

# TREASON AND PLOT

STRUGGLES FOR  
CATHOLIC SUPREMACY  
IN THE LAST YEARS OF  
QUEEN ELIZABETH

MARTIN HUME

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TREASON AND PLOT

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REASON

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STRUGGLES FOR ❧ ❧  
CATHOLIC SUPREMACY  
IN THE LAST YEARS OF  
QUEEN ELIZABETH ❧

BY

EDITOR OF THE CALENDARS OF SPANISH STATE PAPERS  
(PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE)



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*TO*

THE MANY UNKNOWN, FRIENDS IN ENGLAND  
AND AMERICA WHOSE WELCOME LETTERS  
OF APPROVAL HAVE SWEETENED MY  
LABOURS IN A GRUDGING AND  
TOILSOME FIELD

MARTIN A. S. HUME.



## P R E F A C E

THE adoption of the Reformation by England was an event which did not alone concern the nation itself, but threw out of balance the whole edifice of European power, built upon traditional alliances and international policies that had survived for centuries. However much it may have suited the temporal ends of Spanish monarchs to incite their subjects to religious exaltation, it was not crusading zeal or spiritual fervour which impelled them for half a century to lavish the blood and substance of their countries, and to exhaust every expedient, from marriage to murder, for the purpose of bringing England back to the Catholic fold. A Protestant England and a divided Germany inevitably meant the decadence and final ruin of the great Spanish empire which the "Catholic sovereigns" had reared upon a base of bigotry.

Without a close alliance with England, and the certainty of efficient support from Germany, Spain found herself with a jealous rival, France, on each flank. On the one hand, her dominions in Italy, only held by the right of the sword, would sooner or later be lost to her; and, on the other hand, Flanders and Holland, shut off by land if the

Italian dominion passed away, could not be reached from Spain even by water, unless England held the Channel and England were friendly.

When the spread of the Reformed doctrines in Holland drove the Burghers to shake off the yoke of intolerant Spain, and Protestant England, for her own national safety, found it necessary to aid the insurgents, it became no longer a matter of future policy, but of vital and immediate necessity, for Philip II. to persuade or force England into alliance or benevolent neutrality. The need was still further increased when the Huguenot power in France bade fair to overcome the Catholic supremacy there, and thus to leave Spain isolated without the possibility of alliance either with England or France: for it must be remembered that Spain could not afford to deal on equal terms with a Protestant power, because the admission of any question as to the supremacy of the Church, in all its rigidity, would have struck at the power by which Spain held together her mixed and recently reconciled populations, and have invalidated the exclusive right she claimed over the whole of the New World. It was, therefore, a matter of national life or death for her that England, by some means, should be made Catholic.

On the other hand, the circumstances which surrounded the birth and accession of Elizabeth were such that an acknowledgment on her part of the Papal supremacy would have branded her as a bastard, and would have deprived her of her here-



ditary right to rule. Whilst this was the case with her, there is no doubt that her personal leanings were to a great extent in favour of a ceremonious form of worship, and of the authority and dignity which belonged to the ancient Church; and it was equally important for England as it was for Spain to prevent the Flemish dominions of the latter power from ever falling into the hands of France. It will be understood, therefore, that, although the religious problems between England and Spain were opposed and irreconcilable, their national and traditional interests still to a great extent coincided; and it was this latter circumstance which enabled Elizabeth and Lord Burghley, through a long series of years, to play their consummate game of balance and chicanery, which paralysed Spain for harm, whilst England was growing in potency and wealth.

The imminence of the succession of a Huguenot to the throne of France, which threatened an approximation of French religious interests with those of England, at length compelled Philip to abandon a temporising policy with Elizabeth. If he could not force England to be Catholic before Henry of Navarre ruled France as a Protestant and made common cause with Elizabeth, then indeed had the star of Spanish power sunk to rise no more. But, as was usual with all his resolutions of action, Philip adopted his policy too late; and the defeat of the Armada exhibited to a scoffing and

envious world a nation already in decadence, not only in material strength, but in the moral forces which had previously been the principal secret of her success.

But though her Armada was defeated and Spain was riddled with corruption, her national necessity to make England sufficiently Catholic to be a fit ally for her ends remained unchanged. Her dreams of greatness, moreover, continued to loom large in her uneasy slumbers long after the decay of her potency had set in. The Catholic interests in England were many, and, for a multitude of reasons, devotional, sentimental, and mundane, a considerable portion of the people would have welcomed the return of a Catholic dispensation. But the long years of antagonism and informal warfare which the circumstances just mentioned had produced between England and Spain, had before the last decade of Elizabeth's reign given birth to a new pride of country in the breasts of most Englishmen, and a determination that a people who had shown their inability even to hold their own against England on the sea should not gain dominion over the land by means of religion or otherwise. It was this new patriotism that divided the Catholic forces in England, and the knowledge, then general, of Spain's selfish objects that divided them abroad; and, as a consequence of the changed position, the struggles to impose Catholic supremacy upon England that followed the catastrophe of the Armada differed entirely from those that preceded it.

The story of these struggles up to 1588 has been told fully by Froude and many other historians; but it has usually been assumed that with the defeat of the Armada the strenuous attempts to bring England again into the circle of the Roman Catholic Church and to a close alliance with Spain came to an end. That this was far from being the case will be admitted by those who honour me by reading these pages, in which I have endeavoured to set forth, as fully as the limits of one volume would permit, the continuous efforts made by the various Catholic elements, English and foreign, to establish the supremacy of their faith in England from 1593 to the accession of James in 1603; which latter date marks the final extinction of their hopes.

Much of the material from which the story is written is now used for the purpose for the first time, especially the Spanish MSS. transcribed by the present writer at Simancas, and abstracted in the last volume of the Spanish Calendar of Elizabeth. I have also drawn upon the calendared and uncalendared Irish State papers, the latest volume of the Venetian papers, the Hatfield papers, calendared and uncalendared; and, for the story of the Lopez conspiracy, I have been permitted to make abstracts of some interesting manuscripts in the possession of Lord Calthorpe, and also some unpublished papers in the Archives Nationales, Paris. I have endeavoured to set forth the historical facts

in all simplicity, and with absolute detachment so far as regards their religious aspect; and in every case where I have ventured to draw a deduction of any sort, the evidence upon which I have depended is placed before the reader, in order that he may judge for himself how far my conclusions are justified. This book does not claim to be a contribution, however small, to religious controversy, but is a diligent attempt to add something to the knowledge of historical fact, and to set forth, by the light of modern research, one phase of the important last ten years of the reign of Elizabeth; a decade which, for various reasons, has been inadequately treated by recent English historians.

MARTIN A. S. HUME.

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# TREASON AND PLOT

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

Change in the European situation caused by the defeat of the Armada  
— The Jesuits and the English Mission — The unmasking of Philip's designs — The influence of England's new maritime strength—Spain's renewed preparations for the struggle.

WITH the flight of the great Armada, beaten and demoralised, into the wild equinoctial gales of the northern seas, the political and religious problems of Europe underwent a change, which, like most far-reaching changes, was only very gradually and imperfectly realised by those immediately concerned. For a hundred years Spain had imposed herself upon the world to an extent entirely unwarranted by her native resources and the numbers of her population: she had discovered, subjected, and organised a vast continent: the commercial and mineral wealth of both East and West had been proclaimed as her monopoly; and throughout the world her arrogant claim to superiority, and to the leadership of orthodox Christianity, had been humbly conceded by all but a few who were regarded as little better than blasphemers for their denial of Spanish supremacy.

What was the secret that had carried this bundle of antagonistic racial and political units, only nominally a nation, irresistibly through Europe and America, and had in one leap raised Castile to the first place amidst the powers of the world? Not the wealth of the Indies alone; for, thanks to a vicious fiscal system, the gold and silver of the mines enriched every nation of the earth more than they did Spain. Not natural gifts of energy, intellect, or valour; for these were not specially conspicuous in the Spanish people either before or after the fleeting period of their country's greatness. Not the impetus of a united nationality stirred to patriotic ambition by the consciousness of strength derived from community of soil, race, and institutions; for such a feeling could have no place amongst peoples varying in origin, tongue, traditions, and national history, who were loosely bound together with the monarch for their only tie.

The cause of Spain's sudden greatness, as of her inevitable fall, must be discovered in the circumstances of her unification. Unity of some sort was vitally necessary if the ambitions of her successive rulers were to be fulfilled; and, failing the slow process of racial amalgamation, for which they could not wait, Ferdinand the Catholic and his immediate successors deliberately forged in the fires of the Inquisition the weapon with which they were to conquer half the world. The Spanish nation was bound together by the spiritual exaltation which came of the religious persecution of the minority by the majority. The Inquisition was popular, powerful, and revered by Spaniards at large, because

it flattered their pride with the idea that *their* faith alone had divine sanction, and that God had endowed *them* with the exclusive right of imposing that faith upon the rest of the world. They were a chosen people, spiritually superior to others; and in the sacred cause for which they were specially ordained to fight, cruelty, rapine, and blood were praiseworthy and gracious in the sight of the Lord. Mystic fervour and a belief in their mission to exterminate, at any cost, those who had strayed into the service of the devil, gave to Spaniards in the sixteenth century the unity necessary for their rulers to use them as a solid weapon for mundane ends. Much as they might hate each other nationally, they were all knit together in the fierce assurance that they were a divinely favoured people with a mission. This was the spirit which explained their burning enthusiasm and carried the ferocious men-at-arms of Charles and Philip victorious through the world. Their fervour and confidence dazzled the eyes of other nations to the weakness of material resource which lay behind their haughty, cool assumption of unquestionable superiority. Such claims would have been resented generally, as they were by a few in England, but for the absolute conviction of every individual Spaniard that he was on the side of God; and that, as a consequence of this solidarity, all other men were as mire beneath his feet. The moral effect of such a conviction was incalculable.

The first staggering blow dealt at this source of power fell upon Spanish hearts with the defeat of the Armada. All that spiritual superstition, all

that frantic devotion could do for the supposed invincible fleet had been done. Prayers for its success had been offered up by millions; sacred relics and bones of saints enough to stock a cemetery had been carried forth in processions innumerable; Pope and cardinals had blessed and sprinkled; kings, princes, and peoples had fasted and sacrificed; all Spain and Portugal were aflame with religious exaltation and the positive assurance of an easy victory over God's enemies. For such an expedition on such an errand defeat was surely impossible, and in that firm belief the soldiers, at least, on the fleet went forth to liberate a yearning people held captive by a small minority of heretics.

But even as the Armada, under its craven admiral, hustled powerlessly up the Channel in the six days' running fight with foes that eluded and harassed it, the first sinister cry went up from hearts already disillusioned and well-nigh broken: "*God has forsaken us;*" and when the battered wrecks of the ships that were left of the panic-stricken fleet slowly crept back to Santander with the few famished and plague-stricken survivors of their gallant companies, the loss of material power, great as it was, that the country had suffered, was the smallest part of the disaster. For the conviction of divine aid, the certainty of being on the right side, which had been the secret of Spain's strength for a hundred years, was wounded now beyond surgery, and Spaniards, if they fought at all, must in future fight on an equality with the rest of mankind with worldly weapons and skill.

The disillusionment came home but slowly to the mass of the Spanish people. The first wail of sorrow that went up was mingled with a cry for vindication and revenge. The towns of Spain, one after the other, offered new contributions, ruined and desolate as the country was, in order that a more powerful expedition than before should at once be fitted out under other commanders and teach a lasting lesson to the insolent heretic, before whom Medina Sidonia had fled helplessly. But as the winter wore on, and the extent of the catastrophe was better understood, the gloom darkened. One of Philip's own confessors boldly told him, that "though his prayers and processions were very good things, yet it was certain that God gave ear to other voices before his,"<sup>1</sup> and all prayers on account of the Armada were publicly ordered to be discontinued (22nd October). "The better informed," we are told, "begin to think that if all these ships are lost it will be impossible to make another expedition next year" (22nd October). And so with dismay the Spanish people gradually realised—as their king had done from the first—that they themselves were in danger of attack, and that, far from thinking of inflicting punishment upon England, they must strain every nerve first to defend their own coasts and commerce from devastation. "If Drake should take the sea," wrote the Venetian ambassador, "and meet the Peruvian fleet or make a descent on the shores of Spain, he would find no obstacle to his depredations, and he might even burn a part of the ships that have come back, for

<sup>1</sup> Lippomano to the Doge, October 1, 1589. Venetian Papers.

they are lying scattered without troops to guard them, as all the soldiers reach home sick and in the bad plight I have reported.”<sup>1</sup>

“If Drake were to go to the Azores now,” wrote the same authority, “he would not only ruin the whole of the Indian trade, but could quite easily make himself master of the islands.”<sup>2</sup> Philip put as brave a face upon it as he could, and talked about selling his silver candlesticks to arm for an attack upon England; but he knew full well now that before he could hope to prevail over his foe he must learn the lesson to which he had been deaf for years, and must face the English with ships as mobile and sailors as skilful as their own. For, thanks to Drake and his school, the ship was henceforth a fighting entity of itself, not only a machine for carrying fighters into the fray. A new maritime power indeed was born of the knowledge. England had the start, and only by patient work and slow degrees could Spain hope to change her material and tactics to meet the new departure.

With his laborious stolidity Philip turned his hand to the creation of a new navy. He was desperately impecunious; the Pope had scornfully refused the subsidy he had promised to the Armada, and the Cortes, failing to understand the need for the laying down of the new ships, of which the construction would occupy years, haggled over their voluntary subsidy. But to Drake and the English seamen, at least, the position was as clear as it was

<sup>1</sup> Lippomano to the Doge, October 22. Venetian Calendar.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, December 8.

to Philip: Spain was no match for England upon the sea until her ships and tactics were radically altered. It was seen that religious exaltation and a belief in a monopoly of divine protection, however good in their way as aids, were bad substitutes for the ordinary mundane precautions for securing victory. Thenceforward, therefore, the material aspect of the attempt of Philip to impose Catholicism upon England by force of arms assumed an entirely new condition, and for years to come Spain was forced to stand upon the defensive to save her world-wide commerce from utter destruction. A direct attack upon England itself was out of the question.

The altered conditions of warfare springing from the defeat of the Armada almost coincided in point of time with a political event of still greater magnitude, namely, the discovery of Philip's real aims. Long before the rulers of Spain had dreamt of raising a vast empire on a basis of religious bigotry, it had been an article of faith that a close alliance was necessary, in the interests of both parties, between England and the possessor of the Flemish seaboard; and when the crowns of Castile and Aragon passed to the House of Austria-Burgundy, this vital necessity passed with it. Spain with a friendly England could always hope to hold France in check; but with England against her, and in close union with France, Spain's main road to Flanders was closed; and France, free from suspicion of her neighbour across the Channel, was able to oppose the objects of Aragon in the Mediterranean and Italy. This had been the reason that Charles V.,

champion of Catholicism though he was, had not dared to quarrel with Henry VIII. or Edward VI., notwithstanding the Protestant reformation and the repudiation by Henry of his lawful Spanish wife. This was the reason for Philip's marriage with his elderly and unprepossessing cousin, Mary of England; and this was the reason why the Catholic King for thirty years left no stone unturned to win without war Elizabeth and England to the Catholic side, or at least to neutrality. In vain had his hot-headed councillors alternately prayed and hectored at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, and urged that the Catholic majority in England should be aided to throw off the yoke of the heretic Queen. In vain did ambassador after ambassador try to force the King's hands by fomenting treason in England and openly advocating war. Philip knew better than they that he dared not openly break with Elizabeth whilst jealous France was on his flank and his own Netherlands were in full revolt against him. So he had meekly to see his commerce ruined, his treasure stolen, his subjects hanged by English pirates, and his coasts and colonies violated for thirty years before he decided to risk everything on the issue of an invasion. Religion was his stalking-horse, and an effective one; but he would never have gone to war with England on religious grounds for the sole purpose of making her Catholic. It was necessary for him that she should be Catholic because he needed her friendship and a cessation of her aid to the Protestant Netherlanders; and when it became evident, even to his slow mind, that, for all her dexterous balancing and religious



coquetry, Elizabeth meant to stand permanently to the Reformed doctrines and her own supremacy, he was forced to fight or to throw up the sponge. Philip, both from character and on principle, loved to work in the darkness; and it was the first condition of success in the use of his religious instrument that his agents should not be aware of the political objects he had ultimately in view. During all the years they had paltered with treason and murder in England they had chafed and marvelled at their master's cold irresponsiveness to their activity. With hardly an effort in the beginning of Elizabeth's reign he might have turned the scale, and have made England at least as Catholic as Henry VIII. left it when he died. What his agents failed to understand was, that whilst it was desirable for Philip that England should be sufficiently Catholic to be friendly with him and to refrain from helping his discontented subjects, it was infinitely better for his ends that she should remain heretic and neutral than that she should become Catholic *and French*; for if Elizabeth fell, the next heiress to the English crown was Mary Stuart, practically a French princess under the control of ambitious and capable kinsmen of the same nation. So for years before he struck his blow the King's crafty intrigues went on to make Mary Stuart a subservient tool, and to pledge and subsidise the Guises for the promotion of their ambitions in France, in order that they might not interfere with Spanish aims in England.

During the period that Mary was captive the religious position in England underwent a complete

change, and at the time of her death the contending elements on both sides were finally ranged. The mass of the English people, except in London and the eastern counties, were Catholics; but the doctrines and practice of the Romish Church had remained more or less in a fluid state until the publication of the Trentine decrees in 1564. The cautious compromise devised by Elizabeth and Cecil had conciliated many, and for the first few years of the reign the population at large, although they might regret the avowedly papal *régime* of Mary Tudor, outwardly conformed to the established worship, and, but for the action of extreme parties on both sides, would probably have ended in complete conformity. Like Philip himself, Elizabeth and her chief adviser were influenced in their action by political rather than religious considerations; but the English Protestant clergy and laymen, who in the days of the Marian persecution had found shelter and hospitality in Switzerland, came back to the land of their birth burning with zeal to purge the worship of their Church of all traces of Rome. To them political considerations were nothing. In the days of their exile they had seen simplicity and adherence to the very word of Scripture made the test of holiness by communities and men whom they knew to be good, and they were rebellious and impatient to see that the Protestant English Church, for whose establishment they had yearned and prayed, included in its practice much which savoured of their Romish persecutors. Vestments, lights, incense, and images to them were anathema in any circumstances, and Protestant nonconformity was

born of the determination of earnest men to prefer religious purity to political expediency. Violence and rancour on the one extreme were answered by violence and rancour on the other. The laymen of Catholic leanings, offended at the Puritanism of many of the Reformed clergy, began to absent themselves from church, and sought again the ministrations of priests of the old faith. The country was flooded by ardent young missionaries from Allen's Seminary at Douai, who, in disguise and at the risk of their lives, went from one Catholic house to another, exhorting and encouraging Englishmen to stand firm to the faith of their fathers. Their first mission was unquestionably religious alone, but unfortunately in some instances, as was the case in the Northern rebellion, they were too useful as messengers and instruments, or too zealous, entirely to avoid participation in treason. In 1579 the activity of the Seminarist missionaries aroused the jealousy of the young, vigorous, militant organisation whose especial province was propaganda, and the Jesuits, much to the annoyance of the secular priests, insisted on taking a leading part in the English mission.<sup>1</sup> They, too, came at first on a purely

<sup>1</sup> The disturbances in the English College at Rome, an offshoot of Allen's Seminary at Douai, if they were not deliberately fomented by the Jesuit interest, at least gave the Society its opportunity for capturing the Seminaries, and for intruding itself into the English Mission. It was not without hesitation, however, that the ruling Jesuits allowed Persons and Campion to start on their mission to England. Even before they left, the English seculars were in fear that the Jesuit fathers would assume an authority out of proportion to their numbers, and would meddle in state affairs. To calm this fear, the rules for guidance of the Jesuits of the English Mission (1580) strictly laid down that "they must not mix themselves with affairs of state, nor in England must they speak, or allow others to speak in their presence,

religious errand; but one at least of them, Father Persons, soon changed his plans, and thenceforward until her death every plot for the liberation of Mary Stuart was directed and managed by Jesuits under the direction of Persons, whose masterful energy and zeal drew Allen along the same path. Their treason and disloyalty were punished by proscription and persecution.<sup>1</sup> The Jesuits saw plainly after the fate of the Duke of Norfolk and the collapse of the Northern Earls that Elizabeth would never be overturned except by the aid of a foreign force. Whence could such a force come? Not from France, for there the religious divisions were more acute even than in England; and Catharine de Medici only kept her footing by preventing either Catholics or Huguenots from monopolising the national power. The Pope might thunder excommunications, but he could send no galleys out of

against the Queen, except perhaps in company of those whose fidelity has long been steadfastly proved" (quoted by Law from Simpson's transcripts, 1085, Brussels Archives). Campion certainly confined himself to his religious mission, which he considered invincible, and so went to martyrdom. But Persons soon convinced himself that one Jesuit political missionary could do more than a hundred of Allen's easy-going spiritual priests; and notwithstanding the solemn oath he took to the Catholic Synod, which he secretly convened in Southwark (July 1580), that the Mission "was purely spiritual, and had no concern or knowledge of affairs of state," he soon took the direction of all political plots in England. Thenceforward the Jesuits, very few in number at any time in England, constituted themselves a sort of aristocracy of missionaries, who looked upon the purely religious secular priests as underlings, and treated them accordingly, to the indignation of the latter, as will be seen in the course of this book. (On these points see Simpson's "Campion;" T. G. Law's "Jesuits and Seculars;" "Dod," edited by Tierney; Knox's "Life and Letters of Cardinal Allen;" "The Archpriest Controversy" (Camden Society), &c.)

<sup>1</sup> In 1585 it was made high treason for any priest ordained abroad to enter England.

the Mediterranean, and, moreover, was sparing of his money; so to Philip alone could the extreme Catholics and the Jesuits of England look for the liberation of their country from Protestantism. But at what cost? Philip clearly would not incur the risk of invading England for the purpose merely of placing upon the throne a half-French princess, whose son might, for aught he could foresee, be more heretical and inimical to Spain than Elizabeth; and who, in any case, would transfer with his crown to England the ancient Scottish tradition of close alliance with France. So the Jesuits set to work to overcome this difficulty at the expense of England's independence; and for the last few years of the unfortunate Mary's life they carefully enmeshed her in the toils, until she had solemnly disinherited her son for heresy and made Philip of Spain her heir. Cautiously, too, Persons and his satellites in Flanders, Rome, and Spain spread the idea of Philip's own descent from Edward III., in order that in due time he might claim to succeed Mary to the English crown. But when the execution of Mary forced the Spanish king to some extent to show his hand, and to unmask his political aim, there came the inevitable parting of the ways between loyal and disloyal English Catholics. The extraordinary intrigues by which Pope Sixtus V. was hoodwinked as to English succession until it was too late for him to withdraw his promised support to the Armada, has been told by me elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> and when at last the expedition failed, joy and contentment, rather than sorrow, were expressed

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to the Calendar of Spanish State Papers, vol. iv.

by the Pope and cardinals at the Catholic defeat.<sup>1</sup> For years Philip had endeavoured to keep in the background, even from his confidential agents, his political design to subjugate England to Spain; but long before the Armada sailed the Scottish Catholics at the Vatican, jealous of their king's right to the English succession, the French cardinals, apprehensive of a Spanish dominion over England, the Welsh priests, led by Owen Lewis, Bishop of Cassano, and most of the English seculars, Carthusians and Benedictines, none of whom had any love for the pushing Jesuits, were busy with plans that should make England a Catholic country without submitting her to a foreign yoke.

When the Armada suffered catastrophe, the secret was out for all the world, and Philip could work in the dark no longer. Thenceforward it was evident that any direct attempt of his against England would probably meet with the open or covert opposition, not only of Protestants, but of the Papacy itself and of all Catholics but the Spaniards, the Jesuits, and the more extreme of Philip's English refugee pensioners; for the Pagets, Morgan, Hesketh, the Treshams, and many others who had lived on his bounty, declined to sell their country for their mess of pottage. Whilst the death of Mary Stuart and the defeat of the Armada thus laid Philip's real designs open to the world, two other events shortly afterwards still further altered the possibilities of his action against England. The arrogant ambition of Guise, secure as he was of Spanish support and money, drove Henry III. into

<sup>1</sup> Spanish and Venetian Calendars, 1588-89.

the arms of the Huguenots. The next heir to the French throne was Henry of Navarre, the Protestant prince, bound close in alliance and friendship with Elizabeth. If France and England became allied Protestant powers, then indeed were Spain and Catholic supremacy in Europe doomed; and the danger to Philip in France was infinitely more pressing than in England. Money, support, and material aid were consequently forthcoming in plenty to enable the Holy League to crush the Huguenots once for all, though Spain and the Indies were bled almost to the last doubloon. Again circumstances tore away the screen behind which Philip always chose to fight. The screen in this instance was Guise's love of the Catholic Church; but the murder of Guise (December 1588) forced Philip into the open, and the assassination of Henry III. (August 1589) completed the exposure. Spain found herself in the position which for centuries she had avoided, namely, that of being at war with France with England also against her. It was a mere necessity of her continued existence as a great power that the Protestant faith should not be officially established in France; and yet Philip dared not employ all his national resources in a war without ensuring some sort of stability for the objects for which he was making such great sacrifices. It was clear that the weakly ambitious and shifty Mayenne, the figure-head of the League now that his brother Guise was dead, could not be depended upon. Navarre would surrender no part of his birthright; and the Spanish king was obliged to fight openly either for the Spanish domination

or the dismemberment of France. Henry IV. promptly seized the advantage that such a position gave to him, and assumed the sympathetic rôle of the patriotic champion opposed to the foreign subjection of his beloved country, whilst the League had to bear the reproach of fighting against the independence of France with the aid of Spanish pikes; and Philip himself was forced again into the position he hated, namely, to appear to Christendom as an ambitious prince using religion as a cloak for his greed of territory.

It will thus be seen that the words with which this chapter opened were justified. Up to the period which followed the defeat of the Armada, Philip, in his attempts to impose Catholic orthodoxy upon England, by diplomacy, by revolution, or by force, had figured as a devout sovereign bent only upon restoring religious unity to the world, and re-establishing the supremacy of the Church of which he was the divinely appointed champion. But from 1590 onward it was patent to everybody that his ultimate object was the political subjection of the country, in the interests of the Spanish monarchy, in which he would be opposed by most of Europe; whilst it was equally obvious that the crusading zeal of his people, which had been a main source of his potency, had received a shock from which it was not likely to recover. The attempts, therefore, of the Catholics to regain supremacy in England divide themselves into two distinct periods—the first, from the accession of Elizabeth to the end of 1589; and the second, from 1590 until the death of the Queen in 1603. The events of the former



of these periods have been described fully and frequently: the participation of Mary Stuart in the various conspiracies for her benefit has been discussed *ad nauseam*; the Spanish intrigues to regain by any means, fair or foul, Philip's hold upon England are well known; the efforts of the English Catholics themselves to impose their views upon Elizabeth and Cecil in the early years of the reign have been dealt with exhaustively;<sup>1</sup> and the long series of juggles by which Elizabeth's marriage was utilised for similar ends have also been recently detailed.<sup>2</sup> But the story of the final struggles for Catholic supremacy in the new set of circumstances which has just been explained from 1590 to 1603 has never yet been fully told by the light of modern research; and it is the object of this book to set forth in some detail the abortive series of intrigues by which, during the last ten years of Elizabeth's reign, various sections of Catholics—English, Scottish, and Irish—endeavoured to avail themselves of foreign support for the objects they had in view.

These intrigues were on more than one occasion in this period dangerously promising of success; but the vigilance of the Queen's Government, the growing strength of the Protestant party in the country, the repugnance to Jesuit methods and to foreign domination on the part of most English Catholics, seculars, regulars, and laymen, together with the disillusionment and exhaustion of Spain and the wonderful good fortune of Elizabeth, ended

<sup>1</sup> By Camden, Hollingshead, Froude, Lingard, the present writer (in the Spanish State Papers and Life of Burghley), and many others.

<sup>2</sup> "The Courtships of Queen Elizabeth," by Martin A. S. Hume.

by frustrating them all, and finally made England a Protestant country.

The changed position of Philip towards England caused by the circumstances preceding the year 1590 was accompanied by a no less important variation in the attitude of Elizabeth's Government towards Spain. Drake and the newer school of seamen had always proclaimed, and had themselves demonstrated, the hollowness of Spain's traditional claim to overwhelming power. Seconded by the liberal, or Protestant, element in the English Council, they had never ceased to urge the Queen to cripple her foe, boldly and decisively, by means of large national operations against his own country or fleet. But they had against them the Queen's parsimony, Burghley's love of compromise, and the traditional dread and respect of Spain, England's ancient ally, which inspired the more conservative councillors of the Cecil party. The latter were content with the punishment inflicted on the Armada and with the loss of prestige suffered by Spain, and were in favour of limiting their future operations to profitable sporadic attacks upon Spanish commerce. The failure of the English attack upon Portugal in 1589, in the interest of the pretender, Don Antonio, was unjustly laid to the fault of Drake. In any case, the Queen was deeply offended at the result of the expedition, and for the rest of his life the great seaman lived somewhat under a cloud; whilst the cautious, old-fashioned statesmen endeavoured to avoid a renewal of the national war with Spain, and the more adventurous spirits were content to reap such ad-

vantage as they might by plundering Spanish galleons and fighting the King of Spain under the banners of Henry of Navarre or the United Provinces. This unenterprising, indirect warfare gave to Philip the opportunity he so sorely needed of creating a navy of a more mobile type than he had previously possessed. It was seen that, for the purpose of attack or evasion, swiftness and handiness were his first desiderata; and whilst his ports, both home and colonial, were relatively safe from attacks during Drake's disgrace, they were busy turning out vessels of a newer type with which the commerce of the Indies might be safely conducted; and, when opportunity offered, England herself might be attacked.<sup>1</sup> Fast sailing "galley-zabras," armed

<sup>1</sup> That this was still Philip's ultimate object is seen from the instructions he gave to Commander Moreo, his representative to the Princes of the League (May 1589), Paris, MSS. National Archives, Spain, K. 1449:—"As tending also to the promotion of the Catholic faith, you will accept in the form which appears most convenient the offer made to me by the Duke of Mayenne to give me ports and other facilities for my Armada on the coasts of Normandy and Brittany to operate against England, with the power of drawing ships, seamen, &c., for the Armada from those coasts." In September of the same year 1589 Mendoza wrote to Philip from Paris advocating the purchase of Boulogne from Épernon, who, he says, is willing to sell the place for 40,000 crowns; or otherwise that it should be captured by force. He says: "With these two ports (Boulogne and Calais) at your Majesty's command, the enterprise (against England) could be effected very rapidly, even in the winter; and at a very much smaller cost than the fitting out of a fresh Armada in Spain next summer or autumn." From Philip's cool reply to this it is evident that his eyes were still fixed upon Brittany, and that the collection of a Spanish fleet in Boulogne to attack England was no part of his plan at that time. In January 1590 Diego Maldonado sent an elaborate report to Philip with regard to the possibility of fitting out a fleet on the Brittany coast. This led to the seizure shortly afterwards of the port of Blavet, which continued to be the Spanish naval base in France until the signature of the peace of Vervins in 1598 (Spanish Calendar).

treasure-ships, were built in Havana in considerable numbers. Lisbon, Cadiz, Santander, and Ferrol contributed galleons built from English and Flemish designs, and armed not infrequently by English bronze cannon smuggled into Spain by Scottish, German, and other ships.<sup>1</sup> In the meanwhile hired squadrons of armed merchantmen were organised to protect the communications between Spain and Flanders by the Channel; and by the year 1592 Philip once more was in possession of a royal navy, less pretentious and splendid in appearance than the Armada, but much more effective for the service required of it.<sup>2</sup> These preparations did not escape the notice of the English spies in Spain, or diminish in the telling; and periodical scares, with, as we see now, but small justification, kept English sailors on the alert for a possible descent upon the coasts of Great Britain; the Spanish base upon the Brittany coast giving ever-present point to the alarm. Hawkins's great preparations in the winter of 1589 to attack the returning Indian treasure fleet were rendered useless because the Queen in a panic forbade the expedition from leaving the Channel. If Drake's and Raleigh's policy had been followed, the English fleet would have sailed to Corunna and have destroyed the Spanish naval

<sup>1</sup> Richard Horton writes thus from Madrid, April 1591 (Hatfield Papers, part 4):—"Aqui recibimos cada dia en cantidad artilleria de Inglaterra, por via de Lubeck, Embden, Bremen, y Hamburgo; y la llevan los mercaderes de alla sin sospecha con navois cargados con carbon. Todo hace el dinero!"

<sup>2</sup> At the period in question (1592) there were 75 ships ready for sea in the King's service, of which 23 were fine new galleons of 700 to 1000 tons each; besides 40 more of such galleons in course of construction (Corbett, "Drake and the Tudor Navy").

armaments there collected; but the defensive and commerce-harrying tactics of the more cautious spirits prevailed, and the opportunity was missed: the only result of the sailing of the fine English fleet under Hawkins and Frobisher in 1590 being to frighten the treasure fleet of Spain into remaining on the other side of the Atlantic all the winter. The English were, it is true, thus in complete command of the sea, and the detention of the treasure hampered Philip's progress; but the timid policy that now prevailed in Elizabeth's council left his focus of activity untouched, and thus gave plausible ground for a renewal of the alarm which his preparations caused in England. The effect of the policy was seen in the following year, when Howard and the bulk of the English navy, cruising off the Azores to intercept the delayed Indian flotillas, was surprised by the appearance of a much stronger Spanish force under Bazan, of fifty-five ships with 7200 men, before which the English were forced to abandon their expected prey and seek safety in flight—all except the *Revenge*, in which Grenville rashly bade defiance to them all and went to voluntary destruction. Though Bazan's squadron suffered heavily from a storm on its way home, its strength partially convinced the English queen of the growing danger she had to fear from the reconstructed navy of Spain. But still, instead of striking at the root, Elizabeth and Burghley endeavoured to meet the danger, of which their spies constantly warned them, mainly by helping the French king to keep the Spanish forces fully occupied in France, and by urging Henry to special

activity in Brittany, where her own forces under Sir Henry Norreys were also fighting the League. The loss of the *Revenge*, too, and the failure of Howard to tackle Bazan's fleet, as well as the Queen's annoyance with the rash perverseness of Essex, now the leader of the Protestant or war party, gave to the Cecils and their adherents the upper hand; and caution and plunder reigned supreme as a policy until the spring of 1593, when the rehabilitated naval power of Spain was too evident and threatening any longer to be trifled with. It is at this juncture that we propose to take up in detail the story of how the continued attempts to make Great Britain Catholic were met and frustrated.

## CHAPTER II

Intrigues of the Scottish Catholics with Spain—James's share in them—  
The "Spanish blanks"—The Parliament of 1593—Fears of a new  
Spanish invasion—John Cecil's mission from Scotland to Spain—  
The influence of Father Persons—The Spanish mission to the  
Scottish Catholic Lords—John Cecil's betrayal of the cause.

As early as the end of 1586, whilst the preparations for the Armada were still far from complete, one of Philip's most able officers, Bernardino de Mendoza, sent to the King a most convincing state paper, strongly advising that England should not be attacked by a naval invasion, but by a force crossing the Scottish border; and the dangers and difficulties which Mendoza foretold in the case of a direct attack by sea were precisely those which caused the failure of the attempt.<sup>1</sup> The origin of this advice was the offer of the Earl of Huntly and the other Scottish Catholic Lords to secure and deliver to Spain two ports near the English border in which a Spanish force might be received; and in return for Philip's support to the Catholic cause, they also professed their readiness to aid him with their own forces, and to compel James to become a Catholic.<sup>2</sup> At that time, however, Philip's main plan of invasion was laid; and although he sent money and fair words in plenty to the Scottish Lords, in order, at least, that

<sup>1</sup> Mendoza to the King, December 24, 1586. Spanish Calendar, vol. iii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

James might be prevented from helping the English, he had long ago made up his mind that the King of Scots would be no fit instrument for him.

The persistent intrigues of the Scottish and French Catholics, after the Armada, to bring about a compromise founded upon the conformity of James to Catholicism—intrigues to which the King of Scots himself was usually a party—confirmed Philip's determination to exclude James altogether from his operations against England. Fortified by the opinions of the Jesuit party, voiced by Persons, he was convinced that the jealousy of Englishmen against the Scots would lead them to prefer even a Spaniard to a Scotsman as their king; and the Pontiff himself was lectured and rated like a schoolboy by the insolent ambassador, Olivares, for his efforts to bring about a settlement<sup>1</sup> by means of the conciliatory policy of which the great majority of the English Catholics now approved. Philip, however, was still full of expressions of sympathy for the Scottish Catholics; for, with the growing difficulty of a direct naval invasion of England, for reasons set forth in the last chapter, the possibility of having some of the ports of Scotland open to him, if he needed them, was a tempting one. Huntly, Errol, Angus, and the rest of them, therefore still appealed to the Spanish King to aid their party; and James played his tricky double game

<sup>1</sup> See Olivares' letters to the King, in Spanish Calendar, vol. iii., in which the Pope is spoken of most disrespectfully, and details given of the ambassador's rudeness to him. To such an extent was this carried that, when Henry IV.'s approaches to the Pope and his desire to conform were benevolently listened to by Sixtus, not only did Olivares insult the Pope grossly, but Spanish friars denounced him as a heretic (Tempesti, Vie de Sixtus V.).



of taking secret part in the Catholic conspiracies against his own Government, in order to keep both parties in hand. When, in 1589-90, he was obliged to content Elizabeth and the Protestants by going through the pretence of punishing the Catholic Lords whose accomplice he was, and, during his absence in Denmark, entered into negotiations for the formation of a great Protestant league of Scotland, England, the Northern Powers, and Henry IV. (who had not yet "gone to Mass"), the Scottish Catholics took fright in earnest, and sent a humble emissary, one Charles Boyd, to Spain to pray for Philip's assistance to a new confederation, which was evidently pledged to the removal of James.<sup>1</sup> As usual with him, Philip wanted "further information" before he would pledge himself to anything; but this opening was more promising than previous approaches from the same quarter, as in this case it was evident that James himself was left out of the calculation. However this may be, Elizabeth's Government were fully informed of the plot, and whilst Boyd was still in Madrid awaiting Philip's answer, Elizabeth, in her own hand, thus wrote to James on his return to Scotland from his wedding-trip to Denmark in May 1590: "I hope you wyl not be careles of such practisis as hathe passed from any of yours without your commission, spetially such attempts as might ruin your realme and danger you. If any respect whatever make you neglect so expedient a worke, I am affraide your careles heed will worke your unlooked danger." The Queen indignantly closes by saying that she knows her former

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 582.

letters of warning have been shown by James to the Catholics; and if she sees her admonitions disregarded for the future, "I wil hireafter wische al well, but counsel no more at all."<sup>1</sup>

James was not long before he again got his own hand into the plot. Scotland was now flooded by priests and Jesuits who had fled from the severity of Elizabeth's penal enactments or had been sent from abroad for missionary work,<sup>2</sup> and they laboured on fertile soil in the discontent aroused, especially in the King and nobles, by the parliamentary establishment in 1592 of the Presbyterian Church Government. This time it was Lord Balgarys and Graham of Fentry who took the lead (for Huntly, by his recent unprovoked murder of young Murray, was extremely unpopular), and Balgarys openly defied the Presbytery.<sup>3</sup> But the ministers were strong in their numbers and in Elizabeth's support; and the Catholic nobles, this time with the full co-operation of the King, decided to send to Spain an ambassador of more importance than Charles Boyd or Robert

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth to James, May 1590 (Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> Pope Clement VIII. had recently sent James a present of 40,000 ducats by an envoy, promising him a regular subsidy of 10,000 ducats a month if he would protect the Catholics.

<sup>3</sup> The Church Sessions obtained a warrant for Balgarys' arrest and had excommunicated certain persons who had dined in his house. The Sessions were gathered for the purpose of appointing a person to execute the warrant, when Balgarys went with his followers to the place of meeting and made all the ministers present beg his pardon and dine with him, they giving for the purpose the meal prepared for themselves, "which is usually very splendid." They had also to promise never to molest any one again on his account. "He had gone thither for the purpose of killing them all, but contented himself with their submission at the request of his clansmen who accompanied him" (Report of a Scottish Catholic emissary to Spain late in 1592). Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

Bruce of Bemie.<sup>1</sup> The person chosen was George Ker, brother of Lord Newbottle, who carried many letters of recommendation from Catholic nobles, and, like Robert Bruce in 1586, three blank sheets signed and sealed by Huntly, Errol, and Angus respectively, which were to be filled up when he was safely out of reach of the Protestants. He was to ask for a body of 30,000 Spanish troops to be landed in Scotland, to join with 15,000 men provided by the Catholic nobles; the avowed purpose being the seizure of James and the establishment of the Catholic religion in Scotland and subsequently in England. Ker was caught,<sup>2</sup> thanks to the vigilance of the English agents, and though his blanks told but little, under threat of torture the messenger was more communicative, and the story was divulged. But not all of it was made public; for he carried with him a secret paper which, until our own day, has been hidden "to save his Majesty's honour." This extraordinary document is endorsed, "Copy of the Scotch King's instructions to Spain, which should have been sent by Powry Oge,<sup>3</sup> but

<sup>1</sup> Full details of the mission of Robert Bruce to Spain in 1586 will be found in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iii.

<sup>2</sup> He was actually apprehended by Andrew Knox, minister of Paisley, with a number of students of Glasgow University, at Cumray, a small island in the mouth of the Clyde, just as he was taking ship for Spain, on the 27th December 1592. The conspiracy, so called, of the "Spanish Blanks," has been vehemently denounced by many Scottish Catholics, and by the present Marquis of Huntly in his "Memorials of Aboyne," as a mystification got up by the Protestant party to discredit the Catholics. This contention will no longer hold water in view of the original document, transcribed by the present writer, in the Simancas Archives, and summarised in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 603, and others in vol. iii. of the same Calendar.

<sup>3</sup> This was Pury Ogilvie, to whose mission to Spain on behalf of James in 1596 I shall have to refer in a subsequent chapter.

thereafter were concredit to Mr. George Ker, and withdrawn at his taking *for the safety of his Majesty's honour.*" It is in the form of a balanced statement of both sides of the question, such as Lord Burghley was in the habit of making on all important subjects of discussion. "This enterprise is one of the greatest that ever was, since it is to conquer England, partly by foreign force, and partly by some amongst themselves. But since all great enterprises ought to be suddenly and resolutely prosecuted, this ought to be executed at furthest in harvest next."

This is the statement of the case to be decided, and the arguments for and against are set forth with the wordy pedantry so dear to James. After reciting the readiness of preparations in Scotland, and the danger of Elizabeth's learning the secret if the execution is delayed, fear is expressed that in the meantime also Philip "might dip with her for his own particular, which, if it so fell out, would disappoint the whole enterprise."<sup>1</sup> The result of James's deliberation was, nevertheless, finally against present haste. "Wherefore my opinion is that it die down, as I said before. In the meantime, I will deal with the Queen of England fair and pleasantly for my title to the crown of England after her decease, which thing, if she grant it, as it

<sup>1</sup> The approaching reconciliation of Henry IV. to the Catholic Church made a rapprochement between Elizabeth and Philip distinctly probable at the time, and the air was full of rumours to that effect. If the Cecil party had been able to have their way an agreement would probably have been made. This would once more have grouped the powers on the old lines of national rather than religious interest, and the union of England and Scotland under James would then have been extremely unlikely.

is not impossible, however unlikely, we have then attained our design without stroke of sword.”<sup>1</sup> This secret instruction gives us the key to James’s otherwise incomprehensible action in the matter. The Catholic nobles had only told him half the truth, or less, and instead of making use of them, he was their dupe. It was not to gain the crown of England for him, so much as the control of affairs by the Catholic faction, that they sought Spanish aid. When the communications finally reached Philip, little indeed was heard of James’s claim to the English crown, and much of the desire of the Catholic Earls to hold him prisoner as a tool of their party for the destruction of the Reformed doctrines in Scotland and England. The exposure of the plot by the capture of Ker and Fentry drove Huntly and his friends into open rebellion; but James, by his dour attitude towards the Protestants who had discovered the conspiracy, and his tenderness to the Catholic rebels, clearly demonstrated his annoyance at the frustration of his own crooked plans. Fentry, the least culpable of the conspirators, it is true, was executed; but the powerful Earls, who were far more guilty than their accomplice, as James knew, were allowed to return to their strongholds unpunished. What Elizabeth thought of the tergiversation of the King of Scots, she herself set forth in a vigorous autograph letter to him sent by the hand of her ambassador Bowes at the end of January 1593: “Wonders and marvelles do so assail my conceatz, that the long-expected answer to matters of such waight as my last letter needs not seame strange. Yet suche I see the eminent

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 215

danger and wel-ny ready approche of your state's ruin, your live's peril, and your neighbour's wrong, as I may not, to kepe you company, neglect what I should, though you forget that which you ought. I am sorry I am driven from warninge to heed, and from too much trust to seek a true way how your deeds, not your wordz, may make me assurance that you be no way guilty of your own decay and other danger. Receive therefore, in short, what course I mynd to hold. . . . Since you first breathed I regarded alwais to conserve hit (*i.e.* her regard for him) as my womb hit had bine you bare. Yea; I withstode the hands and helps of a mighty king to make you safe, even gained by the blood of many my deare subjects' lives. I made myself the bulwark betwixt you and harm, when many a wyle was invented to steale you from your land, and make other posses your soile. When your best strongholds were in my handes, did I keep them? Nay; I both conserved them and rendered them to you. Could I endure that foreigners had a footing in your kingdom? No; I never left till all the Frenche that kept their lives parted from your soile. . . . Let me remember you how well I was thanked or he rewarded that once brought all the letters of those wicked conspirators of the Spanish faction, even the selfe-same that still to your eminent peril you have conserved in their estates. Was I not so much doubted as hit was thought to be an Italian invention to make you holde me dearer, and contrived of malice not due by cause? . . . See what encouragement I received for many wakeful cares for your safety. . . . Now of late, by fortunate good hap, a

lewd fellowe hathe been apprehended with lettars and instructions. I pray God he be so wel handled as he may confess all his knowledge in the Spanish conspiracie, and that you use not this man as slightly as you don the ringleaders of this treason. I vowe if you do not rake it to the bottome you wyl verifie what many a wise man hathe (viewing your proceedings) judged of your guiltiness of your own wreck; with a whining that they wyl you no harme in enabling you with so rich a protector (*i.e.* as Spain) that wyl prove in the end a destroyer. I have beheld of late a strange dishonourable and dangerous pardon, which, if it be true, you have not only neglected yourself but wronged me. . . . I require, therefore, to all this a resolute answer, which I challenge of right;" and then the indignant Queen demands that sudden retribution shall fall upon the conspirators; and ends with a semi-apology for the justified heat of her "too long skribling."<sup>1</sup>

This letter was followed in a few weeks by the despatch of Lord Borough to James from Elizabeth to urge him to decisive action against the Catholic Lords, instead of the make-believe pursuit of them which the King was undertaking;<sup>2</sup> and simultaneously the Catholics sent a fresh envoy to inform Philip of all that had passed. Huntly and Bal-

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth to James (Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> James wrote to Elizabeth at this juncture (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 296) promising her emphatically "that they never shall have dwelling under him who are guilty of so foul a treason, but the Queen's helpful hand must be had thereto." He tells her, however, that she is quite as much interested as he in excluding the Spaniards from Scotland.

garys, they told him, had compelled the burgh of Aberdeen to deliver to them the person of the Papal envoy, and that "seeing how little they can hope for from their King," they had employed the Pope's subsidy to pay their clansmen in arms.<sup>1</sup>

The two rival organisations of spies, serving the interests respectively of the Cecils and Essex, kept Elizabeth well informed of all these approaches to Spain. Colonel Sir William Semple was known to be resident in the Spanish court, always ready to urge the case of the Scottish Catholics, and the coming and going of the Scottish messengers were fully reported. The violent book just published by Persons against Elizabeth's government and spread broadcast over Europe, and the strong position held by Spain on the Brittany coast, joined with the Scottish intrigue in exciting alarm in England; and this was still further exacerbated by the war party headed by Essex, who were for ever discovering or inventing fresh Spanish plots. The result of all this was a recrudescence of the severity against the recusant

<sup>1</sup> In the same report (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 590) there is a curious account of a "miraculous" victory by Huntly with 37 clansmen over Argyll with 1500 soldiers, 500 of the latter being killed, without the loss of a single man on the Catholic side. The victory is ascribed to the intervention of St. Laurence, Huntly having chosen that saint for his patron during the ensuing year (in accordance, it is asserted, with an old Scottish custom). Another miraculous story is told in the same report about the Earl of Morton, who was a Catholic, but had conformed to the Presbyterian Church. When he was about to sign the Articles an angel appeared to him and foretold disaster to him if he did so. The Earl was alarmed, and "again put on a gold crucifix and an Agnus Dei" that he used to wear round his neck. He allowed himself subsequently to be persuaded to sign the Articles; and shortly afterwards in an affray with the Johnstones met with the end the angel had predicted, his right hand being smitten off by Johnstone himself.



English Catholics. No distinction was made between those of the Jesuit party and the great mass of English Catholics, who were proud of the new potency of their country under the wise government of Elizabeth, and would now have been content, as a last resource, with toleration for their faith. Uniformity of doctrine and practice was made a test of loyalty, and both Catholics and Puritans equally felt the lash. The Cecil party had thus against them the extreme men on both sides, and resorted to rigid severity in order to hold the middle way.

In this excited condition of affairs in England it was necessary for a large sum of money to be spent to place the country into a state of defence. No Parliament had been held for four years, but the expenses of the wars in France and Holland, and her advances to Henry IV., had depleted Elizabeth's treasury, and a fervent appeal to the patriotism of the Commons had to be made in the spring of 1593. The Queen's speech was read by Lord Keeper Puckering. It sounds somewhat curious to modern ears, for the members were warned that it was "Her Majesty's pleasure that the time be not spent in devising and enacting new laws, the number of which are so great already as it rather burdeneth than easeth the subject; but the principal cause of this Parliament is that Her Majesty might consult with her subjects for the better withstanding those intended invasions which are greater than ever before heard of. And where heretofore it hath been used that many delighted themselves in long orations, full of verbosity and vain ostentation, more than in speaking things of substance, the time that is precious should

not be thus spent . . . and the good hours not be lost in idle speeches." "The Queen," he said, "was desirous of the advice of her loving people concerning the defence and preservation of herself, her realms and subjects, from the power and oppression of a foreign enemy. This enemy was the King of Spain, whose malice was increased by his loss and shame received in 1588. His resolution was still to invade this kingdom, as plainly did appear by his building and getting together many ships of less bulk and better fitted for service in our seas than those greater galleons and galliasses were in 1588. That he desired some nearer place from whence to invade England, and therefore at this time was labouring to plant himself in Brittany. He had also raised factions in Scotland and conspiracies against the King there, finding him an enemy to his ambitious designs;" and Puckering, for the Queen, then reproached the Commons with the difficulty of collecting the supplies voted in past Parliaments, and urged them to liberality and a reformed incidence, so that the wealthy classes should pay their full share.<sup>1</sup> The Speaker (Coke), when his turn came, fully fell in with the Queen's humour, and scoffed at "*Elephantinæ Leges.*" Wherefore, to make more laws might seem superfluous, and he might ask, "Quid causa ut crescent tot magna volumina legis?" and answer, "In promptu causa est crescit in orbe malum," and much more to the same courtly effect. But when, according to custom, he prayed the Queen to grant her faithful Commons free speech, freedom from arrest, and access to her

<sup>1</sup> Digges, "The Proceedings in the Last Four Parliaments of Elizabeth."

person, he got a very harsh and grudging answer; for Elizabeth still remembered and resented the talk about the succession, which had offended her in the last Parliament. The Queen's formal reply to the address of the Commons struck the same note of defiance to Spain. "I fear not all his threatenings," she said; "his great preparations and mighty forces do not stir me; for though he cometh against me with a greater power than ever was his Invincible Navy, I doubt not, God assisting me, but that I shall be able to defeat and overthrow him. I have great advantage over him; for my cause is just." She had heard, she continued, that certain English people resident on the coast had fled inland on the approach of the Armada, leaving their towns unprotected. "But I swear, by God, if I knew those persons, or any that shall do so hereafter, I will make them know and feel what it is to be so fearful in so urgent a cause." In the subsequent speeches in the House, the most was made of the Scottish intrigues with Spain; and Sir Robert Cecil especially magnified the danger whilst praising to the skies the King of Scots' attitude. "The King of Spain's malice," he said, "thus daily increaseth against us, and seeketh also to stir up sedition amongst us by his instruments. The number of Papists also daily increaseth, or, at leastwise, be more manifested." With only a dissenting voice from Francis Bacon, for which the Queen frowned upon him for many a day to come, a large subsidy was voted to cover four years' supply, and a ferocious new set of penal laws was enacted against recusants and Catholics. But directly a few of the

Puritan members dared to talk about the succession, they were incontinently clapped into prison, and the House was dissolved in a hurry.

Raleigh's speech on the Spanish plans is interesting, as confirming the information then being constantly sent to Philip by his spies in England, namely, that the great fear of the English was of the new form of Spanish galleys. It will be recollected that the galleys in the Armada had broken down and failed utterly. And it is now generally seen that the day for galley warfare in the open sea had gone by; but contemporaries had not yet fully mastered the fact. It was understood that mobility was the secret of success; and the new type of galley-zabra, which employed both sail and sweeps as needed, seemed to onlookers to provide this desideratum, together with a seaworthiness not possessed by the old galleys.<sup>1</sup> Raleigh, after setting forth the wide ramifications of Philip's activity, continued: "He (Philip) hath so corrupted the nobility in Scotland that he hath promised them forces to assist the Papists, that were ready to join with any foreign forces that would make them strong. . . . In his own country (Spain) there is all possible preparing; and he is coming with sixty galleys, besides other shipping, with purpose, if he goes forward and hath good success. We must then, if he invade us, have no ships riding at anchor, but all will be little enough to withstand him. At his coming he fully resolved to get Plymouth, or at

<sup>1</sup> Although built on galley lines, these vessels were mainly for sailing; but the possession of sweeps greatly added to their effectiveness in war. They ultimately developed into the frigate or cruiser.

least to possess some of the havens this summer within our land, and Plymouth is in most danger." And then Raleigh again advocated for the hundredth time the policy of Drake and the seamen to meet and defeat the enemy before he approached England. "Now the way to defeat him was this—to send a royal army and supplant him in Brittany, and to possess ourselves there; and to send a strong navy to sea, and to lie with it on the Cape, and at San Lucar, to which places come all his ships with riches from all places; and then we may set upon all that comes."

How far the alarm expressed by the members of the Government of a direct Spanish invasion of England was real, it is difficult at this time to say. It was the fixed policy of the Essex party to keep alive distrust and hatred of Spain in order to promote a decisive national war which should give final supremacy to the pronounced Protestant party. But at this juncture the Cecils and their friends were quite as alarmist as the Puritans. And yet Lord Burghley was perfectly well aware, from the reports of his spy, Chateau Martin, and others in Spain, that the naval preparations of Philip in the spring of 1593 could hardly be directed to an invasion of England.<sup>1</sup> There were at that time twenty-

<sup>1</sup> The pretext for the alarm was the numerous avowals of the priests and others captured of the preparations they had heard were being made in Spain for the invasion. Sir William Stanley, it appears, had been summoned to Spain to inspect the ships in Ferrol, of which he said there were thirty-six which were capable of beating the whole English navy. Stanley proclaimed everywhere that he was to command 10,000 troops for the expedition, and the landing was to take place in Lancashire or at Milford Haven; and he boasted much, and perfectly without warrant, of the co-operation of his great kinsman the Earl of Derby, hinting also that Arabella Stuart was to be pro-

eight ships in Lisbon, Seville, &c., destined to go out and meet the Indian flotilla, for the purpose of protecting it on the voyage home. There was also a small squadron, unequipped, at Ferrol, and some other ships scattered in the Biscay ports, intended for the conveyance of reinforcements to Brittany or the south of France. There was, therefore, no possibility of another Armada in that year; and the expressed alarm of the Cecil party in Parliament, and the subsequent action of the Government, may be partly explained by a recommendation of Chateau Martin to Lord Burghley in April 1593. Writing from Bordeaux, he says that the best way to embarrass the King of Spain's action, "et lui rendriez pour cette année ses forces inutiles, qui serait un grand remède pour les affaires d'ici" (*i.e.* France), will be to spread a rumour that Sir Francis Drake is going to attack Portugal, and the spy offers to use the "artifices" necessary for setting such a rumour afloat. "Mais il est besoin de faire quelque demonstration d'y vouloir employer le dit Sieur Drac, parce'que d'un bruit seulement qui a couru en Espagne que sa Majestie (*i.e.* Elizabeth) l'employait, et qu'elle lui avait déjà délivré ses commissions, l'Espagne en a été quelques jours en tres grande alarme; dont il se peut juger ce que serait lorsque l'on y verrait quelque apparence."<sup>1</sup>

claimed Queen. The attempt, he announced, was to be made in the spring of 1593, "before which they hoped to get Brest." No doubt this vapouring on the part of Stanley was for the purpose of frightening the English Government, and of forcing Philip on the course desired by the English zealots. This view is confirmed in "The State of the English Fugitives." (See also Reports of Spies in 1592 in State Papers, Domestic, and Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 307.

The fact is evident to us now that Philip was in far more alarm of the possible attacks of English ships upon his treasure fleet, upon his Brittany garrisons, or upon his coasts and colonies, than the English had reason to be of him, so far as a direct invasion was concerned. Don Pedro Valdés, who was just ransomed from captivity in England (March 1593), wrote very apprehensively of the preparations in the English ports, and hazarded many guesses at the possible destination of the English ships.<sup>1</sup> Philip had his hands more than full in France. He was old, ill, and weary; and he had probably already decided in his own slow mind that his strength was insufficient, as it obviously was now, to repeat the supreme effort of the Armada and to attempt a direct invasion of England; though, as usual, he kept his own counsel on the matter.

It is likely that, so far as the Cecils were concerned at least, the scare in the English Parliament and public was deliberately exaggerated, in order that the supplies necessary for the continuance of the English aid to Henry IV. against the Spaniards in the north of France, and for counteracting the Catholic intrigues in Scotland, might be more libe-

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 596. Almost every letter at this period, also from the Venetian ambassador in Madrid to the Doge (Venetian Calendar), speaks of the fear inspired and the depredations committed by the large number of English privateers on the Spanish and Portuguese coasts; and constant references are made as to the intention of the Spanish armaments being defensive. On the 4th April 1593 he writes: "Although no regular fleet has sailed from England, yet there are about fifty English ships in these waters. They are doing most serious damage every day, as the larger part of the Spanish ships are built by private individuals on the security of about six per cent. on all the goods brought by the Indian fleet."

rally forthcoming. In any case, notwithstanding the exciting speeches in Parliament, little was done in the matter of naval armament beyond the adoption of Chateau Martin's recommendation of spreading rumours of Drake's new commission for sea; and Philip was even allowed to send large reinforcements to Brittany in the winter of 1593 without molestation from the English. This last event, however, reawakened the fears of the latter, and in the following spring a successful attack was made upon the threatening position of the Spaniards in Brest harbour and other Breton fortresses in Spanish hands.

Chateau Martin, who was usually well informed, pointed out in April–May 1593 to Lord Burghley that Spanish intrigues in Scotland were still afoot. “*Ils esperent fort en Espagne une révolte en Écosse. . . . Le roi d'Espagne a bonne envie d'y former un parti à sa dévotion, et d'y aider avec les forces qu'il pourra, s'il y voit tant peu soit-il de fondement.*”<sup>1</sup> Whilst this was being written, a more serious embassy than any that had preceded it was being sent from the Scottish Catholic Lords to Philip. The active intervention of the Jesuit priests in the Scottish Catholic conspiracy of 1581–82 had not been a success, and in the changed aspect of affairs since the failure of the Armada, the Company—as has been explained—continued to oppose any scheme for the settlement of English affairs which should lead to a compromise, or to the doubtful conversion of James Stuart. Either the Scottish Catholic nobles had now grown reckless, and knowing the price to

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.



be paid for Spanish help to their cause, were prepared to pay it, or else they had satisfied themselves finally that Catholicism could never depend upon James, and they were determined to sacrifice him. In any case, their new departure was significant, as it brought them in line with the position to which the Jesuits had led Mary Stuart before her death, namely, to complete dependence upon Spain.

One of the most able and energetic of Father Persons' recruits to his famous English College of St. Alban at Valladolid was John Cecil, a Master of Arts of Oxford, who in 1589 had been sent from Rome, apparently in consequence of the continued squabbles in the English Catholic College there. He had been despatched to England in the spring of 1591, and had thence proceeded to Scotland, where he gained the confidence of Huntly, and, disguised as a soldier, was now entrusted with an important verbal embassy to Spain.<sup>1</sup> The Catholic Lords had

<sup>1</sup> The particulars of this extraordinary man's life up to this period may be gathered from his own letters, under the name of Snowden, at Hatfield, and from the intercepted or stolen letters from Father Persons, respectively to Dr. Barrett and to Cecil himself, also at Hatfield. Although he had been ordained some time before in Rome, and was of mature age, he with others were sent for a year's probation to Valladolid, to prepare, under the direction of Persons, for the English Mission. Persons was very anxious to promote the prosperity of his College, and strove thus to attract zealous men to it, in order that its fame might be spread; and he gives to Dr. Barrett a glowing account of these missionaries when they were on the point of leaving for England (*Hatfield Papers*, vol. v. p. 69). Fathers Younger, Blunt, Dudley, Lockwood, Rooke, Salloway, Walford, and Almond were sent to England from various Spanish ports (1591), Cecil and Fixer, to whom a special political mission was given, being despatched from Lisbon. This mission was no other than to sound Lord Derby and his son as to their willingness to accept the Pretendership to the English crown. Father Persons' instructions to them whilst they were still at Lisbon are now at Hatfield, having been doubtless handed

been detected on each occasion that they had sent either written communications or blanks to Spain. Robert Bruce, too, had played them false and betrayed their secrets, and on this occasion, at Whitsuntide 1593, "the disguised one," as they called Cecil, carried his intelligence in his head instead of in his wallet; bearing only a pre-arranged token of confidence to his old rector at Valladolid, Robert Persons, who, it was known in Scotland, was Philip's principal guide in the affairs of England. Ruffling in doublet and trunks, with a great Flemish rapier on his thigh, "a strange garb for his profession," as he says, Cecil came to Valladolid in July 1593, and, having told his story to Persons, was instructed to draw up a statement of his mission in writing for submission to the King. The document is an instructive one, because, amongst other things, it explains why Father Persons had suddenly<sup>1</sup> been

to Lord Burghley on their arrival, as both Cecil (under the name of Snowden) and Fixer offered their services to him as spies at once. Cecil appears to have gone to Lancashire and thence to Scotland, but does not seem to have had any information to give to his namesakes at that time, for the honourable reasons given in his Snowden letters to Cecil, though he bore a token from them which proved that he was secretly in their interests (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.). There is also a most unflattering contemporary account of Cecil in Cardinal Vaughan's Archives at Westminster (vol. viii. p. 71). He was subsequently one of the most active appellants against the Archpriest's authority in England, to which controversy a further reference will be made on a subsequent page. Although he had entered the Jesuit College at Valladolid, it is evident that Cecil continued to share the repugnance of most of the English scholars in Rome to the Jesuit teachings and methods.

<sup>1</sup> According to Dingley's confession (State Papers, Domestic, August 1592), Sir William Stanley had been told by Persons, when he was in Spain in the previous year, that "the King had *at last* yielded to his (Persons') advice to attempt first against England." This refers to the proposed descent on the Lancashire coast, which, as I have already pointed out, could never have been seriously entered upon in 1592,

brought to smile on the Scottish project. Cecil gives a long account of events in Scotland following on the abortive mission of Ker, and states, for the guidance of the Spanish King, how all the nobles and country stand affected to the cause, both in the Highlands and the Lowlands. There is much abuse of the ministers and other Protestants, who are said to be unpopular and in a minority, and Philip is assured that "the nobles and people are sick of this tyranny and are yearning for a remedy, and they look to his Majesty (*i.e.* Philip) for his help to restore the Catholic faith." James is represented — truly enough — as weak, mean, and untrustworthy, possessing "no religion or fixed purpose;" and it is evident all through that this plot, at all events, was being conducted over the Scottish King's head. The demands of the Catholics was that 3000 foot-soldiers should be sent from Spain or Brittany, arms for as many more, and stores for two months. They were assured a safe harbour and a welcome in Lochryan; and a sum of 100,000 ducats was requested for the payment of the Scottish clansmen. The plan was at once to seize the King and capture Edinburgh and Glasgow, "which they think will be very easy." "They

especially as Lord Derby was not even sounded as to his co-operation — without which a descent upon his country would have been folly — until late in 1593. The fate of the unhappy Richard Hesketh, when he did broach the subject to the Earl, conclusively proved to all concerned that Sir William Stanley had made too free with his great kinsman's name. Whatever Persons may have thought, everything tends to show that Philip had by this time lost hope of conquering England by an attack on the coast, though he would naturally endeavour to secure a diversion by a feint attack by sea, and by arousing the English Catholics to co-operate with his attack from Scotland.

would then reduce the rest of Scotland, and expel or capture the principal heretics, and fortify the castles, which are all now utterly unprovided. After this they would make ready to resist the forces of England." They recommended, too, that the traitor Sir William Stanley should be sent with his regiment of Irish and English Catholics from Flanders, and a diversion is also suggested by a simultaneous descent of the rebel Earl of Westmorland and Lord Dacre on the east coast of Scotland at Lord Seton's port near Leith. All this had been offered to Philip before, and had met with no ready response. But there was this difference on this occasion, that instead of suggesting, as before, that James might be *forced or persuaded to become a Catholic*, Father Cecil says: "Finally, these gentlemen are sure that, with his Majesty's help, they will capture the King at once, *and will deal with him as his Majesty orders.*"<sup>1</sup>

Persons sent "the disguised one" with his statement to see Idiaquez, the King's secretary. "He is a good man," he tells him, "who has suffered for the cause, and full credit may be given to him." "With regard to the special business about which he comes," the writer reminds Idiaquez, "I have frequently said that Scottish and English affairs might advantageously be taken in hand jointly. *The difficulties which have previously presented themselves to this will be solved by the message of this priest.*" And then Father Persons grows quite enthusiastic about the "plan," which, he says, will trouble Elizabeth more than anything else in the

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

world. We shall not be wronging the memory of Father Persons by suggesting that his sudden liking for the Scottish Catholics' plan<sup>1</sup> arose from the fact that their amended programme was intended to shut the door for ever to the Scottish domination of England, and to the doubtful "conversion" of James Stuart. Father Cecil saw Idiaquez at night in Madrid, and pressed him to move Philip to send the expedition in the ensuing winter; but no rapid

<sup>1</sup> Persons had been ceaseless in his efforts to frustrate any plan emanating from the Scottish Catholic party, or intended to get English affairs out of the hands of the Jesuits. The Carthusians had been specially active in seeking a *modus vivendi* for English Catholics, and had gained the powerful support of the Duke of Savoy and his wife, the Infanta Catharine, Philip's second daughter. They sent the Carthusian prior, Dr. Arnold, to Madrid in 1589 to enlist Philip in a proposal to work in Scotland through Chisholm, the Carthusian Bishop of Dunblane, and his nephew, the Bishop of Vaison. They professed to be able to bring James to the side of Spain, by force if necessary, and to kill the Chancellor, Maitland. The Bishop of Cassano (Owen Lewis), and the other non-Jesuit English and Scottish priests in Italy and France, were at the bottom of the intrigue, which included the obtaining of a cardinal's hat for Lewis and the sending of Savoy and his wife to Flanders instead of Parma, giving them the management of the English plans. This would have checkmated the Jesuits entirely, and it is not surprising that Persons promptly upset the plan by persuading Philip that the only person who would benefit would be James. At a somewhat later date a more promising plan with a similar object was nearly successful, as it had the active approval of Allen, and most of the English malcontents in Flanders. The proposal on this occasion was to replace Parma in the government of Flanders by the extreme Catholic Duchess of Feria, an Englishwoman, who would direct the English Mission from Brussels. Persons frustrated this plan also, violently denouncing it as a plot devised by Thomas Morgan and the English Government, which it certainly was not. As a result, Morgan was imprisoned in Brussels as a spy, and was not released until after Parma's death. The priest Dingley, in his confession when captured in England (1592), said, "Persons is really the only man to be feared by England, for he travailleth the King so constantly. If Persons were removed there would be no more trouble." (See Spanish Calendar. vol. iv., and State Papers, Domestic, 1592.)

decision could be obtained from the slow-moving old recluse, whose "leaden foot" allowed every opportunity to fleet past him uncaught; and Father Cecil, pray as he might, was not sent back until the winter.

Persons, who knew the King's mode of proceeding, suggested from the first that, if more information was needed, a confidential person speaking English should be sent back with Cecil to Scotland, to report on his return the true condition of affairs. Persons suggested William Bodendam, a member of a well-known Catholic English family settled in Seville; but his suggestion for some reason was not adopted. There happened, however, to be in Madrid at the time one William Randall, a native of Weymouth, who had long been settled in Philip's town of Dunkirk, there busying himself mainly in the conveyance of priests and Catholics backwards and forwards from England to the Continent. He was a skilful old pilot, who knew every creek on the south and east coasts of England; and when the English and Huguenot ships were together in Dieppe harbour in 1591, at the time that Henry IV. and Essex were besieging Rouen, Randall was the main worker in the plot to burn the combined fleets by "poisoned fireballs," the compounding of which he had learnt from "a lame old villain" at Dunkirk. His services had been enlisted in this plot by the little group of extreme English exiles in Flanders who favoured the policy of personal violence, namely, the Jesuits Holt and Archer, Sir W. Stauley, Captain Jaques, and their accomplices, and it is probable that Randall's visit to Madrid in the summer of 1593

was for the purpose of forwarding in some way the views of this section. At all events, it was he who was deputed to accompany Father Cecil and a Spanish officer named Porres to the west of Scotland, in order to report respectively on the harbour accommodation offered to Philip, and the military resources of the Catholic nobles, to whom assurances of Spanish aid were sent by Cecil and Porres on condition of their keeping in arms against the Protestants. The envoys sailed from Spain in a Breton barque, and appear to have been accompanied by three missionaries from the College at Valladolid. The barque was beset by tempests in the Channel, and forced to take refuge in Plymouth Harbour, in January 1594. This was indeed running into the lion's mouth, for Sir Francis Drake himself was in command of the town, and he had a short way with Spanish emissaries who fell into his hands. What became of the missionaries we know not; probably, like others of their kind by scores, they languished and died in prison; but Father Cecil, who travelled as a Scotsman, was able to satisfy Drake and his colleagues that he was known and trusted by his powerful namesake in London, and both he and Randall were separated from their companions, and kept in private custody until orders came from London. Cecil was then allowed quietly to go on his way, with the Spanish officer as his servant, whilst William Randall, who was kept in ignorance still of Cecil's real character, was sent to the Gatehouse prison, hard by the Abbey of Westminster, there by slow degrees to have his black secrets wrung out of him by the rack and

the ingenuity of the amiable Topcliffe, and so disappears from the scene.

It will be noticed that every step in each conspiracy was perfectly known to the English Government as it was taken; and Father Cecil, with the Spaniard Porres, met the Scottish nobles with the full connivance of Elizabeth's Ministers, who had been informed weeks before that Huntly, Errol, and Angus had made their peace with James, and had promised him to submit to the Kirk.<sup>1</sup> Thus, at this juncture, Elizabeth was far better informed than James, and she kept in her hands the thread of the intrigue, of the true object of which he was in ignorance. The scathing letter she sent to him by the hand of Lord Zouche, in reply to James's intimation that he had become reconciled to the Earls,<sup>2</sup> therefore assumes for us a deeper meaning than it had before. "To see so much," she begins, "I rue my sight, that views the spectacle of a seduced king, an abusing council, and a wry-guided kingdom. I doubt whether shame or sorrow had the upper hand when I read your last lines to me. . . . There is no prince alive, but if he show fear or yielding, shall have tutors enough, though he be out of minority. And when I remember what sore punishment those lewd traitors should have, then I read again, lest at first I mistook your mind. But when the reviewing granted my lecture true, Lord! what wonder grew in me that you should correct them with benefits who deserve much severer correction. Could you please them more than save their lives and make them shun the place they

<sup>1</sup> James's letter to Elizabeth, December 7, 1593 (Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> Printed *in extenso* in Tytler's "History of Scotland."



hate (*i.e.* the Court) . . . and yet as much enjoy their honours and livelihood as if for sporting travel they were licensed to visit other countries? Call you this banishment!—to be rid of those whom we fear and let them go to those they love? Now when my eyes read more, then smiled I to see how childish, foolish, and witless an excuse the best of either three made you! with their *items!* of expenses, lacking but one billet, which they best deserved, an *item* for so much for the cord whose office they best merited. . . . I never heard a more deriding scorn; and I vow that if but this alone, were I you, they should learn a short lesson. For your own sake play the king, and let your subjects see you respect yourself, neither to hide or to suffer danger or dishonour.” But in her letter Elizabeth said nothing to indicate her knowledge that, even as she wrote, the Scottish Catholic Earls were pledging themselves to Cecil and Porres to take up arms again, and hand the two realms over to the Spaniards; for what she wanted to learn was whether James the Shifty had managed again to introduce his own finger into the pasty. It behoved her to watch him carefully, for a powerful Scottish-Spanish force crossing her northern border, where Catholicism was strongest, might well mean the destruction of her glorious life-work and of Protestant England. What she with all her keenness failed to see, because she could not follow Philip’s mind as we can who have his secret papers before us, was that the moment James himself joined in the Catholic plans, all danger to England from Spain over the Scottish Border disappeared.

## CHAPTER III

Appeal to Spain of the Irish Catholics—Meeting of the Chiefs in Donegal—The Archbishop of Tuam's mission to Spain—James sends another envoy to Spain—The battle of Glenlivet—Walter Lindsay in Madrid—Suppression of the Catholic Lords in Scotland—Their renewed appeal to Philip—Its failure, and the reason for it.

WHILST the intrigue described in the last chapter was in progress, with the intention of bringing Catholicism and the Spanish subjection of England across the Scottish Border, a far more promising plan was ripening elsewhere. The constant efforts of the whole of the Catholic elements in Europe, except the Spanish Jesuitical party, to discover a solution of the difficulty by the conversion of James Stuart; and the insincere coquetting of the King of Scots with both sides, had made Philip, with the Jesuit Persons at his ear, distrustful and reluctant to accept any plan for the English subjection which depended upon Scottish pledges. We have seen that his doubts were only partly overcome when the King of Scots himself was entirely excluded from the conspiracy; and we shall have occasion to remark that Philip again cooled towards the Scottish plans as soon as James had once more wormed himself into the heart of the Catholic intrigue.

But no such misgivings assailed Philip the Prudent's mind with regard to Ireland. There

there was no king finessing to obtain the reversion of the English crown, no large native Protestant element to dispute for the Government if once the English garrisons were overcome. The English were practically supreme only within their Pale and in the walled cities; and the introduction of the English, as opposed to the native Irish, rule of succession had caused the existence of at least two claimants to nearly every great estate and chieftainship. This, whilst it gave rise to perpetual weakening tribal warfare, and secured to the English the adherence of at least some members of each of the princely families, with their sub-lords and following, who were glad to have their lands confirmed to them by the English crown, provided also a rallying point to native discontent to those who claimed and held their lands by old traditional tenures which every Irish kern understood. The hand of the old Irish chieftain had been sorely hard upon his tenants and under-lords, but at least he stood in the newer order of things under Elizabeth, for Irish feeling and tradition, and for the Irish Catholic faith, against foreign governors, whose rule might and did mean greater material prosperity, security, and independence for each individual, but who, after all, were not Irishmen and not Catholics.

The Munster rising in 1579-80 had clustered around such a feeling as this when it was voiced by James Fitzmaurice-Fitzgerald. At that time Philip had not decided upon open war with Elizabeth, and the aid he sent to the rebels was timid and tardy, intended to embarrass Elizabeth, not to

dominate Ireland. The intervention of foreigners on that occasion was Papal rather than Spanish, and it was mainly the Nuncio's prayers and Dr. Sanders' religious enthusiasm that drew Philip into the matter at all.<sup>1</sup> In any case, the whole Papal force was slaughtered, and the last Desmond rebellion was suffocated in blood. The boy-son of the unhappy Earl, who had been dragged into the rising against his own interests, was being bred up a prisoner in the Tower of London, and the Catholic kin of James Fitzmaurice were living on the bounty of Philip in Lisbon, whilst the broad domain of the Geraldines was forfeit to the crown of England.

Thus matters in Ireland remained until 1592. The English-bred Earl of Tyrone had held his chieftainship of Ulster under the Queen for some years, quarrelling occasionally with his neighbours and vassals—sometimes even bickering with the Viceroy—but holding the north fairly peaceful without much interference.<sup>2</sup> But in 1592 relations were becoming strained. Tyrone had become too masterful to remain either a good neighbour or a good vassal, and constant complaints were heard against him. His young son-in-law, Hugh Roe O'Donnell, heir of the great chief of Tyrconnel, was a prisoner in Dublin Castle for his turbulence, and Tyrone made suit almost fiercely for his liberation, but without

<sup>1</sup> For proof of this see original letters in British Museum, MSS. Add. 28,420, and Spanish Calendar, vols. ii. and iii.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that Tyrone had no right to the chieftainship other than the Queen's grant. Tirlough Lenogh O'Neil was the chieftain under the Irish rule, and was recognised as such. The son of Shan O'Neil, who had a better title to succeed to the chieftainship than Tyrone after the death of Tirlough, was killed by Tyrone.

effect. In the summer of 1592 O'Donnell succeeded in escaping from prison and hurried down to his country of Donegal, where he took upon himself the chieftainship, notwithstanding the fact that his father was still alive. Leading his clansmen against the English force that occupied his lands, he drove them out with considerable loss, and then stood upon the defensive. In vain the Viceroy threatened and remonstrated; in vain the Queen herself wrote to Tyrone warning him that he must keep his warlike son-in-law in order or punishment would fall upon them both. O'Donnell the Red stood his ground and defied the Government. Tyrone knew the English better than O'Donnell did, and was less hot-headed. He was not ready yet to brave the whole force that England could send, and began cautiously to cast about for allies whilst professing lip-service to the Queen. Macguire of Fermanagh, who claimed his lands by the Irish law, had defied the Viceroy to displace him. MacMahon of Monaghan was in similar case. Brian O'Rourke of Connaught—he of the Battleaxes—Oxford scholar though he was, was discontented because Elizabeth refused to confirm him as successor to his father—that fine old chieftain, Brian of the Ramparts, whom James of Scotland had dishonourably surrendered to Elizabeth only a year or two before, to be hanged and ripped on Tyburn tree. So, as will be seen, there was plenty of discontent upon which to work in the north of Ireland. During the depth of the winter of 1592, when the English troops were snug in their cantonments, the chiefs of the north and west met in

conference with seven Irish Catholic bishops, upon one of whom, M'Gavran, Archbishop of Armagh, the Pope had just conferred the Primacy of the Irish Church. There, in the wilds of misty Donegal, for three days much eloquence and fervour were expended, and vague hopes were counted upon as certainties. We know thus much, though no report exists of the meeting, because a spy of Bingham brought him the news,<sup>1</sup> and we can see now, as Bingham could not, how much was true and how much was otherwise. "They have made some great dispatch of certain letters which shall be sent out of hand by Bishop O'Healy (of Tuam) to the Pope and the King of Spain." This much was true, but the new Primate must have drawn strongly upon his imagination if he vouched for the further information attributed to him, namely, that he had accompanied the King of Spain into France<sup>2</sup> with

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Irish, January 1593. Sir G. Bingham to Sir R. Bingham.

<sup>2</sup> Archbishop M'Gavran had recently come from Rome by way of Spain; he was accompanied by another Irish bishop, Cornelius O'Neil of Killaloe, who remained at Lisbon. Whilst the Archbishop was staying in Madrid (June 1591) the suggestion of an expedition from Ferrol against England, to which reference has already been made on page 37, appears to have been under discussion. The Irish regiment under Sir William Stanley was to have had a large share in the business, and the Archbishop appears to have thought that the liberation of Ireland was one of its objects. Writing to Captain Eustace in Flanders from Madrid in June 1591 he says, "I hope in God it will not be long ere we be discharged and delivered from the cruelty of those people (*i.e.* the Saxons). And although the clergy upon further consideration have let (*i.e.* hindered) the Catholic King about these businesses, I doubt not but the people and soldiers that were disposed to succour that poor island, so long time in thralldom, will be ready ere long." He speaks of Philip and his officers as being slow, and says that a Spaniard is to have supreme command of the expedition (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.). In previous pages I have shown how unlikely it was

his daughter, the Infanta, who was to be married to the Duke of Guise. Also "that the King of Spain had determined to send two armies next summer, the one to England, the other to Ireland. The army for Ireland should come by Scotland and land in the north (of Ireland); but their (*i.e.* the Spaniards) only want was to have some great man to be, as it were, their leader or general, and they have now thought that Hugh Roe O'Donnell would be the fittest man." Alas! for Irish hopes. Philip II. was not in the habit of making up his mind thus rapidly. His thirst for information and for pledges binding others before he bound himself meant many weary voyages backwards and forwards for years to come, and Irish hopes, sanguine as ever, were doomed to many disappointments before armies and fleets were possible. It was, moreover, as we have seen, by no means easy for Philip, overburdened with debt and demands as he was, to muster and provision large forces in a poverty-stricken country like Spain, almost without roads and cursed with such a cumbrous administration as his. If the alarmist reports of Irish spies were to be believed, the whole matter was settled, and a powerful invasion of England by Spain was already being prepared on the first cry for help from the Ulster chiefs. This, as we know now, was far from being the case, and we must turn to the State Papers at Simancas to see what really happened.

Archbishop O'Healy does not appear to have

that the preparations in Ferrol in 1592 were ever seriously intended by Philip for an attack in force upon England, although it was his policy to keep the English in alarm by pretending that it was, and the vapouring of Stanley and the Irishmen in Flanders was doubtless encouraged, to give additional strength to the rumour.

sailed from Ireland until the beginning of April, and probably went first to Rome, as he did not arrive in Madrid before August 1593.<sup>1</sup> The note of his mission is struck by a letter he carried from O'Donnell to the exiled Geraldines, Viscount Baltinglas, and other Irish Catholics in Lisbon.<sup>2</sup> The letter was forwarded to the exiles on the arrival of the Archbishop in Madrid, and runs thus:—  
 “Donegal, 8th April 1593.—You will have heard, my dear friends, how I have contrived to escape the jail and fetters in which I lay; and how, after great travail and difficulty, I came to my own lands, where I found an English personage, a minister of the Queen, with many soldiers, whom, by the divine grace, I have killed and cast out of my land in a very short time, and the English have returned no more; not for want of will to destroy me and do all the harm they can. But I, and the others who joined with me, although we are doing the best we can to defend ourselves, can hardly hold out against the great power of England, unless we get help

<sup>1</sup> It is curious, as showing the duplicity of Tyrone, and the equally sanguine and unfounded hopes of prompt Spanish aid being sent, that the earl, writing to the Lord-Deputy of Ireland in May 1593 (two months before the Archbishop of Tuam even arrived in Madrid), informs him, as one of the reasons for not meeting the Lord-Deputy as requested, that “The traitorous bishops have assured upon letters which some have lately received, that the Spaniards will be here by the 20th July at farthest, and so they give out, with every show of joy” (Irish State Papers, May 1593).

<sup>2</sup> Standin, an English Catholic in the Spanish service, who became a spy-agent for Essex, wrote that a week before he left Madrid in April 1593, Baltinglas and John of Desmond, with eight Irish followers, had arrived there from Lisbon, presumably to urge Philip to intervene in Ireland. A man from Ireland was known to have been closeted with the King a few weeks before, and it was suggested, though questioned, that he had offered to betray to the Spaniards the town of Galway (Birch).



from his Catholic Majesty. With the common consent of them all, therefore, we have thought well to send the Archbishop of Tuam (much as we need him here) to treat with his Majesty of this, and to carry to you, gentlemen, who are there, our letters, begging you all to come and help us to fight God's battle, and win back our lands. It is meet that we should understand each other well, and help one another in this matter. I myself will do my part to the death, with the help of the succour I hope from his Majesty, and with your presence and help. God be with ye; and, pray, hurry the Archbishop back with an answer. From Donegal, this 8th April 1593.—Ardh. O'Donnail.”<sup>1</sup> This letter reached Lisbon on the 3rd September, and on the following day the courier was speeding back again to Madrid with fervent letters from Sir Maurice Fitzgerald<sup>2</sup> and the Bishop of Killaloe to the King of Spain, beseeching him to send aid to the Catholics of Ireland. That of the Irish exiled gentleman is worth transcribing. “Maurice Geraldine, heir of the Earl of Desmond, and the other Irish gentlemen in your Majesty's service here, have received letters by the Archbishop of Tuam, who is now in your Majesty's court, from the most powerful Catholics in Ireland, saying that they are concerting a war against the Queen of England, and they beg us to supplicate your Majesty to send them succour with the utmost possible speed. We know that these gentlemen are Catholics, and are at the present time the most powerful people in Ireland;

<sup>1</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Maurice Fitzgerald and Sir Thomas Fitzgerald had been salaried officers, unattached, on the Armada.

and seeing that they voluntarily risk their lives to serve God and your Majesty, we have decided to beseech your Majesty, for the love of God, and with the utmost earnestness of which we are capable, to favour us all by looking down upon their need and sending them such aid as may be considered advisable. We also beg to be allowed to go with it, to defend and support the enterprise; and we trust, with the divine favour, that your Majesty will be victorious, *and conquer for yourself the realm of Ireland, and then by this means enter into England.* It would be a great pity for these gentlemen to be lost for lack of succour, as the Earl of Desmond was when he rose like these. We trust in God that your Majesty will consider well the advantage that will ensue to Christendom from this business. The conjuncture is favourable, the cause is just, and all are disposed to do good service. If promptness be displayed, the Queen must withdraw the contingents she keeps in Flanders and France, and there will be fewer Englishmen on the coasts of Spain. We humbly beg your Majesty to favour the enterprise. We ourselves are ready to do anything.—Lisbon, 4th September. Don Maurice Geraldine.” Before this, and a similar letter from the Bishop of Killaloe,<sup>1</sup> who was also in Lisbon, arrived in Madrid, the Archbishop had gone through the usual process of sifting from the King’s secretary, Don Juan de Idiaquez, in order that the latter might discover, for his master’s guidance, how much “foundation,” as he was wont to call it, there

<sup>1</sup> This bishop, Cornelius O’Neil, had saved and forwarded to Scotland many of the men wrecked from the Armada on the Irish coast.

was in the Irish revolt. It must be noted that not a word is said throughout the Archbishop's documents about Tyrone. He was working still in the background ; and in the statement finally handed by the Archbishop to Philip II. the revolted nobles are named as O'Donnell, Macguire, and Brian O'Rourke.

The Archbishop in his conference with the King ascribed to himself the principal merit of the rising. "For years past," he said, "he had used great efforts both publicly and privately to unite the Catholics of Ireland, with the object of their taking up arms for the faith, and in your Majesty's service, against the English heretics. His enterprise has succeeded, and the most powerful chiefs of the north of Ireland have now agreed, and have risen against the Queen, with the tacit consent of many other Catholics, who would like to do the same." He then prayed that prompt Spanish aid should be sent. "The gentlemen who had risen," he assured the King, "have in their territories good harbours and troops at their command, and any help sent to them would render the Queen of England powerless for harm. O'Donnell, he told Philip, had sixty Irish miles of land on the sea-coast, with splendid harbours capable of sheltering the greatest navies afloat. He could raise 3000 men of his own vassals, and his kinsmen in Scotland would help him with more. Macguire had forty miles of land, and could raise 2000 of his kerns, whilst Bernard (*i.e.* Brian) O'Rourke, "whose father on his way to Scotland for help was unfortunately captured by the English and decapitated,"<sup>1</sup> could "raise 1000 men, and no

<sup>1</sup> It was decidedly cool of young Brian of the Battleaxes to make

more, because the English after killing his father had devastated his lands. 'The lands of the three chiefs together can furnish 600 horse.' But the Archbishop seems to have attached most importance to the raising of Munster by the two exiled Geraldines, Maurice and Thomas, in Philip's pay, and a similar call to arms of Leinster on the part of Viscount Baltinglas and Sir Charles O'Connor, who were also pensioned exiles in Spain; "and this would be easy with but few men, as the country is easily defensible, and particularly one valley, which a few soldiers could hold against the world." The Burkes of Connaught, too, the sanguine Archbishop thought, would supply 1000 men to the combined forces: "and finally, nearly all Irishmen are against the English, and wish to get rid of such evil neighbours." The armed contingent requested was from 5000 to 10,000 soldiers, as many as possible; and the chiefs promised to welcome them with at least 6000 Irish foot and 600 horse.

