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IOHANNIS WYCLIF

TRACTATUS DE LOGICA.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE VIENNA AND PRAGUE MSS.

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BY

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INTRODUCTION.

All details concerning the manuscript (Univ. Prag. V. E. 14) and the authenticity and date of the work itself having been discussed at sufficient length in the Introduction to the first volume, we may at once proceed to examine the second with regard to its contents alone. It comprises the first eight chapters of the third treatise of *Logica*, or more properly of *Logicae Continuatio*. Wyclif goes over the same ground three times, it may be remembered: once in his Summary, or short abstract of Logic; a second time, with much greater developments, in the first and second treatises of *Logicae Continuatio*; and once again in the work which forms the second and third volumes of the present edition: in a most exhaustive manner this time, and treating of a variety of questions which often seem quite irrelevant to the science of Logic. It is true that in this third treatise Wyclif ostensibly deals with hypothetical propositions alone, and that he leaves out, or expounds only parenthetically, many questions already quite threshed out in his first volume. The difference, however, is to a great extent nominal. Both categorical and hypothetical propositions are for the most part as mere headings of chapters, or as texts from which Wyclif preaches his system with greater or less detail. In the third treatise, the matter is thus really the same, but approached from a different standpoint, and expounded for more advanced students. Perhaps some apology will be necessary for the very detailed summary that is to follow; if so, I may say that I thought it would not be quite useless to go thoroughly through the first work in which Wyclif's system is set forth as a whole, and of which the other philosophical treatises are but modifications and developments. Two volumes of metaphysics — *De Compositione Hominis* and *De Ente Predicamentali* — have indeed been issued already; but the editor has laid

much more stress upon their philological interest than upon their doctrinal meaning. I have, therefore, thought that a full exposition of Wyclif's ideas as set forth in this work might prepare the way for a better understanding of the other treatises.

It is perhaps superfluous to add — but in such cases I prefer saying too much to saying too little — that I must here repeat the thanks I gave to Mr. Matthew in the first volume of *Logica*. Even in so special and technical a subject as this, his general knowledge of Wyclif's views and style has been of much assistance in the understanding of the text.

Chapter I (pp. 1—23). Wyclif begins by a general discussion of hypothetical propositions. They form seven species, according as two or more propositions are joined by the word *and* (copulatives), *or* (disjunctives), *if* (conditionals), *because* (causals), *more than* (comparatives), *where* (locals) or *when* (temporals). These, as Wyclif affirms, comprise all other species; for all, however complex, are reducible to these, and they spring from the essential relations between God and the creature. God is, *and* the creature is; either God is, *or* created being is not; the creatures are *because* God is; God exists *more than* the creature exists; God creates beings *if*, *when*, and *where* He chooses. These primordial truths, seven and only seven in number, are the archetypes of all hypothetical propositions (pp. 1—2).

This classification is to some extent arbitrary, it is true, but founded on the nature of things. It is not denied that these propositions might be set in another order, or deduced from the primordial truths in another way; but the order given here is the best, because it corresponds best to the order of the universe (p. 3, l. 35 to end; p. 4, l. 1—5). The words *and*, *if*, etc., are neither sufficient to establish the order here given, nor to classify the propositions (p. 4, l. 5—12). If it be objected that many hypothetical propositions are false, and that consequently truth, and particularly primordial truth, has nothing to do with their classification (p. 2, l. 20—35), Wyclif points out that every proposition must be true at least in a transcendental sense. If it means something false, it means a thing that is not, and therefore is true — negatively (pp. 4, 5). His classification depends properly, not only on those signs which render the propositions hypothetical, nor on the truth or falsity of the latter, but upon the peculiar sense given by those words to the propositions which they unite into one whole (p. 6, l. 30 to end).

They might indeed be classified according to the first principle of abstract Being. For instance: Whatever is, is, *and* it is; *if* anything is, it is; it is *whilst* it is, and so on (p. 3, l. 1—6; p. 7, l. 5—10). But God's existence is the first truth of all; no other can be known perfectly without it, and in that sense it is prior even to the principle of contradiction, though both are equally primitive as regards the truths which flow from them (pp. 7, 8).

Other words might be employed to form new species of hypothetical propositions (p. 3, l. 13—30). But they may always be analyzed into one of those already given. *Neither — nor*, for instance, means the same as *and* with a negative (pp. 8, 9). These propositions may be combined with each other to the number of 120; but this does not increase the number of primary species. For if I say, A is B if C is D, *because* E is F, it is a causal proposition; but if we have, A is B, *if* C is D because E is F, the proposition is conditional (pp. 9, 10). Here Wyclif solves a number of sophisms at considerable length. It was no doubt useful and even necessary for students of those times to know them; a the present day, most of us would, for all these sophisms, endorse our author's opinion concerning certain among them, and say with him: *sunt mihi odibiles* (p. 14, l. 5). It is, however, worth while to note his remark that a sentence, however, long it may be, is a proposition, provided it imply one predominant act of the mind; where there are several it is not one proposition, and can neither be affirmed nor denied as one. The affirmation or negation bears upon the hypothetical sign. *God exists, and you are an ass*, is denied without any reference to its component parts separately (p. 10).

But there seems to have been a personal argument, particularly directed against Wyclif's theory of universals, which may be noticed apart. We must remember that the universal "animal", in this theory, is a real thing or entity, identical both in men and in brutes. So we have: "You are now *whatever you would be*, if you were an ass; in that case you could bray; therefore you can now." This somewhat humorous syllogism is gravely discussed, for it entails grave consequences. Wyclif not only grants that the major premiss is true, but that the minor is necessary (p. 10, l. 35—41); but this is quite natural, if we refer to his theory. He answers, however, that though a man is identical with an ass, the identity is only partial. What would be necessary to conclude

that a man *is* an ass, is the identity of individuality, not that of a universal attribute. But he adds: "I know that this answer does not please sophists" (p. 16, l. 11—27).

The affirmative or negative nature of hypotheticals is then investigated. Any proposition might with truth be called both affirmative and negative, since all affirm God's existence, and deny whatever is contrary to their affirmation (pp. 16, 17). We must therefore consider how best to classify them. Some say that in any proposition composed of two, both propositions should be affirmative, or both negative, for the compound to be one or the other; so that, where this requisite is wanting, the resulting proposition is neither (pp. 18, l. 31—38). Others, that the *nexus* alone, affirmed or denied, determines the quality of these propositions (p. 18, l. 39 to end; p. 19, l. 1—9). Others again, with whom Wyclif partly agrees, say that they follow the quality of the first of their parts (p. 19).

As for the quantity, i. e. the universality or particularity of such propositions, the first three are said to have no quantity at all; but the last four (causals, comparatives, locals and temporals) follow the quantity of the first of their parts (p. 20). It may be objected (p. 21, l. 25) that these last are really categorical in meaning, since they may be expressed in a categorical form. This, however, is a mere matter of taste and preference. Some prefer the number three, others the number seven. Wyclif chooses not to eliminate the four last species, because every point in the universe, is touched by six, and only six other points: thus making up the number seven. We need not here explain this reason farther than to say that it is at the root of his cosmological system, in which the universe is built of mathematical points. In the next volume, we shall see the whole theory developed at great length.

Chapter II. After a few preliminary remarks about copulative propositions, with which the chapter professes to deal (pp. 23—26), Wyclif launches boldly into the problem of the Universals. One is at first puzzled to see how he manages to bring it in. It begins with the question (p. 26) whether or no a pronoun stands merely for its antecedent, a particular concrete being, or for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb. For instance: "Socrates is an animal, and *it* is an ass;" do we mean by *it* an animal in general, or *that animal which is Socrates*? Here we notice that any copulative proposition in which one of the terms of the

latter half is the same as one of the former, may have the latter term replaced by a pronoun. As, *A is B and B is C*, or *A is B and A is C*, may be rendered: *A is B and it* (meaning either A or B) *is C*. This is the slight link by which the controversy is connected with the subject of the chapter; and here comes the tug of war between Universalists and Nominalists. Wyclif urges that if we say, "A certain man has stolen something, and *he* is a thief," we may very well be ignorant of the particular *he* who has committed the theft. *He* therefore does not stand, as Nominalists would have it, for the individual himself, but for the Universal "A certain man who has stolen this or that". Nominalists say they know this disjunctively: it is either A or B or C, &c. But this is an idle quibble: to know thus disjunctively is not to know (p. 26, l. 31 to end; p. 27, l. 1 to 20).

Now all this looks to modern readers — and since they are modern, they must of course be in the right — very much like mere loss of time and trouble; useless expenditure of brain-work. To the Oxford wranglers of those days, on the contrary, it must have been full of actuality and interest: for it was the very central point round which the battle raged, and Wyclif's unerring acumen, in thus coming to the point at once, is greatly to be admired, if we can for an instant forget our superiority as "moderns". The Nominalists flatly denied the existence of anything but the concrete. For them, a universal name was in itself a mere "flatus vocis", according to Ockam's famous expression; it had no meaning except when applied to its singulars. They therefore could not possibly admit that the pronoun *he* (or indeed any pronoun; *who* or *which*, for instance) stood for a universal Thing, nor even merely for the words which it replaced (which would still give universality of a certain kind). It had to stand for a singular object, an individual man or being. "But then," said the Universalists, "if it stands for only one individual, you must know who *he* is, when you say, *He is a thief*, as usual in such sentences. If you do not know, and deny that it stands for somebody in general, the sentence becomes a jumble of words, without any meaning". We are not here concerned in the Nominalist's reply, which must have been rather shuffling and embarrassed, at least for those of the extreme school of Ockam. But their attack upon Wyclif's position, and the staunch courage with which he stands up to defend it, is very noteworthy.

To put their attack into somewhat more modern language than the crabbed form of the text: If you say, "Socrates is an animal and *it* is an ass," you mean that the universal "Animal" is replaced by *it*. But suppose you substitute *vertebrate* for animal; the sense of *it* is at once altered. Substitute *mammal*; the sense varies again. Thus we have an endless series of different significations given to *it*, each of them more concrete, yet none ever reaching the ultimate limit of individuality. This would be the ruin of all science; for we could never draw any inference from the universal to its singulars; and between each of these *it's* there could be found or imagined room for an infinite multitude of others. These constantly changing significations would destroy the possibility of deduction. "A is an animal; it (not A, but the animal) is a vertebrate; it (the vertebrate) is a mammal" — and so on. We can never conclude that A is this singular individual man (p. 27, l. 20—37). Wyclif answers (pp. 28—30) that, though less universal as a predicatè than its antecedent, *it* has as a subject the power of standing for the same, and consequently for all the singulars which that antecedent represents. There is indeed an endless descent, because there is an infinite distance between any universal and its singulars. But, when we get to the lowest species of all, we have only accidents, that is, non-essential differences, by which the singulars are distinguished; so that makes no difficulty. If we say that one universal is infinitely beyond another, because it extends to more singulars, this does not mean that it is infinite, any more than a surface, infinitely greater than a line, would be infinite.

Beaten off on one side (as we may perhaps be allowed to suppose) the Nominalists return to the charge on another. "You say that *he* does not stand for an individual. Let us then suppose that two men, Socrates and Plato, are running." The proposition, "Somebody runs," will be true; but at the same time it will be true to add: "Socrates is not *he*, and Plato is not *he*." Now, what if no one else in the world is running at the time? (p. 27, l. 37 to end; p. 28, l. 1—12). This however is met (p. 30, 31) by denying that '*he*' has here the meaning of a universal man. It is clearly a singular, meaning *the somebody who runs* in both cases, and in one of the two it could not but be false.

The third argument is aimed more directly against universals. Each of them stands for all its singulars. But *he*, according to the supposition, is a universal. We may say of A, He is a king; and of B, He is a thief.

The same *he* stands for both, and is both. And if we know the universal 'Somebody', we also know — disjunctively of course; this is a retort against Wyclif's argument a few pages above — who has committed any action, however secret: it is *somebody* (p. 28, l. 13—29). Wyclif answers (pp. 32—34) by enumerating various species of universals. Some exist before their singulars, and are God's eternal ideas; some are mere passive potentialities; others are founded upon the individuals in which they exist; as, for instance, the idea of humanity. He then proceeds to deny that, when we apply the universal to its singulars, the supposition (application, or manner of using a word in a proposition) is other than personal. Now essential and personal suppositions are two very different things. When we say: "Humanity is animality together with rationality," we have essential supposition; when we say that humanity comprises the man A, the man B, &c. it is personal. In the first case the subject stands for all that is in the predicate; in the second, only for what is *common* to each of the singulars predicated. Thus, in the case aforesaid, '*he*' would not stand for all the attributes of A and of B; one might be a king, the other a thief; but *he* would have nothing to do with the kingship or the dishonesty of its singulars.

Such is, so far as I can understand it, the position taken up by Wyclif; though he observes that there are many different answers to this difficulty, some of which, in his opinion, amount to the abandonment of the Realistic doctrine (p. 34, l. 30—35). He no doubt alludes to the system of Moderate Realism, which, as it was followed by the immense majority of Schoolmen, and had, as our author himself admits, the advantage of avoiding great difficulties, I may here venture to state in a few words as possible.

When the same sign stands for a great many objects, and has exactly the same signification when applied to one as when applied to another, it is called a Universal. But *what* is Universal? Pure Nominalists say it is the word, and the word only; even the idea is different when applied to different individuals. Thus we do not mean the same thing by *man*, when we say, 'A is a man,' as we do when we say, 'B is a man'. Moderate Nominalists, or Conceptualists, admit that besides the universality of the word, we have also the universality of the idea; so that subjectively we do mean the same thing in the above instance; that is, we mean our idea of humanity. But nothing farther; there is nothing *in any*

way identical between the man A and the man B in their several natures. Is there any midcourse between this doctrine and that of such Realists as affirm that there is in man a humanity corresponding to our idea, and *really identical in all its singulars*? There is; it is the theory of Moderate Realists. To ascribe the universality of our ideas to a mere groundless fiction of the mind would destroy the objective value of all reasoning. To suppose that there exists a mysterious something, substantially identical in each and all of the singular objects that come under a general name, would land us in endless difficulties, with which we shall soon see Wyclif attempting to grapple. They therefore draw a sharp distinction between the Universal, as not seen by the mind, and as seen. The Universal, as formally existing in many singulars, is nowhere but in the mind. Everything that exists in nature is formally concrete, and singular in its essence. Thus the Universal, *as known*, is nothing but a mere abstraction. But, *as able to be known*, it is otherwise; it is real; in each singular it exists as a basis from which our mind is able to abstract the universal idea. Their definition says of the Universal (as known) that it exists *formaliter in mente, fundamentaliter in re*. They avoid defending a position which they consider unsafe, and take up one which it is very difficult to attack with any chance of success. Asked by Nominalists if the redness of the rose, the geranium, and the cherry, is a real universal, they reply: Its reality is formally in the objects, fundamentally in the mind; its universality is formally in the mind, fundamentally in the objects. Asked by those of Wyclif's school if there is nothing identical in two shades of colour in which there is no difference, they answer: Nothing but the aptitude they have for being grasped in one idea; that aptitude, in objects similarly coloured, *really* exists; and when our mind thus grasps them, it becomes actual — but only in the mind. This may seem obscure, but I can find no words to state it more clearly: and indeed this seems to me the true solution of the whole problem. I do not see what the most determined Nominalist could find to attack in this reply, if he understood it properly. It might perhaps not satisfy him; for it keeps up a strict relation between signs, ideas, and things, between the subjective and the objective order, and maintains the validity of human reason without restrictions, *in whatever sphere it may work*. But it avoids with the utmost care giving a handle to this most embarrassing objection: How can anything be real and yet not

concrete? Such caution Wyclif thought excessive; it now remains for us to see how he fought — most courageously and skilfully, it must be acknowledged — against this objection in its various forms.

Faithful to his accustomed method of showing a bold front to difficulties, and never shirking them, however weighty they may be, he at once proceeds to enquire, 1st How we can distinguish Universals from their singulars, and from each other; 2nd How the transcendent entity, Being, is common both to God and to His creatures; 3rd Whether a Universal can receive accidental attributes, and 4th Whether a Universal, taken together with its singulars, makes up a number.

First. Every Universal is all its singulars, and each of them. It would seem that if so, it cannot be distinguished from them, nor from any other Universal that might happen to be those singulars too (p. 34, end). We are free to deny that the Universal is its singulars; it is in them, but is not *they*, having no personal supposition, as they have. But it is preferable to admit that it is its singulars, and, thus considered, receives a different personal supposition in each. This supposition, which it has in its singulars and not by itself, is amply sufficient to differentiate it from them (p. 35). In some cases this difference may be merely logical or notional, but still it suffices for a distinction; as that between the one universal Phœnix and the one phœnix existing in the physical world. Each is identical with the other in all but the fact that the universal Phœnix is (at least successively) communicable to many, whilst the corporeal phœnix is not. Thus, as we see, even in this test case, there always remains, between the Universal and its singular, one difference, — communicability (p. 37).

Second. If God is Being, and the creature is a being, and Being is a universal reality, the same in both: then we come to the Pantheistic conclusion that there is something common to God and His creatures, and really identical in both (pp. 37, 38). And in fact, as the Nominalistic position logically ends in Materialism, so Realism — unless it carefully steers the middle course which has been mentioned — necessarily tends towards (though not necessarily *goes to*) the extremes of Pantheism. To answer the objection, we must note that transcendent being is not in God and in the creature as a difference; — for instance, in the way that rationality exists in all men — but as a *mode*. This mode is one in itself; but it exists in God otherwise than in the creature.

It would be a false argument to say: "Manhood is a thing identical with Socrates and with Plato: therefore, Socrates is Plato." In like manner, to say: "Being is God and is Not-God; therefore God is Not-God" — is false too (p. 38, l. 10—34). We may say: "*That which* (meaning, or as Wyclif says, pointing to, *demonstrans*, Transcendental Being) is Not-God is God;" but we cannot infer thence that the creature is God (pp. 38, 39). But to admit even the former proposition seems perilously near Pantheism: so we must not be surprised if Wyclif reverts to this point and supports his distinction with analogies drawn from the profoundest mysteries of the Christian religion.'

Third. To grant that the Universal Man is identical with each of its singulars seems to imply its doing and being all that every individual does and is. It is thus at the same time awake and asleep, white and black, &c., together with countless other contradictory attributes (p. 39, l. 38 to end; p. 40, l. 1—14). This objection may be solved either negatively or in the affirmative. Man is that which is white and that which is black; but Man is not white and black. For, as a universal, this term can receive no predicates but such as are essential to human nature: and it is evident that neither whiteness nor blackness are thus essential (p. 40, l. 15 to p. 42, l. 6). But again, taking ideal humanity as the exemplar and prototype of each man, and consequently as the cause of each, we may grant that it does every one of the actions of each. So universals do receive accidents: not indeed in themselves, but in their singulars, with which they are identical: and the countless different attributes, which are or may be contradictory in their singulars, are not so in them (p. 42, l. 5—25). This explanation is similar to that of theologians, who deny that the Godhead suffered, although it was *that which* suffered, i. e. the person of Christ (p. 42, l. 28 to p. 44, l. 25). Several other objections are propounded and solved in the same way, by pointing either to the mystery of the Incarnation or to that of the Trinity; in the latter, the essence of the Deity is substantially the same in each of the three persons; yet the Three are really distinct. The Father is not the Son, although *that which* is the Father is *that which* is the Son. "To every sophism against Real Universals, you can find a parallel one against the Holy Trinity," says Wyclif (p. 46, l. 18—22). Very true; and it therefore follows that, *for a Christian*, the distinction is not meaningless, meaningless as it may seem. But the following would seem an obvious

reply: "The Trinity is a mystery; are Real Universals so? If they are, faith and not reason should make us believe in them. If they are not, they destroy the mysterious nature of the Trinity itself." It is perhaps as an answer to this objection, never stated in so many words, that our author in several passages of his works (and in particular a few pages further, pp. 51, 52) takes care to note the differences between the Universal and the Divine Essence. But he only points out other mysteries, and leaves the *that which* distinction untouched, as parallel in both cases. — The serious difficulty, viz., that universals must move about, as they are wherever their singulars happen to be, is taken into earnest consideration (p. 47). Wyclif inclines to think that they move; at the same time he denies that this implies localization of the Universal.

Fourth. The most difficult point of all, where the writer seems to be most uncertain, and which he probably developed and explained at a later period, is, "How the Universals can be said to make up a number with their singulars". If the individual man A and the universal man are identical, they are not two, but one; if, on the other hand, there is a real distinction between them, they must be two realities, and be counted as such (p. 48, l. 3—10). It seems impossible to get a satisfactory answer to this objection; at least that contained in the present work seems to me rather lame, so far as I have succeeded in understanding it; and when I collated the chapter of *De Universalibus*. "Quomodo universalia ponunt in numero," I was too busy with the collation itself to pay much attention to the manner in which Wyclif supplements what seems wanting here. For a man of our author's skill and subtlety, it would have been very easy to wrap up his answer in a string of sentences impossible to understand, and signifying anything — or nothing; such a mode of proceeding would have been not without great precedents even in his time; and contemporary philosophers might perhaps tell us whether it has been quite abandoned at the present day. But Wyclif, often unintelligible when pursuing some of his favourite theories out of sight, is never so on purpose to embarrass an adversary. He may be lost in the clouds; he does not hide himself in mists. His sturdy English nature prefers momentary self-contradiction to wilful ambiguity, and remains in seeming absurdity until such time as he can get a satisfactory reply to what perplexes him. This, I believe, will appear a little further. I do not think that it takes anything away from the admiration due to his talent, and

it makes him respected from another point of view. He begins by enumerating different kinds of number (pp. 48—50), and for some he denies the possibility of ascribing them to a universal taken with its singular. If, however, number be taken to mean *all that can be counted*, then he admits that the Universal and its singular can be counted together, as the Godhead and the Three Persons of the Trinity. Such is the sense, if I mistake not, of the words “tunc concedendum est . . . quod quaelibet unitas quae est essentia substantiae singularis est trinitas suppositorum ejusdem substantiae . . . et sic [ut] homo communis differt ab homine singulari, ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus” (p. 50, l. 20—28).¹ Here the mystery of the Holy Trinity stands Wyclif in good stead. While he takes care to point out the difference between the Godhead, as communicable to the Persons, and the Universal, as applicable to its singulars, he says: The numerical difficulty which you propose to me applies equally to the Divine Essence, counted with the Persons; *qui nimis probat nihil probat*”. This would elude the difficulty; but Wyclif is not satisfied with that. Reverting to the above-mentioned case of the Phœnix, he affirms that the universal and the singular phœnix are not two, but one (p. 51, l. 16); for there are neither two universals, nor two singulars (l. 20—22). You cannot say *they*, pointing to both at once (l. 30). The universal Phœnix *is* in no wise other than (*aliud vel alia quam*, l. 27, 28) its singular, though they differ notionally (*secundum rationem* l. 29). This seems clear enough. Yet if the universal Phœnix is so identical with its singular that there is a mere logical distinction between them, and that we cannot even say ‘between *them*’ properly, can we continue to affirm that it possesses a distinct reality other than that of its singular? *We can*, answers Wyclif (“ . . . duo distincta realiter,” p. 54, l. 10). Every universal and its singular are two things, really different from each other. This looks very like a contradiction in terms, unless (which is also possible) the text is corrupt. But I do not think so, on account of Wyclif’s sudden conclusion of the debate immediately after these words, his avowal that the difficulty is very great (l. 11, 12) and his pointing out two other ways of answering

¹ The text is slightly changed here from what it is in the treatise. I confess I understood it less at the time. Even now it is not quite clear, and some words are probably wanting.

the difficulty, which might for a time be more satisfactory to some of his pupils. They were free to grant that universals might be counted apart from their singulars, though in reality one with them; or to deny it, because they are not different things. "But I," says Wyclif, at the close of the chapter, "stick to my first antwer" (l. 30). If the name of Doctor Evangelicus had not been given to him, he might have deserved, as well as if not better than Durandus, the title of *Doctor Resolutissimus*.

Chapter III. Under cover of investigating the nature of disjunctive propositions, Wyclif continues the debate on Universals, and now proceeds to carry the war into the enemy's country in a very practical way: viz., by asserting that the very idea of a promise demonstrates the truth of his theory. But we must first of all briefly note how he gets to this subject. The proposition which contradicts a disjunctive is a copulative of which both parts are contradictory to the former: as, A is B or A is C: *contr.* A is not B and A is not C (p. 56, l. 6, 7). Now *and* A may be replaced by *and it*; so here, as in the foregoing chapter, comes the question; for what do pronouns stand? In other words, ought the Realist or the Nominalist view to prevail? Only here the field of discussion is restricted and specified. I promise a penny. There is therefore a penny *which* I promise. Does this *which* relate to a universal penny, or to a singular one? Wyclif at once and of course chooses the first alternative. He says that, if anything singular is meant, not only philosophy, but political science and even all human intercourse must go by the board. And not only the act of promising becomes impossible, but purchase, sale, donations, acts of justice, rewards and punishments are rendered null and void. When I promise a penny, *a penny*, according to Nominalists, is a mere empty word, there being no universal penny, but only singular ones; and so the promise becomes ineffective (p. 58). One man owes another £ 20. According to Nominalists, even God's Almighty power could not make him pay. There may be and are particular sums called £ 20; but such a general promise of what is but a *flatus vocis* in itself can have no value. And so on with many other cases, which all result in constructive absurdities; constructive of course, for, rightly or wrongly, they were denied by the partisans of the opposite system. Wyclif therefore declares (p. 59, l. 20) that we are obliged to admit the ancient doctrine of Universals, and closes his case with

observations concerning the nature of promises and obligations (pp. 60, 61) with which he deals at some length. He then takes up a series of objections, in which absurdities, very similar to those of which he accuses his adversaries, are laid to his charge.

1. We are never obliged to give anything but what we have promised. If then the promise concerns only a universal penny, nothing obliges us to give a singular one! Besides, as we may suppose that the other party has a (universal) penny already, how can we give a man what he possesses? So the Realist, not the Nominalist, standpoint is the ruin of promises, obligations, and in short of all human intercourse whatsoever (p. 61, l. 26—37).

The answer is that we are indeed not obliged to give anything but a universal penny, since no other is promised. But *that* we are obliged to give; and since it cannot be given without the singular which contains it, any one of its singulars must be handed over. As to the man's already possessing a universal penny, that has nothing to do with the matter: he must possess it in reason of the promise made, even though he had it already, and independently thereof. He then will have it in one more of its singulars, i. e. more plentifully (*abundantius*). Wyclif adds, with a touch of dry and possibly unconscious humour, that the multiplied possession of a universal penny in its singulars is highly advantageous (*multum confert*). Thus, if a promise concerns the Universal, its execution regards its singulars (p. 62, l. 16 to p. 63, l. 5). That the common people know nothing of universals is quite false; they have a sort of confused knowledge of them. Even those who deny their existence cannot help contradicting themselves and agreeing with us in practice (p. 63, l. 15 to p. 64, l. 7).

2. "But," the adversary urges, "I for one deny the existence, even the possibility of a real universal penny. So, at least when *I* promise one, the promise must be that of a singular: I really mean to give, and I cannot mean what is in my opinion impossible. Thus universality is not necessarily implied by the words of the promise in my case; and if not in my case, in none" (p. 61, l. 37 to p. 62, l. 5). "Quite the contrary," replies Wyclif. "You may intend promising one particular penny — the one, for instance, that you will happen to give — but you cannot help implicitly meaning the Universal which it contains. No doubt it is promised vaguely in this case; still it is promised. That you have

it not in your mind, nay, that you positively exclude it from your mind, is an altogether irrelevant fact (p. 64).” If I may be allowed to clear up the meaning of this by an example, we may suppose that one man promises to give another a piece of land in which he is convinced that there are no mineral riches whatever. Now it so happens that he is mistaken: does the fact of his belief render it untrue that, in promising the land, he has promised all its mineral riches? When you say: I promise a penny — a singular one — you surely promise all that is contained in that penny: now we say that a Universal is contained therein, and that, willing or unwilling, you promise it. — Here Wyclif, in connection with the indefinite universal term, *a penny*, makes some remarks by the way about terms of the first and second intention and imposition respectively. If a singular penny is spoken of, the sense, primarily universal, is contracted by the term *singular*. The promising verb indicates universality, and that is promised in any case. For instance, I have two pennies, and promise you one of the two. That means *neither in particular*; and it follows that the object of any promise must be universal (pp. 64, 67).

3. A third difficulty, made up of several put together, runs thus: Transcendental Being is identical with everything, and at the same time with anything in the world: if I promise *something*, it follows that everything has been promised! And yet such a promise comes to nothing in reality. I buy a man; if the meaning of this be ‘Universal Man’, then it includes myself; yet I surely cannot buy my own person. And it might be proved in the same way that what is promised is not promised (p. 62, l. 5—15).

All this is mere sophistry. The promise of Something is valid; but the very smallest thing given fulfils it, and so it happens to be an idle one, legally speaking; but that is not because its object is universal. There are many such cases which judges would put out of court as frivolous. Notice, however, that when the singulars of any universal are of equal value, any one of them will do; when their values differ, we may not choose at will any one of the worst, but may be compelled by law to give one of average worth. (I suspect that Wyclif’s opponents might have found means to cavil here. You promise a horse; you give a hack only fit to be slaughtered; but you have given the ‘Universal horse’ with it just as well as if you had given a Derby favourite. Why should the

judge enforce an average value, when the value is totally irrelevant to the thing 'principally given'? But this is by the way.) — Some promises may be legally binding, but impossible to fulfil, and not binding in conscience. — We may go to market intending to buy something there; now some of our own goods being in the market, it follows that we intend to buy our own goods. There is nothing absurd in all this, unless we go with the explicit intention to buy what we know to be our own (pp. 67—69). But what absurdity, if a Universal be really nothing, for a Nominalist to express himself grateful to a benefactor who promises him *a horse, a saddle, &c.* (p. 69, l. 39 to p. 70, l. 11).

As to the last quibble: "I will give the (singular) penny which I do not promise to give (since I promise the Universal)." Such a promise is a falsehood, for by its very tenour it flatly contradicts itself. Or we may understand the words to mean: *that I do not promise to give as a singular*; but then the sentence has no difficulty (p. 70, l. 12 to p. 71, l. 35).

The chapter closes with a few observations about obligatory acts, mortal sins incurred by their omission, works of supererogation, and fasting.

Chapter IV. Here Wyclif discusses four difficulties raised, the first separately, as one of the ordinary objections against Universals; the other three together, as raising the question of the greatest number of things possible. There are consequently two distinct parts in this chapter.

1. Given four propositions, *a, b, c* and *d* (*b* contradicting *a*, and *c, d*) we find that *a* and *c*, and that *b* and *d* can coëxist respectively; but that the couples *a b, c d* cannot. It follows that the four propositions, if thought of as coëxisting, are at the same time incompatible and compatible with one another. On the same lines we may prove that all men are equal and unequal, friends and enemies, &c. (p. 73, l. 15 to p. 75, l. 7). But Wyclif easily points out that though such contradictory qualities really exist, they exist relatively to different objects, not to the same; which makes short of the whole objection. They are indeed all contradictory and compatible; but not all with all; *a*, compatible with *c* and *d*, is contradictory to *b*; and *vice versâ* (pp. 75—78). And we come to the conclusion that opposite qualities, though they cannot be predicated of individuals, may be ascribed to universals, either essentially, or

separately. *Four* is even; four is three and one; three is odd: therefore four may truly be said in two different senses to be both even and odd. Christ is indivisible as God, and divisible, as man (p. 78, l. 35 to p. 79, l. 22). All this is explained at what I cannot help thinking needless length; but it is also quite admissible that a teacher may be trusted to have known the requirements of his pupils and the exigencies of his times somewhat better than those who read or edit his works five hundred years after his death.

2. Then comes the second question: Whether God is able to create the greatest possible number of creatures. The three difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter are answered thus; for if God cannot create this greatest number, the conclusions given there are inevitable; whereas if (as Wyclif maintains) He can, then they are worthless (p. 79, l. 22—26). We are, however, not very well qualified to decide whether this is a logical inference, and must take the assertion for granted, most of these difficulties being stated in a very unintelligible form. Perhaps the third (p. 73, l. 10—12) alone is not totally obscure: “*Omnia quae Deus potuit facere possunt esse Deus, vel nihil potest differre ab alio.*” This is itself not very clear; but if I can discern a glimmer of meaning in it, it somewhat resembles the problem still in vogue amongst Neo-Scholastics: “Whether the most perfect creature possible *is* possible.” If there is no limit to the number of creatures which God can produce, there is either no limit to their perfection, and one of the infinite multitude is infinitely perfect, though a creature; or we must deny any difference of perfection between them. I give this, however, merely as a hint, not being sure that it is the very same question to which Wyclif alludes: “*Omnia . . . possunt esse Deus,*” stands in the way.

The adversary is supposed to deny that any greatest number of all is possible; for it would be infinite; and that is no less absurd than a being of infinite size. To create it would exhaust the whole of God’s power, which is inexhaustible. At the Resurrection there would be no room for an infinite number of men come to life again. Not one man more could possibly be created or perish. This, too, would lead to a denial of Free-will. Besides, if the term *man*, for instance, is a Universal, its signification cannot be exhausted, however, great the number of its singulars may be; it may always be supposed capable of having as

many more: which would not be true, if all possible men existed at any time (p. 79, l. 22 to p. 81, l. 6).

But this flatly contradicts Wyclif's principles. To answer the arguments levelled against him, he makes a very remarkable and peculiar use of the term 'infinite'. He indeed affirms the existence of an infinite number, but says that whatever exceeds our power of knowing distinctly, is infinite to us. Thus, to give his own comparison — a striking one — in a given line there is a definite and fixed number of points, known to God, but absolutely beyond our powers of apprehension. As a fact, we must admit the existence of continuous extension: now, how many parts are there in any such extended being? The more we divide it, the more of them we find, and we never can get to the end of our division. Yet God, who created them, knows each in particular, and the sum total of them all (p. 81, l. 6—33).

Would Wyclif have considered the multitude of stars in the sky, or that of the sands on the sea-shore, to be infinite? I think not; for they do not exceed our faculty of counting, but the time we have allotted to us, or the instruments we are obliged to use; if we had time enough, their aggregate would be represented by a number, finite even to us. He takes an instance of quite a different nature; — we might go on counting for all eternity the number of points in a line, or of parts in a given volume, however small. Yet he contends that as those points are *really there* (again a consequence of his doctrine; a Nominalist would get out of the difficulty by saying that they were mere *entia rationis*), it is impossible both that their number should not be known to God, and that it should be infinite to Him. It is therefore definite. To the length of each line corresponds a fixed number of points; a line double that length will have twice as many; numbers beyond all arithmetical calculation, but numbers nevertheless. The idea is not wanting in boldness and originality; but, like all speculations on these subjects, it is liable to a good many formidable objections.

Wyclif strengthens his position by observing that certain propositions which are evidently true must be denied if we refuse to admit this conception of the Infinite. A body certainly consists of *all* its parts; but, were there no definite number, there would be no *all*; the very term supposes them either counted or at least numerable. Again, in Genesis, "God saw all the things that He had made," i. e. with all their details,

which to us are infinite. A line consists of points; the duration of a sound, of instants; the whole is the sum of all its parts. All these imply countless parts — countless, that is, in so far as our mind conceives their multitude. And yet the adversary is driven to deny all this. "I protest before God," cries Wyclif, indignantly "that of all fallacies ever invented these seem to me the most worthless!" (p. 82, l. 6—28.) — If our opponents admit that God knows each part of the said infinite multitudes, he must grant that all these parts exist. Granting this, but refusing to admit that these parts are separately affirmable, he is at once met by the fact that, as they exist, they must be beings, singular beings, and as such affirmable separately. Suppose he takes refuge in saying that, separately affirmable, taken together they are not so; he is forced from that last refuge by the remark that in that case there must be a limit to the number of beings which God is able to cognize collectively; and, since a man could count up to any finite number, his knowledge would be equal to that of God (p. 82, l. 29 to p. 83, l. 28).

It follows therefore that there exists a maximum number of singular possible beings (men, for instance), to which nothing can be added; and this is true both for simultaneously and successively possible beings (p. 83, l. 29 to p. 84, l. 32). Peripateticians, admitting the eternity of the world, affirm the successive possibility of an endless multitude of men (p. 84, l. 33 to end). But Christians deny this; some (those of Wyclif's opinion) asserting a fixed maximum number of every being, all in ideal and necessary proportion, so that nothing in the world can be increased or diminished (p. 85, l. 11—24). This does not limit God's power, but affirms His infinite wisdom; how could more men be produced, when all those who are to exist, exist already? Here, however, two curious exceptions are made; one in regard to the number of inferior animals (possibly because, not having immortal souls, they would never simultaneously make up an infinite number), and the other concerning that of human actions, which depend upon free-will and thus cannot be fixed. *Not all future things take place by necessity* (l. 37, 38). This is an important sentence, for Wyclif, in his theological works, is known to have maintained a doctrine which seems to contradict this clear statement of his views. It may perhaps be interesting to some future student of this subject to inquire when and how the change of opinion took place, if it took place at all. It is quite possible that when

Wyclif speaks of necessity, he may mean that, given the fact of free-will and the actions resulting therefrom, things cannot be otherwise than they are; this, however, is often set forth in language which must have astonished the ordinary Catholic. In Buddensieg's edition of Wyclif's Polemical Works there is a tract entitled *De Perfectione Statuum*, in which (vol. II, p. 450, l. 5—18) a passage occurs that evidently supposes free-will. Now this tract, according to Buddensieg, dates from 1383, quite at the close of our author's life. But, on the other hand, this, as directed against the Friars, may be explained away as an argument 'ad hominem'. And in the *Dialogus*, when accused of fatalism, he might easily have destroyed the charge by the well-known distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Yet he gives none, and simply admits the necessity of all things that happen (*Dial.* pp. 45, 46). That some change or other took place in Wyclif's doctrine is evident from the following passage in *De Ecclesia* (p. 107, l. 12 and seq.), in which he explicitly admits the fact: "*Omnia futura de necessitate eveniunt* Quando autem variavi ab ista sententia, non cognovi, ut modo, quomodo res habet multiplex *esse*, sed omne *esse* posui existentiam individuum rei in suo genere." How he reconciles this doctrine with free-will is not quite clear to me, as I have not been able to find a passage dealing with free-will at any length, except a very orthodox one in *De Ente Praedicamentali* (p. 247); but this treatise, according to Dr. Beer, could not have been posterior to *Logica* by more than a few years. But we must not rashly assume that he did not reconcile them. The Dominicans, in their great controversy with the Jesuits, affirmed that God predetermined all human acts, making all things act according to their nature; so that, as the nature of will is to act freely, human acts were at once predetermined and free! And this theory was not condemned by the Church! — Having thrown out these few hints which may possibly be of use, I return to the summary of Wyclif's arguments.

The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic possibility has no real foundation. A seemingly possible soul is in reality impossible, if God has chosen never to create it. The number therefore of souls extrinsically possible is that of all those which at any time will exist in reality; it is consequently finite, though the abstract idea, 'Soul' contains an infinite multitude of singulars; for all those singulars to which their cause (i. e. God's will) is wanting, imply self-contradiction. Wyclif con-

siders as possible only such as are so in reality, and at one time or other must exist: this does away with all the difficulties that can be brought forward (pp. 86—88). The system in vogue at his time, refusing to limit God's power of creating all that is possible in the abstract, renders it necessary to deny that such a multitude is infinite. Wyclif, limiting God's power by His will, calls the fixed number of possible things that will be produced, infinite *to us* (p. 88 to end of chapter).

Chapter V. brings us to a discussion of causal propositions, after the writer's usual fashion, expounding his views on causes, accidents, modes of being, the identity of God causing Man with Man caused by God, and the origin of evil.

Of such propositions there are two kinds, the one affirmative, the other negative, and each is reducible to a categorical having the same sense. A conditional proposition does not imply causation, but only a nexus between two propositions, neither does a copulative, which means nothing beyond the coexistence of the two (pp. 90, 91). Accidents are caused by their subjects: *because* you are a man, you have such and such qualities. This is a proof that accident and subject are distinct entities, unless we deny the truth of causal propositions in general; but such a denial would be subversive of all science (p. 91, l. 12—39). 'Cause' cannot properly be defined, any more than 'being', because their spheres are equally universal. We can only state that the word signifies 'that which produces an effect', that of which the entity precedes the thing caused; whilst 'effect' is that other being produced, and of which the entity flows from that cause. All beings are causes and effects. Possibly there is no last being, but there is a first one; which is, according to Wyclif, not God, but Essence. This essence is *that which* is created (*unum creatum*); but it is itself neither created nor caused. In short, it seems identical with that Transcendent Being, of which we have already heard a good deal, and which is common both to God and to the creature; a conception so closely verging upon Pantheism that Wyclif avoids that conclusion only by his surprising skill in argument, and the constant employment of the highest mysteries of the Christian faith used as points of comparison and instances to maintain the value of his subtle distinctions (p. 91, l. 39, 40; p. 92, l. 1—18).

He then proceeds to enumerate the fourfold division of causes into material, formal, efficient and final, each of which is a cause either *per*

se or *per accidens*, a true cause or a mere occasion. We may pass over these details rapidly, only noting the conclusion: that the material exists for the formal cause, this latter for the efficient, and the efficient for the final cause. The ultimate End of all beings is that toward which all beings tend, and for which they all exist, whilst it exists for itself alone. Thus it can have no parts, but must be absolutely simple in its essence; for if it had parts, every one would be caused, and would exist only for the whole. Two beings may cause one another in different lines of causation, but not in the same (pp. 92—96).

Every causal proposition is reduplicative. For instance: You move, since you walk, means *Inasmuch as you walk, you move*. Therefore, though other propositions are also reduplicative (as: The more alike two things are, the less they differ), Wyclif takes the present occasion to investigate the nature of reduplicatives, and continues his investigation in the following chapter. Whenever such a proposition is reducible to a causal one, the predicate must be universal. If, for instance, Every man, *qua* man, is rational, then it also follows that Every rational being is a man. This is not always the case when the proposition cannot thus be reduced (pp. 96—98 to l. 6).

Here comes a difficulty. Suppose we say: *A man, in so far as he is white, does not build*: is this true, and may we consider that 'whiteness' is not a cause of his building? Some assert that we may not; for the whole man builds, and whiteness is an attribute of the whole man. Wyclif, on the contrary, thinks that the proposition is true. The connection between this apparently useless and meaningless subtlety and the profound mysteries of the Scholastic doctrine concerning the 'hypostasis', or essence of individuality, becomes clearer, when we ask, Did Christ, *qua* God, suffer and die? Did He, *qua* man, create the world? The answer given is in strict accordance with orthodoxy (p. 98, l. 6 to p. 99, l. 4).

This leads us to examine what such modes of being as whiteness, &c., added to the substance, are in themselves. Real they are no doubt, according to the general drift of Wyclif's opinions; but are they realities distinct from the substance to which they belong and which they modify? If so, every substance would, in each of its modifications, differ from itself. But the difference is merely modal, not substantial; only the modes differ: to be thus or otherwise, and to be existing, are

not the same. Size gives a man magnitude; quality gives him 'suchness', humanity alone gives him to be a man (p. 99, l. 4 to p. 100, l. 6).

But if so, another difficulty springs up. God, *as creating man*, has what is called an accidental mode, which is not identical with His essence, and therefore is posterior to Himself! And if we deny this; if we say that this mode is identical with God's essence, we fall into another snare: for the said mode (action and passion being admittedly the same thing taken from contrary points of view) is also identical with man *as created by God* (p. 100, l. 6 to end). Thus God and man would share in the same reality, or mode of existence; just as the hammer *qua* striking the anvil, is identical with the anvil, *qua* struck by the hammer. It is curious to note how this old-world objection has been reproduced and extended in modern times. Every student of Philosophy will at once recognize the system which says: "I think of an object: — therefore I am identical with the object, the Non-Ego. And the Non-Ego, thought by me, becomes identical with my Ego." What was formerly an objection, refuted in a few pages, has become the starting point and basis of many a volume of German metaphysical speculation, which, having spent its force and lost its interest in its own country, has lately found new life and men of talent to expound it in England. And yet this fallacy (to speak of it in the language of the Schoolmen) was well known even in Aristotle's time, Truly there is no new thing under the sun! But let us see how Wyclif refutes it.

First, he points out that an accident may signify a mere happening which does not in the least change the possessor's intrinsic nature: a rich man may become poor without any loss to his physical attributes. He then notes that not all relations are mutually real. A cause must be, in its essence, prior to its effect, though it is only properly termed a cause whilst the effect is being produced. This 'calling', or denomination, changes nothing in its being. So, the cause depends on the effect only in so far as a verbal change is implied, whereas the effect depends on the cause for its very being. A man, by means of his generative activity, produces a son: he is called a father as soon as his son exists. But the man existed before and independently; there is no real difference between the father and the man. Wyclif therefore answers that the likeness of me in God and the likeness of God in me, both produced by creation, are not identical. For the likeness of me represents me as

I am — i. e. — infinitely beneath God — and changes nothing in Him (pp. 101—103, l. 8).

And how would Wyclif, according to these lines, have answered the Hegelian puzzle of the Ego and the Non-Ego? With the utmost ease. My thinking of an object does not change the object in itself; it only makes it to be thought. The Non-Ego is the Ego — *in my mind*. Not otherwise. My Ego, in thinking — i. e. *mentally*, is identical with the Non-Ego; but only in so far. All this is merely a verbal, or if you prefer, a notional becoming. And the bubble is burst.

From this Wyclif concludes that no inherent accident has any existence of its own, or adds anything to its substance, as a substance (p. 103, l. 8—25); that every proposition of which the predicate essentially belongs to the subject infers a causal proposition, but not *vice versâ* (for instance: *Man is essentially rational: man is rational because he is man*, but, *I exist because God wills my existence* gives no inference; p. 103, l. 25 to p. 104, l. 7); that a conclusion from a cause to the cause of that cause is a true one (p. 104, l. 7 to end); and that, while God's will causes my existence in the physical order, my existence causes God's will to be what it is in the intellectual order, i. e., a cause. One of the two gives the entity, but does not prove the existence of the other; whilst the latter proves the existence of the former, but does not give it entity (p. 105, l. 1 to p. 106, l. 9). It does not follow that either is prior to the other, unless in two totally different orders: that of being, and that of cognition (p. 106, l. 9—25). Nor that God's will, being a mere relation between the Creator and the Created, cannot cause anything (l. 26—34). Nor that any creature, to be willed, must first of all exist (l. 34—37; p. 107, l. 1—8).

But can we draw the following negative inference from a causal proposition: "*I do good because God wills it; therefore, if God does not will it, I do not good because God does not will it?*" It is the very same form of syllogism as the conclusive one which follows: *The day exists because the sun shines; therefore, if the sun does not shine, the day does not exist because the sun does not shine*. Some deny this; others explain the inference, noting that we may suppose the sun not to shine on the earth¹

¹ I have here slightly developed what I believe to be Wyclif's meaning. In other places, I have not scrupled to add a comparison or a line of explanation of my own, to render the sense clearer.

because of clouds that arise from the earth itself. In like manner, God's not willing me to do good (if He willed it, I should do good without fail) would proceed from an obstacle on my part — my non-reception of His grace; just as in the case of the sun's rays. What is not received cannot possibly be given. But I am responsible for not receiving it through my fault (p. 107, l. 8 to p. 108, l. 20).

So far, sin and its possibility and origin is explained in the orthodox way, and reconciled with God's First and absolute Causality. But Wyclif closes the chapter with one or two sentences which, even if defensible, have a somewhat strange sound. God cannot but be the First Cause of all; and therefore, though indirectly, of every act, including sin: of the eternal truth that whatever is able to sin may sin at some time or other; of the creation of such peccable beings; and also of the very happening (*contingentiae*, p. 108, l. 33) of the act, which is thus radically dependent upon God. We must, however, remark that there is no attempt to fix the sinfulness of any act upon God. On the contrary, says Wyclif, in so far as God is the author of sin, sin is good. Whatever is true is good; and the possibility of every sin depends upon the everlasting truth already laid down. Thus we have a logical deduction as follows:

A, B, C Z are severally able to sin.

We suppose the *creation of A, B, C Z.*

Also that, in Wyclif's system, *what is able to sin* means *what* (at one time or other, or in one subject or other) *will actually commit sin*; for *able to* does not signify mere abstract possibility, but the necessity of a future happening.

Then we necessarily have that *either A, or B, or C or Z will at some instant or other of all time* (either the instant *a*, or *b*, or *c* or *z*) actually commit sin.

Here we see, not only that there is no necessity for any of the given singulars taken in particular *A, B, C, &c.* to sin at all, but also that it is not necessary that the sin should take place at a given instant of time. And as contingency is the opposite of necessity, we now see what Wyclif means when he says that sin is of the extremest contingency (*summa contingentia*); for the truth would be verified if only one of the multitude *A, B, C, &c.* sinned but once.

Chapter VI professes to deal with those reduplicative propositions in which there is a comparison implied; but it in reality discusses only one of these propositions, viz.: *In so far as two things are like each other, in so far they differ*. Which means that the greater anything is, the smaller it is, for the magnitude of its smallness is so much greater; and so on of all qualities which are comparable with each other. Man of common sense would at the present day no doubt solve the question with a shrug, and they would treat no more respectfully a problem which I myself heard propounded by one of the lights of Philosophy: What becomes of matter in the intervals of sensation? If all men and beasts were sound asleep at the same time, where would the world be? The problem discussed here at length by Wyclif is certainly not more absurd. He gives three different answers which profess to solve the difficulty, and proposes a fourth of his own. The arguments on either side can hardly be of much interest, dealing with such flimsy sophisms that we can hardly conceive their being seriously set forth by any man in his senses; but we must remember that during the Middle Ages the right understanding of the spirit of mathematical science was in its infancy. Two points however deserve to be noticed here.

Why does Wyclif trouble himself so much about this question? Had it been, as it seems, a mere exercise of ingenuity in verbal juggling, he would probably have dismissed it with a few words of contempt, as he dismisses others, by no means more puerile in themselves, calling them Christmas jokes, "more jocolantium in Natali" (p. 14, l. 10). But the fact is that, absurd though it may be, it is directed against his system. In Wyclif's theory, the universe consists of a multitude of real universals, shared by their singulars in varying degrees. Not only humanity, amongst the rest, is thus shared, but also merit, demerit, size, and in short everything intelligible almost; certainly every quality which allows of comparison with another. The Universal Man, if I may be allowed a simile, is thus, with regard to its singulars, like a straight line of a certain length, containing a number of points, infinite so far as we know, but fixed and known to God's omniscience alone. These points represent the number of really possible men; and their position on the line, the degree to which Universal Humanity is shared in by each individual man. And, to carry the supposition further, this line, produced further, would represent Animality, which includes Humanity and all its

Jevons have in turn endeavoured to adapt Algebra to Logic or Logic to Algebra; whilst Abbé Gratry, in France, has tried to prove God and the Creation by the interpretation of certain mathematical formulae. And, to restrict myself to Mediaeval Scholasticism, we by no means find Wyclif alone in his way of looking at ideas — or rather at their universal objects — as though they were measurable things. Here I must regret not having taken note, in times gone by, of several passages of St. Thomas, in which he distinctly speaks, for instance, of the *distance* between the most perfect brute and man as greater than that between the former and a plant. Here we see an explicit comparison between two entitative differences. There are also in his works certain arguments which, though referring to pure abstractions, might very well be represented by an algebraical equation, if we admitted the assumption already mentioned. I equally regret not being able now to find the passages I refer to; but life would be too short to look through the multitudinous folios of the Angelic Doctor; I had to glance here and there, where I thought I had most chance to find them. One argument, I remember well, struck me as being based on the implicit assumption that “when two variable quantities (or objects of ideas) are always equal to each other as they approach the constants by which they are respectively limited, those constants are also equal to each other”. And we may fairly believe that if, in the days of Schoolmen, mathematics had attained the high degree of development at which they stand now, there would have been wrought a complete transformation of Metaphysics; not perhaps to its disadvantage.

Setting aside the detailed examination of the debate, as useless and uninteresting to us, we may however notice by the way what Wyclif, in his answer to the fourth objection, remarks concerning goodness (p. 122 to and of chapter). Utility has no intrinsic element of goodness; it is good only extrinsically, and varies according to the demand for the thing that is useful. But reversely, whatever possesses intrinsic goodness possesses utility too; so does also that which is bad in itself; for even sin has its use in the world. Intrinsic goodness is divided into two species: that which is physically and that which is morally good. The latter is always useful, at least to some extent; virtue never can be badly employed; yet it may at times be less useful than what is merely extrinsically good. The same division of evil must be made; it is either

merely disadvantageous, or physically or morally bad. God is in no wise evil; He is of use to all; even his punishments are not injurious. Nor can he commit moral evil. Wyclif here (p. 124, l. 34 to p. 125, l. 15) corrects or qualifies what he said at the close of the foregoing chapter. God cannot make a man to sin; but when He permits evil, He gives it an element of goodness by the very fact. A man sins; therefore it is true (and consequently good) that he sins: God makes the inference, but does not posit the premiss. Good to all (p. 125, l. 15—35), He is infinitely good in Himself, and finitely so to His creatures. Many things that we call evil are in reality good; as, for instance, punishments and misfortunes (p. 126, l. 15—20); and in many cases we mistake the value of things, which varies according to supply and demand (l. 22—25). These never can be exactly regulated. Even should the variation in price not spring from the wickedness of men, it is impossible to fix prices exactly. We must leave that to nature; the real worth of anything is its utility in the universe. — This is a clear and far-seeing condemnation of the many attempts to fix or keep up prices which were so common during the Middle Ages, and are far from abandoned even at the present day. In these few sentences we find Free Trade in its germ.

'Hindrance' and 'obstacle' generally mean the reverse of utility; but in a certain sense they may not be evils. If, for instance, God is said to hinder any one from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to work out His plan of the world, in which predestination plays a principal part. The natural tendency of all things is to sink to the centre; but some must be impeded in their descent, or the order of the universe would perish. Wyclif, however, speaks very guardedly here (*forte . . . difficultates plurimae*, p. 128, l. 34—36) and brings the chapter to a close without going into any details on this subject.

Chapter VII. Here our author, availing himself of comparative propositions, his nominal subject-matter, deals *ex professo* with the question whether there is for every faculty, or active power, a maximum and a minimum of intensity beyond which it cannot go either way. Of course he asserts that there is, and in his answer to the objections, he discusses various and very diverse questions, including God's omnipotence, the limits to human strength, size, and knowledge, the beatific vision, and our natural faculty of sight.

The problem is ushered in according to Wyclif's usual fashion; but it is not dragged in, as occurs in too many cases. Comparative propositions easily lead to the question whether, wherever there is a *more* and a *less*, there is not also a *most* and a *least*, not only existing (which is generally allowed) but even possible (p. 129; p. 130, l. 1—15). As preliminaries to the solution, several principles are laid down concerning God's power and His concurrence in every act of His creatures. All things proceed from God, and every act of every creature requires an accompanying act of the Creator, without which that act could not possibly take place. There is also in Him a distinct and spécial power for every being, which, when that being has perished, exists no longer; but this takes away nothing from God's perfection, for it would imply absurdity that He could act with that which does not exist (pp. 130—132, l. 30). This power of concurrence is a relation in God, but a purely logical one (p. 132, l. 30 to p. 133, l. 11). If there is no maximum intensity of an act, God cannot elicit it; and if there is, as we assert, such a maximum, His power itself cannot go beyond it (p. 133, l. 11—25). As God *could* do, absolutely speaking, things which *cannot* really be done, Wyclif objects to the theory which distinguishes His absolute from His ordinate power; the former cannot be *exercised* alone, and therefore is inadmissible. In any case, every being has power to act only so far as it is possible for God to coact with it (p. 133, l. 25 to p. 135, l. 10).

Every finite power or active faculty must have a maximum of activity, beyond which it cannot go. Being finite, it is limited, and the very idea of limit implies a maximum (p. 135, l. 21 to end). We may suppose it to be variable, increasing uniformly during a certain time; it then will become successively twice, three times, &c., as great as it was at first: that is, its limit of maximum performance lies twice, &c., as far as before; so, even in this case, it still has its limit (p. 136, l. 16 to end). The modern mathematical notion of a limit — that which a variable quantity may approach indefinitely, but never reach — finds scant favour with Wyclif. What cannot be done is not the limit of what can. A given weight — say, a stone — that I am unable to carry is not the limit of my strength; unless indeed it be the least weight that I cannot carry, and that is an assumption impossible to prove (p. 138, l. 7—23).

Objections. 1. An army that can defeat a great power can defeat any smaller one; an army that can be defeated by a small power will

be defeated by any greater force. This is the difference between active and passive power. Now, in the sense pointed out, either of these powers is without limit. — Wyclif replies that, in the sense given, passive power is a mere imperfection. If understood to mean receptivity of forms (as in the case of matter, primordial or other) without doubt there is a limit to that receptivity. Sense-impressions have likewise their limits, and produce a wrong judgment when the senses are too strongly stimulated in one particular way. Thence it is clear that our intellect, which perceives all things, cannot perceive them by means of any bodily organ; and also that there is a maximum of receptivity for each of our senses. Thus, whether active or passive, the power at work is in every case a form; and this form cannot be indefinitely perfect (p. 138, l. 23—30; p. 140, l. 23 to p. 142, l. 35).

2. God's power would be restricted by this theory; for then, even by a miracle, He could not make any creature go beyond the maximum of its power (p. 138, l. 30—38). — *Answer.* It is one thing to know that there are limits even to miraculous assistance, and another to know what those limits are. God certainly could not, even by a miracle, make a stone think. His assistance is necessary in every act, and miraculous assistance only displaces the limit, but does not destroy it (p. 142, l. 36 to p. 143, l. 32). Is there such a thing as the most rapid movement possible? Wyclif asserts that there is. As time is made up of indivisible instants, so movement also consists of indivisible degrees of velocity, and the most rapid movement possible is that which increases at every instant by one such indivisible degree. This is however, even from Wyclif's point of view, not the most rapid, but the most rapidly increasing motion possible; and surely we may suppose that at every instant the movement might increase by *two* degrees of velocity. That would certainly give us a more rapid motion: but the passage is not very clear, and I am not quite sure I have understood it rightly. — As for infinitely rapid movement, Wyclif at once sets it down either as impossible (as in the hypothetical case given by Aristotle, of movement *in vacuo*; for a vacuum is an absurdity) or else as not being properly a quantity. Here our author probably alludes to the instantaneous nature of the movement of light, a doctrine universally believed before the discovery of the telescope had rendered possible the celebrated observations on the eclipses of Jupiter's

satellites (potest . . . aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca (p. 144, l. 2—4).¹ We have to consider, not what assistance God could absolutely give to His creatures, but what He gives them naturally and according to His Divine plan. To this there must be a maximum limit; it is that of the creature's ability to act with such assistance (p. 145, l. 13 to p. 146, l. 12).

Can God create worlds indefinitely? If He could, then we are compelled to posit an infinite and absurd vacuum beyond our world. These worlds, however multiplied we may conceive them to be, would form a body infinitely small in comparison with the enormous vacuum surrounding it. We should then find one infinite magnitude to be greater than another: which is a flat absurdity. This difficulty is absolutely unanswerable. An endless vacuum entails quite as many absurdities as the hypothesis of a body infinitely great. Yet God, though thus seemingly limited in power, remains Almighty, for His power is limited only by Himself. He eternally produces an infinitely perfect act (the Word); and above all, creation implies omnipotence. Yet creation could not take place but at a certain fixed point of duration; nor could the world be larger or smaller than it is. Some, refusing to admit these limitations, lay down as a principle that God's omnipotence extends to everything that we are able to maintain that He can do; and that He can thus grant an indefinite amount of assistance to any created faculty. This, as Wyclif points out, is a grossly unfair method of reasoning. He does not however deny that God *could* render such assistance, *if* He chose; but says that, not choosing, He cannot (pp. 146—152).

3. Supposing that a given power A can sustain a weight B during a certain time C, this being the maximum which it can bear, it could evidently bear a heavier weight for a shorter time; again, during this

¹ It is curious to note with what absolute certitude one of the greatest thinkers of old sets aside the true explanation of what light is, while he gets to the right, though vague, conclusion 'that it is not a body'. "Si lumen esset corpus, illuminatio esset motus localis corporis. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in instanti: quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est quod prius perveniat ad medium magnitudinis quam ad extremum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti; *nec potest dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili*. Quia in parvo spatio posset tempore latere, in magno autem non posset. Statim enim cum sol est in puncto horizontis, illuminatur totum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum." (St. Thomas, Sum. Th. 1^a Pars, qu. I.XVII, art. 2.)

shorter time (C') a smaller power, A', would be able to bear this same weight B; this, in the opinion of the adversaries, would prove that no power has a special maximum of its own (p. 138, l. 38 to p. 139, l. 9). Wyclif answers here at great length (pp. 152—162), giving many different senses of the word 'difficulty'; but we need not go into them. The gist of his reply (p. 159, l. 4—10) is that the notion of a maximum must here be considered with regard to the time, and not apart. We may, however, in this long and discursive reply, note several striking sentences, some paradoxical, some quaint, and some proving a considerable knowledge of mechanics, as then known. "Of all difficult things — i. e. of those which deteriorate the agent that does them — mortal sin is the most difficult (p. 155, l. 26, 27)." "In the sense of 'something to be mastered', the universe is a difficulty to God Himself (p. 156, l. 20—25)." "Without God's aid we should find it as difficult to move a bean as to make a world (p. 157, l. 29—31)." "In the act of sustaining, much depends on the manner of application of the weight, An egg will not be crushed even by a considerable force; a sail will bear up against a strong wind; and experiments with levers prove this abundantly and in a marvellous way (*multa . . . mirabilia facere*, p. 160, l. 25—34)." "The least weight a man cannot sustain is the greatest that he can (p. 160, l. 34—37)." "Weight implies distance from the centre, or from the proper sphere of each element; water in its own sphere has no weight, as divers tell us, and I suppose that it is the same for the earth too (p. 161, l. 14—16)."

4. The biggest or the smallest man possible is impossible. If the former got a bump (*tunsiōnem*), he would then be too big to exist. If the latter lost a hair (*quamlibet ablatiōnem partis superfluae*), he would be too small. — This humorous argument is answered on p. 167 (l. 34 & seq.) where it is pointed out that, though the greatest possible giant could not assimilate any more food, so long as his body remained of that size, a swelling would not render his organism, as a living body, any the larger. And a similar train of reasoning would apply to the smallest dwarf. But before this reply, we come to a very interesting digression (pp. 162—166). Wyclif, admitting a minimum of size for all bodily substances, implicitly asserts the existence of atoms from the very outset (*minima naturalia*; p. 162, l. 11); and a few pages later, he openly gives them their right name (*athomorum* p. 166, l. 32). It is too ge-

nerally believed that Schoolmen denied the existence of atoms. It would be more correct to say that they passed them over. They of course combated the systems of Democritus and Epicurus; and, finding that the system of matter and form sufficed to explain in metaphysical terms all that was then known of natural phenomena, they generally did not trouble themselves to enquire if atoms were or were not true in any other sense. St. Thomas, however, certainly says that there is and must be a limit to the divisibility of any corporeal substance; but he goes no farther.¹ Wyclif, with his principle that a limit not reached is not a limit, cannot help admitting atoms (p. 163, l. 13—22). He grants, in answer to objections made, that the combination or decomposition of two atoms is instantaneous; but this does not prevent the chemical change of the whole from taking up a certain time (p. 163, l. 23—31; p. 164, l. 13—31). To the well-known difficulty, urged even in our days by Ultra-Thomists against such Neo-Scholastics as believe in a 'minimum naturale', viz., that such a theory would reduce compound bodies to mere aggregates, similar to so many heaps of sand, he denies the conclusion in the case of organic bodies, which have a supervening form that gives unity to the whole; but whether homogeneous inanimate substances are mere aggregates is, he says, a doubtful point (p. 163, l. 31—41; p. 164, l. 31 to p. 165, l. 37). Division is favourable to chemical change; and on that account alchemists calcine metals, to give them the more perfect forms (v. g. that of gold, or 'aureity'). But, as this calcination does not reduce the metals to their ultimate parts, the successful result of their experiments is ever a matter of chance. — We have thus: 1st, the elementary forms in the atoms, and 2nd, those of the compound: simple in themselves, these forms are to a certain degree extended in the bodies of the lower animals, which accounts for their continuing to live, although divided into several parts. As for monsters with double organs, they are properly two animals joined in one, and possess two forms, or vital principles (p. 165, l. 37 to p. 167, l. 34).

5. It is objected that, at least in the sphere of learning and knowledge, there can be no limit; for the more we know, the more able we

¹ "Quod etiam dicunt . . . quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est. Non enim corpus naturale in infinitum dividitur, sed usque ad certum terminum." (Sum. Theol. 1^a Pars, qu. LXVIII, art. 2.)

become to increase our knowledge. Nor can there be any limit to the raising of a pile indefinitely high (p. 139, l. 19—30). — All this is absolutely denied. We know by faith that the Saints in Heaven do really attain their maximum limit of possible knowledge by means of the beatific vision of God. The question *how* this can be — a favourite one both with Mediaeval and with modern Scholastics — is discussed at some length. The blessed are not infinitely more perfect than we; for their knowledge is an accidental privilege, not an essential attribute. Wyclif inclines to think that they see all things in God; but, however this may be, the essence of felicity consists in the sight of God Himself; even were they ignorant of something, they would none the less be perfectly happy (p. 168, l. 10 to p. 174, l. 18). As to the raising of a pile indefinitely high, of course the higher it went, the more difficult it would be to raise it any further; and there would come a point at which it would exhaust all the powers of the whole human race to get even one more stone to the summit. Thus, Nature imposes a limit to men in all things; excessive increase of anything, for instance, of *Church ceremonies and possessions*, is hurtful. This is a seed which at a later period developed into an enormous tree (p. 174, l. 33 to p. 175, l. 22).

6. A minimum of visibility is absurd. Seeing a surface, we see the whole of it, and therefore we confusedly see all its parts, even to the infinitely small. — But Wyclif posits as an evident principle that whatever is seen confusedly might, under other circumstances, be distinctly seen. This takes all the force out of the objection. A mathematical point cannot be seen distinctly under *any* circumstances; for the smallest thing visible must be the base of a pyramid having its apex in the eye. The chapter comes to a close with some details on the structure and organism of the eye, which may be curious as representing the state of optical science in those days; but I am not in a position to discuss them thoroughly; scarcely at all. As Wyclif avowedly takes most of what he says from the works, not only of Alhazen, but also of the famous Vitellio (Ciolek) of Cracow, one of the most celebrated opticians in the Middle Ages, I should have liked to compare his anatomical description with the summary given by our author. Unfortunately, the work in question was not in the Jagellonian Library when I asked for it, having been lent out at some distance from Cracow; but the English

student will no doubt find Vitellio's works in any great library. — One of Wyclif's mistakes struck me. He denies that the visual rays cross each other in the centre of the eye. If they did, he says, *they would form an inverted image!* This shows how little philosophers of that time cared for experimental tests; for nothing would have been easier, even then, than to examine the image formed and find out that it really was inverted (p. 175, l. 22 to end of ch. VII).

Chapter VIII. Of Conditional Propositions. Wyclif deals rather more at length with them than with the others; but he soon turns away to the problem of individuation, and thence to the question of the so-called *Insolubles*.

Logicians generally hold that such a proposition as, *If A is B, C is D*, does not posit the existence of anything, but merely affirms a connection between two propositions (p. 186, l. 14—16). Wyclif denies this rule, though granting that it possesses an element of truth (l. 23—31). Every proposition of this kind is either necessary or impossible. If necessary, its truth implies God's existence, on whom all truth depends; if impossible, it implicitly denies that He exists. Here occur some details about necessary truth. A truth may be at different times both true and false; and even at the time when it is false, its *having been true* is an eternal truth. The signification of the present may be extended to the past and the future. A thing true in the abstract may be untrue at a certain time and imply false inferences. If I move my hand, I produce a truth, new as to its present actuality, false in the past and the future, and again everlastingly true in an abstract present (p. 188, 189, l. 1—16).

But, what individualizes such propositions as *A will be, was, can be, &c.*? That is, what makes one among such propositions uttered in various circumstances to be true, whilst another of exactly the same form is false? It is the difference of time, say some. What is eternal in itself has a particular (not abstract, but individual) mode of being in time; and it changes accordingly (p. 189, l. 16 to p. 190, l. 3). But if so, this would infer a continual change in truth; nothing would remain the same. For time is constantly changing; no one temporal truth could hold good for more than one instant. And on the other hand, everything would be everlastingly true: before *I am* born, and for ever, *I am* not-born; therefore it is everlastingly true that *I am*. And the same

conclusion might be drawn from every proposition (p. 190, l. 4—30). Wyclif's opinion is that individuation itself proceeds only from the cause of each individual, and finally from God; but that we know the difference between two individuals by their difference in time. Suppose, for instance, that two sparks exactly alike are struck from a flint successively, we know their difference because one was struck before the other (p. 190, l. 30 to p. 191, l. 7). But even God Himself cannot create the same thing twice over; nor, by the same reason, can anything be annihilated (et per idem videtur nihil posse annihilari, p. 192, l. 8, 9). Here is the first hesitating assertion of what was later to become so firm a doctrine, resulting in a new theory of the Eucharist.

After this, Wyclif comes to the grand question concerning certain propositions called *Insolubles*, on account of the great difficulty which their solution offered to logicians. They may in general be put under the form of a conditional, as follows: *If the present proposition be true, A is not A*. This therefore is the best place to deal with them. Before succinctly giving Wyclif's solution, it may be interesting to state various forms of so-called insolubles, and the answer which I fancy a modern logician would give, if he troubled himself to find any solution at all.

If the present proposition be true, A is not A. Grant that this is exact: an absurdity follows. Deny it, and you have another: *It is false that, even if the present proposition be true, A is not A*. We see that a mere denial of the nexus lands us in a contradiction connected with the antecedent; whereas its admission grants the contradiction which its consequent contains. This dialectical puzzle, as is well known, dates from very early times. In the days of the Greek sophists it took a form somewhat like this: A certain philosopher said that all Cretans were liars; but he was a Cretan himself: did he lie, or did he not lie? If he lied, he spoke the truth; and if he spoke the truth, he lied. To say that a liar may speak the truth sometimes does but elude the difficulty: for he might have said: "All Cretans *always lie*," and added the words "myself included", to exclude the possibility of an exception being made in his favour.

This may be expressed much more briefly. Suppose a piece of paper, with nothing written on it but: *What is written here is false*. This proposition, admitted as true, denies its own meaning; denied as

false, it proves itself to be true; and consequently false; and so on for ever. How shall we get out of this?

To make the case plainer, by contrasting it with one somewhat similar, suppose it is said: *No proposition is true*. If granted, the proposition itself is not true; and being false, some propositions must be true. Yes, but if denied, no difficulty follows. This is simply an absurdity akin to the Sceptical position: *It is indubitable that every proposition is doubtful*. It is only on one side that such utterances resemble insolubles: the essence of the latter consists in their being equally impossible to deny or to affirm.

Does a man who swears that he is committing perjury forswear himself or not? Not unless he speaks the truth; and if he is speaking the truth, how can what he says be perjury? Can any one believe that he is mistaken in that very belief of his mistake?

The puzzle seems still more intricate when a decision has, one way or the other, to be taken in consequence. A certain Greek rhetorician taught his art to a young man. Half his fee was paid down in advance; the other half was to be paid when, and only when, he gained his first suit. Time went by, and the young student, having ended his course of Rhetoric, and not appearing to plead, was called before the judges by his teacher. "If," said the latter, "you win this suit, you must pay me according to our contract; if you lose it, the sentence itself compels you to pay me." The pupil retorted: "If I lose, our agreement sets me free; if I win, I shall be free by the decision of the Court."

Or the following: A tyrant sets men at a bridge which is his property, with the order to ask every passenger whether he will pass or no, and allow only those to pass who answer truly. If he says: "I shall pass over," he can either be allowed to pass, or be turned back, and proved thus to have told an untruth; but what of the man who says: "I shall not pass?" If they turn him back, he has spoken the truth, and they fail in their duty; if they make him pass, they fail equally, for he has uttered a falsehood.

One last instance. A man has two slaves A and B. He decides to free them both, under the following conditions: A is to be free, if the first man he meets is a slave; B is to be free only if the first he meets is a free man. Now it so happens that A and B meet each other before

anybody else. A, meeting B who is a slave, is free that very instant; therefore B is also free, meeting a free man; therefore A is also a slave. And so on.

Debates on such questions have practically been dead for many centuries; they are considered as mere useless subtleties. And to speak quite frankly on this matter, they really seem ridiculous enough, even to a man pretty well versed in scholastic lore. But the greater the temptation for men of culture to endorse the sweeping judgments of that proverbially narrow-minded individual — the man in the street — the more they ought to strive against it. They well know that most of the present philosophical debates, though not apparently now so ridiculous, because fashionable, will appear so in the course of a few hundred years. All that we can say of them with certitude is that they serve to sharpen the wits by going as deep down into the principles of things and the laws of thought as it is possible to go. If these old world discussions then served the same purpose, they are worth studying at least from a historical point of view. And at any rate, the reader will perhaps feel some interest in the solution to these puzzles, given from what I should conceive to be the modern standpoint. I say, *I should conceive*; for I have been able to find nothing directly referring to them in any modern work of Logic, not even in the Neo-Scholastic text books of Liberatore and Tongiorgi, nor in that of the Thomist Goudin who, in the 17th century, argued with overwhelming violence to prove the immobility of the earth.

We should, I fancy, make but short work of all such propositions. The main point of the difficulty is that every proposition must be either true or false; the subject affirming of the predicate either the thing that is or the thing that is not. Now, taking any one of these propositions, we are compelled by overpowering evidence to admit that it is impossible to call them either true or false. Well then, what follows? Why, *that they are not propositions!*¹ They are mere strings of unmeaning

¹ A Scholastic friend to whom I showed this said to me: "What would you answer to *What is written here is a proposition?* It could be admitted without danger; and if you say that it is not, then by affirming its contrary, you admit that it has meaning." This was subtle. I answered that it could be admitted without danger, but that, belonging to the same class of sentences, it had logically to be not denied, but set aside. It chanced that by thus ignoring, I apparently denied it;

words having the looks of propositions, but not their nature. They are not absurd merely; an absurdity is not quite unmeaning; *This square is round*, clearly means an impossibility, and its denial is evidently true. Not incoherent: *The number three is fragrant*, does not even seem to mean anything but the raving of a lunatic, which no one cares to deny. Not mere gibberish: *Blitri is Blathro* may be equally well denied or affirmed, nobody knowing what they are. The so-called propositions in question are in reality a peculiar class of pseudo-propositions: words which appear to have a meaning, but which falsify both themselves and their contradictories. And this, I think, would be quite enough to satisfy modern students of logic.

The idea of so simple and easy a solution did not, it would seem, strike any of Wyclif's contemporaries; and he himself, though coming nearest to it in my opinion, does not quite hit the mark. Some of them affirmed that such propositions were neither false nor true (p. 194, l. 24—37). Some, that they were both true and false (p. 194, l. 38 to p. 195, l. 14). Others, that they were in reality exceptive propositions, as no proposition can include itself in its own meaning (p. 195, l. 14 to p. 196, l. 20). Some said that the words implied contradiction if understood as they were, but they did not explain how they were to be understood otherwise (p. 196, l. 20 to p. 197, l. 20). And others again denied that such words as *proposition, true, false, &c.*, could receive universal extension (p. 197, l. 20 to p. 199, l. 9). Several other opinions are enumerated besides (pp. 199—203). Wyclif taking the material or grammatical side of the definition of a proposition, saw that both subject and predicate had meaning apart, and that they were joined by a copula; he naturally could not see his way to denying that in such cases there was no proposition. But then, how could it be one, if it had no meaning, if it neither affirmed nor denied anything? Wyclif's answer (p. 203 to end of work), comes to pretty nearly the same as the one I have given above. It is *not a proposition* in the ordinary sense of the word, for, in this ordinary sense, it has absolutely no meaning. But it exists. Whatever exists, means its own existence. In that sense, every such proposition is

but I do not really. "What is written here is not a proposition" *in my mouth* does not contradict "What is written here is a proposition" *on the paper*, any more than *I am a man* spoken by one person is contradicted by *I am not a man*, spoken by another. (See Wyclif's acute remarks on this subject, pp. 240 and 241 to l. 11.)

true; true, because it is an existing thing. When we inquire if it has any truth beyond this, we are forced to reply in the negative. A proposition reflected, so to speak, back upon itself, can mean nothing but itself; and in so far as it seems to mean something else, it is false. Thus every such proposition is both true and false, though in different ways (p. 205, l. 35, 36). In the case of the tyrant and his bridge, Wyclif cuts the Gordian knot by shortly stating that such a case would never happen; and that if it did, the man should be made to pass over (no doubt because in either case the attendants would fail to do their duty, and it mattered not what they did). As for the two slaves, mentioned above, it is doubtful whether they have not fulfilled the conditions of freedom imposed by their master; and as the law is in favour of liberty (eo quod jura faveant libertati) they ought both to be set free (p. 208, l. 8 to p. 209, l. 24).

A little further, Wyclif explains his theory more clearly still. Let C stand for the proposition: *The meaning of C is true*. This is true in the sense that C exists. True also, in that it means something, viz., *itself*. But false, if it be taken to mean anything further (p. 216, l. 14 to p. 219, l. 5). Here it is clear that Wyclif, saying that such a proposition is unmeaning in the third sense, says what amounts to affirming that it is no proposition at all, as we understand the word nowadays. For him, the word has a far wider extension. Every *thing* is a proposition (Log. vol. I. p. 15, l. 12—22), because it signifies itself, and makes itself known; he cannot therefore refuse to call an 'insoluble' by that name. But what he says, stripped of the numerous intricacies and subtleties which render this part of his work very difficult to understand, comes, I think, to the same.

One word more before we conclude. It is easy to be seen, from many different answers given to this question, that at Wyclif's time it was considered to be a very important and difficult problem; and also that Wyclif, having laboured hard, and in the main successfully, to solve it, is entitled to the just praise which he felt that he deserved. His closing words, both modest and dignified, may be quoted here.

"This matter has given me more trouble and occupied me for a longer space of time than any other part of Logic. Nor do I doubt that every one of the authors of the six above-mentioned theories has also bestowed much care on the truths which they have discovered relative

to this subject. Yet little praise should be given to such as find out these truths; for it is certain that, both on account of the intelligible nature of truth (which manifests itself to whoever seeks it) and by the motion of Him Who is the First Truth teaching us, every one finds out at last, by dint of scrutiny, certain truths of which he was formerly ignorant. Therefore may full praise be given to the Lord of Truth!"

At this point the volume now edited comes to a close. It is, so far as I have been able to calculate, about the middle of the third treatise. Of the seven sorts of hypothetical propositions, five have already been dealt with; in the next volume, local and temporal propositions are alone discussed, but at such great length that they might each be separately considered as a treatise; and indeed, according to the indications given by the catalogues, many of Wyclif's adherents seem to have considered them as such. The question *De Insolubilibus* was also copied out and studied apart.

TRACTATUS TERCIUS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

B 33^a Sequitur de speciebus ypoteticarum, ut prius promiseram, in isto tractatu tercio pertractandum. Et primo supponatur VII esse species ypothetice, scilicet tres cum notis coniungendi mere quodammodo sinkategoricis: ut copulativam, disiunctivam, et condicionalem; et quatuor cum notis coniungendi quodammodo kategoricis: ut causalem, comparativam, localem et temporalem.

10 Et potest sufficiencia numeri istarum specierum sic convinci: diversitas specierum ypotheticarum capienda est secundum diversitatem modi significandi veritates diversas significabiles per easdem. Sed VII sunt species huiusmodi ypotheticarum. Maior patet ex hoc, quia 15 species ypotheticarum vel sunt diversificande solum ex diversitate signorum, vel solum ex diversitate signatorum, vel solum ex diversitate modi significandi, vel mixtim.

Duo prima non sunt danda: ergo, relinquitur alterum posteriorum; sed non est possibile modum diversificari, 20 nisi presupposita diversitate significabilis. Ergo relinquitur 4^m membrum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omne verum primarie significabile per ypotheticam est veritas 2^m aliquam habitudinem ex veritatibus aggregata, vel equivalenter; sed tantum VII sunt species talium 25 habitudinum: ergo, tantum VII sunt species ypotheticarum.

Minor patet ex hoc quod, posita prima veritate (que est *deum esse*) consequitur coniunctio vel copulatio prime veritatis causate (que est *ens esse*); et istis positis, sequitur non solum quod deus est, vel ens est in 30 communi, sed quod est dare veritates disiunctas vel

Of hypothetical propositions; they are seven in number, three with syncategorical signs: copulatives, disiunctives, and conditionals; and four with categorical signs: causals, comparatives, locals, and temporals. There are so many, and no more; for there are only seven modes of hypothetically expressing truth. The signs alone are not sufficient to diversify them, nor the truths signified, nor the modes alone: so it must be the modes taken with those truths. And these together are seven in number; copulative, from the union of the two primordial truths: the existence of God

1. Cap. *deest* MS.

2. *Initial S in red ink* MS

20. *dm^{to} (12) 1 B.*

and of caused
Being;
disjunctive,
inferred from
these by their
difference;
causal, as Being
exists because
of God's
existence;
which,
considered
together, imply
a *comparative*;

differentes. Et 2^m talem coniunccionem vel disiunccionem sunt copulativa et disiunctiva exemplate, significando veritates sub habitudine copulandi vel disiungendi. Ex istis veritatibus immediate sequitur quod, quia deus est, ideo ens in communi est; et quod prius naturaliter est 5 *deum esse quam ens causatum esse*; et sic, habendo habitudinem causandi et comparandi, habemus duas alias species ypothetice: scilicet, causalem et compara-
tivam.

and *conditional*,
local and
temporal,
because God
has power to
produce *if*,
when and *where*
He chooses.
And all other
hypothetical
relations can
be reduced to
one of these.

Quibus 4 habitis, manifestum est sequi, *deum posse* 10
producere causatum si vult, quando vult, et ubi vult;
et sic habemus tres alias habitudines: scilicet condicio-
nalem, localem et temporalem. Nec est possibile invenire
aliquam habitudinem ypothetice pertinentem quin sit
aliqua istarum vel ad talem reducibilis. Ideo sequitur 15
quod sub septenario convenit ponere species ypothetice.
Omnis autem ypothetica est copulativa, disiunctiva,
causalis, comparativa, condicionalis, localis, vel tem-
poralis. |

B 33^b

Objections.
1. Many
hypothetical
propositions are
false; truth has,
therefore,
nothing to do
with their
classification,
but form alone.
The first truth:
God exists,
can be
expressed by all
the different
forms of
propositions;
and here clearly
only the form
makes them
differ.

Sed contra ista sic instatur: Multe sunt ypothetice 20
que significant falsitates: ergo, veritates non sunt cause
ypotheticarum specierum, sed solum modi significandi;
et cum alium modum significandi in specie habet
signum unius speciei, et alium, signum alterius speciei,
sequitur quod secundum naturam et speciem signorum 25
sunt species ypotheticarum. Confirmatur per hoc quod
eadem veritas simplicissima est significabilis quacunque
specie ypothetice, ut patet hic: *deus est et deus est*;
deus est vel deus est; quia deus est, est ita bonus sicut
est; deus est si est, ubi est, et dum est. In quibus VII 30
exemplis patet quodlibet illorum precise primarie signifi-
care illud quod significat hec categorica, *deus est*.
Ex quo videtur relinqui quod, non a significatis suis,
sed a signis parcialibus, specificantur ypothetice.

2. And the
stated order of
dependency
between them
does not exist;
for the principle
of identity can
be expressed
just as well
under any other
form.

Item, quo ad veritates numerales, patet quod non 35
sit ordo inter illas, ut signatus est, quia eque primo
est veritas disiunctiva, condicionalis (et sic de ceteris
indifferenter), sicut est veritas copulativa: ergo, non
propter ordinem talium veritatum est ordo et numerus
specierum ypotheticarum. Assumptum patet per hoc 40

2. ^a *ex te* B.
taliu*m* *twice* B.
assumptum B.

10. ^a *mai*^m B.29. *quia deus est ita* B.32. *circa causata* (??) *pro* categorica.30. *ordinem*40. *a^m pro*

quod prima omnium veritatum causatarum est *nichil simul esse et non esse*; et illa est necessario; vel veritas disiunctiva, et eque primo cum illa sunt ille veritates: *si aliquid est, aliquid est, aliquid est dum aliquid est,*
 5 *quia deus est aliquid est, aliquid potest esse ubi aliquid potest esse, deus potest esse melior creatura.* Ymmo in eadem specie veritatum est dare infinitas species eque primo, ut patet de veritatibus condicionalium et causalium. Ymmo, si ponatur aliqua prima veritas, ab illa
 10 procederet veritas posterior per viam causacionis; et sic, arte imitante naturam, foret talis prima species ypothetice. Ymmo disiunctiva procederet copulativam.

Item est dare multas alias species ad modum coniunctionum copulancium kathegoricas ad invicem,
 15 *prater illas VII*; ergo, cum ab illis sorciuntur ypothetice suas species, sequitur plures esse species ypotheticarum quam VII numeratas. Et idem videtur de ypotheticis negativis oppositis affirmativis, que videntur esse disparium specierum valde ab illis, cum regule que deserviunt ad
 20 cognoscendum veritates ypothetice affirmative non docent cognoscere veritatem negative. Et consimilis est difficultas in commixtione ypotheticarum ad invicem, ut, miscendo disiunctiva cum rationali vel aliter quomodo-
 25 foret unius speciei quin per idem foret mixtim alterius speciei; quia prioritas vel posterioritas signi contingentis non facit ad hoc, ut post probabitur. Et ex commixtionibus VII specierum foret secundaria species simplicis mixtionis,
 B 34^a et duarum ad invicem. | Et conformis est difficultas
 30 de qualitate et quantitate ypotheticarum.

Ad istud dicitur quod non repugnat alias species ypothetice sub istas contineri, cum iste non sunt species specialissime; sed tales VII species ypothetice sunt
 35 ponende, ad quas omnes alie habent reduci; et hoc sufficit pro intento. Nec moveret ratio facta purum logicum ad inevitabiliter asserendum conclusionem; sed potius diceret quod est ex voluntaria ordinatione, sine causa ulterius querenda, quod sunt VII species ypothetice.

And in these different kinds there are infinite kinds (as in conditional and causal propositions) which are equally primitive.

If any species of proposition were to be put first, it should be the causal species; and the disjunctive should precede the copulative.

3. Besides, there are many other species, according to the conjunctions employed; negative hypotheticals, requiring other rules to prove them, cannot be classed with their affirmatives; and hypotheticals can be combined together, forming new kinds.

Their quality and quantity give rise to like difficulties.

General answer: These seven are not particular species, and, therefore, they may contain other kinds, but they are all reducible to these.

The reason why there are seven classes

23. ^{***}voli pro vel B. purum B.

28. ^{***}2i pro secundaria B.

35. pur^o pro

23. *Rationalis* seems to mean two propositions united by the particle *ergo*; but Wyclif uses the word sometimes for causal, sometimes for conditional propositions. See p. 8, l. 38.

need not be sought; they are made arbitrarily by man, but their order is based on the nature of things.

We deny the conclusion of the first argument: i. e. that the signs alone can serve to classify propositions.

1. We must remark that the words *truth* and *falsehood* have various significations. They may mean respectively the same as *being* and *non-entity*, or more

properly, falsity signifies truth negatively, having no meaning by itself.

They, however, add to this meaning a relation with the tense of the verb employed: *I said the truth*: i. e. *I said something that then was.*

Again, *false* is sometimes part of a modal proposition; as: *It is false that . . .* Sometimes it means the defect of correspondance between the sign and the thing signified.

Sed certum tamen est quod non est ordinatum ab homine, quod sit naturaliter exemplatum, et a ratione priori, ordinacione hominis, causatum; quia aliter non est ordinacio, sed deordinacio; nisi illud quod promulgat prius naturaliter esset naturale. 5

Ad primum argumentum negatur consequencia, quia quamvis prima pars conclusionis sit particularis negativa vera, alia tamen est pars exceptiva falsa, cum modi significandi signorum audibilium sunt diversi in specie a modis significandi visibilium, et visibilia diversa in specie habent naturales modos significandi diversos in specie; et totum hoc est inpertinens diversitati speciei ypothetice.

