




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A TREATISE

CONCERNING THE

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

BY

GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D.,

FORMERLY BISHOP OF CLOYNE.

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WITH PROLEGOMENA, AND WITH ANNOTATIONS, SELECT,  
TRANSLATED, AND ORIGINAL.

BY

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## CONTENTS.

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	PAGE
PROLEGOMENA :—	
I. Berkeley's Life and Writings . . . . .	5-17
II. The Precursors of Berkeley . . . . .	18-25
III. Summaries of Berkeley's System . . . . .	25-35
IV. Berkeleyanism, its Friends, Affinities, and Influence . . . . .	35-42
V. Opponents and Objections . . . . .	42-57
VI. Estimates of Berkeley, his Character, Writings, and Influence . . . . .	57-66
VII. Idealism defined . . . . .	66-70
VIII. Sceptical Idealism in the Development of Idealism from Berkeley to the Present: Hume . . . . .	70-72
IX. Critical Idealism: Kant . . . . .	72-86
X. Subjective Idealism: Fichte . . . . .	86-92
XI. Objective Idealism: Schelling . . . . .	92-100
Jacobi . . . . .	100, 101
XII. Absolute Idealism: Hegel . . . . .	101-105
XIII. Theoretical Idealism: Schopenhauer . . . . .	105-122
XIV. The Strength and Weakness of Idealism . . . . .	122-142
XV. Characteristics of the Present Edition . . . . .	142-144
XVI. Its Objects and Uses . . . . .	144-147

### BERKELEY'S TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN

#### KNOWLEDGE :—

I. Fraser's Preface,—Berkeley's Preface . . . . .	151-172
II. Berkeley's Introduction . . . . .	173-191
III. Berkeley's Principles . . . . .	193-281

	PAGE
APPENDIXES:—	
A. Berkeley's rough Draft of the Introduction . . . . .	285-316
B. Arthur Collier . . . . .	317-322
C. Theory of Vision vindicated . . . . .	323-327
ANNOTATIONS OF UEBERWEG, WITH ADDITIONS . . . . .	329-407
INDEX . . . . .	409



## PROLEGOMENA.

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### I. Berkeley's Life and Writings.

§ 1: EARLY LIFE AND EDUCATION.—GEORGE BERKELEY, born at Kilcrin or Dysert, in the County of Kilkenny, Ireland, March 12, 1684-1685,\* was a descendant of the noble English house of Berkeley. The commonly accepted statement is that more than twenty years before his birth his great-grandfather, the first Lord Berkeley of Stratton, who had been ennobled by Charles II., came to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant, and settled there, as it would seem, with his son, the grandfather of Berkeley. In fact, the early years and the ancestry of Berkeley are shrouded in mystery. 'He comes forth the most subtle and accomplished philosopher of his time, almost from darkness.'

George Berkeley, at the age of fifteen, entered Trinity College, Dublin, March 21, 1700, with which he was connected until 1713. He obtained a fellowship in 1707. Peter Browne, subsequently Bishop of Cork, was the Provost of Trinity. Locke's 'Essay concerning Human Understanding,' and the writings of Bacon, Descartes, Malebranche, and Newton, were diligently studied at that time.

§ 2: EARLY WORKS.—In 1707 appeared a Latin Dissertation by Berkeley: 'Arithmetica absque Algebra aut Euclide demonstrata;' the 'Essay towards a New Theory of Vision' followed, 1709; the 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' 1710; Berkeley's next work was the 'Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,' published 1713.

\* This sketch embraces the entire matter of Ueberweg's, in his edition of the Principles, but corrected and very much enlarged from other sources, especially from Prof. Fraser's 'Life and Letters of Berkeley.' Works, vol. iv.

'In the two writings last named,' says Ueberweg, 'he presents his philosophical doctrine, complete in each of them. The manner of presentation, however, is diverse. In the "Principles" we have a systematic development; in the "Dialogues" there is a personal discussion between Philonous, an adherent of the doctrine of Berkeley, and Hylas, an opponent of it. Hylas does not oppose a fixed, thoroughly developed view to that of Berkeley, but, proceeding from the common confusion in regard to the problem, gradually advances to a more scientific apprehension of the subject, but is driven from one position to another by his antagonist, until at last he acknowledges himself beaten, and only asks a verbal concession to the received mode of speaking, which Philonous, without favouring it, concedes. As the concession, however, involves a twofold use of the word "matter," to wit, in the phenomenal and in the transcendental sense, it is open to some objection. In consequence of the life of their mode of delineation, the "Dialogues" have a peculiar charm; but the "Principles" present the doctrine in its most original and purely scientific shape.' Fraser calls the Dialogues 'the gem of British metaphysical literature.'

§ 3: TRAVELS.—The publication of the 'Dialogues' followed upon Berkeley's visit to London, 1713. He formed an intimate friendship with Swift, Pope, and other writers of the highest distinction. Swift introduced Berkeley to his kinsman the Earl of Berkeley. Atterbury, having heard much of Berkeley, wished to see him, and was introduced to him by the Earl. When Berkeley left the room the Earl said to the Bishop, 'Does my cousin answer your lordship's expectations?' Atterbury, lifting up his hands in astonishment, replied, 'So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman.'

It was on a recommendation by Swift to the Earl of Peterborough that Berkeley, as the chaplain and secretary of that nobleman, accompanied him on his journey as ambassador through France to Italy (Nov., 1713, to August, 1714). Soon after his return to London he had a severe attack of sickness. After his recovery, his friend Doctor Arbuthnot wrote playfully to Swift:



'Poor philosopher Berkeley has now the *idea* of health, which was very hard to produce in him; for he had an *idea* of a strange fever upon him, so strong that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a contrary one.' Soon after Berkeley visited France and Italy a second time. He went as the companion and tutor of the only son of the Bishop of Clogher.

In Paris—according to the common story—Berkeley had a disputation with Malebranche, the distinguished metaphysician, most frequently spoken of in our day in connection with his doctrine that we behold all things in God.

§ 4: MALEBRANCHE.—'The doctrine of Malebranche,' says Ueberweg, 'that there are indeed material things which exist without the mind, but that these things have no power of operating upon the mind, but are represented in the divine mind, and that we have intuition of this representation, can easily lead to a view which goes yet further, and denies that material things exist at all; for as they can effect nothing, to suppose that they exist is to suppose that God has created them wholly without an object.' Of this obvious point Berkeley avails himself with much force.

§ 5: ARTHUR COLLIER, an Oxford scholar (1680–1732), had been led into the train of thought suggested by Malebranche. This was mainly due to the influence of the work of John Norris: 'Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World,' 2 vols., 1701–4.

Collier had reached views in general unison with Berkeley's as early as 1703. These he had expressed privately, and had defended in an unpublished work, 'On the Dependent Existence of the Visible World,' which is dated 1708. Three years after Berkeley's 'Principles,' Collier appeared as an author in his 'Clavis Universalis, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence and Impossibility of an External World.' London, 1713.

A full account of Collier's work, with citations from it, will be found in Appendix B.

It is certain that Berkeley was not influenced by Collier; and there is no reason to believe that Collier was influenced by Berkeley. So far as the speculation of the two writers agrees, 'the agreement may be referred to the common philosophical point of view at the time. The scientific world was preparing

for that reconstruction of its conception of what sensible things and externality mean, which has since clarified and simplified physical research. Collier in his own way was not wanting in force; but he expressed his acute thoughts in awkward English, with the pedantry of a schoolman, and wanted the sentiment and imagination and constant recognition of the relation of speculation to human action, which in the course of time made the contemporary writings of Berkeley an influence that has left its mark upon all later thought. The theory of sense-symbolism, which connected Berkeley with the Baconian movement, and also with religion, is wanting in Collier, whose arid reasonings are divorced from the living interests of men. The starting-point of Berkeley was more in the current philosophy of Locke; Collier produced the meditative reasonings of a recluse student of Malebranche and the schoolmen.<sup>1</sup> 'The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, his broad recognition of the distinction between physical or symbolical and efficient or proper causation, and his large philosophical insight, are all wanting in the narrow but acute reasonings of Collier. Berkeley's philosophy, owing to its own comprehensiveness, not less than to the humanity of his sympathies and the beauty of his style, is now recognized as a striking expression or solution of problems of modern thought, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of a mere reasoner of the schools.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 6: RETURNS TO ENGLAND—SAILS TO AMERICA.—Berkeley remained in Italy until, probably, 1720. He shows in his Letters and Journal an intense interest in nature, art, and popular manners.

After his return to England, he spent most of the time in London, from 1721 to 1728. His mind was occupied at this time with a plan for establishing a college in the Bermuda Islands. It was to be modelled in general after Trinity College, Dublin, and its grand aim was to be the extension of Christianity and civilization in America. The king was greatly interested in the 'pious work.' Sir Robert Walpole promised twenty thousand pounds for the endowment of the college.

<sup>1</sup> Fraser: *Life and Letters*, 62, 63.

<sup>2</sup> Fraser: *Preface to Dialogues*. Works, i. 254.

Berkeley was Dean of Derry, 'the best preferment' in Ireland, which he had held since 1724.

In September, 1728, he sailed for Rhode Island. He had been married August 1st of the same year to Anne, daughter of John Forster, who had been Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. The Dean and his young wife, after a voyage of more than four months, landed at Newport. The inspiration of the prospect of planting arts and learning in America prompted the verses which close with the prophetic words :

'Westward the course of Empire takes its way ;  
The four first Acts already past,  
A fifth shall close the Drama with the day,  
Time's noblest offspring is the last.'

§ 7: RETURNS FROM AMERICA — ALCIPHRON.—Berkeley remained in America until Walpole's refusal to fulfil his promises, and the consequent withholding of the needed funds, compelled him to surrender his cherished hopes and plans. He sailed for England in the end of 1731, and early in 1732 was once more in London. The hours of waiting in Rhode Island had not been spent in idleness. He had written there his *Alciphron*, in which the exquisite scenery of Rhode Island is the drapery of the Socratic Drama. '*Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher,*' appeared in March, 1732. It is directed against the 'Free-thinkers.' It was aimed especially at Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Collins, and at some of the views of Bishop Browne on theological knowledge. It is the largest and 'probably the most popular of his works. It should be studied in the light of the history of English Deism from the time of Hobbes.'

Shaftesbury (1671-1713) was the author of '*Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times;*' '*Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit;*' '*The Moralists, a Rhapsody.*'

Mandeville (1670-1733) wrote the '*Fable of the Bees,*' London, 1714. Its aim was to prove 'private vices public benefits.' The bee-hive of the Fable was one in which

'Every part was full of vice,  
Yet the whole mass a paradise.'

Anthony Collins had published, 1713, a '*Discourse of Free-*

thinking, occasioned by the Rise and Growth of a Sect called Free-thinkers.' In this Discourse 'he boldly took for granted that all believers in supernatural revelation must be hostile to free inquiry. The exclusive claim to free inquiry made by the "Free-thinkers" aroused the indignation of Berkeley.' In the Guardian at the time, and long after in Alciphron, 'he appears as a free-thinking Anti-free-thinker.' He demonstrates the bond-thinking of free-thinkers, and shows, as Wesley expresses it, that, as a class, 'free-thinkers are not deep thinkers.'

Dr. Peter Browne, in his 'Procedure and Limits of Human Understanding,' had argued that the attributes of Deity 'can be known to us only in a secondary or analogical signification of the terms employed to represent them.' This hypothesis Berkeley contests with some severity, and was answered by the Bishop about a year after.

The title 'The Minute Philosopher' was suggested by a sentence from Cicero's *Cato Major*, which is quoted as a motto of the book: 'Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi censent, nihil sentiam, non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui philosophi irrideant.' (If at death, as some small philosophers think is the case, my sentient being shall cease, I need not fear that the dead philosophers will ridicule this error of mine.)

Alciphron contains Dialogues to which Fraser assigns a very high rank, pronouncing them 'unrivalled for controversial acuteness and literary beauty in modern times.' He agrees in Hurd's judgment, that nothing approaches them in perfection of form except Shaftesbury's 'Moralists' and Addison's 'Treatise on Medals.' They 'are better fitted than any (dialogues) in our language to enable the English reader to realize the charm of Cicero and Plato.'

§ 8: BECOMES BISHOP.—Berkeley's old friend Sherlock, now one of the chaplains of Queen Caroline, wife of George II., placed in her hands a copy of Alciphron. As Princess of Wales, she had known and admired Berkeley before his voyage to America. To her friendship was due in large part that mere political considerations were overlooked, and that 'an unworldly social idealist and philosopher' was nominated (March, 1734) to the bishopric of Cloyne, in Ireland. In the spring of 1735 he entered upon

his new charge, with the fidelity and devotion which characterized every part of his official life.

Berkeley showed an interest in the great political and social problems of his day. In 1712 he published three sermons vindicating the principle of passive obedience. They were occasioned by Locke's treatises on government, and advocate high Tory principles. They contain Berkeley's moral philosophy. They gave rise to the report that he was a Jacobite, and for a time stood in the way of his advancement. In 1750 appeared 'Maxims concerning Patriotism.' A Utopian romance, 'Adventures of Signor Gaudentio di Lucca,' 1737, embracing many suggestions in regard to philanthropic reforms, has been attributed to Berkeley, but was most probably the work of Berington, a Catholic priest.

§ 9: THE MATHEMATICAL CONTROVERSIES.—Several of Berkeley's writings are devoted to the Mathematical Philosophical Controversies, arising out of the questions concerning the infinitely little and the infinitely great. 'The Analyst' is first hinted at in January, 1733-34. It is an *argumentum ad hominem*. 'Force is as incomprehensible as *grace*.' 'Reasoners who can accept mysteries, and even what seem to be contradictions, in their own province, are inconsistent in rejecting religion merely because it makes a similar demand upon them.'

The problem of Fluxions had been dwelt upon by Berkeley in the Principles, § 118 and following. The Infinitesimal Calculus, which had recently been discovered by Newton, and which was rediscovered at a later period and completed by Leibnitz, gave occasion to the discussion. The new mode of computation, as at first presented, had its weak points. These were exposed by Berkeley; but he did not always confine himself to them. He rejected some things which can be successfully defended. See n. [110]. The Analyst gave rise to 'a controversy which has left its mark in the History of Mathematics,' and which contributed to the elucidation of various fundamental notions in it.

Gibson, Bishop of London, in a letter to Berkeley, says: 'What your lordship observes is very true, . . . that the men of science (a conceited generation) are the greatest sticklers against revealed religion, and have been very open in their attacks

upon it. And we are much obliged to your lordship for retorting their arguments upon them, and finding them work in their own quarters, and must depend upon you to go on to humble them, if they do not yet find themselves sufficiently humbled.' See notes [107] to [110].

§ 10: TAR-WATER AND SIRIS.—Berkeley ventured also into the sphere of Medicine. His attention was drawn to it by the sickness and suffering of the poor in his diocese, 1739-40. His American experience suggested the medicinal value of tar-water. The most lasting effect of his enthusiasm for tar-water 'has been the curious and beautiful work of speculation in which he celebrated the virtues of the new medicine.'

In the spring of 1744 appeared: 'Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from another.' The title, 'Siris,' and the words 'a chain of,' were added in the second edition.

In 1752 appeared: 'Farther Thoughts on Tar-water.'

These works contain a fund of observations in natural science and of philosophical and theological speculation. 'Siris is probably the profoundest English philosophical book of the last century. This wonderful little book far transcends the unreflective and unlearned age in which it appeared, and shows supposed novelties that minister to modern conceit to be as old as the Neoplatonic or even the Pre-Socratic age. Ecclesiastical life and episcopal office had not spoiled the philosopher: he had been perfected by suffering, and his tone is more unworldly than ever.'<sup>1</sup> Siris was Berkeley's 'last word in speculation,' and Berkeley's last words in Siris are: 'He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of truth.'

§ 11: BERKELEY AT OXFORD—HIS DEATH.—The last months of Berkeley's life were spent in retired life at Oxford, for which he had for years been yearning. His son George was pursuing his studies there. Berkeley reached Oxford in July, 1752. On the evening of Sunday the 14th of January, 1753, Berkeley, whose health had long been feeble, was resting on a couch, surrounded

<sup>1</sup> Fraser: Life, 297.

by his family. His wife had been reading aloud the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, and he had been making remarks upon the passage. A little while after, his daughter went to offer him some tea. She found him apparently sleeping, but his body was already cold in death.

In his will he says: 'I do humbly recommend my soul into the hands of my blessed Redeemer, by whose merits and intercession I hope for mercy.'

The feature of it which, to those who suppose that Idealism involves a neglect of all practical preventions, will be most surprising, is, that it directs extraordinary precautions to be taken against premature interment. The body was to be kept undisturbed 'five days above ground or longer,' if unmistakable evidences of change did not appear.

§ 12: BERKELEY'S WORKS.—Berkeley's minor writings were published in October, 1752, at Dublin and London, under the title: 'A Miscellany containing several Tracts on various subjects.'

The editions of Berkeley's complete works are:

1. London and Dublin, 1784, 2 vols. 4to, with portrait by Cooke.

2. 1820, 3 vols. 8vo.

3. 1837, 1 vol. 8vo.

4. 1843, 2 vols. 8vo. London. Edited by Rev. G. N. Wright, M. A., editor of the works of Reid and Stewart. No one of these editions is complete, nor in any sense critical.

5. The Works of George Berkeley, D. D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. Including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, His Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy. By Alexander Campbell Fraser, M. A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. In Four Volumes. Oxford. At the Clarendon Press, MDCCCLXXI.

This is the standard edition of Berkeley's works, and is in every respect a masterpiece of editorial taste, judgment, and completeness.

§ 13: EDITIONS OF SEPARATE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.—

1. New Theory of Vision, 1709 (two editions), 1732.

2. Principles of Human Knowledge. Lond., 1710, 1734, 1776, 1820. 8vo.

3. The Three Dialogues. Lond., 1713, 1725, 1734, 1776. 8vo.

4. The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained, 1733, 1860 (with annotations by Cowell).

5. Alciphron. Lond., 1732, 1752 (3d edition), 8vo, 2 vols. From the fourth London edition, New Haven, 8vo, 1803. With a commendatory note by President Dwight, who styles Berkeley 'one of the first philosophers of any age.' The editor is indebted to Prof. George E. Day, of New Haven, for a copy of this edition.

6. Siris. Lond., 1744 (three editions), 1746, 1747, 1748, 1752. 8vo.

§ 14: TRANSLATIONS INTO FRENCH AND GERMAN.—The Three Dialogues were translated into French by the Abbé du Gua de Malves, 1750, 12mo; Alciphron by de Joncourt, 2 vols. 8vo, La Haye, 1734; and Siris by Boullier, 1748, 12mo.

The Three Dialogues were translated from the French translation of 1750 by J. C. Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy at Rostock. The French was used because the translator could not get the English original. The German translation is given in the 'Sammlung'—a collection of the most important authors who have denied the actuality of their own bodies and of the entire corporeal world. Rostock, 1756, 8vo. Eschenbach has incorporated Collier's Key in his volume, and has added notes and an Appendix in confutation of Idealism.

In 1781, Leipzig, appeared the first volume of Berkeley's 'Philosophische Werke,' with a sketch of his life and of his writings. This volume contains the Three Dialogues.

The philosophical part of Siris has never been translated into German.

§ 15: UEBERWEG'S EDITION.—In the 'Philosophische Bibliothek'—Philosophical Library, or Collection of the Chief Works on Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Times, with the co-operation of distinguished scholars; edited, translated (when the works are not German), with annotations and biographical notices, by J. H. von Kirchmann, the twelfth volume is Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.



It was translated into German, with notes explanatory and critical, by Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, ordinary Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. Berlin, 1869. L. Heimann, Wilhelms-Strasse No. 91.

In his Preface, which we give entire, Ueberweg says :

'The lively interest manifested in our day in the History of Philosophy has led to the present work. It seemed to me desirable to bring closer to the knowledge of my time, by means of a translation with explanatory and critical notes, the chief work of a thinker like *George Berkeley*. He represents with decision, has with unsurpassed clearness established, and with the completest strictness and logical sequence developed, a philosophical theory which is possible and is relatively warranted. His work is one of the classic documents of modern speculation. Berkeley's "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" handle in a somewhat more popular form the same theme that is presented in the "Principles of Human Knowledge." The Dialogues were twice translated into German in the eighteenth century, but the "Principles" now appear for the first time in German.

'Berkeley's fundamental doctrine is that of *absolute immaterialism*. There exist no material substances, no bodies subsisting in and for themselves—subsisting without the mind. What we call bodies—and to which we must refer the term "matter," if it is to have any legitimate meaning—are complexes of "ideas," that is, of images (Gebilden), which can exist only in the mind, and not without it. "Nothing properly but persons or conscious things really exist. All other things are not so much existences, as manners of the existence (ideas) of persons." This of course holds good of our own bodies, equally with all other forms of matter: that these latter exist without *the body*, no one is less inclined than Berkeley to deny. "Ideas"—in the broader sense of the word—are partly furnished through sensuous or internal perception, partly formed by reproduction, analysis, and combination. The former class of ideas is produced in us by God. They are produced in a certain definite order, which we call conformity with the laws of nature, and God produces them not by means of matter existing without us, but without means, immediately.

'The second class of ideas we call forth in ourselves by our own

wills. The mind is active, it thinks and wills ; but corporeal things, inasmuch as they are ideas or complexes of ideas, exist only in the mind, as objects thought by it, not thinking, not operative objects.

'This doctrine is the opposite pole to Materialism, and may claim a philosophical as well as a historical interest in our day, in which Materialism has put forth fresh strength. Berkeley's doctrine has in our own day found distinguished representatives in Great Britain. The views of several of the most eminent thinkers in England and Scotland stand in close affinity with it. The edition of Berkeley's complete works by Professor Fraser of Edinburgh attests the lively interest felt in his views. Though in our day the Berkeleyan form of Idealism is unfamiliar, yet it stands in a close relation to the various tendencies which have arisen among us, beginning with Kant, and which condition our present philosophizing. So close is the relation that any one who wishes to be conversant with the present condition even of German philosophy, and to attain a solid judgment in regard to the philosophical discussions now pending, is compelled to take Berkeley's views into consideration.

'Berkeley's "Theory of Vision" (1709) appeared about a year in advance of the "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge" (1710). The "Theory," as Berkeley remarks (Principles, § 44), does not embrace all the aspects of his later doctrine. In the "Theory of Vision" Berkeley asserted that those "ideas" which are peculiar to the sense of sight, those which are perceived through it alone,—such as light and colours,—cannot exist without the mind. A similar view had been maintained by Descartes and Locke, and has subsequently been almost universally accepted. But in the "Theory of Vision" Berkeley does not yet explicitly maintain the same view in regard also to the 'ideas' perceived through touch. He endeavours in the 'Theory,' however, to prove that distance is not immediately seen, nor is it inferred from lines and angles, but from perceptions of an entirely different sort. This theory prepared the way for the transition to the more advanced theory of the "Principles," that distance also, and in general extension, figure, dimension, position, and motion, exist in the mind alone, exist as its ideas.

'The perusal of Berkeley's writings tends in a high degree to stimulate independent thinking. From the general philosophical notions (Begriffen) which tradition is wont to fix, Berkeley invariably falls back upon the concrete intuitions on which those notions rest, and tests the notion by the intuition. This is the evident secret of his power. Among the writings of modern philosophers I know scarcely any which are so free from the untested adoption of traditional abstractions, so independent and bold in reconstruction, such classic models in style, as the "Meditations" of Descartes and the "Principles" of our Berkeley. These qualities give them a pre-eminent adaptation as an introduction to philosophical research.

'We hardly need say that this recognition of the merits of Berkeley does not involve an acceptance of his doctrine on our part. We have added critical remarks which may stimulate the reader to independent reflection on the problems discussed. We have also given some explanations, especially of the historical references.

'Over against the ordinary presuppositions it is the aim of philosophy, in part to correct and extend, in part simply to clear up and confirm. Philosophy is not merely to strive after new results, but also to account for those grounds of just supposition, scientifically tenable, which escape our consciousness in its *primary* exercise (zunächst). In our sense-perception, the simple opinion that external things exist, and that they exist there and in the way, where and how; the images in our perception (Wahrnehmungsbilder) are present to our mind,—this opinion in a certain respect is to be corrected, in another respect is to be justified. By reference throughout to Berkeley's doctrine, both these can be most easily carried through in such a way that the entire circle of the problems to which we are here to have regard is brought into full light. These problems belong in part to Psychology and Theology, in part to Logic. With respect to Logic, I could desire that my critical observations on Berkeley may be regarded as an essential supplement to my views of external and internal perception, which form the first division of my "System of Logic." Bonn, 1857; 3d ed., do., 1868.

'KÖNIGSBERG, Jan. 22, 1869.'

## II. The Precursors of Berkeley.

§ 1: BACON (1561-1626) AND BERKELEY.—‘It is in the writings of Berkeley,’ says Archer Butler, ‘that we are to look for the first exposition of those acute and important reasonings which may be said in these latter days to have reduced the broad practical monitions of Lord Bacon to their metaphysical principles.’<sup>1</sup>

‘Berkeley’s theory of physical causation . . . consummates Bacon, and opens the way to the true conception of physical induction.’<sup>2</sup>

Berkeley’s judgment, that: ‘As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause,’ is in developed harmony with ‘Bacon’s conception of the *interpretability* of Nature or the sensible world.’<sup>3</sup> The whole spirit of Berkeley is, however, reactive against the speculative superficiality and the one-sided practicalness and materializing tendency of the Baconian System.

§ 2: HOBBS (1588-1679).—Hobbes and Berkeley stand together as defenders of Nominalism. It is almost their sole point of contact. Hobbes assumed, in his explanation of intelligent man, that the body accounted for the mind, and that Matter is the deepest thing in the Universe. Berkeley believed that Hobbes’ ‘wild imaginations—in a word, the whole system of Atheism—is . . . entirely overthrown . . . by the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind.’<sup>4</sup> He saw atheistical principles taking deeper root in consequence of the prevalence of false philosophy: ‘Pantheism, Materialism, Fatalism, are nothing but Atheism a little disguised.’ He regarded with horror the fact ‘that the notions of Hobbes,’ and others of the same school, ‘are relished and applauded.’<sup>5</sup>

Berkeley seemed determined to a surgery of extirpation in his treatment of the malady of the age. He felt that it was beyond poulticing, and he proposed to remove the cancer with the knife.

<sup>1</sup> Dublin University Magazine, vol. vii. 538; quoted in Fraser’s B.’s Life, 407.

<sup>2</sup> Fraser: Life, 43.

<sup>3</sup> Siris, § 254, and Fraser’s note. See [104].

<sup>4</sup> Second Dialogue (Works, i. 305).

<sup>5</sup> Theory of Vision Vindicated (Works, i. 374).

As prevalent falsehood abused matter to the overthrow of spirit, Berkeley proposed to settle the warfare by taking away the very material of war. He characterizes 'unthinking matter as that only fortress without which your Epicureans, Hobbe-ists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 3: DESCARTES (1596-1650) AND BERKELEY.—Berkeley 'inaugurated a new and second era in the intellectual revolution which Descartes set agoing.' Descartes rests upon the fundamental position of Berkeley, that we cognize the idea alone. He inferred from the existence of the idea, in perception, a substantial material world of which it is the idea. Berkeley denies the inference.

There were elements in the developed Cartesianism which could not but provoke opposition on the part of sound thinkers. Descartes did not actually draw some of the extremest inferences of the later Cartesianism, yet his views easily, if not necessarily, ran out into those of his school.

In Cartesianism matter is but the unknown occasion<sup>2</sup> at the presence of which Ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Matter, in the Cartesian system, is passive and inert. Descartes assumed, as Berkeley did, that external substance is not in any proper sense the *cause* of our ideas. Berkeley improved on Descartes, therefore, by rejecting what on Descartes' hypothesis was useless and encumbering. Descartes had exploded the idea, once recognized, that colors, sounds, and the rest of the sensible *secondary* qualities or accidents, have a real existence without the mind. Berkeley,<sup>3</sup> accepting this, went on to show that the *primary* ones—figure, motion, and such like,—cannot exist otherwise than in a spirit or mind which perceives them, and that it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of matter, taking that word to denote an 'unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.' Berkeley clearly saw and exposes the philosophical absurdity of the Cartesian conception of the relation of the external world to the mind of man.<sup>4</sup> 'The modern philosophers, who, though they allow matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate, efficient cause of all things.' 'Created beings are there-

<sup>1</sup> Prin., § 23.

<sup>2</sup> Prin. H. K., § 69.

<sup>3</sup> Prin., § 73.

<sup>4</sup> Prin. H. K., § 53.

fore made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them.'<sup>1</sup> He refers to Descartes when he speaks of those who, 'after all their laboring and struggle of thought, are forced to own that we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things.' In the *Hylas and Philonous*<sup>2</sup> he alludes to Descartes: 'What a jest it is for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God, or to pretend our knowledge on this point falls short of intuition or demonstration.'

§ 4: MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715) AND BERKELEY.—'The Platonism,' says Fraser, 'which pervades Malebranche perhaps tended to encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning that appeared in Berkeley's later writings.'<sup>3</sup> But Berkeley is not so much at home in the divine vision of the French metaphysician as among the ideas of the English philosopher (Locke). The mysticism of the "Search for Truth" was repelled by the transparent clearness of Berkeley's thought. The slender hold retained by Malebranche of external substance, as well as the theory of merely occasional causation of matter, common to him and Descartes, naturally attracted Berkeley.'

The position of Malebranche, as Berkeley himself states it, is, that matter is not perceived by us, but is perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our mind. In treating of the views of Malebranche, Berkeley says, 'If it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose nature or the divine wisdom to make something in vain, or to do that by tedious, round-about methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the world made in vain?' *Ibid.* 'Few men *think*, yet all *have opinions*. I shall not, therefore, be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract, general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses and know not the real natures or the true

<sup>1</sup> Prin., § 88.

<sup>2</sup> p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Pref., p. 113.

forms and figures of extended beings, of all of which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.'

§ 5: SPINOZA (1632-1677) AND BERKELEY.—An approach to Spinoza may seem to be made by Berkeley's removal of some elements of the Cartesian Dualism. Relatively to this, Berkeley may be called a *generic monist*. Descartes maintained two genera or *kinds* of substance, spiritual and corporeal. Berkeley allowed but one kind or genus of substance, to wit: spirit:—Divine spirit and Created spirit. To him all the phenomenal is so far subjective that it is either the operation *of* mind, or operation *on* mind, which is also of course in its result again the operation *of* mind, for the passivity of mind can in no case be more than relative. Its passivity is but a conditioned activity. But while Berkeley maintained one genus of substance, he held to objective, real species within it, and to real individuality and personality within the species. The Infinite spirit is a true, individual person, and the finite spirits are true, individual persons. No philosophical writer more thoroughly than Berkeley insists on the personality and freedom of God, the personality and freedom of man. He had, as we have seen, no sympathy with the latent Pantheism of Malebranche's vision in God, which, however it may be explained, still leaves the operations of the human mind as proper phenomena of the Divine mind, and effaces the true individuality and personality of man. There is no writer among our English classics whose whole moral tendency is purer than Berkeley's, more completely sundered from the ethical destructivism of Spinoza. His works are a bulwark of the highest faiths, hopes, and aspirations of the heart of man, and they are such, in part, because of their distinct assertion of the personality and freedom of God, the personality, freedom, and accountability of man.

§ 6: LOCKE (1632-1704) AND BERKELEY.—The system of Locke, which in one line of development easily runs out into materialism, is in another line carried out with equal ease into idealism. To this extreme tended Locke's depreciation of the accepted idea of substance; a depreciation the danger of which he himself subsequently saw; he ridiculed the distinction expressed in the terms 'substance' and 'accident.' He says (Hum. Und.,

II. xiii. 19), 'They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word "substance" to support them.' Berkeley's theory enlarged and gave scientific shape to Locke's inconsiderate ridicule.

Another point of attachment to idealism is found in Locke's view of knowledge—his answer to the question, 'What do we know?' To this he returns the reply (IV. i. 1), 'The mind hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate;' and he infers that our knowledge is only conversant about them. He says (IV. ii. 1), 'All our knowledge consists in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties and in our way of knowledge are capable of.' This is a distinct admission that we have no immediate proper knowledge of the external world. 'The mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them.' (IV. iv. 3.) This strictly taken means that we know only our ideas and infer the existence of things. He goes on to say, 'Our knowledge is therefore real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.' He ought to have said, to be consistent with himself, our inferences therefore as to things are correct only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.

Locke was too acute to fail to perceive the embarrassment of his position, but he was not acute enough to relieve it, for in fact it cannot be relieved. That he was acute enough to perceive it is shown by his asking, 'But what shall be the criterion, how shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?' 'This,' he says, 'though it seems not to want in difficulty, yet I think there be two sorts of ideas, that we may be assured agree with things.' (IV. iv. 3.)

In these very words he abandons his position and goes into the discussion of a wholly different question. He raises his question in what Kant would call the sphere of the critical reason, and returns his answer in the sphere of the practical reason. His question is, 'How shall I *know*?' His answer is, 'I have good reason to *believe*.' But, philosophically speaking, we can-



not know what we believe, nor believe what we know. When I speak philosophically and say, 'I believe,' I grant that I do not know, in the strict sense in which we here use the term.

Locke says (iv. iv. 8), 'To make our knowledge real, it is requisite that our ideas answer their archetypes.' (iv. vi. 16), 'General certainty is never to be found but in our ideas; it is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge.' (iv. vi. 11), 'The knowledge we have of our own being we have by *intuition*, the existence of God *reason* clearly makes known to us; the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by *sensation*, for there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man has in his memory, nor of any other existence but that of God, with the existence of any particular man, no particular man can know the existence of any other being but only when by actually operating upon him it makes itself perceived by him; for having the idea of anything in our minds no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the vision of a dream makes thereby a true history.' Locke admits in so many words 'the notice we have by our senses of the existence of things without us *is not altogether so certain* as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet it is an *assurance* that deserves the name of knowledge.' Here Locke marks three gradations of intellectual certainty: the first and highest gradation is our *intuitive* knowledge, the second and lower is deductions of *reason*, the third and lowest is the notice our *senses* take of things without us, the result of which Locke calls assurance; in a word, I. Intuition, II. Reason, III. Faith. Now, as the first of these is not more than knowledge, the second and third must be less than knowledge, because they are less than the first. Locke feels this, and hence the rhetorical vagueness 'it is an assurance that *deserves the name* of knowledge'—it is really faith, not knowledge. He says (iv. xi. 9) of this last, 'This knowledge extends so far as the present *testimony* of our senses employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further; for if I saw such a collection of simple ideas, as is wont

to be called man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute since with his existence now; by a thousand ways he may cease to be since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence.' He closes the paragraph by saying, 'Though it be *highly probable* that millions of men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this I have not the certainty of it which we *strictly call knowledge*, though the great *likelihood* of it puts me past doubt; but this is but *probability*, NOT knowledge.' In these words of Locke there is a distinct assertion of the principle that cognition and belief are distinct, that no amount of belief is strictly equivalent to knowledge, and that knowledge proper is limited by the present testimony of our senses, so far as anything external to us is involved. This is not, indeed, Berkeley's doctrine that the unperceived is non-existent; but it is the doctrine, almost as remote from popular impression, that the unperceived is unknown,—it is that the cognitive *esse* is *percipi*, and in a new shape it involves that, on Locke's principles, the external world is not an object of knowledge, but an assumption of faith. In some sense Berkeley developed certain parts of the philosophy of Locke; in others, he took grounds against it.

§ 7: BURTHOGGE (1694).—Richard Burthogge's *Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits*, 1694, is quoted by Prof. Fraser<sup>1</sup> as presenting 'dim anticipations both of Berkeley and of Kant.' Burthogge says, 'Few, if any, of the ideas which we have of things are properly *pictures*, our conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict propriety than our words do our conceptions. . . Things . . . are in all respects the very same to the mind or understanding that colours are to the eye. . . Things are nothing to us but as they are known by us; . . . they are not in our faculties, either in their own reality or by way of a true resemblance or representation. . . Every cogitative faculty, though it is not the sole cause of its own immediate (apparent) object, yet has a share in making it. . . In sum, the immediate objects of cogitation . . . are *entia cogitationis*, all phenomena; appearances that do no more exist without our faculties in the things them-

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Letters*, 44.

selves than the images that are seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist in those places where they seem to be. . . In truth, neither accident nor substance hath any being but only in the mind, and by the virtue of cogitation or thought.'<sup>1</sup>

### III. Summaries of Berkeley's System.

§ 1: In common with every great thinker of every age, Berkeley has been misunderstood and misrepresented in various ways. Men of various schools have been unconsciously biased in their judgment of Berkeley's views by their own.

Where there has been no misrepresentation, there has been a difference in the proportion and prominence assigned by different writers to different parts.

It will therefore be both interesting and useful to present a number of summaries from distinguished writers of different schools. They will have value as testimony also, where differences of opinion may still exist as to Berkeley's meaning.

§ 2: REID (1710-1796).—'Berkeley maintains, and thinks he has demonstrated, by a variety of arguments, grounded on principles of philosophy universally received, that there is no such thing as matter in the universe; that sun and moon, earth and sea, our own bodies and those of our friends, are nothing but ideas in the minds of those who think of them, and that they have no existence when they are not the objects of thought; that all that is in the universe may be reduced to two categories, to wit, *minds*, and ideas in the mind.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 3: KANT (1724-1804).—'Material idealism is the theory which maintains that the existence of objects in space exterior to us is either dubious and incapable of proof, or false and impossible. The former is the *problematic* idealism of Descartes, who holds that there is but one empirical assertion which is beyond doubt, to wit, *I am*; the second is the *dogmatic* idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, with all the things to which it adheres, as an inseparable condition, is in itself impossible, and that by consequence the things in space are mere

<sup>1</sup> Chaps. iii. and v., quoted in *Life and Letters*, 44. Burthogge's Work is in the Philadelphia Library.

<sup>2</sup> Works (Hamilton), 281.

imaginings. It is impossible to escape from dogmatic idealism if we look upon space as a quality of things in themselves; for in that case it is, in common with everything which it conditions, a non-entity.<sup>1</sup> It is acknowledged that Kant does not state Berkeley's view accurately.

§ 4: PLATNER (1744-1818).—'I do not know of any dogmatic idealism but that of Berkeley, of which with complete injustice Kant says that it regards the difference between a dream and a reality as indemonstrable. Berkeley certainly supposes something real to be the object of our sense-cognition: to wit, the material world in the idea of God, and through the power of God really operating upon us, as in the system of Spinoza. Extension is nothing but God's idea of extension, formed by the power of God. In other words, Berkeley reasons on the assumption that the ideal of the material world is in God. As he does not see how a material world can exist without this ideal, or be distinct from it, he infers that what we call the material world, and consider as such, is the divine ideal of it, which floats before us, and by means of the divine power operates upon us. It is consequently a true object, and not a creature of our imagination (*Vorstellungs-Vermögens*); no fancy, no dream, but something thoroughly real; and in this object everything is precisely as it is in our conception (*Vorstellung*). For Berkeley says with truth that on every mode of explanation but his own even the primary qualities must be explained as phenomenon; while he rejects this explanation and says expressly that the senses thoroughly represent (*vorbilden*) that which is without them. This metaphysician concedes consequently to the sense-cognition a more unlimited objective truth than has perhaps ever been ascribed to it. This follows also as a matter of course from his system. See, for example, how he derides the philosophers who deduce colours, cold, warmth, from the primary qualities which are wholly different from them:<sup>2</sup> "I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses and leave things as I find them. It is my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are of the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white

<sup>1</sup> *Krit. d. rein. Vernunft*, herausg. v. V. Kirchmann. Dritte Aufl., 1872, pp. 235, 236.

<sup>2</sup> *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*.

and fire hot; and as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence.'"<sup>1</sup>

§ 5: HILLEBRAND (1819).—'Berkeley was the founder of what may properly be called the dogmatico-psychological idealism. The line of thought in his doctrine is in substance as follows: All cognition begins with the ideas (*Vorstellungen*). These ideas must be either purely subjective, or there must be real objects correspondent with them without the mind. The latter is impossible; for otherwise the external objects must possess the qualities of mind, inasmuch as an idea cannot be absolutely separated from its object, but the separation itself is again idea. But such a supposition must be absurd. Experience further teaches us that one and the same object operates differently upon different subjects. If now the object as such were really existent without the concipient subject, it must be self-contradictory in its qualities, which it is unphilosophical to maintain. Nothing remains, therefore, but to suppose that the entire external world in space is empty appearance without reality; that it rests only on subjective ideas; that these alone are truly real. As, however, the subjective ideas are not produced by our mind itself, there must be another Being from whom they originate. This Being can be a spirit only, as there is no existence but the spiritual. The manifold character and order in the subjective perceptions (there are no abstract ideas), and the mode in which they reach us, justifies the conclusion that this spirit must possess the supremest and noblest attributes—must be the Deity himself.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 6: TENNEMANN (1761–1819).—'With extraordinary acuteness Berkeley exposed the difficulties of external experience, the obscurity of the notions of substance, accidents, and extension; showed that by our senses we can perceive nothing but sensible qualities, and can by no means perceive the existence and substantiality of a sensible object, and that the supposition that there is a corporeal world distinct from and independent of our conceptions is an illusion. There is, therefore, nothing but spirits. Man perceives nothing but his own sensations and conceptions. All these, however, he does not himself originate; and as nothing

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Platner, *Philosophische Aphorismen*, 1793, i. 409, 410.

<sup>2</sup> *Propaedeutik der Philosophie*. Heidelberg, 1819, § 452.

but spirits exist, they must be imparted by a spirit. Their manifoldness and conformity with law, in independence of our will, shows that they are imparted by an infinitely perfect spirit, God. Though he be dependent for his cognition on God, yet man, by his practical freedom, is the author of his own errors and evil acts.<sup>1</sup>

§ 7: HEGEL (1770-1831).—‘Idealism declares that self-consciousness, or the assurance of self, comprehends all reality and truth. The extremest form of this idealism asserts that self-consciousness as individual or formal cannot advance beyond the assertion, All objects are our conceptions. This subjective idealism meets us in Berkeley, and in another shape in Hume. This idealism, before which all external reality vanishes, was preceded by the position occupied by Locke, and grows directly out of it. Berkeley represents an idealism which approached very closely to that of Malebranche. Over against the Metaphysic of the Understanding stands forth the view that all the existent and its determinations are a thing of sensation, and wrought into shape by consciousness. Berkeley’s fundamental thought therefore is, “The being of all, which we call things, is alone their being perceived;” that is, what we know is our own determinations.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 8: KRUG (1770-1842).—‘Berkeley endeavors to show that through the senses we perceive nothing but a sensible appearance, and by no means the existence or substantiality of an actual thing, and that consequently the supposition of a corporeal world independent of us is a pure illusion. Only spirits exist, and the mind of man, strictly speaking, perceives nothing but its own conceptions or ideas. These it does not itself bring forth, but God, the infinitely perfect Spirit, imparts them to it; nevertheless man, by the absolute freedom of his will, remains the author of his own good and evil actions.’<sup>3</sup>

§ 9: ROTHENFLUE (1846).—‘The principles and reasonings of Berkeley may be reduced to the following propositions:

‘I. All properties which we ascribe or refer to external things, such as extension, color, form, &c., are purely subjective sensations;

<sup>1</sup> Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philosophie, 5te Aufl. v. Wendt, 1829, § 348.

<sup>2</sup> Gesch. d. Philosophie. Herausg. v. Michelet. Berlin, 1844, 3e Theil, 441, 442.

<sup>3</sup> W. T. Krug: Allg. Handw. d. philosoph. Wissenschaften. Zweite Aufl., 1832, i. 326.

the objective reality corresponding with which cannot be proved, for they are variously perceived by various subjects; but as the same object cannot have contradictory properties, those sensations are purely subjective.

'II. If we separate or detach the sensible properties of a thing from the thing itself, that thing will no longer be perceptible by the senses; therefore, according to empiricism, it does not exist. Hence we can neither know that the properties of things, nor the external things themselves, exist. Take for example something which is extended; extension in so far as it is the perceived property of things is a purely subjective sensation, from which we can draw no conclusion establishing its objective reality. But the thing extended, if extension be cut off from it, is no longer perceptible by the senses, therefore it does not exist: hence we cannot attribute objective reality either to the properties of things or to the things themselves (according to empiricism).

'III. Nor can it be said that the sensations associated with outward things are, as it were, images through which we have cognizance of the external things. For we are not able from a likeness to have knowledge of its prototype original, unless we already have "a priori," through memory or reason, a notion of that original; but the senses teach us nothing of any relation of images to things, and memory and reason, according to empiricism, are not sources of knowledge.

'IV. Inasmuch as our sensations are mutable, but the objects of them immutable, the sensations cannot be images of the objects.

'V. Therefore we have cognizance of nought except of our own purely subjective ideas.

'VI. But the cause of those ideas is not our own mind, inasmuch as they do not depend upon its free will; the mind is related to them passively; hence they come from a spirit distinct from the mind, and their infinite variety and mutual harmony show that they come from an infinite and perfect spirit, i. e., God: hence,

'VII. As every idea of an outward world arises in us immediately from the will and power of God, we are entirely dependent in our cognitions on the divine will.

'VIII. In action, however, man is free, i. e., has the power of

self-determination; for, although the potency itself is from God, the exercise of it is given to man: hence,

‘IX. The physical reason of action is in God, but the moral reason is in man; hence sin is not to be attributed to God, but to man, in whose free will lies the proximate reason of all his acts.’<sup>1</sup>

§ 10: NICHOL (1854).—‘It is necessary to a right understanding of Berkeley’s speculations that one recall the false conceptions certainly prevailing at his time regarding the mode or manner in which *we know*; we allude to the Theory of the *Idea*. It was thought that the idea through which we know, and the thing that we know through it, are perfectly distinct. The *idea* of an object was fancied a sort of image of the object capable of being perceived by the mind: just as the mind, in seeing, discerns not the object but the image on the retina. Adopting this to the fullest extent in respect of all that knowledge which we call the knowledge of external things, Berkeley yet held that knowledge of the *mind* itself and of its operations comes *at once* and without the interposition of any medium—through a simple act of internal perception: from which foundation his strict logic led to the following singular superstructure. What are termed external objects being seen not in themselves but through or by *ideas*, what right have we to imagine the existence of these objects at all? Supposing them real, they are confessedly not discernible by the human mind; why then assume their existence? True knowledge, on the other hand, comes to us *directly* respecting the *mind*: is not mind and its phenomena therefore—spiritual entities—the sole reality in the universe?’<sup>2</sup>

§ 11: BROCKHAUS (1864).—‘The actual, he maintained, is spirit alone; the corporeal world is but an appearance, which arises out of our conceptions; the involuntary nature of this appearance is the result of original conceptions, which are wrought by the Spirit of spirits, God Himself.’<sup>3</sup>

§ 12: SCHWEGLER (1857).—‘Our sense-perceptions,’ says Berke-

<sup>1</sup> Institut. Philos. Theoreticæ, 1846, vol. iii. 271-273.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. John P. Nichol, LL.D., of the University of Glasgow: Cyclop. of Univ. Biog-raphy, 1854.

<sup>3</sup> Brockhaus: Real-Encyclop. Elfte Aufl., vol. ii., 1864.



ley, 'are something thoroughly subjective. If we believe that we have perceptions or cognitions of external objects, we are entirely in error: what we have and cognize are our own perceptions. It is, for example, clear that we *see* neither the distance, the magnitude, nor the form of objects by means of the visual sensations; we only *infer* them, because we have had the experience that a certain visual sensation is attended by certain sensations of touch. That which we *see* is only colour, the clear, the dim, &c., and it is consequently totally false to say that it is *one* and the *same thing* which we see and feel. Consequently, even in the case of those very sensations to which we by pre-eminence attribute an objective character, we do not go outside of ourselves. Strictly speaking, the objects of our understanding are only our own affections; all ideas are consequently only our own sensations. As little as sensations can exist without the sentient being, so little can an idea have existence without him who has it. What are called things exist consequently only in our conception; their *being* is simply *being perceived*. It is a fundamental error of most philosophers, that they suppose corporeal things to exist without the concipient spirit, and do not discern that the things are only something mental. How can material things educe what is so utterly diverse from them as the sensations and conceptions? Consequently there exists no material external world; *there exist only* spirits, that is, thinking beings, whose nature consists in conceiving and willing. But whence then do we obtain our sense-perceptions, which come to us without our help, which are consequently not the product of our will, as the images of our fancy are? We obtain them from a spirit superior to us (for only a spirit can bring forth conceptions in us),—that is, from God. God brings forth the ideas in us, or gives them to us; as it is, however, a contradiction that a Being should impart ideas which itself has none, the ideas we obtain from God exist *in God*. We may call these ideas in God, archetypes (original images); in ourselves, ectypes (derivative images, copies). This view does not involve, says Berkeley, the denial that there is a reality of the objects of our conception, a reality independent of our conception: it is only denied that they exist anywhere other than in our understanding. Instead, therefore, of speaking of a Nature in which,

for example, the Sun is Cause of warmth, &c., we must, if we would be strictly accurate, express ourselves thus: God announces to us, by the sensation of the eye, that we are about to feel a sensation of warmth. By Nature, therefore, we understand only the succession or connection of ideas; by Laws of Nature we mean the constant order in which ideas attend or follow each other, that is, the Laws of the Association of Ideas. This thorough pure Idealism, which is the complete denial of matter, is, according to Berkeley, the surest mode of escaping Materialism and Atheism.<sup>1</sup>

§ 13: FRASER (1861).—‘He held, with his predecessors, that mind has no objective knowledge of a world of matter; he held, with them, that in this respect the mind is conscious of nothing but ideas; he held, with them, that these ideas must have a cause; he held, with them, that these ideas were not generated from within, but were determined from without. With them, he held that the external cause of our ideas could not be matter; and, with them, he held that the external cause was God. But if God were the cause of our ideas, why gratuitously suppose the existence of an unknown world of matter? The world of consciousness was known. It was a series of conceptions which the mind was stimulated by the Deity to form. It was a dream, such as that with which the Hebrew prophets were inspired. It was an apocalyptic vision. It was a perpetual trance.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 14: SCHOLTEN<sup>3</sup> (1868).—‘The other extreme’ (the first was materialism) ‘into which the empiricism of Locke ran out, was that of one-sided idealism, as it is represented in England by Berkeley. Starting with Locke from the principle nihil est in intellectu, quod non ante fuerit in sensu, he contested the right of the empiricists to infer the existence of a material external world from the reception of sense-impressions.

‘The senses make us acquainted with nothing more than our own perceptions, and, in connection with the internal sense or reflection, with nothing more than our own ideas. From the touch, sight, smell, and taste, for example, of an apple, we are

<sup>1</sup> *Gesch. d. Philosophie.* Dritte Aufl. v. Köstlin, 1857, § 34.

<sup>2</sup> *North British Review*, vol. xxxiv. 459 (1861).

<sup>3</sup> *Gesch. d. Religion u. Philosophie.* Ein Leitfaden. Aus dem Holländischen . . . von Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868.

not justified in the conclusion that it has objective being. The only thing that can be established is that man, by means of his different organs of sense, perceives in himself a union of impressions which, in order to distinguish them from other more or less complicated perceptions, he is accustomed to call an apple. It follows as a consequence that no *material* objects exist *without* us. What is there is the self-percipient subject alone. What we call *nature* is nothing more than the collection of our own perceptions. The universe is therefore entirely spirit. Nevertheless, the fact that our perceptions rise independently of our will, cohere most closely, are linked into unity, and so far transcend all that we could bring into being by our reflective faculty, this fact demonstrates the existence of a most wise Supreme Being, the perfect *Spirit*. Thus, then, as in the case of the French sensualists, the earlier dualistic view of the world had gone over into *Monism, by denial of the existence of spirit*; in Berkeley's system the antithesis between spirit and matter was set aside, by *surrendering the objectivity of the visible world, or matter.*'

§ 15: UEBERWEG (1872).—'Berkeley was the founder of a universal immaterialism (idealism or phænomenalism). He held that the existence of a corporeal world, having a being in itself, is not only not strictly demonstrable,—and so far Augustine and even Locke had gone,—but is in fact a false assumption. There exist only spirits and their functions (ideas and acts of will). There are no abstract ideas; there is, for example, no conception of extension without an extended body, a definite magnitude, &c. An individual conception becomes general, as it represents all other individual conceptions of the same kind, as, for example, a single straight line in a geometrical demonstration represents all other lines of the same kind. That our thinking exists, we are immediately sure; that bodies distinct from our ideas exist, we infer; but this conclusion is fallacious—it has nothing which compels assent, and is confuted by the impossibility of explaining the co-working of completely heterogeneous substances. The *esse* of unthinking things is *percipi*. God calls forth the conceptions in us in a well-ordered manner. What we call the Laws of Nature is in fact the order in the succession of our ideas.'

† Gesch. d. Philosoph. d. Neuzeit, Dritte Aufl., 1872, 100, 101.

§ 16: VOGEL (1873).—‘The objects of human knowledge are either the ideas impressed upon the senses, or ideas attained by observing the soul in its activity and passivity, or, finally, ideas reached by memory and imagination. Besides these ideas exists what I call spirit, soul, or myself, and which is completely distinct from all those ideas. This spirit perceives those ideas, and the existence of an idea consists solely in its being perceived (*esse percipi*). But our conceptions and feelings exist only in ourselves; we perceive consequently only our own ideas or sensations, not the objects of sense-perception themselves. As now the whole choir of heaven and the plenitude of earthly objects—in brief, all things which compose the great frame of the world—have no subsistence without the mind, it follows that there is no other substance than mind, or that which perceives. That what are called *secondary* qualities, such as colours and sounds, exist only in us, is generally conceded; but the so-called *primary* qualities, such as extension, figure, movement, rest, which are asserted to be images of matter, can have no independent existence, as an idea can only be like an idea.

‘The notion of a corporeal substance involves a self-contradiction. So also the notions great and little, swift and slow, or notions of numbers, are only relative notions, pure mental abstractions. But were it granted that corporeal substance exists, we cannot have cognizance of it either by our senses or by thoughts. The senses do not teach us that things exist without the mind; we are shut up therefore to the supposition that we have cognition of them through thought. But can we not think of trees existing in a park, or books standing in a library, when no one perceives them? Certainly we can. To do this is merely to form in our mind certain ideas (trees, books), and at the same time to omit forming the idea of some one who perceives them. Meanwhile, however, we ourselves are thinking of those objects. To these considerations is to be added, that no activity or power is immanent in the things or ideas; so that they can originate no changes; but if they cannot do this, they are not the cause of our sensations. This cause must rather be either corporeal active substance or a spirit. A spirit is a simple, active being, which is named *understanding*, as it perceives ideas, or *will*, as it originates

them. No idea of spirit can be formed, as all ideas are passive, and cannot present us images of that which is active. We have furthermore the faculty of calling forth in ourselves certain ideas at will; but there is another class of ideas which press upon us from without, of which our will is not the source,—press upon us, in fact, in accordance with well-defined rules, what are called *Laws of Nature*. There must consequently be another will or spirit which originates them, and this spirit is *God*. The ideas impressed by the Author of nature on our senses are called actual things, but those which are evoked by our own imagination are *ideas* in the narrower sense, or images of things. The sense-ideas have indeed more reality,—they are more forcible, more orderly, are less dependent on the percipient spirit, as they are evoked by the will of another—God. God is one only, eternal, infinitely wise, good and perfect; he works all in all, and through him all subsists; he upholds all things by the word of his power, and maintains the relation between spirits whereby they have the faculty of knowing the existence one of another. For perceiving the different movements, changes, linkings of ideas, I draw from them the inference that there are distinct, individual, active *beings like myself* who stand in connection with those movements and participate in bringing them forth.

‘The *object of human knowledge* can be only spirits, ideas, and their relations in all their species. The *source of all errors* Berkeley finds in the supposition of the eternal existence of objects of sense, and in the doctrine of abstract ideas.’<sup>1</sup>

#### IV. Berkeleyanism: its friends, affinities, and influence.

§ 1: INFLUENCE.—Berkeley’s position in the history of Philosophy is a commanding one. By direct or indirect influence, by development, or by opposition, he has borne part in all the speculative thinking since his day. The removal of Berkeley would take away an essential link in the chain of modern philosophy. Without Berkeley, as Hamann long ago observed, we should not have had Hume, without Hume we should not have had Kant, without Kant the gigantic structure of the speculation

<sup>1</sup> Philosoph. Repetitorium, 1873, 92–95.

which ends in the school of Hegel would not have been reared, and without this progressive line of thinkers we should not have had the noble antagonism of witnesses to other forms of thought, essential to the highest development of intellectual man. Without Berkeley we should neither have had the developed philosophy of Germany, nor the developed 'Common Sense' of Scotland. 'Berkeley's doctrine,' says Ueberweg,<sup>1</sup> 'has never had a large number of adherents, but it has had no trifling influence on the further development of Philosophy.'

§ 2: FIRST RECEPTION.—'It is difficult at this distance of time to ascertain the immediate influence upon philosophical opinion' of Berkeley's new conception of the material world. It is 'said to have made some influential converts in England.' Swift speaks of him in a letter, 1724, as 'founder of a sect called the *Immaterialists*,' and adds, 'Dr. Smalridge (Bishop of Bristol) and many other eminent persons were his proselytes.' 'But even the educated mind was not then ripe for the due appreciation of a doctrine so paradoxical in its sound. More than twenty years were to elapse before it found an intellectual audience in David Hume, and other Scotchmen and Americans.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 3: JOHNSON.—The first place in the Berkeleyan roll of honour is due to Dr. Samuel Johnson (1696–1772), the Episcopal missionary at Stratford, Connecticut, Berkeley's American friend and disciple, who was on terms of personal intimacy with him while he resided in Rhode Island. '*The Principles of Human Knowledge*' had early fallen into his hands. His intimacy with Berkeley finished the work of conviction. His '*Elementa Philosophica*,' printed by Franklin, 1752, as a text-book for the University of Pennsylvania, was dedicated to Berkeley. It consists of two treatises—*Noetica, or Things relating to the Mind or Understanding*; and *Ethica, or Things relating to the Moral Behaviour*. It is thoroughly Berkeleyan in its main features, though 'the part of the *Noetica* which deals with the pure Intellect and its notions, and with intuitive Intellectual Light, is more akin to Plato and Malebranche, and even Kant, than to Berkeley's early philo-

<sup>1</sup> B.'s *Leben u. Schriften*, in his translation of the *Principles*. See also his Preface, given in *Prolegom.*, I., § 16.

<sup>2</sup> Fraser: *Life and Letters*, 62.

sophical works.’<sup>1</sup> Johnson was ‘one of the most learned scholars and acute thinkers of his time in America.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 4: JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703-1758).—The second illustrious name also belongs to America. Jonathan Edwards, the prince of the New England theological metaphysicians, was a pupil of Johnson at Yale College. He was a defender of Berkeley’s conception of the material world. He nowhere names Berkeley, and there is no evidence that they ever met. Edwards says, ‘When I say the Material Universe exists only in the mind, I mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence; and does not exist as Spirits do, whose existence does not consist in, nor in dependence on, the conceptions of other minds. . . . All existence is mental . . . the existence of all exterior things is ideal.’ ‘That which truly is the *substance* of all bodies is the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable Idea in God’s mind, together with his stable Will, that the same shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other minds, according to fixed and exact established methods and laws.’ Fraser says, ‘If he thus agrees with Berkeley in his account of *sensible things*, they separate in their theory of *causation* and *free-will*. Free agency, which is involved in the Dualism of Berkeley, is argued against by Edwards, whose speculative theology or philosophy is hardly to be distinguished from that of Spinoza. Berkeleyism is essentially a philosophy of causation.’<sup>3</sup> The influence of Edwards possibly connects itself with the fact that ‘the fanciful theory of Bishop Berkeley, as a kind of philosophical day-dream, maintained its prevalence for a season’ at Princeton.<sup>4</sup>

§ 5: BERKELEY IN OUR OWN DAY.—Nor is there wanting in our own day interest in Berkeley’s views, and sympathy in various degrees with them. ‘I am not without hope,’ says Fraser,<sup>5</sup> ‘that the reappearance of Berkeley in the modern philosophical world, in these latter years of the nineteenth century, under the auspices of the great University with which death has associated

<sup>1</sup> Fraser: Berkeley’s Life and Letters, 176.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.

<sup>3</sup> Berkeley’s Life and Letters, 182, 494, 405. See also p. 382.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Beaseley (Provost of the University of Pennsylvania): A Search of Truth. Dedication to Hobart, ii.

<sup>5</sup> Preface: Berkeley’s Works, I., xvi.

him, may be the occasion of a candid consideration of this good philosopher's explanation of the meaning of human existence, and of a fresh impulse to philosophy in Europe and America. There are signs which encourage this hope, in a retrospect of the history of recent opinion and metaphysical literature in England. The return to the deeper questions in metaphysics, inaugurated by Coleridge and Hamilton more than forty years since, in conjunction with the increased inclination in the interval to discuss first principles in theology and in the physical sciences, including physiology, is more favourable to the entertainment of the thoughts which occupied so much of Berkeley's life, and perhaps to harmony between science and faith, than the state of things in almost any former period of the history of this country. There are besides definite signs of an inclination to reconsider Berkeley in particular, and to draw from him what may be available for amending our conception of the nature of the existence we are participating in among the phenomena of sense; or at least for assisting us before we finish our course to inquire what this sense-conscious life through which we are now passing really means.' 'Many,' says Dr. McCosh, 'are turning toward it with longing.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 6: FERRIER.—Among the illustrious thinkers of recent date who have been admirers of Berkeley, we may mention Ferrier. He gives in his adhesion in language such as this: 'The speculations of this philosopher [Berkeley], whether we consider the beauty and clearness of his style, or the depth of his insight, have done better service to the cause of metaphysical science than the lucubrations of all other modern thinkers put together.' 'Among all philosophers, ancient or modern, we are acquainted with none who present fewer vulnerable points than Bishop Berkeley. His language, it is true, has sometimes the appearance of paradox; but there is nothing paradoxical in his thoughts, and time has proved the adamant solidity of his principles. With less sophistry than the simplest and with more subtlety than the acutest of his contemporaries, the very perfection of his powers prevented him from being appreciated by the age in which he lived.' 'The subsequent progress of philosophy shows how

<sup>1</sup> Presbyter. Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan. 1873.



much the science of man is indebted to his researches. He certainly was the first to stamp the indelible impress of his powerful understanding on those principles of our nature which since his time have brightened into imperishable truths in the light of genuine speculation.'<sup>1</sup> 'Berkeley accomplished the very task which, fifty or sixty years afterwards, Reid laboured at in vain. He taught a doctrine of intuitive, as distinguished from a doctrine of representative, perception; and he taught it on the only grounds on which such a doctrine can be maintained.'

'The ingenious and acute metaphysical works of the late Professor Ferrier . . . unfold a system which differs in some important respects from that of Berkeley, being constructed from the ontological, and not, like his, from the psychological point of view. With more form of demonstration, Ferrier leaves in the background the sense-symbolism and intuition of efficient causality, which are essential to the externality and dualism of Berkeley.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 7: PROFESSOR GROTE.—'The strikingly candid speculations of the late Professor Grote of Cambridge, which contain some of the most interesting English contributions to the higher philosophy of this generation, have also a tendency to Berkeley's point of view.'<sup>3</sup>

Professor John Grote (not to be confounded with George Grote, the historian of Greece and biographer of Plato and Aristotle) had published (1865) the *Exploratio Philosophica: Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science. Part I.* His death in 1866 left the second part in a fragmentary condition.

§ 8: MANSEL.—'Dean Mansel's learned and closely-reasoned works in philosophy, besides reviving metaphysical discussion in England, have occasionally approached the speculation of Berkeley, bringing valuable critical light.'<sup>4</sup>

§ 9: SIMON.—'The assiduous zeal and subtlety of Mr. Collyns Simon, his book *On the Nature and Elements of the Material World*, and his various essays since, have drawn attention to the subject not only in these islands but also in Germany.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lectures and Philosophical Remains, ii., 292, 293. <sup>2</sup> Fraser: Berkeley's Works, vol. i., Pref., xvii.

<sup>3</sup> Fraser: Berkeley's Works, vol. i., Pref., xvii.

<sup>4</sup> Fraser: Pref., xvii.

<sup>5</sup> Fraser: Berkeley's Works, vol. i., Pref., xvii.

The second part of the title of Mr. Thomas Collyns Simon's book is *Universal Immaterialism*, fully explained and newly demonstrated. London, 1847 (1862). It is accompanied by a prospectus of the terms upon which a prize of one hundred pounds is offered for a conclusive disproof of *Universal Immaterialism*.

He had a correspondence in 1852-53 with Sir William Hamilton, in which he quotes Sir William as saying that he has seen nothing in Berkeley irreconcilable with his own views.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Simon has written several dissertations for periodicals.<sup>2</sup>

A discussion between Simon and Ueberweg followed the translation of Berkeley's *Principles*.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Simon has also discussed, from the Berkeleyan point of view, Mill's *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*.<sup>4</sup>

§ 10: MILL.—John Stuart Mill ably defended Berkeley's Theory of Vision, of which he says that it 'has remained, almost from its first promulgation, one of the least disputed doctrines in the most disputed and most disputable of all sciences, the science of man. This is the more remarkable, as no doctrine in mental philosophy is more at variance with first appearances, more contradictory to the natural prejudices of mankind. Yet this apparent paradox was no sooner published than it took its place, almost without contestation, among established opinions. The warfare which has since distracted the world of metaphysics has swept past this insulated position without disturbing it; and while so many of the other conclusions of the analytical school of mental philosophy, the school of Hobbes and Locke, have been repudiated with violence by the antagonist school, that of Common Sense, or innate principles, this one doctrine has been recognized and upheld by the leading thinkers of both schools alike.'<sup>5</sup>

'Some chapters in Mr. J. S. Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, and passages in his other writings, show how much in the new conception of the sensible world is appreciated by a fair and able thinker of phenomenalist tendencies.'<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Veitch's *Memoir of Hamilton*, 344-349.

<sup>2</sup> Among these may be mentioned 'Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of Matter' in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, iii., 4 Dec. 1869. *Is Thought the Thinker?* *Ib.*, p. 375.

<sup>3</sup> Ueberweg's Letter to Simon, *Fichte's Z. f. Ph.*, 1869. Simon's Answer, *ib.*, 1870. A brief closing word by Ueberweg, *ib.*, 1871.

<sup>4</sup> *Hamilton versus Mill*, 3 parts, Edinburgh, 1866-68.

<sup>5</sup> *Westminster Review*, xxviii 318.

<sup>6</sup> Fraser: *Berkeley's Works*, i., Pref., xvii.

§ 11: STIRLING.—‘Dr. J. H. Stirling, by devoting reflection to fresh aspects of questions which Berkeley raised by implication, has prepared some for looking at the perennial problem with a fresh eye.’<sup>1</sup>

§ 12: DUBLIN UNIVERSITY.—‘Nor must Berkeley’s own University be forgotten, where philosophy is now cultivated by men who are not unworthy of its fame, and who, either as expositors or as adverse critics, have not forgotten its greatest names in metaphysics.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 13: FRASER.—The admirable and only complete edition of Berkeley’s Works, followed by his Life and Letters, we owe to Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Professor Fraser regards Berkeley as one of the greatest philosophers of Great Britain. He says that his ‘own love for philosophy was first engaged by Berkeley in the morning of life,’ and that he ‘regards his writings as among the best in English literature for a refined education of the heart and intellect.’ Berkeley was ‘the greatest metaphysician in his own age.’ ‘The intellectual influence which partly originated in him has since been silently modifying all the deeper thought of the time in physics and in metaphysical philosophy. Is an unknowing and unknown something called matter, or is intelligence, the supreme reality? and are men the transient results of material organization, or are they immortal beings? This is Berkeley’s implied question. His answer to it, although in his own works it has not been thought out by him into its primary principles, or sufficiently guarded in some parts, nevertheless marks the beginning of the second great period in modern thought, that in which we are living. The answer was virtually reversed in Hume, whose exclusive phenomenalism, reproduced in the positivism of the nineteenth century, led to the Scotch conservative psychology, and to the great German speculation which Kant inaugurated.’<sup>3</sup>

§ 14: GERMANY.—‘I am inclined to believe,’ says Fraser, ‘that the present state of German speculation is not unfavourable to a more ample and appreciative consideration of Berkeley than he

<sup>1</sup> Fraser: Berkeley’s Works, i., Pref., xviii.   <sup>2</sup> Fraser: Berkeley’s Works, i., Pref., xviii.

<sup>3</sup> Berkeley’s Works, i., Pref., viii.

has hitherto received in the occasional allusions made by the philosophers and historians of philosophy of the chief speculative nation of Europe.' He then speaks of Ueberweg's annotated version of the Principles, and adds, 'This translation has, I understand, circulated widely in that country. It has been partly the occasion of recent discussions on Berkeley's philosophy in some of the German periodicals.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 15: AMERICA.—Among the recent American admirers of Berkeley's system may be mentioned Rowland G. Hazard, author of a work on the Will (1864) and of one on Causation (1869).

'Berkeley's remarkable relations to America, and the adoption of distinctive parts of his philosophy by two of his eminent American contemporaries, Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards, should secure for him a hearing in that great country, whose advancement since he lived in it has almost realized the dream even of his benevolent imagination.'<sup>2</sup>

### V. Opponents and Objections.

§ 1: RIDICULE.—The favourite weapon against Berkeleyanism from the beginning has been ridicule; 'Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.' There is but one point to all the jesting, and the variation of form is not very marked. Arbuthnot's joke is the first on record.<sup>3</sup> Swift is said to have left Berkeley standing at the door in the rain, on the ground that if his philosophy were true he could as easily enter with the door shut as open.

Dr. Johnson's confutation by kicking a large stone, 'striking his foot with mighty force against it,' as Boswell happily phrases it, is one for which Ferrier says 'Berkeley would have hugged him.' It embodied the popular common sense unreservedly, and so was superior to the philosophy which accepts that common sense but half way. There is as much argument and more wit in a less-quoted anecdote. When a gentleman who had been defending Berkeley's view was about going away, Johnson said, 'Pray, sir, don't leave us, for we may perhaps forget to think of you, and then you will cease to exist.'

<sup>1</sup> Berkeley's Works, i., Pref., xviii.

<sup>2</sup> Fraser: Berkeley's Works, i., Pref., xviii.

<sup>3</sup> See Prolegomena, I.

Byron linked a well-worn college pun with a versification of Hume's estimate :

'When Bishop Berkeley said, "There was no matter,"  
 And proved it, 'twas no matter what he said.  
 They say his system 'tis in vain to batter,  
 Too subtle for the airiest human head:  
 And yet who can believe it?'

Sydney Smith says, 'Bishop Berkeley destroyed the world in one volume octavo, and nothing remained after his time but mind, which experienced a similar fate from the hand of Mr. Hume in 1737.'

It is not to the credit of the metaphysicians who have combated Berkeley that so much they have written is but a prosy elaboration of the jocosé misrepresentation of his views.

Had Burke carried out his purpose of answering Berkeley, the world would have had a brilliant book,—a brilliant success or a brilliant failure.

§ 2: SAMUEL CLARKE (1675–1729) declined to discuss Berkeley's principles in regard to the existence of matter. 'As Clarke,' says Stewart, 'in common with his antagonist, regarded the principles of the ideal theory as incontrovertible, it was perfectly impossible for him, with all his acuteness, to detect the flaw to which Berkeley's paradox owed its plausibility.'<sup>1</sup> Not only so, but Clarke approaches at times very closely to the Berkeleyan construction of the relation of the universe to mind: 'All things that are done are done either immediately by God himself or by created intelligent beings, *Matter* being evidently not capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only this *one* negative power, that every part of it will of itself always and *necessarily* continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the *effects of God's acting upon matter continually and every moment*, either immediately by himself or mediately by some created intelligent beings. . . . Consequently there is no such thing

<sup>1</sup> Works, iii. 53, v. 4, 18.

as what we commonly call the *course of nature* or the *power of nature*. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner, which course or manner of acting being in every moment perfectly *arbitrary*, is as easy to be *altered* at any time as to be preserved.<sup>1</sup>

§ 3: ANDREW BAXTER (1687-1750), in his 'Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,' has a section (2d ed., pp. 256-344) entitled 'Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the Existence of Matter and a Material World examined and shown inconclusive.' It is the first extended review of Berkeley. Warburton says of the Inquiry, 'He who would see the justest and precisest notions of God and the soul may read this book, one of the most finished of the kind, in my humble opinion, that the present times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.'<sup>2</sup> Stewart pronounces this 'splendid eulogy' as beyond the merit of the Inquiry, though he acknowledges 'that it displays considerable ingenuity as well as learning.'<sup>3</sup>

Fraser says of the Inquiry, 'Its comparative bulk is almost the only circumstance which entitles Baxter's work to consideration. . . . At the best, he is ingenious and acute in the construction of a man of straw.' The truth in regard to Baxter is perhaps midway between these estimates. His examination of Berkeley's scheme is fully equal to the best of the later replies in the Scotch school, and in fact anticipates nearly everything that is important in them. 'We perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the *objects* of them; or we perceive objects existing from without, by the mediation of sensation or motion produced, since we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside ourself. . . . This cause we call Matter.'<sup>4</sup> 'Our *ideas* cannot exist without the mind, but their objects may, and do. And they are still sensible objects, though they fall not under the senses at all times and in all places.' . . . 'The perception of a picture shows not only that the soul is immaterial, but that it is united to a material sensory, where the picture is impressed, and to which it applies for the perception of it, or that matter

<sup>1</sup> Works, fol. ed., ii. 697.

<sup>3</sup> Works, i. 429, 430.

<sup>2</sup> Divine Legation, 1st ed., 395.

<sup>4</sup> Inquiry, 2d ed., 1738, ii. 290, 294.

exists.' The argument of Baxter frequently appeals to the principle of 'common sense,' as it is generally understood in the Scotch school. He speaks of 'plain truths,' 'truths so plain that a man cannot cast doubt upon them without committing much violence to his reason,' 'plain and well-meaning men,' 'an argument to overturn common sense.'<sup>1</sup> He charges on Berkeley a confusion of classification: '*figure* and *motion* are nicely shuffled in with *colour* and *sound*, though they are qualities of a different kind; and in the *last*, that *extended moveable substance* is supposed to be a *species of idea*, . . . in which case Dr. Berkeley is very safe in his argument.'

§ 4: REID (1710-1795).—'Dr. Reid acknowledges the Berkeleyan system to be a logical consequence of the opinions universally admitted by the learned at the time when Berkeley wrote.'<sup>2</sup> 'That from those *data* (which had been received, during a long succession of ages, as incontrovertible articles of faith) both Berkeley and Hume have reasoned with unexceptionable fairness, as well as incomparable acuteness, he acknowledges in every page of his works.'<sup>3</sup>

'I once believed,' says Reid, '*the doctrine of ideas* so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system along with it.'<sup>4</sup> Berkeley's view as epitomized by Reid is this: 'If we have any knowledge of a material world, it must be by the senses; but *by the senses we have no knowledge but of our sensations only*; and our sensations, which are attributes of *mind*, can have no resemblance to any qualities of a thing which is inanimate.'<sup>5</sup>

'Finding other consequences to follow from it,' says Reid, 'which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a material world, it came into my mind more than forty years ago to put the question, What evidence have I for this doctrine that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind?' 'The belief in a material world. . . declines the tribunal of reason and laughs at all the artillery of the logician. It retains its sovereign authority in spite of all the edicts of philosophy, and reason itself

<sup>1</sup> Inquiry, 2d ed., 1738, ii. 344.

<sup>2</sup> Dugald Stewart: Elem. Phil. of Hum. Mind, chap. i., sec. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Dugald Stewart: Essays. Works, v. 90.

<sup>4</sup> Works (Hamilton), 283.

<sup>5</sup> Intel. Powers, Essay II., chap. xi.

must stoop to its orders.' 'If Reason will not be the servant of Common Sense, she must be her slave.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 5: HENRY HOME, OF KAMES (1696-1782), supposes 'the foundation of this terrible doctrine—the ideal system—to be no better than a shallow metaphysical argument, namely, "That no being can act but where it is, and consequently that it cannot act upon any subject at a distance."' This proposition Lord Kames pronounces false. 'Is there anything more simple or more common than the acting upon subjects at a distance by intermediate means? When I see a tree . . . the object perceived is the tree itself, *not* the rays of light, *not* the picture. In this manner distant objects are perceived without any action of the object upon the mind or of the mind upon the object. . . . The air put in motion . . . makes an impression upon the drum of the ear; but this impression is *not* what I hear,—it is the *thunder itself*, by means of that impression.'<sup>2</sup> No burlesque could equal the unconscious richness of this argument.

§ 6: VOLTAIRE (1694-1778) says, 'According to this doctor (Berkeley), ten thousand men killed by ten thousand cannon-shots are in reality nothing more than ten thousand apprehensions of our understanding.' . . . Voltaire answers Berkeley's argument from the relativity of size thus: 'He had only to take any *measure*, and say, of whatever extent this body may *appear* to me to be, it extends to so many of these measures.' 'Extent is not a sensation. When this lighted coal goes out, I am no longer warm; when the air is no longer struck, I cease to hear; when this rose withers, I no longer smell it; but the coal, the air, and the rose have extent without me. Berkeley's paradox is not worth refuting.' 'It is worth knowing how Berkeley was drawn into this paradox. A long while ago I had some conversation with him, and he told me that his opinion originated in our being unable to conceive what the subject of this extension is; and certainly in his book he triumphs when he asks Hylas what this subject, this substratum, this substance is? . . . But the subject does not the

<sup>1</sup> Works, 127. See 'Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense,' Ferrier's Lectures . . . and Remains, 1866, vol. ii., 407-459.

<sup>2</sup> Elements of Criticism, chap. xxv. Appendix. Note. The first edition appeared in 1762.



less exist, for it has essential properties of which it cannot be deprived.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 7: DIDEROT (1713-1784). 'The author of the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (Condillac) judiciously remarks that whether we lift ourselves to the very heavens or go down into the abyss, we never go out of ourselves, and it is nothing but our own thinking which we perceive; but this is the very point reached in the first Dialogue of Berkeley, and is the very foundation of his entire system—extravagant system, which, it seems to me, could have its birth alone among the blind—a system which, to the disgrace of the mind of man and of philosophy, is of all systems the most difficult to refute, yet is the most absurd of all.'<sup>2</sup> On this Stewart, with his characteristic candour, says, 'If the fundamental principle ascribed by Diderot to Berkeley be admitted, it will be found, I apprehend, not merely *difficult*, but altogether *impossible*, to resist his conclusion.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 8: BEATTIE (1735-1803), in his very untruthful Essay on Truth, handles Berkeley with his characteristic display of shallowness and egotism. 'Berkeley's pretended proof of the non-existence of matter, at which common sense stood aghast for many years, has no better foundation than the ambiguous use of a word.' 'This (Berkeley's) argument . . . proves that to be false which *every man* must necessarily believe every moment of his life to be true, and that to be true which *no man* since the foundation of the world was ever capable of believing for a single moment.' This argument, reduced out of its paraphrase, simply means—you lie! Beattie states Berkeley's view as involving 'that the sun, moon, and stars, and ocean, and tempest, thunder and lightning, mountains, rivers, and cities, have no existence but as ideas or thoughts in *my* mind, and independent on *me* and *my* faculties do not exist at all, and could not exist if *I* were to be annihilated; that food and burning and pain which *I feel*, and the *recollection* of pain that is past, and the *idea* of pain which *I never felt*, are in the *same sense* ideas and perceptions in *my* mind, and nothing else, . . . and thus I have no evidence that

<sup>1</sup> Philosophical Dictionary, London. Art. Body.

<sup>2</sup> Lettre sur les Aveugles, quoted by Stewart, v. 66.

