


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THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR



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THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

 \mathbf{BY}

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
TO

FIRST LIEUTENANT PHILIP DURYEE McMASTER
UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

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THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

THE OPENING OF THE WORLD WAR

JUNE 29, 1914, the newspapers in the United States made known to their readers that on the previous day the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, had been assassinated in Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia.

The event was no new occurrence in the House of Austria. Within forty-seven years the Emperor Francis Joseph had lost, by the assassin's hand, his brother, his son, his wife and now his nephew. During a day or two the murder was a matter of eurrent conversation; but ere July was half spent the crime had been almost forgotten. Our trouble with Mexico, home rule for Ireland, the doings of the Ulster men, the Caillaux trial, the violence of the suffragettes in England held the attention of the public.

Great was the astonishment of our countrymen, therefore, when they read in the newspapers of July 24, that cable dispatches from London reported weakness in the stock markets of Europe caused by fear of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and the possible drawing into the conflict of other European powers. Newspapers of July 25 contained a dispatch from London setting forth that an ultimatum of unprecedented severity had been sent to Serbia by Austria-Hungary; that it sought to fasten on Serbia responsibility for the assassination

of the Archduke and his wife, that compliance with the demands of the dual monarchy would be a confession of guilt; that forty-eight hours were allowed in which to reply, and that Russia was seeking extension of the time granted Serbia. Vienna dispatches announced that if Serbia did not reply before six o'clock on the evening of July 25 her minister would be handed his passports. From Berlin came reports that Germany had been consulted by Austria, that her action had been approved, that, should Russia take part with Serbia, Germany was prepared to draw the sword, and that serious developments were expected unless Serbia yielded. July 27, it was known that passports had been handed the Serbian minister and that Germany had notified the powers that she regarded the war as between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and that it must be localized.

When, some months later, the diplomatic correspondence between the powers was given to the world in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, the Serbian Blue Book, the Russian Orange Book, the German White Book, the French Yellow Book, the Belgian Gray Book, and the British White Paper, some faint glimmering of what took place was revealed.

It then came to light that during the interval between the twenty-eighth of June and the twenty-third of July, Austria-Hungary had investigated the murders at Serajevo, and had reached the conclusion they had been prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the help of Serbian officials, had been perpetrated with arms taken from the Serbian State Arsenal, were directly connected with a movement long going on in Serbia to revolutionize, and finally tear away from Austria her southwestern provinces and join them to Serbia, and that in this policy Serbia believed herself to be heartily supported by Russia. Having reached this conclusion, Austria decided that the time had gone by when this agitation across her border could longer be endured; that having informed her ally, Germany, of this decision she was assured that any action taken would be approved, and that, bent on war, she presented to Serbia, on July 23, 1914, not a note but an ultimatum.

In this ultimatum the direct connection between the Serajevo murders and the pan-Serb movement was stated from the Austrian point of view. Serbia was charged with fostering a "propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, . . . whose aim it is to separate from the monarchy parts which belong to it," was required to publish "on the first page" of her "official organ of July 26, 1914," a humiliating apology in words dictated by Austria, bind herself to do ten humiliating things, and return her answer before six o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25. Copies of the note were delivered on July 24, to the Governments in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

The demands on Serbia were:

1. Suppress any publication which incites hatred of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

2. Dissolve at once the Narodna Odbrana and all other societies which carried on propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

3. Eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both from the teaching body and methods of instruction, everything which served to foment feeling against Austria-Hungary.

4. Remove from military and administrative service every officer

guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

5. "Accept the collaboration in Serbia" of representatives of Austria-Hungary for the suppression of "subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

6. Take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the mur-

der at Serajevo.

7. Arrest Major Voija Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch, "compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo."

8. Stop the illicit traffic in arms across the frontier, dismiss and punish the frontier officials at Schabatz and Loznica "guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontiers."

9. Explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials at home and abroad who have not hesitated since the crime at Serajevo, to express hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government.

10. Notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the preceding demands.

The whole world was taken by surprise. On the day the ultimatum was delivered Europe seemed to be in a state of perfect peace. It was vacation time. The Serbian Prime Minister was not in Belgrade; the Russian Ambassador had left Vienna;

¹ British White Paper, No. 4.

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the President of the French Republic was far from Paris; the British and Russian Ambassadors were not in Berlin, and the Emperor of Germany, it may be to keep up appearances of

peace, had gone northward on his yacht.

The day after the delivery of the ultimatum Germany warned the Entente Powers not to interfere.² July 24 her Ambassador appeared before the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and read a note verbale. The publications of Austria-Hungary concerning the Serajevo murders, Germany said, disclosed clearly the aims of the pan-Serb propaganda and the means used for its realization. Serb intrigue could be traced back through a series of years, and was especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only the self-restraint of Austria, and the energetic intercession of the powers prevented a conflict at that time. The assurances of good behavior then given by Serbia had not been kept. Under the very eyes of official Serbia the pan-Serb propaganda had grown in scope and intensity, and at its door was to be laid this latest crime the threads of which led to Belgrade. It was impossible for Austria to any longer look with indifference on the doings across the border. Her demands were justifiable. But the Serbian Government might decline to meet them, and "allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary." In that event nothing remained to Austria-Hungary but to press her demands, if need be, with military measures. But "in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia," and the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desires urgently the localization of the dispute because every interference of another power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by

incalculable consequences."

The part taken by the powers began with a proposal from Russia that the time allowed Serbia be extended. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the Russian chargé at Vienna to telegraph London, Rome, Paris and Belgrade that to prevent the incalculable and fatal consequences of

² German White Book, Exhibit 1.

"the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them time to study them." 3

Sir Edward Grey at once bade the British Ambassador at Vienna "support in general terms the steps taken by your Russian colleague," 4 and the French Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed the French Ambassador at Vienna: "The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia. . . . I beg you to support the request of your colleague." 5 But Count Berchtold of Austria replied "we cannot consent to a prolongation of time limit. . . . Serbia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly relations by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Serbia of all costs and damages incurred by us through our military measures." 6

Within the time allowed Serbia made her reply and yielded to all the demands with reasonable limitations. Austria de-clared it "insincere," "unsatisfactory," "evasive," as not fully complying with her demands, and July 25 her Minister broke off diplomatic relations and left Belgrade.

And now Sir Edward Grey came forward with a new proposition. He had said to the German Ambassador, just after the delivery of the German note on July 24, that "if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia" he "had no concern with it," and reminded the Ambassador "that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose" Sir Edward "would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg." But in view of the stiff character of the note, the wide range of the demands of Serbia, Sir Edward did not believe any

^{*}Russian Orange Book, No. 4.

*British Blue Paper, No. 26.

*French Yellow Book, No. 39.

*Austrian Red Book, No. 20, July 25.

power could exercise influence alone. The only chance for mediation was for Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain to work together simultaneously at St. Petersburg and Vienna.⁷

To the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg he wrote: "The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it."

Austria having rejected the reply of Serbia and having broken diplomatic relations, there was no longer any doubt that Russia and Austria would mobilize against each other, and Sir Edward Grey on July 26 put his plan into operation and inquired of Italy, France and Germany if they would instruct their representatives in London to join "in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications." If so, requests should be made to Serbia, Austria and Russia "that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference." France and Italy at once consented. When Russia was asked if it seemed "desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to examine the possibilities of a way out of the present situation," the Russian Foreign Minister replied, that he had "begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which" he "hopes may be favorable." "If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible" he was "ready to accept the British proposal."

The German Foreign Secretary thought that such a conference "would practically amount to a court of arbitration" which could not be called save "at the request of Austria and Russia." Nevertheless Germany accepted "in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserv-

^{&#}x27;British White Paper, No. 11.

ing, of course, their right as an Ally to help Austria if attacked." The Imperial Chancellor declined to accept the proposal. It would have the appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment on the other two.

Such being the state of affairs on July 28, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin that the German Government having accepted the principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, he was ready to propose that the German Government suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. But he would keep the idea in reserve until the results of the "conversations between Austria and Russia were known." ⁸

He did not wait long. That same day, July 28, Austria declared war on Serbia and the Russian Ambassador at London received this telegram from St. Petersburg: "Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communication between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent."

On the following day Russia began partial mobilization against Austria and Sir Edward Grey "urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia." "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method if Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace." 10

At Berlin on that day the Chancellor, well aware that Austria was bent on war, and that Germany would aid her, sent for the British Ambassador and made a strong bid for British neutrality. Should Austria, he said, be attacked by Russia "a European conflagration," he feared, "might become inevitable owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally." He did not expect that Great Britain would "stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict that might be," and made a bid for

British Blue Book, No. 68.

⁹ Ibid, No. 70. ²⁰ British Blue Book, No. 84.

British neutrality. Should she give assurance of neutrality, Germany would give her assurance that she "aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" should Germany "prove victorious in any war that might ensue." But he would give no pledge as to the French Colonies.

Sir Edward replied that he could not "for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal"; what "he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French ter-

ritory as distinct from the colonies."

As for Belgium, the Chancellor had told the British Ambassador that "it depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian territory would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

To this Sir Edward replied: "The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not enter-

tain that bargain either."

July 30, Russia agreed "to stop all military preparations" if Austria, recognizing that her war with Serbia had become one of European interest, would "eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the principle of sovereignty of Serbia," and the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that the Imperial Government would endeavor to persuade Austria, after taking Belgrade and the Serbian territory near the frontier, to promise not to advance further while the Powers attempted to arrange that Serbia give satisfaction to Austria.

But the next day, July 31, Russia began to mobilize her entire fleet and army; Germany demanded that within twelve hours she demobilize along both the German and Austrian frontiers, declared "Kriegefahrzustand," the state of danger of war, and asked both France and Great Britain what attitude they intended to assume. France asked if Great Britain would help her if attacked by Germany. Sir Edward Grey inquired of both France and Germany if each would respect the neutrality of Belgium if violated by the other. France replied that she would "respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that

France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise." The German Secretary of State replied that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could answer, and was very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all, lest "a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war" be disclosed. This to Sir Edward Grey was "a matter of great regret because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in" England. If Germany, he told her Ambassador, "could see her way to give the same assurance as France," it would greatly relieve the tension. The Ambassador thereupon asked if Germany gave a pledge not to violate the neutrality of Belgium, would England remain neutral? Sir Edward could not say that, but he could say that her attitude would be largely determined by public opinion, and that the neutrality of Belgium would

appeal strongly to public opinion in England.

The end had come. Diplomatic play for time had ended. Never for a moment had Germany intended to keep the Since July 25 her troops had been moving to the French frontier where barbed wire entanglements were made stronger, trees cut down, railway stations occupied, and where in a few days eight army corps were on a war footing. Because of this, France, on August 1, ordered general mobilization. Germany that day declared war on Russia, ordered general mobilization to begin on August 2, and on that day sent her troops over the border into the Duchy of Luxemburg, in wanton disregard of its neutrality, and presented an ultimatum to Belgium. There was no doubt, the note said, "as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory to attack Germany"; it was "essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack," and cross Belgian soil; that if Belgium maintained "an attitude of friendly neutrality" and made no resistance, Germany would, when peace was made, "evacuate Belgian territory," and "guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom in full." Should Belgium "oppose the German troops," Germany would, "to her regret, be forced to consider Belgium her enemy," and the "eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms."

The note was presented at seven o'clock on the evening of August 2, and the reply must be made before seven o'clock on the morning of the third. It was made at that hour and in it are these words: "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe."

At six forty-five o'clock on the afternoon of the third, the German Ambassador at Paris handed M. Viviani a note charging France with certain "flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators," and stating that because of these "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France."

Belgium meantime applied to Great Britain for diplomatic intervention in her behalf as one of the guarantors of her neutrality. Great Britain, thereupon, early in the forenoon of August 4, bade her Ambassador, "protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with ourselves," and "request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." Hearing, as the day wore on, that British ships had been seized "at Hamburg, Cuxhaven and other German ports," and "that German troops had entered Belgian territory, and that Liége has been summoned to surrender," Sir Edward Grey bade the British Ambassador request that an answer to the note of the morning be received in London before twelve o'clock "to-night." If it were not he was to ask for his passports and say: "that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

The German Ambassador at London was now instructed to say that under no pretext whatever would Germany annex Belgian territory; that she had been forced to disregard Belgian neutrality because she had unimpeachable information that France would attack across Belgium, and because it was a matter of life and death to prevent such attack.

When the British Ambassador at Berlin on the morning of the fourth called on the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, to ask if Belgian neutrality would be respected, the answer he received was "No," for it had already been violated. When he went about seven in the evening to state that unless, by midnight, assurances were given that Germany would proceed no further with her violation of Belgium, he must demand his passports, von Jagow replied that he could give no other answer than he had given in the morning. The Ambassador then called on the Chancellor and found him "very agitated." He said "that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word, neutrality, a word which in war time had so often been disregarded, just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her."

About half after nine in the evening Herr Zimmermann, Under Secretary of State, called at the British Embassy to express regret to the Ambassador that their friendly personal relations were about to cease and asked "casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war." The Ambassador replied in substance that his Government "expected an answer to a definite question by twelve o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required." Herr Zimmermann said this was in fact a declaration of war, "as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night."

Meantime the Berliner Tageblatt issued a flying sheet announcing that Great Britain had declared war, a mob soon gathered before the Embassy and the windows were stoned. At eleven o'clock on August 5 the Ambassador received his passports.

Great Britain, France and Russia were now at war with Germany, and on September 4, 1914, at London, Paul Cambon, Count Benckendorff and Sir Edward Grey, representing the Triple Entente, signed a declaration that the British, French and Russian Governments bound themselves not to make peace separately during the war, and that, when the time came to discuss peace, no one of them would demand terms without the previous agreement of each of the others.

Of these stirring events Americans at home and abroad were no idle spectators. They, too, in many ways were seri-

ously affected. By Monday, the twenty-seventh, it was known that the Serbian Minister had received his passports; that partial mobilization had been ordered by Austria; that Russia had mobilized on the Austrian frontier, but that hopes were entertained that the war might be localized. Exchange on London, which on Saturday had been 4.88, on Monday afternoon stood at 4.91; gold shipments were rushed, and the Cable Company announced that messages to or through Austria must be in plain English, French, German or Italian, those for Hungary in Hungarian, and that commercial marks, abbreviations, military news would not be admitted in private dispatches. German and Austrian reservists now rushed to the consulates, to which they had been formally called by the consuls. When news came of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, foreign securities fell from five to twenty points, the stock exchanges at Montreal and Toronto closed, stocks fell three points on the New York Exchange, wheat rose nine cents a bushel, corn five cents and cotton declined nearly two dollars a bale. The Austrian consuls now announced that the Emperor had granted amnesty to deserters and to those who by absence had avoided military service provided they would return to the colors.

On the thirtieth, when it was known that Germany had sent an ultimatum to Russia, stocks in New York fell from six to seventeen points, over 1,300,000 shares were thrown on the market, and charterers began to fear that a general war would prevent vessels leaving port. Their fears were well founded for, on the thirty-first, the President Grant of the Hamburg-American line, which sailed on the thirtieth, was recalled by wireless, the Amerika was held at Boston, the Vaterland at New York and the Imperator at Hamburg, and the North-German Lloyd announced that none of their vessels would leave New York on Saturday, August 1. That day the stock exchanges over all our country, indeed the world over, closed. Only the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Produce Exchange, both dealing in food products, remained open. Washington it was announced that steps to organize the Federal Reserve Board would be taken at once, that \$500,000,000 emergency currency would be made available at National Banks, and an amendment to the Aldrich-Vreeland currency act was rushed through the Senate under a supervision of the rules.

Commerce with Europe now almost ceased. The Cunard Line steamships Lusitania and Franconia were held at New York, Belgian and Italian liners did not leave port, the Mauritania, which left England August 1 and knew nothing of the war, was warned when off Sable Island and put into Halifax, and the Crown Princess Cecilie with several million dollars in gold on board, bound for Hamburg, was recalled by wireless and took refuge at Bar Harbor. Everything imported, dye stuffs, chemicals, medicines, gloves from Germany, glassware, earthenware, malt liquors from Austria, mackerel from Norway, cheese from Holland, macaroni from Italy, rose in price, and what was quite as bad food produced at home began to do the same without any just cause whatever. Flour rose a dollar a barrel: meat from two to eight cents a pound; sugar two cents a pound; and the prices of butter, eggs and vegetables went higher and higher daily. In New York the Mayor appointed a Citizens' Committee to investigate, ordered the police to help in compiling tables showing the cost of food at that time and in August. 1913; and appealed to housewives to send to the District Attorney lists of prices they paid in market.

The President asked the Attorney General to report if criminal prosecutions were possible. The rapid and unwarranted increase in the prices of foodstuffs in this country, under the pretext of conditions in Europe, he said, was so serious and vital a matter that he took the liberty of calling the attention of the Attorney General to it. He would be glad to know if under existing law the Department of Justice could take action. Attorney General answered that "the head of our special agents" the country over, and the District Attorneys had been instructed to investigate and collect facts. They reported that over all the country there had been an unjustifiable rise in the prices of food, but found nothing on which to base a proseeution. The Executive Committee of the Retail Grocers' Association in Philadelphia urged that all Boards of Trade where options for speculative purposes were bought and sold be closed, and requested the President to stop export of foods to warring countries.

Remedies of all sorts were suggested, amend the Constitution and give Congress power to lay an export tax; give the President power to stop the export of foodstuffs and clothing when such exportation would increase cost at home; form non-meat-eating clubs. Some blamed the meat packers; they blamed the farmers who, they said, acting on the advice of the Department of Agriculture not to ship wheat because of the shortage of

ships, were also holding back cattle.

Abroad, our countrymen, both in and out of the war zone, were, many of them, in great distress. Those who had return tickets on the German lines, found them worthless. Letters of credit, and travelers' checks in Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and for the time being in London, were reduced to waste paper. Money was not to be had. Mobilization made escape from these countries almost impossible. In Switzerland, train service on all four borders was suspended. In Paris a panic prevailed. The possible closing of many of the hotels because of the calling of the servants to the colors, the inability to get money, the fear that the great liners would be commandeered caused a flight from the city to London. Dense crowds stood for hours in the railway station and when the trains were ready, hundreds were unable to get aboard. Aliens were required to register and many an American stood all day long in a line waiting his turn. To aid those absolutely without means committees were formed and met at the American Embassy. In Germany no aliens could leave until after mobilization, and no money could be obtained on letters of credit, bankers', travelers' or express company checks. Hundreds, however, made their way before mobilization began, to Holland. After mobilization none could leave without passports which must be taken to the proper German authorities and stamped. One American who took his to the Foreign Office in Berlin did not receive it back. Some months later it was found on the person of a German spy named Lody who was shot in the Tower of London. Towards the middle of August, the Dresdener Bank and its branches agreed to cash letters of credit and checks of the American Express Company, the Bankers Association, Bankers Trust Company, and International Mercantile Marine in small sums, provided all checks and letters of credit were

stamped by American consuls as evidence that the owners were really American. Special trains for Americans were finally arranged for and the movement from Carlsbad, Munich and Berlin into Holland began.

The destination of all refugees from the Continent was London, for very few found accommodation on the Dutch and French liners. At London again tens of thousands were stranded. Ship after ship was commandeered. Those who lost passages on the German lines could find none on the English and American, save in the steerage which was all too small to satisfy the demand. Monday the second of August was Bank Holiday; but that afternoon a moratorium was declared covering Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, and during these days all banks and banking houses were closed. The American Express Company, however, came nobly to the relief of its patrons and while the moratorium was on, cashed checks in small amounts, and the Great Eastern Railway, having for years had the patronage of Americans to and from the Continent, announced that it would cash express and travelers' checks to the amount of ten pounds per person.

Meantime such Americans as reached London in the opening days of August, met and organized at the Waldorf Hotel but soon removed to quarters in the Savoy. There a registration bureau was opened and in time some 90,000 Americans were registered. Committees were appointed to care for those without funds, to find respectable quarters for women of limited means traveling alone, to aid in securing the passage on such steamships as were sailing, to do anything necessary to get them home. The great difficulty was to secure transportation. Almost every day some liner was taken over by the Government and hundreds deprived of passage. More than once travelers stood on the landing stage at Liverpool awaiting their ship when announcement was made that the Government had taken it. On such vessels as sailed no steerage passengers were taken, but the steerage quarters were cleaned and fitted with first class bedding, the steerage dining room turned into bedrooms and the berths sold at the minimum first class cabin rates. passengers became first class and had the run of the ship.

Meantime efforts were made at home to aid stranded tour-

ists by sending gold and providing means of transportation. On July 31 Counselor Lansing of the Department of State announced that, if necessary, the Government would charter enough ships to bring home every American citizen in Europe, and if occasion required Congress would be asked for money to relieve those stranded in Europe. Authority was given to diplomatic officers to exchange embassy checks for letters of credit, or travelers' checks, which it was expected would be received by railroads, steamship companies and hotels abroad. Friends and relatives of those in need it was announced might deposit funds with the Department of State and a like amount would then be paid in Embassy checks. Americans without funds would be loaned money. To meet these requirements the President appealed to Congress for an immediate appropriation. Disturbances in Europe, he said, the interruption of transportation, the increase in the cost of living, the difficulty of obtaining money from home, had placed a large number of Americans, temporarily in Europe, in a serious situation and made it necessary for the United States to provide transportation and relief. He, therefore, asked for \$250,000 to be placed at his disposal for the relief, protection and transportation of American citizens, for personal services and other expenses caused by the troubles in Europe.

Fuller information as to the conditions of our countrymen made it quite clear that such a sum was much too small and August 4 the President asked for an additional sum of \$2,500,000. It was promptly appropriated and, the Secretary of the Treasury said, would be disbursed, by agents of the Government, to Americans actually without funds or the means of getting them. The cruiser Tennessee was to carry the gold, and from five to ten millions more sent by New York bankers for the relief of those who had letters of credit or travelers' checks. By an Executive Order the duty of arranging for the distribution of the \$2,500,000 was assigned to a board of relief consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and the Navy, and on August 6 the Tennessee sailed from New York. She also carried money sent by bankers, and deposited at the Department of State by friends of those in distress in Europe.

Anxiety as to procuring funds now gave place to anxiety

as to obtaining transportation. It was generally expected that the Government would send battleships and transports. The battleships were unfit for such a purpose and the transports were widely scattered and time would be required to fit them for such a use. Coastwise steamships might be chartered, but it was necessary to know if they were really needed. A little patience showed that they were not, and in the course of a few weeks all were brought home by the transatlantic lines, save a few who came in privately chartered vessels and paid exorbitant rates for passage.

By the close of August reports from officials abroad showed that means of transportation were rapidly being found. Ambassador Herrick announced that arrangements had been made to move 2500 Americans from Switzerland to Paris. The Assistant Secretary of War who sailed on the Tennessee reported from Berlin that there were 8000 Americans in that city, 2500 in Munich, 900 in Mannheim, 750 in Hamburg, 500 in Dresden, 200 in Nuremberg and less than a hundred in fifteen other cities; that trains would be sent daily to Holland and Switzerland, and that plenty of sailings would be made from England and Italy.

While Americans abroad were striving to come home, thousands of aliens in the United States were just as eager to go abroad. As nation after nation was drawn into the war, their consuls made haste to call to the colors reservists of their armies and navies. All day long on August 3 the consulates of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and even Switzerland were thronged with men who came to register. Hundreds of others far removed from any consulate, responded by letter or telegram. The consul of the Netherlands when summoning all men members of the army and navy to return announced that deserters would be pardoned if they returned to their native country. Objection was made by charity workers to the return of married men with families lest their wives and children become a charge on the community. To this it was answered that so far as the families of German and Austro-Hungarian reservists were concerned they would be cared for by the patriotic and beneficial societies of their countrymen resident in Americe.

In response to the call French, Germans, Austro-Hungarians came to the consulate to enroll. Men who could not leave their work sent their wives or mothers. All day long hundreds stood in line before the consulates. At New York 41,000 were said to have enrolled in person or by letter. A large number of them from distant places were out of funds. Unable to go home, unable to go abroad, they were in great distress. British naval reserves found an outlet through Canada. French reservists were taken by the French transatlantic lines. But for Germans, Austrians and Russians, there was no means of transportation.

Nevertheless the question of what would become of their families if they did go was taken up by the charity workers in Philadelphia and New York. In Philadelphia the Director of Health and Charities invited the large employers of foreign labor to meet him in conference. He had heard that the consuls of countries at war were practically acting as recruiting agents and promising the men transportation and the care of their families by their respective governments. He did not think it right that heads of families should go leaving their wives and children to become dependent on charity organizations.

The President now issued his proclamation of neutrality.

After some general statements the President summed up briefly the laws and principles of international law which persons living in our country were bound to obey in order to preserve neutrality. They were charged not to accept a commission to serve one belligerent, on land or sea, against the other belligerent; they were not to enlist or enter the service of either belligerent nor hire or retain any person to enlist, or go beyond the limits of the United States to enlist or enter the service of either belligerent as a soldier, marine, or seaman on any armed vessel. They were not to fit out or arm, nor procure to be fitted out and armed, nor knowingly be concerned in the fitting out and arming of any ship or vessel to be used in the service of either belligerent. They were not to increase, nor procure to be increased, nor be knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or armed vessel belonging to either belligerent or to the subjects of either

of them, by adding to the number of guns, or changing those on board for others of larger caliber, or by adding any equipment solely for use in war. They were not to begin, or set afoot, or provide or prepare the means for any military expedition to be carried on from the territory of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the belligerents.

The neutrality statutes thus summarized in the proclamation are historic and the result of our long experience as a

neutral power.

"These are, in concise form," says Mr. James Brown Scott,11 "the neutrality statutes of the United States, which had been found necessary in Washington's Administration and in that of his immediate successor to preserve the neutral rights of the United States against violation by belligerents, and to secure the observance of the neutral duties of the United States in behalf of belligerents. Reissued with slight modifications in 1818 and incorporated in the Statutes at Large in 1874, they reappear in the so-called Penal Code of the United States in 1909 with but trifling changes of phraseology." Our country "was the first country to feel the need of a code of municipal law dealing with the question of neutrality, and it was the first to draft such a code. By its conduct as a neutral" when Washington was President, "it laid the basis of the modern laws of neutrality. . . . The neutrality, therefore, which the United States proclaimed in 1914 was not a neutrality born of the moment."

Belligerents, in their turn, were warned in the proclamation to observe the rights of neutrals. Should one of their vessels of war come within the waters of the United States to prepare for hostile operations, or watch the war ships or merchantmen of an enemy, it would be "regarded as unfriendly and offensive and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this Government to observe." No armed vessel of a belligerent could stay more than twenty-four hours in any of our ports, or use it for warlike purposes or for obtaining warlike equipment, or depart, if in port when an enemy vessel of any sort left, until four and twenty hours after the enemy

[&]quot;"A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, 1914-1917," pp. 44, 45.

ship had passed beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. No ship of war belonging to a belligerent could take in any supplies save food and such other things as were necessary for the subsistence of the crew, and only so much coal as might be sufficient to take the vessel to the nearest port of her own country. If provided with both sail and steam power then but half the quantity of coal necessary if propelled by steam alone would be furnished. When once coaled in a port of the United States a war vessel of a belligerent could not again obtain coal in one of our ports until after the expiration of three months unless she had meantime entered a port of her own country.

Finally, citizens of the United States were warned that while "free and full expression of sympathies in public and private is not restricted," they could not lawfully originate a military force in aid of a belligerent; that while they might manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war, and other articles known as contraband of war, they could not carry such articles upon the high seas for the use of a belligerent, nor transport soldiers and officers of a belligerent, nor attempt to break any blockade lawfully established, without "the risk of hostile capture and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf."

Special instructions from the Department of Commerce warned Collectors of Customs that no vessel was to be cleared if she was to be used as a transport for reservists or recruits for the army of a belligerent.

European commerce for the time being was paralyzed. Total or partial suspension of ocean traffic by some lines; the refusal of bankers to accept bills of lading; high premiums for marine insurance, in some cases 20 per cent; with German and Austrian tonnage driven from the sea; with English and French tonnage greatly reduced and no American merchant marine worth mentioning, the export of our goods, wares, merchandise and foodstuffs became almost impossible. Sailors, firemen, cooks, stewards, longshoremen, teamsters were thrown out of work. Mills and factories of many sorts which manufactured for the export trade were forced to put their employees on part time. Shipment of grain almost ceased, while the owners

awaited guarantees of the safety of vessels from war risks. So grave was the situation becoming that the Secretary of the Treasury called a conference at Washington of shippers and exchange bankers, the one to provide ships for carrying grain and cotton; the other to restore the market for foreign bills of exchange. The conference urged the setting up a bureau of war risk insurance which should assume war risks on American vessels and American cargoes shipped therein; and appointed committees of experts to give the government advice on transportation, foreign exchange and war risk insurance.

The suggestion was taken up and made part of the emergency measures before Congress. First among these was the Ship Registry Bill under which foreign-built ships owned by an American corporation might be admitted to American registry and come under the flag. But this would be too slow in its working. Time, perhaps much time, must pass before any considerable number of foreign vessels could be acquired. quicker way of procuring ships to carry the waiting crops to Europe was needed, and was thought to have been found in a plan to purchase ocean-going vessels and operate them under the direction of a board composed of the President, Secretaries of War and Commerce and the Postmaster General, and to establish a bureau for government insurance of American ships and cargoes against the risks of war. The fine ships of the North-German-Lloyd and the Hamburg-American lines could be purchased and used at once.

No bill for the purchase of ships passed Congress at that time; but the Federal Bureau of War Risk Insurance was established and \$5,000,000 appropriated to be used to insure American vessels, freight and cargo, when war-risk insurance could not be obtained elsewhere on terms that were reasonable.

The sudden interruption of occan traffic, the closing of many European ports to shipment of goods to our country cut down the revenue from imports so rapidly and so much that when August ended there was a deficit of ten million dollars. Aware that this must continue the President applied to Congress for a War Tax.

During the month of August, he said, the revenue collected from customs duties fell \$10,629,538 below that for the same

month of 1913. Should the rate of decrease go on during the remainder of the fiscal year, it would amount to \$50,000,000 or possibly \$100,000,000. This loss was due not to the recent reductions in duties, he held, but to the decrease in importations, caused by war conditions in the industrial areas in Europe. Heavy as was the deficit it should be met, and promptly, not by borrowing, not by issuing bonds, but by taxation. He asked therefore that \$100,000,000 be raised by internal taxes, and Congress in October enacted the War Revenue Act to add \$54,000,000 to the revenue. It was to expire on the last day of December, 1915.

CHAPTER II

PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA-BELGIAN RELIEF

That the people of the United States should be indifferent to the course of events in Europe was impossible. Their neutral rights, their sympathies, their prejudices; indignation over the brutal invasion of Belgium; admiration for the heroism of the Belgian people; hatred of England; good will towards England; grateful remembrance for French support in the War for Independence, detestation of German militarism, love for the Fatherland, ties of blood, race, nationality, a hundred motives forced them to take sides.

As the greatest of neutrals the attitude that might be taken by the people and Government of the United States was a matter of much concern to all the belligerents and to none more than to Germany.

No sooner, therefore, was the war fairly under way than Germans, German-Americans and pro-German citizens began the most remarkable propaganda ever made by a belligerent and its supporters to influence opinion in a neutral country. press, the platform, and the mails were used without stint. deed a special agent, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, late Colonial Sceretary of the German Empire, was sent to do his part in the effort to convince Americans of the justice of the German cause. A Press Bureau was established at New York from which came pamphlets and leaflets, and "The Fatherland, a weekly devoted to Fair-Play for Germany and Austria-Hungary." Professors in many Universities, men who had lived in Germany, and had studied at her Universities, while declaring themselves devoted Americans, wrote and labored for the German cause. The German language press sided with the Fatherland. The English languages press though overwhelmingly proally, opened its columns to the expression of opinions by both sides.

Who began the war, was hotly debated. Friends of the Allies laid the blame on Germany and denounced her for violating the neutrality of Belgium. Pro-Germans defended the invasion of Belgium, maintained that France was the first to do so, charged Great Britain with responsibility for the war and declared that her defense of Belgian neutrality was a mere pretense. So warm did the discussion become that August 18 the President appealed to his "fellow countrymen," to be neutral in speech as well as in action. He supposed, he said, that every thoughtful man in America had asked himself what effect the war would have on the United States. That depended on what American citizens said and did. All who loved America would act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, of impartiality, fairness and friendliness toward all concerned. But the spirit of the nation would largely depend on what was said at public meetings, in newspapers and magazines, by what was uttered by ministers from the pulpit and by men on the streets. Our people were drawn from the nations at war. It was but natural that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire as to the issues of the conflict. He ventured therefore to speak a word of warning against partisanship, against taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name. The people must be impartial in thought as well as in action. Our country must show herself fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, neither sitting in judgment upon others, nor disturbed in her counsels, free to do what is honest, and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

The appeal, coming at the time it did, was by many looked on as a reply to one made to the President by the National German-American Alliance, through its President, Dr. J. C. Hexamer, to use his good offices with Japan. That country, about to enter the war, had sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her armed ships from the eastern seas and the surrender of Kiao-Chow. This act was now used by pro-Germans to frighten the people of the United States. Having seized Kiao-Chow, the next objective point of Japan, it was said, will be Samoa.

Now Samoa, it was pointed out, is but six days sail from

ports in Japan and almost in line with Honolulu, in which were living a hundred thousand Japanese, and Honolulu is but five days sail from San Francisco. With Samoa in her hands and a hundred thousand of her subjects on the island and another hundred thousand in Honolulu Japan would be ready for an attack on any power she pleased. Why not the United States? There was more behind her act than the mere seizure of the leased possessions of Germany in China.

Hoping to involve the United States in the issue the National German-American Alliance appealed to President Wilson "to plead with the Government of Japan," in the name "of humanity, civilization and universal peace to refrain from carrying the war into the Far East by demanding from Germany to abandon all her political and commercial interests in China." She should be fair and submit any grievances against Germany to the Hague Peace Tribunal. Dr. Hexamer likewise appealed to the press to "frown down upon the act of Japan in throwing herself into the European conflict." Japan menaced no other nation as she did the United States, he said. Her purpose was to acquire the Caroline Islands, then possibly Samoa and finally Hawaii.

At a meeting of Irish-Nationalists in Philadelphia a speaker declared England had ever been the bitter enemy of Ireland, and that Redmond had assumed too much, when he pledged Ireland to fight Germany, and resolutions friendly to Germany were adopted: "We, the Irish-Nationalists of Philadelphia," said one, "recognize in this conflict that Germany is the friend of Ireland, and that she is attacked from behind by Ireland's old enemy, England." "We repudiate the so-called leaders of our race who without warrant pledged Irish courage to the cause of the assassin and the coward." "To Ireland we look to hope for German victory over the power that has destroyed our own country." "We pledge ourselves to do all in our power to aid a friendly people to repel their enemies who are also ours, and to use every effort to bring Irishmen and Germans together to fight for a common cause, the national welfare of Germany and the national existence of Ireland."

The ministers of German churches in Philadelphia called a meeting at the Zion German Lutheran Church and expressed their pro-German views. Resolutions presented by the ministers "protested against the censorship by our government of German-American wireless stations. Any so-called censorship of the cables of England and her allies is a farce, as the dispatches can readily be introduced into our country through Canada."

Resolutions adopted by those in the pews set forth that: "We, German-Americans," protest "against the common calumnies against the head of a nation friendly to us, as degrading the entire American people"; brand as false the statement "that Germany and its Emperor have sought and forced this war"; demand "no favor for Germany from the English-American press," but "protest against all articles which tend to incite and seek to create public sentiment against Germany. What we ask is neutrality towards all warring nations."

The Kaiser, meanwhile, on September 7, protested to the President against the conduct of the Allies. "After the eapture of the French fort of Longwy my troops found in that place thousands of dumdum bullets which had been manufactured in special works by the French Government. Such bullets were found not only on French killed and wounded. but also on English troops. . . .

"I solemnly protest to you against the way in which this war is being waged by our opponents, whose methods are making it one of the most barbarous in history. Besides the use of these awful weapons, the Belgian Government openly incited the civil population to participate in fighting, and has for a long time carefully organized their resistance. The cruelties practiced in this guerrilla warfare, even by women and priests, towards wounded soldiers, and doctors and hospital nurses (physicians were killed and lazarets fired on) were such that eventually my generals were compelled to adopt the strongest measures to punish the guilty and frighten the bloodthirsty population from continuing their shameful deeds.

"Some villages and even the old town of Louvain, with the exception of its beautiful town hall, had to be destroyed for

the protection of my troops.

"My heart bleeds when I see such measures inevitable and when I think of the many innocent people who have lost their

houses and property as a result of the misdeeds of the guilty."

No sooner did President Poincaré hear of this protest than he too, addressed President Wilson. He had been informed, he said, that the German Government was attempting to abuse His Excellency's good faith by alleging that dumdum bullets were made in French State workshops and used by French soldiers. The calumny was nothing but "an audacious attempt to reverse the rôles." Germany since the beginning of the war had used dumdum bullets and had daily violated the law of nations. On August 18, and on several occasions since, he had reported crimes. Germany, aware of these protests, "was trying to deceive and make use of pretexts and lies in order to indulge in further acts of barbarity in the name of right."

September 16 President Wilson answered the protest from the Kaiser. He was honored that the Emperor should have turned to him "for an impartial judgment as the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth." The Kaiser he was sure would not expect him "to say more." "It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government; however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation, which like this, has no part in the contest, to favor or express a final judgment."

That same day Belgium made her protests. For weeks past horrid stories of atrocities perpetrated by the Germans on the people of Belgium had come pouring in from abroad. The German armies had swept across Belgium and France almost to the gates of Paris. There they had been checked. The battle of the Marne had been fought and the Germans driven northward to the St. Quentin, Noyon, Laon line.

Everywhere their path had been marked by murder, rapine, brutality and crime. The details of what was done need not be retold. The whole world knows it. In every village, town and little city men, women and children were shot for no offense whatever, houses and shops were looted and burned, churches were destroyed, farmsteads set on fire, peasants shot in the fields, and livestock carried away.

At Louvain the Germans, asserting they had been fired on

by civilians, burned a large part of the city, some of the University buildings and the great library and shot scores of the inhabitants and carried hundreds into captivity. At Aerschot, under the pretext that the son of the burgomaster, a lad of fifteen, had killed a German officer, one hundred and fifty citizens were shot and the town pillaged and almost destroyed. Fifteen houses were burned after the people had fled from Rotselaer. Visé and a score of towns and hamlets met a like fate.

As the reports of these atrocities became known in our country, an outburst of astonishment and indignation followed. That the armies of a people such as the Germans were believed to be should wantonly destroy historic monuments, masterpieces of architecture, works of art and take the lives of noncombatants was at first almost unbelievable. Indeed they were indignantly denied or defended by the German language press and devoted friends of Germany. They were, it was said, of English origin, they came from Paris, were false and designed to prejudice America. Five American newspaper correspondents who followed the German armies as they drove through Belgium joined in a letter of denial and sent it by wireless from Brussels to Berlin for transmission to their newspapers. According to their account 1 they had spent two weeks following the troops a hundred miles, and could not report a single unprovoked instance. Stories of atrocities were groundless as far as they knew. They could not confirm one instance of mistreatment of prisoners or noncombatants. This, they said, was true of Louvain, Brussels, Luneville and Nantes. Many rumors when investigated they had found groundless.

A very different story came from the Belgians. No sooner had the Germans entered Belgium and begun the work of terrorizing the people than the Minister of Justice appointed a Commission of Inquiry to gather and examine all the facts relating to violations of the law of nations, the rights of property and destruction of human life.

The Commission met in Brussels, but after the removal of

¹Mr. Roger Lewis of the Associated Press; Mr. Irvin S. Cobb of the *Philadelphia Ledger*; Mr. Harry Hause of the *Chicago Daily News*; Mr. J. O'Donnell Bennet and Mr. John T. McCutcheon of the *Chicago Tribune*.

the Government to Antwerp on August 18, communication with Brussels ended and no reports came from the Commission. Thereupon the Minister of Justice appointed a subcommission to carry on the work in Antwerp, and from it by the end of August came a report telling how Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium, how in disregard of the Hague Rules of 1907, her aeroplanes and dirigibles dropped bombs on towns that were undefended and on fortified places neither besieged nor invested as Malines, Heyst-op-din-Berg, Louvain, Namur, Antwerp; how the people were massacred at Aerschot, and how buildings were burned, homes looted and people killed in Liége, Louvain, Hersselt.

This report the King of the Belgians placed in the hands of a Special Envoy and sent him, attended by men of distinction, to deliver it to President Wilson as a protest against the wrongs

inflicted on the people of Belgium.2

The Mission was received on September 16, an address was made, the document delivered, and a reply made by the President. In the course of it he said:

"I am honored that your King should have turned to me in time of distress as to one who would wish on behalf of the people he represents to consider the claims to the impartial sympathy of mankind of a nation which deems itself wronged.

"I thank you for the document you have put in my hands. . . . It shall have my most attentive perusal and my most thoughtful

consideration.

"You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. . . . It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form a final judgment."

Ambassador von Bernstorff officially informed the State Department that the statement made by the Belgian Commission did not contain one word of truth. A dispatch from Berlin informed him that because of an attack from Antwerp the German garrison went forth to meet the enemy, leaving one battalion in Louvain; that the priests thinking this meant retreat gave arms to the citizens who suddenly began to shoot out of

² "The Case of Belgium in the Present War, 1914."

windows; that a fight of twenty-five hours followed; that parts of Louvain were burned, and civilians with arms were killed. The German army, the dispatch said, "protested against the news sent out by enemies about the cruelty of German warfare. The German troops had to take severe measures sometimes when provoked, the population making treacherous attacks upon them and bestial atrocities against the wounded. . . . The German soldier is not an incendiary nor pillager."

When the Germans were driven from Rheims in September, and the French came in, the retiring enemy turned their guns upon the cathedral. Against this act of vandalism the French Government, on September 21, made a formal protest to all neutral nations, and sent the American architect, Mr. Whitney Warren, to report on the damage done. Even the German Government at first seemed ashamed, and Ambassador von Bernstorff entered an official disclaimer at Washington and in its name denied that German artillery had purposely destroyed important buildings in Rheims, and that orders were given to spare the cathedral by all means. The report of Mr. Warren proved the destruction was deliberate.

Despite the testimony collected by the Belgian Commission and published in their report, pro-Germans denied that such atrocities had been committed and declared that what had been done was fully justified. The daily lamentations here over the atrocities, the barbarities of the Germans are dictated by English hypocrisy, said the Staats-Zeitung, published in New York. Americans who to-day profess to be so indignant over the bombardment of Rheims have plainly forgotten Sherman's March to the Sea. Atrocities! Enough of the whining of English hypocrisy, because something beautiful has been destroyed. A Philadelphia German newspaper asserted that the Belgian Committee was being used by England to raise a cry against Germany. It had falsely accused German soldiers and the German army of gross infractions of the rules of civilized warfare and the rights of civilians. German wounded were mutilated by Belgian hyenas on the battlefield. Civilian populations had taken up arms and fired on the Germans from behind. partial destruction of Louvain was to be attributed to an organized attack on the Germans by the civilians. Dr. Krauskopf of Philadelphia knew that women and noncombatants had cut off the ears and noses and gouged out the eyes of wounded defenseless Germans.

Scarcely had the Belgians presented their case to the President when the case of Germany was set forth in a pamphlet entitled: "The Truth About Germany: Facts About the War." It was addressed especially to our countrymen, had been written in Germany and the correctness of its statements was vouched for by an Honorary Committee of four and thirty Germans of distinction. In the preface Dr. John W. Burgess of Columbia University vouched for them. Seventeen he had known for years. With six he had labored as a colleague in University work. "They are the salt of the earth! . . . No statement was ever issued which was vouched for by more solid, intelligent and conscientious people. Its correctness, completeness and veracity cannot be doubted." One article took up the question who was responsible for the war and laid the blame on England. Another reminded us of what England had done in the Civil War. Others explained mobilization and the organization of the German army and navy. Among the statements vouched for by the Honorary Committee are some as unbelievable as any that came out of Belgium. Americans were told "that the eyes of wounded German soldiers in Belgium were gouged out, and their ears and noses cut off; that surgeons and persons carrying the wounded were shot at from houses": that "German women were dragged naked through the streets (of Antwerp) and shot to death before the eyes of the police and the militia" and that "children were thrown from the windows of German homes into the streets and their limbs were broken."

In the light of what we now know of the activities of German spies and agents in our country against France and Great Britain, and finally against us while still at peace with Germany this complaint against espionage in Germany is worth citing. "This espionage," said the writer, "was directed from central points in foreign countries." "Repeatedly it appeared that the foreign embassies and Consulates in Germany assisted in this work." "This espionage system was supported with large funds." But the writer did not then know of the work

to be carried on in our country by Ambassador von Bernstorff, by von Papen, Captain Boy-Ed, Dumba and a host of others.

The pamphlet closed with "an appeal to American Friends"; but the appeal was made on the low plane of profit and loss.

"The American citizen who is now leaving Europe, which has been turned into an enormous military camp, may consider himself fortunate that he will soon be able to set foot in the new world where he will be enabled again to take up his business pursuits. . . . But the American will feel the effects of the fate of the old world. . . . He will be affected by every victory and defeat, just as by the sun and rain in his own country. He will doubtless remember that of all European countries, Germany is the best customer of the United States, from which she purchases yearly over one billion marks in cotton, food, metal and technical products. If Germany is economically ruined, which is the wish of Russia, France and England and all the allied friends of wretched Serbia, it would mean the loss of a heavy buyer to America which could not easily be made good." . . . In forty-three years "England, France and Russia had not been able to increase their foreign trade three times, while Germany and the United States have increased theirs five times. The trade of Germany and the United States has increased from 7.6 to 38 billion marks. If these figures show nothing else, they show on which side the American sympathy will be."

That such information as Germany wished the people of the United States to have, might be spread as far and as wide as possible the Oberburgermeister of Berlin appealed to the Mayor of New York to act as news agent. "The Fatherland," said he, "has the greatest possible concern that during the war in which it is fighting for life, neutral countries may not be informed of events of the war solely by the press of the enemy." The municipal administration of Berlin regarded it as a duty to make the reports of the German press on the progress of the war accessible to the authorities and citizens of the great municipalities of neutral states. The German newspapers regularly published reports from General Headquarters on the state of affairs. This information which came, plain and unadorned, from an uncontaminated source would give to the world trustworthy and clear accounts of events. He would be greatly obliged, therefore, if the Mayor would be willing to receive the reports and send them to the sources of public information in the city, and if possible bring them to the knowledge of the citizens by having them exposed in the reading rooms, or in any other suitable manner.

Ninety-three German professors and representatives of science and art now appealed "To the Civilized World" against "the lies and calumnies with which our enemies are endeavoring to stain the honor of Germany in her hard struggle for existence." "It is not true that Germany caused the war." "Neither the people, the government, nor the Kaiser wanted war." Not until "a numerical superiority which had been lying in wait on the frontier assailed us did the whole nation rise to a man."

"It is not true" that Germany "trespassed in neutral Belgium." "It is not true that the life and property of a single Belgian citizen was injured by our soldiers without the bitterest self-defense made it necessary." "It is not true that our troops treated Louvain brutally." "It is not true that our warfare pays no respect to international law." "It is not true that the combat against our so-called militarism is not a combat against our civilization, as our enemies hypocritically pretend it is. Were it not for German militarism German civilization would long since have been extinguished."

"We cannot wrest the poisonous weapon—the lie—out of the hands of our enemies. All we can do is to proclaim to all the world that our enemies are giving false witness against us."

"Have faith in us! Believe that we shall carry on the war to the end as a civilized nation."

Twenty-two German Universities made an appeal, and twenty English scholars answered that of the German professors and men of science. Ludwig Fulda, well known as a writer of poetry and prose, addressed an open letter "To Americans from a German Friend." Fifty-three British authors came to the defense of England. Bernard Shaw's "Common Sense About the War" was published in the New York Times, and was vigorously attacked in the same journal by Arnold Bennett. After the "White Papers" of Great Britain and Germany, the pamphlets containing the correspondence that passed

between them and the Powers from the close of July until the declarations of war, were made public, "A German Review of the Evidence" was written in Germany and sent to Dr. Bernard Dernburg who had it translated and published in the New York *Times*.

From Dr. Dernburg came a series of articles afterward collected and published in a pamphlet "Search-Lights on the War." One, "Germany and England—The Real Issue," appeared in the Saturday Evening Post; another, "Germany and the Powers," in the North American Review; another, "Germany's Food Supply," in the Review of Reviews, and another, "When Germany Wins," in the Independent with a hearty endorsement by the editor. "We hear a great deal about what England and France are fighting for," said the editor. "We have heard very little—except from English sources—about what Germany is fighting for. Here is a chance to read the other side.

"Dr. Dernburg stands for what we Americans most admire in modern Germany, its industries, its commerce, its technical schools and its efficient organization. . . . He is now in the country on a most important mission. As a man thoroughly familiar with American history and politics as well as finance he understands our point of view and can interpret to us the point of view of his own country."

And now the diplomatic representatives of foreign coun-

tries, resident in the United States, began to talk.

Sir Lionel Carden, Minister to Mexico, when about to leave the United States for England, denounced the Government because it withdrew the troops from Vera Cruz. Baron Wilhelm von Schoen, attached to the German Embassy at Tokio until Japan entered the war, arrived in Washington and in an interview sought to excite bad feelings towards Japan. There feeling against the United States, he said, was intense. Should Japan and England be victorious, which he did not believe could happen, the danger to the United States would be great. Japan wanted war. His meaning plainly was that the United States would do well to side with Germany.

The great offender was the Ambassador from Turkey, A. Rustem Bey. His country had not yet entered the war. That

she would do so no one doubted and a report was current that Great Britain had suggested that as a massacre of Christians was likely, the United States should send warships to Turkish waters. Concerning this the Ambassador in an interview said Great Britain, following in the footsteps of France, had agitated before the eyes of the United States the specter of a massacre of Christians in Turkey, and had made this a pretext for requesting the United States to send warships to Turkish ports. Because many newspapers were siding with Great Britain and France he would say that "the thought of lynchings which occur daily in the United States, and the memory of the water cure in the Philippines should make them chary of attacking Turkey in connection with acts of savagery committed by her under provocation." Why should the United States, not one of whose citizens had ever suffered injury in Turkey, "send warships to the ports of that country with the result that it would only cause irritation against her, and could under no circumstances act as a check?" Bombard Smyrna and Beyreuth? "And what more could she do? Nothing! Besides that would be enough to mean war. Do the people of the United States want war?"

For these remarks von Schoen and Rustem Bey might very properly have been required to leave the country. But the administration was long suffering. The attention of von Bernstorff was called to the utterances of von Schoen, then attached to the German Embassy at Washington; the offender called at the Department of State and the incident was settled. Rustem Bey would neither explain nor retract, and, passing by the Secretary of State, he called on the President and announced that he had asked leave of absence and shortly thereafter left our country not to return.

No sooner had Congress assembled in December than the German-Americans turned their attention to munitions of war, and sought to secure legislation to prevent the export of guns, powder, shrapnel and shells from the United States to any of the belligerents. As matters then stood Germany was cut off from such supplies from our country. Therefore they held it was unneutral to sell munitions of war to the Allies. In hope of arousing public sympathy for Germany resolutions were offered in Congress and bills were introduced to prohibit the

sale of arms and ammunition for export during the war; to forbid the furnishing of war materials to belligerent nations; and thousands of telegrams were sent to Senators and Representatives urging them to vote for one or the other of the bills. Attempts were made to even coerce some members, and petitions, chiefly from the middle western part of our country, were presented by scores. One from a meeting of citizens of Enderlin, North Dakota, presented on January 17, was, save for the preamble, word for word the same as the resolutions adopted on January 11 by the Philadelphia Branch of the National German-American Alliance. Ten nations, the preamble to the Enderlin resolutions said, were drawing war supplies from the United States. This tended to increase the loss of life, the destruction of property, and prolong the war. As a people we prayed for peace; but as a nation we helped on the war by emptying our private arsenals and war supplies "onto the battlefields of Europe." Our Government had proclaimed strict neutrality. Yet, when we offer military supplies to any nation that chooses to buy, and do so knowing that for a hundred years England by her supremacy on the seas is master of all contraband goods, we are pursuing a course which diverges so far from strict neutrality that we injure "our ancient friends, Germany and Austria, by every means in our power."

Without the halls of Congress Ambassador von Bernstorff led the opposition by filing with the Department of State on December 5 a protest against dumdum bullets which he charged were used by the British and manufactured in the United States. It had come to the knowledge of the German Government, he said, that the British Government had placed, with the Winchester Repeating Arms Company, an order for "20,000 Riot Guns Models 1897 and 50,000,000 buckshot cartridges for the same. The buckshot cartridge contains nine shots.

"The use of those arms and munitions has not yet become known to civilized warfare.

"The Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Conn., on October 20 took out through Frank O. Hoagland, the enclosed patent for the manufacture of a 'Mushroom Bullet.'

"According to information, the accuracy of which is not to

be doubted, 8,000,000 of those cartridges have been delivered to Canada since October of this year by the Union Metallic Cartridge Company for the armament of the British Army. Cartridges made by that process, although cut through, cannot be distinguished, by their external appearance, from the regular full jacketed cartridges. The soldiers in whose hands this kind of ammunition is placed by the British Government are not in position to know that they are firing dumdum bullets.

"Whether the use of mushroom bullets is contrary to the

law of nations is open to discussion."

The letter of von Bernstorff having appeared in the newspapers, the Winchester Company publicly denied that it had ever received an order for riot guns and cartridges from the British Government or any other government engaged in the present war, or had ever sold any such material to the British Government or any other government engaged in the present war. As to the 8,000,000 mushroom bullets the Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Company on December 10 wrote von Bernstorff that but a little over 117,000 had been made and only 109,000 sold, that they were manufactured to meet a demand for a better sporting cartridge with a soft nose bullet and could not be used in the military rifle of any foreign power.

Nevertheless, Mr. Bryan called on the firms concerned for information as to what they had done. The Winchester Arms Company, by telegraph, confirmed their public statement. The Remington Company sent a copy of their letter to von Bernstorff, and gave a list of the names of every person to whom mushroom bullets had been sold and the number in each case. From this list it appeared they had been sold in lots of from 20 to 2,000; that only 960 cartridges went to British North America, and 100 to British East Africa.

Could the Ambassador furnish evidence, Mr. Bryan replied, that any company was furnishing to the armies in Europe, cartridges whose use would be contrary to The Hague Conventions the President would use his influence to prevent the sale of such ammunition, without regard to whether it was or was not the duty of the Government, on legal or conventional grounds, to take such action.

No war munitions of any consequence had as yet been exported. That they would be seemed certain and to prevent it the agitation for an embargo was taken up by the German-Americans. At a meeting of the Philadelphia Branch of the National German-American Alliance on December 11, attended by delegates from almost a hundred local societies with a membership of some 40,000, it was resolved that it was "the imperative duty" of Congress to pass such laws as would enable the President "to lay an embargo upon all contraband of war, saving and excepting foodstuffs alone, and thereby withdraw from the contending Powers all aid and assistance of this Republic."

The meeting, it was resolved, rejected "as hypocrisy and national sacrilege the commercial spirit of the country that is answering our supplications for peace by sending the instruments of destruction and death to the serried armies arrayed in struggle through the empires of Europe." As citizens who had contributed their full share to American peace, Christianity and civilization, they called on all Americans to join in enforcing that strict American neutrality that would give aid and comfort to none of the contending Powers, but would withhold American resources from promoting destruction and slaughter among the friendly nations of Europe.

A few days later some two hundred German-Americans met in Philadedphia to devise a plan for placing before the authorities in Washington the question, Cannot the shipment of munitions be stopped? It was admitted that the meeting had no specific facts, but the speakers were sure that questionable sales had been made, that the spirit of the neutrality proclamation had been violated. It was therefore suggested that British-Americans, French-Americans, Russian-Americans, sons of all the belligerent nations be asked to join with German-Americans in a call on the Government to stop the shipment of munitions of war. Unable to see how this could be done, the meeting adjourned to meet again.

But there were other ways in which the friends of Germany did their evil work. Charges of bad faith were made against the Government in the press and on the platform. It was partial to the Allies, unfriendly to Germany; negligent of its duties as a neutral, submissive while Great Britain searched our vessels, seized our copper on its way to neutral ports, cut off our commerce and made contraband such articles of commerce as she saw fit. When Congress met members with German-American and pro-German constituents were deluged with letters of complaint.

Taking up these charges, Senator Stone of Missouri summarized them under twenty heads and January 8, 1915, wrote Mr. Bryan:

As you are aware, frequent complaints or charges are made in one form or another through the press that this Government has shown partiality to Great Britain, France and Russia as against Germany and Austria during the present war between those Powers; in addition to which I have received numerous letters to the same effect from sympathizers with Germany and Austria. The various grounds of these complaints may be summarized and stated in the following form.

The Senator then gave the list of twenty complaints and asked "if not incompatible with the public interests," that he be furnished with whatever information the Department has, "touching the various points of complaint."

Mr. Bryan replied on January 24, took up the charges and complaints one by one and answered them.

"1. Freedom of communication by submarine cables, but censorship of wireless messages."

Communication by cable had not been interfered with because a belligerent could cut a cable, and they had done so, the British having cut the German cable near the Azores, and the Germans a British cable near the Fanning Islands. Since cables could be destroyed the responsibility fell on the belligerents and not on neutrals to prevent communication. But it was not in the power of belligerents to prevent wireless messages going out from a neutral country to a warship on the high seas. If such messages directed the movements of warships, or gave information of the whereabouts of an enemy's public or private ships, the neutral territory was being used as a naval base, to allow which was an unneutral act.

- "Submission to censorship of mails and in some cases to the repeated destruction of American letters found on neutral vessels," was another complaint. The Secretary pointed out that both Great Britain and Germany had censored private letters; that they had a right to do so, and that the Department knew of no evidence that mail had been destroyed on neutral ships.
- "The search of American vessels for German and Austrian subjects on the high seas and in territorial waters of a belligerent." Two instances had occurred on the high seas, and in both cases vigorous representations had been made to the offending governments.
- "Submission without protest to English violations of the rules regarding absolute and conditional contraband, as laid down in The Hague Conventions, in international law, in the Declaration of London." There is no Hague Convention, the Secretary replied, which deals with absolute or conditional contraband; the Declaration of London is not in force, international law alone applies, and as to articles of contraband there is no general agreement among nations. The United States had protested against the seizure and detention by British authorities of all American ships and cargoes truly destined for neutral ports.
- 5. "Submission without protest to inclusion of copper in the lists of absolute contraband." In every case in which Great Britain had seized copper shipments the United States had protested.
- "Submission without protest to interference with American trade to neutral countries in conditional contraband, in absolute contraband." The recent note to Great Britain the Secretary considered a full answer to this complaint.
- 7. "Submission without protest to interruption of trade in conditional contraband consigned to private persons in Germany and Austria, thereby supporting the policy of Great Britain to cut off all supplies from Germany and Austria." As no American vessel so far as known had attempted to carry conditional contraband to Germany or Austria, no complaints of seizure had arisen.
 - 8. "Submission to British interruption of trade in pe-

troleum, rubber, leather, wool, &c.," was another grievance. The United States, Mr. Bryan answered, "has, thus far, successfully obtained the release in every case of detention or seizure" of petroleum "brought to its attention." Rubber had been placed on the absolute and leather on the conditional contraband lists by both France and Great Britain.

- "No interference with the sale to Great Britain and her Allies of arms, ammunition, horses, uniforms, and other munitions of war, although such sales prolong the war." The Executive had no power to prevent such sales. Neither international law nor municipal statute prohibited a neutral to trade in munitions of war.
- "No suppression of sale of dumdum bullets to Great Britain." On the fifth of December, was the reply, the German Ambassador presented a note charging the British Government with having ordered from the Winchester Repeating Arms Company, 20,000 riot guns, Model 1897, and 50,000,000 buckshot cartridges for use in such guns. The Winchester Company publicly, and to the Department, had denied that any such order has been given by any government engaged in the present war. The German Ambassador had further charged that 8,000,000 cartridges fitted with mushroom bullets had been sold by the Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Company to the British Government for its army. The company replied that it had sold to private persons 109,000 soft-nosed bullets to supply a demand for a better sporting cartridge, that they could not be used in the military rifle of any foreign power; gave the names of the persons to whom they had been sold in lots of from 20 to 5,000, and proved that only 960 had gone to British North America, and 100 to British East Africa.
- "British warships are permitted to lie off American ports and intercept neutral vessels." Representation had been made to the British Government that the presence of war vessels off New York was offensive, and a like complaint to the Japanese Government as to cruisers near Honolulu. In both cases they were withdrawn.
- 12. "Submission without protest to disregard by Great Britain and her Allies of American naturalization certificates,

American passports." Bearers of American passports, was the answer, have been arrested in all countries at war, and in every case the American Government has entered vigorous protest. Authentic cases have come to the notice of the Department in which American passports have been fraudulently obtained and used by certain German subjects. At least four persons of German nationality had been arrested for having obtained American passports under pretense of American citizenship, and for the purpose of returning unmolested to Germany. There were indications of a systematic plan for obtaining passports by fraud that German officers and reservists might return to Germany in safety.

"Change of policy in regard to loans to belligerents." War loans were disapproved because inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality, and the disapproval affected all countries alike. Such loans if offered for popular subscription would be taken up chiefly by sympathizers with the country offering the loan. Large numbers of the American people might thus become earnest partisans which would result in intense bitterness.

"Submission to arrest of native-born Americans on neutral vessels and in British ports and their imprisonment." That such cases had occurred was true, but Americans in Germany had suffered in the same way. Every ease known to the Department had been investigated and if the facts warranted a demand for release, it was made.

- "Indifference to confinement of noncombatants in detention camps in England and France." All the belligerents, save Russia and Serbia, had made complaints about noncombatants confined in detention camps, and those for whom the Government was acting had asked investigations which had been made impartially by representatives of the Government. Their reports showed that the treatment of prisoners was as good as possible, and there was no more reason for saying they were mistreated in one country than in another, or that this Government had been indifferent in the matter.
- "Failure to prevent transshipment of British troops and war materials across the territory of the United States."

There were no cases of passage of convoys or troops across our territory. The Canadian Government had requested permission to ship equipment across Alaska to the sea. The re-

quest was refused.

17. "Treatment and final internment of German steamship Geier and the collier Locksun at Honolulu." The Geier, said the Secretary, entered Honolulu on October 15, in an unseaworthy condition, was allowed three weeks to make repairs, and while doing so, the Japanese cruiser appeared off the port, and the Geier interned. Soon after the Geier came to the port the steamer Locksun arrived. She had delivered coal to the Geier at sea and had followed her to Honolulu. By so doing she became a tender to the Geier and was interned.

"Unfairness to Germany in rules relative to coaling

of warships in Panama Canal Zone."

Regulations for coaling warships, their tenders or colliers in the Canal Zone were framed through the collaboration of the State, War and Navy Departments without reference to favoritism to belligerents. Fuel may be taken by belligerent warships with consent of the canal authorities and in such amount as will enable them to reach the nearest neutral port. This it had been said is unfair, because Great Britain has colonies near by where her ships may coal while Germany has not. The United States therefore should balance the inequality of geographical position by refusing to allow any warship of belligerents to coal in the Canal Zone during the war. As no German warship has sought to obtain coal in this Zone, the charge of discrimination rested on a possibility that had not materialized.

19. "Failure to protest against the modifications of the Declaration of London by the British Government."

As the Government of the United States was not now interested in the adoption of the Declaration by the belligerents, their modifications were of no concern save as they infringed the rights of the United States. In so far as they had the Department had made every effort to obtain redress.

20. "General unfriendly attitude of Government towards

Germany and Austria."

To this charge Mr. Bryan replied: "If any American citizens, partisans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, feel that this administration is acting in a way injurious to the cause

of those countries, this feeling results from the fact that on the high seas the German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is thus far inferior to the British. It is the business of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy.

"Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government, in the performance of its neutral duty, to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists; it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality on the part of the Government to adopt such a policy if the Executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot import contraband from this country it is not, because of that fact, the duty of the United States to close its markets to the Allies. The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral."

As the German armies swept through Belgium, burning and plundering the towns, killing men, women and children, destroying farms and shooting peasants at work in the fields or met with on the roads, the civil population fled before them, leaving their all behind. After the fall of Brussels in August and Antwerp in October, a million refugees, it was said, had found safety in Holland. In one week, in October, seventy thousand reached London. Such as remained were reduced to dire want. Seizure of cattle by the Germans left them without beef, milk, cheese. The shops had no food to sell; the people, deprived of their usual occupations, had no money to buy. The lace makers of Brussels were out of work. The tapestry factories of Mechlin were in ruins. The diamond cutters of Antwerp were scattered. Belgium in times of peace produced but a sixth of her food, and drew largely on the United States for grain. This was cut off by the war, and the bakeries were shut. Liége, Louvain, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, Dinant were so shattered by shell fire that half the population were without decent shelter.

At Brussels a relief committee was organized, a goodly sum of money raised and Mr. Willard Shaler, an American mining

engineer just back from the Congo when the war opened, was asked to go to London, buy as much food as possible, arrange for sending it across the frontier and report on the prospect of securing more in the future. Assurances were given by the German authorities that supplies imported for the use of the civil population would not be requisitioned. Mr. Shaler set off at once and reached London towards the close of September, and early in October was followed by Mr. Hugh Gibson, Secretary of our Legation at Brussels. He found that Mr. Shaler had purchased food, but had not received permission from the Foreign Office to ship it through the blockade.

That there might be no doubt as to the German pledge, Mr. Page, American Ambassador in London, on October 7 cabled to Mr. Bryan that a Belgian Committee had been formed in Brussels under the patronage of the American and Spanish ministers; that its object was to import food for the poor of Belgium; that the German authorities in the occupied country had consented, that the British Government had given permission for food to be exported, provided it were sent by the American Embassy at London consigned to the American Legation at Brussels, and that Mr. Shaler, an American, was then in London purchasing supplies. It would be well, Mr. Page thought, that a definite assurance be obtained from Germany of her approval of this humane project.

Mr. Gerard was at once instructed to take up the matter, informally, with the German Foreign Office, and while awaiting a reply he received a cablegram from Mr. Whitlock.

The Committee for the Provisioning of Brussels had requested that Mr. Gibson return to London and seek to arrange a permanent agreement with the British Government by which the civil population of all Belgium might be provisioned. was concerning this matter that Mr. Whitlock telegraphed the Secretary of State, on October 16. "A grave situation," he said, "confronts the land. In normal times Belgium produces only one-sixth of the foodstuffs she consumes. Within two weeks there will be no more food in Belgium. Winter is coming on and there are thousands who are without homes and without hope. Therefore it is necessary to extend this relief work to the whole of Belgium. My Spanish colleague and I

have been requested by the local Belgian authorities and by the German military authorities to permit the organization, under our patronage, of a committee that will undertake to revictual all of Belgium, and we have secured from the German military authorities formal official assurance that all foodstuffs shipped into Belgium in the care of the committee and intended for the feeding of the impoverished civil population will be respected by the soldiery and not made the object of military requisition. It is now necessary to obtain permission from the English Government that foodstuffs may be shipped into Belgium. In view of this fact Gibson goes to London to-morrow with messages from the Spanish Minister and me to the respective Ambassadors of our countries to lay the subject before them. Baron Lambert and Mr. Franqui, representing the Belgian Relief Committee, will accompany him to acquaint the Belgian Minister in London with the situation and ask him to present the matter to the British Government. Our hope is that the Belgian Minister can arrange, and if there be no impropriety in their so doing, that the American and Spanish Ambassadors may assist him in arranging for the passage of the provisions which the Commission is ready to buy.

"I trust the Department will approve this course and further it by instructions to London. It is not money but food that is needed. If some appropriate means can be found to call the attention of our generous people at home to the plight of the poor in Belgium I am sure that they will send succor and

relief for the winter that is drawing near."

The German Government approved the plan; the British and French Governments promised the unmolested passage of neutral food ships from the United States to Holland, for Belgium; the German Government agreed to allow unneutral ships to carry food for Belgians to Dutch ports; the American Government endorsed the plan as outlined by Mr. Whitlock and the great work of feeding Belgium began.

At London Mr. Gibson found good friends of Belgium who raised £150,000, formed a committee with Mr. Herbert Hoover as Chairman, and undertook the work of feeding the Belgian civil population. The British Government stipulated that the work be carried on by a neutral organization under the pat-

ronage of the American and Spanish Ambassadors in London and Berlin, and the American and Spanish Ministers at Brussels, and that the food be consigned to the American Minister at Brussels by the London American Relief Committee with Mr. Hoover at its head. All the local Belgian Relief Committees were to be united and form one national committee. But, as the members were all prisoners of the Germans, the British Government stipulated that all responsibility be assumed by the American Committee and that those of the Belgians become distributing agencies.

Early in November the first consignment of food reached Brussels, other barges followed, and in response to an appeal by Mr. Hoover a number of American Rhodes Scholars dropped their work at Oxford and went to Brussels to do their part in

distributing food to the Belgians.

Appeal after appeal, meanwhile, was made to our countrymen. The Belgian Legation asked food and clothes for women and children. Cardinal Gibbons plead for them. The suffering of the Belgians, he said, was beyond words. Their country had become the battlefield of nations. Innocent of wrong doing, they had been driven from their homes into England, France and Holland. They could not look to these countries for help. Therefore, when the cry came to us we should hear it. All in our country who could should give relief, for Belgium deserved the sympathy of all. Cardinal Mercier, through the American Committee in London, begged for food, for potatoes, peas, grain, flour, meat. Everything was lacking.

Mr. Whitlock reported that less than two weeks' supply

of food remained in the Belgian cities; that a hundred soup kitchens were feeding a hundred thousand needy in Brussels; that Louvain had flour enough to last four days and that Liége had none at all. Nearly half the peasants were wander-

ing from town to town seeking food and shelter.

The response was quick. Relief Committees were organized the land over, and money, clothing, food were freely given and hurried to New York for shipment to Holland.

At New York late in October, after an exchange of cable-grams with Mr. Page in London and Dr. Van Dyke in Hol-land, \$300,000 was set apart by the Belgian Committee for

the purchase of food to be sent at once. Half of the money came from the American Commission for Belgian Relief in London for no more food was obtainable in England. The Rockefeller Foundation in the opening days of November chartered a steamer and dispatched her to Rotterdam with four thousand tons of flour, rice and beans, and sent a commission to Europe to visit the warring countries and obtain expert advice as to the time, place and means of rendering aid most effectively. The Red Cross cabled money for relief of Belgian refugees in Holland.

A cablegram from Mr. Page to the President of the Belgian Relief formed in Philadelphia announced that "there are 3,000,000 starving men and children in Belgium. The Commission makes an appeal to all neutral countries for a total of \$5,000,000 a month for the winter. There has never been such dire want in any land in our time." No sooner was it received than Mr. John Wanamaker, who had chartered the Norwegian ship Thelma to carry food, called a meeting of the owners and managers of the chief newspapers in Philadelphia who agreed to do their best to arouse the people to fill the ship. An executive committee representing seven newspapers took up the work, made the appeal and in four days the ship was filled and ready to sail.

Announcement was now made that the steamship Northwestern Miller would sail from Philadelphia, in December, loaded with flour contributed by the millers of the northwest. Their gift of forty-five thousand barrels would be carried free by the railroads. Scarcely had the Thelma gone when preparations were made to send a second ship, and two others were chartered by the Rockefeller Foundation to carry food purchased by the New York Belgian Relief Committee. urgency of the situation, said the Committee in their appeal for funds, cannot be overestimated. The suffering among the women and children and other noncombatants for lack of food is daily becoming more acute. The statement was borne out by the report of one who went with the first cargo of food sent from London to Rotterdam by the American Commission for Relief in Belgium.

"Nothing that has been written exaggerates the misery in

Belgium. We drove for miles through graveyards. Stakes, on some of which were soldiers' tattered coats and helmets, were the tombstones, deserted fields are cemeteries. As we entered the villages women and children sought refuge in the ruins of roofless homes, terrified lest we were some fresh visitation of war.

"The Belgian peasant has in many districts no home in which to sleep, no seed to sow, no implements with which to work, no transport to reach a market, and finally no heart to struggle against the inevitable. It is unbelievable that war ever produced such a complete and tragic paralysis as we saw in many parts of Belgium."

Sir Gilbert Parker in a letter to Cardinal Gibbons and to the heads of a great corporation in Philadelphia, asked "for food, for starving Belgium. I am here," said he, "on the borders of Belgium, watching the refugees fleeing into Holland from their devastated country. Many towns and cities are absolutely destroyed. Countless homes are in ashes.

"Unless America renders immediate aid starvation will destroy more Belgians than have been killed in war. The American Commission for Relief in Belgium asks for less than half a soldier's ration for each Belgian. They ask for bread and salt only. Will you not help to save the names of Christianity and civilization by gifts of money?"

In Brussels, where several hundred thousand men, women and children were fed, the ration was a little potato soup and six ounces of bread. Such as could paid a cent for the meal, which cost three cents, and the money was used to buy more food.

To help speed the good work, the American Commission in London opened an office in New York. It came not to meddle with the relief committees already in the country, but to attend to transportation of supplies. It had the funds and had made all diplomatic arrangements. What Belgium needed most of all was food, any kind of food, that would stand ocean transportation. Wheat, flour, beans, peas, preserved meat were needed, but above all condensed milk for the children, for Belgium was stripped of cattle.

As the need of relief grew greater and greater it became

quite clear that so stupendous an undertaking could not be carried on by charitable gifts, and through our Ambassador Mr. Hoover appealed to the governments of Great Britain and The call was heard and £500,000 per month was granted by Great Britain and 12,500,000 francs per month by France. To this was added by French institutions 25,000,000 francs per month for the relief of the inhabitants of the area in Northern France occupied by the Germans. June 1, 1917, when our Government took over the financing of the work of relief for Belgium and Northern France, the Commission for Relief in Belgium had received from Great Britain \$89,-500,000, from the French Government \$66,000,000 for Belgium and \$108,000,000 from France for use in the occupied ter-Some \$16,000,000 in cash and clothing came in addition from committees and individuals in the British Empire: \$11,500,000 from the United States and \$3,000,000 from the rest of the world. June 1 our Government loaned \$75,000,000 to be paid in six monthly instalments of \$12,-500,000, of which \$7,500,000 was to go to Belgium, and \$5,000,000 to France.

CHAPTER III

NEUTRAL TRADE

The entrance of the great commercial nations of Europe into the war at once involved our country in a struggle for its neutral rights. With the German merchant shipping swept from the seas, and the German fleet, save a few commerce raiders, driven into the ports and harbors of Germany, Great Britain was free to turn her attention to the destruction of that neutral trade from which Germany might obtain supplies of a warlike character. Water-borne traffic of this sort going direct to Germany in neutral bottoms was easily stopped. But to cut off the supply which found its way through neutral countries she was forced to adopt a policy which pressed heavily on the commerce of the neutrals concerned.

At the outbreak of the war the Department of State instructed our Ambassador at London to inquire if the Government of Great Britain would agree "that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by the Declaration of London of 1909," should "be applicable to naval warfare during the present conflict in Europe," provided all the governments with whom Great Britain was or might be at war would do the same. Like instructions were sent to our Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg and the Legation at Brussels. Hungary and Germany agreed; Russia replied that whatever course of action Great Britain took she would follow. Great Britain "decided to adopt generally the rules and regulations of the Declaration in question, subject to certain modifications and additions," and set forth these additions in orders in They consisted of new lists of absolute and conditional contraband, in lieu of those contained in articles 22 and 24 of the Declaration; of the announcement that the British Navy would "treat as liable to capture a vessel which carried contraband of war with false papers if she were encountered on the return voyage"; of the conditions under which the existence of a blockade "shall be presumed to be known," and of other modifications too technical to be stated. Thereupon the Department of State bade our Ambassador at London, Mr. Page, announce that the Government of the United States withdrew its suggestion, and that it "will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration of London."

Trade between neutral countries in neutral bottoms was now no longer regarded as presumably innocent; the final destination of the cargo determined its innocence; the accepted list of contraband articles was greatly extended, and our vessels, seized on the high seas, were taken into port for examination and often detained there for weeks before they were released. In September two shipments of copper to Holland were seized because the final destination was held to be the Krupp Works at Essen. In October three more were stopped at Gibraltar on their way to Italy consigned "to order." Italy had forbidden the export of copper but not its transit through the coun-Next came the seizure of three tankers owned by the Standard Oil Company of New York. These three were the John D. Rockefeller, which cleared from New York in September for Copenhagen, and was taken off the Orkneys and ordered to Kirkwall; the Brindilla, seized when on her way to Alexandria, Egypt, and brought into Halifax; and the Platuria, stopped off the coast of Scotland and sent to Hornoway. The Brindilla and Platuria, when the war opened, were the property of a German company, one of the subsidiaries of the Standard Oil Company, but their registry had been changed and when captured they were under the American flag. The John D. Rockefeller, which had always been under the American flag, and was not subject to any question which might arise from the change of registry after the war began, was therefore made the subject of a protest, and was promptly released. Demand was then made for the release of the Brindilla; the case against her for change of registry was dropped, and, by order of Sir Edward Grev, the British Ambassador explained

the position of his Government. During the last few weeks, he said, there had been a marked increase in the export of certain articles to neutral countries adjacent to Germany. Thus, while the value of the chief exports from the United States during September, 1914, as compared with September, 1913, had fallen off \$107,000,000, the export of gasoline, naphtha, etc., had risen from 20,000,000 to 23,000,000 gallons, and that of fuel oil from 36,000,000 to 58,000,000. A large part of the exports had been consigned to neutral countries and from them had been sent into a belligerent country. Desirous not to be used as a basis for hostilities by either belligerent, these neutral countries were making arrangements which would prevent the export from them of articles which might be used for war. When completed it was hoped trade between neutrals would be subject to little or no hindrance. The Rockefeller had been detained for examination because her cargo of oil was going to a port near the chief naval port of a belligerent, and was consigned to order. There was, therefore, no guarantee that it would not be forwarded to an enemy.

And now the *Kroonland*, of the Red Star Line, with passengers, rubber and copper, while on her way from New York to Naples, was stopped at Gibraltar. Her destination, Naples; the consignment of her copper "to order"; and the fact that Italy had not prohibited the shipment of copper by land to Austria or Germany were the reasons for seizing and sending the cargo before a prize court to decide whether it was or was not destined for Germany.

November 2 the Department of State was informed that the *Platuria* had been released. That same day the British Admiralty announced that the whole North Sea was a military area.

For some weeks past the Germans had been sowing mines in the waters north of Ireland. "Peaceful merchant ships," said the British Admiralty in their order of November 2, "have been blown up by this agency. The White Star liner Olympic escaped disaster through pure good luck, and, but for warning given by British cruisers, other British and neutral passenger ships would have been destroyed." These mines had not been laid by a German warship, but by some merchant ship flying a

neutral flag, "which came along the trade route as if for purposes of peaceful commerce," and sowed the route with mines. "This mine-laying under neutral flags and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships and neutral ships are ordinary features of German naval warfare." Exceptional measures were necessary to meet this novel way of conducting war at sea. The Admiralty therefore gave notice "that the whole North Sea must be considered a military zone." Within it merchant shipping of every kind, traders of all countries, fishing craft, vessels of every sort, were exposed to destruction from mines it had been found necessary to lay, and from warships "searching vigilantly, night and day, suspicious craft."

After November 5 all vessels "passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides, through the Faroe Islands to Iceland, do so at their own peril." Ships bound for Denmark, Norway and Sweden should come by the English Chan-

nel to the Strait of Dover for sailing directions.

Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands promptly protested to Great Britain and Germany against mine sowing in the North Sea save at the entrance of harbors, and were understood to intimate a hope that the United States would take part in a joint protest against mine planting. But the Secretary of State waited until the close of the year and then protested against the whole maritime policy of Great Britain, so far as it interfered with American trade. Instructions to communicate his views to the British Government were cabled to the American Ambassador on December 26; but the communication was not made public until the last day of the year.

It was needless, Secretary Bryan said, to point out to Great Britain, usually the champion of the freedom of the seas, that trade between neutrals should not be interfered with by nations at war unless absolutely necessary to protect their safety and even then only so far as was absolutely necessary. But the present policy of his Majesty's Government towards neutral ships and cargoes exceeded the manifest necessity of a belligerent and imposed on the rights of American citizens on the high seas, restrictions not justified by international law or the requirements of self-preservation. "Articles listed as absolute contraband, shipped from the United States and consigned to

neutral countries," had been seized and detained because the countries to which they were destined had not forbidden the

export of such articles.

Detentions of this kind were unwarranted and the situation was made worse by the indecision of the authorities in applying their own rules. A cargo of copper shipped to a specified consignee in Sweden was held because Sweden had placed no embargo on copper. Italy had not only prohibited the export of copper, but had forbidden shipments of copper to Italian consignees or "to order" to be exported or transshipped. Yet the British Foreign Office had declined to affirm that copper consigned to Italy would not be molested. Seizures, thirty-one consignments amounting to 19,350 tons, worth some \$5,500,000, had by that time been made, were so numerous and the detentions so long that steamship lines would not take copper to Italy, insurance companies would not insure it, and a lawful trade was greatly impaired through the uncertainty as to treatment at the hands of the British authorities.

Foodstuffs and articles of common use in all countries had been stopped despite the presumption of innocent use because destined for neutral countries, and without facts which warranted a belief that the shipments had a really belligerent destination. Mere suspicion was not evidence. Nor was reimbursement for interrupted voyages and detained cargoes after investigation failed to discover enemy destination sufficient. The injury was to American commerce diverted from neutral countries.

The Government of the United States readily admitted the right of a belligerent to visit and search, on the high seas, American vessels or neutral vessels carrying American goods, "when there is sufficient evidence to justify a belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes." But it could not permit, without protest, American ships or cargoes to be taken into British ports, there to search for evidence of contraband.

The situation brought about by the policy of Great Britain was "a critical one to the commercial interests of the United States." Great industries were suffering because their products were denied long established markets. "Producers and exporters, steamship and insurance companies" were pressing, and

with reason, for relief "from the menace to transatlantic trade," which gradually but surely was ruining their business and "threatening financial disaster."

In conclusion, the Secretary wished to impress upon His Majesty's Government that the condition of trade was such that if it did not improve it might "arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed between the American and British people. Already it is becoming the subject of public criticism and complaint."

The reply was made in two notes, both friendly in tone. The first, presented on January 7, contained "preliminary observations," for Sir Edward Grey saw fit to postpone to a later date his full discussion of the issues raised by Secretary Bryan. His Majesty's Government, the note stated, concurred in the principle that trade between neutrals should not be interfered with by belligerents save when absolutely necessary to protect their safety; and that Great Britain would endeavor to keep within the limit, but claimed the right to interfere with trade in contraband destined to the enemy's country. There seemed to be much misconception as to the extent to which she had interfered. The Secretary seemed to hold her responsible for the present state of trade with neutral countries. statistics of the export trade from New York as were at hand gave proof that the exports to Denmark in November, 1913, amounted to \$558,000 and in 1914 to \$7,101,000; to Sweden \$377,000 in November, 1913, and \$2,558,000 in November, 1914; to Norway \$477,000 in 1913 and \$2,318,000 in 1914; and to Italy in November, 1913, \$2,971,000 and \$4,781,000 in the same month in 1914.

It was true there had been a falling off in the export of cotton; but Great Britain had not interfered with cotton. It was still on the free list. The adverse effect of the war on that and other industries was due to the diminished purchasing power of Germany, France, Great Britain.

The Secretary had referred to the detention of copper. Exports of copper from the United States to Italy during the months of August, September, October, November, and the first three weeks of December, 1913, amounted to 15,202,000 pounds; for the same period in 1914 to 35,285,000 pounds.

To Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland during this period in 1913 there went 7,271,000 pounds of copper, and in 1914 during a like period 35,347,000 pounds of copper. From such shipments it must be presumed that the bulk of the copper recently sent to these countries was intended not for their own use, but for a belligerent who could not import it direct. There was in possession of his Majesty's Government positive evidence to show that four shipments of copper and aluminum definitely consigned to Sweden were really destined for Germany.

Foodstuffs ought not to be detained and put into prize courts without presumption that they are for the use of the armed forces of the enemy or the enemy Government. From August 4, 1914, to January 3, 1915, the number of ships going from the United States to Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Italy was 773. Of them but 45 had consignments or cargoes put in the Prize Courts, and of the ships only eight were held, one of which had been released. Under modern conditions it was necessary that the ship be brought into port for examination. In no other way could the right of search be exercised. Rubber had been shipped from the United States under another name to escape notice. Cotton had not been put on the list of contraband. Precisely for this reason ships carrying cotton bales had been selected to carry concealed contraband. No ships had so far been detained for carrying cotton; but should his Majesty's Government have reason to believe that in the case of a particular ship the bales of cotton contained copper or other contraband, the only way to prove it was to weigh and examine the bales, a process that could only be carried out by bringing the vessel into port.