Sed pro ulteriori responsione sunt 3^a notanda, primo quod isti termini, *falsum*, et *falsitas*, sunt equivoce; sicut *verum* et *veritas*. Quandoque enim omnis entitas veritas dicitur, sicut et omne ens dicitur verum; et iste terminus, *falsitas*, contradictorie significat convertibiliter cum illo termino, *aliqua non entitas*. Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significari, cum omne significans significat entitatem, et per consequens veritatem. Et sic iste terminus, *falsitas*, significat omnem veritatem negative. Sed isti termini, *verum*, *falsum*, et *veritas*, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum temporis verbi; ut: *dico vel credo veritatem*, si dico: *ens* (quod est propositio) *significat verum vel falsum*; hoc est, ens quod est vel ens quod non est. Et tunc dixi verum vel veritatem; quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit, et falsum tunc dixi vel concepi, quia ens quod tunc non fuit. Et ita *verum* et *veritas* sunt passiones entis, significando ens quod vere est, fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sic autem non ille terminus *falsitas*. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo ens quod est; si credo falsum, credo ens quod non est. 30

Falsum quandoque sumitur tercio modaliter respectu dicti propositionis quodammodo negative; ut "*hominem esse asinum*" *est falsum*, hoc est, *illud non est*. Et sic non utrobique ille terminus, *falsum*, convertitur cum illo termino, *falsitas*. 2^o capitur veritas per adequacionem signi ad suum primarium significatum, et falsitas per defectum huiusmodi correspondencie. Et huiusmodi 35

veritas vel falsitas est in signo tantum, cum sit formaliter denominans ipsum esse verum vel falsum. Et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi esse veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo *significare falsum* est significare ens quod non est; ut ista: *homo est asinus*, significat quod homo est asinus, et illud non est, et ideo est falsum et impossibile | quia non potest esse; sed talis propositio: *hoc est falsum*, et cetera simplices, significant falsitatem, que est forma privativa qua signum denominatur esse formaliter sine suo primarie significato. Et talium falsitatum alique sunt contingencie, alique impossibilitates. Falsitatem vero, acceptam primo modo, claudit contradiccionem esse; quia tunc esset aliqua non entitas. Nec mirum, si talis terminus significat omnem ens et non significat non entitatem, sicut ille terminus *intelligibile* significat omnem intelligibile et non significat inintelligibile. Omnis ergo propositio falsa primarie significat falsum, quia ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem, nisi forte significando privacionem; ut talis: *hec propositio: "deus est", est falsa*.

Secundo, notandum quod omnes denominationes positive signorum respectu suorum signatorum fuerunt principaliter capte a suis significatis. Sed communiter, aput communiter loquentes denominantur signa false denominationibus huiusmodi, dum defecerunt sua significata propter similitudinem in modo significandi signorum. Videtur [quod] signum vere denominatur universale, quia est signum primarium universalis a parte rei; et dicitur singulare, quia est signum singularis. Est enim signum genus, si primarie significat universale in quid predicabile, demtis differentibus specie. Et voco predicabile, quod habet aptitudinem ut predicetur. Nec est ficticia quod universale predicatur, quia vere et realiter, *predicari* est *inesse*. Ut *animal* copulative predicatur de quolibet suo in quid inferiori. Dicitur etiam signum species specialissima; quia primo significat universale precise communicabile singularibus in quid. Et dicitur differentia, dum primarie significat universale per se, et essentialiter predicabile in quale de specie

In this sense, *false* expresses a truth, and has meaning by itself.

Some of these are contingent, some represent impossibility.

But *falsity* taken in the first sense, cannot possibly be anything. So a false proposition signifies *what is false*, i. e. something that is not; but not *falsity*, except as a privation.

2. Signs have been called after their significations; often inexactly.

A sign is *universal*, when it stands for a universal; it is *singular* when it signifies what is singular; it is a *genus*, if it expresses the determinable essential part of a being;

a *species*, when it signifies the whole essence; a *difference*, if it expresses the determining part that

8. ceteri B. 23, 24. $\widehat{g}uni'$ pro communiter B. 26. $\widehat{m}o^{di}$ pro modo significandi B. 27. $\widehat{V}i'$ ($\widehat{V}1'$?) B; *ib.* quod *deest* B. 32. predicatur B. 34. $\widehat{r}ar'$ $\widehat{p}ri$ B.

separates
different
species;
a *property*, if it
stands for a
quality always
present in a
genus or
species; and an
accident, if for
a quality that
only happens
to be present.

3. The
primordial
truth —
God's existence
— may be
expressed in
many different
ways, but it is
the same truth;
we may thus
know it as
God does,
simply; or in a
complex way.

We proceed by
combining and
dividing; God
knows all in
one infinite act.

Thus we do
not take the
division of
hypotheticals
from their false
significations,
nor merely
from their true
ones, but from
their joined,
disjoined, etc.
senses,
according
to the case.
We often find
that order is
unconsciously

differentibus. Et signum vocatur proprium, quod primo significat proprietatem vel passionem generis vel speciei, qualis per se 2^o suo subiecto inest. Et signum dicitur accidens, dum primarie significat universale quod per accidens et non per se inest subiecto suo. Et sic iudicandum est de aliis denominationibus. Si autem signo defuerit tale significatum, vel non vere denominatur huiusmodi, vel aliter equivoce. Alique tamen denominationes plus capiuntur ex modo significandi, ut quiditates, quantitates et qualitates propositionis; iste tamen originantur aliquibus significatis.

Tercio notandum quod prima et simplicissima veritas, que est *deum esse*, significatur nunc primarie, per terminum incomplexum, nunc per qualemcumque affirmative, kathegorice vel ypothethice speciem. Sed non est diversitas in illo significato, sed in signis et in modo intendendi. Verumptamen coniunctio localis, causalis, temporalis equivoce significant in exemplis propositis, supposita veritate eorum; et sic contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem, ut *deum esse*, incomplexa et non complexa, ut deus cognoscit se; et contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem complexa, 2^m quolibet res et modos significandi. Nichil tamen complexa quicquam cognoscit, nisi quod componit vel dividit. Ideo, quod nos non sufficimus quicquam distincte cognoscere sine discursu, vel compositione vel divisione, cognoscit prima veritas sine discursu vel actu distincto infinitum perfectius. Nos tamen nichil cognoscimus nisi ad minimum novimus illud esse.

Non ergo fuerunt species ypotheticarum exemplata 2^m sua significata falsa, nec immediate 2^m sua significata simplicia, sed 2^m sua significata, correspondenter copulata vel disiuncta, etc. si quis ipsa cognosceret. Frequenter enim contingit quod ordinans literas, ydiomata, vel alia signa habet communem influenciam et veritates alias moventes; et ipse, ignorando ipsarum voces, putat quod ipse sit primaria causa huius ordinationis. Unde instituens istas VII species movebatur forte

3. *pe pro* per se B; *ib. mē pro* inest B. 8. *c^o pro* equivoce B.
9. *mō^{di} pro* modo significandi B. 17. *Galīs Galīs* B. 18. *ḡ^{ūt} pro*
significandi B. 22, 23. *mōs^{di} pro* modos significandi B. 26. *p^{av}l^s pro*
prima veritas B. 35. *cōe³ pro* communem B.

tali ratione. Tales VII sunt ponende, et superfluit ponere speciem que non sit aliqua illarum; ideo ille numerus nec est superfluus, nec diminutus. Ex istis ergo tribus notatis patet responsio ad materiam primi argumenti.

5 Ad 2^m dicitur quod non est magna utilitas ad propositum numerum de ordinatione veritatum, quia certum est quod qualescunque categorice vel ypothetice contingit esse eque primo quo ad consequentiam cum prima veritate, eo quod sunt quotlibet huiusmodi veritates quas claudit contradiccionem non esse. Verumptamen necesse est deum esse primam veritatem. Ipse enim non est veritas universalis vel singularis, presupponens aliam immediate, *ex illa sequitur "ens esse"*; quia veritate contradiccionem claudit esse priorem causatam vel nobis
10 noscibilem; illa enim veritas est transcendens cuiusque noscenti. Primo omnium nota quo ad tempus, quo ad naturam, quo ad instinctam noticiam, et quo ad facilitatem noscendi. Et sub illa noticia confuse noscuntur que discemus in posterius; et principalissime
20 sub illa cognoscimus *deum esse*. Illam enim veritatem primo omnium noscimus quo ad tempus, sed confuse quo ad causam; quia ipsa primarie movet ad eius noticiam.

Ymmo, non est possibile nobis quicquam aliud
25 cognoscere perfectissimo genere cognoscendi nobis possibili, nisi prius temporaliter specialiter cognoverimus deum esse. Quotlibet enim aliud est noscibile nobis noticia *propter quid*, que presupponit dei noticiam. Unde, quamvis *deum esse* analogice contineatur sub transcendente, ipsum tamen non ingreditur eius compositionem quidditativam, nec presupponitur sibi, sed econtra. Nam, dato primo, tunc esset genus, et per consequens predicaretur *in quid*, distingwendo subiectum ab aliis per eius inexistenciam: quod hoc impossibile, cum nichil
35 distingwatur ab alio per hoc quod est ens; sed per hoc certificamur de prima questione, *si est*, et non de 2^a *quid est*. Si autem detur 2^m, tunc veritate transcendente non esset veritas prior, cum tamen essencia, communis multis singularibus, est causata. Est ergo prima veritas
40 extra omne genus, cum nec sit universale nec singulare, sed omnia talia causat.

influenced by that which is ordered.

These seven classes are neither too many nor too few, and any other would be superfluous.

Answer to Obj. 2.

It matters little what order of deduction we follow: all truths flow equally from the first, which is God.

But He is not an abstract truth

from which the conclusion — the existence of Being — flows, by means of another that comes before it:

He is transcendent Truth; first in time, nature, intuitive knowledge, and ease of attainment.

And we can know no other truth perfectly unless by means of this one.

All cognition of a thing by its cause, must suppose God's existence.

Thus, though this truth is analogically contained in that of transcendent being, the latter does not properly contain or precede, but is implied by it.

Thus this First Truth is not included in any genus, and is neither universal nor singular.

So we have first a copulative proposition (God is, and Being is); then a disjunctive (God is or Being is). But all these truths are equally primitive *qua* conclusions, and their order has besides little to do with the present debates: therefore let it be admitted.

We may add that the truth of the principle of contradiction, negation of the impossible, is equivalent to infinite truths in existence, but not in causality.

Answer to Obj. 3. There may be more than seven species of hypotheticals, but all are reducible to these. For this reason the only adverbs used are those of time, place, and comparison; and only a few conjunctions can be employed — copulative, disjunctive, causal and conditional. Some conjunctions are closely allied

Prius ergo videtur esse veritatem copulativam, que est: *deum esse et ens esse*; quia est *ens esse*, quia *deus est*, eo quod *illam esse causatam* presupponit *illam esse*. Et per idem, intelligendo *deum esse vel ens esse* tanquam veritatem disiunctam, patens est quod illa presupponit ⁵ *ens esse* tanquam communissimum; et per consequens presupponit deum esse et ens esse, cum nichil possit presupponere 2^m nisi presupponat utrumque. Omnium tamen istarum specierum veritates sunt eque prime quo ad consequenciam; cum ergo disputatio ordinis istarum ¹⁰ veritatum non multum pertinet huic loco, | accipiatur, B 35^b ut sic, suppositus numerus et ordo specierum ypothetice supradictus.

Et ulterius dicitur quod veritas primi principii est negacio illius impossibilis: *idem simul est et non est*, ¹⁵ que negacio non est primo nota, cum impossibile sit ipsam cognoscere, nisi per cognicionem illius aut communis, *ens est*. Distingwo enim inter *esse* et *non esse*, antequam assencio huic negacioni. Veritas ergo primi principii convertitur, quo ad subsistendi consequenciam, ²⁰ cum infinitis veritatibus, quia cum omnibus necessitatibus; sed non quoad essendi predicacionem; et sic sunt omnia talia eque primo natura quo ad consequenciam, sed non quo ad causalitatem.

Ad 3^m dicitur, ut prius, quod non obest plures ²⁵ quam VII esse species ypotheticarum, dum tamen sint ad illas reducibiles. Unde non cum quibuscunque adverbiiis fiunt ypothetice, sed solum cum adverbiiis loci vel temporis, vel cum adverbiiis comparandi, ut sunt talia: *ubi, dum, donec, usque, magis*, etc. Nec cum ³⁰ quibuscunque coniunccionibus fiunt dispariter ypothetice correspondenter 2^m distinccionem grammaticorum; quia iste coniuncciones, *nec, neque*, sunt copulative negative 2^m logicos; et maior pars coniunccionum quas grammatici ponunt expletivas, tales habent reduci ad copu- ³⁵ lativam; et breviter omnes vere coniuncciones habent reduci ad copulativam, disiunctivam, causalem vel racionalem; que et condicionalis potest dici. Alique tamen sunt coniuncciones adverbiales, et alie ad rethoricam

1. co^{ua} pro copulativam B.
22. p^{com} B.
30. rcho^{ca} pro rethoricam B.

12. fufupp^{tas} B.

30. mg^f pro magis B.

17, 18. a^{ois} pro

31. dispit B.

deservientes; et aliquae mixtim significant circumstantias diversarum specierum; sicut patet advertenti exempla prioris modi. Hec ergo coniunctio, *sed*, superaddit ad copulativam excessum, exceptionem vel aliam circumstantiam; et sic habet reduci ad copulativam. Iste vero coniunctio *vel*, *et*, *ne*, quandoque ponuntur in orationibus rethoricis et non propositionibus, et quandoque significant circumstantiam esse; et ita omnes coniunctiones incidunt in aliquos modos significandi conjunctionaliter supradictos.

Tria tamen sunt dicenda pro materia argumenti. Primum de mixtionibus ypotheticis, si componant novas species; 2^m de qualitativibus earum, et 3^m de quantitativibus earum. Quantum ad primum, patet calculanti, si non fallor, 15 quod sunt 120 combinationes distincte in septenario. Nam iuxta conceptum Porphyrii, sunt ex coniugationibus quinque universalium 643 821, sic illa speciebus ypothetice sunt 21^a combinationes binarie, comparando sexies copulativam ad VI species residuas; 5^{es} disiunctivam ad quinque residuas habentur 10; combinando 20 etiam copulativam et disiunctivam ad quinque residuas et post 2^m alias combinationes, trium habebunt 35 combinationes; combinando etiam 4 ad invicem habebuntur 35; combinando autem quinque ad invicem, 25 21 habebuntur; et combinando 6 ad invicem habebuntur septem; que coniuncta septenario constituit 120.

B 35^a Sed de istis | mixtionibus tria exempla satis est adducere pro intento. Primo coniungendo condicionalem et copulativam cum rationali, ut sic: *Si tu es asinus, tu 30 es caper et tu es asinus: ergo, tu es caper*. Illa magna

with adverbs; some are used in oratory; some signify at once several hypothetical circumstances. *But* is an instance of these last. All can be reduced to one or other of the seven species.

Three heads of enquiry: I. of combinations of hypotheticals; II. of their quality; III. of their quantity. I. There are 120 sorts of compound hypothetical propositions, obtained according to Porphyry's method of combining universals.

Examples of these compounds:
1. *If A is B, A is C and A is B.*
It is much employed by

2, 3. ex ps^a 1^a pro exempla prioris modi B. 11. p̃m pro pro mater B.
16. coniugaciones B. 19. co^{ua} pro copulativam B. 24. ad̃ pro ad-
invicem B. 26. a^{em} pro septem B. 30. cap^m pro caper before et and
before Illa.

26. Some of the numbers here seem to be wrong; at least I cannot account for the 10, nor for the expressions used. But the total is right; thus: any 7 objects, combined two and two, give 21 combinations; three and three, they give 35; four and four, 35; five and five, 21; six and six, 7; and there remains one combination of all seven: these numbers, added together, give 120. As for Porphyry's combinations of the five universals — genus, species, difference, property, and accident — with each other, I quite fail to see how, on the same system (iuxta conceptum Porphyrii) they could amount to the number 643 821, though it is unmistakably plain in the MS., as the other numbers are too.

sophists to prove an absurd conclusion by confounding the place of the comma:

If *A is B*,
A is C and
A is B:
therefore,
A is C.

For the first proposition is true, when *A is B* is absurd.

2. *A is B* or
C is D and
A is not B.

Here sophists take a necessary proposition,

A is B, an absurd one, *C is D*, and changing the place of the comma, say:

A is B or
C is D, and
A is not B:
therefore
C is D.

Some employ this method to show that anything can be deduced from an impossible proposition; but wrongly, for they change the consequence in arguing.

3. *You are now what you would be if you were an ass; in that case you could*

bray:
therefore, you can now.

Here the minor is necessary, the major too; and the whole looks like a true syllogism.

consequencia videtur tenere per illam regulam; argumentando a condicionali ad suum consequens cum constancia sui antecedentis, tenet consequencia. Et antecedens illius consequencie est necessarium cum contradiccione claudit *te esse asinum*, nisi *sis et caper* 5 *et asinus*. Et illa arte utuntur sophiste ad probandum quodlibet impossibile, capiendo unum quod includit contradiccione, et inferendo ex illo copulativam, cuius prima pars est propositio quam intendunt probare, et 2^a pars est impossibilis primo sumpta. Secundum 10 exemplum est copulando disiunctivam et copulativam cum rationali, ut sic argumentando: *deus est, vel tu es asinus et non deus est: ergo tu es asinus*. Nam ista magna consequencia tenet a disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem, cum opposito relique partis; et antecedens 15 condicionalis est una disiunctiva, cuius prima pars est necessaria. Et illa arte 2^o utuntur sophiste ad probandum quicquid voluerunt, capiendo primo unum necessarium, et disiungendo sibi unam copulativam cuius prima pars est propositio quam ipsi intendunt probare; 20 et 2^a pars erit oppositum necessarium primo sumpti. Ymmo ista arte utuntur quidam volentes deducere quodlibet ex impossibili. Sequitur enim: *tu es asinus; ergo, tu es asinus, vel baculus stat in angulo* et ex consequente *tu es asinus vel baculus stat in angulo et tu non es* 25 *asinus*. Ex quo sequitur vel tercius, quod *baculus stat in angulo*. Ideo a primo, si *tu es asinus*, tunc *baculus stat in angulo*. Quamvis autem conclusio quam intendunt sit vera, verumptamen a primo ad ultimum modus argumenti inducit in errorem, cum consequencie 30 intermedie sint variate, eo quod consequens medie consequencie fiat disiunctive, et consequens ultime consequencie fiat copulative; et sic contingit probare quodlibet impossibile. Tercio miscetur condicionalis cum causalis copulativa et rationali: ut sic; *quicquid esses si* 35 *esses asinus, illud nunc es; sed rudibilis esses si esses asinus: ergo, rudibilis nunc es*. Tota magna consequencia videtur esse syllogismus ypotheticus in *darii*; et minor est condicionalis necessaria. Et maior patet ex hoc quod nunc es et omne illud, et solum illud quo esses, 40 si esses asinus. Talibus autem modis multis miscent

sophiste propositiones ad probandum *hominem esse asinum*, vel aliud impossibile; ut sic: *si dico te esse animal dico verum; et, si dico te esse asinum, dico verum*; et cum solum dico hoc ut pono, sequitur quod *tu sis asinus*. Et sic miscent copulativam cum condicionali, causali et rationali; ut *si tu es idem asino et tu es animal, quia tu es homo; ergo, tu es asinus*.

Many other similar compound arguments are used, now with one form of hypotheticals, now with another.

Non enim valet dicere quod tales oraciones non sunt propositiones, quia quelibet talis est | oracio individua, congrue verum vel falsum significans; ergo propositio. Aliter enim syllogismus non esset propositio, et per consequens non necessarius aut verus; nec oppositum consequentis repugnaret generaliter antecedenti, eo quod nullum signum est verum vel falsum, nisi propositio; nec propositio repugnat alicui nisi propositioni; nec esset concedendum tale antecedens negandum, vel dubitandum, vel ponendum, cum tamen omnia illa concedimus de oracionibus mixtis. Sunt ergo propositiones, sicut convertuntur cum propositionibus, et habent significationes congruas propositionibus sine impedimento ex parte multitudinis signorum vel alio signando. Ideo concedendum est quodlibet signum, quantumlibet longum, univoce subordinatum actui complexo principali vero vel falso, esse propositionem; et, si fuerint quantumlibet pauca signa, signancia alicui complexe sine habitudine ad unum actum principalem, non sunt propositio; et sic non intelligit homo pro eodem instanti distincte et principaliter nisi unum; et quotlibet alia intellexerit, hoc erit sub habitudine ad illud unum, et secundarie vel confuse. Sciencie autem multe in sunt que sunt impertinentes ad invicem, nec sunt partes alicuius totalis sciencie. Ideo dicit Aristoteles ad hunc sensum quod plura scimus et tantum unum intelligimus. Possumus tamen successive elicere intellectiones super-
 35 tinentes ad invicem vel alicui tercio, dum tamen credimus. Sensus enim decipiuntur de similitate actuum quo ad tempus.

To reply to them, it is useless to deny that these are propositions, for they come under that definition; a whole syllogism is a proposition, though compound; it is impossible to deny their truth except by their opposite, a proposition; and we could neither deny, nor doubt, nor posit them. Their length makes no difference here; whenever there is one principal act signified, whether true or false, there is a proposition, however long; and where that fails, however short, the sentence is no proposition. All depends on the one act of simultaneous knowledge of things interdependently. We have, however, the knowledge of many things independently of each other. Note that these compound propositions do not form new species; for the act signified by the principal verb is one of

Uterius notandum quod non propter tales mixtiones habebuntur nove species ypotheticarum, cum quelibet talis propositio mixta sortitur speciem ypothetice, 2^o quod subordinatur actui ypothetico principali; et sicut repugnat eundem habere de eadem propositione

the seven, and specifies them. And if one man understands the principal act in one way and another in another, we have no longer a proposition; thus a compound sentence may be either several propositions or one, as it is understood; and if one, either impossible or necessary, according as they are joined in the mind.

This answers the first sophism. We admit the consequence as a *rational*, and deny the minor. A rational proposition (with the sign *therefore*) amounts either to a conditional or a causal. As for the antecedent, we then must deny it; for it was only admitted as part of the consequence, not separately; and as a part of the consequence it should be copulated with *but*, not with *and*. It having one sense true, we should admit it in that sense; but then it would no longer give us the conclusion. There are, therefore, many propositions that must be

disparet actus principales, ita repugnat eandem propositionem mixtam esse copulativam, disiunctivam, etc. eidem homini. Si autem diversi equivocaverunt de eodem signo, tunc vel erit oratio equivoca et non propositio; vel aliter de possibili erit uni propositio vera et alteri ⁵ falsa; quod est michi probabilius. Ut intendendo talem propositionem: *tu es asinus vel deus est vel aliquid est*, stat successive intelligere illud sine habitudine ad actum principalem; et sic intelligenti non est una propositio, ¹⁰ sed forte multe; et stat post successivam et disiunctam ¹⁰ intelectionem parcium ad invicem intelligere totum simul sub habitudine actus copulandi principalis. Et sic intelligenti foret copulativa impossibilis. Et stat confundendo intelectiones confusas parcium ad invicem intelligere totum actu principali disiungendi. Et sic in ¹⁵ telligenti signum foret disiunctiva necessaria.

Per hec patet responsio ad primam mixtionem, quod magna consequentia est concedenda tanquam rationalis, cum habeat unum sensum primarium verum; et minor est neganda. Nec credo quod rationalis est nova species ²⁰ hypothetica; quia vel coincidit cum condicionali vel causalis in sententia; | differt tamen in multis ponere ^{B 37^a} illam notam *Si*, et illam notam *Ergo*, ut est in consequentiis ypotheticis exemplatis. Vocatur enim syllogismus ypotheticus, cuius premissae sunt ypothetice. Et ²⁵ si queratur de toto antecedente prime mixtionis, utrum sit concedendum, dicitur quod post concessionem magne consequentiae, est ipsum negandum, eo quod concessio veritatis primarie significatae per magnam consequentiam limitat antecedens ad sensum copulativum; et propter ³⁰ illum sensum limitandum communiter copulantur alie cum illa nota *sed*. Proponendo ergo antecedens per se foret ipsum concedendum, cum habeat unum sensum condicionalem verum; sed ex isto sensu non sequitur conclusio. Unde multe tales propositiones sunt extra ³⁵ obligationem, cum aliquibus partibus concedende et cum aliis partibus forent negande, sine hoc quod fiat mutacio de suo primario significato; ut patet in proposito, ubi sensus copulativus limitatur per additionem conclusionis. In omni tamen bona responsione respondendum ⁴⁰

11. adⁱ *pro* adinvicem B. 14. adⁱ *pro* adinvicem B. 16. foret signum B. 18. 9^a *pro* consequentia. 23, 24. 9^u9^a *pro* consequentiis B. 36. p^l3^o *pro* partibus B. 37. p^l3^o *pro* partibus B.

est principaliter ad esse significati, et per consequens respondendum est homini et ad eius signa. Sic ergo homo principaliter dicit et intelligit primarium significatum signo et consequenter 2^{aric} illud signum. Sed 5 ille concessionem sunt equivoce, cum concedere vel negare significatum est concedere vel negare id esse; sed concedere vel negare signum est concedere vel negare quod habet primarium significatum. Minor ergo prime mixtionis est falsa; et sic totum antecedens 10 negabitur, et cessat efficacia argumenti.

Per hoc patet ad 2^{am} mixtionem quod magna consequentia est concedenda et minor est neganda, sicut et totum antecedens est negandum; et principaliter sensus secundum quem antecedens infert consequens. 15 Et tamen illud antecedens, per se propositum, foret concedendum tanquam disiunctiva necessaria. Nec est talis modus arguendi a primo ad ultimum laudabilis, nisi stante univocacione sensuum propositionum. Nec est antecedens magne consequencie verum et consequens 20 falsum; quia iuxta dicta, dum magna consequentia est concessa, statim limitatur antecedens ad sensum copulativum et impossibilem, et suum similem esset concedendum ad alium sensum. Et quia gloriantur sophiste coram vulgo habere talem apparenciam, ideo debet 25 logicus caute interimere altercaciones et conclusiones sophistarum; ut si querat utrum antecedens sit verum, dicitur satis vere quod ipsum, cum fuit vocale prolatum, non potest esse verum nec aliqua similis; alia tamen, talis qualis ipsa fuit, est vera, et alia talis qualis ipsa 30 fuit est falsa. Ymmo, scripta tota consequentia, est antecedens impossibile: sed antecedens forte erit verum: Ideo impossibile est concedendum; sed non significatum impossibile est dignum concedi. Magne ergo et infructuose fiunt altercaciones de veritatibus et concessionibus talium 35 signorum; ut stat, 4^{or} bene respondencium sine obligatione ad eandem propositionem, unum concedere illam, alium negare, tertium | dubitare illam et 4^m dicere quod non cognoscit satis illam ut respondeat ad eandem.

denied when taken in connexion, as a whole when they should be granted, if separate. To answer well, we should always reply in the sense of the questioner; but such replies are ambiguous.

As to the second sophism we likewise admit the whole as a consequence and deny the minor and the whole antecedent in the sense of the conclusion. Yet the latter may be true, taken apart; but as soon as we grant the consequence, we limit its meaning to the sense that is false. And to cut short disputes with sophists who want to show off their acuteness, we may say that this antecedent is not true, but that another proposition in the same form is true, and yet another is false. We, therefore, grant what is impossible, but not as meaning the impossible. But there are many useless disputes and various ways of answering in this matter.

2. homi B; *ib.* Sic B. 14. a^s pro antecedens B; *ib.* 9^s pro consequens B. 18. vnō^s pro univocacione B. 19. a^s pro antecedens B. 19. 20. qñs^m pro consequens B. 22. filem z|t pro similem esset B. 25. intr'ine^s pro interinere B.

Again, when we say "This thing" is Robert; it is impossible that the signification of "this thing" should be

Robert. I do not approve of such useless quibbles.

V. g. to say: *You are an ass or my hand is closed.* As the hand is closed at the time, this is granted.

Then, opening both hands, he says: *But neither of my hands is closed.* Here it is clear that there is no conclusion to be drawn, since the principal act of the whole antecedent is not true at any time.

Grant the consequence, deny the antecedent, and stop the debate as useless.

In the third example deny the whole as a consequence.

We have a monstrous paralogism: two conditional premises (maj. *If you were an ass, whatever you are now, you then would be*) and a categorical conclusion.

The conclusion should be: *If you were an ass, you could bray now.*

Et patet de illa proposita: *hoc est Robertus*; sed hoc esset impossibile de significato; ideo equivocaret in sensibus. Inter alias alterationes sunt huiusmodi disputationes de signis; et huiusmodi demonstrationes singularium michi odibiles, quia indoctuales. Conformiter dicitur ad talem syllogismum: *Tu es asinus, vel manus mea clauditur; sed nulla manus mea clauditur; ergo, tu es asinus.* Concedenda enim est consequentia, et antecedens est negandum. Et si verificetur maior pro tempore sue prolacionis, claudendo manum, more ioculancium in Natali, et pro tempore prolacionis minoris verificetur illa, aperiendo ambas manus, illud nec probat antecedens esse verum nec fuisse verum; quia pro nullo instanti foret actus principalis tocius antecedentis verus: quod tamen requiretur. Tunc non sequitur: *utraque pars illius copulative fuit vera; ergo, et copulativa.* Nec oportet ambas eius partes esse simul instanter veras; quia de copulativis vocalibus est hoc impossibile. Nec est color ibi, si seorsum maior conceditur, dum manus clauditur, et alia vice minor conceditur, non clausa manu, concludere conclusionem pro tercio tempore. Satis ergo est concedere consequentiam et negare antecedens, et interrompere intendentes probare tanquam frustracione innitentes.

Ad tercium negatur magna consequentia, tanquam non habens unum sensum verum, cum maior est universalis affirmativa de condicionato subiecto et categorico predicato, et minor sit condicionalis necessaria et conclusio categorica *de inesse*. Ideo patet quod non est syllogismus, sed monstruosus paralogismus decipiens incautos. Ergo oportet in tali modo arguendi addere quod condicio sumpta sit possibilis ad concedendum conclusionem *de inesse*. Ut sic argumentando: *Quicquid esses, si esses episcopus, illud nunc es, existente possibili te esse episcopum; sed episcopus esses, etc., ergo quod potest esse episcopus nunc es.* Vel capiendo in maiori quod cuiusmodi tunc esses si esses episcopus nunc es, sequitur cum paribus quod *nunc sis episcopus*. Et ex primo antecedente sequitur illa condicionalis, *rudibilis*

4. demracionib, pro demonstracionas B. 19. minor; maior above B. 24. fructico⁶ pro frustracione B. 27. t^a to pro categorico B. 35. ergo etc. ergo B. 37. t₃ = tenet pro tunc B.

11. Natali. Christmas games are alluded to here. See *English works of Wyclif*, p. 206.

- nunc es, si nunc es asinus.* Sed pro condicionato breviter notandum quod debet dari per negacionem prepositam toti: sic videlicet: *Non est ita ut quicquid esses si esses asinus, illud nunc es*, quod est falsum; hoc tamen est verum, quod *aliquid non esses, si esses asinus quod tamen nunc es*; quia, si esses asinus, tunc *solum* esses quod nunc es et *non solum* esses quod nunc es, cum antecedens infert contradiccionem. Ideo, propter ambiguitatem sensus multiplicis tollendam in talibus, proponenda est negacio cum illo termino, *est ita*; et illa universalis, B 38' *Quicquid esses*, debet exponi per secundam exponentem talem: | *nichil nunc es quod non esses si esses*: quod est necessarium. Et tamen, intelligendo proposiciones conditionaliter, necessarium est quod aliquid esses quod 15 nunc non es, si esses asinus. Nec contradicunt illa, cum contradictorium talis affirmative conditionalis dandum est per negacionem negantem actum categoricum, qui est priori contradictorius et actus principalis eius; et idem iudicium est de similibus quibuscumque.
- 20 Alii autem distinguunt huiusmodi proposiciones ultra hoc quod oportet. Verumtamen tota equivocacio talium stat in hoc quod possunt sumi ypothetice conditionaliter, vel cathgorice de condicionato extremo. Et in aliquibus refert quo ad veritatem, in aliis autem non 25 refert. In aliquibus est limitacio ad sensum kathegoricum, et in aliquibus potest propositio sumi ad libitum concipientis; ut sic, dicendo *quicquid esses si esses asinus, id nunc es*; intelligendo illam kathegorice, ita quod ultimum eius verbum sit verbum principale, est propositio vera sed contingens, cum ponit te esse. Intelligendo vero extorte illum sensum, *si esses asinus, quicquid tunc esses illud nunc es*, necessarius est sensus, cum actus conditionalis sit actus principalis, et propositio nullum contingens ponit. Attendendum est ergo 35 principaliter ad actus principales proposicionum in respondendo, in dando condicionalem vel convertibile in tali materia.
- Uterius, quo ad aliam mixtionem videtur michi, sicut omnis falsitas presupponit veritatem, ymmo omnis 40 falsitas est veritas, sic omnis dicio falsi presupponit dicere veritatis. Ideo non possum dicere *te esse asinum* nisi dixerim verum, non solum quia necessario omnis

We may note that the opposite of the antecedent taken by placing a non before the whole is in one sense false, implying contradiction, and in another true.

The fact is that the antecedent itself is ambiguous: either hypothetical, or categorical with a conditional term. In the latter case the proposition is true but contingent;

in the latter it is necessary.

As for the other sophism (si dico te esse asinum, dico verum) it is a fact that every falsehood being truth, nothing false

16. catam pro categoricum.

25, 26. audientis before concipientis-B.

can be said without its being true; everything affirms its own existence with truth. And even for the thing primitively signified, some are of opinion that the saying is true in itself, but that its object may be non-existent. As for the last (a man is identical with an ass) the consequence is false; there is only partial identity. They are both indeed identical with a third (the universal animal) but only to a certain extent. Sophists, however, are displeased with this answer, admitting the Universals: which are, however, necessary. It is possible to touch the most difficult subjects, while dealing with trivial fallacies. II. Of Quality in Hypotheticals. Any proposition might, I think, be called affirmative or negative; each implying the existence of God, and denying infinite other things. And since they are called affirmative or negative because of affirmation or negation, they may receive either name.

res dicit se esse, et sic deum esse verum; quia notabiliter, sic proferendo dico et intendo ens esse in communi, etsi non proferam illud verbum. Si autem restringitur dicere ad primarium significatum per propositionem prolatam, adhuc, secundum volentes partes 5 propositionis prolata esse propositionem veram, dicendo quod tu es asinus, dico verum: sed maior esset ad illum sensum falsa, quia potes tu non esse.

Et sic ad ultimam mixtionem dicitur quod magna consecuencia non valet. Maior est vera, quia omnis 10 homo esset idem asino, cum sit idem in genere; et sic omnis homo est idem commune quod est asinus; sed nemo est asinus. Unde non sequitur: hoc quod est asinus est homo; ergo, asinus est homo. Sed si res singularis incommunicabilis sit tam homo quam asinus, tunc homo 15 est asinus; quod tamen non oportet, si ydempticetur alicui 3º communi utrique; sed sicut sunt idem tercio (quia genere), sic sunt proporcionaliter idem inter se. Et patet quod [sic], demonstrando per illum terminum, hoc, communem. Etenim non sequitur: hoc est homo 20 et hoc est asinus, ergo, homo est asinus, quia medium non est ultimum singulare. Scio tamen quod sophistis non placet illa responsio, quamvis tam necessarium sit universalia esse, quam necessarium est neminem esse asinum. Sic ergo in communissimis formis sophismatis 25 possunt introduci materie difficillime; | quia omnes B 38^b veritates et opinabilia sunt connexa.

Quo ad 2^m, videtur michi quod omnis propositio, sive kathegorica sive ypothetica, tam affirmativa quam negativa racionabiliter dici potest; quelibet enim talis 30 implicat satis formaliter deum esse et infinitas alias negaciones. Cum ergo hinc dicitur propositio affirmativa, quia subordinatur actui affirmandi, et negativa, quia subordinatur actui negandi; sequitur quamlibet talem esse tam affirmativam quam negativam. Non 35 tamen dicitur propositio ypothetica una, universalis, particularis (et sic de aliis denominacionibus), propter significacionem 2^{ariam}, etsi fuerit affirmativa; quia affirmare et negare sunt impertinencia ad esse affirmati et negati; et ad multitudinem vel proprietatem significantis. 40

5. pp^{ts} pro partes B. 9. ul^{am} pro ultimam B. 12. cone pro commune B. 17. alicuius B. 19. sic deest B. 31. alia B. 40. fig^{ur} pro significantis B.

Sed veritas propositionis requirit *esse* significati; et alie proprietates sequentes requirunt certas condiciones signorum esse, preter significantes propter quos condiciones sunt huiusmodi. Logicus tamen, distingvens
 5 actum affirmandi et actum negandi ex opposito, et correspondenter ad propositionem affirmativam et propositionem negativam, vocat actum affirmandi actum complexum, per quem principaliter veritas affirmandi est. Talem autem philosophi vocant actum componendi,
 10 et propositionem illi subordinatam vocant propositionem affirmativam. Actum vero negativum vocant actum complexum per quem principaliter veritas est negata. Et talis dicitur actus dividendi. Propositionem vero illi actui subordinatam vocant propositionem negativam.
 15 Unde significata primaria talium propositionum vocat Aristoteles nominibus actuum, affirmationes et negationes.

Sic ergo, loquendo de propositionibus affirmativis et negativis, sunt 3^s modi dicendi, quorum primus solum
 20 attendit ad signa, 2^s solum ad significata, et 3^{us} mixtim. Primi dicunt quod hec propositio, *homo est*, significando primarie quod *nulla chimera est*, est affirmativa, et hec: *nihil est*, significando primarie *deum esse*, est negativa. Ista tamen responsio est nimis vocalis, cum
 25 nullum tale signum de se habeat quod sit affirmativum et negativum, sed a significato vel modo significandi.

Ideo dicit 2^a quod ista: *ita est quod nulla chimera est*, est negativa, et hec est affirmativa, *non est ita quod deus non est*. Prima enim primarie significat illam
 30 negacionem: *nullam chimeram esse*, et cum idem sit *illam negacionem esse ens*, et illa negacio. Et per idem diceret hanc esse negativam *deus est nemo*, vel *non homo*, cum primarie significat *neminem esse deum*, et sic primarie significat negacionem, et per idem quelibet ypo-
 35 thetica foret sic affirmativa, cum quelibet significat primarie veritatem. Et sic nulla esset negativa composita. Cum enim ens et veritas convertuntur, et quelibet propositio primarie significat ens, et per consequens
 40 *ens esse*, quelibet propositio primarie significat veritatem esse.

Yet a hypothetical proposition is not called universal or particular, etc. because its being depends merely on the nexus and not on the secondary signification, even when affirmative. Logicians, opposing the affirmative and negative acts to one another, call affirmation the whole act by which truth is chiefly affirmed, but philosophers call these the acts of combining and dividing.

On this point, there are three opinions. One maintains that a proposition is affirmative according to the form of expression alone; but the form must depend on the signification.

The second takes the meaning alone, and would say that: It is true that *No chimera exists*, is negative, and that *God is not non-existent* is affirmative. It would follow that no hypothetical proposition could be negative, since they all primarily mean what is true.

3. fig^{es} pro significantes B. 24. necessaria B. 25. qst pro quod sit B. 36, 37. 9^{poi} pro composita F.

The third opinion (to which I adhere) asserts that the mode of signifying of the principal verbs must be particularly attended to. For the same sense may be rendered under different forms, affirmative or negative, and this causes a difference in the propositions. So there may be a great number of hypotheticals, signifying the same primary object without any difference.

And every negative is convertible with an affirmative as to its fundamental meaning. Thus: the affirmative affirms truth — negative or affirmative or impossible; in like manner every negative denies truth.

There are three opinions as regards the different quality of hypotheticals. 1. They are affirmative only when both propositions together with the *nexus* are affirmatives; negative only when both, with the *nexus* are denied.

So some would be neither negative nor affirmative: as, *A is not B, and C is D.*

Tercio autem dicitur quod maxime attendendum est ad modos significandi verborum principalium pro qualitatibus propositionum iudicandis, quamvis primarie ceperunt propositiones tales denominationes ab affirmationibus et negacionibus significatis. Sicut ergo actus componendi, *deum esse*, est complexus, et actus apprehendendi essenciam divinam est incomplexus, quamvis idem sit obiectum et eadem potencia, sic actus componendi, *deum esse*, est affirmativus, et actus dividendi: *non esse ita quod deus non est*, est negativus, et tamen utrique actui eadem veritas correspondet; sed talibus equipollentibus, ubi est unicum verbum, ut *non nullus homo currit*, differenter contingit actus affirmativos correspondere. Et contingit illis correspondere actus negativos geminatos; et sic de conformibus terminis contingit habere propositiones cathedricas vel ypotheticas ad placitum, sine distincione obiecti principaliter apprehensi. Ut in istis: *sic est quod si tu es, aliquid est*, etc. *si tu es aliquid est*. Modicum enim variantur termini, et utrobique idem est significatum primarium. Unde, sicut quelibet ypothetica est convertibilis cum cathedrica et econtra, sic quelibet negativa est convertibilis cum affirmativa, quo ad essendi consequenciam. Unde vere dictum est quod per actum affirmandi veritas affirmatur, sive illa veritas sit negatio, sive affirmacio, sive non possit esse. Et per negativam veritas negatur, sive possit esse, sive non; veritas enim est communis ad omne significatum propositionis cathedricae vel ypotheticae. Et affirmacio similiter, ut videtur; et isti vie ego innitor.

Quo ad qualitates ypotheticas, sunt tres modi dicendi. Primi dicunt quod de qualibet specie ypotheticae alia sit affirmativa et alia negativa. Affirmativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi affirmatur; et negativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi negatur. Et sic aliqua est ypothetica que neque est affirmativa neque negativa. Ut talis: *tu non curris, et ego curro*.

Sed 2^o dicitur quamlibet ypotheticam cuius actus coniungendi, qui est actus eius principalis, affirmatur, esse affirmativam, et solum talem; ut sunt tales: *tu es*,

et asinus non est; si deus non est, tunc ipse est; tu non es vel deus non es. Sed propositiones ypotheticas istis contradictorias, in quibus actus principales coniungendi negantur, vocant ypotheticas negativas, ut sunt tales; non est ita quod tu es et quod asinus non est; non, si tu es asinus, tu non es homo. Et sic, ut dicunt, ypotheticæ sunt quodammodo equivoce affirmative et negative cum kategoriaicis.

Sed 3^a via dicit quamlibet copulativam, disiunctivam, vel condicionalem de partibus independencium significancium esse et qualem et quantam, more kategoriaicarum, secundum qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; ut hec est universalis affirmativa: *omnis homo currit ubi vel quando vel quia deus vult sic esse. Et sic de istis: omnis homo est maior quam est milium, omnis homo est substancia et illa non est asinus vel illa non est asinus.* 4 enim note coniungendi sunt categorice; et alie, propter dependenciam sensus relativi, sortiuntur qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; sed non condicionalis. Videtur tamen michi probabile quod solum 4 species ypotheticarum supradictarum sunt quales 2^m qualitatem prime partis, ita quod talis ypothetica non sit qualis, sic: *Sor non est qui est albus.* Nec est de ratione ypotheticæ quod ambe partes sint per se significantes sine habitudine ad invicem, nec negatur uterque actus in tali: *Sor | non est qui est albus, cum iste sit eius intellectus: Sor non est et ille Sor qui non est, est albus.* Verumptamen hec est negativa, *Sor non est ille qui est albus.* Hec autem est amphigorica, *Sor non est qui est albus;* ex hoc quod potest habere sensus prioris propositionis, vel relativum inmediate referri ad subiectum. Et tunc convertitur cum copulativa impossibili.

Quo ad contradicciones ypotheticarum, notandum quod istis quatuor speciebus que sunt quales more kategoriaicarum, sunt contradictoria, et cetera significante proprietates, sicut kategoriaicis; sed cuilibet copulative, disunctive vel condicionali contradicit categorica negativa; ut isti: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal* contradicit ista *non est ita quod, si tu es homo, tu es animal.* Omnium enim contradictoriorum actus principales sunt contradictorii; et vocantur contradictorii,

2. The notion of affirmation or negation comes from the *nexus* alone, denied or affirmed; and ypothetical and categorical propositions are thus somewhat on the same line.

3. All follow the quality and quantity of the first of their parts; for in four cases they are merely connected categoricals, and in the others the relative member follows the quality etc. of the other.

But I think that only the four first species really do so; for we find propositions which cannot be called either affirmative or negative, unless by changing the form into another less ambiguous.

These four have contradictories, and the other properties of categoricals; but they are contradicted by a categorical: *It is not true that . . .*

11. nec . . . nec *pro* et . . . et B.

15. milm̄ A.

25. adm̄ A.

Many propositions are equivalent to contradictories without being so formally; and the rules of contradictories based on the contraposition of *being* or *non-being*, are the same for all.

actus affirmandi et negandi primarie de eodem. Et patet quod multe proposiciones equivalent contradictoriis que non contradicunt; quia solum tales et omnes tales que habent actus principales contradictorios contradicunt. Disiunctiva ergo facta oppositis parcium 5 copulative, repugnat eidem quodammodo contradictorie, equivalenter ad contradiccionem. Cum ergo omnium oppositorum eadem sit disiunctiva, patet quod regule que deserviunt ad noscendum veritatem vel falsitatem qualiscunque ypothetice, deserviunt directe vel in-10 directe ad noscendum veritatem aut falsitatem sui oppositi; et tanta de qualibet ypotheticarum.

III. Of Quantity in these propositions. I think that the three first kinds of hypotheticals have properly no quantity; but that the others (*comparatives, locals, and temporals*) have it by reason of their first members. A sophist would say: All these propositions when written, having length, have *quantity*, and quantity is a *quality*. But logicians means quantity as concerns universality, etc. The same reason would give every proposition many qualities, that are quite foreign to our intent. Can a long speech be one proposition? Probably there is a maximum of possible length. The whole world is a proposition, and so is any artificial disposition of things, however considerable.

Quo ad tertium, dicendum de quantitibus ypotheticarum, videtur michi probabile quod nulla trium-15 priorum ypotheticarum sit alicuius quantitatis, quamvis qualiscunque quantitatis sit kathegorica de tali ypothetico extremo. Quatuor autem alie species possunt dici quante a primis partibus, sicut prius dicte sunt 2^m partes illas esse quales. Nota tamen quod sophista concederet omnem ypotheticam, sicut et kathegoricam, 20 esse tam qualem quam quantam; ut *longa* ypothetica, in hoc quod *longa*, est *quanta*. Et in hoc quod est quantitate denominata, est qualis. Illud tamen dictum procedit ab equivoco, cum logicus non attendit ad quantum molis vel duracionis proposicionis logice, sed 25 ad universalitatem, particularitatem, indefinitatem vel singularitatem. Unde indefinitam kathegoricam contingit esse ypotheticam scriptam, et cathegoricam contingit esse ypotheticam, tempore longiorem, et utramque pulcram, acutam aut aliter qualitatum; sed hoc est impertinens 30 intencioni logice, restringentis qualitatem ad eius affirmacionem vel negacionem superius expositas.

Et hic communiter dubitatur quam longa oracio possit esse propositio; et videtur michi probabile quod esse dare maximum tale: quod sic esse proponam. Sicut 35 totus mundus racionaliter potest dici propositio, sic quantumlibet magnum artificiale secundum formam artis dispositivam potest esse propositio. Nec requiritur intelligere omnes partes proposicionis simul, sicut patet de proposicione vocali futura, sed successive, unam post 40 reliquam. Superfluous tamen et in | debitus esset grandis B 40^a liber iste super quem non scriberetur nisi negativa

13. dum *pro* dicendum 1^o. 35. *fit* *pro* sic B. 38. possit B.

proposicio; sicut indebite loqueretur qui, intendendo dicere quod *Sor scribit*, narraret totam geneologiam eius usque ad primum hominem. Est ergo in talibus dare maximum 2^m mensuram debitam proporcionatum, quod 5 constitueret proposicionem artificialem cum proporcionata concepcione. Nam contingit intelligere brevem oracionem sine habitudine proporcionali; sicut communiter intendunt truffantes cum pueris, proponendo illis claudendo manus talem disiunctivam: *Tu es asinus,* 10 *vel mea manus clauditur*, qua concessa, utramque manum aperiendo, proponunt illam negativam: *nulla mea manus clauditur*; que eciam est concedenda; tunc concludit conclusionem. Sed tota oracio precedens non intelligitur sub habitudine unius proposicionis; vel si sic, ipsa est 15 neganda.

Aliam autem evasionem habent sophiste, concedendo quod *totum est sue partes*; et sic dicunt copulativam esse universalem et particularem, affirmativam et negativam; et tan.en nec est universalis nec affirmativa, 20 sed est ille partes. Sed illud non placet michi, tum quia fundamentum est falsam, tum eciam quia quelibet ypotetica habet notam coniungentem, que neutrius categorice est pars. Ideo ypotetica non est ille kategorice, sicut nec quique sunt 4.

Sed 3^o obicitur evidencius quod quatuor species, que dicte sunt esse quales et quante, sunt categorice et non ypotetice. Aliter enim non esset hec categorica: *A est, significat sicut est, est maior Platone*, et sic de 25 similibus. Sed quo ad illud videtur michi quod sicut affectus numero septenario reducit omnes species ypothetice ad VII, sic affectus numero ternario reducit omnes illas 3^s ad 3^a. Sicut enim ad omnem punctum intrinsecum mundi circumstant solum 6 puncta ipsum tangencia secundum tres differencias posicionis (propter 30 quod numerus septenarius dictus est numerus universitatis), sic omnem veritatem kategoricam circumstant 6 veritates ypothetice, que cum illa constituunt veritatem copulativam. Sic enim completa est quelibet

But as superfluity destroys this art, there must be a maximum of length, beyond which no proposition can go, and with which it is grasped in one corresponding conception. A very short group may be deficient in its last quality; v. g. the fallacy of opening and closing the hand.

Sophists say: A whole is its parts: so a copulative will be universal, particular, affirmative and negative at once, like its parts.

But the principle is false, and besides, the *nexus* is an element which exists in neither of the component categoricals.

Another objection: These four kinds said to have quantity, are in reality categorical; if not, many propositions accounted as categorical would be so no longer.

But I think that he who likes 3 reduces all to 3, and he who likes 7 reduces all to 7. Every

13. pcc^{na} B. 14. fi^e B; *ib.* ipsum B. 15. negandum B. 23. 1^o B.
23, 24. ka^{ce} B. 24. fut B. 28. A enim (?) *pro* A est B 32. 3^s ad
3^a B. 38. co^{va} B.

32. *Ad omnem.* We shall find a good deal more of this, in Wyclif's theory of the Extended, later in the work.

point in the world is surrounded by 6, and 7 is the number of the universe. And as every reality can be reduced to three elements, all hypotheticals can be reduced to three; for causals, comparatives, locals and temporals are directly reducible to copulatives. Examples.

Thus all belong to one of these three classes; but it comes to the same, for we then have 5 sorts of copulatives. And it does not follow that they are categoricals on that account.

essencia, sive corporea, sive incorporea in natura absoluta, que est communis tribus suppositis; et omnibus illis insunt proprietates, et communiter accidentia et oppositiones. Et sicut non est dare realitatem que non sit reducibilis ad aliquod trium suppositorum, 5 sic non est dare ypotheticam quin sit reducibilis ad copulativam, disiunctivam vel condicionalem, cum omnis causalis, comparativa, localis, vel temporalis, directe reducitur ad copulativam: ut idem est *te esse animal quia tu es homo*, et *te esse animal, et causam eius esse quia tu es homo*. Et idem est *A significare sicut B significat*, et: *A significare unum ens et B significare illud idem*. Verumptamen ille terminus, *sicut*, quandoque dicit similitudinem in modo significandi et quandoque ydemptitatem significati; et idem 15 est dicere *tu es ubi vel quando Sor est* et dicere quod *tu es in aliquo loco | vel tempore et ibi vel tunc Sor est*. B 40^b Et sic posset quamlibet talem dici esse copulativam. Nec est possibile aliquam esse ypotheticam que non sit aliqua istarum trium specierum. Verum- 20 ptamen eadem est sententia utrobique; quia reducendo illas 4 ad copulativam, habentur quinque species copulative. Nec sequitur, si sunt quales et quante, quod sint kategorice. Et sic primum exemplorum propositorum est ypothetica, et secundum est propositio kategorica. Et tanta de ypotheticis sint dicta hic, quo ad suas essencias et accidentales proprietates in genere.

5. suppt^r B. 14, 15. mo^{di} B.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum; supponendo primo, quod omnis ypothetica subordinata principaliter actui ypothetico copulandi sit copulativa; et solum talis. Ex quo patet quod ex quibuscunque kathergoricis contingit copulativam componi; et quelibet copulativa, loquendo universaliter, tunc est vera, quando primarie verum significat. Et specialiter discernitur ex hoc esse vera, quando ambe partes principales sunt vere. Nota tamen quod propositionem equivocam copulativam stat esse necessariam, et ambas eius partes impossibiles; ut patet te ista: *non est ita quod deus est et tu es asinus*. Potest enim hec intelligi kathergorice, ita quod negacio cadat super actum principalem copulandi, et consequenter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est kathergorica negativa et necessaria, contradictoria copulative. Vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio cadat super primum actum solum; et talis sensus est impossibilis: conceditur tamen propter sensum verum. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod *tu es asinus*, quia antecedens non infert te esse asinum, nisi ad sensum copulativum. Hic tamen dicitur communiter quod oportet addere talem coniunctionem *quod*, ad hoc quod negacio neget utrumque actum; ut sic: *non est ita quod*, negacio cadat super actum copulandi principalem, et communiter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est categorica negativa et necessarie, contradictoria copulative, quod *tu es asinus* et quod *deus est*; tunc enim est limitatus sensus kathergoricus, de copulato predicato. Ista enim: *homo est, et deus hoc scit*, significando primarie [per hoc] quod *chimera est*, non est copulativa, sicut nec propositio mixta ex

Of copulatives. We assume that every hypothetical of this class is subordinate to the mental act of combining. A copulative, true whenever it primarily signifies truth, is so when both its parts are true; but its negation, equivocally copulative, may be true and both its parts false;

unless the preceding negation falls on the first part alone.

To avoid ambiguity, it is recommended to add *that*; as: *It is not true that A is B and that C is D*. This is a necessary categorical, proposition.

Signs and sense must correspond, or the proposition is not truly

1, 2. Cap. and Initial S desunt B. 7. v^r pro universaliter B.
 16. ne^o B. 27. after copulative B: vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod
 negacio cadat super primum actum solum et talis est impossibilis, con-
 ceditur tamen propter sensum verum, etc. 30. per hoc deest B.

copulative,
as happens in
many cases.

copulativa et alia ypothetica, cuius actus principalis non est actus copulandi, nec propositio simplex significans primarie eandem veritatem quam copulativa significat; quia ad *esse* copulative requiritur correspondencia signorum et sensuum. 5

The negative
might very
well apply to
both verbs of
the connected
members; but
it is better to
add *that*, as
above.

Certum tamen est quod satis debite potest negacio negare utrumque verbum in talibus, quamvis propter evitaciones sophisticas excludendas, expressius sit ponere illum terminum, *quod*, respectu ambarum parcium; tunc non est copulativa, sed kathegorica negativa de copu- 10 lato predicato. Nec obest propositiorem esse ypotheticam, cum hoc quod 2^a pars dependenter significat ad aliam, quia sic est de copulativis quarum parcium posteriorum extrema referuntur ad extrema | propo- B 41^a sicionum priorum; ut hic, *Sor currit et ille movetur*. 15

As a rule, the
relative in such
a proposition
refers to the
whole preceding
proposition.

Unde regulariter in talibus refert relativum suum antecedens sub habitudine ad totam significacionem prioris propositionis: ut idem est dicere: *omnis homo est Sor, et idem est masculus*, ac si diceretur *ille Sor qui est omnis homo est masculus*; et sic de similibus quibus- 20 cunque. Nec dubium attendenti ad experienciam quin tali propositioni correspondat actus ypotheticus copulandi; sed isti oracioni, *ita est quod Sor currit et movetur*, correspondet actus categoricus, cum tota veritas copulative intelligitur, ut una de qua componitur, quod 25 illa est. Et si queratur cuius quantitatis sunt huiusmodi categorice, dicitur quod sunt multe, cum ille terminus, *ita*, demonstrat veritatem communem convertibiliter cum ente. Idem enim est dicere: *Ita est quod ego non sum*, et dicere: *ens est me non esse*. 30

Sometimes,
when the sense
of the second
member is
included in
that of the first,
the proposition
is copulative
only in form;
as *A is BC, and
A is B*.

The term *ita* is
generally
understood as
demonstrative;
but such
propositions as
employ it thus
are equivocal.

It does not
matter in
compound
hypotheticals
which of the
hypothetical
signs comes
first;

Sed ille terminus, *ita*, in propositionibus copulativis accipitur communiter demonstrative, ut: *ita est sicut ego dico*, cuius unus intellectus est talis: *illud ens est, quod ego dico*. Tales enim oraciones sunt equivoce, et ideo respondendo ad illas sufficit sensus primarii com- 35 prehensio. Et ita illa est concedenda, *tu es, vel deus est, et tu non es*, cum sensus disiunctus est verus. Nec prioritas vocem impedit, quin contingit illam intelligere copulative; quia, ut prius dictum est, in mixtionibus intelliguntur huiusmodi antecedencia copulative. Et in 40 talibus mixtionibus ex copulativa et condicionali, nota

contradiccionis communiter facit ipsa esse condicionalia, ut hic: *tu es homo et tu es asinus si tu es asinus*; et sic est in rationalibus, ubi argumentatur a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem communiter in syllogismis ypotheticis, ubi possunt indifferenter specificari a nota priori et a nota posteriori. Nec curo sive negata fuerit talis propositio, sive concessa in sensibus equivocis. Ego tamen elegi concedere illas, supposito uno sensu vero. Et, si argumentans probare voluerit sensum alium, licet, et satis conveniam quod arguatur ad sensum illam.

Unde probabiliter potest ista dubitari: *non est ita quod deus est vel rex sedet*; cum, intelligendo illam ypotheticam disiunctivam, est eque dubitabilis sicut 2^a pars. Sed intelligendo illam kathegorice negative, contradiceret disiunctivae ponenti principaliter veritatem disiunctivam. Et si queratur quare propositio convertibilis cum contradictorio alterius non eque contradicit sibi sicut suum convertibile, dicitur quod in propositionibus convertibilibus est dare gradus. Unde solum in convertibilibus, quorum utrumque ponit explicite omnem veritatem quam ponit reliquum, intelligitur quod, si propositio contradicit uni talium, contradicit utrique. Constat autem quod multe sunt propositiones concin-
vertibiles, tam 2^m predicacionem quam 2^m consequentiam, quarum una ponit explicite veritatem quam 2^a non sic ponit; ut patet de istis: *homo est risibile*; *3 duplum est, duplique dimidium est*, etc. Propositio autem nichil significat explicite, nisi quod ipsa vel aliqua eius pars significat primarie; ut patet de istis, *Sor est et Plato est*, et *ita est quod Sor est et Plato est*. Sicut enim idem est *homo* | et *humanitas* et *esse hominem*, quamvis significatur nunc collective, nunc abstracte et nunc complexe; sic eadem veritas significatur, nunc kathegorice, nunc ypotheticae; et nunc complexe, nunc incomplexae. Et hinc videtur quod quilibet propositio, cum ponit veritatem quam primo significat et asserit, quod sit affirmativa; sicut et videtur quemlibet actum complexum esse actum componendi et copulandi. Diversitates enim talium actuum propter defec-

v. g. when we have *A is B* and *C is D* if *E is F*, it is usually considered as a conditional.

And if such a proposition is equivocal, it matters little whether it be granted or denied; but I prefer the former.

A negative proposition, contradicting a disjunctive, may have two different meanings, either denying the propositions as separate, or denying their disjunction.

But how is it that each of the disjuncts, convertible with the contradictory of the other, is not that contradictory?

Because propositions may be convertible either without adding any explicit meaning on either side, or adding such meaning.

The very same truth may be expressed in different manners, and these different manners add a shade of meaning.

Every act that posits a truth is that of affirming; we do not conceive a positive proposition under a negative

10. licet B.

27. ut3 pro ut patet B.

30. ut3 pro ut patet B.

33. gttive = completive? B. 39. quelibet A.

form in the same way as when its form was positive. Yet they may be both convertible with the same proposition.

This shows the truth of the rules, arguing v. g. from the whole copulative to one of its terms, and not conversely.

We must now examine those sophisms which concern pronouns. Some express identity, others difference, the latter connoting it in different ways, and the former referring to universal or personal identity.

Logicians do not agree whether or no the pronoun stands for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb.

If not, we could not know that a man had committed a theft without knowing who that man was: which is evidently false.

tum nominum facilius possunt concipi quam explicari; ut nullus dubitat quin alium modum concipiendi habet de tali, *ita est quod non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*, et alium de tali: *non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*. Et tamen significata primaria convertuntur, 5 prima existente affirmativa et alia negativa; et tamen utraque illarum convertitur cum ista disiunctiva, *deus non est vel chimera non est*. Et tamen illa non contradicit copulative, quamvis equivalenter opponitur; quia contradicchio debet esse prima et maxima opposicio, 10 cuius non est medium. Ex istis patent regule de modis argumentandi a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem, et non e contra, nisi forte fuerit pars convertibilis vel antecedens ad reliquam. Et sic de aliis regulis veritatum in illa materia. 15

Istis premissis, restat videre materiam sophisticam contingentem in terminis grammaticae relatis, explicatam communiter intra copulativas. Sunt ergo talium relativorum aliqui termini relativi ydemptitatis; ut *ille*, *ipse*, *qui*, *is*, etc. Alii autem sunt termini relativi diver- 20 sitatis; ut *aliter*, *alius* et *alter* et *cetera*. Et differunt isti termini 2^m connotationem; ut alii connotant disparitatem essencie; ut *aliud*; alii connotant disparitatem qualitatatis; ut *alter*; et alii indifferenter cuiuscunq; accidentis: ut *aliter*. Et relativa ydemptitatis quandoque 25 referunt sua antecedencia simpliciter pro communi. et quandoque referunt relacione personali; sicut aliqui sunt termini interrogativi pro personis; ut *quis?* et alii interrogant pro essenciis; ut *quid?* Et sic de multis famosis apud grammaticos. 30

Est tamen una regula grammaticae in qua dissenciant logici; scilicet, quod omne relativum refert suum antecedens sub habitudine alicuius actus verbi sui antecedentis; sic omne tale relativum limitacius se habet quam suum antecedens; ut idem est dicere quod *Sor* 35 *est animal et illud est asinus*, ac si diceretur quod *illud animal quod est Sor est asinus*. Et patet ista significacio ex modo loquendi. Nam nemo dubitat quin sit possibile unum abstulisse furtive bona, vel talem actum particularem fecisse, cum hoc quod ignoret *quis* fuit 40 *ille*. Ipsi tamen qui dicunt omne relativum convertit

- cum suo antecedente, concedunt quod si sciunt quod aliqua res fecit aliquem actum bonum vel malum, tunc non ignorant que fuit illa; quia quamcunque rem sciunt fuisse, sciunt fuisse illam, cum omnem talem sciunt fuisse rem, nec ignorant fuisse rem. Sed ista est satis patens pompa sophistica, qua dicitur quod *ego disiuncte scio quis fuit ille* qui commisit illud furtum, vel quodcunque factum occultum. Et ideo ostensio talium occultorum non est digna nisi premio sophistico.
- 10 Querendo ergo a tali sophista *quis fuit ille* qui fecit talem turpitudinem, diceret quod *ego et quilibet homo mundi est ille*: | ideo, cum accusabit se de quocunque furto, dignificabit se suspendi; vel promittendo sibi quantamcunque rem pro revelacione sua vel labore quocunque, dando sibi quodcunque bonum vel malum, 15 habet ipse contentari; quia promittebatur sibi aliquid, et illud datum est sibi. Omnia ergo ista sunt ignorancium grammaticam sine fructu altercaciones barbarie.
- 20 Sed pro ista opinione arguitur. Si enim quelibet intencio correspondens tali relativo fuerit inferior intencione sui antecedentis, tunc inter quascunque intenciones duas, ordinatas 2^m superius et inferius, contineret esse intencionem. Et sic communitas termini 25 consisteret vere in latitudine, et per consequens esset processus in infinitum, tam ascendendo quam descendendo in generibus et speciebus cuiuscunque predicati; et per consequens periret omnis demonstracio vel sciencia, cum nulla foret species specialissima nec ordo 30 universalium. Deduccio patet ex hoc quod, capto quocunque termino quantumcunque remisse communi, contingit ipsum antecedere ad relativum minus commune illo; et sic inter terminos communes, secundum minimum suorum significatorum esset dare terminos medios, ut 35 inter terminum communem ad 3 et terminum communem ad 4.
- Similiter, posito quod non sint homines currentes nisi isti duo, Sor et Plato; et dicat tercio utroque horum audiente, quod *aliquis homo currit*, et adiungat Sor: *Sor non est ille*, et asserat Plato cum illis quod *Plato non*
- And to say that it is known *disjunctively* is a mere verbal quibble. A sophist would say: "It is either I or another man;" perhaps himself, and he should be hanged for it; or his reward should be the promise of something disjunctively; i. e. of *anything* — good or bad.
- Arguments *pro*.
1. Suppose that the pronoun is less universal than its antecedent; this implies an infinite multitude of pronouns between the former and the latter, all varying in universality, and each of them antecedents of the foregoing one; which would be the ruin of all science.
2. If only two men, A and B were running, each of them denying that it was *he*, supposing that

3. sunt *pro* fuit B.6. ds^{te} *pro* disiuncte B.18, 19. bo^{te} B.23. fri⁹ *pro* superius B.32. con^e B.

both of them spoke the truth and that he was less general than its antecedent, somebody would still run; for there can be assigned no reason for believing either that they both lied, or that one was to be believed rather than the other.

est ille; tunc videtur quod si terminus relativus sit inferior ad suum antecedens (ut pono quod aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille, nec Plato est ille; quia quilibet illorum trium dicit verum; vel, si uterque currencium dicit falsum, quia dicit quod Sor non est ille qui currit vel Plato non est ille qui currit etc.) sequitur cum veris quod chimera non est animal et tu vides illud; aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille, et aliquis homo currit, qui non est Sor: quod est contra grammaticam. Nec dicitur ratio quare Sor dicit verum in casu cum Ciceronis dicto, quin per idem Plato diceret verum cum eodem.

3. Argument *ad hominem.*

If there are universals *ex parte rei*, every pronoun would simply stand for its antecedent. The universal *he* would be a thief and a king at the same time, since it stands for the universal, *Man*. And knowing the universal, *Somebody*, we should know disjunctively who committed any secret action.

Similiter iuxta sepe dicta, est dare universalia ex parte rei, que sunt singularia suorum inferiorum. Ex quo sequitur relativum converti simpliciter cum suo antecedente, et omnes conclusiones reputate false forent concedende; ut concedendum est quod *aliquis homo est turpissimus et indignissimus latro*, et rex esset ille; quia homo communis est omnis homo. Et sic *aliquis fecit peccando maximam materiam in mundo*, et deus est ille. Et sic, si quis fecit quantumcunque occultum factum, tu scis disiuncte quis fuit ille, quia disiuncte scis quod *Sor vel quecumque alia persona* fuit ille, in sciendo quod fuit *aliquis*. Et sic non fieret sola vel differentia inter ista; *omnis homo est animal quod est rationale*, et *omnis homo est animal et illud est rationale*. Et sic de multis scole communium incredibilibus similibus.

Answers. 1. We must note that any mental proposition means either its signs or the things signified; when we know a language we generally mean both, the former subordinate to the latter; and the acts of the mind are called propositions, even when the objects for which they stand have no existence.

Ad illud dicitur, sicut prius, quod generaliter tenet regula supra dicta. Et pro materia primi argumenti sunt 3 dicenda. Primo, quod contingit propositionem anime componi ex in | tencionibus signorum vel intencionibus signatorum. Et communiter scientes ydiomata habent propositiones de intencionibus ydiomata subordinatas propositionibus de intencionibus naturalibus signatorum. Et tercio, actus anime vocantur propositiones eo quod illi immediate ponuntur pro veritatibus signatis, etsi non significant. Per hoc dicitur quod quilibet terminus relativus propositionis in anima primo modo est intencio significans ad placitum rem

1. sic *pro* si B.

4. utrique B.

7. *vei's* B.

11. *cic'onis* B.

18. *indignitiffi* B.
37. *me^{to}* B.

20. *maxim^m ma^m* B.

22. *d^{to}* B.

32. *am'e* B.

signatam per accidens, et omne significatum per totam
 propositionem antecedentis: et sic contingit ipsam con-
 verti quo ad consequentiam cum antecedente. Ut hic:
animal potest esse et illud est Sor; ista enim con-
 5 vertuntur quo ad consequentiam: *animal erit animal*
quod potest esse. Et contingit relativum esse inferius
 subiecto quo ad predicacionem; ut; *hic homo est albus*,
et ille est Sor. Nam *hominem esse album* est inferius ad
 10 *hominem esse*, quamvis plura significet; sicut commu-
 niter facit relativum. Sed, loquendo de propositione
 anime 2ⁱ modi, tunc termino relativo correspondent
 multe intenciones, quarum aliqua est forte illud ante-
 cedens. Non enim sunt intenciones anime primo de
 eodem generate; sed per eandem intencionem contingit
 15 frequenter tam vicissim quam simultanee diversis acti-
 bus concipere illud idem; et sic contingit talem pro-
 positionem anime 2^m subordinacionem diversis actibus
 esse katheroticam et ypotheticam, affirmativam et
 negativam, veram et falsam, ymmo contradictoriam
 20 sibi ipsi. Sed secus est de propositione vocali et de
 propositione anime facta ex intencionibus signorum;
 nec sunt actus tales nobis notissimi aliquales, sed sunt
 accidentia de genere accionis, firmantes intenciones et
 generantes habitus per ipsorum frequentem eleccionem;
 25 de intencionibus ergo non habemus experientiam, sicut
 de actibus.

Secundo notandum quod contingit terminum esse
 inferiorem reliquo aut superiorem, vel quo ad predi-
 cacionem, vel quo ad significacionem. Unde patet ex
 30 dictis quod relativum communiter est inferius suo
 antecedente quo ad predicacionem, et superius quo ad
 significacionem, sicut communiter sunt inferiora per
 accidens, per appositionem agregata ex signis diversorum
 generum. Unde sic loquendo de inferioritate, videtur
 35 michi quod contingit in infinitum descendere, cum non
 contingit capere commune quin per aliam accidentalem
 adieccionem potest intelligi limitacius. Ex hoc tamen
 non sequitur quod non sit dare speciem specialissimam;
 quia sub specie specialissima contingit habere quotlibet

In meaning every pronoun is deductively the same as its antecedent, but it is as a predicate less universal.

When we say: This man is white, and he is A, he stands for the man who is white; which is less universal than man.

But in the second sense we may have many different meanings, and one of them may be antecedent.

Thus the same mental proposition may be widely different, and even self-contradictory; and as for the acts themselves, they are mere accidents that serve to fix the objects in our mind.

One term may be called inferior to another in predication or in signification and the pronoun is inferior in the first way, not in the second. And thus there is, it seems, an infinite descent; for however much we may add to the antecedent, we shall never reach the individuality of this.

14. geminanti B. 15. $\hat{\eta}\lambda\alpha^{\eta}$? B. 22. a' 9^m pro aliquales B. 35. in firmum B.

32. *Predicacionem* — *significacionem*. We should say to-day: *extension* — *intension* (or *comprehension*).

Yet we can get to the last species, for after this point is attained there are accidents which may be added; but these do not interfere.

The terms inferior, prior, and more universal mean the same among logicians; as any term has more signification, they call it more common. We must, therefore, admit an

infinite, signifying more than any other. But a universal term is more common when it can be predicated of more individuals; and the relation of universality between universals cannot be known to us.

If one is infinitely more universal than another, it does not follow that it is infinite.

2. The example given proves nothing; the proposition, so stated, is meaningless, there being no one act of the mind by which we may grasp it.

Note that some man is more singular than the indefinite man, and it implies personal supposition. Not, however, in the highest genera of all, nor as regards logical entities.

intenciones accidencium; et inter speciem et suum genus proximum. Sed talia non erunt illius coordinacionis cum connotabunt encia diversorum predicamentorum; ens, cum est communissimum, quo claudit contradiccione esse communius, cum omne posse sit esse.

Sed 3^o notandum quod logici habent pro eodem terminum esse inferiorem reliquo, priorem, universaliorem et communiorem; et unum dicunt reliquo communiorem quo ad significacionem, 2^m quod plura significat. Et consequenter ponendum est unum vocatum infinitum, in quacunque proporcione | volueris reliquo maius. Sed terminus universalis propter suum significatum dicitur communior, quo suum primo significatum dicitur communicabilis; et sic communitas termini non consistit in latitudine, sicut nec proporcio communitatum se habet in aliqua proporcione numerali nobis cognita. Et communitas termini solum finita significantis nobis est alterius rationis quam communitas termini significantis nobis infinita. Ideo non sequitur, etsi una sit reliqua infinitum maior, quod sit infinitum magna; sicut dicitur de maiortate superficie ad lineam. Ista autem dicta circumstant dubia cuicunque.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod conclusio non sequitur, nec foret illa oracio mixta propositio, cum deficeret sibi significacio propositiois, eo quod nemo intelligit illam proporcionaliter, cum cuilibet propositiois oportet correspondere unum actum principalem preter actus correspondentes partibus. Pro materia tamen illius sunt 3^a notanda. Primo quod intelligendo illum terminum, aliquis homo, personaliter, habetur communiter cum intencione speciei intencio de aliquo singulari homine. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod aliquis homo est singularis. Et logici ponunt quod signa particularia limitant ad suppositionem personalem, cum aliter viderentur superfluere si non supperadderent ad indefinitas. In transcendentibus tamen generibus et terminis 2^e intenciois supponunt termini cum signis particularibus pro communibus et singularibus indifferenter; ut substantiarum, vel universalium encium, quoddam est universale, quoddam singulare. Et universalium quoddam est genus, quoddam species. Sic ergo intelligendo aliquem

hominem, limitando ad certum singulare, sicut communiter intelligunt plebei et negantes universalialia, foret verum quod *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille qui currit*; sed tunc referret relativum suum antecedens
 5 singulariter pro homine communi; quod conceditur ab aliquo currente dicere. Quod si intelligatur antecedens incontracte, tunc cum paribus foret talis propositio falsa; sed hoc foret verum: *ille non est Sor*, sicut *ille homo qui currit non est Sor*, dum falsum est quod Sor
 10 *non est ille qui currit*.

Et ex istis patet 2^o quod sophismate componente sic: *aliquis homo currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*, false componitur; ymmo false componeret referendo ad eundem, sic componendo: *aliquis homo*
 15 *currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*; geminando tamen propositiorem antecedentis, vel per unum intelligeret, vel per diversos, foret talis copulativa vera, sicut et esset, intelligendo illum terminum, *ille*, demonstrative. Et sic Socrates aliter intelligeret, intelligendo
 20 totum simul, quam duo intelligentes seorsum, geminando primam propositiorem. Nec est inconveniens, ymmo communiter convenit, quod simillimis signis correspondent diverse veritates primarie significate; et specialiter intelligendo terminos communes contracte ad aliqua
 25 singularia; ut communiter faciunt moderni, vocantes singulare pro quo componunt predicatum. Et illis foret idem, *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille*, ut si componeret quod *aliquis homo currit qui non est Sor*; sed aliter intelligentibus non sic esset.

30 Tercio nota quod relativum quandoque refertur ad terminum pro suo significato, et quandoque ad totam
 B 43^b propositiorem pro suo significato ad terminum; | ut in exemplis propositis ad propositiorem, ut hic: *chimera non est animal et tu vides illud*; potest enim
 35 intelligi quod *tu vides illam veritatem que est "chimeram non esse animal"*; vel aliter quod *vides animal quod non est chimera*; et in multis differunt tales sensus. Quandoque tamen oportet relacionem fieri ad totam
 40 propositiorem pro suo primario significato; ut hic: *Sor currit et hoc placet michi*. Potest enim placere michi de *non esse rei*, et de eius suspensione, aut alio eventu, et si illa non placeat michi. Ideo patet quod ille veri-

And understanding by some man a certain individual, it might be true that some man runs, and A is not he; but then he would mean a certain individual, not a common term.

And if understood in general, the proposition would be false, but A is not he, true.

Thus we can not admit the proposition some man runs, and he is not A, and he is not B; for we cannot refer he to the same individual man, unless we repeat the proposition. And it is quite possible for two very similar signs to mean different singulars.

The pronoun may stand for the term it signifies, or for the whole proposition relatively to that term;

and such senses are very different; sometimes it must necessarily stand for a whole proposition, for I may like v. g. certain qualities in an

individual,
and not the
individual
himself.

tates distingwuntur. Possum enim odire quod ille peccat, vel peccatum illius, quod idem est; et tamen non odire sed amare ipsum. Et sic possum ignorare quod ille est pater, vel paternitatem eius, quod idem est; et tamen non ignorare ipsum esse, quod est eius essentia 5 et ipse. Videtur tamen quod ego non diligo hominem esse in fovea, nisi quodammodo diligam eum dilectione confusa naturali, vel aliter inordinata. Nec cognosco Petrum nec aliquod accidens subiecti, nisi cognoscam ipsum subiectum, cum omne tale accidens sit *subiectum* 10 *aliquaqualiter accidentaliter se habere*. Sed de istis actenus sufficiat.

3. We answer that, according to Grosseteste, there are five species of universals: some exist before their singulars, and are not founded in them but in God, in the Angels or in the heavenly constellations; and they bear different names. The first are the eternal ideas, which assume only God's existence and His power of producing creatures.

They are in God as an extrinsecal pattern for Him to produce by;

they measure the being of things, and we cannot know things rightly without knowing them.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare universalia ex parte rei, et hoc secundum quinque gradus, ut docet Lincolniensis primo posteriorum. Aliqua enim sunt universalia 15 priora, singularibus corruptibilibus, non fundata in ipsis. Et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sint rationes fundate in deo sine alterius indigentia, vel in intelligenciis, vel 3^o in constellationibus celestibus. Omnes enim manieres universalium vocantur ydee, vel forma exemplares, vel 20 rationes, numeri, aut principia producendi aut causandi ista corruptibilia. Et prime sunt idee eterne, et vocantur a Lincolniensi concreatrices rei, nec ponunt aliud nisi deum esse, et talia posse produci a deo 25 secundum ordinem debitum et mensuram, ut productibilitas hominis in deo esset, quamvis non esset alia essentia preter deum, cum sit coeterna et correspondens productitati dei, sicut coeterna cum deo est talis veritas: *ista possunt ordinate produci*. Nec potest illa veritas 30 poni, nisi in deo qui est plenus veritate, nisi forte equivoce sit in aliis, in quibus est deus. Et notum est quod illa ratio est exemplar extrinsecum iuxta quod deus producit, cum non possit producere illas, nisi secundum suam productivitatem. Ideo sunt cause principiantes et numerantes, hoc est, mensurantes *esse* rei; et 35 illas oportet cognoscere cognoscendo res. Quis, rogo, cognosceret hominem debite, nisi precognoscendo quod est causabilis a deo 2^m debitam habitudinem ad alias partes mundi? et illa causabilitas est ydea primi modi.

11. a'qua^r acci^r B. 16. corrupti^b B. 21. (pn^a pro principia B.
23. r'r' pro rei B. 26. esse B. 28. produci^{te} B. 34. cē pro
cause B. 35. r'r' pro rei B.

Causabilitas vero correspondens causativitati intelligencie est universale 2ⁱ modi. Sed causabilitas correspondens causativitati orbis celestis est universale 3ⁱⁱ modi. Unde universalia primi modi dicuntur nunc in 5 predicacione materiali esse deus, quia nullum alium ponunt esse, nunc distingui 2^m racionem ab invicem et a deo, cum sint raciones formaliter diverse, sed nec substancie nec accidentia; et nunc dicuntur esse homines, quia sunt potencie ex quibus homines fiunt.

B 44^a Et ad istum sensum dicunt philosophi | quod quelibet creatura fuit eternaliter in deo in sua racione.

Sed preter illa tria est dare universales substancias fundatas in singularibus: ut *esse hominem* est veritas, ymmo necessitas communis cuilibet hominum: et illa 15 veritas est species specialissima. Sed plebei et bruta, cognoscendo hominem in suis accidentibus, ut per figuram, vocem et alias proprietates accidentales, etsi cognoscant confuse hominem seu speciem illam, tamen primo cognoscunt accidens vel proprium, posterius 20 specie; et illud vocat Lincolniensis universale 5^{ti} modi. Et de aliis speciebus universalium Porphyrii et suis distincionibus dictum est superius.

Nec dubito quin, concedendo veritates correspondere quibuscunque proposicionibus veris, concedendum est 25 communiter illa universalia esse; ut hec proposicio necessaria, *homo est*, significat primarie veritatem; et, cum sit necesse illam esse, patet quod oportet distinguere tanquam priorem a quacunque tali veritate, *illum hominem esse*. Et illam veritatem suppono esse essen- 30 ciam, naturam, vel speciem humanam. Et propter ignoranciam talium universalium lapsi sunt moderni in multos errores; ut aliqui negant terminos universales, aliqui dicunt quod non est signare quid talis terminus communis significat: et sic nulla talis proposicio signi- 35 ficat primarie sicut est. Aliqui dicunt quod illa proposicio, *homo est*, singulum hominem significat esse; et sic quelibet proposicio significat primarie sicut non est. Alii dicunt quod est dare qualiter ex parte rei primarie significat talis proposicio, sicut illud, *qualiter*, 40 non est ens. Sed ipsi peccant in noticia significacionis

The second and third species are passive potentialities. The first universals are in one sense identical with God, in another distinct from Him and from one another, but neither substances nor accidents. There are also universal substances founded upon individuals; as *humanity* is common to all men; but the people and brutes know man only by his external activities, which knowledge produces a fifth kind of universals.

These universals must then be granted; for the necessity of man's existence must be distinguished from the fact of this or that man existing. Ignorance of this has led the moderns into many errors. Some say that *Man exists* has no signification; others that it signifies a singular man; which denies it to mean as it is. Others admit that it means as it is;

1. $\widehat{\text{cat}}^{\text{u}}$ pro causativitati B. 3. $\widehat{\text{cat}}^{\text{iv}}^{\text{it}}^{\text{at}}^{\text{it}}$ B. 5. $\widetilde{\text{m}}^{\text{lij}}$ pro materiali B;
ib. nullam aliam B. 6. po^{u} B. 9. $\widetilde{\text{po}}^{\text{o}}$ B. 21. pori B.

but say that as is not a being; in which they are wrong.

We, therefore, deny the three first conclusions of the last argument, because the supposition of the antecedent is personal and not essential. But we admit the last: there is no difference in saying *That man is, is necessary*; or *It is necessary for man to be*; for the supposition is not personal, but essential.

And in this sense many men are one, and an animal is every animal.

Different authors have answered these objections differently; and as some abandon the position because of the difficulty of answering, I will subjoin the usual problems and solutions.
I. *How can we distinguish universals from each other and from their singulars?*

termini, cum ens sit commune ad omne ens predicabile, et omne significatum propositionis; ut patet 4^o metaphisice 2^o, et 5^o metaphisice capitulo de ente; et 6^o metaphisice c^o 2^o.

Suppositis ergo omnibus istis delineatis a logica, patet 5^o quod tales veritates, *hominem esse producibilem, hominem esse* etc. sunt; et illas suppono denominari per talia abstracta, *producibilitas hominis, essentia hominis*, etc. Et illa sunt universalia que ego pono, sicut et antiqui concorditer posuerunt. Et tunc ad 3^s primas conclusiones dicitur quod sunt negande, eo quod antecedens relativi stat personaliter per limitationem signi particularis et predicati personalis. Ideo relativum refert ipsum personaliter et non simpliciter. Sed ultima conclusio est concedenda, cum eque contingit intelligere 15 terminum communem supponere confuse tantum a parte subiecti sicut a parte predicati, precedente termino confundente; sicut conceditur quod *hominem esse*, est necessarium; sic quod necessarium est *hominem esse*. Et talis suppositio in sensu composito, ubi non est 20 signare singulare pro quo propositio verificatur, sed propter primarium significatum termini, est una manieres suppositionis simplicis. Sicut ergo predicacione speciei *plures homines sunt unus homo*, quia communis homo, sic *animal est omne animal*, sicut omne animal est 25 animal. Et sophismata que videntur sonare in oppositum sunt in onus logico, inpediencia eum ad breviter et faciliter loquendum, et intelligendum sapienciam antiquorum. |

Sed ulterius notandum quod diversimode inventi sunt B 44^b auctores respondere ad evidencias factas contra illam posicionem. Et credo quod difficultas distingwendi probabilius in ista materia, et apparencia inconsonantie conclusionum sequencium quo ad vulgus, fecit multos dimittere illam posicionem. Unde recitabo communes 35 raciones et respensiones in illa materia, ut veritas magis appareat. Videtur quod, si tale universale sit quodlibet eius inferius, tunc non distingwuntur universalialia ad invicem vel a singularibus; cum omne singulare sit species specialissima, genus intermedium et 40

5. delnat^o B. 12. p^r pro personaliter B. 16. in^o pro tantum B.
27. in o^o pro in onus B; ib. eū, or^o B.

1. See *De Ente Predicamentali* p. 1, l. 1, 2; p. 2, l. 27.

genus generalissimum; et per consequens conversim e contra non est genus vel species, nisi singularis. In illa materia est duplex responsio. Prima negat universale esse singulare et speciem esse genus generalissimum, 5 vel sic mixtim; quia, cum termini tales 2^e intenciones limitant ad suppositionem simplicem solum pro illis que primo significant, patet quod, sicut rationes illorum significant seu differunt, sic et illa; nec sunt illa universalia a singularibus separata, sed insunt illis; non tamen sunt 10 illa. Et illa responsio satis tollit evidencias supradictas.

Sed alia est responsio, concedens omne universale esse quodcumque eius inferius, quia termini tales 2^e intencionis possunt supponere suppositione simplici generali, ut hic: *animal predicatur*, demptis speciebus; vel suppo- 15 sitione simplici speciali, ut hic: *animal est species specialissima*; suppositione personali; ut hic: *animal est Sor.* Nec impediunt termini 2^e intencionis tales suppositiones, existentibus aliis extremis, proporcionatis ad tales suppositiones. Et isto modo invenies auctores 20 sepe loquentes, ponentes universalia multiplicari numerosius in suis singularibus. Et totum universale per hoc differt a toto integrali, quod ipsum est eius pars subiectiva, et non totum integrale est eius pars; quia aliter non vere predicaretur genus de sua specie, nec 25 universale se haberet ad sua singularia sicut essentia trina se habet ad sua supposita. Et sic, demptis evidenciis, quantum ad electionem responsionis in illa materia, non dubium quin intricacio non est in re ipsa, sed in signis. Nec dubium quin ille due responsiones 30 non contradicunt; sed eadem est sententia tenendi utriusque. Teneo ergo 2^{am} responsionem, que est communicatior; et cum hoc dico quod est differentia universalium, ut prius dictum est.

Unde, pro responsione notandum quod tripliciter 35 accipitur differentia: primo modo, pro quacumque accidentali proprietate, sive separabili, ut accidentia generum, sive inseparabili, ut passiones per se inexistentes. Secundo modo accipitur pro speciali qualitate, que non est substantia, sed principium substantie, sicut 40 *rationalis*. Sed 3^o modo accipitur pro relatione, que est, unum differre a reliquo. Et sic differentie duorum

Some say that singulars are not properly species and genera, since these cannot receive personal supposition. Thus these universals are *in them*, but are not *they*.

Another solution is that the universal is each of its particulars, but with different suppositions.

It is in this sense that the Universal is said to be multiplied in its individuals. A universal whole is a subjective part of an integral whole, and not vice versa.

So the difficulty is not in the things themselves, but verbal and though both answers come to the same, I prefer the second as more convenient in debate. Difference may mean any accidental property, or any specific quality, constitutive of a substance, or the relation of non-identity between two things.

33. 8^r (d^r?) pro differentia B. 37. 9 grūū B.

35. See *De Ente Predicamentali*, p. 32, l. 5.

Again two may differ totally, as two individuals, or two different species; partially, as the whole and its part; or merely logically, the points of views being different.

Some differ more than generically, some generically, some specifically, and some individually. And some, though differing specifically, may be identical with the same subject.