When the Archbishop left the King's chamber from the conference this is what Philip scrawled, in that appalling hand of his, on a note attached to the Irish letters and statements. The note was to the secretary Idiaquez—"Here are the letters and notes that the Irish Archbishop has just given me. And if what they say is true it would be a great pity not to help them. What they demand in one of the letters is very much, and would be so if it were less than it is. You (Idiaquez) talk to this a subject for grievance. He wrote to the Privy Council (April 3, 1592) only a year before saying that his father had been fittingly punished for his fractiousness. Brian's real grievance, like that of Macguire, was that Elizabeth hesitated to confirm his chieftainship.

him and get to the bottom of it all,<sup>1</sup> and then we will see what is the very smallest aid that will be needed. If it be so small that we can give it, it will be well to help them. Let Don Cristobal (*i.e.* De Moura, the other secretary) know what you do in the matter." It is evident from this hesitating note that the great armies and fleets which Philip was to send to Ireland and Scotland at this time (September 1593) were conjured up mainly by the hopes of conspirators who knew little of the Spanish King's methods, or by the eagerness of spies to justify the expenses they incurred. Whoever else may have been deceived, the Cecils and Queen Elizabeth certainly were not. Father Cecil was in Madrid at the same time as the Archbishop of Tuam, and we may be perfectly sure that he knew and conveyed to England pretty accurately the particulars of the Irish demands and the reception of them by Philip.<sup>2</sup> The efficient French spy Chateau Martin in Bayonne, moreover, continued to send to Lord Burghley correct accounts of Spanish arma-

<sup>1</sup> One of the results of the conference between Idiaquez and the Archbishop is seen in a note from the former to the King (Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.) saying that "The Irish Archbishop says that it will be of great importance for the success of the confederacy of Irish Catholics that your Majesty should write very affectionately to the Earl of Tyrone, whose name is O'Neil, to induce him to enter openly into the confederacy. He already belongs to it secretly, and he should be assured that your Majesty's aid shall not fail them. The Archbishop consequently begs your Majesty to order a letter to be written to the Earl to that effect." This admission would be quite sufficient to cause Philip to delay action until Tyrone's open adhesion was gained.

<sup>2</sup> As early as the 18th September, an Irish merchant, J. Byrne, of Drogheda, who had just returned from Spain, reported to Bingham that "O'Healy, a priest or bishop, had arrived in Spain to solicit forces to maintain Macguire in his rebellion."

ments and their destinations, mainly the coast of Brittany and the south-west of France; and to describe the prostration and feebleness of Philip. To such a depth of impotence, indeed, had Spain already fallen, that approaches were made in October by Philip's authority to Lord Burghley, through Chateau Martin, offering as a basis for peace negotiations between the countries that the English should have full liberty to trade in all the Spanish dominions, if the depredations of the English corsairs upon Spanish shipping should cease. But Burghley saw and noted that commerce was no longer the main subject at issue. Any negotiations that did not exclude Spain from Holland and Brittany were foredoomed to failure, and the suggestion came to nothing.<sup>1</sup> But the fact that it was made shows how wide of the mark the alarmist reports of the spies were at this juncture.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, Orme reports to Lord Burghley, 15th December 1593, that he had recently heard at Rouen "from Shelton, a papistical rebel, that the Spanish Armada would be ready to sail fifteen days previously, but whether for Brittany, Ireland, or Scotland was unknown" (Domestic S. P. of the date). From other sources we now know that the only armament Philip had at the time ready or in preparation, except for defence, were sixteen ships at Pasages, intended to carry reinforcements of 2000 men, three-quarters of whom were recruits, and building materials for fortifications, the destination being Blavet, in Brittany. A few weeks later (January 1594) the spy Moody, at Brussels, wrote (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.) that since the wars with France began the Spanish army was never so great as it will be in three months' time: "so great as we here do not see how they will be employed except it be for England." He adds that 5000 Spaniards had lately landed in Brittany (which was untrue), and that fifty sail, with 10,000 men, had arrived near Bordeaux, "which are to go to Scotland." "I assure you the expectation for England was never so great as at this present." The English Catholic refugees in Flanders seem, indeed, to have principally amused themselves by exaggerating the power of Spain and the danger of England, which suited Philip exactly.

As soon as the Geraldines in Lisbon had news of the position of affairs in Ireland by the Archbishop's letters, they sent a follower of theirs, one John Slatimor, to report on the feeling in Munster and Leinster towards the revolt. But an Anglo-Irish spy in Bilbao—one Patrick Comerford—was able to send particulars of his mission to Ireland before Slatimor sailed, and the footsteps of the latter were dogged with a warrant for his arrest wherever he went. He was, however, fortunate in being able to elude his pursuers, and returned to Spain before the Archbishop of Tuam left, giving Philip a vivid picture of the determination of the Irish Catholics, and the confusion and ineptitude of the English attempts to crush the budding revolt. There were, he said, 4000 Irishmen in arms against the Queen in Ulster, of whom 1000 were harquebusiers; and the English forces had been rendered powerless by dissensions. The response of the Irish contingents to the English summons had, moreover, been disappointing, and the Viceroy stood upon the defensive until fresh troops came from England. "The principal gentlemen of Munster have sent to Sir Maurice and Sir Thomas Geraldine to say secretly that they are ready to rise against the English at any moment, if the exiles will come to their aid;" and a similar message was sent to Viscount Baltinglas from his friends and allies, notably Feagh M'Hugh (O'Byrne), "who can do great harm to the English, as he has some strong places on his lands; especially one famous valley, where fifteen soldiers with plenty of ammunition could hold the place against the world." "Our people," Slatimor reported to the King,

“are anxiously awaiting the reply (*i.e.* of Philip), and are full of hope and energy. The affairs of Ireland are now in such a condition that if his Majesty will send prompt and powerful aid, great effect will be produced. The Queen will be kept busy at home, with small cost to his Majesty. In order to keep the war alive it will be well to send at once some arms and ammunition, especially harquebuses and powder; and one of the Irish gentlemen in his Majesty’s pay should be sent thither to animate them with his presence.” The Archbishop of Tuam was also warned that the English were on the watch to intercept and arrest him on the voyage home.<sup>1</sup> Whether they succeeded in this is unknown. The Archbishop sailed in the winter for Ireland, with encouraging messages and promises to the chiefs in arms, and a flattering letter from the King himself to Tyrone; but no more was ever heard of him, and neither the prelate nor his letters ever reached Ireland. In the meanwhile the King of Scots was making desperate attempts to regain touch of the Spanish intrigues of his Catholic nobles. Father Cecil and Porres found on their arrival in Scotland, early in 1594, that James’s diplomacy or his sympathies had already attracted to his side again many of the Catholics. The treason of Bothwell (who at the time was called a Protestant and an English partisan, though he shortly afterwards changed sides and joined Huntly) in seizing and holding the King in durance in the autumn, had led James again to surround himself with

<sup>1</sup> Slatimor also reports that the English have discovered and are working a rich silver mine near Wexford. Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.



Catholics and enemies of the Stuart faction. In December 1593, we are told by a gossip at the English court, that there was much talk of James going to Mass; and that "Lord Hume, a remarkable Papist of the realm, lay in that King's pallet."<sup>1</sup> But the presence of Lord Zouche in Scotland and Elizabeth's constant pressure had so far prevented the complete reconciliation between the King and the three great rebel Catholic Earls, whose promised submission to the Kirk was still unfulfilled. He was drawn closer to them soon after the coming of Father Cecil and Porres by another bold attempt of Bothwell to seize his person; and the Earls, encouraged by the promises—and, it is asserted,<sup>2</sup> also money—sent to them by the hand of Porres, assumed an increasingly threatening attitude towards the Protestants,<sup>3</sup> once again mustering their followers, in accordance with the message sent to them from Spain, and bidding defiance to the excommunications of the Scottish Church, the sentence of confiscation and death passed upon them by the Scottish Parliament, and the real or pretended fulminations against them by the Scottish King.

<sup>1</sup> Antony Standen, Birch's "Memoirs of Elizabeth."

<sup>2</sup> Robertson.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Morrison, the Earl of Essex's agent in Scotland, wrote in November 1593 that credible intelligence had just arrived that the King of Spain was preparing vast armaments for next spring. The King of Scots, he continued, had so strong a desire to avenge himself upon Bothwell, that he gave himself no rest. But finding that all persons wished well to Bothwell except the Papists, the King was obliged to make use of the latter, who were extremely glad of his Majesty's confidence, and, under that pretence, pursued their own interests and those of Popery (Birch). It was probably not so much James's desire for vengeance against Bothwell, as to insinuate himself into the Spanish scheme again that drew him to Huntly and his friends.

James must have been fully informed by this time of the mission of Father Cecil to Spain, and his counter-stroke was to send an envoy of his own to Madrid, and to make a great show of negotiation with Philip, in order to prevent any action being taken in Scotland over his head. "Il y'a grande communication entre les rois d'Ecosse et d'Espagne," writes Chateau Martin in March 1594, and a few days later he repeated the information to Burghley. Elizabeth was extremely indignant to hear this, and wrote, in her vigorous way, to James: "I do avowe that if you do aught by forainers; which I do know in end worse for yourself and country, hit shall be the worst aide that ever king had, and I fear may make me do more than you will call back in haste."<sup>1</sup> But the money she promised to James to help him to put down the Catholic Earls and hold his own without Spanish support might have been spared

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth to James, May 18, 1594 (Camden Society). There is no doubt that the belief that James had opened communications with Spain was true, although it is clear that his approaches would never have moved Philip. R. Douglas, writing from Whittinghame, 8th June 1594, to his uncle, Sir Archibald Douglas, the Scots ambassador in England, refers to a rumour that a barque had come to Scotland from Spain with a money subsidy. "As concerning the gold which was thought to have come to our (rebel) Lords, I have been curious to know the truth thereof; but ye shall believe me there was no such thing; for in the bark there were only three passengers, a Spaniard, a Scotsman, and an English priest, who I hear has gone to England by our borders. The Spaniard had a message to the King with large offers; but has not appeared, seeing the time not proper; and large promises he has made to these Lords of money and any other help they can crave against that country (*i.e.* England). This is all I can learn of the matter." It is not certain whether this refers to the arrival of Cecil and Porres in the country some months previously, or to the mission of Colonel Semple, who went from Spain to Scotland about this time with some handsome presents from Philip to James and his wife, but the intelligence proves the general belief that James was intriguing with Spain at the same time as the Catholic Earls.

(as in the end it probably was, but for other reasons) if the English Queen had known how complete an antidote was James himself to the intrigues in Spain of the Scottish Catholics. Whatever else might happen, it was quite certain that Philip would never spend a ducat or sacrifice a trooper to benefit him. This was perhaps the reason why, although Huntly and his friends were in open rebellion, and had thus fulfilled the conditions upon which Spanish support was to be sent to them, month followed month and still no aid from Spain came, though the Catholics depending upon Philip looked for it from day to day.<sup>1</sup>

James was powerless with his own forces alone to put down the rising, even if he was really inclined to do so; but by the autumn he could no longer resist the pressure of England and his Protestant subjects, and was obliged to make a show of bringing the rebels to obedience. The Campbells and the Forbeses had old tribal feuds with them, and to those clans James gave his commission to invade the lands of the Catholic peers. Young Argyll, a boy of eighteen, commanded the Protestant army of 7000 men, and met the small force of 1500 Gordons and Lowlanders under Huntly and Errol at Glenlivet in October 1594.

<sup>1</sup> Foulis writes from Edinburgh to Antony Bacon (Birch's "Elizabeth"), in July 1594, urging the need for Elizabeth to help James with money. "It is necessary that he (*i.e.* James) be satisfied . . . and in time, for the Papists begin to show themselves. The three Earls have six or seven hundred men in the field, and expect to receive forces from Spain very soon. It is thought that 10 or 12 sail (*i.e.* of Spaniards) are already at sea. The King (James) had troops enough to keep the Earls quiet, but wanted money."

"Maccallum More cam' frae the west  
 Wi' mony a bow and brand ;  
 To waste the Rhinnes he thought best,  
 The Earl o' Huntlie's land.  
 He swore that nane should him gainstand  
 Except that they were fey,  
 But a' should be at his command  
 That dwalt by north o' Tay."

But alas! for the young chieftain's boasting; for, as the ancient ballad tells with tedious minuteness, the "Gay Gordons," with their little force, had cannon, of which the wild Campbell Highlanders knew but little, and they routed Argyll completely.<sup>1</sup>

"Now I hae you already tauld  
 Huntlie and Errol's men  
 Could scarce be thirteen hundred called,  
 The truth if ye would ken.  
 And yet Argyll and his thousand ten  
 Were they that took the race ;  
 And though that they were nine to ane,  
 They caused them tak' the chase.  
 Sae Argyll's boast it was in vain,  
 (He thocht sure not to tyne<sup>2</sup>),  
 That if he durst come to the plain,  
 He would gar every nine  
 Of his lay hold upon ilk man  
 Huntlie and Errol had ;  
 And yet for all his odds he ran  
 To tell how ill he sped."

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to this, Elizabeth wrote to James as follows in October 1594 (Letters of Elizabeth and James, Camden Soc.): "You see . . . what danger it bredes a king to glorify too hie and too soudainly a boy of yeres and conduit, whose untimely age for discretion bredes rasch consent and undesent actions. Such speke ere they weigh, and attempt ere they consider. The weight of a kingly state is of more poix than the shalownes of a rasche yong man's hed can waigh."

<sup>2</sup> *i.e.* to lose.

It was clear to the Catholic Lords that, although they had beaten Argyll, they could not continue unassisted to stand if James attacked them in earnest with the aid that Elizabeth would surely lend him in such circumstances. Two months before the battle they had sent Walter Lindsay, Lord Balgarys, to Madrid, fervently praying Philip to fulfil his promise to them;<sup>1</sup> and on the day following their victory they decided to send back Father Cecil with the Jesuit, Father Gordon, Huntly's uncle, to represent their desperate position to the King of Spain. Eventually, Father Gordon was unable to make the voyage, and was replaced by Hugh Barclay,<sup>2</sup> who accompanied Cecil to Spain, and in addition to the almost despairing letters of credence and exhortation which they carried, Angus—who appears to have been a good Spanish scholar—wrote to Philip placing himself absolutely at his service, without reservation of any sort. “In this unhappy country,” he said, “we have no other hope than the aid of your Highness; and in the name of the rest of the Catholics here, I supplicate your Highness to help heartily a cause so just, meritorious, and necessary, in conformity with the statement which will be made to you by Father Cecil, who is the bearer of this. As regards my own person, I beg your Highness to favour me by giving me this consolation in all my troubles, namely, to place me amongst the number of your favoured loyal servants, and to dispose entirely at your will of all I have and all I am.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Angus in his letter to Idiaquez introducing him says, “He has fought for the faith until he had a rope round his neck.”

<sup>3</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

Before Cecil had started on his journey (November 1594), Lord Balthars saw Philip at the Escorial (October 20), and presented the demands of the Catholic Lords. To those who know the Spanish King's methods and principles, it is sufficient to read Balthars' statement of demand to see at once that his mission was destined to fail. Philip missed most of the opportunities of his life through his insatiable desire to force pledges and conditions upon others whilst remaining only vaguely engaged himself. It must have been a novel sensation for him to find that the Scotsmen, though they were pleading to him as suppliants, were at the same time trying to bind him down to all manner of things beforehand. The first condition presented by Balthars would have been sufficient to stay all aid from Philip, even if it had stood alone. "That his Majesty should grant him a patent, assuring them (the Scots) their liberties, and that the war should be declared to be undertaken to restore the Catholic religion. That for the entrance into England, the command should be given either to the Cardinal Archduke Albert or his brother the Archduke Ernest. Either of them would be welcomed by Scotsmen. That for the war in Scotland itself, his Majesty . . . should select for command a Catholic Scottish noble during the time the King (James) remains a heretic; and, indeed, even if he change his opinions, as his conversion cannot be believed in; and that his Majesty (Philip) should confer some dignity upon the general so selected. That a fleet should be sent to protect them, and an army to march into England. That twenty small ships should be granted to them,

with 1000 good horses, and money to arm and pay 24,000 Scotsmen, as well as arms for the Scottish priests; for their own—which were their books—have been burnt by the heretics. That the Spaniards, both in the army and the fleet, should be pious and willing to mix with Scotsmen, so that they should form one army under a single general. It is left to his Majesty's discretion what steps should be taken to restore the Catholic faith. That priests should be sent with full authority to check the license of the soldiery as much as possible. That the money sent from Spain should be destined to certain definite uses, and not be applicable to any other purposes. There should be a written undertaking to this effect given to the King. That, with the exception of the soldiers necessary for the defence of the fleet, the rest of the army should enter England without delay, as otherwise war might break out in Scotland itself, which would embarrass the expedition and render the result doubtful. No delay will arise from the Scots, as they are ready to obey orders." In addition to this, his Majesty is asked to found a college, where the sons of the principal Scots may be educated and taught letters, "as well as the reverence they owe to the King of Spain, which should be obligatory on their successors in Scotland." All this was very different in tone from the first message sent in the previous year by Father Cecil. There was no more talk about "dealing with" James, as the King of Spain might order; and the absence of all reference to the future sovereignty of England seems to indicate that the renewed kindness between James and

his Catholic subjects had not been without influence upon the plans of the latter.<sup>1</sup> At all events, the new conditions presented to Philip by Balgarys left the door open for the assertion of James's claims under Spanish auspices, on the easy condition of his "conversion." But this was not at all in accordance with the views of Philip and his Jesuit advisers, and thenceforward the charming of the Scottish Catholic nobles fell upon deaf ears in the Spanish court. Bland assurances of sympathy they got in plenty from the King and his secretaries and confessors, sometimes even vague, noncommittal promises, sufficient to ensure their employment as a diversion if necessary; but Philip's short-lived trust in Scotsmen withered from the time that Balgarys saw him at the Escorial in October 1594.

Father Cecil arrived in Madrid in December 1594,<sup>2</sup> and added his prayers to those of Balgarys; and

<sup>1</sup> It must not be forgotten that Philip's claim to the English crown depended mainly upon the "heresy" of James; the alleged informality of the marriages of his parents and of his paternal grandparents being an afterthought of small importance. The reconciliation of James to the Catholic Church in Scotland, however half-hearted it might be, would therefore have entirely altered the position of Philip and his daughter the Infanta with regard to the English succession. This was the principal reason why any solution depending upon the reconciliation of James was so vigorously opposed by Philip and the Jesuits. It would have suited Spanish views perfectly if the Catholic Scottish nobles had captured James and killed him, but for them to capture and convert him was the last thing desired.

<sup>2</sup> The Venetian ambassador in Madrid wrote to the Doge at this time (10th December 1594): "Two Scotch gentlemen came here this month on pretext of private affairs. They have had various interviews with the King; and in the name of the King of Scotland they have explained that his Majesty is afraid of treachery on the part of some of his powerful Catholic vassals. He is afraid to make an open enemy of the Queen of England, otherwise he would declare himself a Catholic; both because he is so inclined and in order to



early in 1595 the Laird of Ladyland also came from Scotland with the last despairing cry of the Earls. Heartsick of the cool procrastination of Philip, which, of course, they failed to understand, for they could not look at the King's hand as we have the privilege of doing, the three envoys addressed a letter to Philip (in May?) which set forth the hopeless position of Huntly and his friends. "Sire," they wrote, "the Scottish nobles, who with their blood have fulfilled all that in their name was promised to your Majesty by the priest John Cecil; and not alone by their firm profession of the Catholic faith, but also by their devotion to your Majesty's service, have risked their lives, estates, goods, and reputation, and have risen in arms against the united forces of England and Scotland, gaining the glorious victory they did in October (*i.e.* Glenlivet) over the English troops sent from Ireland and the Scottish troops paid by the English Queen: on which occasion they captured the King's standard, and his commission ordering the expulsion of all Papists, Seminarists, Jesuits, and other confederates of Spain. They now humbly pray your Majesty to send them promptly the aid promised to them in your Majesty's name by Serjeant Porres and John Cecil. In full dependence upon your Majesty's

save his person from these treacherous attacks. At first the (Spanish) Mini-sters were suspicious of this mission, thinking that it might cover some ruse of the Queen of England, especially as it is known that the English intend to attack the Indian fleet next year. Finally, they resolved to send a private emi-sary to Scotland, as was done last week, to speak to the King, and to throw more light on the matter" (Venetian Calendar). Whether this refers to the mission of Cecil and Barclay, or to other envoys simultaneously sent by James to circumvent them, is not clear; but the latter is probably the case.

promise, the said nobles have placed themselves in the dangerous position already described, refusing all offers of agreement made to them on behalf of the Queen of England, to the effect that they should have full protection and liberty for their faith within their own territories, if they would undertake not to treat with Spain. It is now about two years ago since your Majesty sent Serjeant Porres and gave them hopes of succour, and Baron Balgarys has been here for the last seven months pleading for them. They have now despatched Baron Ladyland and John Cecil as the last messengers they will be able to send on this business. Your Majesty is already informed of the need for sending prompt aid to these gentlemen; and how greatly such aid would serve the cause of God and your Majesty. In all other things they submit themselves to your Majesty's orders; and only supplicate your Majesty, if possible, to fulfil your royal word. If this be impossible, they pray for a reply and dismissal.—John Cecil. Balthasar (*i.e.* Walter) de Balgarys. Ladyland.”<sup>1</sup> A

<sup>1</sup> Rolston, Essex's spy at Fuentarrabia, writes under date of January 31, 1595: "The Scots gentleman has now got his despatch and will be here in twenty days. For this reason it will be proper to give orders on the coast of Norfolk to finger him in his way if it be possible. He calleth himself Walter Lindsay, and the master of the ship is Thomas Sutherland of Aberdeen. It is openly said at Fuentarrabia that he was sent to Spain by seven Earls of Scotland, of whom the Earl Bothwell and Earl of Huntly be the chiefs. What despatch he obtained I know not till he cometh to Fuentarrabia. All I can learn is that those Earls had sworn to make war against the Queen of England if the King of Spain would help them" (Birch). In March 1595 the Earl of Mar wrote to the Earl of Essex: "As to the negotiation of Lindsay, I think as yet the directors of him have received small or no comfort of his message." In November 1595 Mr. Aston wrote from Edinburgh

further petition of similar date prayed Philip to intercede with the Pontiff, and prevail upon him to grant to the Catholic Lords in arms the subsidy of 5000 ducats a month which he had offered to James in June 1594 if he would take up arms against England.

But it was already too late for Philip to have helped them, even if he had wished to do so. James had, for once in his life, shown some activity and boldness. He had pawned his jewels and pledged what credit he had, and summoning all that was loyal and Protestant of his realm, had completely crushed Huntly and Errol. Driven to their mountain strongholds, their lands wasted and their houses burnt, they humbly begged the King's permission to retire beyond the sea. With their exile the Catholic revolt was at an end in Scotland, and the King's position with the Protestant party firmer than ever it had been. In July 1595 he wrote to Elizabeth complaining of her slackness in helping him, and again begging for her aid against the Catholics; for during the time of struggle into which her railing had driven him she had silently stood aloof. Again he sought to spur her as before with hints at her own danger: "Surelie, Madame, if it shal please you to wey it, ye will find we both are but at a truce and not at peace with the Romishe

(Birch) that they were in great fear in Scotland of the coming of the Spaniard, and reports—from a letter received from a Scotsman in Spain—of the great preparations being made. "Mr. Walter Lindsay has been honourably entertained in Spain and is made a knight. He has obtained all he desired, both for himself and the banished lords, and is coming to Flanders with the Cardinal" (Archduke Albert). It will be seen that Rolston was mistaken, and that Balgarys remained in Spain.

Spanische practices. These Spanolised rebels of mine that are fledd the cuntrey are but retired to fetch a greater fairde if they may.”<sup>1</sup> How far James may have really believed this it is hard to say, but wittingly or unwittingly, he had ruined the hopes of his rebel Catholic Lords by his artful intervention on the same side. It is giving him, perhaps, too much credit for penetration to suppose that he foresaw the exact result of his action; he probably intended merely to secure for himself the benefit of any Spanish movement, and did not recognise that his participation in Catholic plans would prevent a Spanish expedition altogether. How little the Lords themselves still understood this, and how completely James had outwitted them, is best told in the words of the envoy they sent to Spain from Paris after their flight from Scotland. This was Matthew Semple, probably a son of Lord Semple, and a nephew of Colonel Sir William Semple, who was an officer in Philip’s pay. This is the statement handed to the Spanish King by Semple:—“On the 5th July Matthew Semple left Paris for Spain, on behalf of the Earls of Huntly and Bothwell,<sup>2</sup> and Lord Semple, all of whom left Scotland *in consequence of the confusion in the news coming from Flanders, by which the Catholics were made to believe that his Majesty (Philip) would do nothing for Scotland except with the co-operation of the King.* The King of Scotland was also kept in-

<sup>1</sup> James to Elizabeth, July 1595 (Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> Francis Stuart, Earl of Bothwell, the ultra-Protestant, who had so often been sheltered by Elizabeth after his attacks upon James and his Catholic advisers, had now joined his former opponents, and lived for the rest of his life on Philip’s grudging charity.

formed (*i.e.* by the Catholics) of what was in progress, and he deceitfully continued on good terms with the Lords. They, however, knew his intentions, and paid no attention to his doings, still hoping that his Majesty (Philip) would not allow so much injustice to be done. But as, contrary to their expectations, an answer was so long delayed, they began to suspect that the corrupt management of the Scottish King had upset the plan, as he not only contrived this trick in Flanders (*i.e.* to spread the false intelligence referred to above), but also industriously sought to gain the nobles, either by force or chicanery. At last, as no answer came (from Spain), they concluded that his manœuvres had succeeded, although the King of Scots wrote to them repeatedly that he was of the same intention as they were, and was himself secretly planning the means (to help them), pending the arrival of aid from Spain.<sup>1</sup> He also said that it was necessary for him to maintain a secret correspondence with them. He said, however, that he must still appear severe publicly, and assured them that he only wanted a show of obedience to him, by two or three of them leaving Scotland for any other country but the dominions of the King of Spain, for as long or

<sup>1</sup> Archibald Primrose, writing on the 7th August 1595 to John Colville (Bannatyne Club, Colville Letters) says that "Philip, by means of his instruments in Scotland, had offered James a hundred thousand crowns if he would give liberty of conscience to the Catholics in his realm, with promise of further payments when toleration was fully established." Primrose blames the Chancellor and other Ministers of James for his underhand dealings with the Catholics, but says that as he (James) was the same "auld man," in his opinion "there is no guid to be expectit at his handis," though he (Primrose) hopes to find a way to undo the "traffique."

short a period as they liked. This was written to them secretly and with many expressions of affection; but there was a public arrangement that many should be ostensibly banished, although only the three named really went. This was agreed to by the Catholics, in order to test the truth of the news from Flanders, spread by idle people there who for years have had no communication with Scotland. The Lords left their lands well guarded by the rest of the Catholics, such as Angus, Herrys, and Errol, who hold the authority of these in their absence. Huntly is at Cologne, and Bothwell and Semple in Paris. Semple first passed through Flanders to test the truth of the reports, but could find no impartial person to inform him, and went on to Paris, where advices were received from Huntly which caused them to despatch Matthew Semple to Spain to learn the true state of affairs. . . . We beg that the resolution arrived at may be prompted by the knowledge that the love and determination of the Catholics will not waver if his Majesty will treat them in accordance with their deserts; and they urge his Majesty to act with more promptitude either in deeds or resolutions in writing, and, if promises are punctually fulfilled, he may always count upon the fidelity of the Catholic Lords.—Madrid, August 1595.”<sup>1</sup>

Nothing can be imagined more likely to alienate Philip than this. The Catholic Lords confessed how ready they had been to fall into the trap, and to include in their plans for the future the King whom they had formerly proposed to capture and “deal

<sup>1</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

with" as the Spanish King might desire. They had been outwitted in counsel and thoroughly beaten in the field ; and far from being able to help Philip in England, could not help themselves or their cause in their own country. And yet they made even their affection and steadfastness depend upon the King of Spain's "treating them in accordance with their deserts," and their fidelity to him conditional upon the punctual fulfilment of his promises and his greater promptitude in deeds or resolution. Philip was not accustomed to be addressed in this way. He worked behind an impenetrable veil, and, like the decrees of an inscrutable providence, his decisions had to be accepted by all men with bowed heads as the emanations of a divinely inspired wisdom. To make him a party to a bargain, and to measure allegiance to him by his own fulfilment of conditions, was no less than impious in the eyes of those by whom he was surrounded. So the mission of Matthew Semple was as fruitless as that of Balgarys had been, and the man who had won the game, so far, by his cunning was James Stuart.

## CHAPTER IV

The condition of the Catholics in England—Disagreement between the Jesuits and Seculars—Party politics in the English Court—Real and pretended plots against the Queen—Father Young's confessions—The irreconcilable English refugees—The confessions of Webster—Polwhele's and Collen's plots—Daniel's and Cahill's confessions—Arrest of Father Henry Walpole—The doubtful evidence in support of most of the so-called plots.

WE have hitherto been concerned mainly in describing the intrigues by which it was proposed to utilise the Catholic elements in Scotland and Ireland for the purpose of subverting the established order in England. We must now glance at the position of the English Catholics themselves in the new circumstances which followed the defeat of the Armada. At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, the general desire for peace, and the lack of authoritative fixity of the Roman practice, had caused the mass of the people, clerical and lay, to acquiesce without open revolt in the change in the religion of the country. They attended church, it is true with some mental reservation, and not a few of them still secretly observed the old practices; but a generation that had already seen at least three radical changes effected by law in the established religion of the country was not prepared to risk property and life by going to war with authority to resist the fourth; and there can be no doubt that, if England had been free from outside inter-



ference, the end of Elizabeth's reign would have seen the Reformation permanently and peacefully settled in the country by a workable compromise depending upon general consent. The earlier conspiracies against Elizabeth and Protestantism that took place arose, not amongst the common people or the clergy, but amongst the nobles and higher gentry—the Arundels, Lumleys, Nevilles, Percies, Howards, Dacres, Montagus, and the like—who resented the displacing of the ancient nobility from their commanding position in the councils of the sovereign,<sup>1</sup> in favour of the secretarial class and new men who were trusted by Elizabeth. It was with the nobles that the successive Spanish ambassadors from 1559 to 1585 wove their constant plots; but the evil fate that overtook the successive conspiracies and conspirators had, before the time of the Armada, served as a warning to a class that collectively had so much to lose by unsuccessful rebellion; and although the majority of them remained Catholic in their sympathies, they had grown too cautious to be openly disloyal.

That a condition of things that threatened to allow Catholicism to die out gradually and peacefully in England should be accepted without a struggle by the leaders of the Church abroad was not to be expected. A certain number of Englishmen and Welshmen, who were either too conscientious or too ambitious and deeply pledged

<sup>1</sup> This was the principal pretext for the rising of the Northern Earls, and was recited in the Pope's Bull of excommunication in 1570 as being one of the great misdeeds of Elizabeth which had called for her condemnation.

to change their faith at the bidding of Queen and Parliament, retired to Catholic countries, where they might enjoy their religion openly without molestation. These men had no more desire, at first, to see their country submitted to the foreigner than other Englishmen; but they were naturally determined, if they could, to see her Catholic. The establishment of Father Allen's seminary at Douai in 1568 answered this wish, by providing for the education of young Englishmen in the Catholic faith. Allen himself was good, gentle, and single-hearted. Whilst yet a layman he had done his best in England to dissuade his fellow-Catholics from attending the Reformed services, and thus gradually lapsing to Protestantism; and the immediate object of his seminary was to furnish a stream of ardent young zealots to preach the same doctrine.<sup>1</sup> All sorts of youths flocked to the new school. Lads yearning for adventure, runaway apprentices and students; even soldiers and serving-men, it is said: Allen's charity was large enough to receive them all, but in such a mixed assembly there could not fail to be many who were but ill adapted to the mission they undertook. From 1574 onward great numbers of Seminarists went to England from Douai and the other colleges that were started in imitation of it.<sup>2</sup> That their ministrations were in the main

<sup>1</sup> The oath taken by a Seminarist, after confessing the signal mercy of God in bringing him out of his own country, so affected by heresy, pledges him to devote himself entirely to divine service, and "with the divine grace in due time to receive holy orders, and to return into England to convert the souls of my countrymen and kindred, when and as often as it shall seem good to the superiors of this College" (Fuller's "Church History").

<sup>2</sup> Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, wrote in December 1579 to the

religious, and, although sometimes ignorant and unwise, not political, is seen by the fact that up to 1581 only three persons lost their lives for Catholicism in England under Elizabeth;<sup>1</sup> although from 1570 onward all Catholic propagandists and "obstinate" recusants were treated as disloyal subjects, and imprisoned when caught. Elizabeth and Burghley have been attacked bitterly for what is assumed to be their religious persecution of Catholics who had no direct designs against the State. They certainly made little or no distinction between those who plotted the invasion and subjugation of their native land, and those who, whilst proud of being Englishmen, and of the growing potency of their nation under the rule of the Queen, wished at least for liberty to worship as their consciences or teaching dictated. That this was the case may be partly attributed to the ideas of a period when disregard of the uniformity prescribed by law was considered to

King: "The number of Catholics, thank God, is daily increasing here, owing to the seminary for Englishmen which your Majesty ordered to be supported at Douai, whence there has come in this past year—and from the college at Rome—a hundred Englishmen who have been ordained there: by which means a great number of people are being converted, generally persons who never heard the truth preached before. These priests go about disguised as laymen, and although they are young men, their good life, fervency, and zeal in the work are admirable. God's grace is clearly witnessed in the way they are led on by His hand in this ministry, and in the joy and fortitude with which they offer themselves for martyrdom whenever they are called upon to suffer it for the Lord's sake. Some have suffered thus with invincible firmness and ineffable content, following in the footsteps of so many of their predecessors. Of the old priests very few now remain, and they are imprisoned strictly" (Spanish Calendar, vol. ii.).

<sup>1</sup> Challoner, "Memoirs of Missionary Priests." This, however, does not include Felton, Dr. Storey, Woodhouse, and Father Plumtree, whose offences were clearly treasonable.

be a dangerous departure from the obedience due to the sovereign ; but, as Lord Burghley has himself argued in masterly fashion in "The Execution of Justice," it was far more directly traceable to the aggressive action of Pius V., a pontiff remarkable neither for his wisdom nor his learning. At a time when England was in the throes of revolution the Pope thought fit, probably at the suggestion of Dr. Morton, Dr. Webb, and the Bishop of Ross, to throw down the gauntlet, and by a Bull excommunicated Elizabeth and her obedient subjects. She, already a beloved and powerful sovereign, was denounced in coarse and brutal language as an usurper, whose subjects were enjoined to refuse allegiance, and were declared to be absolved from obedience to her, notwithstanding their oaths. Thenceforward those who acknowledged the Pope's supremacy could not acknowledge the Queen's right to the throne, and were constructive traitors ; and Elizabeth, recognising her danger, naturally treated them as such. The Northern Earls were in rebellion ; Ridolfi and the Spanish ambassador were planning the Queen's murder, and Mary Stuart was already seducing from his allegiance the greatest of English nobles with the bait of marriage. That the priests who preached obedience to the Pope and the laymen who believed in such teaching should be put in a place where they could do no harm was therefore a necessary measure of self-preservation on the part of the Government,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It should be remarked that, contrary to the opinion expressed by most English historians, the Bull, very far from being promoted by Philip, greatly annoyed him. The intrusion of Popes and Churchmen into politics without his connivance caused him endless trouble. The

who could not be expected to draw fine distinctions between Catholics and Catholics. With the disturbances in the English College at Rome and the participation of the Jesuits in the English Mission (1580), the inevitable division of the Catholics showed itself both in England and abroad. There were a dozen excuses which were good enough for the disregard of the Pope's Bull by those English Catholics who did not want to see their country under a foreign yoke. They had not seen the Bull itself; some, with Aquinas, denied the validity of the excommunication of sovereigns and people *en masse*, and others questioned the right of the Pope to compel them to expose themselves to risk of loss of life and goods by rebellion. But to those who accepted to the full the Papal authority, and to the extreme Jesuit party, the Bull was an ample warrant for, nay, a direct incentive to, disloyalty; and from the time when this party obtained a leading share in directing the English Mission it was a war to the death between Elizabeth and the Catholics.<sup>1</sup>

conversion of England was to him a secondary consideration. He wanted either her friendship or her subjection.

<sup>1</sup> Father Mush, one of Allen's favourite pupils and a most respected seminary priest, thus wrote during the appeal against the authority of the Archpriest: "At their first ingress (into England) the Jesuits so acted as to provoke the Queen and Magistrates to enact most cruel laws before unheard of against the Seminarists. The Fathers interfered in the government of the clergy. One of the Jesuits (*i.e.* Heyward) conducted himself as if he had been a legate *ad latere* of the Holy See," &c., &c. Quoted in Law's "Jesuits and Seculars."

In the appellants' declaration to the Pope, Clement VII., in the same cause, the secular priests wrote: "Father Persons was the principal author, inventor, and mover of all our garboils at home and abroad. He fled from the Mission like a dastardly soldier, consulting his own safety . . . but safe abroad he writes treason and threats of invasion, which so incenses the English magistrates that they rise up against us

In an earlier chapter it has been pointed out that the exposure of the ultimate plans of this party by the events of the Armada still further accentuated the division between the two sections of the English Catholics. Englishmen, as a rule, disliked and looked down upon Scotsmen, but at least the King of Scots was a descendant of the royal house of England, and spoke English of a sort; and although the idea of a Scot reigning over South Britain was not a welcome one, it was more acceptable to the mass of the people than that of a Spanish sovereign — a beaten enemy, with the Inquisition and all the old abuses, religious and political, in his train. And so it happened that at the time of which we are now writing (1593-95) the English Catholics, as a body, were not ready to second a Spanish invasion of their country. The English Catholic priests came over still by scores on their Mission, disguised and suffering hardships and dangers untold. They were imprisoned, tortured, and, if firm, executed, with all the refined horrors of death, for treason. Wisbech Castle was crammed with Catholic clerics who were less involved than some of their brethren, and recusant laymen were harried by ruinous fines, by imprisonment, and by galling supervision, until they were worried into conformity, exile, or death.

But withal, they, like the rest of their countrymen, and execute their laws. They exclaim that it is not the concern of religion that busies us, but that under that cloak we meddle in politics and practice the ruin of the State" (*ibid*). It will be seen by this how the inoffensive Catholic priests were thus punished for the reckless and venomous writings of Persons, of which most of them entirely disapproved.

who had witnessed in person the growing greatness and wealth of England under the consummate government of the Queen, were freshly quickened with pride and love for the land that gave them birth. Seminarists who came from their foreign schools to England entered, after a few months of contact with their fellow-countrymen, into the same patriotic humour; and, hard as was the lash that fell upon them by the savage enactments against recusancy passed in the Parliament of 1593, to which reference has been made, few of the Catholics resident in England were really traitors to the State. But they suffered for the ignorance and bitterness of those of their countrymen who lived abroad, and were out of touch with the patriotic feeling which had grown up in England during the years of their exile. Persons and his Jesuits were to all intents and purposes foreigners. Allen, Morton, Holt, Sir William Stanley, Sir Francis Englefield, the Duchess of Feria, Dr. Stillington, Hugh Owen, Heighington, and the rest of their party, who posed as the great authorities upon English affairs in the counsels of Philip, had not seen their native land for many years. Before the Armada they had one and all assured the King that a great Catholic England was yearning with open arms to welcome the Spaniards as liberators and friends. "Not our England, but your England," said Persons's Valladolid scholars to Philip, their patron, in their fulsome address to him. Growing more and more bitter with repeated disappointment and failure, seeing, as the years sped on, their golden dreams of mitres, titles, and commands recede farther from them, whilst their poor

doles of pensions were irregularly and grudgingly paid by Philip's officers, and the bread of exile grew harder, despairing counsels of a way out by the murder of the Queen or her Ministers alternated now with the schemes of invasion and conquest, of which they talked so freely, and, as we have seen, with so little warrant.

The various plans for the assassination of Elizabeth up to this period had been mainly originated in England by nobles and gentry who sought foreign patronage or assistance for their schemes of ambition. This was the case with the Ridolfi plot, the Guise plan of 1583, and the Babington conspiracy. Others, again, like that for which Dr. Parry suffered, and that of Moody and young Stafford, were more or less bogus plots, in which *agents-provocateurs* were sacrificed to the exigencies of party politics.<sup>1</sup> The violent and mischievous talk of the exiles in Flanders, many of them Irishmen belonging to Sir William Stanley's rebel regiment, was now brought to England, distorted and exaggerated by eager spies, or by starved, half-distracted Seminarists, torn by the rack or terrified by the sight of it to say anything that they thought would for the moment please their captors. Much of such stuff was obviously untrue, or at least untrustworthy, but it was made the most of in England, for two reasons. Anything that aroused

<sup>1</sup> My reason for this belief is given in the "Great Lord Burghley." Camden's lines reflect the general feeling in England at the time. "Thus did the English fugitives, lewd priests, and lay villains together plot and contrive the ruin of the Queen by all the arts they could use; and all from a pernicious principle of bigotry rooted in their minds that princes excommunicated are not fit to live; and the Spanish Ministers seconded the design and improved their hatred as far as it would go."



horror and detestation of Spain, and of those Englishmen who were assumed to have sold their bodies and souls to her, was useful—as we have seen in the report of the Parliament of 1593—in keeping alive the patriotism of the country, inciting its liberality in the matter of supplies for defence against so dastardly a foe, and in attracting to the Protestant side those waverers who declined to continue their identification with a cause which allowed regicide to be used for its ends.

The other reason why these so-called plots were frequently exaggerated unduly must be sought in the political situation in England itself. Lord Burghley and his party had always stood for moderation and a mutual understanding with Spain, as opposed to the Puritan, Protestant, or war party, now led by Essex. One of the secrets of Burghley's great influence had been his elaborate system of spies everywhere, which had given him a monopoly of information, and an unrivalled control over affairs. Essex determined to organise a similar system, which should enable him to countercheck the Cecils. This he had done between 1590 and 1594 at great cost to himself. To aid him in his plans he had by his side for a time one of the most plausible, unscrupulous scoundrels in Europe, to whom none of the wiles of statecraft were unknown. Antonio Perez, the absconding Minister of Philip II., was able, as no other man could be, to spread the network of treachery over Europe, with the object of enabling Essex to draw England into war with Spain, and so to vanquish the moderate policy of Cecil.

But the Cecil party could not afford to be outdone, either in vigilance or in solicitude for the safety of the Queen, and each organisation constantly endeavoured to "score off" the other by the sensational nature of its discoveries, and at the same time to blacken the character and discredit the *bona fides* of its rival. The spies were necessarily persons of questionable life; nearly always sold both to Spain and England; and it was usually easy to convict them of treachery. It was, in such case, often the policy of their employers to abandon them rather than seem to countenance men or methods rendered infamous by accusation; and the *agent provocateur*, the eager delator, or the vain babbler, was caught in his own lure and sent to rot in dungeons or die a cruel death, whilst his noble paymaster, who knew or could guess the true circumstances, affected horror at so much wickedness.

This keen competition in the discoveries of treason caused the unfortunate priests or suspects who were caught in or on their way to England to be treated as if each one of them was the emissary of a murder conspiracy or guilty of a design against the State; and there are in the Record Office (Domestic Papers) many scores of sheets of depositions of such men, telling, under torture or threat, their poor squalid little stories of hardship and suffering, but rarely any more important political secrets than the vague tittle-tattle of the seminaries or the braggadocio of renegade soldiers and malcontent refugees.

A typical case of this sort, of which full particulars are available, was that of a priest usually called Dingley, but whose real name seems to have been

James Young, of Eylescliffe, Durham. He had lived abroad in the household of Cardinal Allen, after the death of the Bishop of Ross, whose servant he professed formerly to have been. When we first hear of him in August 1592, he had been caught some months before by Lord Burghley’s pursuivants, and was lodged in the Poultry Compter in the city of London. He was ready at this time, in appearance, to tell all he knew.<sup>1</sup> He was, he said, a humble person, sent by Cardinal Allen to fetch back two priests, Warford and Almond, who were to be sent elsewhere as spies for Father Persons, and more especially to persuade another priest, named John Fixer, to return to Allen, who promised to make him his chaplain, it having been discovered that Fixer was secretly giving information to Lord Burghley. He was, he said, accompanied from Paris by several English priests, whom he had not previously known, and he had heard the directions given to them by their guide in Paris as to the person they should seek in London. He had little to tell about the English refugees in Flanders, but had heard Morgan (who belonged to the Scottish faction) inveigh against Allen and Persons, and knew of the efforts which he, Morgan, and the late Bishop of Ross had made to convince people that

<sup>1</sup> He had been captured at Easter 1592, and we learn by the letter of another prisoner, a spy named Beard, to Antony Ashley, Clerk of the Council, that Young had remained obstinately silent, notwithstanding the efforts of the justices, until August. Not even his name could be discovered until the spy Beard obtained access to him; “when within ten days I discovered him altogether” (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 403). Thenceforward the prisoner seems to have been only too eager to give information in return for his own safety.

the Scots King would come over to the Catholic side. Sir William Stanley, on the contrary, had in his hearing breathed fire and fury, and talked at large of the plans for the coming invasion of England. Young ends his first written confession by asking pardon if he has done wrong, pleads youth and evil counsel of others, and promises to divulge the names of all the Seminarists he can discover.

This was all very well as far as it went, though most of it was untrue. Mr. Justice Young and the spy Beard knew that if so much as this was divulged voluntarily, a good deal probably remained behind. An artful subterfuge then brought to Lord Burghley a long document, written by the prisoner,<sup>1</sup> saying that he had already imparted to the Privy Council as much as his life is worth, and will now make a clean breast of the whole business. He confessed now that he was a priest, and gave his real name and place of education. He had, he said, gained a Queen's scholarship at Durham, and had left that city in 1579 for the ostensible purpose of proceeding to Cambridge University. Lodging in London in the house of Dr. Barrett for two months, he and his host then went to Flanders *via* Gravesend and Dover, under the pretext of joining the army under the command of Queen Elizabeth's lover and *fiancé*, the Duke d'Alençon. Once safe across the Channel, he proceeded to Rheims (where Allen's seminary then was), on the advice of one Darbshire, a Jesuit. There he remained for a time studying for the priesthood, but with great repugnance, as he says. Subsequently he was sent to the English College in

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 403, and State Papers, Domestic, cxlii.

Rome, where he studied for seven years ; was received into the priesthood, and preached in Latin before the Pope. He was then destined to read divinity at Rheims ; but before he could leave Rome, Father Persons begged the Rector at Rheims not to send any priests to England in that year (1589), but to let him have some for his new college at Valladolid. Young was accordingly sent thither with four other priests (one of them being probably the Father Cecil of whom I have already spoken), and found, as yet, only four students, though the number rapidly increased to thirty-six. Young has much to say of the manner in which Persons whipped round amongst the Spanish nobility to obtain funds for his new seminary, and the prisoner himself was designated one of six priests who were to proceed to England on a similar mission. The travelling disguise assumed by four of the priests on this occasion was that of English galley-slaves captured in the English expedition to Portugal, and now released by the Spaniards, whilst Young and another were to sail in Scottish ships and land in Scotland, whence they were to find their way into England. But Young had enough of it by the time he got into the Downs, and “ being unable to bear the seas,” he landed at night and trusted to Providence for safety. All that night he lay under a hedge, and his first care in the morning was to change his outlandish Spanish garb for clothes less conspicuous. He had money, apparently, but knew nobody in London. He recollected, however, to have heard Father Persons tell the priests who were sent direct to England as galley-slaves that they were to seek

a certain Mr. Wiseman who lived at Garnet's Rents, Lincoln's Inn Fields, and in his presence to break a cake as a token.<sup>1</sup> Young accordingly sought the person indicated, and went through the same performance, being welcomed, and forwarded to Lady Throgmorton's house at Upton, beyond Stratford, in Essex. In her house he stayed for a month, ministering and saying Mass; but the lady was frightened at a new proclamation against harbouring priests, and giving him a change of linen and twenty marks, arranged that he should sleep at an inn in London, taking his meals at the house of a Catholic family named Mompeson, in Clerkenwell; the excuse for his presence there being his supposed courting of a "young gentlewoman" living there called Mrs. Temperance Davis. Whilst he and another priest were sitting at table in this house, the constables suddenly appeared at the door to search for such quarry. Young fled by the back way, and contrived to run to earth at the hospitable house of Wiseman in Lincoln's Inn Fields; but the other priest (Patterson) was captured and shortly afterwards was executed. The fugitive was then sent to board at the house of one Cole, "a schoolmaster, at the upper end of Holborn;" but he also soon got into trouble, and again Young fled to Wiseman. The latter, however, had to leave town, and the priest went to lodge at the White Swan, Holborn Bridge. There was no safety in inns, for they were too well watched, and Young was promptly taken

<sup>1</sup> The Wiseman family, most of whom seem to have lived in Essex, were notable recusants, and some of them suffered severely from the delation of Young.

prisoner and lodged in the Compter at Easter, 1592, just as he was about to set out on horseback to his native county of Durham, in the hope of finding it “more quiet than this.”

These personal confidences, however interesting, were of less importance to the Government than news of conspiracies. The authorities had already detected Young in many misstatements, and he was pressed further. He was a mere youth, he protested, and had not been admitted into the company of the serious men of his college, but he had heard Allen say that he had dissuaded Ballard as earnestly as he could from the plot for which he suffered (*i.e.* the Babington plot); “but that Ballard was rather addicted to Morgan and Charles Paget.” He (Young) had been told, too, that the King of Scots had turned Catholic, and all the Scottish Catholic bishops were to be recalled to their sees, which happy event had been greatly aided by Dr. Lewis, Bishop of Cassano. “Yet after the death of the Queen of Scots both Allen and Persons sought to stir up the Spanish King, who never could be persuaded to attempt anything against England in her lifetime, objecting that he should travail for others. She being dead, the expectation was increased for the last invasion.”

All this was obviously merely the loose gossip of past events by men who were not behind the scenes; but the supply of it was apparently unlimited. The names of Englishmen ostensibly in the Spanish service, their movements, salaries, and conversations are given *ad nauseam*; but as many of these men were actually in Burghley’s pay, and sent him regular advices, we can imagine the grim smile of

the aged Lord Treasurer as he read this vague tittle-tattle of their dangerous plans. Still, as has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, the declarations of even this poor sieve of a man and his like were useful and valuable when they repeated the threats of invasion constantly uttered by Persons, Stanley, and others, and exaggerated the great preparations that were being made in Spain with that object. Young prayed abjectly for his liberation in return for his abundant declarations. His misery, his long imprisonment, his penitence, and his ardent desire to serve as a spy on his fellow-Catholics, were repeated at intervals for many months; but he had to be squeezed quite dry before they let him go. Lists had to be furnished by him of every Catholic he had ever known, at home or abroad. All those who had sheltered him, and even *their* friends, had to be denounced. Fellow-priests, who had left Spain or Italy on the English Mission, had to be betrayed, every one of them, before at length the wretched man saw the doors of his prison open, and he was free to carry his craven heart whithersoever he willed, envying till his dying day his firmer brethren who stood steadfast even to death and martyrdom.

Sometimes the pressure, such as was exerted on Young, gave a clue, even a slight one, to something that seemed to be really important, and in that case it is curious to trace the tortuous devices by which more information was obtained. The clever decipherer and forger, Thomas Phellips, who was ostensibly the collector of customs at Leadenhall, was rarely at a loss for a plan, by means of which fresh avowals could be extracted from unsuspecting



accomplices; and Topcliffe, the examining justice, had a persuasive way with the prisoners themselves, that rarely failed.

As an instance of how a case was worked up by such devices, the notes of Phellips respecting a Catholic named Bisley are curious. He sets down in his memoranda that he had learnt that Bisley had been sent secretly to England late in the year 1591 by Sir William Stanley and Hugh Owen;<sup>1</sup> and, as he carried letters, he is to be asked, if he can be caught, whether he had not a message for a priest named Birket or Burke, who Phellips knew to have been lodging at the house of an Italian who kept a bowling-alley in Bishopsgate Street, on the corner of what is now the thronging Liverpool Street. Bisley was said to have brought letters to be delivered to one Webster, a recusant who had long been a prisoner in the Marshalsea; but Phellips suspected that Webster was to deliver some of them to Birket; and Bisley, if he could be caught, was to be charged that this was the case. Bisley on former occasions was known to have brought letters for Webster secreted inside the buttons of his garments, one of which letters, it was said, threatened to kill the Queen, Bisley being promised a pension by Stanley and Owen when he came back to Flanders. This much Phellips had been told by his spies abroad, and the knowledge already in hand was used as a lever to obtain more. The next move was for Phellips's tool, Sterrell, *alias* St. Main, *alias* Robinson, a pretended Catholic, who served as a spy to the English refugees in Flanders, and wrote to

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, ccxl.

them only what Phellips dictated, to write in the name of Robinson, as from Liege, to a Catholic named Morice at the Swan in Bishopsgate Without (May 1592), telling him, amongst many other things, at Phellips's dictation, that "the plot in England is to kill the Queen. Stanley has sent in one Bisley of Flushing, sometime a soldier there, a little, short, black fellow with a red face." This letter was of course written for the purpose of being intercepted and shown to Webster, and also to Bisley and any of his companions if they were taken. In their confusion they might blurt out further admissions or confirmation. Webster seems to have denied, probably with truth, all knowledge of Bisley and of the alleged plot. But he was carefully watched by spies in the Marshalsea, and his every word repeated by them to Mr. Justice Young. Months afterwards, in September 1592, a fellow-prisoner, a spy, was walking in the prison yard with him, when Webster in weariness asked, "Shall we never be released?" "I fear not," replied the spy. Whereupon Webster said that "ere long God or the devil would fetch her and them that detained them; then asking him (the spy) to see that no one was looking, Webster went and talked to Snap, the priest, at his chamber window." This was something. It was thought to inculcate Webster in the supposed murder plot, and the spy-prisoner was again set to work. In a few weeks he could inform the Justice that when a prisoner named Brownell was told that a certain man had been committed at the previous Easter for seeking to kill the Queen, he had replied "that many were committed for that,

but some one would make an end of her one day, and then all those commitments would be void and all would be well." When the apprentices were unruly and would have broken up the Marshalsea. Richard Webster, another prisoner, said "that they could not agree because they had no head, but if they had one all the Commons would rise, for they all disliked the State and Government." This was another step, and by the 23rd December matters were sufficiently advanced for Webster himself to be again brought before Justice Young for examination with another prisoner named Faux. Webster said the only Bisley he knew was the priest of that name who had married him in the Marshalsea three or four years ago; but as Young, the magistrate, noted that this priest Bisley had been executed, he was evidently not the man they sought. Both the prisoners denied the truth of the spy's revelations about them, and Faux was tortured without result. Webster had already confessed enough to hang him, wrote the magistrate, but he would be put to the torture to obtain more if the Attorney-General decided. The other prisoner Brownell, who had spoken about killing the Queen, was "too sick to be dealt with until he waxed stronger." Whether Webster was put to the torture is not certain, though he probably was from the sequel, for he was afterwards removed to Bridewell and Lord Keeper Puckering took him in hand. To him Webster subsequently wrote a letter (19th January 1593) again solemnly asserting his innocence of any crime against the Queen or State. He begs most earnestly that his every act and word

may be scrutinised and his innocence made manifest. But the effect of the pressure put upon him is seen in the continuation of his letter. He had probably under torture repeated to Puckering certain treasonable speeches he had heard others pronounce, and had promised to play the spy or *agent provocateur* upon his friends; and he made this a reason for begging that he himself might be cleared from the capital offence with which he was charged. "If my innocency be not known," he wrote, "your Lordship may think that I told you of the speeches more for fear of my life than for service to her Majesty or the country. Until this matter of mine be thoroughly sifted I cannot go forward with the great good likely to be procured to the land." What eventually happened to him does not appear; he probably suffered death after thus giving fresh clues to other "plots" which would be worked up like that with which he was charged. Public indignation and hatred were in this way constantly kept at fever-heat against a party which was represented as constantly plotting against the life of the Queen, though one loose hint of a spy or an impatient word from a distracted prisoner was evidently a sufficient foundation for the manufacture of a succession of such plots.

But though many of the so-called murder conspiracies for which perfectly innocent Catholics suffered were thus elaborated, there were undoubtedly several that were in some degree dangerous and real. They all emanated from the same small group of extremists in Flanders, with the more or less open connivance of the Spanish

Ministers there—though probably at this juncture without the aid of Philip himself. The proposed perpetrators were usually some of the wild, reckless swashbucklers, English or Irish, who swaggered, drank, and dined in the Flemish cities. There seems to have been no attempt at concealment. We are told that these plots were regularly discussed at a council table at which sat such men as Stanley, Owen, Jacques Francis (Stanley's Burgundian lieutenant), and even some of the leading Jesuit priests, such as Holt, Sherwood, and Walpole, are said to have given their approval.<sup>1</sup>

None of these plots ever came near commission, and in the cases where they were not voluntarily confessed the pressure exerted upon the captured persons in prison or the sight of the rack usually brought out the fullest particulars. For instance, one Polwhele was captured on suspicion late in 1593. He had been backwards and forwards to Flanders several times, having served there as page to Sir William Stanley, and afterwards with his lieutenant, Jacques Francis, who really seems to have been a murderous sort of personage and the principal instigator of the plots. This was sufficient to warrant the arrest of Polwhele when he appeared in England, although he had voluntarily come over from Calais, avowedly for the purpose of unburdening his conscience to Lord Burghley of some dark secret, and had sought the aid of Mr. Jefferys, the English Consul there, to enable him to do so. The story he had to tell was that in the summer of 1593 Jacques

<sup>1</sup> See "The Estate of the English Fugitives," an extremely curious contemporary pamphlet giving an account of the lives of the refugees.

urged him to go to England and kill the Queen, saying "that no action could be more glorious than cutting off so wicked a member, who is likely to overthrow all Christendom." Soon after this happened, Hesketh<sup>1</sup> was sent to England, and thereupon Polwhele seems to have gone to Father Sherwood and offered to perform the task that Jacques had suggested, if a fit opportunity occurred. "Jacques said it was a movement of the Holy Ghost. It could only be done when the Queen went for a walk or to the sermon: then she might be shot or stabbed, as she takes no care. If he could only escape for two or three hours he would be safe."

<sup>1</sup> It will be recollected that when Persons sent Father Cecil to England from Spain on his first mission in April 1591, he instructed him in covert terms to sound secretly Lord Strange—son and heir of the Earl of Derby—as to his willingness to co-operate with a Catholic invasion. As the nobleman was a descendant of the Duchess of Suffolk, sister of Henry VIII., and one of the possible claimants to the Crown, his countenance would have been of great importance. Father Cecil on that occasion betrayed the cause to Burghley, and found an excuse for not fulfilling his mission; but in the autumn of 1593 a Catholic fugitive gentleman from Over-Darwin, Lancashire, who knew the Earl of Derby, was sent by Sir William Stanley to negotiate with the Earl and his heir as to their acceptance of the position of Pretenders. Sir William Stanley, in his instructions to Hesketh, strongly hints that he is supported in his proposal by the King of Spain (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 462). Hesketh performed his office apparently less cautiously than he was instructed to do, and the Earl of Derby, fearing a trap, immediately denounced him to the Government (October 1593). The Earl died a day or two afterwards mysteriously, it was said by poison; but the new Earl followed up the prosecution of Hesketh vigorously, and after much torture and suffering of the prisoner to wring out avowals of supposed murder plots, for which there does not seem to have been a shadow of foundation, the unfortunate emissary was done to death as a traitor at St. Alban's. Standen, an English Catholic spy of Essex's, wrote to another Catholic of similar sort in France in reference to Hesketh's execution, "A worthy piece of work, suitable to the setters on" (*i.e.* Stanley, &c.), "who of the Catholics here at home are accursed."

He was told first to go to Calais, and from thence to seek the aid of Fortescue or Sterrell,<sup>1</sup> who were at court to obtain permission to go to England. There he was to obtain access to Lord Burghley, and inveigh violently against Jacques, and in this way ingratiate himself at court.

Every incentive to the proposed assassin's zeal seems to have been used by Jacques and his friends. He was directed to go to confession and to obtain absolution before he started, and sixty crowns were given him for his journey. At the same time as Polwhele's advent, an Irishman, named John Annias, was also captured coming into England. The first accusation against him was that of intending to set fire to the Queen's ships, by means of the same sort of fireballs with which the former attempt had been made at Dieppe. According to Polwhele's story, he had met Annias and his associate in the former fire-plot, Thompson, at Lille on the way to England. They had fallen into talk about another Irishman, named Patrick Collen, who had recently crossed over to England. Thompson had said that Collen had been sent over to kill the Queen, but that he (Thompson) would do it before he could.<sup>2</sup> He was,

<sup>1</sup> This was walking into the lion's den indeed, for Sterrell was the spy-tool of Phellips.

<sup>2</sup> As an instance of the looseness with which suggestions of such plots were made by the fugitives in Flanders, it may be cited that when Annias was under examination he said that "he supposed Polwhele and Collen came to England to find means to kill the Queen or the Lord Treasurer." When asked why he "supposed" such a thing, he replied that "when any one comes from Brussels to England, they (*i.e.* the English in Flanders) think it must be for some service, and some say to kill the Queen or the Lord Treasurer, or the King of Portugal, or some of the secretaries" (Examination of John Annias, January 1594, State Papers, Dom.).

he boasted, going to England then on his errand, and carried a jewel to present to the Earl of Essex, whose follower he would become.<sup>1</sup> They, Annias and Thompson, said they were going shares in the reward, which would be very large. The three rogues seem to have known each other's business perfectly, and each one intrigued to get rid of the other two; and, as they said, to have alone the "honour" and profit of killing the Queen; but, as it afterwards appeared, to be the first to betray the others. Thompson told Polwhele that Annias meant to rob him, whilst Annias said that Thompson intended to rob and "sell" them both. The end of it seems to have been that Thompson got Polwhele's purse and prudently stayed on the other side of the sea; whilst Polwhele had to depend upon the charity of the English Consul at Calais to send him over and tell his story. Thenceforward, for months, Polwhele, Collen, and Annias, each unknown to the others, continued to unfold their stories in gaol. First, the plan was to fire the ships, then to kill Antonio Perez, to assassinate the Queen and Burghley, and what not. Collen really seems to have been hired in the first instance to kill Antonio Perez with a pistol, at the request of Jacques and the Irish Captain Eustace, who, he says, warned him not to undertake anything against England or the Queen. Father Holt at first had discountenanced

<sup>1</sup> As will be seen later, this bringing in of the name of the Earl of Essex was made the most of by his enemies. Another prisoner under torture was made to say that he had heard Hugh Owen attribute to the Earl aspirations to the crown. Hugh Owen thought it necessary categorically to deny this in a letter to Phellips, who at that time was believed to be attached to Essex.



the murder of Perez, but he eventually assured Collen that he might lawfully undertake anything for the King's service. Holt at the same time expressed to him his sorrow that he, a Churchman, had been told the exact nature of the proposed enterprise. But he nevertheless gave to Collen absolution and his blessing. The assassin Collen, having received £30 in gold for the voyage, seems to have felt some conscientious scruples; and on his consulting another priest, an Irishman named Thomas, he had been told that it was unlawful to commit murder in any circumstances. Annias, on the other hand, testified to having heard Captain Eustace and Collen himself say that the latter had gone, not to kill Antonio Perez, but the Queen, "the highest Antonio of them all," and that the order for doing so had come from Spain through Esteban de Ibarra, the Secretary of State for War then in Flanders.

Whilst these two villains were swearing against each other as to whether the Queen or Antonio Perez was to be the victim, the first prisoner, Polwhele, was, under Topcliffe's persuasion, telling bit by bit a more extraordinary story still. There was no pretence in his case of any one but the Queen being aimed at. When, after some hesitation, he had consented to do the deed, and had informed Father Sherwood of that fact, the Jesuit had replied "that he was a fool for not undertaking it sooner, when he was first moved to it, as he then might have had the honour of it; but that now Collen had gone on the same service, and more were going every day." It would be good sport

for them all, said Sir William Stanley, if Mrs. Elizabeth were dead; to which, according to Polwhele, the amiable Jacques assented, with a suggestion of unlimited loot during the confusion, "He, Polwhele, had often heard Jacques say they did not esteem killing Antonio Perez, who had done all the hurt he ever could do . . . nor the killing of any one else save the Queen. A man," he said, "would run as much risk in killing another person as the Queen herself; and neither he, Jacques, nor Father Holt, would deal with any but for killing the Queen." Sherwood, he said, reproved a man for undertaking to poison Burghley: the Queen alone was to be aimed at, and Jacques' intention to have her killed was public talk in Brussels.

Then, in February 1594, another Irishman, named Cahill, came over and made a set of avowals to Topcliffe at Burghley House in the Strand that quite threw the foregoing revelations in the shade. Cahill's statement was, that an Irish gentleman, named Daniel,<sup>1</sup> had informed him in the previous May that Sir William Stanley, Father Holt, and Hugh Owen wanted to employ a tall, resolute, desperate Irishman to go to England and kill the Queen. Daniel suggested that Cahill should under-

<sup>1</sup> Daniel wrote to Lord Burghley in the previous August 1592 from Calais begging permission to come over to England safely to give some very important news. He warned Burghley at the same time to have great vigilance exercised in preventing any of Stanley's men from joining the Queen's forces going to France. Daniel was allowed to come over, and doubtless from his disclosures the whole of the other proceedings in England arose. In February whilst Daniel's tool, Cahill, was under examination, the former gave notice to the Government of a plan to fire the magazine in the Tower, &c. (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 474).

take the task and get the money ; whereupon they (Daniel and Cahill) should both go to England and divulge the plot to Lord Burghley. Cahill relates that Daniel then took him to Fathers Holt and Archer at Brussels, and they and Hugh Owen had said "that it would be a most blessed deed for him, a soldier, to kill the Queen, as by it he would win heaven and become a saint if he should be killed. If he would do it he would be chronicled for ever." The plan suggested to him was to get into the service of a courtier, "and then manage to waylay her (the Queen) in some progress, and kill her with a sword or a dagger at a gate or narrow passage, or, as she walked in one of her galleries." Cahill consented, the price being fixed at 100 crowns down, and 2000 and a pension if he were successful. Thereupon, with the blessing of Archer, the precious pair, Cahill and Daniel, went to Calais. From there the latter wrote in August to Lord Burghley, telling him he had an important revelation to make if he was allowed to go over. This being accorded to him, he left Cahill in Calais ; whilst he made the first disclosures in England. In Daniel's absence the two Jesuit fathers, Archer and Walpole, came to Calais, and finding Cahill still there, were very angry, and said that Stanley, Owen, and Holt were indignant at so much delay. Upon their urging, Cahill consented to sail secretly for England at once, and landing at Margate, came on to London to join Daniel, who conducted him to Lord Burghley. This story was, of course, confirmed in every particular by Daniel ; and it is not surprising to hear, as these plots were divulged

through the Cecil organisation, that mysterious hints were indulged in that for his own ends the Earl of Essex was more or less mixed up in the nefarious plans, as had been the case when Hesketh was charged and executed for having been sent over by Stanley to sound the Earl of Derby.

It will be noticed that in all the declarations of the prisoners, there was an eagerness to prove their intention from the first to betray their employers, and that their consent to kill the Queen had never been sincere. There is, moreover, an utter absence of proof, beyond their own respective assertions and the conversations they had with each other. Great caution must therefore be exercised in accepting the evidence as conclusive as against their alleged instigators; but enough residuum remains, after all deductions, to give grounds for believing in the existence of an intention on the part of some of them to assassinate the Queen if a favourable opportunity offered, or to betray the plot if the contrary was the case. The weakest case is against the Spanish Ministers, whom all English historians have condemned upon the flimsiest evidence, and especially against the King, who certainly for the moment would have been seriously embarrassed by Elizabeth's sudden death;<sup>1</sup> though doubtless the

<sup>1</sup> As we have seen already, Philip was in no position at this time to take advantage of Elizabeth's death if it had occurred. He was in dire straits for money; his naval preparations were utterly inadequate for an attempt to impose a nominee of his own upon the English nation as king; he had not yet fixed upon any definite policy as to the course to be pursued on the Queen's death; and, with his methods, nothing could be decided upon without infinite delay and consideration. He was, moreover, straining every nerve fighting a losing battle in France, both in Provence and Brittany, and had the greatest diffi-

removal of Antonio Perez, his hated enemy, or of Don Antonio, the Portuguese Pretender, would have been extremely welcome to him.

Hugh Owen himself wrote a spirited letter (March 1594) of disclaimer to Phellips, both as to the complicity of the Earl of Essex in any negotiations of theirs, and also as to himself or Stanley having urged or hired to kill the Queen any of the men who had confessed. He had, he said, never seen Collen in his life, and had hardly exchanged a word with Cahill or Polwhele; and "neither he, Owen, nor Sir William Stanley had any more to do with killing the Queen than the man in the moon." He protested against the reputation of men like himself and his associates being taken away by "perjured jacks, who could not in any Christian commonwealth bear any credit for witnesses." Annias, he says, "is a sorry fellow, who can make white powder, but would not kill a cat if she looked him in the face,"<sup>1</sup> who had recently fled from Flanders for killing and robbing a Spaniard. Owen ascribed to Daniel the invention of the whole story about Annias, not dreaming that the latter was coming to England; but on this point, of course, Owen was ignorant of the compromising admissions of Annias himself, and of Polwhele with regard to him. The Duke of Parma, he said, was constantly receiving intelligence of similar plots being hatched against him in England,

culty in protecting his own coasts and commerce. He was not yet nearly ready to take advantage of the death of Elizabeth; and in my opinion at this period did not desire her sudden removal.

<sup>1</sup> Owen does not attempt to deny the accusation of having employed Annias to burn the fleet.

but always disdained to notice them. "If the Queen and her council would do the same, they need never unquiet themselves as they do, nor so easily permit false juries to cast away so many innocent men."

No doubt the confessions of the criminals were in most cases interested or exaggerated, but Hugh Owen's denials fail to carry conviction sufficient to demolish their stories altogether. An age that saw Henry III., Guise, Orange, and Henry IV. assassinated was not squeamish about killing princes, if they were considered to be in the way; and the few violent extremists in Flanders, and more especially Jacques, belonged to the visionary type from which regicides are usually drawn.

Another case of which much stir was made happened shortly before Owen's letter was written. In January 1594 three persons were caught whilst landing surreptitiously near Flamboro Head in Yorkshire. One of them was found to be Father Henry Walpole, the Jesuit to whom Cahill's confession had referred, the other two being one Lingen and Walpole's young brother, both of them being soldiers in Stanley's regiment. Young Walpole was quite communicative from the first, but the other two prisoners for a time refused to make any admission. Father Walpole was looked upon as an important capture, and in the light of Cahill's reference to him it was immediately assumed that his coming to England was for some deep political object. His brother confessed that the priest had given him six scraps of parchment—which are believed to have been passports for the conveyance

of recusants abroad—and twelve letters; which were buried in the sand of the shore where the prisoners landed. Topcliffe was sent down to York to “work up” the case, and disinterred the letters, which, as they must have indicated many correspondents in England, so much delighted the Earl of Huntingdon, President of the North, that we are told that “his Lordship leaped for joy,” when they were slowly unfolded, dried, and read. “Much lies hidden,” wrote Topcliffe, “in the Jesuit and Lingen which cannot be digged out without further authority.” The “digging out” process was a long and painful one for the wretched prisoner.<sup>1</sup> Again and again Father Walpole protested that his mission was a purely religious one: he was to administer the sacraments and exhort Catholics to remain faithful, obeying in all things his superior in England, Father Garnet; but he stoutly denied his sympathy in plans for a Spanish invasion or subjection of his country; “which,” he said, “would ruin England, seeing the vicious and wanton character of Spaniards.” He repelled, too, with horror the suggestion that he favoured the assassination of the Queen. But alas! it was discovered that, when he was about to set out from Spain on his voyage, Father Persons

<sup>1</sup> At one of his public examinations the unhappy man said that he had been put to the torture no less than fourteen times. The most common torture to which he was subjected seems to have been that of suspending him by sharp irons cutting into the flesh by the hands for six or seven hours at a time, the tips of the toes just touching the ground. A most interesting account of Father Walpole and of the awful cruelty with which he was treated—though probably not worse than hundreds of other poor creatures equally innocent of treason—will be found in Dr. Augustus Jessop’s “One Generation of a Norfolk House.”

had carried him to King Philip, who had said to him "*Dios os encamina*"—God further you; and he had gone thence to Secretary Esteban de Ibarra in Flanders, from whom he had received some money. Besides, he confessed that he was to report himself to Garnet, who, as Lord Burghley argued, "might haply commit to him some matter of the State."<sup>1</sup> In vain he prayed for mercy, for mere life. He would conform to the law, and preach in the English Church according to the word of the Gospel. He would betray all his associates, break all his vows. It was of no avail: the unfortunate Jesuit was carried to York again with others in like case, and there suffered the death of a traitor.<sup>2</sup> There was not a shred of evidence, except Cahill's indirect implication, that Walpole was privy to the murder plot; but the prisoner's disclaimer of any sympathy in a Spanish invasion of England is valueless, even if true, as the efforts of his superiors in that direction are abundantly recorded under their own hands: he was a Jesuit, bound blindly to obey, and, as a

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 608.

<sup>2</sup> Father Walpole with another priest in like case, Alexander Rawlins, suffered martyrdom on the 7th April 1595. The death meted out to all these poor creatures was hanging for a short time and then, often before they were unconscious, disembowelling. One of the most dreadful—and apparently undeserved—punishments was that inflicted upon Father Robert Southwell, the chaplain of Philip, Earl of Arundel, who was indicted for disaffection at the time of the Armada, but died in the Tower. The chaplain Southwell was less fortunate. There was no pretence in his case of his having been accomplice in plots; he was simply indicted of being a priest and of performing Mass in the Queen's dominions. After more than three years of the most heart-rending cruelty in the Tower, he was hanged and disembowelled at Tyburn on the 21st February 1595.



member of the Society, his personal sympathies went for nothing.

It will be seen by the cases recited in this chapter that the accusations that have been repeated by nearly every English historian from Elizabeth's time to our own, of widespread and numerous plots by Catholics to assassinate the Queen at this period, are to a large extent unsupported by serious evidence. That a small party of extreme men may have countenanced such plans is certain, and that some of the wild schemes of regicide, so readily confessed under torture by the intended assassins themselves, were real and dangerous, is more than probable, but that any large section of Catholics, clerical or lay, approved of such means of forwarding their religious objects is untrue, and an impartial examination of the whole of the known facts will prove this to be the case. In accordance with the usual practice, it was the policy of the English Government at the time to blacken the character and methods of the national enemy as much as possible, and it was especially the object of the Essex party to exasperate English feeling to the point of forcing Elizabeth to declared and open national war with Philip. Religious feeling, moreover, ran very high in England itself, and for the zealous Protestants to fix upon Catholicism in general the stain of regicide and disloyalty was a victory for their own side which could not fail to win over waverers who were Englishmen first and Catholics afterwards. Pamphlets and broadsides, professing to give the whole story of the various murder plots, were numerous, and have formed the basis of our historical relations for three

centuries; but they were written in nearly every instance with political or party object, and, from the nature of the case, were necessarily based upon an imperfect or partial statement of the facts. The opening of our own and other national archives in recent years has now enabled us to go to the original sources of information and attempt to discover the truth for ourselves, free from the heat or bias that warped the minds of men who were too near the events to see them clearly. The net result of such inquiry tends to show that, whilst the methods and ethics of ruling statesmen were far less scrupulous than those of our own day, and the valuation of human life as balanced against the welfare of the State much lower, yet the moral rectitude of the mass of the people was quite as high as our own, and it would be as unjust then as now to attempt to fasten upon the members of a particular Church, or upon any large section of the community, the reproach of favouring regicide. Even the English refugees on the Continent must nearly all of them have been against the commission of such a crime, or the Queen would never have died a natural death. We not only have the apparently sincere voluntary declarations in innumerable letters from English exiles of their loyalty to the sovereign and State, but the fact remains that, notwithstanding all the loose talk of the swashbucklers, no serious attempt was ever really made to commit the murder.

## CHAPTER V

The conspiracy of Dr. Lopez—The confessions of Yorke and Williams  
—The alleged connection of the Spanish Ministers with the murder  
plots.

IN the preceding chapter I have dwelt upon a few typical cases of the so-called Catholic murder plots against the Queen, to show how their importance was exaggerated for political reasons, and how very few of the English Catholics can have sympathised with them. I have, however, reserved for treatment in a separate chapter the two principal conspiracies, the fame of which rang throughout England, and aroused a fervour of loyalty towards the person of the Queen, which surpassed any previous manifestation of the people's love for her. This outburst was partly in consequence of the peculiar features of treachery with which one of the plots seemed to be surrounded, and the fact that both of them were ostensibly traced directly to the instigation of the King of Spain or his Ministers.

We saw in the last chapter that the loose boasting of Captain Eustace, repeated by Annias, was accepted as a reason for associating Esteban de Ibarra, Philip's Secretary of War in Flanders, with the plot for the Queen's assassination; but this evidence was really so slight as hardly to be worth consideration. It was otherwise with the famous conspiracy of Dr. Lopez, and the atrocious plot

confessed by Edmund Yorke and Williams. The first of these two intrigues deserves special consideration here, because its apparent heinousness aroused English hatred of Spain to the highest pitch, and so greatly influenced subsequent events, and also because my own recent researches at Paris and in Lord Calthorpe's MSS. have provided me with new information which must be taken into account before a final historical verdict can be given, either as to the guilt of Lopez himself, or as to the direct complicity of Philip II. in a plot to murder his sister-in-law. The story is extremely involved, but I will endeavour to reduce it to as simple a form as is compatible with the statement of all the facts upon which a judgment should be based. Contrary to the course followed by other writers on the subject, I propose to set forth the facts as they were disclosed, instead of in the order in which they were supposed to have happened.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Rodrigo or Ruy Lopez, though a professed

<sup>1</sup> The principal authorities upon the Lopez plot are as follows:—State Papers, Domestic, from vol. ccxxxviii. to celviii., abstracted in the Calendars for 1593–94; the Gawdy Papers, Hist. MSS. Commission; Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.; the Bacon Papers in the Lambeth Palace Library, of which Birch's extracts are in B.M., Sloane MSS., 4112, and are mostly published in his "Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth;" Charles Yetswirt's "True Report of Sondry Horrible Conspiracies," London, 1594 (French version of same; also London, 1594); Francis Bacon's "True Report of the Detestable Treason;" Bishop Goodman's "Court of James I.;" Sir William Waad's detailed account of the case in Lord Calthorpe's Manuscript Papers (for allowing me access to which I desire to thank his Lordship); an excellent article called "The Conspiracy of Dr. Lopez" in the *English Historical Review*, for July 1894, by the Rev. Arthur Dimock; and Mr. Sidney Lee's article on "Lopez" in the "Dictionary of National Biography." There is also a contemporary statement of the whole case drawn up by Coke, the Solicitor-General, in Harl. MSS., B.M., 871.

Protestant, was one of those Iberian Jews through whom the medical lore of the ancient Orient filtered to the Western world. The persecution of this race in the Peninsula had driven them forth with their learning and traditions to seek safety in other lands; and in the sixteenth century no court in Europe lacked a physician of this sort, who was reported to possess secrets of science unattainable to the Gentile practitioners in their profession. Such men naturally attracted the dislike and jealousy of their medical rivals, both on account of their mysterious skill and their outcast race. They were generally self-seeking intriguers, who often wormed themselves into the confidence of high personages, and added to their wealth and importance by making themselves useful as intermediaries in affairs of state, where their knowledge of tongues and their confidential position gave them an advantage over others. Lopez had lived in London since the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, first in Broad Street in the city of London, then in Wood Street, and finally in Mountjoy's Inn, Holborn. Gradually he became a leading physician, and obtained the patronage of Leicester, whose household doctor he was. Leicester was accused by his enemies, and notably by Father Persons, of a propensity for removing inconvenient friends or rivals by poison, and naturally his household physician shared his evil repute in this respect.

The English medical men of the time shrugged their shoulders and turned up their eyes when Lopez was mentioned, and it became an accepted fact that the Portuguese Jew had more skill in intrigue and self-advertisement than in medicine, and knew more

about poisoning than healing. But with the patronage of Leicester and Walsingham, both members of the Puritan party, Lopez continued to prosper greatly in spite of frowns and sneers. In 1586 he was appointed principal physician to the Queen, he was house-physician of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and was to all appearance a person of wealth, though he was really impecunious. In the pursuit of profit he was certainly indefatigable. He had a monopoly for a term of years of the importation of shumac and aniseed into England; his son was being educated at Winchester College, Oxford, by means of the revenues of a parsonage granted to him by the Queen; one of his wealthy patients gave him a house; and when Don Antonio, the Portuguese Pretender, came to England to crave the assistance of Elizabeth, Dr. Lopez at once became his advocate at court, his interpreter, and his inseparable friend—doubtless for very handsome consideration, for the Pretender, at his first coming, had brought with him from Portugal some of the finest jewels in the world, and whilst they lasted he was a welcome guest both to Elizabeth and to Catharine de Medici. Lopez had acted for his patrons, Leicester and Walsingham, in presenting Antonio's cause to the Queen in the most glowing colours; and, influenced by his representations, Elizabeth had been induced to consent to the joint-stock company invasion of Portugal by an English force in 1589, which ended in a dismal fiasco.<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth was very angry with Antonio

<sup>1</sup> The history of this expedition is fully related in "The Year after the Armada," by the present writer.

for the failure of his hopes, and Lopez was extremely apologetic for his share in the transaction.

Thenceforward the Pretender was under a cloud, the jewels were soon gone, and the crowd of Portuguese adherents who had surrounded him whilst his hopes lasted began to fall away from him. Many of them had already prepared a path for their political salvation by serving as spies in England for Philip, and as early as 1586 one of them had sent proposals to Mendoza in Paris, and to Philip himself, to have Don Antonio poisoned.<sup>1</sup> To these proposals Idiaquez, the King's secretary, replied to Mendoza that "the deed might be done without scruple as Don Antonio is a rebel, and has been condemned to death by law." The murderer was to have 25,000 or 30,000 ducats, and Idiaquez, by order of the King, urged that no time should be lost in performing the service.<sup>2</sup> The proposed assassin, however, was a windbag, and the attempt came to nothing; but in the following year (1587) the same spy, Vega, mentioned a plan that he had for persuading Dr. Lopez to poison Don Antonio, by purging the latter with Indian acacia, instead of with his customary fortnightly purge. This was merely mentioned, together with a number of similar vague ideas proposed with the same object by Vega, and does not in any way commit Lopez yet. But shortly afterwards, Vega wrote that he had succeeded in gaining over Dr. Lopez, whom he had "converted to his Majesty's service with good promises, and he has already done wonders in trying

<sup>1</sup> MSS. Simancas and Paris, Spanish Calendar, vols. iii. and iv.

<sup>2</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 12.

to get him, Antonio, turned out of here." Mendoza, in a marginal note to this letter, scornfully asks why Vega, "if he is so sure of Dr. Lopez, does not have Don Antonio put out of the way altogether." On a mere hint which Don Gerau de Spes gave him (Lopez), he offered to purge a Portuguese pilot who was busy about some expeditions from England to the Indies. He took the recipe to the apothecary himself, and on his way he let it fall out of his breeches pocket, in consequence of which he was kept for six months in the Tower. "I (*i.e.* Mendoza) will say that this other business will be well paid for, as the doctor knows, and it may be settled without hesitation."<sup>1</sup> But Lopez would do nothing on Vega's word alone, and wanted a distinct pledge in writing from Philip or his Ministers. Distrust prevented this from being sent, and the matter for the time again fell through.

After the wreck of the Armada, Lopez busied himself greatly in favour of the Spanish prisoners of the poorer sort from one of the captured galleons, and claimed to have rescued 300 of them from the gallows and secured their liberation. One of the most daring and effective of the Portuguese spies was Manuel de Andrada,<sup>2</sup> who sent to Mendoza in

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 78. I cannot find any confirmation of Mendoza's statement that Lopez was imprisoned, as he says, though it is no doubt true that he agreed to poison the Portuguese pilot, Bartolomé Bayon, in 1571.

<sup>2</sup> Every writer on the subject with whose works I am acquainted lavishes upon this man vituperative epithets, which, so far as I can see, are absolutely unjustified, except that, like all the *dramatis personæ*, he was a double spy. Motley calls him "the famous Portuguese poisoner," which he certainly was not. Mr. Dimock says he "was a ruffian pure and simple." The papers I shall cite from Simancas and Paris will prove that at all events he told the truth.



Paris absolutely correct and full advice of English naval affairs, and of the movements of Don Antonio. He spoke French and Flemish, and was frequently sent by Don Antonio on missions abroad, but was already, in 1590, suspected—and with good reason—of playing false to his master. During his absence in France on Don Antonio's business, he had left as his substitute in England another spy, one Rodrigo Marques, and on Andrada's arrival in London from Dieppe at the beginning of 1590, he had met his substitute there, and had learnt of Don Antonio's intention to fly from England to seek the aid of the Dutch, the Huguenots, or even of the Turks, since Elizabeth was unwilling to help him further. Andrada was secretly instructed by the Pretender to freight a ship for this purpose to carry him to Dieppe, and treacherously stipulated with the Flemish skipper, for 10,000 crowns, to alter his course when he was out at sea and run the vessel into Dunkirk, where Antonio would be at the mercy of the Spaniards. This pretty arrangement was conveyed in a letter written by Andrada to Mendoza in Paris, but the letter was intercepted, and, although written with sensitive ink, was promptly deciphered by Phellips, and Andrada was clapped into jail, Marques flying into hiding until the hue and cry was over, and then escaping into France.

By the strenuous intervention of Dr. Lopez, Andrada was released, instead of being hanged by Don Antonio; and when he arrived in France, the spy had a strange story to tell the Spanish ambassador. He had, he said, made great efforts to win over Dr. Lopez, "who is a person of great influence with the

Queen and Council." "When Andrada was about to leave England, the Doctor said that as he had saved Andrada's life—which he certainly did, for if he had not interceded for him nothing else could have rescued him—he would confide in him that he had already been approached by Mendoza for the purpose of putting Don Antonio out of the way;<sup>1</sup> but he had refused, as he was distrustful. He had been the means, he said, of saving from the gallows over three hundred Spaniards from Don Pedro's ship, who had been sentenced to be hanged; and yet, for all this, he had never received any favour whatever from his Majesty (Philip). He said that God had ordained my imprisonment, and made him the instrument of my release, in order that he might be able implicitly to trust me; and since I displayed so much zeal in the service of his Majesty, I might tell Don Bernardino (Mendoza) that if he, Dr. Lopez, received his Majesty's orders to negotiate an arrangement, this was the time. He was sure that the Queen would concede any terms that were demanded of her, as she was in great alarm. It was not necessary to write about this, but that I should go to Calais, and write to him from there to the effect that, bearing in mind the clemency the Queen had extended to me, I was discussing with Mendoza subjects which would redound greatly to the advantage of her country;<sup>2</sup> and that if a pass-

<sup>1</sup> It is fair to observe that on a former occasion when Lopez said this to Vega, Mendoza said it was a lie; but there was nothing improbable in it.

<sup>2</sup> Letters to a similar effect to this were written by Andrada to Lopez in 1591 from Calais. See Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, for that year, where translations of them will be found.

port were sent to me, enabling me to go backwards and forwards freely, which passport Lopez promised should be sent at once, I could come secretly and stay in his house in London, where Secretary Walsingham could come and speak with me. He, Lopez, had no doubt that the Queen would come to terms with his Majesty, and would force Don Antonio to do the same, on the conditions that his Majesty might think just. She would also cause the Netherlands to agree, and he, Lopez, on his part, would endeavour that everything should be done to his Majesty's satisfaction. No one was to know that he had discussed this matter with me. He would continue to let me know the decisions arrived at by the Queen's Council; and when things were sufficiently advanced towards a conclusion to his Majesty's satisfaction, personages might be sent to make the formal contracts. He hopes that everything may thus be settled speedily and advantageously for his Majesty; and he promises, if the matter be kept secret, that he will inform me of everything that happens of interest to his Majesty. If an arrangement be not arrived at, he promises that Don Antonio shall be sent away from England, or detained as his Majesty may desire, and if the present suggestion fell through he would continue to protect his Majesty's interests in England. In very truth no person can report so well as he can, in consequence of his great influence with the Queen and Council: but . . . energy and liberality are necessary."<sup>1</sup>

It is evident that Walsingham was behind Lopez

<sup>1</sup> MSS. Paris Archives, Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

in this suggestion, and having in view the party to which he belonged, we shall be safe in assuming that the suggestion of peace negotiations was only a screen behind which agents might go backwards and forwards to Spain, and obtain information of armaments, &c. But two parties can play at such a game as this ; and when Andrada, with Marques in his company, proceeded to Spain, apparently themselves in all sincerity, Mendoza suggested to the King, and the latter approved of the suggestion, that Andrada shall be "sent backwards and forwards to England under cover of the negotiation, so that he may be able to report what is going on there." <sup>1</sup>

This, however, was not the only message that Andrada took from England. A brother-in-law of Lopez (whose name is not mentioned, but who was one of several brothers, English Jews, perhaps originally from Portugal, named Jorge or Anes) had professed to be deeply offended with Don Antonio for having spoken ill of his father (Gonzalo Jorge?), and promised, if a person were sent to him with an agreed token, he would "kill Don Antonio if his Majesty desired." He disapproved of the peaceful suggestion of his brother-in-law Lopez ; but, pending the authority to kill the Pretender, he also would send information from England. Andrada protests that "he never, on his conscience, urged the person to do this ; yet, seeing that although the heretic Queen had been merciful to him, Don Antonio had tried by all means to have him killed, he, Andrada, in revenge for such cruelty, is now disposed to do

<sup>1</sup> MSS. Paris Archives, Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

everything against Don Antonio, even to have him killed. Nothing will be done, however, without his Majesty's orders."

