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TRANSACTIONS

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OF THE
AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.
1893.

I. — *The Scientific Emendation of Classical Texts.*¹

BY PROF. E. A. SONNENSCHN,
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THE object of this paper may be defined as an attempt to lay down certain canons of textual criticism, and to apply them to and illustrate them from the text of a single author, — Plautus.

If textual criticism is to become something more than the amusement of an idle hour; if we are to avoid the danger which sometimes seems to threaten us that the multiplication of light-hearted emendations will ultimately result in the disintegration of the classical authors, our schools being saddled with a multitude of texts, each differing from the other and showing a constantly increasing tendency to diverge, — it is imperatively necessary to find a method which offers something like a promise of a consensus of opinion. Such a method cannot be anything less than *scientific*; it must be analogous to the methods by which the great results of chemistry or physics or other “exact” sciences have been achieved, and, like them, it must depend on evidence, and not on authority. Science is a great unifier.


But salvation is to be found neither in “slashing surgery” nor in a childlike faith in the plenary inspiration of MSS. The scientific method cannot be adequately described by any

¹ The present paper is condensed from that presented at the meeting of the Philological Association.

of the catch-words borrowed from the vocabulary of political parties, — “conservative,” “radical,” etc. Its true nature, however difficult to define, is simple; simple, though often misunderstood. The first step is to examine into the relations of the extant MSS. to one another, on the basis of an *apparatus criticus*, and to arrange them in families. Without this preliminary inquiry, all subsequent labor may be thrown away. The next step is to proceed, by way of inference, to the probable reading of the archetype or archetypes. Our extant MSS. are copies of copies; what we want to know is the reading of the original copy or copies from which they were derived. By this means we are enabled to discard the corruptions peculiar to the individual derived copies; and it often happens that this stage of our inquiry brings us face to face with the *vera manus* of the author. If so, we attain to what may be called *restoration without emendation*. If not, the next step is to bring all the resources of palaeography, logic, and observation of the usages of the language in general and the author in particular, to bear upon the problem of *emending* the text. Sometimes a very slight change will suffice, and the emendation may be regarded as practically certain: sometimes, where the seat of the corruption lies deeper, the critic may have to take a more venturesome course, and put something of his own into the text; but it must be something that tallies precisely, even in the minutest points, with the usage of the author in question and the context of the passage.

This I have called a simple programme; but it is obvious that there is no immediate danger of its becoming a merely mechanical operation, as easy as handling a pair of compasses, — a leveller of wits. On the contrary, its execution is fraught with the possibilities of error at every point, and gives the amplest scope to the individual genius of the critic. Nor can the personal equation ever be entirely eliminated. Above all, there is need of the seeing eye, — the power of going beneath the surface and seizing upon the really vital point. The true critic is a framer and verifier of hypotheses; and hypotheses are not things that can be manufactured to order, by a process of mere industry.

Let me now apply these principles to the criticism of Plautus. The extant Plautine MSS. fall into two great families, the first being represented by a single MS., the Ambrosian palimpsest (*A*), the second by a number of MSS. called the "Palatini" (*BCDEVJ*).¹ The latter, being of the same family, must be derived from a common archetype, which we may call *p*.² This lost archetype appears to have been a MS. of at least equal value with *A*, and probably of about the same date (fourth, or perhaps third, century of our era); *BCDEVJ*, its offspring, are, roughly speaking, of the eleventh or twelfth centuries. Now, what is the relation in which these two great families (*A* and *p*) stand to one another? The problem is not yet entirely cleared up, but I think it may be said to be approaching a solution. There is a curious problem of likeness and unlikeness in these two groups, and neither of them can be regarded as derived from the other. But it is possible that they may both be derived from a common source, if we suppose, as Seyffert has suggested,³ that that source contained the original text in various forms. Let us imagine, then, a very early MS., say of the first century of our era, which contained, in its margin or written above the text, a number of parallel variants; we may denote this MS. (the archetype of the archetype *p* and also of *A*) by the letter *x*. The stemma of the chief Plautine MSS. would then be as follows:



¹ I neglect the minor MSS. By *E* I mean the MS. discovered in 1879 at Milan (see Löwe and Goetz, *Rhein. Mus.*, p. 53 ff., and Preface to *Curculio*), not the worthless MS. that Ritschl called *E*.

² I use small letters to indicate the archetypes, or hypothetical parent-MSS.

³ In a private communication.

But whence did these parallel variants, which are to explain the diversities of *A* and *p*, arise? Partly, perhaps, in the shifting practice of companies of actors. We know that varying texts of Shakspeare's plays were current in his time, reflecting the preferences of individual actors or the modifications suggested by the experience of a company of actors. Similarly in Plautus there are indications that lines were sometimes introduced into the margin of the actors' copies, intended to serve as a substitute for a passage which seemed too long or which contributed nothing to the development of the plot—and of such passages there are, alas, too many in the works of our Latin playwright.¹

But however the parallel variants may have arisen, it is clear that their existence in the archetype *x* would give rise to precisely the sort of likeness and unlikeness which we observe in *A* as compared with the descendants of *p*. Take Pseud. 392, and let us suppose *x* to have presented somewhat of the following appearance :

	utrumque tibi nunc dilectum para	
Ex multis		certust cedo
Atque exquire ex illis paucis unum qui certus siet.		

The copyist would feel himself in a difficulty, and various methods of dealing with the text would suggest themselves. The copyist of *p* appears to have written in the second line,

Ex multis exquire illis unum qui certus siet,

whereas the copyist of *A*, in a more comprehensive spirit, turned it out as

Ex multis atque exquire ex illis paucis unum qui certust cedo.

Neither of them can be congratulated on the result.

¹ Capt. 958, 959, were perhaps intended as a substitute for the passage beginning in 957 and ending 969. Most. 816 is followed by two lines which merely repeat, with a variation, lines 845-847; the intention of the composer of them, probably, was to enable the actors to skip 817-848, a passage full of humor, and thoroughly Plautine, yet not necessary to the plot.

Again, in the *Mostellaria*, *A* has, after 715 and instead of 716,

Tempus nunc est mihi hunc adloqui senem,

a line which repeats 714 (*Tempus nunc est senem hunc adloqui mihi*) in a slightly different form. This may be explained if we suppose that *x* had *both* of these readings, the one in the text, and the other in the margin; the marginal reading may have crept into the text of *A* after 715, displacing 716.

To take another instance: in *Mil.* 155, *BCD* have (neglecting details)

hic illest lepidus quem dixi senex est.

How are we to account for the meaningless *est* at the end? The key is supplied by *A*, which has, according to Studemund, *senem* at the end of the line. Probably, then, this reading had been introduced in a contracted form in *x* (above the line) — thus, sen^ēx; the *ē* was meant to represent *em*. The copyist of *A* understood it, and adopted the reading intended (*senem*); the copyist of *p* misunderstood it to stand for *est*, and introduced it, in the innocence of his heart, after the word *senex*.

Other instances of the same or similar phenomena will be found in *Mil.* 552, *Cas.* 185, *Pseud.* 631, *Stich.* 342; *Merc.* 757, *Pseud.* 85, 208, *Trin.* 52, 339; *Mil.* 1177, *Stich.* 202, *Poen.* 343.

Seyffert has also called attention to another point in regard to one of the Palatini, — *B*. This MS. appears to contain a sort of secondary tradition, derived from an independent source. It is well known that this MS. is corrected by a second hand, distinguished as *B*²; and it now appears that, in eight plays, these corrections were derived from a MS. which has now disappeared, but which contained a number of various readings of great antiquity, and, in some cases, whole lines not found in the extant copies. But why only in eight plays? The probable answer is that in the Middle Age the plays of Plautus were divided into two volumes, the

first containing eight, the second twelve, plays. In the case of the MS. in question, only the first volume happened to be preserved; so that, for the twelve plays of the second volume, this subsidiary source of information was not available.¹ And there appear to have been differences, even in external form, between the first and the second volume, at any rate in the archetype of *BCDEJ* (i.e. *p*). Seyffert² has made it probable that the first volume of this MS. had only twenty lines on a page, whereas the second had twenty-one—a fact which is at first sight of small importance, but which may turn out to be of great significance to the investigator, especially in regard to lacunæ.

So much, then, for the MSS. of Plautus and their relation to one another. In spite of all their defects, their tradition is, on the whole, an excellent one, especially when we consider the length of time that separates us from Plautus. Probably our MSS. represent the *vera manus* of Plautus quite as successfully as the folio of 1623 represents that of Shakspeare. This may be illustrated by a few examples, in which their readings require only to be understood to be pronounced genuine, and the *vera manus* may be restored without emendation. Take *Rudens* 728, where the true reading³ is staring us in the face in the apograph of *A*, for which we are indebted to the indefatigable labors of that scholar-hero Studemund. Or again, *Rud.* 528–538, which need only to be pronounced with the stammer of chattering teeth to be metrically above reproach. It is impossible to lay too much stress upon the importance

¹ It is well known that at the time of the Renaissance only eight of the Plautine comedies were known to the learned, *viz.* *Amph.*, *Asin.*, *Aul.*, *Capt.*, *Cas.*, *Cist.*, *Curc.*, *Epid.*

² Reconstruction of a fasciculus of the *Mostellaria* (*Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, Feb. 13th and 20th, 1892).

³ *Dei tibi argentum?* ("The gods pay thee money?") But it required the eye of Seyffert to see what others looked upon without seeing. Another instance of his penetration is *Mil.* 1253, where the readings of *BCD*, taken together, point to *ut quaeso amore perditast te misera* as the reading of *p* ('how violently she is in love with you, poor thing!'): *amore perditast* = *deperit*, and so takes the accus. *κατὰ σύνεσιν*; cf. *Cist.* I. 2. 13.

of caution in dealing with MSS. A little knowledge often pronounces them to be corrupt where a wider knowledge reveals their soundness or the soundness of the archetypal reading. And there is no higher pleasure for the critic than to see, emerging from the gloomy places of the *apparatus criticus*, the light of intelligible sense. In this connexion I would refer to Minton Warren's proof of the existence of an asseverative enclitic *-nē* in Plautus, — a suggestion which vindicates the readings of the MSS. in a number of passages.

Side by side with the MS. tradition we have also, in Plautus, a grammarian's tradition, represented in such sources as Festus, Paulus, Nonius. Recent investigations of Hermann Caesar and Carl Reblin prove that the readings of Nonius agree sometimes with *A*, sometimes with *p*, but occasionally show clear traces of a third and different recension,¹ the precise relation of which to *A* and *p* it is not yet possible to define with accuracy. On the relation of Festus to Verrius Flaccus, valuable light has been thrown by Nettleship,² in his *Essays on Latin Literature*.

As illustrations of the third stage of criticism, I may mention the brilliant yet simple emendations of Ellis in *Most.* 595, *ne frit quidem*, 'not a particle,' for *nec erit quidem* of the MSS. (cf. οὐδὲ πασπάλη and καὶ ἄχνην, *Arist. Vesp.* 91, 92), and Palmer in *Cas.* 994 *Hector Ilius* for *ecastor ilius* or *hectore illius* of the MSS. Perhaps I may be pardoned for appending one or two more homely conjectures of my own: *Rud.* 321 *ornatus* for *natus*;³ *Pers.* 392 *eccillud* for *eccillum* (see *Classical Review* for November, 1892, where I maintain that *σώρακος* changed genders in passing into Latin); *Most.* 278 *nimis male* for *ni male* of the MSS.

¹ *Epid.* 233, 559; *Mil.* 1180; *Pers.* 305, 347, 348; *Poen.* 312, 365, 908; *Pseud.* 184, 319, 382, 864; *Rud.* 533; *Stich.* 144, 348, 366; *Trin.* 251, 410.

² It is with deep regret that I record the death of Professor Henry Nettleship, which occurred, at Oxford, about the time when the Philological Congress was meeting at Chicago. In him England has lost one of her foremost scholars; and there are many who will feel their lives the poorer through the loss of his friendship and guidance.

³ Langen supports me by referring to *Pseud.* 756 to illustrate the use of *cum* (*ornatus cum virtutibus = ornatus virtutibus*).

On the other hand, I am inclined to withdraw my conjecture *ad Charontem* in Most. 509 in favor of Bentley's *Accheruntem*. Here, I fear, I was guilty of a fallacy which is too common at the present day, a one-sided and superstitious reverence for what in itself is venerable enough, — the *ductus litterarum* (two MSS. have *adcheruntem*). We are too apt, in our scrupulous attention to the external appearance of the text, to neglect other and even weightier matters, — the sense and the usage of the author. Schoell's *Argentumdonida* in Pers. 120 seems to illustrate this: *nihili parasitus est qui Argentumdonidast*, 'a parasite who is a giver of money is naught,' does not really suit the context; all that the passage will bear is 'a *monied* parasite is naught,' and however we are to read the corrupt words of the MSS. (*cui argentum domideste* or *domi idē*), this is the sense to be brought out, as I maintained in *Classical Review*, November, 1892.

It is at the third stage of criticism that the genius of the critic has its highest opportunity; he may be called upon to put into a lacuna of the text something which the author himself might have written. But this task demands not only an originality and power of initiative which is very rare, but also a profound knowledge of all the well-established results of special inquiry in many departments of scholarship. Who can tell what the author might have written, except one who is soaked in his thought and diction? And what this means is known to those who are acquainted with the vast literature that has grown up around each of the great classics. It is easy to ridicule the scholarship of the present day as "aping the methods of the physical sciences"; and, no doubt, minute research demands an amount of time which often involves a sacrifice of all-round culture. But the question for the critic is simply one of building on solid ground or spinning ropes of sand. He must be content to sacrifice something for the sake of his science. And it must be remembered that scientific research is itself a kind of culture, leading, both directly and indirectly, to a vital grasp of many things that escape the mere *dilettante* student.

Besides MSS., the Plautine student has to take account of problems of metre and prosody. Of the versification of Plautus we know practically nothing except what we can learn by exploration of the facts contained in MSS.,—MSS. of Plautus, Terence, and the other old Latin dramatists. Attempts have recently been made to solve questions of prosody by *a priori* methods; but such attempts inevitably lead to a vicious circle in reasoning, and are, in my opinion, doomed to failure. For we have no independent tradition that we can trust as to the versification of the poets or the pronunciation of the educated classes at the time when Plautus lived. Nor can we safely infer from the metrical phenomena of Plautus to the prose pronunciation of his time. No doubt the versification of the old dramatists was based upon the phenomena of every-day speech; but the plain testimony of facts shows that they did not hesitate to subordinate the word-accent to the verse-accent, where they found it necessary or convenient to do so. Thus, for instance, though in the pronunciation of every-day life words like *óbsecrō* were uniformly accented on the first syllable, we find in Plautus an occasional *obsécrō*, with last syllable shortened by the ictus on the middle syllable; this is a phenomenon essentially similar to the prose pronunciations *béně, málě, ávě, calěfácere*, for *bénē, málē, ávē, calēfácere* (cf. Quintilian, Inst. I. 6. 21). In fact, the law of shortening is the same in prose and in verse; but in verse it may operate in cases in which it cannot operate in prose, because the poets allowed the ictus to fall on syllables on which the prose accent could not fall. All poets have allowed themselves such liberties to a greater or less extent; else they would hardly have got far in the work of composition. If any one, in his anxiety to vindicate the character of Plautus as an artist in words, declares that he cannot have written this or that because it would presuppose a scansion at variance with the normal speech of his time, I fear he is adopting an *a priori* method of argument,—a method to which the recent work of Klotz (*Grundzüge der altrömischen Metrik*, 1890) has lent some encouragement.

But if we fix our eyes firmly on the facts as presented in the only source of information open to us, we are able to form a tolerably accurate idea as to how Plautus intended his verses to be read. The most important phenomenon of old Latin prosody is the law of iambic shortening, in its various developments; side by side with it we have a number of isolated peculiarities of prosody. Luchs has shown that in the time of Plautus the general pronunciation was *hăquidem* instead of *hicquidem*. Bücheler made the discovery that side by side with *mēquidem* there was the pronunciation *mĕquidem*, even under the ictus; similarly, we find traces in the verse of Plautus of the parallel forms *sīquidem*, *sĭquidem*; *sī quis*, *sĭquis*; *nē quis*, *nĕquis*. Seyffert, carrying out the inquiries of Bücheler, has given reasons for believing in the existence of *ĭsquidem* side by side with *ĩsquidem*, *hăquidem* side by side with *haecquidem*, and so forth. To the same scholar is due the discovery that *nempe* never forms a complete foot in Plautus,—a discovery which Skutsch has rationalized by supposing that the Plautine pronunciation was always *nemp*, at the same time extending a similar treatment to the words *unde*, *inde*, etc. (to be pronounced *und*, *ind*). Skutsch supports this contention by reference to the forms *fer*, *fac*, *dic*, *duc* (= *fere*, *face*, *dice*, *duce*), and to such scansiones as *redd* for *redde*, Stich. 768,¹ *mitt* for *mitte*, Pseud. 239;² cf. Mil. 1067. We may add such phenomena as *quodn'* for *quodne*, Mil. 614, *necn'* for *necne*, Mil. 1051, *estn'* for *estne*, Epid. 614, *it' si itis* for *ite si itis*, Poen. 1227, *dicer* for *dicere*, Merc. 282, *nosn'* for *nosne*, Poen. 1238. As to final *s*, it has been held till recent times that it could fall away only before a consonant, as in the verse of Ennius and Lucretius. But Leo has adduced strong evidence in favor of the view that it might disappear also before vowels, with the result that the preceding vowel was elided; thus we find, Bacch. 401, *comis incommodus* is to be scanned *com' incommodus*,³ a pronunciation which is curiously reproduced

¹ redd' cántionem uéteri pro uinó nouam.

² O Pseudole mi, sine sím nihili | Mitt' mé sis, síne modo ábeam.

³ Cf. my note on Rudens 1006.

by the first hand of the Codex Vetus, *com in comodus*. Cicero, in his Orator, § 153, quotes even more surprising instances of the loss of *s* (after a long vowel). And the doctrine of Leo offers, for the first time, an explanation of the familiar Plautine contractions *scelestu's* (or *scelest' es*) for *scelestus es*, *nancta 'st* (or *nanct' est*) for *nancta est*, *re'st* for *res est*, etc. Numerous isolated words might be quoted, in which research has shown the necessity of rectifying the statements of dictionaries or commentators as to quantity; e.g. Palmer has shown that *diirectus* is a word of four syllables, with the first long (Rud. 1170, etc.).

In regard to many questions of metre, we are still only at the beginning of inquiry. The *numeri innumeri* of Plautus attracted the attention of the writer of his epitaph, and we have probably not yet got to the end of them. Inquiry is always leading us on the track of new metres, of which we are sometimes quite unable to say where Plautus got them from. Bücheler has proved the existence of hexameters in Plautus; and we must probably recognize with Goetz and Schoell, in their smaller edition of the *Casina* (lines 959 f.), a metre of which the scheme is $\underline{\text{L}}\ \underline{\text{U}}\ \underline{\text{L}}\ \underline{\text{U}}\ \underline{\text{L}}\ \underline{\text{U}}\ \text{—}\ \underline{\text{L}}\ \underline{\text{U}}\ \text{—}\ \text{—}$ (trochee, dactyl, choriamb, dactyl, spondee):

Hác dabó protinam ét fugiam: heus, sta ilico amator
'Occidí revocór: quasi non aúdiam adibo.

Such, then, are the chief problems which the critic of Plautus has to face, — the problem of MSS., and the problem of metre and prosody. Throughout the critical process he has to exhibit the qualities of taste and power of estimating evidence. Neither of these is a matter for which rules can be given, yet neither is purely capricious. The only test to which the work of the textual critic can be brought is the judgment of those competent to judge.

Two assumptions underlie the whole of my argument: (i) That the object of textual criticism is to restore what the author wrote, and not to improve upon his sentiments or diction. This apparently obvious proposition is implicitly denied when an emendation is praised or condemned on the

ground of its intrinsic beauty or ugliness. (ii) That the process of emending is some day to come to an end. The problem, indeed, can never be absolutely solved, but the day may come when men will be in a position to say that they have solved it so far as it can be solved. And then, if the world still cares for classical learning, a fair prospect opens up. The first Renaissance taught men to love and revere the classics; the second Renaissance, of Wolf and *Altertumswissenschaft*, to study them scientifically; the third Renaissance, of which we already see the beginnings among us, will teach us to interpret and appreciate them.

II. — *On the Canons of Etymological Investigation.*¹

BY MICHEL BRÉAL,

PROFESSOR IN THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, PARIS.

THE time seems indeed to have come for revising the old etymological dictionaries, and putting them in accordance with the discoveries and principles of linguistics. This work has already been begun on different sides: I need only mention Murray's Dictionary as a model of detailed and complete exposition, and, as specimens of abridgment, Kluge's books for German, Scheler's for French, Körting's for Roman. These books, with their different qualities, afford good specimens of linguistic science. What I want to attempt here is to remind the reader of a few rules, to indicate a few desiderata, to point out a few possible and desirable improvements.

There are etymological dictionaries which content themselves with indicating the origin and formation of each word; such is the case with the two last authors we have just named. These brief indications are no doubt of use; but the most important part — which is the history of words, the development of meanings — is unmentioned. These books might be compared to biographical dictionaries, giving the persons' date and birthplace, but silent as to what they were, how their lives were spent, the part they played in general history. They are repertories, rather than dictionaries, in the widest and fullest sense of the term.

Altogether different are the works in which the history of the meanings is set forth. Here is a curious spectacle for the observer, showing how, and according to what laws, a people appropriates to its needs, its ideas, its new conceptions, the ancient inheritance of its tongue. As a master-

¹ Translated by Miss Edith Williams.

piece of its kind, I may mention Jacob Grimm's Dictionary, especially in the part due to its continuators. Yet this great work is not entirely above criticism; going to another extreme, it may appear to carry divisions and subdivisions somewhat to excess, and to supply too lavish an abundance of examples. Littré affords a rare model of sobriety. An etymological dictionary may give the history of words, without pretending to note each separate shade. It should stop where literary criticism begins. However it be, there is no lack of models for imitation. Each people seems to pride itself upon drawing up an inventory of its riches; some small countries, such as Switzerland (I allude to its *Idiotikon*), show themselves equal to the most forward nations.

As regards the ancient tongues the work seems to me, in certain respects, less advanced. One might think that it would be an easier matter in the case of dead languages; for the whole of their literature, since it has attained its entire completion, may be embraced at a glance. But here we meet with a difficulty of a peculiar kind,—the common stock, which would supply the primitive forms and the most ancient meanings, is wanting. We possess Latin, Greek, Gothic, Sanscrit. . . . But we can go no farther back. The idiom whence these languages have been derived is lost forever. We are obliged to restore the words by conjecture, and with the help of comparison; a task that is always delicate, of which the inexperienced reader must beware of becoming the dupe. I may here remark upon the present widespread fashion of putting in the missing words, while contenting oneself with warning the reader, by means of an asterisk, that it is a purely hypothetical form. These vocables, issuing from the laboratory of the linguist, have but an artificial existence. Since they are our own work, they can teach us nothing. Moreover, there is nothing final in their form, and it may be supposed that they are destined to numerous and perpetual changes; it is curious to compare, in this respect, the different editions of Fick's Dictionary: from one edition to another we see the words of the common Indo-European stock transforming their vowels and conso-

nants, according to the progress of science and the theories successively in favor among phonetists. I admit these restorations as useful epitomes of our knowledge, as formulae meant to fix ideas. But abuse follows so close upon use, that these would-be Indo-European words cannot be too cautiously handled. When we see how so wary a mind as Kluge's allowed itself to be led into creating stems which he styles *urgermanisch* or *urindogermanisch*, we learn to mistrust these too easy creations. I will give but two examples. To explain the German word *Zelt*, 'tent,' he supposes a Germanic stem, *teld*, of which he gives this strange translation: "Decken ausspannen." We may be allowed to doubt whether there was ever a stem with so peculiar a sense. At all events, *Zelt* is simply the Italian and the Provençal *tenda*, the Spanish *tienda*, with the same change of *nd* into *ld* that we find in the English *child* compared with the German *kind*. There must have existed, in the popular Latin, a substantive *tenda*, coming directly from the verb *tendere*. It is a word which, like so many others belonging to the military language, passed from the Roman legions to the Germans, probably through the intermedium of auxiliary troops in the service of Rome.¹ So that the supposed Germanic root has but an imaginary existence. On the same page we find the word *Zelter*, meaning a particular kind of horse, a hack. Kluge compares Anglo-Saxon *tealtrian*, 'to tremble, to rock.' But, as may be seen by the Middle High German *ziltari*, the word is of Latin origin: it is the Latin *tolutarius*, meaning a hack.

Here we have a material proof of the danger of these reconstructions. If we could miraculously lay hands upon this oft-quoted Indo-European tongue, we should see how little it resembled the picture we have drawn of it.

When it comes to restoring words, linguists think they are right in accumulating, in the prototypes they invent, all the phonetic elements presented by their descendants. Hence many strange-looking vocables. For instance, I find in

¹ We can find several instances of this kind of borrowed locutions in the military language of all nations and of all times. An interesting one is the Sanscrit *khalīnas*, 'curb,' 'bit,' which is the Greek word *χαλιμός*.

Kuhn's Journal the word "*ktv̄rtos*," which is said to mean 'fourth,' and is intended to explain *quartus* and τέταρτος. The *Ursprache*, after having been praised for a time on account of the harmony and purity of its vocalic system (only three vowels, — *a, i, u*) and the simplicity of its consonantism (fifteen consonants), has suddenly come to be the least sonorous and most rugged of tongues. Let us congratulate M. Brugmann on his not having enumerated, in the volume of *Index* that he has just published, the Indo-Germanic forms with which he has besprinkled his *Grundriss*; this list would have given a most unfavorable and unprepossessing idea of this venerable ancestress.

A Mussulman told me one day that, if his religion forbids the reproduction, in drawing, of the human face, it is because there is danger of committing with the pencil some sin against anatomy, whereby these ill-shaped personages would come and reproach you in the other world with their malformation: to how many reclamations are our modern linguists exposing themselves, if ever the hybrid words that they have created should come and appear before their eyes in another world!

I now come to what is, properly speaking, the subject of this study, — What rules are to be followed in etymology? It hardly seems needful to enounce the first rule: the lexicographer must conform himself to the lessons taught by phonetics. If etymology has ceased to be an amusement and a game, and has become a science, we owe it to the principles established by phonetics — principles that the etymologist should never lose sight of. We all, in turn, invoke these principles: they are our common safeguard and defence against the ever-to-be-dreaded and unconjurable inroad of fancy and caprice. Therefore we should never speak lightly of the laws of phonetics: we cannot tell if we shall not require their aid to-morrow against some ignorant or too systematic mind.

But every one knows there is a difference between the respect of the believer and the superstition of the bigot. Whereas the bigot blindly follows the law, and declares whatever does not fit into foreseen and authorized cases to

be illicit and impossible, the believer examines thoughtfully whatever he meets with, and asks himself whether the general law is not held in check by some special and as yet imperfectly known law. The rules of phonetics must never be overlooked, but the obedience that we owe them is an intelligent obedience. These rules on the permutation of vowels and consonants are the product of observation; observation, carried still farther, will show their bounds and explain the exceptions. . . . Thus the true philologist, before letting fall the word *impossible*, should look closely at each case and give only a well-pondered opinion.

The too oft-repeated saying, that the phonetic laws act blindly, is one of those catchwords that it is well not to accept uncontrolled. The phonetic laws act blindly if we admit a set of conditions that are never realized anywhere; viz. a perfectly homogeneous population coming into no contact with the outside world, learning everything by living and oral tradition, without any books, without any monuments of religion, — a population in which every one should be of the same social condition, in which there should be no differences of rank, of learning, nor even of age or sex. No sooner do you leave aside pure theory, to place yourself in presence of the reality, than you see the reasons appear which make the phonetic laws open to exceptions. The authors of etymological dictionaries are well aware of it; and not from them will there ever come anything resembling the above-mentioned axiom.

The rules of phonetics, while directing our researches, must not be looked upon as a code that has foreseen everything, and to which there is nothing to be added. There are facts which necessarily escape the eye of the grammarian, since he is always being brought back to the same forms. Thanks to the lexicographer, new phonetic rules are discovered little by little. It is not difficult to acquire the reputation of being a rigorous observer of the phonetic laws, but it is quite as important not to check the progress of science. We may even ask ourselves how phonetics could have been elaborated, if the linguists who preceded us had declared whatever they

found no example of to be impossible. It is known that the exceptions of to-day contain the germs of rules for to-morrow. To declare that the Latin *Deus* has nothing in common with the Greek *θεός* may satisfy those who care above all for formal regularity. The wary lexicographer will put a note of interrogation, and leave the solution to the future.

When we see into what remote comparisons and surprising parallels the bigots of phonetics are led, we prefer to vote with the ignorant and the sinners. To reduce *θεός* to a root *gheñ*, 'to frighten,' or to a verb *dhueso*, 'to breathe,' is one of those extremities which seem to me harder than to admit the identity of *θεῖος* and *divus*.

I now pass on to a second rule, which may appear very elementary, but nevertheless deserves mention and is of capital importance. It is that we should always be careful to clearly distinguish the suffixes. It were vain to conform oneself to all the laws of phonetics: the etymologies will be marred with errors if we are unable to separate, in each word, the formal from the material element.

This second recommendation will appear to some still more superfluous than the first; yet it is seen to be forgotten at every instant. Need we remind the reader that quite lately an eminent scholar explained the Latin *breviter* by *breve iter*, thus separating this adverb from the numerous series to which it belongs (*suaviter, fortiter, segniter*, etc.); that in the adjectives *longinquus, propinquus*, he sees the Sanscrit root *anc*, 'to turn'? Ignorance of the suffixes was the disease from which etymology suffered among the ancients. If, during a long course of centuries, it is impossible to point to any progress in the science of etymology among the Romans, it is to be attributed to this cause. Just as Varro explained *frater* by *ferē alter*, five or six centuries later *gloriabundus* was explained by *gloria abundans, oratio* by *oris ratio, monumentum* by *quod moneat mentem*. In fact, the malady existed almost everywhere. The Hindoos, to whom we owe the first lists of suffixes, forget them as soon as they come to decompose words; they make no difficulty about explaining *brahman* by the root *brīh*, 'to grow,' and *man*, 'to think' (what makes

thought grow), or *agni* by *ang*, 'to anoint,' and *nī*, 'to conduct' (he who conducts the libation).

Let us not, then, fear to inscribe this rule among those which should always be present to the mind of the linguist. The Linguistic Society of Paris undertook, a good many years ago, the publication of a Latin Dictionary in which the words, instead of being arranged according to the initial letters, are arranged according to the final letters. Circumstances too long to relate have delayed the publication of this dictionary. A book of this kind would doubtless render great services; from the day when we see arranged in order all the words in *mentum*,—like *segmentum*, *augmentum*,—we shall no longer be tempted to explain the second part of *argumentum*, as a linguist has recently done, by the verb *meniscor*—the same which has given *reminiscor*, *comminiscor*.

I now come to a third rule. The concordance of meanings must be the object of as minute an examination as the concordance of forms. We see philologists who carry the study of consonants and vowels to a great length, and yet prove singularly careless in the matter of sense. Provided there be some distant affinity between the sense of two words, that is enough: the two words are declared to be of the same origin. This is a grave oversight concerning quite half the history of words, an oversight which may mar many an etymology. I see, for instance, that Vaniček places under the stem *kī*, 'to lie' (Sanskrit *çē*) not only the verb *κείμαι*, 'I lie,' and the substantive *κοίτη*, 'a couch,' but words like the Greek *κῶμος*, 'a feast,' *κῶμη*, 'a dwelling,' *κῶας*, 'a fleece,' the Latin *civis*, 'a citizen,' *caelebs*, 'a bachelor,' *tranquillus*, 'tranquil,' *quiescere*, 'to rest.' Independently of all sorts of material difficulties, there is no plausible connection between the meanings of these words. Take but the last of these parallels, *quiescere* and *κείμαι* are by no means synonymous terms. One may lie without resting (for instance, the wounded and the dead), and one may rest without lying (for instance, when one is seated). George Curtius rightly rejects this relationship because a Sanskrit *ç*, a Greek *k*, is never represented in Latin by *qu*: it has been seen that he might have rejected

it, no less rightly, in taking his stand upon the difference of sense. The laws which govern the changes of meaning deserve to be studied with the same care as the permutation of letters. George Curtius connected the Latin *penuria* with the Greek *πείνα*, 'hunger.' But *penuria* belongs by its suffix to the family of *esuries*, *parturio*, *upturio*; it could not, if we admit the etymology of Curtius, mean anything else than the desire to be hungry, which is inadmissible: it means, on the contrary, the desire to have provisions. There is consequently no doubt of its relationship with *penus*, *penum*, in spite of the different quantity.

I am often astonished to see how carelessly the authors of etymological dictionaries go to work when they wish to determine the meaning of a word. They usually stop at the best-known signification,—the one which is at the head of the vocabularies,—without asking themselves if it is not an indirect and modern sense, perhaps the last in date. I see, for instance, that the adjective *laetus* has been connected with the Sanscrit *prī*, 'to rejoice,' under pretext that it means 'joyful.' But that is a derived sense: *laetus* first meant 'fat.' It was said of things before being said of persons: *laetas segetes*, *ager laetus*, *convivium laetum*. Thence the verb *laetare*, 'to fatten,' 'to fertilize,' and the substantive *laetamen*, 'manure.' It was only metaphorically that they came to say *laetum augurium*, *sus laetus*, *frons laeta*. What, then, becomes of the etymology referred to just now?

In order to discover the primitive sense we must not stop on the surface, but look up the whole history of the word, examine its rare and obsolete uses. It is often the last meaning, thrust in at the end by the dictionaries, that is the primitive meaning. At other times, it will be found in the compounds and derivatives. Almost the only meaning now left to the word *Muth* is 'courage'; but it once meant 'intelligence,' 'soul,' and that is still its meaning in *Grossmuth*, 'generosity,' 'greatness of soul,' *Demuth*, 'humility' (Old High German *deomuote*, literally 'soul of a servant'). We also find this sense in the derivatives *muthmaassen*, 'to conjecture,' *einmüthig*, 'unanimously,' *Gemüth*, 'soul.' In the

present day, *Wie ist es dir zu Muthe*, 'in what state of mind are you,' is still said. The primitive meaning has been kept in the English *mood*. A similar example is that of the German *Witz*, which is hardly ever used now in any other sense than 'ingeniousness,' meaning a joke or a witticism. But this term had formerly a loftier signification: it indicated learning or wisdom. This meaning has remained in compounds like *Wahnwitz*, and in the verb *witzigen*, 'to make wise.' Goethe remembered the early meaning:

Was lockst du meine Brut
Mit Menschenwitz und Menschenlist
Hinauf in Todesglut.

Here again the English has remained more archaic: *wit*, 'intelligence.'

I have chosen these two examples from a living language, because there the study of meanings is easier and clearer. But the necessity of observing the filiation of the sense is none the less binding for dead languages.

In the ancient tongues, likewise, it is well to examine common expressions, in order to discover the primitive meaning. Thus, the Latin *litterae* figures in the dictionary with the single meaning 'letters.' But it first signified the tablets they wrote upon, and that is the sense it has kept in *litteris mandare*, in *litteras mittere*, *litteras dare ad aliquem*. Beneath this word *litterae* (that is generally derived from *litura*, which is as unsatisfactory for the sense as for the form) is concealed the Greek word *διφθέραι*, 'skin prepared for writing upon tablets.' The meaning of the word, when isolated, may have changed: it retains its former value in the sentences in which it was habitually introduced.

In thus searching for the sense, one may be led into somewhat unexpected comparisons. Thus, the Latin adjective *serus*, that is usually translated by 'late,' first signified 'slow,' and still earlier 'heavy.' It is synonymous with *gravis*. The poet Afranius says:

Non ego te novi tristem, serum, serium.

Sallust, in a passage preserved by Servius, says, in speaking of a war, *serum bellum in angustiis futurum*. Servius explains *serum* to mean 'grave.' Lastly, Virgil writes this line :

Seraque terrifici cecinerunt omina vates.

Here again Servius translates *sera* by *gravia*. Now, linguistics confirm this translation in the most satisfactory way. The Latin *serus* corresponds with the Anglo-Saxon *swâr*, the German *schwer*, the Lithuanian *swarus*, 'heavy.'

An etymological dictionary, giving the history of the meanings, should indicate the group of ideas, the form of social life, the series of occupations or conceptions to which a word owes its birth, and the different social layers through which it has passed. The most general terms — words meaning 'to do,' 'to set,' 'to throw' — are those that have the richest and most complicated history ; because all the little societies into which the great society is divided and of which a nation is composed, have taken hold of these words and set their stamp upon them. So we must not expect the different meanings of a word to be deduced one from another in a straight line, as through a single series. The general sense may be broken up into a number of special senses, all of the same age ; the verb *agere* being employed simultaneously, at Rome, by those who had a suit to plead (*agere causam*, or simply *agere*) and by those who had a part to play upon the stage (*agere partes*, *actor*). The sacrificer, on his side, asking if he was to strike the victim, said, *Agone?* In this way, certain articles in the dictionary may present an epitome of the activity of a whole people. As to the general sense it is itself derived from some special sense which has faded away by degrees. Thus, *ago* first meant 'to drive along.' It must have been first used by the shepherds. *En ipse capellas Protinus aeger ago.*

Just think of the various meanings the word *matter* has assumed in English, used as it is in almost every art, every trade, every kind of activity or study. This word, through the intermedium of the French *matière*, derived from the Latin *materies*, which signified the new wood grown after grafting, or after the top of the plant has been tied up. Such

is the explanation given by Columella in speaking of the culture of the vine. We have here an example of the double movement; that is to say, a special sense ending in a general sense, which, in its turn, is subdivided into an infinite number of special senses.

Here I will cut short these reflections, which might be developed at great length; for all, or almost all, the chapter of linguistics treating of Semantics, or the science of meanings, has yet to be written. Yet, I would still call attention to one point.

An idiom is never wholly isolated: it is in contact with other idioms, whence mutual loans. But these loans are not confined to taking words from another language. They are sometimes of a more hidden nature, when they consist in thrusting a new meaning upon a native word, in imitation of the foreign tongue. This will be made clear by an example. The Greek *κόσμος* has two meanings: it signified the order existing in the world; and the order existing in the attire, the apparel. The Romans, who called the attire *mundus*, made *mundus* the equivalent of *κόσμος*; adding to its first sense that of world and universe. What proves this second acceptation to be recent is that it has hardly furnished any derivatives; whereas, from the first sense, we get *immundus*, *munditia*, *emundare*, etc.

Loans of this kind are to be noticed at every epoch. If the German *lesen* has two meanings, viz. 'to collect' and 'to read,' it is probably on account of the double meaning of the Latin *legere*. We see that reading is called by different names in the various Germanic idioms. The influence that Roman civilization has exercised upon a number of German words might supply the subject of an interesting study. Thus, the German *barmherzig*, 'compassionate,' formerly *armherzi*, is a copy of the Latin *misericors*. On the other hand, the French substantive *avenir* (the future) looks as if it had been formed on the pattern of the German *Zukunft*; and to pass on to modern times, the word *plateforme*, which has entered into our political language, comes to us straight from the United States.

M. Hugo Schuchardt has written a curious study on these reciprocal influences exercised by idioms in contact with one another.

Vainly do the purists in every nation seek to combat them: here we have an example of the slow and irresistible progress of civilization. These *Uebertragungen*, from one idiom to another, — far more numerous than is generally supposed, — are the cause by which all modern languages appear to be keeping step with one another. A metaphor found in one country immediately becomes the common property of all the other countries; a felicitous expression, a new and picturesque turn, are sure to be reproduced everywhere. The authors of etymological and historical dictionaries have here a vein, as yet unexplored, which will enable them to trace out what is called, somewhat vaguely, the genius of modern languages.

III. — *Ein Ablautproblem der Ursprache.*

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LEICHTE und schwere Vokalreihen sind im Indogermanischen scharf geschieden. Bei diesen ist die Länge, bei jenen die Kürze zu Grunde zu legen. Nun erscheinen aber auch bei den leichten Reihen in ganz bestimmten Formkategorien lange Vokale. Es ist klar, dass sie erst sekundär durch Dehnung aus Kürzen entstanden sein müssen, wenn diese mit Recht als das ursprüngliche angesehen werden. Das Problem ist also das: wodurch sind die Längen der leichten Reihen entstanden? Welche Ursachen haben die Dehnung veranlasst?

Ich übergehe die scharfsinnigen Erklärungsversuche von H. Möller (Paul-Braunes Beiträge VII 492 ff.) und A. Fick (Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen 1881 S. 1452 ff.), die beide in der Dehnung die Wirkung eines musikalischen Akzentes sehn, und wende mich direkt zu der nach meiner Überzeugung richtigen Deutung. Drei Gelehrte haben sie, unabhängig von einander, ausgesprochen.

K. F. Johansson (GGA. 1890 S. 765) vermutet, "oft sei mit der Reduktion eines Vokals die Verlängerung eines andern verbunden;" die Entstehung von *uōq-* aus *ueqo-uoqe-*, von *pēd- pōd-* aus *pedo- podc-* beruhe also auf demselben Prinzip wie die Entstehung der schwedischen Dialektformen *för vēt fār* aus *fōra veta fara*.

F. Bechtel (Hauptprobleme der idg. Lautlehre S. 181) zieht dieselben schwedischen Dialekterscheinungen wie Johansson heran und sieht hierin den Schlüssel zu einer "mechanischen Erklärung der Dehnung." Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt lasse sich die Dehnung aller Silben be-

greifen, hinter denen die einstige Existenz einer zweiten angenommen werden dürfe.

Früher als die genannten Forscher hat Viktor Michels mündlich den gleichen Gedanken geäußert. Er bringt die Entstehung der Dehnstufe in Verbindung mit seinem Gesetz von der Entstehung des Zirkumflexes. Nach ihm wird ein betonter langer Vokal, hinter dem eine Silbe geschwunden ist, geschleift; ein betonter kurzer Vokal, hinter dem eine Silbe geschwunden ist, wird dagegen gedehnt.

Auch hier ist die Fassung des letzten, die Dehnstufe betreffenden Gesetzes trotz der vorgenommenen Einschränkung noch immer zu weit. Nicht um die Länge oder Kürze des Vokals handelt sich nämlich, sondern — wie sich später ergeben wird — lediglich um die Länge oder Kürze der Silbe.

Ich selber formuliere daher beide Gesetze, wie folgt:

Schwindet eine akzentlose Silbe, so wird eine vorausgehende betonte Silbe zirkumflektiert, wenn sie lang, gedehnt, wenn sie kurz ist.

Man sieht, es handelt sich hier um ein "Gesetz des Morenersatzes," von dem schon Fick aO. gesprochen hat. Und in diesem, d.h. in der Annahme "dass die Länge zwei Kürzen in sich vereinigt," beruht, wie Bechtel aO. mit Recht hervorhebt, der gesunde Kern von Möllers und Ficks Dehnungshypothesen.

Da, wie schon hervorgehoben worden ist, ein Versuch die vorgeschlagene Hypothese zu beweisen noch nicht gemacht worden ist, will ich, so gut es angeht, diese Lücke auszufüllen unternehmen. Eine Prüfung sämtlicher für die Dehnstufe vorhandenen Beispiele wird, wie ich hoffe, die Richtigkeit des Gesetzes, speziell der Fassung, die ich ihm gegeben habe, dartun. Für den Augenblick freilich muss ich es bei einer flüchtigen Musterung bewenden lassen; das vollständige Material soll demnächst in den Indogermanischen Forschungen vorgelegt werden.

Die unumgängliche Voraussetzung für die vorgeschlagene Erklärung der Dehnstufe ist die Berechtigung der Schwundstufe nicht nur vor, sondern auch nach der Silbe, die den

Wortton trägt. Das ist unbedenklich; denn in Praxi ist von jeher mit der progressiven Akzentwirkung operiert worden. Und wenn auch hier und da rein theoretische Bedenken geäußert worden sind, so dürfen sie doch heute, nach Kretschmers reicher Sammlung KZ. XXXI 325–366, als beseitigt gelten. Die Bahn ist also frei.

Ich wende mich den einzelnen Belegen zu.

A. NOMEN.

Eine ganze Reihe von Kasus weisen Dehnstufe auf. Es sind die folgenden:

I. Nominativ Sing. 1. Wurzelnomina. Idg. *dīēus gōus*. Es scheint mir in jeder Beziehung gesichert zu sein, dass beide Nomina von leichten Wurzelstämmen (*dīēu- gōu-*) kommen. Johannes Schmidt KZ. XXV 54 setzt allerdings *gōu-* als Wurzel an, steht jedoch hiermit ganz isoliert. Die Gründe, die gegen die Aufstellung eines langen Wurzelvokals sprechen, findet man in des Verfassers Schrift: Zur germanischen Sprachgeschichte (S. 51 ff.). Was für *gōu-* gilt, trifft auch bei *dīēu-* zu.

Wenn nun die Wurzel ursprünglich kurzen Vokal hat, auf welcher Ursache beruht dann die Länge des Nominativs? Die Antwort ist schon gegeben, sie lautet: auf Silbenverlust. In beiden Wörtern hat hinter dem *u* ursprünglich noch ein kurzer Vokal gestanden. Die Urform ist demnach **dīēuos *gōuos*. Durch den Schwund des unbetonten Endungs-*o* wird der vorausgehende kurze Tonvokal gedehnt. Die Dehnung des Wurzelvokals erfolgt also beim Übergang des ursprünglichen *e/o*-Stamms in die sogen. konsonantische Flexion.

Ein solcher Übergang hat nichts befremdliches. Wenigstens nicht für den, der gleich mir der Ansicht ist, dass im Nominativ Sing. *-īo-* zu *-i-*, *-uo-* zu *-u-*, *-no-* zu *-n-* geworden ist. Man vergleiche nur lit. *mēdis*, Genitiv *mēdžio*, aind. *tāku-* neben *takvá-*, griech. *μέγας* aus idg. *mégns*, neben lat.

magnus aus idg. *magnós*. Der Vorgang ist hier derselbe wie dort. Das unbetonte Endungs-*o* schwindet. Geht ihm ein Laut voraus, der selber silbgebend auftreten kann, so muss dieser silbisch d.h. Träger des Silbenakzents werden. Das ist bei dem *í u n* der angeführten Wörter der Fall. Unter solchen Umständen ist also die Silbenzahl des Wortes unvermindert bewahrt. Deshalb bleibt auch die vor der Schwundsilbe befindliche betonte kurze Silbe völlig unverändert.

Anders verläuft die gleiche Entwicklung, wenn der dem ausfallenden Endungs-*o* vorausgehende Laut nicht silbisch werden kann, sei es, dass ihm dies seine Natur verbietet, sei es, dass ihn ein vorhergehender Vokal daran hindert. Der Prozess des Vokalverlustes ist hier zwar derselbe, aber er zieht eine Verminderung der Silbenzahl des Wortes nach sich. Damit aber ist die Bedingung für den Eintritt der Dehnung in der vorausgehenden kurzen Tonsilbe gegeben.

Wer also — ich wiederhol es — an meiner Erklärung von *mēdis, táku-, μέγας* keinen Anstoss genommen hat, der kann auch gegen die von idg. *dīēus gōus* nichts stichhaltiges einwenden. Denn die Wörter der ersten Gruppe bilden nur eine Unterabteilung in jener grossen Gemeinschaft, der alle Nominative mit ursprünglich nachtonigem und daher dem Schwund ausgesetzten *o* angehören. Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen.

Dass wir aber ein Recht haben, bei den dehnstüfigen Nominativen konsonantischer Stämme von alten *e/o*-Bildungen auszugehen, das beweisen aufs klarste die ungemein zahlreichen *e/o*-Bildungen, die ihnen zur Seite stehn. Es ist das grosse Verdienst Wheelers in seinem Buch über den griechischen Nominalakzent zuerst nachdrücklich auf diese Doppelheit hingewiesen zu haben. Man vergegenwärtige sich die folgenden Fälle.

Idg. *dīēus* lat. *dīvos*; idg. *pōds*, aind. mit betonter Endung *padám*; idg. *uōqs* hat den *es*-Stamm idg. *ueqs* zur Seite; zu lat. *lāx* gehört das *e/o*-Verb idg. *lēghō*, zu lat. *rēx* *rēgō*. Ferner gehören zusammen griech. *-βλώψ* und *βλέπω*, *κλώψ* und *κλέπτω*, *λώψ* und *λέπω* (vgl. auch *λοπός* 'Rinde' und

den *es*-Stamm λέπος), σκῶψ und σκέπτομαι, φρώψ und φρέπω, φῶρ und φέρω (dazu φορός 'tragend, fördernd,' vgl. τελεσ-φόρος für *τελεσ-φορός). Zu aind. *dvār-* lat. *fōrīs* (= idg. Nominativ Plur. *dhwóres*) tritt got. *daur* usw., lat. *forum*, abg. *dvorŭ*; zu griech. θήρ lat. *fērus*; zu *ἀστήρ* homerisch *ἄστρο*; zu ahd. *snuor* griech. *νεῦρον* und *νευρά*, zu aind. Nominativ *-há* 'tötend' ved. *ghandá-* griech. *ἀνδροφόνος*; zu *dō* (aus **dóm* nach Michels' Gesetz) aind. *damá-*, griech. *δόμος* sowie das *e/o*-Verb *δέμω*; zu avest. *zyāš* aind. *himá-* und die neutral-femininen Kollektiva russ. *zimá*, lit. *žēmà*; zu griech. *χῆν* aind. *hasá-*; zu lat. *rōs* aind. *rása-* und *rasá-* lit. *rasà*.

Ich begnüge mich für jetzt mit dieser flüchtigen Aufzählung. Die Beispiele sind sämtlich ganz durchsichtig.

Bei allen steht erstlich fest, dass die auftretenden Längen durch Dehnung entstanden, also sekundär sind. Das beweist einmal das Erscheinen der Kürze auch in den starken Kasus. Man vergleiche aind. *nāram* = griech. *ἀνέρα*, griech. *πόδα* = lat. *pēdem*, aind. Lokativ Sing. *dyāvi* = lat. *Iōve* usw. Ferner findet man in den schwachen Kasus zahlreiche Belege von Schwundstufenformen, die kurzvokalische Vollstufen voraussetzen. Z. B. aind. *divás* = griech. *Διός*, aind. *dyúbhiṣ*; aind. Akkusativ Plur. *dúras* *durás*; aind. *nṛbhyas* = avest. *nər²byō*, *nṛṣu* = griech. *ἀνδράσι* usw. Diese Schwundstufen tragen das Gepräge hoher Alttertümlichkeit, da man Schritt für Schritt beobachten kann, wie sie dem Drang nach Uniformierung erliegen, bis schliesslich die Länge im ganzen Paradigma herrscht, wie bei aind. *vāc-* lat. *vōx*, lat. *lēx rēx* usw.

Zweitens steht fest, dass die engsten Beziehungen zwischen den konsonantisch auslautenden Dehnformen und dehnungslosen *e/o*-Stämmen vorhanden sind. Welcher Art sind diese Beziehungen? A priori lassen sich zwei verschiedene Möglichkeiten denken:

a) Bei den konsonantischen Dehnstämmen ist unbetontes *e/o* im Auslaut geschwunden, der konsonantische Stamm beruht also auf einem vokalischen.

b) An einen ursprünglich konsonantischen Stamm ist

“das Suffix *e/o* angetreten,” der vokalische Stamm ist also jünger als der konsonantische.

Für jeden, der die Theorie von den absteigenden Ablautreihen, die in den siebenziger Jahren an die Stelle der alten Gunatheorie gesetzt worden ist, nicht bloss als überlieferten Lehrsatz hinnimmt, sondern die Konsequenzen der neuen Lehre zu ziehn bestrebt ist, kann die Entscheidung nicht zweifelhaft sein.

Denn das unmotivierte “Antreten” des “Suffixes” *e/o* an die “Wurzel” ist um nichts leichter begreiflich als das “Einspringen” des steigenden *a* (oder *e/o*) in die “Wurzel.”

Der Ablaut ist verständlich geworden, weil man, anstatt mit unbekanntem Grössen zu rechnen, diejenigen Kräfte zu Hilfe gerufen hat, deren Wirksamkeit in der Sprachentwicklung wir noch heute mit unsern eignen Augen beobachten können.

Dieselben Mittel, deren wir uns bedienen, um das Verhältnis von *λείπω* und *ἔλιπον*, von *οἶδα* und *ἴδμεν* unserm Verständnis näher zu rücken, genau dieselben befähigen uns auch das Verhältnis von *Ζεὺς* und *διῶς*, von *θήρ* und *φέρω*, von *φῶρ* und *φορός*, *φέρω* zu verstehn, wie sie uns schon vorher die Ursachen der Doppelheit *táku-takvá-* zu erkennen gelehrt haben.

Hier liegt also eine Kette vor uns, wo Glied um Glied ineinandergreift, bis der Ring geschlossen ist. Dort nichts als *disiecta membra*: Ein Suffix *e/o*, das—man weiss nicht, wozu—antritt; eine Ausnahme des Ablautgesetzes, die—man weiss nicht, weshalb—eintritt; eine Vokaldehnung, die—man weiss nicht, warum—auftritt.

Doch man wird sich schwerlich an diesen Rätseln genügen lassen, die ein Ausgehn von den konsonantisch auslautenden Formen unvermeidlich mit sich bringt, sondern das Erklärungsmittel zu Hilfe rufen, das schon in einem analogen Fall Aufschluss gegeben hat. Genau wie wir idg. *smés* aus einer vollern Urform **esmé*s herleiten, wenn diese auch nicht unmittelbar bezeugt ist, genau ebenso haben wir zur Erklärung eines dehnstufigen Nominativs eine vollere Urform vorauszusetzen, von deren einstiger Existenz

die den Dehnbildungen parallelen *e/o*-Stämme unzweideutig Zeugnis ablegen.

Ein wurzelbetonter zweisilbiger *e/o*-Stamm muss überall, wo keine Ausgleichung vorliegt, durch die Wirksamkeit der allgemein herrschenden Ablautgesetze seinen unbetonten Endungsvokal verlieren. Hierdurch würde die Silben- und die Morenzahl des Wortes vermindert, wenn nicht ein teilweiser Ersatz einträte: die Quantität der schwindenden Silbe überträgt sich auf die vorausgehende betonte Silbe. Hierdurch bleibt, bei verringerter Silbenzahl die Morenzahl des Wortes trotz des Verlustes unverändert.

Dass diese Quantitätsausgleichung nur beim Schwund solcher Silben stattfindet, die der Tonsilbe folgen, nicht aber beim Verlust derjenigen, die ihr vorausgehen, ist für den nicht befremdlich, der sich den ganz verschiedenen Charakter progressiver und regressiver Akzentwirkung ins Gedächtnis ruft. Beruht doch der Schwund einer nachtonigen Silbe im wesentlichen darauf, dass sie bei der Bildung der Tonsilbe vorweggenommen wird. Das ist namentlich durch Axel Kocks Untersuchungen über den germanischen Umlaut dargetan worden.

Ein Einwand liegt nah: Es ist unmöglich — so wird man sagen — zur Erklärung der dehnstufigen Nominative überall *e/o*-Stämme vorauszusetzen. Denn es finden sich auch Feminina darunter wie z. B. idg. *uōqs*. Der Einwurf hält nicht Stich. Seit Brugmanns und Wheelers Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des Nominalgeschlechts in der idg. Ursprache, darf unter allen Umständen soviel als feststehend betrachtet werden, dass weder dem "Suffix" *ā* noch dem "Suffix" *e/o* von Haus aus bestimmtes Genus eigen war. Ja, wie *óδός* und Genossen lehren, hat es selbst noch in historischer Zeit neben den Maskulinen auch Feminina in der *e/o*-Deklination gegeben, ohne dass ein äusseres Unterscheidungsmerkmal bestanden hätte. Da die gleiche Erscheinung bei allen sogen. konsonantischen Stämmen sowie bei den *ei*- und *eu*-Stämmen wiederkehrt, so haben wir ein wolbegründetes Recht darauf, die äussere Trennung der Genera als etwas jüngerer, sekundäres zu betrachten.

Damit ist der vorgebrachte Einwurf erledigt.

Der Gegner mag das zugeben, aber er wird sich noch nicht für besiegt erklären. Das alles — wird er fortfahren — beweist, dass wir es mit Vorgängen zu tun haben, die sich in weitentlegnen Zeiten abgespielt haben. Glottogonische Probleme dieser Art lässt man aber am besten auf sich beruhen.

Ich leugne, dass es sich bei der vorliegenden Frage um ein "glottogonisches" Problem handelt. Aus dem einfachen Grunde nicht, weil wir es mit fertigen Wörtern und deren Weiterentwicklung zu tun haben, nicht aber mit der Entstehung dessen, was man in der idg. Ursprache als Wörter bezeichnet. Wer das nicht zugeben will, der muss auch die Herleitung von idg. *smés* aus der Urform **esmés* für ein glottogonisches Problem erklären; denn überliefert ist hier der Ausgangspunkt so wenig wie dort. Damit wär über die ganze Ablautforschung der Stab gebrochen.

In Wirklichkeit steht es nicht so verzweifelt. Denn, wie schon der Ausdruck sagt, befasst sich nicht der mit glottogonischen Problemen, der vom fertigen idg. Wort ausgeht, sondern vielmehr der, dessen Bestreben es ist, die fertigen Wörter in lauter Atome zu zerlegen, indem er auf Schritt und Tritt "Wurzeldeterminative" wittert, bis schliesslich vom Worte kaum ein Laut mehr übrig bleibt.

Dass die vorgeschlagne Erklärung der Dehnstufe richtig ist, wird auch abgesehn von den vorhergegangnen Erwägungen durch den auffallenden Parallelismus wahrscheinlich, worin die langstämmigen Wurzelwörter zu den kurzstämmigen stehn. Während bei den letzten, wie gezeigt, die Tonsilbe gedehnt wird, bekommt sie bei den ersten nach Michels' Gesetz schleifenden Ton.

So steht neben idg. *dīēus* aus **dīēuos* ein idg. Nominativ *nāūs* aus **nāuos*. Der gleiche Unterschied besteht zwischen dor. *πῶς* (so ist statt *πῶς* bekanntlich zu schreiben) von der leichten 'Wurzel' *pedo- pode-* und vedisch *bhās* (Oldenberg Hymnen des Rigveda I 173) von einer schweren Wurzel. Zweisilbig wird im Veda gemessen, *-dās* in *sudās sudāsam*. Auch hier liegt die schwere Wurzel

dō- zu Grunde. Sehr instruktiv ist endlich der Zirkumflex in griech. *γλαῦξ* neben *γλαυκός*. Die Urform ist **gláukos* gewesen. Der Schwund des unbetonten Endungs-*o* hat keine Verlängerung der vorausgehenden Tonsilbe verursachen können, da diese als geschlossene Silbe schon vorher lang gewesen ist. Es hat daher nach Michels' Gesetz Akzentwechsel stattgefunden.

Bartholomae BB. XVII 105 ff. hat das Verhältnis idg. *díēus* : idg. *nāūs* geahnt, wenn er den durch Dehnung entstandenen langen Vokalen der leichten Ablautreihen überlange gedehnte Vokale bei den schweren Reihen gegenüberstellt und die Proportion bildet :

idg. *μῶqs* : *μεqos* = idg. **uróks* (hom. Nom. Pl. *ῥῶγες*) : *ῥήγνυμι*.

2. Neutrale Nominative auf *-d*. Eine zweite, nur kleine Gruppe dehnstufiger Nominative bilden die Neutra auf *-d*, deren Flexion zuerst Johannes Schmidt erkannt hat. Mit Sicherheit sind nur idg. *sāld* 'Salz' und idg. *kērd* 'Herz' hierherzurechnen. Es sind Nominative ursprünglicher *e/o*-Stämme, die mit dem pronominalen "Neutralsuffix" *-d* gebildet sind, anstatt mit dem nominalen *-m*. Ein Nominativ idg. *sāld kērd* steht also auf einer Stufe mit altlat. *alid* aus idg. *aliōd*. Als Urformen sind daher **sālod* **kērod* anzusetzen. Der Zirkumflex in griech. *κῆρ* stammt aus den obliquen Kasus.

3. *ποιμήν* — *ἡγεμών*
πατήρ — *ῥήτωρ*
εὐγενής — *Ἡώς εἰδώς maior*
 Λήτῳ Λητώ (aind. *sákḥā*)
βασιλεύς (apers. *bāzāuš*).

Die obliquen Kasus mit starker Suffixstufe beweisen, dass die Normalform des Suffixes kurzen Vokal besitzt, dass die Länge des Nominativs erst einer Dehnung ihre Entstehung verdankt.

Von *βασιλεύς* (*bāzāuš*) abgesehen, sind die angeführten Nominative sämtlich ohne das Kasussuffix *-s* gebildet. Worauf das beruht ist unklar. Nur bei den *oi*-Stämmen

lässt sich die *s*-Losigkeit durch einen Hinweis auf die Analogie der *ā*-Stämme begrifflich machen. Bei den andern fehlt jeder Anhaltspunkt. Man könnte die alte Regel, dass die einsilbigen konsonantischen Stämme den Nominativ Sing. mit, die mehrsilbigen ihn ohne *-s* bilden, dahin umformen, dass man von zwei- und mehrsilbigen *e/o*-Stämmen spricht — hiermit ist jedoch nichts erklärt.

Man muss sich also mit der Konstatierung der blossen Tatsache begnügen, wenn man nicht folgenden Deutungsversuch, der mir persönlich sehr verlockend scheint, gutheissen will.

Wenn *-ss* im Auslaut schon in der Urzeit vereinfacht worden ist, wie Brugmann Grundriss II § 370 S. 701 Anmerkung annimmt, so lässt sich der Nominativausgang *-ēs -ós* anstandlos auf älteres *-ēss -ōss*, entstanden aus ursprünglichem **-ēsos *-ōsos*, zurückführen. Ferner ist es erlaubt *-ēr -ór* aus älterm **-ērs *-ōrs* herzuleiten. Den lautgesetzlich entstandnen Nominativausgängen *-ēs -ós* und *-ēr -ór* kann dann *-ēn -ón* nachgebildet sein. Dass nämlich auch bei den *en*-Stämmen ein Nominativ auf *-s* bestanden habe, scheint mir durch die isolierten Einsilbler avest. *zāš* und aind. *kṣās*, avest. *zyāš*, sowie namentlich durch die Partizipia auf *-μενο-*, die formell wie begrifflich in engster Beziehung zu den *en*-Stämmen stehn, bewiesen zu werden.

Natürlich hat dieser Deutungsversuch nichts mit der Erklärung der Nominativdehnung zu schaffen. Diese bleibt auch von seiner Ablehnung unberührt. Nur dass alsdann die Doppelheit aind. *kṣās* und griech. *ἡγεμών* so dunkel ist wie zuvor.

Dass wir auch bei den Nominativbildungen dieser Gruppe von ursprünglichen *e/o*-Stämmen auszugehen haben, beweist aufs klarste die schon angeführte Partizipialform auf *-meno-*. Dass formell ein **-téro-* als Urform für *-tér* vorausgesetzt werden darf, lehren die begrifflich allerdings weitabliegenden Komparative auf *-tero-*. Neben den *es-* und *eu-* Bildungen haben sich keine *e/o*-Formen erhalten. Aind. *sákhā* jedoch hat lat. *socius* neben sich, wodurch die postu-

lierte Urform bestätigt wird. Denn es besteht die Proportion:

$$sákhā : socius = *soq(h)óio : *soq(h)íó-s.$$

4 Es bleibt noch eine Nominativform übrig, die eine scheinbare Ausnahme bildet: nämlich der Nominativ Sing. der Partizipia auf *-nt-*. Sie haben in der Urzeit unzweifelhaft kurzen Vokal besessen. Vgl. aind. *bhāvan adán* sowie das gleichflektierende Substantiv *dán* 'Zahn.'

Dass auch hier *e/o*-Stämme zu Grunde liegen, beweisen isolierte Formen wie aind. *hēmantá-* = griech. ἀ-χείμαντος, aind. *vasantá-*, namentlich auch aind. *vāta-* = lat. *ventus* 'Wind, wehend.' Auch die Bildungen wie lat. *cognomentum* = ὀνόματα, *stramentum* = griech. στρώματα, ahd. *hliumunt* = aind. *śrōmatam* sind hierherzuziehn.

Trotz des *o*-Schwundes fehlt die Dehnung des vorausgehenden kurzen Tonvokals. Mit Recht, da die Tonsilbe geschlossen, also lang ist. Unter diesen Umständen wäre Zirkumflektierung der betonten Suffixalsilbe zu erwarten. Wie stimmt dazu ὀδοῦς διδοῦς?

Bei den griechischen Formen liegt allerdings eine Unregelmässigkeit vor, die sich aber leicht erklären lässt. Das Ursprüngliche ist daneben jedoch auch noch erhalten: Der Nominativ Sing. des aktiven Partizipiums ist im Litauischen schleifend betont. Vgl. *sukā̃s* N. *sukā̃*, *sukē̃s*. Hier ist der gesetzmässige Schleifton unverändert bewahrt, während im Griechischen der Nominativ die Akzentqualität der obliquen Kasus angenommen hat.

Zu beachten ist, dass die arischen *vant*-Stämme schon in urarischer Zeit den Nominativausgang *-vās* von den *vas*-Stämmen entlehnt haben, der erst später einen Nasal von den obliquen Kasus bezogen hat, vgl. Brugmann Grundriss II § 198 S. 536. Ich verwerfe daher mit Brugmann schon aus diesem Grund den von Bartholomae KZ. XXIX 449 ff. konstruierten Nominativausgang **-uēnts*.

II. Nominativ Dualis. Die vollste Form des Nom. Du. endet auf *-ōu*, das, wie ich entgegen meiner frühern

Ansicht jetzt annehme, den Wortton getragen hat. Darauf weist, wie Hirt mich belehrt, die Schwundstufigkeit der Wurzelsilbe bei alten isolierten Formen wie idg. *duón* usw. Wir verdanken dem Scharfsinn Meringers die Deutung dieser Bildung: es ist der Nominativ Sing. eines *ou*-Stammes, der die Parigkeit ausdrückt. Die Erklärung ist also dieselbe wie bei den *oi*-Stämmen $\Lambda\eta\tau\acute{o}$ *sákhā*.

III. Nominativ Plur. Neutr. Wir haben hier Doppelformen:

a) Ohne Kasussuffix: avest. *dāman* ved. *dhāmā*, vielleicht lat. *quattuor*.

b) Mit Suffix: aind. *dhāmān-i catvār-i*.

Die Formen der ersten Art sind kollektive Singulare, also wie die früher behandelten Bildungen zu beurteilen.

Die zweite Kategorie hat Joh. Schmidt ebenso gedeutet, indem er aind. *i* als idg. *i* gefasst und dem *i* in *vāri* usw. gleichgesetzt hat. Ich glaube nicht, dass diese Auffassung haltbar ist, vgl. Brugmann, M.U. V 52 ff. Vielmehr muss man ar. *i* = idg. *ə* setzen. Dabei läge die Versuchung nahe, die Dehnung des Suffixalvokals daraus zu erklären, dass *-ə* aus dem feminin-neutralen Suffix *-ā* gekürzt sei, das Wort also eine More verloren habe. Diese Auffassung wäre bedenklich. Erstlich ist damit die Vokallänge der suffixlosen Nom. Plur. N. nicht erklärt, die doch kaum von den *ə*-Formen losgelöst werden können. Zweitens fehlt die sonst stets beobachtete Verschiebung der Silbengrenze. Daher muss man die suffixlosen Formen als kollektive Singulare fassen. Die *i*-Formen sind durch Anfügung des Suffixes *-ə* aus ihnen weitergebildet.

IV. Instrumental Sing. Hirt, IF. I 13 ff., hat *-m* als Suffix erwiesen. Vor diesem erscheint gedehnter Vokal: aind. *pratarām* usw. War das Suffix ursprünglich *-mo*, wie Hirt ebenfalls schon aus andern Gründen vermutet hat, so ist die überlieferte Länge des dem *m* vorausgehenden Vokals erklärt.

V. Lokativ Sing. Es interessieren hier zwei Bildungsweisen.

a) Mit Dehnung: idg. *ognē(i)*; aind. *agnā*, got. *anstai* = ahd. *ensti*, abg. *pati*, abg. Inf. *dati* — lit. *dūti*.

idg. *sunēu* : aind. *sūnāu*, got. *sunau* = ahd. *suniu*.

idg. *domēn* : kret. *δόμην*.

b) Ohne Dehnung: idg. *domen* : ved. *kárman*, griech. *δόμην* abg. *kamēn-e*.

Warum hier Normalstufe, dort Dehnung?

Die Frage wär um vieles leichter zu beantworten, wenn zuvor eine andere gelöst wäre, die R. Meringer in seiner gehaltvollen Rezension von Bloomfields Schrift über Suffixangleichung (IF. Anz. II 23) folgendermassen formuliert: "Man achte darauf, dass bei vielen mehrsilbigen *i-u-r-n*-Stämmen der Lokativ und Nominativ ganz gleich gebildet gewesen sein dürften. Was war der Grund der gleichen Form des Lokativs und des Subjektkasus?"

Gleich Meringer konstatier ich die Tatsache der Gleichheit, ohne sie erklären zu können. Die Tatsache allein hilft schon weiter.

Der suffixlose Lokativ ist allerdings formell nichts anders als der Nominativ und — wie ich hinzufüge — der Vokativ. Wenn *δόμην* = *ποιμήν*, so ist *δόμην* = aind. *śván* griech. *κύον*, *ahar* = *μητηρ*. Hierher gehört auch lit. *tīlte*, das ich für einen regelrechten suffixlosen Lokativ der *e/o*-Stämme halte.

Vergleicht man die Nominative *πατήρ ῥήτωρ Σώκράτης δαίμων* mit den Vokativen *πάτερ ῥήτωρ Σώκρατες δαίμων*, so fällt zweierlei ins Auge:

a) Ein Unterschied im Akzent.

b) Ein Unterschied in der Quantität des Suffixvokals.

Ich bin nun der Ansicht, dass ein Kausalnexus zwischen beiden Erscheinungen besteht. Und zwar glaub ich, dass die Zurückziehung des Akzents auf die Anfangssilbe die Ursache der Kürze des Suffixvokals im Vokativ ist.

Da beide Bildungen als sogen. Lokative wiederkehren, ist auch die im Lokativ bestehende Doppelheit erklärt.

Die Zurückziehung des Akzents im Vokativ beruht, wie H. Hirt gefunden hat, auf der Enklise. Derselbe Gelehrte ist auch in der Lage, enklitische Lokative nach Art des lateinischen *illico* fürs Indogermanische nachzuweisen. Somit ist eine für die kurzvokalischen Formen des Vokativs, der nichts anders als der enklitische Nominativ ist, und des kurzvokalischen Lokativs in gleicherweise zutreffende lautgesetzliche Rechtfertigung gegeben.

VI. Akkusativ Sing. a) Mit Dehnung: idg. *dīēm* (aind. *dyām* und griech. Ζῆν), idg. *gōm* (aind. *gām* und griech. βῶν). Die Urformen **dīēuom* **gōuom* werden lautgesetzlich zu den Dehnformen **dīēum* **gōum*. Vor *m* kann aber nach langem Vokal kein unsilbisches *u* stehn. Es schwindet also nach Meringers Gesetz. Infolgedessen tritt nach Michels' Gesetz Akzentwechsel ein. Damit ist die letzte Stufe, der überlieferte Formenstand, erreicht.

Die Probe auf die Rechnung ermöglicht der Akkusativ von idg. *nāūs*. Die Urform ist **nāuom*. Da die Wurzelsilbe von Haus aus lang ist, muss durch den Schwund des *o* Akzentwechsel in der vorausgehenden Silbe hervorgerufen werden. Wir erhalten demnach **nāūm*. Eine solche Form widerspricht den idg. Lautgesetzen. Auf der einen Seite kann nach Meringers Gesetz *u* nach langem Vokal vor labialem Nasal nicht geduldet werden. Auf der andern Seite verliert nach Bezenberger-Hirt ein geschleifter Langdiphthong niemals seinen zweiten Komponenten.

Hieraus folgt, dass *m* silbisch werden muss. Wir gelangen also zur überlieferten Form idg. *nā-um* = aind. *nāvam*, griech. νῆφα, lat. *nāvem*. Die Probe stimmt demnach.

b) Akkusative ohne Dehnung: Sie erscheinen in allen übrigen Fällen. Im Griechischen heisst es πόδα ὄπα. Kurzer Vokal erscheint im Akkusativ ferner bei allen *en*-Stämmen, die überhaupt noch die Abstufung gewahrt

haben. Bei den *er*-Stämmen haben die Nomina agentis mit Endbetonung in allen Kasus, also auch im Akkusativ, langen Suffixvokal; die Nomina agentis mit Anfangsbetonung haben kurzen Vokal: δῶτωρ, aber δῶτορα. Besonders wichtig sind die Verwandschaftsnamen, da sie mehr als alle andern die ursprünglichen Abstufungsverhältnisse bewahrt haben. Sie haben im Akkusativ ausnahmslos kurzen Vollstufenvokal, mag dieser nun *e* oder *o* sein. Die *es*-Stämme wie der *os*-Stamm Ἡώς haben stets kurzen Vokal im Akkusativ. In der Ilias ι 240 ist nach Ausweis des Metrums noch die unkontrahierte Form Ἡóa erhalten.

Auf indischem Boden erscheint eine Dehnung im Akkusativ Sing. nur bei *a*, niemals bei *i* und *u*. Ferner: kurzes *a* steht im Indischen überall da im Akkusativ, wo es griechischem *ε* entspricht. Daher ist bei den geschlechtigen *es*-Stämmen und den Verwandschaftsnamen auf *-ter- ā* im Akkusativ Sing. unerhört. Wie die *ter*-Stämme flektiert auch *nar-*: aind. *nāram* = griech. ἀνέρα.

Langes *ā* haben von den Verwandschaftsnamen nur zwei: *svásar-* und *náptar-*; ausserdem schwankt *uśás-* zwischen *uśásam* und *uśásam*.

Warum heisst es *svásāram* (*náptāram*) aber *pitāram*, warum *uśásam* aber *āngirāsam*?

Die Antwort drängt sich mit zwingender Gewalt auf: weil *svásar-* und *náptar-* die einzigen Verwandschaftsnamen sind, die nicht den Suffixvokal *e*, sondern den Suffixvokal *o* haben, während *uśás-* der einzige *os*-Stamm ist. Die Nebenform *uśásam* verdankt ihr kurzes *a* dem Einfluss der *es*-Stämme.

Folglich ist Brugmanns bekanntes und vielbestrittenes Gesetz von der Vertretung des mit *e* ablautenden idg. *o* durch arisch *ā* in offener Silbe erwiesen.

Ich selbst gestehe, dass mich dies Ergebnis überrascht hat, denn ich habe nicht zu den Anhängern der Brugmannschen Theorie gehört. Die eben dargelegten That-

sachen haben mich jedoch eines bessern belehrt. Wer nicht die vollendete Übereinstimmung zwischen Griechisch und Indisch für blossen Zufall erklären und dadurch planloser Willkür Tür und Tor öffnen will, der muss sich, davon bin ich überzeugt, daran gewöhnen mit Brugmanns Gesetz zu rechnen.

Das Ergebnis der vorausgegangnen Erörterungen ist dies: weder das Griechische noch das Arische kennen Dehnung des Suffixvokals im Akkusativ Sing. Woher kommt das? Warum heisst es idg. *patérm* usw. aber *diēm gōm*?

Die Antwort ist die.

Bei den Urformen **diēuom* und **gōuom* muss durch den Schwund des Endsilben-*o* regelrechter Weise eine Verminderung der Silbenzahl eintreten. Das ursprünglich zweisilbige Wort wird einsilbig.

Anders bei den andern.

Urformen wie **pōdom* — **pēdom* **uōqom* **patérom* **poimēnom* **āūsōsom* müssen gesetzmässig ebenfalls ihr Endungs-*o* verlieren, genau wie **diēuom* **gōuom*. Aber durch diesen Verlust werden sie nicht wie jene einsilbig. Denn der Nasal muss nach Lauten die schallärmer sind als er silbisch werden. Folglich bleibt die Silben- und Morenzahl der angeführten Worte auch nach dem Schwund des *o* unverändert. Es heisst also idg. *pēdm* — *pōdm*, *uōqm*, *patérm* *poiménm*, *āūsōsm*, wie überliefert ist. Folglich kann eine Dehnung der betonten kurzen Suffixvokalé nicht eintreten, da die Grundbedingung dafür nicht vorhanden ist.

VII. Zwei scheinbare Ausnahmen sind die Genitive der *ei*- und *eu*-Stämme, idg. *ognoīs* und *sūnoīs*. Hirt sieht in ihnen bekanntlich ebenso wie in *ekūās* das Genitivsuffix *-es -os*, setzt also Urformen wie **ognoies* **sūnoyes* an. Wäre diese Annahme richtig, so hätten wir eine Ausnahme des Dehnungsgesetzes anzuerkennen. Aber der Zirkumflex erklärt sich einfacher.

Neben dem Genitivsuffix *-sjo* steht *-so*, vgl. abg. *ce-so*

usw. Dieses Suffix *-so* hat ursprünglich nicht nur bei den *e/o*-Stämmen existiert, sondern bei allen vokalischen Stämmen, während *-es -os* das 'Suffix' des Genitivs konsonantischer Stämme ist.

Unter dieser Voraussetzung kann man *ekyās oḡnoīs sūnoīs* auf die Urformen **ekyā-so *oḡnói-so *sūnóu-so* zurückführen. Der Schwund des auslautenden *o* rief nach Michels' Gesetz Akzentwechsel hervor.

VIII. Zum Schluss dieses Abschnitts noch ein Wort über die Dehnung in der sekundären Nominalbildung. Am häufigsten erscheint sie auf indischem Sprachgebiet, doch fehlt es auch auf europäischem Boden nicht an Belegen.

Von vornherein ist klar, dass in Fällen wie *sáptam* : *saptá*, *sāhāsrām* : *sahásram* u.ä. die Dehnung nicht auf Silbenverlust beruhen kann. Dies sowie der Umstand, dass mit dem Auftreten der Dehnstufe zugleich eine Bedeutungsveränderung verknüpft ist, scheidet die Fälle dieser Art scharf von den Belegen für rein mechanische Dehnung, wie sie bisher behandelt worden sind.