Some differ only logically, while they are the same singular being; as the mind is memory, reason and will.

priorum modorum affirmant differenciam 3ⁱⁱ modi. 2^o notandum quod tripliciter dicuntur aliqua differre ab invicem: vel totaliter 2^m essenciam, sicut duo individua vel due species incommunicantes, ut *Sor* et *Plato*, *homo* et *asinus*; vel 2^o parcialiter, ut | vel duo 5 particulariter, ut singularia que communicant in partibus B 45^a integralibus, et universalia que communicant in partibus subiectivis: quomodo differunt *corpus Sortis* et *medietas Sortis*, et *animal* et *homo*. Sed tercio dicuntur aliqua differre secundum racionem, quando eadem est 10 essencia utriusque, sed raciones formales sunt diverse: ut quantitas eiusdem subiecti, et figura, et superficies, et eius concavitas. Sicut enim curvitas accidit linee, sic concavitas superficiiei. Et sic sunt isti tres modi differendi specie specialissime differenciarum, cum ali- 15 qua differunt primo plus quam genere, ut *deus* et *homo*, alia genere, ut *homo* et *albedo*; aliqua specie, ut *homo* et *asinus*; aliqua numero, ut *Sor* et *Plato*. Aliqua eciam differunt 3^o modo in genere et sunt idem subiecto singulari: ut *figura Sortis* et *eius quantitas*; eadem tamen 20 est essencia utriusque, quia *Sor*. Essencia enim famose vocatur substancia que potest per se subsistere, licet quandoque cuiuscunque predicamenti species vocetur essencia, sicut et substancia, respectu sui accidentis. Aliqua autem differunt et secundum racionem, dum 25 sunt idem singulare; ut *memoria anime*, et *ratio eiusdem*. Memoria enim, ratio et voluntas, sunt una anima in numero et differunt inter se. Aliquando non differunt 2^m racionem, dum unum sit subiectum alterius, sic quod forma dicit idem subiectum et superaddit modum 30 vel racionem; sive forma sit accidens accidentaliter inexistens, ut *albedo*, sive accidens per se inexistens, ut passio, sive substancialis qualitas per se 1^o inexistens;

1. Multipliciter aliqua different in marg. B. 5, 6. Another handwriting from the words vel duo particu^r B. 13. sua pro eius corr. B.
 14. ut^o pro et sic B. 25. ũn; a^l above B. 28, 29. Aliquando — alterius in marg. B.

5, 6. The second handwriting (from f. 45^a to f. 122^a) is illegible rather on account of its being very close and much abbreviated than from careless penmanship; while the third (f. 122^a to 176) is just the contrary. The first is fairly good. From f. 45^a to 122^a there are many marginal notes, very few of any value. — *Ut vel duo particulariter* is evidently a duplication, including a mistake. I have left it in the text because the page begins with those words.

ut *rationalitas* inest homini; et quodlibet illorum dicit eandem essenciam in numero.

Sed 4^o dicuntur aliqua secundum rationem [differre,] etsi dicant precise eandem essenciam et predicentur de se invicem, secundum equum ambitum. Sed rationes diverse insunt illis; ut existente unica fenice, tunc fenix universalis differt a illa, non subiecto sed ratione, cum illa sit incommunicabilis et fenix communis est communicabilis et illa apud aliquos vocatur distincio et non differencia. Et per ista dicitur quod genus differt a sua specie secundum partem, cum sit reliqua species, que totaliter dividitur a priori specie; sicut homo communis per aliquid singulare differt a Sor, et tamen est Sor; et e contra Sor differt ab homine communi, non secundum suppositum, sed secundum rationem, cum sit communicabilis, et homo communis est incommunicabilis; et sic homo communis dupliciter differt a Sorte, quia et secundum suppositum et secundum rationem.

Et si dicatur quod si Sor differt ab homine communi, tunc non est homo communis, iuxta exponentes dictas tractatu proximo; dicitur quod ibidem exponitur differencia primi modi et non complete ista differencia, quia paulative oportet ascendere in tales subtiles materias. Unde sicut prius dicitur [quod] oportet resolve vere primum terminum in exponendo huiusmodi propositiones; ut ista: *Sor differt a specie* debet exponi resolvendo hoc verbum *differt*, significans confuse ad differencias supradictas; ut si *Sor aliqua differencia differt a specie*, ergo *Sor differt a specie*. Et antecedens patet ex hoc quod Sor ratione incommunicabilitatis differt a specie. Et tunc ista propositio: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate differt a specie*, debet exponi, ut superius dictum est: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate est, et species est, et Sor ista incommunicabilitate non est species*. Igitur etc. Nec sequitur: *ista incommunicabilitate vel individuacione Sor est ille homo*; ergo, *secundum illam est species*; et conformiter dicitur ad omnia similia.

2^o dubitatur si ens transcendens sit commune ad deum et ad omnia creata, ut supra dictum est. Et

There is yet another difference (called also a distinction without a difference), as between the universal and the individual phoenix; there can be only one of each, but the former is communicable to successive singulars, and the other not. It is by this difference that the genus differs from its species, and the universal from the individual man.

According to the last treatise, if A differs from the universal man, he is not the universal man; but I then purposely avoided going into all the details of these differences, on account of the difficulty of the matter. But it is clear that A must differ, if he is incommunicable and the universal not; as may be set forth by exposition.

II. *Is transcendent Being common both to God and creatures?*

2. eā pro eandem B. 3. differre *deest* B. 4, 5. de se i = de se ipsis? B. 16. incommunicabilis B. 23. paulatic B. 24. quod *deest* B. 26. sic (= specie?) B.

21. See *Logica*, vol. I, p. 122, l. 4—16.

If so, then there would be an identity beyond that of genus, species or number, which can coexist with the greatest possible diversity; and God would be caused by Himself, since He caused all being and is all being. But on the other hand, the universal can belong to its particulars in two ways; either as a difference or as a transcendent mode of being. The first must be denied; but the second is univocal, since it signifies the same by the same sign. It does not follow that anything besides God is God; that which is God is indeed other than God; but this is a subject of transcendent being. So also, the universal man is that which is A, and that which is other than A.

All deductions to the contrary are mere paralogisms.

videtur quod non, quia sic foret alia ydentitas quam identitas generis, speciei vel numeri, et per consequens summa diversitas vel differentia non excluderet idempnitatem, sicut summa magnitudo excludit parvitatem; et sic de omnibus similibus infinitis denominacionibus 5 positis. Videtur eciam quod deus sit causatum a deo, | quia ens transcendens est primum causatum a deo, et B 45^b deus est illud, cum ipse sit omne ens, sicut homo est omnis homo.

Sed pro illo supponitur quod dupliciter commune 10 possit univoce participari suis inferioribus: vel secundum rationem differentie, sicut univērsalia participantur a suis individuīs; vel ratione transcendencie, ut ratione essendi, sicut analogia participatur. Primo modo non est ens univocum, quia sic esset genus. Sed 2^o modo 15 satis univoce participatur, cum significat omnia illa sub eodem signo naturaliter representata. Unde licet ens transcendens sit omne ens, non tamen aliud a deo, vel inferius deo, est deus. Sicut ergo non sequitur: *homo communis est Sor et ille homo communis est Plato: ergo, 20 Sor est Plato; ita non sequitur: ens transcendens est deus et ens transcendens est aliud a deo, ergo, aliud a deo est deus*. Nec est maior color in istis quam in suis convertibilibus, sic argumentando: *homo est Sor, et homo est aliud a Sor: igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*. Nec sequitur: 25 *illud quod est aliud a deo est deus: igitur aliud a deo est deus; ut non sequitur: illud commune quod est aliud a Sor est Sor; igitur aliud a Sor est Sor*. Sicut enim homo communis est Sor, ita est aliud a Sor; sicut in suo convertibili: *Sor est homo, et aliud a Sor est homo: 30 igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*. Nec sequitur, *hoc est deus et hoc est aliud a deo; igitur, aliud a deo est deus; sicut non sequitur: Ista natura communis est Sor et illa est aliud a Sor: igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*.

Nec est maior color in ista deduceione quam sic 35 argumentando: *homo est Sor et homo est aliud a Sor,*

5. similibus *underneath* omnibus B. 11. *pti*^a B. 17. *eo pro* eodem B. 27. nec *above* ut B.

11. *pti*^a B.

17. *eo pro*

16. *Univoce*. In the great question of the Analogy of Being, moderate Realists abhor using the very term *univoce*; but their *analogia proportionis secundi generis*, as Suarez calls it, does not seem to differ very substantially from Wyclif's position. Yet the slightest differences are important here.

ergo Sor est aliud a Sor; nec est talis deduccio syllogismus expository, sed paralogismus syllogismo expository oppositus; sic argumentando: *hoc est deus, et hoc est aliud a deo; ergo deus est aliud a deo*, posito quod iste terminus, *hoc*, convertatur cum transcendente. Argumentatur enim affirmative a superiori ad suum inferius. Pronomen enim non est demonstrativum in proposito, nec vere pronomen, sed terminus convertibilis cum ente. Et si intenditur eius significati demonstratio, tunc aliud demonstratur in maiori, aliud in minori. Sicut ergo Sor est *illud quod est Plato*, ita quodlibet est ens transcendens, quod est deus; sed non est deus. Nec sequitur, si *deus est illud quod est creatura vel creatum*, quod *deus sit creatura vel creatum*. Deus tamen necessario est supremum causatum, sicut est creatura per naturam assumptam, ut narrant theologo. Non est vis, sive ponatur illa conveniencia in transcendente idemptitas, sive non; ideo consequens. Philosophus tamen loquitur de idemptitate in genere et non alia.

Ex istis patet quod illi qui dicunt nullum individuum esse speciem ad illum sensum quod nullum individuum potest communicari multis individuis separatis, et illi qui dicunt quodlibet individuum esse quodlibet suum superius, et econtra, intelligendo per terminos 2^c intentionis sua denominata confuse, non contradicunt; sicut nec illi qui concedunt quod homo est species et nullus homo est species. Prima enim significat quod *esse hominem* est communicabile cuicumque individuo hominis; et 2^a significat quod nulli individuo hominis contingit sic communicari. Nam communissime, cum terminis significantibus per se idem significatum sed variatis in suppositione vel modo significandi, propositiones sunt valde disparium sensuum, ut hic: *homo est homines et homo est homo; A videt hominem, et hominem videt A; homo communis est omnis homo, et homo singularis est omnis homo*.

Sed 3^o dubitatur si universale recipit accidentalem predicacionem; ut conceditur quod homo communis comedit, dormit, et facit quidquid singularis homo

"This" is God; "this" is other than "God".

Nothing follows, for "this" has only meaning as the pointing to something; now there are two distinct pointings here; or if it be not a demonstrative, it means transcendental being, which is not God.

Nor does it follow that God is caused: though God, by the Incarnation, is really caused.

To deny that an individual is a species, because of its singularity, and to admit this in the sense of *belonging to a species*, is not contradictory; we grant that the essence is common, and deny that the individual is so. Propositions may have very different significations, according to the supposition given to them.

III. Can a universal receive accidental attributes?

3. sic argumentando in marg. B. 9, 10. ut demra^o B. 15. fpp^{um} = supremum B. 32. p^o pro per se B. 38. dūt^o pro dubitatur B.

If so the universal *man* eats, drinks, and has many opposite qualities at once;

if not, universals are of no use; besides, universal accidents would then have no subjects.

To answer this, we may first deny that they receive such attributes.

Predication is either
(1) essential,

or (2) accidental by *inherence* of a form; this latter is to be denied: humanity is not *white*, but it is *that which is white*.

Or (3) by connection with a cause;

or (4) as a mere extrinsic relation.

Why these are to be denied. If the essence received

facit, sicut derisorie arguunt illi quibus deficiunt argumenta in ista materia. Et videtur quod non, quia sic idem esset album et nigrum, sedens et non sedens; generaretur et corrumperetur; et esset maius et minus se ipso; et sic de multis inconvenientibus. Videtur tamen quod suscipit predicaciones accidentales, quia aliter superfluerent universalia, nisi aliquid possent facere vel ad aliquid deservirent. Nec haberent universalia accidentia subiecta illis proposita, nisi inessent substantiis^{2is}, que ideo minus sunt substantie quam substantie prime secundum doctrinam Philosophi; quia minus substant accidentibus quam substantie singulares. B 46^a 10

Pro illa materia notandum quod duplex est responsio, sicut in prima materia. Aliqui enim negant tales predicaciones accidentales formales de substantiis universalibus, distingwendo primo de 4 generibus predicacionum. Alia enim est predicacio secundum essenciam, quando predicatum inest subiecto, sed non per formalem inexistenciam suo subiecto; ut hic: *homo est animal*, *species est album*, et generaliter quando predicatum significatum est nomen substantivatum per subiectum. Alia est predicacio per inherenciam forme, ad quam contingit esse motum, vel inexistenciam quam consequitur per se mobilitas; ut quando predicantur verba adiectiva, vel nomina adiectiva substantivata per substantiam; ut hic: *homo quantificatur*, *qualificatur*, *agit*, *patitur*, *locatur*, *durat*, *sedet* vel *ditatur*. Et tales predicaciones negantur de universalibus et de terminis ultimate abstraccionis: ut *humanitas non est alba*, nec *essencia generat*. Et sic de similibus predicatis personalibus. Humanitas tamen est *album*, et essencia est *generans*, intelligendo in negativo genere substantivato. 3^{us} modus predicandi est predicacio secundum causam, ut hic: *dies est lacio solis*, *motus est mobile*, et sic de aliis. 4^a predicacio est secundum habitudinem; ut *homo intelligitur*, *similatur*; et sic de aliis relacionibus differentibus. Et tales predicaciones recipiunt universalia. 35

Causa autem quare negantur predicata particularia de terminis abstractis, est ista. Termini abstracti ordi- 40

3. a^m pro album B. 17. 1^o pro primo B. 26. na^m pro nomina B.
28. sedet in marg. B. 33. 1^{ne} pro in negativo B.

nantur ad significandum simpliciter veritates abstractas
 5 quas primo significant, eo quod aliter sequitur confusio
 locucionum distinguencium huiusmodi veritates; ut, cum
 aliud sit *esse hominem*, et *esse album* etiam aliud (et
 sic de ceteris), quomodo cognoscentibus haberentur
 signa distingvencia huiusmodi veritates? quoniam, di-
 cendo quod 1^a est qualitas et etiam albedo vel albacio,
 modo, si isti termini supponerent concrete, sicut
 10 *homo est album*; tunc sicut *homo est albus*, ita *humanitas*
esset albacio; nec esset distinccio accidencium a sub-
 stancia. Non ergo sequitur: *humanitas est ille homo*, et
ille homo est albus; ergo, *humanitas est alba*, quia
 15 *humanitas est essencia hominis*; que si esset alba, tunc
esset albedo; talem enim sensum limitat subiectum,
 supponendo abstracte.

Unde aptissimum medium inveniendi differenciam
 vel distinccionem aliquorum est regula Aristotelis: Si
 aliquod ens inest uni quod a reliquo removetur, tunc
 ista differunt; ut, quia *esse hominem* potest manere cum
 20 hoc quod *esse album* tollatur iam ipsis existentibus;
 ergo, quod est *esse hominem* et quod est *esse album*
 differunt. Et illam differenciam nomino supradictis
 abstractis. Quando tunc unum est communius ad reli-
 quum, tunc non sequitur simpliciter negacio superioris
 25 de suo inferiori; ut non sequitur: *ista potencia est in-*
communicabilis et illa essencia est communicabilis; ergo
illa potencia non est illa essencia; sed bene sequitur
 quod *illa que sunt illa potencia et ista essencia differunt*.
 Nec esset possibile tollere illam regulam condicionalem.
 30 Infinitive tamen oraciones sunt concrete, nec conver-
 tuntur cum abstractis, ut: *hominem cecum esse* est *ho-*
minem esse, et per consequens homo. *Cecitas* autem
 non est homo; ideo non convertitur. Verumtamen in
 re *cecum esse* est *esse cecum* et per consequens *cecitas*;
 35 sed signa non convertuntur, ut dicit Aristoteles. Uni-
 versalia ergo causant individua, et per consequens
 multum deserviunt in universitate. Nec sequitur; *uni-*
versale facit illum cursum; ergo *currit*; sicut non
 sequitur de deo. Homo communis ergo facit quicquid

accidental
 attributes (such
 v. g. as
 whiteness) it
 would be
 essentially
 white,

and there
 would be no
 distinction
 between
 accident and
 substance.

Aristotle's rule
 for knowing
 whether two
 things differ is
 the possible
 absence
 of the one, the
 other
 remaining;
 whiteness
 differs, therefore,
 from humanity.

A quality
 may be
 the essence,
 but that which
 is the essence
 and that which
 is the quality
 are different.

The universals
 cause the
 individual, and
 therefore are of
 great use; they
 sustain
 universal
 accidents only,
 not particular
 ones, and are
 therefore less of
 substances than
 their singulars.

3. lacu com pro locucionem B. 5. quo B. 9. et pro est before
 album B. 11—13. est ille — est essencia in marg. B. 22 noio B.
 25. po usually passio B. 27. po B. 28. po B. 29. qditem pro
 condicionalem B. 31. et pro est B.

homo singularis facit, cum causat illud efficienter; et tamen non loquitur, generat, comedit, et sic universaliter substat accidentibus universalibus tantum; sed singulare substat tam singularibus quam universalibus accidentibus, et ideo est magis substantia. 5

Secondly, we may grant that they receive accidents in their particulars, since they are what their particulars are. The Universal would not then be simply greater than itself, but greater than in one or another individual. By this means, it can have infinite different attributes, positive but not negative; or at least negative only in this or that individual.

Alia vero responsio admittit terminos tales in suppositione personali, concedendo quod homo communis currit, sicut et ille homo; et est eiusmodi cuius est aliquis singularis homo. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod sit sapiencior | vel maior se ipso: sed bene sequitur quod sit sapiencior vel maior quam est in isto vel in isto supposito. Nec sequitur, si generatur et moritur vel corrumpitur, quod non est, sed bene sequitur quod incipit vel desinit non esse in isto vel in isto subiecto. Et sic ridet cum ridentibus et flet cum flentibus. Nec sequitur quod sit monstrum, quamvis habeat infinita capita et omnia organa hominis singularis, quia non in eodem supposito, sed in diversis habet illa. Sed negative negantur, ut non sequitur: *iste homo non sedet, et iste homo est homo communis; ergo homo simpliciter vel homo communis non sedet.* Sed bene sequitur quod non sedet in illo supposito. Sed alii concedunt quod *homo communis non sedet*; nec ex hoc sequitur simpliciter quod *nemo sedet*, sicut nec ex affirmativa sequitur quod *omnis homo sedet.* 25

I note these answers, because there is often much confusion, authors admitting and denying the same thing in different senses; for my own part, I think both are good, but prefer the wording of the former, according to which theologians deny that the Godhead suffered, although it was a person who suffered. Examples of similar

Istas responsiones recito, ut concipiantur auctores qui quandoque locuntur secundum unam et quandoque secundum aliam. Nec contradicunt, sed equivocant in suppositione. Ego autem elegi utrumque sensum et utramque sententiam, sed utor verbis prioris responsionis, quia non dubium quin Aristoteles negaret quod *essencia hominis albatur*, etsi ille homo *qui est* illa essencia albatur: ut theologus [non] habet concedere quod divine essencia est mobilis, divisibilis, paciebatur etc. quamvis sit illud quod paciebatur, moriebatur etc. sed est passum, divisibile, creatura; et sic de predicatis substantivis. 35

Nec debent talia recitari pro argumentis: *hoc albatur*, et *hoc est illa essencia: igitur illa essencia albatur; hoc est Sor et hoc est Plato: igitur Sor est Plato.* *Omnis natura universalis hominis est Sor; omnis Plato*

8. cuq3 pro cuius est; est above B. 11. existo vel B. 17. argat pro organa B. 31. ne^o pro negaret B. 33. non deest B.

est natura hominis universalis hominis: igitur, omnis
 Plato est Sor. Nullus Plato est Sor: omnis natura ho-
 minis specifica est Plato: igitur nulla natura hominis
 specifica est Sor. Et sic de infinitis in vanum multi-
 5 plicatis. In omnibus enim talibus est variatio suppo-
 sitionis alicuius termini terminorum principiatiivi syllo-
 gismi; ut in primo argumento quod sinistre vocatur
 syllogismus expository, supponit *ly* 'hoc' in maiori pro
 supposito vel persona compositi; et, sub ratione qua
 10 illud suppositum [est,] sibi inest albedo vel albescietas;
 et in minori supponit absolucius pro essentia, que, ut
 illa essentia, non est albedo. Ideo idem est ac si ex
 istis premissis concluderetur quod illa essentia est
 15 albedo. Cum enim terminus abstractus supponit sim-
 pliciter pro esse hominem, et oppositum predicatur for-
 maliter, dependenter substantivatum ad subiectum,
 oportet ipsam supponere abstracte, ut ille sit sensus:
 esse hominem est esse album. Sed si predicatum per se
 supponeret sine dependencia ad subiectum, tunc con-
 20 tingeret ipsum intelligere personaliter: ut hic: illa
 essentia est album; et illa conclusio sequitur bene ex
 illis premissis, sed alia non. Unde conformiter dicunt
 theologi quod et persone sunt eterne et tam res quam
 persone eterne, et tamen non sunt eterni; quia adiectivum
 25 professionis per se supponens supponit similiter pro
 essentia, ipso significante proprie illud quod est com-
 mune tribus.

Quo ad 2^m, patet argumentum quod non est color
 in deducione, cum medium sit commune. Ac si sic
 30 argueretur: Sor est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sor
 est Plato. Et eodem modo non sequitur: Illa potentia,
 vel illa materia est illa essentia et illa forma vel ille
 actus est eadem essentia: igitur; materia illa est forma
 illa. Sed bene sequitur ex premissis quod materia sit
 35 illud quod est illa forma; quod est verum, cum illa
 essentia sit communis ad materiam, formam et com-
 positum ex hiis. Unde, sicut theologi concedunt quod
 B 47^a mobile et divisibile est immobile et indivisibile, | cum
 homo sit natura divina, et tamen ille homo non est
 40 indivisibilis, invisibilis, increatus, quamvis sit illud quod

objections, all
 solved in the
 same way:
 In all these the
 supposition of
 the middle
 term varies
 from the major
 to the minor;

if the
 supposition is
 kept the same
 all through, the
 conclusion is
 not against us.
 Thus, for the
 first example,
 we admit that
 the essence is,
 not white, but
 something
 white; which
 distinction
 occurs in the
 mystery of the
 Trinity.

For the second
 we cannot
 argue, from the
 fact that two
 things agree,
 that they are
 identical,
 v. g. matter and
 form are each
 of them the
 compound
 body; yet
 matter is not
 form.
 Man is the
 divine nature
 (in Christ), yet
 he is not
 increate, and
 thus the
 communicable
 universal is

1. hominis in marg. B. 8. homo pro hoc B. 10. est deest B.
 15. appo pro oppositum B. 29. gmc pro commune B.

incommuni-
cable in its
subjects, but not
in its nature

And thus,
immovable in
itself and
movable in its
subjects; and
when we say:
*that nature is
extended, seen,
&c.*, we should
convert it so:
*the nature that
is extended,
seen, &c., is
that nature,
and the
adjective,
attributed thus
to the subject,
makes one verb.*

For the *third*:
it is quite true
that of two
individual men,
A and B, both
are *that which*
the other is;
but not that
A is B,
no more than
for matter and
form.
The nature
v. g. of fire,
being made up
of three
different factors,
we cannot
conclude that
each of them is
igneity;

est huiusmodi; sic communicabilis universalis, quia natura
communicabilis, est incommunicabilis, quia tam res
quam persona incommunicabilis; et tamen illa natura
communicabilis non est tantum natura incommunicabilis.
Et conformiter conceditur quod illud quod non potest 5
moveri est mobile, quia res mobilis; et tamen illa res
non est mobilis. Unde illa propositio debet sic con-
verti: *natura mobilis est illa res*; et illa: *natura exten-*
ditur, videtur, et cetera, debet sic converti: *natura*
extensa, visa etc. est illa natura. Et eodem modo de 10
negativis, ut est illa: *nulla natura communis est incom-*
municabilis, debet sic converti: *nulla essentia incommuni-*
cabilis est natura communis, quorum utrumque est verum.
Cum tamen illa natura est res incommunicabilis, quia
persona incommunicabilis, quia quandoque adiectivum 15
appositum substantivatur per suppositum, tunc equivalet
ac si verbum adiectivum predicaretur in adiacens: ut,
si *homo est quantus, albus, relatus*, etc. tunc *homo*
quantificatur, albificatur, refertur, etc. Sed hoc non
oportet, quando predicatum substantivatur per se. Unde 20
peheles in absoluto dicit quod ex significato adiectivi
appositi et significato substantivi supposito implicatur
feri una *usia*, sicut fit ex materia et forma, non sicut
quando predicatum non substantivatur per subiectum.
Et illud est cum diligencia inprimendum. 25

Quo ad 3^m argumentum, patet quod non sequitur;
sed ex illis premissis bene sequitur quod *omnis Plato*
sit idem Sorti vel *illud quod est Sor*, et hoc est verum;
sed non sequitur, si *Sor est illud quod est Plato*; ergo
Sor est Plato, sicut non sequitur: *materia est illud* 30
quod est forma: ergo materia est forma. Nec sequitur:
illud est omne quod est ille; ignis est illa igneitas; ergo
omne quod est ille ignis est illa igneitas. Nam essentia
vel natura illius ignis est 3^a differentia inter se. Ideo
non tantum ille ignis est illa essentia, cum illud quod non 35
est iste ignis est ista essentia, quia tam materia quam
forma. Unde, quamvis ille ignis sit *alius* quam sua

4. tam B. 15. \bar{p} pro persona B. 16. fbstmar^r pro substantivatur B.
20. fbstmar^r B. 21. pehelie B. 25. $\bar{ip}'\bar{s}$ B. 26. Quo pro Quo B.

21. *Peheles*. I can find no meaning to this word. *Peri Hermeneias* seems too far-fetched, unless this is a conventional abbreviation for an often recurring title. 32. I am not quite certain whether we ought not to read here *ille; ille; or ille ignis: ille ignis*.

materia, non tamen est *aliud*, licet *hoc* sit aliud (demonstrando istum ignem). Nam ille terminus, *aliud*, in neutro genere substantivatus dicit alietatem essencie subiecte vel nature. Et aliter non oportet, quamvis aliqua dicta antiquorum sonant quod unus homo est *alius* quam reliquus, sed non *aliud*; quia tunc, ut dicunt, non essentialiter eadem natura singularis vel universalis. Probabile tamen videtur quod est dare alietatem essenciarum singularium, que sunt eadem essentia universalis: ut *ego sum aliud a Sor*, quia alia natura singularis; et *materia illius ignis est alia ab illa forma*, quia aliud suppositum; et tamen illa non est aliud, quia non est alia essentia. Unde illa exclusiva est falsa: *Tantum aliquod illorum est essentia ignis*, demonstrando per *ly* "illorum" omnes formas ignis, habebit illam universalem affirmativam convertibilem: *omne quod est essentia ignis est aliquod illorum*; quod est falsum, cum tam materie quam composita sunt essencie ignis. Et sic corruptibile est incorruptibile, quia essentia et materia incorruptibilis; et tamen ille ignis non est incorruptibilis, cum possit naturaliter corrumpi. Nec sunt illa opposita: *res corruptibilis et res incorruptibilis*, sicut nec ista, *corruptibile et incorruptibile* convertibiliter significantes. *Quilibet enim homo est res incorruptibilis*, quamvis non quodlibet sit *incorruptibile*. Unde, sicut non sequitur: *Ego sum natura universalis, et illa est incorruptibilis; ergo ego sum incorruptibilis*; ita non sequitur: *ista ignis est ista essentia, et ista essentia est incorruptibilis: ergo, iste ignis est incorruptibilis*. Nec sequitur ex isto quod *homo sit non homo, album, nigrum*, vel quodcunque reliquum inconveniens. Album enim est illud commune quod est nigrum, quia suppositum nigrum; et tamen illa res communis nec est alba nec nigra.

Quo ad exemplum 4^m, dicitur quod non sequitur: sed bene sequitur ex illis premissis quod *nulla natura specifica est Sorteitas vel individuacio Sortis*; quod est necessarium. Nec sequitur, *nullus Plato est Sor*, ergo *nullus Plato est illud quod est Sor*; sicut non sequitur: *nullum album est nigrum; ergo nullum album est illud quod est nigrum*. Si enim *album* esset *nigrum*, tunc *res*

and though fire is different from one factor (v. g. its matter), it is not a different thing.

There may be otherness amongst those singular essences which are identical with their universals; but this otherness does not make them other things.

Thus it were false to say: *Only one of these forms is the nature of fire*; for then we should have to exclude the matter, and the whole compounds. Many expressions therefore, apparently contradictory, are not really so.

And so none of the above-mentioned absurdities is to be met with in this theory.

As for the fourth instance; it follows merely that no specific essence that is A is the individuality of B; as in the foregoing examples.

3. sbstātinaty B.

4. a^o pro aliter B.32. g^{me} pro commune B.

If it is urged that the universal man is 'able to laugh' and yet cannot, we again distinguish: *able to laugh in its subjects, in those beings which it is.*

All sophisms against the Trinity find their parallel here, and must be answered likewise.

All these fallacies come under the heads of figures of speech, or of the accidental. As: you are now what you were yesterday; *yesterday you were sitting; therefore you are so to-day.* Comparison with a fallacy on the persons of the Trinity. There is a mean between *per se* and *per accidens*.

alba esset res nigra, sicut res corruptibilis esset res incorruptibilis; sed hoc non potest verificari pro re singulari, quod res singularis alba esset res singularis nigra; et cum nulla res universalis sit alba vel nigra, patet quod non verificaretur, qualitercunque extrema 5 *supponerent. Et si obiciatur quod natura specifica, puta animal risibile ex hoc quod potest ridere, tamen sit nichil, dicitur quod illa natura non est risibilis, sicut nec potest ridere, sed est omne risibile et omnis homo risibilis. Nec sequitur: omnis homo est risibilis; natura specifica est homo: ergo, natura specifica est risibilis; sed bene sequitur quod illa sit risibile: quia in maiori medius terminus supponit personaliter, et in minori simpliciter. Et eodem modo negantur paralogismi* 3ⁱⁱ *medii; ut sic argumentando: Quicquid est illa essentia est immobile; iste filius est aliquod quod est illa essentia; igitur, iste filius est immobilis; sed bene sequitur quod ille sit immobile. Et breviter, non est aliquis paralogismus negandus in materia de trinitate increata, quin proporcionalem contingit habere tam* 20 *in materia de universalibus quam in quacunque materia de trinitate creata. Et ideo expedit cognoscere logicam de universalibus.*

Unde secundum antiquos, isti paralogismi reducuntur ad fallaciam figure dictionis, vel fallaciam accidentis. 25 Unde, sicut hec est fallacia accidentis: *Quicquid heri fuisti, illud nunc es; sedens heri fuisti: ergo, sedens nunc es.* Ista cum verbis de presenti est conformis fallacia: *Omne quale est qualitas: omnis homo est quale: ergo omnis homo est qualitas.* Notum est consequens esse falsum; et minor foret vera, et subiectum supponit simpliciter sicut predicatum limitat. Et conformis fallacia est hic: *omnis pater est relativus; omnis essentia increata est pater; ergo omnis talis essentia increata est relativa;* illa tamen essentia nec per se nec per accidens est 35 *pater, quia est dare medium inter per se et per accidens, ut dictum est superius; et sic omnis substantia etc. significat quale quid; ut quidditatem vel aliam essentialem qualitatem; et quando variantur suppositiones commutatur quid in quale, ut sic: omnis* 40

19. a's B.
notu above B.

20. quin above cum B; ib. (pporle) B.
37, 38. f^a z B. 20. gumia' B.

30. negandum;

homo movetur; natura universalis est homo: ergo, natura universalis movetur.

Dubitatio tamen est si universale potest moveri. Et videtur quod sic, quia potest esse ubi prius non fuit, ⁵ et, motis subiectis, moventur omnia que causaliter illis insunt. Cum ergo universale non est nisi ubi est aliquod eius singulare, sequeretur quod universale fuerit ubi prius non fuit, [ut] et singularia sunt ubi prius non fuerunt aliqua huiusmodi singularia.

Can the universal move? It seems so, for it is where its singulars are, and as they move, so must it.

¹⁰ Pro isto supponatur omne universale esse ubique ubi est aliquod eius singulare, et sic universalis substancia, universale corpus (et sic de quotlibet accidentibus) sunt ubique et semper. Alia autem sunt ubique ubi sunt sua singularia; tunc videtur michi probabile quod sic ¹⁵ universalia possunt esse ubi prius non fuerunt, sic possunt moveri localiter, sed non augeri vel alterari. Unde modus localis predicatur secundum habitudinem aliter quam alii motus. Contingit ergo universale dupliciter acquirere locum: vel secundum sui individui

The principle that it is wherever its singulars are must be granted; but some universals are wherever any of their singulars are, and do not move: as, v. g. *substance*, or *body*.

²⁰ generacionem, sicut deperdit locum ad sui individui corrupcionem; et isti motus vocantur multiplicaciones vel deminuciones universalium; quando scilicet numerosius vel paucius insunt suis singularibus. Sed 2^o modo contingit universalia acquirere vel deperdere loca per ²⁵ suorum singularium mocionem localem; ut, Sorte corrente ad designatum locum, fit homo universalis ibi, tam per cursum Sortis, quam formaliter per motum communem. Sed universalis punctus, linea universalis, et cetera que necessario sunt ubique, non possunt

But setting these aside, I think it probable that, as the others can be where they were not, they can also move with their singulars; which gives us a two-fold species of movement;

^{B 48^a} moveri. | Nec sequitur: *Sor non movetur, et ipse est homo communis: ergo homo communis non movetur*; quia repugnat quod moveatur et non moveatur, sicut repugnat quod sit album et non sit album. Moto autem subiecto, movetur quodlibet quod inest, ratione motus ³⁵ subiecti acquirentis novum locum. Nec oportet, si natura universalis est alicubi, quod illa sit ubicacio, cum sit proporcio secundum habitudinem in qua predicatur transcendens connotando circumstanciam communem universali et singulari; ut *esse in loco, esse in*

except for points, lines and all those things which necessarily cannot move. But we cannot conclude from the non-movement of a particular, that its universal does not move.

Yet this movement does not imply localization of the universal, but a mere relation of identity between it and its singular.

⁴⁰ *tempore, esse intellectum, animatum, etc.* Natura ergo

8. ut *deest* B. 9. *fn'istnt pro fuerunt* B. 13. *eius above* sua B.

25, 26. *currere* B. 33. *igitur above* autem B. 38. *tn'na pro transcens* dens B. 40. *ite^m pro intellectum* B.

universalis est iustus, grammaticus, et sic de ceteris adiectivis professionis que per se supponunt.

IV. Do
universals,
taken with their
singulars, make
up a number?
V. g. are there
three men when
there are only
two individuals,
A and B?

For where there
is one man
there are two
beings one
universal, the
other singular,
but each
is a man.

The usual reply
is that as
number is
properly a
multitude of
singulars, the
universal
cannot count;
and things
specifically

distinct are not
said to differ in
number but in
kind.

But number can
be understood
in a wider
sense, for any
multitude that
we can count.

Now when a
number is
added to a
term of the
first intention,
it is understood
in the first
sense, and
consequently
the supposition
must be
personal.

The universal,
having no
personal
supposition
distinct from
that of its
particulars,
cannot be
counted thus.
So there are
not two men
where there is

Sed 4^o dubitatur de logica cum terminis numeralibus; ut dubitatur si universale ponitur in numerum cum suis singularibus. Ut, si dicatur quod *sunt 3 homines*, non⁵ existente aliquo singulari preter *Sor* vel *Platonem*. Et ita, si alicubi est unus homo, ibi sunt duo homines; sic igitur sunt due res vel due substancie, quarum utrumque est homo, cum veritas universalis detur a singulari, et utraque illarum veritatum est homo. In¹⁰ isto communiter dicitur quod numerus stricte sumptus non est nisi multitudo singularium, eo quod specificè differencia, non numero, sed specie dicuntur differre ab invicem. Sed largius sumendo numerum, tunc quoruncunque numeratorum multitudo dicitur numerus; et¹⁵ isto modo quinarius est numerus specierum universalium, senarius est numerus specierum politici regiminis; et sic de ceteris numeris communium.

Tunc dicitur quod terminus numeralis, additus termino prime intencionis, limitatur ad significandum²⁰ numerum primo modo dictum. Unde, sicut terminus distribuens limitat speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem, ita ille terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intencionis, et specialiter speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem. Cum ergo²⁵ homo communis sit quilibet hominum singularium, non ponit seorsum in numero cum illis; ideo existente *omni homine*, *Sorte* vel *Platone*, non superest³⁰ *3^{us}* homo communis ab illis, sed est uterque illorum, et non esset *tercius*, nec esset *3^a* persona hominis. Et per idem³⁰ non oportet, ubique ubi est unus homo, esse duos homines. Nec sequitur *Sortem* esse tot substancias quot universalialia sunt eius partes; quia *Sor* est *homo communis*, *animal commune*, *corpus commune*, *substancia communis*, et *ens commune*: ideo singulare non est³⁵ multa sed unum in omnibus illis; e contra tamen universale est multa, cum universale sit omnia eius singularia. Et sic duo sunt 4 et 5. Et sic de quocunque

4. ponit B. 7. sibi *pro* ibi B. 8. sicut *pro* sic B. 22. dist'^{us}
pro distribuens B. 24, 25. ff^r ff^{em} ff^{man} B. 33. p^s *pro* partes B.

3. All this looks like another and aggravated form of the difficulty stated thus by Biondello (Taming of the Shrew): *A horse and a man is more than one, and yet not many.*

numero finito vel infinito assignando. Nec ex illa sequitur quaternarium esse quinarium, et sic de aliis speciebus numeri, formaliter dicti, quia talis numerus non est ille res numerate, sed ipsarum accidens. Sicut
 5 enim quantitas continua est *continuum esse quantum*, sive sit corporeitas, que est *substantiam esse corpoream*, sive superficetas aut superficies, que est *substantiam esse superficetalem*, sive linealitas, que est *substantiam esse linealem*, sive punctalitas vel punctus, qui est *sub-*
 10 *stantiam esse punctalem*: sic numerus vel numeracio est *substantias esse multas*: quod dividitur ab illis et quolibet illorum. Aliter tamen multiplicius accipitur numerus.

Sed sic loquendo impossibile est unam speciem numeri esse aliam. Ymmo, sicut impossibile est aliquod moveri
 15 sine motu, ita impossibile est aliquas substantias esse multas sine tali numero, et sic necesse est tales numeros esse; sic quod claudit contradiccionem numeros ydearum non esse. Unitas igitur a qua unaqueque substantia una dicitur, est in qualibet substantia secundum
 20 individuum veritatem, est simplicior et prior puncto, cum est in intersticiis, et punctus superaddit posicionem. Sed species puncti, multiplicata secundum puncta indivisibilia, linealiter posita, principiat lineam tam secundum speciem quam secundum genus; et species linee, multi-
 25 plicata secundum lineas individuas superficialiter positas, principiat superficiem tam secundum speciem quam secundum individua; et sic de corporeitate quo ad superficiem. Et sic omnis quantitatis principium est unitas, sicut docet lincolniensis 1^o posteriorum 15^o.
 B.4^s^b Sic ergo ascendendo | in universaliora invenietur paucitas, et descendendo in inferiora, invenietur pluralitas; ut, omnes homines individui sunt unica species, et omnes species animalium sunt unicum genus; et sic omnis multitudo reducibilis est ad unum, non solum
 35 secundum communitatem sed ad unum separatum in genere causandi. Et vere layci iniciati in ista materia ad pauca respicientes de levi pronunciant veritates quas doctores signorum balbuciendo referunt sompniantes.

Nec sequitur quod *homo communis sit populus*, etsi
 40 sit illi homines divisim, qui collectim sunt populus.

one; nor is A an individual plus a man, plus an animal, plus a body. plus a substance;

Similarly with the different kinds of quantity as, v. g. number is the multitude of substances; volume is the voluminousness of a substance, etc.

Now in this sense it is impossible for one sort of number to be another.

The unity by which every substance is called one is in each substance prior to the special points which compose it, and make up lines, surfaces and volumes.

So that unity is the principle of quantity; plurality being found as we descend to the particular and unity as we ascend to the Universal.

Really laymen, who study this subject know more about it than these stammering Doctors of Signs!

It does not follow that the universal *man* is a people; for he is each individual separately, and

1. signando B. 7. a^r = aut! B. 11. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ v^r B. 21. int'^{clis} B.
 26. ff^{em} B. 36. v^c B; *ib.* initti B; *ib.* lo^{et} = layci? B. 38. fyff signisto
in marg. B.

the people is so collectively.
A line, though made of points, is not a species containing points; and that one species is many things, does not prove that unity is multitude.

Different sorts of unity; transcendent and numeral.

As numeral, it is the principle of number in a substance, which is *one*: this is a stricter sense than transcendental Being.

But if by number we mean anything that can be counted, we must grant that the unity, essence of the individual, is the trinity of its *supposita*.

Here there are many difficulties, all of them concerning the Holy Trinity as well as the Universals.

Thus, God the Father differs from God the Son, i. e. God from God and the universal from the singular man.

And then, following up the comparison, there would be three singulars of the *universal*, God.

Populus enim est multi homines civiliter connexi. Et sic illi homines per accidens sunt populus, sicut intelligunt ipsi qui concedunt quod totum est sue partes, ut collectim componentes. Et sic negatur quod species puncti est linea, etsi sit illa puncta que componunt lineam; quia non credo quod aliquod continuum sit eius pars. Nec sequitur, si una species sit multa diversa, quod unitas sit multitudo, vel quecunque species numeri reliqua. Pro quo nota quod sicut unum est transcendens, convertibile cum ente, sic unitas est convertibilis cum entitate et cum veritate. Sed quandoque sumitur unitas pro principio numeri; et tunc connotat per se substantiam esse unam; et sic striccius significat quam unitas transcendens. Sicut ergo falsum est *quod substantiam esse unam* est *substantiam esse* quadruplicem, et sic de aliis numeris; ita falsum est quod unitas est quaternarius, vel quilibet alius numerus.

Extendendo autem numerum ad quecunque numerata, sive sicut accidentia, sive partes quantitative substantie, sive partes qualitative, tunc concedendum est ad sensum equivocum quod quelibet unitas que est essentia substantie singularis est trinitas suppositorum eiusdem substantie. Et hic multiplicantur multa argumenta apud theologos in materia de trinitate increata, ut aliqui arguunt quod deus a deo differt, quia deus pater a deo filio differt; et sic homo communis differt ab homine singulari. Ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus. Et per idem trinitas incommunicabilis non est essentia communicabilis, nec persona. Et sic essentia queque distincta, quorum quodlibet esset deus. Si enim omnis deus est pater, tunc tantum est deus pater, et communicabile. Et illud quod "nec spirat nec spiratur", ut *essentia divina*, tantum esset spirans vel spiratum; quia tantum esset aliqua illarum trium personarum; et breviter nullum esset argumentum in illa materia, quin contingit proportionale facere in materia cuiuscunque trinitatis create.

22. Unitas B. 30. quandoque B.

22. Wyclif here alludes to his theory, developed at greatest length in *De Materia et Forma*, that in all things the essence corresponds to the *Godhead*, the matter to the *Father*, the form to the *Son*, and the compound to the *Holy Ghost*. These three he calls the *Created Trinity*. 33. *Nec spirat nec spiratur*: allusion to the words in Decr. Greg. Dist. 1. cap. 1: Firmiter.

Quantum ad primum, videtur michi probabile quod ille terminus, deus, nunquam supponit personaliter nisi per limitationem appositi nocionalis; ut deus pater differt a deo filio, deus genuit deum, etc. Nec sequitur: *5 gignens a genito differt, et uterque est deus: igitur, deus a deo differt*, propter limitationem suppositorum.

Pro secundo, notandum quod in parte est similitudo inter universale et sua supposita, et essenciam divinam et sua supposita; et in parte dissimilitudo. Similitudo, *10 in hoc quod ipsum est singulum suorum suppositorum; et dissimilitudo in multis. Primo in hoc quod natura illa habet supposita sibi accidentalialia, ut sic, inter se; nec illa participant communi denominatione secundum magis et minus; ut homo communis potest carere quo-* *15 cunque supposito corruptibili, et unum istorum potest esse sine reliquo; sed contradiccionem claudit essenciam divinam esse sine omnibus suis suppositis, vel unum illorum esse sine quolibet illorum. 2º, universale maius, melius, et quomodocunque dispariter accidentatum sup-* *20 positum habet hic, et opposito modo accidentatum suppositum alibi. Sed contradiccionem claudit unum suppositum increatum distare a reliquo, esse maius, potencius, sapiencius, vel durabilius reliquo. Primum tamen est causa secundi, et ambo sunt una causa 3º;* *25 et sic est quasi prioritas, non nature, cum sit eadem* *B 49ª natura singularis, sed prioritas | originis inter illa. Sed longe similior trinitati increate est trinitas cuiuscunque essencie create, cum in qualibet tali contingit habere proporcionalem proprietatem, cum contradiccionem* *30 claudit aliquam talem excedere vel deficere a ternario suppositorum parium quo ad omnia in quibus communicat.*

Racione ergo illius diversitatis utendum est diversis terminis et diversa logica in materia de trinitate et in *35 materia de universalibus; ut 3 persone hominum sunt 3 homines, sed non sic 3 persone divine sunt 3 dii vel nature divine; nec deus est triplex, sed trinus; nec multiplex sed singularis, cum non habeat universale superius. Nec discrepantia vel numerus est inter illa,*

6. imitationem B. 20. hv B. 24. ca' B. 25. sint B.

24. *Causa.* This word, applied to the Uncaused Being, is generally disliked by Scholastics. They prefer the more general term *principium* — *id a quo aliquid fit vel est.*

But 1. The word *God* has a personal supposition only when applied to the persons; therefore the syllogism is faulty, and *God* does not differ from *God* as such.

2. The comparison between the Universal and the divine Essence as to their *supposita* obtains only in so far as each *is its supposita*; but in the former case these are accidental to it and to each other; in the latter, absolutely essential; in the former case, they may be unequally perfect and modified in different, nay, contrary manners; in the latter, this is impossible. The priority of the Father to the Son and of these to the Spirit, is priority not of nature but of origin.

But the similitude between the increate and the created Trinity is far more perfect than between the Universal and its singulars. We have to use other expressions in dealing with the Trinity and the universals.

Three persons are three men; three persons are not three Gods, etc. And we say, not that the Godhead *differs*, but that it *is* different from each of its persons. This difference is the communicability of the Divine Nature. The Trinity is also an essence, but a plurality; not a person, but persons. *Communicable* may be said either of an essence, or of a person, in different senses. Some grant that the Godhead differs logically from each person, which it is nevertheless; and that only the Godhead which is the Father is God, and yet not only the Father is God; that the Father and the Son 'spirate' the Holy Ghost as one principle, the cause being equally each of the persons, yet not the Holy Ghost, as nothing can cause itself. And so each of the three are one Cause; yet there are several causal agents. The Cause of the Spirit is that of the Son; yet the Son is the Cause of the Spirit and not of himself.

sed differentia et pluralitas. Et sic de multis significacionibus et differentiis terminorum, ad que laboriosum est pertingere. Sic ergo, propter excellenciam idemptitatis personarum in eadem essentia singulari, negatur quod illa essentia ab aliqua illarum differt, sed est a quacunque illarum *differens*. Et hoc concludit communicabilitas conveniens essencie et non personis; ut, quia ista essentia est communicabilis, et ista persona non sic; ideo, quod est ista essentia non est ista persona. Et quia trinitas est pluralitas et non sic persona, ideo talis nulla trinitas est persona, sed persone; est tamen illud quod est quelibet illarum personarum. Nota tamen quod *communicabile* accipitur pro communicabilitate ad personas; ut essentia communicatur; et accipitur pro communicabilitate ad naturas, sicut una persona est multe nature; scilicet, natura humana et natura divina; et sic de termino opposito. Alii autem concedunt quod essentia differt secundum rationem a persona, et tamen est illa persona; sicut trinitas incommunicabilis est essentia communicabilis, sed non persona: ymmo, persone. Ulterius conceditur quod tantum essentia que est pater, est deus, sicut omnis deus est pater; sed non tantum pater est deus, quia quod non est pater est deus. Ulterius conceditur quod pater et filius sunt unum principium spirans spiritum sanctum, et unus spirator, una causa spiritus sancti, sicut et est una spiracio activa. Unde eadem causa que causat omnes creaturas, causat filium et spiritum sanctum; et illa causa est tam pater, quam filius, quam spiritus sanctus; et tamen causa spiritus sancti non est ille, cum nichil inmediate et essentialiter causat se. Nec causa filii est filius: et sic tria sunt, quorum quodlibet est causa; *causa*, et non multe cause; quamvis sint multi causantes et multa causancia; sed non cum predicatis substantivis. Unde omnis causa Spiritus sancti est causa filii; et tamen aliquod suppositum est causa spiritus sancti quod non est causa filii; sicut patet de filio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquid vel aliqua sit causa spiritus sancti quod non est causa filii. Filius enim, sicut non est aliud vel alia res quam pater, sic non est alia causa quam pater. *Aliud* enim, si non sit contractum per terminum per-

sonalem, dicit diversitatem essencie; ut filius est alius quam pater, sed non aliud, est nec alia res. Nec argumentatur ab inferiori ad suum superius: *hec est alia persona; ergo, hec est alia res*; sicut non sequitur: *hec est alia persona; ergo, alia essencia*. Sed nec econtra: *hec non est alia essencia; ergo, non est alia persona*. Sed in istis lapsus sum gratis, tum quia proporcionaliter dicendum est in logica de aliis trinitatibus, tum etiam quia materie sunt connexe; superesset [ut] juvenis, postquam sapuerit materiam de universalibus regendam, pretereat ad materiam de trinitate eiusdem essencie subtilius cognoscendam.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, concedi potest principaliter quod quamvis aliud sit fenicem esse, et aliud illam fenicem esse, cum universalitas differt a singularitate, tamen non sunt due fenices, quia tunc essent duo singularia. Nec sunt due res, due substancie, duo corpora vel duo animalia quorum utrumque est fenix; quia non sunt due sed una fenix singularis: quia vel oportet quod terminus talis supponatur simpliciter vel personaliter; et secundum utrumque sensum, falsum esset quod sunt due fenices. Nec sequitur: *A fenix differt a B; ergo A et B sunt duo supposita differencia*, cum terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intentionis ad supposicionem personalem. Ideo non sequitur quod aliquot differencia sunt illa, quamvis illa sunt differencia. Nec sequitur quod fenix universalis sit *aliud*, vel *alia*, quam fenix singularis, etsi differat ab illa secundum racionem; sed erit aliud singulare quam est illa. Et per idem negandum est quod *ille fenices sunt*, demonstrando fenicem universalem et singularem; sed

In this matter we can neither argue from the particular to the general, nor vice versa. This digression is excusable by the connection between the Increase and the created Trinity.

Return to the main subject. There is indeed difference between the existence of a phoenix in general and that of this particular phoenix.

But they are not two, but one for all that. We must give the term a supposition, either essential or personal; in either case, there is but one phoenix. The difference between them is not a difference of *supposita*, nor of otherness of essences; it is a logical distinction.

7. $\tilde{g}t\tilde{p}$. 9. Srf3(?) B; *ib. ut deest* B. 9, 10. cum; postquam *in marg.* B; \tilde{u} possint *in marg.* B. 10. $\tilde{r}e\tilde{g}a$ B. 11. $\tilde{p}r$ (!) B. 14. quodvis B.

11. *Superesset*. This sentence presents extraordinary difficulty, as is seen by the readings, which however are obviously insufficient. Mr. Matthew suggests that *regendam* being the technical word for certain obligatory lectures which the 'Magister' has to give after inception, the sentence may mean that he should first be qualified to lecture on universals, before studying the more difficult matter of the Trinity. 29. *Racionem*. This word seems to imply that Wyclif abandons his Realism in presence of the difficulty; but a few lines below he says that they are *really* distinct.

We must also deny any plurality between them, so as to say: *These Phoenixes.*

cum termino indefinito facienda est divisio; ut sic: rerum alia est universalis, alia particularis; substantiarum alia prima, alia secunda; causarum alia universalis, alia particularis. In quibus exemplis Aristotelis supponit terminus indefinitus mixtim, pro universali et 5 singulari. Et ita respondendum est ad quotlibet media que implicant universale, ut sic, ponere in numerum cum suo singulari.

Yet they are really distinct from each other: for every suppositum is of two natures.

There are two other answers to this considerable difficulty; one consists in granting that universals can be counted, and are many in one individual, but yet are only one with their singulars; another in denying that the universal differs really from its singular.

Let which opinion pleases most be chosen; I choose the first.

Conceditur tamen quod omne universale substantie et eiusdem singulare sunt duo distincta realiter; quia 10 omne suppositum est due nature. Sed propter difficultatem et apparenciam illius conclusionis sunt duo alii modi dicendi, quorum primus concedit universale ponere in numerum cum suo singulari, eo quod utrumque potest demonstrari, et universale causans singulare est 15 eius causa et prius singulari, et habet multa que non habent singulare. Et sic in cuiuslibet hominis veste sunt tria animalia: scilicet *animal* singulare, *animal* species specialissima, et *animal* generale; et ita de aliis sequentibus. Et ita unum singularium est multa com- 20 munita, sicut unum commune est multa singularia. Omnia tamen illa communia communicant in parte subiectiva singulari. Secunda via dicit quod nullum universale differt a suo singulari, quia per idem argumentum essencia in divinis foret res differens a persona 25 secundum rationem communicabilitatis; et sic loquendo facile est videre quomodo universale non ponit in numerum cum suo singulari. Eligat ergo logicus unam, quia sententia de universalibus est necessaria tam a plebico quam a philosopho implicata; ego autem elegi 30 primam responsionem. Et tanta de copulativis transgrediendo sint dicta.

6. quecunque; quotlibet *above B*; *ib. me^a B.*

18 aliam *pro animalia B.*

28. *vā B.*

CAPITULUM TERCIVM.

Sequitur de disiunctivis tercio pertractandum: supponendo primo omnem ypotheticam subordinatam principaliter actui disiungendi esse disiunctivam; et solum
 5 Proposicio enim de disiunctivo extremo, et proposicio subordinata actui kathegorice quomodocunque composita non est disiunctiva; sicut nec kathegorica disiunctive significans. Nec proposicio mixta cuius principalis actus est actus hypotheticus disiungendi;
 10 ad esse enim disiunctive requiritur proporcio signorum et significacionis. Verumtamen de proposicionibus disiunctivis in anima, factis ex intencionibus rerum, non oportet illum ordinem observare, cum ibi non sit intencio de sinkategoricis distincta, contra intencionem
 15 signi. Ymmo quotlibet accidentibus, tam simul quam successive, potest eadem intencio subici. De hiis ergo non directe tractat logicus, sed de proposicionibus sensibilibus et suis significatis.

Patet ergo ex dictis quod a quacunque parte principalis disiunctive ad ipsam, tenet consequencia, cum ad
 20 eius veritatem sufficit veritas alterius partis. Sed e contra non tenet consequencia, nisi forte pars ad quam argumentatur fuerit sequens ad reliquam; ut sic: *tu curris vel tu moveris; ergo, tu moveris. Tu es homo vel tu es*
 25 *asinus: ergo tu es homo*; et sic de aliis. Patet etiam quod quam vera est altera pars disiunctive, tam vera vel verior est ipsamet disiunctiva; non quidem verior quo ad adequacionem signi ad suum significatum, cum equacio non suscipit magis vel minus; sed verior proprietate sui significati, sicut unum ens dicitur reliquo
 30 realius. Istud patet ex hoc quod falsitas partis

of disjunctives. They are such, and such only, as are subordinate to a principal disjunctive act in the mind. A categorial proposition containing a disjunctive term, or having an equivalent meaning, does not come under the definition. We do not speak here of merely mental propositions, which do not require this similarity of sign and of signification: they do not belong to Logic. If one principal part of the disjunctive is true, the whole is true; but the truth of the whole does not prove that of a part, unless one of the parts is inferred by the other; as: *A is BC or A is C; therefore A is C.* The truer one part of a disjunctive is, the truer it is itself; i. e. in signification, not in degree.

1. Cap. deest. 2. blank space for initial S. 9. non est B.

14. de signatis; corr. in marg. B. 17, 18. Bth B. 27. ipam⁹ B.
 30. quomodo; sicut above the line B.

Every disjunctive made of two contradictories that are contingent is necessary, as also of a more general proposition and the opposite of one more particular; as: *A is C, or A is not BC.*

And of all such the opposite is an impossible disjunctive. Thus the parts are less true than the whole, being less necessary.

Whence comes this necessity? From the very meaning of the proposition; for it means more than its parts.

Therefore, some necessities and impossibilities more obvious than others; *A is, or A is not*, can be at once seen; but that *A is sitting or A is*, does not appear so clearly, and we may be deceived.

If we take the opposite however: *A is not sitting and A is not*, we see that *A cannot be sitting* if he *is not*.

We can oftener see the falsity of a proposition than the truth of its opposite. These principles laid down, we shall deal with fallacies concerning pronouns, especially relatives.

desiunctive vere non facit ad disiunctive falsitatem | vel B 50^a
 inconcedibilitatem eiusdem. Et universaliter hoc: quelibet disiunctiva facta ex contradictoriis contingentibus est necessaria, sicut et quelibet disiunctiva facta ex consequente et opposito sui antecedentis, ut hec; *tu es coloratus, vel tu non es albus*. Cum enim cuiuslibet disiunctive contradictorium equivalet copulative facte ex oppositis parciū, et e contra; patet quod cuiuslibet tali disiunctive repugnat copulativa impossibilis.

Ex quo patet ulterius, cum tam vera est propositio quam falsum est eius contradictorium et econtra, quod quolibet talis disiunctiva est necessaria, dum neutra eius pars fuerit ita vera. Et si queratur a quo capit talis disiunctiva suam necessitatem, dicitur quod a quacunque eius causa, et a sua significacione ac necessitate quam primo significat. Non tamen est dare partem prius necessariam, secundum quam ipsa est necessaria; sed ipsa est primo necessaria, sicut primo significat illam necessitatem.

Ex quo patet quod sicut necessitatum una est reliqua patencior; ita impossibilitatum. Nec correspondent sibi iste impossibilitates ex opposito. Quelibet enim disiunctiva facta ex oppositis significat veritatem facillimam ad cognoscendum de natura veritatis; ut nullus sciollus ignorat quin *hoc est vel hoc non est*, quocumque demonstrato. Sed necessitas disiunctive facte ex consequente communiori et opposito sui antecedentis inferioris est occultior. Non enim est aliqua facilitate notum michi quod necessario *Sor non sedet vel ipse est*. Incauti autem decipimur admittendo in depositionibus huiusmodi disiunctivas, et tamen in utraque est par necessitas, quia quam impossibile est *hoc esse et hoc non esse*, tam impossibile est quod *Sor sedet et tamen ipse non est*. Prima autem istarum opponitur prime disiunctive noscibiliori, et 2^a opponitur 2^e minus cognite. Frequencius ergo est falsitas date propositionis evidens quam est veritas sui oppositi; et frequenter contingit oppositum quod est ex habitudine naturali scientis ad scibile.

Premissis istis generalibus de disiunctivis, superest tractare materiam sophisticam cum terminis relativis factam,

15. cā B. 28. anima (?) pro aliqua B. 30. enim: autem above the line B.
 33. non sedet B. 36. frequenter B. 36, 37. date — veritas in marg. B.

ut superficialiter tactum est in priori capitulo. Maior ergo pars sophisticacionum in ista materia exurgit ex hoc quod relativum in eadem proposicione vel in proposicione disparata refert suum antecedens stans confuse tantum, vel sinkategorice disiunctum. Unde negantes universalia statuerunt sibi, tanquam regulam faciendi sophismata, quod quodocunque relativum idemptitatis refert suum antecedens stans confuse, et indeterminate, facienda est copulativa ex duabus proposicionibus consimilium terminorum et contradictorie qualitatis. Ut, *promittendo denarium*, cum nulliusmodi singularis sit, *ille promittitur denarius qui non promittitur*, sicut *et ille non promittitur*; et *omnis homo est animal quod illud non vidit*; et sic differentia non ponitur inter tales proposiciones ubi relativum in eadem kategorica refert suum antecedens, et proposiciones in quibus relativum ponitur in disparata proposicione a proposicione sui antecedentis. Ut hic: *omnis homo est animal quod est rationale; apparet homo esse animal quod est hoc*; et sic de similibus verificatis in sensu composito, sicut patet per exponentes earum. Sed aliter in sensu diviso de similibus terminis sunt false; ut falsum est quod *omnis homo est animal et illud est rationale*; sicut falsum est de auricalco quod *apparet hoc esse aurum, et illud aurum est hoc*.

Sed patet ex dictis superius quod maior pars sophisticatum in ista materia est neganda, et disiunctive facte ex oppositis parcium sunt concedende. Ymmo, sicut conceditur quod *omnis homo est animal quod est rationale*, quamvis illud non sit dandum, sic concedendum esset de possibili quod *promitto tibi denarium quem tibi promitto*, quamvis ille non sit dandus. *Promittere* enim facit sensum compositum, cum potest fieri in communi circa aliquid cum hoc quod nullum eius singulare terminent istam promissionem; ut, promittendo sub istis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium quem promitto*.

Most of them proceed from the fact that when the pronoun stands confusedly, for its antecedent, sophists make up a copulative out of that proposition, and another, its opposite: as: *I promise a penny, this penny not being singular, we have: I promise a penny that I do not promise; i. e. and I do not promise it.*

Yet *and . . . it does not amount to the same as the relative that; v. g. man is an animal that is reasonable, or: man is an animal and it is reasonable.*

Most of these subtleties are to be denied, granting a disiunctive instead of the copulative. And we say: *I promise a penny that I promise: for a promise can be made in general without specifying which.*

2. in ex *above the line* B. 4. desperata B. 8. t^{ro} B. 11. n^o B.
13. ille? B. 17. despata B. *ib.* a proposicione *before* sui *in marg.* B.

21. alie B. 35. t^{mi}et B.

4. *Disparata*. Here I have slightly changed the text; but later we find the words *proposicio desperata*, meaning one that entails great logical difficulties.

These sophists
cannot deal
with
philosophers,
politicians, or
any men
capable of
speech; their
assumption
would go to
prove the
wildest
absurdities,

and destroy the
very idea of
promising,
buying, selling,
gift, justice or
obligation,

and all possible
merit, or action
worthy of
reward.

All this is
impossible.
Every
meritorious
deed receives
its reward.

Patet ergo quod | maior pars sophismatum conces- B 50^b
sororum a sic opinantibus reputarentur apud antiquos
impossibiles. Nec communicaret sic sophisticans cum
philosophis, cum politicis aut cum quocunque expri-
mendo conceptum suum; ut patet de istis: *promitto* 5
tibi aliquid quod non possum tibi dare; vado Romam
ad videndum hominem quem scio non posse videri; ego
iuste et provide emi vel vendidi equum quem scio et
scivi continue non posse emi vel vendi. Sor debet michi
viginti libros, et deus non potest facere ipsum satis- 10
facere pro debito quod sic debet. Sor racionabiliter obli-
gavit se ad faciendum penitentiam ad quam non potu-
erit obligari, cum non potuit illam perficere nec deus
illam exigere. Sor est dicior ex promissione Platonis
quam est Cicero, vel quam ipse prius fuit; sic quod sibi 15
est ius aquisitum valens 20; et tamen si ex hoc in
aliqua proporcione esset dicior, ipse est in infinitum
dives. Promissio, emcio, vendicio, dotacio, iusticia,
obligacio, et cetera huiusmodi possunt esse cum hoc 20
quod non ad obiecta terminantur, nec sint de materia
vel de ente signando. Requiritur vel oportet ad hoc
quod homo equitet vel habeat equum qui non potest
portare eum; sicut, ad hoc quod cattus moveat caudam
suam, requiritur ipsum caudam habere, que non diffe- 25
rat a duabus. Sor meretur amando hominem et tamen deus
nec scit quod amat, nec scit sibi apparare premium quod
meretur; posito quod Sor noscat in universali multos
concretos esse homines, et faciat actum universalem
volendi, vel amandi, quod concretus est talis, qui sit
omnis actus voluntatis Sortis; et mereatur ex nunc 30
habere premium, sed nullum premium exinde mereatur
habere; sic enim operarii merentur mercedes, sed nullas
mercedes merentur.

Et tunc patet conclusio iuxta principia illius opinionis,
que indubie est impossibilis; quia pro omni merito 35
ordinat deus premium quod scitur esse proporcionatum
merito. Nec Sor amat hominem, nisi ametur homo; et

4. poli^e B. 8. igte B. 16. aq^m B. 22. eq^u B. 25. 2^b B.
26. ap^r B. 27. noscatur B. 30. exūc B. 31. exm B. 35. īdu^e B.

5. We must remember that *a penny*, as promised, is a universal; and Nominalists, denying these, denied that anything was promised, unless in particular.

tamen actus verbi non cognoscitur nisi precognoscatur
 substancia actus. Patet quod si amatus vel amatum est
 tale amabile, tunc illud amatur, sicut *hominis esse ama-*
 5 *humana*. Actus ergo amandi Sortis terminatur specialiter
 et capit suas condiciones ab amato; et tamen solum
 a signo in anima; ymmo *amare hominis* est in amato
 sicut honor est in honorato, quia aliter non differret ab
 amancia. Nec esset talis benevolencia hortata, nisi esset
 10 conformis benevolencie dei; ita quod deus amet illud
 idem, vel saltem velit hominem amare quem amat.
 Uterque enim vult et amat quod illa propositio pri-
 marie significat: *Eiecus est bonus*. Deus ergo scit distin-
 guere inter amatum a Sorte et inamatum ab illo; sicut
 15 sciret cui proficeret oratio Sortis, si caritative oraret,
 correspondenter ad amorem suum. Non ergo sophisti-
 candum est sic cum deo. Sicut ergo sic sophisticans
 dicit se mereri laudem ex illa subtilitate qua non
 meretur, ita premiabitur premio quod non sciet.
 20 Supponatur ergo antiqua sententia de universalibus
 cum qua logicus potest communicare cum grammatica
 et logica laboriose inventa et cognita, cum loquentibus
 in qualibet facultate; et tunc patet quod omnes con-
 clusiones ille sunt impossibiles. Sed pro facultate loquendi,
 25 notandum primo quod promissio est assertio aliquid
 dandi in futuro; et talis solum est subiective in rationali.
 Sed obligatio est in quocunque; nec refert sive pro-
 missio sit dotatum, sive pro equivalente exhibitum:
 oportet tamen quod assignatur dari promissum pro
 30 futuro; quia si daretur in presenti, tunc non esset pro-
 missio, cum promissio dicitur quod *pro omnibus missio*.
 2° modo accipitur promissio pro signo promissionis | :
 B 51^a ut carta, voce, vel alio signo promissionis primo modo
 dicte. Et 3° modo accipitur pro illo quod promittitur.
 35 Dividitur autem promissio in confusam et distinctam;
 in universalem et particularem. Confusa promissio est
 [qua] promittitur omne singulare universalis primo, prin-
 cipaliter, et distincte promissi.

Ex quo patet quod non oportet omne promissum dari
 40 satisfaciendo pro promissione; sed sufficit quod detur

Love cannot exist without an existing object; it we love this: *that a man is*, we love *humanity* or human nature. It is in the loved one that the act of love is terminated.

And as all well regulated love corresponds with God's love of any person. He at least would know who was the object of love.

Sophists turn the tables on themselves; their subtlety merits, without meriting, a reward to which they are insensible.

Let us then admit the old doctrine of universals; we shall see that all these conclusions are absurd.

Note that a promise is an assertion that something will be given; it exists only in reasonable beings, and may be conditional on another promise, or not; but it must imply the future.

7. amari? B. 9. aa7^a B; *ib.* oz^{ta} B. 10. am3 B. 13. Eieco? B.
 13, 14. ds tiu^r B. 17. sic cum *in marg.*; *ib.* ergo sic *above the line* B.
 31. qpoil missio B. 37. qua *deest* B.

13. *Eiecus*. Probably the name of an imaginary man.

It is not necessary to give all the essence promised; only what is promised explicitly or implicitly. It is enough to give one legal penny, if a penny has been promised; thus I shall have the 'universal' penny in its singular. Note also that *I promise* includes a verb in the future, and may be expressed in many different ways; some of which imply obligation. 'Obligation' generally signifies to be obliged' for a benefit; but there are three natural significations of the word:

1. When a person obliges himself without any necessity but his own will; this belongs to God alone.
2. When the obligation proceeds from a superior.
3. When it proceeds from need of a superior towards whom one is obliged: this implies servitude.

There are also obligations between man and man, parallel to the three former;

illud quod est explicite vel implicite promissum; ut, promittendo unum denarium in communi, omnis denarius promittitur, sed confuse; et sufficit dare quemcunque legalem denarium, et quemcunque singularem homo dederit michi, dat denarium communem qui explicite ⁵ promissus [est]. Patet etiam quod hoc verbum *promitto* de presenti, includit verbum de futuro. Ut si *promitto quidquid tibi*, tunc assero quod *dabo tibi illud*; et ideo non refert quibus istorum verborum promittens utatur: ut, *promitto tibi hoc*, *spondeo* vel *asserero quod dabo* ¹⁰ *tibi hoc*, *obligo* me ad *dandum tibi hoc*, vel *dabo tibi hoc*. Verumtamen unum istorum potest quod non possunt reliqua. Possum enim dare tibi hoc, etsi non promittam tibi hoc; possum etiam obligare me ad *dandum hoc* ex debito insurgente, ex mutui receptione, ¹⁵ vel ex graciosa promissione.

Obligatio tamen vel debitum famosius sumitur pro obligatione ratione beneficii precepti. Utraque tamen significatio est satis conveniens. Ex quo patet quod ^{3^x} est obligationis, vel debiti manieres. Prima est qua ²⁰ debens vel obligatus ex sua gracia, sine superioris limitatione vel sui indigencia, statuit dare bonum alteri. Et omnem talem obligationem vel debenciam concomitatur summa libertas in debente, cum solum deus potest sic obligari. Secundo modo obligatur quis quod ²⁵ ex superioris essencie limitatione ad benefaciendum alteri sine debentis indigencia; et illo modo obligantur super-
 celestia inferioribus; quamvis enim non recipiant ab inferioribus equivalentens, recipiunt tamen a causa limitante ipsa ad hoc quicquid habent; ideo illam obliga-³⁰
 tionem non concomitatur summa libertas. ^{3^o} modo obligatur quis aliori, ratione sue imperfectionis vel indigencie; ut creatum obligatur suo conservanti obligatione essentiali; et ista obligatio infert servitutum.

Alie autem sunt obligationes preternaturales inter ³⁵ homines, que sunt istis proportionales, ut dominus gracie obligat se ad beneficium sui inferioris, et sibi subserviens est obligatus benefacere inferiori suo ad preceptum domini; et serviens vel mutuum accipiens est obligatus domino vel creditori. Omnes autem obli-⁴⁰
 gaciones ille implicant indigenciam, cum dominus

6. est *deest* B.
 27. fr'^{ce} B.

15. debito insurgente et *in marg.* B.

19. 9^{vs} B.

indiget servo vel benefacto suo ad eius servicium vel exercicium in virtute.

violent obligations: but these are not properly obligations; and logical obligations.

These are merely positions to be

maintained, admitting a proposition and all that follows from it, or denying one, and all its antecedents;

always supposing that it be not self-contradictory; and answering any irrelevant proposition as it should be answered in reality.

The affirmative course is called position; the negative, deposition.

Alie autem sunt obligationes coactive, non exemplate in natura; sed potius sunt non debite obligationes, cum 5 sint violente contra naturam.

Alie vero sunt obligationes logicales, que non sunt nisi posiciones casuum; ut ponitur quod tu tenearis concedere *hoc* et omne sequens ex illo; vel quod debeas negare *hoc* et omne antecedens ad illud; et sic de aliis, 10 que logici observant in posicionibus et deposicionibus; ubi [posicio] non est aliud nisi cognoscere quid sit possibile, et omne tale admittere; et post cuiuscunque talis posicionem concedere ipsam et quodlibet ex concessio sequens, et negare quodlibet bene concessio repugnans. 15

Et ad inpertinens (hoc est, quod non sequitur nec repugnat) respondendum est secundum suam qualitatem, sicut foret absque casu. In deposicione vero, negandum est depositum et omne antecedens ad illud, vel ad bene negatum; et ad inpertinens respondendum est secundum 20 sui qualitatem. Ista tamen bene cognita sufficiunt pro obligationibus sophisticis; quia imposicio ipsa non est nisi posicio significacionis signi, cui inposicioni est signi-

ficatum inpertinens. | Ideo, post inposicionem significacionis proposicionis, respondendum est ad illam ut ad 25 inpertinens.

Sed dimisso isto, argumentatur tripliciter contra dicta.

Primo per hoc quod, si solum denarius communis promittitur tali communi promissione, et solum ille est iuste vendicabile ex promissione quod promittitur eidem: 30 sequitur quod solum commune est vendicabile in placitis casuum promissionum; consequens est falsum, tum quia communia habita sunt per ante, si possunt haberi, et solum dare vel promittere quod habetur non valet; tum etiam, quia promissiones sunt practice, que solum 35 fiunt per singularia, cum vulgus non cognoscit talia communia.

Similiter, esto quod promittens promittat sub hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium singulare*, vel *alterum illorum in altera manuum mearum*; tunc non solum commune 40 promittitur, sed singulare, sicut patet ex verbo promissionis; et tamen non potest convinci quod est illud

Three objections.

1. If I promise a universal penny, I am not obliged to give anything but a universal one;

but I cannot give a man what he has already, i. e. a

universal penny; a promise is a practical matter, to be fulfilled by singulars.

2. Suppose that I promise somebody a particular penny,

6. non *pro* vero. 11. posicio *deest* B. 31. *pmiffionu* B. 33. v, B.

35. aliqua *pro* per B.

neither I nor the other man admitting the existence of universals; no universal penny can be promised in that case.
 3. If I promise something, I promise everything; yet anything given fulfills my promise; if I buy a man, I do not buy myself, and therefore not a 'universal man'. And if I do, then I promise what I do not promise.

Answers. 1. We grant the first conclusion; what is demanded in justice is a universal penny, not this or that particular one. But it cannot be given, unless by means of a particular one; so it must be paid down. The receiver had, we suppose, a universal penny before, but not on account of the promise; if he could have it thus without the particular one, it would do. And it is a great advantage to have a universal penny many times repeated, unless that be hurtful from another point of view.

sic compromissum. Potest enim uterque compromittens credere et velle quod non sit aliquod tale universale, nec quod de tali fiat compromissio. Non ergo voluntarie compromittendo promittit illud universale.

Similiter, promittendo transcenderet *aliquid*, non ⁵ posset esse amplior promissio, quia omne intelligibile promitteretur; et tamen illa promissio non esset efficax, cum non oporteat dare optimum nec medium promissor, sed quidlibet dando foret satisfaccio. Non ergo homo emit seipsum et omnem hominem, etsi emat hominem ¹⁰ [in] communi; et sic de vendicatione, accusacione, et conduccione, et talibus que fiunt in universali circa hominem. Sic ergo necessario est aliquid quod non necessario est. Ita, promittitur aliquid in casu quod ¹⁵ non promittitur.

Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum nemo placitans pro communi promissione denarii vendicat illum denarium vel illum, sed vendicat quod debetur sibi denarius: quod fuit promissum. Sed quia ²⁰ tale commune non potest dari vel haberi nisi per singulare, ideo requiritur promittentem dare singulare; et tunc sequitur ipsam, dando universalem, impleri promissionem. Non enim potest quandoque dari vel promitti singulare, nisi in sic faciendo involvatur universale; quia omnes tales predicaciones secundum habitudinem ²⁵ suscipiunt universale a suis singularibus. Et sic conceditur quod habeam communem denarium per ante (si habeam aliquem denarium) non tamen ex illa promissione, ideo vendico illud commune michi dari ab illo qui sic promisit; quia, si posset michi dare illud ³⁰ sine denario singulari, placet michi. Sed cum non potest, ex dacione sua multiplicius habeo illud commune. Quotquot enim denarios quis habuerit, totupliciter habet communem denarium, ut si infinitos denarios habet, infinitupliciter habet communem denarium; ³⁵ sicut infinitis vicibus dando denarium, infinicies daretur denarius. Talia enim adverbia numeri significant vicissitudines, et alia adverbia numerum suppositorum. Et sic multum confert dare et promittere, more magnatum,

1. \widehat{co} above the line B.
 27. habitum B.
 39. magtū B.

11. in *deest* B; *fb.* accusa^{oe} B.
 28. habitum B.

23. \widehat{pt}
 35. habet *tunc* B.

denaria in communi, etsi illa habita sint per ante, quia exinde multiplicius habebuntur; et in duplo plus valet habere denarium communem duplicius, supposito quod habitus ille non aliunde noceat.

- 5 Uterius patet quod tam actus iusticie coniunctive quam actus iusticie disiunctive, sicut et actus liberalis, So acts of justice, liberality etc. concern universals. but the execution of such acts regards singulars. A lord may promise me a steed, though he has none; but his groom will not deliver it to me, unless there is a steed to deliver. We deny that the people knows nothing of universals: incantations prove the contrary. Even brutes know them to some extent; even those who deny them will not deny that humanity is a necessary essence, without any singulars of men being required to make it up. It is willed by God and intended by Nature; eternal, unchangeable, and present in each of its singulars. To say: This is multiplied is not against grammar, if this means the being of man. And it is then not properly a pronoun.
- B 52^a magnifici et quomodolibet aliter virtuosi | fiunt circa universalia. Execucio tamen actuum respicit singularia; sicut lex est de universalibus et execucio legis de singularibus. Potest enim dominus promittere vel dare michi dextrarium, etsi non habuerit tale, et dacio valet michi multum. Sed subserviens non deliberabit michi dextrarium nisi singularem habuerit, executive michi dando.
- 10 singularibus. Potest enim dominus promittere vel dare michi dextrarium, etsi non habuerit tale, et dacio valet michi multum. Sed subserviens non deliberabit michi dextrarium nisi singularem habuerit, executive michi dando.
- 15 Nec dubium quin plebei naturaliter confuse cognoscunt universale; sicut patet de incantantibus et tam animatis quam inanimatis naturaliter intelligentibus universalia. Unde brutia naturaliter cognoscunt quod album, dulce, vel tale sensibile est; ad hoc enim sufficit sensus interior. Et sic negantes universalia, ignoranter conveniunt in sententia cum ipsa ponentibus; ut nullus negabit sensum talem, *hominem esse est necessarium*. Et ad hoc quod homo sit, nullum singulare hominis requiritur; sed sufficit quod unum singulare sit posterius
- 20 interior. Et sic negantes universalia, ignoranter conveniunt in sententia cum ipsa ponentibus; ut nullus negabit sensum talem, *hominem esse est necessarium*. Et ad hoc quod homo sit, nullum singulare hominis requiritur; sed sufficit quod unum singulare sit posterius
- 25 aliquid et illud, quod sine aliquo homine potest esse; et est tam necessarium et permanenter volitum a deo et intentum a natura; salvatur in diversis succedentibus; et sic est eternum, necessarium, incorruptibile quid, commune cuilibet eius supposito et ubicunque fuerit
- 30 aliquid eius suppositum; et sic de aliis que philosophi breviter locuti sunt de universalibus.
- Nec dicet grammaticus quod hec est incongrua: *hoc est multiplicatum*, demonstrando per *ly* 'hoc' primum significatum huiusmodi propositionis, *homo est*; nec
- 35 dubium quin verbum sit pariale; et bene sequitur: *hoc est multiplicatum*; ergo, *hoc est hoc*. Verumtamen pronomen in proposito appellat communiter, cum demonstrat universaliter illud quod est multa; et sic non proprie est pronomen. Et sic invenimus de omni sententia
- 40 quam ponunt philosophi de universalibus, quod omnes

2. pro inde. 19, 20. vel—universalia *in marg.* B. 28. quod B.

35. pale B. 39. inveniens? B.

All men grant this in reality; but some deny it in words; and there are secret depths of this doctrine that acute logicians and metaphysicians alone can know.

2. Even when a man promises one particular penny, he promises a universal, because the universal is here included in the singular; only he promises it vaguely.

Universal and singular are terms of the 'second intention'. A term is of the 'first intention' when it does not connote either universality or the reverse in the thing signified; of the second when it does.

A term is of the 'first imposition' when it has not been artificially created; of the second, when it has. These two sets of expressions neither include nor exclude each other. And the terms *genus, species* universal, singular, are analogously employed for all predicamental beings, and are above them all.

scioli conveniunt in sententia, sed errando discrepant in verbis. Sunt tamen multe subtiles consideraciones de universalibus, quas plebei et clerici ignorant in particulari, que subtilibus logicis et metaphysicis reservantur. Vulgus ergo, sicut ut brutum, cognoscit sibi conveniens in specie et naturaliter afficitur sibi ex congruentia specifica, que non fundatur in signis.

Ad 2^m dicendum quod promittens sub tali forma verborum, promittit communia; quia sicut non potest esse commune sine singulari, nec econtra, sic nec *promitti*. Verumtamen secundum quolibet gradus potest tam singulare quam commune promitti; ut confuse et confusius. Nam promittendo singulare primo et distincte, promittitur universale secundarie et confuse, et econtra. Sicut ergo sequitur: *A significat homo, ergo significat animal*, ita sequitur: *promitto tibi denarium; igitur, promitto tibi denarium*. Unde in casu limitato promittitur denarius in universali contractius, et promissione sic confusiori quam si promittitur cum paribus suis hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium*.

Nam isti termini, *universale et singulare*, sunt termini 2^o intencionis, connotantes communicabilitatem et incommunicabilitatem. Vocatur enim signum, terminus prime intencionis qui significat suum significatum, non connotando rationem universalitatis vel singularitatis; ut isti termini: *homo, animal* etc. Et vocatur terminus 2^o intencionis qui connotat alterum istorum, ut isti termini *universale, singulare, genus, species, substantia prima, et substantia 2^a*.

Sed terminus prime impositionis vocatur terminus quicumque, significans primarie significatum quod non est signum artificiale, ut sunt isti termini: *universale, homo*, etc. Et terminus 2^o impositionis vocatur terminus significans signum humanitus inventum, ut sunt talia: *nomen, verbum*, etc. Ex quo patet quod terminus 2^o intencionis est terminus prime impositionis; et multi termini prime impositionis sunt termini prime intencionis. Patet etiam quod isti termini: *genus, species, universale, singulare*, sunt analogia encia circum decem genera, et sunt superiora ad quemcunque terminum prime

8. dr above the line B.
the line B.

18. $\overline{\text{iv}}\overline{\text{is}}$ or $\overline{\text{iv}}\overline{\text{is}}$ B.
39. c'cū^meŋ B.

19. s' pro sic above

21. a'qui B.

intencionis per se in genere; cum omne singulare sit genus, et species, et omnis species est genus, et econtra; sed ratione differunt, ut prius dictum est. Unde iste raciones |

B 52^b vocantur res 2^o intencionis; et res significata per terminos prime intencionis vocantur res prime intencionis.

Dicitur ergo quod cum verbis primo significatis promittitur denarius universalis; sed iuxta prius dicta, ille terminus singularis 2^o intencionis contrahit terminum communem ad supponendum limitate pro denario singulariter dando, sicut et faciunt signa particularia. Ideo non est idem dicere: *dabo tibi denarium*, et *dabo tibi denarium singularem*; quia intendendo primam, feruntur intenciones universaliter incontracte in denarium; sed intendendo 2^{am} feruntur intenciones 15 indifferenter in unum singulare; et illud principaliter est promissum. Et sic contrahitur etiam illatio per illum terminum: *alterum illorum*. Ideo ex ista promissione est dare denarium qui specialiter promittitur; sed solius promittentis est discutere quis sit ille. Ideo 20 sufficit legi quod cogatur dare unum denarium, vel alterum istorum. Nam, iuxta prius dicta, est dare infinitos gradus contrahencium communium suis quacunque specie specialissima, ex limitacione accidentalis proprietatis adiecte speciei; ut, *vir* est specialior quam 25 *homo*, et *anglicus* quam *vir*; et commune ad utrumque istorum est specialius quam *anglicus*. Ita tamen non sunt species substantie, quia ponunt formaliter accidentia substantiarum.

Et faciliter patet quid promittitur quacumque tali 30 promissione primo et principaliter; quia illud quod primo et principaliter significatur verbis promissionis; ut commune ad utrumque illorum promittitur, quando sic promittitur: *dabo tibi alterum istorum*. Ista tamen signa partitiva: *aliquod*, *alterum*, *singulare*, *duo*, *unum*, 35 et quotquot similia, limitant ad intellectum pluralem; et ita limitant verba predicata, ut: *intendo emere bovem*, *conducere equum* vel *aparium*, etc. intenditur parti-

We, therefore, answer that the words, as they signify, promise a universal penny; but they are contracted by the 'second intention' of the word *singular*, etc.

So the meaning is indeed different. Here, therefore, there is one particular penny to be given; but which it will be must depend on the giver, and the law cannot do more than force him to give some penny or other. There are infinite degrees of individuation of a universal term.

What is, therefore, promised? That which the promising verb principally signifies, i. e. the universal.

17. ex ista *and* dare *very illegible* B. 22. ^{um} *pro* contrahencium B.

37. *apariū* B.

13. *Primam*. And. (l. 14.) 2^{am}. I do not know to what feminine substantive this refers, and therefore leave the words as they stand.
25. *Cummine*. Wyclif evidently means '*combinatum ex utrisque*', i. e. *vir anglicus*; but I do not think the MS. is wrong.
37. *Apararium*, I believe, means *apparel* here.

culariter de illo quem non habeo, et de quo potest esse rationabilis commutacio; quamvis logicus diceret hoc non oportere.

It may be said that *man* is an equivocal term if it signifies at once the universal and the singular. 'Man' — including a painted man and a living one — is indeed an equivocal term; not so this.

How can species differ specifically from their individuals? There would be another species including both, and so on for ever.

I do not admit that *mortal* belongs to the definition of man; corruptibility and incorruptibility may be differences found among things of the same species. The Corruptible and the Incorruptible differ very widely; yet not all things that are one or the other differ so much.

A *singular man* denotes incommunicability; a *universal man*, the reverse; *man* denotes neither.

Et si argumentatur quod iste terminus, *homo*, sit equivocus, cum significat homines singulares et hominem communem, qui differunt plus quam genere, cum unum sit corruptibile et aliud incorruptibile; nec est illa vera diffinicio, cum unum sit mortale et aliud immortale: dicitur quod iste terminus, *homo*, est equivocus, significando hominem et ymaginem hominis pictam, sed non significando universale et eius singulare; et sic eundem terminum contingit nunc esse equivocum et nunc univocum, secundum diversitatem intendendi per illum. Nec esset possibile quod species differret specificè ab individuis suis, quia super ipsam speciem quodlibet illorum. Nec est dare speciem specialissimam communem speciei, sibi et illis singularibus, nisi cavendum ne sit processus in infinitum. Et cum species sit quodlibet eius individuum, patet quod est *omne animal rationale et mortale*, et per consequens communicat in diffinitione cum eius individuis.

Credo tamen quod *mortale* non est propria differentia hominis, quia est accidens privativum; ymo, stat res eiusdem speciei specialissime differret corruptibilitate et non corruptibilitate: ut patet de celestibus et sublunariis, et de accidentibus eorum; ut numerus, linea, superficialitas, corporeitas, lumen, figura; et quotlibet talia accidentia in celo incorruptibilia sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime cum accidentibus corruptibilibus sublunariis. Et sic, quamvis corruptibile et non corruptibile differunt plus quam genere, non tamen omnia huiusmodi plus differunt. Sed corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt istis proprietatibus, et non solum genere logico, nec solum genere suorum subiectorum, nec pluri differentia quam differentia generis. Non tamen oportet quod differant plus quam aliqua que genere differunt.

Sic ergo iste terminus, *homo singularis*, de sua particulari significatione significat naturam hominis incommunicabilem multis personis; et *homo universalis* significat eandem naturam, ut communicabilis est. Et

iste terminus, *homo*, neutram istarum rationum connotat. Frequenter tamen termini 2^o intencionis significant similiter sine connotacione rationis huiusmodi; ut patet in istis: *Ego sum species, ego sum homo communis*. Et
 5 frequenter connotat tales rationes; ut in istis: *singulare differt ab universalis*. Ideo, sicut supra dixi, in talibus que videntur contradicere non est repugnancia sentencie.

But these adjectives are not always necessary to make the word *man* mean one way or the other.