These were the missions that Andrada carried to Madrid, in part with the connivance of Walsingham, through Lopez; and I have quoted thus fully from these documents, which are here used for the first time, because upon this negotiation was subsequently built the accusation against Lopez of participating in the plot to murder the Queen, and an infinity of totally unsupported scandal was grouped around it. Andrada and Marques, as usual with persons of their rank, did not negotiate in Spain with the King himself, though they said they were admitted to the presence of Philip, who was seriously ill at the Escorial, to kiss his hand, as he sat in his great black velvet wheel chair. The peace suggestions of Dr. Lopez were discussed with Don Cristobal de Moura, Philip's favourite Secretary of State, and, although we know that the negotiation was as hollow on one side as the other, Andrada was sent back to England, with full instructions to proceed in the manner proposed by Mendoza. Moura's draft instructions on the matter are plain and precise. It is probable that Andrada himself was to think that the Spaniards were sincere, although, if such was the intention, he was really not deceived, and on his arrival in England at once divulged the truth in this respect to Lord Burghley. The draft for his instructions<sup>1</sup> clearly demonstrate that his negotiations in Spain were confined to the matters he had already stated in writing to Mendoza, namely, the

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, p. 162.

peace negotiations, the confinement in or expulsion from England of Don Antonio by the influence of Lopez, the murder of Don Antonio by Lopez's brother-in-law, unknown to the doctor, and the gaining of information in England. All these offers were accepted by Philip's Minister Moura, though, as will be seen, not the faintest indication is given in these most secret papers of any hint of a plot to kill Elizabeth, and certainly none was included in this negotiation. Of course, Moura must have known perfectly well that such an envoy as Andrada would have had no chance of negotiating a peace with the Queen, and the hint that "satisfaction" must be given by England, without, apparently, any concession on the part of Spain, would of itself have rendered the negotiations abortive. The whole matter, indeed, was insincere on both sides, with the object of gaining information. When Andrada and Marques were about to set out for England, Moura only provided the insignificant sum of 300 reals (= £6) for their voyage, and a promise of a pension of 30 reals (per month?)<sup>1</sup> at some future time. So empty, indeed, was Philip's treasury that Andrada's demand for a jewel for Dr. Lopez's "daughter," and the payments for the doctor's brother-in-law and the spy who furnished Andrada with information, had to be met by taking some of the "old jewels from his Majesty's casket"<sup>2</sup> in lieu of sending money. The "old jewel" sent to Lopez's daughter was a fine diamond and ruby ring, worth £100, and it was made, three years afterwards, one of the principal *pièces de conviction* against the doctor. It was said to have been sent direct

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, p. 162.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

from Philip to Lopez as a pledge for the murder of Elizabeth, and was asserted to have been accompanied by an "embrace" from the King himself. Andrada doubtless boasted and made the most of his mission; but there is no indication in the Spanish documents that any such message was sent, or even that he saw Philip at all. To any one who knows, as I do, the relations that existed between Philip and the rest of mankind, the mere idea of an "embrace" being sent by the King himself through such a messenger as Andrada to such a person as Dr. Lopez is ridiculous. The *abrazo*, at all events, may be dismissed as a fable invented long afterwards. The ring itself may have been intended for the Queen, as Lopez's daughters were young girls, and it is not likely that a ring would be sent to either of them. In any case, Lopez offered the ring to the Queen, though it is not clear whether he told her from whom it came, and she graciously refused it.<sup>1</sup> Of Marques we hear no more, but Andrada, after suffering shipwreck and many adventures, arrived at Havre in the summer of 1591, and begged the English Government to give him a passport to come to England. Walsingham, however, had died in the meanwhile, and Lord Burghley had received from his spies full information of Andrada's suspicious visit to Spain. Besides, his former betrayal of Don Antonio had marked him as a dangerous man, and when, eventually, after detention as a suspicious character by the Huguenot governor of Dieppe, he

<sup>1</sup> The fact of her having refused the ring is presumptive evidence of Lopez having said it came from Philip. As a rule, she received such presents from her courtiers with alacrity.

was brought to Rye, it was as a prisoner of the English. Lord Burghley, who evidently knew nothing of Walsingham's complicity in the matter, attached much importance to Andrada's coming. The air, as we have seen, was full of the talk of the Spanish plots, and here was a man known to be a traitor to his own King and in the pay of Spain, coming straight from Philip and was seeking entrance to the English court. When Andrada was brought to Rye (August 2, 1591 O.S.), he wrote to Burghley begging that he may be examined by the Lord Treasurer himself or by some person of great trust, as his mission was important;<sup>1</sup> and to the King, Don Antonio, he also sent a letter full of contrition for past errors, saying that he always wished to serve him, and had determined, in unison with Marques, upon a course which would complete successfully the matter he had in hand. He trusts, he says, that Antonio's Minister, Botello, may be present when he speaks to the Lord Treasurer on matters concerning the Queen and Philip II. Burghley's answer to the spy's letter was to send Mr. Mills to Rye with Botello and Dr. Lopez to examine Andrada and his papers, "at first civilly, and then threateningly, so that in fear of his life he may be compelled to disclose the truth." On the 13th August, Andrada related to Mr. Mills quite truly everything which I have already told from the documents themselves. From that time to this English historians have characterised this statement of his as a pack of lies,<sup>2</sup> and the man himself as a

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Dimock, for instance, dismissed it as "of course, all sheer false-



perjured braggart; but I have checked every statement and cannot find one discrepancy. He had been sent on this peace negotiation, he said, by Philip, whilst the latter prepared an expedition against England or Ireland: he told the whole story of his former negotiation with Mendoza, and assured Burghley that Walsingham was a party to the arrangement, though he does not seem to have appealed to Lopez for confirmation, as he might have done; he disclosed the offer of the Anglo-Portuguese brother-in-law of Lopez—though he did not give his name—to kill Don Antonio, and added that, on the failure of a certain Spanish emissary from Philip to get through France to kill the Pretender, the Spanish Ministers had authorised him, Andrada, to offer Dr. Lopez himself a large sum to commit the crime.

Lord Burghley was indignantly incredulous of the whole story, and sent to Andrada a scornful paper of queries.<sup>1</sup> How could Philip think, he asked, that Andrada could be a fit envoy to England, seeing the way in which he had betrayed Antonio before, and how could he think that the Queen would receive such a man? The suggestion (of Moura) that Andrada should be sent to Parma to make terms, considering how the Prince had tricked the Queen in the former peace negotiations, was ridiculous. What was the use of the disclosure of the names of those who *had been* spies in England, or of his, Andrada's, proposal for England to checkmate Philip by sending a force to Portugal in September in the

hood.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact it is all confirmed by the letters of Mendoza and Moura.

<sup>1</sup> In State Papers, Domestic, of the date.

interests of Don Antonio? Andrada made good and true answers to all these objections. He gave a wonderfully correct list of the Spanish spies still in England, letters from all of whom I have seen. He cited Mendoza's strong letter of recommendation of him to the King as a reason for the latter's trust in him, and protested warmly that his ultimate object was neither ambition nor greed, but to save Portugal from Spanish tyranny and avenge the death of his kinsfolk who had been sacrificed to Philip's cruelty. The man was obviously a traitor, and Burghley would not believe his protestations, or for some time accept his offers of service as a spy. He was consigned to the keeping of Dr. Lopez, in whose house he lived for the next year or so, and in June 1593 we find him living at Calais, whence he had gone from Zeeland, and although, as he says, poorly recompensed, sending to Lord Burghley such news as he could gather in the interests of England.<sup>1</sup> He was, however, discontented with his pay, and in August wrote to the Lord Treasurer a letter very different in tone to those he usually sent, and evidently conveying a covert intimation that unless money was sent to him he would take his services elsewhere. "As the Queen has nothing for him to do, and Don Antonio is not in a position to support him, he is determined to go where his fortune shall guide him." Naturally his fortune guided him to the Spanish territory of Brussels, and, fortunately for himself, Manuel Andrada trod English soil no more, although upon the

<sup>1</sup> His letters to Lord Burghley are in the Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. When he had set out for Flanders, Burghley had given him a sum equal to £10, and he does not seem to have received more.

facts I have here set down was reared the edifice whose fall crushed Dr. Lopez and sent all England into a fresh frenzy of hate and rage against the Spaniards.

Lopez in the meanwhile lived honoured and respected at court, a man of supposed wealth and influence; but he was already marked down for ruin. As we have seen, he had owed his advancement to Leicester, Walsingham, and Essex, the heads of the party determined upon open war with Spain, and lo! the discovery of this peace negotiation of Andrada exhibited him as an anxious intermediary in an arrangement with Spain. Walsingham was dead, and could not say that he never meant the negotiations to be sincere; they were evidently intended to be so by Lopez, and this was a desertion of those to whom he owed everything.<sup>1</sup> Essex was hotheaded and vindictive enough himself, but he had now two men practically living upon his bounty to whom peace with Spain was utter ruin and whose hatred for Philip was a mania.

Don Antonio, the evicted king, whose crown Philip had wrested from his brows; and Antonio Perez, the sleepless foe who had derided, deceived, and defied the sovereign who looked upon himself as semi-divine; who had raised revolt against and

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Goodman, in his "Court of James I.," gives us another reason for Essex's anger with Lopez. It appears that Don Antonio and Antonio Perez were carousing with Dr. Lopez at Eton, where they were all lodged whilst the court was at Windsor, and in the confidence bred of the circumstances the Doctor told his boon companions some very discreditable secrets respecting the Earl's maladies. This breach of professional etiquette was immediately conveyed to Essex by the two Antonios, and "here the Earl was so much incensed that he resolved to be revenged on him, and now he began to possess the Queen that Lopez was a very villain and had poisoned others."

had humiliated the proudest king on earth before his own people. To these men, both of whose lives Philip sought, Lopez, the reputed poisoner, was dreaded and hateful in a double sense. He had been in close communication with their enemy, first, to bring about peace between England and Spain, and secondly, to assassinate by his vile art those whom Philip wished out of the way.

What could save Lopez from such a combination as this, even if he had been innocent, much less if any guilt could be found beneath all this mysterious intriguing?

Either from the spying of Essex's creatures or otherwise, it was conveyed to the Queen by the Earl in the middle of October 1595 that a certain Portuguese gentleman of rank, who had been ruined by his adherence to the cause of Don Antonio, and was then living in Lopez's house in Holborn, being discontented with his master, had determined to compass the death of Don Antonio and offer his services to the King of Spain.<sup>1</sup> The Queen at once gave Essex an order for the apprehension of this man, Esteban Ferreira da Gama, and the examination of his papers.<sup>2</sup> This was the first step, and Essex lost no time in making the arrest, and handing his prisoner over to his own offended sovereign, Don Antonio, who was then lodging at

<sup>1</sup> Carleton ("Thankful Remembrancer") says that "it was conveyed to the Queen that it was Ferreira's intention to go to the King of Spain accompanied by Don Manoel, the eldest son of Don Antonio, and divers other Portuguese, the purpose being for them all to submit to Philip." Such a submission was, as we shall see by the correspondence, at all events one of the objects of the negotiations.

<sup>2</sup> All these men had aliases, some of them several, but I have throughout retained their true names to avoid unnecessary obscurity.

Eton College.<sup>1</sup> Orders were also sent to Rye, Sandwich, and Dover for all correspondence arriving at those ports directed to Portuguese to be detained and read. There was no definite charge against Ferreira; he was merely suspected of an intention to betray his master, Don Antonio; but a fortnight after his arrest a man named Gomez d'Avila, described as a "mean, base fellow," living when at home hard by Lopez's house in Holborn, was taken at one of the ports as he came from Flanders. Upon him was found a letter addressed to one Ferrandis, and signed Francisco de Torres. The terms in the letter were commercial, but neither the writer nor the person to whom it was addressed was known. It ran thus: "The bearer will inform your Worship in what price your pearls are held. I will advise your Worship presently of the uttermost penny that will be given for them, and crave what order you will have set down for the conveyance of the money, and wherein you would have it employed. Also this bearer shall tell you in what resolution we rested about a little musk and amber, the which I determined to buy. But before I resolve myself I will be advised of the price thereof. And if it shall please your Worship to be my partner, I am persuaded we shall make good profit."<sup>2</sup> This was very mysterious, and no explanation could be got from Gomez d'Avila. But he was put in prison as a precautionary measure whilst further inquiries were being made, his arrival and

<sup>1</sup> Sir William Waad's account in Lord Calthorpe's MSS., vol. xxxiii. fol. 148.

<sup>2</sup> Yetswirt's "True Report," &c.

arrest being kept secret. About the same time a large packet of letters was seized on another Portuguese at Dover, addressed to a certain Manuel Luis at Brussels, and in this packet was found a letter written by Ferreira to the Spanish Secretary Ibarra, enclosing another from Dr. Lopez to Ferreira, written before the arrest of the latter, giving him news of what was passing at court, where Lopez was staying, Ferreira being at the time in Dr. Lopez's house in London. This was confirmation of the suspicions against Ferreira, but nothing else.

In the meanwhile Lopez was using all the influence he possessed with the Queen to secure the release of Ferreira. He told her how ungrateful Don Antonio was, not only to this good servant of his, who had sacrificed everything for him, but also to her. He (Antonio) was even now, he assured her, quite truly, again planning to go to France, and to appeal for help to other princes, as he had done before. There was, Lopez told the Queen, no person more likely to be useful than Ferreira "to work a peace between the two kingdoms, in which he (Lopez) had already laid a good foundation."<sup>1</sup> And if her Majesty did not desire this course, what a good thing it would be "to cosin the King of Spain by a speech uttered by himself!"<sup>2</sup> The Queen sharply reproved the Doctor for this. She did not relish such liberties being taken with a crowned head, even that of her enemy. It was noticed, too, by courtiers that the Jew grew more and more

<sup>1</sup> Sir William Waad's account in Lord Calthorpe's MSS.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

haggard and anxious, for Essex had many friends whose watchful eyes were upon him.

In the meantime the "base fellow," Gomez d'Avila, was being daily pressed in Essex's house for some explanation of the mysterious musk and amber missive he had brought. During the time he was waiting in the chamber for examination on one occasion, he begged "an honest gentleman who happened to be there, and who spoke the Spanish tongue, to tell Dr. Lopez that he was captured."<sup>1</sup> This was a clue that was not lost upon Essex, to whom it was conveyed, for hitherto there had been no mention of any connection between Gomez d'Avila and the Doctor. "The honest gentleman" shortly afterwards met Lopez in the Base Court at Windsor, and gave him the message; whereupon it was noticed that Lopez "changed countenance."<sup>2</sup> When Gomez d'Avila saw the rack he gave further extension to the story. He had been sent, he said, by Ferreira two months previously to Brussels to one Manuel Luis—whose real name was Tinoco—and to Secretary Ibarra, and had there awaited for weeks the reply which he had brought to England, the letter signed Torres being really written by Manuel Luis (Tinoco). This at once marked out Ferreira as the man to whom this mysterious musk and amber letter had really been written.

Shortly before this Ferreira had taken a most unfortunate step. He was, be it recollected, only a prisoner of Don Antonio at Eton, and was under the charge of a young Portuguese servant named

<sup>1</sup> Sir William Waad's account in Lord Calthorpe's MSS.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Pedro. In order to test this lad, Ferreira asked him to beg another Portuguese, one Caldeira, who was a member of the household of the French Ambassador, also living at Eton College, to come and speak to him at his grated window. Caldeira replied that he dared not; but as the reply proved that Pedro had given the message, Ferreira then sent him to Caldeira with a little note, praying him to see Dr. Lopez, and to warn him, for God's sake, to prevent the coming over of Gomez d'Avila from Brussels, "for if he should be taken, the Doctor would be undone without remedy."<sup>1</sup> The message was conveyed to Lopez, who had not yet learnt of Gomez's arrest, and he then made his fatal mistake. Caldeira had been arrested, and was imprisoned at Ditton Park, for the lad Pedro had divulged to Don Antonio Ferreira's communication with him and Lopez. So the latter had to find another means of sending a reassuring note to Ferreira. He wrote on a little ticket, folded in a handkerchief sent from the laundry, that he had already taken steps to stop Gomez d'Avila from coming. "He had," he said, "sent twice or thrice to Flanders with that object, and would spare no expense, if it cost him £300."<sup>2</sup> This little note in the handkerchief was, of course, intercepted (by the confessor in the service of Don Antonio), and when Ferreira was confronted with the information contained in it, thinking that Lopez had betrayed him, he hastened to make a declaration

<sup>1</sup> The little note also contained these words: "All the diligence that hath been used doth not condemn Dr. Lopez as yet any whit, for I have bravely diverted anybody from that." This is noted by Waad as being "very suspicious" (Lord Calthorpe's MSS. 33).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



incriminating the Doctor. Lopez, he said, was a principal party in the negotiations for the submission of Don Antonio's son and heir to the King of Spain. The Doctor, he repeated, had artfully secured Andrada's release from prison three years before, in order that he might go to Mendoza and deal for the poisoning of Don Antonio; and he (Lopez) had been in the interests of Spain for years. Much of this was old news, at least to the Cecils, who had squeezed Andrada at Rye two years before, but it gave Essex some further clues. Gomez d'Avila was plied with leading questions till he confessed that when he was in Brussels he learnt that a great sum of money was to be sent to England, some 40,000 or 50,000 crowns, he thought. It was to be addressed to Ferreira, and was for the purpose of buying the adhesion of Don Antonio's eldest son and his followers to the Spanish side. Ferreira being confronted with this statement, admitted its truth, and confessed that the "musk and amber" letter was really intended for him, and referred to this matter. He went further, and proposed that the plot should be allowed ostensibly to proceed, and the sum, when it came, handed over to Don Antonio himself, to be used against Spain. Don Antonio was in dire poverty, and the money would have been welcome enough, but Essex and Perez persuaded him that there was some deep mystery behind all this, which, when discovered, would do more for his cause and against Philip than could be done by the treasure.

The watch upon the English ports was not slackened, and in December it met with its reward.

The Portuguese called Tinoco, otherwise Manuel Luis, came to Jefferey, the English Consul at Calais, asking for a passport and safe-conduct to go to England. He had been, he said, an adherent of Don Antonio; he had feigned attachment to the Spaniards, and had lived in Brussels in order to obtain the release of his wife and children in Portugal. He was, however, disgusted with his prince, Antonio, and owed gratitude and allegiance alone to the English Queen, who had secured his liberation from captivity in Barbary. His object in going to England was to reveal to the Queen and the Lord Treasurer secrets hurtful to England which he had learnt in Brussels. Jefferey, at his request, forwarded two memorials to this effect to Elizabeth and Burghley, and in due time a "prudently drafted" safe-conduct was sent by Sir William Waad, allowing the Portuguese to enter England without molestation, but reserved to the discretion of the Government whether he should be allowed to depart again. Tinoco, taking his safe-conduct for a full protection, sailed for England, in company with one of the Consul's servants, who took care not to let him out of his sight until he handed him to the captain of Dover Castle. Thence he was taken to court with all secrecy, expecting to be granted an interview with Lord Burghley. But, to his dismay, he was seized, searched, and placed safe under lock and key (14th January 1594). On him were found two letters, which were susceptible of sinister interpretation, and bills of exchange for a large sum of money. One of the letters was dated Brussels, 1<sup>2</sup>/<sub>2</sub> December 1593, signed by Count de Fuentes,

the Spanish governor of Flanders, and addressed to Ferreira, who had been languishing in Don Antonio's prison for two months previously. The letter bespeaks credence for the bearer, Tinoco, and requests Ferreira, if possible, to go to Portugal, and thence to Spain, for the purpose of conferring privately with Don Cristobal de Moura, the Secretary of State, following his directions for the service of his Majesty. "If the shadows he speaks of," the letter continues, "have been the occasion of not entreating the commission, and if he would be informed of what has been offered, he may do it; the chief matter is the service of the king. He is to consider well, before he takes the voyage in hand, whether he can give any better order therein, but the whole is referred to him, Ferreira. . . . It is important that he goes thither with the commission, for the profit that may be reaped thereby. . . . As to the young gentleman, it does not seem convenient to move anything till they see his decision."<sup>1</sup> Ibarra's letter was similarly enigmatical. It refers Ferreira to Tinoco, who knows their decision in the affair, which concurs with his, Ferreira's, own. "He is persuaded that Ferreira will do his endeavours, and he may be assured himself to obtain all that is to be expected of one (*i.e.* Philip) who can do so much, and is so willing to recompense that which is done in his service, and which is so much for the benefit of the world."

The wretched Tinoco was then submitted to the searching examination of Essex, Waad, and others. What did these strange letters mean? he was asked,

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, cexlvi.

since Count Fuentes said that he, Tinoco, knew all about it. Tinoco told a tale to explain why he had come to England. The new Viceroy of Flanders, the Archduke Ernest, was going to invade England, and an attack was to be made upon the Isle of Wight: a Gallego priest and a Jesuit were to come across from Dieppe to kill the Queen with a "device of fire," and much more vague stuff of the same sort, was all that at first could be got from him—evidently the loose talk of the English refugees in Brussels.<sup>1</sup> When he was pressed closely as to his object in going to Brussels at all from England, he prevaricated, and was tripped up again and again. But at last leading questions drew from him the avowal that he had been sent over to England to see Ferreira, and with him secretly endeavour to win Dr. Lopez to do "a service" to King Philip, presumably against Don Antonio, as Tinoco confessed that he had deserted the Pretender and despaired of his cause. But this avowal did not explain Fuentes and Ibarra's letters to Ferreira, and it was evident that something more was behind. Tinoco himself grew alarmed at the snare into which he had run, and wrote the next day to Cecil protesting his innocence and praying to be sent back to Flanders. He was, he says, "confused and encumbered by the cunning questions of the Earl of Essex," and had small knowledge of the language, French, in which he was examined. He came voluntarily in all sincerity to do the Queen a service, but has not been treated as he expected.

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, ccxvi.

He gives his word as a gentleman to serve her Majesty truly, and to send all information possible if he is allowed to go back to Brussels. His letters from Fuentes and Ibarra had, he asserted, no reference to Don Antonio and his affairs; and he advises Cecil to allow Ferreira himself to go to Spain, as desired in the letters, so that he may learn the designs of Philip against England. This was written on the 16th January, and its immediate effect was to render Tinoco's prison the closer. For the "cunning questions" of the Earl of Essex had drawn from him the avowal that the main object of his voyage and of Ferreira's curious correspondence was to prevail upon Dr. Lopez to do "a service" to the King of Spain that had no relation with Don Antonio. Gomez d'Avila had confessed that a large sum of money was to be sent to England for something; that he had waited two months in Brussels for a definite reply to some proposal sent by Ferreira—an inmate of Lopez's house—who had in his little note to the Doctor besought him to prevent a reply coming from Brussels or he, Lopez, would be utterly ruined, and had assured the Doctor that he, Ferreira, had not incriminated him, Lopez. The Doctor, moreover, in his little "ticket" in the handkerchief addressed in reply to Ferreira, had said that he would spend £300 rather than the answer from Brussels came over. This seemed to prove conclusively that the Doctor was really the principal in the business, whatever it was, and Tinoco said it did not concern Don Antonio. On the 1st January 1594 the blow of Essex fell upon his enemy. Dr. Lopez, the Queen's principal

physician, a court favourite and a friend of the great Lord Treasurer, found himself a prisoner. Nothing whatever of an incriminating character was found in his house; and when he was taken before the Lord Treasurer, his son, Sir Robert Cecil, and the Earl of Essex, at Burghley House in the Strand for examination, his answers seemed so satisfactory that the Cecils, at all events, were convinced that he had no part in any sinister designs. Burghley knew, of course, that he was in communication with Spanish agents, for he had become one of his own principal spy-masters. The Cecils also knew from their examination of Andrada all about the peace negotiations of two years before, and were persuaded that the new matter was a prolongation of the same intrigue, for the purpose of "cosining" the King of Spain and gaining knowledge of his intention. So, as soon as Sir Robert Cecil could get away from the examination of Lopez, he rode in haste to the Queen at Hampton Court, and told her how Essex had arrested her body-physician, and that on examination the Doctor had proved his innocence of offence. Elizabeth was in a fury. She had been squabbling with Essex ever since Christmas, and this was another grievance against him. When he appeared at court she railed at him vigorously. How dared he, "a rash temerarious youth," to bring these grave accusations of high treason, out of sheer malice, against a faithful servant of hers? She knew that Lopez was innocent, and it touched her honour now to see that justice was done. Cecil, the prim, sly, little hunchback, whom he hated, stood by whilst the haughty

favourite was thus rebuked; and when Essex flung out of the chamber, with flaming face and violent gesture, to sulk for the next two days, it touched *his* honour thenceforward to bring the Jew Lopez to the gallows, guilty or innocent.

Not a word up to this point had been said about poisoning the Queen, but in the excited state of public feeling against Spain, already described, a mere hint of such a plan attributed to Lopez was sufficient to turn every one against him. The hint was not long coming, and it came from the quarter where it might have been expected. Standen, one of Essex's Catholic spies, went to Hampton Court on the 24th January, and wrote to Bacon on the 30th an account of Lopez's first examination in London on the 21st, and the Queen's rage with Essex. He then says that "Lopez had been detected of a design to poison the Queen."<sup>1</sup> The following day Faunt, another of Essex's hangers-on, wrote from London to Bacon, saying that "it was most true that Dr. Lopez was most deeply touched in the particular working of the Queen's destruction, and was discovered to have been the King of Spain's pensioner for seven years past. . . . The Queen had forbidden all access to her, except only of four persons, besides councillors and ladies."<sup>2</sup> The day before this was written Lopez was taken to the Tower, and Essex himself wrote to his spy-master, Antony Bacon: "In haste this morning.—I have discovered a most dangerous and desperate treason. The point of conspiracy was her Majesty's death. The executioner should have been Dr. Lopez; the manner poison. This I

<sup>1</sup> Birch.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

have so followed as I will make it appear as clear as noonday.”<sup>1</sup>

In the meanwhile, the separate examination of all the prisoners continued. Tinoco was told that Ferreira, on a threat of torture, had charged him with high treason; and Tinoco, in a panic, we know not how pressed or led, but determined to save his own neck by the earliest and fullest declarations, opened the flood-gates of revelation, and surpassed himself in the satisfaction he gave to Essex. On the 11th February, Faunt wrote to Bacon some news he had heard secretly from Sir W. Waad about the Lopez case, which he now mixed up vaguely with the Collen, Annias, and Polwhele conspiracies, referred to in the preceding chapter. Then he goes on to say: “The inquiry is still very strict, and Dr. Lopez used great arts to elude it, and swore and forswore himself for that purpose.” However, he has already confessed that many letters had been sent to him from the King of Spain’s Ministers with large offers, but that he had always forborne to make answer, and entered not into promise. Yet one letter was found, in which he offered all his service to the King, saying that he only stayed in England to do him some acceptable service, which, being done, he would think himself happy to retire and die in his Majesty’s dominions.” Lopez, he said, asserted

<sup>1</sup> Birch, vol. i. p. 152. It is not plain whence came the original hint about Lopez killing the Queen, but it seems probable that it arose out of an important exclamation which Ferreira afterwards confessed he had made to his guard, the young Portuguese called Pedro, to the effect that he had no doubt that Lopez would poison either the Queen or Don Antonio if he was paid sufficiently for it.

<sup>2</sup> Sir William Waad, in his account in the Calthorpe MSS., speaks of “Lopez’s customary awful oaths.”



that all this was in pursuance of a plan he had arranged with Walsingham to gain over as a spy one of the assistants of Idiaquez, the Spanish Secretary of State. "But that shift," continued Faunt, "will not serve. This will prove the most resolute attempt, and most deeply advised, of the court of Spain, if Lopez be well sifted, who is a most vile person, and void of all shame and common humanity. Thus much in great secret."<sup>1</sup> All this, be it recollected, was from the various creatures of Essex. The letter to which he refers from Lopez, offering his services to Spain, is not now forthcoming, and Mr. Faunt's hearsay assertion of its existence is not conclusive; but there is no doubt that such letters had been written by Ferreira at Lopez's dictation.<sup>2</sup> This, however, is no proof that such offers as they contained related to the murder of the Queen. The first presumption, indeed, is to the contrary, as the unquestionable negotiations laid bare in the papers

<sup>1</sup> Birch.

<sup>2</sup> Ferreira confessed on the 18th February that ten months previously he had received from Lopez two letters to be delivered to Don Christobal de Moura. These letters were written by Ferreira himself, at the dictation of Lopez, and professed the latter's willingness to do all that the King of Spain desired, though, said Ferreira, the wording was purposely obscure. In answer, evidently, to a leading question, Ferreira confessed at the same time that, in his opinion, "the Doctor would have poisoned the Queen if required." This is an instance of the way in which the evidence was built up. From these extorted admissions to the confident statement that Lopez had written to the Spaniards offering to kill the Queen was but a step. In the same confession Ferreira said that Andrada had told him, shortly before he left England in 1593, that if the King of Spain wished, Dr. Lopez would poison either the Queen or Don Antonio. This speech Ferreira said he had afterwards repeated to Lopez himself, who replied, "As for the King (Don Antonio), he shall die with the first sickness that shall happen to him, but for the Queen we have no answer as yet from the other side." See Ferreira's confession, State Papers, Domestic, and in Yetswirt's book.

from the Paris archives I have quoted in an appendix prove that the communications between Lopez and the Spaniards disclosed therein refer to the simulated peace overtures, and also, probably, to the removal of Don Antonio by poison.

Essex, Waad, and Robert Cecil (for the latter was as anxious now as the Earl himself to sift the matter; it was the Cecil method never to champion an unpopular cause) followed up ceaselessly the clues thus gained, with the object of "making it appear clear as noonday" against Lopez. Tinoco's admissions were used as levers for still further opening the lips of Ferreira; and the two prisoners were so cleverly handled with fears of torture, and by a desire to ingratiate themselves with their examiners, that the story soon looked circumstantial enough to ensure the hanging of Lopez. When the evidence, such as it was, was pieced together, it appeared from the declarations that the reference to "peace" and "service" really meant the murder of the Queen by Lopez.<sup>1</sup> The ruby ring and the mythical "embrace" brought by Andrada to the Doctor were said to be an encouragement direct from Philip to the commission of the crime. The King, however, distrusting such a man as Andrada in so delicate a mission, had instructed

<sup>1</sup> Tinoco confessed on 26th February: "The letters I wrote to Ferreira by Gomez d'Avila concerning the point which speaketh of pearls, and the price of them, was to give him to understand that the news which he had sent that Dr. Lopez would kill the Queen were very greatly accepted, and much esteemed of Count de Fuentes and Secretary Ibarra. And touching the point concerning musk and amber, the Count de Fuentes did tell me that he did look for a resolution of the King of great importance; and when it came there should be a great matter" (Yetswirt).

Count Fuentes to employ Ferreira instead of him. Andrada himself, it was asserted, had written to Count Fuentes three letters, urging that the money for the service (*i.e.* the murder of the Queen) should be paid at once. It was not in accordance with the Spanish principle to pay beforehand—if at all—and, according to the confessions, the matter hung fire until Ferreira was sent by Lopez to Flanders with the two letters already referred to again offering his service in obscure terms. Ferreira stated that Fuentes and Ibarra instructed him to obtain a more binding pledge from the Doctor, which, however, he was unable to do. Tinoco was then sent by Ferreira from London to Brussels and Antwerp, where Andrada was then staying. At Fuentes' instance Tinoco persuaded Andrada to stand aside, whilst Ferreira acted as principal intermediary;<sup>1</sup> and Tinoco then went back to England for one day only—according to his own statement—carrying grand promises and another embrace from Fuentes

<sup>1</sup> Tinoco confessed on the 22nd February that Fuentes had summoned him to his house at Brussels and asked his opinion about Andrada. Tinoco's reply appears to have been unfavourable, and Fuentes's secretary had then exhibited to Tinoco three letters, which he said had been written by Andrada to him from Calais. The first letter related that Dr. Lopez had sent him (Andrada) to say that he "was determined to do such a piece of service to the king of Castile as thereby he (Philip) might with safety satisfy himself of the English nation. But so as the King should recompense his services with honour and favour, according to the quality thereof; for he was old, and in many ways indebted, and would now find rest for his old age. And declaring the quality of the service he (Andrada?) told him (Fuentes) that Dr. Lopez bound himself to despatch the Queen by poison; whereof it behoved him (Fuentes) to advertise the king of Spain thereof with all speed; and he (Andrada) would attend at Calais until answer came from Madrid." According to Tinoco, it was at this point that Philip declined to proceed in such a matter by means of a person so discredited on both sides as Andrada.

to Lopez, and a letter from Moura in Spain to Ferreira, instructing him that the "treaty of peace," which Tinoco said meant the murder of the Queen, should be renewed. Tinoco then returned to Flanders and Ferreira himself kept close to Lopez, urging him to do the service required of him, and Ferreira confessed that the Doctor demanded 50,000 crowns down; and according to the prosecution, it was the delay necessary for the return of Philip's answer to this demand that was referred to in the reply promised to be sent to Ferreira by Tinoco about the price of "pearls." Tinoco's own journey to England after Ferreira's arrest was said to have been urged by Fuentes for the purpose of encouraging the conspirators by the letters from Fuentes and Ibarra, and of exciting Lopez's cupidity by showing him bills of exchange for a large amount, which might be his after the commission of the crime.<sup>1</sup>

It will be seen by these confessions that Tinoco's<sup>2</sup> avowals were all directed to prove his own innocence at the expense of Lopez and Ferreira, whilst the latter sought to shift the principal burden upon Lopez. Both the prisoners, however, admitted the main point, namely, that the conspiracy really aimed

<sup>1</sup> Be it recollected that three years before the Spanish Ministers had themselves offered 30,000 for the killing of Don Antonio by Lopez.

<sup>2</sup> Tinoco confessed on 22nd February that Fuentes and Ibarra had summoned him to a secret chamber, and taking his hands in theirs, had made him pledge himself to inviolable secrecy. "After I had given them my word and faith . . . they told me that Ferreira had written to them that Lopez had offered and bound himself to kill the Queen of England by poison, on condition that the King of Spain should recompense his services according to their quality. This passed at the house of Count de Fuentes in Brussels, and as far as I remember on the 9th December last."

at the Queen's death; and the final triumph for Essex was to wring some sort of admission from Lopez himself. All the avowals of Tinoco and Ferreira were dangled before him daily in the Tower. First he indignantly denied his guilt; then, in terror or distress, he admitted that he had made a promise to the Spaniards to poison the Queen, but that his object was simply to cheat Philip out of a large sum of money and then to expose him. Although it is often asserted that this confession was made on the rack, this does not appear to have been the case. But however obtained, it sufficed; and on the 28th February 1594 Lopez was tried at Guildhall by special commission, including Essex and Cecil. Tinoco and Ferreira told their story again, with all the damning details. In accordance with the usual procedure in such cases, the accused was browbeaten and abused unmercifully by his judges and prosecutors. The various letters I have mentioned were made the most of, though of themselves without the declarations they would have proved nothing against Lopez,<sup>1</sup> except perhaps the little notes that had passed between him and Ferreira when the latter was first arrested. The Doctor solemnly asserted that he was innocent; and on being confronted with his own partial confession, he said that it had been made out of fear of the rack. This was denied; and he then averred that his only wish

<sup>1</sup> It must be recollected that the letters purporting to be written by Andrada in Calais to Count Fuentes connecting Lopez directly with the plot to kill the Queen were only recited on the recollection of Tinoco, who asserted that they had been shown to him in Brussels by the secretary of Count Fuentes.

was to "cosen" King Philip. Confronted with Tinoco and Ferreira, he could only protest passionately that their evidence was all false, and he was in turn told by them that he lied. Lopez, guilty or innocent, was doomed long before, and on his own statement he was condemned to death as a traitor. Cecil was as eager as Essex now to wash his hands of sympathy with the fallen wretch, and directly he left Guildhall he wrote to a friend that "ye vile Jew sayd that he did confess indeed to it that he had talk of it, but now he might tell further he did belie himself; and did it only to save himself from racking, which, ye Lord knoweth on my sowles wytness, to be most untrue: and so he was told home: and the most substantial jury I have seene have found him guilty in the highest degree of all treasons; and judgment passed against him with ye applause of all ye world."<sup>1</sup> Ferreira and Tinoco were put upon their trial a fortnight afterwards, and, notwithstanding their prayers for mercy and their engaging frankness, there was no clemency for them. For some reason or other the Queen hesitated to sign the death-warrant. Lopez begged humbly for himself, his wife and children, but without avail so far as he was concerned. All England was in a ferment of indignation, owing to the revelations made by Ferreira and Tinoco, and the heat introduced into the accusations against Philip and his Ministers by the Essex party; and at length, early in June 1594, the three poor wretches, bound to hurdles, were dragged up Holborn to Tyburn, and the penalty for treason was paid by

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, cclvii.

all of them, with a sickening barbarity exceeding even the usual awful rites.<sup>1</sup> Lopez in vain tried to speak to the vast scoffing crowd that faced him. Almost speechless with agitation, he solemnly protested his innocence: mocking laughter and ribald interruption alone greeted his despairing cry. He was unfortunately inspired to say that he loved his mistress better than Jesus Christ; and this, coming from a Jew, so incensed the multitude that the tumult silenced all else, and Ruy Lopez went to his death, and left his final secret to be guessed by others.

The reader has had placed before him quite impartially all the evidence known to be in existence upon which Lopez was condemned. He can judge for himself as to the righteousness of the sentence. That Lopez was willing to poison his master, Don Antonio, there is no reason to doubt; that he was a false and lying trickster is proved beyond possibility of cavil and by his own statement; but he was a clever, self-seeking man, and he must have known that to poison the Queen, whose chief physician he was, to gain the reward of a King who was notoriously a bad paymaster and an ungrateful patron, would have been foolish from a purely business point of

<sup>1</sup> It is related, though no authority is quoted, in Dr. Lee's "The Church under Queen Elizabeth," that one of the three, probably Tinoco, as he was the youngest, recovered his feet after the hanging, and, mad with pain and desperation, attacked the executioner. The crowd applauding his pluck, broke through the guard and made a ring to witness the fight. Two burly ruffians came to the executioner's help, but one was immediately felled by a blow from the prisoner, who kept the other two at bay for some time. The half-strangled creature was at length stunned with a blow on the head, and the disembowelling then proceeded.

view. Lopez had made his home in England for forty years and all his interests were here. For a large reward he might have undertaken to poison Don Antonio, for the Pretender was discredited everywhere, and his death would have injured no one but himself, but it was far otherwise in the case of the death of Elizabeth under the hands of her physician. That would have ruined Lopez socially and professionally; have made life for him impossible in England or any Protestant country, and have left him to the tender mercies of Philip and the Inquisition unless he had sought oblivious refuge in Turkey, which, for a man of his antecedents, would have been as bad as death.

The proofs against him are absolutely confined to the declarations of his two accomplices, and especially Tinoco, who confessed himself a perjurer, and both of them would probably have sworn to anything desired of them to save their necks. The evidence of Philip's complicity is for the most part demonstrably false, whilst that against Fuentes and Ibarra—so far as the plot to murder Elizabeth is concerned—rests likewise on extremely unsubstantial foundations. The whole of the original documents produced in the case were compatible with the objects of the conspiracy being: (1) the simulation of peace negotiations to obtain information; (2) the winning over of Don Antonio's eldest son and his adherents; (3) the "cosening" of King Philip, for the benefit of the conspirators; and (4) the murder of Don Antonio or of Antonio Perez. It is unwise to pronounce a dogmatic opinion on so very doubtful a case, but on a review of the quality of the whole



evidence, I am inclined to believe that one or more of these objects were those really aimed at. It is not at all necessary to believe that Essex purposely and knowingly sacrificed an innocent man, but the Earl's evident desire to incriminate Lopez would naturally influence the statements of the two prisoners, anxious for their own pardon, upon whose evidence mainly Lopez died.

About a fortnight after the execution of Lopez, and whilst broadsides magnifying the danger to the realm were still in the hands of all men, Essex received a letter, written from Calais, by a young man of good family named Edmund Yorke. The writer expressed deep contrition that he had broken the law by going abroad without licence, and begged the Earl to sue for his pardon, and permission to return to his allegiance in England. He had, he said, been acknowledged at Brussels as heir to his uncle's property,<sup>1</sup> but as the authorities there would not put him in possession of the inheritance until he swore allegiance to Philip, he preferred to renounce it, and to live as a "poor good subject in England." He had with him, he said, two English gentlemen of like mind to himself, one of whom had served under Essex in France, and the other had been for three years in Sir William Stanley's regiment. They all begged for the Queen's pardon, and offered, if they were allowed to come over, to do good service to their natural sovereign. The vagaries of this young man in France and Flanders were not unknown to

<sup>1</sup> His uncle was Sir Rowland Yorke, who, when in command of the English contingent at Zutphen, went over with his regiment to the enemy. He had since died, leaving considerable property in Flanders.

Essex. He had been consorting with Catholics in France, and latterly had been the constant companion of the most swaggering set of the exiles in Flanders. He had been received into the Church by Father Holt, and his relationship to the traitor Rowland Yorke was ominous. So, although Essex sent the permission for Edmund Yorke and his two companions, Richard Williams and Henry Young, to come to England, they were closely shadowed from the hour they first landed. Young was a rogue, pure and simple, and hastened, in the usual way, when he found that suspicion was entertained, to be the first to betray his companions. According to his first story,<sup>1</sup> told on the 30th July 1594, the object of Yorke's coming was to raise rebellion in North Wales by the aid of Williams. They were to go in the winter to Conway, and, with the aid of local friends, to seize the castle: money was to be provided by Williams' uncle, Ralph Sheldon, and a Mr. Pew, a rich Anglesea squire and trader, was to sell his estate and spend the money in maintaining the revolt, whilst a Captain Middleton of the Queen's Navy was to co-operate with his ship. According to Young, the assertion of Yorke about his uncle's property was false, and had been invented by Father Holt to throw the English Government off its guard. Yorke had already received £250 of the inheritance, and the rest was being held for his benefit. The plan of invasion, said Young, had been devised by Sir W. Stanley, and in the various conferences about it he had identified Drs. Gifford, Holt, and Worthington. The trio of suspects had

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, cexlix.

feigned to be discontented with the leaders in Brussels, and had ostentatiously sold their cloaks in pretended poverty, and had given out that they intended to return to their allegiance in England.

Coming after so many similar declarations, to which I have referred in the last chapter, this seemed important, and Yorke and Williams were at once cast into the Tower. Essex himself took the matter in hand, and began by interrogating Yorke, whose statement about himself was vague. Holt, he said, meant to send him to Scotland, but he did not know on what business. But when he saw or suspected that his associates had betrayed him, he grew very communicative about *them*. He had heard Young say that he had offered Father Holt in writing to kill the Queen, on condition of a good sum of money paid down, and more afterwards. Williams had thereupon said that he, too, would do it for a large sum of money, and advancement for his house, as he himself would be sure to die in the attempt. He (Yorke) declared that he had heard Sir William Stanley say that if the Queen were to die, he would take his regiment to Scotland, and there make himself strong, after which he and all Englishmen would go to the Earl of Derby. Williams also had said in his hearing that if he came to England, he would commit some great robbery, and with the proceeds, and with the help of Pew, would raise a rebellion.

All this was the usual swashbuckling gossip of the Brussels refugees, directed specially to the inculpation of Young and Williams, whom Yorke suspected of betraying him. Young, he said, had

sworn to kill both the Queen and Burghley, whilst Williams, who was the special friend of Lieutenant Jacques Francis, had talked loosely about doing some "great service" in England. With these admissions Essex was able to put the screw on Young, who evidently thought that Williams, and not Yorke, had betrayed *him*. Williams, he said, had stolen eighteen hundred pounds-worth of church plate from Winchester, and had coined it into money in the chamber of his uncle, Sir Griffin Markham, in Gray's Inn, sharing it with others. He had afterwards tried to break into the Queen's palace of Whitehall and steal her jewels, but one of the parties took fright and the attempt failed. He (Young) had written letters for Williams to Dr. Gifford and other English refugees, asking for money and employment. In one of the letters Williams had demanded 200 crowns down and advancement for his house for the service, if he perished in the "action." Dr. Gifford replied to this that he should be employed with Yorke. Talking of the killing of the Queen, Williams had said that only resolution was required, to which Yorke had replied "that they were fools to think of killing the Queen: she was always mewed up in a chamber. It would be better service to kill the Lord Treasurer's horse, for he would take it so grievously if the old jade were dead that he would die too." Williams had also said that he should like to tread under foot the base nobility of England that lived in servitude.

These avowals, as will be seen, were directed mainly against Williams, and when, later in the day (12th

August), he was confronted with Young's accusations, he was either too much terrified or too vain-glorious to palliate them greatly. He confessed that he had committed a robbery in England, and had taken service under Essex in France to get out of the way. He had deserted to the enemy, and now came to England for the purpose of raising rebellion, as Young had stated. It was quite true that he had sent offering his services in England to Holt and Gifford, but they had sent him a cool answer. He admitted that there was much talk in Brussels about killing the Queen, and Young had said that he would do it for money; whereupon Yorke had ejaculated, "Tush! you will kill the Lord Treasurer's nag." Torture soon wrung from the poor wretch further avowals. He gave particulars of all the Catholics and priests he knew, and was ready to confess everything.

Two days afterwards Yorke was taken in hand. He had talked wildly and rashly: had expressed a wish to be present at the burning of London: had spoken with gross disrespect of Lord Burghley: had said that he knew Young to be an expert poisoner; and these indiscretions, and the avowals of Young and Williams, made it easy for Essex and Cobham to handle him. On the rack he confessed that Father Holt had promised him 100,000 or 200,000 crowns if he would raise a rebellion in England, "or do some notable act." The plan, he said, was to seize Conway; and Williams immediately afterwards confirmed him in all that he admitted. On the 20th August Yorke was again examined; and on this occasion he said all that was required of

him. Holt, he confessed, had persuaded him to come over on the Queen's pardon and live at court; and had promised him on oath a payment of 40,000 crowns, guaranteed by Secretary Ibarra, if he killed the Queen, by his own agents or by means of two refugee associates designated to him. At the conferences on the subject he had met Stanley, Thomas Throgmorton, Charles Paget, Dr. Worthington, and Dr. Gifford, and various means of committing the crime were suggested—poignard, arrow, rapier, and dagger, to be used on the Queen as she walked in her garden. He had, he said, received forty crowns from Gifford; but they had kept him in want, in order that he should be driven to undertake the task. The plan was for him, Yorke, to have entered the household of Essex, Williams that of the Lord Admiral (Howard), and Young that of the Lord Chamberlain; and on their departure they partook of the sacrament in pledge of their sincerity, being absolved by Father Holt.

This was all admitted under torture; and a day or two afterwards Young alleged that in conversation at Calais the poor, foolish young fellow Yorke had expressed wonder at any man betraying a friend on the rack. He had boasted of the Duke of Parma's admiration of Sir Rowland Yorke's firmness under torture, and had said, if they both kept firmly secret, they might yet ride through London with silver footcloths. Williams in the same conversation had boasted that he would rather die than betray his friends under torture, and said that if anything was dragged from him on the rack he would at once deny it again when he was taken

down. According, however, to Young, this conversation at Calais unnerved Williams, for all his bragging, for when Essex's passport came allowing them to go to England, and he found himself described as "one Williams," he said they would be foolish to go over, for they might be racked and hanged. Young told the examiners, too, that the Council of State for England, which met in the Jesuit College at Brussels every morning, consisted of Charles Paget, Thomas Throgmorton, Hugh Owen, Captain Tresham, and Drs. Holt, Gifford, and Worthington.

Williams's next admission was unreserved and damning. On the 27th August he confessed, as Yorke had done, that he had been sent by Holt and Stanley to kill the Queen, on promise of great reward; and both he and Yorke had taken the sacrament upon it. This was said to Sir Michael Blount, Sir W. Waad, and the Attorney-General Coke; but Essex made Williams repeat the statement in his presence, and wrote on the document containing it that "Williams had said that he would avow it to his death before Yorke's face." There was no need for it, for Yorke had already told almost the same story, and death for high treason was the inevitable doom of both.<sup>1</sup>

There are two things specially to be noted in these confessions, and they did not escape the keen intellect of Lord Burghley.<sup>2</sup> The evidence of the complicity of Secretary Ibarra depends only upon Yorke's statement that Holt had said that he

<sup>1</sup> All these confessions are in State Papers, Domestic, ccxlix.

<sup>2</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 607.

guaranteed the payment; and in Lord Burghley's *breviate* a note points out that "this is all against Ibarra or any other Spaniard;" and secondly, that in the list of persons given as being present at the conference which arranged the assassination there appear the names of Charles Paget, Worthington, Gifford, and others, who were known to be opposed to the Jesuit policy.<sup>1</sup> This was considered important enough for Yorke to be re-examined on the point, and he was constrained to admit that he was not quite sure of their being present. This seems to indicate that, at least in points of detail, his evidence cannot be depended upon. Holt and the few extremists in Brussels, who had been at the bottom of all the genuine attempts to kill Elizabeth, were evidently the originators of this; but from the day of its discovery until now, one English historian after another has repeated that this conspiracy was a Spanish plot hatched by Fuentes and Ibarra. We have seen that Ibarra's connection with it depends upon a second-hand assertion, unconfirmed by any reliable evidence, and yet the contemporary writers un-animously cast themselves specially upon this point;<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It will be noted that Dr. Gifford, who was much more opposed than Worthington to the Spanish party, was mentioned by the prisoners in this case as an active accomplice. This is difficult to believe.

<sup>2</sup> In Yetswirt's "Sondry Horrible Treasons," written almost immediately after the event, it is stated that Yorke confessed that "Hugh Owen showed him at Brussels an assignation in writing, signed by Ibarra, for assurance of payment of 40,000 crowns, to be given to him from the King of Spain if he should kill the Queen, or should assist Williams or any other to perform the same. The assignation was afterwards deposited with Holt the Jesuit, who also showed it to Yorke, and swore on the sacrament to pay the amount as soon as the fact should be committed." I can find no such statements in Yorke's confessions in the State Papers. The main point, apparently, was to connect Spaniards with the plot.



and the plot of Holt, Yorke, and Williams, like that of Lopez, served as fresh fuel for the fire of hatred which it was the object of the Essex party to keep raging between England and Spain, it being represented that Philip and his Ministers, both in the Lopez case and this, were the first instigators of the murder of the Queen.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

Paris Archives, Uncalendared MSS., K. 1578, 7 and 11. As these documents have never been printed, and prove conclusively the falsity of much of the evidence upon which Lopez was convicted, I translate them here entire. They are in the form of minutes from the Secretary of State, Moura, to Philip, for his consideration and approval, and though they bear no date, they are correctly included in the papers for 1591.

K. 1578, 7. *Paris Archives Nationales. Fonds Simancas.*

“Respecting Manuel de Andrada and Pedro Marques his companion.

“The things proposed by Manuel de Andrada are three in number:—

“1. By means of Dr. Lopez he was opening negotiations for peace with England if permission be given to him to do so. He believes that he could carry these through successfully, as he understands that they (the English) desire it, and Dr. Lopez assures him of success.

“2. By means of the same Dr. Lopez he will undertake, if so desired, that Don Antonio shall never leave that country (England).

“3. Or otherwise that he shall be expelled at once, if that course be preferred.

“Besides these three things, which are the main objects of his coming, he says that he has an understanding with an Englishman, a brother-in-law of the said Dr. Lopez, who undertakes to send him advices of events there, and will also attempt to do another secret service which he (Andrada) recommended to him. This understanding with the brother-in-law is unknown to Dr. Lopez.

“It appears that there can be no objection in letting this man (Andrada) return to England; and to give him a pretext for

doing so, it will be necessary to seize upon the first point of his proposals. He may therefore go to Calais, and write from there to Dr. Lopez that his coming has been prompted by the common good, begging him to send a passport. When he receives the passport, he may proceed whithersoever Dr. Lopez may instruct him. On his arrival he may tell him that he had proposed the peace negotiations here as Lopez had requested him, and had set forth the Doctor's good services; whereupon all the (Spanish) Ministers had asked him (Andrada) what letters of credence or other authority he could produce to enable him to deal in the matter. This will lead them to infer that, if he had brought such credentials he would have been favourably listened to; although, at the same time, he may say that he was told that it would be necessary for the peace suggestions to be accompanied by due satisfaction for the offences inflicted upon Spain. Andrada should also be instructed to express hopes of success on some such basis as this, as if of his own motion, in order that he may have an excuse for remaining there safely for some time, and when he thinks best he can return ostensibly on the same matter.

“He must be instructed that, whilst he remains in England, he may urge Dr. Lopez's brother-in-law to do the secret service proposed. And moreover, since Dr. Lopez himself gave his word to get Don Antonio expelled from England if his Majesty desired, he should be asked to fulfil his promise in this respect, as his offer to do so has been accepted, and his good service in all things will be acknowledged.

“Under cover of all this, Manuel de Andrada must inquire and discover everything he can that is going on there, and send us full advices of the same

“It is only reasonable that he should have a grant in aid. He himself proposes a grant secured on some Portuguese revenues.

“His other demands must remain in abeyance for the present, but he may proceed on his service in the assurance that on his return he shall be very highly considered.

“In addition to the grant in aid in Portugal, he will need some money for his voyage, as much as appears necessary. He asks for a jewel to be given to him for the daughter of Dr. Lopez, and he attaches importance to this.

“He also requests money to remunerate the man he has gained to give him information, and the Doctor’s brother-in-law. There seems no objection to this being done in moderation.

“Pedro Marques will apparently follow Andrada’s lead, and will be more easily satisfied.”

This document was, as usual, sent by the King to Moura for his report and recommendations, and Moura returned the following, of which Philip approved :—

*“The opinion of Don Cristobal de Moura respecting the matter of Manuel de Andrada.”*

“He should be given 300 reals as a grant in aid for the expenses of his journey to England with his companion.

“In addition to this he may be told that he shall have a grant not exceeding thirty reals (per month?) secured on Indian revenues, but other than those that he proposes, as they cannot be allowed.

“It will be just to give him something for the daughter of Dr. Lopez, and this may be one of the old jewels from his Majesty’s caskets.

“It will also be advisable to give him something for the brother-in-law of Dr. Lopez, who offers to do the service, and also for the other confidant who gives information. But as at present there is no money to spare, it will perhaps be best to take for this purpose also some of the jewels from the said old caskets belonging to his Majesty, as is suggested above for the other gift.”

## CHAPTER VI

The complete separation of the two sections of English Catholics—Alarm in England at the Spanish armaments—Drake's last voyage—Tyroné's declaration—Promise of Spanish aid—Irish emissaries to Spain—The expeditions of Captains Cobos, Medinilla, and Cisneros to Ireland—Their description of Ireland—Breakdown of the Spanish Administration—Essex's attack upon Cadiz.

THE indignant alarm aroused amongst Englishmen of all classes by the constant threats of conspiracy and foreign invasion on the part of the extreme faction of refugees, was now rapidly hurrying on the complete division amongst Catholics, which finally led to the victory of Protestantism and the peaceful succession of James to the English throne. The seminaries had all been captured by the Jesuit party; the moderating influence of Cardinal Allen had disappeared with his death (October 1594); Father Persons, with indefatigable activity and zeal, practically controlled Philip's policy with regard to England; and Father Holt in Flanders, by his hauteur and violence alienated all but those whose views were as extreme as his own. These causes together operated in the formation of a strong anti-Jesuit Catholic party in England and abroad. We have seen that from the first the secular priests disapproved of the violent political action of the Fathers of the Company, and had smarted under their airs of superiority. Ever since the defeat of the Armada and

the exposure of Philip's real objects, the breach had been widening, but the reconciliation of Henry IV. to Rome, and the now acknowledged hopelessness of Philip's attempt to gain for his favourite daughter a foothold in France, gave rise to circumstances which drove both sections of Catholics still farther apart. Henry IV. being now a faithful son of the Church, and the French interest in the counsels of the Vatican being restored, the anti-Spanish Catholic party was greatly strengthened, whilst the Jesuit interest, to counterbalance this, endeavoured to pledge the King of Spain to its uncompromising course by openly advocating as their candidate for the English throne the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, who, through Philip's father and mother, claimed the crown by right of descent from John of Gaunt and Edward III. The book published by Persons under the name of Dolman, and dedicated, with characteristic audacity, to the ambitious favourite, Essex, completely opened the eyes of Catholics and Protestants alike. Its effect upon the English Catholics was marked and immediate. The group of exiles who followed Charles Paget and Dr. Gifford in Flanders and the Bishop of Cassano in Italy denounced the unpatriotic Englishmen who would submit their country to a foreign yoke; the turbulent English students in Rome broke out into open revolt against their Jesuit masters,<sup>1</sup> and the Catholic prisoners in the castle of Wisbech divided into two distinct antagonistic sections, even in their common

<sup>1</sup> Full particulars of this disturbance will be found in Law's "Jesuits and Seculars," p. xxix., and the sequel may be followed in "The Archpriest Controversy" (Camden Society).

tribulation. To make matters worse, the cardinal's hat vacant by the death of Allen was struggled for with so much acrimony by both sections, that neither Persons, Stapleton, nor the Bishop of Cassano got it, and the much needed English Catholic prelate, with sufficient authority to introduce a spirit of moderation on both sides, was not appointed. Moderation and compromise, indeed, were utterly foreign to Persons' methods and aims;<sup>1</sup> and the secular priests, on the other hand, did not mince their words when they exposed the disastrous effects produced upon the Catholic cause in England by Jesuit action.<sup>2</sup> They who, for the great part, had to bear the brunt of the persecution, could not fail to see that the constant impotent aggression kept up by the extreme party from its safe refuge on the other side of the water gave justification for the severe penal enactments from which all Catholics suffered.

The cause of Spain itself, moreover, was irretriev-

<sup>1</sup> In 1596 Persons threw down the gage anew by circulating his manuscript book called "Memorial of the Reformation in England," in which he set forth his views as to how this should be carried out, in case he died before the restoration of Catholicism. There was to be no "huddling up" this time, he said, whereby fallen priests were admitted to the altar, with no other satisfaction but sending away their concubines. The Church property was to be restored; there was to be no political paltering with that question, as there had been in Mary's time; and "some good and sound manner of Inquisition" must be established. It is plain to see that the only Catholic England with which Persons would be contented was one modelled on Catholic Spain. It is evident, from such blind bigotry as this, that Persons, for all his ability, was utterly out of touch with the vast majority of his countrymen, and that the adoption of such a policy as his by the only foreign power that could effectively aid the Catholics of England to reassert the supremacy of their faith, rendered their cause hopeless.

<sup>2</sup> See Father Bagshaw's "True Relation," reprinted in Law's "Jesuits and Seculars."

ably damaged by the policy of the hot-headed zealots who bragged and swaggered in Flanders, and who wrote impracticable and violent books in Spain. All England was kept in a ferment and for ever on the alert. Philip's slow and cumbrous methods made sudden action at a moment when England was unprepared in any case difficult, but thanks to the continual threatening boasts and abortive plots of Stanley and his party and the alarmist reports of the English spies, all the Spanish plans were forestalled long before they were even matured.

As we have seen in chapter iii., the English Government were fully informed of the proceedings of both the Scottish and Irish emissaries in Spain during the winter of 1594 and the spring and summer of 1595, and, as usual, gave to Philip a credit for promptness and liberality in acceding to the prayers for help which neither his character nor his resources permitted. He was chronically in want of money, and the capture of his treasure fleet, or any considerable portion of it, crippled him for a year at least. The loss of Brest had made a direct invasion of England in force again impossible, for Blavet was too small a port for the rendezvous of a great navy, and the new ships which the Spaniards had constructed, although persistently viewed in England as a threatening Armada destined for invasion, were, in fact, mainly intended to protect Spanish trade and to ensure the arrival of the treasure fleets, upon which the potency of Spain depended. Although, therefore, the English knew it not, Philip was in a position to give only very small aid, if any at all, in 1595 to those who were urging him to strike a blow which should overturn Protestantism in the



three kingdoms. But the constant alarm in which England was kept by the action of the extremists in Flanders, cleverly and systematically exaggerated by the Essex war party at home,<sup>1</sup> led to the re-adoption of an aggressive policy on the part of England in 1595, which drove Philip to despair, and compelled him to make one more great effort, by which at least the English might be diverted from ravaging his own coasts and commerce.

Drake had for years been under a cloud, though doing useful work at Plymouth, but he chafed at the naval supineness which had fallen upon the councils of Elizabeth. He knew that without the money from America, Philip, the national enemy, was powerless, and Protestantism safe. The treasure depot at Panama was the heart from which flowed the life-blood of Spain. Let me strike at that, prayed Drake, and the giant sinks to impotence. Elizabeth doubted and hesitated long; for she hated her wooden walls to drift too far away, and the stories of Philip's preparations and the Béarnais' shiftiness grew more and more alarming, thanks to

<sup>1</sup> A good instance of this is seen when Antonio Perez was sent back to the court of Henry IV. much against his will by Essex in 1595. His mission was to send alarming news to Essex as to Henry's intentions to make peace with Spain and break with England, the object of Essex being to force Elizabeth to join Henry against the common enemy. At the beginning of 1596 Sir Henry Unton was sent to France on a special mission, officially to offer Henry further help in return for the occupation by England as security of Calais and some other French towns. Unton, however, was secretly instructed by Essex to prompt Henry to feign anger and indignation with England and to threaten to make friends with Spain. Unton was to "send us thundering letters, whereby he must drive us to propound and offer." This was behind the back of the Cecils and the rest of the Council. See "The Great Lord Burghley," by the present writer.

Essex's cleverness. But at last the Queen consented, and in January 1595 gave to the great Admiral his last commission, she herself providing a powerful contingent to the joint-stock fleet. The news stirred England like a bugle-blast, and volunteers flocked in thousands to join the expedition; for on the sea the English could beat the Spaniards wherever they met them, and the temper of the country was in favour of bold offensive action—especially with abundant loot in sight.

The terror of Drake's name had lost none of its potency in Spain, and the news that he was to sail the sea again fell upon Philip like a blight. In March and April, we are told, thousands of Spanish soldiers deserted. Lisbon in a single week was abandoned in a panic by most of its inhabitants. "From the highest to the lowest, all the people had no other talk than of Drake's coming,"<sup>1</sup> wrote one of Burghley's spies; and a traveller returning from Spain in April 1595<sup>2</sup> testified that "the intelligence there that Sir Francis Drake is preparing to go to sea wonderfully troubles them, because of the Indian fleet which is to bring great treasure, and the King is in great want of money." The same informant says that the people in Lisbon were in great fear. "The King has made great preparations; but if this money does not come he will be unable to offend or invade this year. The deponent learnt that an Irish bishop went from Spain to the Earl of Tyrone last Christmas, and certain

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, March 16, 1595.

<sup>2</sup> Examination of Richardson, State Papers, Domestic, April 26, 1595.

men with him, by whom the King promised to send the Earl 4000 men every year to assist him. But he will send nothing until he knows where Sir Francis Drake is going. Also, lately a gentleman from the northern Lords of Scotland was sent from them to the King (of Spain), and a priest in his company. The Lords demand money to be lent to them, and the King offered to give them money if they will assure him to land men in Scotland where he shall appoint, and will help him with 10,000 men to join him in his pay.”<sup>1</sup> “Had Drake been able to strike whilst the enemy were thus ripe for defeat, the blow must have been of deep effect, but the usual interminable delays prevented his sailing. The Queen laid the blame on the admirals, the admirals on the Queen.”<sup>2</sup> But whilst Drake, hampered by Hawkins and the old politicians in London, was thus delayed, the Spanish treasure fleet arrived safely;<sup>3</sup> and reports, more alarming than ever, of Philip’s preparations and intentions came fast and thick from the spies. In July colour was given to these reports by the sudden raid of four galleys with 400 Spaniards on the Cornish coast. The country around Newlyn and Penzance was burnt and devastated, and the towns and villages were destroyed. The country levies in a panic fled, leaving Sir Francis Godolphin, their commander, with only five or six gentlemen to stand by him, and the triumphant Spaniards ostentatiously attended

<sup>1</sup> Examination of Richardson, State Papers, Domestic, April 26, 1595.

<sup>2</sup> Corbett’s “Drake and Tudor Navy.”

<sup>3</sup> State Papers, Domestic, May 17, 1595, Palavicini to Burghley.

Mass upon a hill overlooking the smoking ruins of Penzance. Rumours flew through England that the Armada was now to be avenged. But after all, the whole business was but a flash in the pan. The four vessels had been driven from Brittany into Penzance by the stress of weather and lack of drinking water, and the invaders, finding the place unprotected, had worked their will. They soon grew frightened at their own temerity, and took advantage of a northern breeze to run back in safety to Blavet. But the raid thoroughly alarmed the Queen, and she determined to forbid Drake from sailing on his voyage. She had just received also the news—premature, as we have seen in a former chapter—of an intended expedition in force being about to sail from Spain to aid the Ulster rebels, and she ordered Drake to await on the coast of Ireland the threatened approach of the Spaniards. Failing to meet them, he was to proceed to the Spanish coast and to intercept any Spanish naval force that might sail from there towards England; and if no such Spanish force appeared, he was to cruise for a month on the look out for Spanish galleons homeward bound, and finally proceed on the voyage to Panama, on the understanding that he must be back in England in the following spring, to withstand the threatened invasion. These instructions were ridiculous, and would have meant the abandonment of the Panama expedition altogether. The politicians and landsmen were once more for tying the hands of the great seaman on his own element; but Drake was a hard man to bind, and he told the Council that,

though on his way south he would look out for any Spanish force bound for England and follow it, he could not remain wasting precious time on the coast of Ireland.

The Queen herself thereupon wrote a letter (August 9) to the admirals, telling them in strict secrecy "what she should require of them," and the reasons for the orders she gave. She had been advised, she said, that three squadrons were being fitted out in Spain, one at Cadiz, another at Lisbon, and a third at Ferrol, Corunna, and the Biscay ports. "By some reports, we think they intend a voyage to Ireland, to land about Tredagh; we cannot understand whether it is to be before next winter, but we suspect it. The preparations in Spain are greater than in 1588, and it is not to be doubted they intend to invade England or Ireland next summer. For this reason we find it dangerous to yield to your departure at present, and especially before the present attempt in Ireland be discovered; but, most of all, lest you should not have returned next summer in convenient time to help to do service against the Spanish army, expected to attempt the invasion of this realm about June or July."<sup>1</sup> She forbade them, in fact, to sail at all unless they promised to be back by the following May, however profitable the voyage might be. If they could not promise that, they were to consider what they could do now to destroy ships and stores on the coasts of Spain, so as to prevent an invasion of England in the following year. They replied that their ships had been fitted out by a joint-stock enterprise for a

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, ccliii. August 9, 1595.

certain purpose, and were not adapted to such work as she indicated, but, if she insisted upon it, she must bear the whole expense of the squadron herself. She was deeply incensed at this. Burghley and Howard, neither of them a friend of Drake, supported the Queen, and Elizabeth grew more tart and peremptory in every letter as the admirals remained firm,<sup>1</sup> so that it was already September 1595 before the two great seamen, Drake and Hawkins, already at loggerheads, sailed from England to return no more.

In the meanwhile, the supposed danger of a Spanish invasion for that year, which had really never existed, had disappeared, but Philip was slowly maturing the plans upon which he had decided to cripple England, by bringing, as he said, the fire to her own doors. We have seen that the Archbishop of Tuam had advised Philip to write a loving letter to Tyrone, urging him to avow himself openly on the side of the Catholics. Accompanied by an Irishman named Lacy and a Spanish captain, the Archbishop sailed from Spain, carrying this and other letters to the Irish chiefs, assuring them of Spanish support if Tyrone declared himself at one with O'Donnell, Macguire, and O'Rourke. Of the Archbishop and his companions no more was ever seen on earth; but doubtless intelligence of the message they bore reached Tyrone by other means; and in the summer of 1595 he boldly threw off the mask, called himself by the forbidden name of the O'Neil, and defied the English garrison.

The news rejoiced the little knot of fervid Irish-

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. v.

men who waited and prayed in the Peninsula, for it meant to most of them the certain prospect of returning to the land they loved. The Bishop of Killaloe, the most ardent patriot of them all, wrote in July to Tyrone hailing his action with praise and gratitude, hoping "that by his means the Catholic faith should be spread over the whole country, so that there, where the body of St. Patrick rests, there also should the restitution of that faith be accomplished, and the honour and praise of it remain for evermore." Now, he says, that we know that the Earl of Tyrone has openly taken up arms with other chieftains against the Queen, I have every confidence you will meet with success. "I have earnestly, but with great caution, persuaded the King to send you a fleet with which to oppose the enemy and subjugate the English Government, and that you may free yourself and all your people from the oppressive yoke of the English for ever. Furthermore, I find the King most willing to send you immediate assistance. Wherefore you must manfully and bravely resist, without making any peace or treaty with the enemies of the faith; for King Philip has seen these letters, and has told me to write that you shall be helped immediately, so that you may crush the enemy. . . . I promise you that instant succour shall not be wanting. . . . The one thing I ask and pray is, that you make no peace with the foe until I come to you."

This must have reached Tyrone in August 1595, shortly after his successive defeats at Armagh and Newry at the hands of the Lord-Deputy Russell and General Sir John Norreys, and doubtless caused his

changed tone towards the English. Time seemed now the principal thing to be gained by the Ulstermen until the promised "immediate" aid reached them from Spain, and Tyrone's new temporising with his enemies was obviously only in the hope that the Bishop of Killaloe's promise for Philip should be promptly kept. Alas! Tyrone then knew less of the Spanish King's methods than we do, or than he himself learnt afterwards, to his cost. In September the Ulster chief called beseechingly upon Philip to send the aid "now or never," and with his letter to the King sent others addressed to the Spanish commanders in Brittany, praying them to urge their master to promptness. "Ireland," said Tyrone, "would acknowledge no other King than his Catholic Majesty. If I may know for surety that I shall have Spanish aid, I will make no peace with the heretics. They shall fail within a year in Ireland like smoke before the flame."

But these letters were intercepted, and the bearer, an Irish priest, O'Cullan, was put under examination and forced to tell his story; how he had come from Spain twenty days before, and how the Earl, when he gave him the letters for Spain, bade him be importunate for an answer, or he might be obliged to make peace with the English. He was to ask the Spaniards, he said, for 3000 or 4000 troops before May at latest; but if the men could not come so soon, at least the King should send to Ireland munitions and money. If the King would thus help them, the envoy was bidden to say that they would "submit themselves to be governed by him as good subjects."



But though these missives were captured, Tyrone contrived to send his Jesuit confessor, Father Mumford, with similar urgent letters a few weeks afterwards,<sup>1</sup> whilst he artfully kept up his show of negotiations with the Lord-Deputy, much to the disgust of Norreys, who was all for striking a blow at the rebel combination by crushing Connaught, now that "their hearts are broken in Ulster." The Queen, he warned Burghley, must make up her mind either to end the war by conciliation, or else provide full and timely resources to root out the rebels for once and for all. The latter, Elizabeth, in her frugality, was unwilling to do, and the hollow negotiations with Tyrone dragged on. The exaggerated reports of preparations in Spain came almost weekly to the English Government, whilst Russell, the Lord-Deputy, with every fresh report warned Burghley and the Queen that Tyrone was only dallying until

<sup>1</sup> The most exaggerated news of Tyrone's successes was current in Spain at the time. The Venetian Ambassador in October sent to the Doge a report which had been brought to Lisbon by a caravel that had sailed from Ireland on the 21st September, doubtless the vessel which conveyed Father Mumford. "Tyrone," the report said, "had found himself face to face with Norreys, near Antrim; and in reply to an offer of the Queen's pardon if he laid down his arms, the Prince O'Neil had refused peace unless all his friends were pardoned, the Catholic religion allowed without molestation, and the exiles restored to their estates and revenues. In the battle that ensued on the 19th September, on a great plain, the heretics, to the number of 8000, were routed and broken. Norreys himself was wounded by a shot in the arm, and his brother dangerously in the thigh. Fifteen hundred trained troops fell, and they say that not an Englishman escaped except a few fugitives who fled to a fort where there are 400 wounded and dead. O'Neil captured all the heavy guns and baggage. At the same time another officer of the Catholic League routed 300 English in Connaught. O'Neil is said to have burnt four of the principal of the heretic officers though Norreys offered large sums for their ransom" (Venetian Calendar).

the promised Spanish force should come. But nothing could persuade or convince Elizabeth to adopt a liberal or bold course, so the talk of truce and "composition" with Tyrone continued, whilst O'Donnell and O'Rourke, less diplomatic than their chief, sulked unappeased amongst their bogs and mountains.

In the meanwhile, swift pinnacles ran backwards and forwards from Sligo and Donegal to Spain. Several of them were lost or captured by the English, but some of the messages reached Philip from the chieftains. The news of Tyrone's diplomacy was as gall and wormwood to him, and for a time the principal Irish hero in Spain was not the temporising Earl, but Bryan Oge O'Rourke of the Battle-axes, who still smote the English who came within his reach. Early in the year 1596 an Irish priest, Brian O'Donnell, was sent from Spain with messages to the chiefs, praying them not to make truce or peace with the heretics, and promising them aid if they would keep in arms. To O'Rourke especially letters of fervent praise and exhortation were written by Philip II., and by the Bishop of Killaloe in Lisbon, congratulating him upon his recent victory over an English force, and promising him a prompt remittance of arms and munitions of war. The Bishop's letter, however, plainly indicates the knowledge that the attempt to withstand the English in Ireland, except under Tyrone's leadership, will be hopeless, and he urges O'Rourke to obey the Earl in all things. The Bishop requests O'Rourke, also, to get "some principal learned man to write in his (O'Rourke's) name to the Pope, besecching him to

separate Ireland for ever from the English domination, and to appoint Tyrone King of Ireland.”<sup>1</sup>

When Father O'Donnell arrived at Donegal, he found the truce between Tyrone and the English about to be signed, but was assured by the Ulster chiefs that it was only a subterfuge to enable them to await the coming of the Spanish force; and O'Donnell, the chief, and O'Rourke sent their confessor, another Irish priest, to Spain for the purpose of explaining the situation to Philip. There was no pinnace available to carry him across, so he had to travel in disguise through the English pale to Dublin, and leaving Connaught in March, it took him two months to arrive in the presence of the King. The relation he gave is extremely curious,<sup>2</sup> though apparently highly tinged by Celtic imagination. In the beginning of January, he said, the Earl of Tyrone, who was now Prince and Grand O'Neil, issued from his principality of Ulster, “which is the fifth part of Ireland,” and came within eight leagues of Dublin, where many Catholic gentlemen joined him, “especially a great gentleman named O'Reilly, with all his following, his estates being thirty leagues long. They took a fortress called Cavan, and killed all the heretics there. All the Catholic gentlemen of Meath sent word that if the Catholic King would send them help they would

<sup>1</sup> It should not be forgotten that the Bishop himself was an O'Neil. The advice to O'Rourke to get some “principal learned man” to write his letters was less needed in his case than in some others. O'Rourke had been an Oxford student, and his signature is well written. The letters from the chiefs are generally written in Latin by priests and signed by themselves either in Latin or in Irish.

<sup>2</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

join at once." A cousin of Tyrone, he reported, Brian O'Neil, had also killed 400 heretics at Newry, and as many more at Carlingford. On the 13th February, in Connaught, O'Donnell and O'Rourke had gathered an army of 8000 foot and 500 horse, with which they had approached Galway, the only strong place held by the English, where they were met by 3000 of the enemy, very few of whom escaped by flight to the shelter of the city walls; the Catholics being unable to attack Galway for want of artillery. Three days after this victory, continued the confessor, six great chiefs who had been on the side of the English joined the Catholics, with all their vassals. The O'Connor Don, with twenty leagues of land, O'Kelly with as much, O'Connor Roe (McDermot) with twelve leagues, O'Malley with eight leagues, Macguire with twelve leagues, O'Flaherty with twelve leagues, and McDermot with eight leagues. The English all fled from the province to Dublin, except 300 in the strong towns of Killaloe and Roscommon, which could not be attacked as the Catholics had no artillery. O'Rourke, too, had killed 100 Englishmen near one of these towns, and had approached Dublin, being joined by O'Ferrall with 600 vassals and other men of Meath; whilst O'More had risen in Leinster and burnt fourteen heretic towns and had co-operated with O'Rourke from Connaught.

After all this talk of victory it must have disappointed Philip to be told, as he was, that before the messenger left a two months' truce had been signed: "in the hope of the Spanish succour arriving." The Catholics still had in the field, said

the priest, two armies forty leagues apart : one under Tyrone, with 16,000 foot and 2000 horse, within eight leagues of Dublin, and the other, commanded by O'Donnell and O'Rourke, near Galway, with 10,000 men.<sup>1</sup> When the truce expires they intend to follow the English into Munster, where, and in Dublin, all those who have been left alive have taken refuge. The "Englishwoman" was to send 20,000 men to Ireland in May, but if his Catholic Majesty would send help, the Catholics did not fear double that number. In conclusion they begged for great-artillery, muskets, and powder, when they doubted not to have the whole country in their power; and above all, that the bishops, priests, and other Irishmen now in Spain should be sent home.

This flourishing story, with its disappointing rider of a truce, was not of a sort to move Philip without further evidence,<sup>2</sup> and for this he had not long to wait. Since the first day in the year he had been fitting out in Lisbon a little expedition of three or four vessels, with several trusty officers of his own on board, to visit the Irish chief, carrying with them presents in money, a few arms, and many exhortations and promises, their principal object being to examine closely the strength of the rebels and the military

<sup>1</sup> This, as will be seen, was an absurd exaggeration. When Philip's experienced military officers reported to him officially as to the armed force which each of the Catholic chiefs could raise, they found that the aggregate number was less than 6000 foot and 1100 horse.

<sup>2</sup> In many letters from Philip that have passed through my hands there are evidences of his distrust and disbelief in priests as relators of facts or as organisers. The Irish confessor in the present instance seems to have drawn very largely upon his imagination, most of the victories over the English, the slaughter, &c., which he relates being entirely without foundation.

capabilities of the country. As a forerunner to this little expedition there went in April from Santander to Killibegs a swift pinnace carrying Ensign Alonso de Cobos, entrusted with letters from Philip to the Catholics again urging them to stand firm and to make no truce with the enemy. His arrival empty-handed except of letters and promises, after Tyrone and O'Donnell had signed the two months' truce, was a subject for considerable embarrassment for the chiefs. They assured Cobos, on the one hand, that the truce was only a feint, and on the other, protested to Lord-Deputy Russell and General Norreys that they had sent the Spaniard away curtly, "as they had now been received into the favour of their own princess, wherein they will continue." With the Spaniard they made the best of the matter, so as not to lose the long-promised succour. Cobos was persuaded to give them a sort of certificate that, although terms satisfactory to them had been offered by the English for a permanent peace, they had, on his arrival, "solely on conscientious grounds and out of affection for his Majesty, desisted from finally making peace . . . and now sincerely turned their hearts to God and the King, in whose service as faithful vassals they will remain during his Majesty's pleasure." Although Philip's famous letter sent by Cobos to the Earl<sup>1</sup> was forwarded by the latter, as he said, only for perusal to Norreys, with protestations of his refusal of all Philip's advances and his loyalty to the Queen, Cobos carried with him to Spain fervent letters from Tyrone, O'Donnell, Macguire, McSuyne,

<sup>1</sup> A copy of Philip's letter to Tyrone (of which copy more will be heard) is in the Irish State Papers, exc. 6.

O'Rourke, and (most violent of all) from McWilliam Bourke of Mayo, begging for aid to the Catholics and professing unalterable loyalty to Philip.<sup>1</sup> They required, they said, 6000 soldiers and arms for 10,000 more, and begged that the Cardinal Archduke Albert might be appointed their sovereign under the protection of Spain.

No sooner had Cobos sailed homewards than the more formal expedition from Lisbon arrived in Ireland. The two captains who were entrusted with the negotiations appear to have been good specimens of their class and time, brave, quarrelsome, and jealous. Cisneros, who was the senior, began by giving himself the airs and title of "ambassador,"<sup>2</sup> and the junior, Medinilla, who was to remain with the Irish chiefs as military adviser, became jealous. Henceforward the two captains were at daggers drawn, and, as I suspect, came to blows before their return to Spain.<sup>3</sup> The expedition appears at first to have put into the Bourke country, on the coast of Mayo, where the Spaniards boasted of the great things that their king would do for the Catholics. Money they had in plenty to distribute amongst those who would join the rebels; wine flowed in unwonted streams to the gallowglasses who flocked down to the coast to see the outlandish strangers; and the great MacWilliam Bourke himself—Marquis of Connaught dubbed now—who sent one

<sup>1</sup> These letters have all been transcribed from the originals at Simancas by the present writer, and are printed in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. Almost exactly similar letters were sent back by the next expedition in the following month.

<sup>2</sup> Irish State Papers, July 27, 1596; Calendar, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 625.

hundred beeves for the refreshment of the Spaniards, had his present refused except on condition that he would receive their full value in Spanish gold.

The first problem was to persuade the chiefs to meet the King of Spain's "ambassador." The most important of them, Tyrone and O'Donnell, were swearing loyalty to their own sovereign, and the English were watching them with distrustful eyes. Mayo, under Bingham's iron fist, was out of the question as a meeting-place, and Bourke proposed that the captains should accompany him by land to summon the chiefs to the monastery of Donegal for the conference. To Cisneros this seemed a good opportunity for observing the state of the country and the strength of the Catholics, but Medinilla refused to leave the ships, which apparently then went round to Teelin, Sligo, and Killibegs. It was not easy to persuade the rebel chiefs to leave their retreats, but the King of Spain was a dazzling name to conjure with, and most of them were assembled finally at Donegal to receive the message sent by Philip. The Irish, he said, originally came from Spain, and he, the King, who had always favoured them, would now deliver them from the oppression of the English, for which purpose he would join his forces to theirs, and send with them stores and money.

The spies told the English that the chiefs raised objections. The Spaniards were far off, they said, and the English near at hand, with all the strong places in their possession. It would be unwise for the Irish to risk everything by refusing the fair terms now offered to them by the Lord-Deputy, unless they were quite sure that the King would



keep his promise to them, so as to make success certain. Cisneros replied that thousands of men should be sent, and went far beyond his instructions in the promises he gave;<sup>1</sup> whereupon, says the English account, "all the rabble of the Irishry gave a roll of the names of the lords, as they call them, who would depend upon the King, and follow his counsel; that in expectation of that succour they would forbear to make any composition till mid-August, so they might have munition to defend themselves in the meanwhile."

The letters carried back to the King by the captains are worded in a more exalted strain than this, and repeat the professions of loyalty and attachment to Philip taken a few weeks before by Cobos. We see the result of Tyrone's prudence, however, in his refusal to allow Medinilla to remain with him in order that he might be able to say, as he did, that he had refused to enter into any negotiations against his allegiance to the Queen.<sup>2</sup> After an exciting fight with an English ship at the mouth of the Tagus, the captains arrived in Lisbon, bringing with them a curious account of the state of the rebel forces in Ireland in the form of answers to eighteen exhaustive questions, such as Philip loved. What did they (the chiefs) want? was the first question, and, as usual, the King

<sup>1</sup> The English account of the meeting is in the Irish Calendar, July 26, 1596, and the Spanish reports, with a copy of Cisneros' instructions, in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 620.

<sup>2</sup> The Spaniards were at this time very distrustful of Tyrone's trimming, as will be seen later; and an English officer was told (7th June) by Shan O'Brian that the Spaniards threatened to banish Tyrone with his friends the English if he did not join their forces when they (the Spaniards) landed in Ireland.

required to know the irreducible minimum. The captain was to suggest "prudence and due consideration" in their demands, and was to "hint softly at the difficulties in the way, to see how they meet them, but do not push this far enough to cause distrust." But with all the minimising of the Spaniards, the chiefs asked for arms for 10,000 footmen, corselets, pikes, morrions, harquebuses, muskets, powder, ball, &c., and 1000 men at once, to be sent with these munitions pending the coming of a large Spanish force. Cisneros reported favourably upon the unity of Tyrone and O'Donnell, "whom the rest respect;" and he praises their firm Catholicism. But the vast armies spoken of by O'Donnell's confessor as being in the field shrink woefully in the report of the experienced soldier. The chiefs could raise, it appeared, 6000 foot and 1200 horse; and when they took the field they carried provisions with them sufficient for the time they intended to be absent from home. No artillery, moreover, could be landed at any of their ports or be sent inland, in consequence of the boggy nature of the soil, and the provisions available were only sufficient for the native Irish. In another report, given by the ensigns who accompanied the expedition, full particulars are given of the number of men to be raised by each chief, and the state of the strong towns in the hands of the English.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following paragraphs in the report of the ensigns is curious. After summing up the total number of the rebel Lords' forces (5900 foot and 1080 horse), the report continues:—"The men are now spread about the territories of their Lords, and have darts, bows and arrows, shields like ours, and others like Hungarian bucklers. They have no muskets and few harquebuses. Their food is butter and milk; but even

Whilst these minute details were being discussed and weighed laboriously by Philip at the Escorial, news came from England through Flanders and France, at first vague and then with increasing definiteness, which struck the Spaniards with terror. When Drake had finally sailed away in the previous autumn, the way seemed clear for, at least, some show of force being sent to Ireland, although there was never any chance in that year (1596) of any great expedition, such as the English feared.<sup>1</sup> But in the fight off the mouth of the Tagus between the ship with Cisneros on board and the English vessel, two boats' crews of the latter had got adrift and were captured by the Spaniards. When they were

this is not to be bought, as such is not their custom; and if people go from one part of the country to another, they receive butter and milk for their sustenance from the natives of the country they go to. The people are all Catholics, and they show signs of being able to handle weapons well. They seem a well-disposed sort of people. It is impossible to travel on the land, as you sink up to the knees, but it is all land that may be cultivated. In the forty leagues we have travelled (*i.e.* from Mayo to Donegal) we have not seen a single tree, and it is impossible to transport artillery." It may be added that these reports, which were evidently written by men more accustomed to wield pikes than pens, are excessively illiterate, and in places almost unintelligible. (Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar.)

<sup>1</sup> The reports of the Venetian ambassador in Madrid to the Doge throughout the autumn and winter of 1595 give details of the naval preparations in Spain. In October he says that thirty ships are ready, some say for Brittany or Ireland, but most likely to go after Drake in South America. On November 17 he writes that the shipyards in Biscay and Andalusia are busy building new ships. "It is certain that his Majesty intends to have on the ocean next year a larger fleet than at any previous time, except in 1588 . . . If it does nothing else, this preparation, by keeping the Queen of England in alarm, will compel her to think of her own defences rather than . . . of molesting others." "There are thirty armed transports in Lisbon and Seville to be sent to hold Drake in check." This squadron of twenty-five ships sailed from Lisbon on the 2nd January 1596.

questioned by Count Portalegre in Lisbon, the English sailors confessed that the Queen's fleet of 100 ships was assembled when they had left London two months previously, but they knew not its destination. Philip had later news than this, and he also had heard of the gathering of a great fleet in England, evidently destined to do him injury, though at what point he could not guess. His naval advisers soothed him with the idea that it was already too late in the season for the English to come to Spain that year; but Count Portalegre, when he sent to the King the intelligence he had gathered from the English prisoners, not only expressed his fears that the Spanish expedition could not be safely sent to Ireland that year, notwithstanding the vehement pledges given to Tyrone, but he conveys his apprehension of something worse.

“We are now at the 10th June, and it is getting late in the season, considering how early the English came in the year '89; and I do not see much sign of apprehension of that which I am very anxious about, more anxious than ever I was in my life about anything. Notwithstanding reasons of State and prudence, that persuade others that it is impossible that the English fleet should come to the coast of Spain, I have convinced myself that it is extremely probable that it may come to prevent the final union of your Majesty's fleet by cruising about the route, and burning whatever it may find unprotected between Viana and Lisbon. As for this bar (*i.e.* Lisbon), they could act according to the intelligence they received of the city and ships, and of the flotillas which are expected from all parts. And even if

your Majesty's fleet succeed in assembling, they might embarrass it greatly, and this, perhaps, might satisfy them for this summer. It might be all frustrated if what your Majesty promised should be provided could arrive here : but before it can arrive, the cause for alarm will have passed." <sup>1</sup>

This letter is a good specimen of the utter paralysis which fell upon the Spaniards in the face of English naval movements, and of the disastrous effects of Philip's slow methods. Long before he had discussed and considered the infinite pros and cons of the requisites demanded, much less before he could laboriously furnish the resources necessary, either for attack or defence, his opponents had anticipated him, and his action and expenditure were wasted. This is exactly what happened in the summer of 1596. Whilst his officers were reporting and inquiring in Ireland, whilst the priests and others were sending false assurances to the Irish chiefs that the long-delayed support should at once be sent from Spain, Philip's officers, trammelled by his blighting centralising system, were slowly, and with ill success, endeavouring to collect in half-a-dozen different ports the vessels and stores

<sup>1</sup> The Venetian ambassador in Madrid wrote to the Doge, June 11, saying that Count Portalegre had reported the great alarm caused in Lisbon by the English naval preparations. "A sharp answer was returned from here that the governor had exaggerated the alarm ; for the conquest of Calais, the death of Drake, and the dispersion of his fleet, would undoubtedly cause the Queen to change her plans ; and that it was his (Portalegre's) duty to keep up the courage of the population, rather than by lending them his ear, to frighten them more at mere shadows" (Venetian Calendar). The letter from Portalegre, which I have quoted in the text, was evidently the reply to this reproof.

necessary to form an auxiliary expedition.<sup>1</sup> Before one part of the munitions could be got ready, the part already collected went rotten: men deserted as fast as they were levied, for they were no longer buoyed up by the idea of their invulnerability against the heretics or of the invincible sacredness of their cause. In plain truth, they were afraid of the English. In all ranks disillusion and demoralisation were becoming general. The King was a mere name now, seen by no one, and already sick to death. He had with forty years of ceaseless toil woven around himself and his people the endless spider's web of despotism; filaments that had grown into cables centred in the paper-choked closet of a gloomy recluse, stifling all initiative, restricting all activity, and dooming the nation to atrophy and decay.