Dennoch ist es wahrscheinlich, dass ein Zusammenhang besteht. Joh. Schmidt Pluralbildungen S. 145 Fussnote hat auf das Nebeneinander von *vāc-* und *vacas-*, *nābh-* und *nabhas-* aufmerksam gemacht. Ich bin der Ansicht, dass diese feminin-neutralen Einsilbler mit ihrer lautgesetzlichen Dehnstufe den Ausgangspunkt für die Entstehung der Sekundärdehnung abgegeben haben. Denn es war ihnen von Haus aus Kollektivbedeutung eigen. Demnach ist *nābh-* eher 'Gewölk,' *nabhas-* aber die einzelne 'Wolke,' *vāc-* die 'Rede,' *vacas-* dagegen das einzelne 'Wort.' Gleicherweise entsprechen sich *muor* N. und *mari*, *gruose* F. : *gras*, *buost* : *bast*, *snuor* : *veupá*, *vār* : *vqr* F., *qēns* 'Frauenzimmer, im Sinn des ältern Nhd.' : *qinō* 'Weib' u. dgl. m.

Wenn Dehnung und Kollektivbedeutung zusammenfielen und daher als zusammengehörig betrachtet wurden, so war damit die Möglichkeit gegeben, neue Kollektivbildungen

durch Vokaldehnung zu schaffen. So denk ich mir *sáptam* und alle jene Bildungen entstanden, wo lautgesetzliche Erklärung der Dehnung ausgeschlossen ist. Sie sind nichts anders als Nachbildungen der alten lautgesetzlichen Muster.

B. DAS VERBUM.

Minder reich als das Nomen ist das Verbum an Dehnstufenbildungen. Zwar führt Bechtel eine Reihe von Kategorien an, wo Dehnung stattgefunden haben soll, aber die Mehrzahl hält der Prüfung nicht Stich.

Zuerst das Kausativ. Hier ist Brugmann unbestreitbar im Recht, wenn es die Existenz langer Wurzelvokale für die europäischen Kausativa durchaus leugnet. Denn die kärglichen Beispiele, die man für europäische Dehnformen anzuführen pflegt, sind ohne Beweiskraft. Wie abg. *chvaliti* von *chvala* abgeleitet ist, so das angebliche Kausativ *plaviti* von *plavĭ*. Lat. *sōpire* fällt seiner Flexion nach aus dem Rahmen der Kausativa heraus und bei *πωλέομαι* stimmt es mit der Bedeutung nicht.

So bleibt für das in offner Silbe erscheinende *ā* der arischen Kausativa nur die Brugmannsche Erklärung übrig. Sie ergibt sich mit um so zwingenderer Notwendigkeit, als von einem Morenersatz keine Rede sein kann.

Nicht besser ist um die 3. Person Sing. Perf. Akt. bestellt. Auch hier erscheint, von *babhūva* abgesehen, Dehnung nur bei *a* in offner Silbe, ohne dass Parallelen auf europäischen Boden zu finden wären. Denn *γέγωνε* und *bjó* beweisen nicht, was sie sollen. Ist doch *bjó* aus **βεβῶνε* die regelrechte ungedehnte Vollstufenform des Perfekts zum langvokalischen Präsens Inf. *búa bóa*.

Auch beim Perfekt besteht so wenig wie beim Kausativ die Möglichkeit, mit dem Prinzip des Morenersatzes zu operieren. Auf der andern Seite dagegen gibt de Saussures Theorie über den Perfektablauf in Verbindung mit Brugmanns Gesetz eine glatte Erklärung der in der 1. und

3. Singularperson des aktiven Perfekts auftretenden Lauterscheinungen.

Endlich der Aorist. Bechtel nimmt hier Dehnung des Wurzelvokals im unthematischen Aorist an. An sich wäre diese Annahme mit dem Prinzip des Morenersatzes sehr wol zu vereinigen, wenn man den unthematischen Formen ältere thematische zu Grunde legte. Aber der Tatbestand rechtfertigt Bechtels Auffassung nicht.

Was die indischen Formen *áprāt ávāt yāt* anlangt, so hat Bartholomae sie, wie ich glaube mit guten Gründen, dem *s*-Aorist zugewiesen, vgl. IF. III 1 ff.

Von europäischen Formen sind nur die litauischen durchsichtig genug, um zur Entscheidung herangezogen werden zu können. Die litauischen *e*-Präterita zerfallen in zwei Klassen:

- a) mit schleifend betontem *é*: *bẽre*;
- b) mit getossenem *é*: *kėle*.

Die erste Gruppe scheidet aus, da ihr Zirkumflex die Annahme der Dehnstufe verbietet, vgl. Bartholomae aO.

Für die zweite Kategorie hat Bartholomae aO. den *s*-Aorist als Ausgangspunkt zu bestimmen versucht.

Eine weitere Dehnstufenbildung sieht Bechtel im arischen Passivaorist, vgl. aind. *avāci* = avest. *avāci*. Hier aber findet sich von Längen nur *a* in offener Silbe; das Verhältnis von Länge und Kürze ist also das gleiche wie beim Kausativ und bei der 3. Sing. Perf. Akt. Bartholomae's Versuch (IF. III 5) die Doppelheit *átāpi* und *ádarši* durch Ansetzung schleifender Betonung zu erklären, ist abzuweisen: erstlich wissen wir gar nicht, dass diese in den genannten Formen bestanden hat; zweitens wirkt sie im Indischen überhaupt nicht kürzend in der von Bartholomae näher dargelegten Weise, wie das unstreitig schleifend betonte *nāñš* dartut.

Da der indische Passivaorist nur in der dritten Person Sing. auftritt, da er ausserdem im europäischen Verbum seines Gleichen nicht hat, so ist vielleicht eine ganz abweichende Deutung berechtigt. Sie hat Prof. Osthoff versucht; ich verdanke sie seiner mündlichen Mitteilung.

Er geht von dem Vokalismus der Form aus. Dieser ist, wie gesagt, der gleiche wie beim Kausativ und der 3. Sing. Perf., d.h. bei Bildungen, die idg. *o*, das mit *e* im Ablaut steht, aufweisen. Deshalb nimmt Osthoff auch hier *o*-Stufe an. Dann aber ist die Form keine Aoristform mehr. Überhaupt keine Verbalform, sondern ein Nomen, das dem Verbalsystem eingegliedert worden ist. Ein Verbalnomen auf idg. *-i*, wie es deren im Griechischen gibt. Dann erklärt sich auch die passive Bedeutung, die nicht indogermanisch sein kann, da das Indogermanische kein Passiv besessen hat; es erklärt sich die eigentümliche äussere Form, die des für die 3. Sing. charakteristischen *t* entbehrt; es erklärt sich schliesslich die Beschränkung auf die 3. Person Singularis.

So bleiben allein die verschiedenen Kategorien des *s*-Aoristes übrig.

Wenn man vom *siṣ*-Aorist absieht, der nach allgemeiner Ansicht ein Kontaminationsprodukt ist, so bleiben im Indischen der *s*- und der *iṣ*-Aorist als alte Bildungen bestehend. Beide erscheinen auch auf europäischem Boden: aind. *āvākṣam* = lat. *vēxi* = abg. *věsŭ*; *āvēdiṣam* = *ŷdea* (wobei der Suffixablaute *-as* : *-es* zu beachten ist).

Der indische *s*-Aorist hat in den stärksten Formen *Vṛddhi*, der *iṣ*-Aorist schwankt zwischen *Guṇa* und *Vṛddhi*; *Guṇa* überwiegt.

Woher die Dehnung beim *s*-Aorist? Die Antwort kann sich der Leser nach dem vorausgegangenen selber geben.

Das indogermanische Aoristsuffix hat drei Ablautstufen: die Vollstufe idg. *-es*- und die beiden Schwundstufen idg. *-as*- und *-s*-. In der letzten ist der Vokal völlig verloren gegangen, das Wort also um eine Silbe ärmer geworden. Das Prinzip des Morenersatzes muss in Wirksamkeit treten.

Wie die einzelnen Suffixstufen ursprünglich verteilt gewesen sind, lässt sich nicht mehr kontrollieren. Nur soviel steht fest, dass der Indikativ Sing. Akt. gedehnte Vollstufe besessen hat. Er muss also den Wortakzent auf der Wurzelsilbe getragen haben; bei ihm muss die Nullstufe des Suffixes, *-s*-, ursprünglich zu Hause gewesen sein.

So erklären sich unmittelbar alle Dehnformen offner, d.h. kurzer, Wurzelsilben, wie aind. *āvākṣam ānāiṣam āśrāuṣam*. Bei den Verben mit geschlossener, also langer Wurzelsilbe, wo Dehnung nicht möglich ist, darf man unbedenklich die Vṛddhierung als Analogiebildung auffassen, z. B. *ārāikṣam* nach *ānāiṣam*, *ārāutsam* nach *āśrāuṣam*. Auf europäischem Sprachgebiet kann man wegen der Kürzungsgesetze die Länge nur dann nachweisen, wenn die Wurzel auf *e* + Verschlusslaut ausgeht.

Ist die gegebene Erklärung der Vṛddhierung im *s*-Aorist richtig, so müssen die beim *iṣ*-Aorist bestehenden Verhältnisse die Probe darauf bilden. Das Schwanken zwischen Vṛddhi und Guṇa, je nach der Form des Wurzelauslauts, wäre kaum geeignet ein sicheres Resultat zu liefern, wenn es nicht einen festen Punkt gäbe: die Behandlung eines *a* vor Verschlusslaut. Es ist ursprünglich unverlängert. Es steht sich also gegenüber *anāiṣam* und *anayiṣam*. Dieses Verhältnis trägt den Stempel der Altertümlichkeit: dort wo ein Silbenverlust nicht stattgefunden hat, bleibt die Kürze des *a* erhalten; dort wo die Silbenzahl verringert ist, wird *a* gedehnt. —

Ich hoffe, der Beweis ist erbracht, dass sich alle dehnstufigen Kategorien durch das Prinzip des Morenersatzes erklären. Ich überlasse dem Leser, weitere Konsequenzen hieraus zu ziehn. Nur auf einen Punkt sei mir zum Schluss noch hinzuweisen gestattet. Bewährt sich das Dehnungsgesetz, so ist damit die Möglichkeit gegeben schärfer als bisher zwischen einsilbigen und zweisilbigen sogen. Wurzeln zu scheiden. Verba wie idg. *ésti* können nicht von einer zweisilbigen 'Wurzel' *ese-* gebildet sein, während umgekehrt bei Substantiven wie idg. *uōqs* die Einsilbigkeit des 'Wurzelstamms' erst die Folge einer Reduktion ist. Man sieht also, konsonantische und vokalische Flexion sind nach wie vor zu scheiden, wenn auch das Gebiet der ersten vielfach zu Gunsten der zweiten eingeengt werden muss.

IV. — *Dunkles und helles l im lateinischen.*

BY PROF. HERMANN OSTHOFF,

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NACHDEM die wirkungen, welche der gemein- und urindogermanische vocalablaute im historischen vocalismus der einzelsprachen hinterlassen hat, in den letzten jahren immer genauer ermittelt worden sind, ist es zeitgemässe aufgabe der sprachwissenschaft, mehr und entschiedener noch als früher das augenmerk auf diejenigen vocalwandelungen zu richten, die ihren entstehungsgrund in lautvorgängen des einzelsprachlichen lebens selbst gehabt haben. Eine solche erscheinung ist das lautgeschichtliche problem der lateinischen sprache, welches, den gegenstand meines vortrages vor dem internationalen sprachforschercongress bildend, hier in kürze zur darstellung kommt.¹

Im lateinischen ist die lautverbindung *el* von einer modification ergriffen worden, die mit erscheinungen, für welche die germanische grammatik den terminus "brechung" hat, vergleichbar ist: ursprüngliches *el* wurde in weiterem umfange lateinisch zu *ol* (*ul*) gebrochen, so dass hier teilweise ein zusammenfall der drei alten ablautstufen indog. *el* und indog. *ol* = lat. *ol* (*ul*), sowie indog. *l̥* > lat. *ol* (*ul*) sich ergeben hat. Die tatsache an und für sich ist von seiten der heutigen sprachforscher nicht völlig unbeachtet geblieben; doch hat man einerseits noch nicht gesehen, innerhalb welcher bestimmten grenzen sie sich hält, andererseits sind, soweit man sich um regel und

¹ Es sei bemerkt, dass die sache, da sie als einzelnes glied in eine zusammenhängende kette von mir angestellter laut- und ablautgeschichtlicher untersuchungen sich einreihet, an anderem orte abermals und mehr in extenso mich beschäftigen wird.

gesetzmässigkeit bemüht hat, nur unzulängliche aufstellungen erzielt worden.

Wir versuchen, folgende regeln zur anerkennung zu bringen:

I. Ursprüngliches *el* erlitt die brechung zu lat. *ol* (*ul*), wenn unmittelbar darauf einer der dunklen vocale urlat. *ǎ*, *ǫ*, *ǔ* folgte; jedoch *el* blieb unverändert vor vocalen, wenn diese *ě*- oder *ĩ*-laute waren. Es ist überall hier und im folgenden darauf zu achten, was die in der urlateinischen periode bestehende lautliche geltung der hinter der liquida stehenden vocale war; von der historisch vorliegenden form, wie sie vornemlich durch die vocalschwächungsgesetze entwickelt war, muss abgesehen werden. Beispiele sind für

A. *ol* (*ul*) aus *el* vor *a*-laut:

olīva, *olīvum*, entlehnt aus *ἐλαι(ϝ)ᾱ*, *ἐλαι(ϝ)ου* und auf diese griechischen quellformen zurückgehend vermittelt der zwischenstufen urlat. **olaiṽā*, **olaiṽom*. Die entlehnung ist anerkannt; näheres über die zeitliche datierung derselben weiter unten. Die nebenformen *olea*, *oleum* dürften wol durch erneuten einfluss von seiten der gr. *ἐλαιᾱ*, *ἐλαιον* hervorgerufen sein, nachdem nemlich letztere in jüngerer zeit diese ihre digammaverlustige lautgestalt erlangt hatten und indem zugleich eine suffixangleichung an echtlateinische baum- oder pflanzennamen und mit solchen in verbindung stehende productbezeichnungen, wie *laurea*, *picea*, *pīnea*, *vīnea* und *pīneum*, *vīnāceum*, *linteum*, mitwirkend im spiele war.

Volaterrae aus etrusk. *Velasri*.

gula aus **gelā*, vgl. ahd. anfrk. *kēla*, ags. *ceole* 'kehle.'

B. *ol* aus *el* vor *o*-laut:

olor m. 'schwan,' gen. *olōr-is*: gr. *ἐλώρ-ιος* ein wasser-vogel, vgl. auch mir. *ela*, corn. *elerch* 'schwan.'

holus (*olus*) n. 'grünkraut, gemüse' = kluss. *zeļo*, poln. *zioło* n. 'kraut.' Daneben alat. *helus*, *helusa* Paul. Fest. und *helitōrēs* in glossen für *holitōrēs*; die erklärung des doppelvocalismus ergibt sich auf grund der anzunehmenden alten flexion *holus*, gen. **heler-is*.

molo 'ich mahle' < **melō* = air. *melim*. Hier war der vorauszusetzende durch ausgleichung beseitigte ältere flexionszustand *molo*, *molimus*, *molunt*, conj. *molam* u. s. w. und daneben **melis*, **melit*, **melitis*, imper. **mele*, **melitō*, part. **melent*. Das got. asächs. ahd. *malan*, aisl. *mala* dürfte nur scheinbar für ein grundsprachliches praesens mit *o*-vocalismus **molō* sprechen, es mag got. *mala* speciell germanische umbildung eines alten jodpraesens **malja* = lit. *maliù* sein. An die von Bartholomae, Brugmann u. a. vorgeschlagene zurückführung des lat. *molo* auf ein aoristpraesens indog. **mllō* ist gleichfalls nicht zu denken. Denn im italischen ist nicht *ol*, *or*, nach dem was man gewöhnlich bis jetzt annimmt, sondern *al*, *ar*, wie ja auch im keltischen, die vertretung der vorsonantischen tiefstufenformen indog. *ll*, *ʎr*; vgl. lat. *palea* : lit. *pelaĩ*, abulg. *plěva* < **pelvā* 'spreu,' lat. *salix* = air. *sail* 'weide' : gr. *έλίκη*, lat. *caro* 'fleisch' umbr. *karu* 'pars' : gr. *κείρω κέρμα* ahd. *scēran*, lat. *parēns* : lit. *periù* 'brüte,' *varix* 'krampfadern' : ahd. *wërna wërra* 'varix,' lat. *varus* = lit. *wira-s* 'finne' : lat. *vermis* 'wurm' und ähnliches von mir an anderem orte beizubringendes.

Bei *volo* 'ich will,' *volunt* 3. plur. lässt sich für die sämtlichen verbformsformen mit der durch den optativ *velim* zunächst in den gésichtskreis gerückten wurzelablautstufe *wel-* auskommen; inwiefern auch für solche wie *vult* (*vult*) 3. sing., darüber näheres weiter unten.

C. *ol* aus *el* vor *u*-laut:

Hierher gehört *coluber* 'schlange,' wenn es nach Havet und Keller als alte entlehnung auf gr. *χέλυδρος* beruht.

Dass *volvo* 'ich wälze rolle,' wofür älter mit diaeresis dreisilbiges *voluō*, nebst dem zubehör *volūtus*, *volūmen*, *volūcra*, *in-volūcrum* auch im wurzelvocalismus die gleiche basis **welū-* wie die griechische verwandtschaft *ἔλυτρον*, *ἔλυμος* haben mag, ist unbezweifelbar. Morphologisch etwas ferner dürfte das gr. *εἰλύω*, von dem *εἰλῦμένος*, *εἰλῦμα* ihrerseits beeinflusst sind, liegen: *εἰλύω* wol mit einem nasalsuffix aus **felvūō*.

D. *ol* aus *el* vor ursprünglichem *ə* (indog. "schwa"):

Dies vermutlich zunächst in *volumus* I. plur., so dass ein **welamos* hinter ihm zu suchen wäre, gleichwie *volo* I. sing. von **welō* ausging (s. o.).

Von lat. *columen, columna* ist wahrscheinlich, dass sie die gleiche wurzelstufe mit *celsus* und lit. *keliù* 'ich hebe' enthalten, aus dem grunde nemlich, weil *columen, columna* in der bildung sich mit *tegumen tegumentum* und mit gr. *τελαμών, τεράμων ἀ-τέραμνος* vergleichen lassen.

II. *el* blieb erhalten vor *e-* und *i-*lauten:

A. vor folgendem *e*:

Lat. *celeber* < **celes-ri-s*; vgl. *fūnebri-s, fēnebri-s*. Ursprüngliche bedeutung war 'gänge, gangbar, viel begangen.' Das zu grunde liegende neutrale nomen **cel-es-* 'begehung' gehörte wurzelhaft zu gr. *κέλ-ευθο-s* und lit. *kěl-ia-s kel-ỹ-s* 'weg, strasse.'

Betreffs *celer* 'schnell' zur seite des gr. *κέλ-ης* m. 'renner,' 'jachtschiff' mag hinsichtlich der stamm bildung an griechische adjectiva wie *θαλερό-s, μαλερό-s* sich anknüpfen lassen, so jedoch, dass das verhältnis des lat. *cel]-er-i-s* zu dem gr. *-επο-s* als ein solches der weiter bildenden suffixalen ableitung betrachtet wird, ähnlich wie bei *simil-i-s*: *όμαλό-s, humil-i-s*: *χθαμαλό-s, agil-i-s*: aind. *ajirá-s* u. dgl. mehr. — Für *celōx* m. f. 'schnell segelndes schiff, jacht' sollte man **colōx* erwarten; es ist wol, wie auch andere annehmen, zufolge von entlehnung das gr. *κέλης*, mit suffixanbildung jedoch an lat. *vēlōx, nāvis vēlōx* Vergil.

In *sceler-is* gen., *sceler-a* plur., *sceles-tu-s, sceler-āre* ist *scel-* lautgesetzlich; die einzige *-ol-*form **scolus* nom.-acc. sing. stand zu isoliert gegenüber den vielen mit *sceles-, sceler-* da, als dass sie gegen die ersetzung durch analogisch entwickeltes *scelus* hätte widerstandskräftig sein können. Günstigerer existenzbedingungen erfreute sich *holus* (s. o.), schon allein wegen des mangels so häufig gebrauchter ableitungen mit *-es-, -er-*, wie dort *sceles-tu-s, sceler-ātu-s, sceler-ōsu-s*.

Die wunderliche alte erklärung von *elementum* aus den liquiden *l, m, n* hätten neuere etymologen, Havet und

O. Keller, nicht aufwärmen sollen. Am besten ist, was über den ursprung des wortes Leo Meyer mit heranziehung von aind. *anu-sh* adj. 'fein, dünn, sehr klein,' *āniman-* n. 'das kleinste stück' gelehrt hat. Das zweite *-e-* von *elementum* hat man auf gleiche linie mit dem zwischen-vocal von gr. ἡγε-μών, κηδε-μών, ἀνε-μο-ς, γενέ-τωρ zu stellen; hätte an seiner stelle ein dem griech. *-a-* von τελα-μών, τερά-μων, dem aind. *-i-* von *jāni-man-* n. genau entsprechender vocal gestanden, so wäre **olumentum* entsprungen, wie *columen* aus **celāmen* (s. o.).

B. vor folgendem *ĩ*:

Das frappanteste beispiel ist der optativ der wurzel *wel-* 'wollen': lat. *velim, velīs, velit, velīmus* u. s. w. neben indic. *volo* (s. o. s. 52), *volumus* (s. 53). Als sonstige zeugnisse dürften hier noch in betracht kommen

Lat. *felix* f. 'farnkrant' und seine ableitungen *felic-ula, -ātus, -ōnēs*; in vermutlich mundartlicher lautvariation daneben *filix*. Verwandtschaft mit *fol-ium* 'blatt' ist wol nicht zu verkennen; die ableitung *-ix* wie in den pflanzenbenennungen *larix, salix*: gr. ἑλί-κη (s. o.).

Velinus, name eines sees im sabinischen und adjectiv zu dem stadtnamen *Velia* (s. u.).

Velitrae; vgl. das morphologisch abweichende volsk. *Velestrom* 'Veliternorum.'

Als ausnahmen, die unserem lautgesetze sich nicht zu fügen scheinen, sind noch *velut* und *gelu* hier zu berücksichtigen.

Ist *vel-ut, vel-utī* aus verhältnismässig später zusammenrückung seiner beiden einzelbestandteile hervorgegangen, so mag die lautgestalt des *vel* in vocalischer hinsicht unabhängig von dem nachfolgenden *u-* in *ut(ī)* geblieben sein, indem vorher das wirken eines nichtpalatalen vocals auf den vorausgehenden nexus *-el-* abgeschlossen war.

In der sippe *gelu, gelidus, gelāre* kann wenigstens dem adjectiv auf *-idus* lautgesetzmässig die *el-*form zugekommen sein; das gleichgebildete umbr. kaleřuf *calersu* 'callidos, λευκομετώπους' hatte auch von hause aus palatalvocalischen anlaut seines dem lat. *-idus* entsprechenden ableitungsbe-

standteils. Doch kommt auch in betracht, dass *gelu* selbst oder *gelu-s* masc. als mit dem suffixe *-ew-* geformtes nomen von hause aus in den obliquen casus teilweise die *e*-hochstufige stammform hervortreten zu lassen hatte, den loc. sing. aber mit dehnstufigkeit als **gelēw* > *gelū* dat.

Für chronologische datierung des lautgesetzlichen wandels von *el* zu *ol* vor nichtpalatalen vocalen bietet sich zunächst der anhaltspunkt dar, dass *olīva*, *olīvum* zeigen: die entwicklung des *ol* hatte statt, bevor an die stelle von *-ai-* in nicht erster wortsilbe sich durch vocalschwächung *-ī-* geschoben hatte. Darnach könnte sich vermuten lassen, dass zur zeit des wirkens der brechungsregel überhaupt noch in weiterem umfange der ungeschwächte vocalismus der nach der älteren wortanfangsbetonung nicht haupttonigen silben bestanden habe. Und hieraus würde weiter zu folgern sein, dass dann auch in diesen nicht haupttonigen silben ein *el* also von dem einfluss der nachfolgenden vocale je nach der lautqualität dieser afficiert wurde oder nicht. Z. b. ein **-celō* = ahd. *hilu*, air. *celim* 'ich verhehle' könnte mit *ob-* zusammengesetzt eben nach unserer brechungsregel in **oc-colō*, daraus *oc-culo*, übergegangen sein; als die streng lautgesetzliche flexionsweise wäre *oc-culo*, *oc-culunt*, *oc-culam*, aber **oc-cilis*, **oc-cilit* u. s. w. vorauszusetzen.

Bestätigung findet das vorstehende durch die vocalisation ursprünglicher *el*-formen wie *Siculus* = *Σικελός*, *scopulus* = *σκόπελος*, *famulus* = osk. *famel*, *catulus* = umbr. *katel*, *porculus*: lit. *parszēl-i-s* 'ferkel'; *nebula* = gr. *νεφέλη*. Diese bilden mit *Sicilia*, *familia*, *porcilia* im grunde denselben lautlichen contrast, wie *volo*, *volunt* mit *velim*, *velīs*. In *Sicilia*, als entlehnt aus *Σικελία*, stand von hause aus sonantisches *-i-* hinter dem *-l-*; aber *-y-* = consonans *-i-* hatte in *familia* = osk. *famelo* für **famelyo* u. dgl. natürlich dieselbe wirkung auf den vor der liquida stehenden vocal, worüber näheres weiter unten.

Für die nachtonigen silben dürfte aber doch eine weitere fassung der regel, als die, dass *-el-* vor den nichtpalatalen vocalen in *-ol-* > *-ul-* übergegangen sei, sich empfehlen;

denn nach den lehnwörtern wie *pessulus* = *πάσσαλος*, *crāpula* = *κραιπάλη*, *scutula* = *σκυτάλη*, *spatula* = *σπατάλη* erweist sich ja *-ul-* hier auch als das substitut eines ursprünglichen *-al-*.

An der hand der formen der dialekte osk. *famel*, umbr. *katel*, *tiçel* 'dicatio' u. ähnl. ersehen wir auch, dass die vocalbrechende wirkung eines von nichtpalatalem vocale gefolgt *l* vollends nicht uritalisch, sondern eine im speciellen sprachleben des lateins aufgekommene erscheinung war.

Alle diese datierungsversuche sind aber offenbar nur bestimmungen nach relativer sprachchronologie. Durch *olīva*, *olīvum* sind wir jedoch auch in die lage versetzt, mit einer annähernden jahreszahlangabe den zeitpunkt zu treffen, nach welchem die verwandlung von *el* in *ol* unter den erwähnten bedingungen sich zugetragen haben muss. Der ölbaum ist zur zeit der Tarquinischen könige von Grossgriechenland zu den Römern verpflanzt worden, nach dem chronisten Fenestella bei Plinius nat. hist. XV § 1 bis zum jahre 173 der stadt unter Tarquinius Priscus den Lateinern fremd geblieben; vgl. O. Weise d. griech. wörter im lat. 132 f. Die entlehnung von **elaiivā*, **elaiivom* fällt also in diese zeit, die phonetische umgestaltung der wortformen in **olaiivā*, **olaiivom* mithin noch später.

Es erhebt sich die frage nach der phonetischen auffassung des lautprocesses, dass *el* in der stellung vor den *a-*, *o-* und *u-*lauten in lat. *ol* (*ul*) überging. Die antwort liegt nahe, dass in solcher stellung die liquida den dunkleren klang als *l̃* hatte, vor den palatalen oder hellen vocalen *ě* und *ĩ* dagegen helles *l'* gesprochen wurde. Das führt auf ein durchaus analoges verhältnis der verteilung der beiden klangfarben des *l*, wie es bekanntlich auf baltischem und mehreren orts auf slavischem sprachboden ganz regelmässig herrscht, wo "je nach der beschaffenheit des folgenden vokales" sich "hartes" und "weiches" *l* gegenseitig ablösen, jenes vor den sogenannten "dunklen" dieses vor den "hellen" vokalen seinen platz hat. Im litauischen z. b. gilt *l̃* vor

a, o, u, ũ, daneben "l" d. i. *l'* vor *e* und *i*; entsprechendes im lettischen, ferner in dem russischen, polnischen und einigen anderen slavischen sprachen. Vgl. Schleicher lit. gramm. § 10, 2 s. 19 f., Kurschat gramm. d. litt. spr. §§ 80 ff. s. 26 f., Bielenstein lett. spr. § 47 I 87 f., Miklosich vergleich. lautl. d. slav. spr.² (vergleich. gramm. I) s. 475.

Die weitere für das latein insbesondere sich erhebende frage, welche der beiden klangqualitäten die ältere gewesen sei, ob *l'* sich vor *ǎ, ǒ, ũ* in *l̃* verdunkelt oder anfängliches *l̃* vor *ě* und *ĩ* zu *l'* verdünnt worden sei, wird man, glaube ich, zu gunsten der priorität des *l̃* zu entscheiden haben. Einmal erklärt sich bei dieser annahme am einfachsten die beteiligung des *ǎ* an den das *ol* erzeugenden lagen, wenn das *a* wirklich nach der üblichen auffassung als die neutrale mitte der vocallinie, gleich weit von der palatalen mundstellung des *i* wie von dem anderen extrem, dem labialismus des *u*, abliegend, geltend darf. Sodann aber kommt dieser annahme stützend zur hilfe, wenn sich zeigen lässt, dass auch vor consonanten, und zwar vor den verschiedenartigsten und zum teil gegen die labiale articulation ganz indifferenten, der wandel von *el* zu *ol, ul* tatsächlich auftritt.

Es ist *el*, beziehungsweise in nicht erster wortsilbe — zuzufolge mundartlicher färbung vereinzelt auch in der anfangsilbe — durch *il* vertreten, in vorconsonantischer stellung nur unter zwei umständen sicher lautgesetzlich erhalten: einerseits, wenn der nexus *-ly-*, sodann, wenn die geminata *-ll-* auf das *e* folgte.

III A. *e* erhalten vor *-ly-*:

Beispiele dafür sind zunächst nur *melior melius* compar., *Velia* (s. oben s. 54); dazu kommend jedoch mit der erwähnten lautmodification *milium* 'hirsen' und *tilia* 'linde,' gemäss ihrer vergleichung mit gr. *μελίμη, πτελέᾱ* 'ulme, rüster.' Hier finden aber auch ihren platz jene *familia*: *famulus*, *porcilia*: *porculus* (s. 55). Wenn in *melior, familia* u. dergl. für das *-y-* zuvor silbisches *-i-*

eingetreten war, wie es in *Sicilia* = *Σικελία* wol immer bestand, würde es für die beispiele dieser art gar keiner besonderen regel über *e* vor *-ly-* bedürfen.

B. *e* erhalten vor *-ll-*:

Ein *-ll-* war im lateinischen durch die mannigfaltigsten assimilationsprocesse entsprungen; ihm mag ja bekanntlich *-ln-*, *-ls-* und wol auch *-ld-*, andererseits *-dl-*, *-nl-*, *-rl-* zu grunde liegen. Welcher herkunft aber auch *-ll-* in jedem einzelnen falle sein mag, immer bewahrt ein davor stehendes *e* seine lautnatur unverändert. Als beispiele dienen, unter beschränkung auf dasjenige *ell-*, in welchem sicher ein indog. *el-* enthalten war: *cella*, *fell-* 'galle,' *mell-* 'honig,' *pellis*, *tellūs*, *vellus* und die praesentia *pello* und *vello*; insbesondere aber *velle* inf. und *vellem* conj. imperf.

Im einklange damit steht es, dass auch *-all-*, wenn es der vocalschwächung unterliegt, den weg der *e*-färbung einschlägt in *fefellī* perf., *re-fello* comp. zu *fallo*. Die sonderstellung eines *-al-* + *-l-*, welche darin liegt, tritt hervor bei der vergleichung der verdampfenden behandlung eines *-al-*, dem anderweitige consonanz folgt, in *con-culcāre*, *in-sultāre*, *in-sulsus* u. dergl.

In der geminata *-ll-* herrscht die "dünne" aussprache auch auf einigen der romanischen sprachgebiete, im spanischen, rätoromanischen, ferner süditalienisch und sardisch; wahrscheinlich doch auf grund ererbter lautverhältnisse der lateinischen muttersprache. Daher ist ja auch im spanischen *ll* dazu gekommen, als der graphische ausdruck für mouilliertes *l* zu dienen, z. b. in *batalla*, *maravilla*.

Wie ist es zu erklären, dass *-ll-* gemäss seinen wirkungen auf vorhergehende vocale sich als eine lautverbindung ausweist, in der irgendwie das helle *l'* enthalten war, wenn anders dunkles *l̄* ursprünglich der alleinige lautwert der liquida im lateinischen war? Ich weiss darüber nur eine vermutung beizubringen. Geminata ist, wie so oft, nichts anderes als consonantenlänge. So gut nun lange vocale ganz gewöhnlich im laufe der zeit durch unähnlichwerdung ihrer zwei moren diphthongiert zu werden pflegen, ebenso, sollte man meinen, müsste entsprechendes gelegentlich auch

einem langen consonanten widerfahren können. Nehmen wir an, \tilde{l} sei also allmählich zu \tilde{l}' -diphthongiert worden, so konnte mit dieser entwickelung der keim zu einem fürderhin sich einfindenden $-l'$ - gegeben sein; auf die diphthongierung folgte wiederum eine monophthongierung, die einsatz- und absatzmora der langen liquida assimilierten sich wieder, aber unter vorwiegen des klangcharakters des schlusselements. Hier läge folglich der grund, warum *velle*, *vellem* sowol unter den den *e*-vocalismus schützenden formen anzutreffen sind, wie *velim*, im gegensatz zu *volo*, *volunt*.

IV. Vor allen übrigen consonanten, ausser *-y*- und einem zweiten *-l*-, hat die lautgruppe *el* ebenfalls die verdampfung zu *ol* > *ul* erlitten.

Es ist hier geratener, die abfertigung der scheinbaren ausnahmen der regel im voraus vorzunehmen. Solche sind: *celtis* oder *celthis* f. eine afrikanische art des lotus, nur bei Plinius, *celtis* f. 'meissel des steinmetzen,' *celtium* 'schildpatt' bei Plinius, alal. *meltom* i. q. *meliozem* Paul. Fest., spätlat. *spelta* 'spelz'; *helvus*; *celsus*.

Von diesen entfallen wol ohne weiteres das erstere *celtis* (*celthis*) und *spelta*, als vermutlich fremdsprachliche pflanzennamen; *spelta* ist zudem augenscheinlich nur ein spät aufgekommener ersatz für die dem alten latein geläufigen ehrwürdigen kulturausdrücke *fār*, *ador*, *fār adōreum*. Auf *celtium* ist auch nicht viel zu geben, da bei Plinius nat. hist. VI § 173. IX § 38 die lesart zwischen dieser form und *chelyon* schwankt; zusammenhang mit gr. $\chi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\upsilon\varsigma$, $\chi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega\nu\eta$, $\chi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\upsilon\omicron\nu$ auf dem wege der entlehnung wol in jedem falle nicht abzuweisen.

In *celtis* 'meissel,' das wol mit *culter* 'messer' und gr. $\kappa\omicron\lambda\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$, $\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$ wurzelhaft zusammenhängt, ferner in dem alal. *meltom* und in *helvus* hindert nichts die synkope eines *-e*- nach der liquida anzunehmen; bevor dass *-e*- unterging, könnte es zur erhaltung des *e*-vocalismus der wurzelsilbe mitgewirkt haben. Dann würden **cel-e-ti-s* und **mel-e-to-m* morphologisch ihre anknüpfung an griechischen

bildungen wie γέν-ε-σι-ς, νέμ-ε-σι-ς, beziehungsweise ἐλ-ε-τό-ς, σκελ-ε-τό-ς finden; **hel-ewo-s* stünde zu germ. **zel-wa-z* = ahd. asächs. *gëlo* (gen. *gëlwes*), ags. *zeolo* 'gelb' und zu lit. *žel-wa-s* 'grünlich' in demselben verhältnis der suffix-abstufung, wie gr. ion. κενε(φ)ό-ς kypr. κενεφόν zu κεν(φ)ό-ς.

Lat. *pelvi-s* war *pēlvi-s*, nach der bei älteren dichtern vorkommenden messung mit dreisilbigkeit und "diärese" *pēluis*; es fällt also ausserhalb des bereichs unserer lautregel. Gegen die vorgeschlagene auffassung von *helvu-s* aber könnte noch eingewendet werden, dass ein indog. **zhelewo-s* schon ins urlateinische in der form **helovo-s* aufgenommen werden musste, da man ja den wandel von altem hetero- und tautosyllabischem *ew* in *ow* in die uralische sprachperiode zu verlegen pflegt. Aber zu einer so hohen datierung des *ow* aus *ew* ist trotz der teilnahme aller altitalischen dialekte an dieser erscheinung kein durchschlagender grund vorhanden. In dieser erwägung nehmen wir auch keinen anstand an der erklärung des gen. sing. *gelūs* aus einer urlateinisch zunächst noch vorhanden gewesenen *-ew*-form **geleus*; vgl. oben s. 55. Man braucht demnach auch das archaische *Leucesie* des Saliarliedes nicht in der üblichen weise scheel anzusehen.

Was endlich *celsu-s*, *ex-celsu-s* anbetrifft, so ist vielleicht die vermutung nicht zu kühn, dass hier ein contaminations-product vorliege, an dessen zustandekommen einerseits ein geminatabehaftetes adjectiv **cello-s* < **cel-no-s* und andererseits ein participiales **culso-s* sich beteiligten. Gerade bei der wurzel *kel-* 'sich erheben' bieten nominale bildungen mit *-n-* suffix, durch die das hypothetische **cello-s* zu stützen wäre, ungesucht sich reichlicher dar: lat. *colli-s* < **col-ni-s*, im litauischen *kál-na-s* 'berg' und besonders die adjectiva lit. *kil-na-s* 'erhaben,' *pra-kil-nù-s* 'stattlich, ansehnlich.'

Für unsere regel nun, dass *el*, ausser vor *-y-* und einem weiter hinzutretenden *-l-*, sonst vor consonanten im lateinischen zu *ul* verdumpft wurde, lassen wol eine anzahl von belegen sich anführen. Doch ist vorsicht bei der wertschätzung der einzelnen beispiele allerdings geboten;

denn da auch die ablautstufen indog. *ol* und $\frac{l}{o}$ vorconsonantisch im lateinischen durch *ul* vertreten sind, so bleibt mehrfach die möglichkeit offen, dass eine zu einer ausserlateinischen *el*-form gehaltene lateinische *ul*-form mit jener nicht dieselbe wurzelvocalstufe gehabt, sondern zu ihr im ablautsverhältnisse sich befunden habe. Folgendes mag unter dem vorbehalt dieser cautel hier in betracht kommen :

ulcus n. = gr. ἕλκος n., aind. *árças* n. 'hämmorrhoiden.' Die griechische form sollte *ἔλκος lauten; sie hat wol den spiritus asper durch volksetymologische verknüpfung mit ἔλλω 'ziehe, zerre, reisse' bekommen.

culmen n. < **cel-men*, zu der wurzel *kel-* 'sich erheben, ragen' gehörig; den neutren mit dem suffixe *-men-* eignéte bekanntlich mit vorliebe von alters her die *e*-hochstufige wurzelgestalt.

pulmentum < **pel-men-to-m* : umbr. *pel-mn-er* gen. 'pulmenti,' welches "a *pulmento* non longius distat quam *tegminis* a *tegumento*" (Bücheler).

ulmu-s f. = ags. ahd. mhd. *ëlm* m. 'ulme' (engl. *elm-tree*, ahd. mhd. *ëlm-boum*). Allerdings ist eben dies ein fall der verschiedenen ablautsmöglichkeiten, da herleitung des *ulmu-s* aus **lmo-s* an ir. *lem* und solche aus **olmo-s* an aisl. *alm-r* den erwünschten rückhalt finden könnte.

Den participien *pulsu-s* und *volsu-s* (*vulsu-s*) gibt man immer am besten die gleiche wurzelablautstufe wie den praesentien *pello, vello*. Auch *per-culsus* wird sich zu *per-cello* im grunde nicht anders verhalten haben, als *falsu-s* zu *fallo, salsu-s* zu *sallo*; nur dass der voraussetzbare identische vocalismus bei *per-culsu-s, per-cello*, als zusammengesetzten formen, nicht notwendig der der *e*-stufe gewesen zu sein braucht, ganz wol auch **per-calsu-s, *per-callō* dahinter stecken mögen. Die vertreter der vulgaten ansicht, dass *pulsu-s* und *volsu-s* ein *-ul-* (*-ol-*) aus indog. $\frac{l}{o}$ enthalten, gemäss der alten tiefstufigkeit des wurzelablauts der *-to*-participien, berücksichtigen zu wenig den charakter dieser *-so*-formen als anerkannter massen jüngerer analogiebildungen. Es lässt sich im allgemeinen der satz aufstellen,

dass überhaupt die participia auf *-su-s*, zu mindesten aber die nicht lautgesetzlich aus ehemaligen *-to*-formen entwickelten unter ihnen, keinen selbständigen wurzelablaut mehr innerhalb des verbalsystems vertreten; in den weitaus meisten fällen schliessen sie sich einfach der vocalisation des zugehörigen praesens an. Und wie nun z. b. *mersu-s*, *tersu-s* vorliegen, so werden auch **pelso-s* zu *pello*, **velso-s* zu *vello* gebildet worden sein; die vocaldifferenz hier entsprang erst secundär durch das wirken unseres brechungsgesetzes, das *pulsu-s* und *volsu-s* ins leben rief.

Besonders beachtenswert dürfte *mulsu-s* 'mit honig angemacht,' *mulsu-m* n. 'weinmet' sein: dessen verhältnis zu *mel mell-is* gestaltet sich doch erst völliger gleich dem von *salsu-s* 'gesalzen' zu *sāl sal-is*, wenn jenes eben auf **melso-s* zurückgeht.

In *volt* (*vult*) 3. sing. praes. ist das genaue ebenbild von lit. (*pa*)-*welt* 'er will' zu erblicken. Wenn man dann auch *voltis* (*vultis*) 2. plur. aus **veltis* herleitet, so stellt sich damit erst ein vollständigerer parallelismus der flexionen von *volo*, *volt*, *voltis*, *volunt* < **velō* u. s. w., *velle*, *vellem* und andererseits von *fero*, *fert*, *fertis*, *ferunt*, *ferre*, *ferrem*, sowie *eo*, *it* < **eit*, *ītis*, *eunt*, *īre*, *īrem* heraus: das latein hat bei diesen ursprünglich der "athematischen" wurzelclassen angehörigen praesenssystemen übereinstimmend die *e*-hochstufige starke stammform des sing. act. des praes. indic. verallgemeinert.

Über die affection oder nichtaffection eines im wortauslaute stehenden *-l* durch unsere brechungsregel will ich hier nur ein paar zerstreute andeutungen geben. Sie knüpfen an die auf *-el* ausgehenden wörter *vel*, *mascel* und *semel* an. Es ist aus allgemeinen gründen wahrscheinlich, dass diese drei formen irgend eine der bedingungen enthielten, unter denen nach unseren regeln II (s. 53 f.) und III (s. 57 f.) die brechung zu unterbleiben hatte.

Über den ursprung der conjunction *vel* 'oder' stehen sich im wesentlichen zwei ansichten gegenüber. Nach der vulgaten durch Brugmann begründeten theorie ist es injunctivgebilde und als solches auf **vel-s* beruhend.

Dagegen spricht von vocalischer seite nichts, da **vel-s* wol zunächst frühzeitig durch assimilation der lautgruppe *-ls* zu **vell* werden musste und also dann gemination, wie in *velle, vellem*, vorlag; ein **vol* < **vols* < **vels* wäre mithin nicht zu erwarten. Andere, wie Leo Meyer, Wharton und Skutsch, bevorzugen jedoch die erklärung aus einer imperativform **vele*, die vorsonantisch und auch als sogenannte "schnellsprechform" vorconsonantisch zu *vel* verkürzt worden sei. Auch das verträgt sich mit unserem lautgesetz: die regel über *-el-* vor palatalem vocale käme zur anwendung. Skutsch führt für letztere ansicht und gegen die Brugmann'sche deutung das fehlen von zeugnissen des **vell* in der plautinischen metrik an. Vielleicht spricht in demselben sinne insbesondere die zusammenrückung *vel-ut, vel-uti*, die zwar nach dem oben s. 54 bemerkten nicht so frühzeitig in dieser form bestand, dass *-el-* durch *-u-* hätte in *-ol-* gebrochen werden können, jedoch wol immerhin alt genug ist, um bei etwaigem ursprunge des *vel* aus **vel-s* die form **vell-ut* erwarten zu lassen; *velut* ist ja auch schon plautinisch, und Plautus' sprache kennt das von Bücheler nachgewiesene *terr-uncius* mit *terr-* aus **ters-* 'dreimal.'

Als vertreter der synkopierten nom.-sing.-bildung wie osk. *famel*, umbr. *katel*, tiçel gilt für das lateinische bekanntlich *famul* bei Ennius und Lucretius. Nun rivalisiert aber mit diesem *famul* hinsichtlich der frage der lautgesetzlichkeit das ein paar mal bei Probus angeführte, einmal auch inschriftlich als eigenname vorkommende *mascel* = *masculus*. Da es die form auf *-el* ist, die aus dem system herausfällt, so hat wol *famul* seinen vocalismus von *famulo-* in den obliquen casus bezogen; folglich hätte *mascel* den anspruch, eine erklärung auf lautgesetzlichem wege zu fordern. Eine solche ergibt sich bei dem ansatz der entwicklungsreihe **mascel-s* > **mascell* > *mascel* und der annahme, dass auf der durch **mascell* vertretenen zwischenstufe der *e*-laut durch die nachfolgende geminata geschützt worden sei.

Hat man das zahladverb *semel* mit Jakob Wackernagel

aus **sm̄-mēli* herzuleiten und mit got. *mēl* 'zeitpunkt,' unserem *-mal* in *ein-mal* u. s. w. zusammenzubringen, so würde es hier unerwähnt bleiben müssen. Aber diese deutung ist doch gar zu unsicher; viel probabler bleibt die ältere auffassung, dass *semel* irgendwie mit *simul*, altlat. *semol semul*, umbr. *sumel* 'simul' in näherer verbindung stehe. Allerdings wird man *semel* und *simul* nicht als schlechthin identisch betrachten dürfen. Die lautliche differenz in der schlusssilbe klärt sich auf, wenn *semel* auf **semell* < **semel-s* zurückgebracht wird: wie *bi-s*, ferner *ter* < **ter-s* (vgl. oben s. 63 *terr-uncius*), *quater* < **quater-s*, so enthielt auch das erste zahladverb ursprünglich das für diese formenkategorie charakteristische *-s*; ebenso ja auch griech. ἄπαξ in übereinstimmung mit δίς, τρίς, τετράκις u. s. w. Wenn *simul*, wie ja meistens angenommen wird, der alte doppelgänger von *simile*, neutrum zu *simili-s*, war, so muss jene kurz- oder "schnellsprechform" auf so frühzeitiger synkope an dem grundgebilde **semel(i)* beruhen, dass das abgestossene *-i* hier bereits verschwunden war zu der zeit, als unser lateinisches brechungsgesetz in wirksamkeit kam. Ein gleiches gilt für *facul*, *difficul* = *facile*, *difficile*.

Der beobachtung, dass *el* sich unter gewissen umständen normal in lat. *ol* (*ul*) verwandele, ist vor uns am nächsten Havet mém. de la soc. de linguist. V. 43. 46 anm. gekommen. In einigen die negative seite der hier behandelten lauterscheinung betreffenden bestimmungen kommt der französische sprachforscher zu dem gleichen ergebnis wie wir: in der erkenntnis, dass *e* erhalten bleibe einmal vor *ll*, wie in *vellem*, *mellis*, sodann vor *li*, in *velim*, *melior* u. dergl. Die dritte derartige bestimmung bei Havet, dass dies auch nach *c* und *g* geschehe, ist nicht stichhaltig, da die dafür angeführten belege *celer*, *celeber*, *scelus*, *gelu* und *celsus* anderer auffassungsweise zu unterwerfen sind, wie sich uns im vorhergehenden im einzelnen gezeigt hat. Das wahre wesen der erscheinung hat Havet besonders insofern verkannt, als ihm entging, dass die verwandlung oder nichtverwandlung von *el* zu *ol* durch eine lautliche

doppelnatur des lateinischen *l* bedingt war, die ihrerseits wiederum von der phonetischen beschaffenheit des unmittelbar auf die liquida folgenden lautes, insbesondere von der ursprünglichen natur nachfolgender vocale, abhing.

Den unterschied der beiden klangqualitäten des *l* kannten in dunklen umrissen auch schon die alten grammatiker. Es kommen hier vornemlich die zeugnisse des Plinius bei Priscian I § 38 H. = gramm. lat. II 29, 8 K. und des Consentius gramm. lat. V 394, 30 K. in betracht. Was diese beiden gewährsmänner als den "dünnen" laut, "exilem sonum," der liquida anmerken, im gegensatz zu dem "plenum" des Plinius, dem "pinguius" des Consentius, das entspricht im wesentlichen unserem hellen *l*; übereinstimmend ist ja auch bei beiden die angabe, dass der "dünne laut" in der geminata *ll* herrsche, wofür sie die beispiele *ille*, *Metellus*, *Allia* anführen. Bei anderen grammatikern, nemlich bei Servius, Pompejus und Isidor, kehren im grunde dieselben distinctionem der verschiedenen aussprache des *l*, wie in den berichten des Plinius und Consentius, wieder, wenngleich zum teil unter anwendung einer abweichenden terminologie. Von neueren haben Corssen und Wilh. Meyer-Lübke das, was Plinius, Consentius und genossen über *l* und seine wechselnde klangqualität haben sagen wollen, im ganzen richtiger erfasst, als der phonetiker des latein Seelmann, der auch hier, wie sonst seiner gepflogenheit gemäss, in die lehren der alten grammatiker allerlei diesen gewiss fern gelegene moderne lautphysiologische weisheit hineinzuinterpretieren sich abgemüht hat.

V. — *On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides.*

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THE main interest of the History of the Peloponnesian War does not lie in the incomparable vividness of the narrative, nor even in the tragic drama of the pride and fall of imperial Athens, and the pity of this suicide of the Hellenic race in its culminating age. Fascinating as is the mere story, its chief attraction for us consists in the fact that it is the embodiment of a subtle and consistent, if one-sided, philosophy of life; that it is, to adapt a phrase of Carlyle, a portion of human history penetrated and informed by the spirit of the man Thucydides. This Thucydidean criticism of life I propose to study in its two chief aspects, which for convenience I will designate as (1) ethical positivism, (2) intellectualism.

The fundamental assumption of this ethical positivism is that the nature and conduct of man are strictly determined by his physical and social environment and by a few elementary appetites and desires. Around this primitive core of human nature society and convention have wrapped sheath upon sheath of decorous pretence — ethical, social, religious. The naïve man is duped by this moral drapery, he accepts the word for the deed, the alleged motive for the true, and rarely, if ever, penetrates to the underlying realities. The wise man is not so deceived. He has looked into the workings of his own heart, he has studied human nature in the revealing light of war, pestilence, and revolution, and, however well draped the figures he meets in his daily walk, his penetrating imagination discovers the naked man beneath. Such is the conception of human life everywhere suggested

when not explicitly affirmed by Thucydides. The first axiom of this doctrine is that human nature remains always essentially the same, and that it cannot be permanently restrained or moulded by the artificial conventions of law and religion.¹

It is on this belief that he bases his conception of history as philosophy teaching by example. He commends his work to the favorable judgment of those who desire to have an accurate knowledge of the past and so forecast the future which from the nature of man will resemble it.²

The atrocities of the revolutions of Corcyra are such as occur and always will recur while the nature of man remains unchanged. (III. 82.) The Athenians, so their envoys at Sparta declare, were constrained to accept and maintain their invidious empire by motives resistless to human nature, ambition, gain, and fear. It has always been the rule that those should take who have the power and those should keep who can, and no man possessing this power ever stayed his hand for abstract considerations of justice. This basic human nature the Athenians have indulged with great moderation.³ I do not blame the aggression of the Athenians, says Hermocrates.⁴ It is human nature everywhere to dominate those who submit. "We hold the customary beliefs about the gods" (the Athenians declare at Melos, V. 105), and we know for a certainty that men by an inevitable law of their nature dominate when they can. We did not promulgate

¹ The connection of cynicism and the doctrine of necessity in Thucydides is not accidental. In Machiavelli's first work on the revolt in the Val di Chiana, he appeals to Roman history for the solution of a problem in present politics: ". . . Perché gli uomini in sostanza sono sempre gli stessi ed hanno le medesime passione: così quando le circostanze sono identiche, le medesime cagione portano i medesimi effetti, e quindi gli stessi fatti debbono suggerire le stesse regole di condotta."

² I. 22. *κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον* by Thucydidean usage means more than "in all human probability," as Professor Jebb renders it, *Hellenica*, p. 266. Plato, *Crito* 46 E *ὅσα γε τ' ἀνθρώπεια*, is not a parallel.

³ I. 76 *χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπιᾷ φύσει*. For the ethical suggestions of this phrase, cf. Aristoph. *Nubes* 1078 *χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν*. Isoc. *Areopagit.* 38 *ὀκνοῦντας τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι*.

⁴ IV. 61.

this law, nor were we the first to profit by it. We found it in operation and shall leave it for all futurity.¹ It is in seasons of pestilence and revolution that all disguises are thrown off and this indomitable brutality of man is most plainly displayed. Neither fear of God nor law of man could check them, he says of the plague at Athens. Human nature prevailing over all laws is his summary of the conditions at Corcyra.²

The contempt of Thucydides' *alma sdegnosa* for this average elemental human nature is hinted in many a scornful phrase. Man is naturally fickle,³ boastful,⁴ envious,⁵ ungrateful, and selfish,⁶ elated by success, yet unable to bear prosperity.⁷ The multitude are prone to magnify the unknown, and remote,⁸ intolerant of painstaking accuracy,⁹ and easily seduced by false glitter.¹⁰ Their judgments are swayed by mere words,¹¹ their beliefs determined by their desires,¹² and their moods shift with their changing conditions.¹³

But we look for something more philosophic than these

¹ This is generally rendered "We opine that the gods, and we know that men, rule when they can," etc. The sentence, if critically studied, is, as Dionysius says, *δυσείκαστος καὶ τοῖς πάντι δοκοῦσιν ἐμπείρωσ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔχειν*, but in spite of the co-ordination with *τε*, I am inclined to take *ἡγοῦμεθα* in the first member absolutely: "We believe in the gods as a matter of opinion, and we know for a fact that men," etc. It is not in accordance with Thucydides' mental habit to argue that the gods rule when they have the power, and Dionysius in his close paraphrase ignores this thought. He says: *ὅτι τὸ μὲν θεῶν δόξα γινώσκουσιν ἅπαντες*.

² *τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἢ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις* III. 84. The phrase is in Thucydides' manner, even if the paragraph be spurious.

³ Cf. II. 65 *ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὄμιλος ποιεῖν*, etc. Cf. IV. 28; VI. 63; VIII. 1.

⁴ *τὸ ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες* V. 68.

⁵ II. 35; II. 45; VI. 16 *τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει*; II. 64 *ὅστις δ' ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπιφθονοῦ λαμβάνει ὀρθῶς βουλευέται*.

⁶ II. 40. 4; VI. 16 *ἀλλ' ὡσπερ δυστυχούντες οὐ προσαγορευόμεθα*; VIII. 89. 3.

⁷ III. 39.

⁸ VI. 11 *τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα*.

⁹ I. 20; VI. 54 *ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας*, etc.

¹⁰ I. 22; IV. 108. 4 *ἐφορκὰ*; V. 85 *ἐπαγωγὰ*; VI. 8. 2.

¹¹ VI. 34 *πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γινώμαι ἴστανται*.

¹² III. 3 *μείζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι*; IV. 108 *ὁ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι*.

¹³ II. 54; I. 140. 1; III. 82. 2; cf. also IV. 61.

isolated disparaging utterances. We want a systematic ethical terminology based on a psychological analysis of the chief springs and motives of human action. The nearest approach to this is to be found in the speech of Diodotus on the affair of Mitylene, III, 45. “All men are naturally prone to error (he says in substance), and there is no law that will keep them from it. Legislators have run through the list of possible penalties to no effect, and we must invent some more awful terror than the fear of death if we expect to bridle human nature.¹ At one extreme of human condition poverty and necessity inspire reckless daring, at the other license begets grasping greed on insolence and pride; and so the various accidents and conditions of life acting with fatal necessity on the various tempers of men lure them on to danger.² And in addition to these impulses, hope and passionate desire are everywhere operative for harm, the one leading, the other following, the one devising enterprise, the other whispering promise of success,³ — anticipations of the unseen future yet more potent over men’s minds than dangers plainly seen.⁴

“Fortune, too, contributes her part to exalt men’s spirits, and by the unexpectedness of her aid often induces them to venture with inferior resources — more especially states in so far as they contend for the highest stakes, freedom, or imperial dominion, and the individual acting with a multitude is more prone to an irrational overestimation of his powers. In short, it is impossible (and the supposition of the contrary is a mark of the utmost simplicity) to restrain by law or any other deterrent force any strong bent of

¹ Cf. Bacon’s saying: “There is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death.”

² I cannot accept Classen’s text nor his interpretation here. The scholiast rightly says: “*ὀργῇ ὁ τρόπος.*” *ὀργῇ* though construed with *ἐξάγουσι* is felt with *ξυτυχίαι*. For the conjunction of *ξυτυχίαι*, *γνώμη*, and *ὀργῇ*, cf. III. 82. For the thought in *ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος*, cf. Emerson’s words: “. . . Temper prevails over everything of time, place, and condition, and is inconsumable in the flames of religion.”

³ Cf. IV. 65. 4; VI. 15. 1, 2.

⁴ Cf. V. 87 *ὦν ὀρᾶτε*; V. 103 *φαρραλ* — *ἀφαιεῖς*; V. 113; VI. 9. 3.

human nature.”¹ If we add φιλοτιμία² and φιλονικία, pertinacity, or “persistive constancy,” to the positive promptings here enumerated, and supplement νόμος and φόβος by the restraining principles of αἰσχύνη and ἔλεος, we shall have a nearly complete list of Thucydidean motives. Every phrase in the speech of Diodotus is of typical significance for the whole history, and every term demands a commentary. This ἔρωσ retains nothing of the associations of that “thirst in all men’s nature named ἔρωσ,” which fills so large a place in Greek literature. It is simply the master passion, or the passion which for the moment has mastered the mind.

εὖ δ' ἴσθ', ὅτου τις τυγχάνει χρείαν ἔχων
τοῦτ' ἔσθ' ἐκάστω μείζον ἢ Τροίαν ἐλεῖν,

says Menelaus in the *Andromache*. It is the ἔρωσ which the tyrant soul of the Republic (573 A) establishes on the throne as its bosom’s lord; the desire of which Diotima says (*Symp.* 205 D), τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὁ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ἔρωσ παντί. “Speaking broadly, all desire of good things and of happi-

¹ III. 45. 4 ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δὲ ἐξουσία ὑβρεῖ τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσοнос, ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. ἡ τε ἑλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἠγούμενος, ἡ δὲ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα πλείστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὅντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὀρωμένων δεινῶν. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον συμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν· ἀδοκῆτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει καὶ οὐχ ἦσσαν τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν. ἀπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐθεσίας, ὅστις οἰεταὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρωμένης προθύμως τι πράξαι ἀποτροπὴν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ δεινῷ. With this *résumé* of Thucydidean psychology it is interesting to compare the poetic description in the *Timæus* of the mortal soul, “subject to terrible and irresistible (*ἀναγκαῖα*) affections, — first of all pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil, then pain, which deters from good, — confidence and fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be appeased and *hope* easily led astray. These they mingled with irrational sense and *love* (passionate desire) that attempteth all things, according to necessary laws, and so framed man.” (69 C D, Jowett.)

² III. 82. 8. τὸ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον II. 44. 4.

ness is the chiefest and cunning lure of love to every man." Like the Heracleitean *θυμός*, it buys its will at the price of death. It is *ἐπιχειρητὴς ἅπαντος* in Plato's phrase, — *ἐκφροντίζων τὴν ἐπιβολὴν*, as Thucydides puts it. Thucydides usually employs the weaker synonym *ὄρμη*, reserving the tragic intensity of *ἔρως* for the fatal passion of Athens for the expedition against Sicily.¹ But whether exalted and animated by desire² or goaded by necessity and intolerable humiliation,³ men's acts are too rarely determined by a cool, logical calculation of the chances of success. Their judgments are affected by their tempers.⁴ *τόλμα* is frequently *ἀλόγιστος* (III. 82; VI. 59). For when *ὄρμη* hath fallen upon or *ἔρως* taken possession of the soul, *ἐλπὶς* enters in to heighten confidence and blind to the risk of failure.

The Greeks seem to have been particularly exposed to the temptations of the over-sanguine temperament, and their moralists are inexhaustible in warnings against its illusions. "From Zeus there cometh no clear sign to men: yet, nevertheless, we enter on high counsels and meditate many acts; for by shameless hope our bodies are enthralled, but the tides of our affairs are hidden from our fore-knowledge," says Pindar (Nem. XI. in fin., Myers). "For that hope whose wanderings are so wide is to many men a comfort, but to many a false lure of giddy desire," sing the chorus of the Antigone (615 Jebb). And similar is the lesson which the speakers in Thucydides constantly inculcate in a more bitter and cynical tone. "Intelligence," says Pericles, "relies not so much on hope, which is strongest when all else fails, as on estimates based on existing resources by judgment, whose

¹ Cf. IV. 4 τοῖς στρατιώταις . . . ὄρμη ἐπέπεσε; VI. 24 καὶ ἔρως ἐπέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι; VI. 13 μηδ' . . . δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων.

² ἐπαίρεσθαι κέρδει III. 38; ἐλπίδι III. 45; ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι III. 37; τῇ νίκῃ VII. 41; ἡδονῇ I. 84; εὐθυχίᾳ I. 120, etc.

³ παροξύνειν, παροξύνεσθαι I. 67, I. 84, VI. 88, V. 99; τῷ ἀναγκαιῷ VI. 56.

⁴ VIII. 2. 2 ὀργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα; II. 21 ὧν ἀκροῶσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὄργητο; IV. 108 βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοία ἀσφαλεῖ; I. 122 εὐοργήτως. Cf. also VI. 13 ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοία δὲ πλείστα; II. 11 καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλείστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται; II. 22 ὀργῇ . . . γνώμῃ.

forecasts are surer."¹ The feeble who put their trust in the spendthrift hope (the Athenians warn the Melians) discover her perfidy only when she has left them nothing for their dear-bought knowledge to guard.² This disparagement of hope is frequently accompanied by an allusion to the proverbial uncertainty of the future,³—the surprises of war,⁴ the paradoxes of fortune.⁵

"You Athenians (say the Spartan envoys, IV. 17) will not abuse your success at Sphacteria like fools unaccustomed to the vicissitudes of fortune, who ever reach out in hope of more because their present good luck has come as a surprise." Similarly, Hermocrates, urging on the Sicilian States peace and union in the face of Athenian aggression (IV. 62), warns those who expect to profit by a prolongation of their dissensions: And if any one bases expectations of advantage on the justice of his cause or his superior might, let him not expose himself to reverses that will grievously disappoint his hope . . . for righteous Vengeance does not necessarily prosper because deserved, nor is strength secure because it is full of hope.⁶

"When rational grounds of hope fail, men resort to the unseen, to oracles and prophecies," Thucydides says with cold contempt, or its place is taken by stubborn persistency in a course once determined upon. This pertinacity is characteristic of the eager Athenian temperament. As emulous

¹ II. 62. I do not accept Classen's suggestion that *τόλμα* is the subject here. For the antithesis of *ἐλπίς* and *ὑπάρχοντα* cf. VI. 31. 6 *ἐπὶ μεγίστη ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη*, and also V. 111 *ἐλπιζόμενα . . . ὑπάρχοντα*; VI. 9. 3.

² V. 103.

³ I. 42. 2; III. 42; IV. 62. 4; V. 113; VI. 9.

⁴ III. 30. 4; I. 122 *ἤκιστα ὁ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ*; II. 11; VII. 61; I. 78; V. 102.

⁵ VIII. 24 *ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπέοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις*, etc.; I. 140. 1, 2.

⁶ Jowett's "let him not take his disappointment (sc. at the frustration of his hope by my words) to heart" is doubtful. *τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα σφάλλασθαι*, cf. VII. 66, seems to refer to an actual reversal of expectation by the event. The sentence is a curiously worded threatening admonition characteristic of Hermocrates. Cf. VI. 78: "And if he prove to have erred in judgment, he may live to bewail his own misfortunes and wish to be envying my prosperity again."

thirst for fresh glory,¹ it built up and maintained their empire.² As "persistive constancy" it appears in the bull-dog tenacity with which they held on to Aegina in the face of an overwhelming combination of enemies (I. 105) and in the proud boast, "The Athenians never yet withdrew from any siege from fear of any."³ As blind, presumptuous folly⁴ it wrought their final ruin at Syracuse.⁵

We have already noted the impotence of the fear of God or the law of man to control these active promptings of human nature, and we shall find generally a touch of irony in Thucydides' allusions to the checking and restraining principles. "Pity should be reserved for equals," says Cleon in his speech on Mitylene,⁶ and sweet reasonableness or indulgence (*ἐπιείκεια*) should be shown to those who are likely to prove conformable⁷ in the sequel. They are dangerous feelings for an imperial city to entertain towards inferiors. And his opponent, too, is careful to insist that he would not have the decision of the Athenians influenced in the least by pity or equity. "Do not let the Plataeans melt your hearts, O men of Sparta," the Thebans cry, "by appealing to good deeds that are ancient history now. Degenerate virtue can claim no remuneration for the thing it was." (III. 67.) And the Athenians peremptorily bid the Melians base their arguments solely on the real purposes and power of the contestants, and not on any unreal moral conventions. Even where Thucydides' ethical language is not distinctly cynical, it is singularly lacking in warmth and depth of feeling. He frequently indulges in sneers at the illusions of

¹ φιλονικία περι τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ.

² I. 70 ἦν ἄρα τοῦ καὶ πείρα σφαλῶσιν ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν. Cf. IV. 55. 3.

³ V. 111; cf. II. 64 διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἶκειν, and III. 16.

⁴ μωρία φιλονικῶν IV. 64; cf. τῶν πάντων ἀπερίοπτοι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν I. 41.

⁵ VII. 28.

⁶ III. 40. Jowett's "Mercy should be reserved for the merciful" is a misconception. Vide si tanti Classen's note. For the idea that justice obtains only between equals, cf. III. 9; V. 89.

⁷ This is the best single word to convey the associations of *ἐπιτήδειος* here. Cf. *ἐπιτηδείως* I. 19, I. 144, and *ἐπιτηδεία* V. 82.

poetry, patriotism, and the mythical fancy.¹ He habitually speaks of virtue in a hard, external way as something to be acquired, professed, husbanded, exchanged, I had almost said bought and sold.²

A similar moral insensibility is to be noted in his employment of the words *θεραπεύειν*, *εὐπρεπές*, *δίκαιον*, *ἀνδραγαθία*, etc., etc.³

A good illustration of Thucydides' tone in these matters is his treatment of the specially Greek notion of *αἰδώς*, that delicate sensitiveness to the disapprobation of our fellows that sometimes approaches very nearly to the modern idea of self-respect.⁴ It is, perhaps, hardly an accident that Thucydides, except in one passage (I. 84. 3), everywhere substitutes the coarser term *αἰσχύνη* or *τὸ αἰσχρόν* for the more distinctly ethical *αἰδώς*. The implication is that *αἰδώς* is a rational motive only when it takes the form of intolerable constraining shame. At the time of the plague (II. 51) those suffered most who had a reputation for virtue to keep up; for from very shame they were unsparing of themselves. That is the tone. One should deal with a powerful enemy in a spirit of sweet reasonableness and virtue (say the Spartan envoys, IV. 19), for he will be more likely to keep faith from very shame. But this sense of shame is mere folly when cherished as a Quixotic sense of honor by the weak. "What is that word honor? Air. A trim reckoning," the Athenians declare in substance at Melos. And on those who pertinaciously follow its lure it brings

¹ II. 41. 4; V. 41. 2 *ἔδοκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα*, of the combat for Thyrea in Hdt. I. 82; VI. 83 *οὐ καλλιπούμεθα*; I. 21 *τὸ μὴ μωτῶδες . . . ἀτερπέστερον*; I. 10. 3, 4.

² I. 123 *τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι*; II. 51 *οἱ ἀρετῆς τι ἀντιποιοῦμενοι*; I. 33 *φέρουσα ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετὴν*; VI. 11 *δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν*; VI. 54 *ἐπετήθευσαν ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν*; II. 40 *τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσω*; IV. 19 *ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετὴν*.

³ E.g. VI. 79 *δειλία . . . τὸ δίκαιον . . . θεραπεύετε*; III. 56 *τὸ . . . ξυμφέρον . . . θεραπεύοντες*; I. 39 *τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης*; III. 64 *ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προῦθεσθε*; II. 63 *ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται*; III. 40 *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*. Cf. also the use of *ἀνεπίφθορον* to debase the moral currency in I. 75, I. 82, VI. 83, VIII. 50, and the similar employment of *ξυγγνώμη* I. 32. 5, III. 40, IV. 61. 5, VIII. 50. 2.

⁴ Cf. Gildersleeve on *αἰδεσθέντες δλκάν* Pindar. Pyth. IV. 173.

the greater¹ dishonor of impracticable folly (V. 111). In short, a nice sense of honor is simply one of the many perturbing emotional forces that are the cause that men so rarely bring an unimpassioned judgment to bear on the complicated game of life.¹

This brings us to what may be called the intellectualism of Thucydides, — his constant preoccupation with the part played in human life by the conscious calculating reason.² “The moral and the intellectual,” says Professor Jowett, “are always dividing, yet they must be reunited and in the highest conception of them are inseparable.” In Homer we are happily unconscious of this opposition, — the true man is ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων, and to “know lawless things” is to do them even as to know good things is to be just according to the reasoning of the Socrates of the Gorgias. In Thucydides we are never allowed to forget the antithesis. Plato endeavors to reunite the severed halves of our nature; and Aristotle by his formal distinction between the ethical and the intellectual virtues recognizes from the point of view of common sense the impracticability of the Platonic ideal. “We must not permit the wicked to give the name smartness to their unscrupulousness,” says Plato (Theaetet. 176 D), “for they glory in the reproach.” “Most men,” says Thucydides (III. 82), “more easily submit to be called clever knaves than honest simpletons;³ they glory in the one epithet and blush at the other.”

There is a seeming injustice in attributing to Thucydides this feeling of “the many.” But his protest is couched in language half contemptuous: “Simple-mindedness, a chief element of nobility, was quite laughed down.” And the entire history is pervaded by a most un-Platonic antithesis between the just and the profitable; a most un-Platonic association of σωφροσύνη and ἀμαθία, and a constant exalta-

¹ Cf. supra, p. 6; VIII. 27.

² Chez Thucydide partout où les idées paraissent elles priment les sentiments. — Girard.

³ ῥᾶον κέκληνται does not mean “are oftener called,” as it has been taken. It must be construed by the analogy of ῥᾶον φέρει VIII. 89.

tion of unscrupulous intellect.¹ The nomenclature of this intellectual principle is noteworthy. Thucydides does not use σοφός with its earlier suggestion of skill and its later connotation of the higher wisdom. He does not employ the φρόνησις and φρονεῖν of Plato and the dramatists with their moral and religious coloring, nor νοῦς with its speculative associations. His words are: γνώμη, mind, judgment; ξύνεσις, understanding, the intelligence that penetrates shams; λογισμός and its paronyms, the calculating reason.²

His most characteristic laudatory epithet, applied to Archidamus, Themistocles, Theseus, Pericles, Hermocrates, and Phrynichus, is οὐκ ἀξύνετος, not unintelligent, they could see through a mill-stone. When σώφρων is added, it denotes judgment, moderation, discretion, prudence unclouded by passion, rather than any distinctively moral excellence.³ And the most unpardonable insult, the most stinging imputation, to a Thucydidean personage is the suggestion that he is deficient in penetration or dull in perceptions.⁴ "Do not suppose that we would insult your intelligence by attempting to instruct you," say the Spartan envoys at Athens (IV. 17), "our words are only a reminder." The

¹ E.g. I. 42; V. 89; I. 68; III. 37; III. 56; III. 44. 4.

² Cf. II. 11. 7; 40. 3; IV. 10; IV. 108. 4, etc. For ἐκλογίζεσθαι cf. II. 40. 3; IV. 10, etc. I will not, with Professor Jebb (*Hellenica*, p. 302), add διάνοια; for διάνοια in Thucydides means usually "purpose," or mind and temper generally. It rarely is used to denote the intellectual power in especial as in III. 82. 3 τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας. Neglect of this nicety has, I think, led Professor Jebb into error in his interpretation of VI. 11. 6 χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, which he cites together with I. 84. 3 in support of the sentence: "In a trial of human forces the chances baffle prediction, but superiority in ideas (διάνοιαι) is a sure ground of confidence." But the words really mean: We should feel confident only when we have subjugated the minds (broken the spirit) of our opponents, — i.e. made them feel that they are beaten. The context and the use of the aorist are sufficient confirmation of this reading; but if more is wanted, cf. II. 87 οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δὲ τινα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάπτει ἀμβλύνεσθαι. Cf. VI. 72.

³ I. 80. 2. Cf. I. 84. 2, I. 80, V. 101. Cf. σωφροσύνη . . . ἀβουλία I. 32; VI. 6. 2; VIII. 24. 5 ἐσωφρόνησαν . . . παρὰ τὸ ἀσφαλέστερον πράξει.

⁴ ἀναίσθητος VI. 86; I. 69; I. 82.

frequency of similar oratorical precautions¹ and phrases like *ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα* and *τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι* (I. 140) testify to the intensity of this feeling. A Corcyrean audience, like an audience of the Italian renaissance, would certainly have sympathized less with the *ἀναίσθητος* Othello than with the *ξυνητός* Iago, *ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγιγνόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα παρελάμβανε* (III. 82).² "We Athenians," Pericles boasts (II. 40), "can all either originate or at least judge political measures." "What each of you most desires," says Cleon (III. 38), here, as often, showing us the seamy side of the Periclean ideal, "is to be able to speak himself, or, failing that, to vie in cleverness with the speakers in the readiness with which you apprehend, or anticipate, and applaud their points, however slow you may be in foreseeing practical consequences." It is only those who have a saving distrust of their own intelligence,³ like the slow-witted Spartans, who will admit that they are *ἀμαθέστεροι τῶν νόμων*.⁴

The empire of what our ignorance calls chance⁵ reduces this power of the intellect to a comparatively humble rôle.⁶

The course of human events, especially in war, is full of baffling surprises. The wise man is at the best like

¹ Cf. IV. 126; V. 9; V. 69 in fin. Cf. also IV. 10 *μηδεῖς . . . ξυνητός βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι ἐκλογιζόμενος*.

² But cf. the manlier language of Brasidas, IV. 86. 6.

³ *ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ξυνέσει* III. 37.

⁴ III. 37; I. 84. 3.

⁵ *διόπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῆ εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι* I. 140. Cf. Anaxagoras apud Diels *Doxographi* 326 a (*τὴν τύχην*) *ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρώπων λογισμῶ*. This more nearly represents Thucydides' feeling than Professor Jebb's "inscrutable dispensation of a divine Providence." The phrase *τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ* (V. 104, 112) is not used absolutely, but with a verb, *ἐλασσώσεσθαι, σωζούση*, with which the *ἐκ* is connected at least as closely as it is with the noun. It is not *τύχη* in general, but the special favor of heaven, the last straw at which the despairing Melians vainly clutch. Similarly, "they are matters not for reasoning, but for resignation" is too unctuous for the cold severity of *φέρειν τε χρὴ τὰ τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως* of II. 64. It is rather *θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φιλὸν δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκη*—let determined things to destiny hold unbewailed their way. For additional copious but indiscriminating references on *τύχη*, cf. Classen, *Einl.* LVIII.

⁶ IV. 62. 4; I. 84.

Themistocles, τῶν μελλόντων . . . ἄριστος εἰκαστής. The lamp of his intelligence illumines but dimly a few steps in front of his feet, but only a fool (ἄξιυνετος) or a charlatan (III. 42) will affirm that he knows of any other light cast upon the unseen future save that thrown upon it by reason and rational discussion (λόγος). The sensible man will not wish to resemble the herd who when expectations based on visible tangible realities fail them turn in their extremity to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other delusions that lure men with hopes to their ruin, neglecting the human instrumentalities that might still save them from the worst.¹ He knows that he cannot control fortune as he can his own resolutions, and so is prepared to make reasonable concessions in the hour of success.² He knows that the malignity of chance and the illogical logic of events may defeat the best laid plans,³ and that no human achievement is secure against change and decay.⁴ And so he accepts the strokes of human adversaries with courage and those of the higher powers with submission to the inevitable.⁵ Still more baffling to the wise man's sagacity is the dissimulation of his fellows. The naïve man believes what he is told and suspects nothing. On emerging from this naïveté he passes to the opposite extreme (Plato, *Phaedo*, 89 D E). He looks always for the *dessous des cartes*, and the antithesis of the real and the apparent becomes the chief category of his thought. This is the attitude of the personages of Thucydides, who are never weary of distinguishing the word

¹ V. 103. Professor Jebb's paraphrase misrepresents the feeling of this passage: "This, however, he would affirm—that such resources are not to be tried until all resources within human control have been tried in vain." This is a distinctive Socratic or Platonic thought—I do not believe that it can be found in Thucydides. I do not wish to seem to split hairs, but shades of meaning are as worthy of observation as niceties of syntax, and it is as important that our quotations should be strictly relevant as it is that our accents should be correct.

² IV. 64; I. 120. 3, 4, 5.

³ I. 140 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἦσσαν ἀμαθῶς χωρηῖσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. VIII. 24.

⁴ II. 64.

