


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CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

RESPECTING

THE ANGORA AGREEMENT OF
OCTOBER 20, 1921.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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O. W. ...

**Correspondence between His Majesty's Government
and the French Government respecting the
Angora Agreement of October 20, 1921.**

No. 1.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Count de Saint-Aulaire.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, November 5, 1921.

On the occasion of our interview on the 3rd November, I undertook to send you a memorandum containing the principal points arising out of the draft agreement concluded between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government, and also the accompanying letter to M. Franklin-Bouillon from Yussouf Kemal Bey—to some of which I had called your attention, although it was not possible in the course of a single conversation to refer to all.

I commenced by reminding you that in the earlier part of the present year I had asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin-Bouillon had any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private person who was going to Angora in connection with the press or for purposes of his own. Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government, M. Briand had in an official note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally, when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had again enquired as to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Government the larger questions of peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Government, with regard to French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops.

Relying upon these categorical assurances, I had taken no further steps in the matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only during the last week I had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and in spite of their pressure, I had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful effort in the interests of the alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that I had read the provisions of M. Franklin-Bouillon's agreement, as to which I could not avoid asking a number of serious questions, and which I could hardly believe that the French Government would be prepared to accept in its present form.

The points of the agreement as communicated to His Majesty's Government which seemed to me to call for special explanation were the following:—

Article 1 provides that with the signature of the agreement "the state of war will cease between the high contracting parties." Clearly, this phrase implies something more than a local armistice, because a state of armistice is still technically a state of war. Nothing is said as to whether the agreement is provisional pending a general peace between the Allies and Turkey or whether it is intended to have purely local scope. The latter could hardly be the case, as some of the articles appear to be of general application to Turkey. It is presumed, therefore, that the agreement establishes a state of peace between France and the Grand National Assembly.

It would also appear that the agreement involves formal recognition by France of the Grand National Assembly of Angora as the sovereign authority in Turkey, in which case a peace concluded with Angora would be contrary to the Franco-British Treaty of the 4th September, 1914, and to the London Pact of November 1915.

Article 3. This provision for the withdrawal of French troops from the territory handed over to Turkey ignores French obligations under article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, to maintain troops in the zone of special French interests until the French, British and Italian Governments are agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey is being executed, and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities have been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed. While the evacuation of Cilicia, which, as M. Briand stated, was the object of the negotiations, necessarily involved the withdrawal of French troops, it was clearly incumbent on the French Government to take all possible guarantees for the protection of minorities in accordance with their obligations.

But while the full amnesty provided in article 5 may offer some protection for the minorities in Cilicia, the agreement appears to contain no safeguards for its effective operation by the Kemalists.

Further, while article 6 provides that "the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declares that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established by the conversations concluded on this subject between the Powers of the *Entente*, their enemies and certain of their Allies," it is noted that the clause is not drafted to apply to Cilicia and is therefore presumably of general application to Turkey.

It is thus open to the objection that it runs counter to the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres for the protection of minorities, and ignores the responsibilities assumed by the French Government for the protection of minorities in the zone of their special interests under the Tripartite Agreement. Article 1 of that agreement states that the "assistance" to be afforded to the Turkish Government by France "shall be specially directed towards enhancing the protection afforded to racial, religious or linguistic minorities." It appears, therefore, that by this article France has not only renounced her responsibilities with regard to the protection of minorities, under the Tripartite Agreement, but has pledged herself to substitute for the minority provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres other provisions on the lines of the treaties made between the

principal Allies and such European countries as Poland. It need hardly be pointed out that these treaties are inadequate and their provisions generally quite inapplicable to Turkey. In fact, the contention of the Angora Government on one important point of general application to Turkey has been accepted by one Ally in advance of general negotiations for a treaty of peace between all the Allies and Turkey.

Article 7. It is assumed that this article, which provides for special rights of Turks in the Alexandretta area and for the use of Turkish as the official language, will necessitate some modification of, or addition to, the draft mandate for Syria now before the League of Nations.

Article 8. The revision, provided for in this article, of the northern frontier of Syria as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres cannot be regarded as the concern of France alone. It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted a common gage of Allied victory, although by an arrangement between the Allies the mandate had been awarded to France. The mandate is now under consideration by the League of Nations and this important and far-reaching modification of the territory to which it applies altogether ignores the League of Nations, while the return to Turkey of territory handed over to the Allies in common without previous notification to Great Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the treaty which all three have signed.

Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the localities of Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar, both of which are of great strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the same consideration applies to the handing back to Turkey of the track of the Bagdad Railway between Choban-Bey and Nisibin. In neither case have His Majesty's Government been consulted.

It is noted that the frontier is to be "fixed" by the two parties within one month of the signature of the agreement in advance of all the other frontiers of Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.

Article 9. Inasmuch as this concession may be followed by demands from Turkey for similar privileges in regard to other sites, the Allies were entitled to expect that they should have been consulted before any such arrangement was made.

Article 10. The transfer of the Bozanti-Nisibin section of the Bagdad line to a French group seems to be tantamount to the execution by France of paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, in advance of, and independently of the duties and responsibilities undertaken by France towards her Allies under the Tripartite Agreement and under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which are interdependent. It is presumed that the transfer of this part of the Bagdad line by Turkey to the French group is not intended to override article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres, whereby Turkey was herself to liquidate the whole Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal Allies. Nor is it supposed that the article can be intended to give France a large portion of the railway without regard to the claims of her other Allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres is the Allies' common asset, and in respect of which special arrangements are contemplated under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement.

Paragraph 3 of article 10 provides that each party shall have the right to use for military transport that part of the Bagdad line which lies in the other's territory. This in effect appears to mean that France must permit Turkish troops to be carried from Konia to Nisibin and possibly thus threaten the Mesopotamian frontier. Great Britain can hardly believe that the French Government would propose to conclude an arrangement which may well have such serious strategic consequences to her position in Mesopotamia without any prior reference to His Majesty's Government. Moreover, it is not understood how the acceptance of this servitude on territory placed under a mandate of the League of Nations can be accepted without prior consultation with the other members of the League concerned.

The appended letter from Yussouf Kemal expresses the hope that the French Government will endeavour to solve all questions relative to Turkish independence and sovereignty; it goes on to add that the Government of the Grand Assembly (it also speaks of the "Turkish Government") is ready to grant a number of concessions and other advantages in favour of France and French nationals, apparently both within and without the French zone. The form of the letter inevitably lends itself to the interpretation that there is some connection of a conditional nature between the Turkish hope and promise, and the expression "questions relative to Turkish independence and sovereignty" would appear to be quite outside the scope of an arrangement regarding Cilicia and Syria.

His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn whether the letter in question, which has been officially communicated to them, is regarded by the French Government as an integral part of the agreement. The implication is suggested that it was written in connection with some written or verbal understanding with M. Franklin-Bouillon. His Majesty's Government would be pleased to receive information on these points and to know whether the French Government have replied, or propose to reply, to the letter of Yussouf Kemal Bey.

The agreement and the letter have also formed the subject of various statements in the press regarding secret clauses or annexes. It has been alleged that, under arrangements concluded but not published, France is to have a monopoly of the gendarmerie organisation in Turkey (which would be entirely contrary to the arrangements for international control contemplated by the Treaty and already to some extent carried out in anticipation); that a large portion of the war loan is to be handed over to Turkey; that a French loan has been arranged; that France has promised to supply the Nationalists with a formidable armament; that she has undertaken to support Turkish claims to Smyrna and Thrace; even that she has obtained a promise of anti-British agitation by the Nationalists in Mesopotamia. His Majesty's Government cannot believe that there is any foundation for any of these statements, but, in view of their wide dissemination in the press, His Majesty's Government would like to be in a position to issue a formal denial of these and similar assertions and to announce that the published agreement was accompanied by no other written or verbal understandings.

In conclusion, with regard to the agreement as a whole, His Majesty's Government find the utmost difficulty in recognising in its present no doubt provisional form any resemblance to the *tractation locale* described by M. Briand. On the contrary, it has the appearance of being a separate agreement concluded by one of

the Allies with an enemy Government without consultation with the remainder, and this impression, unless it is dissipated, cannot fail to react unfavourably upon the policy of full and complete Allied co-operation in which His Majesty's Government have always believed and which they have consistently practised in their desire to bring about a general peace in the Near East.

His Majesty's Government look forward to receiving a full and friendly explanation on the whole of these points from the French Government, and they express the confident expectation that the agreement in the form in which it is finally approved by the French Government will be freed from many of the ambiguous or questionable features which, in their desire to avoid all possible cause of dissension or misunderstanding, they have been compelled to point out.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 2.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 18.)

Ambassade de France,

M. le Marquis,

Londres, le 17 novembre 1921.

À LA suite de l'entretien que votre Seigneurie a eu avec M. de Saint-Aulaire touchant l'accord intervenu entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et le Gouvernement d'Angora, elle a bien voulu adresser, le 5 novembre, à l'Ambassadeur de la République, une lettre faisant ressortir sur quels points cet arrangement paraît au Gouvernement britannique dépasser le caractère d'une "tractation locale," suivant la définition donnée par M. Briand, et réserver à la France des avantages particuliers.

Je me suis empressé de faire part de cette communication à mon Gouvernement, qui, après l'avoir examinée avec le plus grand soin, et dans l'esprit le plus amical, m'a prié de faire connaître à votre Seigneurie les observations que l'étude de ce document lui suggère. Le Gouvernement français ne doute pas que la netteté et la précision de ses explications ne dissipent l'impression qui se dégage de la lettre de votre Seigneurie et ne peut résulter que d'un malentendu.

Le Gouvernement français a été heureux tout d'abord de constater que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a bien compris la nature des deux missions confiées à M. Franklin-Bouillon, missions dont votre Seigneurie avait été informée dès qu'elles furent décidées.

Le premier voyage de M. Franklin-Bouillon a été entrepris spontanément et à titre strictement privé et personnel; le Gouvernement français a saisi, avec satisfaction, cette occasion de se renseigner sur les tendances du Gouvernement d'Angora et les possibilités de mettre fin aux hostilités dont la France supportait, en Cilicie, tout le poids, alors que la nation et le Parlement avaient exprimé, avec force, leur volonté de faire cesser de cruelles effusions de sang et des dépenses particulièrement onéreuses.

Le Président du Conseil a estimé que M. Franklin-Bouillon était pleinement qualifié pour entreprendre une telle enquête par son passé d'ancien membre du Gouvernement, sa connaissance

approfondie des affaires d'Orient et les garanties qu'offraient son expérience et son activité.

Votre Seigneurie constatera que rien, dans le programme d'information indiqué ci-dessus, n'allait à l'encontre des assurances données par M. Briand, aux termes de quoi la France n'avait contracté et ne contracterait aucun engagement touchant aux questions générales de la paix entre les Alliés et la Turquie, sans être en accord étroit avec eux, et particulièrement avec le Gouvernement britannique.

Quant à la seconde mission de M. Franklin-Bouillon, mission dont votre Seigneurie a connu le caractère officiel, elle n'est pas davantage sortie du cadre tracé par M. Briand; laissant entièrement de côté les problèmes de la paix générale, elle s'est limitée strictement à la négociation des affaires mêmes énumérées par votre Seigneurie dans sa lettre du 5 novembre: libération des prisonniers français, protection des minorités en Cilicie, et questions qui se posaient nécessairement comme corollaires de l'évacuation de la Cilicie par nos troupes.

Le Gouvernement français m'a prescrit de renouveler l'assurance qu'il a toujours réservé la question de la paix avec la Turquie et n'a jamais envisagé qu'un engagement puisse être pris à cet égard en dehors d'un accord étroit avec ses Alliés et, notamment, avec le Gouvernement britannique. Des assurances catégoriques à cet égard ont déjà été données au Gouvernement britannique le 14 juillet 1921, et je suis chargé de les réitérer expressément.

Le Gouvernement français les répète d'autant plus volontiers qu'il a trouvé chez le Gouvernement anglais le même esprit de complète collaboration lors des conversations qui ont eu lieu récemment, à Londres, entre votre Seigneurie et les Ministres grecs, pour la recherche d'une paix satisfaisante en Orient. Le Gouvernement de la République ne peut que se réjouir de constater la parfaite identité de principes qui existe ainsi entre les deux Gouvernements.