The alarming and exaggerated news of Spanish preparations, and the efforts of the French and of Essex's party in England,<sup>2</sup> had at length brought

<sup>1</sup> The Venetian ambassador in Spain wrote on 15th January that 100 new vessels were being built in Biscay, Galicia, Lisbon, and Seville; but he doubted whether the result would correspond with the effort, "for the first flush of preparations in Spain usually promises much more than is eventually accomplished." In February he reported that the King of Spain had abandoned his scheme for an attack upon England, since the Queen has now settled her Irish and English affairs. "He is well aware that neither in Corunna nor in Flanders are there sufficient troops to harass the English, even if they could effect a landing." In April the same ambassador wrote that the "preparations for a fleet are not being pushed on as fast as they might be, or would be, if there was any idea of using a fleet at once."

<sup>2</sup> Sir Francis Vere, the English commander in Flanders, who was an "Essex" man, wrote to the Earl on the 9th March. "You were pleased to acquaint me with a purpose you had to draw her Majesty, the French King, and the States into a firm league. . . . *There is no so ready way in the world to terrify and ruin the great adversary.*" At the

Elizabeth to consent to an aggressive policy. Vere was authorised to obtain the aid of a naval contingent from the States, and once more Plymouth and the Thames were alive with the fitting out of a great fleet. Henry IV. having to a great extent conciliated the Leaguers, had declared a national war upon Spain, and was now at close grip with the enemy. He had strained his own resources to the utmost, and in vain both he and his ally Essex had sought, by cajolery and threats, to obtain more effective assistance from England, especially on the coast of Picardy, where English interests were closely touched. Philip, on the other hand, as will be recollected, had been fortunate in the arrival of his treasure fleet, thanks to the delay in the departure of Drake in the summer of 1595, and had also contracted a large new loan with the Fuggers; and much of the money had been spent in providing for the new Governor of Flanders, the Archduke Albert, a powerful army, with which, as it was thought, to relieve La Fère from its protracted siege by Henry's forces.

When a few weeks earlier Sir Henry Unton had given Henry Elizabeth's message, asking for Calais as a pledge for her further help, the great Béarnais replied in a rage that he had as lief be bitten by a

same time (March 1596) Elizabeth and Burghley were made to believe by forged letters that Spain was making approaches to Henry IV. She sent young Palavicini to France to inquire secretly if this was true. His informant in France was one of the Essex-Lopez gang, who told him, in reply to his questions, "that it was true that the Spaniard was trying to come to terms, but that Henry was little inclined to do so unless he were driven by force. The real way to keep him (Henry) was to assist him vigorously" (Venetian Calendar).

dog as be scratched by a cat, and would prefer the Spaniards in Calais to the English. He spoke more truly than he thought at the time, for the relief of La Fère was only a feint; and early in April the King learnt to his dismay that the Spaniards had suddenly turned aside, marched upon Calais, and had already stormed the outworks of the town. This was threatening news indeed for England. Whilst Elizabeth was haggling, the Spaniards had captured a port which commanded her narrow seas, and the Spanish army in Flanders was in sight of her own shores. As soon as the news came to England of Calais's danger, a hasty levy of men was made in London and hurried to Dover for embarkation under Essex; for the citadel of Calais still held out, and relief was possible. No sooner were the men on board, and the young Earl burning to bring them into action, than a courier galloped in from the Queen counter-ordering the expedition. Essex was frantic, but raved and prayed in vain. Almost within his sight the next day, 14th April, the citadel of Calais fell; and Elizabeth found that she had overreached herself. Henry made the most of it, and sent a special embassy to remonstrate with her upon the effect produced by her avaricious demand for Calais in return for her aid; and she was, though greatly to her dislike, obliged to make a new treaty with France, by which her contingent was to be increased, and Henry was bound never to make peace with Spain without the consent of England—a provision which he broke as soon as it suited him.

This untoward capture of Calais by the Spaniards



made it more necessary than ever now that the power of Spain should again be broken at sea; and the policy which Hawkins, Drake, and Raleigh had always advocated, of attack at sea rather than defence on shore, was forced by circumstances upon Elizabeth and Burghley, though they faced it with much hesitancy and fickleness. We have seen in Count Portalegre's letter to Philip early in June the alarm which the English preparations caused in Spain. The slow and ineffective fitting out of small squadrons in different ports, Ferrol, Corunna, Santander, Lisbon, and Cadiz, in order that they might ultimately form a junction, was rendered necessary by the paucity of supplies and the difficulties of transporting great quantities of stores to one centre, but it always exposed Philip's fleets to be destroyed piecemeal, either in their ports, or on their way to the rendezvous; and this was a danger against which it was difficult for the Spaniards to provide, as they had not sufficient force to protect adequately all threatened points, and rapid concentration was impossible. This was well known to English seamen, and they had constantly urged the Queen to strike at the strength of her enemy in what they saw was the most effectual way. But her lifelong policy was to take a middle course and hold the balance whilst extremists fought; and no sooner had Essex persuaded her to authorise an offensive expedition against Spain than she altered her mind. Through February, March, and April of 1596, whilst the Irish chiefs were praying Philip for immediate aid, and Spanish emissaries were flitting backwards and forwards to Donegal, the hot fit followed the

cold with maddening alternation in Elizabeth's counsels. She was willing to cripple her foe, but she let "I dare not, wait upon I would;" for, she argued: Suppose my fleet should miss the Spaniards, or any large portion of them, what would become of me and my realm, what would become of Protestantism, if another Armada should approach whilst my own ships were far away on the coast of Spain? Essex in his rage sometimes forgot the respect due to his sovereign lady, and this gave rise to fresh wrangles and subsequent self-abasement of the spoilt, ill-disciplined favourite. "The Queen," wrote one of Essex's secretaries to Antony Bacon,<sup>1</sup> "is daily in change of humour about my Lord's voyage, and yesterday almost resolute to stay it, using very hard terms of my Lord's wilfulness, inasmuch as the wisest was fain to use his wisest reasons to appease and satisfy her;" and Essex himself, almost in despair, said, "I have racked my wits to get this commission, and my means . . . to carry it through, as they say. I will either go through with it now, or become a monk at an hour's warning."<sup>2</sup>

It ended by the Queen's allowing the expedition to be prepared, whilst she bound the commanders on all sides with limitations and restrictions. To curb the impetuosity of Essex and temper his want of naval experience, she associated with him in the command the cold, elderly Lord Admiral Howard, at which arrangement both of them impotently

<sup>1</sup> Reynolds to Bacon, Bacon MSS., Lambeth Palace, vol. Delvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

fumed and chafed;<sup>1</sup> and she strictly laid down that the objects to be aimed at were "the taking and destruction of the King of Spain's ships and magazines, and the intercepting of the East Indian carracks and the fleet from the West Indies." When her instructions were asked for in the case of any "rich town" being captured, the Queen was quite scandalised at the suggestion of such a thing. The object was not conquest, but to strike a blow at Philip's navy, which should effectually prevent him from sending powerful aid to Ireland, or threatening Protestant England with another Catholic Armada.

When, at length, the four squadrons were assembled at Plymouth, not without much delay on the part of the Thames contingent,<sup>2</sup> Essex and Howard found themselves in command of a fleet consisting of seventeen Queen's ships, seventy-six freighted armed merchantmen, mostly used for transport, and

<sup>1</sup> A very characteristic letter on this point was written by Essex to Cecil on the 24th May, on the eve of his sailing. He and Howard had written a joint letter of farewell to the Queen, and he wrote:—"Sir, if her Majesty do find fault with the cutting out of a piece of the sheet wherein our joint letter is written, her unruly admiral (*i.e.* Howard, who being a baron, was obliged to sign his name after Essex, who was an earl) must be punished, who cut out my name, because he would have none so high as himself. We are now abroad, and do see all men bestir themselves to leave the shore. Here is such joy in all the fleet, both of soldiers and mariners, English and Dutch, as it would please her Majesty to see the effects of her own work" (Hatfield Papers, vol. iv.).

<sup>2</sup> This was specially under Raleigh's organisation, and Essex's friends threw upon Raleigh the whole blame of the delay. It was not his fault, however; the service was most unpopular, and especially in and about London; and "as soon as we press men one day they run away another, and say they will not serve." See the writer's "Life of Sir Walter Raleigh." So general was the dissatisfaction in the fleet that Essex was forced to hang several of the soldiers on Plymouth Hoe just before sailing ("Voyage to Cadiz," Hakluyt).

a Dutch squadron of twenty-four vessels, besides pinnaces and small craft. This fleet, with 9000 soldiers on board, sailed out of Plymouth Sound on the 3rd June 1596; and so well had the secret of its destination been kept, that, as we have seen, at a similar date (1<sup>st</sup>th June) Count Portalegre placed it on record that he alone of the Spanish officers feared the coming of the English at all that year. Even those who at an earlier date had looked for the possible sailing of an English squadron had feared rather that it might attack the ships in Ferrol or the Tagus than repeat Drake's famous swoop upon Cadiz in 1587, so that when, on the morning of the 20th June, the great combined fleet of English and Dutch ships anchored off Cadiz, panic supreme and uncontrolled seized upon the city.

Under the shelter of the sea-wall there lay defending the entrance to the harbour seventeen of Philip's finest galleys, and inside the port there were six mighty galleons, three of the famous treasure frigates, two strong argosies, the three flagships of the Mexican fleet, and forty great Indiamen loading for the outward voyage. The first decision arrived at by the English joint commanders was in the highest degree unwise and dangerous. Their prime object in sailing was, at any cost, to cripple Spain's navy. Here they had before them huddled in the bay, unable to escape, the finest vessels that flew the flag of Castile and Aragon; and Howard and Essex conceived the idea, before attacking the ships, of landing their soldiers and assaulting the town. Raleigh, who had command of one of the squadrons, returned from

special service on the other side of the bay just as the troops were being disembarked. Hurrying on board the flagship, he besought Essex to push into the harbour and destroy the shipping before anything else was attempted, for if the attack upon the town failed the whole force would be imperilled. Essex threw the blame upon Howard, whose plan it probably was; but at length the eloquence of Raleigh prevailed over both and the plan was altered.

Thenceforward the only rivalry amongst the English commanders was as to who should lead his ship into the harbour first. The final choice fell upon Raleigh, and at first break of dawn on the 21st June, Sir Walter, on the *Warsprite*, pushed past the galleys that blocked the way, and, deriding them as he passed with a fanfare from his ship's trumpets, he struck, straight as a hawk at its quarry, at the two greatest ships of the Spanish navy, the *San Felipe* and the *San Andres*; for on one bloody, never-to-be-forgotten day five years before, those two giants had done to death his dear friend and kinsman, Sir Richard Grenville on the *Revenge*, and Raleigh had sworn never to loose them till their stout hulls were worried to future inoffensiveness.

Of the details of the great fight this is not the place to tell.<sup>1</sup> How Essex, Raleigh, Lord Thomas Howard, and Francis Vere competed with each other in their lust for destruction; how red ruin fell upon the towering *San Felipe*, the *San Andres*, the

<sup>1</sup> See "The Voyage to Cadiz" in Hakluyt; Raleigh's own account, "Relation of the Cadiz Action;" Fernandez Duro's "Armada Espanola;" the present writer's "Life of Sir Walter Raleigh," and Devereux's "Earls of Essex."

*Santo Tomas*, and the *San Mateo* and all the galleys; how, in despair, the wretched Spaniards, to escape the fire, drowned themselves by hundreds, until, as Raleigh wrote, "If any man had a desire to see hell itself, it was there most lively figured;" how the forty splendid Indiamen and their precious freights all fled to the inner harbour at Puerto Real and were burnt by the Spaniards; and how, finally, Cadiz itself, the "pearl of Andalusia," the richest city in Spain, was conquered almost without a blow, to be submitted to sixteen days of systematic plunder, which left her naked, ravaged, and destroyed—all this is told in sounding Elizabethan prose by Raleigh himself, and has been repeated in stirring story by a hundred pens. Our concern in this book is mainly to consider the effect of the ruin of Cadiz upon Philip's power to force Catholicism directly or indirectly upon England.

During the three hours' fight, in which only eight English ships took active part, Spain lost thirteen ships of war and seventeen galleys, besides the forty great merchantmen, and merchandise worth eleven million ducats. What the loot of Cadiz city amounted to no one rightly knew; but great as was the material loss suffered by Spain, the loss of prestige was infinitely greater. The wretched Medina-Sidonia could only look on at the destruction afar off, wringing his hands and weeping. He had long ago pointed out to the King the utterly defenceless state of the city against a sudden attack.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the day after the disaster Medina-Sidonia wrote to the King thus: "This is shameful! I said how necessary it was to send me men and money, and I have never received even an answer from your Majesty."

Like all other representations of a like nature to Philip, it had to run the gauntlet of infinite procrastination, consideration, and inquiry, often to be shelved and forgotten. Philip's resources, great as they were, were a mere drop in the ocean of his requirements. With such a system as his, where one sick old man,<sup>1</sup> writing and reading day and night, tried to sway the universe with his pen, waste and inefficiency were inevitable, and this terrible blow of Cadiz was the natural result. The disaster was even greater in a moral sense than the loss of the Armada, because it proved to the satisfaction of the superstitious people, either that the Lord was fighting on the side of the heretic, or that the powers of darkness were stronger than the powers of light.

But whilst the Spaniards at large, with Oriental fatalism, were resigning themselves to the inevitable, and the English were bickering over their loot in the intervals of self-glorification, the slow, crippled, white-haired, little man in his cell at the Escorial had learned nothing from defeat and failure. He was, he thought, on the side of God, and if the Most High for His good pleasure ordained that temporary disaster should fall upon His legions, it was only that the final victory should be the greater, and that His servants should be purified by trial for the ultimate glory that would surely come to them.

So now I am at my wits' end, and can only stand and await your Majesty's orders."

<sup>1</sup> Philip was chronically ill of gout with complications at this time. In April and May of this year, 1596, he was thought to be dying and all hope was abandoned by his physicians. See the details in Nani's Letters, Venetian Calendar.

There was no defeat but death for such a man as this, and the day after he learnt of the catastrophe of Cadiz saw him calmly plodding and planning the new preparations that should carry aid to insurgent Ireland, and in good time make England Catholic again, a fit ally for faithful Spain.



## CHAPTER VII

Mission of Lindsay to Rome—Father John Cecil and Pury Ogilvie in Rome—Their voyage to Spain—Address of the English Catholic irreconcilables to Philip—The advice of Father Persons—Preparations in Lisbon for the Irish expedition—Strength of the armament—Failure and return to Spain—Meeting of the Irish chiefs with Cobos in the Monastery of Donegal—A new truce with Tyrone.

AT the end of chapter iii. we left Walter Lindsay, Lord Balgarys, the Laird of Ladyland, Father Cecil, and Matthew Semple, fruitlessly praying the King of Spain to send assistance to the Scottish Catholic nobles, the leaders of whom were already in exile. This was in the autumn of 1595, and the reason for Philip's bland irresponsiveness to their cry is obvious to any one who notes the tone of their petitions. When the resources of delay had been exhausted, and the Scottish emissaries intimated that their patience was at an end, Philip adopted his invariable course in such cases, and politely informed them that, as the objects of the Scottish nobles were exclusively directed to the advancement of the Catholic faith, the Pope was the person first to be applied to. The King would recommend them to his ambassador in Rome, the Duke of Sessa, who would forward their suit with his Holiness, and when the Pope had decided how much money he would contribute, he (Philip) would consider how and to what extent he could help them.

The emissaries did not know it, but this course of procedure made it absolutely certain that Philip had no intention of making the Scottish Catholics his principal instruments for gaining England; but they took his message in all sincerity, and, late in the year, Balfarys, Ladyland, Hugh Barclay, and Father Cecil sailed separately from Barcelona for Italy, the priest being entrusted with the principal part of the negotiation.

They must have arrived early in December in Rome, but as Father Cecil was ill, he did not present Philip's letter to the Duke of Sessa until the 3rd January 1596. Although the ambassador had not at that time received any explanatory despatches from Madrid, he knew his master's mind well enough to understand what was required of him. He, too, was full of sympathy for the Scottish Catholics, who were so anxious to benefit their religion exclusively, but it took six weeks for him to obtain for Father Cecil an audience of the Pope. When at length the audience took place, on the eve of Cecil's departure, the English priest laid before his Holiness the prayers of the Scottish nobles, and the good wishes for them expressed by the King of Spain. "They pretended to nothing else, he said, but restoring the Catholic religion in their country, and delivering their King from the heretics, by whom he was oppressed." Clement VIII. was very far from being a fool, and understood perfectly well that Philip would never lift a finger to help a party that professed such objects as this. "He was very well satisfied," he drily told Father Cecil, "of the intentions of the Catholic Lords, and also of the King of

Spain's expressed intention of helping them, without respect to his own particular interest. He was very well contented with so holy a resolution of his Catholic Majesty. But he had great fear of the delays of Spain, with which they wearied the world; besides, the King of Scots had beguiled him (the Pope), and had communicated to the Queen of England the intelligence that he had had with him." This was as far as Clement VIII. would go; and to his nephew, Cardinal Aldobrandino, and to the "protector" of Scottish affairs, Cardinal Gaëtano, he deputed the task of politely but firmly making Cecil understand that not a penny would be contributed to their enterprise by the Pope. If the Scottish Catholic emissaries had understood the position, they must have seen that their clients' case was hopeless of effectual aid from the moment they talked about their desire being solely to benefit their religion, and by inference included in their programme the conversion of James.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of Balfours, Barclay, and Cecil in Rome, another Scotsman appeared there with a still more significant mission. Although the leaders of the Catholic nobility had been banished or forbidden to leave their estates, the sincerity of the King of Scots in his Protestantism was still gravely doubted by the Kirk. The Covenant was solemnly renewed, and the Church Assembly joined with the Puritan towns and gentry in formally requesting James to confiscate the estates of the Catholic Lords (March 1596). This was most unpalatable to the King. It was, in his view, vital that he should retain the goodwill

of his Catholic subjects, or they might at a critical moment effectually oppose his succession to the English throne. He was, moreover, profoundly moved by the open advocacy in Father Parsons' book of the right of the Infanta to succeed, in consequence of his (James's) heresy.<sup>1</sup> This book, written by a leading Jesuit, known to be in the confidence of Philip, was avowedly a blow at James's claims; and now that the banished Scottish Lords were, as he knew, appealing to the Spanish King for help, the most unfortunate thing that could happen, in James's opinion, was that his Protestant subjects, and Elizabeth between them, should sever the last hopes in him entertained by the Catholics.

In this dilemma James took a thoroughly characteristic course. On the 2nd January 1596 he published a proclamation to his subjects calling upon them vigorously to unite with England to resist the threatened invasion of the Spaniards,<sup>2</sup> "the common

<sup>1</sup> The Venetian ambassador in France wrote to the Doge, March 23, 1596: "The King of Scotland is under arms, more by sea than by land, as he is disgusted with the King of Spain for the protection he gives to the rebel Scots; also because of a book published in Spain, wherein all claims to the crown of England are discussed, and the King of Scotland is entirely excluded, the King of Spain and the Infanta both being put before him" (Venetian Calendar). How distasteful this open advocacy of the Infanta's claim was, not only to Englishmen, but also to the Pope and all Catholics but the adherent of Spain *quand meme*, is seen in an extract from a letter written by Dr. Gifford to Throgmorton. "I have made an abstract of Parsons' book, and have given it to the Nuncio (in Flanders), who is mad at Parsons, and bade me write to the Bishop of Cassano, and assure him that Parsons had ruined himself, and that the Pope would detest his behaviour, and that he could never have done anything more disgusting to the Pope" (Hatfield Papers, vol. vi.).

<sup>2</sup> The scare of Spanish preparations was at this time greater in Scotland than in England. W. Colville, writing to Bowes, January 17, 1596, says, "We think verily here that you shall be swallowed up this

enemy of both nations," and thus won from Elizabeth the rare reward of her unstinted praise. "I must tel you," she wrote to him, "that I cannot imagin how you could by any more glorious menes set out your care for your land, your love to your neighbours, and your hate to such wrongful invaders, than with your pen and charge to your subjects you have uttered. . . . In me hit hathe set a deepe impression of a cousin-like zeal, that mixeth not his loss with her decay, and joyeth not that she should perish."<sup>1</sup> Having thus disarmed Elizabeth, James smiled once more on the banished lords (except Bothwell, his personal enemy, whom he never forgave), and soon Huntly, Errol, and Angus crept back to Scotland, and were allowed to go unmolested to their homes. The Kirk raved in vain, and took the extreme and even disloyal course of appointing a "Standing Council," which should control the King and Government. Black thundered sedition from the pulpit of St. Andrews as violently as Knox himself would have done in like circumstances; but James, with the Catholics at his bidding, and the Queen of England well disposed, could afford to brave the ministers, and by the end of the year 1596 he had crushed the malcontents by force of arms and humbled the power of the Kirk.

But whilst he was thus conciliating Elizabeth with his proclamation against Spanish aggression and

summer insomuch as the preparation of the Spaniard is held to be out of doubt; that the French King and Philip will accord, and the States of Holland will return to him. So they think you shall have no friendship but from hence," *i.e.* England (Letter-book of John Colville, Bannatyne Club).

<sup>1</sup> Letters of Elizabeth and James (Camden Society).

curbing the "ministers," he was cleverly and secretly carrying on an extraordinary intrigue which was intended to secure his accession to the English throne, happen what might, and to bind the Catholics to him strongly, whilst frustrating the evil result to him that might follow the appeal of Huntly and his followers to Philip and the Pope. The man whom he chose as his agent was John Ogilvie, Laird of Pury, who, five years before, had been originally nominated to the unsuccessful mission eventually entrusted to George Ker. Pury Ogilvie, as he was called, had an extremely crooked task to perform and he made it more crooked still. He was first—in the autumn of 1595—to go to Flanders. There were many amongst the fugitives there known to be unfavourable to the Spanish-Jesuit party, and the publication of Persons' book had alienated many more. Ogilvie was to approach Paget and his friends of this party, and solemnly assure them that James was really a Catholic.<sup>1</sup>

The next step was for Ogilvie to make friends with the Pope's Nuncio in Flanders, Cardinal Mal-

<sup>1</sup> This is what Dr. Gifford, one of the "patriotic" refugees, wrote at the time. "Here is a proper lord of Scotland come over, called Ogilvy, who saith to Paget in secret, and assureth him, the King of Scots is well inclined, and if he may see men in the field he will venture all to be free. He (Ogilvy) will be shortly at Rome to talk with the Pope. The wife of the King of Scots is now certainly reconciled (*i.e.* to the Church of Rome). This is a profound secret, but 113 positively assures Paget that such is the case" (Hatfield Papers, vol. vi.). There is no doubt that the reason why James took this step of conciliating the anti-Spanish refugees at this juncture was the rumour then current that a compromise was under discussion by which Arabella Stuart might be adopted by general consent as Elizabeth's heir. The Welsh and English anti-Spanish refugees were known to be inclined to favour this solution, as it would obviate the unpopular necessity of subjecting England to the rule of a Scotsman.

vasia, who, as we have seen by the note on page 204, was ill-disposed towards Spain. Ogilvie told the Cardinal that he had been sent by King James to procure aid from the Pope and the Italian princes to defend himself against his rebellious subjects, and to procure the succession to the throne of England. He (James) was desirous of receiving instruction and of being converted to the Catholic religion. But as most of his rebels were Catholics, who were in favour of making the King of Spain also King of England and Scotland, he, James, was obliged to temporise with heretics and "politicians" in order to support himself against so potent an adversary as the King of Spain, who, under the pretence of favouring the Catholics, endeavoured to make himself master of those kingdoms, which would not be expedient either for the Pope or the Italian princes. But if they, the Italians, would not help him, he would be obliged to put himself under the protection of the King of Spain, and make the best terms with him that he could.<sup>1</sup> The Nuncio, naturally taken in with this frank avowal, expressed in no measured terms his opinion of the ambition and insincerity of the Spanish King, and Ogilvie carefully treasured up in his memory the unfavourable language used by the Italian Churchman.

It was not to be expected that all this intimacy between the Scottish envoy and the anti-Spanish party in Flanders should escape the eyes of such as Father Holt and Hugh Owen; and when Ogilvie

<sup>1</sup> A series of letters, intercepted by the French and sent to the Earl of Essex, relating to this extraordinarily complicated intrigue, are quoted at length in Birch.

sought an interview with Secretary Ibarra, Philip's Minister in Flanders, he found extremely black looks to greet him. Nothing abashed, the Scotsman entered upon his negotiation. He had been sent, he said, by the King of Scots to seek a close understanding with the King of Spain against England. James was sincerely desirous of becoming a Catholic, and of avenging the murder of his mother and the Queen of England's ill-treatment of himself. He was ready to concur now in the extirpation of all heresy from England, Scotland, and Ireland; to enter into an offensive and defensive league with Philip against all the world, and immediately to make war upon England; to become reconciled to his Catholic nobles; to recall all Scotsmen in the service of heretics abroad; to receive and protect all Catholics from England who might take refuge in Scotland; to furnish the King of Spain with a contingent of 10,000 Scottish troops; and, as a pledge for his sincerity, he volunteered to deliver his son and heir into the keeping of the King of Spain. In return for all this James would ask Philip not to oppose in any way his accession to the English throne, but that he should, on the contrary, provide him with an army of 12,000 men whilst the war with England lasted, and give him a subvention of 500,000 ducats with which to commence the war; and that he should in future only treat with James himself, and not with the Scottish Catholic nobles or their representatives.

This was so surprising to Ibarra that he appears to have expressed some disbelief in the sincerity of James's offers, seeing how intimate Ogilvie had been



since his arrival in Flanders with those who were known to be in opposition to Spanish views for England and Scotland. Ogilvie then seems to have taken a most extraordinary course, which can only be explained by the assumption that he was a young man of extreme levity and untrustworthiness, determined at any sacrifice to feather his own nest. His mission, he told Ibarra, was a mere farce; the King and some heretics and "politicians" had really sent him "to rouse up some people's spleen, and make them friends to the King of Scotland against the King of Spain;" which meant, of course, to attract wavering Catholics from the Jesuit party to the opposite side. For that purpose he, Ogilvie, had "conferred with Paget, Gifford, and other Englishmen of that herd; but it was all partiality and passion, and the King of Scotland was a heretic." But, continued Ogilvie, he himself was a true Catholic, and if the King of Spain would give him a pension, "he would manage affairs the contrary way from what the heretics and politicians aimed at." This style of negotiation was much more in Ibarra's line, and he promised the respectable Ogilvie 100 ducats a month, with which the Scottish envoy went on his way to Italy rejoicing.

His next stages were Venice and Florence, and to both the Doge and the Grand Duke he spoke in the same tone as he had to the Nuncio. The Italian princes, including the Pope, were extremely jealous of Spain, and their replies to Ogilvie's charming were all to the same effect. They could spare no money or help to the King of Scots themselves, but they fully recognised that the ambition of Philip

was not to forward Catholicism so much as to ensure his own supremacy over Christendom. So far Ogilvie's efforts were admirably calculated to alienate Catholics in general, and especially English Catholics, from the Jesuit-Spanish party by promoting the expression of belief in the political and ambitious objects of Philip; but when the envoy arrived in Rome (December 1595), he found himself in the midst of the other Scottish intrigue in favour of Huntly and the Catholic Lords, which was being carried on by Father Cecil, Lord Balfarys, and Hugh Barclay, and the King of Scotland's emissary was obliged somewhat to alter his tone.

He brought letters from the Scottish Catholic Lords to their envoy Cecil, who soon wormed himself into the confidence of Ogilvie, and promptly carried to the Duke of Sessa, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, the gist of their conversations. Ogilvie himself only visited the ambassador secretly at night, in order, apparently, that his communications with the Italians at the Vatican might not be hampered by any open show of a friendship with Spain. To the Duke of Sessa and to Father Cecil he told the same story as he had to the Nuncio in Flanders (p. 207), but with the addition that all the Italians were badly disposed towards Spain, and from them nothing could be expected, the inference being that James must therefore turn exclusively to Spain. The Spanish ambassador was quite eager to confirm this view of the question, and tried his best to hurry Ogilvie away to Spain to propose his treaty. The Italians, he assured him, had no money to give to the Scots, and the talk of the King of Spain's being angry with James was all nonsense.

Philip's one object, said his ambassador, was to extirpate heresy everywhere, and not, as the Italians asserted, to make himself monarch of the world. If James would become a Catholic he would have nothing to fear from Spain.

This was in January and February 1596, and in the meanwhile Cecil, Balgarys, and Barclay were losing patience. Philip had promised them his decision as to the help he would give to the Scottish Catholics when they had arrived in Rome, but no letter came from Spain, and the envoys, in despair, were anxious to return to Flanders. But they deeply distrusted the sincerity of James and the meaning of Ogilvie's embassy, and to have retired from the field, leaving the King's envoy in possession, would have been unwise; so Father Cecil set to work deliberately to discredit him in the eyes of the Spanish ambassador. Ogilvie, in conversation with Father Cecil, had confessed that James was of no particular religion, but would profess anything that tended to his advantage. He also let slip, according to Cecil, that James suspected that Elizabeth was arranging with the Béarnais (Henry IV.) to poison or divorce the wife of the latter in order that he might marry Arabella Stuart and succeed to the English throne; and again, that if she (Elizabeth) found herself assailed by Spain, she would appeal to the Pope and embrace Catholicism. This talk was of course ridiculous, and was most probably invented by Cecil to blacken Ogilvie. At all events, it puzzled the Duke of Sessa, who thought it might infer that Ogilvie had come to Rome "with some artful design" to the detriment of Spain, and both he and Cecil did their best to persuade him to

proceed into Philip's dominions. At the same time, both Cecil and Balgarys clamoured more persistently than ever that Philip should send an expedition to aid the Scottish Catholics. The Pope now, they said, could not object, for the King of Scots himself had claimed to be a Catholic, anxious for liberation from his heretic subjects. But unfortunately the Scottish envoys were all secretly at issue amongst themselves, and Sessa was more perplexed than ever; for Philip seldom took even his highest officers into his confidence, and his ambassador was absolutely in the dark as to his real intention. Balgarys whispered that Father Cecil was suspected to have sold himself to Lord Burghley (which was quite true). Cecil accused Balgarys of only trying to forward the interests of Lord Huntly, and not of the Catholics generally. Barclay secretly urged that the Spanish forces should be sent to the west of Scotland, whereas Balgarys insisted privately behind his colleague's back that they should be sent to the Huntly country in the east. Sessa, not knowing whether any Spanish force was to go to Scotland at all, could only do his best to keep every road open by persuading the Pope that if the Spanish force did go to Scotland, James would not be dethroned if he became a Catholic.<sup>1</sup> But, he

<sup>1</sup> There appears to have been some divergence in the Jesuit party at this period with regard to James. They had previously been nearly unanimous in their strong disbelief in the possibility of his conversion; but now some of them, at all events, made an appearance of urging him to submit. The explanation probably is that they, no more than the rest of the world, knew whether Philip's force would or would not make Scotland its base, and they were desirous of beguiling James into welcoming, or at least not opposing, it if it entered a Scottish port. It is quite certain that Philip and his party never really intended to be friendly with James for the latter's benefit.

cynically adds in his letter to the King, that he (Philip) need not wait for the authority of the Pope. They none of them (*i.e.* the Italian Churchmen) believe that an expedition will really go, and would accept accomplished facts better than listen to projects. The Churchmen in this case understood Philip better than did his own ambassador. There was less prospect of a Spanish force helping the Scottish Catholics now than ever before. The slightest leaning of James towards Catholicism always effectually checked that, though whether the King of Scots understood that this was the case or not is doubtful. At length Sessa obtained some small guidance from his master. The Pope was to be told that the professed conversion of James was only an artful pretence, and the mission of Ogilvie had been prompted by the Queen of England herself, in order to raise the jealousy of Catholics

John Colville, writing to Bowes from Edinburgh at this time (January 1596), says: "Evin at the closing up heirof, I was informed that a schip was arryved from Flanderis, wharin wes one Elphinston Jesuit . . . having with him commission boyth from the Pope and Philip, to deall with his Majestie and offer conditions, so he will concur against her Majestie (Elizabeth) and the Huguenots. . . . In lyk manner two other Jesuits have written home to his Majestie persuading his Grace timeously to enter in friendship with Spain. . . . Tyrie has written to Lord Hume, schawing that the King's Majestie (James) must, by example of the King of France, either renounce his kingdom or else be a Catholic" (Letter-book of John Colville, Bannatyne Club).

An intercepted letter from the Duke of Sessa to Philip, of February 20, 1596 (Bacon Papers, Birch), says that Father Tyrie, the Scottish Jesuit in Rome, had previously been against Spanish aims, but that he had recently altered his opinion. Some letters recently received by the General of the Jesuits had convinced him and others that James was a heretic, and would always remain so. Sessa thereupon rejoices that the Pope's eyes will be opened without any Spanish influence appearing. By this we may conclude that the few Scottish Jesuits who were anxious to promote the greatness of their own country were now being finally overruled by their superiors.

against Spain.<sup>1</sup> This was another reason for getting Ogilvie away on his mission to Spain. He had a ship waiting for him at Naples, but no money. This difficulty was got over by Sessa's giving him a gold chain worth 230 crowns; and at length, on the 27th February, Ogilvie, accompanied by Father Cecil, at the urgent request of Sessa, sailed for Genoa and Spain.

They arrived at Toledo in May 1596, and Ogilvie presented his letter of credence and a formal memorandum of James's desire for an offensive and defensive alliance between Scotland and Spain against England. On their long voyage Father Cecil had possessed himself of all of Ogilvie's instructions, and immediately after Ogilvie had presented his memorandum to the King the priest presented another, attacking and opposing it article by article.<sup>2</sup> It is not quite clear what Father Cecil's object was at this juncture. He was secretly in the pay of the English Government, and was violently opposed—though not even Persons himself knew it at the time—to the Spanish Jesuit party; he was, moreover, apparently a sincere Catholic, and presumably, like the majority of the party, he secretly favoured the succession of James to the English throne, either as a Catholic or with toleration to Catholicism. His

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen by the note on page 213 that Sessa congratulated himself that the Jesuits would represent this to the Pope before he (Sessa) did so, and that this would render the Pope less suspicious of Spanish aims. Sessa repeats a saying of Sixtus V. in this connection, and says that Clement VIII. has a similar idea. "The Spaniards are Catholics, it is true," said Sixtus, "but they believe nobody else is" (Bacon Papers, Birch).

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum in full with Cecil's commentary was long afterwards obtained and sent to England by Sir Henry Neville. It is printed in vol. i. of the Winwood State Papers.

reason for thus bitterly attacking James's professed desire for conversion must either have been prompted by a wish to see Arabella Stuart or some other English claimant succeed to Elizabeth on the demise of the crown, or what is more likely, simply to convince the Spaniards and the Jesuits, for his own ends, that he was ardently on their side. In any case, his attack upon Ogilvie and his mission was violent in the extreme. The envoy was, he said, a doubtful Catholic, and was no friend to the Catholic nobles; he had associated in Flanders with Paget, Gifford, and others of the English "political" party, who adhere to the King of Scots regardless of religion, and he was not in agreement with the "late Cardinal Allen, Father Persons, Father Holt, and others who follow the same, and only true course, for the conversion of England." His letter of credence, he said, was most likely a forgery, or else the King's signature has been obtained by some "wile." Besides, who, looking at the King of Scots' past life, can believe that he would really become a Catholic? And so, one point after the other is made, showing up the King's monumental insincerity in all things and the envoy's crooked dealings with all men, entirely, no doubt, to the satisfaction of Philip, for it reflected exactly the opinions which justified him in claiming for his daughter the crown of England by virtue of James's incurable heresy.

After the usual procrastination, Ogilvie was dismissed with a handsome present and with the vague, sanctimonious banalities which, in Philip's language, meant No. He was assigned as a travelling companion homewards a Portuguese gentleman who

accompanied him as far as Madrid. But there Ogilvie seems, not without reason, to have taken fright, and, giving his companion the slip, he turned aside and hastened to Barcelona. But he was too late, for before he could take ship Secretary Ibarra himself arrived in Spain, and told the story how Ogilvie had cajoled him to grant him a pension, on the promise that he would betray his trust, and yet while here in Toledo he had negotiated according to the letter of his instructions. This was enough, and the unfortunate Laird of Pury was kept in durance at Barcelona until it could be learned from James whether he had really sent him or not.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst these fruitless and mutually paralysing Scottish Catholic intrigues were progressing, matters of far more serious moment were being conducted with regard to Ireland. The blow of Cadiz must have convinced Philip that the crippling of England by some means was no longer needed alone for the extension of his power, but for the maintenance of his very existence as a potentate of the first class. We have seen how nerveless had grown his officers and people under his blighting sway, but he himself, though fast hurrying to his grave, was as fully convinced as ever of his final invincibility, and of his sacred duty to follow without swerving the path that had hitherto led him to disaster. In all his northern ports shipwrights, riggers, and victuallers

<sup>1</sup> The full particulars of Ogilvie's mission was not known to the English Government until three years afterwards, when Sir H. Neville, the English ambassador in France, sent to Cecil the memorandum with Father Cecil's reply. The English Government then complained to James, who repudiated Ogilvie and imprisoned him in Edinburgh Castle. See Winwood State Papers, vol. i., and Birch, vol. i.



were busy, under the general superintendence of Don Martin de Padilla, Adelantado of Castile, in fitting out ships for a great expedition. Not a soul—except perhaps Don Cristobal de Moura—knew what its destination was to be. That was locked in the breast of Philip. The Adelantado, and even Father Persons, were as ignorant of the King's intention as the ragged beggar who moped and mowed at the church door. But it was patent to all that the great naval preparations were somewhere and somewhen to strike a blow at England in revenge for Cadiz; and the English Catholics of the Spanish faction were all agog to share in the glory and prosperity that they hoped might come to them from Philip's determined effort. In Spain itself spirits were high, for men knew now that the dreaded Drake had been buried fathoms deep in the far Atlantic, and that his fleet had been dispersed. Confidence in Spanish arms and hearts once more began to grow; Irish and Scottish Catholics, it was known, had been begging the King to extend his paternal rule over them, and Spaniards were proud that other peoples should envy them the possession of so sacred a sovereign. But the Englishmen in Spain and Flanders looked somewhat askance at all this secret hobnobbing with Scots and Irishry, and tried to prevent the King's mind from being diverted from the main object, namely, the conversion of England itself and the exclusion of Scottish James at any cost.

In July 1596 the little body of English stalwarts in Spain, under the guidance of Persons, presented a petition to the King, asking him to appoint a

regular board of Englishmen in Flanders to decide upon all English matters. Many nobles in England, they said, were willing to negotiate, now that the Queen's life could not be many more years prolonged, but there was no authorised body with whom they could negotiate; and even the English officers commanding contingents in Flanders would willingly come to an understanding for a settlement on the Queen's death, if they knew with whom to deal. Needless to say that the members recommended to form the board were Stanley, Owen, Treherne, Dr. Worthington, Dr. Pierce, and the Jesuit Holt. Those who were against the Infanta, Paget, Gifford, Tresham, Hesketh, Nicholas Fitzherbert, and others, were to be sent away to places where they could do no harm. Father Persons in Valladolid, too, sent an interminable memorandum to Idiaquez for the King's consideration, laying down the principles which should guide him "in the English enterprise." Some of these priestly recommendations doubtless made Philip smile grimly, if it was possible for him to smile any more. He was enjoined, "in imitation of the Holy Kings of old to make some vow to the Lord, such as to promise Him, if He gave his Majesty victory, to restore to the Church in England the liberty and privileges it possessed before King Henry separated it from the Apostolic See; and especially that his Majesty would do his best to make some restitution . . . with regard to the ecclesiastical property which was taken from the Church." Another recommendation seems more to the point. The King, thinks Persons, should tranquillise men's minds in

England, and disarm jealous foreigners, by announcing at once his intention not to unite the crown of England to that of Spain. A tract, he proposes, might be written by some reputable Englishman, such as Sir Francis Englefield, setting forth the advantages to be gained by a general acceptance of the Infanta's candidature. Next, Father Persons urges the King to cause a diversion, and alarm Elizabeth by sending a force to aid the Scottish nobles: "The same thing may be said of the Irish savages, who should be encouraged by some trifling help in money or arms," and the English exiles in Flanders should be aided to make constant piratical raids on the English coasts and shipping. "Another way of strengthening our friends is that in any fleet his Majesty sends to England, Ireland, or Scotland, there should go some high English ecclesiastic, such as Dr. Stapleton or other in Flanders, with authority both from the Pope and his Majesty to settle matters, and assure the English of his Majesty's intentions, in opposition to the countless lies of our enemies. . . . If the people do not see such a prelate come in his Majesty's fleet, they will be confirmed in their suspicion that the heretics have been telling the truth in saying that his Majesty wanted to conquer the country, and will doubt the Pope's intention of absolving them from their oath of allegiance to the Queen." A printing press will have to be carried in the fleet, "such as was prepared in Flanders in the year '88": the excommunication of the Queen must be renewed by the Pope, and the proclamation drawn up by Allen for the Armada should be now reissued, with such

alterations as are needful. If there is any difficulty in making Dr. Stapleton a cardinal,<sup>1</sup> he might be created by secret brief Bishop of Durham or Ely and Papal Nuncio in England, smaller English bishoprics being given to Dr. Worthington and Dr. Pierce. "But if the fleet is going to Ireland, it might be better to give the title of Archbishop of Dublin to an English priest (Joseph Haydon), who lives in Rome, a relative of Cardinal Allen." This latter paragraph proves that Persons knew nothing of Philip's plans, and the fact is confirmed by what follows. "In this way I trust in God that, in case his Majesty undertakes something promptly to recover his prestige, either by way of Ireland or Scotland, all will be well. I write this on the understanding that something should be done quickly to recover prestige, because otherwise, with the common talk in England and all Northern Europe of the weakness of Spain and of the rich plunder taken by the English (in Cadiz), twenty ships of theirs will be fitted out for every one before,

<sup>1</sup> Stapleton had been summoned to Rome on the death (October 1595) of Owen Lewis, Bishop of Cassano, who had been designated for the cardinalate. But strong pro-Spaniard as Stapleton was, Father Agazzari, the head of the Jesuits, thought he was not sufficiently thorough to be made a cardinal, and wrote to Persons in Spain to secure the promotion of a person about whose fidelity to the crown (of Spain) there can be no doubt (Law, "Jesuits and Seculars"): Stapleton, on the other hand, was simultaneously assuring Persons that he would "ever remain a true and trusty servant to his Majesty of Spain" ("Douai Diaries"), and in 1591 had written his book, now extremely rare, called "*Apologia pro Rege Catholico Philippo II. Hispanæ contra varias et falsas accusationes Elizabethæ Reginae.*" Father Agazzari's objection to him could hardly have been his lukewarmness in adhesion to Spain; it is more likely to have arisen from a belief that Stapleton was more attached to Spain than to the Society of Jesus.

and they will come hither like flies. With regard to commencing with England or Ireland, there is much to be said on both sides, but the decision must turn upon feasibility. If England is impossible, then a beginning should be made in Ireland to recover prestige and give a starting-point from which to attack England next year, rather than doing nothing. . . . Above all, matters should be arranged to send the force to England in September . . . and in any case, the Earls in Flanders should return to Scotland; and the Catholics in Scotland, who are awaiting his Majesty's decision, should receive some help in money to raise troops."

And so on for many pages, Father Persons lays down his rules for Philip's guidance, in ignorance of both the real aims and intentions of the autocrat. One significant paragraph at the end of this document will probably provide for us later a key to a problem which has never yet been satisfactorily solved. It would be well, it says, for some fitting person also to go to England to treat with those Earls there who twice sent their agent, Sterello, to Flanders last winter, and to see what foundation there was for the new offer about Flushing.<sup>1</sup> All July and August Persons was busy in his prospective arrangements for the success of the new Armada, and bombarded the younger Idiaquez with memoranda, exhortations, and advice for the King. He was deeply engaged, he said, in translating into Latin to send to the Pope his famous book on the English succession, for Persons himself was summoned to Rome to quell the renewed disturbances in the English College

<sup>1</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

there,<sup>1</sup> and he was anxious when he left Spain that everything should be in order, from the Jesuit point of view, for the subjugation of England. In the first days of September he wrote to Idiaquez: "Please let me know also about the voyage of the *Adelantado*. Although you say nothing, I am thinking that perhaps his Majesty may be sending him to Ireland. If neither of the other roads (*i.e.* England or Scotland) is practicable, I told you and also his Majesty that this Irish way might be adopted with God's blessing. Much will depend upon the *Adelantado's* taking with him from here sufficient men, arms, and money, and his going thither before the winter sets in or the Queen learns the design. I have put upon paper a few observations that will be useful to him when he arrives." To be quite ready for every eventuality also, Father Persons took the precaution of sending to Lisbon a Jesuit, the Vice-Rector of the College of Valladolid, with half-a-dozen young English missionary priests to be shipped on the Armada. Though they were ready to risk their lives at the bidding of their Jesuit superior, not one of these young priests knew whither they were being sent, the Vice-Rector, "who is very discreet and of noble English family," alone being in his principal's confidence; but, wrote Persons, "they will be worth their weight in gold when they

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note, as marking the intrepid character of Persons, that the aged and blind Sir Francis Englefield, having expressed a fear that the antagonists of the Jesuits in Rome would detain Dr. Persons there, the latter wrote, "I fear not, nor does my spirit faint within me, as St. Paul said. God has brought me through worse passes than this, and I am full of faith and hope that He will give his Majesty victory" (Spanish Calendar).

arrive there," though he had to borrow the money to send them on their way to Lisbon.

Before he left Castile for Barcelona on his way to Rome, Persons amended, in accordance with the altered circumstances, the proclamation that Allen had written to be disseminated in England when the Spanish troops had landed from the Armada of 1588. The English attack upon Cadiz was now made one of the principal reasons why the King of Spain had been obliged to forego his "accustomed clemency" towards people who had committed so many outrages against him. "His benignity," says the draft edict, "has only made them bolder, and he has now decided to accede to the universal demand of the oppressed Catholics and to release them from the yoke." The proclamation promises that the ancient laws and parliament of England shall be maintained, the ancient nobility and gentry upheld in their former grandeur, and Philip pledges himself to confirm in their position and possessions all those that are favourable to him, whilst in cases where the head of a house is against him he will recognise as chief the next heir who shall aid the Catholic army. Where it is impossible for gentlemen at once to proclaim their Catholic sympathies, the King will allow them to remain with the heretics until they can conveniently go over, but at least they must desert the enemy at the time of battle. His Majesty's object being alone the peace and tranquillity of England and the freedom of the Catholic faith, he has no quarrel with the English people as a whole, and will punish with the utmost severity any man in the Catholic army who molests, injures,

or attacks the land or people of the country other than those who resist.<sup>1</sup>

This draft edict with Father Persons' amendments was left with Father Joseph Creswell, another Jesuit, who remained in Madrid in his absence to watch and help in English affairs. It was Creswell who at the time of the great Armada had, at Parma's instance, turned the edict into English; and he now considered himself authorised to suggest in its wording and spirit far more sweeping amendments than those made by Persons. In a long memorandum addressed to the King on the subject, Creswell exhibits himself as a man of entirely different methods from Persons. The latter in his fierce zeal would have no compromise. He was a good hater, a good fighter, and a man of inflexible will; but no velvet glove softened his grip, no fallacious sweetness tempered the bitter venom of his tongue. Creswell was more the typical Jesuit, crawling, if need be, to conquer; and in extremely guarded and sophistical language he advises Philip to adopt a course of conciliation, mildness, and moderation towards the English after the conquest. Liberality, magnanimity, concessions, rewards are the themes of Dr. Creswell's discourse, though he professes himself "so free from personal or national bias in the matter, that if I heard that the entire destruction of England was for the greater glory of God and the welfare of Christianity, I should be glad of its being done." This was the natural concession

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. A full account of these plans, with many additions of his own, gathered probably by personal communication with Persons and Creswell, was sent to the Earl of Essex by Father Cecil, who still remained in Madrid (Birch, Memoirs).



to Jesuit teaching; but in this document, and in others we shall notice later, Creswell shows that the Society of Jesus had not quite killed the Englishman in him, as it had done in the case of Persons.

Whilst these priests were making their preparations for the submission of England to their faith at the point of Spanish pikes, and the Duchess of Feria,<sup>1</sup> Englefield, and the few English pensioners and leading Churchmen in the Peninsula, were again urging that the Infanta should be openly adopted as the Spanish nominee to the English throne, Philip was plodding on his own way, thanking all these zealous advisers with vague sanctimoniousness, but giving no inkling to any of them of his real intentions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Duchess of Feria (Jane Dormer), although naturally extremely pro-Spanish and a personal enemy of Elizabeth, was opposed to Persons' methods and aims. It will be recollected that there had been an obscure intrigue to place her at the head of affairs in Flanders before Parma's death, in order that she might manage English affairs to her liking. She apparently longed for a return of the political power of the old English Catholic nobility under a frequently absent foreign sovereign like the Infanta. But neither the Duchess of Feria nor her class in England, many of whom were enriched by ecclesiastical lands, could desire to live under a harrow in the hands of fierce sacerdotal despots like Persons and Holt. (See letter of the Duchess's sister Anne Lady Hungerford to the Bishop of Cassano, May 10, 1595. State Papers, Domestic.) Persons himself, on his way to Rome at this time, wrote from Genoa to Father Holt in Flanders, suggesting that the most suitable candidates for the English crown would be "the Infanta with the Prince Cardinal" (her prospective husband, the Archduke Albert). This suggestion was the natural sequel of Persons' recent book on the succession.

<sup>2</sup> The Venetian ambassador in Madrid writes (October 10, 1596), that the Adelantado is making great preparations in Lisbon. "He has embarked 400 of the best horses in Portugal, arms for 10,000 men, clothing for 4000, and some vestments for the Mass. He has collected great numbers of carpenters, smiths, and masons, who have been pressed if they would not go willingly. He has brought together every sort of craft, and the total may number ninety, of which a third

In October all things at last seemed ready. Once more, through dim cathedrals, through monasteries and parish churches innumerable, there resounded fervent rogations for the success of the Catholic King's designs, whatever they might be; and again the psalm "*Contra paganos*" was intoned at Mass throughout the land. Gradually by the middle of October it began to be whispered that the Bishop of Killaloe and the Irish gentlemen in Lisbon were on board the fleet; and it was assumed that Philip this time was aiming at the heretic Queen through Ireland, and not direct at the heart of her realm. The Irish exiles, with hearts aflame at the thought of their home and faith, proclaimed to all who would listen how easy such an enterprise would be. Had they not on their side, even now in arms, all that was best and bravest of Ireland itself? True, the Queen of England held the two best harbours, but many others hardly less good were yearning to welcome the delivering Catholic fleet. From the easy conquest of willing Ireland to the domination of England was but a step, and the Queen herself knew that if she lost Ireland England must go too.<sup>1</sup>

would be fit to fight. There are 12,000 men on board, including seamen. Ships and munitions are very poor; there is a great lack of biscuits. The extent of the preparations, the variety of the provisions, and the anxiety of the Adelantado lead people to believe that he is to sail as soon as possible, and not merely go to winter at Ferrol, but may push on at once to some further destination. *Some conjecture that Africa will be the object, but common opinion points to Ireland or England. . . . But nothing certain can be known at present, as all orders are sent to the Adelantado under the King's own hand*" (Venetian Calendar). This will show how completely in the dark every one was as to Philip's intentions on the very eve of the sailing of the fleet.

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that English historians have nearly always

Thus spoke the ardent Celts, and their enthusiasm was contagious amongst the listening landmen. But with seamen it was otherwise. They saw with dismay and understood the meaning of the demoralisation that reigned everywhere. The Adelantado, a passionate, impressionable man, wept and imprecated in turns at the apparent impossibility of having everything ready at the same time. Provisions and water went bad whilst hulls were being caulked: when the guns were on board at Lisbon, the ammunition was at Ferrol or Seville: seamen deserted as soon as they were shipped, and stores dwindled as the weeks passed on. At length, in the middle of October, Philip's almost inexhaustible patience gave way, as it had done, with disastrous result, at the time of the first Armada. Peremptory orders were sent to Lisbon that the fleet must sail at once, ready or not ready, and make for Ireland. Again the miserable precedent of the Armada was followed. The Adelantado summoned his captains to conference, and they agreed to remonstrate with the King that to sail then would be to court disaster. The reply of Philip now was the same as he gave to Medina Sidonia in 1588. The fleet was to obey orders and sail, let the risk be what it might; and on the 23rd October 1596 the second Spanish Armada beat out of the Tagus. But

assumed that this fleet was intended for the invasion of the Isle of Wight. This arose from the fact that its intended destination was kept secret, as we have seen, even from the high officers on board. The captured Spaniards from various coasting vessels seized by the English during the winter (1596-97) could only repeat the common gossip about the fleets going to the Isle of Wight. The official papers that I have quoted—and will quote—in this book show that there was never any idea on the part of the King of it going thither.

alas! unready still, and, like its predecessor, it was forced to put into Vigo to ship more men and provisions, though we are told<sup>1</sup> that "in order to furnish this fleet it has been necessary to take every sort of ship, ammunition, and arms that could be found in all Spain."

News came that an English squadron was hovering off the coast of Galicia, and had even looked into Vigo Bay; but it was evidently no match for the Adelantado's united fleet; and the latter finally, on the 27th October, sailed out of Vigo, with the exception of the Biscay squadron under Zubiaur, which could not weather the point of Bayona.<sup>2</sup> Off

<sup>1</sup> Venetian Calendar, November 3, 1596.

<sup>2</sup> The following is a statement of the strength of the fleet as it left Lisbon for the invasion of Ireland:—

		<i>Tons.</i>
Spanish royal ships . . . . .	15	8190
Portuguese royal ships . . . . .	9	6320
Dutch and German freighted (or rather pressed) ships	53	12,643
Transports . . . . .	6	470
Caravels . . . . .	15	450
	<u>98</u>	<u>28,037</u>
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Companies.</i>	<i>Men.</i>
The levies of De Luna . . . . .	17	1800
"    "    Lisbon . . . . .	13	1285
"    "    Andalucia . . . . .	16	1635
Adventurers . . . . .	32	3410
	<u>78</u>	<u>8130</u>
		<i>Men.</i>
Cavalry . . . . .		360
Adventurers and mercenaries . . . . .		100
Portuguese . . . . .		2800
Men on the Seville squadron . . . . .		2500
In the port of Vigo to be shipped . . . . .		3300
	In all . . . . .	<u>16,590</u>

Finisterre a great winter gale swept down out of the bay, and scattered like husks the ships that represented so many months of toil and trouble.<sup>1</sup> Over twenty crowded vessels perished in the storm with 3000 souls on board, and those that survived destruction hustled, as best they might, battered and crippled, into Ferrol, where 2000 more men died of pestilence in the next few days. Pestilence, too, scourged the Biscay fleet still remaining at Vigo. The men on both fleets, panicstricken at the evil fortune that followed them, deserted as soon as they were landed from the overcrowded floating pest-houses. Despair again fell upon all hearts but one; for the elements themselves seemed against the long-suffering King and the Catholic cause. Out of the welter of misery one fact stood clearly: that for this year, at least, England had no cause for fear of any attack from Spain; and the watchers by the beacons, who had stood, like links of a chain, on every headland along the southern British shore, slept sound of nights in their beds; for the second Armada had shared the fate of the first, and the Power that ruled the tempest fought still on the side of England.

But the news that rejoiced the Protestant Englishmen fell like a death-knell on the hearts of the Irish insurgents, who had looked with such high hopes for the coming of their friends. To make all

<sup>1</sup> It was reported by "an honest man from Bilbao" (December 9, Hatfield Papers, vol. vi.) that 40 ships of war and 12 victuallers with over 4000 men were lost. Other accounts make the number of ships wrecked 30 and the loss of life 3000 men. Spanish accounts give the number of ships lost as being "about 24."

things ready for the reception of the new Armada, Captain Cobos had gone in a swift caravel from Corunna to Killibegs some weeks before, carrying with him letters from the King to Tyrone, O'Donnell, and the chiefs, bidding them be of good cheer and courage, for help was now really at hand. Cobos arrived at Killibegs harbour on the 26th September, and invited O'Donnell to meet him. They agreed that the Catholic "Lords" should be summoned in formal assembly at the monastery of Donegal to hear the message from the King whom they had chosen for their suzerain. For a week Cobos remained in the harbour of Killibegs, whilst the chiefs gathered from their fastnesses at the call of O'Donnell the Red, and spies of the English eagerly watched the Spanish caravel as she waited for news of the assembly.

The truce between the Ulster chiefs and the English still continued, and the Connaught men, with the exception of MacWilliam Bourke, were holding their hands until they should see what punishment would be meted out by the Government to their terrible persecutor, Sir Richard Bingham; but Feagh M'Hugh O'Byrne, and not a few Butlers and Kavanaghs in his train of Leinster "rabble," were ravaging the English Pale well nigh in sight of Dublin. False news came almost daily of the landing of large bodies of Spanish troops, now in O'Dogherty's country at Innishowen in the north of Ulster, now at Donegal, now at Mayo, and elsewhere, and the Lord-Deputy clamoured in vain to the Government in London that the few scattered English troops at his disposal were utterly inadequate

to overcome a powerful incursion of foreigners.<sup>1</sup> Tyrone and O'Donnell were still under arms, wrote the English officers; fairly as O'Neil might speak, his sincerity was more than doubtful, and if the Spaniards came he would throw off the mask.<sup>2</sup> Norreys, the commander-in-chief, was at issue with the Lord-Deputy Russell, for the soldier, brave and experienced as he was, saw the urgent need of conciliating the Irish before it was too late. He it was who insisted that an impartial inquiry should be held on the atrocities of which Bingham was accused in Connaught, and urged that even Feagh M'Hugh, the rebel in arms, should be brought to some sort of "composition," so that the Spaniards, when they came, might find the Irish disunited. But still, said Norreys, when O'Connor Don informed him of the arrival of Cobos in Killibegs, it would be well to send one of her Majesty's vessels thither to capture the Spanish caravel and O'Donnell's pinnace with which he communicated with Spain; "and if her Majesty thinks fit not to endure this underhand dealing of the Earl and O'Donnell, he will attack

<sup>1</sup> Since July the Irish Government had continued to beseech Elizabeth to send at least 3000 more foot and 300 horse, with victuals, money, and ammunition. At the end of September, when the coming of the strong Spanish fleet was expected every hour, the English in Ireland had only seventeen barrels of powder in store.

<sup>2</sup> An English officer wrote the following news, September 27, O.S., which gives an idea of the distrust then entertained of Tyrone:—"The Earl of Tyrone has ridden down in all post haste, very secretly, taking no more than two men who can speak Spanish. Before he went he made proclamation in Dungannon that, upon pain of death, no man should say anything of the ships that were come, for they were but Scottish. I will not judge for what cause is the Earl's departure." This refers to Tyrone's hurrying down to meet Cobos, whose one small boat in the English reports is magnified to two, three, nine, and even a fleet of vessels.

them at once, and so handle them before next spring they will be glad to renounce the Spaniards; and Connaught, with good usage, might be kept from joining them." For Norreys, unlike Russell, disbelieved in the probability of any Spanish fleet being able to attack Ireland at so advanced a period of the year.<sup>1</sup> As we have seen, had it not been for the providential storm which caught the Adelantado's fleet off Finisterre on the 28th October, there would have landed early in November, in one of the fine harbours on the Irish coast, a Spanish force very much stronger than any army the English could have brought against it; and, in all probability, Tyrone would then have been victorious and Protestant England in deadly peril.

This was the dangerous state of affairs when, on Sunday the 6th October 1596, the Irish chieftains met Captain Alonso Cobos within the ancient and ruinous monastery of Donegal. Jealous eyes watched and zealous runners reported to the English Governors every movement of the greater Irish leaders,<sup>2</sup> but we must go to Spanish sources to learn what happened inside the closed doors of the conference chamber.<sup>3</sup> Most of the chieftains who attended were still ostensibly at peace with the English; yet when, after solemn Mass said by the Bishop of

<sup>1</sup> Russell wrote to Sir R. Cecil (Irish State Papers), October 2, Rathdrum, again praying for reinforcements, and offering his resignation. Will do his best when the Spaniards land, if they arrive hereabout, as no doubt the greatest force will, but he leaves the success to God. "I do protest," he says, "before God, that if the present forces be not sent to us with all expedition, all the English Pale will be ready to revolt, myself not knowing whom I may trust."

<sup>2</sup> Irish State Papers of the date.

<sup>3</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.



Raphoe, Cobos presented to them collectively the King of Spain's letter of greeting and exhortation, and to Tyrone, O'Donnell, Cormack O'Neil, MacWilliam O'Neil, and Dennis M'Suynne, Lord of Tyrbane and Chief of Killibegs, special letters of salutation from Philip to his new vassals, each of the chiefs raised the missive to his brow in token of submission, and swore to die, if needs were, "in the service of God and his Majesty."<sup>1</sup> The scene must have been an impressive and pathetic one. Tyrone, O'Donnell, and O'Dogherty were probably dressed in doublets and trunks of silk and velvet and wore gold chains around their shoulders, as Englishmen of their rank would have done; but behind them, or near at hand, must have been their shaggy bands of gallowglasses with loose, saffron-dyed, linen cloaks and leathern jackets and brogues for their garments, a frowsy fringe of mane covering their eyebrows for their only headdress, and their crashing battleaxes for their only weapons. The minor chiefs and the "rabble" of youngsters of chieftains' kindred, with

<sup>1</sup> Dennis O'Rourke and MacWilliam Bourke did not attend the meeting, the former because he was laid up with a gunshot wound in his arm, and the latter "because of the great distance he would have to come, and because he was at feud with a kinsman who claimed his chieftainship and land." The kinsman referred to was the English nominee. The chief himself (Theobald M'William Bourke) is usually referred to by the English officers as "the supposed or pretended MacWilliam." His family was of very variable attachment, but had in the main kept at peace with the English. Theobald was the son of the famous Grace O'Malley. He wrote in June 1596 to Norreys and Fenton saying that "he means, if possible, never to be otherwise than a dutiful subject or to change his own natural prince for any other;" but in the same letter he hinted very strongly that if the English did not grant him "redress for injuries," the chieftainship and lands of his house, and all the rest of his demands, he should consider rebellion justifiable. (See Irish State Papers of the date.)

their flowing yellow mantles over their armour and their swords girt to their sides, were the link between the two; some more savage than courtly, some more courtly than savage. But prince and gallowglass, Oxford scholar and barbarian mountain kern, they were all Irishmen, moved mainly by two overpowering impulses—a fierce love of battle and a fine scorn of the Sassenach.

But alas! they were Irishmen, too, in their weakness; and Cobos reported, when he came home to Spain, that after the chiefs had fervently thanked God and his Majesty publicly for the aid and protection promised to their land and faith, “each one took me aside separately to assure me that *he and his folk* would be the first to join the Spanish force when it arrived.” “I spoke to O’Neil and O’Donnell apart,” wrote Cobos to the King, “and said that at last the hour they had longed for had come, and that before winter set in, the succour they had so often requested would be there. I urged them to set about making what raids they could to show their zeal, and also to make the necessary arrangements secretly for the reception of our force. They thanked his Majesty, and said that they were always ready and waiting, like the faithful vassals they were. They would never fail in their promises. Secrecy was as important, they said, to them as to us. They had been playing fast and loose with the enemy for a long time, awaiting his Majesty’s aid, and a fortnight ago the English came with 1500 footmen and 600 horse into their lands to force them to make peace. . . . Norreys left off fighting and tried to make terms, but they would only consent to

a truce for a month and a day. All this was solely to await your Majesty's succour, whilst they prevented the Queen from sending more forces. I asked them where would be the best place to land the troops, to be most effectual and safe for facilitating the junction of the forces. They thought on the north-west coast, such a place as Galway, where there is a company of English in garrison for the last three months. The town is close to the lands of MacWilliam Bourke, and will surrender the moment a fleet approaches. If weather forces the fleet into St. George's Channel, they think it should anchor in Carlingford, thirty Irish miles from Dublin, where they will be in touch with O'Neill's people. All the north is friendly."

Then followed a closely detailed description of the state of the country from a military point of view, which tallies almost exactly with the accounts to be found in the English State Papers. Every English garrison is enumerated, and the total strength of English troops in the island appears to have been 4000 infantry and 600 cavalry. How great was the danger then imminent, with a Spanish fleet carrying more than double that number of men, only waiting for a fair wind to sail for Ireland, will be apparent, and the despondency of Russell was fully justified. Nothing was omitted by Philip to gain the good-will of the chiefs. Not only were Tyrone and O'Donnell addressed in autograph letters full of flattering expressions, but two similar letters with the address in blank were entrusted to Cobos, with which to gratify such other chiefs as he thought would be most useful. He was extremely diplomatic in his

use of the letters, and handed them respectively to two important Ulstermen, who had usually been friendly to the English, though both of them had rescued and relieved some of the fugitives from the wrecks of the Armada ships in 1588. "One of the letters your Majesty gave me without superscription I gave to a gentleman named O'Dogherty,<sup>1</sup> a lord of many vassals, a great soldier and greatly esteemed, who said he was anxious to prove his loyalty by his acts. The other I gave to a gentleman named James Oge M'Sorleyboy, a Scotsman, who holds some ports on this coast opposite Scotland. He is a good soldier and very brave. He was neutral when I arrived previously, but is now a great friend of the Catholic chiefs, and they thought he would be flattered at your Majesty's writing to him."<sup>2</sup>

The meeting, however, did not pass without some little unpleasantness. It will be recollected that the letter that Cobos had brought from Philip to Tyrone on his previous visit to Ireland had been "lent to Norreys," not to be copied, but simply to prove how the Spaniards were courting him (Tyrone), and how irreproachably loyal he was in spurning their advances. One of the other chiefs secretly told Cobos that Tyrone had sent the King's letter to the Sassenach; and the Spaniard, distrustful of what certainly looked like treachery, taxed Tyrone with

<sup>1</sup> He was an English knight, and the English called him Sir John O'Doherty.

<sup>2</sup> This was the son of the famous Sorleyboy M'Donnell, Lord of Dunluce and joint Lord of the Route, who had so sturdily helped the shipwrecked men from the Armada. He was not present at the meeting, the letter being carried to him by Hugh Boy O'Davitt, afterwards Tyrone's envoy to Spain.

it, saying that the King had heard of it in Spain. Tyrone explained the matter truly enough, saying that he had acted as he did in order to deceive the English and make them believe in his loyalty until the Spaniards came; but Cobos was still indignant, and "warned them to keep their promises better for the future."<sup>1</sup> The chiefs, in their turn, were anxious to know what had happened at Cadiz, "for the enemy said that Essex had sacked and plundered the city and burnt the fleet." "I," says Cobos, "replied that they, being neighbours of the English, should know better than any one that, in order to bring about peace in Ireland, they would invent all manner of lies. It was true, I said, that they had sacked Cadiz, thanks to the weakness of the townspeople, but they did not wait to encounter any force, and only made incursions on unprotected places, and ran away as quickly as they could."

And so, leaving the Irishmen full of hope for the

<sup>1</sup> The letter was entrusted by Tyrone to Captain Warren, who was the officer usually employed to communicate with him. Warren produced it to the Irish Privy Council, who declined to return it, and not only broke the pledge given to Tyrone that it should not even be copied, but sent the original to Queen Elizabeth, who took care to have it conveyed to Philip, in proof of the falsity of Tyrone. The latter and O'Donnell constantly referred to this action as proving how little they could trust the English. Norreys wrote to Sir Robert Cecil in July 1596, when there was a talk of Tyrone going to England, and sending his son to the Earl of Essex to be educated. "This he (Tyrone) hath deferred as he answereth upon detaining the King of Spain's letter: and this I will assure your Honour, that there is not the basest rogue of a rebel in Ireland that hath not ordinarily in his mouth how they may trust us with their lives, when the Earl was deceived in trusting the Lord-Deputy but with a letter. O'Donnell did swear that if that letter had not been detained, either he or the Earl had been in England before Michaelmas" (Irish State Papers). We may doubt this last assertion of O'Donnell's, in view of the Spanish accounts now before us.

speedy coming of the great force which was on the way to free Ireland and make England Catholic, Captain Cobos left Donegal on the 9th October to join his pinnace at Killibegs, carrying with him an interesting sheaf of letters for Spain.<sup>1</sup> Nearly everybody with whom Cobos had come into contact in Ireland wanted some separate favour for himself. The Franciscan friars at Donegal wished for money to repair the ruin of their monastery by the English soldiery, and some chalices and church ornaments. Hugh Boy O'Davitt asked for a pension; Cobos himself petitioned for a captain's pay as well as the rank, and Cormack O'Neil wanted so much as to fill a long letter with his petition.<sup>2</sup> Tyrone and O'Donnell are mainly concerned in the prompt coming of succour; but the former, in a fervent letter to the King, explains the circumstances which led him to send Philip's former letter to the English, and concludes thus: "In the name of God, and by my holy baptism, I assert that I did not send the letter to the Viceroy, except for the above-mentioned

<sup>1</sup> Amongst these was one of extreme interest, which I transcribed at Simancas. It has no special bearing upon the subject of this book, but I cannot help referring to it. It is in the form of a humble, illiterate petition, written and signed by eight Spanish soldiers, who, having escaped from the massacre of the shipwrecked men from the Armada, had lived in the territories of O'Neil and O'Donnell ever since. They humbly pray for some wages or aid "to fit out their persons and arms, better to serve his Majesty as guides, interpreters, or otherwise, when the Spanish force lands." These same men had earnestly prayed Cobos, when he came to Ireland some months previously, to take them back with him to Spain, but he had refused, and told them they would be required as interpreters if a Spanish force were sent.

<sup>2</sup> "Your Lordship," he wrote to Idiaquez, "has done me great honour, and now I beg you to favour me as follows. For I have always fought against the English for the Catholic faith, and if God give me health I will devote the rest of my life to his Majesty's service. I have many

reasons ; and I pray your Majesty to pardon me, without distrust or misgiving.—Donegal, 8th October, 1596.” A few days afterwards, Cobos sailed from M’Suynne’s harbour of Killibegs, arriving in Spain shortly before the disaster already described to the invading fleet, and the letters and reports that the Captain submitted to his sorely-trying sovereign at the Pardo on the 20th November were but as Dead Sea fruit to Philip, for Heaven was still against him, and no Armada of his could go to Ireland that year.

Week after week the Irish chieftains watched with straining eyes for the coming of their deliverers. They had gone too far now easily to draw back, and O’Donnell had come down into Connaught with his clansmen to join the Spaniards when they should sail into Galway harbour. Famine was stalking abroad through Ireland, even in the Pale, and the English garrisons themselves lacked food. The Lord-Deputy, Norreys, and Fenton prayed and supplicated the politicians in London to send men, money, food, and arms ;<sup>1</sup> “for nothing but force will serve

witnesses who will bear testimony to what I have done against the heretics in all times past ; and I do hope to God that his Majesty will remember me for these lands ;” and then follows a long list of estates which Cormack O’Neil covets. “I beg you to ask his Majesty for all these for me, as I have well deserved them, fighting against the English. I also ask you to beg his Majesty to please supply me with 400 infantry and 100 cavalry for his Majesty’s service, as I have great experience in this country.” This characteristic letter is badly written in illiterate Spanish by one of the wrecked Spanish soldiers, and is signed by Cormack O’Neil in stiff, high-drawn Irish characters, like a row of pikes (Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

<sup>1</sup> The constant complaint of the Irish Government was that the men sent from England were utterly unserviceable. Bingham, Fenton, Norreys, and all the experienced commanders referred to them constantly as “poor old ploughmen,” “rogues,” “runaways.” Bingham says of one draught that “many were diseased and many mad ;” and Norreys

now," wrote Russell in January. Armagh was surrounded by rebels and in danger of starvation, and news came that the Spanish fleet was still in being, and might sail again. But Tyrone at length saw that he was resting upon a broken reed, and the talk of "composition" and "pledges" began again. Norreys collected such forces as were available, and marched to re-victual Armagh in the middle of January 1597. When he reached Dundalk, he found Tyrone holding the passes between that town and Newry to contest his passage, but when the rebel saw that Norreys really meant business, he suddenly changed his attitude and sent loyal messages to the English general. At first he wished to make conditions about the pardon of Feagh M'Hugh, but nothing short of unconditional submission would do for Norreys; and the next day the two commanders met, with a little shallow rivulet only running between them, not a gunshot away from the English camp. "There," says Norreys, "he made vehement protestations of loyalty, taking God and heaven to witness. . . . His outward shows are fair, and his oaths deep and vehement, but we cannot tell if his heart and inward meaning are agreeable, considering how often he has slipped before."<sup>1</sup> Hostages were sent, pledges were given; Tyrone was loyalty itself in protestation, though few people believed him, and those who were inclined to do so, like Norreys and

wrote of another that not twenty men out of two companies were likely to prove good soldiers. They were indeed the mere scourgings of the jails, gutters, and hospitals; and the Irish levies in the English service, excellent soldiers, but distrusted on account of their nationality, were really the mainstay of English power in Ireland.

<sup>1</sup> Norreys, &c., to the Privy Council, Drogheda, January 24, 1597.



Fenton, deplored the facility with which he was led by those who were thought to be more deeply pledged to the Spaniards than himself, especially his brother, Cormack O'Neil, and O'Donnell.

Though Tyrone, as paramount Prince of Ulster and "great O'Neil," claimed sway over his associated chiefs, his own devout lip-service to the English Queen found but slight echo in the haughty Hugh O'Donnell and the Connaught men, who, in spite of friend and foe, stood through the winter (1596-97), armed and waiting, often almost at the gates of Galway, the coming of the Spaniards, who came not. Whilst O'Donnell, O'Rourke, MacWilliam, and MacDermot held all Connaught outside the walled towns, and Feagh M'Hugh O'Byrne ravaged Leinster at his will, the English governors of Ireland, in the deepest despondency at the impossibility of obtaining the needed resources from England, were quarrelling and mutually recriminating with each other at the general helplessness; and Philip, in his forbidding granite palace in the mountains far away, was stolidly toiling at the smallest details of another great expedition, that surely, he thought, before he died, should make him sovereign of Ireland, with the future fate of England in his hands. Then indeed all would be well with his beloved Spain, and his weary lifework would be done.

## CHAPTER VIII

Fears of a Spanish invasion of England—English preparations—Essex's voyage—Lopez de Soto's letters—Strength of the Adelantado's fleet (1597)—Its inglorious return to Spain—Renewed appeal of the Irish rebels to Spain—Tyrone's discontent with the Spaniards—Another truce with Tyrone.

IN the last chapter we have seen how extremely perilous was the position of the English in Ireland at the opening of the year 1597. This, however, was not by any means the only point at which danger seemed to threaten from Spain, and the slowness of the Queen and her Ministers in responding to the urgent demands of the commanders in Ireland for warlike resources is explained by the fact that in the view of Englishmen at the centre of government the first duty was to provide against the possibility of a successful attack upon the heart of the nation itself; and, moreover, the intelligence they received gave them the incorrect belief that the main Spanish attack in 1596 was to be on the Isle of Wight, the Irish expedition being only a diversion.<sup>1</sup> Public opinion in England was indeed profoundly impressed by the supposed imminence of a renewed attempt at the invasion and conquest of the country by a foreign force, and the breach between the two sections of Catholics was in consequence

<sup>1</sup> As I have pointed out in a previous note, this erroneous belief has survived to the present day.

ever widening.<sup>1</sup> "Would to God," wrote one loyal Catholic to Lord Burghley, "that her Majesty would grant toleration of religion, whereby men's minds would be appeased and join all in defence of our country" (Hatfield Papers, vol. vii.), as had been the case in France by the granting of the Edict of Nantes. But religious animus had been stirred to its lowest depth by contending politicians, and it suited Elizabeth and her Ministers to affect a disbelief in the patriotism of all Catholics. So the game of priest-hunting and recusant-bating went on as briskly as before, because it strung up the indignation of the majority to the war pitch and frightened waverers into the Protestant camp. The Essex war party had now quite gained the upper hand in the counsels of the Queen. Raleigh and Essex had for once patched up their quarrels, and the Cecil interest

<sup>1</sup> Amongst Lord Burghley's papers there is, for instance, a long and able Latin paper written at this juncture, apparently by Dr. Wright, Dean of Courtrai, one of the fugitives in Flanders, discussing pro and con the question as to whether it is licit for Catholics in England to oppose by arms and otherwise an attack upon the country by Spain. The conclusion arrived at is that English Catholics are in duty bound to protect their country against any foreigner whatsoever, and the author, pensioner though he was of Philip, expresses doubt as to the sincerity of the King's profession that his concern was mainly for the Catholic religion (Appendix to Strype's "Annals," vol. iii.). See also an interesting letter from an English Catholic fugitive to the Queen (Hatfield Papers, vol. vii. p. 34), written in January 1597, begging her to conform to the Catholic faith, but expressing undying loyalty to her. In the same collection (p. 86) there is a letter written by Harry Constable, a Catholic from Paris, to the Earl of Essex (February 1597), protesting his loyalty, and saying that he has written to Rome to dissuade the Pope from giving credit to those English Catholics who favour the designs of Spain. This, he said, was the wish of most Englishmen in Rome, and it was suggested that loyal English Catholics abroad should bind themselves by oath to oppose all violent proceedings under the guise of religion.

almost for the first time smiled upon the Earl's war-like ardour.

For during Essex's absence on the Cadiz expeditions, Sir Robert Cecil had at last received the Secretaryship which he had coveted so long, and everything had gone smoothly. The Earl's rashness and irascibility also exposed him in every expedition to mistakes which on his return irritated the Queen against him. All this suited the Cecils, and instead of opposing Essex, they were now willing that he should have his way. At least they would be relieved of his jealous ill-temper and the constant discord he created at court. As usual, his plan was to strike a hard blow at Spain before England could be attacked; but the soldiers differed from the seamen as to how or where the blow should be dealt. The recent traditions of England pointed to another naval expedition, similar to that of the previous year, only now directed against the north-western ports, where Philip's new armada was being laboriously fitted out; but Essex had usually been in favour of land attack. The Spaniards had captured Calais before his eyes only a year before, and even now the harbour was filled with flat-bottomed flyboats, which threatened an invasion of England. The King of France, too, offered the Queen the possession of Calais if she could wrest it from the Spaniards, though we may be quite certain that there was a reservation behind the Béarnais' proposal, and the soldiers clamoured unanimously for a great land army to be sent from England to capture again England's ancient gate to the Continent. Sir Francis Vere especially urged Essex to undertake this task with adequate forces,

as being the surest way to cripple and disable Spain.

But there were other considerations. All the recent glory of England, all her new-born potency and increasing wealth, had been gained on the sea; the people themselves were stirred at the idea of naval adventure and abundant loot; and the cost of fitting out a fleet would be largely met by "adventurers" on the chance of private gain; whereas the Queen herself would have to pay the entire cost of an army. Raleigh, now hand-in-glove with Essex for a time, wrote a masterly essay called "Opinion on the Spanish Alarum," in which he quite correctly expressed incredulity of an attack in force upon England, but strongly advocated the fitting out of a fleet sufficient for protection and offence. Ten ships were hastily put into commission for the protection of the coast (February 1597), but as alarmist news came from the spies of the vast preparations being made in Ferrol for the sailing of a Spanish Armada,<sup>1</sup> Essex's mind was made up, and he threw his influence on the side of

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Sidney wrote from Flushing to Essex, April 14, 1597, that Philip had ordered the construction of twenty-eight ships of 800 tons each, and had sent 50,000 ducats to begin the work. One thousand soldiers, he reported, had been sent to Ferrol to be embarked for Brittany and Calais to make war upon England in the summer, and he speaks of other preparations in the Spanish ports (Hatfield Papers, vol. vii.). Sir Edward Norreys wrote in the same month from Ostend of the powerful Armada in preparation, with great levies of troops of all nationalities to attack England. There were twenty great ships, he said, at Corunna, sent by the Pope and the Italian princes, ready to sail with the first wind. "They prepare 40,000, wherewith they have swallowed up the poor island of England in their conceit" (*ibid.*, p. 187). This, as we shall see, was untrue, but it greatly disturbed people in England.

the sailors, though to Sir Francis Vere's openly-expressed disgust (Hatfield Papers, vol. vii. p. 212).

Essex laboured diligently, beset with many difficulties, mainly born of the Queen's parsimony, to commission and provision his new fleet. Soldiers were pressed with difficulty, for already the levies for Holland and Picardy had weighed heavily upon the adult male population of the south and east coast; but at length in June Essex found himself in command of a fleet consisting of three squadrons, one under his immediate orders, another under Lord Thomas Howard, and the third under Raleigh.<sup>1</sup> Besides these experienced commanders the best of the young Protestant nobility were included in the officers on board.<sup>2</sup> There are twenty Queen's ships, ten Dutch men-of-war, and a large number of merchant ships and victuallers, the entire force consisting of 120 sail with 5000 soldiers on board. Essex's

<sup>1</sup> The Lord Admiral Howard declined to take part in the command of the expedition, in consequence of his discontent at his share of the plunder of Cadiz. He was not well pleased either at Essex's behaviour towards him, though the deadly quarrel between them did not take place until the return of the expedition of 1597.

<sup>2</sup> John Chamberlain wrote to Dudley Carleton on the 11/21 June: "We have great preparations here for a sea viage which troubles our discoursers how or where it shal be employed. The common sort of talke of Calais, others of the island Terceira, but most likelie in my opinion is set upon the King of Spaine's navy wheresoever they can find it or meet with the Indian fleet. Theire whole number consists of fifteen Queene's shippes besides the two Spanish shippes that were taken last yeare (which be new fashioned after the English manner) and of two and twentie men of warre of Holland and some foure and twenty flyboats for carriage of men and victuals. They have with them 4000 prest men and 1200 muskettiers that come with Sir Francis Vere out of Holland." It will be seen that the official accounts of the strength of the expedition differ somewhat from Chamberlain, but the former is most likely to be correct (John Chamberlain's Letters, Camden Society).

commission was strictly confined to the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, or wherever he might find it, but failure dogged him from the first. Alternate calms and contrary gales kept him for a fortnight between the Downs and Plymouth, then supplies ran short and victuals went bad, and Essex was obliged to send Fulke Greville to the Queen to beseech her "of her princely wisdom" to grant them another month's provisions.<sup>1</sup> This with some demur being granted, Essex again grew hopeful; but such a summer "as was never seen by man" raged in the Channel, and although Essex managed to sail out of Plymouth on the 10th July, he encountered during the next ten days such foul weather as to reduce him to despair. The squadrons were scattered, and more than once the commanders "gave themselves up to God." At length Essex's squadron, battered, crippled, and disabled, regained Plymouth, whilst Raleigh's ships, in even worse case, sought shelter in Falmouth. Lord Thomas Howard's squadron crossed the Bay of Biscay almost to the Spanish coast, but he too was driven back and returned to England.<sup>2</sup>

London was panicstricken at the disaster; for all men had been told that the Adelantado's fleet might appear on the English coast at any time; but the Queen, through her fears, wept for joy when she learned that Essex and Raleigh at least were safe; and even the Lord Admiral earnestly prayed the former to return post haste to court,<sup>3</sup> where, he says, "we are like a naked flock without a shepherd." Again

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. vii.

<sup>2</sup> State Papers, Domestic, Raleigh to Cecil, July 18, 1597.

<sup>3</sup> State Papers, Domestic, cclxiv.

the hard task of persuading the Queen to spend the necessary money to refit the fleet, to allow her favourite to leave her, and to undertake the responsibility of attacking Spain, had to be done afresh. Essex and Raleigh went to court, and together joined their prayers; but they found the Queen more fractious than ever. The season was far advanced, the enemy was now on the alert, and she positively refused to allow her men and ships to be exposed to risk. After much tearful begging, Essex at length persuaded her, for his own honour's sake, to allow him to sail to the Spanish coast with a reduced force, for the sole purpose of sending some fire-ships into Ferrol harbour and burning the Spanish vessels there. But to make quite sure that he did no more than this, the Queen insisted upon his landing all the English troops but the veterans from Holland before he sailed, and he had to pledge himself to her on his honour not to venture one of her ships or himself into Ferrol. Raleigh might enter the harbour if he pleased, but Essex was to remain outside, or he should not be allowed to sail at all. Fretful, discontented, and peevish, the Earl was forced to obey, and finally, on the 17th August, he sailed again with his curtailed force.

Once more a terrible westerly gale assailed him in the Bay, and disabled the great *San Mateo*, the Spanish prize he had captured at Cadiz. She was obliged, in a water-logged condition, to stagger back to England as best she might, whilst the rest of the fleet, disheartened and damaged, was at length swept out of the Bay by an easterly gale which effectually



prevented any of the ships from approaching Ferrol. Raleigh and his squadron of thirty sail was lost sight of altogether. The next day (August 24), Essex received false news from one of Raleigh's captains to the effect that the Spanish fleet had already sailed out of Ferrol under the Adelantado to the Azores, for the purpose of escorting the treasure-fleet home ; and on the faith of this Essex sailed at once towards Terceira, sending despatch-boats to order Raleigh to follow him. Through some blunder the latter remained for a week longer on the Portuguese coast, whilst Essex awaited him at Flores. There the commander-in-chief was informed that the treasure-fleet was, after all, not coming that way, and when Raleigh at length joined him, it was decided to sail for Fayal and St. Michael's to endeavour to intercept the Indian flotillas there. Raleigh lost sight of his chief and reached Fayal first, and, after waiting three days, imprudently took upon himself to capture and plunder the island, greatly to Essex's indignation when he arrived the following day, and bad blood was again brewed between the rival favourites. The fleet remained at sea a month longer in the hope of meeting the treasure-ships, but in vain, and came back to Plymouth, October 26, with only three rich merchantmen as prizes, barely sufficient to cover the cost of the expedition. Black looks greeted Essex at court, for he had not performed or seriously attempted either of the tasks for which he went, the pecuniary result of his efforts was insignificant, and, worst of all, whilst he had been beguiled by false information to sail on his wild-goose chase to the Azores, the Adelantado with the

dreaded Armada of Spain had been almost within sight of the English coast.<sup>1</sup>

No more vivid picture can be found of the utter demoralisation which had taken possession of Spanish officialdom than that presented in the series of papers and letters now in the British Museum<sup>2</sup> relating to the preparations for the great Armada, which, as we have seen, in 1597 created so much alarm in England. They are mainly the letters and reports of Pedro Lopez de Soto, the Secretary of the Adelantado of Castile, who was to command the fleet; and their perusal enables us to understand fully, for the first time, the almost insuperable difficulties which Philip's system had created for himself. Lopez de Soto was the executive officer through whom all orders passed, yet he was kept absolutely in the dark as to the intentions of the King. He writes to the Council of War (July 2, 1597) recommending that all the merchant ships loaded with Spanish produce destined for the Channel or Flemish

<sup>1</sup> The final estrangement of Essex from the Queen dates from this period. In his absence the previous year the Secretaryship had been given to Cecil; on his return on this occasion, he found that Lord Admiral Howard had been made Earl of Nottingham, and now took precedence over Essex. The latter, therefore, stormed and flouted until the whole court was in a turmoil. He challenged the aged Lord Admiral and his sons; was reprovved by the Queen, and absented himself from court for many months, alternately insulting and tearful to his mistress. The Queen, sometimes in a rage at his obstinacy, sometimes grieved at his serious illness, was profoundly disturbed and unhappy; and though she finally forgave him in December 1597, and granted him precedence over Howard, she expressed herself determined to break his spirit before she finished with him.

<sup>2</sup> British Museum, Add. MSS. 28,420. Some of these papers, giving an account of the actual strength of the fleet, have been transcribed by me, and included in the Calendar of Spanish State Papers, vol. iv. The rest are unpublished.

ports should be embargoed, in order that the English might not make use of them, but that the Spaniards might do so if they needed them. This, he insists, should be done swiftly and without notice, as the Portuguese and Andalusian nobles and merchants, whose oil, wine, and produce filled the ships, would not, he said, like it. He then continues as follows: "It is not to be expected that the English fleet will come to Spain this year, even if they had the 20,000 soldiers to land, and the 12,000 men for the ships, and the supplies needful for the purpose. But it is, nevertheless, very desirable that we should make a show of preparation and arming on our side (which seems to have stopped as soon as the news came that no fleet would be raised in England this year),<sup>1</sup> and that forces should be collected sufficient both to gain a footing in England and to defend our own country. Thus, if the attack against England be successful, we shall be able to reinforce our men, and if it be not successful we shall have a reserve. As your Lordships are carrying on everything so secretly, no one can be sure if he is correctly informed, and I have no means of knowing whether the opinions I express will be apposite or not. Time is thus frittered away. I, for my part, have decided to take the plunge, and say plainly what I think. . . . The only way out of all this confusion that I can see is for us to gain a footing in England this year. This will be to strike at the trunk, all the rest is simply climbing in the branches. All diffi-

<sup>1</sup> It should be recollected that Essex at this date actually had, as we have seen, a powerful fleet ready to sail for the Spanish coast as soon as the wind served.

culties disappear before resolute, courageous, and timely action. The stores and men we can get together between this time and the 10th August will be sufficient to effect a landing during that month, and I feel confident that, if we go to Wales, which is only forty leagues farther from Ferrol than Plymouth, and is a better place to land in, we can manage to avoid meeting their fleet. This is borne out by all practical seamen. Even if 300 English ships were to go to Milford fifteen days after we were established there, and land 10,000 men, they would find the mouth of the port defended (which could be done in two days), and the place ready to repel an attack from the sea. It is not to be expected that the English could on such short notice land a force capable of battering the place on the land side, as we shall be strongly situated and on the defensive. Besides this, the conformation of the land is in our favour, so that the only thing to be feared is our delay in deciding to take this course.