⁵ *Ibid.* and II. 44. 1.

from the deed,¹ the pretext from the motive,² the specious or plausible from the actual or true.³ Readiness to conceive suspicions and quickness to anticipate an injury are throughout regarded as marks of a superior intelligence.⁴ But as Plato says, the cleverness of the over-suspicious man is really a low superficial cunning. He quite loses his bearings in the society of large, true natures. The really difficult thing is to discriminate, to know when to trust and when to distrust. For unreasonable suspicion is as stupid as naïve credulity.⁵ Moreover, as Thucydides observes, universal distrust overreaches itself. The unhappy Greeks of this age had become so perfect in this fatal logic of suspicion that they could find a flaw in any argument that promised assurance of security in another's pledges, and so being unable to confide were compelled to forestall.⁶

In these contests brutal dullards who from self-distrust struck at once, got the better of the finer wits who, relying on the ingenuity of their combinations, contemptuously bided their time.⁷ This self-defeat of the power of the

¹ *Passim.*

² I. 23 τὴν ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ; III. 86 προφάσει . . . βουλόμενοι; VI. 6. 1; VI. 33 πρόφασιν . . . τὸ δὲ ἀληθές; VI. 76 προφάσει—διανοίᾳ.

³ E.g. πρόσχημα I. 96; III. 82. 4; V. 30. 2; I. 37. 4 τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀσπονδὸν . . . προβέβληνται; VIII. 66 ἦν τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους; I. 39. 2; III. 38. 2, etc. Cf. in Tacitus the use of obtentui; sub obtentu; praetendere; obtegere; ut ea specie; specie honoris; speciosa verbis; re inania aut subdola, and similar expressions.

⁴ III. 82. 5 καὶ ὑπονόησας ἔτι δεινότερος; cf. III. 43. 3.

⁵ Republic, 409 B C D.

⁶ III. 83. The sentence here paraphrased has been strangely misunderstood by Classen and others through failure to appreciate the Greek point of view. An argument or a speech is a combat of wit in which he who fails to convince is worsted. Cf. III. 37 τῶν τε ἀεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγιγνεσθαι; III. 42 ὁ μὴ πείσας ἀξυνετώτερος ἂν δόξας εἶναι, etc.; Plato Phaedr. 272 B ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. He who says, "I don't believe you," has the better of him (Jowett). Now everybody at Corcyra was superior in his reasoning to any considerations that held out hope of security; which in Thucydides' implicit manner becomes "was superior in argument for (to, towards) the hopelessness of security." Cf. further IV. 108 λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι; III. 11 τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστόν, etc. Cf. the complaint of Diodotus, III. 43. 3, of Athenian suspicion.

⁷ III. 83. 3; III. 37. 4. Cf. La Rochefoucauld, maxim 129.

intellect suggests its abdication, and so, as an alternative to the dominant Ionian ideal, Thucydides depicts for us that of Sparta, — self-restraint in place of expansion, discipline and caution rather than the free play of the intelligence: “We are not cunning in useless matters. We think the wits of our neighbors as keen as our own. We do not expect by ratiocination to forecast the caprices of fortune. We do not base our hopes on the blunders of our opponents. We hold that man does not differ much from man, and that he is best who is trained in the severest school.”¹ This is the Spartan theory of practice. Thucydides pronounces no judgment. Truly, as Pindar says: *τοῦτο δ' ἀμάχανον εὐρεῖν ὅ τι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρτατον ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν*. But the imperishable interest of the history lies chiefly in its incomparably vivid presentation of the struggle between these two conflicting ideals of human life.²

To this prevailing intellectualism it would be possible by the exercise of a little ingenuity to trace the special minor characteristics of Thucydidean style and idiom, carefully noted by critics and editors from Dionysius to Classen and Jebb. E.g. the archaic poetical diction, the bold metaphor,³ the abuse of antithesis,⁴ otiose periphrases,⁵ and pointed pedantic discrimination of synonyms⁶ the loose

¹ I. 84 freely paraphrased; cf. III. 37, 38.

² Cf. I. 70; I. 84; II. 39, 40, 46.

³ To few examples in Blass Att. Bered. 1², p. 211, add ὑπουλον αὐτονομίαν VIII. 64; φυγὰς τε γὰρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας VI. 92; προσείοντες φόβον VI. 86; II. 53 τὴν ἤδη κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι. Cf. III. 40 and I. 18. VI. 18 τὴν πόλιν . . . τρίψεσθαί τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι; VI. 36. 2 ὅπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸν σφέτερον ἐπηλυγάζωνται; VI. 41 οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται; VI. 18. 3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμείεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν.

⁴ λόγῳ — ἔργῳ; οἰκείος — ἀλλότριος II. 39; III. 13. 5; I. 78; IV. 98. 3; I. 70. 6; ἴδιον — κοινόν III. 14; II. 43. 2; δοκοῦσα . . . φαινομένη I. 32; μακρὰν — ἐγγύθεν III. 13; III. 64. 5; IV. 36. 2; IV. 61. 3, 8; VI. 76. 2, 3; III. 38. 4.

⁵ Dionysius De Thucyd. 29, 32. Cf. the mannerism of τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν I. 69; τὰ τῶν πόλεων III. 82; τὰ τῆς ἀργῆς II. 60; τὰ τοῦ πολέμου V. 86; τὰ τῆς τύχης IV. 55; τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος VII. 70.

⁶ I. 69. 6; I. 122. 4; II. 62. 3; III. 39. 2; III. 82. 4; VI. 76. 3; Blass I. 219. Dionysius De Thucyd. Judic. 46 ἢ τε τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησις ἀμφοτέρων σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἀπειρόκαλος.

anacoluthic structure conforming rather to the implicit logic of association than to the explicit logic of formal grammar;¹ the *ποικιλία* or wanton variation of the syntax of functionally parallel clauses and adverbial phrases;² the fondness for litotes and suggestive pregnant uses especially of the adverb,³ the passionate desire, as it has been put, to compress a book into a chapter, a chapter into a paragraph, and a paragraph into a sentence.⁴ Also the deliberate preference for the abstract generalizing vague expression over the concrete definite, and the forcing of Greek idiom in this direction, as illustrated by the quasi-philosophical use of *ἰδέα*,⁵ by the substitution of abstract nouns or neuter adjectives and participles for verbal forms of expression,⁶ by the generalizing use of the neuter participle or adjective,⁷ and the

¹ See the list in Boehme's index, s.v. Anakoluth, Accommodation, Ergänzung, Subjekt, Uebergang, Verschmelzung, Wechsel, etc. Note especially the use of *τοῦτο δρᾶν* I. 5. 2; II. 49. 5; IV. 19. 4; *αὐτὸ δρᾶν = πολεμεῖν* IV. 59. 2; I. 31. 2; III. 10. 6; V. 49. 4; VI. 83. 1 = *ναυτικὸν κτλ. παρεχόμενοι*.

² Blass I. p. 215; I. 2; I. 9. 1; I. 49. 3; I. 82. 1 *μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ' ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν*; II. 27. 2 *κατὰ τε τὸ . . . διάφορον καὶ ὅτι*; V. 9. 4, 6; VII. 82. 2; VII. 57. 1.

³ As Shaks. Cor. I. 1, what he hath done *famously*. Cf. IV. 100. 4 *λοῦσα στεγανῶς*, "through a covered passage"; I. 92 *ἀνεπικλήτως*; II. 64. 2 *ἀναγκαιῶς*, "with close-lipped patience for our only friend"; II. 65. 8 *ἐλευθέρως*; III. 40. 1 *ἀνθρωπίνως*; III. 40. 4 *ξυμφόρως*; III. 56. 7 *κερδαλέως*; IV. 18. 4; *οἴτινες τάγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο*; IV. 62. 3, 4 *χαλεπῶς, δικαίως*; VI. 11. 3 *ἐκείνως*; cf. I. 77 and III. 46; V. 91 *χρησίμως*; VI. 87. 5 *ἀπραγμόνως*. The grammatical indexes ignore this usage, and give only commonplace instances of *ἐς* with implied motion. Thucydides' use of litotes hardly needs illustration. Cf. *οὐχ ἦσσαν, οὐχ ἦκιστα, οὐκ ἐλάσσους, οὐκ ἀξύνετος, οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος*.

⁴ *τὸ πειρᾶσθαι δι' ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλεῖστα σημαίνειν πράγματα* Dionysius De iis quae Thucyd. 2.

⁵ E.g. *τῇ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται* VI. 76. 3. Cf. III. 62. 2; and *εἶδος* in VI. 77. 2, etc.

⁶ Cf. Blass I. p. 213, Dionysius De iis quae Thucyd. propria sunt V., Classen Einleitung LXXX. A good example is II. 64 *ὅστις δ' ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπιφθονον λαμβάνει*, where besides the avoidance of the passive form we gain the thought that it is in any case impossible to escape envy, and therefore the sage will choose to be envied for something worth having. Cf. supra, p. 3; cf. also *τὴν οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγὴν* VII. 34 and similar expressions III. 95, V. 35, and V. 50.

⁷ Blass I. p. 214, Classen Einl. LXXX. The neuter undoubtedly does, as Classen says, give a body to the abstract, but the natural Greek would in the majority of instances have avoided the abstract form altogether.

use of a generalizing personal relative clause in loose appositional exegesis of a preceding generalization, expressed or implied.¹

It would, I say, be a very interesting but somewhat fanciful undertaking to trace these minor traits of style to their source in the dominant qualities of Thucydides' mind. If we followed the lead of Dionysius, we should account for most of them by the writer's conscious desire to display his own ingenuity and startle and subjugate his reader's intelligence.² The more approved modern view is that in Jebb's words, "we see a vigorous mind in the very act of struggling to mould a language of magnificent but immature capabilities." To this view we all except Mr. Mahaffy incline. But I think few of us can read Dionysius' analysis of the Corcyra passage or of the Melian dialogue without being shaken in our faith. *περιπέφρασται πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον* is his illuminating condemnatory phrase. Do the periphrases and the contortions of structure and the affected nicety in the employment of synonyms add anything to the real weight of the thought? Do they result from the struggle of a powerful intelligence with an unformed idiom, or are they added, for general literary gorgeousness (as Mark Twain would say), by a conscious and perverse art? There is enough truth certainly in the disparaging view to make all who have struggled with Thucydides enjoy Dionysius' amusing account of how "he spent the whole twenty-seven years of the war in 'upsetting' the style of those eight books and filing and polishing each one of his parts of speech; now expanding a word into a phrase, and now condensing a phrase to a word, and at one time expressing a verbal idea by a substantive, and again turning

¹ II. 44. 1 τὸ δ' εὐτυχές, οἱ ἄν, etc.; II. 62. 4 καταφρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἄν; VI. 14 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὅς ἄν; VII. 68. 1; VI. 16. 3; IV. 18. 4 σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἷτινες, etc.; III. 45. 7; V. 16. 1. Similar is the use of the relative with ellipsis to motivate or expand a preceding suggestion. I. 40. 2; I. 68. 3; I. 82. 1; III. 55. 3; III. 39; VI. 61. 1; IV. 26. 4; II. 44. 2; II. 45. 2; IV. 92. 2; VI. 68. 1. Cf. Jebb on O. C. 263.

² ἐπιτετηδευκώς . . . ἵνα διαλλάξῃ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγραφεῖς, Dionysius De Thucyd. 51.

the substantive into a verb; and perverting their use so as to make appellatives of names, and names of appellatives; active verbs of passive, and passive of active; and interchanging singular and plural, and predicating masculines, feminines, and neuters of each other to the utter confounding of the natural sequence of the thought" (De Thucyd. Judic. 24).

Quite apart from the contortions of the style, the sympathetic student experiences a sense of strain in reading Thucydides. The actors in the drama never relax the tension of their intellectual faculties.¹ We are in a world of analysis and logical relations in which nothing, to borrow Professor James' phrase, is given over to the "effortless custody of habit." We are constantly called upon to weigh evidence, balance probabilities, divine motives, and to compare or contrast human characteristics and faculties, national, typical, or individual.² We are required to forecast the probabilities of the proverbially uncertain future in the light of the entire record of the past at every crisis of the action, and, whenever the power of God or fortune makes forecast foresworn, as Pindar hath it, we are expected to feel a shock of surprise at the illogical logic of events and the paradoxes of human life.³ *εὐλογος*, *ἄλογος*, *εἰκός* and their synonyms and paronyms occur on every page. The chief concern of every speaker is to show that his own course of action, whatever the actual event, was logical, plausible,

¹ τὸ . . . ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ III. 83. 1.

² I. 70; I. 121; I. 141; I. 142; II. 87. 4; II. 89; III. 37. 1; III. 56. 5; IV. 10. 5; V. 9. 1; V. 14; V. 16; IV. 40; V. 75; V. 105. 3, 4; VI. 11; VI. 17. 1; VI. 18; VI. 68. 3; VI. 69. 3; VI. 72. 3; VI. 77; VI. 80. 3; VII. 5. 4; V. 14. 2, 4; VII. 48. 4; VII. 34. 7; VII. 61-64; VII. 66-68; VII. 71; VIII. 96. Observe the frequency of *ἀντίπαλος*, *ισόβροπος*, *ἀγχώματος*, *ἀντιτιθέναι*, and other compounds of *ἀντί*, as *ἀντεπιβουλεύσαι*, *ἀντιμελλῆσαι*, and the weighing in the argumentative balance of *ἐμπειρία* and *μελέτη* and *φύσει* and *διδασχῆ* and *ἐψυχία* and *ἐξυψοῖς* and *ἀμαθία*. Ionian and Dorian, land power and naval power, etc., etc.

³ III. 32. 3; IV. 12. 3; II. 65. 12, 13; IV. 39. 3; IV. 40; VII. 12. 2; VII. 28; VII. 34. 7; VII. 55; VII. 62. 4 *πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν*; VIII. 25. 5; VIII. 66. 5. Observe also the frequency of *παρὰ δύναμιν*, *παρὰ γνώμην*, *παρὰ δόξαν*, *παρὰ λόγον*, *πολὺς ὁ παράλογος*, *τῷ ἀδοκῆτῳ*, *ἐς τούναντιον*—*περίεστη* I. 120. 5; *ἐς τοῦτο περίεστη ἢ τύχη* IV. 12. 3, etc.

consistent,¹ and when formal disputation ceases, men argue still in the forum of their own minds, and abstractions are personified to continue the debate.²

Thucydides himself, in one of the few passages where he betrays a personal interest, goes out of his way to defend at length the *σωφροσύνη*, that is, the good judgment of the Chians in their treacherous revolt from Athens (VIII. 25). *εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπειοῖς τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις ἐσφάλησαν* — why their error, shared by the best minds of the time, was quite excusable. Similar is the feeling underlying his eager defence of the justice of Pericles' forecasts of the future.³

In conclusion, it would be an interesting if elusive inquiry, to ask how much of this disputatious, analytic, antithetic, cynical manner was due to the fashion of the new rhetorical dialectic, how much to the disintegration of popular morality under the stress of war, how much is the real expression of the mind and heart of Thucydides. The rhetoric of the time was responsible for much. It is impossible to accept Jevon's critical dictum that Thucydides is no stylist, but rather a perpetual demonstration that there is a higher art than that of concealing art — the art of dispensing with it. And there are many exceptions to be taken to Jebb's statement that the student of Thucydides always has the consolation of knowing that he is not engaged in the hopeless or thankless task of unravelling a mere rhetorical tangle. Thucydides is doubtless rich in ideas — *ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς*

¹ I. 32. 3; IV. 87. 3; V. 104; V. 105. 4; VI. 79. 2; VI. 85 *ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράνῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὁ τι ξυμφέρων.*

² VIII. 24 *καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠσθάνοντο οὐδ' αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας . . . ὡς οὐ πάνυ πόνηρα σφῶν βεβαίως τὰ πράγματα εἶη;* II. 87. 3 *οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δὲ τινα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀντιλογίαν.* Cf. the Euripidean subtlety of *καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὦδ' ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ὡς εἰ ἐλέχθη σωτήριος ἂν ἦν* III. 53. Cf. Eurip. Suppl. 298 *οὔτοι σιωπῶς' εἴτα μέμφομαι ποτε | τὴν νῦν σιωπῆν ὡς ἐσιγήθη κακῶς.* Cf. I. 140 *μῆδ' ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ὑπολίπησθε,* etc. Cf. also the curious subtlety of VII. 66. 3; I. 36. 1; VI. 78. 1-3; VI. 79; V. 86; IV. 92. 2; VII. 34. 7; IV. 55. 3; II. 64. 6; V. 90; II. 8. 4, repeated IV. 14. 2.

³ II. 65.

πλουσίας ἀπειρόν τι χρῆμα νοημάτων καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων, says Dionysius. But the expression is almost always elaborately tortured for effect. Often what we take for a new substantive thought is merely an ingenious variation on a commonplace theme. Often periphrases that are apparently wrapped around a kernel of profound suggestion are found empty when unfolded. Irrelevant distinctions of synonyms abound. In place of real antithesis we are frequently put off with the verbal form of an antithesis,¹ and speech after speech is wound up with an aphorism that under scrutiny turns out to be a pompous truism.² More matter with less art, we cry. And these faults, to judge by almost the only strictly contemporaneous writer of prose, — Antiphon, — were characteristics of the formal rhetoric of the time slightly exaggerated by Thucydides. Dionysius cites Antiphon, together with Lysias and Andocides, to prove that Thucydides' style was not that of his contemporaries. But this is very indiscriminating criticism. Antiphon can narrate the murder of Herodes as simply and lucidly as Thucydides the attack on Plataea. But when he puts on the buskins of formal argumentation, we can hardly distinguish his gait from that of the historian.³

Still more difficult is it to apportion the responsibility for the cynicism of the history between the historian and his time. The theme was certainly disheartening enough. A writer would need great naïveté or the support of a transcendental faith in order to retain any moral illusions while chronicling the affairs of Melos, Plataea, and Corcyra, the butcheries of Mycalessus, Mitylene, Scione (IV. 122, V. 32), the treacherous murder of the Spartan Helots (IV. 80), the trick of the Sicilians at Eggesta, the impudent

¹ A notable instance in II. 42 τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε πλοῦτῳ τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἂν ἔτι διαφυγῶν αὐτὴν πλουτήσειεν.

² I. 34. 3 ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοίη; III. 48. 2 ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλευέται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείστων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ' ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοία ἐπίον; V. 9. 4; III. 30. 4; V. 111. 4; II. 11. 9; II. 64. 6; VI. 14 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὅς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλεῖστα ἢ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβῃ.

³ Tetral. I. Γ 3; Herod. 7, 73, 92-93, 84.

knaveries of Alcibiades, the clever stratagem of Phrynichus (VIII. 50), the negotiations between the Peace of Nicias and the battle of Mantinea, the machinations of the revolutionary party of 411, and the various minor treasons and atrocities that darken these pages.¹ And there is little evidence of any such triumphant faith in Thucydides. Classen, it is true, brackets him with Aristophanes as a high-minded castigator of the immorality of his age, and extracts a wealth of moral and religious truth from his unimpassioned narrative. But the more critical Jebb is obliged to put a great strain on the text in order to discover one or two edifying aphorisms, such as that justice is the common good and is identical with true self-interest;² or that we ought to receive the inscrutable dispensations of heaven with resignation;³ and is at last forced to fall back on the oft-quoted sentence about simple-mindedness and true nobility, and the two-edged argument of the "naked repulsiveness in which he exhibits the right of might." We cannot, it is true, attribute to Thucydides himself all the cynicism of the Thebans at Plataea, of the partisans at Corcyra, of the Athenians at Melos, or the shameless euphemisms of the *καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ* of the oligarchical party at Athens,⁴ but there is

¹ Cf. e.g. II. 67. 4; II. 70. 1; II. 79. 2; III. 32. 1; III. 113. 6; IV. 23; IV. 76. 2; VI. 61; VI. 74; VII. 48. 2; VIII. 93. 3; VIII. 56. 2; VIII. 89. 3; V. 76; I. 90; I. 107. 4.

² He cites V. 90 and I. 41, which should be I. 42 *τὸ τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἀν τις ἐλάχιστα ἀμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἔπεται*, which will certainly bear no more moral meaning than is given it by Crawley's "the straightest path is generally the best." The *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν* of V. 90 is not abstract justice, but that reasonable forbearance towards the vanquished and the weak of which the Melians warn the Athenians that they too may one day stand in need.

³ II. 64. 2, on which Boehme, *Einleitung XVIII.*, naïvely remarks: "Es geht ein Zug tiefen religiösen Ernstes eben so entscheiden durch das Werk, als dasselbe durchweg von echt sittlichem Geiste erfüllt ist." Cf. *supra*, p. 12. Similarly Classen, ed. 1879, *Einleitung LVIII.*

⁴ VIII. 47 *οὐ πονηρία οὐδὲ δημοκρατία*; VIII. 53 *εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν σωφρονέστερον*; VIII. 65 *καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀπεπιθήδελους . . . κρύφα ἀνήλωσαν*; VIII. 66 *εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτήδελου τεθνήκει*; VIII. 68 *ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθεῖς . . . Ἀντιφῶν ἦν ἀνὴρ . . . τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς δεύτερος*; VIII. 69 *Ἕλληνας νεανίσκοι οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἰ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν*; VIII. 70 *οἱ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ὑπεξαίρεθῆναι*.

little evidence in his writings of any generous indignation at them. The declaration that Nicias least deserved to suffer what he did, on account of his habitual practice of all conventional virtue, conveys quite as much irony or sense of dramatic contrast as moral affirmation.¹ We learn elsewhere that Nicias was excessively devoted to religiosity, and that sort of thing (VII. 50. 4), and there is an intense Sophoclean irony in the statement that he had resolved to leave behind him, if possible, the name of a man who had never brought disaster upon the state, as well as in the repeated malicious allusions to his good fortune.² *Vive pius moriere pius* seems to be the moral. Thucydides merely chronicles, he does not himself indorse, the pious attribution by the Spartans of their failure in the first period of the war to their violation of their treaty obligations.³

The impression made by the whole history is that the writer's mind was subdued by what it worked in. Only once or twice does he let fall a word of pity, as *μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα*, of the sufferings of the Athenians at Syracuse (VII. 75), or *οὐδενὸς . . . ἤσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίω* of the butchery at Mycalessus (VII. 30). Elsewhere the repressed feeling finds vent in such loaded and contorted phraseology as *κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πέζος καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀπώλετο* (VII. 87); or *πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου καὶ . . . οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω* (3. 81). Sometimes, also, feeling is displayed by the brief pregnant suggestion of a startling dramatic contrast: e.g. *τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πανσαρίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον καὶ*

¹ VII. 86 *διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*. That *πᾶσαν* and *νενομισμένην* go with *ἐπιτήδευσιν* does not affect the sense, which is not "der Gewissenhaftigkeit gemäss eingerichtet" (Boehme), nor "das durch Gesetz und Herkommen geregelte Streben nach dem Edeln" (Classen), nor quite "he lived in the practice of every virtue" (Jowett), nor precisely "his exact attention to every religious duty" (Crawley).

² V. 16. VI. 17 *καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι*. Cf. VI. 23. 3 *ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῆ τύχῃ παραδοῦς ἐμαντὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν*.

³ VII. 18. On Thucydides' attitude towards the religious opinions of his time, see two good pages in Jevons' *History of Greek Literature*, 336, 337.

Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν (I. 138), and τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν (I. 110), or, best of all, the allusion in the midst of the horrors of the break up of the camp before Syracuse to the magnificent description of the splendors of the embarkation at Athens. . . . ἀπὸ οἴας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἶαν τελευτῆν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφίκτο.¹ Even when his own feelings are most strongly enlisted, the expression of them is checked and embarrassed by his deep-seated fear of the spirit of *blague*, as tyrannous in ancient Athens as in modern Paris. His contempt of sentimental expansion (*μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσι*, etc.) returns upon himself and destroys the sources of genuine feeling. *μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετὰς εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο ἀκούοντες ἐπικλασθήτε* the Thebans say with a cold sneer to the Spartans sitting in judgment on the men of Plataea. We make no fine speeches about our merits as the overthrowers of barbarians, the Athenian envoys protest at Camarina. The habit of utterances like these makes it impossible for Thucydides to relieve his feelings by free expansion of Nicias' last words in the supreme crisis of Athens. The smile of an imagined cynical reader² stays his pen, and in place of what might have been the most moving speech in the history, we have the cold, indirect report: *ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τιμὴ ἀρχαιολογεῖν*³ *φυλαξάμενοι εἴποιεν ἄν*: "With other remarks that at such a crisis men would not spare from fear of seeming to fall into old-style sentimental commonplace" — the most pathetic words in the entire eight books when interpreted in the light of the spiritual history of the time and the writer.

¹ VII. 75; cf. VI. 32. Cf. also III. 113.

² Cf. I. 73. 2 τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ . . . εἰ καὶ δι' ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰετὸν προβαλλομένοις.

³ Cf. Isocrates' use of *ἀρχαῖα*, Orat. III. 26, and IV. 30.

VI.—*English Words which hav Gaind or Lost an Initial Consonant by Attraction.*

SECOND PAPER.

By CHARLES P. G. SCOTT.

IN a previous paper, publisht in the TRANSACTIONS for 1892, pp. 179–305, dealing with English words which hav gaind or lost an initial consonant by Attraction, I set forth the largest class (§ I), namely, those involving the gain or loss of initial *n*, in words preceded by (I) the article *an* or *a*, (II) the dativ article *then*, (III) the possessiv *mine* or *thine*, (IV) the negativ *none*, (V) the conjunction *an*, (VI) the preposition *in* (*an*, *on*), and (VII) inflexiv *n*.

In this paper I take up the next largest classes, with some smaller, dealing first with those in which particles ar concernd (articles and pronouns), as a sequence to the similar classes before treated, and then with the rest in the alphabetic order of the consonant affected. The same abbreviations ar used as in the former paper.

§ II. Initial T gaind.

VIII. Cases involving the article *that*. The final *t* of the article *that*, also *thet*, a pronunciation now recognized only in dialect (1847 Lowell, *Biglow Papers*, etc.), but common everywhere in the unemphatic use, and often so speld in ME., is in some instances attracted to the noun, leaving the article in the usual and therefore more stable form *the*. (Compare the article *then* and *them*, dativ, similarly reduced to *the*, in the instances given before (TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 279–287), and hereafter, § III, p. 108). The cases of attracted *t* in this sort, ar not many, and all but two ar of limited use.

1. **Effigies.** *That effigies became the teffigies.* *Effigies* was once very common, in the sense of 'likeness,' 'picture.' It came to be regarded as a plural, and a new singular *effigie, effigy*, in dialectal use **effige, effij* (from *effigies* ef'i-jiz taken as **effiges* ef'ij-ez) arose.

- (a) And as mine eye doth his *effigies* witness,
Most truly limn'd, and liuing in your face . . .
1623 SHAKESPEARE, *A. Y. L.* ii. 7. 193 (F¹ p. 194).

Effij. A likeness — a strong likeness. "He is the very *Effij* of his father." Evidently from the *Effegies* [sic] used the century before last for picture or portrait. 1823 MOOR, *Suffolk Words*, p. 118.

- (b) *The teffigies* and counterfait. 1610 *Honours Academie*, ii. 9. (H. p. 856.)

2. **Even,** contracted *een*. In Scotch use *that een* has become *the teen*, this evening. Compare *the day*, this day, to-day. Compare also *teen* for *at een* (IX. 10), and see *good een, good den*, etc. (XVII).

- (b) But thinks I, chaps, ye're aff your eggs for ance, gif ye ettle to come on
us *the 'teen* at unawares. *Saint Patrick*, i. 168. (1882 Jam.)

3. **Harbinger.** *That harbinger makes (the) tarminging.*

- (a) Let me alone, for the king's *carminger* [read *harbinger*?] was here;
He says the king will be here anon.
1594 *A Knacke to Knowe a Knave* (Dodsley, ed. Hazlitt, vi. 567).
(b) *Tarminging.* Harbinger. A corruption.
1847 HALLIWELL, p. 852 (without reference).

[This may refer to the above passage. Hazlitt's edition is a thing to be abhord.]

4. **Hayloft.** *That or that hayloft, became the *tayloft, taylot, tal-lut, tallat, tallet, tollet;* one of the most permanent aberrations of this class. For the reduction of the second element *loft* to *-lot, -lat, -let*, compare the Somerset *cocklawt* for *cockloft* (1825 JENNINGS, p. 31).

- (a) An *haye house* or *loft*: an *haye mowe* or *rieke*: a place where *hay* lieth.
Foentle. [1580 *haie*.] 1573 BARET, *Alvearie*, H. 15.
(b) *Taylot.* Gloucestershire word; meaning an *hay-loft*. At first, no doubt,
they said *in taylot* for *in the hay-loft*; and then converted the whole
into a substantive, calling a *hay-loft* by that name.

1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.
Tallet (i.e. top-loft). A *hay-loft*. Exm. 1790 GROSE, *Prov. Gloss*.
Tollet, a *hay-loft*. 1804 DUNCUMB, *Herefordshire Gloss.* (E.D.S.), p. 63.
Tallet, s. The upper room next the roof; used chiefly of out-houses, as
a *hay-tallet*. 1825 JENNINGS, *Somerset Gloss*. p. 74.
Tallet. (Tal, Brit. tall; high.) The upper room next the roof; applied
chiefly to a stable, as a *hay-tallet*. *Som. Hants*.

Why, you must know that the puggen end of the linney neist to the peg's-
looze geed way and was ruseing down: maester was standing by *the*
tallot whan the cob-wall sluer'd away all to wance and made such a sture
that a come heal'd in brist and grute. 1837 *Devonshire Dialogue*, p. 3.
1839 HOLLOWAY, *Gen. Dict. of Provincialisms*.

Tallit. A *hayloft*. *West*. "When the prisoner came in he was watcherd,
which shewed he had not been all night in *the tallit*." 1847 HALLIWELL.

Why could not a "watcherd" man have been all night in the hay-loft? Because haylofts are usually dry, not to say dusty; and one comes not out of them, after a night's sleep, 'wet-shod.' *Watcherd* is for *watched* (H.), and this is for *wat-shod*, dialectal form of *wet-shod*, ME. *wetschod*, *wete-shoed*.

Wolleward and *wete-shoed* [wo-werie and *wetschod* C] went I forth after.

1377 LANGLAND, *Piers-Plowman* (B), xviii. 1.

Tallet, s. A hayloft. *West.* Any upper room with a lath window instead of glass. *East.* 1857 WRIGHT, p. 942.

Tallut. The hayloft. 1868 HUNTLEY, *Gloss. Cotswold Dialect*, p. 65.
I determined to sleep in the *tallat* awhile, that place being cool and airy, and refreshing with the smell of sweet hay.

1869 BLACKMORE, *Lorna Doone*, xxxi.

Tallet. The hayloft over a stable.

1891 CHOPE, *Dial. of Hartland* (E.D.S.), p. 115. (*Tallat*, p. 18.)

5. **Heft.** *That heft* is the source of (*the*) *teft*, and this of the verb *teft*.

(a) *Heft*. . . . An effort, a heaving. 1775 ASH.

(b) *Teft* or *Heft*, v. to judge of the weight of anything by poizing it with, or in, the hand. "Teft this, wul ye?" See HEFT.

1825 BRITTON, *Beauties of Wiltshire* (E.D.S.), p. 45.

Teft. The same as *Heft*, q.v. 1847 HALLIWELL.

6. **Hovel.** *That hovel*, the (*t*) *hovel*, became (*the*) *tovel*, or *tuffold*.

(a) In, fellow, there, into *th' Houel*; keep thee warm.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Lear* iii. 4 (F¹ p. 298).

(b) *Tuffold*, or *Tovel*. This means an *hovel* in Derbyshire, where they first said *in tovel*, i.e. *in the hovel*; and then by mistake took *tovel* to be the substantive, for *hovel*.

1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

7. **Iron.** *That ierne cross* appears as (*the*) *tierne cross*.

(b) *Tierne cross* (in Somner's *Antiq. of Canterb.*, pp. 11, 169), is *the iron cross*.

1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

8. **Old**, dial. *auld*, *aud*, *owd*, etc., ME. *old*, *ald*. *That* or *thet old* hen and *that* or *thet old* law are subject to the same new law.

(a) *The owd* hins cackled in the yard,
For we forgot to feed 'em!

1806 BLOOMFIELD, *The Horkey*, in *Wild Flowers*, p. 35.

(b) [*The*] *towd* hen, the old hen, was a popular name for the eagle of the lectern in Chester Cathedral.

1882 PALMER, *Folk-Etym.*, p. 570.

(a) *ðe olde lage*. c 1230 *A Bestiary*, l. 293 (in *Old Eng. Misc.*, E.E.T.S., p. 10).
þe hald[e] [var. *þe alde*, *þe olde*] law.

c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton MS.) (E.E.T.S.), l. 116.

(b) Forr þatt nass nohht onn 3æness Crist,

þatt talde la3he stode. c 1200 ORM, *Ormulum*, l. 18196.

9. **One.** The word *one* in its various forms, *one*, dial. *ane*, and *o*, dial. *ae*, ME. *on*, *oon*, *an*, and *o*, *oo*, *a*, AS. *ān*, has run, both alone, and with its alternative *other*, a long course of riot after the shifting *that*, *thet*, *the*. *That one*, *thet one*, dial. *thet ane*, ME. *that on*, *oon*, *an*, is divided *the tone*, dial. *the toon*, *the tane*, ME. *the ton*, *toon*, *tan*. The form with *n* lost, *that* or *thet o*, or *oe*, dial. *ae*, becomes in like manner *the to*, *the toe*, dial. *the tae*, or *tea*.

Examples are innumerable. I give here only a few of those that involve *the(t) one*; other examples of *the(t) one* are given below in connection with examples of *the(t) other*.

- (b) There was nother power ne ryche,
Who that beheld hem both,
Fayrer neuer more ne cowde say,
That knew *the toon* of the children tway
Bote be colour of here cloth.

c 1430 *Amis and Amiloun*, l. 92 (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* ii. 373).

My desteny is for to dey a shameful dethe, I trowe,
Or ellis to flee — *the ton* must be, none other way I knowe.

c 1502 *The Nutbrowne Maide* (Arnold's *Chronicle*,
repr. 1811, p. 198; Child, *Ballads*, iv. 146).

Ther-for *the ton* of us shall de this day.

a 1550 *Hunting of the Cheviot* (Child, *Ballads*, vii. 32).

And therefore it was misliked in the Emperor Nero, and thought vncomely for him to counterfet Alexander the great, by holding his head a little awrie, and neerer toward *the tone* shoulder, because it was not his owne naturall. 1589 [PUTTENHAM], *Arte of Eng. Poesie* (repr. Arber), p. 302.

So especially in phrases, *the(t) one part*, *the(t) one side*, *the(t) one half*.

Tapart. Of the one part.
Tonpart. Of the one part.

1847 HALLIWELL.
1847 HALLIWELL.

These doubtless refer to old passages not quoted.

Now he setteth his hat on *the toe side*, and commeth sailing in like a shippe in a tempestuous tide. 1609 *The Man in the Moone* (Wright, p. 966). [This is different from "*the to side*, the right hand side" under which Wright puts it. Compare *at o side*, *a to side*, IX. 7.]

There's twa o' them faulded unco square, and sealed at *the tae side*.

1816 SCOTT, *Antiquary*, xv.

There is neither wark nor the very fashion or appearance of wark, for *the tae half* of thae puir creatures; that is to say . . . cannot employ the one moiety of the population.

1818 SCOTT, *Rob Roy*, xxvi.

10. **Other.** *That* or *the tother*, dial. *ither*, *oor*, ME. *that*, *thet other*, becomes *the tother*, dial. *the tither*, *the toor*, ME. *the tother*, sometimes *that tother*.

- (a) Upon *bet oper dai*. c 1258 *Meidan Maregrete*, l. 221 (E.E.T.S.), p. 40.
pat oper.

c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (E.E.T.S.), l. 83. (See full quotation below.)

Thorgh me men gon, than spak *that othir* [*the other*, Wright] side,
Unto the mortal strokis of the spere.

c 1374 CHAUCER, *Parl. of Foules*, l. 134.

(b) Swanborow his sister, Helfed *the tother*. a 1300 *Havelok the Dane*, l. 411.

For in his loue scho failes neuer,

And in *pat toper* [var. *pe toper*, 2 mss., *pat oper*, 1 mss.] scho lasts euer.
c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton MS.) (E.E.T.S.), l. 83.

The tother thinge that we may se.

c 1325 *Eng. Metr. Hom.*, p. 11.

We wil sle be giltif and late *pe tother* [var. *the other*, *pe other*, *pe oper*, *pe opere*] goo.

c 1400 *Gamelyn* (Six-Text), l. 822.

On *pe todir* syde.

c 1430 *Ycrk Plays*, xiii. l. 51 (p. 104).

The *toper* was cledde in a cote alle of clene siluer.

c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S. 1865), l. 3335.

(Other examples l. 233, 2208, 2530, 3855, etc.)

A' *the tothar* syde.

a 1550 *The Hunting of the Cheviot* (Child, *Ballads*, vii. 38).

Ouir man, said scho, vnto *the tother* two.

1552 LYNDESAY, *Testament of the Papyngo* (E.E.T.S.), l. 1182.

The phrases *the(t) one*, *the(t) other*, ar most common in association, as opposits or alternativs: *that*, *thet one* (*o*, *ae*, etc.) . . . *that*, *thet other* (*ither*, etc.), appearing also as *the tone* (*to*, *tae*, etc.) . . . *the tother* (*tither*, etc.). To show how the use shifted, I arrange my quotations this time in mere chronological order, without classification.

(a) (b) He spused *pat an* [var. *pe tan*, *pe toon*], Nachor *pe toper*.

c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton ms.) (E.E.T.S.), l. 233.

That nolde spare for kin *that o* kosin *that other*,

So the fend hem prokede uch man to mourdren other.

c 1312 *Poem on the Times of Edward II.* (Camden Soc. 1839), p. 343.

The tan was man, *the tother* wif.

c 1325 *Eng. Metr. Hom.*, ed. Small, p. 156.

per is an eddre bet is y-hote ine latin aspis, bet is of zuiche kende bet hi stoppeþ *bet on* eare mid erþe and *bet oper* mid hare tayle bet hi ne yhere þane charmere. 1340 MICHEL (tr.), *Ayenbite* (E.E.T.S.), p. 257.

Sem sobly *pat on*, *pat oper* hy3t Cam.

c 1360 *Cleanness*, l. 299 (*Early Eng. Allit. Poems*, E.E.T.S., p. 45).

pire both are hydir brought,

pe tone Moyses, *pe todir* Ely. c 1430 *York Plays*, xxiii. l. 137 (p. 189).

And seyde to him, "Mi leue brother,

Kepte thou *that on*, and Y *that other*."

c 1430 *Amis and Amiloun*, l. 319 (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* ii. 382).

So grete a multitude that they coverde the ysz fra *the ta* bank to *the tother*.

a 1500 (?) *MS. Lincoln A.*, i. 171 f. 19. (H. p. 844.)

This indentur made betweñ Johñ Bolle thelder armerer, and J. Bolle the yonger grocer citezens of London, of *that one* partye, and Johñ de Castro . . . on *that other* partye . . .

c 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 111.

There ben two dyfference of perspectyves, *the one* is pure, separate of ertthlynesse, and *the tother* is spotted by the same and myxed.

c 1532 DEWES, *Introductorie for to lerne French* (1852), p. 920.

That xxx of the principall men of *the ta* clan sal cum with othir xxx of *the tothir* clan.

1536 BELLENDEN, tr. Boece, *Hist.* (in Scott, *Fair Maid of Perth*, Note 2 F).

He winkth with *the tone* eie, and lokth with *the tother*.

1562 HEYWOOD, *Proverbs and Epigrams* (Spenser Soc.), p. 33.

That with spitefull obrayds and uncharitable chaffings alweiz they freat,
az far az any whear *the ton* can heer, see, or smell *the toother*: and
indeed at vtter deadly fohod.

1575 LANEHAM, *Letter from Kenilworth* (N.S.S. 1890), p. 17.
Armathor *ath to the side* [read at *the to side*] O a most dainty man. . . .
And his Page *atother* [read at *tother*] side, that handfull of wit.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *L.L.L.* iii. i. (F¹ p. 131.)

Tak 3e *the taine*, and I *the tother*.

1602 LYNDESAY, *Thrie Estaits* (E.E.T.S.), l. 2214.

The tane was buried in Maries Kirk
And *the tither* in Marie's quire;
Out of *the tane* there grew a birk,
And *the tither* a bonny brier.

a 1824 *Fair Janet* (Child, *Ballads*, ii. 92).

[Similar stanza in *Sweet Willie and Fair Annie*, ii. 139.]

The ghaist gae Rab a kick wi' *the tae foot*, and a kick wi' *the tother*.

1816 SCOTT, *Antiquary*, ix.

The tane gies up a bit, and *the tither* gies up a bit.

1818 SCOTT, *Rob Roy*, xiv.

By the grace of Mercy, the horse swarved round, and I fell aff at *the tae*
side as the ball whistled by at *the tither*.

1819 SCOTT, *Bride of Lammermoor*, xxiv.

In many cases the *t* disappears from one or the other of the two terms, leaving simply *the one* opposed to *the tother*, or *the other* opposed to *the tone*. And *the* may disappear, or may not have been used, before *one*.

þene enne hi honge in *one* half, for to don him teone,

And on bi *þat oþer* half and ihesuc heom betweone.

a 1250 *Passion of our Lord*, l. 439 (*Old Eng. Misc.*, E.E.T.S., p. 49).

þe oone ys heuy and rede, *þe toþer* is list and no3t bittere.

a 1350 (?) *ms.* (cited by Way, *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 94, note).

He schal hate *oone* and loue *the tothir*. c 1382 WICLIF, *Luke* xvi. 13.

The oon halfe of the sayd forfeiturè to be unto the kyng our souereyn
lorde, and *that other* halfe to be unto hym or theym of his subgettis . . .
[etc.]. 1489 *Statutes of Henry VII.* (Caxton, facsim.), p. 12.

Sir Gawaine tooke the lady by *the one* arme,

Sir Kay tooke her by *the tother*.

a 1650 *Marriage of Sir Gawaine* (Child, *Ballads*, i. 38).

You Glasgow tradesfolks hae naething to do but to gang frae *the tae* end
o' the west of Scotland to *the ither*. 1818 SCOTT, *Rob Roy*, xxviii.

It's a common case — *the ae* half of the warld thinks *the tither* daft.

1824 SCOTT, *Redgumlet*, viii.

Then the *t* disappears from both terms, leaving *the one*, *the other*.
This is the now establist usage.

The one wes callit the tre of lyfe;

The other tre began our stryfe.

1552 LYNDESAY, *The Monarche* (E.E.T.S.), l. 743.

The one has taen him by the head,

The ither by the feet.

a 1803 *Lord William* (Child, *Ballads*, iii. 21).

Said, "Saw ye ever a fitter match

Betwixt *the one* and *ither*?"

a 1827 *Earl Richard* (Child, *Ballads*, iii. 276).

The initial *t* is actually 'gained' in *tone* and *tother* when it is used without *the*. *Tone* so used is confined in dialectal use; *tother* is common also in colloquial use.

Had not the Angell thither directed the Shepheards; had not the Star thither pointed the Magi, neither *tone* nor *tothir* would ever there have sought Him. a 1626 Bp. ANDREWES, *Sermons*, fol. p. 110. (P. p. 589.)
Says *one to tother*, what quoine hast?

1611 ROWLANDS, *Knave of Clubbs*. (Wr. p. 778.)

From *One* [house] he dates his Foreign Letters

Sends out his Goods, and duns his Debtors:

In *l'other*, at his Hours of Leisure,

He smokes his Pipe and takes his Pleasure.

1733 PRIOR, *Alma* (Poems, 5th. ed., i. 93).

Ton and *Tother*; as, do you take *ton*, and I'll take *tother*; meaning the *one* and the *other*. 1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

Tuther, pron. The other. *Tutheram*, *Tuthermy*, pron. The others.

1825 JENNINGS, *Somerset Gloss.*, p. 77.

Toor. *Tother*; the other. . . . *Tother*. The other. 1847 HALLIWELL.

Tutheram. The others. *West*. 1847 HALLIWELL.

Tarrowan [tother one: Negro-English in West Indies].

1848 HARRISON, *Eng. Lang.* (1856), p. 117.

Ton tother. One another. *Derb.* 1847 HALLIWELL.

The change is complete when *the* neither appears nor can be supplied before *tone* or *tother*, as when a different particle, as *this*, *my*, *his*, etc., is used.

This same *tother thing*.

1599 PORTER, *Two Angry Women of Abington*. (Hazlitt, vii. 328.)

My ae best son is deid and gane,

And *my tother* ane I'll ne'er see.

The two Brothers (Child, *Ballads*, ii. 356).

But I'se gang hame, and finish the grave in the tuning o' a fiddle-string, lay by my spade, and then get *my tother* bread-winner [his fiddle], and awa to your folk, and see if they hae better lugs than their masters.

1819 SCOTT, *Bride of Lammermoor*, xxiv.

It is to be noted that *the one* and *the other* wer early contracted to *thone* . . . *thother*, later printed *th'one*, *th'other*.

The kynge to haue *thone* halfe of euery of the sayed forfeitures And the partie that wylle sue *thother* halfe of the same.

1489 *Statutes Hen. VII.* (Caxton, facsim.), p. 28. [Similarly on p. 29.]

As ye may see in Chaucer and Lidgate, *th'one* writing the loues of Troylus and Cresseida, *th'other* of the fall of Princes.

1589 [PUTTENHAM], *Arte of Eng. Poesie* (repr. Arber), p. 80.

As the article *the*, *th'*, is in some dialects pronounced *te* and *t'*, and combines with the noun, *tother* may be in some instances for *th'other* instead of (*the*) *tother*.

The *that* in these phrases is not to be taken as the strong demonstrativ, but simply as the article, the neuter article *that*, *thet* coming

to be used concurrently with *the* as masculin and feminin also—apparently first before nouns beginning with a vowel.

The erthe sal tai do to rift And up out of the sted to lift;
The deuele out sal be fordreuin Of that erthe that sal be reuin;
Ber thair bodis in that air. . . .
c 1325 Signa ante Iudicium, quoted in Eng. Metr. Hom., ed. Small, p. xii.
pat oyle [var. þo oyle, þat oyle, þe oyle].
c 1300 Cursor Mundi (Cotton ms.) (E.E.T.S.), l. 1394.

IX. Cases involving the preposition *at*.

Cases in which the final *t* of the preposition *at* before a word beginning with a vowel or *h* has gon over to the following word, the remaining *a* being then in some cases lost.

The first cases involv locativ surnames, which ar to be compared with those which hav attracted the *n* of the article *then*. (See my previous paper, TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 280–284).

1. **Ash.** *At then ashe, atten ashe, atte ashe, at ashe*, results in the surname *Tash*. Compare *Nash* from the same source (TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 282).

(b) *Tash . . . At ash.*

1633 CAMDEN, *Remains*, p. 123.

2. **Asp**, dial. *aps*. Some one dwelling *atte aps*, ‘at the asp,’ gave rise to the surname *Tapps*. Put him *atten aps*, and he becomes Mr. *Nabbs* (TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 282).

(b) Revd. Mr. Richard *Tapps*. 1783 LEMON, *Eng. Etym.*, List of subscribers.

3. **Elm.** John *atte Elme* became John *Telme*, as John *atten Elme* became John *Nelme* (TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 282).

This indentur made betwin T. D. of Oxford Aldirman on \bar{y} one pty and John *Telme* of the same brewar on the other party wytnesseth (etc.).
 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 109.

4. **Heath.** One dwelling *atte hethe* is supposed to be the ancestor of persons whose ‘dental formula’ is *Teeth*. (P. p. 561.)

5. **Well.** There were many living *atte welle* or *atte welles*, ‘at the well’ or ‘near the spring.’ Some of their descendants ar named *Atwell*; some ar reduced to *Twells*.

- (a) Wretyn on Candilmas Day, in hast, *at Welles*.
1489 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, iii. 347.
Thom' *At Welle* carte. 1482 (?) *Id.* iii. 292.
- (b) *Twells*. As we have the name *Atwells* or *Atwell*, one has certainly reason to think that *Twells* is a crasis for *At Wells*.
1777 *Gent. Mag.*, July, p. 322.

The next two cases ar also locativ, but do not involv surnames.

6. Home. *At home*, ME. *at hom*, *atom*, once *a tom*. A British servant, with equal disregard of veracity and orthoepy, without an aspiration for either truth or home, wil report his master or mistress *not a tome*.

- (a) *Atom* his [var. *at hom is*] hire pater noster biloken in hire teye.
a 1250 *A Lutel Soth Sermun*, l. 67. (*Old Eng. Misc.*, E.E.T.S., p. 190.)
þe were betere hadde bileued *at om* þan icome me to fonde;
Li doun, þu ert ouercome: ic wole on þe stonde;
þu mi3t telle *at om* hou þu were vnder a maidenes honde.
c 1300 *Seinte Margarete*, l. 180 (E.E.T.S., p. 29).

Here it is one of the devils who ought to hav staid at home. To them, surely, "there's no place like home."

- (b) Ergo, he nis not alwey *at hom* [*a tom*, ms. V] among ow freres.
1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), ix. 20.
A good gosse iche hav *a toome*.
1542 BORDE, *Introd. to Knowledge* (cited in *Spec. Cornish Dial.*, E.E.T.S., p. 84).

7. One, reduced to *o*. *At o side* became sometimes *a to side*.

- (b) *A to side*. 1575 LANEHAM [see quot. below].
Muscles collateraux. Two muscles in the mouth, one bringing the tongue,
the other drawing the Larinx, *a-to-side*. 1611 COTGRAVE.

8. Other. *At the(t) other (side)* is found as *a . . . toother*.

Thearfore thus, with fending & proouing, with plucking & tugging, skratting & byting, by plain tooth & nayll *a to side* & *toother*, such expens of blood & leather waz thear between them, az a moonths licking (I wéen) wyl not recoouer.

1575 LANEHAM, *Letter from Kenilworth* (E.E.T.S. 1890), p. 17.

The next two cases refer to time.

9. Erst, *at erst*. ME. *at areste*, *at arst*, becomes *tarst*.

- (a) Bot ay be redye in araye and *at areste* ffoundene.
c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S. 1865), l. 311.
- (b) Tho *tarst* began Godrich to go
Upon the Danshe, and faste to slo.
a 1300 *Havelok*, l. 2688. (H. p. 852.)

10. **Even.** *At even*, is contracted to *at een*, and is then reduced to *teen*.

- (a) And up thai wol *atte eve* Into a tree lest thai by nyght myscheve.
 1420 *Palladius on Husb.* (E.E.T.S.), i. 613.
 Thane syr Arthure, *At euene* at his awene borde auantid his lordez.
 c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S. 1865), l. 1593.
 Wretyn in hast, the secund Sunday of Lent by candel light *at ewyn*.
 1461 MARGARET PASTON in *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 544.
 At midday and *at een*. *Earl Richard* (Child, *Ballads*, iii. p. 400).
 Sae near Sabbath *at e'en*.
 1818 SCOTT, *Rob Roy*, xxii. [*At e'en* is common in the Waverley novels.]
- (b) Wow, Jamie! man, but I'd be keen
 Wi' canty lads like you, a wheen,
 To spen' a winter Fursday *teen*.
 1788 PICKEN, *Poems*, p. 98. (1882 Jamieson.)

11. **All.** The phrase *at all*, especially in the negativ, *not at all*, is commonly pronounced *a tall*, and in childish or dialectal use simply *tall*. I have heard the emphatic negation, "'Taint, 'tall!"

- (b) [Narrow Romic :] :djuwəb dzhek(t)lɑ(zw)lɑ bækaɹɔs'moo¹k/ —nɔtɑ
 'tɔɪl.
 [Broad Romic :] dyuwəb jekt(t)ətə bækos'mouk/ notə taol.
 1877 SWEET, *Handbook of Phonetics*, pp. 114, 115.
 [This the common polite question, 'Do you object to tobacco-smoke?'
 with the usual polite lie, 'Not at all.']

These cases ar different from those in which *to*, reduced to *t'* before a word beginning with a vowel, is written with that word, as in ME. *to eken*, AS. *tō eācan*, 'to eke,' for addition, besides (see Mätzner, ii. 7) : in ME. *to eve*, reduced to *teve*; and in ME. *to* before an infinitiv beginning with a vowel, as *taryse* for *to arise*, *topon* for *to open*, etc.

X. Cases involving the pronoun *it*. The final *t* of *it* goes over to the following word, the unaccented vowel being lost.

1. **It is** becomes *tis*, usually written '*tis* or '*t is*. Common in spoken English, and in verse. Emerson unhappily affects it in prose.

2. **It is not**, contracted *it is n't*, becomes *it aint* or *ant*, and so *taint*, written also apostrophically '*taint*, '*tain't*, '*ta'nt*, etc.

Ta'nt, Taint, Ti'n't. Contractions of "it is not." "No *taint*."
 1854 BAKER, *Northampton Gloss.* ii. 328.

3. **It has or it hath**, provincially unified with the first person and the plural form, *it have*, or *it ha*, becomes *tave*, or *ta*.

T'ave. It has, . . . it have . . . or, it hath. *Ta* is our common word for *it*.
1823 MOOR, *Suffolk Words*, p. 420.

4. **It will**, provincially *it wull*, *it ool*, colloquially *it 'll*, becomes *twill* ('twill), *'t will*, dial. *twool*, *tool*, *tull*.

Tull. It will: also *twool* or *ta wool*. See *Ta* and *Wool*.
1823 MOOR, *Suffolk Words*, p. 450.

5. **It will not** becomes *twont*, *'twon't*.

6. **It would** becomes *'twould*, dial. *'tood*.

Praps *'tood*. 1853 *Spec. in Gloss. Glouc. Dial.* (E.D.S.), 1890, p. 209.

XI. Cases involving *saint*.

Cases in which the final *t* of *saint* in names of saints and churches, or places named after them, or persons named from such places, has gone over to the name itself, that beginning with a vowel or *h* or *w*.

Note first that *saint*, ME. *saint*, *saynt*, *seint*, *seynt*, also fem. and sometimes masc. *sainte*, etc. (also in variant form *sant*, *sanct*, whence mod. *saunt*), was in ME. often reduced, even before a name beginning with a vowel, to *sain*, *sayn*, *sein*, *seyn*, *sen* (occasionally spelled *sayne*, etc.). I mention, omitting authorities, *Sain Bede*, *Sain Benet*, *Sen Benett*, *Seyn Cutbert*, *Sain Denis*, *Seyn Edward*, *Sain Gregorie*, *Sain Jam*, *Sain Jerom*, *Sain Jon* (very common), *Sen Lauerauns*, *Sain Louk*, *Sayn Mark*, *Sayne Martyne*, *Sain Matheu*, *Sain Peter*, *Sain Poule*, *Seyn Savour*, *Sain Symeon*, *Sain Thomas*.

This *sain*, *sein*, *sayn*, *seyn*, shortend to *sen*, suffered further alteration to *sin*. This explains the "queer" pronunciation of the surname written *St. John*, and pronounced in England *Sinjon* (sin'jun). The name should be written etymologically *Saint Jon*, or rather *Sain Jon*, or, recognizing the actual mutations of mortality, *Senjon*, and now *Sinjon*. The same reduction, partly due to old French usage, appears in the surnames

Sample, Simple, Sempill, Semple, Simpole, representing the ME. *Sain Paul (Poule, Powle)*; in *Simbarb, Simbarbe, Symbarbe*, formerly *Sembarbe*, ME. *Seyntbarbe*, representing *Seinte Barbe (Sancta Barbara)*, who gave name to *St. Barbe* in Normandy; in *Semper, Simper*, with more than apostolic right of succession representing *St. Peter (St. Pierre)*; in *Seymour*, equivalent to *St. Maur (Sanctus Maurus)*; and in *Sinclair*, less happily *Sinkler*, equivalent to *St. Clair (Sancta Clara)*.

I find the reduced form *San* stil in provincial use.

San Jam Pear. The Green Chiswell Pear, usually ripe about the 25th July (St. James's Day) is so called. At Altrincham, they have a fair called *Sanjam Fair* on July 25. That day is almost proverbially wet.
1877 LEIGH, *Cheshire Gloss.*, p. 175.

Seeing how loosely attacht the final consonant of *saint* was, we ar prepared to see it slide over to the name it precedes, if that begins with a vowel; to see *Saint Ann* become *Sain Tann*, then with the *t* restored where it ought to be, and also left where it ought not to be, *Saint Tann*. And so it happend with Ann and Abb and other names in the bead-roll of attracted saints.

1. **Saint Abb or Ebb.** *Saint Abb's* or *Ebb's* church has become *Saint Tabb's* or simply *Tabb's* (P. p. 571), also *Stabbs*.

- (a) Mary *Abchirch*, diocis London, patron master of Seynt Laurence Pulteney.
1502 *Arnold's Chronicle* (1811), p. 251.
Mary *Apchirch*. 1502 *Id.* p. 76.
The beacon at *Saint Abbs-head*. 1816 SCOTT, *Antiquary*, c. 8.
- (b) *St. Tabbe*. *St. Ebba* was the famous prioress of Coldingham . . . l. c. (p. 123), also Fuller, *Worthies* in Rutland.
1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.
Saint Ebbes [in Oxfordshire, pron. locally] *Stabbs*.
1883 HOPE, *Gloss. Dial. Place-Nomenclature*, p. 58.

2. **Saint Aidan, or Aithan, or Athan,** appears as *Saint Tathan*.

- (a) (b) *S. Tathan*, St. Athan or Aithan. Memorial of Brit. Piety, append., p. 40.
1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

3. **Saint Alchmund or Alkmund** becomes *Saint Talkmund*.

- (a) (b) *Talkmund*. St. Alkmund's church in Derby is commonly called *Talkmund*.
1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 372.

Saint Aldates. See *Saint Olds*.

4. **Saint Alfey**, *Alphey, Alfege, Alphege, Alphage*, AS. *Ælfheáh*, appears in the possessiv as *Saint Talphes* and *Talfas*.

- (a) *Saint Alphay* at Crepilgat. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 77.
Alphey wythin Crepilgate, deocis London, patron deane of Seinte Martyn
 the Graunte, the sine. 1502 *Id.* p. 247.

The first instance of the attracted form shows it as a surname :

- (b) Item as for *Talfas*. . . . Caly hadde ben at hem, and desired to carye
 up *Talfas* on his owen cost and yeve hem goode wages. . . . And
 Margaret *Talfas* seide to me
 1452 (?) *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 247.
 The xxx day of July was bered in *Sant Talphes* in Crepullgatt, masteres
 Parston. 1562 MACHYN, *Diary* (Camden Soc. 1848), p. 289.

5. **Saint Andrew** becomes *Saint Tandrew*, and so simply *Tandrew*, *Tander*. Compare *Dandrie*, *Dandie*, *Dandy*, from *Andrew* (p. 131).

- (a) *Saint Andrew*. c 1305 *St. Andrew* (E.E.T.S.), p. 100.
Saynt Andreu. 1340 MICHEL (tr.), *Ayenbite of Inuyt* (E.E.T.S.), p. 12.
 The bisshop of *Seint Andre*.
 c 1306 *Execution of Sir Simon Fraser* (Child, *Ballads*, vi. 276).
 Item in \bar{y} chirche of *Saint Andrew* is M. yere of pardon.

- (b) *Tander*, *Tandrew*. Corruptions of *St. Andrew*, who is looked upon by
 the lace-makers as their patron saint, as St. Crispin is considered the
 patron of shoemakers. The 30th of November, the anniversary of this
 saint, is, or rather was, kept by lace-makers as a day of festivity and
 merry-making; but since the use of pillow lace has in a great measure
 given place to that of the loom, this holiday has been less observed.
 1854 BAKER, *Northampt. Gloss.* ii. 326.

6. **Saint Ann** becomes *Saint Tann*.

- (a) *Seynt Anne*. c 1300 *Cursor Mundi*, l. 154. [See below.]
 Of blisshed *seynt Anne*, moder to our lady.
 c 1485 *Killing of the Children*, l. 1. (*Digby Mysteries*, N.S.S., p. 1.)
 Abbey of *Saint Anne*, on the Tour-Hyll, Whit Monkis.
 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 259. (*Seynt Anne*, p. 75.)
 I sweir to Yow, sir, be *Sanct Ann*!
 1602 LYNDESAY, *Thrie Estaits* (E.E.T.S.), l. 878.
- (b) O[f] Ioachim and of *sant tanne* (var. *seynt anne*, *saint ane*, *Seynt Anne*).
 c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton MS.), l. 154.
 Say quhat 3e will, sirs, be *Sanct Tan*!
 1602 LYNDESAY, *Thrie Estaits* (E.E.T.S.), l. 3029.

So *Saint Ann's chapel* became *Saint Tann's Chapel*, *Tann's Chapel*, and finally *Turnchapel* (P. p. 567) — as if a chapel for
 converts, persons 'turnd' unto the true faith.
 per from

7. **Saint Antolin** or **Antholin's** church has become *Tantolin's*. (P. p. 571.)

- (a) *Seynt Antolyns.* 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 77.
Antelyne in Bogerowe, diocis London, patrone deane and chapiter of
 Poules, the decis. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 247.

8. **Saint Antony**, or *Saint Anton*, besides suffering the indignity of having his name speld wrong, *Anthony*, has had it reduced to *Tantony*.

- (a) *Saint Anton.* c 1325 *Eng. Metr. Hom.*, p. 69.
Seint Antonis [chirche]. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 75.
Saint Anton's well shall be my drink.
 a 1724 *Waly, Waly, but Love be Bonnie* (Child, *Ballads*, iv. 134).

The name of Antony is used to describe a bell, a cross, and a pig, and in these familiar uses sometimes appears as *Tantony*.

(1) *Saint Antony's bell* becomes *Tantony bell*.

- (a) *St. Anthony's bell*, hung about the necks of animals.
 1765 *Lord Hailes.* (1808 Jam.)
 (b) He had to sell the *Tantonic bell*
 And pardons therein was. a 1765 *Godly Songs.* (Jam.)

[Jamieson cites "Fr. *tantan*, 'the bell that hangs about the neck of a cow,' etc., Cotgr.," and doubts "if this has any relation to St. Anthony."]

Tantony. The small bell over the church-porch or between the chancel and the nave: the term is also applied to any small hand-bell. "Ring the *tantony*" is evidently a corruption of *St. Anthony*, the emblem of that saint being a bell at his tau-staff or round the neck of his accompanying pig. 1854 BAKER, *Northampt. Gloss.* ii. 328.

(2) *Saint Antony's cross* becomes *Tantony cross*.

(3) *Saint Antony's pig* became *Tantony pig*, of the same family as a *Nantony grice*, for which see TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 189. Saint Antony enjoyd the personal attendance of a pig, who claimd the title of a 'page'; a slovenly valet, one would think, but then, we ar told, some of those eremitical saints, whether troglodyte or stylite, in cave or on pillar, wer too particular about godliness to care much for the next thing to it.

- (a) I haue behest a *pygge* to *Saynt Antony*, voto nuncupavi.
 1519 HORMAN, *Vulgaria.* (Way, *Pr. P.*, p. 29.)
 Behald in euery kirk and queir . . .
 Imageis maid with mennis hand, . . .
Sanct Anthone sett vp with ane soow,
 Sanct Bryde, weill caruit with ane koow.
 1552 LYNDESAY, *The Monarchie* (E.E.T.S.), i. 2280-2306.

The gruntill of *Sanct Antonis sow*
 Quhilk buir his haly bell.

1602 LYNDESAY, *Thrie Estaits* (E.E.T.S.), I. 2099.

The proverbial comparison, 'to follow one like *St. Antony's pig*,' or 'an *Antony pig*,' later 'a *Tantony pig*,' refers to the alleged docility of the animal. We ar stil cald upon to wonder at "learned pigs." I take Stow's account to be a fable :

The Officers (charged with oversight of the Markets in this City) did divers times take from the Market people, Pigs starved, or otherwise unwholsome for mans sustenance: these they did slit in the eare. One of the Proctors for St. Anthonies [Hospital] tyed a Bell about the necke, and let it feed on the Dughils, no man would hurt, or take it up: but if any one gave to them bread, or other feeding, such would they know, watch for, and daily follow, whining till they had somewhat given them: whereupon was raised a Proverbe, Such an one wil follow such an one, & whine as it were an *Anthonie Pig*.

1633 STOW, *Survey of London*, p. 190.

(b) Lord! she made me follow her last week through all the shops like a *Tantiny pig*.

1738 SWIFT, *Polite Conversation*, i.

A *Tantony pig*.

1736 DRAKE, *Eboracum*, p. 315 (1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 372).

Tantony Pig.

1820 WILBRAHAM, *Cheshire Gloss.*, p. 89.

(4) *Saint Antony*(*'s*) *pouch* becomes *Tantony pouch*.

Tantonie pouch.

1632 LILLÝ. (H. p. 850.)

9. **Saint Audry**, *Awdry*, *Audrey*, *Awdrey*, *Audery*, ME. *Awdry*, *Awdrey*, *Awdre*, a popular reduction, by successiv ecthliipsis of *th* and *l*, of the AS. *Æpeldryht*, of which the regular modern Eng. form would be **Etheldright*. The AS. was Latinized *Ætheldrytha*, *Ætheldritha*, *Ædilhryda*, *Etheldrytha*, *Etheldreda*, whence ME. *Etheldrede*, mod. *Etheldred*. St. Audry, St. *Æpeldryht*, founded a monastery on the Isle of Ely.

(a) 673. Her Ecgbryht Cantwara cyning forþferde and by geara was senoð æt Heorot forða, and Sæc *Æpeldryht* ongon þæt mynstær æt Elige.

c 900 (?) *A.S. Chron.* (Parker MS.), ed. Earle, p. 36.

And þongedone god mekelyche & seynt *Awdrey*.

c 1420 *Vita S. Etheldredae Eliensis*, l. 925. (Horstmann, *Allengl. Legenden*, 1881, p. 303.)

þorwe goddus grace & þis blessude virgyn seynt *Awdre*. c 1420 *Id.* l. 935.

[So *Seynt Awdrey*, l. 768, 967; *Seynt Awdry*, l. 1052, 1070; *Seynt Awdre*, l. 414, 899, 947, 958, 1117; *Awdre*, l. 506, 1029.]

Of þis blessude virgyn seynt *Etheldrede*.

c 1420 *Id.* l. 587. [So *Etheldrede*, l. 137, 141, 483, 582.]

Wretyn att London on *Seynt Awdryes* Daye, anno E. iiiij^{ti} xvij^o.

1477 *Paston Letters*, ed. Fenn, ii. 248; ed. Gairdner, iii. 195.

Audry, Sax. It seemeth to be the same with *Etheldred*, for the first foundresse of Ely Church is so called in Latine histories, but by the people in those parts, *S. Audry*. 1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 93.

Saint Audry came to be sometimes *Sain(t) *Taudry, *Tawdry, Taudery*.

- (b) *Taudery*, for St. Audery, (Etheldred.)
1692 COLES, *Eng. Dict.* (See full quot. below.)

On and after Saint Audry's day, there was held, in the Isle of Ely, a great fair cald *Saint Audry's fair* or *Audry-fair*, and, we may assume, **Tawdry-fair*.

- (a) *Audry-Fair* in Cambrid[g]eshire.
1692 COLES, *Eng. Dict.* (See full quot. below.)

Lace sold at Saint Audry's fair or **Tawdry-fair* was cald *Saint Audry's lace*, or *Tawdry-* (*Tawdrie-*, *Taudery-*) *lace*. The origin of *Tawdry-* coming to be forgotten, it was taken as an adjectiv, appellativ of this kind of lace, and of other cheap finery; something gaudy, but not neat.

- (a) *Seynt Audries* [misprinted *Andries*] *lace*, cordon.
1530 PALSGRAVE, p. 269.

- (b) Binde your fillets faste,
And girde in your waste,
For more finesse, with a *tawdrie lace*.
1579 SPENSER, *Shep. Cal.*, April.

Come, you promis'd me a *tawdry-lace*, and a paire of sweet Gloues.
1623 SHAKESPEARE, *W. T.* iv. 4. 253 (F¹ p. 293).

Tawdry lace, (i.e.) *Astrigmenta Fimbriæ seu Fasciolæ emtæ nundinis Fano Sanctæ Etheldredæ celebratis*.
1671 SKINNER, *Etym. Angl.*

Taudery, for St. Audery, (Etheldred.) *Taudery lace*, bought at Audry-Fair in Cambrid[g]eshire.
1692 COLES, *Eng. Dict.*

The explanation in the following passage is inaccurate.

Taudry, garish, gawdy, with Lace or mismatched and staring Colours: A Term borrow'd from those Times when they trick'd and bedeck'd the Shrines and Altars of the Saints, as being at Emulation with each other upon that Occasion. The Votaries of St. Audery (an isle of Ely Saint) exceeding all the rest in the Dress and Equipage of their Altar, it grew into a By-word, upon anything very gawdy, that it was All *Taudry*; as much as to say, all *St. Audery*.

1737 *Canting Dict.*, App. to *Bailey*, vol. ii.

The use of *tawdry*, *taudry*, as a mere adjectiv began about the middle of the seventeenth century. Hence *tawdriness* (1670), and *tawdrily* (1736). See examples in Richardson.

I came from the exchange where I saw a flock of English ladies buying *taudry* trim'd gloves. 1674 HOWARD, *English Monsieur*. (Wr. p. 946.)

This adjectiv *tawdry* (in a dialectal pronunciation speld *tardry* — cf. Sc. *arns* for *awns*) has come, thru the notion of "cheap and nasty," to hav a moral application:

Arthur to Doll Is grown bobbish and uxorious,
 While both she and Huncamunca tipple, talking *tawdry*.
 a 1825 *Doodle and Noodle* (*Universal Songster*, i. 401).
Tardry. Immodest. *East*. 1847 HALLIWELL.

From the adjectiv, or directly from *tawdry-lace*, came the noun *tawdry*, lace or other finery.

Of which [coral] the Naides and the blue Nereids make
 Them *tawdries* for their necks.
 1613 DRAYTON, *Polyolbion*, ii. 46. (C.D.)

Once more, and finally, from *tawdry* (**tawdery*, *taudery*), regarded as formed from **tawder*, with the adjectiv suffix -y, was evolvd the verb *be-tawder*, to dress in a tawdry or gaudy style.

Go, get ye home, and tricke and *betawder* yourself up like a right city lady.
 1688 Mrs. BEHN, *City Heiress*. (Wr. p. 203.)

Thus hath the name of a sainted lady come to designate cheap vulgarity. *Sancta Etheldreda, ora pro nobis!*

10. **Saint Austin**, whom we now call *Saint Augustine*, has become reduced as a surname to *Tustin*, as well as to *Sustin*.

- (a) ber stod *seint* [var. *sein*] *Austin*. c 1200 LAYAMON, *Brut*, l. 29551.
Seynte Austyn. 1297 *Robert of Glouc.*, p. 235. (Wr. p. 13.)
 Thurrow Goddes helpe and *Sentawdsen*,
 The spere anon he toke to hym.
 c 1435 *Torrent of Portugal*, p. 44. (H. p. 721.)
- (b) *Tustin*. 1889 *Philadelphia Directory*.

Saint Ebb. See *Saint Abb*.

11. **Saint Ellen**, the earlier form, without aspiration, of *Saint Helen* (ME. *Eline*, *Elyne*, AS. *Elene*, LL. *Helena*, Gr. Ἑλένη). The modern *Helen* is a restored form, after the Latin.

Saint Ellen's or *Helen's* church has become *Tellin's*. (P. p. 571.)

- (a) I swer by *Seynt Elyne*.
 c 1300 *Richard Coer de Lion*; l. 771. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* ii. 33.)
Sentt Elyne. . . . *Seint Eline*. . . . *Seint Elyne*. . . . *Sent Eline*.
 c 1400 *Legend of the Three Kings* (ed. Wright in
Chester Plays, i. pp. 289, 300, 301).
 Prioeres of *Seynt Helyns*. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 251.
 You owe me ten shillings,
 Say the bells at *St. Helens*.
 1783 *Gammer Gurton's Garland*. (Northall, p. 399.)

12. **Saint Etha** appears as *St. Thetha* or *St. Teath*.

- (a) (b) *St. Thetha* or *St. Teath*. *St. Etha* was a Cornish Saint.
 1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

13. **Saint Helen**. See *Saint Ellen*.

14. **Saint Isay** or *Esay*, the old English name of the prophet now known in the imperfect Hebrew form of *Isaiah* (pronounced variously ai-zê'a, ai-zê'-ya, ai-zai'a, ai-zai'ya, ai-zâ'ya), appears to be the source of *St. Tizzy*. The ME. forms ar *Isay, Isaye, Izaye, Isae, Ysay, Ysaye, Ysaie, Esay, Esaie, Esaii*, from OF. *Esaie, Isaie*, LL. *Esaias*, Gr. Ἡσαίας, Heb. *Yeshai'yâh*.

- (a) *Saint Ysaye.* c 1325 *Eng. Metr. Hom.*, p. 48.
Esay. . . Esaii. c 1430 (ms. 1582) *Chester Plays*, i. 155, 159, . . . 156.
 As Moyses sayd, and *Isay*, Kyng David and Jeromy.
 c 1450 *Towneley Myst.*, p. 73. [Also *Isae*, p. 92; *Isay*, pp. 93, 129, 145.]
 Now may I trost þe techeyng of *Isaye* in scryptur.
 c 1485 *Mary Magdalene*, l. 697 (*Digby Myst.* (N.S.S.), p. 81).
- (b) Young was the lass, a servant at *St. Tizzy*,
 Born at Polpiss and bred at Mevagizzy.
 a 1847 *A Western* (Cornish) *Eclogue*. (H. p. xii.)

15. **Saint Ive** appears as *Saint Tive* (*Tyve*).

- (a) At y feste of *Seint Iue* xxv. marc. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 101.
 As I was going to *St. Ives*
 I met a man with seven wives.
 a 1800 *Riddlé* (Halliwell, *Nursery Rhymes*, p. 53).
Sanctus Ivo erat Brito,
Advocatus sed non latro,
Res miranda populo. *Epigram* (source forgotten).
 Nine days I fell, or thereabouts; and had we not nine lives,
 I wis I ne'er had seen again thy sausage-shop, *St. Ives!*
 Had I as some cats have, nine tails, how gladly I would lick
 The hand and person generally of him who heaved that brick!
 1871 CALVERLEY, *Sad Memories* (in *Fly Leaves*).
- (b) Hit is an old said saw, I swere by *seynt Tyve*,
 Hit shalbe at the wyves will if the husband thryve.
 a 1500 (?) *The Enchanted Basyn*, l. 21 (Jamieson, *Pop. Ballads*, 1806, i. 273).

16. **Saint Olave**, ME. *Olof, Oluf, Olef* (gen. *Oloves, Olovis, Olevis*), later reduced to **Owle, Olye*, appears as *St. Towle, Toole, Toly, Tooley*. Hence the name of *Tooley street*, famous for its "three tailors," who, we ar told, once met, and signd a petition beginning "We the people of England." But it seems that one of the three tailors was a grocer, and that only one of the two remaining had a shop in Tooley street. See *N. and Q.*, 21 Jan. 1888, p. 55; 1891, Brewer, *Historic Note-Book*, p. 885.

- (a) *Saint Oloves* church in Southwerke.
 1459 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 462. [Also 1462 *Seynt Oleffes*,
Id. ii. 112; 1465 *Seynt Olevys*, and *Seynt Olovys*, ii. 240, 260.]
 Seint *Olof* in Siluer Stret. Seint *Olof* in the Jury. Seint *Olof* at Crouchid
 frier. Seint *Olof* in Southwarke.
 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 76. [Similarly *Oluf*, four times, p. 253.]

(b) In *saynt Towlles* in the *Oll' Jury*.

1551 MACHYN, *Diary* (Camden Soc.), p. 6.
The parryche of *sant Towllys* in Sowthwarke.

1556 *Id.* p. 118. [So, *sant Towllys*, p. 221; *Sant Towllys*, p. 303.]
Take *Saint Tooles* Parish.

1604 *Meeting of Gallants at an Ordinarie* (Percy Soc.), p. 11.
Saint Oly into [*Saint*] *Toly*.

1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 123.
Tooley Street, Tooley Bridge, Tooley Corner, all in Southwark.

1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

To the same source we may refer the surname *Tooley* (1889 *Philadelphia Directory*, etc.), and probably also *Toole*.

17. **Saint Old's**, the local reduction of the name of *Saint Aldate's* church at Oxford, is stil further altered to *Saint Toles* or *Stolds*.

(a) (b) *St. Tole*. *St. Aldate's* church, or *St. Old's* at Oxford, is vulgarly called *St. Tole's*. Poynter, Oxon. Acad. p. 109. 1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.
Saint Aldates [in Oxfordshire, pronounced locally] *Stolds*.

1883 HOPE, *Gloss. Dial. Place-Nomenclature*, p. 58.

18. **Saint Omer**, sometimes given a 'locus classicus' as *Saint Homer*, appears also as *Saint Tomer*.

(a) Also, ther is on comythe eu'y Markett daye ffro *Seynt Omerys* to Caleys.

1473 *Paston Letters*, ed. Fenn, ii. 150; ed. Gairdner, iii. 95.

[Also *Seynt Omers*, 1477 *Id.* ed. Fenn, ii. 252, 253, 254;
ed. Gairdner, iii. 202, 203, 204.]

Seynt Homers worstedde, demy ostade. 1530 PALSgrave, p. 269.

(b) *S. Tomer*, *De [Sto.] Audomaro*.

1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 151. (Also 1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.)

To this source we may perhaps refer the surname *Toomer*.

19. **Saint Osith**, in the popular form *Saint Osy*, in the genitiv *Saint Osy's* (ME. *Seynt Osy'es*), appears as *Saint Tows*, in the genitiv *Saint Tooses*. I do not find *Saint *Toosy*, but it probably existed, as the source of the surnames *Tousey*, *Toucey*. The surname *Towse* appears to come from the form *Saint Tows*.

(a) *Seynt Osy'es* in Essexe.

1473 *Paston Letters*, ed. Fenn, ii. 142; ed. Gairdner, iii. 92.

(b) *St. Tooses*.

a 1604 R. HALL, *Life of Bp. Fisher* [first pub. 1665 as by Thomas Baily], p. 88. (*Gent. Mag.*, Aug., 1777, p. 373.)

St. Osyth into *Saint Tows*. 1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 123.

20. **Saint Owen** may be the eponym of some named *Town*, tho that surname is in most cases of the more obvious origin.

(a) *S. Owen*. De S. Audoenno.

1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 151.

