


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THE TRUE AND THE FALSE PACIFISM

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BY

COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA


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
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DEDICATED
TO
THE PACIFISTS OF THE OLD WORLD
AND OF THE NEW

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PREFACE

TOWARDS the end of the Second Empire, in Western Europe and particularly in France, a flood of generous ideas was surging through the hearts of men. Everywhere the new generation was captured by the wish not only to introduce into national institutions "the necessary liberties" (as they were called) which the Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen had sanctified, but also to realise, in international affairs, the dreams of universal brotherhood and disarmament. In 1869 the *Ligue internationale de la Paix*, founded in Paris two years earlier, had resolved to award a prize of some value for the best essay on—or, rather, against—the crime of war, and, after having settled the terms of this competition, had nominated a jury of three men for whom all pacifists entertained the highest esteem. These men were Frédéric Passy, Edouard Laboulaye, and Augustin Renouard.

A young man, a student of law at the University of Brussels, at once, with the audacity of his age, became a competitor. The jury, having received some sixty essays—many of them rather considerable affairs—was still far from the end of its labours, when from a clear sky there fell the thunderbolt of the war of 1870, followed by the insurrection of the Commune. The student of Brussels had almost dismissed the thought of his manuscript from his mind, when, in the spring of 1872, he learnt that the jury, having faithfully resumed its work, had awarded the prize between three competitors, and that he was one of those successful persons. The members of the jury invited him, moreover, to publish his work, the tone of which its title, "Disarm or Perish," sufficiently suggests. In it the author unreservedly recommended disarmament, not necessarily by the nations acting together and in agreement, but through the birth of a spontaneous, instant, and unrecompensed movement among all those peoples longing to rid themselves of that rivalry in military preparedness which—already at that time—appeared to be urging Europe,

without hope of escape, towards a speedy economic and moral bankruptcy.

A very natural scruple made him hesitate to agree to this publication. By the events of the two preceding years he had been led to think very differently about the expediency and even the feasibility of the solution which he had recommended in his essay. He found himself faced by the dilemma, either, by altering his original text, to act improperly towards the jury or to be untrue to himself in publishing a work to the conclusions of which he could no longer subscribe. He caused it therefore to be printed as it stood and under its original title; but added, with the permission of the jury, an appendix in which he frankly acknowledged the change which the teaching of events had wrought in his opinions. He admitted that he had reckoned too confidently upon the immediate appearance of a general movement in favour of universal disarmament. But considering that there was no reason to despair of the future, he added that "the sole result of this disillusionment should be to clothe henceforward with a greater

importance the study of practical methods and even the search for remedies admittedly incomplete, which may serve at least to import into our international relationships reforms which are necessary, if our modern civilisation is to be saved from a long period of decay and European society from the ruin which directly threatens it."

Admitting, then, the impossibility of bringing this to pass solely through the advance of public opinion, he demanded, as the one and final remedy, the introduction into international relationships of those institutions upon which the harmony of every society that is organised upon a basis of law depends. "How to put an end to war," he wrote, "is only the negative side of the problem. To make the intercourse of nations subject to the rule of law, this is the essential object that we must set before ourselves." "To-day the writer has grown white in the service of this cause ; but he holds to this conclusion more strongly than ever ; and it is this that has given him courage to discuss the question here, after forty-five years, in the

light of the tragic occurrences which the present hours is witnessing.

The moment may seem ill-chosen for speaking of Pacifism. But it is necessary to distinguish between those dreams or projects which shelter themselves behind this new word and those hopes which must end by triumphing, if the progress of human society is not a delusion. Meanwhile, I will try to show that the place of the true pacifist is among those who are resolved to continue the war up to the decisive victory of the allied nations, in order to maintain against the assaults of Pan-Germanism the cause of the right and of European liberty.

Every war has for its object not war in itself—not even victory—but peace.

From the very beginning of hostilities it has been clear that the drama in which the destinies of Europe are to-day at stake is susceptible alone of one of three solutions—a German peace, an indecisive peace, a lasting peace.

The first of these does not merit the

trouble of examination. The Germans themselves have, as a matter of fact, ceased to believe in it, as is shown by the proposals of the Kaiser. If we are still forced to think about it, it is that we may not lose sight of the dangers with which such a peace must have threatened the world or of the guarantees which we must secure, if our future is to be free from these dangers.

The second still menaces our immediate future, in spite of the failure of those overtures to which I have referred. It would be simply to restore the *status quo ante bellum*, and to annul the contest without annexation or indemnity for either side, according to the cherished formula of certain people whose foresight is superficial or whose sympathies are secretly pro-German. With all my force I entreat the real pacifists, of every land and of every school, resolutely to dismiss this idea from their minds, and definitely to exclude it from among the possibilities of our future.

The third, which shines before our eyes, at the end of the struggle, as the reward of

our persistence and the warrant for our sacrifices, is also the only peace which will enable us to heal our wounds, to ensure the triumph of right and perhaps to direct the nations towards a new and higher stage of development.

It is, of course, understood that the opinions which I publish here are entirely personal, and that for them the responsibility is wholly my own.

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THE TRUE AND THE FALSE PACIFISM

I.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT WAR AND WHAT IS AT STAKE ?

WHEN, about the end of the nineteenth century, one of the last kings of Dahomey died, the sacrifice of several thousand negroes, in order to provide him with an escort into the other world, evoked a cry of horror and indignation from the whole of civilised society. The murder of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and his wife has been made the pretext for bloody sacrifices of a very different kind. Millions of men have died—a holocaust to the demon of war—and we are far from beholding the end of this dismal slaughter. The victims who have fallen in battle, even if we add to their number that of the civilians who have been massacred or shot by the Germans, are no more than one part, immense though it be, of the losses which have been caused by the revolver shots of Serajevo. We must also reckon the destruction that the pillage and burning of towns has wrought, the devastation of whole countrysides, the torpedoing of ships, the closing of factories, the interruption of business, and the war expenses of every nature. At the present moment there are in Europe more than twenty million of men who, in order that they may kill one another, must be equipped, carried here and

there, and fed ; other millions of workers, more or less under military discipline, whose only task is to furnish the first with the means of mutual destruction, though formerly these workmen were producing things, useful to society, which were capable of continually accelerating humanity's welfare. Science, forgetting her true mission, has now no object but to multiply and perfect the agencies of massacre and destruction. The odious practices of general deportation and slavery have been restored to honour by one group of belligerents. What shall we say of all the mental sufferings, of the sorrow that the dispersal of families has occasioned, of the terror that never ends while those we love are in danger, of the emptiness that every irreparable loss must leave behind it ? Not even the neutral nations are secure from the effects of this upheaval, that is shaking the world, and we cannot, without alarm, ask ourselves what will remain for the victors, as well as for the vanquished, and even for some of the spectators of this tragedy, if it is only capable of being ended by the mutual exhaustion of combatants whom their madness shall have urged to the point of suicide.

Confronted by such an accumulation of disasters, for which not the blind forces of nature—vast epidemics or earthquakes—but the weaknesses and wickednesses of mankind are responsible, what may these do, who have not lost all feelings of humanity, but demand, cost what it may, the instant extinction of a conflagration which recalls the most horrifying visions of the

Apocalypse? Is not the time at hand for listening to those counsels which, whether they be disinterested or no, have implored the belligerents, in the name both of Christian brotherhood and a threatened civilisation, to lay down their arms and offer their hands to one another, even on a half-hearted compromise between the unjustifiable ambitions of the one party and the legitimate complaints of its adversaries?

In reply to these suggestions, which, skilfully exploited in certain quarters, might become the causes of an undesirable weakness, it is right to observe that there are wars which can be defended and sacrifices which may not be evaded; in other words, that there are times when the duty to take up arms may not rightfully be neglected. So long as men are not angels, and they are still a long way from that—though, whatever we may say, they are a little nearer to it than were their ancestors in the remote periods of antiquity—the employment of force will continue to be indispensable if the rule of law is to be guaranteed. This axiom is justified by civil society, where the police and even the Army will always be required if the Bonnots and Garniers are to be dealt with successfully; it is no less a foundation-stone of international society, which also has its anarchists and its braves. No doubt diplomatists and journalists understand the art of juggling with facts so well that it is not always easy to perceive where the true aggressor is to be found; and, again, how often it happens that the blame must be borne by more than one party! History alone,

judging from a distance, is able to distinguish the intention under the act, the aim under the excuse ; she cannot, moreover, but be impartial.

But in the present war no mistake is possible, since the aggressors have here revealed themselves with a frankness which can only be called cynicism, unless we regard it as the result of a positive moral infection.

Anyone must be convinced who will read, without prejudice, those collections of documents, with their variously coloured covers, in which the belligerents have made public their negotiations previous to the outbreak of war.*

Here it is made absolutely clear that the war was willed and predetermined by the Central Empires, and that in this drama Austria was simply an instrument of German policy ; while England, France, and Russia spared neither their advice, nor their proposals, nor their labour, in order to secure a peaceful solution for the Austro-Serbian quarrel. I will only remind my readers that Serbia, at the earnest request of the Powers of the Triple Entente, and to the general relief of Europe, had instantly accepted, as early as the

* Nearly all the colours of the rainbow have been called into service. There are the Blue Books of England and Serbia, the Yellow Book of France, the Grey Book of Belgium, the Orange Books of Russia and Holland, the Green Book of Italy, the White Book of Germany, the Red Book of Austria-Hungary. Several digests of these negotiations have been published, among which we can particularly recommend :—P. Saintyves, *Les responsabilités de l'Allemagne dans la guerre de 1914*. 1 vol. Paris : Nourry, 1915.—Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*. Paris : Payot, 1915.—E. Denis *La Guerre, Causes immédiates et lointaines*. Paris : Delagrave 1915.

25th of July, eight of the ten conditions of the Austrian ultimatum of the 23rd of July, 1914, reserving her consent to two only, as being more humiliating than her independence and dignity could tolerate; and even with regard to these she offered to submit herself to the arbitration and judgment of The Hague Tribunal. For sole response Austria severed diplomatic relations with her neighbour, and commenced hostilities against her. Russia, who could not look on unmoved at the destruction of a small Slav kingdom, asked only that Austria should suspend hostilities, and should recognise that her conflict with Serbia must threaten the peace of Europe.

The British Government, upon its side, between the 23rd of July and the 3rd of August gave instructions to its Ministers at Vienna, Berlin, Petrograd, Belgrade, Rome, Paris, to offer the following solutions of the difficulty:—(1) A conference of the four great Powers not directly concerned (that is to say, Germany, Italy, France, and England); (2) the mediation of England and Italy; (3) the opening of direct negotiations between Austria and Russia; lastly (4), even when the Austrian guns were already bombarding Belgrade, any plan which Germany might suggest for procuring a suspension of hostilities. These offers met with nothing but a refusal or silence from Austria, while from Germany only evasive replies were obtained.

But now, on the 29th of July (the very day when the bombardment of Belgrade was begun), the Vienna Cabinet, seized perhaps by hesitation

upon the edge of the abyss—unless this was yet another diplomatic comedy arranged with Berlin—announced that it was ready to accept what it had up till then rejected—namely, to enter into negotiations with Russia upon the subject of the Serbian question. It declared that its refusal was the result of a misunderstanding, and authorised its ambassador, Count Szapary, “to discuss what arrangements would be consistent with that dignity and that prestige which the two empires are equally bound to safeguard.” At the same time, it gave London to understand that its Government had no intention of attacking the sovereign rights of Serbia nor of seeking any extension of territory.

This was peace.

At once Germany, throwing aside the mask, and forcing the crisis, sent to Petrograd, on the evening of the 31st of July, an ultimatum which called upon the Russian Government to stop, within twenty-four hours, the partial mobilisation which it had begun in reply to the Austrian mobilisation.

And it was war.

Nor is it without importance to recall that, two days earlier, the Tsar had sent to William II a personal telegram in which, after having once more proposed that the quarrel between Austria and Serbia should be referred to The Hague Tribunal, he added: “I have confidence in your discretion and your friendship.” The reply was the ultimatum, followed by the declaration of war, which Germany made against Russia on the 1st of August.

