and they cannot deny that while we were entertaining friendly relations with them, and were trying to comply with the demands of their representative at Brussels, they gave the order to their troops to destroy our forts at Namur.

## SECTION XII.

### LEGEND OF THE PUTTING OUT OF EYES.

No. 107.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, November 25, 1914.*

SIR,—I request you to be good enough to have the enclosed *communiqué* published in a paper of the country to which you are accredited.

I should like it to be published as soon as possible.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

### ENCLOSURE TO No. 107

#### *Note*

We have heard from Berlin through an excellent source that two official commissions have been appointed, one of them civil and the other military, acting independently, to inquire into all acts of cruelty attributed to belligerents. The Civil Commission has reported that—



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‘In regard to the matter of the putting out of eyes, whenever a case of this kind has been referred to in the newspapers, or has been reported from private sources, the Commission has sought out witnesses and taken their evidence: in many cases, not to say in nearly all, the witnesses admitted that they knew the facts only by hearsay; others either refused to come forward or did not put in an appearance.

‘The Commission arrived at the conclusion that no formal proofs of wounded men or prisoners having had their eyes put out by Belgian women were produced, and that in no case is there any official record of this having taken place.

‘Doctors and the Members of the Commission of Inquiry stated that, when people’s minds are over-excited as they now are, it was quite natural that acts of brutality and cruelty should be committed by either side, but that generally speaking these acts had been greatly exaggerated.

‘The stories about the putting out of eyes must have arisen from the fact that a large number of wounded men have had their eyes put out by fragments of shrapnel which, bursting at the height of a man, very often cause wounds in the eyes.

‘French and English illustrated papers confirm this. You there constantly see, in places where shells are bursting, men being wounded in the face, and instinctively protecting their faces with their arms or their hands.

‘It seems that thousands of rooks and crows swoop down into all the battlefields, and they always attack the eyes of the dead and wounded. This may have helped to give rise to the story, which medical investigations have in every case proved to be untrue.

‘In a Frankfort hospital twenty-nine severely wounded men lay, it seems, side by side, all with their eyes put out. In not a single case could their wounds be attributed to any other cause than that of fragments of shrapnel.

‘In spite of this the legend still survives; but we have been assured that in official circles the acts of cruelty with which the Belgians have been reproached are formally denied.’

The Civil Commission is quite definite on this subject.

The Military Commission is still pursuing its inquiry, but it has reached the same conclusions. It has not yet

announced officially its findings, and for that reason the conclusions it has reached are subject to reserve, and should be considered as only provisional and of a purely private character.

We are glad to note that the acts of abominable cruelty of which Belgian women were so unjustly accused by the most authoritative organs of the Imperial Government have been formally denied by the two Commissions appointed by that same Government.

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No. 108

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad*

*Havre, December 18, 1914.*

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of November 25th last, I have the honour to call your attention to an article which appeared in the *Temps* of the 15th of this month under the heading 'La légende des yeux crevés.' It quotes, from the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* and the *Vorwärts*, two notes contradicting the calumnious accusations of the German semi-official press on the subject of the alleged mutilation of the wounded by the Belgian civil population. (Signed) DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 108

*Berne, December 12.*

The important Catholic paper, the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, published the following letter in one of its recent issues :

TO THE EDITOR

*Aix-la-Chapelle, November 26.*

SIR,—One of the most ungrateful tasks at the present time is to defend the truth against the absurd rumours which are circulating in the country. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* has already on September 30, 1914, published a letter from me in which I stated that after inquiry I had not found in the thirty-five hospitals in Aix-la-Chapelle a single German wounded soldier who had had his eyes put out. Since then you have informed me that my letter had by no means put an end to these reports, and you sent me an article from the *Kölnische Zeitung* of the 31st October calculated to



revive belief in these fantastic stories. It is stated in that article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* that a doctor named Saethre has visited the hospitals of Cologne, and the following passage occurs in the translation of his report: 'There cannot be any doubt as to the cruelties committed by francs-tireurs. I have myself seen at Aix-la-Chapelle a Red Cross sister who had had one of her breasts cut off by them, and a squadron commander who had his eyes put out while he was lying on the field of battle.'

You have asked me to write to you what I think of this report. I have accordingly approached the official authorities with a view to ascertaining if the facts mentioned by Dr. Saethre were correct. I have received the following letter, dated November 25, from the Director of the hospital: 'The atrocities you mention have not been committed, at least in so far as Aix-la-Chapelle is concerned. We have never seen the Red Cross sister referred to, nor the squadron commander either.'

I do not know where the doctor mentioned in the *Kölnische Zeitung* obtained his information. I think it necessary to state once more that there is not in the hospitals in Aix-la-Chapelle any wounded man who has had his eyes put out, or any Red Cross sister who has been mutilated in the manner named above.

FR. KAUFMANN, *Archpriest*.

Moreover the *Vorwärts* publishes on December 6 the results of an inquiry addressed to the management of the hospitals of Hanover and of the big hospital de la Charité in Berlin. The authorities in charge of the Hanover hospitals sent the following reply to the Socialist paper:—

'After making inquiries among the doctors of the different sections of No. 3 Hospital, we are able to inform you that we have not at this moment any wounded men whose eyes have been put out. We have never had any.'

Similarly the authorities in charge of the hospital de la Charité in Berlin sent the following note to the *Vorwärts*:

'The hospital de la Charité has never had any wounded men who have had their eyes put out.'

## SECTION XIII.

CANCELLING OF THE EXEQUATUR OF CONSULS  
IN BELGIUM.

No. 109.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, December 24, 1914.*

SIR,—I have the honour to beg you to be good enough to have recourse to the kind offices of the Government of His Catholic Majesty to send the following protest to the Imperial Government:—

‘It has come to our knowledge that a note has been recently sent to the neutral States and those allied to Germany. The Imperial German Government declares :

1. That it considers the German occupation has annulled, and thereby put an end to, the exequatur accorded by the Belgian Government to the various consuls residing in the occupied districts of Belgium.
2. That, abolishing the former consular jurisdiction, it proposes to institute three consular jurisdictions only, one at Brussels, one at Antwerp, and one at Liège, and to allow the agents at these three places of residence at present only simple provisional recognition.’

Military occupation, as defined by Article 42 of the IVth Hague Convention, confers on the occupying State over the invaded territories only *de facto* possession.<sup>1</sup> It follows that the *de jure* sovereignty of the invaded State remains, but that it is for the time suspended. The German Text-book of War confirms this provision of the Act of The Hague and completes it: ‘The occupation of a part of enemy territory,’ it says, ‘is not an appropriation of the latter. The right of the State, previously sovereign, therefore remains ; it is simply suspended by a conflict with the superior strength of the conqueror during the period of his occupation and in a provisional fashion.’ If *de facto* possession justifies the occupant in

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Military*,  
p. 482.]