(b) *Town*. This sirname, I imagine, may be corrupted of *St. Owen*, who occurs in Camden, p. 151.

1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

21. **Saint Winnol**, in fuller form *Saint Winwaloe*, appears as *Saint Twinnol*.

- (a) *Winnol*-far, the great horse-fair now held at Downham Market; so called from having been originally granted to *St. Winwaloe's* Priory, at Wereham. Cf. the proverb concerning the weather in the first three days of March —

First comes David, Then comes Chad,
Then comes *Winnol*, Blowing like mad.

1858 (1840) SPURDENS. *Suppl. to Vocab. East Anglia* (E.D.S.), p. 85.

There is a town in France, near Dunkirk, named *Bergues-Saint-Winoc*.

- (b) *S. Twinnel*, i.e. *St. Winnoc*. Ibid. [*Memorial of Brit. Piety*, Append.], p. 48. 1777 *Gent. Mag.*, Aug., p. 373.

The same change of such saint names occurs in Italian and Spanish, *Santo Elmo*, for example, becoming *Sant' Elmo*, *San Telmo*.

The opposit change, whereby a name beginning with *T* loses that initial after *Saint*, occurs in French, where *Saint Audard* stands for *Saint *Taudard*, *Saint Theodard* (P. p. 518).

XII. An isolated case of obscure attraction appears in the following: *I wot well*, Sc. *I wat weel* (ai wât wîl) becomes *atweel* (a-twîl), and so *tweel* (twîl).

Atweel, *at well*, adv. Truly, assuredly; from *I wot weel*; that is, *I wot well*. Ross. It is sometimes abbrev[iated] to 'Tweel.

1866 JAMIESON.

§ III. Initial M gaind.

XIII. In one instance the final *m* of the article *them*, originally only dativ singular and plural, but later extended to all cases and now used in provincial speech as a demonstrativ, equivalent to the literary *those*, has gon over to the following noun, just as the *n* of the parallel form *then* has done in some other cases. See § I., II. A. (TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 279–287).

1. **Adze, Ads**, having a final *s* (z) sound, is sometimes taken as a plural, and then requires the plural demonstrativ — *them ads*, just as we hear in the cross-roads grocery *them molasses*. Then *them ads*

is divided as *the mads*, and so *mads* occurs without *the*. We hear of *a mads* in Connecticut.

In my boyhood, in western Connecticut, I learned to know a common carpenter's tool as a "*mads*," and I think most of the fellow-workmen of my father, who was a carpenter, used that name. . . . The word on account of its form was looked on as a plural, and always took a plural verb, as I remember the usage.

1893 E. H. BABBITT, in *Dialect Notes*, p. 278 (with explanation as above).

On the other hand, the printer's types once with fine irony turned "the masses of the people" into "them asses of the people."

§ IV. Initial R gained or lost.

A. Initial R gained.

Cases in which a word has permanently gained an initial *r* by attraction from a preceding word do not appear. But the possibility of such a change, and therefore the possibility of the reverse process, which comes next in order, namely, the loss of initial *r*, which is to be proved in the next section, is shown by the three casual examples I shall cite. The first is a doubtful reading, the second a mere pun, the third a popular blunder; but all are phonetically allowable, and therefore help to support the next cases.

XIV. Cases involving the possessives *our* and *your*.

1. Anchor. *Our anchor* (*ancor*) may be read *our rancor*.

Our ancor is come back.

1606 MARSTON, *Sophonisba*, I. ii. 76.

Here Bullen conjectures *our rancour*. See *London Academy*, 1893, Aug. 12, p. 131.

2. Oar. A perpetrated pun shows that *your roar* may be used, *coram populo*, for *your oar*:

"I wish you monkeys would quit your everlasting chattering," exclaimed the Lion. "What do you want to put in *your roar* for?" asked a giddy young Simian.

1892 *Puck's Library* (Oct.), p. 15.

Thus do even comic papers justify their existence. Would that serious papers had equal reason!

3. The nawwab or viceroy of Bengal who took Calcutta in 1766 was cald *Sirāj-ud-daula*, 'the lamp of the State.' He appeard in the British newspapers of the time in the guise of a good old English knight, *Sir Roger Dowler*. He also gave name to *Sir Roger Dowlas*, one of the characters, an East Indian proprietor, in Foote's play, *The Patron*. (P. p. 557.)

B. Initial R lost.

XV. Cases involving the possessivs *our*, *your*, etc.

It is known that the familiar names *Richard*, *Robert*, *Robin*, *Roger* or *Rodger*, hav long appeard in homely use as *Hick* or *Hich* (*Hichcock*), *Hob*, *Hobbin*, *Hodge*; but the manner of these changes, and the reason, hav never been given, nor, so far as I know, even considerd. The changes ar generally taken as a matter of course. Yet they ar of a strange sort, and pique curiosity. There was a reason.

One might conjecture (and what etymologist wholly refrains from that gentle exercise?) that the initial *r*, as at one time strongly "trild," or "rold," rold one day into the strongly aspirated *h*. But *r* was not always strongly trild, *h* was not always strongly aspirated, and the interchange has no physiological basis. Moreover, why should the interchange take place in these few household names, and in no other words? Mere infantil variation may be conjectured as the cause; but why, again, should it affect only these few household names? A more definit cause must be found.

The cause was evidently one existing outside of the names *Richard*, *Robert*, *Roger*, themselves. In other words, it was interference, not "phonetic decay" or internal change. The names must hav been used, and used often, in collocations that affected the stability of the *r*. I find these conditions in the use of these names after the possessivs *our*, *your*, *their*, *her*, and the obsolete (ME.) *here*, *hire*, *her*, *hir*, 'their.' As the parents of a child spoke, individually, of *mine Ann*, *mine Ed*, etc., and so, later, of *my Nan*, *my Ned*, and as a neighbor talking to a parent would speak of *thine Ann*, *thine Ed*, and so, later, of *thy Nan*, *thy Ned* (see my previous paper,

TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. p. 295-301), in like manner the parents, together with the brothers and sisters, would speak of *our Ann*, *our Ned*, etc., and the neighbors, referring to them, of *their Ann*, *their Ed* (ME. also *her(e) Anne*, *her(e) *Edde*, etc.), or, speaking to them, of *your Ann*, *your Ed*, or, speaking of the mother, of *her Ann*, *her Ed*, etc. The form *mine Ann* (ME. *myn Anne*) changed to *my Nan* because there was a form *my* to rest on, and because final *n* was a shifting letter inclined to change sides—the Eng. *v* paragogic; *our Ann* remained stable because there was no known short form to help the change. So *mine Richard*, etc., past to *my Richard*, etc., and then remained stable. But in *our Richard*, *our Robert*, etc., *your Richard*, *your Robert*, etc., there is a weak point, the final *-r* before initial *r*. In the easy homely utterance of these possessiv terms, the two adjacent *r*'s would tend to merge into the second *r*, as if *ou' Richard*, *you' Richard*, etc.; but because there was no short possessiv *ou'*, *you'*, already existing, parallel to *my* for *mine*, the *r* that survived, as I explain it, was the first, the possessivs *our*, *your* (ME. *oure*, *youre*, etc.) being too stable to yield their final element. Hence the result was *our (R)ichard*, *our (R)obert*, *our (R)oger*, or, taking the curt colloquial forms of the names, *our (R)ick*, *our (R)ob*, *our (R)odge*, ME. *our(e) (R)icke*, *our(e) (R)obbe*, *our(e) (R)oge*. This leaves *'Ick*, *'Ob*, *'Odge*, ME. **'Icke*, **'Obbe*, **'Oge*, to represent the names concernd. As used after the usual possessivs, their weak form would not be noticed; when used alone, a feeling of their insufficiency, the absence of familiar masculin names beginning with *i* and *o* (because *Osborn*, *Osmund*, etc., wer not familiar), combined probably with a tendency to conform these unaspirated names to certain wel-known masculin names already aspirated (*Henry*, also *Herry*, *Huge*, *Howe*, *Hugon*, *Huggin*, *Hutchin*, etc.), led to their appearance as *Hicke*, *Hobbe*, *Hoge*, and so later *Hick*, *Hob*, *Hodge*. That *'Icke*, *'Obbe*, *'Obbin* did exist is proved also by their appearance with attracted *d* in *Dick*, *Dob*, *Dobbin*, etc. See later, XVIII. 1, p. 128, etc.

For the change of **'Icke*, **'Obbe* to *Hick*, *Hob*, compare the Scotch *Halbert* for *Albert*, whence the abbreviated forms

Hab, Habbie, forms also probably due in part to variation from *Hob, Hobbie*.

For the use of *our, your, their, her*, and especially of *our*, in the way indicated, no proofs are needed. The use is abundant to the present day.

Our. A term implying relation. *Our Thomas*, Thomas belonging to our family. *Var. dial.* 1847 HALLIWELL.

That the diphthong in *our* may be slighted and even reduced to nothing, is proved by the frequent occurrence, in the sixteenth century and later, and probably earlier, of *byrlady, berlady, byrlakin*, for *by our lady, by our *ladykin*.

I give below such early quotations tending to establish the process of change here set forth, as I have found; but from the nature of the case, contemporary proofs are meager. The changes took place in household speech and so were less likely to get into record. They took place in conversation, involving chiefly the first and second person, and so were less likely, again, to get into record, except in representations of dialog, or in familiar letters, forms of literature scantily cultivated in the period in which the changes took place. Even when "plays" came to be written, they dealt chiefly with Herod, Pilate, Mahound, and other ancient worthies, and little with Hick and Hob who gaped at the plays, and for whom alone, let us pretend, the "comic business" was gotten up. Yet traces of Hick and Hob, of Jack and Jill, of Mack and Moll and Maud, do occur very early, and they abound in the later colloquial records.

1. **Richard**, ME. *Richard, Rychard*, from OF. *Richard, Richart*, also *Ricard* (Sp. Pg. *Ricardo*, It. *Riccardo*, ML. *Ricardus*), from OLG. *Richard*, OHG. *Richart*, MHG. *Richard*, G. *Reichard*. The name exists also in the unassibilated form *Rickard* (see below). It does not seem to have suffered the supposed change or loss of its initial consonant, that change taking place chiefly in the homely abbreviated forms.

We ben at on acord

To wende with thee, *Rychard* our lord.

c 1300 *Richard Coer de Lion*, l. 1370. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* ii. 55.)

The best tresore had *Richard* our kyng. c 1300 *Id.* l. 3316. (Weber, ii. 129.)

When the name of *her Richard* she knew! a 1843 *The Maid of the Inn*.

2. **Rich* for *Richard*, by dropping the apparent suffix *-ard* (cf. *Rob* for *Robert*, often *Roberd*; *Rodge* for *Rodger*, *Roger*; *Walt*, *Wat*, for *Walter*, *Water*). Examples of this **Rich* are not found except as a written abbreviation *Rich.*, but it is evidenced by the unassibilated form *Rick* (see next), and by its diminutive *Richie* (which is also found as a surname *Richey*, *Ritchie*), and it may indeed exist in the surnames *Rich*, *Riche*, *Ritch*, which may be only in part due to the adjectiv *rich*.

Our (*your*, etc.) **Rich* became, with the loss of initial *r* and the suppliance of the initial aspiration, our **Hich*. This *Hich*- exists in the surnames *Hitch*, *Hichcock*, *Hitchcock*, *Hitchins*, etc. (See my previous paper, TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 231.)

- (a) **Rich*. a 1600 (?) [See *Hichcock*, *Hitchcock*, l.c.]
Richie *Storie* [a ballad]. a 1800 (Child, *Ballads*, viii. 255).
Richard *Moniplies* . . . *Richie*. 1822 SCOTT, *Fortunes of Nigel*.
 (b) **Hich*-, **Hitch*- [dim. *Hichcock*, *Hitchcock*]. a 1600 (?) (See above.)
Hitch [surname]. 1891 *N. Y. City Directory*.

Hichcock, *Hitchcock*, has a history of its own. In my previous paper, just mentioned, the forms *Mitchcock* and *Lithcock*, in the ballads, are shown to be errors for *Hitchcock*.

3. *Rickard*, ME. **Rickard*, *Ricard* (late AS. *Ricard*) from OF. *Ricard*, ML. *Ricardus*. This unassibilated form of *Richard* appears to have existed from an early period. It exists now in the surnames *Rickard*, *Rickards*, and *Rickardson*.

4. *Rick*, a variant of *Rich*, abbreviation of *Richard*; or a direct abbreviation of *Rickard*. In ME. it usually appears as *Ric.*, a written abbreviation of *Richard* or *Ricardus*, but it must have existed also as a spoken abbreviation, *Ric*, giving rise, in our *Rick*, to *Hick*, ME. *Hicke*, *Hikke*, *Hykke*, a common name. *Hick* is not derived from *Isaac*, as some say (Bardsley and others).

- (a) Which box she delyvered to *Ric*. Call . . . *Ric*. can tell you of the gydyng of the cofer with other boks. . . . And *Ric*. hath the copes of them. . . . And I and *Ric*. informyd hym.
 1465 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, ii. 187 and 238.
 Sir John Fogge, *Ric* Hault for ther suster and me.
 1473 *Paston Letters*, ed. Fenn, ii. 142; ed. Gairdner, iii. 92.
 [Here "Ric" may stand for the written abbreviation "Ric.," but it is printed without a period in both the careful editions cited, and may well represent the actual spoken abbreviation.]
Rick [nickname for *Richard*]. 1853 DICKENS, *Bleak House*.

Hence the surnames *Rick*, *Ricks*, *Rix*, *Rickson*, *Rixon*.

The name *Hick*, derived in this manner, became very common, much like *Tom* or *Fack*. It appears first in the fourteenth century.

(b) *Hikke* [*Hicke* C] þe hakeney mon, and Hogge þe neldere.

1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), v. 161.
[Also *Hikke*, var. *Hicke*, v. 172, 183, 185.]

A! *Hicke* Heuyheed! hard is thi nolle
To cacche ony kunnyng but cautell bigynne!

c 1399 [LANGLAND], *Richard the Redeless*, iii. 66.

Hycke Scorner. Enprynted by me Wynkyn de Worde.

c 1525 (Wynken de Worde). (Dodsley, ed. Hazlitt, i. 144;
Lowndes, 1834, p. 993.)

Hick Scorner, the titular character in this interlude, became proverbial for a reckless scoffer:

Zeno beeyng outright all together a stouique, used to call Socrates the scoffer or the *Hicke-scorner* of the citee of Athens.

1564 UDALL, tr. Erasmus *Apophth.*, Preface, sign. xxv. b
(Nares,² p. 442). [Also *Hicke skorner*, *id.*]

This fleering frumpe is one of the Courtly graces of *hicke the scorner*.

1589 [PUTTENHAM], *Arte of Eng. Poesie* (repr. Arber), p. 201.

Hick at length came to be used as a common name for a fellow:

A kind of gamball called the haltering of *Hix* [*Hick's*] Mare.

1585 HIGGINS (tr.), *Nomenclator*, p. 298. (H. p. 448.)

That not one *hick* spares.

1655 *Acad. of Compl.* (1713), p. 204 (Nares,² p. 442).

That can bulk any *hick*. 1655 *Id.* (1713).

Hick is not now much used as a given name; but it occurs as a surname, *Hick*, *Hicke*, *Hickie*, *Hickey*, also in genitiv form *Hicks*, *Hix*, *Hickson*, *Hixon*.

How *Hick* gave rise to *Dick* is an other story. See XVIII., below.

5. **Robert, ME.** *Robert, Roberd, Robart, Robard*, from OF. *Robert, Robers* (It. *Roberto*, ML. *Robertus, Rothbertus*), from OLG. *Rōd-braht*, OHG. **Hruodpreht*, **Hruodpert*, *Hruodbert*, *Hrōdebert*, MHG. *Ruodpert*, *Ruoprecht*, G. *Ruprecht*, *Rubrecht*, *Robrecht*, *Rupert*, *Robert*. The AS. *Hrōdbert* (*Chron.* an. 1050) follows the Continental form; the vernacular form would hav been **Hrōðberht*. Hence the surnames *Robert*, *Robart*, *Roberts*, *Robarts*, *Robartes*, *Robertson*, *Roberson*.

(a) Sire *Robert* the Bruytz furst kyng wes ycore.

c 1306 *Execution of Sir Simon Fraser* (Child, *Ballads*, vi. 276).

[In an other stanza cald *Kyng Hobbe* (see *Hob*, p. 117).]

And *Robert* [*Robyn*, B.C.] the ribaudowr for his rousti words.

c 1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), vii. 66.

þe kyng was hote kyng *Roberd*;

Neuer man wiste him ferd [var. *aferd*].

c 1400 *Roberd of Cisyle*, l. 9. (Horstmann, *Allengl. Legenden*, 1878, p. 209.)

Robert, probably only because of the mere similarity of sound, became associated with *robber*, ME. *robbere*, *robbour*, *robbur*, often varied with the form *roberd*, *robard*.

Competenter per *Robert*, *robbur* designatur :

Et per *Richard riche hard* congrue notatur ;

Gilebert non sine re *gilur* appellatur ;

Gefrei, si rem tangimus, in *jo frei* commutatur.

a 1300 *Harl. ms.* 978, in *Pol. Songs*, p. 49. (Ellis, *E.E.P.* p. 462.)

Robert [*Robert C*] the *robbour* [*robbere B*, *ryfeler C*] on Reddite he lokede.

c 1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), v. 242.

Ac *Robert Renne*-aboute shal now3te haue of myne.

c 1377 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (B), vi. 150.

Robert was sometimes used a common appellativ :

[Cain to Abel:]

Goo, iape þe, *robard* iangillande.

c 1430 *York Plays*, vii. 47 (p. 36).

Because of this association, or because of some actual robber of that name, the term *Robert's men* arose in the fourteenth century to designate a set of vagabond thieves who wer more definitely described as *drawlatches* and *wasters*. They wer also cald *Robert's knaves*. *Robert* was more familiar in the diminutiv form *Robin*; and Robin Hood, that archer good, may owe his prenamen, or else his infirmity of grammar respecting *meum* and *tuum*, to the mere popular etymology which made *Robert* a *robber*.

Bidders and beggers faste a-boute coden . . .

In glotonye, God wot, gon heo to bedde,

And ryseth vp with ribaudye, this *Robertes knaues*;

Sleep and sleu3the suweth hem euere.

c 1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), prol. 40-45.

[And] ryzt as *Robertes men* raken aboute,

At feires, & at ful ales, & fyllen þe cuppe,

And precheþ all of pardon, to plesen the puple.

c 1394 *Pierce the Ploughman's Crede* (E.E.T.S.), l. 72.

From *our* (*R*)*obert* (*Robart*, *Roberd*, *Robard*) may be supposed to come our **Obert* or **Obard* (which last I take to be represented by the surname *Obbard*), and hence *Hobert*, *Hobart*, *Hoberd*, *Hobard*, all found in ME. records. All examples of these latter forms may of course present the other *Hobart*, *Hobard*, etc. (modern also *Hubbard*), from OF. *Hobart*, a variant of *Hubert*, but it seems likely that with this name of OF. origin has been merged the name thus deuolet in England from *Robert*. Evidence is meager.

With this *Hobert* hav been associated more or less vaguely, but perhaps in part with real justification, the various forms which ar represented by or involvd with the word *hobbledehoy*, namely *hoblede-*

hoy (1540 Palsgrave), *Hobberd de hoy* (1580 Tusser), *hober de hoy* (1678 Ray), etc. They hav a curious history which I can not narrate here.

6. **Robin**, ME. *Robin, Robyn, Robyne, Roben, Robene*, is from OF. *Robin*, a diminutiv of *Robert*, which, tho etymologically *Ro-bert*, was supposed to consist of *Rob-* + *-ert*, a mere termination. It is the source of the surnames *Robin, Robins, Robbins, Robinson*.

(a) Til *Robyn* the ropere weore rad forte a-ryse.

c 1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), v. 180.
And *Robyn* [1362 *Robert* A] the rybaudoure, for his rusty wordes.

c 1377 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (B), vi. 75.
But I can rymes of *Robyn* Hood, and Randolf erle of Chestre.

c 1377 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (B), v. 402.
Bothe Bette the Bakere and *Robyn* Rede.

1468 *Coventry Myst.* (1841), p. 131.

Robene sat on gud grene hill.

c 1475 HENRYSON, *Robene and Makyne* (Child, *Ballads*, iv. 245).

Robin became so familiar as to be applied in rustic personification to a common bird. *Robin Redbreast* was at first a name parallel to the imagind names *Jack Whitehead*, or *Tom Bluenose*. *Robin* is the real personal name, and *redbreast* is a predicate adjectiv elevated to a surname. In present use we hav reduced *Robin Redbreast* to *robin-redbreast*, and employ either *robin* or *redbreast* alone as a name for the bird. An other name for him is *Robin Ruddock*, reduced in provincial use to *robin-riddick* (1825 Jennings, *Somerset Gloss.* p. 64).

I find *Robin* applied to inanimate figures.

The twa cross-legged figures that the callants used to ca' *Robin* and
Bobbin, ane on ilka door-cheek. 1816 SCOTT, *Antiquary*, xvi.

Of *Hobin, Hobbin*, I find no early record. It emerges in the sixteenth century, and exists in the present surname *Hobin, Hobbin, Hobbins*.

(b) *Hobbin*, ah *Hobbin*! I curse the stounde.

1579 SPENSER, *Shepherds Calender*, Sept.
I wote ne, *Hobbin*, how I was bewitcht. 1579 *Id.*

7. **Rob**, abbreviation of *Robert*. Hence the surnames *Robb, Robbs, Robson*. Of *Rob* I hav come upon no examples in ME., except as a written abbreviation. Yet it must hav existed also as a spoken abbreviation. It appears as such in the patronymic surname *Robson* (1450). It gave rise, in the manner before explaind, to *Hob* (ME. *Hob, Hobbe*); unless we ar to explain *Hob* as a direct abbreviation of *Hobbin*. From *Hob* arose the surnames *Hobbs, Hobson*.

Hob, as a familiar abbreviation of *Robert*, appears to be stil so used in England. In the United States, *Robert*, when abbreviated, is always either *Rob* or *Bob*. The last form *Bob* grew out of infantil pronunciation — *Rob*, *Wob*, *Ob*, *Bob*.

(a) *Rob*. Newton lymbrenner . . . and *Robert* Bery.

1470 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, ii. 404.

(b) Sire *Robert* the Bruytz furst kyng wes ycore :

He mai everuch day ys fon him se before —

Nou kyng *Hobbe* in the mures yongeth

For te come to toun nout him ne longeth.

c 1306 *Execution of Sir Simon Fraser* (Child, *Ballads*, pp. 276, 277).

Jak Chep, Tronche, Jon Wrau, Thom Myllere, Tyler, Jak Strawe,

Erle of the Plo, Rak to, Deer, et *Hob* Carter, Rakstrawe.

a 1400 *On the Slaughter of Archbishop Sudbury*; in *Polit. Poems*, i. 230.

Hobbes wif. 1451 in *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 192.

John *Hobbis* . . . Jon *Hobbys*. 1465 *Id.* ii. 209.

Why in this Wooluish tongue should I stand heare

To begge of *Hob* and Dicke, that does appeere,

Their needlesse Vouches: custome calls me too't.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Cor.* ii. 3, 123 (F¹ p. 12).

Call'd in of Dandrie, *Hob*, and Jock.

a 1650 *The Raid of the Reidswire* (Child, *Ballads*, vi. 133).

Thoo's a good lad, my *Hobb*, that teeak sike care.

1685 *Yorkshire Dialogue*. (M. C. F. Morris,
Yorkshire Folk-Talk, p. 101.)

Much water slides past the mill that *Hob* Miller never wots of [p. 187] . . .

Hob Miller of Tuyford [p. 189] [ascribed to the period 1187-1190].

1825 SCOTT, *Betrothed*, xxvii.

Hob, s. *Bob* or *Robert*. *North*. 1839 HOLLOWAY, *Gen. Dict. Provincialisms*.

Hob soon came to be used, like *Hick*, as a general appellativ for any common fellow, a rustic.

Other *hobbis* 3e hadden of hurlewaynis kynne.

1399 [LANGLAND], *Richard the Redeless*, i. 90.

Le pied gris. The *Hob*, Clowne, Boore, Hind; so called, of his euerdustie, or durty shooes. . . . Pied-gris: m. A clowne, *hob*, hinde, or boore of the countrey.

1611 COTGRAVE.

A *hob* or clown. Rusticus.

1677 HOLYOKE.

This sense arose in part from the use of *Hob* with some descriptiv term to form a feignd person's name — *Hob Clunch*, *Hob Hansom*, *Hob Lob*, used originally like *Piers Plowman* or *Hodge Plowman*, but soon reduced to the rank of a general appellativ.

Hobclunch. *Promos and Cassandra*, iii. 2. (H.)

Poore unbegotten wether beaten Qualto, an *hob-hansom* man, God wot.

1583 *Philotimus*. (Wr. p. 246.)

The rustical *hoblobs* of Cretes, of Dryopes and payneted clowns Agathyrsi Dooe fetch theyre gambalds.

1582 STANYHURST, *Æn.* iv. 150. (D.)

The draffe of the carterly *Hoblobs* thereabouts.

1593 NASH, *Lenten Stuff*. (D.)

The familiar use of *Hob* in these ways led to its use in the names of some homely games; which I must here omit.

8. *Robbie*, *Robby*, diminutiv of *Rob*, or, rather, directly substituted for *Robin*. Compare *Collie*, *Colly*, for *Collin*, *Colin*, diminutiv of *Cole* for *Nicol*, originally *Nicolas*, misspeld *Nicholas*; also Scotch *corbie* for *corbin*, a raven (*corbin*, var. *rauen*, *rauyn*, occurs c 1300 *Cursor Mundi*, E.E.T.S., l. 3332).

(a) *Robert* [so cald by Miss Wardour]. . . . *Robie* [so cald by Ochiltree].
1816 SCOTT, *Antiquary*, xlii.

Hence, in the way before indicated, the form *Hobby*, which is in form from *Hob* (*Hobbe*) + dim. *-ie* or *-y*, but in fact probably directly substituted for *Hobbin*, variant of *Robbin*, *Robin*.

(b) The Laird's Jock ane, the Laird's Wat twa,
O *Hobie* Noble, thou ane maun be;
Thy coat is blue, thou has been true,
Since England banish'd thee to me.

Now *Hobie* was an English man,
In Bewcastle-dale was born and bred:

a 1784 *Jock o' the Side* (Child, *Ballads*, vi. 82).
Hobie Noble [a ballad so named]. a 1784 in Child, *Ballads*, vi. 98.

According to Sir Walter Scott, *Hobie* or *Hobbie* in this and other instances is a familiar form of *Halbert*:

Halbert, or *Hobbie*, Noble appears to have been one of those numerous English outlaws who, being forced to fly their own country, had established themselves on the Scottish Borders.
1802 SCOTT, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border* ii. 90
(Child, *Ballads*, vi. 98).

But it will be observd that, greatly to his credit

Hobie was an English man,
In Bewcastle-dale was born and bred,

and *Halbert* appears to hav been peculiarly Scotch (it is supposed to be an aspirated form of *Albert*). There is a Scotch form *Habbie*, which may, with equal propriety, be taken as a variant of *Hobbie* for original *Robert*, and as a diminutiv of *Halbert*.

A young man called *Halbert* or *Hobbie* Elliot.

1816 SCOTT, *Black Dwarf*, ii. [Hobbie Elliot is a prominent character in the story. In ch. x. he calls himself *Hob Elliot*.]

Habbie Gray (p. 168) . . . *Halbert* Gray (p. 169).

1819 SCOTT, *Bride of Lammermoor*, xxiv:

9. *Roger*, also *Rodger*, ME. *Roger*, *Rogger* (= D. *Rogier*, G. *Roger*), from OF. *Roger*, Sp. Pg. *Rogerio*, It. *Ruggiero*, ML. *Rogerus*, from OLG. *Rōdġēr*, OHG. *Hrōdġēr*, *Hruadġēr*, *Ruodġēr*, MHG. *Rüediger*, *Rücdger*, G. *Rüdiger*. The AS. *Rogcer* (*Chron.* 1076) is

borrowd. Hence the surnames *Roger, Rodger, Rogers, Rodgers, Rogerson*.

Our Roger may be the source in part of *Oger*, found as a ME. name, and extant in the surname *Odger*.

(a) Kyng *Roger* spak fyrst above.

c 1300 *Richard Coer de Lion*, l. 1689. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* ii. 67.)

Roger [var. *Rogger*].

c 1386 CHAUCER, *Cook's Prol.* (Six-Text, A., ll. 4345, 4352, 4356.)

Roger was once much more familiar than it is now. Like the other names here treated it became a common appellativ for an animal — in this case a ram (H. p. 689).

The form *Oger* is found very early, and is in part at least of Old French origin: OF. *Oger, Ogier*, ML. *Ogerus, Odgerus, Udgerus*, from OLG. *Odgēr*, ODan. *Odger*, Icel. *Oddgeir*.

Alan fil. *Oger*, E. Roge fil. *Oger*, E. *Oger*, fil. *Oger*. GG.

a 1500 in Bardsley, *Eng. Surnames*, p. 580.

"*Oger the Breton*" is mentioned in Domesday Book (f. 364 b).

10. *Rodge*, ME. *Roge*, is short for *Rodger, Roger*, ME. *Roger*. For the abbreviation, compare *Rich* for *Richard*, *Rob* for *Robert*, *Walt, Wat* for *Walter, Water*, etc., above. I do not find modern examples of *Rodge*, unless there be one in *Rudge*.

Our (your, etc.) *Rodge* has become *our Hodge* (ME. *Hodge, Hogge, Hoge*). Hence the surnames *Hodge, Hoge, Hodges, Hodgekin, Hodgson*.

(a) *Roge* fil. *Oger*.

a 1500 in Bardsley, *Eng. Surnames*, p. 580.

I find the diminutiv **Rodgecock*, parallel to the fuller form *Roggercock*, and the source of **Hodgecock*, which is itself the source of *nodgecock* (see TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 233).

Stephen *Roggekoc*.

a 1500 in Bardsley, *Eng. Surnames*, p. 591.

'Tis *our Hodge*, and I think he lies asleep.

1599 PORTER, *Two Angry Women of Abington*.
(Dodsley, ed. Hazlitt, vii. 308.)

The form *Hodge* has attained celebrity.

(b) Hikke the hakeney mon and *Hogge* [*Hughe B, Houwe C*] the neldere.

1362 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (A), v. 161.

If euvre sithe I highte *Hogge* [var. *Hoge*] of Ware.

c 1386 CHAUCER, *Cook's Prol.* (Six-Text), A. 4336.

[Cald *Roger*, var. *Rogger*, in ll. 4345, 4352, 4356.]

A turne-broche, a boy for *Hogge* at Ware.

c 1430 LYDGATE, *Minor Poems*, p. 52. (H. p. 895.)

- John son of *Hodge* [*Hogge*, p. 237, *Roger*, p. 241] Ratcleff.
 1452 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 244.
Hoge. Rogerus, nomen proprium. 1483 *Cath. Angl.* p. 187.
 [Perhaps the first appearance of the word in a dictionary.]
 I know small difference herein, *Hodge* brother,
 And I (Hugh) know as littell in the tother.
 1562 HEYWOOD, *Proverbs and Epigrams* (Spenser Soc.), p. 65.
 Sat pesyng and patching of *Hodg* her man's briche.
 1575 STILL, *Gammer Gurton* (Old Pl. ii. 12). (Wr. p. 737.)
 Old *Hodge* Bacon and Bob Grosted.
 1664 S. BUTLER, *Hudibras*, pt. II. iii. 224.

Like *Hob* for *Robert*, and *Hick* for *Richard*, and like *Jack*, *Hodge* came to be used as a familiar term for any fellow, especially a countryman, and is now familiar in the political nomenclature of England as a general appellativ for a farm laborer.

- These Arcadians are given to take the benefit of euerie *Hodge*.
 1587 GREENE, *Menaphon*, p. 58.
 No *hodge* plowman in a countrie. a 1600 NASH (in Greene's Works, vi. 21).
 "Not much in 'em either," quoth perhaps simple *Hodge*;
 But there's a superstructure. Wait a bit.
 1871 CALVERLEY, *Fly Leaves: The Cock and the Bull*.

II. *Rod*, short for *Rodger*, *Roger*, or *Rodge*. Compare *Geordie* for *Georgie*. Hence the surnames *Rod*, *Rodd*, *Rodkinson*, *Rodman* (1891 *N. Y. City Directory*). But these may be in part from an other source.

Parallel to *Rod*, existed *Hod*, either develop't from *our Rod*, or shortend directly from *Hodge*.

Hod, ME. **Hodde*, is not found in that form in the ME. period; but I suspect it exists in the name *Hud*, *Hudde*, which I find in the *York Plays* and the burlesque *Turnament of Totenham*, in just the atmosphere suited to *Hod* and *Hob*. The change of vowel is not unparalleld; compare *hod* and *hud*, *hob* and *hub*.

- i. *Pas.* We! *Hudde*!
 ii. *Pas.* We! *Howe*!
 i. *Pas.* Herkyn to me! . . .
 i. *Pas.* We! *Colle*!
 iii. *Pas.* What care is comen to þe? . . .
 i. *Pas.* Whe! *Hudde*! be-halde into the heste!
 A selcouthe sight þan sall þou see . . .
 i. *Pas.* We! no *Colle*! nowe comes it newe i-nowe.
 c 1430 *York Plays*, xv. ll. 37-39, 46, 54 (pp. 119, 120).

The editor prints "hudde!" "howe!" "colle!" without capitals, as if they were mere interjections; but they ar obviously the names

of the shepherds, *Hod*, *Howe* (a form of *Hugh*), and *Coll*, otherwise *Cole*, the abbreviation of *Colin*, *Collin*.

"I make a vow" quod *Hudde*, "I shalle not leve behynde."

a 1500 *The Turnament of Totenham* (Child, *Ballads*, viii. 107).
(So *Hudde* (bis) and *Hud* on p. 112. In Harl. ms. different: "I wov to God, quoth *Herry*," etc.).

Hence **Hodcock*, in a *nodcock* (see TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 233).

12. **Roddy**, diminutiv of *Rod* for *Rodge* or *Rodger*, *Roger*, may be the source of the surname *Oddy* or *Oddie*, in which the aspirate supplied to *Hobby*, etc., does not appear. *Roddy*, *Oddy*, *Oddie* ar in the *New York City Directory*.

(b) Daniel Fortesku, Alisaunder *Hody*.

1460 *Paston Letters*, i. 522.

Other names in *R-* existed in ME., *Ralph* (ME. *Rauf*, *Raufe*, *Raaf*, *Raaff*, *Raff*, whence the modern British pronunciation *Rafe*), and others, but none wer so familiar, it appears, as to hav sufferd the changes set forth above.

The use of *Sir* before *Richard*, *Robert*, *Roger*, tho very common, would hardly be familiar enough in household use to affect the form of the names; but it may be supposed to hav assisted the change begun by an other cause. Perhaps the *r* in *Master* also helpt the change: *Master Richard*, *Master Robert*, *Master Rauf*, etc., wer in constant use.

The possibility of the interchange of *Rob* and *Hob*, *Robert* and *Hubert*, etc., is indicated by a mistake made by an advertiser of bicycles who heds some words of praise for his machine from a rival dealer, "Praise from *Sir Rupert*." (*Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., Sept. 22, 1892, part II. p. 1, col. 2.) If *Sir Hubert* can become *Sir Rupert*, even by mistake, the reverse process is possible.

For all old things there ar more causes than one.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

c 31 B.C. VERGIL, *Georgics*, ii. 490.

I am willing to ad, as a possible additional impulse to the change of *Rob* to *Hob*, etc., the endless succession of cunabular infants who hav been floodd by the initial *r*, and hav pronounced *Rob* as 'Ob or *Wob*. *Ex ore infantium et lactentium* —

I think the examples and analogies I hav given go far to establish the case. It is true, the evidence is meager. But

evidence may be meager and yet conclusiv. In philology it is not the fact that evidence is meager, which condemns a proposition; it is the fact that it is inconsistent with other evidence of a stronger kind. Many important propositions rest, and rest firmly, on a meager muster of facts. A 'law' may be derived from a fact. (I hav known a 'law' to be derived from no facts at all.) But we desiderate a plurality of facts. Attraction in philology, as in physics, must be general. It must work everywhere, unless counteracted.

XVI. If the kind of attraction and resultant loss of one *r* occurd in *our Rob*, etc., as here supposed, it would also probably occur in other cases involving a like collocation of final and initial *r*. The entire absence of such other cases would tend to throw dout on the change supposed in *our Rob*, etc. On the other hand, reflection wil show that cases in which a word ending in *r* occurs before an other beginning with *r*, and occurs so often as to be current, and so liable to the change supposed, must be comparatively rare. And being by supposition current, the words must form a familiar phrase or compound. I can furnish three examples :

1. **Reck.** *Never reck*, in the dialectal form *ne'er rack*, 'never mind,' appears in the Cumberland dialect as *neer ak*, a form so remarkable that the glossarist explains it erroneously as *ne rack*, as if Latin *ne cures*, 'reck not.'

(a) *Recche*, care. They use the word *rack* or *reck* in the North parts of England at this time for *to care*. Hence *never rack you* is the same as take you no thought or care.

1724 HEARNE, *Gloss. to Rob. Glouc.* (ed. 1810) (E.D.S.), p. 87.

(b) *Neer ak*, C., never mind. Ray says, 'To rack or reck' to care, *never rack you*, i.e. take you no thought or care. In that case it should be 'ne rack,' never care, never care [sic].

1878 DICKINSON, *Cumb. Gloss.* (E.D.S.), p. 66.

2. **Ree.** A peculiar case of the loss of initial *r* by absorption with a final *r* in the preceding word, appears in the name of a church in Southwark. It was the church of Saint Mary *over the ree*, that is, 'over the river,' *ree*, speld also *rhee*, *rhe*, *rie*, being a rare or doubtful word, of which I find no early record.

Even to this daie in Essex I have oft observed that when the lower grounds by rage of water have been overflowen, the people beholding the same have said, All is on a *rhe*, as if they should have said, All is now a river. 1587 HARRISON, *Descr. Eng.* (H. p. 681.)

Rhe. The course of water, and the overflowing of it.

1847 HALLIWELL [to introduce the above quotation].

Ree, a river or flood. "All is in a *ree*," that is overflowed with water. Essex. 1847 WRIGHT.

Over the ree came to be written *overtheree*, *overthere*, and, with omission of the article, *over ree*, *over rhee*. The tuching *r*'s then melted into each other, and *over* prevaild, leaving *Over'ee*, *Overe*, *Overie*, *Overy* as an apparent proper name, in the possessiv form *Overes*, *Overies*, *Overus*; the church being now St. Mary *Overy*.

(a) Prior of Seit Mary *Ovirthere*. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 248. Mary, *ouer the ree* in Southwerke, a priorye of Chanons.

1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 252. (Sim. twice more, p. 252.)

Priour of Saint Mary *Oūtheree*. 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 258.

I will not heere give notice how far they are deceived, which call the aforesaid church [Saint Marie *over Rhee*] by the name of Saint Mary Auderies, or Saint Mary ouer Isis or Ise. 1618 STOW, *Survey*, p. 24.

A faire Church, called S. Mary *over the Rie*, or *Overy*, that is over the water. 1633 STOW, *Survey*, p. 450.

(b) Seint Mary *Ouerey* Priory. c 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. 76.

Saint Mary *Overes*. 1555 MACHYN, *Diary* (Camden Soc.) (1848), p. 96.

At Saint Mary-*ouerus*. 1604 *The Meeting of Gallants* (Percy Soc.), p. 28.

S. Mary *Oueries* Chirch. 1618 STOW, *Survey*, p. 48.

3. **Riddle**, a sieve. We find (a) **haver-riddle*, a sieve for haver or oats, speld (b) *haveridil*, a ME. form given by Halliwell (p. 438), without a reference.

§ V. Initial D gaind or lost.

A. Initial *d* gaind.

The cases of attraction now to be shown hav been hitherto wholly unnoticed. They arose in household or colloquial speech, and involv extremely common household or colloquial words, *good* and *old*.

XVII. **Good**. This adjectiv, as a part of conventional formulas of greeting and farewell, originally prayers or precatons, in some instances spred over to its noun, to which the *d* thus extended became attacht. Thus *Good even*, contracted *good een*, *gooden*, *goden*, became *good deven*, contracted *good den*, *godden*.

The full form of the precaton was *God give you a good even*.

God gyve you a good evyn. Dieu vous doynt bon vespre.

1530 PALSgrave, p. 867.

It soon became contracted: **God gi' you good een, God ye good den, God-dig-you-den, Goddigoden, Godigoden, Godigeden, Godigodin.* So *God give you good morrow*, contracted to *God ye good morrow*.

Rom. . . . *Godden*, good fellow.

Ser. *Godgigoden.* I pray, sir, can you read?

1599 SHAKESPEARE, *R. and J.* i. 2. 55 (Q² p. 14; F¹ p. 55).

Nur. I speake no treason.

Cap. O *Godigeden* [1623 *Godigoden*].

1599 SHAKESPEARE, *R. and J.* iii. 5. 173 (Q² p. 67; F¹ p. 70).

Nur. *God ye goodmorrow*, Gentlemen.

Mer. *God ye goodden* [1623 *gooden*], faire gentlewoman.

Nur. Is it *good den* [1623 *gooden*]?

1599 SHAKESPEARE, *R. and J.* ii. 4. 95 (Q² p. 39; F¹ p. 62).

Clo. *God dig-you-den* all, pray you which is the head Lady?

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *L.L.L.* iii. 1. (F¹ p. 130).

For the contraction of *God give you a good even* to *Godigoden*, compare the contraction of *God be with you* to *God be wi' you, God buy you, goodbye, goodby*.

God be with you, a dieu soiez. c 1532 DEWES, *Introductory* (1852), p. 919.
Good b'wy, gentlemen.

1594 *A Knacke to Knowe a Knaue.* (Dodsley, ed. Hazlitt, vi. 553.)

God buy you; fare you well. 1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Ham.* ii. 2 (F¹ p. 259).

God buy, my Lord. 1623 SHAKESPEARE, *1 Hen. VI.* iii. 2 (F¹ p. 108).

Good boy! with all my heart.

1646 SUCKLING, *Ballad upon a Wedding*, l. 120.

Bwy, interj. *Bye!* adieu. This, as well as *good bye* and *good-bwy*, is evidently corrupted from *God be with you*; *God be wi' ye*, equivalent to the French à Dieu, to God. *Bwy*, and *good-bwy*, are, therefore, how vulgar soever they may seem, more analogous than *bye* and *good-bye*.

1825 JENNINGS, *Somerset Gloss.* p. 28.

But the better abbreviation of *God give you good even* is obviously *good even*. It became the prevalent form, often contracted *good een*. So, later, *good evening*.

(a) *Good evyn*, bon vespre. 1530 PALSgrave, p. 867.

Good evenyng, bon vespre. *Good evyn*, bon soir.

c 1532 DEWES, *Introductory* (1852), p. 918.

Iul. *Good euen* to my ghostly confessor.

1599 SHAKESPEARE, *R. and J.* ii. 6, 21 (Q² p. 45).

The pawky auld carle came o'er the lee

Wi' many *good'eens* and days to me.

a 1700 (?) *The Gaberlunzie-Man* (Child, *Ballads*, viii. 98).

As I came by the Lowden banks,

They bade gude *e'en* to me.

a 1800 (?) *Young Benjie* (Child, *Ballads*, iii. 301).

I crave your forgiveness, Master George, and heartily wish you *good even*.

1822 SCOTT, *Fortunes of Nigel*.

The spreading of the *d* appears in the change of *good even*, to *good deven* (*devon*), and of *good een* to *good den, god-den, godden*.

(b)

Gud devon, dame, seyde he;

Sir, sche seyde, welcum you be.

c 1440 *Sir Amadas*, l. 110. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* iii. 248.)Gentlemen, *good den*, a word with one of you.1599 SHAKESPEARE, *R. and J.* iii. i. 34 (Q² p. 46; F¹ p. 64).

See also the three quotations from the same play, above; and elsewhere in the same author.

When the Spaniard saith God keepe you, a good houre haue you, God giue you health: and the Englishman *God den* or *good euen*, and the other like, I allow it for good salutation.

1623 MINSHEU, *Dialogues in Sp. and English*, p. 49.

The following passage is written as of date about 1620:

Propera pedem, O Geordie, and *god-den* with you.

1822 SCOTT, *Fortunes of Nigel*, xxix.*Godden. Good even. North.*

1847 HALLIWELL.

XVIII. **Old.** The way in which the adjectiv *old* has affected the form of certain familiar household names seems never to hav been noticed before. *Old*, beside its literal sense (1) 'advanced in years,' 'aged,' was and is extremely common in other uses; (2) 'relatively advanced in years,' 'senior,' as a father compared to his son; (3) 'long known,' 'familiar'; hence implying on one side special interest or affection, as *old fellow*, *old boy*; on the other, contempt or dislike, as *old fogy*, *old scoundrel*; the two phases being curiously mixt in the familiar names of the devil, *Old Harry*, *Old Scratch*, etc. In many cases *old*, truly meaning 'aged,' implies also 'long known,' 'familiar,' and indicates thus a degree of interest or affection:

Old King Cole was a merry *old* soul

And a merry *old* soul was he.a 1845 in HALLIWELL, *Nursery Rhymes*, p. 1.

Indeed, *old* in colloquial use is so frequent that it becomes in many cases completely void of meaning.

Old, adj. This word is constantly applied to anything or anybody without any reference to age.

1887 PARISH and SHAW, *Dict. Kentish Dial.* (E.D.S.), p. 111.

We ar now prepared to understand how *old* might in careless unletterd use affect a following name. Evidence is abundant, that *old*, in the familiar uses above mentiond, especially of frendly or contemptuous familiarity, was very common in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as before and since, in connection with household names; and my proposition is, that when it thus recurd before a name beginning with a vowel or *h*, there was a tendency to carry the

final element of this naturally long-drawn word (*o* vowel + *l* liquid or semivowel + *d* sonant) over to the name itself. And so, I think, *Old Hick*, whether the aged Hick of fourscore, or the senior Hick of forty seen walking with the junior Hick of five, or the jolly middle-aged Hick cald "old" because he was, in the current phrase "popular with the boys" (sc. boys of forty-five or fifty or more) — *Old Hick*, without the aspiration *Old 'Ick*, became *Ol' Dick* or *Old Dick*, and hence, when the epithet was not used, simply *Dick*. So *Old Hob* would become *Old Dob*, *Old Hobbin* would become *Old Dobbin*, *Old Hobby* *Old Dobby*, and *Old Hodge* probably *Old Dodge*.

In dialectal form *old* was and is also *ould*, *oud*, *owd*, *auld*, *aud*, *awd*, *aad*; and *Old Hick* would be variously *ould*, *oud*, or *ow' Dick*, *auld*, *aud*, *aw'* or *aa' Dick*. The *ow'* or *aw'* or *aa'* may hav become confused with the *a* in names like *John a Nokes*, *John a Styles*, etc. (see TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 283), and perhaps in some cases with the indefinit article *a*, and so would drop out. Compare *audacious*, dialectal *owdacious*, *outdacious* (Tennyson, *Village Wife*): *an audacious fellow* in, dialectal speech *a audacious fellow*, becomes at last *a dacious fellow* (*dacious*, Peacock, *Gloss. N. W. Lincolnshire*). So *an occasion*, *a occasion*, becomes *a 'casion*, *a 'cayshun* (*Holderness Gloss.*).

One poor Highlander, on his deathbed, is even said to have contemplated the possibility of finding whisky in the next world. To the minister who had been trying to give him some idea of heaven he said: "But, sir, will there be any whusky in heaven?" "Oh, no, Donald, there will be no occasion for that." "'Casion or no 'casion," said Donald, "it wad be but dacent to have it on the table."

1893 DAVID PRYDE, *Pleasant Memories of a Busy Life*.
(*London Academy*, 23 Sept. 1893, p. 251.)

The record of the development of *Dick*, *Dobbin*, etc., from *Hick*, *Hobbin*, etc., is incomplete; but there ar reasons for this incompleteness. The development took place in household, rural English speech of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It would seldom find record; and the records of homely English speech of that period ar scanty. This homely English crops out now and then in Chaucer and Langland, and in pieces before their time; but it is not conspicuous until the plays or 'mysteries,' which belong mostly to the fifteenth century. My examples then ar mostly late, and ar chiefly illustrations, not evidence; but it can not be doubted by any one verst in Middle English, that the homely and colloquial phrases here illustrated by examples of the fifteenth and later centuries, existed long before.

For the use of *old* before personal names in general, I hav many random quotations from the earliest times down. I take room here only to mention some of the names, annexing only the chance dates: *Oulde Abraham* (c 1360), *ould Addom* (1814), *auld Aiken* (1816), *auld Ailie* (1816), *old Arthur* (1602), *Antele the olde* (c 1440), *Austyn be olde* (1362), *auld Davie* (1818), *auld Downie* (a 1700), *auld Ellieslaw* (1816), *auld Elspeth* (1815), *auld Gibby* (a 1700), *old Hugh* (1602), *old Jacob* (1816), *old Jervie* (1816), *old John* (1623), *old Johnnie* (1816), *oulde Josephe* (c 1430), *auld Paull* (1602), *auld Rab* (1816), *old Richard* (1600), *old Roger* (1823), *ald Roger* (1785), *auld Saturne* (1552), etc.

I hav many quotations also illustrating the use of *old* before common nouns having a personal and often contemptuous reference; as *auld doited carles* (1816), *auld companzeoun* (1602), *auld deevil* (1816), *old dote* (c 1450), *auld gowk* (1816), *ould hagge* (1598), *old hag* (1816), *auld hellicat* (1816), *auld hystoricience* [historicians] (1552), *auld crippled idiot* (1816), *old mon* (a 1250), *awlde mene* (c 1440), *old rogue* (1816), *oulde vylarde* (c 1430), *old wyfe* (c 1425), etc.

How easily the *d* of *old* could wander off may be seen from the fact that in both English and Low German use *old* in colloquial or dialectal speech often loses the *d* entirely. English *old*, not alone in negro speech, becomes *ol'*, *ole*, and in Low German *old* is in inflection usually *ol*. In Old Friesic we find besides *ald*, *old*, *auld*, the forms *al* and *ol*. So North Friesic *ull*, for *uld* (1837 Outzen, p. 375).

Oold, alt, R. AS. *eald*, E. *old*, H. *oud*. Wenn dieser Wort am Ende verlängert wird, so wird by uns in der Aussprache das *d* gemeinlich ausgestossen. *De Olen*, statt *Oolden*, die Alten, die Aeltern, die Vorfahren. *De Ole*, der Vater, die Mutter. Seven mit *der Olen*: Mutter mit 6 Kindern. 1768 *Bremisch-Niedersächsisches Wörterbuch*, iii. 262.

For the reduction of *old* before a noun to *ol'*, *ole*, even from early times, there is abundant evidence. It is found in Friar Geoffrey (Galfridus) of the fifteenth century and in "Uncle Remus" of the nineteenth.

Olde, or *elde*. Antiquus, vetus, veteranus, senex, grandevus, annosus (veteratus, P). [Next entry is:] *Ole*, for-weryd, as clothys, and other thyngys. *Vetustus*, detritus. 1440 *Prompt. Parv.* p. 363. [Hence *old clothes*, *ol' clo'es*: in the mouths of street pedlers: *ol' clo'*, even *o' clo'*.]

Bang! went queen's-arm, *ole gander* flopped
His wings a spell, an' quorked an' dropped.

1848 LOWELL, *The Two Gunners* (*Biglow Papers*, p. 164).

This loss of *d* after a liquid is quite ancient. I find *gol* for *gold* (*a* 1300 *Havelok*, l. 357), *lon* for *lond* (*id.* l. 340).

We are now prepared to enumerate the names which involv, as I believ, the conceald operation of Attraction from *old*.

1. **Hick**, a familiar form of *Richard*. (See before, p. 113.)

Old Hick, *owd Hick*, *awd Hick* ('*Ick*), *old Dick* became *ol' Dick*, *ow' Dick*, *aw' Dick*, and so simply *Dick*. Hence the diminutiv *Dickie*, *Dickon* (see below), and the surnames *Dick*, *Dicke*, in the possessiv form *Dicks*, formerly *Dickes*, *Dykkys*, *Dykys*, speld also *Dix*, formerly *Dixe*; with the filial addition, *Dickson*, speld also *Dixon*, *Dixson*, formerly *Dicson* (1375 *Barbour*, *Bruce*), *Dikson*, *Dyson*, *Dyxon* (1474 *Paston Letters*, iii. 174), *Dyxson* (1479 *id.* 258).

(b) Peter *Dicke*, Thomas Fitznell, sherefs; the x. yere [sc. of king John: namely 1208]. c 1502 *Arnold's Chron.* (1811), p. xx.
Dick o' the Cow. a 1596 *Dick o' the Cow* [title] (*Child*, *Ballads*, vi. 69).
And, *Dick*, she dances such a way. . . .

1646 SUCKLING, *Ballad of a Wedding*.
"Hae ye ony tidings?—Hae ye ony speerings, Hobbie?—O callants, dinna be ower hasty," said *old Dick* of the Dingle.

1816 SCOTT, *The Black Dwarf*, viii.

There's *Dick*, who sold wine in the lane,
And *old Dickey* himself did not tope ill.

c 1825 *Writing and Reading* (Univ. Songster, i. 74).

2. ***Hickon**, in surnames *Hicken*, *Hickin*, *Hickins*, diminutiv of *Hick* (see above), also **Higgon*, ME. *Hegon*, in surnames *Higgin*, *Higgons*, *Higgins*, *Hyggins*). *Old *Hickon* became *old Dickon*, speld also *Diccon*, *Dicken*, ME. *Decon*, with variant *Diggon*, ME. *Degon*. From *Dickon*, *Dicken* ar derived the surnames *Dickens*, *Dickins* (formerly *Dikkins*, *Dicons*), *Dickinson*, *Dickenson* (formerly *Dickonson*, *Dyconson*, *Dykykson*), *Digginson*, *Digison*, parallel to *Hickins*, *Higgins*, *Higginson*.

(a) Barow and *Hegon* and all the Lord Moleynys men that wer at Gressam.
. . . And ther xuld no mor com with him but *Hegon* and on of his owyn men. 1450 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 110, 111.

(b) The while the *Degonys* (ms. *dogonys*) domes were so endauntid.
1399 [LANGLAND], *Richard the Redeless*, iii. 351.

Tyll *Degon* and *Dobyn* that mennys doris brastyn,
And were y-dubbid of a duke ffor her while domes
Awakyd ffor wecchis and wast that they vsid,
And ffor her breame blastis buffettis henten.

1399 [LANGLAND], *Richard the Redeless*, iii. 362.

[*Degon* and *dobyn*, evidently *Diggon* and *Dabbin*, both common names for country bumpkins, here used in contempt of the upstarts who used to burst in men's doors, and rob them.

1886 SKEAT, note l.c., vol. ii. p. 302.]

And ay he sange in fayth *decon* thou crewe.

a 1529 SKELTON, *Bowge of Court*.

[This song is again mentioned in *Why come ye not to Court*.

1790 RITSON, *Anc. Songs*, li.]

Diggon Davie! I bidde her god day;

Or *Diggon* her is, or I missaye.

1579 SPENSER, *Shepheards Calender*, Sept. l. i. (and 10 times more).

"I'll speak him fair," he said, "as *auld Dickon* advised me."

1816 SCOTT, *The Black Dwarf*, viii.

3. **Hob.** *Old Hob* would, by the process I hav described, result in *old Dob*; for which evidence exists in the surnames *Dobbs* (formerly *Dobbes*, *Dobbis*, *Dobbys*), and *Dobson* (formerly **Dobbe-son*, *Dobyson*), along side of *Hobbs* and *Hobson*.

(b) There was a man and his name was *Dob*
And he had a wife and her name was *Mob*.

a 1845 HALLIWELL, *Nursery Rhymes*, p. 75.

4. **Hobbin**, ME. **Hobin*, **Hobyn*, familiar form of *Robin*, *Robbin*. See p. 116. Hence the surnames *Hobin*, *Hobbin*, *Hobbins*.

Old Hobbin would giv, after the manner above shown, *old Dobbin*, and so simply *Dobbin*. Company *Dobby* from *Hobby* (below). Hence the surnames *Dobbin*, *Dobin*, *Dobbyn*, *Dobbins*, *Dobbinson*, *Dobinson*, parallel to *Hobbin*, *Hobbins*, etc.

(b) *Tyll Degon* and *Dobyn* that mennis doris brastyn.

1399 [LANGLAND], *Richard the Redeless*, iii. 362.

[See quot. under *Dickon*, above.]

Dobbin came to be a familiar name for a horse; it is often con-join'd with the very adjectiv *old* to which the name *Dobbin* owes its initial consonant.

Dobbin my philhorse. 1623 SHAKESPEARE, *M.V.* ii. 2 (F p. 168).

My *old Dobbin* stands in the little stable beside the hencoop. . . . Take

Dobbin, and do not forget to leave your own horse instead.

1825 SCOTT, *Peveril of the Peak*, xxiii.

Horses' names. . . . Dick, *Dobbin*, Doctor . . . Nob.

1889 PEACOCK, *Manley and Corringham Gloss.* (E.D.S.), p. 279.

Hence *dobbin* as a common noun, 'an old horse.'

Dobbin. An old jaded horse.

1847 HALLIWELL.

Dobbin, a familiar name for a horse.

1875 NODAL and MILNER, *Lanc. Gloss.* p. 107.

Hence *dobbin*, a timber cart.

Dobbin, s.—A timber cart. *Dobbin* wheels, the very high wheels of the same.

1877 LEIGH, *Cheshire Gloss.* p. 63.

5. **Hobbie**, also speld *Hobby*, diminutiv of *Hob*, in fact an altered form of *Hobbin*. See above. *Old Hobby*, for which I hav no example at hand, may be the source, in the way above shown, of *dobby*, dialectal *dauby*, 'a silly old man' (H.), 'a fool' (H.), also 'a kind of spirit' (H.)—the last sense going to confirm the connection here asserted with *Hob*, *Hobby*, which names ar often applied to spirits or goblins. *Dobby* also exists as a surname, *Dobby*, *Dobbie*, *Dobby*.

(b) *Dobby*. A fool, a childish old man; also, a sprite or apparition. *North*.
1790 GROSE, *Prov. Gloss.*

Dobby. 1822 IRVING, *Bracebridge Hall*, ii. 183-6. (H. p. 307.)

Dobby. A fool; a silly old man. Also a kind of spirit. *North*. The *dobbies* seem to be similar to the Scottish *Brownies*.

1847 HALLIWELL, p. 307.

Dauby. A fool. *Northumb*.

1847 HALLIWELL, p. 293.

6. **Hodge**, a familiar form of *Roger*, *Rodger*. See p. 119.

From *Old Hodge* may come the surname *Dodge*.

I find "*dodge*, a dog (Alleyn Papers, p. 32)" in Halliwell, an assibilated form of ME. *dogge*. This can hardly be the source of the surname *Dodge*, as the name of *dog* or *hound* was felt to be strongly opprobrious, and however freely applied to a man, it would not, like *fox*, *wolf*, *bull*, and other animal names felt to be in some way complimentary, admit of a humorous or complimentary interpretation and thus enter into general use. Hence the surnames *Dog*, *Hound*, or *Hund*, never common, ar now practically extinct.

(a) *Old Hodge* Bacon and Bob Grosthed.

1664 S. BUTLER, *Hudibras*, pt. II. iii. 224.

(b) *Dodge* [surname].

1891 *N. Y. Directory*.

7. **Hod**, a shortened form of *Hodge*, as *Rod* is of *Rodge*, for *Rodger*, *Roger*. From *old Hod*, or from *Hod* by conformity with the perversion of *Hodge*, may have come *Dod*, known as a surname, *Dod*, *Dodd*, also in patronymic form *Dodds* and *Dodson*. The diminutiv *Hoddy* occurs as a surname. The terms *hod*, *hoddy*, *dod*, *doddy*, run thru a remarkable series of words meaning 'something short or squat,' as a short person, a snail, etc., but these words ar partly associated with other roots, and it can not be safely asserted that they ar derived from the name *Hoddy* or *Hodge*.

The surname *Dodson*, so unhappily familiar to Mr. Pickwick, may be partly from *Davidson*, as *Daud* is a contraction of *David*.

The next name I consider does not appear to have been common in the Middle English period, but it was in use, and it underwent the same kind of change.

8. **Andrew**, dialectally or formerly *Androw*, *Andro*, *Andre*, ME. *Andrew*, *Andreu*, OF. *Andreu*, *Andriuu*, *Andrieu*, *Andre*, LL. *Andreas*, from Gr. Ἀνδρέας; in popular form **Andrie*, *Andie*, *Andy*. Hence by influence of *old*, as in the previous cases, or perhaps by mere conformity, the forms *Dandrie*, *Dandie*, *Dandy*. We may suppose, as a contributing cause, the riming variation of the name *Andy* by children and nurses — *Andy Dandy*, *Handy Andy*, etc.

- (a) *Andrew*e, *Andreas*. 1483 *Cath. Angl.* p. 9.
Andro . . . *Andrew*.
 1552 LYNDESAY, *The Monarche* (E.E.T.S.), l. 4639, 4750, 4790, etc.

So other quotations for *Andrew* under *Saint Andrew*, IX., p. 101.

- (b) Call'd in of *Dandrie*, Hob, and Jock.
 c 1650 *The Raid of the Reidswire* (Scott, *Minstrelsy*, ii.; Child, *Ballads*, vi. 133).

In the small village of Lustruther in Roxburghshire, there dwelt in the memory of man, four inhabitants called *Andrew* or *Dandie* Oliver. They were distinguished as *Dandie* Eassil-gate, *Dandie* Wassail-gate, *Dandie* Thumble, and *Dandie* Dumble.

1815 SCOTT, *Guy Mannering*. Note 5.
Dandy Dinmont (xxii. p. 101 — first mention). . . . *Dandie* Dinmont (xxiv. p. 109). . . . *Dandy* (xxiv. p. 109). *Mr. Andrew* Dinmont (xxvii. li.). . . . *Andrew* Dinmont (xxxvi.). [*Dandie* is the usual spelling throughout the book. 1815 SCOTT, *Guy Mannering*.

In this *Dandy*, a familiar form of *Andrew*, I find the hitherto undiscovered origin of the common nouns *dandy* and *dandiprat*. That *dandy* and *dandiprat* are connected, there should be no doubt. But the connection is peculiar. *Dandiprat* is at least three centuries older than *dandy*. I therefore treat it first.

Dandiprat, in other forms *dandyprat*, *dandy-prat*, *dandie-prat*, *dandeprat*, also in two parts *dandy prat*, *dandy pratt*, is found in two senses. In a personal sense it signifies 'a little fellow, a dwarf, an urchin,' and is used generally in contempt. It is often attributive.

Yet as the gigantes pawes pat downe *dandiprat*s,
 So shall we put downe these *dandiprat* brag brattes.

1556 J. HEYWOOD, *Spider and the Flie*.
 (*N. & Q.*, 29 July, 1893, p. 82.)

A cockney *dandiprat* hop-thumb. 1582 STANYHURST, tr. *Aeneid*, iv. 349.
 Nano, a dwarfe, or *dandiprat* [1611 and 1659 ad "a twattle"].

1598 FLORIO.
 The vile *dandiprat*. 1607 BREWER, *Lingua*, iii. 3. (Richardson.)
 Vn manche d'estrille. A dwarfe, elfe, *dandiprat*, low scrub.

1611 COTGRAVE.
 A *Dandiprat* or Dwarfe, ex. B. Danten, i. ineptire, & Praete, i. sermo, nugæ, fabulæ: Solent enim Nani ad sermocinandum ineptiores esse.

1617 MINSHEU.
 The smug *dandiprat* smells us out.

1622 MASSINGER, *Virgin Martyr*, ii. 1. (Richardson.)
 A *dandiprat* or dwarfe, v. Enano. 1623 MINSHEU, *Span.-Eng. Dict.* p. 284.

- A *Dandprat*, or a dwarfe. Een dwergh, ofte dwerghsken. 1648 HEXHAM.
 Sometimes with lacings and with swaiths so strait,
 For want of space we have a *Dandprat*.
 1653 in BULWER, *Artificial Changeling*.
 "It is even so, my little *dandie-prat*—but who the devil could teach it
 thee?" "Do not care about that," said Flibbertigibbet.
 1821 SCOTT, *Kenilworth*, xxvi.
 Little Jack *Dandy-prat* was my first suitor.
 a 1819 in HALLIWELL, *Nursery Rhymes*, p. 92.

In the second sense, by the record apparently older, it is "a small silver coin current in England in the sixteenth century" equal in value according to one statement (1600) to three half pence. The name was not official, but popular.

- I coyle with money, I trye the currante from the badde. Jesluis . . .
 Coyle out the *dandyprattes* and Yrisshe pence: eslizez les *dandyprattes*
 et les deniers d'Irlande hors de la reste. 1530 PALSGRAVE, p. 498.
 The king's grace went over with a ten thousand men to conquer all France,
 and spent haply an hundred thousand pound, of which he saved the
 fourth part in the *dandyprats*, and gathered at home five or six hundred,
 or more. 1530 TYNDALE, *Practyse of Prelates* (Parker Soc., 1849),
 p. 306. (Spelling modernized.)
Dandprat. 1542 R. RECORDE. (*N. & Q.*, July 29, 1893, p. 82.)
Dandprat (a coin). a 1600 in ELLIS, *Orig. Letters*, ser. iii. vol. i.
 (Oliphant, *New Eng.* ii. 385.)
 And for such stuffe passe not a *Dandy Pratt*.
 a 1600 (?) *Dialogue between Comen Secretary and Felowisy* (see *Beloe's*
Anecdotes, vol. i. p. 890; *Gent. Mag.*, 1819, Part II. pp. 7, 8; in
Gent. Mag. Libr., 1884, p. 142).
 3 halfe-pence maketh 1 *Dandiprate*.
 1600 T. HILL, *Arithmeticke*, i. 13. (C.D.)
 Shall I make a Frenchman cry O! before the fall of the leaf? Not I, by
 the cross of this *Dandyprat*.
 1602 MIDDLETON, *Blurt Master Constable*, ii. 1. (C.D.)
 A *Dandiprat* or Dodkin, so called because it is as little among other
 money as a *Dandiprat* or Dwarfe among other men. 1617 MINSHEU.
 K. Henry the seventh stamped a small coine called *Dandy prats*, & first,
 as I read, coyned Shillings. 1637 CAMDEN, *Remaines*, p. 188.
 A *Dandprat*, or a dodkin [erroneously explained as] Een kleyn man,
 ofte manneken. [See quot. 1648, above.] 1648 HEXHAM.
 Scant worth a *Dandprat*. *Triobolaris homo, homo trioboli*.
 1677 HOLYOKE.
 A small silver coin, struck by Henry VII., of little value, called a *dandy*
prat. 1819 *Northampton Mercury*, April 17 (in *N. & Q.*,
 8th ser. iv., Aug. 19, 1893).

Mr. Henry H. Gibbs has brought out a statement from Mr. Head of the coin department of the British Museum that there was no such coin of Henry VII. A further statement from the same source is thus express by Mr. Wroth.

We can only suppose that it [the coin called *dandiprat*] was some small coin of the Tudor period. The *2d.* piece (half groat) of Henry VII. has a small head of the king on it (so, also, however, has the shilling of the same reign), and the silver penny of Henry VII. has a small seated

figure of the king on it. Your ingenious explanation that the name *dandiprat* was given because of the small head, or the small figure on the coin, is therefore possible. . . . I am rather inclined myself to believe that *dandiprat* was merely suggested by the small size of the coin. . . . 1893 W. WROTH, in *N. & Q.*, 8th ser. iv., Aug. 19, p. 153.

Without laying stress on the forms *dandy pratt*, *dandy prat*, *dandy-pratt*, *dandie-prat*, as cited, which imply a name of two original terms, I am inclined to conjecture that in the reign of Henry VII., to whom the first coinage of dandiprats is ascribed, there existed, probably in London, or in some other place where he would be often seen by the populace, a dwarf named *Andrew Prat* or *Pratt*, familiarly known as *Dandy Prat*; that his name past into popular speech, like *Tom Thumb*, as a synonym for smallness of size; that when the little coins wer issued, they wer cald at first in jest *Dandy Prats*, as it was the passing custom a few years ago to call anything huge of its kind a *Jumbo*, after the great elephant of that name, and as the name of *Daniel Lambert*, the big man, was at one time used as a general term for anything big.

That dwarfs at the time in question and later wer frequent objects of popular notice, needs no demonstration. For the naming of a coin after a man (tho for other reasons) compare *atchison*, *harrington*, *Harry noble*, *louis*. Whether the supposed *Andrew Prat* thus etymologically excogitated, really existed, I must leav undetermind. I may note that *Pratt* is a common surname in the sixteenth century, as it is now; and that *Prat* was then a common spelling.

A mery Play betweene the Pardoner and the Frere, the Curate and Neybour *Pratte*.
1533 HEYWOOD [Title] (1860 Halliwell, *Dict. Old Plays*, p. 188; Dodsley, ed. Hazlitt, i. 198).

I find "Pretty *Pratt*" used as a playful or fond address to a little boy, early in the fifteenth century. Perhaps he was a relativ of little *Dandy Pratt*.

Howe! Prittie *Pratte*, my messinger!
Come heither to me, withouten were.
c 1430 (ms. 1592) *Chester Plays*, i. 173.

Here we hav all the conditions for the rise of *dandiprat* as a humorous popular name for a small coin; and a popular name it was, much like our modern *greenback*, *shinplaster*, etc.

Dandy, as applied, half kindly, half in contempt, to a trim little fellow, a fop, does not appear on record before this century. It has nothing to do with the French *dandin*, of which the sense ("a meacocke, noddie, ninnie, a hoydon, sot, lobcocke; one that knowes not

how to looke, and gapes at every thing he knowes not") (1611 Cotgrave) is far from that of *dandy*. I think *dandy* is either due to *dandiprat* taken as 'a little fellow,' hence 'a trim little fellow,' 'a fop,' and hence 'any man conspicuously neat in his dress'; or is an other, independent, use of the personal name *Dandy* for *Andrew*. When it was coming into literary use it was regarded as a "slang word"; which implies that it was of popular, perhaps local or anecdotal, origin, and was current some time before appearing in print.

Origin of the word *Dandy*: This term, which has recently been applied to a species of reptile very common in the metropolis, appears to have arisen from a small silver coin, struck by King Henry VII., of little value, called a *dandy pratt*; and hence Bishop Fleetwood observes, the term is applied to worthless and contemptible persons.

1819 *Northampton Mercury*, April 17 (in *N. & Q.*, 8th ser. iv., Aug. 19, 1893).

Dandy was and is used also as an adjectiv of admiration. It used to be common in songs. It is now rife in popular speech, to express any kind of approbation for which an exact descriptiv does not suggest itself. At the World's Fair in Chicago, where this paper was red, I heard a Western farmer, in the Horticultural Building, express his admiration of a dozen diverse things by the same comprehensiv formula, "Ain't that *dandy*!" Anything that meets approbation as being neat, fine, nice, is 'a dandy.'

The Alert was agreed on all hands to be a fine ship, and a large one: . . . "A *crack* ship." — "A regular *dandy*," etc.

1840 R. H. DANA, *Two Years before the Mast* (1842), p. 205.

9. **Woman.** A clear case of the development of an initial *a* from the *d* of a preceding *old*, is the following: *An old woman, the old woman, my old woman, his old woman*, ar common phrases, the possessiv especially in rural or low use. A pesant, a costermonger, a jockey, wil speak of '*my old woman*,' meaning either his wife or his mother. In dialectal use *woman* often becomes *oman*, *ooman* (commonly written 'oman), aspirated *hooman*; and *old* 'oman, *old* 'ooman has become in many cases *old dooman*.

(a) By your pore bede *oman* and cosyn, Alice Crane.

c 1455 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, i. 343.

Eua. For shame, *o'man* [read 'oman].

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *M. W. W.* iv. 1 (F¹ p. 53).

Euans. *O'man*, art thou Lunatics? 1623 *Id.* (F¹ p. 54).

Eua. By yea, and no, I thinke the *o'man* is a witch indeede: I like not when a *o'man* has a great peard; I spie a great peard vnder his muffler.

1623 *Id.* iv. 2 (F¹ p. 55).

"How ar'ry jung *umman*," sez a, "how dost do?"

1846 *Spec. Cornish Prov. Dialect*, p. 24.

- Oman*. A woman. Var. dial. 1847 HALLIWELL.
Hooman. The common pronunciation of *Woman* in many of our vil-
 lages. 1854 BAKER, *Northampt. Gloss.* i. 335.
Ooman, a woman. 1881 SMITH, *Isle of Wight Words* (E.D.S.), p. 24.

The term *old woman* is of course of innumerable occurrence.

He has bin . . . greeuously peaten as an *old o'man*.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *M.W.W.* iv. 2 (F¹ p. 56).

'*Ooman*. My *old 'ooman* is the usual term used by an old labourer in speaking of his wife.

1876 *South Warwickshire Provincialisms* (E.D.S.), p. 130.

'My *ole 'oman* done gone en tuck mighty sick,' sezee.

1881 J. C. HARRIS, *Uncle Remus*, p. 76. [Sim. p. 46.]

Awld. — "Awld" is specially used as a term of familiarity, or even endearment. Thus a man would say of his wife, "My *awld 'ooman* 'ool hev dinner jus ready vor us."

1888 LOWSLEY, *Berkshire Words* (E.D.S.), p. 43. [See also p. 20.]

(b) *Dooman*. A woman. Var. dial. 1847 HALLIWELL.

Dooman, a wooman; only used when preceded by *old* — *ol' dooman*, *old 'oman*.

1881 SMITH, *Isle of Wight Words* (E.D.S.), p. 9.

Pure, nice, excellent. 'She's a pure *wold dooman*.'

1881 SMITH, *Isle of Wight Words* (E.D.S.), p. 26.

'*Ooman*. — Woman. When *awld* precedes '*ooman* the *d* is carried on, and '*ooman* is sounded *dooman*.

1888 LOWSLEY, *Berkshire Words* (E.D.S.), p. 121.

In some examples we hav *old dooman*, with two *d*'s, just like *old Dick*.

It is a beautiful and touching custom of the profession to which I hav the honor to belong, after the citation of a dozen incontrovertible causes of action, or offering seven inexpugnable answers to a pleading, to go right on with an other as a "further and separate" cause of action, or answer, as the case may be; to the complete confusion of the other side, until it does the same, m.m. Let me do the like in this freer forum.

In further evidence that the initial *D* in *Dick*, *Dickon*, *Dobbin*, *Dobby*, etc., is derived by attraction from *old*, I cite together two significant facts: first, that these names and the parallel forms *Hick*, *Hickon*, *Hob*, etc., and the original of *Hob*, namely *Robert*, ar often used with reference to the devil or to less malignant demons or goblins; and secondly, that *old* as a term implying at once antiquity and contempt or familiarity, has for centuries been a stock epithet of the devil. The proofs collected for this purpose I must omit; but I may use them on an other occasion.

It may be taken as a rule in philology and indeed in all sciences involving time, that when a cause is obscure, there is more than one cause. While I believ that the initial *d* in question originated mainly by attraction from *old*, it is probable that the process was assisted by

a similar attraction from *good*. I hav shown how the *d* of *good even*, *good een*, spred over to the noun. It is clear that the same might happen with *good* before personal names. That *good* was a very common epithet, often merely conventional, before personal names, is wel known.

I omit the numerous examples showing the frequency of this use of *good* in Middle English — *good boy*, *good brother*, *good cosin*, *good em* ('uncle'), *good mother*, *good nece*, *good sir*, *good sister*, *good son*, etc. So *good John*, *good Mary*, *good Mawdley*n, etc., and *good* alone.

I think it probable that further research along the line thus opend would reveal other personal names and surnames beginning with *d* thus derived from *old*.

An instance of the running together of a particle ending in *d* with a word beginning with *h*, and the consequent absorption of the *h* appears in the following: Noah sends out the raven, saying:

Pou arte ful crabbed and al thy kynde,
Wende forthe þi course I comaunde þe,
And werly watte *andyþer* þe wynd,
Yf þou fynde awdir lande or tree.

c. 1430 *York Plays*, ix. l. 213, p. 52.

[Read 'and werly watte [it would be originally *wite*], and hyper þe wynd,' that is, 'and warely wit (carefully observ), and hither turn thee.']

XIX. **God.** The medieval Englishman, as wel as the medieval Frenchman and the rest of medieval Europe under the fostering care of the Roman church, was extremely apt in that kind of piety which consists in the frequent utterance of the name of God and the names of saints. As the intervals of piety wer fild up by the utterance of profanity, which employd precisely the same vocabulary (as Mr. Smallweed used the deprecations of the litany, "from battle and murder, and from sudden death," as the handiest source of imprecations he could think of), the medieval Englishman had much occasion to use his Maker's name. This led to economy. In the first place, *God* was assimilated to a following word where convenient:

1. **God wot**, 'God knows,' was in ME. assimilated to *god dot*, *god dote*, *goddot*, *goddote*, *godote*.

Goddot, *Goddoth*.

a 1300 *Havelok* (Often.)

"Nai, *goddot*," said þat felun [var. *for-soþ* Fairf.; omitted in other 2 mss.].

c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton MS.) (E.E.T.S.), l. 773.

Godote [var. *Goddote*, *God wat*] said ioseph c 1300 *Id.* l. 4473.

[So *godote*, var. *goddote*, l. 4491, sim. 4612; *goddote*, var. *god dote*, *godote*, *god woote*, l. 3729; *god dote*, var. *godote*, l. 15983; etc.]

Compare with this the fact that *God ('s) will* has become *Goddil* in some places :

" *Goddil* for *God's will*, in Yorkshire and Lancashire.

1843 WAY, *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 201, note 2.

2. **God yield you**, that is, 'God pay you,' 'God reward you,' was once very common. It fel into *God 'ield you*, *God 'ild you*, and this was sometimes expanded into *God dild you*.

(a) *God yelde the*, frend. . . . c 1374 CHAUCER, *Tr. and Cr.* i. 1055.

The highe *father of heaven* I praie

To *eylde you* your good deed to daie.

c 1430 (ms. 1592) *Chester Plays*, i. 169.

God yeld you, brother, that it so is

That thou thi hyne so wold kys. c 1450 *Towneley Myst.*, p. 48.

To begyn. *God yeld yow* for my hatys [hats].