At the same time, Germany called upon the French Government to declare what would be its attitude in case of a rupture between Russia and Germany. France having replied that she must be guided by her own interests, Germany, on the 3rd of August, sent her also a declaration of war.

On the other hand, the Cabinet at Berlin, reckoning on the unwillingness of England to take part in a continental war, had, on the 29th of July, caused the Chancellor to propose to Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador, that if Great Britain would agree to remain neutral, Germany would promise to attempt no territorial extension in Europe to the detriment of France and would respect, on her part, the neutrality of Holland. Asked if these promises applied to the French colonies, the Chancellor replied that he was "unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect; it depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium"; adding that "*after the war* the integrity of Belgium would be re-established if she had not sided against Germany." This was nothing less than to proclaim the intention of laying hands upon the French colonies and of eventually violating the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey replied that to accept that bargain would be a disgrace "from which the good name of his country would never recover." He added, nevertheless, these words, which, since they clearly indicate what was in his mind, deserve to be remembered: "If the peace of Europe can be

preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies either by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately."

As has been said by the German author of *J'Accuse*—written at the beginning of the war, and one of the most tremendous indictments issued against the policy of Germany—if the Germans had consented to enter upon this path, or even to negotiate upon this basis, a treaty might have resulted which would have "assured a condition of peace in Europe, would have brought about an understanding between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and, in place of the system of this balance of power, would have established a general league of peace. In one word, the prospect would have been opened of a new and better Europe, had Germany but accepted the hand which England stretched out to her."*

But for this it was necessary that Germany should not have been Germany. Herr Bethmann-Hollweg abstained even from replying.

England, however, desiring at least to keep the scope of the war within bounds, renewed the attempt which she had successfully made in 1870, when at the same time she requested both the belligerents to undertake to respect the neutrality of Belgium. This time France again, on the

* *J'Accuse*, by a German, 1915, p. 124.

31st of July, answered affirmatively without any equivocation or reservation. As for Germany, who, in spite of her promises, was at this very moment preparing to invade the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, she announced, on the 1st of August, that she could not give any reply, since this would be to expose her plan of campaign to the French Government; and on the following day she sent her shameful demand to Brussels. It is useless to recall how the King and the Government of Belgium, supported by the unanimous opinion of both Parliament and public, gave to this violation of a solemn undertaking the reception which it deserved, fully aware though they were of the danger that lies in resistance to superior force. Their reply, prepared during the night of the 2nd of August, was sent to Berlin on the 3rd. In it they pointed out that the treaty of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, ensured the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantees of the Great Powers, and particularly of the Prussian Government. They declared that Belgium had always been faithful to her international obligations, and that she had spared no pains to preserve her neutrality. "The attack upon her independence, with which the German Government threatens her," it was added, "would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation. The Belgian Government, should it accept the proposals which have been made to it, would sacrifice the honour of its country and

would, at the same time, betray the trust which is reposed in it by Europe."

However, as early as the 3rd of August, France had offered the support of her forces to Belgium. But they had just learned at Brussels that England had attempted to open a last negotiation with Germany, to prevent her from acting upon her ultimatum. It was only when, on the 4th of August, the Belgian Government received the news of the entry of the German troops into Belgian territory that it issued an appeal to the Powers who had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, with the object of obtaining military assistance from them. Germany had replied to the English Cabinet that it was too late, and that the German forces had already entered Belgium. And von Jagow, in one of his last conversations with Sir E. Goschen, did not hesitate to declare that this violation of Belgian neutrality had been forced upon the Germans by the necessity of taking the more direct and convenient road to France, in order to hasten the operations and to strike a decisive blow before Russia should be able to put her troops into the field. It was during a conversation with the Chancellor, later in the same day, that the cynical words were spoken: "What! You are going to fight for a scrap of paper!" And the same day, also, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the well-known speech to the Reichstag, in which he admitted that the invasion of Belgium was a violation of the principles of international law, declared, with a frankness which he has since

regretted: "France was able to wait. We were not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have proved fatal. It is for this reason that we have been forced to ignore the just protestations of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium." No one, then, has been astonished that, in these circumstances, the Powers of the Entente have on many occasions declared that they will never conclude the war until they shall first have ensured the restoration and indemnification of Belgium.*

Is it necessary to add that the facts of the case provide a wholly sufficient reply to all the quibbles of Germany? She had long been ready; not one of her adversaries was so; they were conscious of it, and it is not thus that one embarks upon an aggression. France, whom, for lack of better excuse, Germany has accused of having taken the first step, was so anxious to avoid the conflict that, even after the declaration of war, she withheld her troops at a distance of ten kilometres from German territory, in order that thus she might prevent the occurrence of these frontier incidents by which the interests of Germany alone could be served. Moreover, the French mobilisation was only wholly completed at the end of August, and that of Russia at the end of September. As for England, her first contingents only landed on the Continent when the German

* See particularly the text of the declaration made collectively to the Belgian Government at Sainte-Adresse, on the 14th of February, 1916, by the Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia.

invasion had already reached the heart of Belgium; at the opening of hostilities she had no more forces to put in the field than the contingent which Germany scornfully described as "the contemptible little Army of General French." The German Government has formally admitted this, when it declared so frankly, as I have recalled above, its plan to crush France, surprised by the rapidity of the invasion, in order thereafter to swing round eastwards and invade Russia, in her turn, before she should find time to collect her strength.

It is to break down an open door to insist further upon this question of responsibility, and, in face of her repeated declarations that force is above right and that necessity justifies all crimes, it would be futile to argue any longer upon this subject with the apologists of Germany. If she persists in her attempts to throw upon her adversaries the blame for having let loose the dogs of war—as only lately she tried to do in her Note of the 12th of December, 1916—this is simply the result of one of these forms of hypocrisy which, according to Vauvenargues, are a compliment paid to virtue by vice, but which can have any effect only, at the outside, upon certain neutral countries who wish to remain deaf and blind. The cause is heard, and the judgment pronounced by the opinion of the world.

Perhaps, however, it is not enough thus to fix the responsibility for the war if we are to overcome everywhere the faint-heartedness of those who, from lassitude, impatience, pity, or even

selfishness, may be prepared to forget what has happened and to content themselves with a draw. It must never be forgotten how vitally the general interest of civilisation demands that this hideous drama of massacre and ruin, if we mean that it shall never recommence, should be ended radically, rationally, and equitably. To this end it is impossible too strongly to insist upon the character and scope of that which is at stake.

To-day it is not, as in most of the wars of the past, a simple question of seizing or holding territory, of obtaining outlets for commerce or thrusting competitors aside, of satisfying a stifling national aspiration ; but rather of deciding if one Power shall be able to realise, for its own advantage, the dream of universal dominion, which has so often been cherished, so often disappointed. One may even say more : that what we have here to do with is a new ideal of life and humanity which Germany presumes to impose upon the world by force. The struggle is between civilisation and culture, to give to the latter word the sense with which the Germans have endowed it. Civilisation is a synthesis of ideas, institutions, and arts which unite to secure to the individual the greatest possible measure of liberty, enlightenment, happiness, and morality. *Kultur* may be defined as the scientific organisation of all the national resources for the purpose of assuring the greatness of the State. Civilisation is cosmopolitan and peaceful, though it is not inconsistent with the employment of force where justice demands it. *Kultur* is national and narrow ; it

rests upon force and imposes itself by war. The first is the common heritage of mankind, and all men, in so far as they are able, may freely enjoy it. The second varies with each race and each country, and its most powerful exponents claim the right to absorb the others, in obedience to the example which Nature offers us in the struggle for life.

This contrast has been perceived by the Germans themselves. "Civilisation," writes Professor Lasson, in a pamphlet entitled *Das Kultur Ideal und der Krieg*, "makes for harmony. But civilisation is not *Kultur*. Among different kinds of *Kultur* there can only be conflict and hate. . . . To ask of them a peaceful development is to ask the impossible, to reverse the order of Nature, to set up a false idol in the place of true morality." Another writer of the same school, Thomas Mann, who defines *Kultur* as "a spiritual organisation of the world," after asserting that it outstrips morality, reason, and science, adds that "it will destroy civilisation." This is not simply a question of words. Those who defend civilisation fight for law, which they proclaim the superior of force. The avowed partisans of *Kultur* fight for *their* law, which they base upon *their* force. The Allies have gone to war for the freedom of Europe, for the rights of nations, great and small alike, to work out their own destinies and to sun themselves in the rays of their common civilisation. Germany fights for the enslavement or the annihilation of all who place themselves in the path of her *Kultur*. The Allies are doing battle for

peace—a lasting peace—founded upon respect for treaties and the full development of international law. Germany is at war for war, which she would make the law of humanity and the mainspring of progress. “You must love peace as the means of war, and the short peace better than the long.” So speaks Zarathustra—or, rather, Nietzsche.

We see, then, that we have here two schools of thought which are absolutely contradictory. It is this struggle of two ideals which, far more than the number of the combatants or the appearance of new methods of warfare, gives to the present war upon either side a special significance, an exceptional character, a kind of epic splendour, and even a quality of mysticism such as Europe has not witnessed since the time of the Crusades or perhaps the revolutionary wars of France, when each combatant understood that he risked his life for an object that was above individual interests and even immediate national considerations.

It is thus that we may explain the instant disappearance, in each belligerent country, of every sort of political, religious, and social dissension, as well as the stoical courage with which, everywhere, the heaviest sacrifices and the most grievous losses have been met. But at the same time we thus perceive why any premature peace is impossible, and why even a suggestion of immediate peace sounds, if it comes from outside, like an insult, and if from within, like a treachery.

II.

THE BIRTH OF PAN-GERMANISM

WITH the clearer understanding which is ours to-day of the tendencies of modern Germany and of the methods which her diplomacy pursued during the years precedent to the war, we are forced to conclude not only that the war was premeditated, but also that it was inevitable. The international policy of the German Empire could have no other result ; the Serajevo murders were no more than a pretext, the excuse more and more impatiently awaited. Whatever may have been said about it, and in spite of the disastrous recurrence of primitive tendencies, the German race, taken as a whole, was not a century ago what it is to-day.' What has been able to transform a people who were honest, peaceable, even dreamy, into a nation of prey, the perfect type of a military society ? We have looked for the secret of this evolution in the influence of that Prussian militarism, which has become the means and the symbol of national unity ; in the outgrowth of the idea of the State ; in the habit of passive discipline ; in material greed, excited by the outburst of prosperity, both industrial and commercial, which followed upon the victory of 1870. Each of these factors has had its share in the result. But the primary cause is intellectual and moral. Writers of the first ability, and of differing schools of opinion—Messieurs Bergson, Boutroux,

de Wulf, Lasserre, to mention no more—have shown, in many carefully considered essays, how the conception which Germany has formed of her necessary rôle in the world, as well as the choice of the means which she has put into operation in order to realise it, are both bound up with the development of her philosophy from Fichte to Nietzsche by way of Hegel.

Through having identified the absolute with the ego, the false disciples of Kant ended by absorbing the ego in the absolute and, by logical sequence, the individual in the State, considered as the chief manifestation in this world of divinity. The State has therefore all rights but no duties, except to itself. It is required to advance within itself the natural culture and to spread it abroad indefinitely, by peaceful methods if possible, by force if necessary; everything in the life of its citizens must be subordinated to this object. Now, the German *Kultur* is superior to all other forms; it is the culture *par excellence*; hence its indisputable title to the conquest of the earth.

No doubt the school of German metaphysics lost a great deal of ground, during the last century, before the advance of experimental science. But the genius of Germany has once again shown with what cleverness it can assimilate everything, in the various developments of philosophy and of exact science, that is capable of strengthening its pretensions to the hegemony of the world.

From Darwinism it has taken the theory of

“the survival of the fittest,” accepting as its exclusive test of fitness the employment of material force. From the theory of evolution—which its chief exponent, Herbert Spencer, has carried to the farthest point of political and social individualism—it has borrowed the fatal character of those natural laws which aim at making of human society an organism more and more perfectly organised. From agnosticism and materialism it has retained the denial of duty, with the exception of that respect which is to be paid to such commands as the State has ordained for its own preservation. Lastly, from Nietzsche it has acquired the doctrine that the purpose of life is not happiness, not morality, not even tranquillity, but dominance secured by conflict and maintained by force.