We are confronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the enemy will become on a scale hitherto unprecedented a base of supplies for the armed forces of our enemies and for materials for manufacturing armament. The trade figures of imports show how strong this tendency is, but we have no complaint to make of the attitude of the Governments of those countries which so far as we are aware have not departed from proper rules of neutrality. We endeavor in the interest of our own national safety to prevent this danger by intercepting goods really destined for the enemy, without interfering with those which are for bona fide neutrals.

To our countrymen the note was far from satisfactory. The citation of statistics to show the large increase in our shipments to neutral nations was thought not to the point and mis-These increases, it was said, were due to the rise in price of American goods and to the inability of neutrals to get supplies from belligerent countries near them. Unable to get copper from Germany and Austria, Italy had turned to us. Unable to get wheat from Bulgaria and Rumania, Italy had been forced to buy in the United States. Ever since the beginning of the war the United States has sought to obtain the reasons for the detention of our ships and has asked in vain. The Government knows only from shippers and exporters that scores of ships have been detained. A press dispatch from Copenhagen to the London News reported that M. Scavenius, the Danish Foreign Minister, had declared that the increase in exports from the United States to Denmark from \$600,000 in 1913 to \$7,000,000 in 1914 was because Denmark's normal sources of supply were cut off by the war.

The British Embassy now issued a statement on the detention of our ships. It could not give a pledge that all ships then in prize courts would be released on bail, because the decision in each case must rest with the Judge. Majesty's Government was anxious to relieve the shortage in tonnage and would not therefore oppose release on bail of ships then in prize courts if bail were offered. Only seven vessels were then in prize courts, and but five were detained for examination of the character of their eargoes. No one of these was

under the American flag.

Besides the cases of ships seized and detained, the Department of State had before it the cases of two ships sure to be seized. At the opening of the war the Hamburg-American Line steamship Dacia was interned at Port Arthur, Texas. Early in January she was bought by Mr. E. N. Breitung, of Marquette, Michigan, and given an American registry; the German captain and crew were replaced by Americans, and orders issued to load her with cotton at Galveston and clear for Bremen. The question then was, Will Great Britain and France recognize this transfer of a German ship to the American flag during war time? France had held that even a bona fide sale could

not be recognized so long as the purpose of the sale was to evade capture. A vessel so sold might be seized by a belligerent.

Reports from London left no doubt that she would be seized by the British because it was unfair that a vessel belonging to a belligerent should be transferred to a neutral flag that she might escape capture. Reports from Washington announced that the Department of State had proposed that the destination of the Dacia be changed to the neutral port of Rotterdam; that she be allowed to make the voyage there and back unmolested; and that the larger question of the legality of the transfer be left for future consideration. It might well be that the purchase was a test of the feasibility of the sale to Americans of all the German vessels interned in our ports. The Government of Great Britain replied with a refusal of safe conduct. It was loath to cause loss to the shippers of the cargo, but could not agree that the transfer was valid in international law. "If, therefore, the Dacia should proceed to sea and should be captured, the British Government will find themselves obliged to bring the ship (apart from the cargo) before the prize court." As to the cargo, if it were solely owned by American citizens, the British Government would either buy it "at the price which would have been realized by the shippers if the cargo had reached its foreign destination," or would forward the cotton to Rotterdam without cost to the shippers.

The Berlin Vossische Zeitung held it was clear that there must be cases in which ships of belligerents may be transferred to a neutral flag, without any suggestion that it was done to escape capture. The Dacia was such a case. The Hamburg-American Line did not dream of transferring its fleet or any part of it to the American flag. There was in the United States a demand for ships to carry freight. An offer was made for the Dacia and the owners sold her.

A Paris journal thought the Germans were seeking to put Anglo-American relations to the test; to give aid to those who in America were leading the attack on Great Britain in the name of American commerce, and to save those vessels interned in our ports.

While the Dacia was preparing to sail from Galveston, the American steamship Wilhelmina, loaded with flour, grain and

foodstuffs, cleared from New York for Hamburg. She had been chartered from the Southern Products Company by a firm in St. Louis, and the cargo consigned to a branch of the firm in Hamburg. The food was for the use of civilians in Germany. No shipment of food from our country to Germany had been made since the war began. By many this shipment was looked on as a test case, as an attempt to determine whether or not the British Government would stop American vessels on their way to German ports with food for the use of civilians solely.

If the British Government had any doubts as to what it should do they were quickly removed by the action of Germany. The Wilhelmina sailed on the twenty-second of January and on the twenty-sixth the Federal Council at Berlin issued an order for the conservation of food.

All stocks of corn, wheat and flour are ordered seized by February 1.

All business transactions in these commodities are forbidden from

January 26.

All municipalities are charged with the duty of setting aside suitable supplies of preserved meat.

The owners of corn are ordered to report their stocks immedi-

ately, whereupon confiscation at a fixed price will follow.

A Government distributing office for the negotiation of consumption will be established, distribution being made according to the number of inhabitants.

The Imperial Gazette explained that such action was necessary in order that there might be a regular and sufficient supply of breadstuffs to last "until the next threshing of the new harvest," and that the order gave assurance that "our enemy's plan to starve Germany will be upset, and assures us of plentiful bread until next harvest."

As soon as the order was made known in our country the German Ambassador made haste to give verbal notice to the Department of State that no foodstuffs from the United States to Germany would be seized for military or governmental use.

The German Vice Chancellor took pains to explain that the designation of regions wherein imported grains could be sold only to municipalities had been revoked by the Bundesrath.

The Bundesrath regulations for dealing in grain, he said, did not contemplate the seizure of grain for the use of the Government or the army, but merely its equitable distribution for private use. It was a measure of protection of the individual against speculation. Paragraph forty-five of the regulations, he pointed out, read: "The stipulations of this regulation do not apply to grain or flour imported from abroad after January 31." The German Government "had also declared its readiness to deliver trade in such imported products to American organizations for the duration of the war."

All this Ambassador von Bernstorff had officially stated a few days before in a note.

The decision of the Federal Council concerning foodstuffs, which England had assigned as her reason for declaring contraband food products going to Germany, related solely to wheat. rye, both mixed and unmixed with other products, and to wheat, rye, oats and barley flour. The Federal Council again in Section 45 had expressly provided that "The stipulations of this regulation do not apply to grain or flour imported from abroad after January 31." The Federal Council's order provided that imported cereals and flours could be sold exclusively to certain municipalities and specially designated organizations. This was to throw imported grains and flour into such channels as supplied the civilian, and protect them against speculators and engrossers. Nevertheless this provision had been rescinded so as to leave no room for doubt. The German Government called attention to the fact that municipalities do not form part of, or belong to, the Government, but are self-administrative bodies, elected by the people of the commune. The German Government was amenable to any proposition looking to control of the cargoes by a special American organization under consular offices. That imported food products would be consumed by civilians exclusively the Government gave absolute assurance. England therefore had no excuse for stopping American food products on their way to Germany.

Meantime, lest the cargo of the Wilhelmina should fall under the German order and become liable to seizure by Great Britain, attorneys for the shipping company applied to Ambassador von Bernstorff for a guarantee that the food would not be taken for military purposes. The Ambassador replied:

I, as representative of the German Government, guarantee to you that the foodstuffs will not reach the German Government, its agents or contractors, nor the military and naval forces. I will, further, take the necessary steps which will insure that the German Government will not make use of its right of preëmption.

The order was intended to prevent the cornering, and speculation in foodstuffs in Germany, and did not "affect foodstuffs imported from neutral countries and exclusively for noncombatants."

Despite these assurances, the British Foreign Office on February 4 announced that if the destination of the cargo of the Wilhelmina was Germany, and the vessel were intercepted, its cargo would be put in prize court that the situation created by Germany might be examined. No proceedings would be taken against the ship. Her owners would be indemnified for delay and the owners of the cargo paid for any loss caused by the action of the British authorities. It was quite clear that the Germans did not intend to capture merchant vessels and bring them into port but sink them by submarines, regardless of the lives of the crews and civilians on board. Even hospital ships would not be spared. This raised the question whether more stringent measures should be adopted against German trade. But care would be taken not to inflict loss on neutral ships which sailed before warning had been given.

January 31 the *Dacia* sailed from Galveston, and February 2 Ambassador Page telegraphed from London that the British fleet had been ordered to treat as conditional contraband subject to seizure, all cargoes of grain and flour destined for Germany. The *Wilhelmina* having sailed before the German Federal Council issued its order, an exception would be made in her case. She would be released but the cargo would be

taken and paid for at invoice price.

That same day Mr. Page sent information far more important. The German Admiralty, he reported, had warned all merchantmen not to approach the north and west coasts of France, and cautioned all bound for the North Sea to go north

around Scotland. Two days later the German War Zone order mentioned by Mr. Page was made public. The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, were declared a war zone from and after February 18. Every enemy merchant ship found therein would be destroyed even if it were impossible to save the passengers and crew. Neutral ships would also be in danger, because of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Admiralty on January 31, and because of "the hazards of naval warfare, neutral vessels cannot always be prevented from suffering from the attacks meant for enemy ships." The routes of navigation around the north of the Shetland Islands, "in the eastern part of the North Sea, and in a strip of at least thirty nautical miles along the Dutch coast," were "in no danger."

This order, it was pointed out, was not only extraordinary but without precedent, and was either an empty threat or a war against humanity. All nations had an equal right to the sea. Belligerents might search a neutral ship for goods contraband of war, might shut it out of a port by blockade in force, but could do nothing more. But Germany had done more than violate international law by declaring the waters around the British Isles a war zone. She had announced that every enemy merchant ship found in the zone would be sunk without regard for the lives of crew and passengers. One of the first duties of a captor of a merchant ship is to provide for the safety of noncombatants on board. Germany had asserted that British ships had misused neutral flags and because of this a neutral flag would afford no protection if there were the least suspicion of its genuineness, but commanders of German submarines might, if they wished, sink every merchant ship they captured.

A memorandum issued by the German Government ex-

plained the necessity of the war zone.

The writer began with a long statement of grievances against Great Britain. Her conduct of commercial warfare had been a mockery of all principles of the law of nations. She had declared her naval forces should be guided by the stipulations of the Declaration of London and had then repudiated them in the most essential points; had put on the list of contraband articles not at all, or only indirectly, capable of use in

war; had abolished all distinction between conditional and absolute contraband by confiscating articles of conditional contraband destined for Germany no matter what the port of destination, and no matter whether they were or were not for uses of war or peace; had taken from neutral ships German subjects capable of bearing arms; had declared the whole North Sea the seat of war and so in a way blockaded neutral ports and coasts, and had done these things not only to strike at German military operations, but to deliver over the whole German people to famine.

The writer then complained of the conduct of neutrals, charging them with, in the main, acquiescing in the measures of Great Britain; with failure to secure the release of German subjects and goods taken from their vessels; with aiding Great Britain in her defiance of the principle of the open sea by forbidding the export and transit of goods destined for peaceful uses in Germany.

Because of these things Germany found it necessary to retaliate. "Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise." Neutral powers were therefore "forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers, or merchandise to such vessels." To "recommend their own vessels to steer clear of these waters"; for in view of the "hazards of war, and of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by the British Government, it will not always be possible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack intended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy." It is expressly declared "that navigation in the waters north of the Shetland Islands is outside the danger zone, as well as navigation in the Eastern part of the North Sea and in a zone thirty marine miles wide along the Dutch coast."

While Germany was charging Great Britain with seizing her subjects and goods found on neutral ships and complaining that neutrals tamely submitted, she was busy sinking neutral vessels by means of mines and submarines. Between August 8, 1914, and February 4, 1915, the dates of her war zone order and her memorandum, she had destroyed in these ways, nine Dutch, ten Swedish, nine Norwegian, and eight Danish, in all thirty-six neutral vessels. Great Britain had not sunk one.

In the war zone proclamation was a charge of "misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31, by the British Government." Germany in her Prize Ordinance August 3, 1914, authorized her ships of war to fly a neutral flag for the purpose of making an attack. If it were permissible for a ship of war to use such a flag to make an attack it was equally allowable for a merchantman to use it to avoid attack. The cause of the complaint was the action of the captain of the *Orduna*, who on January 31, out from Queenstown, raised the American flag.

A statement issued on February 7 from the British Foreign Office defended the act. Within certain limits, it was held, the use of a neutral flag was a well established ruse of war. The object, in the case of a merchantman, was to force the enemy to satisfy himself as to the nationality of the vessel and cargo by an examination before capture. The British Government had always considered the use of British colors by foreign vessels to enable them to escape capture as no breach of international law. Therefore it held that the use of a foreign flag by a British merchantman in order to escape capture was no breach of international law.

Germany was bound to ascertain the character of a merchant vessel and cargo before capture. To destroy ship, noncombatant crew and cargo, as she had declared her intention of doing, was nothing less than an act of piracy on the high seas.

With this statement from the Foreign Office there came from London a report that on Saturday morning, February 6, when the *Lusitania* was off the coast of Ireland her captain received from the Admiralty a wireless message ordering him to

hoist the American flag and sail under it to Liverpool. For this act the Americans on board were truly grateful; but if the Admiralty did send forth such an order responsibility was shifted from the Cunard Company to the British Government and trouble was likely to arise.

Our Government acted promptly and February 10 addressed notes to Germany and Great Britain. That to Germany began by calling the attention of the Imperial Government to the "serious possibilities of the course of action apparently contemplated under the 'war zone proclamation,' " and requesting it "to consider, before action is taken, the critical situation in respect of the relations between this country and Germany, which might arise were the German naval forces in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens." To attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed zone without first determining the belligerent character of the vessel and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented that the Government of the United States was loath to believe the Imperial Government "contemplates it as possible."

Suspicion that enemy ships were using neutral flags improperly created no just presumption that all ships crossing a prescribed area were subject to the same suspicion. Should the commanders of German vessels of war act on the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith, "and destroy on the high seas an American vessel, or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two governments."

The Imperial German Government would readily appreciate "that the Government of the United States would be compelled to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

The note to Great Britain opened with the statement that the Government of the United States had been advised by the declaration of the German Admiralty on February 4, that the use of neutral flags by British vessels for the purpose of avoiding recognition had been explicitly authorized by the British Government. Reports had been seen in the newspapers that the captain of the *Lusitania*, acting under orders from British authorities, had raised the American flag as his vessel approached the coast, and from "an alleged official statement of the Foreign Office," it appeared that the use of a neutral flag by a belligerent to escape capture or attack, had been defended.

Supposing these reports to be true the Government of the United States reserved the consideration of the legality and propriety of such use of a neutral flag for future consideration. But it desired "very respectfully to point out to His Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued." The occasional use of a neutral flag under stress of pursuit, was a very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent government for the use of such a flag by its merchant vessels within certain areas of the high seas presumed to be frequented by hostile warships. Because of the avowed "purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in active naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland," the Government of the United States would view with anxious solicitude any general use of our flag "by British vessels traversing those waters," because "such practice would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navigating those waters, and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force."

It was understood, was the reply of Great Britain, February 16, 1915, that the German Government had ordered the sinking of British merchantmen at sight by torpedoes, without making any provision for saving the lives of noncombatant crews and passengers. It was because of this threat that the Lusitania raised the American flag on her inward voyage. On her next outward voyage, American passengers who were em-

barking asked that the American flag be raised, to insure their safety. His Majesty's Government did not advise the company how to meet this request, and believed the vessel left Liverpool under the British flag.

As to the use of foreign colors by British merchantmen, the British merchant shipping act permitted it in times of war in order to escape capture. When a neutral Great Britain always accorded to vessels of other states the use of the British flag as a means of protection against capture. The United States had so used it during the Civil War. It would therefore be unfair, now that conditions were reversed, for the United States and other neutrals to grudge Great Britain the liberty to take similar action. The duty of a belligerent was to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality of a merchant vessel before capturing, sinking or destroying it. If that obligation were fulfilled the hoisting of a neutral flag on board a British merchantman could not possibly endanger neutral shipping. loss were suffered because of disregard of this principle, it was on the enemy vessel disregarding it, and on the Government ordering that it be disregarded, that the sole responsibility for the injury ought to rest.

Well aware that neutral flags would not be respected by German submarine commanders, owners of neutral vessels about to sail from New York had the names of their ships painted in huge letters on the sides as a means of identification. In many cases the flag of the neutral country to which the ship belonged was added.

Both notes were heartily approved by our people. The President, it was said, has again shown that the interests of the country are safe in his hands. His position is sound in law and correct in form. There is no jingoism in the note, no bluster, but a firm and temperate statement of what is in the minds of the American people. No belligerent has the right, and none has hitherto claimed the right, to sink unarmed merchantmen without warning. Does Germany intend to adopt this policy? Instead of announcing a purpose to search and seize vessels carrying contraband goods, the German Foreign Office makes a thinly veiled threat of lynch law against neutrals. There is more than a warning in a clearly defined war zone.

It is a threat that neutral vessels may be "accidentally" torpedoed instead of being overhauled and searched by German submarines.

The notes to Great Britain and Germany make it clear to the belligerents that the neutrality of the United States is to continue fearlessly impartial. The subject is not one permitting delicacy of treatment. If the language used in the protest to Germany is vigorously plain it is none the less a friendly warning. Germany, said the New York Staats-Zeitung, will undoubtedly take the note in good part. "She will undoubtedly overlook the insult which it contains. The American people cannot. We stand to-day a nation in danger. We are ruled by a man and not by a Congress."

By the British press the flag note was held to be fair. No exception could be taken to the tone in which it was couched. It would not be difficult to satisfy the United States that in using her flag to defeat the intentions of the German warships to torpedo merchantmen without warning, Great Britain was acting in the interests of humanity and civilization. It was quite natural that the United States should view with anxiety any general use of the American flag by British vessels crossing the waters barred by Germany. But no claim to make such general use of any neutral flag has yet been advanced. utmost the Foreign Office claimed was the right of a British vessel when escaping from attack to fly a neutral flag as a ruse de querre. To promise that under no circumstances shall a British vessel hoist the Stars and Stripes is more than the President asks and more than our Government could grant. But we could readily agree to limit its use to cases of real necessity.

When something does not suit the Yankees, said the Berlin *Post*, they adopt as threatening and saber-rattling a tone as possible. They think the person thus threatened will be frightened, and yield. If he does not, if he pays no attention and is not scared, the swaggering Yankees soon quiet down. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* thought the threatening sentences in the American note quite unimpressive.

Just at this time, on February 13, the Lusitania sailed from Liverpool for New York. When about to depart her Captain announced that if necessary he would again fly the American flag. Most of her passengers were Americans. They were entitled to the protection of their flag, and so, if the German pirates sank the ship, the Americans should have the satisfaction of dying under their own national emblem.

On February 16 Ambassador von Bernstorff delivered a note by way of a preliminary answer to the note of the United States. From sources absolutely reliable, the note said, it was known that British merchant ships intended to oppose armed resistance to German men-of-war in the area declared a war zone by Germany. Many were already armed and all were to be speedily. They were instructed to sail in small fleets, and to ram the German submarine while the examination was under way or if the submarine lay alongside drop bombs or overpower the examining party as it came on board. A large reward had been offered for the destruction of the first German submarine by a British merchantman. Therefore, British merchant vessels could no longer be considered as undefended, but might be attacked without warning or search. The British admitted that instructions had been given to misuse neutral flags and it thus became necessary to ascertain the identity of neutral vessels, unless they sailed in daylight under convoy. Attacks to be expected from masked British merchantmen made a search impossible as the submarines themselves would be exposed to destruction. The safety of neutral shipping in the war zone therefore was seriously threatened. There was also danger from mines which were to be laid in the zone to a great extent. To this kind of warfare Germany had been driven by the murderous ways of the British who sought to destroy lawful neutral trade and starve the German people. Germany would be obliged to hold to the principles announced until England submitted to the rules of warfare established by the Declarations of Paris and London or until she was forced by neutral powers to do so.

Without waiting for the Foreign Office to formally reply to the American note, Admiral Behncke made a statement on February 16, to Lieutenant Commander Gherardi, naval attaché to the American Embassy. England, he said, was bent on subduing Germany by starvation. Germany in every way

had attempted to bring to the attention of neutral powers her need of food for her civilian population. Her efforts resulted in nothing. Now that the cutting off of food "had come to a point where Germany no longer had sufficient food to feed her people, it became necessary for her to bring England to terms by the use of force." By the submarine she could be brought to the condition of needing food for her people. Germany did not wish to harm American ships or their cargoes unless contraband of war. But she was "in a position where her life depends upon her putting into effect the only means she has of saving herself. She must and will use this means." In spite of the great effect the submarine would have on shortening the war, "the Admiralty does not wish," Admiral Behncke continued, "to put it into effect to the detriment of neutral commerce and the rights of nations on the high seas. They have, therefore, stated that if Great Britain will abide by the Declaration of London, without modification, or by the Treaty of Paris, whereby food supplies necessary for the civilian population can be freely brought into Germany, the whole matter of a submarine blockade will be dropped by Germany." Admiral further suggested that American ships should proceed under convoy and so be exempt from search.

On the nineteenth of February, the day after the War Zone order went into force, the text of Germany's reply to the American note was made public.

Up to the present time, this note said, Germany had scrupulously observed "valid international rules regarding naval warfare," and had done so even to the injury of her military interests. Thus Germany "allowed the transport of provisions to England from Denmark until to-day though she was well able by her sea power to prevent it." England on the other hand had not hesitated to infringe international law a second time, in order to paralyze the peaceful commerce of Germany with neutrals.

All these encroachments were made in order to cut off all supplies to Germany and so starve her civil population, "a procedure contrary to humanitarian principles." America, it was true, protested, but could not induce England to depart from her course of action. Thus the American ship Wilhelmina had

been stopped by British, although her cargo was destined solely for the German civil population and the German Government had expressly declared it should be used "only for this purpose."

Germany was "as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals," not only of such goods as are absolute contraband, but such also as before the war were merely conditional, or not contraband at all. Great Britain on the other hand, with the toleration of neutral governments, was not only supplied with goods conditionally contraband, or not contraband, but also with those which are held by her to be absolutely contraband if sent to Germany, as provisions, raw materials and the like.

Germany felt "obliged to point out with the greatest emphasis, that a traffic in arms, estimated at many hundreds of millions," was going on between American firms and the

enemies of Germany.

them" by Great Britain.

Because of this situation, Germany, "after six months of patient waiting," had been forced "to answer Great Britain's murderous method of naval warfare with sharp counter measures." Great Britain having summoned hunger as an ally in order to force seventy millions of people to choose between starvation and submission to her commercial will, Germany had decided to appeal to similar allies. The German Government was determined by every means in her power to suppress the importations of war material to Great Britain and her allies, and took it for granted that neutrals which had taken no measures to stop the traffic in arms to her enemies would make no complaint because of its forcible suppression by Germany.

Therefore the Admiralty had proclaimed a war zone with limits exactly defined. Germany would seek to close this zone with mines, and would endeavor to destroy hostile merchant ships in every possible way. The German Government did not fail to recognize the danger to neutral ships, but it was justified in expecting that "neutrals will acquiesce in those measures as they have done in the case of grievous damages upon

Germany had announced the destruction of all enemy merchant vessels found within the zone, but not all merchant vessels as the United States has erroneously supposed. Germany was ready to deliberate with the United States as to the best way to secure the safety of the lawful shipping of neutrals in the war zone; but two things made this difficult, the misuse of neutral flags by British shipping, and the trade in war material in neutral ships. Great Britain again had furnished arms to British merchant ships and had instructed them forcibly to resist German submarines. It would be hard, therefore, for submarines to recognize neutral ships. Search in most cases could not be made because in the case of a disguised British merchant ship, from which an attack might be expected, both searching party and submarine would be exposed to destruction.

The suggestion was then made that the United States "make their ships which are conveying peaceful cargoes through the British war zone discernible by means of convoys." Germany would be "particularly grateful" if American vessels were recommended to avoid the war zone until the flag question was settled. If the United States should find a way to remove the causes which made the war zone and the submarine warfare necessary, and "in particular should find a way to make the Declaration of London respected," Germany would "gladly draw conclusions from the new situation."

In Germany the note was naturally approved. Neutrals must either force Great Britain to fight fairly or else keep their ships out of the war zone. It left no doubt of Germany's intention to make reprisals on Great Britain, and neutrals must understand that all Germany desires this, and that this policy will be carried out. The note had none of the excited tone used by America when a single shipload of weapons was delivered in Mexico by Germany. America's bluff assumption that Germany would assume responsibility for endangering her ships is flatly rejected. German submarine commanders had been instructed not to injure American ships when recognizable, but they would be recognizable as such only when accompanied by American warships. To assume that the American flag made them recognizable was to misread the note.

The German note referred to the Wilhelmina case. On February 9, under stress of weather, her captain took her into

the port of Falmouth. There the cargo of foodstuffs, but not the vessel, was seized and put in prize court. The Secretary of State as soon as possible, protested, and February 19 Sir

Edward Grey replied.

When His Majesty's Government, he said, ordered the seizure of the cargo as contraband they had before them the text of a decree of the German Federal Council under which all grain and flour imported after January 31 must be delivered to certain organizations under direct control of government, or of municipal authorities. The Wilhelmina was bound for Hamburg, one of the free cities of the German Empire, the government of which is vested in the municipality.

Information had only just reached His Majesty's Government that by a decree of February 6, the provisions as to grain and flour delivery had been repealed for the express purpose, it would seem, of making difficult the anticipated proceedings

against the Wilhelmina.

But the German decree was not the only ground on which the submission of her cargo to a prize court was justifiable. The German Government had treated every town or port on the east coast of England as a fortified place, and base of operations, and had bombarded Yarmouth, Whitby and Scarborough. Neutral vessels sailing from English ports had been seized and brought before German prize courts. The Dutch vessel *Maria* from California with grain consigned to Dublin and Belfast, had been sunk by the *Karlsruhe*.

"The German Government cannot have it both ways." If it thought itself justified in destroying the lives and property of peaceful civil inhabitants of English open towns and in seizing and sinking ships and cargoes of conditional contraband bound thither, because they considered them consigned to a fortified base, His Majesty's Government had the right to treat Hamburg, partly protected by fortifications at the mouth of the Elbe, as a fortified town and base of supply. If the owners of the cargo of the Wilhelmina felt aggrieved by the action of His Majesty's Government they could present their case before the prize court. The owners of the vessel and the owners of the cargo, if found to be contraband, would be indemnified.

Germany had maltreated the civil population of Belgium

and of such parts of France as she held; had planted mines in the high seas long before any had been sown by Great Britain; had sunk neutral ships and their unoffending crews; fired on English towns and defenseless British subjects; bombarded from airships quiet country towns and villages devoid of defense; torpedoed British ships at sight without warning to the crew and without a chance to save their lives; fired on a British hospital ship in daylight, and had threatened with destruction all British merchantmen and neutrals found near the British Isles.

Faced by such a situation it was unreasonable to expect Great Britain and her Allies to remain bound by rules and principles which they recognized as just if impartially observed as between belligerents, but were openly set at defiance by the enemy.

Germany having suggested that the United States should seek a way to make the Declaration of London respected, and to remove the grounds which made her course of action necessary, the Secretary of State on February 20 addressed identical notes to Great Britain and Germany suggesting a basis of settlement.

In view, each said, of the correspondence which had passed between the United States and Great Britain and Germany relative to the war zone enclosed by Germany and the use of neutral flags by British merchantmen, the Government of the United States ventured to express a hope that the two belligerent governments might reach a basis for an agreement which would relieve neutral vessels from the dangers which beset them in waters adjacent to the coasts of the belligerents. This basis might be reached by reciprocal concessions, and as a means of drawing forth the views of the two belligerents the United States would suggest:

1. That neither sow floating mines on the high seas, or in territorial waters; that neither plant on the high seas, anchored mines save within cannon range of harbors; that all mines bear the stamp of the Government planting them; and be so constructed, as to become harmless if they drifted from their moorings.

- That neither use submarines to attack merchantmen save for the purpose of visit and search.
- That each forbid its merchant ships to use neutral flags as a ruse de querre.

Germany was to agree that all foodstuffs sent to her from the United States shall be consigned to agencies designated by the United States; that these American agencies shall have entire charge of the receipt and distribution of all importations; that they should be distributed to none but retailers having licenses from the German Government; and that such foodstuffs will not be requisitioned by the German Government for any purpose whatsoever.

Great Britain was to agree that food and foodstuffs will not be made absolute contraband, nor interfered with nor detained if consigned to the American agencies in Germany, and distributed by them to licensed German retailers for the use

solely of noncombatants.

February 28, the German Government answered that it was prepared to make the declaration concerning floating mines, and the construction of anchored mines, and affix a Government stamp to all that were laid; but did not think it possible to fully renounce the use of anchored mines for purposes of offense.

German submarines, it was willing to agree, should use force against merchant vessels of whatever flag only in so far as necessary to carry out the right of visit and search. Should the enemy character of the ship, or the presence of contraband be proved, the submarine must be free to act according to international law. All this, however, was "contingent on the fact" that the enemy merchant ships did not use neutral flags or other "neutral distinctive marks." They must also be unarmed and not resist by force.

"The regulation of legitimate importations of food into Germany" suggested by our Government seemed to be in general acceptable. But such regulations must be confined to importations by sea, and to indirect importations by way of neutral ports. The German Government was therefore willing to make the declarations provided for in the American note, so that the importation of food and foodstuffs solely for the noncombatant population would be guaranteed. But the enemy governments must also allow the free importation into Germany of the raw materials on the free list of the Declaration of London.

March 1, the Allies, Great Britain and France, announced their policy towards Germany because of her submarine blockade. Germany, they said, had declared the waters around the British Isles, the English Channel and the north and west coasts of France a war zone, and had claimed the right to torpedo without warning any merchant vessel under any flag. As Germany could not maintain any surface craft in these waters the attack must be by submarine. The law and customs of nations had always required that the captor bring his prize before a prize court, where the regularity of the capture may be challenged. The responsibility of discriminating between neutral and enemy ships had always rested with the captor. So also the duty of providing for the safety of the crew and passengers. But the German submarine observes none of these obligations. She does not take her prize into any court, uses no means to discriminate between neutral and enemy property, does not receive on board for safety the crew of the vessel she The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Her opponents are, therefore, driven to retaliation in order to prevent commodities of any sort reaching Germany. These measures, however, will be enforced without risk to neutral property or the lives of noncombatants. The British and French Governments will be free to detain and take into ports ships carrying goods of presumed enemy declaration, but will not confiscate such vessels and cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to confiscation.

Great opposition was made to this announcement in our country. A strong protest by the Government was expected, for the effect was to end our commerce with Germany.

March 5, the Secretary of State addressed a note to each of the belligerents asking how the embargo on commerce with Germany was to be carried into effect. The intent seemed to be to take into custody all vessels trading with Germany whether outgoing or incoming. This was in effect a blockade of German ports. Nevertheless the rule of blockade that a ship attempting to break this blockade may, regardless of its cargo, be condemned is not asserted. Great Britain and France, it was declared, were to be "free to detain and take into ports ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin. But neither vessels nor cargoes were to be confiscated unless otherwise liable to condemnation."

The first sentence asserted a right arising only from a state of blockade. The last sentence proposes "a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed."

By the rules governing the export of enemy goods from an enemy country only enemy goods in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure. Yet the declaration proposes to seize and take into

port all goods of enemy ownership and origin.

The use of the word "origin" was significant. Except in case of blockade the origin of goods found in neutral ships on their way to neutral countries had never been a ground for forfeiture. Delay, then, and nothing else could come from such seizure. What would be done with such cargoes if found to belong to a neutral? If found to belong to an enemy? Would there be different rules for different ownership?

The United States was fully alive to the fact that the submarine might make the old-fashioned means of blockade impossible. But there should be some limit to the "radius of activity." "It would certainly create a serious state of affairs, if, for example, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into Halifax."

France replied on March 14: "As well stated in the American note, the old methods of blockade could not be entirely adopted because of the use of the submarine by Germany, and the geographical situation of that country. Because of the declaration of war zone along the coasts of Great Britain and of France, on the Channel, the allied Government had been forced to cut off all maritime communication with the German Empire" and thus keep it blockaded by the naval power of the two Allies.

The Government of the Republic, therefore, reserved the right to bring into a French or allied port, any ship carrying

a cargo of presumed German origin, destination or ownership. But no neutral ship would be seized unless it carried contraband. Should a neutral prove his ownership of goods destined for Germany he might dispose of them subject to certain restrictions. If the owner of the goods were a German they would be sequestered during the war. Goods of enemy origin would not be sequestered unless owned by an enemy. Goods belonging to neutrals would be held at the disposal of the owner to be returned to the port of departure.

Great Britain, by way of reply, sent a copy of new Orders in Council to be issued March 15, and stated that the purpose of the British Government was "to establish a blockade to prevent vessels carrying goods for or coming from Germany." Reluctant to exact from neutral ships all the penalties of a breach of blockade, the belligerent right to confiscate ships or cargoes would not be exercised, but merely the cargoes stopped on their way to or from the enemy's country. It was "not intended to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy cargoes of noncontraband nature outside European waters, including the Mediterranean."

On the same day, March 15, on which Mr. Page received the copy of the Order in Council and the note, he was handed a long memorandum dated March 23, in reply to the American note suggesting a basis of concession.

It appeared, Sir Edward Grey said, from the answer of Germany to the suggestion, that she would not cease sinking British merchant vessels by submarines, nor abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes on the high seas. The British Government might, therefore, make no further reply than to take note of the German answer. But the British Government desired "to take the opportunity of making a fuller statement of the whole position, and of our feeling with regard to it."

The United States wished to see the war conducted according to the rules of international law and the dictates of humanity. Such had been the conduct of the British forces. No instance of improper proceedings, either in the conduct of hostilities, or the treatment of prisoners or wounded, could be laid to the charge of British forces on land or sea.

On the German side it had been different:

1. "The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the north of France had been made public," by the French and Belgian Governments "and by those who have had experience of it first hand. Modern history afforded no other instance of such suffering inflicted on a defenseless and noncombatant people."

2. From time to time terrible accounts had been received of the barbarous treatment of British prisoners on their way

to German prison camps.

3. Germany had laid mine fields in the high seas without warning and many neutral and British vessels had been sunk by these.

4. Submarines had stopped and sunk British merchantmen so many times that the sinking of such vessels had become a German practice. A German armed cruiser had sunk an American ship, the William P. Frye, carrying wheat from Seattle to Queenstown. Her cargo should not have been condemned without the decision of a prize court, nor should the vessel have been sunk. The fortified, open and defenseless towns, as Scarborough, Yarmouth and Whitby, have been bombarded, and civilians, including women and children, killed. German air craft have dropped bombs on the east coast of England.

It is said that British naval authorities have laid anchored mines. They have, but the mines were so constructed that they would be harmless if they went adrift. Nor had this been done until long after the Germans had made it a regular prac-

tice to sow mines in the high seas.

It had been said that the British Government had departed from their old position that foodstuffs should not be interfered with when destined for a civil population. The charge was based on the fact that the cargo of the Wilhelmina had been submitted to a prize court. Why this was done had already been explained to the United States.

The Government of Great Britain and that of France had frankly declared their intention to meet German attempts to stop supplies of every sort from leaving or entering British or French ports, "by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany. The British fleet has instituted a blockade effectively controlling by cruiser cordon all passes to or from Germany by sea."

The difference between the two policies is that Great Britain proposes to attain her end without sacrificing neutral ships, taking the lives of noncombatants "or inflicting upon neutrals the damage that must be entailed when a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice. examination or trial.

One important fact, said the critics, clearly established by the notes, is the admission that the cutting off of trade with Germany is a blockade. Of this no neutral, no matter how much its trade may suffer, can complain. Whether a blockade can be established at so great a distance from an enemy's ports is another question. But the promise that ships carrying cargoes to German ports will not be confiscated, and that neutral vessels out of German waters will not be molested, makes the question of little importance. That neither power will depart from its position is certain, and nothing short of the use of force remains for the United States save protest.

CHAPTER IV

SUBMARINE FRIGHTFULNESS

February 18, 1915, the German war zone proclamation went into effect and the campaign of frightfulness on the sea opened at once. The Secretary of State, in his note, had declared that the United States would "hold the Imperial German Government to strict accountability" if American ships were sunk without warning, and would take steps "to safeguard American lives and property and to secure American citizens the full enjoyment of their rights on the high seas." Germany cared nothing whatever for the warning and on the twentieth of the month the Evelyn was sunk off the Borkum Islands, and three days later the Carib went down off the coast of Germany. Both were American vessels laden with cotton for Bremen and each was destroyed by a German mine. first case of deliberate sinking of an American vessel became known on March 10, when the German auxiliary cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich, to the astonishment of the whole country, entered Newport News and her commander reported that he had sunk the American vessel William P. Frye.

The Prinz Eitel Friedrich sailed from Tsing Tau and while cruising in the south Atlantic fell in with the Frye on January

27, put an armed force aboard and took possession.

Wheat was not contraband, but the commander of the cruiser decided it was and ordered the cargo thrown into the sea. February 28, finding this proceeding too slow, he ordered the crew aboard his ship and sank the Frye with gun fire.

March 28, when south of St. George's Channel, the British ship Falaba, out of Liverpool, bound for the west coast of Africa, was attacked by a German submarine and five minutes allowed the passengers and crew, some 250 in number, to take to the lifeboats. But before even that short time elapsed a torpedo struck near the engine room, exploded, killed many, and in ten minutes the Falaba sank. Among the passengers lost was an American citizen, Mr. Leon Thrasher, on his way to Africa.

Another instance of defiance was the case of the German merchant ship *Odenwald*. After lying in the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, since the opening of the war, her Captain decided to take the risk of going to sea and applied for a clearance. It was not given, whereupon the Captain started for sea without a clearance, was fired on by the fort and forced to turn back.

The German Embassy at once requested an investigation and gave its own version of the affair. The Captain, it was said, had asked clearance papers for Hamburg, and the Odenwald was twice searched under orders from Washington. The result was satisfactory to the Custom House authorities and papers were promised. After waiting three days without receiving any, the Captain, fearing the enemy cruisers would assemble off the port, started for sea without his papers, and was fired on from the Morro Castle without the usual "blind shot" of warning. That he should defy the laws of the United States and attempt to leave the port in an unlawful manner was of no importance to the German Ambassador. That the Odenwald was fired on before a blank shot had been sent across her bows was a grievance to be investigated.

Clearance papers, Secretary Bryan replied, had been withheld under orders from Washington; the Captain of the Odenwald had twice been warned not to leave without his papers lest he be fired on from the fort, and in defiance of the warning had raised anchor and started for sea on the afternoon of March 21. As he passed close to the San Augustine Bastion, the officer in command hailed him several times; but the Odenwald went on her way and some 75 shots from a machine gun were fired and fell in front and short of her. Lest vessels ahead of her should be injured 15 shots were fired astern of the Odenwald. These were small solid shot, were not intended to, and did not, strike her, and were used as a warning because blank cartridges could not be used in a machine gun. As the Odenwald gave no heed to the warning, a shot was fired from a 4.7 inch gun on the Morro Castle, and struck the water 300

yards in front of her and short of her projected course. She then stopped and was brought back to her anchorage. By her attempt to leave port "without papers" she "committed a willful breach of the navigation laws of the United States."

A claim for \$228,059.44 damages in the case of the Frye having been promptly presented, Herr von Jagow replied that the wheat was consigned to Queenstown, Falmouth, or Plymouth "to order"; that each of these ports was strongly fortified and served as a base for the British naval forces and that the commander, therefore, "acted quite in accordance with the principles of international law as laid down in the Declaration of London and the German prize ordinance." Wheat, von Jagow held, was food, was conditional contraband, and because it was on its way to a fortified port was to be considered as destined for the armed forces of the enemy and became contraband.

The sinking of the ship was permissible "since it was not possible for the auxiliary cruiser to take the prize into a German port" without endangering his own operations. The legality of the measures taken by the commander of the cruiser would be examined by a prize court as soon as the ship's papers were received. But Article XIII., of the Prussian-American treaty of 1799, and Article XIII., of the treaty of 1828, provided that contraband belonging to the subjects or citizens of either party could not be confiscated by the other, but only detained or used subject to payment of full value. Because of these Articles the owners of ship and cargo would be compensated even if the court decided the cargo contraband.

The prize court found that the cargo was contraband, that the Frye could not have been taken into port, that the sinking was therefore justified, and the German Government was liable for damages; but the court could not fix the amount for lack of necessary information. An interchange of notes now followed and months passed away before it was agreed that the matter of damages should be settled by two experts; that if they disagreed an umpire should be appointed, and that the difference over the interpretation of the treaty should be sub-

mitted to arbitration. With this the case rested and nothing more had been done when we entered the war.

Concerning the Falaba, the German Embassy on April 6 announced that the Ambassador had received from Berlin this official message:

"A report from the submarine has not yet been received. However, according to trustworthy reports the submarine requested the steamship Falaba to put passengers and crew into lifeboats when other ships came up. Lately English merchant ships have been provided with guns by the British Government and advised to warn or otherwise attack German submarines. This advice has repeatedly been followed in order to win promised rewards. Military necessity, consequently, forced the submarine to act quickly, which made granting of longer space of time and the saving of lives impossible.

"The German Government regrets sacrifices of human lives, but both British ships and neutral passengers on board such ships were warned urgently and in time not to cross the war zone. Responsibility rests, therefore, with the British Government which, contrary to international law, inaugurated commercial war against Germany and, contrary to international law, has caused merchant ships to offer armed resistance."

And now the Prinz Eitel Friedrich was interned. As soon as possible after her entrance a survey of the ship was made to determine what repairs were needed and fourteen working days, dating from March 20, were allowed in which to make them. At midnight on April 6, they must be finished, and twenty-four hours later, at midnight on April 7, she must leave the waters of the United States or be interned for the duration of the war. As the time for departure drew near a great show of preparation was made. Coal and provisions were taken aboard, the band played German airs, and it seemed she would sail early in April. But she did not and when the time expired her Captain announced that he feared capture if he went to sea, and the Prinz Eitel Friedrich was formally interned on April 10.

The next day, April 11, the German sea raider Kronprinz Wilhelm also arrived at Newport News. She had slipped out of Hoboken on August 3, 1914, had found the Karlsruhe wait-

ing for her at sea with a new captain, two guns and 50 men, and during 251 days had roamed the sea as a raider. Two more guns were taken from a prize. Her prizes were fifteen in number, ten British, four French and one Norwegian. She also was interned on April 26.

On the twenty-eighth of April, a German aeroplane dropped three bombs on the American steamer Cushing. From the story told by her Captain, it appears she was steaming along at eleven knots an hour in the North Sea when an aeroplane was seen circling around her. It was early in the evening and broad daylight and the maltese cross and the German colors were plainly seen on the aeroplane a thousand feet above the ship. Suddenly a waterspout rose about a foot off the port quarter and tons of water came on deck. Then a second spout rose in the same position and about the same distance from the Cushing. The crew were ordered to shelter just as a third bomb struck the rail near the smokestack, exploded, and splinters flew about the deck, several passing through the American ensign.

Three days later the American oil tank steamship Gulflight when off the Scilly Islands on her way from Port Arthur, Texas, to Rouen, France, was torpedoed by a German submarine but did not sink. Her captain died from shock, and ten of her crew who jumped overboard were drowned. The rest of the crew were taken off by a patrol boat, and the Gulflight was towed into Crow Sound and beached.

The attack was made on Saturday, the first of May, and on that day this notice appeared in the newspapers:

"NOTICE!

"Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

"IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, "Washington, D. C., April 22, 1915."

The story of the origin of that famous notice has since been told by Mr. John R. Rathom, Editor of the Providence Journal. When the war opened in 1914, and spread from nation to nation, Mr. Rathom, convinced that the German Government would at once begin an organized propaganda to consolidate the German-Americans in the United States and that in this attempt Germany would stop at nothing, determined to discover the plots and activities of the German and Austrian officials in the United States, and succeeded in placing secretly a dozen trusted agents in as many important German and Austrian offices. One secured a post in the German Embassy in Washington; the others were placed in the German consulates in Boston, in New Orleans, in Denver and St. Louis; in the German consulates-general in New York, Chicago and San Francisco; in the Austrian consulate in Cleveland and in the Austrian consulates-general in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. From these men came, almost daily, documents and reports which revealed every phase of scores of German plots, great and small, and every phase of German propaganda, and furnished evidence which drove more than one German official out of the country or sent him to jail.1

But the Providence Journal also maintained a wireless station which at two o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1915, caught a code message from Nauen to Sayville, which read:

"From Berlin Foreign Office,

To Botschaft, Washington.

669 (44-W) Welt nineteen fifteen warne 175, 29, 1 stop 175 1 2 stop durch 622 2 4 stop 19 7 18 stop LIX 11 3 4 5 6."

It created, Mr. Rathom states in his account in the World's Work, "great interest in the Journal office because it followed

¹ For the story of the work of Mr. Rathom and his men see the World's Work, December, 1917, February, March, etc., 1918.

none of the known codes and in form was unlike any other message that had been received at Sayville up to that time." "Every attempt to decipher it failed until somebody with a line on the internal activities of the German Embassy remembered that on the morning of April 29 Prince Hatzfeldt had been hunting for a New York World Almanac. The first two words of the message 'Welt 1915' supplied the clue and, following the numbers as representing page, line, and word in the World Almanac, the Journal men decoded the message as follows: 'Warn Lusitania passenger (s) through press not voyage across the Atlantic.'"

The notice, dated April 22, was sent on that day by the Councilor of the German Embassy to an advertising agent in Washington with the request to "have it printed as an advertisement in the newspapers on the enclosed list once a week during the next three or four weeks," and May 1, with the date April 22 unchanged, it was inserted in the newspapers under the advertisement of the Cunard Line, giving notice of the sailing of the Lusitania on May 1. The warning was general. No vessel was named; but the wireless message shows that the Lusitania had been deliberately chosen for destruction and that it was her passengers that were to be warned.

No official at Washington would comment on the attack on the Cushing and Gulflight. But coming so soon after the caution of the German Embassy, and despite the President's notice to Germany, they were admitted to form the most serious incident that had arisen between the United States and any belligerent. The President had told the German Government that "if the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel, or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights."

Did not the attack on the Gulflight and the consequent loss of life constitute "an indefensible violation of neutrality"? But the Government must make sure of the facts. The Secretary of State pointed out that the American consul at Plym-

outh, England, in reporting the attack on the Gulflight did not give his authority, and that his message read as if he were reporting on information given by another. A full report would therefore be called for, from the consul, and Ambassador Gerard would be instructed to make inquiry of the German Government.

By many of our countrymen meantime the attack was regarded as justifying a suspicion that the German Government was making persistent efforts to irritate the United States. Recent occurrences led to the belief that Germany had begun to show her resentment because of the shipment of arms to her enemies, and the widespread sympathy for the cause of the Allies. The von Bernstorff note, the manner of its publication, and the warning to Americans not to take passage on ships under the flags of Great Britain or any of her Allies, all pointed, it was said, to such animosity on the part of Germany. What was she doing? Why should she spend so much money in trying to gain the support and sympathy of America and then by official acts and utterances deliberately injure her cause? Did Germany now think that threats would succeed where pleadings had failed? Was she seeking the enmity of the whole world as a good reason for peace?

The meaning of the warning notice from the German Embassy printed in the newspapers of May 1 and repeated in many of them on May 8, now became apparent. On May 1 the Cunard mail steamship Lusitania sailed from New York, with 1,251 passengers and a crew of 667. On May 7, when eight miles off Old Head of Kinsale, or the south coast of Ireland, she was struck by two torpedoes discharged from a German submarine, and in a few minutes foundered and went down bow first. No warning was given. Many of the passengers were at luncheon; but in the few minutes before she sank such as could found a refuge in ten life boats. The wireless operator sent call after call for help, and tugs, steam trawlers, every available vessel was hurried from Queenstown. Of the 1,918 human beings on board 1,153 were drowned. Of the 188 Americans, 114 men, women and children lost their lives. Among them were many men well known in their walks in life.

No event since the sinking of the Maine so stirred the country. A cry of mingled horror and rage rose from every part of it. Beyond all doubt, it was said, the destruction of the Lusitania was carefully and deliberately planned. The warning notice in the newspapers it now appears had been preceded by anonymous letters and telephone messages to many of the passengers. American citizens traveling peacefully had been sent to their death by the deliberately planned act of Emperor William and his advisers. America must and will resent this invasion of her rights. The Government is in duty bound, emphatically, without shrinking from the proper epithets, to denounce the greatest international outrage of modern times.

By the German language press the deed was justified. Said one journal, War is war. A nation forced to fight for life against a world of enemies should not be guided by sentiment. The Lusitania, loaded to its capacity with explosives, ammunition, war material, was, to the Germans, a warship. To accept passengers under such circumstances was a crime of the worst kind. Considering the character of the cargo, some of it was picric and liable to explode at the slightest shock, it may well be that an inside explosion wrought the destruction of the Lusitania. Survivors tell of asphyxiating gases. Torpedoes do not produce them, but they can be traced back to the horrible explosives in the hold. Does not this show that it was simply an atrocious crime to carry men, women and children in such a ship? If Americans wish to go to Europe and use neutral vessels not carrying contraband of war they will be perfectly safe.

Another, the Cincinnati Freie Presse, remarked that the Lusitania was a British, not an American, ship; that American passengers knew their lives were in danger because they had been warned; that having taken the risk after ample warning, there was no cause for complaint now that the ship was sunk and lives lost. Said a third, the Chicago Abendpost, responsibility for the loss of the Lusitania and American lives rests with Great Britain. The steamer, armed, commanded by a naval officer, freighted with ammunition, was clearly subject to attack within the war zone.

When the news was carried by a reporter to the office of

the German consul in Philadelphia it was received with cheers. German-Americans everywhere found the sinking of the ship a cause for rejoicing. The passengers who were drowned, they held, should not have been on board.

Dr. Dernburg, now accepted as the Kaiser's spokesman in America, took this view of the matter. "Any ship," he said in an interview, "carrying goods to Great Britain is to be sunk." It was "the usage of war that vessels could be stopped, seized and searched. Vessels that carried contraband could be destroyed if they could not be taken into port. It has been customary to give innocent people warning and a chance to get away. A submarine is only one hundred and fifty feet long; it has no accommodations for others than its crew of probably twenty-four men. Consequently it is unable to take off passengers."

"Any American traveling on an American boat under the American flag will be safe. There are, moreover, any number of neutral ships. There is also this condition, an American ship or any other neutral vessel must earry no munitions of war. It is easy for an American who wants to travel to find out what a ship carries. All ships make their manifests to

the Custom House and they are public.

"Everybody takes a risk if they want to. Anybody can commit suicide if they want to.

"We have done and will do the best we can to avoid such trouble, but we cannot allow Americans to be used as shields to get articles of war into the hands of its Allies. The death of the Americans might have been avoided if our warning had been heeded. We put in advertisements and were careful to put them in next the advertisements of the Cunard Line's sailing dates."

As feeling rose higher and higher, What will the Government do? was asked on every hand. Some thought Congress should be assembled as quickly as possible. Some thought the German Ambassador should at once be handed his passports. Others were for a declaration of war against Germany. Senators and Representatives when asked by the New York Times and Philadelphia Ledger for their views advised the people to be calm, and forego hasty action while the facts were

investigated. "Every one should recognize the folly of urging hasty or precipitate action." "The situation does not call for the assembly of Congress." "The sinking of the *Lusitania* is an awful thing to contemplate, and the feeling of resentment may raise our blood to the boiling point. But let us place our confidence in the President of the United States. He has kept us free from entangling alliances so far." "Let us handle the present situation with patience and calmness, trusting to the President to take the proper course."

As soon as possible the German Foreign Office dispatched a note to the Embassy to be delivered to Secretary Bryan.

The German Government [the note reads] desires to express its deepest sympathy at the loss of lives on board the *Lusitania*. The responsibility rests, however, with the British Government, which, through its plan of starving the civilian population of Germany, has forced Germany to resort to retaliating measures.

In spite of the German offer to stop the submarine war in case the starvation plan was given up, British merchant vessels are being generally armed with guns, and have repeatedly tried to ram submarines, so that a previous search was impossible. [Moreover, the Lusitania on her last voyage "carried 5,400 cases of ammunition, while

the rest of the cargo consisted chiefly of contraband."]

If England, after repeated official and unofficial warnings, considered herself able to declare that that boat ran no risk, and thus lightheartedly assume responsibility for the human life on board a steamship which, owing to its armament and cargo, was liable to destruction, the German Government, in spite of its heartfelt sympathy for the loss of American lives, cannot but regret that Americans felt more inclined to trust to English promises than to pay attention to the warnings from the German side.

Two months after this note was received, July 17, the Providence Journal announced that from translations of Sayville wireless messages in its possession it appeared that the warning was not only sent out by the German Embassy, but the very text was provided by the Admiralty, and it "was sent out from Berlin six days before it actually appeared in the newspapers." "The message also shows that the first official knowledge in the possession of the German Government as to the character of the cargo of the Lusitania reached it three days after that ship was sunk.

"On May 10, the following message was sent over the Sayville wireless station by Captain Boy-Ed to the head of the Admiralty Department in Berlin:

"Your message of the thirtieth of April was given to American travelers in all important newspapers in the United States, warning them from the war zone and the use of English steamers. The *Lusitania* had 5,400 cases of ammunition on board and her cargo was almost exclusively contraband, with a total value of about 3,000,000 marks."

The note from the Foreign Office served but to confirm the belief that the Lusitania had been deliberately chosen for destruction, that the attack had been carefully planned, and that the notice had been given for no other purpose than to enable the German Government to say that American lives would not have been lost had American travelers paid "attention to the warnings from the German side." To this the New York World answered: "The fact that A formally announces his intention to murder B at three o'clock to-morrow afternoon does not make the subsequent murder of B an innocent or justifiable act." At Kinsale, the coroner's jury which investigated the cause of the deaths from the sinking of the Lusitania, in its verdict said: "We also charge the officers of said submarine and the Emperor and Government of Germany, under whose orders they acted, with the crime of wholesale murder before the tribunal of the civilized world."

A resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania described the sinking of the Lusitania and its attendant horrors as "a deed unknown by the laws of war, or the principles of civilization," and an "affront to the American nation," such as called for action to obtain reparation; condemned the action of the German nation as "a dastardly deed worthy of none save a barbarous and uncivilized nation," and demanded an apology from Germany, full reparation for the loss of American lives and property, and guarantees that such "a cowardly action will never again be permitted by it to occur." A resolution introduced into the Pennsylvania Senate declared that the Imperial German Government, by the sinking of the Frye, by the drowning of Mr. Thrasher on the Falaba,

by the sinking of the Gulflight, and the sinking of the Lusitania, had shown its utter indifference to the safety of the lives and property of citizens of the United States, and pledged the support of the Commonwealth to the President in any measures he might take to uphold the honor, dignity and safety of the nation.

In Tennessee, resolutions of support were also adopted. At New York City, the sons of political leaders and of men foremost in professional life signed a message to the President stating their conviction "that national interests and honor imperatively require adequate measures both to secure reparation for the past violations by Germany of American rights and secure guarantees against" violations in the future.

On the tenth of May the President came to Philadelphia for the especial purpose of addressing some four thousand newly naturalized citizens on the duties, responsibilities and privileges of American citizenship. The occasion was made a great one. The meeting was held in the Convention Hall, was presided over by the Mayor of the city and, besides the four thousand new citizens, those gathered in the hall numbered some sixteen thousand. That the President would use the occasion to speak on the nation's foreign relations was fully expected. He made no allusion to the Lusitania, he spoke solely to the new citizens, and in the course of his speech used some expressions which went round the world.

"The example of America," he said, "must be a special The example of America must be an example not of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not

need to convince others by force that it is right." .

The words "too proud to fight" were understood both at home and abroad to refer to the Lusitania crime, and to define the policy of the President towards Germany. Under no circumstances will the Government permit its indignation over the drowning of Americans on the Lusitania to lead to war with Germany, was the common interpretation. This was not his meaning, the President told callers who came to the White

House on the day after the speech. He did not, he said, consider the Philadelphia meeting a proper occasion on which to give any intimation of policy on any special matter. He was defining a personal attitude, but did not have anything specific in mind.

"President Wilson," said the London Evening Standard, "is a high-minded man and we can understand what he meant by this rather unpolitical remark—'too proud to fight.' Unfortunately, Germany does not understand this kind of righteousness." The London Star thought the words meant that "the guilt of those who murdered American eitizens on board the Lusitania is so manifest that America can rely on the righteousness of her cause without drawing the sword to defend it." All England was waiting to see what the President would do, and so was all America. There were those who insisted that Germany must be held to "strict accountability," as threatened in the note of February 10. There were those who held "strict accountability" should apply only when American ships were sunk and not when Americans lost their lives because of the sinking of a merchant ship under the flag of a belligerent. There were those who wished to see diplomatic relations broken at once; there were those who stood for "peace-at-any-price," and there were those who insisted that we prepare at once for the war which was sure to come.

On May 13, the Department of State made public the first *Lusitania* note, the first also of a series of notes in which the President stated and defended the principles of neutrality.

Because of the recent act of German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas, the note said, it was clearly desirable that both Governments come to a "full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted." The sinking of the Falaba, the aeroplane attack on the Cushing, the torpedoing of the Gulflight, the destruction of the Lusitania, formed "a series of events which the Government of the United States had observed with growing concern, distress and amazement."

The Government of the United States "was loath to believe—it cannot now bring itself to believe—that these acts so contrary" to the rules, practices and spirit of modern warfare could be sanctioned by the Imperial German Government, and felt in duty bound "to address the Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness."

The Government of the United States had been informed that the Imperial German Government felt compelled "by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war, and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away."

The Government of the United States had already informed the Imperial German Government that it could not "admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of darger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or accidental." These rights it did not understand the German Government to question. On the contrary, it assumed that the German Government "accept as of course the rule that the lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag."

Objection to this method of attack, by the Imperial German Government, on "the trade of their enemies" lay in the fact that it was not possible to use submarines to destroy commerce without "disregarding those rules of fairness, justice and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative." It was "impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo," or make a prize of her, or put a prize crew aboard, or "sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy

of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admit." In the cases of the Falaba, the Cushing, the Gulflight and the Lusitania, "even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received."

Recently there had been published in newspapers in the United States a warning, "purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy," addressed to the people of the United States, stating in effect that if they exercised their "right of free travel upon the seas" they did so at their peril if they entered the war zone. Reference was not made to this in order to call attention "to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers," but to point out "that no warning that an unlawful and inhuman act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission."

The Government of the United States could not believe that these "acts of lawlessness" were done by submarine commanders save "under a misapprehension" of orders, and confidently expected, therefore, "that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation, so far as reparation is possible, for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare." Expressions of regret and offers of reparation for the destruction of neutral vessels sunk by mistake might satisfy international obligations when no lives were lost. They could not justify a practice the effect of which was "to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and unmeasurable risks."

"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

By our countrymen in general the note was heartily ap-

proved. The President, it was said, has spoken and spoken to the point. Germany cannot have the slightest doubt as to his meaning. It is to be held to "strict accountability" as he promised it should be. Truly it can no longer expect "the Government of the United States to omit any work or any act necessary to the performance of the sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens, and safeguarding their safe exercise and enjoyment." This was not a threat, unless Germany chose to so consider it. The whole country resounded with approval of the note. Governors of the States, Senators, Representatives, public men in response to newspaper queries, declared it to be the duty of every American to support the President in the firm stand he had taken. Here and there a Senator declined to express an opinion or dreaded war. One from Nebraska "would not be willing to go to war for the purpose of securing to American citizens the right to travel in the war zone on an English ship loaded with arms and ammunition." Another from California declared that, unless we were prepared to go to war, "the protest will prove to be an idle thing." He did "not believe our people are ready to go to war with Germany for such a cause." It "would be much better for us to stop sending munitions of war to the belligerents and be what we loudly proclaimed ourselves to be, strictly neutral. It is this violation of the spirit of neutrality that has made most of the trouble."

The leading newspapers, north, south, east and west, with scarce an exception, in editorials, approved the tone and tenor of the note. The German-language press gave the President no support. Said the Chicago Staats-Zeitung:

The jingo Anglo-American press is doing its utmost to arouse the public to make a demonstration against Germany. Let the Americans consider what war would mean. War on Germany by this country would give Japan free rein to seize the Philippines and become mistress of the Orient. What has been claimed for several months past, that this great Republic is the ally of England in fact, if not in name, now seems to be fully established.

Said the Cincinnati Freie Presse:

The part of the note dealing with the loss of lives in the *Lusitania* catastrophe more properly ought to have been addressed to London.

England alone is responsible for the *Lusitania* destruction through her brutal threat to starve a nation. We are not obliged and have no right to set ourselves up as the protectors of British shipping.

The Louisville Anzeiger agreed with the President that the German Government should "explain the loss of lives of American passengers," but did "not think that the loss of American lives gives the President the right to demand the cessation of Germany's undersea warfare against British com-The Cincinnati Volksblatt found the note "disappointing in that it disregards the just complaints of Germany and appears to espouse the cause of Great Britain." Indianapolis Telegraph-Tribune thought it impossible for Germany "to comply with the President's extravagant demand, which amounts to German disarmament on the seas. All that will be required to safeguard British armed merchantmen carrying contraband will be to put passengers, preferably Americans, on board and they will be immune from attacks of German submarines. It is a palpable injustice of President Wilson to demand that Germany should lay aside its most effective weapon of attack."

The St. Paul Volkszeitung was glad to see the President "take such a strong stand for upholding the rights of American citizens" and hoped he would "demand that hereafter all countries will respect our rights to the sacred freedom of the seas."

A rumor from Washington that the German Embassy had allowed it to be known that the Imperial Government would not accept the proposals made by the President was now officially denied by Ambassador von Bernstorff. Another that the Ambassador intended to warn editors of German newspapers to modify their editorial comment, because of strained relations with Germany, was scoffed at by the editors concerned. Another that, because of speeches and statements made in justification of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Dr. Dernburg was about to leave the United States, the German Embassy admitted was true. "He is leaving of his own volition. I do not know where he is going," said the Ambassador.

Feeling in Germany, as expressed in the newspapers by prominent men, was that if the United States could so arrange

it that British merchant ships no longer sailed under false flags, were no longer armed, and that contraband goods were no longer protected by American passengers, the United States would find Germany on her side in the effort to make submarine war more humane. If America could not do this, she must put up with the submarine war as waged. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, it was hoped, would teach neutrals not to travel on British vessels. She must take care that her citizens avoid the war zone as they would the firing lines near Arras, Lisle or Przemysl.

To the German Government the destruction of the Lusitania and the loss of lives was a great event. Berlin and other cities were decked with flags, the school children were given a holiday and a medal was struck to commemorate the event and sold by thousands to the people. On one side was a rude representation of the Lusitania sinking into the sea, and the words, "No contraband. The liner Lusitania sunk by a German submarine May 5, 1915." On the other was a long line of travelers waiting their turn to buy tickets at a Cunard Company's window, behind which stood Death as the ticket agent, and the words, "Business as usual."

Attention at home and overseas was now drawn from the Lusitania and the American note to the entrance of Italy into the war. Her declaration against Austria was made on May 23, and our countrymen were expectantly waiting for what was to happen when the newspapers reported that on May 25 the American steamship Nebraskan on her way from Liverpool to the Delaware Breakwater, in ballast, had been attacked some forty miles west southwest of Fastnet, Ireland, and a huge hole blown in her bow. No warning was given and the Captain saw no submarine, but he was sure the vessel had been torpedoed and had not struck a mine. The flag was down, for it was eight o'clock in the evening when the explosion occurred; but it was still light and the name of the vessel was painted, in letters six feet high, on each of her sides.

The crew took to the boats, stood by for a couple of hours, and then returned to the *Nebraskan* and about half-past ten headed her for Liverpool. At half-past one in the morning

she fell in with two vessels sent to her aid in response to a wireless call. One of them went with her to port.

Our countrymen were astonished. That the German Government, in the face of the excitement in America, should permit a submarine to attack an American vessel and endanger the lives of an American captain and an American crew, was almost unbelievable, unless Germany intended to drive us into war. Again feeling rose high, and was not allayed when on May 31 the Secretary of State made public the reply of von Jagow.

The American Embassy, he said, in the cases of the Gulf-light and Cushing, had been informed that the German Government had no intention of submitting neutral vessels, guilty of no hostile acts, to attack in the war zone by submarines or airships. If neutral ships had suffered through submarine warfare because of mistakes in identification, it was the fault of Great Britain's abuse of flags and the suspicious or culpable behavior of the masters of the ships. Whenever a neutral ship, not itself at fault, had been damaged by German submarines or aviators, the German Government had expressed regret and offered indemnity.

The Cushing and the Gulflight would be treated in this manner. An investigation was then under way and it could, if necessary, be supplemented by an appeal to the Hague Tribunal. The commander of the submarine which sank the Falaba intended to give the passengers and crew time to escape. Only when the master tried to escape and summoned help by rocket signals did the submarine commander order the passengers and crew to leave the Falaba in ten minutes. He really gave twenty-three minutes and fired the torpedo only when suspicious craft were hastening to her aid.

For the loss of life occasioned by the sinking of the Lusitania the German Government had "already expressed to the neutral governments concerned its keen regret."

The United States assumed that the Lusitania was an ordinary unarmed merchantman. The Lusitania in reality was one of the largest and fastest of British merchant ships, was an auxiliary cruiser, and was carried as such on the navy list, and "had cannon aboard which were mounted and concealed

below decks." The British Admiralty, moreover, "in a confidential instruction issued in February, 1915, recommended its mercantile shipping not only to seek protection under neutral flags and distinguishing marks, but also, while thus disguised, to attack German submarines by ramming." German submarine commanders were, therefore, no longer able to observe the usual "regulations of the prize law." Finally the Lusitania on her last trip carried Canadian troops and war material, "including no less than 5,400 cases of ammunition intended for the destruction of the brave German soldiers." The German Government, therefore, believed it was justified in "seeking with all the means of warfare at its disposal to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition intended for the enemy."

The British shipping company, in taking passengers on the Lusitania, "attempted deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition aboard and acted against the clear provisions of the American law which expressly prohibits the forwarding of passengers on ships carrying ammunition and provides a penalty therefor. The company, therefore, is wantonly guilty of the death of so many passengers." There could be no doubt that the quick sinking of the Lusitania was "primarily attributable to the explosion of the ammunition shipment caused by the torpedo. The Lusitania's passengers would otherwise in all probability have been saved."

The reply was disappointing. The claim that the Lusitania was armed had been denied by the Collector of Customs at New York. The statement that in all human probability the passengers would have been saved had it not been for the explosion of ammunition in the cargo was not only trivial but false. The charge that the Cunard Line and not the German Government was responsible for the loss of life was regarded as a quibble. Germany had given no pledge to abandon unrestricted submarine warfare, and in charging the Cunard Line with using American citizens to protect ammunition and in asserting that the Lusitania was an auxiliary armed cruiser had raised new issues.

By the press of the country the answer was declared "not

responsive to our demand"; it "does not meet the issue"; "it is worse than evasion. It is insincere"; it "will not satisfy American opinion"; "it is an answer which purposely does not answer."

The German-language press found the answer most encouraging. It met every expectation which the American note aroused; was courteous, logical, straightforward; touched all matters having to do with the violation of American neutral rights; did not discuss Germany's methods of submarine war on Great Britain and her Allies, as Germany was in no way bound to do. It showed beyond dispute that Germany was most anxious to live at peace with America. Germany wished to be shown where she was wrong, and fair-minded men would concede that the *Lusitania* being carried on the navy list as an auxiliary cruiser, it was but fair to believe that the submarine's officer supposed her to be armed.

If the men in Washington act as prosecuting attorneys, the Pittsburgh Volksblatt held, it would be a great misfortune. The clamor of the mob was to be avoided "just now above all times." Calm deliberation was our true policy. The Cincinnati Freie Presse believed the reply showed that "the hand is out for a settlement of differences." It did not say the American position was untenable, but asked that facts be established.

Two days after the German note was made public, Ambassador von Bernstorff requested an interview with the President. What took place was not divulged. But the Providence Journal, "from an authoritative source," probably its spy at the Embassy, gave what it claimed to be "the details of the statement by the Ambassador." He was sure he could obtain from the Imperial German Government certain concessions if time permitted before the President's answer. The concessions were that Germany would stop her attacks on vessels known to carry citizens of the United States, if the American Government would suggest to our citizens that in future, when going to Europe, they should take passage on such ships only as carried no goods contraband of war; that the German submarines would attack no merchant vessels save such as were known to be carrying contraband of war; that this would be made easier

if the President, by proclamation, would forbid the ships of belligerent nations to carry as passengers citizens of the United States; and that if the United States would bring about these conditions, German submarines would not attack any merchant, neutral or belligerent, carrying passengers, whether the ship did or did not have contraband goods on board, without first giving passengers and crew a chance to seek safety in boats and on rafts.

A statement was current that the Ambassador expressed regret that his Government was deprived of means of getting confidential reports from him concerning the feeling in the United States, aroused by the sinking of the Lusitania, and the determination of the President that Germany abandon her submarine warfare against merchant ships. The unsatisfactory character of the German reply, the Ambassador was said to have represented, was due to his inability to communicate with von Jagow. To this the Providence Journal replied the statement was not based on facts. "The Ambassador is not only in constant communication with Berlin, both by wireless and cables, but he actually read and edited the von Jagow note and sent it back to Berlin with some minor changes made by himself before it was delivered to Ambassador Gerard."

Be that as it may, Ambassador von Bernstorff asked permission to send to Berlin, through the Department of State in the American code, a detailed report on the condition of affairs in the United States. The President consented and approved a plan to dispatch a special envoy of the German Embassy to Berlin to acquaint the German Government with the excited feeling in our country caused by the loss of life when the Lusitania went down. Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhardt was chosen, and sailed June 3 under safe conduct obtained from the Allies.

Not long after the sinking of the Lusitania the German Ambassador submitted to the Department of State four affidavits to prove that the vessel was armed and was a warship. An investigation by the District Attorney at New York soon brought to light the fact that the affidavits of Gustav Stahl and others were obtained by German secret service agents, that their operations led directly to the office of Captain Boy-Ed, naval attaché to the German Embassy, and that the affidavit of

Stahl, that he had visited the *Lusitania* on April 30 and had seen four guns, two on the fore deek and two aft, mounted on wooden blocks and covered with leather, was false. Stahl was accordingly arrested and indicted by a Grand Jury for perjury. September 8 Stahl pleaded guilty and was sent to prison for eighteen months.

The reply of von Jagow on May 28 was followed on June 1 by a note treating of the cases of the Gulflight and Cushing. As to the Gulflight, he said, the commander of a German submarine, on the afternoon of May 1, when near the Scilly Islands, saw, coming towards him, a large merchant steamer accompanied by two smaller vessels. The position of the two was such "that they formed a regular safeguard against submarine attacks; moreover, one of them had a wireless apparatus, which is not usual with small vessels." Judging from appearances the submarine commander supposed it to be "a case of English convoy vessel" and that the steamer must be of considerable value to the British Government to be so guarded. "The commander could see no neutral markings on it of any kind, that is, distinctive marks painted on the free board recognizable at a distance." The American flag on the steamer was not seen until the shot had been fired. The attack was to be "attributed to an unfortunate accident" and not to the fault of the commander. The German Government expressed "its regret to the Government of the United States concerning this incident, and declares itself ready to furnish full recompense for the damage thereby sustained by American citizens."

That the *Cushing* had been attacked was still in doubt. From such official reports as were available it appeared that only one merchantman was attacked by German flying machines near Nordhinder Lightship. The German aviator was forced to consider the vessel as hostile because no flag, no neutral markings were visible. That the *Cushing* was the ship attacked was possible, but the German Government must ask for the evidence.

CHAPTER V

THE "LUSITANIA" NOTES

It was now the duty of the Department of State to reply to the note from von Jagow concerning the Cushing, Gulflight and Lusitania. That the President was preparing such a reply was well known in Washington; but rumor had it that the Cabinet was at odds. Mr. Bryan, it was said, wished a note sent to Great Britain demanding all the rights of neutrals under international law; did not approve of the length to which the President went in his "strict accountability" threat; and feared, unless the terms of the new note were modified, or the protest sent to Great Britain at the same time, diplomatic relations with Germany would be broken. Indeed, he might resign.

On June 8, 1915, Mr. Bryan did resign, and in his letter to the President said: "Obedient to your sense of duty and actuated by the highest motives, you have prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war." The resignation was "to take effect when the note is sent, unless you prefer an earlier hour."

Beset by interviewers, as soon as the resignation became known, Mr. Bryan said: "The differences between the President and myself on the question of these notes did not spring up suddenly to-day or this week. They have existed since the Falaba case. We have had many talks about the questions involved, and the difference in our attitude has gradually grown wider. Finally we agreed to disagree. We decided upon that one day last week."

His act made a great sensation, and because of it he was

both praised and heartily condemned. He deserts the President, said one journal, at a moment of grave international complication, does all in his power to create prejudice against the note about to be sent, and gives aid and comfort to the opponents, in Germany and here, of the firm assertion of our rights on the sea. "The country looks upon Mr. Bryan as a deserter," said another. Americans, said a third, understand Mr. Bryan's quixotic devotion to his ideals. But Germany does not know him as Americans do. It will see in his resignation a divided government, a divided people, the one thing Germany has

sought to bring about since the war began.

Mr. Robert Lansing, Counselor to the Department of State, now became Acting Secretary, and June 9 the note, over his name, was started on its way to Berlin. That day Mr. Bryan made a further statement of his views. There were, he said, two points on which he differed with the President. The first was "the suggestion of investigation by an international commission." The second was "warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels or with cargoes of ammunition." We should, he held, "frankly state to Germany that we are willing to apply, in this case, the principle which we are bound by treaty to apply to disputes between the United States and thirty countries." No matter what disputes might arise between us and any one of these nations, war must not be declared, nor hostilities begin until the matter in dispute has been investigated by an international tribunal and one year allowed in which to investigate and report. "Germany has always been a friendly nation, and a great many of our people are of German ancestry. Why should we not deal with Germany according to this plan?"

As to the second point of difference, Mr. Bryan asked: "Why should an American citizen be permitted to involve his country in war by traveling upon a belligerent ship when he

knows that the ship will pass through a danger zone?"

The question was not whether an American citizen has a right, under international law, to travel on a belligerent ship. The question was whether he ought not, out of consideration for his country, if not for his own safety, avoid danger when avoidance is possible. He did not know how far the Govern-

ment could legally go in actually preventing American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships, but it could, and it "should. earnestly advise American citizens not to risk themselves or

the peace of the country."

"President Taft advised Americans to leave Mexico," and "President Wilson has repeated the advice." This Mr. Bryan thought eminently wise and the advice should be repeated. is the duty of the Mayor to suppress the mob and to prevent violence, but he does not hesitate to warn citizens to keep off the streets during the riots. He does not question their right to use the streets, but for their own protection and in the interest of order he warns them not to incur the risks involved in going on the streets when men are shooting at each other."

This new statement of Mr. Bryan's views caused another outburst of dissent, and a hearty approval of the course of the President. To Mr. Bryan it was said, There is no legal difference between warning Americans out of Mexico, which is foreign soil, and warning them off the high seas, which belong to us as much as to Germany. If there be any American who was not reconciled vesterday morning to Mr. Bryan's resignation, he must be reconciled to-day, in the light of Mr. Bryan's own justification of his action. "When a man," said another, "quits the service of a private employer he is bound in honor not to disclose his employer's trade secrets." Mr. Bryan resigns his office, stating his reasons at sufficient length and with all due clearness. Yet on the day following he puts forth a statement in which he does not hesitate to publish to all the world facts in respect to an important state paper of which he had knowledge only as a trusted adviser of the President, and which the President has not yet made public. third, the resignation is to be deplored because it will give the world a mistaken idea that the people of the United States are not standing strongly behind the President.

The German-American press gave approval. "Mr. Bryan frankly stated his object was the prevention of war. Bryan will have the support of all sane Americans on any reasonable proposition which will keep the country out of war." "Whether the departure of Mr. Bryan will exercise great influence on the course of events so far as relations with Germany are concerned is an open question. At all events, the peace party in the country as a whole has found a leader who is a fighter, who to-day still has a large following in Congress and out of it." "Bryan's stand for fair play forces his resignation. Bryan's resignation at this critical moment is the greatest service the Commoner has ever rendered his country, because it has aroused the people to see the danger of the foreign policy now pursued by the President. The warning of George Washington against excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike for another, seems to be forgotten in Washington." Said the Fatherland: "The President in his present course has not behind him the majority of the American people, since even his own advisers desert him."

The English press regarded the resignation as of great significance. It meant "a death blow to the Germanic powers." It meant "that America has crossed the Rubicon"; that "the greatest republic on earth has resolved to be true to itself and its ideals." "By far the most important event of to-day is the announcement which comes to us from Washington that Mr.

Bryan has resigned his office."

The second Lusitania note was made public June 11.

The Government of the United States noted with gratification that in discussing the cases of the Gulflight and Cushing, the German Government fully recognized the principle of the freedom of the open seas to neutrals, and was willing to meet its liability when neutral ships, guilty of no hostile act, were attacked by air craft or submarines. But the Government of the United States was surprised to find the German Government contending, in the case of the Falaba, that an attempt on the part of a merchant vessel to escape attack and secure help altered the obligation of the officer, seeking to capture her, to respect the safety of the lives of those on board even after she had ceased her attempt to escape.

Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of passengers and crew.

Von Jagow had expressed his belief that the Government of the United States was not aware of the character and outfit of the Lusitania, not aware that she carried masked guns, trained gunners and special ammunition, not aware that she had transported troops from Canada and a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to go in a vessel carrying passengers.

Were these statements true, the Government of the United States, [Mr. Lansing replied,] would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral Power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the Lusitania was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the Statutes of the United States, and that if, in fact, she was a naval auxiliary of Great Britain she should not receive her clearance as a merchantman, and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. [The Government of the United States was able, therefore,] to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed.

But whatever the contention of the German Government as to the carriage of contraband of war, or the explosion of the cargo by the torpedo, "these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel."

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion, or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or warning and that men, women and children were sent to their deaths in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. . . .

The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity which every government honors itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under

its care and authority. . . .

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question these rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of noncombatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect to the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

In the newspapers, side by side with the note, was another statement or appeal from Mr. Bryan. It was addressed "To the American People" and reads:

You now have before you the text of the note to Germany, the note which it would have been my official duty to sign had I remained Secretary of State. I ask you to sit in judgment on my decision to resign rather than to share responsibility for it. . . .

[If the difference were a personal one between the President and himself it would matter little.] But the real issue is not between persons; it is between systems. [In dealing with each, other governments used either force or persuasion.] Force speaks with firmness and acts through the ultimatum. Persuasion employs argument, courts investigation and depends upon negotiation. Force represents the old system, the system that must pass away. Persuasion represents the new sytem, the system that has been growing all too slowly, it is true, but growing for 1900 years.

[If he] "correctly interpreted the note to Germany, it conforms to the standard of the old system rather than to the rules of the new," [and he cheerfully admitted that] it is abundantly supported by precedents written in characters of blood upon almost every page of human history. Austria furnishes the most recent precedent; it was Austria's firmness that dictated the ultimatum against Serbia which set the world at war.

A tree is known by its fruit. The war in Europe is the ripened fruit of the old system. This is what firmness supported by force

has done in the old world; shall we invite it to cross the Atlantic? Already the jingoes have caught the rabies from the dogs of war; shall the opponents of organized slaughter be silent while the disease spreads?

A humble follower of the Prince of Peace, a firm believer in the prophecy that "they who take the sword shall perish by the sword," he wished to be "counted among those who earnestly urge the adoption of a course in the matter which will leave no doubts of our Government's willingness to continue negotiations with Germany until an amicable understanding is reached, or at least until the stress of war is over, we can appeal from Philip drunk with carnage to Philip sobered by the memories of an historic friendship, and by our recollection of the innumerable ties of kinship that bind the Fatherland to the United States."

Having made his appeal to the America people, Mr. Bryan followed it with one "To the German-Americans." After some complimentary remarks intended "as an introduction to an appeal which I feel it my duty to make to them," he proceeded to make it under four heads:

"First. If any of them have ever in a moment of passion or excitement suspected the President of lack of neutrality or lack of friendship towards the German Government and the German people, let that thought be forgotten, never again to be recalled." Since his resignation Mr. Bryan had "received numerous telegrams from German-Americans and German-American societies commending" his action. These senders of telegrams understood his position, but that all might understand it he would state it again.

"The President is not only desirous of peace, but he hopes for it, and he has adopted the methods which he thinks most likely to contribute towards peace. My difference from him is as to the method, not the purpose, and my utterances since resigning have been intended to crystallize public sentiment in support of his efforts to maintain peace, or to use a familiar phrase, 'peace with honor.'

"Second. Knowing that the President desires peace, it is your duty to help him secure it, and how? By exerting your influence to convince the German Government of this fact, and to persuade that Government to take no step that would lead in the direction of war."

He feared that the German Government "might, despairing of a friendly settlement, break off diplomatic relations, and thus create a condition out of which war might come without the intention of either country."

"Third. Do not attempt to connect the negotiations which are going on between the United States and the German Government with those between the United States and Great Britain. . . .

"Fourth. I hope that Germany will acquiesce in the demands that have been made, and I hope that she will acquiesce in them without conditions. She can trust the United States to deal justly with her in the consideration of any changes that she may propose in the international rules that govern the taking of prizes."

In Germany the Berlin press found nothing in the President's note likely to change the methods of submarine warfare. One declared "the torpedoing must go on"; another asserted the right of Germany to stop, by any means, the shipment of munitions; another defended the sinking of the Lusitania; another thought the note might put off a settlement but could not bring it about.

Mr. Bryan's notes, and especially his appeal to German-Americans, were followed by an invitation to speak at a great peace meeting in New York held under the auspices of the "Friends of Peace," the German-American Alliance of Greater New York, United Irish Societies, American Truth Society, American Independence Union, American Humanity League, American Women of German Descent, German-American Peace Societies, and many other societies, each committed to a propaganda against the export of munitions of war. The chairman was the president of the United German-American Societies of the State of New York. Among the speakers besides Mr. Bryan were Mr. Frank Buchanan, a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs; Mr. Henry Vollmer, late a member of Congress from Iowa, and Mr. Jeremiah O'Leary. Among those present were the Turkish Ambassador; Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador; Captain Boy-Ed, naval

attaché, and Captain von Papen, military attaché to the German Embassy. The great auditorium of Madison Square Garden was filled. Thousands, unable to enter the hall, stood in the street and were addressed by speakers from six stands.

When denouncing his pro-German speech, a charge was made in the newspapers that on the day the *Lusitania* note was given to the public Mr. Bryan conferred with Ambassador Dumba, told him that the note had been written by the President "for home consumption," to satisfy the public feeling and to overcome the effect of his words "too proud to fight" used in his speech to the new citizens. This statement, it was charged, when telegraphed to Vienna and Berlin gave the German Government the impression that the note was not to be taken seriously and led it to refuse to stop submarine warfare and suggest negotiation. To this Mr. Bryan replied:

I have noticed that a number of jingo papers are publishing a statement to the effect that after the sending of the first note to Germany I gave Ambassador Dumba the impression that the note was not to be taken seriously. I am not willing that the uninformed shall be misled by that portion of the press which is endeavoring to force this country into war. I reported to the President the conversation which I had with Ambassador Dumba and received his approval of what I said. When we learned that the conversation had been misinterpreted in Berlin I brought the matter to the attention of Ambassador Dumba and secured from him a statement certifying to the correctness of the report of the conversation that I had made to the President. Ambassador Dumba's statement was sent to our Embassy at Berlin and Ambassador Dumba also telegraphed the German Government affirming the correctness of my report of the interview and denying the construction that had been placed upon it. These are the facts in the case.

His critics now pointed out that, while he had much to say about the jingo press, he failed to state exactly what he said to Ambassador Dumba. If innocent, why not give it to the public, why keep it secret after revealing so many secrets of the Cabinet? Whatever it was, did not the fact remain that the German Government failed to take the *Lusitania* note seriously? The reply showed this.

The Providence Journal now came forward with the statement that, after the note of February 10 had been dispatched,

Mr. Bryan saw Ambassador Dumba "at least three times at the State Department and twice at his home"; that at these meetings the note was frankly discussed, and that at the last one the Ambassador presented to Mr. Bryan a typewritten statement of what he believed "to be the attitude of the Administration in connection with the note as outlined to him by Mr. Bryan."

First. Germany is willing to discontinue submarine attacks on vessels aboard which it is known there are United States citizens, unless such vessels are known to be carrying contraband of war.

Second. That provision be made for such passenger boats.

Third. Proclamation to be issued by the President of the United States, advising United States citizens that they must not, in the future, take passage aboard vessels sailing under a belligerent flag which are carrying contraband of war, either from the United States or from any other point anywhere from any country in the world.

"Mr. Bryan then and there agreed with the Austrian Ambassador that if this proposition were put up to President Wilson in the form outlined it would be accepted."

Count von Bernstorff was at once notified, sent the "entire story of the conferences" to the Foreign Office in Berlin, and was duly "instructed to visit the President of the United States and agree to the terms." But "it was not until he unfolded the scheme to Mr. Wilson that he knew anything about it."

"The above statements," said the Journal, "are correct in every particular."