1469 *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, ii. 355.

God-ild-you.

c 1600. (H. p. 407.)

How you shall bid *God-eyld* vs for your paines.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Macbeth* i. 6 (F¹ p. 134).

(b) *King*. How do ye, pretty Lady?

Ophe. Well, *God dil'd you*. 1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Ham.* iii. (F¹ p. 273).

Blessing and cursing ar often associated in Scripture and they may result in similar changes of speech. But I pass the cursings by. In the history of *drot*, *drat*, and similar forms, there is a kind of Attraction which must here be left with a mere mention.

B. Initial D lost.

XX. **Deal**. An instance of the loss of initial *d* by attraction to or absorpion in a preceding final *d*, appears in *a good deal*, often pronounced *a good 'eal*. So *a great deal* (often assimilate to *a gread deal*) is often heard as *a great 'eal*. I hav heard this pronunciation from all classes of people. Children use it also; and I hav been askt by a child who had used or heard the phrase *a good 'eal*, "What is 'eal?"

A housand soulis her-in hai bren.

"Alas," sayd Poule, "here is *gret deel!*"

c 1426 [AUDELAY], *The XI Pains of Hell*, l. 51.

(*Old Eng. Misc.*, E.E.T.S., p. 212.)

It is warryed a *grete dele*.

1450 *Towneley Myst.*, p. 32.

XXI. **Dish**. An instance in which initial *d* in the second element of a compound has been absorbd in the final *d* of the first element, is **stand-dish*, a dish or standing receptacle for ink. As the thing was clearly a stand (we call it now an *ink-stand*), and was not

always clearly a dish, the second element yielded to the first, and *dish* took the form of the suffix *-ish*. I have not yet found a single instance of the full form **stand-dish*; nor any instance of *standish* earlier than the end of the sixteenth century.

- (b) Pausing a while ouer my *standish*, I resolued in verse to paynt forth my passion. 1592 NASH, *Pierce Penniless*, p. 5.
 Calamaio, Calamaro . . . a *standish*, or a pen and inkehorne. . . . Scrittoio, a *standish*, an inke-horne. 1598 FLORIO.
 Cabinet d'Allemagne. A kind of *standish*; or a small cabinet seruing for, or hauing in it, a *standish*. 1611 COTGRAVE.
 A box-*standish*. Cabinet d'Alemagne. 1632 SHERWOOD.
 An Ink-horn, or a *standish*, *Atramentarium*. 1677 *Compleat Clerk*, opp. sig. Vvv.
 The massive silver *inkstandish* which stood full before her. 1819 SCOTT, *Bride of Lammermoor*.

§ VI. Initial S gained or lost.

A. Initial S gained. Cases in which a final *s* has spread over to the beginning of the next word, producing two *s*'s, or drawing the final *s* out of its place. The words from which the Attraction takes place are *horse*, *ice*, *any* and *what* with the ME. possessiv suffix, *his* and other possessivs, *yes*, and probably other words. Among the nouns affected are *courser*, a dealer in horses, *ickle*, an icicle, *yokle*, an icicle, and *kin*, kind or sort. The cases are curious and involved, and call for considerable illustration.

XXII. One case involving *horse*.

1. *Courser*, early mod. Eng. also *coursar*, *coarser*, *corser*, ME. *corser*, *corsser*, *corsere*, *cursoire*, *kursure*, *coresur*, from OF. *courtier* (F. *courtier*), a reduced form of *couretier*, *couretier*, *corretier*, *couratier*, *coratier*, *curatier*, Prov. *couratié* (Roquefort), It. *curatiere*, ML. reflex *corraterius*, *coraterius*, *coratiarius*, *curaterius*, a broker, agent; OF. *couratier de chevaux*, a horse-trader; in which use the word was taken over into English. The OF. *couratier*, *coratier*, *curatier*, represents a ML. **curatarius*, equivalent to the usual L. and ML. *curator*, which is in OF. **cureor*, **coreour*, *cureur*, and *curatour*, a factor, agent, tutor, curator; *cureur de chevaux*, a horse-trader. *Courser*, in the first instance I find, occurs in the general sense of 'trader.'

bei ben *corseris* & makers of malt, & bien schep & neet & sellen hem for
wynnyng, & beten marketis, &c.

c 1380 WICLIFF, *Eng. Works* (E.E.T.S.), p. 172. (*C.A.*, p. 77.)

In the next instance it refers to a horse-keeper or groom.

Foles with hande to touche a *corser* weyveth;
Hit hurteth hem to handel or to holde.

c 1420 *Palladius on Husbandrie* (E.E.T.S.), p. 135.

The next *courser* we meet is a young man who steals a colt and offers to sel it for "ten mark of sterlynges." He says it is a mighty fine colt :

"For noon of all thy elderynges
Hadde noo swych in stabele;
For emperours sone, or for kynges,
Hyt ys profytabele."

The buyer acts in the regular modern fashion, and is duly taken in :

Florent answerede to the *corser* :

"Me thyngeth thou louest hyt to there [read *dere*];
Sterlynges ne haue I non here,
As thou gynnest craue:
Here beth ten pound of florens clere;
Wylt thou ham haue

For that colt that ys so bold?"
The *corser* seyde, "Tak me that goold:
To no man schuld hyt be sold
Half swych a chepe."
He tok the florens all vntold;
Away he lepe.

c 1430 *Octovian Imperator*, ll. 807-821. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* iii. p. 191.)

Coursoure of horse. Mango.

1440 *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 94.

Wyth hem they toke stedys sevyn,
Into Almayn they can ryde;
As a *coresur* of mekyll pryde
He semyd for to bee.

c 1450 *Erl of Tolous*, 973-978. (Ritson.)

[This is Halliwell's (and Wright's) "*coresur*, a courier," for which no example is given. Halliwell gives also "*corretier*, a horse-dealer," without reference. This is merely the OF. form, not a ME. form.]

The *corsser* hathe his palfrey dy3t
All reyd for to sell.

c 1460-70 *The Good Wyfe Wold a Pylgremage*, l. 47
(E.E.T.S.), 1869, p. 40.

And if Bayard be onsolde, I pray yow late hym be made fatte ageyns the
Kynge come in to the contre, what so ever I pay for the kepyng of
hym, and I schall wete how goode a *corser* I schall be my selfe at my
comyng in to the contre, be the grace of God, who have yow in kepyng.

1489 WM. PASTON, in *Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, iii. 354.

Corsers of horses by false menyng make them loke fresshe.

1519 HORMAN, *Vulgaria*. (*Way, Pr. P.*, p. 94.)

A *corser* is he that byeth all rydden horses, and selleth them agayne.

1523 FITZHERBERT, *Boke of Husbandry*, sign H. 2. (*C.A.*, p. 77.)

Courser [*coursar*, p. 210] of horses, covrtier de chevaux.

1530 PALSgrave, p. 209.

He can horse you as well as all the *corsers* in this towne: il vous scayt aussi bien monter que tous les courtiers de chevaux en ceste ville.

1530 *Id.* p. 588.

The word early underwent a corruption from *corsere* to **cosere*, *cosyr*, *coyseyr*. (See further, p. 142.)

Hic mango, a *cosyr*. c 1450 *Nominale*. (Wright, *Vocab.*² 684, l. 40.)
A *Coyseyr* of hors, Mango. 1483 *Cath. Angl.*, p. 77.

The phrase *courser of horses* (*corsoure of horse*, 1440 *Prompt. Parv.*), a translation of the OF. *courtier de chevaux* (Palsgrave), *couratier de chevaux* (Roquefort), subsequently took the form of a compound, *horse-courser*.

Mango. . . . An *horse coarser* that pampreth and trimmeth his horses for the same purpose ['to sell them the deerer?].

1565 COOPER, *Thesaurus*.

He that letteth horses or mules to hire: a mule-letter [1580 muleletter]: an *horse courser*: an hackneyman. Veterinarius . . . mango.

1573 BARET, *Alvearie*, H. 602 (1580 H. 650).

When *horsecorsers* beguile no friends with lades.

c 1576 GASCOIGNE, *The Steele Glas* (repr. Arber), p. 79.

A *horse corser*, a hackney man, a horse rider, a horse driver, a cariour, or a carter. 1578 FLORIO, *Second Frutes*, p. 43. (*C.A.*, p. 77.)

Cozzone, a *horse-courser*, a horse breaker, a craftie knaue. 1598 FLORIO.

(Also *horse-courser*, s.v. *palafreniere*; *horse-coarser*, s.v. *scozzonato*.)

Courratier de chevaux. A *horse-courser*. 1611 COTGRAVE.

I omit many later quotations. The word disappeared from general use about the middle of the seventeenth century, and was tucked away in the dictionaries.

Horse-courser, by a spreading of the final *s* of *horse* to the next element, came to be pronounced and written *horse-scourser*, *horse-scorser*, *horse-scoorser*.

(b) Mango equorum, qui emit equos et permutat distrahitque. Maquignon.

An *horse scorser*: he that buyeth horses and putteth them away again by chopping and changing. 1585 *Nomenclator*. (N.² p. 775.)

Corratier: m. A Broker; also, a *horse-scoorser*. 1611 COTGRAVE.

Maquignon: m. A hucster, Broker, *Horse-scourser*, cousening Marchant.

1611 COTGRAVE.

A horse Courser, or *horse scourser*. 1617 MINSHEU (under *courser*, p. 103).

A horse courser. . . . A *horse scourser*.

1632 SHERWOOD (under *c* and *s* respectively).

Nares and others say *horse-courser* "is corrupted from *horse-scourser*" (N.² p. 775), but the fact is the other way, as above shown. I hav not found an instance of *scourser* alone.

When all is said, there is usually more to follow; and the tale of the horse-courser is not yet ended. *Horse-courser*, with its increast form *horse-scourser*, ment simply a 'horse-keeper,' but it came to

mean also a 'horse-trader' and so *courser*, beside its proper sense of 'keeper' or 'groom' came to be used separately in the sense of 'trader,' 'exchanger.' And *courser* being treated as a nativ noun of agent in *-er* (*-er*¹ from AS. *-ere*), in sted of an imported noun of agent in *-er* (*-er*² from OF. *-ier*, L. *-ārtus*), was then naturally referd to a supposed verb *course*, which accordingly crept into use, along with the verbal noun. I mention first the compounds *horse-coursing* and *horse-scoursing*, 'horse trading':

- (a) *Horse-coursing*. 1616 BEAUMONT & FLETCHER, *Scornful Lady*. (C.D.)
1708 COLES, *Eng.-Lat. Dict.*
(b) *Horse-scoursing*. 1611 and 1673 COTGRAVE (s.v. *couretage* and *courratage*).
Horse-scoorsing. 1611 and 1673 *Id.* (s.v. *corratage*).

But the simple verb appears much earlier, namely, in the fourteenth century (first recorded in the verbal noun), in the senses of 'groom,' or 'train' (?) and 'trade, exchange, chop.'

The first record of this pseudo-primitiv verb appears in the verbal noun *coursing*, ME. *corsing*, with the attracted form *scoursing*, early mod. Eng. *scorssyng*, and the equivalent abstract noun in *-ery*, **course**ry*, ME. *corserie*, *coserie*, meaning 'trading,' 'merchandizing,' 'trade.'

- (a) This catel gat he wit okering [usury],
And led al his lif in *corsing* [Camb. ms. *cursyng*],
For he haunted bathe dai and niht
His okering, sine he was kniht.
c 1325 *Eng. Metr. Homilies*, ed. Small, p. 139.
(b) *Scorssyng* or *exchangyng*, *eschange*. [Not in the list of verbs.]
1530 PALSgrave, p. 268.
(a) It semeh, þat alle doying in þis mater is cursed *corserie* of symonie, zevyng
þe sygne of holy ordris for temperal drit.
a 1384 WYCLIF, *Select Works*, III. 283.
It come neuer of knyghthede, know it 3if hyme lyke,
To carpe of *coseri*, whene captyfis ere takyne.
c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S., 1865), I. 1581.

The verb itself appears, in the first quotation I hav, in the sense of 'groom,' 'manage,' or 'train.'

- Here be the best *coresed* hors
That ever yet sawe I me.
c 1500 *A Lytell Geste of Robyn Hode* (Child, *Ballads*, v. 62).
[This is Halliwell's "coresed, harnessed."]

Here belongs the modern provincial verb *horse-course*, to beat, as it were 'to groom,' 'curry down,' with a subaudition of 'horsewhip.'

- Horse-course*. To beat. "I'll *hoss-course* any o' yon lads I find any moore o' my otcherd." "It wo'd hav been a vast sight better to hev gen him a good *horse-coursin'* an' not to hev hed no justice to do about it." 1889 PEACOCK, *Manley and Corringham Gloss*. (E.D.S.), p. 278.

The sense 'exchange,' 'barter,' 'chop,' 'truck,' 'swap,' stil prevailing in provincial English, appears in the sixteenth century, the forms being (a) *course*, *coarse*, *corce*, etc., and (b) *scourse*, *scoorse*, *scoarse*, *scorese*, *scoree*.

(a) Scozzonare, to breake a coult. Also to *coarse* or change a horse. Scozzonato, broken a coult, *coarsed* a horse. 1598 FLORIO.

Scozzonare, as Cozzonare [i.e. 'To break and tame coltes, to play the horse-courser'], also to *coarse* or truck horses or colts as Jockies are wont to do. Scozzonato, broken or tamed, also trucked or *coarsed* with a horse-coarser. 1659 FLORIO, ed. Torriano.

Corce. To chop, or exchange. 1847 HALLIWELL.

(b) *Scorssyng*. 1530 PALSGRAVE, p. 268. [See above.] [Not in 1570 Levins, or 1573 Baret, or 1580 Baret, in either form.]

Changer . . . *scorese*. 1593 HOLLYBAND, *Dict.* (H. p. 713.)

This done she makes the stately dame to light,
And with the aged woman cloths to *scorese*.

1591 HARRINGTON, tr. Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, xx. 78. (N.² p. 774.)

See examples from Drayton and Spenser in Nares, ed. Halliwell, pp. 774, 775.

Barater. . . . To trucke, *scourse*, barter, exchange. 1611 COTGRAVE.

Changer. To change . . . exchange, interchange, trucke, *scoorse*, barter, chop with. 1611 COTGRAVE.

So elsewhere in 1611 Cotgrave: *Scoarse* (s.v. *harder*) [1673 *scoorse*]. So in 1617 Minsheu (*scourse*), 1632 Sherwood (*scourse*), etc.

Scourse is stil common in provincial use.

Scorese, v. to exchange. 'Tis Somers. [Exmoor] too; *Gent. Magaz.* xvi. p. 407. 1736 PEGGE, *Alphabet of Kenticisms* (E.D.S.), 1876, p. 45.

Scorese. To exchange . . . still in use. 1847 HALLIWELL.

This is a long course; but the end is not yet. The word *course*, together with its by-form *scourse*, early suffered the loss of the *r*, appearing as *coyse* (*coise*, *cose*) in 1483, and as **cose*, in the derived *cosyr* for *corser*, and *coseri* for *corserie*, as early as 1440 (see pp. 140 and 141). In modern provincial use we find (a) *course*, *coase*, *cose*, *cocce*, *coss*, *coiss*, *cois*, and (b) *scourse*, *scoase*, *scose*, *scoace*, *scwoce*, *squoace*, *scoss*.

(a) To *coyse*, alterare, & cetera; vbi to chawngce. 1483 *Cath. Angl.*, p. 77.

To cope or *coase*. Cambire. 1573 BARET, *Alvearie*.

To *cocce*, cambire. 1570 LEVINS, *Manip. Vocab.*, 155, l. 17.

Couse. To change the teeth. *Warw.* Formerly to exchange anything, as in the *Reliq. Antiq.* ii. 281.

1847 HALLIWELL. [H. does not give *cose*.]

For the forms *coase*, *cose*, *cocce*, *coss*, *coiss*, *cois*, see 1808 Jamison, 1889 C.D., 1893 N.E.D.

(b) *Scoase*. . . . *Scoarse* or *scoace*.

- 1746 *Exmoor Courtship* (E.E.T.S.), pp. 78, 152.
Scorse, or *scoace*. To exchange. Exm. 1790 GROSE, *Prov. Gloss.*
Squoace. To truck or exchange. Somerset. 1847 HALLIWELL.
Scorse, or *scoase*. To exchange; probably from the fact of discursing
 previously to the exchange. 1853 COOPER, *Sussex Gloss.*, p. 72.
Scoss. To barter; to exchange. 1857 WRIGHT.
Scoase (skoa'us), vb. To exchange. "I'll *scoase* horses with you."
 1887 PARISH and SHAW, *Dict. Kentish Dial.* (E.D.S.), p. 136.

The loss of medial *r* in this position, with its recognition in writing, at so early a period, is somewhat remarkable, but it is not without parallel. I find just the same loss of *r* in a word of similar phonetic form, namely *courser*, a warhorse, early found as *couser*, and current in Scotch as *couser*, *cooser*, *cusser*.

Kyllede *cousers* and couerde stedes.

c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S., 1865), l. 2115.

[Read *coursers*? Cf. *coursere*, l. 2166.]

For ye ken a fie man and a *cusser* fearsna the deil.

1815 SCOTT, *Guy Mannering*, xi.

"Whisht, man, whisht," said the king; "ye needna nicher that gait, like a *cusser* at a caup o' corn, een though it was a pleasing jest, and our ain framing."

1822 SCOTT, *Fortunes of Nigel*, xxxi.

The same loss occurs in the dialectal *coose* for *course*, and *discoose*, for *discourse*, and appears at equally early date in *scace* for *scarce*, a form known from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the present time. And indeed, according to Mr. Sweet and other British authorities, the *r* in such a position is in all modern English words, as spoken in London, totally lost. The same is true of all black and most white speech in the southern United States. Mr. Sweet pronounces *course* as "kaos," in C.D. notation kôs, riming with *sauce*. In the South, they pronounce it *cose* (kôs), riming with *dose*.

XXIII. Two cases involving *ice*.

1. **Ickle**, an icicle. This word has had a checkerd career. The stil in provincial use, in various forms, it is in literary English no longer recognized as an independent word. It exists unrecognized in *icicle*, properly *ice-ickle*, but now so speld as to simulate a diminutiv in *-i-cle*. *Ickle*, especially in this compound, has undergone strange mutations. One is shown in my previous paper, TRANSACTIONS, xxiii. 240. There ar really two words concernd, *ickle* of nativ (Anglo-Saxon) origin, and *yokle* of Scandinavian origin. Both have been affected by Attraction.

Ickle, speld also *iccle*, with varied vowel *eccle*, *ecle*, with sonant guttural *iggle*, *aigle*, is from ME. *ikel*, *ykel*, *ikyl*, *iekyll*, *ykle*, *ycle*, *ekel*, assibilated *ychele*, from AS. *gicel*, an icicle, in *ises gicel*, 'ice's ickle,' ickle of ice, **īs-gicel*, 'ice-ickle,' icicle, and the poetical, each once-occurring, *cyle-gicel*, '*chill-ickle,' ickle of cold, i.e. winter, *hīm-gicel*, '*rime-ickle,' ickle of rime or frost, *hilde-gicel*, '*war-ickle,' hailstone, and the adj. activ *gicelig*, '*ickly,' icy. It is cognate with Frisian *jokkel* (in *is-jokkel*), *jöckel*, *jögel*, *jäkel* (in *iis-jäkel*), *jael* (1837 Outzen, *Glossarium*, p. 143), an icicle, and with Icel. *jökull*, an icicle, also ice, in mod. Icel. especially a glacier, and hence common in local names, the original sense 'icicle' being quite lost (1874 Cleasby); Norw. *jökul*, dial. *jukul*, *jukel*, an icicle, also a glacier, *is-jökul*, icicle (Aasen); Sw. dial. *ikkel*, an icicle, Dan. obs. or dial. *egel*, *egle* (1841 Molbech, *Dansk Dialekt-Lexikon*, p. 97), *huus-egel*, '*house-ickle' (1833 Molbech, *Dansk Ordbog*, i. 470). The word is perhaps a derivativ, probably diminutiv, of the simple form seen in Icel. *jaki*, a piece of ice, broken ice (1874 Cleasby and Vigfusson, s.v., and p. xxxii).

Un esclarcyl, an *ychele*.

Ickle. c 1300 *Bibelesworth Gloss.* (Wright, *Vocab.* i. 161.)

Ikyl (*iekyll*, W.). Stiria. 1440 *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 259.

Thowe, of snowe, or *ychys* or [of?] *yce*. Resolucio, liquefaccio, degelacio.

. . . Thowyn, as *yce* or *oþer lyke* (or *ykelys*, S.). Degelat, resolvit, Cath.

Ikle. 1440 *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 492.

Ikle. c 1460 *Nominale ms.* (H. p. 473.)

A *nykle* [an *ykle*]. a 1500 *Med. Cant.* (Way, p. 259.)

Ickles, stiria. 1570 LEVINS, *Manip. Vocab.* (E.E.T.S.), 125, 6.

Os cowd os *iccles*. 1750 COLLIER ("TIM BOBBIN"), *Lancashire Dial.* (P. p. 632.)

Iccles. Isicles. North. 1790 GROSE, *Prov. Gloss.*

Ickles, Isicles, water *ickles*, *stalactites* [sic].

Iccles. Isicles. North. . . . Also, spars in the form of icicles. 1828 [CARR], *Craven Gloss.* i. 241.

Iccles. Isicles. North. . . . Also, spars in the form of icicles. 1847 HALLIWELL, p. 472.

Eccle. An icicle. *Salop*. 1847 HALLIWELL, p. 329.

Iggle and *aigle*, an icicle. 1848 EVANS, *Leicestershire Gloss.* (P. p. 186.)

Ickle. Another name for the *icicle*. 1854 BAKER, *Northampton Gloss.* i. 349.

Stiff us *iccles*. 1857 SCHOLES (*Lanc. Gloss.*, p. 165).

The Kentish form *aquabob*, an icicle (1790 Grose, 1847 Halliwell), I take to be **icklebob* (*ickle* + *bob*), dial. **ickabob*, which, written down by some profound Latinist, became *aquabob*, apparently one of those "hybrids" which used to disturb purists.

In the compound form *ice-ickle*, *icicle*, the word has run an other course: A.S. **isgicel*, *ises gicel*, ME. *isykle*, *ysse-ikkele*, *ysekele*, *ise-ickue*, *hyshykylle*, *isezekelle*, *izekelle*, etc., mod. E. *isickle*, *isikle*, *isycle*, *isicle*, *icicle*.

**Is-gicel.* c 1000? (Bosworth, ed. Toller, pp. 474, 602 — no ref.).

Stiria stillicidia, *ises gicel.*

c 1000 ÆLFRIC, *Gloss.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 117, 14.)

per as claterande fro þe crest þe colde borne renneþ,

& hengeð he 3e ouer his hede in hard *ysse-ikkles.*

c 1360 *Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight* (E.E.T.S., 1864), l. 721.

And thanne flaumbeth he [the holygoste] as fyre on fader and on filius,

And melteth her my 3te in-to mercy as men may se in wyntre

Ysekeles in euses [*Isykles* in euesynges C] thorw hete of the sonne,

Melteth in a mynut-while to myst and to watre.

1377 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (B), xvii, 227.

Styrium, *hysehykylle.*

a 1500 *Vocab. Roy. ms.* 17 C. xvii. (Way.)

Hyshykylle ought to satisfy those who love *rhyme* and *tongue* and *programme* and *through* and other nimious spellings.

An *Izekelle* (*Isezekille* A), stirium, stircus. 1483 *Cath. Angl.*, p. 198.

Droppe of yse called an *isikle*, whych hangeth on a house eaves or

pentisse. Stiria. 1552 HULOET, *Abececlarium.* (Heritage, *C.A.*, 198.)

Gouttes gelées. *Isicles.*

1611 COTGRAVE.

Her tresses of gold . . . were now growne more white then thistle downe,
the *isickles* of frozen ice, or the white mountains snow.

1635 R. JOHNSON, *Tom a Lincoln.* (Thoms, *Early Prose Rom.* ii. 94.)

The form *icicle*, *ice-ickle*, in its earlier and more correct spelling **ise-ickle*, *isickle*, *isikle*, *isicle*, *isycle*, underwent the spreading of the sibilant, and appeared as *ise-sickle*, *yse-sycle*, *ice-sickle*, as if from *ise*, *ice*, + *sickle*.

The longe *yse cycles* at the hewsys [eaveses] hongē.

c 1520 *Cyteen and Uplondysh-man* (Percy Soc., 1847, xxii. 3.)

For it had snowen, and frozen very strong,

With great *yseycles* on the eves long,

The sharp north wynd hurled bytterly

And with blacke cloudes darked was the sky.

c 1520 COPLAND, *The Hye Way to the Spytell Hous*, l. 15.

(*Early Pop. Poetry*, ii. 9.)

Bruosina, Bruosa, a flake of ise, a hoare-frost, an *isesickle*.

1598 FLORIO. [Ed. 1611 has "Bruósa as *Bruosina*," but omits

Bruosina by accident. Ed. 1659 (Torriano) is quite different.]

Ciondolare, to droppe or thaw, to hang downe dangling, as *ice-sickles*

[1611 *ice sickles*, 1659 *ice-sickles*]. Ciondoli, *ice sickles* [1611 *ice sikles*,

1659 *ice-sickles*], danglings, labels. *Ciondoloni*, dingedangle, hanging

downe, as *ice-sickles* [1611 *ice sickles*, 1659 om.]. 1598 FLORIO.

[Sim. *ise-sickles*, *ise sickles*, *ice-sickles*, *ice sickles*, etc., s.v. *diacciuioli*, *ghiacciuioli*, *scoladura*, *scolature*, *stillecchio*, in the three editions.]

Iis-dacken, *Ise-sickles*. Iis-droppels, Iis-kegels, ofte kegels, *Ise sickles*

hanging downe house ewings. 1648 HEXHAM (sim. 1658, 1678).

Hence *sickle* came to be used alone, in the sense of 'icicle.' It occurs in one of those modernized ballads which lug in "Phœbus" and "Flora." "Phœbus"! what a name—to appear in a Robin Hood ballad!

When Phoebus had melted the 'sickles' of ice,
 With a hey down, &c.,
 And likewise the mountains of snow. . . .

a 1795 *Robin Hood and the Ranger* (in Ritson, *Robin Hood's Garland*, 1795; Child, *Ballads*, v. 207).

The form *sickle* thus developed was confused with the *sickle* of harvest; and *ice-sickles* were thought to be so cold because they were sharp or pointed. A happier likeness is expressed by the term *daggers*:

Daggers. Icicles. So called from their pointed appearance.

1854 BAKER, *Northampton Gloss.* i. 171.

This is a plain provincial use. Tennyson's use is individual, and merely allusive:

The *daggers* of the sharpened eaves. 1850 TENNYSON, *In Memoriam*, cvi.

In keeping with *dagger* is the other provincial name *daglet* (*dag* + *-let*):

Daglets. . . . Icicles. Wilts.

1847 HALLIWELL.

A similar notion lies in Johnson's definition of the word:

Icicle. A shoot of ice hanging down.

1755 JOHNSON.

The same notion of something pointed or tapering appears in the other Teutonic names for an icicle, which I mention for comparison: Sw. *is-pigg*, '*ice-peg'; Dan. *is-tap*; G. *eis-tapfen*, '*ice-tap'; D. *ijs-kegel*, '*ice-pin' (see *kail* in C.D.); Eng. dial. *ice-candle* (Halliwell).

The present notion in regard to *icicle* is reflected in its spelling and its common pronunciation (ais'-i-cl in stead of ais'ic'l), namely, that it is a diminutive of *ice*, like *particle*, diminutive of *part*. This is formally stated in some dictionaries:

Icicle. Dim. of *ice*, that is, a small body of ice.

WILLIAMS, *Readable Dictionary*.

[The next entry is *iceberg*, which is a large body of ice!]

The following is from a recent British dictionary of considerable pretensions:

cle (L. *culus*, a dim. termination), also *cule*, *ule*, *el* or *le*, *en*, *kin*, *let*, *et* or *ot*, *ling*, *ock*, *y* or *ie*, which form nouns and signify "little"; diminution: examples—*icicle*, a little conical mass of ice; *canticle*, a little song; *animalcule*, a very little creature (etc.).

1881 STORMONTH, *Etym. and Pron. Dict.* (6th ed. "revised," Edinb.), p. 768.

Impressed with the belief that the *-icle* of *icicle* was a diminutive suffix, one poet has formed a parallel diminutive with the suffix *-let*, namely *icelet*:

Whilst each tree bereft
Of leaves, did like to virgin mourners stand
Cloathed in white veils of glittering icelets.

1659 CHAMBERLAYNE, *Pharonnida*. (Wr. p. 590.)

2. **Yokle**, the other word for 'icicle,' ME. *yokle*, is not from the AS. *gicel*, but from the Scandinavian cognate, Icel. *jökull*, now *jökul*, *jukul*, *jukel*, above mentiond. *Yokle* has disappear'd from use, except as disguis'd in the compound *ice-shackle*, *ice-shoggle* (for **ice-yokle*), as shown below.

Stiria est gutta frigore concreta pendens guttatimque stillans, a *yokle*.

1500 *Ortus Vocab.* (Way, *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 259, note 1.)

[Halliwell's entry, '*Yokle*, an icicle,' probably refers to this.]

Parallel to *ice-ickle*, *icicle*, there existed a form containing the other term *yokle*: namely **ice-yokle*, ME. **is-yokel*, from *is*, *ise*, *ice*, + *yokle*.

(a) *An izokelle* [read *iszokelle?*], stirium.

1483 *Cath. Angl.* (cited by Way, *Prompt. Parv.*, p. 259, note 1.)

[This is a different reading from that which appears in the printed edition of the *Catholicon Anglicum* (E.E.T.S. ed. Herrtage, 1881), where we read "An *izekelle* (*Isezekille* A)": see above.]

As *ice-ickle*, *ise-ickle*, develop't a sibilant in its second element by attraction from the first, so **ice-yokle*, **is-yokel*, has done: s-y becoming sh, speld *sh*, *sch*, just as in the pronunciation of *issue* (is'yū > ish'u), *passion* (pas'si-on > pas'syon > pash'on), etc. Hence the form *ise-schokill*, *ice-shoccle*, ingeniously alterd, in the plural, to *ice-shackles*, as if 'fetters of ice' 'icy fetters' — a common figure in poetry.

(b)

Furth of the chyn of this ilk hasard auld
Grete fluidis ischis, and styf *iseschokillis* cald
Downe from his sterne and grisly berd hyngis.

1513 (pub. 1553) DOUGLAS, *Virgil*, 108. 30. (Jam. 1808.)

Over craggis and the frontys of rockys sere
Hang great *yse schokkalis* lang as ony spere.

1513 (pub. 1553) DOUGLAS, *Virgil* . . . (*Craven Gloss.* i. 241.)

Ice-shackles, *Iceicles* — May not this word be derived from *shackle*, the wrist, as a shackle of ice. Though *iceicles* vary in their dimensions, they certainly frequently resemble the wrist in rotundity.

1828 [CARR], *Craven Gloss.* i. 241.

Ice-shoccle. An icicle. 1849 TEESDALE *Gloss.*, p. 67. (Also 1847 Halliwell and 1857 Wright.)

Ice-shoccle also appears in an other alterd form, *ice-shoggle*, *ice-shogle*, simulating *shog*, shake (ar not *iceicles* often shaken down?); and *ice-shoggles* takes on a verbal or diminutiv form *ice-shogglings*.

But wi' poortith, hearts, het as a cinder,
Will cald as an *iceshogle* turn!

1805-06 J. NICOL, *Poems*, ii. 158. (Jam. 1808.)

Ice-shoggle, an icicle. 1825 BROCKETT. (Whence in 1847 Halliwell, and 1857 Wright misprinted *ice-skoggle*.)

Ice Shogglins or *Ickles*, *iceicles*. 1855 [ROBINSON], *Whitby Gloss.*, p. 90.

XXIV and XXV. The next two classes involv a gain of initial *s* by attraction from a preceding possessiv or genitiv *-s* or *-es*. It occurs in certain loose compounds or phrases involving *kin* (ME. *kin*, *kyn*, gen. *kinnes*, *kynnes*, often *kines*, *kynes*, and contracted *kins*, *kyns*), 'kind,' constructions in which we now use *kind*, which is in fact, in these constructions, a variant of *kin* with excrement *d* (as in *hind* for *hine*, *pound* for *poun*, *sound* for *soun*, etc.), but confused with *kind*, ME. *kinde*, *kynde*, *ikynde*, AS. *gecynd*, nature. The development was probably thru the genitiv forms *kinnes*, often written *kines*, with consequent lengthening of the vowel, *kînes*, whence, with the loss of the inflexion, *kîne*, *kîn*, then by confusion with *kînd*, *kind*, nature, the modern *kind*, sort.

The phrases with *kin*, genitiv *kinnes*, *kins*, *kin*, which I hav noted and illustrated by numerous quotations, ar *all kin*, *any kin*, *many kin*, *no kin*, *other kin*, *some kin*, *this kin*, *what kin*. I giv for comparison the forms of all these, but giv quotations only for the two which show the attraction of the genitiv *s*, namely *any kin* and *what kin*.

(1) *All kin*, ME. genitiv *alles kinnes*, *al kines*, *alle kyns*, *al kyns*, *alle kynez*, *al kyns*, *alle kyn*, *al kyn*, *alkyn*.

(2) *Any kin*. The ME. genitiv *anyes kinnes*, *enyas kennes*, AS. *ġeniges cynnes*, appears sometimes as *any skynnes*.

(a) Zyf þy wyl rejo[isse] more
In *enyas kennes* þynges. c 1315 SHOREHAM, *Poems*, p. 95.

The genitiv of the adjectiv is here used as in other instances—*enies monnes*, 'of any man,' etc.

Lokiað hweðer *enies monnes sare* beo iliche mine sare.
c 1175 *Lambeth Hom.* (E.E.T.S.) 121.

(b) & pyne yow with so pouer a man, as play wyth your knyzt
With *any skynnez* countenaunce, hit keuerez me ese.
c 1360 *Syr Gawayne and the Green Knight* (E.E.T.S.), 1864, l. 1539.

(3) *Many kin*, ME. genitiv *many kyne*; mod. *many kinds* (of).

(4) *No kin*, ME. gen. *nanes kynnes*, *nones cunnes*, *no kynnes*, *no-kynnez*, *non kyns*, *no kyns*, *nokyns* (mod. dial. *neeakins*); also with loss of inflexiv *-s*, *no-kyne*, *nakyne*, *no kyn*; mod. *no kind* (of).

(5) *Other kin*, ME. gen. *othres kynnes*, mod. dial. *otherkins*.

(6) *Some kin*, ME. gen. *sum kyns*, *somkyns*, *sumkyn*, *somkyn*; mod. *some kind* (of).

(7) *This kin*, ME. gen. *this kyn*.

(8) *What kin*, ME. genitiv *what kinnes*, or by conformation, **whats kynnes*, appears as *what skynnes*. With loss of the inflexiv -s, it appears as *what kin*, *what kyn*, *quat-kyn*, *what-kynne*.

(a) *What-kyn* folk so þer fare, feche3 hem hider.

c 1360 *Cleanness* (*Early Eng. Allit. Poems*, E.E.T.S.), l. 100.

Why *what-kynne* thyng art þou,

þat telles þis tale to me?

c 1430 *York Plays*, v. 52 (p. 24).

(b)

In *what skynnes* maner so hyt be wro3t,

Dedly synne hyt ys forthe broght.

c 1400 MYRC, *Instructions for Parish Priests* (E.E.T.S.) l. 210.

Take gode hede on hys de-gre

Of *what skynnes* luyunge þat he be.

c 1400 MYRC, *Instructions for Parish Priests* (E.E.T.S.), l. 1637.

In this *what kin*, gen. *what kins*, lies the explanation of a form hitherto misunderstood—*devilkins*.

And of every handfull that he met

He lept ouer fotes thre;

"*What devilkyns* draper," sayd litell Much,

"Thynkyst thou to be?"

c 1500 *A Lytell Geste of Robyn Hode*, l. 292. (Child, *Ballads*, v. 57.)

Devilkyns is not a form of *devilkin*, from *devil* + dim. -*kin*, nor is it, so explaiend or otherwise, the source of *dickens*. The significant phrase is *what kyns draper*, 'a draper of what kind'; *devil* is merely the common term of emphasis used by impatient persons who are conscious of a lack of the finer kind of rhetorical ability, and therefore feel obliged to invoke, for the requisit intensity, something wholly irrelevant, like *devil*, or "something hot," like *hell*. This is the explanation of modern profanity. Actual swearing, the intended invocation of supernal or infernal powers, is almost extinct. The gost of Hamlet's father now gets no satisfaction in the cellarage, except in the cellarage under the stage.

Gho. Swear. Ghost cries vnder the Stage.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *Hamlet*, i. 4. (F¹ p. 258.)

XXVI. Case involving *his*.

1. **Noll.** An other instance in which the possessiv -s has gon over to the following noun is probably presented by the provincial *snowl*, the head. This was probably, at first, *his nowl* or *his noll*:

then *his snowl* or *'s nowl*, and so *snowl* even when an other possessiv, or none, precedes.

- (a) What good can the great gloton do with . . . *his noll* toty with drink?
a 1535 Sir T. MORE, *Works*, p. 97. (Wr. p. 118.)
- (b) *Snowl*, s. The head. 1825 JENNINGS, *Somerset Gloss.*, p. 71.

XXVII. Case involving *yes*.

I. Ma'am. In *yes*, the common affirmativ response, before a word admitting initial sibilation the *s* is often spread over, so as to begin the next word. This pronunciation is not, however, recognized, except now and then in humorous writing. I find examples in one writer :

- "*Yes, sma'am*—sir, I mean," said she, as she went downstairs.
1885 F. R. STOCKTON, *Rudder Grange*, p. 56. So also p. 69.
- "*Yes, sm'am*," said Pomona. 1885 *Id.* p. 48.

On the other hand *yes, sir* is often written in novels *yessir*, implying a rapid pronunciation, with one *s*.

XXVIII. Similar cases.

There are many other cases involving a shifting of initial or final *s*, for which there is here no room. They ar not important.

The ease with which *s* may spread or be duplicated appears from the following otherwise trivial examples :

- Vacation is taken in hot Summer, and the temples of learning open in Autumn because it's *school* weather. 1893 *Philadelphia Times*, Sept.
- When Madeline was asked if she would have her new gown cut after the latest style, she said she'd just *as sleeve* as not.
1893 *Boston Transcript*, July.

The *Public Ledger and Transcript* of Philadelphia, in July, 1893, sacrificed some of the space which it daily devotes to "athletics" and lists of persons admitted to the hospitals with broken legs or contused heds or other infirmities of wide public interest, to admit a pun on "*Just as Siam*," in neat allusion to the troubles in Siam, and to a wel-known hymn.

B. Initial S lost.

XXIX. Cases in which an initial *s*, following a final *-s* in the preceding word, is fused with it and so lost, or is mistaken in a compound for a genitiv suffix belonging to the preceding element, and is transferd as such.

1. **Severall.** An instance of the loss of initial *s* by its absorption in a preceding possessiv 's, appears in *everal*, sophistically written, in the plural, *everhills*, also contracted *errills*, a field or enclosure, originally a *several*, or allotment of common land to an individual proprietor. *His several*, *John's several*, seems to hav become *his everal*, *John's everal*, and so *everal* emerged as an independent form.

(a) Of late he's broke into a *several*
Which doth belong to me, and there he spoils
Both corn and pasture.
1600 Sir John Oldcastle, iii. 1 (Sternberg, p. 92).

Truth lies open to all; it is no man's *several*. (Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata.)

1641 JONSON, *Discoveries* (Works, p. 742).
Some are so boysterous, no *severals* will hold them, but lay all Offices common to their power.

1648 FULLER, *Holy and Profane State*, p. 234. (P. p. 113.)

(b) *Severall.* Frequently corrupted into *everhills*, *errills*, etc. A field or enclosure.
1851 STERNBERG, *Northampt. Gloss.*, p. 92.

2. **Skep**, also *skip*, *skepe*, **skap*, a basket, also a beehive made of twisted straw; especially in *bee-skep*, *bee-skip*, which appears to have been taken sometimes as a *bee's cap*.

(a) A *bee-skip*, a *bee-hive*.
1691 RAY, *South and East-Country Words* (E.D.S.), p. 91.
A *bee-skep*. In Scotland . . . a bee-hive.

1823 MOOR, *Suffolk Words*, p. 352.
Bee-skep. A beehive made of rushes or straw.

(b) *Skep*. A basket without a lid, with short handles. "A bushel *skep*," "A *bee skep*." In Scotland, the latter is, I believe, used for bee-hive. I have seen, but I forget where, this Scottish saying, "my head is bizzing like a *bees cap*," which is probably the same word.

1823 MOOR, *Suffolk Words*, p. 352.

3. **Slip**, ME. *slippe*, *slyppe*, AS. *slyppe*; also *slop*, ME. *sloppe*, AS. *sloppe*: the second element in the compounds *cowslip* and *oxslip*. The term *slip*, variant *slop*, AS. *slyppe*, *sloppe*, is supposed by Skeat to refer to the loose droppings of a cow, and to allude to the growth of the plants along fences and roadsides. See the quotation from

Lowsley, *Berkshire Words*, below. Compare the modern *slop* applied to any liquid refuse. I find *slop* used, like *wash*, of the shoal water of the sea, next the shore :

He . . . Gers lawnche his botes appone a lawe watire,
Londis als a lyone with lordliche knyghtes,
Slippes in in the *sloppes* o-slante to þe girdylle,
Swalters vpe swiftly with his swerde drawene.

c 1440 *Morte Arthure* (E.E.T.S. 1865), l. 3922.

(1) *Cowslip*, also dial. and early mod. E. *cow-slop*, ME. *cow-slyppe*, *couslyppe*, *cowsloppe*, *cowslope*, *cowslowpe*, AS. *cūslyppe*, *cūsloppe*, from *cū*, cow, + *slyppe*, *sloppe*, as above explained.

(a) Genim ifig ðe on stane wyxð on eorþan 7 gearwan 7 wudubindan leaf 7 *cuslyppan* 7 oxanslyppan.

c 1000 *Lacnunga* 42. (*Saxon Leechdoms*, iii. 30.) [See also 61 (iii. 46).]

Nim þ ifig þe on stane weaxe 7 gearwan 7 wudu bindes leaf 7 *cuslyppan*.

c 1000 *Leech-book*, III. xxx. (*Saxon Leechdoms*, ii. p. 326.)

Nim wudu merce 7 hrefnes fót 7 wermod niþowearðne *cū slyppan*, rudan, wudu bindes leaf.

c 1000 *Leech-book*, III. xxxi. (*Saxon Leechdoms*, ii. 326.)

Britannica, *cusloppe*.

c 1000 ÆLFRIC, *Vocab.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 135, l. 26.)

Britannica, *cuslyppe*.

c 1000 *Lat. AS. Glosses*. (Wright, *Vocab.*² 361, l. 23.)

Glustrum, an^{ce} *Cowslyppe*.

c 1450 *Lat. Eng. Vocab.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 586, l. 44.)

Herba paralis, an^{ce} *Cowslyppe*.

c 1450 *Lat. Eng. Vocab.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 587, l. 46.)

Hoc ligustrum, a *cowslowpe*.

c 1450 *Nominale*. (Wright, *Vocab.*² 713, l. 11.)

Cowsloppes.

1584 *A Handeful of pleasant Delites* (Park's *Heliconia* II. pp. 1-6).
(Littledale, ed. *Two Noble Kinsmen*, N.S.S. p. 110.)

The *Cowslips* tall her pensioners bee,
In their gold coates, spots you see.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *M.N.D.* ii. 1. (F¹ p. 148.)

And hang a pearle in every *cowslips* eare. 1623 *Id. ib.*

About the middle of the fifteenth century *cowslip* appears to have been taken as *cow's lip*.

(b) *Vaccinium*, an^{ce} a *cowestlyppe*.

c 1450 *Lat. Eng. Vocab.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 618, l. 24.)

Hoc ligustrum, A^{ce} a *cowyslepe*.

c 1475 *Pictorial Vocab.* (Wright, *Vocab.*² 786, l. 25.)

Here a *cowyslepe* may have been taken as 'a cow's leap.'

Verbáscolo odoráto, the *cow's-lip* [1598 *cow-slip*, 1611 *cowslip*].

1659 FLORIO, ed. Torriano.

Cowslip, ab AS. *Cuslyppe*, Flores seu herba Paralyseos, sic dicti quoniam iis Vaccæ delectantur, vel, ut aliis placet, à similitudine Labiorum Vaccæ. Doct. Th. H. dictum putat ab odore suavi animæ Vaccarum æmulo, cujus sc. odor talis est qualem Vaccæ ore & labiis expirant.

1671 SKINNER, *Etym. Ling. Anglicana*.

This is truly rural. "Sweet is the breth of morn;" and sweet, some say, is the breth of a cow.

(2) *Oxslip*, ME. **oxe-slyppe*, AS. *oxan slyppe*, 'ox's slip' or 'slop,' in like manner became reduced to *oxlip*, and has been mistaken as 'ox-lip,' 'ox's lip.'

(a) Pip flie *oxan slyppan* nipewearde 7 alor rinde wylle on buteran.

c 1000 *Leech-book*, I. ii. 15. (*Saxon Leechdoms*, ii. p. 32.)

[Cockayne translates here "ox-slip," elsewhere "oxlip."]

I know a banke where the wilde time blowes,
Where *Oxslips* and the nodding Violet growes,
Quite ouer-cannoped with luscious woodbine,
With sweet muske roses, and with Eglantine.

1623 SHAKESPEARE, *M.N.D.* ii. 1. (F¹ p. 150.)

Paigle, it is of use in Essex, Middlesex, Suffolk, for a cowslip: *cowslip* with us signifying what is elsewhere called an *oxlip*.

1691 RAY, *South and East-Country Words* (E.D.S.), p. 88.

Ox-slips. The flowers of Cowslip roots as produced when these roots are planted upside down, and with cow-dung or soot around. The manure doubtless accounts for the tint produced.

1888 LOWSLEY, *Berkshire Words* (E.D.S.), p. 122.

(b) *Verbascolo*, the pettie-mulleyn, of which be diuers kinds, as *Verbascolo odorato*, the cow-slip [1659 *cow's lip*], *Verbascolo albo*, the *oxe-lip*, *Verbascolo minore*, the primerose.

1598 FLORIO.

Brachecuculi, the flowers Cowslips, Paigle, Palsiewort or *Oxe-lips* [so 1611; in 1659 *Oxelips*].

1598 FLORIO.

Oxlips. 1623 SHAKESPEARE, *W.T.* iv. 3. (F¹ p. 292); 1634 FLETCHER (and SHAKESPEARE?), *Two Noble Kinsmen*, i. 1. 10.

Ox-lips, herbæ Paralyseos species, à similitudine Labri Bubuli in floribus, vel, ut Doct. Th. H. diuinat, ab odore grato florum, instar Animæ seu Anhelitus Bovini fragrante, v. *Cowslip*.

1671 SKINNER, *Etym. Ling. Angl.* (*Etym. Botanicum.*)

Paigles, *Ox-lips*.

1692 COLES, *Eng. Dict.*

4. *Stang*, ME. *stang*, a sting. I find *stang* in *his stang*, referring to a scorpion's sting, reduced to *tang*, and that in one instance mistaken for *tung*, *tong*, the word we ar now pleased to spel *tongue*. The tongue never stings except with words, but most persons, I think, believ that the pretty little harmless red forked tongue of a serpent is his "fangs," with which he "stings." The scorpion's sting is of course as remote as possible from the tongue. The mod. prov. Eng. *tang*, a sting, may be in part a particular use of *tang*, a point or projecting part.

(a) It war to lang to mak narratioun

Off sychis sore, with mony *staug* and stound.

1552 LYNDESAY, *Testament of the Papyngo* (E.E.T.S.), l. 1139.

My curse upon thy venom'd *stang*. 1789 BURNS, *Address to the Tooth-ach*.

(b) The scorpion for-bare is *tang* [*his stange* Fairfax ms., *his tunge* Gött. ms., *his tonge* Trin. ms.].

Fra bestes þar he lai amang. c 1300 *Cursor Mundi* (Cotton ms.), l.

A *tange* of a nedyr, acus. c 1500 *Ms. dict.* (H. p. 850.)

Tang. The sting of a bee, &c. North. 1847 HALLIWELL.

The next two cases arise from the fusion of an initial *s* with a preceding plural suffix, and the consequent loss of the former.

5. Strickle, ME. *striklen*, frequentativ of *striken*, intr. go, pass, etc., tr. go against, hit, strike, etc. The form *striklen*, being, as Professor Skeat first pointed out (*Etym. Dict.* s.v. *trickle*), nearly always used after or in connection with *tears* (*teres strikled, teris *strikland*), came to lose its initial *s* in the plural *s* of *teres*; hence *triklen*, mod. Eng. *trickle*, which has been more or less confused with *trill* in like sense.

- (a) His salte *teres strikled* doune as reyne.
c 1386 CHAUCER, *Prioress's Tale* (Six-Text), l. 187.

Thus the Lansdowne manuscript. The Ellesmere and Hengwrt manuscripts hav *trikled*, the Cambridge *trekelede*. The Petworth manuscript has *striked*, the Corpus *stryked*, the weak preterit plural, and the Harleian has *striken*, the present plural, of the verb *striken*, the simplex of the frequentativ *striklen*. These variations sufficiently prove that the original was *striklen*; altho no other instance of *striklen* appears. All later examples hav *triklen*, *trickle*. Tyrwhitt's reading *trilled* seems to hav no manuscript authority.

- (b) With *teris trickland* on his chekes.
c 1400 *Yvain and Gawain*, l. 1558. (Ritson, *Metr. Rom.* i. 66.)

Nay, ful of sorowe thou now me seest;
The *teeris trikilen* down on my face,
For "filius regis mortuus est."

- c 1400 *Political, Rel. & Love Poems*, ed. Furnivall, p. 207, l. 46.

The red blode *triklond* to his knee.

- a 1500 (?) *MS. Cantab.* Ff. v. 48, f. 122. (H. p. 889.)

To *Trickle* downe, destillare. 1570 LEVINS, *Manip. Vocab.*, 122, l. 7.

To *Trickil*, destillare. 1570 *Id.* 128, l. 22.

He said and from his eyes the *trickling teares* ran down amain.

- 1573 PHAER, *Virgil*, p. 300. (Wr. p. 61.)

The christall dew of faire Castalian springs

VVith gentle floatings *trickled* on his braines.

- 1594 LODGE, *Wounds of Civill War* (Hunterian Club), p. 57.

But where found they thée, O holie Anthony . . . testifying thy contrition,
by thy *trickling teares*.

- 1596 LODGE, *The Divil Coniured* (Hunterian Club), p. 8.

The *teares* fast *trickled* downe his face.

- a 1650 *King Arthur's Death*. (Child, *Ballads*, i. 44.)

And so 'tears trickle' thru all the ballads. In modern dialectal use *trickle* has senses which appear to represent the original sense 'go' or 'glide quietly,' without reference to tears or other water.

- To *Trickle, Trittle*, v.a. (To *Trickle*, to run down in streams or drops.)
 To bowl or roll; as, "*Trickle* me an orange across the table." *Norf.*
 1839 HOLLOWAY, *Gen. Dict. of Provincialisms.*
Trickling, part. Applied to the uncertain scramble of a wounded hare.
 "I seed the hare a *trickling* along the deitch, through the brimbles
 under the boo of yon wicken." 1877 LEIGH, *Cheshire Gloss.*, p. 215.
 We'll make shift to *trickly* down as far as the gate.
 1893 Q[UILLER-COUCH], *Delectable Duchy*, p. 54.

6. **Strike**, ME. *striken* (pret. *strok*), AS. *strīcan* (pret. *strāc*), go, go in a course, glide, flow; stil used in these original senses, tho they ar probably regarded as developept from the now prevailing sense 'hit.' The ME. *striken* is said to appear rarely as *triken*, just as *striklen* appears as *triklen* (see above).

(a) þe cwellers leiden swa luðerliche on hire lich þ̅ tet blod barst ut and
strac adun of hire bodi as stream deð of welle.

c 1200 *St. Marherete*, p. 5.

Ase strem þat *strikeþ* stille.

c 1300 *Song*, in *Spec. Eng.*, Part II. p. 48, l. 21. (Ritson, *Anc. Songs*, p. 32.)

A mous that moche good couthe, as me thouȝte,
Stroke forth sternly, and strode biforn hem alle.

1377 LANGLAND, *Piers Plowman* (B), ProL. l. 183.

He saide to his sone, "Tak a pike,
 To-night thou schalt with mie *strike*."

"Whider?" seide his sone.

c 1320 *The Sevyng Sages*, l. 1254. (Weber, *Metr. Rom.* iii. 50.)

Here I must pause. There remain eight or nine other classes of words which hav sufferd change by Attraction. The total number of words affected is small, but it is necessary to consider them before stating the philological conclusions to which the study leads. In an other paper I hope to conclude the subject, to point out similar cases of Attraction in foreign tongues, and to giv an index of all the words treated.

VII. — “*Extended*” and “*Remote*” *Deliberatives in Greek.*

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I.

IN his Att. Syntax, published in 1843, Krüger (§ 54, 7, A. 2) in effect held that no cases of the indirect deliberative subjunctive were found that could not be solved by regarding the introductory phrases οὐκ ἔχω and the like as equivalent to ἀπορῶ. In 1847, Madvig, in his Synt. d. gr. Sprache, § 121, included, under the head of the deliberative subjunctive, two examples which cannot be so explained (Pl. Symp. 194 and Isocr. 4, 44, for which see p. 160 of this paper), though he did not discuss them. Aken's procedure in his Grundzüge (1861), § 292, is similar; and so is Kühner's, as late even as 1870, in the second edition of his Gr. Gramm., §§ 559, 3, and 394, 5. Professor Goodwin, in his Greek Moods and Tenses, second edition (1865), § 65, 3, treats the dependent clause in ἔχει ὅτι εἴπη, on the ground of its affinities, under the head of the final sentence, but explains it as “caused by the analogy of the common expression οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι (or τί) εἴπη, equivalent to οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι εἴπη, *he knows not what he shall say*, which contains an indirect question”; and in a note on p. 135 of Felton's edition of the Panegyric of Isocrates he expresses the same view with more fulness, making it clear that the construction in his view is of deliberative origin, although in ἔχω ὅτι εἴπη “all trace of the indirect question disappears.” In later editions he continues to hold substantially the same view. Monro, in his Homeric Grammar (first edition, 1882, § 282, and at the same place in the edition of 1891), placed his statement, “in Attic the idiom survives in a few phrases, as ἔχει ὅτι εἴπη,” under the general head of “final relative clauses” and the specific head of “the Relative of Purpose with the Subjunctive.”

Such was the state of opinion, when a note in Professor Jebb's *Philoctetes*, upon ὀρώντα . . . οὐδέν' ἔντοπον, οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, v. 281, brought the matter into formal discussion. The beginning of the note reads thus: "The direct question is τίς ἀρκέση; (deliberative, or 'interrogative' subjunctive)." In a notice of the edition, published in the *Classical Review* for April, 1891, Mr. Arthur Sidgwick comments as follows: "The note begins by treating the sentence as an oblique deliberative: but if this be right, as it probably is, it should be pointed out that the construction is so stretched that *the interrogative character is lost*. The fact I believe to be that the deliberative construction is subtly modified, and three stages may be traced as follows: First stage, οὐκ ἤδειν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, 'I did not know who was to aid,' — truly interrogative and deliberative; second stage, οὐκ εἶχον ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, where the interrogative character is sliding into the relative; third stage, οὐδέν' εἶχον ὅστις κ.τ.λ., where the relative character of ὅστις is established. The last usage is what we have here: it is so like the Latin final *qui* with subjunctive that few readers or commentators stop to notice the difference; but it certainly is not that, else we could say ἔπεμψα ὅστις ἀγγέλλοι, which we cannot do: it is always ἀγγελεῖ." Mr. Sidgwick appends the form in which he himself would have cast the note: "This is an extension of the deliberative construction, used after negative sentences, which becomes at last practically equivalent to the final."

In the *Classical Review* for July, 1891, Professor Tarbell, in a brief article, speaks of the construction as "the extension of the dependent deliberative construction, after certain verbs, to relative clauses"; and, a little later, he cites Soph. Phil. 938 (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω) and Isocr. 21, 1 (οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουί) as illustrating the transition from interrogative to relative clauses, and adds the following:

"By regarding ἄλλον and προφάσεως as proleptic, we could explain the dependent clauses as ordinary indirect questions, without detriment to the sense. Most of the other passages,

however, resist such treatment. The cases after ἔστι (Soph. Aj. 514 ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω; Eur. H. F. 1245 γέμω κακῶν δὴ, κοῦκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπη τεθῆ) are especially noteworthy, because here the verb is not even capable of being followed by an indirect question. οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω grows by an easy transition out of οὐκ ἔχω εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω, understood as meaning 'I have nothing to look to.'

Mr. Sidgwick's note had dealt only with optatives following a secondary tense. Of the fourteen examples cited in Mr. Tarbell's paper, a few were optatives after a secondary tense, but the larger part were subjunctives after a primary tense. Before we proceed further, it will be necessary to have all these examples before us, together with others that have been contributed since. (One example of my own finding I shall add later.) The arrangement is chronological. [Examples in which οὐχ ἔχω may be interpreted as equivalent to οὐκ οἶδα are omitted.]

τοιαῦτα μηχανήματ' ἐξευρὼν τάλας
βροτοῖσιν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῳ
τῆς νῦν παρούσης πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ. — Aesch. P. V. 469.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω
πλὴν σοῦ. — Soph. Ai. 514.

ὦ λιμένες, ὦ προβλήτες, ὦ ξυνουσίαι
θηρῶν ὀρείων, ὦ χαταρρῶγες πέτραι,
ὑμῖν τὰδ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω,
ἀνακλαίομαι παροῦσι τοῖς εἰωθόσιν,
οἷ ἔργ' ὁ παῖς μὲν ἔδρασεν οὐξ' Ἀχιλλέως. — Soph. Phil. 936.

ὀρῶντα μὲν ναῦς, ἅς ἔχων ἐναυστόλουν,
πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἐντοπον,
οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' ὅστις νόσου
κάμνοντι συλλάβοιτο. — Soph. Phil. 279.

οὐκ ἔχων βάσιν,
οὐδέ τιν' ἐγχώρων κακογείτονα,
παρ' ᾧ στόνον ἀντίτυπον βαρυβρῶτ' ἀποκλαύσειεν αἵματηρόν·

ὄς τὰν θερμοτάταν αἰμάδα κηκιομέναν ἐλκέων
 ἐνθήρου ποδὸς ἠπίοισι
 φύλλοις κατευνάσειεν. — Soph. Phil. 691.

οἶμοι, προδέδομαι, κούκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες,
 ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατος Ἀργείων φύγω·
 οὗτος γὰρ ἦν μοι καταφυγὴ σωτηρίας. — Eur. Or. 722.

ΘΗ. ἴσχε στόμ', ὡς μὴ μέγα λέγων μείζον πάθης.
 ΗΡ. γέμω κακῶν δὴ, κούκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπου τεθῆ.

—Eur. H. F. 1244.

οὐδένα γὰρ εἶχον ὅστις Ἀργόθεν μολῶν
 εἰς Ἀργος αὐθις τὰς ἐμὰς ἐπιστολάς
 πέμψειε. — Eur. I. T. 588.

τίν' ἔχω φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἤκεις, ἐφ' ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς ;
 — Ar. Eq. 1321.¹

εἰ δὲ μήτε δι' ὅ τι μήτε ὅτοισι μήτε ἀφ' ὅτου πολεμήσωμεν
 ἔσσι, πῶς οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὴν εἰρήνην ποιητέον ἡμῖν ;
 — Andoc. 3. 16.²

ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι δῶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν
 φίλων, ἂν εὖ γένηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἰκανοὺς οἷς δῶ.
 — Xen. Anab. 1, 7, 7.

ἐὰν μὲν οὖν νικῶσι, τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λύειν τὴν γέφυραν ; οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἂν πολλαὶ γέφυραι ὧσιν ἔχοιμεν ἂν ὅποι φυγόντες ἡμεῖς
 σωθῶμεν. Ἐὰν δ' αὖ ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν, λελυμένης τῆς γεφύρας
 οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ὅποι φύγωσιν. — Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 19.

δεῖ μέντοι τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔξειν ὅτι εἰσφέρωσιν
 εἰς τὸ στεγνὸν τοῦ ἐργασομένου τὰς ἐν τῷ ὑπαίθρῳ ἐργασίας.
 — Xen. Oec. 7, 20.

ἴσως οὖν καὶ Κηφισίου ἀντικατηγορήσει, καὶ ἔξει ὅ τι λέγει.
 — Lys. 6, 42.

(λέγει is a sure emendation of Bekker's for λέγει.)

¹ Cited in the Classical Review for Febr., 1894, by Professor Sonnenschein, whose attention had been called to it by Mr. H. Richards. Professor Sonnenschein's article appeared too late to admit of special discussion here.

² Contributed privately by Professor Tarbell.

πρότερον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχων πρόφασιν ἐφ' ἧς τοῦ βίου λόγον
δοίην νυνὶ διὰ τοῦτον εἶληφα. — Lys. 24, 1.

τοιούτου ἔθος ἡμῖν παρέδωσαν, ὥστε . . . ἑκατέρους ἔχειν
ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν. — Isocr. 4, 43 and 44.

οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἧντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουί.
— Isocr. 21, 1.

οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει αὐτῶ ὀπηροῦν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὀτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι,
ἐὰν μόνου ἔχη ὅτω διαλέγηται, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ.

— Plat. Symp. p. 194, D.

ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος
ἔχει ὅτι λέγη πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον. — Plat. Phaedr. p. 255, E.

(λέγη is a sure emendation of Bekker's for λέγει.)

οὐκ εἶχομεν ὅτου ἐπιλαβοίμεθα οὐδ' ὅτου κρατοῖμεν.

— Dem. 35, 25.

οὐδὲ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τις ἔην ἐπὶ βουσί καὶ ἔργοις
φαινόμενος σπορίμοιο δι' αὐλακος, ὅντιν' ἐροίμην.

— Theocr. 25, 218.¹

In the Classical Review for March, 1892, under the heading of "The Subjunctive of Purpose in Relative Clauses in Greek," Dr. Earle, of Barnard College, combated Mr. Tarbell's position, holding, as Monro had held, that the idiom in question is descended from a clause of purpose, — a conclusion shared, without argument, by a writer in the same

¹ Contributed to me privately by Professor Tarbell, who also points out that the same construction occurs in Theocr. 16, 68, if we take the subordinate clause as relative:

δίξημαι δ', ὃ τινι θνατῶν κεχαρίσμενος ἐνθῶ
σὺν Μοῖσαις.

Οἵπερ φράσωσιν, which used to be read in Thuc. 7, 25, is generally replaced now by ὅπως φράσωσιν, the reading of the Vaticanus.

My colleague, Professor Burton, has pointed out two interesting examples in the New Testament, Mark 14, 14: ποῦ ἐστὶν τὸ κατάλυμά μου, ὅπου τὰ πάσχα μετὰ τῶν μαθητῶν μου φάγω; and Acts 21, 16: ἄγοντες παρ' ᾧ ξερισθῶμεν Μνάσωνι τινι Κυπρίῳ, ἀρχαίῳ μαθητῇ (see also the footnote on p. 186). The latter probably touches the extreme point reached in the development of the construction.

journal, signing the initials J. D. to articles to be referred to in Part II. "The source of the error into which," as Mr. Earle thinks, "Mr. Tarbell and others have fallen" is a confusion among the three meanings of ἔχω, namely, "I have," "I know," and "I am able," and a confusion between the interrogative τίς and the indefinite or general relative ὅστις. The examples after ἔχω in the sense of "I know," as well as those after similar phrases like ἀμηχανῶ, Mr. Earle regards as indirectly deliberative. The examples after ἔχω in the sense of "I have," and examples after such phrases as οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδα, quoted above, and after such phrases as κοῦκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, he considers to be of final origin. With regard to a number of examples which he gives, he grants that it is difficult to determine whether ἔχω means "have" or "know," and consequently to decide whether the construction is final or deliberative, it being final in the former case, and deliberative in the latter.

Mr. Earle's specific argument¹ against Mr. Tarbell's explanation appears in a brief passage which I quote *verbatim*:

"Soph. Phil. 938: ὑμῖν τὰδ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτω λέγω may be paraphrased οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον ἔχω, καθὰ οἶδα, ὅτω λέγω. The fact that the antecedent is here expressed seems enough to show that there is no relation with an indirect question. So Isocr. 21, 1:

οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουί =
ἔχω πρόφασιν κτλ.,

where also the antecedent is expressed."

¹ A remark of Mr. Earle's, not in the nature of an argument, calls for a moment's notice: "As will be seen by the quotations I have made, more than one-half of Professor Tarbell's examples—'of the phenomenon which had not been recognized by any previous grammarian'—have been examined and discussed by Krüger and Goodwin." I am sure that others, like myself, would suppose, if they had before them only the passage which I have quoted, that Mr. Tarbell meant to say that no one before himself had recognized the phenomenon at all. What he actually wrote was "the phenomenon had not been *clearly* recognized, so far as I am aware, by any previous grammarian" [the italics are mine]; and nobody could read the passage in its context without seeing that Mr. Tarbell meant before Mr. Sidgwick, not before himself.

On what I have now quoted from Mr. Earle, three comments need to be made before we proceed to weigh the evidence.

First, neither Mr. Tarbell nor Mr. Sidgwick (if he be meant among the "others") can have fallen into error through overlooking an "ambiguity" between "*ὅστις*, an indefinite or general relative," and "*τίς* introducing an indirect question." Whether right or wrong in their theory, both—as the passages which I have quoted *verbatim* show—recognized as clearly as Mr. Earle himself that, in the examples which illustrate what they regard as the extreme point of development, the connective is not an interrogative, but a relative. In fact, the essential point of their belief is that the construction has been *extended* from the interrogative form to the relative form.

Secondly, I must express my dissent from the general attitude which is indicated in the sentence quoted from Mr. Earle. Nothing is surer than that extensions, and even new formations through association, take place in syntactical mechanisms, just as they do in word-meanings. Mr. Earle would be on no more dangerous ground if he were to say that our word "palace" cannot be descended from the name of a certain hill in Rome (to go no further back in the matter), because our word does not carry with it any idea of a hill. The fact that, in the last example, the antecedent is expressed, shows only that the dependent construction is at any rate no longer an indirect question, but not in the least that it did not originate in such a question.

The third comment is that, if Mr. Earle's argument were sound, a similar argument would, in the case of several of his examples, destroy his own explanation. Stripped of the individual form which it takes in this particular place, his canon would have to read somewhat as follows: If in a given example the full apparatus and full force of a given known construction do not exist, then the construction found in the example can have no relation with that known construction. What then becomes of the example in Orestes 722, which

Mr. Earle pronounces "another instance of the purpose-construction"? It runs as follows: *κούκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον Ἀργείων φύγω*, "there are no longer any hopes to which I may turn and escape death at the hands of the Argives." The main sentence denies the existence of hopes. But hopes, we might make answer to Mr. Earle, do not exist in order that one may escape. Inasmuch, then, as the thought, though similar, is not identical with that of the purpose clause, there could — on Mr. Earle's canon — be no relation between this example and the construction of purpose.

But a positive refutation of this position can, I think, be given. Questions like *cur gaudeam*, in the sense of *why should I rejoice*, are well known. But there can be no doubt that in clauses of the common type seen in *nihil est cur gaudeas* or *nihil est quod gaudeas*, "there is no reason why you should rejoice," the introductory word is a relative, not an interrogative. It is, in fact, an interrogative turned relative,¹ — in other words, an example of a phenomenon exactly parallel, so far as this part of the mechanism is concerned, with the phenomenon contended for by Mr. Tarbell.

This evidence — if it be thought to be evidence — of the invalidity of Mr. Earle's argument undoes his work; but it of course does not solve the question.

Now it would seem to me entirely possible and natural that such a construction as the one under discussion should have been derived from either of the two sources claimed for it. From the deliberative question "to whom shall I speak" could easily come the chain of combinations, "I am at a loss to whom to speak," "I do not know to whom to speak," "I have no one to whom to speak," "there is no one to whom to speak," and even, at the extreme, "there is a man to whom to speak," — a construction not identical with that of purpose, but near enough to it to remind one of it. On the other hand, from the combination "he has built a bridge by which we may escape" could easily arise the combination "there is

¹ Such is, in my conception, the simple explanation of a much misunderstood construction.

a bridge by which we may escape," and, finally, "there is no bridge by which we may escape." Or, quite possibly, a more direct way could be struck out. Under the feeling "I must get me a weapon with which to defend myself," one might say "I have no weapon with which to defend myself." But, in either case, there is an extension. The alternatives between which we have to choose are not a plain clause of purpose and an extended construction of deliberation, but an extended clause of purpose and an extended deliberative clause.

What evidence, now, can be found to decide between these two rival theories, both of which are antecedently rational?

Three kinds of evidence might be looked for, turning upon three things which have to be accounted for; namely, (1) the range of introductory expressions after which the construction occurs, (2) the chronological order in which the various classes under this range are found to stand, and (3) the form of the construction.

(1) We are of course not dealing with the obvious cases of deliberative questions after verbs like ἀμηχανῶ, ἀπορῶ or its opposite εὐπορῶ, but with the construction after such phrases as in οὐκ ἔχω ἰκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδα ὅτε λέγω, κούκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον φύγω, ἔξει ὅτι λέγη, etc. All of these with one exception (Ar. Eq. 1321) come under the head of the expression either of the existence of a difficulty, or (its opposite) the absence of a difficulty (existence of a means). Now this limitation is intelligible, if the construction is descended from that common form of the expression of difficulty, the question of perplexity, which is a shade of the deliberative subjunctive. It never got wholly out of sight of its starting-point. It could not be used, *e.g.* after a verb like "I give," "I send," "I appoint," for there is in the meaning of these verbs nothing to suggest anything like perplexity or difficulty. But, on the other hand, it is quite impossible to understand, on Mr. Earle's theory, why, after these and countless other verbs which are constantly being followed by purpose-clauses, the construction in question never appears.

(2) The second point at which evidence might perhaps be found is in the historical relation of the two kinds of expressions after which, with the exception already noted, the construction occurs; *viz.* the expression of the existence of a difficulty ("I am at a loss," etc.) and the expression of the existence of a means. Not only do 19 examples out of a total of 25 belong under the former type, but, with the same exception from Aristophanes, all the earlier examples belong to it down to the last from Xenophon, — which indeed, as the statement of the *necessity of the procuring* of a means, is not far removed, and forms the transition to the new type ("we have no means," "we must have a means," "we have a means"). This state of things, while not absolutely impossible upon the theory that the construction originates in a final clause, is yet, upon that theory, improbable, while it is precisely what we should look for upon the theory of a development from the deliberative subjunctive, as sketched in detail above.

(3) The third possible evidence lies in the form of the construction. And here, as it seems to me, Mr. Earle's theory receives its death-stroke. In all the examples of the subjunctive that have been cited on either side (with the exception of a single one from Hesiod, which I shall presently show to be of a different character), the mode is unattended by *ἄν* or *κε*. Yet, practically speaking, the clause of purpose introduced by the relative pronoun (the construction after *ἵνα* or *ὄφρα* is of course a different affair) took a subjunctive *with* *ἄν* or *κε*, or a future indicative, the former prevailing in Homer, the latter winning an almost complete triumph later. The subjunctive in Γ 459 (=Γ 287),

ἔκδοτε, καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν ἣν τιν' ἔοικεν,
ἣ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλληται,

is said by Professor Goodwin, M. T. § 568, to be the only case of the relative with the subjunctive without *κε* in such sentences in Homer. The exact force of the mode in this example is hard to determine, and I am willing, so far as our argument is concerned, that it should be classed as final.

We may even grant the case σ 334, placed under this head by Delbrück and Monro,

μή τις τοι τάχα Ἴρου ἀμείνων ἄλλος ἀναστῆ,
ὅς τις σ' ἀμφὶ κάρη κεκοπῶς χερσὶ στιβαρῆσιν
δώματος ἐκπέμψησι φορούξας αἵματι πολλῶ,

though it is possible that the relative clause is only a continuation of the expression of warning ("look to it that another does not arise and"), or that it is only an expression of expectation without $\alpha\upsilon$ ¹ (so Ameis-Hentze). But, even if these cases are sound, they are but two² against a very large number.

Now if the construction under examination were a development from the relative clause of purpose, it would do one of three things. It would, in conformity with ordinary Attic usage, appear with the future indicative for its mode; or it would appear with the indicative in some examples and the subjunctive with $\alpha\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ in others; or, at the extreme, it would appear with the future indicative in some examples, the subjunctive with $\alpha\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ in some others, and, just conceivably in a very small proportion of cases, with the subjunctive without $\alpha\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$. Instead, however, of doing any of these things, it appears in every case with the subjunctive, and, in no case that properly belongs under the head which we are considering, with $\alpha\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$. This state of affairs would, humanly speaking, be impossible if the construction had originated in a clause of purpose, whereas it is precisely what is to be expected if the clause originated in a deliberative subjunctive.

It remains to speak of the one case which Mr. Earle adduces that does not properly fall under the present head. In this example, which is from Hesiod Op. 57 (δώσω·κακὸν ὧ̄ κεν ἄπαντες | τέρπωνται), not only is the introductory expression different from any that we have seen, but the dependent clause contains a $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$. These two facts sever it

¹ See a similar subjunctive *with* $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$, in δ 754, p. 170, below.

² I see no sufficient reason for regarding the verb in *οἳ τις . . . θανάσσειται* in Σ 467 as a subjunctive, as Monro is inclined to do.

from all the other examples, and reduce it to the ordinary construction of the earlier clause of purpose, as commonly treated. Out of such cases as this, had they occurred frequently, a construction similar to that which has been under discussion, only *with* ἄν, not without it, might indeed have been developed, but was not. And, if it had been, it would not have been confined within the narrow range to which the Extended Deliberative Subjunctive is confined; nor would it have stopped at the stage of development represented by the subjunctive with ἄν or κε, but, like the construction of purpose itself, would have passed on to the stage seen in the Attic construction with the future indicative.

These objections were urged by myself in a discussion which took place at the meeting of the American Philological Association in the summer of 1892, at the conclusion of the reading of Mr. Earle's "Notes on the Subjunctive of Purpose in Relative Clauses in Greek." Mr. Earle's paper was printed in abstract in the Proceedings for that year. One phrase in it, in the form in which it was published, seems to point to a conceivable means of escape from the argument which I have given. For this reason, and also because the paper gives a clearer idea of Mr. Earle's conception of the prototype of the Attic idiom than did his article in the *Classical Review*, I reprint it here in full.

The paper contained an examination of the idiom οὐκ ἔστι (μοι), or οὐκ ἔχω, ὅς (ὅστις or rel. adv.) and subj. (or opt. aft. secondary tense). The prototype of the Attic idiom was sought in Homeric Greek: cf. *Il.* 21, 111 sqq., *Il.* 19, 355-7, *Il.* 6, 450 sqq., *Il.* 4, 164, *Il.* 21, 103 sq., *Od.* 6, 201 sqq., *Il.* 3, 459 sq., *Od.* 15, 310 sq., with *Soph. Ai.* 514 sq., *Eur. H. F.* 1245, *Xen. Anab.* 1. 7, 7, *Eur. Or.* 722 sq. (For other examples from Attic Greek, see *Class. Rev.* Vol. VI, pp. 93-5.) It was suggested that "the gradual obsolescence of the subjunctive which can be traced in Ionic and Attic Greek, in what Weber calls 'unvollständige Finalsätze' with ὅπως, seems to have gone hand in hand with a similar obsolescence in the kindred relative final-clauses" (*i.e.* relative in the more restricted sense). In this process the finite construction of the rel. clause may have been influenced by the use of the fut. particip. to express purpose after verbs of motion, a usage so extensive in Ionic Greek that in *Hdt.* viii-ix, which, according to my examination, contain *not a single fut. rel. clause of purpose*, and no certain instance of the οὐκ ἔχω, ὅς, τι constr. with (so-called) final subjunct., we find the fut. part. in all 17 times. — "In such a sweeping away of the subjunctive constr. we must seek an

explanation of a survival as certain as the οὐκ ἔχω δεῖν (δ) constr. appears to be, examined from the point of view of historical syntax. It is here that Goodwin's remark is suggestive. If, instead of saying that the construction in question 'may be explained by the analogy of' the indirect deliberative, we say that it is to be explained from the essential nature of the subjunct., traced in its development in Homer, and found again, in perhaps still further development, in Attic Greek, as a survival, sometimes obscured and confused by the indirect deliberative, the similar form of which served to prevent it from sharing the fate of its companion relative clauses of purpose. If we put the case in this form (pointing out in our support the triple ambiguity of ἔχειν and the ambiguity of δεῖν), we shall, it seems to me, be as near the truth as we are likely to get in so subtle a matter."

[The writer did not make himself responsible for any particular theory of the original meaning of the Greek subjunctive. He does not, however, wish himself to be considered as favoring the putting on the same footing, though they may both for convenience' sake be classed as "final," such subjunctives as those which are discussed above, and the final subjunctive developed from the independent hortatory subjunctive.¹ Cf. Eur. Suppl. 1232, with Soph. Antig. 1332 sq., 1184 sq.]

From the fact that Mr. Earle printed his paper, it is to be presumed that, in spite of the evidence pointed out, in our oral discussion, as afforded by the absence of ἄν or κε, he continued to hold his opinion. If that is so, there are but two forms in which it would be conceivably possible to hold it. These would be somewhat as follows: (1) The construction in question was originally expressed by the bare subjunctive, at a time (this must have been well back of the Homeric age; yet no example occurs in Homer) when the bare subjunctive was the form employed in the relative clause of purpose; but, while other clauses of purpose passed on to the stage at which ἄν or κε was used, and then to the stage in which the future indicative was used, these particular clauses were held to their earliest form by their close resemblance to the indirect deliberative question; or (2) the construction began at a time when the relative clause of purpose took the subjunctive with ἄν or κε, but, when this

¹ I have endeavored to prove, in a paper printed in abstract in the Proceedings of the American Philological Association for 1892, that the subjunctive with ἄν or κε in the relative final clause is not of "hortatory" origin, but expressed originally simply something reckoned upon ("future" or "prospective" subjunctive). This view, though not the one put forth by Delbrück, seems to me to be necessary, and also to have the distinct merit of bridging the chasm which would otherwise exist between the Homeric idiom and the Attic.

clause passed on to the stage in which the future indicative was employed, it remained in the subjunctive, and also shook off its *ἄν* or *κε*, on account of its close resemblance to the indirect deliberative question. In either case, Mr. Earle's phrase ought not to be "sometimes obscured and confused by the indirect deliberative," but "completely obscured and overpowered by the indirect deliberative." The phrase, however, is unimportant. What is important is that to grant either of these alternatives is to grant a closer resemblance between our examples and the indirect deliberative than between our examples and the clause of purpose; and to do this is to surrender the case entirely.