Thus has come into being the creed of Pan-Germanism, which has soon taken a practical turn by throwing itself into the conquest of the world along the threefold road of commercial penetration, diplomatic intrigue, and military expansion.

Philology, ethnography, and history have each contributed its stone to the edifice thus prepared, the first two by propounding the theory that, in the purity of its language and the structure of its skull, the German people declares itself the foremost of human races; the third, by founding upon the vindication of force a whole philosophy of the historical development of nations. Treitschke, who was a professor of history, and exercised a vast influence throughout Germany,

teaches that war is the source of all the virile virtues ; that war alone is the arbiter of legitimacy ; and that the weak nations must inevitably be absorbed by those which are stronger than themselves. This theory, which lays stress upon the rapid development of Germany, and particularly of the Prussian Monarchy, had already been enunciated by Lasson, who, in 1868, maintained, in the pamphlet which I have cited above, that respect for treaties is not a question of right, but of interest. "The weak," he adds, "is, in spite of treaties, the prey of the strongest from the moment when the latter wills it and has the necessary power." We see whose authority was behind Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg when in the Reichstag, on the 4th of August, 1914, he excused himself, by the axiom "necessity makes law," for that which he admitted was a violation of international law. Lasson, who in his professional capacity sets himself above political events, concludes more frankly by this most Hegelian reflection : "This state of things may even be called moral, since it is rational."

It is a matter of course that in all these authors—historians as well as philosophers—modern Germany is privileged to represent the perfection of culture. Even Fichte announced that the other peoples are not nations ; that they are to Germany what the non-ego is to the ego. It would be wrong to suppose that when they dream of extending their dominion over the entire globe the Germans are acting in obedience to purely selfish motives. It is with the utmost good faith

that they imagine themselves to have received a mission from the hands of Providence. They consider themselves to be a chosen people, exactly as did the Israelites of former times, peculiarly destined for the sacred work of regenerating the world by forcing upon it their culture. They have discovered no smallest difficulty in identifying themselves with the superman of Nietzsche. "We are not only men," writes Schönerer, "we are more than that, since we are Germans." And so no one in Germany thinks fit to smile when in his speech at Bremen, on the 23rd of March, 1905, William II says to his enthusiastic auditors: "We are the salt of the earth. God has called us to regenerate the world. We are the apostles of progress."*

After what has been said, we can understand that every attempt to thwart the demands of German culture and, above all, to resist them by armed force becomes an impious act, an act of

* This is a form of Messianism which, with more or less success, has made its appearance periodically in the history of many races for thousands of years. We may add that this prevision of "supermen," being in advance of the humanity of their time, has nothing in it which rationally contradicts the teachings of science; for science enables us to witness, in retrospect, a progressive evolution which there is no reason to suppose is finished so far as the gradual developments of matter, life, and spirit are concerned. The future will see, no doubt, men as superior to the *homo sapiens* as he is already to the earliest prehistoric flint-chippers. Nietzsche's mistake has been to look for his future supermen in the wrong direction and to make of them, above everything, an incarnation of brutal strength. We must not feel too much surprise if the Germans have seen their own portrait in this creation of a diseased fancy.

revolt, which merits chastisement. The Germans, indeed, attribute a punitive character to their military expeditions, as does every nation which has imagined for itself a similar providential rôle. A professor of the University of Berlin, Herr Kohler, wrote in a recent pamphlet, *Noth kennt kein Geboth* (Necessity Knows no Law): "Every sin has its punishment on earth; the sins which States commit are chastised in this world. A heavy responsibility weighs upon the Belgian Government. We can only offer one excuse in their defence: they did not know Germany, the great, the noble, the unique." Better still—and here the fanaticism of *Kultur* enters the region of the grotesque—in a volume where Major Victor von Strantz gives his personal impressions of the conquest of Belgium, *Die Eroberung Belgiens* (1914), we may read this apostrophe to the Belgian people: "And so you come, presumptuous little nation, to stop us; you to whom we have promised peace and protection if you raise no obstacle to our mighty work! And so you make common cause with our enemies! It is as if you were to attack a priest who carries the Holy of Holies. We are made sacred by the greatness of our destiny."

In Germany, literature and art recognise henceforth as their highest aim not co-operation for the advancement and adornment of civilisation, but solely the increase of Germany's splendour. And so we need not be surprised that, constructed by a narrow-minded nationalism, the intellectual progress of the country has been greatly retarded,

to judge at least, if not from the number, then from the quality of recent original productions. In æsthetics the cult of the colossal has replaced the attempt to attain beauty, and even in music we see that Wagner has had no successor. I have just considered the present state of philosophy and history. In all these realms of art and science Germany is reduced to living on her past.

In order to judge of the degree to which this madness can attain, it is enough to re-read the distressing manifesto in which ninety-three intellectuals, announcing themselves, and not without reason, as the cream of German science and art, endeavoured in November, 1914, to justify the invasion of Belgium and the conduct of the German troops in the invaded territory. We stand amazed to find, below assertions so opposed to the evidence of fact, the signatures of men whom we had learned to admire and to follow, for the breadth of their knowledge, the force of their method, and the honesty of their criticism. If this is not the bankruptcy of German science it is assuredly that of her exponents.

The Kaiser has even discovered how to enrol the religions upon his General Staff. In the course of one of his mystical political lucubrations, which is dated in August, 1907, he exclaims: "I believe that to unite all our citizens, all our classes, there is but one means, and that is religion; not religion understood in a narrow, ecclesiastical, and dogmatic sense, but in a sense that is larger, more practical, more human." The thought is fine, but one does not need to dig in it very

deeply in order to discover that if the imperial expositor favours the union of the most diverse cults, Mohammedanism amongst them, and if he finds room for them all in his heart, it is only in so far as they show themselves ready to support his policy. One of his official preachers, the pastor Stocker, discovered this one day, when he endeavoured to press the claims of Christian socialism beyond the limits assigned by his master. In reality, William II loves to invoke the name of God; but the divinity who is here in question is the "old German god," as he himself has named him; *Gott* become *von Gott*, as Monsieur Cochin has wittily said; a "Germanised Moloch," according to the no less happy expression of Monsignor Chapon; in fact, nothing more than a symbolical personification of German *Kultur*.

After having reopened the era of national religions which we had believed closed for ever, as far as our civilisation was concerned, since the appearance of universal cults, the imperial policy has laid hands upon all the faiths of the empire, not even flinching from the unnatural attempt to transform the Gospel into an ally and servant of Cæsarism. Much might be written about this decline of religion, for which the apologists of culture do not hesitate openly to congratulate themselves. We have Dr. Max Lenz, who, in a lecture given in Berlin on the 10th of March, 1915, proclaims that "God Himself has become nationalised." We find, before the war, the historian Karl Lamprecht exclaiming: "Who, then, shall

dare to deny now that there is a Germanic Christian God, and that he manifests himself to the other nations as a God both strong and jealous"? And there is a theologian, Herr Adolf Weissmann, who in a pamphlet, entitled *Der Krieg und der Religion* (War and Religion), maintains that to regard natural religions as inferior is "an error the extent of which is shown by the present war."

Protestantism is an essentially individualistic religion (as we may discover for ourselves among the Anglo-Saxon peoples), and, since Bossuet, rightly or wrongly, this character has been one of its weak points in the eyes of its adversaries. Yet, having remained the State religion of the country in which it arose, it has there quickly become a weapon of tyranny for the hands of the ruler. We need not therefore feel very much surprise at the official sanction which it has given to Pan-Germanism. At the very beginning of the war there happened an event which in this connection is characteristic. On the 4th of August, 1914, a clergyman of Nîmes, Monsieur C. E. Babut, had forwarded to Herr Dryander, chief preacher to the Court of Berlin, a proposal to arrange the terms of a declaration, which should receive the signatures of Christians in Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Russia, and Serbia, without distinction of church or sect. They were to undertake to use their whole influence to ensure that "the war should be carried on with as much humanity as possible; that the victor should not

abuse his strength; that the persons and the rights of the weak should be respected."

Pastor Dryander took his time to consider this proposal. On the 15th of September—that is to say, three weeks after the atrocities of Visé, Aerschot, Louvain, Dinant, Andenne, etc.—he formally [repulsed the advances of his fellow-clergyman at Nîmes. The reasons which he gives deserve mention: "We refuse because it must not henceforward appear, even to the smallest degree, that, in our opinion, the people of Germany stand in need of any warning or of any effort whatever on our part, which shall cause them to conduct the war in accordance with Christian principles and in obedience to the demands of compassion and humanity. It is for our entire people, as for our General Staff, a matter of course that the war is to be conducted between soldiers alone, while the defenceless and the weak are scrupulously to be spared, and the wounded and sick are to be cared for without distinction." And in his unconscious pharisaism he adds: "We are convinced—and we know what we are saying—that this rule is that of the entire army, and that upon our side the war is being conducted with a self-control, a *conscientiousness*, and a *kindness* (!) which are perhaps unexampled in the history of the world."*

Nor have the Kaiser's Catholics lingered in the rear. They have uttered no word of censure when

* This correspondence is reproduced in an interesting pamphlet by Monsieur Alfred Loisy, *War and Religion*. Paris: Nourry, 1915

Monsignor Mercier courageously laid before them an account of the cruelties which had been committed against the clergy of Belgium and their flock ; nor did they make any more protest against the destruction of Louvain University and the Cathedral of Rhêims. There has been neither exaction nor atrocity over which the German Centre, accustomed as they are to every kind of political manœuvre, have not spread the self-satisfied mantle of their loyalty to their empire ; and when the Deputy of Luxemburg, Prüm, who had formerly been among their most enthusiastic supporters, accused them of this, they found no answer for him but an audacious action for libel.

III.

THE PROGRESS AND AIMS OF GERMAN MILITARISM

THE force of the movement which thus carried the public opinion of Germany along with it, made easy the work of her military writers, who proceeded energetically to draw their practical conclusions. In this connection the book of General Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, which was written in 1911, deserves because of its insight into future events to be placed side by side with a work of a very different character which was published in London, in 1912, by Professor Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*. It is to be observed that the second writer was a civilian, who had no guidance to his conclusions but his profound knowledge of German mentality, while the German general had the advantage of being more or less in the secrets of the gods of Valhalla. Bernhardi begins by asserting that if the triumph of German culture is to be assured, war is inevitable. "Once this is admitted, it is proper to declare war at the favourable moment and against no matter whom." First of all, it is necessary "to settle our accounts with France," so that we may thereafter have our hands free. "France must be so completely put out of action that she will never again be able to find herself in our path." No doubt, should Russia intervene, Germany might have two enemies to reckon with instead of one. "This danger can only be avoided

if it has been made possible for us to take the offensive against and crush one adversary before the other shall be able to attack us."

England, however, might also come in. In order to provide for this, Germany must strengthen her alliance with Italy, whose support is not absolutely assured, and with Turkey, whose co-operation would be valuable in order to stir up revolt among the Mohammedan subjects of the two Western Powers. Germans must not allow themselves to be gulled by the attempts of England to come to a better understanding with Germany. Of these attempts, Germany must simply take advantage so that hostilities may be postponed until the moment when she shall have all the trumps in her hand, owing to internal dissensions in the countries of her adversaries. It is also proper for us so to manœuvre that we are able to cast upon our enemy the responsibility for aggression. "In order to force our adversaries to begin we must take some step which, without being positively hostile to France, shall so closely threaten her interests and those of England that these two nations shall be obliged to attack us." He congratulates himself, in this connection, upon the then recent Algeciras Conference because in it he perceives "many possibilities of friction" between France and England.

The author gives us no hint concerning the future invasion of Belgium. But in another work, translated into English under the title *How Germany Makes War*, he suggests a plan of campaign very nearly identical with that which

the German armies attempted to carry out upon the outbreak of hostilities.