<sup>3</sup> Do. do.

any being exists in nature but myself.'<sup>1</sup> All this is directly the reverse of Berkeley's real views. Beattie, however, grants that Berkeley did not foresee the consequences of his doctrines: 'His intentions were irreproachable, and his conduct, as a man and a Christian, did honour to human nature.'<sup>2</sup> A portrait of Beattie, with allegorical accessories, was painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds in 1773, in which Truth (as Beattie, we presume) was represented trampling on Infidelity and Scepticism, in the shapes of Voltaire and Hume.

Dr. Beattie thus defines the *common sense* to which he appeals: 'The term *common sense* hath . . . been used to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse, derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature, acting independently on our will whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore properly called a SENSE, and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called *common sense*.' Beattie distinguishes common sense from reason, as Reid does, and appeals from reason to it. Hamilton, after a fashion, vindicates Beattie's definition of common sense, and apologizes for his identification of reason with reasoning in common with the great majority of philosophers, and, with enough reservations to leave very little of the definition, insists that there is more in it to be praised than to be censured.<sup>3</sup>

§ 9: JAMES OSWALD, in his 'Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion' (1766-1772), charged mankind in general, and learned men in particular, with neglecting or despising common sense. The result of the rarity of the use of common sense was the neglect of the obvious and useful, and the fruitless pursuit of speculative niceties. This had been the error of the earliest philosophy, and continued to be the fatal mistake of the latest. Locke denied innate ideas. His system runs out into materialism and fatalism. Clarke and others wasted time and talents in a philosophical demonstration of the existence of a God, an existence which the merest glance at nature put beyond all doubt.

<sup>1</sup> Essay, 6th ed. London, 1778, 132, 140, 232.

<sup>2</sup> Do. 442.

<sup>3</sup> Hamilton's Reid's Works, 792.

Berkeley and his school considered man as a mere intelligence, and scarcely noticed his sentient bodily nature. The common calamity was want of common sense, and the sole panacea needed for its cure was the neglected thing of virtue, common sense itself, as possessed by Oswald and all who agreed with him. 'The declamatory, insulting style of Dr. Oswald has met with general disapprobation.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 10: DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) says of Berkeley's arguments against the existence of the material world, 'They amount to little more than an ingenious and elegant development of some principles of Malebranche, pushed to certain paradoxical but obvious consequences, of which Malebranche, though unwilling to avow them, appears fully to have been aware. These consequences, too, had been previously pointed out by Mr. Norris, a very learned divine of the Church of England, whose name has unaccountably failed in obtaining that distinction to which his acuteness as a logician, and his boldness as a theorist, justly entitle him.'<sup>2</sup> Stewart's statement of the Berkeleyan question is as follows: 'As our sensations have no resemblance to the qualities of matter, it has puzzled philosophers to explain in what manner our notions of primary qualities are acquired. It is the difficulty that has given rise to the modern scepticism concerning the non-existence of matter. According to the ancient theory of perception, sensible qualities are perceived by means of images or species propagated from external objects to the mind by the organs of sense. These . . . *ideas* were supposed to be resemblances of the sensible qualities. . . . This hypothesis is now commonly distinguished as the ideal theory. On the principles of this theory Berkeley demonstrated that the existence of matter is impossible; for, if we have no knowledge of anything which does not resemble our ideas or sensations, it follows that we have no knowledge of anything whose existence is independent of our perceptions. *If the ideal theory be admitted, the foregoing argument against the existence of matter is conclusive.*'<sup>3</sup> Stewart's argument against Berkeleyanism is that the ideal theory is 'unsupported by evidence, and is even inconceivable. That we *have*

<sup>1</sup> Ethical Questions, by T. Cogan, 1817, p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Works (Hamilton), i. 349.

<sup>3</sup> Works, ii. 18, 19.

notions of external qualities perfectly unlike to our sensations, or to anything of which we are immediately conscious, is a *fact*; nor ought we to dispute the reality of what we perceive because we cannot reconcile this fact with our received philosophical systems.<sup>1</sup> Stewart's estimate of Reid is this: 'Dr. Reid, who first called the ideal theory in question, offers no argument to prove that the material world exists, but considers our belief of it as an ultimate fact in our nature. It rests on the same foundation with our belief in the reality of our sensations, which no man has disputed.'<sup>2</sup> 'Till the refutation of the ideal theory in Reid's Inquiry, the partisans of Berkeley's system remained complete masters of the controversial field. . . . Many answers to it were attempted, . . . the evidence of the conclusion . . . supporting the premises, and not the premises the conclusion.'<sup>3</sup> Stewart notices that Berkeley confidently appeals to the common sense, the popular belief, to sustain him, as the Scotch school appeal to it to sustain them.<sup>4</sup>

In explaining the frequency of his recurrence to the 'paradox of Hume and Berkeley,' Stewart says, 'It is not that I regard this theory of *idealism*, when considered by itself, an error of any serious moment.'<sup>5</sup> As between Berkeley's attempt to disprove and Descartes' to prove the existence of the material world, Stewart says, 'Both undertakings were equally unphilosophical; for to *argue in favour* of any of the fundamental laws of human belief is not less absurd than to call them in question. In this argument, however, it must be granted that Berkeley had the advantage; the conclusion which he formed being unavoidable, if the common principles be admitted on which they both proceeded.'<sup>6</sup> The scepticism concerning the existence of the material world is one, says Stewart, 'which I am inclined to think most persons have occasionally experienced in their early years.'

§ 11: BUHLE (1763-1821).—'The principal arguments against the Berkeleyan idealism are the following: 1. From the argument that all *our cognition* rests on our subjective sensations and conceptions, nothing more follows than that all *cognition* as such is subjective; it cannot be inferred from this that there is no *objective actuality* of *external things*, which are the *real causes* of cognition.

<sup>1</sup> Works, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Do. do.

<sup>3</sup> Do. iii. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Works, 54.

<sup>5</sup> Do., v. 85.

<sup>6</sup> Do., 88.

These may exist in themselves, though it be impossible to know them in themselves.

'2. The reciprocal relation of the external things and of our faculty of cognition is unknown; that is, we cannot see *how* the external things beget the ideas of themselves, but the mode in which the infinite spirit imparts ideas to the finite is equally incomprehensible.

'3. The Berkeleyan idealism cannot account for the alternations in psychological conditions, for example, of waking, sleeping, and dreaming; nor explain the difference between mere imaginings and the conceptions of objects actually present, between accidental and necessary conceptions, or how the emotions of pain and of regret arise. What Berkeley has said in explanation of the distinction between fancies and actual perceptions is entirely insufficient and unsatisfactory.

'4. The system is incompatible with human freedom. Berkeley, indeed, held the doctrine of freedom, and needed it to vindicate his system against some of the most important objections to it which had suggested themselves to his own mind or had been started by others. But as freedom can never exert itself without ideas, and God begets all ideas which relate to external objects, human action must always be under determinism.

'5. The consciousness of right and duty involves the existence of a sphere of rational beings external to us, to which the laws of duty have a reference. Hence the common sound understanding of men and natural feeling directly protest against the Berkeleyan view.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 12: TENNEMANN (1761-1819).—'The reasoning of Berkeley has great plausibility, and, if we do not distinguish phenomena from things in themselves, cannot be confuted. Nevertheless, consciousness revolts against the result, and resists the inference, even if the premises cannot be confuted. As such doctrines, however well-grounded they may be, can accomplish nothing over against the judgment of the common understanding, it is not to be wondered at that the idealism of Berkeley excited less sensation than might otherwise have been expected. To this

<sup>1</sup> Geschichte d. neuern Philosophie, 1803, v. 129, and Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Philosophie, 1802, vfi., 364.

may be added, that while Berkeley in his youth was regarded as a great genius, in after time he was looked upon more and more as an oddity, to whose whimseys and crotchets the majority of scholars felt little disposition to give attention.<sup>1</sup>

§ 13: HEGEL (1770-1831).—‘The want of logical sequence in this system compels it to resort again to God as a drain (die Gosse); to Him is committed the solution of the contradiction. In brief, in this idealism the ordinary sensuous view of the universe and the insulation of the actual, as also the system of thoughts, of notionless judgments, remain exactly where they were before; it changes nothing at all in the contents but that abstract form, to say that all are but perceptions. An idealism like this involves no more than the antithesis of consciousness and of its object, and leaves wholly untouched the extension of the conceptions (Vorstellungen) and the antitheses of the empirical and manifold contents. If it be asked what is the True of these perceptions and conceptions, as it was before asked what is the True of these things, it furnishes no answer. It is pretty much a matter of indifference whether our view involves things or perceptions, if the self-consciousness remains filled up with the finitudes of the present life; it receives its contents in the ordinary way, and is of the ordinary sort. It reels round in its isolation in the conceptions of the entirely empirical existence, without being able to cognize and to grasp anything of the contents; or, in other words, in this formal idealism reason has no proper contents.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 14: ERDMANN (1842).—‘Berkeley contradicts himself in his notion of God. God is conceived of as spirit, and as He imparts ideas to other spirits, He must himself have ideas (as we have). If, on the other hand, He is supposed to have ideas in a wholly different way from that in which we have them, He must have ideas without sensation, &c. If we hold fast to this view, it follows He *has* no sensuous ideas, and can consequently *give* none. Furthermore, it is hard to attach a definite meaning to the expression *wholly different* ideas from those we have. No

<sup>1</sup> Geschichte d. Philosophie, 1819, vol. xi. 415.

<sup>2</sup> Vorlesungen ü. d. Geschichte d. Philosophie. Herausgeg. v. Michelet, Dritte Theil, zw. Aufl., 1844, iii. 444, 445.

effort avails to remove the contradiction that God is a *spirit* (and is consequently like us), and yet wholly different from us (and consequently no spirit). In this contradiction Berkeley has involved himself in supposing at the same time *self-active individual beings*, and a God to whom they are supposed to be passively related.<sup>1</sup>

§ 15: DR. THOMAS BROWN (1778–1820) devotes two lectures to ‘Dr. Reid’s supposed Confutation of the Ideal System.’ ‘So far is Dr. Reid from having the merit of confuting the universal or even general illusion of philosophers with respect to ideas in the mind as images or separate things distinct from the perception itself, that his own opinions as to perception, on this point at least, are precisely the same as those which generally prevailed before.’ To Dr. Reid ‘the highest praise is usually given . . . as if he had truly established *by argument* the existence of a material world. . . . I do not discover in his reasonings on the subject *any ground* for the praise which has been given. The evidence for a system of external things—at least the sort of evidence for which he contends—was not merely the same, *but was felt also* to be precisely the same, *before* he wrote as afterwards. Nay, I may add that the force of the evidence (if that term can be justly applied to this species of belief) was admitted in its fullest extent by the very sceptic against whom chiefly his arguments were directed.’ He then shows, as Hamilton subsequently did, that Reid’s position strengthens ‘the force of the scepticism as to the existence of matter.’ ‘The sceptical argument, *as a mere play of reasoning*, admits of no reply.’ Quoting Reid’s words that ‘the belief of a material world . . . declines the tribunal of reason,’ Brown says, ‘Surely, if it decline the tribunal of reason, it is not by reasoning that it is to be supported, even though the reasoner should have the great talents which Dr. Reid unquestionably possessed. . . . The sceptic and the orthodox philosopher of Dr. Reid’s school . . . come precisely to the same conclusion, . . . that the existence of a system of things, such as we understand when we speak of an external world, cannot be proved by argument. . . . There is no argument of mere reasoning that can *prove* the exist-

<sup>1</sup> Leibnitz u. d. Entwickel. d. Idealismus vor Kant, 1842 (Gesch. d. Philos., B. ii., Ab’h. ii.): 219, 220.

ence of an external world; it is absolutely impossible for us not to *believe* in the existence of an external world.<sup>1</sup>

§ 16: DR. FREDERICK BEASLEY (1777-1845), in his 'Search of Truth in the Science of the Human Mind,' discusses the 'theory of Bishop Berkeley,' specially with the aim of showing that it does *not* legitimately arise from Locke's system, but can be successfully controverted on Locke's principles. Dr. Beasley controverts Reid's position on these points, but in the main coincides with the Scotch school in the structure of his argument: 'The senses are the proper and sole judges in the case. We can give no reason . . . why we believe in the certainty of intuitive truths, but that such are the laws of our constitutions.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 17: DICTIONNAIRE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES (1844).— 'If the doctrine of Berkeley be adopted, I have no guarantee that beings like myself exist exterior to me, and I remain alone in the universe, or rather, with my mind and its ideas, I constitute the universe for my solitary self. My mind and its ideas are the only things which, in a consistent idealism, can escape negation and doubt. Berkeley has not formally avowed this conclusion; but it fixes itself irresistibly on his doctrine.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 18: THE REV. GEORGE JAMIESON (1859), in his 'Essentials of Philosophy,'<sup>4</sup> devotes the Introduction to 'the logical proof of an external world,' and an Appendix to 'Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.' He says, 'It is allowed that no *logical* proof of an external world has as yet been achieved, and philosophers at this day confess the impotency which has hitherto attended all the speculations of logic in this field of investigation.' The author therefore feels that he proposes 'to set forth a plea to which no philosopher has successfully established a claim.' Mr. Jamieson's logical proof presents these points: '1. There is such a phenomenon as consciousness. 2. Consciousness must be the phenomenon of a substantial element—intellect. 3. There is no cognisable phenomenon of intellect which is not presented under the category of consciousness; we have no evidence but

<sup>1</sup> Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 4 vols. Edinb., 1820. Lectures xxvi. and xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> A Search, &c. Philada., 1822. B. ii., chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> Paris, 1844, vol. i. 319, 320.

<sup>4</sup> Edinburgh, 1859.



what is resolvable into that of consciousness. 4. Consciousness is from time to time suspended in sleeping. 5. The suspension of consciousness does not interfere with the existence of intellect, regarded as a substantial reality. 6. Intellect, as the subject of suspended consciousness, must, in order to the restoration of consciousness, of necessity either arouse itself into conscious activity or be aroused by something out of itself. 7. The influence out of itself, by which intellect is aroused to consciousness, can be ascribed to ideas only, with which alone intellect is immediately conversant. That intellect is conscious only of ideas is the imperative dictum of philosophy, the universal law of our reason. Ideas are the objects of all intellect's thinking. We know of no other objects of consciousness. It has nothing else that we know to be conscious of. 8. Ideas must needs be conditioned forms emanating from and representative of the facts of an external world. 9. The conditions of the external world, with their forms, must be what they are directly represented to our consciousness by the ideas descriptive of the same. "If," to use the words of Kant, who embraced the view of Berkeley to this extent, "the things we see are not what they are taken for," then, upon the principles of irresistible logic, "the root of our nature is a lie," let Sir William Hamilton and his followers say what they may to the contrary. . . . There can be no trusting to our cognition if we perceive things differently from what they actually are.'

§ 19: DR. JAS. M'COSE, in treating of primitive cognitions concerning body, holds, as involved in this intuitive knowledge, that, '1, we know the object as existing or having being; 2, as having an existence independent of the contemplative mind; 3, as involving a knowledge of outness or externality. We know the object perceived, be it the organism or the object affecting the organism, as not in the mind, as out of the mind. These convictions set aside all forms of idealism in sense-perception.' 'Berkeley is wrong in maintaining that we can perceive nothing more than ideas in our own minds. . . . He errs in not unfolding how much is comprised in the object as perceived by us; we perceive body as having being, power, and existence without us and independent of us. . . . Berkeley was misled throughout by following the Lockean doctrines that the mind perceives immediately only

its own ideas, and that substance is to be taken merely as the support or substratum of qualities.<sup>1</sup>

§ 20: SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856) maintains that on his own principles Reid reaches a doctrine which 'even supplies a basis for an idealism like that of Fichte.' Just as Reid 'brings the matter to a short issue' in a doctrine which he thinks shows that the 'ideal system is a rope of sand,' Hamilton says, 'Nothing is easier than to show that, so far from refuting idealism, this doctrine affords it the best of all possible foundations. . . . Reid (and herein he is followed by Mr. Stewart) . . . asserts the very positions on which this (the simpler and more refined) idealism establishes its conclusions. . . . *The doctrine of our Scottish philosophers is, in fact, the very groundwork on which the egoistical idealism reposes. The argument . . . from common sense in their hands is unavailing; for if it be good against the conclusions of the idealist, it is good against the premises which they afford him.*'<sup>2</sup>

'The general approximation of thorough-going realism and thorough-going idealism . . . may at first sight be startling. On reflection, however, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. Both build upon the same fundamental fact, that the extended object immediately perceived is identical with the extended object actually existing; for the truth of this fact both can appeal to the common sense of mankind; and to the common sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps *more* logically, than Reid.'<sup>3</sup>

Hamilton held that 'Natural realism and absolute idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher; for as they alone have any foundation in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency with themselves.' Natural realism is Hamilton's own view, and of this view Hamilton's successor asks, 'What is the nature of the natural realism by which the ghost of absolute idealism is to be exorcised?' His answer is, 'As matter of consciousness, it is a figment; as matter of consciousness, a dream.' That the Scotch philosophy has not satisfied the entire Scotch mind, is confessed in the sad words in which Fraser closes the brilliant

<sup>1</sup> The Intuitions of the Mind. New York, 1866: 109, 147, 148. See also Dr. M'Cosh on Berkeley's Philosophy: Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan., 1873.

<sup>2</sup> Hamilton's edition of Reid, 128, 129. See what is quoted from Brown. Prolegomena.

<sup>3</sup> Note C, Reid's Works, 817.

review from which we quote: 'The only conviction which the student of the history of human speculation can regard as necessary is the conviction of our hopeless ignorance of all the mysteries of existence. Truth, like the Deity, is hid in darkness. It is not that we are unable to divine the mysteries of the soul and God; the simplest phenomenon of sense defies our wit. Of the future destinies of philosophy it is in vain to speak. Phenomena we can observe; their laws we are able to ascertain; existence is beyond our ken. The riddle of the Sphynx has never yet been read; the veil of Isis has never yet been drawn; the hieroglyphics of the universe are yet undeciphered.'<sup>1</sup>

#### VI. Estimates of Berkeley—his Character, Writings, and Influence.

§ 1: SWIFT (1667–1745).—'He is an absolute philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power. . . . He most exorbitantly proposeth a whole hundred pounds a year for himself. . . . His heart will break if his deanery be not taken from him. One of the first men in this kingdom for learning and virtue.'<sup>2</sup>

Swift is said to have introduced Berkeley to Earl Berkeley with the words, 'My lord, here is a young gentleman of your family. I can assure your lordship it is a much greater honour to you to be related to him, than to him to be related to you.' 'Berkeley,' he says in the *Journal*, to Stella, 'is a very ingenious man and great philosopher.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 2: WARBURTON (1698–1779).—'He is indeed a great man, and the only visionary I ever knew that was.'<sup>4</sup>

§ 3: BLACKWELL (1701–1737), who was to have been one of the professors in the Bermuda University, says, 'I scarce remember to have conversed with him on that art, liberal or mechanic, of which he knew not more than the ordinary practitioners. With the widest views, he descended into a minute detail, and begrudged neither pains nor expense for the means of information. . . . I admire the extensive genius of the man. . . . Many such

<sup>1</sup> North British Review, xxxiv. 479.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Lord Carteret, in *Fraser's Life*, 102. See *Christian Examiner*, July, 1838, 313.

<sup>3</sup> *Fraser: Life*, vi, 54.

<sup>4</sup> Letters. London, 1809. See article in *Retrospective Review*, vol. xi. (1825) 239.

spirits in our country would quickly make learning wear another face.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 4: HUME (1711-1766).—'Most of the writings of that very ingenious author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from this: that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of scepticism.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 5: JOHNSON (1709-1784).—'Berkeley was a profound scholar, as well as a man of fine imagination.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 6: ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) says of the 'New Theory of Vision' that it is 'one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that is to be found in our own or any other language.'

§ 7: TIEDEMANN (1748-1803).—'His noble and great heart glowed with zeal for the good and for the promotion of the welfare of mankind. . . . He left behind him the renown of a man devoid of selfishness, of one full of ardour for the interest not alone of his native land, but of the human race, strict in the performance of the duties of his see, and full of magnanimity. . . . Few have equalled him in acuteness and profundity. . . . He has filled up an important break in human thought. . . . To attempt to thunder down idealism by a dictum of the popular understanding is unphilosophical, not to say irrational. . . . Berkeley merits the warmest gratitude of all genuine philosophers.'<sup>4</sup>

§ 8: PLATNER (1744-1818).—'Berkeley was the first to render idealism demonstrative and to show that the Deity does not deceive us, though matter does not exist.'<sup>5</sup>

§ 9: REID (1710-1796).—'Supposing this principle [that all the objects of our knowledge are ideas] to be true, Berkeley's system is impregnable. No demonstration can be more evident than his reasoning from it.' 'He is acknowledged universally to have great merit as an excellent writer and a very acute and clear

<sup>1</sup> Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, ii. 277.

<sup>2</sup> Essays. Note N.

<sup>3</sup> Boswell, New York, 1850, i. 173.

<sup>4</sup> Geist d. spekulativen Philosophie, 1797, vol. vi. 621, 623, 624.

<sup>5</sup> Aphorismen, i. 413.

reasoner on the most abstract subjects, not to speak of his virtues as a man, which were very conspicuous.' 'The new philosophy had been making gradual approaches towards Berkeley's opinion, and whatever others might do, the philosophers had no right to look upon it as absurd or unworthy of a fair examination. Several authors attempted to answer his arguments, but with little success, and others acknowledged that they could neither answer them nor assent to them.' 'The "Theory of Vision" . . . contains very important discoveries and marks of great genius.' 'He possessed uncommon penetration and judgment.' 'The principle laid down in the first sentence of his Principles of Knowledge . . . has always been acknowledged by philosophers. . . . This is the foundation on which the whole system rests. If this be true, then indeed the existence of a material world must be a dream.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 10: DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828).—'Possessed of a mind which was fully equal to that of Locke in logical acuteness and invention, and in learning, fancy, and taste far its superior, Berkeley was singularly fitted to promote that reunion of philosophy and the fine arts which is so essential to the prosperity of both. . . . Pope's admiration of him seems to have risen to a sort of enthusiasm. . . . On his moral qualities he has bestowed the highest and most unqualified eulogy to be found in his writings:

"To Berkeley every virtue under heaven."

'With these intellectual and moral endowments, admired and blazoned as they were by the most distinguished wits of his age, it is not surprising that Berkeley should have given a popularity and fashion to metaphysical pursuits which they had never before acquired in England. Nor was this popularity diminished by the boldness of some of his paradoxes. The solid additions, however, made by Berkeley to the stock of human knowledge, were important and brilliant. . . . His *New Theory of Vision* [is] a work abounding with ideas so different from those commonly received, and at the same time so profound and refined, that it was regarded, by all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical

<sup>1</sup> Works (Hamilton), i. 280, 281, 283.

reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical romance than of a sober inquiry after truth. Such, however, has been since the progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the leading and most abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential part of every elementary treatise of optics, and are adopted by the most superficial smatterers in science as fundamental articles of their faith.<sup>1</sup>

'The Minute Philosopher,' Stewart says, 'is a book which (notwithstanding a few paradoxical passages connected with the author's system of idealism) may be safely recommended as one of the most instructive as well as entertaining works of which English philosophy has to boast.'<sup>2</sup>

Speaking of other works of Berkeley, Stewart says, 'The illustrations exhibit a singular combination of logical subtlety and of poetical invention; and the style, while it everywhere abounds with the rich yet sober colouring of the author's fancy, is perhaps superior in point of purity and of grammatical correctness to any English composition of an earlier date.'

Of Berkeley's system Stewart says, 'Considered in contrast with that theory of materialism which the excellent author was anxious to supplant, it possessed important advantages not only in its tendency but in its scientific consistency, and it afforded a proof, wherever it met with a favourable reception, of an understanding superior to those casual associations which, in the apprehensions of most men, blend indissolubly the phenomena of thought with the objects of external perception. It is recorded as a saying of Turgot . . . that "he who had never doubted of the existence of matter might be assured he had no turn for metaphysical disquisitions."<sup>3</sup>

§ 11 : MACKINTOSH, SIR JAMES (1765-1832).—Sir James Mackintosh, in the very act of characterizing the 'paradoxes' of Berkeley as 'unfruitful,' mentions, admiringly, 'the unspeakable charm of that transparent diction which clothed' them. 'His immaterialism is chiefly valuable as a touchstone of metaphysical sagacity,—showing those to be altogether without it, who, like Johnson and Beattie, believed that his speculations were sciep-

<sup>1</sup> Dissertation. Works (Hamilton), i. 338-340.

<sup>2</sup> Do., vi. 355.

<sup>3</sup> Account of Life and Writings of Reid, sect. 1, Works, x. 255, 256.

tical, that they implied any distrust in the senses, or that they had the smallest tendency to disturb reasoning or alter conduct. Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind of this accomplished man.'

'Of the exquisite grace and beauty of his diction no man accustomed to English composition can need to be informed. His works are, beyond dispute, the finest models of philosophical style since Cicero. Perhaps they surpass those of the orator in the wonderful art by which the fullest light is thrown on the most minute and evanescent parts of the most subtle of human conceptions. Perhaps he also surpassed Cicero in the charm of simplicity.'

The judgments of William Archer Butler and of Ferrier have been given in another connection.<sup>1</sup>

§ 12: THE EDINBURGH REVIEW (July, 1872).—'Berkeley becomes an important link in the history of philosophy. He may be justly said to have contributed, indirectly indeed, but powerfully, towards a more complete and scientific theory of knowledge. As connected historically with Descartes and Locke on the one hand, with Hume and Kant on the other, as well as with the modern schools of realistic idealism and extreme sensationalism, he well deserves to occupy a niche of his own in the history of philosophy, and his writings must be carefully studied in order to follow intelligently its modern development.'

§ 13: LEWES (1871).—'There are few men of whom England has better reason to be proud than of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. To extraordinary merits as a writer and thinker he united the most exquisite purity and generosity of character; and it is still a mooted point whether he was greater in head or heart.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 14: DR. McCOSH.—'Some of his works are worthy of being placed alongside of those of Plato.' 'His style is acknowledged on all hands to be graceful and attractive.' 'Taken apart from his speculations, . . . the general influence of his writings is inspiring and ennobling, carrying us above the damp earth into the empyrean, where we breathe a pure and delicious atmosphere.' 'There are numbers in these days heart-sick of the unbending

<sup>1</sup> Prolegomena, IV.

<sup>2</sup> History of Philosophy, 4th ed., 1871, ii. 293.

laws of physics and the pretentious categories of metaphysics, and willing to lose themselves in the "woods and wilds" of the ideal philosophy. The present state and wants of certain schools of philosophy tend in the same direction. It is a curious though by no means an inexplicable circumstance that not a few of those trained by the teaching and writing of Hamilton, especially those who have also felt the influence of Mill, are to be found, if we can catch them anywhere, on the borders of Berkeley's upland of mist and sunshine. Hamilton himself always spoke of Berkeley in a more appreciative tone than most of his predecessors in the Scotch school had done. His more discerning pupils have felt that their great master has left them in a somewhat unsatisfactory position: a professing realist, he is in fact the great relativist, and he ends by declaring that man can know nothing of the nature of things. Those who feel that they have no comfortable standing in such a quivering quagmire look with fond eye towards Berkeley, who, in taking away gross matter, leaves them substantial mind.' 'I should rejoice to find students of philosophy betaking themselves to the works of Berkeley; but they will be miserably disappointed if they expect to find there a foundation on which to build a solid fabric. Let them follow him into the labyrinth into which he conducts them, but let them take a thread to guide them back into the light of day.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 15: RITTER (1791-1869).—'The grand merit of Berkeley was, beyond doubt, in the rigid consequences which, in the development of his immaterialism, he deduced from the sensualistic system. The results which he reached in this way were similar to those of the ancient sceptics: that our senses enable us to know only phenomena, the signs of things, not things themselves. In objective tendency this principle was supported by the prevalent dualism, which conceded to material nature only inertness and passivity. Only the more sharply did dualism now present itself, when substantiality, the sole thing which it had been allowed to have in common with spirit, was denied it. That Berkeley maintained the substantiality of spirit, shows his affinity with Leibnitz's mode of thought.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Berkeley's Philosophy, Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan. 1873, 1-30.

<sup>2</sup> Geschichte d. neuern Philosophie, 1853, vol. iv. 284.



§ 16: UEBERWEG (d. 1871) puts a different estimate from that of the Scotch school on Berkeley. He does not decline argument, as the Scotch school does, and considers the position of that school as to 'immediate perception' an untenable fiction. He admits in general the postulate of Berkeley's argument, and yet endeavours to show that it does not justify Berkeley's conclusion. In this Ueberweg's strictures stand alone, that he maintains that inferential idealism is not justified by the premises which, in common with the mass of philosophical thinking, it occupies. He accepts a challenge which in some shape nearly all writers against idealism have declined. He argues the question. He denies that philosophy may waive the question or appeal against Berkeley to so vague a thing as 'common sense.' He shows an appreciation of Berkeley's real greatness and power, which adds greatly to the force and value of his strictures. Coming, as he does, from the survey of all the forms of philosophical thought, doing justice to all, becoming the partisan of none, the sobriety, sound judgment, and clearness of his annotations on Berkeley give them the highest value. His estimate of Berkeley is already given in the Preface to his translation of the Principles.<sup>1</sup> He thus estimates the relation of Berkeley to other thinkers :

'Hume attached himself closely in certain respects to him, but ran out into a scepticism completely the reverse of Berkeley's religious tendency. Reid and the other philosophers of the Scotch school have battled against Hume's scepticism and Berkeley's idealism. The Scotch school have denied what is assumed by Berkeley, in common with the Aristotelians and Cartesians, that only subjective images or "ideas" are immediately in our consciousness, and that consequently external things, if known at all, can be known only by means of their representation through "ideas." Reid's theory, however, of an immediate consciousness of the external things—the doctrine of a direct presentation of them—is an untenable fiction. Kant, in his doctrine of the phenomenal world, approximates Berkeleyanism, but removes himself from it in this sphere by his theory that the material of the senses is shaped by a priori forms, and comes into complete

<sup>1</sup> Prolegomena, I. See his Article: Ist Berkeley's Lehre wissenschaftlich unwiderlegbar? (Fichte's Zeitschrift, 55 Band, 1869, 63-84.)

antagonism to Berkeley by his recognition of things in themselves.<sup>1</sup> Ueberweg considers Hamilton's doctrine of relativity an approach to Berkeley's view.<sup>2</sup> The *petitio principii* in some points, which Ueberweg charges upon Berkeley, is denied and retroverted by Fraser.<sup>3</sup>

§ 17: STIRLING (1868).—'In the present disintegration of religion around us, the idealism of Berkeley, of Carlyle, and of Emerson has been to many a man the focus of a creed, of a fervent and sincere and influential faith. It is this that makes Berkeley and idealism in general so interesting now. Berkeley indeed is, in every point of view, a grand and great historical figure. Grand and great in himself,—one of the purest and most beautiful souls that ever lived,—he is grand and great also in his consequences. Hamann, an authority of weight, declares that "without Berkeley there had been no Hume, as without Hume no Kant;" and this is pretty well the truth. To the impulse of Berkeley largely, then, it is that we owe the German philosophy. And great as is the service, it is to the majority of English and American thinkers much less great than that which they owe to Berkeley himself, either directly or indirectly (through Carlyle and Emerson), especially in the religious reference already alluded to. When we add to these considerations that also of Berkeley's mastery of expression, and of his general fascination as a writer, it is impossible to think of him . . . without that veneration with which the ancients regarded their Plato, their Democritus, and their Eleatic Parmenides, of which last, perhaps, the sublimity, purity, and earnestness of character approach nearest to those of the character of Berkeley. Apart even from the influence of his earlier writings, there attaches now . . . a peculiar value to his expressions relative to the philosophies of the ancients in his *Siris*. . . . In all these references Berkeley will be found peculiarly admirable for the spirit of candour and love which he manifests. For systems, flippantly characterized nowadays as pantheistic or atheistic, . . . he grudges not, in the sweetness of his own simple, sincere nature, to vindicate Theism. Altogether one gets to admire Berkeley almost more here than elsewhere. The learning, the can-

<sup>1</sup> Berkeley's *Prinzipien*, XIII.

<sup>2</sup> *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos.*, 3d ed., 1871, iii. 364.

<sup>3</sup> *Life*, 370.

dour, and the depth of reflection, are all alike striking. As compared with Hume in especial, it is here that Berkeley is superior, and *that* not only with reference to the learning, but with reference to the spirit of faith and gravity, as opposed to the spirit of doubt and levity. The most valuable ingredient in Berkeley is, after all, that he is a Christian.<sup>1</sup>

§ 18: FRASER.—‘The great glory of Irish philosophy is Berkeley. . . . To the present day the memory of the mild metaphysician is as dear to his countrymen as that of their most turbulent orators and statesmen. Nor is the instinct of the nation wrong. He was one of the first eminent Anglo-Hibernians that were not ashamed of the name of Irishman. He was one of the first Irish Protestants who would honestly tolerate a “Papist.” He was, perhaps, the first Irishman who had the courage to tell his countrymen their faults. He was the first to denounce the race of patriots. The character of this great and good man, indeed, is not the exclusive property of his country; it is the common glory of the human race. His life was one of ideal purity. The metaphysician of idealism was an ideal man. He was as nearly a realization of the conception of the Stoic sage as the imperfection of humanity permits.

‘The range of his intellectual accomplishments was almost as wonderful as his virtue was unique. In his “Analyst” he was the first to point out that logical inconsistency in the modern calculus which Carnot attempted to explain by a compensation of errors, which Lagrange endeavoured to obviate by his calculus of functions, and which Euler and D’Alembert could only evade by pointing out the constant conformity of the conception with ascertained results. The “Querist,” to use the language of Sir James Mackintosh, “contains more hints, than original, still unapplied in legislation and political economy, than are to be found in any equal space.” In his “Minute Philosopher,” modelled on the Dialogues of Plato, he catches the manner of his master; and, while tracking the free thought of the day through its various evolutions, exhibits an exquisite elegance of diction that is unsurpassed in the literature of philosophy. It is in abstract philosophy, however, that we are to seek his glory. His

<sup>1</sup> Annotations on Schwegler, 1868, 420-422.

“Theory of Vision,” his “Principles of Human Knowledge,” his “Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” and his “Siris,” entitle him as a metaphysician to be ranked with Locke and Hume; and their publication vindicated the claim of Ireland to an equality with England and with Scotland in the glories of metaphysical research.

‘Berkeley’s idealism, in fact, is an epoch in the history of modern speculation.’<sup>1</sup>

## VII. Idealism defined.

§ 1: IDEALISM, the general system of which Berkeley is an exponent, is, on the whole, with reference to the part it has played in the history of human thought, the greatest of systems. In its most generic sense, it has been and is now the system of the great mass of thinkers.

Berkeley therefore, were there no other reason, is worthy of study as one of the great masters in one part of a great school of philosophical thinking. He represents with distinguished majesty and grace one grand division of IDEALISM. For idealism is not a narrow province of philosophy, but at least in its mainland a hemisphere of it, and with islands of coincidence stretching over philosophy’s whole globe. Like England, its drum-beat follows the sunrise till it circles the world.

Those who imagine that idealism, in the broad sense of the word, is a feeble thing, or the mere refuge of a few paradoxical minds, either do not know its nature and meaning or are ignorant of its history. In its *principle of cognition* it is so strong as to have carried nearly the entire body of thinkers with it. On this they have agreed; it is on the inferences from it they have divided. Generic idealism is the predominant system of the world, and specific idealism has an immense body of able supporters. To see clearly the nature of this distinction, it may be useful to recall some of the various definitions of idealism and idealists.

§ 2: WOLFF (1679-1754).—‘Idealists is the name given to those who grant no more than an ideal existence of bodies, an exist-

<sup>1</sup> North British Review, vol. xxxiv. (1861) 454, 455.

ence in our minds, and therefore deny a real existence of the world and of bodies.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 3: PLATNER (1744-1818).—'Idealism shows, 1, from the inconceivableness of material substances, 2, from the origin of what are called the primary qualities of matter, that nothing non-spiritual or material, external to the mind in which these conceptions are, and embracing the matter for them, has any existence; consequently these conceptions are either the result of our imaginative faculty or are aroused by the operation of an infinite spirit.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 4: FREDERICK SCHLEGEL (1772-1829).—'The essence of idealism consists in holding the spiritual alone as actual and truly real, in entirely denying to bodies and matter existence and reality, in explaining them as mere appearance and illusion, or at least transmuting and resolving them into spirit. The question at once meets us here, What, then, in antithesis to matter is the proper essence of spirit? To which the reply is, Freedom, activity, living mobility; as substantial permanence, unchangeableness, and dead repose are the essence of corporeal materialism. This is the distinctive point in which idealism directly contradicts both materialism and realism. The view taken of the notion of substance properly determines whether a system be idealistic or not, for in true idealism this notion is completely set aside and annihilated.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 5: WILLICH (1798).—'Idealism is . . . that system of philosophy in which the external reality of certain intuitive representations is disputed or doubted, and space as well as external objects are asserted to be mere fancies.'<sup>4</sup>

§ 6: LOSSIUS (1743-1813).—'Idealism is the assertion that matter is only an ideal seeming, and that spiritual essences are the only real things in the world.'<sup>5</sup>

§ 7: KRUG (1770-1842).—'Idealism is that system of philosophy which considers the real (the existent or actual) as a mere ideal. In this system it is held that there is no actual object corresponding to our conceptions of the external world, but that

<sup>1</sup> *Psychologia Rationalis*, 1734, 1779, § 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Aphorismen*, 1793, i. § 756.

<sup>3</sup> *Philosoph. Vorlesungen*, i.

<sup>4</sup> Willich: *Glossary*, in *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, London, 1798.

<sup>5</sup> Lossius: *Philosoph. Real-Lexicon*. Erfurt, 1803, ii. 607.

we ourselves objectify—regard as something objective—those conceptions, and consequently first transmute the ideal into a real, as we are of necessity self-conscious of those conceptions.’<sup>1</sup>

§ 8: TENNEMANN (1761–1819).—‘Rationalism, in the broader sense, proceeds sometimes from knowledge, sometimes (as in Jacobi’s system) from faith, and either explains our conception and cognition by the existence of objects or explains the existence of objects from our conception and cognition. The former system is *Realism*, which makes the existence of objects the original; the latter is *Idealism*, which makes the conception the original.’<sup>2</sup>

§ 9: DUVAL JOUVE (1847).—‘Idealism is the name given to the philosophical doctrines which consider the idea either as the principle of cognition or as the principle alike of cognition and of being.’<sup>3</sup>

§ 10: PIERER (1859).—‘Idealism, the philosophical system, which, positing the ideal as original, the real as derivative, either regards things as mere conceptions of the reflecting, actual subject, or looks upon the existence of the world of sense as at least problematical and incapable of demonstration.’<sup>4</sup>

§ 11: BROCKHAUS (1866).—‘Idealism, in antithesis to realism, is that philosophical view which maintains not only that the spiritual or ideal being is the original, but that it is the sole actuality, so that we can concede to the objects of the senses no more than the character of a phenomenal world educed by ideal activities.’<sup>5</sup>

§ 12: OTHER DEFINITIONS.—Idealism has been further defined as ‘the philosophical view which regards what is thought as alone the actually existent, in opposition to realism;’ ‘schemes of philosophy which teach that we are concerned only with ideas and are ignorant of everything else;’ ‘the doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas.’<sup>6</sup>

‘Idealism, in antithesis to realism, is the philosophic view which regards the objects of sense only as products of the conception, and considers the thinking subject, or the thing

<sup>1</sup> Krug: *Encycl. Phil. Lex.*, ii. 496, 2d ed., Leipz., 1833.

<sup>2</sup> Tennemann: *Grundriss d. Ges. d. Philos.*, 5th Aufl. von A. Wendt, § 58.

<sup>3</sup> Duval Jouve, in *Dictionnaire d. Sciences Philosoph.*, Par., 1847, iii. 180.

<sup>4</sup> Pierer’s *Universal Lexicon*, 1859, viii. 774.

<sup>5</sup> Brockhaus: *Real-Encyklopaedie*, 11th ed., 1866, viii. 204.

<sup>6</sup> *General und Universal Lexicon*, 1869, ii. 604.

thought, as the truly existent; 'the designation of many and different systems of philosophy, which only agree in the common principle from which they originate. The principle is the opposition of the ideal and the real,—that is, of ideas and things, the contrariety of mind and body, or of spirit and matter;' 'that scheme . . . which, carried to its legitimate results, . . . regards all external phenomena as having no existence apart from a thinking subject.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 13: HAMILTON (1788–1856).—'If the testimony of consciousness be referred to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as the one or other of the terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, *Idealism*; is the subject educed from the object, *Materialism* is the result.' 'There is one scheme which, . . . with the complete idealist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification of the percipient subject, or at least a phenomenon numerically distinct from the object it represents, endeavours to stop short of the negation of an external world, the reality of which, and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks by various hypotheses to establish and explain. This scheme, which we would term *Cosmothetic Idealism*, *Hypothetical Realism*, or *Hypothetical Dualism*, although the most inconsequent of all systems, has been embraced under various forms by the immense majority of philosophers.'<sup>2</sup>

§ 14: SCHOPENHAUER (1788–1860).—We close with Schopenhauer's definition: 'The fundamental view of idealism is this: that everything which has an existence for cognition, and consequently all that is perceived, the entire universe, extending itself in space and time, and linked by the principle of the sufficient reason, is merely *object* in relation to the *subject*, the perception of the percipient (the intuition of the intuitant); it is *conception*, consequently its existence is not absolute and unconditional, but only relative and conditional; in brief, is not a *thing in itself*, but is mere phenomenon.'<sup>3</sup>

§ 15: THE DIVERSITY in these definitions arises very much from

<sup>1</sup> Meyer's Hand-Lexikon, 1872. Cyclopædia of Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 1838, vol. xii. Encyclopædia Britannica, xii. 356.

<sup>2</sup> Sir William Hamilton (1830): Discussions. New York, Harper & Bros., 1868, 61.

<sup>3</sup> Schopenhauer, Lexicon, v. Frauenstädt, 1871, i. 342.

their confounding in various ways the *essential principle* of Idealism and the *processes* by which it is reached, or with the *inferences* which are deduced from it. Conflicting modes of arguing it may exist, and conflicting inferences be drawn from it; but the essential and common feature of idealism is that it holds that the final cognitions, the only cognitions, in the *absolute* or philosophical sense, are those which the mind has of its own states. If it admit that we may in any sense apply the term cognitions more widely than this, it holds that such cognitions are *relative* merely, and that they are to be vindicated even as relative cognitions only by showing that they are of necessity involved in the absolute cognition, the cognition given in self-consciousness. However reached or however developed, any system is so far idealistic which holds 'that the mind is *conscious* or *immediately cognizant* of nothing beyond its subjective states.'<sup>1</sup>

### VIII. Sceptical Idealism in the development of Idealism from Berkeley to the present: Hume.

§ 1: SCEPTICAL IDEALISM, or IDEALISTIC SCEPTICISM, is the system of Hume (1711-1776).

The great aim of Berkeley had been a religious one. It was his design to check scepticism; but the actual result of his system, as it was developed in a special direction by Hume, was the promotion of scepticism in the subtlest and ablest form in which it has ever been presented. The clearness of Hume's thinking, and the luminous beauty of his style, gave a popularity to his speculations which has rarely been enjoyed by great thinkers. As trophies of intellectual power his philosophical writings are incomparably beyond his history. The chief of these are his 'Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' 'Enquiry concerning the Principle of Morals,' and the 'Natural History of Religion.'

DAVID HUME proceeded from the empiricism of Locke as a general basis; but associating with it the speculations of Berkeley, whom he greatly admired, he denies to human knowledge all objective certainty, on the ground that it is impossible to go beyond ideas so as to reach the essence of things.

<sup>1</sup> Hamilton's statement of Dr. Brown's view: Discussion 62.



His system may be stated in the following propositions :

1st. Our perceptions are either impressions or ideas,—either impressions or sensations of that which we hear, see, touch, or are *cogitations*,—*i.e. ideas strictly so called*. These ideas, inasmuch as they are combined solely from our sensations or impressions, are themselves no more than feebler sensations or impressions, and, therefore, are even less certain than the sensations. But the sensations themselves are necessarily uncertain, because reason (arguing from the ground of empiricism) supplies no means of knowing that these sensations or impressions are conformed to objects, or indeed have any object at all.

2d. Hence every cognition is destitute of objective truth.

3d. For our ideas or judgments are referred either, 1st, to a physical order, and ideas or judgments of this class rest upon the notion of cause; or, 2d, they are referred to a moral order, and ideas or judgments of this class rest upon the notion of liberty and virtue; or, 3d, they have regard to a moral and physical order, so as to explain the origin and unity of it; and the ideas and judgments of this third class involve the notion of a universal principle of all Being or Entities, that is, a God.

But all these fundamental notions objectively regarded are mere hypotheses or artificial ideas. Hume takes up the three classes and endeavours to show that this is true of them all. *First*, of the notions which are referred to a *physical order*, he argues that here experience merely teaches us the relations of simultaneousness and of succession. Thus experience shows that B co-exists with A or succeeds A; but from the fact that B co-exists with A to draw the conclusion that the one depends upon the other is impossible, or from the fact that B succeeds A to draw the conclusion that A is the cause of B is impossible. Hence (from the empirical method), we can have no notion objectively real of a cause. But without the notion of cause there are no notions which can be referred to a physical order, inasmuch as without this notion we explain no phenomena, nor can we be certain of the existence of bodies, for we judge that they exist because we think them to be the causes of our sensations. *Second*, as to the notions referred to the *moral order*, Hume argues that from experience no man can have any other

motive for his acts than egoism, selfishness or self-love. But the notion of virtue is distinct from egoism. Hence the notion of virtue (on the ground of empiricism) is pure hypothesis. 2d. We indeed perceive that we will, but how we will we do not perceive. Hence the notion of moral liberty is merely artificial, and in fact self-contradictory, for free choice cannot exist without motive; but motive cannot produce ultimate decision unless it be connected with stronger impressions which necessitate the willing.

*Third, the notion of a universal principle or God* is clearly impossible to man, for we can only reach such a notion by ascending from sensation through the notion of cause, from the whole, as an effect, to God as the cause of the whole,—but the notion of cause is without foundation. This doctrine Hume applies to ethics,—to the question of retribution in another life, to the immortality of the soul, to religion in general, and to morality. All these, as resting on mere hypotheses, he treats in the same way, and thus out of an empiricism which proposed to lay a sure foundation for human belief he developed a universal scepticism.<sup>1</sup>

### IX. Critical Idealism: Kant.

CRITICAL or TRANSCENDENTAL (hypothetical) IDEALISM, the system of Kant (1724–1804). We know things only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. Things as we know them are mental representations in us, and time and space are forms of our intuiting. There are two sources whence we derive cognition. 1. The unfathomable thing in itself, which furnishes the matter for our mental representations; 2. the subjective forms of our thinking, or the categories. Both must be united to make experience possible. ‘Of the two elements whose relation and harmony compose science,—on one side the human mind, the *subject*, and on the other things, beings, the *object*,—Kant proposes to suppress the second, and to reduce science to the first. To eliminate the *objective* forever, as absolutely inaccessible, and to resolve all into the *subjective*, this is his end and here are the great *lines* of his enterprise.’<sup>2</sup> ‘Kant’s system

<sup>1</sup> Rothenflue, *Institutiones Philosophiæ Theoreticæ*, 1846, iii. 273–275.

<sup>2</sup> Saisset, *Essay on Religious Philosophy*, 1863, vol. i. 275.

is to be designated as Idealism in a completely general sense and in all its parts, for alike the ground of phenomena and the law of conduct it sought in the mind of man and in its laws, innate, independent of experience.\*

When we look at the end of the epoch terminating with Hume, it is very clear that a reformation was pressingly necessary. The scepticism of Hume, rising in the empiricism of Locke, threatened not only all that was thought to be known in regard to morals and religion, but subverted the very principles of reason, the foundation of all cognitions, and thus made all science, all real knowledge, impossible. It had become obvious that, whatever might be the speculative force of this tendency, it involved such enormous practical evils that there must be somewhere in it a latent fallacy,—either the premises were incorrect or the reasonings upon them unwarranted. It was clearly necessary to subject the intellect of man and its operations to a new examination, that knowledge might be built upon a more solid foundation. The great master in this work was Kant. He performed this work in such a way that, as his transcendental idealism was developed and supported by his general system, a number of later writers endeavored to find the ultimate principle, *i.e.* the absolute, some in the Ego or subjective understanding, others in the non-Ego or in nature, some in the identity of the Ego and non-Ego. The first of these developed into the system of subjective idealism, the second into that of objective idealism. Germany was the chief arena of these speculations. It will be seen that in this epoch the evolution of philosophy presents the three results: 1st. *Transcendental Idealism*; 2d. *Subjective Idealism*; 3d. *Objective Idealism*, one form of which is the doctrine of *absolute Identity*.

Emmanuel Kant has been considered, by some not incompetent judges, the most profound thinker with whom the history of the human mind has acquainted us. Intelligent men who are not his disciples yet acknowledge him to be one of the greatest and most influential metaphysicians. Of Scotch descent on his father's side, and German on his mother's, he largely combined and harmonized the best traits of the great metaphysicians of

\* Zeller, Geschichte d. deutsch. Philosophie, 1873, 512.

both nationalities. He was thoroughly educated, and early displayed remarkable powers. He began at the age of thirty to teach philosophy and mathematics in the university of his native place. Originally his philosophical teachings were in accordance, in the main, with those of his immediate predecessors, who were disciples of Wolff, the systematizer of Leibnitz. It was the writings of Hume which first awakened him to the defects of the shallow dogmatism into which the system of Wolff had run. Hume's denial of all universal and necessary cognition, because none such is furnished by experience, and none, therefore, can have objective reality, aroused Kant to the refutation of Hume, and led him to subject the entire faculty of cognition to a critical examination. He proposed to himself three questions :

- 1st. What am I able to know ?
- 2d. What ought I to do ?
- 3d. What may I hope for ?

The first of these raises the *metaphysical* question; the second, the *ethical*; the third, the *religious*.

He maintains that these questions cannot be answered except by showing, by critical process, that reason, taken universally, is the faculty of cognition a priori. To perform this work he proposed to treat of three great departments :

1st. To present a critique of pure theoretic reason or of transcendental reason,—that is, of a reason which transcends and goes above mere empirical experience.<sup>1</sup>

2d. The critique of practical reason.<sup>2</sup>

3d. The critique of judgment.<sup>3</sup>

Under the critique of pure reasoning Kant discusses—

A. The nature of our cognition.

B. The divisions of the cognitive faculty.

C. The inferences from the critique of pure reasoning.

A. (*a.*) *Of the nature of our cognition.* All our cognition is either pure, *i.e.* a priori, or is empirical, *i.e.* a posteriori. The pure or

<sup>1</sup> Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781. 2d edit., 1787.

<sup>2</sup> Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788.

<sup>3</sup> Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1793.

Werke : 1. Rosenkranz u. Schubart, Leipzig, 1838-1842. 12 vols.

2. Hartenstein, 1838, 1839. 10 vols. New edit., 8 vols., 1867-1869.

3. Von Kirchmann (Philosoph. Bibliothek), 1868, seq.

a priori cognition grasps what is necessary and universal. Of this nature is mathematical cognition; as, for example, that all the radii of a circle are equal. The empirical or a posteriori cognition lays hold of something which is single, for—

(*b.*) The judgments which involve cognitions are either analytic or synthetic. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate is involved in the concept of the subject: *e.g.* a circle is round. The synthetic judgments are those in which the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject: *e.g.* bodies are heavy.

(*c.*) Analytic judgments as such are also a priori judgments, inasmuch as they enounce something universal and necessary; but synthetic judgments are partly a posteriori, partly a priori: a posteriori in as far as we know by experience that the predicate agrees with the subject, and a priori in as far as they are universal.

(*d.*) Inasmuch as synthetic judgments meet us in all theoretical sciences, and as we cannot learn their universality by experience, the question arises how synthetic judgments are possible a priori?

(*e.*) In answering this question, Kant reasons in the following manner: Synthetic judgments a priori do not wholly come from the object or from experience, therefore at the very least they must come in part from the subject,—the thinking mind. Hence he teaches that our cognitions consist as it were of two elements, one of which pertains to the sense, and the other to the understanding. That which pertains to the sense he called the *matter* or *material* of our cognitions, and that which pertains to the understanding he called the *form* of our cognitions. The forms, therefore, are that something in the mind through which it conceives, in a certain determinate mode, the matter furnished through the senses.

B. In order to detect what are those mental forms, Kant subjected the cognitive faculty of the human mind to an analysis which produced these results:—

The whole cognitive faculty consists of

(*a.*) The sensitive faculty (Sinnlichkeit).

(*b.*) The understanding (Verstand).

(c.) The reason (Vernunft).

The first of these is a power purely passive—a receptivity of impressions. The two latter are active power involving spontaneity.

(a.) The sensitive faculty (*sensualitas*) embraces both internal and external experience. Its object is that outside of us and that within us, of which we have experience. It receives impressions, representations, of objects, which representations the mind looks upon, has *intuitions* of. Hence Kant calls the representations which are afforded by the sensitive faculty ‘intuitions’ (*Anschauungen*). In these *intuitions* we must distinguish between the material and the form. The material is that which is supplied by the sense or sensitive faculty; but the mind in its intuition of this, its looking on this, is bound by certain necessary conditions; for we see that the mind is not able to have intuition of the objects furnished by the sense, except—1st, as outside of the mind itself, *i.e.* as posited in space; or, 2d, as successive, *i.e.* in time; or, 3d, as both in time and space. Hence space and time are necessary conditions of all sensitive intuition. Space is a form of the external sense; time is a form of both external and internal sense. Now these forms are not (1st) empirical, *i.e.* derived from the object, although they are prerequisites to all empirical intuition. Nor are they (2d) abstract, because to the perception of time or space particular individual objects are already presupposed. Hence they are (3d) ‘a priori’ or ‘transcendental,’ *i.e.* transcending all experience, for even though I should think that there were no sensible objects, yet I cannot think of there being no time or space; therefore space and time are forms or necessary conditions of the sensitive faculty.

(b.) The understanding (*intellectus*) conjoins the intuitions of the sensitive faculty into the unity of consciousness, and thus forms conceptions (*i.e.* implicit judgments) and judgments proper: for intuition is not identical with conception. For example, when we look at a house we receive various impressions from various parts of the object, but we do not properly have the conception of a house until the understanding unites the various intuitions of those impressions into unity of consciousness. Intuitions, therefore, are the material of concepts, and concepts are the

material of judgments. But in addition to the material of judgments the forms are also necessary, which by being applied to the material properly constitute the judgment strictly so called.

What then are the forms of the understanding which are necessary to form the judgment strictly so called? From an analysis of all our judgments Kant reached the conclusion that all our judgments are to be referred to either (1st) quantity, or (2d) to quality, or (3d) to relation, or (4th) to modality.

1st. To *quantity*. Whatever we conceive of, we conceive of either as one or many or all, so that *every judgment* of ours is either *singular* as referring to one, or *particular* in respect to many, or *universal* as joining the whole.

2d. As to *quality*. Every human judgment is either (1st) affirmative, or (2d) negative, or (3d) indeterminate or indefinite. An indefinite judgment is one in which the negation does not affect the copula, but either the predicate or subject.

3d. *Relation*. In every judgment the predicate is attributed to the subject either absolutely or hypothetically, or in such a way as not to indicate what predicate is attributed: *e.g.* a body is either liquid or solid. Hence every judgment is either categorical, corresponding with absoluteness, or hypothetical, corresponding with the hypothetical, or disjunctive, corresponding with the indefinite.

Finally, 4th. *Modality*. For the judgment is either problematic, or assertory, or necessary, or, as it is sometimes called, apodeictic. Take this statement, 'If a body be heavy, if the support be removed it will fall: but a body is heavy; therefore, the support being taken away, it will fall.' Then the major is a problematic judgment, because in it weight and gravity are regarded only as possible; the second is assertory; the third or conclusion is necessary or apodeictic. Hence the forms, or, as Kant calls them, the categories, of the understanding are:

1st. Quantity; under which are Unity, Plurality, and Totality.

2d. Quality; under which are Reality, Negation, and Limitation.

3d. Relation; under which are Substance, Causality, Simultaneity (otherwise characterized as action or reaction, or reciprocity and reciprocation).

4th. Modality; under which are Possibility, Existence, Necessity.

Every one of our judgments is necessarily conditioned in some way by these four forms. Thus the judgment 'Bodies are heavy,' according to the 1st form, is universal; 2d, as to quality, it is affirmative; according to relation the judgment is categorical. According to modality it is assertory. Hence the understanding, that it may be able to judge, and even that it may be able to conceive, has of necessity implanted or innate in it those forms as laws without which it is impossible to form a judgment or even a conception. But these forms, in virtue of the fact that they are transcendental or universally applicable to objects of every kind, cannot be empirical, *i.e.* drawn from experience, but on the contrary are prerequisite, in order that the understanding, out of the material furnished by the sense, may form a concept and judgment; hence they are forms inherent in the mind *a priori*. They are purely subjective, and, considered in themselves, void of all objectivity.

(*c.*) Reason (*ratio*), as it is a faculty of arguing and inferring,—a faculty of ratiocination,—in its own nature tends, by the conjunction of judgments in the process of reasoning, to rise from the conditioned to the absolute. Every process of reasoning is so constituted as that the premises contain the condition which involves and necessitates the conclusion; hence it follows that such premises as are themselves conditioned are also conclusions to other premises; hence it is the function of reason, by its own proper processes,—*i.e.* rational processes,—to seek premises which are an absolute condition,—*i.e.* which do not involve or presuppose another condition.

There are three species of reasoning (*ratiocinorum*): 1st, Categorical; 2d, Hypothetical; 3d, Disjunctive.

1st. *The Categorical* or *Absolute* is in accordance with the principle of inherence, and takes place when the understanding supplies the reason with judgments in which the predicate is conceived of as inhering in the subject.

2d. *The Hypothetical* is in accordance with the principle of causality, when the predicate is conceived of as agreeing with the subject under some particular condition.

3d. *The Disjunctive* is in accordance with the principle of com-



munity, or mutual dependence, when either one of the predicates is conceived as agreeing with the subject so as that the predicate is considered as a part of some particular whole or totality. Hence, reason, through the medium of categorical processes of ratiocination, reaches to the idea of the absolute subject which is not the predicate of another subject. By the medium of hypothetical ratiocination it reaches the idea of the absolute cause which is not caused by another cause. By the medium of the disjunctive it reaches the idea of absolute totality, which cannot be a part of another totality. Hence, the reason has three ideas:

1st, of *Absolute Being*; 2d, of *Ultimate Principle*; 3d, of *Absolute Totality*.

1st. Absolute Being, when it considers it as *objective*, lays the basis of Ontology; when it is *subjective*, it lays the basis of Rational Psychology.

2d. The *Ultimate Principle* of all Essence or Being—*i.e.* God—lays the foundation of Rational Theology.

3d. The idea of Absolute Totality—*i.e.* of the universe—furnishes the object or lays the foundation of rational cosmology, and these three are the elements of all metaphysic.

But these ideas, although they have a regulative validity,—*i.e.* give law to our own thoughts,—furnish nothing objectively; for

C. The Critique of Pure Reasoning teaches that all cognition arises by means of impressions made by the objects on the sense or sensitive faculty. So that this sense or sensitive faculty adds at the same *from itself* the form either of space or of time, or of both, in order that it may have a representation. [This follows from B *a.*]

(*a.*) Hence the concepts of the understanding concerning objects of which there can be no experience have no objective reality, but are mere forms of the mind. For the understanding forms these concepts from the representations given by the sensitive faculty. [This follows from B *b.*] But there are no representations objectively, without experience; therefore the concepts also are nothing objectively without experience.

(*b.*) Of the objects, also, of which we have experience,—of quantity, quality, and relation or modality,—we know nothing

objectively real; for these, as forms of the understanding, are added by the subject to the intuition of the object, but are not known to be really in the object.

(c.) Hence, also, the ideas of pure reason, as something concerning which no experience is possible, are not objectively real; at least, are not certainly demonstrable as such. Hence only those things are known by us as objectively real which are offered to our experience, and these themselves are to us =  $x$ ,—*i.e.* to an unknown quantity, of which we know nothing except that it exists. For of an object devoid of the forms of the sensitive faculty and the understanding we know nothing, except its existence. But those forms are not in the object, but are added to the subject; so that every cognition objectively real involves the coalescence, as it were, of a twofold element, the one element empirical, or a posteriori, the other formal, or a priori, which comes from the understanding. Hence, to the question how synthetic judgments are possible a priori, the answer must be given that the reason can reach no synthetic judgment with apodeictic or absolute certainty, inasmuch as the predicate not involved within the idea itself is, without foundation, attributed to the object itself as something in it, when, in fact, it is added by the mind itself, the mind necessarily operating under forms innate to it. Therefore we know nothing concerning the extension, figure, and other attributes even of the objects which are perceived by the sensitive faculty, because they are mere forms furnished by the sensitive faculty; nor can we know anything of the substance, reality, or other qualities of the same objects, because these are mere forms of the understanding; much less are we able to draw any conclusion concerning liberty, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, concerning which no experience is absolutely possible. Hence the arguments for and against these truths have no objective reality, but are a mere play of the mind, and are antinomies—*i.e.* self-contradictions—which seem supported by reason. Hence, metaphysics proper, or the cognition objectively real of things not subject to the senses and of universals, is impossible.

If the philosophy of Kant had stopped here, it would have seemed to have had a most impotent conclusion. Kant himself

clearly perceived this, and, that he might avoid a result from which he shrank, endeavoured to build up with one hand the edifice which he had overthrown with the other. His Critique of Practical Reason has been called the life-boat which he threw out to save the victims of the wreck of the Critique of Pure Reason. He distinguishes in man the practical reason from the theoretic reason; he says that man is not merely a rational being, having cognition by theoretic reasoning, but also a moral being, directed in his actions by practical reasoning. In the development of this consists the second part of Kant's system.

II. Critique of Practical Reason. This has been defined by others as reason operating in the sphere of ethics, as the practico-legislative reason. Kant himself states the point involved thus: 'Theoretic reason has as its object this question, What am I able to know? Practical reason has this question, What is it my duty to do? and What is it lawful for me to hope? And as reason in general by the very law of its nature seeks unity, the practical reason also here seeks some absolute principle.' Now just as it is in theoretical principles, so also is it in practical principles, *i.e.* in the things that influence and determine the will: we are to distinguish between two elements,—1st, the material element, and 2d, the formal element. 1st. The material element is everything which acts empirically on the sensitive faculty and affects the will through the medium of the emotions and passions. 2d. The formal element is that which is referred, not to the sensitive faculty, but to reason. Hence the material element, as that which has its foundation in self-love, and hence is always something merely subjective, is not universal nor absolutely necessary. Hence it cannot constitute the absolute principle of morality. Hence it follows that only (2d) the formal element, as that which withdraws itself from every object of sensitive appetite or desire, and prescribes only that to which, by the power of his reason, every rational being is absolutely bound, can supply the absolute principle of morality. That principle thus supplied is this: So act that the rule of thy will might be the principle of universal law. This principle manifests itself to man through his moral consciousness, *i.e.* his conscience (and conscience through experience), in what Kant calls the form of the

'Categorical Imperative'—imperative, *i.e.* giving command; categorical, that is, absolute. By 'Categorical Imperative' he means the absolute prescription of reason through consciousness or conscience; it is categorical or absolute, because without exception it prescribes the doing of good for its own sake, without any regard to the material motive. Hence that alone is to be considered pure virtue which is to be determined autonomically by the moral law, that which is not only conformed to the moral law, but which is moved only by love of the moral law, and without any extrinsic motive; since otherwise the will never would be pure, but always affected by the passions [pathologically].

But this principle involves three subordinate principles, three theoretic principles as postulates, *i.e.* as truths whose objective reality cannot be theoretically proved, to wit: 1st, the postulate of Liberty; 2d, the postulate of the Immortality of the Soul; 3d, the postulate of the existence of God. Without these the absolute principle of ethics cannot be conceived. For 1st, that principle commands us to do good solely from love of the law; but this cannot be done without liberty,—freedom of the will; for without liberty, a self-determining freedom of will, man cannot be determined in his actions, except by some principle which is extrinsic and is operative in the sensitive faculty. Hence the principle of ethics involves the liberty of man. 2d. This principle commands man that he should establish a perfect harmony between his purposes and the moral law, in which harmony, holiness, or ideal virtue, consists. Hence man ought constantly to tend to this ideal; but that ideal, inasmuch as he is subject to the influence of the sensitive faculty which draws him back from virtue, he is not able completely to attain. Hence he ought to approach it continually by a progress which never ceases, and which is unlimited; but this he cannot do unless his soul be immortal. Hence this principle of absolute morality involves the immortality of the soul. 3d. Virtue is man's supreme end; for if happiness were his supreme end, liberty would not be necessary to it, but instinct would be sufficient. Nevertheless man has an invincible desire of happiness, but he is not able to establish a harmony between virtue and happiness; because, though he is free relatively to virtue, yet relatively to happiness he is dependent

on nature, which itself does not in fact establish this harmony; hence the completion, the consummation of this harmony supposes a Being independent of nature,—a Being who can produce this harmony and wills to produce it, and must consequently be endowed with understanding and will; but such a being is God. The absolute principle of morality involves the existence of God.

Practical reason involves these three postulates; but these postulates are objectively real, for the practical reasoning, determining to action, commands effects which are objectively real. But it is absurd to suppose that real effects are produced by unreal principles: if the effects are objectively real the principles must be objectively real.

III. Critique of the Judgment. Theoretical reason and practical reason present laws opposite in character to each other. The theoretical reason supplies the laws of nature or necessity, the practical reason supplies the laws of liberty. These two classes of laws would forever have remained separated, if man did not possess the faculty of judging, or judgment. (This term 'judgment,' it will at once be seen, is used by Kant in a sense peculiar to his system.) That faculty, judgment, applies the laws of liberty to nature in accordance with the principles of agreement of means with an end; of the agreement which exists in the actions of free beings, and which we ought necessarily also to transfer to the acts of nature in order to make it possible to conceive of a union of nature with liberty, which liberty operates in nature and through it. This principle of judgment, however, by no means teaches what the laws of nature are in themselves, or objectively, but simply supplies a subjective rule, which shows in what way we should reason concerning the things of nature.

The judgment has two modes,—the æsthetic and the teleologic. The judgment is æsthetic when it considers an agreement of means with their end in the forms of things in such a way as to produce the sense of pleasure. The judgment is teleologic when it considers this agreement in a purely logical respect, *i.e.* simply with reference to obtaining a knowledge of things, without having any regard to the pleasures of feeling or of sense.

Hence the critique of the æsthetic judgment is a theory of the beautiful and the sublime, both of which are merely subjective.

The beautiful involves a consciousness of power possessed by the imagination, representing a great variety of things which can be easily reduced to one conception of the understanding; hence it is a sense of the agreement of those faculties with each other, and, as this involves a sense of our power, it is conjoined with satisfaction. The sublime, on the contrary, involves a consciousness of lack of power, of inability to grasp through the imagination the ideas presented by the reason. This feeling of discord and difference between these faculties is, on the one side, attended by an emotion of sadness, because it reminds us of our weakness; on the other hand it exalts us, because through our reason we perceive that we are superior to the things of sense, however great they may be.

The critique of the teleologic judgment comprehends the theory of nature,—a theory which, by applying the principle of final causes or of the relation of means to an end, not to the forms of things, but to their constitution or nature, looks upon entities as organized to attain the special end of each, and, regarding those special ends as subordinate to some supreme and universal end, thus reaches the religious ideas whose objective reality is shown by the practical reason.

Carrying out these principles, Kant wrote a number of works, especially on ethics and jus, on anthropology and the doctrine of religion as within the bounds of pure reason, in which the transcendental idealism of his Critique is carried through.<sup>†</sup> It has been said that there is a parallel between Descartes and Kant in their inability to connect their philosophical results with their philosophical principles. Descartes began with consciousness as the sole source of knowledge proper, but went out from this position to attempt to establish the objective reality of God by means of the notion of God reached through the speculations of reason. In a similar manner Kant, it is said, first destroys the entire relations of our speculations with external reality, and confines himself to the sphere of purely subjective ideas, out of which he attempts in vain to break in his Critique of the Practical Reason. For in

<sup>†</sup> Die Religion innerhalb der Graenzen der reinen Vernunft, 1793. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre der Tugendlehre*; and under the common title, *Metaphysik der Sitten*. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*.

attributing a validity to the practical reason which he denies to the theoretical reason, he falls into a manifest self-contradiction, inasmuch as the practical reason necessarily rests upon the ideas furnished by the theoretic reason. If I cannot trust my intellectual convictions, why should I trust my moral convictions? If my *mind* is forced to work under laws which may have no validity to other beings than man, why may not my *moral sense* be equally subject to forms which are not valid objectively? The innate moral conviction of duty is not stronger than the innate intellectual conviction that there is an objective world of substance, and if our conviction of the reliableness of the one set of impressions is removed we shall find it hard to rest in the certainty of the other. Kant's distinction between the theoretic and the practical reason is really very much of a piece with the old scholastic system which allowed that a thing might be philosophically false and theologically true. If the practical reason is valid for proof of what Kant admits that it proves, it is fairly retrospective, and holds good also as a proof of the objective reality of those things which the pure reason instinctively accepts as real. The ultimate consequence drawn from the doctrine of Kant is that we do not know things as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us in accordance with the constitution of our minds; that consequently our cognition is confined within the sphere of experience; and this cognition itself Kant asserts (illogically) to be objectively real. The logic of Kant's system undoubtedly demonstrates that things which are not the objects of sense are not the objects of science or knowledge, but of faith. Hence as a speculative system the critique of Kant is properly styled 'transcendental idealism,' inasmuch as it teaches that everything which transcends experience, or anything as far as it transcends experience, is merely subjectively ideal.

It is acknowledged, however, by those who have least sympathy with his system that it is one of consummate ability, and that many of its processes and results are of the highest value. Kant has left an impress on the thinking of the world which will abide while the world stands; no system of the future, properly philosophical, can entirely avoid being in some measure a development of Kant's views or an antagonistic force to them.

The philosophical systems of Germany, France, and England since Kant have all revealed his influence. The speculations of Kant have confessedly settled one great point, to wit, that all cognition, although it begins with experience, does not arise from experience alone, but that in addition to the empirical element it is requisite there should be also an intellectual element, in order to the existence of true cognition.

The doctrine of Kant was confessedly understood at the beginning by very few; it was neither understood, nor misunderstood, in the same way. Winning its way to attention very slowly, it finally attracted universal notice. No system has been more earnestly praised or more completely condemned. Apart from its matter, its method and style were objects of complaint. Its terminology was objected to as unnecessarily abstract and obscure. Herder, who greatly admired Kant, nevertheless wrote his *Metacritica* to show that the Critique of Pure Reason is a thing of mist, of chaos, of confusion.<sup>1</sup>

### X. Subjective Idealism: Fichte.

SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM, the system of Fichte (1762–1814), the identity of thinking and being, of the subjective and objective in the Ego. The completely unknown ‘thing in itself,’ of Kant, is thrown aside, the sole source of cognition and of being is the subject, the mind: the Ego posits itself and the non-Ego. The ‘most absolute’ principle is, the Ego is equal to the Ego,  $A = A$ .

From this follows that the *non-Ego* is *not* equal to the Ego, and that the Ego is not equal to the *non-Ego*; but the Ego is equal to the non-Ego, and the non-Ego is equal to the Ego. The thesis and antithesis are reduced in the synthesis. The Ego posits itself as limited by the non-Ego, and thus becomes cognitive; or the Ego posits the non-Ego as limited by the Ego, and becomes active.

The idealistic character underlying Kant’s system was confessed in two ways by its admirers. Those who were not willing to accept idealism endeavoured to strengthen or rather to mend the system at this point of weakness. Those who were not averse to idealism soon availed themselves of the results of the Kantian philosophy. In the former class may be mentioned

<sup>1</sup> Rothenflue, *Institutiones*. Synopsis *Historiæ Philosophiæ*, 1846, iii. 276–290.



Karl Leonhard Reinhold. In his work on the Theory of the Representative Faculty,<sup>1</sup>—his Elementary Philosophy,—he endeavoured, from the very concept of *representation* itself, to establish the objective reality of things. His train of thought was this: Every representation includes in itself the representing subject, the represented object, and the act of representation; hence the represented object must be something objectively real. But this proof was of no value, for it could not relieve the doubt whether the represented object is founded in the subject-mind, or is an object distinct from the mind. This was shown so forcibly by Schulze in his *Aenesidemus* that Reinhold abandoned his own theory.

Of the second class there speedily arose writers who endeavoured to interpret the doubtful and to develop the imperfect idealism in the system.

Beck, professor at Halle, showed that idealism is an essential element in the critical philosophy: for, according to the critical philosophy, a thing in itself is nothing else than the primitive synthesis or combination of all that is determinate pertaining to the essence of the thing, a synthesis formed by the mind itself.<sup>2</sup>

Fichte's Doctrine of Science appeared between the first volume and the last of Beck. In this, removing from the system of Kant all objective reality, he substituted for that system a pure subjectivity. Hence his doctrine is styled Subjective Idealism. It has been said of Fichte that 'his life stirs us like a trumpet. He combines the penetration of the philosopher with the fire of a prophet and the thunder of an orator; and over all his life lies the beauty of a stainless purity.'

He conceived of philosophy as 'the science of science'—'the knowledge of knowledge.' One of his chief works is called the 'Doctrine of Science,' 1795. He transformed the transcendental idealism of Kant into the doctrine of absolute subjectivity. Kant had endeavoured to avoid absolute idealism by granting intuitions

<sup>1</sup> Versuch einer neuen Theorie der menschlichen Vorstellungsvermoegens.

<sup>2</sup> Einzig moeglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die kritische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muss, 1796. The first two volumes of the *Erläuternd. Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des . . . Kant*, of which this is the third volume, appeared in 1793. Beck showed very easily that his views were the legitimate *consequence* of Kant's, but he failed to prove that this was what Kant *meant*. See Zeller, *Gesch. d. deutsch. Philosophie*, 596.

of the sensitive faculty with which corresponded real objects distinct from the mind; but as this involved logical absurdity on the premises of Kant, Fichte pressed his principles to that absolute idealism which seemed to follow logically from them. The notions of Pure Reason, or universal notions, according to Kant, cannot be called objectively real, moreover, because their objective reality cannot be proven; but it is equally impossible on Kant's principles to demonstrate the objective reality of the intuitions of the sensitive faculty,—hence these also ought to be considered as mere subjective phenomena. Reasoning therefore logically on the principles of Kant, Fichte maintains that all realities are nothing but creations of the Ego, and that all existence is nothing but thought itself.<sup>†</sup>

His philosophy may be reduced very briefly to these divisions:

1. Philosophy as a science of science or doctrine of science ought of necessity to proceed from a supreme principle which is *per se* certain.

2. But there is no principle which is certain *per se* except one in which the object or predicate coincides with or is identified with the subject, as, for example,  $A = A$ .

3. Since, however, the Ego has in itself both the  $A$  which it judges to be  $= A$ , and the form according to which it judges, we may substitute for the principle  $A = A$  this, the Ego = the Ego.

4. But this principle, by positing the Ego, judges. But to judge is to act. Hence the Ego posits itself in an absolute mode through the act of activity or of spontaneity essential to itself. For the Ego is reason active and at the same time convinced of its own activity. [By the word *posit* Fichte means to put or place to the consciousness,—to make that which is posited become a fact of consciousness.]

5. But to the Ego is equally essential reflection, through which it acquires self-consciousness, consciousness of self.

6. But the possibility of reflection is founded in *appulse* (Anstoss), opposition, antithesis, contrast; which antithesis cannot be explained by theoretic reason, and hence is postulated. For

<sup>†</sup> Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre.

through this alone the Ego becomes conscious of itself, so that it first posits itself as subject, and then opposes to itself that appulse, that antithesis, as object.

7. Thus, however, the Ego-Object appears in a certain respect as non-Ego in the presence of the Ego-Subject.

8. The Ego thus determining itself through the non-Ego limits its own activity, and, though itself primarily absolute and infinite, becomes or renders itself finite and divisible.

9. To wit: the Ego positing itself as determined by the non-Ego is in a certain sense and so far passive; and the Ego positing itself as the determining non-Ego is active; and this mutual action and reaction between the Ego and the non-Ego is the condition of all representation (*Vorstellens*). This representation is called cogitation or thought if the Ego is conceived of as active, but is called sensation if the Ego is conceived of as passive.

Reasoning in the same manner, he explains the other faculties of the mind or the Ego, and establishes in them a twofold reality,—to wit, of the soul and of the outer world, as also of liberty and necessity.

As the fundamental positions of Fichte's philosophy seem to have peculiar difficulties to English readers, we will present them in a somewhat different manner, following the luminous exposition of them by Scholten:

1. The Ego or the subject is the sole spring of all human cognition. Philosophy starts from the Ego. That the Ego is, is an incontrovertible fact of consciousness.

2. The Ego posits itself (Ego = Ego). This Ego or subject, in conformity with the ordinary empirical consciousness, counter-poses to itself an object as non-Ego. (Non-Ego is not = Ego.)

3. This object or non-Ego cannot, however, be regarded as *in truth* non-Ego without robbing the Ego of its contents, of that which is involved in it, and thus setting aside the actual being of the Ego itself.

4. As this cannot be conceded, inasmuch as the being of the Ego is grounded in the Ego itself, it follows that the non-Ego which is posited by the Ego as object is, strictly speaking, nothing else than the Ego itself. (Non-Ego = Ego.)

5. The contradiction which presents itself in this can only be solved by the supposition that the Ego itself posits the non-Ego.

6. That the Ego posits this particular non-Ego in each case, and not another, points to and involves a necessary though inexplicable self-limitation of the Ego, whereby equally, on the one side, the Ego is determined as passive by the non-Ego, and, conversely, the non-Ego is determined as active power by the Ego.

7. Hereby then the external world, the objective, the non-Ego, becomes purely idealistically a subjective though not arbitrary product of the Ego or thinking subject. The non-Ego not merely as *Phænomenon*, but also as *Nooumenon*, is robbed of all reality outside of the Ego. The objective, that which is perceived in the forms of space and time, has no existence in itself independently of the Ego,—that is, of the thinking subject.

8. This Ego is not, however, even in the first period of the Fichtean philosophy, the individual empirical Ego of one particular man, but the personality (the Egoity, *Ichheit*), the universal Ego (the pure Ego). . . . Everything which in the ordinary conception is thought of as object, over against man as subject, is a self-revelation or self-objectivating, not of *his* Ego, but of the *universal* Ego, or of the universal thinking, which, operating in all individuals in accordance with the same laws, counter-poses the same non-Ego.<sup>†</sup>

II. 1. For, if the intelligent Ego is determined by the non-Ego, and is so far limited and in some measure dependent, the practical Ego, on the contrary, is absolute and free, and hence unlimited and the only true reality.

2. The practical Ego is conjoined with the intelligent Ego because the former is related to the latter as the cause is related to the effect.

3. To wit: the absolute Ego, as free, has causality which reveals itself through the effort of actuating itself as cause.

4. But that effort, of necessity, has a certain determinate quantity of activity, because it always exerts itself to become the cause of some determinate thing, which, as determinate, must be

<sup>†</sup> Geschichte der Relig. u. Philosophie. Aus dem Holländischen v. Redepenning, 1868, 154, 155.

limited: hence the activity of the Ego, which in itself and in its own proper force is infinite, is in act always limited.