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taking the necessary measures for the conduct of military operations, it imposes on him, on the other hand, the obligation of conducting the administration of the occupied territories, with due regard to its provisional character, in such a way as not to interfere with social and public life, and of respecting the laws in force in the country, unless absolutely prevented. (Article 43 of the IVth Hague Convention.)

Thus an occupying Government cannot break up the existing judiciary organisation. By destroying this organisation it would exceed the limits of the powers of the occupant, who is restricted to measures designed to attain the proper aim of the war. The respect due to the existing laws, which is stipulated for in Article 43 of the IVth Hague Convention, implies the maintenance of the functionaries appointed in virtue of those laws.

The occupant may of course believe himself entitled to withdraw the exequatur from a Consul whom he believes to have committed acts serious enough to seem incompatible with the continuance of his mission, even in the eyes of a Government *de jure*. Even then he ought, in the first place, to refer to the Power by whom this Consul was appointed. But he cannot under his *de facto* and provisional title claim the right, apart from any reason personal to the particular individual, to regard as cancelled generally all the exequaturs previously granted.

Such a cancellation is in no way demanded by the exigencies of war. It would be an abuse of the occupation. That would deprive the subjects of foreign States of their natural protectors amidst the vicissitudes of the struggle for occupation and resumption, and would increase the disturbance among a peaceful population.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

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No. 110.

*The Belgian Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Madrid, January 9, 1915.*

SIR,—In reply to your report of December 24th last, I beg to enclose herewith the reply of the German Government

to the protest of the Belgian Government concerning the cancelling of the exequatur of the consuls in Belgium.

(Signed) BARON GRENIER.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 110.

Auswärtiges Amt.—To the Royal Spanish Embassy.

The Foreign Office has the honour to reply to the *note verbale* of the Royal Spanish Embassy of December 31st last as follows :—

The Imperial German Government is of opinion that the protest of the Belgian Government concerning the exequatur of the Consuls in Belgium is without foundation. Article 42<sup>1</sup> of the IVth Hague Convention in particular cannot support the view taken by the Belgian Government. According to this article, the occupying Government is obliged to maintain public order, as far as possible in the occupied districts ; the article by no means obliges it to maintain all the officials in the exercise of their functions. This, on the contrary, could be done only so far as the military interests of the occupation permit, and only on condition that those officials are ready to submit to the authority of the occupying Government. These principles apply to neutral Consuls, so that the latter can exercise their public functions only in so far as the occupying Power consents, for the exequatur of the enemy does not bind that Power.

The circular note of the Imperial Government relating to the Consuls does not in any way affect the rights of the Belgian Government ; it concerns only the interests of the Imperial Government, which claims the original right and the unquestionable duty of regulating the consular protection of neutral subjects for the period of the occupation.

This new regulation, moreover, is necessary, in the first place, in the interest of neutral subjects themselves. Inasmuch as no fewer than 300 representatives of allied or neutral States were admitted into Belgium, the majority of them of Belgian nationality, and a great number of these have left the country, it is evident that, in the interest of the neutral subjects themselves, the Imperial Government would not do well if it delayed in establishing regulations for effectively assuring their protection.

<sup>1</sup> [The reference here is to Article 43. See *Military*, p. 482.]



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

## No. III.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, January 22, 1915.*

SIR,—In answer to your letter of the 9th of this month, I have the honour to enclose herewith a reply to the note of the German Government concerning the withdrawal of the exequatur from the foreign Consuls in Belgium.

Be good enough to beg the Spanish Government to transmit this note to the Imperial Government.

(Signed)            DAVIGNON.

## ENCLOSURE TO No. III.

### *Note.*

Germany claimed in her communication of December the 5th that the occupant of an invaded region has the right to consider as 'annulled' ('*annulés*') in all cases the exequatur given previously to Consuls who are discharging their legitimate functions under the laws of the country.

The claim cannot be maintained.

By reason of the nature of the occupant's power, which is derived from simple possession and has no definitive character, Article 43 of the IVth Hague Convention sanctions, in principle, the maintenance of the civil and administrative laws and, consequently, of the existing conditions.

In vain does Germany, in her note of January the 3rd, invoke the military interest and the administrative interest. These two interests may justify the withdrawal of the exequatur from a consul who committed acts of hostility or behaved in a manner inconsistent with the duties of his mission. But they cannot justify either the general right of annulment, which Germany puts forward, or her claim to overturn the entire consular organisation, to reduce to three the number of Consuls of each nation, and to exclude from the consulates, for the sole reason that they are Belgians, individuals who have committed no act contrary to the military interest, and have loyally recognised those rights of the occupant which are defined by the Hague Convention.

If the principle maintained by Germany were admitted, it would result in disastrous instability among the consulates of districts occupied one day and retaken the next.

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No. 112.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the  
Heads of Missions Abroad.*

*Havre, February 1, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that the American Government have just given their opinion concerning the annulment of the exequatur granted to consuls discharging their functions within the occupied districts of Belgium.

According to a telegram from the Belgian Minister at Washington, the American Government is of opinion that the consuls are not political representatives with a general mission, but commercial representatives with a local mission.

These representatives, in the districts under military occupation, can discharge the duties of their mission, only where the occupant, being in possession of a legal right of control, judges that military operations permit of their doing so.

Germany is of opinion that in the districts occupied by her, military operations do not at present permit the discharge of consular duties elsewhere than at Brussels, Antwerp, and Liège.

It may therefore be considered that the exercise of their functions by the American consuls is not annulled, but simply suspended in the districts under military occupation, except at Brussels, Antwerp, and Liège.

As to the consulates of those three localities, which can continue their activity, and of other localities which may ultimately find themselves in the same situation, there is no ground for changing the existing personnel, unless the German Government informs the American Government that reasons personal to himself prevent any particular individual among these consuls from discharging the duties of his office.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.



# DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

## SECTION XIV.

### ARBITRARY ARREST OF M. MAX, BURGOMASTER OF BRUSSELS.

No. 113.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to  
Mr. Brand Whitlock, Minister of the United States.*

*Havre, January 5, 1915.*

SIR,—The Belgian Government is aware of all the efforts Your Excellency has made to lighten the crushing burdens borne by Belgium, and in particular by Brussels, in consequence of the German occupation. The Belgian Government is profoundly grateful to Your Excellency for the support which you have been kind enough to give to our unfortunate population.

I have the honour to resort again to your kindness with the view of obtaining information concerning the fate of M. Max, Burgomaster of Brussels, whose health is unsatisfactory and who is undergoing, for reasons of which I have no official knowledge, a painful imprisonment at Glatz.