The passage in brackets in Mr. Earle's paper might perhaps at first sight appear to undo my objection to his theory, inasmuch as he would not speak of the prototype of the construction as being strictly "final." It becomes necessary, then, to examine the examples which he cites from Homer, to see what is the concrete starting-point which he has in mind. They are here presented in an order intended to show their relationship; and I add several (marked by the word "additional") for further illustration.

A.

ἀλλά μοι εὖ θ' ὑπόθευ καὶ ἄμ' ἡγεμόν' ἐσθλὸν ὄπασσον,
ὅς κέ μέ κείσ' ἀγάγη. — ο 310.

ADDITIONAL.

ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι δότε νῆα θοὴν καὶ εἵκοσ' ἐταίρους,
οἳ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον. — Β 212.

B.

ADDITIONAL.

κείνος δ' αὖ περὶ κῆρι μακάρτατος ἔξοχον ἄλλων,
ὅς κέ σ' ἐέδνοισι βρίσας οἰκόνδ' ἀγάγηται. — ζ 158.

ADDITIONAL.

ἔσται μάν, ὅτ' ἂν αὐτε φίλην γλαυκώπιδα εἶπη. — Θ 373.

ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἔνμμελίω Πριάμοιο,
Ζεὺς δέ σφι Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων,
αὐτὸς ἐπισσειήσιν ἐρεμνὴν αἰγίδα πᾶσιν
τῆσδ' ἀπάτης κοτέων. τὰ μὲν ἔσσεται οὐκ ἀτέλεστα.

— Δ 164.

ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἔνμμελίω Πριάμοιο. — Ζ 448.

οὐχ ὀράας, οἶος καὶ ἐγὼ καλὸς τε μέγας τε ;
πατρὸς δ' εἶμ' ἀγαθοῖο, θεὰ δέ με γείνατο μήτηρ·
ἀλλ' ἔπι τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή.
ἔσσεται ἢ ἡὼς ἢ δειλὴ ἢ μέσον ἡμαρ,
ὀππότε τις καὶ ἐμεῖο Ἄρει ἐκ θυμὸν ἔλῃται,
ἢ ὅ γε δουρὶ βαλὼν ἢ ἀπὸ νευρῆφιν ὀιστῶ. — Φ 108.

C.

στῆτέ μοι, ἀμφίπολοι· πόσε φεύγετε φῶτα ἰδοῦσαι ;
ἢ μή πού τινα δυσμενέων φάσθ' ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν ;
οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ διερὸς βροτός, οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς κεν Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐς γαίαν ἵκηται
δηιοτήτα φέρων· μάλα γὰρ φίλοι ἀθανάτοισιν. — ζ 199.

οὐ γὰρ οἶω

πάγχυ θεοῖς μακάρεσσι γονὴν Ἄρκεισιάδαο
ἔχθεσθ', ἀλλ' ἔτι πού τις ἐπέσσεται, ὅς κεν ἔχῃσιν
δῶματά θ' ὑψερεφέα καὶ ἀπόπροθι πίονας ἀγρούς.

— δ 754.

ADDITIONAL.

εἰ γάρ κ' ἐν νύσση γε παρεξέλασσησθα διώκων,
οὐκ ἔσθ', ὅς κέ σ' ἔλῃσι μετάλμενος οὐδὲ παρέλθῃ,
οὐδ' εἴ κεν μετόπισθεν Ἄρειονα δῖον ἐλαῦνοι. — Ψ 344.

ADDITIONAL.

κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρον Πηνελόπεια,
θάρσει, μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι μελόντων.
οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ, οὐδ' ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῶ νίει χεῖρας ἐποίσει
ζῶοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο. — π 435.

ADDITIONAL.

οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ὃς πάροιθ' αἰρήσεται
τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύναμιν ἀντ' Εὐρυσθέως.

—Eur. Heracleid. 57.

D.

ὄς ἄρα μιν Πριάμοιο προσήυδα φαίδιμος νιός
λίσσόμενος ἐπέεσσιν, ἀμείλικτον δ' ὄπ' ἄκουσεν·
νήπιε, μή μοι ἄποινα πιφαύσκειο μηδ' ἀγόρευε·
πρὶν μὲν γὰρ Πάτροκλον ἐπισπεῖν αἰσιμον ἡμαρ,
τόφρα τί μοι πεφιδέσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φίλτερον ἦεν
Τρώων, καὶ πολλοὺς ζωοὺς ἔλον ἠδὲ πέρασσα·
νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔσθ', ὃς τις θάνατον φύγη, ὅν κε θεός γε
Ἰλίου προπάροιθεν ἐμῆς ἐν χερσὶ βάλῃσιν,
καὶ πάντων Τρώων, πέρι δ' αὖ Πριάμοιό γε παίδων.

—Φ 97.

E.

ἡμεῖς δ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην καὶ κτήμαθ' ἅμ' αὐτῇ.
ἔκδοτε, καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν, ἣν τιν' ἔοικεν,
ἧ τε καὶ ἔσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλληται.—Γ 458.

The examples in group A convey “purpose” in the ordinary full sense of the grammatical term (being expressible in Attic by the relative with the future indicative), and thereby differ radically in force, as well as in form (namely, in being accompanied by *κεν*) and in the nature of the words which they follow, from the idiom we are studying.

The examples in group B are all simply prophetic in meaning (“happy is he that shall . . .,” “the day will come when . . . shall”), which characteristic is wholly absent from the idiom we are studying. In one example only, Φ 111, is *ἄν* or *κε* wanting, and — to say nothing of the necessities of the meaning — the presence of *ἄν* in the parallel passages, Θ 373, Δ 164, and Z 448, shows that the subjunctive here is of the same nature as in the rest.

In group C we get examples the first of which, but for the presence of *ἄν* or *κε*, would seem at first glance to be parallel

to those we are investigating. But the resemblance is purely superficial. In the idiom which we are studying, the prevailing type of the earlier examples is the negation of the existence, or the assertion of the restriction of the existence, of a means for carrying out an act which the speaker wills. "I must escape this suffering—there is no means," "I must look to some one—there is none but you," "I must escape death—there is no hope,"—such is the cast of all the examples before Xenophon, excepting two only, namely, the second one from Euripides, and the one from Aristophanes. In the former, the idea of impossibility, which in other examples has been present by inference, is the sole idea conveyed. The later growth of the construction *might have* proceeded along this line; but it did not. The construction broadens in scope, in that it comes to be used with the third person as well as with the first, in this case having the power of expressing an act willed by a third person, not by the speaker. In the case of the example Eq. 1321, too, the will expressed is not that of the speaker, but is an echo of a command just given by the person addressed. But here and elsewhere, in all the examples that have thus far appeared, saving only the second from Euripides, the idea of *will*, of *demand*, of *aim*, is always present. The latter example, then, represents merely a quickly arrested side-growth, and the typical construction may be described as involving the expression of the will of the speaker himself or of the subject of the main sentence. Now in the subjunctive examples under C (to say nothing of the presence of *κεν*), the act of the verb is not willed by any one; while, on the other hand, the indicative example which I have added shows how different the after-fate of this construction is from that of the one which we are studying.

The example under D differs from those under C in that the element of will does appear. Achilles says, in answer to Lycaon's prayer for mercy, "there is no man that shall escape," or, in substance, "it is my will that no man shall escape." But this does not correspond to the examples of our idiom. Orestes, in the example from Euripides, Or. 722, does not mean "it is my will that I shall not escape

death." Achilles denies the existence of any such impulse as is suggested in *φύγη*. Orestes expresses, in *φύγω*, the actual existence of an impulse, and denies only the existence of a means for carrying it out.

As for the example under E, though I have already expressed myself as ready to concede it, so far as our present argument is concerned, as a final clause, I should not be able to follow the thought of any one who found a closer resemblance between such a sentence and *οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω* than between the latter and *οὐκ ἀπορῶ δι' ἣντινα πρόσφασιν λέγω*, or between such a sentence and *οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω* than between the latter and *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω*.

As for the phrase "the gradual obsolescence of the subjunctive . . . in the kindred relative final-clauses," as Mr. Earle puts it, I should like to suggest the greater accuracy of some less mechanical phrase, such as "the completion of the passage of the form from the older expression of futurity to the newer, of which hints had already been given in Homer." And as for the phrase "examined from the point of view of historical syntax," — a phrase in itself calculated to array all good men on the side of the theory of which it is used, — it seems to me simply out of place. The one thing that has been lacking has been a rigorous examination of the question from precisely this point of view.

Next, — for the question involves details that call for great patience, — I have to add several examples confirmatory of the theory of the existence of an Extended Deliberative, and to discuss a part of them.

The following from Gothic and Old English, which I owe to my colleague, Professor Blackburn, illustrate incontestably the subordination of a deliberative. The connectives are still interrogatives; for, at this early date, *hwā* had not yet taken upon itself the relative function. In the case of the example from Old English, it might possibly be urged that the form of the Greek has been retained, and that the meaning of *οὐκ ἔχουσιν* is "they know not," but a similar explanation would hardly be reasonable in the case of the example from *Beowulf*.

And hig nabbaþ hwæt hig eton. — Matth. 15, 32. (Greek οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί φάγωσιν, Vulg. et non habent quod manducent.)

Nah hwa sweord wege. — Beowulf, 2252 (3). (= non habeo quis ensem ferat.)¹

The following has not appeared in the controversy :

ἄλλου δ' οὐ τευ οἶδα, τεῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω. — Σ 192.²

If sound, it is of great importance, as proving, of itself alone, the interrogative origin of our idiom. But the presence of ἂν is unexpected, and this fact, together with the use of the interrogative, might be thought to throw suspicion upon the state of the text. What we ought to think upon this point will best appear in connection with the discussion of certain examples of a type οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως with the future indicative, — at first sight identical in form, except for the mode, with the extended deliberative, — which still demand consideration.

In two of the groups below I add, for further light, examples with other tenses of the indicative.

A.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ὄψει σὺ δεῦρ' ἐλθόντα με. — Soph. Ant. 329.

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦθ', ὅπως ἐγὼ λαβῶν
σημεῖα τοιαῦτ', οὐ φανῶ τοῦμὸν γένος. — Soph. O. T. 1058.

τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ποτ' εἰς ἐμέ
τοῦνειδος ἔξεις ἐνδίκως ὀνειδίσαι. — Soph. Phil. 522.

οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ὃς πάροισ' αἰρήσεται
τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύναμιν ἀντ' Εὐρυσθέως. — Eur. Heracl. 57.

οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτῳ φθονήσουσι,
πάντων ὡς οἶόν τ' ἐστί τὰ βέλτιστα πράττουσιν. — Isocr. 3. 18.

¹ The resemblance of the Greek idiom to such examples as nec quid speraret habebat, Verg. Ecl. 2, 2, nil habeo quod agam, Hor. Sat. 1, 9, 19, is obvious, and suggests an interesting question of parallel growth or imitation.

² La Roche, Düntzer, Ameis-Hentze, and Nauck all give the verse as it is here printed, though various ways of substituting a relative for the interrogative τεῦ have been suggested.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὄπου

λόγων ἀκούσαι ζῶν ποτ' ἠθέλησ' ἐμῶν. — Soph. Ai. 1069.

B.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὄπως πόλιν

κείνην ἐρείψεις. — Soph. O. C. 1372.

ταύτην ποτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς.

— Soph. Ant. 750.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὄπου μ' ὀλεῖς. — Soph. O. T. 448.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὄπως οὐκ εἶ σὺ γεννάδας ἀνὴρ. — Ar. Ran. 640.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὄπως

ὄδ' οὐκ Ὀρέστης ἔσθ' ὁ προσφωνῶν ἐμέ. — Soph. El. 1479.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὄπως οὐ πιστὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν πτερόν

ἐξήγαγ' ἐς τόδ' ἄλσος. — Soph. O. C. 97.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὄπως ἐν τινι μικρῷ

δέσποινα χόλον καταπαύσει. — Eur. Med. 171.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτις τοῦτ' ἀν' Ἑλληνὶς γυνή

ἔτλη ποθ'. — Eur. Med. 1339.

C.

οὐκ ἔστιν αἰκισμ' οὐδὲ μηχάνημ' ὄτω

προτρέψεταιί με Ζεὺς γεγωνῆσαι τάδε,

πρὶν ἀν' χαλασθῆ δεσμὰ λυμαντήρια. — Aesch. P. V. 989.

D.

νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας στόλος, οὐδ' ἐν

φροντίδος ἔγχος

ᾧ τις ἀλέξεται. — Soph. O. T. 168.

ταύτη πελάζει ναυβάτης οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν·

οὐ γὰρ τις ὄρμος ἔστιν, οὐδ' ὄποι πλέων

ἐξεμπολήσει κέρδος, ἢ ξενώσεται. — Soph. Phil. 301.

ψευδωνύμως σε δαίμονες Προμηθεά

καλοῦσιν· αὐτὸν γὰρ σε δεῖ προμηθέως

ὄτω τρόπῳ τῆσδ' ἐκκυλισθήσει τύχης. — Aesch. P. V. 85.

In the examples with the future indicative in the first three groups of clauses, the mechanism is simply a negated *statement* with regard to futurity. The evidence of this is to be seen in some of the examples, otherwise of the same nature, in which a negated statement for the present or past is used, as in the last under A ("there is no point in which in life he was ever willing to listen to my words"), or as in El. 1480 under B ("there is no way in which this is not Orestes"). In no example is there that feeling of demand which we found to be characteristic of the extended deliberative, and to be present in every example of that idiom excepting one. Even in the sentence from Isocrates under A, which might at first sight (especially if one translated by the phrase "having no one to envy") appear to resemble the subjunctive idiom, this element is lacking, since the meaning appears to be simply "there being no one whose station in life will (=is of a kind to) lead to envy."¹

Under this general identity of mechanism, however, the three groups differ in that the first expresses only an unshaded statement of expected future or actual present or past fact ("you will not see me coming hither again"), while the second expresses impossibility ("you cannot take the city"), and the third expresses resolve ("Zeus shall never force me to utter this" — the cry of the speaker as he steels himself against yielding. Cf. the resolve of Achilles expressed in the independent indicative in A 88: οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο | σοὶ κοίλης παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει | συμπάντων Δαναῶν).

The examples under D (doubtless many more remain to be noticed) clearly differ from those printed above them in that they do express an act demanded by some one. They are therefore identical in character with the examples of the Extended Deliberative, and might equally well be written with the subjunctive. On the other hand, they are precisely such

¹ If any, however, take a different view of this example, they will properly regard it as an instance of a side-branch from the idiom seen under D, bearing the same relation to that idiom which the example from Euripides bore to all the other examples of the extended deliberative.

examples as one would expect to find if one had information that the Greek *had* developed an extended clause of purpose of the class to which Mr. Earle and J. D. supposed the subjunctive examples to belong.

That such a development is antecedently perfectly possible I have already said. But so is also a development from the deliberative future indicative, parallel to that of the subjunctive examples from the deliberative subjunctive. Examples of the independent deliberative future indicative, as in Aesch. Ag. 1362 and 1367, are common enough. But examples are not rare of the dependent clause, as in Soph. O. C. 1742 (*ὅπως μολούμεθ' ἐς δόμους | οὐκ ἔχω*), Theocr. 16, 16 (*πόθεν οἴσεται ἀθρεῖ | ἄργυρον*), and 17, 10 (*παπταίνει . . . πόθεν ἄρξεται ἔργου*), and Plat. Gorg. 521 B (*οὐκ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς*). Cf. the corresponding subjunctive in Rep. 368 B, *ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι*, and Euthyd. 287 C, *οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι*). As there is a simple dependent deliberative future indicative, so there might also be an extended deliberative of the same mode and tense.

Which of these two possible origins is the real one? I see no means of reaching an absolute decision. Probability, however, appears to point to the second rather than to the first. In the case of the subjunctive idiom we have found positive evidence for belief in a deliberative origin. Unless there is positive evidence forthcoming for a different origin in the case of the indicative idiom, it will be sound method not to assign it to a different cause. The Greek consciousness of the kinship of the force of the *subjunctive* idiom with that of the deliberative subjunctive has kept the mode, in spite of the approach of the meaning toward that of purpose, from passing over into the mode of purpose, and has kept the formula very nearly confined to the expression of the existence or non-existence of a difficulty. Within this range of meaning, then, within which our indicative examples also are confined, the Greek feeling for the quasi-deliberative form was clearly stronger than for the quasi-final form, and the Greek mind is likely, therefore, in using an indicative, to have fallen upon the practically identical deliberative idiom rather than

upon the idiom of the final clause. In default, then, of outside evidence for the final clause, — which, up to the present time, I have not found, — I should regard the whole group of phenomena, subjunctive and indicative alike, as of deliberative origin.¹

The examples of the unquestionable dependent deliberative indicative which in this last discussion we have seen (p. 177) bear upon the question of the genuineness of the dependent $\tau\epsilon\upsilon\ \grave{\alpha}\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ in Homer Σ 192. The subjunctive with $\grave{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ is, in most idioms, either a forerunner of, or an ever-possible substitute for, the future indicative. Even, then, if no other examples of the dependent deliberative subjunctive with $\grave{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ appeared, this example should not surprise us. But other cases do appear, as in N 741, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\nu\ \delta'\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\phi\rho\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$, | $\grave{\eta}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\ \nu\acute{\eta}\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota\ \pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\kappa\lambda\acute{\eta}\sigma\iota\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$, | $\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \kappa'\ \acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma\ \delta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\ \kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\grave{\eta}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$ | $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \nu\eta\hat{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\theta\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\eta}\mu\omicron\nu\epsilon\varsigma$, and I 618, $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \delta'\ \grave{\eta}\omicron\iota\ \phi\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\phi\iota\nu$ | $\phi\rho\alpha\sigma\sigma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\theta'$, $\grave{\eta}\ \kappa\epsilon\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\theta'$ $\acute{\epsilon}\phi'$ $\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho'$, $\grave{\eta}\ \kappa\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$. (Cf. Δ 14, where $\acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\alpha$ after $\phi\rho\alpha\zeta\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\theta'$ is shown by the context to mean "how these things shall be," not "how they will be," and therefore forms the connecting link with the dependent deliberative indicative as seen in Attic.)²

The text in Σ 192 is therefore not invalidated by the employment of $\kappa\epsilon$. Nor is it invalidated by the use of the interrogative $\tau\epsilon\upsilon$, since such a cast of the sentence, seen already above in the case of Old English, forms precisely the first stage which one must assume for the development of the Greek idiom with the bare subjunctive, which, on independent grounds, we have found to be an extended deliberative. The text is therefore sound, and adds strength to a case already strong.

¹ Cobet, *Collectanea Critica*, p. 137, takes the dependent clause in Aesch. P. V. 85, above, as equalling *quo facto* . . ., probably having in mind the interrogative force. Dindorf, *Lex. Aeschyleum*, s.v. $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, uses the phrase "in interrogatione indirecta" in citing the same passage.

² The general view is that the deliberative subjunctive with $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ does not occur in Attic. So Bäumlein, *Untersuchungen*, p. 184, and Kühner, *Gr. Gramm.* § 394, Anm. 4.

I regard the evidence, then, as being conclusive in favor of the view held substantially in common by Goodwin, Jebb, Tarbell, Verrall (by implication from his note upon Aesch. Ag. 620), and Sidgwick, against the view of Monro, Earle, and "J. D."

Monro's view appears only in the sentence already quoted. The views of Sidgwick and J. D. appear only incidentally, and without argument, in their discussion of the optative idiom, and will therefore require no separate consideration.

II.

The certainty which has apparently been reached with regard to the history of the subjunctive idiom does not extend to the history of the optative idiom seen in *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*, etc., to which we now pass. The result of our examination will be, I think, the disproof, in any case and finally, of one of the two contending views. The other view will be shown to have strong arguments in its favor, but a certain difficulty—not necessarily finally insoluble—will still remain.

Madvig appears not to discuss the optative idiom. Krüger (II. § 54, 3, 8) assumes the omission of *ἄν* in eight examples from the Attic stage (see also I. § 54, 14, A. 4). G. Wolff (Rh. M. 1863, pp. 602–6) inclines to emend all independent examples by inserting *ἄν* or reading a subjunctive. Goodwin (M. and T. § 50, 2, N. 1, of the editions between 1860 and 1890, and § 241 of the new edition) regards the dependent examples as "conditionals" or "potentials" without *ἄν*; and this was the generally accepted theory, down to the year 1881.

The participants in the debate which began with that year have been Mr. Sidgwick, Professor Jebb (in his note on Soph. O. C. 170, and Appendix I.), Mr. Verrall (in his note on Aesch. Ag. 620), Mr. Jerram (in the note on v. 52 in his edition of the *Alcestis* of Euripides), Mr. Earle (*Classical Review* for March, 1892), and a writer in the same journal signing the initials J. D. to articles in the numbers for December, 1892, and March, 1893. Professor Wecklein has also expressed his

opinion in a review of Mr. Sidgwick's Choephoroi in the Berl. Phil. Wochenschr. for 1885, p. 487 seq., and, incidentally, in the Jahresbericht LXXI. (1892), p. 181.

Mr. Sidgwick's views were first put forth in his school editions of the Agamemnon (1881) and the Choephoroi (1884), Appendix I. The substance of them may be seen in the following passages, which in substance are common to both books :

“Now, it must be plain, considering these examples all in a lump, that what they *vary from* is not the optative with *äv*, but the interrogative subjunctive, or, as it is usually called, the *deliberative*. The subjunctive might be substituted for the optative in all these instances : and in the first two it is usually so read, though against the best MS. authority.

The difficulty then is this : not why *äv* is omitted, for the sentences are not conditional ; but why the *remote* form [optative] is used instead of the *primary* form [subjunctive], when the sentences are all of a *primary* character.

The answer is that the optative expresses the remoteness, not as usual [*e.g.* in past final, or past indefinite, or past deliberatives] of *pastness*, but of possibility : the instinct is to express by optative something *more out of the question* than the subjunctive would have expressed.

Thus, *e.g.*, in the third instance *τίς κατάσχη* ; (see p. 182) would be good Greek, but the question of restraining Zeus' omnipotence would seem to be more treated as a practical one : the optative puts it further off, as a wild impossibility.

Or again, in Ar. Plut. 438 *ποῖ φύγη* would be in ordinary circumstances the expression, and so the older editors all read it : but *φύγοι*, the MS. reading, and the right one, is the exclamation of supreme terror, treating escape as in the last degree unlikely.”

The examples cited by Mr. Sidgwick in these appendices were from Attic poetry, with the exception of two from Plato. In the appendix to his edition of the Oedipus Coloneus (first published in 1885), Professor Jebb expresses his agreement with Mr. Sidgwick's main point, but very carefully sifts the alleged examples. In Soph. O. C. 170 he would read

ἐλθῆ, and in Ar. Plut. 438 φύγη, on the ground that the apparent meaning demands the subjunctive. In the case of most of the examples which he cites from Attic prose (Lys. 31, 24, Dem. 21, 35, Plat. Gorg. 492 B, Euthyd. 296 E, Antiph. 1, 4) he points out an easy way in which ἄν might have accidentally dropped out, and expresses himself as inclined to adopt the theory of such a loss in the case of all the examples.

Mr. Verrall, in his edition of the Agamemnon, 1889, accepts Mr. Sidgwick's view (see ad v. 625), as does also Mr. Jerram, in his edition of the Alcestis of Euripides, in the following note, ad v. 52: "For μόλοι, the opt., we should expect μόλη, the subj., after the primary tense οὐκ ἔστι. But the optative is used to express something farther removed from possibility, 'Is there absolutely no chance; etc.?' "

The next reference to the matter is at the conclusion of Mr. Earle's article in the Classical Review for March, 1892, in these words: "If the MSS. are to be trusted, we sometimes have the optative of purpose, instead of the subjunctive, after primary tenses. Cf. Eur. Alc. 112, Aesch. Prom. 291, Ch. 72." In the Jahresbericht of the same year (loc. cit.), Professor Wecklein incidentally again expressed the belief which he had expressed before in the review already referred to, that the constructions in dispute were potentials. In the Classical Review for December, 1892, J. D. argued the case against Mr. Sidgwick's remote deliberative and for the potential. Mr. Sidgwick replied in the March number for 1893, holding to his view with regard to the examples from the Attic playwrights, but adding that Professor Jebb had convinced him that the prose examples ought to be given up, on the ground that "the omission of ἄν is much more likely to be an oversight of the scribe in these cases." To some of the objections which in this article Mr. Sidgwick urged against J. D.'s view, the latter made answer in the Classical Review for October, 1893, and Mr. Sidgwick, having seen the article in proof, added a few comments.

Before we can proceed to weigh the arguments which have been put forward in this discussion, it is necessary to have before us, in classified form, all the examples that have thus

far been produced. I add a considerable context in the cases in which the exact shade of meaning might otherwise not be clear :

The Independent Construction.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ τρέφει
 δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη,
 πόντιαί τ' ἀγκάλαι κνωδάλων
 ἀνταίων βροτοῖσι
 πλάθουσι · βλαστοῦσι καὶ πεδαίχμιοι
 λαμπάδες πεδάοροι
 πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβά-
 μονα κἀνεμοέντ' ἄν¹
 αἰγίδων φράσαι κῶτον ·
 ἀλλ' ὑπέρολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι
 καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶ τλημόνων
 παντόλμους ἔρωτας
 ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν ; — Aesch. Cho. 585.

τεὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν
 ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι ;
 τὰν οὐθ' ὕπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ πάντ' ἀγρεύων²
 οὔτε θεῶν ἄκματοι μῆνες, ἀγήρωσ δὲ χρόνῳ
 δυνάστας κατέχεις Ὀλύμπου μαρμαρόεσσαν αἶγλαν.
 — Soph. Ant. 604.

- ΧΟ. τῶν, ξένε πάμμορ', εὖ φύλαξαι,
 μετάσταθ', ἀπόβαθι. πολ-
 λὰ κέλευθος ἐρατύει ·
 κλύεις, ὦ πολύμοχθ' ἀλάτα ;
 λόγον εἴ τιν' οἴσεις
 πρὸς ἐμὰν λέσχαν, ἀβάτων ἀποβάς,
 ἵνα πᾶσι νόμος,
 φώνει · πρόσθεν δ' ἀπερύκου.
 ΟΙ. θύγατερ, ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι ;
 ΑΝ. ὦ πάτερ, ἀστοῖς ἴσα χρῆ μελετᾶν,
 εἴκοντας ἂ δεῖ κακούμεντας.

¹ Codd. κἀνεμοέντων. The gender of αἰγίδων compels emendation.

² Jebb's reading.

ΟΙ. πρόσθιγέ νύν μου. — Soph. O. C. 161.¹

ἄναξ Ἐπιπολλον καὶ θεοὶ, ποῖ τις φύγοι;

— Ar. Plut. 438.¹

καὶ τί φίλος ῥέξαιμι; γάμοι πλήθουσιν ἀνίας.

— Theocr. 27, 24.²

The Dependent Construction.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὕπῳς λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ
ἐς τὸν πολὺν φίλοισι καρποῦσθαι χρόνον.

— Aesch. Ag. 620.

ταῖς σαῖς δὲ τύχαις, ἴσθι, συναλγῶ·
τό τε γάρ με, δοκῶ, συγγενὲς οὕτως
ἐσαναγκάζει,

χωρὶς τε γένους οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ

μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμ' ἢ σοί. — Aesch. P. V. 288.

ΧΟ. πῶς οὖν παλαιὰ παρὰ νεωτέρας μάθω;

ΗΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐνὸς κείραιτό νιν.

— Aesch. Cho. 171.

ΟΙ. τίς δῆτ' ἂν εἴη τήνδ' ὁ προσθακῶν ἔδραν;

ΘΗ. ὅρα κατ' Ἄργος εἴ τις ὑμῖν ἐγγενῆς
ἔσθ', ὅστις ἂν σου τοῦτο προσχρήζοι τυχεῖν.

ΟΙ. ὦ φίλτατε, σχέες οὐπερ εἶ. ΘΗ. τί δ' ἔστι σοι;

ΟΙ. μή μου δεηθῆς. ΘΗ. πράγματος ποίου; λέγε.

ΟΙ. ἔξοιδ' ἀκούων τῶνδ' ὅς ἐσθ' ὁ προστάτης.

ΘΗ. καὶ τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ὅν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι;

ΟΙ. παῖς οὐμός, ὄναξ, στυγνός, οὗ λόγων ἐγὼ
ἄλγιστ' ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἐξανασχοίμην κλύων.

ΘΗ. τί δ'; οὐκ ἀκούειν ἔστι, καὶ μὴ δρᾶν ἂ μὴ
χρήξεις; τί σοι τοῦδ' ἐστὶ λυπηρὸν κλύειν;

— Soph. O. C. 1166.

¹ I agree with Jebb that the general character of these two passages (the first is sufficiently shown here) demands the subjunctive.

² This example was added by J. D., but is not included in Mr. Sidgwick's latest list, *Classical Review*, March, 1893.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ναυκληρίαν
 ἔσθ' ὅποι τις αἶας
 στείλας ἢ Λυκίας
 εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνύδρους
 Ἄμμωνίδας ἔδρας
 δυστάνου παραλύσαι
 ψυχάν· — Eur. Alc. 112.¹

ΑΠ. λαβῶν ἴθ'· οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πείσαιμί σε.

ΘΑ. κτείνειν ὄν ἂν χρῆ; τοῦτο γὰρ τετάγμεθα.

ΑΠ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέλλουσι θάνατον ἐμβαλεῖν.

ΘΑ. ἔχω λόγον δὴ καὶ προθυμίαν σέθεν.

ΑΠ. ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἄλκηστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι;

ΘΑ. οὐκ ἔστι· τιμαῖς καμὲ τέρπεσθαι δόκει.

ΑΠ. οὔτοι πλέον γ' ἂν ἢ μίαν ψυχὴν λάβοις.

ΘΑ. νέων φθινόντων μείζον ἄρνημαι γέρας. — Eur. Alc. 48.

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρυμνῶν δωμάτων ἔχει κράτος,
 ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο ποντίῳ σάλῳ
 κάμνοντας ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ ναυαγίαις;

— Ar. Thesm. 871.

The following, which has not before appeared in the controversy, is thus given by Dindorf:

ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄνευ μάχης καὶ τῆς κατοξείας βοῆς
 ἐς λόγους ἔλθοιμεν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ διαλλαγῆς;

— Ar. Vesp. 471.²

Mr. Earle's theory, it seems to me, may be briefly dismissed. Something approaching purpose (though still clearly differing from it) might be felt in the case of Alc. 112, but in P. V. 288 it would appear a palpable forcing to render by any phraseology remotely resembling such a form as "no one

¹ Not given by Mr. Sidgwick. Theogn. 382 is probably intentionally omitted by him, together with Homeric clauses with *ὅς*, as too early. — Suppl. 20, Phil. 895, Plut. 374, and Av. 172, once read without *ἀν*, are now generally emended.

² V. alone, according to Dindorf, has *ἔλθοιμεν*, the rest of the Codd. having *ἔλθωμεν*. (Liddell and Scott, under *ὅπως*, have inadvertently cited the passage with both readings.) The subjunctive is impossible, making a sentence unlike any that we have seen in Part I. The only question, then, is whether we ought, with Hermann, to amend *ἀνευ* to *ἀν ἐκ*.

exists for the purpose of, with a view to, my paying him greater honor than I pay you." Mr. Earle's view seems to owe its origin to a desire to find a relationship between the optative construction and the subjunctive construction, which latter he has treated as final. If that view falls, as in Part I. I have tried to show that it must, Mr. Earle's probably strongest reason for his explanation of the optative falls with it. It should be added, too, that none of the disputants have agreed with him on this point. J. D., who shares his view of the subjunctive construction, regards the optative construction as potential.

J. D.'s argument upon the optative, as given in the December number, 1892, falls into two parts; *viz.* (1) a special argument, and (2) a canon with application.

The argument is in substance as follows: There is no need of resorting to "a grammatical novelty," since the examples can all be explained as potentials unaccompanied with *ἄν*, such as are frequently found in Pindar and Theocritus (to say nothing of Homer), and occasionally even in Attic (as Aesch. Eum. 265).

The canon, mingled with the application, is contained in the following:

"An oblique question is essentially a question repeated in word or thought; it is therefore necessarily dependent on some verb or verbal substantive implying perception of mind or sense or the outward expression of such perception (*verba sentiendi et declarandi*). In these indirect deliberatives no such introductory statement occurs; neither can it be understood."

Briefly put, the canon would read, as Mr. Earle's canon read (in my version) above: If in a given example the full apparatus and full force of a given known construction do not exist, then the construction found in the example can have no relation with that known construction. This canon, on which I have already commented in criticising Mr. Earle's theory with regard to the subjunctive idiom, would leave us helpless in face of many an idiom in many a language. To say nothing of the *cur*-question of propriety turned relative,

which I have already brought into court, with what heart would one who held such views of method confront a phenomenon like *τί φάγωσιν* in Mark 6, 36: *ἀπόλυσον αὐτούς, ἵνα ἀπελθόντες εἰς τοὺς κύκλω ἀγροῦς καὶ κώμας ἀγοράσωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τί φάγωσιν*, — which is after all but a step in advance of the *ποῦ . . . κλίνη* of Luke 9, 56: *ὁ δὲ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔχει ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν κλίνη?*¹

This part of J. D.'s argument, therefore, has in my judgment no weight. If there exists an independent remote deliberative in Greek, then it could readily pass over into a dependent relative form, just as the deliberative subjunctive did.

The other argument of J. D., on the other hand, certainly is sound in form. Whether it is sound in substance or not, I shall attempt later to show.

Before proceeding to the minuter examination of the two important rival theories, it will be well to consider certain fairly evident antecedent objections that have been raised, or might be raised, against one of them.

Against Mr. Sidgwick's theory lies the evident and not inconsiderable objection that the cause invoked by him to explain the phenomena is a cause not known to exist. The only certified optative of remoteness is an optative of the past. While, then, this state of things is not necessarily fatal to the theory, it constitutes a strong objection to it, and a correspondingly strong presumption in favor of any opposing theory which — like that of the potential origin of the idiom — should be based upon known causes.

This objection lies against Mr. Sidgwick's theory in its application both to the independent and to the dependent examples of the idiom. A second difficulty² lies in the

¹ See also in Mark 8, 1 and 2, *μὴ ἐχόντων τί φάγωσιν* and *οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί φάγωσιν*, and in Luke 12, 17, *τί ποιήσω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω ποῦ συνάξω τοὺς καρπούς μου*; I owe these examples to the kindness of my colleague, Professor Burton, who gave them to me in advance of the publication of the new edition of his *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (1893). See § 346, and cf. § 319.

² Though I should class this among the fairly evident antecedent objections to Mr. Sidgwick's theory, it has not been pointed out in print by any one, nor had it occurred to me before it was suggested by Miss C. E. Millerd, in a discussion in my syntactical seminary.

numerical relation between these two classes. Accepting all Mr. Sidgwick's examples of the independent sentences, together with the one added by J. D., we count but five in all, including the rather late one from Theocritus.¹ Of the dependent examples we have found seven or eight. Now the construction of which the subjunctive idiom already discussed is a special extension, *viz.* the independent deliberative, was an idiom in constant use. There are in the literature undoubtedly many hundreds of cases of the independent construction to perhaps two dozen of the extended construction. It is easy to believe in the occasional extension of an idiom repeatedly read in all kinds of literature, and repeatedly heard in daily speech. It is correspondingly difficult to believe in the extension of an idiom found a few times only in a single kind of literature, and never found elsewhere,—and therefore probably never heard in speech. And even if this general difficulty were to be surmounted, it still remains hard to understand why, in the one class of literature in which the constructions do occur, the dependent examples should exceed the independent in number. In order to meet this objection, Mr. Sidgwick will need to shape his theory still further, by seeking for some conception of the peculiar nature of the idea produced by the combination οὐκ ἔσθ' or ἔσθ' with ὅπως, etc.

The minuter examination of the general question will fall under four heads, the first three having to do with the force of the construction, the last with the form: (1) An application to Mr. Sidgwick's view of certain tests suggested by the nature of that view; (2) an application of corresponding tests to the theory that the construction is potential; (3) an examination of the evidence afforded by the contexts of the examples

¹ As already said, I agree with Professor Jebb that two of these examples should be thrown out. And I further agree with Mr. Verrall's recent note on Cho. 593: "As it is possible to supply ἄν from the parallel clause [φράσαι ἄν] preceding, this cannot be counted with certainty among the examples of the simple optative used in this way [for the expression of greater remoteness or impossibility] as a variant for the subjunctive." Cf. the omission under corresponding circumstances in prose, as in Plat. Rep. 352 E. Wecklein regards the explanation as entirely satisfactory.

cited; (4) the consideration of objections to the solution indicated by evidence reached in (1), (2), and (3).

(1) Mr. Sidgwick's theory that the optative idiom "varies," not from the optative with *ἄν*, but from the subjunctive idiom, and that its difference from the latter lies in its expressing the idea that its contents are "more out of the question," "in the last degree unlikely," "a wild impossibility," must necessarily rest for its support upon the truth of the following tenets: (*a*) This meaning cannot, by the necessary nature of examples cited, be proved to be conveyable by the potential with *ἄν*; (*b*) this meaning *is* proved, by the necessary nature of examples cited, to inhere in the idiom under examination; and (*c*) the differentiation of this idiom from the subjunctive idiom lies only in this one point, the two idioms being otherwise identical in force. These three necessary tenets will be taken up in order.

(*a*) How would the answer to Mr. Sidgwick's *τεὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι* be expressed? Does not a form of expression modelled on Homer's *τέκνα φίλ', ἦ τοι | Ζηνὶ βροτῶν οὐκ ἄν τις ἐρίζοι* (δ 78) and Plato's *οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἄν γένοιτο* (Phil. 16 B),—namely, the form *οὐδεμία ἄν . . . κατάσχοι*, suffice? If it does, then Mr. Sidgwick's genealogical tree of "grammatical affinities,"—to make use of a very good term of his,—is putting very near relatives asunder. If it does not, would not *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄν τις . . . κατάσχοι* suffice? The truth is that the idea of being "more out of the question," "in the last degree unlikely," is to be found in an abundance of potential examples, if one judges them with the same readiness to find the idea with which we approach Mr. Sidgwick's examples. *E.g.* his *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐνὸς κείραιτό νιν* may be compared with *πλὴν τοῦδ' ἄν οὐδεὶς ἐνδίκως μέμψαιτό μοι*, from v. 63 of the same play. The idea of being out of the question certainly does not more necessarily inhere in *καὶ τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ὅν ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι* (Soph. O. C. 1172) than in *πῶς ἄν τό γ' ἄκον πράγμ' ἄν εἰκότως ψέγοις*; in v. 977 of the same play. And surely nothing could be more "wildly impossible" than the dependent clause in *A. r. Nub. 1181: οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως | μί'*

ἡμέρα γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμέρα δύο, or in Soph. Ant. 911 : μητρός δ' ἐν
 "Αἰδου καὶ πατρὸς κεκευθότοι | οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν
 βλάστοι ποτί.

The meaning which Mr. Sidgwick conceives to be fundamental in our idiom being, then, perfectly conveyable by the potential optative, there must be some grave reason to justify a divorcing of the two, and an attaching of the former to the subjunctive idiom.

(b) Since the differentiation of the optative clauses from the subjunctive is defined as lying in the "wild impossibility" conveyed by the former, the two must of course be understood to be in other respects alike. Let us see whether they are.

In Part I. we have found that, with the exception of the single example Euripides H. F. 1245, which represents an arrested side-growth of the construction, all of the twenty-five subjunctive (or corresponding optative) examples from Classical Greek express an act demanded by the speaker, or by some one else; while the main sentence, if negated, as it is in all the examples down to Aristophanes, expresses the non-existence of a way, a person, etc., for the accomplishment of this demand. The formula for the sentence of the earlier type would then be the following: It is my will (your will, his will, etc.) that a certain thing be done, but there is no way. If, then, the optative idiom differs from the subjunctive as Mr. Sidgwick believes it to differ, and only thus, the meaning of a negative main sentence with attached optative would be expressed by the formula: It is my will (your will, his will, etc.) that a certain thing be done, but there is no *conceivably possible* way. Such an interpretation would fit Alc. 48, but not the other passages; for Ag. 620, so interpreted, would mean "I want (or, at any rate, somebody wants me¹) to make a lie seem fair, but there is no conceivably possible way"; P. V. 291 would mean "I want (or somebody wants me) to pay greater honor to some one else than to you, but there is no one to whom I possibly can"; Cho. 172 would

¹ I waive the fact that, in all the subjunctive examples from Aeschylus and Sophocles, the demand is that of the speaker himself.

mean "it is demanded that some one proceed to cut it, but there is no conceivably possible person, save one"; and O. C. 1172 would mean "I want (or, at any rate, you want me) to censure some one, but there is no one whom I can possibly censure," — all of which renderings are impossible.

(c) But a still more serious defect in the theory — a fatal one, it seems to me — lies in the fact that this meaning of "wild impossibility" is *not* fundamental in these examples. In two of them, to say nothing of Vesp. 471, the meaning is the exact opposite; namely, in Alc. 52 and Thesm. 871, — "*might* she then be spared?" and "who is here of kingly power, that *might* receive?" A moment's examination, too, will show that the thought in O. C. 1172 is not "there is no one whom I could possibly blame." These simple facts are destructive; for it is solely upon the idea of "remoteness from possibility" that Mr. Sidgwick's explanation of the grounds of the optative is based.

(2) We pass to the theory that the optatives in question are potentials. The tests to be applied to this theory would be, so far as the *force* of the idiom goes, (a) the theoretical sufficiency of the potential idea to give the actual meanings found in Mr. Sidgwick's examples, and (b) actual correspondence of these examples with others, otherwise the same, in which evidence of the potential meaning is given by the presence of *ἄν*.

(a) The potential expresses possibility. When, then, as in Alc. 52, Vesp. 471, and Thesm. 871, the main clause in a complex sentence is not negatived, the potential yields at once the only meaning conceivable in the passages; namely, "is there a way by which she *might* come to old age?" "*might* she possibly in some way come to old age?" "*might* we possibly come to terms?" etc. In the case of these examples, accordingly, the theory of a potential origin meets the test of consistency with itself which Mr. Sidgwick's theory failed to meet.

When, on the other hand, the main clause is negatived, the effect of the sentence as a whole is the denial of the existence of any possibility, — which is precisely the mean-

ing attached to the construction by Mr. Sidgwick's theory, though he has mistaken the place where the negation lies. It is worth while to say in passing that it is only by this negating of the main sentence that the idea of "wild impossibility" can possibly be attached to any dependent optative, itself unnegated. In other words, the question whether a given complex sentence shall express a possibility or an impossibility turns, not upon the force of the dependent clause, but upon the presence of a negative or implied negative (as often in an interrogative sentence) in the main member.

The theory that the construction is a mere potential, then, will explain Ag. 620 ("the way does not exist by which I could make a false tale seem fair," etc.), will explain Alc. 112 ("no place exists by faring forth to which one could set free the hapless woman's life"), will explain Cho. 172 ("no one else could cut it"), will explain Alc. 52 ("does a way exist by which she might"), will explain Thesm. 871 ("who is king here, that might receive guests weary," etc.), will explain P. V. 291 ("there is no man whom I could place above yourself"), and will explain the difficult sentence O. C. 1172 under its most probable interpretation (see footnote, p. 202).

So much for the dependent optatives. As to the interrogative independent construction of the same mode, it will depend wholly upon the nature of the individual case whether a given optative be taken as a serious inquiry about the existence of a possibility, or as the virtual expression of an impossibility. "How could this be done?" may mean either "inform me of the way by which the accomplishment of the act would be made possible," or may mean "how utterly impossible the act is."

The potential, then, is in its essential nature entirely competent to yield the force of complete impossibility which Mr. Sidgwick found in certain of his examples. It is also competent to account for the resemblance which, though not inherent in the idiom, he rightly found to exist between certain of his examples and the examples of the subjunctive idiom. The idea of *baffled impulse* which we find in the earlier type of the subjunctive examples (the impulse being expressed by

the subjunctive and the baffling by the denying, in the main clause, of the existence of a means, etc.) does indeed lie close to the idea of the *non-existence of a possibility* (the possibility being expressed by the potential, and the non-existence by the main sentence). And, finally, it is competent to yield the force found in the remainder of Mr. Sidgwick's examples, which express *possibility*, and which are widely separated from the examples of the subjunctive idiom.

(b) But we are not confined to a theoretical demonstration. For the competency of the essential nature of the potential to yield the force actually found in the idiom under examination is supported by the exact correspondence of these examples with other optative examples the potential character of which is made indubitable by the presence of *ἄν*. A table of parallels follows :

τεὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν
ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι ;
— Soph. Ant. 604.

ἀλλ' ὑπέρολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα
τίς λέγοι ; — Aesch. Cho. 594.¹

καὶ τί φίλος ῥέξαιμι ; γάμοι
πλήθουσιν ἀνίας.
— Theocr. 27, 24.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ
ἐς τὸν πολὺν φίλοισι καρποῦσθαι
χρόνον. — Aesch. Ag. 620.

ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἄλκηστις ἐς γῆρας
μόλοι ; — Eur. Alc. 52.

τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γὰν ἀπαξ πεσὸν θανάσιμον
προπάραιθ' ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἄν
πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων ;
— Aesch. Ag. 1019.

μένει δὲ μίμνοντος ἐν θρόνῳ Διὸς
παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα. θέσμιον γάρ·
τίς ἄν γονὰν ἀραιὸν ἐκβάλοι δόμων ;
κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτα.
— Aesch. Ag. 1563.

ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαιμι ; θεὸς διὰ πάντα
τελευτᾷ. — T 90.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως
μί' ἡμέρα γένοιτ' ἄν ἡμέρα δύο.
— Ar. Nub. 1181.

κοῦκ ἔσθ' ὅπως διαδὺς ἄν ἡμᾶς ἔτι
λάβοι. — Ar. Vesp. 212.

ὥστ' εἰ μή τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον δια-
φέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ'
ὅπως ἄν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος
γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν
ἐπιστήμην. — Plat. Lach. 184 C.

¹ In agreement with Jebb, I do not here include Mr. Sidgwick's two remaining examples. There would be no difficulty, however, in giving a long list of parallels if they were to be retained.

εἰ γὰρ τις φαίη τῶ πόλει τούτῳ
πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίας γεγενῆσθαι
τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ μεγίστων κακῶν
μετὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν, οὐκ ἔστιν
ὅπως οὐκ ἀληθῆ δόξειεν ἂν λέγειν
τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ τῶν τότε γεγενη-
μένων. — Isocr. 12, 156.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐνὸς κείραιτό
νιν. — Aesch. Cho. 172.¹

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλων πέλας ἔστ' οὐδεῖς,
ὅστις ἂν εἴποι πότερον φθιμένην
βασίλειαν χρὴ πενθεῖν, ἢ ζῶσ'
ἔτι φῶς λείσσει Πελίου παῖς.

— Eur. Alc. 79.

μητρός δ' ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πατρός
κεκευθότου

οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι
ποτέ. — Soph. Ant. 911.

χωρὶς τε γένους οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ
μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμ' ἢ σοί.

— Aesch. P. V. 291.

οὐκ ἔστ' ὅτου θίγοιμ' ἂν ἐνδικώτερον.
— Eur. El. 224.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ναυκληρίαν
ἔσθ' ὅποι τις αἴας
στεύλας . . .

δυστάνου παραλύσαι
ψυχάν. — Eur. Alc. 112.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου
ἔσθλον τι δράσας μάρτυρ' ἂν λάβοις
πάτραν. — Eur. H. F. 186.

οὐκ ἔστ' ὅποιον στάντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου
βίον
οὐτ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν οὔτε μεμψαίμην
ποτέ. — Soph. Ant. 1156.

καὶ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί
τι; — Soph. O. C. 1172.

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεῖς ὅστις ἂν μέμψαιτό
σε. — Eur. El. 903.

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρμυῶν δωμάτων ἔχει
κράτος,
ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο . . . ;

— Ar. Thesm. 871.

ὄρα κατ' Ἄργος εἴ τις ὑμῖν ἐγγενής
ἔσθ', ὅστις ἂν σου τοῦτο προσχρηῖται
τυχεῖν. — Soph. O. C. 1167.

(3) We come next to a scrutiny of the contexts of the examples under examination. In the case of two, clear evidence seems to be presented that the mode is potential.

¹ Compare the following:

ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ', ὃς σῆς γε κόνας κεφαλῆς
ἀπαλάλκοι. — X 348.

οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι
εἰσ', οἱ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν
κακότητα. — δ 166.

In the first passage from Aeschylus in the list on p. 182, *φράσαι* is beyond any reasonable doubt an optative, and, being an optative, is unquestionably potential, whether an *ἄν* is obtained by emendation or not. But the sentence of which it is the verb is exactly parallel with the sentence *τίς λέγοι*, differing from that only in being declarative where *τίς λέγοι* is interrogative. The passage runs rapidly through some of the manifestations of the power of nature, and then continues, "of the rushing wrath, too, of hurricanes, the fowls of the air and the beasts of the field can tell. But who can tell the soaring thought of man and the frenzied passion of woman's daring spirit?" The "grammatical affinities" of the idiom in question are thus clearly fixed for us by Aeschylus himself.

Similar evidence appears in the passage from the *Alcestis* of Euripides. At v. 48, Apollo, giving up the contest so far as he is concerned (but all the time knowing, as he afterwards prophesies in v. 65, that one is coming to rob Death of *Alcestis*), says, "Take then thy prey and go; for I know not whether I could persuade thee." Death answers, "Slay the one that should die? for that was our agreement." Apollo, seizing the suggested advantage, replies, "No, bring death on those who soon must die." Death retorts, "Now I catch your drift and aim." Apollo, in the familiar word-fencing fashion of the stage, again seizes a suggested advantage, and, as if Death were really yielding, asks, "Is there, then, a way by which *Alcestis* might be spared to reach old age?" to which Death, ending the matter, makes the categorical reply, "There is no way." The question in Apollo's mind in v. 48 is thus substantially identical with the question in v. 52, the former being "can she be saved through my persuasions?" the latter being "can she, then, be saved?" and in this parallelism of *ἄν εἰ πείσαιμί σε* and *ὅπως Ἀλκηστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι* the "grammatical affinities" of the idiom in question in the latter are again set forth for us by a Greek writer.

(4) The case in behalf of the potential looks, then, very strong. The force which every grammarian assigns to that mode would render its just meaning to every example.

Moreover, every example is found to have a mate in an undeniable potential sentence exactly or substantially parallel to it. And, finally, in two of the passages in which the examples under examination occur, the context itself betrays the potential force.

Manifestly, it would require a good deal of evidence to overthrow the strong probability thus established. Let us see whether the objection brought by Mr. Sidgwick will do it.

This objection will best be stated in Mr. Sidgwick's words: "If these are simple cases of an *ἄν* omitted in a relative potential clause, why are they all of one kind? Why do we never find them in positive clauses? On J. D.'s principle of explanation you ought to be able to say *εἰσὶν οὐ λέγουσιν* or *ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, usages of which there is in Attic no trace. In the examples the principal verb is always negative, or, what comes to the same thing, interrogative. Why again do we find this omission of *ἄν* with the optative, not merely in subordination only to clauses actually or virtually negative, but only to one special form of negative phrase, *οὐκ ἔστιν* (or the logically identical *τίς ἔστιν*;)? . . . It is not therefore an accident (as it would be on J. D.'s theory) that they stop with *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις κείραιτο*, and do not further extend to *ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*, still less to *πέμπω ὅστις ἀγγείλαι* or any such usage." (Classical Review for March, 1893.)

"It seems to me that a careful observer of language will suspect that he has not got to the bottom of the usage by simply saying '*ἄν* is omitted,' but that there is probably some other instinct at work which restricts the exceptional omission of *ἄν* to just this class (or these classes) of cases." (Ibid.)

The objection as expressed in its first form is not difficult to meet. Putting aside Mr. Sidgwick's statement that "the principal verb is always negative, or what comes to the same thing," which has been disproved above, one may first suggest that Mr. Sidgwick's point is easily turned against himself. The subjunctive idiom does in time develop a declarative and

positive main sentence, as in ἔχει ὅτι λέγει. If now the optative is only a "remoter" form, why does no corresponding declarative example of ἔχει ὅτι λέγοι, ἔστιν ὅτι λέγοι, or ἔστιν ὅπως λέγοι appear in Attic poetry? But a more decisive answer than the *ad hominem* one can be given. The reason why Attic does not, by the omission of ἄν, produce such constructions as εἴσιν οἱ λέγοιεν, ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι, and πέμπω ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι, is that Attic has no such constructions with ἄν, or, if it has them, they are altogether too rare to be a natural field for any variation. It is probably safe to say that no case like πέμπω ὅστις ἄν ἀγγεῖλαι occurs anywhere in Attic, though combinations very like it are occasionally to be found in Homer (as in ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα, | ὅς κ' εἴποι . . ., A 62). I think I may also say with safety, from the use of indices, that no cases like εἴσιν οἱ ἄν λέγοιεν or ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν λέξαιμι declarative exist in Aeschylus or Sophocles. The second does not exist even in Homer, in spite of the greater range of the Homeric grammatical apparatus; while the first, so far as my knowledge goes, occurs but once, *viz.* in K 170, though the negative form occurs frequently, *e.g.* in E 192 and 483, Ξ 299, X 348, δ 166 and 559, and ι 125. (X 348, it may be noted, is without ἄν, and has its exact correspondent, even to phraseology, in δ 166.¹)

Nevertheless, Mr. Sidgwick's objection, though it has gone too far, has, in the second form in which it is put, some weight; for there *are* some examples in Attic of the dependent optative with ἄν, though of a different type from those which he suggests.

In answer to the difficulty thus presented, my colleague, Professor Shorey, suggests that though, as he also firmly believes, the construction is potential, the omission of ἄν may be due to the influence of the subjunctive idiom, especially in the form which it takes in dependence upon a past tense. This may be the right solution, but my feeling is against it. It seems to me that the two idioms would have

¹ The two examples are given in the footnote on p. 193.

to be much nearer neighbors in actual force, — not merely in superficial form, — and in the whole range of both, — not, as is the case, in a part of their range only, — before the one could affect the other. I am more inclined to look for a solution in the essential character of the potential construction, and to be willing to wait for this solution, even if it be not at once forthcoming in a satisfactory and final form.

In this form it is, indeed, not forthcoming. Some considerations may, however, be suggested, which may guide some one else to better results.

As regards the independent construction, the omission of *ἄν* is, in point of fact, not confined to the examples under investigation. The true potential occurs without *ἄν* in *νεογγὸς ἀνθρώπων μάθοι* (Aesch. Ag. 1163)¹; it occurs, according to the Codd., in the perfectly unobjectionable *ἴσως γὰρ ἡ κῆρυξ τις ἢ πρέσβις μόλοι* (Suppl. 727; Codd. *πρεσβήμολοι*); and it occurs in the parenthetical phrases *ὥσπερ εἴποι τις, ὡς εἴποι τις, θᾶσσον ἢ λέγοι τις*, in Eur. Andr. 929 and Hipp. 1186, and Ar. Av. 180 (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 242, and Krüger, Gr. Sprachlehre II, § 54, 3, A. 8).²

Nor is the objection by any means so strong within the province of the dependent construction as might at first

¹ Wecklein holds that emendation is necessary in all these cases. Yet he grants the omission of *ἄν* in the dependent clauses under discussion.

² The optative of a fixed resolve, a derivative, as it seems to me, of the optative of ideal certainty, — to which distinction I shall presently return, — occurs without *ἄν*, according to the usual reading, in a passage cited by J. D., *viz.*:

ἀπὸ δὲ σοῦ

φεροίμαν βοσκὰν πώματος δυσπότου. — Aesch. Eum. 265.

The next line — *καὶ ζῶντά σ' ἰσχνάνας' ἀπάξομαι κάτω* — corroborates J. D.'s general argument that *φεροίμαν* cannot express a wish. A wish is not only in itself impossible here, but would be inconsistent with the positive statement in *σ' ἰσχνάνας' ἀπάξομαι*, — which statement, on the other hand, is entirely in keeping with the idea of a fixed resolve. Wordsworth's emendation to *φέροίμ' ἄν* is, however, so slight and easy as to commend itself to my mind.

In Cho. 854, where the Codd. have *φρένα κλέψειαν*, the emendation to *φρέν' ἄν κλέψειαν* is easy, and is hinted at, though not of course made necessary, by the metre. The passage beginning at Ag. 1374 is too difficult and uncertain of interpretation to cite in support of any doctrine.

hearing seem, as an analysis of the actually occurring examples of other kinds will show.

For these examples I am obliged, in order to save a delay which is forbidden me, to confine myself to Aeschylus and Sophocles, since there are no complete lexicons for Euripides and Aristophanes. Neither can I be sure that the collection is complete for the first two authors; for I find omissions, Ellendt's *Lexicon Sophocleum* giving, *e.g.*, only two examples of the potential with $\acute{\omega}\varsigma = \delta\tau\iota$, while Dindorf's gives four.

The actually occurring examples of the dependent potential optative and of the dependent optative of ideal certainty, or the optative which is used in ordinary conclusions, softened assertions, and the like, are, if I have made no mistake, the following. I group them under these two heads:

Dependent "Potential" Proper.

- (1) τεύξει παρ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικείων στόλων,
ὄσσην παρ' ἄλλων οὔποτ' ἂν σχέθεις βροτῶν.
— Aesch. Eum. 856.
- (2) εἴσιτ' ὦ ξενοί,
ἄλλως τε καὶ φέροντες οἷ' ἂν οὔτε τις
δόμων ἀπόσαιτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἡσθείη λαβῶν.
— Soph. El. 1323.
- (3) οὐ γὰρ ἔχω πῶς ἂν
στέρξαιμι κακὸν τόδε λεύσσων. — Soph. Trach. 991.
- (4) λόγος μὲν ἐστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανεῖς,
ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν
θάνη τις, οὔτ' εἰ χρηστὸς οὔτ' εἴ τω κακός.
— Soph. Trach. 1.

Dependent Optative of Ideal Certainty.

- (5) σπλάγχμων τε λειότητα, καὶ χροιάν τίνα
ἔχοντ' ἂν εἴη δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν,
χολῆς λοβοῦ τε ποικίλην εὐμορφίαν.
— Aesch. P. V. 493.

- (6) ἔμοι δ' ἔτι μὲν ὀμαλὸς ἄγαμος
ὁ βίος ἐν πατρὸς δόμοις,
μηδὲ κρεισσόνων ἐμοῦ
θεῶν ἀφυκτον ὄμμα προσδράκοι με.
ἀπολέμιστος ὕδρ' ἔο πόλεμος, ἄπορα πόριμος,
οὐδ' ἔχω τίς ἂν γηνοίμαν· Διὸς γὰρ οὐχ ὀρῶ
μητιν ὅπα φύγοιμ' ἄν. — Aesch. P. V. 901.
- (7) ἄρ' ἴστ', ἀοιδὰς καὶ γόους πρὸ τοῦ θανεῖν
ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς παύσαιτ' ἄν, εἰ χρεῖη λέγειν;
— Soph. Antig. 883.
- (8) ἦτις λέγεις μὲν ἀρτίως ὡς, εἰ λάβοις
σθένος, τὸ τούτων μῖσος ἐκδείξιας ἄν.
— Soph. El. 347.
- (9) ἀλγῶ ἔπι τοῖς παροῦσιν· ὥστ' ἄν, εἰ σθένος
λάβοιμι, δηλώσαιμ' ἂν οἱ αὐτοῖς φρονῶ.
— Soph. El. 333.
- (10) λέγ', ἐπεὶ σὲ λέχος δουριάλωτον
στέρξας ἀνέχει θούριος Αἴας·
ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν αἰδρις ὑπέιποις. — Soph. Ai. 211.
- (11) ἀλλ' εὐ γε μέντοι τοῦτ' ἐπίστασ' ὡς ἐγώ
σοὶ μὲν νέμοιμ' ἂν τῆσδε καὶ μείζω χάριν·
— Soph. Ai. 1370.
- (12) ὥστ' οὐχὶ μαντείας γ' ἂν οὔτε τῆδ' ἐγώ
βλέψαιμ' ἂν οὔνεκ' οὔτε τῆδ' ἂν ὕστερον.
— Soph. O. T. 857.
- (13) ἀλλ' ἴλεω ἐμὲ τὸν ἰκέτην δεξαίματο·
ὡς οὐχ ἔδρας γῆς τῆσδ' ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι.
— Soph. O. C. 44.
- (14) ὥστε ξένον γ' ἂν οὐδέν' ὄνθ', ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν,
ὑπεκτραποίμην μὴ οὐ συνεκσφῶζειν·
— Soph. O. C. 565.

Two examples remain which cannot be assigned with certainty to the one class rather than to the other, though the first would appear more probably to belong to the second :

- (15) οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅποιον στάντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου βίον
οὐτ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν οὔτε μεμψαίμην ποτέ.

— Soph. Antig. 1156.

- (16) ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐνδίκως γ' ἀτιμάζοιτό σοι.

— Soph. Ai. 1342.

To some of my readers, this division of the non-wishing optative into two classes will have no weight, and the argument founded upon it will have no justification. I know, indeed, of no grammar that sufficiently insists upon the distinction. But the distinction, nevertheless, has long seemed to me not only a real, but an important one. There is a vital difference between "I can" and "in a certain event I surely should," between "he may perhaps" and "he surely would." If we should not tolerate a translation in which "might" was used where the idea was "would," or *vice versa*, no more should we be indifferent to the same difference in the exposition of Greek or Latin syntax.¹

Now the examples of the idiom which we have to explain are all translated by Mr. Sidgwick by the formula "could" or "could possibly," and cannot be translated by "would." We should, therefore, in weighing the force of his last argument, set aside all examples of the optative of ideal certainty, — of which the meaning is clearly different.

If this be done, there remain five sure and six possible examples of the true potential, three (1, 2, and 15) in a relative clause, one (3) in an interrogative, one (16) in a consecutive with ὥστε, and one (4) in the Oratio Obliqua after ὡς.

Of the three in the relative clause, one, namely (16), is cast in the same form with the examples of the problematical idiom. Similar sentences could also, of course, be framed with the other two relative forms οἷος and ὅσος, as οὐκ ἔστι τύχη ὅσην ἂν [οἷαν ἂν] αἰνέσαιο πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ τις.

¹ There is, of course, a neutral border country between the two, and examples are easy to find which you may translate by either "could" or "would," as in "quis hoc credat?" But this does not lessen the difference where the difference exists.

We may, then, describe the general state of affairs thus: In potential relative clauses, *ἄν* may be either used or omitted. In interrogative and consecutive clauses and clauses quoted after *ὥς*, we have no evidence that it is ever omitted; but, on the other hand, we have but a single example of each of these to go upon. The number of actual cases that support Mr. Sidgwick's objection is thus so small—so far as we can judge from two out of the four authors concerned—as to carry little weight.

Before leaving the subject, however, I wish to suggest a possible line of inquiry with regard to the really controlling reason for the omission of *ἄν*. Our knowledge of the history and force of this particle is exceedingly small; but most writers agree in describing it as having meant originally something like "in a given case" (*ἐπειτα*), and having come finally to be a sign of "contingency," of dependence upon some assumption,—not of course necessarily expressed, but underlying the thought. If this is so, we should not expect to see the particle omitted with any freedom in cases of the optative of ideal certainty, since that always has the feeling of contingency underlying it. In two of the examples just given, *viz.* in (8) and (9), an actual condition is expressed; in (6), the questions in the last two verses do not turn upon things as they are, but upon an imaginary case previously clearly implied; in (5), *ἔχοντα* is in effect a condition; in (13), the clause of wish in the first verse quoted forms a condition; while in the rest also there is a sense of *some* assumption underlying each statement. The particle of "contingency," the particle suggesting some idea like "in that case," or "in an imaginable case," is therefore much in place.

It is also much in place in strictly potential sentences where the "possibility" is not absolutely existent, but hangs upon something, as in κ 268: *ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοίοδεσι θάσσον | φεύγωμεν· ἔτι γάρ κεν [= φεύγοντες] ἀλύξαιμεν κακὸν ἡμᾶρ*. In the examples on which Mr. Sidgwick founded his theory, on the other hand, there is no sense of contingency whatever, but only the bare idea of "possibility." Now the use of *ἄν* has become fixed in ordinary use, by Attic times, in the poten-

tial construction, whether with or without contingency, as (substantially) it had already done by Homeric times in the construction of ideal certainty.¹ But the Attic writers for the stage liked to impart an archaic flavor to their style. They used *νιν* for the pronoun of the third person. They used *ἐς* for *εἰς*. In older Greek they found an occasional omission of *ἄν*. They accordingly omitted it occasionally themselves, using this license with comparative freedom in the case of present and future conditions in the subjunctive and in the case of *πρίν*-clauses, etc., where the omission could not possibly lead to confusion, and, much more sparingly and cautiously still, in the case of the potential optative, where they never passed outside the limits of a bare *unconditioned possibility*, as seen in phrases like *ὡς εἴποι τις, ὥσπερ εἴποι τις, θᾶσσον ἢ λέγοι τις*, and in the examples of similar feeling (a point by no means to be overlooked) which have formed the subject of this paper.

Such a view has also something to commend it in the phraseology and historical sequence of the eight dependent examples. The oldest of them—the three from Aeschylus—are in the negative (*οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ*). So is also the example *οὐδὲ . . . ἔσθ' ὅποι* from Euripides. Two others take the corresponding form of inquiry, without the negative (*ἔσθ' ὅπως* ;). There then remain two cases, Thesm. 871 and O. C. 1172. The former, which is the latest of all, is put by Aristophanes into the mouth of Euripides, and might therefore be expected to be somewhat unusual in expression. In simpler form it would have been "is there some one here in authority, that might receive us?—can some one here receive us?" (= *ἔσθ' ὅστις* ;), and so is essentially of the same feeling as the *ἔσθ' ὅπως* of Aristophanes or of Euripides himself. The example O. C. 1172, though not late, is possibly farther removed from the type.² Seven of the eight examples, however, fall within the

¹ Such an omission as the one in Pindar's *κεινὸς εἶην* (Ol. 3, 45) is very rare even in Homer.

² This much discussed example (see Madvig, *Advers. Crit.* I., pp. 189 seq.) is the only one of the whole eight the meaning of which is not perfectly clear. It

type οὐκ ἔστιν, or ἔστιν interrogative, plus relative pronoun. Now, if we remember the extremely frequent recurrence of the idea of the denial of possibility in the combination οὐκ ἔστιν plus relative (seen not only, in Homeric and Attic Greek, with the potential plus ἄν, but also, in Attic, with the subjunctive, as appears in Part I., and even, indeed, with the indicative itself, in one of the commonest uses of the combination), it would seem that, if ἄν were anywhere to be omitted, here was a place where the mode and the introductory phrase together might safely be trusted to convey the potential meaning, — just as, in the independent interrogative, it was safe to trust to the association of the potential idea with the optative question obviously implying a negative answer. This step having been taken with the dependent examples in the *denial* of possibility, as in our three earliest examples, it would then be a natural further advance to use the same formula in the

surely cannot mean “who is there whom I could possibly censure?” as it would have to do if Mr. Sidgwick is right in saying (see p. 195 of this paper) “in subordination . . . only to one special form of negative phrase, οὐκ ἔστιν, or the logically identical τίς ἐστίν;”. The main clause, following ἐξοιδ’ ἀκούων τῶνδ’ ὅς ἐσθ’ ὁ προστάτης, must mean, not “who *is* there?” but “who is *the man?*” The force wanted for the sentence as a whole in the context is “who in the world can the man be whom — following your commands — I am to reject?” Donner gives it this force (“und wer denn ist es, den ich so verwerfen soll?”), and so, apparently, does Jebb in his translation (“and who can he be, against whom I should have a grief?”). To get this exact force, however, we ought to have a subjunctive clause, similar to the τίν’ ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἤκεις, ἐφ’ ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς of Ar. Eq. 1321. The true optative does not lend itself easily to subordination, and so could not express the wish of another than the speaker. The optative with ἄν sometimes has the meaning of propriety, but hardly in such a combination. We thus seem driven to the theory of a mixture of two thoughts in the main sentence, the relative clause being attached to the one which is not formally expressed, so that the sentence means “who in the world can this man be, — at least that could incur my censure?” or, in expanded form, “who in the world can this man be?” and “is there some man that might incur my censure [so that I should yield to your demand]?” This would seem to be substantially the force of Jebb’s rendering in his commentary: “who is he, to whom I could possibly have any objection?” But if the interpretation is right, then the relative clause with its suppressed antecedent conception, involving as it does an ἔστιν ὃν γ’ ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι; is parallel to the ἔσθ’ ὅπως μῦθοι of Euripides and the τίς ἔχει κράτος δοῖς δέξαιτο of Aristophanes, and so is after all essentially of the same type with the other seven examples.

question of possibility, especially if, as may well have been the case, there had previously been an intermediate use in a question implying denial.

My conception of the present state of the question, to sum up, is as follows :

Mr. Sidgwick's theory is in any case disproved ; for, even if the independent use claimed were not so infrequent as to make an extension into the dependent form improbable, and even if the fact that it is based upon an unknown cause were to be overlooked, yet (1) the fundamental meaning which, in keeping with that assumed cause, and as against a potential origin, Mr. Sidgwick assigns to his examples, is precisely the meaning which, in many of the examples, the potential would yield, and (2) this same fundamental meaning is wholly absent from others of his examples, and (3) the subjunctive idiom and the one in question are essentially unlike, in that the former, in all but one of the twenty-five examples thus far adduced, expresses an impulse or demand, which meaning is absent from several of Mr. Sidgwick's examples. Whatever may be thought of any other solution, then, this theory must, it seems to me, be abandoned.

Only one other theory deserving serious consideration has thus far been advocated, the theory that the verbs in question are potentials in the strict sense. This theory meets every condition except one. It accounts for the force of impossibility found in a number of the examples. It accounts for the force of possibility overlooked by Mr. Sidgwick in the others. It receives great strength from the fact that every one of the examples can be shown to have an exact correspondent in an unquestioned potential. It receives great strength from the fact that, in the case of two of the examples, the Greek poet has, for our better guidance, expressed an exactly parallel idea, in the immediate context, by an unquestionable potential. It is possibly defective at one point, in case, namely, of the failure of my explanation that the omission of *ἄν* in these cases of unconditioned potentiality with (οὐκ) *ἔσθ' ὅπως* and *ἔσθι* and the equivalent *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις* and allied phrases, was, if not first suggested, at

least made easier and safer through the association of the potential idea with the phrase οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως, in its frequent use with optative, subjunctive, and indicative, and that there is accordingly nothing remarkable in the fact that the omission is not found in the widely removed constructions of result, quotation, and indirect question. Yet, even if this explanation be not accepted, the defect is not a grave one, since there is reason to believe that the total number of examples with which the comparison is to be made is small (possibly only two, certainly not more than three, for two out of the four scenic poets), and since our knowledge of the force of the particle on which the difficulty turns is confessedly imperfect. My own conclusion, then, is that there is an extremely strong probability that the ultimate solution of the problem will justify the view now commonly held, by making of the examples in dispute nothing but ordinary potentials.

APPENDIX.



- I. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL SESSION, CHICAGO,
ILL., 1893.
- II. TREASURER'S REPORT (p. v.).
- III. LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS (p. liv.).
- IV. CONSTITUTION OF THE ASSOCIATION (p. lxvi.).
- V. PUBLICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION (p. lxxviii.).

MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE AT THE TWENTY-FIFTH
ANNUAL SESSION (CHICAGO).

F. F. Abbott, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Louis F. Anderson, Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington.
H. L. Baker, Detroit, Mich.
M. Bloomfield, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
D. Bonbright, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
H. C. G. Brandt, Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.
James W. Bright, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Demarchus C. Brown, Butler University, Irvington, Ind.
Henry F. Burton, University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y.
A. Guyot Cameron, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Edward B. Clapp, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
John Pitt Deane, Brooklyn, N. Y.
M. L. D'Ooge, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Herbert C. Elmer, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Harold N. Fowler, Adelbert College, Cleveland, O.
James M. Garnett, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.
Basil L. Gildersleeve, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Thomas D. Goodell, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Alfred Gudeman, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
William Gardner Hale, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
G. L. Hendrickson, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
David H. Holmes, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Milton W. Humphreys, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.
George E. Jackson, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
Gustaf Karsten, University of Indiana, Bloomington.
Martin Kellogg, University of California, Berkeley.
David A. Kennedy, Orange, N. J.
J. H. Kirkland, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.
Abby Leach, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
J. H. T. Main, Iowa College, Grinnell.
F. A. March, Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.
C. W. E. Miller, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Charles A. Mitchell, University School, Cleveland, O.
W. B. Owen, Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.
W. H. Parks, City of Creede, Colorado.
Ernest M. Pease, Leland Stanford Jr. University, Palo Alto, Cal.
Samuel B. Platner, Adelbert College, Cleveland, O.
Horatio M. Reynolds, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Louisa H. Richardson, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.

W. S. Scarborough, Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, O.
Charles P. G. Scott, Yonkers, N. Y.
Paul Shorey, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Josiah R. Smith, Ohio State University, Columbus.
Herbert Weir Smyth, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
W. O. Sproull, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O.
Lewis Stuart, Lake Forest University, Lake Forest, Ill.
G. V. Thompson, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Frank L. Van Cleef, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
John H. Walden, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Benjamin I. Wheeler, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Frank E. Woodruff, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.
A. C. Zenos, McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.

[Total, 52.]

AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.

CHICAGO, ILL., Tuesday, July 11, 1893.

THE Twenty-fifth Annual Session¹ was called to order at 3.30 P.M., in the Art Institute, by the President, Professor William Gardner Hale, of the University of Chicago.

The Secretary of the ASSOCIATION, Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, of Bryn Mawr College, presented the following report: —

1. The Executive Committee had elected as members of the ASSOCIATION: —

William F. Abbot, High School, Worcester, Mass.

F. G. Allinson, Professor of Greek, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

Edward P. Baillol, Professor of Romance Languages, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.

Miss Mabel Banta, Bloomington, Ind.

George K. Bartholomew, English and Classical School, Cincinnati, O.

William J. Battle, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

C. C. Bates, Professor of Latin, Buchtel College, Akron, O.

E. C. Benson, Professor of Latin, Kenyon College, Gambier, O.

J. R. Bishop, Hughes High School, Cincinnati, O.

George F. Bristol, Assistant Professor of Greek, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

Robert Baird, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Samuel Brooks, Professor of Latin, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Mich.

Demarchus C. Brown, Butler University, Irvington, Ind.

F. W. Brown, Professor of Latin, Franklin College, Franklin, Ind.

A. H. Buck, Professor of Greek, Boston University, Boston, Mass.

W. I. Burnap, Instructor in Greek, Lake Forest Academy, Lake Forest, Ill.

R. W. Crowell, High School, Columbus, O.

H. A. Dearborn, Professor of Latin, Tufts College, College Hill, Mass.

Joseph H. Drake, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

William S. Ebersole, Professor of Greek, Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Ia.

Miss Kate M. Edwards, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

F. H. Ellis, Wesleyan Academy, Wilbraham, Mass.

Miss E. Antoinette Ely, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Vernon J. Emery, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Frank H. Fowler, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

¹ The regular summer meeting of the ASSOCIATION was held in Chicago in conjunction with the Congress of Philologists, which convened in that city during the week July 11-15, at the invitation of the World's Congress Auxiliary of the World's Columbian Exposition. Two of the regular sessions of the ASSOCIATION were merged into General Sessions, where papers were presented by foreign and other scholars in attendance at the Congress. Some of these papers are incorporated in the present volume of Transactions.

- J. B. Garritt, Professor of Greek, Hanover College, Hanover, Ind.
 W. N. Guthrie, Professor of French, Kenyon College, Gambier, O.
 E. L. Hale, Professor of Latin, Hiram College, Hiram, O.
 L. B. Hall, Professor of Latin, Oberlin College, Oberlin, O.
 Charles Harris, Professor of German, Adelbert College, Cleveland, O.
 William A. Heidel, Professor of Greek, Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Ill.
 K. F. R. Hochdörfer, Professor of Modern Languages, Wittenberg College, Springfield, O.
 H. A. Hoffman, Professor of Greek, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
 Hon. Samuel E. Hunt, Cincinnati, O.
 Mrs. Julia J. Irvine, Professor of Greek, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
 Gustaf Karsten, Professor of Germanic Languages, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.
 A. P. Keil, Professor of Latin, Hanover College, Hanover, Ind.
 R. A. King, Professor of German and French, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Ind.
 H. M. Kingery, Professor of Latin, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Ind.
 E. G. Kinkead, Assistant in Latin, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O.
 A. F. Kuersteiner, Hughes High School, Cincinnati, O.
 Henry B. Longden, Professor of Latin, De Pauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 C. M. Lowe, Professor of Latin, Heidelberg University, Tiffin, O.
 E. W. Manning, Professor of Modern Languages, De Pauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 W. J. McMurtry, Yankton College, Yankton, South Dakota.
 F. J. Miller, Professor of Latin, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 Charles A. Mitchell, University School, Cleveland, O.
 W. O. Mussey, Assistant in English, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O.
 Carl Osthaus, Assistant Professor of German, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.
 W. H. Pabodre, Woodward High School, Cincinnati, O.
 T. H. Paden, Professor of Latin and Greek, New Concord, O.
 W. F. Palmer, Ph.D., Instructor in Latin, Lake Forest Academy, Lake Forest, Ill.
 Thomas M. Parrott, Ph.D., Dayton, O.
 William Morton Payne, Esq., Chicago, Ill.
 Miss S. Frances Pellett, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
 John Pickard, Assistant Professor of Latin, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
 A. C. Pierson, Professor of English, Hiram College, Hiram, O.
 Julius Howard Pratt, Jr., Ph.D., Milwaukee Academy, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Benjamin F. Prince, Professor of Greek and History, Wittenberg College, Springfield, O.
 George Scott, Professor of Latin, Otterbein University, Westville, O.
 Miss Helen W. Searles, Instructor in Greek and German, Ferry Hall Seminary, Lake Forest, Ill.
 T. H. Sonnedecker, Professor of Greek, Heidelberg University, Tiffin, O.
 Hiram A. Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
 Robert B. Steele, Professor of Latin, Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Ill.
 W. F. Swahlen, Professor of Greek, De Pauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
 A. T. Swift, Master in Modern Languages, Lakeville, Conn.