As week followed week and von Jagow made no reply to the Lusitania note of June 9, a change in the attitude of Germany towards the United States became apparent. It was shown by the German press, which now for the first time divided on the question, How shall America be treated? It was shown by the temporary suspension of the Tageszeitung, because of a savage reply by Count von Reventlow to some remarks, in the Lokal Anzeiger, on the importance of American friendship. It was shown by Admiral Oscar von Truppel, who in an article in Der Tag warned its readers not to think lightly of a break with the United States. A German-American war, he said, or even a rupture of diplomatic relations, would do more injury to German prospects than was generally believed.

America at first could give little military aid to the Entente Allies save by hastening the supply of ammunition. But "it could in time coöperate, with considerable land and sea forces and with first-class submarines and aeroplanes, in the complete isolation of Germany." America could also "exercise such pressure on the few remaining neutral countries that these would probably be arrayed actively or passively in the ranks of our enemies." Can we hope, he asked, "so far as we are able to foresee, to force England to her knees through submarine warfare against her commerce?" If the answer were no, then German submarines could be put to a better use in attacks on "hostile warships, particularly in the hunting grounds of the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal," and submarine warfare against merchantmen "could be modified or abandoned to obtain a more favorable neutrality from, and the friendship of America which would be of great value to Germany after the war." If the answer were yes, then Germany was justified in using to the fullest extent her superiority in submarines, "and we can calmly accept all the consequences."
It was shown by an effort of the Foreign Office to arrange by informal discussion a formula for a note acceptable to both Germany and the United States. Herr Zimmermann, under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the report said, and Ambassador Gerard, had a conference on Saturday, July 3, and the draft of the note was discussed. Reports from Washington stated that the seriousness of the issue had so impressed the authorities at Berlin that they were seeking to find out just what changes in submarine warfare would satisfy America without lessening the effectiveness of that kind of warfare against Great Britain; that the draft submitted to Ambassador Gerard was intended to draw from him an expression of opinion, that he promptly asked for instructions from Washington, and the President, then at his summer home at Cornish, was considering a reply.

On July 8, according to dispatches from Berlin, the German Foreign Office was informed that the American Government would not enter into preliminary negotiations respecting the note from Germany, and therefore it would be presented

to Ambassador Gerard at once. The note, dated July 8, was

made public in our country on the tenth.

The Imperial Government, von Jagow said, learned with great satisfaction "how earnestly the Government of the United States is concerned in seeing the principles of humanity realized in the present war." Ever since the time when "Frederick the Great negotiated with John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson, the treaty of friendship and commerce of September 5, 1785, between Prussia and the Republic of the West," the two countries had stood together in the struggle for "the freedom of the seas." If "in the present war the principles which should be the ideal of the future have been traversed more and more the longer its duration, the German Government has no guilt therein." Great Britain was to blame. On November 3, 1914, she declared the North Sea a war zone, planted poorly anchored mines, captured vessels, made it dangerous for neutral vessels to enter the sca, and thus blockaded neutral coasts and ports contrary to international law. On November 16, 1914, her Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons that one of the great tasks of England was to prevent food reaching Germany through neutral ports. Since March 1, she had been taking from neutral ships all merchandise bound to or from Germany, even when neutral property.

While the enemies of Germany were thus conducting a war

without mercy for her destruction, she was fighting "in self-defense" for her "national existence and for the sake of peace of assured permanency." Forced to adopt a submarine war-fare to meet the intentions of its enemies, the German Government on February 4, in its memorandum "recognized that the interests of neutrals might suffer from the submarine warfare." The case of the Lusitania showed "with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting the war employed by our adversaries leads." "All distinction between merchant ships and vessels of war had been done away with" by the orders to British merchantmen to arm themselves, by instructions "to ram submarines and the promise of rewards therefor." Had the German commander of the submarine which sank the *Lusitania* caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing the torpedo,

his own vessel would surely have been destroyed. Experience justified the belief that the *Lusitania* would have floated long enough to enable all aboard of her to take to the boats, had it not been for the large quantity of highly explosive material she carried.

In the spirit of old friendship the Imperial Government would do all it could "to prevent the jeopardizing of lives of American citizens." But to prevent "unforeseen dangers to American passenger steamships," they must be "made recognizable by special markings" and German submarine commanders must be "notified a reasonable time in advance."

That American citizens might not suffer for "adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic," the German Government would suggest that "a reasonable number of neutral steamers under the American flag" be used in passenger service. There would thus be "no compelling necessity" for American citizens to travel under an enemy's flag. The Imperial Government was "unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board." If an adequate number of neutral passenger steamers could not be acquired, the Imperial Government would not object to placing under the American flag four enemy passenger steamships, "for passenger traffic between North America and England."

By the London press the note was called impudent and evasive. The *Times* described it as a "compound of evasion, misstatement and effrontery, such as only Teutonic diplomacy could have brewed," and not likely "to ease the tension between the two countries. The assurances twice demanded by the United States are not even mentioned." "As far as insult and insolence can be carried on without resort to actual language of contempt and defiance," said the *Daily Telegraph*, "they are carried on in this document." "The Washington Government has been shown," said the *Post*, "that Germany does not care a snap of its fingers for American lives, rights or property." The Paris *Figaro* did not know whether "the impudent cynicism of German diplomacy or the extraordinary presumption leading them to believe that the United States would be satisfied with such a reply" was the more remarkable. Said

Petit Parisienne, "It offers America derisive guarantees and openly seeks to prolong indefinitely the negotiations that it never intended to end."

Much the same resentment found expression in the American "The fact that the Germans have thrice over responded to the demands of the United States with evasive notes; that they have with such scant courtesy as to border upon insult neglected the demands of the United States for reparation for the Lusitania incident, and have offered nothing as to future protection for American interests which the United States can consider with dignity or safety, has not failed to impress itself upon the American mind," said one journal.

The difficulty, it was said, in making the German Government understand how seriously the manner of conducting the submarine war is viewed in the United States is due to Mr. Bryan's statement to Ambassador Dumba, to Mr. Bryan's resignation and his subsequent propaganda, to his adoption of the German point of view regarding the shipment of ammunition and the barring of American travelers from belligerent ships, and to the statements in the German press that our Western States are solidly opposed to the policy of the President.

There was little talk of war; but the general opinion was that the two nations had now come to the parting of the ways, and diplomatic relations ought to be severed; that if another note were sent the Government should limit its words to a final statement of its position. Some thought, as Germany for two months past had refrained from attacks violating our rights, the United States could still consider the issue.

To calm, if possible, the growing indignation and remove all doubt as to what would be done, the President authorized his secretary to announce "that from the moment of the arrival of the official text of the German note, I have given the matter the closest attention, keeping constantly in touch with the Secretary of State and with every source that would throw light on the situation; that so soon as the Secretary of State and I have both maturely considered the situation I shall go to Washington to get into personal conference with him and with the Cabinet, and that there will be as prompt an announcement as possible of the purposes of the Government."

Another indication of the seriousness with which the Imperial Government regarded the strained relations with our country was a note presented on July 12. It had to do with the Nebraskan. As yet our Government had made no complaint. The Imperial Government, however, had "received from newspaper reports the intelligence that the American steamer Nebraskan had been damaged by a mine or torpedo on the southwest coast of Ireland," had investigated and was "convinced that the damage" had been done "by an attack by a submarine."

"On the evening of May 25 last, the submarine met a steamer bound westward without a flag and with no neutral markings on her freeboard, about 35 miles west of Fastnet Rock." In "the twilight which had already set in, the name of the steamer was not visible from the submarine." Obliged to assume "that only English steamers," and no neutral steamers, traversed this zone without flag and markings, "he attacked" believing "that he had an enemy vessel before him." Some time after the shot the American flag was hoisted and "he refrained from further attack." Hence it was clear that it was "to be considered an unfortunate accident." The German Government expressed its regret, and was ready to "make compensation for damages" sustained.

Another attack, this time with the loss of American citizens, which had been passed by in silence was that on the Dominion liner *Armenian*.

When the facts were revealed it appeared that shortly before seven o'clock on the evening of June 28, when off Trevose Head on the northwest coast of Cornwall, the captain of the Armenian sighted a submarine and attempted to escape. The submarine gave chase, firing as she came on, and at the end of an hour, when thirteen of the crew of the Armenian lay dead on deck and the vessel was on fire, the Captain surrendered. Ample time was allowed the crew to take to the boats before she was torpedoed and sunk. Those who were killed, died of wounds, or were drowned numbered nineteen, of whom eleven were Americans. The vessel was on her way from Newport News, Virginia, to Avonmouth with 1422 mules; of the Americans many were negro muleteers.

Here was a case of a British vessel carrying contraband of

war, and when attacked seeking to escape, carrying no passengers and engaged in Admiralty business. These facts greatly simplified the situation and left the Government of the United States nothing to complain of save the barbarous method of submarine warfare which made it impossible to care for human life. "Nothing," said the President in his Lusitania note of June 9, "but active forcible resistance, or continued effort to escape by flight when ordered to stop, on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers and crew." "The Armenian had made continued effort to escape by flight."

The next to escape was the Orduna. She left Liverpool July 8, with a crew of 265 and a passenger list of 227, of whom 21 were Americans. Early on the morning of July 9, when about 37 miles south of Queenstown, a German submarine, without warning, fired a torpedo which missed the stern by a The Orduna fled, and the submarine, rising to the surface, gave chase, shelling as she pursued till the Orduna was out of reach. July 17, a few days after the Nebraskan note. the Orduna reached New York.

The President, as he said he would, having "maturely considered the situation" produced by the German note of July 8, made his reply on the twenty-first.

The note from the Imperial German Government he was obliged to say was "unsatisfactory because it fails to meet the real differences between the two governments, and indicates no way in which the accepted principles of law and humanity may be applied in the grave matter in controversy, but proposes, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of those principles which virtually set them aside." The Government of the United States "noted with satisfaction" that the Imperial Government recognized that "the high seas are free"; that the character and cargo of a merchant ship must be known before she can lawfully be destroyed; that the lives of noncombatants must in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or tries to escape. But it regrets that the Imperial Government regards itself "as in a large degree exempt" from the observance of these principles, "even when neutral vessels are concerned," because of the acts of Great Britain.

"Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when they violate the right to life itself." If a belligerent could not retaliate without injury to the lives and property of neutrals, "a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers should dictate that the practice be discontinued." The Government of the United States was ready to make reasonable allowances for the novel aspects of submarine war, but could not consent to abate any essential right of its people "because of a mere alteration in circumstances."

Events of the last two months had shown that submarine operations in the so-called war zone could be conducted accord-

ing to the "accepted practices of regulated warfare."

The Government of the United States could not "accept the suggestion" that certain vessels be designated which should be free "on the seas now illegally proscribed." Such an agreement "would, by implication, subject other vessels to illegal attack" and would be "an abandonment of the principles for which this government contends." The note closed with this warning. "Friendship itself prompts" the Government of the United States "to say to the Imperial German Government that repetitions by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

The German-American press was outspoken in condemnation of the note. It "bears no more the nature of an ultimatum," said the Milwaukee Germania-Herold, "than can be said of its predecessors. That the tone is distinctly sharper cannot be denied," but that need not "disturb us" for possibly "those parts in which Mr. Wilson uses the most energetic language are more for 'home consumption' than for Germany." According to the Chicago Staats-Zeitung Germany could never submit "to the tone of it," and would give no other answer than the breaking off of diplomatic relations. The note showed "the President will break with Germany at all hazards. He should first ask the people of the United States if they are satisfied to

be driven into war. The note is unworthy of the Republic. We hope that Germany will not blame the people for the present Government's action."

By the American press the note was regarded as the final word to Germany on the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the submarine attacks on American merchantmen. It was not an ultimatum in form, but it was in substance. The United States no longer cared what Germany said but what Germany did. It swept away all uncertainty and left the way open for that "act" so clearly foreshadowed in the note of May 13. The President's position is this: Whatever your words may be, it is by your acts we shall judge you. We have drawn a line across which Germany must not step. The future is with Germany. There will be no war unless Germany wills it.

To the press in Berlin, indeed in Germany everywhere, the note was disappointing and the words "deliberately unfriendly" offensive. Why the proposals of Germany were brushed aside without even a counter proposal was puzzling. The Tageblatt found "Mr. Wilson's standpoint" directly opposite "common sense and right." It was useless to seek for "perfume between the thorns in the American note." "The American Government demands that its citizens travel in safety in war time, where and when they please. If they sit on a powder keg, any one lighting a cigar in their vicinity would be guilty of an unfriendly act." The Koelnische Zeitung found the German and American standpoints as far apart at the end as at the beginning. An understanding was impossible. "Germany will neither disown the sinking of the Lusitania nor offer indemnity for the lives of the reckless Americans who perished on the steamship. Germany will continue her submarine warfare in the same manner as in the past two months." The Frankfurter Zeitung declared "Germany cannot afford to abandon her submarine warfare because of threats, and if President Wilson persists in his dogmatic views the world must bear the consequences."

That Germany had no intentions of yielding to any demand was once more made apparent by the sinking of another American ship on July 25. As the *Leelanaw* was on her way from Archangel to Belfast with flax, she was attacked by a German

submarine some 60 miles north of the Orkneys. Ample time was given the crew to leave the ship, and after the *Leelanaw* had been torpedoed and sunk, the men were taken aboard the submarine with the life boats in tow. About half-past eight in the evening another steamship was seen approaching, whereupon the crew were ordered into the boats and made their way to Kirkwall. The cargo was contraband and foreign owned, and could not be made the subject of a claim. But the ship was American owned and her destruction, as was that of the *Frye*, was a violation of old treaties.

During a few weeks ruthlessness in submarine warfare seemed to have been abandoned. Ships were warned, and crews and passengers were given a chance for life. At last the protests of the United States, it was thought, had produced some effect; but on August 20, when our countrymen took up their morning newspapers, they read that on the previous day the White Star liner Arabic, while on her way from Liverpool to New York, was torpedoed without warning off the south coast of Ireland, not far from where the Lusitania went down, and sank in eleven minutes. Aboard of her were 423 souls, of whom forty-four, including two American citizens, lost their lives.

That such an act should be committed in the face of the warnings of February 1, May 13, June 9, and July 21, astonished and enraged all right thinking Americans. The Arabic, it was said, was on her way to New York, therefore she carried no ammunition, no contraband. Clearly the purpose of the submarine commander was to destroy the ship and the lives of all on board. The rights of our citizens, in defense of which we have warned Germany we should omit no act or word, have been stripped from them. In every detail the destruction of the Arabic fulfills President Wilson's definition of an act "deliberately unfriendly to the United States." There is then only one road open, only one course to pursue—without delay, without further protest diplomatic relations must be broken and the German Ambassador given his passports.

It is useless to heap up words to show how serious is the situation. The whole tale is not yet told, but enough is known to prove that the submarine commander acted in defiance of the plain warning of the President. Germany flouts our claim, de-

nies our demands, and chooses to forfeit our friendship and esteem. Over all our country the press insisted that the "unpardonable offense," the "deliberately unfriendly act," has been committed and Count von Bernstorff must go. Newspapers everywhere, in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, Montgomery, Mobile, Knoxville, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Duluth, called earnestly for a severance of relations and a firm support of the President.

Not so the German language press. "The situation is serious," said the New York Staats-Zeitung, "because the policy of our Government, indorsed, applauded, pushed and stimulated by a pro-British press, which, despite all protestations of peace, wantonly excited to war, carried in itself the germ of an inevitable conflict; because, as the case of the Arabic again shows, the German Government, if it would not commit suicide, never more will or can agree to the terms of our Government." Said the Cincinnati Freie Presse, "The Arabic has carried an immense amount of war material, and it cannot be estimated how many German soldiers have bled as the result of wounds received from American bullets. Therefore we may be satisfied that the trips of this British ammunition ship have ceased. If our administration cannot be persuaded to stop the unlimited export of arms and ammunition, then Germany must protect herself." Said the Cincinnati Volkesblatt, "This uncomfortable state of affairs could easily be removed by applying common sense, which would, and ought to, induce the President to tell American citizens to save their country from embarrassment by traveling under the American flag." Said the Louisville Anzeiger, "So far we know nothing except what the British censor passed. We do not know the circumstances of the sinking of the Arabic, but in spite of this, the Anglo-American press breaks into a clamor for war." Said the Detroit Abend Post, "As President Wilson flatly refused to issue an embargo on the export of war material, Germany was justified in carrying on the war by submarine. The Arabic was a swimming arsenal." Said the Illinois Staats-Zeitung, "The Arabic chiefly carried war supplies since the outbreak of the war. The crew formed a rifle club and practiced daily with long-range rifles

of heavy caliber. If Americans knew this and used the boat just the same they are to bear the consequences of their reckless actions." If they did not know it, England was to blame.

Mr. Bryan now made for the press a signed statement of his views. He had read the editorial opinions concerning the sinking of the Arabic as collected by a Chicago newspaper, and thought they avoided "the most important question." The real question was not whether American citizens had a right to travel in the war zone. That was admitted. "The question just now is whether an American citizen should put his convenience or even his rights above his nation's welfare. If American citizens refuse to consider their own safety or the safety of the nation, then a second question arises, namely, whether the Government should permit a few persons to drag this country into this unparalleled war."

The Government had made its protest but that "did not necessarily mean that we were going to war." Diplomacy had not yet been exhausted. Even if it failed "we have recourse to the treaty plan which must be resorted to in case of disputes with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, and should be resorted to before going to war with any other belligerent nation."

"If the treaty plan fails we still have a choice between entering this war and the postponement of final settlement until peace is restored." It was time the unneutral portion of the press put aside its bias and helped the President "keep the country out of war." Pro-Ally papers were insisting on war with Germany for the benefit of the Allies. The pro-German papers were insisting on an embargo on arms and ammunitions for the benefit of Germany. If the two groups would join and urge measures to prevent American citizens from going on belligerent ships in the war zone, and American passenger ships from carrying arms and ammunition, they would help to prevent war and enable our country "to act as peace-maker when the time for peace arrives."

Germany through her Ambassador asked that no stand be taken until facts were known.

"So far no official information is available concerning the sinking of the Arabic," said the note. "The German Govern-

ment trust that the American Government will not take a definite stand on hearing only the reports of one side, which, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance will be given to Germany to be heard equally."

Although the Imperial German Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excitement, which might easily produce wrong impressions.

If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would

naturally be contrary to our intentions.

The German Government would deeply regret the fact, and begs to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Government.

Many interpretations were placed on the note. In official circles it was pointed out that the words "if Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions," were satisfactory so far as they went. But the Government must know whether or not there was an intention to destroy the *Arabic* without warning, when bound from and not to England, and when certainly carrying American citizens. The words "would deeply regret" and "begs to tender sincerest sympathies" might mean that Germany intended to make such amends as would insure a continuance of good relations. At all events it was certain that Germany was anxious to avoid a break with the United States at this time.

Much of the evidence gathered by Mr. Page having reached the Department of State, it was announced that the evidence was summarized and sustained six points: that the *Arabic* was torpedoed; that she was given no warning; that she made no attempt to escape; offered no resistance and did not attempt to ram the submarine; that there was no time to ram the submarine even if it had been seen; and that there was not sufficient time to escape after the torpedo was first seen.

That the Government would suspend action until Germany had presented her side was a matter of course. The action of Germany was regarded as an admission that the Kaiser was not insolently maintaining the right to sink unarmed, unresisting merchantmen. If he were, he would have been sileut. The

statement of the German Ambassador was exceedingly encouraging. "Germany," it was said, "feels obliged to offer an explanation. We are glad to hear that Germany has realized such an act of common decency was due us." The note is a "hopeful indication that Berlin has finally come to see the criminal folly of compelling a diplomatic rupture with the United States."

From Berlin came reports that the German Government was really seriously concerned about the situation. So seriously that the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, made a statement to the Associated Press. "As long," he said, "as the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the Arabic have not been fully cleared up, it is impossible for me to make a definite Thus far we have secured no report about it. Now, we do not even know whether the sinking of the ship was caused by a mine or by a torpedo fired from a German submarine, nor do we know whether in this latter case the Arabic herself may not by her actions, perhaps, have justified the proceedings of the commander of the submarine.

"Only after all these circumstances have been cleared up will it be possible to say whether the commander of one of our submarines went beyond his instructions, in which case the Imperial Government would not hesitate to give such complete satisfaction to the United States as would conform to the friendly relations existing between both Governments."

The people of Germany knew nothing of the excitement in our country. Save short telegrams of British origin nothing was printed on the subject: but officials of the Foreign Office, while refusing to express an opinion on the situation, made it clear that Germany had no intention of defying the United States.

August 26, the German Ambassador had a long interview with the Secretary of State, and September 1, 1915, sent him a note.

With reference to our conversation this morning, I beg to inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last Lusitania note contains the following passage:

Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

Although I know that you do not wish to discuss the *Lusitania* question until the *Arabic* incident has been definitely and satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the above because this policy of my Government was decided on before the *Arabic* incident occurred.

When making public this note Mr. Lansing added the words, "In view of the clearness of the foregoing statement it seems needless to make any comment in regard to it, other than to say that it appears to be a recognition of the fundamental principle for which we have contended."

Everywhere the press hailed the note with satisfaction. Said the Boston Herald, "For the President's Delphic phrase that some people are 'too proud to fight' he has suffered many a jibe. All the world now needs to know is that he did not fight when he might have done so, and that the aim of his endeavors, so far as American interests on the sea are concerned, has been amply realized." "It is a triumph not only of diplomacy but of reason, of right, of humanity, of justice and of truth." 1 "The President by his unyielding devotion to vital principles of law and humanity had brought peace with honor out of the German crisis." 2 "The outcome is a diplomatic triumph which will bring enduring renown to the administration of Woodrow Wilson and put his critics—the war party and the peace-at-any-price party—to confusion. The scene now shifts to England." 3

The American Peace and Arbitration League sent a telegram to the President begging him to "Please accept" its congratulations "upon the gratifying outcome" of his "negotiations with Germany," and another to von Bernstorff. The League thought "his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany and your Excellency should share in the felicitation which we most heartily extend."

In the midst of the rejoicing, news came that just as darkness was falling on the evening of Saturday, September 4, the Allan Liner *Hesperian* with 350 passengers and a crew of 300 men, bound from Liverpool to Montreal, was torpedoed by a German submarine some seventy miles off Fastnet. Most

New York Times.
New York World.

Baltimore Sun.

happily the vessel remained afloat and all were saved by rescue steamers called by wireless. In the crew of the *Hesperian* were two Americans.

A dispatch from the American consul at Queenstown announced that "Admiralty boats landed passengers and troops at 8.30 A. M. Have returned to bring *Hesperian*. . . . There were about 45 Canadian troops on board, unorganized and mainly invalided. Also one 4.7 gun mounted and visible on stern."

At Washington it was believed that the incident, grave as it was, would not lead to a renewal of the erisis between Germany and the United States. On September 1, Count von Bernstorff quoted to Mr. Lansing these words from the coming German note on the *Lusitania*: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, providing that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." In the face of such an assurance Germany must disavow the act.

While the State Department awaited the facts in the case a wave of astonishment and indignation swept the country, and as usual found expression in the comments of the newspapers. Some were sure Germany would disavow the act and punish the perpetrator. She owed it to her own sense of self respect, if she wished to appear before the world as standing up to her recent assurance to our Government. Others asked did this act mean that Germany intends to renew and carry on her eampaign of frightfulness? It was disheartening that at the moment we were rejoicing over the promise of a complete understanding with Germany, this reversion to frightfulness should come to destroy our peaceful expectations. There will of course be more explanations and excuses. But the burden of proof is on Germany. No nation, not even our own, ean long endure such trifling with its dignity and honor. In less than a week, it was said, Germany has broken her solemn promise. her promises made only to be broken? Was von Bernstorff's note only another "scrap of paper"? What explanation does the Ambassador propose to make? What apology does the Imperial Government propose to offer? To blame the submarine commander is useless. He knew that if he sent the Hesperian and every soul on board to the bottom of the sea he would be commended, not condemned, by the Kaiser. Nor can the commander plead a mistake. The German Government does not tolerate mistakes on the part of its officers, naval or military.

The consul of Queenstown, in his dispatch, said there were troops on board and a four-inch gun mounted in the stern. These statements were now seized on by the pro-German press to prove Germany justified. Judging from the consular telegram, said the New York Staats-Zeitung, the Hesperian, under international law, was not "a harmless passenger ship," but "a war craft, for the dispatch says that the liner, despite the fact that she had criminally taken passengers aboard, was armed. Doesn't it appear to be about time for Washington to warn American citizens of the dangers that menace them aboard British passenger ships?"

"The attack on the Hesperian," said the New York Herold, "will scarcely afford the jingoes a cause of war." Nothing was said about her being warned but "it was evidently attempting to escape; besides, it had a gun mounted on deck. These circumstances will undoubtedly be sufficient to relieve our Government of the necessity of writing new notes or putting new questions to Germany." Said the Cleveland Wachter und Anzeiger, "Even according to cable reports, the Hesperian had British and Canadian horse and a mounted gun on board, thereby being an army transport. So Germany seems to have been well within her rights as a belligerent, and since no American lives were lost it is a matter between the belligerents alone, which does not concern America at all."

CHAPTER VI

AN EMBARGO DEMANDED

As month followed month and the war showed no signs of a speedy ending, there sprang up in our country, chiefly in the states along the Atlantic seaboard, a feeling that the time had come for the United States to prepare for defense. We have, it was said, a small but highly trained and efficient regular army. We have a small but undoubtedly efficient navy, and a National Guard with depleted ranks and antiquated guns and probably no ammunition. But the most careless observer of events in the old world must have seen that three implements of warfare, never before used, have made the means of defense once sufficient on land and sea now little better than useless. three are the submarine, the aeroplane and the great siege guns which battered down the forts around Liége. Siege guns are not likely ever to trouble us; but have we submarines and aeroplanes and heavy long range guns to defend our coast, and where are the men to man them? If it is necessary to have an army of any size and a navy of any number of ships, it is equally necessary that the army and navy shall be large enough and so equipped with the very latest implements of warfare that they may really defend the country, for we know not when our day may come.

That Germany in her greed for world dominion might find it necessary to deal with us had not passed unnoticed by her military writers. Only a few years before this time General von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff, had duly considered it in his pamphlet "Operationen Über See."

Operations against the United States of North America would have to be conducted in a different manner. During the last years political friction with that state, especially friction arising from commercial causes, has not been lacking, and the difficulties that have arisen have mostly been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude has its limit, we have to ask ourself what force we can possibly bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the United States against our interests and to impose our will. Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of the United States, which are distributed over two oceans, and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the defeat of their fleet will force the United States with their immense resources into concluding peace. . . .

Considering the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not possible. But enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace.

If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbors, we may conclude that operations on American soil can begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own.

At present the regular army of the United States amounts to about 65,000 men, of whom only about 30,000 could be used. Of them about 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories, and for guarding the fortifications on the seacoast. Therefore, only about 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come up when called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia is not efficient, it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament. . . .

[The] task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of large landing operations through which we are able to take several of their important and wealthy towns (on the Atlantic seaboard) within a brief space of time. By interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving the State, commerce and defense, by taking away all material for war and transport, and lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the United States.¹

While the need of preparedness was under discussion, Mr. Gardner, a representative from Massachusetts, brought the matter before the House of Representatives on October 15, 1914, by offering a joint resolution providing for a National Security Commission, to ascertain if the United States is prepared for war.

^{1 &}quot;Modern Germany," J. E. Barker, 1912.

The United States, he said, is totally unprepared for a war, defensive or offensive, against a real power. We have been trying to believe that no one would dare to attack us; but are we so sure of this in view of what is happening in Europe? We are the most prosperous nation on earth and to the south of us lies the wonderful South American Continent, which we have closed to European colonization by the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine cannot be maintained unless we are ready to fight for it. Does any one suppose that if, after the war, Germany finds the Monroe Doctrine in her way, she will pay the slightest attention to it, if the increase of her population forces her to look for colonial outlet?

"But no matter which side wins, we must remember that since the beginning of time victorious nations have proved headstrong and highhanded. We must begin at once to reorganize our military strength if we expect to be able to resist highhandedness when the day of necessity comes." The resolution went to the Committee on Rules and nothing more was heard of it during the session.

General Leonard Wood, speaking to the Medical Club of Philadelphia, declared we had never fought "a really first class nation" and were "pitifully unprepared, should such a calamity be thrust upon us." The regular army numbered but 103,000 men, scattered through China, Alaska, the Philippines, Hawaii and the United States. Should war descend on us suddenly, as it did on Europe, the regular army "available to face such a crisis" would be "just about equal to the police forces of Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Chicago."

The administration at this time saw no need for such an investigation as Mr. Gardner wished. Indeed, after an interview with the gentleman from Massachusetts, on the eve of the meeting of Congress in December, the President was reported to have authorized the statement that he thought the method proposed an unwise way of handling a question that might ereate a very unfavorable international impression.

What were the views of the President was clearly stated in his speech to Congress on December 8, 1914:

It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that, and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested that we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack? We have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in times of peace. . . .

[We were at peace with all the world, did not dread the power of any nation, were not] "jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce," [meant to live and let live]. We are a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none. . . . We are the champions of peace and of concord. And we should be very jealous of this distinction

which we have sought to earn. . . .

From the first we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. We never have had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army. If asked, are you ready to defend yourselves? we reply, Most assuredly, to the utmost; and yet we shall not turn America into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves. . . . We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms.

Men of every shade of opinion, pacifists and advocates of preparedness, anti-militarists, pro-Germans and German-Americans, now made haste to organize and urge their views. One evening in early December some two hundred and fifty men of affairs in the city of New York met and founded the National Security League. Their purpose was to obtain by investigation exact information as to the condition of our military and naval defenses; find out how much the present annual appropriation for this purpose would have to be increased to secure the utmost efficiency; and bring about such organizations of our citizens the country over, "as may make practical an intelligent expression of public opinion and may insure for the nation an adequate system of national defense."

Scarcely had the National Security League been founded when a meeting called by Bishop Greer, President Butler of Columbia University in the City of New York, Mr. Villard and others, formed the American League to Limit Armament,

and "voice a protest against agitation for increased armament in this country." The day Congress assembled bills and joint resolutions bearing on the war were offered in both Senate and House. From Mr. Lodge in the Senate came a joint resolution, similar to that of Mr. Gardner, providing for a National Security Commission of three Senators, three Representatives and three civilians to investigate and report on the need of national preparedness. Senator Hitchcock offered a bill making it unlawful and a breach of neutrality for any person, partnership or corporation to sell or deliver arms, ammunition, artillery, explosives of any sort whatever to be used against a country with which the United States is at peace, or even export them unless sworn proof that they were not to be used against such a country was filed with the Secretary of Commerce. December 8, 1914, Mr. Lobeck offered a similar bill in the House. December 10, Senator Works of California offered a bill to make it unlawful for any person, corporation or association, a citizen or resident of, or doing business in the United States, to contract for, sell, supply or furnish to any nation engaged in war, or its armies, or soldiers, any food, clothing, supplies, arms, ammunition, horses, or war supplies of any kind whether they were or were not contraband.

When speaking on the subject of his bill a few days later the Senator read from "the proof of an editorial" that was to appear in the *Journal of the Knights of Labor:*

Ever since the war began, [said the writer,] we find everywhere expressed the faith and hope of the people that we are to gain greater prosperity thereby, and are to become richer by the vast trading which it is claimed is thereby opened to us. Now this is all very well and proper under certain circumstances. But if the sending of our exports abroad has a tendency to aid the combatants and to continue the warfare in Europe, then, if we square our actions with our words, we will not send these warring peoples a dollar's worth of our products until they stop fighting. We are a lot of greedy hypocrites as long as we express our desire for peace in Europe and at the same time continue to send the nations at war there munitions of war or provisions which enable them to continue their warfare. The supply should be stopped. Will we do this thing? The answer is we shall not do this thing because our protestations and prayers for peace are in the main sheer hypocrisy and beneath them all lies unbounded greed. Every shipment of wheat, corn, flour, meat should be stopped. Then

it would be utterly impossible for their armies to be fed, and so great would be the needs and necessity of the working masses there that the cry for bread would drown out all thoughts of war.

The writer therefore strongly urged the passage of Senator Work's bill.

Senator Chamberlain presented a bill to establish a Council of National Defense composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the Chairmen of the Appropriation, Military, Naval and Foreign Affairs committees of the Senate and House.

The wishes of German-Americans found expression in joint resolutions offered in the House by Mr. Vollmer and Mr. Bartholdt, forbidding the export of arms, ammunition, and munitions of war from the territory or any seaport of the United States.

At a meeting of the directors in Washington in January, 1915, of the Biennial Congress of the American Peace Society, it was resolved that "we do not favor, and we do not believe the people of this country will favor, a policy which will bring about the glorification and enrichment of a few at the expense of the many. We believe that at this moment when militarism is destroying itself rapidly in Europe, it is inopportune, illogical and a betrayal of the higher interests of civilization for America to declare itself more strongly than heretofore on the side of force."

The German-American Alliance at Minneapolis telegraphed a member of the House, "In the name of Christian humanity and the spirit of neutrality we beg your support for Bartholdt's bill aiming to stop munitions of war from America reaching Europe." Dr. Hexamer, President of the National German-American Alliance, went to Washington and appeared before the Committee in charge of the Bartholdt resolution and urged its adoption.

The recently formed American Neutrality League of Philadelphia now announced that a great neutrality meeting would be held on the evening of January 28, 1915, and the Secretary of the League invited the Bishop of Pennsylvania to be one of the Vice-Presidents. The purpose of the meeting, the Secretary said, was to urge "that no violation of neutrality on

the part of any citizen of the United States be permitted by the National Government, and to advocate the passage of laws to prevent the shipping of munitions to any belligerent nation by any individual firm or corporation within the United States."

From information which has come to me lately, both in Washington and here, [Bishop Rhinelander replied,] I have learned that most of the agitation at present being made to prevent the shipping of war material from this country to belligerent nations is being made, not really in the interest of neutrality, but in hostility to the allied nations, and with the hope of helping Germany and Austria in their campaign. Is the proposed meeting here fairly chargeable with the same purpose, and if not, is there any available evidence to the contrary with which you can provide me?

As an American citizen pledged to uphold American ideals, I am altogether against Germany and Austria in this war, on the ground that they are threatening, and would destroy, as far as they have opportunity, those political and personal liberties and rights which we

Americans have made the foundation of our government.

Feeling as I do, you will readily understand that I cannot have part in any meeting or movement which has for its real object, whether or not explicitly avowed, the support of a cause to which I personally am resolutely opposed.

This patriotic letter in the opinion of the Secretary showed that the Bishop "is a partisan, and, of course, that would make him ineligible to act as vice-president of a neutrality meeting."

The meeting was held in the Academy of Music, the house was packed with German-Americans, and a great throng of men and women unable to enter the building was turned into an overflow meeting which showed its neutrality by singing Die Wacht am Rhein and Deutschland Uber Alles. Within doors Governor Brumbaugh presided, Congressmen Vollmer, Metz and Porter made bitter anti-British speeches, and the crowd went through the form of adopting these resolutions:

With deep feeling of sympathy for the victims of the horrible war now going on in which millions of men are engaged, we citizens of the United States in mass meeting assembled appeal to our President, to our Senators and Congressmen, to perform one of the greatest acts of mercy that it has ever been in the power of a President and Congress to perform.

Let the tear-bedimmed eyes of the mothers of all nations now at war be dried by a chivalrous act of the Government of the greatest of the nations, the refuge of the oppressed of all lands. With that hope in view, with charity for all and malice for none, we urge that real neutrality be enforced by the Government of these United States.

We hold that real neutrality can only be enforced by the placing of an embargo on all supplies of war that can in any way be used by any of the belligerents to further continue the present conflict.

We hold that such an embargo if rigidly enforced will bring about a speedy termination of the war, and restore to millions of suffering

people peace and happiness.

Therefore be it resolved: That we earnestly urge and call on all our fellow citizens to demand the enactment of a law which will empower our President to enforce a real neutrality so that peace may be brought about among the warring nations.

Two days later, January 30, another meeting of Germans and German sympathizers was held at Washington. Mr. Bartholdt presided and among his fellow workers were Congressmen Lobeck, Vollmer and Porter. Then and there was formed the American Independence Union, to secure "genuine American neutrality and to uphold it free from commercial, financial and political subserviency to foreign powers." Resolutions adopted demanded "an American cable controlled by the Government of the United States" in order "to insure the possession of an independent news service"; a free and open sea, "for the commerce of the United States and unrestricted traffic in noncontraband goods as defined by law"; the "immediate enactment of legislation prohibiting the export of arms, ammunition and munitions of war," as a "strictly American policy," and the "establishment of an American merchant marine." That these things might be secured, "we pledge ourselves individually and collectively to support only such candidates for public office, irrespective of party, who will place American interests above those of any other country and who will aid in eliminating all undue foreign influence from official life."

The real purpose of this and all similar pro-German leagues and associations was to carry on a propaganda in behalf of the Central Powers, to start a popular agitation against the export of munitions of war to the Allies, by appeals to humanity, to feelings of resentment against Great Britain for her restrictions on American commerce, and by charges that we were

not truly neutral so long as British supremacy on the sea prevented Germany from also buying munitions of war in our markets. That Germany needed to buy arms and ammunition from us, or would have bought any save to prevent them falling into the hands of the Allies, is beyond all probability. A newspaper in commenting on this meeting said with truth,

With a persistence worthy of a better cause, German sympathizers in this country, hyphenated and plain, are trying to involve the people of the United States in the European war. The conference at Washington, Saturday, January 30, with the professed purpose of forming a national agency to reëstablish genuine American neutrality, may obtain the coöperation of well-meaning and short-sighted advocates of peace, but its pledge to take international questions into national politics is intended to serve Germany only.

To form such associations now became a craze and before six months passed away the American Truth Society, American Peaceful Embargo Society, Friends of Peace, Friends of Truth, Labor's National Peace Council and the Women's Peace Party sprang into existence.

The Women's Peace Party had for its objects the immediate calling of a convention of neutrals in aid of early peace, limitation of armaments and the nationalization of their manufacture, the organization of opposition to militarism in our country, popular control of our foreign policy, humanizing government through woman suffrage; replacing the "balance of power" by a concert of nations; gradual substitution of law for war and international police for rival armies and navies; removal of the economic causes of war, and the appointment by our Government of a commission of men and women to promote peace among all nations.

Of all the efforts to bring world peace the strangest was that set afoot by Mr. Henry Ford. A rumor which came from Detroit and went the rounds of the press declared he was ready to spend ten million dollars in the cause of peace and antimilitarism. Nothing was known of his plans until late in November, 1915, it was announced at New York that negotiations had been opened with the Scandinavian-American Line for the charter of the steamship Oscar II to carry a peace party to Europe to attempt to end the war. Pacifists, peace-at-any-

price men and women, representatives of peace societies were to be invited to go as guests of Mr. Ford, to some place in a neutral country, there to meet with friends of peace from all the neutral nations of Europe.

"We wish to have an organization," his manager, the Secretary of the Chicago Peace Society, was reported to have said, "to which the warring nations can appeal as soon as they are ready for peace. Also we will send out feelers, unofficially, to learn just what chances there are to get them together."

"I hope," said Mr. Ford, "that every mother in the world will bring all the pressure she can to bear on every one in order that the boys can be brought out of the trenches by Christmas and the war ended." Great pressure was brought to bear upon the President to call a conference of neutral nations to urge peace and thousands of telegrams reading, "Work for Peace, the mothers of America pray for it," were sent to the White House. Men and women of note and prominence, ex-President Taft, Mr. Edison, Mr. Bryan, Miss Jane Addams, the Governors of North Carolina, of Georgia, Mississippi, North Dakota, Indiana and a host of others were invited. Many declined; but when the Peace Ship was about to sail there had been gathered from all parts of the country, 139 men and women, advocates of peace, newspaper correspondents, students from various colleges, members of the staff and moving picture men. Not half a dozen were known by name to the public at large. No plan for procedure had yet been made. "All we know," said Mr. Ford, "is that the fighting nations are sick of war, that they want to stop, and that they are waiting only for some disinterested party to step in and offer mediation. Some people in this world have seen fit to be skeptical about the success of our plan, but when we return I think they will change their views."2

Mr. Bryan, who came to see the party off, was in hearty sympathy with the peace movement and hoped to join later at The Hague.

Mr. Ford is making an earnest and unselfish effort in behalf of peace and he ought to have the good wishes and sympathetic support of all who desire peace, even though some may not fully share his faith in the immediate success of this trip. Of course those who

Philadelphia Press, December 4, 1915.

want the war to continue ridicule the effort, especially those who speak for big munition factories which are exporting war material

at a large profit. This was to be expected.

Ridicule is the favorite weapon of those who desire to oppose any movement. If any of the people on the Ark had been making money out of the flood, they probably would have ridiculed Noah for sending out the dove. Success to Mr. Ford and companions! May they return with an olive branch.

The sailing of the Ark of Peace aroused comment abroad. A request in the British House of Commons that an intimation be sent to Mr. Ford and party that this peace mission to England would be "irritating and unwelcome at the present time" brought from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs the reply that the passports issued to the members of the peace party were for neutral countries only and the contingency feared could not arise. "Speaking for myself, I think it would be in the highest degree undignified for the Government of this country to send any intimation to a lot of ladies and gentlemen who, whatever their merits may be, are of no particular importance." To the German press the expedition seemed but an instance of American eccentricity.

December 4 the Oscar II sailed from New York, was stopped by the British and taken into Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands, was released after a short detention and made port at Christiania. The party having landed, Mr. Ford said, "Every nation in the world will now look upon the American peace pilgrims as taking the initiative in stopping history's worst war. The landing of the peace expedition in Europe will be recorded as one of the most benevolent things the American Republic ever did." 3 Eager as were the members of the party for peace in Europe they could not keep peace among themselves. Already the party was split. At Christiania it was hospitably but unofficially received, excited no enthusiasm and was not recognized by the Norwegian peace party. Mr. Ford fell ill and while the rest of the party went on to Stockholm he returned to Bergen and sailed for home.

Thus Christmas night eame with the boys still in the trenches, with Mr. Ford on his way home, and the party in charge of a General Manager and a Committee of Administra-

³ Philadelphia Press, December 20, 1915.

tion, and as yet without any plan for promoting peace. Announcement was therefore made that a plan drawn up with the aid of men versed in international law would be submitted to the warring nations. If rejected or ignored it would be modified and offered again and again until persistence attracted attention.

At Copenhagen, whither the party went from Stockholm, peace meetings were forbidden for the Danish Government would not allow aliens to lecture on the war or the belligerent powers. Unless Germany would permit the pilgrims to cross her territory it would be necessary to go by vessel from Copenhagen to The Hague. The prospect of a trip through the mine sown North Sea was far from agreeable and the German Minister was requested to obtain leave for the party to travel by train without stop. Although their passports did not allow them to travel in a belligerent country, consent was given provided the doors of the cars were sealed, that no written, printed or typewritten papers, cameras, post cards, opera glasses or gold coin were taken out of Denmark. At the end of a week the college students were sent home and a few days later some seventy members of the peace party sailed on the Rotterdam for New York, leaving behind a committee known as the Neutral Confer-The Committee moved to ence for Continuous Mediation. Stockholm where it addressed a letter to the belligerents suggesting ways of ending the war, and another to neutrals urging that a conference for mediation be called.

Congress having adjourned on March 4, 1915, without enacting a law forbidding the sale or export of arms, ammunition and foodstuffs to the Allies, German-Americans and pro-Germans determined to attack the supply of such articles at the source and took up the task of crippling the plants where the materials of warfare were made and one day in early April, 1915, published in the newspapers an "Appeal to the American People." The signers were the owners, or editors, of 389 newspapers published in foreign languages, in Polish, Hungarian, Slav, Greek, Arabic, Lithuanian, Ruthenian, Croatian, Yiddish, Syrian, in short, in all the languages and dialects of Europe, and called on the working men to cease making powder, shrapnel, shells and cartridges.

Because, the signers said, of the receipt of "hundreds of thousands of letters, cables, messages, containing "heartbroken appeals, prayers and pleas from the people of our mother countries," the editors and publishers had decided to appeal to "the great American People on behalf of our readers," "to the high-minded and courageous American press," to the makers "of powder, shrapnel and cartridges," to "the workmen engaged in the plants devoted to the manufacture of ammunition for use by the nations at war to immediately cease making powder, shrappel and cartridges destined to destroy our brothers. widow our sisters and mothers and orphan their children." They appealed especially "to American manufacturers and their workmen engaged in manufacturing any of these articles to suspend at once the manufacture of powder and bullets which are being made for the cruel and inhumane purpose of mutilating and destroying humanity." Workmen in such factories were urged "even at the sacrifice of their positions to go on record as being unalterably opposed to being employed for the purpose of manufacturing ammunition to shatter the bodies and blot out the lives of their own blood relations."

In Chicago, at the time of the publication of this advertisement, the campaign for the election of a mayor was drawing to a close. In the last days of it, leading Austrians and Germans signed a circular urging voters of German, Austrian and Hungarian descent to vote for Robert M. Sweitzer, the Democratic candidate, as an "endorsement" of the war policies of the Kaiser. On the circular were three flags in color, and photographs of the Kaiser and the Emperor of Austria. The letter stated that a vote for Mr. Sweitzer was a vote of confidence for Kaiser Wilhelm and Emperor Franz Joseph and would "save the Fatherland."

Most happily Mr. Sweitzer was beaten by a plurality of 139,000 votes. This propaganda, the Providence Journal now declared, was the work of the German Embassy, which was spending millions of dollars in a publicity plot intended to produce three results: To discredit the administration by creating a belief that the President and the Cabinet officers are discriminating against Germany. To create conditions and manufacture evidence to show that the Allies were breaking the rules

of neutrality, and then discovering this evidence, to make members of Congress believe that "all the foreign elements among the voters" were united in demanding that the exportation of arms and ammunition cease. To promulgate the "doctrine in pulpits occupied by German pastors," and to coerce newspapers through "advertisers of German birth or affiliations throughout the country."

The full page advertisement which had lately appeared in many newspapers, protesting against the sale of munitions of war to the Allies, and signed by many publishers of foreign language newspapers, was written and paid for by agents of the German Government. Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, passed on the advertisement and through his secretary designated the newspapers in which it was to appear.

The recent election in Chicago was to have been a triumph for the German cause. "The German-Austrian appeal circulated during the campaign was proposed in the German Embassy," and since the election those citizens of German birth who did not vote for Mr. Sweitzer had been roundly abused by members of the Embassy staff.

The President of the Association of Foreign Language periodicals denied the charge. He and his secretary had written the appeal and together had made out the list of newspapers in which it was to appear. Of the 575 periodicals in the association 455 had authorized him to sign for them, 21 had refused such authority and the others made no response.

Had proof of the activity of the German Embassy in this propagandist work been needed, it was now laid before the people by Ambassador von Bernstorff himself. April fifth the Department of State received from him a "memorandum" protesting against the failure of the United States to force Great Britain to release the Wilhelmina, and against the export of arms and munitions to the Allies, and one week after its receipt, without consulting the Secretary of State, the Ambassador gave a copy to the press.

The British orders in council, the memorandum stated, had changed the well established rules of international law in such "a one-sided manner" that they arbitrarily suppressed neutral trade with Germany. Before the American protest of Decem-

ber 28, 1914, not one shipment of foodstuffs had gone from the United States to Germany. Since that date one shipment (that by the Wilhelmina) had been attempted and both ship and cargo had been seized by Great Britain. As a pretext for the seizure the British Government had cited a decree of the German Federal Council concerning the meat trade, although this covered grain and flour and no other foodstuffs, although importation of all other foodstuffs were especially excepted, and the German Government guaranteed their exclusive consumption by the civil population.

Under these circumstances the seizure of an American ship was contrary to international law. "Nevertheless the United States Government has not to date secured the release of the ship and has after the duration of the war of eight months" been able to protect its lawful trade with Germany. This seemed equivalent to complete failure, and the Imperial Embassy "must therefore assume that the United States Government acquiesces in the violations of international law by Great Britain."

Passing to "the attitude of the United States, in the question of the exportation of arms," the Ambassador said, Conditions in former wars were not like those in the present war. Therefore it was not fair to point to the fact that in former wars Germany had supplied belligerents with war material. The question then was not whether any war material was to be furnished to the belligerents, but which one of the competing neutrals should furnish it. Now all nations, save the United States, capable of producing any important amount of war material, are either at war, or completing their armament, and have laid embargoes on the export of war material. In the true spirit of neutrality the United States should do the same. On the contrary an enormous industry in war materials is being built up for the purpose of supplying the enemies of Germany, a fact by no means modified by "the theoretical willingness to supply Germany also," if shipments thither were possible.

"If it is the will of the American people that there shall be a true neutrality, the United States will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms, or at least of utilizing it to protect legitimate trade with Germany, especially that in food-stuffs."

The memorandum closed with the reminder that according to a member of Congress, on February 4, 1914, President Wilson on lifting the embargo on arms to Mexico said, "We should stand for genuine neutrality," and that "because Carranza had no ports, while Huerta had them and was able to import these materials, that it was our duty as a nation to treat (Carranza and Huerta) upon an equality if we wished to observe the true spirit of neutrality as compared with a mere paper neutrality."

The more the memorandum was read the more it came to be regarded as an impudent arraignment of the policy of the administration. The bold condemnation of the United States for its failure to obtain the release of the Wilhelmina: the charge that it had done nothing to safeguard lawful trade with Germany; the assertion that this was equivalent to complete failure; the assumption that the United States accepted England's "violations of international law;" the complaint that the United States was violating the true spirit of neutrality; the intimation of something like an appeal to the American people as against their Government contained in the words-"If it is the will of the American people that there shall be a true neutrality, they will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms"; the reference to our treatment of Huerta and Carranza; the way in which the memorandum was given to the press. made the conduct of the Ambassador most offensive.

Bearing no signature, accompanied by no statement of its source, the Government and the people were left in doubt whether the memorandum was the work of the Ambassador, or was sent under directions from Berlin. Whatever its source, there could be no doubt that it correctly expressed the attitude of the German Government and the German people towards the United States. The bitterness felt towards our country by both could not be denied. The memorandum was but another effort to sow discord between the United States and nations at war with Germany.

At Washington, the manner of publication, without first consulting the Government to which it was sent, gave great of-

fense. It was dated April fourth, was received on the fifth, was in German and was sent to the translator, and when returned contained matter so astounding that it was thought to be inexact and was sent back and not returned until April ninth. That day a forecast of its contents appeared in the public prints, and the full text on the eleventh.

Statements of many sorts, as to what the Government would do, now became current. No answer could be made until the country had cooled off; Minister Gerard had been instructed to inquire if the German Government accepted responsibility for the language and matter of the memorandum. None of these rumors was true, and all in good time the memorandum was answered.

While the people waited Dr. Dernburg gave out what seemed to be an inspired letter. He had been invited to address a meeting at Portland, Maine, on "The German View Point." The speech would probably have been badly reported or not reported at all. He decided, therefore, to stay away and sent a letter every word of which went the rounds of the press.

Peace, he said, when made should be no perfunctory patching up, but of a lasting sort. A recurrence of war should be made most remote. The great highway along which thoughts and things travel is the high seas. He could with authority disclaim any ambition on the part of his country to world dominion. Events had shown that world dominion could be secured only by dominion of the high seas. "The aim of Germany is to have the seas as well as the narrows kept permanently open for the free use of all nations, in times of war as well as in times of peace."

The sea is nobody's property and must be free to everybody. But a free sea is useless unless combined with the freedom of cable and mail communication with all countries, belligerents or at peace. He should like to see all cables owned jointly by the nations of the world, and a world mail service system oversea established by common consent.

Germany had been taxed with disregarding treaty obligations, tearing up as a scrap of paper a solemn engagement as regards Belgium. If it were a breach of international law at all "it has been followed up by all other belligerents by destroying other parts of that code." Two German men-of-war had been sunk in neutral waters, without a protest by the United States. Great Britain's violations of international sea law and the rights of neutrals were too many to count. Chinese neutrality had been violated, Egypt and Cyprus had been annexed by Great Britain; the diplomatic representatives of Germany had been driven from China, Moroeco, Egypt, all sovereign countries at the time. There was virtually no international law that could stand the test.

Germany was not seeking territory in Europe. She did not believe in conquering unwilling nations. Belgium commands the western outlet of German trade, is the natural foreland of the Empire, and had been conquered at the cost of untold sacrifice of blood and treasure. It offered to German trade the only outlet to the sea, and had been maintained and defended by England in order to keep these advantages from Germany. "So Belgium cannot be given up."

"However, these considerations could be given up if all the other German demands, especially a guaranteed free sea, were fully" granted. Germany is a country smaller than California, but populated 36 times as thickly as that State. She loves and fosters family life. German parents have no desire to see a considerable number of her children emigrate every year. This means that her industrial development should go on unhampered. The activity of her people should have an outlet in such foreign parts as need development.

Great Britain had shown little foresight in blocking such efforts, in putting Morocco into the hands of the French, a nation that has been stationary for forty-four years. A lasting peace "will mean that this German activity must get a wide scope without infringement on the rights of others." Germany should be encouraged to go on in Africa and Asia Minor for the benefit of the whole world. The brunt of the war had been borne not by the men who fight, but by the women who suffer, and one of the proudest achievements of Germany will be rewarding in a permanent beneficiary way the enormous sacrifice of womanhood.

That the letter was inspired from Berlin was generally believed. Dr. Dernburg had often insisted that he held no of-

ficial post. Yet it seemed beyond belief that he should express such views without the approval of his Government. That he had set out the things that Germany desired, was thought to admit of no doubt.

Transmitted to England the Dernburg Letter was hailed as a "trial balloon," a new move to enlist American support to Germany.

Having stated the seven conditions of peace, Dr. Dernburg in the New York *World* gave ten reasons why Germany could not be beaten, therefore could enforce her terms when the time to make peace came. She had all the ammunition necessary, held all the territory she had taken, had fortified it strongly and could not be dislodged by the Allies.

Reports from abroad now announced that in the fighting around Ypres the Germans had used asphyxiating gas. Concerning this Dr. Dernburg said that when in November, 1914, reports were published describing "an astounding French invention for the purpose of asphyxiating enemies by nauseating gases contained in shells," no exception was taken in America, no inquiry was addressed to the French correspondents of the newspapers to find out if the reports were true or false. "But as soon as the Germans used the same kind of weapon in this battle around Ypres," they had been roundly abused.

"This is exactly what Germany complains of; that the press of this country very often measures with two standards; that what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander, and that if the Allies do one thing it is covered with a mantle of charity, excused and smoothed over, and if Germany afterwards does the very same thing she is held up for it by the American public as the real infractor of established law and decent custom.

"This is why Germany protests, and why they do not believe in the impartiality of public opinion in this country and why they do not take kindly to" the United States as a mediator in the world war.

About a week before this letter of Dernburg's appeared Mr. Bryan replied to von Bernstorff's complaints. Though the note bore the signature of the Secretary of State the language, the

literary style and rumors from Washington convinced the people that the author was no other than President Wilson.

Your Excellency, said the Secretary in substance, has referred to the interference of Great Britain with trade from the United States. Your Excellency's long experience in international affairs must have made you aware "that the relations of two Governments with one another cannot wisely be made a subject of discussion with a third Government which cannot be fully informed as to the facts, and which cannot be fully eognizant of the reasons for the course pursued." He had hoped the position of the Government in respect to its obligations as a neutral power "had been made abundantly clear," but he was "perfectly willing to state it again."

"This seems the more necessary and desirable, because, I regret to say, the language which your Excellency employs in your memorandum is susceptible of being construed as impugning the good faith of the United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral. I take it for granted that no such implication was intended, but it is so evident that your Excellency is laboring under certain false impressions that I cannot be too explicit in setting forth the facts as they are

when fully reviewed and comprehended."

In the first place, at no time and in no manner had the United States yielded "any one of its rights as a neutral to any one of the present belligerents." The right of visit and search, the right to apply the rules of contraband of war, the right of blockade if actually maintained had been acknowledged and admitted "as a matter of course." They were but the well-known limitations placed on neutral commerce on the high seas. "But nothing beyond these has it conceded."

In the second place, the Government had sought to secure from Great Britain and Germany concessions with regard to the measures they had adopted for the interruption of trade on the high seas. It did so as a sincere friend of both parties. "The attempt was unsuccessful, but I regret that your Excellency did not deem it worthy of mention in modification of the impressions you expressed."

In the third place, it was noticed "with sincere regret" that, "in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of

the United States to the enemies of Germany," the German Ambassador seemed "to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the United States. notwithstanding its professed neutrality, and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude towards Germany." The Government held that any change in its laws of neutrality, made during the war, "which would affect, unequally, the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principles of strict neutrality" and "none of the circumstances urged in your Excellency's memorandum alters the principle involved." Placing "an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States." It was "out of the question for this Government to consider such a course."

A Berlin newspaper called the answer a mockery of the German standpoint. Nobody, outside of the White House, believed that the delivery of arms was not a violation of neutrality, and that its prohibition would be unneutral. But Mr. Bryan proclaims that the weapon trade with one belligerent is real neutrality. This attitude, said another journal, will not be forgotten in Germany. The American attitude, said a third, can be explained only by the profits of the armament firms.

Nevertheless, the answer of the United States put an end, so far as Germany was concerned, to her protests against the export of arms and to the activity of the pro-German propagandists in its behalf.

But with the retirement of Germany from the controversy she assigned the duty of further protest to Austria, from whom, on June 29, came a note of remonstrance. The farreaching effects, it said, of the traffic in munitions of war between the United States, Great Britain and her Allies, while Austria-Hungary as well as Germany were "absolutely excluded from the American market," had "from the very beginning attracted the attention of the Imperial and Royal Government."

Although "absolutely convinced" of the intention of the

United States to preserve the strictest neutrality, it was a question whether the conditions developed during the war did not in effect thwart the intentions of the Washington Cabinet, as the American Government was surely aware the "meaning and essence of neutrality are in no way exhaustively dealt with in the" provisions of the several Hague Conventions. The wording of Article 7 of the Fifth and Thirteenth Conventions might indeed afford "a formal pretext for the toleration of traffic in munitions of war now being carried on by the United States." But "to measure the true spirit and import of this provision" it was only necessary to point out that "the detailed privileges conceded to neutral states in the sense of the preamble . . . are limited by the requirements of neutrality which conform to the universally recognized principles of international law."

By none of "the criteria" laid down by writers on international law could "the exportation of war requisites" from the United States as it is being carried on in the present war be "brought into accordance with the demands of neutrality." That industry had "soared to unimaginable heights." "order to turn out the huge quantities of arms, ammunition, and other war material" ordered in the past few months by Great Britain and her Allies, old plants had not only been enlarged, but new ones had been started, and workmen of all trades had flocked into this branch of industry in such numbers that far-reaching changes in the economic life of the whole country had become necessary. That the American Government had the right to prohibit the export of munition by embargo could not be questioned. If it would use that power it "could not lay itself open to blame," for while it is true "that a neutral state may not alter its rules in force" for its treatment of a belligerent while war is being waged, yet it appears from the preamble of the Thirteenth Hague Convention that this principle "suffers an exception in the case 'où l'expérience acquise en démontrerait la nécessité pour la sauvegarde de ses droits," which being interpreted means "where experience has shown the necessity thereof for the protection of its rights."

To the objection that while American manufacturers were

as willing to furnish supplies to Austria-Hungary as to Great Britain and her Allies, but could not do so because "of the war situation," it might be answered "that its Federal Government is undoubtedly in a position to improve the situation." It might "confront the opponents of Austria-Hungary and Germany" with a threat to prohibit "the exportation of foodstuffs and raw materials" unless lawful commerce with the Central Powers was allowed.

The Government of the United States, Mr. Lansing replied, is surprised to find the Austro-Hungarian Government implying that the observance under present conditions of the law is not sufficient, and asserting that "the Government should go beyond the long recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to 'maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties.'"

Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had ever applied the principle urged by the Imperial and Royal Government. During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African Republics the coasts of neighboring neutral colonies were patrolled by British naval vessels, supplies of arms and ammunition were cut off from the Republics, and they were in a situation almost identical in this respect with that in which Germany and Austria-Hungary find themselves at present. Yet, despite the complete commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany and Austria-Hungary sold to Great Britain, the other belligerent, explosives, gun-powder, cartridges, shot, and weapons. If at that time Germany and Austria-Hungary had refused to sell munitions to Great Britain because so to do would violate the spirit of strict neutrality, Austria-Hungary "might with greater consistency and greater force urge its present contention." During the recent war between Italy and Turkey arms and ammunitions were sold to the Ottoman Government by Germany. During the Balkan wars the belligerents were supplied with munitions by both Germany and Austria-Hungary. These instances clearly show the longestablished custom of the two Empires.

In view of this record the United States could not believe that Austria-Hungary would charge it with a lack of impartial neutrality because it furnished the Allies with munitions of war which the Imperial and Royal Government, because of present war conditions, was not able to obtain in the American market.

But there was another reason, and "a very practical and substantial reason, why the United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies." It had never been our policy to keep up in time of peace large armies, or great stores of munitions "sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerful enemy." We desired to remain at peace and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of armies and navies. We had always relied on the purchase of arms and munition from neutrals, and this right which we claimed for ourselves we could not deny to others.

The assertion that the exportation of arms and munitions was contrary to the preamble of the Hague Convention No. 13, Mr. Lansing answered by pointing out that one of the rules "explicitly declares that a neutral is not bound to prohibit the exportation of contraband of war." To the assertion that a neutral state may alter its rules "concerning its attitude towards belligerents while war is being waged" when "experience has shown the necessity thereof for the protection of its rights," Mr. Lansing replied that "the right and duty to determine when this necessity exists rests with the neutral and not with the belligerent." If a neutral "does not avail itself of the right, a belligerent is not privileged to complain." Such a complaint "would invite just rebuke." To the assertion that the best text writers were unanimously of the opinion that the exportation of contraband was unneutral, the Secretary answered that "a careful examination of the principal authorities on international law" showed that less than one-fifth of them "advocated unreservedly the prohibition of the export of contraband." Even such a German authority as Paul Einicke had declared "such prohibitions may be considered as violations of neutrality, or at least as unfriendly acts, if they are enacted during a war with the purpose to close unexpectedly the sources of supply to a party which heretofore has relied on them."

The effect on a disordered mind of the agitation for an embargo on the exportation of munitions was responsible for an attack on the life of Mr. J. P. Morgan, of New York. A half-crazy fanatic who called himself Frank Holt went, on July 3, to the summer home of Mr. Morgan, forced the butler, by showing two revolvers, to admit him to the house, entered the parlor, and finding two children there, compelled them to follow him upstairs. There he was met by Mr. Morgan, who attempted to disarm him, but in the scuffle Mr. Morgan was shot twice. The purpose of the visit was stated by Holt after his arrest.

I went to the Morgan house in order to ask him to use his great influence to stop the shipment of explosives. That is why I took some explosives with me, in order to be able to demonstrate to him what the use of a machine of murder means, but of course I did not mean to hurt any one.

I wanted him to be in the same danger (him and-his family) that we are imposing on Europe. I wanted to send him out to the manufacturers and men of influence to plead for American neutrality, while I held his wife and dear children as hostages in some upper room of his house.

Holt, an accomplished linguist, was instructor in German at Cornell University and turned out to be Erich Muenter, one time instructor in Harvard University, who disappeared after indictment for the murder of his wife by poison in 1906. He committed suicide a few days after his arrest.

A letter forwarded by his second wife to the Department of State contained the statement that "a steamer leaving New York for Liverpool, July 3, should sink, God willing, on the seventh. I think it is the *Philadelphia* or *Saxony* (*Saxonia*)." Warnings by wireless were at once sent off to both steamers, and by a strange coincidence on that day, July 7, a fire caused by an explosion broke out in the hold of the *Minnehaha*, which sailed on the fourth of July, and caused her to race back to Halifax. That Holt placed the bomb is not likely. Both before and after his death bombs had been discovered on several

steamships and had been the cause of fires while in port. In March the *Touraine* had so suffered. In May two vessels from Havre and Falmouth were found to have unexploded bombs in their holds, placed there before sailing. In September the *Sant'Anne* and in November the *Rochambeau* were set on fire by this means.

CHAPTER VII

TREACHEROUS ACTS OF GERMAN OFFICIALS

THE war was scarcely three weeks old when Hans Adam von Wedell, with the knowledge and approval of Ambassador von Bernstorff, made a flying visit to Berlin. He reached there in September, a bearer of dispatches to the Foreign Office, and in November was again in New York, eager to put into execution a great plan to help the Fatherland. While in Berlin he ascertained that the German Government cared nothing for the return of the reservists in our country, but would gladly have the services of the officers scattered over the United States. Mexico and South America. The purpose of von Wedell was to send them back by means of passports bought from Spaniards, Swiss, Swedes, natives of any neutral country who for twenty-five dollars would make application and deliver the papers. All went well until von Wedell sought for an American to aid him in the work and so avoid suspicion. many lawyer found the man who agreed to deliver passports for thirty dollars each, and then promptly informed the Surveyor of the Port, who notified the Treasury Department, which informed the Department of State, which referred the matter to the Department of Justice. This done, the man returned to von Wedell, declared he could not go on, and promised to find a substitute.

Before the substitute came von Wedell heard from Captain von Papen that Dr. Stark, a bearer of one of the false passports, had been stopped by the British at Gibraltar; was warned by others that he was watched, and fled to Nyack on the Hudson. Ere he went he picked out Carl Ruroede, a lawyer, to carry on the work, and it was before Ruroede that the substitute, an agent of the Bureau of Investigation, appeared in the guise of a Bowery tough and gave the name of Aucher. He

agreed to obtain the passports needed, and in time brought a genuine one made out in the name and bearing the photograph, duly stamped with the seal of the United States, of another agent of the Bureau of Investigation and especially prepared at the request of the Department of Justice.

Four photographs of German officers were then given Aucher by Ruroede, who wished to have passports at once that these men might sail on January 2, 1915, in the Norwegian Line Steamship Bergensfjord. Four were provided. But on January 2, 1915, Ruroede was put under arrest, and as the Bergensfjord was going down the bay on her way to sea she was brought to by a revenue cutter, all her passengers were lined up, and four Germans, reserve officers, were taken from her deck. Their names were Sachse, Myer, Wegener and Müller; but their passports bore the names of Wright, Hansen. Martin and Wilson, and had all been furnished by Aucher.

In the course of his many visits to the office of Ruroede the secret agent, Aucher, found out that Captain von Papen supplied the money for the passports and for the needs of the returning officers, and that there was a fund for this purpose. Among the papers seized in the office of Ruroede were visiting cards of "Captain Franz von Papen, Military Attaché to the German Embassy, Washington, D. C.," and of "Arthur Mudra, LL.D., Imperial German Consul, Philadelphia, Pa.," used to introduce the reservists; lists sent by von Papen of officers to be supplied with passports, and instructions to German officers telling them how to behave when traveling on false passports.

1. On no condition and in no way whatever must anything be let out in regard to the conditions under which the voyage was effected.

2. During the passage one should keep aloof from other passen-

gers and make no acquaintances on board.

3. Deportment on board, during the trip, should, as far as it is at all possible, be in harmony with the particular characteristics described in the passport.

4. Should any questions be asked, answer with reserve, and moreover, it is fitting to make use, as far as practicable, of the need created

by sea-sickness for remaining in seclusion.

5. Finally, everything will depend on the maintenance, in every respect, of absolute reticence. All incitements to political or similar

discussions of the war or of soldiers and their obligations must be

absolutely avoided.

6. It should by no means be understood that on landing one should tell everybody everything that happened; on the contrary, then too is silence absolutely necessary, lest through too much talking it become impossible for others to likewise get to the other side.

7. Briefly, the watchword, always and at all times, is "Silence."

March 8, Ruroede and the four reservists were found guilty and sentenced. At that time the espionage act had not been passed by Congress. Their sentences therefore were light. Ruroede was sent to the penitentiary at Atlanta for three years, and each of the reservists was fined two hundred dollars. the Bergensfjord when they were arrested was von Wedell, but his presence there was not suspected until Ruroede in a fit of anger made known the fact. Then the British Government was communicated with, and on January 11 the Bergensfjord was stopped by a British cruiser and Rosato Sprio, or Hans Adam von Wedell, was taken out of her. The cruiser was torpedoed on her way to port and went to the bottom with von Wedell on board.1

Scarcely had Ruroede been placed under arrest and his office put in charge of one of the agents of the Bureau of Investigation when "Wolfram von Knorr, Captain of Cruiser, Naval Attaché, Imperial German Embassy, Tokyo," entered. He insisted on seeing Ruroede, was taken by the agent to an office of the Bureau of Investigation under the pretense that Ruroede was there, and was met by another agent, who pretended to be the man he wished to see. From the Captain it was then learned that von Papen had sent him, and had given him a memorandum which he presented. On it, among others, was the name of Werner Horn.

A month later, February 3, 1915, the whole country knew that Werner Horn had attempted to blow up the international bridge at Vanceboro, Maine.

According to his confession, he had come, at the opening of the war, to New York in hope of returning to Germany, for he was a first lieutenant in the German army, subject

¹For the facts concerning von Wedell and Ruroede I am indebted to "Fighting Germany's Spies," by French Strother, in *The World's Work* for March, 1918,

to call for military duty; had failed in the attempt to return and while in New York had made an arrangement with certain persons to destroy the bridge. December 29, 1914, accordingly, he boarded the midnight train for Boston with a suitcase full of dynamite, which he placed under a lower berth in the sleeping car. Reaching Vanceboro in safety, he was seen to hide the suitcase under a woodpile near a siding, visit the bridge, recover his suitcase and go on to the Exchange Hotel. he remained until the night of December 31, when he gave up his room and set forth on his errand. The thermometer was at thirty degrees below zero; the wind blew eighty miles an hour; but he crossed the bridge, narrowly escaping destruction by two passing trains, and placed the dynamite against a girder near the Canadian shore. Lest another train should come along before the fifty minute fuse he had was consumed, he cut off a part, leaving enough to burn for a few minutes, lit it with his cigar and hurried back to the hotel with ears, nose, hands and feet frozen.

The explosion of the dynamite wrecked the bridge sufficiently to make it unsafe and broke the glass in half the windows in Vanceboro. Wakened by the noise of the explosion, the proprietor of the hotel leaped from his bed and, thinking the boiler had burst, was hurrying to the cellar when he beheld Horn standing in the bathroom. "I freeze my hands," he said, and the proprietor, opening the window, gave him snow to rub on them. The proprietor now went out to see what had happened, and on his return Horn asked for a room, went to bed and slept until in the course of the morning he was wakened and put under arrest. He was charged with malicious mischief for breaking the glass in the windows of one of the houses, plead guilty and was sent to the county jail at Machias for thirty days. Meantime the authorities of the Department of Justice appeared and obtained a full confession. von Papen was at the bottom of the scheme was perfectly clear, for Horn admitted that he met the Captain at the German Club in New York, but nothing could induce him to say that von Papen sent him to blow up the bridge. Early in March, Horn was indicted before a United States Commissioner on a charge of violating the law regulating the transportation of explosives. 2

Another case of the attempted use of a fraudulent American passport was brought to light on February 24, by the arrest in New York of Richard Peter Stegler, said to be a reservist in the German navy. Papers found in his possession bore the signature of Captain Boy-Ed. In his statement Stegler said that the Captain was the head of a German secret organization for sending reservists into England as spies by supplying them with fraudulent American passports, and that the Captain had planned to send him to ascertain the strength of the British fleet in St. George's Channel; find out all he could concerning the fitting out at Belfast of British merchantmen to be sent, disguised as German vessels, to the mouth of the Elbe and sunk in order that Cuxhaven and Bremerhaven might be effectively blockaded.

All this Captain Boy-Ed denied.

March 1, at New York, the Hamburg-American Line and five men were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, charged with having conspired to defraud the United States by false statements, false clearances of vessels from our ports, and false manifests of cargoes made in order that the vessels might go, not to the places for which they were cleared, but to deliver coal and supplies to German warships at sea. One of the men was Carl Bünz, managing director of the New York office; another of the five was the superintendent of the line; a third had been supercargo of the Lorenzo, which was surprised and captured by the British while delivering coal to the German raider Karlsruhe; the fourth had been supercargo of the steamship Berwind which cleared for Buenos Aires and arrived two weeks late; the fifth was Adolph Hachmeister. By the first indictment they were charged with conspiracy "to defraud the United States in and by causing collectors of customs, by means of false statements, to make record and transmit untrue and inaccurate records." The second charged them with conspiracy "to defraud the United States in and by obtaining elearance papers by means of false manifests."

^{&#}x27;The story of Werner Horn is told in detail, with photogravures of documents, in *The World's Work*, April, 1918.

In other words, from the day Germany declared war on Russia the office of the Hamburg-American Line had been to all intents and purposes an American branch of the German Admiralty, had turned New York into a German naval base, and had from that port and others in our country dispatched no less than twelve vessels loaded with supplies for German ships of war in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and had cleared these vessels by means of false manifests.

Germany and Great Britain had each complained of such aid to its enemy. Late in October, despite the fact that the Hamburg-American Line had been sending coal and supplies to German cruisers, Ambassador von Bernstorff wrote the Secretary of State that on the night of September 31, 1914, the tug F. B. Dalzell left New York "to earry provisions to the British cruiser Essex," lying some five miles off Gedney Channel, that she had delivered "about forty tons of fresh meats wrapped in cloth," and that in doing so passed "under the searchlight of the American warship Florida that was lying in front of the channel." Acting Secretary of State Lansing replied that the matter had been "thoroughly investigated," but the Government had "not been able to find sufficient evidence" to prove that the Dalzell had furnished supplies to British warships.

The British Ambassador now complained, acting under instructions from his Government, that the Italian steamship Amista, chartered by the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, had left Newport News loaded with coal, under a strong suspicion that it was for German cruisers. She had cleared on October 17 for Montevideo, by way of Barbadoes, and should have arrived there "at the slowest speed" on the twenty-fourth, but had not. "I have to add," he said, "that the systematic way in which neutral ships have left American ports in order to supply German cruisers, and have been allowed to operate freely in the ports of the United States, in spite of the warnings which have been given, is a matter which causes grave anxiety to His Majesty's Government," and to request that measures "be taken to prevent the use of the ports of the United States for this unneutral purpose."

Mr. Lansing answered that every suspicious case of a vessel

leaving American ports to supply German cruisers, when there was any basis of fact to support such suspicion, had been investigated in order to determine whether the transaction was bona fide or such as must be interfered with for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States. Further than this, the Government "did not understand that its duty" required it to go. "Otherwise the war would impose upon the United States the burden of enforcing restrictions which are not prescribed by the rules of international law."

Following out this course of action, several vessels were detained and two Norwegian steamships were forced to unload their coal. Because of this Ambassador von Bernstorff, on December 15, protested. The position taken by the United States that the delivery of coal and supplies to "warships of the belligerent states" was a violation of neutrality was, he said, "in the opinion of the Imperial German Government, untenable in international law." This opinion was fully stated in a memorandum which, under instructions, he forwarded.

The neutrality declaration of the United States, von Bernstorff said, contained the words: "All persons may lawfully and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war." In spite of it, however, various American port authorities had denied clearances to merchant vessels "which would carry needed supplies or fuel to German warships either on the high seas or in other neutral ports." According to international law a neutral need not stop supplies of this sort, nor could it, "after allowing the adversary to be furnished with contraband, either detain or in any way disable a merchant ship carrying such a cargo." Only when the ports were turned "into bases of German military operations would the unilateral stoppage of the trade of those vessels become a duty." Such would be the case if Germany "kept coal deposits in the ports, or if the vessels called at the port in regular voyages on the way to German naval forces." But the occasional sailing of a vessel with coal or supplies for German warships "does not turn a neutral port into a German point of support contrary to neutrality."

"Our enemies draw from the United States contraband of war, especially arms worth several billion of marks. itself they are authorized to do. But if the United States will prevent our warships occasionally drawing supplies from its ports, a great injustice grows out of the authorization, for it would amount to an unequal treatment of the belligerents and constitute a breach of the generally accepted rules of neutrality to Germany's detriment."

November 22, the case of the Hamburg-American Line and the four officials indicted in March came up for trial in the United States District Court at New York.

We shall show, said the prosecuting attorney, that this conspiracy extended from New York and Philadelphia to San Francisco and New Orleans; that a man named Kulenkampff was employed by Dr. Bünz to clear two vessels in a hurry from Philadelphia immediately after the opening of the war; that one of these vessels, the Berwind, was loaded with coal; that soon after her departure Kulenkampff received from somewhere in Germany \$750,000; that he deposited the money in two New York banks, and was notified by Captain Boy-Ed that it was to be expended as the Captain directed; that some \$500,000 of the fund was sent to San Francisco and was used to charter and supply three vessels with coal and provisions. and that these vessels sailed out and met the German cruiser Leipzig and perhaps the Dresden.

Sixteen or seventeen ships the Government contended were used by the defendants to carry coal, water, wine, sauerkraut and supplies to the Leipzig, Dresden, Cape Trafalgar, Eber, Santa Lucia, Eleanor Woerner and other men-of-war; each supply ship earried a supercargo bearing sealed instructions to be opened at sea.

Counsel for the defendants admitted the charges of the Government as to twelve vessels, admitted that Dr. Bünz had sent them out to meet German cruisers as charged, admitted. that not merely \$750,000 but nearly \$2,000,000 had been expended for these purposes; but denied that the defendants had been guilty of any offense against the laws of the United States, denied any intent to defraud or deceive.

The offer of concession was rejected and in the course of

trial it came out that in the autumn of 1913 Dr. Bünz was notified by the head office at Hamburg that the Company had signed an agreement with the German Government to become operative in case of war, and that it might be seen at the office of the consul general at New York. On reading the agreement, Dr. Bünz testified, he found that the Hamburg-American Line had agreed in the event of a war to send coal and supplies to German warships in the Atlantic Ocean. So the matter rested until July 31, 1914, when the Hamburg office asked, by cablegram, "Are you ready to carry out our agreement with German Government?"

In carrying out the agreement it was admitted that twelve vessels had been used, at a cost, for vessels and supplies, of \$1,419,394; but only one, the Berwind, accomplished her mission. The others either returned to port to escape capture or never left port because they were held under suspicion, or failed in their mission because the war vessels they were to serve had been sunk by the British.

All these relief ships had been cleared for Buenos Aires, La Guayra, Monrovia or Cadiz, and their clearance papers had been obtained by means of false manifests.

December 2, the jury found Dr. Karl Bünz, George Koelter, Adolph Hachmeister, and Joseph Poeppinghaus guilty on both charges. They had conspired to obtain clearance from collectors of customs throughout the United States by means of false shipper's manifests and false captain's manifest. They had caused collectors of the ports throughout the United States to make false statistics and to transmit such false statistics to the Department of Foreign and Domestic Relations, thus falsifying official records of the United States.

December 4, sentence was imposed. In sending coal, provisions and supplies to German warships on the high seas, at a time when the United States and Germany were not at war with each other, the defendants had done no wrong, the court held. Neither the law of Nations, nor any act of Congress, forbade such an undertaking. But they had defrauded the United States by obtaining from its officers clearances for their vessels to which they were not entitled. For this the Court sentenced Binz, Hachmeister and Koelter each to eighteen months imprisonment in the Federal prison at Atlanta, and Poeppinghaus to a year and a day in the same institution, and fined the Hamburg-American Line one dollar. An appeal was taken to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, which in January, 1917, sustained the action of the lower court.

Early in June, Paul König, head of the secret service of the Hamburg-American Line, was brought before a Federal Grand Jury in New York, that it might be determined whether or not the four affidavits presented to the Department of State by Ambassador von Bernstorff, declaring that the *Lusitania* was armed, were true. One of them was sworn to by Gustav Stahl, who disappeared as soon as it was made public. He was now found and arrested in Albany, brought to New York, was placed on the witness stand and swore that his affidavit was true.

"On the day prior to the sailing of the Lusitania I was asked by my friend, A. Leitch (Leach), who was employed as first cabin steward, to help him bring his trunk aboard. In the course of the evening we went aboard without being hindered by the quartermaster on guard. After having remained for some time in the 'gloria' (stewards' quarters) we went to the main stern deck. About fifteen or eighteen feet from the entrance to the gloria, on port and starboard respectively, I saw two guns of twelve and fifteen centimeters. They were covered with leather, but the barrels were distinctly to be seen. To satisfy my curiosity I unfastened the buckles to ascertain the caliber of the guns. I could also ascertain that the guns were mounted on deck on wooden blocks. . . .

"On the foredeck there were also two guns of the same caliber and covered in the same manner."

As he left the stand he was arrested on the charge of perjury, was indicted a few days later and at his trial in September confessed he was guilty. All four affidavits were false and had been obtained by König.

The Government had recently been furnished by the Providence Journal with evidence which led to the arrest of no less a personage than Victoriana Huerta, one time Provisional President of Mexico. When driven from Mexico, in 1914, Huerta found a refuge in Spain, but came to the United States in April and went through the form of making his home on

Long Island. In June, under the pretense of visiting the Panama Exposition, he started, apparently for San Francisco, but turned towards Mexico. As he left the train at Newman, New Mexico, not far from El Paso, where an automobile was waiting to take him across the border, he and his companion, General Pascual Orozco, were arrested and carried to Fort Bliss. He was charged with conspiracy to incite a revolution against a friendly country, Mexico, and released on bail. Orozeo escaped on July 3, and Huerta and five others were arrested on new charges of violating the neutrality of the United States. The death of Huerta early in July ended the matter so far as he was concerned. Aided by Germany, he was really on his way to stir up another revolution and bring on war with the United States and so prevent the exportation of munitions. In proof of this the Providence Journal, in August, published a mass of evidence gathered by its secret agents.

The arrest of Huerta at El Paso, it said, closed the first chapter of a plot to involve the United States and Mexico in war and so stop the exportation of arms to the Allies. The German Foreign Office was not only aware of the plot from the day it was put in operation at Barcelona, Spain, but originated and directed it. "It was when Captain Boy-Ed, acting as the mouthpiece of Count von Bernstorff, tried to hire some American citizens to secure Huerta's safe conduct into Mexico and to undertake the work of transporting German reservists across the border that the exposure came."

"The moment this offer was made, the Providence Journal was notified of it, and, acting under the advice of this newspaper, the men to whom this infamous proposal came went to Washington and laid the entire matter before President Wilson,"

Huerta and his fellow plotters were thereupon shadowed, and when he left New York under pretense of going to the Panama Exposition at San Francisco, the Department of Justice was warned. "Had Huerta proceeded to California he would not have been molested at that time. The moment he turned south and headed for El Paso it was decided to arrest him on his arrival in that city."

The German Embassy, when it became aware that evidence of the plot was in possession of the authorities in Washington, "became panic-stricken," and Captain Boy-Ed spent two weeks in New York "doing his best to break down any possible evidence that the United States secret service men might find against him."

The purpose of the plot was "to divert the public mind in the United States from the crime of the sinking of the Lusitania." "To bring about a condition that would compel the Government, in order to carry through a successful campaign in Mexico, to insist that manufacturers of arms and munitions should cease supplying foreign governments until home demands were filled." To force the lease or purchase of the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd ships in New York harbor for transport service. To cut off from Great Britain and France their supply of oil from Mexico. To force the President to lay an embargo on arms going to Mexico, and "use this declaration in an attempt to bring before the American people the apparent difference in the Washington policy as between Mexico and the Allies in this respect."

Large sums of money, the Journal said, had been paid Huerta since his arrival in this country; prominent Germans with property in Mexico had "known of the plot from the beginning"; the German Embassy had been "repeatedly in communication with the Foreign Office in Berlin with regard to this matter," and the *Journal* was "in possession of wireless messages which prove the interest and activity of the German Embassy in Mexican affairs."

Huerta was arrested on June 28; on July 8 the wireless station at Sayville, Long Island, owned apparently by the Atlantic Communication Company, but really by the great Telefunken Company of Berlin, was taken over by the Federal Government.

By the press the charges against the German Embassy were thought very serious, but the Providence Journal is a newspaper of standing, it was said, and presumably has adequate proof, and the men involved are suspicious characters. Again and again they have been concerned in acts for which they ought to be brought to book. Many a minister has been handed his passports for less weighty offenses. The utter unscrupulousness of Ambassador von Bernstorff does not need to be demonstrated. He has often used his office to embarrass the Gov-That he should find in Huerta a useful tool is not ernment. surprising. The man the Government had been instrumental in driving out of Mexico cherished vindictive feelings. Why, then, should he take up residence in the country whose Government had caused his fall? Because if he went back to Mexico as a German agent he could do much mischief. might bring on war. In that event the exportation of arms to the Allies would be stopped; the export of oil from Mexico might be stopped, and if the United States sent troops to Mexico it would be hampered in enforcing its demands on Ger-The whole intrigue is only too characteristic of the pro-German campaign. The denial of the Secretary of State of any knowledge does not meet the issue. The Journal says it laid the proof before the President. If so, why did he not lay it before the public?

Count von Bernstorff now announced that, because of the report that he and others had planned to send Huerta to Mexico to create conditions that would draw the United States and Mexico into war, he had made to the Secretary of State a formal complaint in behalf of the Imperial German Government

Meantime, on July 31, Dr. Albert, Financial Adviser of the German Embassy, while traveling on the Elevated Railway in New York, lost a portfolio containing documents of various sorts. It was stolen from him, he said, by a British spy. However this may be, they came into the possession of the New York World, and on August 15 and following days were published. Some of the letters shown by photo-engravings bore the signatures of Count von Bernstorff, Captain von Papen, Dr. Albert, Herr Hugo Schmidt, representing the Deutsches Bank of Berlin, and of many others whose names meant nothing to the public.

