


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STUDIES IN LATIN SYNTAX

BY

HERBERT C. NUTTING

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THE LATIN CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

BY
H. C. NUTTING

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY

Attempts to picture pre-literary conditional speaking have been curiously warped by theories as to the function of the moods in Indo-European. Even today a certain vogue attaches to the rather naïve view that, from the very outset, the moods were sharply differentiated in use, each being restricted to a special range of meaning.

This assumption postulates an 'original' or 'fundamental' meaning for each mood; and the investigator sets himself the task of relating all uses of the historical period to these presupposed original or fundamental meanings.

Such procedure has virtually established itself as the norm. Consequently, when the conditional sentence is taken up, few stop to consider whether the use of the subjunctive and optative in conditional relations really requires an evolutionary explanation. On the contrary, it is taken for granted that this special function must be developed by way of certain important and well recognized uses of the subjunctive or optative in independent sentences; for example, the hortatory use.

It is no difficult matter to show on what insufficient grounds such assumption rests. Thus, it seems axiomatic that the development of any kind of hypotaxis out of parataxis means the adaptation of a conjunction to express the relation already existing between clauses standing side by side; e.g.

I came into the house; it was raining.

The relation which is here merely implicit becomes explicit in the hypotactic form:

I came into the house, *because* it was raining.

In like manner, behind the hypotaetic conditional sentence we should look for two clauses standing side by side, the first a condition, and the other a conclusion, but without subordinating conjunction. In primitive times, a person who meant to express the idea that he would not be parted from a friend, doubtless could make his meaning clear through something like the following:

You go, I go.

It is quite true, of course, that on occasion the words "You go" might represent a command; but this is nothing to the point. Here they express a pure condition, a meaning which is made plain partly by the context, but still more by the intonation, as will readily be seen if the sentence is read aloud with a view to bringing out the exact meaning.

Hence it is not only superfluous but also quite mistaken to attempt to explain the use of "You go" in a sentence like the foregoing on the basis of the possible employment of the same words in another context to express a command. Volition, concession, entreaty, and condition are all *coördinate* functions of the same phrase; and the meaning in each case is determined by the context and the manner of enunciation.¹

Clear though this is, the nature of the paratactic condition may be more obvious still when a first person verb is used. For example, an individual who intended to convey the idea that his presence protects others from hostile attack might say:

I go, enemy come.

Properly enunciated, this protasis has no note of volition in it; and, when thus used, it is manifest that "I go" and "You go" stand upon exactly the same footing. Both phrases are meant as conditions, enunciated as conditions, and understood as con-

¹ It is worth noting in this connection that, even in the fully developed period of an inflectional language like Latin, distinctive forms labeled 'imperative' are by no means always used to express a command. With the help of proper defining elements, they may be used as the vehicle for several different categories of thought.

ditions. Only on this basis would they provide a proper foundation on which to build hypotactic conditional speaking.²

If it should be asked what mood would most naturally be used in early paratactic conditional speaking, it may be noted that a pure condition cannot register anything higher than possibility or probability. Hence, on the basis of modal use in the historical period, it might seem that the subjunctive or the optative would be given the preference as vehicles for thought of this type, with avoidance of the indicative, as being the 'mood of fact.'

The unsoundness of such reasoning is sufficiently proved by the wide prevalence of the indicative mood in the conditions of the historical period; and there seems little hope of reaching solid ground in this matter without abandoning the time-honored theory that the moods had originally one meaning apiece. For a very different view as to early modal usage there is much to be said.

It certainly is a significant fact, that in both early Greek and Latin, there is less precision in the use of the moods than at a later period. It seems, therefore, an almost certain inference that in pre-literary times there was even greater freedom, and that the various mood forms were used still more interchangeably. There is a suggestion of this in W. D. Whitney's remark upon the Sanskrit moods:

There is, in fact, nothing in the earliest employment of these modes to prove that they might not all be specialized uses of forms originally equivalent.³

If, on the basis of development in the historical period, we are thus justified in assuming that modal usage began in early promiscuity and ends in later precision, the presence of various moods in conditional clauses presents no difficulty at all. Indeed

² A more elegant example of paratactic first person condition is found in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* iii. 1. 159, where Antony says: "Live a thousand years, I shall not find myself so apt to die." Note the intonation as the sentence is read aloud.

³ *Sanskrit Grammar*, §575c. This citation concerns particularly the imperative, subjunctive, and optative moods.

it is just the thing to be expected; for originally any mood might have stood in a paratactic condition, no mood needing explanation or excuse for being so used.

Though this view of the situation is eminently satisfactory, it will doubtless continue to be slow in winning its way, if for no other reason than that its acceptance leaves upon a foundation of sand the great structure of comparative historical syntax so laboriously raised by scholars of the last century.

How strongly that system has established itself is shown by Bennett's reaction in this connection. Rejecting the theory of early conditional speaking here presented for the second time by the writer, he is content to pass it as "a virtual renunciation of any explanation of origin,"⁴ feeling apparently that anything so 'unorthodox' must be false.

Somewhat like the monks of old with their metaphysical speculations, students of syntax once worked out elaborate theories to which they tried to fit the facts of language, with no regard for the natural laws of speech development. Such mistake is often made through the passion for evolution from a postulated 'origin.'⁵

The time has come when the facts need to be examined anew; and judgment must be passed upon them and upon their implications, without bias from the speculative abstractions of other days.

⁴ *Syntax of Early Latin*, I, 272.

⁵ Since it is held in this chapter that a paratactic condition does not require evolution from something else, no attempt is made at this point to analyze and to refute in detail various evolutionary theories as to the development of conditional speaking.