It is understood from correspondence received by his friends that M. Max is treated like an ordinary prisoner guilty of the most serious offences, that he is confined under the constant watch of two soldiers, and that he is not allowed, under any pretext, to leave his prison.

Perhaps Your Excellency could induce the German authorities, whilst taking the necessary precautions by supervision, to bring about some amelioration in a régime that may well have the gravest consequences for the health of M. Max.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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No. 114.

*Mr. Brand Whitlock, Minister of the United States of America,  
to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, January 14, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of January the 5th, and I much appreciate

## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

the sentiments which the Belgian Government have been good enough to convey to me through you.

I will not fail to seize the first opportunity of discussing the fate of M. Max with Baron von der Lancken, and I shall have pleasure in communicating to Your Excellency the information I obtain on this subject.

(Signed) BRAND WHITLOCK.

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### SECTION XV.

THE TOWN OF COURTRAI FINED 10,000,000 MARKS FOR  
HAVING OBEYED TWO GERMAN COMMANDANTS.

No. 115.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Havre, January 10, 1915.*

The town of Courtrai has just been punished by a fine of ten million marks for an alleged hidden depot of arms. The municipal authorities are in no way to blame, for they only called in the arms and had them deposited in the Broel tower, in accordance with two proclamations, issued in succession, the first by order of Commandant Maxeman, and the second by order of Commandant Pschors.

Be good enough to request the Spanish Government to bring to the knowledge of the German Government the facts which prove the unjustifiable character of this punishment.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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### SECTION XVI.

NO FRENCH OR ENGLISH TROOPS ENTERED BELGIUM  
BEFORE AUGUST 5.

No. 116.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic  
Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, January 28, 1915.*

SIR,—As you know, Germany is endeavouring to justify her attack on Belgium by alleging facts which, if true, would



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

prove that our country was in collusion with France and England, and thereby disregarded our obligations as neutrals.

Thus, the Wolff Agency, according to an article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, telegraphed to the newspapers that French troops had already entered Belgian territory on the 24th July.

I thought it my duty to issue a contradiction of this audacious assertion.

I should be much obliged if you would have this contradiction published in the press of the country to which you are accredited.

(Signed)      DAVIGNON.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 116.

### *Note.*

On July 24th a German manufacturer saw two companies of French troops under arms at Erquelines. He makes this statement to the Governor-General of Belgium, and the *North German Gazette* considers the fact established. We regret for the anonymous witness who guaranteed under oath the truth of this story that his memory has served him very ill. Moreover confusion between the names of places is very possible in an interval of six months.

We have already stated, but we are now compelled to repeat, that before August 5th no armed troops of any kind, whether English or French, entered Belgium. The Government did not appeal to the guarantee of her guarantors, or rescind in favour of the troops of France the prohibition to enter the territory of the kingdom, until Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium. This violation took place on August 4th at 8 o'clock in the morning, and it was on the same day at 8 o'clock in the evening that the Government decided to call France and England to her help.<sup>1</sup> Before that date not a single French soldier entered Belgium.

Against the evidence of the German manufacturer we set that of officials of the German Empire, that of the German Minister at Brussels, of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and even of the Chancellor himself. On the night of August 2nd Herr von Below endeavours to find a grievance against us to support his ultimatum. At 2 o'clock in the morning he goes to the Secretary-General at the Ministry to

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 43.]

tell him that a French cavalry patrol has crossed the frontier. Baron van der Elst asks him where this has taken place. 'In Germany,' is the reply.<sup>1</sup> If a single armed French soldier had crossed our frontier, it would clearly not have escaped the vigilance of Herr von Below's numerous spies.

On August 3rd<sup>2</sup> the Belgian Minister was received by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 'Have you any complaint to make against us?' asked Baron Beyens. 'Have we not always, during three-quarters of a century, observed in respect of Germany, as of all the guaranteeing Great Powers, all the duties of our neutrality?' 'Germany,' replied Herr von Jagow, 'has no complaint to make against Belgium; her attitude has always been perfectly correct.'

Finally the Chancellor, at the sitting of the Reichstag on the 4th August, expressed himself no less frankly. 'Our troops,' he declared, 'have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. This is a breach of international law. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit, we will repair.'<sup>3</sup> But since the Chancellor's frankness has been disavowed by the German press because the cynical disregard of the treaties produced unanimously in every neutral country the most unfortunate impression, Germany has sought for imputations against the loyalty of Belgium.

Thus Germany, after having attacked us unjustly, ruined us, and slaughtered us, seeks to deprive us of the only thing we have left, our honour. But these charges made by witnesses whose names are not even given, brought forward six months after the events, will not alter public opinion. From the first day it has condemned the premeditated attack which has been made upon Belgium, and it has treated as they deserve the abominable calumnies invented to justify that attack.

No. 117.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. Klobukowski, the French Minister.*

*Havre, February 6, 1915.*

SIR,—Your Excellency has been kind enough to draw my attention to the *North German Gazette*, setting forth the evidence according to which armed French soldiers had

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 28.]

<sup>2</sup> [Aug. 4. See No. 51.]

<sup>3</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 356-7.]



entered Belgian territory before the opening of hostilities. This manœuvre forms part of the campaign which aims at proving that Belgium, in complicity with France and England, had failed to carry out her international obligations, and that the first acts of hostility were perpetrated not by Germany, but by Belgium.

The *North German Gazette* had already published in the month of November seven depositions supplied by witnesses, and reproduced in the November number of the *Journal de la Guerre*. These seven depositions agreed as to the presence in Belgium of French officers and soldiers before the war. But they disagreed concerning the spot where the officers and soldiers were seen : it was now at Charleroi, now at Namur, at Ougrés, at Liège. We have not protested against these allegations. Your Excellency knows, of course, that French soldiers on leave, in uniform, but without arms, were often to be seen in Belgium, especially at Dinant, Namur, and Liège. Foreigners also mistake Belgian guides, who wear red trousers, for French soldiers. But when a witness swore to the presence of two French regiments at the Station du Midi on August the 2nd, we issued a denial which was published in the *Petit Havre*.

In its issue of January 9th, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* mentioned, on the authority of a sworn deposition, the arrival at Erquelines, on the 24th of July, of French armed troops coming from Paris. In a *communiqué*, of which a summary was published in the *Matin*, I pointed out the lack of foundation for this accusation. Your Excellency will find this *communiqué* enclosed herewith (see *Enclosure to No. 116*). It is evident that, if French troops had entered Belgium before the latter had appealed to her guarantors, the Government would have been informed by the officials of the Customs and by the police, as the German Minister would have been by his spies. No complaint reached me with regard to this, before the German attack. Now that our territory has been taken from us, it is not possible for us to have the evidence of the German witnesses examined. But it will be possible for the French Government to give a denial to the accusation mentioned above concerning the arrival of troops at Erquelines on the evening of the 24th July.