Ce plein accord, sur les maximes qui règlent la conduite des deux Gouvernements, met le Gouvernement français d'autant plus à l'aise pour dissiper tout malentendu, tant sur la portée de l'Arrangement d'Angora, que sur les motifs qui ont amené la France à l'approuver.

Sans doute, le Gouvernement anglais a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement français sur les inconvénients d'un accord direct entre la France et le Gouvernement d'Angora. Le 4 avril, au cours d'une visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, il fut rappelé à Lord Hardinge qu'en mars 1921, M. Briand avait déclaré, à plusieurs reprises, à Mr. Lloyd George, sans que le Premier Ministre britannique élevât la moindre observation, qu'il ne quitterait pas l'Angleterre sans avoir conclu un accord avec la délégation d'Angora. M. Briand avait fait ressortir que ni le Parlement ni l'opinion française n'accepteraient la prolongation d'hostilités entraînant des pertes cruelles et inutiles, puisque le Traité de Sèvres consacre l'évacuation de la Cilicie et que les légères concessions faites, à la frontière septentrionale du mandat syrien, conformément au principe des nationalités qui a dominé toute l'œuvre de la paix, ne sont au détriment d'aucun Allié, tout en étant propres à faciliter l'entente générale. Il fut, en même temps, précisé à Lord Hardinge que M. Briand avait alors marqué à Mr. Lloyd George qu'il ne signerait cet accord qu'à la dernière heure et après avoir constaté l'impossibilité d'aboutir à Londres à un arrangement

général sur l'Orient. C'est au cours de cette conversation que, dès le 4 avril, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reçut le texte de l'arrangement dont il s'agit.

Ces déclarations ont été renouvelées à votre Seigneurie par M. de Saint-Aulaire le 19 avril dernier, quand elle a bien voulu entretenir le représentant de la République de cette affaire. Le Gouvernement français a été fondé à croire que les explications fournies par l'Ambassadeur de France avaient donné au Gouvernement britannique ses apaisements, puisque votre Seigneurie n'a pas donné suite au projet de note dont elle avait annoncé l'envoi à M. de Saint-Aulaire.

Depuis lors, le Gouvernement français n'a cessé d'ailleurs, et notamment dans sa lettre du 14 juillet dernier, adressée à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, d'affirmer sa volonté de mettre fin aux hostilités qui se poursuivaient sur les confins du mandat syrien, dès qu'il pourrait obtenir l'acceptation de clauses précises assurant la protection des minorités et notamment des Arméniens.

C'est, dans ces conditions, et alors que depuis longtemps déjà les Alliés avaient retiré leurs troupes des divers points de l'Empire ottoman occupés au moment de l'armistice, que le Gouvernement français a estimé, après avoir informé ses Alliés de ses intentions, et en réservant soigneusement la solution de toutes les questions générales à régler en commun par les Alliés, qu'il avait le droit de s'engager dans la voie où ses partenaires l'avaient précédé, en usant des moyens que les événements imposaient. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté reconnaît, en effet, que si le retrait des troupes royales des frontières de la Mésopotamie et la suppression du contrôle militaire allié sur les voies ferrées d'Anatolie ont pu s'accomplir sans accord avec le Gouvernement d'Angora, dépourvu à cette époque de toute puissance offensive, il ne pouvait en être de même sur les frontières de Syrie, car, d'un côté, les forces nationalistes se sont depuis lors considérablement développées et, par ailleurs, la Syrie ne se trouve pas, comme la Mésopotamie, protégée par la distance.

Nul ne peut contester que la France n'avait de choix qu'entre les deux alternatives suivantes : ou bien maintenir ses effectifs et continuer la guerre en Cilicie, ou bien négocier avec le pouvoir de fait qui commandait aux troupes turques de cette région. La volonté de la nation française s'étant clairement, fortement et constamment manifestée en faveur de l'évacuation, le Gouvernement français était dans l'obligation de poursuivre la conclusion d'un arrangement local, qui est, au reste, conforme, dans ses dispositions fondamentales, à celui dont le texte avait été communiqué au Gouvernement anglais le 4 avril 1921.

Les tendances générales qui ont inspiré la conduite du Gouvernement français étant ainsi précisées, j'ai l'honneur de donner, ci-après, à votre Seigneurie quelques éclaircissements touchant des points particuliers visés dans sa lettre du 5 novembre.

Les mots "cessation de l'état de guerre," qui figurent à l'article 1^{er}, ont paru au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté être des termes impropres pour définir un armistice local. Votre Seigneurie estime, en outre, que mention aurait dû être faite du caractère provisoire de l'arrangement intervenu. La rédaction adoptée donnerait, au contraire, à l'accord l'apparence d'un véritable Traité de Paix.

Ainsi que l'a déjà marqué verbalement à Lord Hardinge le Directeur des Affaires politiques, l'Accord d'Angora ne constitue pas

un Traité de Paix. Ce n'est qu'un arrangement de portée locale conclu avec un pouvoir qui n'est reconnu ni *de jure* ni *de facto*, mais qui a manifesté une autorité, un patriotisme et une loyauté, propres à le faire considérer comme capable de tenir et de faire exécuter les engagements qu'il a contractés. D'une manière générale, si l'Arrangement d'Angora eût constitué un Traité de Paix, il aurait dû, suivant la constitution, être soumis à la ratification du Parlement. Or, il a été simplement approuvé par le Gouvernement français et aucune ratification parlementaire n'a été sollicitée.

Le Gouvernement français considère, d'autre part, que l'usage des expressions " d'armistice " et " d'arrangement provisoire " eût risqué d'inquiéter les populations en leur faisant craindre une reprise des hostilités.

Quant au terme " hautes parties contractantes, " il n'a qu'une valeur d'usage et de courtoisie traditionnelle; il figure d'ailleurs déjà dans l'Accord de Londres, et le Gouvernement britannique n'avait, jusqu'ici, formulé aucune objection contre son emploi. Il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que l'emploi de ces expressions n'implique nullement, en droit international, la reconnaissance *de jure* d'un État ou d'un Gouvernement nouveau.

Le Gouvernement britannique estime que l'article 3 de l'Arrangement d'Angora ne tient pas compte des obligations contractées par la France, en vertu de l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite. Selon l'interprétation donnée par votre Seigneurie audit article 8, la France aurait pris l'engagement de ne retirer ses troupes de la zone d'intérêts spéciaux, qu'après s'être assurée de l'exécution des garanties pour les minorités.

Le Gouvernement français considère que l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite du 18 août 1920 a été rédigé non pas dans le but de nous obliger à rester en Cilicie, mais bien au contraire dans l'intention de limiter notre occupation. Il tombe sous le sens que le Gouvernement français n'aurait jamais consenti à prendre l'engagement et à supporter les charges d'une occupation indéfinie.

Le Gouvernement français a d'ailleurs, à plusieurs reprises, comme je l'ai marqué plus haut, indiqué au Gouvernement anglais la nécessité où il se trouvait de mettre fin à la situation anormale qui prolongeait les hostilités sur la frontière syrienne, tandis qu'elles avaient cessé entre les autres Alliés et la Turquie, sans que pour cela l'état de paix pût être considéré comme juridiquement rétabli.

En outre, le Gouvernement français tient à faire une remarque générale quant à la validité de l'Accord tripartite sur quoi est fondée principalement l'argumentation juridique de la lettre du 5 novembre. En aucun cas, le Gouvernement français ne se reconnaîtrait autorisé à transiger sur les droits reconnus par cet accord au profit de ses Alliés, soit d'Angleterre, soit d'Italie. Mais il estime d'autant plus avoir le droit de renoncer aux avantages stipulés en sa faveur que cet accord n'a pas été ratifié et, comme le Traité de Sèvres, doit, aux termes mêmes des déclarations faites par Lord Curzon, tout récemment, à Londres, aux Ministres grecs, subir certaines modifications; il ne saurait donc avoir la valeur d'un traité en vigueur.

Enfin, dans les parties du territoire ottoman comprises ou non comprises dans les zones d'où les troupes alliées se sont retirées, aucune garantie n'avait pu jusqu'à ce jour être obtenue en faveur des minorités. La France, au contraire, a expressément subordonné tout retrait éventuel de ses troupes de Cilicie à l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement d'Angora qu'il assurerait la protection des minorités et la prise effective de dispositions dans ce sens.

Le Gouvernement de sa Majesté regrette que, par l'article 6, la France ait admis, pour la protection des minorités, des garanties différentes de celles que le Traité de Sèvres avait prévues et qu'en ne limitant pas expressément à la Cilicie lesdites dispositions le Gouvernement français ait paru donner satisfaction à une des prétentions du Gouvernement d'Angora en une matière de grande importance et de portée générale, alors qu'un tel sujet devait essentiellement faire l'objet d'un accord entre les Alliés et être réservé pour les négociations de la paix générale.

Il ne saurait, sans injustice, être fait reproche à la France de n'avoir pu faire accepter, pour la protection des minorités en Cilicie, des garanties que la pression de la force totale des Alliés n'a pu obtenir de la Turquie. Le retrait des troupes françaises étant une nécessité, le Gouvernement de la République a estimé que sa volonté de ne point s'écarter des dispositions—signées, mais non ratifiées—du Traité de Sèvres, ne pourrait aller jusqu'à laisser les minorités sans protection aucune, et qu'un devoir d'humanité l'obligeait à leur assurer, tout au moins, les garanties inscrites dans les traités imposés par l'Entente à la Hongrie et à la Bulgarie.

Quant au regret exprimé par votre Seigneurie que ces dernières garanties puissent être considérées comme s'appliquant non seulement à la Cilicie, mais aux autres parties de la Turquie, le Gouvernement français considère que tout l'Accord d'Angora est dominé par l'idée qu'il s'agit d'un arrangement d'une portée locale.

D'ailleurs, il ne saurait être fait grief au Gouvernement français d'avoir étendu ses obligations non point dans son propre intérêt, mais dans celui des populations de l'Anatolie, qui se trouvent encore actuellement privées de toute protection.

Indépendamment des garanties formellement énoncées dans l'Accord, je puis ajouter que M. Franklin-Bouillon est tombé d'accord avec le Gouvernement d'Angora pour contrôler lui-même les conditions dans lesquelles s'effectueraient l'évacuation et l'installation des nouvelles autorités; il sera aidé dans cette tâche par trois délégués spéciaux du Gouvernement français, qui résideront à Adana, à Mersina et à Aintab.

Le régime administratif, visé à l'article 7, pour la région d'Alexandrette, n'est pas en opposition avec le régime prévu pour le mandat qui doit tenir compte de l'extrême diversité des races en Syrie; il est conforme à l'organisation générale des pays de mandat français, organisation qui accorde déjà une large autonomie administrative aux différents groupes ethniques. L'article 7 de l'Accord d'Angora n'attribue, d'ailleurs, aucun droit politique ou économique à la Turquie et ne prévoit l'usage de la langue turque, concurremment avec l'arabe et le français, qu'en raison de l'emploi de cette langue par la grande majorité de la population.

La rectification de frontière prévue par l'article 8 apparaît à votre Seigneurie comme intéressant non seulement le Gouvernement français seul, mais les Gouvernements alliés, les territoires pris à la Turquie constituant le gage de la victoire commune. Votre Seigneurie estime qu'une modification territoriale du mandat syrien ne tient pas compte des obligations de la France vis-à-vis de la Ligue des Nations, tandis que la rétrocession des régions abandonnées par la Turquie aux Alliés sans notification préalable à la Grande-Bretagne et à l'Italie est inconciliable à la fois avec l'esprit et avec la lettre du traité, qui porte la signature des trois Puissances. Cette situation apparaît à votre Seigneurie comme d'autant plus regret-

table que, la frontière devant être fixée dans un délai d'un mois à dater de la signature de l'arrangement, la frontière turco-syrienne se trouvera déterminée avant toutes les autres frontières turques qui doivent être délimitées par le Traité de Sèvres.

Le Gouvernement français doit d'abord faire observer que les Alliés ont, au lendemain de l'armistice, procédé à d'autres occupations et à des mesures de contrôle militaire en Turquie qui constituaient également des gages d'une importance égale, et cependant ni ces occupations, ni ces mesures de contrôle n'ont pu être intégralement maintenues.

Les régions du mandat syrien, dont il est question à l'article 8, ne sont point d'ailleurs des territoires proprement arabes, mais bien des pays de transhumance sans limites nettes, sans populations sédentaires, et où domine non l'élément arabe, mais l'élément kurde.