In the course of the subsequent discussion, however, it is necessary to refer here and there to such theories. See the remarks upon the volitive subjunctive, p. 5, the rhetorical volitive, p. 14, and the concessive use, p. 62, footnote 2.

CHAPTER II

FORMS OF CONDITIONAL SPEAKING

Latin of the historical period has many devices for the expression of conditional thought. The regular hypotactic form is, of course, most frequent; and the numerous questions to which it gives rise must be reserved for consideration in later chapters. Of the other forms in use, the following may be mentioned here:

1. CONDITION SUPPRESSED

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 1368 ff.:

PY. Vix reprimor quin te manere iubeam. PA. Cave istuc feceris.
*Dicant*¹ te mendacem nec verum esse, fide nulla esse te.
Dicant servorum praeter me esse fidelem neminem.

In this passage, the slave Palaestrio is taking leave of Pyrgopolinices, and he so far overacts his pretended sorrow at parting that the soldier says: "I can hardly refrain from bidding you stay"; to which the other replies: "Don't do that. People *would say* that you are untruthful," etc.

Sentences of this type are so common in English that they do not challenge attention. But as soon as they are analyzed, it appears that a condition is lacking. So here: "Don't do that. *If you should*, people would say," etc.

This example merits special attention because of its bearing upon a matter treated in the previous chapter, namely, the all but universal assumption that subjunctive and optative conditions are the result of 'evolution' from volitive expressions, and the like.

¹ M. *dicent*; but see the following line. Either mood illustrates satisfactorily the point at issue.

It will be noted that the passage here under discussion is made up of a volitive expression and an apodosis. The phrase *Cave ne feceris* is a prohibition pure and simple; and it is followed by one-clause conditional sentences with (non-negative) protasis suppressed, but easily supplied by the hearer.

If there were otherwise any doubt about the correctness of the analysis of such expressions, the negative import of the volitive phrase would here be conclusive. Ellipsis must be recognized.

By an interesting coincidence, it happens that the selfsame speaker has occasion in the near context to use the full form:

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 1364 ff.:
 Cogitato identidem, tibi quam fidelis fuerim.
*Si id facies, tum demum scibis, tibi qui bonus sit, qui malus.*²

It is thus shown conclusively what analysis should be applied to a phrase like the following:

Impetum faciat; digne accipietur.

Collocations of this sort are constantly used as showing 'the earlier form from which subjunctive conditional clauses are evolved.' As a matter of fact, they throw no light at all upon the nature of pre-literary protasis. The first clause is a volitive expression, and the other is a conditional sentence with suppressed condition.

One-clause conditional sentences are found in various contexts; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 71: Tantum a vobis peto, ut taciti de omnibus, quos coniurasse cognitum est, cogitetis; *intellegetis* unum quemque eorum prius ab sua vita quam vestra suspicione esse damnatum.

Here *peto ut cogitetis* represents a preliminary volitive expression, and *intellegetis* tells what will happen, *if the suggestion is followed.*

Plautus, *Tri.* 699 ff.:
 Id agis ut, ubi adfinitatem inter nos nostram adstrinxeris, . . .
 Effugias ex urbe inanis, profugus patriam deseras,³
 Cognatos, adfinitatem, amicos factis nuptiis:
 Mea opera hinc proterritum te meaue avaritia autument.

² Cf. Caesar, *B. C.* i. 85. 12.

³ M. *deseres.*

These are the words of a young man who charges his friend with intent to impoverish himself and then to flee the country. He concludes: "[If you should do this], people would say," etc. The substitution of a statement of fact for a preliminary volitive expression renders the ellipsis a little harsher, because the hearer is not so well prepared in advance to fill the gap. So in the following:

Tacitus, *Agr.* 45. 5: Sed mihi filiaeque eius . . . auget maestitiam, quod adsidere valitudini . . . non contigit. *Excepissemus* certe mandata vocesque, quas penitus animo figeremus.

Tacitus expresses regret that he and his wife were away from Rome at the time of Agricola's death; for, says he: "[If we had been there], we certainly should have listened to directions and words carefully to be treasured."

The contrast in the following passage is interesting:

Horace, *A. P.* 102 ff:

Si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia *laedent*,
Telephe vel Peleu; male *si* mandata loqueris,
Aut *dormitabo* aut *ridebo*.

Here *laedent* represents a case of one-clause conditional speaking; but in the following sentence the writer proceeds with the alternative condition, just as though the other had not been suppressed: "If you want to impress me, you must first feel pain yourself; [*if you do*], your distresses then will touch me, Telephus or Peleus: but *if you utter words ill assigned*, I shall either yawn or give way to laughter."⁴

Worth noting in this connection is a familiar passage from Cicero:

in Cat. i. 23: *recta perge in exsilium; vix feram sermones hominum, si id feceris.*

⁴ The alertness of the hearer to note suppressed protasis is illustrated by a bit of chance conversation of the following sort:

A. I think it will snow.

B. Good! Then I shouldn't have to go to school.

C. (who did not hear the first remark). If what?

Had this sentence come to a close with the word *hominum*, that phrase would have stood as an example of one-clause conditional speaking. But Cicero decides for full expression, and brings in the protasis as a subsecutive adjunct.

In such cases, the condition may be more colorful than in the example above; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 17: Quorum si nondum scelera vultis recordari, vultum atque incessum animis intuemini; facilius eorum facta *occurrent* mentibus vestris, si ora ipsa oculis *proposueritis*.⁵

Cicero makes large use of one-clause conditional sentences, and some rather distinctive groups may be recognized. For example, it accords well with the subject matter of his orations that the verb of the apodosis should often be *intellego*, *reperio*, or the like:

p. Sex. Rosc. 83: Quaeramus ibi maleficio, ubi et est et inveniri potest; iam *intelleges*, Eruei, certum crimen quam multis suspicionibus coarguatur.⁶

The contrary to fact group is very large and has a considerable range. The simplest cases are appended to optative and volitive expressions; e.g.