“In any case, it will be well to press forward energetically the supplying of our fleet with stores, and to send constant instructions to the places whence the stores are to come. Especially should the guns from the Lisbon foundry be hurried forward, because with the forty pieces ordered we can arm the new galleons. The Council of War should consider and decide upon all points that have been submitted about the fleet, and the Council of State should take the necessary action to provide the money, the troops, the siege artillery, the cavalry, and especially to decide upon the point where we

shall land. This should be kept strictly secret in the breasts of your Lordships and the Adelantado.”

It will be seen by this letter that everything was unready in July, at the time when, for many weeks past, people in England had been expecting the fleet off their own coasts. The bad *morale* of Philip's officers is conspicuous in the series of petulant letters written by Lopez throughout the whole spring and summer to Esteban de Ibarra, Secretary of the Council of War. He threatens to retire unless he is entrusted with the destination and objects of the fleet. Nothing, he says, must be kept back from him, or he will have no more to do with it. Why should not he know as much as others? He is never consulted; his opinion is never asked; nothing but orders are sent to him! Once in June he wrote a most insolent letter to Ibarra, trying to pick a quarrel with him, because he had not informed him (Lopez) of what orders had been given for wheat and biscuits. More than once Ibarra gravely rebuked, and even covertly threatened him; but Lopez always retorted with a fresh string of grumbling complaints. On the 30th June he wrote that everything was in complete confusion: uniforms for the men were lacking, and there was no cavalry fit for service. “There is no money to provide anything, no meat, no wine, no siege artillery, hardly any guns for the ships.” And so, from day to day, follow new discontents and fresh demands. In a postscript to a letter of 4th July he says that on the previous day he had seen Don Cristobal de Moura, the principal Secretary of the King, who had gone to Ferrol to put

matters straight, and who had told him that the Adelantado had declared that there was no fleet, or any possibility of going out and facing an enemy. Lopez demurred at this, and promised to send to Moura an exact statement of the position of the fleet, which, he said, would be, within five weeks, sufficient for the purpose which he (Lopez) had proposed, viz., for landing a force at Milford. "The Adelantado's general statement that he lacks *everything* is only his usual style of putting things. . . . Of course, if we could reinforce it (the fleet), so much the better; but if we cannot, we must make the best use we can of it."

Here we see the principal executive officer of the arsenals and dockyards absolutely in the dark as to the kind of force he will have to provide, the destination and length of voyage of the expedition, and quite unprepared for a prompt sailing. It is probable that Philip had not the slightest intention at the time of sending his fleet to Milford, or of seriously invading England direct; as how could he hope to do with the material then at his disposal? The statement sent by Lopez to Cristobal de Moura sets forth that the fleet will be ready to sail from Ferrol by the middle of August, and should effect a landing by the 8th September. The whole force, according to Lopez de Soto's estimate, would consist of 93 ships. Of these, 23 were to be of 600 to 1000 tons burden, 25 of 300 to 600 tons, 26 of 100 to 200 tons, with 20 galley zabras of 50 to 100 tons, besides pinnaces, victuallers, &c. The number of men which Lopez proposed to send in the fleet was 20,000 soldiers and 4000 sailors; and he advocated

the seizure of a large number of pinnaces to enable the men to be thrown rapidly on shore. He also professed to have invented a new sort of galley, capable of making long ocean voyages and carrying 17 big guns. "They will live," he said, "through heavy weather as well as high-built ships, which they could accompany anywhere." "If your Majesty had 30 of these galleys, you would be entire master of the coasts of England and France; as 4000 men might be thrown on shore unexpectedly at any point; and any place, however large, may be sacked by such a force if it be surprised."<sup>1</sup>

So evident was the demoralisation in Philip's preparations, however, that close and well-informed observers like the Venetian ambassador, Nani, expressed to his Government disbelief in the possibility of the Adelantado's expedition being intended to attack England, as "the English ships are far quicker and handier than the Spanish," and "the nature of the Spanish fleet is such that it is better suited for transport than for an attack on England, where they would find a fleet far superior to their own." For these reasons the ambassador believed that the real object was to attack the African port of Larache, or to convey a strong force to Brittany;<sup>2</sup> whilst a few weeks afterwards (24th July 1597) the preparations were so backward and chaotic that the same ambassador was of opinion that the preparations were only for defence, as many of the troops were being disbanded, "and the King's intentions about the attack on England are cooling down." The Adel-

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. and British Museum, Add. 28,420.

<sup>2</sup> Nani to the Doge, June 1597 (Venetian Calendar).

antado, a hot-headed Catholic zealot, was in principle all for a crusade against the heretic, but was alternately despairing of going anywhere at all with such a force, and exalted with the idea that the sacredness of the cause would make up for all deficiencies. Philip himself was thought to be dying, though not even the Nuncio had the courage to tell him so; but as he could only work intermittently, and not even the most trifling detail could be settled by any one else, almost complete paralysis had fallen upon his officers at the time that Essex, but for the unlucky Biscay gales, would have had the Spanish ports at his mercy.

At length, when terrifying news came that the English had sailed in force again under Essex, and were first on the coasts of the Peninsula, and then cruising round the Azores to capture the treasure fleets, a last desperate effort was made by the Adelantado; and the much-talked-of Spanish Armada of 1597, all incomplete as it was, put to sea from Corunna on the 18th October (N.S.); but with a military force very different from that foreshadowed by Lopez de Soto's sanguine estimate.<sup>1</sup> The season was late and stormy; the preparations had been so long protracted that many of the ships were extremely foul and worm-eaten; but the orders of the

<sup>1</sup> The report sent by the Venetian Ambassador to the Doge (28th October) says that the force that left Ferrol for Corunna consisted of:—

44 royal galleons, of an aggregate tonnage of 12,686 tons.	
16 merchantmen,	5880 "
52 German and Flemish hulks for stores,	15,514 "
76 small craft.	

This fleet was to have carried 8634 soldiers and 4000 sailors; but as will be seen in the text, at least 600 of the former with 22 caravels failed to join from Lisbon.



King on this occasion, as before, were sternly peremptory, notwithstanding the expressed unwillingness of the Adelantado to put to sea under the circumstances. Essex's fleet was known to be on the way home to England, and if it encountered that of the Adelantado, the latter was certain to be beaten, considering the bad morale of the Spaniards.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In a most interesting account of the expedition given by the confessor of the Adelantado, Father Sicilia, who was supposed to be a natural son of Philip II. (Venetian State Papers), he speaks of the "unwillingness to sail which filled the minds of every one, when they thought of the season far advanced, and of the absolute lack of all that was essential to the success of the enterprise." The ambassador, writing to the Doge after the return of the Adelantado's fleet, says that the whole blame of the failure was being cast on the Adelantado. The design, he said, which had been kept a close secret for two years, was now public; and could never be attempted again. "However, impartial persons know full well that this violent resolution could have met with no other result than it did. It was adopted rather on a punctilio than in hope of success. . . . The King was swept away by a passion for revenge for all these insults which he is constantly receiving: and so in a bad season, with a weak Armada, and without waiting for reinforcements, he resolved to carry out his object, relying on the secret intelligences which he firmly believes he has established in that island" (Venetian State Papers). A clue to the meaning of the last paragraph will be found in the voluntary confession of an English sailor named Love (State Papers, Domestic, April 20, 1598), who tells an extraordinary story. A Devonshire seaman called Captain Elliot, who commanded a flotilla of privateers, in which Love sailed, appears to have been in close communication with Lord Beauchamp (eldest son of the Earl of Hertford by Katharine Grey, and consequently by the will of Henry VIII. heir to the crown of England), and much mysterious intercourse is detailed as having passed between them. Elliot captured a prize in the Channel and took her into Helford haven. To the dismay of the corsairs, they found the Queen's revenue-cutter there. The pirates thought they were caught red-handed, but Captain John Killigrew, who was in command at Falmouth, said they need have no fear: he would "square" matters with Captain Jonas for £100, which he did, receiving as his own payment ten bolts of (stolen) Holland cloth. Killigrew himself had bought the pirates' previous prize: and Elliot, after touching at Cork, then set sail for Corunna, riding thence post haste to see Philip, whom he told

Muddle reigned supreme from the first. A fly-boat was lost at the mouth of Corunna harbour, two pinnaces were lost sight of immediately afterwards, and four others which were sent to Ferrol for a supply of biscuits never came back. Twenty-two decked caravels left behind at Lisbon to ship 600 soldiers failed to join the fleet: but at length the Adelantado, with such forces as he had, came almost within sight of the Lizard on the 22nd October (N.S.), a fortnight before Essex landed at Plymouth (26th October O.S.). The day after the Adelantado's ships had lost sight of Spanish land, a pinnace was sent round the fleet with the King's final orders, which had been kept under secret seal until then. Philip, as the Venetian said, swayed by a thirst for vengeance alone, had listened to the tale of the false Englishman, and had altered his mind. He was no longer sending a halting aid to the Irish rebels. Unwarned by his dire experience of the past, in face of the wretched condition and insufficient strength of his fleet, the utter demoralisation of his men and the faint-heartedness of his commanders, the King had for once forgotten his proverbial prudence, and had determined to stake everything, almost in his dying hours, upon one doubtful turn of fortune. And the orders that went round were, that in the name of God and St. James of Compostella, the fleet was to sail for Falmouth, which they were to

that he had "bought" Falmouth Castle from Captain Killigrew. Elliot and his men entered the Adelantado's fleet, and Elliot himself appears to have been the principal guide and inspirer of the expedition, the deponent Love acting as pilot to the flagship. Killigrew himself was cast into prison, protesting his innocence. There are several letters from him to Cecil, &c., in the Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.

take by surprise, or by the betrayal of its commander, and a land force was to march towards Plymouth.

Nothing short of desperation or a bigotry which blinded Philip to practical events could have dictated such orders at such a time if he had really meant to attempt to conquer England. His troops in France were straining every nerve to hold their own, whilst a peace inglorious for Spain was being patched up by priests and friars; and it was almost certain that any serious aggressive action on the part of Philip against England would have prevented Henry IV. from consenting to a pacification, upon which the Spanish King's last remaining hopes were based. The favourite eldest daughter, whose promotion to a throne had been one of the passions of his life, was to marry her cousin, the Cardinal Archduke Albert, and to assume the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands. If the matter were not finally arranged before his death, which might happen any day, Philip's dearest wish might be frustrated, and he desired, of all things, that it should be carried through without delay. Whilst he was at war with France, and above all, if he launched into a new aggressive or invasive war against England as well, he could not hope to establish the new sovereigns of Flanders, nor could they have withstood for a week the combined forces of Holland, France, and England, which in such case would certainly have been directed against them. Philip was absolutely yearning for peace before he died, and the conclusion forced upon us is, that his plan for seizing Falmouth by surprise, or by

questionable betrayal with a force so utterly inadequate as that at the disposal of the Adelantado, was not meant for an attempt at the serious invasion or the conquest of England, but as a means of frightening Elizabeth into an arrangement with him at the same time as Henry IV.<sup>1</sup>

Whether the Adelantado knew this or not is doubtful; probably he did not; but he must have known, and all his company must have known, that to have landed his seven or eight thousand men, at most, on English soil, whilst an English fleet stronger than his own was on the sea between him and his bases of supply, would have been simply suicidal, both for troops and fleet. So, although we are told by one of the company,<sup>2</sup> that on the King's orders being known, "joy filled each heart with content, and even the sick forgot their ailments," little joy was manifested when they reached the mouth of the Channel. There was a

<sup>1</sup> The French had in September recaptured Amiens from the Spaniards, and the Vatican, with Philip's connivance, was now making desperate efforts to bring about a peace between Spain and France, absolutely necessary for both countries. Elizabeth and the Dutch were furious at Henry's listening to such overtures without their consent. The Spanish King even offered to include Elizabeth in the treaty; but, as will be related in the next chapter, on conditions quite impossible for England to accept. Still, the fact that Philip made the offer at all shows how desirous he was to leave his successor at peace, and tends to prove that the expedition of the Adelantado was never really intended for the conquest of England by invasion, but rather to alarm Elizabeth into the peace negotiation on the terms agreeable to Spain.

<sup>2</sup> Carrera, the Adelantado's courier. The Adelantado had continued to insist that he could not put to sea without great risk of losing the fleet, and had stood out strongly against the order to sail. When the news came to Spain that Essex was at the Azores, positive commands were sent to the Adelantado to sail immediately at any risk, "*for the purpose of effecting a diversion.*" His orders were to land at Falmouth

stiff head wind blowing, which soon showed up the weak points of the Spanish ships. "The admiral<sup>1</sup> wished to lie to, and see if the weather would moderate sufficiently to allow him to proceed. But seeing the wind freshening steadily, and a pinnace having brought word that the *San Marco's* seams had gaped under stress of the storm, he was obliged to stand by her. . . . He resolved to cruise about all night, keeping an eye on the weather, if it would allow him to push forward, and having all the fleet gathered about him. At this moment another pinnace arrived at the Adelantado's flagship, with news from the admiral that his foremast had been carried away, and as he could not hold on his course, he asked for orders. The Adelantado, recognising how dangerous it would be to risk the life of the admiral, of his officers, and the 70,000 ducats on board the galleon, gave orders that the admiral should put about, and, as best he could, make for

and fortify himself, "on the site of the castles, neither of them of much importance, and then, leaving a sufficient garrison, he was to retire to the Scilly Isles, and await the return of the English fleet. If he learnt that the Spanish Indies flotilla had been captured, he was to give battle to the English; and on winning a victory, as was expected, he was again to enter Falmouth and land the rest of his troops. From Falmouth he was to press forward and capture all he could." When the Adelantado returned, he assured Philip that if he had pushed on with his fleet in the weak unprovisioned state in which it was, he would have suffered more damage from the enemy than from the storm. The Adelantado was quite right. It was not on the cards for a moment that he could so entirely annihilate the English fleet as to have been able to go to Falmouth a second time, and quietly land his men. In any case, even if he had done so, they would have been caught like rats in a trap, from which they could not have escaped. (See report of Carrera, the Adelantado's courier, Father Sicilia, the Adelantado's confessor, and the letters of Nani to the Doge, all in the Venetian State Papers.)

<sup>1</sup> Don Diego Brochero.

Spain.”<sup>1</sup> We are told that the Adelantado waited until two hours after sunrise next morning (23rd October, N.S.), intending, as the weather would not allow him to approach Falmouth, to make for Nieuport, or, if that was impossible, to run for Waterford or Cork, or even Brest. But he decided at last that he could do nothing but get back to Spain as quickly as possible. This is the best story that his own apologetic confessor can make of it, but in another account by an eye-witness the picture of demoralisation is a more vivid one. “The Armada began to part company and to scatter (*i.e.* in the night of 22nd October), each one thinking of his own safety; the sea unshipping their rudders, breaking their yards, carrying away their masts, and most gave themselves up for lost. For two days they knocked about without being able to make any harbour,” and then, with a fair wind astern, they ingloriously sailed back in dribbles to Corunna, beaten and cowed, though they had never seen an enemy nor fired a shot.<sup>2</sup>

It was Philip’s last dying effort,” and nothing

<sup>1</sup> Account of Father Sicilia (Venetian State Papers).

<sup>2</sup> At first it was supposed that a large number of the ships had been lost, but most of them subsequently turned up in the various Spanish ports, though greatly damaged. The actual number totally wrecked seems to have been about ten vessels. An English spy in Spain reported on the return of the Armada to the coast: “There is nothing but confusion and stories of misfortune; yet brags of what they will do before next spring” (State Papers, Dom., October 1597).

<sup>3</sup> Philip was thought to be moribund for some days before the news of the failure reached his court. Paralysis had seized him, and he was only kept alive by the exertions of his devoted daughter, who blew liquid nourishment down his throat. The moment he regained consciousness he sighed, “Oh, will he never be ready? What more can Martin (*i.e.* Martin de Padilla, the Adelantado) want?” (State Papers, Dom., October 1597).

shows more clearly than this how the boasted strength of sovereign and people had dwindled under his hidebound rule. For two years, as we have seen, this Armada had been painfully got together, under the innumerable difficulties that have been mentioned. That it should be scattered by the severe gale of the previous year was at least understandable. All fleets at the time were liable to such accidents; but the head winds encountered in October 1597 were not sufficient reason for the utter abandonment of the objects of the expedition. The Spaniards had lost their crusading zeal, and they no longer had the moral stamina which alone had formerly warranted their sovereign's claim to dictate to Christendom the minutiae of its belief.

The readiness of Tyrone to make friends with the English had aroused considerable distrust in Philip's mind. for he admitted no divided allegiance, and he knew that whilst O'Neil himself stood aside no rising in Ireland could hope to be successful against the English rule. After waiting impatiently all the winter (1596-97) for the promised Spanish aid, the Connaught chiefs despatched an envoy named Thomas Lalley in June 1597 to beg Philip to send them promptly the aid he had promised. But he brought no letter from Tyrone (or O'Donnell), and his demands, over and above the formal and general prayer for aid, were more concerned with the individual profit of his principals than with the final triumph of the Catholic cause. Thus Lalley's father-in-law, James Kelly, writes to the King a bombastic letter, saying how much he and Lalley have done against the English, and begging for pen-

sions on the strength of it. MacWilliam Bourke asks that "the land he holds, and all those he may acquire from the heretics, shall be secured to him in fee; and that when the Spaniards arrive in Ireland his clansmen shall be received into the King's service and be paid the same as Spanish soldiers. As he is the chief man in Connaught, he asks that he should be made governor of the province for the King of Spain." He requested that all Irish ships in Spanish ports belonging to English sympathisers should be confiscated, and the value of them given to Lalley to carry to Ireland.<sup>1</sup> It was demanded, too, that if Galway surrendered to the Spaniards, the whole of its privileges should be confirmed by them. Kelly not only petitioned for a large money grant for himself and Lalley, but that "all his people, and also his noble neighbours, should be confirmed in their privileges;" and Lalley wanted a grant of "heretics'" land and some of the King's English prisoners to enable him to ransom a son of his in the hands of the Queen's Government

Most of these personal petitions were readily conceded by Philip, for they were, with the exception of the pensions, which he did not grant, not at his own expense; but upon the margin of the principal letter from MacWilliam Bourke speaking of Spanish armed aid to the Catholic cause, Philip scrawled an ominous direction that they "should be encouraged with generalities." We know what that meant in his vocabulary, and Tyrone certainly appraised at

<sup>1</sup> This petition, which was granted by Philip "as they are enemies' ships," would practically put a stop to the considerable business carried on between Ireland and Spain, as most of the merchants, traders, and citizens were on the side of the English.



their true value the bland "generalities" of the Spaniards. He had grown more and more free with his talk of composition and pledges as the winter wore on and the spring brought no Spanish force to his aid. But though with words of loyalty ever on his lips, there was no possibility of mistaking his rebellious spirit behind the mask. Lord-Deputy Russell insisted upon being relieved of the government. "He would not," he said, "have petitioned to be revoked if he could have found any good tokens of desire in Tyrone to be a subject. The Earl abuseth the commissioners to win time till the Spaniards come" (March 6, 1597, Irish State Papers); and though Norreys was all for making such terms as would satisfy Tyrone, it was mainly from a brave soldier's impatience at the petty persecution and injustice which self-seeking civilians and clerical politicians in Dublin inflicted upon the Irish, making rebellion almost inevitable, whilst the preparations to combat it were quite inadequate.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of March there was a great scare that twenty Spanish ships had entered Killibegs with men, arms, and money, and that Tyrone had gone down to meet them, issuing a proclamation calling for recruits at 12d. per day wages, which Fenton thought might attract most of the Irish soldiers in the English pay, though he still did not believe that the "Irishry" would allow any Spanish army to invade Ireland. Gradually the twenty Spanish ships

<sup>1</sup> The appointment of Sir John Norreys as Lord-Deputy was much desired by Tyrone, who said that if it was made all questions could be settled. The appointment of Lord Borough, he said, made him despair of fair dealing (March 20, 1597, State Papers, Ireland).

dwindled to one small pinnacle<sup>1</sup> with some powder and messages of encouragement, more "generalities," from the King. Even O'Donnell, who was still in rebellion, was disgusted at this paltering, and refused even to speak to Cobos until the latter had been taken to see Tyrone. The Earl was cool and dignified. He had made peace with the Queen of England, he said, and meant to keep it, and he swore a "great oath" to the English Captain Warren, "that if all the Spaniards in Spain should come into Ireland, they could not alter his mind from being a dutiful subject to her Majesty if promise were kept to him."<sup>2</sup>

When the new Viceroy, Borough, arrived in May, the Earl was just as emphatic to him. He was, he said, as he always had been, ready to make his submission. "He did not look for any Spaniards, and he would not join with any foreign nation against his natural prince. The Spaniards are a nation only for themselves and for none other;" whilst O'Donnell himself, in his bitter disappointment at the insignificant aid sent in the one ship to Killibegs, told

<sup>1</sup> The most extravagant and lying reports were sent to the English on this subject. James Barnewall wrote, on April 3, that twelve Spanish vessels had arrived, and that Tyrone was gathering vast quantities of cattle to feed the Spaniards. On the same day a spy, signing his name "Taff," reported that Tyrone had secretly threatened great penalty to any one who should mention the coming of the Spaniards, of whom 1000 had landed, with bishops and priests and a great store of armour and munition. Then eight Spanish ships had arrived in Loch Foyle; and these or similar misstatements were continued far into the summer.

<sup>2</sup> The Lord President of Munster to the Viceroy, &c., March 28, 1597 (State Papers, Irish). Tyrone, in evidence of his desire to please the English, sent formal notice to the Viceroy that the Spaniards had informed him of a great force being prepared in Spain under the Adelantado to be sent into Ireland.

Cobos "that the Spaniards were but a deceitful nation and they had cosened the Irish. After all his promises the King of Spain had sent them nothing but a little powder. The Irish knew that all that the King could do was little enough to strengthen himself against the Queen of England, and it were good for them (the Irish) to depend no longer upon the King's succour."

But with all these professions against the Spaniards the relations between the English and the Irish chiefs grew ever more strained. The last hope of a permanent peaceful settlement vanished when Borough was appointed Viceroy. Tyrone always made his loyalty dependent upon the English promises being kept to him, and the rights of the Irish respected.<sup>1</sup> Borough would have no parley in such matters as good faith and justice. Repentance, he told Tyrone, was his only course. It mattered not to the English how much or how little he depended upon the Spaniards. Complete submission to the Queen's mercy, not only of him, but of all the Irish chieftains, was the only road to peace. This tone made an arrangement impossible, for the grossest bad faith had been practised towards the Irish leaders. Bingham, the scourge of Connaught, was

<sup>1</sup> Early in this year the Countess of Tyrone's lady-in-waiting reported to the English that the Earl had said, when he had submitted to the Queen, "That he had done it to serve his own turn, as they have done it to serve theirs; but let me be hanged and confusion come to all my posterity if ever I trust either to pardon or aught else that they may offer, for I know the Council of England to be arrant knaves and heretics, to whom there is no more credit to be given than to the veriest infidels in the world. I will keep myself out of their fingers till time serve, and then, peradventure, they shall have more of me" (Irish State Papers, February 12, 1597).

still unpunished, truces were broken with impunity by the English, the hostages given by the chiefs were still held tightly, even after stipulations had been fulfilled, and Tyrone boldly prepared now to face the inevitable and, with or without Spanish aid, to head the Irish against English rule.

Feagh MacHugh once more went out rieving and ravaging until he fell into the hands of the English, and Russell, as the last act of his viceroyalty, sent in May the head of the Leinster rebel in pickle to Queen Elizabeth, who was greatly indignant at the gift.<sup>1</sup> But the raids into the Pale still went on, and the black clouds of the coming great rebellion banked higher and higher in the north and west. Tyrone and O'Donnell, in close union now, were busy in their inaccessible fastnesses of bog and mountain gathering their friends for the life and death struggle of the coming year. For one short period after the death of Borough in October peace was made, at least in appearance. Borough had obtained a somewhat important success over Tyrone's forces on the Blackwater in the summer, and had pressed the rebel hard—the running beast, as he called him—until death put an end to the stern Lord-Deputy's efforts. O'Rourke resented the too openly asserted overlordship of O'Donnell, and was inclined to submit to the English conditions, and the Connaught men generally were not enthusiastic in the support of a movement which, unless Spain took the lead, would make

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Cecil writing to the new Viceroy, Borough: "Her Majesty . . . is surely not well contented that the head of so base a Robin Hood should be sent so solemnly to England. It is no such trophy of a notorious victory, and yet his friends make great advantage of it here" (Cecil to Borough, Irish State Papers, May 26, 1597).

an Ulsterman paramount over them.<sup>1</sup> So Tyrone considered it wise to make a two-months' truce in the winter with the Earl of Ormonde, commissioned by the Queen. But his demeanour was vastly changed from his former courtliness. When the parley took place, "he stationed his forces on several hills in proud and insolent manner," as if to threaten the Queen's representatives; and when he was asked what pledges he proposed to give for his future good behaviour, he told them they held his hostages already. Then breaking out he said, "I know what you mean. You want one or both of my sons. I had rather see them dead." He told them bitterly how he had been held in silken bondage and made an Englishman, whilst his father's enemy, Tirlough, was raised to the chieftainship by the Queen's Government. And thus haughtily he contested point by point of his demand,<sup>2</sup> bating nothing, and the sus-

<sup>1</sup> We have seen a manifestation of this in the desire expressed in their petitions sent by Thomas Lally, stipulating that their lands should be held by them in direct fee-simple from Philip himself.

<sup>2</sup> Tyrone's conditions do not appear to modern eyes very unreasonable:—

1. He demanded freedom of conscience of all Irishmen.
2. Her Majesty's full pardon to himself and his adherents, and the restoration of himself in blood and dignity by Act of Parliament.
3. That it may please her Majesty, for that the abuses of her bad officers hath been the beginning of all these troubles, and the Irishry cannot away with the rigour of the law upon every small occasion, their bringing up being barbarous, to grant unto his Lordship authority that Tyrone may be made a County Palatine, as the like is granted to others in Ireland.
4. The withdrawal of all English garrisons from Tyrone "and all other parts of the Irishry, for they are so terrified that they will not account themselves in safety so long as her Majesty's forces are so near at hand."
5. That all his adherents should be included in the arrangement, and

pension of hostilities that resulted hardly pretended to be a peace. Tyrone had made up his mind to fight, but to fight for his own hand, and no longer, if he could avoid it, as a vassal of the King of Spain. So long as he held to that resolution effective help from Philip was impossible, and Tyrone hoped to do without it. We shall see in a subsequent chapter how he was driven by circumstances again to link his cause with that of Catholic supremacy.

be confirmed in their hereditary possessions, the Moores and Connors also to have a reasonable portion of their predecessors' land.

6. That the former hostages he had given should be restored to him, new ones being given (Irish State Papers, December 23, 1597).

## CHAPTER IX

The two sections of English Catholics and the succession—Arabella Stuart *versus* the Infanta—Lord Beauchamp—Party conflicts in England with regard to the peace with Spain—The aims of the Jesuits—Paralysis of the Spanish naval administration—Renewed alarm in England—Its groundlessness—Parleys with Tyrone—His renewed appeals to Spain—Critical condition of the English rule in Ireland—The battle of Armagh.

THE repeated threats and attempts at the invasion of England and Ireland by Spain, and the constant intercommunication between the disaffected Irish chiefs and Philip's Government, had now (1597-98) completed the estrangement of the majority of English Catholics at home and abroad from the irreconcilable Jesuit faction. The string upon which the latter had always harped was the natural repugnance of Englishmen to submit their country to the yoke of a Scottish king; but so long as Elizabeth persisted in her strong determination to allow no official decision or discussion as to her successor, there were other alternatives open besides King James and the Infanta, and every political move of the last four years of the Queen's reign was influenced by the open and covert intrigues which were actively proceeding for the reversion of the crown of England.

The Catholics in the country were still very numerous, especially in the north, notwithstanding the ruthless persecution of priests and recusants since

1593, whilst the openly demonstrated dislike of the Queen to the Puritans and to a frankly Protestant service, kept alive the hope amongst the professors of the ancient faith that some measure of toleration might after all be conceded to them. But it must have been evident to them that the much-longed-for end could never be attained whilst to their religion was attached the reproach of disloyalty to the Queen, whose successful rule had made her personally powerful beyond any of her predecessors: and the English Catholics as a body, with their leaders the secular priests, tried by might and main to convince the Government that they had neither part nor lot in the attempts at foreign invasion or in the murder-plots, genuine and otherwise, which were so much talked of by the few extremists in Flanders. Unfortunately for the success of their cause, these loyal Catholics were themselves divided, and possessed no chief of sufficient authority and character to unite them for a common end; the energies and attention of their priestly leaders being entirely occupied in the long and violent altercation with the Jesuit faction, which sprang out of the old dispute, and came to a head in England in what is called the Wisbech Stirs.<sup>1</sup> Whilst such men as Dr. Bagshaw,

<sup>1</sup> The first open rupture amongst the Catholic priests under arrest at Wisbech took place in 1595, when the Jesuit Father Weston, disgusted, as he says, with the "whoring, drunkenness, and dicing" that went on, was elected by eighteen of the priests who thought like himself, "agent" or superintendent, and drew up rules for the decent government of the prisoners. A minority, led by Dr. Bagshaw, repudiated his elective authority, and a violent quarrel ensued. A temporary reconciliation was patched up at the end of the year 1595 by Dr. Dudley and Father Mush, but matters soon became more strained than ever. The priests desired the appointment of a bishop with the Papal



Fathers Mush and Bluet were hurling vituperation at the Jesuits, and Fathers Persons and Lister were repaying them with interest, the vital question for them of the future religion of England was being quietly settled behind their backs by clever politicians, who were practically of no religion at all.

Probably the majority of the "loyal" Catholics, if it had been possible to poll them, would have declared in favour of the succession of the King of Scotland, whose artful professions of adhesion to Rome and the known Catholicism of his wife had greatly influenced the Papal, Italian, and French Churchmen, who dreaded an increase of Spanish power. We have seen how persistently this section of Catholics had worked ever since the death of Mary Stuart to attain their ends, and how they had been effectually checkmated by the political power and money of Philip, whose main point of policy was the exclusion of James at any cost. As the Queen's age increased, and the demise of the crown became ever more imminent, however, it is not sur-

episcopal authority over all the Catholic clergy, but this the Jesuits prevented, and late in 1597 the English seculars drew up a passionate exposure of the Jesuit aims and methods for presentation to the Pope; but Persons, as we have seen in the text, had gone to Rome to quell the cognate disturbances in the English College there, and persuaded Cardinal Gaëtano, the "Protector" of England at the Vatican, to appoint Father Blackwell, a known ally of the Jesuits, Archpriest over the English clergy. The dignity was a new one; the appointment was underhand and irregular, and a large number of English secular priests rebelled at once. Fathers Bishop and Charnock were sent to Rome to lay their grievances before the Pope in 1598, but on their arrival there they were arrested by the influence of the Jesuits, and their prayer was angrily rejected by the Pope. Thenceforward the battle between Jesuits and seculars went on for years with increasing bitterness. The effects of this dispute upon the progress of events in England will be noted in the text as they occur.

prising that efforts should have been made by the friends of other possible candidates, and by those Englishmen who, whilst indignant at the idea of submission to Spain, hated the idea of a Scottish King ruling over what they considered the superior nation, to discover some means of obtaining their desires under a native sovereign. By the will of Henry VIII. the heir to the throne was Lord Beauchamp, the elder son of the Earl of Hertford, by Katharine Grey, granddaughter of Mary Tudor, Duchess of Suffolk; but Hertford was timid and unenterprising; his marriage with Katharine was of very doubtful legality, and in the case of his father, the Protector Somerset, he had witnessed the danger of aiming too high. His son had, therefore, fallen into the background as a possible candidate, and the strong Protestant traditions of the family would not be likely in any case to recommend him to Catholics. Descending from Eleanor, the second daughter of Mary Tudor, Duchess of Suffolk, were the Earls of Derby and Cumberland, the former of whom had frequently been mentioned, especially by his kinsman Sir William Stanley, as a suitable claimant for Catholics to adopt before the Infanta's candidature was openly announced. He, however, it will be recollected, had repudiated the approaches made to him by Hesketh (p. 102), and for the present stood aside.

The only other serious claimant was Lady Arabella Stuart, the daughter of Darnley's younger brother, Charles, Earl of Lennox, and consequently first cousin to James VI. She lived with her imperious old maternal grandmother, the Countess

Dowager of Shrewsbury (Bess of Hardwick), at this time almost like a State prisoner, for she had offended the Queen by her pride, her flightiness, and the constant hints at political and foreign intrigues of which she was to be made an instrument. She was now a self-willed, passionate, clever young woman, in her twenty-third year, angrily resenting the severe restraint under which she suffered. In a later chapter we shall see the extraordinary and unexplained mystery in which she involved herself. Her hysterical hints at some great State secret, combined with a love affair in which she was the principal person, made most people think her mad; but though she talked in riddles—in evident imitation of the Queen herself—there was probably much more behind her babble than was believed at the time or since. Sir William Stanley, in one of his boasting conversations in Flanders in 1594, had said that he should soon be in the service of a lady in England, and when asked what lady, he replied, Lady Arabella; and in a letter written in October of the same year from Francis Derrick, one of the English refugees in Flanders, to one Henry Wickham, a “servant” of Essex, we catch a glimpse of some important negotiation about her. On page 221 reference is made in the address of Father Persons to the King to an agent named Sterell, who had been sent twice during the previous winter (1595) by certain English Earls to Flanders. Sterell was a member of the household of the Earl of Worcester, who, although he was not of royal blood, was afterwards, as we shall see, the favourite native candidate for the crown at the Spanish court; and

his servant, Sterell, who acted as spy in England for the English refugees in Flanders, was really in the pay of Phellips, the Government spy-master. From the series of letters from Derrick above referred to, it is evident that Sterell's mission from the "Earls" in 1595 had reference to Arabella Stuart.

Political *quidnuncs* had proposed all sorts of matches for her since her early childhood; but in 1591 we get in touch with a really important secret negotiation, in which some of the highest English nobility were evidently concerned, and which, if we could get at the bottom of it, would explain many things now obscure. Moody, who was a Catholic agent in the Netherlands in the interests of Essex, wrote to the Earl in October 1591,<sup>1</sup> asking whether he knew of a negotiation that was being carried on by one Barnes<sup>2</sup> "touching the Lady Arabella," and begging Essex to send him her portrait, "as there was some one there (in Flanders) very desirous of seeing it." This some one was the Duke of Parma; and the plan of the moderate party was to bring about a peace and alliance by marrying Arabella to Ranuccio, the eldest son of Parma, whose descent gave him a better claim than that of Philip to the English crown, and to assure the sovereignty of Flanders to Parma independent of Spain. This would have been a master-stroke of policy, for it would effectually have shut the French out of Flanders, and have given England a preponderant voice there, whilst freeing her from all apprehension from Spain. To

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> This was the name of a man used by Sir R. Cecil for the transmission of spy letters. See letter from Paget to Cecil, April 27, 1598 (State Papers, Dom.).

Moody a reply was sent by a scribe of Essex's,<sup>1</sup> that the latter knew nothing of the negotiation in question, but would be glad to hear more about it from the spy. That Arabella's portrait by Hilliard was sent for Ranuccio's inspection is known,<sup>2</sup> but the affair was promptly nipped in the bud, as may be imagined, when it came to the ears of Essex; and the innocent lady herself was sent from court to the semi-imprisonment of Hardwick Hall under the keeping of her gorgon grandmother.

By the efforts, doubtless, of her young Catholic aunt, the Countess of Shrewsbury, who was her great friend, and some of her Talbot and Cavendish uncles, however, it is clear, as we have seen, that communications were again opened in the autumn of 1594 between Arabella's friends and the Anglo-Spanish fugitives in Flanders. The Spanish Government was assured that she was a Catholic;<sup>3</sup> and in the letters from Derrick to Wickham, already referred to (October 1594), the latter is informed that the proposal with regard to Arabella is accepted, and that all communications are to pass through the hands of Father Sherwood. With the formal adoption of the Infanta's claim shortly afterwards by the Spanish party, the candidature of Arabella was temporarily dropped by them, but at the time of which we are now writing (1598), a considerable number of English Catholics had come round again to the idea that an arrangement for peace and alliance with the new sovereign of Flanders, in

<sup>1</sup> Hatfield Papers, vol. iv. p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Miss Bradley's *Life and Letters of Arabella Stuart*.

<sup>3</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. She professed to be a Puritan in England.

which the marriage and succession of Arabella to the English throne should form a part, would be a good solution of all their troubles.<sup>1</sup> This was a return to the old idea of the Cecils. An English sovereign in close alliance, politically or matrimonially, or both, with a "Duke of Burgundy," reigning in Flanders independently of Spain, would be a renewal of the balance of power in Europe, which had held good for centuries until disturbed by the calamity of the marriage of the heiress of Aragon and Castile with the heir of Burgundy. It was instinctively felt, too, that the Infanta's chance of winning England by Spanish arms would grow less than ever on her father's approaching death. Her half-brother, the new king, would certainly not plunge his already bankrupt country deeper into the slough to win a crown for a relative whom he disliked; and the new dominion of Flanders that would fall to the Infanta and her husband, the Cardinal Archduke, would occupy all their attention, without the need for seeking risk and adventure elsewhere.

So as the star of the Infanta waned in England, that of Arabella Stuart seemed to rise, and the party of "loyal" Catholics was thus further divided by the adhesion of a section to the candidature of the King of Scots, whilst another portion was secretly working

<sup>1</sup> An English Catholic refugee in Flanders writes to Cecil (State Papers, Dom., February 10, 1598), when sending him a book: "The bearer will inform you how different our cogitations be from what our adversaries would make the world believe. We desire peace, and only wish these two kingdoms might flourish again in the old amity." This is one of many similar declarations to be found in the State Papers at this period.

for Arabella Stuart.<sup>1</sup> The mesh of the intrigue was tangled in the extreme, and will probably never be entirely unravelled; but this much may be adduced from the evidence which will be quoted in its proper chronological order: that some of the most powerful of the nobility of England before the Queen's death intended, with Spanish support, to raise Arabella and a fit husband to the throne jointly on the demise of the crown: that Cecil and some of the Howards were cognisant of this plan and did not oppose it, their intention from the first being to betray it and sacrifice their friends; and that Essex with his Puritan party, being naturally excluded from participation in such a scheme, did his best to frustrate it, and was himself crushed in the attempt.

We have seen (p. 257) that when Captain Elliott left the Cornish coast in the summer of 1597 on his treasonable voyage to Spain to direct the Adelantado's fleet to Falmouth, he was in close communication with Lord Beauchamp, the heir to the crown by the will of Henry VIII.; and Elliott subsequently expressed his regret that he had not carried the nobleman to

<sup>1</sup> An intercepted bundle of letters quoted in State Papers, Dom., May 1598, contained a letter dated February 1597 from an English Catholic in Spain, speaking of the going of the Adelantado's fleet to England, says: "When the fleet would be ready, as they prayed for the day when the good Prince of Spain might be placed in England and married to the gentlewoman there, so that they (the refugees) might go and end their lives in their own country." This suggestion for a marriage between the young Philip III. and Arabella was probably nothing but loose talk. We know it was never seriously intended by Spain, but doubtless it had many well-wishers amongst the Spanish party of English Catholics, and perhaps was one of the dreams of Arabella herself.

Spain with him.<sup>1</sup> At the same period Father Cecil, writing from Madrid to the Earl of Essex, told him of the project of carrying "two great personages" out of England, Father Gordon, the Jesuit uncle of Huntly, having informed him some time before "that Lady Arabella was shortly to be conveyed to Spain." When Father Cecil arrived in Spain, he had met there a Captain North, who had been sent on this business, and who said that Arabella herself was in favour of it, "her common speech being that she thought no match in England good enough for her." North asserted that he had been sent by her to Rome, Germany, and Spain on his matrimonial errand, and had negotiated with the younger Archduke Albert, the son of Archduke Charles. A suggestion at the same time was made by one Sakill in Spain to carry thither the eldest sister of the Earl of Derby; but Father Cecil very justly observes that no favour was likely to be intended to these pretenders, "but to lessen the number of their (the Spaniards') antagonists, and to reserve them, in any event, in case their own card (*i.e.* the Infanta) should fail them."

These various suggestions for aiding the Infanta's cause by cajoling or kidnapping to Spain rival English claimants probably never passed beyond the stage of harebrained schemes: but it is certain that any effort that Essex, James Stuart, or the French could make to prevent an arrangement with

<sup>1</sup> In a letter written by the *sagan* Earl of Desmond to the King of Spain in 1599, printed in *Pacata Hibernia*, he mentions that a certain Captain Roche would have carried the heir-apparent of the crown of England to Spain, but that he had been betrayed by his own men. This probably refers to the plan for abducting Lord Beauchamp.



the Archduke in Flanders, which would also have the effect of bringing Arabella to the front, would be exerted to the utmost. The mere suggestion of such a thing set a flood of gossip loose about the intention of Henry IV. himself to marry Arabella, with the blessing of Elizabeth and the acknowledged succession to the English crown. This alarmed the Spaniards, and probably explains their renewed approaches to Arabella at this period (1597-98). It was obvious, however, that the Cecil party and Elizabeth herself would never countenance such an arrangement; and when Henry IV. had made peace with Spain and settled upon his Italian marriage, the purely Spanish party had no further use for Arabella until the Infanta's candidature for the crown was finally dropped. At a later period, as we shall see, the Spanish interest coalesced to some extent with the traditionary conservative elements in England itself, as against the Scottish, Italian, French, and English Puritan interests, which sided with James's candidature. It was the cunning secrecy of Cecil towards the moderate party that his father and he had created which finally raised James to the throne, with Cecil as his all-powerful Minister, and extinguished the high hopes of Arabella Stuart and others.

The efforts of the two divergent interests were clearly seen during the negotiations for peace in the winter of 1597-98. After the recapture of Amiens by the French in the autumn, it was quite evident that both France and Spain were utterly exhausted, and could fight no more. The Pope and the general of the Cordeliers had long been striving to bring about

peace, and at length their overtures were listened to. Henry IV. obtained all he wanted or could ask for, a return territorially to the *status quo* in 1559, and there was no reason for him to continue fighting. It will be remembered, however, that he had pledged himself positively by the treaty of 1596, which had so much offended Lord Burghley, to make no separate peace without including Elizabeth and the States; and a hundred questions were raised by the English before they would consent to join in such negotiations. It was a vital matter for Henry; and the Pope told him that he need keep no faith with heretics; but the gallant Béarnais determined to make an effort to include his allies in the treaty, in pursuance of his pledge. His envoy, De Maise, came to England in December 1597 to persuade Elizabeth to join in the negotiations. Essex had long been in disgrace, and his first sulky appearance at court coincided with the presence of De Maise. He was, of course, all for prosecuting the war with renewed vigour, for sending Henry large subsidies, and so forth; for he dreaded, as did Henry himself, that Elizabeth and Burghley would now revert to the traditional policy and themselves make a separate peace with Spain, leaving France out. De Maise was received by Elizabeth four times, and even then, in her old age, the consummate skill and invincible vanity which had made her the great Queen she was showed more conspicuously than ever. She bared her withered bosom to the pit of the stomach for the Frenchman's delectation;<sup>1</sup> she

<sup>1</sup> Journal de Maise, Archives Affaires Etrangères. Quoted by Prevot Paradol.

talked of her foolishness and ugliness to provoke compliments, which she swallowed; she apologised for her dowdiness when she was clothed in silver tissue and loaded with jewels. She was coquettish, gay, frivolous, and indelicate; but she was dignified, and keenly alert when the question of English interests was at issue, and she lost no point in the game. De Maisse saw that she was playing with him, and at length he told Lord Burghley that the long delay in giving him an answer, yea or nay, as to the Queen's willingness to negotiate for peace, relieved his master of his pledges to refrain from making a separate treaty. It was impossible, Elizabeth said, for her to negotiate finally with an Archduke; she could only make peace with the King of Spain himself; and how could she tell that the Archduke's powers were sufficient even to negotiate? All this was simply to delay, whilst she aroused the fears of the Dutch, and played her own game during the month or more that De Maisse was being kept dangling about Whitehall. Both he and his master knew that the "loyal" English Catholics in Flanders, under the leadership of Charles Paget, were busy with separate negotiations between Elizabeth and the Archduke himself.

Approaches had been made by Cecil's agent, Barnes, for an understanding in the previous year, but had been rejected by the Archduke; but on the 26th December (1597) Paget wrote to Cecil, at the Archduke's request, expressing a desire for a friendly settlement with England, and thenceforward a brisk exchange of notes took place. In one of the last State Papers that old Lord Burghley wrote, he sets down

by his favourite method, in opposing columns, the advantages and disadvantages of a peace as proposed by France. It would be an advantage that France should have Calais restored ; but it would be a disadvantage that the English could not then hope to recover it. English trade and wealth would be vastly increased by a peace, and the Queen could then "avoid the insolence of the King of Scots ;" but it would be inconvenient to suddenly disband so many soldiers. The main difficulty, however, was that the Dutch States would not listen to any peace in which their absolute independence was not assured, and this Spanish pride would not brook. It was, moreover, not to the advantage of England that the new Republic should become friendly with France and at peace with Spain, for that would have left England isolated indeed now that Henry was a Catholic. So, although Sir Robert Cecil went on a hollow embassy to France, he did nothing but reproach Henry for his desertion of his allies ; and whilst on the one hand the States were encouraged by Elizabeth to continue their resistance *à outrance*, the English Government on the other became more and more amiable to the Archduke, and the hopes of all sections of "loyal" English Catholics rose higher and higher.

Their plans were various, and mostly visionary. Constable, the ardent young poet in France, was full of the notion that he could by persuasion convert the Queen herself.<sup>1</sup> Charles Paget had a proposal to request Henry IV., as one of the conditions of peace, to urge upon the Pope the withdrawal of

<sup>1</sup> Petit to Phellips, State Papers, Dom., October 21, 1597.

all the Jesuits from England, prohibiting them to return. In a violent attack upon the Jesuit methods he says to Cecil, "I can assure you that the principal Catholics, both in England and on this side of the sea, that have longest endured for the cause will be glad thereof, for as the said Catholics will not receive them (the Jesuits) in their houses, they are termed by the Jesuits 'politics' or old Catholics."<sup>1</sup> He assured Cecil that it would not be difficult to persuade the Pope to do this, "for if Persons had not gone to Rome just when he did, with great recommendations from Spain, it would have been done before." The idea evidently was that, if Jesuit methods were banished from England, and the loyalty of the mass of the English Catholics was demonstrated, toleration for their religion would follow. The foreign Catholics of the King of Scots' party also were not idle. Cardinal Malvasia, the Nuncio, whom we saw conferring with Pury Ogilvie in Brussels, submitted (October 1597) a long discourse to the Pope in favour of investing James with the crown of England, on the assurance that both the King and his wife would be "converted." "But to execute this plan the Pope should recall from England all Jesuits, and such priests as are known to be of the contrary faction, leaving only those who are in favour of the Scot." The same informer (Petit) says that Lord Dacre had gone to France, hoping to make his peace with Elizabeth, and his son was to follow him; "and some day the Earl of Westmoreland will take the same course. *They like her Majesty's religion better than they like the Scot.*"

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Dom., June 1598.

It must have been evident now to all English Catholics that the Jesuit plan of forcing Catholic supremacy upon England by violent aggressive action and foreign invasion had resulted in utter failure. As each successive loudly vaunted Spanish fleet had crept back baffled and disgraced, not only had the growing impotence of Spain been proclaimed to the scoffing world, but the popular Queen and the Protestant cause had become stronger in their confidence to resist attack. The Catholic cause at the same time had grown increasingly odious to the mass of Englishmen, because it had been possible to blacken it by connecting it with treason and lack of patriotism. This had been the cause of the ruin of the Catholic League in France, and had ended there in the triumph of the Moderates, with religious toleration under a mild Catholic supremacy, and the expulsion of Jesuits from the realm. It was no wonder, therefore, that the English Catholics should be anxious, by a somewhat similar process, to obtain at least toleration, and to dis sever themselves from extreme methods and aims which, after eighteen years of constant effort, had only brought to them increased sufferings, and had rendered ultimate success more hopeless than ever. The great majority of the Catholics would have been content now to work for freedom of religious observance, trusting that time, patience, and opportunity might at some future time enable them to gain the upper hand in the State; and, as we have seen, even many of those who had grown old in exile were wishful for a reconciliation which should restore them to the land of their birth and to their duty as subjects, whilst

assuring them against persecution on account of their faith.

But compromise, or any other agreement with the "heretic," was of all things that least desired by the Jesuit faction.<sup>1</sup> Domination of the State was what they aimed at, in which the whole national life was to be bound up with and subjected to the sole overlordship of Christ—of whom they were the officers. Kings, potentates, even popes, were to be dwarfed finally by the rule of Christ alone; and when Jesuits served kings, as they served Philip, it was only for the purpose of using his power to humble in the long run the caste to which he belonged. No doubt the Dominican order had similar dreams, with the Inquisition as its instrument in Spain, but the secular sovereigns had been able to turn this great engine to their own ends. The Society of Jesus was founded on principles specially devised to prevent this in its own case; and it was perfectly consistent with those principles in utterly rejecting and opposing the efforts of the secular and regular clergy to arrive at a *modus vivendi* in England, which might leave the question of Catholic supremacy in the country to be decided in the future.

<sup>1</sup> A very interesting treatise, written at this period (January 1598) from Rome by Henry Tichborne, S.J., sets forth the Jesuit view. Their hopes of success in England, he says, are founded on the high credit in which Father Persons is held in Rome, and Cresswell and Holt in Madrid and Brussels. He rejoices in the persecutions in England as the principal source of Jesuit strength. The only thing to be feared, he says, is the granting of liberty of conscience in England, "which is supposed to proceed from some deeper brain than our ordinary wits are wont to yield." The writer then warns his fellows against "such as gape after that liberty," which, he says, will be so "dangerous that what rigour of law could not compass in so many years, liberty and levity will effectuate in twenty days" (State Papers, Domestic, Eliz. cclxii. Printed in full in Law's "Jesuits and Seculars").

Whilst, therefore, the mass of Catholics at home and abroad were striving to prove their loyalty to the crown, the Spanish Jesuit faction, with undiminished boldness and ability, were working still to obtain possession of England by means of foreign forces.

The Adelantado's fleet had straggled back to Spain, disheartened and plague-beset, in November 1597. The King was slowly dying, in agonies almost beyond human endurance; his exchequer was drained; his people literally starving; land untilled; industries ruined; corruption and demoralisation supreme in the administration, and the whole country was a prey to spiritual disillusionment and pagan reaction, under the guise of writhing devotion. But, withal, the indomitable spirit of Philip himself burned brightly in his decaying body, and the Adelantado was summoned quickly, not as the news-letters and spies reported, to be hanged, but to consult for the despatch of a new expedition in the following spring. A Scottish sea-captain, coming from Lisbon in January 1598, reported to the English officers that the fleet making ready at Ferrol was "to be double the strength of that which came last year,"<sup>1</sup> and that the purpose was to invade England in April or May, whilst in Lisbon itself twelve ships were being fitted out, and twenty-two bands of soldiers training.

There is amongst Lopez de Soto's papers,<sup>2</sup> a discourse or report for the King's guidance, written soon after the Adelantado's return from his interview

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Domestic, of the date. Report of Wilson.

<sup>2</sup> British Museum, Add. MSS. 28,420, 122.



with Philip in the winter of 1597, with recommendations as to the measures to be taken for the success of the new Armada of invasion. The paper could never have been written by Lopez de Soto himself, as it ignores all the practical difficulties; and its obvious and sanctimonious generalities almost prove it to have been one of those inept "*consultas*" which the Councils usually drew up after the King decided upon any course in principle. But it is extremely instructive, nevertheless, as showing how entirely affairs were managed from hand to mouth, and how the King's secretive monopoly of initiative paralysed all action. "As his Majesty has decided to take the course demanded by the good of Christendom," says the document, "we will proceed to consider and report upon the best means by which the success of the undertaking may be assured. The first is to recommend it to God, and to endeavour to amend our sins; but since his Majesty has already given a general order to this effect, and has appointed a commander who usually insists upon this point, it will be only needful to take care that the order is obeyed and to promulgate it again. It must be borne in mind that the enemy is very vigilant and alert, and that he is well exercised. This, together with the need for fitting out our expedition, since we cannot divert him by going out and meeting him, necessitates that, both in Spain and elsewhere, we should be ready at all points, so that every place should be able to defend itself without calling upon others." This bland beginning leads up to a recommendation equally silly, considering the appalling

state of exhaustion into which the country had sunk. "All these necessities everywhere," it is sagely pointed out, will call for a vast expenditure, for which the money must be collected "with extraordinary rapidity, and by every licit means that can be devised. In order to examine what means are licit, a committee of theologians must be summoned, to whom so great a matter may be confided, and their opinion should be adopted." The order already given to Count Santa Gadea to land and drill the army is approved of, so that it may be all ready for the spring; and in the meanwhile he must be supplied with money and victuals from Galicia. "If progress is made in Ireland this winter, as is hoped, this army may be increased in the beginning of the summer by a sufficient number of Irish troops, and we may then cross over from there (Ireland) to Wales; and if at the same time galleys be sent to Calais, whence a powerful army—collected ostensibly for other purposes by the Archduke—can be carried across, it will be a godsend to the main enterprise. At the same time the negotiations of Father Persons and other Catholics will help." The *consulta* then dictates, at great length, the diplomatic steps to be taken to dissuade the King of Scots,<sup>1</sup> the Dutch, the Danes, the

<sup>1</sup> Excuses are proposed to be adopted for sending embassies from the Archduke to the various Protestant potentates on this matter, the pretext in the case of the King of Scots being "to *inform him of that liar that came here.*" This refers no doubt to the mission of Pury Ogilvie. The proposal to send an envoy to Scotland appears to have been adopted. The notorious George Ker, accompanied by a secretary of the Archduke named Don Diego de Spinoza, went from Flanders to Scotland *via* Calais in February, and were shortly afterwards followed by another emissary named Cunninghame. Full information of these

Italians, and the Shereef of Barbary from aiding the English; but it ends, as it begins, with the opinion that "the principal thing is the money which can be collected legally, since what is illegal is prohibited; and this is a time when no licit means must be spared."

Let us contrast this mealy-mouthed impracticability with the methods adopted in England to meet the threatened new attack. The recommendation to send the Spanish galleys to Calais was adopted rapidly, doubtless in order to make use of the port in landing large reinforcements for the Archduke, before the signature of the treaty with France deprived the Spaniards of it. In any case, England was cast into a renewed ferment by the news received in February 1598 that a Spanish fleet had arrived unmolested in the narrow seas. From a Spanish sailor captured and carried into Dover it was learnt that 38 flyboats full of soldiers, 5000 of them, had sailed under the veteran Admiral Bertondona from Corunna to Calais. The sailor said that they had left 18 large well-appointed ships at Corunna, and that 5000 Italian troops were in the neighbourhood ready for embarkation, but many of them were dying of dysentery. After the troops had been landed at Calais, the 38 flyboats, he said, were to return to Lisbon to be re-victualled, and then to sail under Diego Brochero.<sup>1</sup>

embassies were sent by Colville in Boulogne to Essex, and the intelligence aroused great uneasiness in England, the belief being that James was now in close negotiation with Spain. As we have seen above, the object of the Spaniards was simply to prevent James from aiding the English against them. (See Colville's letters in Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.)

<sup>1</sup> Examination of Pedro Martinez. State Papers, Domestic, February 16, 1598.

All this was alarming enough, for it was known that the peace was as good as signed between France and Spain, and Secretary Cecil himself was crossing the Channel on his mission to Henry IV. Essex seems to have been the first to receive the news, and he wrote post-haste to Cecil, telling him that the Spaniards were in Calais roads. The Earl of Cumberland had been ordered to go thither immediately with such ships as he could collect, and to follow the Spaniards wherever they went. The Lord Admiral, with his kinsman Lord Thomas Howard, had rushed down to Gravesend and Queenborough to fit out fresh vessels with all speed. Lord Cobham had ridden as hard as horses could gallop to Dover Castle; the Lord Chamberlain had gone to the Isle of Wight with equal speed, and Sir Walter Raleigh was commissioned to furnish provisions all along the coast; whilst Essex himself was to stand ready to repel attack at any point. "Above all, the Queen commands that you (Cecil) are not to put to sea." This, be it recollected, was only one day after the news came that the Spanish flyboats were in English waters. A letter bringing at the same time the intelligence to his father and the Lord Admiral had also come from Cecil himself,<sup>1</sup> who had safely crossed to Dieppe. Burghley was dying, and was only useful now in council; but Howard wrote to him from Gravesend (February 17) deploring that so few English ships had remained in the Straits of Dover, most

<sup>1</sup> The letter bore the superscription, "For life, for life, for very life," and had a gallows drawn upon it as a hint to the postman of the consequences of delay.

of them having gone west to escort Cecil to Dieppe —“and yet,” he says, “her Majesty commanded me to lessen them. In my opinion these ships (the Spaniards) will watch a turn to do something on our coast; and if they hear our ships are gone to Dieppe, I think them beasts if they do not burn or spoil Dover or Sandwich. What 4000 men may do on a sudden I leave to your Lordship’s judgment. I hope it shall cost them dear if they attempt it. There is nothing here, at Gravesend, to impeach anything but two silly forts.”<sup>1</sup>

There was no dismay here; no boggling about the theologian’s views of what was licit in a moment of national emergency: only a determination to resist invasion to the death, unprepared though England was.<sup>2</sup> Warned by the threat at Falmouth in the previous year, Sir Nicholas Parker had been sent to fortify the place. Sir Francis Godolphin had mustered his Cornish levies and was standing ready; whilst, as we have seen, not an hour was lost, when the danger in the narrow sea was known, in buckling on the national armour to resist. But there need have been no fear. The wind blew dead off Calais, and eighteen of the fly-

<sup>1</sup> Lord Admiral to Lord Burghley, February 17, 1598. State Papers, Domestic.

<sup>2</sup> Even Cecil and Essex pulled together in this hour of danger. The Earl had promised the Secretary that he would not take advantage of his absence to injure him or to bring about any change, and he kept his word. We have seen that he wrote to Cecil the hour that he heard the news, and Cecil wrote to him, on the day of his arrival at Dieppe: “As the Queen’s affairs must have a good portion of our minds, I do hope, now that God has disposed us to love and kindness, we shall overcome all petty doubts about what the world may judge of our correspondency” (State Papers, Domestic, Cecil to Essex, February 19, 1598).

boats, huddled under the guns of the fortress to escape the Earl of Cumberland's ships, were lost. The rest of them, when they got into the harbour, and the main English squadron came up from Dieppe, dared not venture out again for fear of the English, and their absence crippled the armament fitting out in Spain.

In April an English Catholic of the Jesuit faction wrote from Lisbon already casting doubt upon the possibility of any attempt being made upon England that year. "Alas!" he says, "the King is not well provided with means for recovering our country and establishing the Catholic religion there." The theologians had probably not yet settled what were the "licit" ways of raising the wind. The celerity of the English methods had already, in the six weeks that had elapsed since the flyboats came to Calais, enabled the Earl of Cumberland to assume the offensive. "The archpirate Cumberland is reported to be on the coast," writes the Catholic in Lisbon, "so that the five great carricks for the East Indies dare not go forth. Pray entertain all good Catholics in devotion, and what the King cannot do this year, he will do next. Want of skill in the mariners' last voyage and the sending of those ships to Calais has weakened his naval force, and sickness his land forces. However, the heretics are defending their coasts at home, so there is no fear of their making any attempt here."

In fact, famine and pestilence, in combination with the administrative incompetence, of which we have seen instances in the documents quoted, had already made another expedition to England im-

possible in 1598. So abjectly terrified were the Spaniards, moreover, at the mere presence of Cumberland's ships in their waters, that the five great Indiamen outward bound were brought again to the quay at Lisbon and discharged, their cargoes coming as a very boon from heaven to the famished city. The annual fleet for America, too, dared not sail from Seville for fear of capture;<sup>1</sup> and thus the whole great commerce of Spain for the year was stopped, to the ruin of merchants and the despair of Philip's treasurers, because a few English ships were on the coast,<sup>2</sup> although a much stronger force, 45 ships, we are told, were now ready for sea in Corunna harbour, and the Adelantado's fleet of 20 great ships and 140 small craft still lay in Ferrol unable to get crews.<sup>3</sup>

A foe thus dispirited and so exhausted in moral and material resource was ludicrously incapable of forcing Catholic supremacy upon England at the sword's point. Spain, like a bankrupt ex-millionaire or a palsied prize-fighter, continued to inspire respect or fear by the tradition of her former potency, which itself had largely depended in her best days upon the artificial spiritual exaltation bred of religious intolerance. But the strengthening effects of the stimulant were mostly gone now, except amongst

<sup>1</sup> Van Harnack to Cecil from Lisbon, May 1, 1598. State Papers, Domestic.

<sup>2</sup> A shipmaster from Lisbon reports to Cecil in June (State Papers, Domestic), that the Adelantado with 20 great ships and 140 others was at Ferrol, but had no mariners. Two forts had been built at the mouth of the harbour for fear of the English attacking the ships as they lay at anchor. There were 15,000 soldiers, but sickness was very prevalent, and every one was greatly afraid of the English fleet.

<sup>3</sup> Report of Savage, February 18, 1598. State Papers, Domestic.

the very ignorant. Gross superstition and a slavish obedience to religious forms barely veiled the blackest paganism. There was no longer a confident belief that the Spaniards were the chosen militia of the Lord, for they themselves saw that the contemned "heretic" worked his will with them on the sea whenever he met them. Priests and friars might urge as before upon Spaniards the sacred duty of making other nations as perfect in the eye of Heaven as they were themselves. It still flattered their native pride and the vanity of a people sunk in poverty, sloth, and ignorance to be told that their sovereign was the richest and most powerful on earth, and that they themselves were a people infinitely superior to all others. But they individually were content to sit down and enjoy the fact. They, poor wretches, like other peoples of their time, were pressed for service when the King deigned to need their carcasses, but they were no longer upheld, as they had been in 1588, with the assurance of inevitable heaven-sent victory over the enemies of the Lord. They went forth now trembling with fear at the "devilish folk," and with dumb misgivings that, sacred banners and blessed beads notwithstanding, the powers of darkness were stronger than the powers of light. Thus one by one the weapons by which Philip had dreamed of forcing religious uniformity upon the world were bending in the hands of their wielders. The spiritual exaltation of his people had faded in the face of repeated failure, the national ambitions behind his devout professions had been found out, and the English Catholics, who had so long served him for a stalking-horse, were yearn-



ing for concord under their national flag on almost any conditions which would leave them unmolested for their faith.

This was the feeling that prompted most moderate men in England during the spring of 1598 to hope and believe that means would be found to bring about peace between England and Spain, even if it meant the abandonment by Elizabeth of the Dutch. "We are all of opinion that the peace goes forward," wrote John Chamberlain on the 20th May. . . . Barnevelt, the agent and advocate of the States, is here, and hath had audience these two days together, but I fear we are deafe on that side and no musike will please us unles it be to the tune of peace."<sup>1</sup> Essex, as usual, struggled against a pacification which would draw England into any compromise with Spain and the Catholics, and Lord Burghley, almost with his dying breath, solemnly rebuked the young Earl for his attitude;<sup>2</sup> but the signature of the peace of Vervins and the vigorous renewed action of the Archduke against the States finally made it necessary for Elizabeth to continue her active support of the latter, whilst still making the approaches towards Spain invariably resorted to by the Cecil party when France was at peace.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letters of John Chamberlain. Camden Society and State Papers, Domestic.

<sup>2</sup> Essex wrote an elaborate and eloquent "Apology" for his action at this time. It was reprinted in 1603, and is usually included in Francis Bacon's works, although it is not by him.

<sup>3</sup> In July the States sent three representatives to beg the Queen to continue the war vigorously in their aid, "as in her Council there are not lacking those who recommend this course, chiefly the Earl of Essex, but the Lord Treasurer is opposed, and more important still the Queen herself is inclined to peace" (The Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge).

The principal argument used by the advocates of a settlement, besides the obvious advantages it would bring to commerce, and the need for national tranquillity, was the threatening state of affairs in Ireland.<sup>1</sup> We left Tyrone at the close of the year 1597 enjoying a two-months' sulky truce instead of the two years' cessation for which he had asked. The Irish Government had continued to press the Queen for strong reinforcements, for it was evident now that Tyrone meant to head a great rising of the north and west. The Council in Dublin, whose policy towards Tyrone made peace impossible, to the despair of soldiers like Norreys and Fenton, were inept and doubly unable to conduct the war they provoked, first, by reason of their own slow bureaucratic stupidity, and secondly, because the home Government sent the resources they prayed for in grudging dribbles, which always made large operations impossible. In the meanwhile Leinster was being ravaged by O'Connors, O'Mores, Molloyes, and O'Byrnes with the assistance of numbers of

<sup>1</sup> John Chamberlain writes (May 20): "Another motive to the peace is the troubles of Ireland, which are like to put the Quene to exceeding charge, and, withal, there appears to be a black clowde in Scotland that threatens a storm." "Matters in Ireland grow daily worse and worse, so that unles they have round and speedy succour, all is like to go to wracke. The Council have consulted about it these three or fower days, but I hear of no resolution, but only that 4000 men shal be sent at leisure." On the 31st May the same indefatigable gossip writes to his friend: "In the meane time the state of Ireland stands on ill terms, for we are so wholly possessed with this imaginary peace that we cannot attend it. Not past eight days since it was decreed that Sir Richard Bingham, Sir Samuel Bagnol, and Sir Henry Docwra should be sent thither with each a regiment of 2000 men, but that course is altered, and now they talk that Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir George Carew should undertake it; but how long that will hold is uncertain" (Chamberlain's Letters).

Ulstermen from Tyrone's country, whilst the English-Irish garrisons<sup>1</sup> in Newry, Dundalk, and Cavan, isolated and starving, were in despair. Ormonde during the truce had managed to re-victual the important fort on the Blackwater and had done his best to pacify Leinster, but when he met Tyrone in conference at Dundalk (March 14, 1598), he found that the "arch-rebel" had been even more than busy.

Around Tyrone now were grouped all the hoarded discontents of Ireland, looking to him for redress. For four days the Queen's commissioners met Tyrone on the "parley hill," by Dundalk, and told him that the sovereign, "having seen his submission, had condescended to pardon him on certain conditions." This was very well as far as it went, but Tyrone insisted upon terms being granted to his confederates. Many of these were still in arms; O'Donnell himself was skulking in his mountains of Donegal; but the claim gave to Tyrone what he wanted most, namely, a further delay in which he might concentrate and arm his bands for the struggle. Ormonde strove to please him, giving way on most points, and condoning for his sake even the Leinster ravages of the O'Connors and O'Mores; for, truth to tell, the Anglo-Irish were not strong enough now to fight the rebel, and the latter knew it well.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not above a fifth of the soldiers on the Queen's side in Ireland at the time were English, and suspicions of their steadfastness were constantly expressed by the English governors.

<sup>2</sup> Brian Roe O'More, writing shortly after this to Tyrone, asking him to procure the release of Morris Oge O'Connor, who had been arrested by Ormonde, said of the English, "By God's grace, there is no stand in the churls, if your honour would set upon them now; for all Ireland would have been at your command by this, if it had not been for your parleys and truces" (Irish State Papers).

Still it suited his present purpose to defer open warfare; and when, a month later (April 14), he again met the Queen's men in parley, this time with O'Donnell by his side, another six weeks' truce was concluded.

But there was no possibility of deception any longer as to his high aims. "A traitor will always be a traitor" (wrote one of the commissioners), "do what a man may. Tyrone's unhappy successes in some bickerings against us, the knowledge of his own strength, expectation of foreign help, and the confidence he hath in the multitude of his partakers . . . hath puffed him up with such pride and haughtiness of mind as cannot be reformed but by chastisement and correction."<sup>1</sup> And the soldier Fenton wrote even more emphatically: "Now the traitor being discovered to the bottom, and his conspiracies, practised in effect with all the Irish in the realm, made apparent, her Majesty seeth now what to trust unto; not to depend more upon treaties and parleys, but to turn her mercy into revenge, and proceed really to his prosecution." During the first parley the Bishop of Meath, reproaching Tyrone with his evident wish to delay matters, said: "It is likely you look for the Spaniards, and it is like enough they will deceive you, as they have done; and if they keep touch with you, you and they shall find her Majesty cares little." Then Tyrone drew his sword, and swore on the cross of its hilt, "I look neither for Spaniards nor Scots to help me, but I would not have it be said that I should be counted a perjured wretch to those

<sup>1</sup> The Bishop of Meath, April 18, 1598 (Irish State Papers).

that I am sworn unto, and to leave them in the danger." <sup>1</sup>

It was possibly true that Tyrone at this juncture had no desire or expectation of receiving in Ireland Spanish forces powerful enough to make him a vassal of Philip, but he must have been fully alive to the advantage which would accrue to his cause if he could identify it with those of Catholicism and Irish patriotism. As a pure fact, both this rising and those of the Desmonds thirty years before, were mainly prompted by a desire of the greater chieftains to return to a state of things which formerly had given them the position of petty princes, holding the smaller chiefs and the people in vassalage, from which the English rule had to a great extent emancipated them. But this, as an avowed object of a rebellion, would have been unwise, and patriotism and religion were necessary fuel to set the revolution in motion. Tyrone must have known that the domination of Spain over Ireland would have been infinitely more grinding than that of England; but to link the cause of Ireland with that of Catholic supremacy, and thus to gain the sympathetic support of England's most powerful enemy, was a diplomatic move which was no doubt considered of the highest importance to his success. We have seen that Philip's Council, in the winter of 1597, had counted upon Tyrone's being sufficiently successful against the English in the spring to be able to ship an Irish force upon the Spanish fleet intended to invade England. That fleet, as has been related, had already (in April or May 1598) been reduced to impotent hopelessness by mis-

<sup>1</sup> The Bishop of Meath, April 18, 1598 (Irish State Papers).

management, pestilence, poverty, and fear of the English, and doubtless Tyrone was kept well informed of the progress of events. Thomas Lalley, who, it will be recollected, had been sent to Spain by the Connaught chiefs in the previous year, had remained at Philip's court, and continued to send advices, and the Bishop of Killaloe was still ceaselessly urging the Irish cause in Lisbon.<sup>1</sup>

But what caused much more anxiety than this to the Anglo-Irish Government at the time was the presence in Spain of Tyrone's secretary, Brimingham. The special cause for anxiety in this case was the fact that James Stuart, having been informed by Essex of the secret plans of the moderate Catholic party, probably with the connivance of Cecil, to come to an understanding with the Archduke, in which the succession of Arabella Stuart should form a part, had begun to show increasingly the "insolence" of which old Lord Burghley spoke in his discussion as to the advantages of peace. Tyrone was glad to welcome any aid, and in September 1597 sent Brimingham to Scotland to seek James's co-operation, in union with that of Spain and the Catholics, who in return would assure him the succession to the English throne. James was delighted, and sent Brimingham to Spain with a Scottish companion.<sup>2</sup> If Tyrone

<sup>1</sup> Van Harnack reported to Cecil from Lisbon (April 29) that the *Griffin* flyboat was carrying to Ireland a suspicious Jesuit by order of the Irish bishop (State Papers, Domestic).

<sup>2</sup> The Scotsman Fleming was an agent of Tyrone, sent to purchase powder and munitions. Both he and Brimingham had a narrow escape from capture by the English and Huguenots in Rochelle; but Fleming managed to run some cargoes of ammunition from Bordeaux to Loch Foyle, whilst Brimingham went on his mission to Madrid, where the King's mortal illness, and the complete disorganisation that reigned

had only understood it, this was an infallible means for effectually stopping Philip from sending him any valid aid. But both he and James himself failed to see this, and the latter especially gave himself great airs on what doubtless appeared to him a certain way of gaining Catholic support for his claims. He went so far as to make a statement of his rights and hopes in the Scottish Parliament in the last days of 1597 which stirred Elizabeth to positive fury. She sent Sir William Bowes to him with a letter, which remains still an almost unrivalled specimen of her powers of vituperation. "Look you not, therefore, that without large amends," she said, "I may or will slupper up such indignities."<sup>1</sup> But even to Bowes himself James could hardly attempt to disguise his elation that Tyrone and he were in alliance,<sup>2</sup> and that Spain would certainly be on their side, though to Elizabeth herself he wrote a whimpering apology and semi-

(added to the fact that James Stuart was now concerned in the business) prevented his success so far as material aid was concerned (Irish State Papers).

<sup>1</sup> Letters of Elizabeth and James (Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> Petit, the spy in Antwerp, wrote to Phellips, June 4, 1598: "If I were not acquainted with Scottish brags, I might believe that England was already more than half theirs. The King of Denmark's brother is going to do wonders. The Duke of Mayenne is to be general in England," &c. (State Papers, Domestic). In a letter written by Nicholson to Cecil in August (John Colville's Letters) he details a conversation he had had with Secretary Elphinstone relative to the complaint made by the English Government to James on the presence in Scotland of agents of the Irish rebels "The King said he sought no purgation in that matter. There were none (Irish envoys) here; and if there were, or MacSorley, or yet Tyrone, or yet O'Donnell, why might not they go as well in Edinburgh streets as Bothwell and John Colville in London?" The next day Nicholson saw James himself, who told him he knew of no Irish agents there, but still harped upon the welcome accorded by Elizabeth to his own fugitive subjects.

denial. So whilst Brimingham wrote "comfortable" letters from Spain to his master, and James Stuart was promising armies and navies to Tyrone in the hope of obtaining the subsequent aid of Ireland and Spain to his pretensions to the English crown, the "arch-rebel" waxed in strength and pride. Thirteen thousand English infantry would be needed in Ulster alone, reported experienced English officers, before Tyrone could be put down. The rebel wealth in cattle must be raided, for Ulster will never be established in dutiful obedience "so well by the dent of the sword as if it should also come by the cruelty of famine."<sup>1</sup> But the Government in London refused to understand the gravity of the position, and continued to send reinforcements in drafts of hundreds, instead of by thousands. In vain the alarmed Council in Dublin wrote that they themselves were in daily danger of massacre, and bemoaned weakly to Lord Burghley their "miserable and distressed estate." The Leinster chiefs, whose rebellion had been condoned, broke out worse than ever; and as soon as Tyrone's last truce expired in June he sent a strong force of Ulstermen down to help them, whilst with other detachments he surrounded the important fort on the Blackwater and isolated the castle of Cavan.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irish State Papers. It was estimated by Captain Mostyn that 400,000 head or more of cattle could be lifted. He says that he himself saw O'Donnell take 30,000 head in one morning a little above Roscommon. Tyrone's secretary also told Mostyn that if the Earl levied a subsidy of one shilling on each milch-cow in county Tyrone alone, he could raise between £6000 and £7000.

<sup>2</sup> Fenton wrote to Cecil, June 11, 1598, detailing the plans for succouring Cavan and protecting the Pale, but saying, "But yet touching the Blackwater I see not but it must be left to the valour



There were not sufficient English forces in Ireland to withstand him effectually anywhere, and the most that could be done by Ormonde was to defend Leinster and repel the incursions into the Pale. All the north and centre outside the walled garrisons was in open rebellion against the Queen. Panic-stricken messengers rushed daily into Dublin with false news of Spanish fleets anchored in Loch Foyle; of great victories gained by Tyrone; of fresh risings in Connaught, and the like; whilst the miserable Council of Regency could only continue to write despairing letters to London. In the meanwhile Tyrone's dispositions were skilfully made. He pushed bodies of men down on the west of the Pale to Longford, and on the north to Meath and Dundalk, whilst he raised the clans of Lower Leinster, and the English Governors soon found themselves in danger of being entirely surrounded by land. The English reinforcements, when at length they came in July, reached only 2000 men,<sup>1</sup> not sufficient to defend even the province of Leinster, with which Ormonde was chiefly concerned; but the indignant remonstrances of the English officers at the orders that the fort on the Blackwater should be surrendered to Tyrone, forced the Government to divert a portion of the English reinforcements to that point.

and fortune of the garrison there, for there is no means here to put an army on foot to rescue it."

<sup>1</sup> These men deserted as soon as they could, and great complaints were made that the captains quickly filled up their places with "mere Irish," for whom they drew the same pay. As a matter of fact, when it came to actual fighting, the Irish, though of doubtful allegiance, were worth a great deal more. At the crucial moment of the battle of the Blackwater, the newly arrived English levies refused to fight at all, casting away their arms and bolting (Irish State Papers).

Tyrone in person had for a month past strained every nerve to secure possession of the fort, which was held with great gallantry by Captain Thomas Williams. Every approach to the place had been entrenched and fortified to prevent its relief, and the Council hesitated long before they would allow it to be attempted. At length a force of 3500 foot and 300 horse, under Sir Henry Bagenal, reached Armagh (August 13, 1598), and marched the next morning to relieve the neighbouring fort. An incredible want of skill in the disposition of the force was displayed. The ground was extremely difficult; Tyrone had an army almost double the strength of the English, and had posted men in every position whence a relieving force could be attacked. Bagenal divided his little army into three divisions following each other, each division composed of two regiments, with intervals between the divisions of 140 paces each. This was the first and most fatal mistake, as the path taken lay through a country of broken hills flanked by bogs and woods, and one division was too far distant to help another in case of sudden attack. The three divisions had thus successively to run the gauntlet of a galling flank fire from concealed enemies during the march from Armagh to the first of Tyrone's trenches, a distance of some two miles. The vanguard, by abandoning the path and deploying to the flank, managed to carry the long trench at one point, but only after considerable loss and confusion, owing to the boggy nature of the ground at the point of attack and the flank fire from the woods on each side. The second division, encumbered with a field-piece, stuck in the

bog before reaching the trench, and Bagenal sent orders to the leading division to retreat. The retreat turned into a rout, and many of the men of this division were put to the sword by the pursuing rebels. Bagenal, endeavouring to stiffen the flying vanguard with his central division, waved his helmet, but at once received a bullet through the forehead which laid him low, and almost immediately afterwards two barrels of powder exploded in the second division and completed the demoralisation of the men.

In the meanwhile the new English levies, galled with the flank fire and dispirited by the confusion, threw away their arms and fled helter-skelter, whilst several hundreds of the "mere Irish" deserted to the enemy. It was then decided to withdraw the survivors of the three divisions to Armagh, and, leaving some of their cannon hopelessly bogged, the rear division led the retreat. But the pursuit became so hot and deadly upon the remnants of the former vanguard and centre, that the rear and now leading division turned about and charged the enemy. A second powder explosion had happened in their ranks just before, and the men were unsteady, so that their charge upon the Irish failed. The remains of the other regiments attempted to come to their assistance, but the long distance between the divisions prevented close or effective co-operation; the Irish were numerous enough to isolate them, and the rearguard was practically destroyed. The rest of the force fought their way back, foot by foot, almost to the walls of Armagh, where, before they could proceed further, they found themselves sur-

rounded. A body of English horse cut their way through to the Pale to carry news of the disaster. Between 1500 and 2000 men, with nearly all the officers and standards, were lost; and to the panic-stricken Council in Dublin, to dying Philip at the Escorial, and to all Christendom flew the pregnant news that the English rule over Ireland was tottering, for the only considerable body of English armed men in the kingdom had been swept clean away.

The Irish Council lost its head entirely and descended to the depth of sending a whining prayer to the "arch-rebel" to be merciful, and "let them (the English survivors) depart without doing them any further hurt. . . . And besides, your ancient adversary the Marshal (Bagenal) being now taken away, we hope you will cease all further revenge against the rest."<sup>1</sup> To this Tyrone agreed, and all the Queen's forces marched from the borders of Ulster, leaving rebellion triumphant and O'Neil a sovereign prince.

Almost the last letter that was dictated by Philip in his dying torments was one to Tyrone and O'Donnell, giving thanks to Heaven and to them for the steadfastness and valour which had enabled

<sup>1</sup> The Council, when they grew cooler, appear to have been ashamed of this letter, and said that it had never been delivered. This is still doubtful; but the Queen was in a towering rage when she learned of its being written. "We may not pass over this foul error to our dishonour," she wrote to the Council, "when you framed such a letter to the traitor after the defeat, as was never read the like either in form or substance for baseness. . . . If you shall peruse it again, when you are yourselves, you will be ashamed of your own absurdities, and grieved that any fear or rashness should ever make you authors of an action so much to your sovereign's dishonour and to the increase of the traitor's insolence" (Irish State Papers, August 16 and September 12, 1598).

them to gain this signal victory for the Catholic cause.<sup>1</sup> Failure, utter and complete, had for forty years attended the King's struggle to make England Catholic, that she might become a fit instrument for Spanish aims. He alone had never lost faith in ultimate victory, as one catastrophe had followed another with heartbreaking iteration of disaster; and now, in the awful sufferings of his last hours, he must have thought that Heaven was relenting towards him, for the Catholic cause in the dominions of Elizabeth for once was triumphant.

<sup>1</sup> MS. Simancas (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

## CHAPTER X

Letters of John Colville—James intrigues with the Catholic Powers—The “Wisbech Stirs”—Recriminations against the Jesuit faction—The murder plot of Squire and Rolls—Father Walpole’s connection with it—The desire of the Archduke for peace with England—Successes of the Irish rebels—Discontent of Essex—His government in Ireland—The march through Munster—His parley with Tyrone—His disobedience and return to England—His arrest.

THE jangling policies and factions in Elizabeth’s court, and the threatening state of affairs in Ireland in the summer and autumn of 1598, brought additional hopes and energy to the two schools of Catholics, who, in their different ways, were striving to undo the work of the Reformation on the death of the Queen. John Colville<sup>1</sup> was writing almost weekly alarming letters from his retreat in France to Essex, telling of the coming and going of Papist envoys to James. Robert Bruce, the ex-Spanish agent, was in Scotland, with George Ker, Father Gordon the Jesuit, and a number of French Catholics of the Guise faction, who, according to the reports furnished by Colville, were arranging for armed aid to be sent to James to establish him as Catholic King of England. There is no doubt that James was now, as ever, quite ready to coquet with

<sup>1</sup> Letters of John Colville in Hatfield Papers, vol. viii. Colville, a former ambassador of James, was a member of the Puritan party who had offended the King and had taken refuge in England, whence he had been forced to go to France in order to avoid giving offence to James. He was an agent of the English Government.

the Catholic party, and that he was, as we have seen, in close sympathetic correspondence with Tyrone; but the movements of the Catholics towards him at this juncture—with the exception of the embassy from the Archduke, of which the real object is revealed in the *consulta* quoted in the last chapter—may be confidently traced to the French and Italian, or anti-Spanish, influence, which saw in his conversion and succession the only safeguard against the Spanish domination of England or the perpetuation there of the Protestant supremacy.<sup>1</sup>

This was, of course, not fully understood at the time, and Colville, like all the members of the extreme Puritan party, saw the evil hand of Spain in everything. James himself, moreover, undoubtedly preferred to look with most amiability to the advances of the faction from which alone he could hope for armed support to his claims. He was willing enough to receive doles and blessings from the Pope, or from any one else who would send them to him; but, after all, he knew that armies and fleets, if he needed them, could only come from Spain, and to Spain he looked with a yearning gaze over the heads of Scottish Italianate priests and Guisans. Colville himself to some extent saw

<sup>1</sup> Colville wrote to Essex on the 31st May a long letter relative to the intrigues then being conducted by James's ambassador in Paris, the aged Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow. The King of France, he said, was sending kind letters to James, with others from the Constable, the Duke of Mayenne, the Duke of Guise, and many other high personages. "The chief practices for the King of Scots will come from hence (*i.e.* France) by means of the Bishop of Glasgow and the House of Guise, the French King being disposed to do no more for England than shall be for his own weal" (Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.).

the difficulty of reconciling the interests of James and Philip in England, and wrote to Essex in April 1598 (Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.): "For the opinion holden that friendship is incompatible betwixt him and Spain, shooting both at one mark, there be three arguments which shall—if they have not done so already—blind him in that point. First, the revenge of his mother's death. Second, the assurance that they whom he most trusts, both at home and abroad, shall give him, that Spain means not to punish him. And last, how you (*i.e.* England) shall be invaded, which is intended to be by the King of Spain's money, but with few of his men, the body of the army to be Scotsmen and other nations lifted . . . by the House of Guise, unto whom he sends a man called Ker every half year. And so the army being at his commandment, he need not fear that Spain can punish him. To prove that he wishes you to be invaded in this sort only, peruse the latter end of the project, written in his own hand, which Mr. Geddie did present."<sup>1</sup>

There is no doubt that James would dearly have loved to obtain Spanish aid on such easy terms, and on every opportunity he endeavoured to do so. But we see now that there never was the remotest possibility of Philip finding either money or men for the purpose of establishing James on the throne of England. The policy of Spain was fully as selfish as that of James, and was conducted by diplomatists

<sup>1</sup> It was also laid down in the instructions of Pury Ogilvie which I have quoted. The stipulations with regard to the composition of the army of invasion were always treated by Philip and his Ministers with ridicule and scorn.



for whom the King of Scots, with all his cunning, was no match. Though intense indignation<sup>1</sup> and some alarm were caused in England, therefore, by this active trafficking between James and the Catholic parties, the matter was in truth not nearly so dangerous as it looked.

As a counterbalance to it, the Protestant party in Scotland, who were deeply concerned at this backsliding on the part of their King, made a curious proposal to Elizabeth. Early in the spring (1598) two Scottish gentlemen on the Border (Carlton and Graeme) suggested to an English official named John Udall, that a great Scottish personage (who appears to have been the Earl of Argyll) was willing and able to "do a great service" in Ireland. This "service" was nothing less than the capture and delivery to Elizabeth of Tyrone: the person who was to undertake the task at Argyll's bidding being Sir John MacLean.<sup>2</sup> For some weeks active negotiations

<sup>1</sup> Essex and his party were naturally the most disturbed at James's dallying with the Catholics, especially with the Spanish faction, as he, James, was the principal instrument upon which they (the English Puritans or Liberals) counted to defeat the Moderates and Catholics, who were intriguing for a Spanish alliance with Arabella Stuart as Queen. Essex's secretary, Cuffe, in his declaration on his master's impeachment, declared that the main object of the Earl's correspondence with James, was to "staye him from irreligious courses, in declining from his religion, which of late hath been somewhat feared; and next, that he might hinder the designs of the Infanta, whose pretensions to the succession hee did utterly mislike" (Cuffe's answers to the Council, Hatfield MSS. uncalendared, vol. lxxxiii.).

<sup>2</sup> Early in August Sir John MacLean and all his kin were surprised in the island of Islay, where he was conferring with the son of Angus, and murdered. "James MacSorley (James Oge M'Sorley-boy M'Donnell) had directet out of Ireland privelye the nownber of foure hundredcht Ireland men, wha wer principall executeris of this conspiracie" (The Laird of Glenorchy to Colville, Bannatyne Club, Colville Letters).

to this end proceeded in Scotland; but as Argyll, when he came to the English court in May, avoided the subject, the Queen and Essex distrusted the good faith of the proposers, and the negotiation came to nothing.

Whilst the Catholics of the Scottish faction were endeavouring to bring their King to an open acceptance of their faith, and James, though smiling upon them, was looking rather towards Spain and Tyrone for effective help, the uncompromising Jesuit-Spanish party were still ceaseless in their efforts to forward their own objects. The appointment of the Jesuit nominee, Father Blackwell, as Archpriest of England,<sup>1</sup> and the high-handed action of Father Persons in Rome with regard to the wishes and demands of the English Catholic clergy, had finally driven the great majority of the secular priests and Catholic laymen into open denunciation of the Jesuits and all their works. In Wisbech the two sections of prisoners kept apart, reviling each other heartily. The scandal was so great that the Puritan party naturally turned it to their own advantage, and demanded the closer imprisonment of the Jesuit sympathisers, whom their very co-religionists and fellow-prisoners denounced as accomplices in treason. Father Weston and several others of the Jesuit party were consequently moved from the loose restraints of Wisbech to the strict seclusion of

<sup>1</sup> One of the secular priests thus wrote of the appointment: "All Catholics must hereafter depend upon Blackwell, and he upon Garnet (the Superior of the Jesuits), and Garnet upon Parsons, and Parsons upon the Devil, who is the author of all rebellions, treasons, murders, disobedience, and all such designments as this wicked Jesuit hath hitherto designed against her Majesty, her safety, crown, and life."

the Tower, whilst the leading priests of the loyal faction, especially Dr. Bagshaw, opened up friendly communications with the Queen's Council, with the object of defeating the machinations of their enemies.<sup>1</sup> The natural result of this was a recrudescence of the religious agitation and of the accusations and counter-accusations against Catholics of complicity in real or supposed plots for the murder of the Queen, and for other treasonable ends.