We should be very grateful if they would do this.

## SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK

No. 118.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister, to M. Davignon,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Havre, March 13, 1915.*

SIR,—Referring to your Excellency's letter of the 6th of February last, concerning the alleged violations by France of Belgian neutrality which were sworn to before German tribunals, I have the honour to send you herewith a letter from M. Millerand and explicit declarations from our Consuls at Liège and at Brussels, with which I fully associate myself. These documents, together with the emphatic denials of the Belgian Government, which show the complete absence of foundation in the evidence relied upon—which is full of gross errors and inaccuracies more or less intentional—will be communicated to the neutral Powers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic, moreover, proposes to have a résumé published in the shape of a pamphlet with a view to reaching public opinion in various countries.

The object of the German publications is obviously to justify in the eyes of neutrals the attack upon Belgium.

Although the matter is well known, from the diplomatic publications and notably from the Belgian Grey Book and the declarations of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag, it is nevertheless interesting and instructive to detect the Germans once more in the very act of imposture and bad faith.

(Signed) KLOBUKOWSKI.

FIRST ENCLOSURE TO No. 118.

*The Minister of War to M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs.*

*Paris, February 16, 1915.*

On February the 13th you were good enough to let me know the wish expressed by M. Davignon that the French Government should contradict the definite accusation concerning the arrival of French troops at Erquelines on the evening of the 24th July, and to ask my opinion on this subject.

I have the honour to inform you that I think it would be



a very good thing to give the most formal contradiction to the allegations of the German press on this point, as well as on those contained in the letters from your representatives in Belgium, of which you have sent me a copy. In order to facilitate the measures you may think it necessary to take to refute these false statements, I think it right to give you the following particulars :

(a) Not only is it impossible to prove any arrival of the French at Erquelines on the 24th of July 1914, but at that date no step had been taken of any kind—not merely no preparatory step, but not even a precautionary one, such as watching the frontier or guarding the railway lines.

The first precautionary measure, the suppression of leave, dates from the 26th of July.

(b) Even at a later date, at the moment when the disposition of the covering troops was under consideration, no measures were taken for posting those troops at the Belgian frontier, the reason being the respect due to the neutrality of that country.

(c) Moreover, on August the 2nd, the first day of the mobilisation, in order to avoid any incident, my predecessor gave the following telegraphic order to the general commanding the first district.

*'2nd August, 214 3/11 to 1st District, Lille.*

*'It is absolutely necessary, under the diplomatic conditions of the moment, that no incident should occur on the Franco-Belgian frontier, and consequently that the troops should not approach within a distance of at least two kilometres from it.*

*'The Custom House officials and foresters will be instructed to avoid any incident.'*

This order merely extended to the first district, at the moment when it received the telegram ordering mobilisation, the orders given to the districts of the Franco-German frontier which forbade the crossing of a line which, in view of the chances of a conflict, my predecessor had thought right to fix at a distance of about ten kilometres from the German frontier.

Therefore the German allegations are all false ; they have not even the excuse of probability.

## SECOND ENCLOSURE TO No. 118.

*M. Pallu de la Barrière, French Consul at Liège, now at Havre,  
to M. Klobukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French  
Republic to the Belgian Government now at Havre.*

*Havre, February 2, 1915.*

I have the honour to communicate to you the observations which suggest themselves to me, as far as the Liège Consular district is concerned, after reading the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of January the 9th, 1915, concerning the alleged violations of Belgian neutrality by France.

To the three accusations made on oath before the courts of Essen, Eschweiler, and Bonn, I am able to give a formal denial.

I declare that the facts mentioned by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* are false.

This newspaper says: 'In the last days of July I often saw French soldiers in the neighbourhood of Liège; together with Belgians they were digging trenches round Liège.'

No French soldiers can have been seen either at Liège or in its neighbourhood at that time (nor, moreover, at a later date either), for the excellent reason that there was not a single one there. Under those conditions it was equally impossible to see our soldiers help Belgian soldiers to dig trenches in the neighbourhood of Liège!—I can even guarantee that, at that date, the Belgians themselves were not digging trenches, as I was able to ascertain myself when I walked in front and between several forts. On the contrary, I saw trees being cut down in the neighbourhood of those forts by Belgian soldiers on the very first days after mobilisation (2nd August 1914).

## SECOND ACCUSATION.

*Court of Eschweiler, October 20, 1914.*

'During the last days of July I saw French officers and soldiers in the streets of Liège, and they were there, contrary to custom, in great numbers. They were French infantry of the line (red caps), passing through the streets of the town.'



Neither at that date, nor down to the 6th of August, when I left Liège, did I see either in the streets of that town, or in its neighbourhood, or even at my Consulate, a single French officer or soldier in uniform.

On this subject, I think it also necessary to add that from the moment of the French mobilisation I gave strict injunctions to the Frenchmen who were called up, expressly forbidding them to leave Belgium in military attire, so far as the reservists possessed any. This was in order to avoid manifestations of any kind whatever from the population, and to prevent any act inconsistent with the respect due to Belgian neutrality.

### THIRD ACCUSATION.

*Court of Bonn, December 9, 1914.*

‘At Namur, on August 2nd, it was said generally: “We have help, the French are arriving; whole trainloads have arrived at Liège”; on the road from Namur to Luxemburg, one met nothing but French soldiers (cavalry and infantry), all the stations were occupied by the French military. We were taken from Namur to the frontier under French supervision.’

I protest indignantly against this new accusation, which is as false as the preceding ones. Down to the 6th of August, as can be proved by the record of my telephonic messages at the Post Office at Liège, I communicated several times a day with my consular agent at Namur, who kept me informed even of the slightest details. I vouch for it that on 2nd August no train had brought any Frenchmen to Namur. Whether wrongly informed people declared that ‘the French were arriving,’ I do not know: what is certain is that the information was erroneous for Namur as well as for Liège.

On the other hand, if the French had been found on the road from Namur to Luxemburg I should have been informed of it at once, as well as of the military occupation of the stations of that line by our troops. These statements are false.

It is the same with regard to the conveyance of Germans to the frontier under French supervision.

## THIRD ENCLOSURE TO No. 118.

*Baron Lahure, French Consul at Brussels, now at Havre, to  
M. Klobukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French  
Republic to the Belgian Government, now at Havre.*

*Havre, February 2, 1915.*

You have been good enough to send me the translation of the reports published in Germany, notably in the issue of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for the 9th of January, concerning the alleged violations of Belgian neutrality by France.