- F. W. Tilton, Rogers High School, Newport, R. I.
 A. H. Tolman, Professor of English, Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.
 W. H. Wait, Ph.D., Peoria, Ill.
 F. Whitlock, Professor of Latin, Ohio Wesleyan College, Delaware, O.
 W. G. Williams, Professor of Latin, Ohio Wesleyan College, Delaware, O.
 Charles A. Wilson, Assistant in French, Wittenberg College, Springfield, O.
 Theodore L. Wright, Professor of Greek, Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.
 G. H. Young, Professor of Latin, Wittenberg College, Springfield, O.
 A. S. Zerb, Professor of Hebrew, Heidelberg University, Tiffin, O.

[Total, 85.]

2. The TRANSACTIONS and PROCEEDINGS for 1892 (Vol. XXIII.) were issued together in May of the present year. Separate copies of the PROCEEDINGS may be obtained of the Secretary or of the Publishers.

In presenting his report as Treasurer, Professor Smyth alluded to the fact that, despite the heavy outlay for Vol. XXIII., one of the largest volumes yet published, the finances of the ASSOCIATION were in a satisfactory condition. The following is the report for the fiscal year ending July 8, 1893:—

RECEIPTS.

Balance from 1891-92	\$1652.22
Fees and Arrears	\$1138.00
Sales of Transactions	225.17
Reprints and Authors' Corrections	71.20
Dividends Central N. E. & Western R. R.	6.00
Interest	33.04
Total receipts for the year	<u>1473.41</u>
	\$3125.63

EXPENDITURES.

Transactions and Proceedings (Vol. XXIII.)	\$1592.74
Salary of Secretary	250.00
Postage	47.86
Expressage	3.00
Job Printing	17.25
Stationery	4.50
Binding	1.20
Incidental	2.84
Total expenditures for the year	<u>\$1919.39</u>
Balance, July 8, 1893	1206.24
	\$3125.63

The Chair appointed as Auditors of the Treasurer's Account, Professors Kellogg and Hendrickson.

As a Committee on Place of Meeting for next year were appointed Professors Sproull, Goodell, and Sterrett; on Officers for 1893-94, Professors D'Ooge, Fowler, and Abbott.

The reading of papers was then begun. At this time there were about sixty persons present. At subsequent meetings the number fluctuated greatly, at times being as large as one hundred.

1. The Latin Prohibitions,¹ by Professor H. C. Elmer, of Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

PART I. — This paper owes its origin to a feeling the writer has long had that certain uses of the Latin perfect subjunctive are inadequately, and, in some particulars, inaccurately, treated in Latin grammars. It is customary, for instance, in dealing with *ne* and the second person of the subjunctive in prohibitions, to dismiss the subject with the statement that, when the prohibition is addressed to no definite person, the present tense is used; otherwise, the perfect. All attempts, like Gildersleeve's,² for instance, to make any further distinction between the tenses have been frowned down. Scholars in general have been inclined to accept the views of Madvig (*Opusc. acad. altera*, p. 105)³ and of Weissenborn (on *Livy* 21, 44, 6) as final, viz. that the perfect is used, when a definite person is addressed, only because the present cannot be used. The reason for this remarkable state of things they do not trouble themselves to seek. Even Schmalz in the second edition of his *Lat. Synt.* § 31, would have it understood that the perfect tense in this use has no special significance. Such ignoring of all distinction between tenses is common also in other constructions, e.g. in the so-called potential subjunctive. One of the latest grammars (Allen and Greenough, § 311) says that in *aliquis dicat* and *aliquis dixerit*, the two tenses refer without distinction to the immediate future. The same grammar, in dealing with modest assertion, draws no distinction between *putaverim* and *putem*. It is customary, again, to dismiss the perfect subjunctive in prayers with the mere statement that it is a reminiscence of archaic formulae, without a hint that the perfect necessarily means anything. It has seemed to me that this looseness of interpretation is entirely unjustified by the facts of the language, and I have accordingly undertaken an investigation of the whole range of those independent constructions of the perfect subjunctive in which that tense deals with future time. I have included also in my investigation such uses of the future perfect indicative as are frequently said to be "equivalent to the simple future."

For the purposes of this paper I have collected and classified all the instances of the uses concerned that are to be found in the remains of the Latin language

¹ The paper, of which this is an abstract, will be found in complete form in No. 58 (Vol. XV.) of the *American Journal of Philology*.

² *Latin Grammar*, § 266, Rem. 2, which is, as far as it goes, in perfect harmony with the results reached in this paper.

³ Madvig is inexcusably careless in some of his statements in this connection. On page 105, e.g., he says that *ne* with the present is *apud ipsos comicos rarissimum et paene inusitatum*. As a matter of fact, it is extremely common *apud comicos* — far more so than any other form of prohibition.

up to the end of the Augustan period (except the late inscriptions), together with important parts of Silver Latin. I ought, perhaps, to say that for four volumes of the Teubner text I accepted a collection of instances made by one of my students. He is, however, one in whose care and accuracy I have great confidence, and I feel sure that his collection is substantially complete. That part of my investigation, the results of which I have chosen for the present paper, deals chiefly with the second person, present and perfect tenses, of the subjunctive in prohibitions. For the purpose of simplifying the discussion, I shall, for the present, exclude the few cases (commonly called prohibitions, and classified under *ne* with the subjunctive) introduced by *nec, numquam, nihil* (e.g. *nec dixeris, nec putaveris*). There are so many serious objections to explaining any one of those introduced by *nec (neque)* in the best prose writers, and some of those introduced by *nihil, numquam*, as instances of the same construction as that found in *ne feceris*, that I shall here merely refer to my full discussion of the subject in the American Journal of Philology. Furthermore, the limits of this abstract are such that I must omit references and citations, and can give hardly more than a few bare results of my investigation. All the statements, however, that are here made will be found fully substantiated in my complete paper.

The impression is very generally given that *ne* with the perfect subjunctive is one of the most common methods of expressing prohibition in the best classical prose. As a matter of fact, it is almost entirely unknown to such prose. It will be understood, of course, that the Letters of Cicero do not represent the usage of what is understood by "classical prose." Tyrrell has clearly shown that the diction and constructions in the Letters are the diction and constructions of the early comic drama, and not at all those of what is commonly meant by Ciceronian Latin. Indeed, Cicero himself (*ad. fam. IX. 21, 1*) calls especial attention to the wide difference in this respect between the Letters and his other productions. We must not consider them in determining the usage of the best classical prose any more than we should the usage of early comedy — they both reflect the language of familiar everyday life. Throwing the Letters aside, we may say that *ne* with the second person perfect subjunctive does not occur in any production, whether prose or poetry, of the whole Ciceronian period, except in seven dialogue passages of Cicero where the tone distinctly sinks to that of ordinary conversation, or unceremonious ordering.¹ Were it not for four instances in Horace we might make the same statement for the entire period between Terence and Livy. It is not to the point to say that a prohibition is in its very nature familiar, nor would such a statement be true. The orations and the philosophical and rhetorical productions of Cicero, as well as the productions of other writers belonging to the same period, abound with prohibitions. The orations of Cicero alone contain 81 prohibitions (or probably twice this number if we count such expressions as *quaeso ne facias, obsecro ne*, etc.); and still in his orations no instance can be found of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive except *pro Murena* 31, where Cicero is quoting the supposed words of a teacher to his pupil.

Again, the grammar-rule which says that the present tense is used when the

¹ There is no manuscript authority whatever for *ne siris* (*Catullus* 66, 91). The manuscript reading *non siris* is the true one. This will be fully discussed in the American Journal of Philology.

prohibition is general, i.e. addressed to no one in particular, while the perfect is used when it is addressed to some particular person, or persons, is entirely misleading and blinding in the form in which it is given. The truth which the rule contains is rendered useless by the absence of any hint as to the principle involved. Furthermore, exceptions to the rule are not uncommon, despite the sweeping assertions of the grammars. Sometimes general prohibitions take the perfect tense, e.g. *Cato de agr. cult.* 4;¹ 37, 1; 45, 2; 93; 113, 2; 158, 2; 161, 2; *XII Tabulae*, quoted in *Serv. in Verg. Ecl.* 8, 99; *Cic. pro Murena* 31, 65 (quoting general precepts of the *vestri praeceptores*, who had just been mentioned. Notice the singular verb side by side with *vestri* (instead of *tui*), which seems to show that the prohibition is general); *Hor. Sat.* 2, 2, 16. On the other hand, it is probable that prohibitions addressed to definite persons occasionally take the present tense at all periods of the literature, and that it is not, even in classical times, confined to poetry, as is commonly supposed. At any rate there are passages in prose which it requires ingenuity and violence to explain in any other way, and which, if found in Plautus or Terence, no one would have thought of explaining in any other way. This use is very common in early comedy, and I have collected the following instances from Cicero and later prose: *Cic. in Verr.* II. 4, 23, 52 *ne putetis*; *ib. de republica* 6, 12, 12 (where the imperative "*audite*," instead of a subordinate subjunctive, makes it probable that *ne excitetis* is also independent); *ib. ad fam.* 1, 9, 23 *ne pertimescas*; *ib.* 16, 9, 4 (where *cautus sis* and the form taken by the rest of the sentence show that *ne naviges* also is probably independent); *ib. ad Att.* 9, 18, 3 *ne agas* (a proverb applied here to a particular person); *ib. ad Quintum fratrem* 1, 4, 1 *amabo te, ne . . . adsignes* (Cicero never uses *amare* in this sense with a dependent clause, though its parenthetical use is common in his Letters with independent imperative constructions, e.g. *ad Att.* 2, 2, 1; *ib.* 16, 16 c; *ib.* 10, 10, 3; *ad Quint.* 2, 8 (10)²); *Phil.* II. 5, 10 *ne putetis* (most naturally taken as independent); *Livy* 44, 22 *ne alatis* (this, or some reading which involves the same construction, seems inevitably correct, and would undoubtedly be accepted by everybody were it not for the supposed rule); *ib.* 22, 39, 2 *neque desis neque des* (*Livy* and later writers freely use *neque* for *neve*); *Tac. Dialogus* 17 *ne dividatis*. It was formerly customary among editors of the *Dialogus* to take this as a prohibition. Recent editors use only a comma, or a semicolon, before *ne dividatis*, understand an ellipsis, i.e. *Haec dico ne*, and then apologize for the awkwardness of the sentence they have made Tacitus use. Why make this so difficult? Why not let it be what it seems to be on the face of it, namely a prohibition?³ Here are ten probable instances in prose of the present sub-

¹ The attempt of Nitzsch to show that this production of Cato was intended for the management of a particular estate is, on every hand, acknowledged to have been a failure. The evidence against such a view is overwhelming.

² Even in Plautus and Terence *amabo* in this sense is almost invariably thrown in parenthetically.

³ When this paper was read before the American Philological Association Professor Gudeman objected to my distinction between the two tenses of the subjunctive in prohibitions, saying, if I understood him correctly, that he had in mind a certain very impassioned prohibition in Tacitus in which the present tense was used. As I had not then examined Tacitus with reference to this construction, I could not answer his objection. An examination of this author, however, will show that Professor Gudeman's memory was certainly playing him false. The passage above

junction with *ne* addressed to a definite person. The reason why it is not more common will appear later in this discussion. But even if none of these examples existed (and there have been ingenious attempts to explain away most of them in deference to the supposed rule), there would still be no sufficient ground for the rule laid down by the grammars. In the whole field of classical prose, from the beginning of the Ciceronian period to the end of the Augustan period, and even later, there is but a single example of *ne* with the second person of the present subjunctive in an indefinite prohibition. There are a few examples from poetry, but these have no bearing upon the point in question, as it is everywhere acknowledged that *ne* with the present is common in poetry even in addressing a definite person. The single example just referred to is, of course, the one cited under this rule, with suspicious uniformity, by all Latin grammars, viz. *Cic. de senectute* 10, 33, though even here it might be noticed that Cato is speaking to definite persons, addressing at one time Scipio individually, again Laelius, and still again both together. The truth is that a general prohibition in Latin is nearly always expressed by the use of the third person, e.g. *nemo pulet*, etc., or some circumlocution introduced by *cavendum est ne*, *oportet*, or the like. It will, I think, be admitted that the above considerations at least cast serious doubt upon the validity of the grammar-rules regarding the use of *ne* in prohibitions. The question as to the true distinction between the tenses in such constructions seems to me to be still an open one, and this paper is intended as a contribution to its solution.

Let us start with certain general principles. All will agree that the perfect subjunctive, when dealing with a future act, differs, at least in some uses, from the present in representing the act as one finished in the future. For instance, in the expression *si venerit, videat* the act of coming is conceived of as a finished act in the future, about to be completed prior to the beginning of the act of seeing. In *si veniat*, on the other hand, the act is conceived of as in progress in the future. Such a distinction between the tenses of *ne feceris* and *ne facias* would not be entirely satisfactory at all points of the parallel. *Ne feceris* cannot mean literally "Do not, prior to a certain point in the future, have done it." In one respect, however, the distinction still holds. In *ne feceris* there is at least no thought of the progress of the act. The expression deals with an act in its entirety. The beginning, the progress, and the end of the act are brought together and focussed in a single conception. The idea of the act is not dwelt upon, but merely touched for an instant, and then dismissed. The speaker, as it were, makes short work of the thought. There is a certain force about the tense. When a man says *ne facias* he is taking a comparatively calm, dispassionate view of an act conceived of as one that will possibly be taking place in the future; *ne feceris*, on the other hand, implies that the speaker cannot abide the thought; he refers to it only for the purpose of insisting that it be dismissed absolutely as one not to be harbored. As far as the comparative vigor of the two expressions is concerned, the difference in feeling between them is similar to that between "Go!" and "Be gone!" "Go" dwells upon the progress of the act. A man never says "Be gone!" except when aroused by strong emotion, which does not allow him to think of the progress of the act, but only the prompt accomplishment

cited contains the only instance in Tacitus in which the present tense of the subjunctive is used in prohibition, and this, instead of making against my view, is a striking confirmation of it.

of it. In a similar way *ne feceris* betrays stronger feeling than *ne facias*—it disposes of the thought with the least possible ado. This feature of the tense, if my characterization is correct, would lead us to expect it to be used only, or chiefly, in animated, emotional, or unusually earnest discourse, and to such passages, as we shall presently see, is it almost exclusively confined. I wish to insist upon this as the only real distinction between the two tenses with *ne*. We shall now, of course, expect that in the majority of cases where a prohibition is a general, indefinite one, the present tense will be found. When a man is soberly philosophizing and writing precepts for the world at large, he is not often aroused by emotions so strong as he is when, actually face to face with a person, and perhaps under the influence of anger, alarm, or some other intense feeling, he orders that person not to do a certain thing. But even in this sort of writing, when he feels that his precept is of prime importance, he may occasionally fall into the more vigorous form of expression. For the satisfactory study of such expressions, we look for some production abounding in general precepts and still not written in the form of dialogue and not addressed to any one in particular. Naturally we turn to Cato's *de agricultura*. In the seven different passages of this work cited above, Cato uses *ne* with the perfect in a general prohibition. In each case the context makes it probable, or, in the light of facts which I shall present later, practically certain, that he considers of especial importance the particular thing prohibited.

By far the best place to study the difference in feeling between the two tenses is Plautus and Terence, because in them (and only in them) both tenses are very freely used with *ne* in prohibitions. It is there, too, that the tone of the prohibition can best be determined, because the dramatic action makes clear the feeling of the speaker. I give, in my complete paper, classified lists of all the passages in Plautus and Terence containing prohibitions of this sort. There are in these two authors 31 instances of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive. In nearly all of these the feeling of strong emotion of some sort, e.g. great alarm, fear of disaster if the prohibition is not complied with, or the like, is very prominent. Many of them are accompanied by other expressions which betray the speaker's earnestness, e.g. *per deos atque homines, opsecro, hercle*, etc. And there is not one of them in the least inconsistent with my explanation of the meaning of the tense.

The same feeling that prompts the use of the perfect tense with *ne* explains the use of the same tense in prohibitions introduced by *cave*. Plautus and Terence present 33 instances of *cave* with the perfect, though elsewhere in Latin only the present tense is found with *cave*.

If now we turn to *ne* and *cave* with the present subjunctive, we find a very different state of things. There are in Plautus and Terence more than 100 instances of *ne* and 18 (19?) instances of *cave*, in this form of prohibition, all of which are given in my complete paper.

There are certain remarkable differences between the prohibitions expressed by the present tense and those expressed by the perfect, which a casual observer might not notice. If my distinction between the two tenses is correct, we should expect that a prohibition dealing with mere mental action, e.g. "Do not suppose," "Do not be surprised," "Do not be afraid," would commonly take the present tense, because such prohibitions would not commonly be accompanied by strong

emotion, and, as far as the interests of the speaker are concerned, it matters little whether the prohibition be complied with, or not. Such a condition of things is exactly what we find. Among the instances of *ne* with the perfect tense, not a single example of a verb of this class will be found; but among those of *ne* with the present there are no less than 31 instances of such verbs, or nearly a third of the entire number. Again, such prohibitions as "Do not ask me," "Do not remind me" (i.e. I know already), would not ordinarily imply any emotion, and no such verbs will be found among the instances of *ne* with the perfect. But there are 13 such verbs among the instances of the present. Substantially the same holds true for the *cave*-constructions. Among the 33 instances of *cave* with the perfect there is no instance of a verb belonging to any of these classes. There is no avoidance of such verbs with *cave* used with the present tense (in spite of the fact that there are only about half so many instances of the present as of the perfect); or with *noli* (though *noli* is comparatively rare in Plautus and Terence); or with *ne* followed by the imperative, a construction which, in Plautus and Terence, occurs 32 times with verbs of this sort out of a total of 84 instances. A similar state of things is found outside of Plautus and Terence. Scores of such verbs are found in other forms of prohibition. But nowhere in this whole period is such a verb to be found in the perfect tense in a prohibition. Why this mysterious absence of all such verbs from this one sort of prohibition? Recurring to the instances of the present tense in Plautus and Terence, we notice that, in eleven of the passages, the prologue or some one else is calmly addressing the audience with "Do not expect me to disclose the plot of the play," or some prohibition equally calm. But there is not one instance in the prologues either of Plautus or Terence of the perfect tense in this use. And this again is exactly what we should expect. (It matters little, for our present purpose, whether Plautus wrote the prologues to his plays or not.) In general the fact may be emphasized that *ne* with the present is chiefly confined to prohibitions of the most common-place sort. Where this is not apparent from the nature of the verb itself, a study of the context will show that the speaker is not under the influence of any strong emotion. There are in all only 5 instances (a small number out of so many) which can fairly be said to be accompanied by emotion, and in all of these cases the verb is the same; so they should really count for only one instance.

Whatever differences of opinion may be held regarding individual instances, I feel sure that no one who compares carefully the instances of the present and of the perfect tenses respectively can resist the general conclusion to which I have come.

If now the distinction I have drawn between the two tenses holds so clearly for the only two authors who make frequent use of *ne* and *cave* with both tenses of the subjunctive in prohibitions, a strong presumption is established in favor of a similar distinction in the few instances to be found in later writers, where there are not always so many indications at hand, as in dramatic productions, to make clear the feeling of the writer. And a study of these instances confirms the presumption. There are, in classical prose, from the time of Terence up to near the end of the Augustan period, only 7 instances of *ne* with the perfect in prohibition, and these are all in Cicero. As pointed out above, each of these occurs in dialogue where the tone sinks to that of ordinary conversation, in which

some one is delivering himself of an earnest, energetic command. One is naturally more unceremonious in addressing a familiar friend than in addressing a mere acquaintance — he falls more readily into energetic forms of expression. Often he assumes an off-hand imperious tone in such cases merely as a bit of pleasantry. This would be especially natural when one was urging his friend not to do what he feared that the friend might do, viz. in prohibitions. One can hardly fail to notice this at any talkative gathering of intimate friends. The 7 instances mentioned are: *de div.* 2, 61, 127 (a supposed command of a god to a man); *de rep.* 1, 19, 32 (addressing the *adulescentes* before him); *de leg.* 2, 15, 36 (Atticus replying sharply to Marcus); *Ac.* 2, 40, 125 (in conversation with Lucullus at a familiar gathering of friends); *Tusc. Disp.* 1, 47, 112 (replying, in a deprecatory tone, to a suggestion that had just been made); *Mur.* 31, 65 (quoting a supposed command of a teacher to his pupil); *Par. Sto.* 5, 3, 41 (in a vigorous protest). An unusually earnest and energetic tone is to be found in each one of these. Notice, for instance, the strongly contrasted pronouns and the other indications of strong feeling. The reason why this construction is so rare in classical productions is that they are, for the most part, of a very dignified character. The prohibitions they contain are therefore commonly expressed by *noli* with the infinitive (a construction that occurs 123 times in Cicero, twice in Nepos, 3 times in Sallust, 3 times in Caesar), or by *cave* with the present subjunctive (30 times in Cicero, once in Nepos, once in Sallust), or by *vide ne* with the subjunctive (18 times in Cicero, once in Nepos). Even *ne* with the present subjunctive is less deferential than the constructions just named; it smacks somewhat of its sister construction, and so is comparatively rare. Where, next to the early comedy, do we find the most familiar tone prevailing? One may answer, without hesitation, in the Letters of Cicero. And it is in these letters that most of the instances of *ne* with the perfect in classical times are found. It is also a significant fact, and one, I think, not hitherto noticed, that all but 2 of the 14 instances here found are addressed to his bosom friends, or relatives: 8 of them to Atticus, 2 to his brother Quintus, and 2 to his intimate legal friend Trebatius, upon whom he was always sharpening his wits, and whom he never lost an opportunity to abuse good-naturedly to his face. One of the 2 exceptions is in a very impassioned passage of a letter written by Brutus (*ad Brut.* 1, 16, 6); the other is in *ad fam.* 7, 25, 2, where Cicero is enjoining upon Fadius Gallus in the most urgent terms possible not, under any circumstances, to reveal a certain secret. To his other correspondents he uses only *noli*, or, in 2 instances, *cave* with the present subjunctive. Excepting the passionate remonstrance referred to in a letter written by Brutus, the correspondents of Cicero use only *noli* when addressing him. In the treatise *ad Herennium*, I might add, *ne* never occurs in prohibition, though other forms of prohibition are common.

Most of the instances to be found in the prose of classical times, of *ne* with the second person present subjunctive in prohibitions, have been cited above. The following should be added to complete the list: *Cic. Cato Maior* 10, 33; *ad Att.* 2, 24, 1. That *ne* with the present subjunctive is not more common in the best prose is due to an increasing fondness for the *noli* construction, which in dignified address became the regular usage. In early comedy there was comparatively little call for the more calm and dignified forms of expression, and there, accordingly, we find that *noli* is comparatively rare. It occurs in Plautus and Terence

only in addressing some one who must be gently handled. It is found only where the tone is one of pleading — it never conveys an order in the strict sense of that word. It is almost never used by a superior in addressing an inferior. In the two or three exceptions to this rule the superior has some motive for adopting the mild tone.

As regards the different forms of prohibition in classical times, nothing can show more strikingly the difference in feeling between *ne* with the perfect subjunctive and *noli* with the infinitive than a comparison of the classes of verbs found in the two constructions. Of the 123 instances of *noli* in Cicero, 76 are used with verbs indicating some mental action, or some action which would not be likely to be accompanied by emotion on the part of the speaker, e.g. "Do not suppose," "Do not be afraid," etc. In the Letters 21, out of 32 instances, are verbs of this sort. Of the 29 instances of *cave* with the present subjunctive, 16 are of this sort. In the Letters the proportion is 10 out of 17. A glance at the instances of *ne* with the present subjunctive will show that most of the verbs in this construction also belong to the same class. We find the same state of things also in Plautus and Terence. Now side by side with these facts put the fact that, in the whole history of the Latin language, from the earliest times down to, and including, Livy, there are to be found in prohibitions expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive only two, or at most three, verbs that denote merely mental activity.¹ The only other instances (four in number) of verbs dealing with mental action at all, distinctly involve also other sorts of action. The almost entire absence, until the beginning of the period of decline, of this whole class of verbs in prohibitions expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive and its remarkable frequency in other forms of prohibitions can, it seems to me, be explained only in one way. Verbs of this class are, from their very nature, such as would not often be accompanied with passionate feeling, and so are confined to the milder forms of expression. And this, it seems to me, goes far to establish my contention that *ne* with the perfect subjunctive is reserved for prohibitions that are prompted by uncontrollable emotion, or else that are intended, generally from some serious motive, but sometimes merely as a bit of familiar pleasantry, to be as vigorous as possible in tone. This tone is commonly one of commanding. Rarely it is one of earnest entreaty, though in such cases the prohibition is commonly introduced by *noli*. *Noli* with the infinitive is the expression best calculated to win the good will of the hearer, as it merely appeals to him to exercise his own will (i.e. "Be unwilling"), or to forbear using it, while *ne* with the perfect subjunctive disregards altogether the will of the person addressed, and insists that the will of the speaker be obeyed.

The paper was discussed by Professors Shorey, Gildersleeve, Gudeman, and Hale; and in reply by Professor Elmer.

2. On the Interpretation of *Satura* in Livy VII. 2, by Professor George L. Hendrickson, of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

¹ Such expressions as *ne vos quidem timueritis* (*Cic. Tusc. Disp.* 1, 41, 98), *nunquam putaveris* (*Sall. Jug.* 110, 4), *nec putaveris* (*Cic. Acad.* 2, 46, 141) represent very different uses, as I shall show in my fuller discussion.

According to the prevailing view, the compositions designated as *saturae*, in this celebrated summary of the origins of the Roman drama, were rude and uncouth specimens of rustic banter, for the most part extemporized and quite devoid of plot. They are looked upon as representing a third and original form of Roman satire, in addition to the Lucilian and the Ennian forms recognized by ancient critics. The passage is one of great importance, and scholars from Scaliger and Casaubon down have vied with each other in their efforts to cast light by its aid upon the early history of satire and the drama at Rome. No important progress, however, was made in its elucidation (with the exception of a suggestion by Casaubon, which neither he nor subsequent scholars carried to its logical conclusion) before O. Jahn (*Hermes* II. 225) pointed out that it betrayed a sharpness of division into periods suggesting philological combination rather than authentic history, and that this was due to an effort to explain certain existing institutions by the circumstances of their origin, according to the well-known aetiological methods of the Roman philologists of the first and second centuries B.C. The suspicion thus cast upon the trustworthiness of this account received an extraordinary confirmation in the fact observed by F. Leo (*Varro und die Satire*, *Hermes* XXIV. p. 67 ff.) that the passage reproduces in some of its most essential features Aristotle's description of the origin and development of comedy. But while furnishing the clue to the solution of Livy's description, without which it must ever have remained an enigma, Leo does not seem to have given a correct explanation to his own observations, nor to have realized the closeness of the parallelism existing between this account and Aristotle. To point this out is the object of this paper, in which the writer will seek to show that the *satura* of Livy's account is an assumed parallel to the old Attic comedy, the designation of which was chosen with reference to the vehement personal invective (*ὄνομαστί κωμῳδεῖν*) of the *saturae* of Lucilius. Leo held that *satura* is here used either as the designation of a loose and irregular poetical form in the sense introduced by Ennius (*per saturam*), or else that it was chosen, under the influence of the Greek *σάτυροι*, to designate an assumed analogue to the satyr-drama, maintaining (with most interpreters) that a connection between the satyr-drama and the *saturae* is suggested by Livy's account. Both these views, however, are incorrect, the latter admitting of refutation without reference to the true interpretation. That the *saturae* are made analogous to the *σάτυροι* is a view which depends upon the assumption quite universally made, from the time of Casaubon, that the *exodia* of Livy's account (sec. 11) are a survival of the *saturae*, while, as the name implies and as their connection with the *Atellanae* reveals, these *exodia* were afterpieces in the manner of the Greek satyr-drama. In this account two classes of performers are sharply distinguished, voluntary (*iuventus*) and professional (*histriones*). The periods into which it is divided are four in number (exclusive of the Etruscan *iudiones*): (1) The Fescennine *iocularia* of the *iuventus*, (2) the *saturae* of the native *histriones*, (3) the *fabulae argumento sertae* of the *histriones*, inaugurated by Livius Andronicus, and (4) the *ridicula* (*exodia*) of the *iuventus*. The latter productions are represented as a revival of earlier performances, not, however, as has commonly been assumed, of the *saturae*, which were produced by *histriones*, but of the ancient (*antiquo more*, 11) *iocularia* of the *iuventus*, to confirm which a comparison of the almost identical descriptions of the performances of the *iuventus* in sections 5, 7, and 11 will

suffice. The *saturae* are not, therefore, put in any relation to the satyr-drama by Livy, but are simply described as the step in the development of the drama preceding the employment of the general plot by Livius Andronicus.

According to Aristotle, comedy had its origin in extemporary phallic verses. Its early history was obscure, and only late was it given a chorus at public expense. The most important event in its development was the introduction of the general plot (μῦθοι), an innovation ascribed to Epicharmus of Sicily; but at Athens Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν ἀφέμενος τῆς λαμβικῆς ἰδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους (Poetics 5). With this compare Livy l.c. 8: *Livius . . . ab saturis ausus est primus argumento fabulam serere*. It is only necessary to put these passages side by side to reveal the fact of their relation, and that in the Latin account *saturae* corresponds to the λαμβικὴ ἰδέα, the latter phrase designating the element of personal satire in the old comedy, which Aristotle censured. Ἡ λαμβικὴ ἰδέα is therefore at once a designation and a description of the old comedy, with which Horace (Sat. I. 4, 6) connects Lucilius (*Hinc omnis pendet Lucilius*). What, then, is more natural than that a descriptive designation of the old comedy should be interpreted by the name of Lucilius' compositions? Our conclusion, therefore, is that *satura*, employed in the sharply defined meaning given to that word by the aggressive quality of the poems of Lucilius, is the name of an assumed Roman parallel to the old Attic comedy, and that it is chosen as containing the most significant suggestion of the aggressive character of the old comedy which could be conveyed by a single Latin word. The description of the *saturae* as *impletae modis* may refer to the πολυμετρία (especially of the parabasis, cf. Platonius de diff. com. Dübner I. vs. 52), while the two predominant characteristics of the ἀρχαία κωμῳδία recognized by the ancient critics, its γέλωσ and its σκώμματα (ἄδεια τοῦ σκώπτειν), are here reproduced by *risus ac solutus iocus* (11).

Parallel and related to this description of Livy is a well-known passage of Horace (Epp. II. 1, 145 ff.), descriptive of the origin and development of the drama at Rome. Here, as in Livy, the beginnings are connected with the *Fescennina licentia* (the φαλλικά of Aristotle), after which follows a description of the transition of this playful banter to open abuse (*aperta rabies*), which had to be restrained by law. Now this account is nothing more nor less than a description of the λαμβικὴ ἰδέα of the old Attic comedy, with its unrestrained directness and openness of attack (*φανερῶς σκώπτειν, aperta rabies*), to which the check of legal restriction was applied at Athens. The compositions thus described by Horace correspond therefore to the *saturae* of Livy's account, and both represent an assumed parallel to the old Attic comedy, devised perhaps to afford an aetiological explanation of phenomena of the literary history of Rome (cf. the paper referred to below), or perhaps merely for the sake of constructing a literary history for Rome on the Greek pattern.

In the passage from Livy's account, quoted above, Livius Andronicus is said to have been the first to abandon *saturae* and to compose the play with general plot (*argumentum*), a change which is represented as an advance in artistic form. Now it is well known that Aristotle's estimate of the old comedy, as compared with the new (καινὴ = the later μέση), was very similar to this. For the old comedy of personal (τὰ καθ' ἑκαστον) satire was the most direct conceivable antithesis to his fundamental principle of the universal (καθόλου). In Horace's

account Aristotle's conception of this relation is also preserved, though less clearly and in a somewhat different way; for it has apparently escaped observation that Horace's description of the transition from the *aperta rabies* (vs. 149) to a milder form of composition (*vertere modum . . . ad bene dicendum delectandumque redacti*, vs. 154, 155) reproduces Aristotle's definition of the character of true wit as illustrated by the history of comedy: *πότερον οὖν τὸν εἰς σκώπτουσα ὀριστέον . . . τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν* (Eth. Nic. IV. 8, 7). Just as in Livy the drama *in artem paulatim verterat* under the influence of Livius Andronicus, 'a captive Greek,' so in Horace, *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis || intulit agresti Latio* (vs. 157).

It appears, therefore, that the descriptions of Livy and Horace reproduce the three stages of development presented by the history of comedy, as set forth by Aristotle: (1) The *φαλλικά* (*Fescennina licentia*), (2) the *λαμβική ιδέα* (*saturae, aperta rabies*), and (3) the artistic comedy of general plot (*μῦθοι, argumentum*), designed to please (*τέρπειν, delectare*) and not to hurt (*μὴ λυπεῖν, benedicere, i.e. non maledicere*).

[The detailed arguments in support of the views here advanced and additional instances of this assumption of an old comedy in Roman literature will be found in the writer's paper entitled "The Dramatic *Satura* and the Old Comedy at Rome," in the American Journal of Philology, Vol. XV. pp. 1-30.]

3. Solution of Some Problems in the Dialogus,¹ by Dr. Alfred Gudeman, of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

The paper deals (1) with the question concerning the relevancy of the introductory chapters to the main point at issue. (2) It is shown, on the basis of hitherto overlooked material, that the statement in c. 17 centum et viginti anni, etc., is neither an erroneous addition of the preceding enumeration nor a round number, but the pivotal point upon which the speaker's entire argument rests. (3) Arguments derived from 'culture-historical' conditions are adduced, which show that the Dialogus could not have been written in the reign of Domitian or later.

Remarks were made by Professors Sproull, Hendrickson, and the author.

4. "Hunc Inventum Inveni" (Plautus, Captivi, 442), by Professor W. S. Scarborough, of Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, O.

Whether Plautus was purposely obscure or whether the obscurity is due to the license to which Schlegel refers when, in speaking of Terence, he says, "Even his contemporaries reproach him with having falsified or corrupted a number of Greek pieces for the purpose of making out of them a few Latin ones," is in some respects an open question. No one will deny that the Latin comic poets assumed liberties and licenses in attempting to copy the new Greek comedy and to adapt

¹ Incorporated in the author's edition of the Dialogus (Ginn & Co.).

it to the Roman vehicle of thought, liberties which were out of harmony with the Greek originals.

This may not be due either to indifference, to laziness, or to that "negligentia" which Terence praises and which Dr. West in his excellent edition of Terence says must not be confounded with slovenliness. The liberties referred to may be attributed to some other causes, — to undue haste prompted by the need of money, to the genius and structure of the Roman tongue, possibly to the character of the audience for whom the plays were intended. Whether one of these or all of these, the fact remains the same that Plautus has succeeded well in weaving into his plays here and there an obscure passage that neither context nor the circumstances of the play itself seem to throw much light upon. The passage under consideration is one of them.

In this passage it will be observed the alliterative element appears, to the frequent use of which Plautus was especially addicted. It occurs, indeed, with almost clock-like regularity, and to my mind the indication is that there was method in its use, that it was not merely accidental or a fortuitous coincidence.

Be this as it may, no one can deny its large presence in his plays.

Plautus was not alone in its use. Alliteration was a Latin characteristic. To quote Professor Peck,¹ "Those who to-day doubt, as Lachmann doubted, the presence of alliteration as characteristic in Latin diction, should in this particular compare such contemporary and fairly comparable writers as Lucretius and Catullus, Cicero and Caesar, Vergil and Horace."

But we are forced to the conclusion that in too many instances Plautus sacrificed clearness to the swing of the verse that alliteration enabled him to give. The present passage, in my opinion, is a strong illustration of this.

Let us turn to the act and scene itself.

The personae of the 3d scene (Act II.) of the *Captivi* are Hegio, the rich old man of Aetolia, Philocrates, a captive, and his slave, Tyndarus (Hegio's own son, but as yet unknown to him as such). Hegio turns to Philocrates, mistaking him for the slave, tells him that his new master desires that he should pay faithful obedience to his former owner in whatever he may wish, and further that he is desirous of sending him to his father in order that he may secure the return of his son.

Philocrates declares himself ready to do anything that he is commanded to do. Tyndarus appeals to Philocrates not to forget him when he has returned to his own country. Philocrates assures him that he will be true to the trust reposed in him. The language of both is designedly ambiguous, as Hegio is standing in hearing distance and it is the purpose of each to deceive the old man. I quote:

"*Serva tibi in perpetuom amicum me atque hunc inventum inveni.*"

Some editions have the following:

"*Serua tibi in perpetuom amicum me atque hunc inuentu inueni.*"

Hallidie gives the following note on the passage:

"Inuentu 'by finding his son'; so Sch., who refers to Merc. 847, eorum inuentu. The MSS. reading, inuentum, is taken to mean '(on your return) find a friend in this man, in whom we have already found one'; in support of it Brix

¹ Transactions American Philological Association, 1884.

quotes Men. 452, homines occupatos occupat, Cur. 540, subiges redditum ut reddam tibi, Cic. Fam. XIV. 1, uide ne puerum perditum perdamus."

Lindsay says: "*hunc*: i.e., Hegio, 'and do not lose this one you have found.'"

Harrington gives this as his opinion:

"*Hunc inventum inveni*. The meaning of this passage is much disputed. *Hunc* is referred to Hegio and to his son, and to Tyndarus in the character of Philocrates. Some translate, 'And still find Hegio yours, as you have found him'; others, 'Find this young man, already in part found by the information we have given of him'; or, 'Find a friend in this young man, discovered and restored to his father.' Brix says, 'Gain one already gained to be wholly a friend to you.' *Insure Hegio's perpetual friendship by the restoration of his son.*"

It will be seen from the extracts given that editors are not at all agreed as to the exact meaning and translation of this line; and no one of them, so far as I have observed, ventures to give an interpretation of his own, but each contents himself with giving what others say.

Dr. Proudfit approaches nearest an acceptable interpretation of the passage in question of any of the editors and annotators of Plautus that I have consulted. He disposes of it as follows:

"*Hunc inventum inveni*. This obscure passage has given rise to many conjectures. Some interpret thus: 'Find a friend in Hegio, *already found*,' i.e., confirm his friendship to you by restoring him his son. Others suppose it to refer to the son of Hegio: 'Find *this* young man, already in part *found* by the information we have given of him.' Both are unsatisfactory. It most probably refers to the son of Hegio in a different sense, and the whole line may be interpreted thus: 'Make me your friend forever, and *find* (*gain*) a friend in *this* young man, *discovered* and restored to his father.'"

The meaning of this particular line is determined by the antecedent of *hunc*. If we make this antecedent Hegio, then it would read, "Find this person, Hegio, a friend still as you have found him." This is not a common-sense translation, taking the material we have to make it out of. What ground have we for declaring that Hegio was ever a friend to either of these, Tyndarus (though his son) or Philocrates, both of whom were as yet unknown to him at the time the play begins? Philocrates was a prisoner of war, and was purchased with others by the old gentleman, who hoped to find his son among the number. Tyndarus was the servant of Philocrates at the time of the purchase. Both were strangers, at least so far as Hegio's knowledge went, and were thus regarded till the discovery was made by the return of Philopolemus through the agency of Philocrates, and till Tyndarus had been sent for to come home from the quarry to which he had been taken.

Again, no such translation as the following is allowable, neither will the Latin permit it, whatever be the suggested relations of the words of the passage: "Make this old man, Hegio, a friend and keep him so by finding his son and returning him to his father." The editors who adopt this view have no ground for it whatever, it seems to me, and are doing violence to the verse that they are striving so hard to explain by making it mean what it has never meant and cannot now mean. I quote the context and a portion of what follows:

"Scito te hinc minis viginti aestumatum mittier.
Fac fidele sis fidelis, cave fidem fluxam geras.

Nam pater, scio, faciet quae illum facere oportet omnia.
 Serva tibi in perpetuum amicum me atque hunc inventum inveni.
 Haec per dexteram tuam te dextera retinens manu
 Opsecro, infidelior mi ne fuas quam ego sum tibi."

If we make *hunc* refer to the son of Hegio, Philopolemus, the meaning is clear and the interpretation is simple. The thought in the mind of Tyndarus, doubtless, was the absent Philopolemus for whom Philocrates was now to be sent. He is not lost, as Hegio supposes, but *found* (*inventum*). The play upon words comes in the *finding* and the already *found*. To the old man, Hegio, he was lost, hence the word *find* (*inveni*) could be with propriety used; to Tyndarus he had already been *found* (*inventum*). The cleverness of Plautus appears in the use of the two words *inventum* and *inveni*,—the one referring to one person, the other to another; *inveni* (*find*) from Hegio's point of view and *inventum* (*found*) from that of Tyndarus. With *hunc* referring to the son of Hegio, the thought suggested by the passage would be, *and do you now seek out this person whom we have discovered to be in possession of Menarchus. Go fetch him to his father, for we know where he is. He is no longer lost, but found* (*inventum*). This latter rendering seems to me to be in keeping with the idea intended to be expressed by Plautus himself, and therefore to be the only intelligent and rational view to take of it with the light we have at hand.

It will be observed that I have based the remarks of this paper upon the reading *inventum*, as found in the text of Fleckeisen (Teubner series) and upon which Harrington and others based their editions of Plautus, and not upon the reading *inventu*. (Vide *Ausgewählte Komödien des T. M. P. für den Schulgebrauch erklärt* von Julius Brix, II., 2d ed., 1870 (Captivi); T. M. P. *comœdiae. Ex recognitione Alfredi Fleckeiseni*, 2 vols.; Fr. Ritschl über die Kritik des Plautus, eine bibliographische Untersuchung (1836) in his *Opuscula philologica*, II., 1868, 1 sqq.)

Hallidie, who substitutes *inventu* for *inventum*, avails himself, as he tells us, of the *apparatus criticus* in Professor Schoell's edition of Plautus and a collation of V included in his preface to the *Casina*, 1890.

Inventum is found in all the MSS., B D V E J. This being true, the question arises, How did *inventu* creep into the text? Is it an interpolation, a mistake of the copyist, or did some editor or scholiast insert it to help himself out and to make the text read as he thought it ought to read? I have not accepted the substitution because it lacks MS. authority, so far as I have been able to observe.

With an interpretation based upon *inventu* the translation suggested by this paper would necessarily be modified, and the interpretation given of it by the majority of editors would stand.

At 5.15 the Association adjourned.

EVENING SESSION.

At 8 o'clock the Association convened to listen to the address of the President of the Association. Professor Hale was gracefully introduced to the large audience present by William Morton Payne, Esq., of Chicago, Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements.

5. Democracy and Education, by Professor William Gardner Hale, of the University of Chicago.

"Es ist dafür gesorgt," says Goethe, "dass die Bäume nicht in den Himmel wachsen." "Care is taken that even the tallest trees shall not invade the heavens."

We Americans cannot, even in the possible presence of visitors from other countries, conceal our belief in the essential value of a democratic form of government. But it would be idle for us, whether in their presence or in the completest secrecy of our own hearts, to deny that the advantages which our political system brings us have their accompanying defects. Care has been taken that even the young Republic shall not scale the heavens.

These defects lie in the unequal workings of the parts of our machinery, in consequence of the freedom of the individual state, the individual county, and the individual town, and of the great power for mischief which, in a country that lacks an aristocratic class and a conservative force in legislation, lies in the power of individuals of mistaken or low ideals. Hence our Civil War, our fiat-money and silver-coinage schemes, our slow gains in civil service reform, our misgoverned cities. Yet against this mischief wrought by the energy of individual leaders there rise up other leaders who, in the newspaper office, in Legislatures, in Congress, in State House or White House, mould and consolidate public opinion for good. And so a civil war is successfully carried to its issue, and the country purged of a national shame; so popular economic follies are checked; so the once received doctrine "to the victor belongs the spoils" begins to be disreputable; so some, at least, of our Tweeds die in prison; and so, when the shock of disillusion, suffered by the young voter nurtured upon Whittier's poem of the freeman and the ballot-box, is once over, there grows up a deepening faith that, rough as is the mechanism by which human life in the mass governs itself, the masses learn by their mistakes, and the better side in the end triumphs.

If this be true in politics, then one may with a stouter heart face and unreservedly discuss the difficulties and discouragements which our system of individualism brings to the cause of education.

The largest conglomeration known in education is the state. Yet even this has, in general, no serious controlling power. Each little town will shape the education it gives its children according to the views of shifting officers, more or less controlled by local opinion. Even the state universities cannot rise much above the convictions of the average voter; and these convictions will differ widely in different states. In this country, the average man is, in the main, the court of ultimate appeal in education, and, in a matter so far removed from his practical knowledge, the average man is very likely to go astray. The average local school-board is consequently in great danger of not knowing what constitutes an education; and in particular, it is in danger of regarding only those subjects as desirable for young men and women the immediate advantage of which in earning a living is obvious to a shallow observer. In its ignorance of the extent to which specialization has gone, it generally assigns several subjects to each teacher; so that, in place of a Latinist, a Germanist, and a historian, you may, perhaps, in large schools, find three men each of whom has to teach all three subjects. For the same reason, it generally, if it seeks college graduates for

teachers, supposes them capable of teaching anything, without inquiring whether they have gone beyond the minimum demands of the institution in which they were trained ; but it much more frequently is content to appoint, even to positions in high schools, young men and young women who are themselves graduates of such schools only, and who therefore have not advanced a step beyond the point to which they may have to carry their own pupils. The same want of appreciation of differences also leads communities to pay small salaries to school teachers, to lay upon them many hours of work, and to grant them no security of tenure, and little honor outside of a high-sounding title that once belonged to specialists. The result is a school system that puts us far behind Germany, England, or France. And a further result is that, while a large quantity of advanced work comes out of the German gymnasium, almost none issues from the American high school. The idea of a creative scholarship has no home there.

When it comes to the universities, the same tale has to be told, with some additions. The average board of trustees overloads the college teacher with hours of stated teaching, and, finding always many competitors for vacant places, pays scantily. The result is twofold. The professor's life, with all its charm when at its best, does not attract as large a number of thoroughly able men into its ranks as could, in the interests of education, be desired ; and, on the other hand, in many of our strongest universities, those professors who possess no independent means are obliged, instead of devoting their scanty leisure to investigation and publication, to devote it to earning enough money from outside sources to make up what is necessary to satisfy the claims of the butcher, the grocer, and the coal-combine. And the same law of supply and demand has led to the almost entire absence of any organized arrangements for the maintenance of the professor, if, after a life of ill-paid and saving-forbidding toil, he has the misfortune to outlive his usefulness.

It is not, however, the outside governing body or the outside community alone that will be found to go astray under the freedom of individualism. The views of professors themselves, in the things which it is their function to settle, are likely to be colored, to an extent by no means inconsiderable, by the local conditions under which they have lived, and especially by the local conditions under which they have been educated. The result is the greatest diversity of opinion upon the most fundamental questions of education.

But, as I have spoken of these difficulties, two ideas must have repeatedly forced themselves upon your minds, namely, first, that in a system in which individualism can and must work harm, the remedy for this harm lies in the very thing which brings it about, that is, in individual action ; and second, that upon the individual there rests, in such a system, a heavy obligation. In education, as in politics, Americans of convictions have no right to sit idly by.

Obligation rests upon individual schools, and upon parents who have children in schools, since it is only the development of the best schools that can give to the rest the evidence of what is possible. Obligation rests upon individual universities to lead the community which forms its environment and feeder to higher and juster conceptions of education than it possesses. And upon universities founded and supported by private means obligation of an especially heavy kind rests, since no other institutions can act upon their beliefs so fearlessly. It would be difficult, for example, to bring a body of state regents, themselves largely affected by the opinions of

the masses which form their constituents, to entertain certain convictions about salaries and hours of instruction and character of work which were unanimously reached by the trustees of the university of this city. And finally—for to this Rome all the roads in our country lead—a grave responsibility lies on every individual man or woman, in or out of schools or universities, that has firm beliefs. It is individuals that form the nucleus for false opinion; it is individuals that must lead the fight for sound opinions.

The picture I have drawn has been a dark one. But I should do myself an injustice if I were to leave an impression of fundamental doubt. I believe in the democratic idea. The doctrine is sound which stands written upon the gate of the water-front of the White City: "Civil liberty the means of building up personal and national character." And even if for a while the price of widely varying and often faulty systems of formal education has to be paid for this education of character, the purchase is well made. But there are many signs of hope. What has been done by the accumulated work of individuals in a comparative length of years may be seen in our oldest university, Harvard, of which an American has no reason to speak with anything but pride. What may be done by the work of individuals in less than a score of years may be seen in one of our youngest universities, Johns Hopkins; and the lesson seen in the record of such a university, of the rapid power of creation possessed by individual minds working under democratic conditions, is most significant, when one recalls at how many points in these United States colleges and universities, already established, stand ready as vantage-grounds for the battle of educational ideals. In the lower education, too, signs are already to be seen of a consolidation of opinion similar to that of the consolidation which I have spoken of as carrying great movements in politics. In particular, the now-famous work of the Committee of Ten—whatever may be the value of this or that opinion advanced—constitutes an event of national importance. The time is one of wide-spread interest in educational questions, and of busy discussions of them in journals and at conventions. Not only, then, as I believe, will education in America finally reach a high efficiency, but—a matter of some interest for us who have not yet left the stage—we are, unless signs fail, at the threshold of a time of rapid advances.

At the conclusion of the address an informal reception was held.

GENERAL SESSION.

CHICAGO, July 12, 1893.

Professor Hermann Osthoff, of the University of Heidelberg, who had been requested to preside over this joint meeting of the AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, the MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION, and the DIALECT SOCIETY, opened the proceedings at 10 A.M. by a brief address of welcome. On motion, Professor Smyth was appointed Secretary.

6. The Connection between Indian and Greek Philosophy, by Professor Garbe, of the University of Königsberg.

Professor Garbe first briefly outlines the fundamental principles of the idealistic monism of the Vedânta and the dualism of the Sâmkhya philosophy. The ideas of both these systems are found in Greece: the monism of the Vedânta in Xenophanes and Parmenides, and the doctrines of the Sâmkhya philosophy in the Ionic physiologists, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and the rest. In Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus, indubitable points of agreement with the Sâmkhya philosophy are found, especially with respect to the ideas of metempsychosis and the eternity and indestructibility of matter.

But all these coincidences are coincidences of general thought, and not of special or arbitrary details. Hence, Professor Garbe will not give an apodictic opinion as to the source of the doctrines of these Greek philosophers; for the Greek and Hindu doctrines might each have arisen independently, the resemblances being due to the natural sameness of human thought. He inclines, however, to the opinion that the Greek systems mentioned *were* derived from India, and substantially adopts the conclusions, though not all the arguments, of Ed. Röth, Aug. Gladisch, and C. B. Schlüter on this question. He regards Persia, not India, as the place of mediation of these ideas.

But if the resemblance between the two philosophies in the case of the above-mentioned philosophers is only a general one, in the case of Pythagoras it is *very* clear and striking, even in details. The very word "sâmkhya" denotes number. The two systems further agree in the doctrine of metempsychosis, the prohibition of eating beans, the doctrine of the *five* elements, in the possession of the so-called Pythagorean theorem, the irrational number $\sqrt{2}$, and in the character of their religious and philosophical fraternities. But while in Pythagoras all these doctrines are *unconnected*, and lack an explanatory background, in India they are at once rendered intelligible by the intellectual life of the times. On this point Professor Garbe accepts the main conclusions of Schroeder. Unquestionably, the system of Pythagoras is derived from Indian sources; but according to Garbe, Pythagoras acquired his knowledge of the Sâmkhya philosophy in Persia, not in India.

One other point is elucidative here. With Pythagoras number is the essence of all things. In the Sâmkhya system, however, number does not play so important a rôle, that system being simply *named* after the enumeration of the material principles. The Pythagorean form of the doctrine Professor Garbe attributes to a misunderstanding on the part of Pythagoras, and disagrees with Schroeder in the belief that it is an *older* form of the Sâmkhya philosophy.

The next influence of the Hindu philosophy is that on Christian Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. Disagreeing with Lassen as to the share of Buddhism in the formation of the Gnostic systems, Professor Garbe is rather inclined to attribute the greatest part of Hindu influence exerted on these doctrines to the Sâmkhya philosophy—especially with respect to the Gnostic identification of soul and light, which is exactly the idea of the Sâmkhya that soul and light are the same. Also, the Gnostic classification of men agrees with the Sâmkhya doctrine of the three Gunas. There are also many other points of contact.

The agreement of Neo-Platonism with the Sâmkhya doctrines is striking and

considerable. Especially is this the case with Plotinus and the Yoga philosophy, a branch of the Sâmkhya doctrine. But perhaps the most significant loan of Grecian thought from Hindu philosophy is the Neo-Platonic conception of the *λόγος*. This is derived from the Hindu doctrine of the Vâch (voice, speech, word). Garbe accepts Weber's opinion on this point (*Indische Studien*, Vol. IX.), only he thinks that the date of the derivation of the *λόγος* idea from India is to be put 500 years earlier than Weber would seem to put it.

The influence of the Sâmkhya doctrines and of Hindu philosophy generally on Occidental thought does not extend beyond Neo-Platonism. With the exception of a tinge of Buddhism in Schopenhauer and Hartmann, no modern influence of Hindu ideas is noticeable. This state of affairs will be bettered by new and more complete expositions of the Indian philosophy. In this lecture, which will appear in *The Monist* of January, 1894, Professor Garbe only attempts to seek out the *historical* connection between Indian and Greek philosophy, and does not discuss the internal character of these relations.

7. Some Problems in Greek Syntax, by Professor Basil L. Gildersleeve, of the Johns Hopkins University.

The problems of syntax, like all problems of grammar, are problems of method and problems of material. At one time method comes to the front, and in the dissertations of the forties and the fifties one grew somewhat weary of *via atque ratione*, or, by way of variety, *ratione viaque*. The logical method was discarded years and years ago because, as we were told, language is not logical but psychological; as if the psychological did not involve the logical; as if there could be any orderly presentation of truth without some kind of reasoned arrangement; as if the establishment of categories were not important for the discovery of law. Then there was a period when the 'organic' method was rife, the organic method, which was after all only the logical method in disguise, the method against which Krüger protested so vehemently because it made syntax the theory of the sentence, said sentence being a telescopic thing, now shut up into the compass of a word, now drawn out to the starry-pointing extreme of the Ciceronian period. But in spite of Krüger's protest against the identification of syntax with 'Satzlehre,' the method had and has its advantages, and for parallel grammars will always be available, though all manner of crimes have been committed in its name. Whether the danger of further crime is averted by the cloud of controversy that has gathered about the definition of the sentence is questionable, because under these conditions discussion is apt to assume the character of a religious war, always the most merciless of wars. The jelly-fish theorists have also had their say in the matter, though the doctrine that the sentence preceded the word and the word was differentiated from the sentence has had little influence on syntax. The earlier attempts to handle syntax etymologically, that is, to arrange the clauses of the sentence after the supposed case-relations of the introductory particles, was, as might have been expected, not an unqualified success. The uncertainty of the etymology and the perverseness of language in smothering etymology under analogy combine to make such a method as a universal method hopeless. Still, one cannot say that the attempt has been fruitless, and the neogrammarians have been busy in sorting the good from the bad. Among other things, this method

has led to a very conspicuous line of work, has led to what may be called the rehabilitation of parataxis. The primitive Aryan, we are told with all the solemnity of a revelation, spoke in sentences, and these sentences were simple sentences. How these sentences were combined to make compound sentences is the problem. The question was primarily one of proximity, as dangerous in language as in life. Then came correlation, then all the other complex groups that we call hypotactic. The only explanation of a hypotactic sentence, therefore, is the restoration of the original parataxis. Up to a certain point nothing has been more fruitful than this 'paratactic' method. But we have to be on our guard. Hypotaxis is older than our record, and we cannot argue safely as to prehistoric processes with consciousness lost and analogy working its will; we cannot insist on the steadiness of the original function. How wild such theorizing may become is shown by the fact that one adventurous gentleman wished to make *πρὶν* with the infinitive a paratactic sentence in spite of the dependent nature of the infinitive itself, and another has recently considered it a great gain to make the same infinitive an imperatival infinitive, as if an imperatival infinitive were any less dependent than an infinitive of purpose, of which it is only a form. Not one of these methods is to be rejected out and out, none to be applied without caution, and, to exemplify the importance of caution, a few words may be said in regard to some of the recent studies in the range of historico-statistical syntax, for it is hardly fair to speak of historico-statistical method. The historico-statistical school deals with the registration of facts on lines that are supposed to be historical, but when it comes to the interpretation of the facts there is great divergence, and first one method, then another, is applied. As in every sphere of so-called intellectual activity, so here human absurdity asserts itself unabashed, and the lies of the census bureau and the foolish inferences of the manipulators of figures are not lacking in this new order of philological knighthood—the Knights of the Decimal Table. Not that the use of figures is illegitimate. Some minds are accessible to nothing else, and to so many is an array of figures an end of controversy that the weary investigator, whose tabulation has proved what his insight had divined before, counts all his toil a gain if he can thereby escape the din of a fruitless logomachy. Then the statistical way is often the only way. It is only thus that the question of proportion is to be determined, and statistic has often called attention to significant facts, and so led to truly scientific results. But in the majority of cases the conditions of the problem were settled in advance, and mountains of statistics are of no avail without a clear appreciation of those conditions. Statistic has to be taught what categories are worth watching, otherwise the *cum pulvisculo exhaurire* brings forth nothing but dust. The position of clauses makes an enormous difference; the position of words makes an enormous difference; positive and negative conceptions have often a controlling influence, and these are things that not unfrequently slip through the meshes of statistic. Of course, no matter how arid the statements, the investigator who knows what he is after can make some use of them. So the work, mostly mechanical, that has been going on in the range of the prepositions has aided scholars in reinforcing lessons that have long been known to those who choose to watch. But apart from the distinct relegation of certain prepositions and certain uses of certain prepositions to the field of poetry and dialect, the 'favorite preposition' business seems to have been very much overdone. In his treatise

on the prepositions in the Attic orators, which is one of the most laborious and on the whole one of the most valuable works in this line, Lutz has passed over some of the most significant phases, and the elaborate tables are nothing more than confirmations of *a priori* conclusions. An author's favorite preposition is in many instances nothing but the preposition demanded by his subject, and what Lutz has seen to be true of Isaeus' use of $\epsilon\zeta$ is true elsewhere. In many of the dissertations that swarm over this field, history and chronology are treated as if they were practically identical, as if the emergence of a construction in literature were the emergence of the construction in language, and the disappearance of it from literature were its death. The individual counts everywhere, even if not so manifestly in Greek as in Latin; and in Greek the department is more potent than the individual. Take the familiar example of the articular infinitive. To my mind nothing is clearer than that it belonged to the people, and was so slow in making headway because it belonged to the people. Hence the exclusion of it from the aristocratic epic; hence the occasional use of it in lyric poetry, which had to break bounds if it was to be truly lyric. The articular infinitive is an indispensable organon of philosophic thought, and hence it is not disdained by Parmenides, who forces the plebeian construction into epic verse, and shows thereby that his epos is no true epos. It is the same Parmenides, be it noted, that uses $\omicron\upsilon \mu\eta$, that familiar turn which is strictly conversational, strictly dramatic. That $\omicron\upsilon \mu\eta$ is young is a *non sequitur* from its late appearance. It is old even if it is not so old as the articular infinitive, which in turn can hardly be so old as the historical present, for the historical present is Aryan if anything is Aryan, and yet the historical present is absent from epos and higher lyric. Students of the Greek language who study Greek as a language and not as a form of literature, rebel against the stylistic reason. But those whose chief interest in language lies in language as a form of art are too familiar with similar phenomena in other spheres to see anything dangerous in the admission of style as a norm of usage. The realm of the artificial as well as the artistic has to be extended into the past. Ornament is older than clothing. In raiment and apparel one hardly thinks of the covering of nakedness. The English language was at its noblest in the time of Elizabeth, the Greek language at its noblest in the time of Pericles, and while the comparison is evidently not fair, if urged, and while the complexity of the English problem is almost infinitely greater, still Spenser might help us to understand how the dramatic poets consciously used obsolete words and hyperepic syntax, and what is true of the Attic dramatists is true of Pindar, and who knows how far back it is safe to push this use of ornament? These are things that statistic will not reach, and yet statistic tries to reach. Still statistic has stirred many problems, none more noteworthy than the use of the tenses. After passing along a number of formulæ about the historical tenses, in which conative, progressive, panoramic, ingressive, complexive have figured largely, in which convenient translation has too often taken the place of convincing argument, grammarians have at last been aroused to the serious study of the imperfect and the aorist. The machinery of statistics has been brought to bear on the problem, and is even now at work — apparently to the detriment of the aorist in Greek. But what is an aorist, what is an imperfect? Are we to call everything an imperfect that has the form of an imperfect? Are we to huddle together first aorist and second aorist, so manifestly different in their build? And what is to

become of our accepted school grammars, if we do not? Statistic will not relieve us of this important condition of the investigation. Nor can we put aside the question of the dialects. So Cobet says that Herodotus uses the imperfect very freely, indeed implies that he uses it amiss, 'after the Ionic fashion.' But the same Cobet says that the imperfect is the tense for actual vision; *imperfectorum usus*, he says, *oculatis testibus proprius*. Why may not Herodotus have assumed the position of an *oculatus testis*? The artist and the Ionian would be at one. But what of Thucydides, who, when he falls into the descriptive vein, has no objection to the imperfect? As to Xenophon, he seems to have caught Herodotus' trick during his campaign in Asia Minor, and the influence of Herodotus and Xenophon was potent in after times. We cannot get out of the abhorred category of stylistic, if we will. Nor will the counting of imperfects and aorists suffice even after we settle our definition of imperfect and aorist, because we have to reckon with the effect produced by the temporal relation of the moods and verbs. A pageful of evolving present participles cannot fail to temper the sharp aorist indicative. So a comparison of the relative use of aorist and imperfect in Greek with the relative use of historical perfect and imperfect in Latin will not yield the clear results that are anticipated. There are too many other temporal factors, and a practical grammarian but the other day made the portentous blunder of leaving out of the calculation, though not out of the statistic, the Latin use of the historical present. This omission of important elements is one of the serious and at the same time amusing defects of modern 'methods.' So in the study of the prepositions what may be called the *metastasis* of the prepositions has often been overlooked. After it became a familiar thing to vilify Xenophon for his use of the preposition *σύν*, one would have thought that *σύν* was avoided by model prose as if it were a pestilence, and every school-boy is taught nowadays to model his prose composition on the law of the Attic orators. *σύν* dead? Yes, somewhat as *ἀνά* is dead. Its prepositional life may be over, but the death as a preposition is compensated by its enhanced life as an element in compound verbs, and that enhanced life is the original life, and breathes the strong personality of the primal *σύν*. But such things do not enter into the calculation of the mere statistician. In fine, for illustrations might be multiplied without number,—in fine, no mechanical scheme can take the place of the loving sympathy to which alone language will yield her inmost treasures. The wise Centaur, the first philologist on record, was right when he said

κρυπταί κλαῖδες ἐντὶ σοφῆς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων.

The kingdom of syntax is not to be won by the violence of brute numbers.

8. On the Origin of the so-called Root-Determinatives, by Professor Maurice Bloomfield, of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

The writer's article 'On Adaptation of Suffixes in Congeneric Classes of Substantives' (American Journal of Philology, XII. 1-29) furnished the starting-point for his remarks on the 'root-determinatives.' He began by pointing out additional cases of congeneric attraction. Vedic *aṅguṣṭhā* (Sk. *aṅgūṣṭhā*) = Zd. *aṅguṣṭa* 'great toe'; Ved. *ḍṣṭhā* 'lip'; Ved. *urpṣṭhā* 'lap'; Ved. *kōṣṭhā* 'abdomen' (cf. Arm. *kust* 'venter') exhibit a case of adaptation of the suffix *-stha*

in four designations of parts of the body removed from another as far as possible. So also Ved. *asthi* 'bone' (cf. Obg. *kosťi* 'bone'), *sakthi* 'thigh,' and *aṣṭhī-vāntāu* 'the knees,' are parts of the body, and that, too, *bony* parts. The last case exhibits a more narrow congeneric domain than the first, but there is no law which dictates the lengths to which language may go in feeling that things are congeneric. Vague and half-relevant associations are as much at play in this kind of operation as the sober and matter-of-fact. The nom. *πούς* may have been formed after *δδούς*, the distance being no greater than that between *ὄσθη* and *aṅguṣṭhā*.

Congeneric assimilation and adaptation may take place, first, between words which designate things absolutely or nearly identical. Lith. *saldūs*, Obg. *sladūkū* 'sweet,' are derivatives from the I.-E. stem *sāld* 'salt' (Schmidt, Indogermanische Neutra, p. 182), but they owe the particular conformation of their suffix and the specialization of their meaning to I.-E. *svādūs* 'sweet.' The *v* of the oblique cases of *εἷς* 'one' supplanted I.-E. *m* [stem *sem*, (σ)μα] owing to the influence of stems *olvo-* (European *oino-*) and **μῶνφο* (*μῶνος*, *μόνος*). Avestan *asti* 'minister' and Sk. *at(i)thi* 'guest' (I.-E. **olh-ti*) seem to exhibit the effect of the congeneric relation with Lat. *hostis*, Germ. *gast(i)s*, Obg. *gostī*, whose basic form may have been I.-E. **zhostis* for **zhoth-tis*. Greek *ἀντμήν* is formed from the twiced reduced form *αφη-* 'breathe.' The identity of its suffix with Sk. *ātman* is due to their identity of meaning. The latter may be *ḡtman* from the dissyllabic root *an¹* 'to breathe,' and may again represent a radically independent, but congeneric formation with Germ. **ēp-ma*, the basis of Obg. *ātum*, Old Saxon *ēthma*, Ags. *āthom*. Hosts of doublets, occasionally triplets, owe their similarity to congeneric influence; words like *ἀγρυ*: *δάκρυ*; *σκῶρ*, *σκατός*: *ζάκρυ* *ζακνάς* (*κόπος*); Zend *partau*: Sk. *sētu* 'bridge'; *ἀλι-*: *ἀνυα-*; *ἤξεν*: *ἤξεν*, and many others which will be discussed in the fuller presentation of this paper.

Secondly, words belonging to the same broad class frequently call up for congeneric assimilation those members of that class which stand related to them by more special traits. Thus, of parts of the body those of the head are especially prone to influence one another; hence *augō* and *ausō* in German; *ζῆγῆγα* and *ἀγῆγα* in Sk. (even the Zend has *srva* in *srvō-jan* 'breaking the horns'). Germ. *mūs* and *lūs* are not only united by the common bond of 'designations of animals,' but they are both 'varmint,' ungeziefer. Gr. *λάρυγξ* and *φάρυγξ* evidence a special intimacy within the class which designates 'hollowness,' of which *σῦριγξ* 'pipe,' *σάλπιγξ* 'trumpet,' *σπηλυγξ* 'cave,' and *σῆραγξ* 'cleft,' are the more broadly related representatives.

Thirdly, opposites exercise the same influence upon one another as identical congeners, les extrêmes se touchent. To the hosts of well-known examples may be added e.g. Vedic *lāyú-* 'thief': *pāyú-* 'protector.' Just as *kubjā* 'hunch-backed' seems to betray in its final sound its congeneric relation to *ny-ubja* 'crooked-back,' so also *urubjā* 'wide open' is the opposite of *kubjā*. We have here a start in the direction of a suffix *-ubja*, whose productivity is limited, however, by lack of opportunity.

Fourthly, the broadest categories produce congeneric assimilation and adaptation. Not only those which readily suggest themselves, as designations of animals,

¹ The mutilated forms, e.g., instr. *tmānā* Sk. are clearly formed under the influence of *tanū* 'body, self': the loss of the *ā* cannot be due to phonetic influence.

colors, but such as are hardly categorized consciously at all, as e.g., the Greek words designating hollowness, above. The London public and the London papers have created of recent years a suffix *-eries* (plurale tantum), designating public exhibitions. It appears to have started with the fisheries exhibition, which was called 'the fisheries' for short; next came an exhibition of flowers, which required no violent adaptive process to be turned into 'the flowereries.' Again, the hygienic, or health exhibition, became 'the healtheries,' and finally the Colonial and Indian exposition appeared as 'the colinderies,' a word which the purist would say ought to turn the very printer's ink vermilion.

Verbal suffixes are in general preëmpted for the expression of indispensable relations: voice, tense, and mood. But occasionally a verbal suffix is free to adapt itself to some more special function, totally foreign to its original value. A considerable number of Greek verbs with the suffix *-ιδω* (*ὀδοῦριδω*, etc.) designate 'to suffer from a certain disease,' or 'to have the symptoms of a certain disease'; an equally large number in *-ιδίζω* designate religious acts and celebrations (*βακχιδίζω*, *ὀργιδίζω*, etc.). In Lat. *-ēscō* the inherently inchoative value of verbs like *senesco*, *adulesco*, *cresco*, etc., has been transferred to the suffix, wherever it occurs. The I.-E. stems *pr̥(k̥)-sk-* 'ask,' *i(s)-sk-* 'search, wish,' *uṛ̥-sk-* 'wish,' point to a proethnic adaptation of the same suffix (*-sko*) to the idea of 'asking, searching, wishing.' The suffix *-to* has adapted itself to the acts of 'binding, twisting, bending, braiding, folding': Lat. *plecto*, Obg. *flihtu*; — Goth. *falpan*, Obg. *pletq*, Sk. *puṭa* (*plṭa*); — Lat. *pecto*, Obg. *fihtu*; — Lat. *necto*; cf. Sk. *nadh* (I.-E. **nedh* abstracted from I.-E. **neǵh* and **neǵdh* for **neǵh-t*), and Obg. *nista* (**nedh-to* with suffix *-to*, not unconsciously doubled), Goth. *ga-vida*, Obg. *witu*; — Sk. *veṣṭate*, Lith. *vystau*.

Romance *tastare* (Ital. *tastare*, French *tâter*, Germ. *tasten*, Engl. *taste*) is a modification of late Lat. *taxare* 'to touch vigorously' in deference to *gustare*,¹ just as German *heischen* [I.-E. *i(s)-sko-*, Obg. *eiscōn*] owes its *h* to *heissen*, and dialectic English *squench* is *quench* with the *s* of congeneric *quelch* added. The Vedic root *bh̥yas* 'to be frightened' is clearly root *bh̥i* with *as* of root *tras* 'tremble' as an extension. All such cases throw a strong light upon the so-called root-determinatives: I.-E. *u̯ers* 'flow' may be *ers* 'flow' with the *u̯* of congeneric *u̯ōr* or *u̯ēr* 'water' *u̯ōd-ṛ*, *u̯d-nós* 'water' prefixed; I.-E. *stembh* (**sthembh*) 'support' may be I.-E. *skembh* 'support,' formally modified in deference to *stā* (*sthā*) 'stand'; the Aryan root *tvaks* is built up upon the I.-E. root *teks*, Aryan *taks* with a dash of the root *vaks* 'grow' (I.-E. *u̯eks*) through it. Only a shade less certain is the genesis of Ved. *tsar* 'to sneak up with malicious intent' as a contamination of root *sar* 'go' by root *tar* 'overcome,' or the origin of the I.-E. root *kleys* 'hear' from *k̥leu* under the influence of verbs and nouns for 'hearing,' which end in *s*: I.-E. *oys* 'ear,' Goth. *hausjan*, *ἀκου(σ)ω*, etc.

In some such way the intrinsically harmless I.-E. alveolar voiced stop *d* has established itself as a 'root-determinative' for actions and things pertaining to the 'podex': Lat. *pēdo*, *pōdex*, *βδέω*, New Slovenic *pezdēti* from I.-E. *pezd*; — *πέπδεσαι*, Sk. *pardate*, Obg. *firzan* from I.-E. *perd*; — *χέζω*, *χόδαρος*, Sk. *hādati*, Zd. *zaḍanh* from I.-E. *ǵhed*; — Norse *skita*, Ags. *scītan*, Obg. *scīzan* with Lith. *skėdū* again point to a root in *d*; — note also Sk. *bhasad* 'podex' and perhaps, as an opposite to I.-E. *perd*, I.-E. *skerd* 'vomit,' Sk. *chard*; cf. Obg. *skarēdū* 'nauseating.'

¹ For the current view of the origin of *tastare* see Kluge s.v. *tasten*.

One more group may be indicated briefly: it is a group ending in *n* in roots for 'sound.'

- 1) Sk. *dhvánati*, ON. *dynja*, Ags. *dynnan* (Engl. *din*).
- 2) Sk. *dhranati* (Dhatupāṭha), Goth. *drunjus* 'sound,' Nhg. *dröhnen*, Gr. *θρήνος* 'dirge.'
- 3) Sk. *stánati*, Gr. *στένω*, *στένος*, ON. *stynja*, Nhg. *stöhnen*.
- 4) The variant root *ten* in Ved. *tanyati* 'thunder,' Lat. *tonare*, *tonitru*, and the German derivatives.
- 5) Sk. *svanati*, Zd. *hvanant*, Lat. *sonere* (arch.) *sonare*, with nominal derivatives.
- 6) Obg. *zvíněti* 'to sound,' *zvónü* 'sound,' is a direct modification of I.-E. *ǵhew* 'call,' Obg. *zovā* (cf. Ved. *hávate*) to sound-roots in *en*.
- 7) We may mention also Lat. *cano*: Gr. *καράζω* 'sound,' Erse *canaid* 'canit,' and point out the special congeneric relation between *καραχή* 'clash' and *στοναχή* 'groan.' Perhaps also Sk. *kvāṇ*¹ 'sound' may belong to the same root, having borrowed its *v* from *dhvan* and *svan*, thus still further accentuating its character of congener with these.²

In the light of such cases the ordinary view of the origin of the 'root-determinatives' as agglutinative elements needs to be strongly modified. The determinatives are more frequent at the beginning of roots than at the end. The phenomena in question are due less to agglutination and more to congeneric assimilation and adaptation of certain final elements to certain categories of roots grouped as a semasiological unit. The writer will shortly present his views more completely and with a greater abundance of illustration.

9. On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides, by Professor Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago. This paper appears in full in the TRANSACTIONS.

Adjourned about 1 o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The President called the meeting to order at 3.15 P.M. The reading of papers was resumed.

10. The Language of the Law, by Herbert L. Baker, Esq., Detroit, Michigan.

The language of the law, as the meeting point between linguistic and legal science, offers interesting material for the student of either science. Its study will tend to further the advancement of both sciences, and especially the latter. It is worthy of special study for the accomplishment of two purposes amongst others; viz.: first, improvement in the means of legal expression; secondly, the elucidation

¹ The cerebralization need have no etymological value any more than in *nada* = *nada* 'reed.'

² In Nhg. *dröhnen*, *stöhnen*, and *tönen* (the latter secondarily from the loan-word *ton*, *τόνος*) the congeneric character of the group is indicated vividly even to-day.

of legal history, by tracing the origin and history of the elementary legal conceptions represented by single words.

Improvement in Legal Expression. — The need of improved means of legal expression in English law is great. It is a want which is very generally felt, though perhaps not so generally recognized. The crying need of the hour in the field of law is a better arrangement and statement of the law, one which will render the law clearer, more systematic, and more accessible, — in a word, more scientific. A great difficulty in the way of supplying such scientific statement is the want of a scientifically accurate terminology. The present terminology is inadequate for scientific uses. It partakes of the unscientific character of the legal system which produced it. It has been for the most part produced in the course of judicial administration, in which it was moulded by lawyers and judges to meet immediate practical needs; and it is therefore adapted to those uses, but not to scientific arrangement, or to expression for purposes of codification or other legislation. Any statement of the law for purposes of legislative enactment calls for the highest powers of accurate and comprehensive expression of which human language is capable. If we are ever to have a legal language fitted for such uses, it must be formed with those ends in view, and must come from scholars conversant with both legal and linguistic science. It will not come from the courts or from legislatures, or from lawyers engrossed in legal practice. It is to be hoped that the subject may ere long engage the attention of persons having both the ability and the opportunity to deal with it successfully.

The most valuable service, however, which philology is capable of rendering to the science of law is in the field of legal history. Legal science must be based upon legal history, and legal history must be essentially a history of ideas; that is to say, a history of the development of legal conceptions and principles, as well as of the various rules and enactments which have found a place in positive law. Much of this history of ideas is to be read in the history of the words by which they have been expressed. A study of the terminology of English law discloses facts which are of the first importance to a right understanding of that system of law. English law is found permeated with, and largely made up of, legal conceptions and principles which are practically identical with those found in the Roman civil law. At the same time, English law is held to be an indigenous and independent system, produced, developed, and sanctioned by the customs or immemorial usages of the English people. If this theory of English law were true, the fact that English law contains so much that is common to Roman law would be of great significance in comparative jurisprudence. If these elements which the later system has in common with the earlier were acquired by independent growth and development from within, and not by borrowing from the older system, that fact would be remarkable testimony to the permanency and universality of those elements. But the philology of English legal language leads to wholly different conclusions. In a paper read before this Association in 1889 upon "The Roman Element in English Law," I pointed out the following facts, viz.: (1) That these elements which English law has in common with Roman law constitute more than four-fifths of the elementary legal thought entering into the composition of English law; (2) that the words by which these elementary legal conceptions are expressed in English law are of Roman origin, and were directly borrowed from the Latin language; and (3) that there are no native English words in existence by

which to express these ideas. From these facts the conclusion is that these legal ideas in English law were not developed there independently, but were, on the contrary, borrowed from Roman law. If this conclusion is correct, the presence of these elements in English law becomes much less significant in comparative jurisprudence, but much more significant in determining the essential nature of English law. In the light of these philological evidences the accepted theory of English law alluded to must be abandoned or profoundly modified. Native English custom could not grow up and find its first and only expression in words of a foreign language. These words could not in the nature of things have been borrowed by the people at large for the purpose of giving expression to their own existing customs. A custom presupposes current ideas held in common, and ideas cannot become current until they are clothed in words. Native custom having the force of law therefore could not exist without being expressed in native words; and if it once existed and was so expressed, it is impossible to conceive how the native words could have not only given way to foreign words, but also entirely disappeared.