As was the case in 1593, most of these accusations were the exaggerations of over-eager spies, or the deliberate inventions of scoundrels who sought gain or consideration for themselves by the denunciation of others; this latter motive being much stronger now than before, owing to the increasing hatred between the two sections of Catholics. A large number of English prisoners and others were released or allowed to escape from Spain on the accession of the new King (September 1598), and they were mostly eager to gain solid reward as well as pardon for themselves by telling sensational

<sup>1</sup> Their great fear apparently was that the letters which they expected to come from Rome, as a result of their appeal against the appointment of the Archpriest, would command them to obey Weston, who would swear them all to be true to the Infanta of Spain, as Persons had caused the priests in Spain to be sworn; which rather than do, said one of them (Bluet), he would starve to death in the castle of Wisbech (Manuscripts in Inner Temple, Hist. MSS. Com., Report ii. part 7). Father Watson some months afterwards (early in 1599) wrote a refutation of Persons' book on the succession, which was read by the Queen, Essex, and Cecil. The latter (according to Watson) only took exception to the word "toleration," which was expunged. He (Cecil) said that her Majesty would not grant it. Essex, on the other hand, apparently anxious to conciliate even the Catholics who were opposed to Spain, said "that he could wish with all his heart that we might have liberty of conscience" (Law's "Jesuits and Seculars").

stories of what they had seen and heard abroad.<sup>1</sup> Plymouth was "sold" by Gorges, they said, as well as Falmouth by Killigrew. Pickford, the master-gunner at Lisbon, had undertaken to kidnap "Sir William Beville out of his house." Lists of the Englishmen in receipt of pensions in Spain were given *ad nauseam*, with embellishments as to the character and designs of the recipients. Most of this was the loose talk of uneducated men<sup>2</sup> desiring to add to their own value, but it was given an importance out of due proportion in order to strengthen the Essex party, who were now deter-

<sup>1</sup> Many of them had served as pilots, gunners, &c., on the Spanish ships, and had with apparent eagerness sought the favour of Spaniards. For this they had been denounced by others to the English Government, and now sought to make their peace by extravagant professions of loyalty, and of their intention from the first to betray their Spanish paymasters. They were very anxious too to give particulars of their countrymen in Spain, and the names and descriptions of a large number of them are given in the Spanish State Papers of the period, and in the Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.

<sup>2</sup> Patrick Strange of Waterford, an Irish shipmaster, who was in Spain, reported in October 1598 that the new King Philip III. had acceded to the request of Tyrone and O'Donnell to send them men, munitions, and money. Six thousand men were to land in Limerick and 6000 in the Isle of Wight whilst the English fleet was elsewhere. A great navy was to be raised by Spain finally to conquer England, and the King had sent "wise men" to the courts of France, Germany, Italy, and Rome to seek aid for a general Catholic crusade. Great preparations, he said, were already afoot for Ireland, under the command of the Adelantado. "Every gentleman expects to be a Don and every parson a bishop" (State Papers, Domestic, February 3, 1599). Most of this was merely the loose talk of the seaports, and the ignorance of the informer is seen by his reference to the aid to be demanded by Spain from the other Powers. He also makes the aged Bishop of Clonfert Philip's principal adviser in Irish affairs, which he certainly was not. Hugh Boy O'Davit first carried the news of Tyrone's victory to Spain, and it was he who, during the winter and spring of 1598-99, was urging Philip to send the 6000 men to Limerick (Irish State Papers of the date).

mined, if possible, finally to defeat Cecil. The young Earl himself was alternately flouting at Court and sulking at Wanstead House. He coveted the late Lord Burghley's offices, he wanted to ruin Cecil, he wanted his enormous debts paid, he wanted, in fact, to have his own vain, wrong-headed way in all things, and this the aged Queen, in spite of her affection for him, was determined he should not have at any cost.

At a time when Essex was in deep disgrace, the circumstances of which will be related farther on, an Englishman, named John Stanley, arrived in London from Spain (September 1598). He at first addressed himself to Essex, but being unable to obtain audience of the Earl, he went to Raleigh, and told him an extraordinary story, to the effect that when he was in prison in Seville he had met there one Francis Sparry, a sailor, whom Raleigh had left on the Orinoco, when he had gone on his voyage of discovery thither. This Sparry, he said, had discovered some valuable gold mines unknown to the Spaniards, and had given Stanley a map, which would enable Raleigh to find them. Stanley, moreover, said that he had escaped from Spain, and bore two letters from Fitzherbert, the King of Spain's English secretary, and Father Richard Walpole,<sup>1</sup> the Rector of the English College at Seville. He desired a private audience of the Queen, to whom he professed to have some important secret to impart. Raleigh, who, no doubt, was constantly being pes-

<sup>1</sup> He was a brother of the Jesuit Father Henry Walpole, whose execution is mentioned in a former chapter. See Dr. Jessop's "One Generation of a Norfolk House."

tered by such approaches, referred the man to Secretary Cecil, to whom he gave two letters he had received from Walpole and Fitzherbert, and he made a long statement about his communications with the King of Spain's Ministers and Father Walpole, with regard to the betrayal of Flushing or Ostend to the Spaniards.

In the meanwhile the spies and some of the Englishmen from Spain had some curious stories to tell about Stanley. He had come out of Spain with a false passport; there were many circumstances of suspicion about him, and he and a companion who had come from Spain with him, one Munday, were haled to the Tower. There they were examined by Sir John Peyton, Sir W. Waad, and Francis Bacon. They had agreed together in the Spanish prison, they said, to pretend to Father Walpole that they would turn Catholics, and do some service to the King of Spain, in order to get their liberty. When he asked them what service they could do, they suggested the betrayal of one of the Flemish fortresses; and were carried to Madrid to see Idiaquez, who sent them on their mission, and gave them money for their journey. Father Creswell, they said, had blessed and commended them; the sacrament had been partaken of by them in company of Captain Elliot and Fitzherbert himself, the celebrant being an Irish bishop.<sup>1</sup>

A little pressure, however, and perhaps a taste of the rack, brought out something more important.

<sup>1</sup> The only two Irish bishops in Spain at the time were Cornelius O'Neil, Bishop of Killaloe, and the Bishop of Clonfert, who lived at Burgos.

Stanley told an utterly ridiculous story, which bears indications of its falsity on every line of it. On the 5th of August previously he had, he said, been carried before the King of Spain himself, and after being sworn to secrecy, he was instructed by Philip to go to one Munday, who was then in Spain, and to receive from him a certain perfume, which he was to scatter in the way of the Queen of England, who would then be "cut off from life." Stanley declared the King's instructions were that he was to approach the English Government with some feigned proposals for peace, and was to inform the King by letter of the reception his approaches met with, especially from the Earl of Essex; and the King also enjoined him to aid his colleague, Munday, to "burn her Majesty's navy." He was, moreover, to go to Sir Thomas Arundell and other Catholic gentlemen, if he needed aid. "After I had been sworn, the King said my gain would not only be much money, but that he and his son would be my friends. Creswell said to the King that they had often been deceived by taking the bare oath on the Sacraments, and, therefore, they had sworn me by the Lord, and as I hoped to be saved." There was much more talk of the same sort implicating Philip II., Walpole, Fitzherbert, and Creswell; although Stanley, of course, professed that he had undertaken the murderous task only for the purpose of betraying it. What was more important than all else was that both the prisoners declared that Walpole and Creswell had at different times angrily denounced two men then in England, named Squire and Rolls, who they said had received a large sum of money in

Spain to kill the Queen and Essex, but had betrayed their trust and had done nothing.

Apart from the gross improbability of Philip at any time receiving such men for such a purpose as Stanley professed, the King on the day mentioned (5/15th August 1598) was lying at the Escorial hopelessly ill and quite unable to see any one on business. When on the following day the Nuncio came to give him the Pope's last blessing, he found that Philip had practically finished with the world. Thenceforward, until he died (13th September), prayers, masses, and an agony of devotion occupied his every thought; and it is quite incredible that he would have sent a man on a journey of murder from his death-bed at such a time.<sup>1</sup> The two letters from Fitzherbert and Walpole, Stanley subsequently confessed were forgeries;<sup>2</sup> and the whole story, when looked at in the light of our present knowledge, will not stand a moment's investigation.

But loose as the denunciations were, they came in the nick of time for the party of Essex, to which Bacon and Waad belonged; for Squire and Rolls were at once laid by the heels in the Tower, and by

<sup>1</sup> The following extract is from the present writer's "Philip II.": "On the 16th August the Nuncio brought him the Papal blessing and plenary absolution. Philip by this time was incapable of moving, a mere mass of vermin and repulsive wounds." From the beginning of July until his death he was quite disabled. "The pain of his malady was so intense that he could not even endure a cloth to touch the parts, and he lay slowly rotting to death for fifty-three dreadful days without a change of garment or the proper cleansing of his sores." This is the textual account given by an eye-witness of the King's last days, and of itself is a sufficient refutation of Stanley's absurd story of his long interview with Philip on the 5/15th August 1598.

<sup>2</sup> State Papers, Domestic. Examinations of John Stanley, October 1598.



means of the rack, upon which Squire suffered for five hours at a stretch,<sup>1</sup> a story was torn out, which, if true, surpasses all the rest in unavailing villainy, and, what was more important still, coupled the name of Essex with that of the Queen as the intended victims of a Jesuit plot. Squire, it appears, had been captured from Drake's fleet, and was imprisoned in Seville. On the rack he told his story thus: "Walpole persuaded me to be employed against her Majesty's person. He asked me whether I could compound poisons? I said no, but that I had skill in perfumes, and had read of a ball the smoke whereof would make a man in a trance, and some die." Walpole thought this a difficult way, and told Squire that he would give him better directions later. Squire then went on to say that Walpole gave him written instructions to buy certain poisons in England, which writings he professed to have destroyed. Opium and other drugs were to be macerated and steeped in white mercury water, put into an earthen pot and stood in the sun for a month. The mass had then to be put into a double bladder, one side of which was to be pricked full of holes in the upper part and carried in the palm of the hand upon a thick glove for the safety

<sup>1</sup> Lingard ("History of England"). When Squire was first arrested, and apparently prior to the racking, he wrote down at Waad's instance a long statement, "very well set down for so bad a matter," says Waad, of the methods used by the Jesuits in Spain to pervert Englishmen who fall into their hands, "and to induce them to adventure their lives to cut short tyrants." Whilst he detailed the persuasions of Walpole for him to commit the crime, he brought forward many assertions to prove that he had neither sought nor obtained any opportunity when he arrived in England of carrying out the plot. (See Hatfield Papers, vol. viii., and State Papers, Domestic, October 1598.)

of the user's hand. "And then I was to turn the holes downward, and to press it hard on the pommel of her Highness's saddle." Squire professed that Walpole had directed him to cause the five ingredients to be bought by different persons and at different places, for fear of suspicion; and, according to his own account, he procured two drachms of opium and five of mercury water at an apothecary's shop in Paternoster Row, towards the farther end, an ingredient at the Plough in Bucklersbury, and the other two in Newgate Market. "I carried them about with me six or seven days, and then compounded them in an earthen pot, which I set it in a window of my house at Greenwich. I applied a part of it to a whelp . . . and never saw it afterwards; and therefore I think it died thereof."

This was in July 1597, and Squire had then enlisted in Essex's fleet, bound for the Azores, giving to the Earl, as he says, much information with regard to Spanish preparations and plans. On the rack he confessed that during the voyage he had anointed the arms of Essex's chair with the poison; but, as may be supposed, without the least evil effect. On his return he obtained some under-post in the Queen's stables, where he managed to smear his composition on the pommel of her Majesty's saddle; but again ineffectually. Urged by the great persuader, the poor wretch became quite communicative about the share of Walpole and others in the proposed crime. The Jesuit, he said, had urged upon him how easy and safe the plan was of execution. "It was a meritorious act, he said, to stab the Earl of Essex; but this against the

Queen is all in all, for there shall need but little else than to do that well, which I charge you to perform above all other things.”<sup>1</sup>

At a somewhat later period, when Squire was in the confessional, Walpole had taxed him with an intention not to commit the crime. “I protested to him that I verily meant to do it. Then he laid before me the danger that I was in if I did not endeavour to the utmost to perform it, and that I must not now fear death. . . . If I did but once doubt of the lawfulness or the merit, it was sufficient to cast me down headlong to hell; and then, taking me by the arm, he lifted me up, and took me about the neck with his left arm, and made a cross upon my head, saying, ‘God bless thee, and give thee strength, my son; and be of good courage. I will pawn my soul for thine, and thou shalt ever have my prayers, both dead and alive, and full pardon for all thy sins.’ He also used a speech over my head, which I could not understand, save the first word, Dominus.” But the most astounding, and, it must be admitted, the most suggestive part of the whole confession, was that Squire declared that Walpole handed him a letter addressed to Dr. Bagshaw at Wisbech Castle—which letter Squire

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Lingard greatly ridicules the conduct of the Crown counsel at the trial. It was, however, no worse than usual in such cases, which were nearly always prejudiced, and were marked by the grossest brow-beating and injustice towards the accused. Coke, on this occasion, made a theatrical display of being overcome by his feelings of horror, and closed his speech abruptly, as if unable to proceed. His junior then dwelt upon the extra danger to which the Queen had been exposed by reason of the attempt having been made in hot weather, “the veins being then open to receive any malign tainture.” Although it must have been patent to many, no word was said of the absurdly inept and inadequate nature of the attempt itself.

said that he had destroyed with the poison formula ; and, in answer to some doubt expressed by Squire as to his ability to carry through such a mission, Walpole is represented to have said : "Tush ! let Dr. Bagshaw but see your intent and be assured of your resolution, and all your wants will be supplied."<sup>1</sup>

When Squire was placed on his trial (November 9, 1598) public feeling was at fever heat, and the Attorney-General Coke and his colleagues made the most of the opportunity. Squire passionately protested that the untrue avowal of his guilt had been torn from him by the torture ; and that, whilst he admitted having promised Walpole to attempt the crime, he had never intended to effect it, nor had he done so. Cecil told him that his confession was enough to hang him, and in due course he suffered at Tyburn (November 13), protesting with his last breath that what he had confessed under torture was untrue.

The consideration that arises in the case, apart from the complete absurdity of Stanley's second confession about Philip's personal directions to him with regard to the poisoned perfume, &c., which may be dismissed as untrue, is, that while Squire appears to have been sent on a fool's errand by Walpole so far as the actual commission of the crime was concerned, the reference and letter to Dr. Bagshaw, which would hardly have been invented by Squire on the rack, point to a desire on the part of the

<sup>1</sup> The declarations of Stanley, Munday, Squire, and Rolls will be found in the State Papers, Domestic, for September, October, and November 1598, and abstracted in the Calendar for that period. Several other papers connected with the case are calendared in the Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.

Jesuits to strike a fatal blow at the leader of their opponents. Dr. Bagshaw, as we have seen, was then, and for years afterwards, the champion of the "loyal" clergy, and was precisely the least likely man to connive at the murder of the Queen by a Spanish agent. On the face of it, therefore, it certainly looks probable that Walpole did prompt Squire to undertake some utterly impossible and harmless attempt at murder, simply that he might on discovery or confession discredit and ruin Bagshaw.<sup>1</sup> When it was found by Walpole that after Squire had been in England for a year and a half, Weston and the other Wisbech Jesuits were incarcerated in the Tower, whilst Bagshaw and his friends were more leniently treated than before, Walpole probably came to the conclusion that Squire had betrayed him whilst saving Bagshaw. Hence his bursts of indignation to Stanley and Munday about the falsity of Squire, and hence also Stanley's voyage to England for the purpose of divulging Squire's plot, so that the rack might drag from the latter a mention of Bagshaw's name. If we accept this as a possible explanation of an extremely obscure affair, it follows that the real object of the Jesuits on this occasion was not primarily the murder of the Queen, for it must have been obvious to a man of learning and culture like Walpole that such a means as that

<sup>1</sup> John Chamberlain, in his gossiping account written to Carleton, says Squire died very penitent. Chamberlain, doubtless voicing the general opinion of the time, attributes the coming of Stanley and Munday to Walpole's belief that Squire had betrayed him, and to the desire of the Jesuit to be revenged upon his false instrument. It will be seen in the text that I suggest what seems to me a more adequate reason for Walpole's action.

employed by Squire was not likely to be effectual, but rather the connecting of the "loyal priests" with an attempt at assassination. Stanley's and Munday's voyage was probably prompted by Walpole mainly with this object, as the denunciation and arrest of Squire, which was the real purpose, would necessarily force from him some declaration concerning the letter and message from Walpole to Bagshaw. That all the accused men talked wildly and falsely on the rack is almost certain and natural, but the Bagshaw incident is one that would hardly have been invented by them, and he was certainly not suspected by the examiners; so that the germ of truth in all the confessions seems to be that Walpole was willing to blacken himself personally with the reproach of having incited men to regicide for the purpose of securing the infamy of the "loyal" Catholics opposed to the Jesuits.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As in the case of the Lopez plot, the Essex influence in the Government caused an account of Squire's so-called attempts on the lives of the Queen and Essex to be published broadcast, presenting the heinousness of the Jesuit incitement to murder in the blackest possible light. Father Walpole wrote a spirited refutation of this account, in which he said that Squire was a prisoner of war, and had been incarcerated in a Carmelite convent (probably by the Inquisition for heresy), and had sent to Walpole to profess a desire for conversion. Walpole declares that he distrusted him, and refused to ask for his release. He denies strenuously that he ever had any conversation with him about the Queen's assassination, and declined to give him a letter for any Catholic in England. Squire had then escaped, and had gone to England. The confession of Squire, before torture was applied, that Walpole had incited him to commit the murder and had provided the means, seems, however, damning as against the Jesuit. Unlike others in similar case, he had not come with sensational "confessions" for the purpose of gaining money and credit. He had been eighteen months in England, and had not said a word until Stanley's and Munday's denunciation of him caused his arrest. (See Waad to Cecil and Essex, Hatfield Papers, vol. viii, p. 382.)

The effect of Squire's revelation, that Walpole had given him a recommendation to Bagshaw to aid in the plot, caused the immediate despatch of orders to the local justices to send Bagshaw from Wisbech to London for examination. How bitter the feeling was between Jesuits and Seculars was seen even in this hour of trial. One of the former confined in the Tower, named Ralph Ithel (or Udal), told Waad, when he knew of the suspicion against Bagshaw, that in his room at Wisbech there was a hiding-place in a certain part of the wall "where he bestows his letters and books that are seditious which he disperses abroad. He further tells me (Waad) of a priest there called Blewit, who is of counsel with Bagshaw in all his doings, in whose chamber are like private conveyances."<sup>1</sup> The Council, however, seem to have been persuaded of the innocence of Bagshaw, although he remained in the Gatehouse Prison, Westminster, until February 1599. There is ample reason to believe that during the period he was there he gave to Cecil the fullest information with regard to the case of the loyal clergy against the Jesuits, and doubtless laid the foundation for the general understanding which was afterwards effected between the Government and the appellants against the Archpriest's authority.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Waad to Essex and Cecil, Hatfield Papers, vol. viii. Ithel was a personal enemy of Bluet. Persons in his "Apologie" says that Bluet in his conversation at this time with the keeper of Wisbech Castle, had asked the latter, when he wrote to Waad, to warn him against Ithel, who he said was still in correspondence with Gerard, who had escaped from the Tower. Persons, who blackens Bluet's character as a drunkard and a brawler, relates that he came to fisticuffs with Ithel and another priest at Wisbech.

<sup>2</sup> An interesting letter written to him from Yorkshire by his friend Father Mush shortly after this (May 1599) proves the fear that Bagshaw's

This persistent talk of renewed Jesuit murder plots in the autumn of 1598 was rendered the more alarming by the reports of the English spies already referred to with regard to the aggressive intentions of Spain. The Mayor of Boulogne continued to write frequently to the Earl of Essex, giving him details of the warlike plans of the Cardinal Archduke Albert.<sup>1</sup> John Colville was still equally industrious in assuring him that the Bishop of Glasgow in Paris was "marvellously busie with the Cardinal" to persuade him not to do anything against James's claims to the English crown. Huntly and Lennox were now in high favour in Scotland, and Catholic agents were speeding backwards and forwards daily between Scotland and France. "The Cardinal" (reported Colville on the 4th September) "doth expect some more forces from Spain, and it is yet unconcluded whether they invade England by entering in Scotland or the Low

negotiations with the Council aroused. "Jesu! what vile rumours and skanders are cast all over touching you. . . . For God's sake be wary of your tongue, that no advantages be taken of you; and be sure of them you impart your mind unto. It is said you are notably circumvented by one you trust; one of our own cloth, who deals very cunningly with you. . . . Since your departure Waad hath had all the priests in prisons before him, his chiefest questions and threats were about this Arch(priest) and accepting of him. A plot, as he saith of Fa. Parsous to make all priests co-operate for bringing in the Infanta for to be our Quene. . . . Wonder they make no proclamation against it; but I muse they ar so senseless as not to thinke upon some tolleration, with conditions w<sup>ch</sup> might free vs from this jelosye" (Petyt MSS. xlvii., printed in full in Law's "Jesuits and Seculars").

<sup>1</sup> See these letters in Hatfield Papers, vol. viii. Even Charles Paget, in a letter written (November 30) to Cecil's agent, Barnes, about the secret negotiations—probably relating to Arabella Stuart—then afoot, said that the King of Spain had prepared a force of 8000 men to send to Ireland, and had seized all Hollander ships in Spanish ports for a similar purpose (State Papers, Domestic).



Countries." An English pilot captured in a Spanish ship confessed that "a kinsman of the Earl of Tyrone had been with the King of Spain, from whom he had obtained six galleons, certain Flemish ships, and pataches, wherein shall be transported 3000 old soldiers from the garrisons of Calais, Blavet, and others, whereof was gathered at the Groyne (Corunna) before this examinant's coming from thence eight companies, and the ships were graven and rigged."<sup>1</sup> A French agent of the Earl of Essex assured him that the Archbishop of Glasgow was his enemy, and was in daily confabulation with Cardinal Lorraine and other princes of the House of Guise. France and Spain, he said, were endeavouring to form a league against England; and John Colville capped this intelligence with the news that James had sent the Laird of Spynnies and other Catholic agents to Paris and Brussels in order to associate Scotland with the Catholic Powers, and facilitate an invasion of England.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Deposition of W. Wylles (Hatfield Papers, vol. viii., September 10, 1598).

<sup>2</sup> No one in England seems to have understood that these influences were mutually destructive, and that all approaches of James to Spain stultified his own objects by alienating his French, Italian, and Papal friends, whilst Spain was bound to oppose to the utmost all attempts to raise him to the English throne under French auspices, or as the result of a compromise which gave to England and Scotland religious toleration like that already granted in Germany and France, and thus leave Spain entirely isolated in her unbending bigotry. It was here that the interests of Flanders under the Archduke separated from those of Spain; and the best hope of reconciliation, as the Cecils saw, was to induce the Archduke to revert to the ancient policy of the Burgundians, by throwing over Spain altogether, and depending upon England and Germany. The difficulty which prevented this was the ultramontanism of the Infanta, and the uncompromising attitude of Essex and the Puritan party in England.

How small a modicum of truth there was in all these, and scores of similar advices, we shall see presently; but, true or false, they gave new strength to the war party and to Essex, and rendered it increasingly difficult for Cecil and the moderates to bring about a peaceful arrangement with Spain which might enable the whole of the Queen's resources to be cast against the most threatening danger of all, namely, that of Tyrone in Ireland. The Archduke himself had really no wish to burden his and the Infanta's new sovereignty with his father-in-law's old quarrels. Flanders, separated now from the Spanish crown, had no cause of quarrel against England; and it was distinctly against the interests of the latter to avoid driving Flanders, by persistent enmity, into friendship with France. We have seen that already the Cecils had opened communications with the Archduke through Charles Paget; but the agents of Essex at home and abroad threw every obstacle in the way of an understanding,<sup>1</sup> and, thanks to them on the one hand and the Jesuits on the other, the efforts at reconciliation failed. It is interesting to note, however, that this arose from no unwillingness of the Cardinal Archduke, as will be seen by the letter he wrote to Philip whilst the latter was on his death-bed. "We learn from England that the Queen is desirous of peace, and that much discussion is taking place there on the question . . . but they wish the first approaches to be made on our side, in which case they would reciprocate. . . . As I am naturally

<sup>1</sup> See the reference to this point in the "Advices" of Essex's French agent in Paris at this period, in Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.

desirous of the general peace . . . I have considered whether it would not be advisable, after I have taken possession of the States on behalf of the Infanta, to send an envoy to the Queen of England on some complimentary mission, in the names of the Infanta and myself." He then suggests that the embassy might give a hint that the transfer of the sovereignty of Flanders had, *ipso facto*, ended the war between the dominion and England, and this might open the way to a formal peace. "I think that this could hardly fail to give satisfaction to your Majesty, as it is evident from what your Majesty has written to me on several occasions, that your Majesty's own inclinations are in favour of some peaceful arrangements."<sup>1</sup> This is highly significant, because it not only shows that the idea of dominating England by force was already well nigh abandoned by practical men, even on the Spanish side, but also that the Archduke, at all events, had no desire to promote the claims of his bride, the Infanta, to the English throne. These, it is true, were the traditional Spanish aims fostered by Philip; but Spain herself was, for all her boasting, as prostrate and corrupt now as was the body of the King who had ruined her. The Archduke was an Austro-Flemish prince, whose only hope of a peaceful and prosperous sovereignty was to free himself from the strangling toils of impossible Spanish ambitions, whilst peace with Flanders was of vital interest to English trade. But the tales of spies and fugitives, who did not understand the real

<sup>1</sup> Archduke Albert to the King, August 12, 1598, MSS. Simancas, Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

trend of affairs, the foolish panic about widespread Catholic murder plots, the vapouring of bigots and swashbucklers, and, above all, the staggering blow struck at English power in Ireland by Tyrone's victory, gave to Essex and his friends the opportunity they sought to prevent reconciliation and compromise, which were the objects of more moderate men.

Events proved that the fears of the Irish Council had not exaggerated the danger arising out of the English defeat at Armagh; and both in England and in Ireland it was soon understood that the island would have to be reconquered by the Queen's troops, no matter at what cost. "We cannot but fear far more dangerous sequels, even to the utter hazard of the kingdom, and that out of hand, if God and her Majesty prevent them not," wrote the Irish Council immediately after the disaster. "This," opined John Chamberlain, "is the greatest loss and dishonour the Queen hath had in her time. . . . The state of Ireland grows daily *di mal in peggio*, for they begin now to stir in Munster, where the White Knight, Sir James of Desmond, and one Patrick Condon, a shrewd fellow, are out. . . . Some think that Lord Mountjoy shall be sent thither as deputie; others say that the Earl of Essex means to take it upon him, and hopes by his countenance to quiet that country. Marry! he wold have it under the brode seale of England, that after a year he might return at his will."

In any case it was evident that the pettifogging churchmen and lawyers who composed the Council in Dublin, and a general like Ormonde, mainly in-

terested in preserving his own domains from damage, were unequal to the task of crushing the rapidly spreading revolt. Sir Richard Bingham, who in his time ruled Connaught with a rod of iron, at little or no cost to Elizabeth, was sent back to Ireland as Marshal: the English troops originally destined for Loch Foyle in Ulster were diverted to Dublin; for the first need was to put into safety from capture the seat of English government. If Tyrone had been allowed by the composition and resources of his army to follow up rapidly his victory at Armagh, the capital would have fallen at once, and he would have been absolute master of Ireland. But his stores were short, O'Donnell's men wanted to go home, and Tyrone was anxious about Loch Foyle.

In October a plan was discovered in the nick of time, by which the rebels were to have surprised Dublin from the inside, and have murdered the English in the city. The Irish there and elsewhere, in the parts hitherto well affected, were profoundly moved by the success of their countrymen in the north; and within two miles of Dublin the rebels reived unchecked. Even Kilkenny and Tipperary, where Ormonde's own lands lay, were spoiled and ravaged; the wavering Anglo-Irish nobles began to go over to the winning side; Sir Conyers Clifford was with infinite diplomacy striving, but with only partial success, to keep Connaught from open revolt; <sup>1</sup> whilst

<sup>1</sup> O'Rourke, who with his sub-chiefs subsequently threw in his lot again with O'Donnell, told Sir Conyers that "if all the magistrates of Ireland were of your mind, these wars of Ireland would have ended long ago." Men like Norreys, Fenton, and Clifford, who were desirous of either conciliating the Irish or else of crushing them absolutely, were always hampered by the Council and the English Government,

Munster blazed out irresistibly under James Fitz-Thomas Fitzgerald, the "Popish" Earl of Desmond. It was especially against the English settlers in the wasted Desmond country in Munster that the rebels directed their attacks, and most of these promptly fled from their holdings to the comparative safety of Cork and Dublin, leaving the revolution triumphant in the province outside the walled cities.

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that all Ireland rallied spontaneously to the Catholic rebellion. The inhabitants of the towns, and the trading classes generally, understood perfectly well that Tyrone had adopted the Catholic cause rather as a means than an end. The laws notwithstanding, there was but little interference by the English with the practice of Catholic worship; and it was felt that trade and industry, at least, would be likely to prosper—as they had done—much more under the English supremacy than under the sway of native territorial princelings. The smaller landowners also, whom the English had freed from the tyrannical extortions of the great Irish overlords, had grown immensely in wealth and importance in consequence, and were not at all enamoured of a return to their former position of vassal chiefs. Many of this class were, it is true, driven, sooner or later, to join in the rebellion, by threats and the fear of finally being caught on the losing and unpatriotic side, or else by the desire of establishing their claims to estates which the English had confirmed to others of their house; but in most cases they were eager to make

who scorned all arrangements whilst refusing to furnish the resources for coercion.

friends again with the Queen's government when the tide began to turn.<sup>1</sup>

All this, however, was but imperfectly understood at the time by the English, who were ready to lump together all Irishmen as barbarians and born traitors, who could not be believed on their oath: and the problem, as it was presented to the eyes of contemporary English statesmen, was to reconquer by main force the island from the Irish, and possibly to be brought face to face with a veteran Spanish army, now liberated from France by the peace of Vervins. In these circumstances it was natural that the thoughts of Englishmen should turn to the most noted and most popular of military leaders, the official head of the Queen's land forces. Essex was, as we have seen, fractious and ill-tempered at the time, "chased," as he says, "into exile" by the Queen, "whose indignation did take hold of all things that might feed it, and that you did willinglyst hear those that did kindle it." . . . "Yet when the unhappy news came from yonder cursed country of Ireland, and I apprehended how much your Majesty would be grieved to have your armies beaten, and your kingdom like to be conquered by the son of a smith, duty was strong enough to rouse me out of my deadliest melancholy: I posted up, and first offered my attendance, and afterwards my poor advice in writing to your Majesty; but your Majesty rejected both me and my letter."<sup>2</sup> The reason for the Queen's anger was that Essex refused to speak

<sup>1</sup> Even immediately after the victory of Armagh, there were bitter complaints from Irishmen of the tyranny of Tyrone and O'Donnell.

<sup>2</sup> Essex to the Queen, August 26, 1598 (Hatfield Papers).

in the Council, or to give any opinion except to Elizabeth herself, and this was a pretext for a fresh series of heady complaints on the one side, replied to by harsh treatment on the other.

At length, at the beginning of October, the Queen, who hated to lose sight of him, made him some amends, and the Earl returned to court, "in as good terms, they say, as ever he was." But still he was disappointed. The Mastership of the Court of Wards, vacant by the death of Burghley, would have produced a large revenue to pay his vast debts; but it was refused to him, and was going to his enemy, Cecil: the Lord Treasurership had been given over his head to Buckhurst: the Queen was still tart with him, for she had sworn to humble him, and had not forgotten, nor ever would forget, the personal slight he had put upon her, like a spoiled child, on the occasion of their last squabble.<sup>1</sup> The wise Lord-Keeper Egerton had written to him on that occasion, gravely warning him that unless he

<sup>1</sup> It was on the occasion of a discussion as to the appointment of a new Viceroy of Ireland. The Queen and Cecil wished to send Sir William Knollys, the Queen's second cousin and Essex's uncle. The Earl, however, was pleased to consider that this was a trick of the Cecil party to reduce the number of his friends at Court, and tempestuously urged the appointment of Sir George Carew, a cousin of Raleigh's and an adherent of the Cecil party. When the Queen rebutted his opinion, he ostentatiously turned his back upon her, whereupon the irate sovereign boxed his ears, and told him to go and be hanged. The Earl then clapped his hand to his sword, and swore he would take such an indignity from no one—not even Henry VIII. He was restrained by the Lord Admiral, and forbidden the presence for some time afterwards. He came back, as we have related in the text, as a result of the efforts of his friends and of his own expressions of lovelorn desperation to the Queen; but he was still consumed with a hatred worse than ever for Cecil, Raleigh, Cobham, Howard, and every one else who presumed to exist by his side without being his abject slave.



obtained a victory over his own temper, he would go downhill to certain destruction; his mother, the Countess of Leicester, tearfully prayed her "sweet Robin" to humble himself before his sovereign—a woman.

But though the Earl had been wheedled back to court by his friends, he was still unhumbled, and at the meetings of the Council to discuss the affairs of Ireland he would only flout and sneer at what was proposed by others. Every viceroy, he said, had failed because he had not struck swiftly and boldly at the heart of the trouble; but had compounded and paltered with traitors. Nothing and nobody pleased or satisfied him. When his friend Lord Montjoy was proposed as viceroy, he cavilled at his capability and scoffed at his comparative poverty. Finally, at a suggestion that he might undertake the task himself, Essex was almost forced, by his attitude towards all other suggestions, to acquiesce. No sooner had he done so than he began to make demands and conditions. He must have fuller powers than ever had been granted to a viceroy before; he must have an army much larger than had previously been authorised; and, above all, he must have warrant under the great seal to return, if he pleased, in a year. When Cecil was absent in France in the summer of 1598, Bacon had written to Essex urging the latter to take charge of Irish affairs; but now that the Earl had committed himself to the grave responsibility, his friends—and amongst them Bacon, by his own showing<sup>1</sup>—saw the trap into which his fractiousness

<sup>1</sup> The letter from Bacon, urging him to take Irish affairs in hand, is printed in "Cabala." The assertion that he did not persuade him is

had led him and begged him to refuse the command. Egerton also wrote to the Earl pointing out the risk of failure, the danger of his absence from court, and the ungrateful nature of the service he had undertaken. Essex would fain have withdrawn, but now he dared not; and already there was seething in his mind that plan of his, by which he dreamed of imposing his authority over all others by means of the forces of the Queen under his command.<sup>1</sup> The project was a mad and a wicked one, but Essex was crazy with vanity and ambition.

All through the winter the fresh demands of Essex, conditional upon his acceptance of the command, caused the question of his appointment to waver. He was, wrote Chamberlain (November 22), to go in "February or March with as ample a commission as ever any had; the conditions whereof it were lost labour to set down, because they vary and alter every week; and withal, his going is not resolved so fully but that once in ten days it is in question." And again, on the 8th December the same letter-writer says: "The rebels grow daily both in heart and strength; and what is worse, the great ones of that country, and those that have always been thought soundest, use the matter so

made by Bacon in his disingenuous attempt, long afterwards, to justify his vile treatment of his patron when he had fallen (Bacon to the Earl of Devonshire).

<sup>1</sup> Bacon in his apology for his conduct to Essex, written to the Earl of Devonshire, says that Essex believed that the Queen could only be successfully managed by compulsion; and it is probable that the principal object of his desire to go to Ireland was to have under him an army large enough to overcome all resistance to him. We shall see later how he proposed to employ the forces entrusted to him by his sovereign.

that they be not out of suspicion ; for neither do they any service themselves nor assist those who would do it. . . . The Earl of Essex's journey thither is neither fast nor loose, but holds still in suspense, by reason the proportions thought fit for such an enterprise are daily clipt and diminished ; for it was first set down that his number (with those already there) should be 14,000, with full allowance of victual-money, &c. ; but whether they think the matter may be compassed with less charge, or that we be not able to beare such a burthen,<sup>1</sup> these rates are brought lower ; wherewith he is nothing pleased : and on these terms it stands."

During all this bickering and uncertainty Essex was besieged with applications for commissions and offers of service in his ranks. His lavish scattering of knighthoods and loot at Cadiz, and his personal splendour, now at his height, had made him the most popular man in England, both with the younger gentry, who swore by him as their leader, and amongst the London crowd, whose heart he had gained by his anti-Catholic politics and his solicitude for the welfare of his soldiers in war. Shortly before Christmas the idea of his going to Ireland was entirely abandoned for a time, on some question of the Queen's forgiving a great debt nominally owing to her by him. "But whether it were that

<sup>1</sup> The Queen was extremely short of money at the time, and only on very onerous terms could she obtain a loan of £150,000 from the London bankers. So hard pressed was she that it was feared she would have recourse to her father's bad old plan of a benevolence, and she was "faine to descend to mean men, and pick up here and there as she can get it. You must think they were neere driven when they found out me as a fit man to lend money" (John Chamberlain, *State Papers, Domestic*).

matter or some other, all is turned upside down, and he (Essex) and Mr. Secretary (Cecil) have so good a leisure that they ply the tables hard in the presence chamber, and play so round a game as if Ireland were to be recovered at *Irish*" (*i.e.* backgammon). At length the Queen gave way, pardoned him £32,000 of debt, and danced a gaillard with him on Twelfth-day, "very richly and freshly attired," though even on so festive an occasion as this, the Earl must needs come to open quarrel, and almost combat, with the aged Lord-Admiral Howard.<sup>1</sup> All the young nobles flocked round their leader again. Derby, Rutland, Southampton, Windsor, Grey, Audley, Cromwell, and knights by the score, competed for his smile; whereupon the Queen grew jealous, and forbade many of them to accompany him. "Some suspect it is his owne doing, because he is not able to give them all satisfaction, but I am not of that opinion," says John Chamberlain, who was probably right.

At length, in March, the matter was finally settled, though not before all the court was set by the ears

<sup>1</sup> A Spanish spy in England writes thus on January 24, 1599: "The preparations for Ireland are being pushed forward, but the Earl of Essex will not be ready to sail until the middle of March. He is meeting with many impediments . . . and his rivals particularly wish him to sail without his stores, which they promise to send after him. But he insists upon taking at least six months' provisions with him. He asserts that he learns from men recently in Spain that the King is making great preparations to aid the Irish rebels, and he (Essex) demands more stores. But the Lord-Admiral greatly opposes this, saying that it is not true, and this year the King of Spain is not making, and cannot make, any preparations against Ireland. They are much at issue about this, and had even arranged to fight a duel but the Queen would not allow it (MSS. Simancas, Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

by Essex's fretful humours and his universal jealousy. He wished to go and he wished to stay. He hated his opponents for their eagerness to aid him in his journey and so get rid of him, and he was equally angry with those who sought to stay him. He wished for the armed power to coerce the Queen, and yet he dreaded to leave her surrounded by those who bore him no love. But he had gone too far now to back out, and on the 13th April 1599 he landed in Dublin, the most splendred viceroy that Ireland had ever seen, attended by the flower of the English nobility and an army of 20,000 foot and over 1300 horse.<sup>1</sup> The powers he bore were those of a sovereign, though he assumed the title of Lord-Lieutenant only. His power of pardon extended even to crimes of treason against the person of the Queen, and the highest officers in Ireland were at his mercy; even the sovereign's letters-patent might be suspended by him. He had the disposal of the rebels' lands he conquered, subject only to a chief rent to the crown. He might create barons and issue treasury warrants of his own; his writ was made to supersede in Ireland that of the English Privy Council, and the command of the fleet in the Irish seas passed from the hands of the Lord-Admiral into those of Essex.

The ill-balanced young man who wielded these great prerogatives, backed by the largest armed force that England could muster, was in a dangerous frame of mind. His heart was raging with jealous

<sup>1</sup> Chamberlain wrote: "They talke likewise of carrienge over two or three hundred mastives to werry (*i.e.* worry) the Irish, or rather (as I take it) their cattell."

pride, and the knowledge that the simpering hunchback he hated had outwitted him at every point; that the semi-Papist Howards were at court, and that the clever middle-aged upstart Raleigh was posing in his glittering silver cuirass at the Queen's side, whilst he, young, high-born, and a greater favourite than Raleigh ever had been, was consigned by his own ill-temper to a hard inglorious struggle against half-savage rebels, in a hateful land that had engulfed his father's life and fortune.<sup>1</sup> Above all, in his absence and that of his friends, the ground would be clear for Cecil and his party to complete those arrangements which he knew to be in progress for commencing a new reign when the old Queen should die, under auspices which would finally consign the magnificent Essex to obscurity or worse.

In these circumstances it was inevitable that Essex should think more of his own future than of the special service that he had undertaken; and almost

<sup>1</sup> Instance his famous and oft-quoted letter to the Queen at this time, beginning, "From a mind delighting in sorrow, from spirits wasted with passion, from a heart torn to pieces with care, grief, and travail, from a man that hateth himself and all things else that keep him alive, what service can your Majesty expect, since any service past deserves no more than banishment and proscription to the cursedest of all islands?" (Birch). From Markham's letter to Harrington, printed by the latter in his *Nugæ Antiquæ*, it is evident that the court was fully alive to the danger of Essex's position, and to the distrust the Queen still felt of him. "Observe the man who commandeth and yet is commanded himself; he goeth not forth to serve the Queen's realm but to humour his own revenge. . . . If he performs in the field what he hath promised in the Council, all will be well; but though the Queen hath granted forgiveness for his late demeanour in her presence, we know not what to think. . . . I sore fear what may happen. . . . You have difficult matters to encounter besides Tyrone and the rebels."

the first exercise of his prerogative on Irish soil was to violate the Queen's express command. The foolish, flighty young Earl of Southampton had, with Essex's connivance, contracted a secret marriage with Miss Vernon, the cousin of the latter. Southampton had retired to France for a time, in order to escape the anger of the Queen when his marriage was discovered. In Paris he took to gambling and lost the remains of his fortune, and on his return to London was sent to prison for marrying without the Queen's permission. He was released at the continued importunity of Essex, but when the Earl proposed before his departure to appoint Southampton commander of the cavalry in Ireland, the Queen angrily forbade such an appointment in favour of a man who had offended her. Essex broke this royal behest, and placed Southampton at the head of the cavalry soon after he arrived in Ireland. It was probably meant for a deliberate trial of strength between him and the Queen, and if so, it failed miserably. He had begun before he left England to complain and doubt about the support that would be accorded to him. "If I have not inward comfort and outward demonstration of her Majesty's favour I am defeated in England," he wrote on April 5 from Cheshire. He sent back Sir Christopher Blount, his father-in-law, in a huff, because the Queen would not allow him to be sworn a member of the Irish Council. "If," he wrote complainingly, "I, going to manage a difficult war and to govern a dissolute and undisciplined army, have to consult with a council to whom her Majesty imputeth almost the loss of a kingdom, without one able assistant to

consult, I shall find a lack.”<sup>1</sup> If Blount could not be a councillor he should not come at all. He was “being maimed beforehand,” the Earl grumbled; and when he was on board his ship ready to sail, he protested to Cecil “that it is not Tyrone and the Irish rebellion that amazeth me, but to see myself sent on such an errand, at such a time, with so little comfort or ability from the court of England.” Nothing satisfied him, though to all appearance every effort to do so was made by the Council in England; and the Irish Council were effusive in their submission and flattery.

When he took command in Ireland, he found the rebels ranging at their will over the country. Carrickfergus, Newry, and Carlingford were the only towns in the north held by the Queen; a good portion of Connaught had now revolted; there were 3000 rebels in Leinster, and Munster was practically abandoned by English sympathisers, except the walled towns. Essex’s plan had always been to strike hard at Tyrone in his own country, but there were difficulties in the way of which he had known nothing. There was no forage in Ulster so early in the year; provisions for the troops must be all led or carried, for the country was in the hands of the enemy; food was still very scarce all over Ireland, and the roads were impracticable for a great part of the way. So Essex was forced to throw over his own plans and devote himself to Leinster and Munster, until the advanced summer allowed him to tackle the arch-rebel in his own fastnesses. The English settlements in Munster had been a doubtful success;

<sup>1</sup> Irish State Papers of the date.



there was bitter hatred between the English and Irish, and even between the English themselves: the most glaring corruption existed amongst English officials, and the native Irish could get neither justice nor protection except by bribery. Wherever the English came into contact with the Irish, the latter were robbed and maltreated; and the country people, oppressed by the English and by the rebel bands alike, were reduced to utter famine, "with nothing but roots, grass, and boiled nettles to eat." The people of Connaught had "already eaten their garrans, and were now living on the ground and eating dogs' flesh."<sup>1</sup>

It was in this disastrous state of affairs that Essex, still bewailing and complaining, started, on May 9, 1599, for his journey through Leinster and Munster. He had, in the period since his arrival, reduced the chaos in Dublin to something like order, but he clamoured in vain for still larger reinforcements<sup>2</sup> and increased supplies from England. To his indignation he was told that he must get volunteers from the English in Ireland. They were cowards, he said, and would not fight; even the soldiers he had brought from England with him were a poor lot, and much inferior in "hardness" to the rebels. The latter had now in the field an organised army—7000 men under Tyrone near Armagh, and another body of 4000 under O'Donnell in Connaught, besides smaller bands all over the country. There was still much talk of a Spanish force coming to their aid,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irish State Papers, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> The reinforcement of 2000 men was not due in Ireland till June 1.

<sup>3</sup> When Essex was on his march through Munster, he learnt (June 15) that two small ships of munitions and treasure had arrived from

and Essex did not for a moment beguile himself or the Queen with hopes of an easy victory.

But he found the guerilla warfare to which he was committed in an enemy's country even harder and more distasteful than he had thought. His passage through Leinster was comparatively unopposed. Rebel castles surrendered to him with but little resistance, and the bands generally scattered as he attacked them; but the constant harassing of his flanks and cutting-off of his stragglers gave him a foretaste of the task before him. "This war," he wrote, "is likely to exercise both our faculties that do manage it, and her Majesty's patience that must maintain it." His men, he complained, had "neither bodies, spirits, nor practice of arms." The enemy were light and swift—"rogues and naked beggars," he called them—who could elude the English in mountains and morasses after delivering their attack. At Cahir a force of 5000 rebels were encountered, and the castle was captured.<sup>1</sup> Then, after passing

Spain in Loch Foyle, but no men; but, as we have seen, the reports of the preparations in Spain to send a large force were constant. The Adelantado seconded the Irish demands, and the bigoted, inexperienced young king was burning to undertake the "enterprise of England." But he was absolutely bankrupt, and his new guide and favourite, the Duke of Lerma, was in favour of deferring the undertaking for that year. Lerma, of course, had his way, as will be related in the text. About the same time (June 1599) Tyrone also received several cargoes of munitions in Scottish ships, either from Scotland or from France and Flanders.

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth was very indignant at this small result of Essex's journey. The capture of Cahir Castle she ridiculed as the mere "taking of an Irish hold from a rabble of rogues" (Irish State Papers, Elizabeth to Essex, July 19, 1599). Lord Cahir was already in the hands of the English, and his castle was surrendered by the rebels at his request with hardly a show of resistance. Cecil, writing to Sir Henry Neville in France (July 14), explained the little effect produced in Munster by

through Limerick, Essex had to fight and push his way through the Desmond country, inflicting a considerable defeat upon the Catholic Desmond himself on June 11, finally arriving at Waterford on the 21st.

Whilst he was on this march he received the peremptory order from the Queen to dismiss Southampton, and he wrote in reply the letter, which has often been printed, in which he so passionately defends himself and his friend. But here Essex suffered his first fall, for he dared not refuse to obey the Queen's indignant command, and Southampton was dismissed. The temper of Essex at the time is shown by another letter from him (25th June) to the Queen herself, giving her an account of his movements and plans. As usual, it is full of complaints. "But why," he asks, "should I talk of victory or success? Is it not known that from England I receive nothing but discomforts and soul's wounds? Is it not spoken in the army that your Majesty's favour is diverted from me, and that already you do bode ill both to me and it? Is it not believed by the rebels that those whom you most favour do more hate me out of faction than them out of duty or conscience? Is it not lamented of your Majesty's faithfullest subjects, both here and there, that a Cobham or a Raleigh (I forbear others for their places' sake) should have such credit and favour with your Majesty, when they wish the ill-success of your Majesty's most important action, the decay of your greatest strength, and the destruc-

Essex by saying, "But the rouges shunne fight, and so know how to spend us and eat us out with tyme" (Winwood Papers).

tion of your faithfulest servants? Yes! yes! I do see both my own destiny and your Majesty's decree." This was both wicked and wrong-headed. There was no desire on the part of the moderate members of the Queen's Government that he should fail in Ireland, and his suggestion that the army itself was discontented was intended as a veiled threat. It is plain to see that his jealousy had warped his judgment, and that he believed all men to be leagued together for his ruin. This belief, real or pretended, hurried him on to his own destruction.

And thus he slowly returned to Dublin, raging against the Queen's angry disapproval of his march through Leinster and Munster. On his way back he had been obliged to make a detour. In his absence Sir John Harrington had endeavoured to punish and suppress the O'Byrnes and O'Tooles, who were ravaging Wicklow. The English force, depleted by dishonesty, desertion, and drafts for service elsewhere, only reached about 300 men, and Harrington found on arriving at Wicklow, that he was surrounded by hordes of rebels, far exceeding his own strength. In attempting to secure his retreat to the town of Wicklow over a ford on the Ranelagh, he was attacked in the rear. Panic seized the pikemen—"base, cowardly, ill-guided clowns," as Essex calls them—and they fled incontinently, casting away their arms, accoutrements, and even their garments, most of them being overtaken and slaughtered by the rebels. The wavering chiefs of the O'Byrnes, O'Moores, O'Connors, and Kavanaghs rallied to the victorious side,

and Essex was forced to turn aside and face the united army of the Leinster rebels at Arklow. He had now only 1200 fighting men with him, for he had left garrisons at various places on his march; and at one time during the ensuing fight it looked as if he must be overwhelmed, for his guides had misled him, and the rebels caught him in an ambush. But a charge of heavy horse saved the day, and the Leinster men were beaten. This was on the 29th June, and early in July Essex entered Dublin dispirited and distempered in mind and body.

His march through the provinces had produced no important effect upon the rebels. None of the chiefs had submitted. The little garrisons he had scattered about were all surrounded, and the armies of the northern rebels remained intact and powerful. Rebuke and stern reproof came from the Queen and her Council,<sup>1</sup> whereupon Essex again bewailed his hard fate in piteous and eloquent letters, saying that he was being stabbed in the back by enemies in London. The Council tried to appease him with dig-

<sup>1</sup> "You must needs think that we, that have the eyes of foreign princes upon our actions, and have the heart of the people to comfort and cherish, who groan under the burden of continual levies and impositions, which are occasioned by these late actions, can little please ourselves with anything that hath been effected" (Elizabeth to Essex, July 19, 1599, State Papers, Irish).

With regard to Essex's complaints of the enmity of the Queen's chief Ministers against him, the Council wrote gravely: "We can only say this, that those imputations of any indisposition towards you are so improper to us, as we will neither do your Lordship that wrong to take them as so intended, nor ourselves that injury to excuse them" (*ibid.*).

John Chamberlain writes from London (28th June): "The Queene is nothing satisfied with the Earl of Essex manner of proceeding, nor likes anything that is done. She sayes she allowes him 1000l. a day to go in progresse."

nified assurances and expressions of confidence; but they, too, were forced to point out that all had been done that was possible to send him the resources he had demanded. The Queen ridiculed the idea of his being wilfully injured by his enemies at court, and became haughtily angry at his veiled menace that many of the gentlemen in his train were so annoyed at her treatment of him in the matter of Southampton that they desired to return to England.

At length she grew tired of his childish petulance, and peremptorily ordered the Earl (July 30) to proceed against Tyrone—"that base bush-kern," as she called him—who, through bad management on the part of the English, had now "come to be accounted so famous a rebel" as to need the employment of many thousands of soldiers to suppress him. She had spent vast sums of money, she said, specially with this end, and yet "the base rebels shall see this golden calf preserve himself without taint or loss." There must be no more whimpering and dallying on the part of Essex. He was to go at once with the forces he had and engage Tyrone. "And after you shall have certified us to what form you have reduced things in the north, what hath been the success, and whom you and the Council could wish to leave with that charge behind; and that being done, you shall with all speed receive our warrant, *without which we do charge you, as you tender our pleasure, that you adventure not to come out of that kingdom by virtue of any former license whatever.*"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth to Essex, July 30, 1599, Irish State Papers. A week later she wrote again, sternly rebuking Essex for not going on his

Before he received this letter a serious blow fell upon the English. Sir Conyers Clifford, the President of Connaught, was completely defeated by O'Donnell at the Curlews, Clifford and all the principal officers being killed, and 450 men being slain or wounded in their headlong flight. Urged by this disaster and by the Queen's reproaches, Essex hastily recruited 2000 more Irish troops during the harvest-time, and informed the officers of his forces and the Anglo-Irish Lords and gentry of his intention to set out at once for the invasion of Ulster. He had not available for the field more than 3500 foot and 300 horse. His men, as he was never tired of writing, were mostly shirkers, cowards, and malingerers.<sup>1</sup> He had only two, or at most three, general officers upon whom he could depend, and his company and regimental officers were more concerned in lining their pockets by peculation and bribery than in fighting. The Connaught chiefs, even O'Connor-Sligo, and the "English" head of the Bourkes, it was feared, had fallen away in

errand at once, instead of arguing about it, and she threatened to call him to strict account unless he promptly obeyed. She would not allow her kingdoms, her honour, and the lives of her subjects to be trifled with any longer. "We see the bitter effects of our long-sufferings." She throws, however, most of the blame on the Irish Council, whom she abuses roundly for their Papist sympathies (Elizabeth to Essex, August 8, *ibid.*).

<sup>1</sup> "Her Majesty payeth many, but hath her service followed by few," he wrote at this period, "for every garrison is an hospital, where our degenerate countrymen are glad to entertain sickness, as a supersedeas for their going into the field; and every remove of an Irish company is almost the breaking of it." Again, "They disband daily: the Irish go over to the rebels by herds; and the others make strange adventures to steal over; and some force themselves sick, and lie like creatures that neither have hearts nor souls" (Essex to the Council, Irish State Papers).

consequence of Clifford's defeat, and O'Donnell was now as supreme in the west, as Tyrone was in the north; the rebel armies reaching a total of at least 16,000 men.

All these discouraging circumstances were urged by Essex's council-of-war to dissuade him from proceeding to Ulster; but the orders of the Queen were so positive that Essex dared not disobey, and on the 28th August he and his unfit little army set forth, leaving affairs in Leinster somewhat better than they had been.<sup>1</sup> It was shrewdly suspected that Tyrone would repeat his old policy of parley and delay, and Essex, in order to bring him to an engagement, and at the same time to secure the future safety of the Pale, determined to make Kells his base, advancing thence into Ulster by Cavan and Monaghan, driving back Tyrone to his own far northern strongholds. On arriving at Kells, however, it was found that Tyrone with 8000 men was in the neighbourhood, and an advance of Essex towards Cavan would have left the road open for the rebels to ravage the Pale. On the 4th September the English found themselves at Ardagh, in full sight of Tyrone's forces, which lay on a hill opposite to them, with the river Lagan running between. There was some little skirmish-

<sup>1</sup> Donnell Spainagh (Kavanagh), the Munster chief, who had been aiding the Leinstermen, submitted. The other principal Kavanaghs under Brian M'Donagh had also come in, and Onie M'Rory O'Moore had accepted a month's truce, in which some of the principal O'Byrnes had joined. The O'Connors, the O'Molloys, and the M'Geoghans were still in the field in Leinster. It must be repeated here, as giving the key of the situation, that the smaller chieftains were not at all desirous of re-establishing the territorial power of the Irish princelings of whom they were formerly vassals. They usually hastened to make good terms of "composition" for themselves on the first opportunity.



ing of stragglers and outposts, but no general fight; and as the country was bare of supplies, Essex was forced to march down the river towards Louth, whither his stores had been sent. Tyrone proceeded parallel with him on the other side of the stream until they reached the Mills of Louth, where Essex crossed and encamped within sight of Tyrone's scouts, the main body of the rebels being concealed in a wood.

The next day Tyrone sent to request a parley, which Essex refused, but told the messenger that on the following morning he would be at the head of his troops on a hill between the two camps: if Tyrone wished to speak with him, he might seek him there. True to his word, Essex drew up his array on the hill at the hour named, and on advancing to a second hill, upon which were stationed Tyrone's cavalry, the latter retired before him after a slight skirmish. Finding that Tyrone's main force did not show itself, Essex returned to his camp, the rebel Earl sending after him another message still desiring a conference. Early next morning the English set out for Drumcondra, but had hardly gone half-a-mile before Tyrone's messenger, Captain Hagan, overtook him, and said that his master desired the Queen's mercy, and begged that the Lord-Lieutenant would hear him. If the Earl would do so, he said, he (Tyrone) would gallop to a ford at Bellaclynthe, which lay in the way to Drumcondra, where he would await his coming. Essex sent two of his officers ahead to reconnoitre this ford, where they found that Tyrone had already arrived. The water, however, appeared

to them too deep, and they objected to the place as unfit for a conference. "Then," cried Tyrone, "I shall despair ever to speak with him." On examination, a shallower place was found lower down, and thither Essex was conducted, whilst a troop of English horse commanded the position from a hill overlooking it, and a similar troop of Irish crowned a hill on the opposite side.

Tyrone sat alone, with uncovered head, on his horse in the midst of the stream, the water of which reached his girths. Bowing low as the Queen's representative approached, he bade him welcome to Ireland; and there, with no person within earshot, the two Earls held fateful conference for full half-an-hour, Essex on hard ground and Tyrone with his feet in the running water. Exactly what passed at that interview is not known, but spies reported that treason to crown and state was covertly plotted.<sup>1</sup> Tyrone knew that Essex was deeply discontented with the Queen's Government, and that he had made himself the champion of James Stuart's claim to the crown, as against the Cecil plan of forwarding that of Arabella with a Flemish-Spanish alliance. At the same time letters of sympathy, and even more solid aids, were reaching Tyrone from the King of Scots; and there seems nothing improbable, seeing

<sup>1</sup> A spy who professed to be in the bushes hard by, but whose testimony is open to question, said that when Tyrone bade Essex welcome to Ireland, the latter answered, "Nay! ye are too Scottish to bid me welcome." "No, my Lord," replied the Irish chief, "there is no man liveth that may better welcome your father's son." "Can I build upon that?" asked Essex. "Yea! my lord, ye may be sure of it." This, according to the informer Udall, led up to a treasonable understanding between them. (See Bathe's and Udall's declarations in Irish State Papers, uncalendared, 208, part ii.)

the temper of Essex and his ambitions, that he may have more or less explicitly connived with Tyrone on this occasion at a plan for securing the succession of James, conjointly with the restoration of the territorial princely autonomy of Ireland, or at least of Ulster. The Spanish Archbishop of Dublin, in the following year, reported to Philip III., on the authority of Tyrone, that the latter had "almost gained the Earl of Essex, the Queen's commander, to leave her side and join your Majesty, surrendering the country to you, on the promise of great favours in your Majesty's name; and O'Neil gave him his own son as hostage. The Earl did not carry out the arrangement, because of his suspicion of your Majesty, in consequence of certain acts of his against Spain some time ago."<sup>1</sup> It may be doubted if this is quite a correct statement of what happened. Neither Essex nor Tyrone desired to "surrender the country to your Majesty," and it is much more probable that the arrangement fell through on the question of Tyrone's continued adhesion to Spain and the supremacy of Catholicism. The success of James and Tyrone under those auspices would not have served Essex's plans. Religion was a mere stalking-horse for most of the Irish chiefs; but doubtless Tyrone considered it a stronger lever to work with, now that he had once adopted it, than the aid of a self-seeking hothead like Essex of exactly opposite views.

<sup>1</sup> No doubt the sacking of Cadiz, where, however, Essex's behaviour was so humane and chivalrous as to have called forth the greatest praise and flattery from Spaniards generally, even from Philip himself; and the Infanta, who said, "If he treats his enemies thus, how would he treat his friends?"

When Essex retired from the secret interview, Tyrone's base son Con followed him and prayed, in his father's name, that a conference of a few chosen men on each side might then be held. To this the Lord-Lieutenant consented, and again he descended to the bank of the stream, this time with Southampton and five of his principal officers, to meet Tyrone and a similar number of Irish chiefs, who stood in the stream up to the bellybands of their steeds. A further meeting was held next morning, and a truce of six weeks was concluded, to be extended from six weeks to six weeks till the following May, such of the rebels as refused to join in the cessation to be left to the mercy of the English (September 8, 1599).

This was the inglorious and impotent conclusion of the vaunted government of the spoilt favourite. The forces on both sides were withdrawn, Tyrone returning into his principality of Ulster, and Essex to Drogheda. No attempt even had been made to strike at the rebels' strength; his country was unwasted, his crops and cattle safe, his harbours unassailed, and his prestige now higher than ever. Above all, what rankled in the heart of Elizabeth was the knowledge that all her "charges" had been in vain, and the money she had so painfully borrowed was worse than wasted. The letters she wrote to her hapless favourite were steeped in bitter scorn; his sneers and cavils at others, the ample resources she had provided, his boasting promises of victory, his protestations of service, are all paraded before him and cruelly contrasted with his weak pusillanimous paltering with the armed rebellion he had been

sent to crush. His petulant complaints and accusations of personal enmity are scathingly rebuked. "We have seen a writing in manner of a catalogue full of challenges that are impertinent and of comparisons that are needless, such as hath not been before this time presented to a State, except it be done more with a hope to terrify all men from censuring your proceedings."<sup>1</sup> He had no power, she told him, to make such terms as he had done, though now he had done so they should be respected, and she hinted more than once to him, who, to do him justice, was as brave as he was proud, that he was either disloyal or a coward. It must well-nigh have broken his heart, but it quite banished his judgment. He knew how his presence affected the Queen, and he dreamed that tears and love-lorn submission at her feet, even if he returned against her express sovereign command, would still be strong enough to overcome her indignation. But weak as she was in many things, she was strongest of all in her sense of regal duty and her personal dignity. Essex had outraged both by his perverse failure and his petulant presumption, and henceforward he must be humbled to the dust or he must die. He, poor, blind, vain-glorious creature, knew it not, but added desertion of his post to his past disobedience, and leaving Loftus and Carey to govern in his absence, he posted over to England without notice.

"He never drew a sword," sneered the Irish, "but to dub knights,"<sup>2</sup> and, like a hasty messenger, he ran

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth to Essex, September 14, 1599, Irish State Papers.

<sup>2</sup> He had given great offence to Elizabeth by his lavish creation of knights in Normandy and at Cadiz, and a "knight of Cales" became a

away before he had finished his errand." As fast as posthorses could bring him he rode to Westminster, where he learned that the court was at Nonsuch. Then crossing to Lambeth and seizing such horses as were waiting there for their masters, he sped on to the Queen's house. Lord Grey de Wilton passed him on the road, and riding ahead, was able to warn Cecil of the Earl's coming some ten minutes before his arrival. The Queen was not yet about when, at ten o'clock in the morning of Michaelmas Day, 1599, Essex alighted at Nonsuch gate. He was mud-bespattered and haggard with his headlong journey, but he waited not a moment. Pressing forward through the presence chamber and ante-rooms, none daring to stay him, he came unbidden into the Queen's bed-chamber, where her Majesty sat only half-dressed with "her hair about her face." Then throwing himself at her feet he kissed her hand and prayed for pardon. The Queen was so much taken aback that she forbore to chide him, and he went with a light heart and smiling face to

scolding by-word. It was felt generally that his object was to gain adherents to serve his own ambition, but now that fifty-nine knights were added to his creations under patent in Ireland during the six months he was there, the suspicion was fully confirmed, since there were no feats of arms to reward. Chamberlain writes (August 23), deriding some of the new knights, and continues, "It is much marvelled that this humour should so possess him, that, not content with his first dozens and scores, he should thus fall to huddle them up by the half-hundreds, and it is noted as a strange thing that a subject in the space of seven years (not having been six months together in any one action) sholde upon so litle service and small desert make more knights than in all the realme besides. It is doubted if he continue in this course he will shortly bring in tag and rag, cut and long taile, and so draw the order into contempt." When he returned to England Elizabeth was with difficulty dissuaded from unmaking the knights he had dubbed.

put himself in order for further speech with her. An hour later he saw her again, and still no angry reproaches greeted him. At dinner his friends, reassured, flocked to him, and to them he "discoursed merrily of his travels," and "thanked God that, though he had suffered much trouble and storms abroad, he found a sweet calm at home." Alas! for him, it was the calm that precedes the tornado. Cecil and his friends had stood aloof from him, and when the Earl, gay and debonnaire now, in easy confidence of his influence over the Queen, went to see her after dinner, he found her changed. With haughty severity she directed him to attend her Council and give to them an account of his proceedings in Ireland and an explanation of his disobedient return.

With bowed, uncovered head and apologetic mien, he stood before the men he hated and contemned, whilst he palliated, excused, and apologised for what he had done or left undone. That evening Essex was a prisoner under arrest, and for many days to come he stood daily before the Council, making the best of a sorry business, but full of plans still by which he dreamed of crushing at one blow these men, who were, he thought, banded together to weaken or subject English Protestantism, and to ruin its strongest champion, Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex. How could he foresee that the sly little man whose brain directed the forces against him would betray and destroy his own associates, and reach lifelong power by the road that Essex himself meant to tread. In the meanwhile all went merry as a marriage bell with the Cecil party; and the day

after Essex's arrest, "Mr. Secretary" gave a great banquet, at which were gathered the Howards and Talbots, Arabella's uncle Shrewsbury, Cobham, Gray, Carew, and Raleigh—all the men against whom the fallen favourite had raged and stormed in his pride.



## CHAPTER XI

The aspect of the succession question in England—Cecil and Essex—Negotiations for peace with Spain—Renewed alarm of Spanish invasion in England—Measures for defence—Probable intentional exaggeration of the fears, for political reasons—James continues to intrigue with the Catholics for support—The Pope's offer to him—Fitzherbert's address to Philip respecting the Scottish advances—Lord Semple's mission to Madrid—The future religion of England trembling in the balance.

THE two great conspiracies for securing the English succession were now bracing themselves for the final struggle. The Queen's age had only increased her determination that during her lifetime no successor to her throne should be acknowledged; but it was obvious to Englishmen of all sorts that some arrangement must be made for the great change before it happened, unless England was to be plunged at the critical moment into the vortex of civil war, and perhaps foreign invasion. The centres of the two conspiracies, which we have seen were formerly in Madrid and Rome respectively, had now (1599) gradually changed their position to England itself. This much, at least, had been gained by the proved ability of Englishmen to defend their country against foreign invasion or dictation, and by the increased patriotic pride which the brilliant reign of the Queen had infused into all of her subjects; but, nevertheless, each of the two factions which divided the English court still looked for outside support and alliance to strengthen and justify its action.

It is extremely difficult to define clearly the exact limits of each conspiracy; for there were many subsidiary and personal issues, abundant lying and betrayal on either hand, and, so far as was possible, a studious concealment of action and aim. But, generally speaking, the patent impotence of Spain now to enforce her religious views upon England, and the erection of the Belgic provinces into a separate sovereignty, had caused a tendency to resume in England the old political line of cleavage, which had been obscured for many years by the new religious groupings consequent on the Reformation. The moderate or old-fashioned English element, the germ of the present Conservative party, largely influenced by respect for the past and by Catholic traditions, looked again to a close Belgic alliance, which necessarily mean either a mild tolerant Catholic supremacy like that existing in France, or the continuance of the Anglican establishment with such toleration to Catholics as was allowed by Henry IV. to the Huguenots. Of this party, which included the heads of the old nobility, the Howards, Stanleys, Talbots, Grevilles, Brookes, Somersets, Herberts, and their like, Sir Robert Cecil was supposed to be the head, or at least the brain; but whatever may have been the ultimate object of most of the members, it is certain that Cecil himself never intended that the Anglican Church as established should be overthrown or radically altered in a Catholic sense, as a result of any action of his party. Although nearly all English Catholic priests and laymen—except only the Jesuit faction—belonged to this group, Cecil in his official relations always maintained an attitude

of strict reserve, not to say severity, towards the professors of the old religion ; and, as we have seen by Father Watson's letter on page 315, had expressly repudiated even the word "toleration" in connection with them.<sup>1</sup>

The other dynastical conspiracy was headed by Essex, who had succeeded his stepfather, Leicester, in his position as leader of the men professing the newer or reformed ideas. Around him were grouped the Puritan elements, which resented the retention of Catholic forms or traditions in Anglican worship, and sought to perpetuate the alienation from Spain and Spanish Belgium, which had been brought about by Philip's arrogant attempt to dictate the religion to England. To semi-Huguenot France and Presbyterian Scotland this party naturally turned its eyes : and, broadly, in politics Essex stood for a French-Scottish alliance, and Cecil for a Belgic-Spanish alliance. The issues were, however, infinitely complicated by the self-seeking attempt of James VI. to intersect both conspiracies by his own lines of intrigue. He was tireless in his attempts to obtain

<sup>1</sup> Many instances of this are seen in Cecil's treatment of the Catholics whom he employed as spies. The priests of the "loyal" faction were treated almost as harshly as the Jesuit fathers. Writing to Sir Henry Neville in Paris, with reference to applications of Charles Paget, Sir Thomas Tresham, Father Cecil, and other repentant refugees, for pardon and permission to return to England, Cecil says that he knows very well that if they have fallen out with the Jesuits, it is from no love of England, but to work their own ends. If the refugees like to do any real service to show their hearts are changed, their cases may be considered ; but they need not hope for pardon on mere professions or upon sending information which may be false. Cecil speaks of all these refugee Englishmen in the most offensive terms. He calls his namesake, John Cecil, who for ten years past had given him information, "a lewd priest with an honest name" (see Winwood Papers).

some recognition of his right from Elizabeth; but when he at last understood that neither cajolery nor menace could win that from her, he made efforts to obtain the countenance of the principal statesmen of her court. The Abbot of Kinloss (Edward Bruce), his agent for the purpose in England, could triumphantly point out to Catholics that James's actions showed that he was on their side. His agents in Rome, and the Archbishop of Glasgow in Paris, were busy impressing the same fact upon the non-Spanish Catholic powers; whilst Denmark and the German princes, as well as the mass of English Protestants, were attracted not only by the strength of his legal claims, which were laboriously enforced by means of pamphlets and treatises, but they were also urged to support him as the main bulwark against renewed Spanish aggression. Essex himself, James's principal henchman in England, Puritan though he was, and gravely apprehensive of the King's dallying with Papists, attracted Catholics to his side by promising toleration for their religion. On the other hand, the moderate party of Cecil was gaining Puritan sympathy by their severity towards Catholics and their rejection of all suggestions of toleration. Personal rivalry and jealousy further complicated an already involved position, and finally, each party for its own ends chose to blacken its opponents by attributing to them objects which they must have known to be false. They have thus led astray not only their own generation but all the generations that have succeeded them. The Essex party, for instance, loudly proclaimed that Cecil

and his friends, especially Cobham and Raleigh, had arranged to sell England to the Infanta, which at the time was absurd, and is now, perhaps for the first time, demonstrably untrue; whilst the "moderates" cast upon Essex the reproach that he sought by armed force to seize the crown of England for himself.<sup>1</sup>

Outside the two main conspiracies there was the old irreconcilable Jesuit-Spanish party, greatly reduced now by its unpopularity in England and by repeated failure, but still bragging about the thrusting of the Spanish form of Catholicism with a Spanish monarch upon England, with or against her will. After the death of Philip II. this party in Spain itself temporarily flared into hope again.

<sup>1</sup> Even James seems to have been persuaded that this was the case soon after Essex's death—though he must have changed his mind when he became King of England—for he always called Essex "*my martyr*," and loaded his son with favours, whilst he disgraced Raleigh and Cobham. In the often printed letter, written by the Earl of Northumberland to James in 1601 (Hatfield Papers), assuring him of the general consensus of feeling in his favour amongst all classes in England, the Earl refers to a remark made by James, that he "had lost no great friend" by Essex's death, and confirms this opinion as follows: "Although he was a man endued with good gifts, yet was his loss the happiest chance for your Majesty and England that could befall us; for either do I fail in my judgment, or he would have been a bloody scourge to our nation. . . . Did he not decree that it was scandalous to our nation that a stranger should be our king? Was not his familiarity with me quite cancelled when he discovered my disposition leaning to your right, and that I was not to be led by his fortunes? . . . How often have I heard that he inveighed against you amongst such as he conceived to be birds of his own fortune? Did his soldier-followers dream but of his being King of England?" Northumberland continues in this strain for several pages; but he was a poor, mean-spirited creature, and was evidently currying favour for himself by blackening his dead brother-in-law, so that his evidence against Essex does not go for much, if even the writer was honestly stating his conviction.

The young King, whose education was narrow and bigoted, dreamed of carrying with a rush the great object at which his father had toiled fruitlessly for so long. Spain was to resume her greatness and her strength under a new energetic ruler, and the Catholic supremacy was to make her predominant in the world. The Adelantado and the Count de Fuentes, hot-headed fanatics both, were for ever breathing fire and fury against the heretics; the bishops and Jesuits who flocked about the court were as sanctimoniously truculent as ever, and, for a time, the conquest of England seemed easy and imminent to these extremists. But in the course of our story we shall see that sloth, waste, and a love of pleasure, joined to the utter prostration and corruption that had overtaken the people, paralysed the action of Spain more effectually even than the niggard centralisation of the greater Philip had done.

Tyrone's success introduced another disturbing element in the situation, and each party had to take into consideration the force that he might bring to bear for or against them. For purposes of his own, the Irish chief had elected to fight under the Catholic banner, and to obtain such help as he could from Spain; but, as we have seen, that did not prevent Puritan Essex and James from courting him in the interests of the latter, whilst to the "moderate" party in England, Catholics though most of the leaders were, it was absolutely vital to crush Tyrone utterly, cost what it might; for they knew that the victory of Catholic rebellion in Ireland by Spanish arms would have meant the downfall

of the potent edifice of English independence, which the Queen and they had so strenuously built up. Tyrone might speak fairly now, but neither he, nor Essex, nor James, could hold the Spanish avalanche if once it was started, crafty as they all thought themselves in their efforts to harness it to their own chariot. This was the position of affairs when, amidst squabbles and jealousies innumerable, Essex went to Ireland in the spring of 1599.

As a result of the approaches made to him, and in accordance with the letter he wrote to Philip II. (page 330), on his assumption of the sovereignty of Flanders for the Infanta, the Archduke Albert sent a confidential agent, named Coomans, to England in the beginning of 1599, to discuss with Cecil the possibility of a peace being made. He was sent back with amiable though vague expressions of a desire to come to terms, if conditions could be arranged.<sup>1</sup> It was known, however, that nothing really would be done until the Archduke had seen his new brother-in-law, Philip III., and a basis for future relations had been laid.<sup>2</sup> It was Cecil's policy, whilst keeping even his own agents in the dark as to his desire for peace, to give out generally that Spain was seeking a *modus vivendi*; the object being partly to encourage the "moderate" section and the mercantile interests in England, and partly to render more pliable the King of France, whose naval activity and growing friendship with Spain

<sup>1</sup> Cecil to Sir Henry Neville, July 2 (Winwood Papers).

<sup>2</sup> The Archduke had gone to Spain to marry the Infanta, which he did in May, embarking at Barcelona for Italy on his return in June.

were causing no little uneasiness to Elizabeth.<sup>1</sup> It was important at the same time for Cecil and his friends not to appear desirous of peace, for fear of alienating the Puritan party in England, and the Dutch, who had undertaken to retain a strong fleet on the coast of Spain during the summer (1599) to prevent any attack upon England whilst the principal national forces were in Ireland. To keep the matter of peace alive, agents came with letters to the Queen and Cecil on the subject in June from the Archduke's *locum tenens* in Flanders, the Cardinal Andrea; but it was still policy for Cecil to hold back,<sup>2</sup> for great things were then expected of Essex in Ireland, and the Dutch had promised to commit vast devastation on the shipping and ports of Spain, either of which events would have enabled better terms to be made for England.

Suddenly, however, in July a change came over the appearance of affairs. The spies of Cecil had continued to report the great naval and military preparations in Spain and the vapouring of the revived militant party there; but with the Dutch

<sup>1</sup> See correspondence in Winwood Papers, Part i.

<sup>2</sup> The answer sent by the Queen to Coomans' advances was thus reported by the Venetian ambassador in France to the Doge. "She declares that she is equally desirous of peace; but that she cannot initiate nor conduct any negotiations, for she has no guarantee that the terms agreed upon would be maintained, as she is not dealing with a person of sufficient authority. She repeats what she said before, that whilst she was negotiating with the Duke of Parma, she found herself tricked, for the Spaniards attacked England with a powerful fleet (1588). But still she promises not to lose time, but to make inquiries as to the opinion of the States (Holland), and in this way she puts off the business, because she wishes to see whether Flanders is to be entirely separated from the Spanish crown (Venetian Calendar. Contarini to the Doge, April 25, 1599).



fleet threatening the Spanish coast and the known disorganisation of the kingdom, it was concluded that the armaments were intended for defence alone; and so it happened that while Essex and the soldiers were on their weary and barren march through Munster the Queen's navy was mainly laid up in dock. This being the case, early in July Cecil received news that the Dutch fleet, bent mainly upon plunder, had sailed away to Madeira, leaving the Bay of Biscay and the Channel open for a Spanish fleet, and at the same time intelligence arrived that an agent of the King of Spain had gone to request the Governor of Brest to allow a Spanish fleet to anchor in his port. This news fell in London like a thunderbolt. Couriers were sent flying to France to beg the King not to shelter the enemy's vessels, and from end to end of England the country was aroused to its defence. "It was little expected," wrote Cecil to the English Ambassador in France, "that those who published so brave a purpose to interrupt all supplies for Spain,<sup>1</sup> and to keep the coast blocked up from trade, would now thus, fondly and mechanically, put all upon a journey to the islands for wines and sugars. Now that Spain is clear of them (*i.e.* the Dutch), and hath in readiness forces to have defended, he (the Adelantado) may in all probability convert some hitherward."<sup>2</sup> Cecil

<sup>1</sup> Vast quantities of corn and other provisions, &c., had been sent from France to Spain. Elizabeth had bound herself to respect the French flag, but she did not bargain for this, and bitter complaints were made by Neville to Henry IV., whilst an acrimonious dispute proceeded on the same subject with the French Ambassador in England (see Correspondence in Winwood Papers).

<sup>2</sup> Cecil to Neville, July 14, 1599 (Winwood Papers).

had full warrant for fearing this from the reports of his agents. One usually very well informed spy wrote to him (July 24) in the most alarming strain from Lisbon. The Adelantado, he assured him, was bound for England or Ireland. He had just arrived in Lisbon with 35 ships from Andalusia, and after embarking in the Tagus Spanish and Portuguese troops to the number of 4000, was to proceed to Corunna. He had already 6000 soldiers on board his fleet, almost as many as his ships would carry, but (and this is a good instance of the complete want of organisation existing) the large number of German and Flemish vessels that had been seized some time before to carry the additional troops and stores had all bribed their way out and had escaped. Still his force was formidable, for there were 14 galleys and other ships ready to sail—though short of artillery—at Corunna and Ferrol, and at least 8 fine new galleons in the Biscay ports. In all, the spy reported that the fleet would consist of 35 galleons, 22 galleys, 15 or 20 caravels, and 35 other vessels, and the armed forces to land would reach 25,000 soldiers.

This was the most formidable force that had been organised since the Armada, if it had been as efficient as was reported on paper; and there was, for the first time since 1588, a momentary revival of the crusading spirit that had given Spain force in years gone by. "They go forward with the old vanity of 1588, making full account of victory, and never respecting to prevent that anything should happen to the contrary. Falmouth is spoken of, yet I think it is no place for conquest, unless he first put his

men on land, and then, having fortified, go to Ireland, and so transport some of Tyrone's people for their further strength; but if they depend to transport the Irish into England, some ports of the Severn or Welsh coast will be pretended."<sup>1</sup> The writer, however, thinks they will first go to Ireland and land at Limerick, and he sounds a note of alarm that a diversion or conjoint attempt at invasion will be attempted from Flanders. Above all, he says, let the Queen look to herself, for her death is daily threatened, and if it can be effected it is determined. Let the English ships, he prays, stand on the defensive, if they can do nothing else, "for the Spanish practices will go forward until they have either destroyed themselves or spoiled England." "All these mischievous intents began by English seminarians and Irish bishops. Ferret out such fellows in England, for there be many of them there. The Spaniards have great hope of help from some great men there (*i.e.* in England), stirred up at their instigation." "The Adelantado is so stirred up against England that, though it be already late for the galleys to go out, it shall be a bad time of the year that he will refuse to go over, as by his last voyage you had had experience, if God had not prevented. If this summer he should be hindered, be assured of him betimes in the spring. Meanwhile all helps have been, and will be, sent to Tyrone, for upon his broken staff they hope to lay a great foundation to annoy, yea, to conquer England."<sup>2</sup>

In Spain and Portugal the talk, of which this was

<sup>1</sup> Van Harnack to Cecil, July 24, 1599 (State Papers, Domestic).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

a faithful echo, ran that the Queen of England was dead, and that the King of Spain would, in his clemency, not capture the country for himself, but would take advantage of the confusion to establish an English Catholic of royal blood; "but still," said Cecil's agent, "the crown is their desire, and upon this cast of the die, he assured his master, the future of both countries depended." Almost solemnly he declares that this is Spain's last possible effort. "Here goeth the whole seal of Spain. Spoil this and wear the Spanish crown. Their sweet speeches, that they come not for conquest but to raise up the next heir that is Catholic to the English crown, are dangerous. Possibly some Jesuit persuasions have seduced the English Papists to believe it, but let them not be deceived, it is the English crown the Spaniards covet, and not religion or conscience. I fear there is some great personage already obtained unto that which the last Earl of Derby denied, though I accuse none, yet by their speeches it is a dangerous suspicion."<sup>1</sup>

This fairly represented the inflated current ideas of the Spaniards and their English sympathisers under the hopeful influence of a new reign; but those who held them had not the privilege, as we have, of raising the veil that covered the secret deliberations of Philip's councils, and of understanding to the full the demoralisation, the corruption, the ineptitude, and the penury that prevailed, notwithstanding the frenzy of presumption and prodigality that had attended the King's first progress to meet his bride, under the auspices of his now

<sup>1</sup> Van Harnack to Cecil, July 25, 1599 (State Papers, Domestic).

all-powerful favourite, the Marquis of Denia (Duke of Lerma). The Adelantado might vapour on the quays of Lisbon or Ferrol, and Fuentes sneer at heretics in the council chamber, but the ships scattered in the various ports were mostly unprovided, unmanned, and unseaworthy. Where there were soldiers, arms and clothes were lacking; stores rotted in one place whilst troops starved in another; no money could be obtained from Madrid except for wasteful shows and the endowment of monasteries. Plague and famine were devastating the land, and Lisbon itself was a wilderness, for nearly the whole population had died or fled.

But still, as Spaniards themselves did not understand how bad things were with them, it was not to be expected that Englishmen, whom they threatened, could discern the true state of affairs; and the result of these alarmist reports, coming as they did when the Dutch fleet was far away, the Channel undefended, the English army in Ireland, and the English navy in dock, was that an uncontrollable gust of panic swept over the country. John Chamberlain gives us a vivid picture of the state of affairs (August 1, 1599, State Papers, Domestic): "Upon what ground or good intelligence I know not, but we are all here in a hurle, as though the enemy were at our doors. The Queene's shippes are all making ready, and this towne (London) is commanded to furnish out 16 of their best shippes to defend the river, and 10,000 men; whereof 6000 to be trained presently, and every man els to have his arms ready. Letters are likewise going out to the bishops and their clergy, and all the

noblemen and gentlemen hereabout, to prepare horses and all other furniture, as if the enemies were expected within fifteen days." A camp was to be held at Tilbury, as it was at the time of the Armada, the Lord Admiral Howard (Earl of Nottingham) was appointed commander-in-chief, and his kinsman, Lord Thomas, commander of the navy; whilst Sir Francis Vere, who had charge of the English contingent in Holland, was to be recalled with his 2000 best men. "All this noise," continues Chamberlain, "riseth upon report that the Adelantado hath an Armada redy at Groine (Corunna), of 30 gallies and 70 shippes, some say more." On the 9th August the same letter-writer describes the progress of the scare. "The newes increasing daily of the Spaniards coming, and advertisements concurring from all parts of their desaigne for London (whereof the Adelantado himself gave out proud speaches), and the day of their departure from the Groyne being saide to be appointed, at the uttermost, as Sondag last, order was geven for a campe to be raised." All the generals are named; and each county had to muster its men under the local gentry ready to march. Twelve of the Queen's ships were hastily put into commission under Lord Thomas Howard and Raleigh; and the Earl of Cumberland undertook the defence of the river Thames by means of a bridge (of pontoons), "after an apish imitation of that of Antwerp," a little above Gravesend. That, however, after much expense and trouble, had to be abandoned, as the Thames was found to be a different sort of river from the Scheldt; and the bridge scheme

was substituted by one for sinking hulks in the fairway.

“Upon Monday toward evening came newes (yet false) that the Spaniards were landed in the Ile of Wight, which bred such a feare and consternation in this towne, as I wold litle have looked for; with such a crie of women, chaining of streets, and shutting of the gates; as though the enemy had been at Blackwall. I am sorry and ashamed, that this weakness and nakedness of ours, on all sides, should show itself so apparently, as to be carried far and neere, to our disgrace, both with friend and foe.” All the nobility had raised troops of horse; and it is noticeable that the names given as having done so most liberally are mainly those opposed to Essex and the Puritans. The Lord Admiral, for instance, had raised a hundred horse; Shrewsbury, Worcester, Northumberland, and Cecil the same; and the Earl of Pembroke two hundred. As Chamberlain himself saw, there was something more behind this than mere patriotism. The vain babble in Spain about a great “personage having been gained,” was interpreted by Essex’s opponents as referring to him; and this scare was no doubt made the most of by Cecil, as a counter-demonstration to the veiled threats of Essex, about the discontent of his army at the treatment meted out to him.

“But now,” writes Chamberlain, “after all this noise and blustering, methinks the weather begins to cleere somewhat, for our preparations begin to slacke and not go on so hedlong as they did, and there may be hope that all should be well.” On the 23rd August he reports that the alarm is now “blown

over," and says that even with so short a warning England has made a good show of defence. "Our navie has gone to sea prettilie strong and in goode plight for so short a warning, conteinning twenty-three shippes and pinnasses of the Quene's, twelve good marchant shippes provided by the citie and six more hired by her Majestie, with fourteen hoys well-furnished with ordnance and made for fight. Our land-forces are dayly discharged, litle by litle, and this day I thincke will be quite dissolved. . . . On Friday there mustered 1600 horse by St. James', and the next day 400 for the clergie in St. George's Field, yet none of the noblemen have shewed their troupes. . . . If occasion had been to draw forces to a head or into campe, it is thought the first proportion wold have risen to 27,000 foot and 3000 horse. I assure you they were very well provided for the most part of horse armour and apparel, and wanted not their setting forth with feathers, skarfes, and other light ware. The Lord General (the Earl of Nottingham) with all the great officers of the field came in great bravery to Powles Cross on Sunday sevensight when the alarme was at the hottest and dined with my Lord Mayor. The vulgar sort cannot be persuaded but that there was some great misterie in the assembling of these forces, and because they cannot finde the reason of it, make many wilde conjectures and cast beyond the moone: as sometimes that the Quene was dangerously sicke; *otherwhile it was to show to some that are absent that others can be followed as well as they, and that if occasion be, militarie services can be as well and as redily ordered and directed as if they were present.*"



“And now,” continues Chamberlain, “in the midst of all this hurle burle here is a sudden sound of peace, and that certain fellows are come from Brussels with a commission from Spaine.”<sup>1</sup>

We shall probably be safe in adopting as our own the suggestion that the nobles of the “moderate” party took advantage of the scare to read to Essex a much-needed lesson that they could appeal successfully to force as well as he: but whilst the prompt and efficient measures of defence adopted proved that Essex, idolised as he was in London, was very far from being the potential dictator he imagined himself, it showed also to foe as well as friend that the organisation, the resources, and the energy of England were infinitely superior at an emergency to those of Spain. We have glanced at the several ostentatious and boasting attempts that had been made since the Armada to despatch a powerful fleet to coerce England. We have heard the exalted bragging of the Adelantado and the haughty assurances of invincibility proclaimed by high ecclesiastics and responsible statesmen; but on each occasion humiliation and disaster had been the outcome of prodigious effort, and it is abundantly evident that no fleet complete and efficient with a formidable military force could be sent out promptly from Spanish ports because of the administrative dry-rot which the centralising policy of Philip II. had brought upon the country.

What had happened before was repeated in 1599. Throughout the spring the most abject fear of an attack on the coast and shipping by an English fleet was prevalent in Spain, and false reports were fre-

<sup>1</sup> Chamberlain to Carleton, State Papers, Domestic, August 9, 1599.

quent of this or the other important place having been sacked. The new King was away on his wasteful journey in the east of Spain, and cool-headed observers were confident that, no matter what efforts were made, the country could not even defend herself, much less attack, that year.<sup>1</sup> But, as we have seen, when Essex and most of the English forces were in Ireland and the Dutch fleet had relieved Spain of its threatening presence, the old vainglorious spirit prevailed again, and the talk of a great fleet to attack England or Ireland under the Adelantado was believed both by friend and foe. And yet, after three months of labour and boasting, the Adelantado's fleet, badly provided, ill armed, and poorly manned, could only endeavour fruitlessly to defend the Canaries from the depredations of the Dutch; and by the time the unfortunate Adelantado reached the Azores (September 30), his fleet was crippled by bad weather and twenty-two out of his

<sup>1</sup> Robert Bruce, who was a Spanish agent but sold to the English, reported to Colville on his way through France from Spain (July 1599), "Notwithstanding all their preparations and fleeing bruttis, he doth assure that this year the Spanyard shall be habil to do no thing in theis parts: his resons being the fearfull plage which is among thame; the year being far spent, and neither the galees as yet cum to places appointed nor a bastant (*i.e.* sufficient) army listed." Bruce proceeds to report what we already know, that Lerma was strongly opposed to any attempt at the invasion or coercion of England being made during the Queen's life, whilst the Adelantado was violently in favour of an immediate conquest. Philip was understood to side with Lerma, as he did in all things (Colville Letters, Bannantyne Club).