I hasten, as far as Brussels is concerned, to make the following remarks suggested by the reading of these statements. I take the quotations in their order.

(1) Court of Rastatt.—‘A regiment in field-grey uniform is said to have taken part in the last review on the 26th July at Brussels, on the occasion of the visit of the Lord Mayor.’

The Belgian General Staff, while considering a change in their uniforms, caused a company of infantry dressed in the new grey blue uniform then under consideration, and with a cap of the same colour, to march past at the various reviews held in Brussels before the war. The object in view was probably to ascertain the opinion of the public as to the uniform then on trial.

I have never heard of an incident said to have occurred in the neighbourhood of the Bourse on July 29th, when an officer is supposed to have addressed the crowd. The witness asserts that he wore four stars on his collar and that he was a cavalry officer.

This is obviously not true ; no French officer wears stars on his collar : only Belgian officers wear stars on their collar, three being the maximum.

(3) Court of Tittlungen.—‘Soldiers in uniform were to be seen in the streets of Brussels as early as the morning of August the 3rd, after the ultimatum had been sent, but before the declaration of war. The crowd is said to have cheered a French hussar.’

That is quite possible and entirely normal. Indeed, French soldiers on leave whose families resided in Belgium were allowed to visit their relations in uniform, but without



arms. As the Belgian national fêtes take place at the end of July, a date coinciding with the Brussels Fair, it is at this date that the soldiers were in the habit, before the manoeuvres, of asking for leave of a week to a fortnight to visit their families. The case in question may perhaps have been that of a soldier on sick leave with his family, who was getting ready to rejoin his regiment before the expiration of his leave.

As our French colony in Brussels numbers 25,000, and has its activity centred in the heart of the city, it is quite natural that a group of Frenchmen should cheer the uniform of our army at the moment when war had just been declared against our country ; that Belgians should join in cheering a soldier belonging to one of the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, at the moment when this had just been violated by the sending of the ultimatum announced in the press, can surprise nobody.

(5) Court of Düsseldorf.—‘Cheering of French soldiers on the boulevards at Brussels on August 2nd.’

As I have just remarked, this is quite normal, in consequence of the number of French soldiers on leave who were in Brussels at that time. August 2nd being the first day of our mobilisation, the Legation, which had received notice of it during the night, had at once communicated the order of mobilisation to the Havas Agency. It had been published in the Belgian papers on the morning of Sunday, August 2nd. Soldiers in uniform, no doubt, in the course of the day, passed through the town to go to the station.

6. Court of the Reserve battalion of the 119th Infantry Regiment of the Landwehr at Stuttgart.—‘Several French artillery officers were seen on July 16th, and were received with enthusiasm by the crowd.’

The place where this manifestation was said to have occurred is not stated exactly. The 16th of July was a Thursday. During the festivities, the concourse of people is always large in the centre of the city, even on week days. I have never heard that a group of officers of our artillery was cheered, and I ask how they could have walked about in their uniforms without the Legation having been informed of it. Our officers would, as a matter of fact, have had to ask at the Legation for permission to wear uniform, and this is granted only in exceptional cases. May it not have been

a group of Belgian musicians, since the members of some bands of music wear uniforms somewhat resembling those of our artillery officers : a black tunic with red band, cap with plume and stripe ?

(8) Court of Hamburg.—‘The crowd sang the Marseillaise in front of the Bourse, on August 2nd, and cheered a group of French soldiers.’

Groups of our fellow-countrymen, so numerous in Brussels, have indeed sung the Marseillaise and cheered our soldiers on leave when they met them on their way back to France. As the Bourse is situated on the main road leading to the Midi Station, and as war had been declared against France, this patriotic manifestation was quite natural.

That the crowd should have cheered English officers on the arrival of the train at the Nord Station at Brussels on August the 5th is not at all surprising, as the German troops had two days before violated the territory of Belgium, and the Government had appealed to England on 4th August.

(9) Court of Anrath.—‘On Sunday, 2nd August, on the Boulevard Botanique, at Brussels, a French soldier, in full kit, with fixed bayonet, was to be seen walking on the pavement, his mission being apparently to muster young Frenchmen of military age.’ The witness is said to have recognised him as a French soldier by his ‘red breeches.’ Here there is obviously a confusion, as no soldier on leave had a rifle. One cannot see, moreover, how a soldier could have been of any use in the Boulevard of the Botanical Gardens, where the French colony has no place of meeting from which he could have mustered reservists.

It must have been a Belgian private of one of the Guide Regiments, which likewise wear red trousers. As the Belgians had on August 2nd been mobilised for several days, one frequently met soldiers, even solitary individuals, fully equipped, going to the station to join the headquarters of their corps.

None of these facts therefore can be seriously appealed to as indications of the violation of Belgian neutrality by France. But, on the other hand, there exist proofs of German premeditation which would be easy to verify if one collected the evidence of persons with whom German Reserve officers lodged, and of firms engaged in furniture removals ; it could



be proved that, from the month of July, Germany had begun the mobilisation of her army by calling up separate individuals, and under conditions never previously in force, even at the moment of the greatest tension after the demonstration at Agadir.

I was warned of this soon after July 14th, by one of our fellow-countrymen belonging to the business world, with whom I lunched at the industrial club on the Boulevard Anspach. He regarded as a sure sign of an early war the fact, ascertained by him, that a great number of Germans, especially officers of the Reserve, as if they were obeying a single order, had just broken up their establishments in Belgium, sent their furniture to Germany, and let their apartments or their houses. This had never occurred before, and from it might be inferred a presumption of the certainty they felt that their country would violate Belgian neutrality. How else could be explained their anxiety to place their furniture in safety by sending it to Germany?

I was much struck by this information, and you will certainly remember, Sir, that I mentioned the matter to you. I also spoke of it to Lieut.-Colonel Génie, a certain number of Reserve officers of our army having come to see me in order to express their surprise at having not yet received personally the order of recall to France.

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No. 119.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*

*Havre, April 10, 1915.*

SIR,—In their ultimatum of August 2nd, the German Government tried to justify their aggression against Belgium, on the ground of a threat of a French attack which, passing through Belgian territory, would have developed against the German right wing.

'The German Government,' said the ultimatum,<sup>1</sup> 'has received trustworthy information to the effect that French troops intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.'

<sup>1</sup> [For text of ultimatum, see *Diplomatic*, 2, pp. 26-7.]

From the very first day it was apparent that these allegations were contrary to the formal declarations of the French Government and to the facts. Nevertheless, in several neutral countries, the question was asked whether there was not some foundation of truth for them.

The course of events has dissipated this doubt, so that no sensible person could any longer give them the slightest credit.