Phil. v. 5: Qui utinam omnes ante me sententiam rogarentur; facilius contra *dicerem*.

ad Att. ii. 18. 4: Tu vellem ego vel cuperem adesses; nec mihi consilium nec consolatio *deesset*.

ad Att. xi. 6. 2: In oppido aliquo malletm resedissem, quoad arcesserer; minus sermonis *subissem*, minus *accepissem* doloris.

⁵ There is a very close parallel in the use of a *cum*-clause in the following passage:

Cicero, *de Prov. Cons.* 1: Si quis vestrum, patres conscripti, expectat, quas sim provincias decreturus, consideret ipse secum, qui mihi homines ex provinciis potissimum detrahendi sint; non *dubitabit*, quid sentire me conveniat, *cum*, quid mihi sentire necesse sit, *cogitarit*.

⁶ Cf. *p. Sulla* 71 (cited above); *p. Quinct.* 79, in *Verr.* ii. 3. 183 (*intellegitis*); *p. Sulla* 76 (*reperietis*); *p. Flacc.* 26 (*reperientur*); *p. Tull.* 26 (*non dubitabitis*).

Contrary to fact examples appear in another subtype as a parenthesis embedded in sentences of negative import; e.g.

p. Deio. 38: . . . non modo tibi non suscenset (*esset enim non solum ingratus, sed etiam amens*), verum omnem tranquillitatem . . . refert clementiae tuae.

de Fin. ii. 24: at tamen non negat libenter umquam cenasse Gallonium (*mentiretur enim*), sed bene.

Tusc. Disp. ii. 33: Non ego dolorem esse nego (*cur enim fortitudo desideraretur?*), sed eum opprimi dico patientia.

In each of these cases the condition is readily suggested by the negative expression that precedes.

The same is true of other cases not parenthetical in character:

de Div. ii. 43 ff.: Non enim te puto esse eum, qui Iovi fulmen fabricatos esse Cyclopes in Aetna putes; nam *esset* mirabile, quo modo id Iuppiter totiens iaceret, cum unum haberet.

in Verr. ii. 4. 28: Fuit tanti, mihi crede; *haberes* quod defenderes.

Acad. ii. 85: . . . eentum Alexandros eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione *discerneres?*

Brut. 266: doleo nihil tuam perpetuam auctoritatem de pace valuisse. Nam nec istos excellentis viros nec multos alios praestantis cives res publica *perdidisset*.

ad Att. ii. 19. 1: Me miserum! Cur non ades? Nihil profecto te *praeteriret*.

p. Sest. 43: Contenderem contra tribunum pl. privatus armis? *Vicissent* improbos boni, fortes inertis; . . . quid deinde? quis reliqua *praestaret?*

With reference to one-clause conditional speaking generally, it may be noted that a negative condition is hard to suppress, as may be seen by examining the following sentence:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* ii. 33: Pungit dolor, . . . ; si nudus es, da iugulum; sin tectus . . . fortitudine, resiste. Haec enim te, *nisi ita facies*, custos dignitatis *relinquet et diseret*.

Had the sense of the passage called for *si ita facies*, that phrase could have been omitted, without any loss of clarity, after the volitive expression *resiste*; but the negative protasis cannot be dropped out with like impunity.

Yet Cicero has a small group of cases in which such a condition is suppressed; e.g.

ad Att. xvi. 3. 3: De Quinto filio gaudeo tibi meas litteras prius a tabellario meo quam ab ipso redditas; quamquam te nihil *fefellisset*.

The meaning of the appended clause is plain: "although [if my letter had *not* come to hand first], you would have understood the situation fully." So also the following:

ad Att. xiii. 25. 1: De Andromene, ut scribis, ita putaram. *Scisses enim mihi que dixisses.*

p. Tull. 54: Quid opus fuit vi, quid armatis hominibus, quid caede, quid sanguine? At enim oppugnatum me fortasse *venissent*.

de Invent. ii. 73: Intentio est: 'Non oportuit arma et impedimenta relinquere.' Depulsio est. 'Oportuit.' Quaestio est: 'Oportueritne?' Ratio est: 'Milites enim omnes *perissent*.'

The general discussion of one-clause conditional speaking may be rounded off by consideration of the following odd example:

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 24: Nam illud quidem dici, praesertim a Stoicis, nullo modo potest: 'Non *isset* ad arma Pompeius, non *transisset* Crassus Euphratem, non *suscepisset* bellum civile Caesar.'

The point of this passage is that a knowledge of coming evil could not help us at all, if the fatalists are right. The subjunctive clauses undoubtedly are apodoses, and the condition is suppressed. The peculiarity of the case lies in the fact that the content of the suppressed condition must be gathered from the context in general. It might take some such form as: "If the future had been foreseen."

2. PARATAXIS

The one-clause type of conditional speaking discussed under the previous heading may well represent a very primitive method of expressing conditional thought. For example, a person seeing a child preparing to touch fire might cry out:

Burn your hand

Thus used, the words do not state a fact, nor do they predict that something will certainly come to pass. They warn that touching the fire will result in a burned hand. The intonation and the circumstances under which the phrase is uttered make the meaning clear. Such a form of speech is suited to simple usage and sudden emergency.

It is a distinct advance, of course, to give expression to the condition even paratactically:

Touch the fire, burn your hand.