The story as told by the World was, in substance, that it had in its possession a correspondence revealing unmistakably the fact that representatives of the German Government were promoting ventures directed not only against the powers with

which it was at war, but against the United States as well; that the chief actors were Ambassador von Bernstorff, Captain Franz von Papen, Dr. Albert, Herr Hugo Schmidt, representing the Deutsches Bank of Berlin, and that the work of these agents was to get control of and influence the press of the United States, establish news services, finance professional lecturers, and moving picture shows, and "to enlist the support of American citizens and publish books for the sole purpose of fomenting internal discord among the American people, to the advantage of the German Empire."

The German Government through its agents sought control of the New York Evening Mail, and of the American Press Association, was building a large munitions plant, was responsible for the strikes in the Remington Works, was conniving with disloyal trade union leaders to foment others, and while spending large sums to arouse the people to demand that war munitions be not shipped to the Allies, the German Government was arranging to manufacture munitions for itself in the United States, and had financed the Fatherland. The documents in possession of the World, the editor of the Fatherland said, had been stolen by a British spy from Dr. Albert.

The Providence Journal now asserted that secret information from the departments at Washington had come to the German Embassy; that Horn had confessed that he was ordered to blow up the Vanceboro bridge by an attaché of the Embassy, that this attaché was Captain Franz von Papen, and that from records of all wireless messages sent from and received at Savville, furnished the State Department by the Journal, the Department believed that during the period "covering the week prior to the Lusitania's sailing and the day of her destruction" code messages were sent by Captain Boy-Ed, giving to the German Admiralty information as to the route and daily position of the Lusitania, furnished by a spy in the office of the Cunard Company.

All these charges, Ambassador von Bernstorff said, would be given official attention at the proper time. "It would be undignified to answer them piecemeal at the present time."

Nevertheless, on August 18, he made to Secretary Lansing a long statement "concerning the facts." Most of the documents found in Dr. Albert's portfolio, he said, were insignificant. They were proposals, offers, advice of the most "unbalanced and irresponsible" kind, coming from every conceivable source. As to the proposals to hamper munition plants, both the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments considered it their "right and duty, so long as Great Britain continued her piracy on the high seas, to protect themselves against this international system of robbery by placing difficulties, as far as possible, in the way of the export of war materials for the Allies, either by the purchase of the factories or of war material, in spite of the fact that at present we are not in a position to make use of these goods for our own protection." He protested against branding as German propaganda any attempt to control the output of a single American factory. As to the false suggestions "based on certain letters that I, or some one else who has relations with the German Government, have taken part in instigating or forwarding strikes in munition factories, I can only say that such assertions or insinuations are groundless."

From the Providence Journal came still more charges. At the request of the President, it said, documents which proved that for several years before the war a German spy system existed in the United States had been laid before Secretary Daniels and the members of the Neutrality Board. Dr. Frank, head of the Sayville Wireless Station, in January, 1909, sought to obtain admission to parts of an American ship, not open to visitors, in order to obtain the secret of its fire control system. That in 1911, during the Morocco trouble, the naval attaché at the German Embassy attempted to use the Sayville Station to send orders to the German fleet cruising in the British Channel and North Sea. That in 1910 the same attaché attempted to obtain full and accurate information concerning the entire wireless service in the United States, the naval radio service included. That in May, 1911, the Telefunken Company of Berlin, under orders from the German Foreign Office, sought to submit to the United States Government a bid for supplying and installing a large number of wireless stations in the Philippines, at stations marked on a special map supplied to the Telefunken Company by the German Government. That in 1913 the general manager of the Telefunken Company and an officer of the German army sought to obtain control of "an entire chain of private wireless stations, and of stations owned by other Governments in South and Central America working through Sayville."

Further evidence presented to Secretary Daniels went to show that a civilian employed in the electrical service of the Navy Department was in the pay of Germany, and that in 1913, when the Department ordered a report on conditions at Sayville, "the report was in the possession of the German Government before it reached the United States Government." German interests had done "everything in their power to force the ship purchase bill through Congress" as a means of forcing "the purchase of the Hamburg-American ships tied up in New York Harbor."

Evidence, supporting many of the charges made by the Providence Journal, now came from a most unexpected source. On August 30, an American newspaper correspondent, Mr. James J. F. Archibald, on his way to Germany on the Rotterdam, was detained by the British authorities at Falmouth. He was the same Mr. Archibald who in April had traveled about the country delivering a pro-German illustrated lecture intended to set forth the power and efficiency of Germany. In his possession were found some thirty-four documents which he was to deliver in Berlin and Vienna. Among them were letters of recommendation to the German and Austro-Hungarian authorities from Dr. Dumba, Count von Bernstorff and Captain von Papen. He "is again going to Germany and Austria-Hungary," said von Papen, "to collect new impressions from the point of view of the strictly impartial journalist that he has always been." "I have heard with pleasure," said von Bernstorff in a letter to Mr. Archibald, "that you wish once more to return to Germany and Austria after having promoted our interests out here in such a zealous and successful manner."

The all important letter which was at once cabled to New York from London and promptly published in the newspapers was written by Dr. Dumba to Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, inclosing an aide mémoire from

the editor of an Hungarian newspaper suggesting how a strike might be brought about at the Bethlehem Steel and Munition works.

"Yesterday evening Consul General von Nuber received the enclosed aide mémoire from the chief editor of the locally known paper, Szabodsog, after a previous conference with him and in pursuance of his proposals to arrange for strikes in the Bethlehem Schwab Steel and Munitions War factory, and also in the Middle West.

"Dr. Archibald, who is well known to your Lordship, leaves to-day at twelve o'clock on board the *Rotterdam* for Berlin and Vienna. I take this rare and safe opportunity to warmly recommend the proposal to your Lordship's favorable consideration.

"It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German military attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the expenditure of money involved.

"But if the strikes do not come off it is probable that we should extort, under pressure of the crises, more favorable conditions of labor for our poor, downtrodden fellow-countrymen. In Bethlehem these white slaves are now working for twelve hours a day and seven days a week. All weak persons succumb and become consumptives. So far as German workmen are found among the skilled hands, a means of leaving will be provided for them. Besides this, a private German registry office has been established, which provides employment for persons who have voluntarily given up their places, and is already working well. They will also join and the widest support is assured us.

"I beg your Excellency to be so good as to inform me with reference to this letter by wireless telegraphy, replying whether you agree."

Dr. Dumba when seen at Lenox by the newspaper correspondents was not at all disturbed, admitted writing the letter, and said, "I can't understand how Archibald could have been so stupid." Everything could be explained. The proposals to embarrass the steel works were nothing more than "a very

open and proper method to be taken to bring before our races employed in the big steel works the fact that they are engaged in enterprises which are unfriendly to their Fatherland and that the Imperial Government would hold the workers in munition plants where contracts are being filled for the Allies, as being guilty of a serious crime against their country." In order to bring this before the natives of Bohemia, Moravia, Camiola, Galicia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and other races from Austria-Hungary he had "subsidized many newspapers published in the languages and dialects of the divisions mentioned, attempting in this way to bring their felonious occupations to their attention." This seemed to him "a peaceful and entirely satisfactory means of preventing the making and shipment of war material to our Allies."

The Government thought otherwise and on September 8 requested that Dr. Dumba be recalled.

Mr. Constantine Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, has admitted that he proposed to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in the production of munitions of war. The information reached this Government through a copy of a letter of the Ambassador to his Government. The bearer was an American citizen named Archibald who was traveling under an American passport. The Ambassador has admitted that he employed Archibald to bear official dispatches from him to his Government.

By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary . . . Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington.

Dr. Dumba desired to return on a leave of absence, but the Secretary of State insisted on a recall. Thereupon he addressed an impudent note of protest to the Secretary of State and made it public through the newspapers.

While the newspapers were attacking Dumba for his inso-

lence, a White Paper, containing the thirty-four letters taken from Mr. Archibald, was laid before Parliament, on September 21, and the documents, immediately telegraphed to the United States, were published in the newspapers. Among them were three letters from Dumba. One was that already made public. Another was a report on the documents lost by Dr. Heinrich Albert on July 31. The letter of Dr. Dumba was dated August 20.

A portfolio containing a number of papers was stolen from the Financial Adviser of the German Embassy here, evidently by the English Secret Service. These papers were all typewritten, unfinished copies, or else memorials from petitioners (Eingaben von Bittstellern). The documents were immediately published as a great sensation and with much tom-tom beating by the World, which has entirely gone over to the English jingo camp. The gravest accusations are made by the papers against the German Embassy, Count von Bernstorff, the military attaché, Captain von Papen, and Geheimrat Albert, in particular in that they had secretly conspired against the safety of the United States by purchasing arms and munition factories, by making false contracts with Russia and France, by acquiring great quantities of materials for explosives, also by attempting to corrupt the Press, and to stir up strikes in munition factories: also by organizing in every class in America a widespread agitation in favor of effecting a general embargo. The other great New York papers second the World, though less violently. Their leading articles deal with the exposure of the facts, and accuse Germany of every possible and impossible machination; for instance, they, like the World, assert that the German Government wishes to prevent the supply of ammunition in the case of the Allies, and at the same time secretly to send over large quantities from here for their own use.

Count von Bernstorff took up the position that these slanders required no answer and had the happy inspiration to refuse any explanation. He is in no way compromised. On the contrary, it appears from the published correspondence of various press agents that he had put his veto on the purchase of a press agency.

Geheimrat Albert, on the other hand, published a very clever explanation, the text of which I permit myself to lay before your Excellency. The German Embassy derives especial benefit from having already on the fifteenth of June officially announced to the State Department that they were obliged to buy as much war material as possible in this country to control its delivery in order to prevent the enemy from acquiring it. This material is now at the disposal of the

American Government, either in whole or in part, at favorable prices, and its acquisition by the United States would only serve to increase

their preparedness for war.

This knocks the bottom out of the ridiculous accusation of a conspiracy. Moreover, with regard to the accusation of stirring up strikes, there is no evidence to support the bare charge. In spite of this, everything German here will be still more energetically and consistently slandered and befouled. No impartial person could fail to be impressed by a feeling of gratitude at the wide activity of Geheimrat Albert. There are, however, very few impartial people in New York. The torpedoing of the Arabic, should she have been sunk without warning, or should any American passengers have lost their lives, will have a more unfavorable effect as regards Germany on public opinion in the United States of America than all the newspaper revelations.

The Royal and Imperial Ambassador,

DUMBA.

The third letter from Dr. Dumba related to Mr. Lansing's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note of June 29.

New York, August 20, 1915.

Subject: Uselessness of attempts to bring about an embargo on weapons and munitions. The prohibition of shipping munitions in passenger ships to be attempted afresh.

1. Enclosure.

To His Excellency the Foreign Minister,

Freiherr von Burian.

The reply of Mr. Lansing to the note of the twenty-ninth of June, in which your Excellency protested against the enormous deliveries of weapons and munitions to the Allies from the United States of America was published here—I do not know whether with the agreement of the Austrian Government—on the 16th ult.

As was to be expected, the refusal was quite categorical. The legal arguments are certainly very weak, for the reference to the articles supplied by Germany and Austria during the Boer War are not to the point and are misleading, for at that time Germany claimed the right to send foodstuffs to the Boers via the neutral port of Lorenzo Marques and—if I am not mistaken—carried the point, after the war, against England.

The true ground of the discouraging attitude of the President lies—as his confidant, Mr. House, already informed me in January and has now repeated—in the fact that authoritative circles are convinced that the United States of America in any serious crises would have to rely on neutral foreign countries for all their war material. At no price and in no case will Mr. Wilson allow this source to dry up. For this reason I am of opinion that the return to the question, whether officially by a reply from your Excellency, or by a semi-official conversation between myself and the Secretary of State, is not only useless, but even, having regard to the somewhat self-willed temperament of the President, harmful. In this matter I agree entirely with the view expressed by Consul Schwegel in the report attached. The President has broken all the bridges behind him and has made his point of view so definite that it is impossible for him to retreat from this position. As last autumn, he can always, through his personal influence, either force the House of Representatives to take his point of view against their better judgment or, on the other hand, in the Senate, can overthrow a resolution, already voted, in favor of prohibiting the export of guns and munitions.

In these circumstances any attempts to persuade individual States to vote parallel resolutions through their legislative bodies offer no advantages, apart from the internal difficulties which the execution

of this plan presents.

The proposal to forbid passenger ships to carry munitions stands on a different footing, however. Mr. Bryan and his democratic supporters would stand for this prohibition rigorously, and I believe that the President would not show himself so "intransigeant" with regard to this action.

As for the note of protest against the British interference with shipping (Seeubergriffe), which has so often been notified and as often postponed, I learn that the issue has been delayed in consequence of the imminent declaration of cotton as contraband. The feeling which obtains amongst the great American importers is accurately represented in Mr. Meagher's speech, quoted by Consul Schwegel. Mr. Meagher is one of the principal exporters of the United States of America, for he is a partner of the Chicago firm of Armour & Co., who, with the firm of Swift, control the meat market of the whole Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Meagher, whom I recently met on a yacht, and whose acquaint-ance I had already made in Chicago, is absolutely furious with regard to England's arbitrary acts. No fewer than thirty-one ships with meat and bacon shipments of his firm for Sweden, in value nineteen million dollars, have been detained in English ports for months under suspicion of being ultimately intended for Germany. The negotiations are being so long drawn out because Mr. Meagher and his companions will not accept a lame compromise, but insist on full compensation or release of the consignments in which the bacon may be still sound. My informant further gave me to understand that he had not yet played his last trump—namely, the refusal to import meat to England in any circumstances. He, that is to say, the two abovenamed slaughtering houses, controlled the Argentine market. At the present moment they are paralyzed here also by the action of the British Admiralty, for the latter have commandeered most of the

English freight ships intended for the transport of meat from the Argentine. If England stood face to face with the danger of not being able to get any meat from the United States of America, or

the Argentine, she would soon give in.

What the immediate result of making cotton contraband will be is hard to say. The anger of those interested in cotton will be enormously increased. On the other hand, the fear of the threatened confiscation may make the leaders of the Cotton Trust so yielding that they, against their better judgment, may agree to the sale of the greater part of the present supply en bloc to England, who would be in the position in the future to control the whole cotton market, and, on peace being declared, to force on the whole world fantastic prices for this essential raw material.

The Imperial Ambassador, C. Dumba.

There were also two letters from Captain von Papen. These related to the papers lost by Dr. Albert, and reviewed the effect of their publication from a business point of view.

BRIDGEPORT PROJECTILE COMPANY:—The report of the treasurer of this society of June 30, which I forwarded on July 13, J. No. 1888, to the Imperial War Office, was among the stolen papers.

The statement published in the newspapers of the president of the Etna Explosives Company, that he wished to repudiate the powder contract with the Bridgeport Projectile Company, is naturally only newspaper gossip, and was weakened yesterday by a new announcement of the firm.

I do not think that the manufacturers will put many difficulties in our way with regard to the delivery of the presses, for the careful phrasing of the contract makes an attack upon the Projectile Company, under the well-known Sherman Law, out of the question, and the view that the manufacturers had thought that the consignments were intended for the Allies—that is to say, that we obtained the contracts under false pretenses—is not strong enough from a legal point of view to expose the manufacturers to the expenses and consequences of a legal action.

The only actual damage consists therein, that the Russian and English Commission broke off their negotiations with the Bridgeport Projectile Company at once, and accordingly our prospects of preventing other firms here from embarking on the supply of war material by the undertaking and the non-delivery of a shrapnel contract have come to nothing.

The purchase of phenol by Dr. Schweitzer from the Edison Company, which was discovered at the same time, has been settled by the

public declaration that this phenol was only to be used for medicinal

purposes.

Most of all, our attempts with regard to the purchase of liquid chlorine have been hindered, as any control (Bindung) of the Castner Chemical Company, which is friendly to England, through a middleman seems now out of the question.

I will make use of the means put at my disposal (information of Mr. Grithen) in order to come to an agreement with the Electro-

Bleaching Gas Company.

The publication of the negotiations with regard to the acquisition of the Wright patents is without importance, because our view that we could obtain a legal decision against the Curtiss Company

probably could not have been maintained.

The culminating point of all attacks against us lies in the assertion of the "unstraightforwardness and deceit" of German policy, which, on the one hand, carries on with all the means at its disposal a propaganda for the prohibition of the export of arms, and, on the other hand, secretly purchases war material for Germany. This accusation could not better be refuted than by the publication of the memorandum which the Imperial Ambassador already on the twelfth of June addressed to this Government at my request.

It is worthy of note that in reply to the telegraphic request of his Excellency to the State Department to be good enough to publish this memorandum the reply was: "We cannot find it, please send a copy."

The existence of the memorandum is evidence beyond all doubt that, in the first place, the purchase of war material by us was a consequential part of our propaganda for the prohibition of the export of war material, and that, in the second place, our action met in the widest sense the views of the United States Government with regard to strengthening their own fighting power at the present moment.

From this point of view the publication can only be regarded as

advantageous.

PAPEN.

His second letter, the "idiotic Yankees" letter, was written to his wife.

New York, August 20, 1915.

We have great need of being "bucked up," as they say here. Since Sunday a new storm has been raging against us—and because of what? I'm sending you a few cuttings from the newspapers that will amuse you. Unfortunately they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the Elevated (English secret service, of course!), of which the principal contents have been published. You can imagine the sensation among the Americans! Unfortunately there were some very important things from my report among them, such as the buy-

ing up of liquid chlorine and about the Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents regarding the buying up of phenol (from which explosives are made) and the acquisition of the Wright aeroplane patent.

But things like that must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to see how we protect ourselves. We composed the document

together yesterday.

It seems quite likely that we shall meet again soon. The sinking of the Adriatic (sic) may well be the last straw. I hope in our interest that the danger will blow over.

How splendid on the Eastern front. I always say to these idiotic Yankees they had better hold their tongues—it's better to look at all this heroism full of admiration. My friends in the army are quite different in this way.

A sixth document was a copy of a note from Ambassador von Bernstorff to the Secretary of State. It was written on August 18, just at the time the New York World was publishing the papers lost by Dr. Albert.

Because of "the wide publicity given to documents and letters stolen from a member of my staff," and "the entirely false and unjustifiable conclusion attempted to be drawn from these documents as appears in the press comments and leading articles," he had decided "to make a short statement confirming the facts."

As the representative of one of the great nations involved in the world war, it was inevitable that he "should receive from every conceivable source and from most unbalanced and irresponsible authors, proposals and advice." Most of the documents found in the stolen portfolio, he said, were of this kind.

"It is asserted that the documents show that the German Government" is acquiring ammunition factories while at the same time demanding that the export of war material to the Allies be stopped, and that it was supporting "a propaganda in favor of this." He could not "understand on what grounds criticism of our behavior in this respect can be based." He regarded it as "a right and duty, so long as Great Britain continued her piracy on the high seas," to place "difficulties as far as possible in the way of the export of war material for the Allies either by the purchase of factories or war material, in

spite of the fact that for the present we are not in a position to make use of these goods for our own protection."

"If," he continued, "we possessed the means and opportunities, we would buy up every munition factory in the United States of America, if in this way we could deprive the enemy of munitions and our proceeding would not involve a lack of logic or mala fides." To show that the proposed plan to purchase war material was not unknown to the Department of State, he quoted from a note of June 12.

Criticism of the plan "to prevent the export of liquid chlorine to the Allies, through buying the output," was unjustified "when one bears in mind the fact that the British Government would not supply rubber or wool to a manufacturer save on condition that he sells the whole output through a British agency, and is prevented from selling to Germany or Austria-Hungary"; that producers of copper "are forced to proceed in the same manner with regard to their output," and that manufacturers of "preserved provisions equally are forced to refuse to supply their goods to neutral countries unless Great Britain, through her own agents, allows them to earry out their contracts." The moment the German Government tries to get control of the output of a single factory, "this perfectly lawful proceeding is branded far and wide as a propaganda which 'entangles the United States in the European war,' and 'involves a flagrant breach of the spirit and object of the American anti-trust law."

"To the false suggestion, based on certain letters, that I, or some one else who has relations with the German Government, has taken part in the instigation and forwarding of strikes in munition factories, I can only say that such assertions and insinuations are groundless."

Nevertheless, such strikes had occurred to an extent never known before. During July, August, September and October there were one hundred and two strikes and six lockouts of machinists employed in munition plants. Fifty of these were in Bridgeport, Connecticut. According to the report of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor, to its annual convention, attempts had been made by German and Austrian agents to buy labor leaders to foment strikes.

According to the testimony of a score of men arrested and convicted of conspiracy to destroy munition ships and munition plants, the representatives of Germany and Austria were not guiltless.

The purchase of ten pounds of picric acid, a chemical used in the manufacture of high explosives, led on October 24 to the arrest in Jersey City of Robert Fay and Walter Scholz, on suspicion of connection with explosions in ammunition works, and of bombs on board steamers carrying supplies to the enemies of Germany. Fay in a confession claimed he was a lieutenant in the German army, and, while serving with his regiment in the Champaigne district, invented so clever a device for exploding mines without electrical wiring that he was put in touch with the German Secret Service by his colonel and sent to the United States. His object in coming was to cut off the supply of ammunition to the Allies by attaching to the sterns or propellers of ammunition-laden vessels the mines of his invention, so timed that they would explode when the steamer was in mid-Atlantic. "Both Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed refused to make any use of my device in this country." More arrests followed and soon seven men were in the hands of the Federal authorities.

Ambassador von Bernstorff having assured the Department of State that Fay had no connection with the German Secret Service, nor with the German Government, the Department left the matter to be settled by the Courts, and on November 8, Fay, Max Breitung, Walter L. Scholz, Paul Deache, Dr. Herbert Krenzle, and Bronkhorst were duly indicted on two counts. The first charged that Fay and his associates devised "a metal box containing springs, coils and other mechanisms and loaded with dynamite, trinitrotoluol and other explosives" and had conspired to attach it to steamships sailing out from New York.

The second charged them with conspiracy to injure persons who had underwritten policies of insurance on the vessels they sought to destroy. December 13, all save Deache were rearraigned to plead to five new charges.

Dr. Joseph Goricar, for many years in the Austro-Hungarian consular service, and who resigned in December, 1914,

now came forward with specific charges in the Providence Journal. The United States, he said, were honeycombed with German and Austrian spies, all working directly under von Bernstorff and Consul General von Nuber; that every Austro-Hungarian consul in the country was a center of propaganda for the destruction of munition factories, for the creation of strikes. The office of von Nuber in New York was the center of the plot for securing fraudulent passports under which hundreds of German and Austrian reservists had been able to return to their colors.

"The United States," he said, "is not awake to the danger which threatens her from the activities of German and Austrian agents who since the beginning of the war have spent \$30,000,000 to \$40,000,000 in this country in their efforts to

destroy life and property.

"I charge that the German Ambassador, knowing that the Austrian consulates have far more influence among their people here than the German consulates have among theirs, has worked through Ambassador Dumba and Consul General von Nuber to cause every Austrian consulate in the United States to become a center of intrigue of the most criminal character." He charged that the Austrian consuls at Cleveland, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Paul were the men on whom von Bernstorff and von Nuber depended "to carry out their infamous work" and that they held regular conferences with von Nuber. He charged that von Nuber had in his employ "a gang of men who are regularly subsidizing foreign language newspapers." Many times since Dumba's departure von Nuber had been doing the very same sort of acts as those which led to Dumba's dismissal. "Within the past week von Nuber, at the suggestion of Ambassador von Bernstorff," Dr. Goricar charged, had ordered his consuls scattered over the country "to close in on the campaign to get workers out of munition factories," and to force them out was working through the great secret societies and fraternal organizations with which the men were connected.

The consuls accused by Dr. Goricar one and all denied the charges and denounced him as a traitor and a renegade; and some one in behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy issued

a statement. This, too, was almost wholly given up to denouncing Dr. Goricar, and dismissed his charges with the words "the Embassy must emphatically declare these accusations as false and absolutely groundless."

The Journal thereupon began the publication of documentary evidence in support of its charges. Among these documents were facsimiles of letters from the Austrian Consul General in New York and the Austrian consul in Philadelphia to certain workers in munition factories who had written asking the meaning of an advertisement which had appeared in the

foreign language newspapers.

"The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Embassy," this warning said, acting under orders from the home Government, gave notice to "all Austrians and Hungarians, including the men who belong to Bosnia and Herzegovina," that all who were making arms or ammunition for the Allies were "committing a crime against the military safety of their Fatherland," a crime punishable by imprisonment for from ten to twenty years, or it might be with death. Against those who violated the order "the whole force of the land will be brought in the event of their return to their own country."

So specific were the charges made by Dr. Goricar, so convincing was the evidence presented by the *Journal*, that the Department of Justice at once began to investigate. Had other evidence been needed it might have been found in the startling series of explosions and fires which just at this time wrecked parts of some of the great munition plants in the East. On November 10, flames consumed a machine shop at the Bethlehem Steel Company, destroyed machinery and war material valued at \$1,000,000 and threw out of employment some 2,100 men. at \$1,000,000 and threw out of employment some 2,100 men. That same day a building used for the storage of patterns, belonging to the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddystone, was burned to the ground. Twenty-four hours later a new wire-rope shop belonging to the John A. Roeblings' Sons Company at Trenton was totally destroyed by fire. The firm declared they had no war orders, but the origin of the fire was as mysterious as were those at Bethlehem and Eddystone.

While the causes of these fires were under investigation, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of

Justice was sent to confer with the editor of the Providence Journal and Dr. Goricar. On his return to Washington the Department of Justice announced that "much information of a valuable nature was obtained concerning the activities of Austrian Consul General von Nuber and his associates, the details of which cannot be disclosed at present. Prompt investigation, however, will be made. Information was also obtained which probably will lead to further indictments for passport frauds."

A Reuter dispatch giving a summary of the charges of Dr. Goricar having reached Vienna, Baron Burian at once instructed the Austrian *chargé* at Washington to make a "categorical and official denial of these inventions."

"According to Reuter," so ran the message, "former Austro-Hungarian Consul Goricar has made totally false statements in the Providence *Journal* about Austro-Hungarian and German espionage in the United States. You are authorized to make categorical and official denial of these inventions."

Baron Erich Zwiedinek, Austro-Hungarian chargé, accordingly visited the Department of State and protested against the issuance in the name of the Department of Justice of the statement which he claimed tended to confirm the alleged unlawful activities of the Austrian consular offices made by Dr. Joseph Goricar.

To this the Providence Journal made reply that, in view "of the astounding action of Baron Zwiedinek, the Journal now feels called upon to declare it has placed in the hands of the Department of Justice conclusive proof not only of the guilt of Baron von Nuber and Vice Consul Samuel Augyal of the New York consulate, but also of Consul General von Grivicio, formerly of Philadelphia, and Baron Lother von Hanser of the Pittsburgh consulate.

"Furthermore, the Journal has also given to the Department of Justice conclusive proof of the guilt of Baron von Zwiedinek himself on several occasions since the departure of Ambassador Dumba." Proof of the guilt of the Austrian officials, the Journal said, "rests almost entirely on documents over their own signatures, and this is particularly true in the case of Baron Zwiedinek himself.

A rumor having been set afloat that because of the failure of the Department of Justice to get wind of the activities of the consuls, and the country-wide plots to destroy ammunition works, the Secret Service force of the Treasury Department would take charge of such investigations, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General thought it wise to make a joint denial and on November 19 made this statement:

"In view of the widespread statements to the effect that the Secret Service force of the Treasury Department has been put in charge of investigation of all bomb plots, ship burnings, munition factory explosions and the like, and the determination of whether the criminal statutes of the United States have been violated," they wished to say that the different departments of the Government had been and were furnishing each other with all information that was useful; that there was no disagreement between them, and none expected; that it was the duty of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to investigate all information indicating violations of eriminal statutes of the United States, conspiracies, passport frauds and violation of interstate commerce statutes included: and that the Secret Service of the Treasury Department had been instructed to turn over to the Bureau for Investigation of the Department of Justice any information acquired by the former that would be of use to the latter.

Whether Federal statutes could be applied to the burning of munition plants owned by individuals or corporations was a doubtful question, and some suspicion was expressed by officials in the Department of Justice that State officials had started no prosecutions as a result of munition plant fires. It was time, however, that the government acted. Actual warfare had been conducted by German and Austrian officials against the United States. Guns had not been trained on our citizens, armies had not been landed on our shores, but the torch had been set to munition plants, bombs had been prepared to sink ships at sea, plots had been hatched to prevent manufactured goods reaching their destination, passports for German and Austrian spies had been forged, and strikes fomented. Plotters, conspirators, schemers must be ferreted out, no matter who they were. But in punishing plotters

against manufacturing plants the Federal Government was badly handicapped. If bombs are made in one State and sent into another for criminal purposes the Government has jurisdiction under the interstate commerce act. But when an industrial plant is set on fire the State has jurisdiction and must act.

To overcome this difficulty the United States Attorney General, on November 20, issued an appeal to local authorities.

"Information," he said, "indicating attacks upon lawful American industries and commerce through incendiary fires and explosions in factories, threats to intimidate employees and other acts of violence, has so often developed during the past few months as to demand searching investigations and prosecutions." The Department of Justice would continue to investigate all such acts, prosecute all violations of Federal statutes, and seek indictments under the Federal law forbidding interstate transportation of explosives, under the Sherman law, the law concerning conspiracy to commit an offense against, or defraud the United States, and the laws against crimes on ships and on the high seas. But Federal criminal laws because of our dual form of government were limited in their scope. Many could be enforced only where the Government has special jurisdiction. It was hoped, therefore, that the State officials would be active, and whenever evidence was found, by the agents of the Department of Justice, that State laws had been violated, it would be placed at the service of State authorities.

Prosecutions of such offenders as the Government had been able to detect went on, meantime, with vigor. Chief among these were Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed.

Captain Franz von Papen was right in his surmise when he wrote his wife, "It seems quite likely that we shall meet again soon." A careful investigation of the activities of von Papen and Boy-Ed forced the Secretary of State to inform Ambassador von Bernstorff on November 30 that they were "no longer acceptable or personæ gratæ to this Government," and to ask their recall because "of what this Government considers improper activities in military and naval matters."

The Providence Journal now asserted, basing its assertion "on the highest authority, that the recent Hamburg-American

trial had nothing whatever to do" with the demand for the recall of the Captains. Captain Boy-Ed was recalled, it said, because the Government had positive proof of his connection with Stegler and the passport frauds. A mass of letters and telegrams showing his direct connection with the frauds was in the possession of the Government. He was recalled because the Government had positive evidence that he had been active in the attempt of certain officials of the Hamburg-American Company in the spring "to embroil the Government of the United States and the British Government by the production of false affidavits tending to show that certain tugboat captains had been carrying supplies from New York Harbor to German cruisers. He had been recalled because the Government had conclusive proof that the Huerta conspiracy, hatched in Barcelona, was carried on through Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen and Dr. Dumba.

Captain von Papen would be recalled because of his connection with the Huerta plot, the storage of large quantities of arms in New York and the discovery among the Archibald papers of two cipher dispatches and the manner in which they were sent abroad.

December 10, the German Ambassador formally notified the Secretary of State that the Emperor "had been pleased to recall Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen in compliance with the wishes of the United States Government"; December 22, Captain von Papen sailed, and six days later was followed by Captain Karl Boy-Ed.

When about to sail von Papen handed to representatives of the press a written statement. He refrained, he said, at the hour of his departure, from again refuting the stories told about him in the newspapers, most of which stories, "like the silly Huerta tales," were invented by the Providence Journal. This paper, with its British-born Mr. Rathom, has done its utmost to create an almost hysterical suspicion of spying throughout the country in order to prejudice public opinion against Germany."

"Your farewell statement to the American people," said the Providence *Journal* in a long wireless to the Captain, "in so far as it relates to the Providence *Journal*, is a willful and deliberate falsehood. Has the Providence Journal created a hysterical suspicion concerning the destruction of American factories, the murder of American workmen, or the daily plots against the peace and safety of this Government and its citizens, almost all of which acts have been fathered and financed from your office? Every word of what the Journal has published with regard to your personal connection with these plots has been true, and nobody knows it better than yourself."

But it was not only in the East that such deeds had been done. Agents of Germany had been busy on the Pacific coast, falsifying manifests to clear ships laden with supplies for German cruisers, plotting the destruction of bridges and tunnels in Canada, and hiring men to place bombs on board of ships carrying munitions of war. In December, in San Francisco, Charles C. Crowley, a detective in the employ of the German consulate, Baron George William von Brincken, the Vice Consul General, and a woman were indicted for conspiracy to interfere with and destroy commerce with the Allies, and use the mails to incite arson, murder and assassination by burning certain buildings of munition making firms at Ishpeming, Michigan, and Pinole, California. An affidavit, published in the Providence Journal, set forth that Franz Bopp, the German Consul General at San Francisco, had employed the affiant Koolbergen to blow up tunnels on the Canadian Pacific Railway, that Bopp and von Brincken worked out the details, and that Koolbergen in collusion with the officials of the Canadian Pacific Company caused statements to be published in the newspapers to the effect that they had been blown up mysteriously. More arrests followed as the plot developed until in February, 1916, thirty-two conspirators were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.

A telegram from Chicago, December 5, announced that two artisans of that city had gone to New York in obedience to a subpœna to appear before a Federal Grand Jury and testify as to the activities of Labor's National Peace Council. This organization, it was said, had taken a part in the warfare headed by von Papen and Boy-Ed against munition plants, and the Department of Justice was seeking indictments against Congressman Buchanan of Illinois; former Congressman Fow-

ler of Illinois; the notorious "Wolf of Wall Street," David

Lamar; Franz von Rintelen, and sundry others.

"In view," said the United States Attorney at New York,

"of the publicity given in the morning newspapers of to-day
of the story concerning Labor's National Peace Council, I will
state that for some time I have had information that this organization was financed through money furnished by Franz von Rintelen, through David Lamar. A part of the activities of Labor's National Peace Council consisted in stirring up strikes in various plants which engaged in the manufacture of war munitions."

Franz von Rintelen came to our country in April, was believed to have financed the so-called "peace meeting" held in June in New York, the meeting addressed by Mr. Bryan, and on his way to Germany in August under the protection of a passport, obtained by fraud, was stopped at Falmouth by the British and lodged in the Tower of London. Labor's National Peace Council was formed late in June by the promoters of the "peace meeting" at New York. Its President for a few weeks was Congressman Buchanan. H. Robert Fowler was its general counsel, and Frank S. Monnett, one time Attorney General of Ohio, was Chairman of a Committee. These men, with Henry B. Martin, Secretary, Henry Schulteis, David Lamar, and Franz von Rintelen, were duly indicted on December 28, 1915.

The defendants, it was charged, had "conspired together to restrain our foreign commerce in munitions of war," rifles, vehicles of transportation, building material, articles of many sorts useful in war on land and sea; had conspired to instigate strikes and walkouts in munition factories, and in places

gate strikes and walkouts in munition factories, and in places where such material was shipped; and by bribing and distributing money among labor officials, tried to induce them to use their influence to cause employees to drop their work.

Efforts were now made to secure the support of organized labor, on their behalf, and on December 30 a statement was issued warning laboring men of the "great danger which awaits their future struggles for economic liberty and justice should a precedent be established by the courts in upholding a prosecution and conviction under such a construction of this stat-

ute as is now proposed by the United States Attorney Marshal."

These and many other acts of treachery by aliens and disloyal citizens of alien birth were so serious and menacing that President Wilson on two occasions had denounced the hyphenates roundly. The first occasion was on the evening of November 4 at a banquet given by the Manhattan Club in New York City.

The only thing within our borders that has given us grave concern in recent months has been that voices have been raised in America professing to be the voices of Americans which were not in deed and in truth American but which spoke alien sympathies, which came from men who loved other countries better than they love America, men who were partisans of other causes than that of America, and had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance was to the great government under which they live.

These voices have not been many, but they have been very clamorous. They have proceeded from a few who were bitter and who were grievously misled [They were] the spokesmen of small groups whom it is high time that the nation should call to a reck-

oning.

A month now passed away and on December 7 the President made his annual address to Congress. During that month fires had destroyed shops of the Bethlehem Steel Company, of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, at Eddystone, and of the Roebling Wire Works at Trenton; Goricar had made known the plots of the Austrian Consuls to destroy ships and cripple munition works, and the Attorney General of the United States had appealed to the State authorities to aid him in prosecuting the plotters everywhere.

In his annual address to Congress at the opening of its session the President, therefore, again denounced the hyphenates

and asked for means to restrain their activities.

I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it

effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not as great as compared with the whole number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of virile foreign stocks; but is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers.

America never witnessed anything like this before. It never dreamed it possible that men sworn into its own citizenship... would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek to make this proud

country once more a hotbed of European passion.

A little while ago such a thing would have seemed incredible. Because it was incredible we made no preparation for it. . . . But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are with-

out adequate Federal laws to deal with it.

I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property; they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government; they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. . . .

I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and misrepresenting the temper and principles of the country during these days of terrible war. . . . But it cannot. There are some men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. They also preach and practice disloyalty.

These charges met with a quick response from those concerned. In the House a resolution was carried calling on the President to furnish the names and former allegiance of persons involved in alleged criminal and otherwise unneutral plots together with specific information regarding such plots. The Committee on Judiciary reported the resolution adversely. The

Attorney General by a second resolution was then called on to furnish the names and former allegiance of persons involved in alleged criminal plots. He sent a list of names of 71 persons and four corporations; but the Judiciary Committee again reported adversely.

A week later the directors of the Northeastern Saengerbund, happening to hold their meeting at Baltimore, took occasion to express their sentiments towards the President and certain measures then pending in Congress. Whereas, they said, the President having by "innuendo in his message" of December, 1915, "accused American citizens of German birth of being traitors to their adopted country," and the Attorney General in response to a call by the House "for a probe of these allegations" having "submitted a list of the persons arrested or charged with offenses against the laws of the United States" referred to by the President, and there appearing in the list the names of but three or four American citizens of German birth, therefore it was resolved that, as American citizens, they protest against the charges of the President in his message as an attack upon and an insult to "a large and loyal part of the citizenship of the United States." The "attack and charges" were "made upon insufficient information without cause, and, as shown by the Attorney General's report had no foundation in fact."

The directors therefore recommended the members of the Saengerbund to oppose the renomination and re-election of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States, and endorsed and urged all members to endorse the bills to prohibit the sale and export of arms; prohibit the issue of passports for use on vessels of a belligerent country; prohibit vessels from carrying American citizens as passengers and contraband of war at the same time; and the bill to authorize the President to forbid any national banking association to make a loan to any of the signatory Powers to the Declaration of London which shall be found to be obstructing the neutral commerce of the United States.

To a mass meeting of Hungarians held at New York City about the same time to take action on the President's remarks he sent a message through a personal representative.

In good time the speech of the President reached Berlin, alarmed the Imperial Government by the vigor of the attack on German-American plotters and drew forth a disavowal of the acts of its agents and a plea that Germany had been misunderstood. No official note or memorandum was sent to Washington, but the Berlin correspondent of the New York *Times* was authorized to make a long statement which he sent by wireless on December 29. "I am authorized," said the correspondent, Mr. Garrett, "to make the following statement":

The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority. If it should be alleged that improper acts have been committed by representatives of the German Government they could easily be dealt with. To any complaints, upon such proofs as may be submitted by the American Government, suitable response will be duly made.

As is well known, the means of communication between Germany and the United States are very unsatisfactory. It is practically impossible for the German Government to keep itself in touch with the American sentiment. It has often to depend upon the Foreign Press for information concerning American affairs. The Message of President Wilson to the Congress, in which the activities of German sympathizers in the United States were discussed, will serve as an illustration.

A brief summary of this Message which was received in Germany referred to riots and conspiracies against peace and order in the United States, and the effect produced thereby on the public sentiment in Germany was probably more painful than the American Government knew. A different impression might have been produced by the full text of the Message, but, unfortunately, that was not available in Germany until the American newspapers arrived in Germany by mail a fortnight or three weeks later, except such portions as might be taken, with doubt and reservations, from the English Press.

In the meantime confidential communications between the

German Government and its diplomatic representatives in the United States, by wireless or cable, are impossible for reasons which the American Government knows.

Apparently the enemies of Germany have succeeded in giving the impression that the German Government is in some way, Mr. Garrett continued, responsible for what Mr. Wilson has characterized as anti-American activities, comprising attacks on property and the violation of the rules which the American Government has seen fit to impose on the course of neutral This the German Government absolutely denies. cannot specifically repudiate acts committed by individuals over whom it has no control, and of whose movements and actions it is neither officially nor unofficially informed. It can only say it does most emphatically declare to Germans abroad, to the United States and to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness in thought, suggestion, or deed against the life, property, and order in the United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause, and a source of embarrassment to the German Government, nothwithstanding anything he or they may believe to the contrary.

It happens regularly that Press messages from Germany are taken from the air by the English and are reproduced as representing the official German point of view, the assumption being that the German censor will only pass such things as the German Government wishes the world to believe. Finally, owing to these conditions, all German expression of opinion falls under an awkward restraint. If the German Government could speak, and alone, to the American Government, out of the hearing of the rest of the world, and if it could communicate confidentially with its diplomatic representatives in the United States, much misconception, Mr. Garrett was sure, could be avoided. By the use of wireless, it is true, the German Government may communicate with its Ambassador in Washington in a private code known only to the American Government; but, as all other Governments may communicate by cable in an absolutely secret code, the German Government feels that to be alone deprived of this same privilege, and to be required, as no other Government is, to correspond with its representatives

in a code open to the American Government, is an unfair discrimination. This, therefore, is an obstacle that combines both fact and feeling, and if one adds thereto the misfortune that the German Government thinks it has reason to distrust the neutrality of the United States, it will be seen how serious it is. We need not inquire whether the German Government is justified in regarding American neutrality with reservation. The doubt exists, and hinders every approach to an understanding.

The reason for denying the German Government the privilege of using a secret code by wireless was, in the beginning, that it might communicate in this way with its ships at sea, but the German Government thinks that if this reason were ever valid it has ceased to exist, since there are no more German

ships upon the seas.

CHAPTER VIII

SINKING WITHOUT WARNING

The Imperial German Government having inquired into the circumstances of the sinking of the Arabic, and having obtained a report from the commander of the submarine from which the torpedo was fired, Ambassador von Bernstorff delivered to the Secretary of State a note in which Germany refused "to acknowledge any obligation or grant any indemnity in the matter."

On August 19, 1915, it said, a German submarine stopped the British liner *Dunsley* about sixteen miles south of Kinsale, and was about to sink her by gun fire when the commander beheld a large steamship making towards him. This steamer, the *Arabic*, was recognized as an enemy vessel because she did not fly any flag and had no neutral markings. "When she approached she altered her original course, but then again pointed directly towards the submarine." Sure that the *Arabic* "had the intention of attacking and ramming him," the commander gave the order "to dive and fired a torpedo at the steamship."

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost," and "particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens." But "the German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic." Should the two Governments find it impossible "to reach a harmonious opinion on this point" the German Government was ready "to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague tribunal." In doing so, the German Government assumed "that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general

decision on the permissibility of, or the converse, under international law, of German submarine warfare."

Thus was the hope that the commander of the submarine would be disciplined and his act disavowed, dispelled. But the German Ambassador after conferences with the Secretary of State declared in an interview that he was sure all differences would soon be adjusted. "Ordinarily," he said, "I give only prepared interviews over my signature. To-day I shall make an exception. You may say for me that I am sure that within a fortnight all supposed difficulties between the United States and Germany will have been settled and permanently settled, and the nations will be more friendly than they ever have been."

A Berlin newspaper, the *National Gazette*, remarked that "for the moment it does not seem to have been recognized with sufficient clearness in America that Count von Bernstorff's principal statement and the *Arabic* note are two totally different expressions of intention on the part of the German Government and only superficially connected."

The destruction of the Arabic was "in no sense a diminishing of assurances given shortly before in Washington, and which were hailed with lively satisfaction in America, showing the wish of the overwhelming majority of the American people to maintain peace between Germany and America. There can be no talk about Germany having broken her word to the United States, or of trying to liberate herself from a given promise."

The Imperial Government having denied responsibility for indemnity in the case of the *Arabic* now returned to that of the *Frye*; and to the manner of fixing the damages. It proposed to do away with an umpire, settle the damages by means of two experts, and name its own expert, agreed to separate the question of indemnity from that of interpretation of the Prussian treaties of 1799 and 1828, and to refer this dispute to The Hague Tribunal.

To the question, whether in the meantime, Germany would govern her submarine operations according to the American or the German interpretation, the answer was, that "it is not prevented, in its opinion, from proceeding against American ships 200

conveying contraband, according to its interpretation, until the question is settled by arbitration." Nevertheless, as evidence of its "conciliatory attitude" the German Government had ordered its naval forces "not to destroy American merchantmen which have loaded conditional contraband," but allow "them to continue their voyage unhindered, if it is not possible to take them into port." But it reserved "the right to destroy vessels carrying absolute contraband" whenever allowable under the Declaration of London.

In its note on the Arabic the German Government had declared itself unable "to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic." From this position the Imperial Government now retreated and on October 5, Count von Bernstorff informed Secretary Lansing that, prompted by a desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with respect to the Arabic incident, his Government had instructed him to say His Imperial Majesty had issued such stringent orders "that the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question.

"According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine which sank the Arabic and his affidavit as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine.

"On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavits of the British officers of the Arabic, according to which the Arabic did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine, therefore, was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly," and would pay indemnity for the lives of Americans lost on the Arabic.

Before the month ended, Germany, in a note explaining the attack on the Orduna, renewed her pledge that large passenger steamers were "only to be torpedoed after previous warning and after the rescuing of passengers and crew."

At about a quarter past seven on the morning of July 3, said the note, a German submarine sighted a steamer some five miles away and a sailing vessel a mile distant. The steamer showing no flag or neutral markings, was taken to be an enemy-ship and the submarine submerged and fired a torpedo which missed its mark. Thereupon the submarine rose to the surface and gave chase, firing shells which did no harm as the submarine was pitching about and the distance great.

"The first attack on the Orduna was not in accordance with the existing instructions which provide that large passenger steamships are only to be torpedoed after previous warning and after the rescuing of passengers and crew. The failure to observe the instructions was based on an error, which is at any rate comprehensible, and the repetition of which appears to be out of the question, in view of the more explicit instructions issued in the meantime."

The surrender of Germany seemed to be complete, and was generally attributed to the good work done by Ambassador von Bernstorff. The triumph of American diplomacy seemed to be a notable one, for it had forced an arrogant nation to abandon its campaign of maritime frightfulness and acknowledge the principles of humanity it had hitherto defiantly and wantonly outraged. But the triumph was not to endure. From sources good and reliable it appeared that Great Britain had captured forty-four German submarines and had sunk some twenty-six others. Alarmed at her losses Germany found it expedient to suspend her campaign of frightfulness not only until her losses had been made good, but until her fleet of submarines had been greatly increased. Meantime, to avert a break with the United States at that time, the Imperial Government adopted a policy it did not intend long to pursue.

Confining its operations in the North Sea and the Channel to raids, the German Admiralty now sent submarines to the Mediterranean Sea to prey on transports carrying troops to Salonika and Egypt, while Austria, which as yet had done little with her submarines, turned them loose on neutrals as well as enemy merchantmen.

Austria had made no promises not to sink ships without warning, or to provide for the safety of passengers and crew. In frightfulness, therefore, she soon equaled her ally and quickly brought on a crisis in her relations with us.

On November 7, as the Italian liner Ancona, with 400 passengers and a crew of 170, was on her way from Messina to New York she was torpedoed off Cape Carbona by a large submarine flying the Austrian flag. About midday, according to the account first received from Ferryville, Tunis, the Ancona perceived two submarines which, because of the thick fog, the sound of her whistle and her reduced speed, were able to approach her unperceived. Rescued passengers declared that when first seen both submarines were flying the German flag which was quickly lowered and replaced by that of Austria-Hungary.

The Ancona attempted to escape but was fired upon and hit, whereupon the captain ordered the boats lowered and just as the eighth touched the water the Ancona pitched forward and sank bows first, carrying down with her over two hundred human beings, many of whom were killed by gunfire after the torpedo struck. Of twelve Americans aboard nine lost their lives.

A telegram from Rome announced that "a submarine approached the *Ancona* towards noon, and as soon as the steamer saw it, an attempt was made to escape at full speed. The *Ancona* was overtaken and stopped. Then the submarine fired on the *Ancona*, sinking her amid the desperate cries of the passengers. The life boats were next attacked, the submarine likewise firing on them."

On November 14, 1915, the Italian Government addressed a circular note to neutral governments giving its version of the attack. The submarine, it charged, fired on the *Ancona* without warning; fired at the wireless apparatus, at the sides and decks and "even at the boats in which the terrorized passengers were seeking refuge." Some who fell into the sea and approached the submarine "were driven off with jeers."

That same day the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty Office made a statement without waiting for the Foreign Office to act. "The submarine," it said, "fired one shot in front of the Ancona's prow, whereupon the steamer fled at full speed, in accordance with the order issued by the Italian authorities, which instructs ships' commanders to flee or sink the sub-

marine," was pursued and stopped only after being hit several times.

"The submarine allowed 45 minutes for the passengers and crew to abandon the steamer, on board of which panic reigned, but only a small number of boats were lowered and these were occupied principally by the crew.

"A great number of boats, probably sufficient to save all

the passengers, remained unoccupied.

"After a period of fifty minutes, and as another steamer was approaching, the submarine submerged and torpedoed the *Ancona* which sank after an additional 45 minutes.

"If any of the passengers lost their lives, this was due to the fault of the crew, because the steamer tried to escape after it had received orders to stop and then the crew only saved themselves and not the passengers.

"Reports published in the foreign press that the submarine fired on the *Ancona's* life boats are mendacious inventions. When the steamer stopped the submarine ceased firing."

As soon as the text of the Austrian Admiralty's statement was received all doubt as to the nationality of the submarine was removed. Rumors that it was really a German vessel were set at rest, and the Secretary was free to call Austria to account. Our Ambassador at Vienna was therefore furnished with a copy of the Italian note, and instructed to ask whether or not the Ancona was properly warned and if so how the warning was given. Whether or not the Ancona tried to escape, after warning shots were fired, and how long the firing continued. Whether or not any shots were fired after the Ancona settled, and if, as the Italian note asserted, the life boats were shelled while passengers were entering them or after the boats were in the water. And finally whether or not any efforts were made by the submarine commander to save the lives of the noncombatants, and if not, then why not.

The cable to Mr. Penfield, our Ambassador at Vienna, was passed by one from him embodying the text of a communication from the Austrian Foreign Office. This official statement differed in no respect from that issued by the Admiralty.

After patiently waiting three weeks for a note from Austria and receiving none the Secretary of State, on December 6, made

a demand for disavowal and reparation. Reliable information furnished by American and other survivors, passengers on the Ancona, shows, he said, that on November 7, a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag fired a solid shot towards the Ancona, that she attempted to escape, was chased, overhauled and stopped, and that after a brief period, before all the crew and passengers could take to the boats, a number of shells were fired at her, and she was finally torpedoed and sunk while many persons were still aboard, and that by gunfire and foundering American citizens lost their lives.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had been advised, through the correspondence between the United States and Germany, of the attitude of the United States "as to the use of submarines in attacking vessels of commerce, and of the acquiescence of Germany in that attitude; yet, with full knowledge on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the United States as expressed in no uncertain terms to the Ally of Austria-Hungary," the commander of the submarine had sunk the Ancona. The Government of the United States considered that he violated the principles of international law and humanity by shelling and torpedoing her before those on board had been placed in safety. His conduct could "only be characterized as wanton slaughter of defenseless noncombatants." As good relations must rest on a common regard for the laws of nations and humanity the Government of the United States could not "be expected to do otherwise than to demand that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the Ancona as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be punished, and that reparation be made for American citizens killed or injured by the attack."

• The Government of the United States expected Austria to "accede to its demand promptly, and it rests this expectation on the belief that the Austro-Hungarian Government will not sanction or defend an act which is condemned by the world as inhuman and barbarous, which is abhorrent to all civilized nations, and which has caused the death of innocent American citizens."

That a rupture of diplomatic relations would follow was

thought more than likely. In diplomacy, it was said, the word "demand" is a strong one, and has been twice used. In none of the notes hitherto addressed to any of the belligerent powers has language so direct and menacing appeared. The note had much the character of an ultimatum. Austria must now either accept or reject what is demanded. Which will she do?

One London newspaper referred to the note as "stern, uncompromising." Another, alluding to the mildness of the Lusitania note, thought that to Austria "would have been more impressive had it been addressed to the Power capable of injuring the United States instead of to its ally, from which the United States has nothing to fear." A third remarked that the President's description of the outrage and his demand were "perfectly justified; but would not both have been even more justified in the Lusitania case? However, one may congratulate the President on his novel vigor."

Reports from abroad set forth that the note had given great offense to the Austro-Hungarian Government, that it had aroused intense anger, and that diplomatic relations were soon to be broken; that Berlin was seeking to persuade Vienna to adjust the difficulty and that a high personage had left Berlin for Vienna "to assist in making the Austrians see the light."

As yet the Austro-Hungarian Government did not see the light, but still sitting in darkness replied December 15, 1915, that "the sharpness with which the Government of the United States considers it necessary to blame the commanding officer of the submarine concerned in the affair, and the firmness with which the demands addressed to the Imperial and Royal Government appear to be expressed, might well have warranted the expectation that the Government of the United States should precisely specify the actual circumstances of the affair upon which it bases its case.

"As it is not difficult to perceive, the presentation of the facts in the case in the aforesaid note leaves room for many doubts." But even if the presentation were correct in every respect, it did not "warrant attaching blame to the commanding officer of the war vessel, or to the Imperial and Royal Government."

"The Government of the United States has also failed to

designate the persons upon whose testimony it relies and to whom it apparently believes it may attribute a higher degree of credibility than to the commander of the Imperial and Royal fleet. The note also fails to give any information whatsoever as to the number, names, and more precise fate of the American citizens who were on board of the said steamer at the critical moment.

"However, in view of the fact that the Washington Cabinet has now made a positive statement to the effect that citizens of the United States of America came to grief in the incident in question, the Imperial and Royal Government is in principle ready to enter into an exchange of views."

It must however "raise the question why" the United States failed to give reasons for its demands in "reference to the special circumstances of the incriminating events upon which it lays stress, and why, in lieu thereof, it referred to an exchange of correspondence which it has conducted with another Government in other cases. The Imperial and Royal Government is the less able to follow the Washington Cabinet on this unusual path, since it by no means possesses authentic knowledge of all the pertinent correspondence of the United States nor is it of the opinion that such knowledge might be sufficient for it in the present case, which, so far as it is informed, is in essential points of another nature than the case or cases to which the Government of the United States seems to allude. The Imperial and Royal Government may, therefore, leave it to the Washington Cabinet to formulate the particular points of law against which the commanding officer of the submarine is alleged to have offended on the occasion of the sinking of the Ancona.

"The Government of the United States has also seen fit to refer to the attitude which the Berlin Cabinet assumed in the above mentioned correspondence. The Imperial and Royal Government find in the much esteemed note no indication whatever of the intent with which this reference was made." If, however, the United States "intended to express an opinion" that a precedent was thereby created for the guidance of the Imperial and Royal Government in its "judicial consideration of the affair in question, this Government must, in order to

preclude possible misunderstandings, declare that as a matter of course it reserves to itself full freedom of maintaining its own legal views in the discussion of the case of the Ancona."

Secretary Lansing in his "esteemed note" demanded that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the Ancona as an illegal and indefensible act; that the commander of the submarine be punished; and that an indemnity be paid for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured. Not one of them was answered.

Baron Burian, said the Neue Freie Presse, a Vienna journal, "has answered the uncouth note of the United States with careful reserve. The White House at Washington is not yet the Supreme Court of the whole world and its diction is not yet the verdict good for all time. The burden of proof rests upon the accuser. We await the proofs."

In Berlin the note was hailed with delight. "Something," the Gazette was sure, "has happened, only we don't exactly know what. At all events, in a very polite form the Austrian Foreign Office gives a receipt for Washington's 'very esteemed note.' The contents of the answer can be briefly summarized as 'What's all the noise about." The Kreuz Zeitung was much pleased at "the delicious way" in which Austria had imparted some elementary lessons in diplomatic procedure and wondered if the President and Secretary of State would "accept their defeat or sever diplomatic relations." The Neueste Nachrichten of Munich, thought that the dignified and business like tone of the answer offered a pleasant contrast "to the weakness of the reasoning on which Washington based its demands. The American Government in drafting its demands left itself uncovered at many points, but the diplomatic armor of the Austrian representative has not a weak spot."

The London press ridiculed the note as a careful evasion of the demands of the United States, an insult to American intelligence, "more or less veiled in diplomatic phraseology." "Austria's insolent reply to U. S. A." was a headline in one newspaper. Another pointed out "the extraordinary insolence of the Austrian reply," and was sure the note "could not have been sent without Germany's approval for nobody seriously doubts that in this campaign, as in all the rest of her policy, Austria is the subservient tool of her ally."

From the Washington headquarters of Labor's National Peace Council, whose activities were then under investigation by a Grand Jury at New York, came an attack on the Administration for its reported action in the Ancona case. The Council was "sternly opposed to any action on the part of the Administration which in secrecy leads or tends to lead this country up to the very verge of war with any country, and insists that no action should be taken by the State Department tending to break off diplomatic relations with any nation without the full knowledge and consent of Congress." That body, it said, "alone has the power to declare war, and any action on the part of the executive which involves the country in war or makes war inevitable is not only an invasion of the rights of Congress, but of the whole people of this country, and a direct violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States."

As soon as possible, on December 19, Mr. Lansing answered the Austrian note. On November 15, he said, Baron Zwiedinek, the Austrian chargé d'Affaires, transmitted a report of the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty on the sinking of the Ancona. In this report it was admitted that the Ancona was torpedoed after her engines had stopped and while passengers were still on board. This admission was sufficient to fix, on the commander of the submarine, "the responsibility for having willfully violated the recognized laws of nations, and entirely disregarded those humane principles which every belligerent should observe in the conduct of war at sea. In view of these admitted circumstances the Government of the United States feels justified in holding that the details of the sinking of the Ancona, the weight and character of the additional testimony corroborating the Admiralty's report, and the number of Americans killed or injured are in no way essential matters of discussion."

The rules of international law and the principles of humanity "thus willfully violated," were so manifest, and "so long and so universally recognized," that the Government of the United States "does not feel called upon to debate them," nor

did it understand that the Imperial and Royal Government disputed them.

"The Government of the United States therefore finds no other course open to it, but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible for the act of its naval commander and to renew the definite but respectful demands made in its communication of the sixth of December."

And now the Imperial and Royal Government in its turn surrendered and in a note of December 29 agreed "with the Washington Cabinet that even in war the sacred demands of humanity must be complied with;" agreed "that hostile private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety;" announced that "the officer has been punished in accordance with the rules in force in this matter, for exceeding his instructions," and promised such indemnity as the American citizens concerned were entitled to receive.

Much the greater part of the note, which was very long, was devoted to an elaborate and detailed account of the sinking. From the facts thus related Baron Burian claimed that "the information reaching the American Government that a solid shot was immediately fired towards the steamer," was incorrect; that she was not overhauled by pursuit; that shells were not fired at her after she had stopped, and that an unusually long time, forty-five minutes, was given to enable the passengers to take to the boats; and that after she was torpedoed another period of forty-five minutes elapsed before she quietly sank.

Nevertheless, the Imperial and Royal naval authorities had decided that the commander "had failed to take into due consideration the panic of the passengers, and the spirit of the rule of the Royal and Imperial Navy that officers must never refuse to help any one in distress, not even an enemy." The officer therefore had been punished for exceeding his instructions.

Investigation into the cause of the sinking of the Ancona "as a matter of course" could not determine "to what degree American citizens are entitled to a claim for indemnity." Austria could not be held responsible for injuries due to the "justified firing on the fleeing ship," nor for those caused by the cap-

sizing of the boats after they reached the water. The Imperial and Royal Government assumed that the Washington Cabinet was able and willing to supply information of the circumstances under which American citizens were injured. Should these circumstances be unknown because of lack of proper material evidence, the Imperial and Royal Government as a manifestation of its "friendly sentiments" would "overlook this gap" and extend the indemnity also to those injuries the direct cause of which could not be ascertained.

The text of the note was made public in our country on New

Year's Day, 1916, and was read with great satisfaction.

The threatened break with Austria-Hungary, it was said, has been averted by the full compliance of the dual monarchy with the demands of the United States. Not only are the important points of the demand squarely met, but indemnity is promised and assurance is given that no more ships will be sunk unless they flee or offer resistance. This is more far reaching and satisfactory than the assurance from Germany. She only pledged herself not to sink "liners" until the passengers were in the boats. We can now face the new year with renewed pride in our Government because of this great diplomatic success coming as a fitting climax to a year of real diplomatic achievements.

These high hopes were quickly dashed for, on January 2, the newspapers announced that the *Persia* had been sunk in the eastern Mediterranean by a submarine, that of 550 passengers and crew but 158 survived, and that among those drowned was the newly appointed American consul on his way to his

post at Aden, Arabia.

Coming so soon after positive assurance from the Austro-Hungarian Government that private ships, if they did not resist or flee, would not be torpedoed until persons on board had been placed in safety, this new act of frightfulness seemed like a deliberate breaking of the pledge, a wanton act of defiance. In great alarm the Austrian chargé, Baron Zwiedinek, made haste to explain. Judgment, he said, should be withheld during an investigation of the real facts surrounding the sinking of the Persia. It may have happened in many ways. It is not yet proved that a submarine sank her. If so, and the destroyer was an Austrian submarine, he was quite sure his Government

would not hesitate to settle the matter satisfactorily. It might be that circumstances warranted the action. From the White House came the statement that the President was taking every means in his power to obtain the facts, and would act just as soon as full information was at hand.

Much information was secured: but nothing that bore on the point in dispute. At Alexandria the American consul took the affidavits of many of the survivors; but not one of them had seen a submarine, or a torpedo.

Without waiting for action by the German Government, Count von Bernstorff, on January 7, 1916, brought to the Department of State a memorandum explaining the German method of conducting submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. From the beginning of the war, it stated, German submarine commanders in that sea had been ordered "to conduct cruiser warfare against enemy merchant vessels only in accordance with the general principles of international law." Measures "of reprisal, as applied in the war zone around the British Isles, were to be excluded." Merchant vessels in the Mediterranean therefore could be destroyed by submarines only after passengers and crews had "been accorded safety" provided the vessels did not attempt to escape or offer resistance. Destruction of such ships was officially investigated and so far as American interests are concerned the results would be sent to the American Government. "Thus also in the Persia case, if the circumstances should call for it." If submarine commanders did not obey orders they would be punished and reparation made for the death or injury of American citizens.

When investigation was made the German Government sent

When investigation was made the German Government sent assurances that it had heard from all its submarine commanders in the Mediterranean Sea, and that each reported that he had not attacked the *Persia*, and the Austrian chargé declared that no Austrian submarine commander, so far as heard from, had sunk the ship. In the absence of evidence from survivors, and in the face of such statements from Vienna and Berlin, the loss of an American life by the sinking of the *Persia* could not be made the subject of complaint. Perhaps a Turkish submarine had done the deed. Turkey was therefore asked concerning the

operations of her submarines and denied they had anything to do with the destruction of the Persia.

On the tenth of January, 1916, the newspapers announced that Count von Bernstorff and Secretary Lansing, who had been working for some time past for a settlement of the Lusitania question, had agreed on a tentative arrangement and sent it to the Foreign Office at Berlin. Although the utmost secrecy surrounded the negotiation the assertion was made that the draft as submitted by Germany made no mention of the warning issued by the German Embassy, and contained no admission of wrong doing on the part of the submarine commander who sank the Lusitania, and that for these reasons the proposal was rejected by the President. A new draft was therefore presented later in January. This too was rejected because, it was said, Germany had not consented to admit legal liability for the destruction of the Lusitania. Germany was willing to pay indemnity as an act of grace, but not as a matter of law or right as the United States insisted she should. Another draft was therefore drawn up and finally referred to Berlin. As summarized by those who claimed to know, the terms of the memorandum were that Germany was not called on to make a specific disavowal of the sinking of the Lusitania; that the destruction of the vessel was an act of reprisal recognized by international law, in retaliation for the illegal starvation blockade of Germany by Great Britain; that Germany recognized that while the sinking of the liner was a lawful reprisal, the consequent killing of innocent neutrals was an illegal and unlawful act: that realizing that the killing of American citizens was illegal Germany would pay indemnity; and that she had abandoned this form of reprisal and in future would not sink without warning.

On February 2, it was reported from Washington that new instructions had come from Berlin, that there was a reasonable hope of coming to an understanding; that important concessions had been made; that all danger of a break in diplomatic relations was over, and that from the German point of view all that the United States asked had been, in substance, granted. Reports from Berlin set forth that Germany could not and would not acknowledge the sinking of a liner by a submarine to be

illegal; that the new instructions to von Bernstorff contained merely a new formula by which it was hoped to satisfy Washington in this respect without humiliating Germany; that the word "illegal" was not in the formula, which in other respects went as far as possible toward meeting the wishes of America.

went as far as possible toward meeting the wishes of America.

Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, in an interview, said he hoped the formula would afford a possible base of settlement, for Germany had reached the limit of her concessions and under no circumstances would she concede that her campaign in the war zone was illegal. "The Government is willing to do everything in its power to meet American wishes, but there are limits beyond which even friendship snaps. I do not understand America's course. We thought the submarine issue settled, and the Lusitania question on the way to arrangement, had agreed to pay indemnity and all that, when the United States suddenly made its new demands, which it is impossible for us to accept."

His firm stand, made it was afterwards charged for home consumption, was heartily approved in Germany. The feeling was bitter against our country because of the shipment of munitions of war, and because of what was held to be our double standard of neutrality as shown by not pressing Great Britain as hard as Germany.

To the charge of Dr. Zimmermann, Secretary Lansing replied, "I doubt very much that Dr. Zimmermann made such a statement as he must know it is utterly false." The United States, the Secretary said, had not increased its demands over those in the notes of May 13, June 9, and July 12. In the first Lusitania note, that of May 13, 1915, are the words "disavow the act, make reparation and take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything as obviously subversive of the principles of warfare." The second note, that of June 9, 1915, "very earnestly and very solemnly" renewed the demands of the first. In that of July 21, our Government, taking the ground that the Imperial Government by pleading "the right of retaliation in defense of its acts" admitted their illegality, "could not believe" that it would "longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the

Lusitania." It was this demand for disavowal three times repeated that prevented settlement.

Rumors of a settlement now became current. The language of the new memorandum was said to have been approved, and the formula made broad enough to cover all that had been demanded in the *Lusitania* case, and only the most unexpected event could reopen discussion; but the rumors were false, the formula was not accepted and the issue still remains unsettled.

And now, Germany once more explained her position in the U-boat controversy, and March 8, 1916, the Department of State received an undated memorandum. The Imperial Government, Count von Bernstorff said, because of the friendly relations which had always existed between the two great nations, and earnestly desiring to continue them, wished to explain the U-boat question once more to the American Government. At the opening of the war, the German Government, acting on the suggestion of the United States, expressed willingness to ratify the Declaration of London. Great Britain on the other hand declined, began to restrict the lawful trade of neutrals as a blow at Germany, extended the list of contraband articles, and by an order of the Admiralty declared the whole North Sea a war zone within which merchant ships would be in serious danger from mines and men of war. Protests from neutrals were of no avail, and thenceforth neutral trade with Germany was dead. Under these conditions Germany was forced to resort to reprisals and chose for that purpose a new weapon, the submarine boat. As both belligerents claimed that their acts were "in retaliation for the violation of international law by their opponents, the American Government approached both" in the hope of reëstablishing international law as it had been before the war. "Germany was asked to adapt her new weapon to rules" which applied to the old naval weapons. Great Britain was asked not to cut off "the food supplies intended for the noncombatant German population and to admit their distribution under American supervision." Germany expressed her willingness to comply; England declined. Nevertheless, Germany after "neutral citizens had lost their lives against the wish and intention of the German Government,"

complied with the wishes of the American Government in the use of submarines.

"Thus England made it impossible for submarines to conform with the old rules of international law by arming nearly all merchantmen, and by ordering the use of guns on merchant vessels for attack," and supplemented the order by "instructions to the masters of such ships to hoist false flags and to ram the boats." Finally "the principle of the United States not to keep their citizens off belligerent ships has been used by Great Britain and her Allies to arm merchant ships for offensive purposes."

"Now Germany is facing the following facts": A blockade contrary to international law which has cut off neutral trade from her ports; an extension of contraband provisions in violation of international law, which for eighteen months has hampered the overseas trade of neighboring neutral countries; and the interception of mails in violation of international law. "Following the principle of 'might before right,' England had prevented neutral trade on land with Germany so as to complete the blockade of the Central Powers intended to starve their civil population," and by arming merchant vessels for offensive purposes had made it impossible for Germany to use U-boats "according to the principles set forth in the London Declaration."

On March 23, the Allies, through their representatives in Washington, replied to Mr. Lansing's request that they disarm their merchantmen, and declared themselves unwilling to give up their "acknowledged right to arm," or to "agree that, upon a non-guaranteed German promise, human life may be surrendered defenseless to the mercy of an enemy who, in circumstances of this kind as in many others, has shown himself to be both faithless and lawless."

The very next day a German submarine gave a fine illustration of the worthlessness of German pledges by torpedoing without warning an unarmed passenger steamer while crossing the Channel.

The torpedoed vessel was the French passenger steamer Sussex, regularly employed in transporting travelers between Folkestone and Dieppe. She left Folkestone about half past

one o'clock on the afternoon of March 24, 1916, with a crew of 53 men and 325 or more passengers, of whom some 25 were American citizens. She carried no armament, had never been used as a troop ship, and was following a route not taken by vessels transporting troops from England to France. At ten minutes before three o'clock, when the Sussex was some thirteen miles from Dungeness, the captain saw, one hundred and fifty meters off the port side of his ship, the wake of a torpedo, and gave orders to port the helm and stop the engines, hoping to swing the Sussex to starboard and allow the torpedo to pass along the port bow. Before she could be turned sufficiently to prevent her crossing the path of the torpedo it struck her just forward of the bridge, exploded and tore away the forward part of the vessel as far back as the first water tight bulkhead, killing or wounding some eighty persons. Such was the story

of the captain.

The story of two American survivors as given in an affidavit sets forth that about five minutes after three, when the Sussex was about an hour and a half out from Folkestone, there was a loud explosion; that wreckage and tons of water were thrown into the air; that when the affiants went forward they saw that the forward part of the vessel including the bridge and foremast were gone, and that many persons had been killed and others had been thrown or had jumped into the water. Six life boats were lowered, but, finding the ship did not sink, they were later recalled, and taken aboard. Near midnight a French trawler took off the women and children and some men, and carried them to Boulogne. A British torpedo boat removed the remainder of the passengers and crew and carried them to The Sussex was towed into the harbor of Boulogne. A careful and thorough examination of the vessel both inside and out, by naval and military officers of the United States, attached to our Embassy at Paris, and the finding of fifteen fragments of what seemed to be a torpedo, established the fact that it was a torpedo and not a mine that almost destroyed the Sussex. Indeed, when the fragments were compared with German torpedoes in England, no doubt remained that they were parts not merely of a torpedo, but of one "made in Germany." More sinkings now followed in rapid succession. The Englishman, and the Manchester Engineer, with Americans aboard, were reported sunk, and because the Government could do nothing before facts had been obtained, Ambassador Gerard was instructed to inquire of the German Government if the Sussex, the Englishman and the Manchester Engineer had been destroyed by submarines. Investigation by the German Admiralty was begun but before any reply was made to the American request news came that the steamers Berwindvale and Eagle Point with Americans on board had been torpedoed, and Germany was asked if they were sunk by submarines. "Who on earth in Germany cares," said a Hamburg newspaper, "whether these ships were torpedoed by German submarines or not? They belonged to and were used by the enemy and were destroyed. That is all we care about at this moment."

In the Reichstag resolutions were adopted declaring that "Germany's sea warfare should be carried out by all means most instrumental in securing a successful issue of the war." In the course of debate leaders of all parties called for unrestricted submarine warfare. A National Liberal said, "America has interpreted the idea of neutrality in a manner incompatible with the German conception. It is an unjustifiable demand that armed merchantmen should be permitted to sail unhindered within the war zone." A Conservative member asserted that "the German people are firmly resolved to disregard the unjustifiable demands of America." A leader of the Center complained that the people, press and Government of the United States had shown by their acts that they sympathized with England and not with Germany.

Little surprise, therefore, was expressed when reports from Berlin announced that Germany would enter a flat denial that a submarine had sunk the Sussex, and that in a day or two Ambassador Gerard would be handed the note. The report proved to be true and on April 13, 1916, the note was made public.

On March 16, said the note, a steamer "which possibly was the *Berwindvale*" was met, in sight of Bull Rock on the Irish Coast, by a submarine running unsubmerged, attempted to escape, was warned by a shot, put out all lights and continued to flee, was fired on, forced to halt and then lowered her boats. After the crew had entered them and rowed away she was sunk. Her name was unknown but as she "was a tank steamer like the *Berwindvale* the identity of the ship may be assumed." The steamer *Englishman* off the west coast of "Islay Heb-

The steamer Englishman off the west coast of "Islay Hebrides" was summoned to stop, on March 24, but went on, was fired on and "after an extended chase" made to halt. When the crew had taken to the boats she also was sunk. That the Manchester Engineer was destroyed by a submarine was doubtful. More information therefore was asked. The account of the sinking of the Eagle Point, as told in the German note, was much the same. She had been warned, chased, fired on, made to halt and when the crew were in the boats, was sunk.

As to the Sussex, the facts, gathered with much difficulty, were, that on March 24, "a long black craft without a flag, having a gray funnel, small gray forward works and two high masts, was encountered about the middle of the English Channel, by a German submarine." The "plain unbroken deck," the form of the stern, "sloping downwards and backwards like a war vessel;" the "high speed developed" and her color, "like a war vessel," led the commander of the submarine to believe she was a war vessel, and "indeed a mine layer." Therefore she was attacked while the submarine was submerged. "The torpedo struck and caused such a violent explosion in the forward part of the ship that the entire forward part was torn away to the bridge." The violence of the explosion justified the belief that "great amounts of munitions were aboard."

The German commander made a sketch of the vessel, "two drawings of which" were enclosed as were two pictures of the Sussex, "reproduced photographically from the English paper, the Daily Graphic, of the 27th ultimo."

A comparison of the picture and the sketch showed, the note said, such differences in the positions of the stacks and shape of the sterns, that the eraft attacked could not be the Sussex. As no other attack by submarines occurred at the time she was on the Folkestone—Dieppe route "the German Government must therefore assume that the injury to the Sussex is attributable to another cause than an attack by a German submarine." Such a cause might be a mine, for "no less than 26 English mines were exploded by shots by German naval forces on April

1 and 2, alone. The entire sea is, in fact, endangered by float-

ing mines and by torpedoes, that have not sunk."

Should any difference of opinion arise "between the two Governments, the German Government now declares itself ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed commissions of investigation in accordance with the third title of The Hague Agreement for the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflicts, November 18, 1907."

April 18, the newspapers asserted that the President would address Congress on the submarine issue on the nineteenth; that it was expected "he would not mince words"; but, after reciting the long list of offenses committed against us by Germany, would declare her guilty of bad faith, no more worthy

to be considered a friend, and would announce that diplomatic relations with her were ended.

When the people opened their newspapers on the morning of the nineteenth they found the note to Germany printed in full, and learned that it would be in Berlin before the President met Congress.

Information in the possession of the Government, the President said, fully established the facts in the case of the Sussex. "A careful, detailed and scrupulously impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender, and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture."

If the sinking of the Sussex were an isolated case the Government of the United States might hope that the officer responsible for the deed "had willfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions" required. On the contrary, the Government of the United States was forced to conclude "that it is only one instance" of "the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended."

The President then reviewed the German war zone order of February, 1915, the earnest protest of the United States, the grounds on which the protest rested, and continued, "In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries," German submarine commanders had carried on "practices of ruthless destruction" which the German Government could not restrain "as it had hoped and promised" to do. "Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity." Vessels owned by neutrals, bound from neutral port to neutral port, had been destroyed "in constantly increasing numbers." Some had been warned before they were attacked; sometimes their passengers and crews "had been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats." But again and again no warning had been given and "great liners like the Lusitania and Arabic and mere passenger boats like the Sussex have been attacked without a moment's warning" and "in a manner which the Government of the United States cannot but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification."

The "roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds."

The Government through all this repetition of tragedy after tragedy had been most patient. It had striven to be guided by "sentiments of genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany." It had accepted every explanation and assurance as "given in entire sincerity and good faith." It had "hoped even against hope" that the German Government would be able "so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations." It had "made every allowance for unprecedented conditions." It had "been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation."

"It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come." If therefore it was still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, there was but one course for the Government of the United States to pursue.

"Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no other choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

An appendix to the note gave the evidence, affidavits of survivors, reports from the Captain of the Sussex and the American officers who examined her wreek, statements from the British Admiralty and the French Foreign Office and descriptions of the fifteen pieces of metal, all of which went to prove that the Sussex was struck by a German torpedo.

The speech to Congress was a review of our relations with Germany, but what the President said added little to the contents of the note. Indeed, whole passages were quoted from it word for word.

By those who heard the address it was received with approval and disapproval. Some thought the issue was a matter for the President and not for Congress to settle; that the address pointed to a very grave situation; that the President could not have done less under the circumstances; that it was a mere statement of facts and might as well have been given to the newspapers so far as Congressional action was concerned; that coming after the note had been sent, the address was wholly unnecessary; that the situation was serious, but that breaking diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war unless another case like the Sussex occurred; that the time to have threatened the breaking of diplomatic relations was when Belgium was invaded, or the Lusitania sunk; that "the President has never been neutral. He has been on the English side all the time. What he said about Germany, while it is grossly exaggerated, is a just complaint. But he could say just as much about England, by substituting 'seizing ships' for 'sinking ships'," that "the President has issued his ultimatum and now asks Congress to sustain him. He has told Germany that she must abandon submarine warfare, a modern institution that no nation would for a single moment think of abandoning. I

know it is popular to say, 'stand by the President.' I propose to stand by that President when he is right, but in this instance a nation fighting for her national life is not going to be harassed or hounded by ancient, antiquated, antediluvian international laws that have been resurrected at Germany's expense."

The German language press was outspoken against the President. The New York Staats-Zeitung held it to be "unthinkable that the German Government should recognize" the President as the spokesman of all neutral nations, "and grant the peremptory demands of the President as long as the cause for the inauguration of this submarine warfare, the illegal British blockade," remained in force, "and as long as British inhumanity against the civilian noncombatant population of Germany is continued." "The President has brought about a diplomatic situation which must involve the United States in a war with Germany unless Congress intercedes in proper time."

The Illinois Staats-Zeitung was "not aware that Mr. Wilson ever received a mandate to represent humanity, and if he did he ought to return his retainer, for he never represents humanity, but the interests of ammunition makers." The Cincinnati Freie Presse declared that "Wall Street wants war, and Morgan wants it, but the majority of the American people want no war, especially no war with a nation that has been our friend for a hundred years."

The American press the country over approved the address and the stand the President had taken. The patience of the country, it was said, had been strained far beyond the point where the forbearance of other nations would have ceased. Only an accumulation of grievances, only a repeated violation of pledges, made to us by the German Government, has at last brought the President to the breaking point. It is now for Germany to decide whether or not her barbarous conduct is to continue. The President does not seek war. There can be no war unless Germany commits an overt act of war. If that is what Berlin is bent upon nothing the United States can do will prevent it, save shame and submission, a price no great nation would ever pay. Whatever disposition fate may make of the present emergency, the people will support the President with every resource they command.

German-Americans, however, were active in their opposition, and members of Congress from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, having German constituencies, received hundreds of telegrams protesting against a break with Germany.

The London press expressed the opinion that there was now no retreat for either party, and that Germany must either yield or fight. That she would yield was not expected. America had now practically taken her place beside the civilized nations of the earth. In Paris the press took the same view. "France," said one, "awaits calmly the eventual rupture. America could not give us greater sympathy than she has already shown, but we will feel moral joy to see that noble nation break all relations with a nation of pirates which precipitated the present world tragedy."

The Berlin press, as reports from Geneva announced, was angry. Germany, the Tages Zeitung declared, would never yield to America because of Wilson's bluff. "The attitude of the American press is in comical contrast to the really effective power of that country. When the sword of Damocles remains too long suspended we can see it is only a wooden one." The Berlin Post had "heard enough of silly reproaches leveled at us by America's seagoing citizens. If Washington gentlemen believe we have nothing more important to do than to investigate whether any cattle driver had a lock of his precious hair ruffled while crossing to Europe, then the people in the White House are terribly mistaken. Why do Americans choose ships in which they can be hurt? Does the American Government deny that there are rascals among America's sons? If such rascals are paid with British gold to make dangerous ocean trips, why should Wilson make us responsible for their lives?" "We did not sink the Sussex," said Admiral von Holtzen-

"We did not sink the Sussex," said Admiral von Holtzendorff, of the German Admiralty, in an interview with the agents of the United Press. "I am as confident of that as of anything which has happened in this war. Many of our submarines have returned from rounding up British vessels. They sighted scores of passenger ships going between England and America, but not one of these was touched." "We have definitely agreed to warn the crews and passengers of passenger liners. We have lived up to that promise in every way, but we

cannot be asked to regard freight ships in the same manner." "If diplomatic relations with America are broken our submarines can attack an enemy ship without warning. But we have no desire for a break with the United States. That would be insanity. We shall not bring it about despite our desire to push vigorously our submarine warfare."

The reply from von Jagow was dated May 4. The German Government, it said, had turned over to the proper naval authorities the evidence submitted by the Government of the United States concerning the Sussex, and by the results of the investigation was led to believe it possible that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10, as having been torpedoed, was the Sussex. But the German Government must reserve "further communication until it had settled certain points" of decisive importance for establishing the facts in the case. Should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to be a man-of-war the German Government will not fail to draw the consequence resulting therefrom.

The Government of the United States, von Jagow went on to say, had made "the assertion that the incident is to be considered but one instance of a deliberate method of indiscriminate destruction of vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations, by German submarine commanders. The German Government must emphatically repudiate the assertion."

But the German Government would not discuss the matter "more particularly as the Government of the United States omitted to substantiate the assertion by reference to concrete facts." It would only state that "far reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon" had been imposed solely "in consideration of neutral" interest in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of disadvantage to Germany's interests. No such consideration for neutrals had ever been shown by Great Britain or her allies.

"The German submarine forces had, in fact, orders to conduct submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels as recognized by international law, the sole exception being the

¹Dispatch of C. W. Ackerman, correspondent of United Press, Philadelphia Ledger, April 22, 1916.

conduct of warfare against the enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships that are encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain. With regard to these no assurance has ever been given to the Government of the United States. . . .

"The German Government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the Government of the United States," and fully takes into account that both Governments had for years sought to confine warfare on sea and on land to the armed forces of the belligerents and to safeguard, as far as possible, noncombatants against the horrors of war.

"But, although those considerations are of great weight, they alone would not, under the present circumstances, have determined the attitude of the German Government." it was not Germany but the British Government that "has extended this terrible war to the lives and property of noncombatants." . . . "In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for her national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare. As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate its regret that the sentiments of humanity which the Government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to the many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intentions of the British Government. shall be starved and who, by their sufferings, shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into ignominious capitulation. The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination." . . . "The German people know that the Government of the United States has the power to confine this war to the armed forces of the belligerent countries in the interest of humanity and the maintenance of international law," by insisting "against Great Britain on its incontestable rights to the freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for her existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon, and while making the compliance with these demands a condition for the maintenance

of relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against the illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people know to what a considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States."

But the German Government had no desire that the submarine question under discussion should "take a turn seriously threatening the maintenance of peace between the two nations. As far as it lies with the German Government it wishes to prevent things taking such a course." Therefore, guided by this idea, it "notifies the Government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless those ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

"But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law." Therefore, "in consequence of the new orders," the German Government did "not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law" as laid down in the American notes to Great Britain on December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. "Should the steps be taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision."

As understood by the people, the note seemed to mean that Germany was desirous to avoid a break with the United States; that the Imperial Government sought to convey the impression that its new instructions to submarine commanders was a full compliance with the demands of the United States, and that they were made in good faith. But there was good

reason to believe, in view of the record of the past, that the spirit and perhaps the letter of the instructions would not be carried out very long. On the other hand, there were expressions and passages in the note that were offensive. "Must emphatically repudiate" the assertion that the destruction of the Sussex was but an instance of a deliberate destruction of vessels was too strong. The "regret" that the sentiments of humanity expressed for victims of submarine warfare were not extended to the many millions, women and children, Great Britain sought to starve was a little too ironical.