The majority of military writers, moreover, who have published works of late give us to understand that Belgium lies upon the route of invasion which necessity indicates; and a Note, more or less confidential, of the German Government, drawn up on the 19th of March, 1913, in order to justify its demand for new military credits, contains the following declaration, which has been recorded in the Yellow Book of the French Government: "We must be strong in order to annihilate with a powerful assault our enemies on the East and on the West. But in the next European war the small States will also have either to be compelled to follow us or to be crushed." And to think that Germany has made it a crime of the Belgian Government that consultations were initiated by the English military attachés for the purpose of considering with the Belgian General Staff what defensive measures should be taken in case Germany should actually violate the neutrality of Belgium! *

* Bernhardi is a prolific writer. Besides his two classic volumes on *The War of To-day*, he has published a work, also translated into French, called *Our Future*. In it the author examines both the domestic and foreign policies of Germany in a style that is clear, methodical, and copious. Some of his general opinions upon the mission of the State and the duties of the citizen are not without point. Unfortunately, confounding war with competition, he embarks upon an enthusiastic eulogy of the former, which he represents in turn as a biological necessity, a moral obligation, and an indispensable agent of civilisation. There is no lack of paradox in the contrasts which he traces between Germany and other nations, when he asserts, for example, that individualism is more widespread among the Germans; while among the English the collective spirit is stronger and more general.

During more than twenty-five years, without ceasing, the pamphlets published by the powerful Pan-German League have held before the eyes of the German-speaking peoples the conception of a German Empire which should have swallowed Belgium and Holland, Luxemburg, the Pas de Calais, and the Somme, Artois, Burgundy, German Switzerland, Poland, the Balkan Peninsula as far as Salonika ; that is to say, an empire of some 162 millions of inhabitants, with the addition of a Customs Union which should yield 204 millions of consumers, without taking count of the extension of the German colonies at the expense of France and England. It is unnecessary to say that the nations who by tongue and blood should be foreign to the culture of Germany were to be kept in a purely dependent condition, deprived of all share in the government of the empire. One of the most energetic of the League's presidents, Herr Ernest Hasse, in his book *Deutsche Politik* (German Policy), published more than sixteen years ago, suggests the creation, along the empire's new frontiers, of a "glacis," whence the conquered population should be expelled in order to make room, after a plan borrowed from Ancient Rome, for German colonists, recruited from among the veterans and non-commissioned officers. Nothing could have been wanting to this plagiarism of antiquity but the sale as slaves of the former inhabitants ; and now the brutal seizure of workmen and even of women in the North of France, and the deportation *en masse* of those Belgian workmen who have been

cast into the *ergastula* of Germany, to provide forced labour for her factories and trenches, remind us vividly enough of the fate of those populations whom the conquerors of the Ancient World were wont to carry off into servitude.

And here again is a last suggestion put forward in a pamphlet, published by the League in 1900, under the title *Deutschland beim Beginn des 20^{ten} Jahrhunderts* (Germany at the Beginning of the 20th Century): "In ancient times a conquered people were annihilated. No longer to-day can this be done literally; but it is possible to imagine a condition of existence which would amount to annihilation." The Turks have imported less hypocrisy into their dealings with the Armenians.

Was there, then, no longer in the German people any leaven of moderate, far-seeing, or peaceful citizens capable of resisting this bellicose frenzy? No doubt the commercial and industrial classes must have viewed with alarm the prospect of a long and costly war. But the greater part of those who were engaged in business allowed themselves to become convinced that the war would be a short one, by the very fact of the immensity of the military establishments; that success had been made certain by an intelligent preparation during more than thirty years; that, as in former wars, this one would be followed by a magnificent outburst of natural prosperity; finally, that the conquered nations would provide the commerce of their conquerors with an almost unlimited field of exploitation. It was not only the political

domination of the German race which was to be spread over the earth, but its economic supremacy. The people of Germany believed absolutely that it was necessary to discover new territories where it would be able to swarm, and where its imperial banner should symbolise the physical extension of the Fatherland. William II, who shared with the former king of the Belgians the taste for grandiose enterprises, had in no small degree helped, to engage in the sphere of trusts, monopolies, and all kinds of financial combinations such capital as was not involved in the production of armaments or the development of the fleet. The war was indicated as the sole means of procuring for the empire colonies which should be really profitable, and of crushing the rivalry of the principal maritime nations. One may say that the whole commercial population had swallowed the bait.

Only the working classes were left. The mirage of a greater Germany had gradually been imposed upon their vision through the channel of the compulsory schools, where nothing is taught that is not initiated and approved by the State. The peasantry had long been accustomed to endure the rule of the *Junkers*, who by tradition and interest are dedicated to the profession of arms. As for the working-men—so powerfully organised by the Sozial Demokratie, where political and economic affairs are concerned—they, too, had allowed themselves to be carried away by the prospect of a great industrial revival which, born of victory, must necessarily cause their wages to rise.

Still echoes in our ears that contest of oratory which took place at the Socialist Conference held, during the November of 1909, in the ancient cathedral of Basle. The comrades from Germany were not the least eager to acclaim "the complete unanimity during war against war of the Socialists of all countries." They vied with one another to protest that if war should be declared the workmen would refuse to fire upon one another, and that they would, moreover, assuredly succeed in preventing their respective Governments from committing this stupidity. In fact, the German workmen did nothing to prevent the war. Their leaders—with the exception of Liebknecht, whom, when the Government put him in prison, his party had already disowned—were by no means the last, when the time came, to vote credits for the opening and continuation of hostilities, to join the invading armies, to sanction by their tacit approval, where they did not actually take part in them, the excesses of which the victims were the innocent inhabitants (among whom were the workmen) of those parts of Belgium and France that were invaded.

Four days after the meeting held at Brussels, on the 30th of July, 1914, and arranged by *The International*—at which the delegates of all countries, including Germany, had sworn to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and particularly to refuse all military credits—the representatives in the Reichstag of the Sozial Demokratie ratified both the declaration of war against the Triple Entente and the invasion of

Belgium by unanimously voting the subsidies that had been demanded. Yet more, when after the month of August the executive committee of *The International* issued an appeal to the German nation which denounced the injustice of the aggression and the horrors of the German invasion, the Parteivorstand and the *Vorwärts* contented themselves with declaring that this was a manœuvre which was intended to influence the neutral countries. The *Vorwärts* added pharisaically: "Soldiers who in their millions have passed through the school of the Party are not barbarians."*

* In order to understand to what a degree the Sozial Demokratie has made itself the accomplice of Pan-Germanist Imperialism and has exploited the Socialist movement in other countries, we may consult the works of certain Socialist writers, and those which are more especially of a documentary nature: — Edmond Laskine, *Internationalism and Pan-Germanism*. Paris: Floury, 1916.—Jules Destrée, *The Socialists and the European War*. Paris: Van Oest, 1916. We may add the revelations of other Socialist writers:—Emile Royer, *The Social Democrats v. The Belgian Socialists*. London, 1915.—La Chesnais, *The Socialist Group of the Reichstag and the Declaration of War*. Paris: Colin, 1915.—Paul-Hyacinthe Loyson, *Are you Neutral towards Crime?* Paris: Berger-Leveault, 1916.—See also the controversy between Messieurs Vandervelde and Scheidemann in *Invaded Belgium and International Socialism*. I vol. Paris: Berger-Leveault, 1917.

IV.

THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL REFORM

IF we examine the history of the last hundred years—or, we may almost say, of the centuries which have elapsed since the Peace of Westphalia—we cannot fail to perceive a tendency among the civilised nations gradually to grant to the operation of law a wider influence upon international affairs ; and this development was arrested—or, at least suspended—by the aggressive policy of Germany. It may not be inopportune if we shortly consider the history of a movement which held out the prospect of a happier existence to humanity and proposed to itself to put an end to the possibility of conflagrations such as that through which we are passing to-day.

The repudiation of war is no new thing. Religion, first of all—or, rather, certain universal religions, Christianity, and, earlier still, Judaism and Buddhism—has expressed itself clearly upon this question. Philosophy, in its turn, has made a like attempt. Centuries ago, the stoics and the prophets of Israel shared the vision of a future era, when all the nations of the earth should form one family. In the Middle Ages, the Church claimed, without much success, to settle the quarrels of sovereigns. She endeavoured also to minimise the evils of war by arranging sundry truces of restricted significance and recommending

to belligerents the observation of certain humane principles. So, in 1105, the Council of Clermont resolved that women, husbandmen, merchants, and shepherds should enjoy a perpetual peace. The Hindoos, according to Diodorus, already possessed a similar regulation, which it is probable met with very little more observance.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the moralists and philosophers introduced new arguments, but without achieving their escape from Utopia, as is shown by the *New Atlantis* of Bacon and the *Neo-Salente* of Fénelon. Such, again, was the dream of the good abbé of Saint Pierre, who, nevertheless, devised a scheme of perpetual peace through which all international disputes were to be settled by a permanent congress of plenipotentiaries.

It is strange that a German—perhaps of Scotch descent—Immanuel Kant, was among the first who pronounced the suppression of war to be dependent not upon sentiment, but upon the essential idea of justice. He demonstrated the necessity of applying to international affairs the principles which govern the mutual relations of individuals. He added that, in order to realise this conception, the nations must form an alliance or confederacy, the members of which should agree between themselves not to interfere in one another's domestic difficulties and to protect one another mutually against attacks from outside.

Presently the French Revolution proclaimed the right of the nations to govern themselves; but it took little heed of any method of regulating

their disputes, and, forced to defend itself against coalitions of royal personages, it allowed itself to be led away into a policy of conquest which endured to the end of the imperial adventure. After the downfall of Napoleon, his conquerors endeavoured to establish a lasting peace upon the basis of their own territorial arrangements, and even to endow this peace with a permanent character by undertaking to defend one another against all warlike aggression.

This was the Holy Alliance, which might perhaps have deserved its glorious name had its vision been less shallow and its purpose more honest. Unfortunately, it took no account of those national affinities which were to play so important a part in European politics, while the end which it sought to attain was not only the security of the frontiers, but also that of the rulers. Its only application was the mandate which it gave to the French army to stifle the revolution in Spain which had dethroned Ferdinand VII. England, as a constitutional and Liberal Power, stood aside at once. The revolutions in Greece and Belgium gave the finishing stroke to this addled confederation of Europe, which was in reality nothing but an alliance of kings against their subjects.

Nevertheless, hostility to the employment of armed force began to penetrate the consciousness of the masses. It was in the United States of America, about 1814, that, according to Frédéric Passy, the earliest peace societies were formed. This example was followed in England, especially

among those religious sects whose object was to restore the traditions of primitive Christianity, and notably among the Quakers, whose unyielding hatred of bloodshed is well known. The movement progressed slowly; yet it was not long before it had given birth to a growing number of organisations, such as, in England, the Workingmen's Peace Association, the Women's Peace Society, and the International Association of Arbitration and Peace. The last, in order to justify its name, began a search for adherents upon the Continent, and between 1843 and 1848 the appearance of international congresses, gathered successively in London, Brussels, and Paris, gave evidence of the advance which the pacifist propaganda was making.

In one of these gatherings, which was held in Paris shortly after the revolution of February, 1848, there sat side by side men as widely differing in opinion as Cobden, Victor Hugo, the abbé Deguerry, the pastor Athanase Coquerel, and the Chief Rabbi of France. Victor Hugo opened the session in these words: "You have come together from every quarter of the horizon, in order to turn the Gospel's most glorious page, where men are commanded to love one another like the children of the same Father, and to teach the nations at last to permit Reason to say that which until now has been said by Force alone."

The language of all these groups, however well-intentioned it may have been, suffers a little from their sentimental and mystical origins. These pacifists, however, were about to receive an ally who

should provide them with arguments of a more positive nature—free trade, which, while recommending the overthrow of all economic barriers, proposed to establish on a true understanding of self-interest the mutual assistance and even the brotherhood of nations. For a time it seemed as if the rulers of the world were prepared to accept this idea. After the Crimean War, the Conference of Paris, on the motion of Lord Clarendon, who it appears was acting upon the suggestion of Henry Richard, the general secretary of the Peace Society, resolved that the high contracting parties, and those who should afterwards subscribe to their decisions, should forbid all recourse to arms before the good offices of a friendly Power should have been invited, “in so far as the circumstances of the case should allow.” In spite of this reservation, we are entitled to regard as an historical event, if not as the beginning of a new era, this recognition of the principle of compulsory arbitration, not only in a convention between two Powers of minor importance, but in a diplomatic document which was intended to become the charter of European stability. The English Government did not fail to claim the authority of this clause in order to justify its friendly intervention when, ten years later, the question of the railways of Luxemburg almost brought about a war between Germany and France. The conflict was averted, and through this success a new and a wider influence was given to the pacifist agitation.