Il y aurait, enfin, quelque exagération à reprocher à la France de renoncer à une fraction, relativement insignifiante, des territoires ottomans occupés, alors que plus de trois ans après l'armistice elle supporte encore, sur les frontières de Syrie, les pertes et l'entretien d'une armée de près de 100,000 hommes, tandis que dans les autres régions ottomanes où stationnaient des troupes alliées les effectifs ont été progressivement réduits à quelques bataillons. Le maintien de contingents aussi nombreux a été, d'ailleurs, jusqu'ici la conséquence non des difficultés que présenterait la préservation de l'ordre public en Syrie, mais bien de la nécessité de pouvoir faire face en Cilicie à une menace éventuelle de la Turquie. La fin de ce danger permettra sans doute au Gouvernement français d'opérer dans le plus bref délai une réduction considérable des forces françaises en Orient.

Il convient d'ajouter que l'obligation où se trouvait la France, pour assurer l'évacuation de la Cilicie, d'abandonner certaines parcelles du mandat syrien, était depuis longtemps connue de nos Alliés.

En ce qui concerne les territoires situés entre l'Euphrate et le Tigre qui, pratiquement, n'ont du reste jamais été occupés par les forces alliées, la communication faite, le 4 avril, à Lord Hardinge, de l'accord conclu à Londres par M. Briand avec Bekir Sami, constituait tout au moins une notification précise de l'intention du Gouvernement français de renoncer à l'occupation desdits territoires.

Quant au reproche d'avoir effectué cette renonciation à la suite d'un accord, il convient de répéter que la situation actuelle est fort différente de celle dont les Puissances avaient pu bénéficier précédemment. Les forces turques se sont considérablement développées. Le Gouvernement d'Angora dispose d'années d'une valeur offensive qu'il n'avait point précédemment. Il n'était pas possible d'échapper à la nécessité d'un arrangement dès l'instant que l'évacuation de la Cilicie était décidée et il eût été inconcevable qu'un tel accord pût s'établir sans certaines concessions réciproques. Le Gouvernement français est convaincu qu'à cet égard il n'a donné à la Société des Nations aucun motif de reproche.

En outre, l'argument des mandats ne peut être retenu pour des raisons multiples. Les mandats n'ont pas encore été ratifiés par la Société des Nations et leurs termes sont encore en discussion. Le Traité de Sèvres n'est pas entré en vigueur. De l'aveu même du Gouvernement anglais, il doit être modifié. Les frontières qu'il a fixées ne sont donc pas intangibles. La France, mandataire en

Syrie, a seule qualité pour traiter les intérêts des populations syriennes dans leurs rapports inévitables avec les populations turques au delà de la frontière.

Le regret exprimé par votre Seigneurie au sujet de l'article 9, qui est relatif au tombeau du Sultan Soliman, paraît fondé sur une interprétation que le Gouvernement français tient à rectifier. Il ne s'agit point d'une question de souveraineté, mais d'un droit de propriété, reconnu pour des raisons de sentiment.

L'article 10 se borne à constater que le Gouvernement d'Angora accepte le transfert à un groupe français de la concession de la section Bozanti-Nisibin du Chemin de fer de Bagdad et ne précise pas, comme le fait l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres, que le Gouvernement "transférera" ladite concession. Ainsi la procédure envisagée par l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres se trouve réservée, et l'Accord d'Angora ne fait aucun obstacle à ce qu'elle soit appliquée.

Quant au fond même de l'arrangement intervenu entre les Alliés, en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer, tel qu'il résulte de l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite, et, notamment, du paragraphe 2 de cet article, le Gouvernement britannique veut bien reconnaître que le Gouvernement français tient à confirmer qu'il n'est en rien modifié, pas plus d'ailleurs que la répartition entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Italie de l'ensemble de la ligne de Bagdad.

Le Traité de Sèvres n'a réglé le sort du Chemin de fer de Bagdad que jusqu'au fleuve Djaihoum. Si ce traité était entré en vigueur, le chemin de fer à l'est du Djaihoum se fût trouvé en pleine Syrie et, à ce titre, il aurait dû être liquidé aux termes du Traité de Sèvres par la Puissance mandataire agissant seule: le transfert de cette section à une compagnie française, prévu par l'Accord d'Angora, nous maintient dans la même situation, tout en laissant le chemin de fer en territoire ture. Il est vrai que cette argumentation ne peut s'appliquer à la section du chemin de fer comprise entre les portes de la Cilicie et le Djaihoum. La protestation contre le transfert immédiat à une compagnie française de cette section, qui, d'après l'Accord tripartite, tombait dans une exploitation en commun franco-anglo-italienne, aurait donc une certaine apparence de fondement. Mais, en réalité, l'alinéa 2 du paragraphe 4 de l'Accord tripartite a expressément prévu le transfert à notre profit de cette section, en représentation des intérêts français existant dans le Bagdad avant 1914. Ainsi l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora, loin d'être une violation des stipulations de l'Arrangement tripartite, n'en constitue, en réalité, qu'une application anticipée.

Quant à l'utilisation militaire de la ligne, elle a principalement pour but le maintien de l'ordre dans les parties éloignées de toute communication, mais il serait inconcevable que la voie ferrée puisse être utilisée contre l'Angleterre. En effet, le chemin de fer passe en mandat syrien depuis Maidam-Ekbes jusqu'à Chobanbeg et le Gouvernement français serait par conséquent en mesure d'arrêter les transports s'ils paraissaient impliquer la possibilité d'une menace militaire contre la frontière de Mésopotamie.

Sur ce point, le Gouvernement français tient à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance la plus formelle qu'en aucun cas il ne pourrait envisager l'hypothèse d'une facilité quelconque donnée par lui à des desseins hostiles dirigés contre un territoire de mandat britannique. Les liens étroits qui unissent la France à l'Empire britannique et l'idée que le Gouvernement

français se fait de ses devoirs, en tant que membre de la Société des Nations et Puissance mandataire, suffisent à faire écarter semblable préoccupation.

En cas de conflit armé, les lois de la neutralité feraient même au Gouvernement français l'obligation d'interdire aux transporteurs l'utilisation du territoire syrien et la voie ferrée au delà de Chobanbeg, coupée du reste de la Turquie, perdrait toute valeur pratique.

La lettre adressée par Youssouf Kemal et qui accompagne le texte de l'accord a également fait l'objet d'observations du Gouvernement britannique. Votre Seigneurie a marqué le regret que ladite lettre paraisse établir un rapport entre des promesses de concessions et le vœu exprimé, dans ce document, qu'en raison des relations anciennes des deux "nations," les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie seraient examinées par la France dans un esprit de cordialité.

Le Gouvernement de la République tient à donner l'assurance qu'il ne recherche en Turquie aucun avantage exclusif, ni dans l'ordre politique, ni dans l'ordre économique. Il ne s'est en rien départi des principes généraux du Traité de Sèvres et de l'Accord tripartite. Il a réservé avec le plus grand soin toutes les questions ayant trait à la paix avec la Turquie, qui est et doit rester une œuvre interalliée. Les promesses de concessions visées dans la lettre de Youssouf Kemal ne sont la contrepartie d'aucun engagement secret, écrit ou verbal, que M. Franklin-Bouillon aurait pris touchant les questions qui doivent être réglées d'accord entre les Alliés et notamment les revendications turques sur Smyrne et la Thrace. M. Franklin-Bouillon n'a eu et n'aurait d'ailleurs accepté aucune conversation sur des questions territoriales autres que celles impliquées par l'évacuation de la Cilicie.

Le négociateur ture d'Angora a si bien lui-même compris cette situation qu'un procès-verbal spécial mentionne que les questions d'ordre général sont réservées pour être traitées lors de la paix. Ainsi il a réservé expressément pour la conclusion du Traité de Paix le règlement des questions relatives à la participation de la Syrie à la dette ottomane, à la liquidation des biens de l'État, de la Couronne et de l'Eukap, au régime des Capitulations et à toutes autres conséquences du changement de souveraineté sur les pays à mandat. S'il exprime quelque désir au négociateur français, il a bien soin de ne s'adresser qu'à lui en le priant de recommander sa demande au Gouvernement français pour le moment où sera négocié le Traité de Paix.

Votre Seigneurie a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement français avait répondu ou se proposait de répondre à Youssouf Kemal. M. Franklin-Bouillon s'est borné à adresser à Youssouf Kemal un accusé de réception de sa communication dans les termes du paragraphe premier en ajoutant ses remerciements des sentiments et des vœux exprimés par le Ministre d'Angora.

Quant aux rumeurs relatives soit à la promesse faite à la France d'un monopole pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie, soit à l'éventualité d'un emprunt, soit encore à la fourniture de matériel de guerre, elles sont dénuées de tout fondement. Les échanges de vues, oraux ou écrits, qui ont pu avoir lieu entre des personnalités politiques et M. Franklin-Bouillon, n'ajoutent rien à la substance de l'accord, qui ne comporte aucun arrangement secret. Ce n'est point

sans une douloureuse surprise que le Gouvernement français a vu mentionner dans un document officiel, même en ajoutant qu'il n'y était accordé aucune créance, les bruits d'un encouragement donné par la France à une agitation antibritannique en Mésopotamie. Les relations entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne sont trop intimes et trop amicales pour qu'il soit nécessaire de démentir de semblables imputations.

Si, abandonnant la discussion proprement juridique, les deux Gouvernements élèvent le débat, votre Seigneurie reconnaitra, d'une part, que le Gouvernement français ne pouvait prolonger indéfiniment les sacrifices de tout ordre qu'impliquait l'occupation de la Cilicie, alors que les forces alliées s'étaient retirées de nombre de régions saisies comme gages lors de l'armistice, et que, d'autre part, cette intention avait été clairement et constamment manifestée par la France, tant par l'organe de son Premier Ministre que par celui de ses représentants diplomatiques. Sans prétendre aucunement s'être assuré l'assentiment de l'Angleterre à ses desseins, la France peut légitimement soutenir qu'elle a averti son Allié des nécessités dont elle devait tenir compte.

Dans ces conditions, je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne maintienne pas les objections qu'il a élevées à première vue contre l'Accord d'Angora et veuille bien reconnaître que la France a tout fait pour concilier le maintien de ses obligations contractuelles et le souci des intérêts de ses Alliés et de ses devoirs d'humanité avec la nécessité où s'est trouvé le Gouvernement de la République de se libérer d'une charge que l'opinion publique considérerait comme intolérable.

Le Gouvernement français ne se refuse, d'ailleurs, pas à admettre que, lors de la conclusion de la paix, les différents accords négociés jusqu'à ce jour, Traité de Sévres, Accord tripartite, Arrangements pour la Libération des Prisonniers, Accord d'Angora) soient ajustés pour prendre place dans le règlement général.

Veillez agréer, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

(Translation.)

November 17, 1921.

My Lord,

FOLLOWING on the conversation which your Lordship held with M. de Saint-Aulaire in regard to the agreement reached between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government, your Lordship was good enough to address, on the 5th instant, to the Ambassador of the Republic, a letter drawing attention to the various points on which the agreement in question seems to the British Government to go beyond an arrangement of a purely local character ("tractation locale") as defined by M. Briand, and to reserve special and particular advantages for France.

I hastened to bring this letter to the notice of my Government, which, having examined it with the greatest care and in the most friendly spirit, has requested me to communicate to your Lordship the observations which its consideration has suggested. The French Government has no doubt but that the clear and precise character of this explanation will remove the impression which would appear, from your Lordship's letter, to have been formed, and which can only be due to a misunderstanding.

In the first place, the French Government is glad to see that His Majesty's Government have clearly understood the nature of the

two missions with which M. Franklin-Bouillon was entrusted, missions of which your Lordship was informed from the moment when they were first decided on.

M. Franklin-Bouillon's first journey was undertaken on his own suggestion and in an entirely private and personal capacity; the French Government gladly availed itself of this opportunity to obtain information in regard to the policy of the Angora Government and the possibilities of putting an end to the hostilities, of which France was bearing the whole brunt in Cilicia, at a moment when the nation and the Chamber had vigorously expressed their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed and to expenditure which it was particularly difficult to bear.

The President of the Council considered that M. Franklin-Bouillon was fully qualified to undertake such an enquiry, in view of the fact that he was a former member of the Government, in view of his deep knowledge of Eastern affairs, and of the guarantees offered by his experience and activity.