5. But this limitation cannot take place except through the counter-effort or resistance by which it comes to pass that the effort of the Ego is thrown back upon the Ego itself, and thus the Ego opposes a counter-effort or resistance to its own effort; from which arises the non-Ego, by which Fichte means that appulse or opposition in the Ego itself.

6. Hence the Ego acts upon the non-Ego, thus posited, by determining it in as far as the Ego is causality; but the non-Ego reacts upon the Ego and relatively to it, and this reaction becomes causality.

7. Hence arises that mutual action between the Ego and the non-Ego which we call the world (*κοσμος*), by which it comes to pass that the Ego (as intelligent or understanding) is on the one side dependent on the world or *κοσμος*, while on the other side the Ego (as practical) is absolutely free.

III. 1. But, although the Ego be absolutely free, it nevertheless perceives itself bound by the conception of duty,—a conception which manifests itself in the manner of an Imperative, and impels to the equipoise, co-ordination, or harmony of the Ego and the non-Ego,—*i.e.* to what Fichte calls ‘the realization of the moral order in the world.’<sup>1</sup>

2. This moral order of the world, in which every duty is founded, and to the realization of which the practical Ego puts forth its effort, is the divinity, the essential being of which is, consequently, the sole object of faith.

3. Whoever realizes for himself and as his own this order, in that measure approximates to the divinity and walks in that true life which is of God. But he who hinders or disturbs this moral order in his own case, sunders himself from the divinity.

4. Hence virtue consists in the perfect harmony of knowledge and action, in order to the free realization of this moral order. These views are developed in Fichte’s work ‘On the Ground of our Faith in the Divine Government of the World.’

The views here presented received important modification in what is called the second period of Fichte. His nature was too

<sup>1</sup> Zur Realisirung der moralischen Weltordnung.

essentially religious to rest in the dreary abstraction which substituted a moral order for a personal Deity. That position seemed to be equivalent to atheism. It might preserve the name of Deity, but it denied the thing. In the later thinking of Fichte, he brings out, with far greater clearness, that the Ego is *not* the limited human consciousness, but is God, the primeval original consciousness,—what he calls the absolute subject-object (the Eternal One), the eternal universal reason, whose life reveals itself in the infinite multiplicity of relations. This God, thus defined, he regards as the ultimate reason of all,—that is, of all essential being.<sup>1</sup> God is the infinite thinking, the sum of whose eternal thoughts is the universe. Jacobi happily characterized Fichte's doctrine as an inverted—an idealistic—Spinozism.<sup>2</sup>

Fichte, although greatly influential on the later thinking, can hardly be said to have established a school, though he had a number of devoted admirers. One reason, doubtless, of his establishing no distinct school was that his system was met by the elaborate system of Schelling, who endeavoured to meet the defects of both the transcendental and the subjective idealism by fusing them into the system of Absolute Identity.

### XI. Objective Idealism: Schelling.

OBJECTIVE IDEALISM, the system of SCHELLING (1775-1854): the system of Identity,—the identity of thinking and being even independently of the Ego. In the Absolute, the object, or non-Ego, and the subject, or Ego, are identical. 'Nature sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal, wakes in man.' Transcendental philosophy is the history of consciousness. Ideas are mediators between God and things. The Universe is the self-revelation of the Absolute Subject. Nature is visible Spirit; Spirit is invisible Nature. In Nature there is a self-objectivating and revelation of the Spirit, of whom it may be said that he not only *thinks*

<sup>1</sup> Rothenflue, iii. 291-294.

<sup>2</sup> Scholtens, 158. The English reader will find of great value in attaining a knowledge of Fichte: 1. The Science of Knowledge, by J. G. Fichte. Translated from the German by A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868. 2. The Science of Right, by J. G. Fichte. Translated from the German by A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1869. For an estimate of Fichte's life and character, see Zeller, 599.

himself, but in Nature also *actualizes* himself. The Universe or the Absolute is an Organism, which stretches forth from one formative principle into the evolutions of a graduated unfolding. This supreme Principle, this organizing Idea, the Ego of Fichte, is called by Schelling the *Soul* of the world.<sup>†</sup>

Schelling at first occupied the position of Idealism as maintained by Fichte, but subsequently rejected it as unsatisfactory to reason, and laid down as the basis of a new system that the primary principle of all essence or real being and of cognition is in the Absolute, considered as the complete identity of the subjective and objective. Fichte, as we have seen, laid down as the principle of all being and cognition the subjective Ego. Schelling showed, with equal right, that the objective non-Ego, or Nature, could be laid down as the principle of being and cognition. This had been laid down by Spinoza, who had inverted the process of Fichte. As Fichte deduced or constructed the whole non-Ego, or Nature, out of his own subjective Ego, Spinoza had deduced the Ego from the objectively real,—the non-Ego, or Nature. But, according to Schelling, both Ego and non-Ego are relative, and hence ought to be referred to a principle above and beyond both; and this principle, he held, was supplied in the system of absolute identity, according to which all essence and cognition, all matter and spirit, are identified in the Absolute as their ultimate reason. But this absolute identity of the subjective and objective in philosophy is not susceptible of proof in the strict sense,—*i.e.* it cannot be known mediately or by process of reasoning, inasmuch as it is itself the principle, the beginning of all knowledge, and that which begins cannot follow. But it can be proved that without it all knowledge is impossible, inasmuch as the conformity of knowledge to the object known, which is essentially prerequisite to all knowledge, cannot be conceived of unless the absolute identity of the subject knowing and of the object known be presupposed. Hence, according to Schelling, the absolute identity or absolute indifference—*i.e.* the equivalence or perfect unity—of what are called different things is the principle, the unity, the centre of all science, as it is the centre of all existence; and immediate per-

<sup>†</sup> Scholten, 161.

ception, or the pure intuition of reason, is the sole organ or medium by which man can reach the spring of all truth. The views of Schelling are developed in his Sketch of the Philosophy of Nature, in his System of Transcendental Idealism, in his work on the Relation of the Real and the Ideal in Nature, his Annals of Medicine as a Science, and in a Collection of his smaller writings.\* His system may be stated under two general heads :

I. 1. Philosophy is the science of the Absolute, as the complete identity both of the subjective and the objective, or the indifference or equivalence of things which are called different, in which difference or identity the essence of the Absolute (*i. e.* of God) consists.

2. Hence the Absolute is neither the Infinite nor the Finite,—neither essence nor cognition, neither subject nor object,—but it is that in which all opposition between cognition and essence, between the spirit and nature, between the ideal and the real, and, in fine, all difference, is removed, and the absolute identity, the absolute indifference, or equivalence and unity, is constituted, which is at the same time all that is, or is the whole,—the all.

3. Hence this absolute identity alone truly is or has *essence*: outside of it nothing actually *is*.

4. Hence this absolute identity is the one only substance, and this substance is God.

II. 1. For God primarily posits or affirms his own essential existence. His proper self and existence once posited, God, in virtue of the idea alone, is the absolute identity of the universe.

2. To wit: God, positing himself, posits himself in ways infinitely manifold,—*i. e.* produces a diversity of entities which are nothing but modes or forms of existence of the one absolute identity. This production or outgoing or emanation is sometimes revealed, according to Schelling, as a differentiation or dualization (*Entzweiung*, *Differenzirung*) of the Absolute; sometimes as a manifestation of himself; sometimes as a defection of the Finite from the Infinite,—that is, of ideas from God,—which is virtually a self-defection on the part of God. The theory of

\* Entwurf der Naturphilosophie. System des transzendentalen Idealismus. Ueber das Verhaeltniss des Realen und Idealen in der Natur. Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft. Sammlung kleinerer philosophischen Schriften.



dualization is given in his work, 'Exposition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Fichtean Doctrine.' The later views are presented in his 'Philosophy and Religion.'<sup>1</sup>

3. Hence existences or entities are both finite and distinct only as they are regarded either as individual or as mutually correlated.

4. But in God all things are equal and infinite, because to him and in him they are identical.

5. Hence in the whole universe—in the real world as well as in the ideal world—there is essentially but one and the same power which manifests or evolves itself: in the real world with the preponderance or excess of reality, in the ideal world with the preponderance or excess of ideality (to which he applies the terms duplicity and polarity), and, through the totality, again conjoins them with itself. Hence the fundamental position of Schelling: Identity in triplicity is the law of evolution. This may be called Philosophical Trinitarianism.

6. Hence anything whatsoever is nothing else than the quantitative difference of subjectivity and objectivity, or of ideality and reality, and hence is not itself the essence of the Absolute, for that lies in identity, but is only a determinate form of the essence of absolute identity.

7. A quantitative difference of this kind, so far as anything or any determinate form of the essence is placed in opposition with the absolute essence, is called power.

8. Hence in no single thing can there be absolute subjectivity or absolute objectivity, but only the identity of both with the preponderance of reality or of ideality in the particular case.

9. But the Absolute posits itself as the whole of the essence and the whole of cognition, as nature and as spirit: in the former, with the relative preponderance or excess of the objective or of reality; in the latter, with the relative preponderance or excess of the subjective or of ideality; so that in each is contained, entire and undivided, the absolute identity, only that in nature it is under the form of the essence or reality; in spirit, under the form of cognition or of consciousness, *i.e.* of ideality.

<sup>1</sup> Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichtes'chen Lehre. Philosophie und Religion.

10. Thus, both the ideal and the real appear in corporeal nature under the form of reality,—the ideal as light, the real as matter, whose extension is a manifestation of reality as of gravity. In the spirit each appears under the form of ideality: to wit, the ideal as free or unimpeded activity, the real as restricted or confined activity.

11. But *first*, in corporeal nature, one of the two potencies, either matter or light, predominates, or both are in equilibrium. If matter predominates, the life of things is in extension or in space; if light predominates, the life of things is in motion or in time; if they are in equilibrium, the life of things is organic, *i.e.* is the unity of matter and of light. *Secondly*, in the spirit or in the ideal world there is either an excess or preponderance of restricted activity upon the free, or, in other words, of necessity upon liberty: and this is knowledge or science, whose end is truth; or there is an excess or preponderance of free activity upon the restricted, or, in other words, of liberty upon necessity: and this is morality, whose end is the good; or, finally, there is an equilibrium between the two: and this is art, whose product is beauty.

The scheme of the philosophy of Schelling may be reduced to a tabular view, thus:

The Absolute Being, God, or the Whole,  $\tau\omicron\ \pi\alpha\nu$ , manifests himself in nature, or as absolute indifference in himself differentiates himself in nature,—

as relatively real,		as relatively ideal,	
under the following potencies:			
Gravitation, } Light, } Life, }	{ Matter. { Motion. { Organism.	Truth, } Good, } Beauty, }	{ Science. { Morality. Religion. { Art.

According to the philosophy of Schelling, God *alone* exists, and all things which do exist are but the phenomenal manifestations of the one sole Absolute; they are equal to him in nature, and really identical with him. The absolute whole of being is really identical with God. His illustration is, 'for as one and the same electric fluid manifests the opposite effects of attraction and repulsion at the two poles, so the primary and absolute unity in nature and intelligence, as it were at two poles, continually puts forth effort to differentiate itself through a series of evolutions,

out of which arise all the phenomena of the physical and intellectual world.' In this way the universal becomes individual, and by the opposite tendency the individual endeavors to become universal by returning to the point of indifference or non-difference: to wit, that point at which, the phenomenal merging itself again in the Absolute, the difference between phenomenal being and non-being ceases. Hence philosophy, according to Schelling, is the science of God and of his manifestation, nature. Hence philosophy necessarily comprehends the study of nature, as that in which, under a sensible form, is manifested or revealed God, the eternal or absolute being, the knowledge of which, philosophy searches for. Hence philosophy is coincident with poetry and with religion, inasmuch as all three tend to the single point of attaining to the Absolute. Philosophy does this by intuition, poetry by description, religion by meditation and adoration.

These views help to solve the seeming mystery, that the philosophy of Schelling gave a powerful impulse toward the natural sciences, and, furthermore, that the positivism which repudiates all speculation really is the offspring of this most attenuated speculation. Schelling's system of Absolute Identity is a wonderful co-ordination and evolution of former thinking. It combines the ideas of Plotinus (205-270), of Bruno, (d. 1600), and especially of Spinoza (1632-1677). It gratifies in the highest degree the love of unity; it considers the whole universe as an immense epic without proper beginning and without definite end. In this vast poem the ages are as cantos of books,—the single beings like single words, which separated have no meaning, but have their complete sense when regarded in their due place in the vast poem of identification with the Absolute.

Schelling went forth from the narrow bounds which Kant had placed to human knowledge. Kant had almost affirmed that we could know nothing. Schelling opened the knowledge of the whole. Nature, which Fichte had represented as a sterile negation, Schelling endows with soul and life; and while he does not explain its phenomena, he paints them with a vivid enthusiasm, like that of Plato and of the Oriental thinkers. This, beyond doubt, is the chief reason why Schelling at once obtained so large a number of followers. With the appearance of unity he

confounds the understanding ; with his brilliant and often poetical style, his images and parallels drawn from nature, he captivates the imagination. These qualities had the greater potency in consequence of the characteristics of his time. The dry and oftentimes barren criticism of Kant, and the scarcely less dry idealism of Fichte, only relieved in its dryness by what seemed, to the popular mind at least, its impiety and its thorough-going egoism,—both systems, alike in their inability to satisfy either the speculative intellect or the common sense of men, were dividing the supremacy in German thinking. Contrasted with these systems, the theory of Absolute Identity had much that was fascinating. Its simplicity of parts, its apparent facility in explaining everything, its modes of construing nature, the many novel and exceedingly beautiful thoughts associated with it, gave it immense popularity.

But its triumph was of short duration ; its defects and contradictions were palpable. The reason, escaping from the charm, at once detected these, and the author's system scarcely outlived him. Against the system various objections, theoretical and practical, have been urged. Theoretically it has been charged not only with lack of foundation, but with positive absurdity. For, first of all, the entire theory rests upon an hypothesis confessedly assumed and really absurd, to wit, that because no beings are conceivable without the idea of an Absolute, it follows that all beings are to be identified with the Absolute in its essence. Christian theism grants the former and denies the latter. It is theoretically just as preposterous as to say that because we cannot conceive of the existence of a watch without the idea of a watchmaker, the watch is identical in its essence with its maker.

Schelling's conception of the nature of God in that cloudy idea of Absolute Identity and Original Indifference is very little more than a tricking out with fresh phrases the Brahma and the Brahm of the Hindoos roused from his deep slumber. According to the Vedas and the Vedantas (the theological summary of the Vedas), Brahm alone exists, and the phenomena of the universe are only modifications of Brahm as Brahma. Thus, according to Schelling, God alone exists, and this God is the absolute identity of all things. As in the Hindoo system, Brahm aroused from

slumber becomes, of an indeterminate being, a determinate intelligence, so Schelling's God from the primal absolute indifference becomes 'Intelligence;' from the non-intelligent, from nature in God, from chaos, comes forth divinity as intelligence.<sup>1</sup> The God who is primarily implicit, in time becomes explicit, or the folded becomes the unfolded. But the question arises, Why does God unfold himself? What reason of evolution is there in him? The Absolute, as such, would seem to have equally at all times the reason of evolution. In attempting to meet this difficulty, Schelling can make no better answer than this, that the self-evolution of God is the result of a certain fatality incapable of explanation. But that which evolves itself under a fatality is not the Absolute, but is dependent. According to Schelling, all the evolutions in the world, and consequently all history, are but a diversification of necessary positings or evolutions of God. In his dissertation on freedom he calls this necessity of evolution 'an act morally necessary,' which in his system can have no intelligible meaning, for the word moral as an attribute of necessary makes it cease to be absolute in Schelling's sense. Morality and freedom are inseparable, and that which is necessitated by fatality is ipso facto not morally necessary.

In pure despair of harmonizing facts to his theory, he attempts to account for the existence of evil by a sort of mythical representation, by what he calls the defection or apostasy of ideas from the Absolute. This raises the question how anything can fall away from the Absolute when there is nothing beside the Absolute. Evil must be the falling away of the Absolute from itself.

The God of Schelling, except that he is represented in a constant process of becoming, differs little, as we have seen, from the God of Hindoo mythology, in which we have Brahm as passive, Brahma as active. In Schelling's views of God evolving (as active) and the evolutions or phenomena themselves (God as passive), he contradicts himself completely; for whatever pertains to God as passive is to be considered as one of these evolutions of God, consequently man is one of these; but Schelling affirms that man can, by his intellectual intuition, grasp the Absolute: *i. e.* passive

<sup>1</sup> Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.

evolutions of God—to wit, men—would at the same time be active (capacious of the intuition of the Absolute). Hence his system lacks that logical consistency which marks the Hindoo view. In that system we are supposed to be under an illusion like that of protracted dreams. This Schelling does not admit. To admit this would have been to renounce all scientific cognition; while it was Schelling's peculiar glory to assert that on his system absolute cognition of the Absolute was reached.

Quite as serious are the practical objections to the system of Schelling. It lies open to all the difficulties which are valid against the system of Pantheism. No morality is possible without liberty, and Schelling puts even his Absolute under Fate. Consequently Schelling denies in terms that there is liberty in the proper sense, and asserts that good is possible only by a sort of divine magic. It is hardly necessary to say that the system is in conflict not only with the common sense of the illiterate, but equally so with the solid thinking of the cultivated and judicious. Qualified by the religious temperament, it loses itself in mysticism, opens the way to fanaticism, to superstition, to all the insanities of disordered imagination. It has, in fact, been laid hold of by schools of the most conflicting extravagances in support of their notions.<sup>†</sup>

Among the ablest of the opponents of this system was Jacobi (1743-1819). He held that all purely speculative philosophy is incapable of reaching a satisfactory system; that the dogmatic tendency, working itself out by way of demonstration, conducted to fatalism and pantheism; that the critical system led to destruction of all religious faith. Hence he brought back all philosophical knowledge or science to Belief, or the immediate notion, as its principle.

I. He affirmed that every demonstration implied something already demonstrated, and by consequence ended in this, that there must be something back of all, not demonstrable, but which is immediately known, and this primary and consequently immediate notion is called Faith, or Belief.

II. For through sense and through reason in man, and having man for their object, is distinguished a twofold world, a visible

<sup>†</sup> See Zeller, *Gesch. d. deutschen Philosoph.*, 649, 697.

and an invisible world, the existence of which can be equally proved with the existence of the reason and of sense themselves.

III. For the exterior visible world is manifested to sense through sensation. Hence all cognition here begins through faith in the veracity of sensation and the truth of its results. But the invisible or intellectual world, the intelligible world or world of understanding, is manifested to reason through the internal, the inmost sense, or consciousness. Hence concerning God and divine things we have not a knowledge or notion through processes of reasoning, but have only Faith, or immediate perception of the manifestation of the divine through the internal sense, or consciousness.

IV. Hence philosophy is able to evolve this Faith, but not to render a reason for it.

V. Wherefore Faith in God, and in the manifestation of God through reason, is the principle and essence of all philosophy. Jacobi held, with Descartes, that, humbling as it may be to human pride, we are driven at last to acknowledge that our conviction of the reality of the things of which we seem to be conscious rests upon the veracity of God. Reason is compelled to take refuge in Faith. The intellect without the moral nature—the head without the heart—leaves man essentially pagan.<sup>1</sup>

## XII. Absolute Idealism: Hegel.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, the system of Hegel (1770–1831): thinking is the immanent origin of the Notion, and is the only actual and true,—Schelling's results reached and vindicated by Fichte's general method,—the strictly dialectic. The non-Ego is subordinated to the absolute Ego, but is an essential *momentum*, an operative, impulsive element or force of the Absolute, in which the Absolute works itself out. All philosophy falls into—1. Logic, the science of the pure notions of reason, the science of the Idea in and for itself; in other words, the laws of thought, in accordance with which the unfolding or process of the universe takes place: 2. the philosophy of Nature, as the science of the Idea in its alterity; that is, the science of the unfolding of the Cosmos

<sup>1</sup> Schriften über Spinoza und gegen Mendelssohn. David Hume, über den Glauben, oder: Idealismus und Realismus.

considered as Nature: and 3. the philosophy of the Spirit, the science of the Idea reverting out of its alterity into itself, or the science of the Absolute, as, out of the process of Nature, through successive phases of development, in the spheres of art, religion, and science in mankind, it becomes actual self-conscious spirit. The spirit is subjective, objective, absolute. Nature is a process whose ground is the concept, logic, or, in other words, the absolute thinking.

The relation of the philosophy of Hegel (1770-1831) to that of Schelling is first that of coincidence, and next that of diversity. He coincides with Schelling in the presupposition of an absolute identity between knowing and being, thought and actuality, the subjective and the objective. But at an early period he deserted the theory of Intellectual Intuition, which Schelling considered as the sole organ of science, and contended that the notion of the Absolute is to be reached through the medium of reasoning. Hence the Absolute cannot be laid down as a principle from which all the rest proceed, but, on the contrary, the Absolute is the final conclusion to which reason attains by working out from the indefinite being (*Sein, esse*). According to Hegel, philosophy is the science of reason, as reason is conscious of itself as the entire being (*Sein*). The object of philosophy is the idea which is identified with reason. This idea, according to Hegel, can be considered in three ways:

I. As in itself and for itself, as self-being,—*i.e.* as the pure Idea; and this is the object of Logic, which Hegel defines to be the science of the pure Idea (*der reinen Idee*),—*i.e.* 'of the Idea in the abstract element of thinking.'

Logic, which Hegel builds on the Trilogie already applied by Fichte, *Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis*, embraces—i. The doctrine of Being (*Sein*): 1. Quantity; 2. Quality; 3. Measure. ii. The doctrine of Essence (*Wesen*): 1. the Essence as Ground of Existence; 2. the Phenomenon; 3. the Actuality. iii. The doctrine of the Notion (*Begriff*): 1. Subjective Notion; *a.* Notion as such; *b.* Judgment; *c.* Inference, as the unity of both; 2. Objectivity; 3. Idea, as the absolute unity of Notion and Objectivity.

II. Or it may be considered as opposed to itself in 'other-being,' alterity, objectively or in other,—*i.e.* in its outward mani-



festation as existing out of itself in nature. And this, he says, is the object of Somatology, or the Philosophy of Nature. This divides itself into—i. Mechanics; ii. Physics; iii. Organics.

III. Or the idea may be considered as reverting or returning from 'other being,' alterity, into itself, or the 'self-being.' And this reverting from 'other-being' to 'self-being' is the object of Pneumatology, or the philosophy of Spirit. From the position that the idea is the same as reason, and that reason is the entire being, he infers that the idea is identical with nature and the mind, and that it is the thing essentially which is represented through it, and hence that philosophy is reason itself, having cognition of itself as the identity of mind and nature,—that is, what is reason is nature, what is nature is reason. The laws of thought are the internal logic of the universe.

Spirit is—i. Subjective in the form of relation to itself, and, as such, object of—1. Anthropology; 2. Phenomenology; *a.* Consciousness; *b.* Self-consciousness; *c.* Reason; 3. Psychology. ii. Objective,—the absolute idea, having being in itself, manifests itself in—*a.* Jus; *b.* Ethics; *c.* Morality. iii. Absolute,—the unity of the subjective and objective Spirit. It forms the highest sphere,—Religion. It reveals itself in—1. Art; 2. Religion; 3. Philosophy.

The philosophy of Hegel may be characterized as in general the reaching and ripening of Schelling's results by Fichte's method. More particularly, its features are these:

*First.* Its principle which lays down the positive conception of spirit, in antithesis to Schelling's vague indifference of the subjective and objective. And

*Second.* The method of its dialectic. This had been anticipated in a negative form by Kant in the antinomies of his Critique of Pure Reason; but Hegel has developed it in a positive manner, in which Fichte was his forerunner.

Hegel has greatly benefited Logic by thoroughly carrying through a principle which had been proposed by Kant, to wit, that there is an inseparable interpenetration of Logic and Metaphysics. In this way Hegel has united into one great system all the laws of thought, categories, forms of conception, and methods. His system is one in which every department of knowledge in all

its theories finds its place, so that its compass, limits, value, significance, method, and connection with all the others, are marked and proven. It was this encyclopædic character which did much in giving the philosophy of Hegel precedence over all the rival schools. His influence has been felt in every direction; peculiarly so in the Philosophy of Religion. Three great schools have been, in a general sense, followers of Hegel. They are known as the Right, the Centre, and the Left. The Right wing is the Supernaturalistic or Orthodox School; the Left is the Rationalistic; the Centre is a mediating, mystic School which attempts to rise above the Supernatural and the Rationalistic into a region which is freed from these differences by leaving them beneath it.

The general sentiment had been that the speculations of Hegel were favourable to religion; but four years after his death the appearance of the work of Strauss, which was Hegelian in its philosophy, proved very clearly that if orthodoxy could use Hegel it could not monopolize him.

Hegel has indeed expressed himself very beautifully in regard to religion. It is only necessary to separate some of his utterances from their connections to have what seems profoundly religious. He says, 'Religion is the realm in which all the enigmas of life are resolved, all the contradictions of thought harmonized, all the sorrows of the affections allayed, the realm of eternal truth and of eternal peace. Through it flows the true Lethe from which the soul drinks forgetfulness of all its ills. The mists of time vanish before the unfading brightness. In the consciousness of God, the spirit is freed from the forms of the finite. It is a consciousness of absolute freedom and of absolute truth.'

What this religion is has been well stated thus: 'The pantheism of Hegel is not a real pantheism, but a logical pantheism. All that is is but the manifestation of God in the movement of thought. In his system God is everything and is nothing. He is nothing, for he has no consciousness of himself, except in the soul of man. He is everything, for he is the universal sole substance which underlies all consciousness and all existence.' With Hegel<sup>1</sup> the proper development of modern systems is usually

<sup>1</sup> System der Wissenschaft. Phœnomenologie des Geistes. Wissenschaft der Logik. Encyclopædie des philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse.

regarded as terminating. He seems to have reached the last possible point. Speculation, moving as we have seen under certain impulses communicated from Locke's system, has gone through the theological idealism of Berkeley to the subjective idealism of Fichte, to the absolute identity of Schelling and Hegel.

'To construct scientifically the totality of the actual out of the Absolute, and from the position of the Absolute, was a problem on whose solution Hegel wrought with amazing power and tension of thought, and thus became the creator of a system which must be regarded as the most perfect form of German idealism, as the ripest fruit of the development through which it has run since Kant. This development closes in Hegel, as the Socratic school closes in Aristotle.'<sup>1</sup>

### XIII. Theoretical Idealism: Schopenhauer.

I. THEORETICAL IDEALISM is the name given by Erdmann to the system of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). In this extraordinary man the Orient and the Occident combine their influences, so that he presents the anomalous appearance of a Hindoo thinker in the intellectual garb of Europe. He is the Brahmin of our modern metaphysics. This cast was given him in the study of the Indian antiquities, to which he was directed by the Orientalist Majer. He had the large culture produced by travelling in France, England, and Italy, and by a thorough acquaintance with French and English literature. He had as teachers or as friends some of the most illustrious men of his day. But the greatest mover of his intellectual life was Kant.

II. SCHOPENHAUER AND KANT: Schopenhauer had been advised by his preceptor, Schulze, to confine himself, in his earliest philosophic studies, to Plato and Kant, and not until he had mastered these to take up others, especially neither Aristotle nor Spinoza,—advice which he never regretted having strictly followed. Schopenhauer often declares that he is thankful to Kant above all other philosophers; that subsequent to Kant none but his own system had a claim to be considered really philosophical, as between himself and Kant nothing had been accomplished,

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, *Gesch. d. deutsch. Phil.*, 775.

pseudo-philosophy had been supreme, and that he had completed what Kant had begun.<sup>1</sup>

Schopenhauer and Herbart speak in the same general way of their relation to Kant, but in exactly opposite aspects. Herbart clung to the realistic element in Kant, Schopenhauer to his subjective and idealistic elements. What to the one was the weakness of Kant's system was to the other its strength.<sup>2</sup>

III. SCHOPENHAUER'S ESTIMATE of Kant is a very high one: 'Kant's almost superhuman merit lies therefore in this, that he distinguishes the thing in itself from the phenomenon, and shows that the phenomenon alone is the object of cognition; so that it amounts to the same thing whether we style it object or phenomenon, that is, conception (*Vorstellung*). The objectionable feature in Kant is that he unnecessarily multiplies the number of the connections through which the Object is formed. This, however, is not the case with the Transcendental *Æsthetics*, which, in its results as well as in the manner of its execution, is one of the greatest masterpieces, and in itself sufficient to immortalize the name of Kant, as its principles embrace unanswerable truth.'<sup>3</sup> 'This cannot be said, however, of the Transcendental Analytic. Among its twelve Categories there is one which is a downright absurdity,—the Category of Reciprocation, which is a monster, like Spinoza's *causa sui*. But, beside this, the whole twelve, strictly taken, can be reduced to a solitary one,—Causality,—the only one, consequently, which Kant ever brings to exemplification.'<sup>4</sup>

IV. GENERAL VIEWS.—The world is only my conception, my mental representation (*Vorstellung*). The thing in itself is Will, which presents itself in things as phenomenon. It is the essence of the phenomena. Without a subject there can be no object. Were there no one to perceive things, there could be nothing perceived. 'The antithesis between the *ideal* and the *real* is equivalent to the antithesis between *phenomenon* (mental representation—*Vorstellung*) and the *thing in itself*.' 'The dividing line between the real and the ideal is so run that the whole intui-

<sup>1</sup> Kritik der Kant. Philosophie, 469. Welt als Wille, 2 Th. 291.

<sup>2</sup> Erdmann, Entwicklung d. deutsch. Speculation, s. Kant, ii. 384.

<sup>3</sup> Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie, 492.

<sup>4</sup> Do., 501, 502.

tional world—the world presenting itself objectively, including our own bodies, together with space, time, and causality, involving, therefore, the Extended of Spinoza and the Matter of Locke, —all this, as mental representation (conception—*Vorstellung*), belongs to the Ideal, while nothing remains as Real but the Will.' 'After men had, for thousands of years, regarded the universe of our intuitions as *real*,—that is, as existing independently of the concipient subject,—Idealism brought to consciousness the fact that, boundless and massive as the universe is, it hangs on a solitary thread,—the thread of the *consciousness* at the time in which it exists.' 'It is a mistake to suppose that Idealism denies the *empirical* reality of the external world. The genuine Idealism is not the *empirical*, but the *transcendental*.' 'In all *transcendental* Ideality the objective world retains empirical reality. The object is not, indeed, the *thing in itself*, but it is, as empirical object, *real*. *In fact*, space is only in my head; but, empirically, my head is in space.' 'The absolute Idealism, holding the objective world to be a mere phantom, a spectre of the brain, is *theoretic Egoism*.' 'Idealism is not to be confounded with Spiritualism, for Spiritualism, with its antithesis, Materialism, belongs to *Realism*, and is, consequently, opposite to *Idealism*.' 'What is mental representation (*vorstellung*—conception)? A very complicated *physiological* process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of an *image* there.' 'Every object is conditioned by the Subject, and exists only for the Subject, and is the Conception of the Subject. Object and Conception are not different, but are one and the same thing.' 'The being in and for itself of everything must of necessity be a *subjective* one.'<sup>1</sup>

V. IDEALISM, ANCIENT.—'Idealism, or the view that the world is but phenomenon, reveals itself not only in Plato's affirmation of the nullity of sensuous things, but in the fact, also, that it is the original doctrine, and that the Hindoo religion, which is worthy of the supremest regard, as it is the oldest religion and the one received by the majority of the race, avows it in its doctrine that things are but illusion, and that their existence is guilt.

<sup>1</sup> See Schopenhauer-Lexikon, von Frauenstädt, Leipzig, 1871; art. Aussenwelt, Ding an Sich, Ideal und Real, Idealismus, Vorstellung.

With the predominance of Judaism, which is thoroughly realistic, Realism in philosophy also pervaded the Christian world, as if Judaism were Reason.<sup>1</sup>

VI. IDEALISM, MODERN, HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT.—‘It was reserved for modern philosophy again to return to the true view, and here the first merit belongs to Descartes, who is with justice regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, for he began with self-consciousness, and thus gave a thoroughly subjective turn to philosophy. A very important advance was made in this direction by Locke, who vindicated for the subject, by his notion of secondary qualities, a part of that which Realism had ascribed to the object. In this tendency Berkeley went still further. His chief merit is that he gave up the undue distinction between Conception (*Vorstellung*) and the object of Conception. Finally, with Kant begins a new period. Not only, with Locke, did he deny as things in themselves what pertains to the senses, but he also showed that what pertains to the intuitive understanding is not things in themselves, but forms lying in the subject, and decisively established the fact that all objects are but phenomena,—that is, are Conceptions (*Vorstellungen*). Locke had denied that colour is in the objects, and rightly determined it to be mere sensation of the Subject, yet granted that extension belongs to the objects. Kant, whose Critique of Pure Reason is a continuation of Locke’s philosophy, shows that extension—that is, space—is only in the subject, and hence enounces the proposition, thoroughly correct, that if there were no cognizing subject there would be no objects and no world. This is a proposition which, strictly taken, is tautological, as an object *in itself*—that is, not an object to a subject—is a contradiction.’<sup>2</sup>

VII. THE CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS CONTRASTED.—‘As the sensations are subjective, and the form of causality, whereby they come to be the perceived object, is subjective, it is clear that Realism, which makes the (unconceived) things the causes of the conceptions, and (Fichte’s) “Doctrine of Science,” which makes the subject the cause of the objects, involve a preposterous doc-

<sup>1</sup> Vierfache Wurzel, § 19.

<sup>2</sup> Welt als Wille, 2d B., 83. Vierfache Wurzel, 2d edit., § 16.

trine. Just as preposterous, finally, is the system of Identity (Schelling and Hegel), which is a fusion of the other two.'<sup>1</sup> 'The truth is, that represented (conceived) Objects—that is, Phenomena—must submit to the law of Causality, for without that law Objects are impossible. It is the condition of Object-being. It is a matter of course that what holds good of all phenomena holds equally good of our own body, which, as Kant has correctly shown, is only phenomenon, and which we may name the most immediate object.'<sup>2</sup>

VIII. CAUSALITY AND FINAL CAUSE.—Only in the case of Phenomena can we speak of Causality. In this sphere, however, we *must* go back from effects to causes, though an ultimate cause is not thinkable. In spite of the unanswerable proofs by which Kant has annihilated all speculative theology, there are still many who use the absurd expression 'Ultimate Cause,' and nonsensically talk of a cause which is not also effect. They think they are talking in the interest of religion, confounding Religion and Theism, whereas, in fact, Theism is merely Judaism; and in Buddhist lands, which are decidedly atheistic and pantheistic, Kant's Critique of Reason, the most serious attack ever made upon Theism, would be regarded as an edifying tract, written against the heretics, in defence of the orthodox Idealism.<sup>3</sup>

IX. MAN AND THE ANIMALS.—It is rightly acknowledged that reason distinguishes man from the animal, and this distinction is wrongly made as great as possible. The Orient has not this unamiable pride; only in the Occident, which has bleached man, and to which the old-time primal religions of his home could not follow him,—only in this Occident, man no longer recognizes his brothers, but calls them beasts. All animals, even the most imperfect, have understanding;<sup>4</sup> for they all know objects, and this knowledge, as motive, determines their movements. The understanding distinguishes animals from plants, as reason distinguishes men from the animals. The mark which distinguishes the animal from the plant is that its motion does not depend on mechanical, chemical, or physiological causes, but is really voluntary, produced by an object known, which is the *motive* of that move-

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, §§ 5, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Do. § 6.

Vierfache Wurzel, § 22.

<sup>3</sup> Vierfache Wurzel, § 34.

<sup>4</sup> Welt als Wille, § 6.

ment.<sup>1</sup> The animals have *intuitive*, but not abstract, knowledge; they apprehend the immediate causal connection, and the higher animals can carry it through several links of the chain; but they do not in the strict sense *think*, for they lack *notions*, that is, the abstract conceptions.<sup>2</sup> We cannot deny an analogue of morality to the animals if we contrast the diverse animal characters which meet our view. Contrast, for example, the dog and the elephant with the cat, the hyena, and the crocodile. This empirical character may very well be the exhibition of an intelligible one.<sup>3</sup> The life of animals is a clear exemplification of the nullity and the suffering of life. It is the nature of animals, more than of man, to be satisfied with mere existence. They give themselves up to the present; they are the present personified, and heartless man robs them of their little all. The bird, organized to sweep over a hemisphere, he mews up in a narrow space; and on his most faithful friend, the dog, endowed with such rare intelligence, man fastens the chain.<sup>4</sup>

X. METAPHYSICS, NATURE OF.—‘Philosophy, or Metaphysics, as the doctrine of Consciousness and of what is involved in it, as a matter of course does not enter into the circle of the other sciences. As it does not follow the Principle of the Ground, but considers this Principle itself, which, in the nature of the case, does not allow of being grounded by demonstration, we may say that Philosophy takes up things where the Sciences leave them. Hence it considers things in a manner wholly different from that of the Sciences. It does not ask *whence* the world is, nor *wherefore* it is, but *what* it is. It does not ground and demonstrate in the way in which the Sciences do, but that which first of all is given as feeling it seeks, that it may exalt it to knowledge, and may picture *in abstract* the essence of the world, so as to render itself a repetition and mirroring of the world in abstract notions.’<sup>5</sup> ‘Hence it follows inevitably that there can be no other Philosophy than a Philosophy of Reflection. Any other is mere twaddle. Metaphysics embraces, therefore, all the cognitions a

<sup>1</sup> Sehen und Farben, 3d edit., 18 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Welt als Wille, 3d edit., ii. 62-66. Ethik, 2d edit., 33, 34.

<sup>3</sup> Memorabilien, 314, 315.

<sup>4</sup> Parerga, 2d edit., 318, 403.

<sup>5</sup> Welt als Wille, § 15.



priori which relate to time, space, and matter, and forms the tacit presuppositions of the Sciences.<sup>1</sup>

‘Hence Metaphysics is idealistic through and through, and the proposition, *The World is nothing but Conception*, is synonymous with Kant’s assertion, The World is phenomenon, and is identical with the proposition, The World is subject to the Principle of the Ground.’<sup>2</sup>

XI. THE WORLD NOT A DREAM.—Were we simply to abide by the results thus far reached, this world would be little more than a dream conformed to laws. Kant shows a way out of this in teaching us to distinguish the *In-itself* from the phenomena. (When he forgets this, and for example places objectivity simply in conformity with law, he coincides entirely with Leibnitz, who had maintained that the actual phenomena are distinguished from those in dreams only by their strict conformity to law.) The question now rises, if the world to this point offers only relations, is merely Conception, is it nothing more? is it an insubstantial dream, or is it something more? and if it be, *what* is it?<sup>3</sup> The response to this question Schopenhauer considers the most marked step in his system, by which it removes itself, more than by any other, from Kant.<sup>4</sup> First of all, nothing is given but what has already been considered, that is, Consciousness. To this our own body is object, like all other objects, only more intimate, more immediate: as our body, however, is in time and in space, and is material, we have an objective knowledge of it, or, what is the same thing, it, with all its circumstances, movements, and such like, is Phenomenon.

But the observation we make that our bodily movements follow not simply on causes and excitations, but on motives also, shows clearly that in these movements, in addition to their being objective changes, something else articulates itself, of which the Subject is conscious in a purely immediate manner. This something is *Will*.<sup>5</sup>

XII. WILL, THE WORLD IS.—‘I am conscious of my Will in a manner wholly different from that in which I am conscious of Objects, even of my own body, and hence I have not an objective

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, 2 Th. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Do., 2 Th. 193.

<sup>2</sup> Do., §§ 1-16.

<sup>5</sup> Welt als Wille, § 15.

<sup>3</sup> Do., § 17.

but an immediate cognition of my Will. Of my body, to wit, I am conscious under the three forms of Space, Time, and Causality (Matter). The cognition of my own Volition is free from two of these forms. It is true that in cognizing my Will it appears to me under the form of Time, as a train of acts, and so far my cognition is not exhaustive; yet it is so much more intimate and immediate than my consciousness of my other objective being, that Kant's doctrine of the incognizableness of the thing in itself must be so far modified as that the Subject is conscious in its material being of its phenomenon; and, on the other hand, is in its Will conscious of its In-itself.<sup>1</sup> Kant himself seems to have had a surmise of the fact that when the Subject is conscious of his Volition he cognizes more than the mere phenomenon; for when he speaks of things in themselves there are at once suggested to him practical determinations, that is, determinations of Will. In the knowledge of our Volition we have a cognition with which no other can be compared, which is neither a priori nor a posteriori is neither a physical nor a logical truth, but is the philosophical truth by pre-eminence.<sup>2</sup>

'To the position that the Will is the proper In-itself of man is opposed the prejudice that knowledge is the primary, and that Volition is a mere accident of the Intellect. To meet this prejudice, attention must be directed to the fact that the Will has the proper primacy in self-consciousness, for that which is recognized in self-consciousness, our effort, our fear, our pleasure and displeasure, is aroused or repressed Volition. The Will is, therefore, what is properly substantial in us; the Intellect is the secondary, the accessory; whence it is that we come only in a supplementary way to know our Volition (our Character), Hence also our Volition constitutes the identity of person. Consequently every man has, in himself, the experience that he is Phenomenon, that is, Conception; and that he is an In-itself transcending the phenomenon, that is, he is Will. If now we would avoid theoretic Egoism, the view that ourself alone is in existence, a view which it is hard to believe any one in his senses has ever seriously held, we must concede that as our phenomenal Ego is related to the world of phenomena, so precisely our In-

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, 2 Th. 200 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Do., § 18, 2 Th. 199.

itself is related to that which it is in itself. This train of reasoning leads to the proposition to which Schopenhauer devotes the Second Book of his chief work, to wit, *The World is Will*.

XIII. WILL DEFINED.—The word Will is here to be taken in a broader sense than the ordinary one; for we are not to confine it to conscious will, but are to understand by it what unfolds itself in nature in various gradations, and reveals itself in its supremest form in conscious human volition, which gives it its name as a *denominatio a potiori*, a term for the genus derived from what is its pre-eminent species. This extension of the meaning is justified by the fact that there is an identity of essence with Will in every striving and operative power in nature. Force is a sort of willing. The In-itself is the Will, that is, that which is not object (conception), and which, in order to think it, must be compared with and named after that which has most completely stripped off the forms of objectivity, and that is the human Will.<sup>1</sup>

It lies in the nature of the case that the predicates which belong to the phenomena must be denied of the Will. The Will as universality and unity, exalted above all multiplicity, must be thought of as the one which is all, the  $\xi\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ .

XIV. UNIVERSALITY OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE WORLD AS WILL.—The true, not the mere phenomenal in the world is therefore nothing but this One Will, which reveals itself as the pressure of waters to the Deep, the turning of the magnet to the North, the longing of the iron for the magnet.<sup>2</sup>

In perfect independence of this system, the greatest investigators of nature have gradually begun to recognize the Will as the proper *agent* in nature. This is true of Brandis, Meckel, Burdach, when they speak of plants; it is true of the comparative anatomists when they explain the structure of the animal by its character and inclinations; it is true of the physicians when they speak of the healing power of nature; it is true of the astronomers when they construe gravitation as a mode of willing.<sup>3</sup>

Were the world conception only, it would justify the attempt to reduce everything to the simplest relations a priori, that is, the arithmetical relations, and to construe everything into one huge

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, §§ 17-29.

<sup>2</sup> Do., § 24.

<sup>3</sup> Ueber den Willen in der Natur.

sum in arithmetic, as Fichte's Doctrine of Science seems to have accomplished it,—merely seems. As primarily in my own body this double side comes to my consciousness, that my body is phenomenon, and that it is the thing in itself, to wit, Will, it becomes my key to this double cognition of the entire world. According to the view we have now reached, the world is nothing but the objectivation of One Will; and Spinoza is right when, speaking of freedom, he says that if a stone were conscious it would speak of its falling as its Will. As the character of man consists in his Will, so is it with the quality of things which make up their *character*.<sup>1</sup> Kant was right when, following Priestley, he regarded the essence of matter as forces.<sup>2</sup>

XV. THE BRAIN.—The brain is an organ in which the supremest objectivation of the will reveals itself. With this organ alone, at a single stroke, the world, as conception, comes forth with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity, causality. The brain, with all its conceptions, whether they be merely intuitive, as in the animal brain, or abstract, as in man, is in the main no more than an instrument of the Will. In the objective mode of looking at the matter, the brain is the efflorescence of the organism. Not until the organism reaches its highest perfection and complication have we the brain appearing in its greatest development. The brain, with its attachments, the nerves and spinal marrow, is a mere fruit, a product, of the rest of the organism,—is, in fact, a *parasite* of it, in as far as it does not directly interlock into its mechanism, but serves the aim of self-preservation only as it regulates the relations of the organism to the external world. Tiedemann was perhaps the first who compared the cerebral nervous system to a *parasite*. The comparison is striking, so far as the brain, with its attachments, the nerves and spinal marrow, is as it were planted into the organism, and nourished by it, without itself *directly* contributing anything to the economy. Hence life can exist without brain, as in the case of brainless abortions, and of tortoises, which can live for three weeks without their hearts, if the medulla oblongata, which is an organ of respiration, is left. A hen from which Flourens had removed the entire brain lived ten months, and did well. Even

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, § 27.

<sup>2</sup> Do., § 27. Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 87.

in the case of man the destruction of the brain brings on death not directly, but first through the lungs, then through the heart. The brain, with its function of knowing, is nothing but a vedette stationed by the Will, which looks out from its watch-tower; the heart, through the window of the senses, gives warning of dangers, and gives notice of the approach of what is useful, that the Will may decide itself by its reports.<sup>1</sup>

XVI. THE SENSES.—It is a decided error that we come to objects through the senses. The senses only impart sensations, that is, subjective conditions. The very sensations which we are quickest in referring to objects—the sensations of light and colours—are but actions of our retina. In the retina, therefore, there is actual polarity, not, as Goethe supposes, in the physical conditions of our sensation. It is the activity of our eye which is quantitatively and qualitatively divisible, not, as the Newtonians suppose, the light itself. Thus this activity begets the three, or the infinitely many, pairs of colours, in which the one is always the complement to the other for the full activity of the eye.<sup>2</sup> The specific diversity of perception in each of the five senses has its cause not in the nervous system itself, but only in the way in which it is affected. Hence we may regard every sensation as a modification of touch, or of the capacity of feeling which is spread over the entire body. For the substance of the nerves (apart from the sympathetic system) is one and the same throughout the body. The mode in which it is affected is determined partly by the nature of the agent (light, sound, aroma), partly by the apparatus through which it offers itself to the impression of this agent.<sup>3</sup>

XVII. THE IDEAL AND THE REAL NOT IDENTICAL.—Their diversity is the topic which, since Descartes, has most occupied the philosophical world. Kant has established this diversity with such force that they who speak of the identity of the two are mere wind-bags. Philosophy has a transcendental (ideologic) and a physiological side. On the former side it is idealism, on the latter realism. It amounts to the same thing whether we say (idealistically) the world is conception, or (realistically) it is brain-

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, 3d ed., ii. 273. Ueber den Willen in Natur, 3d ed., 23, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Ueber das Sehen und die Farben, §§ 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Do., 3d ed., 9.

function. It is the same in effect whether we had said (idealistically) Locke took the side of the senses, Kant that of the understanding, or whether we now say (realistically) Locke has shown that what belongs to the organ of sense, Kant that what belongs to the brain, does not belong to the things themselves.<sup>1</sup>

XVIII. Music stands completely out of the circle of the other arts. While they by the presentation of single things excite the knowledge of ideas, music objectivates the entire will; and while other arts speak of the shadow, it speaks of the substance. In it, therefore, the essential being of the world repeats itself: in the fundamental bass, inorganic, massive nature; in the principal voices singing the air, the thoughtful life and effort of man: the ripieno voices repeat what remains, which, from the crystal to the animal, gather to a whole its self-sustained consciousness. Music, like philosophy, is the complete and just repetition, the expression, of the world. It is, to parody the familiar words of Leibnitz, unconscious metaphysics. Music is the melody of which the world is the words. We may as well call the world incorporated music as incorporated will.

XIX. THEISM AND POLYTHEISM.—Faith in God (Theism) has its root in *Egoism*. It is not the product of cognition, but of *will*. *Necessity*, the constant fearing and hoping, brings man to the hypostatizing of personal Being, that he may have some one to pray to. At the beginning there were various gods, but in later time the necessity of bringing consistency, order, and unity into knowledge led to the subordination of them to one, or the reduction of them to one. As polytheism is the personification of the particular parts and powers of nature, monotheism is the personification of all nature,—at a single stroke.

XX. BUDDHISM.—It is the resorption into the primal spirit of the Nirvana of the Buddhists, which is desired by all those in whom the Will has turned and denied itself, and to whom the real world, with all its suns and galaxies, is nothing.<sup>2</sup> Buddhism, in view of its having more adherents than any other system, and of its admirable internal character and truth, is to be regarded as the principal religion on earth. Buddhism is strictly *idealistic* and *pessimistic*, and decidedly and in express terms *atheistic*, which

<sup>1</sup> Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 91.

<sup>2</sup> Welt als Wille, § 71.

shows how mistaken those are who make Religion and Theism pure synonyms. A special disadvantage of Christianity is that in the main matter . . . it revolves around a single event, and makes the destiny of the world depend on it. A religion which makes a solitary event its foundation rests on a very weak foundation. How wise, on the other hand, is it in Buddhism to accept the thousand Buddhas! The moral system of Christianity is inferior to that of Buddhism and Brahminism, in that it does not have regard to the animals. Buddhism has the most perfect harmony with Schopenhauer's philosophy, in its *idealism*, *atheism*, and *pessimism*,—and in its considering physical evil as the result of moral defect,—in the doctrine that nature is to be redeemed by man. The Buddhist antithesis of Sansara and Nirvana corresponds with Schopenhauer's *affirmation* and *negation* of the Will to live. *Sansara* is the world of perpetual re-births, of pleasure and longing, of the illusion of the senses and of shifting forms, of infancy and prime, of old age, sickness, and death. Nirvana, *the Quenching*, is redemption from all this, and marks what enters after the negation of the sinful Will.<sup>†</sup>

XXI. THE ONE AND ALL. PANTHEISM.—The doctrine of the One and All, the  $\epsilon\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ ,—that is, that the inner essence of all things is one and the same,—was, subsequently to the Eleati, thoroughly taught by Scotus Erigena, Iordano Bruno, and Spinoza. Schelling has revived the doctrine, and it has been generally grasped in our time. But *what* this One is, and *how* it comes to present itself as the Many, is a problem whose solution I have been the first to present. From the earliest times man has been spoken of as a Microcosm. I have inverted the proposition, and have shown that the world is a Makranthropos, in that Will and Conception exhaust the world's being, as they exhaust man's. With the modern Pantheists I hold indeed the  $\epsilon\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ , that the One is also the All, but I do not hold their  $\Pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$ ,—that *God* is the All. My views as distinguished from theirs involve these points:

1. Their  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$  is an  $x$ , an unknown quantity; my 'Will,' on the contrary, is most accurately known.

2. Their  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$ , their *God*, manifests himself *animi causa*, to unfold his glory, and to cause himself to be admired; with me

<sup>†</sup> Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Buddhismus.

the *Will*, by its objectivation, comes, in what way soever, to self-knowledge, whereby its turning, its redemption, becomes possible.

3. I proceed from self-consciousness.

4. While Pantheism is Optimism, and hence the world is regarded as the total possibility of all being, with me the world also has space for the negation of the Will.

5. To the Pantheists the intuitional world is an unexplained manifestation of God; to me, on the contrary, it is a conception *per accidens*, inasmuch as the Intellect is primarily only a *medium* for the more perfect phenomena of Will, and subsequently, in a perfectly definable way, rises to objective intuition.

Pantheism is a misnomer, for the word God means a personal Creator, whom true philosophy denies. Spinoza represented his system as Pantheism, that is, called his substance *God*, only to escape the fate of Bruno and Vanini.<sup>1</sup> Pantheism presupposes the existence of Theism. The idea would never originally come into any mind, or a mind free from prejudice, to look upon this world as a God.

XXII. SPINOZA AND HIS DISCIPLES.—Spinoza himself stood far above the modern distortions of his system. His blunder is his Optimism, that 'Behold, it was very good,' which stuck to him as a Jew, so that he calls his substance *God*, and makes of it a Jehovah who lacks nothing but personality. Hence his Ethics is weak, often revolting. With me, the essence of the world is rather the crucified One,—crucified Saviour, or crucified Malefactor, as he himself determined it,—and my Ethics harmonizes with the Christian, and with the Brahminical and Buddhistic. Those, finally, who in their fear of fatalism substitute for it the going forth of the world from a free act of will (as Jacobi does) forget that there is a third view, the one I offer: the Act of Will, out of which the world springs forth, is our own. This Will is free, for the Principle of the Ground, from which, above all, necessity derives its significance, is the mere form of its phenomenon.<sup>2</sup>

XXIII. PESSIMISM.—Optimism regards the phenomena as the true, this world as the best. This view is impious; it is heathenish in the worst sense of the word. It presents itself in Judaism

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, §§ 17-29.

<sup>2</sup> Do., vol., ii. 636-640.



with its 'Behold, it was very good,' and most glaringly in Islam, the newest, and therefore the worst, religion. In direct opposition to this view, the oldest and truest religion—which, in view of its possessing these qualities, we may call Pessimism—regards all being as guilt and as misfortune. The only true and profound thing in Judaism is its dogma of the Fall. This is the only point at which real Christianity coheres with Judaism. Hence Christianity rightly teaches original sin, and properly uses the words world and evil as synonyms.<sup>1</sup>

'In fact, it is mockery to speak of that as the "best world" in which life is but the alternation of pain and weariness, where the happiest has no moments more blissful than those of slumber, and the hopeless no moment more wretched than the moment of waking. Because Life is guilt, it is punished with Death. How much nearer the truth on this point does Hume stand than Leibnitz, whose Optimism has no other merit than that of having occasioned Voltaire's *Candide*!'<sup>2</sup>

XXIV. DEATH AND LIFE.—To say I shall pass away, but the world will continue to run its course, is not, strictly speaking, correct. We should rather say, The world (which I see) shall pass away, but I (my true being) am eternal. The death of the individual is for the race what falling asleep is to the individual, and hence the life of the race seems like an oscillation, the vibrations of which are produced by the passing away of the persons that have lived and the entrance of the new. The primary aim of all religions and philosophical systems is to furnish an antidote to the certainty of death. When a man dies a world perishes,—the world which he bore in his head. The more intelligent the head, the more clear, significant, and comprehensive was its world, the more terrible is its destruction. With the animal perishes only a poor rhapsody, or sketch of a world. The cause of old age and death is not a physical one; it is metaphysical. From the cessation of the organic life of an individual we are no more to infer that the force which actuated that life is annihilated than we are to infer that the spinning-girl is dead because her wheel stands still. We know well what we lose by death, but we know not what we gain. A comfort which can always

<sup>1</sup> Welt als Wille, § 63.

<sup>2</sup> Do., vol. ii. ch. 46.

be grasped by every one is: Death is as natural as life. The individuality of the most of men is so pitiful that they lose nothing in losing it. The only thing in them of value is the common humanity, and that will never pass away. In fact, every individuality is at bottom only a special error,—something which had better not be,—hence, something which ought not to be,—and that is the reason we cease to be. Death, even more than sorrow, has the power to hallow. Every death is in some sense an apotheosis, and hence the dead body of the lowliest of the race cannot be looked upon without reverence. What the bad man most fears is certain to come to him,—that is, death. It is just as certain to the good man, but to him it is welcome. The fear of death is independent of all knowledge. The animal has it, though it knows nothing of death. Everything that is born brings this fear with it into the world.

XXV. ESTIMATES OF SCHOPENHAUER.—Imperfect as is this presentation of Schopenhauer's views, we think that the reader cannot fail to be struck with their wonderful brilliancy. Herbart, who is of so different a school, in speaking of the great men who have developed the system of Kant, pronounces 'Fichte the profoundest, Schelling the most comprehensive, but Schopenhauer the most lucid, the most versatile, the most attractive.' He says that it is an extremely rare thing to find an extended acquaintance with literature so variously and felicitously used to render luminous the objects of speculation as in Schopenhauer's 'World as Will,' through whose seven hundred pages scarcely a sentence reveals the decline of the life which glows through it. The image, clouded with such obscurities in Fichte and Schelling, is clearly mirrored in Schopenhauer, whose book, because of its clearness, is best adapted to show that 'this most recent, idealistic Spinozistic philosophy, in whatever way it shifts, in whatever form it reveals itself, is and remains alike erroneous.'<sup>1</sup>

The general estimate of Schopenhauer which Zeller has given makes any other unnecessary: 'Schopenhauer does not merely take an exalted position in philosophical literature as a writer, but was a man of extraordinary intellectual endowments, of many-sided culture, and adapted, in a decided measure, for

<sup>1</sup> Herbart's Review, 1819, in his Works, xii. 369.

philosophical investigation, by the acuteness of his thinking, the force of his intuition. That it was nevertheless, in common with Beneke, his destiny long to remain little known, that not until toward the end of his life, and subsequently, he attracted any general or appreciative notice, is to be accounted for in part by the character of his philosophy and its antagonism to the prevailing modes of thought, but is due in no little measure to his personal peculiarities and conduct. High as was his scientific aspiration, lively as was his feeling for the beautiful, cultivated as was his taste, and strong as was the ideal impulse of his nature, it is no less true that, on the other side, his sensuality was indomitable, his self-esteem and self-laudation boundless, his vanity pitiful, his ambition consuming, and his selfishness illimitable. Incapable of drawing out of himself, and lifting himself by science above his personal infirmities, he carried over into his system all the whimsies of his capricious nature. Every defence and every success of a contemporary system he regarded as an attempt on the life of his own renown, and this aroused his implacable hatred, which poured itself out in passionate invectives. Instead of continuing patiently to labour for the position which he felt entitled to claim, he withdrew himself into a corner and pouted.

‘Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the idealistic counterpart of Herbart’s Realism. Both proceed primarily from Kant; both passed through Fichte’s school, the one in Jena, the other in Berlin; both were as little satisfied with him as with Schelling and Hegel, and desired to construct a new system on a Kantian basis, to draw out more correctly the consequences of Kant’s Criticism. But in their apprehension of Kant, and in their judgment of what was needed to improve him, they sundered from each other in exactly opposite directions. What the one extolled as his highest merit the other regarded as his greatest weakness. Herbart, to avoid Fichte’s Idealism, turned back to Leibnitz and Wolff. Schopenhauer, little as he was willing to confess it, and with all the malevolence and depreciation with which he judged Fichte, did no more than go back to Fichte to improve and complete his Idealism. As Herbart’s Realism went over into Idealism, so Schopenhauer’s Idealism went over into a hard Realism, a materialistic Pantheism.

'... A system which runs into such gross contradictions may certainly embrace many fruitful thoughts, many valuable observations,—and we willingly concede that Schopenhauer's system is not wanting in these; but as a whole, as a system it is, in its most favourable aspect, no more than a brilliant paradox.'<sup>1</sup>

#### XIV. The Strength and Weakness of Idealism.

It is impossible to understand the weakness of a system without understanding its strength. The strength and weakness of Idealism connect themselves with the same facts and principles, so that they can readily be grouped in pairs and reduced to parallels.

I. It rests on *generally* recognized principles in regard to *consciousness* [<sup>117</sup>]. Its definition of consciousness is the one most widely received: the mind's recognition of its own conditions. It maintains that the cognitions of consciousness are absolute and infallible, and that nothing but these is, in their *degree*, knowledge. In all these postulates the great mass of thinkers agree with Idealism. The foundation of Idealism is the common foundation of nearly all the developed philosophical thinking of all schools. Idealism declares that while consciousness is infallible, our *interpretations* of it, on which we base *inferences*, may be incorrect; and nearly all thinkers of all schools agree with Idealism here. No inference, or class of inferences, in which a mistake ever occurs is a basis of positive knowledge. Hence, says Idealism, only that which is directly in consciousness is positively known, and nothing is directly in consciousness but the mind's own states. Therefore we *know* nothing more [<sup>118</sup>]. So completely has this general conviction taken possession of the philosophical mind, that even antagonists of Idealism, who would cut *it* up by the roots if they could cut *this* up, have not pretended that it could be done. Dependent on and involved in its postulate regarding consciousness, is the idealistic postulate, 'An idea can be like nothing but an idea;' that is, the mental image cannot be like some supposed *material* thing, of which it is asserted to be an image. To a certain point at least, nearly all the thinking of philosophers is consonant with this postulate. The subjective cannot be like

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, *Gesch. d. deutschen Philosophie* (1873), 872-874, 894.

the objective ; the idea of a house cannot be like a house. The proposition, taken in one way, is a truism. The idea of a house cannot be like a house : the idea is intellectual, the house is material ; the idea is in my mind, the house is external to my mind ; the house is a complex of modifications of materials, the idea is a modification of the immaterial ; my idea in no respect is a cause of the house, the house is in a certain respect one of the causes of my idea ; the idea depends on acts *on* the mind, acts *in* the mind, acts *of* the mind, the house depends on none of these. Bricks and mortar are not like mental modes. 'The beings of the mind are not of clay.'

But while Idealism has here a speculative strength, which it is not wise to ignore, it is not without its weakness, even at this very point, for its history shows that it is rarely willing to stand unreservedly by the results of its own principle as regards consciousness. If it accept only the direct and infallible knowledge supplied in consciousness, it has no common ground left but this,—that there is the one train of ideas, which passes in the consciousness of a particular individual. A consistent Idealist can claim to know no more than this,—that there exist ideas in his consciousness. He cannot know that he has a substantial personal existence, or that there is any other being, finite or infinite, beside himself. And as many Idealists are not satisfied with maintaining that we do not know that there is an external world, but go further, and declare that we know that there is not an external world, they must for consistency's sake hold that an Idealist knows that there is nothing, thing or person, beside himself. Solipsism, or absolute Egoism, with the exclusion of proper personality, is the logic of Idealism, if the inferential be excluded. But if *inference*, in any degree whatever, be allowed, not only would the natural logic and natural inference of most men sweep away Idealism, but its own principle of knowledge is subverted by the terms of the supposition. Idealism stands or falls by the principle that *no inference is knowledge*. We may reach inferences by knowledge, but we can never reach knowledge by inference.

'An idea can be like nothing but an idea.' We have said that in one sense this is a truism. There is another sense, in which it is a sophism. As a truism it is like the proposition that the most

perfect portrait cannot be like the face, that a picture can only be like a picture. The face is flesh and blood, the picture is oil and colour; the face changes its hues and expression, the picture cannot change; the face is rounded and diversified to the touch, the painting is on one surface. And yet the portrait *is* like the face, and the idea *is* like the object. The portrait is like the face in this, that through the light which it modifies, as its medium, it produces certain effects on the consciousness like those which the face itself produces through the same medium. Under the same laws, the idea is like the object, in that it is a faithful mental picture, drawn under divine laws, by the touches of the senses, conformably to the innate conditions of the mind itself. It is the picture of the object, painted by the object itself, through its media, on the canvas, which is conscious of the picture it bears; or rather it is a photograph which becomes a picture by the modification produced through the media, and by the internal changes of the sensitive substratum, which co-acts responsively to the media. The object is as it seems to the mind, and the idea is like the object, so far, that there is a real correspondence, correlation, analogy, conformity, between the object mediating through its means of force and the idea co-mediated by these means, and by the powers, connate or educated, of the mind itself. That which produces the phenomenon is in the real accord of *natural cause and effect* with the phenomenon. Different phenomena imply different objects, or different conditions of the same object. In Idealism there is no object beyond the mind and correspondent with the phenomenon, but the phenomenon itself exhausts the whole conception of object. It is not the phenomenon of an object, but is itself object. Hence Idealism proper holds that in the phenomenon we *in no sense* grasp anything beyond it, while Idealistic Realism holds that in an important sense, though mediately, we do grasp the thing beyond,—in other words, that the *medium establishes a real relation* between the object itself and the mind.

2. Idealism seems to be strong in the fact that it rests upon generally accepted principles in regard to the *personality* of man. The common view, with which Idealism concurs, is that not the *whole man*, which is the Ego, but that only man's mind, is the Ego; that man *is* not a person, but merely *has* a person :

in brief, that man is not man. It assumes the simplicity of man proper. The Cartesian construction of man and of person is the received one, and this is the construction on which Idealism builds. When we are conscious of our *self*, we are not conscious of the material nature associated with our self. The assertion of Idealism which strikes most persons as the extremest of its absurdities, to wit, that we have not substantial bodies, or do not directly know we have them, is a mere logical necessity from the commonly-received principle,—a principle very probably held by the very people who ignorantly stand aghast at its inevitable inference. The dualistic Realists, on their own principles, no more *know* that they have bodies than the Idealists do; and hence some of the strongest dualistic Realists, like the Scotch school in general, lay the foundations of an extreme Idealism in the very effort to overthrow the older and weaker one. In denying Berkeley they unconsciously assert Fichte.<sup>1</sup> This school has consequently shown a tendency, in some of its latest and noblest representatives, to run out into a sad indeterminism, or to go over to the Idealism against which it has fought for a century.<sup>2</sup>

But the seeming strength of idealism here is really a weakness; for, in common with the received dualism, it accepts a false construction of the *personality* of man. The attestation of consciousness is as real to the substantial existence of our bodies, as an integral part of our person, as it is to the substantial existence of our minds. There is no sort of proof proper that man is spirit, apart from proof that he also is body [119].

3. Closely connected with the false dualism of the popular system in regard to the person of man is its construction of the *relation* of *matter* to *mind*. This also has always been a tower of strength to Idealism; and it is one of its unquestionable benefits, that it has shown the untenableness of the old position. If the choice must lie between occasionalism, pre-established harmony, and materialistic physical influence on the one side, or Idealism on the other, every sound thinker will accept Idealism, at least provisionally, as not so great an evil as the others. The ignorant physicist sometimes says, "We *know* that there is *matter*. Why need we go further to an unknown something called mind?"

<sup>1</sup> See Prolegomena, V. 10, 15, 20.

<sup>2</sup> See Prolegomena, IV. 6, 13, VI. 14.

But his very assertion is self-destructive. It implies the priority of the something knowing to the something known. He has not been able to assert matter without postulating mind. You not only cannot prove matter, you cannot define it, without implying the existence of mind. In its assertion that mind is first, Idealism is beyond all successful assault.

Berkeley here did a great work in pulling down the false, in showing the defects of the existing systems. Descartes and Malebranche accepted matter, and were at a loss what to do with it. It was simply in their way. Locke's was the magnificent chaos of all systems. It only needed selection to determine whether his views should be developed into scepticism, materialism, idealism, or realism. Were Berkeley but a blind giant, it was, at this point at least, not in the temple of a true God that he reached forth his hands to feel the pillars. It was Philistia's temple of false theories that fell. If Berkeley was not a Solomon, he was at least a Samson. His argument against matter is, as directed against some of the dominant theories he assailed, simply invincible. If matter were no more than what they assumed it to be, could do no more than they supposed it to do, it was a mere obstruction, which it was a relief to sweep out of the way. If the battle was not won, the deck was at least cleared for action.

Yet at this point it is a weakness of Idealism that, in regard to the relation of *mind* and *matter*, it attempts to set aside *false theories* by repudiating *well-grounded facts*. The evidence that facts are facts is not weakened by the false theories that are broached to account for them, nor by our inability to offer any theory which explains them. Idealism may overthrow occasionalism, or pre-existent harmony, or physical influence, or any and every theory as to the *mode* in which the non-Ego operates on the Ego; but the *fact* that the non-Ego does operate on the Ego remains untouched. In denying the *fact*, Idealism is forced out of itself into scepticism, its own theory becomes chaotic and preposterous, and it reacts into realism, or even materialism, or runs out into nihilism. We know too little of the ultimate nature and relations of matter and mind to venture beyond the ground of facts in regard to them. In matter are hidden divine forces; it



too is worthy of God; it too is an out-thought of God; and we cannot measure it, because we cannot measure Him. We cannot think too highly of spirit, but we can think too little of matter. Matter, too, is in the sphere of faith. We cannot walk all through its domains by sight merely. There are three spheres of wonder in thought. The lowest is simple matter, with its mysteries and beauty and grandeur. The highest is pure Spirit, the self-existent Cause of the Universe, and his angels. Midway between is the being in whom spirit takes to itself matter, not that they may mechanically cohere with their wonders separated, but that a new world of wonder may arise,—mysterious forces, and forces which neither simple matter, nor pure spirit, in their isolation, possesses. Matter and mind conjoined do not merely add their powers each to each, but evolve new powers, incapable of existence outside of their union.

4. Idealism in its best forms addresses a powerful appeal to confidence in making so much of the universe as a thing of *thought*. Its Platonic harmony with the *idea* as the primal thing, the presupposed model of the existent in nature, is part of its strength. Against the theories of blind fate, of aimless chance, of evolution, without mind to guide it, of unconscious nature fretting itself into form or consciousness, in the happy accidents of millions of ages of failure,—against the theories that in any sense make mind the product or function of matter, or put it after matter, or co-ordinate it with matter,—the best Idealism, in asserting spirit as the glorious original, asserts plan as before all evolution, asserts that the entire phenomenal, whether physical or spiritual, finds its last root and cause in personal reason.

But while it is a strength of Idealism that it confesses the *thought* in the universe, it is its weakness that it denies the *word*. The word is the *body* of the thought, the *medium* through which thought awakens thought, and by which mind is operative on mind. After all its efforts, Idealism totally fails to give an intelligible account of the excitation of thought. Berkeley is totally unsatisfactory in the explanation of the *impartation* of the divine ideas to us, and simply helpless when he confesses, but leaves unexplained, the fact that the mind of one man communicates excitation to the mind of another. Fichte confesses that the

positing of the non-Ego, as the non-Ego inevitably appears in every man's experience, is incapable of explication ('unbegreifliche'); and Schelling, in his Fichtean period, acknowledges that while the limitation of the Ego, in a *general way*, can be *explained*, 'the *definite* limitation of it is the *incomprehensible* and *inexplicable* demand in philosophy.'<sup>1</sup>

Berkeley appeals to the omnipotence of God as capable of making direct impressions on the mind; but the first sentence of the Principles shows that *God* is not the object of human *knowledge*,—we have no more than our knowledge of our *idea* of Him. We know the idea, not the Being. Berkeley can find no solution of the facts he admits, except by a tacit desertion of his own principles of knowledge. Matter, in many of its aspects, may be considered as the medium of thought, the interpreting word of God's mind,—the necessary condition of man's conscious relation to man; but of all these, in its Gnostic undervaluation of matter, Idealism has persistently taken no notice.

5. Closely allied with the position it assigns to thought, is the strength which Idealism derives from the conception of the *phenomena* of the universe, as *language* in which mind speaks to mind, or speaks to itself. 'Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge; there is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard.'

Yet, while Idealism speaks much of *language*, it is a language without words, without lip, and without ear. It has no words, for words are not ideas, but the representatives of ideas, and the media of expressing them; and Idealism has no medium between minds,—it has mind speaking without words, articulating without organs, and heard without an ear. Its words are self-uttered, that is, unuttered,—self-heard, and therefore unheard.

But while objective nature is like language in that it reveals mind to mind, it is even as a revealer greatly unlike language in many respects. Objective nature is not only a means to an intellectual end, but is also in some respects an end to itself. And even when it is a means, it is, in its first and most direct intent, a means to a natural, not to an intellectual, end. The bird has faculties for itself alone; and those which it has for me it *shares*

<sup>1</sup> System des transcendental Idealismus, 118.

with me. It does not only sing for me, it sings for itself also. The flowers that blush unseen are not lost, and the sweetness shed on the desert air is not wasted. The intermediate purposes of nature do not find their analogy in language, and hence the conception of language fails to cover the whole problem. It does not answer to build a system on the straining of a metaphor. But the secret force of the analogy, even as far as we grant it, is not what it ought to be for the ends of Idealism. Objective nature has not the arbitrary character of language. Talking man has innumerable languages,—man as the excitant of the perceptions of his fellow has but one language, and to percipient man nature addresses but one. The man of spoken language is 'homo,' and 'anthropos,'—and the nation of 'homo' does not understand 'anthropos;' but nature's man is man himself, asserting himself to the normal perception of the whole race in the one perception, in its kind identical and unmistakable. If nature finds in language some of her *parallels*, she finds in it, in others, her *contrasts*. She is so vast, and so manifold, that she soon exhausts the figure and leaves it behind her. The spoons of our Systems never throw back the tide-line of her ocean.

6. Idealism has been strengthened by the obscurity, confusion, and vacillation of thinkers in regard to the notion of *substance*, or of the '*thing in itself*.'

Yet Idealism itself involves all the most serious demands of the notion of substance, falls into its greatest difficulties, and complicates instead of relieving them. The difficulties touching substance are in the sphere of the ideal. But although it raises the difficulties, it never settles them. It has all the empirical difficulties in accounting for what *seems*, and then the complicating difficulty, which haunts it all through, that this only seems. It is encumbered with the perplexity of treating physical substance as if it were a fact, while it yet conceives of it as a fiction. In a word, it is encumbered with all the embarrassments brought in by the idea of physical substance, yet can avail itself of none of the relief the idea brings.

7. Closely allied with the notion of substance is that of *cause* and *causality*, whose obscurities have given a place of shelter to idealistic speculation.

But Idealism is no less weak than other systems in its interpretation of causality. The causal relation of intellectual forces and effects, of mental precedences and successions, is not only as obscure in its own nature as is physical causation, but is, in fact, the source of difficulty as regards the physical. It is the adjustment in the mental construction which creates the perplexity. Here, as in regard to substance, Idealism is compelled to accept experience as a source of difficulties, yet dare not use it as a means of relief from them.

8. It is an element of strength in Idealism, in common with all monistic systems, that it appeals to the love of *unity* natural to the mind. All great tendencies in human nature point in some way to great truths,—to some truth possessed or some truth needed. When they swing and tremble, it is still under a prevailing drawing toward the true; and when they at last lie still and point steadily, they point to the pole. One of the most marked desires of human thought is toward unity, to make as nearly as may be the One the All. The great struggle of thinking has been toward a monistic construction of the facts, and this has given us Pantheism, Materialism, Idealism, and the Doctrine of Identity.

It is a weakness of Idealism, in common with Materialism and Pantheism, that it finds unity not in the *harmony* of the things that differ, but in the *absorption* of the one into the other. Two sets of things are before us in the natural construction of experience, as all schools alike admit,—things spiritual, things material. Before they begin to philosophize, the Materialist and the Idealist wholly agree on the phenomenal facts. There *seems* to be a world external to me, and I *seem* to be conscious that there is. But when they begin to philosophize, the Materialist insists that, as such a thing as mind is supposed to be can neither act on matter nor be acted on by matter, there can be no mind. The Idealist, holding to the fundamental mode of the Materialist construction, simply inverting the terms, says, 'As such a thing as matter is supposed to be can neither act on mind nor be acted on by mind, there is no such thing as matter. Each is a dogmatist, arbitrarily assuming the element, by which he will stand, as separate from the other, and each, by the thing he re-

jects, making void the thing by which he holds. For there is no genuine proof that there is matter which is not a proof that there is mind, no genuine proof that there is mind which is not a proof that there is matter. All proof of the existence of matter links itself with the consciousness which the mind has of certain facts which involve the existence of matter; all proofs of the existence of mind are linked with the evidences that matter operates on it and is operated on by it. Matter isolated from mind is unknown, and mind isolated from matter is unknowing. As subject and object are correlate terms, and the real existence of the thing in one term of the relation implies the real existence of the other, so mind and matter are not opposites, but correlates. *As philosophy alone knows them*, there can be no mind conceived without matter, no matter conceived without mind. Materialism and Idealism are alike forms of direct self-contradiction.

9. It is a source of strength to Idealism that with its principles various speculative errors, especially Materialism, seem to be most effectually overthrown. The hope of accomplishing this was one of Berkeley's practical incentives. That he has not accomplished this in the manner and to the degree he proposed is certain, but his labours were nevertheless not a failure. Berkeley has helped to lay an immovable foundation for a true estimate of the value of the soul and of the majesty of mind. Quite outside of this peculiar speculation, in which many may decline to follow him,—and, indeed, the more potently if we drop it,—he has helped to fix forever, to thoughtful men, evidence of the personality, the independent existence, the amazing faculties of man's spirit. If he has not demonstrated that there is no *substantial* body, he has demonstrated that, whatever body may be, it is for the soul; that matter is for mind; that the psychical rules the physical; that the spirit is the educator of the organs; that the universe is expressed thought and embodied plan; it is conceived by mind for mind, is the language in which the Infinite Spirit speaks to the created spirits; that law is but the revelation of will, nature an eternal logic and æsthetic; that man is an indivisible person, and that his essential personality is inherent in his soul; that soul is not the result of organism, but that organism is the result of soul; that the universe *we know*

cannot exist without mind. The esse of *the known* is percipi, man is the measure of his own universe, and there is no *man's universe* outside of man.

On the other hand, Idealism promotes Materialism by reaction, as all extremes, in the same way, produce their counterparts. To make a real thing nothing, is the best preparation for making it everything. The soil of the most matured Idealism is, equally with that of a one-sided Realism, the soil of the most extravagant Materialism. The land of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is the land of Feuerbach, Vogt, and Moleschott, as the land of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke is the land of Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. Many in the world of thinkers, nearly all in the every-day world of what is called 'common sense,' if fairly pinned down to the choice between 'no substantial mind,' 'no substantial matter,' would say, 'If this be so, there is no substantial mind.' To the populace throughout, and to nearly all the cultivated, the thing seen, felt, heard, tasted, is the substance; not the thing which sees, feels, hears, tastes. That is to most men the shadow. If you can make them doubt of what they have seen, how can they continue to believe in that which they have not seen?

10. Closely associated by misconstruction and one-sided extravagance with Materialism is the doctrine of *Realism*, against whose abuses the best Idealism is arrayed. The common sense of the Occidental races is prevailingly *realistic*, but realistic beyond all the metes and bounds which any system of intelligent thinking can endure. All philosophers are agreed that in a certain aspect the popular interpretation of consciousness is demonstrably false. It is so false that half an hour's talk will satisfy any man of ordinary intellect that he has misconstrued the testimony of his own eyes, ears, and touch. When the refined sense of the race becomes realistic, it tends to Materialism. Those who are terrified at Idealism would do well to contrast its workings not merely with their own sober Realism, but with the workings of Materialism; to put side by side materialistic France and idealistic Germany, or in Germany to contrast even the extravagances of Idealism with the reactionary extravagances of Materialism, remembering that the abuse of Realism is the direct stronghold of Materialism.

But if the extravagances and mistakes of Realism are favorable to Idealism, there is a strength, naturalness, and consistency in a *sober Realism*, which make it a very formidable antagonist in the sphere of speculation, and an invincible one to the practical mind. Not only so, it is invincible to the idealistic mind in its practical moods. Fichte himself says, 'Idealism can never be a *way of thinking*, but is *speculation* only. When it comes to action, Realism presses upon every man, even upon the most decided Idealist.'<sup>1</sup> 'Idealism is the true *reverse* of life.' Fichte elsewhere says, 'If I do not acknowledge practically what I *must* acknowledge theoretically, I put myself in an attitude of clear self-contradiction.'<sup>2</sup> And in saying this he passes judgment on his own system.

11. It is a great source of strength to Idealism that, appealing to the reason as its ground, those who are *its antagonists* have so often failed in meeting it successfully,—have so often insisted that the whole question is to be carried out of philosophy and put to the popular vote,—or, accepting the challenge to meet Idealism in the sphere of speculation, have, on that sphere, failed to overthrow it.

If the antagonists of Idealism have strengthened it by their differences, the friends of Idealism have weakened it by their vital differences. Its friends have failed to agree.

12. It is one of the great attractions of Idealism to thinkers that it meets the problems of thought in a *philosophical spirit*. If it does not solve them, it *tries* to solve them. If it does not answer the question, it does not *give it up*. If its heroes are vanquished, they fall in battle, with their harness on.