The Universal Exhibition, held in Paris in 1867,

was a marvellous assertion of the solidarity of the nations ; war came to be looked upon more and more as a relic of barbarism. Everywhere men were beginning to agitate against armaments, which the least Utopian felt to be exaggerated, if not useless, and to demand the abolition of the obstacle to the economic progress of the world which all this military emulation constituted. Above all, the lesser nations, which had everything to fear from war—Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries—hailed with enthusiasm a movement which could find adherents even among the professors and politicians of Prussia and Austria, who now, since Sadowa, were reconciled.

From this time, however, dates the appearance among the adversaries of militarism of two divergent tendencies ; on the one hand there were those who proposed to persist in their mission regardless of all political and social differences. Such was the programme of the *Ligue permanente et internationale de Paix* (the Permanent and International League of Peace), founded by Frédéric Passy.

“The League,” he wrote in a manifesto dated the 1st of October, 1867, “has but one thought—to compose the quarrels of the nations ; but one banner—the banner of justice and mutual respect. And neither politics nor religion—let them have what influence they may upon the belief and the conduct of each one of us—shall be able to spoil this harmony. Whosoever loves peace, whatever may be his reasons, is one of us.”

On the other hand, there were those who, anticipating the theory of the International Socialists, could not be satisfied to separate pacifism from certain political and social requirements. Shortly afterwards, a Belgian writer, Charles Lemonnier, founded at Geneva the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* (the League of Peace and Freedom), which proposed as its object nothing less than the establishment upon a republican basis of the United States of Europe.

This was the moment when the French Empire seemed ready to proclaim its Liberalism by taking the first step towards European disarmament. Count Daru, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, attempted to open negotiations for this purpose with the neighbouring Powers; and the French Government, even at the beginning of that fatal year, did not hesitate to give the example by reducing by 10,000 men the contingent of recruits for 1870. By the explosion of the war these illusions were blasted. In vain, during the days of agonised patriotism which preceded the opening of hostilities, the most prominent leaders of the pacifist associations addressed to Napoleon III and William I appeals as eloquent as they were despairing. One wonders with what kind of a reception they met. The diplomatic intervention of Great Britain, while it provided for Belgium's safety, succeeded only in preventing the extension of hostilities.

Once again the spirit of conquest was to triumph, and for several years the spectacle of the Germans in forcible possession of Alsace and Lorraine made

it rather difficult to return to the discussion of a perpetual peace. None the less, Frédéric Passy and his friends did not abandon their ambitions, and after reorganising their League under the name of the *Société française des Amis de la Paix* (the French Society of the Friends of Peace), they devoted themselves principally to the popularisation of the idea of international arbitration, announcing, in a manifesto which they issued in 1872 under the title *Revanche ou Relèvement* (Revenge or Re-birth), that they pardoned nothing and forgot nothing, but that they left it to the progress of ideas and morals to ensure that in the immediate future Force should atone for the injuries which it had done to the Right.

The partisans of international reform, moreover, were showing themselves inclined to work for the practical realisation of their ideal. Their aspirations henceforth took a double direction: on the one hand towards the mitigation of the evils that arise from war, and on the other towards the regularisation of the mutual relations of States. In every age the belligerents who valued themselves on their civilisation have admitted their duty to avoid useless cruelty, and even to obey certain principles which introduced a little humanity into the customs of war. These restrictions of the rights of the strongest grew in number, and it became possible to believe that they had definitely taken their place in the inheritance of mankind, even when it was at war. For instance, the rule that military operations

should be conducted only against the armed forces of the enemy, and not against his civil population ; the rule that destruction ought to be strictly confined to such damage as the conduct of operations should make unavoidable ; the rule that, at any rate on land, private property should be respected ; the rule that, in war as in peace, each person is required to answer solely for his own acts, and that the imposition of collective responsibility is opposed to the most elementary requirements of distributive justice.

In order to clothe these rules with greater authority, it was even thought advisable to place them under the protection of treaties, which should come into force upon the declaration of hostilities. Hence, during the latter part of the nineteenth century is to be remarked an ever-swelling stream of international conventions for ameliorating the lot of the wounded ; for ensuring to the services of the Red Cross the benefits of neutrality ; for guaranteeing that prisoners of war should receive humane treatment ; that the use of certain forms of bullet which were considered treacherous or needlessly cruel should be forbidden ; that open towns should not be bombarded ; that religious monuments and works of art should be preserved from destruction ; that pillage should be punished ; that requisitions should be confined within the limits of that which is essential for the maintenance of armies ; that the inhabitants of occupied territory should be spared the necessity of undertaking work which would be repugnant to their patriotism ; and, finally, that respect should

be shown to the legislation of invaded countries in all questions with which the civil authority is concerned. For one kind of systematic brutality no provision had been made, perhaps because it was considered a baseness so outrageous that it could never occur to civilised belligerents to put it into practice. This was the employment of hostages as living shields, in the hope of preventing or hindering the fire of the enemy. These provisions unite to form what we may call the Modern Code of War.

At the same time, the parallel movement for establishing the mutual relations of States upon a legal basis was being developed. The year 1873 had witnessed the foundation at Brussels of the *Institut du Droit international* (the Institute of International Law), where legal experts from every country lent their aid to the experimental improvement and codification of international law. It is here that, during the last forty years, the chief of those measures have been concerted, which have for their object the harmonisation of the enactments of the various States with the general principles of law, whether public or private. In 1889 there was founded a *Union Inter-parlementaire* (an Inter-Parliamentary Union) which was formed of members of various parliaments. Its original object was to promote recourse to arbitration; but it ended by interesting itself, at its annual meetings, in everything which could be of advantage to the cause of peace. On the eve of the year 1914 this institution numbered no less than 3,600 adherents, among

whom there were 156 members of the German Parliament, 126 of the Austrian, and 229 of the Hungarian, not to mention Turks and Bulgarians.*

At length, in 1899, at the invitation of the Tsar, the official representatives of all the civilised nations met together at The Hague, in a "peace conference," to endeavour to find some means of extending the scope of arbitration and procuring a limitation of armaments. This assembly held two sessions, one in 1899, the other in 1907; twenty-six States took part in the former, forty-four in the latter. Certain points were established, the importance of which is not to be undervalued. Several of those measures, for lessening the evils of international conflicts, which had been most strongly recommended by the jurists were codified. A considerable advance was also made towards the organisation on a legal basis of international society, by the institution of a permanent court of arbitration, at which all the Powers who had taken part in the conference should be represented.

Thus encouraged, treaties for permanent arbitration of a particular, and even of a general, character increased in number in both the Old and the New Worlds; about 1913 a hundred and twelve could be counted. It is true that the greater part of them contained restrictions, admitted by the conference itself, with regard to disputes in which one of the parties might consider its vital interests, its independence, or

* Annual of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Fourth year. Brussels, 1914.

its honour to be involved. Some Governments, however, would have agreed to the excision of these reservations. Four among them—Italy, Denmark, Holland, and the Argentine Republic—made among themselves treaties of general arbitration which were quite unrestricted. The *Union Inter-parlementaire*, in its session of 1908, also declared that if any dispute should arise in which matters not provided for in an arbitration treaty should be concerned, the contracting parties to it should be bound not to commit any hostile act until, together or separately, they should have invited the mediation of one or more friendly Powers. This declaration first took practical shape when the United States of America, during the administration of Mr. Taft, and afterwards of Mr. Wilson, succeeded in introducing it into the Treaties for the Advancement of Peace, which, since 1911, the great American Republic has arranged with France and England, and subsequently with a dozen other States, among them Italy, Russia, Holland, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, and several of the South American Republics.*

Meanwhile, armaments had continued to swell disquietingly, and the political horizon was dark with threatening clouds. For the dispersal, however, of these the world relied upon the common sense of the masses, the pacific utterances of Governments, and especially upon the growing interdependence of material interests which

* Chr. Lange: *The American Peace Treaties*. Christiania, 1915.

demanded that peace should be maintained. Capital had become daily more cosmopolitan, and financial operations—unless perhaps we except those which Germany organised—were no longer endowed with nationality. Moreover, every year witnessed the birth of new associations formed, without consideration of frontiers, for the advancement of science, charity, public health, education, and similar objects of universal interest. The Governments themselves had recognised the necessity of uniting for the organisation of certain spheres of activity affecting the whole of mankind, such as the postal services, the exchanges of money, the preservation of artistic, literary, and industrial property, the regulation of transport by land and sea, the treatment of epidemics, the protection of workmen, the suppression of the white slave traffic, etc., not to mention the conventions, referred to above, whose object was to minimise the evils of war. Just before 1914 there were fifty-six organisations of this kind which had been created and were subsidised by the civilised nations collectively. As the report of the eighteenth session of the *Union Inter-parlementaire* observes: "Nothing seems more favourable to the spread of law and the growth of good feeling among nations." There had even been formed—thanks to the efforts of private persons—a *Union des Associations Internationales* (Union of International Associations), which held periodical congresses. That which met in Brussels, in June, 1913, brought together delegates from 169 associations and 22 Govern-

ments. We must also notice, particularly, the *Bureau permanent de la Paix* (the Permanent Bureau of Peace), established at Berne, to provide the peace and arbitration propaganda with a centre of information and activity.

There was, indeed, no lack of reassuring movements, whose importance the world, apart from a few pessimistic or far-sighted people, was always prepared to exaggerate. A new session of the Peace Conference was expected in 1915; already the various Governments were busy with their programmes, and it was hoped that this time there would result some really decisive resolutions concerning compulsory arbitration, if not actually disarmament. England for fifteen years had never ceased in her suggestions to Germany that she should agree to a mutual limitation of armaments, at any rate so far as naval construction was concerned, and the official *pourparlers* that had been exchanged between members of the two Governments gave rise to the hope that this question might achieve a satisfactory solution. As for the relations of France and Germany, there had been formed, on the 30th of May, 1914, in the little town of Basle—so obviously designed for a meeting of this nature—a committee of eighteen German and thirteen French Members of Parliament, who, in spite of a few unfortunate incidents, had not separated without declaring themselves to be “determined to redouble their efforts to demonstrate the wish for peace that inspired the vast majority of the two peoples.” This promise was sincere, but only on one side.

A few months earlier the Queen of Holland had opened, at The Hague, that Palace of Peace for which the world had to thank the munificence of Mr. Carnegie ; and we cannot to-day suppress a melancholy smile when we remember the enthusiasm which this ceremony evoked among those who witnessed it, in whose number the members of the Peace Congress and of the Inter-Parliamentary Union were to be counted. Alas ! not a year was to pass before the Palace of Peace should close its doors, while, at the same moment, Berlin was opening those of the Temple of Janus.

V.

SOME ILLUSIONS ENTERTAINED BY GERMANY

WITH our better knowledge of to-day, we can easily understand why those who guided the policy of Germany remained steadily unfavourable to the advances of the British Government, as well as to every proposal which they could not have accepted without fettering their hands in questions of peace and war. The generous suggestion of the Tsar had met from both the Press of Germany and her politicians with nothing but covert sneers or open hostility. In this connection there is a significant passage in Bernhardt. We read in his book *The War of To-day*: "Formerly, with the exception of Immanuel Kant, the men who spread these ideas of universal brotherhood were nothing but dreamers and idealists. To-day the Governments of great and powerful States have laid hands upon these conceptions and disguise their movements under the cloak of an edifying humanitarianism. We, who are Germans, must not allow ourselves to be hoodwinked by advances of this kind. If we propose to obtain for our nation the place in the world which is her due, we must put our trust in our sword."