Your Lordship will recognise that there was nothing in this programme of enquiry, to which I have just referred, which was contrary to the assurances given by M. Briand, to the effect that France neither had contracted nor would contract any engagement in regard to the general questions of peace between the Allies and Turkey without being in close agreement with the former, and particularly with the British Government.

As regards M. Franklin-Bouillon's second mission, of the official character of which your Lordship was informed, that mission fell no less within the scope indicated by M. Briand than the first. Leaving wholly on one side the problems of a general peace, it was strictly limited to the negotiation of those questions referred to by your Lordship yourself in your letter of the 5th November, that is, the liberation of French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and questions which arose as necessary corollaries of the evacuation of Cilicia by our troops.

The French Government has instructed me to renew the assurance that it has always reserved the question of peace with Turkey, and that it has never contemplated that any engagement could be entered into on this subject excepting in close agreement with its Allies and particularly with the British Government. Explicit assurances on this point have already been given to the British Government on the 14th July, 1921, and I have been directed categorically to repeat them.

The French Government repeats these assurances all the more willingly since it has found in the British Government the same spirit of complete collaboration during the conversations which have recently taken place in London between your Lordship and the Greek Ministers with a view to reach a satisfactory settlement in the Near East. The Government of the Republic cannot but express its satisfaction in recognising the absolute identity of principles which is thus shown to exist between the two Governments.

This full agreement on the principles which govern the conduct of the two Governments renders it all the easier for the French Government to dissipate all misunderstanding, both in regard to the scope of the Angora Agreement and in regard to the motives which have led France to approve it.

It is true that the British Government have drawn the attention of the French Government to the disadvantages of a direct agreement

between France and the Government of Angora. On the 4th April, in the course of a visit of the British Ambassador to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lord Hardinge was reminded that in March 1921 M. Briand had declared on several occasions to Mr. Lloyd George, without the British Prime Minister making the slightest observation, that he would not leave England without having concluded an agreement with the Angora delegation. M. Briand had pointed out that neither the Chamber nor French public opinion would agree to the prolongation of hostilities, involving as they did losses which were both heavy and useless, since the Treaty of Sèvres sanctions the evacuation of Cilicia, and since the slight concessions made in regard to the northern frontier of the Syrian mandate, in accordance with that principle of nationality which has dominated the whole peace settlement, are not to the disadvantage of any of the Allies, while, at the same time, being of a nature calculated to facilitate a general settlement. It was at the same time clearly explained to Lord Hardinge that M. Briand had also stated to Mr. Lloyd George that he would only sign such an agreement at the last moment, and after it had been proved impossible to reach a general settlement of the Eastern question in London. It was in the course of this interview that, as early as the 4th April last, the British Ambassador received the text of the agreement in question.

These declarations were renewed to your Lordship by M. de Saint-Aulaire on the 19th April last, when you were so good as to discuss this question with the representative of the Republic. The French Government was justified in believing that the explanation given by the French Ambassador had reassured the British Government, since your Lordship went no further with the despatch of the note which you had informed M. de Saint-Aulaire you would send him on this subject.

Since that date, indeed, the French Government has continually announced, particularly in its letter of the 14th July last to the British Ambassador in Paris, its desire to put an end to the hostilities which were being carried on on the borders of the Syrian mandate, as soon as it could obtain the acceptance of definite provisions assuring the protection of the minorities and especially of the Armenians.

It was in these circumstances, and at a time when the Allies had long withdrawn their troops from the various points of the Ottoman Empire, the military occupation of which had taken place as a consequence of the armistice, that the French Government considered, after having informed its Allies of its intentions, and while carefully reserving the solution of all the general questions which must be decided jointly by the Allies, that it had the right to embark on a course which its partners had already followed, and in making use of such means as events forced upon it. His Majesty's Government will in fact recognise that, if the withdrawal of His Majesty's forces from the frontiers of Mesopotamia and the removal of Allied military control over the Anatolian railways was able to be carried out without any agreement with the Angora Government, which at that time had no power of attack, a similar course could not be pursued on the frontiers of Syria, for, on the one hand, the Nationalist forces have since then considerably developed, and on the other, Syria is not, like Mesopotamia, protected by distance.

No one can doubt that France only had a choice between the two following alternatives:—

Either to maintain her effectives and to continue the war in Cilicia, or

To negotiate with the *de facto* authority which was in command of the Turkish troops in this region.

The will of the French nation manifesting itself clearly, strongly and constantly in favour of evacuation, the French Government was obliged to attempt the conclusion of a local arrangement which, moreover, conforms in its fundamental provisions, with the arrangement of which the text was communicated to the British Government on the 4th April, 1921.

Having thus described in detail the general tendencies which prompted the action taken by the French Government, I have the honour to give your Lordship the following explanations regarding particular points mentioned in your Lordship's letter of the 5th November.

The words "cessation of the state of war," which appear in article 1, seem to His Majesty's Government to be unsuitable terms in which to define a local armistice. Your Lordship considers, furthermore, that the provisional character of the arrangement arrived at should have been mentioned, whereas the terms actually used, on the contrary, give the agreement the appearance of a regular treaty of peace.

As the Director of Political Affairs has already pointed out verbally to Lord Hardinge, the Angora Agreement does not constitute a treaty of peace. It is only an arrangement of local significance concluded with a Power which is neither recognised *de jure* nor *de facto*, but which has manifested a degree of authority, patriotism and loyalty, such as to warrant the opinion that it is capable of keeping and executing the obligations which it has assumed. Generally speaking, if the Angora Agreement had constituted a treaty of peace, it should, according to the Constitution, have been submitted to Parliament for ratification. As it is, it has simply been approved by the French Government and no parliamentary ratification has been asked for.

The French Government, on the other hand, considers that the use of the expressions "armistice" and "provisional arrangement" would have involved the risk of alarming the populations by making them fear a resumption of hostilities.

As regards the term "high contracting parties," its value is only one of usage and traditional courtesy. Moreover, it already figures in the London Agreement, and the British Government have hitherto raised no objection to it. It is scarcely necessary to add that the use of these expressions by no means implies, in international law, the *de jure* recognition of a new State or Government.

The British Government consider that article 3 of the Angora arrangement does not take into account the obligations assumed by France under article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement. According to the interpretation which your Lordship puts upon article 8, France has undertaken not to withdraw her troops from her zone of special interests until after she is assured of the execution of the guarantees for the safety of the minorities.

The French Government considers that article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 18th August, 1920, was drawn up, not with the object of obliging us to remain in Cilicia, but, on the contrary, with the intention of limiting our occupation. It stands to reason that the

French Government would never have consented to undertake an indefinite occupation and to bear its cost.

The French Government has, moreover, on various occasions, as I have pointed out above, drawn the attention of the British Government to the fact that it was obliged to put an end to the abnormal situation which was being prolonged by the hostilities on the Syrian frontier, at a time when hostilities had ceased between the other Allies and Turkey without rendering it possible to consider that a state of peace had thereby been established.

Furthermore, the French Government desires to make a general observation as to the validity of the Tripartite Agreement upon which the juridical arguments in your Lordship's letter of the 5th November are principally founded. The French Government would in no case consider itself authorised to enter into any compromise regarding the rights accorded by this agreement to either of her Allies, Great Britain or Italy, but it considers that it has all the more reason to renounce the advantages accorded to it, because this agreement has not been ratified, and because the Treaty of Sèvres must, as has been stated quite recently by Lord Curzon to the Greek Ministers in London, undergo certain modifications. It cannot, then, be considered as having the force of an operative treaty.

Again, in the Turkish territory, both within and outside the zones from which Allied troops have been withdrawn, it had not been possible hitherto to obtain any guarantees in favour of minorities. France, on the contrary, has expressly made any eventual withdrawal of her troops from Cilicia subject to the engagement entered into by the Angora Government that it will assure the protection of minorities, and to the effective adoption of the necessary measures.

His Majesty's Government regret that by article 6 France should have admitted, for the protection of the minorities, guarantees which differ from those which the Treaty of Sèvres provided, and that by failing to limit these provisions specially to Cilicia, the French Government should have appeared to meet one of the claims of the Angora Government in a matter of great importance and of general bearing, whereas a matter of this kind should, by its nature, form the subject of an Inter-Allied agreement and be reserved for negotiations as to a general peace.

France cannot, without injustice, be reproached with having failed to secure the acceptance of the guarantees for the protection of the Cilician minorities, which the pressure of the aggregate strength of the Allies has been unable to exact from Turkey. The withdrawal of French troops being a necessity, the Government of the Republic considered that its desire not to depart from the terms of the signed, but unratified, Treaty of Sèvres, could not be pushed to the point of leaving the minorities without any protection, and that an obligation of humanity obliged it to secure for the minorities at least the guarantees contained in the treaties which have been imposed by the *Entente* upon Hungary and Bulgaria.

As regards your Lordship's regret that these latter guarantees might be considered as applying not only to Cilicia but to other parts of Turkey also, the French Government considers that the entire Angora Agreement is dominated by the idea that it is only a question of an arrangement of local importance.

Furthermore, no reproach should be made to the French Government on the ground that it has extended its obligations, not in its

own interests, but in the interests of the Anatolian populations, who at the moment are still deprived of every kind of protection.

Over and above the guarantees formally specified in the agreement, I may add that M. Franklin-Bouillon agreed with the Angora Government that he should himself supervise the conditions of the evacuation of the territory and of the establishment of the new authorities. In this duty he will be assisted by three special delegates of the French Government, who will reside at Adana, Mersina and Aintab.

The administrative system for the district of Alexandretta contemplated in article 7 does not conflict with the system contemplated for the mandate, which is to take into account the extreme diversity of races in Syria. It harmonises with the general organisation of countries under French mandate, and this organisation already allows a large measure of administrative autonomy to the different racial elements. Article 7 of the Angora Agreement, moreover, does not confer on Turkey any political or economic right, and only contemplates the use of Turkish concurrently with Arabic and French because the great majority of the population speak Turkish.

The frontier rectification contemplated in article 8 appears to your Lordship to affect not only the French Government, but also the Allied Governments, since the territories taken from Turkey constitute the gage of the common victory. Your Lordship considers that the territorial modification of the Syrian mandate does not take into account the obligations of France towards the League of Nations, while the retrocession, without previous notice being given to Great Britain and Italy, of the territories which Turkey had abandoned to the Allies, is incompatible with both the spirit and the letter of the treaty which bears the signature of the three Powers. This situation appears to your Lordship to be all the more regrettable because, as the frontier is to be fixed within a month of the signature of the agreement, the Turco-Syrian frontier will be decided before all the other Turkish frontiers, which are to be delimited by the Treaty of Sèvres.

The French Government must first point out that upon the morrow of the armistice the Allies effected other occupations and took measures of military control in Turkey, which equally constituted gages of importance, and yet it has been impossible to maintain in their integrity either these occupations or these measures of control.

The districts under the Syrian mandate dealt with in article 8 are, moreover, not properly Arab territory, but rather a country of migrations without precise limits, without sedentary population, and where not Arabs but Kurds predominate.

Finally, there would appear to be some exaggeration in reproaching France with giving up a relatively insignificant fraction of the occupied Turkish territory at a time when, more than three years after the armistice, she is still bearing the losses and the cost of maintenance of an army of nearly 100,000 men on the frontiers of Syria, while in the other parts of Turkey where Allied troops were stationed effectives have been progressively reduced to a few battalions. The maintenance of such numerous contingents has been the result hitherto, not of the difficulties of keeping order in Syria, but rather of the necessity of being in a position to face an eventual Turkish threat against Cilicia. The end of this danger will enable the French Government no doubt, in a very short time, to make a considerable reduction in the French forces in the East.

It is well to add that our Allies have for a long time been aware of the obligation under which we were to abandon certain portions of the Syrian mandated territory in order to secure the evacuation of Cilicia.

As regards the territories lying between the Euphrates and the Tigris which, for that matter, have never been occupied by the Allied forces, the communication made to Lord Hardinge on the 4th April of the agreement concluded at London between M. Briand and Bekir Sami at any rate amounted to a precise indication of the intention of the French Government to give up the occupation of these territories.

With regard to the reproach that we have given up this territory as the result of an agreement, it is right to repeat that the present situation is very different from that of which the Powers might have previously profited. The Turkish forces have developed considerably. The Angora Government now possesses armies of an offensive value which it had not previously. As soon as the evacuation of Cilicia was decided upon, it became impossible to avoid the necessity for making an agreement, and it would have been inconceivable that such an agreement should be arrived at without certain concessions on both sides. The French Government is convinced that in this respect it has given the League of Nations no ground for complaint.