The fact that the Belgian army found itself alone in the face of the German armies during the first period of the campaign has demonstrated the falsity of the German General Staff's assertions.

The German military writer, General von Bernhardi, nevertheless endeavoured some weeks ago, in an article published in the *New York Sun*, to make the Americans believe that, as early as the month of July, France and England were making ready to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

The French Government, wishing to reply categorically to these accusations, caused a note to be published in which they gave precise information as to the position of the French troops at the beginning of the war. You will find a copy of this note enclosed.

This publication in the first place proves conclusively the sincerity of the declarations made to us by the French Government, from before the opening of hostilities: secondly, it proves that the German allegations were only an idle pretext for the purpose of concealing the real object of the Imperial General Staff, which was to surprise France by an overwhelming advance while she was in the act of general mobilisation.

An error has crept into the *communiqué*. The violation of Belgian territory took place on the 4th and not on the 3rd of August (*First Grey Book*, No. 30).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [See  
*Diplomatic*  
2, p. 36.]

#### ENCLOSURE TO No. 119.

#### FRANCE AND THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.—THE REPLY OF FRANCE TO THE GERMAN LIES.

In an article published by an American newspaper, the German General von Bernhardi, returning to the subject of the origin of the war, claims to prove that the French concentration and the presence on our left wing of our principal



forces demonstrate the fixed resolve of the French Government to violate Belgian neutrality, jointly with Great Britain.

To this allegation of General von Bernhardt's, the French plan of concentration is a categorical reply.

### I.—*Our Plan of Concentration.*

The whole of the French forces, in pursuance of the plan of concentration, were placed, when war was declared, facing North-East, between Belfort and the Belgian frontier, that is to say :

1st Army : between Belfort and the general line Mirecourt—Lunéville ;

2nd Army : between this line and the Moselle ;

3rd Army : between the Moselle and the line Verdun—Audun-le-Roman ;

5th Army : between this line and the Belgian frontier.

The 4th Army was in reserve, west of Commercy. In consequence, the whole of the French armies were placed *facing Germany, and facing Germany only.*

### II.—*The Alterations in our Concentration.*

This is so true that, when the violation of Belgian neutrality by the German troops was known, the French General Staff had to prescribe alterations in the plan of concentration.

The contingency of these alterations had of course been studied, because many indications had prepared us to fear the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. When this violation had taken place and the Belgian Government (4th of August, *Yellow Book*, p. 151),<sup>1</sup> had asked us for support, the sphere of action of our 2nd Army was extended as far as the Verdun region : the 4th Army was interposed between the 3rd and the 4th<sup>2</sup> on the Meuse ; the 5th was slipped towards the North-West along the Belgian frontier, as far as the height of Fourmies.

Moreover, two corps of the 2nd Army, the 18th and the 9th, were transferred from the region of Nancy towards Mezières and Hirson.

In this direction were sent also the two divisions of Algeria and the division of Morocco.

Finally, a cavalry corps received the order to penetrate into Belgium to reconnoitre the German columns and to

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, I, p. 405.]

<sup>2</sup> [Sic.]

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slacken the speed of their movement (6th August), three days after the latter had violated the Belgian frontier. Thanks to this alteration, the French General Staff was in a position to face the German assault on the west of the Meuse, by bringing our principal forces there.

If there had been premeditation on their part, this sudden displacement of our troops would not have been necessary, and we could have arrived in time to prevent the enemy from crossing the Meuse in Belgium.

A small detail may serve to illustrate this conclusive argument :—Our left covering corps, the second, that is the Amiens one, was, in pursuance of the plan of concentration, not facing the Belgian frontier, but in the Montmédy-Longuyon district.

### III.—*The Concentration of the English Army.*

As to the English army, its support was assured to us only on the 5th of August, that is to say, after the violation of the Belgian frontier by the Germans, which occurred on 3rd August (*Yellow Book*, p. 151).<sup>1</sup>

The concentration of the British army took place behind Maubeuge, from the 14th to the 20th August.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, I, p. 404.]

### IV.—*Various Orders concerning the intentions of the French Government.*

On July 30th the French Government gives the order to our covering troops to keep at a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier, in spite of the military measures taken by Germany.

On August 2nd a second order is given to our troops, instructing them to leave to the Germans the entire responsibility of hostilities and to restrict themselves to repulsing any attacking force that may penetrate into French territory.

On August 3rd, a further telegram gives peremptory orders to avoid any incident whatever on the Franco-Belgian frontier. The French troops are to keep at a distance of from two to three kilometres away from it.

On the same day, August 3rd, a new order confirms and defines the instructions given on August 2nd.



## DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—DIPLOMATIC

On August 4th, an order of the Minister of War says :—

‘Germany will endeavour, by spreading false news, to induce us to violate Belgian neutrality. It is strictly and most emphatically forbidden, until an order to the contrary is given, to enter upon Belgian territory, even with patrols or single cavalymen, and airmen are forbidden to fly over that territory.’

On August 5th only, at the request of the Belgian Government (formulated on the 4th)<sup>1</sup> the French aeroplanes and airships are authorised to fly over Belgian territory and our reconnoitring troops to penetrate into it.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Diplomatic*, 2, p. 43.]

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### SECTION XVII.

#### TAX ON ABSENTEES.

No. 120.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all Belgian Legations Abroad.*

*Havre, February 8, 1915.*

SIR,—I beg to enclose herewith a copy of the protest sent by the Belgian Government to the German Government on the subject of the order of the Governor-General dated January 16th, imposing an iniquitous penalty on Belgians who have left their domicile since the outbreak of hostilities.

Be good enough to send this protest to the Government to which you are accredited.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

#### ENCLOSURE TO NO. 120.

*The Belgian Government protests against a fresh Misdeed on the part of the German Government.*

On entering Belgium the German troops did not shrink from any form of violence in order to terrorise the population ; they destroyed towns, set fire to farmhouses, ravaged the lands, slaughtered inoffensive inhabitants. Flight was for many the only means of saving their lives and protecting their honour.

The whole country is terrorised, and now, with a refinement of irony, the German Government seeks to punish the

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absentees, that is to say, those who, frightened by the barbarity of their proceedings, have resigned themselves to abandoning their fatherland and their homes, often destroyed by fire, in order to live in hardship abroad.

By an order of January 16th, 1915, the Governor-General has now determined that Belgians who have left their domicile voluntarily since the outbreak of war and who have not returned to Belgium before March 1st, 1915, will be subjected to an additional and extraordinary tax, fixed at ten times the amount of the personal tax to which they were liable in the year 1914.