At The Hague, during the two sessions of the conference, Germany never ceased in her opposition, direct or indirect, to every measure which might hamper her in her schemes of aggression or

lead to a limitation of her armaments. She threatened to withdraw, if a proposal made by Russia should be discussed, which called upon all those countries who were represented not to increase their expenditure upon their armies for five years and upon their navies for three. Owing to the same opposition, nothing came of the proposal to make compulsory—and not simply optional—the intervention of the Court of Arbitration in all differences which do not affect national existence or honour. And so it was, when an attempt was made to give this proposal a more definite character, by enumerating twenty-four kinds of dispute which should always be submitted to arbitration. Since thirty-nine States had voted for this solution of the difficulty, it was suggested that it should, at any rate, bind the majority which had favoured it; but a German delegate put this amendment aside as contrary to the principle of unanimity which must sanction all the resolutions of the conference.

Those measures which were directed solely to the diminution of the horrors of war had generally met from Germany with a better reception. They were, indeed, of a nature to embarrass those of her adversaries who should faithfully abide by them, while she no doubt reserved to herself the privilege of treating them as “scraps of paper,” like other and more important agreements. As a matter of fact, there is not one of them which she has not violated in the course of the present war. When we recall the strange recommendation given by William II to his troops on their departure for

the Chinese expedition—"Conduct yourself as did the Huns"—we can only lament that the effect of this exhortation should have manifested itself not in China alone.

After such a record—still far from complete—of the German atrocities in Belgium, as has been compiled by the Commissions of Inquiry convened in Brussels, Antwerp, and London, I do not propose to dwell upon this subject, about which it is difficult to speak calmly or with moderation. The reports of the French Commission which was entrusted with the examination of the conduct of the German troops in the invaded Departments of France can only confirm our impression of horror for the butchers and of pity for their victims.* I will content myself with insisting upon this—that it is not alone upon a brutal and often drunken soldier that the responsibility for these crimes must be laid; but also upon the leaders who organised them, on the writers who advised them, and on the nation which has applauded them. They are, indeed, no more than the practical application of principles which the apologists of German militarism had logically deduced from their conception of war, and which they had successfully instilled into every section of their people.

If a State, in time of peace, may admit no guide and no check but its own interest, how much the

* See, besides the official reports of these Commissions:—P. Nothomb, *Les Barbares en Belgique*. Paris: Perrin, 1915.—Joseph Bedier, *Les crimes allemandes d'après des témoignages allemands*. Paris: Colin, 1916.—H. Davignon, *La Belgique et l'Allemagne*. London, 1915. Etc.

less, when it goes to war, does it need to trouble itself about the rules of international law, respect for treaties, or the principles of humanity? For the officers and soldiers it would even be a wickedness to think of these things if only the excesses to which they abandon themselves may improve their chances of victory. Such is the invariable argument of Bismarck, Moltke, Clausewitz, von der Goltz, von Hartmann, von Bernhardt, Frobenius, and others. Von Hartmann propounds as an axiom that "from the moment when a national war breaks out, terrorism becomes a principle of military necessity." Clausewitz claims that not without committing an absurdity may the principle of moderation be introduced into the philosophy of war. Von der Goltz teaches, in his *The Armed Nation*, that since the aim of warfare is the total defeat of the enemy, we are required to "use to the very utmost all methods, both material and moral, which will strike dismay into his mind." An official manual, *The Laws of Continental War (Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege)*, published in 1902 by authority of the Great General Staff, put officers on their guard against the temptation "to administer the laws of war from a standpoint which is entirely opposed to their objects, and which has already met with moral recognition from the Convention of Geneva, as well as from the Conferences of Brussels and The Hague." Yet more violence exercised against civil populations is represented as a measure of—humanity; "for, by the terror which it inspires, it tends to hasten the coming of peace."

For the honour of the human race, we must congratulate ourselves that such a theory should have proved completely false, and if from the application of it any lesson is to be derived, it is that methods of terrorism in war end by recoiling upon the heads of those who practise them. Germany flattered herself that by this means she would compel the belligerents to accept her conditions. The Allies have replied by reciprocally engaging themselves to carry on the war to the very end, to require complete reparation, and to conclude no peace to which all of them should not be parties. The pillage of open towns and all the abominations that accompany it have hastened the surrender of no fortress. The employment of hostages as living shields has in no case prevented attack or paralysed defence. And it is only of late that we have witnessed the outburst of indignation which, even among neutral nations, has been caused by the carrying off of whole populations in order to constrain them, by starvation and blows, to undertake forced labour. The destruction of Louvain University and the Cathedral of Rheims has intimidated the Catholics neither of Belgium nor of France, who have simply declined henceforward to regard the Germans as Christians. The murderous raids of their Zeppelins into Great Britain have only resulted in giving an impulse to the recruitment of volunteers and in facilitating the introduction of compulsory service. The exploits of their submarine pirates finally brought about war between Germany and the United States of America, without having to an appre-

ciable degree embarrassed the ocean transport of troops. Of late, again, the Belgian workmen, whom the Germans have been conducting at full speed, crowded without food into cattle trucks, towards the infernos of their concentration camps, and labour in their munition factories and trenches, have passed through the railway stations of Belgium undauntedly singing the *Brabançonne* and the *Leeuw van Vlanderen*.

In short, they have succeeded in nothing save in arousing a hate which will not die with the present generation ; they have made war more relentless and peace more hard to attain ; they have closed to themselves for many years countries which, when peace should have come, might have been willing to renew neighbourly relations with them ; they have alienated the sympathy which a certain number of neutral countries still retained for them ; and they have dishonoured themselves in the sight of history. A shrewd statesman has said that in politics mistakes are worse than crimes. Here we perceive the two in constant combination, and with the same negative result.

We observe an equal clumsiness in the reasoning of the Germans whenever they have sought to penetrate into the minds of other nations.

There is no doubt that the concentration of the whole body of national activities upon a single object engenders an incomparable force ; and it is this which explains the strength of the moral resistance which Germany offers, even to-day, in spite of her increasing military and economic embarrassments. But this unity of aim may

become also a source of weakness, where it proceeds from an infatuation which no longer takes account of facts. Absorbed in the contemplation of their own soul, the Germans have ended by no longer understanding anything in the souls of their neighbours, nor, indeed, in the soul of man. And so they have opened the flood-gates of war without having any conception of the moral and material resources of the nations with which they now must deal.

They were on their way to the conquest of the earth by means of an economic penetration without precedent in history. In the course of the last forty years their population had increased in number from 40 millions to about 70 millions, a growth which was owing, no doubt, to a remarkable advance in their birth-rate, but also to their transformation from an agricultural to an industrial nation. Among commercial Powers, they had raised themselves from a position of no importance at all to the second place. Their manufactures crowded all the markets of the globe, and they were preparing to rob England of the monopoly of ocean navigation. Their engineers, their bankers, their men of business, their clerks—each aiding the other—threatened with actual dispossession the classes which in every country were the representatives of its commercial and industrial activity. In all important towns they founded schools to which the middle classes of those towns even sent their children. What will remain to them out of all these peaceful conquests? Even had they been

victorious, and however enormous might have been the contributions which they would have exacted from the conquered, they must have been too gravely affected in their private and public fortunes not to feel, for very many years, the handicap of their losses in men and material. Conquered, or even simply disappointed of their hopes, they will see their development arrested for generations to come, if, indeed, they do not find themselves confronted, without escape, by positive ruin. In any event, they will have opened the eyes of the other nations, even of neutrals, who, realising the extent of a danger the full gravity of which they had never suspected, will take such steps as may be necessary to prevent its recurrence. One may, without ceasing to be a Free Trader, require that obstacles of an economic kind shall be erected against the crafty and treacherous inroads of German competition, even as one may, without ceasing to be a pacifist, insist that the war shall be carried on until German militarism shall have been definitely defeated, if this be the price of a lasting peace.

Their judgment was again at fault when they imagined successively that the Russians would suffer them to destroy Serbia; that an attempt to annihilate Russia would fail to rouse the French to action; that the Belgians would prefer safety to honour; that the English, for the sake of peace at any price, would be willing to betray their promises; and that Italy, in return for a respectable commission, paid in territory, would give them her support. What could be more

sincere and more characteristic than the astonishment of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg when he complained that for "a scrap of paper" Great Britain should go to war "with a nation of kindred blood who asks nothing better than to be her friend."

Another of their illusions was the belief that beyond their own borders there was nothing—not even public opinion—which was not for sale. We shall never know how many millions they have wasted among the neutrals in order to hire pens and even consciences, nor must we overlook either the vast number of their propaganda publications, or the sagacious organisation of their espionage, which they had raised to the dignity of a patriotic institution. Here again they have only reaped disappointment, unless perhaps in the case of certain Oriental nations who are worthy to come to an understanding with them.

Deceived by the reports of their agents, which flattered their own illusions, they told themselves that they would be met by adversaries weakened by interior dissensions. In Russia it was the democratic agitation, as well as the revolutionary ambitions of Poland and Finland; in France, the conspiracies of the *Confédération du Travail* (Confederation of Labour); in England, the opposition of a pacifist radicalism, the selfishness of the trade unions, and the prospect of civil war in Ireland; in Belgium, the confusion created by the quarrels of parties, religions, classes, and tongues; finally, outside of Europe, the national aspirations of the Hindoos, the Mohammedans, and

the Boers. They failed to see that while, among themselves, every difference of opinion vanished in the prosecution of an object which was greater than all, precisely the same thing would take place among their adversaries, when patriotism should raise its voice and the magnitude of what was at stake should be perceived.

VI.

PACIFISM AND AN INDECISIVE PEACE

AT no time has the outbreak of hostilities between two nations, or two groups of nations, so profoundly affected the spectators of the conflict as has the present war. Small and great, all the neutral countries have felt themselves threatened by the theory that strategic or political necessity suffices to justify the violation of rules hitherto recognised, even in time of war, on the foundation of international order. Yet their fear of finding themselves involved in the struggle was so great that, sheltering themselves behind an over-meticulous anxiety to preserve a neutral attitude, they have invariably refused to pronounce upon the acts of the belligerents, even when these have constituted the most flagrant breaches of conventions to which they themselves have subscribed, and which they themselves have guaranteed. A similar, though less excusable, lack of frankness has been visible in the gatherings of those pacifists who, after the first months of the war, initiated, in the neutral countries, a campaign whose object was to bring about peace upon a pretended basis of mutual satisfaction.

In February, 1915, a number of Swiss associations proposed to the Federal Council that it should summon a conference of the neutral States in order to lay the foundations of a peace wherein

guarantees of permanency should be discovered. To this the answer of the Council was, naturally, a polite refusal. In the month of April, 1916, the *Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad* (the Dutch Anti-War Council) itself summoned to a congress "the representatives of the various national and international movements which were concerned with the cause of pacifism before the war, and which since its outbreak have been doing their utmost to procure peace upon lasting conditions." The result of this step was the foundation of a "Central Organisation for a Permanent Peace," which published a manifesto containing the terms of such a peace. In this nothing is to be found which is in advance of the earlier programme of pacifism, apart from the development of reforms which the conferences of The Hague had already set on foot. As far as the present war was concerned the society forbade to itself "all attempts to decide where the responsibility for the war is to be laid or to protest against violations of international law." The "International Council," which was founded upon this basis, comprised members belonging to as many as twenty different States; but, although it has obtained a considerable amount of support, particularly in Switzerland and Holland, it has hardly made its existence felt, except through a few local meetings.

Meanwhile, certain Socialist groups who claimed to have remained faithful to the true doctrine of the movement, as, before the war, it had been settled by the general councils of *The International*, arose in force against those of their

fellows who, abandoning the theory of anti-patriotism, had voted credits for the war in the allied countries, lent their support to the organisation of national defence, and even accepted office in the Cabinets of the new Holy Alliance. It was this element which, upon the proposal of the official leaders of Italian Socialism, endeavoured to organise itself and to reconstitute *The International* towards the end of 1915.