Et si obicitur quod contingit intelligere *alterum*
 10 *istorum*, sicut et *singularem*, non contracte, intelligendo unum singulare potius quam quodcunque, sicut experientia docet; dicitur quod sic intelligentes abutuntur significacione termini; et frequenter cogitat homo confuse de singulari, dum tamen ignoraverit; ut cogitando
 15 quod *rosa est pulcher flos, et homo est elegans creatura*, communiter intelligendo illas species sub conceptibus ymaginabilium que notacius in una specie sunt in ymaginativa mea. Et sic facit maior pars hominem, que non habet intellectum elevatum sufficientem ad intelligendum universaliter illas abstractas essencias, sicut
 20 docet Lincolniensis. Intelligendo ergo sic similiter non repugnarent illa: *Alter istorum denariorum promittitur, et neuter istorum promittitur*; quia sicut hic non est contradiccio, *homo est species et nemo est species*,
 25 propter supposicionis singularis mutacionem in pluralem; sic nec in proposito, cum eadem sit causa, ut dicitur. Sic ergo, etsi nolim quod sit universale, non eo minus erit, me invito: ymmo, sequitur me illud promittere communi promissione, etsi velim oppositum.
 30 Ad tercium dicitur quod talis promissio non valet ad lucrum illi cui promittitur; quia etsi esset dare invisibile, minime valens, cum tamen illud non potest per se dari, deficeret executio iuris in talibus casibus. Ideo iurista reputaret omnes tales casus frivolos, sicut
 35 et casum quo ponitur Sor mereri cum Platone per horam uniformiter gradu meriti ut 4^{or}, sed mereatur Sor usque ad finem inclusive et non ultra, et Plato usque ad finem exclusive. Certum est quod nullus iudex mortalis sciret proporcionare illa premia suis meritis
 40 totalibus correspondenter; sicut nec testes possunt per experientiam proporcionare, vel docere quod de facto unus

To say that a *singular* means one particular singular, is an abuse of language; we often think by imagination of some particular which we do not know to exist. Such are the thoughts of most men, whose intelligence is not sufficiently lofty to understand abstract essences. There is, therefore, no real contradiction between: *One of the two, and neither, is promised*; and the promise will have a universal object, even in spite of me. 3. The promise of 'something' is a valid promise, but a useless one; it could not be judicially enforced, as the smallest of things cannot be given. As in the case of two men meriting a reward, but one during only one indivisible instant less than another; no man could settle the

difference between their merits; nor could the fact be proved.

When we promise to give a universal of which the singulars are of equal value, any of those singulars will do, but none of less value; when the value varies, we are bound to give an average one and the judge's duty is to see that, as nearly as possible, this is done.

When a man promises *every* animal, or all the gold in the world, we may say that the promise is *logically* obligatory,

but ethically he would not be obliged, because in all such promises it is understood that the thing promised must be possible. So every impossible promise or vow is null and void.

sic alium excessit in merendo. Sic ergo quodlibet, promissum tali promissione, valet; sed promissio talis non est utilis propter defectum executionis de mere nobis cognito possibili. Deus tamen scit si promittens teneatur dare ex promissione tali quiddam, et quomodo tenetur 5 dare.

Nota tamen quod, pro promisso de aliquo communi inter eius individua non differencia in valore, satis est dare quodcunque individuum; ut promittendo denarium in communi, satis est solvere quemcunque denarium ar- 10 genteum non peccantem in pondere vel figura; sed non est satis dare denarium peccantem in aliquo istorum, ut plumbeum vel aliter equivoce bonum. Quod si promittitur, cuius individua sunt gradatim bona, capiendum est de illis mediocriter bonum, secundum circum- 15 stancias promittentis et persone cui promittitur; quod relinquo politicis secundum epikeiam iudicandum. Ut, promittendo lignum vel bovem in specie, habet iudex proporcionare valorem individui dandi ad circumstan- B 53^b cias [et] particularitates. Et in talibus satis est quod iudex arbitretur, iuxta suum credere, arbitrio propinquo veritati, quia non tenemur, cum non sufficimus arbitrari iustum simpliciter. Et taliter arbitrandum est quando promittitur aliquid in genere; ut si sic: *dabo tibi unum animal*. Et, si queratur quantum debet dari, pro- 25 mittendo universaliter, distributo termino significante promissum; ut sic dicendo: *dabo tibi omne aurum mundi*, dicitur quod multe promissiones huiusmodi sunt inanes. Ideo sufficit logico dicere quod de veritate significacionis esset solvendum. Sufficit ergo quod pro tempore con- 30 gruo detur omne aurum quod fuerit in mundo pro tunc. Et patet quante differt universaliter promittere aut confuse.

Et si ulterius queratur utrum illud quod non potest esse potest promitti, dicitur quod sic. Ideo diceret logicus quod sic promittens: *omne aurum mundi dabo tibi*, 35 aurum quod non potest esse promittit; quia omne aurum significatum per terminum promittit et infinitum magnum significatur per terminum, *aurum*. Sed politicus diceret quod, quando sub communi includuntur aliqua ad que obligatus non potest tendere regulariter, intelligenda 40

7. promissio B.

8. non est B.

18. $\widehat{\text{hōne}}$ B.

20. et *deest* B.

26. $\sqrt{\text{m}}$ pro universum B.

est tacita condicio de possibilibus; ut in quocunque voto vel obligatione alia intelligitur: *si illud potest fieri*. Vana ergo est huiusmodi promissio universalis, et alia quecunque, que non potest impleri.

- 5 Ulterius conceditur quod fatue emendo bovem in communi incontracte, universalis bos distincte emitur, et quilibet singularis bos confuse. Et sic de vendicatione, accusatione, conductione, que sunt in universali; nec est inconveniens quod quis improvide vadat
 10 ad forum ad emendum vel conducendum res proprias; quia intendit hoc, sed confuse; principaliter enim et distincte, si discrete intendit tali commutationi subcibilia quibus indiget; et sic contraccius intenditur quam speciem; et sic non secuntur inconveniencia adducta.
- 15 Nota tamen quod facientes sophismata cum talibus verbis, negando universalialia et actus confusos, habent cum quocunque gerundivo talia facere sophismata, rationi verbi inclusi; ut: *vado ad videndum*, est sensus: *vado pro videre*. In omnibus enim talibus gerundivis
 20 intelligitur actus proponendi, vel actus intendendi. Et si dicatur quod inconveniens est concedere quod homo intendit vel proponit emere res proprias, dicitur quod non. loquendo de intencione vel proposito confuso inordinata; sicut non est inconveniens hominem scire
 25 illud quod nunc ignorat et cum difficultate adiscit. Et si communiter delectant restringere tales actus ad distinctos, tantummodo respectu illorum ad que principaliter terminantur, tunc concedendum esset quod homo bovem emit, sed nullum singularem; sed et vadit ad
 30 emendum alloc, sed nullum alloc vadit emere. Vel 2^o oportet dicere quod in omnibus commutationibus subauditur "taliter commutabile". Vel 3^o commutacio illucita est irrationalis; ideo fatuitas sequitur ex illa. Moderni ergo, reputantes superiorem modum loquendi ab
 35 surdum, modicum attendunt quomodo absurdus esset dicere quod vadens ad forum ad emendum victualia nescit quid emat; ymmo, emit pisces et cetera multa, et tamen nec deus nec ipse scit quid emit, quia nichil
 B 54^a emit. Ymmo, unus dedit sibi equos, sellas, et multa | talia
 40 donaria, et tamen non debet sibi regraciari pro donatis,

An ox, bought in general, without any specification, is the universal ox, or any one of its singulars. Is it absurd to go to the market to buy anything in general, perhaps to buy one's own goods? In all these acts of buying, etc., there is an idea of intention and intelligence;

it is, therefore, false to say that going out to buy in general, we explicitly intend to buy our own things.

If they choose to restrict our acts to particular objects, then a man, going to buy an ox, would go to buy none; or he would implicitly suppose certain conditions to individualize it; or such buying would be mere foolishness. They think our point of view absurd; but how much more is theirs!

It would do away with all gratitude for gifts; nothing

12, 13. fbiellm B. 18. errantes est sensus errantes B. 20. ppo^{di} B.

25. indiffinite; corr. in marg. B; ib. non pro nunc B. 26. commune B; ib. delcat B. 30. alloc or alloc before sed B. 39. fellas telas B.

has been given,
if v. g. A horse
is given.

Such sophistry
would arouse
the anger of
their
benefactors.

Accusation
concerns
singular facts
alone.

Though a thing
may necessarily
not be
necessary, it
does not follow
that what is
promised is not
promised:
because
necessarily
alludes to
the whole
proposition;
and we must
also have
something —
universal or
singular — that
is promised.
I may know
in general that
a planet exists,
without
knowing the
existence of
any one in
particular.
And this
knowledge,
even referring
to particular
instances, is
distinct, i. e. in
its principle;
but not distinct
as to the facts
it may or may
not include.

cum alius nichil dederit sibi: ymmo, utroque obli-
viente donacionis, vanum esset laborare rememinendo
vel referendo quid donans vel magnificus dedit sibi,
sicut vanum esset querere de specie, magnitudine, boni-
tate, et ceteris accidentibus huiusmodi donacionis. Ta-
liter enim sophisticans ex sua sophistica incurreret indi-
gnacionem suorum benefactorum promulgando illam
logicam suam. Accusacio autem est de singularibus; et
de querela in casu de universalibus, ut dicitur, pre-
datus conquiritur de latronibus, et post evidentem
noticiam de personis predantibus, accusat eosdem.

Sed pro ultimo dicto est notandum quod sicut
necessario aliquid est contingens, ita necessario aliquid
est quod non necessario est. Sed non ex hoc sequitur
per locum *a simili* quod possibile sit hominem pro-
mittere aliquid quod non promittitur; quia actus termini
mobilis fertur super veritatem significatam per illam
proposicionem: *Aliquid erit quod non necessario erit.*
Sic ergo, si similitudo esset ad propositum, signifi-
candum esset illud quod promittitur. In omnibus ergo
talibus veris sophismatibus est dare commune, vel sin-
gulare, super quod fertur talis actus: ut distincte scio
planetam esse quem non ut sic distincte scio esse;
posito quod distincte sciam quod planeta est, et quod
omnem planetam ignorem esse, tunc scio planetam
esse quem non distincte scio esse: est unum com-
mune quod distincte scio, sed nullum eius singulare sic
scio; et cum commune non sit dandum nisi aliquid
eius singulare sit dandum, patet quod si distincte
quemlibet planetam cognovero esse planetam, tunc falsum
est quod distincte scio planetam esse quem non sic
scio esse. Infinitas tamen partes celi non distincte scio
esse; et tamen, quacunque michi ostensa, sic quod sim
certus illam esse partem celi, statim scio distincte illam
esse. Unde planetam aliquid scio esse, qualiter nescio
istum planetam esse; quia distincte scio *hoc* esse, de-
monstrando racionem; et tamen non distincte scio illum
planetam esse, cum ignoro utrum sit planeta sicut pono.
In proposito autem non est dare denarium quem non

2. bonum vanum at top of page B. 3. † above the line for vel
after donans B. 10. em^{tem} B. 23. quē = quem? B; *ib.* sicut B.
25. scio B. 26. quē = communem B.

promitto super quem fertur talis promissio, cum omne
 singulare communis denarii promittitur confuse. Si
 autem promittam sub hiis verbis: *dabo tibi denarium*
quem tibi non promitto, adhuc communem denarium
 5 confuse promitto. Et sic falsum dico; nec excusor per
 hoc ne tenear solvere denarium, quia in illo falso im-
 plicatur *quod dabo tibi denarium*; ad quod tenear, cum
 sit possibile.

Unde in talibus obligationibus sunt tria: scilicet casus,
 10 actus obligationis, et verba obligandi. Quodlibet autem
 illorum trium est possibile per se: sed primum est incom-
 possibile cum duobus sequentibus: ut ponatur quod
 ego obligem me sub hiis verbis sic sequentibus, et quod
 dabo denarium quem non promitto; quia, si sic non
 15 obligem me, tunc omnem denarium promitto. Si autem
 sub hiis verbis obligem me: *dabo tibi denarium quem*
non distincte promitto; certum est quod in solvendo uni-
 versaliter promissum, generaliter verificatur tale dictum.

B 5.4^b Unde in tali casu: *promitto tibi denarium quem | non*
 20 *distincte promitto*, et ille est dandus, quia quilibet de-
 narius singularis est talis; et tunc sophisma est simile
 priori, ut cum distincte scis aliquid esse quod non scis
 esse. Sed in omni tali casu illud est dandum, nisi
 quia quid distincte promitto in tali casu, dicto quod
 25 *denarium quem non distincte promitto*; sed nec illum nec
 illum sic distincte promitto. Et si obligem me sub istis
 signis: *dabo tibi alterum istorum et quem non teneor tibi*
dare, satis bene admittitur casus, quia tenear multa
 facere que nunc non teneor, cum succedente oportunitate
 30 temporis, vel alia variacione circumstantie, insurgit nova
 obligacio. Unde deperdicio, consumpcio, vel alienacio
 unius promissionis obligat me ad dandum reliquum ex
 debito. Multiplex tamen est obligacio tenenda, vel de-
 bitum secundum variacionem modi obligandi.

35 Unde, secundum theologos, aliqua debeo facere sub
 pena peccati mortalis, et aliqua sub pena parva amissio-
 nis antiqui meriti, cuiusmodi sunt opera super-
 40

I cannot give
 the penny that
 I do not
 promise, for
 there is none
 such.

And if I say,
 I will give the
 penny that I do
 not promise, I
 tell a falsehood,
 and yet the
 object is
 universal, and
 I am bound by
 my promise.

Three factors
 here: the
 particular case,
 the obligation,
 and the words:
 the first is
 incompatible
 with the two
 others.

But if I say:
 I will give the
 penny that I do
 not distinctly
 promise, there
 is no difficulty,

for any
 particular
 penny is such,
 and we return
 to the previous
 case (of distinct
 knowledge).

Also, if I say:
 I will give the
 one of these
 two that I am
 not obliged to
 give; for I may
 be obliged to
 give it hereafter.

12. $\overset{\vee}{p}r$ puta B. 19. $\widehat{q}p \parallel \widehat{q}u\widehat{c}$ B. 22. ut above the line B. 36. $\widehat{v}a$
 or $\widehat{p}a$ pro parva B.

37. *Meriti*. According to the Catholic Church, merit can be
 lost only by mortal sin. *Antiqui* is very likely a mistake; per-
 haps *maioris* (aris) would be the right word.

As we cannot
always do what
is perfectly
right, we sin
continually.
We ought not
to oblige
ourselves to do
anything in the
future;
and I am not
obliged to fast
on any
particular day;
for it might be
that my fasting
would be more
acceptable on
any other.
Thus I ought
to do many
things which I
am not
absolutely
compelled to
do; and if I
gave them up
for a year, I
should sin
continually.
Another answer
to the
foregoing
difficulties: I
am obliged to
give a
particular thing;
which? God
only knows.

All this is but
an introduction
to the
difficulties of
this subject.

errogacionis. Unde non est possibile non bene omnia hic facere que debemus. Ideo continue peccamus, licet non mortaliter. Unde obligans se et heredes suos ad dandum annuatim 10 in perpetuum non debet infinitipliciter; nec debet dare 10; sed debet isto anno dare 5 decem. Et ex isto patet quod non est possibile quod racionabiliter sim obligatus ad ieiunandum aliquo die huius anni quo tenebor ieiunare; quia, si bene ieiunabo aliquando, tenebor tunc ieiunare; nec potest esse rationale quod obliger sub pena mortalis peccati ieiunare illo die, quo non tenebor sub pena mortalis peccati ieiunare; quia tunc deventus ad ultimum dierorum limitatorum, essem perplexus, et per idem ante illum diem. Multa ergo sunt racionaliter fienda ad que deus non potest obligare me sub pena peccati mortalis: ut racionabile est quod faciam multa ad que non obliger sub tanta pena. Ymmo, si per annum cessavero a faccione talium, ego continue peccarem mortaliter.

Alia responsio est, concedens quod deus scit quod singulare universalis teneat dare, cum non potest esse 20 indifferencia quo ad deum. Sed ego ignoro illud; et ita est dare singulare quod debeo dare, quamvis individuum humanum deficiat. Et ignorancia istius inducit omnes illas frivolas conclusiones supradictas. Negando ergo formam casus ponentes in datoribus in talibus 25 commutationibus.

Ista autem iam dicta erunt occasionalis introductione ad inveniendum latentes difficultates in istis materiis.

2. 91^e in marg. B. 1, 5. $\widehat{\text{f}}\widehat{\text{t}}\widehat{\text{u}}\widehat{\text{p}}^{\text{r}}$ B. 8, 9. al $\widehat{\eta}$ B. 25. po^{tes} B;
ib. d^rob, B.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Sequitur de sophismatibus ortis de relatione relativi idemptitatis ad antecedens pluralitatis, discretum pro suppositis quorum non est dare totalem multitudinem. Continuation of the same subject; solution of sophisms.

5 In talibus enim fiunt huiusmodi sophismata.

Primum: omnia compossibilia illorum 4 contradicto- I. Four given riorum sunt scripta, que vel sunt deus, vel illa non written contradictories are either God or impossible. possunt esse. 2^{um}. Omnes homines quos deus potest II. Impossibility producere, possunt esse chymere, vel illi non possunt of the esse producti ab aliquo si non a chymera. 3^{um} Omnia production of man by God. que deus potuit facere, possunt esse deus, vel nichil III. All is God, or all things are B 55^a potest differre ab alio. [4^{m.}] | Aliqua possunt fieri; et si identical. ipsa, vel aliquod illorum esset factum, deus differet IV. God would a se. Et sic de quotlibet similibus sophismatibus. differ from Himself by creation.

15 Primum autem probatur, significando ista 4 contra- I. dictionaria: *tu es, tu non es. Ego sum, ego non sum*; que Demonstration. Take four such: sunt a, b, c, d, scripta secundum ordinem; et tunc *A is B, A is not B; C is D, C is not D.* patet quod prima pars est vera, sicut et sue exponentes; A and C, B and D are 20 esse omnia compossibilia illorum. Si enim aliqua duo esse omnia compossibilia, supersunt alia duo com- two couples that can coexist; possibilia istorum: non ergo data sunt alia compos- but the couples A and B, C and D cannot coexist. sibililia istorum et 3^a istorum sunt omnia com- Thus the four: A, B, C and D 25 dentur, illa sunt impossibilia, tum etiam quia are and are not possible at the perinde alia 3^a essent impossibilia istorum. Nec 4^{or} possible at the same time. sunt omnia compossibilia istorum, quia nulla 4 sunt 4 istorum, sed ista, et illa 4 non sunt compossibilia.

Et isto modo probatur quod omnes homines univer- This reasoning, extended, applies to universals that must exist at the same sales similes, equales, socii, vel adversarii, currunt, et nullus illorum movetur. Et omnes ille conclusiones

1. Cap. *deest, space for initial S.* 3. pl^{is} B. 9. chy^e B. 10. chy^a B.
12. ab al B; *ib.* 4^m *deest* B. 24—26. istorum — *essent in marg.* B. 26. p^u. B.

time; yet the
coexistence of
some of them
at the same
time implies
contradiction.

probantur per hoc quod nulla talia possunt esse omnia
talia qualia exigent conclusiones. Contra illas conclu-
siones argumentatur supponendo duo: primo quod
omne relativum restringit suum antecedens ad kathe-
gorice supponendum. Aliter enim non plus posset esse 5
suum antecedens quam adverbium vel aliud synkathe-
goricum. Et hoc pretendit illa posicio, ponens vere
quod omne relativum idemptitatis reflectans significa-
cionem super suum antecedens significat idem quod
suum antecedens; ut si omnis homo est animal et ille 10
currit, tunc ille qui est omnis homo currit. Per hoc
enim probatur quod falsum est omnia compossibilia
istorum esse, et illa esse finita vel infinita, eo quod
tunc illa que sunt omnia compossibilia istorum sunt
huiusmodi et finita: illud fundat omnes conclusiones 15
huius materie.

Every object of
thought may
be indicated by
a demonstrative
pronoun: if not,
these and *those*
are to be
excepted; which
is itself an
indication.

2^o; supponatur quod quecumque significanda sint,
sive finita vel infinita, sive possibilia sive impossibilia,
sunt demonstrabilia, ut illud patet expositorie; quia
aliter esset dandum de aliquibus quod illa non sunt 20
demonstrabilia. Sed, negando quod illa possunt demon-
strari, vel concedendo quod *illa non possunt demonstrari*,
satis implicatur per subiectum huius propositionis
'demonstrari illa que data sunt non posse demonstrari.'
Ideo tam expositorie quam inductive patet suppositicia. 25

Things that
cannot exist,
may be thus
indicated, since
they can be
known to the
mind.
These may be
pointed out in
particular, and
infinite others.
For the number
of things
compossible is
infinite.

Similiter, aliqua que non possunt esse, possunt
demonstrari, cum possunt intellectui notari; et eadem
ratione omnia que non possunt esse: ergo nulla impos-
sibilitas existendi impedit demonstrabilitatem. Et ex
istis patet quod hoc verbum *demonstrari*, est summe 30
ampliativum, ita quod sequitur: *omnes homines demon-*
strantur, igitur omnes homines qui possunt esse vel qui
non possunt esse demonstrantur. Et forte deus necessario
demonstrat alicui omnia demonstrabilia, et per con-
sequens infinita que non possunt esse. Similiter, 35
secundum precipuos philosophos, unus numerus infinitus
est reliquo maior, sicut tota universitas causatorum
est infinita. Sed nulle tales propositiones essent
concedende, vel negande, nisi infinita possent demon-
strari illorum. Sive enim sit verum sive falsum quod 40
unus numerus infinitus est reliquo maior, dande sunt

singulares talium, per quarum subiecta bene intellecta demonstrari habent infinita. Est ergo firmissime tenendum quod si aliqua possunt intelligi, ipsa possunt demonstrari, et per consequens, cum necessario infinita intelliguntur, necessario contingit demonstrari infinita.

B 55^b Quibus habitis, argumentatur tripliciter contra primam conclusionem. Primo sic. Ista sunt | omnia compossibilia istorum; ergo, aliqua sunt omnia compossibilia istorum. Et demonstro per *ly*, 'ista', omnia que sunt compossibilia istorum, et solum illa que sunt compossibilia istorum. Cum enim possum demonstrare quecumque voluero iuxta secundam suppositionem, et sine dubio libenter volo sic demonstrare, patet quod possum sic demonstrare. Sicut ergo impossibile est rationale non posse intelligere quicquid voluerit, sic impossibile est rationale non posse demonstrare quidquid voluerit. Possibile est ergo demonstrare hoc aggregatum, sive possit esse, sive non. Et antecedens patet per hoc quod omne demonstratum per *ly* 'ista' est istorum, sive sit multitudo, sive unitas; ut patet ex casu. Hec ergo propositio: *ista sunt omnia compossibilia istorum*, primarie significat sicut est.

Similiter, ista sunt, cum quodlibet istorum est, eo quod nichil demonstratur per *ly* 'ista' nisi quod est; et cum ista non sunt infinita, sequitur quod sunt finita, et omnia finita de aliquo numero sunt quo ipsa formaliter numerantur. Ergo et ista sunt de tali numero. Et quicumque detur, patet quod istorum numerus sic est istorum sicut et ista habent illum numerum. Sic enim est idem numerus 10 canum et 10 equorum; nec forent ista formaliter multa, nisi haberent numerum, sicut suppono, cum omnis species quantitatis distinguitur a subiecto. Quod si loquamur de numero pro rebus numeratis, patet idem, cum singula illorum sunt de istis, et partes numerales illorum; nec habet alium sensum hec propositio apud bene intelligentes: *Ista sunt [omnia compossibilia] istorum*. Similiter, ista 4 sunt A B C D; sed illi duo binarii sunt compossibilia: ergo ista 4^r solum sunt illa que

Yet it is not so. These propositions are all that are compatible, understanding by *these*, all that can coexist, and only those; for I am free to take which I like. And thus the whole aggregate is compatible.

Again, these exist, for no things can be called *these* unless they exist; therefore their number is finite, and is *theirs*;

for number is distinct from its subject.

Again, call these propositions A, B, C and D. A and C, and

13. fppom B. 29. demonstratur de B. 38. omnia compossibilia deest B.

B and *D* can be coëxistent, and these couples alone. But these two couples are the four contradictories, which are therefore compatible; It is not necessary that each proposition should possibly coëxist with the other, or there would be no contradictories.

sunt compossibilia, et per consequens, sicut sunt illa compossibilia, ita sunt aliqua compossibilia. Sunt enim duo paria compossibilia, et illa duo paria compossibilium non sunt nisi duo et duo, que sunt illa 4. Aliter enim non cognoscerentur plura compossibilia 5 quam *A*; et sic, posito quod ista 4 essent omnes propositiones, et sic prime essent tot compossibilia quot sunt binarii vel paria possibilium; scimus tamen quod *BD* sunt alia compossibilia quam *AC*. Ideo Deus conservans omnia compossibilia, conservat et cognoscit 10 plura compossibilia quam *A* et *C*. Non enim oportet quod singulum compossibilium sit compossibile singulo, quia sic non contradicerent propositiones, nec converterentur, nisi singula sic se haberent ad singula illorum; quod est contra dicta tractatu proximo. 15

Answer. I consider this conclusion as impossible. That each of the 4 is coëxistent with the others, I admit; they are those that they are, and yet differ from those that they are. The four, and not only three of them, can be coëxistent.

Videtur ergo michi quod prima conclusio, sicut et quelibet consimilis, est impossibilis. Ymmo conceditur quod ista sunt 4 compossibilia istorum, quia singulum istorum est compossibile alteri; nec est inconveniens quod ista sunt istorum et tamen sunt ista, sicut ista 20 sunt ista et tamen differunt ab istis. Potest enim quelibet talis propositio dupliciter sumi; in sensu composito vel diviso, tam ratione subiecti quam ratione predicati. *Ista 4 ergo sunt compossibilia*, et non 3^a istorum sunt omnia compossibilia. Nec sequitur ex istis 25 quod 4 contradictoria sunt unum istorum vel quod unum 4 sunt pauciora quam 4. Et si obiciatur quod 4, inter se contradictoria, sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.

Unde pari evidencia qua conceditur ista 4 contradicere inter se vel sibi ipsis, concedendum est quod 30 sunt compossibilia inter se vel sibi ipsis: Sicut enim bina et bina contradicunt, sic bina et bina sunt simul; et sic de ceteris que diversim, reciproce, vel alternatim, inexistunt, 4^{or} vel quotlibet pluribus. Attendendum tamen est ad numerum subiectorum et ad condiciones 35 predicatorum; quia 4 propositiones sunt convertibilia et contradictoria; sed duo non. Et duo homines amant se in casu, quia reciproce; et odiant se, quia alternatim. Et si 2^o obiciatur quod omnia compossibilia sunt ponibilia et admittibilia, et per consequens sic est de 40 istis 4^{or} cum sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.

Ymmo, conceditur quod simul sunt possibilis, et sic
 admissibilia; et concedo quod stat in casu ita 4 bene
 admitti ab ipsa ponentibus sic primarie significando;
 quia stat unum par bene admitti ab uno et
 5 aliud par bene admitti pro eodem instanti a
 B 56^a reliquo. | Ymmo stat eundem bene admittere ista duo
 paria pro eadem mensura a diversis hominibus. Non
 tamen oportet quod si ista sunt compossibilia vel
 possunt simul esse vera, quia possibile sic et illa simul
 10 esse vera, quia 4 sunt duo paria possibilium que
 possunt simul esse vera; sed non est possibile quod
 simul sint vera. De duobus tamen non sic sophisticatur
 secundum sensum compositum et divisum. 4 enim sunt
 compossibilia, quia duo paria compossibilium; et eadem
 15 4 sunt duo paria impossibilium.
 Nec sunt aliqua impossibilia. In 4 enim sunt
 6 coniugaciones binarii possibilis, iuxta dicta de duobus;
 ergo sequitur *ista sunt compossibilia; ergo possibile est*
quod simul sint vera; sed de 4 non sequitur, propter
 20 combinaciones binariorum in 4 quales non sunt in
 duobus. Nec tantum dicuntur combinaciones compossibi-
 biles, quamvis sint possibilis pro eodem instanti, sed
 quia significata primaria illarum stat simul esse pro
 eodem instanti. Multe autem sunt propositiones com-
 25 possibilis que, ut secum convertibiles, possunt esse vere
 pro aliquo instanti: ut patet de istis; *nulla propositio*
est, et hoc instans est, et multe possunt esse vere pro
 aliquo instanti que non possunt simul esse vere; ut
 iste due possunt esse vere pro medio instanti crastine
 30 diei: *Ego sum et ego non sum*, quia utraque istarum
 in sensu diviso potest esse vera pro illo instanti; et
 tamen neutra simul potest esse vera cum altera istarum,
 continue sic primarie significando sicut iam significat
 primarie.
 35 Et si 3^o obiciatur quod iste 4 propositiones non
 sunt compossibiles, nec possunt simul esse vere, eo

may be
 admitted, and
 that these are
 together
 possible;
 one couple may
 be admitted by
 one person,
 another by
 another at the
 same time.
 But if they are
 possibles that
 may be true,
 yet it is not
 possible that
 they be true at
 the same time.
 These sophisms
 can not be
 made with one
 couple only:
 Four — i. e. two
 couples of in-
 compatibilities,
 and
 compatibilities
 — are required.
 In these four
 propositions
 we find six
 separate
 compatibilities
 which can
 together be
 true; but it does
 not follow that
 all the four
 propositions
 can be true
 together.
 Many
 propositions
 may be true
 at a given
 instant, and
 some, true at a
 given instant,
 cannot continue
 true; as the
 fact of an
 existence that
 ceases to be.

Is may be
 objected that
 if these four
 could be true at

3. $\bar{b}\eta$ ad i p mitti ad b; *place of words here very doubtful.* 4—5. ab uno — admitti *in marg.*; instanti a reliquo *bottom of page B.* 9. quod; quia *above B.* 25. n^o pro ut B. 26. ut — instanti *in marg.* B. 32. cum altera istarum *in marg.* B. 33, 34. sicut — primaria *in marg.* B.

17. 6. *A is B; A is not B; A is C; A is not C;* and so on. Of these pairs of propositions, six are compatible: *A is B; A is C, A is D, B is C, B is D* and *C is D.* But the six negatives (*A is not B, etc.*) are also compatible with each other.

one time they would be compatible; but it seems inconsistent to say that at the same time they are compatible and incompatible.

We repeat that they are compatible two and two, and incompatible likewise.

Thus four men may be friends and brothers, enemies and strangers, each to each, but not each to every one; like coalternate angles.

So 4 contradictories may be true at a given time; but not two.

Thus two couples of contradictories are not necessarily contradictory; it is enough for one member be opposed to one in the other couple.

Opposites cannot be predicated of individuals, but they can of universals;

1. Essentially: as of Christ, twofold and yet indivisible.

quod tunc omnes iste 4 essent compossibiles, et tales sensus pretendunt communiter loquentes in talibus sophismatibus. Non enim videtur bene illa sonare quod ista 4 possibile est esse vera pro B instanti, et non est possibile ista 4 esse vera pro B instanti; nec quod ista 4 sunt compossibilia et eadem 4 sunt incompossibilia, et per consequens non compossibilia. Sic enim duo contradictoria et contraria incomplexa vere predicarentur divisim de eodem. Ad ista dicitur concedendo sicut prius, quod omnes iste 4 propositiones sunt 10 compossibiles, quia divisim bine et bine; et omnino ille 4 contradicunt, quia divisim bine et bine: et sic 4 homines sunt similes, amici et fratres, et tamen sunt cum hoc valde dissimiles, inimici et disparium nacionum. Unde si quilibet vir sit frater alicuius, 15 omnes viri sunt fratres: non singulus singulo, sed singulus alteri. Anguli enim sunt sese respicientes, coalterne, aut contra se positi; etsi non quilibet sic se habeat ad quemlibet. Et sic conceditur, tam de 4 quam de duobus contradictoriis, quod illa possibile est esse 20 vera pro B instanti, et non est possibile illa esse vera pro B instanti; sed 4 contradictoria possunt simul esse vera pro B instanti, et duo non. Et sic, si duo sunt contradictoria, tunc utrumque contradicit alteri, nec de duobus similibus vel quibuscunque connotanti- 25 bus relacionem equiparancie. Non tamen oportet, si duo sint paria contradictorium, quod unum illorum parium contradicat reliquo; sed sufficit quod singulum illorum contradicat alteri vel alicui illorum. Et patet quod sequitur: *hoc est par contradictoriorum et hoc est par 30 contradictoriorum; ergo, ista sunt contradictoria et paria contradictoriorum*; et tamen non sequitur: *hic est frater et hic est frater: ergo isti sunt fratres*; cuius diversitas satis patet.

Uterius, quantum ad predicacionem oppositorum 35 de eodem, patet ex prius dictis quod non est possibile de eodem ultimo singulari duo opposita diversim per se formaliter predicari, sed de eodem communi pro divisim bene possunt. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo modo predicacione per essenciam; ut hic: *Hoc est divisibile 40 et hoc est indivisible*, demonstrando Cristum, qui est

10. sic B. above per B.

26. eq'pon^e B.

30—31. et — ergo in marg. B.

40. 2^m

due nature. 2^o modo de eodem ternario numerali predicantur duo opposita ad sensus equivocos; ut, *4 homines sunt similes, et idem 4 sunt dissimiles*. Et 3^o modo coniunctim, ut: *ista 4^{or} sunt numerus par et numerus 5 impar*. Sed duo contradictoria inconnexa non predicantur per se divisim formaliter de eodem | ; ut, quamvis illa 4 sint impossibilia, non tamen sunt non compossibilia; quia tunc sunt illa que non sunt compossibilia; et per consequens ad nullum sensum sunt compossibilia. Sed termini privativi non sic negant.

Et si dicatur quod tenet consequentia ab affirmativa de predicato privativo ad negativam de predicato infinito, dicitur: est ut sic, et est ut non. Nam in terminis de plurali, ubi multi sensus sunt negandi, non oportet predicatum privativum inferre sic predicatum infinitum quod plus negat. Nec valet subtiliatio illorum qui dicunt quod si iniustum est, quod tunc non iustum est, et nullum iustum est. Innumerabilia ergo contingit fieri sophismata secundum diversas combinaciones sensuum, et denominationum cum terminis de plurali; sicut hic et in fine tractatus proximi est videre.

Quo ad 3^a alia sophismata, restat videre si aliqui possunt esse omnes homines, vel omnia que deus potest creare. Si non, tunc illa tria sophismata et quecumque similia sunt vera. Et si sic, tunc omnia talia sunt impossibilia. Argumentatur ergo 1^o de hominibus, quod non est dare omnes homines qui possunt produci; quia significatis illis, si possunt produci, tunc possibile est quod illi sunt vel erunt. Posito ergo quod erunt, querendum est utrum pro quolibet instanti vel tempore erunt infiniti vel non. Quomodocumque dicetur, sequitur inconveniens; quia impossibile est quod sit magnitudo universitatis infinite vel multitudo encium actu infinita. Et si continue, omnes tamen erunt simul infiniti; tunc deus continue creabit homines secundum ultimum sue potencie et sic terminaretur sua potencia ad valde parvum, quod foret maximum in quod posset; et tunc nemo possit producere suum simile, nisi qui de facto producet; nec posset accelerari productio alicuius,

2. Separately, with different meanings; four men are like and unlike.
3. Together: four is at once even, and includes an odd number.

We may say: these four are incompatible, but not *not* compatible; privative terms deny separately, but not together, like negations. It may be urged that privations imply negations.

Yes and no. No, when plural terms are affected by them.

On this point there are countless fallacies; see the end of the foregoing treatise.

II. Can God create the greatest possible number of creatures?

If so, an infinite number of men could be produced, and exist together; but an infinite number is impossible; so is infinite bulk.

God would exhaust His power in this infinite multitude, which is yet very little. No man would be able to beget his like, unless he actually did so, and with his

14. universaliter pro ubi? B.

21. *Videre*. In *Logice Continuatio* 2nd part, last chapter.

22. This is a favourite question amongst Schoolmen, bristling with difficulties, whichever answer be given.

ultimate effort there would be God's infinite power exerted to the utmost.

Again, if a general resurrection is possible, all these infinite men could exist together and the world would be infinite, or God could not make a more perfect creature. And then not one man more could either be created or perish.

The positing of this greatest possible number would lead, by the same reasoning, to the denial of free will.

Take the word *man*, and take that greatest number of men possible; it is certain that *man* includes infinitely more;

we cannot exhaust the signification of a general term;

nor suppose that *man* may signify some individuals that God cannot possibly produce.

For what reason could he not produce them?

nisi forte deperdatur potencia producendi hominem pro tempore futuro. Primo sic quilibet applicaret se ad producentem suum simile tam efficaciter sicut posset; et preter hoc deus tantum multiplicaret creaciones hominum sicut posset.

Similiter, quicumque homines possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse, cum resurreccio generalis sit possibilis. Cum ergo omnes isti possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse; et tunc haberetur mundus infinitus; vel in potenciam dei ad faciendum quamlibet creaturam maiorem; quod de facto est. Sequitur eciam quod nullus istorum prodest producere suum simile, nec deus novum hominem creare, vel aliquem istorum corrumpere; et si aliquem istorum corrumpere, non posset novum loco illius producere, eo quod tunc non essent primo dati omnes homines qui possunt esse. Ymmo verisimiliter vel ex dubio sic ponenti *quotquot homines possunt produci sic producentur*, et per idem ex simili dubio: *omnia que evenirent inevitabiliter evenirent*, et nichil casualiter, nec aliquid posset mereri vel demereri et tolleretur omnis contingencia ad utrumlibet et libertas.

Similiter, certum est quod iste terminus, *homo*, significat infinitos preter istos vel aliquem istorum; sed quemcunque iste terminus significat, deus potest producere. Ergo infinitos preter istos potest deus producere. Maior patet ex hoc quod non solum contingit ymaginari vel intelligere quod infiniti alii ab istis erunt, verum eciam contingit probabiliter credere quod alii ab istis erunt. Et certum est quod sic intelligens conciperet per talem terminum, *homo*, istos alios ab istis vel aliquo istorum; igitur talis terminus, *homo*, non solum significaret istos vel aliquos istorum. Et iuxta illud videtur sequi quod non est dare omnia que terminus communis quicumque significat. Et minor argumenti videtur, ex hoc quod caret omni ratione significare aliquem hominem quem impossibile esset deum producere; cum quoslibet homines quos ymaginor esse infinitos, | deus potest producere. Ideo aliud est dicere quod deus non potest producere talem essenciam, et aliud est dicere quod deus non potest facere ipsam esse huiusmodi. Theologo ergo videtur

esse difficile lingere rationem quare deus non potest
 producere illum hominem; vel annihilatis istis omnibus,
 producere in toto novos, quia aliter, anichilatis omnibus
 possibilibus preter deum, non esset possibile esse
 5 aliquid preter ipsum.

Talia ergo argumenta et multo potentiora contingit
 facere ad probandum quod non sit possibile omnia que
 possunt esse, fore in tempore eterno; quia contradictorie
 veritates contingencium ad utrumlibet possunt esse sive
 10 fore: etsi una erit reliqua non erit; ut sunt quotlibet
 tales: *hoc fuit futurum*, et *hoc non fuit futurum*, demon-
 strando filium meum. Caret ergo omni apparencia
 probabilitatis quod nullus relativus vel eius significandum
 posset causari ab homine, vel ab aliquo, nisi id quod
 15 de facto erit esset.

In oppositum argumentando, suppono prima aliqua
 esse infinita; sed quia istud communiter negatur, probo
 illud supponendo 1^o quod, si sunt aliqua quorum
 numerus non sit distincte a nobis noscibilis, tunc illa
 20 sunt naturaliter infinita. Ut, si aliqua sunt omnia
 puncta illius linee, non est nostrum distincte scire quot
 sunt, nec in qua proporcione se habent ad 4^{rum} vel ad
 quemcunque numerum nobis finitum. Quo supposito,
 argumentatur intentum sic: aliqua est universitas rerum,
 25 sicut et aliquis est mundus; sed neutrum potest poni,
 nisi aggregatum ex numeraliter infinitis: ergo aliqua
 sunt taliter infinita. Similiter contingit demonstrare
 quecunque infinita, ut patet ex predictis demonstratis;
 ergo, omnibus partibus que componunt hoc continuum,
 30 et solum illis vel aliquibus illarum. Non est ratio negandi
 quod isti sunt, aut quod ista sunt ista, cum propositio
 solum significat illa esse que de facto sunt singulariter.

Aliter sequitur quod infinitum multa sunt corpora
 que deus non cognoscat nec essentialiter, et per con-
 35 sequens valde multa sunt corpora que non sunt cognita
 vel causata. Antecedens patet per opinionem concedentem
 quod non tot corpora possunt esse. Cum ergo
 sequitur: *infinitum multa corpora sunt*: ergo *aliquot
 corpora sunt*; et cum antecedente stat, ymmo sequitur,

Such arguments go to prove that in eternal time all that can be, will not be;

and that our principle concerning relatives is false.

To answer, we assume firstly that some things infinite exist.

Whatever multitudes exceed our power of distinct knowledge, are infinite.

We cannot v. g. know how many points there are in a line.

As we must grant that the world exists, so we must grant things infinite;

for as already shown, we must assume that the parts of a continuum are so;

and that each part exists separately.

If not, we are driven to deny that God causes these parts or even knows them; and yet they are proved to exist!

¹⁶. S || before talia zi' in marg. B. 13. re^{us} B. 33. Sil^r = similitur B. 34. al^r above; argumentatur B. 35. cor^a — con^a in marg. B. 40. a^{te} B.

30. The general sense is sufficiently clear, but some words are probably wanting in this place.

quod deus non causat illa: ergo cum consequente stat quod deus non causat illa. Nec alia, vel plura significat antecedens unius relativi in una propositione quam in reliqua: ideo relacio ad diversa antecedencia non facit diversitatem. 5

We also have to deny all propositions that imply the infinite, among which several are evidently true.

Similiter, iuxta istam viam neganda est quecunque affirmativa in qua predicatum implicat kathegorice infinita, ut tales: *hoc corpus componitur ex omnibus suis partibus; deus cognoscit omnia que ego cognosco; deus videt cuncta que fecit;* et sic infinita conservaret, 10 quorum nullum potest conservare, cum nullum illorum potest esse bonum vel non bonum. Ymmo, si ipse conservaret omnia corpora que ego conservo, tunc esset infinitum potencior quam est modo. Ymmo, quando infinita successive concurrunt ad aliquid causandum, 15 sic quod nullum illorum faciet totum, sed quodlibet suam partem, sicut contingit de linearibus, de sonis, et aliis tam permanentibus quam successivis; tunc illud causatum non causabitur ab aliquo, nec ab aliquibus causacione univoca. Et sic ubi auctores ponunt totum 20 esse omnes eius partes, vel saltem causari ex illis, ista via dicit quod si aliqua earum esset complete compositum ex omnibus eius partibus, ipsa esset infinitum; et tantum pompat de suis diviciis, quod deus non potest cognoscere omnia bona sua propter multi- 25 plicitatem. Sed, deum contestor! inter omnia sophismata unquam inventa videtur michi quod ista minimum valent.

And in the case of lines, sounds and such things in general of which no ultimate element makes up the whole, but only a part, we must deny that they have a cause. The whole is no longer the sum of its parts, for then it would be infinitely great. I protest, these seem the poorest of all sophisms.

And the answers given are of no value.

Some say that there is an infinite multitude, known by God separately; but then this infinite multitude really exists.

Others, that these (infinitely numerous parts) are; but cannot be separately affirmed; but if they are, they are beings; and therefore, these singular beings, or nothing.

Nec valent responsiones devie que dantur | ad B 57^b salvandum ista dicta; ut aliqui concedunt quod in- 30 finitum multe res sunt, et deus cognoscit eas in sensu diviso; sed hoc est contra primam suppositionem, que declarat quod ista implicat quod deus cognoscat illas res que *sunt* infinitum multe; et hoc bene concedit opinio. Alia via concedit quod *ista sunt* (demonstratis 35 infinitis), sed *ista non sunt ista*: Sed certum est quod si *iste numerus est*, tunc *ista que sunt iste numerus sunt*; et per consequens aliqua sunt iste numerus; et sic ista sunt ista. Sequitur enim: *ista sunt*; ergo, *encia sunt ista*, per conversionem. Sed que encia, si non 40

1. quante *pro* consequente B. 8. componi B. 13. 9fuo B.
17. 1mb9 B. 22. aliquid B.

ista? Si enim solum demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista" illa que sunt, et illa demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista", sequens est quod ista sunt ista que sunt. Tercia via dicit quod omne demonstrantur per *ly* "ista" est, 5 sed non omnia demonstrata per *ly* "ista" sunt. Sed ista via, sicut et priores, ducit in devium; quia contra istam viam stant rationes priores. Si unum omne demonstratum per *ly* "ista" est, tunc omnis numerus vel multitudo demonstrata per *ly* "ista" est. 10 Nec habet colorem quod omnia visa a me videntur a te et tamen, si deus cognosceret quod nos videmus illa, ipse annihilaret nos ambos; Sor tamdiu numerabit materias primas quo usque deus non possit ipsas cognoscere; et tamen quelibet quam numerabit est eterna; 15 quelibet res intellecta a Sor est: et tamen si aliquis numerus esset omnium istarum, tunc ipse esset asinus, quia impossibile est quod sit aliqua multitudo que non sit pars alterius multitudinis. Similiter sequitur quod Sor promisit infinitos denarios et deus non potest satis- 20 facere pro illo per se vel alium; sed Sortes satisfaciat promissioni, solvendo quemlibet denarium quem promisit, posito quod Sor in loculo habeat denarium cuius aliquam partem contingeret inferre residuo, existente legali denario. Tunc patet quod Sor in illo infinitos 25 denarios communicantes habet; promittat ergo Platoni omnes denarios qui sunt in loculo suo, et solvat omnem partem illius.

Others, that each separate part is singularly affirmable, but not together in the plural. But if each, then all.

Absurd consequences of the latter hypothesis.

Supposito ergo quod quecumque infinita sunt demonstrabilia, argumentatur quod aliqui possunt esse omnes 30 homines. Nam *isti homines possunt esse* (demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse et solum illos). *Nulli non possunt esse, nisi omnes homines: ergo, aliqui possunt esse omnes homines.* Minor patet ex hoc quod omnes homines demonstrati per *ly* "isti" possunt esse, sicut 35 quilibet illorum potest esse. Sicut ergo omnes res collectim sunt omnis res, sic omnes homines collectim possunt esse omnis homo, cum ipsi non possunt esse alii. Similiter maxima significabilitas humane nature est danda, cum data parte, dandum est suum totum. Sed 40 illa non esset danda, nisi esset danda maxima multitudo hominum quibus potest communicari: igitur etc.

As, therefore, each individual in this infinite number can be pointed out, some certain men are all men.

As each of them can exist, so can the whole multitude: and as all things are everything, so all men are every man.

We must admit a maximum of significancy of the term "man"; if so, a maximum of individuals to which it can apply:

or we should not know to what extent God can actuate the possibility of man.

And God Himself, not knowing the number producible would not know the essence of man perfectly.

Every individual signified by the term must be possible, or the term would signify what it does not.

There is, therefore, a maximum of men possible. And if of men possible, of men

simultaneously possible. If not, the indefinite number would imply a world that might be infinitely great, and, therefore, an infinite and useless vacuum surrounding our world.

This is a problem of far more depth than the preceding sophisms. It is answered:

By Peripateticians, granting an infinite number of men to exist in an infinite time and an eternal world: but not at the same instant. By Christians, denying the

Aliter enim non esset dare quam productivus esset deus hominum, cum non sit precise tam causativus hominum sicut est conservativus hominum, nec tam conservativus individuorum alicuius speciei quam volitivus est conservare eadem; quod repugnat omni 5 potencie divine; et per idem non cognosceret deus gradum communicabilitatis illius termini *homo*, cum non cognosceret quot ad maximum significat. Nec cognoscit in qua proporcione sit iste terminus, *animal*, eo ipso communior: et similiter, cum omne quod iste 10 terminus *homo* significat potest esse, sequitur quod omnia que iste terminus, *homo*, significat possunt esse. Et certum est quod non plura nec altera, nisi illa vel aliqua illorum significatorum possunt esse homines. Ergo est dare | maximum numerum hominum qui B 58^a possunt esse, sicut est dare totalem multitudinem quam iste terminus, *homo*, significat.

Ymmo cum omnes homines qui successive possunt esse possunt simul a deo conservari, sicut est dare quot homines possunt simul esse ad maximum, sic est 20 dare quot homines possunt esse ad maximum. Si enim non est dare maximum numerum hominum possibilem simul, tunc infinitum magnus posset esse mundus, et per consequens esset vacuum infinitum extra mundum plus capax corporis quam aliquid esset causativum 25 corporis; quod claudit contradiccionem, cum tunc quilibet pars illius vacui superflueret, et per consequens esset causatum a deo et non causatum a deo. Et similiter, consimilibus mediis, contingit arguere quod omnium specierum vel generum est dare maximam 30 multitudinem individuorum possibilem.

Quoad istam difficultatem, patet quod longe aliquid quam istam sophisticam requirit declaracio illius materie. Unde varie responsiones, secundum quod 35 diversimode sic opinantur materiam se habere. Peripatetici autem ponunt generationem rerum eternam esse a parte utriusque extremi; et illi ponerent quod impossibile est omnes homines qui possunt esse, fore pro aliquo instanti. Verumtamen, ampliando verbum, bene possunt esse in tempore eterno. Cristiani vero 40

1. pductio B.

2. cano B.

8. qualiar pro quot? B.

11. p̄ B.

33. iam sop^a B.

vere ponunt quod impossibile est mundum esse eternum a parte ante, cum necessarium sit quod omnes partes mundi pro certo instanti inceperunt esse, et pro certo instanti cessabunt generaciones sublunarium, cum 5 mundus habebit ultimum eius complementum.

Et utraque pars opposicionis est bipartita. Nam primorum aliqui ponunt nulla posse esse, nisi que sunt vel erunt; et sic omnia ponunt inevitabilitate naturali evenire. Aliqui vero ponunt contingenciam ad utrum- 10 libet, vel racione materie, vel racione libertatis prime cause. Et sic de 2^{da} secta. Aliqui ponunt quod deus terminat se ipsum maximo numero possibili numero- rum punctalium, ex quibus fit mundus, et sic nichil potest annihilare, nec mundum maiorare vel 15 minorare; sed animas usque ad certum numerum creare et non ultra. Et sic terminat se ipsum, secundum raciones ydeales maximo numero indivi- duorum substancie possibili. Et specialiter de partibus mundi eternis. Quo ad illas enim ordinat numerum 20 simpliciter congruum; ita quod superaddendo excederet, et diminuendo deficeret a proporcione debita, sicut est de magnitudine, figura, etate, et numero mundi, cum suis partibus.

Nec est talis limitacio propter defectum potencie, sed 25 propter infinitatem sciencie, mensurantis talia secundum ultimum et optimum sue factibilitatis; sicut deus non est impotens, quamvis non posset facere hominem esse asinum, corrigere circulum vel aliud factum secundum ultimum sue complecionis. Et ita cessabit homines 30 producere, cum sciverit tot esse productos quot esset conveniens produxisse; nec plura posset superaddere, quia non potest agere omnimode superflue, et omnes tales partes mundi servabit in eternum post datum tempus i. e. post diem iudicii: bestie tamen et alie substancie 35 corruptibiles cum accidentibus hominum possunt diversificari in numero, magnitudine, loco, et tempore, et aliis circumstanciis. Et sic non omnia futura inevitabiliter evenient; cum illa que subiacent humanis actibus possunt impediri ex quolibet causis fortuitis

eternity of the world, and the continuation of generation after a certain instant.

Of the former, some posit absolute necessity, and others admit a contingent happening.

Of the latter, some say that the maximum number of men corresponds with that of the punctal atoms of the world; and that nothing can be destroyed, increased or diminished. God's power terminating itself with this maximum number; and as all things are in ideal and necessary proportion, He can change nothing in the world. This limitation proceeds not from finite power, but from infinite wisdom, doing all that is best; just as God is almighty, though He cannot make a man to be an ass, or a round line straight. No more men can be produced, when all that should exist, exist. As for brutes etc., and human actions, they are not subject to this absolute rule.

11. ¹²cc pro cause B; *ib.* [∞]z pro 2^a B. 24. po^e B. 35. [∞]acci 9 horum hominum *in marg.* B.

11. *Aliqui ponunt.* This is Wyclif's opinion

Thus, not all future things are inevitable: events that depend upon the human will may be prevented or not.

In the state of immortality, there will be no generation of men, for the very reason of that state.

If, therefore, God's power is said to transcend these limits, it is dependently on His will;

that anything can exist it is necessary to have a cause able to produce it; and of two seemingly possible souls, the one that will not exist is impossible, because God cannot will it to be.

And so of any other creature.

It is impossible that all these beings are or will be these singulars: separately they may be; but together, one excludes the other.

Thus, without denying the infinite multitude of possibles, without denying

vel iuari, nec est de imperfeccione hominum, cum fuerint sic incorruptibiles, quia tunc non poterunt producere sibi similia; nec deus tunc continueret generationem rerum secundum illum ordinem. Tunc enim erunt homines immortales sicut celum et intelligencie; 5 per consequens ad perfectionem illorum carebit indigencia producendi sibi similia pro se salvandis vel perficiendis, cum hoc non sit perfeccio | sic nisi secundum quid, ponens imperfeccionem evacuabilem. B 58^b

Quo ad dicta hominum quibus est credendum, 10 dicitur quod, si ponunt quod deus potest in plus, intelligunt condicionaliter: *si voluerit*. In hoc enim stat omnipotencia sua, quod, si iubet aliquid fieri, tunc illud facit: quod impossibile est competere alteri ab illo: et ista negat secundam conclusionem sicut et 15 primam. Sed concedit alia duo sequencia; quia contradiccionem claudit quod omnia que ego vel quecunque alia res potest facere sunt vel erunt, cum a quocunque tali veritates possunt et fieri; et si una illarum fieret, reliqua non fierit. Ut patet de talibus: *Ista anima erit, et 20 ista anima non erit*. Nam iste [sunt] due veritates que possunt esse, et tamen nec deus nec aliud a deo potest creare ipsas, quia non possunt esse causate, nisi ab aliquo quod non potest causare illas. Et sic: *ista 25 possunt causari*, demonstrando omnia creabilia; sed non est possibile quod *ista creabuntur*, nisi aliquid potest causare ista; et sic ista ambo possunt esse, sicut utrumque illorum potest esse, quia utrumque potest esse de numero quo ista possunt numerari. Sed non est possibile quod *ista sunt vel erunt ista*; quia si 30 unum erit, reliquum non erit; et ista deus potest causare, quia utrumque divisim; sed non potest causare *ista*. Et sic multa sunt cognoscibilia, sed deus non potest cognoscere illa, quamvis illa potest cognoscere; ut patet de istis: *Ego fui producturus filium, et ego 35 non fui producturus filium*.

Non ergo negandum est aliqua esse infinita; nec repugnat signare quecunque deus potest facere. Ymmo, conceditur quod ista possunt esse ista divisim; et

3. g^{ret} B. 19. una utre B. 21. sunt *deest* B. 23-25. ipsas — causari *in marg.* B.

quando ponitur quod *ista sunt vel erunt*, negandus est casus. Nec videtur michi verum quod infinita numeraliter sunt finita numeraliter. Sed infinitum multa sunt finitum multa, ut patet per exponentes; sed hoc non antecedit ad priorem propositionem, cum illa sit infinita cuius quodlibet singulare est impossibile, nec est aliter particulariter verificabilis. Non enim est dare quanta sit, si non infinita; nec quomodo dispariter significabit subiectum eius a subiecto multiplici de similibus terminis.

Est ergo signare aliqua infinita, quorum aliqua possunt esse et aliqua non possunt esse, cum numerus numerat aliquid que non possunt esse: non sic quod mensurat quot sunt, sed mensurat quot vere intuemur. Et illa solet antiquitus concedi intellectualiter. Et si dicatur quod in aliis terminis talia convertuntur: *Ista possibile est esse et: possibile est ista esse; Ista deus potest cognoscere et: deus potest cognoscere ista, vel ista cognoscere*, quod idem est; dicitur quod hoc est gratie materie, quia multa verificantur de infinitis que non competunt finitis; et aliquibus finitis multa possunt competere que reliquis non possunt competere. Quandocumque hoc verbum *potest* (vel equivalent) precedit affirmative orationem imperfectam, implicatur potentiam posse in suum significatum; ut, *si deus potest ista cognoscere*, tunc est potentia vel possibilitas ad ista cognoscendum. Sed quando mediat, tunc sufficit quod ad illa divisim est potentia cognoscendi.

Addit etiam illa posicio quod ille terminus, *homo*, non significat infinita, sed solum illa que possunt esse, sicut nec aliquid significat: *inintelligibile* vel: *melius deo*. Isti termini iuvant ad significandum *hominem*, vel aliquid absolutum, aliquid se habere qualiter non possunt se habere; ut iste terminus, *homo*, consignificat in casu hominem esse infinitum magnum, et ipsum esse omnes res, vel infinita supposita, et quotlibet modis se habere, non per se, sed ratione adiuncti. Primo ergo et per se significat naturam illam, et secundarie significat quotcumque individua, quibus ipsa potest communicari; et 3^o, ratione adiuncti, significat quecumque volueris, ut in ista: *Tot possunt esse*

that certain in particular are causatively possible, and even that all may be so, it is denied that all will be so. An infinite multitude is, therefore, finite, though an infinite number is not.

Of this multitude some can, some cannot exist.

These things can be; therefore, it is possible for these things to be.

True, if by 'these things' the abstract objects of thought alone are meant; they are infinite. The place of *can* or *possible* in a sentence, may in many cases change the sense.

In this theory, *man* does not signify an endless multitude, but merely those that are really possible; the rest imply self-contradiction.

So it means in the first place, human nature; in the second, all individuals that can have that nature; and

thirdly (with an addition) anything whatever. *homines quot possunt esse animalia* significat iste terminus, *homo*, causatam multitudinem hominum quanta potest esse animalium; ymmo illam naturam per se, et homines qui possunt esse, primarie significat; sed secundarie posse esse tot homines quot possunt esse 5 animalia. Sed talis significacio est inpertinens communitati termini, cum attenditur penes communica- B 59^a tatem sui primo significati et non penes multitudinem, cum ymaginabile est ipsam communicari; quia ymaginabile vel intelligibile est hominem esse omnia que 10 possunt esse, vel ydemptificari cuilibet.

This last meaning is, however, quite irrelevant to the universality of the term.

Thus God knows the precise degree of extension of each term, and the individuals each contains; and I much prefer this opinion.

Ideo, ut superius dictum est, deus scit gradus communitatum terminorum, sicut scit quot ille terminus, *homo*, significat; nec significat ille terminus, *sol*, multos soles; nec iste terminus, *ly* "chymera" 15 multas chymeras, cum talia multa possint esse, vel forte ex adiuncto. Et tenendo istam viam, que est michi valde opiniabilis, tollerentur faciliter instance supradicte.

Another system is now more in vogue, which refuses to limit God's power to anything below the Infinite exclusively. For this reason, an infinite multitude has been denied not only to exist, but to be individually affirmable as such. Without this denial, there would be an infinity of things that God could not produce. So God cannot distinguish what He can and what He cannot do; though He understands both. These things are possible, though God cannot cause them; Alia autem est responsio famosior modernorum que 20 abhorret terminare divinam potenciam ad aliquod finitum, sed ultra omne finitum potest; sic quod potencia sua terminetur ad bonum intellectivum, ad infinitum exclusive. Et pro isto defendendo inventa est illa inprobabilis logica, que dicit quod nedum nulla 25 sunt infinita, sed nulla infinita possunt demonstrari. Dicit ergo quod signatis omnibus illis in que deus potest, sequens est quod signerentur infinicies infinita que non possunt. Nec esset possibile omne signare omnia que possunt [esse], nisi signarentur alique que 30 non possunt. Unde deus, quamvis intelligat omnia illa que possunt, et omnia illa que non possunt [esse], tamen nescit distincte discernere inter ista, nec demonstrare illa seorsum ab aliis. Sic ergo, quantumcunque homo velit intendere distincte possibilium per se, ignoraret et 35 non intenderet impossibilia. Nec sequitur: *quemlibet hominem quem ego intelligo deus potest causare*: ergo, *omnes quos ego intelligo deus potest causare*; quia multos intelligo quorum nullus potest esse, quamvis tamen quilibet quam ego intelligo possit esse. Et talis 40

6-7. 91ⁿ B. 7. pēs B. 8. pēs B. 13. 91^m B. 20. moder-
orum in marg. B. 23. 60^m B. 30. esse deest B. 32. esse deest B.

- copulativa conceditur: *Omnes homines intelliguntur a me et illi non possunt esse*, quia non possunt esse omnes homines posibles, cum oportet, demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse, condemnari
 5 homines qui non possunt esse. Et sic deus non potest intelligere omnes homines qui possunt esse; quia tunc isti possent esse; aut saltem non potest cognoscere omnes causas cuiuscunque hominis, et tamen omnia que ego nosco.
- 10 Cum tamen solet dici quod ad perfectam causati-
 noticiam requiritur cognoscere omnes eius causas, et quod deus docet hominem primo in cognoscendo omnia que ipse cognoscit; ideo non dubium quin iste conclusiones, sicut quotlibet similes, repugnant isti
 15 opinioni et veritati. Si enim aliquos significaret terminus, qui non possunt esse, potissime foret de multitudine infinita hominum, quod talis non est demonstranda, ut dicit opinio. Ymmo si esset demonstranda, adhuc illam posset deus successive producere, et potest anichilare,
 20 iuxta sic opinantes. Ymmo simul posset in totam multitudinem, sicut et signabilem eius partem, vel saltem deus posset illos indivisim producere, etsi non posset producere illas. Non ergo possum demonstrare homines aliquid se habere, qualiter non possunt se habere;
 25 et tunc non significat iste terminus complexus, infinitos homines; sed finitos significat esse infinitos. Nec potest intelligi *homo*, nisi aliquis illorum, demonstrando homines qui erunt, et illos oportet necessario fore; sed non sic omnia. Eligat ergo philosophus sententiam sibi plus
 30 placentem.

we can know objects that are impossible; v. g. the existence of all men.

But God cannot, or they would be possible by His knowledge of them.

All this is false; to know a thing perfectly we must know its causes, and God's knowledge is the cause of ours.

If an infinite multitude of men were affirmable, God could produce them successively and annihilate them.

In short, *infinite men* means a certain fixed number, which is the infinite, or maximum possible.

Let the philosopher choose which system is the best.

8. 23 *in marg.* B. 20. ¹⁰⁰ tom u¹⁰⁰ B. 21. ¹⁰⁰ fçulç B.

5. We must here note the Scholastic distinction between intrinsic possibility, or mere non-absurdity, and extrinsic possibility, or being causable. We can think of an infinite multitude of men as possible in the first manner and not in the second. But if God saw them as possible in the first manner, He would also see Himself to be their cause, i. e. they would be possible in the second too. Which would involve contradiction in the case of those who will never exist.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Of causal propositions: definition; propositions related by the idea of cause.

Divisions, *affirmative*, in which one proposition is affirmed to be the cause of another;

and *negative*, in which such causality is denied; the negative or affirmative form of the component propositions being irrelevant.

So to every causal we can substitute a categorical proposition with the verb *to cause*.

A causal, therefore, differs from a conditional, because it affirms both of its parts; and from a copulative, because it adds the idea of causation.

Sequitur de causalibus pertractandum. Ubi primo supponatur omnem yppotheticam, subordinatam principaliter actui yppothetico causandi, esse causalem; utputa quando due kathegorice coniunguntur ad invicem cum 5 nota cause.

Sunt autem causalium talium quedam affirmativa et quedam negativa. Affirmativa, quando significatum primarium antecedentis significati prioris consequentis asseritur esse causa; ut hic: *quia tu curris, tu moveris*. 10
Ista enim asserit tuum *currere* causare tuum *movere*. Et vocatur antecedens, propositio immediate subsequens notam cause; et alia vocatur consequens. Vocatur autem causalis negativa yppothetica | per quam negatur B 59^b
principaliter huiusmodi causacio. Ut hic: *non ideo tu 15*
es animal, quia tu es asinus. Unde stat esse affirmativam, quamvis utraque eius pars fuerit negativa, ut hec; *paries non respirat, quia non habet pulmonem*. Attendendum est ad negacionem actus yppothetici principalis.

Ex istis patet quod quelibet causalis convertitur cum 20 kathegorica, in qua predicatur terminus significans veritatem consequentis, de termino significante veritatem antecedentis, mediante verbo causandi. Ut idem est dicere: *tu es animal, quia tu es homo*, ac si diceretur: *humanitas tua causat animalitatem tuam*. *Non quia tu 25*
times, tu curris; et *non timor tuus causat cursum tuum*, et sic de aliis. Et sic de ceteris patet quod talis longe differt a condicionali et a copulativa. Causalis enim ponit utriusque partis significatum inesse, sicut non facit condicionalis. Et quamvis in hoc conveniat cum 30 copulativa, superaddit tamen causacionem unius partis

1. Cap. deest: blank space for initial S B. 7. q̄ B. 8. q̄ B.
18. p̄ies B. 27. de ceteris in marg. B. 29. potest B.

per reliquam. Unde mirabiliter abutuntur tam grammatica quam logica, qui concedunt quamlibet copulativam converti cum causali. Ut si *ego sum, et baculus stat in angulo*, tunc *ego sum, quia baculus stat in angulo*; et econtra. Nam sic ponentes ignorant grammaticam, que ponit huiusmodi coniunctiones ideo esse causales quia sunt note causandi. Et ad talem sensum vocant logici yppotheticas causales. Per idem enim dicerent quod amodo existens cum reliqua causat ipsum.

10 Grave est ergo semper stare in significacionibus terminorum, communicando cum ignorantibus.

Et ex isto patet 3^o, noscentibus istam grammaticam et logicam, quod species et genus differunt sicut subiectum et eius predicacio. Ymmo quodcunque subiectum et eius accidens sequitur manifestissime differre ab invicem; ut: *quia tu es homo tu es animal et risibile et quantum et coloratum*. Ideo animalitas et humanitas differunt; et per idem risibilitas et quantitas et coloracio, et [cetera] huiusmodi differunt ab humanitate a qua causantur. Et ista puerilis consideracio de causalibus est medium electum ad probandum quecunque accidentia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Quis enim negaret quin aliqua causa sit quare substantia est quanta, qualis, relata, agens, paciens, locata, temporalis, posita, et habens? Nec dubium quin quicumque concedit aliquam unum talem causalem, habet consequenter concedere accidentia talia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Ut, si *Sorex hoc sedet quia placet sibi, tunc placere sibi Sortis est causa sessionis sue*. Ideo vel negent tales causales vel concedant; quod sequitur consequenter. Sed negatis causalibus, vanum est philosophari, cum ad hoc adiscimus ut sciamus causas rerum; nec aliter arbitramur nos quicquam cognoscere. Vanum ergo esset querere rei causam, quare animalia habent membra secundum talem anathomiam ordinata; et sic de omni ordinatione nature. Non enim ageret natura, nisi propter finem, cum non posset esse causa quare natura aliquid ordinaret. Sed omnia talia corrumpunt bonam doctrinam.

Supponendo ergo ista tria corollarie illata, restat describere causam in communi. Sed forte non potest

Some absurdly deny this last difference; according to them, coexistence and causation are the same. Such an assertion contradicts both grammar and logic.

This shows clearly how species and genera, subject and predicate, differ from one another; i. e. causally.

This childish discussion, therefore, leads us to prove the existence of accidents distinct from their subjects.

Causals ought either to be denied, or the doctrines that follow from their admission allowed. But without the former all science would perish, and nature would no longer work with a purpose: an utterly false doctrine.

What is a cause? As its

9. amo B
23, 24. quali⁹ B.

14. pri⁹ B.
39. cor. 1^o B.

19. cetera deest B.

22. (1^o ?) B.

signification is as wide as *being*, it cannot be described *a priori*, but *a posteriori* as that which causes its effect, and effect as that which is caused by a cause.

It follows that all beings are causes and effects.

If not a last, there is a First Being; which is Essence.

Four sorts of causes: material, formal, efficient and final. The material cause is either analogous or proper; if proper, it is either that out of which, that about which, or that of which anything else is.

The formal cause is either intrinsic or extrinsic: either that by which or that according to which the thing is.

The efficient cause is what makes anything to be; in a wide sense every cause is

describi *a priori* vel nociore, cum sit analogum conveniencie cuilibet enti. Ideo oportet colligere noticiam cause *a posteriori*, sicut cognoscimus universale experimentale. Sicut ergo qualitas est accidens denominans formaliter substantiam accidentaliter qualem, sic causa⁵ est ens causans suum causatum; vel ens cuius esse antecedit ad aliud; et causatum e contra est ens cuius esse sequitur ad aliud.

Ex quo patet quod omne ens est causa; sicut omne ens est illud quod est causatum. Primum patet, ex hoc¹⁰ quia dato ultimo ente adhuc illud cognoscitur confuse a me et multis aliis. Et sic habet infinitas denominationes sibi accidentales quas omnes causat. Ex quo videtur patere quod est dare primum ens si non ultimum. Primum tamen ens est essentia que est 2^o creata,¹⁵ et per consequens est unum creatum, quamvis illa essentia non causatur nec est creata.

Sunt ergo 4 genera causarum, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficiens et finalis. Causa materialis est causa ex qua est suum causatum. Et hec est duplex, scilicet proporcionalis et propria. Proporcionalis, ut genus est causa materialis cuiuscunque sui per se inferioris. Si propria, hoc est tripliciter; vel quod sit pars rei ex qua et in qua est sua forma, sicut est materia prima elementi et materia proxima elementi; vel quod sit materia de²⁵ qua, sed non in qua formaliter sit forma illa; ut subiectum de quo est sciencia est eius materia; vel 3^o, quod sit materia de qua sed non ex qua fit parcialiter suum causatum; ut subiectum accidentis causat ipsum materialiter. 30

Causa formalis est causa a qua formaliter est suum causatum; et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit causa intrinseca que est pars qualitativa rei; ut igneitas est forma ignis, vel aliter, causa formalis extrinseca; ut formula est causa exemplaris formati; ut deus est causa exem³⁵plaris cuiuscunque essencie causate vel create. Differentia eciam communis est causa formalis speciei; et omne universale dicitur forma.

Causa efficiens vero, large loquendo, dicitur esse quodcunque causans; omne enim causans facit suum⁴⁰ causatum esse. Sed specialiter, restringendo terminum,

solum agens vel conservans active rem in *esse* dicitur esse causa efficiens; qualiter solum substantia activa potest efficere: et illa vocatur causa unde motus.

Causa finalis est causa gracia cuius est suum causatum, et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit finis extrinsecus, sicut deus est finis omnium rerum causatarum; vel finis intrinsecus, sicut felicitas est finis operationum humanorum.

Ista ergo confuse dicta non docent ignorantem cognoscere causacionem; sed cognoscendo de quocunque ente quod ipsum est requisitum ad *esse* alterius, cognoscitur quod est causa eius. Ut video quod species lignorum et lapidum requiruntur ad *esse* domus, quia ipsis pereuntibus perit domus et non e contra, exinde cognosco quod sunt *causa* domus. Et sic cognosco solem causare lumen, et obstaculum, umbram. Multe tamen sunt habitudines causandi quas non cognosco per sensum; ut causacionem qua unum universale causat reliquum, et causacionem qua unum universale eternum necessario causat reliquum; ut deus causat universitatem encium; pars materie causat suum totum, ut compositum; et sic de multis causacionibus insensibilium.

Nec sufficit cognoscere quod unum sit reliquo prius natura ad cognoscendum causacionem; quia, cum quelibet pars materie prime sit eque primo natura sicut alia non communicans cum illa, videtur quod sicut materia ignis est ipso prius natura, sic quelibet materia prima esset prius illo igne in natura; et tamen non quelibet est eius causa, quia non quelibet requiritur ad *esse* istius ignis, nec antecedit ad *esse* eius. Nec sequitur: deus necessario requirit quotlibet veritates pro causacionibus inferiorum, ergo ille veritates requiruntur ad *esse* dei; cum *ly* 'ad' significat circumstanciam causandi. Infinita ergo sunt sine quibus ego non possum *esse*, que non requiruntur ad mei *esse*, quia non conferunt ad hoc. Si ergo vis videre quid iuvat ad *esse* alterius, [oportet] discurrere per 4 genera causandi supra dicta cum suis membris, et videre *ex quo* vel *de quo*, unde vel *a quo* est, *secundum quid* est vel *quid* est, 40 *gracia cuius* vel *propter quid* est; et si nullum istorum

efficient; but it is restricted to the principle causing movement. The final cause is that for which anything is: it is either extrinsic or intrinsic.

When we know of anything that it is necessary to the existence of another, we know it as a cause,

either by sensible cognition, or otherwise.

Yet mere priority of nature, or the circumstance of being required, does not give us the proper idea of cause; it must have a real influence on the being it causes.

We must, to know if anything is a cause, enquire if it belongs to one of the above-mentioned genera of causes.

5. q^{pt} *pro* quod sit B. 23. non *above* nec B. 26. a^o *above* B. 37. oportet *deest* B.

4 possis invenire, nec causacionem quesiti invenies. Et, si aliquid illorum inveneris, illud genus causandi invenisti. Sic igitur ad inveniendum istas rationes causandi deserviunt regule quas invenerunt philosophi.

Priority of nature can be understood in two senses; in the order of perfection and in the order of cognition.

Nota tamen quod dupliciter aliquid dicitur nocius; 5 vel prius natura; vel quia ipsum est principalius intentum tanquam perfectius in natura, sicut omne totum est prius ens et cognitum in natura quam est aliqua eius pars; vel quia ipsum precedit in ordine cognoscendi, qualiter | omnis pars naturaliter precedit suum B 60^b totum; et sic est ordo naturalis inter materias primas omnium, cum prima quo ad primum modum, sit maxima materia ex quo mundus constat, et prima omnium quo ad secundum modum, est materia punctualis; et sic aliis quantis. 15

There are many divisions of causes; but for brevity's sake we shall only take the first: a cause *per se* or *per accidens*.

Sunt ergo istorum generum causandi multi modi; ut aliqua est causa per se et alia est causa per accidens; alia est simplex et alia composita; alia in actu, alia in potencia; alia partialis vel incompleta, et alia totalis et completa. Et de quolibet istorum modorum alia est 20 causa universalis et alia est causa particularis. Sed propter brevitatem tantum loquendum est de primo modo. Sicut autem tribus modis aliquid dicitur per se ens, sic tribus modis dicitur aliquid esse per se causa. Magis tamen famosa accipio est, vel large accipiendo 25 pro quacunque causa requisita, vel striccius pro causa requisita cum qua non concurrat ex equo alia in eodem genere causandi: ut tota materia ignis per se causat ipsum, vel 3^o quando causans sub ratione alicuiusmodi causat, utputa, quando sibi inesse causat per se 2^o 30 modo predicandi per se; ut edificator per se edificat, medicus per se sanat, statuificaturus qui per se statuficat: et sic de aliis. Nec refert sive iste terminus, *per se*, precedat, sive subsequatur, dummodo terminus supposuerit simpliciter. Et iste modus loquendi est cre- 35 brior apud philosophos qui accipiunt verba significancia tales actus, ut significant aptitudinem ad actus; ut *edificare est esse edificativum*; et sic de aliis. Nec sequitur:

Per se has three meanings here, as in the case of Being; applying it either to all causes, or to a principal cause,

or to a cause of which causality is predicated from a certain point of view.

3. al. Et *above* sic igitur B. 9. ordn^e B. 12. om, B. 15. 2^{us} q^uis B. 18. alii *above the line* B. 23. quinque 2 bus *above* B. 24. quinque 2 bus *above* B. 26, 27. vel — requisita *in marg.* B. 27. excq^o B. 29. acq^o B. 30. causare B. 32. statu^{ic} B. 33. 19 B.

edificator per se edificat; omnis edificator est homo: ergo, homo per se edificat. Terninis tamen supponentibus personaliter, utrobique bene corresponderet de dicto.

5 3 bus eciam modis dicitur aliquid causa per acci-
dens alterius: primo modo, ex hoc quod causanti acci-
dit datum causatum causare, sicut deus accidentaliter
causat me. 2^o modo, ex hoc quod causato accidit
causari a dato causante; et illo modo individuum cor-
10 ruptibile causat speciem incorruptibilem, cum species
possit esse sine illo. Et 3^o modo dicitur aliquid per
accidens causare causatum, quando ipsum non ut huius-
modi causat causatum; ut musicus per accidens edificat,
sed non ut musicus. Et sic idem est per accidens musi-
15 cum esse edificativum, et musicum per accidens edi-
ficare, ut termini supponunt simpliciter. Nec sequitur
ad illum sensum: musicus per accidens edificat, et om-
nis musicus est edificator: ergo edificator per accidens
edificator.

20 Ex istis patent aliq̄ue veritates. 1^o, quod stat eidem
querere rationem cuiuscunque generis causandi; ut deus
est finis omnium finitorum, forma exemplaris est, effi-
ciens vel conservans continuitatem eorundem, et est
materia vel subiectum sapientie. Non tamen est possi-
25 bile quod componat tamquam partes rei; sic enim
materia non coincidit cum forma, vel cum movente,
vel cum fine illius materiali. 2^o patet quod totum genus
esse intrinsece materialis est propter formam, et totum
genus esse formalis intrinsece est propter agens, et to-
30 tum genus compositorum agencium est propter finem.
Ex quo patet quod impossibile est quicquam habere
causam, nisi habuerit causam finalem que sit per se
causa; nec est ratio causandi materialiter vel formaliter
intrinsece perfeccionis simpliciter, sed ratio causandi
35 efficienter vel extrinsece finaliter. Et 3^o patet quod
ultimus finis simpliciter non habet partes integrales
qualitativas, quidditativas, vel subiectivas. Et per conse-
quens est omnino indivisibilis, unicus et eternus. Si enim
haberet aliquas partes, tales causarentur, et per conse-
40 quens haberet causam finalem, et sic non esset finis
ultimus. Et eodemmodo sequitur quod non sunt multi

Per accidens
has also three
significations;
either that it is
accidental for
a given cause
to produce a
given effect; or
that a certain
causation is
accidental to
the thing
caused;
or that a given
cause,
producing its
effect, does not
produce it as
such.

We thence
conclude,
1. That the same
being may be
several causes
in different
ways at the
same time, but
not when those
causes are
tantamount to
parts of a
whole.
2. That the
material exists
but for the
formal cause,
this for the
efficient and the
efficient for the
final cause.

3. And that the
ultimate End
of all things can
have no parts;
for if it had,
they would be
for the whole,
and thus would
not be the
ultimate End
of all: likewise
it is unique and
eternal.

3. torret B.
divisibile B.

23. 9ti^m; in marg. 9ti^o B.

27. māli B.

38. in-

tales fines, nec possunt fieri; quia sic haberet universale suam causam, et efficiens quod ipsas generat, ipsas conservans continue. Quamvis enim necessarium sit aliqua causare se reciproce in generibus diversis causandi, hoc tamen est impossibile in eodem genere causandi, 5 sicut et impossibile est idem causare se.

Causal propositions follow the same divisions as the causes which they signify; some being *per se* and complete, others *per accidens* and incomplete, etc.

And this also holds good of reduplicative propositions;

some signifying the same as cause, and some the proportional accompaniment of one fact by another.

When they signify causality, they are said to have four exponents: *Because A is B, C is D, i. e. A is B, and C is D, and every B is D, and if anything is B, it is D.*

But one of these last is surely redundant. These exponents cannot be applied to reduplicative propositions that are not causal.

Notatis istis preambulis, notandum quod conformes | B 61^a
sunt divisiones preposicionis causalis, sicut dictum est de divisionibus eodem modo, cum de qualibet causa et suo causato contingit facere causalem veram; ut di- 10 cenda est causalis per se et completa, cuius antecedens infert suum consequens; ut quia deus vult me esse, ideo ego sum. Et aliqua est causalis particularis et incompleta: ut, Sor currit, quia frigescit; et sic de aliis, ubi antecedens est causa consequentis, sed per accidens, 15 incompleta vel remota. Et sic porporcionaliter dicendum est de divisionibus causalium, ut dictum est de divisione causarum; et cum omnis talis causalis sit reduplicativa, et non econtra, patet quod conformis est divisio reduplicativarum. Aliqua ergo reduplicativa re- 20 ducatur ad causam, et aliqua gracia porporcionalis concomitancie. Gracia cause, ut hic: *In quantum tu curris, tu moveris*; gracia porporcionalis concomitancie, ut hic: *porporcionaliter vel in quantum vel de quanto vel prout aliqua magis conveniunt, minus differunt; et econ- 25 tra*. Et ista est yppothetica comparativa et non causalis.

Quando ergo sunt causales, tunc dicuntur habere 4 exponentes, ut ista: *Ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal, dicitur debere sic exponi; tu es homo et tu es 30 animal et omnis homo est animal et si aliquid est homo, ipsum est animal*. Sed revera illud videtur michi superfluum et non sufficiens, quia sequitur: *Tu es homo et si aliquid est homo ipsum est animal: Ergo tu es animal et omnis homo est animal*. Ideo certum est quod due 35 illarum superfluerunt, quantum ad istam expositionem. Multe etiam sunt reduplicative in quibus insunt tales 4 exponentes signande; ut patet de talibus: *In quantum deus est, non idem simul est et non est; in quantum deus vult me esse, ego sum*; et sic de aliis. Ymmo ista est 40 falsa, tenta causaliter: *In quantum tu es nichil tu es*

homo; et tamen exponentes sunt vere; nec exponunt iste exponentes sensum reduplicandi gracia proporcionis concomitancie.

Et ideo notandum quod terminus reduplicativus
 5 quandoque tenetur reduplicative, quandoque simpliciter,
 et quandoque comparative. Reduplicative, quando tenetur
 sinkategorice et mobilitat terminum connotando com-
 pletam causam, ut hic: *In quantum numerus aliquis est*
senarius, est numerus perfectus: quod tantum valet ac si
 10 diceretur quod *esse senarium est per se et complete causa quia*
ipse est numerus perfectus. Vel secundum volentes exponere
 sufficit capere causalem et condicionalem, ut: *quia Sor*
est homo est animal; et *si aliquid est homo ipse est*
animal, ergo Sor, in quantum est homo, est animal. Et
 15 sic sequitur expositorie: *quia deus est, nichil simul est*
et non est. Et, *si deus est nichil simul est et non est*:
ergo in quantum deus est, nichil simul est et non est.
 Et racione note condicionis debet terminus reduplica-
 tivus mobilitare terminum super quem cadit: ut, *si*
 20 *iusticia est bonum, in quantum bonum; tunc iusticia est*
omne bonum; quia dato antecedente, tunc in quantum
 aliquid est bonum, ipsum est iusticia; et per consequens
 iusticia in commune est omne bonum. Vel si iste ter-
 minus, *iusticia*, supponat personaliter cum paribus in
 25 hoc dicto, *Iusticia est bonum in quantum bonum*, tunc
 aliquam iusticiam implicat esse omne bonum.

Quando vero terminus reduplicativus terminatur
 simpliciter, tunc dicit confuse kategoriale quamcunque
 causam vel formam racione inherencie predicati ad
 30 subiectum, ut hic: *motus est actus, id est forma mobilis*
in quantum actualiter est mobile, quod tantum sonat ac
 si diceretur, *motus est forma actualis mobilis secundum*
quam ipsum formaliter est in motu. Et ita auctores de-
 scribunt quascunque formas, dicendo quod forma talis
 35 est actus secundum quem subiectum est sic for-
 matum; et tunc isti termini *in quantum, secundum quod*,
 et sic de ceteris terminis usitatis in talibus descrip-
 tionibus significant circumstanciam cause formalis. Et
 patet generaliter quomodo forme quecunque sunt de-
 B 61^b scribende, et quomodo descripciones | auctorum sunt

The reduplicative term is sometimes to be understood reduplicatively, sometimes simply, and sometimes as a comparative. Reduplicatively, when *as such*, &c. point to a cause or a condition;

and in this case, the predicate becomes universal; if *as such* is B, then every A is every B.

Simply, when it merely implies in general some cause that unites the subject with the predicate: as: A is B in so far as it is C.

In such cases the terms modified by *in so far* does not become universal.

2. reduth B.18. d^t B.

20. est bonum est B.

28. t^{er} sup^r B.30. act^{us} i. B. 32. actⁱ B.

intelligende, et iuxta illum sensum non mobilitat terminus reduplicativus terminum super quem cadit, cum idem sit dicere: *motus est actus mobilis in quantum movetur* ac si diceretur, *Motus est forma qua formaliter mobile movetur.* 5

But as for negative propositions, logicians do not agree. Some admit, v. g. that a man, qua a white man, does not build, understanding the negation to fall on whiteness. Some admit that simply: Some say that he does build, considering whiteness as a remote cause. Some, denying this, would except the case of Christ's actions qua man.

In negativis autem, ubi reduplicativi supponunt simpliciter, altercantur logici; ut alii concedunt quod *Sor in quantum albus non edificat*, intelligentes propositionem negative simpliciter, scilicet ad illum sensum, *Sor per albacionem non edificat*; quod tantum valet ac si diceretur: *Sor albacione non edificat*, vel: *non in quantum albus edificat*. Alii autem concedunt illas ultimas propositiones in quibus negacio precedit terminum reduplicativam, et negant propositiones in quibus negacio subsequitur. Alii etiam in affirmativis concedunt propositiones reduplicativas, ponentes causam remotam causare suum causatum ut hic; Cristus secundum quod homo passus est, moriebatur et sitivit etc., et tamen humanitas non fuit per se causa completa talium. Alii autem negant omnes huiusmodi; sed concedunt quod Cristus secundum quod homo fuit ambulativus, materialis etc., nec Cristus secundum quod deus fuit immortalis et immobilis etc., quia non fuit immortalis immobilis. 15 20

I prefer the first opinion.

The reduplicative term understood as above, no inconvenience follows.

The human actions of Christ proceed from his humanity; and if also from his Deity, it is in another way altogether; so that they cannot be ascribed to the Godhead.

And thus a man does not build qua man, but qua able to

Ego autem assencio priori modo loquendi, quia sonancior et antiquior et facilior. Nec sequitur: *Sor in quantum albus non edificat, ergo, si est albus non edificat*; quia terminus reduplicativus terminatur simpliciter ad sensum expositum. Et sic conceditur quod Cristus est corporeus, palpabilis, divisibilis, etc., quia ut homo est huiusmodi; et cum hoc est indivisibilis et immortalis, quia est due substancie vel due nature, quarum una est talis, et alia talis; et una est essencia divina, et alia est minor essencia divina. Quamvis ergo divinitas sit causa ambulacionis Cristi, tamen non est causa eiusdem generis cum actu vel proprietate actus; homo tamen per se est gressibilis, etsi non poterit ambulare. Gressibilitas ergo est in specie humana tanquam eius passio, quamvis species non sit subiectum eius primum. Et conformiter negatur quod aliquid, in quantum homo, 25 30 35 40

21, 22. albatu; ambulativus above deus; Cristus above B.
24. imo^t B.

edificativum est, sed in quantum habens artem; quia *esse edificativum* non est passio sed accidens separabile; et sic homo est alterius generis quam edificabilitas.

Dubium tamen est apud multos logicos, si omnis
 5 substantia, secundum omnem rationem qua est, sit aliquid. Et videtur quod sic; quia sequitur: *secundum istam rationem Sor est: ergo, secundum istam rationem est ens* et per consequens *secundum istam est aliquid*. In oppositum sic: Si homo est secundum omnem rationem
 10 qua est aliquid, tunc per omnem famulatum accidentalem sui esset aliquid. Sed quid est per hoc quod est *albus, pater, currens* etc.? Certum est quod ille nichil esset per ista, nisi homo; et per consequens quodlibet illorum esset substantia et non accidens. Dicitur ergo
 15 quod quelibet substantia infinitis modis rationum est, secundum quarum nullam est ipsa substantia vel aliquid; sed aliquantum, aliquale, vel alicuiusmodi. Pro quo nota quod ablativus in tali propositione: *Isto accidente Sor est* potest regi ex vi cause, et sic esset sensus
 20 falsus; vel ex vi accidentis, et sic tunc esset sensus verus; ut: *iste equus est albo colore* vel *albi coloris* vel *secundum albedinem* vel *rationem albandi*: que omnia idem sonant. Et patet quod ista propositio est equivoca: *Iste homo est isto modo*, ex hoc quod iste terminus: *iste homo*
 25 potest simul intelligi ut subiectum, et ablativus regi de *ly* 'est' ex vi accidentis ad illum sensum: *Ille homo est huiusmodi*; vel aliter, quod pronomen sit subiectum, et iste terminus, *homo*, sit appositum, regens alterum ex vi cause formalis, ita quod sit sensus: *iste homo isto*
 30 *modo formaliter est homo*. Notata ergo ista equivocacione, patet quod quelibet substantia secundum infinitas rationes formales vel modos accidentales *est*, quia est illorum subiectum; et tamen non secundum aliquam
 B 62^a istarum *est ens* vel *aliquid*, | cum in talibus regitur terminus ab appposito ex vi cause; ut suppono ex grammatica. Homo ergo humanitate est homo vel substantia,
 35 aliquid, et ens; et quantitate est quantus, et qualitate est qualis, et aliis modis aequaliter; sed nec substantia nec aliquid Nec sequitur *secundum istam*
 40 *rationem Sor est similis alteri*, ergo *secundum istam est aliquid*; quia circumstantie significante per huiusmodi

A question: whether every substance is something in every one of its modes of being; for a mode is something. On the other hand, every possible accident would then make it something substantially new; which is not admissible. These modes do not make a substance to be some *thing*, but of some *size, quality or manner*. The ablative case is ambiguous, and may be understood in several ways, some false.