There is often a great misconception of the whole purpose of philosophical effort. It is not to find a ground of practical conviction sufficient for the routine of every-day life. That ground is common to all the systems. The most absolute Idealist and the most positive Realist are undistinguishable here. The whole circle of the phenomenal is the same to both. It is not the *εἶναι* but the *διδόναι* which divides them. It is indeed one of the marvels of the case, that Idealists have so often been distinguished in the

<sup>1</sup> Philosoph. Journal, v. 322, 323, n.

<sup>2</sup> Brief an Reinhold, 5. See Krug, Idealismus.

largeness and pureness of their practical thinking and of their active lives. One grand object of philosophy is to vindicate the sensations or instincts to the reason, or to correct both by the reason, or reason by both, or to show that they lie out of the range of reason and must be accepted without hope of harmonizing them. It is the object of philosophy to ascend as high as it is given to man to ascend, to adjust our beliefs and our cognitions, and to escape the error of simply believing what we ought to know, or of assuming to know what we can only believe. When divine revelation is accepted, we must believe in order to understand. Is this the canon of philosophy too? Under which flag, *Credo ut*, or *Intelligo ut*? A great school, the school of Belief, replies, *Credo ut*: another school would totally deny the *Credo ut*. 'However harmless,' says Kant, 'psychological Idealism may appear as regards the essential aims of metaphysics (though in fact it is not harmless), yet it would remain a perpetual scandal to philosophy and the common reason of our race to be compelled to assume, simply on *belief*, the existence of things external to us,—the very things from which we derive the entire materials for the cognitions of our internal sense,—and when any one doubts their existence to be at a loss for a sufficient proof of it.'\* 'Brave words; but Kant never reached the point at which he could pretend to say, on speculative grounds, *Intelligo*. His heart went over from the philosophers to the vulgar, and tried to staunch the wounds of the 'Pure' with the bandages of the 'Practical;' but the bandages of the 'Practical' could only be found in the repository of the 'Pure,' and from thence Kant had removed them. His 'reason' affirmed Idealism. His instinct clung to Realism. Kant perpetually unravelled in one what he wove in the other. The shroud of Penelope was never completed. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and hundreds of others, have worked upon it, but it is unfinished. If the work is ever stayed, it will not be by its completion, but by the coming of some Ulysses of metaphysics who shall bring it to an end by removing its motive. Meanwhile it cannot be denied that the Idealists have been marked by bold, persistent labour, and by great fidelity to speculative processes. They have refused all compromise with 'com-

\* *Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, Vorrede.* Ed. Kirchmann. *Dritt. Aufl., Berlin, 1872, p. 41.*



mon sense,' have pushed away persistently the friendly but coarse hand of empiricism. There is an air of the heroic characteristic of the school, in its unceasing warfare with all, however strong or popular, which does dishonour to man as a being of speculative thought. They cannot be driven or bribed into compromising the dignity of science, the majesty of mind.

But though Idealism has nobly represented in its best names the philosophical spirit, it has by no means a monopoly of such names or of this spirit. Other systems have worthy names, and some very bright ones are found arrayed against Idealism. Many of the most illustrious thinkers of England, Scotland, France, and Germany have resisted its premises, and yet more frequently its inferences. Some of its masters sit uneasy on their thrones, put there against their protest by their disciples. All recent Idealism is the exaggeration or isolation of principles of Kant; but if Idealism is Kantianism, Kant did not understand his own system. If his creed was idealistic, his faith was realistic. Recent Idealism is the disavowed, if not the illegitimate, child of the great thinker it claims as its father.

13. Idealism has nurtured many of the *noblest spirits* of the race, and claims the power of begetting exaltation of mind and character. Berkeley is a sublime embodiment of the true philosophical spirit; of the loftiness of its aims, the singleness of its purpose, the invincible persistence of its fidelity to conviction. Without disloyalty to the practical turn of the English mind, he has been true to purely intellectual interests. He at least has not degraded philosophy to the kitchen. His intellectual life is consistent with his own utterances: 'The first spark of philosophy was derived from heaven. . . . Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments that chain the soul down to earth, and assist her flight toward the Sovereign God.'<sup>1</sup> Idealism in its best forms is characteristically the system of noble, intellectual, and pure men. If it does not lift men to the heavens to which they aspire, it at least keeps them out of the slough and the mire.

Yet Idealism has also, in some cases, nurtured, even in noble spirits, an overweening Titanic arrogance. Not even the noble nature of Fichte could hide this tendency, or rather the frankness

<sup>1</sup> Siris, §§ 301, 302.

of a true manliness brought it into consistent relief. It stands forth like a spectral giant of the Brocken on every mountain peak of his speculation. One passage will be sufficient to illustrate it: 'And now with this view—that there is no objective being correspondent with our conceptions—be free, O Mortal!—be redeemed forever from the fear which has been thy humiliation and torment! Thou shalt tremble no more before a necessity which exists but in thy thoughts. Thou shalt no longer fear that thou shalt be crushed by things which are but the products of thine own mind. Thou shalt no longer class thyself, the thinker, with the thoughts which go forth from thee. As long as thou wert able to believe that such a system of things, as thou didst describe to thyself, actually existed, external to thee, independent on thee, and that thou mightest be a mere link in the chain of this system, so long thy fears were well grounded. Now thou art redeemed, and I resign thee to thyself!'<sup>1</sup>

14. Idealism has been and is, in some shape, received by immense portions of the race,—predominatingly in the philosophical races of Asia, and to no little extent in Europe. 'In Asia,' says Schopenhauer, 'Idealism is, both in Brahminism and Buddhism, a doctrine of the religion of the people even. In Hindostan, in the doctrine of the Maja, it is universal; and in Thibet, the main seat of the Buddhist church, it is taught in the most popular form.'<sup>2</sup>

It is equally true that the Western mind is not inclined to accept Idealism. The Oriental mind receives it through the channel of Pantheism. To that mind it is theology rather than philosophy. 'Idealism in Europe,' says Schopenhauer, 'is bare paradox,—it is known as a paradox scarcely to be seriously thought of, confined to a few certain abnormal philosophers.'

15. Idealism is a system of great versatility, and has the power of associating its fundamental position with structures of the most diverse kind.

But it is also true that if it can be built in with the strong and noble, it can also be built in with the weak and unworthy. If it

<sup>1</sup> Bestimmung des Menschen, 159-162.

<sup>2</sup> Ueber . . . Grunde, 3d Aufl., 32. Parerga, 2d Aufl., ii. 40. Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 3d Aufl., 133. Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Idealismus.

has won to itself the self-sacrificing Christian heart of Berkeley, and has drawn into it his profound theistic convictions, it has also woven in with itself the dreamy Pantheism of the Orient, and the more vigorous Pantheism of the West. It has adjusted itself to Fichte's Moral Order of the World as an ideal God; to Schelling's God, of his first era, as 'the absolute indifference of Antitheses;' of his second era, as the God 'who attains to perfected being by theogonic process;' and of his third era, with the various modifications of his mystic theosophic tendency. It has been bound up with Hegel's Religion, as 'Man's consciousness of God, and of God's consciousness of himself in man;' and with Schopenhauer's unpaling Atheism, Pessimism, and Animalism. Beginning in the spirit with Berkeley, it has ended in the flesh with Materialism, and has taken in all between. It surely has established no claim to be a religious or ethical regulator.

In its native soil it is the philosophy of Brahminism and Buddhism, which are systems of Atheism and Pessimism. The Maja, which is the popular form of the Idealism of the Hindoos, is 'the veil of illusion, which shrouds the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world of which it cannot be said that it is, nor even that it is not; for it is like a dream, or like the sunlight on the sands, which the distant traveller mistakes for water, or like the thong which he takes for a serpent in his way. Suicide is the masterpiece of Maja.'<sup>1</sup>

16. As Idealism is one of the earliest, so does it claim to be the latest, and therefore the ripest, result of speculative thought.

As a philosophical system, not as an adjunct to a pantheistic theology or mythology, or to the atheistic systems of the East, Idealism is not earliest in its rise, and its ripeness is of no value unless the fruit be good. But Idealism is not the last result of philosophical ripening. Already the marks of transition are manifest. The philosophy of the future is one which will be neither *absolute* Idealism nor *absolute* Realism, but will accept the facts of both, and fuse them in a system which, like man himself, shall blend two realities as distinct yet inseparable. The *duality* of natures harmonized, yet not vanishing, in the *monism*

<sup>1</sup> Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Maja.

of person, a universe of *accordant* not of *discordant* matter and mind, held together and ever developing under the plan and control of the one Supreme, who is neither *absolutely* immanent nor *absolutely* supramundane, but *relatively* both,—*immanent* in the sense in which Deism denies his presence, *supramundane* in the sense in which Pantheism ignores his relation,—not the mere Maker of the universe, as Deism asserts, nor its matter, as Pantheism represents him, but its Preserver, Benefactor, Ruler, and Father, who, whether in matter or mind, reveals the perfect reason, the perfect love, the perfect will, the consummate power, in absolute and eternal personality.

17. The facts we have presented upon the one side justify the language in which a distinguished thinker of Germany does homage to the strength of Idealism in the very preparation to expose its weakness:†

‘Idealism is in substance and tendency closely allied with Spiritualism; but it is profounder, more imposing, more towering. Among all philosophical systems, the boldest and loftiest is Idealism; the idea of the self-dependence of the mind is in it carried to its supremest height; the omnipotence of the Ego is its fundamental dogma; the Ego, the thinking mind, is the centre of the universe, it is the solitary fixed point in the being of things, the primal spring of all existence; the Ego is God. It is in the fullest and highest sense of the word the system of freedom and self-dependence. Everything in it is freedom, free activity, the spontaneity of the Ego,—knowing no limits but those of its own imposition; for outside of the Ego is nothing which can set bounds to it,—the whole external world, the non-Ego, is but empty seeming or product of the self-active Ego itself. In this lies the gigantic power with which Idealism so often lays its grasp on the mind of men of great force and independence of character. This explains the enchantment with which it often lures especially the young man, who feels most vividly the self-dependence of his spirit. Idealism is the system of fiery, active, free youth; Realism the system of sober, cold, calm old age.

† Heinrich Th. Schmid (1799–1836), Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg: *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Philosophie*, Stuttg., 1836.

‘Hence also it is that the moral element in man finds its most potent stimulus in Idealism; for Idealism, by pre-eminence, reposes on the self-dependence and freedom of the mind.

‘As in Pantheism it is the religious view of the world which predominates, in Idealism it is the ethical view. A potent, exalted, and strict style of moral thinking arises from the idealistic principle. This principle involves Egoism indeed, but it is an Egoism of the noblest, purest kind, standing in harmony with the most genuine morality. For it throws into the first line, not the empirical, sense-bound Ego, but the pure rational Ego. Thus at least it appears in its highest shape, in one whose strong, lofty, masculine soul lived wholly in Idealism. We mean Fichte, as he presents it in its rugged completeness in his “*Doctrine of Science*.”’

The same illustrious writer, whose eloquent tribute to the strength of Idealism will heighten the value of his exposure of its weakness, has said,† ‘Let us look now at the shadow-side of Idealism,—for in truth it lacks not in very dark and mournful shadows. It has been remarked, in speaking of Pantheism, how intolerable to the common understanding of man is the view that the world of the senses is but deception and seeming. This contradiction to the ordinary view of the world is greatly strengthened in Idealism, as according to it not merely the finite world of the senses, but the entire Universe, Nature, Man, and God, the Natural and the Supernatural, the Corporeal and the Spiritual,—in brief, all that is actual, external to the Ego,—is annihilated. Nothing but the Ego with its activity has true substantiality; the entire external world is but show and illusion, is no more than an empty, insubstantial play of images which the Ego calls into being and then allows to vanish, is no more, as Fichte expresses it, than “the mirage of our divine Ego.” Thus the Ego finds itself alone in the boundless waste of emptiness and nothingness which circles it all round. Can any man, endowed with emotion, feel satisfied with such a view? Must it not make any man shiver, vividly to actualize to himself the desolate loneliness involved in this idealistic view of the world?’

18. Jean Paul has painted, with his characteristic matchless

† Schmid, *Vorlesungen*, 268.

eccentricity and vigour, the desolate condition to which an actualized Idealism brings the mind: 'The worst of all is the pinched, aimless, perked-up, insular life that a god must live. He has no society. If I am not (as the idealistic Ego) to sit still all the time and to all eternity, if I am to let myself down as well as I can, and make myself *finite*, just to have *something* about me, I shall be like the poor little princes; I shall have nothing about me but my own servile *creatures* to echo my words.' 'Any being whatever—the Supreme Being himself, if you choose—wishes something to love, something to honour. But Fichte's doctrine of every man his own body-maker leaves me nothing at all, not even the beggar's dog or the prisoner's spider. For, granted that those two animals existed, the dog, the spider, and I would only have the *nine* pictures which we would paint of ourselves and of each other, but we would not have each other.' 'Something better than myself—that better something to which the flame of love leaps up—is not, if Idealism be true, to be had. The mantle of love, which for ages has been narrowed to the canonical four fingers' breadth of the bishop's pallium, now goes up in a blaze, and the only thing a man has left to love is his own love. Verily I wish there were such things as men, and I wish I were one of them.' 'If it has fallen to my lot, unhappy dog that I am, that nobody really exists but myself, nobody is as badly off as I am.' 'No sort of enthusiasm is left me but logical enthusiasm. All my metaphysics, chemistry, technology, nosology, botany, entomology, runs down into the old principle, Know *thyself*. I am not merely, as Bellarmine says, my own Saviour, but I am also my own devil, my own messenger of death, and master of the knout in ordinary to my own majesty. Around me stretches humanity, turned to stone. In the dark, desolate stillness glows no love, no admiration, no prayer, no hope, no aim. I am so utterly alone! no pulsation, no life, anywhere. Nothing about me, and, without me, nothing but nothing. Thus come I out of eternity, thus go I into eternity. And who hears my complaints and knows me now? Ego. Who shall hear me and who shall know me to all eternity? Ego.'

19. The picture drawn by Jean Paul is gloomy enough, yet it has a solitary point of light and relief. The Ego itself is left: one

only, it is true, but each man will consider that his own. And it is the fact that Idealism is supposed to leave this great something secure that has given it a fascination to men, who feared that other systems would leave them nothing, not even themselves. A self-conscious, a possibly immortal, something,—this, at least, is gain.

When everything else sinks in the ocean of idealistic nothingness, does not the personal Ego stand unshaken, a rock towering in solitary grandeur above the sweep of all the billows of speculative doubt? On that long line of coast, chafed by waves which ever pile it with fresh wrecks, will not that rock of personal consciousness furnish a base for one light-house of the mind? Alas! no; for the logic of Idealism robs us of consciousness of self. If, as Berkeley and all Idealists assert, ideas without correlate realities are the only *objects* of knowledge, the personal mind itself is either mere *idea* or it is *unknown*.

Idealism can only affirm '*There is consciousness,*' but it does not *know what* is conscious. If the Ego be assumed to be the *object* of knowledge, it is in that very fact transmuted into idea; it is the mirage of a mirage. Two things which God hath joined together cannot be put asunder without loss to both. The murder of matter is the suicide of mind.

20. Tested, then, by its own logic, where does Idealism end? We shall not answer the question for it, but accept the answer of its pure and great representative, Fichte. 'There is,' says he,<sup>1</sup> 'nothing permanent, either within me or external to me. All is ceaseless change. I know of no being, not even of my own. There is no being. I know nothing and am nothing. There are *images*: they are the only things which exist, and they know of themselves after the manner of images,—images which hover by, without there being anything *which* they hover by,—which hang together by images of images,—images which have nothing to image, unmeaning and aimless. I myself am one of these images. Nay, I am not so much as that; I am only a confused image of images. All reality is changed to a marvellous dream, without a life which is dreamed of, without a mind which dreams; a dream which hangs together in a

<sup>1</sup> Bestimmung des Menschen, 142.

dream of itself. *Intuition* is the dream; *thought*—the source of all the being and of all the reality which I frame to myself, source of my being, source of my power, source of my aims—is the dream of that dream.' -

### XV. Characteristics of the Present Edition.

It is designed that the present edition of the great philosophical Classic of Berkeley shall be in every respect the standard one.

1. It contains the text of the Principles given in Berkeley's works, collected and edited by Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. This edition was printed in 1871, at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 4 vols. 8vo, the fourth containing a life of Berkeley.

The text of the English edition is thoroughly critical, printed with great accuracy, giving the various readings of all the editions of the Principles. The present text is a careful reproduction of that of Fraser, except that a few typographical errata have been corrected, after collation with the other editions. It is claimed for the present text of Berkeley that it is more accurate than any other.

2. It contains the entire illustrations by which Professor Fraser has enriched his edition of the Principles,—his Preface and Notes, which are entirely worthy of his reputation as a thorough scholar, an acute thinker, and a brilliant writer. His notes are historical, critical, and exegetical; they imply admiration of Berkeley, and a sympathy, though not a blind or indiscriminate one, in his general thinking. They largely concur in Berkeleyanism, partly qualify it, and in certain directions aim at developing it.

3. To the Principles have been added three Appendixes of great value. The first is 'Berkeley's Rough Draft of the Introduction to the Principles.' It possesses 'a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical interest,' illustrating the rise and growth of one of the most extraordinary productions of human speculation. The second appendix gives an account of Arthur Collier; who nearly cotemporaneously with Berkeley, and in entire independence on him, reached the same general results as to the non-existence of an external world. To this account is added the Introduction to Collier's *Clavis Universalis*. The third appendix



is 'The Theory of Vision Vindicated' by a number of the most important instances of the 'experience of persons born blind.' Cheselden's paper is reprinted entire, and Mr. Nunnely's account of a case, 'one of the last and most philosophically described,' is given unabridged. These cases have a special bearing on Berkeley's theory, but they are of great importance in their relation to all the theories of sense-perception, and have an interest to thoughtful readers of all classes.

4. In this edition will be found the entire notes and illustrations of Dr. Frederick Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. In the 'Philosophische Bibliothek,' edited by J. H. von Kirchmann, which is confined to the master-works of philosophy in ancient and modern times, the first work from an English hand is Berkeley's Principles. The preparation of it was intrusted to Ueberweg, one of the greatest scholars of our age. He is known to English readers by the translation of his Logic and of his History of Philosophy. His estimates and critiques on Berkeley are admirable. Thoroughly appreciative of the greatness of Berkeley and the value of his views, the adverse judgments of Ueberweg are the more important. It may be fairly claimed for his notes that they present some of the best estimates and critiques ever made in connection with Berkeley's system, and that they have done something toward that confutation of Berkeley's Idealism which some of his admirers have pronounced impossible. Ueberweg says that his notes are essential to the completion of his work on Logic. The many English readers who possess and value Ueberweg's Logic will on that account, were there no other, be glad to have his notes on Berkeley.

To the notes of Fraser and of Ueberweg the editor has added much that is important and interesting from the best sources, with a large amount of original matter. These notes of Ueberweg and of the editor are numbered, and at the points at which they illustrate the text there will be found in it the numbers of the notes, in heavy brackets [ ]. The subjects of the notes are given in their titles. In the various annotations will be found the most important parallels and illustrations of the Principles furnished by Berkeley himself in his other works.

5. The editor has prepared extended PROLEGOMENA, embracing—A Sketch of Berkeley's Life and Writings; an Account of his Precursors; Summaries of his System; Berkeleyanism: its Friends, Affinities, and Influence; Opponents and Objections; Estimates of Berkeley: his Character, Writings, and Influence; Idealism Defined; History, Outlines, and Criticisms of the Idealistic Systems, from Berkeley to the Present; Hume; Kant; Fichte; Schelling; Hegel; Schopenhauer; The Strength and Weakness of Idealism.

6. This edition contains a very full Analytical Index to every part of the work.

7. As the attention of all readers of philosophical works is now drawn to the great German thinkers, and as the metaphysical terminology of that language has peculiar niceties and peculiar difficulties, the editor has believed that he would render a special service by making this book, in some degree, a clue to these difficulties and a guide to these niceties. This he has done, first, by inserting before Ueberweg's notes the terms of this class which he uses in rendering Berkeley; second, by adding Ueberweg's German terms of this class to the translation of his notes; and third, by giving the leading German terms in the Index.

#### XVI. Its Objects and Uses.

1. This edition is meant to meet the intense and peculiar interest felt at this time in Berkeley's views. It at once proves and intensifies this interest that, in such close proximity in time, we should have from the successor of Hamilton an edition of the complete works of Berkeley, and from one who held the chair of Kant an annotated translation of Berkeley's Principles.

2. The *mere text* of the Principles, as it is here presented, can only be had elsewhere in connections which oblige the buyer to make a large outlay, and compel the purchase of much in which he may feel no interest. But to those who are able to purchase, but have not purchased, Fraser's Berkeley, this edition of the Principles may prove at least an advertisement, perhaps a stimulant, to the securing of those noble works, no fragment of which is destitute of value. If this book attains its end, it will lead to a larger study of all that Berkeley has written, a larger sale of

his works. But even to those who possess Berkeley's works, this edition of the Principles may serve as an introduction and companion to the philosophical portion of them.

The very able notes of Fraser, vindicating the views of Berkeley, and the notes of Ueberweg, which, with distinguished moderation, qualify and criticise them on purely scientific grounds, will help to make this book the most able and attractive exponent we have in English of the two great systems, Idealism and Realism.

Berkeley's Principles thus annotated has just claims to be taken as a text-book, either direct or collateral, in all the higher institutions of education in our country. It is hoped that this edition will be regarded as one with which no intelligent reader, student, or professor of the intellectual sciences can afford to dispense.

3. The Principles of Berkeley is the best book from an English hand for commencing thorough philosophical reading and investigation. At the outstart, as the very preliminary to all thinking, is the question, '*What* can I know?' and this is but another shape of the question, '*How* can I know?' This is Berkeley's question,—and it is the same question with which Kant opened the great revolution in modern philosophy; it is the question of the Critique of Pure Reason, urged with such a general analogy to Berkeley's Principles that the Critique was at first neglected, as virtually no more than a reproduction of Berkeleyanism. No student can make a solitary real step in genuine philosophical thinking until he understands Idealism, and there is no other such guide at the beginning of this as Berkeley's Principles.<sup>1</sup>

4. The universal judgment is that the Principles is not a classic in philosophy merely, but in literature also. For, in common with the other works of Berkeley, it possesses that rare union of qualities which commands at once the admiration of the scholar and of the general reader. The thought is so clear that no amount of depth prevents seeing to the bottom. Like Plato, Berkeley conjoined the highest poetry with powers of the abstrusest meditation. Rich in his imagery, at times, as Jeremy Taylor, he is yet as luminous as Addison. His style is one which Sir James Mackintosh 'envied for all writers on such subjects.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Prolegomena, I. 2, 15.

<sup>2</sup> See Prolegomena, VI.

5. This book has been arranged so as to make it in some sense an *Introduction* to Philosophy. Whenever it stops, it tries to give the clue to the student which shall enable him to go farther. It is meant to show the student the *processes* of investigation and arrangement, to help him to help himself; it opens up to him a large body of philosophical works of a high order, and individualizes them to him by quotation.


6. This book is meant in part as an aid in making instruction in mental science at once more deep and attractive. The experience of the editor, as Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, has borne a part in leading him to prepare this edition. He has for several years delivered lectures to the Senior Class of the University, on the Modern Systems of Philosophy, from Bacon to Hegel and Cousin, stating the views of the writers in their own words, criticising them, and inviting criticisms upon them. He has found that, in this mode of treatment, aversion or indifference to philosophical studies has invariably given way, and, in a majority of cases, has been converted into enthusiasm. One of the most cheering tokens of this has been the desire on the part of many in the classes for guidance in a larger course of independent reading. There is certainly no difficulty in indicating to students much that is worthy of perusal; yet there is hardly a book in the English language which is precisely what is most desirable for such a class of readers. The great philosophical works of the present cannot be appreciated by the student without a knowledge of the past. There is no thorough study of philosophy without historical aids, and the greatest historical aids are not books about the past, but the master-works of the past themselves, and these need annotations to relieve their obscurities and to link them with the present. It is very important that there should be a series of 'Philosophical Classics' which shall furnish at once what is needed for the library and the classroom, which shall be companions to the lecture and aids in private study, books which the professor shall study *with* the learner, and not alone for him, and which shall prove at once an incentive and guide to ampler reading.

It is hoped that this edition will meet these wants so far as Berkeley is concerned, and that it will be received with a favour

which may encourage the publishers to add to the 'Philosophical Classics' other works adapted to aid in extending and satisfying an interest in this grand department of knowledge, in giving broader views of the nature, the capabilities, and the charms of the intellectual sciences, and in promoting that deep and healthy reflectiveness which is the greatest need of our whole land and of our whole time.

In the preparation of this work, a very large portion of which has been made during the summer holidays (and what holiday is like a summer with Berkeley?), the editor has been encouraged by the sympathetic judgment of friends. The kind reception given by the 'Princeton Club' to a paper entitled 'Ueberweg on Berkeley,' which was read before them at their request, and the judgment they expressed that an edition of the Principles with Annotations would be valuable, was the immediate occasion of the offer of the work to a publishing house. In the preparation of it the editor was compelled, in matters of references, to depend mainly upon his own library. Next to his own he has used our venerable City Library; and to the kindness of Lloyd P. Smith, Esq., and Mr. George M. Abbott, its Librarians, he is indebted for the unrestricted use of its treasures, which, in spite of the lack of proper public appreciation and liberality, furnish the most important aid to which the scholars of Philadelphia have access.

This work is, the editor believes, the first of its kind from an American hand. Though we have had, and now have, scholars who would have enriched the thinking world by labours of this sort, none of them, he believes, have attempted an extended illustration of a philosophical classic. Nor is the editor aware that there is in our language, nor even in the German, incomparably rich as it is in literature of this class, any body of Annotations, of the same relative extent as this, on a modern philosophical classic. But publishers are rarer than authors. The editor feels that the distinguished publishing house which so promptly accepted this work is richly entitled to the gratitude of the public, if gratitude shall be the feeling with which the work is received.



THE ENGLISH EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF  
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.





# EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

## TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

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BERKELEY'S *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* is the most systematically reasoned exposition of his peculiar philosophy which his works contain.

Like the *New Theory of Vision*, its pioneer, it was composed at Trinity College, Dublin. The first edition, 'printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat,' appeared in Dublin in 1710. The next, which contains some additions and other changes, was published in London in 1734, 'printed by Jacob Tonson,' the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* being conjoined with it in the same volume. This edition was the last in the author's lifetime. The variations in these are carefully marked in the present edition.

An edition of the *Principles* appeared in London in 1776, more than twenty years after Berkeley's death, 'with *Remarks* on each section, in which his doctrines are carefully examined, and shewn to be repugnant to facts, his principles incompatible with the constitution of human nature, and the reason and fitness of things.' To this edition, likewise, the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* are appended, followed by 'A Philosophical Discourse on the Nature of Human Being, containing a defence of Mr. Locke's Principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's *Essay on Truth*,' by the author of the *Remarks*.

To the edition of 1776 the following 'Advertisement' is prefixed:—  
'Bishop Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and his *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* on the same subject, being out of print, and both being much inquired for, the Editor thought a new edition of them, with an Answer thereto, might not be unacceptable to the

public. The tenets maintained in the *Dialogues* are precisely the same with those in the *Principles*, and the arguments are the same, though put into a different form; but it was thought quite unnecessary to make any Reply to them, as the *Remarks* on the former are equally applicable to the latter.

'How far the author of the *Remarks* is right in believing they contain a full refutation of the doctrines of the Bishop must be left to the judgment of the candid reader; he has, however, the satisfaction of knowing the rectitude of his intentions, and the pleasing hopes he entertains that his endeavours may be attended with some success in the cause of truths of the greatest importance.'

The *Remarks* are printed on the right-hand page of the 1776 edition, in sections corresponding in number and length to those of the *Principles*. Their acuteness and conclusiveness, however, is by no means proportioned to their bulk: many of the glaring and ludicrous misrepresentations of which Berkeley's philosophy has been the subject are here gathered and served up.

Although this Treatise is the fullest explanation of Substance and Power, the two central conceptions of Berkeley's philosophy, that he has given, it bears the marks of an unfinished work. It is expressly designated 'Part I,' and in the Preface to the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* the author promises a Second Part, which never appeared. Passages in the work itself, as well as allusions in Berkeley's Common-place Book, suggest that only a portion of what is required to complete his conception is here executed. In referring Dr. Samuel Johnson, of New York, many years after their publication, to this and his two other early metaphysical essays, Berkeley thus describes their character:—'I had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes. What I have done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times reading these small tracts, and making what is read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative truths.'

The contents and language of the *Principles of Human Knowledge* prove that Berkeley had been a careful student of Locke's *Essay*, published twenty years previously, and dedicated, like the *Principles*, to the Earl of Pembroke. This was to be expected, for the *Essay*, partly through the influence of William Molyneux, the friend and correspond-

ent of Locke, had become an authority in Trinity College in Berkeley's undergraduate days. The *Principles* are proposed as a refutation of leading doctrines in the *Essay*. The term 'idea' is as characteristic of the former as of the latter; in both it stands for the *immediate object of consciousness*—alike in external and internal intuition—in memory, imagination, and generalization. With both, the only objective universe of which we are directly aware consists of the 'ideas' that we are conscious of, and by both this is assumed as a self-evident truth. Both appeal exclusively to this experience as their final test. Locke's classification of ideas as simple and complex, with some of his divisions and sub-divisions in each class, re-appear, sometimes in altered phraseology, in the *Principles*. Berkeley's whole theory of Substance and Cause, Matter and Mind, Space and Time, is a bold and subtle modification of Locke's theory of 'ideas.' A distinguishing feature in Berkeley is, that he recognises signs of independent reality in one order of Locke's 'ideas'—those given in the senses, and is thus able to dispense with the reasonings in the Fourth Book of the *Essay* on behalf of a real material world. Then, the meaning of the word 'Substance,' which perplexes Locke, is resolved by Berkeley into the concrete and familiar meaning of the word 'I' (*ego*)—the permanent synthesis of ideas perceivable in sense being, according to him, *substances* only in a secondary meaning of that term. 'Cause' or 'Power' he finds exclusively in voluntary activity. Finite 'Space' is with him experience in unresisted organic movement, which is capable of being symbolised in the visual consciousness of coexisting colours. Finite 'Time' is the apprehension of changes in our ideas, length of time being measured by the number of changes. 'Infinite Space' and 'Infinite Time,' because inapprehensible by intelligence, are dismissed from philosophy, as terms void of meaning, or which involve contradictions.

Next to Locke, the influence of Malebranche is apparent in the following Treatise; but Berkeley is not so much at home in the 'Divine vision' of the French metaphysician as among the 'ideas' of the English philosopher. The mysticism of the *Recherche de la Vérité* was repelled by the transparent clearness of Berkeley's thought. The slender hold that is retained by Malebranche of external substance, as well as the theory of merely occasional causation of matter, common to him and Des Cartes, naturally attracted Berkeley, however, to the Cartesian school, then dominant in France, and reproduced in its mystical form in England by Mr. Norris.

The Platonism which pervades Malebranche perhaps tended to encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning that appear in

Berkeley's own later writings; but Locke, Malebranche, and Des Cartes are almost the only philosophers directly or indirectly recognised in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. In fact, this juvenile Treatise moves, as it seems on the surface, towards the opposite pole from Platonism and a Platonic idealism; for, Berkeley by 'ideas' means phenomena and sensible things, not supersensible realities and Divine Reason of Ontology.

The 'Introduction' to the *Principles* proclaims war with Universals, and more immediately war with Locke. Its remedy for the disorders of philosophy is the expulsion of *abstract ideas*—which, as understood by Berkeley, involve a contradiction; and the restriction of philosophy to the intelligible, concrete objects of which mind can be conscious. The metaphysician is here required to resolve the meaning of such terms as Matter, Substance, Space, and Time into ideas, relations of ideas, and mind which is the one necessary condition on which all ideas and their relations depend; and he is promised that, as the consequence of this, the real world, hitherto obscured by abstractions, will become intelligible. All ideas—in other words, all phenomena or objects of which we can be conscious—must, it is argued, be concrete and particular. It is relations among objects of which we can be conscious, and not pretended abstractions, that can be signified by universal terms. Abstract Matter, abstract Substance, abstract Space, abstract Time—that is Matter, Substance, Space, and Time which are supposed to be what cannot be resolved into particular ideas, and relations among such ideas—are thus in the sequel proved to be absolutely unintelligible. Berkeley's reformed doctrine of abstraction, and of the office of language, virtually banishes them all. With him, 'abstract ideas' are absurdities, resulting from an unlawful analysis, which attempts to penetrate beneath perception or conscious experience—that essence or ground of existence; and the lesson of the 'Introduction' is virtually, that objective existence must consist exclusively of what is particular and concrete. The only lawful kind of abstraction is, that through which we have what Berkeley calls *notions of relations* among ideas, as distinguished from ideas themselves. And, as *names* are required to constitute notions, this introductory polemic against abstract ideas, or pretended analyses of the original synthesis of knowledge and existence in perception, takes the form of what is called Nominalism\*.

\* The relation between the Phenomenalism (apt at first to be confounded with the assertion of Protagoras) and Nominalist Idealism of Berkeley's early metaphysical writings, on the one hand, and the Platonic Realism and Idealism of his *Siris*, on the other, is one

The first two of the 156 sections which compose the *Principles of Human Knowledge* contain a classification of the objects of which we are conscious, and a recognition of Mind as the one condition common to them all.

When we reflect upon our knowledge, we find (sect. 1) that its *ideas* or *immediate objects* are—(a) the phenomena presented to us in or through our different organs of external sense; (b) those of which we are conscious in our internal thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions; and (c) representations (or misrepresentations) of both of these in memory and imagination. Of these three sorts of ideas, the sensible ones are found in experience to be associated together independently of the will of the percipient, in objective groups, forming what are commonly called 'sensible things,' or (in the popular meaning of substance) material substances\*. And all, whether called phenomena, or objects, or ideas; whether presented in external senses, or feelings and operations confined to the individual who is conscious of them, or merely imaginary objects—inasmuch as they are all objects of consciousness—imply (sect. 2) a *subject, mind, self, or ego*, that perceives them, remembers them, and judges of their relations. On mind they must all depend, so far at least as they are actual objects of consciousness, that is to say, so far as they are *ideas*.

What is immediately given to us in experience thus consists of Mind or Spirit, in the state of being conscious of ideas or objects that belong to one or other of the three classes already mentioned. *Spirits* and *ideas* constitute Berkeley's Dualism. (The exact definition of this duality has been one of the difficulties in his philosophy.)

The lawful aims of human intelligence accordingly seem to be:—

1. The observation of particular ideas, i. e. objects or phenomena.
2. The scientific determination of the relations of particular ideas to one another.

of the most important, and yet hitherto least considered, aspects of his philosophy. In *Siris* (e. g. sect. 335, &c.) he distinguishes the Platonic Ideas (a) from the 'inert, inactive objects' or phenomena of which we are conscious, in our presentative and representative experience (i. e. his own 'ideas'); and also (b) from 'abstract ideas, in the modern sense.' Plato's Ideas are characterised by Berkeley as 'the most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, cannot be subjects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge.'

\* According to Berkeley, we are immediately percipient in sense only of *simple ideas*; our so-called perception of sensible *things* (i. e. *combinations* of simple ideas) is in a great degree mediate—involving a representative, along with a purely presentative, perception. When we *see* what we recognise to be an apple, but without touching, tasting, or smelling it, we have already learned by custom to combine its qualities; and we have learned also to represent in idea its other than visible qualities, on occasion of the purely visual state of being conscious of the colour, which alone is visible.

3. The philosophical recognition of their common relation of dependence on Mind; and the study of Mind, as manifested in various orders of intelligent beings.

But, according to the old 'Principles' of metaphysicians, this is not philosophy at all. Philosophy has to do with what is real, absolute, or substantial—with Matter or Substance, and other attractions, which are assumed to be independent of, i. e. external to, the perceptions of every mind.

The design of the sections which follow the two first is, to state and defend new universal or philosophical Principles, for the regulation of the understanding in its attempts to conceive and reason about the universe. They are proposed instead of the old ones which assumed that *real things* must be abstract entities, independent of Mind. The sections in which they are explained, defended, and applied, may be arranged in three Divisions, thus:—

I. (Sect. 3—33.) Here the new Principles of philosophical knowledge are stated, illustrated, supported by facts and abstract reasoning, and contrasted with the old Principles to which Berkeley attributes the confusion and scepticism involved in all previous attempts. They are virtually three in number—one negative and two affirmative, viz.—

1. The negation of Matter, in the philosophical meaning, or rather no-meaning, of the word; i. e. as signifying an unperceiving and unperceived substance and cause.

2. The affirmation, as Substance proper, of what is signified by the terms mind, spirit, soul, or self—in short, by 'I' (*ego*); and, as Cause proper, of what we are conscious in voluntary effort—a reasonable will.

3. The affirmation of *matter*, in the only intelligible meaning of that term, viz. as consisting of the ideas, objects, or perceptions of sense—which appear, disappear, and re-appear, independently of the will of the mind that is conscious of them, in uniform order of co-existence and succession, so that their changes may be foreseen, and which are the medium of intercourse between one mind and another; of *material substances*, or groups of co-existing sense-perceptions, united in conscious experience independently of our will, and commonly called 'sensible things;' and of *material causes*, or uniform antecedents in the permanent and rational order of sensible changes.

In short, the universe in which we find ourselves is a universe that consists, in the last analysis, of *mind conscious of ideas or phenomena*. The ideas of *sense* appear in an order which, because independent of

our individual will, may be called *external* to each of us; and which, being uniform, is capable of being interpreted; while it affords, through its meaning or reasonableness, exercise and development to reason, and, as a whole, perpetually illustrates the universal supremacy of Divine Mind. Abstract or unperceived Matter, and abstract or unconscious Mind, are banished from philosophy and from the universe; particular ideas or objects, perceived or imagined, and dependent for their existence on conscious minds, capable of interpreting their relations, are alone recognised as real, by the new Principles. What we have, or can have, to do with in the universe, must, accordingly, consist of the conscious experience of conscious agents, in the indefinite varieties of that experience which each may manifest. Unexperienced abstractions are negation or absurdity, to be exploded under the name of 'abstract ideas.' They can neither be believed in nor conceived.

II. (Sect. 34—84.) A series of supposed Objections to the foregoing Principles of the philosophical knowledge of the world and man are stated and refuted in succession in these sections.

III. (Sect. 85—156.) The logical Consequences of the new Principles, in their application to our knowledge of (a) the *ideas* or objective things, and (b) the *minds* or subjective things that constitute the universe, are here unfolded. A restoration of belief, and a simplification and purification of the sciences, by the exclusion of unmeaning abstract questions, are represented as among their chief advantages.

Let us now look at the grounds, in faith, reasoning, and experience, on which Berkeley rests these new Principles, in the thirty-one sections which form the First Division of his work. The discussion may be said to take its rise from a question which is virtually proposed in section 3. The objects of conscious experience—in a word our ideas—were alleged, in section 1, to be (a) sense-given or external phenomena, (b) internal phenomena, (c) phenomena which may be representative or misrepresentative of both these. The question proposed, by implication, in section 3 is this:—

Are any of these phenomena *not ideas merely*, but also things that exist *absolutely*—that is to say, independently of their ideal character, and in complete abstraction from a conscious mind; or, if the very phenomena of which we are immediately percipient be not themselves thus independent of being perceived, do all, or any of them, represent something that does exist absolutely? In short, are we, can we be,

either directly or indirectly, cognisant of aught existing unintelligibly or without a Mind?

Now, the objects or phenomena of which we are conscious in the senses, i. e. our *sense*-ideas or perceptions, are, it is assumed, the only ones about which this question can be raised. Hence the problem of this Division of the Treatise is—to find whether the phenomena presented in the five senses, are either *themselves* in substance external, or *represent* things that are in substance external—meaning by ‘external,’ without (i. e. unperceived and unconceived by) a mind, foreign to all conscious experience.

That the ideas or phenomena actually presented to us in the five senses cannot *themselves* be qualities of what is external, in this meaning of the term ‘external,’ is affirmed (sect. 3) to be ‘intuitively evident.’ An object is called an *idea* because it is present in a conscious experience. Now, we have no sensible proof that it continues to exist when it is not thus present; and every sensible thing includes qualities which, by the consent of all who think, are dependent on a sentient organization.

But, although our very sense-given ideas themselves cannot exist substantially, when divested of their ideal or immediately objective character, and put out of all relation to a conscious mind, may they not, it is asked (sect. 8), *represent* what exists in an unthinking substance? This supposition, it is answered, is a mere unproved supposition, and it even involves a contradiction. Those supposed solid, extended, and coloured *originals* or *archetypes* of our sense-ideas are themselves perceived, or they are not. If they are perceived, they are *ipso facto* ideas; for, an idea is simply that which, whatever else it may be, is the immediate object of a conscious mind. On the other hand, if they are not themselves, and cannot be, contained in a conscious experience, they cannot resemble what is so contained. ‘An idea can be like nothing but an idea.’ A quantity of conscious experience can be like nothing but another quantity of conscious experience. This conclusion cannot be evaded, it is argued (sect. 9), by Locke’s favourite discrimination of the qualities of this unperceiving and unperceived Matter into primary and secondary: so that if solid, extended, coloured substances exist, *per se*, or absolutely, it is impossible that we should come to know this; and, if they do not thus exist, we should have exactly the same reason for believing in their absolute existence that we now have (sect. 20).

The very supposition, however, of the existence of anything out of conscious experience involves, Berkeley further argues, a contradiction in terms (sect. 23). We may, indeed, imagine trees in a park, or



books in our study, with no one at hand to perceive them, and maintain their existence in a *presentative* experience. But, are we not ourselves, in the very act of thus imagining them, keeping them in existence in our *representative* experience? Thus, when we do our utmost, by imagination, to conceive bodies existing externally or absolutely, we are, in the very act of doing so, making them ideas—not of sense, indeed, but of imagination. The supposition itself of their unideal existence makes them ideas; inasmuch as it makes them imaginary objects, dependent on an imagining mind.

On the whole, to say that sensible objects either themselves are, or themselves represent substances that exist independent of Mind, is to say what involves a contradiction in terms, or it is to use words which mean nothing. It is to speak unintelligibly, in short, according to the general conclusion of this part of the Treatise.

In thus banishing Absolute Material Substance, Berkeley does not allow that he has banished Substance—a substantiating or uniting principle, in which phenomena have their ground and meaning. He substitutes an intelligible, because intelligent, substantiating principle, of which we are conscious, for an unintelligible and contradictory one of which we neither are nor can be conscious. Here Berkeley's thought becomes obscure. I think it may be worked out in this way:—Absolute Material Substance is, he says, an empty abstraction of metaphysicians, and every real substance must be either perceived or percipient; for we cannot go below experience or consciousness. Now, every percept or phenomenon perceived implies a percipient, and every percipient implies a percept. Are substances, then (i. e. the ultimate ground of phenomena), percepts, or are they percipient minds? When we compare these, we find that the deepest and truest ground of things lies in the latter, and not in the former; in a mind, and not in percepts or phenomena which depend upon a mind. We are aware in memory of the mysterious identity of the former, and to this *personal identity* there is no counterpart in the perpetual changes of the perceived or objective world. The *substances* of the universe are thus properly the minds or persons that exist in it. There is, strictly speaking, 'no other Substance than *Spirit*, or that which perceives' (sect. 7).

It is next argued (sect. 25—27), that voluntary mental activity is the only Causation in the universe—that all Power, as well as all Substance, is essentially mental. To satisfy ourselves that changes among phenomena are only the passive effects of spiritual agency, it is maintained that we have only to observe them. As the essence of all phenomena has been proved to consist in perception of them, it follows

that they cannot contain anything of which the percipient is incognisant. Now, power or activity is not exhibited by any. Sensible (or other) phenomena, therefore, cannot be the cause of our being conscious. Nor can they cause the changes which occur among themselves: phenomena are related to each other as signs and significates, not as causes and effects.

But, while the universe of ideas or phenomena is void of causality, power (implied in the changes of the objects of consciousness) must exist. As it cannot be attributed to ideas, it must belong to that on which they depend. Now, Berkeley has already concluded that what they depend on must be conscious Mind, Self, or Ego. To conscious Mind, Self, or Ego, accordingly, he refers all the changes in existence. Minds not only substantiate phenomena; they cause changes.

But there is a plurality of powers at work among ideas. Each one of us finds, on trial, that his personal power over the phenomena of which he is conscious varies (sect. 28—33). We can make and unmake at pleasure the objects of *imagination*; the ideas of the *senses* are independent in a much greater degree of the mind to which they are present. When in broad daylight we open our eyes, it is not in our power to choose whether we shall see or not, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to our view. In our sense-experience we find ourselves confronted by the signs of a larger reason and a firmer will than are exhibited in the arbitrary constructions of our own imagination; we encounter the Supreme Power signified by the steady natural laws of sense-given phenomena. In and through our senses, we awaken to the discovery, that our individual conscious life is, in the sense-given part of it, a portion of the Universal System, which is evolved in a manner so orderly and constant that we can, by interpreting what we perceive, foresee the future, and regulate our lives. What we perceive places us habitually in relation to Supreme or Essential Intelligence expressed in the laws of nature; and to other minds, like our own, who share with us this experience of the senses, and who, through its means, can (we find) convey to us, and we to them, indications of our respective experiences. The ideas which are given to us in the Senses are thus distinguished from all our other ideas. Their arrangements of co-existence and succession are not merely the arbitrary results of our own imaginative activity; they are independent of, or external to, our will. They thus reveal to us the only contemporaneous External World of which we have any proof, or of which we can even conceive the possibility—a world in other minds. Ideas of this sort (if, indeed, one should call *them* 'ideas' at

all) may emphatically be distinguished from all other ideas, as *real* ones; and their established combinations are what men commonly call 'real things.'

These sections (28—33) are among the most important in the Treatise. They express Berkeley's reasons for distinguishing groups of real or sense ideas—which, irrelative to anything beyond, can neither be representative nor misrepresentative—from ideas in an individual imagination. All truth and all error belong to the latter, not to the former. Physical truth is the true interpretation of real or sense ideas. Physical error is the misinterpretation of *these* ideas. But sense-ideas themselves, which may be thus interpreted or misinterpreted, represent nothing—except, indeed, the Divine meaning of which their laws are signs, and of which human science is the imperfect interpretation. They can have no archetypes behind them, existing in an unconscious substance. Imagination is the only representative faculty. *A representative sense-perception is an absurdity\**. The ideas of sense are what they are, and we cannot go deeper. If they were themselves representations of other ideas, then these others would become the real ideas, and those so called would be relegated to imagination. And Absolute Matter is not their archetype, which, as it cannot be perceived in sense, can as little be suggested by custom and association, inferred by abstract reasoning, or believed in by the common faith or reason of men. The world of material things is thus substantially syntheses of phenomena in conscious minds, and Intelligence is the essence of the universe.

Such in spirit are Berkeley's new Principles, with the grounds in reason and experience to which he refers them. What I have called the Second Division of the Treatise (sect. 34—84) is devoted to the statement and refutation of supposed Objections to the Principles.

The objections and answers may be briefly presented as follows:—

*First objection.* (Sect. 34—40.) The preceding Principles banish from existence all that is real and substantial, and substitute a universe of mere ideas or chimeras.

*Answer.* This objection is a play upon the popular meaning of the word 'idea.' That word may be used to signify objects of sense—in respect of their necessary dependence upon mind; and not merely fancies and chimeras, the 'ideas' of popular language, creatures of individual minds, which may, and often do, misrepresent the real ideas of

\* Illustrations of this statement, and a comparison of Berkeley's presentative perception with that of the Scotch psychologists, will be given afterwards.

the natural system that is independent of our will, while dependent on Divine Mind and Will. An idea, in the language of this system, is simply that of which we are conscious.

*Second objection.* (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles abolish the distinction between Perception and Imagination—between imagining one's self burnt and actually being burnt.

*Answer.* Real fire differs from the mere thought or fancy of it, as real pain does from the mere thought or fancy of pain; and yet no one supposes that real any more than imaginary pain can exist unperceived, or in an unperceiving substance.

*Third objection.* (Sect. 42—44.) We see sensible things actually existing at a distance from us. Now, whatever is thus seen at a distance is surely seen as external, which contradicts the foregoing Principles.

*Answer.* Distance, or outness, is absolutely invisible. It is a conception which is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connection between colours (which alone we see) and visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one hand, and certain varieties of tactual and locomotive experience, on the other—as was proved in the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, in which the mere ideality of the visible world is demonstrated\*.

*Fourth objection.* (Sect. 45—48.) It follows from the new Principles, that real things, i. e. combinations of real or sense-ideas, must be at every moment annihilated and created anew.

*Answer.* On the contrary, it is quite consistent with the new Principles that a sensible thing may actually exist, in the sense-experience of other minds, during the intervals of perception by an individual mind; for the Principles do not affirm their substantial and causal dependence on this, that, or the other mind, but on Mind. They imply, indeed, a constant creation or presentation in finite minds; but the conception of the universe in a state of constant creation was familiar to the Schoolmen and other Theists, and enables us impressively to realise Divine Providence.

*Fifth objection.* (Sect. 49.) If extension and the other primary qualities of matter can exist only *in mind*, it follows that extension is an attribute of mind—that mind is extended.

*Answer.* Extension and other sensible qualities exist *in mind* not as modes or attributes, which is unintelligible, but as *ideas*, or objects of

\* Moreover, even if the outness or distance of things were visible, it would not follow that either they or their distance exist unperceived. On the contrary, the very hypothesis implies that they are perceived visually.

which Mind is percipient ; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that mind itself is extended or solid\*.

*Sixth objection.* (Sect. 50.) The Newtonian and other discoveries in natural philosophy proceed on an assumption of external Matter, and are thus inconsistent with the new Principles.

*Answer.* On the contrary, external Matter—if 'external' means what exists in absolute independence of Mind—is useless in natural philosophy, which is conversant exclusively with particular ideas, phenomena, or concrete things, and not with mere abstractions.

*Seventh objection.* (Sect. 51.) It is absurd, because at variance with the universal use of language, to exclude power or causation from Matter, and to attribute every sensible phenomenon to Mind, as the foregoing Principles do.

*Answer.* While we may continue to speak as the unreflecting multitude do, we should learn to think with the reflecting or philosophical. We may still speak of physical causes, even when, as philosophers, we have recognised that all true efficiency is in mind, and that the material world is only a system of sensible symbols regulated by mind.

*Eighth objection.* (Sect. 54, 55.) The Common Sense or universal belief of men is inconsistent with the exclusively ideal character of real or external things.

*Answer.* This is doubtful, when we consider that, in their natural confusion of thought, ordinary men do not comprehend the metaphysical meaning of their own assumptions ; and it seems a small objection, when we recollect the prejudices, dignified as Common Sense, which have successively surrendered to philosophy.

*Ninth objection.* (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is inconsistent with the common belief in the existence of an external world must be rejected.

*Answer.* The fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the cause of changes in our *sense*-ideas, which we gradually learn by experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the common belief in externality, and is what men really mean by the word.

*Tenth objection.* (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles concerning Matter and Mind are inconsistent with various established rules in mathematics and natural philosophy.

\* It is also to be remembered that sensible things may exist 'in mind,' without being *mine*—meaning by 'mine' the creatures of my *will*. Mind and they are connected, but not as cause and effect. Properly speaking, that only is mine in which my will exerts itself. But, in another view, my involuntary states of feeling and imagination are *mine*, because their existence depends on my individual consciousness of them ; and even sensible things are *mine*, because, though present in many minds in common, they are, for me, dependent on *my* mind.

*Answer.* The laws of motion, and the other truths here referred to, may be all conceived and expressed in perfect consistency with the new Principles about the substantiality and causality of Minds, and the absence of all proper substance and causation in Matter.

*Eleventh objection.* (Sect. 60—66.) If, according to the foregoing Principles, the material world is merely the series of phenomenal or ideal effects of which we are conscious in our senses, the elaborate contrivances which it contains are useless.

*Answer.* These elaborate contrivances, while unnecessary as causes, are relatively necessary as signs: they express to *us* the occasional presence of other finite minds, the constant presence and power of Supreme Mind, and the Divine Ideas of which the objective universe is the symbol.

*Twelfth objection.* (Sect. 67—79.) Although the impossibility of an Absolute Material Substance that is active, solid, and extended may be a demonstrable Principle, this does not prove the impossibility of one that is *inactive*, and *neither solid nor extended*, which may be the occasion of our sense-ideas, or which at any rate may exist.

*Answer.* This supposition is unintelligible: the words in which it is expressed cannot convey any meaning.

*Thirteenth objection.* (Sect. 80, 81.) Notwithstanding the foregoing Principles, Matter may be an *unknown somewhat*, neither substance nor accident, cause nor effect, spirit nor idea; and all the reasonings against the notion of Matter, conceived as something positive, fail, when this purely negative notion is maintained.

*Answer.* This is to use the word 'Matter' as people use the word 'nothing:' the supposed abstract existence cannot be distinguished from nothing.

*Fourteenth objection.* (Sect. 82—84.) Although we cannot, in opposition to the new Principles, infer by reasoning the independent or absolute existence of Matter, according to any possible conception, either positive or negative, of what Matter is; and although we may be unable even to understand what the word means, yet Holy Scripture is sufficient to convince every Christian of the existence of an external material world—as an object of faith.

*Answer.* The absolute or independent existence of a material world is nowhere affirmed in Scripture, which employs language in its popular and practical meaning.

In what I have called the Third Division of the Treatise (sect. 85—156), the new Principles, thus guarded against objections, are applied

to invigorate belief, which was suffering from the paralysis of metaphysical Scepticism. They are also employed to purify and simplify the sciences which relate to the *ideal world of the senses*—the Physical Sciences; and those which relate to *spirits*, by whom ideas are sustained, and their changes determined—the science of Minds, and Theology. It may be thus subdivided:—

I. (Sect. 85—134.) Application of the new Principles, concerning Matter, Mind, Substance, and Cause, to our knowledge of the objective and physical world of *ideas*—

1. To the refutation of Scepticism, as to the existence of sensible things (sect. 85—91); and of God (sect. 92—96);
2. To the liberation of Thought from the bondage of unmeaning abstractions (sect. 97—100);
3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by correcting paradoxical conceptions of Time, Space, and Motion (sect. 101—116);
4. And of Mathematics, through criticism of our notions of Number and Extension, and by the abolition of the contradictions involved in the common doctrine of Infinites (sect. 117—134).

II. (Sect. 135—156.) Application of the new Principles to our *notions* of Mind or Spirit—

1. To explain and sustain our faith in our natural Immortality (sect. 137—144);
2. To explain and vindicate the belief which each man has in the existence of other men (sect. 145);
3. To vindicate belief in the existence of Supreme Mind (sect. 146—156).

It was only by degrees that this scheme of Berkeley's philosophy attracted the attention due to so original and ingenious a mode of conceiving the Universe. A fragment of metaphysics, by a young and almost unknown author, published at a distance from the centre of English intellectual life, was apt to be overlooked. In connection with the *Essay on Vision*, however, it drew enough of regard to carry its author with *éclat* on his first visit to London, three years after the publication of the *Principles*. He then published the immortal *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, in which the absurdity of Absolute Matter is illustrated, and the doctrine defended against objections, in a manner meant to recommend to popular acceptance what, on the first statement, seemed an unpopular paradox. A. C. F.





A TREATISE

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO.

*First Printed in the Year 1710.*



TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE<sup>1</sup>, &c.,  
KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND  
ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST  
HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our Society<sup>2</sup> gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most humble  
and most devoted servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of Pembroke and fifth Earl of Montgomery, the friend of Locke—who dedicated his *Essay* to him as a work 'having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a draft of'—and representative of a family renowned in English political and literary history. He was born in 1656; was a nobleman of Christ Church, Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his titles in 1683; was sworn of the Privy Council in 1689; and was made a Knight of the Garter in 1700. He filled some of the highest offices in the state, in the reigns of William and Mary, and of Anne. He was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1707, having previously been one of the Commissioners by whom the union between England and Scotland was negotiated. He died in January, 1733.

<sup>2</sup> Trinity College, Dublin.



## THE PREFACE.

WHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry<sup>1</sup>, seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known—particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity<sup>2</sup> which some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration<sup>3</sup>, for no other reason but because it is newly known<sup>2</sup>, and contrary to the prejudices

<sup>1</sup> In his Common-place Book Berkeley seems to refer his speculations to his boyhood. The theory of the sensible world propounded in the following Treatise was obviously conceived by him before the publication of the *New Theory of Vision*, which was a first instalment of it.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Locke, in the 'Epistle Dedicatory' of his *Essay*. As regards the 'novelty' of the chief principles of the following treatise, viz. the *negation* of Abstract Entities (absolute or unperceived Matter, absolute Space, absolute Time, absolute Substance, and absolute Cause); and the *affirmation* of Mind, as the Synthesis, Substance, and Cause of all ideas or objects—the best preceding philosophy, ancient and modern, was a dim anticipation of it.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in illustration of the demonstrative character of Berkeley's distinctive doctrine.

of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Berkeley's one request to his reader, here and throughout his writings, is, to take pains to understand his meaning. This especially requires us to avoid confounding his *sense*-ideas with mere fancies or chimeras—arbitrary creations of the individual mind. The history of this doctrine has been a history of its misinterpretation.

## INTRODUCTION.

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth<sup>1</sup>, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the high road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle—to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism<sup>2</sup>.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, 'the faculties we have are few, and those designed by na-

<sup>1</sup> 'Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things.' Locke.

<sup>2</sup> The purpose of these early essays of Berkeley was to reconcile philosophy with common sense, by employing demonstration to make common sense reveal itself truly. Cf. the closing sentences in the *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*.

ture for the support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite<sup>3</sup>.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are<sup>4</sup> which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties<sup>3</sup>. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to sus-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Locke's *Essay*, Introduction, sect. 4—7; B. II. ch. 23, § 12, &c. Locke (who is here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the perplexities of philosophy to our narrow faculties, which are meant, he maintains, to regulate our lives, and not to explain the mysteries of Being. See also Des Cartes, *Principia*, I. 26, 27, &c.; Malebranche, *Recherche*, III. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The assumption that Matter, Space, Time, Substance, Cause, may and do exist as abstract entities, i.e. unperceived and unconceived by a mind, is, with Berkeley, the fundamental false principle, to which is due the alleged confusion and inconsistency of philosophy, and the consequent inclination to philosophical and religious scepticism.



pect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider what a number of very great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs<sup>5</sup>, yet I am not without some hopes—upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing *abstract ideas* or notions of things<sup>6</sup>. [1] He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no

<sup>5</sup> A work previously undertaken under the same designation, by Des Cartes in his *Principia*, and, in fact if not in name, by Locke in his *Essay*.

<sup>6</sup> Here 'abstract idea' and 'notion' are used convertibly. Cf. sect. 142. Cf. with what follows against *abstract ideas* in the remainder of the Introduction, sect. 97—100, 118—132, 143; *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 122—125; *Alciphron*, Dial. vii. 5—7; *Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics*, sect. 45—48; *Siris*, sect. 323, 335, &c., where he distinguishes the Platonic Ideas from the 'ideas' and Nominalism of his own early philosophy.

In the following sections Berkeley has Locke chiefly in view. He appears here as the second great modern defender of Nominalism, and is so referred to by Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, B. I. part I, ch. 7. Hobbes was the first. Berkeley's reasonings, in the sections which follow, have become commonplace in later discussions of the question, What are we cognizant of when we use the common terms on which human science depends? According to Berkeley, it is not an *idea*, inasmuch as all ideas (i.e. presentative and representative objects) must either be particular or else involve contradictory characters; it is, he concludes, a *relation* among ideas that we know when we employ general terms. Yet, many who have accepted his reasonings against abstract ideas have not discerned their connexion with his abolition of abstract Matter and Space.

small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved; this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by *abstraction* the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract

idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings<sup>7</sup> which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake—abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of *animal*, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By *body* is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the *abstract idea*. Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is

<sup>7</sup> Cf. sect. I of the *Principles*.

nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas<sup>8</sup>, they best can tell: for myself, [I dare be confident I have it not.] I find indeed I have indeed a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid—which last are the two proper acceptations of *abstraction*. And there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to *abstract notions*<sup>10</sup>. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Derodon's *Logica*, P. II. c. 6, 7; *Philosophia Contracta*, I. i. § 7—11; and Gassendi, *Leg. Instit.*, I. 8, for reasoning similar to what follows in this section. Also Cudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, B. IV.; Browne's *Procedure of the Understanding*, B. II. ch. 4; Bolingbroke's *Works*, vol. I. pp. 117, &c.

<sup>9</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>10</sup> 'abstract notions'—here used convertibly with 'abstract ideas.' Cf. sect. 142, on the meaning of the term *notion*.

study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction<sup>11</sup>, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late [<sup>12</sup> excellent] and deservedly esteemed philosopher [<sup>2</sup>], who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. ‘The having of general ideas,’ saith he, ‘is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs.’ And a little after. ‘Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some [<sup>3</sup>] would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.’—*Essay on Human Understanding*, B. II. ch. 11. § 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned

<sup>11</sup> Here assumed to mean, that we can perceive or imagine Entities, from which all phenomena of experience have been abstracted, and which are thus *abstract* objects or ideas, e. g. ‘Existence,’ after abstraction of all the phenomena in which it manifests itself to us; or ‘Matter,’ after abstraction of all the phenomena which appear in the senses—perception or intelligence being abstracted, in short.

<sup>12</sup> Omitted in second edition.

into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this supposition—that the making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: ‘Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?’ His answer is: ‘Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas.’—*Essay on Human Understanding*, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems that a word<sup>13</sup> becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind<sup>14</sup>. For example, when it is said ‘the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,’ or that ‘whatever has extension is divisible,’ these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning ‘it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there

<sup>13</sup> ‘To this I cannot assent, being of opinion that a word,’ &c.—in first edition.

<sup>14</sup> Though we cannot have the logical *extent* and *content* of our concepts intuitively exhibited to us, either in a percept or in an image, it is to be noted that we may have resembling signs of conceptual relations, as well as verbal or non-resembling signs. We think by means of specimen-objects, in which our concepts are exemplified; as well as by means of arbitrary verbal symbols—in short, after the analogy of geometry, as well as after the analogy of algebra. Cf. the following section.

are any *abstract* general ideas<sup>15</sup>; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as *that particular line* becomes general by being made a sign, so the *name* 'line,' which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the *Essay on Human Understanding*, [4] which is as follows: "*Abstract ideas* are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea

<sup>15</sup> Berkeley distinguishes between (a) reasoning or thinking, e. g. about length without any reference to breadth, which he allows; and (b) having an idea or intuition of length without breadth, which he denies the possibility of. Length and breadth combined make only one *idea*, or sensuous presentation or representation. All ideas, whether in sense or imagery, must be particular. We rise above them only in a less or more extensive apprehension of their *relations*,—not by the apprehension of *ideas* different in kind, because abstract, and which were supposed to be the object-matter of metaphysics.

of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."—B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle—which is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once<sup>16</sup>?

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for *communication*, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Alciphron*, Dial. VII. 7.



difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions<sup>17</sup> will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the *enlargement of knowledge* than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions<sup>18</sup>, to which I fully agree; but then it does not appear to me that those notions<sup>18</sup> are formed by abstraction in the manner premised—*universality*, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions<sup>18</sup>, being in their own nature *particular*, are rendered *universal*<sup>19</sup>. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense *universal*. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it.

<sup>17</sup> In Berkeley's language, we have *notions* but no *ideas* of substance proper (i. e. Mind), or of relations among particular phenomena. Sensible objects, passive states of mind, and representations (or misrepresentations) of these in imagination, are alone *ideas*. Cf. sect. 142; also *Siris*, sect. 308.

<sup>18</sup> See note 17.

<sup>19</sup> i. e. 'things' and 'notions' which are resembling, and 'names' which are non-resembling signs, are in themselves *particular*, as every immediate object of which we are conscious must be. They are *universalized* in the act of *thinking their relations*—the apprehension of relations being the essence of thought. Note that 'notions' are here said to be particular; which they are, in as far as they must be capable of being individualized or exemplified in individual experiences. Notion seems here to be used for relative image.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. [<sup>20</sup>And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. [<sup>5</sup> So far he may abstract; but this

<sup>20</sup> What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the 1734 edition.

will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.]

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remain full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement<sup>21</sup>—I say, the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this<sup>22</sup> of *abstract* general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the *source* of this prevailing notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion

<sup>21</sup> So Bacon in the *Novum Organon*.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Introduction, sect. 1.—'this that we have been endeavouring to overthrow'—in first edition.

so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such thing as speech or universal signs<sup>23</sup> there never had been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and elsewhere of the *Essay on Human Understanding*. Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.—First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification<sup>24</sup> annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to any one by a little reflection. To this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be ‘a plain surface comprehended by three right lines,’ by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea<sup>25</sup> which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea<sup>25</sup>; the one is necessary<sup>26</sup>, the other useless and impracticable.

<sup>23</sup> This should include resembling as well as non-resembling signs—relative images as well as verbal symbols. But no particular image can represent in the phantasy the *content* and *extent* of a notion, which imply the recognition by the mind of a relation among a plurality of particular objects.

<sup>24</sup> This must be understood of the denotation of names.

<sup>25</sup> i. e. presentative or representative intuition.

<sup>26</sup> A definition determines the ideas or particular objects to which the name is applicable, but the notion signified by the name cannot be individualized in an abstract object.

19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for—in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for<sup>27</sup>.

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition—to which the former<sup>28</sup> is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas<sup>29</sup> coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas<sup>29</sup> that were fitting to produce those emotions ;

<sup>27</sup> See Leibnitz on Symbolical Knowledge (*Opera Philosophica*, pp. 79–80, Erdmann), and Stewart on 'Abstraction,' in his *Elements*, vol. I. ch. 4, § 1. Names are constructive in their office, as ministers of thought. Cf. *Principles*, sect. I.

<sup>28</sup> i. e. the communication of *ideas*—in other words, the excitement of particular images in the fancy, which verbal language often supersedes to a great extent.

<sup>29</sup> 'ideas,' i. e. images of particular objects to which the words are applicable.

but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas<sup>29</sup> that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a *good thing*, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befall us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas<sup>29</sup> in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas<sup>29</sup> of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me 'Aristotle hath said it,' all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. [<sup>30</sup>So close and immediate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? [<sup>6</sup>]

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.—It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge

<sup>30</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single person. But most parts of knowledge have been [<sup>31</sup>so] strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered, [<sup>32</sup>that it may almost be made a question whether language has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the sciences]. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, [<sup>31</sup>I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can]: whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following advantages:—

22. *First*, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal—the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. *Secondly*, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of *abstract ideas* which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. *Thirdly*, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas<sup>32</sup> divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare

<sup>31</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>32</sup> 'My own ideas,' i.e. the particular objects of which I am presentatively or representatively conscious.

hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of *abstraction*. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it does not seem strange that they should use words for ideas—it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the *abstract* idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those<sup>33</sup> who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they<sup>33</sup> advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. [7] But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than *particular* ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the *abstract* idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas<sup>34</sup> will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the

<sup>33</sup> He probably refers to Locke.

<sup>34</sup> Inasmuch as they may stand for *relations* of ideas, whether in sense or imagination; and for a Mind or Self, as distinguished from any of its particular ideas. Cf. sect. 142. In the state which Leibnitz calls 'symbolical consciousness' we can use words without realizing their meaning.



earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.



OF THE  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

I. IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the *objects*<sup>‡</sup> [8] of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to ac-

‡ This threefold division of the *objects* or *phenomena* of which we are conscious—viz. (a) *Sense-ideas* or *presentations*; (b) the ideas of the 'passions and operations' of mind, by some called *internal presentations*; (c) *representations*, which may be more or less elaborated—nearly corresponds to Locke's simple ideas of sense and reflection, and his complex ideas. The two first are Hume's 'impressions,' and the last his 'ideas.' But Berkeley raises a question which Locke did not conceive, viz. Do any of the three classes of objects or ideas of which we are conscious exist independently of a conscious mind; or, if not, do any represent or suggest what exists thus absolutely? Are they, or at any rate do they stand for, 'things in themselves'—substances from which all perception or consciousness may be abstracted? Can we, in short, find in perception, by any analysis, Mind and Matter existing in a *mutually independent* duality? This treatise is an answer to this question. Cf. sect. 86, 89.

company each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing<sup>2</sup>. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name *apple*; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things—which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something<sup>3</sup> which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind, spirit, soul, or myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing<sup>4</sup>, whereby they are perceived—for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived<sup>4</sup>.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind<sup>5</sup>, is what everybody will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or

<sup>2</sup> This is the synthetic or constructive function of names, according to Berkeley. He here and elsewhere distinguishes between sensible *things* properly so called, and the *simple ideas* or objects of sense, of which 'things' are composed. Cf. sect. 33, 38.

<sup>3</sup> This 'something' is the Ego or conscious subject, which the object-world implies, through which it is united and becomes intelligible, and by which it is causally regulated. But Berkeley does not affirm of the Ego, any more than of the world of ideas, that it exists *absolutely*, i. e. independently of being conscious—that the *percipient* is independent of ideas, any more than that these last are independent of a percipient.—For Berkeley's *notion* of Self, as distinguished from his ideas, cf. sect. 7, where he speaks of the Self or Ego as the only 'substance;' and sect. 27, 125—140. Though he affirms, in this section and elsewhere, that Self and its ideas are 'entirely distinct' from one another, he denies that they are distinct *substances*. The Dualism of Berkeley—*spirits* and *ideas*—does not *underlie* perception, but is, so to speak, co-extensive with it. It is resolvable into the distinction between the Ego, as *permanent* or *identical*, and the phenomena of which each Ego is conscious, in sense or otherwise, as *changing*—with whatever is implied in this, which, however, he does not try to analyse.

<sup>4</sup> i. e. by *a* percipient—but not necessarily by *me*. Cf. sect. 48. An idea must now be, or have been, or hereafter become, part of the experience of *a* mind, in order to its present, past, or future actual existence. Cf. sect. 6.

<sup>5</sup> 'without the mind,' i. e. unperceived and unimagined.

combined together (that is, whatever objects<sup>6</sup> they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind<sup>7</sup> perceiving them.—I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term *exist* when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it<sup>8</sup>. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. [9]

4. 9It is indeed an opinion<sup>10</sup> strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects,

<sup>6</sup> Here 'objects' = sensible things. This is the popular meaning of the term object, as distinguished from its more extensive or philosophical meaning. Cf. *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, sect. 9—11.

<sup>7</sup> 'in a mind,' i. e. as phenomena of which a mind is conscious. The main problem of the book is, To determine whether *those objects or ideas which constitute what are commonly called real or sensible things* are independent of a conscious mind, in a way that thoughts and passions and fancies are not—whether, in short, the presented world of the senses is non-egoistic, in another manner than the presented world of our own feelings, or than the representative world of imagination; and, if so, what that manner may be. What should we mean when we say that *sense-ideas*—in other words, objects of sense—are 'external?' Is it that they exist independently of a percipient mind; or merely of *my* mind, they being my medium of intercourse with other minds, and of other minds with me? Berkeley's solution, here given by anticipation, is that sense-ideas, like all other objects of consciousness, cannot exist actually, otherwise than in a mind perceiving them (i. e. as objects immediately present to an intelligence). He afterwards enumerates marks by which real or sensible are distinguishable from merely imaginary objects. See sect. 29—33.

<sup>8</sup> This is part of Berkeley's interpretation of our belief in the *distinct* and *permanent* existence of sensible things. It is a belief that they are conditionally presentable in sense—'permanent possibilities of sensation,' as Mr. J. S. Mill would say. See *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, pp. 220—33, third edition.

<sup>9</sup> Sect. 4—24 contain Berkeley's *proof* of his doctrine, contained in sect. 3, about sensible ideas and things.

<sup>10</sup> He does not mean to say that this opinion can be held *intelligently* by those to whom he here attributes it. Cf. sect. 54, 56.

have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived<sup>11</sup>? [10]

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive [11] them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures—in a word the things we see and feel—what are they but so many sensations, notions<sup>12</sup>, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract—if that may properly be called *abstraction* which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. [12] Hence,

<sup>11</sup> That all the objects of which we are actually percipient are ideas or sensations (in Berkeley's meaning of the words) *during the percipient act*, inasmuch as they are then objects-perceived,—whatever besides and in other circumstances they may be,—is self-evident. They are *at least ideas*, i. e. perceived-objects, *while a mind is in the act of being sensibly percipient of them*. Whether they ever exist otherwise; or whether, if not, they represent what is existing otherwise, are two questions which Berkeley proceeds to answer in the negative. He argues that their *uncognised* existence is not merely unproved but involves a contradiction in terms, or, at least, can mean nothing.

<sup>12</sup> The term *notion*, elsewhere either restricted to minds or applied to concepts, seems to be here applied to the immediate object-world of the senses. Locke uses it with similar looseness.

as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct<sup>13</sup> from the sensation or perception of it. [<sup>14</sup>In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing<sup>15</sup>, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.]

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their *being* is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit—it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. [<sup>16</sup>To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the *being* of a sensible thing from its *being perceived*.] [<sup>13</sup>]

7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other Substance than *Spirit*, or that which perceives<sup>17</sup>. [<sup>14</sup>] But, for the fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered the sensible

<sup>13</sup> i. e. existing distinct from perception.

<sup>14</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>15</sup> With Berkeley 'object,' 'idea,' or 'sensation,' with reference to our sense-experience, signify what is assumed to be numerically the same, and which cannot therefore be distinguished from itself by abstraction. An absolute negation of meaning, or else a contradiction in terms—which are virtually equivalent—alone remain, when an attempt is made to disentangle 'sensible things' from a perception of them.

<sup>16</sup> In the first edition, instead of this sentence, we have the following: 'To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflexion of the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes.'

<sup>17</sup> Berkeley thus holds a *duality* of 'things' (viz. spirits and ideas), and a *unity* of 'substance.' Moreover, he does not say that this 'substance' may exist unperceptible of any ideas, whilst ideas or objects necessarily depend on being perceived. On the contrary he goes on to say that 'there can be no *unthinking* substance or substratum' of ideas. And elsewhere he argues that a mind must be always conscious. Cf. sect. 98, and also sect. 139, where he appears to hold that the very existence of a spirit or substance consists in perceiving ideas or being conscious—that its *esse* is *percipere*.

qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, &c., *i. e.* the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, &c. exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or *substratum* of those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind<sup>18</sup>, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance<sup>19</sup>. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; [15] a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest. [16]

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt *primary* and *secondary* qualities<sup>20</sup>. [17] By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. [18] By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only [19] ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but

<sup>18</sup> As Sir W. Hamilton (e. g. Reid's *Works*, pp. 883, &c.) seems to say the immediate objects or ideas of sense do.

<sup>19</sup> As some who hold a representative perception say.

<sup>20</sup> Here again he refers to Locke, whose notion of material substance is charged with being self-contradictory. See *Essay*, B. II. ch. 8.



another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called *Matter* or *corporeal substance*, involves a contradiction in it. [20] [21] Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity. But, because the tenet of the existence of Matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.]

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original<sup>22</sup> qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not—which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter<sup>23</sup>. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. [21] For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. [22] In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> What follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>22</sup> Sometimes called *objective* qualities—which are supposed to exist without a mind or unperceived, and in an unperceiving substance. Cf. *First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, pp. 279, &c.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. sect. 10. See Locke's *Essay*, B. II. ch. 8, § 18; ch. 23, § 11; B. IV. ch. 3, § 24—26.

<sup>24</sup> 'in the mind, and nowhere else'—i. e. perceived or conceived, and in no other manner. Cf. *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, p. 346.

11. Again, *great* and *small*, *swift* and *slow*, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. [23] But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without the mind<sup>25</sup> depends on that strange doctrine of *abstract ideas*. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of *materia prima*, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn that extension<sup>26</sup> exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind<sup>27</sup>, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these are equally units, though

<sup>25</sup> 'without the mind' = without *a* mind, or in an absolute negation of all intelligence, Divine or finite.

<sup>26</sup> Extension is thus the fundamental characteristic of the material world. Both geometrical and physical solidity, as well as motion, are said to imply extension. But Berkeley's analysis rather resolves extension into a locomotive experience in sense, which visual sensations of colour may symbolize.

<sup>27</sup> 'the creature of the mind,' i. e. dependent on being conceived by a mind. Cf. *Siris*, sect. 288. This dependence is here illustrated by the relation of *number* to the point of view of the individual mind; as the dependence of the other primary qualities was illustrated by their relations to the organization of the percipient. In this, the preceding, and the following sections, Berkeley argues the inconsistency of the *absoluteness* attributed to the primary qualities, with their acknowledged dependence on our organization, and on our intellectual point of view.

some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily [24] put together by the mind<sup>28</sup>.

13. Unity I know some<sup>29</sup> will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word *unity* I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. [25] To say no more, it is an *abstract idea*.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove<sup>30</sup> certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. [26] Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without<sup>31</sup> any alteration in any external object?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 107—110.

<sup>29</sup> e. g. Locke, *Essay*, B. II. ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § 1.

<sup>30</sup> 'certain sensible qualities'—'colours, tastes, &c.'—in first edition.

<sup>31</sup> 'without any alteration in any external object'—'without any external alteration'—in first edition.

brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion<sup>32</sup>. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object<sup>33</sup>, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.—It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the *substratum* that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's *supporting* extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident 'support' cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense—as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [<sup>34</sup>For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can be applicable to it.]

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by *material substance*, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents.[<sup>27</sup>] The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, pp. 278—285.

<sup>33</sup> 'an outward object,' i. e. an object abstracted from all intelligence—an *absolute* object, which is alleged to be a contradiction, all objectivity implying a relation to an intelligence, and the qualities in question relation to an *embodied* intelligence, with its organic variations.

<sup>34</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words *material substance*, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material *substratum* or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason<sup>35</sup>.—As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.[<sup>28</sup>] This the materialists[<sup>29</sup>] themselves acknowledge.—It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But (<sup>36</sup>I do not see) what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all [<sup>30</sup>] the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them<sup>37</sup>. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies<sup>38</sup> is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced

<sup>35</sup> 'reason,' i. e. reasoning, or inference from our immediate *sense*-experience—our sensations or ideas of sense. It is argued, in this and the next section, that the absolute existence of Matter cannot be proved, either by the senses, or by reasoning from our sense-perceptions.

<sup>36</sup> Omitted in the second edition, and the sentence converted into a question.

<sup>37</sup> But the ideas or objects of which we are cognizant in dreams, &c. differ in important characteristics from the ideas or objects of which we are conscious in sense. Cf. sect. 29—33. The former are not in harmony with what may be called the universal and well-ordered dream of real life.

<sup>38</sup> 'external bodies,' i. e. bodies that exist absolutely or unperceived—independently of any sense-experience.

sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists [3<sup>r</sup>] their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind<sup>39</sup>. Hence it is evident the production<sup>40</sup> of ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances<sup>41</sup>, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose. [3<sup>2</sup>]

20. In short, if there were external bodies<sup>42</sup>, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose—what no one can deny possible—an intelligence without the help of external bodies<sup>42</sup>, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind<sup>43</sup>. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the

<sup>39</sup> i. e. they cannot shew how the unintelligible or contradictory hypothesis of Absolute Matter accounts for our having the sense-experience we have had, are conscious of having, or expect to have; or which we suppose other conscious minds to be having, to have had, or to be about to have.

<sup>40</sup> 'the production,' &c., i. e. the fact that we and others actually have sense-perceptions.