By the press the note was generally condemned. The new pledge had a "string tied to it" and would not be kept unless we forced Great Britain to lift her blockade. British violations affected only property, and could be atoned for with money. Those of Germany affected human life and could not be atoned for with money. Manifestly the tone of the note was intended for Berlin; the substance for Washington. All told, it had the appearance of being as little conciliatory as words could make it. "The German Government makes damnable faces all through its note, but the central thing required by President Wilson it yields." Knowing the difficulties which beset the German Government, we could therefore well afford to overlook what under other circumstances would be impudence. The concession was conditional, but it would bring the conduct of submarine warfare into accord with our demands. Expressions of opinion by forty-five daily newspapers of importance, the Philadelphia Ledger declared, showed, while eighteen approved and twelve were noncommittal, fifteen were outspoken in their disapproval.2 Extracts from ten German language newspapers 3 showed that, in their opinion, Germany had gone more than halfway in an effort to meet Ameri-The Toledo German Express considered the note "not an ultimatum, but on the contrary a sincere and renewed effort not to have the peaceful relations of the last hundred years" severed. The Louisville Anzeiger called the note a clear, frank, fearless exposition "in which, while the German Government virtually accedes to American demands," it "at the

² Philadelphia Ledger, May 6, 1916. ³ Ibid.

same time turns the issue neatly and leaves the final decision with the United States."

The special concession thus wrung from Germany after months of constant protest and negotiation was small, indeed. Enemy freight ships found in the war zone were not to be stopped, visited, searched and destroyed according to the principles of international law; other merchant ships, if they did not resist or attempt to escape, were to have the benefit of the principles of visit, search and destruction as prescribed by international law; but neutrals would not be granted even this concession if Great Britain were permitted "to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the principles of international law." Yet it was of real importance to force Germany to pledge herself to conduct her submarine warfare "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels," for it was an admission that hitherto she had not done so. But was this pledge worth anything with the condition attached? The President and his Cabinet thought not, and on May 8, 1916, Secretary Lansing replied with a note, made public on May 9, in which "the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries," was accepted and the condition expressly rejected.

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth instant appear to be susceptible of that construction."

"In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made con-

tingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

Meantime on May 8, 1916, the German Government finished its investigation and in a note to Mr. Gerard acknowledged that a German submarine damaged the Sussex. "On the basis of the American material," said von Jagow, "the German Government cannot withhold its conviction that the ship torpedoed by the German submarine is in fact identical with the Sussex, for in accordance with this material the place, the time, and the effect of the explosion by which the Sussex was damaged agree in the essential details with the statements of the German commander, so that there can no longer be any question of the possibility of two independent occurrences." Undoubtedly the German submarine commander thought he "was facing an enemy warship."

But he formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict instruction which called on him to exercise

particular care.

"In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits that the assurances given to the American Government" that "passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning has not been adhered to in the present instance." Therefore, the German Government expressed "its sincere regret regarding the deplorable incident and declares its readiness to pay an indemnity." The note closed with the expression of a "hope that the American Government will consider the case of the Sussex as settled by these statements."

CHAPTER IX

PREPAREDNESS AND PACIFISTS

While the Department of State was busy with the case of the Ancona, Congress assembled and listened to the annual speech of the President. He had much to say concerning our policy towards Mexico; fuller justice for the Philippines and Porto Rico; a great merchant marine; more revenue that we might "pay as we go"; a commission to canvass the question of proper regulation of railroads; and the mobilization of the resources of the country, and asked for laws for the punishment of citizens who, "born under other flags, but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America," had "poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life," and sought "to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue."

But the portion of his speech which aroused the widest interest was that in which he asked for preparedness for national defense.

No one who understood the spirit of our people, he said, could fail to perceive "that their passion is for peace." Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war. We regard war merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression. We will not maintain a standing army except for uses as necessary in times of peace as in times of war. But we do believe in a body of free citizens ready and sufficient to take care of themselves and of the Government they have set up to serve them. But war has never been a mere matter of men and guns. If our citizens are to fight effectively they must know how modern fighting is done and what to do when the summons comes, and the Government

must give them the training they need in order to eare for themselves and it.

With these ideas in mind plans had been prepared by the Department of War "for more adequate national defense," which Congress was urged "to sanction and put into effect as soon as they can be properly scrutinized and discussed."

The President would have the standing force of the regular army increased from 108,013 officers and men to 141,843, rank and file, and supplemented by "a force of 400,000 disciplined citizens raised in increments of 133,000 a year throughout a period of three years." The men should be volunteers and bind themselves to serve with the colors for two months during each of the three years for purpose of training. Their three periods of training over, they would be required to serve three years more on furlough and be ready to join the colors at call at any time. "At least so much by way of preparation for defense seems to me to be absolutely imperative now. We cannot do less," said the President.

Turning to preparedness in the navy, the President continued, we have always looked to it "as our first line of defense, we have always seen it to be our manifest course of prudence to be strong on the sea." His plan, therefore, called for the building within five years of ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifteen fleet submarines, eighty-five coast submarines, four gunboats, one hospital, two ammunition, two fuel oil ships, and one repair ship. There should be 7,500 sailors, 2,500 apprentice seamen and 1,500 marines added to the personnel of the navy and at least 300 midshipmen to the Academy at Annapolis. Authority should be given to appoint for engineering duty only graduates of engineering colleges, and for service in the aviation corps a certain number of men taken from civil life.

As the two Houses settled down to the routine business of the session the effect of the President's appeal for national preparedness for defense and his attack on disloyal citizens born under other flags than ours became quickly apparent. Senator Kenyon offered a resolution that, whereas it was apparent from the President's speech that he desired revenue to be raised for an elaborate system of national defense, and the general welfare of the United States had been imperiled by the manufacture and shipment of munitions of war in large quantities to foreign nations, and the policy of preparedness advocated by the President had been made necessary, if at all, by the irritation caused to other nations by the shipment of arms and munitions of war; and whereas a few manufacturers of arms and munitions had made enormous profits thereby, and the country none at all; and whereas prosperity based on profits from the making of instrumentalities to kill people could not be a lasting prosperity, justice required that those making huge profits should pay the expenses made necessary by their gains; therefore, taxation should be laid on arms and munitions of war to such an extent as to produce sufficient revenue to pay for preparedness.

Senator Gore introduced two bills. One prohibited belligerent vessels from transporting American citizens as passengers to or from ports in the United States; and American and neutral vessels from carrying American citizens and contraband of war at one and the same time. The other forbade the issuance of passports for use on vessels of a belligerent country. Under existing laws, both national and international, the Senator said, every American citizen has the legal right to travel on any passenger vessel that sails the seas. He has the legal, not the moral right, to run the risk of involving this nation in war and causing the sacrifice of millions of lives and billions of treasure. So long as the legal right exists it must be defended, at whatever cost, for our Government cannot suffer the rights of its citizens to be invaded with impunity. He believed this right should be suspended. Great Britain during the Russo-Japanese War had warned her subjects to keep off belligerent ships. Here was a precedent; but we had one of our own making, for the President had ordered American citizens to abandon their homes and business and leave Mexico.

Senator Lodge now applied to the Legislative Reference Division of the Library of Congress for information as to when the British Government warned its subjects not to travel on belligerent ships. The reply was that the statement originated in a letter from a C. L. Schlens, published in the New York Sun, July 30, 1915. The British consulate at Shanghai, China, during the Russo-Japanese War, the writer said, issued this notice: "All subjects of the Crown are notified that the British Government will not undertake to be responsible for the safety of any British subject leaving this port on a ship of either of the belligerent nations." August 7, 1915, this notice under the heading, "An English Precedent for Wilson," was copied and commented on by the Gaelic American; found its way, accredited to the Gaelic American, into a book published in Richmond and entitled, "Documents on the War of Nations, by C. L. Droste"; appeared in The Fatherland of February 16, 1916, under the heading "The Warning," and finally in the Outlook. The British Embassy was now applied to for information, inquired of the Foreign Office, and answered that the statement was untrue. The Foreign Office had never heard that any consular office had ever issued such a notice. If so, it acted contrary to instructions never to give advice to merchants or other persons. No such name as C. L. Schlens appeared in the New York City Directory for 1915.

On another day Mr. Gardner in the House declared there were three groups of persons who opposed preparedness, pacifists, cotton kings, who sought to cut off ammunition from Great Britain because she cut off their cotton from Germany, and German-Americans who said: "American helps the Allies, so, by hook or by crook, by laws or by strikes, by torpedoes or by mines, by gold or by dynamite, we will do everything we can to prevent the ammunition reaching the Allies." To this Mr. Longworth of Ohio indignantly replied and said that in purity of motives, in lawfulness of acts, the German-Americans were the peers of any body of American citizens, and the House applauded.

From the legislature of Georgia now came a joint resolution approving, and pledging it to support, the principles for practical and adequate preparedness urged by the President in his Manhattan Club speech. Any plan of preparedness ought to include economic development of the country. Georgia, therefore, called attention to the importance of her great water power, and objected to the concentration of muni-

¹ Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3514-3516.

tion plants along the coast from Connecticut to Virginia. Senator Owen offered a resolution authorizing the President to invite the nations of the world to send delegates to meet in Washington, in May, 1916, in conference to make more certain, and properly declare, the rules of international law and propose the means of enforcing them. Each nation should have one vote for each 5,000,000 of its inhabitants, but none should have more than twenty.

From all parts of the country, from all sorts of societies, associations, organizations, leagues, from Farmers' Unions, Chambers of Commerce, religious bodies, from Workers' Unions, and from the legislatures of Rhode Island and Virginia which sent instructions to their Senators, came petitions for and against an embargo on the export of arms and munitions. One, from The Organization of American Women for Strict Neutrality, with headquarters at Baltimore, presented by Senator Kenyon on January 27, 1916, was, he told the Senate, fifteen and a half miles long and bore the signatures of a million men and women, inhabitants of every State in the It was brought from Baltimore in a huge moving van, was composed of a thousand rolls, each tied with red, white and blue ribbon, and was carried into the Senate Chamber in twenty clothes baskets. The signers declared they protested, for humane reasons, against the exportation from our country of "the things that kill," for the use of nations engaged in the present conflict. To sell arms and munitions to the belligerents might be legally right, but was morally wrong; while an embargo on the exportation of arms was both legally and morally right, and was supported by precedent. President Taft had forbidden the export of arms to Mexico in 1912, President Wilson had followed his example in 1913, and Great Britain and Germany had not allowed munitions to be exported during our war with Spain.

Of all the workers for an embargo on the exportation of arms and munitions, the most active, persistent and effective was the German organization known as the American Embargo Conference at Chicago. How it worked was made known to the Senate one day in April, 1916, by Senator Husting, of Wisconsin. "I have here," he said, "some letters and tele-

grams sent to me which I think might be of interest to the Senate, and to the people. I want first to offer about one thousand letters which I received some time in February, and ask to have the Secretary read one of them. They are all identical." The letter, signed by a German, was from Montello, Wisconsin, under date of February 9, 1916. "I am addressing this appeal to you, as my representative in the upper house of Congress, to support the resolution placing an embargo upon the further shipment of arms and ammunition to the belligerent nations of Europe. . . . I would point out to you that the large majority of the Wisconsin Congressional delegation is in favor of the embargo resolution, . . . and I feel that these men are convinced that their constituents want an embargo, and with this the situation in our State I respectfully request that you will give the embargo your support."

To show the source of the thousand similar letters the Senator then had read a letter not addressed to him but forwarded by one who had received it. It was a circular letter sent out by the American Embargo Conference from Chicago, dated February 9, 1916, and asked if the receiver would not "join with us in the effort being made to induce United States Senator Paul O. Husting, of your State, to join with practically all the other members of the Wisconsin Congressional delegation in the work of bringing about such an embargo.

"Believing that you feel with hundreds of thousands of our members that the United States should at least have no hand in the war, and should not be reaping a harvest of bloodstained money, and that you stand for a real and genuine neutrality for this nation, we are sending you with this letter some letters addressed to Senator Husting.

"They are ready to be dated and signed and should then be placed in separate envelopes and mailed as personal letters."

No attention was paid to them at that time; but in April the State Department was exchanging notes with Germany on the Sussex incident, the country was aroused, and there came to Senator Husting a flood of telegrams, from New York, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, and places in Wisconsin hundreds of miles apart, all dated April 24, 1916, and drafted according to one or another of seven forms. One form read:

"Your constituents urge and expect you to stand like a rock against the passing frenzy of insane and cruel folly on the part of the small portion of interested persons who are clamoring for war. We want peace. Nothing warrants any other action."

Another form read: "Will you let me assure you that the great majority of your constituents stand for peace, believe war now unnecessary and uncalled for, and will resent being participated into the European conflict." Scores upon scores in this form coming from places far apart contained the word "participated," showing they had a common origin. A letter and inclosure from a constituent to Senator Husting proved they all originated with the American Embargo Conference.

The letter from the Conference read:

"Feeling confident that as one of the patriotic citizens of the United States you are anxious to see this country held out of the present terrible war in Europe, we are making this extraordinary appeal to you because we know from the most positive information that is possible to be obtained at this time that the situation warrants it.

"We cannot find words strong enough to tell you of the gravity of the situation, and we assure you in the most earnest manner possible that the only way in which this country can keep from becoming involved is an immediate and great expression of the real sentiment

of the people of the country who want peace.

"We also most solemnly assure you that it is too late to mail an expression of this sentiment to Washington. It must be telegraphed. We have prepared night letters to be signed by the voters. At the top of this sheet we ask that you hold these sheets until we give you notice to telegraph them. Now we ask that you have the night letters signed as rapidly as possible and that you send them from the telegraph office without a moment's delay. . . . Then send the bills to us and a check will be mailed you immediately." ²

Inclosed in this letter was a sheet on which were seven forms of night letters, from which had been selected the forms of the "two or three hundred thousand" telegrams received by the Senator. Other Senators had been favored in the same way. A Senator from Kansas had that morning received 35 on form one; 27 on form two; 15 on form three; 9 on form

Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, p. 6891.

four; 30 on form five, and 20 on form six, all from Kansas City. Another Senator had received 4,000.

Well aware that his plan would be bitterly opposed in Congress, in his own party and by a large part of the people, especially in the Middle West, the President in January, 1916, set forth on a speaking tour that he might in this way explain the need of national preparedness and appeal for support directly to his fellow countrymen. The first speeches were made at New York City on January 27, one before the Clerical Conference of the New York Federation of Churches, another before the Motion Picture Board of Trade, and the third before the Railway Business Men's Association.

January 28, the President set off on his tour of the Middle West, spoke at Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and on the thirty-first reached Milwaukee. There he was in the hotbed of Socialism, in a city whose population was largely German-American and strongly pro-German. To them he said:

"I know that you are depending upon me to keep this nation out of war. So far I have done so, and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I will—if it is possible.

"You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothing stains or impairs the honor of the United States. And that is a matter not within my control. That depends upon what others do, not upon what the Government of the United States does, and therefore there may be at any moment a time when I cannot both preserve the honor and the peace of the United States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory thing, but stand ready, and insist that everybody who represents you should stand ready, to provide the means for maintaining the honor of the United States."

From Milwaukee the President passed to Chicago and Des Moines, where he said to the crowd that gathered to hear him: "America cannot be an ostrich with its head in the sand. America cannot shut itself out from the rest of the world, because all the dangers at this present moment, and they are many, come from her contact with the rest of the world." He had not come to tell his hearers that there was danger to our national life from anything the Government might do, but to tell them that "there is danger to our national life from what other nations may do." And if something did happen,

"do you want the situation to be such that all the President can do is to write messages, to utter words of protest? If these breaches of international law which are in daily danger of occurring should touch the very vital interests and honor of the United States, do you wish to do nothing about it? Do vou wish to have all the world say that the flag of the United States, which we all love, can be stained with impunity?"

At Davenport the President denied that munition makers had anything to do with the policy of the Government. At Kansas City he said "there may come a time, I pray God it may never come, but it may, in spite of everything we can do, come upon us, and come of a sudden, when I shall have to ask. 'I have had my say, who stands back of me?' Where is the force by which the majority and rights of the United States are to be maintained and asserted?"

"I have seen editorials written in more than one part of the United States sneering at the number of notes that were being written from the State Department to the foreign Governments and asking, 'Why does not the Government act?' And in those same papers I have seen editorials against the preparation to do anything effective if those notes are not regarded. Is that the temper of the United States?"

When St. Louis was reached the tour came to an end. There the President said: "So far as America is concerned, no man need go about preaching peace. We are disciples of peace already. But suppose my neighbor's house is on fire, and my roof is of combustible shingles, and the fire eats into the wood?" The danger was not from within, but from without. "And I am bound to tell you that danger is constant and immediate, not because anything new has happened, not because there has been any change in our international relationship within the last several weeks or months, but because the danger comes with every turn of events." Commanders of submarines had their instructions; but one reckless commander of a submarine, putting his own construction on what his Government told him to do, "might set the world on fire." . . . "Speaking with all solemnity, I assure you there is not a day to be lost. . . . This month should not go by without something decisive being done."

The return of the President to Washington was quickly followed by the resignation of Mr. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War. Since the opening of the year the House Committee on Military Affairs had been busy on a bill for national defense. Hearings had been held, experts had testified, and though they differed on many points, agreed that the military power of the country should be greatly increased at once. As to what should be the strength of the Regular Army differences in opinion were slight. But great differences existed as to the character of the force by which it was to be supported. General Scott, Chief of Staff, was for a continental army raised according to the plan of Secretary Garrison and explained by the President in his speech at the opening of the session. Mr. Hay, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and the National Guard Association, which maintained an active lobby, were for the federalization of the National Guard. Against this plan Mr. Garrison, January 12, 1916, protested in a letter to the President. The military part of the program of national defense, he said, was facing a critical juncture. Unless the situation was dealt with promptly and effectively, there was no hope of good results. Nothing but a national force under exclusive control and authority of the National Government would be effective. The plan of Mr. Hay to add a few thousands to the strength of the regular army; a few regiments of artillery to that branch of the service; abandon the idea of a federal force of national volunteers, and grant direct aid to the enlisted men and officers of the State troops would never succeed. The issue must be clearly drawn. It had nothing whatever to do with the number of men or with the way of raising them. It was between two absolutely different systems. One was based on the nation's undertaking on its own responsibility to raise and manage the national troops. The other, the system in use ever since the founding of the Government, was to rely on the States to do this thing for the nation, leaving the Government to rely on a military force it does not raise, does not officer and does not control.

The President replied, in substance, that he was ready to abandon the plan of the Secretary for a continental volunteer force and accept that of Mr. Hay for a Federalized militia if it would accomplish the desired result. Mr. Garrison then, January 14, 1916, restated his position briefly and forcibly, and January 17 the President replied that he understood his views. "You believe, as I do, that the chief thing necessary is that we should have a trained citizen reserve, and that the training, organization and control of that reserve should be under immediate Federal direction. But apparently I have not succeeded in making my own position equally clear to you, though I feel sure that I have made it perfectly clear to Mr. Hay. It is that I am not irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of providing the nation with such a reserve, and am certainly willing to discuss alternative proposals."

The President returned from his western tour on February 4. Mr. Garrison was to speak on preparedness on February 10, and lest, in urging his plan, he should be acting contrary to the policy of the President, he wrote again on February 9, restated his position and asked from the President a final expression of his views. There were two matters of pressing importance on which in the course of his speech he must positively and definitely declare himself. One was the Clarke amendment to the Philippine bill. The other was the question of a continental army or a Federalized militia. He considered reliance on militia for national defense an unjustifiable imperiling of the nation's safety. Not only was it a sham in itself, but if enacted into law would prevent, perhaps destroy, the opportunity to obtain measures of real national defense. He could neither accept it, nor acquiesce in its acceptance. If the President did not agree with him on these matters, then he could not with propriety remain the seeming representative of the administration in respect to them.

The President answered and said that he was not yet convinced that the Hay plan would prove acceptable; that it was his duty to keep an open mind; that the Clarke amendment seemed unwise at the present time, but it would be most inadvisable to take the position that he must disapprove "should both houses concur in a bill embodying that amendment." When this reply reached him Mr. Garrison at once resigned,

and after a delay of a few weeks Mr. Newton D. Baker became

Secretary of War.

Mr. Garrison resigned on February 10, 1916, and on that day Count von Bernstorff and Baron Zwiedinek appeared at the Department of State and announced that the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments would instruct their submarine commanders that, after February 29, they were to treat armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers. Secretary Lansing some weeks before, on January 18, addressed an informal note to the representatives of the Entente Powers in Washington, urging that their Governments agree to disarm merchant vessels.

As obtained "from a European correspondent" and published by the Chicago Herald, the text of the note set forth that the Government was deeply interested to bring to an end the dangers to life which attended the use of submarines for the destruction of enemy commerce. Despite the appalling loss of life among noncombatants, without regard to age or sex, the Secretary did not think that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines, but believed that submarine warfare might be brought within the general rules of international law and the principles of humanity by the adoption of a formula or rule which would appeal to the sense of justice of all belligerents. As a basis for such a rule he suggested that a noncombatant had a right to traverse the seas on a merchant ship flying a belligerent flag: a right to rely on the observance of the rules of international law, a right to know that if the vessel on which he sailed were approached by a warship of another belligerent it would not be attacked without being ordered to stop. When so ordered by an enemy submarine it should stop immediately. If, after the order to stop, a merchantman attempted to resist or flee it might be fired on, but the firing should end when the vessel ceased to resist or flee. If impossible to put a crew aboard or convey the prize to port it might be sunk, provided crew and passengers had been removed to a place of safety.

The Secretary was not unmindful of the obstacles which would be met with by the submarine. Prior to 1915 commerce destroying on the high sea had been done by cruisers heavily

armed, and international law allowed merchantmen to carry arms for defense.

This right of merchantmen ships to carry guns, he said, "seems to have been predicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers." Submarines had changed these relations. They depended for protection on their power of submerging and were almost defenseless in point of construction. "Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would be able to use it effectively for offense against a submarine." Pirates and sea rovers had been swept from the great channels of trade and privateering had been abolished. Placing guns on merchant ships in these days of submarines, therefore, must be in order to render the merchantman superior in force to the submarine, and to prevent warning, visit and search. "Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament." Under such conditions, if a submarine be required to stop, visit and search a merchantman, and, if necessary to destroy her, put her passengers and crew in a place of safety, it was not just to require her when so doing to expose herself "to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel."

The Secretary ended by saying: "I may add that my Government is impressed by the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."

It was in hope of forcing the Allied Government to reject this note that Germany and Austria bade their representatives serve the notice of February 10, that armed merchant ships would be treated as auxiliary cruisers and sunk on sight with passengers and crew on board, and that on February 14 Mr. Gerard forwarded from Berlin a note verbale and a long "Memorandum" on the treatment of armed merchantmen. The memorandum was accompanied by twelve exhibits consisting chiefly of a digest of nineteen cases in which Allied merchant ships, it was claimed, had fired on submarines, and papers of a "confidential" nature found on two captured British ships. The "German Government," it was said, "had no doubt that a merchantman assumes a warlike character by armament with guns, regardless of whether the guns are intended for defense or attack." Particular attention was called to the words "enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceful vessels of commerce." There fore, the German naval forces would receive orders, within a short time, to treat such vessels as belligerents.

"The German Government brings this status of affairs to the knowledge of the neutral Powers, in order that they may warn their nationals against continuing to intrust their persons or property to the armed merchantmen of Powers at war with

the German Empire."

The controversy now shifted from the Department of State to the Halls of Congress, where on February 15 a Senator from South Dakota submitted a long resolution. In substance it was that the Senate viewed with anxious concern the order of the German Admiralty that, after February 29, armed merchant ships might be sunk without warning; that if put into effect it would be a more serious menace to neutral commerce than any act of the belligerents in the present war; that any recognition by the United States that necessities of the war or the exigencies of submarine warfare justified the order would be an abandonment of our contention for the freedom of the seas, and a contravention of our policy set forth in our notes to the British and German Governments on September 26 and November 7, 1914, and that at this time neither the United States nor any other neutral should acquiesce in the order.³

The resolution was submitted under the belief that the closing words of Secretary Lansing's note of January 18 stated the intent of the Government to accept the German contention that armed merchantmen should be considered auxiliary cruisers. But on February 15, the day on which the Senator

² Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st session, p. 2564.

submitted his resolution, the President reversed his policy and from the Department of State came a semi-official statement of a very different sort. In substance it was that the Government did not expect to change the present rule of international law regarding armed merchant ships without the consent of all the belligerents, that meantime their merchant ships had a lawful right to carry arms for defense, and that the right of our citizens to travel on such vessels would not be impaired.

A fear of war with Germany now fell on Congress, a determination to check the President grew stronger and stronger, and all signs pointed to a serious break between the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government. American citizens, Congressmen held, should be forbidden to travel on armed ships of the belligerents. To this surrender of their rights the President was determined not to submit, and at a conference with the Democratic leaders on February 21 made his position quite clear.

Nevertheless, on February 22, resolutions were introduced in the Senate and the House. That offered by Mr. McLemore, a member of the House from Texas, was preceded by a long preamble setting forth that, whereas two of the Powers at war had informed all neutrals that after February 29 armed vessels of their enemies, naval, or merchantmen armed for defense, would be attacked on sight; that, whereas Germany had submitted to the United States photographic facsimiles of alleged secret orders of the British Government authorizing such defensive armament to be used for offensive purposes and manned by naval officers and men and concealed and disguised when in neutral ports; that, whereas the Government of the United States had no desire to dictate to any Power whether it should or should not arm its merchant ships, had no interest in the success or failure of such ships in using their arms to destroy an enemy's submarines or naval vessels, had no concern in the success or failure of submarines in destroying merchantmen and could not look on any engagement between any armed ships of opposing belligerents, no matter how such ships may be designated or disguised, as other than a naval engagement; and, whereas Germany and Austria-Hungary had given assurances that unarmed ships carrying noncombatants would not be sunk unless the noncombatant passengers could be removed to a place of safety.

Therefore, the resolution read, "the House of Representatives hereby solemnly does request the President to warn all American citizens, within the borders of the United States or its possessions, or elsewhere, to refrain from traveling on any or all ships of any and all the Powers now or in future at war, which ship or ships shall mount guns, whether such ship be frankly avowed a part of the naval forces of the Power whose flag it flies, or shall be called a merchant ship or otherwise, and whether such gun or guns or other armament be called 'offensive' or 'defensive,' and in case American citizens do travel on such armed belligerent ships, that they do so at their own risk."

The rest of the resolution provided that when the President or Secretary of State came into possession of the "actual memorandum" of the German Government "concerning the secret orders of the British Government," it should at once be sent to the Speaker and laid before the House to assist it "in performing its constitutional duty of advising the President of the United States" with regard to foreign relations.

On the same day, February 22, on which Mr. McLemore introduced his warning resolution, Mr. Fuller of Illinois brought forward another. Because it was "manifestly unsafe" for American citizens to travel "on belligerent ships that are armed," and inasmuch as "the taking of such chances at this time may involve this country in serious trouble in its efforts to protect American lives," and as it was the "earnest desire of all our people that this country shall remain absolutely neutral," therefore the President was to be "authorized and requested to issue a proclamation warning all American citizens of the great danger of taking passage on any belligerent ship that is armed or that carried munitions of war, and requesting them for their own safety and in the interest of this country's neutrality to refrain from so doing."

Both resolutions went to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The day following their introduction was one of wild hysteria in Congress. Suddenly the House became panic-stricken from fear that the new position of the President would lead to

"Keep out of war" was demanded on every side. The party of the President was in open revolt. In the cloakrooms, in the corridors, on the floor, the President was bitterly attacked for his determination to stand firm in behalf of American rights even if war resulted. Nothing but the utmost exertions of the administration supporters prevented immediate action. Late in the afternoon the Democratic members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs met and decided to send a delegation to the White House to tell the President that a resolution warning American citizens to keep off armed merchant. vessels would surely be passed unless he changed his position. The Democratic floor leader was reported to have said that forty-eight hours would be allowed the President in which to make this change. The revolt spread even to the Senate, where Senator Gore, of Oklahoma, announced that he would introduce a resolution forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchantmen.

That the position taken by the President at the conference on February 21 might not be misunderstood, Senator Stone, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, gave his understanding of it in a leter to the President. This was:

That while you would deeply regret the rejection by Great Britain of Mr. Lansing's proposal for the disarmament of merchant vessels of the Allies, with the understanding that Germany and her Allies would not fire upon a merchant ship if she hauled to when summoned, not attempting to escape, and that the German warships would only exercise the admitted right of visitation and capture, and would not destroy the captured vessel except in circumstances that reasonably assured the safety of passengers and crew, you were of the opinion that if Great Britain and her Allies rejected the proposal and insisted upon arming her merchant ships she would be within her rights under international law. Also that you would feel disposed to allow armed vessels to be cleared from our ports; also that you are not favorably disposed to the idea of this Government taking any definite steps towards preventing American citizens from embarking upon armed merchant vessels. Furthermore, that you would consider it your duty, if a German warship should fire upon an armed merchant vessel of the enemy upon which American citizens were passengers, to hold Germany to strict account.

Numerous members of the Senate and House have called to discuss this subject with me. I have felt that the members of the two Houses who are to deal with this grave question were entitled to know the situation we are confronting as I understand it to be. I think I should say to you that the members of both Houses feel deeply concerned and disturbed by what they read and hear. I have heard some talk to the effect that some are saying that after all it may be possible that the program of preparedness, so called, has some relation to just such a situation as we are now called upon to meet.

I have counseled all who talked with me to keep cool; that the whole business is still the subject of diplomacy and that you are striving to the utmost to bring about some peaceable adjustment, and that in the meantime Congress should be careful not to "ball up" a diplomatic situation by any kind of hasty and ill-considered action. . . . As much and deeply as I would hate to radically disagree with you, I find it difficult from my sense of duty and responsibility to consent to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war.

President Wilson that same day, February 24, replied: "You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war." For the moment the announced intention of the Central European Powers to sink all armed merchant vessels at sight seemed to threaten "insuperable difficulties." But the apparent meaning of the order was so manifestly at odds with explicit assurances recently given that he was sure later explanations would "put a different aspect upon it."

But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such nation we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

For my part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit—but not an explicit—acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesman even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and right.

February 25 the Speaker, the majority leader of the House and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, met

the President and found him fully determined to stand by the position taken in his letter to Senator Stone. Said the Speaker, in a statement made in behalf of the Democratic leaders who conferred with the President: "The sum and substance of the conference, outside of an explanation made as to the temper of the House, regarding the diplomatic situation with Germany and some argument on both sides, is fully set out in Senator Stone's letter to the President and the President's reply to Senator Stone."

We explained to the President how the House felt in our judgment. I told the President that this warning resolution would carry two to one if they ever got a chance for a vote. Some enthusiastic gentlemen, I said, thought it would carry three to one.

Of course there was a great deal of talk about international law regarding the rights of Americans on the seas and precedents. At the conclusion of the conference it was very clear to all that the

President stands on his letter to Senator Stone.

But there are rumors which were discussed that Germany may postpone enforcement of the new admiralty order to sink armed ships, from March 1, either to April 1 or the middle of March. I think the chances are that Germany will postpone this threatened performance. This will give more time for consideration of this matter.

In the House the President's letter, the flood of telegrams that poured in upon members from all parts of the country demanding that he be supported, the belief that the conduct of the House on the previous two days might stiffen the attitude of Germany, all contributed to produce a change of feeling and greatly lessen the chances of the passage of a resolution of warning. To this change Mr. Bryan contributed by a telegram.

I honestly hope that Congress will speedily announce legislation refusing passports to Americans traveling on belligerent ships, or still better, refusing clearance to belligerent ships carrying American passengers.

No owner of belligerent ships will claim that he has the right to safeguard a contraband cargo with American lives, and no citizen should be permitted to endanger the peace of the nation at a time like this. Ours is the greatest of neutral nations, and will probably be the mediator when the time comes for mediation. It would be a crime against civilization, as well as against our own people, to become

involved in this war, and thus loan our army and money to a European

monarch to use in settling his quarrels.

If Congress has the right to declare war, it certainly has the right to promote peace by restraining citizens from taking unnecessary risks. A mayor keeps the people of his city out of the danger zone during a riot. Can our Government afford to do less when the world is in riot?

In the Senate Mr. Gore offered a concurrent resolution, that it was the sense of Congress, "vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should, on behalf of their own safety and the vital interests of the United States, forbear to exercise the right of travel as passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent Power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State or by any one acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for the purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent Power."

Senator Jones in the course of the day offered a very different sort of resolution. It reads: "That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States of America that any issue claimed to affect the national honor should be referred for its decision to the Congress of the United States and no ultimatum should be sent to any belligerent Power and no severance of diplomatic relations be brought about by Executive action until after the advice and consent of Congress."

In London the President's letter found hearty approval. The *Times* was pleased to note that he stood "immovably true to his lofty moral attitude." How far he could carry with him the opinion of his countrymen was not a matter for speculation. Nevertheless, he deserved credit for standing manfully to his guns. The *Post* remarked that "it is the fate of America, whether it will or not, to make a choice between her own God and Germany's idols." The *Chronicle* found in the President's words "the right ring." He had "made plain to the whole world that the United States is unshakable in its resolve to reject the impudent demands of Germany."

How the President viewed the uprising in Congress was

believed to be made clear by some remarks in a speech before the Gridiron Club of Washington on the evening of Febru-

ary 26.

"The point in international affairs," he said, "never lies along the lines of expediency. It always rests in the field of principle. The United States was not founded upon any principles of expediency; it was founded upon a profound principle of human liberty and of humanity, and whenever it bases its policy upon any other foundations than those it builds on the sand and not upon solid rock." He would "a great deal rather know" what men were "talking about around quiet firesides all over this country than what they are talking about in the cloakrooms of Congress. I would a great deal rather know what the men on the trains and by the wayside and in the shops and on the farms are thinking about and yearning for than hear any of the vociferous proclamations of policy which it is so easy to hear and so easy to read by picking up any scrap of printed paper. . . .

"America ought to keep out of this war. She ought to keep out of this war at the sacrifice of everything except this single thing upon which her character and history are founded,

her sense of humanity and justice."

The leaders in the Senate and the House having prevented any action on the resolutions of warning before them, the President on February 29, in a letter to the ranking member of the House Committee on Rules, urged that an "early vote" be taken.

"The report that there are divided counsels in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the country," he wrote Mr. Pou, "is being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that the report is false; but so long as it is anywhere credited it cannot fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the utmost serious risk. I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will permit me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard to travel on armed merchantmen, which have recently been so much talked about, in order that there may be afforded an immediate opportunity for full public discussion and action upon them and that all doubts and conjectures may be swept away and our foreign

policy once more cleared of damaging misunderstandings."

What the President wished was now quite clear. He did not wish a vote of confidence, but a direct vote on the McLemore, or some similar resolution, declaring that Americans ought not to travel on armed merchantmen. He wished every member of the House to go on record when the vote was taken that the country might know who stood by the Government, and who sought to embarrass it, in its diplomatic dealings with Germany and Austria.

Leaders in both Houses were surprised and embarrassed. With great difficulty they had a few days before prevented action on the very resolutions they were now asked to bring to a vote. Conferences were held with the President, but he did not yield, and March 3, 1916, the Senate took up the resolution offered by Senator Gore and an immediate vote was demanded. Mr. Gore, rising to a point of personal privilege, then offered a substitute which reads:

Resolved by the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring: That the sinking by a German submarine, without notice or warning, of an armed merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient cause of war between the United States and the German Empire.

But the Senate leaders in their haste to end the business forced an immediate vote on both resolutions taken together and, amid a scene of great confusion and disorder, the roll was ealled on the question of laying the resolutions on the table. The yeas were 68; the nays 14, and the motion was carried. Then for the first time the Senators realized that in their haste they had tabled a resolution declaring that if a German submarine, without warning, sank an armed merchantman and an American citizen thereby lost his life, the act would be a just cause of war. This was the very principle for which the President was contending.

As soon as the vote in the Senate was known in the House the Committee on Foreign Affairs voted to report back the McLemore resolution with a recommendation that it be tabled because, "Under the practice and precedent in this country, the conduct of diplomatic negotiations has been left with the President, and with this practice the committee does not feel it proper for the House of Representatives to interfere. We know that if the President reaches a point in any negotiations with foreign Governments at which he believes he has exhausted his powers in the premises he will, in the usual way, report all facts and circumstances to Congress for its consideration."

March 7, the struggle began and when it ended with the roll call on the question of agreeing to the motion to lay the McLemore resolution on the table the yeas were 276 and the

nays 142.

The States, all of whose representatives voted no, were Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska. The States, all of whose representatives voted yes, were Maine, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Idaho. As far as Congressional interference was concerned, the armed merchantmen issue, it was said, was settled. There were those, indeed, who held that tabling the resolutions was not decisive, and among these was Mr. Bryan. "The question was presented in such a way," he said to an audience at Columbus, Ohio, "that there is little significance in the vote. It does not represent the sentiment in Congress as to the wisdom of Americans traveling upon belligerent merchantmen. Had this question been presented and the opinion of Congress asked upon it, there is no doubt that a majority of both Senate and House would express themselves in favor of preventing Americans from traveling into the danger zone on belligerent ships."

The people, taking the words of the President, that he would rather know what men were saying around their firesides than what was said in the cloakrooms of Congress, as an invitation to give their views, now sent letters and telegrams by thousands to the White House expressing approval of his stand and con-

veying congratulations on his victory.

The day following the action of the Senate on the resolution of Senator Gore, March 4, 1916, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported a bill "for making further and more effectual provision for national defense." As explained by the Chairman, Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, the bill provided for a regular army of 178,000

men; a federal volunteer force of 261,000 to be trained for one month each year in summer eamps, a strictly federal force not under the control of Governors of the States; a federalized National Guard of 250,000 men; officers' reserve corps, and a reserve officers' training eorps composed of students of colleges and schools where military training was given the boys. On the sixth of March Mr. Hay, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, presented a bill providing for a regular army of 143,000; a federalized National Guard which in five years would number 400,000 men; and civilian training camps from which would come another 100,000 trained fighting men.

While the bills were under debate our countrymen were given a fine illustration of the need of preparedness. March 9, a band of Villistas, believed to be acting under orders from Villa, crossed our Mexican border, entered New Mexico, raided the town of Columbus, and killed eight soldiers and nine civilians, and the President at once announced that troops would be sent in pursuit of Villa to capture him and end his forays, and that this would be done in friendly aid of the authorities of Mexico and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that republic. Carranza at once proposed an agreement under which the military forces of Mexico should be allowed to chase bandits or outlaws across the border into the United States, in return for permission for the military forces of the United States to cross the border into Mexico. March 13, our Government agreed to the proposal, and March 15 some 12,000 men under General Pershing crossed the border. Carranza on March 17 protested; complained that a false interpretation had been put on his note of the tenth; that no notification had been given to the Mexican Government, nor to the civil and military authorities of the region through which the troops were to pass, and, March 19, refused to allow supplies to be sent over the Northwestern Railway to General While negotiations dragged along, a force of Villistas was routed by American cavalry at San Geronimo, March 29; fights and skirmishes occurred in many places during April, and May 5 some two hundred bandits crossed the border and attacked Glenn Springs, Texas. Again the President was forced to act, and May 9 called the organized militia of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico into service, and sent them with 4,000 regulars to the border.

With this illustration of our means of defense before them, the Senate and House meanwhile labored on their bills for preparedness. March 23, the House adopted the Hay Bill. April 18, the Senate returned it with amendments providing for a regular army on a peace footing of 250,000 men, for the construction of a nitrate plant to cost \$15,000,000, and for the establishment of reserve officers' training corps at universities, colleges and schools. From the conferences which followed came at last a bill providing for a regular army of 186,000; a federalized National Guard to number 425,000; officers' reserve corps for the regular army; enlisted reserve corps to supply men to the engineer, signal and quartermaster corps, medical and ordnance departments; and reserve officers' training corps at schools, colleges and universities. June 3, the President signed the bill.

CHAPTER X

PLOTS AND CRIMES ON SEA AND LAND

Considering the submarine dispute as settled, by the last of the Sussex notes the German Government bade Ambassador von Bernstorff define its position on another matter fast becoming serious, the violation of our neutrality by its consular officers and agents. The Ambassador accordingly, May 18, 1916, announced that the German Government was opposed to all plots and propaganda leading to violation of our laws and our neutrality.

"In consequence," he said, "of cases that have occurred of late, the German Ambassador has sent instructions to all the German consuls in the United States strongly to impress on German citizens living in their districts that it is their duty scrupulously to observe the laws of the states in which they reside."

German consuls needed the warning quite as much as "citizens living in their districts." It will be remembered that on December 22, 1915, Captain von Papen sailed from New York on the Oscar II. All went well with him until the steamer, January 2, 1916, touched at Falmouth, where the British seized his papers. When von Papen, according to the managing editor of World's Work, was about to depart and was packing his papers in the office of the Austrian Consulate-General in New York, the stenographer, a young woman placed in the office by the Providence Journal as its secret agent, reported the contents of the box and was instructed to so mark the case that it could be identified later. "The day it was nailed up for shipment," so runs the story, "she ate her luncheon seated on the top of it. When she was in the midst of her meal von Papen came in. He asked if he might share her sandwiches. She consented. They sat on the box together.

He grew sentimental. She did not discourage his sentimental mood. At its height she took a red crayon pencil from her hair and in a dreamy way drew on the packing box the outline of two hearts entwined. The susceptible von Papen, in the spirit of the moment, seized the pencil and with his own hand drew an arrow piercing them." And so the box was marked and when the Oscar II touched at Falmouth and the secret service agents inspected the cargo the box was easily identified and seized.

Von Papen at once telegraphed to the American Embassy at London asking the American Ambassador to request the German Ambassador at Washington to protest to the Department of State because the British authorities had opened his private papers. They were found to consist of letters from Germans in this country and abroad, bank books, check books and counterfoils showing some five hundred items of expenditure.

Some were of no importance. Others were records of payments to German spies and agents in our country; to a spy named Kupferle, who killed himself in a British prison; to the "War Intelligence Bureau," \$2,300; to Werner Horn, who a few weeks later attempted to destroy the bridge at Vanceboro, \$700; to the German consul at Seattle, some two weeks before the explosion at that city, May 20, 1915, \$500. During January, 1915, von Papen received from Ambassador von Bernstorff \$6,400, and spent \$5,000.

Among the letters was one from Baron von Meysenburg, the German consul at New Orleans, dated December 4, 1915:

I read with great regret that the fate of recall has, indeed, overtaken you. I do not suppose that you are very unhappy at being able to shake the dust of this unfriendly country off your feet. What chiefly offends me is that in always giving way to the Government here we have never found that they are kindly disposed to us. That the demand for your recall has been so sudden and belated throws an interesting light upon the Government here. May the day of reckoning also come here, and our Government find again that iron determination with which alone one can make an impression on this country.

In another Dr. F. W. Meyer of New York, expressing regret at his departure, said:

I had occasion yesterday to discuss recent events with some Germans. . . . The Austrian note is, of course, matter for general quiet enjoyment, and the whole business can scarcely be taken tragically. The President this time has talked a bit too big, even for those who blindly support him. . . . It is not surprising, in view of the fictitious neutrality of the President, that a term should have been put to your work, and you must carry back with you the knowledge that you have done your duty according to the best of your ability as long as it was possible.

I gladly comply with your proposal to send a line from time to time, and it will be very pleasant to receive one from you occasionally, especially if by proposals you mean such as could be discussed with some gentlemen of the German House of Columbia University. I

am keeping an eye on the matter especially mentioned.

A letter from General von Bernhardi, dated April 9, 1915, says:

I thank you most sincerely for your kindness in sending me a copy of the New York Sun, containing my two articles. I am glad to hear that these articles will, in your opinion, have a good effect

so far as that is at all possible in America. . . .

I have now written two other articles for America. The Foreign Office wanted the first of these, entitled "Germany and England," distributed in the American Press. The other, entitled "Pangermanism," was to appear in the Chicago Tribune. . . . They will certainly have some sort of effect.

I wonder [Dr. Albert from San Francisco wrote, without date] if our Government will respond in a suitable manner. In my opinion it need no longer take public opinion so much into consideration, in spite of its being artifically and intentionally agitated by the Press, and legal proceedings, so that a somewhat stiffer attitude would be desirable, though naturally quiet and dignified.

Please instruct Mr. Amanuensis Igel as precisely as possible. You will receive then the long-intended report of expenses paid through my

account on your behalf.

Photographic copies of the important cheeks, counterfoils and letters were duly sent to the Department of State, and not long afterwards Horst von der Goltz, in charge of a Scotland Yard detective, arrived in New York.

From a British White Paper, Cd 8232, it appears that von der Goltz arrived in England from Holland November 4, 1914, "offered information on projected air raids, the source whence the *Emden* derived her information as to British shipping, and how the *Leipsic* obtained her coal supplies." He was questioned, detained, sentenced to six months' imprisonment with a recommendation for deportation, for failing to register, served his time and was still held for deportation when, January 2, 1916, von Papen's papers were seized at Falmouth and among them was found a check dated September 1, 1914, for \$200, drawn by von Papen to the order of Bridgeman Taylor, under which name von der Goltz had obtained a false passport and sailed from New York in October, 1914, for Germany by way of Italy.

The check was endorsed in the handwriting of von der Goltz who, when it was shown to him, willingly acknowledged the endorsement was his, and asked to be allowed to make a

voluntary statement in writing and under oath.

This confession, very long and very full of detail, begins with an account of how at the opening of the war he was relieved from service with a brigade of the Mexican Army, made his way to New York and met Captain von Papen, then engaged with Captain Boy-Ed in concocting a scheme to invade Canada with a force recruited from reservists in the United States, and how when this failed he was asked by von Papen to see two Irishmen who had proposed to Captain von Papen to blow up the locks of the canals connecting the Great Lakes, the main railway junctions, and grain elevators. It was alleged that by those means, as well as by wholesale distribution of proclamations intended to terrify the populace, combined with rumors of invasion judiciously circulated in the Press, a panic would be created in Canada, which would prevent the Dominion from giving aid to England.

I received the gentlemen at my hotel, the men bringing with them a letter of introduction written by Captain von Papen, and received, after having taken them to my room, further details about the matter, in addition to maps and diagrams showing the most vulnerable points of the different canals.

I then had to get some men to help me to put the scheme into execution, but engaged, before I went to Baltimore, only one man, Charles Tucker, alias Tucsheimer, who had also some conversation with one of the men who proposed the scheme.

Receiving a letter of introduction to Mr. Luederitz, consul at

Baltimore, who was to aid me by his counsel, I went there, taking Tucker with me, and was received by Mr. Luederitz at the consulate in Baltimore. He evidently had been informed about the matter beforehand, for he addressed me as Major von der Goltz, although my letter of introduction was written in favor of Mr. Bridgeman H. Tav-He showed very much interest, and besides supplying me with a revolver, my own being out of order temporarily, suggested to furnish me with a passport to be obtained through the State Department, Washington, D. C., proving me to be B. H. Taylor, in order that I should be able to travel safely. He also proposed to me to make use of part of the crew, and one officer of a G, ship at that time in the harbor, and furnished me with his visit card, at the back of which he wrote recommending Major von der Goltz, or something to that effect, which I should give to the captain of the ship. While I was still conversing with Mr. Luederitz the captain of the ship was announced by a clerk, and Mr. Luederitz, telling the clerk to bring the gentleman in, introduced me to the captain personally. One of the clerks, a notary, made out an application to the State Department, Washington, D. C., for a passport purporting to be desired by a certain B. H. Taylor. All information given in this passport was fictitious. It was arranged that this passport was to be sent to Mr. Buck. New York, who was to deliver it to me. The following day. a Sunday, I paid, accompanied by Tucker, a visit to the ship, dined there, and selected the men intended to be used in the enterprise personally. The captain promised me to pay off the men selected at the consulate in a few days and to send them to New York, under the supervision of an officer. Everything necessary having been agreed upon, I left for New York to report there to Captain von Papen. Arrived at New York, I selected three men recommended to me and acquainted them with the main object of the scheme.

As I needed money to furnish these sailors with necessaries, Captain von Papen gave me a check payable to Bridgeman Taylor, which check I had cashed through the agency of an acquaintance, Mr. Stall-

ford, member of the German Club.

The men arrived, were quartered in several hotels, but on my noticing that my movements were being watched, I sent them back to make the detectives think the enterprise abandoned.

I told Captain von Papen that it would be more easy for him to supply me with materials, dynamite, and arms cheaply, on account of his connections, informing him that I could not get those materials except at a prohibitive price.

Von Papen then informed me that Captain Tauscher, of Krupp's Agency, had agreed to furnish me with these things, and told me to

see him at his office.

I saw Mr. Tauscher, and he gave me a letter of introduction to the DuPont Powder Company, recommending B. H. Taylor, and the company supplied me with an order to the bargee in charge of the

dynamite barges lying on the New Jersey side near the Statue of Liberty. Captain Tauscher told me he would send the automatic pistols by messenger to Hoboken, New Jersey, to be delivered there to one of my agents at a certain restaurant, as he would be liable to punishment if he delivered them in New York without having seen my permit. The reasons why I did not apply to the police for a permit are obvious.

In order to get the dynamite it was necessary for me to hire a motor-boat at a place near 146th Street, Harlem, and to put the dynamite on board of the barge in suitcases. After returning to the station, where I had hired the boat, I went in a taxicab, having two suitcases with me, to the German Club to see von Papen, who told me to call for the generators and the wire again at the club. I took the dynamite to my rooms, where I kept also a portion of the arms packed in small portmanteaus ready to be removed, the rest of the dynamite and arms being in the keeping of two of my agents, one of which was Mr. Fritzen, discharged from a Russian steamer, where he had acted in the capacity of purser; the other one being Mr. Busse, a commercial agent, who had lived for some time in England; the only other agent I employed besides C. Covani, who attended to me personally, Tucker not being entrusted with any of those things.

Two or three days afterwards I received from Captain von Papen at his rooms at the club, in the presence of Fritzen and Covani, generators and wire, which I took to my rooms in a taxicab.

After some days spent in conferring about the ways in which we would try to execute the orders given to me, we started from Central Station, New York, for Buffalo, Fritzen, Busse, and Tucker taking care of the dynamite and arms, Covani attending to me.

Arrived at Buffalo, I hired rooms at 198 Delaware Avenue, had the dynamite brought there, and spent some days trying to get information about the precautions taken by the Canadian Government. Then I transported myself and three of the agents to Niagara Falls, New York, September 15. While still at Buffalo I received a telegram sent by von Papen and signed "Steffens," informing me that John Ryan, lawyer, had money and instructions. I went to see this man, but he told me he knew nothing whatever about the matter. I directly sent telegram to "Steffens" asking for explanation. September 16, received answer, "Ryan got money." On applying to the man again I received money, but no instructions.

Being thrown upon my own discretion, I determined to reconnoiter the terrain where I wanted to act first, but to do nothing further till I should receive orders.

On September 25, received notice from Ryan to come to Buffalo. Having meantime received privately information that the 1st Canadian Contingent had left Valcartier Camp, I knew that I should be recalled, the object of the enterprise being removed.

Without waiting for recall von der Goltz returned to New York, reported to von Papen and in October sailed for Berlin

by way of Italy.

All this was made known to the Department of State and von der Goltz, in charge of the man from Scotland Yard, was sent from London to testify before the Federal Grand Jury sitting at New York. He arrived March 28, 1916, on the Finland and within three days Captain Hans Tauscher, Charles Tucker, J. F. Busse and Alfred Fritzen were taken into custody. April 17, the Federal Grand Jury indicted Captain Franz von Papen, Tauscher and the three others for conspiring to blow up the Welland Canal. The Assistant District Attorney at New York explained that, so long as von Papen was an attaché of the German Embassy, it was not possible to bring him into the case. But now that he was out of the country the Government could take action so that if he ever returned he could be brought to book, or if he ever entered England or France or any other country with which we had an extradition treaty he could, after the war, be extradited.

The following day, April 18, agents of the Department of Justice went to 60 Wall Street, New York, to the office formerly used by Captain von Papen, arrested Wolf von Igel, and seized his papers. Taken to the Federal Building, he telephoned to von Bernstorff, who demanded his release and the return of the papers. He was demanded as a member of the Ambassador's official family and his office was declared to be a branch of the Embassy and as such "extra-territorial." But it was proved that the office was not rented by the German Embassy, but by a private person, and was not "extra-territorial." As to the papers, which were at once photographed, Mr. Lansing offered to return such as von Bernstorff would identify as official or Embassy records. To this it was answered that they must be returned without condition, that the Ambassador could not be required to pass on them individually or collectively; that the fact that they were in the possession of a diplomatic attaché was enough to make them immune; that to require the Ambassador to say which were or were not official papers was a restriction of diplomatic privilege. In the course of time they were returned.

In May of 1915 Franz Rintelen and ten others had placed incendiary bombs on vessels leaving New York laden with food and ammunition for the Allies. Nine of these men were now put under arrest charged with placing "fire bombs" on munition ships; with attempted arson; and with "acting in concert with others" in the manufacture of liquid fire bombs and placing them in sugar bags on the steamship Kirk Oswald of the Fabre Line. She left New York on May 15, 1915, caught fire at sea when on her way to Marseilles, and finally put into a French port, where two unexploded bombs were found in the cargo of sugar. Ernest Becker, electrician of the North German Lloyd steamship Friedrich der Grosse, and Captain von Kleist, Superintendent of the New Jersey Agricultural and Chemical Works; the Assistant Superintendent of the Hamburg-American Dock: the Superintendent of the piers of the Atlas Line; the Chief Engineer of the Friedrich der Grosse; three assistant engineers of the Hamburg-American Line, and Walter T. Scheele, head of the Chemical Works where the bombs were filled, were the men in question. Scheele was a fugitive, but the rest were indicted on April 28, 1916, and with some others were sentenced in February, 1918, to two years and a half in the Atlanta Penitentiary. Scheele fled to Cuba, where he found refuge aboard a German vessel interned at Havana: but when Cuba entered the war he fled again, was arrested, and in March, 1918, was brought back to the United States.

May 3, superseding indictments were obtained for Captain von Papen, Wolf von Igel, Hans Tauscher, Alfred Fritzen and Constantine Covani, all named in the confession of von der Goltz. Karl Tucker and Frederick J. Busse were mentioned as co-conspirators, but were not indicted. The defendants were charged with seeking "the obstruction of the military operations of the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and the furthering of the military operations of the Emperor of Germany, and by means of bombs, dynamite and other explosives to blow up and destroy the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway."

Karl A. Luederitz, German consul general at Baltimore, was the next to be indicted for procuring the false passport for von der Goltz. At the same time, May 8, an indictment was returned charging von Igel, Walter Scheele, and Gustav

Steinberg, said to have been an aid to von Rintelen, with conspiracy to falsify a ship's manifest in order to send a cargo of oil to Germany. Seven hundred and twenty bags of oil, chemically reduced to powder, had been shipped as fertilizer.

Fay, Walter Scholz and Paul Deache were now convicted and sentenced, Fay for eight years, Scholz for four and Deache for two. Four months later Fay escaped from the prison at Atlanta. In June Captain Tauscher was acquitted, for there was no evidence to show that he knew for what purpose the dynamite he procured for von der Goltz was to be used.

The presidential campaign was now near at hand, the nominating conventions were soon to assemble and the part the German-Americans, the hyphenates, would take in the election was a matter of some concern.

At the close of May a meeting of German-Americans was held in Chicago. They came from twenty-five states and represented business, social, and political organizations, churches, and the German-American Press Association, and made public a statement of principles. German-Americans demanded a neutrality of the sort advised by Washington in his Farewell Address; urged a foreign policy that would protect "American lives and American interests with equal firmness and justice," condemned "every official act and policy which shows passionate attachment for one belligerent nation or inveterate antipathy for another," deplored all utterances "by officials, exofficials and others designed to create, or tending to create, a division along racial lines among our people," and hoped the Republican and Democratic conventions would nominate candidates who would subscribe to these views.

Reports from the West announced that an organization backed by the German-American Newspaper Association was giving notice that voters of German extraction would support neither Wilson nor Roosevelt, and would not hear of Root. In a speech at St. Louis, Mr. Roosevelt reviewed these reports and attacked the German-American Alliance as anti-American. "I am happy to say that it denounces me a little more bitterly than it has denounced Mr. Wilson or Mr. Root. The German-American Alliance of Pennsylvania, for instance, as reported in the public press, states that it intends to show the leaders

of the national conventions that they have to deal with a united German-American vote. Such a statement represents moral treason to the Republic. . . . I want to serve notice on these men that our purpose next fall is to elect an American President and not a viceroy of the German Kaiser. . . . Whatever defects I have, I do not pussyfoot. If an English-American Alliance were formed I would say it is anti-American just as I say the German-American Alliance is anti-American."

On Flag Day, June 14, 1916, the President marched at the head of a "preparedness parade" and at the foot of the Washington Monument delivered a speech, in the course of which he replied to the threats of the hyphenates to use their influence against the Administration in the November election. "There is," he said, "a disloyalty active in the United States, and it must be absolutely crushed. It proceeds from a minority, a very small minority, but a very active and subtle minority. It works underground, but it also shows its ugly head where we can see it, and there are those at this moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying: 'Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will wreak our vengeance at the polls.' That is the sort of thing against which the American Nation will turn with a might and triumph of sentiment which will teach these gentlemen once for all that loyalty to this flag is the first test of tolerance in the United States."

Outside the Betsy Ross house in Philadelphia, the house where many believe the first American flag was made, Dr. C. J. Hexamer, President of the National German-American Alliance, repudiated the charge that the hyphenates were anti-American, denounced those who raised the anti-hyphenate cry, and called all those who attacked the political integrity of German-Americans criminals.

While the President was speaking at Washington the Democratic National Nominating Convention was holding its opening session at St. Louis. Not content with an expression of his own feeling towards the hyphenates, the President insisted that a plank strongly American and anti-German-American should be put in the platform. It was badly needed, for the Chairman, when opening the session, made a strong pacifist

peace-at-any-price speech. The plank, it was reported, would denounce individuals or alliances seeking to embarrass the Government in its relations with foreign powers, and condemn any political party that changed its policy for fear of the hyphenate votes. When finally adopted the plank summoned "all men of whatever origin or creed who would count themselves Americans to join in making clear to all the world the unity and consequent power of America. . . . We condemn as subversive of this nation's unity and integrity the activities and designs of every group or organization that has for its object the advancement of the interests of a foreign power, or which is calculated and tends to divide our people into antagonistic groups. We condemn all alliances and combinations of individuals in this country, of whatever nationality or descent, who agree and conspire together for the purpose of embarrassing or weakening our Government, or of improperly influencing or coercing our public representatives in dealing or negotiating with any foreign power. . . . We condemn any political party which, in view of the activity of such conspirators, surrenders its integrity or modifies its policy."

In the Republican platform were these words: "We appeal to all Americans, whether naturalized or native born, to prove to the world that we are Americans in thought and in deed,

with one loyalty, one hope, one aspiration."

Our relations with Great Britain during the first half of the year 1916 were complicated by the arrival of the Appam, the censorship of the mails and the publication of a "blacklist." February 1, the British steamer Appam, captured by the German sea raider Moewe, entered Newport News in command of Lieutenant Berg, of the Imperial Navy, having on board the crews of seven enemy vessels. Ambassador von Bernstorff at once notified the Department of State that she would stay in an American port until further notice, because she "has not been converted into an auxiliary cruiser, is not armed and has made no prize under Mr. Berg's command." 1

Besides the crews of the seven captured vessels, there were on board passengers taken from the prizes, "a locked-up mili-

¹Special Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, October, 1916.

tary party of the enemy whose internment in the United States I request." The crew of the Appam, he asserted had offered resistance by training the guns on the Moewe, were therefore to be looked on as combatants, and should also be interned until the end of the war.

The British Ambassador claimed that if the Appam were regarded as a prize she should be given back to her owners and the crew interned, and cited Article 21 of The Hague Convention XIII, of 1907.2 Great Britain, it was true, had not ratified this rule, but it should be applied to the Appam. If ordered out, the British Embassy was confident "that she will not be allowed to leave the United States' jurisdiction under German control in a condition which would enable her to undertake offensive action."

Ambassador von Bernstorff, under instruction from Berlin, now claimed that Article 21 was not binding, as Great Britain had not ratified it, and that under Article 19 of the old Prusso-American treaty of 1799,³ the Appam, as a prize, might remain in American water as long as she pleased.

Mr. Lansing promptly ruled that all aboard, save the prize crews, should be allowed to leave and they went ashore. The British and African Steam Navigation Company, Limited, now filed a libel against the Appam, and Lieutenant Berg was summoned to appear before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In view of the treaty of 1799 Ambassador von Bernstorff was "at a loss to understand why

² Article 21. "A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions. It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral power must order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral power must employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew."

Article 22 required a neutral to "release a prize brought into one of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to in Article 21."

Article 19 provides: "The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall carry freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their captors to the places expressed in their commission which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be in their commission which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show."

such action has been taken by a court of your country." Article 21 of The Hague Convention, he wrote, did not apply. Besides, the sovereign whose officers had captured a vessel remained in possesion of that vessel and had full power over her. He, therefore, protested against the action of the Court and requested that the Attorney General procure the dismissal of the libel. Article 19 of the treaty of 1799, Secretary Lansing answered, applied only to prizes brought in by vessels of war. The Appam was not accompanied by a ship of war, but came alone in charge of a prize master and crew. Article 19 also provided that capturing vessels might take out their prizes "to the places expressed in their commissions." The commission of Lieutenant Berg was that of a prize master and directed him "to bring the Appam to the nearest American port and 'there to lay her up.' The treaty contemplated "temporary asylum for vessels of war, accompanying prizes while en route to the places named in the commander's commission, but not the deposit of the spoils of war in an American port." As to whether the Court had or had not jurisdiction, that was a question the Court must decide. July 29, the Judge decided the Court had jurisdiction, "that the manner of bringing the Appam into the waters of the United States, as well as her presence in those waters, constitutes a violation of the neutrality of the United States" and restored the vessel to her British owners. The ease was appealed to the Supreme Court, where in March, 1917, the decision was sustained.

Late in December, 1915, reports reached the Department of State that British customs authorities were interfering with the mails. From the Danish steamer Oscar II 734 bags of parcel mail were removed while on their way from the United States to Norway, Sweden and Denmark; from the Swedish steamer Stockholm 58 bags while on their way from New York to Gothenburg; from the Danish ship United States the customs authorities at Kirkwall took 5,000 packages of merchandise, the property of American eitizens; from the Frederick VIII, manifested for Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 597 bags of parcel mail, and from the Dutch steamship New Amsterdam the entire mail, American diplomatic and consular pouches included. Against all this Mr. Page was instructed on

January 4, 1916, to enter "a formal and vigorous protest." The Department was "inclined to regard parcel post articles as subject to the same treatment as articles sent by express or freight in regard to belligerent search, seizure and condemnation." But it could not admit the right of Great Britain to seize neutral ships on their way from neutral European ports to ports in the United States, bring them in, and while in port remove and censor the mails they carried.

France and Great Britain replied February 15, 1916, in a joint memorandum. In no wise, they held, do "parcels" constitute "letters" or "correspondence" or "dispatches," and are clearly not exempt in any way from supervision, visitation and seizure any more than belligerent cargoes on the high seas. As regarded letters, wrappers, envelopes entrusted to the postal service and generally contained in the mail bags, the Allied Governments "bring the following consideration to the notice of the Neutral Governments." Between December 31, 1914, and December 31, 1915, German or Austro-Hungarian naval authorities sank without warning thirteen mail ships with mail bags on board coming from or going to neutral countries without a word of protest from any neutral Government. Examination of the mails of steamers that called at ports in the allied countries revealed the fact that in the wrappers, envelopes and mail were contraband articles much sought after by the enemy. On the Turbantia were 1471/2 pounds of india rubber and seven parcels of wool, and on the Medan seven parcels of crude rubber, worth in Germany on December 15, 1915, twenty-five marks per kilog. Enemy traffic, driven from the sea, "thus resorted to hide in mail matter, in order to get through, all kinds of merchandise, contraband of war included, apparently by imposing on the post-office department of the neutral Hence the Allied Governments had decided that merchandise shipped in post parcels "shall not be treated otherwise than merchandise shipped in any other way"; that the inviolability of postal correspondence does not affect the right of the Allied Governments to visit and, if needs be, "arrest and seize merchandise hidden in wrappers, envelopes or letters con-

⁴ Special Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, ¹Vol. 10, pp. 402-409.

tained in mail bags"; and that in future they will refrain from seizing on the high seas genuine correspondence, letters or dispatches and will forward them as quickly as possible after "the sincerity of their character has been ascertained."

A pamphlet, "The Mails as a German War Weapon," published in London some months later, gives some account of what had been found in the mails. From the first few mails that were examined over 3,000 packets of raw rubber were seized on their way to Germany, while the German exports intercepted comprised jewelry, drugs, machine needles, violin strings, in short, almost every article Germany could afford to export. When it became known that merchandise sent by letter mail was not to pass unmolested, resort was had to every sort of subterfuge. Thus, the wrapping of a package of photographs when examined was found to contain a bar of pure nickel in each fluting of the corrugated paper wrapper. Packages described as containing photographs in reality contained packed sheets of dental rubber. In our country parcel post packages for Germany during two weeks in April, 1915, increased from 115 to 1,200 per day. All sorts of food except meat were in them. Department stores made special provisions for such shipments and furnished airtight containers.

Search of the mails on neutral ships voluntarily entering British waters during the first two months of the censorship resulted in the seizure of securities to the value of £2,000,000, and of checks, drafts and money orders for enemy benefit amounting to well over £50,000,000.

To the memorandum of February 15 the Secretary of State replied, on May 24, to the French and British ambassadors in notes identical in language. Despite the assurance that they would refrain from seizing and confiscating on the high seas genuine correspondence, the Allies, he complained, now seized and confiscated mail from vessels in port instead of at sea, or forced "neutral ships without just cause to enter their ports," or "induced shipping firms to send their mail" through British ports, or "they detain all vessels merely ealling at their ports," remove all mail and post parcels, take them to London, and there open and critically examine every piece to determine "the sincerity of their character," and finally forward "the

expurgated remainder," often after irreparable delay, to its destination. This had been the practice since the announcement of February 15, which seemed to be "merely notice that one illegal practice had been abandoned to make way for another more onerous and vexatious in character."

"Important papers which can never be duplicated, or can be duplicated only with great difficulty, such as United States patents for inventions, rare documents, legal papers relating to the settlement of estates, powers of attorney, insurance claims, income tax returns, and similar matter have been lost." Business opportunities were lost through failure to transmit promptly bids, specifications, contracts. Checks, drafts, money orders, securities, were lost or detained for weeks or months. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, mail matter including stocks, bonds, coupons, money orders, checks, drafts, notes, was to be considered as merchandise and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. But correspondence, shipping documents, money order lists, and papers when relating to enemy supplies or exports unless carried on the same ship with the goods referred to were to be treated as "genuine correspondence." The Government of the United States therefore "could no longer tolerate the wrongs which citizens of the United States have suffered." Only a "radical change in the present British and French policy will satisfy this Government." So strongly was the censorship resented that when Congress passed the General Revenue Act of September 8 a provision was inserted that whenever, during a war in which the United States was not engaged, the President is satisfied that in any belligerent country American citizens, ships, firms, companies, or corporations are not given "any of the facilities of commerce, including the unhampered traffic in mails which the vessels or citizens, firms, companies or corporations of that belligerent country enjoy in the United States or its possessions," he is authorized to deny the citizens and corporations of such belligerent country the use of the United States mails, telegraph, wireless or cables.

October 12, the French and British Governments replied in another memorandum, but conceded none of the contentions made by Mr. Lansing.

One of the objects of the examination of the mails stated in the little pamphlet "The Mails as a German War Weapon," was the detection of "plots hatched by our enemies in their own or in neutral countries." These were revealed by "letters relative to and furthering the perpetration of acts of violence, incendiarism and sabotage in the United States," and "letters containing enemy propaganda." In this latter class was a great mass of "scurrilous leaflets and pamphlets" dispatched to our country to be reforwarded to British territory for the purpose of fostering disloyalty and rebellion in the Empire. Tons of such propaganda leaflets and pamphlets found in the mails were "destroyed each week or sold as paper waste."

Just at the time Mr. Lansing wrote his notes of protest rumors became current that Germany was about to reopen trade in much needed articles by means of submarine merchantmen.

From reliable sources, the report said, it is learned that a regular submarine merchant service is about to be established between Hamburg and New York, and the first under sea liner will be due at Quarantine, New York, about July 4. She would earry mail, parcel post, express matter and perhaps a few passengers and would be armed for defense but not for attack. An American shipping man just from Hamburg brought the news. Nothing more was heard of the boat for a month, when Lloyds Weekly announced that a German submarine was carrying a message from the German Emperor to the President. A dispatch from Madrid confirmed this rumor and fixed the date of arrival at New York as June 25. Another from Baltimore announced that the submarine was off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, that she was loaded with dyestuffs and medicine, chiefly aspirin, and that her return cargo of nickel and rubber was already awaiting her on the pier of the Eastern Forwarding Company at Locust Point.

This report was true in substance, but not until July 8 did the submarine merchantman *Deutschland* arrive off the Virginia Capes and make her way to Baltimore, commanded by Captain Paul König. She left Heligoland on June 23, loaded with dyestuffs, but carrying no money, no securities, no mail, no guns, and after a run of sixteen days reached port. No sooner had she come than both the British and French Embassies called attention to her presence and asked that her character be investigated. She was a submarine. No such type of craft had ever before been used for merchant purposes. Was the submarine of her size and build to be considered purely an instrument of naval warfare?

In the opinion of the Allies any submarine was a vessel of war. She could not be treated as a merchantman. The fact that she could submerge made it impossible to subject her to the treatment of merchant ships as required by international law and so often insisted upon by the United States. She could not be stopped, visited, searched and the character of her cargo determined.

Who were her real owners was another question to be settled. Her ship papers showed that the *Deutschland* was owned by a Bremen concern, the Deutsche Ozean-Rhederei Gesellschaft mit Beschraenkter Haftung, that is, the German Ocean Transportation Company, Limited. Was this really a corporation or only the German Government in disguise? What was the status of her officers and crew? The Collector at Baltimore reported that the *Deutschland* had no guns, was manned by a merchant crew, carried a merchant cargo, was not a warship. Nevertheless, the Secretary of the Navy at the request of the Department of State appointed three naval officers to inspect her. They found no evidence that the ship was armed or could be armed without structural changes so extensive that she would have to go to a ship yard. In short she could not be armed at sea.

England heard the news of the arrival of the Deutschland with good humor. The press had much to say in compliment to Captain König, but saw no demonstration of the weakness of the British blockade. We, said the Manchester Guardian, are quite ready to join in the laugh at our expense and applaud the daring of the Captain who appears to us a good sportsman. We, said the Express, can honestly congratulate the Captain and his crew in having given the world cause to smile. "America is to be shown, just before the presidential election, that the blockade can be broken and a German cargo can be landed in the United States in spite of the British Navy. We thank the Kaiser for the comic relief in a busy week." Other journals did not think the success of the Deutschland showed that the

blockade was ineffective, but rather that it was so effective that this extraordinary means was the only way to evade it. The fact that a German U-boat had really reached our shores we should carefully consider in view of the repeated warning of the Tirpitz writers that America was not too far away for Germany to reach her. Though the *Deutschland* carried no guns, she was none the less a threat to the American navy.

Dispatches from Berlin told of a second submarine, the Bremen, about to start for America, and of others nearing completion, and of a weekly service soon to be established. But the Bremen never came, nor did the Deutschland leave as soon as was expected. Supposing her stay would be short, great sums were offered for passage, and hundreds of letters were mailed with the request that they be sent by the Deutschland. Neither requests were granted when on August 1 she left Baltimore on her voyage home. November 1, she came again, this time to New London, and after a stay of twenty days departed once more for Bremen.

The arrival of the *Deutschland* on her first trip and the decision of the Department of State that she was a merchantman and should be treated as such brought from the Allies, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, Russia and Japan, memoranda identical in language, insisting that submarines were to be treated as vessels of war.

Application of the principles of international law to submarines, they said, "offers features that are as peculiar as they are novel" because such craft could navigate and sojourn in the seas while submerged and so escape detection; because it was impossible to determine their national character, to know whether they were neutral or belligerent, and because it was not possible "to put out of consideration the power to do injury which is inherent in their very nature." Therefore the Allied Governments held that submarines should be deprived of the benefits of the rules of international law "regarding the admission and sojourn of war and merchant vessels in neutral waters, roadsteads and harbors." Any submarine of the belligerents that once enters a neutral harbor must be held there.

"The Allied Governments take this opportunity to warn the neutral Powers of the great danger to neutral submarines" navi-

gating their waters visited by the submarines of belligerents.

Our Government expressed its surprise at the seeming attempt of the Allies to make a rule for the treatment of submarines in time of war, and to enforce its acceptance by warning neutrals of the great danger to their submarines in waters visited by belligerent submarines. The Government knew of no circumstances which would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable either to war or merchant submarines, and reserved its liberty of action in all respects. That there might be no misunderstanding as to its attitude the Government of the United States would say to the Allied Governments that the belligerent Powers were in duty bound to distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality, and that responsibility for any conflict between belligerent warships and neutral submarines must rest entirely on the negligent Power.⁴

The retaliatory section of the General Revenue Act of September 8 was intended to apply to another form of British interference with neutral trade. From the opening of the war Great Britain under her trading with the enemy act had forbidden her subjects to trade with an enemy, but had not attempted to interfere with trade between an enemy resident in a friendly or neutral country and the land to which he owed allegiance. On July 18, 1916, however, she went further, made public a "blacklist" of eighty-three firms and individuals of enemy nationality or associations, resident in our country, and forbade British subjects to trade with them under the same penalties as if trading with the enemy. This prohibition it was explained applied to German firms with head offices in Germany; to German firms incorporated in the United States and technically American; and those that made use of a secret code or cloak to cover the fact that they were using the cables in the interest of the enemy. Mr. Lansing at once instructed Mr. Page to protest. The "blacklist," he said, had been received with "the most painful surprise" by the people and Government of the United States. It seemed to be an arbitrary interference with neutral trade against which it was the duty of the Govern-

⁴Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, October, 1916, pp. 342-344.

ment "to protest in most decided terms." British steamships would not accept cargoes from the persons and firms proscribed; neutral bankers refused them loans; neutral merchants would not contract for their goods, fearing a like proscription, and steamship lines under neutral ownership were given to understand that if they accepted freight from the "blacklisted," coal could not be had at British ports and they might themselves be put on the list. Among the proscribed were American firms, importers of foreign products or distributors in foreign lands of American products. These foreign connections, fostered during many years, when once broken, could not easily be resumed. All such citizens of the United States, the Government begged to remind the Government of His Britannic Majesty, were quite within their rights in trading with the people of any of the nations now at war, subject to the well-known and well-defined rules of international law. For breaches of blockade when the blockade is real and effective, for every unneutral act by whomsoever attempted there were well-established remedies and penalties, which the Government of the United States could not consent to see altered or extended at the will of a single Power or group of Powers. That neutrals must not be condemned, nor their goods confiscated, save on fair adjudication and full opportunity to be heard in prize court or elsewhere, was a just and honorable principle accepted by all civilized nations as a safeguard of the rights of neutrals. This the blacklist brushed aside. It condemned without notice, without hearing and in advance. Manifestly the United States could not aequiesce in such methods of punishment of its citizens. Government of the United States had no intention, no inclination to shield its citizens from the just consequences of unneutral acts. It was quite willing they should suffer the penalties which international law has sanctioned. But His Britannic Majesty's Government could not expect the Government of the United States to consent to see its citizens put upon an ex parte blacklist without calling attention in the gravest terms to the serious consequences such an act must entail.

In course of time the names of seven firms were removed from the blacklist; but vessels were blacklisted and British subjects forbidden to furnish them with bunker coal or handle the goods they transported.

October 10, 1916, the British Government made a long reply. "The trading with the enemy (extension of powers) act, 1915," Viscount Grey said, "is a piece of purely municipal legislation which provides that His Majesty, by proclamation, may prohibit persons in the United Kingdom from trading with any persons in foreign countries who might be named in that proclamation or subsequent order. That is all." The Government neither attempted nor claimed to lay penalties on neutral individuals or neutral commerce. The measure simply bade those owing allegiance to Great Britain to cease trading with persons found to be assisting or rendering service to the enemy. "Neither the rights nor property of the persons specified is interfered with, condemned or confiscated; they are as free as before to carry on their business." The right of the Government to prohibit British subjects to trade with such firms as it saw fit was held to be beyond dispute. The measure in question was justified as a military necessity. The modern means of transport and communication, opening new, easy methods for an enemy subject residing in a neutral country to render aid to his Government, was cited as another justifying reason. German business houses in foreign lands had been not merely agents active in spreading espionage was common knowledge. They had been used as bases to supply German cruisers, they were paymasters of miscreants hired "to destroy by foul means factories engaged in making, or ships engaged in carrying, supplies required by the Allies. Such operations have been carried out even in the territory of the United States itself," and His Majesty's Government was bound to say "that no adequate action has yet been taken by the Government of the United States to suppress breaches of neutrality of this particularly criminal kind." And so the matter stood when we entered the war.

By this time another German submarine, the U-53, fully armed with torpedoes and guns, suddenly appeared off Newport, stayed a few hours and put to sea. From Newport she made her way to a point some sixty miles south of the Nantucket Lightship, directly in the route of European trade, and there lay in wait for her victims. She did not wait long, for at

about half-past five in the morning of October 8 the American steamer Kansan was stopped, but allowed to proceed. Half an hour later the Strathdene was met, torpedoed and sunk. Then came in succession the British freighter, West Point, the Stephano, the Dutch steamer Bloomersdijk and the Norwegian tanker Christian Knudsen. Meantime the distress call from the West Point, sunk about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, was picked up by the radio station at Newport, and fifteen American torpedo boat destroyers were at once dispatched to search for the boats of the torpedoed ships, and bring back the crews and passengers. All were landed in safety. For a time men engaged in the shipping business were panic-stricken. Ships under the flags of the Allies were held in port, anxiety was felt for the safety of vessels nearing port, and warnings by wireless were sent out from every available station along the coast. Wild rumors were current. Some said there were three submarines, others two, others that a "mother-boat" had been seen and had undoubtedly accompanied U-53, carrying her supplies. Questions of law and policy were raised. Germany it was said has now practically established a blockade of our ports. Will the United States quietly tolerate this bringing of the European war to its very shores? Were the United States Naval authorities acting lawfully when they sent destroyers to save the passengers and crews? The act was humane but was it not aiding and assisting the submarine in its work of destruction and to that extent unneutral? What was the object of Germany in sending the U-53 to cruise off our coast? The French press declared it was to intimidate public opinion on the eve of the election.

The story of some fishermen and of the Captain of the Stephano that they had seen two submarines was supported by the Providence Journal, which gave a new explanation of the visit of the U-53.

"The Providence Journal," it said, "has information secured direct from German Embassy sources which conclusively settles the controversy as to the real reasons why the German submarine U-53 crossed the Atlantic and entered Newport Harbor. The entire scheme was originated and supervised by Captain Boy-Ed, late naval attaché to the United States, who

from his headquarters in Subec, where he still is, has directed every move that has been made or is yet to be made by German submarines off the coast of the United States."

The report, the Journal said, that there were more than one submarine, was true. The U-53 had as consorts U-48, commanded by Captain L. Michaelis, and U-61, in charge of Lieutenant Commander H. Griefen. In proof of the part taken by Boy-Ed, the Journal gave an extract from a letter written by him September 4, to an official in the German Embassy. said:

"It is vitally necessary for us to establish some proper working basis which will be satisfactory to the President, and in order to do that we must create a condition which will necessitate a ruling.

"Any thought of our being permitted to use our submarines to bring captured vessels into American ports as prizes must, of course, be abandoned when we think of the Appam case. Confronted by such an obstacle at one end, we are also forced to the conclusion that we cannot at this moment, 'while domestic events are pending in America,' sink such vessels without taking account of human life. In order to ascertain where we stand, we must, therefore, force the issue and see to what extent America is willing to carry out her alleged humanitarian ideals by helping us to save the lives of those whose ships we destroy in the coming campaign in the Western Atlantic."

Thus, said the Journal, "the sole motive was to bring to the spot, as a result of S.O.S. calls, whatever vessels of the United States Navy might be in the neighborhood, and on their arrival to ask the question, how far American men-of-war would aid the plans of the submarine commanders by saving the lives

of the passengers and crews of the doomed vessels."

At a conference held on Monday, October 9, at the German Embassy, the Journal asserted, Ambassador von Bernstorff said that at last a working basis had been established for submarine "We now have a preceactivities on this side of the Atlantic. dent which makes it certain that American vessels of war will not hesitate to save the lives of passengers and crews of ships that are destroyed by submarines, and as long as the physical conditions of submarines are what they are, we are very glad, not desiring to destroy noncombatant life, to hand the humanitarian work of saving men and women over to the United States Navy." ⁵

The same newspapers which announced the arrival of the Deutschland at New London made public a dispatch from the American consul at Queenstown stating that the British steamer Marina had been torpedoed without warning, off the southwest coast of Ireland, and that six of the fifty-two Americans aboard Testimony given to the consul by survivors were drowned. was to the effect that the ship was struck by two torpedoes, that no warning was given and that she sank in eighteen minutes. The consul also reported that on October 26 the British steamer Rowanmore with Americans aboard was torpedoed. A few days later the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer Arabia with one American aboard was sunk by a submarine in the Mediterranean off Malta. Then came news of the sinking off the Spanish coast in the Mediterranean of the American steamer Columbian. The captain, sitting in his cabin, heard the sound of guns, and, rushing on deck, saw a shell fly across his vessel and a submarine some four miles away. Drawing near, she signaled for him to follow, which he did all night, guided by rockets sent up from his captor, and answered under orders by rockets from the Columbian. At six o'clock in the morning he manned a boat and sent it to the submarine to explain that the Columbian was American-owned; but no explanation was allowed and the boat came back with a German officer and two sailors. The crew were then ordered on board the Bolo, another prize standing by, and the captain was taken to the U-boat. Bombs were then placed on the Columbian and in about twelve minutes they exploded and she sank. All hands remained aboard the Bolo, until a Swedish steamer, the Varing, was met and captured, when they were transferred to her and the Bolo sunk. A Norwegian steamship, the Fordalen, was the next prize. Her crew was sent to the Varing and the Fordalen was sunk. Food growing scarce, the Varing was allowed to enter Corunna.

As soon as the election was over the Department of State instructed our chargé at Berlin—Mr. Gerard was then in the

Providence Journal, October 24, 1916.

Mr. Lansing denied all knowledge of any such intention on the part of Germany. "I do not know," he said, "the origin of the stories that the submarine situation is serious, but I have the impression that they are emanating from some source in this country." What source he declined to specify.

And now a dispatch from our consul at Valencia reported the sinking of the American steamer *Chemung* near Cape de Gata in the Mediterranean Sea off the southeast coast of Spain, by gun fire and torpedoes from a submarine. No lives were lost, as the boats were towed to within five miles of the coast by the submarine.

December 4 the Italian steamer *Palermo*, on her way from New York to Geneva with horses and mules, was torpedoed off the Mediterranean Coast of Spain. On board were some twenty-five Americans.

The German note on the Arabia, now made public, gave as the reason for sinking her the belief that she was a transport. November 6, one hundred miles west of the island of Corigo, a German submarine, said the note, fell in with a large steamship coming from the Corigo Straits. She was painted black, and did not, as was usual with the Peninsula and Oriental steamers, have light-colored superstructures. Though identical with the Arabia, she was off the route taken by steamers between Port Said and Malta, and on that taken by vessels of war. On board were "large batches of Chinese and other colored persons in their national costumes." Supposing them to be workmen soldiers, "such as are used in great numbers behind the front by the enemies of Germany, the submarine commander believed he was concerned with a transport ship, and "attacked without delay and sank her."

Should the United States give the data showing that the Arabia was an ordinary passenger steamer, the action of the submarine commander would not then be in accordance with his instructions. The act would be a regrettable mistake "from which the German Government would promptly draw the ap-

propriate consequences."

The British Government, when informed of this reply and asked for the facts, answered that the Arabia was not, when sunk, and never had been, in the service of the Government; that there were no Asiatics on board save the Indian erew; and that she did not take the usual route, for fear of submarines. The Marina, Germany said, was also supposed to be a transport. Great Britain admitted that she had carried horses on her eastbound trip, but declared she was not in the Government service on her westbound trip. The Columbian had been torpedoed because of assistance given to the enemy by wireless. Quite as useless was another protest called forth by another act of German brutality in Belgium.

As October wore away letters and press dispatches from Amsterdam and London told of a new reign of terror in Belgium, a new form of German atrocity. Having destroyed Belgian industry by earrying off machinery of every sort, having seized all raw materials and having by such seizures deprived tens of thousands of men of the means of earning a living and forced them to become a public charge, the German authorities in the military area of Flanders now proceeded to seize the workmen because they were idle and send them to "somewhere in Germany" and October 3 posted a decree in every town and village in the area subject to army orders.

DECREE CONCERNING THE LIMITING OF THE BURDENS ON PUBLIC CHARITY

I. People able to work may be compelled to work even outside the place where they live, in case they have to apply to the charity of others for the support of themselves or their dependents on account of gambling, drunkenness, loafing, unemployment, or idleness.

II. Every inhabitant of the country is bound to render assistance in case of accident or general danger, and also to give help in case of public calamities as far as he can, even outside the place where

he lives; in case of refusal he may be compelled by force.