Inasmuch as Latin literature began at a time when hypotaxis had long since established itself as the norm, it is by no means easy to find simple and unstudied examples of paratactic conditional speaking.

As for the use of the indicative in such conditions, it is noteworthy that the illustrative material cited in the handbooks consists mostly of sentences of the conditional relative order, i.e., sentences which tell what customarily happens under certain circumstances.

Such examples cannot very accurately represent the beginnings of the construction. The following case seems less artificial:

Plautus, *Pseud.* 863:
Si iste ibit, ito; *stabit*, astato simul.

The balance in this sentence shows clearly the function of *stabit*, which may be rendered: "should he stop."⁷

⁷ Cf. Cicero, *Phil.* xi. 19 (*adsensus ero*, etc.).

Among the subjunctive cases available for illustration there appears to be a somewhat wider range. But, as shown under the previous heading, the mistake is often made of listing here passages of a very different character; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 26: Veniat nunc, experiatur; tecto recipiet nemo.

The subjunctives of this sentence are volitive; and what follows is a one-clause conditional sentence: "Let him come, let him try it on; [*if he does*], no one will receive him to his home."

There is room for difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a case like the following:

Plautus, *Tri.* 441:
Hic postulet frugi esse nugas postulet.

If the first clause of this sentence is volitive, the interpretation of the whole is the same as that of the example just discussed, and a semicolon should be placed after *esse*. On the other hand, it is possible that the opening clause is a paratactic condition, in which case a comma is the correct punctuation.⁸

In many passages of a more complicated or formal character, a subjunctive clause undoubtedly represents a paratactic condition; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 168: Adservasses hominem . . . , dum Panhormo Raecius veniret; *cognosceret* hominem, aliquid de summo supplicio remitteres; *si ignoraret*, tum . . . hoc iuris in omnes constitueres, ut, etc.

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 57: *Roges* me, qualem naturam deorum esse ducam, nihil fortasse respondeam; *quaeras*, putemne talem esse, qualis modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri minus.

In the first of these passages, the paratactic condition is balanced by an alternative hypotaetic construction; in the other, both alternatives are paratactic. Cf. also:

⁸ Influenced, apparently, by the prevalent notion that subjunctive conditions need to be 'evolved' out of something else, editors of early Latin texts are perhaps too conservative in the use of the comma in passages in which an opening subjunctive clause might well be a paratactic condition.

Horace, *Ep.* i. 16. 54:

Sit spes fallendi, misceris sacra profanis.

Horace, *A. P.* 439 ff.:

Melius te posse *negares*, . . . iubebat.⁹

Pliny, *Ep.* i. 12. 8: *Dei* huic animo par corpus, fecisset quod optabat.

The last sentence of this group refers to a friend of Pliny's, who, though plagued by ill health, yet hoped to live long enough to see the tyrant Domitian dead. The point is that it was only the man's illness that prevented him from taking a hand in putting Domitian out of the way: "Had you given him bodily strength commensurate with his resolution, he would have brought to pass the thing for which he prayed."¹⁰

The imperative in paratactic protasis is hard to demonstrate. The following may be a case in point:

Cicero, *de Dom.* 37: *Probate* genus adoptionis, iam omnium sacra interiorint, quorum custodes vos esse debetis, iam patricius nemo relinquetur.

This case is chosen as a possible illustration because *Probate* can hardly be volitive; for, without apparent sarcasm, it refers to action *against which* the speaker is advising.

Wherever the imperative has volitive force, even of a rhetorical character, the stronger punctuation must be used; and the sentence as a whole will be analyzed in the same way as the analogous passages with the subjunctive already treated above.

This chapter would be incomplete without mention of certain irregular expressions in which a statement of fact and a volitive expression are joined by a coordinating conjunction; e.g.

Pliny, *Ep.* ix. 5. 1: *Egregie facis . . . , et persevera.*

Reversal of order introduces a new problem:

Plautus, *Bacch.* 695: *Perge, ac facile ceciveris.*

⁹ With iterative force.

¹⁰ Since a normal paratactic condition requires first position in order to be comprehensible, it seems necessary to deny this status to phrases like *absque te foret*, which may either precede or follow the apodosis; cf. Plautus, *Tri.* 832 and 1127.

Here the action of *ecfeceris* is readily felt as contingent. But the coördinating conjunction precludes regarding *Perge* as a protasis. The question therefore arises whether suppressed condition is to be recognized with *ecfeceris*. Before taking ground on that matter, it may be well to consider the following example:

Pliny, *Ep.* ii. 9. 6: *Ostende modo velle te, nec deerunt qui quòd tu velis cupiant.*

This sentence is essentially like the last; but the choice of *nec* (rather than *et non*) shows very conclusively that the writer was not consciously suppressing a condition. Such passages, therefore, must be classed as anomalous.

Sometimes the opening expression is a volitive subjunctive (real or rhetorical); e.g.

Juvenal, xvi. 29 ff.:
 'Da testem,' iudex cum dixerit, *audeat* ille
 Nescioquis pugnos qui vidit dicere 'Vidi,'
Et credam dignum barba dignumque capillis
 Maiorum.

The poet is here commenting upon the difficulty of finding witnesses willing to give evidence in a military court: "Let the individual who witnessed the blows venture to say 'I saw,' and I will rate him worthy a place among our rugged ancestors."

However interesting, examples of these types are rare, and they have no direct bearing on the subject in hand.

CHAPTER III

FORMS OF CONDITIONAL SPEAKING (*Continued*)

3. CONDITION CONDENSED

a. Verb Omitted

Abbreviation of condition by omission of the verb occurs frequently when the verb, if expressed, would repeat something said in the immediate context.¹ Such cases require no comment here.