Moreover, the argument about mandates can for many reasons not be maintained. The mandates have not yet been ratified by the League of Nations, and their terms are still under discussion. The Treaty of Sèvres has not come into force. The British Government even admit that it must be modified. The frontiers which it has fixed are therefore not unalterable. France, the mandatory for Syria, is alone entitled to deal with the interests of the Syrian population in their unavoidable relations with the Turkish population beyond the frontier.

The regret expressed by your Lordship regarding article 9, which deals with the tomb of Sultan Suleiman, appears to be based upon an interpretation which the French Government desires to correct. The matter at issue is not a question of sovereignty, but rather a right of property which has been recognised for sentimental reasons.

Article 10 merely establishes the fact that the Angora Government accepts the transfer of the concession of the Bozanti-Nisibin section of the Bagdad Railway to a French group, and does not state, as does article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres, that the Government "will transfer" the said concession. Thus the procedure contemplated by article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres is reserved, and the Angora Agreement constitutes no obstacle to its application.

As regards the basis of the arrangement made between the Allies regarding railways under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, and particularly paragraph 2 of that article, the British Government will be so good as to note that the French Government desires to confirm the fact that this arrangement is in no sense modified, nor is the distribution between France, Great Britain and Italy of the whole Bagdad Railway.

The Treaty of Sèvres provided for the disposal of the Bagdad Railway up to the River Jeihun only. If this treaty had come into force, the railway east of the Jeihun would have been in the heart of Syria, and, in view of this, it would have had to be liquidated, in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, by the mandatory Power acting alone. The transfer of this section to a French company, in

accordance with the Angora Agreement, leaves our position unaltered, while leaving the railway in Turkish territory. It is true that this argument cannot be applied to the section of the line which runs between the Cilician Gates and the Jelhun. There would therefore appear to be a certain justification for the protest against an immediate transfer to a French company of this section which, according to the terms of the Tripartite Agreement, was to be exploited jointly as an Anglo-Franco-Italian undertaking. But in reality paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement expressly contemplates the transfer to us of this section as representing the French interests which existed in the Bagdad Railway before 1914. Thus article 10 of the Angora Agreement, far from being a violation of the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement, does not in reality amount to more than application of them in advance.

As regards the use of the line for military purposes, its principal object is the maintenance of order in the districts far removed from all means of communication; but it would be inconceivable that the railway could be used against Great Britain. The railway, in fact, passes over Syrian mandated territory from Maidan Ekbez as far as Choban Bey, and the French Government would therefore be in a position to put a stop to any transport which might seem to imply the possibility of a military threat against the frontier of Mesopotamia.

On this point, the French Government is anxious to give to His Majesty's Government the most formal assurance that it could in no case contemplate the possibility of any sort of facilities being given by it to hostile designs directed against any territory under a British mandate. The close ties which unite France and the British Empire, and the French Government's conception of its duties, both as a member of the League of Nations and as a mandatory Power, are sufficient to dispel any such fears.

In the event of an armed conflict, the laws of neutrality would, in fact, impose on the French Government the obligation to prohibit the use of Syrian territory by Turkish transport, and the railway beyond Choban Bey, cut off from the rest of Turkey, would lose all practical value.

The letter from Yousouf Kemal, which accompanied the text of the agreement, has also formed the subject of comment on the part of the British Government. Your Lordship has expressed regret that this letter would appear to establish a connection between promises of concessions and the wish, expressed in the same letter, that in view of the ancient relations existing between the two "nations," questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey should be examined by France in a friendly spirit.

The Government of the Republic desires to give the assurance that it seeks in Turkey no exclusive advantages, either political or economic. It has not departed in this matter in the slightest degree from the general principles of the Treaty of Sèvres and of the Tripartite Agreement. It has taken the greatest care to reserve all questions relating to peace with Turkey, which is and must remain an inter-Allied matter. The promises of concessions indicated in Yousouf Kemal's letter are not connected with any secret engagement, either written or verbal, entered into by M. Franklin-Bouillon, in regard to questions which must be decided by agreement between the Allies, and particularly in regard to the Turkish claims to Smyrna.

and Thrace. M. Franklin-Bouillon, indeed, has neither discussed nor would have agreed to discuss, any territorial questions other than those involved in the evacuation of Cilicia.

The Turkish negotiator at Angora has himself so clearly understood this situation that it is stated in a special minute that questions of a general nature are reserved to be discussed when peace is made. Thus he specifically reserved, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, any settlement of the questions connected with the participation of Syria in the Ottoman debt, with the liquidation of property of the State, of the Crown and of the Wakf, with the Capitulatory régime, or with any other matters following on the change of sovereignty in the mandated territories. If he expressed a desire to the French negotiator, he was careful to limit himself to begging him to recommend his request to the consideration of the French Government at such time as the Treaty of Peace may be negotiated.

Your Lordship has expressed the desire to know whether the French Government had replied or proposed to reply to Youssouf Kemal. M. Franklin-Bouillon confined himself to addressing to Youssouf Kemal an acknowledgment of the receipt of his communication in the terms of the first paragraph, adding his thanks for the sentiments and wishes expressed by the Angora Minister.

As to the reports regarding on the one hand a promise made to France of a monopoly over the organisation of the gendarmerie, and on the other the possibility of a loan, or again, the supply of war material, they are devoid of all foundation. The exchanges of views, whether verbal or written, which may have taken place between certain political personages and M. Franklin-Bouillon, add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which carries with it no secret arrangement. It is, in fact, not without painful surprise that the French Government has seen mention in an official document, even though it was added that no credence was attached to them, of rumours of encouragement alleged to have been given by France to anti-British agitation in Mesopotamia. The relations between France and Great Britain are too close and too friendly for it to be necessary to deny such imputations.

If, putting aside the purely legal aspect of this question, the two Governments look at the matter from a higher point of view, your Lordship will recognise on the one hand that the French Government could not prolong indefinitely the sacrifices of every kind which the occupation of Cilicia involved, at a time when the Allied forces had withdrawn from numerous districts seized as guarantees at the time of the Armistice, and, on the other hand, that the intentions of the French Government in this matter had been clearly and frequently declared by France, both through her Prime Minister and through her diplomatic representatives. Without claiming in any sense to have assured herself of England's agreement to her plans, France can legitimately maintain that she warned her Ally of the necessities which she had to take into account.

In these circumstances, I have no doubt that His Majesty's Government will not adhere to the objections which they raised at first sight to the Angora Agreement, but will recognise that France has done everything in her power to reconcile the maintenance of her legal obligations, the care of the interests of her Allies, and her duties from the humanitarian point of view, with the necessity with which the Government of the Republic was faced of freeing itself from a burden which public opinion regarded as insupportable.

The French Government, however, is not unwilling to admit that when peace is concluded, the different agreements which have been negotiated hitherto (Treaty of Sèvres, Tripartite Agreement, arrangements for the liberation of prisoners, and the Angora Agreement), shall be adjusted in such a way as to take their place in the general settlement.

I avail, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

No. 3.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. de Montille.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 25, 1921.

His Majesty's Government have considered with the utmost care and attention the note which you addressed to me on the 17th November regarding the agreement negotiated by M. Franklin Bouillon at Angora. They have observed with satisfaction the detailed character of the reply which the French Government has returned to my note of the 5th November, and they desire to reciprocate the conciliatory tone in which that reply has been couched. If further observations are required it can only be with the object of removing still outstanding misconceptions, and of passing, if it may be, from the sphere of a common understanding to that of common action.

2. It gives pleasure to His Majesty's Government to take note of the emphatic assurances contained in the reply of the French Government with regard to the scope and consequences of the Angora Agreement as understood by its signatories. These assurances are so important, and it is so essential that no doubts as to their nature should exist between our two Governments, that it appears desirable to summarise them as they are deduced from your note as follows:—

- (1.) The agreement is not a treaty of peace, and implies no recognition *de jure* or *de facto* of the Government of Angora.
- (2.) The agreement is of purely local scope, and is "dominated" by that idea. The French Government, as hitherto, reserves the question of peace with Turkey and has never contemplated any engagement in that direction without a close agreement with the Allies and especially with Great Britain. In particular, the rights of Italy and Great Britain recognised in the Tripartite Agreement are not in any way touched by the Angora Agreement.
- (3.) No facilities will be given by France for hostile designs against a territory under the British mandate; and in particular, in the case of armed conflict, France, as a neutral, would not permit the transfer of Turkish troops across Syrian territory under article 10 of the agreement.
- (4.) No reply beyond a formal acknowledgment was returned by M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal's letter of the 10th October, and that letter—the official publication of which in these circumstances it seems somewhat difficult to understand—was not the counterpart of any secret understanding written or oral with M. Franklin-Bouillon

on matters which must be settled in agreement between the Allies, and especially the question of Thrace and Smyrna. M. Franklin-Bouillon held—and would have consented to hold—no conversation on territorial questions other than those implied in the evacuation of Cilicia. As proof of this, mention is made of a *procès-verbal* of questions reserved by the Kemalist negotiator at Angora.

- (5.) The rumours as to the French monopoly for gendarmerie organisation, a French loan, the supply of French war material to the Kemalists, and in particular as to the encouragement of an anti-British agitation in Mesopotamia are baseless, and the views exchanged orally and in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangement.
- (6.) The French Government admits the principle of adjusting in the final treaty of peace the different agreements negotiated: "Treaty of Sèvres, Tripartite Agreement, agreements for the liberation of prisoners, and the Angora Agreement."

3. Confidently believing that this summary accurately represents the views and intentions of the French Government, His Majesty's Government express their sincere gratification at the full and frank nature of these assurances, and they cordially recognise the spirit of amity and goodwill in which they have been offered. If I now draw attention to certain points on which His Majesty's Government have found and still find some difficulty in reconciling these assurances, and the detailed arguments by which they are supported, with the actual text of the agreement of the 20th October, this is due to a desire, not to prolong controversy, but to remove any misgivings that may still survive, and which might become a source of conceivable misunderstanding in the future.

4. I will deal first with a question with which British public opinion, and, indeed, the sentiment of the civilised world, is profoundly concerned—namely, the protection of the non-Turkish minorities in Cilicia. Whatever view may be taken of the precise validity of the Tripartite Agreement and the underlying intention of article 6, the French Government will hardly dispute that that agreement represented not only a definite pledge on the part of France towards her other Allies to undertake in Cilicia the common Allied task of protecting the minorities of Turkey, but also the immediate assumption of a definite responsibility towards those minorities themselves, who had been admittedly encouraged by the continued Allied occupation of Cilicia and by the published terms of the Tripartite Agreement to return there.

5. The French Government will readily understand, therefore, the apprehensions felt by His Majesty's Government at finding in the agreement no guarantees for the safety of these people beyond the amnesty of article 5 and the general declaration of the Kemalist Government, as to the minority rights in article 6. I need hardly remind you that while Part IV of the Treaty of Sèvres provides a measure of restitution for the serious injuries inflicted upon the minorities since the 1st August, 1914, and for the renewal of those necessary privileges accorded to them by the Turkish Government throughout Turkey before the war, no counterpart to these provisions exists in the minority treaties concluded with the European

countries. Yet it is only the guarantees afforded by the latter treaties which the Kemalist Government in article 6 of the present agreement have declared themselves ready to offer. In fact, the value of this article and of article 5 depends exclusively on that loyalty of the Kemalist Government "to keep and execute engagements" as to which sanguine views are expressed by the French Government in your note. His Majesty's Government in the light both of past history and of recent events find it difficult at present to share those views, and they would fain hope that in any final treaty of peace the Allies may insist upon obtaining Turkish assent to the fuller safeguards of the Treaty of Sèvres. In the meantime, however, the grave responsibility of withdrawing the protection of her troops has been taken by France, and the presence of a limited number of special French representatives in Cilicia during and after the evacuation is the sole additional guarantee that has been provided for the security of the jeopardised sections of the population. His Majesty's Government, while convinced that the French Government will lend its utmost efforts to the safeguarding of their interests, cannot conceal the fact that they regard the situation with no small anxiety.