In the same month (July 6, 1599) Thomas Phellips, the astute spy-master, now in disgrace, wrote a very clever letter to the same effect (State Papers, Domestic). Philip III., he says, is spirited and eager, but he has no money to spend upon aggression at present. The Adelantado and Fuentes are "Hotspurs," but nothing will be done until the King confers with the Archduke, who, the writer knows for certain, desires peace.

eighty-five ships had foundered at sea.<sup>1</sup> He had failed to meet the India fleet; he had failed to find the Dutch, and the four millions of gold ducats, wrung out of miserable Spain to pay for his fleet, were worse than wasted. As for help to the Irish Catholics, two small pinnaces with arms and money were sent to Loch Foyle, over the division of which Tyrone and O'Donnell quarrelled, but the oft-promised army of conquest came not, and for another year at least the Protestants of England knew that they were safe from Spanish attack.

In the meanwhile James of Scotland was striving incessantly to gain the sympathy of Catholics everywhere. Now that he had humbled the Presbyterian clergy, whom he had hated heartily, and not without reason, for their arrogance and the republicanism that underlay their Church discipline, he carried his ostentatious approaches to Rome to an extent which appears almost imprudent. His eager reconciliation with the Catholic lords, his reappointment of Archbishop Beaton as his ambassador in France, and the violent anti-Puritan opinions he expressed in his book "Basilicon Doron," were enough, almost, to drive his Presbyterian subjects and the Puritans of England to despair. But apparently James weighed the chances well. If he could win over the English Episcopalians and moderate Catholics, who still formed the great bulk of the nation, he could afford to risk any displeasure, short of revolution, from his own Presbyterians and the English Puritans. Doubtless Essex and he quite understood each other, and had agreed to a similar line of

<sup>1</sup> Sorzano to the Doge, October 31, 1599 (Venetian Calendar).

action, by which they might gain partisans from the other side, whilst holding their own adherents in hand by personal, party, and national sympathies.

James, at all events, was determined to be prepared betimes, let who would be unready. In addition to the Archbishop of Glasgow, who was authorised to tell every one that his master was really a Catholic, Lord Hume was sent to Paris and to Italy to set forth James's claims to the English crown, and to beg for recognition (May 1599). In response to the persistent touting of Scottish agents, the Pope also sent an embassy, consisting of the visionary young poet Constable (whom we last heard of as desirous of converting Elizabeth herself) and James Wood of Bonnington, to offer James 100,000 crowns for preliminary expenses, and 2,000,000 more to maintain war with England, if he would decree liberty of conscience in his realm and declare war. The Pope also assured him the concurrence of all Catholic princes, and a further contribution of £20,000 from the English Catholics with 20,000 English soldiers, immediately after war was commenced. This was a tempting offer. The Archbishop of Glasgow fervently exhorted James to accept it, or, he said, "the Pope would know him no more, but would help some other competitor."<sup>1</sup> James was surrounded by Catholic influences. Jesuits, Capuchins, and Cordeliers were almost ostentatiously summoned to his court: the Papist Seatons, two of whom, at least, were Spanish officers, were his close friends; and, above all, Henry of France had sent as special ambassador

<sup>1</sup> Colville's Advertisements, August 18, 1599.

to him at the same time, that Maximilian de Betune, who was afterwards famous as the Duc de Sully. His ostensible errand was to renew the ancient alliance between France and Scotland; but we are told by one who was present:<sup>1</sup> "Monsieur de Betune, thoch he pretend no errand bot from the King his master, to veseit the King of Scotland for entertaining the auld amitie betuix the two nations, yit he is as ernist to persuade the King to embrace the Pope's offres as Boniton or Constable is, and his persuasion shall prove of no small consequence." James could hardly resist such influences as these, and he sent Constable back to Rome (*via* Denmark) with an acceptance of the Pope's pregnant offer; though whether he, James, ever intended to fulfil his part of the bargain is more than doubtful. His object was probably not war, but simply to frighten Elizabeth into acknowledging him as her heir. All this underhand dealing of James, however, was duly conveyed to Cecil by his agents (August 1599), and doubtless was one of the reasons for the sudden and formidable warlike preparations in England already referred to as having been made in that month. Elizabeth was highly indignant with Henry IV. for his dallying with James's intrigues, and demanded Betune's immediate recall. The French king had every reason for preferring the succession of James to that of a Spanish nominee, but he could not afford to quarrel with Elizabeth, so Betune was instructed to return through London, in order to assure the Queen of the harmlessness of his mission: but, withal, he failed to conciliate her, and the peace negotiations with the

<sup>1</sup> Robert Colville of Cleish, the nephew of John Colville.

Archduke's agent were now actively pursued by Cecil as a counterbalance to James's friendship with the Pope and Catholic France.

But the King of Scots was determined to leave no element in Europe unconciliated. Whilst he was thus humbling himself at the feet of the Pontiff and coquetting with the King of France ; whilst he was surrounding himself with Scottish Catholics, promising toleration, conciliating English moderates by his leanings to the Episcopacy, and holding the English Puritans by means of Essex, he was endeavouring to prove to the new King of Spain that he was *his* most faithful servitor. The Englishmen who had advocated the domination of England by Spain had, for the most part, become discouraged by repeated failure. Their recommendations and prayers had been disregarded : the old King had died without forcing his beloved daughter on the English throne, and it was felt that the new King would have other objects of his own to serve. Many of the old refugees had died or had sought pardon : the Spanish pensions they had received were, for the most part, stopped, and destitution had thinned their ranks, so that now Sir William Stanley in Flanders, a few of the Jesuit priests, and such old pensioners as Colonel Semple, alone remained faithful to the idea that had inspired the Armada. Even Father Creswell, disciple of Father Persons though he was, who represented the English Catholics in the Spanish court, saw that the circumstances were radically changed. Thomas Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Sir Francis Englefield as Philip's English secretary, represented the general opinions of his class in an able State

paper,<sup>1</sup> reporting upon the King of Scots' embassy (Lord Semple) to Spain to ask for support of his claims to the English crown. In the previous pages of this book we have had occasion to see how such embassies from James had been treated in the past, and this instructive document of November 1599 marks the change that had come not only over the spirit of the English partisans of Spain, but also over the whole situation in consequence of the death of Philip II.

Fitzherbert discusses at length the possibility of James having sent the embassy to Spain, with or without Elizabeth's connivance, but with the only object of diverting the Spanish armaments against England, and he decides finally that the King of Scots is acting in good faith in asking for Spanish help to become King of England. This being premised, Fitzherbert poses the question whether it is desirable or not that Philip should give him such aid. "In my opinion it is not, if it can be avoided; but that his Majesty should make King of England a Catholic whose zeal for our holy faith is more to be depended upon. It is certain that his Majesty (Philip) has the power to make a king of England and to exclude the Scotchman, if he will deign to take the course which we have so often begged him to adopt with regard to the Infanta, but always on condition that he does it before the Queen dies, and before the King of Scotland has won over the English Catholics, as he is now endeavouring to do, and will in future do more than ever, thanks to the

<sup>1</sup> Fitzherbert to Lerma, November 30, 1599 (British Museum, Add. MSS. 28,420, Spanish Calendar).

delays on this side, together with his intrigues and show of favour to the Catholics, whom he leads to suppose that he is in his heart a Catholic too. But if his Majesty will not, or cannot, execute the undertaking during the life of the Queen, I warn your Lordship that after her death will be too late, as the King of Scotland will attain his object before his Majesty has time to gather his forces and prevent it. It must be borne in mind that most of the English nobles who do not pretend to the crown themselves, and the claimants who have no means of enforcing their claims, will recognise the King of Scotland more readily than any of the competitors who are their equals . . . With regard to the Catholics, as it is certain that none of the other claimants (who are all malignant heretics), will grant them such favourable conditions as the King of Scotland, who is moderate and now professes to be a Catholic, they will certainly join his party as soon as he enters England. Seeing the strength of his claims, the forces he has ready, his facility for entering the country, the support of Denmark, and even of the English themselves, he will not only be stronger than any other claimant, but will carry through his design before his Majesty's forces can arrive there. . . . If, therefore, his Majesty cannot, or will not, attack England during the life of the Queen, I see no way of stopping the King of Scotland from becoming monarch of both realms; and I submit to your Lordship whether it would not be advisable for his Majesty to take the present opportunity of seeing if the King of Scotland will consent to be a Catholic. If he consent thereto, he might be aided to declare



war against the Queen of England, on his furnishing sufficient security to fulfil his engagements towards his Majesty, and to remain perpetually the ally and friend of the Spanish crown, to which, moreover, he will be bound by the ties of gratitude, and by the fact that he is Catholic King of England and Scotland. In this case, the cause of the alienation of England from the old alliance with Spain, I mean heresy, will have disappeared; whilst, at the same time, the reason for the close friendship between Scotland and France (that is to say, the constant quarrels between England and Scotland) will also be non-existent, and it will behove the King of England and Scotland, whoever he may be, to renew the old connection with Spain and the house of Burgundy. . . . If aid were given to the King of Scots against the Queen of England, it would be effectual in frustrating the designs of the King of France against Spain and keep them fully occupied, without breaking the peace which his Majesty (Philip) has made with him."

This, it will be perceived, is a counsel of despair, which it would have been impossible for men in Fitzherbert's position to have given to Philip II. The recognition and promotion of James's designs on the crown of England, on his mere profession of Catholicism, would have represented a complete triumph for the "politicians" throughout Europe who had been working against Spain for that very end for fourteen years. It would have meant an abandonment of the dead Philip's and his father's life-dreams of the supremacy of Spanish Catholicism in the political interests of their house; and though

Spain had fallen low, the ambitions of her rulers had survived their potency, material, moral, and mental. Spain was effete, but she was still traditionally powerful, and her pretensions matched her traditions rather than her circumstances. So complete a surrender as that suggested by Fitzherbert was, therefore, not yet probable, and this seems to have occurred to the writer himself, for he hastens to keep up the hollow old pretence that it only depended upon the mere word of Philip to place the Infanta on the throne of England.

“If, on the other hand,” he says, “his Majesty does not wish to aid the King of Scots to become King of England, but intends to undertake the enterprise in favour of the Infanta with the necessary speed (which we, the English Catholics, earnestly desire and petition him to do), I still think that great advantage may be derived from these negotiations with the Scots, which can be continued or broken off as occasion may require, and will serve to conceal his Majesty’s other objects. These communications with the Scots, moreover, will arouse the suspicion of the Queen of England against the King of Scotland, and she will not trust him to help her when his Majesty (Philip) attacks England; she may perhaps in the meanwhile try to disturb Scotland . . . the effect of which might be to upset both countries to such an extent as to prevent the Queen from injuring Spain, as she usually does. His Majesty will thus fish in troubled waters, to his own benefit and her disadvantage. In any case, the least benefit that will follow these negotiations is, that the King of Scots will declare

himself a Catholic, if in his heart he be one (which will be no small service to God and honour to his Majesty), or else we shall strip the mask with which he seeks to deceive the Pope and others, and shall thus alienate from him the English Catholics. Finally, if his Majesty desires peace with the Queen of England, it may be assumed that, in the present state of Irish affairs, she will be so apprehensive of the result of these negotiations, and the evil that may reach her through her backdoor (as she calls Scotland), as to agree the more readily to some fair settlement."

Fitzherbert finally concludes that, in any case, the Scottish envoy should be publicly honoured in Madrid, and that a Spanish embassy should be sent in return to Scotland, "with a little ready money and moderate promises of pensions to win over Scottish Catholics," who may usefully serve Spanish interests, whatever these may be; and that, above all, an effort should be made to persuade James to pardon and restore Bothwell, then a refugee in Flanders, existing on Philip's bounty. "He is one of the principal persons in Scotland, and a near relative of the King. He has a large party who follow him in everything, as is the custom of the country, and he and his adherents alone may be instrumental in effecting what I have said (*i.e.* rising against James if he broke his promise to the Catholics). He is naturally a turbulent man and greatly incensed against the King.<sup>1</sup> Philip and

<sup>1</sup> Francis Stuart, Earl of Bothwell, Lord Admiral of Scotland, was the natural grandson of James V. He made an unsuccessful attempt to seize James at Falkland in 1592, and had to fly the country. He

his Council were, for the reasons I have stated, not ready to accept Fitzherbert's first suggestion of helping James to the English crown, but they were willing to sow distrust between Elizabeth and the King of Scots by appearing to patronise the latter.

So James's envoy, Lord Semple, was made much of, and sent away loaded with gold chains for himself and fine messages for his master, whilst other emissaries from Spanish Flanders flattered James in the conviction that even Spain had been caught in his Catholic lure, and that the only remaining Catholic interest that he had to fear was now on his side.<sup>1</sup> All the cards then seemed to be in his

returned in the next year, and succeeded in his attempt, forcing James to dismiss his Chancellor Maitland, whom he considered too Catholic. By a counter-movement Bothwell was forced to fly to England and was sheltered by Elizabeth, as up to that time he had been an ultra-Protestant. When, in order to revenge himself, he entered into a league with the Scottish Catholic Lords, he found it necessary to escape to Spanish Flanders. In 1596 he sought reconciliation with Elizabeth, as he was destitute in Paris, offering to become a spy in her interest upon Spain, France, or the Scottish Catholics (Danvers to Cecil, Hatfield Papers, vol. vi., June 28). He made other desperate efforts to recover the favour of Elizabeth in 1598 through John Colville, whose opinion of his character is curious: "Albeit in one of my former letters I did write as I thought of Bothwell, being moved thereto by his terrible oaths and protestations, yet finding him still as light as a feather and more fraudfull nor a fox, I am forced to alter my opinion, car en son fait il n'y'a ny ryme ny raison" (Hatfield Papers, vol. viii.; see also Colville's Letters and Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.). It may be added that the Spanish envoy was not sent to Scotland as suggested by Fitzherbert, but a man was sent from Flanders in the name of the Archduke.

<sup>1</sup> Edward Bruce, writing to Lord Henry Howard (Hatfield Papers, uncalendared, cxxxv. fol. 81), says: "My Lord Semple at his return from Spaine did acquent the King that thair was ane propos there to send ane ambassadour to this countrie, and that it was contentously much in dispute in thair Counsell *pro et contra*. . . . So tossing these

hand, and he could afford to assume a tone towards Elizabeth that a few years before he would not have dared to use. He suggested to his principal nobles that they should form a "Band," ostensibly for the protection of his person, but really to enforce his claims to the English crown;<sup>1</sup> and whilst he was dabbling in conspiracy with Essex and Montjoy—as will presently be related—for the traitorous use of English troops, he demanded of the Scottish Parliament a liberal subsidy with the same object, for "he was not certain how soon he should have to use arms; but whenever it should be, he knew his right, and would venture crown and all for it."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, at the opening of the year 1600, the clouds lowered darkly over England and Protestantism. Essex, a prisoner, was raging and plotting, mad with spite and disappointment, ready to sacrifice loyalty, country, faith—everything, for rehabilitation and revenge: Tyrone, rejoicing in his hollow truce, was busy preparing for the great struggle, whilst his zealous agents in Spain were whispering to Philip's Ministers that this indeed was the opportunity for repairing all past failures, and for finally making England Catholic through Ireland.

doubts to and fro they break up thair Counsell without any resolution. . . . Since this time the King protests that neither nor indirectly he never heard motion or speach of any such messenger to come unto him." This was true, but a Flemish envoy was sent by the Archduke and his wife.

<sup>1</sup> In a letter from Cecil to his agent in Scotland, Nicholson (April 1600), he quotes James as expressing himself thus in the instrument forming the new "Band": "Divers persons upon frivolous and impertinent presumptions would go about to impugn his birthright, contrary to the most ancient and approved laws of both realms" (Hatfield Papers, uncalendared, vol. lxxviii.).

<sup>2</sup> Nicholson to Cecil, December 15, 1599 (Scottish State Papers).

James almost for the only time in his life was warlike, with, as he thought, all Catholic Europe behind him, and the English Puritans betrayed by their leader; and the moderate Cecil party were face to face with the fact that they had been outflanked and outbidden by the King of Scots. The religion of England, which meant the fate of civilisation, was trembling in the balance. There seemed only one possible way by which the Anglican Church might be saved and civil war avoided, and that way was only possible for one man. The man was Sir Robert Cecil, and the way, a crooked and devious one, came out straight in the end, as will be seen in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER XII

Essex in disgrace—His attempts at reconciliation—Small Spanish help to the Irish rebels—The mission of Mateo de Oviedo, Archbishop of Dublin, and Martin de la Cerda to Ireland—Resolution in Spain to aid Tyrone actively—Irish envoys to Spain—Helplessness of Philip and discouragement of Tyrone—Father Persons' appeals to Philip to take a decided course on the English succession—Discussions in the Council of State on the subject—Father Creswell's efforts in Madrid—The projects of the Earl of Bothwell—Essex and James. Abortive peace negotiations with Spain—Essex's rebellion and execution.

“What! did the fool bring you too? Go back to your business.” This was the greeting flung by the Queen to her trembling poet-godson, Sir John Harrington, as he entered her chamber to pay his respects on his return to England with Essex; one of a host of idle knights, captains, and swaggerers, who scorned to stay in Ireland longer than their lord. And when Harrington knelt to his sovereign, as she paced up and down the room in a fury, she grabbed his girdle and cried to him, “By God’s Son! I am no Queen: that man is above me. Who gave him command to come here so soon? I sent him on other business.” Then, becoming somewhat calmer, she told Harrington to bring for her inspection the diary she knew he had been keeping of the Munster campaign. It was never meant for her eyes, but her godson dared not refuse; and as she read the record she flared out in anger again, and swore her awful oath, “that we were all idle

knaves, and the Lord-Deputy (Essex) worse, for wasting our time and her commands in suchwise as my journal doth write of.”<sup>1</sup> In the meanwhile the object of all this anger was sick and sorry at York House in the custody of Lord-Keeper Egerton. Debarred from access to the Queen, and refused permission even to write to his wife, who had just given birth to a daughter, he could only profess abject submission in heart-breaking appeals to the sovereign whose former kindness to him had turned to bitter resentment.

The sternness of Elizabeth and her Council against Essex at this juncture is less surprising to us than it was to most of their contemporaries.<sup>2</sup> We know, as they did not, that the English Government were fully informed of the coquetting of James with the Pope, the Catholics, and with Tyrone, and had more than a suspicion that Essex had been in treasonable communication with both.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Harrington's *Nugæ Antiquæ*.

<sup>2</sup> Chamberlain's letters from Court at the period reflect the bewilderment generally felt at the Queen's implacability against Essex. Writing on the 22nd February 1600 to Carleton he says: "You left us here with so fair weather and with so confident an opinion that all sholde go well with my Lord of Essex, and that we should soon see him a-cock-horse again, that I know it wilbe strange news to you to hear that all was but a kind of dreame and a false paradise that his friends had fained to themselves." Again on the 5th March he speaks of Essex as being very ill, and "a man quite out of his mind." "The Bishop of Worcester preached at Court on Sunday last, made many proffers and glances in his behalf as was understood by the whole auditorie and by the Queene herself, who presently calling him to reckoning, he flatly foreswore that he had any such meaning."

<sup>3</sup> This idea was encouraged by Tyrone's constantly expressed partiality for Essex, which greatly angered the Queen. Tyrone, amongst other things, said that he would never draw the sword against Essex, whereupon the Queen wrote to Fenton (November 5, Irish State Papers): "That Tyrone should forbear to draw his sword against our



They did not yet know the extent to which his disloyalty had reached: that was to come out in the helter-skelter rush to confess first and most fully which overtook Essex and his friends when their plot had failed a year later. Then it was to come out that Essex had suggested to his father-in-law, Sir Christopher Blount, and his friend the Earl of Southampton, whilst he was yet in Ireland, to bring over 4000 of the Queen's troops to England without authority, "with the full purpose to right himself by force of such wrongs as he complained of receiving here (in England) in his absence,"<sup>1</sup> which, says Blount, both he and Southampton opposed.

Essex had many friends and was greatly beloved by the populace. It was hardly likely that his harsh treatment and present suffering on what appeared publicly to be inadequate grounds should not provoke some attempt at remedy. The Queen was so jealous of any one having access to him, that most of his relatives retired to the country, to remove themselves from suspicion, and even "his servants dared not meet or make merry lest it might be taken ill." But still projects were not wanting for his rescue. Old Sir Christopher Blount, who had advised him when he left Ireland to bring a sufficient number of adherents with him to prevent his arrest by force, was now for seizing him out of custody and carrying him into Wales, guarded by a squadron of cavalry; but this was too bold and risky a course;

Lieutenant rather than against us, we shall take ourselves much dishonoured, and neither value anything that shall proceed from him on such conditions, nor dispose our minds to be so gracious to him hereafter."

<sup>1</sup> Confession of Sir C. Blount, Hatfield Papers, lxxxiii.

for the Queen was in no humour to be trifled with, and a more secret but no less dangerous course was adopted. A few days after Essex's arrival, Lord Montjoy, who was deeply in love with the Earl's sister, came to Essex House, where the ruined gambler, Earl of Southampton, had rooms, and told him that even before Essex had returned from Ireland he had seen that his disgrace was impending, "and desiring to save him, if it mought bee, he (Montjoy) had sent a messenger to the King of Skottes to wish him to bethinke himselfe, and not suffer, if he could hinder it, the government of this State to be wholly in the handes of his enemies; and if hee (James) would resolve of anything that was fitt, he should find him (Montjoy) forward to do him right, as far as he mought with a safe conscience and his duty reserved to her Majestie."<sup>1</sup> James sent a prompt but timid verbal answer to the effect that "he would think of it, and put himself in readiness to take any good occasion." This, however, was not sufficient for Montjoy, who thereupon sent a bolder suggestion to him. He was destined, he said, to go to Ireland as Lord-Deputy, and when he was there he would at convenient time declare himself and place the English army at James's disposal. With half the troops he would have, he said, he might "doe that which was fitt in establishing such a course as should be best for our country." This proposal was backed by a letter from Southampton to James offering his services on his behalf. After some delay, the King

<sup>1</sup> Confession of the Earl of Southampton, Hatfield (un calendared), lxxxiv. (Printed as an Appendix to the Letters of Cecil and James, Camden Society.)

of Scots signified that "hee lyked the course well, and would prepare himself for it;" but it is very evident that James was lukewarm. The encouragement and money he was getting from the Catholic Powers and his warlike talk were intended by him as a means of forcing Elizabeth to acknowledge his heirship; he had no real intention of precipitating events by commencing war, and certainly not to participate in a treasonable rising in England, which must necessarily turn a large number of his future subjects against him for the sole benefit of Essex. The friends of the latter gradually understood this, and dropped James for the present out of their plans. Sir Charles Danvers thought that the English army in Ireland under Montjoy would be sufficient of itself to force Essex upon the Queen and destroy the Cecil party. Essex himself, now a prisoner in his own house,<sup>1</sup> approved of this idea, and Southampton was sent to Ireland to propose the matter to Montjoy. But responsibility had sobered the new Viceroy, and "hee utterly rejected it as a thinge which hee could no way thinke honest, and dissuaded me (Southampton) from thinking any more of such courses."

All this, although perhaps suspected by Cecil, was unknown to the Queen at the time, and in pity for her late favourite's despairing state and dangerous illness, on more than one occasion she seemed inclined to relent towards him. Once, indeed, when a consultation of physicians had pronounced him to be dying she had sent him a message of comfort,

<sup>1</sup> He had been transferred thither from York House on the 19th March 1600.

saying, with tears in her eyes, that if it were consistent with her honour she would visit him. But the mood soon changed. She wished to correct, not to destroy, she told Francis Bacon; but it needed all the reasoning of the jurists and the abject prayers of the prisoner to dissuade her from submitting Essex to the tender mercies of the Star Chamber. At length a commission of the Privy Council was appointed to inquire into his conduct and to hear his defence, with power not to sentence, but to censure. As usual, the Crown lawyers, amongst whom, to his eternal shame, was Francis Bacon, were virulent and grossly unfair in their attacks upon the accused, whilst Essex, pathetically eloquent, broken in health and heart, drew tears from eyes more accustomed to frowns by his pleading; the result of the inquiry being the suspension of the Earl from all his offices, and his remaining under arrest during the Queen's pleasure.<sup>1</sup> Cecil through all this was prudently moderate; it was clear that Essex's temper would ruin him without much aid from his opponents, and though Raleigh vindictively urged severity,<sup>2</sup> the Earl was liberated at the end of August,

<sup>1</sup> The trial or inquiry took place early in June. Bacon's account of the proceedings will be found in his works (Montagu).

<sup>2</sup> This famous letter from Raleigh to Cecil, which has so often been misinterpreted to mean the writer's desire for Essex's execution after his rising, bears no date; but the context shows it to have been written at the period now mentioned. "If yow take it for a good counsell to relent towards this tirant, yow will repent it when it shal be too late. His mallice is fixt, and will not evaporate towards any your mild courses. For he will ascribe the alteration to her Majestie's pusillanimitye, and not to your good nature, knowing that yow worke but upon her humour, and not out of any love towards him. The less yow make hyme the less he shalbe able to harme yow and yours. If her Majestie's favour fail hyme, he will again decline to a common

but was still forbidden to appear at court. He professed a desire to retire from public life and live away from London; but it is highly probable that at this juncture he made his way unbidden into the Queen's presence at Greenwich, trusting to his old fascination to regain her love.<sup>1</sup> If so, he was deceived, for she thrust him from her presence with scorn and resentment, and thenceforward his heart had no room for other feeling but hatred for her and those who he thought had stolen her love from him. All his hope of regaining his mistress's favour was abandoned, and "his speeches," as Harrington said after an interview with him, "of the Queen become no man who hath *mens sana in corpore sano*."

No sooner had Essex fled from Ireland than Tyrone began to haggle about the terms and renewal of the truce. He would have nothing to do, he said, with any Minister of the Queen but Essex; he must, he declared, consult O'Donnell, who disapproved of peace altogether, and he must include the other rebels in the truce; but finally a renewal of six weeks was agreed to. Truce or no truce, however, Leinster was being ravaged still, and Munster, outside of the garrisons and Lord Barry's lands, was in open rebellion. The great territorial Munster chiefs, Florence M'Carty More and the Earl of Desmond (James FitzThomas Fitzgerald).

person. For after revenges, fear them not." (See Edwards' "Life and Letters of Raleigh," and "Sir Walter Raleigh," by the present writer.)

<sup>1</sup> See Devereux's "Lives of the Devereux Earls of Essex." The evidence as to Essex having seen the Queen at this time is slight. It depends mainly upon a remark contained in a letter subsequently written by the Earl to Elizabeth, to the effect that she had by her voice commanded, and by her hands thrust him out of her presence.

were re-established by Tyrone; and Connaught since Sir Conyers Clifford's defeat and death was at O'Donnell's obedience. Thus Tyrone could afford to speak haughtily to the Queen's commander, the Earl of Ormonde. The terms of the truce, he complained, were being violated by the English, and he threatened that, after a fortnight longer, "I will, for God and my country, do the best I may against enemies and tyrants." "I wish you to command your secretary to be more discreet," wrote the Irish chief to Ormonde, "and to use the word 'traitor' as seldom as he may. By chiding there is little gotten at my hands."<sup>1</sup>

All this made it obvious that further parley would end in no good. "To use her name to so odious a traitor," ordered the Queen, "no more than to cast pearls before swine," and Lord Montjoy was instructed to make ready in England to crush Irish rebellion once for all, cost what it might. Garrisons were to be established everywhere throughout Ireland and no further truce or quarter was to be given to Tyrone.<sup>2</sup> An army of 12,000 foot and 1400 horse were to be at the new viceroy's disposal, and the

<sup>1</sup> Tyrone to Ormonde, October 30, 1599, Irish State Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Although Cecil was even blasphemously indignant—on paper—at Tyrone's assertion at this period that the Government had plotted to have him murdered, there is now no room to doubt that such was the case. The Irish State Papers disclose that at various times Lord Borough, Sir Geoffry Fenton, the Earl of Ormonde, Sir Robert Cecil, and the Queen herself countenanced the assassination of Tyrone, and Raleigh goes so far as to defend the goodness of such a course in a letter to Cecil (October 1598). The Carew Papers and "Pacata Hibernia" also prove that murder was a regular instrument of English policy in Ireland, and Sir George Carew quite coolly mentions to Montjoy the despatch of a man to Spain to kill O'Donnell, who had fled thither (Carew MSS., October 1602).

blow, it was agreed, must be struck at the rebel before the Spaniards could come to his aid in force. It was felt even in England now that the nervelessness hitherto shown in the dealings with Tyrone could not fail to encourage the new King of Spain to send the powerful aid for which Irish churchmen and chiefs had been praying so long and so earnestly. The adhesion of Munster especially to the rebellion was seen to be the great peril in this connection. It was perhaps the most fervently Catholic part of Ireland; its splendid harbours were the easiest of access from Spain, and the re-erection of its native southern princes, M'Carthy More and Desmond, had given a temporary appearance of national solidity to the Irish cause. For this reason Tyrone himself attached the greatest importance to fomenting the rebel cause in Munster, which became in consequence the principal battle-ground upon which finally the cause of Catholic supremacy in England, Scotland, and Ireland was to be fought out to the bitter end.

The Geraldines in exile and the crowd of Irish priests in Spain continued to beg fervently for aid to their cause. Soon after he had arranged the truce with Essex, Tyrone had sent yet two more emissaries to plead his cause with young Philip; and hopeful messages and promises were again sent back to Ireland and made the most of by the ardent Celts who carried them. But still the habit of long deliberation weighed heavily upon the Spaniard, and old Philip's love for infinite information dwelt in the statesmen who had sat at his feet. So, instead of a powerful fleet for which the Irish looked, there sailed into the bay of Donegal in April 1600 a ship

carrying some presents of money and munitions and a Spanish friar, Mateo de Oviedo, whom the Pope had appointed Archbishop of Dublin, and with him came an experienced soldier, Captain Martin de la Cerda, to inspect and report to the King upon the military position of Tyrone. The new Bishop was delighted with his foreign flock. Writing to his King from Donegal (April 24) he assured him that he had in Ireland "the bravest and most faithful vassals that any king could have, such indeed, that if they were not already devoted to Spain it would be necessary to obtain their adhesion by all possible means."

The meeting of chiefs in the monastery of Donegal was less optimistic now than when Captain Cobos had gone thither four years before. "When we arrived empty-handed only to repeat again the old promises, they were overcome with sorrow and dismay. . . . Although O'Neil and O'Donnell are full of courage they cannot prevail over the other chiefs, who fear the long delay in the arrival of succour, and suspect that they are being played with. We have done our best to stiffen them by every possible argument . . . and again promised that help should be sent with all speed. This has tranquillised them somewhat, and they have promised to wait for five months, as they think that they cannot, in any case, hold out longer than that without help, at least in money to pay their men. They have done great things last summer, O'Neil having overrun all Munster and submitted it to your Majesty, whilst O'Donnell has subjected Connaught." Tyrone, the Archbishop informed Philip, had almost gained over the Earl of Essex, and had recently refused the sur-



render of Cork, as he could not hold the city without the Spaniards. "These sixty gentlemen," he continues, "met in this Monastery of Donegal and discussed matters, not like savages, but like prudent men. They received the chains and your Majesty's portraits with great ceremony, saying that they would wear no other chains nor bonds than those of your Majesty. They are very grateful for the arms, munitions. &c., and I, for my own part, humbly supplicate your Majesty to bear in mind the importance of this business. With 6000 men you may carry through an enterprise which will bridle English insolence in Flanders and secure Spain and the Indies from future molestation."<sup>1</sup>

Whilst the Archbishop remained at Donegal as Philip's representative, Don Martin de la Cerda hurried back to Spain, equally impressed with the great results that might now be obtained by the sending of timely assistance to Tyrone. With him he carried fervent letters from the Irish chieftains to the Spanish king. That signed jointly by Tyrone and O'Donnell is the most important. They were, they said, in the last extremity. Their estates, men, and resources were exhausted; and as the Spanish aid is delayed from day to day, after so many messengers and letters have been sent, they are sure that all spirits must fail, and they will have to give way, unless the Spanish succour reaches them this year (*i.e.* 1600). Without it, all is lost. Don Martin de la Cerda takes a schedule of their requests, and of the money needful, if the army cannot possibly come this year. They have placed the chains and portraits

<sup>1</sup> Simancas (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

round their necks in token of Philip's favour, and they fervently pray him not to forsake them and the Catholic cause. "God knows, if it had not been for the service of God and Spain, they would not have undertaken the war at all, as they might have lived in peace."<sup>1</sup> Above all, they beg that Maurice Geraldine, heir of Desmond, now in prison in Lisbon for participation in a riot there, should be released and be sent to Ireland with the Spanish expedition, as well as all the Irish bishops and men of rank in Spain and Flanders. As a further pledge of Tyrone's faithfulness to Philip, he sent with La Cerda Henry O'Neil, his son, to be educated in the Spanish court.<sup>2</sup>

A few days before these reports arrived in Spain, Philip's Council had exhaustively considered the question of Ireland, in consequence of a letter sent from Flanders by the Archduke Albert on the subject. Tyrone, apparently in despair of getting a prompt decision from Spain, had appealed to the Archduke in March. The Irish, he assured him, had sustained the war, and had routed the English, in the confident expectation that the long-promised

<sup>1</sup> Simancas (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

<sup>2</sup> The Archbishop of Santiago wrote to Philip III. (May 18, 1600), saying that, in accordance with the King's order that he was to welcome and assist any person sent from Ireland by the Spanish Archbishop of Dublin, he had received at Santiago young O'Neil and his attendants, "welcoming them spiritually by confession, absolution, and the Mass, in which they showed themselves truly Catholic; and he had entertained them bodily to the best of his ability." The King, he says, is doing a truly pious work in supporting the Irish Catholics. In June young O'Neil was brought to Madrid with much distinction. John O'Neil, Earl of Tyrone, the other son of the great Hugh, fell at the storming of Barcelona in 1641. He commanded the Irish regiment in the service of Philip IV.

aid from Spain would be sent to them, but as nothing came, they fervently begged the Archduke to intercede for them. But the new sovereign of Flanders was at that moment in close negotiations with the English Government for peace, as will be related presently; his hands were full of his own affairs, and he had no desire to be involved in the old Spanish ambitions; so he simply passed on Tyrone's letter to Spain, as a matter that concerned him not.

The Council of State, on this occasion, sent a report to the King of a somewhat more practical character than the canting platitudes which they had usually presented to his father. They deplored that all the efforts to aid the Irish had ended in disaster, and that the Catholics were in a more desperate plight than ever; "but as past failures have not occurred through want of will, and our Lord always helps in the direst need, we must trust to His mercy in this case to infuse fresh spirit into them, whilst your Majesty aids them as far as you can, pending the possibility of undertaking the matter in force. Your Majesty will greatly serve God and your own interest by doing so, as in no place can the Queen of England be so effectually and cheaply embarrassed as in Ireland. It will also enable us to improve our conditions of peace and encourage the English Catholics. It is therefore recommended that at least 20,000 ducats and 4000 quintals of biscuit<sup>1</sup> should be forwarded to Corunna, to be sent, with some arms and munitions, to Ireland by quick-sailing ships, so that the Irish may see that we are helping

<sup>1</sup> A<sup>c</sup> quintal is 100 lbs.†

them with the things they most want, without delay. They should be written to kindly, and assured that, in any case, your Majesty will continue to protect them, and when God wills, that a full force may be sent to liberate them.”<sup>1</sup>

It will be noted that as the Spaniards became more practical they became more modest. Past failures, after all, had taught them something; and the 20,000 ducats and two cargoes of biscuits show up but poorly by the side of the pretentious promises of the past. When, however, La Cerda came back in May with his report and fresh letters from Tyrone and O'Donnell, the whole matter had to be reconsidered, for the exhortation of the Spanish Archbishop of Dublin, and the imposing array of sixty Irish chieftains in the Monastery of Donegal protesting their loyalty to Spain, impressed Philip and his advisers with the reality of the opportunity. Don Martin told the King that the five havens in the hands of the rebels would receive the whole fleet in safety, and that the food necessary for the 5000 or 6000 Spanish soldiers expected existed already in the island. Horses they had, he said, in plenty, though no carts or traces; and if the Spanish expedition came promptly, Tyrone could raise a well-equipped army of 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. The enthusiastic opinion of La Cerda evidently produced great effect upon the Council, and the latter warmly recommended to the King that the Irish Catholics should be supported, “so that the Queen should be served as she serves his Majesty by helping the Flemish rebels.”

<sup>1</sup> Simancas (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

But alas! then comes the characteristic Spanish touch, which shows us that the administration, at all events, had not changed for the better under the new King. Two months had already passed since it was decided to send immediately the 20,000 ducats and the biscuits, which, it was again stated, was all that could possibly be afforded (July 1, 1600); but the Council, after this interval, had to pray that "the Marquis of Poza should be instructed to provide the necessary funds without delay, because, although his Majesty has given orders, and application has been made to the Marquis, he has not delivered the money, saying that his Majesty has given him no orders."<sup>1</sup> When young Philip had before him this opinion of his Council again urging him to send, at least, the small aid decided upon without delay, he scrawled across it an order, which of itself proves his youth and ignorance of affairs, as well as the wide gulf which in character separated him from his father. His Council had told him that the utmost that could be done for the Irish at present was to send them the temporary assistance mentioned, but he astounded them by ordering peremptorily that a powerful army and fleet should be sent at once to conquer Ireland. Idiaquez, the King's secretary, explained the reasons for Philip's decision, and the Council of State consisted of courtiers too submissive openly to dispute his wisdom. They had no doubt, they replied, that the enterprise would be quite easy and safe, and "your Majesty would gain enormously in prestige by conquering a kingdom thus unexpectedly. The bridle which the possession

<sup>1</sup> Simancas (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

of Ireland by your Majesty would put upon England and the Northern Powers, would enable you to divert them from all other points of attack, and prevent them from molesting Spain, &c. It would also enable you to make good terms of peace and recover the Flemish fortresses held by the English for the rebels. In case of the Queen's death, your Majesty, as master of Ireland, would be in a greatly improved position to nominate a successor to the English crown." *But*—although they applauded the King's decision as the quintessence of wisdom and godliness, they humbly pointed out that there was no money and no time to send an expedition to Ireland that year; and finally they repeated their former advice, to send only the ducats and the biscuits, whilst making preparation for an Armada of conquest in the following year (1601).

Philip was young, ardent, and unwise, and would not be gainsaid. Again he returned the Council's report, ordering them to discuss and decide upon the means for sending out at once the Armada of conquest upon which he had set his heart. His decision, the Council again assured him, was "worthy of his grandeur and catholicity;" but again, they pointed out the impossibility of carrying it into effect. The fitting out of the fleet, the raising and training the men, the supply of the arms and stores, and the provision of at least 150,000 ducats to pay the troops during the campaign, would all have to be done in six weeks; because, to send an expedition later than the middle of September, would be to risk losing it altogether. Besides, they pleaded, where was the money for it all to

come from? No effort should be spared to obey his Majesty's orders; and the Adelantado should be requested at once to send a report of all that would be needed and the money it would cost. Troops should be warned for service, and every man and weapon that could be drawn from Spain, Italy, or the Islands should be utilised for Ireland. Still the Council were doubtful, and could only promise to do their best. Philip's autograph note in reply to this is so characteristic that it deserves to be reproduced entire, as I transcribed it myself at Simancas: "As the expedition is so entirely for the glory of Almighty God, all difficulties to it *must* be overcome somehow. The greatest energy and diligence must be exercised on all hands. I will find money for it, even if I have to sacrifice what I need for my own person, so that the expedition may go this year. Settle everything without delay. Get statements of all that will be needed, and forward them immediately to me. Do not wait to send to the Adelantado. I will give orders for the immediate collection of the money sufficient to send a force of 6000 men. In the meanwhile, send to Ireland instantly Don Martin de la Cerda, with the 20,000 ducats and the 4000 quintals of biscuits." Such hastiness and disregard for "information" were enough to make Philip II. turn in his porphyry tomb; but old Philip's system was stronger than young Philip's despotism, and nothing was done.

These deliberations of the King and Council had delayed matters to the end of August, and three months later (23rd November 1600), the Council of State were asked to report upon fresh letters from

Tyrone and O'Donnell, which had just been brought to Spain by Richard Owen.<sup>1</sup> In the course of their report, to which reference will be made presently, the Council say that great efforts had been made to complete the expedition which had been ordered by the King. "But your Majesty's absence has so delayed matters that the vessels and galleys in Andalusia are still very much behind-hand. Of the sixteen needed, only eight have been fitted out, and the raising of the sailors has not even begun." They pray the King to insist upon greater speed being used, and that the rest of the ships should be got ready at once, as well as the necessary provisions. "Out of the 30,000 quintals of biscuit expected, only 12,000 have yet arrived in Lisbon, of which it was decided to send 4000 quintals to Ireland." Thus, as we see, whilst Tyrone was at close grip with Montjoy in Ireland, the administrative paralysis of Philip's system was preventing the despatch of the precious aid which might have turned the scale in his favour. Councils might recommend, kings might command, realms might go a-begging; but corruption, poverty, sloth, and bigotry reigned supreme over all.

Tyrone's demands now brought by Richard Owen were more important and far-reaching than any that he had sent previously. Prince O'Neil, as

<sup>1</sup> Richard Owen was an Irishman who for years had been in the pay of Spain, and was formerly in Sir William Stanley's Irish traitor-regiment. He had accompanied Tyrone in the latter's famous interview with Essex; and after Essex had returned to London the latter tried to excuse Tyrone's sulkiness towards other English officers by saying that Owen, an agent of Spain, was always by his side, and Tyrone dared not seem friendly with the English in his presence.



Tyrone now calls himself, must be appointed Captain-General of all Ireland, "as no Irishman will consent to be governed by one of lower rank than himself." O'Donnell and Desmond (James FitzThomas), respectively, must be recognised as governors of Connaught and Munster, and the Irish people must be adopted by Philip, either as subjects, allies, or *protégés*. The war should be actively prosecuted during the spring and summer, and all the Irish gentlemen in Spain and Flanders should be sent in the expedition when it comes. The Pope, moreover, should be urged to excommunicate all Irishmen who aid the heretics, and no Irish ship should be allowed in a Spanish port without a licence from Tyrone. Artillery and harness must be sent, but no horses are needed. The plan now proposed by Tyrone was for Philip to seize in Spanish ports all the Irish, Scottish, and Breton ships that had gone thither as usual for cargoes of wine. These should be loaded with men and arms, and, under the convoy of ten small ships of war, be sent to Ireland. "If any disaster occurs," says Tyrone somewhat ungenerously, "your Majesty will lose less than if you sent your own galleys." Above all, he says, the way to cast out the heretics speedily and cheaply will be for the expedition to go to Carlingford, forty miles from Dublin. "Operating from there, the Spaniards may expel in three days four of the six English garrisons in O'Neil's country, and more can be done there against the English in six months than elsewhere in many years. If the force goes to Munster the war will be interminable."

But Tyrone closes his long despatch discouragingly. The Catholics, he says, are tired of fighting, and if aid be not promptly sent they must make peace with the English. The Queen offered them liberty of conscience, and to each chief the possession of his lands, with many new privileges. The Catholics have hitherto refused peace out of affection to his Majesty; but the King of Scotland has now offered to make good terms for them with the Englishwoman, and they may be forced to accept them. "Most nations dislike Spain. The Irish love it." It is only just, therefore, that they should be succoured; but help must come at once to be of any use.

This reference to James was hardly likely to strengthen the Irish cause in Spain. The Scottish envoy already referred to (page 388) had been received ceremoniously, but, as we have seen by Fitzherbert's report, insincerely. The rallying to James's side of the non-Spanish Catholic elements in Europe had, in fact, caused the utmost uneasiness amongst the Jesuits and thorough-going Spaniards everywhere, as it had also done to a large number of the English people, though for opposite reasons. The logical result of James's Catholic intrigue, so far as the English Government was concerned, was to cause an active renewal of the negotiations for peace with Flanders and Spain, to which reference will be made presently; but in the Spanish court it gave a pretext for the opening of a fresh series of intrigues with the object of defeating the party of compromise, and seating upon the English throne a nominee of Spain.

Father Persons was now the Rector of the English College in Rome,<sup>1</sup> and from him came, fittingly, the renewed note of alarm. Notwithstanding his famous book and his constant efforts to forward the Infanta's candidature, he had never been able to persuade Philip II. to proclaim officially his daughter's claim to the English throne. The Queen of England was now getting old and feeble, the King of Scots, with his cunning and ability, was grouping around him every interest that could help him, and Spain alone, for which Persons and his friends had worked incessantly for twenty years, stood slothfully by boasting, whilst the great prize of England ripened to drop into the ready hands of the very man whose accession seemed to threaten Spain with extinction as a power, and the final defeat of Spanish-Catholic supremacy in Europe. Persons therefore asked the Duke of Sessa, the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, to address a despatch upon the subject to the King; and at the same time he arranged through his agents in England for the extreme English Catholics to send a memorandum to Father Creswell, their representative in the Spanish capital, praying Philip for a decision in accordance with their views, in anticipation of the proximate death of Elizabeth.

<sup>1</sup> Persons' ability and authority had reduced the turbulent Roman College to something approaching order, but in the meanwhile his own college of Valladolid was feeling strongly the revulsion caused amongst the young English students to the anti-patriotic Jesuit teaching. A considerable number of them ran away and took the Benedictine habit especially; and thenceforward some of the most unselfish missionaries who faced martyrdom in England were drawn from that order, which, according to Father Watson ("Quodlibets"), the Jesuits were desirous of suppressing in the event of a revival of the Catholic supremacy in England. A very interesting account of the Benedictine Mission at the period will be found in Dom Bede Camm's "Life of John Roberts."

This was in the spring of 1600, and the interminable secret discussions on the question in the Spanish Council took place at the same time as their deliberations on the Irish expedition related on pages 403-407. The result they arrived at was to recommend the King to adopt his half-sister the Infanta as his nominee to the English throne, and that Father Persons alone should be cautiously informed of the fact by the Duke of Sessa, in order that it might be conveyed in strict secrecy to the leading Catholics in England, who were opposed to a Scottish ruler. The Infanta<sup>1</sup> and her husband were also to be informed, by means of an autograph letter from the King, of the honour intended for them. They were to be urged to promote the plan by means of secret agents in England, and to be lavish of money and promises in order to win over useful adherents. In the meanwhile it was recommended that the Irish expedition should go forward, and 200,000 ducats be sent to the Spanish Ambassador in Flanders (Zuñiga), to hold for the moment that Elizabeth should die: "so that he may be able promptly to provide troops and whatever else may be needed for successfully carrying through the business, which principally depends upon celerity of action at the proper time."<sup>2</sup> Some of the councillors were alarmed at the idea that Flanders and England under one sovereign might in time become a danger to Spain; and it was decided that the Infanta should be told that if she became Queen of England she must give

<sup>1</sup> Isabel Clara Eugenia, the eldest daughter of Philip, was, it will be recollected, married to her cousin, the Archduke, and was with him joint sovereign of Flanders.

<sup>2</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

up the Belgic provinces to Philip. This, although only two members seemed to see it, was sufficient to render the whole plan nugatory. The Infanta was not likely to give up the State she had inherited for one she would have to conquer and hold by force of arms; whilst the main attraction to Englishmen of any such solution as that proposed was the certainty of a close union between Flanders and England, always a necessity for both countries.

The despatches from the Duke of Sessa which had given rise to this discussion are more important for the elucidation of an obscure point in English history than for the inept, self-destructive, decision just described. Father Persons assured the Duke that if action were taken promptly, "not only Catholics, but also many heretics will flock to his Majesty's side; *even the principal councillors, such as the Lord-Admiral, the Lord Treasurer (Buckhurst), and Secretary Cecil.* It is impossible now to say how far Father Persons was warranted in making this statement; but it is evident that communications had passed between a group of English noblemen and his agents,<sup>1</sup> because in his list of possible candidates as alternatives to the Infanta proposed by the English Catholics, he mentions the Duke of Savoy, whose wife (a daughter of Philip II.) had recently died; and suggests that he should marry Arabella

<sup>1</sup> It is likewise very significant that at this period (July 1600), Cobham and Raleigh, who were afterwards sacrificed for having plotted with Spain against James, had been sent by Cecil to Flanders, ostensibly for the purpose of informing Lord Grey that the Queen was relenting towards him. It is quite within the bounds of probability that communications then passed between them and the English refugees with regard to the succession.

Stuart; and more curious still, the only English nobleman suggested in the list was the Earl of Worcester,<sup>1</sup> "a Catholic of good parts, who, although he has no claim to the crown, might marry the daughter of the Earl of Derby." These suggestions could not have been made without the connivance of the persons mentioned. Still the English Catholics for whom Persons spoke expressed their great preference for the Infanta; and the Spanish Council decided to mention no other name, either in approval or otherwise, until matters were further developed. On one point every Councillor was absolutely agreed, namely, that the most important thing was "utterly to exclude the Kings of Scotland and France." "As in a matter of this sort right is the least important element of the claim, although it is necessary in order to justify the employment of force, the Council is of opinion that the financial question should be first considered and decided; whilst the forces in Flanders and the fleet should be made ready, so that on the very day that the Queen dies a movement may be made from both sides (*i.e.* Flanders and Ireland) simultaneously in favour of the object aimed at." Philip was, as we have seen, slothful and pleasure-loving, deciding

<sup>1</sup> The Earl of Worcester (Henry Somerset) was an elderly man, who died in the following year (1601), leaving a small fortune and a large family. The person referred to in the text is probably his son, Lord Herbert, and curiously enough at the period when the Spanish Council were discussing his candidature for the English crown, he was marrying with great pomp and splendour Anne (or Elizabeth) Russell, a cousin of Sir Robert Cecil's. Accounts of this magnificent festivity will be found in Chamberlain's "Letters" and Nichols' "Progresses of Queen Elizabeth." See also Lady Russell's letter to Cecil, Hatfield Papers, vol. vii. p. 267.

often by impulse, but neglecting to insist upon his decisions being carried out. Everything was left to Lerma, who was too lavish in Spain to be anxious to undertake much expenditure elsewhere. So, month after month passed without any active orders being obtained from them with regard to the English succession.<sup>1</sup> Father Creswell, who, of course, was ignorant of the discussion I have just described, incessantly prayed for an answer that he might send to England, but for months he begged in vain. There was no promptitude to be expected from Philip III. any more than there had been from Philip II., in the one case because he worked too little, and in the other because he had worked too much.

At length, early in December 1600, Father Creswell appears to have been asked his opinion as to the form in which an answer to the English Catholics should be drafted; and the memorandum which he consequently submitted to the King begins with a somewhat obscure suggestion. "The answer," he says, "should include some general reference to the pretensions of the Earl of Essex, so as to open the door to an arrangement by which he may be gained

<sup>1</sup> During this period (the autumn of 1600) an event happened which shows how keen the Jesuit party was to lose no point in the game. The Duke of Parma, who had a far better claim to the English throne than Philip or the Infanta, was intriguing in Rome to obtain a cardinal's hat for Arthur Pole (nephew of Cardinal Pole); but the Jesuits took fright at this at once. Pole, they said, was only twenty-five, and practically a foreigner, and worst of all, "he will not be a fit instrument to aid in the object desired by all good English Catholics in your Majesty's interests, as the most intimate English friends he has have been those opposed to your Majesty." The English Jesuit party, through Thomas Fitzherbert, therefore, urged Philip to move the Pope to make Father Persons a cardinal instead of Pole (Brit. Mus. MSS. 28,420).<sup>2</sup>

to the service of God and your Majesty.”<sup>1</sup> As he did on a former occasion (page 224), Creswell urges the necessity of an appearance of great moderation and mildness, and his draft answer points out “that the fault being national rather than personal, it will be unjust to treat heretics in England as they are treated in Spain, or as they were treated in England by Queen Mary. Conversion may be best forwarded by caring well for working people, and by winning converts by suavity and mildness.” The principal Catholics, he thought, should be informed privately that the King of Spain would support the Infanta’s claim with a powerful force when the Queen died, but no time must be lost or they will rally to the King of Scots. Certainly, continues Creswell, “any new sovereign of England (except a Spanish nominee) will be worse for Spanish interests even than Elizabeth; because by granting freedom of conscience he will conciliate a certain faction in

<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to see how Essex’s pretensions could have been reconciled with Spanish aims; but as it was known that he had been in treasonable communication with Tyrone, who had reported that he (Essex) was willing, in return for favours to himself, “to hand the country over to your Majesty” (Philip), Father Creswell doubtless believed this to have been the case, and that Essex could be bought by the concession to him of power and wealth. It is, however, fair to say that this statement only rests upon Tyrone’s word as repeated by the Archbishop of Dublin, Mateo de Oviedo. Considerable strength is given to the chance of its truth by a note written in April 1601 by Father Bluet on a letter from Dr. Bagshaw to him, asking for further particulars of Persons’ hand in Essex’s matter (“Jesuits and Seculars,” from Petyt MSS.). Bluet writes: “Mr. Parsons about three yeares since was tampering and hatching a plotte to set up Essex against her Majestie. Hereof he brake w<sup>th</sup> a priest, and acquayting hym w<sup>th</sup> ye helpes y<sup>e</sup> he shuld haue out of Spayne and ye Lowe Contries, moved ye said priest to be his messenger of this matter unto ye earle. But ye priest refused to be a dealer in such cause, and yet gaue him good words lest otherwise he might haue procured hym to be sent to ye galleys.”



Rome, and will prevent the Catholics from looking to your Majesty." Above all, he prays that an answer should be speedily sent to England, in which recommendation the Council concurred, though they rejected his hint that Arabella Stuart or the Earl of Derby's daughter (sister?) should be mentioned as alternatives to the Infanta. But again the whole business was relegated to the pigeon-holes of Philip and Lerma, and still no decided answer was sent to the English Catholics.

Nor were the Irish and English appeals the only ones that at this time occupied the ponderous deliberations of Philip's advisers. Bothwell, after trying unsuccessfully to intrigue with Cecil, to whom he offered his services as a spy, had travelled from Flanders to Spain, and was for ever bombarding the King and Lerma with projects and memoranda for the "conversion" of Scotland. His first plan was for 3000 troops to land in the Orkneys, which belonged to his brother, the Earl of Caithness. The latter was to contribute 4000 clansmen, and, after fortifying the islands, the force was to seize Broughty and Perth, which, Bothwell said, could be made impregnable. The advantages he promised from this step were enormous. The Dutch could be crippled by the stoppage of all their commerce; the Queen of England would be forced to stand on the defensive with all her resources; the Irish could be supported with ease from the west coast, and the King of France would find himself checkmated by the only means that could frustrate his plans,<sup>1</sup> as he would be

<sup>1</sup> War between France and Spain was threatening in consequence of the claim of France to the Marquisate of Saluzzo.

obliged to send troops to Scotland. The principal object, however, at first professed by Bothwell was that James should be rendered powerless to push his claim to the English crown when Elizabeth should die. If he is allowed to establish himself in England, "he will be a greater enemy to God and Spain than ever, since he will be very powerful by land and sea, aided by Denmark, Holland, and all the heretics."<sup>1</sup> Again and again Bothwell returned to the charge. The Irish enterprise could not be undertaken successfully, he assured Philip, unless in conjunction with an invasion of Scotland, which would furnish a base of supplies. Then his plans became larger: 4000 men should land in the Orkneys and 4000 in Kirkcudbright, the noblemen of the north and west, all of whose names he gives, will be ready to join the Spaniards when they land; the Catholic Church in Scotland must pay the whole of the expense of the war, and a Spanish ambassador should be sent to Scotland at once to arrange the business secretly with the Catholic nobles.

All this was, of course, visionary, and in the circumstances impossible, seeing the financial and administrative condition of Spain; but to add to its impracticability Bothwell somewhat later suggested conditions that might, he thought, be proposed for bringing in James himself. The King of Scots might be recognised by Spain as King of England if he would marry his son to the Duke of Savoy's daughter and his daughter to the Duke of Savoy himself, the Prince (Henry) being sent to live in Spain under Philip's control. "There is no other

<sup>1</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv., Simancas.

alternative but to make peace and a firm alliance with the King of Scots before the Queen of England dies, or else to make a determined war which will utterly ruin and destroy him, which will be easy for his Majesty." Bothwell did not apparently care very much which course was adopted so long as his intriguing spirit might be employed in promoting it; but Philip was powerless to undertake such a task as the invasion of Scotland, even with the questionable aid of the shifty Scottish nobles. It was seen that in every Scottish plan there still lurked the possibility of James Stuart being placed on the English throne by the Catholics as a consequence of his assumed conversion, and this, as we have seen from the first, was the one solution which Spain dreaded of all things. So Bothwell's grand schemes were all vaguely praised and relegated to the oblivion of Lerma's pigeon-holes, whilst he was kept in hand by great pensions on paper and small payments in cash.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst the Spaniards were thus trifling, James Stuart was busier than ever. Patrick Stuart and James Drummond were sent to the Pope in the summer of 1600<sup>2</sup> to confirm the promise previously

<sup>1</sup> One scheme of Bothwell's was accepted (August 1600), although I can find no record of its having been carried into effect. Lord Burleigh, a Scottish Baron, had been sent by James as his ambassador to Holland to obtain the recognition of the States to his English claims. Burleigh was instructed to purchase in Holland 20,000 muskets and as many cuirasses to send to Scotland; "but," said Bothwell, "he is so good a servant of mine that it will be easy to induce him to bring all these arms hither instead of to Scotland" (Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar).

<sup>2</sup> The Master of Gray sent to England the copy of the letter written by James to the Pope, in which the Cardinal's hat was requested for the Carthusian Chisholm, Bishop of Vaison, and a confirmation sent of the promise taken by the latter of concessions to the Catholics in

taken to Rome by the Scottish Carthusian Bishop of Vaison (for whom James asked for a cardinal's hat), and to pray for the money promised by the Pontiff for making war upon heretic England. Father Persons in Rome was now almost fiercely remonstrating with the Duke of Sessa, as the Scottish King's successful hoodwinking of the Papacy and the Catholics everywhere became more and more apparent. Persons had persuaded the Pope to throw cold water on Constable's romantic efforts to convert James in the spring of 1600, but, as we have seen in the last chapter, Constable had then managed to enlist the French in his plans, and had gone to Scotland in conjunction with Bethune and other French representatives. They had managed also to bring into the plan the Pope's Nuncio in Paris, and had swept into their net most or all of the English refugees, who had despaired of a Spanish dispensation after the death of Philip II. and the

Scotland. This was accompanied by professions of reverence to the Pontiff. Elizabeth indignantly sent Bowes to demand an explanation from James, who solemnly declared that he had sent no such letter, which assertion the Secretary of State, Elphinstone (Lord Balmerino), confirmed. At a subsequent period Cardinal Bellarmine published the letter, and upon investigation Elphinstone confessed that the King's signature had been obtained by a trick and that the King was ignorant of the contents of the letter. Elphinstone accordingly was tried and condemned, but pardoned on the intercession of the Queen of Scots. Both Robertson and Dr. Gardiner appear to accept Elphinstone's confession in good faith, and the Scottish Jesuit, Creighton, who had been concerned at Rome in Drummond's mission, endeavoured to let his King down gently by declaring that in the letter James did not profess to be a Catholic. With the many letters now before us in which James does pretend his desire for reconciliation with Rome, the most probable explanation of Elphinstone's action in this particular case is that he sacrificed himself to save his sovereign's reputation, and on that, as on so many other occasions, James lied like the coward he was.

stoppage of their pensions. Emissaries of this strong combination actively sped between Paris, Rome, England, and Scotland, and their errands were soon divulged to Persons (December 1600).<sup>1</sup> The association of the King of France with James in his plans made the matter all the more alarming for the Jesuit party, for Henry was their deadliest enemy, reigning as he did by means of conciliation and tolerance. Persons reported that already Henry had begun to make an arrangement with the English nobles, both Catholics and heretics, to obtain some measure of toleration for the former during the Queen's life and for James to succeed on the same lines when she died. The promoters of the scheme, he said, had their agents with the Earl of Essex and other members of the Queen's Council for the purpose of settling the details, and if something was not done at once the cause of the Infanta was ruined.<sup>2</sup> This seems somewhat to have aroused Philip's Government, who in consequence sent orders to the Duke of Sessa to watch matters closely in Rome and to alienate the Pope from the King of Scotland. Again the Spanish Council of State prayed the King of Spain to make up his mind openly to champion the Infanta's claim. Here was England slipping from

<sup>1</sup> It must not be forgotten that at this period also the Archpriest controversy was in full swing. The English Seculars, many of whom had been suspended by the Archpriest Blackwell for schism, had appealed to the University of Paris for judgment on the points involved. The Faculty of Theology decided in favour of the appellants, and Blackwell condemned the judgment as injurious to the Holy See. A fresh appeal from the Seculars was then sent to the Pontiff. Persons was, of course, in the thick of the dispute in Rome, the political bearing of the controversy being now as important as the religious.

<sup>2</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. p. 683.

his grasp, they told him, for want of resolute action. Persons had assured the Duke of Sessa that he had means for gaining to his side certain members of the English Council, and this was acknowledged to be of the highest importance, but still no prompt action was taken. Persons had to confer with Sessa, and the latter had to communicate with Brussels and Valladolid, where infinite time was wasted in discussion and in the King's indecision. And so everything on the Spanish side dragged and dragged whilst all other interests were alert and working.

But these intrigues, impotent on the one side and active on the other, give us a clue to the unsolved riddles of Essex's fate and the obscure tragedies that ushered in the reign of James. Exactly how far Essex and his friends were pledged to the Franco-Scottish intrigue just mentioned it is difficult to say, though, as he was in close and confidential communication with James, as the latter was with the French King and the Pope, it is fair to conclude that Essex was cognisant of the whole plan,<sup>1</sup> and was either convinced of the falsity of James's professions of Catholicism or was content to sacrifice the Protestant cause for the sake of his personal ambition. It is quite as certain, on the other hand, that Persons, probably through Garnet or Blackwell, had some sort of understanding with a group of English nobles who professed to have gained, or to be able to gain, some of the members of the Council. These members, of course, could

<sup>1</sup> It must not be forgotten also that after Essex's revolt Boissise, the French Ambassador, interceded with the Queen for him, "the greatest friend of France in all England."

only be those of the moderate party, most of whom were secret Catholics opposed to Essex and to the French or Scottish alliance.<sup>1</sup> The Lord Admiral, Cobham, Pembroke, Shrewsbury, and Cecil belonged to this party, and these, or some of them, must be the men indirectly alluded to by Persons. It is probable that some whisper of these communications may have reached Essex, and have given him the pretext for the cry he raised on his hare-brained attempt at revolution, that Cecil and his party had sold England to the Infanta.

During the disgrace of Essex after his return from Ireland, active negotiations for peace with Spain were proceeding. As invariably was the case when Scotland and France drew together, Spain and England did the same. Sir Thomas Edmunds was sent to greet the Archduke and the Infanta, and was received with unusual honours, and in February 1600 Verreyken, the Flemish envoy, came to England, where, says Chamberlain, the Queen received him "with all the ceremonies and compliments that could be devised." Whilst Essex was languishing a prisoner at York House it must have been gall and wormwood for him to hear of the grand feasts with which the emissary of a Spanish prince was entertained at the English court. "He (Verreyken) on Monday and Wednesday sat at the Lord Treasurer's in council with the Lord Treasurer, the Lord Admiral, the Lord Chamberlain (Hunsdon), Mr. Secretary

<sup>1</sup> I consider it extremely unlikely that the Spanish Jesuits' plan of winning Essex to their side was ever seriously undertaken. From the note of Bluet, quoted on page 416, it is plain that though Bagshaw was anxious to obtain particulars for the purpose of damaging Persons and his party, the accusation rested on a flimsy foundation.

(Cecil), and Sir John Fortescue. The negotiation is kept very close. . . . Our discoursers shoot many bolts in this business, which to them seems so entangled and intricate that in seeking to undo one knot they make two. . . . Whatsoever the reason is, methinks we are not so hot on this peace as we were, and the least stop in such a cause may turn the tide."<sup>1</sup> There were many considerations which made peace difficult of arrangement, but in good truth the desire of Cecil was not so much peace—unless indeed on such terms as Spain was not yet humble enough to grant—as the appearance of a *rapprochement* between England and Spain as a countercheck to James's Catholic intrigues. In March Edmunds was again sent back to Flanders to discuss with the sovereigns the time and place for a conference, whilst "Sir Walter Raleigh attends the ambassador (Verreyken) much, and carries him up and down to see the sights and rarities hereabouts. He hath had him at Powles, at Westminster, at Whitehall, and where not. This day he is feasted at the Lord Treasurer's and to-morrow at the Lord Chamberlain's, where methinkes it shold be somewhat strange to see carowses to the King of Spaine's health."<sup>2</sup>

At length, after infinite bickering about the place of meeting, Boulogne was agreed upon, where the

<sup>1</sup> Chamberlain's Letters. See also Rowland Whyte's Letters in the Sidney Papers, which give a glowing account of the festivities. Verreyken lodged at the house of Alderman Baning at Dowgate, which being near the ancient Gildhouse of the Hanse, was the quarter of the Easterlings.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, March 5. The Lord Chamberlain Hunsdon, the Queen's first cousin, was a member of the Puritan party.



English Commissioners arrived in the middle of May, and the Flemings and Spaniards shortly afterwards.<sup>1</sup> The differences were quite irreconcilable from the first, for Elizabeth could not afford to abandon the Dutch unaided to the tender mercies of Spain, or to allow them to seek safety by appealing to France; whilst, on the other hand, Spain would not yet acknowledge herself completely beaten and surrender her dream of Catholic supremacy. In fact, however, the grave issues were never even approached by the conference. The principal point in the instructions of the Spanish representative was that he must be "very circumspect to uphold the dignity and prestige of our King." The first step taken with this object was to arrive at Boulogne after the English envoys, in order that the latter might, as Zuñiga says, have the good manners to pay the first visit. But the Englishmen were on their guard, and merely sent a servant to exchange copies of powers. Then endless haggling by correspondence took place as to the style to be given to the Archduke, Serene Highness being at last agreed to. When, however, the question of precedence in the mention of England and Spain came forward, a deadlock occurred. "They are so obstinate," wrote Zuñiga, "in claiming precedence, notwithstanding

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Herbert, Sir Robert Beale, Thomas Edmunds (afterwards knighted), and Sir Henry Neville were the English representatives, Louis Verreyken and President Jehan Richardot the Flemish, and Baltasar de Zuñiga and Fernando Carillo the Spanish. A full account of the negotiations will be found in Neville's and Winwood's Correspondence (Winwood Papers), and in British Museum, Cotton. Vesp. cviii., as well as in the uncalendared papers of the date at Hatfield, the French Correspondence in the Record Office, and the Spanish State Papers Calendar, vol. iv.

our serious arguments, that we closed the colloquy, and we shall not again enter upon the matter." The English then suggested that they should toss up or cast lots for precedence, which greatly shocked the Spaniards, as being undignified. Much discussion and various suggested ingenious expedients followed to get over the difficulty, the most hopeful being that the meeting should be held in the lodgings of the Spanish envoys, who then, as hosts, would give their guests, the English, the place of honour. But this was refused by the English, and weeks more were wasted whilst instructions came from the respective Governments. The utter hollowness of the negotiation is seen by the view taken by the Spanish Council of State. They were furiously indignant with Zuñiga and Carillo for discussing or considering the English claim for precedence, or even for equality. "Such a claim," they said, "had never been advanced before, and it is not befitting so great a King as ours that it should be listened to for a moment." So the envoys were smartly reprehended, and carefully warned to admit nothing derogatory to the King's dignity, "which," said the Council, "was so fully established that no discussion as to equality must be allowed." The temper of Elizabeth and her Government was, with better reason, quite as firm as that of the Spaniards, and the deadlock continued, both sides in the meanwhile looking to events in Ireland and Savoy respectively to render their antagonists more yielding.

But whilst it must have been evident almost from the first that nothing would come of the negotiations, Zuñiga made good use of his opportunities

for plotting and planning with the English Catholics of the Jesuit party. He wrote to his King in September 1600: "The English Catholics and Jesuits in England are pressing gravely for the invasion of England to be undertaken, which they say they can facilitate by means of the Catholics there. This will be effected by opening negotiations in your Majesty's name with some leading personages; and Zuñiga says that they (the English Catholics) desire above all things that some decision should be adopted with regard to the succession, as they are very distrustful as to whether your Majesty will take the matter up. He (Zuñiga) is keeping them in hand as well as he can, but arguments are no longer of any avail. The Catholics tell him that the Irish enterprise will not be of much use in the English affair; because, although the Irishmen are Catholics, they are not to be trusted, owing to their ancient enmity against England. Zuñiga himself is of opinion that no money can be better spent than that employed in supporting the Earl of Tyrone."<sup>1</sup>

This letter from Zuñiga was seized upon by the Spanish Council as an opportunity for once more urging their slothful King to action, and at the same time they made a noteworthy admission of the wane of Spanish power. "There is no need," they wrote, "to discuss the enterprise (*i.e.* invasion) proposed by the (English) Catholics, as experience has shown the impossibility of conquering the country from here, even under better circumstances than at present; but, in order to keep hold of the English Catholics, it will be advisable for your Majesty to

<sup>1</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

adopt some resolution respecting the succession. If this be not done in good time, the Catholics may join the King of Scots or some other claimant." And so the negotiations for peace with England simply resolved themselves into a conspiracy against her; but it answered the purpose of both Governments to drag them out for their respective national objects.

This hollow junketing with Spain, from which he, of course, was excluded, seems to have driven Essex finally to despair. Still forbidden from the Queen's presence, though in the autumn he had been released from custody, he must have heard through his zealous friends and spies plentiful whispers of plots to counteract the Catholic activity of the King of Scots—plots which, if they were successful, would mean his own ruin. Father Persons' talk of his agreement with high English Catholic nobles, and Zuñiga's close communications with the leaders of the same party, can hardly have been entirely hidden from Essex, and drove him onward to his catastrophe. By means of the papers quoted in these pages we are able, perhaps for the first time, to understand how futile all these intrigues were rendered by the sluggish ineptitude of the Spanish King and his Government. There was, we can now perceive, no danger really to be apprehended from plots which depended for their execution upon the decisions of Philip III. and Lerma; but it must not be forgotten that contemporaries were not able, as we are, to see the hands of all the players at the great game, and Essex, doubtless, represented many of his countrymen, especially of

the Puritan party, in believing that the work of the Reformation was to be undone, and England sold to Spain and the Jesuits by Elizabeth's principal Ministers.

The scope of this book does not admit of a repetition of the details of Essex's foolish attempt at revolution, but it will be necessary to glance at the accusations brought by him, and against him, with regard to the intended betrayal of the Protestant cause. We have seen sufficient of his ambitious and vindictive temper to know that his first thought must have been to revenge himself upon those he hated, and to secure for himself at least the dictatorship of England; but it must have been obvious, even to him, blinded by his popularity as he was, that some better cause than his personal aims must be alleged before he could arouse a law-abiding people to rebellion. The not unfounded suspicions of Spanish intrigue, to which I have referred, gave him the cry he needed. Whether he believed them to the full himself matters little; if he could make other people of his party believe them, his end would be served.

After his liberation in August he tried desperately to regain the good graces of the Queen. Lord Henry Howard, his false friend, who betrayed him, as he betrayed every other creature that trusted him, carried to the Queen abject letters of submission and despair from her fallen favourite. The Queen dryly hoped that the writer's deeds might match his words, but she showed no signs of relenting. In October, we are told by Chamberlain, the friends of Essex were trying to obtain permission for him to join the

tilting on the Queen's birthday, "and they are very confident to see him shortly in favour. You may believe as much of it as you list, but I ne'er a whit, for till I see his license for sweet wines renewed (that expired at Michaelmas), or some other substantial favour, I shall esteem words as wind and holy water at court." When Elizabeth came to understand that the first object of his tearful prayers was to obtain a renewal of his sweet-wine monopoly, her heart hardened more than ever. Penitence and remorse, that he might gaze upon her bewildering beauty again, was of course natural, and might in time have melted her, but to find that he was only hankering after money aroused her rage, and she refused his hint insultingly. "An ungovernable beast," she said, "must be stinted of his provender," and Essex, thus repulsed, sought for favour no more.

Thenceforward his only chance was to overturn by force and destroy all the men who surrounded the Queen. We have seen that he had appealed in vain to his successor in Ireland, Montjoy, to bring over the Queen's army to coerce the Queen's Government, and that his cry for aid to the King of Scots had been answered by vague promises.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> When Montjoy had first gone to Ireland in the early spring of 1600 (Essex's fate being then undecided), he had sent to James, offering to bring over the Queen's troops to England for the purpose of co-operating with the Scottish King's forces and Essex, for the removing Elizabeth's advisers and securing the acknowledgment of James's right to the succession, with, incidentally, Essex's future paramountcy. James hesitated; for he did not really wish to be King of a faction or to fight against his future subjects. When Essex, later in the year, urged Montjoy to act alone, the latter naturally refused to risk his head only to serve Essex's ambition (Confessions of Sir Charles Danvers and the Earl of Southampton).

At length, however, James consented to send a formal embassy to demand of Elizabeth the recognition of his rights, on the understanding that Essex should seize the Government by a *coup de main* at the same time and force the Queen to consent.<sup>1</sup> During the winter of 1600-1601 Essex threw aside the attitude of love-lorn despair, which had proved ineffectual, and threw open the doors of Essex House to the members of the advanced Puritan party. Violent sermons were preached against Rome and all her works; the Earl's old friends and adherents flocked to his anterooms, as did the rabble of idle captains and younger sons, who looked to him for advancement, and the leading citizens, to whom the very name of Spain was anathema; and it was impossible for Cecil to shut his eyes to the fact that Essex was gathering around him the elements of revolt.

Whilst this was going on at Essex House, the leading conspirators, Essex, Southampton, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Sir Charles Danvers, and others, matured their plans, as they thought secretly, at Drury House hard by. The Government, however,

<sup>1</sup> The instructions suggested by Essex to be given by James to his ambassador, the Earl of Mar, are important as showing that the pretext for the movement was to be mainly religious. Certain of her highest Ministers, the Queen was to be told, meant to take advantage of the succession being open to ruin the country. The West Country was commanded by Raleigh, the Cinque Ports by Cobham. The navy was in the hands of the Lord Admiral, the Treasury was controlled by the Lord Treasurer (Buckhurst), whilst Cecil had placed his brother as governor of the north, and Sir George Carew commanded in Munster, the key of Ireland. All these men bear malice against the King of Scots, "and all theyre counsayles and endeavours tend to the advancement of the Infanta of Spayne to the succession to the crown." The reason for these assertions is given at length in Cuff's confession.

were quite cognisant of the objects of the conspiracy, and it was important that the attempt should be nipped in the bud before the arrival of the Earl of Mar with James's demands. On the 7th February 1601, accordingly, Essex was summoned by Secretary Herbert to appear before the Council, but excused himself from attending on the plea of illness. Gathering his principal friends at Drury House on the same day, he told them that the affair was discovered, and asked them whether they would move thus prematurely or submit. Dismay sat upon every brow, and there was a general feeling that submission would be the wiser course. A message from Sheriff Smyth promising the aid of 1000 of the trained band of the city seems to have turned the scale, and the fatal decision was adopted of raising the cry of revolt early next morning. The original plan of seizing Whitehall by surprise was now, of course, impossible, as the Queen's Guard was on the alert; but messengers were sent through the city in the evening, Saturday, to spread the news that Raleigh and Cobham intended to kill the Earl of Essex. And early on Sunday morning the 8th February Essex's friends Southampton, Monteaule, Sandys, Rutland, and 300 gentlemen met at Essex House with the intention of riding into the city, and arousing the citizens with the cry that England was sold to the Catholics, and that the people's idol, Essex, was to be done to death by the unpopular Raleigh and Cobham.

Whilst they were assembling in the courtyard, a message came from Raleigh to his kinsman Gorges,



asking him to meet him. Essex consented to his doing so, if the interview took place in boats on the river. There Raleigh solemnly warned Gorges of his danger, but without avail, for "I told him that there were 2000 gentlemen who had resolved that day to die or live as free men." A committee of the Council was sent to Essex House to summon the assembly to disperse in the name of the Queen. They found the great courtyard opening from the Strand filled with armed men, amidst whom stood the Earl; and as the gate closed behind the Lords of the Council, they found themselves prisoners, with a threatening crowd surrounding them. After a heated harangue of complaint and accusation, Essex led the Lords into the house, where they were kept as hostages, whilst the misguided conspirators, 300 gallants and swashbucklers, hot-gospellers and riffraff, trooped into the City through Temple Bar. "For the Queen! for the Queen!" they cried sometimes; but more often that Raleigh had tried to kill Essex and that England had been sold to the Infanta. The citizens, on their way to early morning service, flocked around agape, but raised no hand and few cheers. The emissaries of the Council sped forward to warn the Lord Mayor of his duty, and the chief magistrate, being at service at St. Paul's, ordered Ludgate to be closed. But when Essex and his followers appeared before the closed gate, and, waving his sword, the Earl told his story to the custodians, he was granted admission, and rode triumphantly up Ludgate Hill and Cheapside. no man, so far, staying him.

Near the Exchange was the house of Sheriff

Smyth, his mainstay in the City; but before the Earl arrived there the Sheriff had taken fright and had rallied to the Lord Mayor, for on the steps of the Cross of Chepe, Cecil's brother, Lord Burghley, with the Lord Mayor by his side, had, in the Queen's name, proclaimed Essex and his followers traitors, and treason was no light matter under Elizabeth. Some of Essex's men had charged the Queen's *posse*, and Burghley's horse was killed by a petronel shot; but Essex and his principal friends waited in vain in Smyth's house, lingering over their breakfast, until the Sheriff should return with his trained bands. As he came not, Essex grew uneasy, and walked up Cheapside into St. Paul's Churchyard, still doing nothing but complaining of his wrongs to his dwindling band. Whilst he was thus trifling the City was arming. Chains were run across the streets, gates were shut, and armed men were mustering, and when Essex, thoroughly alarmed, at three in the afternoon, thought of returning home, he found that only a hundred men stood by him, his way was barred, and the cry of treason followed him as he rode. Driven back from Ludgate Hill, he fled up Watling Street and Friday Street into Chepe again; but all were against him there, and, galloping down Bow Lane to the river, he took boat at Queenhithe to his house in the Strand.

He entered his water-gate a beaten man: the Lords of the Council had been released by his steward, and only a few followers were with him. His first care was to take from his neck a little black taffeta bag, with the reply of King James to his appeal for aid, and another paper, both of which

he burnt, and then he and a few gentlemen determined to fight till they should fall. But the forces against them were too strong; the house was beset by land and water, and presently the Lord Admiral carried the gardens and banqueting-house. At nine o'clock at night two great guns were dragged to the main doorway, and then, after some parley, Essex and his deluded friends surrendered, and the next morning the Traitor's Gate in the Tower received them, whilst their followers found in arms were sent to the common jail.<sup>1</sup>

On February 19 Essex and Southampton were arraigned at Westminster before a court of twenty-six peers, Cecil, who was only a knight as yet, listening to all that passed, hidden behind an arras. The accusations against the prisoner were confined to the narrowest limits possible to secure his conviction on the capital offence of treason. The Government by this time were aware of the complicity both of James and Montjoy, and unless they were prepared to disqualify the former from the succession, and risk a military revolt of the latter, they dared not emphasise this grave element in the case. Essex throughout his trial loudly and wordily protested his loyalty to the Queen. His intention was, he said, to remove the advisers who were bent upon ruining her country by bringing in the Infanta; and as a proof of this he let slip a remark which gave occa-

<sup>1</sup> Some few days afterwards Captain Thomas Lea conceived a plot for seizing the Privy Chamber of Whitehall by surprise and coercing the Queen to sign an order for the release of Essex and his friends. He foolishly divulged the plot to Sir H. Neville and Sir Robert Cross, who informed Cecil of it. Lea was at once arrested, and executed February 17, 1601.

sion for a startling and dramatic scene, in which practically the fates respectively of Essex and Cecil were sealed. He had been told, he said, that Secretary Cecil had observed to one of the councillors "that the Infanta's title was as good as that of any other person."<sup>1</sup> In a moment Cecil sprang from behind the arras, and dropping on one knee, prayed the court to allow him to clear himself of "so foul and false a report." The peers thought there was no need of it; but Cecil persisted, and in vehement speech dared Essex to name his informant. After some evasion the name was given by Southampton—Sir William Knollys, the uncle of Essex, and a cousin of the Queen. Cecil pressed that the Queen might be prayed to send Knollys to the tribunal immediately, without stating why he was required, and swore, on his salvation, that if the Queen sent him not, he (Cecil) would never more be Minister of hers. In breathless suspense the proceedings were delayed for Knollys' appearance, and when he came all present knew that the word he was to speak must ruin either Essex or Cecil. His answer was

<sup>1</sup> The counter-accusation against Essex, that he was in league with Spain, was, on the other hand, industriously spread about by Cecil and his party on equally slight foundation. Chamberlain writes in surprise (February 24) that none of these accusations were included in the charge. "I must say that one thing stickes much in men's mindes, that whereas divers preachers were commanded the Sondag before to deliver to the people, amongst his other treasons, that he had plotted with Tirone and was reconciled to the Pope . . . and that he had practised by the meanes of seminary priests with the Pope and the King of Spaine to be King of England, there was no such matter once mentioned in his arraignment." We know now that the two last of these loose accusations were untrue. They probably rested mainly upon the statements, already mentioned, of the secular priests anxious to injure the Jesuits.

clear. "I never heard him (Cecil) speak words to that effect." On the contrary, he cited instances in which Cecil had referred to the King of Spain's claim as "impudent." Essex's sole good pretext for his rebellion was thus cut from under his feet. He apologised to Cecil, but all was of no avail now, for Knollys' evidence showed that his revolt was founded on a lie. Then Cecil, with passion unusual to him, made a pronouncement, which, if men could have read the hidden meaning of it, would have shown them the road he meant to take. "I have said," he exclaimed, "that the King of Spain is a competitor for the crown of England, and that the King of Scots is a competitor, and my Lord of Essex, I have said, is a competitor, for he would depose the Queen and call a parliament and so be King himself; but, as to my affection to advance a Spanish title to England, I am so far from it that my mind is astonished to think of it, and I pray God to consume me where I stand if I hate not the Spaniard as much as any man living."

So whilst Essex and his friends went forth to their death, his rival cleared his position to the extent of completely disavowing the Infanta's candidature. Of the three claimants mentioned by him, one he thus vehemently repudiated, another stood before him a convicted and condemned traitor, and the third, James Stuart, was inferentially invited to bid for his support. And yet very few men understood this at the time.

## CHAPTER XIII

The change in the succession question in consequence of the death of Essex—The secret understanding between James and Cecil—James's new attitude towards the Catholics—Lord Montjoy in Ireland—Occupation of Derry—Disappointment of Tyrone and O'Donnell with Spain—La Cerda's mission to Ireland—Preparations for a new Spanish expedition to Ireland—Carew in Munster—Sailing of the expedition—O'Sullivan Beare—The Spaniards in Kinsale—The siege—The Spaniards isolated in Kinsale, Castlehaven, Dunboy, and Baltimore—Defeat of Tyrone—Capitulation of Kinsale—The O'Sullivans and Dunboy—O'Donnell in Spain—Death of O'Donnell—Exodus of the O'Sullivans, pardon of Tyrone, and the pacification of Ireland.

THE disappearance of Essex from the scene completely changed the position of the succession question. Essex had, in his secret correspondence with James, persistently represented Cecil as the King's enemy. It had always been the policy of the moderate party in England to promote a close friendship with Spain and Flanders, as a counterbalance to the traditional union of France with Scotland; and the younger Cecil in this had followed the footsteps of his father. But that either of them had the slightest intention of subjecting England to Spanish interests, or of favouring Catholic supremacy, as Essex averred, is untrue. Yet whilst Essex, with his vindictive personal jealousy and political ambition, took the zealous Protestant party as the tool to serve his ends, Cecil was obliged to lean for support, as his father had done, upon the nobles and gentry whose

sympathies were more or less avowedly Catholic, tempered mainly by a desire to retain the vast landed estates they held from the plunder of the Church. This party had many reasons for disliking the idea of a Scottish King. They had always looked upon Scotland as an inferior and semi-subject country, and upon Scotsmen as uncivilised boors of predatory and murderous habits; the levelling tenets of the Scottish Presbyterian clergy filled them, moreover, with alarm, and many of them would frankly have preferred a pure Catholic domination under a native sovereign to the acknowledgment of James as their King. Cecil could not afford to do without the support of these men; and yet he saw that the attempt to bring in any other sovereign than James on the Queen's death could only succeed if aided by foreign forces, which would mean civil war and the almost certain subversion of Protestantism.

The problem before him was an extremely difficult one. He was now by far the most powerful man in England,—“King in effect,” James called him in his instructions to the Earl of Mar; but still his power in a great measure depended upon the Queen's good opinion of him and the support of the moderate party. For him to have openly favoured the King of Scots would have deeply offended Elizabeth, who was determined to have no successor legally acknowledged in her lifetime, and would also have driven the nobles, upon whom he depended, into schemes from which he would be excluded. The only course by which England could be saved from civil war and the Protestant Church preserved from destruction was for Cecil secretly to reassure James of his

fideliety and wean him from his Catholic dependence, whilst Cecil kept in close touch with his own party opposed to James, for the purpose of being able at the critical moment to subvert their plans.<sup>1</sup> This was the course that Cecil took, and in doing so he not only betrayed and ruined Catholics like his brother-in-law Cobham, but men of whom he was personally jealous, such as Raleigh and Grey, who were really stronger Protestants than he was himself.

James's ambassadors, the Earl of Mar and Edward Bruce, lingered on their way south until after the head of Essex fell, and they did not reach London until March 1601. Their instructions were greatly modified from those originally suggested by Essex, but they were to still urge the Queen to acknowledge James's right, and more forcibly to threaten Cecil and his party with vengeance if they opposed him, whilst to Cecil especially they were to promise James's favour for his timely aid. The instructions were never carried out; for the ambassadors, Bruce notably, were cleverer than their King. They saw in London how untrue had been Essex's libels upon the Cecil party of favouring the Spanish domination of England, and heard how Cecil had vehemently disavowed the King of Spain at Essex's trial, and they accordingly got into touch secretly with the

<sup>1</sup> Cecil on one occasion was afraid that James might be offended at his consorting with his enemies, but the King thus reassured him: "I hairetely praye you to assure youre self, that ye can have no dealing quhatsumever with jewe, gentile or heathen, that ever will breede the least suspition in me of any crakke in your integretie towards me; but by the contraire the further ye are upon thaire secreats, the more abil will I be to sitt as a godd upon all the imaginations of their heartes" (Correspondence of James and Cecil, Camden Society).



all-powerful Secretary. Lord Henry Howard, who had been the go-between of Essex and James, appears to have been the first promoter of the arrangement; and at a meeting between Cecil and the Scotsmen at Cecil's House in the Strand, the terms were agreed upon, and a cypher for the correspondence arranged. Cecil's conditions were that he would assure the peaceful succession to James if the latter would trust him, and cease all endeavours to obtain the recognition of his rights during the Queen's life. The correspondence between them was to be kept inviolably secret, and the extraordinary precaution was taken of sending it all by way of Ireland to divert suspicion.<sup>1</sup>

Our main concern at present with this most interesting correspondence is to mark how completely it changed James's policy towards the Catholics. He was now all amiability to the Queen, he ceased pestering her about the succession, and he discoursed quite eloquently of the foolishness and wickedness of any suggestion that he could ever turn his arms against England, which, as we have seen, he had been so eager to do a little while previously.<sup>2</sup> All irritating embassies and activities with the

<sup>1</sup> This extraordinary correspondence, which was kept up until the Queen's death, is published entire by the Camden Society. Cecil, on one occasion at least, solemnly denied that any understanding existed between him and James, and to the last the secret was well kept.

<sup>2</sup> Nicholson, the English agent in Scotland, in a letter to Cecil at Hatfield, tells the story at this period of how James rebuked the Laird of Kinnard, in whose house he was staying on his progress. The Laird drank to the speedy union of the two kingdoms, and said he had forty muskets ready; whereupon the King told him it was very wrong to wish such a thing, "but in Godes tyme." Kinnard was not in the secret, and no doubt wondered at the King's change of tone.

Catholic powers were stopped, and James thenceforward, with growing confidence in Cecil's strength and wisdom, was content to await the death of the Queen rather than "by climbing of hedges and ditches for pulling of unripe fruit to hazard the breaking of my neck." Incidentally the falsity and baseness of the man are shown in a vivid light. We have seen some of his cringing approaches to Spain and his devout professions of Catholicism when he thought such a course suited his interests; yet when Cecil asked his advice as to proceeding with the peace negotiations with Spain, the King strongly urged that no peace should be made, because the prospects of his succession might be prejudiced by the new friendship and by the possible presence in England of Spanish agents, "Jesuites, seminaric priests, and that rable, qubairwith England is already toe muche infected, who would then resort there in such suarmes as the katerpillers or flies did in Ægipte." The King took this opportunity of giving to Cecil an account of what he dignified by the name of his religion. Warning him of the large number of priests who were allowed unmolested to remain in England, he says, "I protest in Goddi's presence, the daily increase that I hear of Popery in England, and the proude vanterie that the Papists daily make . . . is the cause that moves me to break forth in this digression."