<sup>41</sup> 'Matter,' in an intelligible meaning of the term, he not only allows to exist, but maintains its existence to be intuitively evident.

<sup>42</sup> i. e. bodies existing without being perceived or conceived by any knowing substance.

<sup>43</sup> i. e. to have all our sense-experience.

existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? [<sup>33</sup>] Of this there can be no question—which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter<sup>44</sup>, after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments *a posteriori* [<sup>34</sup>] are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated *a priori*, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them<sup>45</sup>.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflection? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial<sup>46</sup> may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:—If you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, [<sup>35</sup>] or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it<sup>47</sup>; I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot

<sup>44</sup> i. e. absolute or uncognised Matter—not interpretable sense-perceptions, the existence of which last Berkeley assumes.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. sect. 85—156.

<sup>46</sup> The appeal here and elsewhere is to reflection—directly upon our own experience and indirectly upon that of others.

<sup>47</sup> i. e. otherwise than *as* an idea—perceived or conceived—a presented or represented object.

either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while<sup>48</sup>? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. [<sup>36</sup>] When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies<sup>49</sup>, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas<sup>50</sup>. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself<sup>51</sup>. [<sup>37</sup>] A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of *material substance*.

24. [<sup>52</sup> Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words,

<sup>48</sup> There seems to be a confusion of existence in *sense* with existence in *imagination*, in this section. To exist as an object in fancy is indeed to exist, but not as part of the universal system of sensible order; and it is the apparently interrupted existence of *this* system, on his doctrine, that Berkeley has to reconcile with the common belief, on which we all act.

<sup>49</sup> 'to conceive the existence of external bodies,' i. e. to conceive bodies that are neither perceived nor conceived—that are not ideas or objects at all, but which exist absolutely. To suppose what we conceive to be thus unconceived, when we are actually conceiving it, is, it is argued, to suppose a contradiction in terms. Such Being is absolutely unapproachable by intelligence.

<sup>50</sup> 'ideas'—i. e. ideas of imagination, not of sense.

<sup>51</sup> A delusion which is at the root of those objections to metaphysics which overlook the subjective phase of all physics.

<sup>52</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.



we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the *absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind*<sup>53</sup>. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. [38] And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions<sup>54</sup>, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive—there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another<sup>55</sup>. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. [39]

<sup>53</sup> 'The absolute existence of sensible objects, i.e. in themselves or without a mind,' is the principle which Berkeley argues against as either *meaningless* or *contradictory*—not the existence of a material world or sensible order, regulated independently of our individual will, and to which our actions must conform if we are to avoid pain and secure pleasure.

<sup>54</sup> Here again 'notion' applied to ideas or inactive things.

<sup>55</sup> In this and the next section, Berkeley argues that there can be no *power* or causality proper, in the world of ideas or objects, uniformities of co-existence and succession alone being either immediately or mediately perceivable—the doctrine of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mr. Mill.

Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause<sup>56</sup> of these ideas, whereon they depend<sup>57</sup>, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance<sup>58</sup>; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the *understanding*, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the *will*. Hence there can be no *idea* formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, (vid. sect. 25,) they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of *spirit*, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth<sup>59</sup>. [49] If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being; and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names *will* and *understanding*, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of

<sup>56</sup> Berkeley here assumes as granted the metaphysical and synthetical principle of causality—that every phenomenal change implies a cause—which cause, he goes on to shew, cannot be itself phenomenal.

<sup>57</sup> 'depend'—not for their very *existence*, which, according to Berkeley, depends upon their being perceived, but for the *changing forms* in which they exist relatively to one another.

<sup>58</sup> He here connects the metaphysical and synthetical principles of Cause and Substance—finding them united and realized in actively conscious Mind.

<sup>59</sup> In other words, it cannot be an object of perception, though its effects can. We are conscious of it as percipient only, not as perceived. Does this consciousness of being percipient imply consciousness of active will? For Berkeley's treatment of the objection that *mental* substances and causes are as unmeaning or contradictory as *material* substances or causes, see *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, pp. 327—329.

Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject [41] of the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name *soul* or *spirit*. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words *will*, [60 *understanding, mind,*] *soul, spirit*, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [61 Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some *notion* of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind<sup>62</sup>; such as willing, loving, hating—inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.] [42]

28. I find I can excite ideas<sup>63</sup> in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words<sup>64</sup>.

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will<sup>65</sup>. [43] When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it

<sup>60</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>61</sup> This sentence is not contained in the first edition.

<sup>62</sup> In sect. 1 he speaks of '*ideas* perceived by attending to the operations of the mind.'

<sup>63</sup> '*ideas,*' i. e. of imagination.

<sup>64</sup> With Berkeley the object-world of ideas is partly distinguished from Self by its essential passivity. Every object is caused; nothing except a Self or Ego causes. Cause or power is with him of the essence of our notion of mind, to which we necessarily attribute power or activity—thus distinguishing our Self from the changing ideas of which we are conscious. Except figuratively, we never attribute action to ideas or objects. Cf. *Siris*, sect. 249, 250, 292—295.

<sup>65</sup> In this and the four following sections, Berkeley mentions *marks* by which *sense*-phenomena are found in experience to be distinguished from all the other ideas of which we are cognisant, and in consequence of which they are termed '*real,*' '*external,*' or properly '*objective;*' while other phenomena (those of feeling and imagination) are called subjective or individual. The changes in the ideas or phenomena presented in the senses are found to be part of Universal External Order—*external*, inasmuch as it is independent of the will of the sense-percipient—the interpretation of which enables us to foresee (sect. 31) more or less of our future sense-experience; thus determining our pleasures and pains, and also informing us of the existence of other conscious minds.

is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some *other* Will or Spirit that produces them. [44]

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination<sup>66</sup>; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series—the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the *laws of nature*; [45] and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive—all this we know, not by discovering any necessary<sup>67</sup> connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born. [46]

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense

<sup>66</sup> This mark—the superior strength, liveliness, and distinctness of our sense-ideas—was afterwards noted by Hume. See *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. II.

<sup>67</sup> Berkeley insists throughout his writings on the *arbitrary* character of the laws of nature in general, and of those by which the phenomena of vision symbolize those of touch in particular.

constantly followed by other ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former<sup>68</sup>. [47]

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly<sup>69</sup> termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are *ideas*, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it<sup>70</sup>.

<sup>68</sup> So Schiller, in *Don Carlos*, Act III, where he represents the sceptics as failing to see the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. Berkeley, like Hume, Brown, Comte, Mill, &c., eliminates all power or causality from the material world; but, unlike them, he recognises power or causality, properly so called, in conscious mind—in the Ego—distinguished from the ideas of which it is immediately cognisant as contemporaneous and successive. 'Physical causation,' or constant order in the co-existence and succession of phenomena, accordingly, is not causation proper, but the effect of it.

<sup>69</sup> In popular language 'idea' is applied exclusively to the representations and misrepresentations of fancy or thought, and not, as with Berkeley, to the 'real things' present in the senses. See Leibnitz, *De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis*.

<sup>70</sup> In the thirty-one preceding sections, two relations should be carefully distinguished—that of conscious mind to the *sense-ideas* of which it is conscious, and which depend upon conscious mind for their very existence; and that of mind to the *changes* of such ideas or phenomena. The former relation—that of percipient and percept—is not the relation of cause and effect at all, but is *sui generis*. The latter and correlative relation, also involved in our consciousness, is alone causal, and is our only proper example of causality—the orderly relations of phenomena to one another being only results of causal energy—of in-

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections<sup>71</sup> which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.

*First*, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of *ideas* takes place. [48] All things that exist exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a *rerum natura*, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by *real things*, in opposition to *chimeras* or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense<sup>72</sup> are alike *ideas*.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which *philosophers* call Matter or corporeal

tending volition—and not power or causality itself. Note also that while Berkeley regards all phenomena as dependent on *an* intelligence and *a* will, he regards the changes in *sense*-phenomena as emphatically independent, for all practical purposes, of the *will* of the finite sense-percipient.

<sup>71</sup> Sect. 34—84 contain Berkeley's answers to supposed *objections* to the foregoing principles, concerning the true meaning of the terms 'Matter' and 'Mind,' 'Substance' and 'Cause;' and to his distinction between the presented realities of the material or sensible world, and the chimeras of imagination.

<sup>72</sup> To be an 'idea' is, with Berkeley, to be the object of a conscious intelligence. But he does not define precisely the relation of ideas to minds conscious of them. 'Existence in the mind' is existence in *this relation*. His problem (which he determines in the negative) is, the possibility of the existence of sense-ideas—objects of sense-experience—*out of this relation*.

substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation. [73 But that is all the harm that I can see done.]

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, [49] he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:—There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite<sup>74</sup> ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these<sup>74</sup> are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense—which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits<sup>75</sup>. These latter are said to have more *reality* in them than the former;—by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them<sup>76</sup>. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of *reality*, it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a *real being* by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term *reality* different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see<sup>77</sup>.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense—for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like—this we cannot be accused of taking away<sup>78</sup>:

<sup>73</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>74</sup> i. e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28—30.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. sect. 29.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. sect. 33. 'Not fictions,' i. e. they are presentative, and therefore cannot be misrepresentative in their character.

<sup>77</sup> The metaphysic of Berkeley is an endeavour to convert the word 'real' from being the symbol of an unintelligible abstraction into that of the conscious experience of a mind.

<sup>78</sup> With Berkeley *substances* are either (a) conscious minds, which are substances

but if it be taken in a philosophic sense—for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind<sup>78</sup>—then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. [50]

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so—the word *idea* not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called *things*; [51] and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses<sup>79</sup>. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together<sup>80</sup> constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them *ideas*; which word if it was as ordinarily used as *thing*, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word *idea*, and do not rather in compliance with custom call them *things*; I answer, I do it for two reasons:—first, because the term *thing*, in contradistinction to *idea*, is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because *thing* hath a more comprehensive signification than *idea*, including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thought-

proper, or (b) the divinely conceived and constituted groups of sense-phenomena called 'sensible things,' which are substances conventionally.

<sup>79</sup> And which, because perceived, are ideas—an idea being with Berkeley a *perceived* or *imagined object*.

<sup>80</sup> 'combined together,' i.e. as 'sensible things,' according to the natural laws of the contemporaneity and succession of ideas or phenomena. Cf. sect. 33.



less and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word *idea*, which implies those properties<sup>81</sup>.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. [52] Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense<sup>82</sup>. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn<sup>83</sup>.

41. *Secondly*, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. [53] This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said<sup>84</sup>; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very

<sup>81</sup> Berkeley's philosophy is a system of Intelligible Realism or Dualism, rather than of Idealism in the popular meaning of *idea*—for, he uses the word *idea* merely to mark the fact, that he recognises the existence of objective things only so far as they are perceived and passive objects of a conscious mind; and he does not, as the term Idealism suggests, regard 'sensible things' as created or constructed by the voluntary activity of the individual mind in which they appear. They are perceived, but neither created nor regulated, by the finite percipient, and are thus *external* in the only practical meaning of that term.

<sup>82</sup> The existence of Matter, out of the relation of percept and percipient, cannot, without a contradiction, be said to be sensibly perceived. Therefore, our sense-perceptions, at any rate, do not justify us in affirming more about their immediate objects than that they are ideas or objects of which we are sentient. Custom, not sense, according to Berkeley, induces our imagination and expectation of such and such future sense-perceptions, in consequence of such and such present and actual ones. But cf. *Siris*, sect. 347—349.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. sect. 87—91, against the scepticism which originates in the alleged fallacy of the senses.

<sup>84</sup> It is always to be remembered that with Berkeley the presented ideas or objects of sense are *themselves* the archetypes or real things, whilst the ideas of imagination are images of, or derived from, the archetypes of sense.

different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea<sup>85</sup>.

42. *Thirdly*, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts<sup>86</sup>. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. [<sup>54</sup>]

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, which was published not long since<sup>87</sup> [<sup>55</sup>]<sup>87</sup>—wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight<sup>88</sup>, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it<sup>89</sup>; but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance<sup>90</sup>;

<sup>85</sup> Here feelings are spoken of as in the same relation to a consciousness of them as sensible things are, i. e. both are alike dependent on, but not of the essence or substance of, the percipient—the conscious person.

<sup>86</sup> That our percepts should be seen 'at a distance of several miles' is not inconsistent with their being dependent on a percipient, if the distance—the ambient or external space—is *itself* only an object-perceived, and therefore dependent on a percipient. Cf. sect. 67.

<sup>87</sup> See the Editor's preface to the *Essay*.

<sup>88</sup> *Essay*, sect. 2.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* sect. 11—15.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* sect. 16—28.

but, by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for<sup>91</sup>; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous<sup>92</sup>. The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise<sup>93</sup>. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects—not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning *Vision*. So that in strict truth the ideas of sight<sup>94</sup>, when we apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch<sup>95</sup> will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning *Vision*, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

45. *Fourthly*, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created

<sup>91</sup> *Essay*, sect. 51.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* sect. 47—49, 121—141.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* sect. 43.

<sup>94</sup> i. e. what we are conscious of in seeing.

<sup>95</sup> i. e. tactual sensations. Touch is here taken in its wider meaning, and includes our muscular and locomotive experience, which with Berkeley is involved in the conception of distance. Cf. Mr. Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, chap. 13, in third edition.

anew<sup>96</sup>. [56] The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence<sup>97</sup> of an idea [57] distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are

<sup>96</sup> To define the condition of sensible things *during the intervals of our perception of them*, consistently with the belief of all sane persons regarding the material world, is a challenge which has been often addressed to the advocates of an Intelligible Realism. According to Berkeley, there are no intervals in the existence—either actual, i.e. as perceived, or potential, i.e. as perceivable—of sensible things. They are permanently perceivable, under the laws of nature, though not perpetually perceived by this, that, or the other finite percipient. In other words, they always exist actually in the Divine Conception, and potentially, in relation to finite minds, in the Divine Will, the evolutions of external nature being the constant expression of that Will.—As to creation, cf. *Siris*, sect. 325—328, &c.

<sup>97</sup> Berkeley allows to unperceived bodies a potential or conditional, though not an actual, existence relatively to us. When we say a body exists *potentially*, we mean that if, in the light, we open our eyes, and look towards it, we shall see it, and that if we place our hand where it is we shall feel it.

perceived? [58] Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. [59] For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter<sup>98</sup>, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation<sup>99</sup>.

47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. [60] For, it is evident from sect. 11 and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter [61] which are not perceived by sense<sup>100</sup>. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only

<sup>98</sup> 'Matter,' i. e. material substance or Matter existing *per se*.

<sup>99</sup> 'Those who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that *natura naturans* (to use the language of the Schoolmen) is God, and that the Divine conservation of things is equipollent to and in fact the same thing with a continued repeated creation; in a word, that conservation and creation differ only as the *terminus a quo*. These are the common opinions of Schoolmen; and Durandus, who held the world to be a machine, like a clock made up and put in motion by God, but afterwards continued to go of itself, was therein particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach a doctrine unlike the Schools—*mens agitat molem* (Virgil, *Æneid*, VI). The Stoics and Platonists are everywhere full of the same notion. I am not therefore singular in this point itself, so much as in my way of proving it.' (Berkeley's Letter to Dr. Samuel Johnson of New York.) Cf. *Alciphron*, Dial. IV. sect. 14; *Vindication of New Theory of Vision*, sect. 8, 17, &c.; *Siris*, *passim*, but especially in the latter part. See also *Correspondence between Clarke and Leibnitz*. Jonathan Edwards, in his book on *Original Sin*, and elsewhere, maintains the continual creation of all existing persons as well as things, and employs it in defence of his theology. In several of his writings Edwards approaches the peculiar doctrines of Berkeley regarding the material world. It is worthy of note that when Berkeley was in Rhode Island, Edwards was settled in Massachusetts.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. sect. 123—132.

a finite number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. [62] In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, [63] and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. [64] During all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, [65] and consequently void of all shape and figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is without as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived.

48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever<sup>1</sup>. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them. [66]

<sup>1</sup> Cf. sect. 2, 3, &c., and the *Second and Third Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*.

49. *Fifthly*, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject [67] in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it—that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of *idea*<sup>2</sup>; [68] and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else<sup>3</sup>. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition ‘a die is hard, extended, and square,’ they will have it that the word *die* denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those

<sup>2</sup> i. e. ‘mode or attribute,’ as philosophers employ these terms, when they (unintelligibly) distinguish *modes* or *attributes* from absolute material *subjects* or *substances*. With Berkeley, the ‘substance’ of *matter* (when the term is applied to all to sensible things) is the established group of phenomena of which a particular thing consists. Now extension, and the other so-called qualities of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, related to mind either (a) according to the *unmeaning* relation of subject and attribute, of which philosophers speak, nor (b) as one sense-idea or phenomenon is related to another sense-idea or phenomenon, in the group of sense-phenomena which constitutes, with him, the (perceivable) *substance* of a *material* thing. A mind and its sense-perceptions are, on the contrary, related as percipient or person to the ideas or objects perceived—whatever ‘otherness’ that *sui generis* relation implies. Berkeley sees in this relation a certain sort of *duality*, i. e. (1) mind or person, and (2) its ideas; but it has been disputed whether this distinction of *persons* and *their ideas* is with him a properly numerical, or a merely logical distinction. At any rate, he rejects the unintelligible hypothesis that sense-ideas exist as entities that are independent of all intelligence of them—Divine or finite; and he also refuses to regard them as mere creations or constructions, due to the will of the finite thinker who is conscious of them. Sense-ideas are signs of that Universal Divine Order, which God enables us, through immediate perception and custom or suggestion, to become so cognisant of in physical science, as that the Order is in a measure understood by us. And the sense-ideas present in one mind are numerically different from the sense-ideas present in another—like different copies of the same book, all suggesting a like (i. e. the same) meaning. Cf. Collier’s theory of the ‘inexistence’ of Matter in human minds, and the existence of all minds in the *λόγος*. Parr’s *Metaphysical Tracts*, pp. 116, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Moreover, mind can conceivably exist without perceiving extended or sensible objects, for it may exist conscious of objects of another sort; but extended objects cannot exist without being perceived. Hence mind is distinct from any of its ideas.

qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word *die*. [69]

50. *Sixthly*, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. [70] To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it<sup>4</sup>, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25.

51. *Seventhly*, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to 'think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.' They who to demonstration are

<sup>4</sup> Philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in *perception* as one of cause and effect—the result, according to Berkeley, of illegitimate analysis or abstraction, which creates a fictitious duality of substance. By his new principles, philosophy is based on a recognition of the fact that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but in a relation to it that is *sui generis* and ultimate. Cf. Prof. Ferrier on 'perception' and 'matter,' in his *Institutes of Metaphysics*, Prop. IV., and *Remains*, Vol. II. pp. 261—288.  
407—409.



convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say 'the sun rises,' 'the sun sets,' or 'comes to the meridian;' and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible—even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings—so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things<sup>5</sup>. These men [7<sup>1</sup>] saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense<sup>6</sup>. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without

<sup>5</sup> He refers to Des Cartes, and especially Geulinx, Malebranche, &c., who, while they argued for material *substance*, denied the *causality* of sensible things. With them, as with Berkeley, there are no causes in the material or phenomenal world—only effects, which are evolved in a constant order, contemporaneous and successive, and thus express the meaning of the Supreme Power. See Malebranche, *Entretiens*, VI., VII.

<sup>6</sup> i. e. of their hypothetical material world, existing unperceived.

them—this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition<sup>7</sup>.

54. In the *eighth* place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind<sup>8</sup> may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?—I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it<sup>9</sup>, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a

<sup>7</sup> On the principle, 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.'

<sup>8</sup> Commonly called the argument from Common Sense, and illustrated in the writings of Reid and other Scotch psychologists. That the unreflecting part of mankind should hold an unintelligible, or at least confused, Realism is not to be wondered at, when we recollect that it is the very office of philosophy to interpret the sensible reality, which they and philosophers acknowledge in common to be 'external,' *in some meaning of the term.*

<sup>9</sup> Sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.

small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas<sup>10</sup>, whereof they themselves were not the authors—as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills—this made them maintain those ideas<sup>10</sup> or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar<sup>11</sup>; but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects<sup>12</sup> on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to *Spirit* which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because

<sup>10</sup> i. e. *sense-ideas*.—Though his own sense-ideas or objects are independent of the *will* of the finite percipient, it does not follow that they are independent of his *perception*. Cf. sect. 29—33.

<sup>11</sup> By recognising that what we are immediately percipient of must be *ideal*, or at least that it is only known by us in sense as ideal—as a sense-percept.

<sup>12</sup> i. e. by the unperceived or absolute objects which, on this hypothesis of a representative sense-perception, were assumed to exist *behind* the properly perceived objects or ideas, and to be (according to some) the *cause* of their appearance in our consciousness. Cf. *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, p. 359.

the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflection; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a *Free Spirit*; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of *freedom*<sup>73</sup>.

58. *Tenthly*, [72] it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not: but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them; [73] and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train

<sup>73</sup> Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that the Divine Ideas and Will, and the Laws of Nature, are coincident. But in fact the scientific discovery of *laws* in nature, instead of narrowing, extends the sphere of intelligible Divine agency.

and succession of ideas<sup>14</sup> in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas<sup>14</sup> we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. [74]

60. In the *eleventh* place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary<sup>15</sup> connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a *fiat* or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in

<sup>14</sup> 'ideas,' i. e. sense-ideas or sensations. This 'experience' consists of the established association of *sensations* or *percepts* in the order of external nature, not mere 'association of ideas'—in the popular meaning of the word idea.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. sect. 25, and also various passages in Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon the *arbitrariness* of the so-called causal relations among sensible things, and the consequent sense-symbolism of Nature. It is thus that he speaks of a *language* of Vision. Cf. *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, passim.

the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved *a priori*, with the utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration<sup>16</sup>. [75] Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus: nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without the mind; for it has been made evident [76] that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no *activity* or *efficacy* in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them<sup>17</sup> to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them<sup>17</sup>, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not ab-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. sect. 3, 4, 22—24.

<sup>17</sup> 'them,' i. e. the solid and extended objects, which are supposed to exist unperceived and unperceptible—as distinguished from the Intelligent Cause to whom Berkeley attributes the orderly appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of ideas or objects in the senses.

solutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. [77] There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena—which explanation consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the *uniformity* there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with [78] the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things<sup>18</sup>. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but

<sup>18</sup> So far as that series has been interpreted by us. The nature and moral office of miraculous or supernatural events, in a system of Universal Providence, is here touched upon.

then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. [79] Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:—ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect: there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely *inefficacious perceptions*<sup>19</sup> in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being [<sup>20</sup>credible] that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose. [<sup>80</sup>]

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a mark or *sign* with the thing *signified*. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof<sup>21</sup>. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular com-

<sup>19</sup> Cf. sect. 25.

<sup>20</sup> 'imaginable'—in first edition.

<sup>21</sup> According to Berkeley, Minds, Spirits, Persons are the only proper causes; and it is only by an abuse of language that the term 'cause' is applied to the ideas or objects which



binations, is the same with that for combining letters into words<sup>22</sup>. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by *rule*, and with *wise contrivance*. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas—which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said<sup>23</sup> that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may so call it) of the Author of nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit 'in whom we live, move, and have our being.'

67. In the *twelfth* place, it may perhaps be objected that—though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no are invariable antecedents of other ideas or objects—the prior form of their objective or phenomenal existence. He contrasts so-called Physical with Spiritual Causation—the latter being implied in our conception of mind; the former consisting in the observable relations of phenomena, in which causation proper is unperceived, and therefore non-existent. Physical Science is the interpretation of natural signs, and is only confused (Berkeley would say) by reference to an unconscious agency which is inconceivable.

<sup>22</sup> Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal Natural Symbolism as the true character of the sensible world. See next section, which describes the orderly co-existences and sequences of nature as not *causally necessary*, but *arbitrarily constructed*—in order to be a means of social intercourse, and for the use of man in his contemplation of the Supreme Mind.

<sup>23</sup> See Locke's *Essay*, B. IV. ch. 3, § 25—28, &c.

such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter—yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of *matter* the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us— [81] it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance<sup>24</sup>. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind<sup>25</sup> is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain—since all place or extension exists only in the mind<sup>26</sup>, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of *matter*. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a *nonentity* I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the *unknown occasion*<sup>27</sup>, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflection, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place.

<sup>24</sup> With Berkeley, *material* substance is merely the complement of simple ideas or phenomena which *arbitrarily* constitute a particular thing. (Cf. sect. 37.) The Divine Will is, with him, the cause of phenomena being thus constituted, combined, or substantiated. His substance-proper, i. e. mind, is *necessary*, because an object-perceived necessarily implies a percipient.

<sup>25</sup> i. e. that it is not perceived.

<sup>26</sup> i. e. 'place' exists only as perceived or conceived by an intelligence—sense-perception being its real, and conception its imagined existence. Mind is thus, with Berkeley, the *place* of locality and of space. Cf. *Stiris*, sect. 285, &c.

<sup>27</sup> He refers to the Cartesian theory of occasional causes.

The words 'to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by *occasion*. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. [82] But, when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense—as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an *occasion*? This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds<sup>28</sup>. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they are perceived<sup>29</sup>, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds—that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence

<sup>28</sup> So Geulinx and Malebranche.

<sup>29</sup> As known by the Divine intelligence, they are accordingly *ideas*. And, if this means merely that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate archetype—that the Ideas of God are symbolised in our senses, to be interpreted or misinterpreted by human minds, as reason in man is applied or misapplied—this theory allies itself with the Platonic. It is partly worked out in *Siris*.

of a thing distinct from *Spirit* and *idea*, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God, [83] which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method—much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature<sup>30</sup>. But, as for *inert, senseless Matter*, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of *material substance*; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent

<sup>30</sup> 'It seems to me,' says Hume, 'that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations.' *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. VII. p. i.

that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking *substratum* or substance wherein they did exist—since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves<sup>31</sup>. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this *substratum* or material substance of those qualities<sup>32</sup>, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows [<sup>84</sup>] that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter<sup>33</sup>; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an *unthinking substratum* of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

74. But—though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing<sup>34</sup>, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon—yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the *thing* itself is indefensible, at least to retain the *name*, which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, [<sup>85</sup>] or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflection, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived oc-

<sup>31</sup> Is the assumption of the need for substance of some sort, percipient if not corporeal, regarded by Berkeley as a truth of the absolute or common reason?

<sup>32</sup> e. g. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c.

<sup>33</sup> That is, if we mean by Matter, something existing unperceived and unperceiving. But 'matter,' in another and intelligible meaning of the word, according to Berkeley, may and does exist.

<sup>34</sup> Seeing that sensible phenomena are sufficiently 'supported' by mind.

casation? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion<sup>35</sup> to excite ideas in our minds?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless *somewhat*, [<sup>86</sup>] by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is—that there are certain *unknown Ideas* in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by *occasion* with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name *Matter*, I shall not dispute<sup>36</sup>. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance<sup>37</sup>.

77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or *substratum* of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we

<sup>35</sup> unless that 'occasion' is only another term for His own Ideas.

<sup>36</sup> Berkeley's philosophy seems to imply the existence of Divine Ideas, which receive expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect interpretation. In this view, the assertion of the existence of Matter, material substance, or occasion is simply an assertion that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a reasonable or interpretable universe; and that it would be actually interpreted, if our conceptions were harmonized with the Divine or Absolute Conception which it expresses. The Divine Thought would thus be Absolute Truth or Being. Cf. *Siris* passim.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. sect. 3—24.

have not a sense adapted to them. [87] But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours.—I answer, first, if what you mean by the word *Matter* be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not *what*, and we know not *why*.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but *sensations* or *ideas*, which exist only in a *mind* perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a *substance*, or *occasion of ideas*; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptance but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.

80. In the *last* place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown *somewhat*—neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place? For, say you, whatever may be urged against *substance*

or *occasion*, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this *negative* definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word 'Matter' in the same sense as other men use 'nothing,' and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition—the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term *nothing*.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the positive abstract idea of *quiddity*, *entity*, or *existence*. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption—since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds<sup>38</sup>. But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, *abstracted* from *spirit* and *idea*, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.—It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.

<sup>38</sup> Matter and physical science is *relative*, inasmuch as we may suppose an indefinite number of additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of sense-experience, of course at present inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of all *sense*-perceptions, and having ideas or objects of another sort altogether.



82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies<sup>39</sup>. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: and the difference betwixt *things* and *ideas*, *realities* and *chimeras*, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call *Matter*, or the existence of objects without the mind<sup>40</sup>, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there be or be not external things<sup>41</sup>, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not *really* turned into a serpent, or

<sup>39</sup> Holy Scripture, and the assumed possibility of its existence, added to our natural tendency to believe, are the grounds on which Malebranche and Norris infer the existence of a material world. Berkeley's material world needs no proof—unless of its permanent orderliness, which he rests on suggestion and custom. His aim is not to prove that the material world exists, but to explain what we should mean when we say that it exists.

<sup>40</sup> i. e. existing uncognised by any intelligence—finite or Divine.

<sup>41</sup> 'external things,' i. e. things existing absolutely, or out of all relation to *any* cognitive agent.

was there only a change of *ideas* in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles; [<sup>88</sup>] which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.—To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of *real* and *imaginary* has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. [<sup>89</sup>] I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality<sup>42</sup>;—so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences<sup>43</sup>. Some of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. 'Whether corporeal substance can think,' 'whether Matter be infinitely divisible,' and 'how it operates on spirit'—these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but, depending on the

<sup>42</sup> The simultaneous consciousness of, or participation in, the 'same' *sense*-ideas, by different persons, as distinguished from the purely individual or personal consciousness of *imaginary* objects and emotions, is here referred to as a test of the *reality* of the former.

<sup>43</sup> They are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Treatise, sect. 85—156: those which apply to *ideas* and sensible things in sect. 86—134; what belongs to *spirits*, or subjective substances and powers, in the remainder of the Treatise.

existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.

86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that of IDEAS and that of SPIRITS. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

And *first* as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense<sup>44</sup>—the one *intelligible* or in the mind, the other *real* and without the mind; [9<sup>o</sup>] whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism<sup>45</sup>; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth *real* as it was conformable to *real things*, it follows they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? [9<sup>r</sup>]

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many *sensations* in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to *things* or *archetypes* existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things

<sup>44</sup> Berkeley's 'principles' abolish this *representative* idea in perception, and recognise as the real object only what we are sensibly conscious of—not any uncognised archetype.

<sup>45</sup> So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who see in the hypothesis of a representative perception, implying 'a twofold existence of the objects of sense,' the germ of scepticism. Berkeley claims that under *his* interpretation of what reality, externality, and existence mean, an intuitive knowledge of the real existence of sensible things is given to us.

remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in *rerum natura*. All this sceptical cant follows from our supposing a difference between *things* and *ideas*, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects. [<sup>46</sup>But this is too obvious to need being insisted on.]

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things<sup>47</sup>. But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms 'absolute,' 'external,' 'exist,' &c.—signifying we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very *existence* of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>47</sup> This is admitted by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke.

<sup>48</sup> On Berkeley's own principles, there is no contradiction in the non-existence in *sense* of these 'qualities' of a material substance which we are not at the moment sensibly percipient of—which we merely infer we should be percipient of on certain conditions, e. g. the smell, &c. of an orange whilst we are only looking at it. Their non-existence in *imagination*, when they are suggested by what we are sensibly conscious of, is indeed, on his principles, contradictory.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing, reality, existence*; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words<sup>49</sup>. *Thing* or *Being* is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, viz. *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are active, indivisible, [<sup>50</sup>incorruptible] substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, [<sup>50</sup>perishable passions,] or dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves<sup>51</sup>, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. [<sup>52</sup>We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason<sup>53</sup>. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas<sup>54</sup>. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations<sup>55</sup> between things or ideas—which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that *ideas, spirits, and relations* are all in their

<sup>49</sup> The chief end of the Berkeleian philosophy is to reach an *intelligible* conception of Being, Existence, or Thing, (favourite terms with philosophers); which, according to Berkeley, are not, as Locke would have it, simple ideas, but general names. Being or Existence, as explained by Berkeley, may be viewed either in relation to its permanent or to its variable element. In the former aspect it is the spiritual substance or self; in the latter, when manifested in the *sense-given* co-existences of simple ideas or objects, it is what we call material or sensible existence. Spirits and also syntheses of sense-given objects may be called 'things.' With Berkeley the word 'thing' stands, not for an *archetype* of the associated groups of phenomena of which a mind is percipient, but either for the groups themselves, or for the minds cognizant of them, and who cause the changes which they manifest.

<sup>50</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>51</sup> But whilst ideas or objects depend on being perceived, do not spirits depend on ideas in order to be percipient?

<sup>52</sup> What follows to the end of this section was added in the second edition.

<sup>53</sup> 'reason,' i. e. reasoning or inference, from the changes in the sense-ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. sect. 139—142.

<sup>55</sup> 'Notion' is thus applied by Berkeley to our knowledge of *minds*, and to our knowledge of *relations among ideas*.

respective kinds the object of human knowledge and<sup>56</sup> subject of discourse; and that the term *idea* would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of.]

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist<sup>57</sup>; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind<sup>58</sup>: since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed *external*, with regard to their origin—in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be ‘without the mind’ in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind<sup>59</sup>.

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves.<sup>60</sup> Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived

<sup>56</sup> ‘and’ = or (?),—unless ‘object’ is used in a vague meaning, including more than idea. Cf. sect. 1; also *New Theory of Vision Vindicated*, sect. 11, 12; *Siris*, sect. 297, 308.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. sect. 33, for the meaning of the term ‘real.’

<sup>58</sup> i. e. without or unperceived by *any* mind, human or Divine; which is quite consistent with their being ‘external’ to a finite percipient, i. e. independent of his will, and determined by the conceptions of a higher mind than his—consistent also with the existence of archetypal Ideas in the Divine Mind.

<sup>59</sup> Berkeley here explains what he regards as the legitimate meanings of the term *externality*. Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world—in some conception of the term ‘external.’ It is the business of the philosopher to say what that conception ought to be. Berkeley here acknowledges (a) an externality in *our own* possible experience, past and future, as determined by natural laws, which are independent of the *will* of the percipient; and (b) an externality to our own conscious experience, in the contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future, experience of *other* minds, finite or Divine.

<sup>60</sup> i. e. they are not properly substances, though Berkeley sometimes speaks of them as such. Cf. sect. 37.

by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist<sup>[92]</sup>, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their *reality*, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or *spirits* which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call *Matter*—to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances<sup>61</sup> created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be at all created<sup>62</sup>.

92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter<sup>63</sup> to be uncreated and coeternal with Him. How great a friend *material substance* has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this cornerstone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

<sup>61</sup> 'ideas of the corporeal substances'—whereas Berkeley might say real ideas which are *themselves* our world of sensible things.

<sup>62</sup> On the scheme of intelligible Realism, 'creation' of matter is the production, in finite minds, of sense-objects or ideas, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in a language which God employs for the expression of *His* Ideas, and of which human science is the partial interpretation. Cf. *Siris*, sect. 326.

<sup>63</sup> 'Matter,' i.e. an unperceiving and unperceived Substance and Cause—to which Atheists attribute our personal existence and that of the universe in which we find ourselves. *Such* Matter once allowed, what proof that it is not Supreme or Absolute Being?

93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body on another—all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on *unthinking Matter*, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like [93], have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own *ideas*—but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the *same*, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense<sup>64</sup>, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take

<sup>64</sup> Of which Berkeley does *not* predicate a *numerical* identity. Cf. *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*, pp. 343—345.



away this *material substance*—about the identity whereof all the dispute is—and mean by *body* what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter<sup>65</sup> being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external<sup>66</sup> existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of *abstract ideas*, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a *time* in such a *place*, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if *time* be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of *time* [<sup>94</sup>], abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I

<sup>65</sup> 'matter,' i. e. absolute Matter, unknowing, and unknown by any intelligence.

<sup>66</sup> 'external,' i. e. in the philosophical, but not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, note.

am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence<sup>67</sup>;—since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the *existence* of a spirit from its *cogitation*, will, I believe, find it no easy task<sup>68</sup>.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. [<sup>69</sup>Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the 'fire is not hot,' nor 'the wall white,' &c., or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike *sensations* and alike *real*; that where the extension is, there is the colour too, *i. e.* in his mind<sup>70</sup>, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other *mind*<sup>71</sup>; and that the objects of sense<sup>72</sup> are nothing

<sup>67</sup> *i. e.* of what Mind, Self, the Ego means, of its relation to time, and what personal identity consists in. Berkeley sometimes seems to imply that the existence of the Ego is independent of time or succession, in an eternal present (an *I am*), amid the changes of phenomena of which it is conscious.

<sup>68</sup> As the *esse* of sense-ideas or sensible objects is *percipi*, according to Berkeley, so the *esse* of minds or persons is *percipere*. The existence of a Mind thus depends on consciousness, and the sensible existence of Matter depends on a sense-percipient.

<sup>69</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 43, &c.

<sup>71</sup> *i. e.* as ideas, sensible or intelligible—human or Divine.

<sup>72</sup> 'objects of sense,' *i. e.* sensible or external things. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of *thing*, as distinct from object-proper or simple idea.

but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. [<sup>73</sup>And that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, and in the same sense.]

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect one may make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he did before. This hint may suffice to let any one see the doctrine of *abstraction* has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. [<sup>95</sup>]

101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations.—And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the *true* and *real* nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence<sup>74</sup>, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something

<sup>73</sup> This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>74</sup> With Berkeley, the nominal or logical essence is the real essence of things, in as far as things are in sense what they are conceived to be. But this is quite consistent with the fact that we may and do misinterpret the sensible symbols which constitute our material universe; and thus our conceptions of their meaning are often misconceptions—so that their logical or nominal essence becomes different from their real essence.

there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. [96] Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles<sup>75</sup>; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than *spirit*, it being evident that motion, as well as all other *ideas*, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine<sup>76</sup>.

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is *attraction*. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is

<sup>75</sup> e.g. Locke's *Essay*, IV. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Berkeleyism is so far a Spiritual Positivism, which eliminates all causation from the *objective* world, concentrates it in Mind, and seeks among phenomena or ideas only for the *larvas* of their constant co-existence and succession. But the modern Positivists deny that we may thus infer the ultimate causality of Mind, holding that the ultimate cause or power is incognisable—that the universe is a 'singular effect.'

determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed 'impulse,' or 'protrusion,' as 'attraction.' [97] Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, &c., there is something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name 'attraction,' whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them—for that can be no other than the *will of a spirit*—but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agree-

ments are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it *universal*; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; [98] and, so far is that gravitation from being *essential* to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. [99] There is nothing necessary or essential in the case 77, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit 78, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a *mind* or *spirit*. Secondly, considering the

77 According to Sir W. Hamilton, for example, we are *intellectually necessitated* to think that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in *another* form—but not necessarily in this, that, or the other particular form; for a knowledge of which we are indebted to experience.

78 In other words, what *the* preceding form of any new phenomena actually was, has been determined by the Supreme Will, and is, in that sense, arbitrary. God is the proper cause of the antecedent and consequent forms or phenomena of existence being what we actually find them to be.

whole creation is the workmanship of a *wise and good Agent*, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold<sup>79</sup>) about the final causes of things; [<sup>80</sup>for, besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications of things;] and I must confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made—which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say *demonstrate*, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles<sup>81</sup>—which we cannot evidently know.

108. [<sup>82</sup>It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life. And to me] Those men who frame<sup>83</sup> general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive<sup>84</sup> the phenomena from those rules, seem<sup>85</sup>

<sup>79</sup> He probably refers to Bacon.

<sup>80</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>81</sup> Our assumed 'principles,' or supposed *laws of nature*, may be subordinate or special, and therefore variable, associations of sensible signs which, in their ultimate meaning, express a perfect, and therefore necessary, Divine Idea.

<sup>82</sup> Omitted in the second edition.

<sup>83</sup> i. e. inductively.

<sup>84</sup> i. e. deductively.

<sup>85</sup> 'seem to consider signs rather than causes'—'seem to be grammarians, and their

to consider signs rather than causes. <sup>86</sup>A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar-rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend <sup>87</sup>the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.

109. [<sup>88</sup>To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. [<sup>100</sup>]

110. [<sup>89</sup>The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of *Mechanics*.] [<sup>101</sup>] In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into *absolute* and *relative*, *true* and *apparent*, *mathematical* and *vulgar*;

art the grammar of nature. Two ways there are of learning a language—either by rule or by practice—in first edition.

<sup>86</sup> 'A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the grammar of it, or being able to say,' &c.—in first edition.

<sup>87</sup> 'extend'—'stretch'—in first edition.

<sup>88</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>89</sup> In the first edition, instead of this sentence, the section commences thus: 'The best grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of *Mechanics*, demonstrated and applied to nature by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation whom all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the performance of that extraordinary person; only some things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.' He refers, of course, to Newton. The first edition was published in Ireland—hence 'neighbouring nation.'—On absolute Space, cf. *Siris*, sect. 270, &c.



—which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all.

III. As for *Time*, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an *absolute Space*, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immoveable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. *Place* he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. *Absolute Motion* is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. [102] And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties.—First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed

otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than *relative*<sup>90</sup>; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This to me seems very evident, in that the idea I have of motion does necessarily include relation.—[<sup>91</sup>Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little attention may satisfy them.]

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body *moved* which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force [<sup>92</sup>or action] causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as [<sup>93</sup>I cannot assent to this; for, since we are told] relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to *move*, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which

<sup>90</sup> On motion, cf. *Analyst*, qu. 12, and *De Motu*. See also Malebranche, *Recherche*, I. 8. All attempts to imagine space imply the thought of locomotive sense-experience—an unimpeded, as distinguished from an impeded power of locomotion. Cf. sect. 116.

<sup>91</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>92</sup> Added in second edition.

<sup>93</sup> Omitted in second edition.

is not therefore itself in motion, [<sup>94</sup>I mean relative motion, for other I am not able to conceive.]

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies<sup>95</sup>. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted *absolutely* to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII.* For the water in the vessel [<sup>103</sup>] at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. For, to denominate a body *moved* it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; secondly, that the force occasioning that change be impressed on it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance

<sup>94</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>95</sup> See Locke's *Essay*, B. II. 13. § 7—10.

from some other to be moved, though it have no force <sup>96</sup>applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be [<sup>97</sup>applied or] impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all, [<sup>98</sup>but does not prove that, in the common acceptance of motion, a body is moved merely because it changes distance from another; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given position between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways, though without any change of distance or situation to any other bodies; which we should not deny if they meant only that it might have an impressed force, which, upon the bare creation of other bodies, would produce a motion of some certain quantity and determination. But that an actual motion (distinct from the impressed force or power productive of change of place in case there were bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.]

116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an *absolute Space*, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related to bodies; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of *pure Space* exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible<sup>99</sup>, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *Space*; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is *Body*: and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less *pure*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space,

<sup>96</sup> 'applied to'—'impressed on'—in first edition.

<sup>97</sup> Added in second edition.

<sup>98</sup> What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>99</sup> 'seems impossible'—'is above my capacity'—in first edition.

it is not to be supposed that the word 'space' stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion—though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *pure Space*, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance; but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space<sup>100</sup>. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing does furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the *Essay concerning Vision*.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of *pure Space*. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it<sup>1</sup>. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions.

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some enquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative

<sup>100</sup> i. e. pure Space, as immediately perceived, is ultimately the sensation of an unresisted motion of the body, or of any of its organs. See this less fully developed in *New Theory of Vision*.

<sup>1</sup> Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, which appeared in 1706.

knowledge, to wit, Mathematics<sup>2</sup>. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if so be that in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not ascend into any enquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestable, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of *Number*; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions,

<sup>2</sup> Sect. 118—132.

and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many *difficiles nugæ*, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. [104]

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a 'collection of units,' we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, *i.e.* some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to

those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or *vice versa*. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name or figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in signs, (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the *things* but the *signs*, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numerable things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal<sup>3</sup>. [105]

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 107, &c.



123. From numbers we proceed to speak of *Extension*<sup>4</sup>, which is the object of Geometry. The *infinite* divisibility of *finite* extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so is it the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an *idea* existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely divisible<sup>5</sup>. If by finite extension be meant something

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 122—125, 149—160.

<sup>5</sup> Infinitely divisible extension, being unperceived, must be non-existent—if existence necessarily depends on a percipient, and must be actually perceived. The only possible extension is then sensible extension, which cannot be infinitely divided, but only divided down to the point at which its parts become insensible or non-existent.

distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. [106] But if the terms 'extension,' 'parts,' &c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so; [107] and it is 'impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile<sup>6</sup> to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a *principle*, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.

125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be [7 easily] persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in *abstract* is infinitely divisible. And any one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that<sup>8</sup> a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts—really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [9 But this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15. *Introd.*); where it is explained in what sense this

<sup>6</sup> 'converted Gentile'—'pagan convert'—in first edition.

<sup>7</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>8</sup> 'will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that,' &c.—'will not stick to affirm that,' &c.—in first edition.

<sup>9</sup> Omitted in second edition.

ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude—which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; for, though the ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without any error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained

parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great<sup>10</sup>. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs *a posteriori* [<sup>108</sup>] are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity—as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

130. Of late [<sup>109</sup>] the speculations about Infinites have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on *ad infinitum*. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end: so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity *ad infinitum* of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is

<sup>10</sup> 'we must mean a line,' &c.—'we mean (if we mean anything) a line,' &c.—in first edition.

any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. [110] And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are *both* in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles—that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light, and shew how lines and figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, without supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible, may be the proper business of another place<sup>11</sup>. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application<sup>12</sup> would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it—I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of

<sup>11</sup> See *Analyst*.

<sup>12</sup> 'men of great abilities and obstinate application,' &c.—'men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate application,' &c.—in first edition.

or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the *minimum sensible*; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. [<sup>13</sup>And, whatever mathematicians may think of fluxions, or the differential calculus and the like, a little reflection will shew them that, in working by those methods, they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and almost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or infinitesimals of infinitesimals, if they please; but at bottom this is all, they being in truth finite—nor does the solution of problems require the supposing any other. But this will be more clearly made out hereafter.]

133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly *Matter*, or *the absolute*<sup>14</sup> *existence of corporeal objects*, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of *Matter*<sup>15</sup> is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of 'infinites being incomprehensible;' if withal the removal of this *Matter*<sup>15</sup> be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world,

<sup>13</sup> What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

<sup>14</sup> 'absolute,' i. e. unperceived or irrelative existence—supposed to be either something extended, or something of which we have no positive conception at all.

<sup>15</sup> i. e. absolute or unperceived Matter, but not the relative or perceived material world of the senses.

but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion—methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an *hypothesis*, and the existence of Matter<sup>15</sup> had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless [<sup>16</sup>and in effect conversant about nothing at all]. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and made large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down—that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, compendious, and attainable than they were before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS<sup>17</sup>—with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is—our not having an *idea* of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add—that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but

<sup>15</sup> See note 15 on previous page.

<sup>16</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>17</sup> Sect. 135—156 treat of the consequences of the new Principles of Human Knowledge, in their application to *Spirits* or *Minds*—the second of the two correlatives in the dualism of Berkeley. This dualism Berkeley does not sufficiently explain. When he speaks of Mind as a *Substance*, and of minds in the plural, he cannot mean by 'substance' what Spinoza means—that which for its existence needs nothing beyond itself. Mind, with Berkeley, needs ideas, and must be conscious; and finite minds are dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define.

that this *substance* which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined<sup>18</sup>) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms *soul* and *substance* is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a *round square*.

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an *idea* which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word *spirit* we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea [<sup>19</sup>or notion], it is evident there can be no idea [<sup>19</sup>or notion] of a spirit.

<sup>18</sup> Locke.

<sup>19</sup> Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142.



139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms *soul*, *spirit*, and *substance*, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing—which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself—that which I denote by the term *I*—is the same with what is meant by *soul* or *spiritual substance*. [<sup>20</sup> But if I should say that *I* was nothing, or that *I* was an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these propositions.] If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, since the immediate significations of other names are by common consent called *ideas*, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name *spirit* or *soul* may not partake in the same appellation, I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking<sup>21</sup>. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between *spirit* and *idea*. See sect. 27.

140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea [<sup>22</sup> or rather a notion] of *spirit*; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul—which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142.

<sup>21</sup> If the existence of a mind consists in perceiving, it follows that mind is as dependent on ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind.

<sup>22</sup> Introduced in second edition, in which he professes to apply the term *notion* exclusively to our knowledge of the Ego, and to our knowledge of *relations* among our ideas. Sect. 142.

<sup>23</sup> We know *other* minds or Egos phenomenally, i. e. through phenomena, or by inference from them, but not as ideas or phenomena of which we ourselves are conscious. Cf. sect. 148. It is thus a phenomenal knowledge that we have of other finite minds—of Ego viewed empirically and in plurality. The real meaning of Ego in the plural number, dis-

141. [<sup>24</sup>The natural immortality of the soul [<sup>111</sup>] is a necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we attempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul<sup>25</sup> are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. [<sup>112</sup>] But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind—which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness<sup>26</sup>. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the *course of nature*) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, un compounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, ‘the soul of man is naturally immortal’<sup>27</sup>.

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of *idea*. *Spirits* and *ideas* are things so wholly different, that when we say ‘they exist,’ ‘they are known,’

tinguished from the absolute or transcendental Ego, is a question which Berkeley has not discussed.

<sup>24</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>25</sup> ‘the soul,’ i. e. the finite mind or empirical Ego.

<sup>26</sup> This is an emphatic assertion of the dualism of Berkeley—Minds or Egos being distinguished from their ideas or objects.

<sup>27</sup> Although minds are dependent on ideas, as well as ideas on minds, yet minds are not, by any abstract necessity, dependent on *sense*-ideas or physical organization. Hence, while pure materialism is, on Berkeley’s principles, a contradiction, the continued existence of a disembodied spirit involves no necessary absurdity.

or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures<sup>28</sup>. There is nothing alike or common in them; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle<sup>29</sup>, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. [<sup>30</sup>We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an *idea* of an active being, or of an action<sup>31</sup>, although we may be said to have a *notion* of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas—inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms *idea* and *notion* may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind<sup>32</sup>, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word *idea* is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.]

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of *abstract ideas* has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions

<sup>28</sup> The objective essence of matter, or the sense-given non-ego, is, with Berkeley, purely phenomenal or ideal; the essence of mind—the Ego—is substantial and causal. Sense-ideas or phenomena are at once dependent on mind, and symbolical of the intentions of mind. Mind and its ideas are, in short, at the opposite poles of existence—being related as subject knowing and object known, as cause and effects, as substance and phenomenon. But he does not say that these poles, thus opposed, are numerically distinguishable as things independent of each other.

<sup>29</sup> i. e. objectively—as an object or idea.

<sup>30</sup> What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which the term *notion* is defined, and assists to express Berkeley's duality in things.

<sup>31</sup> Yet he speaks elsewhere (sect. 1, &c.) of ideas formed by attending to the 'operations' of the mind. He probably refers to the *effects* of the operations, holding that the effects, but not their cause, are ideal.

<sup>32</sup> Here is the germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes *relation*, as distinguished from the personal acting of *will*. Cf. remarkable passages in *Siris*, sect. 297, 308, &c.

of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. [<sup>13</sup>] Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the *motion* of the soul: this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to [<sup>33</sup>depart from some received prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [<sup>33</sup>But the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise.]

145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. [<sup>14</sup>] Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>34</sup> This is one of the most important sections in the book. It has been common (see Reid's *Essays*, VI. 5, &c.) to allege that, on Berkeley's principles, I have no reason to believe in the existence of *other* minds or wills—a plurality of Egos, or at any rate in other Egos than my own, and the Supreme or Absolute. I can design or intend; all the rest is God's—my volitions and His determine the phenomenal universe. Now, Berkeley holds that we have the same *sort* of reason to believe in the existence of other *human* minds that we have to believe in the existence of God, viz. the sense-symbolism which implies the existence of other finite minds, embodied like our own, as its only reasonable interpreta-

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals—I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, ‘who works all in all,’ and ‘by whom all things consist.’

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents<sup>35</sup>. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be

tion. Cf. sect. 147, 148. Both are beliefs gathered from the *suggestions* of experience. This enables us to infer the existence not merely of other, and by us, at present, unperceived phenomena, in *our own* past or future experience; and phenomena in the present, past, or future experience of *other minds*; but also, as implied in the latter, the *existence* of other minds—other selfs. His mode of looking at the universe leaves the evidence for the existence of other men as it was before (although our ideas and those of other men are with him not numerically identical, but only in a harmony of similarity); while his theory was believed by him to intensify the evidence of Divine Presence and Providence. See *Alciphron*, Dial. IV., and *Vindication of New Theory of Vision*, sect. 8, 38, &c.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Alciphron*, Dial. IV. 8—14; *Vindication of New Theory of Vision*, sect. 8.

attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, 'upholding all things by the word of His power,' maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other<sup>36</sup>. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible [<sup>37</sup>to the greatest part of mankind].

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot *see* God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is<sup>38</sup>, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. [<sup>35</sup>] But I shall explain my meaning:—A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man—if by *man* is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do—but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to our-

<sup>36</sup> God so regulates the sense-given phenomena or ideas of which spirits are individually conscious, as that these phenomena, *while numerically different in each mind*, are nevertheless a practical medium of intercourse between minds. Egoism is seen not to be a necessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be conscious of my own experience, when we recognise that persons only are powers, and that *I* am not the cause of *all* the changes which my ideas or phenomena exhibit. Without being themselves conscious of my consciousness, we may infer that other persons or minds are at work to modify it. In short, our experience of power or volition, and of our own limited power, is essential to Berkeley's recognition of a plurality of minds or substances—to his escape from the unity of Absolute Egoism, and to his scientific recognition of *his* external world.

<sup>37</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>38</sup> Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. According to Malebranche we see material or sensible things in God, who transcends, and in transcending unites the substantial antithesis of Mind and Matter. See *Recherche*, liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c.

selves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity—everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men<sup>39</sup>.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short 'in whom we live, and move, and have our being.' That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by *Nature* is meant only the visible *series* of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all<sup>40</sup>. But, if by *Nature* is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Chris-

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Alciphron*, Dial. IV. and *Vindication of New Theory of Vision*, sect. 8, 38, &c. The *eternal* existence of conscious Mind, and the *present* existence of other finite minds than my own, are both inferences, according to Berkeley. The former, however, follows from the assumption that *something* must be eternal, because something now exists; seeing that this 'something,' as existing, must be a mind conscious of ideas or objects.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. sect. 25, 51—53, 60—66, &c.

tians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. 'The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. 'He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night.' Amos v. 8. 'He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.' See Psal. lxxv. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) 'He be not far from every one of us.'

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected, that the slow, gradual, and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent<sup>41</sup>. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. [<sup>42</sup> For, it doth hence follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner, which gives him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. 'Verily' (saith the prophet) 'thou art a God that hidest thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though

<sup>41</sup> Cf. sect. 60—66.

<sup>42</sup> Omitted in second edition.



the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of beings<sup>43</sup>. [44 Secondly.] It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. But, we should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals<sup>45</sup>. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere *fiat* or act of his will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of his power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of

<sup>43</sup> So Pascal in the *Pensées*.

<sup>44</sup> Omitted in second edition.

<sup>45</sup> So Butler, in his *Analogy*. Also cf. sect. 60—66.

finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it *evil*; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings<sup>45</sup>.

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence<sup>46</sup>—[<sup>116</sup>] the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it, at least with a full and direct view? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian

<sup>45</sup> So Butler, in his *Analogy*.

<sup>46</sup> A constant Divine Thought and Providence in the changes of the phenomenal world, rather than the original creation of finite minds and of their ideas or phenomena, is the conception which runs through Berkeley's philosophy, conspicuously in *Siris*.

countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into [<sup>47</sup> a sort of Demy-] Atheism. [<sup>48</sup> They cannot say there is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret misgivings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety?] Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without all scruple 'that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on;' that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; in fine, that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circum-spection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to *Virtue*, and the best guard against *Vice*.


156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practise is the highest perfection of human nature.

<sup>47</sup> Omitted in second edition. Our alleged necessary ignorance of the *ultimate* cause and meaning of the Universe in which we find ourselves is, in the present day, a common objection to the assumption that its phenomena may be interpreted as significant of Supreme or Absolute Mind. As Hume or Comte would have it, the Universe is a *singular* effect or complement of phenomena, which we can interpret only so far as our secular wants and duties are concerned. They look to the physical or phenomenal, and not to the moral and spiritual evidence.

<sup>48</sup> Omitted in second edition.



APPENDIX.



## A.

### BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

[AFTER the *Principles of Human Knowledge* had passed through the press, I found Berkeley's autograph of a rough draft of the Introduction, in the manuscript department of the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. It seems to have been written in November and December, 1708. I here present it to the reader, who will find that it varies considerably from the published version, besides containing erasures and interlineations which have a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical interest. As this Introduction forms Berkeley's early attack upon metaphysical abstractions, and his reasoned exposition of what has since been called his Nominalism, it may be well to have so important a part of his philosophy placed before us in various verbal forms which it successively assumed when it was struggling into the final expression. The student of his mind may like also to compare these with still earlier illustrative fragments in the *Commonplace Book*, appended to his *Life and Letters*, as well as with the theory of universals in *Alciphron* and especially in *Siris*. What Berkeley here means to deny is the existence of any *physical* reality, corresponding to general names, apart from actual or imagined sensible phenomena. In this early attack upon 'abstract ideas,' his characteristic ardour carried him in appearance to the extreme of rejecting the universalizing element, by which Mind constitutes and gives objectivity to things, and of resting knowledge on the shifting foundation of phenomena or ideas—particular, contingent, and subjective. But if he seems to do this in the Introduction, he virtually proceeds in the body of the *Principles* upon the assumption that personal substantiality and efficient or voluntary causality are universal and uncreated necessities of Being—axiomatic truths involved in all concrete consciousness of phenomena. This assumption (along with the assumed general fact of established cosmical order) redeems his philosophy from subjectivity, and gives cohesion and fixedness to knowledge. This stable intellectuality is more manifest in *Siris*. But he everywhere leans on living acts, not verbal formulas.

A. C. F.]

Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may seem strange that they who have spent much time and pains in it, do usually find themselves embarrass'd with more doubts and difficulties than they were before they [<sup>1</sup>came to that study. There is nothing these men can [<sup>2</sup>touch] with their hands or behold with their eyes but has its inaccessible and dark sides. Something ] they imagine to be in every drop of water, every grain of sand which can puzzle [<sup>3</sup>and confound] the most clear and [<sup>4</sup>elevated] understanding, and are often by their principles led into a necessity of admitting the most irreconcilable opinions for true, or (which is worse) of sitting down in a forlorn scepticism.

The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, together with the natural weakness and imperfection of our understanding. It is said the senses we have are few, and these design'd by nature only for the support of life, and not to penetrate into the constitution and inward essence of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wonder'd at if it run into absurdities<sup>5</sup> and contradictions, out of which it is [<sup>3</sup>absolutely] impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite<sup>6</sup>.

But I cannot think our faculties are so weak and inadequate in respect of things, as these men would make us believe. I cannot be brought to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end<sup>7</sup> in consequences which cannot be maintain'd or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that which he had placed quite out of their reach, and so made it impossible for them to obtain. Surely our wise and good Creatour would never have made us so eager in the search

<sup>1</sup> On the opposite page of the MS., instead of what follows within brackets—'meddled with that study. To them the most common and familiar things appear intricate and perplex'd, there's nothing but has its dark sides. Somewhat'

<sup>2</sup> 'handle.'

<sup>3</sup> Erased.

<sup>4</sup> 'comprehensive.'

<sup>5</sup> 'absurdities' instead of 'inconsistencys' erased.

<sup>6</sup> on the margin of this paragraph is written—'Nov. 15, 1708.'

<sup>7</sup> 'end' instead of 'terminate' erased.



of truth meerly to baulk and perplex us, to make us blame our faculties, and bewail our inevitable ignorance. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole my opinion is, that the far greatest part, if not all, of those difficultys which have hitherto amus'd philosophers, and block'd up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to themselves. That they have first rais'd a dust, and then complain they cannot see.

My purpose therefore is, to [<sup>8</sup>try if I can] discover [<sup>9</sup>and point out] what those principles are which have introduc'd all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurditys and contradictions into the several sects of philosophy, insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And at the same time to establish such principles in their stead, as shall be free from the like consequences, and lead the mind into a clear view of truth. And surely it is a work well deserving of our pains, to try to extend the limits of our knowledge, and [<sup>10</sup>do right to] human understanding, by making it to appear that those lets and difficultys which stay and embarrass the mind in its enquirys [<sup>11</sup>after truth] do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or [<sup>12</sup>natural] defect in the intellectual powers, so much as from false principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider what a number of men of very great and extraordinary abilitys have gone before me, [<sup>9</sup>and miscarry'd] in the like [<sup>13</sup>designs, yet] I am not without some hopes, upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is shortsighted will be apt to draw the object nearer, and by a close and narrow survey may perhaps discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

<sup>8</sup> Instead of 'endeavour to.'

<sup>9</sup> Erased.

<sup>10</sup> Instead of 'beat down those mounds and barriers that have been put to.'

<sup>11</sup> Within brackets in the MS.

<sup>12</sup> Instead of 'incurable' erased.

<sup>13</sup> Instead of 'undertakings.'

[<sup>14</sup>In my entrance upon this work] I think it necessary to take notice of [<sup>15</sup>that w<sup>ch</sup> seems to have been the source of a great many errors, and to have made the way to knowledge very intricate and perplex'd, that w<sup>ch</sup> seems to have had a chiefe part in rendering speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have been the source of innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge]—and that is the opinion that there are Abstract Ideas or General Conceptions of Things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and [<sup>16</sup>notions] of philosophers must needs acknowledge that [<sup>17</sup>no small] part of [<sup>18</sup>them] are spent <sup>19</sup>about Abstract Ideas. These are, in a more special manner, thought to be the objects of those sciences that go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime philosophy. In all which [<sup>20</sup>speculative sciences] you shall scarce find any question handled [<sup>20</sup>by the philosophers] in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is very well acquainted with them; [<sup>20</sup>so that these parts of learning must of necessity be overrun with [very much] useles wrangling and jargon, [innumerable] absurdities and contradictions [opinions], if so be that Abstract General Ideas are perfectly inconceivable, as I am well assur'd they [never were—cannot be] conceived by me, [<sup>21</sup>nor do I think it possible they should be conceiv'd by any one else].]

By abstract idea, genera, species, universal notions, all which amount to the same thing, as I find these terms explain'd by the best and clearest writers, we are to understand ideas which equally

<sup>14</sup> Instead of 'But here in the entrance, before I proceed any further.' On the blank page opposite we have—'In my entrance upon this work [before I descend to more particular subjects] [and] [to more particular enquiries].'

<sup>15</sup> Instead of—'yt w<sup>h</sup> seem to me [one] very powerful and universal cause of error and confusion throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages'—and the opposite page, 'that which seems to me a wide-spread [in philosophical enquiries] throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages.'

<sup>16</sup> Brackets in the MS.

<sup>17</sup> Instead of 'very great.'

<sup>18</sup> Instead of 'their disputes and contemplations [speculations].'

<sup>19</sup> 'concerning' instead of 'about' erased.

<sup>20</sup> Erased.

<sup>21</sup> On opposite page—'and I very much question whether they ever were or can be by any one else.'

represent the particulars of any sort, and are made by the mind which, observing that the individuals of each kind agree in some things and differ in others, takes out and singles from the rest that which is common to all, making thereof one abstract general idea; which [<sup>22</sup>general idea] contains all those ideas wherein the particulars of that kind agree [<sup>22</sup>and partake], separated from and exclusive of all those other concomitant ideas whereby they [<sup>22</sup>individuals] are distinguished [<sup>22</sup>from each other] one from another. [<sup>22</sup>To this abstract general idea thus framed the mind gives a general name, and lays it up and uses it as a standard whereby to judge what particulars are and what are not to be accounted of that sort, those only which contain every part of the general idea having a right to be admitted into that sort and by that name.]

For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John, &c., resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other quality, leaves out of the complex idea it has of Peter, James, &c., that which is peculiar to each, retaining only that which is common to all. And so it makes one [<sup>23</sup>abstract] complex idea, wherein all the particulars partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence: and after this manner you come by [<sup>24</sup>the] precise abstract idea of [<sup>22</sup>a] man. In which [<sup>22</sup>idea] it is true there is included colour because there is no man but hath some colour, but then it can be neither white [<sup>22</sup>colour] nor black [<sup>22</sup>colour] nor any particular colour, but colour in general, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. In like manner you will tell me there is included stature, but it is neither tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middling stature, but stature in general. And so of the rest. [<sup>25</sup>Suppose now I should ask whether you comprehended, in this your abstract idea of man, the ideas of eyes, or ears, or nose, or legs, or arms [this might perhaps put you to a stand for an answer, for] you will own it to be an odd and mu-

<sup>22</sup> Erased.

<sup>23</sup> Instead of 'general.'

<sup>24</sup> Instead of 'a clear.'

<sup>25</sup> Erased. On opposite page, but erased, are the words—'an odd and mutilated idea, that of man without all these.' And on the same page—'it must needs [make an odd and frightful figure the idea] of [a] man without all these,' also erased.

tilated idea of a man w<sup>ch</sup> is without all these. Yet it must be so to make it consistent with the doctrine of abstract ideas, there being particular men that want, some arms, some legs [some noses, &c.] ]

[<sup>27</sup> But supposing the abstract idea of men to be very conceivable, let us proceed to see [<sup>26</sup> how] it comes to be enlarg'd into the more general and comprehensive idea of animal.] There being a great variety of other creatures [<sup>27</sup> as birds] that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those onely which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, [<sup>27</sup> which is more general than that of man, it comprehending not only all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects.] The constituent parts whereof [<sup>27</sup> of the complex idea of animal] are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body [<sup>27</sup> in general], without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering either of hair, or feathers, or [<sup>28</sup> scales], and yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers [<sup>28</sup> scales], and nakedness being peculiar distinguishing properties of [<sup>27</sup> the] particular animals, and for that reason left out of the [<sup>29</sup> abstract] idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be neither walking nor flying nor creeping, it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to say.

In like manner a man [<sup>27</sup> having seen several lines] by leaving out of his idea of a line [<sup>30</sup> the particular colour and length] comes by the idea of a line which is neither black, nor white, nor red, &c., nor long nor short, which he calls the abstract idea of a line, and which, for ought that I can see, is just nothing. [<sup>27</sup> For I ask whether a line has any more than one particular colour and one particular length, which [when they are] being left out, I beseech any <sup>31</sup> one to consider what it is that remains.]

Whether others have this [<sup>32</sup> wonderful] faculty of abstracting their ideas, they can [<sup>33</sup> best] tell. For myself, I dare be con-

<sup>26</sup> Instead of 'by what steps and abstractions.'

<sup>27</sup> Erased.

<sup>28</sup> Instead of 'fins.'

<sup>29</sup> Instead of 'general.'

<sup>30</sup> Instead of 'all particular colour, and all particular length.'

<sup>31</sup> 'one' instead of 'man.'

<sup>32</sup> Instead of 'marvellous.'

<sup>33</sup> Instead of 'better.'

fidest I have it not; [<sup>36</sup> and I am apt to think that some of those who fancy themselves to enjoy that privilege, would, upon looking narrowly into their own thoughts, find they wanted it as much as I. For there was a time when, being banter'd and abus'd by words, I did not in the least doubt my having it. But upon a strict survey of my abilities, I not only discover my own deficiency in that point, but also cannot conceive it possible that such a person should be even in the most perfect and exalted understanding.] I find I have a faculty of imagining, conceiving, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceiv'd, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joyn'd to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose each by itself [<sup>34</sup>abstracted or] separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever eye or nose I imagine, they must have some particular shape and colour. The idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling sized man. I cannot by any effort of [<sup>35</sup>thought] frame to myself an idea of man [<sup>36</sup>prescinding from all particulars] that shall have nothing particular in it. [<sup>36</sup>For my life I cannot comprehend abstract ideas<sup>37</sup>.]

And there are grounds to think [<sup>38</sup>most] men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which are simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without much study and speculation, we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are altogether confin'd to the learned.

But it must be confess'd, I do not see what great advantage they give them above the rest of mankind. He who considers that whatever has any existence in nature and can any wise affect or concern [<sup>36</sup>is] him is particular, will not find great cause to be discontent with his facultys, if [<sup>39</sup>they] cannot reach a piece of knowledge as useless as it is refin'd; [<sup>36</sup>and] which whether it

<sup>34</sup> Instead of 'singled out and.'

<sup>35</sup> Instead of 'imagination.'

<sup>36</sup> Erased.

<sup>37</sup> On opposite page the words—'I can conceive well enough what is meant by adequate and inadequate, clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd [ideas], but'—are written and erased.

<sup>38</sup> Instead of 'the far greatest part of.'

<sup>39</sup> Instead of 'he.'

be to be found even in those deep thinkers may well be made a question.

For besides the [<sup>49</sup>incomprehensibleness] of abstract ideas to my understanding (which may pass for an argument, since those gentlemen do not pretend to any new facultys distinct from those of ordinary men), there are not wanting other proofs against them. [<sup>41</sup>It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive that which God cannot cause to be? Now it is on all hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist; whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding.]

[<sup>42</sup>I do not think it necessary to insist on any more proofs, against the doctrine of abstraction in this place, especially for that the absurditys, which in the progress of this work I shall observe to have sprung from that doctrine, will yield plenty of arguments a posteriori against it.] I proceed [<sup>42</sup>therefore] to examine what can be alleged in defence [<sup>43</sup>of the doctrine of abstraction], and try if I can discover what it is that [<sup>44</sup>inclines] the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so pregnant of absurditys, and so remote from common sense as that seems to be.

There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteen'd philosopher, to whose judgment, so far as authority is of any weight with me, I would pay the utmost deference. This great man, no doubt, has very much countenanc'd the doctrine of abstraction by seeming to think [<sup>45</sup>it] is that which puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. Thus speaks he: 'The having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the facultys of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for [<sup>46</sup>making] universal ideas; from which we have reason

<sup>40</sup> Instead of 'incomprehensibility,' and on opposite page, but erased—'incomprehensibleness to my understanding by any [intellect—understanding] whatsoever.'

<sup>41</sup> Erased. On opposite page—'That a contradiction cannot be conceiv'd by any human understanding whatsoever is, I think, agreed on all hands. And to me it is no less clear that the description of an abstract idea doth include a contradiction in it.'

<sup>42</sup> Erased. <sup>43</sup> Instead of 'thereof.'

<sup>44</sup> Instead of 'has inclined.'

<sup>45</sup> Instead of 'the having abstract ideas.'

<sup>46</sup> Within brackets in the MS.

to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs.' And a little lower: 'Therefore I think we may suppose that 'tis in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense, but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receiv'd them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.' (*Essay on Human Understanding*, Book 2, chap 11. s. 10, 11.) I readily agree with this authour that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to the making of abstract general ideas. But then if that inability to abstract be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that now pass for men must be reckon'd into their number.

The reason which is here assign'd why we have no grounds to think that brutes have general ideas, is that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs—which is built on this supposition—that the making use of words implys the having of general ideas, and that [<sup>47</sup>on the other hand] those who have general ideas fail not to make use of words, or other universal signs, [<sup>48</sup>whereby] to express [<sup>48</sup>and signify them]. [<sup>48</sup>That this is the] From which it must follow, that men who use language are able to abstract and generalize their ideas, but brutes [<sup>49</sup>that] use it not are destitute of that faculty. That this is the sense and arguing of the authour of the *Essay*, will farther appear, by his answering the question he in another place puts. Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms? His answer is—'Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas.' (*Essay on Human Understanding*, b. 3. c. 3. s. 6.) From which assertion I must crave leave to dissent, being of opinion that a word becomes general by being [<sup>50</sup>the]

47 Instead of 'reciprocally.'

49 Instead of 'who.'

48 Erased.

50 Within brackets in the MS.

made the sign, not of a general idea, but of many particular ideas. Sure I am, as to what concerns myself, when I say the word Socrates is a proper [<sup>52</sup>or particular] name, and the word man an appellative or general name, I mean no more than this, viz. that the one is peculiar and appropriated to one particular person, the other common to a great many particular persons, each [<sup>51</sup>of which] has an equall right in propriety of language to be called by the name man. [<sup>52</sup>This, I say, is the whole truth of the matter, and not that I make any incomprehensible abstract idea wherunto I annex the name man. That were to [make] my words stand for I know not what.]

That great man seems to think the necessary ends of language could not be attain'd [<sup>52</sup>to] without the use of abstract ideas. B. 3. c. 6. s. 39 [<sup>52</sup>he shews it] and elsewhere he shews it to be his opinion that they are made in order to naming. B. 3. c. 1. s. 3 he has these words: 'It is not enough for the perfection of language that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplex'd their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms whereby one word was made to mark a number of particular existences, which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of. Those names becoming general which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular where the ideas they are used for are particular.' Now I would fain know why a word may not be made to comprehend a great number of particular things in its signification, without the [<sup>53</sup>help] of a general idea? Is it not possible to give the name [<sup>54</sup>colour to black, white, and red, &c.] without having first made that strange and to me incomprehensible idea of [<sup>55</sup>colour in abstract]? Or must we imagine that a child upon sight of a particular body, and being told it is called an apple, must first frame to himself an abstract general idea [<sup>56</sup>exclusive of] all particular

<sup>51</sup> Instead of 'whereof.'

<sup>52</sup> Erased.

<sup>53</sup> Instead of 'interposition.'

<sup>54</sup> Instead of 'man to Peter, James, and John.'

<sup>55</sup> Instead of 'man which shall have nothing particular in it.'

<sup>56</sup> Instead of 'thereof, abstracting from.'



colour, tast, and figure before he can attain to the use of the word apple, and apply it to all the particulars of that sort of fruit that come in his way? [<sup>58</sup>This surely is a task too hard and metaphysical to be perform'd by an infant just beginning to speak.] Nay, I appeal to the experience of any grown man, whether this be the course he takes in acquainting himself with the [<sup>57</sup>right] use and signification of any word? Let any man take a fair and impartial view of his own thoughts, and then determine whether his general words do not become so only by being made to mark a number of particular existences, without any the least thought of abstraction. For what, I pray, are words but signs of our thoughts? and how are signs of any sort render'd universal otherwise than by being made to signify, or represent indifferently, a multitude of particular things?

The ideas that are in every man's mind ly hid [<sup>58</sup>den], and cannot of themselves be brought into the view of another. It was therefore necessary, for discourse and communication, that men should institute sounds to be signs of their ideas, which being [<sup>59</sup>excited] in the mind of the hearer [<sup>60</sup>might] bring along with them [<sup>58</sup>into his understanding] such ideas as in the propriety of any language were annex'd to them. But because of the almost infinite number and variety of our [<sup>61</sup>ideas], it is impossible, and if it were possible would yet be a useless thing, to appropriate a particular [<sup>58</sup>word to a] sign or name to every one of them. From which it must necessarily follow, that one word be made the sign of a great number of particular ideas, between which there is some likeness and which are said to be of the same sort. [<sup>62</sup>But then these sorts are not determin'd and set out by nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor yet are they limited by any precise abstract ideas settl'd in the mind, with the general name annexed to them, as is the opinion of the authour of the *Essay*, nor do they in truth seem to me to have any precise bounds or limits at all. For if [there were] they had I

<sup>57</sup> Instead of 'proper.'

<sup>58</sup> Erased.

<sup>59</sup> Instead of 'raised.'

<sup>60</sup> Instead of 'shall.'

<sup>61</sup> Instead of 'thoughts.'

<sup>62</sup> Erased. On the opposite page we have—'Every one's experience may convince him that this is all that's meant by general names, and that they do not stand either for universal natures distinct from our conceptions as was held by the Peripatetics and generality of the Schoolmen, nor yet for universal notions or ideas as is the opinion of that sort of Schoolmen called Nominals and of the authour of the *Essay*.'

do not see how there could be those doubts and scruples about the sorting of particular beings which [that authour insists on as a good proof] are observ'd sometimes to have happen'd. Neither do I think it necessary the kinds or species of things should be so very accurately bounded and marked out, language being made by and for the common use of men, who do not ordinarily take notice of the minuter and less considerable differences of things.] From [<sup>63</sup>all] which to me it seems evident that the having of general names does not imply the having of general ideas, but barely the marking by them a number of particular ideas, and that all the ends of language may be and are attain'd without the help of any such faculty as abstraction.

Which will be made yet more manifest if we consider the different manners wherein words [<sup>63</sup>and ideas [are] do stand for and represent things] represent ideas, and ideas things. There is no similitude or resemblance betwixt words and the ideas that are marked by them. Any name may be used indifferently for the sign of any idea, or any number of ideas, it not being determin'd by any likeness to represent one more than another. But it is not so with ideas in respect of things, of which they are suppos'd to be the copies and images. They are not thought to represent them [<sup>63</sup>any] otherwise than as they resemble them. Whence it follows that an idea is not capable of representing indifferently anything [<sup>64</sup>whatsoever], it being limited by the likeness it beares to some particular [<sup>65</sup>thing] to represent it rather than any other. The word man may equally be put to signify any particular man I can think of. But I cannot frame an idea of man which shall equally represent and correspond to each particular of that sort of creatures that may possibly exist.

I shall [<sup>63</sup>only] add one more passage out of the *Essay on Human Understanding*, which is as follows: 'Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry difficulty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are

<sup>63</sup> Erased.

<sup>64</sup> Instead of 'or number of things.'

<sup>65</sup> Instead of 'existence.'

apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult), for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 'Tis true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the hast to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much enclin'd; but yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earlyest knowledge is conversant about.' B. 4. c. 7. s. 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here describ'd, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that every one would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one to look a little into his own understanding, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description here given of the general idea of a triangle which is neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? He that can conceive such manifest contradictions and inconsistencies, 'tis fit he enjoy his privilege. For my part [<sup>66</sup>I am well assur'd] <sup>67</sup>I have not the power of so doing, nor consequently of making to myself these general ideas; neither do I find that I have any need of them either for the conveniency of communication or the enlargement of knowledge [<sup>66</sup> for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge. For which I am not sorry, because it is here said one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our *imperfection*. Tho', I must own, I do not

<sup>66</sup> Erased.

<sup>67</sup> On opposite page—erased—'I must own I have so much of the brute in my understanding, that.'

see how this agrees with what has been above quoted [out of the same authour], viz. the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an *excellency* which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.]

It is observable [<sup>68</sup>what it is here said] of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill that is requisite to the forming [<sup>66</sup>of] them. To the same purpose Aristotle (who was certainly a great admirer and promoter of the doctrine of abstraction) has these words: *χεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴστι τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθησέων ἴστι.* There is scarce anything so incomprehensible to men as the most universal notions, because they are most remote from sense. *Metaph.* lib. i. cap. 2<sup>69</sup>. It is on all hands agreed, that there is need of great pains and toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate [<sup>70</sup>our thoughts] from particular ideas such as are taken in by the senses, and raise [<sup>70</sup>them] to those lofty speculations [<sup>71</sup>which] are conversant about abstract and universal ones.

From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming of abstract ideas is not necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men, even the most barbarous and unreflecting. But we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know at what time it is men are employ'd in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary [<sup>72</sup>materials] of discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then they are not conscious of any such pains-taking. It remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiply'd labour of framing general notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot commune one with another of their sugar-plumbs and rattles, and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tack'd together number-

<sup>68</sup> Instead of 'that which is [here] said by that authour on this occasion.'