The answer is therefore that *to be thus* and *thus*, and *to be being*, are not the same; a man is something by *humanity*, *great* by *size*, *such* by *quality*, &c.

The argument from what is accidentally

3. edificat^{us} B. 5, 6. a'd B. 8. a'd B. 10. fatm B. 35. ato
 or o^{to} B. 39. after aliquid, a space for three words B.

more particular
to what is more
universal, does
not hold.

Can the same
thing be,
through these
accidental
modes,
posterior to
itself in its
essential being?
v. g. God, as
cause of my
being, is not
God,
and as such,
He is in
relation to me,
and thus
identical with
my being.

On the other
hand, if God
is identical
with me in any
point of view,
then He really
is not above me
in so far;

and God has
become our
equal by the
Incarnation.
Some frivolous
adversaries
never answer
such arguments,
unless by
repeating the
reduplicative
term in the
conclusion.

abstracta impediunt modum argumentandi a *per acci-*
dens inferiori ad suum superius; vel ad transcendens
superius. Sed in genere, argumentando a *per se* inferiori
ad superius, tenet consequentia; ut, si *ista albedine Sor*
est albus, tunc *ista albedine Sor est coloratus*. 5

2^o dubitatur si eadem res secundum rationes acci-
dentales sit posterior quam est secundum rationem
substancialem; et videtur quod sic, quia deus secundum
infinitas rationes est, secundum quarum nullam ipse est
deus; secundum rationem ergo qua ipse est causa mei 10
non est deus; et secundum illam rationem habet se in
aliquo ordine ad me. Cum ergo secundum illam rationem
est prior me, vel posterior me, vel eque primo mecum,
non potest dici quod secundum omnem rationem ipse
sit prior me; quia, ut sic, ipse est relatus michi, et 15
relativa, ut huiusmodi, sunt simul natura; et per idem
sequitur quod non secundum illam rationem ipse est
posterior me, potissime cum, ut causa huiusmodi, est
prior suo causato. Sed ad oppositum videtur esse hoc
medium: Si deus, ut huiusmodi, sit eque primo mecum, 20
tunc ipse est eque primo mecum. Et tunc per idem ipse
est eque primo cuilibet rei, et infinitum est posterior se
ipso. Sequitur enim: *secundum illam rationem est deus*
eque primo mecum; ergo secundum aliquid et secundum
veritatem est eque primo mecum. Nec aliter concederent 25
theologi quod deus ex humana conceptione est minora-
tus. Sicut ergo deus, ut homo, est par nobis, sic, ut
causa illius causati est eque primo cum illo. Et in isto
est tediosum communicare cum trutanis qui nunquam
respondent ad tales propositiones, nisi addendo deter- 30
minacionem reduplicativi. Ut, quando queritur utrum
pater est prior fili, dicunt quod pater, ut pater, est
eque primo cum filio; et aliter non respondent; et in
ista materia legiste et plebei sunt nutriti.

10. (§ pro rationem! B. 12. vel pro cum B. 16. h⁹ B. 20. me^m B.
26. huā cōc B. 29. trutāis B.

16. *Simul natura*. This expression is one side of a double distinction: *together in time* — *together in nature*. I have chosen to render it by the idea of identity; for the difficulty of Wyclif is the very same as that concerning the identity of cause and effect, of subject and object.

Dicitur ergo quod dupliciter dicitur accidens. Primo modo quando ipsum in sui natura est substantia sed secundum habitudinem alteri actualem habetur ab alio; et illo modo divicie sunt accidentia diviti, et igneitas
 5 est accidens essencie ignis, sicut et humanitas accidit Verbo. Ubi ergo est unio talium naturarum in eodem supposito, bene sequitur illud suppositum, in quantum homo vel ignis, est aliquid, cum natura in se unita sit substantia. Cum ergo tale suppositum sit more univer-
 10 salium multe nature, concedendum est quod est maius et minus, prius et posterius eodem; et sic de aliis que insunt illis naturis. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod idem sit maius et minus se ipso, ut verbum est par patri et minus patre, quia natura minor patre et tamen illa
 15 natura est verbum. Nec sequitur: *ista humanitas incipit esse et ipsa est deus, igitur deus incipit esse*. Nec sequitur, etsi verbum quod est illa humanitas sit natura divina, quod illa humanitas sit natura divina. Nec sequitur, si verbum assumpsit illam humanitatem, que est
 20 ipsamet persona, quod verbum assumpsit parem vel seipsum. Nec sequitur quod illa humanitas sit in infinitum perfecta, etsi sit in infinitum perfectum. Nec sequitur, si libere contradictorie assumpsit illam naturam, quod poterit sumpsisse aliam, faciendo se alium hominem,
 25 sicut homo facit libere se esse istum currentem, nec possit esse alium currens. Nec sequitur quod aliqua res que est non idem deo possit fieri idem deo, cum illa natura non posset manere dimissa, cum illa natura sit *Verbum esse hominem*. Est ergo homo optimus possi-
 30 bilis, et tam bonus homo quam bonum est ipsum esse hominem. Aliud ergo est homo et aliud deus, quia alia natura; sed non alius est iste homo quam deus, sed est homo eiusdem speciei et univocus cum quolibet altero homine. Cristus ergo, in quantum est homo, est
 B 62^b aliquid, quia substantia et creatura; | et in quantum homo, est posterior essencia divina.

Sed 2^o modo dicitur accidens quod claudit contradiccionem esse non inherens, ut accidentia 9 generum; et illa non possunt in se esse substantie. Ideo nichil

Accident has two meanings.

The first implies one substance that, *happening to* belong to another, is called its accident; as v. g. riches.

Now when two such substances are united in one person, this person is greater or less, &c. according as we speak of one substance or the other; yet not greater or less than itself, nor does any other contradiction follow thence,

because they bear upon the natures, not on *that which* is these natures.

The second, meaning of 'accident' is *what must*

20. p^m B. 23. 9^d B. 24. p^rit B. 28. manere dⁱ's dimissa:

in marg. dim^eca B. 30. p^ut B.

essentially belong to another; and such an accident brings no otherness with it, nor does it render the substance more or less perfect.

A cause is thus at the same time with its effect, and prior to it, because there is priority and simultaneity both of causation and of consequence.

God is infinitely before the effect which he causes, precisely in the order of causation.

Aristotle, saying that relatives are simultaneously related, is to be understood to mean as to consequence; as to causation, one may be prior to the other.

This simultaneity, however, does not identify God with us.

I choose to answer that God, though like to me, is not identical; but that His likeness with me is identical to mine with Him.

in quantum sic accidentatum est aliquid, nec mutat speciem propter tale accidens; quia non est illud accidens concretionem vel abstractivum. Nec dicitur substantia prior aut posterior propter illud accidens, quia sic necessario deus esset posterior quam aliquid posset esse, cum esset postremum ens, et impossibile est dare postremum ens. Et sic conceditur quod deus, ut est causa mei, est summe prior me, ymmo omnis causa, ut causa, est prior natura suo causato; et tamen aliqua causa, ut causa, est simul natura cum causato suo; quia est dare duplicem simultaneitatem sicut duplicem prioritatem nature, scilicet simultaneitatem quo ad causacionem et simultaneitatem quo ad consequenciam. Et sic multe cause simultanee quo ad consequenciam sunt simul cum suis causatis; sicut omne subiectum est eius passio; sed non simultanee quo ad causacionem. Sed in propositionibus concessis tenentur termini reduplicativi simpliciter; quia aliter essent sensus impossibiles. Deus ergo, causando me, facit se esse summe priorem me; nec ex hoc sequitur: omnis causa mei esse summe prior est me. Patet ergo quo ordine prioritatis deus se habet ad me, quia secundum causacionem qua causat me.

Et ad Aristotelem de simultaneitate nature relativorum dicitur quod ipse vult omnia correlata esse simul quo ad correlativa; et tamen non repugnat unum relativum antecedere reliquum causacione secundum quam est relata, et simul alia simultaneitate. Alii vero intelligunt per relativa, aggregata per accidens ex subiecto et relatione; et illa possunt simul esse natura; et sic non est dare causatum, quin aggregatum ex deo et relatione ad illud sit eque primo cum illo causato; et talia aggregata intelliguntur communiter per substantiam et per terminos reduplicativos. Et ex illis non sequitur: *deus, ut est causa mei, vel deus causans me est simul natura mecum; ergo deus est simul natura mecum.* Et sic de similibus. Nec est ista sententia falsa; sed cavillacio verborum stat in eleccione.

Ego vero determinavi me ad priorem responsionem, negando quod deus similis michi est simul natura mecum, sed similitudo dei ad me est simul natura cum similitudine mei ad deum; et deus eque primo natura

10. quod B.

19, 20. nec — me *in marg.* B.

23. Ar. f. B.

est similis michi vel causa mei, sicut ego sum. Ideo posterius natura est similis michi quam est, quia prius naturaliter est quam est similis michi. Nec sequitur: *deus isto gradu prioritatis vel posterioritatis est causa mei vel huiusmodi*; ergo *isto gradu est*, nisi equivocando intelligatur quod est subiectum huius gradus; et ita de similibus est dicendum.

Ex istis dictis inferri potest evidenter quod nullum accidens inherens potest esse aliquid per se existens, ut partes substantie; quia tunc possibile esset quod substantia in quantum taliter accidentata esset aliquid; utputa in quantum alba vel similis vel quanta esset aliquid. Et per consequens proportionaliter ut esset magis alba, esset magis illud aliquid, et per consequens in infinitum posset aliquid unius speciei esse reliquo eiusdem speciei magis ens. Consequens est impossibile de naturis. Ideo dicit philosophus signanter quod substantia non suscipit maius et minus. Si ergo albedo esset aliquid per se existens, aut natura potens per se existere, tunc utique esset aliquid, et unio illius ad subiectum esset accidens quo subiectum foret accidentatum immediate formaliter, et non illa albedo. Omnis talis unio esset vere qualitas et non albedo data; ut alias declaravi.

Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima, omnis propositio de *per se* predicacione infert causalem in eisdem terminis, et non econtra; ut, si *per se* homo est animal vel risibile, tunc ex hoc quod aliquid est homo, ipse est animal vel risibile. Patet prima pars regule ex descriptione causalis vel reduplicative | complete et dictis de universalibus, eo quod quelibet species est completa causa sui generis et sue passionis. Et 2^a pars regule patet ex hoc quod multe sunt veritates, quarum una est completa causa alterius, inter quarum extrema non est *per se* predicacio, ut patet in istis: *ex hoc quod paries non habet pulmonem, ipse non respirat; quia deus est, ego non sum asinus; quia deus vult me esse, igitur ego sum*. Et patet quam deminute sunt 4 exponentes supradicte, ymmo iuxta illas sequitur indifferenter econtra quod in quantum sum risibilis vel gressibilis sum homo vel animal, sicut econtra. Et patet quante

God is like me, as I am; so I being after Him, this likeness is also posterior to Him.

We thus see that no inherent accident can exist by itself, for if it could, it would by itself render the substance other, and whiteness, v. g. increasing indefinitely, would make it more of a being than it was; but there is no more or less in being.

Whence several rules follow.

1. Every proposition, when the predicate is affirmed *per se*, infers a causal proposition in the same terms; but not *vice versa*; the first part is evident, and the second also, because many true causes cannot be predicated *per se*.

It makes a great difference in the sense if we

2. filis B.

17. natis B.

20. vere above utique B.

40. egv B.

41. egv B.

place the subject before or after the reduplicative term.

II. Every causal proposition to which is added a *minor* stating the cause of the antecedent, gives a conclusion, thus:

Because *A* is *B*,

C is *D*;

Because *E* is *F*,

A is *B*;

Because *E* is *F*,

C is *D*.

This reposes on the axiom: The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect.

And we must note that when a term is reduplicated, it becomes

universal; 'quod man' means in so far as possessing the essence of humanity.

refert preponere subiectum ante terminum reduplicative tentum, vel postponere ipsum, ut hoc est verum: *Aliquid in quantum est substantia, ipsum est homo, quia Sor ex hoc quod est substantia est homo et tamen non in quantum aliquid est substantia, ipsum est homo; 5 quia tunc, si aliquid est substantia ipsum est homo.*

2^o patet quod ex omni tali, cum minore capiente causam sui antecedentis, sequitur sylogistice causalis cuius antecedens causatur, et consequens maioris concluditur; ut sic argumentando: *quia tu es homo 10 tu es animal, sed quia tu es lapis tu es homo; ergo, quia tu es lapis tu es animal; quia chimera non habet pulmonem non respirat, sed quia non est non habet pulmonem; ergo, quia non est, non respirat.* Tenet autem illa regula per hoc: quidquid est causa cause est causa 15 sui causati; et quidquid antecedit ad antecedens antecedit ad suum consequens. Ut patet quod pulcre syllogizatur ex causali tanquam minori et ex alia causali cuius antecedens est primum consequens ad 3^{am} causalem cuius antecedens est antecedens primo sumptum, 20 et consequens est illud quod est consequens in minori; ut sic argumentando: *quia tu es homo, tu es animal, quia tu es animal tu es corpus; ergo, quia tu es homo tu es corpus.* Et tenet ista regula per hoc quod quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad suum ante- 25 cedens; utrumque tamen istorum dictorum intelligitur quando non est variacio in genere vel in modo causandi. Ex hoc patet quod terminus super quem cadit reduplicacio mobilizatur, ut sequitur: *In quantum tu es homo, tu es animal; tu es iste homo; ergo, in quantum 30 tu es iste homo, tu es animal.* Et si capiatur in minori quod *iste est homo*, sequitur simpliciter quod *iste est animal*. Sed tamen non tenet descendendo ad inferiora per accidens: ut non oportet quod, si *ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal, et tu es iste homo 35 albus; ergo, ex hoc quod tu es iste homo, tu es animal.* Nam impossibile est quod *tu sis homo ex hoc quod tu es iste albus homo, pater, quantus, etc.*; sed ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es hoc album, quamvis non secundum causam completam et per se sufficientem. 40

2. tētū B 24. consequencia: regula *abore* B.

33. Non tamen

illud; *corr. abore* B.

3^o patet quod sicut ex nulla causa necessaria per se sequitur logice contingens, sic non quelibet partialis causa et per accidens inferens causatum sequitur logice ex eadem. Verbi gracia, quamvis deum esse sit causa 5 quare ego sum, non tamen si deus est, ego sum; sed oportet illi necessario adiungere causam contingentem, ut est volicio dei respectu mei esse, vel aliquid consimile. Ex quo patet quod non est latitudo causandi a prima causa usque ad contingens, quia totum genus 10 contingentium est creatum a causa necessaria, et inter necessarium et contingens est magna distancia. Ymmo, dato opposito, sequitur quod, posita prima causa, poneretur omne possibile. Ex quo sequitur quod oportet dare causas reciproce se causantes, ut volicio qua deus 15 est formaliter et contingenter volens me esse bonum est relacio ponens deum et me esse bonum; et illa causatur a me, sicut quodlibet extrinsecum volitum a deo causat in ipso, sine eius mocione, unam volicionem vel complacenciam; omnia tamen volibilia extrinseca 20 causantur ex eius volicione eterna, que est prima essencia. Est tamen ordo in volicionibus dei, cum una prior B 63^b causat aliam posteriorem: | ut volicio qua vult me esse precedit volicionem qua vult me esse virtuosum; et sic volicio qua vult omnem hominem esse precedit volicionem qua vult me esse; nec indiget volubili extrinseco ad eius volicionem, quia non indiget sic velle. Nulla ergo accidencia sunt subiective in prima essencia que implicant ipsam esse mobilem.

Exemplum 2^o partis est: lumen ideo est, quia produ- 30 citur a luminoso; et anima est, quia creatur a deo: et tamen lumen et anima possunt esse sine talibus productionibus. Tales autem producciones sunt cause parciales et per accidens productorum, et per se causa productionum passivarum, sicut producciones successive per- 35 manencium non sunt cause illorum productorum, sed suarum productionum passivarum. Sic ergo producencia mundi fuit causa per accidens mundi, sed mundus fuit

III. As a necessary cause does not infer what is contingent, so neither does it infer a partial cause. V. g. God is the cause of my being; yet God's existence does not infer mine. We must, therefore, admit that some causes cause each other; for instance God's will that I exist causes me and is caused by me to be such.

There is besides an order in the volitions of God, one being prior to another and causing that other; the universal v. g. causing the particular.

Though light is because produced by a luminous body, it can exist without that production; so also of the soul. This brings us to admit the existence of certain truths which are

34. Sicut B.

29, 30. *Produccionibus*. I can only understand this passage by supposing Wyclif to mean by *production* and *creation* what takes place at the first instant of being; it is then true that during the rest of their existence, both light and the soul *are*, while the first act of causation is no longer.

neither the causing nor the caused substances; if not, the world could not have been produced.

Three objections severally answered.

1. If A and B cause each other mutually, they are each of them prior to the other. This, however, does not follow except with a distinction: prior *qua* causes, not otherwise.

2. It is false that relations cannot be causes; but one volition of God, if posited, at once posits infinite others. He Himself being the efficient cause of all.

3. A creature must be willed by God before it exists; for if not, it would not depend on His volition.

causa per se sue productionis, cum sit subiectum illius accidentis, sicut deus fuit subiectum illius active productionis. Nec aliter esset possibile mundum fuisse productum, nisi esset reciproca causacio, eo quod necesse est omne causatum habere causam, qua posita ponitur, 5 et qua non posita non ponitur; quod non esset possibile nisi essent veritates preter substancias causantes, et encia reciproce causata a se ipsis.

Sed huic obicitur; si A causat B, et econtra, tunc A est prius natura quam B et econtra; et sic idem esset 10 prius se ipso natura. Similiter complacencia dei, cum sit relacio, non causat suum causatum ipsa prius natura. Similiter subiectum pro instanti prioritatis naturalis foret non volitum a deo, cum non prius sit volitum quam deus illud velit. 15

Ad primum dicitur quod consequencia ultima non valet, quia est dare multos ordines prioritatum naturalium; ideo, ad modum exponendi hoc verbum *differt*, superius expositum, debet ista propositio: *A est natura prius B*, sic exponi: *A est aliquo ordine nature prius B*; 20 et, notato omni ordine in quo utrumque est, capienda est 2^a exponents: *talis B non est isto ordine eque primo cum A*. In diversis ergo ordinibus utrumque antecedit reliquum.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod relaciones faciunt multa bona; 25 ut proporcio causat modum. Videtur tamen michi quod ista: *deus vult me esse*, ponit infinitas voliciones dei; et alia est causa *esse* mei, ut volicio qua vult me esse, volendo omnem hominem esse (et sic de multis aliis); et causa agens in istis omnibus volicionibus est ipse qui 30 est prima voluntas. Complacencia ergo presupponens me esse, si sit causa conservans me, conservatur a me in illo ordine causandi obiective.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod conclusio est impossibilis. Et admittantur quotlibet instancia nature esse simul in 35 eodem instanti temporis, cum illa instancia non sunt nisi gradus prioritatum naturalium. Nec posset deus

12. ipso B. 25. Ad 2^m dr *underlined* B. 31. Ad 3^m dr *underlined* B. 35. *Q^m* pro instantia B.

6. Before the world existed, God could not have become its cause, if there had not been *something* to make God that cause; that something is *the truth that the world is possible*.

ponere complacenciam suam in instanti nature quo est obiectum, quamvis utrumque sit quandocumque est alterum, altera. Pro illo ergo instanti nature nec est obiectum volitum a deo, nec pro illo est non volitum, sed pro illo est volitum *vel* non volitum in sensu composito. Illud patet de virtute sermonis, ut alibi exponitur.

4^o patet quod si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, et negacio est causa negacionis: et hinc solet regulariter antiquitus inferri ex qualibet completa causali condicionalis facta ex causali oppositarum parcium; ut, si *Sor est respirativus quia habet pulmonem; ergo, si non habet pulmonem, ideo non est respirativus vel igitur non est respirativus quia non habet pulmonem.* Solercia tamen est, quando capitur oppositum consequentis et quando oppositum antecedentis; quando enim consequens est naturaliter prius quoad consequenciam suo antecedente; tunc antecedit condicionaliter negacio consequentis negacionem antecedentis; ut: *quia tu curris, tu moveris: igitur, si non moveris tu non curris, quia non moveris.* Sed si antecedens sit causa completa, convertibiliter inferens suum causatum, sicut est de subiecto et sua passione, tunc negacio cause antecedentis sequitur mixtim causaliter et condicionaliter ex negacione causati consequentis; ut: *Sor, quia est homo, est risibilis; ergo, si non est homo, ideo non est risibilis, quia ideo non est homo:* et non econtra; sed non oportet, si antecedens sit causa convertibilis efficiens consequentis, quod negacio antecedentis sit causa negacionis consequentis; ut: *quia deus vult me bene agere, igitur bene ago; si deus non vult me bene agere, ideo non bene ago quia deus non vult me bene agere,* non sequitur secundum aliquos; quia tunc deus esset causa quare non bene ago, et cuiuscunque inordinacionis mundi. Ac si gratis subtraheret volicionem suam, necessitando me cessare a bene agere, cum tamen cuiuscunque defectus moralis radicalis est causa in deficiente et non in summo bono conservante; ideo, sicut repugnat solem debite applicari medio diaphano et non illuminare idem, nisi defectus fuerit in medio, causans privacionem luminis, sic repugnat hominem esse non motum a deo ad agendum sibi

But we must distinguish between time instants and nature instants.

In the same instant of time there may be infinite instants of natural priority. Before the creature exists it is willed or not willed.

IV. Affirmation causes affirmation, negation negation: thus every causal proposition is tantamount to a conditional with a contradictory members.

Ex: *A is B because A is C;* therefore:

1. *If A is not C, A is not B because not C;* or. 2. *If A is not B, A is not C, because A is not B;*

1. being employed in the case of partial and 2. in that of complete causes.

This, however, does not hold, according to some, when the antecedent is the efficient cause of the consequent.

Digression concerning the origin of evil:

I do well because God wills so; if God wills that I do ill, I do ill because God wills it.

It would surely follow that, God's will that I do good being removed, I cannot do good;

A, 5. a deo — in sensu in marg. B. 18, 19. above negacionem an illegible word; id? B. 38. ymmo; ideo above B.

but the defect would be in me, not in God, as the opacity of an object prevents the light from penetrating; and God would not give His grace, because I should not receive it.

It is thus impossible that God should be the cause of all that is caused, if we include non entities and privations under that head.

We grant, however, that all, directly or indirectly, depends on the First cause; my want of resistance to temptation is in my nature, which, as created by God, is good; my peccability is an eternal truth,

but my act of sinning is of the extremest contingency, though radically dependent on God.

complacenter, nisi defectus sit in homine. Sic quod deus non causat istum defectum; quia defectus posicione illius solis, vel defectus applicacionis, vel invidia de *bene esse* alicuius non potest sibi inesse, cum tunc foret mobilis. Solum ergo antecedens quod est iniustum et 5 per consequens naturaliter causans suum consequens est in beneplacitum deo; et consequens iustum beneplacitum; ut peccatum causat penam, sicut et negacio eius, affirmacio est diminuta. Et tamen talis displiceret deo. Sed consequens non sic, cum sit iustum. Ipse ergo 10 est tam bonus et tam impotens deficere quod si non dat, ideo non datur, quia accipiens non accipit. De nobis autem qui sumus avari communicatum frequenter contingit quod ideo non accipit accipiens, quia non damus. Quod si arguatur deum esse causam uniuscuiusque cau- 15 sati, dicitur quod est impossibile, cum negaciones et privaciones et earum futuricionis vel pretericionis eterne sonantes in deordinacione non causantur ab illo, cum nichil causat nisi complacendo de causancia et causato.

Verumtamen conceditur quod omnia creata habent 20 vel directe vel indirecte reduci ad primum: ut ideo pecco, quia sum peccabilis, et sum sic motus, cum illa pauca sufficiencia ad resistendum; et non bonum est ut causatum a deo quod sum peccabilis. Sicut et ista veritas eterna est bona: *Omnis natura peccabilis* 25 *erit peccabilis*; et ab isto bono processerunt contingenter futuricionis peccatorum, et de necessitate primo omnium futuricio omissionis alicuius debiti deo. Et prima obmissio habuit disposicionem et inclinacionem in obmittente, cum qua non tunc stetit oppositum illius 30 omissionis; et tamen immediate ante instans omissionis fuit declinacio omissionis possibilis, cum summa contingencia sit de talibus futuricionibus, cuius contingencie primaria et radicalis causa fuit prima essencia. Ista ergo generalia de causalibus notata habuerunt introduc- 35 toria in pulcerrimas veritates.

2. po^e B. 3. fōl B. 13. av'e above avari B; *ib.* om̄t; *in marg.* ḡm̄cat̄ B. 23. mō or zūo B. 24. est et B.

5. *Antecedens . . . iniustum.* Wyclif means here, I believe, that the fact of sin, because of its injustice, being the cause of its punishment, pleases God. 34. *Primaria et radicalis causa.* It is well to note the boldness of Wyclif's speculations in this (apparently) his first work.

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Restat ergo dicere de terminis reduplicativis comparative tentis. Hoc autem non est commune omnibus terminis reduplicativis, cum iste terminus, *ex hoc*, *ex* 5 *presse* connotat causam et non comparacionem, sicut isti termini, *in quantum*, *de quanto*, *pro ut*, *secundum quod* etc. Quando ergo predicti termini tenentur comparative, propositiones ratione illorum exponende debent exponi secundum exponentes positivi gradus, de 10 quibus dictum est tractatu proximo. Sunt ergo denominationes sibi mutuo correspondentes, ut bonitas | creature et eius obligacio deo, entitas rei et eius cognoscibilitas, et intellectivitas, et intelligibilitas; et sic de omnibus denominationibus, quarum unam gradatim 15 repugnat correspondere alteri; sicut est de per se causis et suis completis causatis. Ut entitas rei causat eius cognoscibilitatem, sed non intelligibilitatem, eo quod omne ens est necessario eternaliter intelligibile, quanto deus est illius intellectivus; ipse enim est tam intellectivus quam 20 volitivus. Quamvis multa intelligit que non vult, quia non de omni intelligibili habet volicionem; et per idem est tante causativus, ordinativus, et productivus, sicut est volitivus. Multa tamen vult que non ordinat; et volendo se non causat se, quamvis causet illud quod 25 est ipse. Quelibet autem alia persona volitiva est plus volitiva quam causativa. Ipse eciam precise tam bonus est quam iustus est; et sic de aliis que non sunt sibi actualia. De istis autem respectu cuiuscunque subiecti est maxima difficultas, cum tangat rationes ydeales 30 que sunt principia rerum, sine quibus cognitio nemo est sapiens.

Reduplicative terms, considered comparatively. They cannot all be so considered; v. g. *ex hoc*. The exponents of such propositions follow the rules of comparisons of equality (as much, as &c.) already dealt with.

There are many qualities that go beyond each other in degree and cannot be thus reduplicatively affirmed. Examples: entity, intelligibility, &c.

But this question is full of difficulties, touching as it does, the ideal principles of all things.

1. *Cap. deest.* 2. *Space for initial R. B.* 26. *creativa B; ib.*
 Ipsa B. 28. ² *accua B.*

The present chapter deals with positive and negative 'breadths' of qualities. Is it true that if two things agree to a certain extent, they disagree to the same extent?

If so, every privation that admits of variation in intensity is equal with the opposite quality.

And many absurdities follow. For if some opposite qualities are thus equal, all of them are so.

Take a line; an infinitely small part of it belongs to the line; so the line is what its part is, infinitely small; and its smallness is infinitely great: so it is both at once.

Increase, lessening, and change, are all impossible thenceforth.

What is proved of size can be likewise proved of all other qualities. An infinite number is infinitely small, because its smallness is infinitely small; *etc.*

Istis autem primissis, tractandum est de denominacionibus, latitudinibus positivis et latitudinibus privativis ex opposito sibi correspondentibus: ut *si aliqua in quantum conveniunt, in tantum differunt*. Quod si sit verum, tunc aliorum consequentia et eorum differentia sunt pares; 5 et per idem quolibet privatio suscipiens magis et minus foret parificabilis suo positivo; ut similitudo disimilitudini, magnitudo parvitati, intensio remissioni, rarefaccio condensacioni, distancia propinquitati: et sic de aliis. Quo dato, secuntur multa inconveniencia; et con- 10 sequentia prima patet ex hoc quod illa propositio: *in quantum aliqua conveniunt, in tantum differunt*, expresse parificat comparata secundum convenientiam et differentiam. Et quod ex illo secuntur inconveniencia, patet ex hoc quod pari evidencia qua aliqua talia opposita sunt 15 equalia, et quolibet; et tunc sequitur quod nulla talis denominacio suscipit magis et minus. Si ergo omne magnum sit ita parvum sicut magnum, et econtra, tunc omne magnum est infinitum magnum et infinitum parvum; et per consequens, proportionaliter ut est maius 20 est minus, et econtra; et per consequens non esset possibile maiorari vel minorari, vel aliter moveri subiectum aliquod, cum nichil possit fieri intensius vel remissius, distancius vel propinquius. Prima consequentia probatur, dando oppositum de A pedali: quantumcun- 25 que parva est aliqua pars A, ita parvum vel magis parvum est A. Sed infinitum parvum est aliqua pars A; ergo infinitum parvum est A; et omne parvum est ita magnum sicut ipsummet est parvum. Per datum ergo infinitum magna est aliqua pars A, et per consequens A 30 est infinitum magnum, et infinitum parvum. Argumentatur ex hoc quod A est magis magnum quam aliqua eius pars, et precise tam magnum est quidlibet, sicut est parvum; ergo A est magis parvum quam aliqua eius pars. 35

Et idem argumentatur de qualibet magna vel qualicunque denominatione suscipiente maius et minus denominato; ut, si infinitum sit aliquis numerus, tunc infinitum parvum est; si infinitum remissum est aliquod, tunc infinitum intensum est; et sic de aliis, eo quod omne tale 40 est precise ita magnum sicut parvum; et per consequens,

si est magis magnum, tunc est magis parvum. Ex quo
 palam sequitur quod repugnat quicquam se habere pro-
 B 65^a porcione | maioris inequalitatis ad aliquid, eo quod ex-
 cedens aut excellens vel plus denominaretur positivo quam
 5 privativo.

Hic audiui multas fugas sophisticas. Illi enim qui
 ponunt omne ens absolutum, ponunt quod omnis priva-
 cio et suum oppositum comparantur sicut termini vel
 conceptus aut subiecta taliter se habencia; cum omnis
 10 privatio vel sit terminus privativus vel subiectum priva-
 tivum; et sic concedunt quod illa privatio est pedalis
 vel tanta, sed non est tanta privatio. Alii dicunt quod
 si parvitas augmentabitur ad suum duplum, tunc erit in
 duplo maior quando est subdupla quam est modo. Et
 15 alii dicunt quod talis privatio privative intellecta est
 tanta, et positive intellecta est tanta, ita quod ipsi faci-
 unt ex sua consideracione ens extrinsecum esse tantum
 vel tantum. Sed falsificant se ipsos, et distinguunt igno-
 ranter inter esse positive et esse privative. Tales ri-
 20 mas circumpalpitantes excogitabant, qui per ignoranciam
 distincionis encium tenebantur.

Supponatur ergo quod loquimur de entibus ex parte
 rei non causatis ex consideracione hominis; et tunc
 patet quod stat difficultas querens sub quo gradu est
 25 ista parvitas; utrum secus sit tanta magnitudo sicut
 parvitas vel non; aut, sub aliis verbis, utrum subiectum
 sit tantum sub racione qua magnum, sicut predicatum
 est sub racione qua parvum. Idem enim est querere
 utrum tanta sit illa magnitudo, sicut est illa parvitas,
 30 et querere utrum hoc sit tam magnum sicut ipsum est
 parvum. Nam iuxta primam responsionem, non sequitur
 A est tanta parvitas: igitur A est tanta res; quia
 parvitas proportionaliter ut est maior parvitas est minor
 res, ut dicunt. Multum ergo differunt magnitudo et par-
 35 vitas, cum est dare maximam magnitudinem et non est
 dare maximam parvitatem; et duplare parvitatem est
 subduplare magnitudinem et nichil duplare. Ymmo fa-
 cere parvitatem sic quod fiat et incipiat esse quantum-
 libet magna parvitas, non est facere sed destruere magni-
 40 tudinem. Aliud ergo est rem esse magnam, et aliud
 rem esse parvam. Quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur:

There are many answers that attempt to elude the difficulty. Some say that a privation of size is *so great*, but not so great a privation of size. Others that smallness, to be doubled, would require to be halved. Others that smallness and magnitude are both equally great, but one *understood* positively, the other negatively.

But we are speaking of things as they are, not as created by our mind. What we want to know is if greatness and smallness are equal or not.

The first answer says that as smallness becomes greater, entity decreases. There can be a maximum of magnitude and not of smallness; to double smallness is to halve a magnitude, and not to double at all. Smallness being thus distinct

18. se ipsas B. 25. f9 B. 36. duplac B.

4. A word is probably wanting after *vel*.

from magnitude
the question
bears upon the
magnitude that
is wanting;
and neither
the 1st nor the
2nd answer
touches the
difficulty.

The question
is: "How can
that privation
have
magnitude?"
It is a flat
absurdity to
say that at the
some instant it
is double and
half of itself.
If the smallness
of $A = 4$ and
will be twice
as great when
 $A = 2$, this is
merely calling
things by
contrary names

Thus the third
answer avoids
the difficulty
too; for
magnitude,
positively or
negatively
understood, is
still magnitude.

Less logically
wrong than the
two former
answers, it is
more erroneous
than they are.

Every negative
quality for
which no
medium degree
can be assigned,
becomes
infinite by the
very fact, like
certain positive
qualities.
And if the
medium degree
of a positive

aliud est magnitudo et aliud parvitas. Loquimur ergo de tali privacione secundum rationem sue magnitudinis, qua privatur, et ut distinguitur a magnitudine: et tunc patet quod nec prima responsio nec 2^a tangit difficultatem logicam illius materie. 5

Totum ergo intentum logici est querere quomodo magna est illa privacio; et non sollicitatur de subiecti magnitudine. Patet ergo quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis aput quemcunque bene intelligentem dicere quod hoc erit in B instanti duplum ad hoc quod illa 10 est; et tunc erit in duplo minus quam illa est. Si enim loquimur de magnitudine privacionis, ut distinguitur contra magnitudinem positivi, utamur terminis numeri ad denominandum maiorem gradum privacionis. Quando ergo dicunt quod parvitas A corporis iam est ut 4, et 15 infinite erit in duplo maior quando erit ut duo, vel mensurant parvitatem secundum equalitatem subiecti, vel aliter, gratis vocant maius, minus.

Et patet ex eadem consideracione quod 3^a responsio fugit difficultatem, quia queritur utrum magnitudo positive intellecta sit tanta magnitudo, sicut est parvitas, vel privacione intellecta. Et supponatur quod in quacunque denominacione maius et minus sit signandum proporcionaliter maiori termino numerali, ut ipsum est maius. Est ergo illa responsio, ponens quod omnia 25 privative opposita sub mediis gradibus correspondent, et proporcionaliter ut gradus positivi supra medium gradum sunt intensiores, sub gradus privacionis remissiores; et econtra. | Ista autem responsio minus peccat B 65^t in logica quam priores, cum respondit formaliter iuxta 30 veritatem sermonis; sed magis peccat in sententia, cum per alias non devenitur ad aliquam difficultatem propter proterviam. Improbatur autem ista posicio per hoc quod cum latitudinum privatarum non sit dare medium gradum, eo ipso quelibet talis in infinitum procedit in 35 quibus positivum infinitum procedit; ut patet de motu et raritate. Ymmo, secundum magnificantes potenciam dei, omnis species denominacionis positive in infinitum potest procedere. Et si gradus medius in actu alicuius positivi sit semper par privacioni correspondenti sibi, 40

13. utantur B. 19. patet quod B. 34. latitudinū B. 36. in aliquo B; *ib.* $\alpha\beta\gamma$ pro infinitum B.

sequitur quod quemcunque gradum positivum possibile esset parificari privacioni sibi correspondenti. Et cum tales gradus nunc equales non possent fieri inequales, sequitur quod omnes tales gradus correspondentes sunt
 5 equales. Sive ergo latitudo positiva ponitur procedere in infinitum, vel non, semper procederet altera in infinitum, cum cuilibet parti finite terminate ad non gradum de una latitudine correspondet latitudo infinita de suo opposito; ut magnitudini a gradu ut 4 usque ad
 10 non gradum correspondet in infinitum magna latitudo parvitatatis. Et sic invenies in aliis.

Similiter videtur quod repugnat certe calculacioni ut, posito quod A calidum sub medio gradu ut 4 sit precise ita intensum sicut ipsum est remissum; tunc, ipso
 15 remisso ad suum subduplum uniformiter in hora, intendetur remissio uniformiter ad suum duplum, eo quod proporcionaliter ut aliquid est magis intensum quam sub medio gradu est ipsum minus remissum, et econtra. In medio ergo instanti erit intensio A calidi ut tria, et remissio erit ut sex; et per consequens infinitum velocius.
 20 Et non proporcionaliter acquireretur remissio quam deperderetur intensio; cum tamen quantumcunque velociter fiet aliquid magis intensum, fiet ipsum minus remissum, et econtra, cum illud sit motus utriusque. Vel aliter
 25 oportet ponere processum in infinitum in motibus; non enim gradum finitum motus infinitum velocem motum consequi, et per consequens omnem motum velociter in infinitum velociter moveri.

Ex isto videtur quod non sit possibile idem esse precise
 30 [ita] intensum ut remissum; quia tunc, acquisita remissione dupla, deperderetur precise intensio subdupla, et cum tantum deperderetur de intensione sicut acquireretur de remissione, patet calculanti quod sequitur intensi-
 35 onem fuisse duplam ad remissionem in principio. Non enim stat aliquod ens crescere ad suum duplum propter tantam latitudinem acquisitam, quantum reliquum deperdendo decrescit ad suum subduplum, nisi primum fuerit subduplum ad secundum, eo quod oportet sic

22. intensio *above* remissio B. 30. *it* deest. 36. acquirendam; acquisitam *above* B.

5. Here Wyclif enters into mathematical calculations on a subject which is perhaps not to be dealt with thus, and at a time when mathematics were hardly able to grapple with questions concerning the Infinite.

What increases, increases by the whole of its intensity; what

diminishes, only by the half.

The third answer denies that positive and negative intensities are comparable.

But this is false, since privations can be compared with positive qualities as to their good or evil results.

No two things can bear the same specific name, unless they are in so far comparable,

at least analogously: which the very answer implies, by saying that positive and negative

qualities differ; for to differ supposes comparison.

They are besides properly comparable, for their magnitude is of the same nature.

And when we say that each has v. g. an intensity equal to 2, we mean that it really has this intensity.

All doubles being equal, the magnitude A is to its half as the smallness B to its half; which makes a regular proportion.

augmentum acquirere tantum quantum ipsum est; et diminutum non oportet deperdere nisi medietatem sue latitudinis. Repugnat ergo illas latitudines esse pares.

3^a responsio negat omnem comparationem privacionis ad habitum; et istam opinionem tenent aliqui (de quibus miror), qui ponunt omnem privacionem esse rem privatam. Ista autem responsio excedit, cum stat privacionem comparari quo ad bonitatem vel maliciam positivam; et sic de causacione et multis aliis. Nam habitus facit plus boni, et per consequens est religiosior data privacione; sicut et una denominacio talis est reliqua durabilior, potencior, remocior, propinquior; | et sic de quibuslibet denominacionibus extrinsecis. Ymmo, claudit contradiccionem aliqua esse, quantumcunque disparia fuerint, nisi sit comparacio inter illa secundum convenienciam et differenciam in aliqua denominacione specifica generali vel analogica. Et hoc invenitur in responsione, cum dicitur privacionem et habitum tantum differre quod neutrum est compossibile alteri. Omnis enim differencia vel est comparacio, vel ad eam secuntur infinite comparaciones.

Item, videtur quod ille forme sunt proprie comparabiles, quia eadem est magnitudo utriusque, cum utrumque capit magnitudinem suam a subiecto preter eius subiecti magnitudinem; non est illis alia, quia aliter ad omnem punctum, quam talis infinitum magna esset magnitudo parvitatatis, et per idem ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna intensio.

2^o confirmatur illud per hoc quod utramque significatur vere habere magnitudinem ut duo, et unam esse causatam in genere suo, sicut reliqua est in suo; cum ergo omnia quorum magnitudines vere significantur, cum eodem termino materiali sunt equalia, sequitur quod omnis privativa denominacio sit equalis denominacioni positive.

3^o sic: proporcio A magnitudinis ad eius medietatem est equalis proporcioni B parvitatatis ad eius medietatem, quia omnes proporcionones duple sunt equalis. Ergo illa 4 sunt proporcionalia ad invicem secundum 6 genera proporcionum, de quibus in 5^o elementarum Euclidis.

10. rligi^{er} B. 12. diuturnior; corr. below B. 13. q,13; and so very often throughout the MS. 25. e Till a^r B; ib. a^r B. 26. q, B. 29. q,utrq3 vtrq3 B. 30. ad 1^o B.

Aliter enim non esset verum quod proportionaliter ut privacio est maior est eius oppositum minus, et econtra.

4^o sic; posito quod A et B in principio illius hore fuerint eque bona cum suis habitibus et quod habens
5 A sit frustratum ab illo, salvo B eque bono suo habenti, patet quod tam mala est privacio A quam bonus est habitus B, et per consequens malicia privacionis est par bonitati habitus. Et sic non solum malicia et bonitas, sed carencia et habitus sunt equales. Et per
10 idem in quacunque proporcionem maioris inequalitatis sunt comparabiles. Et idem patet de privacione privacionis; ut quam bonum est habere visum, tam bonum est carere cecitate, quia tantum proficeret (eo quod sunt proprie idem); sicut tantum nocet carencia rei,
15 sicut proficit habitus eiusdem; et sic iuvamentum et nocumentum, carencia et habitus, erunt quomodolibet proportionalia.

Pro responsione ad istam difficultatem, suppono quod omnis privacio differt ab habitu et econtra. 2^o suppono
20 quod aliqua sunt comparabilia immediate per se, ut due substancie comparantur in perfeccione essentiali, due quantitates in equalitate et due qualitates in intensione. Quamvis enim talia formaliter comparantur relacionibus distinctis a comparatis, non tamen habent accidencia
25 absoluta subiectata in illis et per que fundamentaliter comparantur; 2^o comparantur aliqua per accidencia eorum absoluta, ut homo et asinus eque proprie comparantur in quantitate et figura et qualitate et aliis accidentibus, que univoce participant, sicut homo et
30 homo, quamvis substancie magis differunt. Et 3^o comparantur aliqua secundum accidencia respectiva extrinseca; ut due albedines sunt eque proprie michi, quia subiecta quibus insunt sunt ita proprie michi. 3^o supponatur quod aliqua comparantur in denominacionibus
35 certi generis univoce particularis; ut, *Sor est melior lapide*. Aliqua autem in denominacionibus analogis extrinseca genus; ut dicitur: *deus est sapiencior Sorte*; *Afirmacio est melior quam privacio vel negacio*. Tales enim denominaciones secundum quamdam analogiam insunt
40 vel circumeunt multa genera analogica. Et 4^o supponitur quod aliqua sit comparacio vel proporcio proprie dicta, qualis est proporcio numeralis quantorum eiusdem

Again, it is evident that it is as bad to lose a good quality as it is good to have it; therefore goodness and badness are equal here, and also the 'having' and the privation.

To solve the problem, we must make a few assumptions.

1. That privation and possession differ.

2. That some things are immediately comparable with each other, and others by means of their absolute or relative accidents.

3. That some things are univocally, others analogically comparable.

4. That there is a kind of comparison properly so-called, as

2. b⁹ B.3. f⁹ B.

30. the dnuū B.

40. ecmū B.

among quantities of the same species, whether rational or irrational; and another sort of proportion, that is not mathematical but universal. It is obvious that all beings are comparable according to this universal proportion.

No negation is by itself and properly comparable with a positive quality; not even by means of an absolute accident, for they can be the subject of none such.

But they are comparable, even properly, if the comparison is founded on some extrinsic relation.

Some privations, especially worthy of the

speciei, sive sit rationalis, que | immediatè denominatur B 66^b
ab aliquo certo numero, sive sit irrationalis, sicut est
medietas duple, ut proporcio diametri ad costam qua-
drati. Alia autem est proporcio communiter dicta, que
non est numeralis; sed ad illam sufficit habitudo. 5

Istis premissis, patet quod omne ens secundum pro-
porcionem communiter dictam est comparabile alteri
cuicumque. Patet ex hoc quod quidlibet habet se ad
quidlibet aliud in quadam habitudine. Sic enim homo
sapiencior est, deo similior, lapide perfectior; et erit 10
affirmacio negacione melior; et tamen non oportet in
talibus dare proporcionem numeralem, quia similitudo,
perfectio, bonitas, et magnitudo analogice ampliata ad
magnitudinem molis et magnitudinem virtutis, circumeunt
omne genus. In omni enim genere contingit reperire 15
similitudinem, perfeccionem, bonitatem, unitatem, magni-
tudinem, prioritatem etc., que conveniunt transcendenti.

2^o dico quod nulla negacio vel privacio est positive
proprie proporcionaliter, vel per se vel per absolutum
accidens quod subiectat. Primum patet ex hoc quod 20
nullum genus est illis commune; ergo non per se sunt
talia proprie proporcionalia vel comparabilia. Conse-
quencia tenet ex illa suppositione; et 2^a pars patet ex
hoc quod privaciones et negaciones non possunt sub-
iectare aliquod accidens absolutum, nec forme illis 25
opposite; patet ergo quod non sunt secundum se pro-
prie comparari, nec secundum quantitatem nec secundum
qualitatem quam subiectant.

Et 3^o, dico quod tales forme opposite possunt tam
communi comparacione quam comparacione proprie 30
dicta fundata in accidente extrinseco ad invicem com-
parari; ut contingit dandas privaciones esse datis habi-
tibus, in quacunque proporcione volueris, plures aut
pauciores, diuturniores vel breviores; et sic de aliis que
insunt illis per accidentia suorum subiectorum vel alios 35
respectus. Et patet quid generaliter sit dicendum de
comparacione privacionis ad habitum.

Sed pro ulteriore declaracione notandum quod aliqua
sunt privaciones que non suscipiunt magis et minus;

3, 4. 4^u B. 11. añ^{ma} B.

3. *Irracionalis*. Irrational quantities, or surds; as $\sqrt{2}$ (pro-
porcio diametri ad costam quadrati). But what Wyclif means
by (I. 4) *medietas duple*, unless it be *the square root of two*
I cannot imagine. Mr. Matthew suggests *aut* for *ut*, on l. 4.

ut quies et cecitas, et breviter omnia que non comparantur in eodem subiecto aliquid positivi sibi oppositi. Et ille proprie et simpliciter privaciones sunt. Omnes tamen dicunt aptitudinem subiecti ad formam et negacionem habitus talis forme. Sicut ergo omne privatum visu est quod non habet visum, sic omnis cecitas est cuilibet alteri cecitati par; et sic de talibus similibus. Alii autem dicunt quod tales privaciones sunt eo maiores quo forme quas privant forent maiores; de quo alibi. Alię autem sunt privaciones communiter dicte, et secundum quid, que ponunt sua subiecta et aliquid de forma, et alicuius gradus forme carenciam, ut parvitas, remissio, etc. que ex opposito correspondent suis positivis. Ista autem non proprie privative opponuntur suis positivis; sed quodammodo relative, ut duplum et dimidium; et de istis est nobis sermo.

De istis ergo dicitur quod nulla talis privacio est suo positivo maior vel minor, nec inequalis secundum essenciam, vel equalis. Illud patet ex 2^a conclusionē; quia, si aliqua talis esset reliqua maior vel minor, aut finite aut infinite. Si finite, tunc contingeret aliqua talia parificari. Per idem non est causa dicenda quare non omnia forent paria. Si infinite, tunc omne magnum foret infinite magis magnum quam parvum, vel econtra; et quecunque pars detur, sequitur inconveniens. Si enim omne quantum foret infinite magis magnum quam parvum, tunc infinitum parvum foret in tanta proporcionē |
B 67^a magis magnum quam parvum, sicut maximum in mundo; et cum infinitum crescit parvitas alicuius talis super
30 parvitatem maximam, sequitur quod minus, in quantum minus, foret maius. Et idem patet, dato quod quelibet parvitas sit infinitum maior magnitudine.

Ultimo dicitur quod omnes tales forme proportionaliter et non secundum equalitatem ex opposito correspondent; ut si magnitudo corporis fiat in duplo maior, parvitas eius fiet in duplo minor, et econtra; et sic de quacunque proporcionē signanda. Ex quo sequitur quod si una talis forma acquiratur uniformiter, reliqua deperderetur difformiter; et econtra. Et pro tempore quo una
40 velocius acquireretur, reliqua tardius deperderetur et econtra. Ut, maiorato A uniformiter ad sui duplum in

name, do not admit of increase or diminution; but all imply not only the denial of a quality but the aptitude of the subject to receive that quality.

All these are equal to each other by reason of their absoluteness. Others are not so absolutely opposed to their contrary qualities, but rather relatively; it is with them that we have to do. We deny that any of these privations is greater or smaller than its positive quality, or equal or unequal; to grant this would be to admit many absurdities.

But they correspond one with another symmetrically, and not as equals; so that, as one quality increases faster, the other decreases slower; as one increases more, the other decreases less, but always in proportion.

6. ^{est} ep, pro est quod B; ib. ^{hns} above habet B. 12. ^{pr^m} (?) B.

30. maxⁱ B. 3y. after econtra three lines crossed off B.

hora, tunc in prima mediate maiorabitur, ad sui sexqui-
alterum et in 2^a mediate ad suum sesquitercium et
parvitas econtra in prima medietate diminuetur ad suum
subsesquitercium, et in 2^a ad suum subsesquialterum.
Et sic invenies omnia talia opposita in suis denomina-⁵
cionibus et condicionibus valde dispariter se habere;
ut, si una illarum quantumcunque tarde remittatur ad
non gradum in situ, celeriter intenderetur reliqua,
quia semper infinitum magno de uno infinito parvum
correspondet de reliquo; et sic est de multis proprie-¹⁰
tatibus, iuxta quas possent multiplicari quotlibet con-
clusiones. Et patet responsio ad omnia argumenta,
preterquam ad ultimum cum suis confirmacionibus.

To the first
difficulty we
reply that
privation has
no
magnitude, nor
parts.

Two shadows
may make one
doubly intense;
but they are
not the parts,
but the cause
of that new
shadow.

If privations
had parts, why
should they not
be extended
like positive
qualities?

Ad primum dicitur quod privacio non est mole
magna; quia si sic, tunc infinitum modica eius pars¹⁵
quantitativa foret quantumlibet infinitum maior suo
toto. Infinitas tamen parvitates in quocunque continuo
est signare quantumlibet maiores parvitate tocus, qua-
rum quelibet presupponitur adesse parvitatibus tocus; et
tamen non sunt eius partes, cum nulla talis privacio²⁰
habet partes. Unde, quamvis due umbre causant per
idem medium umbram magis intensam, neutra tamen
est eius pars intensiva, sed causa suppositiva. Aliquando
non posui parvitatem habere duplices partes, sicut motum;
et sic proposui tales privaciones esse dupliciter magnas²⁵
proportionaliter ad illas partes, ita quod pars infinitum
parva quo ad molem esset quantumlibet maior suo toto
quo ad intensionem; quia grave videtur quod talis pri-
vacio sit continue magna sine hoc quod habeat partes.³⁰
Nec est explicabile qualiter parvitas partis principia-
ret parvitatem tocus, nisi causacione intrinseca, tanquam
pars componens. Si enim cecitas habet partes secundum
extensionem subiecti, sicut et quies, et alie priva-
ciones, quare ergo non extenderentur alie privaciones³⁵
que plus ponunt? Sed grave videtur fundare partes in-
tensivas parvitatibus vel principiare illas secundum dis-
parem individuacionem ab individuacione aliarum par-
cium.

1. sex B. 4. ses B. 11, 12. gones B. 23. Above supp. p̄ B;
ib. alii; alin̄ above B. 24. possunt; posui above B. 33. sic (?) B.
35. q̄r pro quare B.

Quomodocunque ergo de hoc sit, certum est quod
 opposito modo est de talibus privacionibus. et aliis posi-
 tivis; quia in quantis positivis maius minus presupponit
 tanquam eius partem; sed in privativis minus presuppo-
 5 nit maius et minimum est dandum; ut patet de parvi-
 tate mundi. In proporcionibus autem conservantur maior
 proporcio maioris inequalitatis, et minor proporciona-
 liter minoris inequalitatis; ita quod deperdita propor-
 cione maioris inequalitatis usque ad equalitatem, infini-
 10 tum cresceret proporcio minoris inequalitatis; et
 maiorata in infinitum proporcione maioris inequalitatis,
 infinitum diminueretur proporcio minoris inequalitatis;
 B 67^b sic quod infinitum | magnam proporcionem maioris ine-
 equalitatis, si detur, consequitur infinitum modica pro-
 15 porcio minoris inequalitatis et econtra: minima tamen
 proporcio, a qua alie procedunt, est proporcio equali-
 tatis. Cum ergo magnitudo magnitudinis non sit, nisi
 illa magnitudo, sicut magnitudo parvitatis est vel ipsa
 parvitas vel eius passio, ne sit processus in infinitum, vel
 20 nugatorie replicetur eadem sententia: patet quod falsum
 est quod eadem est magnitudo magnitudinis et parvi-
 tatis. Nec est inconveniens, extendendo nomina inten-
 sionis et magnitudinis, concedere quod infinitum intensa
 magnitudo et intensio sunt ad quemlibet punctum
 25 mundi; sicut theologi concedunt de potencia dei. Ista
 tamen anologa per se supposita communiter intelligun-
 tur de magnitudine molis et intensione qualitatis:
 magnitudo tamen parvitatis non est magnitudo, sicut
 nec intensio remissionis est intensio, si non equivocetur.
 30 Ad secundum dicitur quod minor est falsa, quia,
 ratione certitudinis, in numeris qui sunt prime mesure
 rerum, signantur exemplariter per eundem numerum qui
 non possunt equari; ut perfectio hominis vere designa-
 tur suo genere, gradu ut 8, et perfectio asini gradu
 35 ut 8, sicut magnitudo temporis, magnitudo corporis, et
 velocitas motus signantur gradu ut 8. Et tamen dicere
 quod illa sunt equalia est pure demencie. Et si argu-
 mentatur sic: A est tantum in suo genere, sicut B in suo
 genere; ergo A est tantum sicut B, eo quod quantum
 40 cunque est aliquod ens in suo genere tantum est:

In positive quantities the greater implies the less; in negatives, the less supposes the greater, and as the one increases the other must diminish.

Now as there is no magnitude of magnitude, so there is no magnitude of smallness; and to say that both have the same magnitude is false; for we either mean nothing by that term, or else greatness and smallness in themselves: which are evidently not identical.

The second argument is met by denying that, if the same numbers are employed to designate things that are not homologous, they are therefore equal. Though 8 may stand for the perfection of a man in his species, of an ass in its

3. "mig pfupp" "maig B. 6. gnt se; above gfernr B. 10, 11. et —
 inequalitatis bottom of page B. 15. nua B. 23. int ~ B. 32. veris (?) B.
 ib. signant; f, nr above B. 33, 34. designatur B.

species, of a length of time, a volume, or a movement, it were folly to say that these are equal.

This may apply to all similar cases.

And it does not follow that two things being great, and neither greater than the other, they are equal.

The third argument is valid; but Euclid understood quantities of the same sort. These quantities may be proportional with each other, even though neither equal nor unequal.

Thus the world is as much greater than a grain of millet, as it is less small than the same.

If not, we could neither assign a minimum nor a maximum of size,

dicitur quod argumentum non est verum de virtute sermonis; sed A est ut 8 in suo genere et B est ut 8 in suo genere. Et sic in consimilibus proporcionibus se habent ad gradus suorum generum eisdem terminis numeralibus signatis. Cum enim non cognoscimus gra- 5
 dus talium magnitudinum nisi ex suppositione, nec habemus dispares numeros proporcionatos ad denominandum omnes dispares magnitudines. Nec mirum, si magnitudines diversorum generum mensuremus eodem termino numerali; nec sequitur: *utrumque istorum est magnum* 10
et neutrum reliquo maius: ergo, utrumque est equale alteri; quia oportet ad equalitatem esse convenienciam specificam fundamenti.

Ad 3^{ci}um conceditur quod argumentum est verum; sed quo ad illos sex modos argumentandi Euclidis, 15
 dicitur quod ipse intelligit illas in quantitativibus eiusdem generis (quamvis aliqui illorum possunt habere locum) eciam quantumcunque disparatis. Conceditur ergo quod proporcionales aliquorum sunt proprie comparabiles et proporcionata, nec sunt equalia nec inequalia per se, 20
 sicut patet de proporcione temporis ad tempus, et spacii ad spacium, et similium discontinue proporcionabilium quibus proporcionantur proporcione communiter dicta. Unde non sequitur: *proporcionaliter ut magnitudo est maior, parvitas est minor, et econtra; ergo, parvitas* 25
et magnitudo sunt equales vel inequales; sed sufficit quod proporcionales excessuum sint equales, vel ex opposito correspondentes. Ex istis enim probabiliter inferitur quod omne finite denominatum aliqua tali denominatione participat proporcionaliter suo opposito: ut mundus 30
 situ sic finite magnus, est eo minus parvus quam mileum, quo est magis magnus.

Aliter enim non esset dare | minimum gradum quo B 68^a
 aliquid est parvum, nec maximum quo nichil est parvum. Ymmo nulla foret subdupla parvitatatis ad parvitatem 35
 medietatis mundi; quia, dato quod sic, mundus foret in duplo minus parvus sicut est in duplo magis magnus. Non enim est verisimile quod addicio unius puncti ad istum mundum induceret parvitatem ad omnem eius punctum, postquam per ante non fuit usquam eius 40

7. quando *above* cum B. 11. utr^o q, B. 17. pūt *above* comit' B.
 18. despate B. 23. cp por^{ater} cpor^{oo} B. 31. sc^u *pro situ*; *very*
 illegible B. 37. mi^o *underlined* B.

aliqua parvitas; et ablacio puncti tolleret parvitatem a remanente, cum unum talium oppositorum non possit auferri, nisi per oppositionem reliqui. Sicut ergo est dare maximam magnitudinem, sic est dare minimam parvitatem, quia aliter mundus infinitum maioratus successive non esset minor in aliquo instanti quam in quolibet instanti; et per idem posset in tantum diminui ad non quantum sine hoc quod minoraretur et non minoraretur, nisi pro instanti foret parvus; et per consequens, nisi fuerit ita quod est parvus.

Probabile ergo est dicere quod parvitas mundi est minima, sicut eius magnitudo est maxima; et sic gradus parvitatatis mundi est primum et minimum, quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum illius generis; ut alia sunt eorum minora, que ab illo sunt plus distancia, et gradus magnitudinum mensurantur penes distancia a non quanto; et sic principium magnitudinis non communicat in illa denominatione cum suis principiatis, sicut principium parvitatatis communicat in illa denominatione cum suis participiatis: quia perfectionis est participare positivum et non communicare cum illo in denominatione imperfectionis. Primum ergo principium est indivisibile et tamen inmensum virtute, sed non mole; et ipsum principiat utramque denominationem ultimatē. Mundus ergo est parvus, non secundum comparacionem ad maius ymaginatum quod non est, sed in comparacione ad magis parvum; et alia sunt parva in comparacione ad maius. Et proporcionaliter dicitur de remissione, propinquitate, et similibus. Tales ergo denominationes que non sunt similiter denominationes quo ad aliquid habent se positive, et quo ad aliud privative; ut densitas quo ad quantitatem privative se habet, sed quo ad multitudinem materie positive; et econtra de raritate. Et sic est de sompno et vigilia, que suscipiunt magis et minus, sed non proporcionaliter ut alie privaciones nunc citate.

Et si queritur quid est talis privacio, dicitur quod est forma denominans subiectum formaliter huiusmodi; et sunt de eodem genere in quo sunt sua positiva opposita, sed per reduccionem; ut parvitas est in genere quantitatis, et cecitas in genere qualitatis. Non enim

but there must be a limit both to magnitude and smallness.

We may affirm that the world is at once the greatest and the least small of possible beings.

The first principle of all things is infinite, but without dimensions, because indivisible: the world is not infinite since something exists greater than it, not in magnitude but in smallness. The like may be said of remissness, propinquity etc. but some qualities are positive from one point of view, and privative from another; as density, rarity, sleep and waking, etc. If asked, what this privation is, we answer: A form

5. minoratus above B.

6. maior above minor B.

27. pñ B.

36. nc citate.

intrinsically causing its subject to receive a certain name, and belonging to the same genus as the positive quality to which it is opposed.

There is a question whether that which increases or diminishes can be called a privation or not; some admit this; some call privation the property of an accident and some, a mere want.

Privations are either of something already

possessed, or to be possessed, or that might be so; or of a merely

intelligible form that cannot be

possessed v. g. to be deprived of infinite size is to be small.

My opinion is that smallness is a property of quantity, not a privation of infinite size. Though not so

properly as in the case of substances, accidents may have the five predicables; but the accident, difference or property of an accident belongs to the substance.

As to the fourth argument, the conclusion may be granted. Opposite forms can be properly compared, though not in

oportet ponere privacionibus, negacionibus, futuricionibus, pretericionibus et possibilibus, nova genera; quia de ratione generis est dicere positivam quidditatem substantie vel accidentis, que est veritas de presenti in substantia, fundata per formalem inherenciam. 5

Utrum autem illa que suscipiunt magis et minus sunt privaciones vel non, est dissencio. Aliqui enim vocant ipsas | quantitates vel qualitates, alii melius vocant illas B 68^b passiones vel proprietates accidencium, non per se in genere. Et alii vocant illas privaciones carencias et 10 tunc illa verba *privari* vel *carere* etc., non mobilitant terminos. Sed idem esset hoc, *carere quantitate* et *quantitate carere*. Unde aliqua est privacio forme habite de predicato, ut cecitas, vel visus debilitas; aliqua privacio est forme habende, ut privacio principians generationem 15 compositi naturalis; aliqua est privacio forme possibile, ut inpotencia infantis qui moritur in prima eius etate. Et aliqua est privacio vel carencia forme intelligibilis que non potest esse, sed subiectum habet formam talis speciei; ut omne quantum est parvum, et omne intensum 20 est remissum, ipso carente infinita quantitate et infinita intensione. Si ergo esset aliquod tale infinitum magnum vel intensum simpliciter, tunc esset non parvum et minime remissum.

Videtur autem michi quod parvitas est proprietas 25 quantitatis et non carencia quantitatis infinite. Et sic de ceteris que suscipiunt magis et minus. Ad alias enim consequuntur carencie, sed non formaliter sunt carencie. In omni enim genere accidencium est dare genus et speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens, quamvis 30 non ita proprie sicut in cathegoria substantie. Omne tamen accidens accidentis est accidens substantie, sicut omnis differencia vel proprium accidentis inheret substantie per accidens cui per se inest; ut parvitas quantitatis est *subiectum, sic quantum, esse parvum*; et sic 35 illa parvitas potest separari a subiecto, sed non ab illa quantitate. Non tamen est possibile quod accidens habeat sic per se, posterius illo quod ipsum accidens posset esse non inherens et subici tali posteriori.

Ad 4^m dicitur quod in casu posito est conclusio pro- 40 babiliter concedenda, cum tales forme opposite comparantur in suis denominacionibus ab extrinseco causatis;

4. quod *above* que B.5. *fū*^{ta} B.11. *mo*^{ta} B.17. e^o e^o B.

et in talibus sunt ipse proprie comparabiles, iuxta 3^{am} conclusionem. Quod autem talis forma sit bona vel mala, hoc est per comparacionem ad utilitatem subiecti et ad multa alia; et ita de malicia est dicendum.

5 Omne enim bonum est quodammodo bonum debile; ut res quecunque est precise tam bona alicui alteri quam utilis est eidem; et tam mala est res alteri quam inutilis vel impediens est ab opposito alterius indebite.

Ex quo sequitur quod non proportionaliter est res

10 bona alteri sicut est bona in se, ut habere centum solidos est bonum virtuoso indigenti; et prodigo forsitan esset malum. Ymmo, cum diversis circumstantiis potest vicissim esse magis bonum vel minus bonum habere centum solidos, sicut patet de valore usibilium que sunt

15 eo alicui valenciora quo utiliora: ut panis valeret in tempore necessitatis famelico quodlibet magnum aurum, ubi non valeret denarium solidi pro loco et tempore quibus posset habere illum pro obula. Et sic gladius valeret iniuste obsesso centum guldenis; et tamen eidem

20 furioso esset alias malus. In omnibus ergo talibus, ubi agitur de valore vel bono sub ratione qua utile, attendendum est ad indigenciam alicuius cui est bonum, et ad commodum quod cum paribus sibi inferret; quia valde relativa est ratio talis boni.

25 Bonum autem nature est eo maius quo ens habens illud est naturaliter perfectius, sicut fines perfectiores sunt hiis que sunt ad finem. Homo enim, qui est finis omnium | aliorum sublunarium, daret in casu iuste pro salvacione sua quotlibet talia bona. Ideo est quantum-

30 libet melior illis; sicut deus est sic optimum quod potest esse, et quamvis omnis res naturalis absolute sit taliter bona, omnis tamen res naturalis est bona primo modo, quia aliter talis. Ymmo probabiliter potest dici quod quelibet pars mundi est cuilibet indigenti utilis;

B 69^a et de facto prodest cuilibet homini ut quelibet pars celi, causando celum, prodest michi, cum ipsum celum causatum conservat me secundum corpus. Et sic invenies de bonis accidentalibus quibuscunque. Vicia autem et peccata sunt occasionaliter bona, cum prosunt

themselves.
Their goodness or badness proceeds from a comparison with outside objects, to which they are useful or the contrary.
Intrinsic and extrinsic goodness (utility) are not the same.
Money may be a good for a poor but honest man, and an evil for a spendthrift.
According to circumstances, the same thing, equally good in itself, changes its extrinsic value; as bread in a famine; or a sword in the hands of a warrior or of a madman.
In these things demand is an important factor.
Physical goodness depends on the perfection of that being which possesses it.
The salvation of one man is worth more than the whole world.
But natural good comprises in every case usefulness to some one;
and even vice and sin have their uses.

18. s^t B. 19. g^p pro guldenis B.

18. *Obula*. Cf. Lafontaine, *Le Serpent et la Lime*: "Seulement le quart d'une *obole*."

Nothing can exist that is not good in some way.

The third sort of good — moral good — is useful; it is impossible to put virtue to a bad use.

But things morally good are sometimes equally so, sometimes

more, sometimes less; their utility also varies so much that at times

very slight external advantages

outbalance it. Evils in like manner are

threefold: unserviceable, injurious, immoral.

Nothing is of use to God; because he has need of nothing.

He is unserviceable to none, since He preserves all nature in being,

and punishes only for the good of the universe; so

that the punishment He inflicts is not an injury.

Moral evil can in no case be committed by Him.

Thus God cannot make a man sin, though He can

make his sin to be good,

non solum in exemplum aliis, sed et ipsis peccantibus quod peccaverunt. Unde impossibile est esse ens, nisi fuerit quodammodo bonum.

3^m vero genus boni, honestum est utile; ut omnino virtuoso prosunt virtutes et actus virtuosi; ymmo tanta est de illis virtutibus honestas quod nemo potest uti male virtute morali, sicut potest abuti virtute naturali, et forte intellectuali. Unde virtutes anime valent multa bona naturalia et extrinseca. Et quo ad rationem boni honesti, sunt quedam eque bona, quamvis quo ad rationem bona utilis quandoque plus prosunt et quandoque minus; ymmo quandoque superantur a parvis bonis extrinsecis. Cum ergo tot modis dicitur unum oppositorum esse, sic et reliquum.

Patet ergo quod 3^x est ratio mali. Divicie enim quandoque actualiter sint male, eo quod alicui inutiles. Peccata nature et morum sunt mala nature; et actus viciosi sunt mala inhonesta. Ex quibus patet quod sicut nichil est bonum deo primo modo; sic ipse nulli est malus primo modo, sed cuilibet alteri nature est ipse bonus primo modo, sed nulli tam bonus quam bonus est in sui natura. Prima pars patet ex eo quod deus non potest alio indigere. Cum ergo *utile* dicit indigenciam, nichil potest esse utile vel commodiferum sibi. Et 2^a pars patet ex hoc quod ipse pre-exigitur tanquam necessarius observator et dans omne bonum cuilibet tali nature; et per consequens nulli tali est inutilis; quia si puniat aliquos, hoc est misericorditer, et ad universi honestatem, et ad eorum utilitatem. Ideo non nocet vel impedit aliquos, etsi infligat illis malum pene, quod est malum et nocens nature secundum quid. Malum autem moris non potest principiari, quamvis illud bonum non formaliter.

Ergo deus potest facere hoc esse bonum quod Sor peccat, et tamen non potest facere Sor peccare. Et sic

4. honeste B. 16. accat B. 28. qui sic above B. 33. vd bonū for B.

32. *Malum moris* is here taken evidently in the sense of *sin*; I think that *peccata morum* (l. 17) may mean a bad habit. Scholastics divided good into *utile*, *delectabile* and *honestum*, evil into *inutile*, *molestum*, *inhonestum*. On l. 15, 16, we have *inutile*; on l. 16 *molestum* and on l. 17 *inhonestum*. Now only *inhonestum* corresponds to moral evil; and if we take *peccata morum* as *sin*, it would not necessarily be malum nature (i. e. molestum).

ista [conclusio] est bona: *Sor peccat*: ergo, *bonum est vel verum est quod Sor peccat*; et deus facit consequens et non antecedens. Racio, quia antecedens non est in ordine nature, sicut consequens; quia Sor peccare est de ordine nature. Et primo conclusio probatur: Sor peccat; ergo verum est quod Sor peccat; ergo ens est quod Sor peccat; ergo bonum. Similiter: Sor peccat; ergo iuste punitur; deus facit consequens et non facit antecedens in sequela logica, ut est hic. Et sic licet facit posterius, non tamen facit prius in sequela logica; licet in sequela reali semper faciens posterius, facit prius, dummodo illud prius non sit suppositum in ordine nature. Nec facit consequens et antecedens non facit, quia ipse non est naturaliter prius, cum non sit in ordine nature.

because the first does not belong to the physical order. Whatever exists must be good.

Thus the antecedent, though really produced by God as a fact, is not logically ascribable to Him.

B 69^b 3^a autem pars patet ex 2^a; nec obest res eternalis habere indigentiam alicuius quod semper habent et appetunt sed non indigent aliquo quo eternaliter carent vel sperant, cum habent inamissibiliter quo indigent vel declinant.

God is good to all His creatures.

Et quarta pars patet ex hoc quod tam bonus est deus cuiquam quantum prodest illi, ut patet de virtute sermonis; sed nulli tantum prodest quam bonus est in se; ergo, etc. Nec sequitur quod deus infinite concurrat ad actum essencie create; quia necessario libere concurrat ad omnem talem actum causate essencie, quante iuvat ad illum; ideo proportionaliter concurrat ad actum ut ipse est magnus; et hoc est melius quam esset, etsi infinite concurreret ad quantumlibet actum. Et hoc est impossibile, quia tunc prima mensura immoderate haberet, quia nullum haberet motum ipse deus; quia ad agendum magis vel minus equaliter se haberet. Et si infinite concurreret illi, non esset modus vel moderatio. Nec potest probari quod quante deus est, tante concurrat, vel est alteri similis vel dissimilis. Minima enim differentia possibili differt primum suppositum a 2^o.

But to none so much as He is good in Himself; for He is that infinitely, and He is good to His creatures only in so far as serviceable to them.

God's *concursum* to the acts of His creatures, since it is free cannot be infinite; besides, it must be adapted to the intensity of each act.

Et si arguatur sequi: *illo modo deus agit similatur vel differt ab aliquo quare deus est sicut est causa*: ergo *illo modo est*, dicitur quod non est color in argumento si non equivocetur; quia tunc esset respectus accidentaliter causa, qualiter similatur vel differt ab aliquo; et cum

Analysis of an objection, showing it to be based on an equivocation,

1. conclusio *deest*; que B. 11, 12. \widehat{dn}^o B. 14. 2a⁶ B. 26. actus sit *underlined after* ipse; est *above the line* B. 27. actum *underlined*; q, l, *above* B. 28. \widehat{mefa} B. 31. i' B. 36. \widehat{qr} quare, qualiter) ergo *in marg.* B. 39. \widehat{qr} dens est sicut est causa *underlined before* \widehat{qr} B.

taking the
ablative case in
different senses.

causa formalis sit eadem forma que est causatum, sequitur quod talis respectus foret essencia divina. Quod si equivocetur in relacione ablativi casus, intelligendo in antecedente, "*isto modo* deus differt a me" ablativum regi ex vi cause formalis, et in consequente "*isto modo* 5 deus est" ipsum regi ex vi accidentis, tunc est imperitinens sensui concludere, quia *quante deus est* quod *tante differt a me*. Non enim est subiectum tante quante est accidens, sed plus. Nec est verum quod differencia qua deus differt a me est par deo vel infinita, quia terminatur 10 ad duo extrema, et non convenit deo in magnitudine.

It follows that
many things
that we call
evils are good;
for instance,
punishments
and
misfortunes.

Patet eciam ex dictis quod multa sunt bona que dicimus mala; et alia plus valent quam estimamus, alia minus valent, cum omne tale imperfectum tantum valet quantum iuvat ad perfectionem universitatis. Prima pars 15 patet ex hoc quod penalitates et alia que dicimus infortunia, sicut generaliter cuncta que nobis displicent, dicimus mala, cum tamen iuste ex divina providencia ad bonitatem universi eveniunt; et sic nobis placencia dicimus bona, etsi de facto sint mala; sicut patet de 20 ignorantibus et vicis corruptis.

Also, that our
estimate of
values is often
mistaken.
Dearth raises
prices; we can
never
exactly regulate
supply and
demand.
Sometimes
man's
wickedness
makes the
estimate to err
notably;
sometimes it
approaches
truth; but it is
Nature and not
the estimate
that really fixes
the worth of
things.
The measure of
worth of
anything is its
utility in the
universe,
even though it
be not actually
in use:

Sed 2^a pars patet ex hoc quod venalia plus valent in caristia quam in fertilitate valerent, eo quod equalis plus valet cum paucioribus quam, ceteris paribus, cum pluribus. Cum ergo nullus hominum scit propor- 25 tionare incorrigibiliter usualia ad multitudinem utencium, patet quod ignoramus valorem talium. In empcionibus autem et vendicionibus, accedit quandoque error notabilis ex sceleribus hominum, et quandoque accidit iusticia ex quadam estimacione propinqua veritati; nun- 30 quam tamen accidit valor ex sola ordinacione hominis, vel ex hoc quod pro pluribus vendi potest, sed ex dispositione nature regentis sublunaria.

Et ultima pars patet ex hoc quod *valere* vel *esse bonum utile* dicit habitudinem ad id cui est utile. Et 35 cum universitas sit a deo cathereta participando quocunque tali bono, patet quod participacio utilitatis ab universitate est mensura valoris rei. Nec obest rem cuius non est usus actualis valere, quia ipsa iuvat quiescendo; licet avarus | quandoque impediatur rem iuvare. Summe B 70

3. re^{us} B. 16. pena^s B. 18. et ex fuma^{us} above ex divina B.
22. venalia B. 24. veniat above valit B. 29. scilicet B. 30. iustia B.
36. catheta B.

ergo inter creaturas valet humanitas in Cristo, de qua non est nostrum scire quantum valet, sed relinquatur consideratio illius subtilioribus theologis.

Christ's Humanity is of all creatures that which has most worth. Thus *to have* may be as good as *to want* is evil;

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod est dare habitum rei tam bonum quam mala est alterius rei privatio; et sic bonitas et malicia sunt denominationibus extrinsecis pares, sicut sunt habitus et privatio: sed hoc est impertinens ad concludendum magnitudinem et parvitatem esse pares; quia iste denominationes sunt per se quante, et secundum se non possunt parificari, modo bonitas habitus rei et malicia privatione rei capiunt suam magnitudinem ab extrinseco, sicut a prodessencia vel utilitate universi quam ponunt vel privant. Et ideo generaliter tam bona est res corruptibilis quam mala esset, cum paribus, eius privatio. Et isti termini *tam* et *quantum* dicunt parvitatem proportionum et non parvitatem illorum proporcionatorum secundum sua intrinseca; ac si diceretur: tante est magnitudo illius minorata quante est eius parvitas maiorata; vel econtra. Et sic de similitudine et dissimilitudine et cunctis similibus. Et si aliquis inferret ex illo exemplo quod magnitudo et parvitas parificentur, negatur; quia illa *tanta quanta* dicunt paritatem proporcionem solum et non paritatem magnitudinis et parvitatibus ab intrinseco.

but this does not prove that magnitude and smallness are equal.

Nota tamen quod dupliciter intelligitur inter aliqua esse similitudo vel conveniencia, et dissimilitudo vel disconveniencia: vel quo ad sua accidentalialia, vel quo ad sua essentialialia. Et utroque modo tripliciter, vel secundum speciem, et sic Sor et Plato sunt similes in humanitate et accidentaliter similes in albedine; vel generaliter, et sic homo et asinus sunt similes in animalitate et accidentaliter similes in colore; et analogice, sicut motus et color sunt similes in *esse*, et accidentaliter sunt similes in calefaciendo. Et correspondenter de dissimilitudine.

Tam and *quantum* indicate of proportion, not intrinsic equality.

Similarity and unlikeness are either in accidental or essential qualities; and either specific, generic, or analogous.

Unde patet quod impossibile est quidquid produci nisi a sibi simili. Nam quodlibet est simile cuilibet, ut homo melior est deo similior, proporcionem communiter dicta, fundata in similitudine analogica. Stat ergo infinitum dissimilem alicui in uno accidente esse, quantumvis sibi similem in alio. Ymmo stat illud quod non est simile alteri in genere vel in specie, sive substancialiter

Nothing can be produced except by its like; but likeness can be understood in many ways, and is not contrary to difference.

sive accidentaliter, esse quantumlibet sibi simile similitudine analoga. Ex quo patet quod simile et dissimile non sunt contrarie nec privative opposita. Nam duo summe calida sunt in caliditate simillima; ita quod sunt calida infinitum simillima, et tamen sunt finita 5 et ceteris accidentibus valde dissimilia. Similia ergo possibilia sunt supposita increata.

We say of help and hindrance what has been said of the useful and the useless; God, hindering one species from being another, does not properly hinder, but helps. Some say that everything is as much a hindrance as a help; but this is an abuse of terms.

De iuvamento vero et impedimento dicitur correspondenter sicut dictum est de utili et inutili; ut deus summe iuvat, nec potest impedire vel nocere. Impedit 10 tamen ne homo sit asinus, et ne mundus vel eius partes deficient; sed hoc non est impedire sed iuvare. Unde abutuntur terminis qui dicunt quod quodlibet tantum impedit sicut iuvat, et quodlibet equale cui libet, ut sicut iuvat ad hoc quod homo peccat, sic impedit 15 ne peccet. Ipsi autem dicunt quod omne impeditum est infinitum impeditum, et tantum adiutum, ut omne mobile impeditur ab infinito motu, ab infinita magnitudine, et sic de ceteris infinitis, et iuvatur ne idemptificetur cui libet; et sic de ceteris denominationibus 20 infinitis, unde, iuxta sic loquentes, deus tantum vel plus impediret hominem fieri quam potest iuvare, quia quodlibet impedit ne faciat infinita bona.

As the privation of a privation is not a privation, neither is to hinder from evil properly to hinder, nor is the magnitude of smallness anything but smallness. Hindrance may, therefore, be a thing positively good; and thus God may hinder some from attaining eternal happiness.

Dico ergo, sicut privacio privacionis non est privacio | sic impedire rem a malo non est impedire sed iuvare. B 70^b
Nec magnitudo parvitatatis est magnitudo, sed potius parvitas. *Impedire* tamen quandoque accipitur largius quam *obesse*, et *iuvare* quam *prodesse*; ut omne habens naturalem inclinacionem ad finem et prohibitum ab illo fine vel executione dicitur impeditum; et isto modo 30 grave impeditur a descensu, et leve ab ascensu. Sic autem loquendo de *impedire*, quod sonat in bonum et naturale, non est inconveniens deum impedire; et sic forte impediret aliquos eternaliter a sua beatitudine. Sed de limitibus huius impediti, et aliis huiusmodi 35 superficialiter solutis, sunt difficultates plurime; quas transeo, tam propter impedimentum ignorancie quam gracia brevitatis.

14. ðle after quodlibet B. 35. delñb9 B.

34 *Beatitudine*. This looks like a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the 'Presciti', or foreknown. If God prevents any from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to further the accomplishment of the Divine Plan of predestination.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Consequens est ad dicta superaddere in capitulo de
 comparativis sententiam de maximo et minimo. Voco
 autem propositionem comparacione yppothetica et nota
 5 comparandi denominatam, ut hec, *Sor est ita sapiens
 vel magis sapiens quam est Plato*; et sic de comparativa
 vera. Nam ista species yppothetice multum accedit, ut
 dictum est, ad condiciones kathergoricarum; cum idem
 sit dicere, *Sor est melior Platone* et *Sor est melior quam*
 10 *est Plato*, nec perfecte intelligitur altera pars sine coin-
 telleccione alterius partis. Ideo possunt dici tam quante
 quam quales, ut kathergorice. De expositione vero talium
 racione termini comparativi gradus, dictum est supe-
 rius, et quomodo refert dicere, *Sor fuit melior Platone*
 15 et *Sor fuit melior quam fuit Plato* vel *quam Plato iam*
est. Si enim *Sor fuit melior Platone* tunc *fuit ita quod*
Sor est melior illo, et econtra. Sed si *fuit melior quam*
fuit Plato, tunc *fuit melior quam unquam fuit Plato*.
 Nec requiritur quod simul fuerunt, sed requiritur quod
 20 aliquando fuit ita quod Sor est melior quam fuit Plato,
 vel quod est melior quam erit Plato, et ita [ad] dan-
 dum instans.

Comparativa ergo, sicut quecunque alia propositio,
 tunc est vera quando est signum primarium veritatis,
 25 et falsa quando deficit veritas quam primo significat.
 Supponatur ergo ex ante dictis quod nichil vere com-
 paratur alteri, nisi in aliquo communi univoco vel ana-
 logo, quod utrumque participat; et hoc sive sit essen-
 ciale comparatis sive accidentale. Patet quod omne sic
 30 comparatum alteri vel comparatur sibi secundum magis
 vel secundum minus; aut aliter secundum equalitatem,

Of comparative
hypothetical
propositions
and of maxima,
and minima.

The very
much resemble
categoricals.

The way of
expounding
them and
pointing out
their different
meanings, has
already been
shown.

The truth of
these
propositions
depends on
their
comparisons
being true.
Comparison
must be made
respecting some
other thing
common to
both, and
concerning
excess,
deficiency or

2. Blank space for initial C. 4. comparacionem yppotheticam B.
20. alη B.21. zil^o; ad deest B. 26. parte pro ante B.

7, 8. *Ut dictum est* See *Logica*, Vol. I, p. 30, l. 27—37.

equality of
that thing
which is
common.

et sic equale vel inequale, que proprie competunt
quantitati, transumuntur ad denominandum quemcun-
que excessum vel paritatem in quacunque denominatione
signanda.

Every power is
limited by the
utmost that is
possible to it;
and this is not
only true of
active power,
but of every
sort of
potentiality.

Et hinc dicitur quod quilibet potencia terminatur 5
affirmative vel negative maximo vel minimo in quod
potest, nec solum restringitur potencia ad potenciam
activam, que est accidens de 2^a specie qualitatis, sed
ampliatur ad omne *posse* logicum respectu cuiuscunque
denominacionis predicabilis, ymmo respectu cuiuscunque 10
entis possibilis, cuiusmodi sunt tales potencie cum suis
contentis: *posse* esse substanciam, *posse* esse quantum
discrete vel continue, *posse* esse quale, *posse* esse ad
aliquid, agens vel paciens; et sic de potenciis respectu
privacionum, potenciarum, pretericionum, futuricio- 15
num, et negacionum. Omnes ergo tales potencie pro-
cedunt a prima potencia, que sic est actus purus quod
sibi non inest potencia respectu sue denominacionis
absolute, nisi quam habet | necessario actualiter coeter-

All there
proceed from
the first active
power, which
is purely Act,
and the term
of Divine power
is the limit of
actual
possibility.

nam; et ideo, cum omne *posse* causati procedit ab illa 20
potencia que est actus, potest dici quod quilibet ter-
minus alicuius potencie terminat potenciam activam.

Thus we must
in every
proposition
presuppose the
power of the
First Entity.
Those who
sustain that a
negative
proposition
cannot be
absurd, put
logical
potentiality
before Divine
Power; at the
same time they
lose the
meaning of the
word.

Ex isto patet quod omnis potencia logica vel natu-
ralis presupponit potenciam primi actus. Si enim potest
esse quod nichil sit ab alia potencia, potest sic esse. 25
Aliter enim non quilibet affirmativa poneret significatum
sui verbi; sicut fantasiantur illi qui dicunt quod nulla
negativa includit repugnanciam. Ipsi enim preponunt
posse logicum *posse* dei; sed nesciunt exprimere quid-
ditatem illius potencie, sicut nec sciunt huius verbi 30
potest significacionem declarare.

God's being is
absolutely
necessary.
If God is
possible, He
exists.
But God's
existence is
possible;

Secundo patet quod absolute necessarium est deum
esse; eo quod, si aliqualiter potest esse, deus est; sed
absolute necessario aliqualiter potest esse; igitur etc.
Maior patet ex nota proxima; minor patet per deducens 35
ad impossibile. Si enim potest esse quod non aliqual-
liter potest [esse] tunc potest esse quod nichil potest
esse; et cum iuxta opinionem nichil potest esse

27. fantasiat B. 37. esse deest B.

19. From the beginning of f. 71^a there is another hand,
much more cramped than the former, up to f. 82^b. After which,
and until f. 122^b, there is again another.

impossibile, nisi claudans formaliter contradiccionem, sequitur quod potest claudere contradiccionem quod aliquid sit quod nichil simul est et non est; quod si homo est, animal est; et sic qualitercunque proposicio nata est significare. Et cum nichil potest claudere repugnanciam nisi quod claudit repugnanciam, sequitur quod claudit repugnanciam aliquid potest esse: quod est impossibile.

otherwise
nothing would
be self-
contradictory.

Tercio patet quod omnia citra deum que dicuntur posse, dicuntur posse a potencia aliena. Sicut enim homo potest vinci a potencia aliena, sic qualitercunque potest esse ipsum; vel suum antecedens potest esse a potencia prima. Actus enim principians est simpliciter prior potencia, sicut *esse* est naturaliter prius *posse*; cum omne *posse* sit *esse*. Patet ergo quod ad unam simplicem que est actus primus possibilis habet reduci quelibet alia potencia, cum quelibet talis sit causata.

All powers
below God
imply another
power that
gives them
movement
for act is
simply prior to
power, and all
powers have
their source
in Act.

Sed hic obicitur. Videtur enim quod potencia dei terminatur ad eundem terminum ad quem terminatur quelibet alia potencia, quia usque ad illum terminum potest deus cum tali potencia, et non ultra. Et sic non distingueretur *posse* dei absolutum a *posse* ordinato, sed omne potens tantum posset quantum posset cum cursu prime potencie et sic quodlibet foret cuilibet eque potens, quia vel ad eundem terminum terminaretur eius potencia usque ad quem deus posset cum illo et non ultro, vel aliter non terminaretur.

Objection. The
power of God
goes no further
than any other
power; thus
absolute and
ordinate power
are not distinct
in Him; every
power does all
it can with His
concurrence.