Cecil knew better than James that the English Catholics must not be driven to desperation at that juncture, and replied that he, too, detested priests and their doctrines, "only I confess that I shrink to see them dye by dozens when at the last gasp

they come so neere loyalty. . . . But contrariwise for that generation of vypars, the Jesuits, who make no more than ordinary merchandise of the blood and crowns of princes, I am so far from any compassion. as I would rather look to receive command from you to abstain than to prosecute." It is noteworthy, too, in this secret letter, that Cecil repudiates all ideas of toleration for the Catholics, and only asks that "some charitable relief should be used in prison or beyond sea" to those priests who have proved by acts their loyalty to the Government and to the claims of James. Thus, so far as the King of Scots and Cecil are concerned, the plot is laid bare: both of them hated priests and repudiated toleration; but for the furtherance of their aims, "loyal" Catholics were to be dealt with mildly, in order that they might expect toleration from a King who had so often avowed himself a Catholic, and whose utter baseness they did not yet know.

The interests were thus gradually narrowing. James dropped out of the international intrigue; the Spanish Council acknowledged the impossibility of invading either England or Scotland direct; and thenceforward Spain could only work through Ireland, or through the English Catholics, who disliked the idea of a Scottish king of England. When Montjoy had landed in Ireland early in 1600, he had found the whole country except the Pale and the walled towns in the hands of the rebels. Though the fastidious young lord had seen comparatively little fighting, which was the fault of the Queen rather than his own, he was a theoretical soldier of a high order, and seized at once upon the tactical needs

of the situation. His army was small, not exceeding 14,000 English infantry, mostly of very inferior quality, and some 1500 horse, and he could not hope to march a sufficiently powerful force by land through trackless Ulster to beat Tyrone in his own fastness. Munster was in different case. There the sturdy veteran, Sir George Carew, had a free hand, by severity and conciliation alternately, to bring the province back again to its obedience. The smaller chiefs were not overjoyed at the re-erection by Tyrone of the feudal princes, M'Carty More and Desmond, and the hold of the former, at least, over his clan was sufficiently precarious for him to hanker after the recognition of the Queen's Government, who were inclined to favour his kinsman, Donnell, the chief chosen by the clansmen themselves before Tyrone's interference. By working upon the greed and ambition of these rival chieftains, and others in like case all over Munster, Carew managed before the end of the year to drive M'Carty and most of the other Munster chiefs into a sulky and shifty obedience,<sup>1</sup> whilst the *Sagan* Earl of Desmond lurked in hiding with a few followers.

But Montjoy could not deal thus with the north and west. The base of Tyrone's position was Lough Foyle, and that of O'Donnell, Ballyshannon, because their supplies of munitions of war and other

<sup>1</sup> Carew writes to Cecil, January 15, 1601 (Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared), advocating a decided policy of conciliation with the Munster chiefs, with a general pardon. "I do not know any one man of quality in Munster who was not bound by his oath upon the Sacrament to assist the rebellion, though some have more openly declared themselves than others." Full particulars of Carew's campaign in Munster will be found in "Pacata Hibernia" and the Carew Calendars.

necessaries from abroad could reach them there alone with safety; and only by means of a force conveyed by water could the English hope successfully to attack them. Whilst, therefore, Montjoy made a feint of marching against Ulster by land, a force of 4000 foot, 200 horse, and 3 guns, under Sir Henry Docwra, sailed to Lough Foyle and succeeded in fortifying themselves at Derry (May 1600). The second part of the programme, the occupation of Ballyshannon on Donegal Bay, commanding the string of lakes which stretch right into Connaught, was not then possible, as Montjoy was obliged to return into Leinster to suppress the fresh risings of O'Byrnes and O'Tooles there. The seizure of Lough Foyle, however, struck a shrewd blow at Tyrone, for he dared not now take too large a force elsewhere, for fear of seeing his own principality overrun by the men from Derry;<sup>1</sup> and Montjoy was able before the end of the year to bring much of Ireland, outside Ulster and Donegal, into at least nominal obedience.

We have seen (page 407) that, notwithstanding the peremptory orders of Philip III. to the effect that a powerful force should be sent from Spain at once to aid the Irish rebels, all the summer and autumn of 1600 had been frittered away by his officers, and by the end of November 1600 not even the small preliminary supply of money and biscuit had been despatched from Lisbon. Apparently, however, owing to the renewed prayers of Tyrone's envoy,

<sup>1</sup> Fenton writes to Cecil on the 1st January 1601 that "Tyrone is not a little gravelled to see Leinster in hazard to be gott from him" (Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared). In the same letter Fenton says that Tyrone remains in the south part of his country "attending on Lough Foyle."

Richard Owen, a great effort was then made, and early in December "two tall ships" sailed from Lisbon with Don Martin de la Cerda on board, taking with him 10,000 ducats in money and a quantity of weapons and munitions of war. As usual, the most exaggerated and alarming news was spread in Ireland as to the strength of the expedition, but thanks to Fenton's desire to "beat out the truth" and to the report of his trusty spy, we are in a position to know exactly what happened<sup>1</sup> when La Cerda sailed into Donegal Bay. There promptly came to greet him not only O'Donnell,<sup>2</sup> but Tyrone himself from Dungannon, O'Rourke, MacWilliam Bourke, O'Connor Sligo, Hugh Mostyn, and other chiefs. They had, they told the King's officer, already despaired of help from Spain, and O'Donnell, much as he was needed in Ireland, was on the point of himself sailing to make a last appeal to the King.<sup>3</sup> The Queen's troops had overrun Ireland during the summer and the Catholic cause was reduced to the last extremity, they told La Cerda, but if their sovereign, King Philip, would send them, without fail, at least 5000 infantry before July they could hold out in Ulster and the west till then.

When, however, Philip's two short Latin letters

<sup>1</sup> Fenton to Cecil, January 20, 1601 (Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared).

<sup>2</sup> Tyrone quarrelled with O'Donnell because he went on board the Spanish ship and had speech with La Cerda before Tyrone arrived at Donegal. The money, arms, &c., were divided, one half going to Tyrone, and the other half between the rest of the chiefs (Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared).

<sup>3</sup> Spanish Calendar, vol. iv. (Simancas).

were opened with much ceremony and read by Tyrone and O'Donnell, disappointment again fell upon them. There were only a few lines in each letter of vague sympathy and exhortation to stand firm, with the same general promise of aid that had been made and broken so often before. "Whereupon O'Donnell was like a madd man, when he saw no kinde of news neither of men or money to come, and presentlie swore he would go himself to Spain, and would indeede have gone, if the captain of the Spaniards had suffered him. The Spaniard, seeing O'Donnell and the rest so angry, he told O'Donnell that he wronged himself, for, said he, you thinke that if the King send here an armie that he will let you or any one else know it? No! nor the Council of Spaine shall not know it. For so, mayhap, intelligence shall goe into England and so draw an armie against us, and this is the cause that none shall know what he meaneth to do."<sup>1</sup> With this comforting suggestion of La Cerda, the chiefs were only half satisfied, for of excuses they had had more than enough. So they settled to send back the Spanish Archbishop of Dublin and Tyrone's confessor, Father Chamberlain, to add their verbal prayers to the letters to the King which were carried by La Cerda. "But by God," swore Tyrone to Fenton's spy, "I have no longer any hope of help from the King of Spain, although, peradventure, he will send us a shippe with as much as he did now to feede us, for the King of France is at war with the Duke of Savoy, whom the King of Spaine will help, and so will have no men to spare this year."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Tyrone was truly in evil case just then. His cattle were now but few, and of corn, bread, or butter he had none. The strong English garrison at Lough Foyle was a sharp thorn thrust deeply into his side, and the policy of keeping an English ship or two on the Irish coast was stopping his supplies by sea. His communications with Munster were almost cut off.<sup>1</sup> John of Desmond, the fugitive Earl's brother, had come to Donegal to pray for aid from the chiefs, who agreed to send O'Rourke's brother with 1000 men to the Earl's rescue,<sup>2</sup> whilst Montjoy now had Leinster well in hand, and the Pale was safe from incursions. James Stuart, moreover, no longer smiled upon the rebel chief, and it must have been evident to Tyrone that his only hope of ultimate success now lay in the questionable arrival of powerful aid from Spain. The bulls he had received from the Pope, from which such great results were expected, had fallen flat, for the real root of the movement, in the case of the chiefs, was territorial rather than religious, and they held (when it suited them) that Rome had no power to dissolve their allegiance to their sovereign, the Queen of England, who made no serious attempt, moreover, to interfere with their religious observances.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Spanish Archbishop, writing to the Sagan Earl of Desmond, who was in hiding, bidding him farewell (January 13), says he should have gone personally to him, but he could not go without an army ("Pacata Hibernia").

<sup>2</sup> This desperate attempt of Tyrone to force a way down to Munster was frustrated by Carew, who reinforced Limerick and held the line of the Shannon ("Pacata Hibernia").

<sup>3</sup> It is related in "Pacata Hibernia" that certain Munster Catholics sent to Rome at this time priests to purchase from the Pope absolution for abstaining from helping the Catholic cause.



The Irish cause, therefore, was now at its turning-point. If aid came from Spain promptly and strong, Ulster, at all events, might retain its autonomy under O'Neil and the old Irish tradition; if it came not, then Tyrone must make the best terms he could with the Queen's Government.

La Cerda, with the Spanish Archbishop and the Irish chieftains' letters, arrived in Spain towards the end of January 1601 at a favourable juncture, for the war between France and Savoy had just come to an end, and the Spanish infantry that had been raised to help Savoy was not now needed. The Archbishop pleaded eloquently for the Irish. "The country," he said, "and especially Tyrone and O'Donnell and the rest of the Catholics, now stood in imminent peril, and there was a danger of the entire extinction of the faith and obedience to the Church which they had hitherto upheld with so much bravery and bloodshed." He submitted the "grave prejudice which would thereby be suffered by Christendom at large, and expressed deep sorrow that, after they had exposed themselves to so much jeopardy in the service of God, and so many promises had been sent to them, they should be thus abandoned by a powerful and Catholic monarch, upon whom, after God, they had founded all their hopes."<sup>1</sup> These appeals touched Philip in his most tender points, namely, his Catholicity and his pride; and once more the whole subject was turned over to his Council of State for consideration and report. Again they told him that it was his obvious duty to support the Irish Catholics; and they thought that in the circumstances 6000 men

<sup>1</sup> Simancas MSS., Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

might be sent instead of the 5000 asked for by Tyrone. "Stores and munitions should be made ready at once, for they have not even bread to eat in Ireland. Everything should be done with great secrecy; the men should be quietly concentrated in Lisbon, and an increased quantity of biscuit ordered." Sufficient money should be sent with the expedition to last six months—200,000 ducats, which sum it was supposed already existed in Lisbon—and 105,000 ducats more must be raised for fitting out the fleet.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the recommendation previously made, Irish and other ships in Spanish southern ports were seized for the service,<sup>2</sup> and all the preparations were detailed for the sending to Ireland, at last, of a powerful force to strike a blow for the Catholic cause.<sup>3</sup>

In the meanwhile, alarming news of the threatening Armada came to Ireland and to England.

<sup>1</sup> February 9, 1601. The Council to Philip. Simancas, Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared.

<sup>3</sup> Ibarra provided the following estimate of the cost of the expedition:—

	Ducats.
Maintenance of 4500 men for two months . . . . .	40,000
One wage for 4000 new soldiers to be shipped . . . . .	20,000
Two wages for veteran cavalry . . . . .	12,000
Shipping and keep of men . . . . .	17,000
Two wages for Irish infantry . . . . .	16,000
It is most important that the troops should be kept in good order and prevented from molesting the natives, so they must be paid punctually. For this and other needs there must be taken with the expedition . . . . .	200,000
Total.	<u>305,000</u>

The remaining 1500 or 2000 men were to be provided for in Lisbon, presumably by the Portuguese Exchequer. Twenty caravels were to

Timothy Williams, a Plymouth mariner who had been a prisoner in Spain, escaped from Corunna and told of the vast collection of stores; a merchant arriving in Ireland from Spain said that 9000 men were in Lisbon destined for Ireland.<sup>1</sup> Montjoy clamoured for more men and stores, especially for Munster; Carew caught the shifty M'Carty More corresponding with the rebels and haled him to prison (July 1601); the *Sugan* Earl of Desmond was tracked to his last cave by the White Knight, and fell into English hands (May 1601);<sup>2</sup> there was no great Munster chief now to lead the province, and all men knew that the final trial of strength was coming which should make Tyrone a semi-independent vassal of Spain, or a beaten traitor at the mercy of Elizabeth. Through the summer the alarming news of a great Spanish fleet in preparation came. Sometimes Cecil believed that the destination was Flanders, and once there came in July a false alarm that the Spaniards were already in the Channel, where there were no English ships ready to resist them but a few foul little vessels under Sir Richard Leveson; but the flocking of priests to Ireland, the rising hopes of the rebels, and the irrepressible talk on the quays of Lisbon, convinced the Anglo-Irish governors, at all events, that the Spaniards were to strike at them. But at what point? Carew persisted in his belief that Munster would be at-

be freighted (those seized in the ports doubtless) at a cost of 140,000 ducats, to bring troops from the Azores. The accounts are extremely detailed, and the above is a mere abstract of them.

<sup>1</sup> Harris to Cecil, March 9, and Lord Chancellor of Ireland to Cecil, February 9. Irish State Papers, 208, uncalendared.

<sup>2</sup> A most quaint and curious account of James Fitz-Thomas's capture is in vol. i. of "Pacata Hibernia."

tacked, either Cork or Waterford, and the aged Lord Admiral was of the same opinion. Carew, therefore, with his quite insufficient forces, made what dispositions he could to hold Cork against an enemy, whilst he still kept back an advance of the rebels southward by grimly clinging to Limerick and the line of the Shannon. Montjoy was determined, if possible, to strike a blow at Ulster itself before the arrival of the Spaniards, and though he got but little help from England, he did nobly. In July he captured the fort on the Blackwater, which formed the door to Ulster from the Pale; for Tyrone dared not divert his force from Lough Foyle, or Docwra at Derry would push down to Ballyshannon and so divide Tyrone from O'Donnell. Though Docwra was unable to reach so far south as that, he did the next best thing possible to him, namely, to make a dash at O'Donnell's capital of Donegal, which he captured and held in August.

Thus month after month passed and still no Spanish Armada appeared. By the middle of September a fine flying squadron of seven new galleons had been fitted out in England to supplement Leveson's little Channel fleet, and the fear of a Spanish descent upon England, which still haunted the minds of the men who had fought the Armada of 1588, grew less alarming as England stood on her guard.

In the meanwhile affairs were proceeding in Spain in the usual inept fashion. When Philip had again accepted the advice of his council to send the fleet to Ireland (February 1601), he had "entrusted this matter to my confessor, as it is so much for God's service, in order that he may see everything recom-

mended here carried out with all possible speed." And yet, although the soldiers were mostly mustered in Lisbon in February, it was late in August 1601 before the Council could advise Philip that all was ready for a start. Two flyboats had been sent to Killibegs during the summer<sup>1</sup> carrying messages to the chiefs as to the aid they might expect, and to take counsel as to its destination ; but almost to the hour of sailing of the fleet a difference of opinion existed as to the most suitable place for it to attack. Some of the Irish thought it should go to Ulster, some to Drogheda, but it was finally considered that the nearness of Munster to Spain gave it an advantage over other parts of Ireland, and Cork was selected as the port of debarkation.

Early in September all was finally ready. There were thirty-three ships, great and small, for the conveyance of troops, besides storeships, flyboats, and victuallers. Don Juan del Aguila, a famous Spanish soldier, who had held Brittany for so long against France and England combined, was in chief command of the troops, of which there were nearly 5000, besides six pieces of siege artillery and a large quantity of stores. The shipping was under the command of Don Diego Brochero as admiral, and a fine old sailor, Pedro de Zubiaur, as vice-admiral. Carew stood ready at Cork, determined to fight as became his name, though the Government in London had helped him but little. On September 13 a swift pinnace, under Captain Love of

<sup>1</sup> One of these vessels was very nearly caught by Captain Plessington of the *Tramontana*, but she escaped by her superior sailing powers (Irish State Papers, 209, uncalendared).

Crookhaven, brought him the news that the Spanish fleet, with wind astern, was out of the Bay and sailing straight for Ireland; and that day, and the next, and the next, the stout President of Munster looked hourly for the invaders who came not. On the fourth day the wind changed to the north, and he knew that, whilst that wind blew, Cork was safe from any Spanish fleet that sailed. Montjoy in the meanwhile had pushed south as far as Athy, and thither Carew rode to concert with his chief the plan of defence; but fatigue and sickness overtook him before he reached Athy, and Montjoy found him lying ill near Kilkenny. Whilst they were there conferring, the wind changed to the east, and on the 23rd a breathless messenger came from Sir Charles Wilmot at Cork to say that the Spanish fleet had two days before endeavoured to make the harbour, and had failed, whereupon the invaders had sailed towards Kinsale. Munster was the place of danger; and Montjoy and Carew determined to concentrate every available man to face the foe there, leaving Dublin and the Pale to look after itself till the more pressing peril had passed.

The danger was again not so great as it looked. Spanish organisation was still wretched, and Spanish hearts were no longer in the task. When the northern gale had struck the fleet off Ushant, the vice-flagship of Zubiaur, with eight other vessels carrying 650 soldiers and most of the stores, had been driven back crippled to Corunna, and another of the largest ships, full of men, had straggled, and had been captured at the mouth of the Channel by an English privateer. Three more vessels, with 700

men on board, fell off too far to leeward, to make either Cork or Kinsale, and sought shelter in O'Driscoll's harbour of Baltimore. The main expedition, therefore, that sailed into the harbour of Kinsale (October 1, 1601, N.S.) brought only about 3000 effective soldiers under Don Juan del Aguila. The town was garrisoned by one English company; the defences were obsolete and the place untenable; so the Spaniards were allowed to land without opposition. Don Juan was a chivalrous soldier of the old school, brave as a lion, but thinking little of sailors; whilst Brochero, the admiral, like most of the men of his profession, believed that, though their function was conveyance and not fighting, seamen were, in their way, as dignified as men-at-arms. The demoralisation that afflicted the Spanish service also touched him; and when Aguila requested him not to sail away until he had sent the food stores up the river to the town, Brochero replied that he could not wait to land the food, and simply cast the munitions anyhow, without order or account, into the ooze at the mouth of the harbour, "where they were all ill-handled and wet as if the enemy had been already playing with their artillery on the ships;" and so Brochero sailed away, leaving Don Juan del Aguila with his little army, and only two field-pieces and two demi-cannon, to do the best he could.<sup>1</sup>

He endeavoured to tranquillise the townspeople,

<sup>1</sup> Don Juan reported that the rest of the cannon was not landed, as he had not ammunition for it, much of the latter being spoilt by the wet. Philippus O'Sullivan ("Historiæ Catholicae Ibernicae") says that, from the first landing of the force, dissensions existed between the Spanish officers, and between Aquila and the Spanish Archbishop of Dublin, who accompanied him.

assuring them personally and by proclamation that he would use them as friends and brothers; "yet, withal, he findeth no assistance from them, neither dare they declare themselves." The place, with its crumbling mediæval walls, was commanded by hills on all sides, but a small peninsula jutting out in front of the town would make a good point from which the entrance from the sea could be defended. This, however, Don Juan decided that he had not sufficient men to effect, and to defend the town from the land-side as well. Many of his soldiers were boys and recruits, who began to skulk and evade as soon as they landed. This, however, he presently stopped, and his skill and firmness infused some spirit and courage into them. Still it was evident to him that in this exposed little town, with a small isolated force, short of food and stores,<sup>1</sup> he could do nothing effectual until he had formed a junction with Tyrone. Montjoy he knew was with over 4000 English troops at Cork, only sixteen miles away, and there was nothing to prevent the Viceroy from pushing between Kinsale and the forces of the northern rebels. Aguila, therefore, could only send off beseeching messages to Spain for reinforcements and supplies, whilst the English troops gradually drew around him. Swift runners and pinnaces, too, were sent by Don Juan and the Spanish Archbishop to

<sup>1</sup> One of the first acts of the English was to burn all the food within five miles of Kinsale and seize the cattle ("Pacata Hibernia"). As we have seen, the Spaniards had always been told that they need bring no horses, but only harness. The former, however plentiful they might be in Ulster, were non-existent in Kinsale, and the harness had drifted back to Spain. Aguila had therefore no cavalry with which to prevent the English destruction.



warn Tyrone and O'Donnell of his coming. But they were afar off; the English troops held Derry and Donegal, whilst Limerick and the Shannon in English hands lay between the rebels and the Spaniards, and before the chiefs could join Del Aguila, the force of the Lord Deputy would have to be utterly defeated.

The Munster chiefs saw, like the rest of the world, that this was the struggle which was to decide once for all whether the Catholic supremacy should be restored or not. The fates had decreed that at the critical point all the chances leant to the side of England and Protestantism: but Catholic churchmen had not been exhorting and preaching to Irishmen in vain for so many years, and the Munster men began to simmer into fervour for the cause, as they thought, of God and Ireland. The great men, M'Carty More and Desmond, were safe under lock and key, offering to fight against their own countrymen and swearing unalterable loyalty to the Queen in return for a recognition of their rank and possessions, but the smaller chiefs, all of whom had taken the oath of obedience, were impelled for many besides religious reasons to think of the future. Many of them held their lands, as English nominees, against the hereditary claimants under the Irish law, and if they sided with the English now, a rebel victory would mean their ejection and ruin. Such a man as this was Donal O'Sullivan Beare, Lord of Beare and Bantry, whose importance had been of late years enormously increased by the suppression of his prince, M'Carty More, and by the patronage of the English, who had dispossessed his uncle Owen

in his favour. He, like most of his neighbours, had always been effusively loyal, though some of his kinsmen had risen up and joined the Fitzgeralds in the Desmond wars. This chief, with his magnificent harbour of Bantry and his apparently impregnable castle of Dunboy, did not wish to offend the English, but he was even more loath to lose his rank and possessions at the hands of Tyrone. So from Dunboy a secret message went to Del Aguila to say that a thousand sturdy clansmen, fully armed, were ready, and a thousand more if arms were sent to them, to march under their chief to check the advance of Montjoy until Tyrone and O'Donnell could join the Spaniards. The Spanish commander could only reply sadly that his arms had drifted back to Spain in Zubiaur's ships, and he had none to spare. He was, moreover, ignorant as yet of Tyrone's plan of campaign; and whilst thanking O'Sullivan, he advised him for the moment to stand firm but not to declare himself.<sup>1</sup>

In the meanwhile Carew and Montjoy worked like the heroes they were. The artillery and stores had to be brought from Dublin, and this delayed them for weeks before a regular siege of Kinsale could be undertaken; but skirmishes and desperately resisted sallies of the Spaniards took place almost nightly, for the English force of about 4000 men were now close around the town. One of the victualling ships, under Captain Button, and a pinnace called the *Moon* belonging to the Queen, were the only vessels as yet available for blockade; and once they made an ineffectual attempt with

<sup>1</sup> Philippus O'Sullivan.

their little guns, as they lay in the harbour mouth, to capture the Castle of Rincorran, which commanded the entrance to Kinsale on the east side of the channel. At length, however, towards the end of October, the siege artillery and stores were landed in a little haven to the east of Kinsale towards Cork, and the siege of the town began in earnest. The first task of the English was to reduce the Castle of Rincorran, where Aguila had posted 150 men with a promise that they should be reinforced if the place were attacked. The English had only two faulty culverins for their battery, and numberless mishaps befell them before they could be effectually used. Again and again they broke down, and during the first night of the attack Aguila endeavoured to reinforce the castle by means of boats from the town. In this, however, Captain Button, the sturdy victualler, who was on the alert, frustrated them by means of his popguns of demi-sakers.

On the second day of the canuonade Carew lost patience at the poor practice, and laid and worked the guns himself. Aguila seeing that the fort must fall if not relieved, made a bold attempt to thrust reinforcements into it by land. A desperate little battle ensued, in which many fell on both sides before the Spaniards were driven back.<sup>1</sup> The gallant little

<sup>1</sup> It should be explained that the harbour of Kinsale lies inside the serpentine mouth of the Bandon, which opens into the ocean towards the south. A little way inside the river suddenly turns west, forming a peninsula in front of the town, which lies on a slope facing the east. The Castle of Rincorran was on the east side of the outer channel, facing the peninsula towards the west, so that to relieve it by land from the town a detour had to be made on the north side, and it was here that the battle in question was fought on October 31st, in which the Spaniards were driven back.

garrison of Rincorran did their best to make terms, but Montjoy insisted upon complete surrender and this the Spanish captain, Paez de Clavijo, refused unless he might retain his sword and return to Kinsale. His own men threatened to throw him over the walls for his obstinacy, and many of them escaped by the waterside; but by the 1st November all was over at Rincorran; Paez surrendered his sword to Montjoy, and Aguila now found friendly access to him cut off by land and sea. In the meanwhile, both England and Spain had awakened to the important crisis that had been reached. The troops to be sent from England were increased from 2000 to 5000, but unfortunately mariners were hard to get, for all sea service except privateering for plunder was unpopular. Thus the soldiers stood waiting, and it was quite the end of October before the flying squadron of six royal galleons with merchantmen and transports sailed out of the Thames, crowded with troops, under Sir Richard Leveson. Then bad weather, head winds, and accidents delayed them in the Channel, and it was the 15th November before the naval force reached the offing of Kinsale with the reinforcements which placed Montjoy in a position of at least numerical equality with the enemy.

Tardy as had been the English naval preparations, those of the Spaniards were fortunately more lagging still. Zubiaur's squadron had to be refitted and reinforced, and, notwithstanding Aguila's urgent and repeated messages, did not sail from Corunna until the 7th December (N.S.). The force was a strong one, consisting of ten ships with 829 foot-soldiers and a large quantity of food and stores. Again mis-

fortune or want of skill dogged the Spaniards from the first. One of Zubiaur's ships was wrecked going out of port, and he lost sight of three others in the bad weather that followed, one of which was wrecked on the coast of Brittany, one returned to Galicia, and the third was captured off Kinsale by the English. With the six ships remaining Zubiaur approached Kinsale, but learning from Irish fishermen that the mouth of the harbour was full of English men-of-war, he sailed off to the convenient port of Castlehaven to the west. Sir Finnan O'Driscoll and his sons had always been loyal to the Queen, like their neighbour, O'Sullivan, but this fresh force of Spaniards arriving in their country turned the scale. Tyrone and O'Donnell were hastening south with the rebel army, Carew's attempt to intercept the latter at Cashel with a flying column having failed, either by reason of O'Donnell's better knowledge of the ground having enabled him to slip past the English into West Munster, or from Carew's disinclination to engage the Irish in an action, of which, from the first, he disapproved.

There had also drifted into the O'Driscoll port of Baltimore three of the vessels of the original Brochero squadron, which had remained there isolated but unmolested. Now that Zubiaur's fresh reinforcement had arrived in their country, it seemed wise for the O'Driscolls and the O'Sullivans to throw over their loyalty and to rally openly to the Catholic side. The fortresses of Castlehaven and Baltimore were solemnly handed over by their owners to the Spanish officers for King Philip. The news ran like wildfire through Munster, and from bog and mountain shaggy clansmen flocked down to their chiefs to fight for faith

and Ireland against the Sassenach. O'Sullivan Beare, to be denied no longer, tendered the submission of his lands and castles to the King of Spain.<sup>1</sup> Zubiatur armed 700 Irishmen, whom he despatched with 200 Spaniards to join O'Donnell, and then putting Spanish garrisons into Castlehaven, Baltimore, and Dunboy, he sent pinnaces flying to Spain to beg for powerful reinforcements.

Here were three little isolated Spanish forces, whose very existence depended upon the victory of the rebel chiefs over the English. With an incredible want of skill or good fortune, each separate Spanish expedition had got itself bottled up in a different port, and practically beleaguered by land and sea. In the meanwhile, the siege of Kinsale, whither Carew had now returned from his abortive attempt to intercept O'Donnell, proceeded briskly; the fleet under Leveson co-operating effectually with Montjoy. Two of the naval guns were landed, and forced the surrender of the entrenched fort on the peninsula facing the town that defended the inner harbour, and this enabled some of the ships to warp

<sup>1</sup> O'Sullivan wrote a famous letter to Philip III. on December 20, on the occasion of his voluntary submission to the Spaniards. After setting forth his own noble lineage and the racial connection between Ireland and Spain, he continues: "For these considerations and for many other commendable causes, I bequeath and offer in humbleness of mind and heart, my own person, with all my forces, perpetually to serve your Majesty, not only in Ireland, but in any other place where it may please you. I commit, also, my wife and my children, my manors, towns, country, and lands, and my haven of Dunboy, next under God to the protection, keeping, and defence or commerce of your Majesty, to be in your hands and at your disposal." This letter was intercepted, and although O'Sullivan was afterwards anxious to be reconciled to the English, he was never forgiven. As will be told, he became a great Spanish noble, and lived and died in Spain, as did most of his kinsmen.

inside, facing the houses of the town, and to add their battery to that of Montjoy from the land-side. At length, by the end of November, the lower town had become quite untenable, and the Spaniards were driven to the trenches on the farther side, and higher up the slope. Aguila looked, and looked in vain, for the coming of Zubiaur, or for the descent of the rebel chiefs. A great number of his men were sick, and all were famished; but they fought well, sallying night after night and charging the English batteries, sometimes almost successfully. In the midst of this came the news of Zubiaur's arrival at Castlehaven (December 11, N.S.), and thither Leveson hastened with four galleons and two merchantmen of his squadron to engage the Spanish ships. The action that ensued is told variably by the two sides. Zubiaur himself reported that the English landed artillery to attack him; but that he drew off and sank the Queen's flagship, greatly damaging the others, though two of his own ships sank. Philippus O'Sullivan goes beyond this, and says that 501 Englishmen were killed, 60 being knocked over by one shot, as they sat at table: whilst Leveson in his account to the Lord Deputy, claims to have driven the Spanish flagship on to the rocks, that another ship sank, and that two more Spaniards ran aground. Leaving Zubiaur with one, or at most two ships, Leveson then returned to Kinsale and told his story, whilst Zubiaur waited and prayed for succour in vain.

But still the rebel chiefs came not. Don Juan del Aguila wrote to them on December 28, almost indignantly. He expected them long before,

he said: the English were weak and weary, and a blow struck now would be effectual. He spoke truly. The march southward of Tyrone had drawn all Munster into revolt behind him. Montjoy's army was worn and reduced by the winter siege; the small English squadron of galleons at Kinsale was quite inadequate to blockade the whole coast of Munster; and another Spanish expedition under Don Martin de la Cerda was known to be ready to sail from Lisbon. With a little good luck and ability on the part of the Spaniards, Tyrone might at this juncture have turned the tide of events and have made England Catholic. But it was not to be. The weather was bad; O'Donnell lagged on the way for Tyrone's coming; and it was January 1, 1602 (N.S.), before the advance guard of the rebel army appeared to the north on the hills overlooking Kinsale and the English position. Tyrone's plan was to thrust the Castlehaven Spaniards and Irishmen, who had joined him, round the extreme right (or western) flank of the besieging line, where the Irish levies were placed, into Kinsale, which he thought might make Aguila strong enough to come out and join hands with him. Interecepted letters and willing Irish spies informed Montjoy of the plan,<sup>1</sup> and when, before dawn on January 2, 1602, the Spaniards and Munster Kerns crept round and made their attack,

<sup>1</sup> In "Pacata Hibernia," a somewhat significant account is given of one of the sources of Montjoy's information. Two days before the battle, Brian MacHugh Ogue MacMahon, Lord of Monaghan, sent a messenger to ask Montjoy for old acquaintance sake to send him a bottle of aquavita, which the Viceroy did. Either out of gratitude, or from a desire to hedge, or else because he dreaded the overlordship of O'Neil more than that of the Queen, MacMahon sent Montjoy a hint next day, upon which the latter was prompt to act.



they found themselves outnumbered by the English whom Montjoy had stationed there since the previous evening. Out of the 200 Spaniards 140 were killed in the surprise; and as they fled headlong, Tyrone, still in the dark, ordered his forces to draw off, his intention being to attack again with his main body by daylight. As soon as Montjoy learnt this, he advanced rapidly and fell unexpectedly upon Tyrone's right flank as he retreated. The Irish were already demoralised by the confused retreat in the dark, and were seized with panic. The whole six thousand of them fled for life, being slaughtered without mercy when they were caught. Fifteen hundred died thus, and the next day every prisoner, not already sacrificed, was hanged. Tyrone was wounded, and was carried in a litter up into Ulster, and O'Donnell, with Redmond Burke, Hugh Mostyn, and the few remaining Spaniards, managed to reach Castlehaven. Heart-broken, panic-stricken, and desperate, he could only pray Zubiaur to carry them to Spain at once, with the dire news that all was lost; that the heretic cause was victorious, and that Spain must put forth the whole of her might now, or abandon her dream for ever.

The news fell upon Spain like a thunder-clap, and for once aroused the King and his Council to some activity. "Your Majesty's prestige is at stake," said the latter, "and yet there is no means of sending effective and prompt aid, for want of ships, arms, and men, everything being scarce and short." But still, they said, something must be done to keep up the war in Ireland, or the English would descend upon Spain and destroy them all. Every

man must be taken from the garrisons and sent to Ireland ; money, stores, and arms must be collected from every point and at any sacrifice. Knighthoods, increased pay, and rewards must be promised to officers to prompt them to activity. Nobles and bishops must arm their vassals ; Italy and Savoy must be scoured for war materials and men ; all the galleys must come from Naples for the defence of Spain ; ships must be sent to warn the Indies, and the King himself must write a letter to Aguila, urging him to stand firm until help reaches him, that at least will allow him to leave Ireland with honour.<sup>1</sup> O'Donnell, deploring, beseeching, and exhorting, was propitiated with flattery and presents ; but when he asked that the chief command of the new expedition should be given to the Adelantado, he was told that the latter was too great a personage for such a force as could be sent. In the tornado of fright that was passing over the Spanish Administration, the most extravagant advice was given. The Adelantado himself, unpractical as usual, stormed at the policy of sending aid by dribblets : “ which will only prolong the agony, and let the patient die after all.” If only a great Armada had been sent under his command, as he advised, all would have been well ; and even now it might be done. Commissary-General Contreras was for raising an army of 14,000 men for Ireland, half of whom might be Germans and Walloons shipped from Dunkirk. The King's confessor, Father Cordoba, thought they should be prepared for the worst ; but, as the poverty-stricken treasury could not hope to provide for the danger at all points,

<sup>1</sup> The letter is printed in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

“the most important of all preparations will be to appease the anger of Almighty God, provoked by the vices and sins so prevalent in this country. We must therefore earnestly seek a remedy by mending our ways of life and by constant prayer.”<sup>1</sup> In the midst of all this panic and despairing effort, another blow fell. The five ships loaded with men, arms, and stores, which had sailed from Lisbon late in December, under Martin de la Cerda, were driven back again by storm, the flagship alone having reached within sight of Kinsale. There she had captured eleven Irish boatmen, from whom it was learnt that the harbour was full of English ships and the town in possession of the Viceroy; one of the sailors having that very day seen Don Juan del Aguila dining in public with the Queen’s representative. La Cerda waited to hear no more, but sped off to Spain under every rag of sail.

This news somewhat altered the plans. It was clear that matters could not wait until a great force was mustered from all quarters, and orders were given that La Cerda’s squadron, with four more ships, should muster in Corunna, ready to sail with all the stores and men then ready, as soon as news came from Ireland of the real condition of affairs. In the

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Semple’s idea at this time was to raise the number of men for Ireland to 6000, and to send an embassy to Scotland in return for his brother’s mission to Spain in the previous year. The “envoy was to be secretly instructed to assist the Catholics and endeavour to induce them to obtain possession of the little Prince (Henry). If this be done and he be married to the daughter of the Duke of Savoy, the Catholic faith may be restored in Scotland.” Semple also thought that the West Highlanders might be induced to side with Spain, “as they are greatly devoted to the Spaniards, from whom they boast their descent” (Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.).

meanwhile Aguila, shut up in Kinsale, had been growing desperate. Again and again he tried to cut his way out, but ineffectually; and finally, on the last day of the year 1601 (O.S.), the Spanish general prayed for a parley. To Sir William Godolphin, who met him, he expressed his disgust at the Irish, being "not only weak and barbarous, but, as he feared, perfidious friends,"<sup>1</sup> and finding Montjoy a gentlemanly foe, he offered terms of composition. If he might depart honourably for Spain, with all his people, arms, and stores, he was willing to surrender to the English the garrisons now occupied by the Spaniards; but otherwise, he said, with a bit of true Spanish swagger, they "would rather bury themselves alive, and endure a thousand deaths, than to give way to one article that should savour of baseness or dishonour." Aguila, with his 2000 good fighting men, might doubtless, as he said, have held out for a considerable time longer, but he plainly confessed that, after Tyrone's behaviour, the Irish were not worth fighting for. For the English the proposal was distinctly advantageous, since Castlehaven, Dunboy, and Baltimore, as well as Kinsale, were to be delivered to them without further fighting, and the voluntary retirement of the Spanish invading force would be an object-lesson more significant to the world than their destruction by superior numbers. Articles were accordingly soon agreed upon for the Spaniards to leave, with all their property, peacefully in English ships bound for Spain, of which they were to pay the freight.

<sup>1</sup> One of his officers went further: "Surely," he said, "Christ never died for this people."

Whilst the arrangements were being made for the transport of the Spaniards, Aguila and his principal officers lived with the Lord-Deputy in Cork, and one of the Spanish pinnaces sent from Corunna to carry the King's letter already mentioned, and others to his general, came into Bantry. Don Juan del Aguila was now at peace with England, and technically had a right to receive his letters without hindrance; but we are told that Montjoy's "heart itched" to know what was in them, and Carew, who thought everything fair in war against the Irish, arranged to have the courier waylaid and robbed as if by thieves, and the letters were accordingly stolen and brought to Carew whilst Aguila was at dinner with him. The Spaniard, when he heard of the treatment of his courier, was indignant and "vehemently suspicious;" but good George Carew lied to him like a patriot, and offered a large reward for the discovery of his own instruments. The letters may now be read in "Pacata Hibernia," and that of the King in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv., and confirm the account of the active preparations in Spain to help the beleaguered force, which I have already given from the Simancas manuscripts; but, as we have seen, the letters came too late, and Don Juan del Aguila and the last of his men sailed out of Kinsale on the 8th March 1602, with a "flattering gale," and the last struggle of expiring Spanish potency to force Catholic supremacy upon England through Ireland ended thus in ignominious failure.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Don Juan del Aguila had carried with him to Ireland a large number of gold chains, to the value of 2000 ducats, and ten swords of

Whilst Don Juan was feasting in dignified fashion with the English commanders in Cork and exchanging mordant witticisms with George Carew, O'Sullivan and the O'Driscolls were raging and fuming. Their castles and harbours had been voluntarily handed to the Spaniards, to hold for the King; not to surrender to the English without striking a blow. For Irish chiefs to rebel was nothing new, and nothing very heinous; almost every great gentleman in Ireland had been a rebel at one time or another, and pardon could always be had by submission. But though it was not unpardonable to rebel, it was the blackest of treason to surrender the Queen's dominion to the King of Spain, her relentless enemy. The O'Sullivans and O'Driscolls had, doubtless, thought that the English rule over Ireland was doomed, and had sought salvation by enthusiastic adhesion to their new masters. When they found that they had made a mistake their rage and dismay knew no bounds. Our old acquaintance, Pedro Lopez de Soto, who was in command at Castlehaven, peacefully delivered the place to Captain Harvey; but before the force to occupy it had arrived, the O'Driscolls slipped into the fortress and held it against the Spaniards. Whilst the latter were fighting to recover it, the English entered the harbour and the O'Driscolls retired. Baltimore and honour, to be distributed amongst the Irish chiefs after the expected victory. These presents were taken back to Spain by the general, and early in the following year (1603) an interminable discussion took place in the King's Council as to their whereabouts and destination. It was at last agreed that the chains and swords should be again sent to Ireland in the new expedition of aid then being prepared in Corunna under the command of Don Martin de la Cerda, but which never sailed.

Doneshead were delivered by the Spaniards without difficulty, and old Sir Finnan O'Driscoll surrendered himself to mercy, whilst his more warlike sons, except those who had been killed before Kinsale, lurked in hiding, later, as will be told, to escape to Spain.

Dunboy and Bearhaven were a more difficult business. The first English company of nearly 200 men sent in a hoy from Cork to receive the surrender were driven back by foul weather and lost fifty or sixty men from plague; and when, finally, an English force appeared before Dunboy, they found that Donal O'Sullivan had been before them, and had surprised his own fortress. From the inside the chief and his servants had, in the dead of night, pierced a hole through the wall and had admitted eighty of his clansmen, with Father Archer the Jesuit, Thomas Fitzmaurice, Lord of Linx naw, William Burke, Captain Tyrrell, and others. At daylight the priest Archer had begged the Spanish Captain Francisco de Saavedra to go with him to O'Sullivan's chamber. There he was told by the chief that he (O'Sullivan) would hold his castle himself for the King of Spain. He had 1000 armed clansmen outside and 80 inside the walls, and resistance was useless. The Spaniards were all disarmed, not unwillingly, it was said, and most of them were sent to Baltimore and so to Spain. Aguila was indignant, and wanted to recapture the place again for the English, but Montjoy only wished to see the back of the Spaniards and preferred to conquer O'Sullivan himself.

Before this happened, O'Sullivan wrote the second

of his series of eloquent letters to Spain.<sup>1</sup> It was addressed to Count Caracena, the Governor of Galicia, who had written to tell him that O'Donnell was coming with aid to Ireland. Indignantly, O'Sullivan tells the story of the betrayal of his castle by Aguila. "If this place of mine be surrendered with the rest to the enemy, all of us who are faithful to his Majesty in Munster will be lost and the spirit of our people broken. I, by God's grace, can serve his Majesty anywhere with a thousand men armed in our Irish fashion, and will muster them at my own cost from my twenty leagues of well-protected coast. But once my castle, the chief stronghold of my land, is surrendered to the enemy, I shall be reduced to such straits that my people will follow my castles, and the Queen of England will get both. I must take refuge in the woods, there to live miserably amongst the wild beasts until some lure entrap me, and I am led to my death." A day or two later (February 22) he wrote a series of letters to the King, to Lerma, to Zubiaur, to Caracena, and others, all in the same strain of indignant determination. He would lose, he said, 2000 vassals by the surrender of his land, and "would barely find twenty to follow him to the woods and mountains, there to live like wolves until the English entrap us." In the Spanish despatch-boat that carried these heart-breaking epistles to Corunna, O'Sullivan sent his eldest son and other boys of his kin, amongst whom was the future historian, Philip O'Sullevan, with Donal, son

<sup>1</sup> Most of these were intercepted and are in "Pacata Hibernia," but there are two others in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv., from Simancas.



of Sir Finnan O'Driscoll, to clamour still for the Irish who were holding out for Spain in Dunboy.

Of the heroic defence of O'Sullivan's castle for four long months, and of its sanguinary destruction; of the marvellous march of O'Sullivan and his clan through the west of Ireland from the wilds of Glengarriff to Connaught, after holding out for a whole year, this is not the place to relate in detail. The legends and ballads of Ireland are full of references to the heroism which led the O'Sullivans, men, women, and children, to the number of nearly 1000, over rugged mountains and swollen rivers, fighting and famishing, two-thirds the length of Ireland, from Bantry Bay to the O'Rourke stronghold at Leitrim, there to arrive a poor remnant of only 35 spent souls whilst Tyrone was already making good terms with the English. Thenceforward O'Sullivan and his kinsmen were Spanish nobles and Ireland knew him no more; for, plead to Elizabeth as he might for forgiveness, his crime was unpardonable. Devout as was doubtless his Catholicism, and loud as was his professed detestation of English rule, we must need look facts in the face, and admit that his Homeric struggle was, in good truth, neither for his faith nor his country, but only for the O'Sullivan lands and lordships, to which he had no right but the favour of the English law, and which he had by all rules forfeited by treason against the sovereign to whom he had sworn allegiance.

The news of Aguila's capitulation and return to Spain caused the abandonment of the preparations for a great expedition to Ireland. It was patent to every one now that Tyrone had overstated his in-

fluence, and was a weak reed upon which to rest the conquest of Ireland. But still it was considered necessary for Spain to keep up English alarm by supporting the Irish who were in arms. O'Donnell in Corunna prayed fervently for an expedition in force. Writing to the King on April 15, 1602, he says: "Promptness is the very essence of success. . . . I see the time going on apace, and as every hour passes, nearer and nearer approaches the knife to the throats of the faithful band of brave, sorely tried people, whose hope alone is in God's mercy and in your Majesty's pity. I cannot help repeating my sorrowful reminders. . . . If I do not arrive within a month in the north of Ireland, I will not say with 2000 soldiers, but with 1500 or even 1000, with victuals, munitions, stores, and money, to raise 5000 or 6000 natives, and to sustain the war by expelling the enemy from O'Neil's country and my own, I doubt if a large force arriving from your Majesty even in June will be in time to find anything there but the blood and ashes of the multitude of faithful believers in your Majesty."

O'Donnell's plan was to sail at once for Killibegs, which he would make his base of operations, and to form a junction with O'Neil by Donegal and Sligo; but Caracena, with whom he stayed, and to whom he clamoured, as he says, day and night, was not in favour of sending hurriedly a small number of men, but rather to "feed" Tyrone with munitions, food, and money until a larger expedition could be got ready. At last, in despair, O'Donnell prayed that if all his supplications were unavailing he should at least be allowed "to go thither myself to end my

life with the rest of the Catholics of the north." But Philip III. could not think of such a thing, and Red Hugh O'Donnell could only weep and pray for his lost cause. At length, in the autumn of 1602, the beaten chief obtained permission to go to court and personally urge the Irish Catholic cause upon Philip and Lerma. They were at Valladolid, and O'Donnell with his train was lodged seven miles away, in the ancient castle of Simancas, where his beseeching letters were first transcribed by the present writer. There, worn out with grief and anxiety, Red Hugh was seized with a burning fever, and the great Irishman, almost the only one of the chiefs who displayed any real disinterestedness in this struggle, ended his short, strenuous life. Whether his end was hastened by the poison hinted at by Carew or not, I cannot say, but probably it was not.<sup>1</sup> In any case, his death left the Irish cause with no great-hearted champion, for Tyrone ruffled and smiled for years afterwards, a fine gentleman at the English court, until the crafty hands of James and Cecil fastened upon Ulster, and the "plantation" of the country drove out of it the race that looked upon O'Neil as its prince, as well as O'Neil himself.

O'Donnell's faithful confessor, Father Florence

<sup>1</sup> Carew to Montjoy.—May 28, 1602.—"James Blake of Galway . . . departed from me and is gone into Spain, with a determination, bound by many oaths, to kill O'Donnell. God give him strength and perseverance" (Carew Papers).

Same to the same.—October 1602.—"O'Donnell is dead, and I do think it will fall out that he is poisoned by James Blake, of whom your Lordship hath been formerly acquainted. At his coming into Spain he was suspected by O'Donnell, because he embarked at Cork under my authority, but afterwards he insinuated his access and O'Donnell is dead" (*ibid.*).

Conroy, continued to press, as his master had done, for help to the Ulstermen; the Adelantado still propounded flighty schemes for the conquest of England and Ireland,<sup>1</sup> for which he was severely snubbed by the Council; the King's confessor, Father Cordoba, assured Philip that Tyrone could hold out until the spring (1603) if money and arms were sent to him by La Cerda; and one O'Driscoll after the other came backwards and forwards to Corunna, and prayed fervently that something should be done for the Munster Catholics. A few remittances of money and stores were sent to them, but after the exodus of the O'Sullivans and the submission of Tyrone, the clamour and prayers of the Irish priests and refugees died down. Red Hugh's son, like O'Sullivan, became a Spanish noble, leaving worthy descendants to-day in the higher grandeeship; those of the O'Driscoll blood who dared not go back to their native land settled down into Spanish citizens; Tyrone himself long afterwards fled and saw Ireland no more. Tyrone's son died a Spaniard, fighting for his adopted country thirty years after his father's surrender, and thus ingloriously the hope flickered out of Spain's great dream. Powerless long ago to conquer England, as she first dreamed of doing, or of carrying Catholicism by force across the Scottish border, this last failure brought home to her what to the rest of the world was proved by evidence, that

<sup>1</sup> In the spring of 1602 the Adelantado was full of a great scheme for the invasion of England direct, by the co-operation of a force of 14,000 from Spain with Federico Spinola from Flanders, who could, he said, bring 11,000 Germans, Walloons, and Italians in galleys from a Flemish port.

her administration had lost honesty and grip, that her sailors had lost boldness, that her captains had lost skill, and that her people had lost everything. Craft and cunning might yet prevail, but by force of arms nerveless Spain could aspire no more to dictate the religion of England.

## CHAPTER XIV

Mission of Thomas James to Spain—The policy of Philip towards the English succession—Discussion in the Council of State—The new policy adopted too late.—Cecil's conduct—Dynastic intrigues in England—Arabella Stuart's strange behaviour—Suggested explanation—Lord Beauchamp—Attempted flight of Arabella—Death of Elizabeth—Cecil triumphant—Extinction of the last hope of Catholic supremacy by means of foreign intervention.

THE only result of the repeated petitions of the English Catholics urged upon Philip by Father Persons in Rome and Father Creswell in Madrid, and of the recommendations of the King's Council detailed in chapter xii., had been the transmission of a message to the Duke of Sessa and Persons, informing them of the King's intention to adopt the candidature of his half-sister the Infanta to the crown of England. Persons was to convey this intelligence to a very few only of the leading Catholics in England, the rank and file being simply assured generally that the King of Spain had not forgotten them, and would help them when the time came. The messenger by whom the English Catholics communicated with Father Persons was one Thomas James, a rich London merchant settled in Spain,<sup>1</sup> and this man carried from Rome to his Catholic-Jesuit countrymen in Flanders the decision which

<sup>1</sup> An account of this man will be found in Hatfield Papers, vol. viii. He lived when at home at San Lucar, but travelled much. He communicated with the Catholics in England through his brother, Francis James, a merchant in Bread Street, London.

had been sent to Sessa and Persons from Madrid. The uncompromising section to which he was accredited were not likely to be satisfied with so vague a message, and determined to make another effort, before it was too late, to urge the slothful Spaniards to action.

With their renewed instances Thomas James arrived at the Spanish court in the early spring of 1602. He assured the King that "he found the Archduke well disposed, and the English Catholics anxious to participate in an action so conducive to the interests of the Catholic Church. But they were so loyal to the King of Spain that they would take no steps without his orders, and, consequently, the Archduke had sent him (James) to Spain, to make the proposals to the King himself. They had directed him to assure the King how they rejoiced at the news, and how humbly they thanked him for choosing such princes (*i.e.* the Archduke and the Infanta) for their sovereigns." This was all very well, but whether Thomas James and his countrymen in Flanders understood it or not, it really meant that the Archduke would not raise a finger until he was assured that sufficient support would be sent to him from Spain to enforce his wife's claim against all competitors. He and the Infanta were in the midst of their hard struggle with Maurice of Nassau, a struggle which had already reduced their principality to desolation, and almost to despair; and they knew that to make an open offensive war upon England at the same time was absolutely beyond their power. They were middle-aged people, and were aware that they would be childless; in addition

to which, as we have seen, their succession to the English crown was clogged with the condition of their surrendering the dominions which they had inherited; and it is therefore not surprising that they displayed no enthusiasm in accepting the impracticable task so vaguely suggested to them. It was Thomas James's mission from the English Catholics to obtain some practical decision from the King, instead of the hollow, sanctimonious bombast with which for years they had been put off, and to this end they submitted a list of suggestions. The Archduke, they thought, should make Ireland his base, and a large Spanish naval force and arsenals should be established there;<sup>1</sup> and that the King should publicly and formally transfer his rights to the English crown to the Archduke and the Infanta. Money, too, must be sent to Flanders, in order that Dr. Garnet, the Provincial of the Jesuits in England, might carry on his work of gaining political adherents. Twenty galleys and thirty ships should be maintained in Flemish harbours, ready for use at the critical moment, and, besides the troops who will go in them, they should carry arms sufficient to equip 6000 or 7000 Englishmen on their arrival. This force should be supplemented by forty other ships, standing ready in Spain to convey a like number of men to England at the same time. They (the English Catholics) were quite confident of success if these measures were promptly adopted, for the King of Scots was very unpopular, and their friends in England were numerous. "Even

<sup>1</sup> It must be recollected that this was written before the capitulation of Kinsale was known in Flanders.



the heretics in office in England are only anxious to keep their places, and may easily be bought, and they will then gradually gain others to our side."

But the Council could only report to the King in reply to all this that he had not a ducat to spare. The large sum which it had been decided to send to Flanders for the purpose two years before had never been sent. "Indeed," they told Philip, "nothing whatever had been done, although the case was very important." But they sadly confessed that now much more than 200,000 ducats would be needed. The army in Flanders should be reinforced and the Spanish fleet mustered, ready for the pretended protection of Spain and Italy, but the Council knew well that with an empty treasury all this was impossible. O'Donnell and the Irishmen were fretting their hearts out for a tithe of the sum demanded by the English Catholics, and even that could not be provided. "If the money can be found for all this," the Council told Philip, "the blow can be struck at the right moment, and in force sufficient; but if not, the Council can only repeat what it has already said when the affair of Scotland was under discussion."<sup>1</sup>

At the same time the notorious George Ker, who, it will be recollected, had formerly served the King of Scots as a Catholic emissary, came to Madrid—apparently on his own account this time, and as a matter of business—to urge Philip to persevere in helping Tyrone (whose defeat was now known) by means of a large employment of Scottish ships and men, and by the purchase, through Ker, of course.

<sup>1</sup> That is to say, to conciliate the interests which they could not successfully oppose, and make the best terms possible with James.

of a number of armed vessels, to hold the Irish coast for the Spaniards. Nothing, however, came of this either; for it all meant money, and of money there was none to spare under such a king as Philip III., and such a Minister as the Duke of Lerma.

But still, the constant advices received from England of the failing health of the Queen made it necessary that some move should be devised, unless the worst possible solution for Spain was to be adopted on the death of Elizabeth, without an attempt to prevent it. In November (1602), accordingly, Father Creswell once more urged upon Philip to take up the matter actively. Galleys and troops, he said, should be mustered in Flanders, to hasten to England the moment the Queen should die; the Spanish fleet should be kept ready to sail; foreign ships should be freighted: all the old counsels of activity and expenditure were repeated, for the claimants were many, said Creswell, and Spanish aid at the right moment would turn the scale. When this minute of Father Creswell's came for examination before the Council of State, utter helplessness dictated their report upon it. "Father Creswell should be thanked for reminding your Majesty of the papers he sent last year; but it is difficult to know what to say about them, as they recommend the taking up of the English enterprise; and things are here in such a condition as to make this impossible." This was on the 5th December 1602 (N.S.), and up to this time it is evident that nothing whatever had been done to comply with the petitions of the English Catholics, or to promote

effectually a large party in England pledged to support Spanish Jesuit aims.

Spaniards had been too proud to confess it, but it was now quite clear that the aims themselves, so far as they depended upon forcing the Infanta upon England as Elizabeth's successor, were absolutely impracticable and impossible. In any case, only by means of overwhelming force or popular consent could such a course have been feasible. That Spain could no longer wield such a force was demonstrated, and that the general feeling even of Catholics in England was violently opposed to a Spanish sovereign and to Jesuit methods, was proved by a hundred signs; and more than all else, by the bitter antagonism of the English secular priests, and by the wholesale desertion to other orders of the Church of the English students in seminaries controlled by Jesuits. But it needed a bold man to tell the truth to Philip, and to propose means for making the best of matters as they were. The bold man was found in Guzman, that haughty, rough-tongued Count of Olivares, who had lectured and bullied Pontiffs for years as Spanish ambassador in Rome. What was the good, he asked, of talking any longer of the Archduke and the Infanta? Neither of them cared for the candidature: the King had no money or resources sufficient to force the Infanta on the English throne against the will of the nation; nor would it be to his interest to do so, even if he could. Why not face the facts at once, and promise support to the most popular English Catholic claimant, and thus, at all events, keep out the King of Scots, who would otherwise walk into

the succession without an effort? This was very un-Spanish in its practical directness, and it took the King and the Council of State two months before they sufficiently recovered from the shock to discuss and decide upon the matter finally for the King's guidance.

On the 5th February and the 2nd March 1603 (N.S.), accordingly, the whole matter of Spain's policy towards the English succession was passed under review in the light of this new idea. The English Catholics, for whom Persons and Creswell spoke, had in the interim again urged, through the latter, that Philip should either make effective preparations for action on the Queen's death, or else relieve them of their pledges to support the Infanta or any other Spanish nominee. If they knew that they had to depend only upon themselves, they might take some course advantageous to their cause; but if they were kept in suspense until a vacancy occurred, they were certain that the King of Scotland would succeed. They rather indignantly pointed out that, after all their years of devotion to Spain, they and their cause were likely to be ruined by the fault of the Catholic King. In addition to this, Zuñiga, the ambassador, had been told by Henry IV., that if Philip would agree with him to nominate a neutral King of England, he would support him, but if Spain endeavoured to foist the Infanta, or any other avowedly Spanish candidate upon the throne, he (Henry IV.) would throw in his weight on the side of the King of Scots. The problem was thus complicated: Henry must be excluded, but yet prevented from helping James. All this made it necessary to discuss

again the whole of the candidates proposed three years before by the English Jesuit Catholics through Father Persons. The Infanta was ruled out, for the reasons already stated, and the Dukes of Savoy and Parma were dropped, because they were foreigners connected with Spain, and would be opposed by France. The only candidate, therefore, remaining on the list presented by Persons in 1600 was the son of the Earl of Worcester (Henry Somerset, Lord Herbert), but no specific reference to him was made in the new discussion.

It was considered by the Council the absolute duty of the King to bring England, if possible, into the Catholic fold; and with this end the Catholics of England were to be given to understand that he had no temporal interest of his own to serve; no desire to control England or promote his own house. They (the English Catholics) had formerly prayed him to adopt the Infanta, and he had done so; but if there were any other Catholic candidate of their own nation who would be more likely to unite the country, the King of Spain would cede his own rights to him and help him with might and main. He (the King), for his part, will immediately make ready for the eventuality, and urges the Catholics to choose their candidate, but not to announce his name prematurely. In the meanwhile, the Council prayed the King to have ships fitted out with all speed in Spain, a large sum of money sent to Flanders, and means devised for raising money in the abundance required. Count de Miranda here put in a word of reason. He thought they had better see first whether they *could* raise any money,

and in the meanwhile avoid offending the King of Scots by taking sides against him, until they knew they could crush him. But Poza said it would be better to have any heretic there rather than James; and again Olivares came down with his cool *douche* of common sense. He had always insisted, he said, that the greatness of the empire did not consist of a further extension of territory, and to help an English candidate for the throne was the only way to exclude James. As for listening to the canting professions of the latter of his readiness to become a Catholic and surrender his son in return for the payment of a sum of money and the support of Spain, he did not believe a word of it, nor of the talk of the Italian and French priests about the King of Scots' conversion. But still, he would not quite shut the door even against James, in case of unavoidable eventualities.

The great thing now was that no time should be lost in assuring the English Catholics of effective support for the Catholic candidate of their choice; their hatred of the Scots should be fomented; very liberal promises of reward should be given to all prominent Catholics and heretics, "almost without distinction," and the various other claimants and their principal supporters should have given to them "estates, incomes, offices, grants, privileges, and exemptions; almost, indeed, sharing the crown amongst them." Olivares recommended, too, that the anti-foreign cry should be promoted as much as possible in England; whilst the people should be persuaded that the mighty King of Spain was behind the chosen English candidate, not for his

own ends, but in order that England might be happy, and prosperously governed by a native King of her own free choice. If possible, moreover, the Queen's Ministers were to be reconciled to the Catholics, and peace negotiations with them again initiated by Spain. The Pope, and through him the King of France, as well as the English themselves, were to be greatly impressed with the splendid magnanimity of Philip in surrendering his paramount claims to the English crown for the sake of the Catholic Church and the tranquillity of England.

All these points were discussed *ad nauseam*, the object mainly being to save appearances, and to convince the world that the change of front was made from generosity, and not from want of power; and the Pope especially was to be made an instrument for spreading this view of the subject and for disarming the King of France. At the same time it was made clear that Spain still intended, if she could, by religious chicanery to monopolise power in England. The troops in Flanders were to be landed in the Thames, or at any other point requested by the chosen candidate; the Spanish ships were to land another force in the north-west of England, as near to the Scottish border as possible. The King-elect would take care that the English fleet would be no longer dangerous to the Spanish ships; and Olivares thought that when the question of the gratitude of the new King towards Spain came to be discussed, there would be no difficulty in obtaining the cession of the Isle of Wight. On no account should an English port on the mainland be accepted by Spain, even if offered, to avoid offending France

or arousing English suspicion; and if Henry IV. was very much discontented about Spain getting the Isle of Wight, he might have the Channel Islands to keep him quiet. The whole business was to be cautiously disclosed to Persons first, and to Creswell<sup>1</sup> after arrangements had been made with the Pope; and when the time for action came, Father Persons was to hurry from Rome to Flanders and cross to England as cardinal with full power.

This was the plan finally adopted by Spain for making England Catholic, and some activity really seems to have been exercised in obtaining the money necessary for the purpose; but before the English Catholics themselves could be fully enlightened, it was considered necessary for Persons and Sessa to make sure of the Pope, and through him of the King of France. Father Creswell, in the meanwhile, was chafing with impatience. His principals in England were sending him constant news of the growing weakness of the Queen and the impatience of the Catholics who looked to Spain. Creswell in the months of February and March haunted Lerma's ante-chambers, and prayed personally and by letter for a resolution that he might transmit to England. If he did not get one at once, he said, he would wash his hands of the whole business, and tell the English Catholics that they must take their own course, for he had lost hope. A person upon whom entire dependence could be placed, Federico Spinola, or another, would have to be appointed in Flanders

<sup>1</sup> It was decided that Creswell should be told at once if news came that Elizabeth was like to die. This was the case, and Creswell was told in March.



to make the final arrangements with the leading Catholics in England, and to act when the moment came; the self-denying, soft-spoken proclamation to be published in England when the Spanish troops landed must be printed and sent to Flanders to be ready; and, above all, urged Creswell, the one hundred thousand ducats which had been promised for transmission to the English Catholics should at once be obtained from Ambrosio Spinola, who had agreed to lend it. "Otherwise," says Creswell, "I must have permission to undeceive the persons to whom the promise was made. They have spent, and are spending, money on the public service, trusting to the pledge given to their messenger (Thomas James?) by the Count de Miranda at San Lorenzo, and the delay in the matter looks very bad. They are, moreover, persons of so much importance that the whole success of the affair depends upon keeping them; and this can only be done by straightforward and punctual dealing."<sup>1</sup>

It is plain from this that Creswell had now—the middle of March 1603 (N.S.)—been informed of the whole plan, and was hurriedly making the arrangements for at least the remittance to Flanders of the money to be used in gaining English support; and as this money had been promised by Ambrosio Spinola on loan, it may be concluded that it was duly forwarded before Elizabeth's death was known in Spain, although it cannot have arrived in Flanders until after the event.

At the same time as these deliberations were pro-

<sup>1</sup> All the papers referred to above are in the Simancas MSS., and are printed in the Spanish Calendar, vol. iv.

ceeding, one more effort was made by the Scottish Catholics to revive the plan suggested by Bothwell in the previous year, to restore Catholicism in Scotland by means of Spanish troops. The Scottish lords sent Fernihurst (Andrew Ker) to Madrid with proposals to this end in March 1603. He, Colonel Semple, and Bothwell were urgent and persistent in their prayers to Philip, and the offers they made would perhaps, at another time, have been tempting. They would establish the faith in Scotland, reinforce Ireland with troops and stores, and trouble the Queen of England from the west coast of Scotland. They would surrender to the King of Spain the four great fortresses of Scotland, Dumbarton, Broughty, Blackness, and Hermitage, and in the event of war between Spain and England, would provide a mercenary army of 26,000 Scotsmen to help the Spaniards. All they asked in return was that a force of 4000 Spaniards should be sent to Scotland at the cost of Spain; and they promised for repayment that, on the restoration of the Catholic faith, a third of the ecclesiastical revenues of the country should be set apart until the whole of the cost was reimbursed to the Spanish King. Bothwell tried hard also to make terms for his own reconciliation with James as part of the arrangement, but the Spaniards declined to have anything to do with that; and as the whole proposal was, like all previous ones from the same quarter, open to the suspicion that in the end the King of Scots alone might benefit by it, the Spanish King and Council discussed it unsympathetically, until the great news of James's peaceful accession to England rendered it obsolete.

Whilst the fate of England was thus being discussed and decided in leisurely fashion in Spain, matters in England itself were rapidly nearing the crisis. The secret of Sir Robert Cecil's close understanding with James had been well kept even from the most intimate friends of the former.<sup>1</sup> There were plenty of courtiers besides Cecil who sought the smiles of the rising sun, and their private advice to the coming King was duly conveyed by the latter to Cecil. It was natural, of course, that Elizabeth's officers and ministers should look with some anxiety to the future. The Queen was old and ailing, a disputed succession would inevitably mean civil war, and probably foreign invasion, and yet, so far as could be seen, the man who was of all others most responsible for the prosperity and order of the country was detached from every interest in the matter and free from anxiety for the future. His own political associates looked to him for a lead but did not get it. They knew that the traditional policy he had inherited was to keep Scotland and France at arm's length by a friendship of England with Flanders and Spain; they saw that the talk of peace with these powers always found a ready listener in Cecil, and that practically peace now existed between the new sovereigns of Flanders and the Queen. Surely, thought those members of the "Moderate" party who had always followed Lord Burghley and his son, "Mr. Secretary" will not

<sup>1</sup> Cecil was in such fear that the correspondence might be discovered that on one occasion he prayed James not to write to him direct, but only through Lord Henry Howard. James, however, still continued to send some of his letters to Cecil.

stand helplessly by and see his own ruin consummated by the unchecked accession of a King whose national policy had always been that of Cecil's enemies. Raleigh, his old friend, Cobham, his brother-in-law, and others like them, tried to draw from him some expression of his sympathies and intentions, and that he purposely deceived them is seen by his own ungenerous words written to James on the subject: "This I do profess in the presence of Him that knoweth and searcheth all men's harts, that if I dyd not some tyme cast a stone into the mouth of these gaping crabbs, when they are in their prodigal humour of discourses, they would not stick to confess dayly how contrary it is to their nature to resolve to be under your sovereignty, though they confess (Raleigh especially) that (*rebus sic stantibus*) natural policy forceth them to keep on foot such a trade against the great day of mart. In all which light and sudden humours of his, though I do no way check him, because he shall not think I reject his freedom or his affection, but alwaies (*sub sigillis confessionis*) use contestation with him that I neyther had, nor would ever *in individuo* contemplate future idea, nor ever hoped for more than justice in time of change, yet under pretext of extraordinary care for his well doing I have seemed to dissuade him from engaging himself too far even for himself, much more therefore to forbear to assume for me or my present intentions."<sup>1</sup> Such talk as this from Cecil to Raleigh under the circumstances the latter must have known

<sup>1</sup> Letters of James VI. and Sir Robert Cecil. Hatfield (published by the Camden Society).

to be insincere. It was evidently intended to prevent an approach of Raleigh to James, and to encourage him to proceed with any plans he might have for arranging the succession on the traditional lines of the party to which both he and Cecil belonged. That this was the case is seen by Cecil's anger, expressed in his letter to the King that the Duke of Lennox, who had recently passed through London, should have approached Raleigh and others of the Cecil party with the object of gaining them to the King's side.<sup>1</sup> A more startling proof still is seen in the dastardly letter from Lord Henry Howard to Cecil,<sup>2</sup> suggesting how Raleigh, Northumberland, Cobham, and others of the party should be led astray and ruined, both in the eyes of Elizabeth and of James. "So must you embark this gallant Cobham by your wit and interest in some course the Spanish waie, as either may reveale his weakness or snare his ambition. . . . Be not unwilling . . . to engage him in the traffic with suspected ministers, and upon the first occasion of further treaty (with Spain) to make him the Minister. For my part, I account it impossible for him to scape the snares which wit may set and weakness is apt to fall into." By this it is evident that it was the deliberate plan of Cecil and his *ame damnée*, Howard, to use Cobham and Raleigh especially as their unconscious instruments. To tempt them by half hints, opportunity, and significant glances to enter into any negotiation tending against the candidature of the

<sup>1</sup> Letters of James VI. and Sir Robert Cecil. Hatfield (published by the Camden Society).

<sup>2</sup> British Museum MSS., Cotton. Titus, cvi. 386.

King of Scots, with the double object of allowing Cecil to keep in touch with and frustrate any intrigue that was afoot, and of ruining friends who might possibly become rivals.

How far the Jesuit intrigues for the succession really extended in England it is now extremely difficult to decide. We have seen by the deliberations of the Spanish Council and by Father Creswell's importunities that no decided action was taken or any large sums of money sent from Spain to the English Catholics in Flanders, at least until within a week or ten days before Elizabeth's death, and it was not possible for the 100,000 ducats promised to have reached Brussels in time for employment before that event. But we have also Creswell's word for it that his principals were already spending considerable sums of money by anticipation, and it may be concluded that the English Catholics of the Jesuit party were acquainted with the probable intention of Spain to help any acceptable native Catholic chosen by them in place of the Infanta, as their candidate for the English throne, before the discussion in the Spanish Council of the  $\frac{2 \text{ March}}{20 \text{ February}}$  1603. This being the case, we shall be safe in assuming that any movement at about this period amongst Catholics and others in England to promote the accession of a native-born candidate as opposed to the Scotsman, was connected more or less directly with the series of deliberations in Spain and Flanders, which have been described in the preceding pages.

The only English candidate mentioned in the

petition of the English Catholics to the Spanish King upon which the deliberations referred to were based was the Earl of Worcester; but in the interminable discussions in the Council, neither his name nor any other was adopted, in order, apparently, that the choice of the English themselves should seem to be quite spontaneous. It is, however, improbable that matters had gone so far as for Spain to promise powerful armed and pecuniary aid without some general understanding as to the person likely to be selected. It is to be noticed that in the course of the discussions in the Council the person to be chosen is always referred to in the masculine gender, and when the question was considered what reply should be given to the English if they suggested, "as they had done before," a marriage between the English sovereign of their choice and a member of the King of Spain's family, it was agreed that "inasmuch as France would be just as jealous that the *Queen* (Consort) of England should be of your Majesty's kin as if the King were, and as such a marriage would additionally pledge your Majesty's prestige in the success of the undertaking, and it might be advantageous to the Catholics to have the disposal of both positions, and thus enable them to reconcile difficulties and silence discontents, the Council is of opinion that your Majesty should reply that . . . you think best to leave them absolute freedom of action in this particular."

It will be seen by this that the Spanish Council, at all events, anticipated the choice of a man and a bachelor. Whom could they have had in their minds? The young Earl of Worcester had already

been married three years, and from his character and subsequent action it would appear extremely improbable that he was the person now thought of. The Earl of Derby was not likely to be approached after his reception of previous advances—though his sister had been mentioned more than once—nor was the Earl of Cumberland, who was an avowed Puritan and also extremely unpopular with the Spaniards for his depredations upon their shipping. The Earl of Huntington, the representative of the Poles, was also a Puritan, and certainly had no connection with the Catholics. There only remained, therefore, Arabella Stuart and the descendants of Catherine Grey, and it is quite possible that this may lead us to the threshold of the mystery which has always surrounded the doings of these personages at the period, behaviour so extraordinary in the case of Arabella as to lead those who knew her to conclude that she was mad.

Some of the gossip of the English Jesuit party, with regard to the selection of a candidate to take the place of the Infanta, and pointing to Arabella Stuart, must have reached the ears of James as early as 1601; for writing to his secret agent, Lord Henry Howard, in that year, he deplores “this accident fallen to Arbell,” and expresses a hope that for “her own weal such order were taken as she might be preserved from evil company, and that evil-inclined persons might not have access unto her, to supplant, abusing of the frailty of her youth and sex; for if it be true, as I am credibly informed, that she is lately moved by the persuasions of the Jesuits to change her religion and declare herself a Catholic . . . she



hath been very evil attended on." That she had been sounded by the party with this end is certain, for we have already seen that in the confidential accounts given by the English Jesuits to the Spanish King she is distinctly called a Catholic; but from the absence of any specific mention of her in the subsequent Spanish discussions, and from the assumption throughout that the candidate was to be a man, it is clear that she had not openly avowed herself a Catholic, and was not at this time the principal person in the minds of the anti-Scottish Catholics as their candidate for the throne. The correspondence of the Jesuit Father Rivers in England with Father Persons in Rome<sup>1</sup> in the following year confirms this, as he mentions her (March 1602) in connection with a supposed plan of a party in England to place her upon the throne by French aid. Although there was no truth in this rumour, its transmission from one influential Jesuit to another shows that Arabella, at this period at least, was not the principal candidate of their party. A few months later (July 1602) Father Rivers informed Persons that he hears of an intention of marrying Arabella to the Earl of Hertford's second son, "and to carry the succession that way; but these *supra nos nihil ad nos*." This seems to form the first clue to what I conceive was the plan of the anti-Scottish Catholics in union with Spain.

Matters had not been going smoothly for some time at Hardwick Hall. Arabella was fretting and chafing at what she considered the undeserved semi-imprisonment in which she was kept by her grandmother. She was disappointed at the way in which

<sup>1</sup> Foley Papers.

she had been treated by the Queen, sometimes flattered with the idea that she was regarded as her successor, and sometimes exposed to humiliation if any of the courtiers dared to look towards her. She had incurred the Queen's displeasure, amongst other things, by some sort of flirtation with Essex, and now that she was buried at Hardwick, she, and those around her, were treated with ever-increasing suspicion. She was, on the other hand, as amorous, and probably as ambitious, as Elizabeth herself had been at a similar age, and evidently endeavoured to imitate the behaviour of Elizabeth before her accession. Both her Cavendish and her Talbot uncles sympathised with her; and her aunt, the Countess of Shrewsbury, her greatest friend and a Catholic, was unquestionably in communication with the Jesuit party.

Negotiations of some sort were in progress between Arabella and these relatives of hers in 1602, and during the summer of that year she endeavoured to plan a flight from Hardwick by the aid of a chaplain and tutor named Starkey, whose mysterious proceedings with her and his subsequent suicide gave rise to an infinity of gossip and questionable scandal. At some period early in that summer a suggestion had been made, circuitously and secretly, by the Earl of Hertford, or his son Lord Beauchamp, for a marriage between Arabella and one of the two sons of the latter. On the face of it the suggestion was absurd, as the two boys in question were then only sixteen and fourteen years old respectively, whilst Arabella was twenty-seven. When the idea was broached to the old Countess of Shrewsbury she was in great alarm, and forbade all further mention of

such a project ; but late in December of the same year, 1602, Arabella, either because she now better understood the significance of such a match, or simply, as she pretended afterwards, to enable her to get out of the clutches of her grandmother, renewed the negotiation on her own account with the connivance of her uncles. With much difficulty, for every one was in mortal fear of the old Countess, she managed to induce a servant, one Dodderidge, to carry to the Earl of Hertford a letter of credence from her, and a verbal message to the effect that if he still wished for the marriage formerly proposed between his eldest grandson and herself he should renew the negotiation in another way and not through the old Countess. She suggested also that the boy suitor should be sent in disguise to Hardwick, in order that she might see him ; and her Cavendish uncles were mentioned as approving of the step she was taking.

The messenger arrived at Tottenham Park on the 30th December 1602, and with some trouble obtained access to the Earl, who was at dinner. Kneeling, he delivered his message out of earshot of the other persons in the room ; but before the words were well out of his mouth, Hertford, in great perturbation, bade him be silent, and, placing the hapless messenger under lock and key, he sent post-haste to reveal the whole matter to the Council, and to beg for orders as to what course he should take. At first sight, this action of Hertford's was inexplicable if he had, as was apparently the case, previously made the same proposal secretly himself ; and we are driven to seek an explanation of his inconsistency

in any change of the circumstances that had taken place in the interim. His own venture in that field had probably rendered Hertford somewhat shy of dynastic marriages; he could have nothing personally to gain by plunging himself and his family into revolutionary action unless with a certainty of success, and it is most likely that the initiative had in the first place come rather from his son, Lord Beauchamp, than from Hertford himself. He must have seen, moreover, how rapidly James's chances had advanced during the course of the year, and what looked possible when the proposal was first made might look impossible later. But all this, though it may explain Hertford's inconsistency, does not explain the subsequent proceedings of Arabella and Lord Beauchamp.

In any case, Hertford's message caused an immense sensation at court, and the air was full of strange rumours and conjectures. The Queen was in a towering rage.<sup>1</sup> Hertford himself was summoned to explain personally; the messenger was brought to London and examined again and again, though he had nothing fresh to tell; and Sir Henry Brounker was sent down to Hardwick to examine Arabella herself. He found her flighty, fractious, and hysterical, contradicting herself repeatedly, writing interminable letters so obscure that no one then or since could fathom their meaning. Full of hints at one time of some mysterious love affair, talking of "my little little love," and bewailing that she, a grown woman, could not have a sweetheart like any-

<sup>1</sup> The Venetian ambassador in London says that the chagrin shortened her life.

body else; and then suddenly declaring that the man to whom she is attached is—of all persons—her cousin, the King of Scots. At the beginning of February her confidant, Starkey, hanged himself in London, and this set afloat another swarm of rumours. At one time (February 21) Arabella determined to get out of her grandmother's clutches somehow, and resolutely refused to eat or drink under her roof. The old lady herself was extremely unwise, exaggerating and treating with undue seriousness Arabella's "tantrums," and Sir Henry Brounker was kept continually running backwards and forwards for two months, trying ineffectually to discover what it all meant. On the 2nd March Arabella wrote a letter to Brounker, asserting that she was "free from all promise, contract, or intention to marry," and declared that she would never do so, as she preferred death to matrimony. She complained that her "conceits" were taken seriously, and, at another time, confessed to Brounker that what she said was only for the purpose of mystifying him. To the Queen she wrote long, incoherent letters, praying that she might tell her the great secret personally, and said that two lines from the Queen's own hand would gain more from her than all the councillors could.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The correspondence and examinations are at Hatfield, and have, to a great extent, been printed in Miss E. T. Bradley's "Life of Arabella Stuart." One important letter is in Edward's "Life and Letters of Raleigh," in which Arabella hints that those who are abetting her are abroad. "I can assure you that all that are of my counsell are out of all possibility of danger and out of your reach. Neither doth her Majesty's commandment prevail so far, though her fame and entreaty be everywhere glorious and powerful. And for myself, I will rather spit my tongue in my examiner or torturer's face than it shall be said . . . that an extorted truth came out of my lips."

As the Queen's death became daily more imminent the plot thickened. Both Beaumont, the French ambassador, and Father Rivers mentioned early in March that the Earl and Countess of Shrewsbury were "very inward" with Secretary Cecil, with whom they had constant secret meetings; and rumours of the wildest character were rife about the proceedings of Arabella, Father Rivers repeating a strange rumour that Cecil was going to marry her himself and raise her to the throne. We can understand now better than his contemporaries why Cecil was so friendly and confidential with the Catholic Shrewsburys, in whose plans for their niece he was probably pretending to be a consenting party until the moment came for action. On March 10 Henry Cavendish and a Catholic gentleman named Stapleton—a relative, be it noted, of the most influential English Catholic ecclesiastic in Flanders—mustered a squadron of forty horsemen in the neighbourhood of Hardwick Hall. The leaders, one of whom had a lady's pillion upon his horse, awaited, according to agreement with Arabella, at the church of Hucknall, about half a mile from Hardwick. But the redoubtable old Bess, secretly forewarned, no doubt, by Cecil, caused her granddaughter to be prevented from leaving the domain. Finding that she came not, Henry Cavendish and his friends rode up to his mother's gates and demanded to see his niece. The old Countess admitted her "bad son," as she called him, but warned the Papist, Stapleton, away. Henry Cavendish endeavoured to convey his niece outside to his horsemen, but the Countess had assembled her household and tenants, and a stormy scene ensued,

in which Arabella indignantly demanded if she was a prisoner, and conversed through the closed gates with Stapleton, with whom she arranged a meeting for the following day. But by this time the alarm had spread, the Countess declaimed and protested *urbi et orbi*, and Stapleton sought safety in flight, whilst Cavendish was summoned by the Council to London, and Arabella was carried off to Wrest House, where, under the guardianship of the Earl of Kent, all hope of her escape was gone. Simultaneously with this attempt to abduct Arabella, Lord Beauchamp, who had recently become a widower, and was, it is said, betrothed to her, also disappeared,<sup>1</sup> and it is impossible not to see a connection between the two facts.

From a consideration of all these circumstances it would appear probable that, although Hertford himself was a Protestant, as befitted a son of the Protector Somerset, Lord Beauchamp, the direct heir to the crown under the will of Henry VIII., was ready to accept Spanish and Catholic aid to raise him to the throne, and that, at a period subsequent to the autumn of 1602, the Jesuit party conceived the plan of conciliating Arabella's friends and consolidating the Catholic forces by a union between the two claimants. The plan, if it existed, was a clever one, for the Grey-Seymour succession would not fail to please the Protestant party, whilst the anti-Scottish Catholics, of course, would have rejoiced at the exclusion of James and the accession of monarchs under the patronage of Spain. But it is evident

<sup>1</sup> Venetian Calendar, Scaramelli to the Doge, March 20, 1603. It will be recollected that years before this we have seen Beauchamp on the point of escaping to Spain.

that Cecil had his hand on the intrigue. His "inwardness" with the Shrewsburys gave him all the information he needed about the plans of Arabella's friends, and doubtless Hertford's panic when he received Arabella's message was owing to a warning that Cecil had been made acquainted by the old Countess, and disapproved of, the former matrimonial proposal to Arabella; as well as to the conviction that James's accession had now become inevitable. These feelings may not have been shared by his son, who was more adventurous and more directly interested than Hertford himself, and the balance of probability seems to incline to the conclusion that Beauchamp and Arabella were the persons indicated as the candidates of the Spanish Catholic party to succeed to Elizabeth by the aid of the ships, troops, and money of King Philip.

But the plot failed even before it reached maturity, first, from the vigilance and secrecy of Cecil, which enabled him to tranquillise James and make every preparation for his peaceful accession, whilst remaining himself, to all appearance, so entirely detached as to invite the confidence of his own partisans; and, secondly, from the procrastination and unreadiness of the Spanish King and his Ministers; who, as we have seen, were prosily deliberating and laying down a course of action that would take months to develop, whilst Elizabeth had but a few days to live. England was thus kept peacefully Protestant at the critical moment by the craft of Cecil and the sloth of Spain.

As the hour approached for which James had so



long and impatiently yearned; the hour when he might mount the "towardly rydding horse of St. George," instead, as he said, of "daily burstin in daunting a wylde, unreulie coalte," men of all parties in England understood that nothing was likely to stand in the way of his accession. On March 17 Northumberland wrote to him saying that the Queen had been "evil now almoaste a month." The fact had been kept secret for twelve days and the indisposition was ascribed to Elizabeth's anger at the conditions granted to Tyrone, to Arabella's strange vagaries, and to the Countess of Nottingham's death; but at length the truth had to be told. The Queen ate and slept but very little and the "phisitions conclud that if this contineu she must needes fall into a distemper, not a frensie, but rather a dulnesse and a lethargie." The Venetian envoy in London, writing on the same day (March 17), says that on the anniversary of Essex's death a few days before, "the Queen had burst into tears and dolorous lamentations, as though for some deadly sin she had committed, and then fell ill of a sickness, which the doctors instantly judged to be mortal."

As the great Queen lay dying at Richmond all things were made ready. Eight fine galleons, fully armed, and with 500 troops on board of each one, lay in the Thames; the City of London was secured; Cecil's brother, Burghley, commanded in the north; the doubtful recusants throughout the country were cast into prison,<sup>1</sup> and the draft proclamation to

<sup>1</sup> Bruce writes (for King James) to Lord Henry Howard (for Cecil): "The means are most politique and wise by which yow have dispersed the clowd of ane apparent Popish upore, and it is a very safe and singularly good rewle rather to prevent than to be prevented; but we did so

be issued by the new King was sent for his approval by Cecil.<sup>1</sup> "This accident," wrote Northumberland to the King in reference to the Queen's illness, "made all the nation looke about them. Men talke freely of your Majestie's rights, and all in general gives you a great allowance. The affections of many are discovered to be wholly devoted to your service. Every one almost embraces you." The only thing necessary now to stamp the seal of right upon the claim of James was for the Queen at her last hour to acknowledge him as her successor, and this requisite was thoughtfully provided by Cecil to make his work complete. Elizabeth lay speechless with her hand in that of the Primate when Cecil and the Council clustered around her couch. On the mention of the King of Scots' name the Secretary asserted that the dying sovereign gave a mute sign of assent. It was enough, and almost before the Queen's last sigh was breathed, Robert Cary was galloping along the north road as hard as swift horses could speed bearing the pregnant news to the new King.

We have seen that for years past, when it suited him, James had professed his leaning towards Catholicism, and even since the friendship with Cecil had rendered unnecessary his advances to the Pope and Spain, he had certainly led Catholics of all sorts to

mucho trust in your industrie that if thay had gon on to do their worst yow could have pulled such feathers from their wings as might have made them come shorte of the great prey they hunted for" (Letters of Cecil and James, Camden Society).

<sup>1</sup> "Music," wrote Bruce, "which soundeth so sweetly in his ears that he cannot alter no note in so agreeable an harmony" (*Ibid.*). "It sall not be amiss," wrote the same agent, "if yow temper the King's too great haste in removing hence in case God sall call the Queen . . . for now he burnes to be gone."

expect at least toleration at his hands. The Catholics, checkmated as they were, and unprepared either with an organisation or the assurance of foreign aid, could only hope for the best, and hasten as they might to secure the smiles of the monarch, from whom a large number of them had reason to expect some sympathy.<sup>1</sup> A bold voice here and there, like that of Raleigh, dared to say a word of remonstrance at the adulation with which Englishmen were preparing to receive the King of a nation which they had always been taught to look upon with disdain—"to spoil a gude King," as one of James's Scottish courtiers said; but as a rule, each man was thinking of his own future, and the race to greet the King was not for the purpose of imposing conditions upon him, but to encourage him in his extremest ideas of the sacredness of the royal prerogative. Even the Jesuit party, either in hopelessness of help from Spain or in the real belief that James would keep his word, welcomed the new King; and Father Garnet, the Provincial, burnt two briefs of the Pope exhorting English Catholics to allow no one to succeed to the throne who did not promise at least toleration.<sup>2</sup> They were soon unde-

<sup>1</sup> In a notable secret letter to Cecil, in reply to the latter's remark that he did not like to see loyal Catholics sacrificed by dozens, James said, "I will never allow in my conscience that the blood of any man shall be shedde for diversitie of opinions in religion; and I would be sorry that Catholiques should so multiplie as they might be able to practise their old principles upon us. I will never agree that any should dye for erreure of faith against the first table; but I think they should not be permitted to worke rebellion against the second table . . . No! I am so far from an intention of perseeution, as I protest to God I reverence their Church as our Mother Church, though clogged with many corruptions."

<sup>2</sup> Whilst James was on his journey south Garnet wrote: "The

ceived. There was to be no concession either to Catholics or Puritans from a King who had professed at different times to belong to both creeds; and the Catholics now, doubtless aware too late of the tardy decision of the Spanish King, were doubly chagrined to find how they had been betrayed.

That the Bye and Main Plots, and even the Gunpowder Conspiracy, were the rank, sporadic aftergrowth of the greater plan which Spanish procrastination prevented from ripening in time, may be accepted as certain. It is more than doubtful if the sum of money offered by Count Arenberg, the Archduke's ambassador, to Cobham and Raleigh after James's accession was intended to promote revolution or regicide; it was far more likely to have been employed to obtain better terms for Spain and the Catholics in the coming treaty of peace. The Spaniards and Jesuits must have seen now that they had failed in conspiracy, as they had failed in invasion; the archpriest Blackwell, Jesuit nominee though he was, was as anxious to denounce the disloyal plots of secular priests like Watson,<sup>1</sup> as was the notorious Jesuit-hater Father Cecil himself, and a cause thus divided and subdivided against itself could not hope to prevail. The 100,000 ducats lent by Spinola, and the knowledge of the decision of Spain to have aided an English Catholic candidate,

Catholics have great cause to hope for great respect; in that the nobility, almost all, labour for it, and have good promise thereof from his Majesty."

<sup>1</sup> The action of the Jesuit party in divulging the Bye Plot to Cecil, partly, no doubt, owing to the bitter feud between the two sections of Catholics, may also have been inspired by the knowledge that the aim of the conspirators was toleration.

still drove a few ambitious hot-heads to dream that they could turn back the hands of the clock and undo what had been done. But it was too late. Toleration perhaps might still have been wrung from James by formidable united pressure from without and within ; but the battle of Catholic supremacy in England was finally lost when Robert Cecil secretly rallied to James, and when the slothful Spanish King and Lerma wasted two years in making up their minds finally as to their policy towards the section of English Catholics that had for so long looked to Spain for help and guidance.

Even if the Gunpowder Plot had destroyed the King and his house, a Catholic sovereign of England under Spanish tutelage would no longer have been possible. James might cringe and truckle before Gondomar and his master until good Englishmen blushed for shame at their sovereign's baseness ; his son might dance attendance on a Philip, and endure the insolence of Olivares in the hope of being honoured with a Spanish bride, but no English prince dared now adopt Catholicism as the exclusive religion of his country, or attempt once more to submit England to the yoke of the Papacy : for out of the forty years of struggle a potent empire had emerged, determined to choose its own form of faith, and able successfully to resist all dictation from the foreigner, even though its degenerate sovereign had forgotten the dignified traditions of Elizabeth.



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