<sup>69</sup> Text as in Schwegler—*σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθησέων ἔστω.*

<sup>70</sup> Instead of 'it.'

<sup>71</sup> Instead of 'that.'

<sup>72</sup> Instead of 'preliminarys.'

less inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds general abstract ideas, and annex'd them to every common name they make use of?

Nor do I think they are a whit more needful for enlargement of knowledge, than for communication. For tho' it be a point much insisted on in the Schools that all knowledge is about universals, yet I [<sup>73</sup> can by no means see the necessity of] this doctrine. It is acknowledg'd that nothing has a fairer title to the name of knowledge or science than geometry. Now I appeal to any man's thoughts whether, upon the entrance into that study, the first thing to be done is to try to conceive a circle that is neither great nor small, nor of any determinate radius, or to make ideas of triangles and parallelograms that are neither rectangular nor obliquangular, &c. ? It is [<sup>74</sup> true] one thing for a proposition to be universally true, and another for it to be about universal natures or notions. [<sup>75</sup> Because] that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones is granted to be a proposition universally true, it will not therefore follow that we are to understand it of universal triangles, or universal angles. It will suffice that it be true of [<sup>74</sup> any particular tri] the particular angles of any particular triangle whatsoever.

But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the general idea of a triangle, which equally agrees to and represents them all? For because a property may be demonstrated to belong to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to [<sup>74</sup> some] any other triangle which in all respects is not the same with the former. For instance, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles, rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore, that to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or else we must, once for all, demonstrate it of the general idea of a triangle in which all the

<sup>73</sup> Instead of ' [could never] bring myself to comprehend.'

<sup>74</sup> Erased.

<sup>75</sup> Instead of ' Thus [notwithstanding].'

particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally represented.

To which I answer, that notwithstanding the idea I have in my mind, whilst I make the demonstration, be that of some particular triangle, e. g. an isosceles, rectangular one whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain that it extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the legs are at all concern'd in the demonstration. 'Tis true the diagram I have in my view does include these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the legs comprehending it are [<sup>76</sup>equal] of the same length; which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and yet the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle; and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the general idea of a triangle which was all and none, it not being possible for me to conceive any triangle whereof I cannot delineate the like on paper. But I believe no man, whatever he may conceive, will pretend to describe a general triangle with his pencill. This being rightly consider'd, I believe we shall not be found to have any great [<sup>76</sup>want] need of those eternal, immutable, universal ideas about which the philosophers keep such a stir, and without which they think there can be no silence at all.

But what becomes of these general maxims, these first principles of knowledge, [<sup>77</sup>so frequently in the mouths] of [<sup>76</sup>the] metaphysicians, all w<sup>ch</sup> are suppos'd to be about abstract and universal ideas? To which all the answer I can make is, that whatsoever proposition is made up of terms standing for general notions or ideas, the same is to me, so far forth, [<sup>76</sup>absolutely] unintelligible: and whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest and profound study attain'd to an elevation of thought above the reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, or whatever else be

<sup>76</sup> Erased.

<sup>77</sup> Instead of 'these curious speculations.'

the cause, sure I am there are in their writings many things which I now find myself unable to understand. Tho' being accustom'd to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty in them. But this one thing seems [<sup>81</sup>to me] pretty plain and certain. How high soever that goodly fabrick of metaphysics might have been rais'd, and by what venerable names soever it may be supported, yet if [<sup>81</sup>withall] it be built on [<sup>78</sup>no other] foundation [<sup>79</sup>than] inconsistency and contradictions, it is after all but a castle in the air<sup>80</sup>.

It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, and all others whether ancient or modern logicians and metaphysicians, thro' those numerous inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute, which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversys, and what a learned dust has been rais'd about those matters, and what [<sup>81</sup>great] mighty advantage has been from thence deriv'd to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need to be insisted on by me. Nor has that doctrine been confin'd to those two sciences, that make the most avowed profession of it. The contagion thereof has spread through [<sup>81</sup>out] all the parts of philosophy. It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of physic and divinity, and even the mathematicians themselves have had their full share of it.

When men consider the great pain, industry and parts that have [<sup>81</sup>in] for so many ages been lay'd out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that [<sup>82</sup>notwithstanding] all this, the far greatest part of them remain full of doubts and uncertainties, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations do contain in them paradoxes that are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that taking all together a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement—I say upon the consideration of all this, men are wont to be cast into an amazement and despondency,

<sup>78</sup> Instead of 'the sandy.'

<sup>80</sup> On margin, 'Dec. 1.'

<sup>81</sup> Erased.

<sup>79</sup> Instead of 'of.'

<sup>82</sup> Instead of 'for.'

and perfect contempt of all study. But that wonder and despair may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles and wrong foundations of science [<sup>86</sup>which] that have been made use of. Amongst all which there is none, methinks; of a more wide and universal sway over the thoughts of studious men than that we have been endeavouring to detect and overthrow. [<sup>86</sup>To me certainly it does not seem strange that unprofitable debates and absurd and extravagant opinions should abound in the writings of those men who, disdainng the vulgar and obvious informations of sense, do in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas<sup>83</sup>.]

I come now to consider the [<sup>84</sup>source] of this prevailing. [<sup>85</sup>notion], and that seems to me most evidently to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion, as epidemical as it is absurd. That [<sup>86</sup>words are] the conceit of abstract idea owes its birth and origine to words, will appear, as from other reasons, so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of y<sup>t</sup> doctrine, who [<sup>86</sup>do] acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that there had been no such thing as speech, or universal signs, there never had been [<sup>86</sup>abstract ideas] any thought of abstract ideas. I find it also declared in express terms that general truths can never be well made known, and are very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in words; all which doth plainly set forth the inseparable connexion and mutual dependence [<sup>86</sup>on each other] that is thought to be between words and abstract ideas. For whereas it is elsewhere said [<sup>86</sup>there could be no communication by general names [<sup>87</sup>without there being] also general ideas of which they were to be signs; we are here, on the other hand, told that] that general ideas [<sup>88</sup>are] necessary for communication by general names; here, on the other hand, we are told that names are needfull for the understanding of [<sup>86</sup>abstract notions] general truths. Now by the bye, I would fain know how it is possible for words to make a man apprehend that which he cannot apprehend without

<sup>83</sup> On margin—' Dec. 2.'

<sup>85</sup> Instead of 'imagination in the minds of men.'

<sup>87</sup> Instead of 'except there were.'

<sup>84</sup> Instead of 'cause.'

<sup>86</sup> Erased.

<sup>88</sup> Instead of 'were.'



them. I do not deny they are necessary for communication, and so making me know the ideas that are in the mind of another. But when any truth, whether [<sup>89</sup>about general or part] about general or particular ideas, is once made known to me by words, [<sup>89</sup>I cannot see any manner of] so that I rightly apprehend the ideas contained in it, I see no manner of reason why I may not omit the words, and yet retain as full and clear a conception of the ideas themselves, as I had [<sup>89</sup>of them] while they were clothed with words. Words being, so far as I can see, of use only for recording and communicating, but not absolutely apprehending [<sup>89</sup>of] ideas. [<sup>89</sup>I know there be some things which pass for truths that will not bear this [stripping—being stript] of the attire of words, but this I always took for a sure and certain sign that there were no clear and determinate ideas underneath.] I proceed to show the manner wherein words have contributed to the growth and origine of that mistake.

That which seems [<sup>89</sup>to me principally] in a great measure to have drove men into the conceit of [<sup>90</sup>abstract] ideas, is the opinion, that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settl'd signification: which inclines [<sup>89</sup>men] them to think there are certain abstract, determinate, general ideas that make the true and only immediate signification of each general name, and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas there is in truth [<sup>91</sup>a] diversity of significations, in every general name whatsoever [<sup>89</sup>except only the proper names]. Nor is there any such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to each [<sup>89</sup>appellative] name. All which does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will [<sup>89</sup>be] clearly appear to any one by a little reflexion.

But [<sup>89</sup>here] to this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby tied down and restrain'd to [<sup>92</sup>one certain] signification, e. g. a triangle is defin'd to be a plain surface comprehended by three right lines, by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea, and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said, whether the surface

<sup>89</sup> Erased.

<sup>91</sup> Instead of 'an homonymy or.'

<sup>90</sup> Instead of 'general.'

<sup>92</sup> Instead of 'a particular.'

be great or small, black or white or transparent, or whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, or with what angles they are inclin'd to each other. In all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle. 'Tis one thing for to keep a word [<sup>89</sup>everywhere] constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea: [<sup>93</sup>that] is necessary, but [<sup>94</sup>this] is useless and impracticable. [<sup>89</sup>Nor does it avail to say the abstract idea of a triangle, which bounds the signification of that name, is itself determin'd, tho' the angles, sides, &c. are not. For besides the absurdity of such an idea, which has been already shown, it is evident that if the simple ideas or parts, i. e. the lines, angles, and surface, are themselves various and undetermin'd, the complex idea or whole triangle cannot be one settled determinate idea.]

[<sup>95</sup>But to give a farther account, how words came to introduce the doctrine of universal ideas, it will be necessary to observe there is a notion current among those that pass for the deepest thinkers, that every significant name stands for an idea. It is

93 Instead of 'the former.'

94 Instead of 'the latter.'

95 On the opposite page, we have, instead of this paragraph, the following:—'But to give a farther account how words came to introduce the doctrine of general ideas, it [<sup>1</sup>must be observ'd] that [<sup>2</sup>it is a receiv'd opinion] that language hath no other end than the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant, do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for general ones.

'That there are many names in use amongst speculative men, which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. [<sup>3</sup>And that there are significant names denoting things, whereof it is a direct repugnancy that any idea should be form'd by any understanding whatsoever, I shall in its due place endeavour to demonstrate that it is] not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which [<sup>3</sup>are marks of ideas] stand for ideas shou'd every time they are used excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to [<sup>3</sup>signify] stand for. In reading and discoursing names are for the [<sup>3</sup>thinking on] most part us'd as [<sup>3</sup>figures in casting up a sum in which to compute exactly is not necessary] letters are in Algebra, in which, tho' a particular quantity be mark'd by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step [<sup>3</sup>you have these particular quantitys in yr view. Tho' you regard only the letters themselves without ever thinking on what was denoted by them, yet if you work according to rule, you will come to a true solution of the question] each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity [<sup>4</sup>which] it was appointed to [<sup>5</sup>stand for].

1 Instead of 'is necessary to observe.'

3 Erased.

4 Instead of 'whereof.'

2 Instead of 'the common opinion of philosophers is.'

5 Instead of 'be the figure to make—denote.'

said by them that a proposition cannot otherwise be understood than by perceiving [<sup>96</sup>the agreement or disagreement of] the ideas marked by the terms [<sup>97</sup>thereof] of it. Whence it follows, that according to those men every proposition that is not jargon must consist of terms or names that carry along with them each a determinate idea. This being so, and it being [certain] withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for general ones.

In answer to this I say, that names, significant names, do not always stand for ideas, but that they may be and are often used to good purpose [tho' they are] without being suppos'd to stand for or represent any idea at all. And as to what we are told of understanding propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or disagreement of the ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many cases seems absolutely false. For the better clearing and demonstrating of all which I shall make use of some particular instances. Suppose I have the idea of some one particular dog to which I give the name Melampus, and then frame this proposition—Melampus is an animal. Where 'tis evident the name Melampus denotes one particular idea. And as for the other name or term of the proposition, there are a sort of philosophers will tell you thereby is meant not only a universal conception, but also [corresponding thereto] a universal nature or essence really existing without the mind, whereof Melampus doth partake, as tho' it were possible that even things themselves could be universal. And [But] this with reason is exploded as nonsensical and absurd. But then those men who have so clearly and fully detected the emptyness and insignificancy of that wretched jargon [of S.G.W.(?)], are themselves to me equally unintelligible. For they will have it that if I understand what I say I must make the name animal stand for an abstract general idea which agrees to and corresponds with the particular idea marked by the name Melampus. But if a man may be allow'd to know his own meaning, I do declare that in my thoughts the word animal is neither suppos'd to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other.

<sup>96</sup> Erased.

<sup>97</sup> This and some words that follow are within brackets in the MS.

Nor does it indeed in that proposition stand for any idea [at all] at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this—that the particular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the name animal. And I do intreat any one to make this easy tryal. Let him but cast out of his [thoughts] the words of the proposition, and then see whether two clear and determinate ideas remain [<sup>98</sup>in his understanding] whereof he finds one to be conformable to the other. I perceive it evidently in myself that upon laying aside all thought of the words ‘Melampus is an animal,’ I have remaining in my mind one only naked and bare idea, viz. that particular one to which I gave the name Melampus. Tho’ some there be that pretend they have also a general idea signified by the word animal, which they perceive to agree with the particular idea signified by the word Melampus, [which idea is made up of inconsistencies and contradictions, as has been already shown.] Whether this or that be the truth of the matter, I desire every particular person to consider and conclude for himself.]

And this methinks may pretty clearly inform us how men might first have come to think there was a general idea of animal. For in the proposition we have instanc’d in, it is plain the word animal is not suppos’d to stand for the idea of any one particular [anima] [creature] animal. For if it be made stand for another different from that is marked by the name Melampus, the proposition is false and includes a contradiction; and if it be made signify the very same individual that Melampus doth, it is a tautology. But it is presumed that every name stands for an idea. It remains therefore that the word animal stands for [the] general abstract idea [of animal]. In like manner we may be able with a little attention to discover how other general ideas [of all sorts] might at first have stolen into the thoughts of man.

But farther to make it evident that words may be used to good purpose without bringing into the mind determinate ideas, I shall add this instance. We are told [that] the good things which God hath prepared for them that love him are such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it enter’d into the heart of man to conceive. What man will pretend to say these words of the

inspir'd writer are empty and [ses(?)] insignificant? And yet who is there that can say they bring into his mind [determi] clear and determinate ideas, or in truth any ideas at all [ideas] of the good things [pre] in store for them that love God? It may perhaps be said that those words lay before us the clear and determinate abstract ideas of good in general and thing in general; but I am afraid it will be found that those very abstract ideas are every whit as remote from the comprehension of men as the particular pleasures of the saints in heaven. But, say you, those words of the Apostle must have some import. They cannot be suppos'd to have been utter'd without all meaning and design whatsoever. I answer, the saying is very weighty, and carries with it a great design, but it is not to raise in the minds of men the abstract ideas of thing or good, nor yet the particular ideas of the joys of the blessed. The design is to make them more chearfull and fervent in their duty; and how this may be compass'd without making the words good things [to be] stand for and mark out to our understandings any ideas either general or particular, I proceed to show.

Upon mention of a reward to a man for 'his pains and perseverance in any occupation whatsoever, it seems to me that divers things do ordinarily ensue. For there may be excited in his understanding an idea of the particular good thing to him proposed for a reward. There may also ensue thereupon an alacrity and stediness in fulfilling those conditions on which it is to be obtain'd, together with a zealous desire of serving and pleasing the person in whose power it is to bestow that good thing. All these things, I say, may and often do follow upon the pronunciation of those words that declare the recompence. Now I do not see any reason why the latter may not happen without the former. What is it that hinders why a man may not be stirr'd up to diligence and zeal in his duty, by being told he shall have a good thing for his reward, tho' at the same time there be excited in his mind no other idea than barely those of sounds or characters? When he was a child he had frequently heard those words used to him to create in him an obedience to the commands of those that spoke them, and as he grew up he has found by experience that upon the mentioning of those words by an honest man it has

been his interest to have doubled his zeal and activity for the service of that person. Thus there having grown up in his mind a customary connexion betwixt the hearing that proposition and being disposed to obey with cheerfulness the injunctions that accompany it, methinks it might be made use of, tho' not to introduce into his mind any idea marked by the words good thing, yet to excite in him a willingness to perform that which is requir'd of him. And this seems to me all that is design'd by the speaker, except only when he intends those words shall [be the mark of] signifie the idea of some particular thing: e. g. in the case I mention'd 'tis evident the Apostle never intended the words [good things] should [mark out to] our understandings the ideas of those particular things our faculties never attain'd to. And yet I cannot think that he used them at random and without design; on the contrary, it is my opinion that he used them to very good purpose, namely, to beget in us a cheerfulness and zeal and perseverance in well-doing, without any thought of introducing into our minds the abstract idea of a good thing. If any one will joyn ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I doubt not it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own which he would [them] have them raise in the understanding of the hearer.

[<sup>99</sup> Even] proper names themselves are not always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those particular things that are suppos'd to be annex'd to them. For example, when a Schoolman tells you that Aristotle hath said it, think you that he intends [thereby] to [ra] excite in your imagination the idea of that particular man? All he means by it is only to dispose you to receive his opinion with that deference and submission that custom has annex'd to that name. When a man that has been accustom'd to resign his judgment [of] to the authority of that philosopher [shall] [upon] in reading of a book meet with the letters that compose his name, he forthwith yields his assent to the doctrine it was brought to support, and that with such a quick and sudden [<sup>2</sup> glance of thought] as it is impossible any

<sup>99</sup> 'Nor is it less certain that' erased.

‡ Erased.

<sup>2</sup> 'action of the mind'—on opposite page.

idea either of the person or writings of that man should go before—so close and immediate a connexion has long custom establish'd betwixt the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men.

I intreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not oft happen, either in hearing, or reading a discourse, that the passions of delight, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, &c. [<sup>11</sup>do not] arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasion'd ideas that may be apt to produce those emotions of mind. But if I mistake not, it will be found that when language is once grown familiar, <sup>3</sup>to a man the hearing of the sound or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produc'd by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted.

[<sup>4</sup>Further], the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action.<sup>5</sup> To which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes <sup>6</sup>entirely omitted when these can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language.

I ask any man whether [<sup>7</sup>every time] he tells another that such an action is honourable and vertuous, with an <sup>8</sup>intention to excite him to the performance of it, he has at that instant ideas of honour and virtue<sup>9</sup> in his [thoug] view, and whether in reality his intention be to raise [<sup>10</sup>that] idea, together with their agreement to the [<sup>11</sup>particular] idea of that particular action, in the understanding of him he speaks to [<sup>11</sup>or rather whether this be not his full purpose, namely, that those words should excite in the mind of the hearer an esteem of that particular action, and stir him up to the performance of it].

<sup>3</sup> 'to a man' erased.

<sup>4</sup> 'From which it follows, that' erased.

<sup>5</sup> On opposite page—'the putting the mind in some particular disposition. Hence we may conceive how it is possible for the promise that is made us of the good things of another life excite in us suitable dispositions, tho' the words *good things* do not bring into our minds particular ideas of the pleasures of heaven, nor yet the ideas of good in general or things in general.'

<sup>6</sup> 'entirely' erased.

<sup>7</sup> 'when' erased.

<sup>8</sup> 'vertuous, with an' substituted for 'vertuous.'

<sup>9</sup> 'virtue' substituted for 'vertue.'

<sup>10</sup> 'those abstract' erased.

<sup>11</sup> Erased.

[<sup>15</sup>Upon hearing the words lie [&] rascal, indignation, revenge, and the suddain motions of anger do instantly [ensue] in the minds of some men, without our attending to the definition of those names or concerning the ideas they are suppos'd to stand for—all that passion and resentment having been by custom connected to those very sounds themselves and the manner of their utterance<sup>12</sup>.]

It is plain therefore that a man may understand what is said to him without having a clear and determinate idea annexed to and marked by every particular [<sup>13</sup>word] in the discourse he hears. Nay, he may perfectly understand it. For what is it, I pray, to understand perfectly, but only to understand all that is meant by the person that speaks? which very oft is nothing more than barely to excite in [<sup>14</sup>his mind] certain emotions without any thought of those ideas so much talk'd of and so little understood. For the truth whereof I appeal to every [man's] one's experience.

I know not how this doctrine will go down with those [philosophers] who may be apt to give the titles of gibberish and jargon to all discourse whatsoever so far forth as the words contained in it are not made the signs of clear and determinate ideas, who think it nonsense for a man to assent to any proposition each term whereof doth not bring into his mind a clear and distinct idea, and tell us [<sup>15</sup>over and over] that every pertinent [<sup>16</sup>word] [<sup>17</sup>hath an idea annexed unto] which never fails to accompany it where 'tis rightly understood. Which opinion of theirs, how plausibly soever it might have been maintain'd by some, seems to me to have introduced a great deal of difficulty and nonsense into the reasonings of men. Certainly nothing could be fitter to bring forth and cherish the doctrine of abstract ideas. For when men were indubitably conscious to themselves that many [<sup>18</sup>words] they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should

<sup>12</sup> On opposite page—'Innumerable instances of this kind may be given—arise. But why should I be tedious in enumerating these things, which every one's observation will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?'

<sup>13</sup> 'name'—on opposite page.

<sup>15</sup> Erased.

<sup>17</sup> 'is the mark of an idea'—on opposite page.

<sup>18</sup> 'names'—on opposite page.

<sup>14</sup> 'the hearer'—on opposite page.

<sup>16</sup> 'name'—on opposite page.



be thought altogether insignificant, they were of necessity driven into the opinion that they stood for [<sup>19</sup>general ones].

But more effectually to show the absurdity of an opinion that carries with it so great an appearance of [clearness and strength of] reason, but is [<sup>20</sup>in fact] most dangerous and destructive both to reason and religion, I shall, if I mistake not, in the progress of this work demonstrate there be names well known and familiar to men, which tho' they mark and [stand] and signify things, cannot be suppos'd to signifie ideas of any sort, either general or particular, without the greatest nonsense and contradiction; it being absolutely impossible, and a direct repugnancy, that any intellect, how exalted and comprehensive soever, should frame ideas of these things.

We have, I think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas. We have consider'd what has been said in behalf of them by their ablest patrons, and endeavour'd to demonstrate they are of no use for those ends to which they <sup>21</sup>are thought necessary. And, lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.

Since therefore words have been discover'd to be so very apt to impose on the understandings of men, I am resolv'd in my [<sup>22</sup>inquiries] to make as little use of them as possibly I can. Whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united to them.

Let us conceive a solitary man, one born and bred in such a place of the world, and in such circumstances, as he shall never have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas. That man shall have a constant train of particular ideas passing in his mind. Whatever he sees, hears, imagines, or anywise conceives, is on all hands, even by the patrons of abstract ideas, granted to be particular. Let us withall suppose him under no necessity of labouring to secure himself from hunger and cold, but at full ease, naturally of good facultys, [<sup>23</sup>and] contemplative. Such a one I should take to be nearer the discovery of certain

<sup>19</sup> 'good sense and sound'—on opposite page.

<sup>20</sup> Instead of 'withall.'

<sup>21</sup> 'are' instead of 'were.'

<sup>22</sup> Instead of 'reasonings.'

<sup>23</sup> 'but' erased.

great and excellent truths yet unknown, than he that has had the education of schools, [<sup>24</sup> has been instructed in the ancient and modern philosophy], and by much reading and conversation has [furnish'd his head] attain'd to the knowledge of those arts and sciences that make so great a noise in the [<sup>24</sup> learned] world. It is true, the knowledge of our solitary philosopher is not like to be so very wide and extended, it being confin'd to those few particulars that come within his own observation. But then, if he is like to have less knowledge, he is withall like to have fewer mistakes than other men.

It cannot be deny'd that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge, which has been purchas'd by the joynt labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations, may be drawn into the view, and made the possession of one [<sup>24</sup> particular] single person. But there [<sup>25</sup> are some] parts of learning which contain the knowledge of things the most noble and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have had the ill fate to be so signally perplex'd and darken'd by the abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they are deliver'd, that in the study [<sup>26</sup> of them] a man cannot be too much upon his guard, [<sup>27</sup> whether] in his private meditations, or in reading the writings or hearing the discourses of other men, to prevent his being cheated [<sup>24</sup> by the glibness and familiarity of speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, in truth, stand for none at all: which grand mistake it is almost incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over the understandings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted.

I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [<sup>28</sup> to put myself in the posture of the solitary philosopher. I will confine my thoughts and enquiries to the naked scene of my own particular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following advantages.

First. I shall be sure to get clear of all [<sup>29</sup> verbal] controversies purely verbal. The [<sup>30</sup> springing up of] which weeds in almost all the sciences has been [<sup>29</sup> the] a most fatal obstruction to the

<sup>24</sup> Erased.    <sup>25</sup> Instead of 'is one.'    <sup>26</sup> Instead of 'thereof.'    <sup>27</sup> Instead of 'either.'

<sup>28</sup> Erased. On the opposite page—'to take off the mask of words, and obtain a naked view of my own particular ideas.'

<sup>29</sup> Erased.

<sup>30</sup> Instead of 'insisting on.'

growth of true and sound knowledge: and accordingly is at this day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complaint of the wisest men.

Secondly. 'Tis reasonable to expect that [<sup>31</sup>by this] the trouble of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion may be very much abridg'd. For it oft happens that a notion, when it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to be conceiv'd, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas shrink into a narrow compass, and are view'd almost by one glance of thought.

Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other men seem to have had. [<sup>32</sup>Because] I find myself to want several of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philosophers do usually spend much pains and study. [<sup>29</sup>nay, even of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that pass for simple, particular ideas. It [is inconceivable what] cannot be believ'd what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.

Fourthly. Having remov'd the veil of words, I may expect to have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my understanding. To behold the deformity of errour we need only undress it.]

Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [<sup>33</sup>way] to extricate myself out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas; which has so miserably perplex'd and entangled the minds of men, and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and the more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held therein.

Sixthly. So long as I confine my [<sup>34</sup>thoughts] to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I [<sup>35</sup>clearly] and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv'd in thinking I have an idea which I have not. Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea that I have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own ideas are

<sup>31</sup> Instead of ' hereby.'

<sup>33</sup> Instead of ' means whereby.'

<sup>35</sup> Instead of ' perfectly.'

<sup>32</sup> Instead of ' For that.'

<sup>34</sup> Instead of ' contemplations.'

alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern the agreements and disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what simple ideas are included in any [<sup>36</sup> compound] idea, and what not, [<sup>37</sup> there is nothing requisite but] an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a habit, as that betwixt words and ideas.

Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas'd by the [<sup>38</sup> doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought abstract ideas were annex'd to their words, it does not seem strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about words, to which they suppos'd abstract ideas were connected, and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be conceiv'd, tho' they could not without them. [<sup>39</sup> But surely those ideas ought to be suspected that cannot endure the light without a covering.]

Another thing which makes words and ideas thought much [<sup>40</sup> harder to separate] than in truth they are, is the opinion that every name stands for an idea. [<sup>41</sup> For] it is no wonder that men should fatigue themselves in vain, and find it a very difficult undertaking, when they endeavour'd to [<sup>42</sup> obtain a clear and naked] view of [<sup>43</sup> those] the ideas marked by those words, which in truth mark none at all; [<sup>43</sup> as I have already shown many names often do not, even when they are not altogether [insignificant], and I shall more fully show it hereafter].

[<sup>44</sup> This] seems to me the principal cause why those men that

<sup>36</sup> Instead of 'complex.'

<sup>37</sup> Erased here—'all this I can do without being taught by [another], there being requisite thereto nothing more than.' Also—['the writings and discoveries of other men or without having any great parts of my own]      there is nothing more requisite.'

<sup>38</sup> Instead of 'opinion of abstract ideas.'

<sup>39</sup> Erased.

<sup>40</sup> Instead of 'more inseparable.'

<sup>41</sup> Instead of 'Now.'

<sup>42</sup> Instead of 'strip and take a.'

<sup>43</sup> Erased.

<sup>44</sup> Instead of 'These.'

have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside the use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet been so little able to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions, and insignificant disputes, that grow out of the abuse of words. In order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend to the ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from the words that signify them. But how good soever this advice may be that they have given others <sup>45</sup> men, it is plain they little regarded it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now, with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of words. He that knows he hath no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names [<sup>50</sup> when made use of in the propriety of language] do not always stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now remov'd, I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost endeavour to attain a clear and naked view of [<sup>46</sup> the] ideas he would consider [<sup>47</sup> by separating] from them all that varnish and mist of words, which so fatally blinds the judgment and dissipates the attention of men.

This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend our views into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth. In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of [<sup>48</sup> our hand].

Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge from the [<sup>49</sup> incumbrance and delusion] of words, [<sup>50</sup> the consequences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings

<sup>45</sup> 'men' erased.

<sup>46</sup> Instead of 'his own.'

<sup>47</sup> Instead of 'having separated.'

<sup>48</sup> Instead of '[any man] to pluck it.'

<sup>49</sup> Instead of 'cheat.'

<sup>50</sup> Erased.

upon them to no purpose. We may [<sup>51</sup>deduce consequences from] consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.

I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following sheets, that he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him [<sup>52</sup>to discover the truth or falsity of what I say]. He will be out of all danger of being deceiv'd by my words. And I do not see what inducement he can have to err in considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my thoughts [<sup>50</sup>to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I shall throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest, plainest, and most familiar <sup>53</sup>manner, abstaining from [<sup>50</sup>all flourish and pomp of words], all hard and unusual terms which are [<sup>50</sup>commonly] pretended by those that use them to cover a sense [<sup>50</sup>intricate and] abstracted and sublime.

[<sup>50</sup>I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and [<sup>50</sup>accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable man.]

<sup>50</sup> Erased.

<sup>51</sup> Instead of 'lose ourselves in.'

<sup>52</sup> Instead of 'whatever mistakes I might have committed.'

<sup>53</sup> After 'manner' 'I shall' erased.

## B.

### ARTHUR COLLIER.

THE simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of sensible reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has been considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am induced here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's *Clavis Universalis: or, a new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, or Impossibility, of an External World*<sup>1</sup>. The reader of Berkeley may thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis regarding the inexistence of the material world.

Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680—more than four years before Berkeley—at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wiltshire. He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He succeeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours, during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of *An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World* (1701—4), who died in 1711.

From his own account, Collier seems to have adopted his new thought regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about 1703, though he did not publish it till 1713, in the early part of which year the *Clavis Universalis* appeared.

Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his notion of Matter, are given in Benson's *Memoirs*. Two of them were written in 1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written in 1715 is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to Samuel Low, a grammarian; another was sent to Dr. Waterland; and the last is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.

Collier seems to have been more disposed than Berkeley to apply philosophical speculation directly to Christian theology. His theologi-

<sup>1</sup> The motto of this work, taken from Malebranche, is *Vulgi assensus et approbatio, circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur*. --De Inquir. Verit. Lib. III. p. 194.

cal speculations occupied a considerable share of his life, and involved a subtle modification of Arianism—according to which the sensible world exists in the mind of man; the mind of man exists in Christ; and Christ exists in God—all exemplifying what he calls ‘in-existence,’ or dependent existence. This chain of *inexistent* being he deduces from speculative reason, and also from the words of Scripture. Collier was a friend and correspondent of Whiston, whose theory of ‘Primitive Christianity’ was discussed about that time.

Collier was a Tory and High Churchman, and curiously, like Berkeley, he published a sermon on the Christian obligation of submission to the higher powers, founded on Romans xiii. 1.

It does not appear that Berkeley and Collier ever met, nor is he once named by Berkeley, though Berkeley is more than once named by him.

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#### THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS,

*‘Wherein the Question in General is explained and stated, and the whole subject divided into two particular heads.*

THOUGH I am verily persuaded that, in the whole course of the following treatise, I shall or can have no other adversary but prejudice; yet, having by me no mechanical engine proper to remove it; nor being able to invent any other method of attacking it, besides that of fair reason and argument; rather than the world should finish its course without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists, (and for one reason more, which I need not name, unless the end desired were more hopeful); I am at last, after a ten years pause and deliberation, content to put myself upon the trial of the common reader, without pretending to any better art of gaining him on my side, than that of dry reason and metaphysical demonstration.

The Question I am concerned about is in general this—Whether there be any such thing as an External World. And my title will suffice to inform my reader, that the *negative* of this question is the point I am to demonstrate.

In order to which, let us first explain the terms.

Accordingly, by *World*, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c., if there be any other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or any of these terms.

And now nothing remains but the explication of the word *External*.



By this, in general, I understand the same as is usually understood by the words, absolute, self-existent, independent, &c. ; and this is what I deny of all matter, body, extension, &c.

If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the word external, I am like to meet with no adversary at all, for who has ever affirmed, that matter is self-existent, absolute, or independent?

To this I answer, What others hold, or have held in times past, I shall not here inquire. On the contrary, I should be glad to find by the event, that all mankind were agreed in that which I contend for as the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be, independent, absolute, or self-existent. In the mean time, whether they are so or no, will be tried by this.

Secondly, and more particularly, That by not independent, not absolutely existent, not external, I mean and contend for nothing less than that all matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in dependence on, mind, thought, or perception; and that it is not capable of an existence, which is not thus dependent.

This perhaps may awaken another to demand of me, How? to which I as readily answer—just how my reader pleases, provided it be somehow. As for instance, we usually say, An *accident* exists in, or in dependence on, its proper subject; and that its very essence, or reality of its existence, is *so* to exist. Will this pass for an explication of my assertion? If so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of the words. *Again*, we usually say (and fancy too we know what we mean in saying,) that a body exists in, and also in dependence on, its proper *place*, so as to exist necessarily in some place or other. Will this description of dependence please my inquisitive reader? If so, I am content to join issue with him, and contend that all matter exists in, or as much dependently on, mind, thought, or perception, to the full, as any body exists in place. Nay, I hold the description to be so just and apposite as if a man should say, A thing is like itself: for, I suppose I need not tell my reader that when I affirm that all matter exists in mind, after the same manner as body exists in place, I mean the very same as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of body, and so its place, as that it is not capable of existing in any other place, or in place after any other manner. *Again, lastly*, it is a common saying, that an object of perception exists in, or in dependence on, its respective *faculty*. And of these objects there are many who will reckon with me, light, sounds, colours, and even some material things, such as trees, houses, &c., which are seen, as we say, *in* a looking-glass, but which are, or ought to be, owned to have no existence but *in*, or *respectively on*, the minds or faculties of those who perceive them. But, to please all parties at once, I affirm that I know of no manner in which an object of perception exists in, or on, its respective faculty, which I will not admit in this place to be a just description of that manner of *in-existence* after which all matter that exists is affirmed by me to *exist in mind*. Nevertheless, were I to speak my mind freely I should choose to compare it to the in-existence of some, rather than some other objects of perception—particularly such as are objects of the

sense of vision ; and of these, those more especially which are allowed by others to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty ; such as objects seen in a looking-glass, by men distempered, light-headed, ecstatic, &c., where not only colours, but entire bodies, are perceived or seen. For these cases are exactly parallel with that existence which I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever.

Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms, what I do not mean by it.

Accordingly, I declare in the *first* place, That in affirming that there is no external world, I make no doubt or question of the *existence* of bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It is with me a first principle, that *whatsoever is seen*, is. To deny or doubt of this is errant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part or office of a disputant, or philosopher ; so that it will be remembered from this time, that my enquiry is not concerning the existence, but altogether concerning the *extra*-existence of certain things or objects ; or, in other words, what I affirm and contend for, is not that bodies do not exist, or that the external world does not exist, but that such and such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist externally ; or in universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world.

*Secondly*, I profess and declare that, notwithstanding this my assertion, I am persuaded that I see all bodies just as other folks do ; that is, the visible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, seems to me, to be as much external or independent, as to its existence, on my mind, self, or visive faculty, as any visible object does, or can be pretended to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, as I know of, another nature, nor another knack of seeing objects, different from other persons, suitable to the hypothesis of their existence which I here contend for. So far from this, that I believe, and am very sure, that this seeming, or (as I shall desire leave to call it) *quasi externity* of visible objects, is not only the effect of the Will of God, (as it is his Will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it is a natural and necessary *condition* of their visibility : I would say that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet, by the condition of its being seen, it would, and must be, *quasi external* to the perceptive faculty ; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually seen in this visible world.

Moreover, *thirdly*, When I affirm that all matter exists dependently on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by this—that matter or bodies exist in *bodies*. As for instance, when I affirm or say, that the world, which I see, exists in my mind, I cannot be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the bodies which I see exist in that which common use has taught me to call *my body*. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because

experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake me in this particular.

*Fourthly*, When I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or dependently on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be understood to mean no more than I say, by the words *mind* and *perceptive faculty*. In like manner I would be understood, when I affirm in general, that all matter or body exists in, or dependently on, mind. I say this to acquit myself from the imputation of holding that the mind causes its own ideas, or objects of perception; or, lest any one by a mistake should fancy that I affirm—that matter depends for its existence on the will of man, or any creature whatsoever. But now, if any such mistake should arise in another's mind, he has wherewith to rectify it; in as much as I assure him, that by *mind*, I mean that part, or act, or faculty of the soul which is distinguished by the name *intellective* or *perceptive*; as in exclusion of that other part which is distinguished by the term *will*.

*Fifthly*, When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no matter is external, I do not mean that the world, or any visible object of it, which I (for instance) see, is dependent on the mind of any other person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any other person sees, is dependent on mine, or any other person's mind, or faculty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant, that the world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the same in this as in any other case of sensation; for instance, that of sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the *same* notes or melody; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not the *very same* with the sound which another hears—because the souls or persons are supposed to be different; and therefore, the sound which Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John, and that which John hears is external to the soul or person of Peter.

*Lastly*, When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished by the proper names of John, Peter, &c., I have no design to affirm that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must needs exist in some *created* mind or other. On the contrary, I believe that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather merely created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are thousands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there is an Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numerically different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. By this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice created) matter, *by* which all things are produced; or rather, (as my present subject leads me to speak,) *by* which the great God gives sensations to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not are preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were.

And now I presume and hope, that my meaning is sufficiently

understood, when I affirm, That all matter which exists, exists in, or dependently on, mind; or, that there is no such thing as an External World.

Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two. For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs be one article to shew that the *visible* world is not external; and when this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any opinion yet entertained by men, yet something still is wanting towards a full demonstration of the point at large, and to come up to the universal terms in which the question is expressed.

Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. *First*, to shew that the visible world is not external. *Secondly*, to demonstrate more at large, or simply, that an external world is a being utterly impossible. Which two shall be the subjects of two distinct Parts or Books.'

Collier in the end resolves the difference between sense-perception and imagination into a difference in degree merely. To imagine an object is to perceive it less vividly than we perceive it in the senses. 'I can no more,' he says, 'understand how we can create the objects we imagine than the objects we are said to see.' What is imagined 'exists as much, to all appearance, without, or external to, the mind which perceives it as any of those objects usually called visible—but *not so vividly*; and this is that whereby I distinguish the act which we call imagination from the act which we call vision: but why is this, but because the common cause of both, viz. God, does not, in the former act, impress or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If He did, both acts would become one, or require the same name; and there would be no difference between seeing and imagining<sup>2</sup>.' So Hume afterwards. Berkeley's position in relation to the difference between sense-perception and mere imagination I have elsewhere noted.

The difference is surely more than one of degree. There is a difference in kind between real existence in place, and a subjective imagination, peculiar to an individual mind. Is not this difference consistent with the real things present in sense, and also the space or place in which they exist, being alike dependent for their actual existence on Mind—in short, with their being grounded on Knowing, and not on an abstracted Unknown? May not space be the uncreated or necessary condition of the possibility of all sense-experience like ours, but yet dependent for its actual existence upon the existence of the sense-experience? This is not to make it the *abstract* space against which Berkeley argues, nor need it involve quantitative infinity.

<sup>2</sup> See Benson's *Memoirs of Collier*, pp. 26, 27.

## C.

### THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED.

#### EXPERIENCE OF PERSONS BORN BLIND.

IN the last Section of the *Vindication* (p. 299), Berkeley refers to the now well-known experiment of Cheselden, in which sight was given to a boy born blind. As this case is described imperfectly in the *Vindication*, and as it is often referred to in the controversy as to whether our power of interpreting the tactual, muscular, and locomotive meaning of visual signs is, on the one hand, original and instinctive, or, on the other hand, the acquired result of mental association and habit, I here reprint the entire Communication, given in the *Philos. Trans.*, No. 402:—

*'An account of some observations made by a young gentleman, who was born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no remembrance of ever having seen, and was couched between 13 and 14 years of age. By Mr. Will. Chesselden, F.R.S., Surgeon to Her Majesty, and to St. Thomas's Hospital.*

Tho' we say of the gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all people who have ripe cataracts, yet they are never so blind from that cause but that they can discern day from night; and for the most part in a strong light distinguish black, white, and scarlet; but they cannot perceive the shape of anything;—for the light by which these perceptions are made, being let in obliquely through the aqueous humour, or the anterior surface of the chrystalline (by which the rays cannot be brought into a focus upon the retina), they can discern in no other manner, than a sound eye can thro' a glass of broken jelly, where a great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light that the several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye into their proper foci; wherefore the shape of an object in such a case, cannot be at all discern'd, tho' the colour may. And thus it was with this young gentleman, who though he knew these colours asunder in a good light, yet when he saw them after he was couch'd, the faint ideas he had of them before were not sufficient for him to know them by after-

wards; and therefore he did not think them the same, which he had before known by those names. Now scarlet he thought the most beautiful of all colours, and of others the most gay were the most pleasing, whereas the first time he saw black, it gave him great uneasiness, yet after a little time he was reconcil'd to it; but some months after, seeing by accident a Negroe woman, he was struck with great horror at the sight.

When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he express'd it) as what he felt did his skin; and thought no objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho' he could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object that was pleasing to him: he knew not the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, however different in shape or magnitude; but upon being told what things were, whose form he knew before from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again; but, having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them; and (as he said) at first he learn'd to know, and again forgot a thousand things in a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I will relate:—having forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he was ashamed to ask; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, 'So, Puss! I shall know you another time.' He was very much surpris'd that those things which he had lik'd best did not appear most agreeable to his eyes, expecting those persons would appear most beautiful that he lov'd most, and such things to be most agreeable to his sight that were so to his taste. We thought he soon knew what pictures represented which were shew'd to him, but we found afterwards we were mistaken; for about two months after he was couch'd, he discovered at once, they represented solid bodies; when to that time he consider'd them only as party-colour'd planes or surfaces diversified with variety of paint; but even then he was no less surpris'd, expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow appear'd now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd which was the lying sense,—feeling or seeing?

Being shewn his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly surpris'd; asking how it could be that a large face could be express'd in so little room, saying, it should have seem'd as impossible to him as to put a bushel of anything into a pint.

At first he could bear but very little sight, and the things he saw he thought extremely large; but upon seeing things larger, those first seen he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond the bounds he saw; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house could look bigger. Before he was couch'd he expected little advantage from seeing, worth undergoing an operation for, except reading and writing; for he said he thought he could have no more pleasure in walking

abroad than he had in the garden, which he could do safely and readily. And even blindness, he observ'd, had this advantage, that he could go anywhere in the dark much better than those who can see; and after he had seen, he did not soon lose this quality, nor desire a light to go about the house in the night. He said every new object was a new delight, and the pleasure was so great that he wanted ways to express it; but his gratitude to his operator he could not conceal, never seeing him for some time without tears of joy in his eyes, and other marks of affection; and if he did not happen to come at any time when he was expected, he would be so griev'd that he could not forbear crying at his disappointment. A year after first seeing, being carried upon Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly delighted with it, and called it a new kind of seeing. And now being lately couch'd of his other eye, he says that objects at first appeared large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other; and looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it look'd about twice as large as with the first couch'd eye only, but not double, that we can anyways discover.'

No very satisfactory inference can be drawn from a narrative so deficient in the refinement of thought and expression which the subject requires. The question is too subtle for experiments conducted in this fashion. Nor can more be said in favour of a succession of somewhat similar experiments recorded in the *Philosophical Transactions*. The most important are the following:—

1. Case described by Mr. Ware, Surgeon, in the *Philos. Trans.* (1801).
2. Two cases described by Mr. Home, in the *Philos. Trans.* (1807).
3. Case of the lady described by Mr. Wardrop, Surgeon, in the *Philos. Trans.* (1826).

To these may be added Stewart's 'Account of James Mitchell, a boy born deaf and blind,' in the seventh volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*. See Hamilton's Edition of Stewart's Works, Vol. III. Appendix, pp. 300—370; also p. 388.

As I have quoted one of the earliest described cases—that of Cheselden, I shall end by giving the following, which is one of the last and most philosophically described of any I have met with. It is contained in Mr. Nunnely's valuable scientific treatise on *The Organs of Vision: their Anatomy and Physiology* (1858):—

'The case was that of a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years of age, who had congenital cataract of both eyes, in whom the retina was

more perfect than it commonly is at so advanced an age, as shown by the excellent sight he subsequently acquired. He had always lived in a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds. He could find his way all about this place. Walking along the middle of the road, when he heard any object approaching, he at once stopped, groped his way to the side of the road, and remained perfectly still until it had passed. Any one whom he knew he was able to recognise by the sound of the voice, and by passing his hands over the face and body of the person. He could perceive the difference between a bright, sunny, and a dark, cloudy day, and could follow the motions of a candle without discerning what it was. He had been sent to school for some time, and by means of models and a raised alphabet, could by touch alone arrange the different letters into short words. I presented to him in succession a great number of different objects, each one of which he took into both hands, felt it most carefully over with both, then with equal minuteness with one, turning the object over and over again, in every direction; the tongue was next applied to it; and lastly, he applied it so near to the eye as to touch the eyelids, when he pronounced his opinion upon it, and generally with correctness, as to the nature and form of the object, when these were distinct. Thus he recognised books, stones, small boxes, pieces of wood and bone of different shapes, a broken piece of hard biscuit. A cube and a sphere he could readily recognise, saying the one was square and the other round, and that both were made of wood; but a sphere which was made of perfectly smooth, hard wood, he was very confident was bone. In an object where the angles were not very distinct, he made constant mistakes in the shape, first saying that it was square, then that it was round. Very bright light colours, when touching the eyelids, he could at once recognise, calling them all white; all dull and dark colours he said were black. Between a thin circle of wood and a sphere or a cube he instantly decided by the hand alone. On putting half-a-crown piece into his hands he immediately said it was money; but for long was undecided whether it was half-a-crown or a penny; however, after carefully turning it over for some time, so as frequently to bring every part into contact with the hand, then putting it to the tongue, and afterwards so close to the eye that it touched the eyeball itself, he said decidedly, "It is half-a-crown."

The lenses were very large, milky, with caseous particles, quite white and opaque, the capsules being clear and transparent. As is well known, in most cases, before this period of life, the lens itself has been absorbed, leaving only a leathery, opaque capsule, and, of course, not nearly so favourable for such observations as this one. After keeping him in a dark room for a few days, until the opaque particles of lenses were nearly absorbed, and the eyes clear, the same objects, which had been kept carefully from him, were again presented to his notice. He could at once perceive a difference in their shapes; though he could not in the least say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw they were not of the same figure. It was not until they had many times been placed in his hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the



one which he had just had in his hands, from the other placed beside it. He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it was only after several days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone, which was the sphere and which the cube; when asked, he always, before answering, wished to take both into his hands; even when this was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were placed before the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. Of distance he had not the least conception. He said everything touched his eyes, and walked most carefully about, with his hands held out before him, to prevent things hurting his eyes by touching them. Great care was requisite to prevent him falling over objects, or walking against them. Improvement gradually went on, and his subsequent sight was, and now is, comparatively perfect.'

None of these experiments, taken by themselves, unequivocally determine the question—Whether the power of interpreting the visual signs of real or tangible extension is inspired, or is, on the contrary, acquired by association and constructive activity of intellect. But they confirm the conclusion, that visible signs are not less indispensable to an imagination of trinal extension than the artificial signs of language are necessary to abstract thought and reasoning—that one born blind can have only a vague perception of an external world. Moreover, when once we are experimentally acquainted with distances, a mathematical analysis of the perspective lines leading from any object to the eye is possible, with an involved sense of necessity, which seems to presuppose relations common to the visible signs and the felt reality. The difficulty which confronts Berkeley is, that on his theory space and its mathematical relations are relative to sensations which, *per se*, are contingent and phenomenal, and thus wanting in the element which alone gives absolute stability to mathematical science: quantitative infinity disappears, and space and its relations are the real but arbitrary results of creation or the voluntary activity of God.



ANNOTATIONS  
ON  
BERKELEY'S PRINCIPLES,  
CONTAINING  
UEBERWEG'S NOTES ENTIRE,  
WITH ADDITIONS, TRANSLATED, SELECTED, AND  
ORIGINAL.



## ANNOTATIONS.

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### [1] Idea.—Abstract ideas.

BERKELEY, Intr., § 6: ‘the opinion that the mind (Geist) hath a power (Vermögen) of framing *abstract ideas* or notions (Begriffe) of things.’

UEBERWEG: “‘*Idea*’ was used by Plato in the objective sense, as designation of the pure, archetypal essence of homogeneous things. In the course of time, mainly because of the Aristotelian Scholastic doctrine that the human mind, in the act of perceiving things, receives into itself the form or shape (*ιδέα, εἶδος*) without the matter of them, the word came to have a subjective force as well as an objective one. In the subjective sense it denotes the psychical image of the objective form, and consequently came to be more and more limited to the *subjective* sense. It thus came in Descartes, and still more in Spinoza and Locke, to have the meaning ‘psychical image’ or conception (*Vorstellung*), in the wide sense of that word which embraces the image in sense-perception. In this sense some recent psychologists have employed it.

‘In Berkeley, who did not regard the subjective forms as images of objective forms, “*idea*” has exclusively the sense “psychical image.” As he uses the term, “*ideas*” exist partly through sense-perception, partly through reflection on the psychical antecedents, partly through the reproduction, decomposing, and combining of the conceptions which have risen.

‘In the translation of Berkeley’s work we retain the term “*idea*.” In this use of it we must guard against the mistake of supposing that the word refers merely to reproduced images, or to mere images of the fancy at all.

‘This mistake would be most effectually guarded against, if, as has been suggested by T. Collyns Simon, one of Berkeley’s adherents, the term *phenomenon* (*Erscheinung*) were used.

'The objections to this rendering are :

'1. That "Erscheinung" is a translation of phenomenon rather than of idea, and would consequently be a *displacement* of the word "idea" rather than a rendering of it.

'2. That exactly the opposite mistake would be encouraged, as if the conceptions of the imagination were not included.

'3. That "Erscheinung" rather denotes a complex of sense-ideas than the separate constituents of this complex.

'4. That the being in the subject, or *that* "esse," which is the same as "percipi," indubitably presents itself in the word "idea," not in the word "Erscheinung" (phenomenon).

'5. That "Erscheinung" (phenomenon) either presupposes a "thing in itself," of which it is the phenomenon (a supposition which Berkeley rejects), or, as Berkeley himself uses the word phenomenon, stands in antithesis to the "essence" or "law," whose cognoscibility Berkeley does not deny.'

EDITOR: 1: Berkeley discusses abstract ideas in the *New Theory of Vision* :

§ 122: 'I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in abstract.' 123: 'I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of.' . . . 124: 'It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract extension.' 125: 'After reiterated endeavours to apprehend the general idea of a triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible.'

Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5-7: 'May not words become general by being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular ideas, which, from a mutual resemblance, belong to the same kind, without the intervention of any abstract general idea? May we not admit general ideas though we should not admit them to be made by abstraction, or though we should not allow of general abstract ideas? . . . A particular idea may become general by being used to stand for or represent other ideas, and that general knowledge is conversant about signs or general ideas made such by their signification.'

A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics (§ 45-48): 'I hold that there are general ideas, but not formed by abstraction in the manner set forth by Mr. Locke. . . . According to Locke, the general name *colour* stands for an idea which is neither blue, red, green, nor any other particular colour, but somewhat distinct and abstracted from them all. To me it seems the word *colour* is only a more general name applicable to all and each of the particular colours; while the other specific names, as blue, . . . and the like, are each restrained to a

more limited signification. . . . Nothing is easier than to define in terms or words that which is incomprehensible in idea; forasmuch as any words can be either separated or joined as you please, but ideas always cannot. It is as easy to say a round square as an oblong square, though the former be inconceivable.'

2: Berkeley has noted the difference between Plato's use of 'idea' and his own (Siris, § 335): 'In Plato's style the term *idea* doth not merely signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is used as synonymous with *αἰτίον* and *ἀρχή*, cause and principle.'

### [2] Locke.

BERKELEY, Intr., § 11: 'There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteemed philosopher.'

UEBERWEG: John Locke, b. 1632, d. 1704. His chief work is 'An Essay concerning Human Understanding,' in four books. First edit., London: 1690.

### [3] Brutes.

BERKELEY, Intr., § 11 (quoting Locke): 'For if they (the brutes) have any ideas (Vorstellungen), and are not bare machines (as some would have them).'

UEBERWEG: 'The reference is to the Cartesians, followers of the system of René Descartes, b. 1596, d. 1650.

'The bold separation which Descartes made between spirit and matter, which allowed of their having nothing in common, led to the alternative either of ascribing to brutes souls, which like those of men are spiritual in kind, and consequently independent of the body and separable from it, or the entire denial of their possessing souls, and the conceding that they had nothing more than "vital spirits," which were capable of none of the psychical functions, no sensation, no perception, or the like. Descartes accepted the second horn of the dilemma. He also ascribed to man material vital spirits, which he supposed to be the medium of the relation between the soul and the grosser parts of the body.'

### [4]

BERKELEY, § 13: 'The Essay on the Human Understanding.'

UEBERWEG: See Note 2.

### [5] Abstraction.

BERKELEY, § 16: 'And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.'

UEBERWEG: 'This admission on the part of Berkeley is sufficient to secure for abstraction rightly understood its full value in scientific investigation. His discussion of abstraction at this point is of great value.

'No contradiction arises unless it be maintained that an idea can be entirely definite and at the same time be abstract; for universal definitiveness, as the Leibnitzians correctly maintained, is the distinguishing character of the individual conceptions. By abstraction is to be understood no more than the exclusive consideration of *that* in which the entire ideas of a particular group coincide with one another.

'In a certain measure the process of abstraction is completed independently of our conscious concurrence, because of the predominance which the concurrent marks, in consequence of their frequent occurrence, have over the marks which differ and which are presented singly. Abstraction is aided by the use of the common term which is associated with every idea of the group involved; it comes to completeness by means of the conscious logical formation of definitions, in which the common element is brought to consciousness in a complete and well-arranged order, and is distinguished from the differing elements.

'Abstraction involves the power of attributing common predicates to all the objects of a group, in such a way that through what is defined, and by means of the highest development of the definitory consciousness in regard to the common marks of this group, it is accurately bounded. Such, for example, is the power of making assertions in regard to conic sections which hold good of every particular figure of this kind, so that by means of the consciousness we have of the marks of a conic section, all figures which are conic sections are accurately distinguished from all others.

'This *capacity* is in fact a prerogative of man, and in its highest degree a prerogative of the man of scientific culture. Without it there would be no scientific knowledge.'

#### [6] Tricks of phrase.

BERKELEY, *Intr.*, § 20: 'those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?' (*ins Bewusstsein ruft?*)

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley here admirably characterizes the mystery of phrase, of that false rhetoric, the aim of which is to produce great effects upon the minds of the uneducated and half-educated, at the expense of truth and rectitude.

'Where reasons are wanting, the Shibboleth is still mighty. The commonplace, the formulary, still stirs men like the roll of the drum



or the ensnaring tinkling of the lute. The feelings carry away the judgment.'

[7] Words.

BERKELEY, *Intr.*, § 23: 'they advise well that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them.'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke says: "I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by taking *words* for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations." (*Ess. of Human Underst.*, II. xiii. 18.)

'"Men who abstract their thoughts and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking, however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in." (*Ib.* 28.)'

[8] Objects of knowledge: ideas.

BERKELEY, *Principles*, § 1: 'It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the *objects* (*Gegenstände*) of human knowledge.'

UEBERWEG: 'As Berkeley here designates "ideas" as the *objects* of human knowledge, he assumes the very thing he ought first to prove, and, without this, is guilty of begging the question.

'By ideas he means phenomena which exist in our consciousness, sensations, and the complex of perceptions, and that which proceeds from them.

'Any one disposed to dispute the truth of Berkeley's assertion might reply that ideas are not the *objects* of our knowledge, but the *means* of it. We have cognition by means of our ideas. Our ideas have actual existence in our souls, or are something subjectively real or psychically real. By means of our ideas we have cognition of the objectively real external world standing over against us, inasmuch as a primitive thinking (*primitives Denken*) coalesces with sensation (*sinnlichen Empfindung*) and in conjunction with it forms the sense-perception (seeing, hearing, etc.). See Ueberweg's *System der Logik*, § 41, seq. 45-47, etc. (tr. by Lindsay, London).

'This primitive thinking, not reflecting upon its separate elements (*Momente*), but bringing only the results to consciousness, interprets the image furnished in perception, and has the power to give it shape,—for example, to bear its part in determining the form of the firmament, a power not possessed by the subsequent reflective thinking, which meets shapes already fixed.

‘The complexes of sensations or ideas co-determined or shaped by the primary thinking are subjective *images*, or at least subjective *signs*, of the external world.

‘But to these *complexes* of sensations Berkeley assigns names, such as apple, tree, mountain, house, which, according to the usage of language and the popular consciousness on which that usage rests, designate external objects, by which apparently, but only apparently, it is proven that the so-called “external objects” exist in the spirit, for “ideas” (phenomena) have no other existence than in the percipient spirit.

‘The fixing on the complexes of sensations the names which pertain to the external objects wears an appearance of truth, because of an error in which the common view is involved.

‘The common view is that what is in fact our sensation, that is our psychological reaction toward the operation proceeding from the external thing, the operation exercised directly or by certain media upon our senses, that this is an attribute of the outer thing as such; as, for example, it supposes the green colour to be a quality of the leaf as such, the warmth a quality of the fire as such.

‘Now as Berkeley considers and treats this error as if it were a truth, in accepting the inseparableness of the object from *these* qualities, and consequently, in accordance with the popular consciousness, refers the *names* of the things to those objects to which these qualities pertain, and as he then goes on to show that these qualities consist of sensations of the subject, in Berkeley’s view those objects (as the apple, etc.) are identified with these sensations as something existing in the subject.

‘The popular apprehension considers these sensations as outward, inasmuch as it considers our sensations as qualities of objects, and not our own sensations, which are only possible in the subject.

‘Berkeley considers the objects as internal, that is, in the subject, inasmuch as he considers our sensations as qualities of the objects (to wit, ideas), but at the same time apprehends these (qualities) as our own sensations.

‘But the argument of Berkeley presents the fittest occasion to separate in the distinctest manner the correct and incorrect in the popular opinion as regards the existence and qualities of external objects, and not simply to claim concession for what is really scientifically justified, but over against Berkeley’s very thorough and acute negation to seek *proofs* of it. In this lie the suggestiveness and the abiding scientific value of the paradox of Berkeley. Cf. notes 10 and 90.’

EDITOR: 1: Ueberweg, in his Logic, treating of the 'Combination of Internal and External Perceptions,' says, § 41: '*The knowledge of the outer world depends upon the combination of external with internal perceptions.* Our corporeal circumstances, sensibly perceived by ourselves, are in orderly coherence with circumstances belonging to our internal perceptions.' § 42: 'Extending his consideration of the external world, man recognizes the *internal characters of other things* chiefly by means of the related sides of his own inner existence.' § 43: 'Every phenomenon objectively founded, as this very act of becoming a phenomenon testifies, and as the scientific investigation of the laws of nature makes evident, is to be traced back to some active power as its real basis.' § 44: 'The order in space and time belonging to real objects mirrors itself in the order in space and time of external and internal perception. Sense-qualities, however, colours, sounds, etc. are as such subjective only. They are not copies of motions, but are regularly and connectedly related to determinate motions as their symbols.' § 45: 'The INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTION, OR INTUITION, is the mental image of the individual existence, which is objective or at least is imagined to be.' § 46: '*Individual intuitions* gradually arise out of the original confused aggregate image of perception, when man first begins to recognize himself an *individual being* in antithesis to the outer world.' § 47: 'As the individual conception corresponds generally to the individual existence, so *its different kinds or forms* correspond to the *different kinds or forms of individual existence.*'

2: By '*objects of knowledge*' Berkeley means the objects of unmediated cognition. For the objector to say that the ideas are not the objects but the *means* of knowing the objects, is to admit that the objects, in the objector's sense, are not known except through a medium, to wit, the ideas. This means that the medium is itself known directly, and that the object whose medium it is is known mediately. But it is *immediate knowledge* of which alone Berkeley is speaking, so that the opponent meets him by repeating his affirmation with a change of phrase.


3: The Cartesian and post-Cartesian definitions of 'idea' illustrate both the usage and the argument of Berkeley. Syrbius (d. 1738) defines idea: *exemplar rei in cogitante*,—the copy of the thing in the thinker. Locke (l. i. 8) defines it 'whatsoever is the *object* of the understanding when a man thinks; whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.' In the Letter to the Bishop of Worcester: 'the things signified by *ideas* are nothing but the *immediate objects* of our

minds in thinking. He that thinks must have some *immediate object* of his mind in thinking, *i.e.* must have *ideas*.' Le Clerc defines idea 'the immediate object of the mind.'

SCHUBERT: '*Representation in the soul* is that operation by which the characters of any object are expressed in the soul. That state of soul which arises from this operation is called *idea*, and if the object of representation be a universal entity it is called *notion*.'

4: KANT regarded the fixing of the proper sense of the word 'idea' as of great importance. 'I beseech those who have the interests of philosophy at heart,—and this involves more than is commonly imagined,—. . . to protect the term idea in its original sense, so that it be not confused among the words with which, in careless disorder, all kinds of mental representations (*Vorstellungen*) are ordinarily designated, to the great detriment of science. There is no want of appellations adapted to every species of mental representation, completely obviating any necessity of encroaching on the proper province of others.'

Kant then gives these terms in a graduated list, which Mellin<sup>2</sup> has reduced to a very convenient tabular form:



<sup>1</sup> *Krit. d. rein. Vern.*, II. Th. ii. Abt. i. Buch.

<sup>2</sup> *Marginalien* (1794), 87.

5. Among the most serious difficulties which the English reader and translator of German metaphysics encounters is the perplexity he finds in the use of the terms *Vorstellung*, *Begriff*, and *Idee*. The perplexity arises from the shifting senses attached to these words by the various schools of philosophy. In ordinary life a German will say, 'I can form no *Begriff*, no *Idee*, no *Vorstellung* of it,' just as we say in English, 'I can form no *notion*, no *idea*, no *conception* of it.' The three terms have this in common, that they involve the activity of a thinking being. Each of them is sometimes used to translate *idea*, *notion*, and *conception*, and those three terms are used in translating each one of the German words.

*Vorstellung* is generally used as equivalent to *Repræsentatio* and *Perceptio*, and covers everything which is wrought by the activity of the mind. It is a generic term for mental operation, mental presentation, and representation, external and internal perception. It is often best rendered in a translation by *Conception*. 'Under the term *Vorstellung*,' says Krug, 'may be embraced everything which we call Intuition, Sensation, Notion, Thought, and Idea. Consequently, all our Cognitions rest on *Vorstellungen*.'

*Begriff* is an element of a judgment. Kant and his school depart from the common usage by confining *Begriff* to the *allgemeinen Begriffe*, the universal Notions. They give the name *Begriff* simply to the *Verstandes Begriff*, the Concept of the Understanding, the Notion.

Those who call the *Vorstellung* of individual things a *Begriff* do so on the ground that there are also single judgments, which present a logical relation between individual things.<sup>1</sup>

The most generally available English representative of *Begriff* is *Notion*.

Hamilton says, 'The distinction of *ideas*, strictly so called, and *notions*, under the contrast of *Anschauungen* and *Begriffe*, has long been . . . established with the philosophers of Germany.' 'No longer *Begriffe*, but *Anschauungen*; no longer *Notions* or *Concepts*, but *images*.' 'The terms *Begriffe* (*Conceptions*), etc.'<sup>2</sup>

The term *Representation* as a translation of *Vorstellung* does not correspond with Hamilton's usage. 'The term *Representation* I employ always strictly as in contrast to *Presentation*, and, therefore, with exclusive reference to individual objects, and not in the vague generality of *Repræsentatio*, or *Vorstellung*, in the Leibnitzian and sub-

<sup>1</sup> *Synonymik*: Eberhard, Maas und Gruber, 1826, vi. 168.

<sup>2</sup> Reid's Works, 291, 365, 407.

sequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cognitive act, considered, not in relation to what it knows, but to what is known; that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensations, Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, etc. as species.<sup>1</sup> See Schubert's definition under 3 in this note. As a rule the translator of Ueberweg's notes represents Begriff by 'Notion,' Vorstellung by 'Conception,' Idee by 'Idea.' See INDEX.

### [9] Esse—percipi.

BERKELEY, § 3: 'Their *esse* is *percipi*. 'Nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.'

UEBERWEG: 'Beyond question the being (*esse*) of ideas (phenomena) is identical with their being perceived (*percipi*); but it does not follow from this that there are not other things, "unthinking things," which condition the existence of ideas (phenomena), things whose existence is independent of the percipient subject, an existence in itself, and not a mere being perceived.

'Such "things in themselves" must be accepted, if a *connection* of natural phenomena *in accordance with natural laws* is not merely to be asserted but actually demonstrated.' (See further in notes which follow.)

EDITOR: If the *esse* is *percipi*, the *percipi* is also *esse*; that is, the thing perceived is the thing that is, and the thing as it is. Then arises the difficulty in regard to the mistakes in sense-perception. The one *percipi* in which a bush is taken for a man is corrected by a second *percipi*, in which the man is cognized. Is each *percipi* in this case the *esse*?

### [10] Things perceived.

BERKELEY, § 4: 'And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?'

UEBERWEG: 'The first thing necessary in the investigation is clearly to fix what is meant by the expression "things perceived" (as an apple, tree, etc.). In popular language, by such terms are meant things which exist outside of our mind, and which yet have qualities, such as greenness, warmth, and such like, which can only be sensations of the percipient subject.

'If it be acknowledged that there is a contradiction in this, it is only possible to retain one of the two elements which are united in popular language in the same expression.

<sup>1</sup> Reid's Works, 805, n.

'As essential to this we must avoid the parallogism into which Berkeley himself has fallen, of accepting as truths in this old and common sense of the word what can be established only in the *new* sense of the word.

'Either one sense or the other must be taken, to the exclusion of the other in the argument. If, on the one hand, we take the "things perceived" as meaning the complexes of sensation, images in perception, we do what Berkeley does. In this case it is not only true, but it is a truism, that these are in our consciousness only; but it is false to hold this as proven in regard to what is understood in popular language by the "thing perceived;" for example, the apple which I see, feel, and eat; in this usage "the thing perceived" means a *real thing external to my mind*, and that *this* thing is in fact reducible to a mere complex of sensation is what Berkeley has not *proved*. Or if, on the other hand, we must, as in correspondence with the general tendency of language, understand by the "things perceived" *external things*, in this must also be conceded that in *perception* is involved a primary thinking, which blends with sensation, through which we *infer* (schliessen) (cf. Obs. 8) the external things; but from this would follow no more than this, that the external things do not exist wholly as we *perceive* them, but not that they do not exist at all.

'As we do not call the *knowledge* which we have of the intellectual life of our friend his intellectual life itself which is known, just as little do we call the *image* in our perception of an object the object perceived.

'By the object perceived we understand the external thing itself, whose non-existence has been demonstrated by no proof.'

### [11] Abstraction.

BERKELEY, § 5: 'So as to conceive them existing unperceived.'

UEBERWEG: 'Not to *them*, but to those external things, is directed the supposition of existence in itself.

'The error designated by Berkeley lies not in abstraction as such, but in the supposition that by means of abstraction distinct things (such as the existence of the idea, and its being perceived) can really be separated. Abstraction (*ἀφαιρέσις*), rightly understood and properly applied, is thoroughly proper and indispensable. (See Obs. 5.) The fault which has most commonly characterized its use (the fault which Aristotle calls *χωρισμός*, separation) has no necessary connection with it.'

## [12] Abstraction.

BERKELEY, 5: 'But my conceiving or imagining power (Fähigkeit zu denken oder vorzustellen) does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception.'

UEBERWEG: 'The possibility of *Abstraction* stretches itself, however, in fact beyond this, for we are able to consider separately what in every act of perception is united with something else. This takes place, for example, in forming the notion (Begriff) of a mathematical body.'

## [13] Being and Perception.

BERKELEY, § 6: 'To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the *being* (Sein) of a sensible (sinnlich wahrnehmbaren) thing from its being perceived.'

UEBERWEG: 'Correct as is that which Berkeley says in reference to our complexes of sensation or images in perception, he has not proven that there are not things existing in themselves which operate in such a way upon our senses that, in consequence of the excitation thus received, the psychical principle dwelling within our organism begets the sensations and their regular complexes (the images in perception); and to those things existing in themselves—which, as the *correlates* of our perceptions, may be called the "objects perceived," so far as in the course of investigation sufficient grounds for accepting them are furnished—is to be ascribed an existence independent of the act of perception itself.

'This independence of the act of perception does not, however, exclude the supposition that between the things existing in themselves and perceptible, and the mind capable of perception, there exists a primitive affinity and correlation. Those things are the fore-steps of the mind; they condition it genetically, as on their side they are conditioned by it teleologically; by means of them the mind has intellectual existence and perceives: they exist, at the most, for the sake of the mind. By no means, however, do they exist in our mind.'

## [14] Spirit the only Substance.

BERKELEY, § 7: 'From what has been said, it is evident there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives.'

UEBERWEG: 'This would only follow if the things in themselves were identical with the images in perception, which they are not.'



## [15] An Idea like an Idea.

BERKELEY, § 8: 'An idea can be like nothing but an idea.'

UEBERWEG: 'This proposition is not proven, and is false. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that the figure of an image in perception—for example, the image we get of the course of a stream, or of the path of a planet—is like the figure of the course or path itself, although the one figure exists in the mind, the other outside of it.

'Not every figure is an "idea," although every colour is an "idea" (something purely subjective). See Obser. 17.'

## [16] The Perceivable.

BERKELEY, § 8: 'I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.'

UEBERWEG: 'Only the double use of the word perceivable (to which we have already alluded) leads to this dilemma.

'The originals are not perceivable in such sense that they can themselves be perceptions, but in this sense that they by means of our perception come to our consciousness.

'When, through touch and the eye, with the co-operation of the primitive mental action (*Denken*), which consists of involuntary associations, we obtain a perceptive image of the stream, we call this result "perceiving the stream."

'I see, feel, perceive, not the image, and not the constituents of the image (the ideas), but the external object by *means* of the image.

'On the other side, it must be conceded that usage does not designate exclusively the external things,—what is seen, heard, perceived,—but also the particular qualities, as, for example, redness, sound (as we say, I see the redness of the cheeks, I hear a sound), which are, in fact, purely subjective.

'This language is used, however, only on the erroneous supposition that they are objective, so that the *tendency* of the language here also remains unchanged; that is, to conjoin the objective as grammatical object with the verb "perceive." What is manifestly subjective, as, for example, a "pain," is not *perceived*, but is felt—is not the object of sense-perception, but of sensation (*nicht "sinnlich wahrgenommen," sondern "empfunden"*).'

## [17] Primary and Secondary.

BERKELEY, § 9: 'Some there are who make a distinction betwixt *primary* and *secondary* qualities.'

UEBERWEG: 'This distinction, which is drawn by Locke, is a correct one; only it would be better to style them Qualities in the *primary* sense (inhering in the object itself), and Qualities in the *secondary* sense (operations of the things on us; qualities of sensation, which they, the things, excite in us).

'The *Geometrical* is both objective and subjective. Everything else in the sense-perception is purely subjective, but linked with the objective, in conformity with laws: for example, every separate sound and every separate colour is linked with vibrations of a separate kind.'

EDITOR: See Hylas and Philonous. First Dialogue. Works (Fraser), i. 279.

Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. viii.

Hamilton's Reid, pp. 313-318, and Note D, pp. 825-875.

## [18] Matter.

BERKELEY, § 9: 'By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert (träge), senseless (empfindungslose) substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist.'

UEBERWEG: 'It is entirely unnecessary to conceive of matter as purely "inert," without force. Something internal, on which rest its motions (its forces, the analogues of our conceptions), may and must be conceded to matter.'

EDITOR: Leibnitz was the first thoroughly to bring to scientific consciousness 'force' or power as an essential element of matter.

## [19] Only Ideas.

BERKELEY, § 9: 'Are only ideas.'

UEBERWEG: 'The "only" is not proven.'

## [20] Matter or Corporeal Substance.

BERKELEY, § 9: 'Hence it is plain (offenbar) that the very notion (der Begriff) of what is called *matter* or *corporeal substance* involves a contradiction in it.'

UEBERWEG: 'This would be plain (offenbar) only in case the unproved assertion were true, that a figure can be *only* an "idea."

'The true proposition—that *those* figures which are in our perceptive images are something psychical—Berkeley has incorrectly converted into the proposition that figures exist *only* in the mind.'

## [21] Extension and Movement.

BERKELEY, § 10: 'to reflect (nachzudenken), . . . try (erproben), . . . abstraction of thought (Vorstellungszerlegung), . . . without all other sensible (sinnlichen) qualities.'

UEBERWEG: 'That extension and movement which is in the perceptive image (Wahrnehmungsbilde) can certainly not exist outside of the mind sundered from the other constituents of the perceptive image. This requires no argument. The real question is, *Is there anything else?*—to wit, is there an objective extension existing outside the mind, with figures and movements which are similar to the subjective? That this is impossible Berkeley has affirmed, but has not proved.'

EDITOR: Much of the difficulty of this question has arisen from the loose and conflicting senses in which the terms 'similar' and 'like' are used.

Strictly or materially taken, the external objective cannot be 'like' the subjective,—matter cannot be 'like' a condition of mind,—but the differences between the mental states produced by different objects really correspond with, have real analogues in, the objects differing. With *reference to each other*, objects have a relative likeness to the subjective state they produce. A real lion has this sort of likeness to the mental image of a lion,—it is like the mental lion in a sense in which an ox or a flower is not. So, too, the picture of a lion is materially neither like a real lion nor the mental image of a lion, but it has a relative likeness to both—such a likeness as the picture of an ox has not.

## [22] Qualities of Matter.

BERKELEY, § 10: 'which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind (Geiste).'

UEBERWEG: 'It has already been observed that matter to which the objectively real extension, figure, and motion belong is not to be conceived of as having no other qualities.'

'But the nature of these other qualities is not as readily and as surely known as the nature of the geometrical qualities of matter.'

'If they are analogues of our conceptions, they are nevertheless certainly not in our mind, and are not identical with its sensations (sinnlichen Empfindungen). The questions bearing on this point will not come up in a methodical discussion until the problems relating to the primary qualities are solved.'

## [23] Great and Small.

BERKELEY, § 11: 'The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all.'

UEBERWEG: 'This false inference is reached by confounding the position of scientific observation with that of the popular view. Scientific observation shows that *great* and *little* are relative conceptions; that consequently where no relation exists we can no longer, in the strict sense, speak of greatness or littleness; from the fact that what only in this *strict* sense can be called neither great nor little is to be taken for something which is neither large nor small in the *popular* sense (and consequently where the comparison is complete), the inference is drawn that an extension which is neither great nor little is "nothing at all."

'The fallacy is the same as in the Thesis (which has often been adduced, and may be justified by the relativity of the notion of *poison*), "Aut omnia aut nulla venena," with which is linked the inference that it makes no difference whether we eat bread or arsenic.

'Every real extension is one distinct extension and no other (not at all, however, as Berkeley immediately after imputes it to the defenders of the objectivity, "extension in general"). But the notion of greatness or littleness cannot be applied to it without a comparison which *we ourselves* make.

'The same is true of motion. A planet moves around the centre of its system in a certain path, which, by means of a particular motion (not "motion in general"), can be measured. Whether the motion is to be called swift or slow depends upon the comparison which *we* make.

'The motion of Mars, for example, is slow in comparison with the motion of the earth, but swift in comparison with the motion of Uranus; in itself, not compared with other motions, it is neither swift nor slow. But this would not justify us in saying "that as it is in itself neither swift motion nor slow motion" *it is nothing at all.*'

'The setting aside of antithetical predicates, which apart from comparison have no meaning, does not set aside the thing itself. No, indeed is the comparison always a *purely* subjective one, but in many cases, and those of the highest scientific importance, it is brought out in objective connections.'

## [24] Unity.

BERKELEY, § 12: 'in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily (willkürlich) put together by the mind.'

UEBERWEG: 'The mind proceeds not arbitrarily, but in conformity with objective relations, when it considers three persons or three trees as three entities, and not as ten or twenty cubic unities, the size of each of which is taken into consideration.'

'Number as number is a structure of the mind which summarizes what is homogeneous; but the unity of measure is only in certain cases and in a certain degree arbitrary. So far as *individuals* exist it is objectively grounded.'

#### [25] Unity: Locke.

BERKELEY, § 13: 'all the ways of sensation and reflection (der sinnlichen und inneren Wahrnehmung).'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke says (Ess. on H. U., II. xiii. 26), "There is not any object of sensation or reflection (sinnlichen und inneren Wahrnehmung) which does not carry with it the idea of one." He maintains (do., II. xvi. 1) that no idea is so simple as that of unity, and that it is most intimately interwoven with all our thoughts. This proposition of Locke is here controverted by Berkeley.'

#### [26] Cold and Warm.

BERKELEY, § 14: 'the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.'

UEBERWEG: 'This argument (as Berkeley himself grants) is not in itself sufficient to prove that there is no particular grade of caloric in the external object itself,—a grade which may be ascertained objectively by the thermometer. The argument does no more than bring before us the obvious fact that the expressions "hot" and "cold," as they involve a comparison with the grades of warmth in parts of our body, cannot be used without a subjective reference. We cannot, therefore, just "as well," but rather can just "*as little*" infer that there is no particular figure and no particular extension belonging in every case to the external object involved. The conclusion, however, that the sensation of warmth cannot be an *image* of an objective quality of caloric, while yet the perception of a form *can* be an *image* of the perceived form of the external object, rests upon different premises.'

'All the qualities of sensation can be excited by processes of motion. These latter must as such be objective, for otherwise the presupposition of an objective causal (nexus), a thing established by all the results of physical investigation, falls away with them. See (45).'

## [27] Substance.

BERKELEY, § 17: 'but the idea of being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seienden) in general (überhaupt), together with the relative notion (Begriff) of its supporting (Tragens) accidents.'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke (H. Und., II. xii. 3-6) reduces complex ideas (zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen) to three classes: 1. Modes (Accidentien), 2. Substances, 3. Relations (Verhältnisse). Under modes or accidents he understands "complex ideas which contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves (für sich bestehend), but are considered as dependencies on or affections of substances" inhering in certain substances.

"The ideas of *substances*," says Locke, "are such combinations of simple ideas (Vorstellungen) as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves" (für sich bestehende). The "*relation*" consists in the comparing one idea (Vorstellung) with another."

"Under *accidents*," says Locke (H. U., II. xiii. 19), "is understood a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in,"—something real, which of necessity presupposes some other thing in which it subsists. "*Substance* is that which supports accidents,"—their substratum. He adds, "Of *substance* we have no idea what it is, but only a confused, obscure one of what it does." "The idea of substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection (äussere innere Wahrnehmung) (I. iv. 18); it is furnished to us only by the constant association of certain simple ideas. As we are unable to conceive how these can subsist in themselves, we are *accustomed* to suppose some certain substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result; which, therefore, we call substance' (H. U., II. xxiii. 1).

'Only the constant combination of properties is given to us; the nature of substance is hidden from us (do. do., 3-6).

"He has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances who has gathered and put together most of the simple ideas which do exist in it" (do. do., 7).

'It is true Locke would have been more logical, without, however, on that account by any means reaching Berkeleyanism, if he had rejected as an empty fiction the conception of substance as a something distinct from qualities, and had acknowledged only the reciprocal combination of qualities as real. As he, however, regarded this inference (subsequently drawn by Hume) as doubtful, he confined himself to characterizing as dark and of little use the idea of substance as something distinct from all qualities.