By whom, then, were these Roman words borrowed? and how did they find their way into English law? To this question an examination of the words themselves will furnish an answer; and it will, at the same time, inferentially disclose the true nature of English law. Appended hereto are groups of words, belonging to the five great branches of law, which exhibit the nature, proportion, and importance of the Roman and native elements respectively. From these it will be seen that the Roman element greatly predominates everywhere, but especially in the law of procedure, which is practically all Roman in its elementary thought. It is well known that the law of procedure, or adjective law, precedes substantive law in point of time; that substantive law is produced by the workings of adjective law in the practical administration of justice. When, therefore, we find the organic and the adjective law of the English so completely dominated by Roman thought as it is shown to be in the first and second groups, it is evident that English national life and its attendant national administration of justice, though retaining necessarily many English characteristics, were from the outset developed very largely upon lines marked out by the Romans, and with the free and constant use of Roman thought. And it is also evident that these Roman words were borrowed by those who were in authority during the early stages of English national life,—those upon whom devolved the task of organizing the nascent nation, and supplying it with workable machinery for the orderly administration of justice. Those who did this were chiefly the king and his counsellors, the judges and lawyers. They borrowed the words and the thoughts because they needed them and as they needed them, and they put them to immediate practical use. English society was feeling its way to a vigorous and compact political unity, and those who were directing its energies learned from the Romans, and utilized, the means by which Roman political unity had been accomplished.

In the three remaining groups of words we find constant confirmation of this, and also abundant evidences of its effect upon English law. In the criminal law, the law of property, and that of contract, we find that the line of contact between English life and English governmental control is coincident with the line of contact between English and Roman thought.

English legal thought is primarily Roman thought super-imposed upon English

non-legal thought, to meet the necessities of government. And the resulting English law is not a mass of customs having the force of law through long continuance, but rather a great body of rules developed by English judges and lawyers in the course of the actual administration of justice. This body of rules is what is known as English Case Law, and its authority rests, not upon custom, but upon what may be called the concensus of public opinion as expounded and applied by the courts in the administration of justice. It is not directly connected with custom, and is generally affected by custom only in so far as existing customs have entered into the formation of public opinion.

The conclusion thus indicated by the philological evidences is important not only to the theory of English law, but to its practical application. If it shall come to be accepted in lieu of the theory hitherto prevailing, it will help to solve some perplexing problems in English legal history, and materially aid in the advancement of legal science.

Groups of words exhibiting and contrasting the Roman and native elements: —

1. Organic and International Law.

Advocate, Alien, Allegiance, Ambassador, Amnesty, Attorney, Appropriation, Arbitration, Chancellor, Circuit, Citizen, Code, Constitution, Comity, Committee, Compact, Congress, Constable, Coroner, County, Court, Democracy, Denizen, Deputy, District, Domain, Edict, Enfranchise, Exchequer, Excise, Exequatur, Expatriation, Extradition, Forum, Franchise, Function, Funding, Government, Heptarchy, Herald, Inauguration, Interdict, International, Intervention, Legation, Legislate, Loyal, Magistrate, Majority, Mandatory, Mandate, Manifesto, Mayor, Mediation, Minister, Mob, Monarchy, Municipal, Mutiny, Nation, Nobility, Nisi Prius, Nominate, Notary, Office, Officer, Oligarchy, Opinion, Ordain, Panel, Pardon, Parish, Parliament, Peace, Pension, People, Political, Posse, Precinct, President, Prize, Proclamation, Province, Public, Quarantine, Quorum, Rebellion, Record, Renunciation, Repeal, Republic, Repudiate, Resident, Resignation, Respite, Revenue, Revolt, Rogatory, Royal, Seditious, Senate, Sine die, Society, Solicitor, Sovereign, Sovereignty, State, Status, Statute, Subsidy, Suffrage, Sumptuary, Superior, Supremacy, Supreme, Surrogate, Tariff, Tax, Term, Territory, Traitor, Treaty, Tribunal, Ultimatum, Unconstitutional, University, Usurpation, Vacancy, Vassal, Veto, Vicinage, Viscount, Visne, Vote. *Borough, Domboc, Earl, Folk-gemote, Gemote, Gerefa, Hundred, King, Lord, Mark, Queen, Reeve, Shire-gemote, Sheriff, Thane, Town, Town-ship, Witenagemote, Wood-mote.*

2. The Law of Procedure.

Pleading.— Abatement, Action, Amendment, Allegation, Assumpsit, Averment, Certainty, Covenant, Declaration, Debt, Demurrer, Departure, Dilatory, Disclaimer, Ejectment, Inducement, Intendment, Issue, Joinder, Multifarious, Non-joinder, Pleading, Rejoinder, Repleader, Replication, Similiter, Surplusage, Surrebutter, Surrejoinder, Trespass, Traverse, Variance, Verification, Versus, Vi et armis. *Practice.*— Appeal, Appearance, Application, Attachment, Case, Cause, Certiorari, Challenge, Citation, Client, Compurgator, Continuance, Decree, Defense, Defendant, Detinet, Detinue, Discontinuance, Docket, Elegit, Elisor, Engross, Enjoin, Enroll, Execution, Garnishee, Habeas corpus, Impanel, Imparlance, In-

junction, Inquest, Inrollment, Interlocutory, Interpleader, Intervention, Judgment, Levary, Levy, Lis pendens, Motion, Ne exeat, Non-suit, Order, Oyer, Practice, Precept, Pro confesso, Proceeding, Procedure, Process, Profert, Prohibition, Provisional, Quash, Recoupment, Regular, Remedy, Replevin, Respondent, Retainer, Return, Reversal, Review, Revival, Revivor, Scire facias, Sequester, Severance, Subpcena, Suggestion, Suit, Summary, Summon, Supersedeas, Supplemental, Surcharge, Surprise, Temporary, Transcript, Transitory, Trial, Triors, Trover, Venditioni Exponas, Venire, Venue, Verdict, Voir-dire. *Answer, Forswear, Oath, Set-off, Speaking, Wager of Battel, Wager of Law.*

3. *Criminal Law.*

Accessory, Adultery, Amercement, Arrest, Arson, Assault, Attainder, Battery, Burglary, Bigamy, Bribery, Capital, Carnal, Champerty, Conviction, Crime, Defense, Embezzlement, Embracery, Flagrante delicto, Forgery, Fugitive, Homicide, Hue and cry, Suicide, Treason, Impeachment, Imprisonment, Indictment, Infanticide, Information, Innocent, Larceny, Maintenance, Penal, Penalty, Penitentiary, Perjury, Pillory, Piracy, Premeditation, Prosecution, Provocation, Punishment, Recrimination, Rescue, Reprieve, Reward, Robbery, Sentence, Solicitation, Vagrant. *Blackmail, Breaking, Guilt, Manslaughter, Mayhem, Murder, Outlaw, Steal, Theft, Thief.*

4. *The Law of Real Property.*

Accession, Adverse, Alienation, Amotion, Appendant, Apportionment, Beneficiary, Close, Common, Courtesy, Conveyance, Coparcenary, Copyhold, Curtilage, Dedication, Defeasance, Deforcement, Demesne, Demise, Descent, Detainer, Detention, Devastation, Devastavit, Devise, Devisee, Disinherit, Disseizin, Distribution, Disturbance, Dower, Emblements, Eminent domain, Encroach, Entail, Entry, Enure, Escheat, Escuage, Estate, Eviction, Extinguishment, Feoffment, Feud, Fine, Fixture, Formedon, Habendum, Heir, Hereditaments, Heritage, Homage, Immovable, Inalienable, Inchoate, Incorporeal, Incumbrance, In esse, In fieri, Intrusion, Irrigation, Lease, Livery, Merger, Messuage, Metes, Mortgage, Mortmain, Occupancy, Perpetuity, Possession, Pre-emption, Quit, Real, Recovery, Re-entry, Release, Remainder, Rent, Resulting, Reversion, Riparian, Scutage, Seizin, Servitude, Severalty, Succession, Tenancy, Tenant, Tenement, Tenure, Terre-tenant, Title, Turbary, Vacant, Vadium-vivum. *Backwater, Betterments, Bote, Building, Burgage, Deed, Dwelling, Fardel, Farm, Fee, Folkland, Freehold, Gavelkind, Gift, Glebe, Ground, Grant, Haybote, Hidage, Hedge-bote, Hothbote, Homestead, House, Hudegeld, Land, Landlord, Socage, Squatter, Things, Thainsland, Waste, Warren.*

5. *The Law of Contract.*

Acceptance, Accord, Account, Agreement, Bailment, Bargain, Barter, Bill, Bilateral, Bona fide, Bonus, Broker, Charter, Cheat, Cognation, Collateral, Commodatum, Commutation, Compact, Concurrent, Condition, Confirmation, Consent, Consideration, Consolidation, Construction, Contract, Contribution, Covenant, Cy pres, Damages, Debenture, Debt, Deceit, Defalcation, Default, Delivery, Demand, Deposit, Discharge, Due, Express, Execute, Factor, Foreclosure, Guarantee, Hypothecation, Implied, Inception, Indebtedness, Indemnity, Inducement, Inter-

est, Interpretation, Laches, Liquidate, Locatio, Marriage, Maturity, Misrepresentation, Mutual, Negligence, Negotiable, Note, Novation, Obligation, Obligor, Offer, Option, Partner, Party, Payment, Performance, Pignus, Pledge, Policy, Precedent, Premium, Principal, Privity, Promise, Protest, Provision, Purchase, Quid pro quo, Ratification, Reciprocal, Recognizance, Re-insure, Relation, Rescission, Respondentia, Risk, Salary, Satisfaction, Security, Simple, Solvent, Special, Stipulation, Suppressio veri, Supra protest, Surety, Tender, Ultra vires, Unilateral, Usury, Valuable, Vendue, Waive, Warranty. *Bearer, Bond, Borrow, Bottomry, Breach, Drawer, Holder, Loan, Maker, Sale, Seller, Settlement, Sight, Warehouse.*

11. Professor F. A. March, of Lafayette College, reported as Chairman of the Committee on Spelling Reform.

He began with an outline of the action of the Association on this subject. At the annual meeting in 1875, President J. Hammond Trumbull suggested in his address that a list of words exhibiting side by side the present and a reformed spelling, such as prominent scholars in England and America would recognize as allowable, would go far towards insuring the success of the reform. A committee was appointed to consider the subject, and prepare and print such a list if they thought best. The Committee were Professors W. D. Whitney and J. Hammond Trumbull, of Yale; Professor F. J. Child, of Harvard; Professor F. A. March, of Lafayette; and Professor S. S. Haldeman, of the University of Pennsylvania. At the next meeting, in 1876, the Committee reported the general principles which should govern attempts to amend orthography. In 1877 it made an application of these principles to English, and stated the prevailing sounds of the letters in English, and so gave an alphabet with constant sounds for each letter such as it is hoped may finally be established in use. In 1878 a beginning of the list was made with eleven words. In 1880 the president of the Philological Society (London), Dr. Murray, brought the matter before the scholars of England. The Philological Society discussed amendments for six meetings, and adopted a body of them, January 28, 1881, which were issued by the Society in a pamphlet. This was discussed in the American Philological Association the same year. In 1882, at the suggestion of the English Society, communications were opened between the Societies, to effect a complete agreement, so that "a joint scheme might be put forth under the authority of the two chief philological bodies of the English-speaking world." In 1883 this complete agreement was effected, and a scheme of partial reform was jointly approved, and recommended for immediate use. It was in the form of comments on the letters, mentioning with each letter when it should be dropped or changed, sometimes mentioning particular words, sometimes giving general rules with limitations and exceptions. It was accompanied by an alphabetic list of some three hundred and fifty words. In 1886 the list, enlarged to some thirty-five hundred words, was presented to this Association and printed in the Transactions of that year. The corrections are made in the interest of etymological and historical truth, and confined to words which the changes do not much disguise from the general reader. Other reports have been little more than reports of progress from year to year. The list was reprinted in 1887 by the Spelling Reform Association, in 1891 in the Century Dictionary,

in 1893 by the U. S. Bureau of Education. The Committee has taken no official action during the last year. It reports progress. The Modern Language Association of America, at their annual meeting last December, adopted a resolution uniting with the Philological Societies in "recommending the joint rules for amended spelling and the alphabetical list of amended words published in the Transactions of the American Association and in the Century Dictionary." The Anthropological Society of Washington held a symposium on the question, "Is simplified spelling feasible as proposed by the English and American Philological Societies?" It was continued for three sessions, and participated in by Hon. W. T. Harris, U. S. Commissioner of Education; A. K. Spofford, Librarian of Congress; J. W. Powell, Director of the U. S. Geological Survey; Alexander Melville Bell, William Dwight Whitney, Professors W. B. Owen, C. P. G. Scott, and others. The speeches and papers were published, several of them spelt according to the rules and list, in the *American Anthropologist* for April, 1893. The Hon. William Mutchler, representative from Pennsylvania, moved as an amendment to the House Bill on Printing, that the public printer be instructed, whenever variant spellings are found in the current dictionaries, to use the simplest. The amendment was adopted. The Bill has not yet passed. Under the influence of the Association Phonétique des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes, and of Volapük, the headquarters of both of which are at Paris, there is now much discussion of French reform. M. Paul Passy, Professor G. Paris, Professor A. Darmesteter, M. Bréal, and many other prominent teachers and linguists are taking part. Permission has been obtained to try fonetic teaching in certain schools, and the reformers are very hopeful and active.

The report was accepted, and the Committee continued. It now consists of Professors March (Chairman), Child, Lounsbury, Price, Trumbull, and Whitney.

Remarks were made by Professors Sproull, Hale, and March, and by several gentlemen in the audience.

12. English words which have Gained or Lost an Initial Consonant by Attraction, by Charles P. G. Scott, Yonkers, N. Y.

This paper is printed in the TRANSACTIONS.

13. The Hebrew Names in the English Bible, by Professor W. O. Sproull, of the University of Cincinnati.

Professor Sproull reported briefly upon the work done upon this paper.

Adjourned about 5.30 P.M.

CHICAGO, July 13, 1893.

At 10 A.M. the Association assembled with President Hale in the chair. The reading of papers was at once begun.

14. Critical Notes on Certain Passages in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and *Antigone*, by M. L. Earle, Ph.D., Barnard College, New York City.

I. PHILOCTETES.

Vv. 43 sq. ἀλλ' ἢ 'πὶ φορβῆς νόστον ἐξελήλυθεν
ἢ φύλλον εἴ τι νόδονον κάτοιδ' ἐπου.

The traditional text of v. 43 is quite out of the question, nor does any one of the emendations hitherto proposed (so far as they are known to me) seem to restore the *manus Sophoclea*. This was, I conjecture, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπὶ φορβῆ-
NECTIN ἐξεληλυθῶC (φορβῆν ἐστὶν ἐξεληλυθῶC). The ease with which this could corrupt into the traditional form needs no comment.

Vv. 54 sqq. ΝΕ. τί δῆτ' ἀνωγας; ΟΔ. τὴν Φιλοκτῆτου σε δεῖ
ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων.
ὅταν σ' ἐρωτᾷ τίς τε καὶ πόθεν πάρει,
λέγειν Ἀχιλλέως παῖς· τόδ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον·

The syntax of these verses as they stand is very dubious. But I do not think it is to be helped adequately by changing λέγων to an inf. (e.g., σκοπεῖν). A simple solution of the difficulty may, I think, be found, if we stick closely to the connection of the speech of Odysseus with that of Neoptolemus, observing also the opening of the speech of Odysseus. Neoptolemus says τί δῆτ' ἀνωγας; "What then do you direct?" The natural answer to such a question is an oblique form of expression = inv. of oratio recta. This is, of course, in the case in question, the infin. Note now that the preceding speech of Odysseus, which Neoptolemus does not regard as imperative, has the δεῖ construction; and, further, that in v. 57 λέγειν would fall in much more naturally as second member of a compound infin. (= inv. in oratio recta) structure. In fine, I would read (adopting Gedike's δόλοισιν for λόγοισιν in v. 55, a conjecture that might occur to any one as it had to me independently, and Nauck's suggestion ὅταν δ' in v. 56) as follows:

τί δῆτ' ἀνωγας; — τὴν Φιλοκτῆτου σκοπεῖν
ψυχὴν ὅπως δόλοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων·
ὅταν δ' ἐρωτᾷ τίς τε καὶ πόθεν πάρει,
λέγειν Ἀχιλλέως παῖς· τόδ' οὐχὶ κρυπτέον·

(κρυπτέον Nauck for κλεπτέον). *Ai.* 556 sq., cited by Professor Jebb in support of the construction δεῖ ὅπως c. fut. ind., admits of easy correction by substituting σκοπεῖν ὅπως for σ' ὅπως πατρὸς at the close of v. 556.

V. 567. ὡς ταῦτ' ἐπίστω δρώμεν', οὐ μέλλοντ' ἔτι.

Though this verse is undoubtedly corrupt, it does not appear that either Nauck or Blaydes has been successful in his conjecturing, — the former reading σὺ for ὡς; the latter, ὡς δρώμεν' ἴσθι ταῦτα, or ταῦτ' ἐξεπίστω δρώμεν'. The last, however, comes nearest to what Sophocles seems to have written, viz., εὐ ταῦτ' ἐπίστω δρώμεν': cf. *Electr.* 616 εὐ νυν ἐπίστω τῶνδε μ' αἰσχύνῃν ἔχειν. The corruption may easily have arisen from contamination of { ΥΕ
ΠΩC (568) — such contamination being a fruitful source of error in the Sophoclean text; or perhaps it may be due to v. 563 ὡς ἐκ βίας κτέ.

- Vv. 900 sqq. ΦΙ. οὐ δὴ σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος
ἔπεισεν ὥστε μὴ μ' ἀγειν ναύτην ἔτι;
ΝΕ. ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
ὅταν λιπῶν τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσεικότα.
ΦΙ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἕξω τοῦ φυτεύσαντος σύ γε
δρᾷς οὐδὲ φωνεῖς, ἐσθλὸν ἀνδρ' ἐπωφελῶν.

A similar case of contamination to that just suggested is to be detected, I think, in v. 901, where instead of **ναύτην ἔτι** we should read **νεῶς ἔπι**. The source of corruption here was **ΑΥΤΟΥ** in v. 902, probably aided by **ΝΟΧΜΑΤΟΣ** in v. 900. Again in v. 904 there has been a somewhat similar degeneration. **ΟΥΔΕΝ** owes its origin in part to **ΟΥΔΕ** in v. 905. But, whatever were the details of the process, the original form of the verse I venture to think was this:

ἀλλ' ΟΥΖΕΝΟΝΤΙ (τοῦ φυτεύσαντος σύ γε
(= οὐ ξένον τι).

ξένον c. gen. = *alienum* a c. abl. can be supported by O. T. 219 sq.: *ἄ γὰρ ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔξερῶ, | ξένος δὲ τοῦ πραχθέντος*. It also falls in most aptly as a retort to τὰ μὴ προσεικότα in v. 903.

V. 917. *οἰμοι, τί εἶπας*; Valckenaer's *τί μ' εἶπας*; is, of course, out of the question here. *τί γ' εἶπας* of B is, as Jebb says, "weak." But why may not the phrase *τί εἶπας*; (common to-day, as always) have taken the place of a less common equivalent? I would suggest *τί φωνεῖς*; as in *Electr.* 1349.

V. 991. *ὦ μῖσος, οἶα κάξανερῖσκεῖς λέγειν*.

λέγειν certainly strikes one oddly. Jebb suggests that it should be *λέγων*. That seems hardly likely, however, with **ΚΡΑΤΩΝ** at the close of v. 989 and **ΔΕΓΩ** at that of 990. Perhaps we should rather write **ΕΠΗ**. There are several ways in which **ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** might have come into the text.

II. ANTIGONE.

- Vv. 82 sqq. IC. *οἰμοι ταλαίνης, ὡς ὑπερδέδοικά σου.*
AN. *μὴ μοῦ προτάρβει τὸν σὸν ἐξόρθου πότμον.*
IC. *ἀλλ' οὖν προμηνύσης γε τοῦτο μηδενὶ
τοῦργον, κρυφῆ δὲ κεύθε, σὺν δ' αὐτῶς ἐγώ.*
AN. *οἰμοι, καταύδα πῶλλον ἐχθίων ἔση
σιγῶσ', ἐὰν μὴ πᾶσι κηρύξηςι τάδε.*

In v. 86 *οἰμοι* has long seemed to me wrong. Jebb slides over it in his commentary. In his translation he gives "Oh, denounce it!" which may be natural English, but does not adequately represent the Greek. The Schneidewin-Nauck commentary gives nothing; nor is Blaydes's note ("An exclamation here of indignation. Cf. 320") of much more service. Professor Humphreys offers us at least something more when he annotates *οἰμοι* thus: "Of disapproval or dissatisfaction. So even *οἰμοι κακοδαίμων*, of rage, *Ar. Av.* 1051. In *id.* 1260 *οἰμοι τάλας* may be ironical." But even this is unsatisfactory; the presence of *κακοδαίμων* and *τάλας* after *οἰμοι* in the Aristophanic citations robs them of all appositeness, and we are left no better off than before. Let us confess it frankly, this is a case for emendation, not explanation. Why should we not restore the vigorous

and apt μή μοι (perhaps better written here μή μοί or μή έμοί)? The source of the corruption is not far to seek, being contained in ΟΙΜΟΙ above. A scribe was quite capable of jumbling the two neighboring passages in such a way as to produce the present state of affairs in the text. In further support of this emendation may be compared vv. 544-7:

IC. μή τοι, κασιγνήτη, μ' άτιμάσεις τὸ μή οὐ
θαρεῖν τε σὺν σοὶ τὸν θανόντα θ' άγνισαι.

AN. μή μοι θάνης σὺ κοινά, μηδ' ά μή 'θιγες
ποιοῦ σεαυτῆς· άρκέσω θνήσκουσα' έγώ.

Here, though there is no ellipsis, there is yet a striking similarity in the tone of harsh refusal and repulsion.

Vv. 404 sq. ταύτην γ' ιδὼν θάπτουσαν ὄν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν
άπέπας.

Every one feels the harshness of the position of τὸν νεκρὸν. The words may be sound, but they look like a gloss. Perhaps they may have taken the place of τοῦτο δρᾶν.

Vv. 417 sq. καὶ τότε' έξαίφνης χθονὸς
τυφῶς άείρας σκηπτὸν, οὐράνιον ἄχος.

οὐράνιον ἄχος has given trouble for more reasons than one. I would suggest ἄχος οὐρανοῦ as possibly the original form of the words. If άχος became άχος, transposition and a change from gen. to adj. might follow.

Vv. 478 sq. οὐ γὰρ έπέλει
φρονεῖν μέγ' ὅστις δοῦλός έστι τῶν πέλας.

So dubious a word as έπέλει is in more than suspicious company when it stands over πέλας. There has doubtless been contamination between the ends of vv. 478 and 479. Blaydes writes: "Qu. οὐ γὰρ ὄνν πρέπει (οι πέλει)." The former is nearer what I believe Sophocles wrote; viz., εὔπρεπής. (Cf. *Class. Rev.* VII., p. 344.)

Vv. 1001 sq. άγνώτ' άκούω φθόγγον ὀρνίθων, κακῶι
κλάζοντας ὀστρωι καὶ βεβαρβαρωμένωι.

We read smoothly enough through ὀστρωι καὶ; but after the καὶ we get a mental jolt. We are all ready for another attribute to the ὀρνίθων implied in φθόγγον ὀρνίθων, when we have an attribute to ὀστρωι suddenly thrust upon us. Here again I feel sure there has been contamination, an original βεβαρβαρωμένους = άσαφεῖς having been assimilated to κακῶι above it. The loci classici for the 'barbarism' of birds (Hdt. 2, 57; Ar. Av. 199; Aesch. Ag. 1050 sq.) are also in favour of the reading proposed. (In the very similar passage, Eur. Alc. 777, we should follow Nauck's suggestion [*Eur. Studd.* II., p. 85], and read συνωφρυωμένος [ξυν-] for συνωφρυωμένωι.)

This paper, which in the absence of its author was read by Professor D'Ooge, was commented on by Professors Shorey, Gildersleeve, Smyth, D'Ooge, and Humphreys.

15. Some Suggestions Derived from a Comparison of the Histories of Thucydides and Procopius, by Dr. W. H. Parks, City of Creede, Colorado.

This is merely a general discussion of the subject, preparatory to a more detailed treatment of the grammatical side at a future meeting.

There is always something fascinating to the human mind in comparing the literary work of two men, one of whom has, either consciously or unconsciously, been influenced by the other. And if this statement be true in general, how much more so in the case which we have before us. Both writers participated, to some extent, in the events of which they wrote; but how different the circumstances under which they lived!

Let us pause for a moment to contemplate the contrast of light and shadow afforded by this picture. Thus we find Thucydides living in the very atmosphere of freedom, in the springtime of the world's life and thought. We behold Procopius, on the other hand, living at a time when no one dared to call his life or even his thoughts his own, and when spies lurked in the innermost recesses of a man's household. With these changes in the political world had also come changes in the language, the religion, and the national life of both the Greeks and the Romans.

But in investigating this matter of imitation, a considerable degree of caution should be observed, it being almost an axiom in logic that, of two or more phenomena, each may be derived from a common source, as well as one from another. To give one from the infinite number of examples of this principle, the story of "Puss in Boots" is found in so many languages, and among such widely separated peoples, that to extract its origin and the details of its subsequent progress from the evidence which we have at hand is well-nigh impossible.

Further, we must constantly keep in mind the fact that Procopius' history is sensibly affected by his imitation of Herodotus.

Before proceeding to a further discussion of the subject, it may be well to refresh the memory of our readers by the barest outline of the life and works of Procopius.

Procopius of Caesarea was born in Palestine, about 500 A.D. In early life he went to Byzantium, where he was made secretary of the great general Belisarius. This event coincided in time with the accession of the famous Justinian, whose death in 565 A.D. must have been nearly coincident with that of Procopius. His works consist of somewhat full descriptions of the three great wars of Justinian (the Persian, Vandalic, and Gothic), besides a work on the Edifices of Justinian (*Περὶ Κτισμάτων*) and the so-called *Ἀνέκδοτα* or Secret History, which administers a scathing rebuke to the avarice of the emperor and the early vices of his empress, Theodora. The last-mentioned work is generally explained on the supposition that Procopius became offended at various slights received from his imperial patron.

We shall consider the resemblances and differences between our two authors from five standpoints.

I. HISTORICAL.—The beginning of Procopius' Persian War is very similar to the beginning of Thucydides' History; but Procopius is more diffuse, and the general plan of his work bears traces of conscious imitation of Thucydides, notably

in the chronological arrangement of his campaigns. But he is of course decidedly inferior as an historian to his predecessor. In general, he imitated him in form rather than in substance, especially in copying more or less faithfully his stock-phrases. In matters of accuracy and impartiality, he resembles Herodotus more than he does Thucydides. He takes sides, for instance, in the factions of the circus and in religious dissensions, particularly in the *Historia Arcana*.

In the matter of gossip, Procopius is far inferior to Thucydides. We may, indeed, say that the times in which the former lived were much more favorable to the Homeric *φήμη*. But let us consider what a scandal Thucydides might have made of the intercourse of Socrates and Pericles with Aspasia, or how he could have revelled in the midnight escapades of Acibiades!

II. LITERARY. — We find perhaps less difference between our authors under this head than under the former. As Gibbon has said: "Procopius at times rivals the strength and even the elegance of the Attic historian." But it is only at times. For, while Thucydides generally subordinates manner to matter, we find many noble sentiments in his pages (cf. II. 43, ἀνδρῶν . . . ἐνδιατᾶται). And his noticeable harshness of diction would undoubtedly have disappeared had he written at a more finished period of the language, to such an extent are the strongest characters influenced by their surroundings. Now Procopius had all of Thucydides' roughness, unredeemed by many of his better qualities. Thus, instead of the periodic arrangement, he often jumbles the members of a periodic sentence in well-nigh inextricable confusion (cf. Th. I. 143, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ . . . συναγωνίζεσθαι with Pr. Bell. Vand., p. 103, 21 (Hoeschel's edition), οὐχ ὄσια ποιεῖς . . . λαβεῖν, κ.τ.λ.).

Thucydides' transitions, too, are often elegant, resembling those of Pindar (see I. 23), while Procopius wearies one with his continual ὥσπερ μοι λελέξεται οὐ πολλῷ ἕσπερον, κ.τ.λ.

Procopius often imitates Thucydides quite closely in forms of expression, notably at the beginning and end of paragraphs (note αἶμα δὲ ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ) passim.

In conclusion, while Procopius can by no means equal the vivid pictures of Thucydides (cf. the plague, Th. II. 47-54), yet some of his narrations are decidedly striking, such as his account of the self-abasement of Belisarius (H. A. ch. IV.).

III. GRAMMATICAL. — As we hope, at some future time, to discuss this part of our subject more thoroughly, we shall omit it from this abstract for want of space, merely pausing to remark that, in this regard, Procopius imitates Thucydides more in phrases than in constructions.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS. — 1. *The Plague*. While Procopius is generally considered to have been a lawyer by profession, such eminent authorities as some of the French medical dictionaries include him among the physicians, basing their claim on the fact that he describes, in B. P. II. 22, 23, the plague which devastated Byzantium in 543 A.D. with much minuteness and scientific method. But, in reality, his description bears a striking resemblance to Thucydides' account of a similar calamity which befell Athens in the spring of 430 B.C. This resemblance consists not only in style and forms of expression, but also in the more important matters of the origin and character of the disease.

2. *Speeches*. These form a prominent part of the works of both historians. Procopius undoubtedly copied this feature from Thucydides, as the latter got it from Herodotus. Now the Byzantine imitates many of the characteristic features

of the speeches of the Athenian, such as the opposition of pairs of speeches, the use of pithy proverbs, and of similar forms of expression. But there seems to be more variety in the speeches of Thucydides, in spite of their general sameness of character (cf. the funeral oration of Pericles, II. 35-46, with the speech of the Spartan ephor, I. 86).

V. CONCLUSION. — We may say in summing up that, the more one studies Thucydides, the more one finds to admire, the more depth one discerns in his pages, while the greater part of Procopius' excellence is apparent on the surface. But when we consider the circumstances under which the latter wrote, the artificial character of the language, the blighting influence both of an effete civilization and a despotic system of government, we are constrained to wonder that he did as well as he did.

The Committee to audit the Treasurer's Report announced that they had compared it with the vouchers and found it to be correct.

The Committee on Officers for 1893-94 reported as follows: —

President, Professor James M. Garnett, of the University of Virginia.

Vice-Presidents, Professor John H. Wright, of Harvard University.

Professor Bernadotte Perrin, of Yale University.

Secretary, Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, of Bryn Mawr College.

Treasurer, Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, of Bryn Mawr College.

Additional members of the *Executive Committee*.

Professor B. L. Gildersleeve, of Johns Hopkins University.

Professor W. W. Goodwin, of Harvard University.

Professor Abby Leach, of Vassar College.

Professor F. A. March, of Lafayette College.

Professor W. D. Whitney, of Yale University.

The report was adopted.

The Committee on Place of Meeting in 1894 reported, through Professor Goodell, that the invitation of Williams College be accepted. The report was adopted. The next annual session of the ASSOCIATION will therefore be held at Williamstown, Mass., beginning July 10, 1894.

Considerable discussion then ensued as to the feasibility of holding a session every other year in conjunction with the AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY, the MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION, the DIALECT SOCIETY, and other kindred organizations.¹ Upon the motion of Professor D'Ooge, it was resolved that the Executive Committee be requested to ascertain whether it is feasible to hold such a joint meeting.

16. Vedic Studies, by Professor M. Bloomfield, of the Johns Hopkins University.

This paper will appear in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, XVI. 1-42.

¹ See PROCEEDINGS for 1892, p. xi.

17. 'Extended' and 'Remote' Deliberatives in Greek, by Professor W. G. Hale, of the University of Chicago.

This paper is printed in full in the TRANSACTIONS. Remarks were made by Professors Sonnenschein, Gildersleeve, Shorey, D'Ooge, and by Drs. Parks and Miller; and in reply by Professor Hale.

Professor Sonnenschein contributed a new instance of the subjunctive (Arist. Knights 1320: τιν' ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἤκεις, ἐφ' ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγυιάς;) and called attention to the ultimate identity of the final and the deliberative subjunctive, both being forms of "will-speech" and developments of the subj. of "command." The question is therefore not one of choosing between two different kinds of subj., but of deciding by what road the unusual subj. of the relative clause made its way into Greek. The subj. of Aesch. Prom. 471 οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ἴστω | τῆς νῦν παρούσης πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ is ultimately the same subj. as that of the Latin *non habeo artificium quo liberer*, though it was probably developed in a different manner. He agreed with Sidgwick and Professor Hale that the immediate source of the Greek subj. of the relat. clause was to be found in the deliberative question (the command-question), whereas the origin of the Latin *qui* with subj. may be seen in such an instance as Plaut. Rudens 1329 *quo nihil invitus addas, talentum magnum*, 'a great talent, to which you *are not to* (need not) add anything against your will,'—an instance which is not final in the ordinary sense: cf. the Plautine *eas* 'go,' *ne eas* 'go not,' and οἶσθ' οὖν ὃ δρᾶσον.—In regard to the immediate origin of the optat. in Soph. Phil. 281 (ὄστις ἀρκέσειε) and other instances dependent on a past tense, there is the difficulty that the Greek did not use the optat. in *independent* questions as to what '*was to be done*': ποῖ τις φύγοι; means not *quo fugeres?* but *quo fugias?* Thus ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἀλκηστis ἐς γῆρας μόλοι; (Eur. Alc. 52) is easier to account for as of deliberative origin than Soph. Phil. 281. Still it is quite possible that when the use of the subj. with the relat. had become established, the use of the optat. in dependence on a past tense arose by way of an *adjustment* (cf. λέγω ἵνα μάθῃς, ἔλεγον ἵνα μάθῃς).

At 1 o'clock the ASSOCIATION adjourned.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The reading of papers was taken up at 4 P.M., with President Hale in the chair.

18. *Fastigium* in Pliny, H. N. 35, 152, by Professor Harold N. Fowler, of Western Reserve University (College for Women), Cleveland, O.

Pliny's words are "Butadis inventum est rubricam addere aut ex rubra creta fingere, primusque personas tegularum extremis imbricibus imposuit, quae inter initia prostypa vocavit, postea idem ectypa fecit. hinc et fastigia templorum orta."

By comparison of passages in which the word *fastigium* is applied to any part of a building, the result is reached that when used accurately (i.e. not in the general sense of roof or slope or top), it means the sloping cornice. Nearly all these passages are in Vitruvius. Incidentally it appears that *corona* is used by Vitruvius to designate a cornice exclusive of the *sima*, and is therefore frequently used of the horizontal cornice.

When *fastigium* is used of sculptural adornment it applies to acroteria, not to pediment groups. This is most clearly shown by comparison of Sueton. Div. Jul. 81, *Calpurnia uxor imaginata est conlabi fastigium domus*, with Plutarch, v. Caes. 63, 738, ἦν γὰρ τι τῇ Καίσαρος οἰκίᾳ προσκείμενον . . . ἀκρωτήριον . . ., τοῦτο δ'ναρ ἢ Καλπουρνια θεασαμένη καταρρηγνύμενον ἔδοξε ποτινῆσθαι καὶ δακρύνειν. It is therefore evident that the passage of Pliny cannot be used as an argument for the origin of pediment sculptures from terra cottas. (This paper has been published in full in the American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. VIII. (1893), p. 381 ff.)

19. On Some Greek Inscribed Wax Tablets in the University Library at Leyden, by Professor Harold N. Fowler, of Western Reserve University (College for Women), Cleveland, O.

The University Library at Leyden has recently received from Mr. A. D. Van Assendelft de Coningh, Burgomaster of Leidendorp, seven Greek wax tablets, bought in Palmyra in 1881 by the late Lieutenant H. Van Assendelft de Coningh. These tablets seem to have formed a little book. On the outside of the first tablet is the line (Hesiod op. 347) ἔμμορέ τοι τειμῆ(ς) δς τ' ἔμμορε γείτονος αἰσθλοῦ. On the other tablets are fables of Babrios. The photographs shown at the meeting represented the first and the fourth tablets. On the fourth is Babrios *fab.* 117 (Schneidewin, Lewis, Gitlbauer) and the beginning of *fab.* 91. The writer evidently intended to give the exact wording of Babrios, but numerous variations occur, some of which show a marked disregard of metre. This may be because the writer was unable to appreciate quantitative metre. The chirography and orthography are those of an early period,—possibly not later than the second century after Christ,—and the tablets therefore help to fix to some extent the date of Babrios. An exhaustive discussion of these tablets—by far the most important Greek wax tablets extant—is at present impossible, pending their publication by Dr. D. C. Hesseling of Leyden. (This publication has now appeared in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. XIII. (1892-93), p. 293 ff.)

Remarks were made by Professors Sonnenschein, Smyth, and Fowler.

20. Περιπέτεια and Allied Terms in Aristotle's Poetics, by Professor Horatio M. Reynolds, of Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Commentators and critics, ancient and modern, have often used the term *περιπέτεια* in a general and incorrect sense. Especially in recent times it has been employed frequently as synonymous with 'catastrophe' or dénouement whereas Aristotle, from whom, whether he coined it or not, dramatic criticism

obtained the word, seems to have employed it consistently in a technical and carefully defined sense. In the Encyclopaedic Dictionary under 'peripetia' we read, 'Old drama. The sudden reversal or disclosure of circumstances on which the plot in tragedy hinges: the dénouement of a play.' In Worcester, 'A sudden change of fortune.' In the Century Dictionary, 'That part of a drama in which the plot is unraveled and the whole concludes: the dénouement.' These definitions are doubtless fully borne out by modern usage, and to that extent justified in dictionaries; that they are not Aristotle's is also clear. According to them, peripetia seems applicable to any play. This may find its explanation in the fact that modern drama is generally 'complex.' Greek tragedy, Aristotle teaches, is not so; and 'peripetia' is not a universal phenomenon even in complex tragedy. In the first definition, the phrase 'disclosure of circumstances' would better represent ἀναγνώρισις. In Worcester, there is not even a limitation of the term to the drama. In the Century Dictionary, we seem to have a translated echo of Aristotle's definition of λύσις — λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους. So, too, of the general definition, dénouement. Translators also fail to give the strict meaning, rendering ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ περιπέτειας 'sudden recognition,' regardless of the paraphrase in the same chapter, ἀναγνώρισις ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκότων. Teachers and editors of tragedy also use the term in a loose way. The foremost of the English scholars of to-day in his edition of the Oedipus Tyrannus paraphrases the word with 'reversal of fortune,' which is inadequate, and yet he is dealing with the Aristotelian criticism of the play. And a well-known American scholar, in his edition of the Antigone, on l. 988, speaks of 'the beginning of the περιπέτεια of the play,' where, if he preferred a Greek word, λύσις or μετάβασις would have been more exact. To use a word generally understood to be Aristotelian in an un-Aristotelian sense is productive of confusion. What, then, is the Aristotelian meaning? The *locus classicus* is found in the Poetics 1452 a :

εἰσι δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις, ὧν μμήσεις οἱ μῦθοι εἰσιν, ὑπάρχουσι εὐθὺς οὔσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἀπλῆν μὲν πρᾶξιν, ἧς γινομένης ὥσπερ ὄριται συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶς ἄνευ περιπετειᾶς ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένη δὲ ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετειᾶς ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἢ μετάβασις ἐστίν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα· διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὰδε διὰ τὰδε ἢ μετὰ τὰδε.

ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ ἀναγκαῖον· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπου καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας, ὃς ἦν, τὸνναντίον ἐποίησεν· καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι.

In the discussion preceding this passage, after giving his celebrated definition of tragedy and deducing therefrom the six qualitative elements of tragedy, — the myth, the ethical element, the diction, the sentiment or thought, the scenic decoration, and the lyric element, — Aristotle proceeds to discuss the myth as first in importance, and disposes of certain general questions of dramatic form, — the proper extension of the myth, dramatic unity, and poetic truth in contrast with

historic truth. He then turns to his main theme — how the action is to be shaped in order to be *tragic*. Things that awaken pity and terror¹ — τὰ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τὰ φοβερά — are in his view the peculiar field of tragedy. Without here defining these, he elucidates at some length their nature: they will exert the better their peculiar influence if they happen contrary to expectation (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν), and still more if they happen contrary to expectation, one from another (δι' ἄλληλα), i.e. in causal sequence. And the θαυμαστόν, or ἐκπληκτικόν, as he elsewhere² terms it, is shown by more than one reference³ to be in Aristotle's view a substantial element of tragedy. Such myths as have the qualities of surprise and causal sequence are those to which the poet should direct his gaze as more worthy of the tragic muse.

In the passage quoted above, the train of thought is somewhat as follows: Since a tragic action without change of situation (μετάβασις) is unthinkable, what change of situation is appropriate to tragedy? An action, and hence its imitation in the myth, is simple when the transition from one situation to another is without περιπέτεια or ἀναγνώρισις; it is complicated, when it is brought about by or with περιπέτεια or ἀναγνώρισις, or both. A transition of some kind is absolutely necessary, for the action cannot conclude as it begins. περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις are only special forms or means of this transition, and either or both may be dispensed with. If the transition is effected without these, the myth is simple; if with one or both, the myth depicts a movement which fails to reach the goal at which it aimed, and this failure is brought about as a necessary or probable consequent. Aristotle then defines περιπέτεια, and gives in detail two instances of its employment in tragedy. In explanation of καθάπερ εἴρηται, it is well to cite with Vahlen 1450 a, συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας . . . μεταβάλλειν (cf. μεταβολή in the definition and the example of Lynceus, in whom the reversal of fortune centered). By τῶν πραττομένων, Vahlen understands not 'circumstances' or 'situation,' but 'what a character does for a special purpose,' — a purpose, however, which is defeated and the direct opposite wrought. This distinction is certainly borne out in the two examples cited by Aristotle from the Oedipus and the Lynceus. Each of these plays contains a thwarted purpose, and the form of statement gives prominence to this element; but the distinction is more apparent than real. A drama implies action, and hence actors who must have purposes. A sudden change of situation without a thwarted purpose, therefore, is hard to imagine. The element of suddenness and surprise, on which Aristotle elsewhere⁴ lays so much stress, is here implied in the use of the word μεταβολή instead of μετάβασις, and still more in the phrase εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον. We may now paraphrase Aristotle's definition: περιπέτεια is the sudden, striking reversal, in necessary or probable sequence, of the situation or action to the directly opposite, i.e. from happiness to unhappiness, or the contrary.

In regard, then, to Aristotle's use of the term, the following conclusions are warranted: First, that περιπέτεια is not synonymous with μετάβασις, the latter

¹ Subsequently defined and classified under περιπέτεια, ἀναγνώρισις, and πάθος.

² *ib.* 1454 a.

³ Cf. *Rhet.* I. 11. 24 quoted below.

⁴ Cf. *Poet.* 1452 a and *Rhet.* I. 11. 24 καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαὶ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σφύζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων (sc. ἡδονῆ)· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα, 'From the love of wonder arises the pleasure we derive from tragic περιπέτειαὶ and narrow escapes from danger,' etc.

being applicable to every tragic action, simple or complex, the former merely to some complex actions; secondly, it may denote the special manner in which (*μετὰ κτλ.*), or the special means by which (*ἐκ κτλ.*), the transition is effected; further, it consists of or includes a special act that brings consequences unforeseen by the agent, who may or may not be the hero of the drama; and lastly, it is such as to excite wonder by its suddenness and completeness. A term liable to confusion with *περιπέτεια* is defined by Aristotle (cf. *Poet.* 1455 b), *ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγωδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις . . . λύσις δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους*. Etymologically, therefore, *λύσις* is exactly *dénouement*, which is often made the synonym of *περιπέτεια*. But *λύσις* includes the *μετάβασις* and all that follows; it is hence far more general, both in its application to a single tragedy and in the fact that it is applicable to every tragedy.

So much for the Aristotelian usage, which is strict and consistent.¹ In later Greek authors, we may not see occasional conformity to that usage. Cf. Plutarch *de Socratis genio*, I. 596. 29, and perhaps Diodorus Siculus III. 57. 8. In Sextus Empiricus 310, the word occurs with reference to tragedy, though in the sense of *ὑπόθεσις*. But usually in later Greek authors it is employed in the general sense of a chance event, favorable, unfavorable, or neutral, as in Polybius. Cf. Schweighäuser's *Lexicon Polybianum* and Stephanus' *Thesaurus*.

Remarks upon this paper were made by Professors Shorey and Reynolds.

21. Libration in the Periods of Cicero, by Professor W. B. Owen, Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.

The paper treated the methods by which Cicero secured the enrichment of style, — especially duplication, the balancing of related parts of sentences, and the grouping of ideas and synonyms in pairs. *De Oratore*, Book I., was closely examined with a view to this vibratory movement.

There is a natural tendency in emphatic speech to reinforce meaning by repetition, or double strokes, and it is in the nature of expression, further, to seek clearness and emphasis by throwing parts of sentences into the attitude of correlation. The Latin developed an elaborate machinery for these purposes: First, in the particles which throw clauses and phrases into correlation and admit them in pairs; and secondly, in its ample vocabulary, furnishing the materials for duplication.

Cicero's sentences vibrate with pairs, in which the added members give differences of meaning if you look into the shades of meaning, but very often without distinct intention beyond the dual cadence, where the duplication is one of movement and sound rather than of thought. This is conspicuously the case in sentences which start out with the vibratory swing, and the movement is then kept up thru a succession of pairs. Such a style gives an excellent opportunity for the study of synonyms; but that method applied to a particular text is likely to inject more thought into the phrases than the writer was conscious of. Of course Cicero is accurate and discriminating in the choice of words; but when his

¹ *De hist. Animal.* 590 b. 13 forms no real exception.

sentences fall into vibration we must not press too hard our search for an argument in every frase.

A few variations wer noted and illustrated.

The libration ofn extends to the structure in detail of hole frases and even clauses.

The second member is very ofn more fully developpt, especyally at the close of a period.

On the other hand, where more exact rhythmic balance is desired it is secured by attaching common adjuncts partly to one and partly to the other member.

The effect of a pair is at times greatly hightend by reversing in the second member the terms of the first.

Pairs ofn occur within pairs.

In the management of larger groups of particulars when they ar subjects which require discussion they ar frequently introduced in pairs.

When mention is all that is required, the mere list stil bears evident traces of libration, the vibratory grouping being determined by similarity or contrast of meaning.

The series of particulars at times presents a climactic gradation, and yet easily falls into the vibratory swing.

In formal libration, the second member is sumtimes broken into another pair ; in such cases the enlargement of a singl member frequently balances a lighter pair.

Even without the forms of libration a difference of connectiv ofn puts the items of apparent triplets on a slightly different footing, the result being sum variation of the dual cadence.

Then again, in formal triplets, the third member ofn contains a pair, thus giving it the effect of double libration.

Groups of four ar almost always thrown into the form of two pairs.

Words ar ofn displaced to bring them more obviously into pairs. These remarks wer abundantly illustrated by passages from De Oratore.

The bearing of this trait upon certain grammatical figures involving duality, as Hendiadys, Hysteron-proteron, Zeugma, etc., was then discust ; also certain fixt combinations which recur as redy-made pairs.

Its relations to the criticism of uncertain text wer also noted, and passages cited in which considerations of rhythmic symmetry ar important if not decisiv.

Then followd a comparison of Cicero in this respect with Caesar, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus.

Professors D'Oooge, Shorey, and Gudeman briefly discussed the above paper.

22. Varro and Chrysippus as Sources of the Dialogus of Tacitus,¹ by Dr. Alfred Gudeman, University of Pennsylvania.

A comparison between Quintilian's I. bk. and the treatise *Περί παιδων ἀγωγῆς*, ascribed to Plutarch, shows that both authors are largely indebted to Chrysippus' work *Περί παιδων ἀγωγῆς*. It is next shown that Ps. Plutarch and the chapters on the education of children in the *Dialogus*, reveal some remarkable parallelisms in

¹ Incorporated in the author's edition of the *Dialogus* (Ginn & Co.).

thought and language, coincidences which can only be explained on the supposition that both authors are indebted to Chrysippus as their common source. The Dialogus finally contains a remarkable parallelism with Varro's de liberis educandis, who in his turn was very likely influenced by the Greek treatise. The question whether Tacitus borrowed directly from Chrysippus or got his information through the medium of Varro cannot be decided with confidence.

Remarks were made by Professors Sproull, Hendrickson, and the author.

23. The Indo-European root *stā* 'stand' in Italic, by Professor Carl D. Buck, University of Chicago.

The present systems in which the I.-E. root *stā* 'stand' most frequently appears may be grouped as follows:

I. Reduplicating-class: A. Unthematic, e.g. ἵστημι, ἵσταμεν; B. Thematic, e.g. Skt. *ti-stha-ti*.

II. Root-class, e.g. Skt. *ā-sthā-t*, *ā-sthi-thās*, Gr. ἵστη, ἑστάνθης.

III. *io*-class: A. with strong ablaut-form of the root, I.-E. *stā'-iō*, e.g. Lith. *stōju*, O.B. *stajq*; B. with weak ablaut-form of root, I.-E. *stō-iō*, e.g. Skt. *sthi-yā-te* (for **stha-ya-te*, cf. Brugmann, Grundriss II. p. 897), O.B. *stojq*. Another subdivision, based on the ablaut-change of the suffix, is: 1. With ablaut *io-īe* (corresponding to thematic *o-e*), e.g. Lith. *stōju*, 3rd sing. *stōja*, O.B. *stajq*, 3rd sing. *stajetū*; 2. With ablaut *io-ī*, again subdivided a) *io-ī*, e.g. O.B. *stojq*, 3rd sing. *stojitū* (like *veljā-velitū*), b) *io-ī*, e.g. Lith. *stōviu* (with root-increment *u*), 1st plur. *stōvim*. Here, as in many other verbs, A. seems to go hand in hand with 1., and B. with 2. Yet the divisions do not always coincide.

As regards the semasiological difference between the present classes of *stā*, we may assume, on the authority of Greek and Latin, that the reduplicated forms had transitive force 'set.' In Sanskrit, however, *tiṣṭhāmi* is intransitive, the meaning 'set' being brought out by the causative *sthāpāyāmi*. Within the *io*-class, while we cannot maintain complete coincidence between the semasiological divisions transitive-intransitive and the morphological divisions A-B or 1-2, yet it is certainly true that the intransitive meaning is especially prominent in groups B. and 2. It is from the forms of B. that the Sanskrit passive has been developed, and in Balto-Slavic it is the forms of 2. which outside the present show the element *ē* which is seen again in the Greek 'second aorists passive,' e.g. O.B. *monjā*, *monēti* 'think' = *μαλτρομαι*, *ἐμάρην*, cf. Brugmann, Grundriss II. p. 1082. In O. Bulgarian the simple intransitive meaning 'stand' is expressed by *stojq*, while *stajq* is rather an iterative, and used only with prepositions, as *vustajq* 'stand up.' So, too, Lith. *stōju* is not the word for 'stand,' but is used in the reflexive form *stōjū-s* in sense of 'I place myself, take stand,' and also in active with prepositions like the O.B. *stajq*.

After this classification of the formations in which the root *sta* appears in other languages, the paper discusses the Italic forms with reference to their position in the scheme.

The Latin *sistō* offers no difficulty. It belongs, of course, under I. (reduplicating-class), and in the main subdivision B, though a form like *sistimus* may equally well be placed under A (unthematic).

The points with which the paper deals are 1) the position of the Latin *stō*, 2) that of the various forms of the Italic dialects, such as Umbrian *stahu*, *stahitu*, *staheren*; Oscan *stahint*, *staiet*, *stait*, *staiëffuf*, etc.

In regard to the inflection of Latin *stō* the paper claims a far more important share for the root-class (II.) than is allowed it in the latest treatment (Brugmann, Grundriss II. passim). It is doubted whether even in the first person *stō* we are to see an exact equivalent of the Umbrian *stahu*, and consequently a representative of the *io*-class, cf. also Bartholomae, Idg. Stud. II. p. 142.

The Oscan and Umbrian forms are plainly connected with III. (*io*-class), but beyond this there is a difference of opinion. The writer considers the supposition of an Oscan-Umbrian present-stem **sta-ē*, as assumed by both Brugmann (Grundriss II. p. 1066) and Bronisch (Osk. I und E Vocale, p. 185), but with totally different explanation of the same, as unnecessary. Not merely Umbrian *stahu*, but also *stahitu*, Osc. *stahint* may be referred to an I.-E. **sta-īo-*, **sta-īi-*, that is, according to our scheme, to III, B, 2, a. We say B, not A, because of the syncope in Oscan *eestint* 'extant'; 2, not 1, there being no trace of 1 in Italic; a, not b, on account of the lack of syncope in Umbr. *stahitu* and the analogy of other examples of the formation in which the length of vowel is indicated in the writing, as Umbr. *hercitu* 'volito.'

Umbr. *staheren* 'stabunt' is, as already noted by Bücheler, on a line with other Oscan-Umbrian futures. It represents an older **sta-īe-s-ent* in form subjunctive of an *s*-aorist. That we should have **stajes-*, not **stā-s*, need not surprise us. It has already been remarked (Buck, Vocalismus, d. Osk. Sprache, p. 53) that wherever a difference between present-stem and verbal-stem exists, it is the former which appears in this future formation, cf. Osc. *didest* 'dabit' with present reduplication, Osc. *hafiest*, Umbr. *habiest* 'habebit,' Umbr. *heriest* 'volet.' The form *staheren* is the proper plural to a singular **stahest* formed exactly like *heriest*. Bücheler's conjecture of [*hereset*] in line 27 of the Cippus Abellanus is altogether probable, in spite of the objection of Bronisch, l.c. p. 100, note.

GENERAL SESSION.

CHICAGO, July 14, 1893.

This general meeting of the various philological organizations was presided over by Professor Gildersleeve, of the Johns Hopkins University. Professor Smyth was elected Secretary.

24. Dunkles und helles *l* im Lateinischen, by Professor Hermann Osthoff, of the University of Heidelberg.

This paper, which is printed in the TRANSACTIONS, was briefly discussed by Professor B. I. Wheeler.

25. The Scientific Emendation of Classical Texts, by Professor E. A. Sonnenschein, of Mason College, Birmingham.

This paper appears in the TRANSACTIONS.

26. The Greek Nouns in *-ís, -ídos*, by Professor Benjamin Ide Wheeler, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

This important class of nouns is yet without historical explanation. Recent writers seem convinced that it is connected in some way with the Sanskrit nouns in *-ís*; cf. Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der indog. Neutra* p. 55; Johansson, *K.Z.* XXX. 401; Kretschmer, *K.Z.* XXXI. 346; but no account is attempted of the stem consonant *-d*. Brugmann, *Grundriss II.* § 128, discusses the nouns in question under the heading of "the suffix *-d*," in connection, on the one hand, with the scanty group of Latin nouns like *cassis, cuspis, capis, lapis*, and on the other with Greek nouns in *-ás, -ádos*; see also *Gr. Gramm.* p. 2110. Schmidt speaks of the genit. *-ídos* as "heteroklitisch," and Gustav Meyer, *Gr. Gramm.* 2 § 321, speaks of the confusion of *i*-stems and the dental stems. An I.E. *d*-suffix seems to be therefore the common presumption. That the stem-ending *-íd* has its origin in a Indo-European prototype *-id-* is, however, apart from any other positive explanation, highly improbable, and for the following reasons:—

(1) There was no I.E. suffix *-id-*. The Indo-Iranian branch shows none. There is no trace of such a suffix except in Greek and Latin. The one possible comparison, *κόρις, -ίδος* : O. Eng. *hnitu* : O.H.G. *niz* : Bohem. *hnida*, does not affect the case, as the *-d* is apparently part of the root (*κλίξω*). The Teutonic and Sclavic words have vowel-stems. The Latin words mentioned above show no connection in meaning with the Greek nouns, and are insufficient by themselves to establish an I.E. stem-class. If the suffix is not Indo-European, it must be a special Greek development.

(2) The existence in I.E. of any form of a vital suffix ending in *-d* is to be doubted. There were probably stems ending in *-d*; cf. the probable etymology *δρῆσάδ-* : Gr. *δευράδ-*, and the Teutonic verbs in *-atjan*. The Greek nouns in *-ás, -ádos* were a numerous class, but were in part at least derived from the weak form of the stem in *-ovr-*; cf. Kretschmer, *K.Z.* XXXI. 347 f. The older Sanskrit has but three certain examples of the suffix: *δρῆσάδ-, bhasád-, çarád-*.

(3) Such words as afford the opportunity of direct etymological comparison show the *-d-* to be peculiar to the Greek: *κληῖς, κληῖδος* : Lat. *clāvis*; *πελλῖς, -ίδος* : Lat. *pelvis, pēluis* : Skr. *pālavī*; *ἐμπῖς, -ίδος* : O.H.G. *imbi* (?).

The I.E. inflectional type with which our class of nouns shows clearest marks of relationship is that in *-ís -ῖος*, represented in the older Sanskrit by *ναπτῖς, naptiyam, naptiyā*, etc.; pl. *ναπτῖyas, naptībhis*. This type in Skr. is to be distinguished on the one hand from the monosyllabic nouns like *dhis, dhiyam, dhiyás*, with varying accent, and on the other from those with the feminine differentiating suffix I.E. *iā : ī(i)*; *deví, devīm, devyās*. From the latter it was distinguished in the following points: (1) Suffix; *-i-* without ablaut *vs. iā : ī(i)*. (2) Constant accent upon the *-i-* except in compounds. The other accented the root in the nomin., the endings in genit., etc., cf. *μα, μᾶς*; *δργυια, δργυιᾶς*, Joh. Schmidt, *K.Z.* XXV. 36. In Sanskrit the most of these nouns follow in accent the masculines from which they are derived: *deví : devá-*, whereas those which are independent of their primitives in accent are all barytone; *τάυιζῖ (taviśá-)*. The importance of this fact has thus far been concealed under a descriptive form of statement; cf. Lanman, *Noun Inflec.* p. 368. (3) Nom. sing. ends in *-s, vṛkῖς*. (4) Accus. sing. in *-iyam vs. im*.

The Skr. group in question is evidently made up of diverse materials. Most of the nouns may be explained as originally adjective derivatives. I regard the inflection as representing a development upon the basis of the nominative singular, and this nominative singular as representing the type, Goth. *hairdeis*, Lith. *gaidys*, Lat. *alis*, i.e. a nomin. ending in I.E. *-ts* for earlier *-tios* (Streitberg, Paul Br. Beitr. XIV. 165 ff.). The appearance of *i* in the form *-ii-* is due to the drawled (*zweigipfliger*) accent; cf. Ved. *-aam*. The connection with forms in *-iios* is betrayed, e.g. by *rathī-s*, "belonging to a wagon," "driver," etc.: *rathiya-* "belonging to a wagon"; *dutī-s* : *dūtiya-*; *samudrī-s* : *samudriya-*; *puruṣī-s* : *puruṣiya-*. The evenness or "regularity" of the paradigm is evidence of youth. It is a paradigm indeed which is ever tending to reconstruct itself anew. Its basis is the nomin. sing., its materials the commonest analogies of noun inflection. Under this point of view are explained the following features: (1) Absence of exact etymological correspondences. (2) Use of this stem-formation parallel to *i*-stems and *yā*-stems without apparent difference of value. (3) The parallelism of *ū*-stems: *tanūs* : *tanūvam*, cf. *ιχθῦς*, *ιχθῦος*. (4) The appearance occasionally of the same method in *i*-stems, Skr. *dvi-s*, *dvya-s*, possibly I.E.; cf. Gr. *δῖς*, *οἰός* (< *δφιός*).

The Gr. nouns in *-ts*, *-lidos*, correspond to the Skr. *-ts*, *-iyas* in the following points: (1) Prevailing oxytonesis of nom. sing. Paroxytones like *ξρις* admit an accus. in *-ν*, oxytones never. (2) The continuance of the accent upon the *i*. (3) The nom. sg. ending *-s*. There are abundant traces of a long *i*, though the short vowel of the majority of the cases has predominated; thus *κνημίδας*, *ψηφίδας*, *ἀψίσι*, etc., also *κληίς*, *βλοσυρῶπις*, *παίς* (X. 499, Hes. Theog. 178); cf. Lesb. *παίεις*, Collitz, Sammlung 299, *βοῶπι* (voc.) Hartel, Hom. Stud.² I. 105 f. Cf. also *πολίτης*, *οφίτης*, etc., whose paroxytonesis is I.E., Kretschmer, K.Z. XXXI. 344.

It may be that neither the Skt. nor the Gr. type is I.E., but the basis and the plan appear to be the same. Whence is the *-δ-*? The nouns in *-ás*, *-ádos* and *-ts*, *-lidos* doubtless assisted each other. If either class is old, it is the former. The nouns in *-ts*, *-lidos* are rare in the earliest monuments. The dialects have few examples. There are none in the Gortynian inscription. It is a possibility that, after all, the *-δ-* is a special development of *-i-*, — not, however, as loosely stated by Curtius (cf. Gr. Etymol.⁵ 636 ff.; Stokes, B.B. IX. 87), but under the special conditions of an accented *-li-* preceded by a labial, or perhaps only by an *ϕ*. The old word Hom. *παίς*, *παιδός* (for **παϕίς*, *παϕίδος*) is here of great value, as its contraction and partial heteroclisia give it the value of an isolated form. The contraction in Homer of *a + i > ai* belongs to the trisyllabic forms; *οἰός* is a possible parallel. Wackernagel's "*παϕίός*" is impossible (K.Z. XXVII. 277). The *-δ-* is here removed from the possibility of explanation by suffix extension. The syllable *-ιδ-* appears here under like conditions with that in a large class of words like *ἀπλοίδας*, *δαίδας*, *βασιληίδος*, *ληίδος*, *Κισσηίς*, *Νηρηίδες*, *Ἀχαιίδος*, *Χρυσηίς*, *Ἄϊδος* (*Ἄϊδος*?), *κληίς*, etc. To be noted is also the parallelism of *Ἐρεχθίης* : *Ἐρεχθειδαί*, *Ἄϊδος* : *Ἄϊδης*, in which the ending *-ης* (*ās*) serves the same individualizing purpose as the *-ων* of *Οὐρανίων* : *οὐράνιος*; cf. *Ἄτρείων* : *Ἀτρείδης*. Other labials precede *-ι-* in, e.g., *ἐλπίς*, *ἀσπίς*, *γλυφίς*, *πραπίδες*, *σκαφίς*, *ψηφίς*. The development of a dental explosive from *ι* after a labial has its parallel in *πτ < ρι*, *χαλέπτω*, *ἀστράπτω*, *πτύω*; Grassmann K.Z. XI. 13; Osthoff M.U. IV. 13 ff.; Brugmann, Gr. Gramm. § 40; Froehde, B.B. VI. 179. As *ρι > πτ*, so

δι > βδ; ῥάβδος : Lith. *viṭbas*; ῥοῖβδος : ῥοῖζος; ἔλδομαι < *ἐλβδομαι < ἐλπῖ-, ἐλπῖς; ἐπιβδαι (*repositā*) < *ἐπιπιβῖα to Skr. *piḍāmi*, Bury, B.B. XVIII. 292. The -δ- of ἴδιος is unexplained. The meaning of the word points to √*smi*-; cf. Skr. *svayāmi*, self, Cretan *flv*. Is it for *smiios* with re-added -ιος? ῥηῖδιος in its relation to ῥᾶ-θυμος still awaits explanation. Osthoff's connection with Lat. *rārus* is unsatisfactory on the side of meaning; is not *yrāmi*- as reasonable as *yrāso*-? Whatever the origin of the -δ-, the striking parallelism of the type ἐλπῖς, ἐπιβδαι and *nadīs*, *nadiyas* cannot be overlooked, and the stem-ending -δ- must be explained as a Greek product.

27. On the Canons of Etymological Investigation, by Professor M. Bréal, Collège de France.

This paper was read by Professor Wheeler, and discussed by Professor Osthoff. It is to be found in the TRANSACTIONS.

Adjourned at 1 P.M.

AFTERNOON (GENERAL) SESSION.

At 2.30 the General Session of the morning was resumed.

28. Ein Ablautproblem der Ursprache, by Professor Wilhelm Streitberg, University of Freiburg (Switzerland).

Remarks were made by Professors Bloomfield and Osthoff, and in reply by Professor Streitberg. This paper is printed in the TRANSACTIONS.

29. The Importance of Uniformity in the Transliteration of non-Roman Alphabets was presented as a subject for general discussion by Professor M. Bloomfield, of Johns Hopkins University.

Remarks were made by Professors Bloomfield, Wheeler, Osthoff, Streitberg, and by Dr. Parks.

A vote of thanks, especially to the Committee of Arrangements and President Hale, was then carried. In seconding this motion Professor Sonnenschein gave expression to the pleasure experienced by all the European visitors in participating in the sessions of the Philological Congress.

Adjourned at 3.45 P.M.

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 Waterbury, Conn.: Silas Bronson Library.
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Indian Office Library, London.
Bodleian Library, Oxford.
University Library, Cambridge, England.
Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Trinity College Library, Dublin, Ireland.
Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.
Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
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University of Upsala, Sweden.
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Austrian Imperial Academy, Vienna.
Anthropologische Gesellschaft, Vienna.
Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence, Italy.
Reale Accademia delle Scienze, Turin.
Société Asiatique, Paris, France.
Athénée Oriental, Louvain, Belgium.
Curatorium of the University, Leyden, Holland.
Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Batavia, Java.
Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin, Germany.
Royal Saxon Academy of Sciences, Leipsic.
Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Munich.
Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, Halle.
Library of the University of Bonn.
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[Number of foreign institutions, 37.]

[Total (379 + 61 + 37 + 1 =), 478.]

CONSTITUTION
OF THE
AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.

ARTICLE I. — NAME AND OBJECT.

1. This Society shall be known as "The American Philological Association."
2. Its object shall be the advancement and diffusion of philological knowledge.

ARTICLE II. — OFFICERS.

1. The officers shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary and Curator, and a Treasurer.
2. There shall be an Executive Committee of ten, composed of the above officers and five other members of the Association.
3. All the above officers shall be elected at the last session of each annual meeting.

ARTICLE III. — MEETINGS.

1. There shall be an annual meeting of the Association in the city of New York, or at such other place as at a preceding annual meeting shall be determined upon.
2. At the annual meeting, the Executive Committee shall present an annual report of the progress of the Association.
3. The general arrangements of the proceedings of the annual meeting shall be directed by the Executive Committee.
4. Special meetings may be held at the call of the Executive Committee, when and where they may decide.

ARTICLE IV.—MEMBERS.

1. Any lover of philological studies may become a member of the Association by a vote of the Executive Committee and the payment of five dollars as initiation fee, which initiation fee shall be considered the first regular annual fee.
2. There shall be an annual fee of three dollars from each member, failure in payment of which for two years shall *ipso facto* cause the membership to cease.
3. Any person may become a life member of the Association by the payment of fifty dollars to its treasury, and by vote of the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE V.—SUNDRIES.

1. All papers intended to be read before the Association must be submitted to the Executive Committee before reading, and their decision regarding such papers shall be final.
2. Publications of the Association, of whatever kind, shall be made only under the authorization of the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE VI.—AMENDMENTS.

1. Amendments to this Constitution may be made by a vote of two-thirds of those present at any regular meeting subsequent to that in which they have been proposed.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

THE annually published "Proceedings" of the American Philological Association contain an account of the doings at the annual meeting, brief abstracts of the papers read, reports upon the progress of the Association, and lists of its officers and members.

The annually published "Transactions" give the full text of such articles as the Executive Committee decides to publish. The Proceedings are bound with them as an Appendix.

The following tables show the authors and contents of the volumes of Transactions thus far published:—

1869-1870. — Volume I.

- Hadley, J.: On the nature and theory of the Greek accent.
Whitney, W. D.: On the nature and designation of the accent in Sanskrit.
Goodwin, W. W.: On the aorist subjunctive and future indicative with *ἔρω*s and *οὐ μή*.
Trumbull, J. Hammond: On the best method of studying the North American languages.
Haldeman, S. S.: On the German vernacular of Pennsylvania.
Whitney, W. D.: On the present condition of the question as to the origin of language.
Lounsbury, T. R.: On certain forms of the English verb which were used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Trumbull, J. Hammond: On some mistaken notions of Algonkin grammar, and on mistranslations of words from Eliot's Bible, etc.
Van Name, A.: Contributions to Creole Grammar.
Proceedings of the preliminary meeting (New York, 1868), of the first annual session (Poughkeepsie, 1869), and of the second annual session (Rochester, 1870).

1871. — Volume II.

- Evans, E. W.: Studies in Cymric philology.
Allen, F. D.: On the so-called Attic second declension.
Whitney, W. D.: Strictures on the views of August Schleicher respecting the nature of language and kindred subjects.
Hadley, J.: On English vowel quantity in the thirteenth century and in the nineteenth.
March, F. A.: Anglo-Saxon and Early English pronunciation.
Bristed, C. A.: Some notes on Ellis's Early English Pronunciation.

Trumbull, J. Hammond: On Algonkin names for man.

Greenough, J. B.: On some forms of conditional sentences in Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit.

Proceedings of the third annual session, New Haven, 1871.

1872. — Volume III.

Evans, E. W.: Studies in Cymric philology.

Trumbull, J. Hammond: Words derived from Indian languages of North America.

Hadley, J.: On the Byzantine Greek pronunciation of the tenth century, as illustrated by a manuscript in the Bodleian Library.

Stevens, W. A.: On the substantive use of the Greek participle.

Bristed, C. A.: Erroneous and doubtful uses of the word *such*.

Hartt, C. F.: Notes on the Lingoa Geral, or Modern Tupi of the Amazonas.

Whitney, W. D.: On material and form in language.

March, F. A.: Is there an Anglo-Saxon language?

March, F. A.: On some irregular verbs in Anglo-Saxon.

Trumbull, J. Hammond: Notes on forty versions of the Lord's Prayer in Algonkin languages.

Proceedings of the fourth annual session, Providence, 1872.

1873. — Volume IV.

Allen, F. D.: The Epic forms of verbs in *daw*.

Evans, E. W.: Studies in Cymric philology.

Hadley, J.: On Koch's treatment of the Celtic element in English.

Haldeman, S. S.: On the pronunciation of Latin, as presented in several recent grammars.

Packard, L. R.: On some points in the life of Thucydides.

Goodwin, W. W.: On the classification of conditional sentences in Greek syntax.

March, F. A.: Recent discussions of Grimm's law.

Lull, E. P.: Vocabulary of the language of the Indians of San Blas and Caledonia Bay, Darien.

Proceedings of the fifth annual session, Easton, 1873.

1874. — Volume V.

Tyler, W. S.: On the prepositions in the Homeric poems.

Harkness, A.: On the formation of the tenses for completed action in the Latin finite verb.

Haldeman, S. S.: On an English vowel-mutation, present in *cag*, *keg*.

Packard, L. R.: On a passage in Homer's *Odyssey* (λ 81-86).

Trumbull, J. Hammond: On numerals in American Indian languages, and the Indian mode of counting.

Sewall, J. B.: On the distinction between the subjunctive and optatives modes in Greek conditional sentences.

Morris, C. D.: On the age of Xenophon at the time of the *Anabasis*.

Whitney, W. D.: $\Phi\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota$ or $\theta\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota$ — natural or conventional?

Proceedings of the sixth annual session, Hartford, 1874.

1875. — Volume VI.

Harkness, A.: On the formation of the tenses for completed action in the Latin finite verb.

Haldeman, S. S.: On an English consonant-mutation, present in *proof*, *prove*.

Carter, F.: On Begemann's views as to the weak preterit of the Germanic verbs.

Morris, C. D.: On some forms of Greek conditional sentences.

Williams, A.: On verb-reduplication as a means of expressing completed action.

Sherman, L. A.: A grammatical analysis of the Old English poem "The Owl and the Nightingale."

Proceedings of the seventh annual session, Newport, 1875.

1876. — Volume VII.

Gildersleeve, B. L.: On *ei* with the future indicative and *edv* with the subjunctive in the tragic poets.

Packard, L. R.: On Grote's theory of the structure of the Iliad.

Humphreys, M. W.: On negative commands in Greek.

Toy, C. H.: On Hebrew verb-etymology.

Whitney, W. D.: A botanico-philological problem.

Goodwin, W. W.: On *shall* and *should* in protasis, and their Greek equivalents.

Humphreys, M. W.: On certain influences of accent in Latin iambic trimeters.

Trumbull, J. Hammond: On the Algonkin verb.

Haldeman, S. S.: On a supposed mutation between *l* and *u*.

Proceedings of the eighth annual session, New York, 1876.

1877. — Volume VIII.

Packard, L. R.: Notes on certain passages in the Phaedo and the Gorgias of Plato.

Toy, C. H.: On the nominal basis on the Hebrew verb.

Allen, F. D.: On a certain apparently pleonastic use of *ws*.

Whitney, W. D.: On the relation of surd and sonant.

Holden, E. S.: On the vocabularies of children under two years of age.

Goodwin, W. W.: On the text and interpretation of certain passages in the Agamemnon of Aeschylus.

Stickney, A.: On the single case-form in Italian.

Carter, F.: On Willmann's theory of the authorship of the Nibelungenlied.

Sihler, E. G.: On Herodotus's and Aeschylus's accounts of the battle of Salamis.

Whitney, W. D.: On the principle of economy as a phonetic force.

Carter, F.: On the Kurenberg hypothesis.

March, F. A.: On dissimilated gemination.

Proceedings of the ninth annual session, Baltimore, 1877.

1878. — Volume IX.

Gildersleeve, B. L.: Contributions to the history of the articular infinitive.

Toy, C. H.: The Yoruban language.

Humphreys, M. W.: Influence of accent in Latin dactylic hexameters.

Sachs, J.: Observations on Plato's Cratylus.

- Seymour, T. D.: On the composition of the *Cynegeticus* of Xenophon.
Humphreys, M. W.: Elision, especially in Greek.
Proceedings of the tenth annual session, Saratoga, 1878.

1879. — Volume X.

- Toy, C. H.: Modal development of the Semitic verb.
Humphreys, M. W.: On the nature of caesura.
Humphreys, M. W.: On certain effects of elision.
Cook, A. S.: Studies in Heliand.
Harkness, A.: On the development of the Latin subjunctive in principal clauses.
D'Ooge, M. L.: The original recension of the *De Corona*.
Peck, T.: The authorship of the *Dialogus de Oratoribus*.
Seymour, T. D.: On the date of the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus.
Proceedings of the eleventh annual session, Newport, 1879.

1880. — Volume XI.

- Humphreys, M. W.: A contribution to infantile linguistic.
Toy, C. H.: The Hebrew verb-termination *un*.
Packard, L. R.: The beginning of a written literature in Greece.
Hall, I. H.: The declension of the definite article in the Cypriote inscriptions.
Sachs, J.: Observations on Lucian.
Sihler, E. G.: Virgil and Plato.
Allen, W. F.: The battle of Mons Graupius.
Whitney, W. D.: On inconsistency in views of language.
Edgren, A. H.: The kindred Germanic words of German and English, exhibited with reference to their consonant relations.
Proceedings of the twelfth annual session, Philadelphia, 1880.

1881. — Volume XII.

- Whitney, W. D.: On Mixture in Language.
Toy, C. H.: The home of the primitive Semitic race.
March, F. A.: Report of the committee on the reform of English spelling.
Wells, B. W.: History of the *a*-vowel, from Old Germanic to Modern English.
Seymour, T. D.: The use of the aorist participle in Greek.
Sihler, E. G.: The use of abstract verbal nouns in *-σις* in Thucydides.
Proceedings of the thirteenth annual session, Cleveland, 1881.

1882. — Volume XIII.

- Hall, I. H.: The Greek New Testament as published in America.
Merriam, A. C.: Alien intrusion between article and noun in Greek.
Peck, T.: Notes on Latin quantity.
Owen, W. B.: Influence of the Latin syntax in the Anglo-Saxon Gospels.
Wells, B. W.: The Ablaut in English.
Whitney, W. D.: General considerations on the Indo-European case-system.
Proceedings of the fourteenth annual session, Cambridge, 1882.

1883.— Volume XIV.

- Merriam, A. C. : The Caesareum and the worship of Augustus at Alexandria.
 Whitney, W. D. : The varieties of predication.
 Smith, C. F. : On Southernisms.
 Wells, B. W. : The development of the Ablaut in Germanic.
 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual session, Middletown, 1883.

1884.— Volume XV.

- Goodell, T. D. : On the use of the Genitive in Sophokles.
 Tarbell, F. B. : Greek ideas as to the effect of burial on the future life of the soul.
 Perrin, B. : The Crastinus episode at Palaepharsalus.
 Peck, T. : Alliteration in Latin.
 Von Jagemann, H. C. G. : Norman words in English.
 Wells, B. W. : The Ablaut in High German.
 Whitney, W. D. : Primary and Secondary Suffixes of Derivation and their exchanges.
 Warren, M. : On Latin Glossaries. Codex Sangallensis, No. 912.
 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual session, Hanover, 1884.

1885.— Volume XVI.

- Easton, M. W. : The genealogy of words.
 Goodell, T. D. : Quantity in English verse.
 Goodwin, W. W. : Value of the Attic talent in modern money.
 Goodwin, W. W. : Relation of the *Πρόεδροι* to the *Πρυτάνεις* in the Attic *Βουλή*.
 Perrin, B. : Equestrianism in the Doloneia.
 Richardson, R. B. : The appeal to sight in Greek tragedy.
 Seymour, T. D. : The feminine caesura in Homer.
 Sihler, E. G. : A study of Dinarchus.
 Wells, B. W. : The vowels *e* and *i* in English.
 Whitney, W. D. : The roots of the Sanskrit language.
 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual session, New Haven, 1885.

1886.— Volume XVII.

- Tarbell, F. B. : Phonetic law.
 Sachs, J. : Notes on Homeric Zoölogy.
 Fowler, H. N. : The sources of Seneca de Beneficiis.
 Smith, C. F. : On Southernisms.
 Wells, B. W. : The sounds *o* and *u* in English.
 Fairbanks, A. : The Dative case in Sophokles.
 The Philological Society, of England, and The American Philological Association : Joint List of Amended Spellings.
 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual session, Ithaca, 1886.

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