III. Any one called upon to work, under Articles I or II, who shall refuse the work, or to continue at the work assigned him, will incur the penalty of imprisonment up to three years and of a fine up to 10,000 marks, or one or other of these penalties, unless a severer penalty is provided for by the laws in force.

If the refusal to work has been made in concert or in agreement with several persons, each accomplice will be sentenced, as if he were

a ringleader, to at least a week's imprisonment.

IV. The German military authorities and Military Courts will enforce the proper execution of this decree.

The Quartermaster General, Sauberzweig.

Great Headquarters, October 3, 1916.

Notices which followed the decree gave warning to all concerned to come at a certain day and hour to a certain place with a kit containing specified articles. Municipal authorities who alone had the lists of names of persons receiving public aid were ordered to furnish them to the Military Authorities. In general this was refused and the town heavily fined. Thus the Municipal Council of Tournai, having refused to furnish a list, felt it a duty to place on record the following:

The City of Tournai is prepared to submit unreservedly to all the exigencies authorized by the laws and customs of war. Its sincerity cannot be questioned. For more than two years it has submitted to the German occupation, during which time it has lodged and lived at close quarters with the German troops, yet it has displayed perfect composure and has refrained from any act of hostility, proving thereby that it is animated by no idle spirit of bravado.

But the city could not bring itself to provide arms for use against its own children, knowing well that natural law and the law of nations (which is the expression of natural law) both forbid such

action.

In his declaration dated September 2, 1914, the German Governor

General of Belgium declared: "I ask none to renounce his patriotic sentiments."

The city of Tournai reposes confidence in this declaration, which it is bound to consider as the sentiment of the German Emperor, in whose name the Governor General was speaking. In accepting the inspiration of honor and patriotism, the city is loyal to a fundamental duty, the loftiness of which must be apparent to any German officer.

The city is confident that the straightforwardness and clearness of this attitude will prevent any misunderstanding arising between itself and the German Army.

Major General Hopfer replied:

In permitting itself, through the medium of municipal resolutions, to oppose the orders of the German military authorities in the occupied territory, the city is guilty of an unexampled arrogance and of a complete misunderstanding of the situation created by the state of war.

The "clear and simple situation" is in reality the following:

The military authorities order the city to obey. Otherwise the city must bear the heavy consequences, as I have pointed out in my previous explanations.

The General Commanding the Army has inflicted on the city—on account of its refusal, up to date, to furnish the lists demanded—a punitive contribution of 200,000 marks, which must be paid within the next six days, beginning with to-day. The General also adds that until such time as all the lists demanded are in his hands, for every day in arrears, beginning with December 31, 1916, a sum of 20,000 marks will be paid by the city.

Reports from Ghent, Bruges, Courtnai, Tournai and Antwerp told of the seizure of men. Five thousand, it was said, had been deported from Ghent and 15,000 from the country. A week later the number deported was said to have reached 30,000. Refugees from around Antwerp who broke through the barbed wire obstructions along the Dutch border, and escaped, reported that on short notice all males from 17 to 30 had been summoned, grouped in bands of sixty, herded into open goods cars and cattle cars and sent to Germany. Wives, children, relatives were not allowed to come within three hundred yards of the station.

German War Practices, issued by the Committee on Public Information, Nov. 15, 1917, p. 58, 59.

What happened at Mons is thus described by an eye witness:

"At half-past five, in the gray of the morning on the eighteenth of November, they walked out, six thousand two hundred men at Mons, myself and another leading them down the cobblestones of the street and out where rioting would be less than in the great city, with the soldiers on each side, with bayonets fixed, with the women held back.

"There they were collected; no question of who they were, whether they were busy or what they were doing, or what their position in life. 'Go to the right! Go to the left! Go to the right!' So they were turned to the one side or the other.

"Trains were standing there ready, steaming, to take them to Germany. You saw on the one side the one brother taken, the other brother left. A hasty embrace and they were separated and gone. You had here a man on his knees before a German officer, pleading and begging to take his old father's place; that was all. The father went and the son stayed. They were packed in those trains that were waiting there." ⁷

The Belgian women now appealed to Minister Whitlock:

"Mr. Minister," they said, "the erime which is now being committed under your eyes, the deportation of thousands of men compelled to work on enemy soil against the interests of their country, cannot find a shadow of excuse on the ground of military necessity; it cannot be admitted that citizens may be compelled to work directly or indirectly for the enemy against their brothers who are fighting. Nevertheless the occupying power will force thousands of men to this monstrous extremity, both those who have already been taken to Germany and those who to-morrow will undergo the same fate, if from the outside, from neutral Europe and the United States, no help is offered.

"Those who are taken away to-day do not go to perform a glorious duty. They are slaves in chains who, in a dark exile, threatened by hunger, prison, death, will be called upon to perform the most odious work—service to the enemy against the fatherland. The mothers cannot stand by while such an abomination is taking place without making their voices heard in protest. We extend our hands to you and address to your country a last appeal.

John H. Gade, in The National Geographic Magazine, May, 1917.

"Only the united will of the neutral peoples energetically expressed can counterbalance that of the German authorities." $^{\rm s}$

And now Belgium, through her Minister at Washington, protested to Secretary Lansing. The German Governor General, he said, is forcing thousands of Belgian workmen to go to Germany to work in quarries in the manufacture of concrete, and in lime kilns, under the pretext that they are a charge upon public charity. This he protested was contrary to the law of nations and inhuman, and in the name of the King of the Belgians asked that the United States intervene to procure the stoppage of deportations, and obtain the liberation of those deported. Germany's statement that they were not used in war industries was false, for they were used in work directly connected with war and released Germans who were sent to the front to fight. A week later the Minister again protested. The situation in Belgium was daily growing worse. The "slave raiding" was going on over all the country. When not put to work in German ammunition factories, the men were sent to northern France to dig trenches or build strategic railroads. On November 24 two hundred textile workers were deported from Ghent. By the first of December the number of those deported was given at 200,000, and men up to fifty-five years of age were then being taken.

Our chargé, Mr. Grew, meanwhile had been instructed to protest informally, and in the course of a conversation with the Under Secretary of State was handed this memorandum:

"Against the unemployed in Belgium, who are a burden to public charity, in order to avoid friction arising therefrom, compulsory measures are to be adopted to make them work so far as they are not voluntarily inclined to work, in accordance with the regulation issued May 15, 1916, by the Governor General. In order to ascertain such persons the assistance of the municipal authorities is required for the district of the Governor General in Brussels, while in the districts outside of the General Government, i.e., in the provinces of Flanders, lists were demanded from the presidents of the local relief committees containing the names of persons receiving relief. For the sake of establishing uniform procedure the competent authorities

German War Practices, pp. 71, 72.

have, in the meantime, been instructed to make the necessary investigations regarding such persons also in Flanders through the municipal authorities; furthermore, presidents of local relief committees who may be detained for having refused to furnish such lists will be released."

Mr. Grew then discussed with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the unfortunate impression which this decision would make abroad, reminded him that the measures were contrary to the assurances given to the Ambassador by the Chancellor at General Headquarters, dwelt on the effect which the policy might have on England's attitude towards relief work in Belgium, and said that the measures having been promulgated solely by the military government in Belgium, he thought the matter ought at least to be brought to the Chancellor's personal attention because of the consequences the new policy would entail. Herr Zimmermann did not think that the Foreign Office had any influence with the military authorities; did not believe that the new policy in Belgium could be revoked; but did not disapprove of Mr. Grew seeing the Chancellor about the matter.

To the Chancellor, when seen, Mr. Grew suggested that: Only actual unemployed be taken; that married men or heads of families be not taken; that employees of the Comité National be not taken; that the lists of the unemployed be not required of the Belgian authorities; that Belgians, who had already been imprisoned for refusing to supply these lists, be released; that deported persons be permitted to correspond with their families in Belgium; and that places of work or concentration camps of deported persons be opened by the German Government to inspection by neutral representatives.

The Chancellor, through his adjutant, replied informally and orally that only actually unemployed were to be taken, and the selections would be made in a careful and deliberate manner; that married men or heads of families could not in principle be exempted, but each case would be considered carefully on its merits; that employees of the Comité National were regarded as actually employed and therefore exempt; that it was essential that the Belgian authorities should coöperate with the German authorities in furnishing lists of unemployed, in

order to avoid making mistakes; that only one Belgian had been imprisoned for refusing to give such lists, and orders had now been given for his release; that deported persons would be permitted to correspond with their families in Belgium; that places of work and concentration camps would in principle be open to inspection by Spanish diplomatic representatives; and that American injection might also be informally arranged if desired.

Failing in this informal way to produce effect, a formal note was drafted by Mr. Grew and duly presented December 5, 1916.

The Government of the United States, it set forth, has learned with the greatest concern and regret of "the policy of the German Government to deport from Belgium a portion of the civilian population for the purpose of forcing them to labor in Germany and is constrained to protest in a friendly spirit but most solemnly against this action." It was contrary to all precedent and against "those humane principles of international practice which have long been accepted and followed by civilized nations in their treatment of noncombatants in conquered territory." If carried out it would "in all probability be fatal to Belgian relief work so humanely planned and so successfully carried out."

To this it was answered by Germany that in Belgium the number of unemployed had become a matter for serious consideration, because the British policy of exclusion had cut off raw materials, closed the factories, brought Belgian industries to a stand, thrown out of employment upwards of 1,200,000 Belgians, and made them dependent on public relief. Under such conditions the Governor General of Brussels on March 15, 1916, issued an order imposing imprisonment or coercive labor upon persons depending on the public for relief and refusing to do work according to their abilities. To find work for all such in Belgium was not possible. Nothing therefore was left to do but assign them to work in Germany. These measures were strictly in accord with international law, and had been carried out "with all possible consideration and without harshness."

At an indignation meeting in New York it was resolved that "we American citizens in public meeting" express abhorrence

of the "fresh outrages and violations of the laws of war, the law of nations, and the instincts of common humanity deliberately perpetrated by the German Government," and the Government was called on "to protest with all its force and earnestness against these outrages."

The statement by Germany that the British blockade was solely responsible for the shortage of raw material was false. At the very outset of the war Dr. Walter Rathenau, in August, 1914, suggested a plan for the conservation of the economic resources of Germany, and for the acquisition of the needed raw material by purchase in neutral countries and by seizure in the countries to be conquered. To put this plan in operation a new bureau with 36 subdivisions was created, and placed in charge of the Minister of War, and on the day the Germans entered Belgium the bureau began its work in that unhappy country. In obedience to 66 decrees issued in the course of two years, Belgium was stripped bare of machines and machine tools, of lathes, wool and linen, cotton, jute and thread, rubber, mineral and chemical products, locomotives and automobiles, horses, cattle, hides, fats and oils, of almost everything the people possessed. Why this was done was made clear in a speech by Herr Beumer in the Prussian Diet about the time of the great "slave raids."

"Anybody," said he, "who knows the present state of things in Belgian industry will agree with me that it must take at least some years—assuming that Belgium is independent at all—before Belgium can ever think of competing with us in the world market. And anybody who has traveled as I have done, through the occupied districts of France, will agree with me that so much damage has been done to industrial property that no one need be a prophet in order to say that it will take more than ten years before we need think of France as a competitor or of the reëstablishment of French industry." ⁸

Protests produced no effect whatever, and on January 17, 1917, Mr. Brand Whitlock in a long report to the Department of State said:

"The deportations began in October in the Etape, at Ghent, and at Bruges, as my brief telegrams indicated. The policy spread; the rich industrial districts of Hainaut, the mines and

^{*&}quot;War Cyclopedia," p. 33.

steel works about Charleroi were next attacked; now they are seizing men in Brabant, even in Brussels, despite some indications and even predictions of the civil authorities that the policy was about to be abandoned.

"During the last fortnight men have been impressed here in Brussels, but their seizures here are made evidently with much greater care than in the provinces, with more regard for the appearances. There was no public announcement of the intention to deport, but suddenly about ten days ago certain men in towns whose names are on the list of chômeurs received summons notifying them to report at one of the railway stations on a given day; penalties were fixed for failure to respond to the summons, and there was printed on the card an offer of employment by the German Government, either in Germany or Belgium. On the first day out of about 1,500 men ordered to present themselves at the Gare du Midi about 750 responded. These were examined by German physicians and 300 were taken. There was no disorder, a large force of mounted Uhlans keeping back the crowds and barring access to the station to all but those who had been summoned to appear. The Commission for Relief in Belgium had secured permission to give to each deported man a loaf of bread, and some of the communes provided warm clothing for those who had none and in addition a small financial allowance. As by one of the ironies of life the winter has been more excessively cold than Belgium has ever known it, and while many of those who presented themselves were adequately protected against the cold, many of them were without overcoats. The men shivering from cold and fear, the parting from weeping wives and children, the barriers of brutal Uhlans, all this made the scene a pitiable and distressing one.

"It was understood that the seizures would continue here in Brussels, but on Thursday last, a bitter cold day, those that had been convoked were sent home without examination. It is supposed that the severe weather has moved the Germans to postpone the deportations." 9

German War Practices, p. 55, 56.

The etapes were the parts of Belgium under martial law, and included the province of western Flanders, part of eastern Flanders, and the region of Tournai. The remainder of the occupied part of Belgium was under civil government.

CHAPTER XI

THE PEACE NOTES

Tuesday, the twelfth of December, 1916, was a day long to be remembered in Berlin, for on that day the Reichstag had assembled in special session to hear peace proposals, made by the Emperor to the Allies. Every member of that body, those at home and those in the trenches, had been summoned, for the meeting, it was said, would be "the most remarkable since the outbreak of the war and of world-wide historical importance."

The Chancellor began his speech in a boastful vein, telling how Roumania had entered the war to roll up the German army in the east; how the Allies on the Somme had sought to pierce the German line; how the Italians had attempted to crush Austria-Hungary; how, with God's help, the western front still stood, and in spite of the Roumanian campaign was stronger in men and material than ever before; how, "while on the Somme and on the Corso the drumfire resounded, while the Russians launched troops against the eastern frontier of Transylvania," von Hindenburg captured the whole of western Wallachia and the capital of Bucharest; and how great stores of grain, food, oil, had fallen into German hands in Roumania and had put the abundance of their own supplies beyond question.

He told how on the sea the submarine had brought to the Allies the specter of famine they had intended should appear before Germany; and how the Reichstag by "the national auxiliary war service law" had built up "a new offensive and defensive bulwark in the midst of the great struggle." Behind the fighting army stood the nation at work. The Empire was not, as its enemies fondly imagined, a besieged fortress, but "one gigantic and firmly disciplined camp with inexhaustible resources."

The enemies of Germany, he said, had accused her of seek-

ing to conquer the whole world. Unmoved by these accusations she had gone on always ready to fight for her existence, her free future, always ready "for this prize to stretch out her hand for peace." Therefore, moved by "a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards his nation, and, beyond it, towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action," and had decided to propose to the Allied Powers "to enter into peace negotiations." He had that morning transmitted to all the hostile Powers "a note to this effect."

The Chancellor then read the note and continued, "To-day we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity."

While the Chancellor was speaking, the Emperor announced to the army and navy that "in agreement with the sovereigns of my allies and the consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that moment arrives you will fight on."

The note was to be transmitted to Serbia by the Netherlands Minister; to Italy, Belgium, and Portugal by the Swiss Minister, and to Great Britain and France by our Ambassadors at London and Paris.

On receipt of official copies at Washington it was proposed to send with the note an appeal to consider the peace proposal favorably and hold a conference; but a wiser course was taken and the note was formally delivered by Ambassador Page in London and Ambassador Sharp in Paris without comment.

"Our aims," said Germany and her allies in their joint note, "are not to shatter nor annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us) to the bitter end, if necessary, at the same time, prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end to the atrocities of war, the four allied Powers propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations."

The four allied Powers had been forced to take arms in defense of "justice and the liberty of national evolution." Germany and her allies, "Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey," had "given proof of their unconquerable strength in this struggle." They had gained "gigantic advantages over adversaries superior in number and war material." Their lines stood un-

The last attack in the Balkans had been victoriously The resistance of their forces could not be overcome, and the whole situation justified their "expectation of further successes."

"If in spite of this offer of peace," the war went on, they were resolved to fight to a victorious end.

Russia, the first to answer the German note, declared in resolutions adopted by the Duma, that she favored a flat refusal, by the Allies, to "enter into any peace negotiations whatever." To her the proposal of Germany was a new proof of the weakness of the enemy and "a hypocritical act from which the enemy expects no real success."

France made her answer on the field of battle, where December 15, 1916, she won another great victory before Verdun. drove back the German lines, captured some 11,000 prisoners, reoccupied almost all the ground lost since February, and disproved the claim of the Chancellor that the western line stood unshaken.

In England a change of ministry had just taken place; Mr. Asquith had retired; Lloyd George on December 7 had kissed the King's hand and become Prime Minister, and as such on December 19 made his speech in Parliament outlining his policy. In the course of it he said:

There has been some talk about proposals of peace. What are the proposals? There are none. To enter, on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany. . . .

We feel we ought to know, before we can give favorable consideration to such an invitation, that Germany is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained in Europe. What are these terms? [In the words of his right honorable friend they were,] "Restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition."

President Wilson, meantime, without any knowledge of what the Kaiser was about to do, had it in mind to appeal to the belligerents to state what they were fighting for, in the hope that their statements of their objects might become the basis of peace. He now wrote the note, and on December 18 sent it

to the warring Powers. Our diplomatic representatives to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria were to say:

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also contains the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

In the notes to the Allies this paragraph was replaced by one identical in substance but not quite the same in words. With this exception all the notes were alike.

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them.

By what particular means this should be brought about the President cared not. Any means would be acceptable to him if only the great object he had in mind was accomplished. The belligerents on both sides he believed had virtually the same objects in mind. Each side desired to make the rights of weak peoples and small states as safe against aggression in the future as were the rights of the great and powerful states then at war. Each side was opposed to the formation of more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power. Each was ready to consider a league of nations to insure the peace of the world. But the issues of the present war must first be settled on such terms as would safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity and the political and commercial freedom of nations involved.

"In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war." They were ready and eager to cooperate in accomplishing these ends when the war was over. "But the war must first be concluded." Therefore the President felt "justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world" which all desired.

If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted; if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

Every part of the great family of mankind had felt the burden and terror of the war, "and yet the concrete object for which it is being waged has never been definitely stated."

"The leaders of the several belligerents" had "stated those objects in general terms," and stated in such terms they seemed to be the same on both sides. But never yet had "the authoritative spokesmen of either side" stated precisely what would satisfy them. The world had been "left to conjecture what definite results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military successes even, would bring the war to an end." He was not proposing peace, nor offering mediation, but suggesting that soundings be taken that neutral and warring nations might know "how near the haven of peace may be."

What caused the President to make his unexpected move was, however, a matter of speculation. This Mr. Lansing sought to explain by a statement, that it was "not our material interest we had in mind when the note was sent, but more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical.

"I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks in order that we may negotiate our

conduct in the future."

No nation has been sounded. No consideration of the German overtures, or the speech of Lloyd George, was taken into account. The only effect of the overtures was to delay it a few days. "The sending of this note will indicate the possibility of our being forced into the war. That possibility ought to serve as a restraining and sobering force safeguarding American rights. It may also serve to force an earlier conclusion of the war. Neither the President nor myself regards this note as a peace note."

Stocks, which began to decline as soon as the German proposal was known, now fell sharply, and hearing of this and that a belief existed that the President had acted because the country was about to be drawn into the war, Mr. Lansing later in the day made a new statement. He had, he said, been misunderstood. "My intention was to suggest the very direct and necessary interest which this country as one of the neutral nations has in the possible terms which the belligerents may have in mind, and I did not intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality, which it has consistently pursued in the face of constantly increasing difficulties."

Not until December thirtieth was the reply of the Entente Powers to the German peace note handed to our Ambassador at Paris, and not until January 4, 1917, was it delivered to Germany by our Ambassador at Berlin.

The Allied Governments, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, and Serbia, faithful to their pledges "not to lay down their arms separately," had "resolved to reply collectively to the pretended proposals of peace." They protested against two assertions in the note, against that which attempted to throw on the Entente Powers the responsibility for the war, and against that which proclaimed the victory of the Central Powers. The Allied Powers had sustained for thirty months a war they did everything possible to avoid. Their attachment to peace was still as strong as in 1914, but it was "not upon the word of Germany, after the violation of its engagements, that the peace broken by her may be based."

"A mere suggestion, without a statement of terms, that

negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace." It was a sham proposal. It lacked all substance and precision. It was "less an offer of peace than a war maneuver." It was nothing more than an attempt to end the war "by imposing a German peace"; an effort to stiffen public opinion in Germany and in countries allied to her, countries sorely "tried by losses, worn out by economic pressure, crushed by the supreme effort imposed upon their people"; an attempt to deceive public opinion in neutral countries whose peoples had long since made up their minds as to the origin of the war and were too enlightened to help the designs of Germany by abandoning the defense of human freedom; an attempt, finally, to justify a new series of crimes, submarine warfare, deportations, forced labor and violations of neutrality. The Allies in short refused "to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere"; declared "that no peace is possible so long as they have not seeured reparation for violated rights and liberties"; so long as "the principles of nationality and the free existence of small states" were not recognized; so long as the forces which constituted a perpetual menace to the nations had not been destroyed, and the security of the world fully guaranteed.

The note closed with a review of the "special situation of Belgium" after two and a half years of war, how her integrity had been guaranteed by treaties signed by five European Powers, of whom Germany was one; how, in spite of these treaties, she was the first to suffer from German aggression; how, on August fourth, in the Reichstag, the German Chancellor had admitted this aggression, and pledged himself in the name of Germany to repair it; how, during two and a half years, "this injustice" had been cruelly aggravated by the occupying army which "exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and villages," and "was responsibile for innumerable massacres, executions, and imprisonments," and how at the very moment Germany was "proclaiming peace and humanity to the world" she was deporting Belgian citizens by thousands.

To this the Kaiser made reply in a general order to his army and navy. He had offered to enter, he said, into peace negotiations. His enemies had refused. The war therefore would continue. "Before God and humanity I declare that on the Governments of our enemies alone falls the heavy responsibility for all the further terrible sacrifices from which I wished to save you.

"With justified indignation at our enemies' arrogant crime and with determination to defend our holiest possessions and secure for the Fatherland a happy future, you will become as

steel.

"Our enemies did not want the understanding offered by me. With God's help our arms will enforce it."

At home the note of the President was both denounced and Those who sympathized with the Allies declared supported. it to be meddlesome, untimely, ill advised. Whether it was a peace note or a war note they were at a loss to know. "If." said Mr. Roosevelt, "the note was designed merely to promote an early conclusion of peace, it was untimely, irritating and dangerous. If on the other hand, as Mr. Lansing first interpreted it, it was a threat of war and foreshadowed the end of American neutrality, it was not only dangerous but profoundly mischievous." The note took positions "so profoundly immoral and misleading that high-minded and right-thinking American citizens, whose country this note places in a thoroughly false light, in honor are bound to protest." To say that the Germans who had trampled Belgium under foot and were transporting ten thousand Belgians into slavery were fighting for the same object as their victims who fought for their country, their homes, their wives and their children, was "not only a falsehood, but a callous and most immoral falsehood."

Partisans of the President upheld his act as likely to bring peace, and introduced in the Senate, December twentieth, a resolution that "the Senate approves and strongly endorses the action taken by the President in sending the diplomatic notes of December eighteenth to the nations now engaged in war, suggesting and recommending that those nations state the terms upon which peace might be discussed."

To adopt the resolution in this form, its opponents claimed, would commit the United States to an international league to enforce peace, would be an abandonment of the doctrine of neutrality established by Washington, an abandonment of the

doctrine of Monroe, and would plunge the United States into the political complications and entangling alliances of Europe. When adopted the resolution had been modified to read: "Resolved: That the Senate approves and strongly endorses the request of the President in the diplomatic notes of December eighteenth to the nations now engaged in war that those nations state the terms upon which peace might be discussed."

Germany and Austria-Hungary replied to the President's note on the same day, December 26, 1916. The Imperial Government believed the best way to reach the desired result would be by a direct exchange of views, and suggested "the speedy assembly, on neutral ground, of delegates of the warring states." The great work for the prevention of future wars could not be taken up until the end "of the present conflict of exhaustion." When that time came Germany would be ready "to cooperate with the United States in this sublime task."

Austria-Hungary also believed a direct exchange of views by the belligerents was the most suitable way of attaining peace, and proposed "that representatives of the belligerent powers convene at an early date at some place on neutral ground." She also, when the present war was over, was ready "to undertake the great and desirable work of the prevention of future wars."

The Swiss Federal Council was "glad to seize the opportunity to support the efforts of the President of the United States." True to the obligations of strict neutrality, a friend to the States of both the warring groups, placed 'like an island amid the seething waters of the terrible world war," with its "ideal and material interests sensibly jeopardized and violated," Switzerland was filled with a deep longing for peace and ready to do her small part to stop the endless sufferings caused by the war.

The Norwegian Government had every hope that the initiative of the President would bring results worthy of the high purpose which inspired it. Greece longed for peace, heard with the liveliest interest of the steps taken by the President to end the long and cruel war, and would gladly accede to his noble demand but was powerless. Spain expressed her sympathy, but declined to cooperate. "The action to which the United States

invites Spain would not have efficacy, the more so because the Central Powers have already expressed their firm determination to discuss the conditions of peace solely with the belligerent Powers."

As the new year opened there began to come, from abroad, rumors concerning what sort of a reply the Allies would make to the peace note of the President. Mr. Hall Caine, in a letter to the Philadelphia Public Ledger, reported that when M. Ribot left London on December twenty-eighth he carried with him a draft of the reply, that it would have to be sent to each of the Allies, including Japan, and that their approval or changes would have to be sent to Paris before the note could be telegraphed to Washington. Despite the harsh criticism the peace note met with in London, Paris and Petrograd, he was sure the reply would be appreciative and even grateful in tone. But he did not think the Allies would recognize the right of America to force on a peace because of the loss of the lives and property should the German submarine war take on a form of ruthless inhumanity.

Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver in a long article in the London Times insisted that there should be no bargaining, no yielding. The President, said he, believes that if the belligerents would state their terms of peace the war would be a deal nearer its end. It was true, as the President pointed out, that the concrete objects of the war had never been definitely stated. This was because the objects of the war were not concrete; could not be stated and defined in diplomatic language; could not be listed, and bargained for; did "not belong to the same order of things as indemnities, cessions, or retrocessions of territory." The Allies had already set forth before the world "the three general objects for which they are fighting, and which under God they are determined to achieve: restitution, reparation and security. But the greatest of these is security." No league of nations could "insure peace or justice in the future unless the German army is beaten in the present war."

The London Times in an editorial said:

We are convinced that the ends for which the Allies are fighting to-day are as high and sacred as those for which Americans fought and died two generations ago. They are in the last resort the same assured supremacy of right and freedom before the law. We believe that if the true character of our cause were once brought home to the American masses American opinion would support it warmly, as British and French opinion supported emancipation in 1863.

Mr. Wilson's note affords us a great opportunity for laying our case before Americans in words which cannot be misunderstood. We trust it will be used to show, in sharp contrast, our aims and the aims of our enemies, that they may stand out sharp and clear in American eyes, as the contrast between the cause of freedom and the cause of bondage stood before our eyes when Lincoln invoked the "considerate judgment of mankind" upon his liberating edict.

The Frankfurter Zeitung reported that in a speech in Budapest, on New Year's day, Count Julius Andrassy, one time Premier of Hungary, said:

If the Allies reject our offer of peace only because, as they say, our offer is not honorably meant, is only a maneuver. If they say they cannot enter into negotiations before they know our conditions, they can learn them from President Wilson, to whom they will be communicated.

While the press of Great Britain and the United States was guessing what would be the Entente reply, Ambassador Gerard, who had just returned to Berlin from a visit to Washington, was dined by the American Association of Commerce and Trade. Dignitaries of all sorts were present: Dr. Helfferich, Imperial Vice Chancellor; the Vice President of the Reichstag; the Secretaries for the Colonies; the Foreign Secretary; bankers, financiers, leaders in public life. To them the Ambassador was reported to have said:

Never since the beginning of the war have the relations between Germany and the United States been as cordial as now. I have brought back an olive branch from the President, or don't you consider the President's message an olive branch? I personally am convinced that so long as Germany's fate is directed by such men as my friend the Chancellor and Doctor Helfferich and Doctor Solf, by Admirals von Capelle, Holtzendorff and von Mueller, by Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and last, but not least, by my friend Zimmermann, the relations between the two countries are running no risk.

In Germany the speech was welcomed, as a proof of the wish for a continuance of good understanding, but was hotly

attacked by the Pan-Germans. Why, said one, should Americans not be filled with kindly feelings for Germany so long as she does everything America wishes? He asserts that no difficulties will arise while a number of specially mentioned men stand at the head of the German Government. He thereby intimates that any departure from directions hitherto followed may endanger the existing friendship. Such peace messages are suspicious. In saying that so long as certain men remain in office there is no danger of unfriendly relations, Gerard's words, said another journal, must be filled out thus, "but if other men come who do not suit us, then the threat is unmistakable." "From the Ambassador's words it must be concluded that a far-reaching, unpublished agreement exists between Germany and the United States, and the latter country having reached its political aim regarding Germany, the fact is being celebrated in Berlin by a great demonstration."

To these criticisms a reply was made in a dispatch from Berlin to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a dispatch said to have been semi-official or inspired by Government. The Pan-Germans, it said, "see ghosts when they show such anxiety about an understanding pending with the United States as to how ruthless submarine warfare may be avoided.

"The majority of the German press and people desire good relations with the United States, and would rejoice if an agreement were reached on the question of armed merchantmen. Count von Reventlow's assumption that the dinner in Berlin celebrated the attainment by the United States of its political ends is an exaggeration both of the occasion and of what is now negotiating between Germany and the United States." The mention by name of German statesmen, generals and admirals was perhaps not diplomatic but was well meant.

That it was not diplomatic seems to have been the opinion of Secretary Lansing who let it be known that the Ambassador had been called on to state if his speech had been correctly reported. In any event, what he said was on his own responsibility.

And now the long-awaited reply of the Allies to the President's note was announced as ready. Dispatches from London and Paris on January tenth stated that Premier Briand had

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delivered it to Ambassador Sharp, and that it would not be made public until forty-eight hours after its receipt by the President. January 12, accordingly, it appeared in the newspapers.

The Allies, the note set forth, heartily approved of the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world, and desired as sincerely as did the Government of the United States to end as soon as possible a war for which the Central Powers were responsible and which inflicted such cruel sufferings on humanity. But they did not believe it possible, at that time, to obtain such a peace as would assure reparations, restitutions, and such guarantees as were necessary to establish the future of European nations on a solid basis.

The Allies were fully aware of the losses and suffering the war was causing to neutrals, and deplored them; but were not responsible, for in no way had they either desired or provoked the war. The Allies must therefore, "in the most friendly but in the most specific manner, protest against the association in the American note of the two groups of belligerents, an association based on public declarations of the Central Powers, in direct opposition to the evidence both as regards responsibility for the past and as concerns guarantees for the future."

No fact was better established than "the willful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hegemony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg, and by her manner of conducting the war, her systematic contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small states." Was it necessary to recall the invasion of Serbia and Belgium; the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians; the barbarous treatment of the people of Syria; the Zeppelin raids on open towns; the sinking, by submarines, of passenger steamships and merchantmen under neutral flags; the cruel treatment of prisoners of war; the judicial murders of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt; the deportation and enslavement of civilians? All these crimes would fully explain to President Wilson the protest of the Allies against being grouped with the Central Powers.

But the President wished that the belligerent Powers state

what they sought by continuing the war. They sought the "restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, of Montenegro, and the indemnities due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia, and Roumania, with just reparation"; the "reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable regime, and founded as much on respect of nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development" as upon "territorial conventions and international agreements."

They demanded the restoration of provinces wrested from the Allies in the past; the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, Teheco Slovaks from foreign domination; "the enfranchisement of peoples subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks," and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire.

With the note from the Entente Powers came one from Belgium. The Government of the King, it said, desired to pay tribute "to the sentiment which prompted the President of the United States to send his note to the belligerent Powers." But the President seemed "to believe that the statesmen of the two opposing eamps pursue the same objects of war." The example of Belgium unhappily showed this was not the case. The barbarous manner in which Germany had treated, and was still treating, Belgium, did not justify the belief that Germany would guarantee in the future the rights of the weak nations she had not ceased to trample under foot since the war began. When announcing to the Reichstag the violation of treaties by the invasion of Belgium the Chancellor of the Empire had been forced to recognize the iniquity of the act and had promised reparation. But, since the occupation the Germans had shown no better observance of international law or the stipulations of The Hague convention. They had by taxation, as heavy as it was arbitrary, drained the resources of the country; they had deliberately ruined its industries, destroyed entire cities, put to death a large number of the people, and while loudly proclaiming their desire to end the horrors of war had added to rigors of occupation by deporting into slavery thousands of Belgian workers. If ever there was a country that had a right to say it had taken up arms to defend its life that country was Belgium. Forced to fight or submit to shame, she passionately desired that an end be put to the unprecedented sufferings of her people; but she could accept no peace which did not assure her reparation, security and guarantees for the future.

On the day on which Ambassador Sharp, at Paris, received these two notes from the Entente Powers, Ambassador Gerard at Berlin was handed a copy of a note addressed to neutral nations by the Central Powers. It was their reply to the answer of the Allies to the German peace proposals of December twelfth.

"Our adversaries," so ran the note, "declined this proposition, giving as a reason that it is a proposition without sincerity and without importance. The form in which they clothe their communication excludes an answer to them, but the Imperial Government considers it important to point out to the Governments of neutral Powers its opinion regarding the situation."

It was needless to enter into a discussion of the origin of the war. The encircling policy of England, the revengeful policy of France, the endeavor of Russia to gain Constantinople, the instigation of the Serbian assassination in Serajevo, and the complete mobilization of Russia meant war against Germany. According to the declaration of the responsible statesmen of the hostile Powers their aims were "directed toward the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the partition of Turkey and the mutilation of Bulgaria.

"In the face of such war aims, the demand for restitution, reparation and guarantees in the mouth of our adversaries" was surprising. The Allies had declared that peace was impossible "so long as the reëstablishment of violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationalities and the free existence of small states were not guaranteed." The sincerity of the Allies would not be admitted by the world, while it held before its eyes "the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the Boer republics, the subjugation of northern Africa by England, France and Italy, the suppression of Russian alien nations, and the violation of Greece, which is without precedent in history."

The war of starvation against Germany, the treatment of

neutrals by England, the use of colored troops in Europe, the extension of the war to Africa, the barbarous treatment of prisoners of war in Africa and Russia, the deportation of civilian populations from eastern Prussia, Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, and Bukowina were so many proofs of the insincerity of the Allies in their complaint against the situation in Belgium. On Belgium and those who instigated her to take her attitude fell the responsibility for her fate.

Having made an honest effort to end the war and open the way for an understanding between the belligerents, the Imperial Government left it with its adversaries to decide whether the road to peace should, or should not be followed.

Various opinions were held by our countrymen as to the meaning of the Entente reply. Some thought it a frank and specific answer to the request of the President, and compared it favorably with the flat refusal of Germany to state terms. Others held that while it met the President half way, it set forth clearly that the Allies were fighting for a cause, that they were unwilling to make peace until they had accomplished the objects for which they were pledged, that no compromise was possible, and that for the present the door was closed to peace. Still others claimed that stripped of its diplomatic language the note was as blunt a rebuke to the President for meddling as was the note from Germany.

The delivery of the reply from the Entente Powers was followed by a note from Great Britain supplementing and explaining that from the Allies. It was signed by Balfour, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and brought to the Department of State by the British Minister.

His Majesty's Government shared the earnest desire of the President for a speedy and lasting peace; but no peace could long endure if the foundations were defective. The calamities from which the world was suffering arose from the existence of great Powers consumed by the lust of dominion, in the midst of nations ill prepared for defense, and though plentifully supplied with international laws, with no means of enforcing them; nations whose boundaries and internal constitutions did not harmonize with the aspirations of their constituent races. This latter evil could be mitigated if the Allies secured the changes

in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note. The existence of the Turkish empire had long been considered essential to the peace of Europe. It could no longer be so considered. In the hands of Germany it had ceased to be a bulwark of peace and had become an instrument of conquest. Led by German officers, Turkish soldiers were fighting in lands from which they had long ago been expelled. A Turkish Government controlled and subsidized by Germany had perpetrated in Armenia and Syria massacres more horrible than any ever before known in those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace require the expulsion of Turkey from Europe as much as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, or Italia Irredenta to Italy.

These territorial changes would lessen the occasion for war, but would afford no security against its recurrence. If Germany again set out to rule the world she might find war more difficult but not impossible, she might still have ready at hand a political system organized through and through on a military basis; she might still persist in her methods of attack and strike down her more pacific neighbors before they could prepare for defense. If so, Europe, when the war is over, would be poorer in men, in money, in good will, than when it began, but no safer, and the hope of the President for the future of the world would be as far as ever from realization. While other nations, while the United States and Great Britain were seeking by treaties of arbitration to make sure that no chance quarrel should destroy the peace they wished to be everlasting, Germany stood aloof. Her philosophers and historians preached the splendors of war, and proclaimed power as the end of the State, and her General Staff forged the weapons by which power might be ob-So long as Germany remained the Germany which without the shadow of justification overran and barbarously illused a country she was bound by treaty to protect, no state could be secure if its rights had no better protection than a treaty.

The brutal methods of the Central Powers were designed not merely to crush into the dust those with whom they were at war, but to terrorize those with whom they were at peace. Belgium was not only a victim, but an example. It was intended that neutrals should note the outrages which accompanied its occupation, the reign of terror, the deportation of some of the people, the oppression of the rest. And lest nations, protected by the British fleets or their own, should think themselves safe from German methods, the submarine imitated the barbarous methods of the army.

No peace could last unless the existing causes of international unrest were removed or weakened; unless the aggressive aims and unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own people; unless behind international law, behind all treaties for preventing hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would make the hardiest aggressor pause.

The very day this note was delivered at Washington, the British Admiralty announced that a German raider was in the Atlantic, that it had sunk eight British and two French merchantmen, and had captured two, that "the Japanese Hudson Maru" had reached Pernambuco with 237 officers and men from the lost ships, and that the others, some 450 in number, had been placed on the captured steamer Yarrowdale.

The captain of the Dramatist, one of the ships destroyed by the raider, on reaching Pernambuco on the Hudson Maru, stated that December 18 he sighted a steamer going in the same direction as his; that early in the afternoon she drew alongside, broke out the German naval ensign, dropped her sides under the forecastle bulwarks, revealing two guns trained on the Dramatist, and called on him to surrender. The Dramatist was then boarded and, after her crew was transferred to the raider, was torpedoed. Later part of the crew was sent to the Hudson Maru and orders given to follow the raider till January 12 and then proceed to Pernambuco. Reports from Buenos Aires added eleven ships, British, French and Danish, to the list given out by the Admiralty. The Yarrowdale with 469 prisoners, of whom 72 were Americans, reached a German port in safety.

To the astonishment of the country the President now appeared, unexpectedly, before the Senate, and delivered an address which amazed Europe.

On December 18, he said, he addressed an "identical note" to the Governments of all nations at war, asking for a more definite statement than had yet been made of the terms on

which it would be possible to make peace. He "spoke on behalf of humanity, of the rights of all neutral nations," many of whose "vital interests the war put in constant jeopardy." The Central Powers replied merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists and discuss terms of peace. Entente Powers had stated in general terms "the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation" necessary to a settlement.

The peace that would end the war must be followed by a "definite concert of Powers" which would "make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again." In that the United States must play a part. It was right before such a settlement came that our Government should frankly state the conditions on which "it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace." He had come to state those conditions. First of all there "must be a peace without victory. . . .

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms forced upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last."

The equality of nations on which peace, to be lasting, must rest must be an equality of rights, resting "on the common strength, not the individual strength, of the nations on whose concert peace will depend." But there was "a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty, as if they were property."

He took it for granted, to take one example, that statesmen everywhere were "agreed that there should be a united, independent, autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have hitherto lived under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own."

So far as practicable every great people should "be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where it cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by neutralization of direct highways under the general guarantees which will assure the peace itself."

The "paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and coöperation."

There must be concession and sacrifice. No safety or equality among nations was possible "if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue, here and there, to be built up and maintained." The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, was the most "intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and mankind."

He was sure he had said what the people of the United States would wish him to say. He hoped he spoke for the friends of humanity everywhere. "I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent masses of mankind everywhere, who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear."

Holding out the expectation that our country would join the other civilized nations in guaranteeing the permanence of peace on the terms he named would, he thought, be no breach in our traditions or our policy as a nation. He was proposing "that the nations, with one accord, adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

He was "proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which

makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

"These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. They are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."

By those who listened to this remarkable address it was received with mingled feelings of astonishment, approval and dissent. Some said the League for Peace was quixotic, Utopian, impossible to be obtained. Others thought the address marked an epoch in our history, was the greatest state paper since the famous message of Monroe; would have more influence on the course of world democracy than any speech ever made in Congress. Still others declared that it was ill-timed; that it was a fine literary effort; that it would appeal to the American people; that it would alienate the Entente Powers; that it was startling in its proposals and dictatorial in its suggestions. We had no right to say to Germany, You must give up Poland; nor to Turkey who should go through the Dardanelles. How would the words "a free, independent and autonomous Poland" be received by Russia and Germany? How would the words "freedom of worship" be received by Russia and Turkey? Was the reference to a direct outlet to the highway of the sea an approval of Russia's ambition to obtain Constantinople? "Peace without victory" was likely to go down in history coupled with "Too proud to fight." But how would the Allies receive it after having just declared they were "determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their powers and consent to all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which they are convinced not only their own safety and prosperity depends, but also the future of civilization."

By the press of the country the address was received in much the same spirit. One journal thought it the greatest utterance yet made by the President. As an American he spoke American sentiments, and American principles, and served notice to all the world that in the peace which will end the war our views must be consulted. Said another, the President is sworn to execute the laws; he is not sworn to execute

faithfully the office of President of humanity. Nothing in his official duties requires him to demand a free and united Poland, nor lay down the principles in accordance with which Switzerland shall have free access to the sea. If peace without victory means anything, said a third, it means a peace bearing the hallmark "Made in Prussia."

According to others it was a masterly address, a shining ideal seemingly unattainable, while passion ruled the world, but expressing the hopes of nations, great and small. A Monroe doctrine embracing the earth, a league of peace including every nation, was no idle dream. The Illinois Staats-Zeitung declared the President had "lost all moral authority to make demands on the nations at war from the standpoint of morality, because of his unneutral policy and his direct protection to munition and blood usury." The New York German Herold remarked that "Mr. Wilson's Anglophile leanings are so well known that any alliance proposition he advances should be well subjected to close scrutiny."

By the London journals the speech was published under such headlines as: "Wilson's Speech. Hostile United States Attitude"; "Wilson's Astonishing speech"; "Wilson's Speech, Neither Side Must Win, Victory Ruled Out"; "Peace Without Victory"; "Wilson's Surprising Declaration for Peace Without Victory Pleases Germans." The Daily Mail thought the address "an abstract pontifical statement of a future international morality"; searched in vain "for any expression of sympathy with those who are shedding their blood for freedom"; wondered "whether he spoke as the head of an American University or as the Chief Magistrate of a flesh and blood Republie"; and could only envy him his remoteness from the reality of war when he spoke of peace without victory. Germany had declared treaties scraps of paper. It would be interesting to learn from the President how she is to be induced to keep any treaties of peace if she is not defeated.

The Globe, after reminding the President that he made no protest when Belgium was invaded, and merely wrote a note when the Lusitania was sunk, asked him what he had done for justice and humanity that he should now presume "to school us" in the mighty conflict from which he had most carefully

kept aloof. The men who tore up the scrap of paper laughed at his notes, and sank more ships, respected force and nothing else. Peace had no attraction for the Pall Mall Gazette if it left the perjured enemy fleets and armies. Victory was essential for safety. Lord Northeliffe said Englishmen were puzzled to know why the President did not begin by pacifying little Mexico. The President's misunderstanding of the situation was due to German propaganda and geographical distance. Baron Sydenham believed the President saw, as in a vision, "a new world in which there shall be no preparation for war, but a solid union of all peoples acting in the common interest." Unless Germany was defeated not one of his demands could be fulfilled, and his roseate vision would fade into oblivion. "Reparation and restitution to France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, were not possible until Germany acknowledged defeat."

Hall Caine told the readers of the Philadelphia Ledger that the first expression of opinion in France and Britain had been "that of scarcely disguised disdain." But the President need not be troubled on that account. "From the days of Joseph downward ridicule had been the first heritage of all exalted dreamers. Let President Wilson take heart from the first reception of his remarkable speech." The "best opinion here is one of deep feeling and profound admiration." He for one had found it profoundly moving. Two facts were of high significance: that the President based his plan of future welfare on the supremacy of moral law; that he claimed to speak for the first time for the voiceless masses. "To all persons with the historic sense there is something inexpressibly pitiful in the spectacle of the silent procession of the simple people in all ages who have no part in making wars and yet suffer most from them." Could the present war, with a full knowledge of the merits of the quarrel, be referred to the twenty voiceless millions actually engaged in it, the battlefields would probably be deserted within a week.

John Dillon, the Irish leader, declared the speech was "unquestionably the most remarkable and momentous utterance by the ruler of a great power for more than a hundred years." The President did speak for liberals and friends of humanity everywhere. No peace could last or ought to last

that did not recognize the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. "Coming at such a crisis from the President of the United States, these words will strike deep into the hearts of all lovers of liberty throughout the world."

"We flatly refuse," said a German newspaper published in Cologne, "to accept the President's watchword, 'Peace without Victory,' or his intolerable pretensions for a united, independent, autonomous Poland." "Peace without victory" means, said another journal, "that the great gains made by the Central Powers would be taken away. It means that Poland, liberated by German blood, would be able to pursue a policy hostile to Germany."

"Peace without victory," said the Tages Zeitung, meant the ruin of the German Empire. Neutralization of the Dardanelles meant the ruin of the Turkish Empire and the eastern policy of Germany. The speech, said another, is a theoretical utterance, a political and academic utterance. Germans must decline to recognize him as a framer of the European map, nor can they accept his prescription that they must end the war without victory. They were ready to make peace with the Allies and with them alone, because they recognized the Monroe Doctrine for Americans and claimed a like doctrine for Europe. One journal was surprised that such dreamy philosophical ideas should be held by the President of practical America. Others were sarcastic and told him, politely, to mind his own business, asked if they were to understand, if the peace when made did not suit him, he would refuse "to play in our yard," and told him they would discuss his ideals after they had thrashed the enemy.

A French journal called the President's idea an Utopia and would support it if he could find human beings fit to people his land of promise. Generally in France the speech was received as inspired by good will, and a desire to lead to better conditions in Europe. A Swiss journal thought the spirit of the speech suggested the prophecies of Isaiah. In the Canadian Senate a resolution was introduced that "in the opinon of the Senate of Canada only representatives of na-

tions which have taken part or have been engaged in the present war should participate in the negotiations for peace."

In our own Senate a resolution was offered that Monday, January 29, should be set apart for a full and free discussion of the speech. An attempt made by the Democratic leaders to smother the resolution in committee was met by the determination of the Republicans to have a full discussion of the President's proposal that the United States enter a league for the enforcement of peace, and of what they considered the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and the time-honored policy of no entangling alliances. The resolution went on the calendar, and on January 30 was laid on the table.

CHAPTER XII

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BROKEN

And now all this discussion of peace, and the terms of peace, and ways to enforce peace came to a sudden end when, on January 31, 1917, the German Ambassador presented a note announcing the immediate resumption of ruthless submarine warfare.

The Imperial Government, the Ambassador said, had carefully considered the message of the President to the Senate on January 22, and was gratified to know that "the main tendencies of this important statement corresponded largely to the desires and principles professed by Germany. These principles especially included self-government and equality of rights of all nations.

"Germany would be sincerely glad if, in recognition of this principle, countries like Ireland and India, which do not enjoy the benefits of political independence, should now obtain their The German people also repudiate all alliances which serve to force the countries into a competition for might and to involve them in a net of selfish intrigue."

Freedom of the seas, the Ambassador continued, had always been one of the leading principles of Germany's political pro-But the attitude of her enemies, entirely opposed to peace, made it impossible to realize these lofty ideals. to Belgium, Germany had never intended to annex her. peace to be signed with her was to provide for such conditions as should prevent her ever again being used for hostile purposes against Germany.

The attempts of the four Central Powers to bring about peace had failed because of the lust of conquest of their enemies. Their real aims in the war were the dismemberment and dishonor of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

"They desire a fight to the bitter end."

"A new situation has thus been created which forces Germany to new decisions." During two and a half years the Entente Powers, led by England, had sought to force Germany into submission by starvation, and insisted on continuing this war of starvation. Thus forced to fight for existence the Imperial Government could not neglect "the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal."

Two memoranda accompanied the note. In one the United States was informed what weapon was to be used.

Germany has so far not made unrestricted use of the weapon which she possesses in her submarines. Since the Entente Powers, however, have made it impossible to come to an understanding based on equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central Powers, and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible as shall be dictated by the Entente Powers, and shall result in the destruction and humiliation of the Central Powers, Germany is unable further to forego the full use of her submarines.

The United States it was expected would understand the situation thus forced on Germany, and "that the now openly disclosed intention of the Entente Allies gives back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916."

Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing, after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England, from and to France, etc. All ships met within that zone will be sunk.

Another memorandum defined the boundaries of the barred zones, and the open routes through them, and stated the rules for the guidance of American shipping:

"Sailing of regular American passenger steamships may continue undisturbed after February 1, 1917, if—

"(a) The port of destination is Falmouth.


"(b) Sailing to, or coming from that port course is taken via the Scilly Islands and a point 50 degrees north, 20 degrees west.

"(c) The steamships are marked in the following way, which must not be allowed to other vessels in American ports. On ship's

hull and superstructure three vertical stripes, one meter wide each, to be painted alternately white and red. Each mast should show a large flag checkered white and red and the stern the American national flag. Care should be taken that, during dark, national flag and painted marks are easily recognizable from a distance, and that the boats are well lighted throughout.

"(d) One steamship a week sails in each direction, with arrival at Falmouth on Sunday and departure from Falmouth on Wednesday.

(e) The United States Government guarantees that no contraband (according to German contraband list) is carried by those steamships."



German boundaries of the barred zones.

The line marking out the barred zone around the British Islands started at the mouth of the river Scheldt, ran north-

ward twenty miles off the Dutch coast to the Terschelling Lightship, and then north to the Udsir Lightship twenty miles off the coast of Norway. Thence it curved northward, and westward, dipping under the Faroe Islands, and keeping to the west of the British Isles, swept southward and eastward to a point twenty miles from Cape Finisterre and followed the north coast of Spain, twenty miles from shore, to the French boundary. Not a port on the western and northern coast of France from the Spanish boundary to Belgium, not a port in Belgium nor in the British Isles was open to our vessels save Falmouth, to which passenger ships might proceed through a lane twenty miles wide along the fiftieth degree of north latitude.

In the Mediterranean the line was drawn southward from Point de l'Espiquette to the intersection of longitude 6° east with latitude 38° 20′ north. Point de l'Espiquette is some twenty-two miles east of Cette and some sixty west of Marseilles. From this point the south coast of France was open along the Gulf of Lyons to the Spanish border, but on this coast there is no port of importance save Cette. To the westward of the Point de l'Espiquette line the entire Mediterranean Sea was blockaded save for a safety lane twenty miles wide which wound through the zone to Greece. The north coast of Africa was barred eastward from Cape Kalos.

Our country had now received its orders. Had the German armies been in possession of every foot of our soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific these orders could not have been more tyrannical. No "Avis," no "Proclamation," no "Ordre" signed by von Bissing, or von der Goltz, or von Bülow and pasted on the walls of Brussels, or Liége, was written more in the spirit of the conqueror. Once each week one passenger steamship, striped like a barber's pole, and flying at each masthead a flag resembling the kitchen tablecloths of bygone days, might leave one port of the United States, and making its way along a prescribed course, enter a specified port in England on a Sabbath day, or be sunk without warning. The gravity of the situation alone prevented such a spectacle from being laughable.

That the Imperial Government supposed we would submit is impossible to believe. The President in his Sussex note had said: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

That diplomatic relations would now be severed was fully expected. Count von Bernstorff, it was said, must be handed his passports. The President has no other choice. He must do this or swallow his own words. All differences that may have existed now vanish. The American people stand behind him as one man. With the Government showing a resolute front and the people united behind it, we have little to fear. The German note shatters the last hope that the nation that considers treaties scraps of paper and violated Belgium will stand by her half promises to us. We must break relations with Germany or make an abject surrender. The case is simple; the course is plain.

Germany has deliberately defied the ultimatum of April 19. There can be but one answer, and that answer should be made at once. It is no time to parley. The challenge should be accepted within twenty-four hours and the war thus begun should not end till the imperial despotism of Germany is com-

pletely and forever crushed.

The German language newspapers made such defense and gave such advice as they could. Said the Cincinnati Volksblatt, "The only way to conquer England is by a submarine war, and this war being hampered by restrictions imposed by the President, Germany has concluded to throw off these restrictions. Germany's pledges were given with respect to merchant ships. They can, therefore, no longer apply, as the Allies have converted their merchant ships into men-of-war by supplying them with heavy guns and offering rewards to captains of liners for ramming German submarines. The proper policy of the President is to warn American citizens not to travel on ships of the Allies."

"Germany," said another, "has a right to wage an unrestricted undersea warfare, the right of self-defense. It is her duty to leave no means untried to end this war, and the submarines are the weapons for this purpose. England is the only obstacle to peace." The duty Germany owed neutrals "is ful-filled by warning them off ships of belligerents, and her duty to the United States, in particular, by giving directions how American passenger ships must proceed to reach their destination without danger."

When the note was made public stocks fell, the rate of marine insurance rose, sailings of neutral vessels were canceled or suspended, the port of New York was temporarily closed: a searching examination was made of seventeen German vessels, which had been lying at their piers in New York and Hoboken since the opening of the war, lest they should attempt to make a dash to sea, or block a channel; officers and men on the two German raiders Prinze Eitel Friedrich and Kronprinz Wilhelm, interned at the navy yard at League Island, Philadelphia, were denied shore leave; torpedo boat destroyers at the New York navy yard were put in readiness for sea, and the crew of the German freighter Liebenfels, long anchored in Charleston harbor, opened the sea cocks and sank her in forty feet of water.

What should be our conduct towards Germany caused much diversity of opinion. There were those who thought that diplomatic relations should not be severed until Germany committed some overt act or sank one of our merchantmen, and that the retention of Ambassador von Bernstorff in Washington would do more good than his dismissal. There were those who held that the German note was no more than a fair warning; that Germany had been forced to take the step; that it was inevitable after France and Great Britain armed their merchantmen to sink submarines that Germany should retaliate to protect herself, and that this retaliation was no more an attack on our rights than the blacklisting of our merchants by Great Britain or the stopping of our vessels on their way to neutral ports. There were those who thought the issue should be left with the President, that nothing should be said or done to embarrass him; that if peace could be maintained he would find a way to do it, and that he should be assured that, come what might, the nation stood loyally behind him; and there were those who held that war was inevitable. We have, they said, submitted to outrage long enough. Peace will be purchased at too high a price if we submit to the insulting instructions of the Kaiser as to how our commercial affairs shall be conducted. The note is a shameful insult to the American people. No American in his senses would, for a moment, consider acquiescence in Germany's orders. They amount almost to a declaration of war. There must be no more killing of Americans at sea, and if insistence on this means a break with the Central Powers then let the break come.

At a peace meeting held at Madison Square Garden, New York, by the American Neutral Conference Committee, Mr. William J. Bryan said to those assembled:

When I hear people say that there is danger, that, however much we desire peace, we are yet likely to be forced into war, I find solace, comfort and assurance in his message. If we can ask people to forget the hatreds engendered in them against other nations who have sought to do them harm; if we can ask people who are struggling for their existence in a death grapple which has already taken the lives of 6,000,000 of them; if we can ask them to stop in their extreme, who shall say that this nation shall rush into war?

What a spectacle we should present to the world, asking them to be patient and forbearing, while the heart's blood of millions is being shed, and then not be able to be patient and forbearing ourselves.

It would be bad enough for us to go to war with a nation which wished to harm us, but God forbid that we should ever compel any nation to go to war with us that is not an enemy and does not want war with us.

I believe that it would be a crime for us to go into this war, would be a crime against this nation and against the world. I have faith not only in the President's desire to keep us out of war, but in his ability to do so.

The Philadelphia Branch of the American Union against Militarism sent a message to the President urging him to call on the belligerents to meet, as the Central Powers had offered to do, and state their peace terms as the Allies had done; and to make a final and personal offer of mediation to the Sovereigns and Executive heads of the Powers at War.

In Germany the reports of the war feeling in our country, awakened by the announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare, served but to harden the resolve not to abandon it. "We know that America will not remain silent under our submarine warfare," said the Bavarian Premier, "but the time for consid-

ering the opinions of other people has gone. It is the only way to end the war. Nothing can stop us whatever the consequences." "We await the American attitude with a good conscience," said the Vorwärts. "If the reply is different from what we expect, though we regret it, we cannot be moved by it. We know not how neutrals, especially America, may take it, but be their position what it may, we cannot be shaken in our determination after to-day's declaration of war zone and the note to America," said Taegliche Rundschau. It cannot be imagined, the Frankfurter Zeitung said, "that there can be any new yielding to American protests. The Imperial authorities are firmly convinced that Germany will hold her own against an onset by the whole world. Whatever America may do the German people face the future without fear."

The decision was quickly made and on the afternoon of February third, the President announced to Congress that diplomatic relations with Germany were severed.

The scene was impressive. Two o'clock was the hour fixed for the arrival of the President. As it drew near the members of the House after a half hour's recess were again in their seats, some with their little sons on their knees; the diplomatic gallery was filled and the members' and the public galleries were crowded to the doors. A few minutes before two o'clock the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, accompanied by all the Associate Justices, entered and took seats on the left of the Speaker. The Cabinet and officers of the Department of State followed almost immediately, and as soon as they were seated behind the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Senators, two by two, filed down the center aisle to the benches reserved for them. A committee from the Senate was then appointed to escort the President, who, welcomed by hearty applause, entered the Chamber just on the hour, and shook hands with the Speaker and the Vice-President. "Gentlemen of the Sixty-fourth Congress," said the Speaker, "I present the President of the United States"; whereupon Mr. Wilson stepped to the desk in front of the Speaker, and said:

The Imperial German Government, on the thirty-first day of January, announced to this Government and to the Governments of the other neutral nations that on and after the first day of February,

the present month, it would adopt a policy with regard to the use of submarines against all shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas, to which it is clearly my duty to call your attention.

Let me remind the Congress that on the 18th of April last, in view of the sinking on the 24th of March of the cross-channel passenger steamer Sussex by a German submarine, without summons or warning, and the consequent loss of the lives of several citizens of the United States who were passengers aboard her, this Government addressed a note to the Imperial German Government in which it made the following declaration:

After quoting the paragraph in the note of April 18, 1916, in which Germany was warned that unless she immediately abandoned her methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States had no choice but the severance of diplomatic relations altogether; after citing the pledge of the German Government embodied in its answer of May that merchant vessels "shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance," and after quoting from his reply to this in the note of May 8, the President continued:

I think you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind, deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the 18th of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes to again resort.

I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to his Excellency his passports.

The President could not bring himself to believe that the German authorities would "pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy

American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the willful prosecution of the ruthless naval program they have announced their intention to adopt."

Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded, if American ships and American lives should, in fact, be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas.

At two o'clock on February 3, just as the President began his address, the German Ambassador received from the Secretary of State a note of dismissal and his passports. The affairs of the German Embassy were then taken over by the Swiss Minister and preparations were made for the departure of Count von Bernstorff. France and Great Britain each gave a safe conduct; passage was secured, with the consent of the Danish Government, on the Frederick VIII.; the German consuls scattered over the United States, and their families, were summoned to Washington; and on February 14 the Ambassador and his party, one hundred and forty nine persons in all, sailed from the port of New York. Our diplomatic relations with Germany were taken in charge by Spain.

As soon as the break occurred neutral Governments were officially notified and our representatives instructed to say that because of the announced intention of the German Government to renew unrestricted submarine warfare the United States had no choice but to follow the course laid down in the Sussex note of April 18, 1916; that the American Ambassador had been recalled from Berlin and passports delivered to the German Ambassador at Washington, and that the President believed it would make for the peace of the world if other neutral Powers would take like action. Not one did; but Switzerland, Holland and Spain, Norway, Sweden and Denmark,

Brazil, Chili, Peru, all the South American Republics, Cuba and China protested against the ruthless submarine warfare and the barred zone.

From Mr. Bryan came an appeal to the people not to enter The President, Mr. Bryan said, had asked the belligerents to forget the bitterness caused "by the killing of more than 6,000,000 human beings and the expenditure of more than \$50,000,000,000 in money and come together in honorable peace. If we can expect such an exhibition of virtue by them are we not in duty bound to measure up to the standard which we have set for them?" There were several ways out of our difficulties. We might put off, until after the war, the settlement of such disputes as could not now be amicably arranged. We might keep American citizens off the ships of belligerents. We might refuse clearances to any vessel which carried passengers and articles contraband of war, whether it sailed under the flag of the United States or that of a neutral Power. We might withdraw protection from American citizens who were willing to risk the peace of the country by traveling as seamen on neutral or American ships carrying contraband. We might keep all American ships out of the danger zone, just as the Mayor of a city keeps citizens at home when a mob is in possession of the streets. Congress could submit the question of war to popular vote. It was most important that the officials at Washington should know "that the people at home protest against entering this war on either side, with its frightful expenditure of blood and treasure; that they are not willing to send American soldiers across the Atlantic to march under the banners of any European monarch, or to die on European soil in settlement of European quarrels."

The people therefore were urged to "Wire immediately to the President, your Senators, your Congressmen. A few cents now may save many dollars in taxation and possibly a son."

The German language press was luke-warm. The New York Staats-Zeitung could not believe "that commanders of German boats could willingly sink American ships; but in a warfare, such as from now on will be waged in European waters, such incidents may occur. Mistakes may be made or intrigues carried out by Germany's enemies, which after the breaking of

diplomatic relations cannot be discussed or cleared up any more. Therefore war may very suddenly engulf our country. It is almost needless to mention what great anxiety is filling the hearts of those who, being subjects of Germany, are forced by circumstances to be in our midst, and the American citizens of German descent who have endeavored to foster the very best of relations between the country of their birth and their new Fatherland."

The Chicago Staats-Zeitung believed that an "overwhelming majority of our people stand behind the President in his efforts to keep this country at peace with all the world. But it is doubtful that a majority will endorse giving the German Ambassador his passports at the present time." Were Americans to enter the war, "the hearts of millions would be saddened by the knowledge that they must wage war against their kin. The war of races would break out in the midst of us, passion would be aroused, hatred engendered, and internecine warfare result unless the causes that led to our entering the European war were shocking and all peaceful procedure futile."

The Philadelphia Morning Gazette declared "Our duty as American citizens makes it absolutely necessary for us to be loyal to the country that we swore allegiance to—the United

States of America."

Said the Louisville Anzeiger, "Every German-American who has become a citizen of this country knows which flag he must follow in this hour. The loyalty of German-Americans towards the country of their adoption has been proved often

enough."

The editors of nearly every foreign language newspaper in Philadelphia met, adopted resolutions and sent them to the President. They approved his stand, pledged their devotion to country and flag. Five hundred representatives of German, Austrian, and Hungarian societies in New York met and pledged unqualified loyalty to the United States even in the event of war, but begged the President "to make every effort to preserve peace."

Severance of diplomatic relations with Germany had no effect on her avowed policy of ruthless submarine warfare, nor did any reasonable person suppose it would. Sure that war

would come, our countrymen awaited the perpetration of the overt act which would bring the President before Congress with a request for a declaration of war. For a moment it seemed that the overt act had been committed for on February third, the American ship *Housatonic* was sunk off the Scilly Islands by a German submarine. When, however, the facts were known it appeared that the ship was stopped and searched, the crew given plenty of time to take to the boats which the submarine towed to a point off the coast of England, and that she fired a gun to notify a British patrol boat which landed all hands at Penzance.

What might be the action of Germans living in our country, of German-Americans and German sympathizers was a matter of no little concern and preparations were promptly made for The National Militia was prepared for mobihome defense. lization at a moment's notice, marines were sent to guard important bridges, reservoirs, water works; civilian guards were placed on railroad bridges and at ship yards, and those at steel plants and munition plants were greatly strengthened; police protection was given to the Mint at Philadelphia, the Custom Houses and Federal buildings, arsenals, armories, navy yards; the White House, the State, War, Navy and Treasury Buildings were closed to the public and the Kronprinzessin Cecilie, at Boston, was taken possession of, in civil proceedings, by the United States Marshal. He reported that within three days the machinery had been tampered with. Under orders from Washington the crew were held at the immigration station as aliens, to await the decision of the Department of Labor as to their status. Officers and crews of some twenty-five German steamships at New York were ordered to remain on board their ships. From Manila came the report that the machinery of twenty-three German ships in Philippine ports had been dam-The crew of an interned German gun boat at Honolulu, it was reported, had set fire to the vessel.

Orders went out from the American Red Cross headquarters at Washington to all its Chapters the country over, to make ready for emergencies. From the Carnegie Steel Company, the Bethlehem Steel Company, the Remington Arms Company, the Ford Motor Company came assurances that these great plants

were ready at a moment's notice to suspend work and place their equipment at the service of the Government. Private vacht owners made tenders of their craft, the American Federation of Labor agreed to a suspension of the law restricting the hours of labor on Government work, and the President by proclamation forbade the sale, lease or charter, to any person not a citizen of the United States, or transfer to a foreign flag, of any vessel registered or enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, as he was empowered to do by the Act approved September 7, 1916. The Executive Council of the National Suffrage League was called to consider how women could help in case of war, and to make a definite proposal to the Government.

Aroused by these warlike preparations Pacifists, Socialists, Anti-War Leaguers, persons for any reason opposed to the entrance of our country into the war made haste to protest. Dr. C. J. Hexamer, President of the German-American Alliance. sent messages to friends throughout the country urging them to arrange peace meetings and send to Congress resolutions praying that it submit the question of war to popular vote. case of sudden attack by another country, calling for instant action, a referendum was, of course, he said, impossible. for a country deliberately to go to war without allowing the people to express their approval was wrong, utterly wrong.

Telegrams by the hundred, indorsing or condemning the break with Germany, meantime came to the Senators. One from the Detroit Socialists protested against war. Labor and peace organizations in Wisconsin sent appeals urging peace. The Legislature of Nevada indorsed the course taken by the President. So did the United States Senate by adopting a resolution introduced by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, setting forth that, whereas, the President, for the reasons given in his address to the Congress in joint session, had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, had recalled the American Ambassador at Berlin, sent passports to the German Ambassador at Washington, expressed his desire to avoid a conflict with Germany, and declared that should occasion arise for further action he would submit the matter to Congress and ask authority to use such measures as might be necessary for the protection of American seamen and people pursuing their peaceful and lawful business on the high seas, therefore, the Senate approved the action taken by the President as set forth in his address.

To quiet the anxiety felt by German subjects residing in our country lest their bank deposits and other property should be seized by the Government in the event of war, the President instructed the Secretary of State to say that such fears were unfounded. Under no circumstances would the Government take advantage of a state of war to seize property to which international law and the law of the land gave it no just claim or title. All rights of property both of American citizens and of subjects of foreign states would be respected.

Germany meantime, true to her policy as announced, had begun her ruthless submarine warfare and day after day the list of vessels sunk grew longer and longer until, on February 7, twenty-two had been torpedoed without warning. Among those destroyed were two which caused some excitement in our country for it seemed quite likely their sinking might be the

overt act that would bring on war.

February fifth the British steamship Eavestone was sunk by gun fire from a German submarine, and the crew while in life boats was fired on and the Captain and three seamen killed. One of the seamen, Richard Wallace, was a negro from Baltimore. This, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, was not an overt act. The Eavestone was a collier, an auxiliary to the British fleet; the presence of Wallace aboard made him a member of the armed forces of Great Britain, and the ship, being a provisional collier, had the status of a warship subject to attack without warning. Nothing in international law, however, justified firing on a lifeboat; nevertheless, there was no occasion for anything more at present than a protest and settlement later.

The second case was that of the Anchor liner California, torpedoed without warning off the coast of Ireland. On board were two hundred and twenty-seven passengers. One American, a member of the crew, was reported saved. Whether saved or lost the gravity of the act was not altered, for the President for two years past in his notes to Germany had insisted that the lives of Americans on any peaceful merchant ship should not be

put in jeopardy by attacks without warning. When the first week of submarine frightfulness closed sixty-nine ships had been sunk.

In Great Britain our break with Germany gave intense satisfaction not merely because it seemed certain that the United States would soon be in the war, but because after enduring all things with amazing patience, after seeking by every honorable means to avoid entrance into the conflict, the great Republic of the West had been forced to recognize the justice of the cause of the Allies in their struggle with the enemy of the human race. A moral victory had been won and was duly noted when Parliament reconvened on February seventh.

Speaking in the Commons, Mr. Asquith said, "It is not for us to forecast the bearing of this memorable event on the future of the war. Still less is it fitting for us to tender advice or suggestion to a Government which is well able to take care of itself. We shall hail with acclamation, with a strain of family pride, the stern and resolute determination of the other great English-speaking Power to frustrate the enormity of those who have abundantly earned for themselves the title of enemies of the human race."

"The fact that the United States Government has broken with Germany" said Mr. Andrew Bonar Law, "is, in itself, the best testimony of the justice of our cause and the illegality of the methods whereby our enemies are trying to obtain victory."

To the request of the President that neutral Powers follow the example of the United States and sever diplomatic relations with Germany, Holland declined. The presence of a German army on her frontier made it impossible. Sweden replied that her policy during the war had been one of strict neutrality; that she had done everything in her power faithfully to perform the duties imposed by such policy; but the methods adopted by the United States for the realization of peace were contrary to the principles which, up to the present time, had guided her.

Germany, though fully determined not to depart from her policy of destroying neutral ships found within the danger zones, now suggested that the United States discuss the situation with her. The Swiss Government was requested to instruct her Minister at Washington accordingly and on the afternoon of Satur-

lay, February 10, he called at the Department of State and made a verbal proposition. No reply on behalf of the United States was made at that time, but the Minister was soon informed that the President would prefer to have the suggestion put in writing. On Sunday night accordingly a memorandum was delivered to the Secretary of State.

"The Swiss Government," it read, "has been requested by the German Government to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate formally or informally with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby."

As quickly as possible the Secretary replied that the Government of the United States "would gladly discuss with the German Government any question it might propose for discussion were it to withdraw its proclamation of the thirty-first of January, in which, suddenly and without previous intimation of any kind, it canceled the assurances which it had given this Government on the fourth of May, last," but would not discuss the policy of submarine warfare then waging against neutrals, "unless and until the German Government renews its assurances of the fourth of May and acts upon the assurance."

The cause of this action by Germany, it was said, was a message, sent to the Cologne Gazette by Mr. George Barthelme, the

American correspondent for that journal.

Mr. George W. Kirchwey, President of the American Peace Society, obtained permission from Secretary Daniels to send the dispatch of Mr. Barthelme over the wireless controlled by the Navy Department. The message as given by the newspapers was this:

From high sources whose identity cannot be disclosed I am urged, almost implored, to convey to the German people, and if possible to Government, the idea that message (the President's) should not be construed as indicating any desire on the part of Government or the people for war with Germany.

Attention is called to the following passage: "I refuse to believe it the intention of German authorities to do in fact what they warned us they will feel at liberty to do," and so forth: "only actual overt acts can make me believe it even now."

Further attention is called to the following sentence: "If this inveterate confidence should unhappily prove unfounded I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask authority to use any means necessary for the protection of our seamen and people."

These passages widely construed: First, as expressive of confidence some way out might be found. Second, not containing any threat of war. Widely shared opinion is President could do nothing else but sever relations to make good former note. Now up to Germany to provide an opening. First thing necessary avoid everything which makes maintenance of friendly relations impossible.

Particularly refrain from destruction of American ships not carrying contraband, thus inducing a delay of perhaps one month to make possible limit of submarine activities object of negotiation. Such delay offered as token of ancient friendship of two countries. Then consider the possibilities provided in the resolution for calling conference of Powers. These possibilities closed by hasty action.

Some explanation about sailing of only four especially marked American ships would remove very bitter impression created by this wholly incomprehensible proviso, hurting the national pride as nothing else. My informants assure in most emphatic manner country is not for war, and will be for war only when forced into it. Only small circles clamoring for hostilities, but huge majority praying for peace with honor.

I feel it my solemn duty to inform you about these sentiments and opinions entertained by men of highest standing, noblest character, responsible position, and loftiest ideals and thoroughly good will. Should you deem advisable to exert influence of our great paper, do so to find way out of situation not yet unavoidable, pregnant with gravest possibilities. I honestly believe country just anxiously waiting for one more good word.

This good word the Pacifists believed was the offer of Germany to negotiate; but Mr. Barthelme was forced by the Government to leave the country and, provided with a safe passage, sailed with Ambassador von Bernstorff and his party.

The German explanation of the proposed parley set forth that the Swiss Minister in a dispatch from Washington had offered to mediate with the American Government concerning the declaration of prohibited areas because he believed the danger of war between Germany and the United States might thereby be lessened; that the Imperial Government replied that it was ready, as before, to negotiate with America provided the commerce barrier against the Allies was left untouched; that Germany, of course, could not have entered into such negotiations unless diplomatic relations were restored, and that the only objects of negotiation were certain concessions regarding American ships carrying passengers. Under no circumstances could the restriction on overseas imports by the Allies be relaxed; from the resolute carrying out of the U-boat war there was no turning back.

Germany now added to her long list of offensive acts by

holding the Yarrowdale prisoners.

On the nineteenth of January Ambassador Gerard reported that the evening newspapers in Berlin announced that the British steamship Yarrowdale had reached Schwinemunde; that she was a prize; that aboard her were 469 prisoners; that 103 were neutrals, and that such of them as had served on enemy ships for pay would be held prisoners of war.

Late in November the German cruiser Möwe, or Seagull. stole out of the Kiel Canal and the North Sea and began depredations in the Atlantic. The British Admiralty first heard of them on December second and on the eighth sent out a general warning; but the extent of her work was not known till January 16, 1917, when the Japanese steamer Hudson Maru reached Pernambuco, Brazil, with 287 men taken from six vessels sunk between the Azores and Brazil. One of these, the Yarrowdale, was not destroyed, but taken to a German port with 469 prisoners from one Norwegian and seven British ships, and with a valuable cargo of rifle cartridges, motor lorries, barbed wire, steel, meat, bacon and sausages. December 31, she reached Schwinemunde; but her arrival was not announced till January 19, 1917. The Möwe likewise reached a German port bringing 573 prisoners. She had captured or destroyed at least twenty-six ships. Her prisoners landed in Germany and Brazil numbered 1389. Fifty-nine of those on the Yarrowdale were Americans taken from an armed British merchantman. These and other "subjects of neutral Powers," the official statement of the return of the Möwe, issued at Berlin, announced, "have been removed as prisoners of war in so far as they had taken pay on armed vessels."

To the demand for the release of the Americans, on the ground that when they shipped on board the British merchantmen they did not know that Germany would treat armed merchantmen as ships of war, the German Foreign office replied, February 4, that they would be released at once. But just at that time diplomatic relations were severed, the men were not set free and on the seventeenth the Swiss Minister notified the Department of State that the men would be detained until the Imperial Government was informed concerning the treatment of the crews of German warships interned in American harbors, and until she had definite assurances that the crews of German merchantmen would not be held or imprisoned. Washington was amazed. The crews of the raiders Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Kronprinz Wilhelm, and of such gunboats as were interned at Guam and Honolulu were, under international law, held as prisoners during the war. German merchantmen were not interned, remained in our harbors as ports of refuge, were at liberty to put to sea at any time, and the members of their crews were as free as any aliens to enter our country on complying with the requirements of the immigration laws. Until then they were held aboard their ships by the immigration authori-The United States had seized no German ships. formal demand was then made through the Spanish Ambassador, for their immediate release. He was asked to say that if not liberated at once, "and allowed to cross the frontier without further delay," the United States would be forced "to consider what measures it may be necessary to take in order to obtain satisfaction for the continued detention of these innocent American citizens." March 11 they finally reached Zurich.

From the day of their arrival, January 3, to the hour of their release they had been subjected to cruel and brutal treatment, though during all this time Germany was professing sincere friendship for the United States. The official report sets forth that they were given no clothes suitable to the weather; that some were made to stand for hours barefoot in the snow; that food was poor and insufficient. One, after the sinking of the Georgia, was wounded by shrapnel fired by the Germans at an open boat in which he and others of the crew had taken refuge. Another was kicked in the abdomen by a German officer.

At Berlin the break in diplomatic relations and the recall of Ambassador Gerard was followed by the placing of a police guard before the Embassy; but it was not needed as no unfriendly demonstration of any kind was made. The Ambassador, however, was treated much like a prisoner. His telephone was cut, his mail was stopped, he could not communicate with American consuls, and he was denied permission to cable Washington in cipher. No passports were furnished Americans desirous of leaving Berlin, nor would the police allow them to set out for Denmark, Holland or Switzerland. Mr. Gerard, it was suggested, should use his good offices with Washington to induce the Government to endeavor to obtain from France and Great Britain safe conducts for the return of German merchantmen from America to German ports. When he refused it was intimated that his help might hasten the departure of Americans, to which he answered, it was reported, that he would sit where he was till Kingdom come before he would go without them.

The restraint imposed on Ambassador Gerard was explained by Dr. von Stumm, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We had, he said, no reports from the United States. We knew not how our Ambassador, consuls and subjects were faring. Apparently the United States had stopped telegraphic communication with our Ambassador as soon as the rupture occurred. Such treatment forced us to adopt the same measures towards the American Ambassador. From Reuter dispatches we learn that German ships are confiscated and the crews hampered in their movements. We know not if these reports are true. We hope they are not, for such action would be contrary to the spirit and letter of our treaties with the United States, giving the subjects of both States nine months' immunity in event of war. Not until the good treatment given to Germans in this country was known in Berlin was it arranged that the Ambassador, the Secretaries, attachés, members of the consular service, and American newspaper men should go to Switzerland by way Thence Mr. Gerard traveled to Paris, Madrid and Barcelona, whence he sailed for Havana and home.

The effort to persuade Ambassador Gerard to sign a protocol confirming and enlarging the privileges of German subjects in our country in case of war having failed, the document was sent to Washington and delivered to the Secretary of State by the Swiss Minister on February 10, 1917.

On the eleventh of July, 1799, a treaty of amity and commerce was made with Prussia. The German Empire, as we

know it, did not then exist. The twenty-third article of this treaty provided for the treatment of the subjects and citizens of the States in case of war between Prussia and the United States, and it was to this article that Germany now proposed to add nine "explanatory and supplementary clauses."

Merchants of each country living in the other should be free to remain and carry on their business even after the time, nine months, specified in Article 23; Germans in the United States and Americans in Germany should be free to leave with their personal property, money, valuables and bank accounts; they must not be sent to concentration camps, nor their property be subject to confiscation or liquidation under any conditions other than such as applied to neutral property. Patent rights held by Germans in America or Americans in Germany must not be declared void, contracts between Germans and Americans made before or after the severance of diplomatic relations must not be canceled or made void, save under provisions applicable to neutrals.

The proposition was promptly rejected, because of the "repeated violations by Germany of the Treaty of 1828, and the articles of the Treaties of 1785 and 1799, revised by the Treaty of 1828;" because of the sinking of American vessels, said to have carried articles contraband of war, although Article 13 of the Treaty of 1799 provides that: "no such articles carried in the vessels of either party to the enemy of the other shall be deemed contraband so as to induce confiscation or condemnation or a loss of property to individuals." It was rejected because foreign merchant vessels carrying American citizens and property were sunk by German submarines without warning although by Article 15 of the Treaty of 1799 "all persons belonging to any vessel of war, public or private, who shall molest or insult in any manner whatever the people, vessel, or effects of the other party shall be responsible in their persons and property for damages," and although by Article 12 of the Treaty of 1785, "the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neutral with the belligerent powers shall not be interrupted."

Heedless of these obligations Germany had established certain barred zones, had declared that within them all vessels, neu-

trals included, would be sunk without warning, and had within these zones ruthlessly sunk vessels and jeopardized or destroyed the lives of Americans on board. Nay more; since the severance of diplomatic relations certain American citizens had been prevented from removing from Germany. This was a violation of the treaty, was a disregard "of the reciprocal intercourse between the two countries, in times of peace," and must be taken as a sure sign of her intention to disregard "in the event of war the similar liberty of action provided for in Article 23 of the Treaty of 1799, the very article which it is now proposed to interpret and supplement almost wholly in the interests of the large number of German subjects residing in the United States."

In view of the violations, by Germany, of plain terms of the treaties in question; in view of "the disregard of the canons of international courtesy and comity of nations in the treatment of innocent American citizens in Germany," the United States could not see any advantage likely to result from further explanations of any articles in these treaties. Indeed, the United States was seriously considering whether or not the Treaty of 1828, and the revised articles of the Treaties of 1785 and 1799 had not been, in effect, abrogated "by the German Government's flagrant violation of their provisions." It would be unjust to expect one party to hold to its stipulations while the other was free to disregard them.

An immediate result of the severance of diplomatic relations was the ending of American relief work in Belgium. Mr. Warren Gregory of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium was notified by Baron von Der Lancken, civil governor of Brussels, that American citizens could no longer hold positions under the Commission in the occupied territory in Belgium and France, but that a few, Mr. Brand Whitlock among them, might reside in Brussels and supervise the work. Furthermore automobiles and other means of transportation were to be denied them. Unable to work under these conditions, the German authorities were informed that the Americans would officially withdraw.

"Immediately after the break in relations," said the Department of State in its official statement, "the German authorities

withdrew from Mr. Whitlock the diplomatic privileges and immunities which he had up to that time enjoyed. His courier service to The Hague was stopped. He was denied the privilege of communicating with the Department of State in cipher, and later even in plain language."

Nevertheless the Government and the Commission had "determined to keep the good work going, until the last possible moment" when they heard that between the twenty-fifth of March and the tenth of April four Belgium relief ships loaded with food and bound from our country to Rotterdam had been sunk by German submarines, "without warning and in flagrant violation of the solemn engagements of the German Government. Protests addressed by this Government to Berlin through the intermediary of the Spanish Government have not been answered.

"The German Government's disregard of its written undertakings causes grave concern as to the future of the relief work. In any event, it is felt that the American staff of the Commission can no longer serve with advantage in Belgium." The President, therefore, late in March ordered them to withdraw.

Dutch citizens then took up the work, with Mr. Hoover directing it from Rotterdam.

The sins of our country as viewed by the Germans after diplomatic relations were broken were enumerated by von Bethmann-Hollweg in a speech in the Reichstag. For more than a century, said the Chancellor, friendly relations with America had been carefully promoted. "We honored them, as Bismarck once put it, as an heirloom from Frederick the Great. Both countries profited by it, both giving and taking." But since the war opened things had changed on our side of the water. Old principles had been overthrown. "On August 27, 1913, during the Mexican troubles President Wilson, in a solemn message to Congress, declared he intended to follow the best usages of international law by a prohibition of the supplying of arms to both Mexican parties at war against each other. One year later, 1914, these usages apparently were no longer considered good. Countless materials of war have been supplied by America to the Entente, and, while the right of the American citizen to travel without hindrance to Entente countries, and the right to trade without hindrance with France and England, even through the midst of the battlefields, even the right of such trade as we had to pay for with German blood, while all these rights were jealously guarded, the same right of American citizens towards the Central Powers did not seem worthy of protection and as valuable."

The Chancellor protested against the assertion that by the manner in which Germany withdrew the assurances given in the note of May 4, she had offended the honor and dignity of the United States. From the very first Germany had openly and expressly declared that these assurances would be withdrawn under certain conditions. England did not abandon "the isolation of Germany." The Allies were not made to respect the principles of international law, "nor made to follow the laws of humanity."

Breaking off diplomatic relations and attempting to mobilize neutrals against Germany would not make "for the protection of the freedom of the seas proclaimed by the United States." Germany "regretted the rupture with a nation which by her history seemed to be destined surely to work with us, not against us, but since our honest wish for peace has met only jeering on the part of our enemies, there is no more going backward. There is only going forward possible for us."

Professor Hans Delbrueck of the University of Berlin, at the request of the Associated Press, gave his views on America and the war. He believed, he said, that he ought to state very frankly how the German people feel towards America.

They feel bitterness and believe they have been wronged. Hundreds of thousands have lost fathers, husbands, and sons through American ammunition. Hundreds of thousands of young men of Germany have been maimed for life with American ammunition.

In all wars the makers of arms and ammunition have supplied the belligerent nations, but the manufacturers of arms are not the exponents of humanity. Never before were the industries of peace of a country not a belligerent in the war reorganized to kill. Your people forged for our enemies those tremendously effective weapons of death, and we protested in vain.