‘In the Platonic Aristotelian view of material substance extension is embraced.

‘By Berkeley’s negation of the existence of extension *extra mentem* the notion of material substance is, as he justly says, also taken away ; but the converse is by no means true, that the negation of that dark something necessarily involves the negation of the objective reality of extension.’

### [28] Ideas as Objects.

BERKELEY, § 18: ‘Reason (Denken), Sensations (Sinnesempfindungen), immediately perceived by sense (unmittelbar sinnlich wahrgenommen werden): but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.’

UEBERWEG: ‘We have here again a return to the terminology which has already been objected to, in which “ideas” are designated as the objects of knowledge and of sense-perception ; indeed, as “the objects immediately perceived.”’

‘In fact, ideas are only *objects* of contemplation in internal perception ; that is, in reflection on an internal psychical image.

‘Berkeley is indeed so far entirely right that it is actually only these complexes of sensation (perception) which are immediately in our consciousness ; the reference of them to the corresponding external objects takes place by means of an accessory primitive thinking, which presupposes partly nearer, partly more remote analogues of our own existence, of which we know by internal perception on occasion of those complexes of sensation, and indeed as the external causes of them ; the perception (sight, touch, etc.), to the extent to which it is more than mere sensation, already involves that primitive act of thinking.

‘But the complexes of sensation, though alone *immediately* in our consciousness, are not therefore necessarily the immediate *object* of sense-perception, to wit, if they be at all not the object but the *means* of it ; our attention, in the case of the complexes of sensation, is directed entirely to the external things manifested to us through them ; the external thing is that which I see, handle, perceive.

‘The complexes of sensation are, as such, late in becoming the object of psychological reflection.

‘The act of thinking which enters into the sense-perception itself, and forms a constituent part of it, is an elementary one, through which, it is true, the existence of external objects is known ; but the distinction is by no means yet consummated, which shows what constituents of the complex of sensation correspond in a fuller and what in a more

restricted measure with the particular nature of their objects; *this* distinction (which Descartes and Locke have in the main correctly carried through) only takes place as the product of a far-advanced scientific penetration.'

[29] **Materialists.**

BERKELEY, § 18: 'The Materialists.'

UEBERWEG: 'That is, those who hold to the existence of a matter external to the mind,—defenders of the doctrine of matter.'

[30] **Dreams.**

BERKELEY, § 18: 'With all the ideas.'

UEBERWEG: 'With all? In accordance with the order of natural laws, assuredly not!

'Consequently no more follows than what is beyond doubt, aside from the facts here urged by Berkeley, that the *inference* as to the existence of external objects is in certain cases deceptive, and that the conditions under which the *inference* holds good must be ascertained. The images in dreams and visions would not be possible without antecedent affections made through actual external objects; they are the result of a reproduction and metamorphosis of the presentations furnished by memory. If Berkeley's argument held good, the existence of other persons—which can also be dreamed of—would, equally with the existence of "unthinking objects," be taken away. The weakness of the argument is shown in its proving too much.'

[31] **Materialists.**

BERKELEY, § 19: 'The Materialists.'

UEBERWEG: 'Here appears yet more clearly than above (29) that Berkeley uses the term "Materialist" in a sense different from the received one.

'The ordinary meaning of "Materialist" is one who believes that nothing exists but material substance. Berkeley applies it to all who hold that material substances exist, although at the same time they may hold to the existence of spiritual substances.'

[32] **Intercourse.**

BERKELEY, § 19: 'And serve to no manner of purpose.'

UEBERWEG: 'They serve at least to render possible, in a manner conformed to natural laws, the intercourse between intellectual beings, if indeed the very possibility of the existence of conscious being be not conditioned through them.'



‘Language is the medium through which thought is imparted. Grant that the word spoken by me can exist only in certain ideas linked to my thoughts, which ideas, like the word itself, exist purely in the mind; and grant that the air itself exists only as the complex of ideas in illocal essence or spirits, yet it would still be inconceivable why similar ideas should be aroused by that word in the mind of another who is near me (the nearness itself cannot be one of a local kind, on this system), and still less would it be intelligible how a writing, long after the death of its author, could continue to produce the same kind of effects.

‘All conformity to law would be the mere association of ideas in the individual subject; for all relations between persons we must have recourse to the immediate or miraculous working of the divine Omnipotence. But if outside of the mind of the person who speaks or who writes, and of the mind of the hearer or reader, the air and other material media have an existence, the intermediation can be explained by physics and the other natural sciences in a manner which cannot be contemptuously set aside.

‘It is true that something still remains unexplained; but the path to the explanation is broken, and the difficulty made so prominent by Berkeley is diminished, if we do not regard matter and spirit as so utterly heterogeneous as Descartes and even Locke, and their contemporaries, have done.

‘The view of Berkeley, on the other hand, removes all possibility of an explanation based upon natural science.’

### [ 33 ] Dreaming.

BERKELEY, § 20: ‘That you can possibly have for believing the same thing.’

UEBERWEG: ‘Undoubtedly; and in dreaming we actually have the very belief without any grounds for it. But the supposition that waking is but dreaming with open eyes can only be carried through by the removal of all objective order of nature, of everything which goes beyond the bare association of ideas in the individual subject.’

### [ 34 ] A Posteriori.

BERKELEY, § 21: ‘Arguments a posteriori.’

UEBERWEG: ‘“Arguments a posteriori” in the old Aristotelian Scholastic sense of the term, according to which the argumentation a priori (to wit, ad posterius) implies the inference from the cause, as that which in its nature is earlier (*φύσει πρότερον*) to the operation or effect,

or that which in nature is later (*φύσει ὕστερον*), while the argument a posteriori (to wit, ad prius natura) implies the inference from the operations or effects to the cause,—the inference from the *φύσει ὕστερον* to the *φύσει πρότερον*.

‘In the inference a posteriori, the later (the operations) is, according to natural sequence, the nearer to us (*πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*), or that which is earlier and more easily recognizable by us,—*γνωριμώτερον ἡμῖν*,—from whence we go back to the earlier,—the Causes; we argue in this case *regressively*, while in the a priori (ad posterius) we argue *progressively*. For the use of the terms a priori and a posteriori which has reference to the Course of Argumentation, Kant, partly following Hume and others, has substituted a completely heterogeneous use. According to Kant’s use the distinction of a priori and a posteriori is referred to the judgment as such; by knowledge a posteriori he means the knowledge derived from experience, empirical; by knowledge a priori, the knowledge (erroneously assumed by him as possible and actual) which we have apart from experience.’

### [35] Extended Substance.

BERKELEY, § 22: ‘If you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea.’

UEBERWEG: ‘The subsumption of “extended moveable substance,” under the term “idea,” already implies the Berkeleyan doctrine. The opponent of the view must consequently challenge this questionable position itself, and must refuse to concede what it tacitly assumes. *Nego suppositum*. As Berkeley here, however, simply repeats his former positions, we could do no more than repeat our former objections, which is unnecessary.’

### [36] External Things.

BERKELEY, § 23: ‘Which is a manifest repugnancy.’

UEBERWEG: ‘The existence of external things without my thinking of them can very well be granted, but my consciousness that external things can exist is not possible, unless I am thinking of these very things. The periods of the formation of the earth, during which there were no living creatures, have existed without being perceived by men; but we can know or conjecture that they existed, in no other way than by having them in our thought. Berkeley does not separate the two things. While the Opponent, whom he supposes to present himself, directs his reflection only to the existence of the external object, Berkeley makes this very reflection of the thinking subject upon the

object the starting-point of his argument, and in the abstraction of the object from the subject, made by the Opponent, does not follow him. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that the possibility of performing this abstraction does not in itself *demonstrate* that things in themselves exist; but he is not justified in maintaining that this possibility does not exist, because we, when we reflect upon *it*, do then certainly (in addition) think about the Things.'

### [37] Representation.

BERKELEY, § 23: 'Though at the same time they are apprehended by (vorgestellt) or exist in itself?'

UEBERWEG: 'Not the things, but only a representation (Vorstellung) of them, exists in me, just as, when I think of a psychical being distinct from myself, it is not this being, but a representation of it, which exists in me.'

### [38] Things in themselves.

BERKELEY, § 24: 'Those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.'

UEBERWEG: 'The alleged contradiction, as we have before shown, does not exist.

'Were there such contradiction, there would be equally a contradiction in supposing that there was a time previous to my own existence. For to suppose this I must think of that time; it is consequently in me; consequently it does not exist without me, or outside of me; consequently not before my existence: for that anything should be in me, without myself being, is a palpable contradiction.

'The solution of Berkeley's argument is the same as that of the paralogism just given. I think of the past now as I now generate an image of it in me,—not the past itself, but an image of it, is now in me; but the past itself has existed without me. I cannot know that it has existed without me without (now in addition) thinking of it; but it can have existed, and has existed, without this thinking of mine.

'In the same way, things which exist in themselves are thought of by me when I generate in me an image, more or less accurate, of them: the things themselves are not in me, but this image of them is in me; but they themselves exist independently of my image. I cannot know that they exist in themselves without thinking of them, but they can exist, and many of them do, in fact, exist, indubitably, without this thinking of mine. The objection made by Berkeley is brought up again by Fichte, who denies Kant's assumption of "Things in themselves" (Dingen an sich). The same thing is done by Reinhold

Hoppe. In his work on the Sufficiency of the Empirical Method in Philosophy (“Zulänglichkeit des Empirismus in der Philosophie,” Berlin, 1852), he argues for a doctrine allied to that of Berkeley. Hoppe shapes his statement in this form,—that the opposition between Actuality and Cognition involves a contradiction, for in as far as Actuality is discussed, investigated, brought into contrast, so far is it thought of; from which he infers that everything we affirm of it relates, in fact, only to our own thinking.

‘The objection, however, in this mode of conception, is that it involves a mingling of two grades of thinking,—to wit, that in which thinking is simply concerned with the truth (meaning that there is a harmony of our subjective apprehension with the objective Actuality; as, for example, the harmony of our apprehension of the assassination of Cæsar with the assassination as it actually occurred), and that in which it is concerned with our insight into the essence of the truth. Our notion of objective actuality belongs only to the second grade (in its antithesis to the subjective apprehension). To this grade, too, exclusively belongs the notion of cognition, and it is a matter of course that we cannot have these notions without thinking them. It is the first grade, indeed, which alone enables us to account for the second; and in connection with this first grade we have to do merely with the existence of that harmony, not with our knowing of its existence; and in this it is not our thinking of the Actuality, but the Actuality itself, which is determinative,—that is to say, the thing which exists or which has happened, which is not dependent on my knowledge of it (or is, in other words, “the thing in itself”—“an sich ist”), but which conditions my knowing.’

EDITOR: It can exist without my knowing it, but I cannot know it without its existing.

### [39] Incitement of Ideas.

BERKELEY, § 25: ‘or pattern of any active being, as is evident from § 8.’

UEBERWEG: ‘The argument in § 8 has already been met. The inactivity of ideas is by no means established by self-observation: the association of ideas testifies to exactly the opposite. The supposition that our ideas are incited by external objects has not been proven false by Berkeley.’

‘It is indeed false to suppose such a relation between mind and the external world as imputes all the activity to the external world and considers the mind as a passive substratum, like a writing-tablet or a

piece of wax ; but just as false is the opposite theory, which claims all activity for the mind exclusively. The expression "incitement" (Anregung) or "affection" marks the actual relation most accurately

#### [40] Substance.

BERKELEY, § 27: 'only by the effects which it produceth.'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke says (Hum. Und., II. xxiii. 5), "the operations of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., . . . we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, are apt to think them the actions of some other substance, which we call Spirit."

'According to Locke, we think of Spirit as the substratum of activities which we perceive in our own (psychical) internal nature, as we conceive of bodies as the substratum of qualities which affect our senses.

'We have, according to Locke, no distinct idea either of corporeal or of spiritual substance, but can on this account no more deny the existence of one than of the other.

'Berkeley denies corporeal substance in behalf of spiritual substance ; but at a later period Hume denied both, or, at least, declared them equally doubtful, and adopted a self-dependent subsistence of conceptions in their reciprocal connection.

'Kant explained the notion of substance as an original notion of the understanding, which, just because of this its subjective origin, is applicable only to phenomenal objects, which are in our consciousness. By this view the skepticism is not confuted, but rather strengthened. In fact, we form the notion of substance on the ground of the knowledge of ourself (in virtue of internal perception), as of an individual, by transferring the notion thus formed to personal and impersonal objects.'

#### [41] Subject.

BERKELEY, § 27: 'of its supporting or being the subject (zu tragen oder ihr Substrat zu sein).'

UEBERWEG: "'Subject" in the ancient Aristotelian Scholastic sense (*ὑποκείμενον*, substratum).'

#### [42] Solipsism.

BERKELEY, § 27: 'Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some *notion* (Begriff) of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind (den psychischen Thätigkeiten), such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.'

UEBERWEG: 'Whether our consciousness of the psychical should be

designated by the term "idea" or "notion," is rather a question of verbal than of practical interest. It is worthy of remark, however, that if we propose to designate the "notions" of the mind in regard to other minds and their operations, as *objects* of cognition, in the manner in which Berkeley in the case of sense-perception designates "*ideas*" as the *objects* perceived, using in part the same arguments on which he has grounded the conclusion that we know only our own ideas, and not bodies, which are external to our mind, it would warrant the inference that we know only our own "*notions*" of spirits, and not spirits themselves, which have an existence outside of our own. Berkeley's arguments would lead to the acceptance of the sole existence of the person arguing,—to what is called "theoretic Egoism," or "Solipsism,"—and as it proves too much must be faulty.'

#### [43] Senses.

BERKELEY, § 29: 'But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will.'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke, in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding," treats in Book iv. chap. xi. "of our knowledge of the existence of other things," external to us. He supposes that we are compelled to trust our senses, which give us notice of the existence of other things, by which the senses are affected. No man can be so skeptical as to doubt of the existence of these things (do., § 3). Among the grounds of conviction he reckons also the circumstance which Berkeley here mentions, that when our eyes are open we cannot avert the entrance of the ideas (*Vorstellungen*) which sun and light occasion in us. Locke draws the inference (§ 5) that the thing which evokes in me ideas of this or that kind must be the impression of an external object affecting my senses. In place of this cause Berkeley substitutes the immediate operation of Deity on our souls.'

#### [44] Activity and Passivity.

BERKELEY, § 28: 'When in broad daylight I open my EYES—'

'There is, therefore, some *other* Will or Spirit that produces them.'

UEBERWEG: 'If our spirit is susceptible of an operation, through which another being calls forth ideas in it, it follows that it is not in its own nature a perpetually active being, but is also capable of passivity. It is worth giving prominence here to the fact that by this view the distinction between Activity and Passivity is shown to be a relative one.'

## [45] Laws of Nature.

BERKELEY, § 30: 'Now the set rules or established methods wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the *laws of nature*.'

UEBERWEG: 'From the position of Berkeley, an order conformable to the laws of nature, inasmuch as he interprets this as the order of our own ideas, may be *maintained*; but no laws of nature can be *actually demonstrated*, so that by them we can explain the natural phenomena. If, for example, the course of the planets is to be explained, that is, referred to laws universally holding good, it is impossible to do so by merely taking into account our own perceptions in their mutual relations. For in these perceptions, if they be regarded in themselves, a precise fixed order does not reveal itself. Such an order can only be found if we suppose a causality which limits the subject (in the act of seeing) with material objects external to the subject, to wit, the heavenly bodies, which carry on their movements in consonance with the laws of gravitation, the laws which Newton discovered. They carry them on, not within our consciousness, but independently of it, and did carry them on probably long before human consciousness existed, though we are able to develop our consciousness supplementally concerning them. It is not this supplemental consciousness which works upon our eyes, but the real external course of the planets.'

## [46] Causality.

BERKELEY, § 31: 'This gives us a sort of foresight, . . . and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.'

UEBERWEG: 'Locke says (Hum. Und., B. II. xxvi. 1): "In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect." He gives as an example that in the substance we call wax, fluidity is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call fluidity therefore the effect and heat the cause. Locke concedes that, in this, the manner in which cause brings forth effect remains unknown.'

'Berkeley's theory of cause and effect is an application, in the most subjective shape, of this doctrine of Locke. Hume's sceptical Reflections on the Notion of Cause, which he traces to our habitually finding

certain perceptions linked with certain others, found here a point of connection, as his sceptical reflections found their point of attachment in sections xvi., xvii., and xxvii. In the internal perception of our will and of the effort we make in overcoming obstacles, Reid and some others of the Scotch school found the solution of our notion of causality, and among French thinkers Maine de Biran adopted this view. Kant on the contrary regarded this notion and that of substance as a primary notion, originally immanent in the mind, "a category." With this view he imagined that he had vanquished the scepticism of Hume, while in fact he had only promoted the extremest subjectivism,—a subjectivism which soon emerged in Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, but shifted round into the objectivism of Schelling, which objectivism in turn has led to new attempts at solution. *Adhuc sub iudice lis est.*'

#### [47] Causal Connection.

BERKELEY, § 32: 'Perceiving (wenn wir wahrnehmen) the motion (die Bewegung) and collision (Zusammenstoss) of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect (Wirkung) of the former.'

UEBERWEG: 'Here again holds good what was observed before, that the Causal Connection, if it be apprehended as merely the order established by God in the ideas which are in the *subject*, can merely be asserted, not actually demonstrated and formulated. But if the Causal Connection be associated with the external things, it is explained in conformity with mathematical mechanical laws. For example, the union of collision with sound is explained by the displacement connected with the visible motion of bodies in the motions of the minute parts of body.'

#### [48] Prejudice.

BERKELEY, § 34: 'It will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of *ideas* takes place.'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley has only too much to justify him in believing that the first objections urged against a theory which departs from the current opinion will be of the kind he here describes. As children are wont to say No, when anything is demanded of them which they have not themselves imagined or desired, so adults thrust away what is strange to them, simply because it is strange. They cry out that it is odd and absurd, while the only real question is whether it is asserted



on sufficient grounds. Berkeley's task is easy enough with this class of objections; there is another class which has more weight.'

#### [49] Reality.

BERKELEY, § 36: 'If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of.'

UEBERWEG: 'As Locke, who (IV. xi. 8) characterizes the negation of the corporeal world as a view according to which "all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality."''

#### [50] Substance.

BERKELEY, § 37: 'If it (substance) be taken in a philosophic sense for the support (Träger) of accidents or qualities (Eigenschaften) without the mind, then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take that away which never had any existence, not even in the imagination (blossen Vorstellung).'

UEBERWEG: 'The two questions are not identical, whether there be extended things without our minds, and whether there be substance which is the support of qualities. It is not true that Berkeley simply contests the second supposition, and is on other points in unison with the common view. The existence of extension, figure, magnitude, and impenetrability, and also of gravitation and of forces in general, without the percipient mind, is the very essence of the question. Locke's notion of substance can be denied without denying that existence without the percipient mind. He who denies this existence denies indeed of necessity, at the same time, the notion of corporeal substances, but not *merely* this. To this add that Berkeley himself acknowledges spiritual *substances* as the supports of the inherent.'

#### [51] Eating and Drinking Ideas.

BERKELEY, § 38: 'It sounds very harsh to say, we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so,—the word *idea* not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called *things*.'

UEBERWEG: 'Were this the only ground, it would sound less harsh to say that we eat and drink sense-perceptions. The true ground is that the things we eat and drink are *things* existing without our consciousness (in themselves), and are not ideas in the mind of the percipient subject, and are regarded as such by the non-philosophic also.'

The theory of Berkeley does not deviate from the ordinary use of language merely, but from the conviction which lies at the root of this usage. To be sure, this is no proof that Berkeley's theory is not right; but the deviation is unmistakable.

'Berkeley himself not only acknowledges that he deviates from the ordinary use of language, but subsequently (§ 39, with which compare the beginning of § 56) acknowledges his deviation from the common supposition on which the usage of language rests. With this is not in consonance the assertion made in § 35, and frequently elsewhere, "the *only* thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance." Berkeley's assertion, moreover, that we eat and drink ideas, is not only opposed to the usage of language and the common presuppositions on which that usage rests, but to Berkeley's own position, which is at once necessary on the one side and untenable on the other. Nothing of the colour and taste of the apple or of wine enters into the stomach,—the stomach neither sees nor tastes; the processes of assimilation run through their normal course with scarcely any recognition on the part of consciousness. How, consequently, can "ideas," or sensations, or sensible qualities, be eaten? The chemical processes which science has gradually, in part, discovered, are known only in their effects. So long as they are unperceived, they are upon the one side, according to Berkeley's principles, nothing, and on the other side, as they are associated with operations, they are something,—which is a complete contradiction. Consequently, the negation of things which exist without the consciousness (and of whose existence we can only gradually attain a consciousness) is untenable. See the note on § 52.'

EDITOR: Schulze,<sup>1</sup> who rejects Berkeley's view, says, 'The system seems ludicrous only because our modes of speech and of thought are not in conformity with it.' It may be said, however, that the language which Berkeley uses is not self-consistent, for the eating is as ideal as the thing eaten. We have the eating-idea of the apple-idea, the dressing-idea of the raiment-idea. The relation in Berkeley is not that of an objective act brought to bear on an ideal thing, but of ideal on ideal. On the other hand, if the idea *is* the thing, the idea is the apple, the idea is the eating. Strictly speaking, the apple of Berkeley is not the idea *of* an apple, but is an idea-apple; the eating is not the idea *of* eating, but is the idea-eating. Berkeley himself falls into the trap of the every-day formulary in the first part of the phrase. As he defines reality, the idea-eating of the idea-apple is a real eating

<sup>1</sup> Grundr. d. philosoph. Wissenschaft, 2 v., 1788, i. 23.

of a real apple; but this makes our psychical *activity* depend on God as much as our psychical *passivity*, and overthrows the infallibility of our consciousness to our own mental acts. My idea that I am eating is not a mere sense-impression, but a consciousness of will.

### [52] Testimony of the Senses.

BERKELEY, § 40: 'But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them.'

UEBERWEG: 'Compare Locke, iv. xi. 3: "This is certain, the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. . . . Our senses do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them."

'He says further (§ 8), "the certainty of things existing in *rerum natura*, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs."'

### [53] Fire and the Idea of Fire: Locke.

BERKELEY, § 41: 'if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness.'


UEBERWEG: 'Locke (iv. xi. 7): "He that sees a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too"; (§ 8): "if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish."'

### [54] The Sensorium.

BERKELEY, § 42: 'In a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet, for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.'

UEBERWEG: 'It must undoubtedly be acknowledged that all the perception-images which are outside the perception-image of our own body are by no means on that account without our mind. But this does not forbid that there should be without the entire sphere of the perception-images those real objects which affect our senses, and that there should be organs of sense which are affected, from which organs, by means of the sensible nerves, the affections are conveyed to the central parts, in which we are to look for the seat of the sensorium

commune, and the seat consequently, also, of the perception-images themselves. The following figure may be of service in elucidating the statement just made :



'*AB* is the external object ; *ba* is the image of *AB* in the right and in the left eye ; *b'a'* is the image of *AB* in the sensorium commune ; *Oa* is the right eye ; *Os* is the left eye ; *C* is the brain (linear, half the natural size) ; *od*, *os*, *c*, the *represented* (*vorgestellten*) places of the right and left eye and of the brain.

'The sensorium lies within the real brain *C*, but within the sensorium, in addition to images of the rest of objects, lie the images of our eyes, of our head, of our retina, of our optic nerves, and of the brain itself, so far as we know them by anatomy ; it is a mistake to seek the objects here.'

### [55] 'New Theory of Vision.'

BERKELEY, § 43: 'The consideration (*Erwägung*) of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (*Sehens*), which was published not long since.'

UEBERWEG: "'An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision'" appeared 1709. In this Essay Berkeley maintained that we do not estimate the remoteness of the object by the "optic axes," or the lines from the two eyes to the object seen, and the angle which they form with each other by their concurring at the object.

'In defence of this opinion he advanced three arguments :

'1. We do not perceive these lines and angles, and yet our estimation of distance can only rest on what is perceived.

'2. These lines and angles have no real existence in nature, but are merely a geometrical hypothesis (*Voraussetzung*).

'3. Though we should grant their real existence, and that it is possible for the mind to perceive them, they would yet be insufficient to explain the phenomena of distance.

'In accordance with the clearness or confusion of the perceptions of colours, and in accordance with other changes which associate themselves with certain sensations of touch (*Tastempfindungen*), the person seeing judges in regard to distances, judges, consequently, on the ground of *experience*.

'From this Berkeley draws the conclusion that if a person born blind should recover his sight by an operation, he would at first have no idea of distance, and that sun and stars, and all the remotest objects, equally with the nearest, "would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind." (Essay, § 41.) This supposition of Berkeley's has been confirmed by the fact that persons born blind who have obtained sight by an operation do not at first know how to estimate distances, but are obliged to learn to do it gradually. Such persons, also, while they can distinguish forms from each other, as, for example, a dog from a cat, are not able at once to connect with them the shapes which had previously become familiar by touch. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that we judge of the third dimension—Depth—only according to certain signs, though many other signs are to be added to those which he makes prominent. This judging takes place through that primary thinking which is performed by virtue of associations involuntarily arising, a thinking which exercises an essential influence in shaping the perception-image,—for example, in producing the form of the firmament. There is another question, however, Whether the shaping in vision in general rests *only* in this primary thinking, or whether a beginning of the shaping already lies in the original sensation (*Empfindung*) itself. The great physiologist JOHN MULLER (1801-1858) adopted the latter view, as he grants that the superficial shape of the image on the retina (or of a representation of it within the sensorium?) immediately, as such, reaches the consciousness.

'Others, for example LOTZE, suppose that no shape as such enters immediately into the consciousness, but that all apprehension of form fashions itself in us out of qualitative distinctions; the theory of the punctual existence of the soul necessitates this latter assumption; and this assumption seems also on its part necessarily to presuppose that punctual position of the soul, inasmuch as in a soul not punctual there must of necessity already be some grouping in the Sensations (*Empfindungen*) themselves.

'The "Empiristic (*Empiristische*) theory" represented by HELM-

HOLTZ, which aims at reducing *all* apprehension of form to unconscious inferences, must either advance to the doctrine of punctual position or return to MULLER'S doctrine. The controversy is still undecided.'

EDITOR: Berkeley's New Theory is generally regarded as a discovery. Such it is in the only sense in which anything intellectual is a discovery: it is the actualizing and culmination of a series of efforts. There are hints of the theory in Descartes, dim anticipations of it in Malebranche (Rech. d. l. Vérité, i., ch. 9), and in Glanville's *Scep̄sis Scientifica* (ch. 5), and a nearer approach in Molyneux's *Dioptrics* (1690), and in Locke's *Essay* (4th ed., 1694), B. II., ch. ix. § 8.

### [56] Constant Creation.

BERKELEY, § 45: '*Fourthly*, it will be objected (eingewandt) that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated (vernichtet) and created anew.'

UEBERWEG: 'This objection to Berkeley's doctrine is well grounded: the objection is but a special form of the more general one, that the actual existence of any causality of nature is not compatible with Berkeley's view. The opening and shutting of the eyes produces in the same person, at the same place, and at the same time, and accordingly under the same psychical conditions, entirely different results according as long ago a gardener or a carpenter has or has not bestowed a certain activity on the place which lies before his eyes, according as a storm or a fire has or has not destroyed the results of that activity. This can only be explained in conformity with natural laws, if the results of that activity relate to objects, which exist in themselves without the consciousness, experience changes by the labours of certain persons, or by the operations of external circumstances, and in conformity with these operate on the senses of other persons. If such objects are wanting, then there is wanting between the earlier and later processes the connection established by the laws of nature, and the sequence of our ideas, which in dreaming is explained by the images stored in memory and by subjective laws of association, can in our waking time be explained only by an interference of divine Omnipotence at once immediate and without order.'

### [57] Existence of an Idea.

BERKELEY, § 45: 'I . . . desire he (the reader) will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived.'

UEBERWEG: 'By the actual existence of an *idea* (perception, or representation of imagination) certainly not, but by the existence of the object, through whose operation on us the idea is excited in us.'

## [58.]

BERKELEY, § 46: 'Philosophers . . . agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations (*sinnliche Empfindungen*), that exist no longer than they are perceived.'

UEBERWEG: 'But that which can excite these sensations continues, according to the common doctrine, to exist.'

## [59.]

BERKELEY, do.: 'that things should be every moment creating . . . is very commonly taught in the schools.'

UEBERWEG: 'This is taught only so far as the subsistence of matter is regarded as a preservation of it by God, and this—as Augustine had taught—is compared to a constant creation; but not in such sense as to involve an interruption of existence.'

## [60.]

BERKELEY, § 48: 'Though we allow the existence of Matter or Corporeal Substance, yet it will follow from the principles which are now generally admitted that the particular bodies of what kind soever do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived.'

UEBERWEG: 'If, to wit, these bodies be connected with the Berkeleyan subjectivating of magnitude, form, and motion.'

## [61.]

BERKELEY, do.: 'Hence (from the infinite divisibility of matter) it follows that there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of matter which are not perceived by sense.'

UEBERWEG: 'To wit, potentially, not actually; that is, matter is infinitely divisible, but not actually infinitely divided. It lies in the very nature of infinite division that it shall never be completed, and that every actual division can be carried yet further.'

## [62] Infinite Divisibility.

BERKELEY, do.: 'but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them.'

UEBERWEG: 'And because the parts are not *actually* sundered one

from another into an infinite number,—for even on the Atomistic theory they are divided only into a very great number,—that rather only the *divisibility* is unlimited.’

[63] **Sense infinitely acute.**

BERKELEY, do. : ‘that is, the object appears greater.’

UEBERWEG : ‘This does not necessarily follow, if the parts as they grow in number diminish in bulk in the same ratio. A “sense infinitely acute” would know the “infinitely small parts” *as* infinitely small, while our senses cannot pass beyond the “sensible minima.” The eye, for example, can perceive two points *separated*, only by means of a certain extremely minute angle of vision. The microscope does not change this angle of vision at all, but only allows other points of the object to form it with our eye.’

[64] **Sense infinitely acute.**

BERKELEY, do. : ‘When the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite.’

UEBERWEG : ‘Entirely wrong ; because it wholly leaves out of consideration the diminution in the size of the parts, which takes place in inverse proportion to the increase of their number.’

[65] **Infinite Extension.**

BERKELEY, do. : ‘is infinitely extended.’

UEBERWEG : ‘For this assertion not even a show of proof is adduced.’

[66] **Intervals of Perception.**

BERKELEY, § 58 : ‘or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.’

UEBERWEG : ‘This reply to the objection involves the supposition that one uniform object subsists. But in fact if the being of the object in itself be set aside, and no existence be ascribed to it beyond that which it has in individual percipient spirits, what we call a house is rather a number of houses, each one of which exists in a single percipient spirit. Each single one of this multitude is certainly annihilated and created anew with the closing and re-opening of the eyes. Add to this that there are frequently intervals during which no one perceives particular objects. Are we, for instance, to say that the Herculanean Manuscripts did not exist during the centuries through which they remained buried, and that God at a later period created them anew? The restoration is certainly not to be explained by an order established



by natural laws. This order subsists only in case that there is an existence without all (finite) minds during the interval. The existence in the divine mind cannot explain the permanence of the object, inasmuch as this supposition would involve *too much*, to wit, an *eternal* existence of the object, which nevertheless has a beginning and an end in time; there must, consequently, be an object distinct from God's idea of the object, which subsists during the interval in which no finite spirit perceives it.'

### [67] Subject.

BERKELEY, § 49: 'Since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject (Substrat) in which it exists.'

UEBERWEG: 'The term "subject" is not used here in the special sense given it in modern philosophy, as designating merely the substratum of the psychical phenomena. Berkeley uses it in the older sense, in which it corresponds with the Greek *ὑποκειμένον*, designating the substratum in general. It is a term which can also be employed to designate the grammatical subject in a sentence. This paragraph shows very clearly how, out of the original use of the word, has grown on the one side the grammatical sense, and on the other the prevalent philosophical one.'

### [68] Extended Idea.

BERKELEY, do.: 'but only by way of idea.'

UEBERWEG: 'How an extended "idea" can be in an unextended being is absolutely inconceivable, and is not in the least explained by Berkeley, or even made plausible. An object may have in it objects which are red or blue, without at the same time being itself as a whole red or blue; but it cannot have extended objects in it without itself being extended. If the meaning is that the idea of a thing extended is not itself extended, that would be in part false, in part in conflict with Berkeley's principles, according to which there is no extended different from the idea of the extended, but that idea is itself the extended.'

### [69] Substance and Essence.

BERKELEY, do.: 'but only an explication of the meaning of the word *διε*.'

UEBERWEG: 'The Aristotelians understand by the subject or substratum (*ὑποκειμένον*) the support of the qualities. By substance (*οὐσία* or *τί ἐστίν*), they meant in addition to this substratum the complex of

the *essential*; that in virtue of which the thing is what it is, and which is consequently stated in its definition (*ὀρισμός*). This essential without the substratum is essence abstractly conceived, what Aristotle calls *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. To the constituents of this essence—the essentialia—are yet to be added, according to Aristotle and his followers, the *συμβεβηκότα*, the accidentia or modi. These definitions Berkeley rejects.'

### [70] Natural Science.

BERKELEY, § 50: 'as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars.'

UEBERWEG: 'This is an assertion unproven and false. Not a solitary fact is adduced to support it, and it is in conflict with the entire condition of the physical sciences. The mathematico-physical explanation of the mechanical operations in the stricter sense, of the acoustic and optical processes, of electricity and of magnetism, rests entirely upon the supposition that certain movements exist without our minds, which stand partly in a causal connection with each other, partly so operate upon our senses as to affect the optic, the auditory, and other nerves; and in consequence of these affections there rises in us a consciousness partly of shapes and movements as such, partly of colours, sounds, et cetera. And here come in, in a pre-eminent sense, what Berkeley could not know, as they belong to the most recent scientific discoveries, the facts that mechanical movements can be transmuted into heat and the converse, by virtue of the transposition of the movement of entire bodies into the movement of molecules, and the converse, and in general the explanation of the transposition of one group of physical phenomena into another group, in conformity with the laws of the conservation of force. In what manner the movements result has been differently explained by the physicists in the time of Berkeley and of a later period; as, for example, whether the ray of light is to be regarded as the rectilinear progress of a material object or as the transmission of undulatory movements, in which the material particles have a vibratory motion. The next assertion of Berkeley is certainly correct, that the operation of matter on spirit has remained unexplained. The Cartesian theory of a complete heterogeneity between the two substances rendered impossible any attempt at an explanation of the matter which rested upon the connection of the processes of nature. But the true inference from this was that the Cartesian philosophy needed a reshaping of principles, and not that the results of natural science reached by mathematico-mechanical investigations should be despised, or that a new path which no one had actually struck out should be entered on.'

## [71] Occasionalists.

BERKELEY, § 53: 'These men.'

UEBERWEG: 'The "Occasionalists" Geulinx and Malebranche, who, proceeding from the Cartesian view of the complete heterogeneousness of soul and body, denied that a reciprocal operation exists between the two, and supposed that *on occasion* of the one process God wrought the other; for example, that God takes the occasion of an affection of my senses to call forth the corresponding perception, and takes the occasion of my desire and moves my arm. Bodies can only operate on bodies, and conceptions can only operate on conceptions (Vorstellungen). From occasionalism, and especially from the doctrine of Malebranche, that we know objects by means of the representation of their essence in the divine mind, and that we behold, in general, all things in God, the transition was easy to the Berkeleyan view.'

## [72] The Ninth Objection.

BERKELEY, § 58: 'Tenthly.'

UEBERWEG: 'What has become of the ninth objection? It must lie in § 56, and § 54 should begin, "In the eighth and ninth place."'

EDITOR: The NINTH objection is stated and answered in §§ 56, 57.

## [73] Astronomical Movements.

BERKELEY, § 58: 'and appearing in all respects like one of them.'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley here seems in two respects to lower the significance of the question. First, with respect to the processes of movement as such; secondly, with respect to the forces on which these processes depend. In the first respect, and still more in the second, the actual view, taken by the artificial aids which astronomy calls into its service, the view from a fixed position, has an advantage of completer truth, as compared with the view from a second position. This better view Berkeley has not touched. The advantage it presents is of the same kind as the view that the dancer moves round the room, has over the view that the room moves round the dancer. The first theory can only be maintained under distinctly subjective determinations; the second is not bound in the same way to such determinate conditions, and does not offer itself, therefore, in the same isolated way, but holds equally good in the main under an infinite diversity of conditions, and in this very way demonstrates its objective superiority. If, however, we consider the movements with respect also to the *forces* by which they are produced, in conformity with the Newtonian law of

gravity, we reach the certainty that only the one view holds good objectively, that is, is in harmony with the process as it takes place in itself, in the material world apart from our consciousness of it; for the earth has not the force to move daily the universe around it, and in addition give to the sun its annual course. The other conception, on the contrary, solves the processes by the mathematical mechanical explanation. See Note 103.'

#### [74] Order of Nature.

BERKELEY, § 59: 'or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.'

UEBERWEG: 'We can reply to this in a similar manner. The possibility of forming well-grounded anticipations cannot be explained merely by the laws of the association of ideas, but requires the reference of the Subject to a normal order of nature, an order which comprehends objects existent without the Subject.'

#### [75] Proofs untenable.

BERKELEY, § 61: 'which may be proved *a priori*.'

UEBERWEG: 'Were it not that the "proofs," as we have seen, are entirely untenable.'

#### [76] Begging the Question.

BERKELEY, do.: 'for it has been made evident.'

UEBERWEG: 'As if this proof (given in § 25) did not rest upon the very supposition which his opponent contests, that figure, etc., can exist *only* as an idea in the mind of the Subject.'

#### [77] Order of Nature.

BERKELEY, § 62: 'the laws of nature.'

UEBERWEG: 'This answer of Berkeley's is in itself admirable; it is the very one which must also be given from the point of view opposed to his own. But this very answer, run out into its consequences, can be turned against Berkeley himself. If he made no appeal to an order conformed to the laws of nature, and if he ascribed to his God an operation without order, a thing of freak, as it were (as if He were like Setebos, the god of Caliban's dam, in Shakspeare's *Tempest*), his view might perhaps be beyond confutation, though it would be completely unproven and totally destitute of probability. But the moment he concedes the order of nature his position becomes untenable, as from it the conformity with natural laws, as we have seen, may indeed be asserted, but cannot be carried out. If I take my watch to be put in order, and when I get it back find that it keeps good time, the pro-

cesses in my consciousness have been taken for themselves alone, and manifestly not in connection with the result fixed by the laws of nature. For, instead of the perception that my watch goes right, which followed taking it away and returning it, there might just as readily have been the exactly opposite result ; if, for instance, the watchmaker had been unskilful or had put the watch into the hands of a bungling workman. With the conceptions and operations of this *workman*, however, *my* ideas stand in no normal connection, unless this connection be brought about by an *external object*, which, from the consciousness of the one (the workman), experiences effects, and which, when it is afterwards brought to the other (the owner), produces effects on his consciousness. But this is the very thing which Berkeley denies. His negation is consequently untenable.'

### [78] The Watch.

BERKELEY, § 62 : 'As, also, that any disorder in them be attended with the perception (Wahrnehmung) of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.'

UEBERWEG : 'According to this, the irregularity we perceive in the movement of the hands seems to be the prior and conditioning thing, and the derangement in the interior of the watch, which, on Berkeley's principles, does not exist until it is perceived, is the subsequent and conditional thing ; the natural mechanical connection, however, is exactly the reverse. By what antecedent perceptions or "signs" is the irregularity of the whole conditioned? If, for example, a little dust, which no one has perceived, has got into the watch and put it out of order, the result is linked with something unperceived in the interior of the watch. This thoroughly unperceived something, of which not even a dim suspicion exists, is, according to Berkeley, a nothing, and out of the nothing comes the change in the running of the watch. But that this, as a thing self-contradictory, is not possible, must, to adopt Berkeley's way of speaking, be clear to any one who will reflect even a little. The recognition of the fact, therefore, that nature is regulated by law, draws with it irresistibly the inference that material objects exist without the mind. What we see to be true in the comparatively simple relations of the parts of a watch holds good in a yet stronger degree in complex organisms, where none of the subtler processes are perceived, and where they yet are the conditions of processes which are palpable. Between the perceptions we have, for example, of the taking of food and drink, and those we have of the growth of the body, there lie not only certain sensations, but a multitude of pro-

cesses also, which, though not perceived, are not nothing, but must be acknowledged to be processes which go on without all finite consciousness. Of existence in the consciousness of God, we have spoken in Note 66.'

### [79] Miracles.

BERKELEY, § 63: 'otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect.'

UEBERWEG: 'It cannot be denied that Berkeley succeeds, by this reflection, in harmonizing the recognition both of the laws of nature and of miracles; but it is manifest that in attaining this end he presses the analogy of the divine education of our race, so as to bring it very close to the style of thinking natural to a schoolmaster.'

### [80] Sign and Link.

BERKELEY, § 64: 'it not (being credible) that He would be at the expense (Aufwand) (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.'

UEBERWEG: 'The difficulty does not lie in the fact that these groups of ideas come forth at a later period, and that we consequently are also able to base anticipations on them, but rather in this fact, that they did not come forth at an earlier period, were not in our consciousness, when they must yet have served as intermediate links between our earlier and our later ideas, so that they consequently must have existed before they existed. This is the contradiction involved, and the solution of it can hardly be any other than this, that what becomes by degrees better known—as, for example, the chemical process connected with the act of digestion—must have previously existed, and consequently have existed without the consciousness; in which case it could not have served as a *sign*, for that which is unknown to us cannot be a sign to us, but must have been a link in the chain of mechanical causes.'

### [81] Analogues.

BERKELEY, § 67: 'or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us.'

UEBERWEG: 'It would have been more correct to proceed in exactly the opposite way, to drop the negative determinations and to hold fast to the positive mark *extension* (by which the question as to the *where* is decided; a question which, from the Berkeleyan position, also exists in reference to other *minds*), and at the same time to ascribe to substances, by whose movements our senses are affected, operativeness, power, and, indeed (unconscious), analogues of our conscious concep-

tions. In a certain respect Leibnitz had struck into this path; but Leibnitz supposes each of his "monads" to have merely representations (Vorstellungen) and forces, a place also, but not extension and form. The view of Herbart is in affinity with that of Leibnitz. Nor is the view of Spinoza remote from it, so far as with this philosopher we have in view less the uniform substance than the individual as immanent modes of it down to the minutest corpuscles; in all of which, according to the fundamental doctrine of Spinoza, in virtue of the inseparable union of the attributes extension and cogitation, there must exist, at the same time with size and form, an internal something, a mode of "cogitation," consequently an analogue of our conceptions. To the method of Berkeley, which proposed the aggregation of mere negations, lies nearest that which Kant struck out in his doctrine of the "thing in itself." The difference is this, that Kant denies extension to the "things in themselves," but does not expressly mention the existence of the sensitive faculty, though he is inclined to recognize it. Kant's view rests on his *a priori* method, which has been disputed by Beneke, Ueberweg, v. Kirchmann and others, and in certain respects by Herbart and his school. Fichte's rejection of the "thing in itself" brings his doctrine very close to Berkeley's; but Fichte considers the Ego itself as the Producer of the Non-Ego. The philosophy of Schelling and Hegel throws out the problem entirely by objectivating the subjective, etc.; as, for example, in optics, by adopting Goethe's theory of colours, in this respect returning to the simple hypotheses.'

### [82] Occasion.

BERKELEY, § 69: 'what is meant by occasion (Veranlassung),—the agent which produces any effect (Erfolg), or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things.'

UEBERWEG: 'Not the being observed as accompanying the effect or as going before it, but the presence of it as the condition of the effect, is its characteristic. That which is to God the occasion need not in every case fall into the sphere of our observation. We may also venture to speak of an occasion where we cannot directly observe it, but can only in some way reach it by inference.'

### [83] Things in themselves and Ideas of God.

BERKELEY, § 71: 'as the notion (Begriff) of matter is here stated (gefasst) . . . in the mind (Geiste) of God, which are so many marks (Merkmale) or notes (Zeichen) . . . sensations (Sinnesempfindungen)

. . . tune (Tonstück) . . . perceive (wahrnehmen) . . . extravagant (ausschweifend) . . . senseless (empfindungslose).'

UEBERWEG: 'This is the shape which the question assumes on Berkeley's principles, while those whom he supposes to combat his views by no means, from their own position, regard of necessity the "things in themselves" as *ideas of God*. The aim of the assumption is, in fact, rather the very reverse: its aim is to restore between our earlier and later perceptions a normal causal connection by means of natural media which exist in themselves, without our mind. The ideas of God are eternal, the objects of nature are temporal. But even the doctrine which concedes that the things in themselves are ideas of God, is by no means as extravagant and baseless as Berkeley would represent it. The comparison with the musician suggests the idea that God needs some mnemonic aid, an idea whose inadequacy is instantly felt by every one; but it does not follow that the same is true of a hypothesis which is built upon a speculation not in regard to God's power, but in regard to his will, his volition to act in accordance with a natural order or normal regularity. This order, however, demands those intermediate links which, as they do not exist in our consciousness, must either exist in themselves or in the mind of God. So much, however, is to be conceded, that as this hypothesis in both forms, in regard to the "things in themselves" or "ideas of God," either disregards or explicitly denies order in space, it loses the best part of its force. For the actual conceivableness of an order of nature links itself with special tenacity to the order in space reached by mathematical study. This arrangement, in view of the affections experienced by our senses, is not merely valid as an order within our consciousness, but must be recognized as reaching beyond it; as an order common to our consciousness and to the things which exist without it.'

#### [84] Existence external to the Mind.

BERKELEY, § 73: 'to stand in need of a material support (Trägers) . . . it follows that we have no longer any occasion to suppose the being of matter.'

UEBERWEG: 'This inference is false. Were it granted that *none* of the qualities *known to us* had an existence without the mind, yet on the basis of the normal order of nature we would still be justified in inferring from the incitation of our sensations that something external to the mind, some "thing in itself," exists; and the only inference justified on this supposition would be that attributes pertained to it of which we were ignorant.'



## [85] Consciousness, its External Stimulations.

BERKELEY, § 74: 'being (seienden) . . . What is there on our part (was für einen Anhalt haben wir) . . . sensations (Sinneswahrnehmungen) . . . notions (Begriffen) . . . reflection (Selbst-betrachtung) inert (trägen) . . . directed (geleitet).'

UEBERWEG: 'In Notes 32, 45, 54, 77, and elsewhere, it has been shown that our consciousness, in its empirical determination, is not without distinct external stimulations. In this lies what there is "on our part" to induce us to suppose that there is an "occasion," though it is not necessarily to be regarded as something absolutely "inert" and heterogeneous to the mind.'

## [86] A Somewhat.

BERKELEY, § 75: 'a stupid thoughtless *somewhat* (*Etwas*) . . . interposition (Einschiebung) . . . forsakes us (uns im Stich lassen) . . . if anything (wenn überhaupt irgend etwas).'

UEBERWEG: "'The things in themselves," says Herbart, "are not to be banished by reproaches." Herbart is right; and this fact is a proof, not of the power of prejudice, but of the power of sound reason. But it is not necessary to conceive of "the things in themselves" as a mere incognizable "somewhat."'

## [87.]

BERKELEY, § 77: 'support (Träger) . . . inert (träge) . . . because we have not a sense adapted to them (weil wir keinen auf sie eingerichteten Sinn haben).'

UEBERWEG: 'The point here made puts into the mouth of the opponent a false turn. It is out of place at this point to take refuge in other possible senses. The right way would be to mark that it would be hard for us to refer the sensations (sinnlichen Empfindungen) to their two co-operative causes, the subjective or psychical force and the external excitant (Reiz), and to apprehend the external purely in accordance with its own nature (Beschaffenheit). He who regards this as impossible must regard the nature of "matter," or, still better, of "things in themselves," as something completely unknown, and may yet have good ground, in conformity with the laws of causality, to infer the existence of this thing unknown. It is, nevertheless, to be noted, in conformity with what was before said, that the inference is robbed of some of its force if it be denied that the extension, with the forms and movements in our sense-perceptions (Sinneswahrnehmungen), is the

representation, for the most part faithful and capable of increasing fidelity, of a homogeneous extension, with its various shapes and movements, situate without our mind.'

### [88] Miracles.

BERKELEY, § 84: 'The same may be said of all other miracles.'

UEBERWEG: 'That is, of all the biblical miracles, which alone Berkeley has in view, and for which his solution is adequate. It is doubtful, however, whether it would suffice for the miracle of transubstantiation, maintained by the Catholics, which Berkeley indeed did not believe. In that miracle substance as such comes directly into consideration, and is said to be transubstantiated, though the accidents, especially the taste of bread and wine, remain. This assertion does not seem capable of ready harmonizing with a view according to which we could only give the designation of substance of bread and wine either to the mind of the participant or to the unity of the accidents, that is, to their connection with one another. Yet the difficulty may be met perhaps if we might understand by *substance*, not the substratum or support, but the sum or complex (Inbegriff) of the essential (Wesentlichen), and might then say that in the religious act there was an access of Christ's body and blood, and a union of them with bread and wine, and that the qualities of the bread and wine as bodily food ceased to be *essential* and sank into mere accidents; so that instead of the earlier *substance* there was now another *substance* present. This explanation would also allow of a harmony of the Catholic and of the Lutheran doctrine.'

EDITOR: Ueberweg's harmony of transubstantiation with idealism turns upon a mere verbal play. Transubstantiation in its own nature denies that *esse* is *percipi*. It has an *esse* which it is impossible *percipi* by the natural powers. What is perceived is not the *esse*, and the real *esse* is entirely unperceived. Berkeley's doctrine is in conflict, also, with the church doctrine of the incarnation and of the resurrection.

### [89] Miracles of two classes.

BERKELEY, § 84: 'it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place.'

UEBERWEG: 'The objection, so far as the wine is concerned, is certainly met, in the sense of Berkeley's doctrine and use of words, by what has been said before; but Berkeley is not entirely justified in assuming that the difficulty in regard to the serpent is equally met, for in the case of the serpent the question involves more than its being perceived in the vicinity of the spectators, and more than the concep-

tion of these persons that the snake is possessed of animation. The question involves the actual animation of the serpent, an animation existing outside of the consciousness of these persons. The change of water into wine involves, according to Berkeley, merely the change of one set of perceptions into another set. But the change of a staff into a serpent involves this also in part, but in addition to this the transmutation of the staff into the soul of the animal, a soul which is also furnished with perceptions. It is, consequently, a potentiated miracle, whose special features deserved a separate consideration. A well-grounded objection to the Berkeleyan principles is nevertheless just as little to be deduced from this as from the rest of the miracles. In spite of the judgment of some recent writers to the contrary, it must be conceded that these principles are in as good harmony with the miracles, as they are irreconcilable with a recognition, severely carried through, of the conformity of nature to law.'

### [90] Objects of Sense.

BERKELEY, § 86: 'the one *intelligible*, or in the mind, the other *real* and without the mind.'

UEBERWEG: 'It is worthy of note that Kant applies this very term "*intelligible*" to the "things in themselves," which exist without the mind of the percipient and thinking subject; while he holds that the phenomena, which are in our consciousness merely, are to be accepted as the things or objects which are empirically real in us. Those philosophers, however, who accept a real existence of material things without the mind, may very well grant that the forms (*ιδέαι*) of them exist representatively (*abbildlich*) in the mind also,—and this is explicitly taught by the Aristotelians,—but they can only metaphorically give the title *objects* of sense to those sense-images which they suppose to have an existence in the mind, and to "be immediately perceived." The use of this expression readily misleads; and to speak of a *twofold* existence of the "objects of sense" would be as preposterous (*verkehrt*) as if I were to call my conception (*Vorstellung*) of the spirit of Cæsar the immediately presented Cæsar, and the spirit of Cæsar himself the mediately presented Cæsar, and should consistently with this speak of a twofold existence of Cæsar. The *objects* of sense exist *only* *extra mentem*—without the mind. See Notes 8, 12, 28.'

## [91] Conformity of the Perceived to the Unperceived.

BERKELEY, § 86: 'How can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable (conform) to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind (Geistes)?'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley here touches upon a real, though by no means insoluble, difficulty. But, besides this, he need not oppose it in the exclusive manner in which he has here done it, to the representatives of the views which conflict with his own; for the same difficulty, though in a narrower compass, also exists if we accept his position, to wit, in so far as the *knowledge* of other spirits, outside of the mind of the cognizant subject himself, is concerned. In the history of states, of culture, of religions, of the sciences, and similar departments, the main object is the intellectual life of the time antecedent to our own. This life may, in fact, have passed completely outside the consciousness of the historical investigator, who, as a rule, was not living in the era in which occurred the events with which he desires to make himself familiar. His knowledge is true, or has validity in reference to the reality to be known, so far as it is *conformed* to that reality. Our historical apprehension of the Homeric religion, of the Platonic philosophy, or of the Arabian astronomy, is true or has objective reality (or, to speak more accurately, has validity in respect to the reality to be known, which in this case is an intellectual reality) in as far as it is *conformed* to Homer's mode of religious thought, to Plato's speculation, to the astronomical conceptions of the Arabians. Here, too, the question arises, How can I know that my knowledge which is in my consciousness is conformed to such (intellectual) objects as are not in my consciousness, but have been in the consciousness of other persons centuries ago? But we must not press these questions here, nor in reference to the external things which are without our consciousness, as if they were unanswerable, and as if the theory on which they rest is absurd. They are to be pressed solely for the purpose of finding an answer. The assurance of the harmony of my knowledge with the thing to be known, if this thing lies without my consciousness, can never be reached *directly*, by comparison, as I can never pass beyond the bounds of my own consciousness; but I can reach it *indirectly*, by *inferences*, which rest upon the presupposition that there is a causal nexus linking itself in with my consciousness. See Ueberweg, System of Logic, §§ 41-44.'

EDITOR: See additions from Ueberweg's Logic to Note 8. As the question here raised is perhaps on the whole the greatest which arises

in metaphysical speculation, it may be well worth while to give a synopsis of the entire view of Ueberweg, as presented in his 'System der Logik:'

'1. Perception is the immediate cognition of things existing in juxtaposition and in succession. External or sense-perception is directed to the external world; internal or psychological perception to the psychical life.

'2. The immediateness of the cognition in perception is, however, always merely relative, since in it there are fused, even with the very activity of the sense, many operations of the mind. These operations, though they do not enter separately into consciousness, conjointly condition the total result.

'3. *Perception* (Wahrnehmung) is distinguished from simple sensation (Empfindung) by this, that in sensation consciousness is fixed upon the subjective condition only, while in perception is involved a reference to something perceived. This percept, whether it belongs to the external world or the subject himself, is opposed to the act of perception, as in some respect objective.

'4. *Perception* is distinguished from *thought* (Denken) by its relative immediateness. Thought may, however, be used with a latitude which makes it embrace perception.

'5. To logic, as the doctrine of cognition, belongs the question, *Whether in sense-perception (sinnlichen Wahrnehmung) things appear to us as they exist in actuality, that is, as they are in themselves?* To returning an affirmative answer to this question, is opposed, first of all, the sceptical argument that the consonance of Perception with Being would not, even if such a consonance existed, be cognizable; as the sense-perception can never be compared with its object, but only with another perception. The doubt is confirmed when we reflect upon the essential nature of sense-perception. For as an act of our mind the perception must either be of purely subjective origin, or in any case contain in it a subjective element: on either supposition, the theory that it renders the proper real being of the percept undisturbed and exhaustively can be sustained only by artificial hypotheses, which it is difficult to justify. The character of the phenomenal world is, in any case, conditioned by the subjective nature of our senses. The senses may be differently constructed in other beings, and may, consequently, lead to a different sort of sense-intuition of the world. From all these the actuality as such, as, apart from every particular mode of apprehending it, it is in itself, that is, the "Ding an Sich," is different.

'6. Not only can we adjust, on the basis of sense-perception alone,

the proportion in which it is conditioned by what is objective, but we cannot even at all cognize the existence of the affecting objects. For, as the perceptions are acts of our own minds, they cannot as such lead us beyond ourselves. The conviction of the existence of external objects, which affect us, is grounded on the hypothesis of causal relations, a hypothesis which does not rest upon sense-perception alone.

'7. The doctrine of the Scotch School (Reid, Beattie, and others), that "Common Sense" reveals immediately the existence of an external world, and the affiliated doctrine of Jacobi, who claims the same power for Feeling or Belief, is a fiction, which dispenses with a scientific foundation.

'8. Internal or psychological perception, or the immediate cognition of the psychical acts and images, can apprehend, with material truth, *its* objects as they are in themselves.'

Logik, Dritte Aufl., §§ 36-41. Ueberweg's development from this point is given in [8].

#### [92] Substance.

BERKELEY, § 91: 'an existence independent of a substance, or support (Träger), wherein they may exist.'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley argues as if the difficulty he urges (§ 16) against the notion of *substance* as a "*support*" (Träger) of accidents involved exclusively the notion of material substance, and were not of equal and perhaps of higher force against the notion of a spiritual substance. Berkeley says rightfully that in regard to spirit he harmonizes with the dominant view of substance as a *support* (Trägerin) of accidents; but he shows neither here nor elsewhere that he rightfully holds fast to this supposition, and that in this respect his argumentatio ex concessis is an argumentatio ex concedendis, that his argument from things conceded is an argument from things that ought to be conceded.'

#### [93] Epicureans and Hobbists.

BERKELEY, § 93: 'and supposing (voraussetzen) . . . fatal (verhängnisvollen) . . . impulse (Einwirkung) . . . without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like have not even the shadow of a pretence (Vorwands).'

UEBERWEG: 'Epicurus (341-270 B. C.), following Democritus, taught that the universe came into being by the concourse of atoms without the co-operation of a Deity. Similar views were taught by Hobbes (1588-1679), who is more generally known by his political absolutism than by his philosophy of nature. He maintains that matter can have sensation and thought.'

## [94] Time.

BERKELEY, § 98: 'Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of *time* . . . *cogitation* (Denken).'

UEBERWEG: 'According to Aristotle (Phys., iv. ii.), *time* is the number of movements (of change) in relation to earlier or later. According to him (Phys., vi. ii.), time and space are equally infinitely divisible. According to the doctrine of Locke (Hum. Und., B. II., ch. xiv., §§ 3, 5, 17), reflection on the train of ideas, which appear one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the notion of *succession*; the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our mind, is that we call *duration*; and duration, set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs, is *time*—duration designated by a definite measure. Though the notion of duration has arisen from reflection on the sequence and number of ideas, it is yet applicable to things which exist while we do not think, as the notion of the extension of bodies, though it has been derived from the impressions of sight and touch, can be applied to distances where no body is seen or felt.'

## [95] Abstraction.

BERKELEY, § 100: 'the doctrine of Abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.'

UEBERWEG: 'The definite demarcation of the groups of conceptions, of which each can be represented by a definite word, by means of complete and well-arranged specification of the material constituents which come into the consideration of those conceptions, in other words, by means of *definition*, is an indisputable demand of all scientific reflection. There is great merit in Berkeley's denial, on principle, of the false substantializing of abstracts, and in his own striving to give a complete basis to general notions and judgments in the corresponding concrete conceptions. Yet we cannot approve of his polemic against the effort to form and define the most general notions. In the ethical sphere the expressions of Berkeley are in complete opposition to the *Socratic* basing of all ethical action on the notional cognition of the ethical. There is a justifiable polemic against a one-sided over-estimate of the notion and of the rule. This polemic has been directed, in the sphere of ethics, against Kantianism, especially by F. H. Jacobi, who, in his polemic, gives prominence to the moral tact, and who lays stress on the ethical right of the individual, as Schleiermacher also does. But this polemic is exposed to the peril of falling into a one-sidedness of

an opposite kind, when it arrays itself not simply against an over-estimate of the general notion, but against the thing itself. Scholastic and sceptical errors are to be overcome by genuine science, not by returning to a pre-scientific position. This latter, however, though it was not Berkeley's design, seems to be a very easy result of the assault which, without the proper restrictions, he makes upon the attempts to define certain very general notions.'

#### [96] Essence.

BERKELEY, § 102: 'that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties, or that there is in each object (Dinge) an inward essence (inneres Wesen), which is the source whence its discernible (unterscheidbaren) qualities flow, and whereon they depend.'

UEBERWEG: 'This is the view of Aristotle and of the Scholastics, by whom essence (*οὐσία*), that is, the sum of the essential or of that which is involved in the definition, is regarded as the cause of the qualities (*ποιά*).'

#### [97] Gravitation.

BERKELEY, § 103: 'and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction."''

UEBERWEG: 'Undoubtedly Newton himself has left this possibility open; but the majority of those who adopt his views have found in attraction an essential property of matter. The Cartesians, on the contrary, denied the doctrine of attraction, and endeavoured to explain the turning aside of the celestial bodies from a rectilinear course, as also the falling of the terrestrial bodies, on the theory of an impulse imparted by *æther*. This hypothesis of Descartes was held by French scholars as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, but more and more lost its hold as the conviction grew more general that every portion of matter in the universe attracts every other, in conformity with the Newtonian law of gravitation [*i.e.*, with a force proportional directly to the quantity of matter they contain, and inversely to the squares of their distances]. The *comets* especially, whose course it is impossible to co-ordinate with that of the *æther*, furnish a powerful argument, in fact, an unanswerable one, for the Newtonian school. There has been a growing tendency to consider attraction as an immanent property of all matter. Yet the mooted question has remained and yet remains undecided, whether there can be an "actio in distans." Such an "actio" seems demanded by attraction, yet leaves it inconceivable, what the former is while it traverses the space intervening between the masses, whether it be a substance or a property. And if



we suppose—as it seems thoroughly necessary we should—that there is a substantial *continuity* filling all space, within which the corporeal atoms exist, still the question as to the mode of the extension of power or force remains unsolved. Kant's Dynamic, but still more Herbart's doctrine that the approximation rests on modifications of the "internal conditions," Schiller's comparison of attraction with love, and Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will, seem to shed some light on the darkness.'

### [98] The Fixed Stars.

BERKELEY, § 106: 'Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other.'

UEBERWEG: 'That Berkeley is mistaken in this assertion is, in our day, placed beyond all dispute. The error into which he falls was a pardonable one in his day, for astronomy at that time very properly concentrated itself on the investigation of our planetary system, and the question in regard to the movement of the fixed stars had not yet been seriously looked at. In our day the movement of the fixed stars is no longer a matter of doubt. It is known that all the bodies belonging to the system of our Milky Way move around a common centre of gravitation. Mädler maintains that this centre is in or near the Pleiades; but the question is not settled.'

### [99] Gravitation universal.

BERKELEY, § 106: 'as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air.'

UEBERWEG: 'These errors also of Berkeley no longer need a confutation. Every part of the growing plant and of the elastic air has gravity. The gravity itself does not cease, though its operation be paralyzed by counter-operations and be transmuted into its counterpart. But, throughout, where several forces co-operate with each other, and in part compensate one another, it is impossible, in accordance with Berkeley's principles, to trace and acknowledge the efficacy of the very laws of nature which clearly reveal themselves in the more simple, uncomplicated cases; for, on Berkeley's principle, the results follow the immediate operation of God.'

'These laws appear as if they were not of universal validity, though they really are so, and only seem to yield to other laws, to which we can, therefore, ascribe no more than a very limited validity. The principle of Berkeley, as we again see, though it may be harmonized with a sort of general recognition of the laws of nature as rules of the

divine activity, cannot be brought to unison with an acknowledgment of the laws of nature, scientifically carried through.'

[100] **The Practical.**

BERKELEY, § 109: 'God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.'

UEBERWEG: 'If Berkeley's advice were acted on, the result would be a zealous striving after material good, and a comfortable enjoyment of life on work-days, and a striving equally zealous, on Sundays and church-festivals, after heavenly blessedness. Another result would be a theology in correspondence with these practical tendencies, and with both we should have the sort of science and art which is wont to fall very short in the striving after the true and the beautiful without regard to subordinate aims, either mundane or supramundane. Though this result is not that at which Berkeley aims, yet in this way what he here recommends does in fact most commonly take shape.'

EDITOR: Berkeley's advice, interpreted by his intellectual and practical life, hardly justifies Ueberweg's stricture.

[101] **Newton.**

BERKELEY, § 110: 'The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of *Mechanics*.'

UEBERWEG: 'In § 114 Berkeley gives the full title of this Treatise. It is Newton's *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, first published 1687. The distinctions which Berkeley here cites and controverts are presented in the Scholion to the Eighth Definition in the Introduction to his *Principia* (edit. of 1687, p. 5, seq.).'

[102] **Motion Absolute and Relative.**

BERKELEY, § 111: '*Absolute Motion* is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another.'

UEBERWEG: 'According to this, in the figure given in Note 54 a movement in the external object *AB* would be an absolute movement, a movement of the image *a'b'* among the other images in the space of consciousness would be a relative movement. Yet this determination is not exactly correct, inasmuch as the movement of the external object *AB* may be referred in part to absolute space, in part to particular external objects. This latter relation, also, is not merely brought into consideration by us, but is grounded in the real co-operation of the

powers of nature itself. Thus, for example, the double motion of the moon, the one motion around the earth, the other, with the earth, around the sun, is the result of a twofold attraction, an attraction to the earth and an attraction to the sun. Our subjective relative notions in general rest upon objective relations: for example, the subjective relative notion of *number* rests upon the objectively real existence, one with another, of individual things with like natures; the subjective relative notion embodied in the word "and" rests upon an objective connection; and so in other cases.'

### [103] Movement.

BERKELEY, § 114: 'For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion has, I think, no motion at all.'

UEBERWEG: 'The water is supposed to be in a vessel which is attached to a cord and suddenly whirled round. The water is gradually drawn into the movement of the vessel.—If Berkeley's theory be correct, that in every movement the power of God operates directly, or without "secondary causes," it is not very clear what is meant by saying that God directs his power, not to our ideas of the heavens, but to our ideas of the earth, and in our apprehension of what seems to be offered to the senses there may be an error in this direction.'

### [104] Numbers.

BERKELEY, § 119: 'so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.'

UEBERWEG: 'This utilitarian view of Berkeley's, like various others which he expresses in depreciation of the pure mathematics, reminds us greatly of Bacon of Verulam. We may regard it as an illustration of what was said in Note 100. There have been various fantastic speculations in numbers, which rest upon a spurious attributing of substantial character to the results of abstraction. There have been mystic dreamings, such as the definition which Xenocrates, the Platonist, gives of the soul, that "it is a self-moving number," or the Pythagorean definition of rectitude as a square number. But Berkeley makes a mistake in placing in a line with these fancies the serious, strictly scientific theory of numbers. We admit that this theory is not directly "subservient to practice," and that it rests on very broad and comprehensive abstractions. But these abstractions are of the class which are scientifically justifiable; they are abstractions which concentrate the

observation on particular aspects of the total object, and do not involve the vice of a false substantializing of that which is viewed abstractly.'

[105] **Number.**

BERKELEY, § 122: 'or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.'

UEBERWEG: 'It would be far more correct than this to compare the theory of numbers with the investigation of the laws of language. That which in a certain respect is a sign may yet have in it a certain conformity with law, which makes it worth while to estimate it, not as a *mere* auxiliary, but as itself an object of investigation.'

[106] **Extension.**

BERKELEY, § 124: 'If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it.'

UEBERWEG: 'Though Berkeley cannot, from his point of view, accept any extension subsisting outside of the mind, yet this, as has been shown, by no means proves that the supposition he rejects is false. In *extension in itself* there is no minimum. In our *subjective perception as such* there are minima, the minutest separations, in which two tactual impressions on the end of the finger, the back of the hand, the tip of the tongue, the lips, and other parts of the body, two excitations of the retina, the distance of which from each other is conditioned by the visual angle, call forth two separate or distinguishable sensations.

'As, however, any external object, say, for example, an inch line drawn on paper, at different degrees of closeness, and especially when we call the microscope to our aid, allows us to see a different number of parts, restricted in fact to no precise limits, it follows that we cannot fix any minutest *perceptible* part of an object,—at least any minutest part perceptible by sight. The microscope shows us even the ten-thousandth part of an inch.'

[107] **Sum and Members of a Series.**

BERKELEY, § 124: 'to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number, is so manifest and glaring a contradiction that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so.'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley has simply asserted this "contradiction;" he has not proved it. A contradiction is the affirmation and denial of the *same thing*. It would be a contradiction to call the sum of a series both finite and infinite, or to call at the same time the number

of the members of that series both finite and infinite; but to call the *sum finite* and the *number of the members infinite* is not a contradiction, either on the supposition that the magnitude of the collective members is an infinitely little one, or that the magnitude of the individual members diminishes, in a definite manner, infinitely. Locke, however (Hum. Und., II. xxiii. 31), holds that "the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent."'

### [108] A posteriori.

BERKELEY, § 129: 'it is held that proofs *a posteriori* are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity.'

UEBERWEG: 'Berkeley here uses the term "proofs *a posteriori*" in the good old sense—proofs which are drawn from the effects (the *ὑστερον φουσει*, *natura posterioris*). He knew nothing of the Kantian abuse of terms, in which *a priori* implies an independence of what is empirically given, an independence which has in fact no existence whatever, and, in harmony with that definition, makes *a posteriori* completely synonymous with *empirical*.'

### [109] The Calculus.

BERKELEY, § 130: 'Of late the speculations about infinities have run so high.'

UEBERWEG: 'Especially after Newton had discovered the method of computation by fluxions. With this method essentially coincides the differential and integral calculus, brought forward by Leibnitz soon after, and in fact before Newton had made his own discovery public. Both come together under the notion of the "infinitesimal calculus." The difference is only in form; but the notation and mode of operation presented by Leibnitz must be acknowledged to be preferable. Newton began in 1665 to develop the "Arithmetic of Fluxions," and up to 1672 had communicated it to particular friends, rather, however, by way of hints than of complete statement. He first presented it to the world in his *Principia Philosophiæ Naturalis*, 1687. Leibnitz, *perhaps* not entirely without some knowledge of Newton's hints, sustained, however, by his own earlier investigations of series, had, with at least a relative independence, reached the new calculus in 1676, and first gave it to the public in the "Acta Eruditorum," 1684.'

## [110] Infinitesimals.

BERKELEY, § 130: 'thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.'

UEBERWEG: 'Not "with good reason," but simply because of a pure misunderstanding of the notion of infinitesimal quantities, this idea of Berkeley's has been maintained by some. Such a misunderstanding is only possible when the representatives of the opposite view foster the error that the infinitesimal can be a fixed quantity. By an "infinitesimal" is not to be understood a fixed quantity, but a quantity which, by a fixed law, takes diverse values which have zero as the *ultimate value*. The ultimate value is that value which a variable quantity constantly approximates without ever reaching it, and so that the distance from it may be less than any particular fixed quantity you may name. In a series which has zero as the final value it must consequently always be, name what *fixed* quantity you please, that a member can be found which, in common also with all that follow it, is less than that fixed quantity named. Thus, the infinite quantity in the mathematical sense—or the reciprocal value of an infinitesimal—is not a *fixed* quantity, but one which in accordance with the series takes diverse values, and may because of that fact be *greater* than any *fixed* quantity which can be named.

'Two quantities which are infinitely small or infinitely large may be compared with one another by comparing with one another the corresponding members of the two series, from which arises a series of relations. The ultimate value of *this* series makes the relation of the one infinitely little or infinitely great quantity to the other.

'The augmentation of a quantity simply by infinitesimals is continuous. The series in which a *single* infinitesimal is represented need by no means, however, consist of members which differ from one another simply by infinitesimals, yet it *can* become continuous by the unlimited insertion of members.

'Let, for example, the first series be as follows:

$$' \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{16}, \dots$$

'Let the other series be the following:

$$' \frac{5}{4}, \frac{9}{16}, \frac{17}{64}, \frac{33}{256}, \dots$$

'These series are so formed that the common member of the first is

$$\frac{1}{2^n}, \text{ the common member of the second is } \frac{2}{2^n} + \frac{1}{2^{2n}} = \frac{2^n + 1 + 1}{2^{2n}}.$$

‘If we call the first infinitesimal  $a$ , the second is  $= 2a + a^2$ . On the dependence of  $n$  rests the association of the members.

‘If we now compare with one another the corresponding members of both series, we obtain the series of relations :

$$2\frac{1}{2}, 2\frac{1}{4}, 2\frac{1}{8}, 2\frac{1}{16}, \dots$$

whose common member is  $2 + \frac{1}{2^n} = \frac{2^n + 1 + 1}{2^n}$ . Now, the members

of the third series have an ultimate value, which they approximate beyond every difference however minute, yet without ever wholly reaching it. This ultimate value is  $= 2$ , because the ultimate value of the fraction yet to be added to 2 (which fraction coincides with  $a$ , as given before) is  $= 0$ . The ultimate value 2 is *not* the relation of any two members to one another. If we should consider it as the relation of the last members, or of the members in process of vanishing, we should involve ourselves in a contradiction, for there are no last or vanishing members. As long as we remain within the first two series, and compare two corresponding members with each other, the relation is not  $= 2$ , but  $> 2$ ; but if we go beyond to the ultimate values of the first two series, both of these are  $= 0$ , their relation to one another is consequently  $= \frac{0}{0}$ , which, again, is not  $= 2$ , but is something wholly indeterminate. But we are involved in no contradiction if we seek neither a relation of the last members, nor a relation of the ultimate values, but the ultimate value of the relation of the entire members. *This answers for all applications, as in them we have also to do with ultimate values.* Thus, for example, the tangent has the position to which, as the ultimate position, the chords protracted from the point of contact, constantly, by continuous diminution, approximate, beyond every angular difference however minute. As upon both sides, in the arithmetical consideration and in the geometrical application, the *ultimate values* are regarded, an *absolutely accurate* result may be attained; the mistake would be to identify an ultimate value with one member of the series.

‘It may, however, happen that the members of the series of relation itself increase or diminish infinitely. In this case the one infinitesimal is considered as an infinitely small portion of the other, that is, as an infinitesimal of the second order. If, for example, we take the first series we have given, and make the second  $\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{16}, \frac{1}{64}, \frac{1}{256}, \dots$  (or, make the first quantity  $= a$ , the second  $= a^2$ ), the series of relation is identical with the first series, and consequently diminishes infinitely; the quantity therefore which runs through the values in the second

series is an infinitesimal of the second order. With this determination of the notion, which coincides with that of Eisenstein, R. Hoppe, and others, all the contradictions which Berkeley and others have urged against the doctrine of Infinitesimals fall away. They are contradictions, which in fact have no existence, unless the infinite be regarded as a *fixed* quantity.'

EDITOR: Playfair (Prel. Dissert., Enc. Brit., 650) says of the Controversy on Fluxions, 'Though the defenders of the calculus had the advantage, it must be acknowledged that they did not always argue the matter quite fairly, nor exactly meet the reasoning of their adversary. The true answer to Berkeley was that what he conceived to be an accidental compensation of errors was not at all accidental, but that the two sets of quantities that seemed to him neglected in the reasoning were in all cases necessarily equal, and an exact balance for one another. . . . If the author of the *Analyst* has had the misfortune to enroll his name on the side of error, he has also had the credit of proposing difficulties of which the complete solution is only to be derived from the highest improvements of the calculus.'

### [111] Immortality of the Soul.

BERKELEY, § 140: 'The natural immortality of the soul is a necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine.'

UEBERWEG: 'The soul consequently has not merely an immortality conferred on it by the grace of God, as Justin and some others of the early fathers maintained in express opposition to Platonism. At a later period, mainly through the mighty influence of Augustine, the Platonic doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, an immortality grounded in its very essence, became the predominating doctrine of the Christian Church.'

EDITOR: On hardly any point did Christianity find a completer chaos of human thought than on the doctrine of the future state. The confusion yielded very slowly.

### [112] Opinion and Character.

BERKELEY, § 141: 'And this notion (Vorstellung) has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion.'

UEBERWEG: 'This position of Berkeley involves a support of the argument by the moral degradation of the opponent. Its confirmation in experience is not without exceptions. There has been faith in im-



mortality which has not been conditioned by character, and character not conditioned by this faith.'

EDITOR: Berkeley simply speaks of a class, and, thus qualified, his remark is true. Opinion is not the sole shaper of the external life, but it is the mightiest of moral forces; but it often requires a long time and a multitude of examples to determine what is the influence of opinions. Centuries of experience have left some questions of this class still in doubt.

### [113] Sundering of the Faculties.

BERKELEY, § 143: 'Men have imagined (sich vorgestellt) they could frame abstract notions (Begriffe) of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded (abgelöst) as well from the mind (Seele) or spirit (Geiste) itself, as from their respective (bezüglichen) objects and effects (Wirkungen).'

UEBERWEG: 'This attack of Berkeley's on the abstractive sundering or hypostasizing of the "faculties of the soul" has great merit; it would require, however, to be carried much farther to lead to the results, which long after followed upon Herbart's resumption of it.'

### [114] How can Mind communicate with Mind?

BERKELEY, § 145: 'I perceive (nehme . . . wahr) several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform (bekunden) me there are certain particular agents (bestimmte einzelne thätige Wesen) like myself, which accompany them and concur (Theil haben) in their production (Hervorbringung).'

UEBERWEG: 'How *this* concurrence (Antheil) is to be conceived of, is obscure. The concurrence of the mind in the evoking of its *own* ideas has been defined by Berkeley, § 28-30; but how, in any ordinary manner, can my mind operate on other minds, or in any way whatever concur in their operation? According to the doctrine of Berkeley I cannot evoke thoughts in others immediately, but only by means of my own "ideas." My "ideas," however, and their changes, as, for example, in the complex of ideas which I call my body, can, according to this very doctrine, produce no operations in another person, nor evoke ideas in him. How do the complexes of ideas in different persons come into relation to one another? The answer "by the will of God" of course helps out in every case; but a cognizable *order of nature* falls before such a view. Without the supposition of a connection conformed to the laws of nature, I can only infer the existence of God, not the existence of finite beings beside myself. On

the supposition of *this* connection, however, words, writing, and other signs can only be the means of producing a relation between different thinking beings, in as far as they are not mere ideas, but are changes in certain objects existing in themselves; on which objects the one mind produces operations, and these thereby modified operate in their way on the mind of the other person.'

[Ueberweg has alluded to this argument against Berkeleyanism in his *Sketch of the History of Philosophy*, vol. iii., 2d edit., Berlin, 1868, p. 331: 'the relations between thinking beings must be mediated by real unthinking beings.']

He has developed the argument in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 54, Heft 2. Halle, 1869.

### [115] Berkeley and Malebranche.

BERKELEY, § 148: 'Not that I imagine (*stelle mir. . . vor*) we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view, or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible.'

UEBERWEG: 'The doctrine referred to is that of the Cartesian, Malebranche (1638-1715), that we see all things in God. Berkeley expresses himself more at large on this point in his "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," a little before the middle of the Second Dialogue (*Works*, Fraser, i. 308). Berkeley does not say, as Malebranche does, that we see the things by perceiving that by which they are represented in the infinite substance of the Godhead, but only that the things which we perceive, that is, our ideas, are known in virtue of the will of an infinite Spirit. According to Berkeley, our ideas, which are purely passive, cannot be like the divine substance, which is wholly active, nor even like a part of this substance, which is wholly indivisible. In the system of Malebranche, moreover, the existence of a material universe, whose "perfections" are embraced in the spiritual essence of the Godhead, is accepted in a completely purposeless way, and involves Malebranche's theory in all the contradictions to it, which are derived from the supposition that material things exist outside the mind.'

### [116] Providence.

BERKELEY, § 154: 'Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence.'