More interest attaches to small phraseological groups. One such is made up of cases of *si nihil aliud* ("if nothing else"), which verges toward the general meaning "at any rate"; e.g.

Livy, v. 2. 11: . . . ne in turba quidem haerere plebeium quemquam, qui, *si nihil aliud*, admoneat collegas.

Cicero, *ad Att.* ii. 15. 2: Fiat tribunus pl., *si nihil aliud*, ut eo citius tu ex Epiro revertare.

A second group consists of cases of *si forte*, used approximately in the sense of *fortasse*. Consciousness of a suppressed verb probably was vague; e.g.

Cicero, *de Orat.* iii. 47: ex quo vereor ne nihil sim tui nisi suppositionem pedis imitatus et pauca quaedam verba et aliquem, *si forte*, motum.

Cicero, *ad Quint. Fr.* i. 2. 7: Ac si omnium mearum praecepta litterarum repetes, intelleges esse nihil a me nisi orationis acerbitatem et iracundiam et, *si forte*, raro litterarum missarum indiligentiam reprehensam.²

Most of the condensed conditions considered in this section do not use *si* at all. The idea is conveyed by some other syntactical device which has the effect of a hypotaetic condition. Further classification, therefore, is according to the element chosen:

¹ As, for example, with *sin minus*.

² Cf. *p. Mil.* 104, *ad Att.* xiv. 13. 2, *de Off.* ii. 70.

b. Represented by Adverb

This particular aspect of condensation is best approached through full hypotactic conditional sentences in which the apodosis is introduced by such an adverb as *tum*, thus balancing *si* of the protasis; e.g.

Cicero, *de Off.* i. 158: Quod*si* omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent, quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, *tum* optimo quisque ingenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia collocaret.

Compare with this the use of the *tum*-clause in the following:

Cicero, *p. Font.* 49: O fortunam longe disparem, M. Fonteius, si deligere potuisses, ut potius telis tibi Gallorum quam periuriis intereundum esset! *Tum* enim vitae socia virtus, mortis comes gloria fuisset.

The opening sentence of this passage is virtually a wish; and, were it not for *enim* after *Tum*, it would be quite possible to treat the last clause of the passage as an example of one-clause conditional speaking with protasis suppressed, just as in the sentences discussed in the previous chapter. In that case, the function of the *tum*-clause would be the same as that in the sentence first cited here.

But with *enim*, a certain stress is put upon *tum*, which gathers up into itself the force of an entire conditional clause. Hence we may render: "For, *in that case*," the last three words being another way of saying: "*if that had been the case*."

The power of an adverb thus to function is more clearly shown when the word chosen is less of the correlative type; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xiii. 27. 1: De epistula ad Caesarem nobis vero semper rectissime placuit, ut isti ante legerent. *Aliter* enim fuissimus et in hos inofficiosi et in nosmet ipsos . . . paene periculosi.

Here *Aliter* obviously embodies a negative condition: "For, *in the reverse case*," or, in other words, "*had that not been my procedure*."

The range of adverbs thus used is not great. Aside from *tum*³ and *aliter*,⁴ there is but a scattering fire; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiii. 65: Peto a te in maiorem modum, ut honoris mei causa hac laude Hispanem adfeci velis. . . . *Ita* et Hispanem meum per me ornaris et societatem mihi coniunctiorem feceris.

Cicero, *Orat.* 153: Hoc idem nostri *saepius* non tulissent, quod Graeci laudare etiam solent.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xv. 14. 4: Tertium est, ut id, quod de nostris rebus *coram* communicassemus inter nos, conficiamus idem litteris.⁵

In the previous chapter attention was called to certain anomalous expressions wherein a volitive clause and a statement of fact are joined by a coördinating conjunction. Here must be taken into consideration cases which employ a disjunctive; e.g.

Caesar, *apud Suet. Iul.* 66: Proinde *desinant* quidam quaerere ultra . . . ; *aut* quidem vetustissima nave impositos . . . in quascumque terras *iubebo* avehi.⁶

This sort of combination is familiar enough in English in sentences of the same general character:

Stand, *or* I'll fire.

Probably cases like this are to be explained as due to a careless substitution of the disjunctive for the more exact *aliter* or "otherwise." So interpreted, the general effect of such sentences is very much like that of examples in which the force of a condition is gathered up in an adverb.

³ In an interesting passage, stress is put upon *tum* through contrast with *nunc*, the former standing for a contrary to fact condition, the other for the actual state of affairs:

Cicero, *p. Lig.* 16: Sed tamen aliud est errare Caesarem nolle; aliud est nolle misereri. *Tum* diceres: 'Caesar, cave credas. . . !' *Nunc* quid dicis? 'Cave ignoscas!'

⁴ Found sometimes in examples of parenthetical type, e.g., Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 42.

⁵ A few lines earlier in this passage, Cicero has occasion to say of the same situation: Eadem fere absentes, quae, *si coram essemus*, consequemur.

⁶ So Martial, v. 23. 8; and cf. the use of *vel* in Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 54.

In this connection, note must be made of the middle ground represented by cases which use the same mood in both clauses; e.g.

Livy, vi. 18. 7: Audendum est aliquid universis, *aut* omnia singulis patienda.

It is possible to interpret this sentence as presenting two alternatives that might be marked by *aut . . . aut*. On the other hand, by strengthening the punctuation after the word *universis*, *aut* may be made to seem a substitute for *aliter*.

c. Represented by Adverbial Phrase

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 73: De meo iure decedam et tibi, quod *in alia causa* non concederem, in hac concedam fretus huius innocentia.