Inasmuch as it is in conflict with the principles of equity and of the fiscal system in force in Belgium, this imposition is contrary to Articles 43, 46, 48, and 49 of the Fourth Hague Convention.<sup>1</sup>

It is so ingeniously worded as to wear the appearance of a personal tax analogous to the personal tax in force under the existing laws, whereas it is in reality altogether different.

Instead of respecting the Constitution and the laws of the Belgian people, it doubly disregards them, from the point of view alike of equality and of liberty. It draws a distinction between the taxpayers, it is aimed at only one class, the absentees, and even only at one class of absentees. It denies to the citizens the right of judging as to the reasons which may call for their absence from the country, reasons of health, of business, family reasons, the destruction of their homes or their factories, fear of the perils of war. It strikes at the exercise of their individual liberty, and it strikes them without discrimination.

Instead of being based on a legitimate estimate of income, drawn from obvious signs, which have been observed within a limited period (the kind of house occupied, the size of the establishment, etc.), it is based upon a list drawn up on March 1st, 1914, upon data which, in many cases, have been completely upset by the subsequent military operations. It thus disregards the whole scheme of the Belgian fiscal system.

Instead of leaving to the judicial authority, in accordance with the law of the land, the verification of the conditions on which the assessment for the tax should be based, and especially in the case of absentees, it leaves the matter absolutely to the *de facto* executive power, that is to say, to

<sup>1</sup> See *Military*, I, pp. 482-3.]



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the German exchequer, which is directly interested in securing the largest returns, and which will fix the amounts summarily and without affording any opportunity for public hearing or objection.

Instead of being moderate in its rate, it amounts to positive spoliation. It comes as an addition to all the other taxes: it has been fixed at ten times the rate of personal tax, which was regarded as normal before the war; it is to be levied under penalty of arrest, at a moment when there is neither income nor ready money, and when a legal moratorium and the difficulties of the situation are stopping all payments. It is, in reality, confiscation in disguise.

This new burden is all the more odious because the country has been ruined by the war, by the requisitions and collective fines, by the numerous confiscations and the removal to Germany of cattle, food-stuffs, and indispensable raw material for industry. Whilst ordering collection of the taxes imposed by existing laws, the German Government has in addition, quite recently, exacted an enormous war-tax, equal to twenty times the total of all the taxes and contributions levied annually in the nine provinces. They did not obtain the vote of the provincial councils to this monthly taxation of forty millions of francs until they made, on December 14th, 1914, the formal declaration that: 'no other taxes would be imposed on the country.' It was on the very morrow of this declaration and of this vote that the iniquitous provision was made regarding absentees.

Such a tax is, therefore, not only a disregard of the Hague Convention, it is also a flagrant breach of a recent and solemn engagement.

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### SECTION XVIII.

#### REMOVAL OF MACHINERY.

No. 121.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all  
Belgian Legations Abroad.*

*Havre, February 13, 1915.*

SIR,—It appears from an appeal addressed to the Governor-General of Belgium on January 22nd, by the Federation of

Belgian Engineers, that the German authorities entered the factories and declared they were going to seize the machine-tools which were in use there. These machines were taken to pieces, many were removed and sent to Germany, often without the owners' receiving any memorandum showing the nature, the number, and the value of the plant which had been seized. On that date, January 22nd, the value of the machinery seized exceeded 16,000,000 francs.

Moreover, according to the terms of a contract entered into between the royal Feldzeugmeisterei of Berlin and the firm Sonnenthal Junior of Cologne, the latter places itself at the disposal of the Feldzeugmeisterei to forward the machinery seized in the occupied regions of Belgium and Flanders by the quickest route to German factories which have been entrusted with orders for munitions. It also undertakes the retransport, after the war, of this Belgian and French machinery back to the Belgian and French factories to which it belongs.

The firm has the right and the duty, with the assistance of the ordnance foundry at Liège, of proving the existence in the factories of the occupied territories of machinery suitable for the manufacture of munitions, and of suggesting the seizure of this machinery.

The Belgian Government protests indignantly against these proceedings, which are a flagrant violation of Article 33<sup>1</sup> of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention. Article 53 is restrictive in its enumeration, and does not authorise either the seizure or the transfer to another country of industrial machinery, which must always be respected when it is private property (Article 46).

<sup>1</sup> [A misprint for '53.' See *Military*, I, p. 484.]

The removal of machinery puts an end to the efforts of manufacturers to maintain a certain activity in their factories, it condemns numbers of workmen to unemployment and starvation, and it will have the effect of delaying the revival of industry after the war.

Finally, the German authorities also systematically ignore the directions of Article 52 of the above-mentioned Regulations, according to which requisitions in kind shall not be demanded from local authorities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.

As illustrations I will quote the following :—



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(a) The advertisements in German newspapers of sales to German agriculturists of stallions, mares, and foals requisitioned in Belgium ;

(b) The removal to Germany and to the Russian front of wines taken from private individuals ;

(c) The systematic felling of walnut-trees, which are sent to Germany to be manufactured into butts of rifles ;

(d) The seizure and removal to Germany of raw materials belonging to private individuals, such as cotton, flax, rubber, wool, nickel, copper, leather, the value of which amounts to several tens of millions of francs ;

(e) The requisition in the neighbourhood of Jodoigne and in the district of Geer of 130 head of cattle and of a great number of pigs, which have been sent to Germany.

These illegal requisitions are all the more odious because they affect a population already ruined by the war, and deprive it of supplies absolutely indispensable for its subsistence.

I have the honour to request you to be good enough to present a copy of this despatch to the Government to which you are accredited, and which, equally with Belgium and Germany, is a signatory to the Fourth Hague Convention.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

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### SECTION XIX.

THE GERMAN OFFICERS AND MEN TAKEN PRISONERS BY THE  
BELGIAN ARMY HAVE BEEN TREATED ACCORDING TO  
THE REGULATIONS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION.

No. 122.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron  
Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

*Havre, February 18, 1915.*

SIR,—In the course of the months of November and December, my colleague, the Minister of War, and various other Belgian persons received numerous letters from officers, prisoners in Germany, making it known that the military authorities of that country believed, on the strength of reports sent in by, amongst others, a German doctor named Weinstein, that the prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Belgians

and French were being ill-treated. The writers of the letters in question had been informed that reprisals would be taken against them if the treatment of the Germans were not promptly improved.

Identical complaints having reached the French Government, the latter on 15th December addressed a note to the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin, a note which he was requested to transmit to the Imperial Government, concerning the prisoners of war in France and in Germany ; in this particulars are given of the treatment to which the German prisoners in France are subjected.

The German combatants captured by the Belgian Army are subjected to the same treatment, because as they come in they are sent on to the French military authorities and kept in France under the same conditions as the Germans taken by the French troops.