After long preliminaries, a certain number of delegates met together between the 5th and 8th of December at Zimmerwald, in the picturesque alpine valley of the Kienthal. The object of this gathering was "to unite the proletariat in a common movement for peace, to create a centre of activity, and to recall the workers of the world to their historic mission"—that is to say, to the war between the classes. Eleven countries were represented. German and French delegates presented a joint declaration which cast the responsibility for the war upon the intrigues of capitalism, with the complicity of *all* the Governments, and called for energetic action which, "paying no regard to the military situation in the various countries," should lead to a peace "without annexations and without indemnities."

This conference set up at Berne, under the name of the International Socialist Commission, a permanent commission, acting in competition with the permanent bureau founded by the former International and transferred, after the beginning of the war, from Brussels to The Hague. This commission publishes a bulletin, at

rather irregular intervals, which distinguishes itself principally by the violence of its attacks upon those whom it has named "social patriots." Connected with the same organisation there is in France a "Committee for the Re-establishment of International Relations" which carries on a fairly active propaganda. Here is an example of the arguments with which it endeavours to impress the working classes: "The self-government of the nations is impossible in a society which is founded upon distinction of class. Socialism alone is able to assure to the people their autonomy and independence. It is for this reason that the struggle for the autonomy of the people can only be the struggle for Socialism." And, elsewhere: "'Civil War and no Holy Alliance'—such must be our motto. Nothing but the social revolution will be able to ensure a lasting peace and the liberation of humanity."*

It was shortly afterward that the official delegates of the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Socialist parties, gathered together at Vienna on the 12th and 13th of August, 1915, declared themselves strongly hostile to any peace which should restore Alsace-Lorraine to France or should in any way diminish the territory of Germany and her allies. Since that time the majority of the Sozial Demokratie has suffered no change in its views upon this subject, for in the course of its last General Conference, held in Berlin between the 21st and 23rd of September,

* *Bulletin of the International Socialist Commission of Berne*, No. 2. Pages 2 and 17.

1916, it reaffirmed, by 251 votes to 5, its adherence to the Imperialist policy, though it is true that a considerable number of delegates abstained from either taking part in the debate or voting. No doubt the motion which was adopted condemns all thought of annexation, which, at this time of day, is not a particularly meritorious circumstance; but it adds that any peace which the party may demand must guarantee "the political independence, the territorial integrity, and the economic freedom of Germany." We know the import of such language, and we need not be surprised to find it again upon the lips of von Bethmann-Hollweg or his colleagues. The conference also calls for the reconstitution of *The International*, so that everywhere and in complete harmony the struggle against capitalism may be renewed. Nevertheless, a minority has made its appearance among the parliamentary representatives of the party which favours the refusal of credits for the war, and this division of opinion has become more pronounced of late. The minority, which is led by Haese, has not been satisfied with rejecting the credits for the continuation of the war, but has also formed itself into a group, if not into a party, that has a separate existence. Would it, however, be ready to accept the only conditions under which Germany may hope for peace, now that reparation and guarantees are necessarily in question?

As for the Zimmerwaldians, they have met with no very warm response from the Socialists of the various countries of the Entente, unless we

except the so-called official Italian Socialists. In France they have again and again been disowned in the General Council and the National Congress of the Socialist Party; on the last occasion, during December, 1916. We remember that in the Chamber of Deputies the Extreme Left strongly repudiated them on the day when one of the "pilgrims of Zimmerwald" had the audacity to declare from the tribune his hostility to the continuation of the war. In England, the trade unions, after rousing themselves to the support of conscription in order to strengthen the national participation in the military operations, declared themselves, in their last congress at Birmingham, in favour of the prosecution of the war until a decisive victory should be gained, and even refused to associate themselves with a proposal of the American Confederation of Labour, which advised the meeting of a general congress of labour associations to discuss the terms of peace, side by side with the Diplomatic Conference to which this task should be officially entrusted.

This attitude gains significance from the fact that some weeks earlier—about the end of July—a conference of the Socialists of the Neutral Countries had met at The Hague, and had demanded from the bureau of the former International the summoning of a General Assembly of the Socialists of all schools and all countries, pointing out that neither of the two opposing forces could hope for a decisive victory, and that, furthermore, it was not desirable that either of the adversaries should hold the other at its

mercy. It is to be observed that Monsieur Emile Vandervelde, the President of the International Socialist Bureau, who is also a member of the Belgian Cabinet, has never ceased to declare, in both his letters and his speeches, that he refuses to enter into any discussion of peace with the Germans so long as Belgium shall not have obtained full reparation and Pan-Germanist militarism shall not have been made incapable of doing further damage.*

Again, the leaders of Belgian Socialism, at a gathering held in Brussels on the 3rd of May, 1916, did not hesitate, though the menace of the Prussian hung over them, courageously to make the following declaration, the signatories to which I may not at the moment name, but the genuineness of which I can guarantee: "We have no authority over the Reunion of Socialists of the Neutral Countries, but we may ask those who are so good as to take interest in what we do not to allow themselves to be influenced by the belief that we are anxious for peace. . . . No one must suppose that it is his duty for our sake to hasten matters. We do not ask for peace. The working classes of Belgium are resolved to endure any misery, to undergo any suffering, if only they may not be given a German peace which will not be a lasting and a secure one."

The same note of admirable self-denial and confidence is heard in the manifesto which, on the 5th of December last, while the deportations were at

* Cf. *Invaded Belgium and International Socialism*, by Emile Vandervelde. Paris, 1917. Pages 170 and 176.

their height, the delegates of the Belgian labour associations, both Socialist, Catholic, and Liberal, addressed to the working-men of the whole world. This moving appeal ends by this proud assertion: "As for us, even if force succeeds for a time in reducing our bodies to slavery, our souls will never consent to it. We will add this: Let our tortures be what they will, we will have no peace that does not secure the independence of our country and the triumph of justice."

The idea of compelling the workers of Belgium, both those who were and those who were not out of employment, to work for the enemy may perhaps be traced to the German Socialists: "There are in Belgium," said *Vorwärts*, in the early days of the occupation, "sixty to seventy thousand employés of the railway, postal, and telegraph services, whose places it is necessary to fill by German workmen. If it were possible to set Belgian labour once more to work, an entire army corps would be placed at Germany's disposal."* Already, a little time before, certain deputies of the Sozial Demokratie—Wendel, Noske, and Koster—had appeared at the *Maison du Peuple* of Brussels in order to undertake a campaign for this object. It is unnecessary to say that their proposal met with no success.† This is not, by the way, the only occasion on which the Socialists of the Kaiser have sought to insinuate themselves into the counsels of their fellows in the neutral and even

* See *Humanité* of the 1st of August, 1915.

† *Id.*, the numbers for the 16th, 17th, and 18th of December, 1914.

in the belligerent countries, there to play the part of those tame elephants which are trained to make their way among the herds of their wild comrades, in order to lead them into the stockade where slavery awaits them.

Happily, we have many grounds for anticipating the failure of these intrigues. The other nations will easily perceive that under this sudden love which Germany is now professing for peace is hidden the knowledge of imminent defeat. The sense of justice will be outraged in all decent people if, after having violated every law of war and of humanity, Germany should acquire the means of escaping the punishment of her cruelties and oppressions. On the other hand, it is certain—and this consideration should be enough to justify every further effort and sacrifice which may be required of us—that if we do not secure guarantees against future aggression the whole tragedy must begin over again within a few years. It would be in vain that Belgium should have exposed herself, with open eyes and in spite of the odds against her, to all the horrors of an invasion which, by its massacres, its devastations, and its deportations, recalls the worst excesses of barbarism in the days when the Roman Empire was crumbling into ruin; vain that France, through her prodigies of valour, should have brought the Teuton flood to a standstill upon the banks of the Marne and beneath the walls of Verdun; vain that England, with a vigour and resolution without precedents in her history, should have cast into the struggle the whole of her population that

was of age to serve ; vain that ten nations should have drenched with their most precious blood a battle-front that reaches from the North Sea to the Caspian, and even to the Pacific.

Even the neutrals, however great may be their eagerness to hasten the return of peace, cannot wish that that peace should be only a clumsy compromise.

What would happen should we be content to restore the situation as it existed before the war ? Germany—disappointed in her greed, but in no way healed of her ambitions, her mind filled beyond all else with thoughts of revenge, remaining in full possession of her resources and her territories—will not fail to embark once more upon her military preparations and with greater determination than ever before. Her adversaries, on their side, taught by experience—an experience which has cost them dear—will move heaven and earth to follow her, if not to outstrip her, in all those regions of activity in which, while she was devoting herself exclusively to her preparation for war, they had allowed themselves to fall behind. Europe will thus witness the continuation, to an unimaginable extent, of that ruinous rivalry of armaments, which will quickly place the nations, still but a little recovered from their losses, in the dilemma of either rushing on into bankruptcy or of beginning the war again in order to determine, once and for all, whether or not Germany is to dominate the earth. Is there a pacifist of any honesty, no matter to what country he belongs, who does not perceive that such a

peace must be utterly hostile to both his hopes and his aspirations?

It may be objected that if Germany does not modify her character, the Allies will only have postponed the day of reckoning, and that the time must surely come when the conquered, having healed their wounds, will find themselves ready to renew their aggression. It is certain that no one can dream of annihilating, nor even of permanently suppressing or dismembering, a race which numbers more than sixty-five million souls. But, immense though the recuperative force of Germany undoubtedly is, we may consider what her situation will be during many long years, if only the conditions which justice demands for her be imposed upon her and her allies: complete reparation for the damage they have caused and the abandonment of territory wherein they have oppressed populations of alien blood, without mentioning the fate which is reserved for the colonies by which the increase of their fleet is justified and for the fleet which justifies the extension of those colonies. When we consider that Germany, though victorious, has required forty years in order to place herself in a condition to renew the war of 1870, we may well ask ourselves how much time she will need, if she is conquered, in order to embark once again upon the path along which her bellicose tendencies urge her. And thereupon the question arises whether, by that more or less distant time, war will still be possible.

VII.

A DURABLE PEACE

THE nineteenth century was characterised by the parallel advance of two tendencies contradictory in appearance, but really to be regarded as the counterpoises and complements of each other. These are Nationalism and Internationalism ; that is to say, on the one hand, the aspirations of the people to group themselves according to their affinities—national, ethical, historical, or of choice ; on the other hand, the development of institutions which form the common heritage of man, especially those which tend to introduce into the Society of Nations the law and order which already regulate the relations of individuals within each separate State. I have said enough about international reform, and have shown how the chief obstacle which it encountered was the resistance of Pan-Germanism. As for the sentiment of nationality, Germany, who has made use of it in order to ensure her own unity, has become, in agreement with her two chief allies—Austria and Turkey—the no less irreconcilable adversary of this, too.*

Ever since the first months of the war I have

* Mr. Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at Manchester, has written upon this subject a book which can be most confidently recommended for the conciseness and logical character of its conclusions, *Nationalism and Internationalism*. London : Constable, 1916.

nursed a dream which I have succeeded in translating into the terms of the accompanying map. That with which I am here concerned is nothing less than to procure the coincidence of the political frontiers of the countries of Europe with the lines which mark off her various nationalities from one



another. To achieve this result it would be enough to break the artificial chains which bind to the Central Empires a dozen provinces which would thereafter be free to follow the guidance of their own national affinities and antipathies. Is it necessary to cite them at length? Alsace-

Lorraine, Trieste and the Trentino, Transylvania, Bosnia and Herzégovina, Galicia and the Duchy of Posen, the Banat and the Bukhovina, the Duchy of Schleswig and the Walloon cantons of the Rhenish provinces—to say nothing of the other liberations which the collapse of Turkey would make possible ; that, for instance, of the unfortunate Armenia. It would perhaps mean, within a longer or shorter period, the independence of Hungary and Bohemia.

All these rearrangements would together form a tribute to that principle of self-government which, having penetrated everywhere throughout the political organisation of civilised communities logically points, in the International Order, to the right of populations to dispose of their own destinies. It would also mean the disappearance of a source of trouble which, if it be allowed to continue, must make precarious the future of every kind of peace. It would, lastly, be to set about the discovery of the best foundation for the establishment of a final order in the equilibrium of Europe.*

May I add that I have never dreamed of a

* In a speech, delivered on the 28th of May, 1916, at the banquet of the League to enforce Peace, the President of the United States of America declared his programme of international organisation in these terms:—(1) Every people has the right to choose its own rulers. (2) Small States have the same right to see their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected as the great nations. (3) The world must be preserved from every rupture of peace which originates in aggression and contempt for the rights of peoples and nations.