UEBERWEG: 'But not *as such*. Berkeley from his own point of view, not that of the supposed antagonist, regards the phenomena in question

as the works of Providence. If he did take that view, he would involve himself in gross self-contradiction; as he does not, it would greatly aid in establishing his own view if he would enter thoroughly into the antagonistic position to evince its untenableness. It is admitted that among modern thinkers this has been done most thoroughly by Leibnitz (1646-1716). In his *Théodicée*, which appeared in the same year as Berkeley's *Principles* (1710), he examines the problems here touched upon.'

[117] **General Recognition of the Basis of Idealism.**  
**Definitions of Consciousness. Definitions of Realism.**

EDITOR: It is an element of strength in Idealism that beyond other systems it *seems* at least to have these elements:

1. It sharply defines consciousness; 2. It separates the primary and unmistakable acts of consciousness from the inferences made from those acts; 3. It maintains the absolute infallibility of consciousness; 4. It denies, or puts on a lower plane of evidence, whatever is not thus infallibly testified to. That its position here is a strong one will be apparent from the definitions generally given of CONSCIOUSNESS.

'Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.'<sup>1</sup>

'To the mind is attributed *apperception*, as it is conscious to itself of its own perception. Leibnitz uses the term *apperception*, as synonymous with consciousness in the writings of Descartes.'<sup>2</sup>

Consciousness, self-consciousness; *Apperceptio* (Leibnitz), *Conscientia* (Descartes); *Bewusstseyn*, *Selbstbewusstseyn*; perception, conscience, *sentiment intérieur*. This word is used by Kant in two senses:

1. It means *consciousness of self*, that is, the simple conception of the Ego. When a subject capable of conceptions has conceptions, there is constantly linked with them the further conception *that it* (the subject) has *them*. The second conception, that I, the concipient subject, have these conceptions, is called *consciousness of myself*, or *apperception*.

2. Kant understands by the term the *faculty* (*Vermögen*) of consciousness the faculty of accompanying the conception with the conception of the Ego.<sup>3</sup>

'Those changes in the mind by which it is made possible to it to conceive things external to itself are called in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian system *perceptions*. If with these is united the consciousness of self,

<sup>1</sup> Locke, *Hum. Und.*, 11., i. 19.    <sup>2</sup> Wolff, *Psychol. Empir.*, § 25 (1732), Verona, 1779.

<sup>3</sup> Mellin, *Wörterbuch d. kritischen Philosophie*, 1797.

as well as of the things perceived, we have *apperception*.' 'Consciousness is that condition in which we distinguish from each other, and from ourselves, the conceptions of things as changes in us, and with them their objects.'<sup>1</sup>

STEWART: 'Consciousness denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations.'<sup>2</sup>

KRUG: 'Consciousness is knowledge of being, an immediate linking of both.'<sup>3</sup>

REID: 'Consciousness is . . . used . . . to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds.'<sup>4</sup>

HAMILTON: 'This knowing that I know or desire or feel, this common condition of self-knowledge, is . . . consciousness.'

'Consciousness is . . . the recognition by the mind or Ego of its acts and affections.'

REGIS: 'We obtain this knowledge [of our own minds] by a simple and internal intimation, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and which I call consciousness (*conscience*).'<sup>5</sup>

BROWN: 'Consciousness . . . is only a general term for all our feelings, of whatever species these may be,—sensations, thoughts, desires; in short, all those states or affections of mind in which the phenomena of mind consist.'<sup>6</sup>

PORTER: 'Consciousness is . . . the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states.'<sup>7</sup>

'Consciousness is the term applied to the internal perception of that which is presented and takes place in us as determination of the mental life.'<sup>8</sup>

FRASER: 'By being *conscious* I mean knowing phenomena, whether extended or unextended, which are immediately and actually present to the conscious mind,—with all the conditions or relations implied in this.'<sup>9</sup>

MORELL: 'Locke's fundamental principle *that all our knowledge consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness* (is) a principle

<sup>1</sup> Lossius, Real-Lexicon, 1803.

<sup>2</sup> Dugald Stewart, *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, 1793, 1801. Works (Hamilton), 1854, i. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Krug, *Handwört.*, 1832.

<sup>4</sup> Reid, *Int. Powers*, *Ess. I.*

<sup>5</sup> *Syst. de la Philosophie*, quoted by Blakey, *Hist. of Philos.*, ii. 297.

<sup>6</sup> *Philos. of Human Mind.*, Lect. XI.

<sup>7</sup> *Human Intellect*, New York, 1869, 83.

<sup>8</sup> Brockhaus, *Convers. Lex.*, *Elf. Aufl.*, 1864, iii. 189.

<sup>9</sup> *Life and Letters of Berkeley*, Works, iv. 389.

which had never been questioned from the time when it was asserted by Plato and Aristotle to the time when it was put into so clear a light by the great author of the "Essay on the Human Understanding."<sup>1</sup> To this may be added that few out of the entire body of metaphysicians have doubted it since.

It may be useful to have some of the DEFINITIONS OF REALISM before us. (For definitions of Idealism, see PROLEGOMENA, VII.)

'Realism as opposed to Idealism is the dogmatic affirmation that *the things in themselves* are as we perceive them in our conception.'<sup>2</sup>

'The reality of mind and the reality of matter,—Natural Realism.' 'A scheme which endeavours, on the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown material universe, and, on the other, to explain the ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of . . . Hypothetic Realism.'<sup>3</sup>

'Realism has different meanings, according to the different antitheses which it involves. In antithesis to Idealism it is the system which maintains that the existent, that which constitutes the foundation of the phenomena, is independent of the thinking subject, and of thought in general.'<sup>4</sup>

'Realism, as opposed to Idealism, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while, according to Idealism, our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, *i.e.* by means of ideas.'<sup>5</sup>

'Realism, . . . the system which maintains that what exists external to and independently of the concipient subject.'<sup>6</sup>

'Realism, the philosophical doctrine which ascribes to external things an actual being independent of our conceptions.'<sup>7</sup>

The reader can hardly fail to be struck at some of the approximating points of the definitions of Idealism and Realism, with the illustrations of Iordano Bruno's principle of the 'Coincidence of Opposites.' He can understand how some thinkers have hesitated between the two, how some have defended the one system on the principles of the other, how some have passed from one to the other, how some have declared for both, and some have refused either, and some again are claimed on both sides, and some have left their relations to the two theories wholly insoluble.

<sup>1</sup> Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1851.

<sup>2</sup> Lossius, Real-Lexicon: Realismus.

<sup>3</sup> Hamilton, Reid's Works, 748, 749.

<sup>4</sup> Pierer, Realismus.

<sup>5</sup> Fleming, Vocabulary,—edited by C. P. Krauth, Philad., Smith, English & Co., 1860.

<sup>6</sup> Brockhaus, Convers. Lex.: Realismus.

<sup>7</sup> Heyse, Fremdwörterbuch, 12th ed., 1859.

Hamann said that 'only the scholastic reason separates Idealism and Realism,—genuine philosophy knows nothing of such a separation.' The point at which the modern tendencies divided is, according to Erdmann, a point at which philosophy was neither Realism nor Idealism. The attempt to *prove* the existence of the things of sense, says Jacobi, leads to the denial of them,—that is, to Idealism. The most that can be reached in that way is an empty thing of the understanding, a non-entity,—chaos, in fact. He says that Kant's position was that of a chameleon shifting between the hues of Idealism and Realism; had he been consistent with his position that the transcendental object is but an  $x$ , an unknown quantity posited by consciousness, he would have been an idealist. Fichte was the true Messiah of speculation, Kant was no more than its John the Baptist, Reinhold its Nathanael. There are only two logical systems, the Material-Idealism of Spinoza, or the inverted Spinozism, the Ideal-Materialism of the moderns, especially of Fichte.

All this connects itself with what Hamilton calls 'the startling' 'general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going Idealism.'<sup>1</sup>

It is hoped, however, that the definitions will at the same time be an aid to the reader in determining the precise question involved in these controverted cases.

### [118.] Idealism—what is not and what is its Question.

EDITOR: Consciousness in its direct attestation, according to the general judgment of thinkers of all schools, absolutely demonstrates no more than the mind's own states or acts. (See [117].) It cannot then directly attest the external causes of those acts or states. The *proof* of the external world, *in every philosophy*, on this basis, is therefore an *inference* from the facts of consciousness proper. The inference may be justified, may be regarded as necessary and intuitive, but it is an inference, and is not, in any case, in the precise grade of certainty that the act of consciousness itself is.

When Sir William Hamilton says that the object non-Ego is *given* in consciousness, he can only with propriety mean that it is logically or mediately given, or necessarily involved logically in the consciousness of the Ego: it is given in the *idea* of consciousness, not in its *act*: it is *implied*, not *expressed*.

In other words, Ego and non-Ego are intuitional logical correlates in consciousness. Both, as more than empirical, are involved in the

<sup>1</sup> See Prolegomena, V. 20.

inferences of a logic which is intuitional, or, at least, undistinguishable from the intuitional. But the Ego is no more conscious *of itself* in consciousness than the eye sees *itself* in seeing. Self-consciousness, as the consciousness of intellectual acts and states, is directly and infallibly known; but if it means that we have consciousness of a self *apart from* acts and states, or *distinct from* the acts and states while it is in them, it is not true that we have *self-consciousness*. Consciousness itself is a specifically conditioned state; and to know ourselves apart from or distinct from a conditioned state would imply two absurdities: *one*, that mind, as known, is unconscious; the *other*, that the mind knowing, which in this case is the same mind which is known, is unconscious. Furthermore, unconsciousness itself is a state. To be conscious of absolute self is a contradiction in terms. To be conscious of self in its states and acts, or through its states and acts, is to be conscious of the acts and states, that is, to have an immediate cognition of them, while our judgment of the essence or substance acted upon and acting is mediate. We can make a dialectic separation of a mind from its states, but there can be no real separation. And in the dialectic separation there would be left to the mind nothing but dialectic being. So far as conceivable reality is concerned, its being would be equivalent to non-being. There is no absolute to man's cognition. He does not *know* substance, either matter or spirit. The Ego itself we know then only in and by its acts and states, not apart from them. Mental acts and states are alone the objects of immediate or strictly philosophical cognition. The real *primary* question hinges on this point only. The sole and consequently infallible utterance of consciousness is on the mind's own states and acts. Out of the facts thus testified to, and acknowledged in general, alike by every school of philosophy, everything else is to be built up. On this general ground, the ground of the phenomenal facts, there is no controversy whatever between Berkeley and the extremest of his opposers. That the thing to which consciousness testifies, as the act of putting the finger into the fire, is followed by what consciousness testifies to as the sensation of pain, is as certain on Berkeley's view as on Locke's and Reid's. The world of the *phenomenal*, both as regards causes and effects, is left untouched by Idealism. Body and spirit remain *phenomenally* as distinct as ever; our fellow-men stand in every *phenomenal* relation as before. Our own bodies are known as they were known before. The divergence belongs to the sphere of the supersensuous. The question is, What is that something to which consciousness does not immediately testify, which is the cause on which are conditioned those mental acts

or states to which consciousness does immediately testify by being their inseparable condition?

There are then two distinct questions. The *first* is,—What is it to which consciousness *immediately* testifies? The *second* question is,—What is *involved* mediately in that testimony? There is a question of testimony and a question of judgment.

On the first question, Idealism, as we have seen, accepts the common answer of philosophy, past and present,—the mind is conscious not of what is not in it, but of what is in it, and nothing can be in it but its own acts and states. Nothing is known *immediately* but what is known to consciousness, and whatever *is* known to consciousness is known immediately. The worlds of immediate knowledge and of consciousness are conterminal; each is in each. The *mental state* associated with the sense-perception of a tree is immediately known, because there is no medium between the state and the consciousness,—the mental state is consciousness itself. The tree itself is *mediately* known, if it be known at all; though Idealism and other schools of thought concur in the principle that *mediate* knowledge is no *knowledge*. The tree is known through a medium, or rather through a series of media, terminating in the final excitant of the perceptive act, which excitant may be called the medium of the media. Nearly all thinkers agree that there is no consciousness of this excitant; we only know the state which results from it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' assumes that there is a consciousness of it,—it is the only non-Ego of which we are conscious; but as the great non-Ego, the external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are compelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of 'a representative entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch school combated Idealism had reached a point at which 'there is no escape from confession but in suicide;' and Hamilton's Natural Realism is the proof that 'suicide *is* confession.'

But neither on the ordinary view, nor on Hamilton's, can the mind be conscious of the tree. On either theory it can only be conscious of a state, for which it supposes, or does not suppose, the existence of a material, substantial tree, external to the mind and the body, as a



necessary cause ; for the state itself and the act of reference of that state, or the refusal to refer, are both in itself. It cannot indeed shake off the empirical reference. The world of an idealist's experience is precisely that of every other man. He sees a tree as a Materialist sees it. Fichte, born idealist as he was, acknowledges that Idealism cannot be a *way of thinking*,—can only be *speculation*, though he none the less held that it was the veritable truth in speculation. It is the *speculative* reference on which the question hinges. It is time thrown away, therefore, to attempt to settle the question with an idealist by the mere urging of the empirical phenomena as in themselves decisive. As empirical, Nature puts them more emphatically than Beattie and Reid can put them. No idealist ever, in this respect, doubted them, or could doubt them, or pretended to doubt them, and no realist ever felt himself in any degree strengthened by an argument at this point.

So far as the direct reaching of the empirical facts is concerned, nearly all philosophy is idealistic, and hence going so far only does not constitute what is pre-eminently and by antithesis Idealism. It is simply *generic*, not *specific*, Idealism. *Generic* Idealism has been the predominant view of thinkers in all ages. *Specific* Idealism has by no means shared so largely in the philosophic confidence.

When we come, therefore, to the second question, we come to the dividing point. The phenomenal or empirical being conceded, the great facts being, in general estimation, beyond dispute, how are we to account for them ?

Through the whole range of the perceptive acts of all educated consciousness there rises a phenomenal external world, whose normal features are generically the same to the masses of men of all lands and of all time. How are we to account for that phenomenal world ?

The *first* answer is, The phenomenal, empirical, external world involves, as its concause, the existence of a real, substantial, material world, which is brought into mediated relations to the mind through the organs of sense, or by the act of God to which they furnish occasion, or by a pre-established harmony, or in some unknown way. The world is substantially real, the mind is substantially real ; phenomena are the results, in some sense, of the existence of both. This is the answer of REALISM. [117.]

The *second* answer is, *either* : The phenomenal world involves no more than the existence of mind, real, substantial spirit, which, by the action of another mind or other minds on it, or by the laws of its own self-originated conditions, attains its various states and acts ; *or*, That world involves no more than ideas, conscious states and acts,—

the question, *What* is conscious? being thrown out, as beyond the reach of knowledge. The systems involved in these answers, and pre-eminently the second (and, if logic be laid to the line, *only* the second), are Idealism.

But as the generally received Realism of philosophy is idealistic in the recognition of the first principles of human knowledge, so a great deal of Idealism, and especially that of Berkeley and his school, has been realistic, in acknowledging real spirit, and in real spirits real phenomena (that is, phenomena *objectively* produced, by *object*-spirit, not by the *subject*-mind).

It is not true that Berkeley maintains that *all* is mere 'show,' or 'illusion,' or 'idea.' In Berkeley's view neither that which receives nor that which imparts ideas is an idea. Both the giver and the recipient are substantial realities, and the 'ideas' themselves, either directly or by succession, spring from God. They are not illusions, but divine verities. The objection is not that they are incredibly unreal, but that they are incredibly real; they are not revelations through media, but revelations direct. In an overwhelming sense, in Berkeley's view of man, 'the *inspiration* of the Almighty giveth him understanding.' The theophany of nature is one in which God speaks to man face to face. Berkeley's world is one in which a Peniel is never far off. Our realities are indeed subjective, for they are ours; but our subjectivities are realities, for their cause, their objective base, is a substantial personal God. In this aspect Berkeley claimed to be the true realist,—his opponents were charged with unrealism.

The philosophical division between the generally accepted Realism and the various forms of Idealism turns entirely upon the answers given to the *second* question. There is an unmixed Realism which acknowledges nothing but the *objectively* real, and makes the seemingly *subjective* real no more than a phenomenon of the objective. There is an absolute subjective Idealism which acknowledges nothing but the idea, and makes the seemingly real in both matter and mind mere conditional ideas. But the mass of philosophers are idealistic realists, holding to direct consciousness of the idea alone, but regarding the realistic inference as valid. On the other hand, Berkeley is a realistic idealist; holding that the realistic inference is invalid as regards matter, but conceding it as regards mind. He holds to real substantial spirits, God and man. Hence, too, his monism is only generic. He holds to a monism of genus,—to spirit alone; but he concedes a dualism of species,—infinite Spirit, the Cause of ideas, and finite spirits, the recipients of them. But this his strength is also his weakness. Every

moral advantage of his Idealism over its successors is secured at the expense of its development and of its logical consistency.

[ 119 ] Mind and Matter. Spirit and Body.

EDITOR: No Physics can ever be worthy of its name which excludes Metaphysics; no Metaphysics is entitled to attention which does not accept and attempt to harmonize the facts of Physics. Both by the law of its genesis, and of its intellectual supremacy, *Metaphysics* must be *after* Physics, and Physics has no intellectual value except as it prepares the path and the materials for Metaphysics. Metaphysics is after Physics, but Mind is before both, and by Mind both consist. The great weakness of psychology has been that it has not done justice to the personal unity of man. Receding, as it ought, from the monism which annihilates either mind or matter, spirit or body, it has run into the dualism which hopelessly antagonizes them. Man is a unit, beyond all the ordinary concessions of his unity. Up to the last point at which human philosophy can trace him he is an inseparable unity. When the bond of that unity is broken, philosophy knows him no more. He has passed out of the world whose best souls can only love wisdom, to that world whose pure intelligences possess it. Philosophy must not be a philosophy of mind apart; she must not emphasize the *and*, and be a philosophy of mind *and* body, but, taking what God offers her, become a philosophy of *man*. Except as man she knows not soul; except as man she knows not the human body, for when matter is severed from the knitting soul which made it body, it no longer is for her; philosophy surrenders it to the dissecting-table or the grave.

No theory of the *body* of man is worthy of attention which does not acknowledge the *soul* as the controlling force of the body. No theory of the soul, as we know the soul in philosophy, is entitled to respect, which ignores or diminishes the reality of the personal union into which it has taken the body with itself,—a union the most consummate and absolute of which we know, or of which we can conceive, infinitely transcending the completeness of the most perfect mechanical and chemical unions,—a union so complete that, though two distinct substances are involved in it, it makes them, through a wide range of observations, as completely one to us as if they were one substance; so that we can say the human body does nothing proper to it without the soul, the human soul does nothing proper to it without the body. As the soul operates through the body, the body operates by the soul. The soul cannot perform the most exquisite act of abstract thinking without a co-operation of the body which can be distinctly demon-

strated, and the most involuntary and trifling acts distinctive of the body involve and demonstrate the presence of the soul. So much is this the case that, if the body gave no other evidence of the presence of the soul than the distinctive tremulousness of the smallest muscle, or the slightest conceivable act involving true muscular movement, it would constitute ample evidence that the soul was still there. The best modern science accepts, practically at least, these principles. The extremest spiritualist in philosophy, though he may talk the old jargon which treats the body as, if not a prison, at least a mere mechanical and chemical appendage of the soul, cannot think or write without showing the extravagance and hollowness of his view. To nothing does the common, as well as the educated, consciousness more positively testify than to the personal unity of man; his body is not an appendage to himself, but it is a part of himself. He is not, as he has been called, an 'intelligence served by organs,' but he is a being in whom two natures constitute one indivisible person,—that is, so constitute the person that if divided from each other, absolutely and forever, the personality itself, as it now exists, would lose its completeness: there would remain after such a dissolution, not man, but at most the spirit of man, a higher and nobler part, and yet but a part. The soul of man is but a part of man.

The dualism of the current speculation, most commonly allied with what passes for orthodoxy, is so shallow that it has been the great promoter of the monism of Materialism. Over against the dualism which persists in yoking together two heterogeneous incompatibles, on the one side, and the spurious monism which ignores or perverts the most important and well-grounded half of the facts, on the other, Idealism comes in to reach a higher Monism by throwing out utterly the false everything of Materialism, and the disturbing, helpless, useless one-thing—matter—of dualism. Materialism abuses matter, and the received dualism cannot use it; and Idealism comes in to take out of the way what is either not used or misused. To this hour Berkeley's sarcasm retains its point. The mass of sticklers for substantial matter do not know what to do with it when they have it, and if it could be quietly taken away from them they would never miss it. It is true that over against even this poor dualism, Idealism demonstrates nothing. So far it has no advantage over the other view. It is guess against guess. But it has the charm of simplicity. It offers one great absorbing mystery, instead of a thousand frittering, irritating difficulties. Instead of the perplexity of tracing, and of attempting in vain to trace, the manifold streams to their obscure springs, it brings

before the mind an all-embracing ocean of speculative mystery. It goes forth

‘dread, fathomless, alone.’

It is at least deep enough for a despairing man to drown himself in. Some of the systems spread out great shallow morasses on bottoms of mud. You may be stifled in them, but you cannot be drowned. Idealism is like the old Church of the West, resting on one idea, the idea of the One, building all conclusions on a solitary premise, giving you all, to the last, if you grant but the first. Not without a mighty charm for the active mind in the proud independence it offers him, Idealism also has its fascinations for souls weary of the many and of the much, ready to cry,—

‘The world is too much with us.’

It is the cloister of the system-worn thinker. Relatively it meets some great tendency of the human mind. Many of the greatest minds have been tempted by it,—some of the greatest have yielded, others have resisted it; some have dreaded; but no real metaphysician has despised—no real metaphysician can despise—it. If it be an error, it is the error most difficult to sound; if it rest on sophisms, they are the most perplexing of sophisms. Herbart, the greatest of its direct assailants in recent time, says, ‘Idealism is an opponent we dare not despise; it plants itself in our way, and we must arm ourselves for the battle.’<sup>1</sup>

It is on grounds of great importance then that able works on ‘Body and Mind,’ even though written with a prevaillingly physical or medical aim, have a great attraction to the true metaphysician. Metaphysics shall be perfect in all its theories so soon as physics shall be perfect in its collection of all its facts. The contempt which ignorant or arrogant physicists heap on metaphysics is really the disgrace or the misfortune of the physical sciences. Reach the demonstrably absolute in physics, and we shall not demand in vain that the thinkers of the race shall give us a demonstrably absolute philosophy. On the general theme, Mind and Matter, Spirit and Body, the ages have pondered. A great body of literature exists in connection, in various aspects, with their relations. Tuke, one of the most recent writers on Body and Mind,<sup>2</sup> enumerates ninety works among the principal authorities to which he refers. Nearly all of these are English, or translations into English; a few are French. Not one, except through translations, is German,

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysik*, Werke, iv. 265.

<sup>2</sup> See a review of his ‘*Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body*,’ *Penn Monthly*, Oct. 1873, 722-728.

though the German possesses, beyond all other languages combined, a fund of books bearing on this theme. In addition to the ample treatment of the topic in the systems, and the more general psychological, anthropological, practical, and religious works, there are special treatises by Erdmann (1837, 1840), Ennemoser (1825), Beneke (1826), Beraz (1836), Hilgers (1834), Messerschmidt (1837), and by others of more recent date, devoted to the discussion of the essential conception of body and soul, their relation to each other, their distinctness, their intimate reciprocal action, and the connection between just views of them and of man's moral freedom and accountability, the question whether the phenomena of intellectual activity are mere operations of a high organization, or of an essence, united intimately indeed with it, but distinct, spiritual, immortal.

The whole body of evidence in regard to mind and matter justifies certain conclusions in regard to soul and body. *First*, they prove that soul and body are distinct. Their laws of action on each other belong neither in species nor in genus to any of the departments of physical power. No analogies exist to them, even in the subtlest forms in which matter is operative. Matter is operative on mind, but under laws wholly distinct from those by which it operates on unpsychical matter. Light operates on the mind in awakening consciousness, perception, certain sensations of pleasure, but not as it operates in the whole sphere of the unpsychical. The operation of light and of all matter on the body is accompanied by entirely distinct sets of results, when the body is possessed of the soul, and again when it is destitute of it. Fire will not burn a living body in precisely the same manner in which it burns a dead one, and the vast array of forces which dissolve the dead body are the elements of the life and power of the living body. Oxygen consumes the dead body: the living body consumes oxygen and converts it into force.

*Second*, the facts show that though body and soul are distinct, their unity is very close, so close and peculiar that out of it arises what is so transcendently wonderful that up to this hour it has failed of due recognition, though the evidences of it have such overwhelming force that glimpses of it exist from the earliest time and through all time. This great ignored or imperfectly recognized principle is the principle of the *personal fellowship of attributes*; that is, that in the unity of the person, by it, and in consequence of it, the two essences really share each other's properties, so that we have a personally corporeal soul and a personally psychical body. In consequence of this the body receives, in its personal union with the soul, *real attributes* which it cannot have

outside of that union, and which, within it, give to it capacities which mere impersonal matter cannot possess. The 'seeing eye' and 'hearing ear' are not mere forms of phrase, but the eye does really see *by* the soul, as the soul sees *through* the eye. The nerve which thrills with the pain feels pain *by* the soul, as the soul feels pain *through* the nerve. There is one real, indivisible, personal act.

Every sensation, perception, cognition, imagination, involves a real *conjoint* affection or action of the personal soul, and of the personalized organ. The soul is not a spider in the centre of a cobweb of nerves, but is an essence, which has evolved organism by taking matter into personal union with itself, and which gives to the nerves power to feel by it, as it uses the nerves in turn to receive influence through them, neither ever acting apart from the other. The two sets of acts are, in a certain sense, distinct as the essences themselves are; in some cases the intervals can be marked by time, but their coalescence is the act of consciousness, the act of their complete unity. The *separate* action of touch upon the nerves is conveyed with an ascertainable interval to the soul, but the *perceived* touch is that in which the *separation* ceases, and the one indivisible act of consciousness, in the personal mind and the personalized body, takes place. There is no interval in perception. It takes place indivisibly, in the mind through the nerve, and in the nerve by the mind. The motion which becomes a co-factor in perception takes time, but the perception takes none. Meanwhile, the nerve has not acted apart from the mind; the soul has not been separated from it in the interval of unconsciousness; the soul has given the nerve its nerve-power. The power of the nerve to transmit depends upon its personal organic union with the soul. The nerve of a dead body carries no force from a touch. The nerve receives real attributes from the soul in the union, and in this personal connection, and because of it, though real matter, does what matter, as such, cannot do,—it feels; feels none the less really because it feels by the soul. The people and the philosophers here, as in many cases, divide the truth between them. The illiterate man thinks that the pain is in his toe, and not in his mind; the philosopher thinks the pain is in his mind, and not in his toe. The fact is, it is in both. The nerve has real pain by the mind, the mind real pain through the nerve. The pain is in both, indivisibly,—not two pains, but one pain; not two parts of one pain, but a pain without parts in one person; in the mind as person, in the body as personalized by the mind. It can exist in neither without the personal co-operation of the other. Take away the nerve from the organism, and neither nerve nor mind can feel pain; abstract the mind by an

intense interest, and neither mind nor nerve feels pain. We *can* hold a burning coal within our hand by thinking on the frosty Caucasus,—on a simple condition,—that we think of nothing else. We assert that there is no cure for the spurious monism of Materialism and Idealism on the one side, and for the hopeless dualism which reigns in the current philosophy and the popular thinking on the other, except in the recognition of the personal unity of man,—the monism of person harmonizing the duality of natures. Man is not two persons, or a jumble of person and non-person,—a muddle of spirit resenting matter, and of matter clogging and embarrassing spirit. Man is a personal unity. Man is a unity of two parts. In this is implied that the parts are not co-ordinate and independent. Two, as two, cannot be one. One must be first, the other second; one must be higher, the other lower; one must depend, the other sustain; one must have personality, the other must receive it.

Physics and Metaphysics, the former negatively, the latter positively, demonstrate that the psychical is the first, the higher, the sustainer, the personal; the physical is the second, the lower, the dependent, the personalized. The entire world of the conscious, taking the term conscious in its widest reach, shows that the psychical in the organism is that for which the physical in it exists. The reason why the matter of an oyster's organism is not left inorganic is found in the psychical element of the oyster. The *matter* in his organism is all arranged in adaptation to his little circle of sensations and perceptions. Taking it for granted that all conscious being is in part an object for itself, the conscious element is that to which the material element is adjusted. All nature illustrates this. The inorganic is for the organic. The organic is for the psychical in it. The psychical, then, is first. It is the conditioning power of the material. It is the organizing force which lifts the organic out of the inorganic. The reason why that which grows from the germ of an oyster differs from that which grows from the germ of a man, is not in the material, as physical science knows it. The difference in the material is already conditioned with reference to the character and purpose of the psychical. The chemical and all the physical differences between the two germs shed no light on the differences of the result. The psychic is not a mere undiscovered material force,—it is a force generically different from matter.

The elementary psychical is as multiform and varied as the elementary physical, and out of its varieties, assimilating the varieties of the material, each to its own wants, arises the organic world.

What are the psychical and the organic? They are the embodiment



of two great ideas,—creator and creature, artificer and workmanship, the plastic power and the moulded matter. The universe is the out-thought of God, and God's out-thought can be nothing other than the revelations of his own mind and activity. He *is* conscious, free Creator, Artificer, Moulder. His work is creation, the Divine Art of Nature, the shape through which the finite shifts in the eternal and infinite line of grace, power, and mystery. In the psychical, God posits the forces which are shadows and remembrancers of his own creative, plastic power, and puts it into nature for its work of sub-creation. The psychical is, in a larger or smaller sphere, a Vice-Creator, in which a determinate set of forces is divinely immanent. The psychical enfolds the plan, the material submits to plan, and the organic is the result. The organic is the harmony of the psychical and material in plan. As the psychical is a little sub-creator, the organic is a little sub-creation, in which the psychical remains immanent, as the sub-cause. Each organism is the rising of a new world of order out of the chaos of the inorganic. On each little deep, miniature of the vast whole, hovers and broods the psychic spirit, with the less or greater measure of embodied force appointed to it. This power of the psychic on the physical is followed, as God pleases, by the feeble glimmer of mere sensation, never growing, or by the day-spring of a light whose noon is the resplendent glory of reason and immortality.



# INDEX.

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The leading topics of the PROLEGOMENA are indexed by the divisions and paragraphs. The pages are given where a minuter subdivision is necessary.

The PREFACES of Fraser and Berkeley are indexed by the page.

The INTRODUCTION and the PRINCIPLES OF BERKELEY are indexed by paragraphs, and this Index answers for every edition of them. The APPENDIXES are indicated by Letters.

The ANNOTATIONS are indexed by their Numbers in brackets [ ].

## ABBREVIATIONS.

- App*(endix).
- In*(troduction) of Berkeley.
- Pref*(aces) of Fraser and Berkeley.
- Prin*(ciples).
- Prol*(egomena).
- n*(otes) by Fraser, at the foot of the page.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>Abbild (image), Prin. § 140.</p> <p>Absolute dependence, Prin. § 88, 155.</p> <p>“ matter, 18.</p> <p>“ space, 110.</p> <p>“ truth, 76.</p> <p>Absoluteness of primary qualities, Prin. § 12, <i>n</i>.</p> <p>Abstract existence, Prin. § 4.</p> <p>Abstract ideas, In. § 6, 10, <i>n</i>., 11, 12, 14, 15, 18; Prin. § 5, 11, 17, 97, 143.</p> <p>Abstract ideas, Ueberweg on, [11].</p> <p>Abstraction, Pref. 154; In. § 8, 10, 11, 17, 19, <i>n</i>., 23; Prin. § 5, [11, 12,] 100, [95]; App. A.</p> <p>Abstraction, Ueberweg on, [5, 11, 12].</p> <p>Accidents, Prin. § 73.</p> <p>Activity, Prin. § 61.</p> | <p>Advantages of considering ideas apart from names, In. § 21-24, [7]; App. A.</p> <p>Alciphron, Prol. I. § 8.</p> <p>Algebra, names like the letters in, In. § 19.</p> <p>America, Berkeley visits, Prol. I. § 6.</p> <p>“ lines on, 6.</p> <p>“ returns from, 7.</p> <p>“ adherents of Berkeley in, Prol. IV. § 15.</p> <p>Analogies, caution in, Prin. § 106-108.</p> <p>Analyst, on motion, Prin. § 112, <i>n</i>.</p> <p>“ on infinite divisibility, 130, <i>n</i>., [110].</p> <p>Annihilation and creation every moment, Prin. § 45, 56, [57], 48, [66].</p> <p>‘An sich,’ existence, things, [9, 81, 86, 90].</p> |
|---|---|

- Antipodes, Prin. § 55.
- A posteriori arguments, Prin. § 21, [34, 108], 129.
- Apparatus, Prin. § 61.
- Appendixes to Principles, ProL. XV. § 3.
- “ A. Rough draft of Principles, 283.
- “ B. Arthur Collier, 317.
- “ C. Theory of Vision vindicated, 323.
- Apperception defined, [117]
- Apple, Prin. § 1.
- A priori arguments, Prin. § 21, [34, 108], 129.
- Arbitrary character of laws of nature, Prin. § 31, [46].
- Archetype of sensible system, the divine idea the ultimate, Prin. § 71, [83].
- Archetypes, external, Prin. § 87; Pref. 158; Prin. § 9, 41, *n.*, 99.
- Aristotelian scholastic definition of idea, [1].
- Aristotle, *materia prima*, Prin. § 11.
- Arithmetic, its object, Prin. § 119, 121.
- “ regards signs, not things, 122.
- Arrogance, fostered by Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 13.
- Atheism, atheists, Prin. § 35, 92, 94, [116], 154, 155.
- Attraction, Prin. § 103, 104, [97].
- Attribute defined, Prin. § 49.
- Attributes, personal, fellowship of in man, [119].
- Augustine, existence of an external world not demonstrable, ProL. III. § 15.
- Bacon and Berkeley, ProL. II. § 1.
- “ In. § 17; Prin. § 107.
- Baxter, Andrew, opponent of Berkeley, ProL. V. § 3.
- Beasley, F., Dr., opposes Berkeley, ProL. V. § 16. (See *Princeton*.)
- Beattie, opponent of Berkeley, ProL. V. § 8.
- “ defines ‘common sense,’ § 8.
- Beck shows that the critical system is Idealistic, 87.
- Begriff, -e, a notion, Prin. § 74, 140, 142. notions, 143; In. § 6.
- Begriff, -e, ideas, [46].
- Being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seien den), incomprehensible, abstract idea of, Prin. § 17, 74.
- Being, conception of intelligible, Prin. § 99, *n.*
- Being, and being perceived, Prin. § 6.
- “ Ueberweg on, [13].
- Beneke disputes Kant’s method, [81].
- “ on body and soul, [119].
- Beraz, on body and soul, [119].
- Berkeley, Life and Writings, ProL. I.: early life, works, travels, § 1-3, 6, 7; bishop, 8; controversies, mathematical, 9; death, at Oxford, 11; works, 12, 13; translations of, 14.
- Berkeley, precursors of, ProL. II.
- “ System, summaries of, ProL. III.
- “ estimates of character, writings, and influence, ProL. VI. (See *Berkeleyanism*.)
- “ Principles, present edition, characteristics of, ProL. XV.
- “ a student of Locke’s Essay, Pref. 153.
- “ influenced by Malebranche, 153.
- “ combats Locke, 154.
- “ Idealism and Realism, 155, *n.*
- “ follows Locke, In. § 6, *n.*
- “ proof of his doctrine, Prin. § 3, 4, *n.*
- “ held unity of substance, 7.
- “ assumes causality, 26, *n.*
- “ connects cause and substance, 37, *n.*
- “ what meant by his potential existence, 45, *n.*
- “ on continual creation, 46, *n.*
- “ on miracles, 84.
- “ abolishes representative idea in perception, 86, *n.*
- “ holds a sort of spiritual positivism, 102, *n.*
- “ a true realist, [118].
- “ his monism only generic, [118].
- “ his dualism, [118].
- Berkeleyanism, its friends, affinities, and influence, ProL. IV.; influence of, § 1;

- first reception, 2; opponents and objections to, V.; ridicule of, I.
- Bewusstseyn, consciousness, [117].
- Blackwell, estimate of Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 3.
- Bodies, external, useless, Prin. § 18, 19, 20; denied by Ueberweg, [32].
- “ exist in the mind, 23; denied by Ueberweg, [37].
- “ do not exist when not perceived, 47, [60].
- Body, spirit and, [118].
- Bolingbroke on abstract ideas, In. § 10, *n.*
- Brahm, Brahma, and Schelling's God, ProL. XI. 98-100.
- Brain, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 114.
- Brockhaus (Real-Encyclop.):
- “ summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 11.
- “ Idealism defined, VII. § 11.
- “ Realism defined, [117].
- Brown, Thomas, Dr., on Idealism, and Reid, ProL. V. § 15.
- “ on power in ideas, Prin. § 25, *n.*
- “ eliminates all power from material world, 32, *n.*
- “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Browne, Peter, Bishop, controversy with Berkeley, ProL. I. § 7.
- “ on abstract ideas, In. § 10, *n.*
- Bruno and Schelling, ProL. XI. 97.
- “ and Spinoza, 118.
- “ coincidence of opposites, [117].
- Buddhism, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 116, 117.
- Buhle, arguments against Berkeley, ProL. V. § 11.
- Burthogge, ProL. II. § 7.
- Butler, Bishop, on atheism, Prin. § 145, *n.*
- Calculus, differential, Prin. § 132.
- “ infinitesimal, 130, [109].
- Cartesian theory of occasional causes, Prin. § 69.
- “ “ of nature, 102.
- “ “ of brutes, Ueberweg, [3].
- Causality, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 109.
- Causality and Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 7.
- “ principles of, assumed and interpreted by Berkeley, Prin. § 26, *n.*
- “ notion of, 31, 32.
- “ views of Locke, Hume, Reid, Maine de Biran, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, [46, 47].
- Causation, physical, contrasted with spiritual, Prin. § 65, *n.*
- Cause, final, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 109.
- “ and Idealism, XIV. § 7.
- “ free voluntary activity, Pref. 165.
- “ substance connected with, Prin. § 27, *n.*
- “ corporeal, 53, [71].
- “ and effect, 65.
- “ spirit the only efficient, 102.
- Cheselden's account of the blind boy, App. C, 323; ProL. XV. § 3.
- Chimeras, difference between real things and, Prin. § 34.
- Clarke, S., opposed to Berkeley, ProL. V. § 2.
- “ approaches his views, V. 2.
- “ on continual creation, Prin. § 46, *n.*
- “ on the being and attributes of God, 117, *n.*
- Coexistent qualities, idea of, In. § 9.
- Collier, theory of matter, Prin. § 49, *n.*
- “ incidents of his life, App. B.
- “ theory of inexistence, App. B.
- “ his philosophy applied to Christian theology, App. B.
- “ introduction to his Clavis, App. B.
- “ makes sense-perception and imagination differ only in degree, App. B.
- “ and Berkeley, ProL. I. § 5; App. B.
- Colour and extension, In. § 7, 8; Prin. § 99.
- Colours, secondary qualities, Prin. § 9, 10.
- “ exist no longer than perceived, 46; [58].
- Commonplace Book, Pref. 171, *n.*
- Common sense, argument from, Prin. § 54, *n.*
- Communication, abstract ideas not necessary for, In. § 14.

- Comte, on power in ideas, Prin. § 25, *n.*  
 “ eliminates all power from material world, 32, *n.*  
 “ on the universe, 155, *n.*  
 Conceive, we cannot, of things existing unperceived, Prin. § 23; Ueberweg on, [36].  
 Conform, [91].  
 Conformable, the perceived, to the unperceived, Prin. § 86; [91].  
 Conscious experience, objects of, what, Pref. 157.  
 Consciousness, generally recognized principles in regard to, Idealism rests on, ProL. XIV. § 1.  
 “ definitions of, [117].  
 Consequences of Principles of Human Knowledge, Pref. 157; Prin. § 86.  
 Copernican system, Prin. § 51.  
 Corporeal causes, Prin. § 53.  
 “ substances, 19.  
 Creation, continual, advocated by schoolmen, Prin. § 46, [59].  
 Creative act continuous, Prin. § 152.  
 Cudworth on abstract ideas, In. § 10, *n.*  
 ‘Darstellen’—present themselves, Prin. § 29.  
 Day, our own, Berkeleyanism in, ProL. IV. § 5.  
 Death and life, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. § 24.  
 Deception of words, In. § 23, 24.  
 Definition, [95].  
 Demi-atheism, Prin. § 155.  
 Demonstration, Berkeley claims, Prin. § 61, [75].  
 Derodon on abstract ideas, In. § 10, *n.*  
 Descartes and Berkeley, ProL. II. § 3.  
 “ theory of matter, Pref. 154; Prin. § 73, *n.*  
 “ on man’s finite mind, In. § 2, *n.*  
 “ on principles of knowledge, 5, *n.*  
 “ on causality in sensible things, Prin. § 52, *n.*  
 “ on the existence of sensible things, 88, *n.*  
 Descartes on idea, [1].  
 “ on animals, In. § 11, [3].  
 “ on consciousness, [117].  
 Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, objections to Berkeley, ProL. V. § 17.  
 Diderot opposed to Berkeley, ProL. V. § 7.  
 Distance, Prin. § 42, 43, [54].  
 Distrust of senses by philosophers, Prin. § 88.  
 Divine ideas and will coincident with laws of nature, Prin. § 57, *n.*  
 “ “ ultimate archetype of sensible system, 72, *n.*  
 Divine thought, absolute truth, Prin. § 76, *n.*  
 Divisibility, infinite, Prin. § 47, [61, 62, 63, 64, 65], 124, [107].  
 Divisible, infinitely, Prin. § 128, 129, 130, [110].  
 Douval, Jouve, Idealism defined, ProL. VII. § 9.  
 Dreams, ideas in, Prin. § 18, [30].  
 Dualism, Berkeley’s, Pref. 155, [118].  
 “ or intelligible Realism, Prin. § 3, *n.*  
 “ spurious, [119].  
 Duality of existence held by Berkeley, Prin. § 7, *n.*  
 Dublin University and Berkeley, ProL. IV. § 12.  
 Durandus, the world a machine, Prin. § 46, *n.*  
 Duty, Prin. § 156.  
 Edinburgh Review on Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 12.  
 Editor, American, Prolegomena, 1–148.  
 “ translation of Ueberweg’s notes on Berkeley, 329–407.  
 “ additional notes: idea, abstract idea, [1].  
 “ on objects of knowledge, ideas, [8], 337–340.  
 “ on esse, percipi, [9].  
 “ on primary and secondary, [17].  
 “ on matter, [18].

- Editor, American, on similar and like, [21].
- “ on things in themselves, [38].
- “ on ‘eating and drinking ideas,’ [51].
- “ on New Theory of Vision, [55].
- “ on transubstantiation, [88].
- “ on Ueberweg’s view of the conformity of the perceived to the unperceived, [91].
- “ on infinitesimals, [110].
- “ on immortality of the soul, [111].
- “ on opinion and character, [112].
- “ Idealism, basis of; consciousness; Realism, [117].
- “ Idealism, its question, [118].
- “ body and mind, matter and spirit, [119].
- Edwards, Jon., views in consonance with Berkeley’s, *Prol. IV.* § 4.
- “ said to be in affinity with Spinoza’s, 4.
- Efficient cause none but spirit, *Prin.* § 102.
- Ego is substantial and causal, *Prin.* § 142, *n.*
- the non-Ego given in, [118].
- Eleati, Pantheists, *Prol. XIII.* 117.
- Ennemoser, body and soul, [119].
- Entity, abstract idea of, *Prin.* § 81.
- Epicureans, *Prin.* § 93, [93].
- Erdmann, objections to Berkeley’s system, *Prol. V.* § 14.
- “ point of modern division, [117].
- “ on body and mind, [119].
- Esse is percipi in unthinking things, *Prin.* § 3.
- Ueberweg on, [9].
- Essence nominal, *Prin.* § 102.
- “ *obola*, [96].
- Exist (existiren), existence, *Prin.* § 3, [9], 35.
- Existence, abstract idea of, *Prin.* § 81.
- “ of an idea consists in its being perceived, 2.
- “ intelligible conception of, 89, *n.*
- Experience, conscious objects of, what, *Prof.* 157.
- Experience, presentative and representative, *Prof.* 159.
- Extension (ausdehnung), &c., only ideas, *Prin.* § 9; denied by Ueberweg, [19].
- “ neither great nor small, is nothing, 11; denied by Ueberweg, [23].
- “ and colour, 99.
- “ and figure, 49, [68].
- “ abstraction frames the idea of colour exclusive of, *In.* § 8.
- “ a primary quality, *Prin.* § 9.
- “ and motion, 10, 161.
- “ Ueberweg on, [21].
- “ the characteristic of the material world, 11, *n.*
- “ an accident of matter, 16.
- “ an object of geometry, 123.
- “ finite, 124, [106, 107].
- External bodies, supposition of, *Prin.* § 19, 20.
- “ “ their existence within our knowledge impossible, 20.
- External things (äussere) are perceived by sense, *Prin.* § 90.
- Externality, how seen, *Prof.* 156; *Prin.* § 90, *n.*
- Eyes, *Prin.* § 29, [43].
- Fall, dogma of, Schopenhauer on, *Prol. XIII.* 119.
- Ferrier, Prof., on perception and matter, *Prin.* § 50, *n.*
- “ friend of Berkeleyanism, *Prol. IV.* § 6.
- Fichte, system of, *Prol. X.*
- “ compared with Schelling, 97, 98.
- “ his trilogie, Hegel adopts, 102.
- “ and Hegel, 103.
- “ illustration of the arrogance of Idealism, *Prol. XIV.* § 13.
- “ ‘thing in itself,’ *Prol. X.*, [81].
- “ ‘Messiah of Idealism,’ [117].
- Figure, a primary quality, *Prin.* § 9.
- Fire, idea of, and real fire, *Prin.* § 41.
- “ Locke on, [53].

- Fleming, Realism defined, [117].
- Fraser, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 13.
- “ on Berkeleyanism in our day, Prol. IV. § 5.
- “ friendly to Berkeleyanism, 13.
- “ opinion of Baxter, Andrew, Prol. V. § 3.
- “ on Hamilton’s natural Realism, 20.
- “ estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 18.
- “ edition of Berkeley’s works, Prol. XV. § 1; XVI. § 1, 2.
- “ notes to Principles, Prol. XV. § 2.
- “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Freedom, Prin. § 57, 93.
- Gassendi, on abstract ideas, In. § 10, *n.*
- General, how idea becomes, In. § 12.
- General ideas not denied, In. § 12.
- Generalization, Locke on, In. § 11.
- Geometry, objects of, Prin. § 123.
- German metaphysical terms, Prol. XV. § 8.
- Germany, Berkeley in, Prol. IV. § 14.
- Geulinx, on causality in sensible things, Prin. § 53, *n.*
- “ on matter, 70, *n.*, [71].
- God, *natura naturans* is, Prin. § 147, 148, 152.
- “ his existence known like that of men, 145, *n.*
- “ is known certainly, 164, 174.
- “ ideas of, 71, [83].
- “ seeing things in, Malebranche’s view, 148, [115]. (See *Nature*, author of, language of.)
- Gravitation. (See *Attraction*.)
- “ not essential to bodies, Prin. § 106.
- “ denied by Ueberweg, [99].
- Grote, Prof. John, tends to Berkeleyanism, Prol. IV. § 7.
- Hamann, Berkeley and Hume, Prol. VI. § 17.
- “ Idealism and Realism, [117].
- Hamilton, Sir William, on Reid, Stewart, Idealism, Prol. V. § 20.
- Hamilton, Sir William, natural Realism of, Fraser’s estimate of, Prol. V. § 20.
- “ on Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 14.
- “ Idealism defined, Prol. VII. § 13.
- “ consciousness defined, [117].
- “ Realism defined, [117].
- “ Idealism and Realism, [117].
- “ his ‘natural Realism,’ [118].
- “ ideas of sense exist without the mind, Prin. § 8, *n.*
- “ on representative perception, 86, *n.*
- “ on previous existence of every new phenomenon, 106, *n.*
- Happiness, Prin. § 100.
- Heat and cold, Prin. § 14, 32.
- “ “ Ueberweg on, [26].
- Hegel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 7.
- “ objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. § 13.
- “ system of, Prol. XII.
- Hegel, [81].
- Hegelian schools, Prol. XII. 104.
- Herbart and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 106, 121; [81, 86].
- Herder, on Kant, Prol. IX. 86.
- Heyse, Realism defined, [117].
- Hilgers, on soul and body, [119].
- Hillebrand, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 5.
- Hobbes and Berkeley, Prol. II. 2.
- “ referred to, In. § 6, [93].
- Hobbists, Prin. § 93, [93].
- Home, Henry, of Kames, opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. § 5.
- Hume, on Berkeley’s philosophy, Prol. VI. 4.
- “ Idealism of, Prol. VIII.
- “ refers to Berkeley as a nominalist, In. § 6, *n.*
- “ on power in ideas, Prin. § 25, *n.*, 30, *n.*
- “ eliminates all power from material world, 32, *n.*
- “ on theory of universal energy of Supreme Being, 72, *n.*



- Hume, on representative perception, Prin. § 86, *n.*  
 “ on the universe, 155, *n.*  
 “ as pessimist, 119.
- Idea. (See *Ideas*.)  
 “ defined, Prin. § 5, *n.*, 49, *n.*, 89.  
 “ none of substance, In. § 14, *n.*  
 “ nor of spirit, Prin. § 135.  
 “ its esse is percipi, 2.  
 “ implies passiveness, 25.  
 “ denied by Ueberweg, [39].  
 “ in contradistinction to thing, 39.  
 “ history of the word: how should it be expressed in German in translating Berkeley, Ueberweg on, [1].  
 “ can be like nothing but an idea, 8.  
 “ Ueberweg denies it, [15].  
 “ distinct from its being perceived, 45, [57].
- Ideal and real not identical, ProL XIII. 115.
- Idealism defined, ProL VII.  
 “ definitions of, diversity, § 15.  
 “ development of, from Berkeley to the present, ProL VIII.-XIII.  
 “ sceptical, ProL VIII.  
 “ critical, ProL IX.  
 “ subjective, ProL X.  
 “ objective, ProL XI.  
 “ absolute, ProL XII.  
 “ theoretical, ProL XIII.  
 “ ancient, Schopenhauer on, 107.  
 “ modern development, history of, by Schopenhauer, 108.  
 “ systems of, contemporary with Schopenhauer, contrasted, 108.  
 “ strength and weakness of, ProL XIV. 122-142.  
 “ received in the East, rejected in the West, § 14.  
 “ versatility of, 15.  
 “ not ripest result of speculation, 16.  
 “ logical issues of, 19.  
 “ Fichte’s description of, 20.
- Idealism and Realism, Berkeley’s, Pref. 155.  
 “ basis of, general recognition of, [117].  
 “ what is not and what is its question, [118].  
 “ leaves the *phenomenal* untouched, [118].  
 “ its advantage over the current dualism, [119].
- Ideas, phenomena, sensible things, Pref. 154.  
 “ archetypes of, 157.  
 “ advantages of considering them apart from names, In. § 22.  
 “ relations of to principles of knowledge, Prin. § 1-8.  
 “ visibly inactive, 25.  
 “ cause of, 26, 27.  
 “ succession, 26, 28.  
 “ of sense and imagination, 33.  
 “ and things, 38, 39.  
 “ divine, ultimate archetype of sensible system, 70, *n.*  
 “ and spirits make up the whole of knowledge, 86.  
 “ are real things, 90.  
 “ scheme of, not chimerical, 34, [48].  
 “ succession of, 59, [74].  
 “ abstract, In. § 6-16.  
 “ (*vorstellung*, -en), 21, 22; Prin. § 5-11, 13, 97, 125, 143.  
 “ occasion of, Prin. § 69.  
 “ sensible, 144.  
 “ train of, 59, 71, 77.  
 “ universal, 126.
- Idolatry (*götzendienst*), Prin. § 94.
- Images of things, ideas, Prin. § 33.
- Imagination, its power, Pref. 160.  
 “ confounded with sense, Prin. § 23, *n.*  
 “ ideas of, 30.  
 “ Collier and Hume on, App. B.
- Imagining, faculty of, In. § 10.
- Immortality of the soul, Prin. § 141, [111, 112].  
 “ proved by Berkeley’s Principles, Pref. 165.

- Impenetrability a secondary quality, Prin. § 9.
- Inch, Prin. § 127.
- Inexistence of sensible things, Collier's, App. B.
- Infinite divisibility of finite extension, Prin. § 124.
- Infinities, speculations about, Prin. § 124, [109].
- Infinitesimals, Prin. § 130, [110].
- Infinity, difficulties about, In. § 2.
- “ quantitative, App. B.
- In itself (in sich), In. § 102.
- Intelligence, an, without help of external bodies, Prin. § 20, [33].
- Intelligible Realism and dualism, Prin. § 39, *n.*, 91, *n.*
- “ existence of sense-objects, 86.
- “ meaning of, [90].
- Jacobi, F. H., on Fichte's doctrine, ProL. X. 92.
- “ system of, 100, 101.
- “ on ethics, [95].
- “ the world as free act of will, 118.
- “ on Fichte, Kant, Reinhold, and Spinoza, [117].
- Jamieson, George, opposes Berkeley, ProL. V. § 18.
- Jean Paul (Richter), picture of Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 17.
- Johnson, Samuel, of Stratford and New York, a Berkeleyan, his works, ProL. III. § 3.
- “ Berkeley addresses him on his essays, Pref. 152.
- “ addressed by Berkeley on continual creation, Prin. § 46, *n.*
- Johnson, Dr. Samuel, on Berkeley, ProL. V. § 1; VI. 5.
- Kant, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 3.
- “ system of, ProL. IX.
- “ compared with Schelling, ProL. XI. 97.
- “ and Hegel, ProL. XII. 103.
- “ and Schopenhauer, ProL. XIII. 105.
- “ Schopenhauer's estimate of, 106.
- Kant lies nearest to method of Berkeley, [81].
- “ use of term 'intelligible,' [90].
- “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Kantianism, in Berkeley, Prin. § 142, *n.*; in the sphere of ethics, [95].
- Knowledge, objects of human, defined, Pref. 155.
- Kroeger, translation of Fichte, ProL. X. 92, *n.*
- Krug, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 8.
- “ definition of Idealism, ProL. VII. § 7.
- “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Language, phenomena of universe as, ProL. XIV. § 5.
- “ difficulty of, Prin. § 144.
- “ its nature and abuse, In. § 6, 139.
- “ cause of error, 18-20.
- “ visible ideas are a, Prin. § 44.
- “ of Author of nature, 66.
- “ use of, 83.
- “ and numbers, study of, 122, [105].
- Laws of nature, Prin. § 30, 62, [45, 77].
- “ divine ideas and will coincident with, 57, *n.*
- Leibnitz on symbolical knowledge, In. § 19, *n.*
- “ on the idea, Prin. § 33, *n.*
- “ on continual creation, 46, *n.*
- “ Theodicée, [116].
- “ apperception, [117].
- Leibnitz, [81, 109].
- Leves's estimate of Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 13.
- Life and death, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. § 24.
- Locke and Berkeley, ProL. II. § 6.
- “ a friend of Molyneux, Pref. 152.
- “ essay introduced into Trinity College by Molyneux, 153.
- “ Berkeley a student of the essay, 153, In. § 6, *n.*
- “ combated by Berkeley, Pref. 154.
- “ quoted, 171, *n.*

- Locke on man's finite mind, In. § 2, *n.*  
 " principles of knowledge, 6, *n.*  
 " on abstraction, 11.  
 " on generalization, 11.  
 " on abstract ideas, 12, 13.  
 " on abuse of words, 23.  
 " ideas of sense and reflection, Prin. § 1, *n.*  
 " notion of material substance self-contradictory, 9, *n.*  
 " on matter, 10, *n.*, 73, *n.*  
 " on unity, 13, *n.*  
 " on methods for exciting ideas, 65, *n.*  
 " on existence of sensible things, 88, *n.*  
 " on being, 89, *n.*  
 " on motion, 114, *n.*  
 " quoted by Ueberweg, [2, 4, 7, 17, 25, 27, 53, 94].  
 " anticipations of 'Theory of Vision,' [55].  
 " definition of consciousness, [117].
- Locomotive experience in sense, Prin. § 11, *n.*
- Logic, In. § 6.
- Lossius, Idealism defined, ProL. VII. § 6.  
 " consciousness defined, [117].  
 " Realism defined, [117].
- Mackintosh, Sir James, estimate of Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 11.
- Maja, popular form of Hindoo Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 14, 15.
- Majer and Schopenhauer, ProL. XIII. 105.
- Malebranche and Berkeley, ProL. II. § 4.
- Malebranche, In. § 2, *n.*; Prin. § 70, *n.*  
 " influence of, on Berkeley, Pref. 153.  
 " causality of insensible things, Prin. § 53, *n.*  
 " on matter, 73, *n.*, 82, *n.*, 88, *n.*  
 " on motion, 112, *n.*  
 " seeing in God, 148, [71, 115].  
 " Norris a disciple of, App. B.
- Malebranche, occasionalism, [71].
- Man and the animals, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 109.
- Man, powers of, their feebleness, In. § 2.  
 " personal unity of, [119].
- Manicheism, Manichean heresy, Prin. § 154.
- Mankind, assent of, Prin. § 54, 55.
- Mansel approaches Berkeley, ProL. IV. § 8.
- Materia prima of Aristotle, Prin. § 11.  
 " " modern notion of matter resembles, 11.
- Material substance defined, Prin. § 17.  
 " motives for supposition of, 73.
- Material world, extension the characteristic of, Prin. § 11.
- Materialism, Idealism as opposed to, ProL. XIV. § 9.
- Materialists acknowledge that the senses do not prove the existence of matter, Prin. § 18.  
 " cannot tell how our ideas are produced, 19.  
 " invent matter to support accidents, 74.  
 " Berkeley's peculiar use of the word, [29, 31].
- Mathematics, application of Berkeley's principles to, Pref. 165.  
 " a province of speculative science, Prin. § 58, 118, 119, 123.  
 " discussed, 101.
- Mathematicians, Prin. § 132.
- Matter, what, Prin. § 9-76.  
 " Descartes' theory of, Pref. 154.  
 " a negative notion, 156.  
 " Locke on, Prin. § 10, *n.*  
 " substratum of external qualities, 16.  
 " infinite divisibility of, 47.  
 " unknown occasion, 67, 68, 70, [81].  
 " support of accidents, 72, 73, 74.  
 " unknown somewhat, 75, 80.  
 " Scriptures on existence of, 82.  
 " idea of, pernicious, 26, 96, 133.  
 " inert, 9.

- Matter, denied by Ueberweg, [18].  
 “ involves a contradiction, Prin. § 9.  
 “ denied by Ueberweg, [20].  
 “ and its qualities, Ueberweg on, [22].  
 “ relation of, to mind, ProL. XIV. § 3.  
 “ and mind, [119].  
 M’Cosh, Dr. Jas., against Berkeley, ProL. V. § 19.  
 “ estimate of Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 14.  
 Mellin, graduated list of Kant’s terms, [8].  
 “ definition of consciousness, [117].  
 Messerschmidt, body and soul, [119].  
 Metaphysics, nature of, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 110.  
 “ abstract ideas, objects of, In. § 6.  
 “ true position, [118].  
 Mill, J. S., defends ‘Berkeley’s Theory of Vision,’ ProL. IV. § 10.  
 “ permanent possibilities of sensation, Prin. § 3, *n.*  
 “ on power in ideas, 25, *n.*  
 “ eliminates all power from material world, 32, *n.*  
 “ on touch, 44, *n.*  
 Mind, the acting perceiving spirit, Prin. § 2.  
 “ sensible qualities must be in the, 10.  
 “ acts and powers, not to be pre-scinded, 143, [113].  
 “ its omnipresence, 148.  
 “ and matter, [118].  
 Mind, Prin. § 2.  
 Minimum, sensible, Prin. § 132.  
 Miracles, relation to Berkeley’s principles, Prin. § 84, 63, [79, 88, 89].  
 Mitchell, James (deaf and blind), case of, App. C.  
 Molyneux, William, made Locke’s Essay known in Trinity College, Pref. 152.  
 Monism, systems of, ProL. XIV. § 8.  
 Morell, on Locke’s definition of consciousness, [117].  
 Moses’ rod, Prin. § 84.  
 Motion of the earth, Prin. § 58, 186, [73].  
 Motion, absolute and relative, Prin. § 110 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, [102, 103].  
 Music, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 116.  
 Names, like letters in algebra, In. § 19.  
 Natura naturans, is God, Prin. § 46, *n.*  
 Natural effects, uniformity in producing, Prin. § 62.  
 Natural philosophy, purified by the Principles, Pref. 165.  
 “ “ discussed, Prin. § 101.  
 Nature, laws of, Prin. § 30–32.  
 “ laws of, coincident with divine ideas and will, 57, *n.*  
 “ sense symbolism of, 60, *n.*  
 “ methods of, styled language of its Author, 33, 64, 66, 106, *n.*, 107.  
 “ volume of, how to read, 109, [100].  
 “ what, 150.  
 Necessary connection between ideas, no, Prin. § 31.  
 Newton, Sir Isaac, on motion, Prin. § 114.  
 “ treatise on mechanics, 110, [101].  
 “ on infinites, 130.  
 “ and Leibnitz, the calculus, [109].  
 Nichol, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 10.  
 Nirvana and Sansara, ProL. XIII. 117.  
 Noblest spirits, many, nurtured by Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 13.  
 Nominal essence, the real essence of things, Prin. § 101, *n.*  
 Nominalism, Pref. 119.  
 Nominalist, Berkeley not a, App. 416, *n.*  
 Nominals, App. A.  
 Norris, John, of Bemerton, a Malebranchian, Pref. 153.  
 “ on material world, Prin. § 82, *n.*  
 “ a neighbor of Collier, App. B.  
 Nothing, Prin. § 80.  
 Notion (begriff) and idea (idee), Prin. § 27, [42].  
 Notions of relations, Pref. 154.

- Notions, particular or universal, In. § 15, *n.*  
 “ how represented in the phantasy, 18, *n.*  
 “ how applied to the object-world of the senses, Prin. § 5, *n.*  
 “ visibly inactive, 25.
- Number, a primary quality, Prin. § 9.  
 “ a creature of the mind, 12.  
 “ abstract ideas of, object of arithmetic, 119.
- Nunneley, on case of born blind, App. C.
- Object, external, Prin. § 14.  
 “ outward, a contradiction, 15, *n.*  
 “ signification of, 5, *n.*
- Objections to Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, Pref. 157, 162; Prin. § 34-84.  
 “ ninth of these, [72].
- Objects of knowledge, defined, Prin. § 1.  
 “ perceived by sense, defined, 91.  
 “ ideas as objects of knowledge, Ueberweg on, [8].  
 “ of conscious experience, what, Pref. 157.  
 “ in themselves, a contradiction, Prin. § 24; denied by Ueberweg, [38].
- Occasion, Prin. § 68, 69, 70, 74, [82, 85].
- Occasional causes, theory of, Prin. § 53, 68, *n.*
- Occasionalists, [71].
- Omnipresence of mind, Prin. § 148.
- One, the, and all, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. § 23.
- Optimism, Prin. § 153, [116].  
 “ Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. § 23.  
 “ Leibnitz, and Voltaire's *Candide*, Prol. XIII. 119.
- Origin of Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, Prin. § 43.
- Oswald, James, against Berkeley, Prol. V. § 9.
- Outness, Prin. § 43.
- Pain in the world, Prin. § 153.
- Pantheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. § 23.
- Parr, on mode or attribute, Prin. § 49, *n.*
- Passiveness implied in an idea, Prin. § 25.
- Pembroke, Earl of, dedication to, Pref. 169.
- Perceivable, Prin. § 8.
- Perceivable, Ueberweg on the term, [16].
- Perception of God, Prin. § 147, 148, *n.*  
 “ images of, [54].
- Perceptions, inefficacious, Prin. § 64.  
 “ defined, [117].
- Personality of man, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. § 2.
- Pessimism, Schopenhauer's, Prol. XIII. § 23.
- Phantasy, notion how represented in, In. § 18, *n.*
- Phenomena, sensible things, ideas of sense, Pref. 154.  
 “ objects of human knowledge, Prin. § 1, *n.*  
 “ numerically different in each mind, 147, *n.*  
 “ explained without matter, 50.  
 “ denied by Ueberweg, [70].
- Philosophical spirit, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. § 12.
- Philosophical Transactions, Cheselden's and other cases, App. C.
- Philosophy defined, In. § 1.
- Physical causation, contrasted with efficient or spiritual, Prin. § 65, *n.*
- Physics and metaphysics, [118].
- Pierer (Univ. Lex.), Idealism defined, Prol. VII. § 10.  
 “ Realism defined, [117].
- Platner, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 4.  
 “ estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 8.  
 “ definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. § 3.
- Plato and Schelling, Prol. XI. § 97.  
 “ idea, [1].
- Plotinus and Schelling, Prol. XI. § 97.

- Polytheism, Schopenhauer on, *Prolog.* XIII. § 116.
- Porter, definition of consciousness, [117].
- Positivism, spiritual, Berkeleyanism a sort of, *Prin.* § 102, *n.*
- Potential existence, what Berkeley meant by, *Prin.* § 45, *n.*
- Potentially, sensible things exist, *Prin.* § 45, *n.*
- Power, voluntary activity, *Prof.* 153.  
 “ impossible in world of ideas, *Prin.* § 25, *n.*
- Practical, arithmetic should be, *Prin.* § 119, [104].
- Prediction, scientific, *Prin.* § 59.
- Presentative and representative experience, *Prof.* 159.
- Primary qualities, ideas of, *Prin.* § 9.  
 “ “ their absoluteness, 12, *n.*
- Primary and secondary qualities, distinction between, *Prin.* § 9.
- Primary and secondary qualities, Ueberweg on, [17].
- Princeton, Berkeleyanism at, *Prolog.* IV. § 4.
- Princeton Club, *Prolog.* XVI. § 6.
- Principles of Human Knowledge, present edition, objects and uses of, *Prolog.* XVI.  
 “ Berkeley’s, best book for commencing reading, *Prolog.* XVI. § 3.  
 “ a classic in philosophy and literature, *Prolog.* XVI. § 4.  
 “ arranged as an introduction, *Prolog.* XVI. § 5.  
 “ criticisms of, *Prof.* 151.  
 “ editions of, *Prof.* 151.  
 “ analysis of, *Prof.* 155.  
 “ consequences of, *Prof.* 157.  
 “ objections to the, *Prof.* 157, 162; *Prin.* § 85-156.  
 “ universals combated in, *Prof.* 154.  
 “ against sceptics, *Prof.* 171.  
 “ original introduction to, *App.* A.
- Principles of human knowledge investigated, *In.* § 4.
- Production of ideas, *Prin.* § 19.
- Prolegomena to Principles, 1-148.
- Proof, Berkeley’s, of his doctrine, *Prin.* § 4, *n.*
- Providence, immediate works of, little souls burlesque, *Prin.* § 154, [116].
- Psychical and physical, [119].
- Psychology, its weakness, [118].
- Qualities, do not exist apart, *In.* § 7.  
 “ coexistent, idea of, 8.  
 “ primary and secondary, *Prin.* § 9.  
 “ primary, can exist only in the mind, 73, [84].
- Quiddity, abstract idea of, *Prin.* § 81.
- Real and substantial in nature, what, *Prin.* § 34, 36.
- Real, sense-ideas are, *Prin.* § 90.
- Realism defined, [117].
- Realism and Idealism contrasted, *Prolog.* XIV. § 10.  
 “ Berkeley’s, *Prof.* 155, *n.*  
 “ or dualism, intelligible, *Prin.* § 39, *n.*  
 “ foundation of, 92.
- Reality in ideas, *Prin.* § 36.  
 “ meaning of, 89.  
 “ of things, 91.  
 “ not denied, 36, [49].
- Reason gives us knowledge of external things, *Prin.* § 18.
- Reasoning and thinking, distinction between, *In.* § 12, *n.*
- Reflection, Locke’s ideas of sense and, *Prin.* § 1, *n.*
- Regis, definition of consciousness, [117].
- Reid, summary of Berkeley, *Prolog.* III. § 2.  
 “ first accepts, then rejects, his views, *Prolog.* V. § 4.  
 “ estimate of Berkeley, *Prolog.* VI. § 9.  
 “ on representative perception, *Prin.* § 86, *n.*  
 “ on plurality of Egos, 145.

- Reid, on definition of consciousness, [117].
- Reinhold, K. L., argument against Idealism, ProL. X. 87.
- Relativity of motion, &c., Prin. § 113.
- Religion, Hegel on, ProL. XII. 104.
- Representative idea in perception, Prin. § 86, *n.*
- Representative and presentative experience, Pref. 159.
- Rest, a primary quality, Prin. § 9.
- Ritter, estimate of Berkeley, ProL. VI. § 15.
- Rothenflue, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 9.
- “ of Hume, ProL. VIII.
- “ of Kant, ProL. IX.
- “ of Fichte, ProL. X.
- “ of Schelling, ProL. XI.
- “ of Jacobi, ProL. XI.
- “ of Hegel, ProL. XII.
- Sätze, propositions, Prin. § 129.
- Sansara and Nirvana, ProL. XIII. 117.
- Scepticism, refuted by Berkeley's Principles, Pref. 165.
- “ its causes, In. § 1.
- “ its root, Prin. § 86.
- Sceptics, Principles useful to, Pref. 171.
- Schelling, system of, ProL. XI.
- “ relation to Hegel, ProL. XII. 102.
- Schiller, on the laws of nature, Prin. § 32, *n.*
- Schlegel, Frederick, Idealism, definition, ProL. VII. § 4.
- Schmid, Heinrich Th., on the strength and weakness of Idealism, ProL. XIV. § 17.
- Scholten, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 14.
- “ Fichte's system, ProL. X. 89, 92.
- “ on Schelling, ProL. XI. 93.
- Schoolmen, their doctrine of abstraction, In. § 17.
- “ argue for a continued creation, Prin. § 46.
- Schopenhauer, definition of Idealism, ProL. VII. § 14.
- Schopenhauer, Idealism of, ProL. XIII.
- “ estimates of, by Herbart and Zeller, ProL. XIII. § 25.
- Schwegler, summary of Berkeley, ProL. III. § 12.
- Scotch school, runs into Idealism, [118].
- Scotus Erigena, pantheist, [117].
- Scripture, on existence of matter, Prin. § 82.
- Secondary qualities, their occasion, Prin. § 9.
- Sensation, signification of, Prin. § 5, *n.*
- Sensations, cannot exist but in a percipient mind, Prin. § 3.
- “ visibly inactive, 25.
- “ uniformity of, 72.
- “ in the mind are perfectly known, 87.
- Sense, and reflection, Locke's ideas of, Prin. § 1, *n.*
- “ ideas of, exist without the mind, Sir William Hamilton, 8, *n.*
- “ locomotive experience in, 11, *n.*
- “ and imagination confused, 23, *n.*
- “ ideas of, 29, [43].
- “ supposed want of a, 77, [87].
- Sense, common, Beattie's definition, ProL. V. § 8.
- Sense-ideas, how distinguished from imagination, Prin. § 28-30.
- Sense-objects, archetypes of real things, Prin. § 41, *n.*
- Sense-symbolism of nature, Prin. § 60, *n.*
- Senses are to be believed, Prin. § 40, *n.* [52]; distrusted by philosophers, 88.
- “ do not prove matter, 18; Ueberweg on, [28].
- Senses, the, Schopenhauer on, ProL. XIII. 115.
- Sensible, minimum, Prin. § 132.
- Sensible objects, have no abstract existence, Prin. § 4.
- “ “ Ueberweg on, [10].
- Sensible qualities, are the secondary, Prin. § 9.
- “ “ must be in the mind, 10, *n.*

- Sensible system, divine ideas ultimate archetype of, Prin. § 72, *n.*
- Sensible and perceivable, the terms, Ueberweg on, [16].
- Sensible things, exist potentially, Prin. § 45.
- “ “ existence of, 88.
- Shaftesbury, Alciphron, Prol. I. § 7.
- Sight, ideas of, distinct from those of touch, Prin. § 44.
- “ gives the idea of light and colour, 1.
- Sign, a word a sign of general ideas, In. § 11.
- “ relation of with thing signified, Prin. § 65, [80].
- Signs, regarded by arithmetic, not things, Prin. § 22.
- Simon, Collyns T., a Berkeleyan, Prol. IV. § 7.
- “ suggested rendering of ‘idea,’ [1].
- Sinneswahrnehmung, ‘sensation,’ Prin. § 137, 146.
- Siris, Prol. I. § 10.
- “ its relation to the Principles, Prin. § 67, *n.*
- Solidity, a primary quality, Prin. § 9.
- “ figure, &c., have no activity, 61, [76].
- Somewhat, matter as, Prin. § 75, [86].
- Soul, its natural immortality, Prin. § 141.
- “ and body do not act apart, [119].
- “ and body distinct, yet in unity, [119].
- Sounds, secondary qualities, Prin. § 10.
- Space, absolute, Prin. § 112, *n.*
- Spinoza and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 5.
- “ and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97.
- “ Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. § 21, 22.
- “ on substance, Prin. § 135, *n.*; idea, [1].
- Spirit, defined, Pref. 160; Prin. § 27, [40], 89, 138.
- “ is the only substance, 7; Ueberweg on, [14, 40].
- “ alone can act, 57.
- “ the only efficient cause, 102.
- “ no idea of, 135.
- Spirit and body, [118].
- Spirits and ideas, or phenomena, every thing known, Prin. § 86.
- “ heterogeneous, 89.
- “ other, how known by us, 145, [114].
- Spiritual causation, contrasted with physical, Prin. § 65, *n.*
- Spiritual positivism, Berkeleyism a sort of, Prin. § 102, *n.*
- Stars fixed, not attracted, Prin. § 106; denied by Ueberweg, [98].
- Stewart, Dugald, on abstraction, In. § 19, *n.*
- “ “ on Baxter, Prol. V. § 3.
- “ “ on Diderot, 7.
- “ “ on Berkeley, 10.
- “ “ on Malebranche, Norris, and Reid, 10.
- “ “ estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 10.
- “ “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Stirling and Berkeley, Prol. IV. § 11.
- “ estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 17
- Strauss and Hegel, Prol. XII. 104.
- Subject, Prin. § 27, [41], 49, [67].
- “ or substance, 49.
- “ Aristotelian distinctions, [69].
- Substance, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. § 6.
- “ meaning of, Pref. 153, 156, 159; Prin. § 37.
- “ no idea of, [50], 14, *n.*
- “ unity of, held by Berkeley, 7, *n.*
- “ is spirit, soul, 135.
- “ no unthinking, 139.
- “ connected by Berkeley with cause, 26, *n.*
- “ cause of ideas must be a, 27.
- “ in vulgar sense, 37.
- “ as a support of qualities, 91.
- “ cannot be an idea, [92], 135.
- “ and accidents, 17; Ueberweg on, [27].
- “ extended moveable, an idea, 22; denied by Ueberweg, [35].




- Substantial and real in nature, Prin. § 34.  
 Substratum, no unthinking, Prin. § 7.  
   " matter is a, 16.  
   " of qualities, 77.  
 Succession of ideas, Prin. § 26, 59, 98.  
 Suggestion of experience, Prin. § 145.  
 Swift, estimate of Berkeley, ProI. I. § 3;  
   VI. § 1.  
 Symbolical knowledge, Leibnitz on, In.  
   § 19, *n.*  
 Symbolism, sense-, of nature, Prin. § 60, *n.*  
 Symbolism of nature, universal, Prin. §  
   65, *n.*
- Tar-water, ProI. I. § 10.  
 Tastes, secondary qualities, Prin. § 100.  
 Tennemann, summary of Berkeley, ProI.  
   III. § 6.  
   " objections to Berkeley, ProI.  
     V. § 12.  
   " definition of Idealism, ProI.  
     VII. § 8.
- Theism, Schopenhauer on, ProI. XIII. 116.  
 Thing, meaning of, Pref. 155, *n.*, Prin. §  
   89, *n.*  
   " in contradistinction to idea, 38,  
     [51].  
   " real, 33, 172.  
   " not regarded by arithmetic, but  
     sign, 122, 219.
- Things, reality and existence of, not de-  
 nied, Prin. § 36, [49].  
 Thinking and reasoning, distinction be-  
 tween, In. § 12, *n.*
- Thought, universe as a thing of, ProI.  
   XIV. § 4.  
   " divine, absolute truth, Prin. §  
     76, *n.*
- Tiedemann, estimate of Berkeley, ProI.  
   VI. § 7.
- Time, finite, apprehension of changes of  
   our ideas, Pref. 153.  
   " idea of, Prin. § 98, [94].
- Touch and sight, heterogeneous, Prin. §  
   44.  
   " the ideas acquired by, I.
- Transcendental, Prin. § 118.  
 Tuke, literature on mind and body, [119].
- Ueberweg, edition of Principles, ProI. I.  
   § 15.  
   " Preface, 15.  
   " summary of Berkeley, ProI.  
     III. § 15.  
   " correspondence with Simon,  
     ProI. IV. § 9.  
   " estimate of Berkeley, ProI. VI.  
     § 16.  
   " Annotations on the Principles,  
     ProI. XV. § 4; XVI.; 329.  
   " Logic, ProI. XV. § 4.
- Understanding implies spirit, Prin. § 27.  
 Uniformity, in production of natural ef-  
   fects, Prin. § 62.  
   " of sensations, 72.
- Unity, love of, Idealism appeals to, ProI.  
   XIV. § 8.  
   " an abstract idea, 13.  
   " arbitrary, 12.  
   " denied by Ueberweg, [24].  
   " Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg,  
     [25].  
   " in abstract denied, 120.  
   " of substance held by Berkeley, 7,  
     *n.*
- Universal assent of mankind, an argu-  
 ment for matter, Prin. § 54.
- Universal or particular notions, In. § 15,  
   *n.*
- Universality, in what it consists, In. § 16,  
   147.
- Universals combated in the Principles,  
   Pref. 154.
- Vanini and Spinoza, ProI. XIII. 118.
- Virtue, strongest incentive of, Prin. § 155.
- Visible ideas, are a language, Prin. § 44.
- Vision, origin of Essay towards a New  
   Theory of, Prin. § 43, [55].  
   " essay on, referred to, 116.
- Vogel, summary of Berkeley, ProI. III. §  
   16.
- Voltaire, opposed to Berkeley, ProI. V. §  
   6.
- Voraussetzung, principle, Prin. § 129.
- Vorstellung, Schopenhauer, ProI. XIII.  
   106, 107.

- Vorstellung, notion, Prin. § 130, 141, 142.  
 “ idea, [43].
- Warburton, on Baxter, Prol. V. § 3.  
 “ on Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 1.
- Watch, illustration from, Prin. § 62, [78].
- Will, the world is, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 111, 112.  
 “ defined, 113.  
 “ world as, universal recognition of, 113.  
 “ is active spirit, Prin. § 27.  
 “ or spirit, some other produces our ideas, Prin. § 29.  
 “ Ueberweg on, [44].
- Willich, Idealism, definition of, Prol. VII. § 5.
- Wolff, definition of Idealism, Prol. § 2.  
 “ definition of consciousness, [117].
- Words, deception of, In. § 23.  
 “ Locke on abuse of, 23.  
 “ embarrass and delude, 24.  
 “ men amuse themselves with, [111]. § 24.  
 “ Ueberweg on, [6].  
 “ Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg, [7].
- World not a dream, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 111.  
 “ is will, 111.  
 “ a makranthropos, 117.
- Zeller on Beck, Prol. X. 87.  
 “ on Hegel, Prol. XII. 105.  
 “ on Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. § 25.

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