Then we were to receive from you bread for our noncombatants. Our enemies interfered. You said their interference was illegal, but you did not make your protest effective.

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Our people are asking with growing bitterness the reason for this discrimination. There may be many technical and legal answers to this question, but our people feel that, had there been a will, there would have been a way. We have been told time and again that the principle of the freedom of the seas is deeply rooted in your race. Again and again we have heard repeated your President's words, "I will contend for the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it is violated and without compromise."

Our people were told that the principle of the freedom of the seas should be so conducted that noncombatants on sea and land would be spared the sufferings of war. Thus our people patiently looked on, month after month, while a continuous stream of American ammunition poured into England and Russia unchecked by our submarines.

Now we are going to fight out this battle. The German people had wished that it might be fought out, as other wars had been—between enemy and enemy.

As February closed and the day drew near when the session must end the Senate grew restive over the blockade of our ports by Germany. Something must be done to break it, and in order to do so Senator Fall of New Mexico introduced a bill to give authority to the President to use armed vessels to protect American ships; to permit the crews of merchantmen to resist search, seizure or attack; repel by force any assault, and subdue, capture or destroy the attacking vessel. Should war break out before the next session of Congress the President might enlist and call into service five hundred thousand troops over and above those in the regular army and the National Guard. But, two days later, the President once more appeared before the Senate and House and asked for means to maintain armed neutrality.

The German policy of ruthless submarine war on neutrals had, he said, been in force nearly four weeks. It was too scon to determine its practical results, but the commerce of other neutrals was suffering severely though perhaps not more severely than before the new policy was put into operation. Cooperation of other neutrals to stop these depredations had been asked, "but so far none of them has thought it wise to join us in any common course of action." Our commerce had suffered, "rather in apprehension than in fact, rather because so many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports, than because American ships have been sunk."

Two of our ships, the Housatonic and the Lyman M. Law, had indeed been sunk. "The case of the Housatonic, which was carrying foodstuffs consigned to a London firm, was essentially like the case of the Frye," in which Germany admitted damages, and in which, as in the case of the Housatonic, the lives of the crew "were safeguarded with reasonable carc." The sinking of the Law, "which was carrying lemon box staves to Palerme," was "accompanied by no circumstances" which might not have been expected from the use of submarines against merchantmen as Germany was using them. In short he could "only say that the overt act" he hoped "the German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred." Nevertheless "it would be foolish to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers."

"No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared."

Our duty was clear; only the manner and extent of doing it remained to be chosen, and since diplomacy has failed to safeguard our neutral rights, there might be no means left but armed neutrality. He was not "proposing or contemplating war, or any steps that need lead to it." He was merely requesting that Congress would give him "the means and authority to safeguard in practice the right of a great people who are at peace," and who desired "to follow the pursuits of peace in quietness and good will." War could come only by the willful acts and aggressions of others. He believed the people would be willing to trust him to act with restraint, with prudence, and in that belief he asked for authority "to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods," necessary to protect our ships and people in their rightful pursuits on the sea. He asked also for a sufficient credit to enable him "to provide adequate means of protection where they are lacking, including adequate insurance against the present war risks."

The appeal, in brief, set forth that Germany had established a blockade of our coast by so terrorizing our merchants that

our ships were not sent to sea; that to break this blockade our ships must be armed for defense; and that for this purpose authority and money were requested.

To meet this request a bill was at once introduced in the House to authorize the President to supply arms, ammunition, and the means of using them, to American armed and registered merchant ships and to appropriate for the purpose \$100,000,000 to be raised by the issue of three per cent bonds.

Scarcely had the President finished reading his address when a rumor spread through the Capital that the Cunard passenger liner *Laconia* had been torpedoed and an American woman and her daughter lost. Was not this, it was asked, the overt act for which the President was waiting? What would he do? Nothing, was the answer, until Congress has acted on his request.

By the newspapers the appeal of the President was warmly approved. He had asked for too little; not too much. The powers he wished were barely short of those needed for war, but the situation was barely short of war. We must defend our seamen and our people in the exercise of their rights, or make a cowardly surrender to the Power that has forbidden us to use them. Arming our merchantmen will not prevent war. Germany has shown that she will not slacken her ruthlessness in order to avoid war with the United States. Nevertheless our ships must have the free use of the sea, must defend themselves against German submarines, and the Government must furnish the guns and the gunners. The President asks for nothing more than the release of American commerce. If German submarines keep our ships in port they are doing their blockade work just as effectively as if they sank the ships. If Great Britain is starved Germany cares not how ships are kept off the The Cincinnati Volksblatt complained that while the President demanded armed neutrality against Germany, he did not say he would send our ships under convoy to neutral ports from which they were barred by England. "It is this one sided neutrality that will drive us into war, for such is the ultimate effect of the measures proposed by the President."

Members of Congress were greatly divided in opinion. "He has asked us for a blank check," said one. "He wants us to give him a power of attorney to do as he pleases," said an-

other. "That address ought to be printed in the 'help wanted' columns," said a third.

Republicans held that the three words "such other instrumentalities" in the bill gave him authority too broad in such critical times. Under it he might use the land and naval forces which would amount to a surrender of the Constitutional right of Congress to declare war. These words must be cut out and something specific, something definite substituted. Give him, it was said, the money needed; give him authority to loan guns and gun crews to American ships, but not the "blanket powers" requested.

Such was the situation when on February 28, 1917, the Associated Press announced that on January 19, Germany was planning war on the United States, and on that day von Eckhardt, German Minister to Mexico, was instructed by Foreign Minister Zimmermann to propose an alliance with Mexico against the United States, and to persuade Mexico to seek to bring in Japan.

"On the first of February," the instructions read, "we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral with the United States of America.

"If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico. That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory of New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

"You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan, suggesting adherence at once to the plan, and at the same time to offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

"Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months."

The Senate, astonished and scarcely able to believe that the

note as published in the newspapers was true, requested the President to furnish whatever information he had. He replied through the Secretary of State, that the Government was "in possession of evidence which establishes the fact that the note referred to is authentic." Indeed Foreign Secretary Zimmermann admitted the note had been sent. Asked by a staff member of the official German press bureau concerning the note, he justified it as a proper measure of precaution in view of the possibility of war with America.

When criticised by a leader of the Socialist minority in the Reichstag he said that his instructions were to be earried out only in the event of war with the United States. Herr Haase had said the note caused great indignation in the United States. Of course it was used to create feeling against Germany. But the storm had abated, and "the calm and sensible politicians and also the great mass of the American people saw there was nothing to object to in the instructions themselves. I refer especially to the statements of Senator Underwood."

To the reproach that he had attempted to join Mexico and Japan against the United States he replied, if we wanted Allies against America, Mexico would be the first to be considered. The relations between Mexico and Germany from the time of Porfirio Diaz had been "extremely friendly and trustful. Mexicans, moreover, are known as good and efficient soldiers." Relations between the United States and Mexico could hardly be called "friendly and trustful." All the world knew that antagonism existed between America and Japan. He believed they were stronger than those which, despite the war, existed between Germany and Japan. Nor was there anything extraordinary in his wish that Mexico should join with Japan. Good relations between the two had long existed.

Opposition to the armed ship bill was now dropped in the House of Representatives and it passed by a vote of 403 to 13.

It was then the first of March and on the fourth the life of the Sixty-fourth Congress must end. In the Senate a little group of Senators had been filibustering for several days to prevent the passage of revenue and appropriation bills, and so force the President to call a special session of the new Congress. They now extended their filibuster to the armed ship bill, and

sought to prevent a vote before the session ended. During three days the debate went on, and lasted all through the night of March third and until twelve o'clock noon on the fourth when the session ended without a vote.

Early in the morning of that day seventy-five of the ninety-

six members of the Senate signed a protest.

"The undersigned United States Senators favor the passage of Senate Bill 8322, to authorize the President of the United States to arm American merchant vessels.

"A similar bill already has passed the House of Representa-

tives by a vote of 403 to 13.

"Under the rules of the Senate, allowing unlimited debate, it now appears to be impossible to obtain a vote prior to noon, March 4, 1917, when the session of Congress expires.

"We desire the statement entered in the record to establish the fact that the Senate favors the legislation and would pass it if a vote could be obtained."

A few minutes later the President took the oath of office and entered on his second term. The day was Sunday. The ceremony and the address with which, ever since the days of Washington, it has been the custom to mark the inauguration of a President were therefore deferred till Monday the fifth of March. But, on the morning of that day when the people opened their newspapers, they found spread before them an indignant arraignment, by the President, of the eleven filibustering Senators.

The termination of the last session of the Sixty-fourth Congress by constitutional limitation disclosed a situation unparalleled in the history of the country, perhaps unparalleled in the history of any modern Government. In the immediate presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle and far-reaching possibilities of national danger than any other Government has known within the whole history of its international relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard the country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens. More than 500 of the 531 members of the two houses were ready and anxious to act; the House of Representatives had acted by an overwhelming majority, but the Senate was unable to act because a little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not.

The Senate has no rules by which debate can be limited or brought to an end; no rules by which dilatory tactics of any kind

can be prevented. A single member can stand in the way of action if he have but the physical endurance. The result in this case is a complete paralysis alike of the legislative and of the executive branches of the Government.

This inability of the Senate to act has rendered some of the most necessary legislation of the session impossible at a time when the need of it was most pressing and most evident. The bill which would have permitted such combinations of capital and of organization in the export and import trade of the country as the circumstances of international competition have made imperative—a bill which the business judgment of the whole country approved and demanded—has failed.

The opposition of one or two Senators has made it impossible to increase the membership of the Interstate Commerce Commission to give it the altered organization necessary for its efficiency. conservation bill, which would have released for immediate use the mineral resources which are still locked up in the public lands, now that their release is more imperatively necessary than ever, and the bill which would have made the unused water power of the country immediately available for industry have both failed, though they have been under consideration throughout the sessions of two Congresses and have been twice passed by the House of Representatives.

The appropriations for the army have failed, along with the appropriation for the civil establishment of the Government, the appropriations for the military academy at West Point and the general deficiency bill. It has proved impossible to extend the powers of the Shipping Board to meet the special needs of the new situation into which our commerce has been forced or to increase the gold reserve of our national banking system to meet the unusual circum-

stances of the existing financial situation.

It would not cure the difficulty to call the Sixty-fifth Congress in extraordinary session. The paralysis of the Senate would remain. The purpose and the spirit of action are not lacking now. The Congress is more definitely united in thought and purpose at this moment, I venture to say, than it has been within the memory of any man now in its membership. There is not only the most united patriotic purpose, but the objects members have in view are perfectly clear and definite. But the Senate cannot act unless its leaders can obtain unanimous consent. Its majority is powerless, helpless. In the midst of a crisis of extraordinary peril, when only definite and decided action can make the nation safe or shield it from war itself by the aggression of others, action is impossible.

Although as a matter of fact the nation and the representatives of the nation stand back of the Executive with unprecedented unanimity and spirit, the impression made abroad will, of course, be that it is not so and that other Governments may act as they please without fear that this Government can do anything at all. We cannot explain. The explanation is incredible. The Senate of the United States is the only legislative body in the world which cannot act when its majority is ready for action. A little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible.

There is but one remedy. The only remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can act. The country can be relied upon to draw the moral. I believe that the Senate can be relied on to supply the means of action and save the country from disaster.

The filibuster in the Senate aroused the indignation of the people. Mass meetings were held to condemn the little band of willful men. Some of them were hung in effigy. Resolutions of protest were adopted by societies and associations of importance; the legislatures of many states passed resolutions pledging support to the President, and the Senate made haste to change its rules.

That branch of Congress, according to long established custom, had assembled after the inauguration to act on any nomination to office the President might make. Never, in the whole course of its existence, had it laid any restraint on the length of debate. The previous question was unknown in its proceedings. But now, under the pressure of public opinion, on the eighth of March, 1917, a rule was adopted which provides that by a two-thirds vote of the Senators present a measure may be brought to a vote; that thereafter each Senator may debate the measure only one hour; that the question of its passage must then be put; and that no dilatory motions or debate shall be in order.

The Senate having thus amended its rules, the President on March ninth summoned the Sixty-fifth Congress to meet on April sixteenth, and on the twelfth of March the Department of State informed all members of the Diplomatic body that, because of the announcement of the Imperial German Government on January thirty-first, 1917, that all vessels found within certain zones would be sunk without warning, the Government of the United States would place armed guards upon all American merchant ships passing through the barred areas. The Secretary of the Navy then requested all newspapers and news agencies in the country not to publish the sailings of American

ships from home or foreign ports, and give no information con-

cerning the arming of ships.

While the country awaited the meeting of Congress in special session, the world was amazed to hear that Russia was in a state of revolution and that the dynasty of the Romanoffs which had ruled Russia for three hundred years had been swept away. Signs of a coming crisis had not been wanting. A belief had long been growing that a large part of the nobility and the ruling classes was strongly pro-German, and was intriguing to have Russia desert the Allies and make a separate peace, and that the bad administration of army affairs was a plot to impede the war. Food in the cities grew scarcer and scarcer. Protests were made by workingmen in Petrograd, and there were threats of a general strike. Letters in the newspapers, from popular leaders in the Duma, besought the people not to make disorders or hinder the manufacture of munitions. But, early in March, when they were told that flour was so scarce that for some days there could be no bread, strikes were declared; the disturbances took on the form of a revolution; the troops ioined the people, and anarchy reigned. The Government was paralyzed. There was fighting in the streets of Petrograd; but, by the night of March 12, the revolutionists were in possession of the city and the red flag replaced the colors of Russia. The Czar ordered the Duma dissolved, but he was not obeyed. His authority was gone. A Provisional Government was established, and he, in turn, was bidden to abdicate. March 15, 1917, he yielded and appointed his son Alexis as his successor; but that evening changed his mind and named his brother Michael. The right to do this was denied by the Provisional Government. What form of government there should be in Russia was for the whole people to decide, acting through an Assembly elected by universal suffrage. Michael declined the throne, and Russian autocracy became a thing of the past. From Petrograd the revolution spread to Moscow, to all the cities of the new Republic, and the new Government was accepted with enthusiasm by the armies at the front. On the twenty-first of March it was formally recognized by our Ambassador, and two days later by the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Italy. Meantime the Czar, the Czarina and some

two hundred courtiers and upholders of the old régime were imprisoned in the Alexandrovsky Palace. A little later all save Nicholas and Alexandra were removed to the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul.

Would the new Government stand, and if it did would Russia fight, or, intoxicated by Liberty, would she make a separate peace, were questions which now gave great concern to all the Instructions from Foreign Minister Milyukov belligerents. bade the men who represented the new Russia in neutral and Allied countries say, as he had said to the representatives of the Allies, Russia did not wish the war which for three years has drenched the world with blood. Though a victim of long prepared aggression, she would continue, as in the past, to struggle against the spirit of conquest of a predatory race seeking to subject Europe of the twentieth century to the shame Faithful to the comof domination by Prussian militarism. paet which joined her to her glorious allies, Russia was resolved to "fight by their side against the common enemy until the end, without cessation and without faltering."

Tons of grain and other foodstuffs found hidden in obscure places in Petrograd confirmed the belief that the pretended shortage was part of the plan of the old régime to force Russia

to a separate peace.

The first news of what was happening in Russia reached our country March 16, 1917, and was quickly followed by the intelligence that three American ships, the City of Memphis, the Illinois and the Vigilancia, had been sunk by German U-boats. Two were homeward bound in ballast, and all three were American built, owned and manned. The City of Memphis left Cardiff in ballast on March 16 and about five o'clock the next day encountered a U-boat, whose commander gave the crew fifteen minutes to leave the ship. The men, some fifty-seven in number, entered five boats; a torpedo from the submarine then struck the Memphis on the starboard side, and in a few minutes she sank. During the night the boats became separated, but early Sunday morning a patrol boat picked up three of them containing thirty-three men, almost all Americans.

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The Vigilancia was torpedoed without any warning, but the Captain and twenty-eight men landed on the Scilly Islands.

The overt act had now been committed, if indeed it had not been committed long before. That Germany was determined to send to the bottom every vessel, whatever its character, neutral merchantman, passenger, Belgian Relief, found within her forbidden zones was no longer to be doubted. War with Germany existed.

СНАРТЕК ХЦІ

WE ENTER THE WAR

What the President thought of the situation was made manifest when, on March 21, he recalled his proclamation of March 9 and summoned Congress to meet in extraordinary session at noon on April 2, instead of April 16, "to receive a communication concerning grave matters of national policy which should be taken immediately under consideration."

To the Sixty-fifth Congress, when it assembled on the appointed day, the President delivered his war message at the unusual hour of half-past eight in the evening. All day long the pacifists had been active in their opposition. They sought to get possession of the Capitol steps up which the President was to go; but were dispersed by the police. Some entered the room of the Vice-President, behaved in an unseemly manner and were put out. Others attacked Senator Lodge. became necessary as a means of precaution to guard the approaches to the Capitol with two troops of cavalry, and put secret service men and police on guard in the corridors. Another troop of cavalry guarded the President while on his way to the Capitol from the White House. Never on any former visit had he met with such applause, such cheering, as greeted him as he entered the Chamber of the House, walked to the Speaker's desk and looked out upon an excited audience almost every member of which was waving or wearing a national flag. It was some minutes before he was able to begin his address. He said:

"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

1 .

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making. On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean.

That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. . . .

The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents.

Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe-conduct through the prescribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle. . . .

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it.

The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion. . . .

There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are not common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it and that it take immediately steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. . . .

While we do these things—these deeply momentous things—let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world, what our motives

and our objects are. . . .

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. . . .

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war.

It was not with their previous knowledge or approval.

It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools.

One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend, is that from

the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of Government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity and counsel,

our peace within and without our industries and our commerce.

Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States.

But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security of the democratic Governments of the world.

We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.

We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nations can make them.

I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified indorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has, therefore, not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reëstablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it toward all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test.

They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose.

If there should be disloyalty it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all it will lift it only here and there, and without countenance except from a lawless

and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war—into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.

But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

That night, before the two Houses adjourned, a resolution declaring a state of war existed was introduced in each.

Whereas, The recent acts of the Imperial German Government are acts of war against the Government and people of the United States:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and

That the President be and he is hereby authorized and directed

to take immediate steps not only to put the country in thorough state of defense, but also exert all of its power and employ all of its resources to carry on war against the Imperial German Government and to bring the conflict to a successful termination.

After a debate of thirteen hours the resolution passed the Senate, and April 5 came before the House with a long report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The conduct of Germany towards the Government, the people and their interests, the Committee said, had been discourteous, unjust, cruel, barbarous and wanting in honesty and fair dealing. The Imperial Government was waging war upon our people and our commerce and no course was open to us but to accept the gage of battle, declare that a state of war existed, and wage that war vigorously. Since its note of February 4, 1915, declaring that the German navy had been ordered "to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such," and its note of February 16, 1915, declaring that it was "far indeed from the intention of the German Government ever to destroy neutral lives and neutral property," the British steamer Falaba had been torpedoed; the American steamer Cushing had been attacked by an airship; the American steamer Gulflight, the British liner Lusitania, and the American steamer Nebraskan had been sunk and one hundred and twenty-five of our citizens had perished; the Armenian had been torpedoed; and the Orduna, the Leo, the Leelanaw, the Arabic, Nicobian and Hesperian destroyed with the loss of twenty-three American lives.

The Committee then called attention to the assurance of the German Ambassador on September 1, 1915, that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance"; and to the note of November 29 stating that "the German Government quite shares the view of the American Government that all possible care must be taken for the security of the crew and passengers of a vessel to be sunk. Consequently the persons found on a vessel may not be ordered into her lifeboats except when the general conditions, that is to say, the weather, the conditions

of the sea, and the neighborhood of coasts, afford absolute certainty that the boats will reach the nearest port."

Yet even these pledges were not kept. In December the American steamers Communipaw and Petrolite, the Japanese liner Yasaka Maru, and the liner Persia were sunk. On the Persia were 500 passengers, of whom but 165 were saved. Among the lost was the American Consul going to his post. In March the French liner Patria with Americans aboard was sunk without warning; the Norwegian bark Silius with seven Americans aboard; the British steamers Berwindvale and Englishman with Americans aboard; the French unarmed channel steamer Sussex and the British liners Manchester Engineer and the Eagle Point. On the Sussex, twenty-four Americans were injured.

Against all these acts we had protested in vain. In February, 1915, the German Government was told that the Government of the United States could not reconcile such acts "with the friendly relations so happily existing between the two governments"; that it "would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities." In July, 1915, the German Government was told that "repetition by commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly." In April, 1916, the German Government was warned that if it did "not immediately" abandon "its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations."

In her answer of May 4 Germany gave assurances that new orders had been given to her naval forces "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels," and lived up to it until January 31, 1917, when her ruthless submarine warfare was resumed.

Turning from this summary of violated promises, the Committee passed to a review of German intrigues in our country and told of the doings of Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed; how Dr. Chakrabarty received \$60,000 from the Ger-

man Embassy for "Indian revolutionary propaganda in this country"; how the German Embassy employed Ernest T. Euphrat to carry information between Berlin and Washington under an American passport; how officers of interned warships violated their word of honor and how six of them escaped in a boat purchased with money supplied by the German Consul at Richmond; how under the eyes of Captain von Papen and Wolf von Igel, Hans von Wedell maintained an office for the procurement of fraudulent passports for German reservists; how James J. F. Archibald, under cover of an American passport and in the pay of Ambassador von Bernstorff, carried dispatches for Ambassador Dumba and committed other unneutral acts; how Albert O. Sander and other German agents sent spies to England protected by American passports; how when Irving Guy Ries with an American passport went to Germany it was taken from him and held for a day; how when Paul Julius Hensel, a German spy, was arrested in London he had a counterfeit of the Ries passport in his possession; how prominent officials of the Hamburg-American Line under the direction of Boy-Ed attempted to supply German warships at sea, how vessels were sent from San Francisco, and how with funds furnished by Captain Franz von Papen, Werner Horn attempted to blow up the international bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, and Albert Kaltschmidt attempted to blow up a factory at Walkerville, and the armory at Windsor, Canada.

The Committee next told of bomb plots against ships. German agents had been convicted and sentenced for making bombs to be attached to allied ships leaving New York. Under the direction of von Papen and Wolf von Igel, Captain von Kleist, Captain Wolpert of the Atlas Steamship Company, and Captain Rode of the Hamburg-American Line made incendiary bombs and put them on board allied ships. The shells were made on the steamship Friedrich der Grosse. Captain Franz Rintelen came from Germany, secretly, to prevent exportation of munitions to the Allies, organized and financed Labor's National Peace Council, and tried to bring about strikes.

Consul General Bopp at San Francisco and Vice-Consul General von Schaick and others had been convicted of sending agents into Canada to blow up bridges, tunnels and wreck vessels sailing from Pacific Coast ports with war material for Russia and Japan. Paul König, head of secret service of the Hamburg-American Line, sent spies to Canada to gather information concerning the Welland Canal, and movement of troops; bribed a bank employee to give information concerning shipments to the Allies; sent spies to Europe with American passports to secure military information, and was involved with von Papen in his bomb plots. Finally, the indignities heaped on American consular officials by German frontier authorities who ordered them stripped and searched, the detention and maltreatment of the Yarrowdale prisoners, the detention of Gerard and the American correspondents, and the Zimmermann note to Mexico were passed in review. No such an arraignment of a great Power had ever before been made by a Committee of the House of Representatives.

After some fifty speeches attacking and defending Germany the House, a few minutes after three o'clock on the morning of April 5, 1917, passed the joint resolution. The yeas were 373 and the nays 50.

Thus empowered to act, the President on April 6 issued a proclamation declaring that "a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German Government."

Two days later the Austrian chargé d'affaires asked for passports for himself, the embassy staff, the consuls and the Ambassador-designate Count Tarnowski, and diplomatic relations with Austria were severed. The Count, appointed to succeed Dr. Dumba, reached our country just as diplomatic relations were severed with Germany and had not been received by the President when war was declared. Fourteen Austrian merchant ships, in our ports, were now seized by the Government as a measure of precaution.

From the heads of the Entente Powers, from ministers of state, from mayors of cities, from learned societies and universities, came scores of telegrams of thanks and congratulations to the President and the People of the United States. By order of the War Cabinet the war speech of President Wilson was placarded on all official billboards throughout France; celebrations were held and our flag was everywhere

displayed. President Poincaré, of France, sent a long dispatch to President Wilson.

"At the moment when, under the generous inspiration of yourself, the great American Republic, faithful to its ideals and its traditions, is coming forward to defend with force of arms the cause of justice and of liberty, the people of France are filled with the deepest feelings of brotherly appreciation." He was sure he expressed "the thought of all France in expressing to you and to the American Nation the joy and the pride which we feel to-day as our hearts once again beat in unison with yours." . . . "In never-to-be-forgotten language you have made yourself, before the universe, the eloquent interpreter of outraged laws and a menaced civilization. Honor to you, Mr. President, and to your noble country."

At Rome a great multitude carrying our flag and singing The Star-Spangled Banner went to the American Embassy to cheer and shout, and former Premier Liezzatti and sixty-seven

deputies dispatched an address to the President.

"Your message, with its ideal beauty and political contents, brings us back to the dawn of civilization when the United States, inspired by Washington, gave to the oppressed people of Europe and of the two Americas the fruitful example of their redemption. Your message is not addressed to the United States alone, but to all humanity, and awakens the noblest instincts among free nations. Your message is the hymn of freedom."

King George, "on behalf of the Empire," offered heartfelt congratulations "on the entry of the United States of America into the war for the great ideals so nobly set forth in your speech to Congress. The moral not less than the material results of this notable declaration are incalculable, and civilization itself will owe much to the decision at which, in the greatest crisis of the world's history, the people of the great Republic have arrived."

Lloyd-George in behalf of the Imperial War Cabinet, in a

message to the American people, said:

"The Imperial War Cabinet, representing all the peoples and all the nations of the British Empire, wish me, in its behalf, to recognize the chivalry and courage which calls the people

of the United States to dedicate the whole of their resources and service to the greatest cause that ever engaged human endeavor." Two phrases in the President's address, he said, would "stand out forever in the story of this crusade"—that "the world must be saved for democracy," and that "the menace to peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic Governments backed by organized force and controlled wholly by their will and not by the will of their people."

Parliament was not then sitting; but when it met on April 17 the House of Commons, amid cheers, and with but one dissenting vote, that of an Independent Irish Nationalist, resolved:

"This House desires to express to the Government and people of the United States of America their profound appreciation of the action of their Government in joining the allied Powers, and thus defending the high cause of freedom and rights of humanity against the gravest menace by which they have ever been faced."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in moving the resolution, deeply regretted "that the Premier is unable to be present himself to move the resolution. Not only the members of Parliament, but all the people of the British Empire and the allied countries welcome the new Ally with heartfelt sympathy. This is not only the greatest event, but, as I believe, the turning point of the war. The new world has been brought in, or has stepped in, to restore the balance in the old. Being in, the United States has already shown that her enemies must beware of her. Despite the fact that the path immediately before us is more difficult than ever before, I venture to express the hope and belief that a change is coming; that the long night of sorrow and anguish which has desolated the world is drawing to a close."

Mr. Asquith seconded the resolution, and said:

"It is only right and fitting that this House, the chief representative body of the British Empire, should, at the earliest possible opportunity, give definite and emphatic expression to the feelings which throughout the length and breadth of the Empire have grown day by day in volume and fervor since the memorable decision of the President and Congress of the

United States. I doubt whether even now the world realizes the full significance of the step America has taken. I do not use language of flattery or exaggeration when I say it is one of the most disinterested acts in history."

Sir Alfred Mond announced that the Government had given instructions that on Friday, April 20, the day set apart to mark, with suitable ceremony, the entrance of the United States into the war, the Stars and Stripes should be flown, beside the Union Jack, on as many public buildings as

possible.

When that day, "American Day," it was fittingly called, came, bright and clear, the good people of London beheld such sights as never before had been seen by man. From the Victoria Tower of the House of Parliament, over which until that day the flag of no foreign nation had ever been raised, they saw the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack flying in unison from the same staff. Through streets richly decked with American flags and lined with people they saw the King and Queen proceed from the Palace to St. Paul's to take part in "A solemn service to Almighty God on the occasion of the entry of the United States of America into the great war of freedom."

How deeply that act of our country moved the thinking people of London was well told by Hall Caine in a cable to the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*.

American Day in London was a great and memorable event. It was another sentinel on the hilltop of time, another beacon fire in the history of humanity. The two nations of Great Britain and America can never be divided again. There has been a national marriage between them which only one judge can dissolve, and the name

of that judge is death.

Nature herself seemed to celebrate the nuptials. The morning broke fine with the breath of summer and the smile of spring. Never had the city looked so bright and heartsome. The crisp air seemed to crackle under the thud and rumble of the thoroughfares. The Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes were entwined on countless flagstaffs, and cordons of police were keeping back the crowds that lined the course of the royal procession.

The broad circle of St. Paul's was framed with faces. Rarely, if ever, has our old gray cathedral, compassed round with its tides of traffic, seen such a congregation. It was a solid mass of people from

the portico to the altar steps. The King and Queen were there with the beloved Queen Alexandra, the American Ambassador, the Ministers and Ambassadors of the Allied nations, our leading statesmen, soldiers and sailors and a fair representation of the beauty and intellect of the nation. . . .

It was not for nothing that the flags of Great Britain and America hung side by side under the chancel arch on Friday morning. At one moment the sun shot through the windows of the great dome and lit them up with heavenly radiance. Was it only the exaltation of the moment that made us think the invisible powers were giving us a sign that in the union of the nations for which those emblems stood lay the surest hope of a day when men will beat their swords into plowshares and know war no more?

The United States of Great Britain and America! God grant that the union celebrated in our old sanctuary may never be dis-

solved until that great day has dawned.

From the Old World the excitement spread to the New. April 10 Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Germany and, aroused by the sinking of the Brazilian steamship *Parana* without warning by a German U-boat, seized forty-six German vessels in her waters.

That same day Argentina announced her approval of the action of the United States. The posting of the declaration on the bulletin boards in Buenos Aires caused a great excitement, pro-ally demonstrations were made, and on the fourteenth the German consulate and the offices of several pro-German newspapers were attacked by the people.

Chili declared she would remain neutral. Bolivia severed relations with Germany on April 13; Paraguay expressed her sympathy for the United States; Uruguay would remain neutral, but recognized the justice of the attitude of the United States; Costa Rica "indorsed the course of President Wilson"; Panama canceled the exequaturs of all German consuls and approved of the declaration of war by the United States; Cuba declared war against Germany.

Without a moment's delay Great Britain and France each prepared to send a high commission to our country to express the thanks and gratitude of their Governments, and discuss the most effective way of coöperation.

The British Mission, headed by Arthur J. Balfour, slipped out of England secretly on April 11, landed at Halifax on the

twentieth, crossed to St. John and came by special train to the little town of McAdam at the Canadian end of the International Bridge. A special train brought them to Vanceboro on the American side, where they were received by the Third Assistant Secretary of State, Rear-Admiral Fletcher and General Ward and escorted to Washington.

M. Viviani, former Premier of France, headed the French Mission. Accompanied by General Joffre, victor of the Marne, and a host of distinguished men, he crossed the Atlantic in a vessel convoyed by French ships of war and was met at night, a hundred miles at sea, by a flotilla of American destroyers, reached Hampton Roads April 24 and was carried to Washington by the President's yacht, Mayflower.

A visit was made to the tomb of Washington, where tributes were made by M. Viviani and Mr. Balfour, and a bronze palm laid on the tomb by General Joffre and a wreath of lilies by Mr. Balfour. To the wreath was attached the words:

"Dedicated by the British Mission to the immortal memory of George Washington, soldier, statesman, patriot, who would have rejoiced to see the country of which he was by birth a citizen and the country his genius called into existence fighting side by side to save mankind from a military despotism."

By invitation M. Viviani and Marshal Joffre appeared before the Senate and the House of Representatives, and were given a great ovation in each. Chicago was then visited, and St. Louis and Kansas City, and Springfield, where a palm was laid on the tomb of Lincoln, and then Philadelphia, New York and Boston.

While the French Commissioners were making their tour, Mr. Balfour by invitation addressed the House of Representatives. Never before had a British official been so honored. May 11 they reached New York and passed through streets lined with shouting multitudes. A reception at the City Hall was followed on May 12 by a dinner tendered by the Mayor's Reception Committee to both the French and British Commissions.

"I have not," said Mr. Balfour in his after-dinner speech, "come here authorized by my Government to set myself up or

set my friends up as instructors of the great American people." It might be, it probably was, the fact that there were certain mistakes which a democracy unprepared for war might make. "We shall be happy to describe these mistakes to you, if, happily, it will be your desire to learn the lesson from them."

Such was the purpose of the missions, and this purpose accomplished, they departed as secretly as they came and reached their destinations in safety.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CALL TO THE COLORS

The call to arms found our country ill prepared for the great work which lay before it. Vast sums of money must be raised. A great army must be gathered and trained. Industries must be mobilized. A peace-loving people must be aroused to a due sense of the meaning of their entrance into the world war:

Not a moment was lost. No sooner had the President signed the joint resolution declaring that a state of war had been thrust upon us than the news was sent by wireless and by telegraph to every fort and army post; to every warship, navy yard and naval station in our country and insular possessions; and to our Ambassadors, Ministers and consuls the world over. Every German vessel in our ports was seized, and scores of Germans, leaders in plots, were arrested in New York, Chicago and San Francisco; orders went out for the immediate mobilization of the navy, and the taking over of privately owned motor boats and yachts already enrolled; the naval militia and naval reserve were called to the colors, and the work of enlisting was taken up with renewed ardor.

The Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission went seriously to work. Created by Act of Congress, the Council consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Advisory Commission of seven men drawn from civil life, and put in charge, one of transportation, another of munitions, another of food, clothing and supplies in general; another of raw materials, minerals and metals; another of labor; another of engineering; another

of medicine, surgery and sanitation.

To aid them in their work there at once sprang up a host of Boards and Committees, each to play a special part in the mobilization of our resources and industries. At the request of the Council the presidents of the great railroads met and named five men to put the railroads on a war basis. Mr. Hoover was invited to become Chairman of a Committee on Food Supply and Prices, charged with the duty of securing the coöperation of all food distributing agents, preventing if possible speculation and waste and increasing production of food. A general medical board of physicians, surgeons, dentists and hygiene and sanitation experts was appointed to mobilize the medical resources of the country. An Economy Board was organized, and April 15 the President made an appeal to the people to increase the output of war materials and raise food in abundance.

We must, he said, not only supply ourselves, our army and our navy but a large part of the nations with whom we had made common cause. We must build ships by the hundred "to carry to the other side of the seas, submarines or no submarines," whatever would be needed there, but which England, France, Italy, Russia could not spare the men, materials or machinery to make. Our industries, therefore, our farms, mines, shipyards, factories must be more prolific, more economically managed than ever before.

To the farmers he urgently appealed. The "supreme need" of our own country and of our Allies was "an abundance of supplies and especially of foodstuffs." The importance of a sufficient food supply was "superlative." Without it "the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked" would fail. On the farmers rested "in large measure the fate of the war and the fate of the nations." Might the nation depend on them to leave nothing undone that would increase the yield of their land. He called on "young men and old alike," on "able-bodied boys," to "turn in hosts to the farms." Farmers in the South were urged to "plant abundant foodstuffs as well as cotton"; middlemen were told the eyes of the country were on them; that the country expected them, as it expected all others, to "forego unusual profits," and organize to hasten shipments. Every one who cultivated a garden helped "to solve the problem of feeding the nations." Every housewife who practiced strict economy put herself in the ranks of those who served the nation.

The response was quick. Thousands of young men and lads left the universities, the colleges, the high schools and the home and volunteered for work on the farms and in munition plants and factories. Vacant lots in the cities were turned into little gardens with children for cultivators. The front lawns and flower beds of suburban residences were plowed and sown with every sort of vegetable seed and farmers, the land over, increased the acreage of corn and wheat, and potatoes.

The Secretary of Agriculture declared the problem was not how to secure more acreage, but how to obtain more labor. the cities and towns there were more than 2,000,000 boys from fifteen to nineteen years of age not engaged in work vital to the nation. These should be used. High schools and colleges in rural districts, he thought, should suspend their work and resume later than usual in the autumn, that the students might go to the farms. Industrial plants should do their repair work during the harvest, and certain public and private undertakings of lesser importance to the nation should shut down for the time being and so set free additional labor. To upwards of two thousand Boy Scouts, gathered on the plaza before the Department of Agriculture in Washington, and carrying garden tools of all sorts, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture said: "Arm yourselves with pick and hoe. Till every scrap of vacant lawn. Raise tomatoes, beans and peas, and you will do an immeasurable service to your country," and the promise was given that the message would be sent to all Boy Scout organizations in the country. The day, April 21, had been called "National Planting Day" and the boys marched to a three hundred acre plot donated by the Government for farming purposes.

In New York City a mass meeting of Boy Scouts received a telegram from Mr. Hoover telling them that "America will have to feed the world for the next two or three years, even if the war should end this year," and Mr. Roosevelt urged them to "start a garden and thereby help to feed the soldiers." The Governor of North Carolina appealed to the County Commissioners to cultivate every idle farm and use every chain gang that could be spared from roadmaking to plant food crops, and three thousand women and girls, enrolled in clubs, pledged

themselves to can all surplus fruit and vegetables. The State Council of Defense in West Virginia took up the question how to increase the food supply. In Alabama the Superintendent of Education promised to release all boys in the high schools and district agricultural schools for farm work, if their parents made no objection. In Detroit, Mr. Henry Ford promised to release a thousand men from his motor plant to go on the farms. and to take them back in the autumn. In Connecticut, the State Food Committee called for boys to work on the farms. A bulletin from the Department of Agriculture at Washington urged everybody to make gardens. "Somebody has to raise everything you eat. Do your share." In Philadelphia the Bourse and the Commercial Exchange organized a Farm Work Enrollment Bureau to mobilize the war-farmer boys for work in the West. A Committee of men of prominence living in towns near Philadelphia along the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad formed the Main Line Food Supply Department of the State Committee of Public Safety and called for aid. Their purpose was to cultivate and maintain a series of Community War Gardens on all unused land one mile north and south of the railroad from Merion to Villanova. No money was wanted, but land owners were asked to loan unused land in quantities from one to twenty-five acres; to donate labor then in their employ; to loan farm implements or horses, and give fertilizers and seed, potatoes, beans and cabbage, carrot, turnip and onion seeds. From information received, the Committee declared the need of cultivating every bit of unused land was more than urgent if the shortage of food sure to prevail in the autumn and winter was to be lessened. Vegetables raised in this way were to be sold at cost to the people of their towns. Not a cent of profit would be taken. Like appeals were made by Vacant Lot Associations, Community Gardeners' Associations, School Garden Associations, and scores of others. Hundreds of students at the University of Pennsylvania joined the farm and industrial volunteers. It was the same everywhere.

To raise food was not enough. Quite as important was the careful use of it. The American habit of wastefulness must be stopped, and this Mr. Hoover sought to do by an appeal to the women of the country. A nation-wide association, the

United States Food Administration, was started and every woman above the age of fifteen was asked to sign a card and become a member. On the card were a few simple questions, and a pledge which bound all who signed to "accept membership in the United States Food Administration," and "carry out the directions and advice of the Food Administrator" in the conduct "of her household" in so far as "circumstances will admit." Each member was then told what to do, was given a card to hang in the window, and, if desired, a button. The first card, issued to the wife of the President, was hung in the window of the White House dining-room.

In Philadelphia they were delivered at the door of every occupied house by the police, one Monday in July, and gathered on Wednesday. Nobody signed unless willing to do so. Those who did not were then visited by members of the women's clubs and organizations and the object of the card explained.

That all might know how to save and what to save, Mr. Hoover sent out a food card to be hung in the kitchens. called for the use of less wheat, meat, fats, milk, sugar and fuel; for a larger use of fruit and vegetables; for the canning or drying of surplus produce, and urged all to buy in the neighborhood and save the cost of carriage from places far away. One pound of wheat saved each week meant 150,000,000 bushels for our Allies. This would help them "to save democracy." Sugar was scaree. "We use to-day three times as much per person as our Allies. If every one in America saves one ounce of sugar daily, it means 1,100,000 tons for the year." One-third of an ounce less animal fat each day would save 375,000 tons in a year. Every American was in duty bound not to cat a fourth meal; "preach the Gospel of the clean plate"; buy less, serve smaller portions, eat less cake and pastry, less meat and no young meat, serve no wheat bread at one meal a day, and "watch out for the wastes in the community."

The first step on the part of the Government was taken by the President. Acting under authority given him by an Act of Congress, he forbade the export of a long list of articles to any of fifty-six countries and their dependencies, save under licenses obtained from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. The purpose of the Government, he said, was to

better the food conditions which had arisen and were likely to arise before the crops were harvested. In liberating any surplus over and above our own needs, the wants of nations fighting against Germany and her Allies would be first considered. Neutrals would not be unduly hampered; but the Government must be assured that they were husbanding their own resources, and that our own supplies did not directly or indirectly go to feed the enemy. Not only was the shipment of food and fodder to be restricted, but such essentials as pig iron, steel, bullets, arms, ammunition and explosives. The ban was to go into effect on July 15.

That the helpless neutrals, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, would suffer was to be expected, but for this Germany, and not the United States, was responsible. A comparison of our exports during the nine months ending with March, 1917, with those for a like period ending with March, 1913, the year before the war, showed that those to Denmark had nearly trebled, those to Norway had increased ninefold, those to Sweden fourfold and those to Switzerland twenty-fivefold. This did not mean that everything brought from our country was sent by these neutrals into Germany. Much of it was, and the rest went to make up the depletion of their own products caused by shipments to Germany. Sweden in times of peace was a large exporter of iron ore, but she was now selling to Germany each year more than she had ever before sold to all the world, and to replace her depleted stock was importing ore from the United States. Assurances from these neutrals that they would not send to Germany wheat, grain, copper, war supplies of any kind, bought from us, meant little if what they bought was merely to replace their own products sold to our enemy. was the source of supply our duty to our Allies and ourselves required we should stop.

A Danish journal did not believe that the contest for liberty and democracy would be fought with weapons which would mortally wound small nations. Before the war President Wilson had again and again upheld the right of neutrals to carry on trade with one of the belligerents. Before the war American goods in large quantities went through Denmark to Germany.

Indeed, it was to defend the neutral commercial rights of America that the United States declared war.

A German journal called the embargo a brutal assault against little neutrals. In France the embargo was hailed as one of the decisive acts of the war. The Allies, despite the vigilance of their navies, had failed to make the blockade tight. A new measure was needed. This the United States had furnished by forbidding indirect aid to the enemy. From Norway came a special commission, headed by the Arctic explorer Nansen, to remonstrate. Norway, he said, was dependent on the United States for supplies. In times of peace she bought from Germany sugar, grain and fats; but now she must get them from America. She was in great need of iron and grain. The harvest would be poor and little could be expected from the erop.

When the new minister from Switzerland arrived there accompanied him a commission to present the needs of that country as to food. She raised but twenty per cent. of her food supply, and besides her own population must feed thousands of interned people from neighboring countries. After some negotiation with Norway an agreement was reached by which she promised, if allowed to buy forty-seven thousand tons of cereals, to give up thirty-six thousand tons of wheat and rye for the benefit of Belgium. The rest, eleven thousand tons of barley, she was to keep. Germany had sunk seventeen of twenty-three Belgium Relief Commission ships, and it was to replace this loss that the thirty-six thousand tons were to be given up at cost and taken to Belgium in vessels Norway had chartered to carry foodstuffs home.

A like agreement was tentatively made with Holland for the loading of some thirty of her ships, provided the larger part of their cargoes was given to Belgium. But the Exports Council would not consent, and it was soon announced that no ships with American wheat would be allowed to sail to the ports of any northern neutrals before the first of December. The Netherlands, despite its protest, it was said, had wheat and grain enough for her population until that time.

The embargo proclamation was scarce forty-eight hours old when the President appealed for unselfishness in war prices.

The Government was about to fix the prices it was willing to pay for supplies needed for the war. A fair price would be paid. By a fair price was meant such as would keep the industries concerned in a high state of efficiency, provide good wages and make possible such additions to the plants as war needs made necessary. The acceptance of such prices as the Government would pay must not be put on the ground of patriotism. At a time when hundreds of thousands of our young men were going across the sea to fight, no true man who stayed home to work for them would ask himself how much he was going to make. No true patriot would take toll of their heroism, or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood. The President had heard it said that more than a just price, more than was needed to sustain the industries, must be paid; that it was necessary to pay very generously in order to stimulate production; that nothing but rewards paid in money would do this. Do you who say so mean "that you must be paid, must be bribed to make your contribution, a contribution that costs you neither a drop of blood nor a tear, when the whole world is in travail and men everywhere depend upon and call to you to bring them out of bondage and make the world a fit place to live in again amidst peace and justice?" He could not believe that men "living in easy peaceful fashion" would exact a price, drive a bargain with the men who were enduring the dangers of the war on the battlefields, in the trenches, on the sea.

Did the ship owners, the ocean carriers realize what obstacles they had put in the way of a successful carrying on of the war? They were doing everything that high freight rates could do to make the war a failure, to defeat the armies fighting against Germany. When they realized this he was sure they would reconsider the matter. It was high time. But there was something else to be considered; the whole people were mobilized to finish the nation's task in the war, and under these conditions it was not possible to distinguish between industrial purchases made by the Government and those made by individuals. Prices to the public must be made the same as prices to the Government.

His next appeal was to the housewives. Increased production, to which the farmers had responded so patriotically, was

but a part of the solution of the food problem, he said. What was raised must be cared for, and saved. Every bushel of potatoes stored, every pound of vegetables put up for future use, every jar of fruit preserved, would help to win victory and end the war. We must use food grown locally and so lessen the pressure on the railroads and leave them free to carry things necessary for military purposes. Food we did not need at once must be conserved.

The letter was addressed to the National Volunteer Committee on the Preservation of Fruit and Garden Products, representing twenty-four states; was issued by the Secretary of Agriculture with whom the Committee worked; and was in reply to the question, "How May Housewives Immediately Start Canning, Preserving, Pickling, Drying and Preserving?"

Information on these matters was so eagerly sought that the "National Emergency Food Garden Commission," working with the Conservation Department of the American Forestry Association, issued a "Home Garden Primer," a "Home Canning," and a "Home Drying Manual for Vegetables and Fruits," giving full instructions. To save fruits and vege-

tables by canning was, this year, a patriotic duty.

Congress while the people were plowing and planting, volunteering for farm work and pledging themselves to save food and stop waste, was busy with a Food Control Bill. As passed by the Senate, July 21, 1917, the President was empowered to appoint a board of three commissioners, one of whom must be a farmer actually engaged in raising food, to perform such duties as the President might direct. To destroy any necessaries in order to enhance their price, to hoard, monopolize, waste, willfully allow deterioration in their production or manufacture, charge an unfair price, conspire to limit the carrying, harvesting, storing or making in order to enhance their price was a misdemeanor punishable with imprisonment for two years, or a fine of \$10,000, or both.

Foods, feeds, fuel, supplies of any kind needed for the army, the navy, the common defense, might be seized and a just price paid, and so might any factory, mine, packing house, or plant. That he might guarantee fair prices to producer and consumer the President might buy, store, and sell for cash

at reasonable prices, fuel, wheat, flour, meal, beans and potatoes, and if he found that dealings in futures unduly raised the price of wheat and food cereals, he might close the grain exchanges and declare such trading unlawful. Thirty days after the passage of the act no foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds were to be used in making distilled liquors save for Government use; importation of such liquors was to cease, and liquor in hand was to be taken over by the Government. The prices of coal and coke, wherever and whenever sold, either by producer or dealer, might be fixed; the carrying, distribution and allotment among merchants and consumers regulated; and if necessary the mines and yards of dealers seized and operated. One hundred and fifty million dollars were appropriated for the purposes of the act. Whenever, in the opinion of the President, it became necessary, he might require any person or corporation, operating a grain elevator, a cold storage establishment for the storage of meat, poultry or dairy products, a packing house producing meat or meat products, a factory making farm implements or machinery, the operator of a coal mine, or person making, handling, or storing fertilizers to take out a license, provided the articles made or stored formed "a part of interstate or foreign commerce."

Finally, there was to be a committee, composed of five senators and five representatives, to be called "The Joint Committee on Expenditures in the Conduct of the War." As the name implied, it was to keep watch over the use made of all appropriations by Congress, all contracts entered into by officers of the executive departments, bearing on the conduct of the war. It was to advise and confer with the President, the heads of all executive departments, commissions, voluntary boards and organizations connected with the conduct of the war, might send for persons and papers, administer oaths, and compel attendance.

To the bill in this form the President was strongly opposed. He disliked the board of three commissioners. He would have but one commissioner, and that one, Mr. Hoover. He was opposed to the Joint Committee on the Expenditures and, while the bill was in conference, stated his objections in a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture. Not

only was Section 23 which created the Committee "entirely foreign to the subject-matter of the food administration bill," but, if made a law, it would amount to the taking over by Congress of work of Administration and render his task of conducting the war impossible. A like "committee on the conduct of the war" had been created during the administration of Mr. Lincoln and had been "the cause of constant and distressing harassment."

Before the bill passed both these objectionable features were stricken out, and Mr. Hoover was appointed what the newspapers called "Food Dictator." Not a moment was lost in putting the law in operation. Notice was at once served on speculators and "profiteers" that the day of reckoning had come for all who would not join in the effort to secure lower prices for the consumer and food for our Allies.

"If necessary," said Mr. Hoover, "we shall not hesitate to apply to the full the drastic, coercive powers that Congress has conferred upon us" by the act. It was not his intention "to proceed with a host of punitive measures," but by working with the various trades, make gambling, extortion, and wasteful practices impossible. A deep obligation rested on us to feed the armies and the peoples joined with us in this struggle. The turning of forty millions of their men from peaceful pursuits to war and war work, the drafting of millions of women to take the places of husbands and brothers, the toll of the submarine had so cut down production that their harvests would fall five hundred million bushels of grain below the usual yield. No market but ours could relieve their pressing needs. Despite our own short crop we must send them two hundred and twentyfive million bushels. We must stop all waste, cut down consumption and use other food, such as fish, corn, cereals. Every ounce wasted was a contribution to starvation. There was no royal road to saving. Nothing but the cooperation of the twenty million kitchens and twenty million dining tables in our country would answer.

First to be regulated were the prices of wheat, flour and bread. To stop speculation in wheat and flour it was now announced that on the first of September all elevators, and flour mills turning out one hundred and more barrels of flour each day must take out licenses; that no wheat could be stored for more than thirty days; that grain exchanges would be asked to stop dealing in futures, and that a committee would be appointed to fix a fair price for wheat.

In Massachusetts a "wheatless week," during which no white bread was to be served in hotels, restaurants, or homes, saved, the State Food Administrator estimated, twenty-five thousand barrels of flour. In Chicago all dealings in futures ceased. Actual wheat for delivery was then selling at \$2.40 to \$2.60 a bushel. What price the Food Administrator would fix was yet to be determined.

From the Department of War now came the announcement that an expeditionary force of "approximately one division of regular troops," commanded by Major General John J. Pershing, had been ordered to go to France as soon as possible, and that the General and his staff would precede the troops. The offer of Colonel Roosevelt to raise a volunteer force and take them to France, the President said, could not at present be accepted.

"I shall not avail myself, at any rate, at the present stage of the war, of the authorization conferred by the act to organized volunteer divisions. To do so would seriously interfere with the carrying out of the chief and most immediately important purpose contemplated by this legislation, the prompt creation and early use of an effective army, and would contribute virtually nothing to the effective strength of the armies now engaged against Germany.

"I understand that the section of this act which authorizes the creation of volunteer divisions, in addition to the draft, was added with a view to providing an independent command for Mr. Roosevelt and giving the military authority an opportunity to use his fine vigor and enthusiasm in recruiting the forces now at the western front.

It would be very agreeable to me to pay Mr. Roosevelt this compliment and the Allies the compliment of sending to their aid one of our most distinguished public men, an ex-President, who has rendered many conspicuous public services and proved his gallantry in many striking ways. Politically, too, it would no doubt have a very fine effect and make a profound impression. But this is not the

time or the occasion for compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with regard to it at every step and in every particular under expert and professional advice from both sides of the water.

That advice is that the men most needed are men of the ages contemplated in the draft provision of the present bill, not men of the age and sort contemplated in the section which authorizes the formation of volunteer units, and that for the preliminary training of the men who are to be drafted we shall need all of our experienced officers. Mr. Roosevelt told me when I had the pleasure of seeing him a few weeks ago that he would wish to have associated with him some of the most effective officers of the regular army. He named many of those whom he would desire to have designated for the service, and they were men who cannot possibly be spared from the too small force of officers at our command for the much more pressing and necessary duty of training regular troops to be put into the field in France and Belgium as fast as they can be got ready.

The first troops sent to France will be taken from the present forces of the regular army, and will be under the command of trained

soldiers only.

The responsibility for the successful conduct of our own part in this great war rests upon me. I could not escape it if I would. I am too much interested in the cause we are fighting for to be interested in anything but success. The issues involved are too immense for me to take into consideration anything except the best, most effective, most immediate means of military action. What these means are I know from the mouths of men who have seen war as it is now conducted, who have no illusions and to whom the whole grim matter is a matter of business. I shall center my attention upon those means and let everything else wait.

I should be deeply to blame should I do otherwise, whatever the argument of policy for a personal gratification or advantage.

A division of the army as reorganized for the war, it was announced, would consist—infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, signal battalion, aero squadron, all included—of 25,718 men and officers. Wagon trains and motor trains would raise this number to 28,334, to which must be added the medical department of 125 officers, 1,332 enlisted men and 48 ambulances.

Steps to mobilize the National Guard had already been taken. Late in March fourteen units of the Guard were called

out for police purposes in nine Atlantic States 1 and the District of Columbia, and sent to protect railways, bridges and water works. Before the month closed twenty regiments and five battalions of the Guards in eighteen States from Ohio to the Pacific Coast were called; the muster out of service of 22,000 guardsmen who had been on the Mexican border was suspended, and seven more regiments called out. Thus, by April 1, 60,000 guardsmen out of a total of 150,000 were under arms.

The order, on April 6, for the mobilization of the navy found it 35,000 men short of the 87,000 authorized by law. But to put it on a war footing 99,809 regulars and 45,870 reserves were needed. Of these 73,817 regulars and 25,219 reserves were for use on battleships, scouts, destroyers, submarines and training ships; 10,633 regulars and 17,195 reserves for coast defense, and 10,318 regulars and 2,080 reserves for shore stations.

The work of enlisting began at once. Every possible means of securing volunteers was used. Attractive cartoons and posters were affixed to fences and displayed in shop windows and at recruiting stations. Appealing hand bills were pasted across the fronts and sides of taxi-cabs, motor trucks and wagons. Movies depicted life on shipboard and in camp. "Wake-up, America," and "Your Country Needs You" became familiar forms of appeal.

In this country-wide effort to arouse the men, the women bore a conspicuous part. From in front of the little brown tents scattered over every part of the great cities and towns, from platforms in halls where meetings were held each day, and from automobiles drawn up at street corners, they pleaded with

the men to heed their country's call.

Recruits obtained by such means were often far from satisfactory. Some, moved it may be by shame, gave fictitious names or false addresses when they signed, or did not report at the place to which they were directed. Scores of those who came to the tents and recruiting stations failed in their physical examinations. Some were under weight. Flat feet, narrow chests, bad teeth, defective sight or hearing caused scores

¹Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.

of others to be rejected. Nevertheless, stimulated by such appeals, the daily enlistments rose rapidly from twenty-five to a thousand a day for the navy, and to 1,434 a day for the army. By the end of July more than 1,000,000 men had offered, and 558,858 had been accepted. Of these 163,633 had entered the regular army; 69,000 the navy; 35,000 the Officers' Training Camp; 145,000 the National Guard.

Congress began its part in the work of preparation by the passage of a bill providing for a loan of seven billion dollars. Five billions were to be in bonds bearing three and a half per cent. interest. Two billions were to be in short-time Treasury certificates to be redeemed with money gathered by new taxes. Three billions of the loan was to be lent to the Allies

on such securities as the President approved.

Early in May the Secretary of the Treasury announced that the first offering of bonds would be a \$2,000,000,000 three and a half per cent. per year Liberty Loan, open to popular subscriptions at par; that the denominations would be so small as to place the bonds within the reach of people of very moderate means, and that he had no doubt the offering would be oversubscribed. The twelve Federal Reserve Banks were to act as agents, each in its own district, for receiving subscriptions; taking care of the details of delivery of the bonds and payment of the subscriptions in such manner as not to disarrange the financial situation. But subscriptions were to be sought by all banks, trust companies, private bankers and bor houses the country over.

Subscriptions to the Liberty Loan came pouring in at once, from financial institutions in every State in the Union, and in every part of the world over which our flag is flown, from the Philippines, from Hawaii, from Porto Rico, and from Fairbanks in Alaska. In forty-eight hours \$311,657,000 of the loan was taken, and two days later \$447,421,000. It was then announced that the bonds would be redeemable at the option of the Government after fifteen years, that they would fall due in thirty years, that two per cent. must be paid when subscription was made, that the remainder might be paid in four installments; that the lowest denomination would be \$50 and the highest \$100,000; that the bonds would be of two classes,

coupon and registered, and that no subscriptions would be received after June 15.

The Secretary of the Treasury now appealed by letter to the heads of all Government departments and Governors of the States to aid in giving the widest publicity to the offering of the Liberty Loan, and asked them "to have all envelopes and" other official mail containers stamped in red with the following lines, 'Your Patriotic Duty,—Buy a liberty Loan Bond.'" In the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District, National and State banks and trust companies agreed to send circulars and information regarding the loan to each one of their depositors: investment bankers were to do the same with their customers. and on May 15 an army of bond salesmen set out to solicit subscriptions. The movies were called on to aid, flash on the screens throughout the country the words, "Buy a Bond," and prepare one-reel dramas written around the buy-a-bond slogan. Private bankers through advertisements in the newspapers offered their services to subscribers without charge, and urged all persons to buy. Every patriotic American was expected to subscribe no matter how small the sum. The loan was a sound investment for savings. It was not a tax or a gift. The Post-office Department stamped every piece of mail with the words: "Do Your Bit. Buy a Liberty Loan Bond. Inquire at any Bank or Post-office."

An appeal issued by the Philadelphia Liberty Loan Committee of Bankers read:

"Which do you choose—the harvest of victory, or the desolation of defeat?

"Will you submit America to the frightful horrors of desolation, or will you loan your money to guarantee peace and freedom for the whole world?

"Will you suffer the stigma of giving your country no help in this world-wide crisis, when you can loan your money (not have it taken from you by the soldiers' brute force, mind you) and be paid in gold for all you give?

"Will you let your neighbors point at you with scorn, when you can so easily help your Government, and make safe your property and protect your family?

"Remember, Germany watches! For you to help with the Liberty Loan is to tell Germany that Prussianism must go! that frightfulness must end; that you and all America are for a free world and free people.

"The sooner you buy your bond, the sooner you end the war.

Buy to-day—it is the prudent, patriotic thing to do!"

The country over subscriptions poured in from social clubs, business men's associations, benevolent associations, manufacturing companies and great corporations; from employees of manufacturing concerns of every sort, of department stores, of railroads, of cities; from school teachers, wage earners and from the governing boards of church organizations. firms and corporations offered to buy bonds for their employees and hold them till paid for gradually. Daily meetings were held in the theaters and appealing speeches made.

As the last day for subscription drew near the bell in the tower on Independence Hall, "The Cradle of Liberty," Philadelphia, was tolled each night at nine o'clock as a "dirge for slackers." On the night of June eleventh the bell was struck four times as a reminder that but four days remained in which to subscribe. On June twelfth, three strokes, on the thirteenth, two strokes, and on the fourteenth, one stroke, its last appeal, was given. In many of the churches bells were rung. And so it was the country over, for by request from Washington the slacker was reminded by ten thousand bells in churches, school houses, court houses, public buildings, that his country expected him to do his duty.

At the close of the business day of June thirteenth the enormous sum of \$342,000,000 was still to be raised and fortyeight hours left in which to do it. These hours were therefore marked by what was truly called "a tremendous eleventh-hour drive throughout the country." In Philadelphia, the old Liberty Bell, the bell that proclaimed "liberty throughout the land" when its joyful ringing greeted the reading of the Declaration of Independence in the State House Yard, July 8, 1776, was brought from its case, and the Mayor, in the presence of a great crowd of invited guests, at twelve o'clock noon, struck it thirteen times, one stroke for each of the thirteen states that founded our Republic. From the Hall the sound was carried by telephone over the length and breadth of the land. Every form of effort was redoubled, young men with megaphones appealed from automobiles to passers-by on the side-walk, subscriptions were taken on the curb stone, huge clocks showed how the subscription was mounting; railroads, industrial corporations, banks, business houses subscribed for their employees, on the installment plan; and when all was over it appeared that more than four million persons had subscribed for \$3,035,226,850 of the loan. The Liberty Loan was oversubscribed. Subscriptions amounting to \$17,000,000 had been secured by the Boy Scouts of America in a house to house canvass.

While the campaign for the Liberty Loan was still under way, Congress was wrangling over the details of a bill to provide a great army. Well aware that to draw two million men from the pursuits of civil life by the old fashioned method of volunteering would be too slow for the needs of the Allies, a bill providing for a selective draft was framed by the General Staff, approved by the President and laid before the Military Committees of the Senate and House. As explained by the President the force necessary to meet the emergency was to be raised

by bringing the regular army and the National Guard to war strength, and by adding the additional forces which will now be needed so that the national army will comprise three elements, the regular army, the National Guard and the so-called additional forces, of which a first 500,000 are to be authorized immediately and later increments of the same size if they may be needed.

In order that all these forces may comprise a single army, the term of enlistment in the three is equalized, and will be for the period of the emergency. The necessary men will be secured for the regular army and the National Guard by volunteering, as at present, until, in the judgment of the President, a resort to a selective draft is desirable. The additional forces, however, are to be raised by selective draft from men ranging in age from nineteen to twenty-five years.

The quotas of the several States in all of these forces will be in

proportion to their population.

This legislation makes no attempt to solve the question of a permanent military policy for the country, chiefly for the reason that in these anxious and disordered times a clear view cannot be had either of our permanent military necessities or of the best mode of organizing a proper military peace establishment. The hope of the world is that when the European war is over arrangements will have been made composing any of the questions which have hitherto seemed to require the arming of the nations, and that in some ordered and just

way the peace of the world may be maintained by such coöperations of force among the great nations as may be necessary to maintain peace and freedom throughout the world. When these arrangements for a permanent peace are made we can determine our military needs and adapt our course of military preparation to the genius of a world organized for justice and democracy. The present bill, therefore, is adapted to the present situation, but it is drawn upon such lines as will enable us to continue its policy or so much of it as may be determined to be wise, when the present crisis has passed.

But what would be its fate in the House of Representatives was watched with the deepest interest. The minority of the Committee on Military Affairs favored a draft: but from the majority came a bill providing that the army should be raised by calls for volunteers, that no more than 500,000 should be called for at a time, and that conscription should not be resorted to unless volunteers failed to respond.

This compromise the President made known he would not accept. "The idea of the selective draft is," he said, "that those should be chosen who can be most readily spared from the prosecution of the other activities which the country must engage in and to which it must devote a great deal of its best energy and capacity.

"The volunteer system does not do this. When men choose themselves they sometimes choose without due regard to their other responsibilities. Men may come from the farms or from the mines, or from the factories or centers of business who ought not to come, but ought to stand back of the armies in the field." The principle of the selective draft had at heart "this idea: that there is a universal obligation to serve and that a public authority should choose those upon whom the obligation of military service shall rest, and also in a sense choose those who shall do the rest of the nation's work."

In the House, after a sharp contest, the supporters of the volunteer system were defeated, and a bill was passed embodying the principle of the President's selective draft. The Senate made three amendments of some importance. The House bill provided for drafting men between the ages of twenty-one and forty years inclusive. Members were opposed to waging war with young men only. A Senate amendment fixed the limits at twenty-one and twenty-seven years, and by another amend-

ment authorized the President to regulate the sale of liquor both in and near training camps and military stations and if he saw fit forbid the serving of liquor to officers and men in uniform. A third amendment provided for the acceptance of the Roosevelt volunteers: the House believed that a selective service bill should not provide for the acceptance of volunteers.

As finally passed by Congress and approved by the President the act gave him authority to raise the regular army, by enlistment, to 287,000 men, the maximum strength provided by existing law; to draft into the service of the United States all members of the National Guard and the National Guard Reserve; and raise by selective draft an additional force of 500,000 men or so much as he might deem necessary, and another 500,000 at his discretion. The age limits for drafted men were twenty-one and thirty years inclusive, and all male persons between these ages were required to register "in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President," or failing to do so became liable to imprisonment for one year. Vice-President of the United States; the officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the United States, and of the several States, Territories and the District of Columbia, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion; students in recognized schools of divinity and theology; all persons in the military and naval service of the United States; members of sects whose creeds forbade them to engage in war; county and municipal officials; custom house clerks, those engaged in the transmission of the mails; artisans and workmen in armories, arsenals, navy yards; pilots and mariners actually in sea service; those employed in industries and in agriculture necessary to the operations of the armed forces; those physically or mentally deficient, and those on whom some one depended for support, were or might be exempt.

The signing of the bill was immediately followed by the signing of a proclamation, already prepared, which fixed June fifth as registration day, save in Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico, where a time for registration would be named later, and closed with another defense of the selective draft, and a very proper reminder that the day should "be approached in thoughtful apprehension of its significance, and that we accord to it

the honor and the meaning that it deserves," and that those called to the colors were not the only ones called to serve.

The power against which we are arrayed has sought to impose its will upon the world by force. To this end it has increased armament until it has changed the face of war. In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are no armies in this struggle. There are entire nations armed. Thus, the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war, it is a nation. To this end our people must draw close in one compact front against a common foe. But this cannot be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose.

The nation needs all men; but it needs each man, not in the field that will most please him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a triphammer for the forging of great guns and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, the nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his levers. The whole nation must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted. To this end Congress has provided that the nation shall be organized for war by selection and that each man shall be classified for service in the place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him.

The significance of this cannot be overstated. It is a new thing in our history and a landmark in our progress. It is a new manner of accepting and vitalizing our duty to give ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common purpose of us all. It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass. It is no more a choosing of those who shall march with the colors than it is a selection of those who shall serve an equally necessary and devoted purpose in the industries that lie behind the battle line.

The day here named is the time upon which all shall present themselves for assignment to their tasks. It is for that reason destined to be remembered as one of the most conspicuous moments in our history. It is nothing less than the day upon which the manhood of the country shall step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to which this nation is consecrated. It is important to those ideals, no less than to the pride of this generation in manifesting its devotion to them, that there be no gaps in the ranks.

It is essential that the day be approached in thoughtful apprehension of its significance, and that we accord to it the honor and the meaning that it deserves. Our industrial need prescribed that it be not made a technical holiday, but the stern sacrifice that is before us

urges that it be carried in all our hearts as a great day of patriotic devotion and obligation when the duty shall lie upon every man, whether he is himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated ages is written on these lists of honor.

As the day drew near when registration would take place, anti-draft, anti-war demonstrations were made by Socialists and slackers who marched about the streets of the great cities distributing leaflets and carrying banners. In Boston a band of Socialists, men and women, with red flags inscribed "War is hell—we demand peace"; "Liberty bonds are a mortgage on labor"; "Who stole Panama?" "Who crushed Haiti?" "If this is a popular war, why conscription?" when marching down Tremont Street were met by sailors, marines and soldiers, their flags torn from them, their band forced to play the "Star Spangled Banner," and their meeting on the Common prevented.

In Philadelphia, some thirty Socialists led by a German set out one day to distribute anti-draft handbills. A conscript, said the bills, is little better than a convict. He is deprived of his liberty and his right to think as a free man. In a democratic country each man has a right to say whether he is willing to join the army. Only a despot can force his subjects to fight. Conscription belongs to a bygone age. You have a right to demand the repeal of such a law. Do not submit to intimidation. Scarcely had they begun their work when a crowd gathered, and some fighting ensued; but the Socialists were scattered and thirteen arrested. Determined to put an end to such attacks on the Government, a raid was made a few nights later on the rooms of the Young People's Socialistic Society where a secret meeting was under way and some forty-nine slackers and antidraft agitators and a quantity of anti-draft documents were captured.

From the headquarters of the Socialist Party tens of thousands of leaflets and pamphlets were sent broadcast over the land, under such titles as "Down with Conscription"; "Down with War." "Every man," said one, "who is determined to uphold the dearest rights of personal liberty, every man who refuses to become a victim of the war declared by the Government to pro-

tect the millions loaned the Allies by the capitalists of this country should refuse to register for conscription."

A Socialist journal in Kansas issued an envelope on the back of which was printed a violent appeal, containing such demands as: "Let those who want great victories go to the firing line and get them." "They say, war is Hell, then let those who want Hell go to Hell."

At a meeting of the Socialist party in Cleveland it was resolved that the draft act was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, that it proposed "involuntary servitude"; that all members of the party be urged not to register for the draft, and pledged moral and financial support to all who refused "to become the victims of the ruling classes." Aroused by such appeals numbers of Socialists failed to register. Numbers of others, slackers who were not Socialists and quite likely never saw one of their leaflets, did the same. A search was made for such, and all who were caught were forced to register or, under the provisions of the draft act, were fined or sent to prison for one year.

An estimate of the Census Bureau gave the number of men likely to be registered for service as 10,000,000. When the returns were received it was found that 9,586,508 had been enrolled.

The drawing of the 625,000 young men to form the first selective army, it was announced, would take place in Washington on July 15. The serial numbers for each of the five thousand districts in the country would be placed in a wheel and drawn one at a time until the requisite number was obtained. Each number drawn would apply to each registration district, so five thousand men would be drafted at a time. Thus, if number 20 were taken from the wheel, the man in each district holding that number would be selected for service and required to appear before the local board for physical examination, or for the hearing of his claim to exemption if any he had. Before the drawing took place some changes were made in the plans. The numbers on the registration cards were disregarded, each man was given a new "red ink" number and required to go to the headquarters of the exemption board of his district and ascertain his new number. Ten thousand five hundred of these

"red ink" numbers, each in a black celluloid capsule, were thrown in a huge glass bowl, where all were well mixed, and on Friday, July 20, the drawing began. The Secretary of War, blindfolded, drew the first capsule, handed it to the announcer, who broke it, drew out the paper, said "Number 258" and some man in each of the 4557 registration districts throughout the United States, if as many as 258 had been registered, was called to the colors. This number when thus announced was taken down by three tally clerks, was written on a huge blackboard in plain view of every one in the room and telegraphed to every city, town and hamlet the country over. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs drew the second number; the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs the third; and the ranking minority members of the two committees the fourth and fifth.

Moving picture machines were busy while these early numbers were being drawn, for it was the wish of the Secretary of War that the scene should be so recorded that the people might see for themselves in what manner the drawing had been conducted.

By the people the result was watched with the deepest interest. In the cities, towns and manufacturing centers business was all but suspended. All day long and until far into the night crowds of young men whose lot was soon to be made known, lawyers, clerks, artisans, laborers, the fathers, mothers, friends of those likely to be drawn, idle spectators, thronged the sidewalks in front of every bulletin board whereon the numbers were displayed. During sixteen hours and a half the drawing went steadily on until the last of the 10,500 black capsules had been taken from the bowl, and 1,374,000 young men had been drafted into the selective army.

When the time came for drafted men to appear before their local boards for physical examination, bands of negroes, Indians and tenant-farmers in Oklahoma determined not to be drafted, organized as the Working Class Union and the Jones Family and spread terror over three counties. Crops were abandoned, telegraph wires were cut, bridges burned, and peaceful citizens forced into their ranks. Posses sent to arrest them found only women and children in their homes. As a warning

to them and to resistants everywhere the Provost Marshal General issued a statement. There was, he said, nothing to resist as yet. The call to appear before the examining boards was to afford an opportunity for those called to present reasons why they should not be ordered for military duty. Failure to appear did not prevent the raising of the army. The names of those who did not come were automatically posted, and automatically they were inducted into the military service and made subject to military law, and the swift and summary procedure of court martial. Failure to report for duty when ordered was desertion, and desertion, in time of war, was a capital offense.

In the course of a few days several of the resisters were killed and some two hundred taken prisoners and held under the charge of treason against the United States.

Mobilization of the young men drawn for selective service began in September. On the fifth of the month five per cent. of the white men enrolled in the first quota of the National Guard were to begin their journey to the sixteen instruction camps scattered over the country. That there might be no congestion on the railroads they were to go in five daily detachments of equal number, and, as far as possible, were to consist of men with some military experience. September nineteenth, forty per cent and October third, another forty per cent were to set out, and the remaining fifteen per cent were to go as soon thereafter as possible.

Never before in the history of our country had such an event occurred. Hundreds of thousands of young men, drawn from every walk in life, physicians, lawyers, business men, clerks, laborers, rich and poor were to leave their homes in every city, town and hamlet the country over, and go into training that they might be made fit to fight on European soil to make "the world safe for democracy." That such an event should be marked in some signal manner was most proper. On the third of September, therefore, the President addressed to them this message:

TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE NATIONAL ARMY:

You are undertaking a great duty. The heart of the whole country is with you.

Everything that you do will be watched with the deepest interest and with the deepest solicitude not only by those who are near and dear to you, but by the whole nation besides.

For this great war draws us all together, makes us all comrades and brothers, as all true Americans felt themselves to be when we

first made good our national independence.

The eyes of the world will be upon you, because you are in some special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, to show all men everywhere not only what good soldiers you are, but also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in everything and pure and clean through and through.

Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory to live up to it, and then let us live up to it and add a new laurel to

the crown of America.

My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and every test. God keep and guide you!

In Washington, on the fourth of the month, the men drawn in the District of Columbia for the new army, in their civilian clothes, escorted by regulars, marines, national guardsmen, marched down Pennsylvania Avenue and past a reviewing stand before the White House. At their head on foot, walked the President, the Cabinet, and hundreds of members of the Senate and the House, a visible confirmation of the words of the President "the heart of the whole country is with you."

To the Chairman of the Mayor's Committee of National Defense in New York the President wrote.

Please say to the men on September 4 how entirely my heart is with them and how my thoughts will follow them across the sea with confidence and also with genuine envy, for I should like to be with them on the field and in the trenches where the real and final battle for the independence of the United States is to be fought, alongside the other peoples of the world, struggling like ourselves to make an end of those things which have threatened the integrity of their territory, the lives of their people and the very character and independence of their Governments. Bid them Godspeed for me from a very full heart.

At the head of marchers was the Mayor, and behind him the Plattsburg graduates who a little later would be their officers in France. A banner carried by one division of the drafted men read "Harlem Hun Hammerers," and another "From Harlem to France." All along the route the buildings were gay

with flags and the sidewalks densely packed with excited and cheering men and women.

September first was the day chosen by Philadelphia to give Godspeed to her sons. Sailors, marines, regulars, Red Cross and coast reserve units and representatives of almost every organization in the city formed the escort. Bombs were exploded from the roof of the City Hall, hydroaeroplanes from the Navy Yard and the school at Essington flew over the marchers; aeroplanes dropped capsules containing the message from the Mayor to the friends and relatives of drafted men. The British Recruiting Station was represented; fifty Canadians were sleeve bands inscribed "Comrades in Arms"; the Emergency Aid and the War Emergency Unit had six floats illustrating their work; the Baldwin Locomotive Works sent a French locomotive and a banner inscribed "Our Energies Are Concentrated to Help Win the War"; the Eddystone Corporation exhibited shells and a banner bearing the words "These shells will clear the way for the United States boys when they go over the top." But the center of attraction were the few thousand boys in every day clothes, the first of the city's quota to be called to the colors. Without arms, without uniforms, keeping no step, they brought to the dense crowd before which they passed a far stronger realization of what the war meant to our countrymen than did the highly trained and finely organized sailors, regulars and marines.

Though wanting in all the pomp and circumstance displayed in the great cities, the Godspeed given the boys in the little towns was not the less sincere. Nay, it may well be it was deeper seated for the good people of the small communities must have realized far more keenly than the shouting crowds of the cities, that some of the young men they had seen grow up among them were leaving the home town never to return.

Pacifists, Socialists, Industrial Workers of the World, antiwar, anti-conscription, pro-German organizations of all sorts, meantime were busy with their propaganda. The Philadelphia branch of "Conscientious Objectors to War" one night in late August attempted to hold a meeting in the Arch Street Theater, to hear speeches and adopt resolutions asking the President to unite with the Pope in his proposal for peace. But the police

refused a permit, blocked the doors, and as the crowd was beginning to disperse some sailors interfered and started a small riot. Camden was then chosen for the meeting but there too they were barred.

Headquarters of the Socialists on Arch Street were now raided and thousands of leaflets denouncing the draft act and calling on all citizens to disregard it, were seized by the chief postal inspector and the Sceretary and others arrested. Thousands of anti-draft leaflets, it was charged, had been sent to men in the training camps and distributed on the streets.

The People's Council of America for Democracy and Peace had been called to meet at Minneapolis. Its purpose was understood to be the formation of a political party which should unite all the anti-war pro-German organizations which had been active ever since the war began. Minneapolis was selected, it was understood, because the city had a Socialist Mayor, because Wisconsin, Minnesota and North Dakota had large German populations, because in North Dakota was the home of the Farmers' Non-Partisan League, openly opposed to the war policy of the Government, and because in days before the war the Northwest had been strongly infected with pacificism. Among its leaders and organizers were men well known as extreme Socialists. One had been in charge of the Ford peace party, another was national Secretary of the Socialist party, a third editor of the Socialist journal, The Masses.

Whatever the purpose of the meeting the Governor of Minnesota was determined it should not be held, and issued a proclamation forbidding it anywhere in the State, as he believed the purpose was to aid the enemies of the United States. The Governor of North Dakota then announced he would give the delegates protection should they assemble in that State. The Constitution, he said, guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and of petition, and they were entitled to protection. Fargo was then thought of as a meeting place, but the Attorney General promptly announced that no meeting would be allowed at Fargo. Hudson, Wisconsin, was the next choice; but there also the city authorities interfered. The Mayor of Milwaukee having sent assurances that "liberty of speech and the right of the people to assemble to consult for

the common good," had not been suspended in his city, and having promised a welcome, it was decided to go there. But, when warned that the meeting would be resisted with violence word was sent out that Washington had been chosen. Government of the District, it was said, was in the hands of Congress. A denial of the right of the People's Council to meet would be a denial by the Government and not by "the unpatriotic caprice of any official." If no building could be obtained the plaza before the Capitol would be used. The police of Washington announced that no street meetings would be allowed.

Nevertheless a meeting of the Organization Committee was held in Chicago; but it had not been long in session when the chief of police appeared and ordered it to disperse. The police were acting under instructions from the Governor who said it was the duty of the Governor to preserve peace in the State; that if in his opinion disorder and riot were likely to result from the proposed meeting it was his duty and he had the power to prevent it; that it was his belief that the real purpose of the meeting was to obstruct the Government in the prosecution of the war, and was likely to cause disorder and rioting, and that no such meeting therefore should be held in Illinois. Under assurance of police protection from the Mayor of Chicago another meeting was held the next day, whereupon the Governor, notified of the defiance of his orders by the Mayor, sent four companies of a National Guard Regiment, not yet taken into Federal service, from Springfield, but when Chicago was reached the meeting had adjourned.

A few days later a raid was made on the headquarters of the Industrial Workers of the World in a score of cities, and books, papers, records, documents, were seized. One of the warrants charged them with "willfully causing and attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States," of "obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States," and "of using the mails for the transmission of matter advocating treason."

The first contingent of our army was then in France. Early in June dispatches from London reported the safe arrival in England of General Pershing and staff. The White Star liner

Baltic brought them to Liverpool with such secreey that not a man in the guard of honor drawn up on the landing stage knew why he had been paraded. General Pershing and his officers, standing at head of the gangway, were greeted by General Sir Pitcairn Campbell and Admiral Stileman and then came down to the wharf and inspected the Royal Welsh Fusiliers paraded in their honor, a regiment beside which many of the American officers had fought during the Boxer rebellion in China.

A special train carried the Americans to London where Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, Field-Marshal Lord French and a host of distinguished officers waited to bid them welcome. A round of dinners, receptions and formal calls followed; the King and Queen received them at Buckingham Palace; and June 13 the General reached Paris whither a part

of his staff had preceded him.

"From early afternoon," said the London Times, "Parisians of all sorts and conditions began to line the two mile route along which the cortège was to pass. Thousands upon thousands of workers left shops, offices and factories in time to swell the ranks. The Stars and Stripes were waving in countless windows. At the station itself a company of infantry, with band, was drawn up to render honor. A few minutes before the time appointed for the arrival of the train M. Viviani, Marshal Joffre, General Foch, General Brugère, Military Governor of Paris and an officer representing the President of the Republic, and the Prefects of Police and of the Seine, assembled to receive General Pershing and his imposing suite of .53 officers, 69 civil secretaries and 67 soldiers."

On the fourteenth a visit was made to the Chamber of

Deputies where another ovation was given the General.

"The setting was worthy of the historic occasion," according to the London Times. "The large, sweeping hemicycle of the Chamber was crowded, hardly a Deputy was absent, the public galleries were packed, and in the diplomatic box facing the Tribune sat Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador, and the modest, khaki-clad figure of General Pershing. Time after time as M. Viviani eloquently described the part America is ready to play at this solemn moment of destiny the House was swept to its feet and General Pershing looked down upon a sea

of upturned faces of cheering Deputies, while from the public galleries cheers echoed and reëchoed."

The departure of Pershing and his staff was no secret, but the people knew nothing of the sailing of the first contingent of fighting men until they heard with pride of its safe arrival on the twenty-fifth of June at a port in France. A second contingent arrived a few days later, and as July drew to a close a third landed at "a European port." So secretly did they come that no demonstration attended their landing. Only a few spectators saw them as they quickly entrained and left for parts unknown.

At home, meanwhile, the militia had been mobilized. On the ninth of July the President, acting under the power given to him by the Constitution, called the National Guard into the service of the United States. In eleven States it was to mobilize on the fifteenth of July and gather in such places as might be chosen by the Secretary of War. In eighteen States and the District of Columbia the men were to assemble on the twenty-fifth of the month, and on August fifth those in all States were to be drafted into the new army under provisions of the act of May eighteenth.

CHAPTER XV

GERMAN INTRIGUE

With our entrance into the war events in Europe, military and political, acquired for us a new interest and concern. From onlookers we had become allies. The war was now our war, and every victory gained, every check met with along the hundreds of miles of battle front was felt by us as never before. In the West the progress of the ruthless submarine war alone gave cause for deep anxiety. During February and March, if German reports may be trusted, 803 enemy and neutral ships had been sunk by submarines, causing a loss of 1,642,500 tons of shipping. On land all went well. The British and French in February and March drove back the German front between Arras and Soissons, for a depth of twelve miles, capturing Bapaume, Péronne, Noyon, and some sixty villages. country over which the Germans retreated they turned into a desert. Wherever possible, said the German account, houses were burned down before evacuation. Walls that would not fall were blown down when the artillery fire of the Allies drowned the noise. Whole villages disappeared over night, the people having gathered in a few designated towns where they would be safe. Not a tree nor a bush—nothing was left lest it might give shelter to the Allies. Orchards were destroyed, fields ruined, farmsteads burned, every tree sawed off close to the ground. Church organs were pulled to pieces for the copper, brass rails were torn from the altars and crucifixes pulled from the walls and broken. Tombs and chapels were blown to pieces. and young girls carried away.

On Easter Monday, April 9, the British began another drive along a forty-five mile front from Arras to St. Quentin. By the end of the first day they had driven back the Germans along twelve miles of the line and captured the famous Vimy Ridge, and so opened the battle of Arras which raged day after day for more than a month. Villages, guns and thousands of German prisoners were captured and a great advance made. On the west all was going well. But not so in the east. Russia was giving way.

The Provisional Government was recognized on the twenty-second of March by the United States, and on the twenty-third by Great Britain, France and Italy, and proceeded to make great reforms. Thousands of political prisoners were liberated and brought back from Siberia. Poland was set free and left to choose her own form of government; Finland was given back

her constitution, and religious liberty was proclaimed.

Among those who came back to Russia was Vladimir Utulyanov, better known as Nikolai Lenine, a Radical Socialist leader allowed by Germany to return through Switzerland. He now used his liberty to denounce the Provisional Government and the Allies and to urge a separate peace. Angered by his harangues, an anti-pacifist demonstration was made in Petrograd on April twenty-ninth. Hundreds of maimed, crippled and convalescent soldiers gathered in front of the Cathedral and, followed by thousands of the people, started for the Duma. Halting on the way before the American Embassy, they were addressed by our Ambassador.