6. There is another feature of the agreement, namely, the formal revision of the northern frontier of Syria, provided for by article 8 of the Angora Agreement, as to which it is necessary to say something. I do not wish to dwell here upon the extent of the surrendered territory, although this is far from inconsiderable, nor upon the danger that the normal number of its inhabitants may have been swollen since the armistice by an influx of Christian refugees; but His Majesty's Government cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad railway to Turkey, or of the transfer to that Power of the "localities of Jeziret-ibn-Omar and Nisibin. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, the latter transfer has never been contemplated up to this date, and no attempt has been made to ascertain their views upon it. For the rest, while they readily accept the French Government's assurance of their determination that no movement of Turkish troops over the Syrian portion of the Bagdad line with hostile intention against Irak shall be permitted, they apprehend, nevertheless, that article 10 of the agreement as it now stands may be found to preclude the French Government from arresting such movements in time of peace, whatever their ultimate object might prove to be.

7. Thirdly, the misgivings expressed by His Majesty's Government at certain features of article 10 have not been altogether dispelled by your explanations. Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French company in advance—and therefore possibly to the prejudice—of the reciprocal Allied arrangements contemplated by article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres and article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, it is necessary to point out that these stretches of the railway which were previously in Syria but are now surrendered to Turkey, although placed in the French zone of economic interest, ought naturally to fall to be divided among the Allies in accordance with the above-mentioned articles of the Tripartite Agreement and the Treaty of Sèvres, and accordingly it is not relevant to claim that, had they remained in Syria, they could, by article 293 of the treaty, have been liquidated by the French Government as

mandatory for Syria. Nor does the transfer to a French company of that part of the railway which still remains in Syria in itself fulfil the provisions of article 293 of the Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulates for liquidation by the mandatory and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial Commission as an Allied asset.

8. There remain a number of subsidiary questions concerning which I am most reluctant to pursue a controversy that can only divert our two Governments from larger and more important issues, and which are mentioned here solely with the object of correcting certain errors of fact. These questions relate, firstly, to the two missions of M. Franklin-Bouillon, concerning which the French Government is mistaken in thinking that His Majesty's Government were fully informed either by the French Government or by M. Franklin-Bouillon himself, and secondly, to the explanations alleged to have been given to the British Government concerning the abortive agreement concluded by M. Briand with Bekir Sami Bey. His Majesty's Government had no certain knowledge of the terms or even the general character of this agreement until they were presented with the text. As soon as this had been received I stated very fully and explicitly the objections entertained by His Majesty's Government in a conversation with the Comte de Saint-Aulaire on the 19th April last; and these objections (which I gave no undertakings to record or repeat in a note) were only not pursued because it was a matter of public knowledge that the Angora Government had already declined to accept the agreement.

9. In the concluding paragraph of the note under reply the French Government admits that when peace is finally concluded the different agreements which have been negotiated up to date, including the Angora Agreement, will require to be adjusted with a view to taking their place in a general settlement. On this understanding it appears to be no longer necessary for me explicitly to reserve the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Angora Agreement in general. These subjects will come up again for discussion later on, and more especially will this be the case with regard to those articles of the agreement, such as articles 6, 8 and 10, which appear to infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement.

10. Of greater importance is it to turn to the question of that larger settlement which both Governments must continually hold in view and the prolonged postponement of which is a source of ever-growing injury to all the parties concerned.

11. I have already acquainted the French Government with the satisfactory results of the conversations which I have held with the Greek Ministers in London. The acceptance by the Greek Government without reservations of Allied mediation of which the French Government has already been informed, is the first and necessary step towards some general Allied intervention. The French Government will readily appreciate, however, that if such intervention is to be made at an early date with reasonable hopes of success, both combatants in the present struggle must be made clearly to understand that the three Allies are loyally united and firmly agreed upon the terms of their mediation and the manner in which it is to be put forward. It is this paramount consideration which renders particularly gratifying to me those passages in your note which indicate the importance which the French Government attaches to Franco-British

co-operation in the Near East, and in which, acknowledging the spirit of "complete collaboration" which characterised my conversations with the Greek Ministers, it expresses its satisfaction at "the perfect identity of principles" existing between the two Governments. His Majesty's Government, for their part, are convinced that it is only on the basis of such a collaboration, bearing fruit in acts rather than in words, that a speedy, just and general settlement in Turkey—essential alike for the prosperity of Europe and Asia—can be secured.

12. In the firm hope that the identity of principles, which His Majesty's Government have always felt to underlie the Eastern policy of the Great Allied Powers, may at no distant date be translated into identic action, I reserve for another communication the proposals which, on behalf of the British Government, I am prepared to make

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 4.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 7.)

Ambassade de France,

M. le Marquis,

Londres, le 6 décembre 1921.

J'ai transmis à mon Gouvernement la lettre que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'adresser, le 25 novembre dernier, au sujet de l'accord négocié par M. Franklin-Bouillon à Angora.

Je suis chargé de marquer à votre Seigneurie combien le Gouvernement de la République a été heureux de constater que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique appréciait le sentiment dans lequel il suivait cette affaire et était résolu à la traiter dans le même esprit. Comme votre Seigneurie, M. le Président du Conseil est convaincu que la continuation d'échanges de vues entre les deux Cabinets sur ce sujet ne peut avoir d'autre fin que de prévenir la possibilité de tout malentendu et de rendre plus facile, par une entente commune, une action commune que le Gouvernement français souhaiterait voir étendre au règlement de tous les problèmes qui intéressent les deux pays alliés.

J'ai pour instructions de faire savoir à votre Seigneurie que le résumé, fait dans sa lettre, des assurances que j'avais été invité à formuler est l'exacte expression des vues et des intentions de la France.

Il me sera seulement permis, à propos du paragraphe 1 de ce résumé, de remarquer que si l'Accord d'Angora n'implique aucune reconnaissance *de jure* ou *de facto* du Gouvernement d'Angora, ce Gouvernement avait été traité comme un Gouvernement de fait par les Alliés, à côté du Gouvernement de droit de Constantinople, lorsqu'ils admirent aux Conférences de Londres ses représentants sur un pied d'égalité avec ceux du Gouvernement de Constantinople, qui d'ailleurs laissèrent constamment la parole aux représentants du Gouvernement d'Angora.

Après avoir bien voulu marquer sa sincère reconnaissance pour le caractère des assurances données et cordialement reconnu l'esprit d'amitié et de bonne volonté dont s'est inspiré mon Gouvernement en les exprimant, votre Seigneurie attire mon attention sur certains

points qui lui paraissent comporter encore quelques éclaircissements destinés à dissiper ou à prévenir tout malentendu qui pourrait être dans l'avenir une source de mésintelligence.

En ce qui concerne la protection des minorités non turques en Cilicie, le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur le sens et la portée de l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite. Mais il est évident que la charge d'une responsabilité définie envers ces minorités suivra immédiatement la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix générale par lequel les Alliés de la France seront appelés en même temps qu'elle à assumer cette charge qu'il n'y a aucune raison pour imposer d'avance à la France seule.

Le Gouvernement français partage les préoccupations du Gouvernement britannique en ce qui concerne les garanties à assurer aux minorités chrétiennes, et il n'est pas moins soucieux d'éviter que les groupements arméniens aient à regretter leur retour en Cilicie, retour évidemment encouragé par l'occupation prolongée de ce pays par les forces alliées.

M. Franklin-Bouillon n'a pas perdu de vue cette question au cours de ses conversations à Angora. S'il n'a pas obtenu du Gouvernement nationaliste les conditions figurant à la Partie IV du Traité de Sèvres, conditions que la force totale des Alliés n'a pas d'ailleurs réussi jusqu'ici à faire accepter, il a du moins, dans la mesure du possible, assuré aux minorités chrétiennes, par l'article 6 de l'Accord d'Angora, dont l'application ne peut qu'être strictement limitée à la Cilicie évacuée, des garanties qui ne sont pas sans valeur, surtout si l'on songe à la situation dans laquelle se trouvent actuellement les minorités chrétiennes dans le reste de l'Empire ottoman. Comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en exprime l'espoir, il sera loisible aux Gouvernements alliés de demander que la question de la protection des minorités en Turquie soit traitée dans le Traité de Paix à intervenir avec la même extension que dans la Partie IV du Traité de Sèvres.

Sans doute, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, la protection des minorités en Cilicie dépendra, dans une large mesure, de la loyauté du Gouvernement kémaliste à tenir ses engagements, encore que les garanties présentées par la présence actuelle en Cilicie de M. Franklin-Bouillon et l'installation dans le pays de représentants spéciaux de la France pendant et après l'évacuation, constituent des sûretés supplémentaires dont la valeur ne doit pas être sous-estimée.

On peut déjà constater avec satisfaction que les premières informations reçues de Cilicie par le Gouvernement français permettent d'espérer que les autorités nationalistes suivront avec loyauté une ligne de conduite conforme aux obligations contractées par le Gouvernement d'Angora. Une série de décisions favorables aux minorités chrétiennes de Cilicie viennent d'être prises : abrogation de la loi de réquisition appliquée jusqu'ici ; ajournement de la conscription militaire ; organisation d'une commission mixte franco-turque afin de garder les propriétés des émigrés et d'en empêcher le pillage pendant leur absence ; assurance de la liberté des personnes et du respect des biens ; amnistie totale et immédiate. On ne peut dire que ces mesures, qui seront appliquées sous les yeux d'agents français, ne constituent pas un supplément appréciable aux garanties inscrites dans l'Accord d'Angora.

Il est à espérer que les populations chrétiennes répondront à ces bonnes dispositions par une attitude appropriée et qu'elles y seront encouragées par la sagesse et la prudence des conseils de leurs com-

patriotes résidant au dehors, dont l'influence est fort grande sur tous les groupements de même race et religion demeurés à l'intérieur des frontières ottomanes.

En ce qui touche la revision de la frontière septentrionale de la Syrie, le Gouvernement français se réserve, lors de la discussion du Traité de Paix, de faire valoir les raisons qui la justifient, dans l'intérêt même du mandat syrien, qu'il est particulièrement qualifié pour apprécier. En tous cas, quelle que puisse être la différence d'opinion concernant la valeur, même au point de vue stratégique, de localités comme Nizibin et Djéziret-ibn-Omar, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a déjà reçu l'assurance de la détermination du Gouvernement français d'interdire en tout temps, sur la portion syrienne du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, aucun mouvement de troupes susceptible d'être dirigé contre un pays de mandat britannique.

Au sujet de l'article 10 de l'accord, votre Seigneurie fait remarquer que, par le transfert d'une section importante de la ligne de Bagdad, il serait assuré à la France un avantage immédiat qui anticiperait sur les arrangements entre Alliés prévus par l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres et l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite. Je me permets de rappeler que l'Accord d'Angora comporte uniquement "l'acceptation" préalable d'un transfert et réserve l'application des dispositions du Traité de Paix et des arrangements entre Alliés au sujet de l'autorité qui prononcera ce transfert, de la procédure qui sera suivie et des accords sur la répartition entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Italie de l'ensemble de la ligne de Bagdad.

Le Gouvernement français entend, en ce qui concerne la section Bozanti-Djaihoun, ne faire valoir à l'égard des Alliés aucun droit autre que celui qui est inscrit à l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite, comme d'ailleurs il considère que l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora ne lui retire, en ce qui concerne les sections Djaihoun-Ekbès et Chobanbeg-Nisibin, aucun des droits que lui reconnaissent ledit article 4 et les articles 293 à 296 du Traité de Sèvres. Il considère également comme devant recevoir toute son application le dernier paragraphe de l'article 293 concernant le versement à la Commission financière du produit de la liquidation des chemins de fer.

Quant aux quelques "questions subsidiaires" qui ne paraissent pas à votre Seigneurie avoir une importance suffisante pour justifier la poursuite de la discussion, je me contenterai, me conformant à son avis, de marquer que les objections présentées verbalement par votre Seigneurie au Comte de Saint-Aulaire, sans juger utile de les confirmer par une note, me paraissent avoir été levées complètement par les assurances que j'ai eu l'honneur de donner à votre Seigneurie, sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement, dans ma note du 17 novembre dernier.

J'aime à croire qu'après les explications que cette Ambassade a été chargée de fournir en toute franchise sur l'Accord d'Angora, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est convaincu que le Gouvernement de la République, en réalisant un accord que réclamait à bon droit l'opinion publique française, n'a cessé d'avoir en vue la nécessité de conclure au plus tôt, en commun avec ses Alliés, un traité rétablissant la paix dans tout l'Orient.