Ad illud dicitur quod potencie sunt distincte respectu dei secundum formalem distinccionem ab invicem et ab eius essentia; et quelibet talis potencia terminatur ad deum ut ad eius subiectum. Et preter hoc est dari extrinsecum in quod potest et non in aliud, cum tot *posse* sunt in deo quot res possunt causari ab eo; nec est tale *posse* alia essentia, sed veritas ponens deum esse, et tantum causatum causari ab eo. Nec est inconveniens deum deperdere quotlibet tales potencias per lapsum rei in preteritum quam impossibile est redire; sicut patet de motu, tempore, et multis aliis. Et in talem distinccionem dei incidunt qui verbaliter illud negant, dum ponunt quod aliqua deus potest a

Answer. There
are as many
powers in God
as there are
things able to
be caused; and
these powers
are formally
distinct from
each other and
from His
essence.
When a thing
becomes past,
God loses that
power, it is
true, but this
makes no
change in Him.

9. cñ dm B.

38. *Quam. Rem* understood.

potencia absoluta que non potest de potencia ordinata. Nec est inconueniens accidens eternum esse in deo, cum non dependat ab essencia extra ipsum. Nec est talis potencia activa, quia ipsa potest quicquid agere, sed quia ipsa denominat formaliter deum posse agere: 5 sicut virtus oculi visiva dicitur, et qualitates potencie active, quia per ipsas potest subiectum agere. Tales ergo potencias potest deus deperdere sed non acquirere, sed cum sint relaciones, habent possibilitates passivas ad quas dicuntur. Et, ut ego credo, prius est deum 10 posse in hoc, quam hoc posse fieri, non quoad consequenciam, sed quoad perfeccionem. Nec repugnat veritatem eternam que non est accidens obiective terminare accidens eternum in deo secundum rationem obiecti, esse quodammodo prius *posse* dei sibi relato. 15 Sic enim tam non potest facere deus me esse asinum quam non possum esse asinus, quam e contra.

Et si queretur quare deum posse agere est accidens et non rem posse agi ab illo, dicitur quod ideo quia de ratione accidentis est inherere subiecto quod pre- 20 supponit et determinat modo. Non dubium, conciliante alias veritates, quin deum posse producere B actu, sicut est veritas, sic est in deo, et denominat ipsum formaliter id posse; et cum idem accidens potest desinere esse per causacionem B actus, patet quod a divina 25 essencia quam presupponit. Sed B actum posse produci, quamvis sit in deo causaliter, non tamen denominat ipsum formaliter, nec per consequens aliquod aliud subiectum. Ideo non habet rationem accidentis. | B 71^b

Et, si dicatur quod auctores negant esse relaciones 30 in deo propter defectum fundamenti absoluti, dicitur quod communiter ponunt auctores relaciones rationem esse in deo, et non dicere mobilitatem subiecti, nec requirere accidens absolutum pro suo fundamento; et tales ponunt in predicacione modali esse illam primam 35 essenciam, quia nullam aliam ponunt. Sed non est dubium quin tales distinguuntur formaliter a subiecto, si aliqua distinguuntur. Et placet michi quod sint relaciones rationis. Modicam enim vel nullam realitatem ponunt alique relaciones preter realitatem sub- 40 iectorum. Et, si dicatur quod multe tales positive

An eternal accident may exist in God, if independent of all but Him. Thus active power merely expresses the fact that God can act thus and thus; like the visual power of the eye. And such power can be lost, but not acquired, by God. God's power of producing things is anterior to their potentiality of being produced. Why should this power be called an accident? Because it inheres in a subject and qualifies it. Active power does so formally; passive power does not, though it is also in God as in its cause. It has been denied that there are relations in God, on account of there being no foundation of such relations. But logical (not real) relations are generally admitted, which imply only the existence of the First Essence; and I am willing to grant that they are such.

superfluunt, cum nunquam procedunt in actum, dicitur quod non sequitur; sed videamus quid valet quod deus potest *hoc* producere (demonstrando unum quod nunquam produceretur). Ad hoc valet prima potentia; et sic facit multa bona, sicut privaciones et negaciones, cum omne *causare*, extendendo terminum, sit facere; nichil tamen agit proprie nisi essentia absoluta, cuiusmodi est substantia habens propriam inclinacionem naturalem, a qua procedit accio extrinseca, ut sepe dictum est, quod alienum est a quocunque accidente.

Dicitur igitur quod nec potentia dei nec alicuius alterius terminatur ad aliquod non existens. Ideo, si maxima quantitas quam possum habere non est, tunc nulla potentia terminatur ad ipsam. Si autem illa potest esse, tunc sicut ad illam possum maiorari, et non ultra. Sic unum *posse* dei usque ad illam potest me maiorare et non ultra. Et ad illum intelligentibus dicitur communiter huiusmodi potencias ad tales terminos terminari. Ad quam sensum concedendum est nullius potenciam terminari ad aliquid non inseparabiliter malum, quin potentia dei terminetur ad illud. Talia enim mala non sunt in deo, sicut nec causantur ab illo, sed sunt in rationibus eternis que causantur a deo.

Ulterius per distincionem potencie absolute a potencia ordinata est notandum quod illos terminos magistrales et consimiles diversi diversimode concipiunt. Aliqui enim large intelligunt, per potenciam absolutam, essenciam rei sub ratione qua absolute est potens, non considerando possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem termini in quem potest per alicuius posterioris ipsa potentia; et 2^m talem potenciam Filius dicitur producere alium Filium, infinitos modos, et ipsos infinicies annihilari. Ipse enim, ut prius dictum est, habet sufficientem potenciam ad omnia illa, si illa possent esse.

Et ad illum sensum dicunt auctores quod potentia absoluta potest multa facere que non possunt fieri: ut post lapsum operis mei, manente potentia eadem, sum ita potens sicut fui in principio; ideo non est defectus in potentia absoluta mei quod non possum

To say that a power that will never be exercised is superfluous, does not include these;

for the real agent is God's essence.

No power can have the non-existent for its term. If there is no maximum of quantity, nothing can produce it; if there is, it can increase so far and no farther, and God's power is limited by that maximum. Likewise, God's power extends to every act, however evil, if not inseparably so, by means of the eternal laws of things. *Absolute* and *ordinate* power have different significations; some understand by the first the essence of a being, as having power, distinct from that on which it has power.

In that sense it is said that God can do things that cannot be done: For instance it is impossible to do the same thing twice, yet the *power* to do is not gone.

16. dei B.
32. fig dr B.

26. mgrales B.
33. 1^m B.

27. coci^{nt} B.

31, 32. ip^o po^o B.

facere illud opus, sed impossibilitas est ex parte factibilis. Sicut non est defectus in visu meo quod non possum videre remotissimam arenam in oceano, sed ex impossibilitate proportionate applicationis; ideo potencia absoluta est potencia, sed deficit potencia respectiva que ponit, et agens posse facere productibile, et illud posse esse; et illud vocatur potencia ordinata.

Others say: All that can be done by God's ordinate, can also be done by His absolute power; and *vice versa*.

But I follow this opinion: that a past thing must have existed, and many things future do not exist.

The distinction between the two powers, though practically useful, would imply a power (*absolute*) that is never exercised unless with the other (*ordinate*).

And the loss of such power merely on account of the want of receptive power in the subject is no defect.

I grant that every being can act in so far as it is able with the concurrence of the First Cause.

In so far as God can give aid, in so far as it is possible to act.

How far? I do not know; but God knows.

Alii dicunt quod omne quod deus potest facere de potencia ordinata potest facere de potencia absoluta, et econtra, et solum que ordinavit fieri de potencia ordinata potest facere. Et ista via ponit omne quod fuit vel erit esse deo presens, et sic nullam potentiam a deo deperdibile; ut dicitur capitulo ultimo.

Hic tamen prosequor prius dicta quod rem preteritam impossibile est non fuisse, et quod multa erunt que non sunt; et sic de aliis que sunt magis famosa. Oportet enim gradatim ascendere in subtiliora. Quamvis autem illa distincio deservit pro auctoribus concordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens potest in aliud, nisi posset in ipsum de potencia ordinata. Illud patet ex hoc quod omnis potencia activa dicitur comparative ad potentiam causabilem; ut, si posset facere hoc, hoc posset fieri. Nec propter deperditionem potencie respectue materie potencie absoluta dicitur aliquid simpliciter minus potens, sicut nec Pater est potencior Filio, quamvis potest producere quod Filius non potest producere; eandem enim potentiam absolutam habet uterque, cum illa sit essentia communis trinitati. Quamvis ergo tertium suppositum non potest tantum producere sicut alterum priorum, est tamen *id quod* potest tantum producere.

Ulterius conceditur consequenter quod omne agens tantum potest, et usque ad tantum, sicut potest concursu vel iuvamine prime cause. Et sic, si deus potest facere me causare quodcunque opus ad quantumcunque intensivum gradum, et ego possum usque ad illum gradum in illud opus. Striccius tamen sumitur quandoque potencia pro sufficiencia quam potens habet; sicut dicitur puerum non posse in actus viriles antequam acquisiverit potentiam naturalem. Si vero queratur a me usque ad quantum potest talis potencia, deum contestor ego ignoro de quacunque, sed bene credo

quod est dare terminum quem deus satis noscit. Ideo damus nos per modum petitionis vel supposicionis termini talis potencie, quis, queso, non ignorat gradum magnitudinis, intensionis, vel alterius singularis accidentis subjecti? Nec est cura de talibus individuis corruptibilibus, cum non sit sciencia habitualis de illis ut de subiecto prime sciencie propter confusionem et rectitudinem. Ideo iubent populo quiescere a talibus et intendere utilibus.

10 Istis ergo premissis plus pro fundamento declaracionis materie quam pro fructu sciencie qui exinde patefecit pueris, videndum est quomodo regulariter ponendum est tales potencias terminari. Et quicquid moderni dixerint, videtur michi probabile 2^m sentencias antiquorum, 15 quod respectu cuiuscunque potencie terminabilis est dare cuiuscunque speciei denominacionis maximum in quod potest; ut est dare maximam quantitatem sub qua homo potest esse, maximum gradum quantitatis et cuiuscunque alterius accidentis sibi possibilis; et pro- 20 porcionaliter de aliis potenciis.

Et suppono quod ille terminus *maximum* dicat supremum vel excellentissimum in quod potest talis potencia. Probatur ex hoc regula: quelibet talis potencia dicitur esse maior, que cum similibus paribus in plus po- 25 test; sed cuiuscunque talis potencie est dare maximum gradum possibilem; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod quelibet talis potencia eo est magna quo in magnum potest; ergo est eo magis magna quo in magis magnum potest. Aliter enim non diceretur in qua proporcione est potencia que 30 precise in duplo plus potest quam A, maior quam A.

Sed hic dicitur quod non est dare quantum precise potest, et per idem non est dare precise duplicatam vel in quacunque proporcione rationali proporcionatam ad illam. Sed illud videtur michi nimis mirabile quod 35 data sit potencia finita et non sit dandus gradus magnitudinis sue. Aliter enim foret mirabiliter magnum, si nichil posset cognoscere quam magnum ipsum esset. Ymmo, per exponentes sequitur quod hoc est precise tam magnum sicut ipsa est; et per idem sequitur quod

The foregoing questions being elucidated we come to the main point, and affirm that every power is limited by a *maximum*: v. g. that there exists a maximum size possible for a man, &c.

The word *maximum* implying the highest stretch of possibility, we affirm this, because the more anything is able to do, the greater its power is said to be; and there is a *maximum* of anything that can be done.

It may be said that there is no precise limit to power, and therefore our proportion does not hold. But if the power is finite it is limited, and the limit is precise. The very meaning

7, 8. v'eti^m B. 8. pl^m B. 21. 1^m B. 26. et maximum gradum possibilem pro etc. B. 32. dupla^m B.

2. *Ideo*. To give this, sentence a reasonable sense, it would be necessary to supply too many words wanting. Perhaps *non* is superfluous. At any rate, the text is corrupt.

of the proposition proves that two things can be precisely equal; if not, there would be no equality, and if a power can be doubled or halved, it is exactly half its double and double its half.

illa potencia potest equari alteri, quod possibile est alteram et ipsam precise esse equales, cum contradiccionem includit equalia non esse precise equalia, eo quod qualitas consistit omnino indivisibili. Et per idem, si aliqua potest esse dupla vel subdupla, aut in quacunque alia proporcione ad illam, tunc stat quod aliquid sit precise duplum vel subduplum ad illam; nec magis quam duplum, nec minus quam duplum, est duplum. Ideo omne duplum ad aliud precise est duplum ad idem. Et sic invenies de quacunque proporcione rationali. Si enim millecuplum foret duplum ad suum submillecuplum, et per idem esset sesquialterum, et equale; et omne magnum esset sub quocunque gradu parvum, quo alia esset pars, esset parva: quod non est opinabile. 15

Every power is as great as the sum of its parts:

it can diminish to zero and increase again.

If the power of a given subject increases uniformly from a given instant to another until it is four times as great, then, when exactly half the time has elapsed, it must be exactly twice as great as at first.

Quelibet ergo talis potencia est precise dupla ad eius medietatem et quadrupla ad eius 4^{am} ; et sic de aliis proporcionibus. Et per idem sine dubio est precise tanta quantam eius partes ipsam constituunt. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod potencia, cum sit debilis, potest remitti ad non gradum, et iterum crescere; vel saltem subiectum potest intendi vel remitti in potencia. Pono ergo quod subiectum intendatur quousque fuerit in 4^{lo} magis potens; et sit A totum temporis per quod erit in duplo potencius quam est modo. Et sit B tantum temporis per quod erit minus quam in duplo quam est modo. Talia enim tempora sunt danda, cum iste propositiones sint primarie significantes; A est plus quam in duplo potencius quam fuit in F instanti, et A est minus quam in duplo potencius quam fuit in F instanti, manebunt vere in suis adequatis temporibus. Sit ergo C medium instans inter illa duo tempora, et patet B quod in C erit subiectum precise in duplo potencius quam est modo; quia, si excederet, tunc non esset datum tempus totum per quod subiectum erit plus quam in duplo potencius. Et per idem si deficeret a potencialitate dupla, non esset datum tempus totum per quod erit minus quam in duplo potencius. Nec potest dici quod illa tempora non erunt immediata, quia tunc esset dare medium inter contradictoria. Relinquitur ergo quod pro C instanti erit precise in duplo potencius quam est modo. 20
25
30
35

Dicitur quod forte est dare quanta est quecumque potencia, sed non est dare quante potest. Sed contra, illud est primo illud quod superius tangitur, quod potencia non dicitur magna quo ad molem, sed eo maior potencia quo plus potest. Sic enim dicit potencia relationem ad suum potenciale, iuxta dicta. Cum ergo potencia capit suam magnitudinem per comparacionem ad potenciale et non nisi ad maximum, sequitur quod tunc, data magnitudine respective potencie, dandum esset maximum *posse*. Ymmo illud *posse* est illa potencia.

Similiter, cum *posse* plus vel minus sit denominacio consistens in latitudine, est dare gradus et proporcionem in illa latitudine. Et per consequens est dare unum quod precise tantum potest sicut illa potencia, unum quod precise in duplo plus; et sic de quacunque proporcione: et stant rationes superius facte. Ut ponatur quod A sit in quadruplo plus potens quam B et remittatur quousque precise tantum possit sicut B; et sit C tempus maximum per quod poterit in duplo plus quam B et D tempus per quod non poterit in duplo plus quam B; patet quod in medio instant inter illa precise in duplo plus poterit A quam B. Et patet iuxta superius arguta, cum non sit latitudinem dare subito acquisitam vel deperditam, quod in medio instanti precise poterit in duplo plus A quam B. Sed, iuxta opinionem adversam, est dare potencias indefectibiles, respectu quarum est dare maximum in quem possunt.

Et cum infinitum modica sunt, sit aliqua potencia talis: sequitur quod est dare potenciam defectibilem et potenciam indefectibilem equales. Ergo sic ut est dare maximum in quod potest prima, sic et de reliqua. Non enim est possibile quod, duarum potenciarum equalium quo ad *posse*, una plus potest quam reliqua. Nec valet dicere illas potencias esse incomparabiles propter differenciam corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis, quia talia sunt propriissime comparabilia: ut patet de qualitatibus et quantitatibus eiusdem speciei sic differentibus, et patet de quantitate partis celi et quantitate hominis, que sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen differunt corruptibilitate et incorruptibilitate. Nec

If it be objected that every power has its magnitude, but no maximum of possible effect, we remark that, powers having no dimensions, their magnitude and that maximum are identical.

Again, to be more or less able, implies a certain *breadth* of power; if so, there are degrees in that breadth and it may be exactly the double &c. of another. If A, four times as powerful as B, loses its power uniformly until both are equal, then when exactly half the time is past, $A = 2B$.

It is admitted by all that certain forces do attain their utmost limit; but there are other forces that are equal to them, being in the same genus, though perhaps differing by incorruptibility, present or absent, which makes no difference;

nor does the length of time

3. \widehat{ca} B. 26. $\widehat{indebilis}$ B. 28. \widehat{illis} B. 29. $\widehat{debilem}$ B.
 30. $\widehat{indebilem}$ B. 36. $\widehat{ppigisse}$.

during which they are active, make them to differ.

capiunt potencie suam magnitudinem a diuturnitate temporum per que possunt esse, quia potencia non consistit in sucessionem, quia tunc quelibet defectibilis foret infinitum minor [in] defectibili, cum tamen aliud sit posse ad diuturnitatem et aliud posse quo ad maioritatem causabilem.

Nor can we call a negative limit a limit properly; what cannot be done is not the limit of what can.

A stone that is too heavy to be carried by me is no more the limit of my strength than any greater weight, unless it be — which can never be known — the least weight I cannot carry: The proposition is therefore proved.

Similiter, per deducens ad impossibile, patet quod non est dare terminum negativum, ut communiter signatur; quia si terminus temporis est, tunc non potest esse ad terminandum potenciam, cum illa potencia non potest in illud quo non plus illud est finis termini illius quam quodlibet aliud. Ut, si non possum ferre A lapidem, que ratio quare ille plus terminat potenciam meam quam quodlibet reliquum quod non possum portare? Non enim illud potest esse signum noscendi magnitudinem potencie mee, quia nemo potest cognoscere quod illud sit minimum quod non possum, cum non possum tantum nisi sicut possum. Exponentes enim talium negativarum sine putacii sunt impossibiles. Sequitur ergo quod proporcionaliter ut potencie ad potencias, sic posse potenciarum habent se ad invicem; illud patebit particularius in processu.

Objections:
1. This theory would destroy all difference between active and passive power.

Sed contra illud arguitur primo: Aut sequitur quamlibet potenciam esse activam, cum passiva potencia differt ab activa in hoc, eo quod activa eo ipso quod potest in maius potest in minus, et potencia passiva econtra eo ipso | quo potest in minus potest in maius. Sed vix 2^m illam viam est dare maximum in quod quecunque potencia potest.

2. It would make all power — even God's omnipotence — to be limited by some extraneous bounds.

Similiter, quantumcunque potencia debilis proporcionatur passo, potest melius proporcionari ab extrinseco; ergo nec est dare per maximam potenciam resistivam in quam potest, nec maximum gradum accionis possibilis. Sic enim ex proporcione equalitatis proveniret motus, vel accio; vel aliter unum excedit aliud per indivisibile, et deus terminaretur maximo iuvamento quo posset iuvare agens.

3. If a given power can carry a maximum of weight for a

Similiter, cum facilius sit difficillimum facere parem per minus tempus quam per maius tempus, sequitur

4. in *deest* B. 5. a¹¹⁵ B. 19. putac³ B.

28. *Maius*. There is probably a sentence missing in this paragraph, somewhere about this place.

quod si potencia debilis facit difficultatem per A tempus, per partem illius temporis posset facere maiorem. Ymmo potencia minor sufficeret ferre tantam difficultatem per tempus minus, et illud communiter tangitur
 5 deportacione. Et per idem non est dare maximum temporis per quod corruptibile sufficit durare; et sic universaliter de omni accione quam debile sufficit ferre.

certain times, it could carry double that weight during half that time, the quadruple during the quarter &c.; so there is no *maximum*.

Similiter non est dare maximam quantitatem sub
 10 qua potest esse homo, sicut nec maximam parvitatem sub qua potest esse: ergo regula falsa. Antecedens patet ex hoc quod, signatis 2^{bus} hominibus, quorum unus sit maximus possibilis, et alius minimus possibilis, neuter sufficeret ferre aliquam lesionem, cum maior
 15 propter quamlibet tusionem, ab ictu vel punccione desineret esse; et minor propter quamlibet ablacionem partis superflue corrumpetur; et sic esset dare ultimum instans hominis et in infinitum debilem hominem.

4. The biggest or smallest man possible is impossible; the first could not receive a *blow*, nor could the second lose any part of himself, without ceasing to be a man.

Similiter non est dare maximam multitudinem
 20 habituum quos quis simul potest habere; quia Sor habens illos ipse, esset habilior ad ulterius descendendum. Aliter enim impediret plenitudo sciencie Sortem ad quidquid discendum a sensu; et sic esset habitus de infinitum facili mobilis. Et idem argumentatur de cumulo
 25 mixtorum que possunt per homines congregari, de gradu et de multitudine caliditatis vel frigiditatis, quos potest homo simul habere. Videtur enim quod, sicut non est dare difficillimam penam quod potest tollerari, sic nec in maximum gradum quantitatum nocivarum.

5. There is no maximum v. g. in learning; the more one learns, the more one becomes able to learn.

Similiter de potenciis passivis, videtur quod non sit
 30 dare minimum quod data virtus sufficit videre; tum quia infinitum modicum sufficit cum alio confuse videre, tum quia, visu vidente illud, possunt 8 circumstancie concurrentes ad visionem vel aliqua illarum meliorari,
 35 et per consequens videns sufficeret minus videre. Ymmo, cum non sit dare remississimum gradum visionis, nec acutissimum pyramidem radialis, sequitur quod minus visibile sufficeret videns confusius et sub apparencia minoris quantitatis videre aliquod visibile. Tales quot
 40 libet evidencie se offerunt deducendas in quibus materie difficiles possunt introduci.

6. So also of passive powers: a minimum visible is absurd. We see (confusedly) even the infinitely small.

General Answer: Not only is there a most perfect substance of all, but every substance is as perfect as it can be; there is a maximum in the possible number of points in any continuous body; also a limit to the velocity of movement, action and passion; to the number of possible men, &c.

Ad illud dicitur sicut prius, tenendo generaliter partem affirmativam in talibus dimensionibus, ut est dare perfectissimam substanciam que potest esse, sicut et quelibet substantia est tam perfecta essentialiter sicut potest esse; et sic est dare maximam multitudinem 5 punctorum et punctualium que possunt esse, sicut patet de punctis mundi et maximam quamlibet continuitatem que potest esse; ut patet de corporeitate, de loco, et de duracione mundi. Est eciam dare velocissimum motum, accionem et passionem, que possunt esse; et sic 10 generaliter de omnibus aliis, tam simpliciter quam respectu speciei. Est enim dare maximam multitudinem hominum qui possunt, simul vel successive, esse; et sic de aliis speciebus; quia, signata minima multitudine hominum possibilium que non potest esse, patet quod 15 auferendo unitatem ab illa multitudine foret residuus numerus maximus sub quo homo posset esse. Et sic generaliter, cum omne continuum sit compositum ex non quantis, dato numero negativo, patet quod, auferendo ab illo vel vel addendo ad illud unum indivisibile, foret 20 residuum maximum vel minimum respectu talis potencie.

Confutation of objections:
1. Every power must be active, in so far as ease of dissolubility is impotence, not power in the form that disappears.

The potentiality of primordial matter is only extrinsically passive; and as it cannot receive one form while it has another, its power has a maximum — the maximum of the form that it can receive.

Ad primum dicitur quod impossibile est signare rem absolutam quin sit potencie active, nam posse faciliter vinci vel corrumpi non attestatur super magnitudine 25 potencie, sed super impotencia minoris potencie; quia aliter ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna foret potencia, et infinitum minoris potencie cuiuscunque corruptibilis pars, quam ipsum totum; sicut communiter argumentatur quod omne | corpus sit infinitum potens B 73^b ratione materie sue prime, que videtur infinitum potens passive; quia infinitum passivior quam forma vel compositum. Potencia ergo materie prime est potencia passiva denominatione extrinseca, et est finita, cum terminatur ad maximum in quod potest; quia capacitate 35 eius repleta, sive forma substanciali sive forma accidentalit, non potest ulterius recipere formam illius rationis, stante illa, quia recipiens oportet denudari a natura rei recepte. Unde, si aliquod subiectum haberet secundum ultimum sue capacitatis formam innatam, non 40 reciperet super illam formam eiusdem rationis.

3. fa^m = figuram? B.19. $\widehat{m}b^o$ ne^o B.

34. infinita B.

Et hinc est quod intellectus non habet species innatas eiusdem rationis cum speciebus quas recipit. Nec materia prima formas substantiales, nec primum organum sensus recipit species ducentes in distinctam noticiam qualitatis sensus conformis gradus cum gradu quantitatis sui organi; sicut supposuerunt philosophi tanquam per se notum. Sicut enim subiectum habens 2^m ultimum sue capacitatis formam quamcunque, non recipit super illa novam consimilis rationis; sic subiectum cognitum, i. e. animal secundum partem corpoream non gignit distinctam noticiam per receptionem similitudinis ab aliquo simillimo, sed confunditur noticia sensus per notabilem fixationem speciei in suo primo organo extranei accidentis.

15 Prima pars patet de ratione, cum recipiens formam ulteriorem non habuit capacitatem prius saciatam; et 2^a pars patet experimento, quo scimus visum non noscere dyaphanum quale est in xpo elayde, que est primum subiectum visus; nec auditu sonus percipitur in 20 crystallo connaturalis aëris in miringa; nec olfactu, gustu, vel tactu qualitatis connaturalis primi sui subiecti: ut tactu non percipitur distincte qualitas sub illo gradu sub quo est organum sensus tactus. Sensus autem interiores sunt multiplicata per organa spiritualia, quia 25 per sensus alentes, et tamen non illis distincte cognoscuntur quantitates sui organi. Et 3^a pars patet ex hoc quod intritus vel habens fortem impressionem visibilis, confuse iudicat de aliis visibilibus; habens tinnitum auris, vel forte sonum extraneum, permixtim discernit de 30 aliis: et sic de habente fetorem narium, de ethico, de habente gustum infectum (ut febricitantes); de ethico non percipiente propriam inanicionem propter calorem occupantem diutine nervos tactus; et conformiter stupe- 35 scunt sensus propter fortem sensibilis extranei impressionem. Ymmo ymaginativa in sompnis movetur ad apprehendendum secundum impressionem humoris complexionati; ut melancolici sompnant de nigris; et sic de aliis, sine hoc quod species primo recepte sint in sensu

Digression on the forms received by intellect and sense; if either had any 'innate' forms, they would be incapable of receiving any others.

Sense impressions become confused when the organs are very strongly impressed in one particular way.

Both reason and experiment teach us this.

The first subject of vision, hearing &c. must be quite free from any quality perceptible by those senses.

If not, both sight, hearing, taste feeling and smell are apt to judge wrongly of their impressions.

10. âl B. 12. gfu^r B. 18. xo *above* xpo B. 24. sp^ualia B.

25. alēs B. 27. itr^rtus B. 32. ianico B. 36, 37. coplexiōti B.

18. *Xpo elayde*. Of *xpo* I can make nothing; but *elayde* seems to stand for *hyaloide*, the vitreous humour; which would very well agree with the sense.

This proves that intellect, which perceives all beings distinctly, has no organ; and that wherever there is a receptive faculty there is a maximum of reception, both as to number and intensity of the forms received. Return to the main subject: the distinction between active and passive power is at fault. Whether active or passive, the power is in any case a *form*. The stronger a man is the more work he can suffer. Sight is active and passive at once. The essence of these powers is identical, but the point of view from which they are considered is different. And as a fact, the world is the maximum of our sight, and also of our power of producing change.

There must be some limit — though unknown to us — to the aid given to the power of any creature. Whether, v. g. pigs can fly miraculously, is but a small thing;

particulari. Et per illam consideracionem probatur intellectus cuiuslibet entis distincte perceptivus non esse organicus. In quibus omnibus patet quod, data capacitate, danda est maxima multitudo forme quoad partes quantitativas et quoad diversas species; maxima eciam ⁵ intensio et maxima diurnitas temporis per quod materia prima potest taliter transmutari. Ideo materia est omnimode potencie finite. Sed non obest partem plus esse passivam suo toto.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, dicitur quod non bene ¹⁰ distinguitur potencia activa a potencia passiva per differenciam recitatam. Sed potencia activa est forma qua substantia est formaliter activa. Et potencia passiva est forma qua substantia est formaliter passiva. Et talis vocatur habitudo ad agendum vel paciendum. Nota ¹⁵ tamen quod in omni obiecto quo substantia est possibilis, potest agere et econtra; ut fortis homo potest plus pati laborando quam datus debilior, et idem homo qui potest oculo plus diaphano recipere speciem visibilis potest plus active videre ipsum idem. Virtus enim visiva ²⁰ est tam activa quam passiva, sicut materia prima habet accionem manentem; rationes autem illarum potencia- rum, sicut et ipse potencie, formaliter et abstractive intellecte, distinguuntur, quamvis essentia sit eadem: multe ergo sunt potencie active que, si possunt in ²⁵ minus possunt in maius, ut potencia videndi, potencia transmutandi; et sic de multis similibus. Est enim dare maximum quod quis potest videre, ut patet de mundo; et maximum quod alteratum potest alterare | ut mun- ^{B 74^a} dum vel eius materiam ^{2^m} partem. Est eciam dare poten- ³⁰ ciam passivam que, si potest in maius, potest in minus; ut potencia portandi, potencia recipiendi, et sic de multis aliis. Non ergo in hoc dicuntur potencie supra dicte.

Ad ^{2^m} dicitur quod est dare optimam applicationem possibilium, et maximum iuvamen possibile ab extrin- ³⁵ seco, quod nobis vanum est venari sive supponere. Utrum autem possibile sit porcos volare, muscas arare, et plumbum natate, cum iuvamine extrinseco, [est] alterius negocii. Talia enim creduntur deo valde possibilia ^{2^m} acciones quas nostri vocant miracula. Non ⁴⁰ tamen potest [facere] lapidem posse intelligere vel

12. ⁿdm B.
38. est *deest* B.

16. ab^{to} B.
41. facere *deest* B.

27. trns^{di} B.

37. *suppoc* B.

sentire: et sic de accionibus appropriatis speciebus. Suspendere tamen nisum gravis ad inferius vel levis ad superius; vel iuvare nisum porci plumbati ad volandum in aere, vel musce trahentis quodlibet trahibile videtur deo satis facile. Nullum tamen istorum sufficit in ista de sui natura; sed si deus potest ista iuvare ad talia, tunc est dare maximum gradum iuvaminis deo possibilem et maximum gradum motus vel accionis cum tali concursu dei. Nec est ymaginandum quod una pars accionis tribuatur deo et alia pars intensiva vel extensiva agentis; sed tota accio tribuenda est utrique, cum nullum tale agens 2^m potest sine deo iuvante et agente communiter totam accionem, quidquid agere.

Nec sequitur ex isto quodlibet esse tante potencie sicut aliud, etsi possit cum deo iuvante tantum agere, quia non habet in se tantam potenciam vel sufficienciam ad sic agendum, sed hoc potest potencia activa. Essentialiter tamen quantum potest quicquid cum iuvante, tantum potest. Et si ampliatur potencia ad posse logicum, tunc conceditur quod tantam potenciam habet quodlibet tale agens sicut aliquod, sed non est ita sufficiens nec ita activum vel passivum, quia isti termini dicunt dispositionem actualem potentis. Unde deus concurrens miraculose cum tali agente 2^o infundit sibi potenciam, quia aliter non ageret totam accionem. Ideo creditur non esse possibile deum sic insoliter agere, nisi adaugeat potenciam cause cum qua concurrat. Non enim potest concurrere ex equo ut unus homo iuvat alium sine augmentatione sue potencie; et credere quod talis potencie sit absolutum quod per se esse potest, quamvis sit qualitas, non est sani capitis.

Ulterius dicitur quod stat unum excedere aliud minima proporcione maioris inequalitatis; et per consequens minus habet se ad maius in maxima proporcione minoris inequalitatis. Est ergo dare motum velocissimum possibilem, ut motum equivocalem, vel cuiuscunque quod in quolibet [instanti] oppositi motus acquirat unum indivisibile materie motus 2^m eius indivisibile. Et quando supponitur motum [in] infinitum velocitari ex subtiliacione

on the other hand, God could not make a stone think.

We admit miraculous aid; but there must be a limit even to that.

In every action, both the First cause and the second causes work together.

This does not prove that all things have equal natural power; for God, making one being to do more than it can do naturally, gives it an augmentation of power.

If we mean by 'power' mere absolute possibility, one may have as much as another; but this is not the proper signification of the word. And thus, for one being, to equal another in act, its power must be increased by the help of God.

There is both a greatest and a least possible inequality between two things; and consequently the most rapid movement possible, sudden or

18. quod quantum B. 19. 20. 10^e B. 28. bonus B. 31. q^o B.

36. eq^o voc^o B. 37. instanti *deest*. 38. me B. 39. in *deest*;
ib. velo^o B.

infinitely rapid movement is either not properly a magnitude, or is impossible; as in the case of movement *in vacuo*, in which there would be a successive change of place, but rapid in the highest possible degree. If it be asked what cause could produce such a movement, it is to be answered that there would be present only the aptitude of the motive power. In movements that are violent, the cause is a proportion of greater or less inequality between the activity of the motor and the resistance of the thing moved; and the greater the inequality, the more considerable the movement is. But there are also natural movements, in which the thing moved does not resist, but the influence of the motor may be greater or less: as in the movement of the heavens. But it is often impossible to say by how much such an

cione medii, vel capitur hoc ex dicto, sicut fecit Aristoteles, vel supponitur impossibile, gracia argumenti. Potest enim aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca, sed nullum tale subitum est magnum, sic nec aliquod indivisibile est quantum. Posito ergo 5 *in vacuo*, per summum impossibile, simpliciter mobilietur successivo motu in illo motu naturalissimo 2^m ultimum sui appetitus, pro quolibet instanti acquirendo quolibet eius indivisibili situm indivisibilem.

Et si ponitur partes eius laterales non resistere toti 10 (sicut tamen communiter ponitur, propter appetitus earum per lineam rectam brevissimam); et si queritur de proporcionē ex qua talis motus causaretur; dicitur quod proporcio ex qua talis motus causatur non est nisi ydoneitas vel sufficiencia moventis ad movendum 15 mobile. Unde in motibus quodammodo violentis vocatur proporcio maioris inequalitatis, maior ydoneitas moventis ad motum quam est resistive ad impediendum. Unde, quamvis minus potens agat in magis potens, propter bonitatem applicacionis, propter iuvamentum 20 extrinsecum, vel propter difformitatem passi, potencia-rum, aut aliam talem causam, non tamen ex proporcionē minoris inequalitatis | provenit motus, sed ex propor- B 74^b cione maioris inequalitatis, que est maioris sufficiencie moventis ad movendum quam est resistencie ad resi- 25 stendum.

Alii autem sunt motus pure naturales, qui causantur ex proporcionē maioris inequalitatis, que est dominium moventis super motum, sine eius reclamacione vel prohibicione. Taliter enim proporcionatur motor celorum 30 ad quascunque partes eorum motas; et taliter proporcionatur anima corpori. Sed in multis proporcionibus istis non est dare excedens et excessum; sicut in proporcionibus quantitatum. Nec sunt ille proporciones racionales; ideo non abutitur terminis qui vocat 35

1. ca^r B.
34. qu^m B.

19. motum B.

21, 22. poz^r B.

28. dm^m B.

1. *Velocitari*. Aristotle demonstrates as follows the non-existence of a vacuum: If the resistance of the medium in which a given body moves is halved, quartered, &c. the velocity must be doubled, quadrupled, and so on: thus a vacuum being absolutely unresisting, movement would be infinitely rapid.

proporciones (quas motus consequitur) nec proporciones maioris inequalitatis nec proporciones minoris inequalitatis. Sed una proporcio est 2^{la} vel quomodolibet magna ad aliam, sine hoc quod ista proporcio data proprie comparantur. Quis, queso, scit signare proporcio-
 5 2^{lam} maioris orbis ad eius partem, vel fundare illam proporcio-
 nem in fundamento debito? Unde est ordinatum quod intelligencia proporcio-
 netur uni parti orbis ad movendum illam certo gradu motus? quem ex suppo-
 10 sitione mensuramus termino numerali, ut 2 vel ut 4. Sed quod illa proporcio sit 2^a vel alia numeralis, non est docibile.

Ulterius, pro ultimo verbo nota quod solum loquimur pro presenti de iuvamento quod deus potest naturaliter
 15 vel ordinate 2^m possibilitatem cursus naturalis facere, et non de illo quod deus potest facere de potencia absoluta. Sed revera illud verbum non solvit, cum quicquid deus potest facere cum agente 2^o, potest facere de communi cursu nature, et de naturalitate agentis 2ⁱ.
 20 Ymmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de potencia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potencia ordinata; quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest ipse ordinare potenciam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stultissimum est verbum modernorum quo dicitur deum
 25 non posse de lege vel potencia ordinata talia facere; quia si intelligunt quod repugnat isti ordinationi et legi qua deus voluit eternaliter universitatem ordinare, certum est illi legi vel ordinationi [repugnare] quod [ne] quicquam boni fiat preter illud quod fit vel fiet, cum
 30 eternaliter ordinavit quod solum ista vel aliqua illorum fient. Et si intelligunt de parte legis ordinate, illa esset explicanda, sicut repugnancia illius ad illud quod deus potest facere. Et non assignabitur repugnancia; quia talem contingit assignare inter aliam partem ordinationis
 35 dei et potenciam cuiuscunque preter illud quod de facto erit. Dicendum ergo est de talibus, utrum potencia eorum repugnat ordinationi dei vel non. Si ergo loquimur de potencia que potest esse ordinata, a qua talia possunt fieri, tunc certum est quod nichil potest facere
 40 nisi de potencia ordinata.

influence may be greater or less; and so these proportions might even be said to be neither of greater nor of less inequality. We can indeed suppose, but not prove, that a greater orb has influence on the movement of a smaller, as 2 to 1. The present question concerns the aid that God gives naturally and ordinately to His creatures, not that which he can absolutely give. But there is no real distinction between absolute and ordinate power. If God can work a given miracle absolutely, there then can be an ordinate power for the miracle to be wrought. To say that such and such an act is against God's ordinate power, either means that it is contrary to the eternal law of what is and will be; or that it is opposed to something that God can do: in the first case the act is impossible: in the second, no such opposition can be proved. So God can do nothing but by His ordinate power.

8. mt^{ela} pporoci^o B.
 ne deest B.

17. rena' B.

28. repugnare deest; ib.

Speaking, therefore, of this latter power, there must be a maximum limit to it. For if there is a limit to causability, there must also be a limit to causing power; and, therefore, there is a maximum in both cases. If God was indefinitely able to create, we should have to admit an infinite vacuum, because beyond the limits of this world, God could create still. This vacuum would be necessary, and more able to receive bodies than God to produce them; unless we suppose that God could create a world as large as this vacuum; it would again be coeternal with God, not to be annihilated or changed in any way. And God could not accelerate to an infinite degree the speed of the world; because all movement supposes a new accident (of position) successively gained and lost; but here there would be no succession at all.

Supposito ergo quod loquamur de *posse* dei relativo, ponente possibilitatem factibilis, tunc videtur valde inconsonum quod non sit dare quam causativus sit deus alicuius causabilis. Posita enim sua causabilitate, oportet ponere causabilitatem causabilis sibi parem; quibus ⁵ datis, oportet dare maximum in quacunque specie productionis quod deus potest producere; sicut patet ex superius deductis. Nam causativitas est eo maior quo plus potest; ergo, data maxima causativitate vel causabilitate, est dare quante ad maximum deus potest active ¹⁰ causare, et quante causabile potest passive causari.

Similiter, si cuiuslibet speciei effectus sit deus infinitum causativus, tunc necessario est vacuum undique infinitum; quia si versus aliquam differentiam terminaretur, tunc extra eius terminum deus posset producere ¹⁵ mundum, cum non posset producere mundum nisi in vacuo. Sequitur: si vacuum potest esse, necessario est vacuum undique infinitum. Et quod illud sit passive susceptivum corporis plus quam deus est productivus caret omni apparencia. Si ergo ipsum potest suscipere ²⁰ tantum corpus sicut ipsum est, tunc deus potest producere tantum corpus. Sed non dabitur quod ipsum est tante susceptivum quante est, nec quod [pars] suscipiens sua sit per totum tanta precise quantum est totum, nisi ipsum possit suscipere precise tantum corpus quan- ²⁵ tum est ipsum terminis.

Similiter, cum illud vacuum sit a deo, et tam utile sibi quod non posset producere mundum sine illo dato, patet quod est necessario coeternum, sic quod deus non posset ipsum annihilare, vel unam partem eius ³⁰ cum alia coextendere. Si enim posset, tunc non requiritur vacuum recipiens rem corpoream, | ut dicitur, et ^{B 75^a} tunc sine dubio deus non infinitum velociter posset movere mundum versus occidens, ut communiter conceditur quod omnis motus successivus ponit formaliter ali- ³⁵ quod accidens aquisitionum mobili, et aliquod deperditum; quia aliter non est fingenda causa quare mundus tam infinitum velociter movetur versus omnem differentiam,

12. effcus B.

23. pars deest B.

26. t^o B.36. acci^o B.

38. dram B.

19. *Plus quam.* Because the vacuum would be actually infinite; and God, however able to create new worlds, would never fill it up successively.

eo quod nullum ens foret aquisitum mundo, si de possibili sic moveretur, quia iam acquiritur; et sic deperdito.

Ponendo ergo vacuum, ut nostri sentiunt, oportet 5 ponere ipsum esse ens positivum, specificans motum et eius accidentia. Si ergo vacuum sit tante permanencie et necessitatis, patet ex ratione substancie quod esset substantia, eciam ordinata valde. Sed quomodo hoc, si, infinitum multas et magnas partes eius auferendo, 10 residuum sufficeret? ideo est servitium ad quod totum deservit. Frustratorium ergo esset vacuum ad omne eius punctum, et huic sine dubio non esset a deo bono conservatum.

Similiter, iuxta modernos ponentes potenciam terminari 15 exclusive ad infinitum quod non potest deus, non tantum potest producere quantum potest, cum non potest cognoscere quantum potest producere, et per consequens non potest cognoscere quam potens precise ad quidquam producendum sit, et per consequens est plus 20 causativus vacui quam substancie corporee, et sic non omnium specierum est eque causativus. Causat enim vacuum, et contradiccionem claudit quod tante esset corpus, cum exclusive et non inclusive usque ad tantum potest causari corpus. Potencia ergo qua deus 25 causat vacuum per indivisibile excedit producibilitatem corporis. Vel aliter sequitur quod due sunt concausantes eiusdem rationis, et una earum non potest tantum causare sicut reliqua, cum tamen ille potencie dicuntur pares, quia illis paria possunt causare. Corpus ergo 30 per indivisibile excessum a vacuo foret maximum in quod deus posset.

Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod unum infinitum sit reliquo maius; quia rectificaret deus lineam girativam (cum sit secundum se totam rectificabilis) et pre- 35 tendat ipsam in infinitum versus oriens, servando a puncto continue fixo Oxonie; quo facto, pono quod in qualibet parte porporcionali illius hore deus protrahat A, totam lineam, versus occidentem, et devento ad finem hore noto lineam terminatam ad situm Oxonie, 40 ubi finit A punctus in principio, et signo illam per AB, sive fuerit finita ad reliquum extremum linee girative, sive non. Circumducat ergo deus AB lineam, fixo B

To posit a vacuum is to posit it as a real being, nay as a substance; and yet it is useless; for no one part of it is necessary.

The moderns admit that God can do all things, except create what is infinite; then God can do more than He is able; since He is not able to know all the objects to which His power extends; and at any rate He would conserve vacuum in being, rather than substance.

And the maximum of God's creation would be a body infinitely small, surrounded by an infinite vacuum. One infinite would be greater than another. Example to demonstrate this.

If, one end A of an infinite line AB being in Oxford, God was to make the whole line turn on B,

we should have an infinite circle surrounded by a vacuum, the circle could generate an infinite sphere; other volumes could be inscribed or circumscribed; all which are impossible things.

puncto, et patet quod in vacuo causabitur circulus infinitus, quo circumducto super polos, et axe quiescente, causabitur spera infinita; et per idem contingit inscribere vel circumscribere quadratum et habebitur quecumque figura superficialis vel corporea infinita in vacuo: quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis. Patet ergo quod [ad] nullum tale est deus infinitum [potens], cum ipse cognoscit ubi sit quilibet eius punctus et quante pedale confert ad eius magnitudinem; et sic per consequens in qua proporcione se habet ad pedale, et ad quamcunque eius partem, proporcionalem: et per idem deus scit ubi terminabatur A linea in principio versus oriens; quia aliter, circumducendo A, stante extremo eius fixo et circumducendo B lineam infinitam versus oriens excessam ab A per pedale, sic quod tam B quam A fiat infinita versus occidens, foret B maius quam B per pedale sine alterius maioracione vel minoracione: et sic de infinitis quorum primum excedatur a B per pedale, 2^m per 4rupedale, et sic in infinitum.

Refutation of certain weak answers to this difficulty.

1. Denies that that the Infinite is not great, because it is not small. But in this case it would really be smaller than a part of the infinite vacuum; besides, the idea of quantity includes that of magnitude.

2. Considers each proportional part of such a line as equal to the whole; but there can be no proportion between equals.

Thus an infinite line must have a half, a quarter, an eighth, &c.

Hic sunt responsiones inutiles. Prima dicit quod tale quantum infinitum magnam, partem habet, sed ipsum non est magnum quia non est parvum. Sed hic non valet, tum quia est minus parte vacui infiniti, tum etiam quia ad esse quantum sequitur omne magnum sive immensum, ut videtur de vacuo sive finite magnum, sicut est de linea girativa. Quid, queso, componerent magnitudines parcium A linee, nisi magnitudinem? cum pars, ut huius[modi], requirit suum totum.

Secunda responsio dicit quod quelibet pars proportionalis linee A est ita magna sicut A. Sed contra illud est descriptio proporcionis multiplicis que non potest esse inter equalia. A ergo habebit se ad eius medietatem, 4^{am}, 8^{am}; et sic in infinitum in proporcionibus multiplicibus correspondet. Aliter enim non fieret alia pars finita ipsius ad eius quantitatem, nec per consequens ad eius esse. Cum enim tantum sit residuum sicut est hoc totum, quomodo habet hoc totum esse sic magnum ab ista parte? Ymmo, aggregatis infinitis partibus in A et totidem in B, sic quod prima in A

2. axem quiescentem B. 4. 4^m B. 7. ad *deest*; ib. potens *deest*.
 26. $\widehat{m}f\widehat{u}$ B. 29. modi *deest*. 32. *mul*p B. 35. a^a *pro* alia B.
 38. $\frac{2}{3}$ B.

sit dupla ad primam in B, 2^a sit dupla ad 2^{am}, et sic
 in infinitum; patet quod totum aggregatum ex primis
 est duplum ad totum aggregatum ex 2^{is}, ut patet
 11^o elementorum Euclidis, prima conclusione. Nec
 5 refert sive illa fuerit finita sive infinita. Et evidencia
 ad illud est quod non quantum additum finito quanto
 facit totum maius: ergo per idem, quodlibet finitum,
 pars infiniti, facit totum maius. Et ad illud valet quod
 quolibet linea quantumlibet magnum est par alicui de
 10 genere superficies vel corporeitatis. Non ergo foret pars
 linee per se causa sue magnitudinis, nisi, illa ablata,
 residuum foret minus.

Tercia responsio negat deum taliter posse movere
 vel causare substantiam vel accidens infinitum, ut in
 15 infinitum potest movere lineam, rare facere corpus, et
 sic de aliis; sed repugnat quod illa maneant in fine.
 Illud non valet isti vie, quia in vacuo infinito est linea
 infinita, vel extremum simillimum linee, cum vacuum
 sit quasi quantitas abstracta. Nec dubium quin, si deus
 20 potest protrahere illam lineam vel rarefacere illud cor-
 pus [in] infinitum usque ad finem illius hore, vel aliter
 continuare recte lineas pedales ad invicem, ipse potest
 omne tale finitum conservare in fine, eo quod non
 corrumperetur nisi ab eo; et ille libere contradictorie cor-
 25 rumpit illud, cum tamen non necessitaret se ad corrup-
 pendum illud, propter producciones precedentes, cum
 sit tam conservativus rerum talium, sicut est producti-
 vus. Nec deest sibi locus ad conservandum, quia est
 vacuum undique infinitum, cui deus non potest quid-
 30 quid addere vel quidquid auferre. Deus ergo, in infinitum
 rarefaciendo mundum usque ad finem illius hore
 exclusive, replet illud totum vacuum, quia cuiuslibet
 partis illius replet aliqua parte. Ideo replecio totalis,
 sicut rarefaccio totalis, erit ita magnum sicut vacuum.

35 Et, ut breviter dicam, non est aliquod inconveniens
 deducibile ex admissione corporis infiniti, quin conforme
 deducibile sit ex posicione vacui infiniti. Quelibet enim
 pars eius superflueret; et cum nullum eius punctum
 foret sursum vel deorsum, ipsum non posse circum-
 40 duci, nisi pro quolibet instanti transiret infinitum mag-
 num spacium, sicut patet ymaginando lineas concur-

Yet one of its
 parts taken
 away, it
 remains as
 great as before.

An infinitely
 small added to
 a finite quantity
 makes the
 whole greater;
 therefore a
 finite added to
 an infinite
 quantity should
 make it greater
 too.

3. Denies that
 God is able to
 cause a
 substance or an
 accident that
 is infinite; a
 body infinitely
 expanded
 would cease to
 exist.

But for those
 who admit an
 infinite vacuum,
 this answer is
 of no use.

If God can
 expand a body
 in vacuo
 so that it
 attains the
 infinite in a
 given time, He
 can also

preserve it from
 ceasing to exist,
 being as much
 the preserver as
 He is the cause
 of everything;
 nor would room
 be wanting for
 this expanded
 body, since the
 vacuum is also
 infinite.

Thus the
 hypothesis of an
 infinite vacuum
 entails as
 many difficulties
 as that of an
 infinitely large
 body.

Not one of its
 points could be
 moved up or
 down, nor could
 it revolve upon
 itself, without

4. 6^{ne} B.
21. in *deest* B.

12. *maius* B.
26. *per* B.

16. *maneat* B.

18. *x^mūlijm* B.

supposing an infinite space traversed; for however small the angle made by the lines that meet in the centre of revolution, still they are at last at an infinite distance. Other difficulties.

That there is a limit to God's power can also be proved by arguments leading to absurdities. If there was no limit He could make one part of the world as large as the whole, together with many other impossibilities.

rentes in centro, causando quantumcunque acutum angulum infinitum. Namque magna basis terminaret aliquem angulum conatum in centro. Ideo infinicies infinitum spacium transiretur, antequam una parva linea deveniret ad situm in quo est reliqua. Nec posset deus 5 alterare, movere localiter, augmentare vel diminuere aliquam partem vacui, cum sit per se quantum et immutabile. Ymmo tunc deus posset movere se, cum quiescit in vacuo tenebroso, visibili per totum, ut tenebra videtur et infinitum taccio. Cum ergo quotlibet 10 talia inconveniencia sequuntur ex posicionem vacui, et necesse sit ponere vacuum ad hoc quod deus posset talia mirabilia mobilia facere, videtur quod deus non potest facere talia.

Similiter per deducciones ad inconveniens videtur 15 idem probari. Videtur enim quodlibet tantum posse sicut aliquid; sed nichil tantum quantum ipsum potest. Deus enim potest facere quodlibet secundum tantum causare sicut aliquod ut formica, et quelibet pars mundi potest esse tanta sicut totus mundus potest esse. Et 20 per idem tantam difficultatem facere |, et cum difficultas attenditur penes gradum proprie potencie, sequitur quodlibet habere tantam potenciam sicut deus, cum quilibet habens tantam potenciam sicut deus, haberet corpus infinitum magnum, quod foret deo par in potencia. Et si dicatur quod omnis talis est potencia dei, 25 et non potencia rei tante potentis, vere sic posset dici nullam substanciam habere potenciam, inclinacionem vel accionem; sed totum fit, aliis solum passive se habentibus. Ymmo, non essent raciones immobiles secundum 30 quas partes mundi ordinantur, eo quod contingentissime posset esse ita ordinatum quod terra locetur in supremo mundi et sol in infimo, et quod minima species corporum foret maxima species, et sic de anathomia hominis et cuiuscunque partis mundi; ymmo 35 inclinaciones et proprie acciones rerum possent in toto

3. conatū B. 6. altar' B. 9, 10. teneb^o vif B. 10. tacio B.
18. βnλ B. 24. habet pro habens B. 31, 32. qtm^o B. 35. antho^a B.

16. *Idem probari.* This evidently makes the present paragraph a mere sequel to the preceding one. I have not been able to see the sequence, and not understanding this paragraph clearly in any sense, have been very sparing of marginal notes.

communicari. Omnes ille leges dependent ex voluntate dei contingentissima, secundum quam posset facere quamlibet partem mundi esse totum mundum, ut hominem posset constituere ex terra vel parvis accidentibus, cum anima, ita magnum sicut iam est mundus, sine aliquo corpore alio preter eius partem. Et sic periret substantiarum certitudines, rationes eterne et incorruptibilitates rerum.

Posset ergo philosophus dicere quod deus in omnibus talibus terminat se 2^m rationes eternas maximo in quod potest; quia aliter esset imperfectus; nec est solum infinite potencie durative, ut alie partes mundi, sed tripliciter excedit alias potencias. Primo in hoc quod que- libet alia potencia habet finem extrinsecum finientem ipsam; sed nichil potest finire deum. Et ad illum sensum demonstrat Aristoteles deum esse potencie infinite ex hoc quod eternaliter movet celum, tanquam finis ultimus. 2^o excedit potencias quascunque alias infinite, in hoc quod eternaliter gignit actum vel intellectionem sibi equalem, et nichil potest causare tam perfectum causatum, nisi fuerit infinitum. Tercio, in hoc quod ipse potest creare sine materia preiacente, et hoc claudit contradiccionem aliud facere.

Et ex istis sequuntur multe proprietates in modo causandi independenter et ultimate sumendi; et sic de ceteris, que solum sibi possunt competere. Nec est alicuius potencie intellective, nec porporcionaliter sufficit facere maius opus, nec est plus potens, nec est modo minus potens quam quando produxit mundum, etsi nunc non possit mundum producere. Nec sequitur quod prius potuisset produxisse mundum, nec forte posterius, nec maiorem nec minorem, et sic libere contradictorie produxit mundum. Et conformiter est dicendum de aliis factis 2^m ultimum sue factibilitatis. Nec probatur ex operibus que deus fecit, vel ex auctoritate sufficienti quod ipse possit taliter facere. Nec valet protervia qua dicitur, quod deus tante potest quante potest sustineri ipsum posse. Sed potest faciliter sustineri quod ipse potest [in] infinitum perficere et operari cum quocunque, igitur etc. Taliter enim arguunt aliqui, induendo habitum responsalem, quando deficit illis

God's power, thus terminated by a maximum, differs in three ways from that of His creatures; 1st, because He alone has only Himself for end;

2nd because He eternally begets an Act which is infinitely perfect; and 3rd because He can create without any previous matter.

Many other consequences flow from these principles. Though God cannot create the world now, He is just as powerful as when He created it.

Nor could He have created the world before or after the fixed time, nor larger nor smaller than He did.

To say that God can do as much as He can be maintained to be able to do, is idle obstinacy. It consists in merely shifting the burden of proof upon other shoulders

10. t'iat B.

23. a^d B.

35. aucte B.

39. in *deest*.

We do not however deny that God, if He chose, could render any being indefinitely perfect.

III. It must be admitted that there is a limit to the difficulty that can be overcome by any given power.

To deny this would be to deny both the totality of any force and the limit attained by its highest act, and the maximum of difficulty to be overcome by it.

It is quite certain that every

suppositum can produce another equal to itself, and this is the

highest act of all, similar to the begetting of the Word in God's essence.

There are also certain actions in which a maximum of difficulty is

overcome; but in reckoning this, we must not say that these actions are greater in proportion as they last longer,

nor that the difficulty is in direct ratio with the effect produced;

difficulty may be overcome without any external effect being produced.

probacio. Non ergo infinite potest deus concurrere cum quolibet, sed mensurate cum agentibus secundum proporcionem ad eorum potencias. Posset tamen, si vellet, ut superius dictum est.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare maximam difficultatem 5 quod quecunque potencia sufficit facere, et multitudinem et magnitudinem, que communiter attenditur 2^m eius ultimum virtutis. Et sic locuntur (quamvis inconvenienter) illi qui negant potenciam terminari maximo in quod potest. Ipsi enim nec darent totalem potenciam, nec maximum 10 nisum eius possibilem, nec maximam difficultatem eius possibilem fieri a data potencia; ita quod grave plus posset niti, sicut omne divisibile per comparacionem suarum parcium posset melius applicari 2^m partes que propter distanciam ociantur, non tantum intendentes sicut inten- 15 dentur propinquius posite. Sed quomodocunque sit de hoc, claret michi quod quelibet essencia habet unum suppositum, 2^m quod producit aliud suppositum par priori; et illa est accio immanens perfectissima possibilis tali nature, 2^m aliquod eius suppositum; ut per- 20 fectissima et difficillima accio quam deus potest agere est productio ad intra, et proporcionaliter de aliis essentiis.

Est eciam dare acciones et facciones ad extra perfectissimas et difficillimas posibles | respectu talium B 76^b agencium; que acciones non sunt eo maiores quo per maius tempus durant; quia sic infinitum modice difficultatis esset portare maximum lapidem per tempus, cum portare ipsum per horam sit tantum finita difficultas, et nisus minor esset portare ipsum per infinitum 30 minus tempus. Et sic in infinitum magna difficultas esset portare quamlibet leve per tempus eternum, et per consequens nulli difficultati finite proportionalis. Nec attenduntur tales difficultates penes magnitudinem effectus extrinseci producti; quia tunc semper ad maio- 35 ritatem motus consequitur maioritas difficultatis, et per consequens quantamlibet magnum difficultatem sufficit quantumcunque movens facere. Nec in aliquo consequerentur se magnitudo potencie prime agentis difficultatem et difficultas facta. Ymmo stat "facere diffi- 40 cultatem" univoce cum "producere effectum extrinsecum"

2. mif,ate B.

17. a3 (o3?) pro claret B.

30. nisi B.

41. pro-

ducente B.

solum conservando productum vel resistendo produccioni, sicut patet de conservante lumen vel quemcunque effectum alium, et de portante proporcionale vel prohibente accionem agentis.

- 5 Videtur ergo quod hoc nomen, "difficultas", sit nomen equivocum, sicut et hoc concretum, "difficile", et termini illis oppositi. Quandoque enim quecunque res difficilis dicitur difficultas, sive sit accio, sive obiectum circa quod est accio; et ista accepcio est
 10 valde extensa; ut sic loquendo: *omne difficile est difficultas*. 2^o modo accipitur pro illo quo res formaliter denominatur difficilis, quod est accio vel passio circu-
 15 agencia requirens certam potenciam. Et cum omne ens sit taliter intelligibile vel conservabile, qualiter a sola potencia infinita potest conservari vel intelligi, patet quod cuncte res sunt summe difficiles, inseparabiliter quoad aliquem actum: ut puta actum intelligendi vel
 20 causandi. Sed 3^o modo dicitur res difficilis propter eius perfeccionem; penes hoc enim uno modo mensuratur difficultas causancie. Et sic est maior difficilis producencia qua deus producit animam quam producencia qua producit lignum. Et forte non est una difficultas
 25 respiciens illas ambas, si non aggregative. 4^o modo dicitur aliquid difficile, quia infert fatigacionem vel debilitacionem exercendi potenciam circa illud.

- Et ita tripliciter dicitur difficultas formaliter. Prima respicit perfeccionem potencie causantis subiectum
 30 difficulter. 2^a respicit perfeccionem causati. Sic enim duobus modis dicitur causancia bona. 3^a vero difficultas respicit fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis subiectum illius difficultatis. Ut summe difficile, tam primo modo quam secundo, est producere deum; et
 35 quoad primum modum eque difficile est intelligere vel causare quidquid finaliter. Omnis autem causancia pure naturalis excludit difficultatem 3^o modo dictam, cum omnis talis respicit penam vel debilitacionem potencie. Nec video quod ille 3 dicuntur univoce diffi-
 40 cultates; sed forte omnes fundantur in causanciis.

Different
 acceptions of
 the word
difficulty:
 1. The thing
 itself that is
 difficult is called
 a difficulty.

2. That by
 which it is
 difficult;
 requiring a
 certain power
 either to be
 made or
 preserved in
 being, or
 understood; in
 this sense all
 things are
 difficult.

3. The
 perfection of
 one thing above
 another,
 requiring a
 greater display
 of power to
 produce it.

4. The
 tendency to
 tire or weaken
 the force that
 produces it.

Only the three
 last kinds
 express
 difficulty
 properly so
 called:

1st as requiring
 a cause,

2nd as implying
 perfection in
 the effect,

3rd as implying
 that the effect
 makes the cause
 to deteriorate.

8. vi's diffi^o B.

13. 'gũa B.

38. pẽm B.

39. 3 duiv^o B.

The 3rd sort of difficulty is to be first discussed. Nothing is in this sense difficult to God or to purely natural agents, only to things that act by material movements.

The same thing may be more or less difficult to different agents; it follows that there is no sense to the word "difficult" unless we determine the agent.

It follows also that the magnitude of the difficulty is in direct ratio to the deterioration or fatigue caused by it.

Also that it cannot increase infinitely, since that would totally destroy the agent that is to overcome it.

Conclusions.

1. If it be asked how difficult it is to carry a bean, we must, to answer, first know, who carries it, how long, and in what way.

2. But speed or slowness makes no difference; and the carrying it for one instant or for a longer period bears the same proportion as one instant to the same given time.

3. The length of time only accidentally affects the fatigue, and consequently the difficulty;

De tercia autem fiat nobis primo sermo. Et patet quod sic loquendo nichil est deo vel aliis pure naturaliter agentibus difficile, sed mobilibus physicis que continue modo moventur, et sic sicut idem uni est bonum, et alteri est magis bonum, et 3^o non sic bonum; sic eadem accio uni est difficilis, et alteri est magis difficilis, sed 3^o facienti illam est ipsa non difficilis; ut de deo et homine et eius factis, faciendo idem opus. Nec est oracio perfecta qua dicitur difficultas sic magna, vel res sic difficilis, nisi explicetur illud respectu cuius ultime dicitur; ut imperfecta est locucio dicere quod aliquid est simile, nisi explicetur cui est simile. Sic ergo, loquendo de difficultate, patet quod est eo maior quo maiorem penam vel maiorem fatigacionem vel debilitacionem infert, sive agenti, sive patienti, sive quolibet aliter accidentato; ut uni est magna difficultas comburendi, alteri est magna difficultas stare vel sedere, vel esse in tali loco per tantum tempus etc. Nunquam tamen | crescit talis difficultas in infinitum, cum nichil in infinitum puniri, fatigari, vel debilitari potest, sed in omnibus talibus est dare maximum terminum possibilem. B 77^a

Unde querenti quante difficultatis est portare fabam, querendum est econtra difficultatem cui, qualiter, et per quantum tempus; uni enim esset maior difficultas et alteri minor uno modo portandi; ut velociter movendo esset maius difficultas, et alio modo portandi minor; per maius tempus portare esset maior difficultas quam conformiter portare per minus.

Ex quo 2^o patet quod velocitas vel tarditas motus est impertinens tali difficultati; et difficultas instantanea, vel aliter indivisibilis, est taliter comparabilis difficultati temporanee vel aliter divisibili, sicut instans est comparabile tempori; vel continuare res 2^m puncta tantum non est simpliciter infinitum facilius quam continuare ipsas 2^m lineas vel superficies; sicut nec superficies infinitum excedit lineam, nec accio corporea, accionem superficialem vel linearem.

Patet eciam quod difficultas non est eo maior quo diuturnior, quia magnitudo debilitacionis vel fatigacionis accidentaliter respicit diuturnitatem; sicut nec motus

(ut aliquid habens magnitudinem maiorem a diuturnitate vel longitudine) est eo maius quo longius, ut patet de corrupcione et de aliis multis. Tempus tamen et linea, cum sibi similibus, sunt eo maiora quo longiora. Pena ergo eterna non erit infinitum magna, sicut nec gaudium eternum sibi oppositum; sed videndum est quantum bonum ponit vel privat, et penes hoc mensuretur eius magnitudo. Dampnatus tamen semper fatigatur et debilitatur, semper fit fatigatus et debilis, etsi non successive deperdat potenciam.

Patet 4^o quod non penes proporcionalem deperditionem potencie attenditur difficultas, quia tunc omne deperdens potenciam in agendo usque ad non gradum infinitam difficultatem faceret. Ex quo sequitur quod nulla pars corporis maiorem difficultatem facit quam suum totum; et per consequens stat aliquid continue debilitari et fortificari 2^m diversas partes sicut simul fit forte et debile. Non enim, si aliquid calefit, incipit esse calidum, sed satis est quod nova caliditate vel intensione fiat calidum: et sic de impedimentis denominationum que videntur contrarie. Unde patet quod forte agens facit maiorem difficultatem, que tamen est sibi insensibilis, et debilius facit sepe minorem debilitatem, que tamen est sibi sensibilis, quia equalis ablacio a minori est sibi sensibilior quam a maiori.

Quinto, patet quod summa difficultas huius generis est peccare moraliter, quia patet sic: nullo modo pro aliquo bono possibili servando vel acquirendo, et per consequens pro nullo malo possibili evitando vel evadendo [homo] committeret aliquod huiusmodi, unde deus offenderetur: quod non esset, nisi omne tale peccatum esset peius pene sensus; et sic de ceteris. Et maior patet ex hoc quod, si commutaret aliquid huiusmodi pro obtentu alterius, offenderet contra summam iusticiam, sicut patet explicato; sed quilibet debet non

movement is not always greater in proportion to its length of duration; e. g. corruption; Thus neither damnation nor eternal bliss is infinite; both are to be considered according to the amount of happiness lost or gained.

4. Difficulty is not to be appreciated by the loss of power occasioned by an act, or a man would overcome an infinite difficulty by exhausting himself completely. If a man is exhausted in one part of his body, and not in the whole, it does not follow that that part has overcome a greater difficulty than the whole; so also in the case of a strong and a weak agent.

5. In this sort of difficulty, mortal sin is the greatest of all, since it should not be committed for the sake of any possible good. The reason why mortal sin is never licit, is that God is thereby offended; and

3. corpore? 17. forti^{ti} B. 24. difficultatem before debilitatem B.
 27. mo^o = mortaliter? B. 30. homo deest B. 32. et pro et sic de ceteris B. 33. gmittar³ B. 34. altius B. 35. explicato (sic?) B.

3. *Corruption*, or decomposition, was counted by Aristotle as a sort of *movement*, meaning *change*. 26. *Difficultas*. We must remember that Wyclif speaks of that which, if done, tends to make the agent deteriorate. Mortal sin is in that sense a difficult thing.

as we should
always choose
the lesser of
two evils,
mortal sin is
the greatest
possible;
and what is
true for sin in
general is true
for individual
sins.

There is also
a maximum
difficulty in
the other two
senses of the
word; difficulty
may be greater
or less, just
as the
perfections of
things, or the
powers of
causes are
greater or less.

These three
senses are not
opposed.

Most sophists
only speak of
difficulty as to
external
effects; but the
word means
*something to be
mastered*; and
what is more
masterly than

God's
preservation of
the world?

In the second
sense, difficulty
does not
imply any

particular effort
of the agent;
God, a spirit,
our soul, and
a material body
can all produce
the same given
movement
without any
difference of
effort;

taliter commutare: igitur maior vera. Et minor patet
ex hoc quod semper de duobus malis minus malum
est eligendum, si oportet alterum habere: in malo
vero moraliter non potest esse electio. Sicut ergo in
privativis est dare maximum genus difficultatis, sic est 5
de esse et individuis.

Et quo ad difficultatem primo modo vel 2^o modo
dictam, patet ex dictis quod sicut perfectio difficilis,
vel potencia causantis ad accionem, sic difficultas ad
difficultatem; et sic aliqua sunt univoce comparabiles, 10
et alique equivoce; aliqua proporcione proprie dicta, et
alia proporcione communiter dicta. Omnes autem ille
difficultates sonant in bonitatem, sicut omnes priores
in maliciam pene vel culpe. Nec distinguuntur illa
difficilia ex opposito, cum puniri sit tribus difficultatibus 15
difficile, sed non peccare moraliter. Hoc enim con-
sequitur penam maximam 2^m genus. Communitas autem
sophistarum non loquitur nisi de difficultate accionis
ad extra. Certum est tamen quod tunc omne ens pre-
dicamentale est difficultas. | Nam difficultas, positive B 77^b
intellecta, sonat in magisterium et subtilitatem. Sed
quis dubitat magnum esse magisterium servare mundum
in quantitate, bonitate, proporcione, situ, tempore,
posicione, et habitu suarum partium?

2^o patet quod 2^a difficultas non consequitur nisum 25
aut multitudinem potencie secundum se totalem agentis,
quia contingit animam movere corpus proprium vel
alienum localiter et alteracione; et parem difficultatem
contingit agens corporeum facere, et deum per se, sive
intelligenciam cum communi influencia. Et certum est 30
quod talia non apponunt certos nismus vel potencias.
Ideo non oportet ad huiusmodi paritates difficultatem
rerum productarum esse equalitatem nisuum vel po-
tenciarum. Non enim includit difficultas ista fatigacionem
vel debilitacionem causantis, ita quod maior sit diffi- 35
cultas rem fieri a debiliori quam a potenciori. Nec

1. commutari B. 9. a³ B. 16. h^e B. 17. g⁹ B. 19. es B.

19. 20. ple B. 21. mgrm B. 22. mgrm B.

21. mgrm. This form occurs three times; *magisterium* does not agree well with the sense each time; but I can find no similar word that is on the whole preferable.

includit ista 2^a difficultas generaliter paritatem prime difficultatis in gradu, sed communiter oppositum, cum omne ens primo modo sit summe difficile.

5 Tercio patet quod omnem difficultatem concomitatur conservativa, ultimate, et omne opus meum facit; et hoc non posset aliquid facere preter deum. Unde patet quod infinitis modis contingit facere opus. Cum modo facere illud est facilius, et alio modo facere illud est

10 difficilius; ut cultellum facere opus artificis, quam hominem qui dirigit; quia ipse multas difficultates coëfficit quarum nullam cultellus potest facere; et per idem longe difficilior et artificialior est faciencia dei. Faccio autem passiva est eadem, eque difficilis,

15 causata ab omnibus. Aliquis autem faciencias reservat sibi deus 2^m totam speciem, ut creare, finaliter gubernari, iustificare etc. Et alias communicat creaturis, ut patet de operibus nature que sunt communia deo et nature, et alias operationes nature malas moraliter, ut [deus

20 potest hec] facere sed non approbare, quamvis approbet bonum consequens ex illis: ut patet de blasphemia, mendacio, furto, homicidio, luxuria, et cetera. Talia enim dicitur deum velle esse permissive, approbando sua convertibilia et non illa. Unde, sicut passio aliqua

25 bene placet deo et agencia secum convertibilia non sic placet; ita econtra bene deo placet facere accionem moraliter malam, et non sic placet sibi illam accionem fieri, quoniam si genus eius placet deo, sic et convertibile sequens ex eo. Videtur ergo tantam difficultatem

30 esse movere fabam, quantumlibet tarde, sicut facere mundum; quia deum sic movere est summum magisterium; sed distincio solvit.

Quarto patet quod stat idem equivoce, et univoce respectu diversorum, esse sub quibuslibet gradibus esse

35 difficile et per consequens facile; ut idem opus est uni agenti facile et alteri difficile; et respectu unius agentis summe difficile et respectu alterius minoris potencie facilius secundum equivocacionem dictam. Unde non oportet, si tante sit difficultatis quo ad potenciam

40 requisitam, quod sit simpliciter tante difficultatis. Et ita dicitur de perfeccione denominacionis et multis

but it does not follow that the difficulty is the same, only that it does not cause the agent to deteriorate.

Nor is the necessity of an equally perfect agent always implied in the idea of an equally perfect effect.

In every act, owing to the concurrence of God, the highest possible degree of difficulty is overcome.

A thing may be done in various ways, unequally difficult; but 'to be done' is of equal difficulty in all.

Creation, providential government, justification &c. are acts that God reserves; the rest He communicates to His creatures; so that He makes the sin which a man commits, without approving it, but only the good that comes of it;

if, therefore, God wills sin, it is only permissively.

Thus God is pleased with His own share in a bad action, though He is not pleased that the action takes place.

And in one sense (the requiring the action of God) there is as much difficulty in moving a bean as in making a world.

13. fa^{ca} B. 15. aboibg B. 16. fina^r B. 19, 20. deus — hoc deest B. 31, 32. mgrm B.

It is clear that in these different senses, and in the same sense relatively to a different being, the same thing may be difficult and easy at the same time, or more and less difficult. There is thus a maximum to any difficulty that can be overcome; there is also a maximum of duration to all decomposable things.

similibus que augentur ex denominacionibus et consequentibus; et acciones dei, relaciones, et multa alia similia positiva et privativa.

Et per ista patet aliquid durare quod est dare maximam difficultatem quam agens sufficit agere vel causare; sicut est dare maximum tempus per quod corruptibile sufficit durare; cum sequitur: Usque ad finem illius temporis sufficit Sor durare; ergo per totum illud tempus sufficit durare. Sic enim durabit motus et alie res per tempora, ex hoc quod exclusive durabunt usque ad eorum terminos; quia aliter nullum successivum posset durare per tempus, et per consequens non esset longum vel breve, nec aliquam partem posset habere. Nec dubium quin pari evidencia qua ille motus per totum tempus *illud* durabit (demonstrando *illud* quod ponitur minimum tempus per quod sufficio durare) ita ego per totum illud tempus possum vel sufficio durare, quia continue a principio usque ad finem possum durare, et sic precise tamdiu possum durare quamdiu durabit ille motus; quia tamdiu, et quancumque erit aliquod instans intrinsecum motus huius qui erit per totum tempus.

Nec aliter posset aliquid deperdere potenciam durandi successive, nec senescere; sicut nec aliquid posset in proporcione rationali esse reliquo durabilius. Et sic nichil haberet periodem naturalem; ut si tempus centum annorum sit minimum per quod non possum durare, et nunc sit medium instans, ita quod precise medium duracionis deperdi posset, patet quod adhuc sufficio durare per dupla instancia. | Aliter enim non esset homo magis durabilis quam homo, et continue successive decresceret, quousque fuerit minus durabilis; et cum inde quam fuerit durabilis ut homo cum tamen duraciones sunt eiusdem racionis; et tunc sine dubio deus non posset scire in qua proporcione unum est durabilius reliquo, nec aliquod tale posset tamdiu durare sicut posset. Nec esset dare maximam durabilitatem mei; et sic partes sine toto vel totis. Quamdiu ergo erit ita quod ego sufficio vivere in instanti quod est presens, certum est ergo quod cuiuslibet corruptibilis

1. dno⁹ B.23. a^d B.38. ps B.16. po^r B; *ib.* per quod non B.29. po^r B.30. 2n, *pro* dupla B.21. intu^{cu} B.33. n, *pro* inde.

sive permanentis sive successivi quod natum est durare per tempus est signare maximum tempus per quod potest durare.

Et conformiter est dare maximam difficultatem que
 5 possunt facere quo ad diuturnitatem temporis, quo ad intensionem difficultatis per instans et quo ad minutionem difficultatis per minimum tempus compositum ex 2^{bus} instantibus. Et conformiter dicitur quod est dare maximum grave quod per totidem sufficit portare.
 10 Pro quo est notandum quod *portare* est equivocum. Quandoque enim sumitur generaliter pro *sustinere* vel *conservare* cuiuscunque effectus. Et taliter princeps dicitur portare illius onera regni et deus totum mundum. Quandoque capitur striccius pro *prohibere grave*
 15 *a descensu*; et isto modo equus portat hominem succurrando pro declino montis, quamvis aliquando sit alcior et aliquando bassior, sicut homo gradiens portat cifum. Et sic loquendo aer sufficit portare quodcunque grave, quia impedire ipsum a descensu. Sed 3^o modo sumitur
 20 portare pro *impedire grave ne descendat*; et hoc dupliciter, vel per se, vel cum alio ex equo concurrente, quod nec est ipsum portans nec aliquid eius. Quamvis enim ad portacionem hominis concurrat terra supportando, deus eciam gubernando partes hominis, et
 25 alia iuvando; et tamen dicitur homo per se portare, quando portat cum istis adiutoriis sine aliquo eius concurrente ex equo; ut aere existente indifferenti, et quocunque alio comportante quod non est illius hominis extrinsece causa portacionis sue. Unde impertinens est
 30 portacioni sue quod portans moveat localiter vel allevet pondus portatum.

Ex quo patet quod abutuntur termino qui restringunt
portare ad *per se vehere per tempus*. Sic enim, iuxta principium illorum non esset possibile quicquid portare
 40 nec distinguuntur *vehere* et *portare*; et per consequens

We must also admit a limit to the difficulty that can be overcome in a given time, and in the smallest possible amount of time, which is composed of two instants; also a limit to the weight that can be borne in that time. Three senses of the word to bear: The 1st (very wide) is to maintain anything whatever, even metaphorically; the 2nd is to prevent a heavy body in its fall; the 3rd is to hinder a heavy body from falling; and this last sense is again subdivided, according as the thing which bears does so by itself or by means of another.

To bear does not mean to carry, nor to lift up:

if we restrained its meaning to movement in time, a column would no longer bear up a building.

6, 7. mi^o B. 11 gñalit^r B. 13. 1^o pro illius B. 24. et cetera pro eciam B.

3. *Durare*. The whole of the preceding paragraph, especially from *Aliter* to *Certum est* is not easy to understand, for me at least. I have a note on the transcript that it is not very illegible; so perhaps the text is corrupt. But I cannot see why Wyclif strives to prove at such length that all things have a limit of duration, nor how his arguments prove it.

Thus a weaker thing may bear a stronger one; a plank or a stone may bear a strong man; so also of the air between two stones at the foundation of a castle.

It does not follow, however, that any body can bear any weight, nor that all can bear equally well; for some can do so for a longer time, and thus their mode of bearing is more perfect.

Besides, the way of application of the weight makes much difference; a straight perpendicular rod can stand under any weight without bending, because there is no reason for it to bend on one side rather than another.

This is seen in the sails of ships, in pressing an egg lengthwise, and in experiments with a balance (or lever). The least weight that a man cannot bear for a given time is identical with the greatest weight that he can bear for the same time; so here again we find a

columna et cetera quiescencia nichil portant, cum quiescant. Patet eciam quod stat in potencia portare portencius; ut lignellum vel lapillus portat fortissimum hominum. Ymmo tenuis aer interceptus inter duos lapides planos in fundo castri, vel quantumlibet gravis edificii, portat per se totum edificium suppositum; et sic sine dubio sufficit stuppa pluma vel lana, ymmo omne corpus quod potest per se subici cuicunque gravi. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod omne portativum sit eque portativum; quia unum excedit aliud quo ad sufficientiam diuturne portacionis, quantum ad modum portandi, erecte vel decline, alcius vel bassius; et sic de multis modis portandi. Non ergo sequitur; si [A] sufficit tantum portare sicut B; ergo A est tante potencie portative sicut B; quia quamvis quoad illud sunt pares, tamen B excedit A in aliquo modo portandi, non ut simpliciter portativus. Nota tamen quod applicacio multum iuvat ad portandum; ut quantumlibet gracile uniformis continuitatis et grossiciei sufficeret portare quomodocunque grave erecte, cum non foret ratio quare potius ad unum signum deficeret quam ad quodlibet; et ex indifferentia non potest fieri accio. Et idem contingit de tractu uniformis continuitatis et grossiciei, dum sit par violencia ad quemlibet eius punctum. Et cum isto concordat experiencia de velo, ad modum arcuacionis oneris finiti que propter indifferentiam vel prope indifferentiam diu durant: sicut ovum inter duas manus 2^m dyametrum longitudinale quantumlibet fortiter constrictum non frangetur propter indifferentiam deficiencie ad unum punctum potius quam ad reliquum. Et sic contingit elevari per elongacionem brachii libre quantumlibet grave, et multa alia mirabilia facere, si quis cognosceret aptare instrumenta.

Ymmo, signato minimo ponderoso | quod non sufficit Sor portare per tempus, sed per instans, iuxta adversarium, ex hoc tam contingit eum levestieri, vel plus contingit, quam Sor debilitatur ex eius portacione. Sequitur quod illud et non gravius sufficit Sor portare

13. A *deest* B. 16. *est pro* ut B. 19. g^oficiei B. 21. fig^m B.
26. artua^o B. 26. finitis B. 27. oim B. 29. fuget^r B. 30. et deficiencie B. 31. ele^r B.

26. *Arcuacionis*. This sentence, of which I can make nothing, is the exact reading of the MS.

per tempus. Et ita undique tenenda est pars affirmativa, iuxta regulam Aristotelis. Et si argumentatur quod est dare gravissimum portabile, cum spera terre non est portabile et non est dare eius maximam partem 5 quantitativam, dicitur quod deus portat terram, primo modo loquendo, sicut et mundum qui est maximum portabile; sed aliis modis loquendo non portatur, sicut nec celum, eo quod terra non potest esse inferius, nec celum esse grave. Et portacio 2^{bus} posterioribus modis 10 dicta includit violenciam tam ex parte portantis quam ex parte portati. Unde, sicut inclinacio ferri ad deorsum suspenditur per attractionem adamantis, sic et naturalia, terra, et quelibet eius pars caret nisu ad inferius. Sicut ergo aqua constituta cum spera totali non est 15 gravescens, sicut patet expertis subversis in aquis, ita credo esse de partibus spera terre. Et si obicitur quod partes spera terre violente cadunt ad puteos perpetua violencia, et per consequens habent inclinationem ad esse inferius, et ita ad omnem punctum elementi esset 20 perpetuo violencia, cum cuiuslibet partis terre violentatur aliqua pars: dicitur quod haberet in tali casu appetitum descendendi pro ordinando aere incluso in puteo supra terram, sicut aque pro illo fine descendunt ad quantumlibet ymum locum. Existente autem corpore 25 naturaliter locato in illo situ, non sic appeteret. Ideo talia inanimata, pro universi ordine servando, mirabiliter mutant appetitus suos ex regimine et inclinatione prime nature portantis omnes partes mundi in suis sitibus.

Est ergo dare maximum portabile, sive sit lapis, sive 30 terra, sive aggregatum ex talibus gravibus; et valde modice potens sufficit illud portare cum iuvamine virtutis regitive universi, a qua orbis terre movetur, motus localiter, etsi pars terre levefiat vel auferatur. Nec est verum quod spera terre moveatur circulariter vel recte 35 propter partes exalatas a sole, et ipso facto conteratur; quia vel circumdatur virtute regente et supplente per aliquod intrinsecum ad oppositum, vel porporcionando unum orbem terre pure in medio mundi, cui tanquam fixo et immobili innitatur, tota terra, sicut omne motum, innititur fixo; et sic partes circumferenciales terre 40

maximum, since our opponents admit there is a minimum of weight that can be borne for one instant. If it is said that no one can bear the globe, and that there being no maximum to a part of the globe, there is no maximum of bearable weight; we answer that God bears it up in the first sense of the word, and that in the other senses, neither the earth nor the sky can be borne, since the former cannot fall lower than it is, and the sky has no weight. As divers tell us, water has no weight in its own sphere; so it is, I believe, with the parts of the earth.

We, therefore, must admit a maximum of weight, which can be borne by a small power with the aid of the Divine influence, that governs our globe. The earth moves neither circularly nor in a straight line;

12. alteracionem (?) B.
28. fitib9; ii very illegible B.
quia B.

14. 9ftu^{ta} B; *ib.* 10li B.

19. est B.

32. movet B. 35. qte'ar B. 36. vel

its central parts are fixed, and the exterior parts, which may move and tremble, rest upon them.
 IV. Every thing has a limit both as to possible magnitude and littleness.

Proof: Nature proceeds with order in all her works; this implies a definite relation between each individual and its possible size.
 Not to admit order in nature is to deny God's existence, which is one of the first principles of a priori cognition.
 As the whole world, composed of all its parts, cannot be made greater, so each of its parts must have a definite and certain size.
 Order must prevail in the world as in the human body;

stat tremere et alterari propter suam porositatem, non autem illud purum. Nec est vis, sive idem numero sit eternum, sive idem in specie, corruptis individuis. Et quamvis sit mobile naturalitate prima, tamen naturalitate 2^a repugnat legi eterne quod moveatur. 5
 Ad 4^m respondetur negando assumptum, cum cuilibet speciei corporum et qualitatum corporearum sit distincta magnitudo usque ad quam inclusive potest integrum esse magnum, et parvitas usque ad quam potest tale per se existens esse parvum; et illa vocantur apud 10 philosophos minima et maxima naturalia, non quod continue sunt in tali specie; sed quod sic per se existencia in tali specie. Infinitum namque modicum homogeneum creditur esse inexistentis parcialiter suo toti in quantacunque specie corporeitatis porosi. Evidencia 15 autem phisicorum est talis: natura ordinate procedit in omni eius causacione; sed non sic procederet, nisi ordinaret individuis relaciones magnitudinum et parvitatatum; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod, si natura [non] ordinate procederet in causando, tunc deus non 20 esset deus: quod est summe impossibile. Ideo maior est evidencia phisico, et una de nocioribus conclusionibus sequentibus ex *deum esse*, quod est primo notum phisico in perfectissimo genere cognoscendi, cum nichil aliud potest perfectissima noticia philosopho possibili 25 cognosci (propter quid), nisi precognito *deum esse*. Ideo noticia huius conclusionis est prima et principium tocuis noticie conclusionis propter quid, que est perfectissima noticia nobis possibilis. Minor patet ex hoc quod oportet esse | debitam habitudinem inter partes B 79^a maioris mundi, sicut inter partes minoris mundi; sed cum mundus maior, constans ex tota materia sua possibili, non potest maiorari, patet quod ad debitam proporcionem suarum per se parcium ad invicem et ad se ipsum, oportet ipsas proporcionari et diffiniri in 35 magnitudine et parvitate. Et per consequens sic oportet de accidentibus corporeis ipsas consequentibus. Sicut ergo incongruum esset quod oculus hominis esset in talo, cor in capite, lingua fracta ut manus, cerebrum sicut venter, aut dentes tanti ut tybie; sic periret ar- 40 monia mundi, si sol esset in polo arctico, aut in

13. t'mc' B. 4. nã^{to} B. 7. S. dt^st^{ta} B. 12. q̄ pro quod B.
 16. philosophorum (?) B. 20. non deest. 24. in in B. 28. 9g'6^s B.

centro, aut quadrangularis figure, protensus ab uno polo ad alium, vel quodlibet astrum tantum sicut orbis, vel totus mundus esset lucidus sicut astrum. Ideo non dubium quin natura ordinat pro partibus maioris mundi, quoad numerum suarum partium, quoad appetitus mundi vel pondera tendendi ad certos fines, ut locaciones et naturales acciones, et quoad instantias in quantitate, figura, potencia, et ceteris accidentibus, non solum pro sempiternalibus aut incorruptibilibus, sed pro naturalibus, pro terre nascentibus et suis seminibus, pro animalibus, et breviter universis conservatis quoad singula corporum accidentia naturalia.

Nec valet dicere quod iste terminantur exclusive ad suos terminos, quia nichil potest terminari ad terminum quem non potest attingere. De terminis autem corporum naturalium aliqui possunt sensu et experientia convinci, ut termini corporum eterogeniorum et seminum. Sed aliorum parvitates excedunt sensus et experientias, ut parvitates lapidum, mineralium, elementorum, et talium simplicium. Certum tamen est quod est dare cuiuscunque talis speciei simpliciter minimum quod potest per se existere.

Contra hoc tamen argumentatur. Primo sequitur quod sit generacio subita, sicut et corrupcio subita minimi numeralis; et sic, tam subita generacio quam subita corrupcio cuiuscunque generis accidentis; quod est contra rationem proporcionis agentis ad passum. Racio satis patet ex hoc quod ignis, applicatus passo carente igne, subito inciperet inducere minimum naturale. Et sic ex minori proporcione velocius ageret.