The work of Lenine, however, was not without effect. The Government was forced to declare its policy in a manifesto addressed to the Russian people and formally communicated to the Allies in a note. It denied that Russia would make a separate peace, denied that the overthrow of the old Government had caused any slackening on the part of the new, pledged it to work with the Allies to bring the world war to a victorious end and declared its belief that, inspired by the same sentiments, "the allied democracies" would find means "to establish the guaranties and penaltics necessary to prevent any recourse to sanguinary war in the future." To the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates this policy gave great offense and, May fourth, demonstrations against the Government were made in Petrograd. In the opinion of these men the note was too vague. The Government must speak plainly and give the Allies to understand that Russia stood for no annexations and no indemni-

ties. A truce was at last arranged, a vote of confidence in the Government was given by the Council, and an explanation of the note of May first was announced. The Government in speaking of "a decisive victory," the Council said, did not mean that free Russia would seek to dominate other nations, or strip them of their "national patrimony," or by force occupy their territories; but would establish a lasting peace on the basis of the right of each nation to arrange its own affairs. "penalties and guarantees" essential to a durable peace the Government meant the reduction of armaments, and the setting up of international tribunals. This explanation was to be sent to the Allies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister refused to do this. To send another note was impossible. Rather than take such a step the Ministers would resign, an act which the course of events soon forced them to commit. First to go was the Secretary of War, whose place was given to Kerensky. Milyukov was the next; a coalition Cabinet was then formed, and into it were taken six Socialists of all shades of opinion. Truly enough did Kerensky say to a delegation from the front. "The process of the change from slavery to freedom is not going on properly. We have tested freedom and are slightly intoxicated. What we need is sobriety and discipline."

Meantime appeals and offers of aid were on their way to Russia from our country. Early in May the American Federation of Labor through its president, Samuel Gompers, appealed to the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates. "We assure you," said he, "of the whole-hearted support of the American people." In free America, as in free Russia, agitators for a Prussian peace had spoken out so freely that they seemed more influential than they really were. In truth, but few in America were willing to allow that Kaiserism should continue its rule over non-German people who wished to be free. Should we not then protest against that pro-Kaiser Socialist interpretation, no annexation, which demanded that all oppressed non-German people should be forced to remain under Prussia and her lackeys, Austria and Turkey? Should we not rather hold that there must be no forcible annexations, that every people be free to choose its allegiance? Like you we are opposed to punitive indemnities, and denounce those laid on Belgium, Poland, Serbia.

"Let the German Socialists stop their pretenses and plottings to bring about a peace in the interests of Kaiserism. Let them stop calling international conferences at the instigation of the Kaiser. Let them stop their intrigues to cajole the Russian and American working people, to interpret your demand for no annexations, no indemnities in such a way as to leave intact the power of the German military easte.

"We feel certain that no message, no individual emissary, no commission has been or will be sent to offer any advice whatever to Russia as to how she shall conduct her own affairs." Reports contrary to this had been circulated in Russia. They were the criminal work of pro-Kaiser propagandists, set afloat to deceive and stir up bad feeling between the two great democracies of the world.

Something more than appeals and assurances of sympathy was needed if Russia was to continue to fight. She must have financial and material help and both were now supplied. On the ninth of May a commission of distinguished railroad engineers set off for Petrograd, to aid in rebuilding and developing Russian railways and routes of transportation, and to carry assurances that the United States stood ready to furnish any amount of rolling stock and rails. May fifteenth \$100,000,000 was deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank to the credit of Russia, to be used for the purchase of supplies in our country. That same day the State Department announced that a special mission headed by Mr. Elihu Root would be sent to carry to the new Republic greetings of friendship, brotherhood and Godspeed, assurances of confidence and help and to break down the efforts of Germany and Austria to make a separate peace.

Lest this should be done by the contending factions in Russia before the Special Mission arrived the President, May 26, addressed a note to Russia.

The approaching visit of the American delegation was a fitting occasion to state again, he said, "the objects the United States had in mind in entering the war." America sought no material profit, no aggrandizement, she fought for no advantage for herself, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from

the aggressions of autocratic power, for the liberty, the self-government of all peoples, and every feature of the peace which ends the war must be designed for that purpose. Wrongs must be righted, and then safeguards created to prevent their being committed again. No people must be forced to submit to a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live.

No territory must change hands save for the betterment of its inhabitants. No indemnities must be demanded save in payment of wrongs done. No readjustment of power must be made save to secure the future peace of the world and the future happiness of its peoples.

These things accomplished, the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant which will combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be an empty phrase.

The message was delivered to the Government in Petrograd early in June, but was not made public in the United States until the ninth of the month. A few days later the American delegation reached Petrograd and was lodged in the Winter Palace. The Provisional Government was then laboring hard to persuade the army to take the offensive.

With the fall of autocracy all discipline in the army disappeared. Fighting ceased; the Russian and German soldiers began to fraternize; and German agents went about trying to persuade the troops to demand a separate peace or at least an armistice. Men left the ranks and went home. Officers who did their duty were arrested by the men. On one occasion three regiments refused to occupy positions to which they were ordered.

The German Commander on the Eastern front, quick to seize the opportunity, now sent a wireless to the Russian troops offering an armistice, and inviting delegates to meet him if Russia wished to know the terms of peace. The Council promptly rejected the offer. Russia was beginning to awake. The General Congress of Officers Delegates at Petrograd called for "vigorous fighting and an immediate offensive." At Odessa delegates from the front demanded that fraternizing with the Germans cease. Those doing so must be declared traitors, and

if they continued to offend should be shot. Deserters must be deprived of the right to vote at the elections for the coming Constituent Assembly, and be denied a share in the future distribution of land. A Swiss Socialist pacifist who had come to Petrograd, and handed two of the members of the Provisional Government a telegram from a member of the Swiss Federal Council, was ordered to leave Russia. The telegram set forth that the sender was sure Germany would make an honorable peace with Russia, give her financial support, not meddle in her internal affairs, come to a good understanding concerning Poland, Lithuania and Courland, and restore her occupied territories. The Congress of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates of all Russia just gathered in Petrograd approved of the expulsion, and the Duma resolved that the safety of Russia lay in an immediate offensive.

July first the offensive began along a twenty mile front in Galicia, and for a time all went well. Day by day the enemy was driven back, mile by mile, on a front one hundred and fifty miles long. All Russia was wild with delight. Congratulations poured in from the Allies. Russia had found herself. The long hoped for blow had been struck. Then came the disaster. On the morning of the 17th, in northeastern Galicia, a regiment left the trenches and retired. Others when commanded to advance held meetings and debated whether or not the order should be obeyed. This was the beginning. As the Executive Committee of the South Western front reported to the Government, a fatal crisis had occurred in the morale of the troops. "Most military units are in a state of complete disorganization, their spirit for an offensive has utterly disappeared and they no longer listen to the orders of their superiors." Some left the trenches without waiting for the approach of the enemy. "For a distance of several hundred versts long files of deserters, both armed and unarmed, men who are in good health and robust, who have lost all shame and feel that they can act together with impunity, are proceeding to the rear of the army. Frequently entire units desert in this manner." When the month closed the enemy had won back almost all of Galicia, and August third crossed the Russian frontier northeast of Czernowitz.

Just at this time the American Mission to Russia, coming home, reached our Pacific Coast. At a luncheon given to the members Mr. Root declared his unshaken faith in Russia. "I have," said he, "abiding faith that Russia through trial and tribulation will work, create and perpetuate a great, free, self-governing democracy." He praised the Russian people, their consideration for the rights of others, their "high capacity for self-control," their "noble idealism," and pleaded for sympathy for a nation struggling with problems we had been studying for a hundred and forty years and for which we have not yet found solutions.

The faith of our Government was shown when, towards the close of August, \$100,000,000 was loaned Russia, making \$275,000,000 advanced since we entered the war, and the President sent to the National Council assembled at Moscow the "cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the United States," an expression of their "confidence in the ultimate triumph of the ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies within and without," and "renewed assurances of every material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united."

The month was notable for the occurrence of many events of more than passing interest, or importance. Great gains were made and thousands of prisoners taken by the French and British along the battle front from Verdun to Ypres; the Italians renewed their drive towards Trieste, earried Monte Santo by storm and captured prisoners, guns and stores from the Austrians; the Pope amazed the Allies by laying before them a plan for peace; our late Ambassador at Berlin aroused world wide discussion of the causes of the war by the publication of his experiences at the Imperial Court; and China, the seventeenth nation, declared war on Germany.

The journals which announced the entrance of China into the war, also made known the peace proposal from the Pope. The note was addressed to the Leaders of the Belligerent Peoples; but the Holy See having no diplomatic relations with the Republic of France, the kingdom of Italy and the United States, copies were sent to King George to be forwarded to these Powers. Twelve other copies were likewise sent for the "leaders of nations friendly to the Allies" except Russia, Belgium and Brazil, to whom the document had been sent direct.

News of the note and a summary of its contents came from Rome, but some days elapsed before an official copy was made public by the Foreign Office at London. It then proved to be an invitation to "the Governments of the belligerent peoples to come to an agreement on the following points which seem to be a basis for a just and durable peace."

First of all these must be replacement of the force of arms by the moral force of right, and reciprocal disarmament, leaving only enough to maintain public order. There must be the replacement of armies by arbitration with penalties to be laid on any State that refused to arbitrate a national question or accept the decision. Indemnity for damage done and the cost of war should be waived; there should be "entire and reciprocal condonation"; Belgium should be evacuated with guarantees for her political, military and economic independence; Germany should be given her colonies in return for the occupied regions in France. Territorial questions such as those between Italy and Austria, and Germany and France, in other words, Alsace-Lorraine, Trent, Trieste, should be submitted to peaceful negotiation; and so too should the territorial and political questions relative to Armenia, the Balkan States and Poland. "Such are the principal bases whereon we believe the future reorganization of the peoples ought to be built. . . . Incline your ear therefore to our prayer. Accept the fraternal invitation which we send you in the name of the Divine Redeemer, the Prince of Peace. Reflect on your grave responsibility before God and before man."

In Great Britain the peace plan was held to be such as the Allies were bound to reject. It was pro-German, anti-Ally, and the outcome of German inspiration, a relayed message from Berlin. What were nations to think of a proposal which put the aggressor and the assailed on the same footing, and offered the innocent nothing but "entire and reciprocal condonation" for the wrongs they had suffered? The hand of the Central Powers was in it. The hand was the hand of the Pope, but the voice was the voice of the Kaiser. The Allies' terms of peace were

and would remain, full restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantees. They must, if they would survive, reject the pro-

posals and see the war through.

French opinion as set forth in the Paris journals was the same as that in London. The whole world, it was said, including the Pope, knows the peace terms of France and her Allies. The Pope has but sent the terms of the Central Powers. His offer is doomed to be rejected. How can a voice be raised in the name of divine justice and yet demand no punishment for the guilty, no reparation for all wrongs, those of 1871 as well as those of 1914?

Lord Robert Ceeil, speaking for himself, to the Associated Press, said: the Allies could not think of condonation until the criminals had repented and shown their repentance by word and deed. Yet he could not help feeling surprise and sorrow that the note contained not a word concerning certain outrages done during the war which made it impossible for the enemies of Germany to trust her or treat with her. Impartiality need not have prevented the Pope from pointing out and deprecating these outrages.

In our country opinion was divided. There were those who could see nothing improbable in the suggestion that the terms of peace came from Germany or Austria. The Pope did not say with whom the Allies were to negotiate. If he meant Germany, the Germany which looked on treaties as scraps of paper, the treacherous Germany which murdered our citizens, sought the dismemberment of our territory, covered our country with spies and plotters, and defied our rights as neutrals, at the very time she was engaged in the exchange of friendly notes, the proposal ought to be promptly rejected.

There were those who held that, as a stroke of policy, the President ought to urge on the Allies a careful consideration and acceptance of the proposal. It was not expected that Germany would accept. In that event she would have to settle with her Socialists, Radical Socialists and the Centrum party, which, as composed of Catholics, would be disposed to join in the demand for its acceptance, and the Junkers would be given a serious blow. If Germany did accept, which was not expected,

a way to peace would be opened.

There were those who could see nothing practical in the proposal, nothing but a reduction of armament, the setting up of a world court, a return to the status quo ante bellum, to conditions as they were before the war. Arbitration on Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, the Trentino, Poland, Armenia and the Balkans it was idle to expect.

August 27 the President made his rely. His Holiness had in substance proposed a return to the status quo ante bellum, with condonation, disarmament, a concert of nations, freedom of the seas, and a settlement of the territorial claims of France and Italy, and of the troublesome problem of the Balkans. It was clear no part of this program could be carried out unless a return to the status quo ante gave a firm and satisfactory basis for it.

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of International action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly, stopped at no barrier, either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent with the tide of blood, not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also, and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

This power was not the German people, but the ruthless master of the German people. To deal with it in the way proposed by His Holiness would make necessary a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, and would abandon "the new-born Russia to the intrigues, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world."

Can a peace be based upon a restitution of its power, or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

The President did not think so.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be

justified in accepting.

Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

The test of every plan for peace, the President believed to be:

Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious intriguing Government, on the one hand, and a group of free peoples on the other? . . .

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material

advantage of any kind.

We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people, rather a vindication of the sovereignty, both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of Empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

Everywhere in our country the reply met with approval by the press. His Holiness, said a New Orleans journal, suggests certain terms as a basis for discussion. The President answers, that negotiation is impossible so long as one side doubts the other's good faith. The Allies cannot forget that Hohenzollern Germany had no scruples about violating the neutrality of Belgium, a neutrality she stood pledged to protect, and the President cannot forget Germany's broken promises regarding submarine warfare, promises which, as the Chancellor told the

Reichstag, were meant to be kept while a great fleet of U-boats was building and not an hour longer.

The President, said another, repeats the distinction he drew between the German people and the ruling autocracy. His declaration that any treaty agreement must have the indorsement of the German people states the essential truth of the situation. The people will applaud the demand that peace when it comes must bring to despoiled nationalities a restitution of their heritages and to democracies a safety that can never be violated.

"They read with their eyes shut who say that the President has rejected the peace proposals of Pope Benedict," said the Philadelphia Evening Ledger. Far from it: he had, indeed, shown how the German people might have peace: he had opened the gates for reconciliation and a way out of the war. His words "we must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers," were an "invitation,

open and aboveboard, clear and emphatic."

The wrath of the press in Germany, as was to be expected, flamed high. The President must draw his knowledge of the German people from the British press, else he would know that in its belief in the righteousness of the cause for which it bleeds and suffers the German people is one with the Government. His language was the outward expression of solidarity with England. He used the same weapons as his ally, held the alleged German autocracy responsible for the war. The "autocratic system" of Germany could no longer be charged with causing the war. Disclosures made by General Sankchonitinoff on trial for treason, proved to the world that the irresponsible despots of Russia were used to unleash the dogs of war. The charge against Germany was ridiculous and comic in the mouth of Mr. Wilson, that "democratic ally of democratic England which used oligarchical Russia." Had his Democratic conscience always been as susceptible as he pretended it was, he would not have supplied the Czar's Russia with materials of war, he would not have played a part in the Anglo-Russian plan. would not have used against Germany that poisonous weapon, so hateful to Democracy, "a conscious lie." Mr. Wilson's answer must be characterized as pitiful. The man who once stood forth as a peacemaker now blows one of the loudest war trumpets.

He who proclaimed peace without victory now demands the crushing of Germany. Every word of the note was "grotesque nonsense." The "climax of all nonsense" was that the German people were groaning under a cruel government. The whole people, rich and poor, Socialist and Conservative, stood firm for the Emperor and the Empire, and might be relied on to stand more firmly around the Emperor "against this hypocrite."

The Austrian press echoed the expressions of the German. The tone of the President's note was unparalleled. In the most humiliating and offensive manner terms were dictated to the German people. If Germany lay prostrate, her army beaten, her fleets destroyed, no more degrading terms could have been proposed. He sets up a European Monroe Doctrine and claims the right to change the forms of government on the Continent.

Despite the outburst of abuse and indignation the answer of the President to the Pope made a deep impression in Germany. Matthias Erzberger, leader of the elerical center in the Reichstag, it was announced would demand legislation to make the Government responsible to that body, and to leave the question of Alsace-Lorraine to the decision of the people in those territories. A Socialist journal of Leipsic declared that the German people must demand that its political institutions be made more democratic, and must repudiate the argument of the pan-Germans that such charges cannot be made because they are insisted upon by the enemy.

The President in his reply to the Pope had referred to "the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world." One of the nations subjected to this malign influence, as shown by documents now made public by

Secretary Lansing, was Sweden.

"The Department of State," said the Secretary, "has secured certain telegrams, from Count Luxburg, German chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires, to the Foreign Office at Berlin, which, I regret to say, were dispatched from Buenos Aires by the Swedish legation as their own official message, addressed to the Stockholm Foreign Office.

"The following are tranlations of the German text:

"'May 19, 1917, Number 32. This Government has now released German and Austrian ships on which hitherto a guard had been

placed. In consequence of the settlement of the Monte (Protegido) case there has been a great change in public feeling. The Government will in future only clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. I beg that the small steamships Oran and Guazo, 31st of January (meaning which sailed 31st), 300 tons, which are (now) nearing Bordeaux with a view to change the flag, may be spared if possible or else sunk without a trace being left ("Spurlos Versenkt").

'Luxburg.'

"'July 3, 1917. Number 59. I learn from a reliable source that the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is a notorious ass and Anglophile, declared in a secret session of the Senate that Argentine would demand from Berlin a promise not to sink more Argentine ships. If not agreed to, relations would be broken off. I recommend refusal and if necessary calling in the mediation of Spain.

'Luxburg.'

"'July 9, 1917. Number 54. Without showing any tendency to make concessions postpone reply to Argentine note until receipt of further reports. A change of Ministry is probable. As regards Argentine steamships, I recommend either compelling them to turn back, sinking them without leaving any traces, or letting them through. They are all quite small.

"'Luxburg."

The meaning is clear. If the ships could be spared, well and good. If they must be sunk, the destruction of them should be so done that not a man should escape to tell the tale lest diplomatic relations with Argentina be severed and a means of sending important information to Berlin be lost. But the real offense lay in the act of the Swedish Foreign Office which, by transmitting to Berlin information intended to aid German war measures, had committed an act of war against the Allies.

At Buenos Aires there was an anti-German demonstration; the German legation was stoned; the German Club and a German newspaper office were set on fire, and passports were sent to Count Luxburg, and his immediate departure requested and

Germany duly notified that he was persona non grata.

From Stockholm came the explanation that in the summer of 1915, Great Britain had requested, not formally demanded, that the sending of telegrams between Germany and North America should cease. The request was granted but the Swedish Minister did not consider this a bar to sending telegrams to neutrals, other than the United States, and Sweden had continued to be the channel of communication between Germany

many and Argentina. The telegrams mentioned in the American statement were written in code; Baron Lowen, the Swedish Minister to Argentina, did not know their contents; had acted in good faith in forwarding them, and would not be recalled.

But it was not only in Buenos Aires that representatives of Sweden had aided the cause of Germany. Her Minister in Mexico had been so helpful that the German Minister urged that he be rewarded. His letter, dated March 8, 1916, was now made public by Secretary Lansing and reads as follows:

Herr Folke Cronholm, the Swedish chargé d'affaires here, since his arrival here has not disguised his sympathy for Germany and has entered into close relations with this legation. He is the only diplomat through whom information from a hostile camp can be obtained. Moreover, he acts as intermediary for official diplomatic intercourse between this legation and your Excellency. In the course of this he is obliged to go personally each time to the telegraph office, not seldom quite late at night, in order to hand in the telegrams. Herr Cronholm was formerly at Pekin and at Tokio, and was responsible for the preliminary arrangements which had to be made for the representation of his country in each case. Before he came out here he had been in charge of the consulate at Hamburg. Herr Cronholm has not got a Swedish, but only a Chinese order at present. I venture to submit to your Excellency the advisability of laying before his Majesty the Emperor the name of Herr Cronholm, with a view to the crown order of the second class being bestowed upon him. It would perhaps be desirable, in order not to excite the enemy's suspicion, to treat with secrecy the matter of the issue of the patents until the end of the war, should the decision be favorable to my suggestion. This would mean that the matter would be communicated to no one but the recipient and his Government, and even to them only under the seal of secrecy, while the publication of the bestowal of the decoration would be postponed until the end of the war. I should be particularly grateful to your Excellency, if I could be furnished with telegraphic news of the bestowal of the decoration, which I strongly recommend. in view of the circumstances detailed above.

VON ECKHARDT.

And now Secretary Lansing made further disclosures of German intrigue in our country by no less a personage than Count Johann von Bernstorff.

"The Secretary of State," so reads the public statement, "issues the following message from Ambassador von Bernstorff to the Berlin Foreign Office, dated January 23, 1917:

"I request authority to pay out up to \$50,000 in order, as on former occasions, to influence Congress through the organizations you know of, which can, perhaps, prevent war. I am beginning in the meantime to act accordingly. In the above circumstances a public official German declaration in favor of Ireland is highly desirable in order to gain the support of Irish influence here."

That the Ambassador would attempt to bribe Congress with so small a sum of money as \$50,000, indeed, that he would try to purchase any member of Congress, was not to be supposed. Nevertheless, both Senate and House were thrown into violent excitement. Demands were made for a prompt investigation of the method of German propaganda and a member from Alabama declared that he could name "thirteen or fourteen men" in Congress who, in his opinion, had "acted in a suspicious fashion." After the excitement had gone down a little the feeling grew that no investigation was needed; that the influence on Congress to which von Bernstorff alluded was the letters and telegrams sent by thousands to members at every serious crisis before the declaration of war.

While the question was still under debate the Committee on Public Information put out a bulletin exposing certain German plotters and plots and the part certain Americans took therein before the United States entered the war. Government agents one morning in April, 1916, entered the office of Wolf von Igel in Wall Street, New York, and seized the papers there found they came into possession of a mass of letters, telegrams, ledgers, checks, receipts, cipher codes, lists of spies all going to prove that the German Imperial Government. while at peace with our country, through its representatives was deliberately engaged in violating the neutrality laws of the United States; was planning the destruction of merchant ships on the high seas; was aiding Irish revolutionary plots against Great Britain; was supporting a spy system disguised as a "bureau of investigation" and a bureau to foment labor troubles in munition plants; was paying Americans to write and lecture in behalf of Germany and in short was financing a country-wide propaganda. Much of the evidence produced in support of these facts had been used in the prosecution of those concerned and had already been made public. Some had never before been

published. All was of great interest because of the official denial of the German Government transmitted by wireless and published in the New York *Times* in December, 1915.

The German Government has, naturally, never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, or organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsel of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority.

Among the documents was a letter taken from the papers of Mr. James J. F. Archibald, when seized by the British in August, 1915. It was written by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Washington, and makes known the workings of a certain pretended labor information and relief bureau. Disguised as the Liebau Employment Agency with a head office in New York City and branches in Bridgeport, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago, and appearing to have no other purpose than securing employment for German, Austrian and Hungarian workmen, the real object of the Agency was to prevent the manufacture of munitions. The letter reads:

It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West which, in the opinion of the German military attaché, is of importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved; but even if the strikes do not come off it is probable that we should extort, under pressure of circumstances, more favorable conditions of labor for our poor downtrodden fellow-countrymen.

So far as German workmen are found in the skilled hands, means of leaving will be provided immediately for them. Besides this a private German employment office has been established which provides employment for persons who have voluntarily given up their places, and it is already working well. We shall also join in and the widest support is assured us.

How well this Agency succeeded in its work is told in a letter of March 24, 1916, to Ambassador von Bernstorff.

"Engineers and persons in the better class of positions, and who had means of their own, were persuaded by the propaganda of the bureau to leave war-material factories."

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"The commercial employment bureaus of the country have no supply of unemployed technicians. . . . Many disturbances and suspensions which war material factories have had to suffer and which it was not always possible to remove quickly, but which, on the contrary, often lead to long strikes, may be attributed to the energetic propaganda of the employment bureau."

Nearly a score of men are mentioned in the bulletin as having been engaged in violating the neutrality of the United States. One, in a letter to Ambassador von Bernstorff, expressed his desire to rent rooms near munition plants and blow them up; another offered a shell of his own design; another describes new methods of blowing up trenches and planting mines for the destruction of ships.

The collection of letters in the possession of the Secretary of State was not yet exhausted, and October 10 he made public three messages which revealed the fact that the German Ambassador as far back as January, 1916, had been a party to acts of war against the United States.

"January 3: Secret: General staff desires energetic action in regard to proposed destruction of Canadian Pacific Railway at several points with a view to complete and protracted interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm, who is known on our side and is shortly returning, has been given instructions. Inform the military attaché and provide the necessary funds.

"ZIMMERMANN."

"January 26: For military attaché. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable for carrying on sabotage in the United States and Canada from the following persons: 1, Joseph MacGarrity, Philadelphia, Pa.; 2, John P. Keating, Michigan Avenue, Chicago; 3, Jeremiah O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York.

"One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. Number three is reliable, but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the United States sabotage can be carried out in every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war. Railway embankments and bridges must not be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propaganda.

The following telegram from Count von Bernstorff to the Foreign Office in Berlin was sent in September, 1916:

"September 15: With reference to report A.N. two hundred and sixty-six of May 10, 1916. The embargo conference, in regard to whose earlier fruitful coöperation Doctor Hale can give information, is just about to enter a vigorous campaign to secure a majority in both houses of Congress favorable to Germany and requests further support. There is no possibility of our being compromised. Request telegraphic reply."

The publication of these letters in September and October, making known the activity of German agents in our country, was most timely, for on October 1 the great drive for the Second Liberty Loan of \$3,000,000,000 began. Again every means the wit of man could devise was used to arouse the people. Hundreds of thousands of men, women, boy scouts and school children took part in the sale. Subscriptions could be made at the office of any financial institution, broker, insurance company, department store, at booths in the streets, at home, in the hotels, in the clubs, in the training camps. In the cities the fences and shop windows were gay with posters; automobiles, taxicabs, trucks and wagons bore little placards urging every one to "Buy a Bond." The postage stamp on every letter was canceled with the words, "Buy Now, U. S. Government Bonds, 2nd Liberty Loan." Former President Taft, Secretary McAdoo, former Secretary of State Bryan, members of the Cabinet, men prominent in public life traversed the country in a nation-wide speaking campaign to impress on the people the necessity of buying a bond at once. A laundry company inserted in each bundle before it was sent home a printed slip which read, "Buy Liberty Bonds to-day, because if the Kaiser wins, good night shirt." In New York a German U-boat, captured by the British and sent over, was placed in Central Park, named "U-Buy a Bond" and became an office for the receipt of subscriptions.

The bonds were to bear an annual interest of four per cent., were to mature at the end of twenty-five years, or in 1942, but might be redeemed at any time after ten years. There were three ways of subscribing. They might be paid for in full at the time of subscription, in which case, if the subscription was not large, the bonds were delivered. They might be bought on the Government plan: two per cent. when the subscription was

made; eighteen per cent. on November 15; forty per cent. on December 15, 1917, and a like amount on January 15, 1918. They might be paid for in installments of a dollar a week or so much a month. This was a plan used by banks and trust companies and by great corporations for their employees.

On the first day of the campaign bonds to the amount of \$50,000,000 were taken. Expecting that the \$3,000,000,000 offered would be oversubscribed, the Secretary had announced that half the oversubscription would be taken; but he now asked for offers up to \$5,000,000,000 that at least as much as \$4,000,000,000 might be obtained, and this enormous sum, \$5,000,000,000,000, became the goal which the workers sought to reach under an extension of time to November 1.

When ten days had passed and the subscriptions, great as they were, fell short of what they should have been, the Secretary of the Treasury made an appeal in the form of a statement. After making due allowance, he said, for unreported amounts the fact remained that if the \$5,000,000,000 was to be obtained in the twenty-four working days which remained up to the first of November the daily average must be \$208,000,000, whereas it had been but \$36,000,000. To the first Liberty Loan there had been in round numbers some 5,000,000 subscribers. Better organization which now existed, and the large amount of educational work which had been done ought to bring subscriptions from 10,000,000 persons and corporations. "Shall we be more tender with our dollars than with the lives of our sons?" said the Secretary on another occasion.

On November 7 the Secretary of the Treasury announced upwards of 9,400,000 subscribers had offered to take bonds to the amount of \$4,617,532,300, an oversubscription of 54 per cent. This was \$1,617,532,300 more than the Secretary had agreed to take. Why not, he asked, take all that was offered? Because, was his answer, the Government must never change the basis of subscription after the subscription is closed. Having offered to take one-half of all above \$3,000,000,000 his agreement must be kept, and \$3,808,766,150 was accepted.

The drive for the Liberty Loan was hardly under way when,

October 6, Congress closed its memorable session. Never before had a Congress dealt with war issues of such magnitude or enacted laws of such far-reaching consequences. The passage on April 6 of the joint resolution declaring a state of war with Germany to exist was followed before the month ended by the first Liberty Loan act, and the act increasing the number of midshipmen at the Naval Academy. In May came acts authorizing the Allied Governments to recruit from their peoples in our country; authorizing the President to take over enemy vessels in our ports; providing for the drafting of the National Army and increasing the strength of the active list of the navy from 87,000 to 150,000 and of the Marine Corps from 17,400 to 30,000. In June came the war appropriations act providing \$3,281,094,541 for the needs of the army and navy, a sum greater than the National debt at the end of the Civil War; and the Espionage Act. The Aviation Act carrying an appropriation of \$640,000,000 was enacted in July; the priority in Shipments Act, the Food Survey Act and the Food Control Act in August; the Second Liberty Loan Act in September; and on the last days of the session the Revenue Act, imposing war taxes on incomes and excess profits; the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Insurance Act, and the Urgent Deficiency Act carrying the enormous appropriation of \$5,356,666,016.93. During the first session of the 65th Congress the total of appropriations was \$18,879,177,-014.96, of which \$7,000,000,000 was to meet loans to the Allies, to be repaid by the Governments to which the advances were made. To this should be added \$2,511,553,928.50 contract authorizations, making a total of \$21,390,730,940.46.

CHAPTER XVI

RATIONING AND FIGHTING

These acts having been approved by the President, steps to put them in force were promptly taken. By one proclamation November 1 was named as the day whereon, under the provisions of the Food-Control Act, cold storage warehouse owners, operators of grain elevators, warehouses, and other places for storing grain, and sellers of a long list of food products whose gross sales exceeded \$100,000 a year must obtain licenses to carry on their business. By another the provisions of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act were put in force and the War Trade Board, the War Trade Council, and the Censorship Board to control all communication between the United States and foreign countries by cables, telegraph or mail were established. Under this Act a custodian was appointed to take care of all property in the United States owned by enemies, or allies of enemies. Each enemy or ally of an enemy doing business in the United States was required to obtain a license to continue in business; citizens of the United States were forbidden to trade without a license with any person there was reason to believe was an enemy or an ally of an enemy; and every newspaper printed in a foreign language must furnish to the Postmaster General English translations of all it printed concerning the war, unless a license not to do so was obtained.

The provision touching newspapers the Postmaster General at once put in force; but assured them that none need fear suppression unless the bounds of fair criticism of the President, the Administration, the army, the navy, the conduct of the war were passed. He would, he said, take great care not to let criticism, personally or politically offensive to the Administration, affect his action. But if newspapers attacked the motives of the Government and thereby encouraged insubordination they would be dealt with severely. They would not be allowed

to say that Wall Street, or munition makers, or any other special interest controlled the Government. Publication of anything intended to hamper the prosecution of the war; campaigns against conscription, enlistment, sale of bonds, or collection of the revenue would not be tolerated. The policy of foreign language newspapers would be judged by past utterances, not by newly announced intentions. Copies of all such newspapers were on file in the Department and on the examination of these files would depend their licenses. German language newspapers when not licensed must publish English translations. Socialist newspapers, unless they contained treasonable or seditious matter, would not be barred from the mails. In a few weeks The Call, a Socialist journal published in New York, was deprived of its second-class mail privileges.

A third proclamation put all bakeries in the country under license, and a fourth shut out alien enemies from the District of Columbia and the Panama Zone. They were forbidden to ascend into the air in a balloon, airplane, airship or flying machine; were required to register; were ordered not to come within one hundred yards of any wharf, pier or dry dock used by any vessel of over five hundred tons engaged in the foreign or domestic trade, nor within one hundred yards of any warehouse shed, elevator, railroad terminal operated in connection with such wharf, or pier, and, save on public ferries, were warned not to be found on any ocean, bay, river, or other waters within three miles of the shore line of the United States or its possessions, nor on any of the Great Lakes, their connecting waters or harbors. In a little while placards were posted along the water fronts of the seaboard cities giving notice in English and German to alien enemies not to go within one hundred vards of the river front, and calling on ail good citizens to notify the United States Marshal of any violation of the warning.

The President forbade, after November 15, and during the war with Germany, the manufacture, distribution, storage, use or possession of explosives or their ingredients save as provided by the Act of October 6, 1917. The Food Administrator announced that on and after November 1 no retailer or other dealer who put excessive prices on necessary foods should obtain

supplies, and that no wholesaler or other handler of food would be allowed to sell to any retailer anywhere in our country who made unreasonable profits or bought large quantities of food for speculative purposes. Speculation in butter and eggs was ordered to be stopped on the exchanges until after the war, and the price of sugar was fixed, for many causes, all produced by the war, had produced a shortage. The nation-wide canning of fruits in the summer and fall had greatly increased consumption. Hundreds of thousands of tons of sugar were shut up in Java for want of vessels to carry it away. At least a third of the world's production came from the Central Powers of Europe and had been cut off since the war began; the western battlefront passing through the sugar producing territory of Belgium and France had reduced the supply still further, and had forced England and France to compete with us for the cane sugar of Cuba. When the shortage became known to the people a rush on the retail grocery stores in the eastern cities followed and sugar rose to twenty cents a pound.

Sugar was the first article in which the people experienced a shortage. Coal soon followed. As early as May, 1917, the Council for Defense appointed a committee on coal production which called a meeting of some four hundred operators who, through a committee, finally fixed the price of coal at three dollars a ton for the region east of Pittsburgh and at two dollars and three-quarters to the west of that city. This the Secretary of War, as Chairman of the Council of Defense, repudiated as oppressive and until late in August the price of coal was unregulated; consumers put off buying, and orders for millions of tons were canceled and little coal was moved. In August the President appointed Mr. Garfield coal administrator, and late in September by his order the price of coal was fixed at two dollars a ton. Then orders for coal, increasing in volume as the cold weather approached, came pouring in; but the shortage of cars and the congestion of freight at the terminals, held there for want of ships to take it abroad, greatly hindered the movement of coal from the mines to the consumer, and by January 1 the situation, especially in New England, was serious.

Meantime, in December, the Government took over all the railroads and the President appointed the Secretary of the

Treasury Director General. By his order some 1,500 cars of coal between Harrisburg and New York were diverted and sent northeastward. Finding that the labor shortage near New York made it impossible to unload hundreds of cars on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River, the Mayor of New York was asked to use the street cleaners for the task and charge the cost to the railroads, and coal was sent through the Hudson River tunnel of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Shipping Board released five ships at Hampton Roads to carry coal to New England, and at the Boston Navy Yard the commandant was authorized to give scraps of timber and waste wood to the poor. To relieve the congestion and so make way for food and fuel export traffic was ordered to southern ports, and passenger trains were annulled by hundreds that their locomotives might be used for other purposes, for the congestion, it was claimed, was caused by the overwhelming amount of freight due to war industries. To make matters worse intensely cold weather almost put a stop to coal mining. In Philadelphia the use of gas for warming homes was so great that the United Gas Improvement Company issued a warning. It might, temporarily, be unable to meet the great increase in consumption "due to cold weather and the shortage of the domestic coal supply." There was danger of some burners going out when the demand for gas was heaviest and the gas coming on again later. Consumers must not go to sleep with any gas burning nor keep a burner lighted unless some one was in the room. Such was the suffering that hundreds of people unable to get coal any other way stormed the yards of dealers who had any and emptied cars standing on the tracks. Churches were urged to consolidate: threats were made to close theaters and motion picture houses, and the Director of Supplies was forced to seize three carloads of coal for the use of fire and police stations. Office buildings were required to use no steam for heating between seven o'clock in the evening and seven in the morning; and none on Sundays and holidays save enough to keep water pipes from freezing; electric lights in hallways and offices were ordered to be cut twenty-five per cent, all outside lighting discontinued and only enough used in show windows to protect property. So great was the shortage that, January 15,

there were in the harbor of New York thirty-seven ships unable to sail for France for want of coal. At Indianapolis theaters, saloons and poolrooms were ordered closed until further notice. In Michigan, the State Fuel Administrator forbade churches to be heated more than six hours a week, or office buildings, stores and places of business more than nine hours each weekday, and closed theaters and motion picture houses on Mondays and Tuesdays. In Chicago, where a heavy snow fall prevented coal coming in or empty cars going out, it was announced by the County Fuel Administrator that factories and industrial plants would have to shut down in five or six days if no relief came.

Mr. Garfield, January 16, ordered that in the vast region east of the Mississippi, from Canada to the Gulf, every industrial plant, those making munitions included, should shut down from January 18 to 22, both days included, and that no fuel should be burned save for the manufacture of perishable foods, the printing of daily newspapers, the current numbers of magazines and periodicals. On ten consecutive Mondays, beginning January 28 and ending March 25, no fuel, save to prevent the freezing of water pipes, could be burned for the purpose of supplying heat for any business or professional offices, unless used by the United States, State, County or Municipal governments, transportation companies, physicians, dentists, banks or trust companies; nor for theaters, moving picture houses, bowling alleys, billiard rooms, dance halls or any place of amusement; nor for stores, business houses or buildings except for the purpose of selling food, drugs and medical supplies. In food shops heat might be maintained until twelve o'clock noon, and in drug stores throughout the day and evening. These restrictions, it was estimated, would save 30,000,000 tons of coal and bring the supply almost up to normal.

Bitter opposition was at once aroused. The United States Senate adopted a resolution requesting Mr. Garfield to "delay for five days the order suspending the operation of industrial plants in portions of the United States in order that protests may be heard, investigation made and information presented." In the House a resolution expressing the "regret of the House" at the "summary action" and appealing to the President to

interfere was not acted on. Protests from all parts of the country affected came to Washington. Lithographers protested to the Liberty Loan publicity bureau in the Treasury Department that the Third Liberty Loan compaign would suffer from the loss of working time on the posters. Theatrical men sent a committee to see the President. Motion picture men protested to members of Congress. Closing the "movies" in the great industrial centers would lead to disturbances because thousands of idle workmen would have no amusements. In their behalf the order was changed. Some plants engaged in work for the army and navy were made exempt.

During the five heatless days every effort was made to move coal. Empty cars were rushed to the mines. Long trains of full cars were hurried to the shipping ports and by January 22 each of the thirty-seven ships in New York Harbor had received its supply of fuel. Freight congestion was relieved, and that it might if possible be ended the Director General of Railroads laid an embargo on all new shipments of freight over the Pennsylvania and Reading System, over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of the Ohio River, and over the Pennsylvania Railroad east of Pittsburgh. Fuel, food and some war material were exempt from the embargo.

The President on January 18 in a statement defended the action of Mr. Garfield. "This war," he said, "calls for many sacrifices, and sacrifices of the sort called for by this order are infinitely less than sacrifices of life which might otherwise be involved. It is absolutely necessary to get the ships away, it is absolutely necessary to relieve the congestion at the ports and upon the railways, it is absolutely necessary to move great quantities of food, and it is absolutely necessary that our people should be warm in their homes, if nowhere else, and halfway measures would not have accomplished the desired end."

A series of snowstorms resulting in a fall of fourteen inches of snow at the end of January blocked all traffic on the coal roads of Pennsylvania, cut down the already insufficient supply to Philadelphia and forced the local coal administrator to seize some 12,000 tons destined for Florida and other places in order to relieve the suffering and sickness among the poor. Four hundred thousand tons of coal, it was reported, were in cars

held ice bound on the tracks. Some 6,000 coal cars were reported snow blocked between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh and men could not be obtained to set them free. Unable to move more than a few thousand tons of coal into Philadelphia each day, the Fuel Administrator ordered that none should be delivered save to homes, hospitals, food stores and hotels. All other stores must do without even if they had to close. Early in February milder weather brought some relief, and by the tenth of the month record-breaking shipments were made to the West and the East, and by the thirteenth the only part of the country suffering from a shortage of coal was New England. Fuel Administrator Garfield therefore on that day announced the suspension of the heatless Monday order, with a warning that it might be resumed; but State administrators were authorized to continue it if they thought fit.

While the fuel shortage was at its height the Food Administrator called for further conservation of wheat flour. order, he said, that 100,000,000 bushels of wheat might be exported it was necessary to cut down consumption to thirty per cent. below normal. In his last cable Lord Rhondda said: "Unless you are able to send the Allies at least 75,000,000 bushels of wheat over and above what you have exported up to January 1, and in addition to the exportable surplus from Canada, I cannot take the responsibility of assuring our people that there will be food enough to win the war. Imperative necessity compels me to cable you in this blunt way." "We have replied," said Mr. Hoover: "We will export every grain that the American people save from their normal consumption. We believe our people will not fail to meet the emergency." we must save more than the Allies needed. Belgium must have 15,000,000 bushels or starve, and 10,000,000 bushels must go to Cuba and neutrals on whom we depend for food supplies. It was estimated that 30,000,000 bushels had been saved from the last harvest. We must, therefore, reduce wheat consumption to thirty per cent. below normal until next harvest. Beef must be cut to fifteen per cent. and pork twenty per cent. and sugar ten per cent.

The Food Administrator accordingly ordered that beginning Monday, January 28, all licensed bakers must mix a

minimum of five per cent. of other cereals with flour in making Victory Bread and rolls, and increase the minimum to twenty per cent. on or before February 24. No city consumer should be sold more than twenty-four pounds, and no country consumer more than forty-eight pounds of wheat flour at one time, and to get any must buy at the same time some substitute flour equal to one-sixth the amount of wheat flour purchased. These substitutes were cornmeal, cornstarch, corn flour, rice, rice flour, oatmeal, rolled oats, hominy, barley flour, potato flour, bean flour, sweet potato flour, buckwheat flour, corn grits, and no others. Hotels, restaurants, and all public eating places were expected to observe meatless Mondays and Wednesdays, and one wheatless meal each day when nothing containing wheat should be used. A like observance was urged on all To fix the prices of food was not in the power of the Administrator: but wholesale grocers who charged exorbitant prices had their licenses temporarily revoked and could not sell any of the twenty articles of food which could be sold only under license.

Even this reduction was found not enough and March 23 a further saving of wheat was ordered. Householders were not to use more than one and a half pounds of wheat products per person per week, which was a ration of one and three-quarters pounds of Victory Bread made with the proper proportion of wheat substitutes, and one-half pound of flour, macaroni, crackers, pastry, cakes, or wheat breakfast cereals separately or combined. Hotels, restaurants and public eating places, besides observing wheatless Mondays and Wednesdays, must not serve to any one guest, at any one meal, macaroni, breadstuffs, crackers, pastry, pies, cake, or breakfast cereals containing in the aggregate more than two ounces of wheat flour, nor could they buy more than six pounds of wheat products for each ninety meals served. Retailers were forbidden to sell more than one-eighth of a barrel of flour to a town customer, nor more than one-quarter to a country buyer, nor any at all unless an equal weight of substitutes was purchased. Bakers and grocers must cut down the amount of Victory Bread sold by delivery to three-quarter pound loaves where one pound loaves were formerly sold, and not buy more than seventy per cent. of the average monthly amount bought in the four months prior to the first of March. The minimum of substitute flour having reached twenty per cent. on February 24, was now increased to twenty-five per cent., which must be reached by April 14. The purpose of the order was to reduce the consumption of wheat flour at least fifty per cent.

Speaking a few days later to some seven hundred hotel men gathered at Washington, Mr. Hoover asked that no wheat be used. The last harvest, he said, was less than estimated. Shipping troubles had caused greater delay in feeding the Allies than was foreseen, and the Argentine crop had not been as large, nor reached the market as soon, as was expected. Thereupon the hotel men pledged themselves to drop all wheat products from their menus.

Nearly ten months had now passed since our entrance into the war, and our sailors and soldiers had already begun to do their part. Twenty-eight days after the declaration of war a fleet of destroyers reached a British port to aid in the patrol of European waters, and since that time our warships had been busy day and night convoying troops, supplies and ammunition. The losses had been few and slight. In October the Cassin was torpedoed in the war zone and badly damaged, but made port. One man was killed and five wounded. A few days later the transport Antilles was sunk and seventy lives lost. The transport Finland when homeward bound from a French port early in November was torpedoed, but returned to port. Nine men lost their lives. Towards the close of the month two United States destroyers captured a German U-boat and all its crew. But the water cocks were opened by the Germans and the submarine sank while the captors were towing it to port. In November the patrol boat Alcedo was torpedoed and sank. One officer and twenty men were killed or drowned. destroyer Chauncey while on patrol duty in the war zone was sunk in collision with an unnamed vessel on November 19 and twenty-one men were lost. December 6 the destroyer Jacob Jones was torpedoed and sank almost immediately, sixty-nine officers and men were reported missing.

Most fortunately the loss of life occasioned by these disasters was in each case comparatively small; but the day was

near when a transport crowded with our soldiers was attacked and sunk by an unseen U-boat and more than a hundred per-Towards dusk one day in early February, as the Cunard liner Tuscania, carrying 2,179 American soldiers, was passing along the north coast of Ireland within sight of land she was struck amidship by a torpedo, but did not immediately sink. The troops on board were chiefly National Guardsmen from Michigan and Wisconsin, engineers, men belonging to three aero squadrons, parts of three regiments of infantry and Forestry Engineers recruited in Maine and the lumber districts of the Northwest. Two British destroyers from the convoy were promptly on the scene and by them and by trawlers the rescued were taken to Bancranna and Larne. How many were lost has not been finally stated. By the end of a week 164 bodies had been washed ashore on the coast of Scotland, and buried, and more were recovered as time passed. So far our warfare on the sea seemed but an unbroken record of disaster. for the great work the navy was doing convoying fleets laden with troops, ammunition and food for the Allies, and, it may be, sinking submarines and patrolling some parts of the coasts of Great Britain, were not made public for good and sufficient reasons.

Before the first year of our war for democracy had rolled around the man power of the navy had been increased from 4,792 officers and 102,500 men to 20,600 officers and 329,300 men; 1,275 vessels for every sort of service, mine sweeping, mine laying, transport, patrol, submarine chasing, had been put in commission; the German vessels in our ports when the war began—damaged, their engineers believed, beyond mending for at least nine months—had been repaired in less than six and used to carry troops to France; contracts had been let for 949 new vessels, and Germany, because of our naval activity, had been forced to draw a war zone around the Azore Islands.

"The hostile Governments," her memorandum said, "are endeavoring by the intensification of the hunger blockage against neutral countries, to force out to sea neutral cargo space which is keeping in port and to press them into their service.

"As hostile shipping and shipping sailing in hostile interest

are being supplemented by violent measures, the German Government, in its struggle against Great Britain's domination of violence, which tramples under foot all rights, especially those of smaller nations, finds itself forced to extend the field of operation of its submarines."

Therefore, she established a barred zone around the Azores "which have become in military and economic respects important hostile bases of Atlantic navigation," and closed "a channel to Greece hitherto left open in the Mediterranean, as it has been used by the Venizelos Government, not so much for the supply of the Greek population with foodstuffs as for the transport of arms and ammunition." 1 The United States, a German Vice Admiral declared, had "established herself on the Azores and had constructed fortifications at Punta del Garda."

On land the record of our little army in France has been most inspiring. The first shot from our men in the trenches was fired on October 27, 1917. A few weeks later the shell case was presented to the President as a fitting memento of the great event. The first trench fighting occurred just before dawn on the morning of November 3, when a small detachment of Americans in a front line instruction salient were attacked by a superior force of Germans, and the salient cut off from the rest of the men by a heavy barrage. The fighting then became hand to hand and in the course of it three Americans were killed, five wounded and eleven taken prisoners. The dead were buried on the slope of a hill overlooking a little village somewhere in France, and the site a few months later was marked by a stone monument bearing the name and regiment of each of the dead, and the inscription: "Here lie the first soldiers of the great Republic of the United States who died on the soil of France for justice and liberty, November 3, 1917." Fifteen officers and men, the dead included, cited by the French General commanding the sector were, a few days later, deco-

¹The new barred zone was bounded thus: "From 39 degrees north latitude and 17 west longitude, to 44 degrees north latitude and 27 degrees 45 minutes west longitude, to 44 north latitude and 34 west longitude, to 42 degrees 30 minues north latitude and 37 west longitude, to 37 north latitude and 37 west longitude, to 30 north latitude and 26 west longitude, to 34 north latitude and 20 west longitude, and thence back to the starting point."

rated with the French War Cross. When presenting the decorations the General said:

"On the night of November 2-3, this company, which was in the line for the first time, met an extremely violent bombardment despite which it seized arms and offered such stubborn resistance that the enemy, though numerically superior, was obliged to retire." ²

A graphic picture of the prisoners is given by a German correspondent of a Berlin newspaper:

"There they stood before us—these young men from the land of liberty. They were sturdy and sportsmanlike in build. Good-natured smiles radiated from their blue eyes, and they are quite surprised that we did not propose to shoot them down, as they had been led in the French training camp to believe we would do.

"They know no reply to our query, 'Why does the United States carry on war against Germany?' The sinking of American ships by U-boats, which was the favorite pretext, sounds a trifle stale. One prisoner expressed the opinion that we had treated Belgium rather badly. Another asserted that it was Lafayette who brought America French aid in the war of independence, and because of this the United States would now stand by France."

November 30, when the Germans attacked west of Cambrai, American army engineers working on the British railways were caught in the turning movement, lay in shell holes while the British fired over them, and when the Germans were pushed back took arms and joined in the fight. "We must," says the French communication, "remark on the conduct of certain American soldiers, pioneers and workmen on the military railroad in the sector of the German attack west of Cambrai on November 30. They exchanged their picks and shovels for rifles and cartridges and fought beside the English. Many died thus bravely, arms in hand, before the invader. All helped to repulse the enemy. There is not a single person who saw them at work who does not render warm praise to the coolness, diseipline and courage of these improvised combatants."

²Those killed were Corporal James D. Gresham, Evansville, Indiana; Private Thomas F. Enright, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Private Merle D. Hay, Glidden, Iowa.

Towards the end of January the War Department permitted it to be known that our troops were occupying front line trenches in a certain sector, but did not state where. A correspondent of the Associated Press in February announced that the sector was northwest of Toul on the south side of the St. Mihiel salient. A writer in the Paris Temps described the place as in the Woevre region. It was, he said, a low plain shut in by the highlands of the Meuse, and the hills of the Moselle, covered at that season of the year by swamps and pools, impracticable for the movements of troops and most suitable for the Americans to learn by experience from limited daily actions. One such action occurred on the night of February 9 when a patrol was ambushed in No Man's Land by a superior force of the enemy who cried "Kamerad" and then opened fire and cut to pieces the patrol.

And now attack followed attack in rapid succession. ruary 14, east of Rheims in the Champagne, American troops took part in a bombardment preparatory to a French attack on the German lines between Tahure and the Butte de Mesnil. On the following day our troops were bombarded with gas shells, and on February 23 they took part with the French in a raid in the Chemin des Dames sector. Thus it became known that our men were on the front line in the St. Mihiel, Champagne and Chemin des Dames sectors. February 26 there was another gas attack in which some sixty Americans were injured before they could adjust their masks. A fight on March 1 showed a force of our men were near Chavignon, north of the western end of Chemin des Dames sector, and another on March 6 that they were east of Luneville in a sector in Lorraine. Our losses on land and sea, from the time the first contingent landed in France, as given out by the Department of War, March 15, were 1.722. Of these 136 had been killed in action, 237 lost at sea, and 641 had died of disease; 475 had been wounded, 21 captured, 14 were missing, 6 had been gassed, and 26 had died of wounds. A variety of causes accounted for the deaths of the others.

Secretary of War Baker and a staff of seven, meanwhile, had quietly slipped away and reached France. He came, he told the French, to confer with General Pershing, visit the American Expeditionary Force, inspect its lines of transportation, storage and supply system, and learn how America could most effectively supply her own army and those of her Allies.

Support was badly needed, for on March 21, 1918, the Germans began their great drive in Picardy. At five o'clock on the morning of that day a terrific bombardment of the British was begun along a fifty-mile front stretching from southeast of Arras to La Fere, and the wonderful battle of Picardy opened. The story of the weeks of carnage that followed cannot be told. It is enough to remember that the attempt to drive a wedge between the French and British armies at their point of union failed; that the attempt to drive the British from Arras and Vimy Ridge failed; and that the attempt to overwhelm the British army in Flanders and reach the Channel ports was checked.

As the battle raged and the Allied armies were forced westward and southward day by day our troops began to play their part. March 25, when the British had been driven west of Bapaume, Péronne and Ham, General Pershing reported that in this desperate fighting three companies belonging to two regiments of American engineers had been engaged. A German War Office statement gave the locality as Chauny and the Crozat Canal. Busy with Canadians and under Canadian command in construction work back of the lines, they became fighting men as the Germans came on, took their place in the line and, though forced to fall back, fought bravely until some place near Noyon was reached where they were given time to rest and reëquip. By March 28 the Germans had taken Albert and Montdidier, and on that day General Pershing called on General Foch at headquarters and offered him all the American troops in France. The American people, he was reported by a Paris newspaper to have said, would consider it a great honor if their troops were engaged in the present battle, the greatest battle in history. He came to ask it in the name of the American people. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we had was at the disposal of General Foch to do with as he would. Secretary Baker, then at American headquarters in France, declared he was delighted at General Pershing's prompt and effective action. General Foch placed the offer before the French War Council at the front, and March 31 an official note announced that the American troops would fight side by side with British and French troops and that "the Star Spangled Banner will float beside the French and English flags in the plains of Picardy."

On the evening of March 27 at a dinner given at the Lotos Club in New York City, Lord Reading, British High Commissioner to the United States, read an appeal to the people of our

country from the Prime Minister, Lloyd George.

"We are at the crisis of the war, attacked by an immense superiority of German troops," said the Premier in his message. "Our army has been forced to retire. The retirement has been carried out methodically before the pressure of a steady succession of fresh German reserves, which are suffering enormous losses.

"The situation is being faced with splendid courage and resolution. The dogged pluck of our troops has for the moment checked the ceaseless onrush of the enemy, and the French have now joined in the struggle. But this battle, the greatest and most momentous in the history of the world, is only just beginning. Throughout it the French and British are buoyed with the knowledge that the great Republic of the West will neglect no effort which can hasten its troops and its ships to Europe.

"In war, time is vital. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of getting American reënforcements across the Atlantic in the shortest possible space of time."

The appeal was heard and for many weeks to come thousands on thousands of our men were rushed across the ocean and by early May 500,000 were in France.

CHAPTER XVII

INTERNATIONAL PEACE DEBATE

Abroad, as the autumn of 1917 drew to a close, the tide of war set strongly against the Allies. Great victories had, indeed, been won by the French in October along a seven-mile front near Soissons and the enemy forced to give up his hold on the Chemin des Dames. In Flanders in November, after weeks of desperate fighting, the British gained possession of the Passchendaele Ridge, broke the Hindenburg line along a thirty-two mile front from St. Quentin to the river Scarpe, and penetrated the German defenses for a depth of more than six miles to the outskirts of Cambrai, and were then forced to yield much of the ground so gallantly won. In December the Allied and neutral Christian world heard with delight that Jerusalem was in British hands. But elsewhere matters had gone badly. The army of Italy had suffered a severe defeat, and Russia had abandoned the Allies.

The Italian front in October stretched from the Gulf of Trieste northward to the Julian Alps and westward through the Carnic Alps. But October 23 the Austro-German army opened an attack on the front in the Julian Alps, broke through and forced back the whole eastern front from the Carnic Alps to the shores of the Adriatic. November 2 the pursuing Austro-Germans reached the Tagliamento River; November 8 they crossed the Livenza River, and November 13 were on the western bank of the Piave. There the retreat ended and there, when the year closed, the enemy was still held. In Russia the radical Socialists, the Bolsheviki or Maximalists, November 7, overthrew the Provisional Government and put the peasants and workingmen in control. Premier Kerensky fled and the Workingmen's and Soldiers' Congress adopted resolutions declaring for "an immediate peace, without annexation and without indemnities"; proclaimed "its decision to sign peace terms which will bring this war to an end" on the basis of no annexations, no indemnities, and summoned all belligerents to do the same. November 20 the Council of "The People's Commissaries," with Lenine as President, Trotsky Commissary of Foreign Affairs, and Krylenko of War, announced that by order of the All Russian Workmen's and Soldiers' Congress the Council of The People's Commissaries had assumed power and that they were in duty bound "to offer all peoples and their respective Governments an immediate armistice on all fronts for the purpose of opening negotiations immediately for the conclusion of a democratic peace." A formal offer of an armistice would therefore be sent without delay "to all the belligerents, enemy and ally." The "citizen commander-in-chief" was then ordered "to approach the commanding authorities of the enemy armies with an offer of a cessation of hostile activities for the purpose of opening peace pourparlers."

To this order General Dukhonin, Commander-in-Chief, made no reply, was promptly deprived of command and a fortnight

later was thrown from a moving train and killed.

"What," said a representative of the Associated Press to Trotsky, "are the plans and intentions of your Government?" "An immediate publication," was the reply, "of all secret treaties and the abolition of all secret diplomacy; an offer of an immediate armistice on all fronts for the conclusion of a democratic peace; transfer of all lands to the peasants; State control of all industries; delivery of all authority to local Soldiers' and Workingmen's deputies; the meeting of a constituent assembly. The offer of a peace has already been made; the decree transferring the land to the peasants has already been issued; authority has already been assumed by Soldiers' and Workingmen's deputies in many important places."

"What," he was asked, "will Russia do if her allies refuse to enter into negotiations for peace?" "The allied people will support us against their Governments," was the answer. "Does Russia think a separate peace with Germany is possible?" he was asked, and replied, "We are against a separate peace with Germany, we are for universal peace with all the European nations." "What will the Government do if Germany refuses to negotiate, will it continue the war?" "We rely on the German army and the working classes to make a continuation of the war impossible."

The Russian Ambassador at Washington at once repudiated the Bolshevist Government and announced his intention to go on with his duties until the United States Government recognized a successor. Mr. Lansing made no statement of the views of the Administration.

All Russia was now in ferment and turmoil. But that made no difference to the Bolshevist Government, and December 1 peace delegates appeared before the German front, were blindfolded and escorted to von Hoffmeister, Divisional Commander, who, under authority from his Chief, agreed that negotiations for an armistice should be opened at Brest-Litovsk headquarters of the German Commander on December 2. At that conference a suspension of hostilities, for a period of ten days, along the entire front from the Baltic to the Black Sea was concluded and went into effect on the eighth. The time was to be used to arrange an armistice which was to be immediately followed by negotiations for peace.

Trotsky now called on the embassies and legations of the Allies in Petrograd to define, within one week, the attitude of their Governments "towards the peace negotiations," and state their willingness or refusal to join in negotiations for an armistice and peace. In case of their "refusal they must declare clearly and finally before all mankind the aims for which the peoples of Europe may be called to shed their blood during the fourth year of the war."

President Wilson had just done so for the United States. Congress had assembled on the third of December and on the fourth he made his annual address. He believed that he spoke for the American people when he said two things: "First, that this intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this Thing and its power are

indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace —when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the basis of law and of covenant for the life of the world, we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends.

"You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, 'No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.'

"Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to the right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray, and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson and the people of the world put in control of their own destinics.

"Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. . . . We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done.

"They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be re-

paired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own, over the great empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan States, over Turkey and within Asia, which must be relinquished.

"The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and Northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien domination of the Prussian military and commercial autoeracy.

"We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

"And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

"What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

"One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany, but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with AustriaHungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is, in fact, the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others."

Joint resolutions declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government were introduced in both the Senate and House and sent to the appropriate committees. That in the House was unanimously reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, accompanied by a long report setting forth all the

reasons why the resolution should be adopted.

A state of war, it said, had actually existed for many months. Depredations on American lives and rights by Austrian naval forces had been small compared with those by Germany, but they had been enough to constitute war upon this country and, taken with other acts of Austria-Hungary, had brought the American people to realize that she must be grouped with Germany as an enemy.

As far back as 1915 Ambassador Dumba and Austrian consuls in St. Louis and elsewhere had instigated strikes in manufacturing plants engaged in making munitions; an American citizen protected by an American passport had been used by Dumba as a bearer of official dispatches, and Austrian consuls at St. Louis and New York had procured false passports for the use of their countrymen going home. Austria-Hungary

in a note of January 31, 1917, had officially announced her intention to adopt the ruthless submarine policy begun by Germany, and had notified the Government of the United States before war with Germany was declared to exist that if such a declaration were made Austria-Hungary would sever diplomatic relations. No sooner was the declaration made than, true to this threat, Austria-Hungary, as an ally of Germany, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.

Until the recent Austro-German drive in Italy, the forces of Austria were gradually driven back by the Army of Italy. With the aid of German troops drawn from the Russian front, a serious disaster had been inflicted on Italy, which had it not been stemmed might have ended in her collapse. Because of this situation the Allies had rushed aid to Italy, and the United States was sending ships, money and supplies and might soon send troops who would then be facing and making war on Austrian soldiers.

Because of these facts a declaration of war should be made. It would hearten the people of Italy, misled by German propaganda, and from a military point of view would strengthen the whole allied cause.

December 7 the Senate passed the resolution unanimously and sent it at once to the House where, to save time, it was substituted for that of the House, was passed by a vote of 363 to 1, and about five o'clock on the same day was signed by the President.

Why war was not declared on Turkey and Bulgaria was explained by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. A deal of friction existed, he said, between the Turks and the Germans. Even the pro-war party was split into factions, and that headed by Talaat Bey was beginning to look with suspicion on Germany. A declaration of war, unless we could strike Turkey, would strengthen the weakening German influence and injure the anti-German party. But we could not strike Turkey, for she had no troops on the western front and few submarines. There was no danger therefore of a direct conflict of forces. Bulgaria had not severed diplomatic relations with the United States, had no interest in the German plans of world conquest, had always been friendly to the

United States, had no submarines in the sea and no forces on the western front, and there was therefore no good reason to wage war against her.

The ten-day period of suspension of hostilities having expired, an armistice was signed by the representatives of Russia on the one hand and those of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the other, to begin at two o'clock on the afternoon of December 17 and continue until January 14, and include the land and air forces along the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and along the Russo-Turkish front in Asia Minor. While it lasted neither party was to increase its forces on these fronts, nor on the islands in Moon Sound. Neither party was to regroup its forces, nor move units from the Baltie-Black sea fronts except such as had begun to move before the armistice was established, nor gather troops on any part of the Black Sea or the Baltic east of the fifteenth degree of east longitude. Either party might end the armistice on seven days' notice to the other. Peace negotiations were to begin at once.

On the afternoon of December 22 accordingly at a solemn sitting of the delegates peace negotiations were begun. At the head of the German delegation was Dr. Richard von Kühlmann; Count Czernin headed that from Austria-Hungary; Minister Popoff that from Bulgaria; Nessimy Bey, one time Minister of Foreign Affairs, that of Turkey, and Joffe Kamineff that of Russia. Dr. von Kühlmann, who presided, having invited the Russians to present their proposal for a basis of peace, it was laid before the delegates under six heads, and these six were: no forcible appropriation of any territories taken in the course of the war; full independence for those nationalities which had been deprived of it before the war began; nationalities which were not independent when the war began to decide by referendum whether they would unite with other nations, or acquire independence, and in countries inhabited by several nationalities the rights of minorities to be safeguarded by special provisions; no war indemnity; all requisitions to be returned and war sufferers compensated out of a fund levied on all belligerents in proportion to their resources. Colonial questions to be in accordance with these conditions.

Count Czernin, speaking for the quadruple alliance, December 25, said the Russian proposals formed a discussable basis for peace. The delegates of the quadruple alliance were ready for peace without annexations and without indemnity. "It must, however, be expressly pointed out that all the Powers now participating in the war must within a suitable time, without exception and without any reserve, bind themselves to the most precise adherence to conditions binding all nations in the same manner, if the stipulations of the Russian exposé are to be fulfilled, for it would not do for the Powers of the quadruple alliance negotiating with Russia one-sidedly to tie themselves to these conditions without a guarantee that Russia's allies will recognize and will carry out these conditions honestly and without reserve as regards the quadruple alliance."

Passing in review the six points of the Russian peace basis, Count Czernin said it was not the intention of the allied Governments "to appropriate forcibly" territory they then held, nor was it their intention "to rob of its independence" any of the nations which in the course of the war had lost it. Allegiance of national groups which had no independence could not be regulated as between States, but must be settled by every State with its people. Protection of the rights of minorities was an essential part of the right of peoples to self-determination. The allied Powers had often said that both sides could renounce indemnification for war costs and for war damages. The creation of a special fund could only be considered if the other belligerent Powers within a suitable period joined in the peace negotiations.

Return of colonies forcibly occupied and captured was "an essential part of the German demands from which under no circumstances could she depart."

The Russians thought ten days a suitable period within which the Allies should express their willingness or refusals to join in peace negotiations, and the Germans having approved, it was ordered to begin on December 26, 1917, and end January 4, 1918.

This agreement reached, the discussion of matters that would have to be settled, in the event of peace, was begun. The Bolshevist delegates proposed that Russia withdraw her troops from Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Persia, and that the Central Powers withdraw theirs from Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. This was in accordance with the declaration by the Russian Government of the right of all people living in Russia to self-determination, including even separation. Populations in these districts were to be given an opportunity within the shortest possible time to decide whether they would join Russia, Germany, Austria, or be free.

The Germans replied by presenting two articles of a pre-

liminary treaty:

"First. Russia and Germany are to declare the state of war at an end. Both nations are resolved to live together in the future in peace and friendship on condition of complete reciprocity. Germany will be ready as soon as peace is concluded with Russia and the demobilization of the Russian armies has been accomplished to evacuate her present positions in occupied Russian territory in so far as no different inferences result from Article II.

"Second. The Russian Government, having in accordance with its principles proclaimed for all peoples without exception living within the Russian empire the right of self-determination, including complete separation, takes cognizance of the decisions expressing the will of people demanding a full state of independence and separation from the Russian empire for Poland, Lithuania, Courland and portions of Esthonia and Livonia.

"The Russian Government recognizes that in the present circumstances these manifestations must be regarded as an expression of the will of the people, and is ready to draw conclusions therefrom. As in those districts to which the foregoing stipulations apply the question of evacuation is not such as provided for in Article I, a special commission shall discuss and fix the time and other details in conformity and in accordance with the Russian idea of the necessary ratification by a plebiscite on broad lines, and without any military pressure whatever, of the already existing proclamation of separation."

-To this the Bolshevists answered:

"Our standpoint is that only such manifestation of will can be regarded as a de facto expression of the will of the people as results from a free vote taken in the districts in question with the complete absence of foreign troops. We therefore propose, and must insist thereon, that a clearer and more precise formulation of this point be made. We consent, however, to the appointment of a special commission for the examination of technical conditions for the realization of such referendums and also for the fixing of a definite time for evacuation."

December 28 provisional agreements were finally reached on many points with the reservation that they were to be examined by the respective Governments. The delegates then went home. The agreements were that the war was to be declared at an end; that Germany was to evacuate her positions in occupied Russia as soon as the Russian armies had been demobilized; that there should be no economic war after peace was concluded, and no discrimination against subjects, merchant ships or goods of either party; that civilians interned were to be immediately released; prisoners of war exchanged as soon as possible; and no demands for damages suffered during the war. Many other issues were to be arranged to suit the interests of Germany.

January 4 the ten days allowed the Allies in which to say whether they would or would not take part in the peace negotiations ended. On that day the delegates of the Central Powers returned to Brest-Litovsk, and finding no Russian delegates there, von Kühlmann, Count Czernin, M. Popoff and Nessimy Bey sent this wireless message to "Comrade" Joffe, head of the

Russian delegation:

"In their reply to the proposals of the Russian delegation the delegations of the Central Powers outlined on December 25 at Brest-Litovsk certain guiding principles for the conclusion of an immediate general peace. In order, however, to avoid any one-sided commitment, they expressly made the validity of these guiding principles dependent upon the obligation that all the Powers engaged in the war, without exception and without reserve, should within a suitable period bind themselves strictly to observe these conditions which were equally binding upon all peoples. With the consent of the four allied delegations the Russian delegation then fixed the term of ten days within which the other belligerents should take cognizance of these

principles for the conclusion of an immediate peace as laid down at Brest-Litovsk and decide whether they would join in the peace negotiations or not. The delegations of the allied Powers now place on record the fact that the ten days' term agreed upon lapsed on January 4, and that no declaration regarding participation in these peace negotiations has so far been received from any of the other belligerents."

It was further announced that the failure of the Allies to notice the invitation to take part in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk relieved the Central Powers from all obligations and left them free to conclude a separate peace with Russia, and that they were no longer bound by the general peace proposals submitted to the Russians.

The Bolsheviki, meantime, requested that negotiations be transferred to Stockholm because they preferred a neutral place to the German headquarters, and because at Stockholm it would be easier to secure full publicity to all proceedings. Hearing that the delegates of the Central Powers were at Brest-Litovsk, the Russian delegates, however, at once set off for that place on January 5.

On that day Mr. Lloyd George, speaking to the delegates of the trade unions, answered the Central Powers with a clear statement of the British war aims, of what she was fighting for, and on what conditions she would welcome peace. was not fighting a war of aggression; was not seeking the destruction of Germany or Austria-Hungary; did not wish to deprive Turkey of its capital nor of the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace.

She was fighting for complete restoration of Belgium, with full indemnity for the devastation of her towns and provinces; for the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, Roumania; for an independent Poland; for a recognition of the great wrong of 1871 when, regardless of the wishes of the people, two provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire: selfgovernment must be granted those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have so long desired it; the claims of the Italians for union with those of their race and tongue must be satisfied: and justice must be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech "in their legitimate aspirations."

Constantinople should remain the capital of Turkey; the passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean should be internationalized and neutralized; Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine recognized as separate nations, and the German colonies held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must respect the wishes and interests of the people of each colony. Reparation must be made for injuries done in violation of international law, especially as regarded British seamen; the sanctity of treaties must be reëstablished; and a tribunal set up to limit armament and lessen the chance of war.

Taking up the speech of Count Czernin to the Bolshevist delegates, Mr. George said: "We are told that 'it is not the intention' of the Central Powers 'to appropriate forcibly' any occupied territories or 'to rob of its independence' any nation which has lost its 'political independence' during the war. It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge.

"Does it mean that Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as the Germans or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economie, incompatible with the status and dignity of a free, self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention there will be one kind of independence for a great nation and an inferior kind of independence for a small nation. . . . Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages and their inhabitants is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called 'offer' of the Central Powers is almost entirely a refusal of all concessions. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to Arabs, Armenians, or Syrians is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte.

"On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the 'German demand' for the restoration of the whole of Germany's colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or as our earlier phrase goes, government by the consent of the governed, here vanishes into thin air."

Everywhere among the Allies the Prime Minister's restatement of the war aims of Great Britain found a hearty approval and telegrams of congratulation were still coming to Downing Street when President Wilson on January 8 appeared before Congress and stated his "program of the world's peace."

"1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the

public view.

"2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with

domestic safety.

- "5. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.
- The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months

to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own inter-

ests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

"7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

"8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests

of all.

"9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

"10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

- "11. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.
- "12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
- "13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish

populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

"14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike."

Germany having flatly refused to transfer negotiations to Stockholm, they were resumed at Brest-Litovsk and dragged along until January 23. By that time the Central Powers had demanded the cession of the Baltic provinces and drew a line of demarcation from the Gulf of Finland east of the Moon Sound Islands to Valk, and thence to Brest-Litovsk, declared these were the last terms they would offer, and that if they were not accepted hostilities would be at once resumed and Revel occupied within a week. They were unanimously rejected by the Bolshevist delegates; but at their request the Central Powers granted a recess until January 29 in order that the peace proposals might be laid before the Council of Soldiers' and Workingmen's delegates.

On the following day, January 24, Count Hertling, the Imperial German Chancellor, in a speech before the Main Committee of the Reichstag, answered both Lloyd George and President Wilson. Taking up the fourteen points in the President's speech, he said, concerning the first, on no secret treaties: "History shows that it is we above all others who would be able to agree to the publicity of diplomatic documents. . . . The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk are being conducted with full publicity. This proves we are quite ready to accept this proposal." The second point, freedom of the seas, was also "demanded by Germany as the first and one of the most important requirements of the future. Therefore, there is here no difference of opinion." With point three, trade equality: "We, too, are in thorough accord. . . . We, too, condemn economic war which would inevitably bear within it causes of future warlike complications." Point four, limitation of armaments,

¹The speech is given in full in Current History for March, 1918, pp. 389-394.

was "entirely discussable." . . . "An understanding might be reached without difficulty on the first four points of Mr. Wil-

son's program."

The fifth, colonial claims, was sure to "encounter some difficulties in any case," and "for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally." Point six, evacuation of Russian territory, concerned "only Russia and the four allied Powers." "Now that the Entente has refused within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance to join in negotiation, I must, in the name of the latter, decline to allow any subsequent interference."

Point seven, Belgium free and restored, Count Hertling said, "belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference." So long as the Allies held that the integrity of their territory could "offer the only possible basis of a peace discussion," he must "refuse the removal, in advance, of the Belgian affair from the entire

discussion."

Point eight, all French territory free and Alsace-Lorraine restored, was refused. "Forcible annexation" formed no part of the official German policy, but the conditions of evacuation must be settled between Germany and France. Alsace-Lorraine

would never be given up.

Points nine, ten and eleven, having to do with the Italian frontier, were left to be dealt with by Count Czernin. Matters touched on in point twelve concerned "our loyal, brave ally Turkey" and must be left to the Turkish statesmen. Point thirteen dealt with Poland. To this, Count Hertling said, it was not the Entente, "but the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which liberated Poland from the Czaristic régime." Therefore, it was Germany, Austria and Poland that must settle the future of that country. "The last point, the 14th, deals with a league of nations." If such a league proved, on closer examination, to be in the spirit of justice and impartiality to all, "then the Imperial Government is gladly ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of such a bond of nations."

While Count Hertling was addressing the Main Committee of the Reichstag, Count Czernin made his reply to Lloyd George and the President before the Austrian Parliament. part which had to do with the speech of President Wilson, Count Czernin said it was evident that no such offer could be accepted in all its detail. Were this the case negotiations would be unnecessary and "peace might be made by simple acceptance, by a simple yea and amen." Taking up the fourteen points, he had "nothing to say on the point which discusses abolishing secret diplomacy and complete publicity of negotiations." He had "serious doubts whether it is always the most practical and quickest way to reach a result." Of points two and three and four he approved. To point five he made no reference. To point six he replied that Austria-Hungary did not demand a square meter of Russian territory, and to point seven that: "So far as these possessions concern her allies, whether in the case of German possessions, Belgium or Turkey, Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements, will go to the extreme in defense of her allies. She will defend the pre-war possessions of her allies as she would her own." The eighth point was not discussed; to the ninth he said: "Italy had, before the war, an opportunity of realizing a great territorial expansion without firing a shot. She refused to do this and joined in the war. She has lost hundreds of thousands in killed, and millions in war expenses and destroyed riches, all that solely in order to lose the advantage which she would have been able to gain." Point ten was answered in the negative. Point eleven was refused; point twelve was covered in his answer to seven; to the thirteenth he said, "We also are supporters of the creation of an independent Polish State," and to the fourteenth, "In his idea of a league of Peoples, the President would very probably meet with no opposition in this monarchy."

February 11, 1918, the President replied to Count Hertling and Count Czernin. The German Chancellor's speech he found very vague, very confusing, full of equivocal phrases, and leading it was not clear where.

"His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them

to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international council. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities, and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood.

"He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the 'conditions' under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland.

"In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves.

"It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that.

"What is at stake now is the peace of the world." . . . "The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in

a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. . . .

"Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

"We cannot have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it, because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

"The United States has no desire to interfere in European

affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. . . .

"But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered, as nearly as may be, impossible.

"This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of

small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. . . .

"Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes, and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern, and must, of course, be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind.

"If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must, of course, be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much further had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

"After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

"First—That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

"Second—That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that,

"Third-Every territorial settlement involved in this war

must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States; and,

"Fourth—That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.

"A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice

but to go on."

February 12 Mr. Lloyd George made his reply to the speech of the German Chancellor, and February 25 Count Hertling answered the four points of President Wilson's speech of February 11.

"It has been repeatedly said that we do not contemplate retaining Belgium, but that we must be safeguarded from the danger of a country with which we desire after the war to live in peace and friendship becoming the object or the jumping-off ground of enemy machinations. If, therefore, a proposal came from the opposing side, for example from the Government at Havre, we should not adopt an antagonistic attitude even though the discussion at first might only be unbinding."

Meanwhile, as there did not seem to be a chance of such a thing happening, he "must adhere to the existing method of dialogue across the channel and the ocean."

Turning to the four points, he asked as to the first, "Who would contradict this?" Certain "it is that only peace based in all its parts has a prospect of endurance." The second point also could "be unconditionally assented to," and so could the third. "Now in the fourth clause he demands that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world. Here also I give assent in principle, and I declare, therefore, with President Wilson, that a general peace on such a basis is discussable." But these principles must not

be proposed by President Wilson alone. "They must be definitely recognized by all States and nations."

"Our war aims from the beginning were the defense of the Fatherland, the maintenance of our territorial integrity, and the freedom of our economical development. Our warfare, even when it must be aggressive in action, is defensive in aim. I lay special stress on that subject just now in order that no misunderstandings shall arise about our operations in the east. After breaking off the peace negotiations by the Russian delegation on February 10 we had a free hand against Russia. The sole aim of the advance of our troops, which was begun seven days after the rupture, was to safeguard the fruits of our peace with Ukraine. Aims of conquest were in no way a determining factor. . . . We do not intend to establish ourselves, for example, in Esthonia, or Livonia. In Courland and Lithuania our chief object is to create organs of self-determination and self-administration."

Allusions in the speech of Count Hertling to affairs in Russia make it necessary to narrate what had there taken place since January 28 when the Bolshevist delegates went home to lay the German peace terms before the Congress of Soldiers' and Workingmen's delegates. January 30, 1918, the conference at Brest-Litovsk was resumed and continued until February 10, when the Russian delegates broke off negotiations, refused to sign a treaty of peace and formally withdrew Russia from the war. In a wireless announcement addressed "to all whom it may concern," Trotsky said:

"The peace negotiations are at an end. The German capitalists, bankers, and landlords, supported by the silent cooperation of the English and French bourgeoisie, submitted to our comrades, members of the peace delegations at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such as could not be subscribed to by the Russian revolution.

"The Governments of Germany and Austria possess countries and peoples vanquished by force of arms. To this authority the Russian people, workmen and peasants, could not give its acquiescence. We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression, and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants.

"But we also cannot, will not and must not continue a war begun by Czars and capitalists in alliance with Czars and capitalists. We will not and we must not continue to be at war with the Germans and Austrians, workmen and peasants like ourselves.

"We are not signing a peace of landlords and capitalists. Let the German and Austrian soldiers know who are placing them in the field of battle and let them know for what they are struggling. Let them know also that we refuse to fight against them.

"Our delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility before the Russian people and the oppressed workers and peasants of other countries, declared on February 10, in the name of the Council of the People's Commissaries of the Government of the Federal Russian Republic to the Governments of the peoples involved in the war with us and of the neutral countries, that it refused to sign an annexationist treaty. Russia, for its part, declares the present war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end.

"Simultaneously, the Russian troops received an order for

complete demobilization on all fronts."

Ît was to this surrender that Count Hertling alluded when he said, "After the breaking off of the peace negotiations by the Russian delegates on February 10, we had a free hand as against Russia." How the free hand was to be used was shown when, on February 18, the Germans once more resumed the offensive and advanced against the great fortress of Dvinsk in the north, and to the relief of the Ukrainians in the south. With the course of events in the Ukraine we need be not concerned. It is enough to know that the Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed by the Rada on November 20, 1917; that delegates attended the Brest-Litovsk conference in January, 1918, and signed a separate peace with Germany on February 9; and that it was in response to a call from the Ukrainians for help against Bolsheviki, bent on the destruction of the Republic, that the Germans made their advance towards Kieff.

To resist the invasion of the Germans was impossible, and February 19 Trotsky and Lenine issued by wireless a proclamation denouncing the invasion but declaring that under the

circumstances the Council of People's Commissaries was forced formally to declare its willingness to sign a peace on the terms dictated by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. General Hoffmann in reply demanded that the offer be put in writing and sent to the German commander at Dvinsk. A messenger carrying a copy of the wireless message with the signatures of Trotsky and Lenine was sent post haste to Dvinsk; but the Germans continued their advance, occupied Esthonia, took Lutsk. Minsk and Rovno and February 23, through Foreign Secretary Kühlmann, the Imperial Government made a new peace offer. imposing terms more drastic than before. The terms must be accepted within forty-eight hours, and the treaty signed within three days and ratified within two weeks. The terms were at once accepted, a new delegation was sent to Brest-Litovsk, and March 3 the treaty was signed and the German advance was stopped within seventy miles of Petrograd. Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Russian Armenia ceased to be Russian soil. Humiliating as were the terms, they were accepted by the Pan-Soviet Congress assembled at Moscow on March 14, 1918. To that Congress President Wilson telegraphed a message of sympathy.

"May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

"Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

"The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their

own life."

Samuel Gompers in behalf of the American Alliance for

Labor and Democracy sent a cablegram, "to the All-Russian Soviet," assuring it that every blow struck at Russian freedom was as keenly felt by the people of the United States as it could be if struck at their own; that he spoke for a great organized movement of working people devoted to the cause of freedom and the ideals of democracy; and the whole nation ardently desired to be helpful to Russia, and eagerly awaited to be told how its help might be most effectual.

Three days after Russia made peace with the Central Powers, Roumania, on March 6, was forced to sign a preliminary treaty which provided for the cession of Dobrudja as far as the Danube, changed the Austro-Hungarian-Roumanian frontier, required immediate partial demobilization, pledged the use of railways for the movement of troops of the Central Powers through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa, and for the evacuation, at once, of all Austro-Hungarian territory occupied by Roumanian forces. During the German occupation of Roumania requisitions to the amount of \$250,000,000 had been levied. These it was believed the Central Powers in the final treaty would treat as a war indemnity and never repay.

Russia and Roumania were thus lost to the Allies, and separate treaties had been made with Russia, Ukraine and Roumania. When speaking of them to a deputation of the Vienna City Council, April 2, 1918, Count Czernin took occasion to reply to President Wilson's four point speech of February 11. The four points, he said, were a suitable basis on which to begin negotiations for a general peace; the only question was could the President unite his allies on this basis. As for himself, he said: "God is my witness that we have tried everything possible to avoid a new offensive. The Entente would not have it. A short time before the beginning of the offensive in the west M. Clémenceau inquired of me whether and upon what basis I was prepared to negotiate. I immediately replied, in agreement with Berlin, that I was ready to negotiate and that as regards France I saw no other obstacle for peace than France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine.

"The reply from Paris was that France was willing to negotiate only on that basis. There was then no choice left."

As soon as M. Clémenceau, the French Premier, heard of

this he exclaimed, "Count Czernin has lied." Then followed an exchange of statements. That conversations had taken place in Switzerland in August, 1917, when M. Ribot was Premier, between Count Revertata, a personal friend of the Emperor Charles, and Commandant Armand of the French General Staff; that no results were obtained; that the conversations were renewed in January and February, 1918, was not denied by either side. M. Clémenceau asserted they were held at the request of Austria-Hungary. Count Czernin maintained it was at the request of France; that after all it was not of consequence to know who began them, but who caused their collapse, and that France was responsible for this by her refusal to negotiate on the basis of her renunciation of the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. M. Clémenceau, in his reply to this charge, said there was no need for Count Revertata to obtain such information from Commandant Armand, for the Emperor Charles in a letter written in March, 1917, had acknowledged "France's just claim relative to Alsace-Lorraine."

That such a claim had been acknowledged the Emperor stoutly denied. The French Prime Minister, he said in a telegram to the Kaiser, "driven into a corner is endeavoring to escape from the net of lies in which he has entangled himself by piling up more and more untruths," and did not hesitate to falsely state that "I recognized that France had a just claim to the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. I disavow this assertion with indignation."

Thus forced to prove its assertion the French Government published in full an autograph letter written March 31, 1917, by the Emperor Charles to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, and by him sent to President Poincaré. In it were the words, "I beg you to convey secretly and unofficially to Poincaré, President of the French Republic, that I shall support by every means, and using all my personal influence with my allies, the French just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine." Count Czernin at once resigned.

The long debate between the leaders of the warring nations came to an end with a speech from President Wilson at Baltimore, on April 6, 1918. On that day, "the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live

and be free," the drive for the third Liberty Loan was to begin over all the country and it was to give a formal opening to this effort that the President spoke at Baltimore. "I call you to witness," he said in the course of the speech, "that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately." He had sought to learn from the mouths of her spokesmen what are her objects in the war; had asked them to say plainly what it is they seek. "They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it is not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will." German statesmen were ready to discuss the terms of peace. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates professed their willingness to conclude a fair peace and give to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiance. But her military masters proclaimed a very different purpose. "Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition. and build upon that dominion an empire of force."

Should such a program be carried out "everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin." "Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible for us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and east every selfish dominion down in the dust."

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