Certain allegations, however, of the German doctor Weinstein had special reference to the period during which the German officers by whom the complaints were made had been kept as prisoners in Belgium, and particularly at Bruges.

The enclosed copy of a report by Lieutenant-General Thieman, ex-Inspector-General of the internment depots of prisoners of war in Belgium, shows the inaccuracy of the allegations in question.

The French note on the prisoners of war in France and in Germany, to which reference has been made above, enumerates, on the other hand, many grave matters of complaint as to the way in which French prisoners are treated in Germany. The Belgian Government have on their side received written evidence proving that the treatment given to Belgian prisoners in certain German camps is not such as Chapter II. of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land<sup>1</sup> ought to secure to those within the jurisdiction of the Powers who signed the Convention. They reserve to themselves the right to return to the subject later on.

You will be good enough to ask the Spanish Government to transmit to Berlin, in the form of a note, the text of the present letter. You will find enclosed a copy *ad hoc* which you can hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

<sup>1</sup> [See *Military*, I, p. 475.]



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ENCLOSURE TO No. 122.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERNMENT DEPOTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

### *Declaration.*

In my capacity as Inspector-General of the Internment Depots for Prisoners of War, I visited on the 11th and 18th of August the depot established and occupied at Bruges.

On my first visit, I ascertained that Major-General Stiénon, commanding the Province of West Flanders, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Capoen and Major Lambert, had decided upon and put in force an organisation in which I had to make only trifling modifications. The measures prescribed were embodied in an order which ensured a most generous interpretation of the Belgian regulations, the humanitarian rules of which allow the suffering of prisoners of war to be reduced to a minimum, alike from the moral and from the physical point of view.

A copy of this order should form part of a dossier to be found at the War Office.

On August 18 I had only congratulations to offer; all the rules were observed.

### *Officer Prisoners.*

On August the 11th I visited each prisoner in the room which had been allotted him, and I had a private conversation with the occupant, in the course of which I bade him make any request he wished, and I assured him that I would do my best to grant it so far as I was able.

The requests I received may be summed up as follows:—

- (1) To be prisoners on parole;
- (2) To be united in groups;
- (3) To improve the diet;
- (4) To increase the lighting and ventilation of the rooms;
- (5) To increase the time devoted to walks.

Except as concerns the requests under (1) and (2), satisfaction was given immediately to those concerned. Instructions received from the War Office prevented me from granting the wishes expressed in Nos. 1 and 2.

The cost of the daily board was increased from two to three

francs, *and that with the consent of those concerned*, who had been consulted by myself.

At the time of my visit on August the 18th I again saw the officer prisoners. To those whom I had seen on the 11th others had been added, amongst whom were some medical officers. I talked to every one of them: I asked each one his opinion about the diet, and they all declared themselves satisfied. No more wishes were expressed to me. One of them thanked me in the name of all for what I had done on their behalf.

*Prisoners of the Rank and File.*

The rules to which prisoners of the rank and file had to submit were nearly the same as those to which our soldiers have to submit in peace time.

As early as the 11th of August, the rank and file (like the officers) were supplied with postcards; between August the 11th and 19th a canteen was established, which is no doubt still in working order.

During my visit on August the 19th, I was told *by those concerned* that they had no complaint to make. Everything was in fact carried out in accordance with the instructions in force.

The Minister of State, M. Vandervelde, was able to ascertain by personal inspection, during his visit on August the 11th to the depot at Brussels, that all the efforts of the military authorities were directed to a mitigation in the fullest possible measure of the unhappy condition of prisoners of war. The Consul of the United States of America, who visited the depot during the first ten days of October last in company with Captain Vermeire of the General Staff, who had been sent by Major-General Bihin, and whom I saw in the offices of the 'Place' at Bruges, assured me that he carried away with him an excellent impression, of which he would inform his Government.

From the above, it follows that the German assertions are categorically refuted, so far as concerns the rules to which the prisoners of war (officers and men) have been subjected at the internment depot of Bruges.

THIEMAN,

*Lieutenant-General, retired.*

January 21, 1915.



## SECTION XX.

## CREATION OF EXTRAORDINARY TRIBUNALS.

No. 123.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all  
Belgian Legations Abroad.*

*Havre, April 6, 1915.*

SIR,—I have the honour to request you to be good enough to transmit the following protest to the Government to which you are accredited :—

‘It has been brought to the knowledge of the Belgian Government that various decrees of the German authority in occupation of the country alter quite unnecessarily the domestic legislation of the country. Moreover, recent decrees inspired by the desire to grant exceptional treatment to German and Austrian subjects who were in the country at the outbreak of hostilities modify the decree of the Tenth Vendémiaire, Year IV, on the responsibility of the communes, and the law relating to contracts of tenancy, and institute special jurisdictions for the application of the new regulations. These proceedings show complete disregard of the principles of International Law, of the conventional provisions, and of the laws and customs of war.

‘According to these principles, occupation, by reason of its provisional character and its being merely possession *de facto*, cannot destroy or modify, as long as the necessities of the war do not require it, the civil legislation or the power and jurisdiction of the tribunals established in the occupied territory.

‘Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention,<sup>1</sup> signed and ratified by Germany, provides that : “The authority of the power of the State having passed *de facto* into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall do all in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, respecting at the same time, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” The German military authority had not hitherto contested these principles. The Treatise on the laws of continental warfare, published in 1902 by the German Great General Staff, con-

<sup>1</sup> [See *Military*, I, p. 482.]

tains the following: "The occupant being only a substitute for the true sovereign, he continues to govern by means of the existing laws and regulations. He must avoid the putting into force of new laws, the suppression and modification of the established laws, and all acts of the same kind, unless they are justified by the inexorable exigencies of the war, which alone give the right to legislate outside the scope of provisional and temporary administrative necessities."

'The Council of the Order of Barristers of the Court of Appeal at Brussels, at their meeting of February 19th, 1915, protesting against so flagrant a violation of the principles of international law, passed a resolution "to forbid any barrister or licentiate in law [*avocat stagiaire*] from taking part in any way whatsoever, even by the simple recording of adjournments, decisions, memoranda or notes, in the proceedings of exceptional tribunals appointed by the decrees of the German Government dated February 3rd, 1915—purporting to modify the decree of the Tenth Vendémiaire, Year IV—and February 10th, 1915, purporting to create courts of arbitration for disputes on the subject of tenancy."

'The Bâtonnier of the Order, in a letter dated February 22nd, 1915, communicated this decision to the German authorities and informed them as to its motives and scope.

'The Belgian Government have the honour to call the attention of neutral States to these fresh violations of the rules of International Law committed by the invader in Belgium.'

(Signed) DAVIGNON.





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