Similiter, tale minimum non esset alicuius potencie active vel passive per se, cum quodlibet contrarium superdurans subito corrumperet ipsum, et per consequens cum ipsum non posset pati, non posset naturaliter agere. Cum tamen tam perfecta sint minora sicut maiora eiusdem speciei, ymmo perfectissima sunt non quante; quomodo ergo derogaret perfectio proporcionum mundi ad eius partes? quia quantumlibet perfectum foret simplex aggregatum cum aliis, tamen tantum figuratum constitueret, sicut contingit de arena.

Similiter, capto igne duplo ad minimum naturale per se existens, videtur quod contrarium subito ipsum

and if so, no doubt this order extends to everything, and consequently to the accident of quantity, both in things incorruptible and corruptible, inanimate and animated.

It is ridiculous to say that these limits are never reached; a limit that is never reached is not a limit. In some cases we see that in fact this limit is reached; in others, as in stones and minerals &c., the smallness of their parts exceeds our powers of sense.

Arguments to the contrary.
1. If there is a minimum of size, we must also admit instantaneous combination and decomposition, which is impossible.

2. There would be a want of unity and stability in all bodies composed of such parts, since every thing possessed of a contrary activity would destroy the compound, and the whole body would be a mere aggregate, like a heap of sand.

3. If two bodies of different sorts are mixed in

unequal quantities, the greater quantity will meet with no resistance at all from the smaller.

corrumperet, quia non posset inducere de contrario per se, nisi par minimo igni, ad cuius induccionem sequitur minimi ignis corruptio. Et ultra, cum accio contrariabitur propter facilitatem, ex induccione talis minimi sequitur quod subito corrumperetur totus ignis: 5 et per idem quantumlibet magnum simplex, cum continue post erit agens melius dispositum ad agendum, et subiectum ita capax sicut in principio fuit. Ymmo tunc infinitum facile esset corrumpere totaliter tale simplex, cum per divisionem in minima naturalia subite 10 cederet in continuis, et per consequens motus in nullo consequitur proporcionem.

Answers. 1. We admit the possibility of instantaneous combination and decomposition in these cases; but it would take place according as circumstances allowed, just as a full bottle empties itself only when the air penetrates.

Ad primum dicitur quod minimum naturale est subito generabile et subito corruptibile, ut assumitur; et sic de accidentibus ipsum consequentibus. Nec sunt 15 tales minores partes motus successivi; sed termini motuum successivorum. Non desunt illis motibus proporcionem ex quibus causantur; aliter agunt cum quibusdam circumstanciis et aliter cum aliis, propter motum et ordinem universitatis servandum: ut, plano existente 20 immediate plano, natura non sinit unum elevari a reliquo, nisi tali modo quo corpus potest subingredi pro pleno servando. Sicut nec liquor exit fialas vel alia vasa, orificiis eorum subversis, nisi aliunde aer posset B79^b subingredi, supplendo locum liquidi exeuntis. Et sic de 25 multis exemplis naturalibus in quibus certum est naturam occulte facere talia, vel per se, vel supplendo sufficienciam agentis sensibilis. Et alia est proporcio cum talibus paribus. Alia autem erit cum aliis paribus 30

2. It does not follow that the minimum in size is also a

Ad 2^m negandum, cum tale potest esse minimum per se possibile in quantitate et non in virtute; quod si

2. eius B.

11. 9ti^{is} B.

32. v^{te} B.

19. *Circumstanciis*. I can very doubtful as to Wyclif's meaning, but it is perhaps this: Each movement of combination or of decomposition of two atoms (minimum naturale) must be instantaneous, but as a vacuum is impossible (pro pleno servando) such movements can take place only when other atoms are so situated as to fill up the vacant space which their movement occasions, and thus the combination or decomposition of the *whole* must take place in time. Wyclif two pages later (p. 166, l. 32) distinctly uses the term *atoms*, which are probably identical with his bodies that occupy *only two points in space*, as we shall see towards the end of *Logica*.

utraque insit alicui corporis, tunc ipsum est minime
 potencie per se possibilis, et talia minima iuxta poten-
 5 ciam, 2^m proporcionem debitam constitueret maximum,
 cuius forma superaddita servaret illa minima in tem-
 pore et operatione. Nec est verum quod inanimata
 omogena minora sunt tam perfecta sicut maiora eius-
 dem speciei; eo quod non solum perfeccio accidentalis,
 sed essentialis perfeccio componitur ex suis partibus
 10 integralibus. Omne tamen individuum alicuius speciei
 habet perfeccionem debillimam speciei ad minimum;
 sed unum in perfeccione individua maiori, et aliud in
 perfeccione individua minori, 2^m quod contingit univer-
 sitati. Ideo, ex dacione perfeccionis specificæ, implicatur
 15 minimum naturale. Nec obest quod perfectissima sunt
 foret imperfeccionis in alio; ut habere magnos oculos
 est in equo bonum signum perfeccionis, in homine vero
 signum stolliditatis. Indivisibilitas ergo est simpliciter
 prestancior divisibilitate, sed non potest competere
 20 corporalibus; ideo non sequitur quod essent perfecciora
 vel eque perfecta propioribus divisibilitati. Ymmo, cum
 deo sit quodammodo cura de omnibus, ut dicit commen-
 tator, non sineret tam modicum corpus per se esse
 quod ipsum non sufficeret in operationem, nec servaret
 25 per successiorem debitam speciei. Utrum autem simpli-
 citer non quanta de corporibus homogeniis possunt
 integrare mixtum, et sic per se esse sine immediacione
 corporum speciei sue, est dubium. Sed de arena, de
 partibus metalli calcinatis, de carnibus, et aliis mixtis
 30 ceteris, patet quod sunt quantitative divisibiles, cum
 aliter non servarent formam mixti. De elementis vero
 in mixtis est credibile quod multa non quanta sunt
 coniuncta. Certum tamen est quod continuacio vel
 adnascencia talium in mixtis est de perfeccione universi,
 35 eo quod inordinacio esset, si omnia mixta essent cathe-
 nata, eciam minima naturalia non adnata.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod non sequitur; sed posito igne
 duplo ad minimum, tam quantitate quam virtute,
 subducta sensibili conservacione, contingeret ipsum
 40 corrumpi subito. Ideo de elementis non sunt minima

minimum in
 active power;
 but if it were
 so, then there
 would be a
 superadded
 form to bind
 those minima
 together and
 preserve them.

Every
 individual
 of a species has
 precisely the
 minimum of the
 perfection of the
 species; but
 considered
 individually
 one is more or
 less perfect
 than another.

This fact of
 having specific
 perfection
 implies a
 minimum.

It is quite true
 that size is
 quite wanting
 in the most

perfect beings;
 but it does not
 therefore follow
 that the parts
 of a body are
 more perfect
 than the whole;

what is
 perfection in
 one being is
 imperfection in
 another, and
 indivisibility is
 a quality that
 bodies cannot
 possess.

Whether there
 is or is not in
 every
 homogeneous
 body,
 something
 indivisible that
 gives it unity,
 is a doubtful
 question.

3. In the given
 case, i. e. fire
 applied to a
 minimum of
 quantity, the
 fire itself would
 go out.

4, 5. $\widehat{te} \widehat{ce} \widehat{oe} \widehat{pe}$ pro tempore B. 18. scollit^{is} B. 21. ppriorib⁹ B
 34. aduafc η B 36. ec^e B.

And for that reason there are no such minima in the elements, but only in compounds. Yet we admit that division is in many cases favourable to chemical change. Alchemists calcine the imperfect metals in order to dispose them for the reception of more perfect forms. This, however, is great labour and does not reduce the metals to their smallest parts: for that reason, if they succeed, it is by chance.

Thus bodies that form a continuous whole vary both as to continuity and as to the forms that make them so; first the forms of the elements, then the superadded forms of the compound, and so on; but each form is extended through a number of its subjects sufficient to make up the whole; as e. g. if a stone requires 1000 elementary parts, the form is diffused through all.

So of plants and animals, one form of plant or of animal

naturalia nec solum dupla ad minima, nisi in mixtis, ubi conservantur ex armonia commixtorum. Nec est difficile nature, gracia mixti producendi, subito producere quotlibet minima naturalia in medio contrario, sicut contingit distanter infra terram et aquam et ignem 5 et aerem a celestibus generari ad mixti constitutionem. Nec sequitur quod continuabitur subita elementi productione, quia deficiet proportio recta, gracia cuius sic fieret. Conceditur tamen quod per divisionem contingit mixtum celerius consumi, sicut noverunt Alchimiste, 10 calcinantes metalla imperfecta, et postmodum per mediantes, disponentes calcinata, purgata, et coagulata, ad formas perfecciores. Verumptamen sic dividere per ignem est laboriosum; nec scit artifex per sublimacionem dividere talia omogenia in minima naturalia, cum excedunt 15 iudicium sensus. Ideo errant artifices in istis operibus; quod si perficiunt est prope casuale, cum executio practica huius sciencie deficit propter materie subtilitatem.

Ex quo patet quod sunt multi gradus in continuacionibus corporum, et formarum quibus fiunt continuaciones; | et simplicia sunt fortissime continuata, et post B 80* gradatim modis suis extenduntur forme mixte, secundum quod sunt propiora elementis. Nulla tamen forma superaddita extenditur per subiectum par vel minus 25 subiectum quam sufficit corpus illius speciei per se esse; ut si ad esse lapidis requiritur adnascencia mille non quantarum de elementis, tunc quotquot sunt tales millenarii debite proportionati, sive continuitates, sive non continuitates, tot precise sunt forme lapidum et 30 per consequens lapides. Et sic, notatis numero et modo athomorum requisitorum ad esse causans plante arboris vel cuiuscunque alterius mixti, tot sunt forme et individua quot sunt tales numeri; et ad omnem punctum talis numeri est causa, forma indivisibilis, multiplicata. 35

Ideo differt extensio forme superaddite cuius pars indivisibilis est multiplicata, et extensio forme elementaris cuius pars indivisibilis est punctualiter situata. Et in prima specie sunt multi gradus; ut patet de mixtis inanimatis, de plantis, et anulosis, quorum forme 40 extenduntur modis suis. Nec est omne continuum

1. zpla B.
40. annlof, B.

12. media^e B.

20. coi^{tes} y^{tes} B.

32. cans B.

divisibile in infinitum, cum sit status ad numerum indivisibilem, ut postea dicetur. Verumptamen ultra hoc quod nos sufficimus cognoscere est quodlibet tale divisibile; ideo ponitur tale mixtum omogeneum, cum 5 nulla pars eius quantitativa sensibilis sit disparis speciei a toto. Manifestum tamen est eterogeneum, cuius una pars quantitativa est ignis, alia aeris. Unde non infinitum est parvum tale mixtum, sed ad omnem eius punctum quelibet species elementi, sine earum 10 extensione vel continuacione, ut alias dicetur. Sed, si fuerit aliquod individuum per se quantumlibet magnum, et non habuerit multas partes non communicantes, quarum quelibet componitur ex atomis sufficientibus 2^m numerum et modum principiandi tale individuum, 15 tunc forma illius est multiplicata per totum, sicut est de hominibus et bestiis que requirunt membra simplicia, et componi in debita qualitate, quantitate et proporcione; et ex nulla tali forma cum parte sui corporis componitur adequate aliquod unum, vel qualitative; quia 20 sic quilibet homo foret quodlibet eius pars, sicut communiter tangitur de Sor. Anima tamen inest, continue actuabit illam, sed diversimode cum fuerit pars materie, et cum fuerit completa materia ex qua adequate fiet totum animal. Si ergo tales due materie 25 non communicantes adunate, tunc sunt duo animalia, sicut patet de monstro habente duo corda et duo capita, cum aliis membris sensibilibus duplicatis, et cum toto residuo inferiorum membrorum ac si esset unicus animalis. Tale autem aggregatum esset duo animalia communicancia et non per se individuum alicuius speciei; 30 sed esset unum, continuum, animatum, vivum etc. et tamen nec substantia nec accidens etc.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod maximus homo possibilis non posset auferri per assimilationem alimenti, stante habita materia. Sed contingeret ipsum tumescere 2^m partes, sine eius maioritate; quia magnitudo corporis attenditur penes multitudinem suarum specificarum partium non quantitivarum. Unde non sequitur ipsum maiorari, si pars eius maioretur; 40 nec haberet minimus homo possibilis partes superfluas. Nec est inconveniens, sed verum, quod est dare tam

life is multiplied in each atom. Each elementary form occupies only one point; each superadded one is diffused through many. In the lower beings, stones, plants, and *annelida*, the superadded forms are also to some degree extended. No continuous being is infinitely divisible, but far beyond all we can conceive. The forms of men and of the higher animals require all their organs to be properly disposed; and thus these forms belong indeed to each part, but only partly, and not in the same way as to the whole body. As for monsters with double organs joined together, they are simply two animals and not one individual of any species, having no one common form. To return to the question: the biggest of all possible men could not become bigger by assimilating any food, so long as his body remained that maximum of size. But a part of his body might swell up, provided it was not a specific part.

16. mb^v B.21. *coit*^r B; *ib.* *ca*^r B; *ib.* *me*^c B.

There is a first and a last instant of man's being; he would not then be infinitely weak, though his soul might actuate his body less intensely.

V. The assumption of the fifth objection is false; the blessed will enjoy Heaven to the utmost of their capacity. Grosscote says that they will know all things. The soul has a natural disposition to know all truth, whether complex relations or simple facts.

But the intellectual habit, or actual exercise of this faculty is required, in order to know.

And it actual knowledge is acquired by contemplation without labour, it is called *knowledge in the Word*, and implies that the soul, tending towards God, is enlightened by Him. It may, however, be denied that the soul has a separate

primum quam ultimum instans esse hominis. Nec foret talis homo infinitum debilis, cum posset tam agere quam pati. Verumtamen anima potest sub remissiori gradu dispositionis materie actuare materiam in quam est inducta, quam potest noviter induci. | Nec ideo desineret homo incipiens esse propter indisposicionem inceptacionis sue materie. Nec foret materia incipiens indisposicionem in tali gradu dispositionis in quali immediate ante hoc fuit.

Ad 5^{am} obieccionem dicitur quod assumptum est 10 falsum, cum beati habebunt habitus 2^m ultima suarum capacitatam. Et 2^m Lincolnensem, quilibet talis cognoscet omnia, cum anima eius non fuerit mole corporis prepedita nec aliunde accidente extraneo occupata, sed primo lumine 2^m ultimum irradiata. Nec est hoc in- 15 credibilis quam quod unum puntuale lucis diffundat infinitas lineas radiosas, manifestando distincte omnia que prius confuse videbantur in humine radioso. Anima ergo habet in se naturalem disposicionem ad cognoscendum quamcunque veritatem sue noticie possibilem. 20 Et illam disposicionem, habilitatem, pronitatem, vel potenciam naturalem ad complexe comprehendendum, vocant habitum aut scienciam innatam; sicut pronitatem naturalem ad incomplexe comprehendendum vocant speciem innatam vel noticiam innatam. Sed ad actua- 25 liter et distincte noscendum veritatem requiritur naturalis exercitacio; et disposicio ab illa adquisita vocatur habitus intellectualis, ut habitus, sciencia intelligibilis, ars vel prudencia. Et correspondenter dicendum est de speciebus aquisitis, respectu apprehensionis incomplexe. 30 Quod si quis, contemplando veritatem primam secundum omnes rationes suas causandi cognoverit sine proprio labore singulas alias veritates, tunc vocatur illa noticia apud theologos noticia in verbo, noticia matutina vel meridiana, noticia facialis vel intuitiva clara. 35 Et illa non est res absoluta, sed ponit animam non extranee impeditam, tendendo in deum, inclinari ab ipso ad taliter clare noscendum huiusmodi veritates.

Utrum autem anima habeat tot habitus correspondentes, dubitatur a multis. Et videtur quod non, tum 40 quia tunc infinitum perficeretur per infinitos habitus,

14. \overline{p} pedita B; *ib.* ut *pro* nec B.

35. *Facialis*. Face to face. "Now we see as in a glass, darkly."

tum quia obiectum primum sufficit ad illam noticiam
 actualem, sine habitu inclinante. Videtur tamen michi
 quod ex illis fortibus impressionibus causantur 2^m ulti-
 mum tam species quam habitus, quorum primum in-
 clinat ad apprehensionem incomplexam, et 2^m ad com-
 plexam; sic quod anima per impossibile impedita ab
 impressione felici, adhuc posset recolere de actibus
 preteritis et per consequens de veritatibus obiectis illis
 actibus. Et pronitatem derelictam voco speciem vel
 10 habitum; quia, cum anima nunquam ociabitur a talibus
 actibus, ideo communiter ponitur quod non intelligeret
 in habitu. Omnem ergo huiusmodi actualem apprehen-
 sionem consequitur vel precedit dispositio vel habitus
 inclinans ad talem actum, et per consequens species.
 15 Actus autem est prius causacione quam species vel
 habitus ab illo generatus; sed habitus est prius quo ad
 consequenciam, et talis habitus intellectivus vocatur
 apud theologos lumen glorie; et habitus voluntatis
 vocatur caritas. Nec potest deus sine talibus beatificare
 20 hominem, sicut nec potest sine actu.

Unde frivoli sunt casus, quibus ponitur deum supplere
 vicem speciei vel habitus sine posicione talium, quia
 claudit contradiccionem quod sic faciat. Sed magis
 frivolum est credere quod talia possunt per se esse,
 25 sicut aliqui arguunt de dispositione, causata in corpore
 circumducto. Nec sequitur deum correspondentem quali-
 ficari, quia non potest aswefaccione disponi. Nec sequi-
 tur quod anima sit in infinitum perfecta accidentaliter
 propter infinitatem talium accidencium, sicut nec subiec-
 tum | est infinitum perfectum propter infinitos modos et
 30 infinitas relaciones, vel talia accidentia; nec est subiectum
 proportionaliter perfectius, ut plures tales qualitates
 habet, sicut infinite partes subiecti perficiunt ipsum
 omnes equaliter: et tamen ex illis resultat una perfectio
 35 finita, sicut deus scit ex quot partibus tale componitur.

Alia ergo est perfectio essentialis quam claudit con-
 tradiccionem augeri vel minui, quia, si posset, esset
 accidentalis et non essentialis subiecto; et alia est
 perfectio accidentalis, sive ex substanciis sive ex acci-
 40 dentibus resultans; et sicut deus scit numerum princi-
 pantium talem, ita scit gradum perfectionis et quante
 unus numerus dictus a nobis infinitus excedit alium

disposition for
 each object of
 cognition;
 these being
 infinite, the
 dispositions
 would be so
 too.

Possibly the
 powerful
 impression of
 God's being
 causes both
 the images and
 the dispositions
 towards them;
 so that if the
 Saints could be
 without the
 actual sight
 of God, they
 would still
 enjoy its

remembrance.
 This tendency
 taken by itself,

I call the
 cognitive image
 or disposition.
 It is the light
 of glory in the
 intelligencence and
 charity in the
 will; both are
 necessary.

It would be self-
 contradictory
 to suppose
 cases in which
 God dispenses
 with these
 dispositions:
 or to fancy that
 they can exist
 by themselves.

It does not
 follow that
 the soul is
 accidentally
 infinite;
 a substance
 may be qualified
 by infinite
 modes

without being
 infinite on that
 account.

There are two
 sorts of
 perfection; one
 essential, that
 can in no wise
 increase or
 diminish: the
 other accidental,
 resulting from

different causes, of which God knows the number, and the degree of perfection they give.

No being is infinitely *perfected* in the sense of *good*, God alone is infinitely perfect.

Though the blessed in Heaven may have infinitely more both of knowledge and of happiness, they are not infinitely more perfect than we.

Two senses to *A exceeds B infinitely*; one, as the number of points in a surface and in a line, i. e. infinitely to us, but absolutely capable of equality; the other implies no equality possible.

Thus, though a being is twice as perfect in science (or any accident) as another, we cannot conclude that it is twice as perfect simply.

numerum finitum nobis vel infinitum. Et per consequens scit quante beatus est accidentaliter perfectior non beato. Nichil enim est infinite perfectum, nisi forte intelligatur ille terminus *perfectum* nominaliter pro bono et non participialiter pro plene perfecto. Sic autem 5 deus dicitur infinite perfectus, hoc est, bonus. Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est aliquid esse in proporcione rationali perfectius quam prius; quia vel oporteret perfectionem essencialem crescere, vel perfectionem accidentalem parificari perfectioni essentiali; quorum 10 utrumque est impossibile. Nec sequitur: *Sor beatus est infinitum perfectior accidentaliter quam Plato est accidentaliter: ergo, Sor, est infinitum accidentaliter perfectus*. Sicut non sequitur: *virtus est infinitum melior domino 15 coactivo: ergo, illa virtus est infinitum bona*. Quando- cunque ergo dicitur substantiam esse ita perfectam, intelligitur de totali perfectione aggregata ex substantiali et accidentali; et ita de perfectione accidentali vel perfectione generis accidentis, semper intelligitur de 20 totali huiusmodi perfectione. Et hinc non sequitur quod ultimate felices sunt infinitum perfectiores nobis, quamvis infinitum perfectius cognoscunt et delectantur quam nos.

Nota tamen quod aliud dicitur infinitum excedere aliud quoad nos, aliquando cum aliqua deo finita parificarent unum alteri; ut patet de numero punctorum 25 superficie, et numero punctorum linee. Et aliqua non sic; ut comparando virtutes fortitudini, felicitatem delectacioni sensuali, noticiam intellectivam sensacioni; et sic de aliis. Unde non sequitur: *A est in duplo perfectius accidentaliter quam B: ergo est in duplo perfectius B*. 30 Nec sequitur: *A est in duplo perfectius quo ad scienciam, vel aliud genus accidentis, quam B; ergo, A est in duplo perfectius quam B*; quia non est possibile subiectum esse tam perfectum accidentaliter quam perfectum est simpliciter, aut econtra. Nec sequitur: *ille 35 due intellectiones perficiunt in duplo plus subiectum quam faceret altera illarum per se: ergo, subiectum per illas est in duplo perfectius quam fuit, quando solum unam habuit*. Sed bene sequitur quod in duplo perfectius intelligit et est in duplo perfectius intelligens per illas 40 quam per alteram solam intellexit.

Sunt autem multa dubia contingencia hanc materiam; utputa si una sit perfectio composita ex accidentali et essentiali, aut una accidentalis perfectio composita ex perfectionibus diversorum generum aut diversarum specierum. Et videtur quod sic, quia aliter nichil possit crescere in perfectione. Vel aliter; substantia posset esse perfectior quam prius fuit, sine hoc quod habeat maiorem perfectionem quam prius habuit. Ideo videtur esse una perfectio unitate aggregacionis vel unitate subiecti; et illa crescit per adventum accidentalis perfectionis, salva perfectione priori.

2^o. Videtur quod omne accidens perficit subiectum, quia privaciones, ut peccata morum et nature, faciunt substantiam iuste pati. Et in hoc, pulcrificant universum, et per idem inperfectio perficit subiectum efficienter et non formaliter, cum solum perfectio perficit subiectum formaliter.

B 81^b 3^o. Videtur quod omne accidens subiecti facit ipsum tam perfectum sicut aliquid; quia aliter esset quelibet substantia corporea infinitum modice perfecta et per consequens quelibet eius perfecta cuilibet. Nec aliud posset esse minus perfectum quam est, et per idem omne quantum esset infinitum parvum vel remissum. Sicut ergo musca contrahit navem, sic quantitas perficit subiectum ad gradum totalis perfectionis. Sed precise tante perficit quam perfectum accidens ipsum est, loquendo de perfectione quam ipsum per se facit, et non de perfectione quam ipsum conficit. Unde non sequitur; *sub illo gradu accidens perficit subiectum: ergo, sub illo gradu subiectum perficitur*, cum aliud sit perficere et aliud perfici. Et ad antiquas reduplicativas quibus solet concedi quod subiectum, *ut quantum*, est sic perfectum, et, *ut sciens*, est perfectius, dicendum quod intelligende sunt de quantitate et sciencia quod ille sunt sic perfecte, et illa perfectio attribuitur subiecto; quia nullam aliam essenciam ponit tale accidens.

Nota tamen quod aliquod dicitur per se, excludendo actualem inherenciam, et aliud, excludendo parcialem inexistentiam; quomodo completa accidencia sunt per se, cum non sunt partes aliquorum sue speciei. Unde

19. aliquod B.

23. musca B; *ib. nane* B.

37, 38. *Inherenciam . . . parcialem inexistentiam*. The former word is used by Scholastics to denote an accident as distinguished from a substance; the latter to denote a part as different from its whole.

Several minor points.

1. There is one single perfection consisting of accident and substance, and one likewise consisting of the different sorts of accident.

2. Every accident renders its subject more perfect; for every sin makes the sinner suffer, thus

rendering the universe more perfect;

3. accident gives a real quidditative perfection; if not, bodies would have very little perfection indeed.

Quantity helps towards perfecting substance, as a fly helps in dragging a ship; and every accident aids in so far as it is perfect itself.

Remark that *by itself* may either mean the negation of 'in another', or of 'part of another'.

The whole of a given accident is in the latter sense *by itself*. Again, a thing is called better than another either because it has a superior degree of goodness by itself, or belonging to a subject. In the second sense many accidents are superior even to reasonable substances. Quantity, however, and material accidents cannot be thus superior.

nota quod dupliciter dicitur bonitas reliqua maior; vel quia sic perfectum per se habet bonitatem cui reliquum non habet per se parem vel excedentem; et illo modo quelibet substancia infinitum excedet quodlibet accidens in perfeccione; 2^o modo dicitur unum participative 5 reliquo perfeccius; et illo modo virtutes, et felicitates, et multa alia accidentia, nedum excederent substancias inanimatas et vegetabilia et irrationabilia, sed homines; ut perfeccius et melius est hominem esse virtuosum vel felicem (quod est virtus vel felicitas) quam est 10 habere quotlibet divicias; ymmo quam est hominem esse absolute, cum preexigit esse hominem, et superaddit finem eius perfectum. Ista autem perfeccio vocatur participativa vel relativa, quia nichil valeret nisi, communicando cum perfeccione substancie, supperadderet 15 bonum modum, qui non potest per se esse, nec uniri vel parificari perfeccioni per se. Sed quantitas et alia accidentia corporea non sunt sic perfecta, quia tunc subiectum, ex hoc quod sic quantum vel accidentatum, esset sic perfectum; et per consequens omne sic acci- 20 dentatum est sic perfectum. Omnis ergo essentialis perfeccio accidentis est per accidentalem perfeccionem substancie, vel pars talis perfeccionis.

Thus it may be maintained that a blessed soul has at the same time infinite acts, relative to the infinite objects it knows, all clearly seen in the First Sight. Even now the fact of sight proves that we have an infinite multitude of acts; we do not, it is true, see all distinctly; but God can strengthen our mental vision. All other visions merely follow upon the sight of God.

Unde videtur michi probabile quod aliquis ultimate felix habeat infinitos actus, terminatos ad veritates 25 cognitatas, qui omnes causantur et clarificantur a prima luce, in qua felix clare videt omnia que ego uno actu transeunte confuse. Possibile enim est animam simul habere infinitos actus; ut patet ex intuicione visibilis; et quamvis nunc non sufficio in tot obiecta simul di- 30 stincte tendere, facile tamen est illi luci prime disponere animam meam ut distincte in tot tendat. Et tunc in ipsa et per ipsam viderem omnia, et ab ipsa terminaretur omnis talis visio mea; sed non obiective ad ipsam, cum idem sit obiectum sic terminare visionem, 35 et illud obiectum esse illa visione visum. Ad visionem ergo felicem qua videtur deus terminans illam obiective consequuntur omnes alie visiones quas et ipse terminat ad obiecta visa. Visiones vero in proprio genere possunt excidere, stante felicitate, | per desinicionem veritatum in- B 82* tuitarum, et non aliter, sic quod anima langueat desiderando videre ignotum; et per consequens non esset

However, this secondary knowledge may proceed not from the sight of God, but from previously known truths; and such may also be the knowledge of the blessed.

illa cognoscere, et potest tantum discere quod vel ignoret vel si, aliqua ignorando, fuit felix, tantum sciens sicut potest; tunc huiusmodi aquirendo noticiam unius deperdit noticiam alterius. Potest tamen esse quod adquirat illam noticiam sine hoc quod deperdat reliquam, sicut communiter sophisticantur in materia de fortitudine solius mulieris derelictae de specie humana impregnate. Semper ergo felix habet noticiam claram de deo; et replecio capacitatis sue impedit ipsum in casu ad discendum; quod non est proprie impedire. Non tamen est possibile quicquid discere vel scire, nisi discatur vel sciatur in verbo vel per verbum. Sed si noticia fuerit imperfecta, et per mociones veritatum scitarum ignorato verbo, tunc vocatur noticia vespertina rerum in proprio genere. Et forte habitus tales ad quosquisitos habebunt ultimate felices sicut et noticias ab illis causatas.

Leaving this point, we say that there is a limit to the size of a pile that can be made by men, and to which no addition can be made without diminution on another part. As its building progressed, the powers of the human race would be exhausted.

Sed relinquendo illa theologis, | conceditur quod est B 82^b dare maximum cumulum possibilem fieri ab hominibus; quo dato, repugnat quod cumuletur ulterius, nisi aliter unde fiat diminutio. Nec est hoc incredibile philosopho, quia antequam ferit talis turris, valde debilitaretur tota multitudo hominum qui forent habiles ad agendum opus. Ita quod, vel propter inpotenciam illorum, vel propter carenciam vel indisposicionem materie, vel propter vetacionem virtutis regitive universi non sufficerent ulterius, ymmo data minima quantitate sub qua non potest esse talis cumulus. Iuxta opinantes contrarium tam incredibile esset plebeo, postquam cumulus non deficeret nisi per 4^{am} pedis a tali quantitate, quod omnes homines mundi non sufficerent addere ille quantitati 4^{am} pedis.

Nature thus imposes a limit to men both in this respect and as regards curious instruments,

Certum ergo est quod est dare quantum regula nature sinit homines inordinate vagari in talibus edificis et curiositatibus instrumentorum, indumentorum, vel

6, 7. fortine B. 10. ad discendum B. 13. mocoes B. 22. tris B. 27. 9^{te} B.

6, 7. *De fortitudine*. This example occurs at more length in other works. Mediaeval philosophers, debating the question whether, if the whole human race perished, except one woman in a state of pregnancy, she could possibly die or miscarry, decided it negatively, because she would be necessary for the existence of the species.

quorumcunque aliorum artificiatorum. Immo quantum
 sinerentur inordinate procedere in destructionem poli-
 cie, superhabundanter augendo agricolas, vel bellatores,
 vel artifices, vel mercantes, vel qualescunque ritus ec-
 5 clesiasticos: et sic de bonis que sibi accumulunt. Sicut
 enim ex ordinacione politica nature prime universum
 est dispositum in numero, in qualitate et quantitate
 ac positione suarum partium, ita non dubium quin
 deberet esse in arte regendi policias imitante naturam;
 10 et cum pars policie tantum hodie excedunt in multis
 nominatorum, verisimile est quod aliqua pars policie
 cito paciatur eclipsim; ymmo, cum homo sit quodam-
 modo dominus et finis aliorum que sunt in mundo,
 iusticia exigit quod illa que homini subserviunt sint
 15 proporcionata suo fini et dominio, cum a fine impo-
 nente necessitatem rebus, limitantur modi mediorum ad
 finem. Et hinc credo homines proporcionabiliter puniri
 ad sua vicia. Relinquendo ergo illa moralibus concedimur
 quod est dare maximam penam vel indispositionem
 20 quam quis potest subire, tam quoad intensionem quam
 quoad extensionem vel monstrationem.

Ad 6^{am} obieccionem conceditur quod est dare maxi-
 mum et minimum quod quecunque data virtus visiva
 sufficit videre. Nota tamen quod duplex est visio, sci-
 25 licet sensitiva et intellectiva; et utraque duplex, scilicet
 distincta et confusa. Distincta, qua excluditur a vidente
 ignorancia primo visi; ut cognoscendo per visum quod
 hoc sensibile est videro illud distincte. Sed visio con-
 fusa non excludit ignoranciam primo visi illa visione;
 30 ut, videndo a remotis silvam vel acervum, videro con-
 fuse multa individua illius multitudinis, que tamen
 B 83^a ignoro; ita quod, quesito | a me utrum sint, dicerem
 quod nescirem, nisi forte in universali. Et in utroque
 membro visionis sunt quotlibet gradus; utrumque eciam
 35 membrum subdividitur in 3^a; ut aliqua est visio recta,
 aliqua reflexa, ut visio ad specula, et 3^{cia} est visio re-
 fracta, ut visio per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum.
 De visione eciam intellectuali sunt proporcionabiles
 distinciones.

garments,
 numerous
 husbandmen,
 soldiers,
 artisans,
 merchants, or
 ecclesiastical
 rites and
 possessions.
 Government
 ought to
 imitate nature
 in these things.
 And as men
 are punished
 proportionately
 as they are
 wicked, I
 believe there is
 a limit to the
 greatest
 punishment
 of all.

VI. There is a
 maximum and
 a minimum
 that the visual
 faculty can see;
 but both
 intellectual and
 bodily sight are
 either distinct
 or confused.
 Confused sight
 does not
 exclude
 ignorance.
 There are
 infinite shades
 dividing these
 two extremes;
 and each of
 them belongs
 to direct, or
 reflected, or
 refracted sight,
 physical or
 intellectual.

2. indestruccon B. 4. agri colifices B. 21. mra³ B. 23. visiva
 in marg.

5. Ecclesiasticos . . . accumulunt. Note this.

The minimum of intellectual sight is the union of two mathematical points. There is also a minimum of bodily vision; for nothing can be seen confusedly that could not be seen distinctly; thus the composition of quantity out of mere points could not be seen; for this minimum must be the basis of a pyramid whose apex is in the eye.

Some details about the eye.

1. The eight varying influences: light, distance of the object, its position, its size, its density, its shape, the transparency of the medium and the sanitary state of the eye, are all factors in the act of vision.

Compositum ergo ex duobus non quantis est minimum quod potest intellectualiter videri. Est autem videre in communi apprehendere visibile immediate virtute visiva; et sic est dare minimum visibile sensu exteriori, ut superficiale circulare. Et probabiliter potest dici quod nichil videtur aliqua virtute confuse, nisi quod a virtute talis speciei sufficit videri distincte; et sic visus corporalis non potest videre non quantum, nec compositum adequate ex non quantis nobis finitis; sed minimum sic visibile videtur 2^m pyramidem radia-¹⁰ lem, cuius basis est in viso et conus in centro oculi. Et consequenter ponendum est quod est dare remississimum gradum cuiuscunque 8^{to} circumstanciarum ad visionem concurrencium, et optimum gradum possibilem, et per consequens remississimum gradum confuse vel¹⁵ distincte videndi, qui gradus est subito generabilis: et patet responsio ad 6^{am}.

Nota tamen quod nec organum nec sensus videt, sed animal organo et virtute, nisi forte *videre* sit equivocum ad *recipere speciem visibilis* et ad *apprehendere virtute*²⁰ *visiva dandum visibile*. Sed quia visio corporalis est medium ad visionem ymaginativam et intellectualem, necnon et subtilior inter alias sensaciones ac propinquior intellectui, ideo perstringam aliquas paucas notas in ista materia.²⁵

Primo dico quod ad visionem respondent octo circumstancie, 2^m quarum variacionem variantur gradus visionum et erroris in visione contingencium. Circumstancie vero sunt iste: lux, distancia, situs opposicionis, magnitudo visibilis, densitas visibilis, figura visibilis,³⁰ dyaphaneitas medii, tempus conveniens, et sanitas oculi. Cuiuslibet autem istorum est dare gradum summe conveniencie ad visionem, et gradum minime conveniencie ad visionem, et 2^m variacionem graduum in istis variantur gradus apparenciarum visibilium.³⁵

2^o nota quod 20 sunt sensibilia communia; ut, remocio, magnitudo, situs, corporeitas, figura, contiguitas, separacio, numerus, motus, quies, asperitas, levitas, dyaphaneitas, densitas, umbra, obscuritas, pulcritudo, deformitas, consimilitudo, et diversitas. Omnium⁴⁰

2. intbar (?) B. 9. fit B. 11. coug B. 13. ccufuciar? B.
23. subtilior' B. 26, 27. ccuffatie B. 37, 38. gtitas B.

autem istorum visiones presupponunt visionem lucis vel coloris; et aliqua istorum subtilius videntur et aliqua difficilius; aliqua subito et aliqua successive, aliqua con-
 B 83^b fuse et aliqua distincte. | Ad omnia tamen ista con-
 5 currit virtus distinctiva vel sensus communis, eliciens diversos actus de istis, 2^m modum presentandi speciei per se sensibilis sine specie illorum acta per medium.

Tercio, nota compositionem oculi ex tribus humoribus; scilicet, ex humore crystallino vel glaciali, ex
 10 humore vitreo, et ex humore albugineo. Primus humor est sperula in medio oculi constituta, ad subiectandum virtutem visivam, habens in anteriori parte compressionem superficialem ad modum lenticule. 2^s humor est inter primum et cerebrum, subrubens in propinqua
 15 dispositione, ut ex illo fiat humor glacialis. Sed 3^s humor est quasi fex primi in anteriori parte oculi, constituens cum vitreo quasi unam speram continuentem primum humorem. Duo ergo nervi exeunt a lateribus exterioris ventriculi cerebri directe ad ambos oculos,
 20 qui sunt primum par nervorum concavi pleni spiritibus, et statim canallisant se eversim, exeundo piam matrem, hoc est pelliculam tenuem involventem cerebrum contextam ex venis et arteriis deferentibus a corde vitam et spiritum, et ab eppate nutrimentum. Et per illos nervos
 25 vocatos opticos deferentur species ad intra. Ex optico- rum ergo substantia oritur in oculo tela aranea vel retina 2^m unam eius partem, separans humorem 1^m a 2^o, et 2^m aliam centuram utrosque primos humores, dividendo illos a 3^o. Deinde nervi predicti, antequam
 30 subintrans duram matrem, coniunguntur, constituens unum nervum concavum; deinde obviant dure matri et accipientes ab ea pellem unam exeunt craneum. Ex substantia ergo pie matris accipiunt nervi optici tenuem pelliculam ex qua producitur in oculo 2^a tunica que
 35 vocatur uvea vel etina, circumdans tercium humorem, sed cum nigra, viridi vel glauca, perforata rotunde ad anterius, ut per pupillam species ingrediantur. Sed de

have each a limit favourable and unfavourable to this act.

There are 20 common objects of sensation perceived by sight, by means of colour, its primary object, some more, some less easily; but the interior sense is needed to distinguish them.

Anatomical description of the different parts of the eye; of the crystalline lens, of the vitreous and the aqueous humours, of the optic nerves, that cross each other, traverse the *pia mater*, and widen out into the retina which separates the crystalline from the vitreous and both from the aqueous humour.

They take from the *pia mater* a thin pellicle which, in the eye, becomes the iris,

and from the *dura mater*

21. canalla^{nt} B. 28. ceturj B. 35. z¹na B.

5. *Sensus communis*. This is the sense which, according to medieval philosophers, receives the impressions of the different external senses, and also those feelings that arise within the body.

21. *Canallisant*. Perhaps a mistake for *cancellant* (see pag. 180, l. 27) but I understand one word as little as the other; unless *cancellare* means "to cross".

a membrane that thickens into the cornea. The whole is covered with a membrane called the conjunctive. All this is wonderfully contrived by nature to enable us to see.

Location of different sensitive faculties in the brain: The interior sense resides in the first lobe of the first ventricle; the imaginative in the 2nd; the estimative, together with fancy, is in the middle ventricle; the memorative and the motive faculty is in the last (the cerebellum?).

substantia dure matris producitur in oculo tunica, vocata cornea sive sclerotica, que est alba, operiens foramen uvee ad anterius. De substantia autem panniculi involventis craneum, cui per commissuras alligatur dura mater immediate intra craneum procedit 4^a tunica, 5 vocata coniunctiva vel consolidativa, que continuatur cum cornea, constituens orbem oculi; et ista est cornea interius alligata in concavitate ossis, vocati orbita oculi. Complexiones autem, qualitates, quiditates, et posiciones istarum parcium oculi sagacissime sunt ingeniate a natura pro visione complenda.

4^o nota | quod sensus communis viget in prima parte B 84^a primi ventriculi cerebri, sicut ymaginativa in 2^a, et correspondenter estimativa et fantastica in medio ventriculo, et in postremo ventriculo memorativa et virtus 15 2^m locum motiva. Et sunt omnes recte virtutes multiplicate per sua organa, sicut visiva virtus multiplicatur per crystalloidem et locum concursus opticorum. Visiva ergo virtute elicitur actus videndi, que non est mole magnus, sicut taccio, sed obiective magnus, habens 20 quotlibet partes 2^m differenciam basium pyramidis radialis, et tactus ille est quodammodo inextensus in illo visu, sicut et virtus visiva. Formaliter tamen et subiective solum est actus vel virtus in vidente. Et hinc posuerunt antiqui visionem fieri per extramissionem 25 virtutis, et animam vel hominem esse quodammodo cum illo cui afficitur. Et defectus noticie terminorum in tali materia, et defectus admissionis modi loquendi, facit multas dissensiones ab opinionibus antiquorum. Certum tamen est quod visio est de genere accionis, de- 30 penden's éssencialiter a viso et a parcialibus visionibus dependentibus a suis obiectis ad que terminantur. Nec terminarentur ad illa, ut ad suas causas, nisi aliqua essent in illis. Ymmo, in medio est actus videndi, ubi non est terminative; sicut patet quando, propter 35

8. of, B. 9. $\tilde{g}^{tes} \tilde{q}p^{tes}$ B. 22. \widetilde{icxndi} B.

14, 15. *Estimativa - memorativa.* These must not be confounded with judgment and memory; the former belong to man in common with the more perfect animals, and exclude any idea of abstractive cognition. 16. If by *postremo ventriculo*, Wyclif really means the cerebellum, then he is in singular agreement with recent physiological experiments as regards the motive faculty. The cerebellum has certainly a good deal to do with the motor apparatus.

dislocacionem oculi vel aliam racionem, de uno continuo apparet quod sint duo distancia localiter. Vanum tamen est credere quod actus tales possunt per se esse vel conservari sine objecto; et sic de multis que loquentes 5 nostre legis fabulantur.

Omnis ergo actus anime ponit formaliter animam agere, et imprimit disposicionem vel habitum; et sic est in alteracione, et arguit animam mobilem. Ymmo, habita prima noticia primi veri 2^m intellectum et plene 10 amore 2^m voluntatem et scienciam perpetuo sic manendi cum summa dotacione corporis et infrigibili subordinacione completarum virium inferiorum ad superiores, resultat naturaliter felicitas, que est qualitas inseparabilis. Et iste disposiciones prime quandoque 15 vocantur partes beatitudinis; et beatitudo vocatur aggregacio omnium istorum bonorum. Quandoque vero materialiter loquendo, unum istorum vel multa vocantur beatitudo particularis. Actus ergo denominat subiectum quale, sed non formaliter.

20 Per istas 4^{or} notas posset naturalis dare causas omnium erronearum apparicionum in visione; utputa quare uritur nebula a longinquo et non de prope; quare latent anguli et supereminencie visibiles a longinquo; quare propter velocem giracionem ticionis 25 apparet candentem circulum in noctibus causari, et quare de quiescentibus apparet quod moveantur, et econtra. Et sic de multis aliis. Dubia tamen copiose B 84^b pulcherrima circumstant ista dicta: | utputa, quomodo distancia vel magnitudo visibilis est pertinens visioni, 30 cum per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum contingit quantumcunque parvum ad quantamlibet magnam distanciam apparere quantumlibet magnum distincta visione. Ymmo, homo videt acervum et tenebram, sicut audit silencium infinitum, si esset: ubi non videtur 35 virtutem egredi, cum non percipitur talis privacionis distancia. Ymmo, cum eadem visio non potest esse in diversis locis, hic confusa et ibi distincta (et sic de quotlibet gradibus) videtur quod visio sit extensa per medium habens in aere partem confusam, sicut et in 40 tenebra per quam videtur visibile, et in objecto partes dispariter distinctas. Aliter enim esset quelibet anima

Every act of the mind supposes a new state of mental movement. And when this act is an act of perfect knowledge and love of God with the certitude of never changing, it is a state of bliss, the necessary dispositions to which are called parts of bliss, or particular bliss. The preceding observations enable the natural philosopher to explain the cause of all errors in sight: the red clouds of sunset, the invisibility of angles and the conspicuousness of heights at a distance, and why a brand whirled round seems a circle; also, why motionless things seem to move and *vice versa*. Some very interesting questions are e. g. in what way distance affects the sight; how we can see darkness, whether sight is not extended in the object and in the intervening air, whether, as a body at the greatest

5. nr̄ B. 8. ar̄ B. 9. pleno B. 10. f̄c̄nt̄ B. 22. v'rr B.
23. an^u B; *ib.* visi^u B. 39. a'c B.

possible distance would appear as a point, the slightest change for the worse in the conditions would render it invisible; whether a piercing sight cannot see what a weak sight can; whether there is a limit to human merit; whether our eyes deceive us as to the position of objects.

Waiving all these questions, we may say that the perpendicular ray penetrates to the centre of the nerve common to both eyes; the others are refracted in the same direction, so as to coincide with the perpendicular ray; if they did not, they would cross each other in the centre of the eye, and form an inverted image. There are thus four pyramids of rays; two based on the object and with their apex in the centre of each eye; and two based on the surface of the vitreous humour, with their apices

ubique, cum omnia intelligit. Videtur eciam quod remocio facit ad noticiam; quia, posito B visibili in fine maxime distancie possibilis videri, cum aliis optimis circumstanciis videndi, videtur quod ibi apparet indivisibile; et quantumcunque modica elongacio vel debilitacio circumstancie perciperetur a visu, cum tamen non a maxime proporcionato propinquo perciperetur quodlibet tale crementum vel decrementum. Et idem videtur de acie visus penetrantis et non videntis medium quod visus debiliior satis videt. Videtur eciam quod homo possit tantum mereri hic, quod non possit promereri ulterius. Et sic terminaretur potencia dei respectu cuiuscunque effectus ad maximum in quod posset; cum homo in ultimo instanti sue promericionis non posset ulterius convalescere merendo. Videtur eciam quod diversarum dyaphaneitatum ad quas oportet radios visibilis frangi.

Sed dimissis illis, gracia brevitatis, dicitur quod perpendicularis, que est axis pyramidis radialis, penetrat refracte usque ad centrum nervi communis; et alii radii obliqui franguntur declinantes a perpendiculari propter humorum vitreum, quia est maioris dyaphaneitatis quam glacialis; et cum species visibilis in concavitate sit quasi conformis dyaphaneitatis, multiplicat species 2^m congruam positionem, usque ad nervum communem. Aliter enim cancellarent se in centro, et eversim intendentem, signarent posiciones eversas sensibiles. Patet ergo quod sunt 4^{or} pyramides per quas visio completur, quarum duo bassantur in visibili et conantur in centris oculorum, et due alie bassantur in anteriori superficie vitrei et conantur in centro nervi communis, racione cuius concursus apparet una res, non obstantibus ambobus oculis. Ibi enim fit individuum 2^m positionem et figuram duarum proximarum pyramidum. Et conformes sunt pyramides virtutes egredientis ab oculo, que vocantur pyramides visuales; et punctus, ubi concurrunt in basi visibili, vocatur punctus coniunctionis et axis communis vocatur linea recta protracta a centro communis nervi, stans perpendiculariter, connectens centra foraminum; et quando punctus coniunctionis est in axe communi, tunc est optima opposicio

9. acucie (sic!) B.

31. cona^r B.

40, 41. connectentem B.

possibilis. Et semper per axem pyramidis radialis fit
 distincior visio, et indistincior ut, cum paribus, radius
 est ab illa axe remocior. Unde, ad iudicandum uni-
 formitatem rei, oportet punctum coniunccionis rotari
 5 super superficiem visam; quia videtur quod axis pyra-
 midis radialis, quantumcunque debilis, penetrans re-
 fracte, sit forcior ad certificandum quam radius obli-
 quus, quantumlibet fortis.

joining at the
 common nerve;
 the pyramids
 of visual force
 being similar to
 the former.
 Sight is more
 or less distinct
 according as
 the ray is more
 or less in the
 direction of
 the visual axis.

Si autem delectat videre particulariter istam materiam,
 10 notetur Alacen et liber tercius Vitulonis etc.

7. *Alacen* is Alhazen, an Arab philosopher; *Vitulonis* is
 Vitellion (Ciolek), a Pole, who lived in Cracow in the XIIIth cen-
 tury. His works were printed at Basle in 1572.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

This chapter deals with conditional propositions; i. e. all such hypothetical propositions as imply a condition.

Sequitur de condicionalibus pertractandum.

Et primo supponatur omnem ypotheticam subordinatam actu condicionato, esse condicionalem; ut est talis: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal*, et cetera que vulgariter vocantur consequencie, quamvis 2^m vim vocis habitu veritatis posterioris ad priorem sit consequencia qualis est in significato cuiuscunque condicionalis vere, inter antecedens naturaliter prius et suum naturaliter consequens. Et hinc patet quod differunt iste note consequenciarum, *si*, *ergo*, *igitur*, et forte omnia synkategorica que nos ponimus synonymina. Nam iste coniunciones *ergo*, *ideo*, *igitur*, et *si* que consimiles, connotando causacionem, ponunt consequenciam nec in materia nec in forma peccantem: Sed non sic condicionalis: cum hoc sit necessarium, *si tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis*. Et sic differunt note consequenciarum 2^m genera causandi.

The particule *if* differs from others that suppose causation, in that it merely implies necessary sequence.

Sed, relictis istis altercacionibus signorum grammaticis, notandum quod *si* quantocunque ponitur pro *quia*, quandoque dicit simpliciter necessariam veritatem condicionatam. Et hoc 2^{ter} variatur; vel sic quod sit veritas conditionis tenens ut nunc: ut hic: *si ego sum Rome, falsum est verum*. Nam veritati eterne repugnat quod nunc sim Rome, nisi quilibet sequatur. Istam tamen significacionem communiter abiiciunt sophiste. Vel 2^o quod sit veritas condicionata tenens pro omni tempore eterno; ut: *si deus est, ipse vult mundum esse*. Vel pro tempore eterno a parte post; ut: *si ego non sum, nichil fuit*. Et talium per accidens consequenciarum aliqua ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condicionaliter assumptam esse pro aliqua mensura temporis pro qua non sit veritas condicionaliter deducta. Ut: *si*

If is sometimes taken to mean *because*; sometimes a mere link of sequence, either existing for the present, or eternally, or from all eternity till now. It may imply that the consequence must exist so long as the condition exists;

deus vult tempus esse, tunc tempus est. Aliqua autem solum ponit quod impossibile est veritatem conditionaliter assumptam esse, nisi veritas conditionaliter deducta sit pro aliqua mensura. Ut, *si deus vult me esse, ego sum*; nam antecedens est eternum, et consequens temporale. Semper tamen fuisset tale signum verum; *ego sum*; quia sufficit ad veritatem talis signi quod suum primarium significatum aliquando sit, ut patebit capitulo ultimo. 4^o vero modo sumitur nota 10 conditionalis de condicionato extremo, quandoque copulans imperativam: ut hic; *si vis vitam ingredi, serva mandata*; quandoque coniunctivam, ut hic: *domine, si* B 85^b *fuisses hic, frater meus non fuisset mortuus*; quandoque copulat oraciones imperfectas in propositionibus non 15 tentis conditionaliter; ut hic; *tu es quicquid esses, si esses asinus.* Omnes tamen tales implicanc condicionales. Unde videtur michi quod sicut hec oracio individua non est proposicionaliter vera: *fecistine hoc?* ita racione coniunccionis est hec propositio conditionaliter vera: 20 *si Judas decessisset in gracia, fuisset salvatus.*

Ex istis patet quod 3^{ter} est conditionalis vera. Primo simpliciter et absolute; 2^o per accidens, et 3^o ut nunc. Et omnis conditionalis vera convenit in hoc cum qualibet, non solum quod primarie significat veritatem, sed 25 quod impossibile est veritatem conditionaliter assumptam esse, nisi sit veritas eius conditionaliter deducta; et econtra. Et hoc est quod principaliter solet dici quod signanter tunc est consequencia bona quando impossibile est antecedens illius sic primarie significantis esse 30 verum, nisi suum consequens sit verum.

Et ita tripliciter dicitur *impossibile* et *necessarium*: scilicet simpliciter, per accidens, et 2^m quid. *Simpliciter necessarium* est quod de nulla potencia potest non esse. *Necessarium per accidens* est veritas quam ordi- 35 nacioni eterne repugnat pro aliqua parte dati temporis eterni non esse. Et *necessarium 2^m quid* quidem solum temporaliter est, sed legi eterne repugnat ipsum non esse. Et correspondenter de impossibili per accidens et 2^m quid. Unde, sicut omne necessarium per accidens 40 aut 2^m quid potest non esse, sic omne impossibile per accidens aut 2^m quid potest esse.

or that it exists during some part of the existence of its condition.

Again, it may have its condition under the imperative or the subjunctive form;

or it may join sentences that do not strictly form, but imply, a conditional proposition.

A conditional proposition may be true simply and absolutely, or accidentally, or in one respect. But in any case it is impossible for the consequence to be true, if the condition is false.

Impossible and necessary are either absolutely so, or accidentally,

or in one respect.

Rules:
 1. As a 'conditional' is true, so it is necessary; as it is false, so it is impossible. This is not generally admitted now, unless for absolute necessity and impossibility; so it is no wonder if our rules present some discrepancy. From what is absolutely necessary may follow what is so contingently; and thus all that happens, happens necessarily; though not absolutely so.
 2. Truth may follow from falsity, but not vice versa. In things contingent, however, what is false may become true, what is necessary, false and what is true, impossible, at a different time, but it does not follow that *this will be false* implies *this will be*. Some say that falsity is true in so far as it is an object of thought; others that what is true (at one time) is false (at another). And thus falsity follows from truth: If God wills that the day of Judgment be, *it is: it is*, false now, will be true at a given time.

Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima quod proportionaliter sicut condicionalis est vera, sic necessaria; et sicut ipsa est falsa, sic est impossibilis; et econtra. Communitas tamen sophistarum non admittit condicionalem esse bonam, nisi fuerit absolute necessaria. Ideo non mirum si regule eorum dissonant ab ampliantibus *necessarium* et *impossibile*. Nam ex absoluto necessario sequitur necessarium per accidens: ut ex *deum esse* sequitur *ipsum velle mundum esse*, et per consequens *mundum esse*; et breviter omne aliud verum, quantumlibet contingens. Ex quo sequitur quod omne futurum necessario eveniet, non quidem necessitate absoluta, sed necessitate ex suppositione. Sequitur etiam quod consequentia sit ponibilis et de impossibilibus, cum talis impossibilis per accidens potest esse vera. 15

2^o patet ex falso, tam signo quam signato, sequi verum; sed nunquam ex vero sequi falsum ex parte rei, pro mensura pro qua est falsum. Pro omni enim tali mensura, ipsum non est. Potest tamen falsum contingens esse verum, et per consequens necessarium aliquo modo. Unde in talibus que sunt per accidens, nedum ex falso fiet verum, sed necessarium erit falsum et verum erit impossibile. Hoc enim potest esse necessarium: *Iste lapis occidit Sortem*; et hoc potest esse impossibile post corruptionem lapidis. Idem ergo in re est, *falsum fore verum* et *illud quod aliquando non est aliquando fore*: quia, si hoc nunc non est tunc *hoc esse* est falsum, et si illud est, tunc *illud esse* est verum. Nec est color, si *hoc tunc erit falsum* vel impossibile | *quod tunc erit*; cum oppositum sequitur. B 86^a 30

Unde aliqui dicunt quod verum converteretur in falsum et impossibile, et ipsum falsum habebit esse possibile vel intelligibile. Alii autem dicunt quod verum est falsum; quia quod pro uno tempore est, pro alio non est. Unde non sequitur: *hoc est falsum* vel *impossibile*; ergo, *non est*; sed bene sequitur quod pro aliqua mensura repugnat necessario illud esse; non tamen simul et semel est verum et falsum; et sic ex vero sequitur falsum ut ex *deum velle diem iudicii esse*, sequitur *illum esse*; quod adhuc est falsum, sed in tempore suo verum. Et illud reputo esse probabile. 40

14. ponit B. 26. al^h B. 27. a^h B. 35. esse B.

40. *Illum*, i. e. *diem*.

Alii autem dicunt quod si *hoc esse* sit falsum, tunc pro nulla mensura est, quia aliter quelibet creatura esset impossibilis, cum in eternitate sit falsum et per consequens impossibile illam esse; et ita de veritate et falsitate signi sunt opiniones. Ego autem voco signum verum, si suum significatum primarium est aliquando.

Alii autem dicunt quod non est verum pro mensura, nisi suum significatum sit pro eadem mensura. Et iuxta primum modum dicendi foret illa copulativa nunc vera:

10 *Primum instans mundi est, et dies iudicii est.*

Alia via dicit quod, sicut signum non est falsum, quamvis deficiat pro aliqua mensura temporis a veritate significata, sic nec ens ex parte rei est falsum, quia aliquando fuit falsum; quia *esse falsum* est simpliciter *non esse*; et ista tollit multas conclusiones concessas que male videntur sonare. Tota tamen ista difficultas stat in significacione termini. Ideo eligat logicus viam plus placitam. Dimissis ergo istis usque ad ultimum casum, fiat restrictio veritatis condicionalis ad
20 absolute necessariam.

Et tunc patet 3^o quod quicquid sequitur ad tale consequens, sequitur ad suum antecedens; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad antecedens antecedit ad consequens.

25 4^o patet quod quicquid repugnat consequenti, repugnat antecedenti; et si quid steterit cum antecedente, ipsum stat cum consequente. Sed non oportet in altero quod econtra.

5^{to} patet quod ex opposito consequentis sequitur
30 oppositum antecedentis, et non generaliter econtra; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad oppositum consequentis, antecedit ad oppositum antecedentis; sed quicquid sequitur ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur ad oppositum consequentis; sed in neutro oportet generaliter quod econtra.

6^o patet quod ex omni simpliciter impossibili sequitur quodlibet concludendum, sicut ex omni antecedente sequitur quodlibet absolute necessarium assignandum. Si enim impossibile est te esse asinum, non potest esse
40 quod tu es asinus, nisi deus non sit; quia si posset esse cum hoc quod deus sit, tunc potest sic esse, et per

Others maintain that what is false: never can be true; for then the existence of every creature would be false from all eternity. Others think that what is true at any time is true now.

Finally others affirm that not to be completely true does not exclude some truth; to be quite false would imply not to be at all; and this view avoids many ill-sounding conclusions.

3. The consequent of a consequent is the consequent of its antecedent;
4. What contradicts the consequent, contradicts its antecedent but not *vice versa*.

5. What contradicts the consequent, is the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent; but not *vice versa*.

6. From any absolutely impossible proposition any conclusion whatever may be drawn; and any absolutely necessary proposition may follow from any antecedent whatever.

consequens non est impossibile sic esse: quod tamen datum est. Et eodem modo probatur 2^a pars regule.

7. In the latter case God's existence is supposed; in the former, it is denied. Every true proposition posits the existence of truth, and the latter the existence of God, on whom all truth depends.

7^{mo} patet quod omnis talis consequentia ponit formaliter *deum esse*, et e contra; et per consequens necessitates sunt sic concathenate, quod posita una, impossibile est quod reliqua destruatur; sicut, posito uno impossibili, formaliter sequitur quidlibet concludendum. Si enim quelibet talis ponit aliquo modo esse, utputa, veritatem significatam primarie per eandem, sequitur quod quelibet talis ponit primam veritatem esse, ex qua posita sequuntur due partes residue. Medium autem ad probandum istas regulas est descriptio consequentie bone superius posita, et lex contradictoriarum. |

Objections.

1. The old rules of logic say that no conditional posits anything.
2. According to this doctrine no irrelevant truth could flow from an impossible proposition, which is also against the old rules.

Answers:

1. This, not being strictly true, cannot be a rule. Yet it is partially true, if understood of contingent conditionals.
2. From the absolutely necessary or impossible no irrelevant proposition can be deduced, since the former follows from any truth, and the latter contradicts all truth.

And a proposition is relevant to another, either because it follows from or because it contradicts it. There can be no good

Sed contra illud argumentatur *primo*, per hoc quod, B 86^b iuxta antiquas regulas, nulla condicionalis quidquid ponit; ergo non ex qualibet tali sequitur *deum esse*. 2^o sic nunquam, nisi materialiter, sequitur impertinens ex impossibili, sicut antique regule sumant; addentes, quod nunquam sequitur necessarium nisi materialiter ex impertinenti. [3^o] multe necessitates possunt non esse, quia aliter non esset ordo inter illas; sed, posita una veritate, poneretur quelibet veritas possibilis.

Ad primum dico quod assumptum non est regula, cum obliquat a veritate. Verumptamen cum antiqua sententia communis non sit in toto falsa, intelligitur isto modo: nulla condicionalis de contingentibus extremis ponit alterum illorum; ut non oportet si *tu movearis te currente* quod *vel curras vel movearis*; quodlibet tamen talis condicionalis ponit suum primum significatum et omnem eius causam.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod nichil est impertinens simpliciter necessario vel impossibili, cum omni tali impossibili repugnat quodlibet assignandum; et omne sic necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet. Et ex istis duobus modis dicitur propositio pertinens alteri; vel quia, antecedit ad illam, vel quia repugnat illi. Si enim A est pertinens B, quia sequitur ad B, per idem B est pertinens A, quia antecedit ad A, cum pertinencia sit relatio equiparantie, eque fundabilis in antecedencia sicut in consequentia. Ulterius dicitur quod tam repugnat consequentiam esse bonam et non de forma

20. et sic (?) *pro* 3^o B.
34. ³bas B.

23. argumentum? B; *ib.* r'a = vera? B.

quam repugnat materiam esse informem. Nam ista est
 veritas et forma exemplaris per quam quelibet alia
 condicionalis tenet: *si duarum veritatum unam impossi-*
bile est esse cum hoc quod non sit reliqua, tunc, si illa
 5 *est, reliqua est.* Verumptamen est dare aliquas formas,
 substantiales, syllogisticas, entimematicas, et induc-
 tiones; quia tenent aliquae consequentiae quae vocantur
 formales; sed non iste vocate materiales. Non tamen
 est possibile quod aliqua consequentia teneat, nisi teneat
 10 ad minimum per hanc formam. Sufficit ergo ad in-
 vestigandum bonitatem formalem cuiuscunque conse-
 quentiae logice, quod sit consequentia; et demonstratis
 primariis significatis per suum antecedens et suum conse-
 quens, sit impossibile hoc esse, nisi hoc sit.

15 Nec aliud intendit logicus per huiusmodi consequen-
 tias; ut quando dicitur: *si ego sum asinus, tunc baculus*
stat in angulo, idem est ac si diceretur: *non potest esse*
quod ego sim asinus nisi baculus stet in angulo. Quod
 patet ex hoc quod contradictoria istorum sunt conver-
 20 tibilis. Ista enim propositio repugnat tanquam contra-
 dictione condicionali signate: *potest esse quod ego sim*
asinus, cum hoc quod nullus baculus stet in angulo; ideo
 communiter, negata consequentia, ponit logicus commu-
 niter quod oppositum stet: quod sibi tantum valeat
 25 ac si dicatur: detur oppositum consequentiae negatae. Et
 hinc dicitur illam notam sic mobilitare terminum sub-
 sequentem, more negacionis. Unde sequitur: *si homo*
currit, animal currit; ergo, si iste vel quicumque alius
homo currit, tunc animal currit. Nec oportet capere
 30 constantiam subiecti, sicut nec in negativis; quia que-
 libet talis includit contradictoriam negacionem de pos-
 sibili: ut idem est dicere: | *Si tu es asinus, tu es animal,*
 ac si dicatur: *Non potest esse quod tu sis asinus, nisi*
tu sis animal.

35 Et constat michi quod vulgate sententiae in illa ma-
 teria sunt infundabiles; utputa quod nulla negativa
 includit repugnantiam, sed quod possibile est nullum
 ens esse, cum hoc quod non antecedit ad affirmationem;
 ymmo quod possibile est quod si deus est, tunc, qua-
 40 litercunque potest non esse, est. Hoc enim iuxta
 sic fantasiantes est possibile, cum non includit repug-
 nantiam. Sed procul a philosopho ista sententia! Ad

consequence if
 not in due
 form, according
 to this
 principle:
*If A cannot
 exist
 without B,
 then if A is
 posited, B
 is so too.*

No
 consequence
 can be good
 unless based
 on this
 principle.
 In fact
 consequence
 means that
 the contrary
 is impossible.
 Example.

If like no
 renders the
 following term
 universal.
 It is not even
 necessary
 that the subject
 should be the
 same; the fact
 is that every
 conditional
 includes a
 negative:
*If A is B,
 C is B means:
 No A can be B,
 without C
 being D.*
 The common
 opinion on this
 subject seems
 to me quite
 unfounded,
 viz. that no
 negative
 includes
 impossibility.
 It leads to
 many absurd
 consequences,
 and is to be
 rejected.

6. spales; in marg. falses B. 23, 24. logicus communiter in marg. B.

3. Necessary truths are coordinated by the dependence of one upon the other,

which their essential connection does not destroy. A truth may be necessary, and yet not exist actually;

it may also be at the same time contingent, in the various senses of the word.

We must remember that the signification of the present sense can be extended to the past and future.

From a proposition that is false now we can draw any conclusion that is false at the same time; and contrariwise for true propositions. Moving my hand, I produce a new truth, and consequently a present necessity, throughout the world.

On account of this extension of meaning, we must define the *Determinate* as that which must exist at a certain time; the *Contingent* ad utrumlibet as anything caused by an agent that is quite free not to cause it;

3^m dicitur quod necessarium est quod sit ordo inter necessitates, quarum nulla potest esse sine reliqua; ut prius naturaliter est *nullum hominem esse asinum* quam est *me non esse asinum*. Et prius naturaliter est *consequens esse, si antecedens est* quam est *animal esse, si homo est*. Et sic de infinitis similibus. Ideo non est color concludendi quod non sit ordo prioritatis vel dependencie inter aliqua, si unum non potest esse sine reliquo. Nec est inconveniens quod multe necessitates possunt non esse, que non possunt destrui, corrumpi, vel desinere esse, ut tales: *ego fui quadragenarius, ego predicavi* etc.; et multe veritates, que iam non sunt possunt esse, sed non possunt incipere esse; cum, si sunt, eternaliter fuerunt, ut sepe dictum est de talibus: *ego fui predicaturus, Sor fuit episcopandus*. Nec est in-
conveniens, necessarium ex suppositione et impossibile per accidens, esse secundarie contingens natum in maiori vel minori vel semper.

Et ad cognoscendum dicta hominum in ista materia multum confert cognoscere quomodo verba presentis temporis ampliantur ad quodlibet tempus, preteritum, presens vel futurum, ut postmodum docebitur. Admittendo autem consequenciam ut nunc, conceditur quod ex omni nunc falso sequitur quidlibet ut nunc, sicut omne nunc verum sequitur ad quidlibet ut nunc. Et ulterius patet ex dictis quod sicut movendo manum meam facio ad omnem punctum mundi veritatem, sic facio universalem condicionalem necessitatem. Unde, propter ampliacionem temporis verborum, oportet aliter loqui quam in proximo tractatu locutum est; ut determinatum potest dici *omne quod necesse est esse pro aliquo tempore*; et per consequens omnis veritas est alicui esse determinata. Contingens vero ad utrumlibet potest dici *omnis effectus agentis libere, quod pro omni mensura qua causat eundem eque potest ipsum non causare*. Ex quo patet quod omnis creatura est contingens ad utrumlibet quo ad deum. Ymmo [sunt] quotlibet voliciones dei eterne que possunt non esse, sed non incipere vel desinere. Unde libere contradictorie causare, est causare causatum voluntarie pro omni mensura pro qua eque potest non causare illud; ut est omnis volicio

1. q.¹ pro quod sit B. 37. sunt deest B.

12. pui B.

15. p̄tur̄g B; *ib.* ep̄andus B.

dei ad extra. Contingens vero semper est *effectus habens causam ex qua sequitur*; et huiusmodi est omne contingens; ut voliciones dei ad extra sequuntur ex esse dei contingenter. Et omne aliud contingens sequitur

the *Contingent* in all cases, as an effect having a cause, and flowing from it;

5 necessitate condicionali absoluta ex voluntate dei. Contingens in maiori est *effectus habens causam ex qua naturaliter sequitur*. Contingit tamen casualiter causam

the *Contingent* in most cases as an effect that usually flows from a given cause; the *Contingent* in few cases, as an effect that flows from a given cause, contrary to the usual tendency of the same. *Contingent* and *necessary* are merely relative terms.

B 87^b illam poni, et effectum illam non sequi. Contingens in minori est *effectus preternaturaliter sequens ex causa illud non intendente*. Ex quo patet quod dicta contingenter non opponuntur contrarie, sed relative. Nec obest equivocantes in temporibus verborum sic varie loqui, et cognoscere utrumque modum loquendi; ut, communicando cum iuvenibus, loquamur primo modo, 15 et cum proventis, modo secundo.

Dubium autem est si pretericio, futuricio, volicio, et posse logicum (ut sunt iste veritates: *A fuisse, fore, non esse, posse esse*, etc.) individuantur a tempore. Et videtur quod sic: nam alia est futuricio Sortis, alia

Whether the past, the future, &c. depend on time for their individual entity, differing from all others. *Reason pro.* Two truths of the same kind, existing both in the future, in the past, &c., are nevertheless different from each other.

20 Platonis, quamvis utraque sit futuricio hominis; quia aliud est unum illorum futurorum quam erit reliquum; ergo, per idem, alia est futuricio A cursus mei, alia futuricio B cursus mei, quamvis utrumque istorum sit veritas que est *me esse cursurum*; et sic de pretericio-

25 nibus. Nam pretericio cursus mei incipit esse, me desinente currere, etsi millesies prius desii currere; et per consequens sunt tales quandalitates communes tam a subiecto quam a tempore, continententes sub se alias infinitas; ut per quot tempora ego durabo, tot sunt veri-

30 tates, quarum quilibet est *me esse duraturum*. Videtur etiam quod necessario individuantur a tempore; ut, me non sedente postquam sedi, est alia necessitacio sessionis quam fuit ista eterna que precessit *esse* mei; quia aliter eadem veritas potest infinicies redire. Ymmo

The difference of time is what makes them differ;

35 videtur quod necessitacio potest incipere esse propter incepcionem nove per se cause, etsi eternaliter fuerit talis necessitacio, ut, me incipiente esse, verum est quod non sum extra B situm qui de facto continet me; et hoc fuit eternaliter verum. Cum ergo existencia mei 40 in B situ sit sufficiens causa ad faciendum me non esse

otherwise the same truth might exist an infinite number of times. Besides, a necessity that is eternal in itself, may begin to exist in a new way in time.

10, 11. 9tin^v B. 26. millesius; *ib.* desii B.

26. *Millesius* is probably a corruption of *millesies* for *millies*. Wyclif speaks of a series, A, B, etc. of *runs*.

extra illum situm, et illam potencia non impedita, videtur quod facit unam talem negacionem preter illam eternam.

Reasons contra.

If this were so, all things would continually be new, according to Heraclitus, for if the individuality of such truths is caused by time, their essence is succession; and every necessary truth is composed of successive parts; so also of all accidents; and this is inconceivable. Again, if there can be an infinite number of individual negations under the same form, there must be as many affirmations; and this would destroy individuality. Again, all things would be eternal. Nothing commences without its opposite ceasing.

Wyclif's own opinion.

Every individual takes its individuality from its proper cause; but God is the supreme principle of individuation. Accidents, such as time, movement, &c. are principles of cognition, of individuality,

Sed contra, ista videtur esse opinio Eracliti, ponentis omnia continue esse nova. Nam si veritates recitate 5 individuantur a tempore, tunc consistunt in successione, sicut tempus. Et per consequens tam necessitaciones quam pretericiones et futuriciones, habent partes successivas, quod non est sane intelligibile. Ymmo, multo magis, omnia alia accidentia individuantur a tempore. 10 Et sic, moto uno, omnia mobilia moverentur.

Similiter, iuxta illud oportet ponere infinitas aut communes synonymas, quod est summe nugatorium. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod tot modis ponitur unum oppositorum quot et reliquum; ergo, si infinite 15 sint tales negaciones, *me non esse extra B situm*, infinite forent tales affirmaciones, posita una, quarum quelibet esset *me esse extra B situm*; et sic non esset dare ultimum singulare; sed omnia essent communia, cum accidens posterius subiecto individuat subiectum. 20

Similiter, cum nulla necessitacio potest incipere esse sine desinicionem sui oppositi vel econtra, videtur quod *me generato in B situ*, racione cuius generacionis incipit necessitacio, que est *me non esse extra B*, desineret ista affirmacio; *ego sum extra B*, et per con- 25 sequens, ista affirmacio fuit ante *esse mei*; et tunc non esset possibile aliquod ens incipere esse, sed omnia essent eterna. Et tamen prius deductum est omnia esse nova.

Quantum ad istam materiam de individuacione rei 30 videtur michi | pro presenti quod omnis substantia B 88^a individua individuat a qualibet sui per se causa, sicut est a qualibet tali. Deus autem, extra genus, et per consequens carens individuacione, est principium individuan- 35 di omne individuum. Accidentia etiam principia substantiam sunt cause cognoscendi et regulariter individuan- 40 di omne suum causatum, ut mensura temporis in qua generatur res corruptibilis, motus, accio, potencia etc. que per accidens causant rem talem, individuant ipsam; ut existente eadem materia et eodem 40

1. ia^m B; ib. pov (po^r?) B. 13, 14. a'coēs pro aut communes B.
16, 17. ĩlĩfĩc B. 17 a'coēs actuciones B.

agente respectu B ignis quod sint respectu A ignis, alia tamen est forma et per consequens alius ignis: quod cognoscitur ex alietate temporis in quo producitur, ex alietate producencie et multorum consimilium
 5 accidencium que concausant productum; quia aliter rediret idem ignis in numero, quociens eadem materia susciperet formam eiusdem speciei. Est autem aliqualis idemptitas in talibus circa ydemptitatem specificam, que vocatur ydemptitas 2^m materiam. Et maior est
 10 ydemptitas qua corpus laceratum vel divisum 2^m partes aliunde continuatas, nulla penitus corrupta, maneret idem corpus, quam prius; quia est idem 2^m materiam primam et 2^m partes quantitativas, que sunt materia propinqua. Unde sicut unio materie cum forma in ista, continuacio
 15 parcium materialium est de essencia ultimi singularis. Rediret autem idem homo quamcunque materiam anima actuaverit, quia anima vere est persona hominis. Et sic rediret quodammodo idem corpus.

Omne ergo accidens individuatur a suo subiecto, cum
 20 sit ab illo, ut situs individuatur a mundo et eius quantitate et figura, et situs individuat motum, et modus in communi individuat tempus, et tempus individuat omnem motum singularem, et omne aliud successivum; cum ad unitatem motus, unitas mobilis, unitas tem-
 25 poris, et unitas materie motus requiratur. Et correspondenter, futuriciones, pretericiones, et potencie, principiantur a suis causis a quibus individuantur talia a tempore: ut si alia eveniunt futura, alie erunt futuriciones, et si alie fuerint res preterite, alie sunt earum
 30 pretericiones. Et sic alie possunt esse res producte, alie sunt potencie ex quibus possunt produci. Nec individuantur talia a tempore, nisi sui termini individuentur a tempore. Et sic, eo ipso quod aliquid non per se substantia, successivum vel permanens, pro aliquo in-
 35 stanti 2^m se totum incipit esse, non solum pretericio instantis iniciantis, sed ipsum instans est principium sue individuacionis: ut si sessio mea, actus anime, habitus, et quecunque forma accidentalis vel substancialis materialis non potest fieri ante vel post idem instans in
 40 quo fit; quia existente alia generatione, non foret illud ultimum singulare. Et forte sic est de omni generali.

and are accidental causes. If the same matter and the same agent produce fire in two cases, the form is different; and this is known by the difference of time &c., in their production. There is identity of species, called identity according to matter.

Thus every accident is individuated by its subject.

Things future and things past individuate futurity and preterition; things possible, their possibility, &c. The instant at which any successive or permanent substance commences to be, is the principle of their individuation;

14. 9ti^a co B.
 30. res rs' B.

17. r' *between and above* anima and actuaverit.
 38. tal B.
 40. lit B.

Successiva tamen individuatur 2^m suas partes continuas a novo tempore; sed permanencia a primo sui instanti, et ab aliis quorum ipsum est principium. Ex quo videtur quod impossibile est aliquod ultimum singulare fieri prius atque posterius quam sic. Successiva 5 autem non possunt corrumpi prius aut posterius quam corrumpuntur, sed permanencia bene possunt et hoc. Sed impossibile est aliud recreari; et per idem videtur nichil posse annichilari. |

Re-creation is self-contradictory; so is annihilation.

It is absurd to suppose that after dissolution the same form can return again; or that negative qualities are individuated by time. These consequently have no real existence.

This solves the second objection, as to the infinite multitude of negatives; for it is eternally true that *one* negation is true at certain times, and in that there is no succession, as in created things.

There is a third action by which God produces a thing instantaneously; which action is also to be found in second causes.

Et patet impossibilitas casuum quibus ponitur quod idem ultimum singulare forme substantialis vel accidentalis absolute vel respective redeat post sui corruptionem; et per consequens non redit eadem negacio in numero, potissime cum nulla potest incipere vel desinere. Ex quo videtur quod nulla negacio individuat 15 a tempore, tum quia non potest esse individua respectu sue speciei, tum etiam quia omnis negacio videtur esse communis in finitis a tempore. Ergo videtur nullam negacionem habere *esse*, cum quelibet sit eterna, quamvis vicissim habeant diversas causas per accidens. 20

Et patet responsio ad 2^m, superius suadens multitudinem talium negacionum. Unde, si sto postquam sedi, non est verum quod non sedeo, sed est eternaliter verum quod non nunc sedeo, quamvis habeant diversam causam. Talia enim fiunt continue, et si non consistant 25 in successione, sicut omnia creata sunt de quanto conservantur in *esse*; ut Sor facit Platonem fore episcopum; sicut et multa alia prius fecerant et facient in futurum. Unde deus simpliciter facit quamlibet partem mundi, non solum quia eternaliter vult illam esse ad 30 intra, sed quia facit illam esse ad extra, dum ex eterna voluntate necessitat illam esse.

Est tamen dare 3^{am} facienciam qua Deus subito facit opus, que faciencia desinit esse quando opus incipit esse. Et tales faciencias est dare in causis 2^{is}, tam 35 respectu affirmacionum quam negacionum. Unde miro modo negacio eterna fit, nunc ab uno corruptibili et nunc ab alio, sicut contingit successivum fieri et quodlibet corruptibile. Unde existencia mea in B loco facit me non esse extra B; et tamen illud fuit factum eter- 40 naliter ab illo qui fecit me non esse.

Et ex istis patet quid tenendum est, 2^m meum *vi-
dere*, in dubio, et quomodo respondendum est argu-
mentis. Non enim est inconueniens, sed verum, quod
idem commune potest redire, intendi, et remitti. Nam
5 quecunque veritas primo significata per oracionem in-
finitivam est communis ad infinita; ut *me currere*, vel
esse calidum est commune ad *me currere* isto cursu,
vel isto, vel isto; et sic de similibus; et *me esse cali-
dum* ista caliditate, vel ista; et sic de similibus. Est
10 tamen dare singularia significata per abstracta; quibus
accipiunt infinita actu; que omnia ponuntur de infini-
tiva oracione contracta.

Such is my
opinion in
this matter.
It is quite true
that the same
universal
quality can
return again,
and become
more or less
intense in its
individuals.

Sed pro individuacione privacionum, notandum quod
individuantur a suis privativis, ut a subiecto et tempore,
15 et a quibuscunque suis principiis, saltem 2^m esse in-
telligibile: ut alia est privacio A materie et alia pri-
vacio B materie, propter diversitatem subiectorum; et
aliud est materiam carere B forma et aliud est ipsum
carere C forma, quia B forma differt a C forma 2^m
20 esse possibile; et per idem individuantur a tempore
sicut sua positiva. Ex isto videtur quod quies habet
partes successivas 2^m quas mensuratur tempore, sicut
motus. Nam unaqueque pars motus nata est opponi
sue proprie quieti; ut motus B tempore mensuratus
25 non potest opponi, nisi quieti pro eodem tempore. Unde
B 89^a oppositio vel repugnancia inter significata | non ponit
illa ambo simul existencia; sed unum ponit et aliud
destruit. Ex quo patet quod quies est longa 2^m longi-
tudinem temporis, habens partes successivas tempori
30 correspondentes; et per consequens impossibile est quie-
tem esse sine tempore, si non equivoce sit quies. Sed
istis satis.

As for the
individuation
of privative
qualities,
its principle is
in that which
they deprive—
subject,
time, &c;
in different
subjects, what
is called the
same privation
is really
different;
rest as well
as movement
is measured by
time.
Every
movement has
its opposite
rest; so
movement in a
certain time
is opposed to
rest in that
same time.
Rest, properly
so called, must
take place in
time.

Contra predicta de bonitate consequencie arguitur.
Videtur enim sequi ex dictis, quod homo sit asinus, vel
35 quodlibet volitum, probari. Nam *si ista consequencia est*

Objection to
the preceding
doctrine.

35. This argument, as Wyclif himself says, serves to bring
in the question *De Insolubilibus*, one of the most difficult
points in logic at that time, and for which he proposes a special
solution. It may be stated thus: *If the present proposition is true,
you are an ass*; the defender must either deny or grant it. If
he denies it, it follows that even if the proposition is true, he
is not an ass; and thus he would at the same time be and not
be that animal. If on the contrary, he grants it, he grants a
very inconvenient proposition indeed.

If this consequence is good, you are an ass; meaning by this, the consequence of the present proposition and by consequence, either the power of concluding from one proposition to another, or the conclusion itself.

bona, tunc tu es asinus (et demonstro per subiectum eandem consequenciam quam facio); potest enim consequencia dupliciter significare vel pro habitudine qua veritas posterior formaliter sequitur ad priorem, sive inter signa, sive inter signata; vel pro illis veritatibus, sive sint signa sive signata. Et sic dicunt sophiste quod consequencia est propositio antecedens et propositio consequens cum nota consequencie. Et illa est bona, quando primarie significat necessitatem condicionalem. Et si suum significatum non fuerit talis necessitas, tunc dicitur talis consequencia non valere. Quibus modis loquendi suppositis, patent argumenta ad utramque partem; quia, si consequencia sit impossibilis et non valens, tunc cum paribus est antecedens impossibile; et sic, iuxta predicta, ipsum infert quodlibet consequens 15 concludendum. Si dicatur quod ista consequencia est bona, tunc, cum veris, sequitur quod antecedens est verum, et sic consequens. Et conformiter argumentatur ad quodlibet volitum probare.

This introduces the grand question *De Insolubilibus*, to which there are very many answers, but six principal ones.

I. The first denies that any such proposition is either true or false. But can it be said to have no meaning? and if it has, it must be either true or false.

Et hic introducitur materia de insolubilibus, in qua sunt tot opiniones, quot sunt fuge invenibiles movende in eadem; quod sine dubio attestatur super difficultatem materie.

Sunt ergo opiniones sex in ista materia plus famose, quorum prima dicit quod nullum insolubile est verum 25 vel falsum. Sed ista tollitur, querendo de significato insolubilis, utrum sit vel non. Ut in communi casu: *utrum Sor dicit falsum vel non?* et cum nemo dubitabit divisionem datam per contradictoria, patet quod stat difficultas, etc. Si enim hec sit omnino individua, congrua, significans primarie sicut non est, tunc est falsa. Vel si negatur consequencia, supponatur illa significacio termini, vel queratur utrum hec: *Sor dicit falsum*, sit signum tale vel non. Potest enim cuiuslibet insolubilis materia trahi ad divisionem regulariter factam 35 per contradictoria.

II. The second maintains that such propositions are true, but

2^a via dicit quod omne insolubile est verum et falsum, falsificando se; sed illa tollitur, sicut prior, supponendo

I. tunc *in marg.* B. 17. vi's B. 21. mo^{do} B. 28, 29. negabit *in marg.* B. 30. $\bar{1}di^{11}$ B. 35. $d_1'o_3$ B.

28. Wyclif explains this further, pp. 167, 199. Socrates (or Sor) is supposed to be the only man of that name, and to utter this one proposition: *Sor dicit falsum*.

existenciam vel non existenciam significati primarii sufficere, et exigi ad hoc quod sit vera aut falsa. 2^o supponatur experientia certa quod insolubilia, sicut alie propositiones primarie, significant iuxta extensionem 5 terminorum; et tunc patet contradiccionem sequi, querendo si ex parte rei sit ita in communi casu quod Sor decipitur vel non. Et patet per communem deduc-
 10 tionem quod, quecunque pars detur, sequitur oppositum: ut, si decipitur et solum credit quod ipse decipitur, ut pono, tunc non est ita quod decipitur; et si non decipitur et credit precise quod decipitur, tunc credit sicut non est; et omnis talis et solummodo talis supponitur decipi: et ita contingit argumentare in aliis.

Tercia opinio ponit nullam partem supponere pro 8^o toto cuius est pars. Et sic | dicit quodlibet insolubile significare exceptive: ut, posito quod ista solum sit propositio: *Nulla propositio est vera*, sic primarie significando tunc dicit quod illa significat quod *nulla alia ab ista est vera*; et correspondenter dicit in aliis casibus 20 quibuscunque. Sed contra illud est veritas quod pars supponit pro continuo, et per consequens pro toto cuius est pars. Ymmo in ista, *omne ens est*, supponit subiectum pro omni quod potest esse, et per consequens tam pro se quam pro tota propositione. Terminus uni-
 25 versalitatem supponens supponit pro omni quod significat, ut alias declaravi. Cum ergo multe partes supponentes significant naturaliter se ipsas et sua tota, quare non supponerentur pro illis? Sicut ergo hec propositio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, potest significare se esse falsum,
 30 sicut nullus dubitat; ita potest subiectum specialiter supponere pro ipsa propositione, cum significat illam; sicut quelibet pars significans significat suum totum. Nec dubium quin contingit in universali intelligere subiectum huius propositionis, *propositio est falsa*, sine
 35 contracta connotatione, eque ipsa sola existente propositione, sicut multis aliis existentibus cum illa. Ymmo si sic significaverit: *omnis propositio alia ab ista est falsa*, tunc subiectum significat et supponit pro ista exceptione, cum propositio exceptit *illam esse falsam*.
 40 Non enim consonat huic vie quod subiectum supponat pro illis solummodo, pro quibus propositio verificatur;

falsity themselves. But again have they any meaning? if so, they cannot be both true and false. And, e. g. a man must either be mistaken or not; if he is mistaken and thinks he is, he is no longer so; and if not mistaken and thinks he is, he is mistaken. III. The third affirms that a part cannot stand for the whole; that every 'insoluble' accordingly has the meaning of an exceptive proposition. No proposition is true, must mean except this very proposition. But this part stands for a universal whole, and therefore it also stands for itself. The proposition: *Whatever is, is* stands for itself too. In the written proposition, *This is false*, this may mean the proposition itself. And the words, *propositio est falsa*, have quite a universal meaning,

2. adhe B; *ib.* et B.

10. p̄o B.

20. v̄is B.

25. ūa₃ B.

and do not signify that every

proposition, but the present one is false.

It is impossible that the subject

should stand only for such individual cases

as would verify the proposition.

And in such a case *A is A* would be false,

for *A* (subject) would no longer be the same as *A*

(predicate).

It is, moreover, quite possible to affirm what

is false, the falsity being in the mind alone,

and at the same time to believe that no such

thing can exist in the mind.

IV. The fourth denies that in such cases there

is any signification that agrees

with the terms; thus there is a

primary signification different from

what the words imply, and impossible to be known by

them.

This is a mere sophistical evasion;

that alone is false which is

false, and if I do not know it to be

so, I cannot affirm it as such.

quia sic dicto, *falsum est*, supponeret subiectum huius propositionis false in casu communi, non pro falso quod *est*, sed pro falso quod *non est*; quod contradicit rudimentis de suppositione. Ymmo, sic dicto, *propo-*

sicio est propositio, predicatum non esset possibile esse 5

synonimum cum subiecto, quia pro una parte propositionis significat, pro qua reliqua non potest significare.

Et tamen potest significare pro se et vero, que sunt illa propositio pro qua negatur posse supponere.