There is no reason to suppose that since then Mr. Wilson has altered his opinion on these three points.

dismemberment that should be carried any further than this? Let the conquerors seek complementary guarantees in the transfer of colonies, the confiscation of machinery, the restitution of merchant fleets and industrial machines, without mentioning still other measures of a military and economic character—I have nothing to say against this if circumstances favour it. That they should support the aspirations of certain secondary States, who should propose to themselves to throw off the Prussian yoke, would manifestly be a wise policy. But I should pity the nations who should think to increase their power or prosperity by creating upon their borders, by the annexation of German provinces, permanent focuses of hate and trouble. May the precedent of Alsace-Lorraine serve as a lesson!

But is it possible that my dream should come true, and to what extent?

Two new factors have recently been added to the situation. On the one hand, the vague Note of Germany demanding that *pourparlers* for the discussion of the terms of peace should be initiated; on the other, the message of Mr. Wilson requesting the belligerents to inform him of their aims. We may ignore the first of these, which simply exposes the growing weakness of Germany's resistance, and has been rejected by the Allies on good grounds. The case of the other is different, since, owing to the favourable reception which it has met from the nations who are not directly engaged in the struggle, it marks perhaps a first step towards the constitution of a League

of Neutral Powers with which we might eventually have to reckon.

We naturally regret that these nations who, upon their own showing, are exclusively inspired by the love of peace and an anxious care for the welfare of humanity, should not have manifested their sentiments when Germany let loose the scourge of war and trampled International law under foot ; and, similarly, that to-day they still seem desirous, while calling upon the name of law, of maintaining the balance of power between the authors and the victims of these outrages. I believe, however, in the sincerity of their protestations, when they propose to themselves for their ultimate aim, over and beyond the re-establishment of peace, the creation of an organisation which will make impossible the return of similar cataclysms ; and, even through the red fog which envelops us to-day, I seem to catch a gleam of consolation from this unanimous desire not only to put an end to this war, but to all wars. What we have to ask of these nations, above everything, is that they should clearly understand that no lasting peace is possible that is not founded upon justice ; that is to say, upon adequate reparation for the past and effective guarantees for the future.*

I would add that the map shown above contains yet another warning upon which the

* There is no need to point out that, since this was written, the actual intervention of the United States in the war has somewhat altered the aspect of things and strengthened the hopes of those who look for a lasting and rightful peace.

pacifists and neutral nations will do well to reflect, if they feel in themselves any inclination to believe that a peace which shall be concluded or imposed upon the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* can lead to the firm establishment of European society according to the principles of law. The first condition of such an establishment will be to guarantee to the contracting States the integrity of the territories which they possessed before the outbreak of war, and protection, at the same time, against all foreign interference in their domestic concerns; the Courts of Arbitration being permitted to intervene only in international disputes. A glance at the distribution of races in Europe will be enough to make evident what important sections of the civilised world would, lacking such condition, be handed over to the uncontrolled and undiluted mercies of the gaolers of Prussia, the hangmen of Austria, and the butchers of Turkey. We must admit that this would be a strange corollary to a movement that had been begun in the names of justice and humanity.

I am well aware that it is possible to draw up, in the admirable language of diplomacy, clauses which shall guarantee to all the subjects of the confederated States the full enjoyment of their civil and religious liberties by which the rights of man are represented. It is this which the third article of the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th of July, 1878, attempted to do for that kaleidoscopic medley of races which inhabits the Balkan Peninsula. The year had not run out before the

persecutions had recommenced more gaily than ever. It would be the same with guarantees, of whose observance the only custodians should be the very Governments who would stand to gain by their violation.

We may be certain that there will be no hope of the birth of a new order, nor even of a lasting pacification, in a peace that shall be founded upon the *status quo* or upon anything resembling it.

VIII.

A DEFINITIVE PEACE

FROM the fact that the pacifists cherished, up to the very eve of the war, illusions which were cruelly dissipated by events ; from the fact that Germany has torn up treaties which her own signature had clothed with solemn authority, violated every article of the code of international law, and in the course of her invasions brought back the excesses of barbarism to earth, must we conclude—as we may too often be tempted to do—that the cause of international law has received a blow from which it will not recover ; that the modifications which we had supposed the ruthlessness of war had undergone are no more than a farce ; and that the appeal to arms must once more and for ever become the final method of settling international differences ?

This conclusion might be a just one, had Germany been victorious. In that case, it is true, it is her conception of the right of the strongest which would have had the upper hand in the world, and the only lasting peace for which we could have hoped would be a *Pax Germanica*, founded, like the *Pax Romana* of former times, upon the complete subjection of the other nations. But the victory of the Decuple Alliance will have the contrary effect of re-establishing in our public

law the principles which have been misunderstood or violated by the barbarians of the twentieth century. We ask for no other proof of this than the refusal of the Allied Governments to undertake reprisals beyond what strict military necessity requires. Much more, it is alone out of their victory that there can come any decisive movement in the direction of more happily organised international relations.

The efforts of juridical pacifism have already secured to us, in spite of the obstacles raised by the German Government, an international code—which has never paused in its development—and an international tribunal charged with the duty of giving effect to the principles of that code; that is to say, two out of the three institutions without which the mechanism of every regularly organised society must come to a halt. Unfortunately, the third is still to seek—the authority; that is to say, the provision of the force necessary for the execution of judicial decisions.

All those who are concerned to bring about the abolition of war—jurists, politicians, diplomatists, socialists, and sociologists; above all, women, wives and mothers, whose eternal attitude to this question the Latin poet expressed when he denounced *bella matribus detestata*—must fully understand that this problem of problems will never be solved by sentimental considerations or by the simple pressure of public opinion, any more than by the organisation through the fortune of war of a single State keeping its neighbours

in order. The solution will only be found in the growth of solidarity between peoples who, while they respect one another's independence, will agree to make such sacrifices as may be necessary to replace force by justice in their mutual relationships.

I have here no intention to use such sounding words as Perpetual Peace or even the United States of Europe. It is better to place our reliance in practical reforms. And of these would it not be one, and one of the utmost value, if the nations who are allied against the ambitions of Germany, after having brought her to reason, should bind themselves by a formal treaty to take up arms collectively against any State, though it be one of the signatories themselves, who shall refuse to refer an international difference to a Court of Arbitration, or who, after having submitted itself to such a tribunal, shall desire to escape the execution of judgment? It is probable that the "Holy Alliance" thus constituted would quickly receive the support of neutral countries, who have themselves too greatly suffered during the present war not to hail with joy this specific against a further outbreak.

Each contracting party would be able to maintain its military and naval forces—at least, in a proportion which should be agreed upon in common. But these forces would be necessarily reduced to the simple status of an international gendarmerie, as would war itself to a form of punitive expedition, justified by the *casus fœderis*. The most ardent pacifist cannot reason-

ably look for more, having regard to the present state of the development of society.*

An eminent diplomatist who is at the same time a writer of note, Monsieur Gabriel Hanotaux, has lately published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* an article upon "The Problem of Peace," in which, while he recommends a solution of the same nature, he reminds us that, already in the eighteenth century, the Treaty of Westphalia had attempted to establish a new balance of power in Europe by means of a similar organisation: "All the contracting parties bind themselves to maintain each and all of the arrangements effected by the treaty. And if it should happen that any of these arrangements has been violated, the offended party shall endeavour first of all to turn the offending from his purpose, either by submitting the difference to amiable settlement or by recourse to law. But if the question shall be settled by neither of these means, each of the contracting parties shall be bound to join his advice and his strength to those of the injured party and to take up arms to repel the injustice." "Thus," adds Monsieur Hanotaux, "a European force would be constituted which would lend a permanent sanction to the decisions of the law—a force

* In his recent volume, *Magnissima Charta* (Boston, 1916), Monsieur La Fontaine, a Belgian Senator, and the President of the International Bureau of Peace, outlines the organisation of an armed force, which should remain at the disposition of the International Courts, and whose duty it should be to undertake the execution of the federal judgments whenever all methods of conciliation and indirect coercion should have failed.

which has hitherto been wanting, and whose support the platonic resolutions of The Hague Conference have strikingly lacked."

It is difficult to see in the future any more favourable opportunity for initiating a reform through which, in the words of Monsieur Hanotaux, "an organised, a better Europe," will emerge out of this dreadful crisis.

The armies of the Allies are fighting with equal discipline and heroism, and the memory of their deeds will live for ever in the hearts of generations who shall be free from the nightmare with which the adventure of Pan-Germanism has burdened the world. But joined to this sentiment of admiration and of gratitude there is another which we shall feel in no less a lively fashion, more especially when the first intoxication of triumph shall have given way to a perception of the realities of life and of what the future is to bring. This is the earnest desire to prevent the return of a catastrophe which represents a legacy bequeathed by barbarism, and one by which its hateful customs are given a new birth. On the other hand, will the neutrals, who have all more or less been affected by the repercussion of the war, and who had already for the most part been won over to the cause of compulsory and general arbitration—will they be able to refuse their adherence to an international union which will guarantee to them security together with independence and peace?

The conquerors will emerge severely tested from their fiery trial, like those legendary knights

who won their victory over the destroying dragon only at the cost of innumerable wounds. Whatever may be the amount of the indemnities to be obtained from the vanquished, in whatever way they may be distributed, the fortunes of every one, save of a few speculators, will have been seriously reduced; taxation will increase everywhere so greatly that the very springs of wealth will be affected; there will be few homes that will not mourn an empty place by their fireside; hundreds of thousands of cripples will for long years recall to our streets the memory of the struggle and its horrors. In exchange for this, what are the Allied Governments to offer to their peoples? Never, perhaps, will they encounter conditions more favourable to the foundation of that reign of peace imagined by the prophet, when, indeed, the wolf will not be seen living harmoniously by the side of the lamb, since this is against the laws of Nature, but when the sword shall have been beaten into the plough-share, for this depends upon liberty and human reason.

* * * *

“You ask me what it is that Germany desires,” wrote Professor Oswald, during the first months of the war, in a Swedish review. And he answered himself thus: “She desires to organise a Europe who has never hitherto been organised.” This famous Pan-German chemist was right when he pointed out what was wanting. His mistake lay in his belief that, in order to supply her want, Europe has any longer need of Germany.

Already, with regard to this matter, we possess the promise of statesmen, leaders of nations, who will not fail to keep their word. "Peace," said Monsieur Briand, in May, 1916, "must be no empty formula. It must be founded upon international law and guaranteed by an authority which no country will be able to assail. Such a peace will be like a sun to humanity, and will give a security to the nations wherein they shall be able to work and to develop each its own noblest qualities."

Coming still closer to the question, Lord Grey, in his speech of the 24th of October, 1916, to the foreign journalists in England, after having supported the idea of creating, when the war is over, a union of nations with the object of assuring the continuance of peace, added, for the benefit of the neutral countries, that in order to make such a union effective the nations who give it their adherence must be prepared to employ force, if necessary, to ensure the observance of treaties. "There must be no end to this war, no peace except a peace which is going to ensure that the nations of Europe live in the future free from that shadow (*i.e.* of Prussian militarism) in the open air and in the light of freedom." Here speaks the true pacifism.

It is the same spirit which breathes in the joint reply of the Allies to the Note of Mr. Wilson which requested them to make known to him the objects for which they are fighting: "The Allied Governments declare their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations which

shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognise all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilisation from the institution of international agreements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations, and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression. But a discussion of future arrangements for assuring a durable peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the present conflict."

Indeed, it is a condition precedent to any step towards this goal that German militarism should be removed out of the way, and hence it is that those pacifists who, in the neutral as in the belligerent countries, call for any other conclusion to the war are blind to that which is possible or else are traitors to their own flag and subverters of their own cause.

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