In this passage, the phrase *in alia causa* embodies the thought: "If we were engaged upon another case." Similar examples follow:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 46: Deinde cur quiequam contra leges parasti? Valeret hoc crimen *in illa vetere severitate ac dignitate rei publicae*; nunc non modo te hoc crimine non arguo, sed ne illa quidem communi vituperatione reprehendo.

Cicero, *p. Q. Rosc.* 50: Vix me dius fidius tu, Fanni, a *Ballione aut aliquo eius simili* hoc et postulare auderes et impetrare posses.

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 102: Consuluisti me per litteras de Capua tu quidem, sed idem *de Casilino* respondi.

Cicero, *in Verr.* i. 28: Quid faceres *pro innocente homine . . .*, cum propter hominem perditissimum . . . de officio ac dignitate decedis?

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 12. 5: Sed haec oratio magis esset apta *ad illa tempora . . .*; nunc vero tantum te para ad haec nobiseum ferenda.

In this type of construction, the negative that belongs with the apodosis sometimes fuses with the conditional element; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xv. 4. 14: His ego subsidiis ea sum consecutus, quae *nullis legionibus* consequi potuissem.⁷

⁷ For illogical fusion of the negative element in another construction, cf. Tacitus *Agr.* 43: Nobis *nihil comperti* adfirmare ausim. These words have reference to the rumor that Agricola was poisoned by Domitian. Tacitus is willing that the reader should believe the worst, but candor compels him to state: "I should *not* venture to say that we found *any* definite evidence." A more complicated case appears in Livy, xxii. 54. 10 (*Nulla alia gens*). Cf. too, Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 12.

When the conditional element is itself negative, that fact may be indicated by prefixing *nisi*; or the negative idea may be expressed through the use of *sine* and the ablative case:

Cicero, *ad Att.* vii. 7. 3: Pomptinum cupio valere et, quod scribis in urbem introisse, vereor, quid sit; nam id *nisi gravi de causa* non fecisset.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 63: Quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes *sine divino ingenio* potuisset imitari.⁸

The following passages are of special interest as showing full hypotactic protasis and *sine* and the ablative side by side as parallel expressions for conditional thought:

Cicero, *ad Att.* iii. 2: simul intellegebam ex eo loco, *si te haberem*, posse me Brundisium referre, *sine te* autem non esse nobis illas partes tenendas propter Autronium.

Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 12: quae nec haberemus, *nisi manus et ars accessisset*, nec iis *sine hominum administratione* uteremur.⁹

d. Represented by Noun or Pronoun

Cicero, *de Imp. Pomp.* 44: tanta repente vilitas annonae consecuta est unius hominis spe ac nomine, quantam vix *diuturna pax* efficere potuisset.

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 71: multosque praeterea, qui e proelio effugerant, quos *Caesar* fortasse servasset, crudelissime persecutus trucidaras.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vii. 1. 2: Quae popularem admirationem habuerunt, delectationem *tibi* nullam dedissent.¹⁰

Cicero, *in Pis.* 11: Pro Aurelio tribunali ne conivente quidem te, quod *ipsum* esset scelus, sed etiam hilarioribus oculis, quam solitus eras, intuentem dilectus servorum habebatur.

⁸ *Sine* and the ablative are rather closely matched by *praeter* and the accusative in Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 36. There is interesting pleonasm in *ad Fam.* xiii. 66. 1 (*tua sponte sine cuiusquam commendatione*).

⁹ This sentence begins a long passage in which the balance of *nisi*-clause and prepositional phrase is illustrated again and again.

¹⁰ Examples like this, in which the conditional idea centers in a personal pronoun, may shed some light on a case of the following sort:

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 52: Vides igitur te ea sumere, quae non concedantur. . . . *Equidem* in omnibus istis conclusionibus hoc *putarem* philosophia nobisque dignum, . . . vitam nostram, . . . non verba corrigi.

The antithesis marked by *te* *Equidem* gives the latter word something of the force of an emphatic *ego*, with suggestion of a conditional idea. Less clear is *de Fin.* ii. 22, where the person is marked only by the verb-ending and the use of the vocative (*Sed tamen nonne reprehenderes, Epicure, . . . ?*)

Here, too, a negative conditional idea may be indicated by prefixing *nisi*; e.g.

Cicero, *de Div.* i. 38: Ut igitur nunc (oraculum Delphis) in minore gloria est, quia minus oraculorum veritas excellit, sic tum *nisi summa veritate* in tanta gloria non fuisset.

e. Represented by Infinitive

The fact that the infinitive so frequently functions as a noun makes its use here the more natural. The cases are not essentially different from those treated under the previous subhead, and the clearest examples are of the contrary to fact order; e.g.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 24: Vultis autem evenire omnia fato; nihil ergo illis profuisset *divinare*.

This passage has to do with the fortunes of certain prominent Romans. On the basis of the view that destiny is controlled by fate, Cicero makes the point that it would have availed these men nothing *to have had* prophetic vision, i.e., *if they had had* prophetic vision. Other examples follow:

Cicero, *p. Cacl.* 50: Si quae mulier sit eius modi . . . , cum haec aliquid adulescentem hominem *habuisse* rationis, num tibi per turpe . . . esse videatur?

Cicero, *Phil.* xiv. 35: Quam ob rem maximum quidem solacium erit propinquorum eodem monumento *declarari* et virtutem suorum et populi Romani pietatem et senatus fidem et crudelissimi memoriam belli.

Tacitus, *Agr.* 33. 6: Nec inglorium fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine *cecidissee*.

Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 77. 2: Absurdum fuerit *non cedere* imperio ei, cuius filium adoptaturus essem, si ipse imperarem.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 49. 3: Quae seditiosa et corrupendae disciplinae mox in praedam vertebat (Antonius), nihil adventantem Mucianum veritus, quod exitiosius erat quam Vespasianum *sprevissee*.

This last case is specially noteworthy, *quam . . . sprevissee* being a conditional clause of comparison, with the force of *quam si . . . sprevisset*. The meaning is that Antonius took a greater risk in disregarding the second in command (i.e., Mucianus) than if he had treated Vespasian himself with contempt.

Further evidence of the ability of the infinitive to express conditional thought may be seen in the following closely parallel sentences:

Terence, *Eun.* 382 ff.:

An id flagitiumst, *si* in domum meretriciam
Deducar atque eas itidem *fallam*, ut ab illis *fallimur*?

Plautus, *Bacch.* 97 ff.:

Ego oponabo; nam id flagitium meum sit, mea te gratia
 Et operam *dare* mi et ad eam operam *facere* sumptum de tuo.

It will be seen at a glance that the conditional clauses of these two sentences exactly match one another. In the second example, the fact that the verb of the apodosis stands in the subjunctive leaves no room for doubt as to the function of the infinitive.

f. Represented by Adjective or Participle

Cicero, *p. Rab. Post.* 33: Nam, si me invitum putas, ne Cn. Pompei animum offenderem, defendisse causam, illum vehementer ignoras. Neque enim Pompeius me sua causa quicquam facere voluisset *invitum*, neque. . . .

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 79: Quonam modo ille vos *vivus* afficeret, quos mortuus inani cogitatione percussit?

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiii. 27. 2: Id mihi multo iucundius te esse in me tali voluntate, ut plus prosis amicis meis, quam ego *praesens* fortasse prodessem.

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 52: neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico quae tibi plus prodescent *cognita* quam tritici vilitas.

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 50: Nemo ei *neganti* non credidisset, quem esse omnes salvum etiam confidentem volunt.

Cicero, *p. Arch.* 25: Sulla, cum Hispanos et Gallos donaret, credo, hunc *petentem* repudiasset.¹¹

In the following passage, the participles represent alternative conditions of the futurum in praeterito type:

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 37: Nee vero eram tam indoctus , ut frangerer animo propter vitae cupiditatem, quae me *manens* conficeret angoribus, *dimissa* molestiis omnibus liberaret.

¹¹ In Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 82, the participle *damnata* resumes a full *si*-clause.

Here again a negative condition may be indicated by prefixing *nisi*:

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 180: Vide quam sim, inquit, deus in isto genere, Catule. Non herele mihi *nisi admonito* venisset in mentem.

g. Represented by Ablative Absolute

Cicero, *p. Caec.* 77: Hoc loco percommode accidit, quod non adest is . . . C. Aquilius; nam *ipso praesente* de virtute eius et prudentia timidius dicerem.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xiii. 27. 1: . . . praesertim cum illud occurrat, illum, cum antea nihil scripserim, existimaturum me nisi *toto bello confecto* nihil scripturum fuisse.

In the first of the following passages, a regular hypotactic conditional clause is balanced by an ablative absolute; and in the other, such a condition is resumed in like manner:

Cicero, *de Off.* i. 157: Itaque, *nisi* ea virtus . . . attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga cognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi, *remota communitate coniunctioneque humana* feritas sit.

Cicero, *p. Balb.* 38: Sed quid ego disputo, quae mihi tum, si Gaditani contra me *dicerent*, vere posse dici viderentur? *Illis enim repetentibus*¹² L. Cornelium responderem legem populum Romanum iussisse de civitate tribuenda, etc.

It bears directly upon the problem of the condensation of conditional clauses generally that, in the full hypotactic form, some feature other than the verb is frequently the emphatic and essential element in the condition.

This fact escapes notice the more readily, since it falls to the verb to register the class of a condition, whether or not it is itself the essential feature; e.g.

Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 6: Quodsi *solus* in discrimen aliquod adducerer, ferrem, Quirites, animo aequiore; sed mihi videntur certi homines . . . vos universos . . . vituperaturi.

There is no doubt, of course, in regard to the class of this conditional sentence; but the action of *adducerer* is not unreal;

¹² Interpretation as a dative is possible.

for the speaker *is* threatened. It is *solus* (in antithesis to *vos universos*) that renders the clause contrary to fact: "If I *alone* were threatened"; and the verb registers accordingly. So again:

Cicero, in *Pis.* 18: Quodsi vestem non publico consilio patres conscripti sed privato officio aut misericordia mutavissent, tamen id his non licere per interdicta tua crudelitatis erat non ferendae.

Though the text reads *vestem . . . mutavissent*, it is perfectly clear that the senate *did* put on mourning. The contrary to fact element in the conditional clause lies in the intervening ablatives, and the verb again registers mechanically.¹³

It thus happens sometimes that the framework of the hypotactic condition drops away, leaving merely the emphatic and essential element to be incorporated with the apodosis. This produces some of the condensed types already considered in this section; cf.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 1. 44: Nihil dicam nisi singulare, nisi id, quod si in alium reum diceretur, incredibile videretur.

The essence of the contrary to fact idea of this condition lies in *in alium reum*, and not in *diceretur*. The speaker would have been perfectly well understood, if he had said:

id, quod in alium reum dictum incredibile videretur.