Nec dubium quin contingit terminum fieri propositionis 10

partem prius apprehense per illam, ignorante apprehendente. Unde ergo non significaret sicut prius? Contingit etiam hominem componere quod falsum est,

ipsa sola existente ad intra, cum hoc quod credat nullam talem rem esse in anima, sicut vulgus et multi 15

clerici credunt. Sed quis dubitat quod sit contingens ut, sic concipiendo, appropriate apprehendit illam propositionem? non enim cogitat de hoc. Non ergo oportet

multum insistere ad refellendum hanc fugam.

4^o via dicit quod repugnat insolubile significare 20

precise primarie sicut termini pretendunt. Ideo sequitur in communibus casibus quod insolubile significat

primarie aliter quam pretenditur de famosa significatione, sed casus non certificat quomodo aliter. Unde concedit

insolubilia, sed negat illa esse vera, quia quamvis signi- 25

ficacio communis talium insolubilium sit vera, tamen habent aliam significationem falsam, sicut sequitur ex

casu. Ideo sunt concedenda esse falsa propter illam ignotam significationem. Et tamen sunt concedenda

propter significationem cognitam. 30

Sed ista via, inter alias, est pure fuga sophistica. Gradus certe experientie, qua scimus quod solum primarie concipimus per talem, *falsum est quod falsum est*. Ymmo non esset possibile illam significare primarie

michi aliter, nisi innotescat michi quare sit aliter, cum 35

significare sit "movere veritatem apprehensivam"; et apprehensio hominis est sibi notissima, cum actus anime

sint per se noti, et potissime actus connotandi. | Quo- B 90'

modo, rogo, exponerem distincte copulative quod *Sor dicit falsum*, et uno alio modo, cum hoc quod non 40

haberem experientiam de significatione alia? Oportet

enim sub quadam habitudine illud absconditum significatum significari; et habitudo copulandi est maxime pertinens cum, propter illud significatum, est insolubile falsum. Sed utrum possibile vel impossibile, hoc nescit sic opinans. Si enim disiunctive significaret, vel conditionaliter, vel alio modo ypotetico, tunc non respondendum esset regulariter, sicut docet hec posicio.

Caret etiam omni ratione quod propter proposicionem desinentem esse Rome, me latente, ero coactus ad eliciendum novum actum apprehendendi distinctum, quem ego ignoro; ut opinio concedit, posito quod A sit ista proposicio: *homo est asinus*, Rome impossibilis, et B: ista: *in mente mea falsum est*, sicut precise significans ipsis solis existentibus; tunc, si cum paribus corrumpatur A proposicio Rome, manente solum B in mente mea, naturaliter significante, significabit, me invito, aliter quam prius. Unde, queso, principium movens ipsam ad sic faciendum? Multi etiam sunt casus insolubilium in quibus non satisfacit illa evasio.

5^a via fingit diffuse quod nulli tali termino 2^e impositionis, verum, falsum, proposicio, terminus etc. correspondere potest intencio universalis; sed componendo quod *Sor dicit falsum*, oportet singulariter intelligere proposicionem falsam, que concipitur Sor dicere; ut sic: *Sor dicit illam proposicionem: homo est asinus, que significat primarie aliter quam est.*

Sed revera ista fuga non minus contradicit experientie quam proxima, cum caret omni ratione diversitatis ponere quod terminis prime impositionis possunt correspondere intenciones reales, et non terminis 2^e impositionis. Quis enim non credit quod multe sunt proposiciones in mundo quas ipse ignorat esse? iuxta illud vulgatum sophisma: *tum scis aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam ignoras esse veram.* Et certum est quod hoc non posset sustineri, nisi ponendo actus ac intenciones universales, correspondentes talibus terminis 2^e impositionis. Nemo etiam dubitat quin contingit hominem credere quod alterum illorum contradictorium

We must make a copulative proposition out of this 'insoluble' one, of which we grant the first part and deny the second; but it is impossible to expound it thus, if we do not know the second sense, nor even whether it is possible or impossible.

V. The fifth says that terms of the second imposition (true, false, proposition, &c.) have no meaning, but in particular instances.

But this evasion contradicts experience as much as the former one. There is no reason to deny a general meaning to these terms. And there are many propositions of which a man may be ignorant; so there must be a universal signification to the word.

7. r^aet' B; *ib.* p^o B. 12. roune B. 17. alit' alr' B. 28. du'el' B.
33. for (or fo^a ?) B.

8. *Caret.* The whole of this proposition seems so unintelligible that I fancy the text is corrupt, though the grammatical construction does not appear very faulty.

And when we say that of two contradictories, one is *true*; we do not give a precise individual meaning to 'one'.

contingencium est verum: *rex sedet vel nullus rex sedet*, quamvis nec sic credat illam, *rex sedet*, esse veram, nec reliquam. Nam, sciendo me sic habere illas significantes, puto me scire quod altera illarum est vera, et de neutra illarum sic scio quod illa est vera, 5 cum utramque illarum dubito, sicut dubito que illarum est vera. Ubi patet sic componendo: *altera illarum est vera*, nec singulariter compono pro prima quod illa sit vera, nec singulariter pro 2^a; quia tunc non assentiret compositioni mee. 10

Aristotle and Boetius give general rules for propositions; so the word 'proposition' has a general meaning. The very enunciation of this theory implies this belief in a general meaning.

Similiter, auctores tradunt regulas universales de propositionibus; ut patet per Aristotelem et Boecium, describentes propositiones: ubi nemo dubitat quod ipsi non intendebant singulariter propositiones suas describere, sicut nec sic opinans, ponens pro conclusione quod nulli 15 propositionum correspondet intencio simplex, nec simpliciter negat pro illa que est in mente sua, nec pro illa que est in mente mea; quia sic non esset conclusio alicuius efficacie pro intento. Et si dicatur quod sic componit, non illa propositio: *deus est in mente mea*, 20 habet intencionem simplicem sibi correspondentem, nec aliqua propositio sibi similis. Quero qualis intencio correspondet | subiecto secunde propositionis; si universalis, contradicit regule impositionis; singularis, non probatur nisi de illis 2^{bus} quod non correspondet illis 25 intencio universalis. Et cum isti termini, nomen, verbum, etc. sint termini 2^e intencionis, repugnat quod illis correspondeat talis universalis intencio. B 90^b

Again logicians dispute as to what a proposition is, some saying that every sentence is one, another that it must signify something true or false.

Similiter est dissensio apud logicos quid requiritur ad *esse* propositionis, cum unus ponit propositionem 30 quam reliquus non ponit esse propositionem; ut unus ponit quidlibet esse propositionem, alius quamlibet oracionem individuum veram vel falsam ponit propositionem; et sic opinans ponit omne connexum in anima et solum tale esse propositionem. Modo quod- 35 libet illorum clauderet contradiccionem, si non posset esse intencio communis de propositione. Nam sic dicto, *quodlibet signum in anima, significans verum vel falsum, est propositio*, elicitor iste sensus; *quodlibet tale signum significans deum esse vel hominem esse asinum est hoc*; 40 quia iuxta istam viam sequitur: utrumque illorum est propositio; ergo, utrumque illorum est hoc.

In each case there would be contradiction, if there were no such thing as a proposition in general.

Unde talia sunt incongrua vel impossibilia: *Omnis propositio est, multe sunt propositiones, ego credo quod tu habes propositionem in mente tua; et sic de similibus.* Sed ista habere concedere in casu: *omnis propositio est omnis propositio, quamvis propositio tua differt a propositione mea, ego habeo omnem propositionem, et sic de multis frivolis, quarum deducio esset stulcius quam est posicio.*

There are also other absurdities.

Nimis ergo profundaret se sic opinans pro fundamento solutionis insolubilium stabiliendo, quia negando intentiones universalium fluctuaret in respondendo in propria materia, sicut edificium constructum super aquas. Singularia enim, propinqua divisioni, et incerta sicut aqua, non fundant scientiam propriam obiective.

Sexta via ponit in quolibet insolubili 3 concurrere, primo, casum facti; 2^o, antecedens vel causacionem: et 3^o consequens ex 2^o. Ut, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor qui dicat solum quod ipse non est albus, hoc totum est casus facti; et quando adiungitur quod quicumque dixerit verum quod sit albus, hoc est antecedens vel causacio ad *esse album*, quod est naturaliter consequens causacionem illam; tunc tenet ista posicio pro regula generali quod *omne naturale antecedens est prius pro aliqua mensura quam suum consequens*; ut *esse album*, in casu posito, sequitur in fine prolacionis sicut talis motus ipsum consequitur. Et ita dicit insolubile esse verum post causacionem et falsum ante causacionem, et per ista tria inventa in quolibet insolubili solvit generaliter insolubilia. Nam primo sunt falsa, vel neque vera neque falsa, et in fine erunt vera. Ideo oportet diligenter notare mensuram pro qua opponens querit utrum insolubilia sunt vera vel falsa.

This opinion can, therefore, give no stable foundation to explain the 'insolubles', because singulars have no coherence, and no theory can be based on them.

VI. The sixth distinguishes in every such proposition the fact itself, its antecedent and its consequent.

Ex. gr.
1. *Whoever speaks the truth is white.*
2. *A says he is not white;*
1. is the antecedent;
2. is the fact; and to be white is the consequent.

These propositions are false or doubtful, considered before the antecedent is applied, and afterwards true.

Objections:

Contra illud sunt multe instanciae. Primo enim videtur quod impossibile sit hominem esse album propter *dicere* talis propositionis, sicut et impossibile est solam obviam esse causam libertatis. Et sic generaliter in omnibus

13. di'oni B. 34. pp dice' B.

32. The first conclusion is: *A says he is not white; if so, he does not speak the truth.* The second conclusion is: *If he does not speak the truth, saying he is not white, then he is white.* The solution would consist in asking the opponent how he understands the proposition? As merely containing the first conclusion, or as containing the second too?

1. This theory makes the mere meaning of a proposition to be the cause of its objective truth or falsity: which is impossible.

2. The antecedent successively enunciated, is never together with its consequent;

so at the end of the cause of the consequent exists no longer, and, therefore, can cause nothing, and if we take an indivisible instant and ask if the 'insoluble' is then true or false, this theory can give no reply, for its upholders do not admit that continuity is composed of things without magnitude.

3. If this proposition be at a certain time neither true nor false, it must be neither granted nor denied; and yet at this time its meaning disagrees with reality. Suppose time composed of instants: we can conceive a case in which the proposition, according to

casibus insolubilium implicatur pro causa quod non potest esse causa; et per consequens omnes casus insolubilium negarentur tanquam impossibiles, cum tamen nec vis videtur, nec argumentantes intendunt generaliter talem causacionem. Ut *dicere* istius proposicionis: *Sor* 5 *dicit falsum*, non implicatur per communem casum esse causam quare illa sit vera; quia tunc esset vera sine correspondencia veritatis significate. |

Similiter, iuxta responsionem, tale *dicere* successivum pro nullo instanti temporis simul erit cum suo causato 10 consequente, eo quod nullum successivum potest esse in suo fine temporale, et per consequens non pro instanti tali determinato erit propositio vera postquam fuit falsa, vel econtra: et per consequens in fine non erit causa quare proferens est albus. Non enim est 15 possibile quod illud quod non est quicquam causet. Loquamur ergo de eodem instanti temporis, mensurante causam et eius causatum; et queratur si pro illo instanti sit insolubile verum vel falsum, et stant tunc rationes communes insolute. Et ex isto patet quod 20 distincio quam ponit de *dicere* nichil facit. Ponit enim quod aliud est *dicere* successivum principale quali vocaliter dicitur propositio et aliud est *dicere* consecutivum quali in finem dicitur propositio quando erit vera. Nam 2^m illam viam nullum continuum componitur 25 ex non quantis in fine; ergo non erit illud successivum, quia tunc erit dictum, factum, vel causatum. Ergo tunc non erit aliquod eius *dicere* vel aliqua eius causacio. De vocali ergo proposicione, et non mentali, tunc primo genita est nobis sermo, retorquendo omnes responsiones 30 ad illud instans pro quo est talis propositio sic quante significans.

Uterius dicit ista responsio in particulari quod propositio insolubilis pro tempore sue causacionis nec est vera nec falsa, et per consequens nec pro tunc con- 35 cedenda vel neganda, quamvis pro tunc significat aliter quam est. Ymmo, ut dicit, si tempus per ymaginationem componeretur ex instantibus, et maneat per illud idem tempus talis propositio in anima, *ego concipio falsum cum tali negativa*: "*hoc non est verum*", foret continua 40 eius mutacio de veritate in falsitatem, et econtra; quia

B 91^a

.1. vis B.

6. ca^m 2| ca B.31. q^{te} f^{us} B.

38. macat B.

omnis talis negativa in priori instanti foret vera et in proximo instanti falsa; et omnis talis affirmativa econtra in priori instanti foret falsa et in proximo instanti vera; sic quod continue per idem tempus alternatim 5 esset mutacio a veritate in falsitatem, et econtra.

the hypothesis, would be continually changing from true to false.

Et addit responsio, quod si pro signando instanti ponitur talem proposicionem, *A non est verum*, fore verum, non sequitur ex hoc *A* pro illo instanti significare sicut est, sed potius oppositum, cum "significare sicut est" est causa quare *A* est verum. Et sic est in proximo instanti precedenti; et conformiter si pro hoc instanti significat aliter quam est, non ex hoc est falsum pro illo instanti, sed incipit esse falsum pro instanti proxime futuro.

A further position of those who answer thus is that if a given proposition, *A is not true*, is supposed true at a certain moment, it would not follow that *A* would signify according to reality at that moment, that would entail its falsity only for the succeeding instant.

15 Istud autem dictum est multum extraneum; primo, in hoc quod ponit ordinem prioritatis naturalis causare successionem. Nam tota prioritas naturalis est simul pro eodem instanti temporis, sicut prius et posterius in natura; aliter enim non esset possibile quod pro aliquo instanti temporis causatum simul sit cum sua causa. Et tunc vel pro hoc instanti deus et quelibet alia causa non esset, vel pro eodem instanti nullum causatum esset. Sequitur etiam quod nulla successiva 20 propositio potest esse vera vel falsa; quia "significare sicut est vel sicut non est" antecedit per instans denominationem esse rei; ut *dicere* et taliter significare concomitantur illam toto tempore sui esse.

All this is beside the mark and implies that natural priority causes succession; it may well exist without succession at all; as in the case of cause and effect.

Videtur etiam quod anima, eadem proposicione permanente, omni motu subducto, caret successione; quia 30 prioritatem et posterioritatem temporis continue uniformiter componendo sic ex integro falsum; ubi non est fingenda ratio diversitatis instancium, nec ratio quare in uno illorum instancium foret talis propositio potius vera vel falsa quam in quolibet illorum. Nam 35 propositio, solum manendo per instans, foret vera vel falsa cum "significare precise primarie sicut est vel sicut non est" sit sufficiens causa talis denominationis.

1. falsa pro vera B.
37. ff^{us} B.

26. veri pro rei(?) B.

29. subducta B.

31. The text as it stands has no sense. This, if owing to missing words, is all the more regrettable because the words would perhaps have given a clue to the rest of the paragraph, which I have failed to understand.

Quomodo ergo explicaretur denominatio usque ad non esse subiecti? Habita ergo continue tali causa non foret differenter nunc vera et nunc falsa. | Et ex eodem B 91^b videtur quod non stat eandem propositionem manere per tempus neque veram neque falsam, et tamen per 5 idem tempus primarie significare sicut est vel sicut non est; specialiter cum instans temporis contineat tam prius quam posterius in natura.

There are other manners of eluding the difficulty.
1. By saying that a man is not, but is only called Socrates

&c.
2. That successive speech or motion is impossible.
3. That, there being no succession, nothing can move, though it is possible to be moved.
4. That every proposition, as it primarily signifies itself, is true.

5. That no meaning of a proposition can be reflected upon itself at the same instant as it is considered separately.
6. That every negative signifies an affirmative negatively; and that an insoluble proposition is one of them.

7. That there is no truth at all in negatives.

8. That some such are true, and some are false.

Preter istas vias audivi multas evasiones; ut prima dicit quod non est possibile hominem esse Sortem vel 10 Platonem, quamvis vocetur taliter. 2^a dicit quod non est possibile loqui vel moveri successive. 3^a dicit quod non est possibile movere aliquo motu, quamvis possibile sit moveri sine motu, quia non est possibile successivum esse: et multo magis non est possibile propositionem 15 vocalem esse, cum tunc forent distincte voces que non possunt pro eodem instanti proferri. Et ille sunt fuge sophisticæ interruptentes doctrinam. 4^a dicit quod omnis propositio significat seipsam primarie et sic verum. 5^{ta} dicit quod non sunt responsiones vel denominationes 20 propositionum retorquendo ad idem instans, cum hoc non sit possibile. 6^a dicit quod quelibet negativa principaliter et primarie significat affirmationem, ut ista: *homo non est*, primarie significat *hominem esse*, sed negative, sicut ille terminus "inintelligibile" significat 25 intelligibile, sed privative; et per hoc evacuat insolubilia negativa. Ymmo dicit quod quelibet talis propositio, *hec non est vera*, *hec non habet primum significatum*, etc. primarie significat illam propositionem, et per consequens primarie significat illam esse: 7^{ma} negat 30 omnes veritates negativas; nec est possibile quod propositio precise primarie aequaliter significet, nec quod propositio nunc significet uno modo et alias alio modo; quia significatio propositionis est eius forma. 8^{va} dicit altercando quod aliqua talis est vera, et aliqua talis est 35 falsa; et, posito quod una talis sit omnis talis, tunc vel dubitat quam opponens proponit, vel dicit quod repugnat casui aliquam talem esse propositam, vel 3^o distinguit infinite quamlibet talem.

Tales innumeratas responsiones potest quis audire, 40 quas oportet cum solercia excludere, inmutando casus

successionis in casus de permanentibus; ut, posito "Sor videat vel intelligat *istam*, sic primarie significantem: *Sor videt vel intelligit falsum*", et sic de similibus. Vel aliter petatur concorditer, gracia noscendi veritatem, talis modus loquendi; vel tercio directe vel oblique destruatur fundamentum evasionis, utendo veris verbis; quod est in pluribus onerosum.

Relictis istis ergo viis volentibus per ipsas incedere, suppono aliqua alibi declarata. Primo quod cuiuslibet propositionis vere pro suo significato significatum primarium est veritas. Istud patet; quia aliter non foret significatum propositionis ipsam esse veram.

2^o suppono quod ad contradiccionem, convertibilitatem, vel equipollenciam propositionum, non sufficit habitudo signorum, sed requiritur habitudo in modo significandi. Contradiccio enim non est nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis. Unde in multis talibus homo non intelligit, etsi voluerit, sensus equivocas sub eadem habitudine; ut nemo simul intelligit illam: *nullum A videt B*, intelligendo distincte subiectum vel predicatum tam in nominativo quam in accusativo. Ideo non contradicunt talia, equivoce intellecta: *nullum A videt B*, et *aliquod A videt B*.

3^o supponatur quod cuiuslibet propositionis vere pro suo significato significatum primarium est veritas significata per suum verbum principale, in comparacione ad eius suppositum: ut ista propositio, *Sor est*, primarie significat *esse Sortem*, quod est essencia Sortis, et per consequens ipse Sor. Et hoc, *Sor movetur*, significat primarie *moveri Sor*, quod est accidens priori; quia eius motus. Et sic de aliis verbis adiectivis, significantibus accidentia inexistencia subiectis significatis per verba substantiva. Et ex istis patet quod omne verbum significat substantivum copulacione, quia aliter aliquod esset verbum singulare, et per consequens eius participium esset pronomen.

4^o, suppono quod omnis veritas 2^a mensuretur a prima, que deus est, et in latitudine illarum veritatum sunt tot gradus defectuum vel falsitatum quot sunt gradus deficientie a prima veritate. Et sic omnis veritas creata est vera, quia prime veritati conformis, et falsa,

Wyclif's
solution of the
difficulty:
preliminaries.

1. The primary
signification of
every true
proposition is
truth.
2. Two
propositions
cannot
contradict each
other in form
alone; the sense
must be
contradictory
too.

3. The primary
signification of
every true
proposition is
the meaning of
the verb
together with
its subject,
and every verb
is a compound
of the verb
to be.

4. All created
truth is to
some extent
false, because,
compared with
the first truth,
which is God,
it falls short
of it to a
certain extent.

14. e^eia B. 19. n^a B. 34. sm cone B. 35. verbum singulare
very illegible B; ib. pp^m = pauperum (!) pro participium B.

There are thus three degrees in the truth of a proposition; it is true, 1st, in the vaguest sense, because it is what it is, i. e. a proposition, and consequently a being, and thus true.

And the falsest proposition is true antecedently to its falsity.

The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a mere negation, and every false proposition is true in this sense, falsity being grounded on truth.

A second meaning of truth implies that the proposition must agree with the meaning given to it, whether that be the proposition itself, dependent upon it, or wholly independent.

This proposition is, merely affirms

quia ab illa defectiva. Sed restringendo sermonem ad signa notantur 3^s gradus famosiores quibus contingit proposicionem esse veram vel falsam. Primo modo largissime est propositio vera, quia ens; nam ens et verum 2^m philosophos convertuntur. Nec est dictum sine ratione; quia, si quicquam est, tunc *ipsum esse* est verum. Sed idem est *quodcumque ens esse et ipsum ens*. Ideo non dubium quin, si quicquam est res vel ens, ipsum est verum ens, vel vera res, et per consequens ipsum est verum. Ymmo, cum omne ens naturaliter significat se esse, propositio falsissima, cum sit ens, significat se esse naturaliter. Et non dubium quin principaliter significat se esse quam significat illud falsum quod ex ordinacione hominis significat; quamvis illud quod principaliter intelligitur ex imposicione per pro-¹⁵posicionem dicimus illa primarie significare: ut *layco* significat propositio principaliter seipsam, et *literato* significat, preter significanciam naturalem, veritatem quam imponitur significare: et tali primaria significacione suppono quod fiat locucio in presenti. Ver²⁰o autem isto modo dicto opponitur falsum contradictorie, ut dictum est in principio tocius tractatus. Sic ergo loquendo de vero, omnis propositio falsa est propositio vera. Unde peritissimi philosophi posuerunt falsitatem signi esse eius privacionem, que non plus potest esse nisi in vero quam malicia potest esse sine bono.

2^o modo, paulo contraccius dicitur propositio vera, propter veritatem quam primarie significat; sive ipsa veritas sit ipsamet, vel ab ipsa dependens, sive ens omnino distinctum; et isto modo sunt tales vere: *hec propositio est, hec propositio significat, hanc propositio-³⁰ nem videt Sor, deus est*, et similia. Et isto modo descripta est propositio vera in principio tractatus primi. Prima autem istarum 4 propositio-³⁵num exemplancium significat primarie ipsam propositio-³⁵ nem, quia eius essenciam; et 2^a significat primarie eius accidens, quia suum *significare*. 3^a significat primarie visionem activam Sortis causatam ex eius significacione; et 4^a significat principaliter essenciam divinam. Prima ergo istarum

16. *layco* (sic!) B. 17. *lrato* B.

17. *Layco*. I have sometimes met with the same word, evidently signifying *loyco* (*logico*). This would agree with the sense pretty well, if not for the *literato* which follows. 22. See Logica I, pag. 77.

- proposicionum solum in hoc superaddit quodlibet ens significandum, ut ipsa sit propositio vera, et non quodlibet reliquum quod ipsa ex ordinacione hominis significat suum significatum. Sed ista causa est exilis, cum ordinacio nature sit prestancior ordinacione hominis. Vero autem isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum, quod significat complexu primarie significatum quod non est, ut sunt tales; *homo est asinus, hec propositio non est*, etc.
- 10 Sed 3^o specialiter dicitur propositio vera, quando habet primarie significatum independens ab ipsa, ut sunt tales: *deus est, sol movetur*, etc. Et isto modo locutus est Aristoteles de proposicione, dicens: in eo quod res est vel non est, quam propositio primarie significat,
- 15 est ipsa vera vel falsa, et non propter mutationem B 92^b factam | in proposicione. Et cum isto famoso modo intelligendi proposicionem concordat ethymologia, qua propositio dicitur a *pro alio posicio*. Unde intelligentes proposicionem significative et proposicionaliter intelligunt
- 20 ipsam significare significatum quod nec est ipsa propositio nec ab ipsa dependens; quia aliter non esset proposicione vera dicta relacio, que est adequacio significati primarii ad suum signum vel intellectum intelligentem. Nec aliter foret ratio quare hoc foret propositio: *hoc est* (demonstrando se ipsam) quin per idem
- 25 quelibet res significans se ipsam esset propositio. Et vero isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum carens primarie significato, quod non est ipsum significans nec ab illo dependens, sicut sunt talia: *hec propositio est, significat, et movetur*, et similia que materialiter significant pro se ipsis. Et ex istis patet quod falsum isto modo est verum tam primo modo quam 2^o. Patet etiam quod si quicquam est verum 3^o modo, tunc est verum 2^o modo; sed non econtra.
- 35 Istis premissis, dico quod omnia vocata communiter insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa. Claudit enim contradiccionem quod aliqua sit propositio insolubilis; sed sicut illud cuius magnitudo est de difficili noscibilis dicitur infinitum, ut profunditas maris, ita quecunque
- 40 propositio de difficili solubilis, quam quis nescit solve, dicitur sibi insolubilis, et specialiter propositio significans affirmative vel negative pro se ipsa, ex cuius
- that it is something distinct from anything else. The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a contrary, in which the signification is affirmed wrongly.
3. A proposition is true in the third sense, only when it has a primary signification that does not depend upon it.
- In this sense, therefore, the proposition stands for what is neither that proposition, nor depending upon it. The opposite of truth is here its contrary; falsity; i. e. the absence of any meaning independent of the proposition itself. This falsity is truth in the two former senses; and truth in the third comprises truth in the second sense.
- I say that every 'insoluble' is both true and false. 'Insoluble' is a contradiction in terms, unless it merely signifies 'very difficult to solve', or 'insoluble for such and such persons'.

If we take 'true' in its transcendental sense, then *this sign is true* ∴ *it is a true sign* is no longer a sophism.

The general solution is that these propositions are false in the third sense, and true in the other two; for they have no meaning whatever that does not depend upon the proposition itself.

Aristotle says that a man who swears that he is committing perjury swears truly; for there is produced by a reflex influence, some thing of truth in these, so that they are verified in their significations. Again, take the case of a hypothetical proposition; the antecedent is true in the first and second sense; but, as the consequent is impossible, the whole proposition is false in the third. If an attempt be made to urge the matter syllogistically, we merely deny that the consequence is good,

veritate sequitur illam esse falsam, et e contra. Nec est hic sophisma, *hoc signum est verum et est signum verum*, intelligendo istum terminum *verum* transcendentaliter quia in talibus non est sophisma, nisi accidentaliter coniungantur. 5

Per hoc patet solucio in particulari ad communia insolubilia. Nam, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor, et quod solum istam proposicionem dicat vel eius partem: *Sor dicit falsum*, sic primarie significando, patet quod Sor dicit falsum 3^o modo, quia proposicionem 10 carement significato primario independente ab illa; et in tanto habet rationem falsi vel vacui carencia talis significati. Manente ergo illa falsitate, gignit ipsa per suam significacionem quandam denominacionem que est vera 2^o modo. Et correspondenter dicitur de illis: *hoc 15 est falsum*, seipso demonstrato; *ego cogito vel percipio falsum*. Et [sic] de ypotheticis ex talibus compositis.

Unde Aristoteles solvens talia 2^m quid et simpliciter dicit quod qui iurat se esse periurum bene iurat, iurans hoc solum, quia non dubium quin talia reflectant super 20 se quandam denominacionem esse veri, propter falsitatem presuppositam. Ideo dicuntur 2^m quid vera et 2^m quid falsa; unde ex suis significacionibus verificant se.

Conformiter dicitur quod ista condicionalis est impossibilis: *Si ista consequencia est bona, tu es asinus,* 25 quia antecedens est verum non solum primo modo, sed etiam 2^o modo, et consequens est impossibile. Omnis enim consequencia est bona, sicut et omnis res. Et sic tam hoc antecedens quam hoc consequens est bonum et verum, sed non est bonum vel verum quod tu es 30 asinus; quia non potest esse. Quod si queris utrum illa consequencia sit bona vel vera 3^o modo, dicitur quod non, sicut patet ex supradictis. Non enim est dare veritatem independentem ab illa quam ipsa primarie significat. Et si isto modo formatur consequencia: 35 *Ista consequencia est bona 3^o modo: ergo, tu es asinus*, negatur consequencia, cum antecedens sit possibile et consequens impossibile. | Potest enim esse quod illa B 93^a

4. acci^r B. 17. sic deest B.

2. *Signum verum*. This is Aristotle's class of fallacies, *dictum simpliciter* and *dictum secundum quid*, as: *This shoemaker is good* ∴ *he is a good shoemaker*.

consequencia materialis aliter significet tam pro antecedente quam pro consequente. Ideo antecedens significat primarie de facto qualiter non potest esse. Nec valet responsio que ponit significacionem signi esse eius
 5 formam, cum sit illa [tam] accidentalis signo quam accidentale est michi quod sedeo. Non tamen est possibile quod ista consequencia sic primarie significans sit vera 3^o modo. Ideo bene sequitur: *ista consequencia sic primarie significans est vera 3^o modo: ergo, tu es asinus.*
 10 Sed antecedens est inprobabile.

the antecedent having an impossible signification here;

or we may admit the consequence, taken with this signification, but deny the antecedent.

Et conformiter respondetur, negando istam consequenciam tanquam impossibilem: *Sor decipitur et Sor credit quod ipse decipiatur: ergo, non est ita quod Sor decipitur;* quia sic credendo clauderet contradiccionem
 15 quod non deciperetur, intelligendo terminus ut logici communiter intelligunt tales. Sicut in simili non sequitur: *Sor periurat, et Sor iurat se periurare: ergo, non est ita quod ipse periurat.* Et excludantur eciam dubietates in Sor, cum hic forte diceretur quod aliquis
 20 iurans verum, dum tamen dubitaret, illud male iuraret. Et adverte denominacionem veri in hiis, super se reflexam ex falsitate presupposita, in eis tunc est leve [dicere quod] Sor decipitur, nisi ipse decipiatur; quia tunc claudit contradiccionem quod non deciperetur,
 25 intelligendo terminos ut logici communiter concipiunt.

The answer to the question: *can a man be deceived and believe that he is deceived?* is the same;

likewise to the question: *can a man be forsworn by swearing that he is forsworn?* setting aside the case of doubts that would render the oath a perjury.

Unde, posito quod Sor precise primarie credat quod aliquis homo decipitur, nullo alio homine aliquialiter existente, et quod omnis homo primarie credens falsum decipiatur, et solum talis; patet quod Sor decipitur,
 30 cum propositio credita ab illo careat significato independenti ab illa, cum illa sit causa quare Sor credit illam, et sic quare Sor decipitur. Unde non conceditur ista consequencia de materia et forma, sed gracia terminorum: *iste homo credit quod aliquis homo decipitur,*
 35 *ergo, aliquis homo decipitur.* Et, si ponatur quod nullus homo decipiatur qui credit verum, dicitur quod hoc repugnat casui, cum magna deceptio est vagari in propositiionibus carentibus significatis independentibus ab eisdem. Unde quomodocunque ponatur istum terminum,
 40 *deceptus*, significare, multos homines possibile est decipi

The fact of Socrates believing that some man is deceived loses all independent signification if we suppose that there is no other man but he; and therefore is false.

If it is said that no one who believes the truth can be deceived, we reply that to be misled by propositions that have no sense independent of themselves is a great deception.

3. nō potest B. 5. tam deest B. 15—16. intelligendo — intelligunt punctis deleta; talis B. 22. le^o B. 23. dicere quod deest. 28. credente vro existente B. 30, 31. īdepn^{ti} B.

It is quite possible to be deceived without actually believing anything; what is necessary is a disposition to believe what is false.

Case of a tyrant ordering that those and only those who speak the truth, shall pass over a bridge; what is to be done to a man who says:
"I shall not pass it?"
The case is impossible, for it implies contradiction.

So, if God should ordain the first part, it would be impossible that the second should take place.

Either any ordinance of the first part is impossible, or merely not forthcoming, or no man will speak the above words.

As for the execution of the decree, the man should simply be made to pass over the bridge.

Case of a master who decrees of his slaves, A and B, that A is to be free if the first person he meets is a slave; B is to be free if the first person he meets is free;

et esse deceptos, cum hoc quod nichil actualiter credant: ut omnis male agens est deceptus, quia movetur assensiendo alicui tanquam bono quod non est sic bonum; et ista est magna deceptio. Nichil tamen decipitur nisi habeat dispositionem ad credendum falsum: ut incon-

tinens credit vel in actu vel in habitu quod expedit prosequi delectabile, cum omnis sic malus sit ignorans. Et per ista patet responsio ad casus quibus ponitur condicionaliter quod, *si quis dixerit verum, pertransibit pontem, et aliter non*; et quod *Sor solum dicat primarie quod ipse non pertransibit pontem*; talem enim deordinationem posset tyrannus possessor pontis constituere et casualiter veniens sic dicere. Verumptamen condicionalis est impossibilis, sicut universalis ponens quod quicumque dixerit veritatem pertransibit pontem. Est enim impossibile quod omnis transiens hodie per hanc viam, et dicens propositionem veram 3^o modo, pertransibit A ponte et solum talis, et quod Sor transiens hodie per hanc viam dicat solum primarie quod ipse non pertransibit A pontem. Hoc enim tacite includit contradiccionem. Ideo, si deus ordinaverit universalem primam partem casus, repugnat quod Sor sic veniens ita dicat. Ideo, vel est impossibile quod deus sic ordinet, propter impossibilitatem et irrationabilitatem ordinationis; vel 2^o quod deus [non] sic ordinavit et potest esse quod deus sic ordinavit, vel 3^o quod talis ordinatio impediret Sor ad sic veniendum et dicendum. Sed primum istorum est michi probabilius. Et si queratur quid procurator tyranni faceret cum Sor in casu superius posito, dico quod exequendo vim vocis sive statuti faceret Sor pertransire pontem, cum Sor dicat verum. Et si gravetur casus quo usque fiat impossibilis, dico tunc quod utendum est epykeya. B 93^b

Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est tyrannicum dominum ordinare de Sor et Platone servis suis, quod si primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit servus, tunc Sor erit liber et aliter non: et econtra de Platone; si primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit liber, tunc Plato erit liber, et

4. $\hat{u}^1 \hat{t}u$ B. 25. non *deest* B. 26. non sic B. 27. $\hat{d}d^m$ B.
34. $\hat{t}y\hat{c}^m$ B.

8. *Et per ista.* This paragraph and the following may throw some light on the allusions in *De Apostasia* (pag. 34, ll. 23—31) which I did not then understand very well.

aliter non: et obviat isti sibi ipsis primo in B instanti; tunc, si in B instanti cum istis paribus Sor fuerit liber, sequens est exposito quod Plato pro illo instanti erit servus. Et sequitur ex opposito cum illo dato, quod
 5 Plato tunc erit liber, cum tunc obviaverit primo libero. Sed, quamvis 2^m logicum non sit possibile quod talis sit ordinatio, sicut nec est possibile quod talis quis ex sola carta fiat liber vel servus: tamen difficultas est quid fieret 2^m legem politicam, tyranno manu-
 10 mittente illos servos sub illa conditione et residuo contingente, ut positum est; dicitur quod logico non est difficultas, quia condicionalis est impossibilis, vel casus gravatus habebit partes impossibiles, sicut proximus. Secundum vero ius humanum rationabile
 15 videtur quod uterque fiat liber, eo quod iura faveant libertati et domino deficiet probatio ad detinendum eos in servitute; cum, domino affirmante quod pro primo instanti obvie alter fuerit servus, redarguetur ex propria confessione evidente quod ex hoc tunc uterque erit
 20 liber. Quecunque ergo pars probaverit partem suam induceret oppositum. In tali ergo casu utendum est epykeya, quid ratio iudicaret pro utilitate reipublice; et illud est faciendum.

and it happens that A and B meet each other first,

the case is logically impossible; but the legal difficulty

should be met by setting free both A and B, because the law is in favour of liberty, and the master has no convincing proof of a right to keep either of them.

Case of three propositions actually known at a given time.

Patet etiam ex hiis dictis et tractatu proximo quod
 25 satis possibile est te scire sciencia actuali solum istas tres propositiones, *deus est, homo est, animal [est]*, et omnem propositionem quam nunc scis per horam post hoc scies, istis sic primarie significantibus. Nam iuxta prius dicta falsum scitur, sicut cognoscitur; sicut enim
 30 scio hominem falsum, sic scio vel cognosco quod hoc est signum falsum. Verumptamen eius significatum non scio, quia non est; et quod non est non scitur; et si ponatur cum casu, *Nullam propositionem sciri nisi cuius significatum primum scitur*, patet scientibus obligationes quod post impositionem stabit responsio sicut
 35 prius, cum ad *esse* rei est respondendum. Ymmo sophista diceret quod claudit contradiccionem sic scire 3^{am} propositionem, que sit C, sicut clauderet contradiccionem quod eius significatum maneat per tantum
 40 tempus. |

9. tu^o B. 22. epybeya? B. 26. est after animal deest B. 30. hō B.
 38. f^a B.

Note that there are many sorts of propositions, according to what they denote. Some cannot be true in their primary signification, although another with the same meaning may be true. Some cannot be false, and yet a convertible proposition may be so. And thus insoluble propositions are not absolutely convertible with others, for *This is false* (meaning this very proposition) cannot be true; and *This is false* (meaning the preceding proposition) may be quite true. Their diversity proceeds from their mode of signification, the second referring to an object independent of itself. But it is not every difference as to the mode of signification that causes this diversity; a proposition may be true for many men, and yet false, if meant for me and not corresponding with its meaning: as: *I see this*, (written down) may be understood in the first person or in the third by one who reads it.

Unde nota diligenter quod sunt multe manieres pro- B 94^a
 positionum pro suis denominacionibus capescendis. Ali-
 qua enim est propositio que non potest esse vera pro
 suo significato primario, sed sua convertibilis bene
 potest; ut patet de ista in mente mea: *Ego non sum*, 5
 et de ista: *hec propositio non est* (seipsa demonstra-
 ta); et sic de similibus, quarum significata non possunt esse,
 nisi ipsi non sint. Et econtra alique sunt propositiones
 que non possunt sic significando esse false, sed sue
 convertibiles bene possunt; ut patet de tali in mente 10
 mea, *ego sum*; et de talibus, *hoc est*, vel *significat*, vel
est verum (ipsomet demonstrato). Et hinc bene dicitur
 in materia insolubilium quod insolubile significans pro
 se ipso non in toto convertitur cum alio consimili de
 terminis synonymis; ut hec propositio, *hoc est falsum*, 15
 est vera primo modo et 2^o, et est falsa 3^o, cum solum
 significat pro se ipsa, quod est falsa, et vera alia de
 similibus terminis, *hoc est falsum*, foret vera simpliciter
 pro priori, cum significaret veritatem que esset inde-
 pendens ab illa; et tamen primaria significata propter 20
 oposiciones non essent diversa, sed modi significandi.
 Utraque enim esset vera et convertibilis cum reliqua;
 sed prima esset falsa qualiter 2^a non esset falsa. Nec
 est inconueniens, duorum simpliciter convertibilium,
 unum esse simpliciter verum et aliud falsum, dum 25
 significando pro se ipsa careat veritate independente
 ab ipsa, reliqua significans primarie illud idem, habeat
 suum primarium significatum independens ab ipsa.

Verumtamen non omnis variacio in modo significandi
 causat diversitatem talem, sicut facit variacio in signi- 30
 ficando materialiter, vel significative. Nam stat A esse
 propositionem que quotlibet hominibus potest signi-
 ficare, et tamen esset falsa, significando cuicumque
 sicut modo significat, si non michi taliter significaret;
 ut patet de ista scripta: *ego video hoc* (me demon- 35
 strando per subiectum). Quilibet enim alius, intelligens
 subiectum sub habitudine prime persone, intelligeret
 aliud per subiectum quam ego intelligo. Et quilibet
 intelligens ipsam sub habitudine 3^e persone habet alium
 modum intelligendi subiectum, eo quod pronomen ideo 40
 est prime persone quod singulariter significat ipsum

apprehendens sub habitudine qua ipsum apprehendit. Sequitur enim: *ly* "ego" significat me singulariter et est prime persone: ergo, ego apprehendo ipsum. Verbum autem ideo est prime persone, quia subiectatur pro-
 5 nomini prime persone. Stat ergo in talibus modum loquendi variari, stante idemptitate significati cum convertente; ut patet de istis: *ego sum*, et *hoc est*; et stat modum significandi manere conformem, variatis significatis et equivalencia. Et patet de istis duabus:
 10 *ego sum*, *ego sum*; quarum prima est michi prime persone et 2^a Sorti.

Thus, though the form is the same, the sense changes, so that *I am*, becomes equivalent to *This being is*. And *I am* has a different sense on the lips of different men.

Aliqua autem est propositio possibilis cui nec est alia secum convertibilis; potest esse vera pro dato significato, ut patet de talibus: *Nulla propositio est*,
 15 *nullum signum alicui significat, omne apprehensivum actualiter differt ab actualiter apprehendente, nichil cogitat per dispositionem sibi accidentalem*; et sic de similibus, quarum significata posita tollunt veritatem propositionis. Unde, si sophista velit cognoscere deum
 20 suum, capiat pro regula quod solum illud quod omnem veritatem potest cognoscere est deus. Nam 2^m theologos potest esse verum quod nulla creatura sit, quod solum deus est intelligens, qui nichil intelligit nisi distincte, sine actu distincto vel iuvamine alterius. Talia enim
 B 94^b non potest aliud | a deo cognoscere propter repugnantiam.

Certain propositions that cannot be converted into others may be true in a certain sense, even though that sense destroys their truth; v. g. God's eternal act, if understood in that way.

Quocunque ergo nostrum significato, est dare quotlibet veritates quas non possumus cognoscere; ut ego non possum distincte cognoscere quod oblitus sum
 30 omnia que scivi, quod nichil scio, quod cesso ab omni actu intelligendi, et sic de similibus. Et hoc sine dubio arguit imperfectionem intellectus; quia nos indigemus tot ycraciis ad nostram noticiam, quod multas veritates non possumus cognoscere, nisi destrueremus illas. Noticia vero dei ex parte sui solum ipsum ponit, et ideo
 35 omnia potest cognoscere. Unde multa eternaliter cognoscent omnem veritatem, que non omnem veritatem possunt cognoscere, et 2^m theologos aliquis homo omnem veritatem potest scire, et tamen infinite veritates
 40 non possunt sciri ab illo homine, nisi fuerunt

There is an indefinite multitude of truths that we cannot know, as to know what we forget, &c. which argues imperfection in our minds. God's knowledge in the infinite simplicity of its objects, comprises all.

A man may know all truth, and yet all truths cannot be known by him.

2. significans B. 10. m' pro michi B. 12. que pro cui B. 16. n' B.
 9. d'm B. 33. ycc^ois B. 35. non solum B.

chymera nescia, quod verificatur de exemplo quod ponunt: posse desinere esse hominem, etc.

And though God teaches all truth there are infinite truths that He cannot teach or reveal to me; for instance, that I shall be damned; and there are truths that neither God nor man can know; to know them would be the total destruction of everything.

Yet God can know all truth; and, therefore, it is false to say that absolute non-existence is conceivable. It is equally absurd to suppose a time in which nothing begins to exist, even in the absurd hypothesis of annihilation. So that time and succession, once posited, must continue to exist.

Some truths are to be known only at a given instant, if we do not take the wide sense of the words; this happens particularly for the truth of propositions in the second and third sense. Some truths, to be known, require to be experienced, and are conditional, like a bribe given

Infinitas veritates deus non potest revelare vel docere, quamvis necessario docet omnem veritatem; nam ipse non potest revelare quod nichil revelat vel 5 docet, sicut nec revelare michi quod non sum; quod nichil revelatur michi, quod dampnabor, etc. sicut nec possum sic cognoscere quod privor omni distincta noticia. Est etiam dare veritates quas possum cognoscere. Et, si homo vel deus ipsas vel alteram earum cogno- 10 verit, tunc quidlibet annihilabitur; ut patet de talibus contradictoriis: *incipio perpetuo oblivisci me fuisse in hoc instanti*, et, *non sic incipio oblivisci*. Contradiccionem enim claudit alteram illarum fore, sicut repugnat pri- 15 miam rememorari vel docere. Deus tamen omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, quamvis aliqui false dicant quod potest esse quod nichil sit. Hoc enim claudit contradiccionem deum cognoscere, cum tamen equa passio entis sit cognoscibilitas. Ideo puto me scire quod claudit contradiccionem "nullum ens esse", aut "tempus 20 fuisse et nullum ens incipere esse"; quia, si per impossibile omnem creaturam deus annihilaret, adhuc infinite negaciones incipiunt esse de qualibet creatura, vel saltem incipit esse quod solum deus nunc est, quod ipse est sine A, sine B, et sic de aliis infinitis. Ex quo 25 videtur quod necessario sunt tempus et successio; quia pro primo instanti annihilacionis foret magna successio, et illud semper maneret.

Aliqua autem est veritas quam nemo potest cognoscere nisi pro instanti, 2^m restringentes verba; ut talis: 30 *hoc instans est*, et talis: *omnem propositionem quam nunc scio, per horam post hoc sciam*; quia aliter posset hoc instans manere per tempus; et breviter ita est de denominacionibus quo ad *esse verum* 2^o modo vel 3^o modo, sicut est de suis primarie significatis. Unde vere 35 dicitur quod non possum cognoscere quod gratus sum deo, nisi fuero in gracia vel caritate; aliquam veritatem non possum cognoscere, nisi fuero cesus; et sic quotcunque possibilia volueris de me vel quocunque alio

15. docv' B.

9. *Est etiam*. This sentence is evidently wrong, as appears from the context.

enunciare. Unde aliqui eliciunt quod reliqui cognoscant veritates, ut prebendarius dat superiori magnam pecuniam ut sciat se esse beneficiatum in tali pingui beneficio: quod caret ratione.

by a prebendary to his superior.

5 Redeundo ergo ad propositum: iuxta restrictionem predictam dicitur quod repugnat me cognoscere tales veritates, et cum hoc cognoscere quod omnem veritatem quam nunc cognosco, per horam post hoc cognoscam. Ymo, vocando omnem talem veritatem propositionem,
 10 cum significet seipsam, concedendum esset aliquam propositionem veram esse in me, quam impossibile est me distincte cognoscere; sicut dictum est de talibus: *ego nichil apprehendo, omne quod nunc distincte cognosco* |
 B 95^a *per horam post hoc distincte cognoscam*, posito quod
 15 solum cognoscam distincte A vel B, et quod continuum illas noticias per horam, tunc illa C veritas est in me, etsi distincte cognoscerem C, tunc cum paribus cognoscerem C per horam futuram. Ex quo sequitur quod
omne quod distincte cognosco, cognoscam per horam;
 20 et sic est verum quod distincte cognosco; ergo illud C distincte cognoscam per horam, et per consequens manebit, cum in instanti medio hore erit futura per horam, et in medio instanti istius hore; et sic in infinitum,
 25 sicut communiter arguitur in ista materia.

I say that it is impossible for me to know at the end of an hour every truth that I know *now*, i. e. only at this instant; at least distinctly.

For the fact of my knowing the truths A and B at the end of an hour is another truth, C. If I know C distinctly at the beginning as at the end of the hour, it would be an eternal, not an instantaneous truth.

Unde multe sunt responsiones in ista materia; ut illa prima que negat partem supponere pro suo toto, negat consequentiam factam in *Darii*. Et alia dicit quod bene credo C propositionem veram sine hesitatione, sed repugnat me aliter scire illam. Hoc tamen
 30 videtur falsum, eo quod cognosco quod C est verum, et cuiusmodi C verum est. Cui ergo repugnaret me scire C? nam, negato quod scio C, non stat aliquod scitum a me, nisi A vel B; et cum utrumque istorum
 35 cognoscam per horam futuram, sequitur quod omne distincte scitum a me cognoscam per horam futuram. Cum ergo sum certus de ista consequentia et de isto antecedente, ut suppono, relinquitur certitudo de consequente. Argumentum enim est ratio rei prius dubie
 40 faciens fidem, hoc est, certitudinem. Nichil ergo impedit hoc argumentum a productione sui naturaliter causabilis. Ymmo de illa veritate quam scio stat difficultas.

There are many answers to this difficulty, either denying the consequence of the argument, or saying that I merely believe (not *know*) the truth of C at the beginning of the hour; but the latter, denying all knowledge of C, contradicts the hypothesis

and the consequence as well as the antecedent is true; so is the consequent also.

1. e^{mut} = eximunt or eveniunt B.

3o. alig B.

If we keep to the strict sense of the words and admit a general knowledge of being, it is impossible to know anything for more than one instant; but I can know what it is to cognize during time.

I may know distinctly A and B at the beginning, and at the same time know confusedly my knowledge of A and B at the end; also that this knowledge cannot be distinct at the beginning.

If we give a wide sense to the tense of the verb,

we can admit that C is (i. e. is or will be) distinctly known together with A and B. Thus it does not follow: *I know C now; ∴ C is now;* but: C is now about to be in its time.

It is possible for me to know C, but many things here can be known only in general; my cognitive act is confusedly known to me. There are thus numberless truths that I know in general; if I distinctly knew

Relictis ergo istis novis invencionibus sophists, suis auctoribus, dicitur sicut prius, restringendo verba et admittendo noticiam confusam quod omne ens cognosco confuse, et per consequens, cum nichil possum cognoscere, ignorando ens esse in communi, patet quod claudit contradiccionem me vel aliud cognitum esse quod nunc cognosco per tempus cognoscere, saltem si nichil sit extra presens instans. Possibile tamen est me esse, quod distincte scio vel cognosco quod illud est per tempus cognoscere. Sed hoc creditur esse impossibile de deo. Sic ergo posito quod distincte cognoscam solum A vel B que sic per horam cognoscam, cognosco confuse me esse cognitum per horam omne quod nunc distincte cognosco; et, si reflexero actum apprehendendi distinctum super illo, sicut oportet ad eius distinctam noticiam, inveniam in 2^o actu reflexo quod impossibile est me distincte cognoscere illam, sicut impossibile est deum qui solum distincte potest cognoscere continuare per tempus omnem eius noticiam.

Sed patet ampliamentibus verba de presenti quod deus omne quod unquam novit vel noscet semper noscet, cum non potest incipere vel desinere quicquam scire. Et sic semper noscit omne instans esse pro mensura sua, et hoc distinctive. Sed secus est de homine. Verumptamen iuxta ampliacionem conceditur quod homo potest distincte cognoscere C cum A et B, sicut iam cognosco omne instans quod fuit vel erit esse tempore suo. Et sic, posito quod simus in medio instanti hore sequentis instans demonstratum, concedunt in principio quod omne pro nunc scitum a me per horam, post hoc sciam semper, demonstrando uniformiter; sed non sequitur: *nunc scio C; | ergo, nunc est C.* Et istam responsionem approbo. Concedo quod est possibile me scire C; semper tamen, dum sum in via, ignoro multa in particulari. Unde in omni noticia mea remanet aliquis actus meus confuse cognitum, quia aliter reflecterem actus super priores in infinitum.

Unde infinite sunt veritates quas non possum nisi confuse cognoscere, ut est confusa noticia; et multe alie ignorancie mee; infinite enim sunt conclusiones quas ignoro. Et si distincte cognovero quod ignoro illas,

18. q̄ire B. 26. non pro iam.

tunc non ignorarem illas. Ignorare enim dicit, ultra nescire, existenciam ignorati. Quando ergo sic arguitur *omne quod distincte scio per horam post hoc sciam; sed C veritatem distincte scio; ergo etc.*: conceditur conclusio, sicut minor in casu. Nam si *ego distincte scio quod ignoro C, ergo distincte scio C esse verum antecedens*: patet ex hoc quod videtur michi deductum evidenciam infallibili quod ignoro C. Et consequencia facta patet, ex hoc quod distincte scio illam consequenciam esse bonam: *si ignoro C, C est verum et distincte scio antecedens, ergo et consequens*. Sed constat repugnare aliquem distincte scire datum singulare quod ignoravit. Ideo, si in casu posito credo distincte absque formidine contraria quod scio distincte, scilicet C, tunc scio C: quod conceditur. Et patet ex dictis responsio ad instantiam superius positam; et illa est una evidenciam inter multas ad laxandum verba de presenti.

Uterius patet, cum viator, sciendo in universali veritatem aliquam, scit eius singularia confusa, quod ignorat ab eo scitum; nisi forte de illis sit aliunde sciencia specialis, excludens ignoranciam. Tenendum est eciam quod principaliter scitur vel cognoscitur veritas apprehensa, et 2^{arie} signum. Unde multi laici sciunt multas veritates, et tamen ignorant signa esse; sic ut versatur tamquam dubium inter doctos si sunt talia signa in anima. Et hoc fortificat quod oportet ponere tales veritates, cum aliter foret sciencia sine proportionali scito (ut tactum est tractatu *de scire*); quoniam sciencia universalis et sciencia singularis non repugnant. Septimo restat videre quomodo in particulari sint solvendo insolubilia negativa. Ipsa enim videntur habere maiorem difficultatem, ut sunt talia: *hec propositio non est vera; Sor non dicit verum sicut est; non est ita sicut ego cogito; non est ita sicut ego principaliter credo*: et sic de similibus. Primam autem claudit repugnanciam esse veram pro isto supposito, cum quelibet propositio est vera, eo ipso quod est. 2^a eciam est falsa, cum impossibile sit quicquid dicere, nisi dicatur necessitas eterna, sequens ad omne dicibile. Quelibet ergo creatura dicit quotlibet veritates. Et sic dicitur ad

that I did not know them, I should know them.
We may thus admit that we know confusedly a distinct act of cognition of C.

If I do not know C, C is a truth: I distinctly know the antecedent and, therefore, the consequent. This is one of many proofs in favour of extending the present tense to more than one instant.

To know confusedly is tantamount to ignorance.

We know firstly the truth and then the sign that denotes it in our mind; for unlearned men may know many things, and nothing about their signs; and even the learned dispute as to whether they exist at all. The negative insoluble propositions, being particularly difficult, are to be dealt with now separately.

"This proposition is not true" is false in the sense given. "A does not speak the truth as it is", is also false, for the act of speaking is true. "It is not as I

12. scire datum *twice* B.

30. quo B.

31. maiorem *twice*

34. *pn^{ter}* B.

28. Cf. *Logica*, Vol. I, pag. 179. "*Secundo patet*", etc.

think", is also false, for whatever we think we imply God's existence. "It is not as I believe" gives greater trouble; but we must employ the words *true* and *false* for the second sense of truth and falsehood. And then we answer that these negatives are simply false.

A proposition may be adduced, for which we must deny that there is any signification except what naturally belongs to it.

Or we may say that negations have no reality. Or we may note that, though to signify, to be true, and to signify the thing that is, come to the same, yet they may be very different if one is taken to mean something independent of itself.

3^{ciam}, cum nemo potest cogitare, nisi aliquando principaliter cogitet deum esse. Sed in 4^a et similibus modificatis stat difficultas. Et ut brevis loquamur, restringatur *verum* vel *falsum* ad verum et falsum dictam 2^o modo; et restringatur *significare*, *dicere*, et *cogitare* etc. ad tales primarios actus ex impositione causatos et cogitata, dicta, et sensata etc., ad illa que sunt 2^m primariam impositionem huiusmodi. Quamvis enim illud sit in multis onerosum, tamen potest, gracia argumenti, in multis amicaliter admitti, et responsio aptari ad proporcionem, | ac si termini modificantes illos B 96^a sensus essent expressi utrobique. Tunc dicitur quod talia insolubilia negativa sunt falsa simpliciter.

Sed tripliciter variatur responsio; primo, capta illa propositione: *non est ita sicut hec propositio primariae 15 et ex impositione significat*. Dicitur quod non habet significationem ex impositione, cum nichil ex impositione significat simpliciter seipsum, eo quod talis impositio superflueret, cum hoc habet quidlibet ex natura. Nec est hoc nomen, *propositio*, impositum ad significandum, nisi signa veritatum independencium ab eisdem. Et sic talia communiter vocata insolubilia non habent 2^m omnes suos terminos significata primaria ex impositione resultancia. 2^a responsio evadit insolubilia negativa per hoc quod nulla negacio potest esse ex parte 25 rei. Sed pro 3^a responsione, consequente ad dicta de impositione ac laxacione propositionem ac veritatibus negativis, notandum diligenter quod licet hec 3^a convertantur, *hec propositio significat, hec propositio est vera vel significat sicut est, hec propositio est*, et sic de 30 quotlibet cum istis convertibilibus, in quibus propositio principaliter significat pro seipsa; ista tamen convertibilitas est gracia terminorum, cum propositiones consimiles significantes pro significatis extra ipsas sunt valde dispares. Probat per deducens ad impossibile. 35 Nam si ista non convertuntur, *hec propositio significat et hec propositio significat sicut est eadem inceptu denominata*, tunc esset possibile quod hoc significaret cum hoc quod non significaret sicut est; quia certum est quod reliqua coniugacio non est possibilis. Sed contra; 40

4. dcta B.

18. fm^{ter} B.

37-38. dcta (= demonstrata?) B.

40. gingo B.

si C primarie significat sic, tunc C est verum, et tunc significat sicut est: ergo, si C significat precise *se significare*, tunc est ipsum verum significans sicut est.

Et ex isto patet quod in qualibet tali idem est significatio et significatum: ut significatum huius, *A significat*, est ipsum *A significare*, quod est eius significatio. Et ita est de istis: *A significat sicut est*. Nam hec convertuntur: *A habet significatum vel significacionem que est*.

And in all such propositions the signification and the thing signified are identical.

2° patet quod quelibet talis negativa, significans pro seipsa, *hoc non significat sicut est*, significat seipsam non habere significacionem et per consequens falsificat se, cum in significando facit se ipsam habere significacionem.

Any proposition that denies its own signification falsifies itself.

Et ex istis patet 3° quod sicut propositio significans se esse verum est vera pro veritate extra ipsam, et sic significans primarie, idem est falsum 3° modo; sicut B propositio, significans primarie quod *non est ita ut A significat*, est vera pro A, et ipsum A sub conformibus vocibus significans est simpliciter falsum.

As a proposition affirming its own truth is false in the third sense, so B (= A is false) may be true, while A (= A is false) cannot be true.

Ex quo patet quod B significat dispariter ab A, quia A significat quasi manenter pro se vel suo actu, cum actus significandi sit absolutus, non transiens in extrinsecum, ut actus significandus. Et ista oportet diligenter notare. Nam sicut conceditur quod A est falsum, ita conceditur quod non est ita sicut A significat; quia non est ita quod A non habet significacionem, quod valde est disparatum a significacione A. Ideo patet quod talis disparatencia non valet: *A precise significat se non esse verum et ipsum non est verum: ergo, A primarie significat sicut est*; sicut patet in suo convertibili. Nam non sequitur: *non est ita quod A non habet significacionem et A primarie significat quod A non habet significacionem: ergo, A primarie significat veritatem que est*; sed directe sequitur oppositum.

Thus A and B have different significations, the latter being independent, and the former not.

Et si dicitur quod sequitur A significare modo quo est, conceditur; sed ex hoc non sequitur A esse verum, cum omne significans significat modo quo est; sed non significat, saltem precise, ens quod est, quod tamen requiritur ad esse verum. Unde patet ex dictis quod ista non repugnant: *A significat sicut est* (hoc est, modo quo est) et tamen *ipsum non significat sicut est*

We admit then that A is false, and that it means that which is not, but not that it means nothing. The arguments to the contrary are not conclusive.

There are two meanings to *as*: to signify as it is may be either in the way in which it is or the truth that is.

12. se in marg. B. 15. c pro se 16. precise above primarie B.
20. disipit B. 21. accidente pro actu (?). 27. disparatum B.

(hoc est, modum vel veritatem que est). Iste enim terminus, *sicut*, potest intelligi equivoce sub habitudine accusativi casus, vel sub habitudine ablativi casus. In aliquibus autem, significantibus materialiter pro se ipsis, non differunt isti sensus; quod sic declaro. Sit C ista 5
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In some cases these meanings make one.

For instance: *It is as C signifies* contains both meanings of *as*.

C cannot here be taken as a general term implying being. What C means is purely its own signification,

as we see by turning any proposition into the infinitive.

So if C signifies, it signifies both the thing that is and as it is.

Such propositions are true in the first, and second and false in the last sense of truth. It is plain that a proposition having the same form as A, and meaning A, might not be convertible with it.

It is not as A signifies would not mean A has no signification, but the thing signified by A is not.

Ex quo patet quod idem est C significare et C significare ens quod est, vel veritatem que est, vel modo quo est; et sic de aliis recitatis. Cum enim talibus convertitur hoc: C habet significationem.

2^o patet quod quelibet talis est vera 2^o modo et 3^o modo. Et per consequens sua contradictoria est falsa 2^o modo et 3^o modo, et vera primo modo.

Et patet 3^o quod propositio de similibus terminis cum A, significando pro A, non converteretur cum A. Nam A, significando quod *non est ita sicut A significat*, 35
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11. acc^s pro actus B.

18. hoc pro hec B.

42. \widehat{v} pro verbum B.

reciprocum, cum comentitur cum illo *non est ens quod est primario significatio A*. Sed B, significans immanenter et transitive pro A, est verum significando quod *ens significatum per A non est*.

5 Et si dicatur quod possibile est B precise convertibiliter significare cum A, et tunc stat ratio: dicitur quod repugnat casui A et B significancia sic primarie convertibiliter significare, sicut repugnat quod ista in mente mea: *ego sum homo*, primarie significet sicut
10 ista in mente tua: *ego sum homo*. Denominaciones autem pronominum prime persone erunt diverse; sed sicut oportet mutare personas pronominum ad convertibiliter significandum, ita oportet mutare terminos B ad primarie significandum convertibiliter cum A; cuius
15 ratio est, quia A significat negative materialiter pro sua significacione, et B significat significative pro A. Ideo, si B esset talis propositio: *non est ita quod A habet significacionem primariam*, tunc converteretur cum A; sed utrumque foret falsum.

20 Et si ultra dicatur quod eque possibile est A contrahi ad significandum convertibiliter cum B, sicut econtra, conceditur: verumptamen non est possibile A primarie significare ut ponitur, nisi significando quod *nullum ens est eius significatio: ymmo sic dicto: nullum*
25 *ens est extra A quod A significat, foret eius significare*. Sed B, significando quod nulla est veritas extra A quam A significat, foret falsum transitive, negans A habere significatum extra se; cum tamen eternaliter |
B 97^b ante A *esse fuit illa negacio: nulla est veritas extra A*
30 *quam significat*. Et certum est quod perposicionem A non extingwitur ista negacio; quia extingwendo illam poneret illam. Ideo manet illa negacio sicut prius.

Scio tamen quod maior pars logicorum mirabitur de significacione imposita insolubilibus negativis. Cuius
35 admiracionis causa est hoc quod intelligendo insolubilia, intelligitur per disparatas propositiones que immaterialiter et transitive significant. Ideo videtur illa significacio esse contra experienciam qua experimur propositiones nostras significare pro significatis extra se. Certum est
40 tamen quod ita significant insolubilia negativa, et alios

Objection:
1. B may be made to signify absolutely the same as A. This is impossible; as much so as to say that I am a man in the mind of two different persons, signifies the same. Personal pronouns, in order to conserve the same sense, have to be changed in form.

2. A may be made to signify the same as B.

True; but then B would become false.

Most logicians will be surprised at the signification I give to these negatives. They assimilate such propositions to ordinary ones, which we know to have a meaning independent of themselves; but it is not so of these 'insolubles'.

15. m^r mutabiliter (?) B.

16. t.^{ne} B.

36-37. 1 uilr'z B.

37. tuf.^o B.

40. aliter B.

proposiciones quas proferimus ad eorum similitudinem. Et ideo racionabiliter querit sophista certificationem de propositione ad quam responderet. Et per hoc patet quomodo respondendum est ad talia: *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*. Nam negative tales exemplate sunt concedende propter insolubilia negativa falsa. Unde hoc insolubile negativum significat primarie quod *nullum ens est primaria conceptio mea: quod est falsum*. Ideo concedendum est quod *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*; sed significatum primarium insolubilis negativi est negandum, cum sic significet *non est ens quod est primaria conceptio mea*. Et sic tale impossibile: *ego primarie credo sicut non est*, significat primarie quod *ego credo credulitate que non est*. Et sic decipior; et causa quare talia sic significant est ista, quia significatum et res verbi affirmativorum est idem: ut idem est *credo sic sicut est* et *credo credulitate vel credulitatem que est*. Et suum oppositum repugnat esse verum sic significando; tum, quia impossibile est me credere credulitatem que non est, et per accidens est quod talis significat me credere credulitatem que non est, tum [quia] principalis significatio sua sit talis: "me credere ens quod non est;" sed cum actus credendi non transit in distinctum, sed absolute terminatur in se ipso, ideo idem est ac si poneretur "me credere credulitate etc." Et, ut puto, omne insolubile negativum est 2^m istam viam satis solubile.

Ut putat, quando ponitur condicio per effectum consequendo, et additur casus de scripto aliquo ad denominationem dependentem ex condicione vel effectu futuro: ut patet de transicione pontis, de liberatione servorum, et similibus 2^m infinitas circumstantias valde confusas variatas. Ubi nunc prodest ars obligacionis pro evasionibus, et nunc tantum gravantur casus, quod sunt impossibiles.

Unde communiter argumentat sophista ad probandum socium esse redargutum, vel cuiusmodi voluerint, ponendo quod quicumque negaverit se esse redargutum, et solum talis, sit redargutus. Et illa est condicio. Tunc

We must know to which of the two propositions we ought to reply. "It is not as I primarily conceive" = "Nothing false is my primary concept"; which we admit.

Or it may mean: "There is no being that is my primary concept," which we deny. "It is not as I believe should be explained likewise;

also all other negative 'insolubles'. We must note that many propositions are only apparently negative insolubles. Examples.

A common case in the exercise of obligations: Whoever denies that he is refuted is so by the very fact, is put and granted.

6. pp B. 10. tamen B. 22. cum B; *ib.* quia *deest*. 29. i¹⁹ B.
30-31. 9fe^{do} B. 41. 9d1^o B.

post istam proponitur probandum: tu es redargutus; quod est negandum, quia falsum et impertinens. Et cum non sit intencionis sophiste probare nisi manifeste falsum, generaliter sunt talia 2^o loco proposita falsa. Negato
 5 ergo illo, arguitur: *Quicumque negaverit se esse redargutum est redargutus; sed tu negas te esse redargutum; ergo tu es redargutus.*

Then; *You are refuted*, is put and denied. Lastly, a syllogism joining these two and concluding from them, is formed.

Hic est 3^x responsio. Prima negat antecedens tanquam falsa et impertinens, et concedit utramque eius
 10 partem. Sed in isto non est efficacia, cum ad hoc ordinatur posicio, ut sustineatur positum cum omni concessio, et sequentibus ex illis. Ideo consonantius esset negare totam copulativam tanquam impertinentem, et
 B 97^b concedere primam partem tanquam positam, et negare
 15 2^{am} partem tanquam repugnantem bene concessis, vel oppositis bene negatorum. Nec est inconveniens negare proprium actum vel eius pretericionem, quia communiter, quando opponens proponit responsali propositionem de proprio actu, non est ille actus; et per accidens necessarium frequenter est negandum tanquam repugnans. Sed quia idem potest tolli mutando casus
 20 sic: *quicumque negaverit in ista hora in anima vel voce se esse A fit ipse A*, tunc tertia responsione conceditur positum; et post conceditur tanquam verum et inper-
 25 tinens, quod tu sic negas te esse A; et 3^o conceditur conclusio tanquam sequens, scilicet, quod tu es A. Probatio tamen conclusionis, subducto casu, nullius est efficacie, cum non plus concedit nisi quod falsum negatum extra casum est concedendum in casu post bonam
 30 concessionem antecedencium ad ipsum. Ideo idem est ac si intendens probare quod *tu es episcopus*, post eius negacionem ponat *te esse episcopum*.

There are three answers.

1. To deny the antecedent. But this would be against the rules of Obligations; the antecedent has to be admitted.
 2. To deny the whole of the last syllogism, granting or denying its parts, as the case may be; for a past act may be denied in the present, since it exists no longer.

But the difficulty may be formulated so as to render this impossible.
 3. To admit everything, and say that the conclusion means no more than that a falsehood has here to be admitted on account of the case put.

Et ex istis patet quod negandum est tanquam impossibile quod *quicumque negaverit se esse asinum sit
 35 asinus*. Ymmo, cum necessario quelibet res mundi negat se esse quod non est, quasi omnes tales casus sunt impossibiles. Variantur autem tales casus multipliciter; ut ponitur quod *quicumque concesserit, dubitaverit, vel
 negaverit primum sibi proponendum sit talis* et post
 40 proponatur unum impertinens concedendum, dubitandum, vel negandum, et 3^o, facto argumento ex

Most of such cases, besides, are to be denied as impossible.

They are often varied in many ways.

18. rñfali B.

10. See Logica, Vol. I. Introduction p. p. XXVIII, XXIX.

condicione et facto responsali, concluditur intentum. Et eodem modo variatur casus; ponendo quod "quicumque aliter responderit ad istam: *tu es A*, quam respondet Sor affirmative respondens ad illam, sit *A*, et solum talis." Et sic de infinitis intricationibus que plus inducunt sollicitudines quam profectus.

But these subtleties only give fruitless trouble. There are also many subtleties concerning the commandments of God v. g. if God had commanded, under pain of mortal sin, to have sorrow for no sin but one's own, and you, having never sinned before, have sorrow for sin in general: is this a mortal sin or not?

It may be answered (1) that sorrow for sin in general includes sorrow for one's own sin, even though it be only possible and not existing. The difficulty here is that sorrow must have some object able to cause it; which mere possibility has not. Or (2) that such cases imply an absurd condition; for God cannot make it a sin to have sorrow for the sin of our neighbours; and if it be said that they only imply the mere fact of sin happening concomitantly, the whole argument is destroyed.

In aliis autem materiis sunt intricationes plurime de obligacione legistarum; ut ponatur quod deus precipiat taliter sub pena peccati mortalis quod non doleas de peccato, nisi dolendo de peccato proprio; quod nunquam ante hoc peccasti, sed quod solum doleas de peccato in communi, sicut faciunt illi qui dolent quod multa peccata sunt in mundo, nec aliunde pro nunc pecces. Tunc videtur quod nunc infringis preceptum; quia si cum istis paribus peccas, non superest unde peccares, nisi contraveniendo precepto. Et ex hoc sequitur cum veris quod non peccas, cum in universali doles de peccato proprio et sic comples preceptum. Et si dicatur primo quod non peccas, tunc oportet quod doleas de peccato proprio, et per consequens peccas.

In isto vero diceret sophista quod stat te dolere simpliciter de peccato possibili, etsi non actualiter sit; et sic in casu posito tu doles de peccato proprio, non contraveniendo precepto. Contingit enim dolere de impossibili; multo magis ergo, de quolibet seu quocumque possibili. Et sic doles de quocumque peccato dolendo de peccato in communi; et sic de peccato proprio, licet illud non sit. Sed quia videtur quod omnis dolor habet aliquod tristabile pro obiecto, ut pretericionem, futuricionem, negacionem, vel aliam quamlibet veritatem; non satisfacit ista responsio casum paululum. Ideo dicit 2^a responsio quod solucio talium exigit noticiam condicionis, quia ablativi casus, gerundia, ista coniuncio, *nisi*, et similia, implicant condicionales, quarum maior pars est impossibilis: ut, deus non potest obligare hominem quod, si dolet de peccato proximi et non de peccato proprio, quod eo ipso peccet. Et sic de aliis condicionibus simpliciter et absolute intellectis. Si autem condicionales non dicant causam completam, sed teneantur specificative, tunc non superest

1. *fñfali* B. 9. *mōrlis* B. 10. *n' B.* 13. *aliū de pñc pro aliunde pro nunc* B. 22. *fñt^{er}* B. 22. *fñmp^{ter} in marg.* B. 29. *t'ñ^a* B. 31. *nec* B; *ib.* paululum (sic!) B.

argumentum ad probandum quod peccat, si dolet de peccato proximi et non suo, cum stat oppositum. Et ista responsio potenter enervat casus huiusmodi. Unde non est in potestate hominis vel dei statuere quod simpliciter et absolute, si homo sic dolet, peccat, vel si sic obviat, liberabitur; et ita de ceteris.

Sed quia admissa est condicionalis bona, ut nunc, sicut et condicionalis necessaria ex suppositione vel ordinatione divina, potest 3^s admitti casus, et concedi quod pro dato instanti doles de peccato proprio quod haberes post modum, te adhuc manente innocente. Et sic cessat obieccio, scientibus ampliaciones verborum, quomodo omne preteritum vel futurum est presens tempore suo. Si autem gravetur casus quod continue manneas innocens, si non sic dolendo peccaveris, stante residuo casus: certum est quod casus est impossibilis, implicans inconvenienciam in ordinatione divina; ut puta quod deus ordinet te perpetuo innocentem et cum hoc ordinet te elicere talem actum ex quo cum obligatione sequitur te peccare. Ideo, si deus ordinat tibi te habiturum perpetuam innocenciam, vel preservabit te ne elicias talem actum, vel faciet quod non obligaberis sub forma ex qua sequitur te perplecti.

Conformiter dicitur quod, deo precipiente michi negative sub pena peccati mortalis, quod per istam horam non diligam eum, vel cogitem de eo actualiter, sed vacem praxi quod expedit, aliquando non esset possibile solvere illud mandatum quo ad partem negativam, cum non possit solvi quo ad illa, nisi faciendo affirmationem negacioni oppositam que est diligere deum. Et certum est quod claudit contradiccionem, diligendo deum peccare. Et conformiter dicitur ad talia precepta negativa, *non diligas deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}, non incipias peccare non incipiendo per posicionem de pre-* 35 *senti*; et sic de similibus. Nam primum mandatum non possum infringere, nisi diligendo deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}. Et certum est quod non peccarem, sic faciendo. Et quo ad 2^m, patet quod si infringerem illud pro hoc instanti primo, ego inciperem peccare per posicionem

Or (3) that at a given instant we may be sorry for a sin that we shall commit in the future; according to the doctrine of ampliation of the present.

If it be supposed that no other sin will be committed, but that of being sorry for the sins of others, the case is palpably absurd.

If God forbade me to love Him during a certain time, or to think of Him,

this could not be breaking His law; to sin through love of God,

or through too much love of Him, is a contradiction in terms.

3. potnt-~~o~~ B; *ib.* en'uat B. 6. sic B.

6. *Liberabitur*. Allusion to the case of setting two slaves free under certain conditions. See above, pag. 209.

If it be objected that man would thus be impeccable, should he have no other obligation, we answer that this supposition too implies an absurdity. The above remarks, together with practice, are, I think sufficient to solve every difficulty of the sort. Comparison of Wyclif's opinion with the six former ones.

a) *As regards likeness.* It is like the 1st, as it says that no 'insoluble' is simply true or false: Like the 2nd, affirming that the same proposition is diversely true and false: Like the 3rd, denying all signification to such propositions except in so far as they signify themselves; Like the 4th, denying that they have the same meaning as other propositions having exactly the same form, and standing for them: Like the 5th, admitting that many examples of 'insolubles' imply an absurdity; and like the 6th, denying that any such proposition is really insoluble.

de presenti, et non ut sic solverem illud. Et incipiendo solvere hoc mandatum, vel aliter, peccarem; per remotionem de presenti non solviter hoc mandatum. Ideo patet quod talia mandata de virtute sermonis essent insolubilia. Et si argumentatur quod deus, obligans hominem solum ad illa, faceret eum impeccabilem, dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem hominem solum obligari ad talia, cum necessario, si homo est, obligatur naturaliter multis obligacionibus inseparabilibus. Quicunque ergo fuerit taliter obligatus potest faciliter peccare aliunde. Ex istis ergo notatis credo quod exercitatus cum deliberacione dicta habebit viam solvendi quecunque talia insolubilia proponenda.

Ultimo patet in quibus hec posicio convenit et discrepat a singula de sex opinionibus supradictis.

Convenit enim cum prima in hoc quod ponit multa insolubilia nec simpliciter esse vera nec simpliciter esse falsa.

Convenit eciam cum 2^a in hoc quod ponit eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam diversis modis.

Et convenit cum 3^a in hoc quod ponit quodlibet tale insolubile in quo pars supponit pro toto suo insolubili manere vacuum, et nullum debitum vel distinctum sensum gignens, nisi in quantum antecedit se ipsum et ex sua significacione reflectit quamdam denominationem pro illo insolubili vel causato suo.

Convenit autem cum 4^a in hoc quod ponit repugnare aliquod insolubile significare primarie in toto conformiter sicut significant propositiones de similibus terminis significantes immanenter et transitive illis insolubilibus; ut patet de solucione insolubilium negativorum. Ymmo, omne insolubile, sive affirmativum, sive negativum, est resolubile in tales terminos per quos non est exprimenda sua significacio, sed per alios disparatos ut *credo quod decipior, credo quod credo primarie sicut non est*, et sic *credo quod credo credulitate que non est*: et sic de similibus.

Convenit autem cum quinta in hoc quod ponit multos casus positos in materia de insolubilibus esse impossibiles; ut patet de condicionibus superius notatis.

Et convenit cum sexta in hoc quod ponit nullum insolubile non posse solvi; sed veritatem esse de se

cognoscibilem, licet de difficili. Nec stat solucio in negationibus casuum vel principiorum logicorum, quibus innitantur responsiones priores; sed specialiter in noticia denominationis signorum quo ad *esse verum vel falsum*,
 5 et in distincta noticia significacionis proposicionis solvende.

Discrepat autem hec posicio a prima in hoc quod ponit insolubilia affirmativa dupliciter esse vera, et unice esse falsa; et insolubilia negativa 2^r esse falsa et
 10 unice vera; et significatum primarium cuiuscunque insolubiliter concedit simpliciter esse vel non esse.

Discrepat autem a 2^a in hoc quod ponit nullam proposicionem posse esse veram et falsam denominationibus contrariis; quia tunc significatum primarium
 15 proposicionis esset et non esset.

Discrepat autem a 3^a in hoc quod ponit partem supponere pro suo toto; ut hic: *hec propositio est, mundus est*. Ymmo, sicut pars integralis significat communiter suum totum (ut patet de partibus superficialibus
 20 ostendentibus suum integrum) ita supponit partes. Nec dubium quin contingit me ymaginari singulariter unam talem proposicionem posse scribi: *hoc scriptum est propositio*, et me oblivisci illius ymaginati; contingit illud interim scribi et obici michi, faciendo me re-
 25 minisci de tota priori ymagine et ymaginato, et ita significabit se ipsum. Et si obicitur quod prius naturaliter intelligitur pars proposicionis antequam intelligitur tota propositio, et sic propositio esset prior se ipsa: dicitur quod illud argumentum peccat 3^{ter}.
 30 Quis enim dubitat quin eque primo intelligitur per subiectum huius proposicionis, *ens est*, ipsa tota propositio, sicut et eius subiectum, cum, significacione ex impositione causata (de qua solum est nobis sermo), omne singulare intelligibile eque primo significat? Nec
 35 obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte. Nec sequitur, si ista pars prius naturaliter intelligatur a me, quam intelligitur esse pars, vel quam intelligitur esse hec propositio noticia tali connexa et distincta, quod exinde idem sit prius se ipso. Nam de eodem possum
 40 habere multas noticias. Nec obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte.

b) As regards difference. It differs from the 1st in asserting that affirmative insolubles are true in two senses and false in one, and that negative insolubles are false in two and true in one. It differs from the 2nd in denying that the same proposition is true and false in the same sense.

It differs from the 3rd in not denying that a part can stand for the whole.

Objection.
 1. The part must be understood before the whole; which is absurd if it signifies the whole.
 Denied.
 When we say: *Something is*, the subject includes the affirmation; the part, the whole.
 It is one thing to know a part, and another to know it as a part.

12. cum (!) pro a B. 34. ſūī^r B.

It differs from the 4th in stating clearly what meaning the insolubles have, and not shirking the question sophistically, like a man who despairs to find the true solution.

Discrepat autem a 4^a via in hoc quod certificat qualiter insolubilia significant, et non fingit sophisticè, dicendo quod sequitur insolubile significare aliter, sed impertinens est qualiter aliter significet. Et sic ponendo in eleccione arguentis quomodo aliter vult propositionem significare, certum est quod illa responsio est similis evasioni | hominis desperati de vera solutione, postquam scrutatus est multas vias et nullam invenit ducentem in noticiam veritatis.

It differs from the 5th, in admitting that not only the things signified, but also their signs, have corresponding universals. But it does not follow that every universal causes a universal idea in the mind.

Discrepat eciam a 5^a in hoc quod ponit intenciones universales eque de signis sicut de suis significatis. Nec sequitur ex isto quod quelibet propositio vel intencio universalis A gigneret in anima aliam sibi similem, sicut non sequitur de specie singularis gignente aliam singularem vel universalem; quia tale signum non est per se completa causa speciei genite. Ymmo, etsi esset, cessaret ex capacitate anime gignere, sicut luminosum cessat gignere lumen.

Objection:
2. A true or a false proposition would only cause an idea signifying truth or falsehood. This is denied absolutely: any proposition may produce any idea, true or false, or none at all.

Et si obicitur 2^o quod propositio vera solum gigneret intencionem significantem propositionem veram, et propositio falsa solum gigneret intencionem significantem propositionem falsam: certum est quod nec illud dictum nec eius fundamentum habet linearem umbram coloris; quia stat quamcunque propositionem gignere intencionem universalem significantem omnem propositionem veram vel falsam; et stat quod nullam gignat, sicut homo albus potest gignere intencionem universalem significantem nigrum hominem, et quomodocunque accidentatum, sine hoc quod gignat intencionem in accidentatis. Non enim per veritatem et falsitatem tanquam formas substantiales vel accidentales producit propositio speciem talem; sed est obiectum immediatum anime, faciens cum aliis animam elicere speciem talem; sicut homo magis facit in anima intencionem significantem omnem hominem. Nec est aliquid falsius quam [quod] significatio propositionis sit eius forma substantialis, sicut false fingit ista posicio. Et si 3^o inferatur quod actus anime ageret in animam, dicitur quod non sequitur; actus enim anime est accidens de genere accionis. Nec ex hoc sequitur processus in infinitum

Truth or falsehood, i. e. the meaning of a proposition, is not to be likened to a substantial form.

Objection:
3. It would follow that the acts of the mind act on the mind, and so on ad infinitum. Denied.

4. a^r B.

27. intensionem (!) B.

13. agigne't B.

29-30. acc^o B.16. q^{ta} ca B.

36 quod deest.

23. liare B.

37. fingitur B;

ib. inf^r B.

vel aliquid inconueniens. Et sic potest facere animam
 producere speciem, sicut per cogitationes de diversis
 individuís 2^m suas conueniencias et differencias produ-
 citur universalis species in anima.

- 5 Discrepat autem in hoc a 6^a via quod ponit multos
 casus impossibiles quos illa admittit. Dicit eciam quod
 tales oraciones consistunt in successione, ita quod est
 dare primum instans in quo non sunt; et per conse-
 quens non tunc sunt vera vel falsa. Dicit eciam quod
 10 talis propositio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, continue uni-
 formiter sic significans, non plus foret vera pro uno
 instanti quam pro quolibet. Ymmo pro quocunq[ue]
 instanti temporis significat primarie veritatem que,
 pro eodem instanti [quo] fuit, pro illo instanti est vera.
 15 In ista autem materia diucius et frequencius fatigavi
 me ipsum quam in aliqua reliqua materia logica. Nec
 dubito quin quilibet sex predictorum opiniancium habuit
 notabilem sollicitudinem pro veritatibus huius materie
 quas inuenit. Modica tamen laus tribui debet invento-
 20 ribus huiusmodi veritatum; quia certum est quod ex
 discibilitate veritatis (que satis presto est cuilibet inda-
 ganti), et ex mocione doctrinali prime veritatis, evenit
 cuicunq[ue] quod scrutando inuenit veritatem aliquam
 quam prius ignorans diucius fuerat perscrutatus. Ideo
 25 sit laus plena domino veritatis! |

And it differs
 from the 6th in
 setting down
 many more
 cases as
 impossible;
 such
 propositions,
 if spoken,
 begin to be
 true and false
 at a given
 moment:
 but when
 written, are
 always equally
 so, as soon as
 they exist.
 I have taken
 more pains
 about this
 subject than
 about any
 other part of
 Logic.
 And I do not
 doubt but the
 authors of the
 other six
 opinions have
 done their
 best.

14. quo *deest* B.19. *met* B.23. *c'c3* B.

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The Society's book for 1896 is now ready; and the works for 1897 and 1898 are in the binders' hands, and can be sent next month to such Members as will pay their Subscriptions for those years. The Subscription for 1896 became due on Jan. 1, and should be paid at once to the Hon. Sec., J. W. STANDERWICK, Esq., GENERAL POST OFFICE, LONDON, E.C. Cheques to be crossed, 'London and County Bank.'

The Wyclif Society.

Tenth Report of the Executive Committee, for 1896.
(April, 1896.)

THE continued help that the Society gets from its printer, Mr. Carl Georg Fromme of Vienna, combined with the devotion of its editors, M. Dziewicki and Prof. Loserth, aided by Mr. Matthew, alone enables it to produce its books in time, and in advance.

The volume for 1896, comprising the third and fourth parts of Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, edited by Prof. Loserth, is bound and ready for issue.

The volumes for 1897 and 1898, *De Logica* II, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and *De Simonia*, edited by Prof. Dr. Herzberg-Fränkell and M. H. Dziewicki, are in the binders' hands, and can be issued next month to any Members who will pay the two years' subscription in advance.

The Society is clear of debt to the end of 1895; but it owes Mr. Fromme £350 for its three volumes of 1896-8, and it has about enough in hand to pay its binders for covering these volumes. The Committee therefore appeal to Members for three years' advance subscriptions at once, so that a fresh start may be made, free from all liability, at the future years' work, 1899-1912.

For 1899 and 1900-1, *De Logica* III, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and Prof. Loserth's edition of *De Civili Dominio* II, III,—whose sheets Dr. Reginald L. Poole and Mr. F. D. Matthew see, and Dr. R. L. Poole side-notes,—have been some time at press, and may be finished this year. For 1902 or 1903, M. Dziewicki has kindly undertaken to edit the

Miscellaneous Tracts, Nos. 54-61 in Shirley's Catalogue, which were copied by Dr. Buddensieg, and were in the hands of Dr. Schnabel of Dresden, as editor, till his death three years ago. Also, for 1902 or 1903, the *De Potestate*, which has for many years been in the hands of M. Patera of Prag, has just been sent to Professor J. Loserth, so that it will probably go to press next year. For 1904, the Rev. Dr. Buddensieg hopes to produce his edition of *De Veritate*; and then all Wyclif's great *Summa Theologiae* will be in type, except the *De Mandatis Dei* and *De Statu Innocentiae*, which Mr. F. D. Matthew will take up as soon as his help to other editors leaves him time for his own texts.

The other works of Wyclif remaining unprinted and not likely to be included in the second volume of *Miscellanies* § now in charge of the Rev. J. P. Whitney, are, by Shirley's Nos. :

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 6. De Materia et Forma.* | 26. De Imaginibus.† |
| 7. De Materia (?).† | 28. Peccatum Mortale et Veniale.† |
| 8. De Ente, Bk. I*, Bk. II.* | 32. Errare in Materia Fidei, &c.† |
| 9. Replicatio de Universalibus.* | (45. Commentary on N. Test. ? not |
| 10. De Universalibus.* | Wyclif's.†) |
| 11. De Anima.* | 64. De Paupertate Christi.† |
| 13. De Fide Catholica.* | (69. ? part of De Potestate Papae.) |
| 24. De Prophetia.* | 70. De Clavibus Ecclesiae.* |

Members have, then, to keep "pegging away" till the work they have set themselves is done, and England's long-due debt to Wyclif's memory paid. For that, money is wanted. Who will give it?

In order to increase the Society's funds, the Executive Committee have resolved that any Member may give the right to any Library or person to buy the first fourteen years of the Society's publications, 1882-95, at half-price—19 volumes at 8 guineas and a half—provided that with this sum are paid the full Subscriptions for 1896, 1897, and 1898.

England, Europe, and the rest of the Christian world owe so much to the memory of Wyclif, that support ought to be forthcoming for the printing of his Works, the records of his thoughts and life. Two-thirds of the Society's task will be done by 1900. It is for our Members to see that the other third is finished speedily. Editors are ready and willing. Money alone is wanting.

* Copied. † Not copied.

§ Shirley's Nos. 43, 44, 47, 48, 68, 77, 92, 94, 95.

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