En considération des préjudices que causerait à tous un nouveau retard dans la conclusion de cette paix si désirée, mon Gouvernement fera tous ses efforts pour collaborer à l'œuvre de médiation envisagée,

qui sera rendue plus facile par l'accord de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, tant sur les termes de ladite médiation que sur les modalités de sa réalisation.

Aussi le Gouvernement de la République attend-il avec confiance les propositions annoncées à la fin de la lettre de votre Excellence, estimant toutefois nécessaire que l'intervention des Alliés ait lieu dans des conditions qui permettent d'aboutir à un résultat pratique.

Agréez, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

(Translation.)

French Embassy,

London, December 6, 1921.

My Lord,

I TRANSMITTED to my Government the letter which your Lordship was so good as to address to me on the 25th November last, concerning the agreement negotiated by M. Franklin-Bouillon at Angora.

I am instructed to acquaint your Lordship of the great pleasure with which the French Government has noted that His Britannic Majesty's Government appreciate the spirit in which it has been dealing with this matter, and that His Majesty's Government are resolved to treat it in a similar spirit. In the same manner as your Lordship, the President of the Council is convinced that the continuation of exchange of views between the two Cabinets on this subject cannot but prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding and facilitate joint action by means of a mutual understanding, which action the French Government would wish to see extended to the settlement of all problems which concern the two Allied countries.

I am instructed to state that the summary, made in your Lordship's letter, of the assurances which I had been asked to formulate is an exact expression of the views and intentions of France.

I beg only to be permitted to point out, in regard to the first paragraph of this summary, that although the Angora Agreement implies no recognition of the Angora Government *de jure* or *de facto*, this Government had been treated as an actual Government by the Allies in addition to the rightful Constantinople Government, when they admitted its representatives to the London Conferences on a footing of equality with those of the Constantinople Government, who, moreover, frequently allowed the representatives of the Angora Government to act as spokesmen.

After having been good enough to express your sincere gratitude for the character of the assurances given and cordially to acknowledge the spirit of friendship and goodwill which led my Government to give expression thereto, your Lordship draws my attention to various points which seem to your Lordship to require some further explanation, for the purpose of dispelling or preventing any misunderstanding which might be a source of future disagreement.

As regards the protection of non-Turkish minorities in Cilicia, the French Government agrees with the British Government in regard to the meaning and scope of article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement. It is obvious, however, that the creation of a definite responsibility towards these minorities will at once follow the coming into force of the general Treaty of Peace, in virtue of which the Allies of France will at the same time as herself be called upon to assume that burden, which there is no reason to impose in advance on France alone.

The French Government shares the anxiety of the British Government in regard to the guarantees to be given to the Christian

minorities, and is no less anxious to avoid that the Armenian groups should have reason to regret their return to Cilicia, which return has obviously been encouraged by the prolonged occupation of that country by the Allied forces.

M. Franklin-Bouillon did not lose sight of this question during his conversations at Angora. Although he did not obtain from the Nationalist Government the conditions set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of Sèvres—the acceptance of which the entire strength of the Allies has, moreover, been unable to enforce up to the present—he at least assured as far as possible to the Christian minorities by article 6 of the Angora Agreement (the application of which can only be strictly limited to the evacuated district of Cilicia) guarantees which are assuredly not valueless, more especially if one considers the present position of Christian minorities in the remaining portions of the Turkish Empire. It will still be possible, in accordance with the hope expressed by His Majesty's Government, for the Allied Governments to ask that the question of the protection of minorities in Turkey should be dealt with as exhaustively in the eventual Treaty of Peace as in Part IV of the Treaty of Sèvres.

Until the conclusion of peace the protection of minorities in Cilicia will doubtless largely depend upon the fidelity with which the Kemalist Government keeps to its engagements, even though the guarantees furnished by the fact that M. Franklin-Bouillon is now in Cilicia and by the establishment in that country of special French representatives both during and after evacuation, constitute supplementary guarantees the value of which should not be underestimated.

It can already be noted with satisfaction that the first news received from Cilicia by the French Government allows one to hope that the Nationalist authorities will honourably follow a line of conduct corresponding to the obligations undertaken by the Angora Government. A number of decisions favourable to the Christian minorities have been arrived at, such as abrogation of the law as to requisitions applicable hitherto; the postponement of military conscription; the creation of a mixed Franco-Turkish Commission for safeguarding the property of persons who have left the country and preventing the plundering thereof during their absence; the guarantee of personal liberty and the respect of property; and a full and immediate amnesty. It cannot be said that these measures, which will be applied under the supervision of French agents, do not appreciably supplement the guarantees included in the Angora Agreement.

It is to be hoped that the Christian populations will respond to these favourable dispositions by adopting a suitable attitude, and will be encouraged in that course by the wise and prudent advice of their compatriots abroad, who have a very great influence on all groups of their own race and religion residing within Turkish frontiers.

As regards the revision of the northern frontier of Syria, the French Government reserves to itself the right of urging, at the time when the Treaty of Peace is discussed, the reasons justifying this revision in the interests of the Syrian mandate itself, which that Government is particularly qualified to appreciate. In any event, whatever may be the difference of opinion concerning the value, even from a strategic point of view, of places such as Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar, His Britannic Majesty's Government has

already been assured that the French Government is determined to forbid at all times, on the Syrian section of the Bagdad railway, any movement of troops capable of being directed against British mandated territory.

In regard to article 10 of the agreement, your Lordship points out that the transfer of an important section of the Bagdad Railway would assure to France an immediate advantage in anticipation of the Inter-Allied arrangements provided for in article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres and article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. I beg to remind your Lordship that the Angora Agreement only admits of the preliminary "acceptance" of a transfer and reserves the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and of Inter-Allied arrangements as to the authority which will make this transfer, of the procedure to be followed, and of the agreements as to the division of the entire Bagdad Railway between France, England and Italy.

As regards the Bozanti-Jeihun section, it is the intention of the French Government to urge no right other than that contained in article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement; it considers, moreover, that article 10 of the Angora Agreement does not deprive France, in so far as the Jehun-Ekbez and Choban Bey-Nisibin sections are concerned, of any of the rights granted to it by the said article 4 and articles 293 to 296 of the Treaty of Sèvres. It also considers that the last paragraph of article 293, dealing with the payment to the Financial Commission of the proceeds of the liquidation of railways, should be applied in its entirety.

As regards the various "subsidiary questions" which did not, in your Lordship's opinion, appear to have sufficient importance to justify a continuation of the discussion, I shall confine myself, in accordance with your Lordship's suggestion, to observing that the objections which your Lordship made verbally to the Count de Saint-Aulaire and considered unnecessary to confirm by a note, appear to me to have been entirely removed by the assurances which I had the honour of giving to your Lordship, on the instructions of my Government, in my note of the 17th November last.

I trust that, after the explanations which this Embassy has been instructed to furnish quite frankly in regard to the Angora Agreement, the Government of His Britannic Majesty will be convinced that the Government of the French Republic, in effecting an agreement which French public opinion was entitled to ask for, never lost sight of the necessity for concluding as soon as possible and jointly with its Allies, a treaty re-establishing peace throughout the East.

In consideration of the harm which would be caused to all parties by any fresh delay in the conclusion of this urgently desired peace, my Government will make all possible efforts to collaborate in the suggested work of mediation, a task which will be rendered all the easier by the agreement of France, Great Britain and Italy, in regard both to the extent of this mediation and the methods by which it is to be brought about.

Consequently the Government of the Republic awaits with confidence the proposals alluded to at the end of your Excellency's note, deeming it, however, essential that Allied intervention should be resorted to in circumstances which would admit of a tangible result being attained.

I avail, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

No. 5.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 14.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 10 décembre 1921.*

M. le Marquis,

PRENANT acte des assurances données par mon Gouvernement, votre Seigneurie voulait bien noter au paragraphe 5 de sa lettre du 25 novembre que "the views exchanged orally or in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangement." Le Gouvernement français, tenant à ce que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté reçoive tout apaisement à cet égard, me charge de communiquer à votre Seigneurie les lettres et notes annexes échangées entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et les représentants kémalistes, lettres et notes dont M. Briand a, d'ailleurs, déjà donné lecture à Lord Hardinge.

Ces documents, qui se trouvent ci-joints, sont au nombre de onze. Comme votre Seigneurie pourra s'en assurer, ils n'ont pas le caractère d'avantages secrets modifiant l'Accord d'Angora.

Le Gouvernement français serait obligé au Gouvernement britannique de ne pas rendre ces textes publics sans s'être au préalable mis d'accord avec lui.

Veillez, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Note.

IL a été convenu entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Youssouf Kémal Bey que l'accord signé aujourd'hui n'entrera en vigueur qu'après l'approbation des deux Gouvernements, approbation qui devra être donnée dans un délai de quinze jours au plus. Youssouf Kémal Bey déclare en sa qualité de Ministre des Affaires étrangères que l'approbation du Gouvernement français entraîne de plano celle de son Gouvernement.

Fait à Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.
YOUSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Youssouf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

COMME complément à l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, je suis heureux de déclarer à votre Excellence que les œuvres scolaires et hospitalières françaises et les institutions d'assistance continueront à exister en Turquie, étant bien entendu que ces œuvres et institutions ne pourront sous aucun prétexte ou dans aucun cas se livrer à une propagande ou une action quelconque contraires aux intérêts de la Turquie et aux lois turques.

Veillez, &c.

YOUSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

Note.

Au moment de procéder à la signature de l'accord intervenu aujourd'hui entre le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et le Gouvernement de la République française, Youssouf Kémal Bey, le plénipotentiaire ture, a émis les considérations suivantes, dont M. Franklin-Bouillon, plénipotentiaire français, a bien voulu prendre note :

Le plénipotentiaire ture tient à faire des réserves expresses en ce qui concerne le règlement des questions relatives à la participation de la Syrie à la Dette ottomane, aux biens de l'État, de la couronne et de l'Evkaf, et à tous autres points résultant du changement de la situation juridique de ce pays, règlement qui devra avoir lieu lors de la conclusion du Traité général de Paix.

Pour les régions d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche, Youssouf Kémal Bey déclare nécessaire d'accorder aux habitants la faculté d'adopter un pavillon spécial contenant le drapeau ture. Le plénipotentiaire français, ayant convenu de l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à reconnaître une telle faculté aux habitants de ces régions, a bien voulu promettre d'entreprendre les démarches nécessaires à cet effet auprès de son Gouvernement.

Pour ce qui est de l'article 5, concernant l'amnistie plénière à accorder par les deux parties contractantes, le plénipotentiaire français déclare qu'il recommandera à son Gouvernement de prendre les mesures nécessaires en vue de faire profiter de cette amnistie les habitants des régions d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche.

Le plénipotentiaire ture déclare par rapport à l'article 10 ce qui suit :

1. La garantie kilométrique était, en vertu des actes de concession du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, établie jusqu'ici sur la base des recettes globales de toute la ligne ; il est indispensable de fixer la garantie kilométrique afférente à la section turque de Bozanti-Nousseïbine, comme par le passé, sur la base des recettes globales de la totalité de la ligne de Bagdad. Le plénipotentiaire français s'engage à appeler l'attention de son Gouvernement sur le bien-fondé de cette réclamation.

2. Les plénipotentiaires des deux parties sont d'accord que la fixation du tarif des transports militaires tures à effectuer par chemin de fer en territoire syrien et la fixation du tarif des transports syriens à effectuer par chemin de fer en territoire ture seront réservées à un examen ultérieur. Ils ont également reconnu la nécessité de donner, de part et d'autre, un préavis suffisant toutes les fois que l'un des deux pays se trouvera dans le cas de faire usage de la faculté mentionnée à l'article 10, alinéa 2, de l'accord turco-français.

Le plénipotentiaire ture formule la demande suivante que le plénipotentiaire français accepte de défendre auprès de son Gouvernement :

Dans le port d'Alexandrette, les ressortissants, les biens et le pavillon tures devraient jouir de l'entière liberté de l'utilisation du port. Ils seraient, sous ce rapport et à tous égards, traités sur un pied de parfaite égalité avec les habitants, les biens et les navires du pays.

Dans ce port, il serait donné à bail à la Turquie un espace qui serait affecté au transit direct des marchandises en provenance ou à

destination de la Turquie. Pour la jonction de cet espace avec le chemin de fer reliant Alexandrette aux territoires tures, son aménagement, sa location et son mode d'exploitation, toutes les facilités seraient accordées à la Turquie.

Aucun droit ou taxe autres que ceux de tonnage, de quai, de pilotage, de phare, de quarantaine perçus également sur les habitants, les biens et le pavillon du pays ne seraient imposés aux ressortissants, aux biens et au pavillon tures à l'occasion du transit des marchandises en provenance ou à destination de la Turquie.

Fait à Angora, en double original, le 20 octobre 1921 (1337).

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.
YOUSOUF KÉMAL BEY.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

Youssouf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement désire profiter de la collaboration des professeurs spécialistes français dans les écoles turques de gendarmerie.

J'espère que le Gouvernement de la République française voudra bien prendre en considération ce désir; je serais heureux de faire connaître plus tard à votre Excellence le nombre des instructeurs français dont nous aurons besoin.

Veillez, &c.

YOUSOUF KÉMAL.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

Youssouf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

PAR rapport à l'article 12 de l'accord signé aujourd'hui entre nos deux Gouvernements, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à votre Excellence que le mode de répartition des eaux du Kouveik pourra être déterminé par les représentants de la population des régions turques restées au nord de la ligne désignée à l'article 8 et ceux de la population de la ville d'Alep.

Veillez, &c.

YOUSOUF KÉMAL.

Enclosure 6 in No. 5.

Youssouf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

En réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 20 octobre 1921, relativement à la demande d'un groupe français au sujet de la mine d'Argana et d'une concession agricole qui aurait été accordée avant la guerre dans le vilayet d'Adana, je suis heureux d'informer votre Excellence que je vais faire reprendre sans retard l'étude de ces deux questions.

Veillez, &c.

YOUSOUF KÉMAL BEY.

Enclosure 7 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence, *Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.*

JE désire vous accuser immédiatement réception de la lettre accompagnant l'accord dont nous avons arrêté ensemble les termes.

Je me plais à espérer comme vous que l'accord conclu entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée de Turquie en vue de réaliser une paix définitive et durable aura pour conséquence de rétablir et de consolider les relations étroites qui ont existé dans le passé entre les deux nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'efforçant de résoudre dans un esprit de cordiale entente toutes les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie.

Je saisis, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 8 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence, *Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.*

JE suis heureux de vous accuser réception de vos lettres annexes en date du 20 octobre 1921, concernant :

1. Le maintien des écoles et institutions françaises en Turquie.
2. Le choix d'officiers français comme instructeurs de gendarmerie.
3. La répartition des eaux du Kouveïk.
4. La concession de la mine d'Argana et de terres à coton en Cilicie.

Je prie, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 9 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence, *Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.*

COMME complément de l'article 7 de l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, il me paraît utile de préciser qu'en ce qui concerne le régime administratif spécial de la région d'Alexandrette, les régions à majorité turque seront administrées en général par des fonctionnaires de race turque. Il sera institué des écoles qui profiteront de toutes les facilités pour le développement de la culture turque.

Ce régime s'appliquera également à la région d'Antioche et aux parties de l'ancien vilayet d'Adana restées au sud de la ligne désignée à l'article 8.

Veuillez, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 10 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

COMME complément à l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, j'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence que la reconnaissance du transfert prévu à l'article 10 de cet accord est subordonnée aux deux conditions suivantes :

1. Que les droits du Gouvernement ture seront maintenus.
2. Que le Gouvernement sera couvert contre toutes réclamations de la part de l'ancienne société résultant de ce transfert.

Veuillez, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 11 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

J'ai eu l'occasion de vous signaler qu'au cours des négociations qui ont eu lieu à Londres en mars 1921, vos plénipotentiaires avaient promis aux représentants du Gouvernement de la République française la concession des mines d'Argana, sur lesquelles un groupe français avait fait des études préliminaires très complètes. Votre Excellence m'a déclaré que cette concession avait déjà été accordée à un groupe ture; je lui ai alors demandé de bien vouloir faire tous ses efforts auprès de ce groupe pour que les intéressés français soient associés à cette affaire dans une juste proportion.

J'ai signalé de même à votre Excellence qu'une société française, la Société Vandœuvre de Lesséps, avait obtenu en Cilicie la concession de terres à coton et que les plus grandes difficultés avaient été faites à cette société, pour la remise des terres concédées. Votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance qu'elle ferait tout son possible pour hâter l'étude de ces deux affaires.

Je tiens à prendre acte de votre déclaration et je renouvelle, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

(Translation.)

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

French Embassy, London,

December 10, 1921.

My Lord,

IN taking note of the assurances given by my Government, your Lordship was good enough to observe in paragraph 5 of your note of the 25th November that "the views exchanged orally or in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangement." The French Government, anxious that His Majesty's Government should be completely reassured in this respect, has instructed me to communicate to your Lordship the letters and notes exchanged between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the

Kemalist representatives. M. Briand has already read these letters and notes to Lord Hardinge.

These documents, which are attached, are eleven in number. As your Lordship will be able to see for yourself, they do not bear the character of secret advantages involving any modification of the Angora Agreement.

The French Government would be grateful if the British Government would refrain from publishing these documents without previous consultation with the French Government.

I avail, &c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Note.

It has been agreed between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Yussouf Kemal Bey that the agreement signed to-day will not come into force until after it has been approved by the two Governments. This approval must be given within a maximum period of fifteen days. Yussouf Kemal Bey declares, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the approval of the French Government entails *de plano* that of his own Government.

Done at Angora, the 20th October, 1921.

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

YUSSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Yussouf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Your Excellency,

Angora, October 20, 1921.

As a corollary to the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, I am happy to inform you that the French educational and charitable institutions and relief organisations will continue to exist in Turkey, it being clearly understood that such institutions and organisations shall not under any pretext or in any circumstance lend themselves to propaganda or to any action whatsoever contrary to the interests of Turkey or to Ottoman law.

I have, &c.

YUSSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

Note.

In signing the agreement arrived at to-day between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government of the French Republic, Yussouf Kemal Bey, the Turkish plenipotentiary, has advanced the following considerations, of which M. Franklin-Bouillon, the French plenipotentiary, has taken note.

The Turkish plenipotentiary wishes to make express reservations concerning the settlement of questions relating to the participation of Syria in the Ottoman Debt, in State, Crown and Wakf property,

and in all other matters arising out of the change in the legal status of that country, which settlement shall take place at the time of the conclusion of the general Treaty of Peace.

As regards the districts of Alexandretta and Antioch, Yussouf Kemal Bey declares that it is necessary that the inhabitants should be granted the right to adopt a special flag containing the Turkish flag as a part of its design. The French plenipotentiary, acknowledging the desirability of according such a privilege to the inhabitants of these districts, has promised to take the necessary steps to this end with his Government.

As regards article 5, concerning the complete amnesty to be granted by the two contracting parties, the French plenipotentiary declares that he will recommend his Government to take the necessary measures in order that the inhabitants of the districts of Alexandretta and Antioch may benefit by this amnesty.

With regard to article 10, the Turkish plenipotentiary declares as follows:—

1. The kilometric guarantee has hitherto, by virtue of the acts of concession of the Bagdad railway, been established on the basis of the gross receipts of the whole line; it is essential to fix the kilometric guarantee pertaining to the Turkish Bozanti-Nisibin section, as in the past, on the basis of the gross receipts of the whole of the Bagdad line. The French plenipotentiary undertakes to call the attention of his Government, to the equity of this claim.

2. The plenipotentiaries of the two parties agree that the fixing of the tariff for Turkish military transport by railway in Syrian territory and the fixing of the tariff for Syrian transport by railway in Turkish territory will be reserved for subsequent examination. They have likewise recognised the necessity on both sides of giving adequate notice every time that either of the two countries desires to avail itself of the right specified in article 10, paragraph 2, of the Franco-Turkish Agreement.

The Turkish plenipotentiary makes the following request, which the French plenipotentiary agrees to support with his Government:—

In the port of Alexandretta, Turkish nationals, Turkish goods and vessels under the Turkish flag should enjoy entire freedom of use of the port. They should, in this and in all respects, be treated on a footing of absolute equality with the inhabitants, the goods and the vessels of the country.

In that port, there should be leased to Turkey a piece of land which should be set apart for the direct transit of merchandise coming from or going to Turkey. All facilities should be granted to Turkey for linking up this piece of land with the railway connecting Alexandretta with Turkish territory, and for its administration, leasing and method of exploitation.

No dues or taxes other than tonnage, wharfage, pilotage, lighthouse and quarantine dues, levied equally on the inhabitants, goods and vessels of the country, should be imposed on Turkish nationals, goods and vessels engaged in the transit of merchandise coming from or going to Turkey.

Done at Angora in duplicate, the 20th October, 1921 (1337).

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.
YUSSOUF KEMAL BEY.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

Yussouf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that my Government desires to avail itself of the collaboration of French specialist instructors in the *Turkish gendarmerie schools*.

I trust that the Government of the French Republic will be good enough to give this request their consideration. I should be happy to inform your Excellency later of the number of French instructors we shall require.

I have, &c.

YUSSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

Yussouf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921.

WITH reference to article 12 of the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, I have the honour to inform you that the method of apportioning the waters of the Kuweik can be settled by the representatives of the population of the Turkish districts situated to the north of the line specified in article 8, and those of the population of the city of Aleppo.

I have, &c.

YUSSOUF KEMAL.

Enclosure 6 in No. 5.

Yussouf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921.

IN reply to the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 20th October, 1921, respecting the request of a French group regarding the Arghana mine and an agricultural concession which is stated to have been granted before the war in the vilayet of Adana, I am happy to inform your Excellency that I shall cause the examination of these two questions to be proceeded with without delay.

I have, &c.

YUSSOUF KEMAL BEY.

Enclosure 7 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal.

Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921.

I HASTEN to acknowledge the receipt of your note accompanying the agreement, the terms of which we have drawn up together.

I fully share your hope that the agreement concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with a view to effect a definite

and durable peace, will result in the re-establishment and consolidation of the close relations which have existed in the past between the two nations, the Government of the French Republic making every effort to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey.

I have, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 8 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal.

Your Excellency,

Angora, October 20, 1921.

I HAVE much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the 20th October, 1921 (of which I attach copies), respecting:—

1. The maintenance of French schools and institutions in Turkey.
2. The selection of French officers as gendarmerie instructors.
3. The apportioning of the waters of the Kuweik.
4. The concession for the Arghana mine and for cotton-fields in Cilicia.

I have, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 9 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal.

Your Excellency,

Angora, October 20, 1921.

As a corollary to article 7 of the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, I think it desirable to explain that as regards the special administrative régime for the district of Alexandretta, the districts with Turkish majorities will in general be administered by officials of Turkish race. Schools will be established which will enjoy all facilities for Turkish cultural development.

This régime will apply equally to the district of Antioch and to the parts of the old vilayet of Adana to the south of the line specified in article 8.

I avail, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 10 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal.

Your Excellency,

Angora, October 20, 1921.

As a corollary to the agreement signed this day between our two Governments, I have the honour to confirm the fact that the recognition of the transfer prescribed by article 10 of that agreement is subject to the two following conditions:—

1. That the rights of the Turkish Government shall be maintained.
2. That the Government shall be guaranteed against any claims by the old company resulting from the transfer.

I have, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 11 in No. 5.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal.

Your Excellency,

Angora, October 20, 1921.

I HAD occasion to draw your attention to the fact that in the course of the negotiations which took place in London in March 1921, your plenipotentiaries promised to the representatives of the Government of the French Republic the concession of the Arghana mines, of which a French group had made a very complete preliminary examination. Your Excellency informed me that this concession had already been granted to a Turkish group. I then requested you to make every endeavour to arrange with this group that the French group should participate to a fair extent in this undertaking.

I pointed out to your Excellency at the same time that a French company, the Société Vandœuvre de Lesseps, had obtained the concession of cotton-fields in Cilicia and that the greatest difficulties had been placed in the way of the transfer of the lands granted. Your Excellency was good enough to assure me that you would do everything possible to expedite the examination of these two questions.

I have pleasure in taking note of your declaration.

I have, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

No. 6.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. de Montille.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 15, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 10th December, communicating, for the information of His Majesty's Government, copies of certain annexes to the agreement of the 20th October, signed by M. Franklin-Bouillon and Yussouf Kemal Bey, and also of certain letters exchanged between these gentlemen on the same subject.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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