Probably few of the hearers would have failed to grasp the idea, even if the bare prepositional phrase had been used to express the condition:

id, quod in alium reum incredibile videretur.¹⁴

¹³ The discussion here trenches upon the larger question of the extent to which advantage is taken of the inflectional equipment of the verb to give expression to qualifications which properly belong to other elements of the sentence, but which cannot be indicated through them; e.g.,

Plautus, *Tri.* 604 ff.:

CA. Quoi homini despondit? ST. Lysiteli, Philtonis filio,
Sine dote. CA. Sine dote ille illam in tantas divitias dabit?
Non credibile dices. ST. At tu edepol nullus creduas.

Whatever futurity lies in the phrase *Non credibile dices* centers properly in *non credibile*; the speaker declines to believe what has already been stated. It is left for the verb, quite illogically, to mark the future relation.

¹⁴ It is, of course, the distinctive form of the apodosis (*videretur*) that assures understanding of the abbreviated condition.

Approaching the matter from the other direction, it would be easy to build the scaffolding of a hypotactic condition about a noun or a phrase that functions as a protasis; e.g.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 32: Nemo umquam *sine magna spe immortalitatis* se pro patria offerret ad mortem.

This particular adverbial phrase, thus treated, might yield the following form: *Si sine magna spe immortalitatis essemus*. Sometimes, however, the condensed form does not easily allow of expansion without change, for the reason that the word or phrase which carries the conditional idea is forced into some unfavorable grammatical construction to suit the wording of the apodosis; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 90: Mortem me timuisse dicis. Ego vero ne *immortalitatem* quidem contra rem publicam accipiendam putarem.

4. APODOSIS CONDENSED

a. Verb Omitted

Omission of the verb of apodosis is exceedingly frequent; several types can be distinguished even among the cases in which the clause is abbreviated to the single word *quid*; e.g.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 25: Dasne aut manere animos post mortem aut morte ipsa interire? 'Do vero.' *Quid*, si maneant? 'Beatos esse concedo.'

This type of brevity is simple and natural. Both speaker and hearer are conscious of the suppression of the verb, as is shown by the ready response.

Suppression of the verb was probably felt rather clearly in the following variety of *a fortiori* expressions often met in formal and rhetorical language:

Livy, *xliv.* 36. 8: iam nunc nimis saepe per ambitionem peccari; *quid*, si domini milites imperatoribus imponantur?

Tacitus, *Hist.* *iv.* 42. 7: Invenit aemulos etiam infelix nequitia; *quid*, si floreat vigeatque?

More phraseological seem to be two little groups of sentences found in Plautus, one with the indicative and the other with the subjunctive.

With the indicative, the question commonly suggests a possible difficulty or objection, or makes a counter proposition; e.g.

Plautus, *Poen.* 721 ff.:

AG. *Quid nunc mihi auctores estis?* ADV. *Ut frugi sis.*
AG. *Quid si animus esse non sinit?*

Plautus, *Most.* 580 ff.:

TR. *Reddet; nunc abi.*
DA. *Quid ego huc recursem aut operam sumam aut conteram?*
*Quid si hic manebo potius ad meridiem?*¹⁵

The subjunctive is used to propose some line of action:

Plautus, *Cas.* 357 ff.:

Quid si propius attollamus signa eamusque obviam?
Sequere.

Plautus, *Cure.* 145:

PH. *Quid si adeam ad fores atque occentem?* PA. *Si lubet, neque veto neque iubeo.*

In sentences like these last, the feeling for suppressed verb is least pronounced, and the expressions mean little more or less than: "Suppose I (we) do thus and so."¹⁶

¹⁵ The same effect may be secured by the use of *sin*, with complete suppression of the apodosis:

Plautus, *Pers.* 227:

PAE. *Ne me attrecta, subigatrix.* SO. *Sin te amo?*

¹⁶ For other Plautine examples, see present series, I, 89. In one case at least the indicative seems to be used somewhat in the same way as the subjunctive:

Men. 844 ff.:

MA. *Quid est? quid agimus?* SE. *Quid si ego huc servos cito?*
Ibo, adducam, qui hunc hinc tollant.

To avoid recognizing this exception to the rule, it has been ingeniously suggested that *cito* is adverb. But the presence of the deliberative question *quid agimus?* in the very same line serves as a reminder that the modal usage of Plautus is not characterized by machine-like exactness.

b. Represented by Noun

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* iii. 88: Neque Herculi quisquam *decumam* vovit unquam, si sapiens factus esset.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* ix. 24. 2: *magnum periculum* summæ rei publicæ demonstrabat, nisi ad superiorem consuetudinem . . . revertissēs.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiii. 20. 5: Nero trepidus et interficiendæ matris avidus non prius differri poterat, quam Burrus *necem* eius promitteret, si facinoris coargueretur.

Tacitus, *Hist.* 75. 3: Vitellius litteras ad Titianum fratrem Othonis composuit, *exitium* ipsi filioque eius minitans, ni incolumes sibi mater ac liberi servarentur.

In all these sentences, the noun phrase stands for the infinitive clause of indirect discourse, serving thus as apodosis for the condition that follows. For example, the first case may be rendered: "And no one ever vowed [that he would give] a tenth to Hercules, if he should attain unto wisdom." So again:

Livy, xxxvii. 36. 2: *auri pondus ingens* pollicitus est et . . . *societatem* omnis regni, si per eum pacem impetrasset.

By elimination of the noun phrase, the apodosis sometimes disappears altogether; e.g.

Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 35. 4: Opposuerunt abeunti arma, minitantes, ni regrederetur.¹⁷

Noun phrases representing other kinds of subordinate clauses serve as apodoses in the following passages:

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 25. 7: Timebat *iram senatus*, ni paruisset legatis.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 72. 3: . . . metu *infamiae*, si licentia saevitiaque imbuere militem crederetur, pressit iras.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xv. 51. 3: adicitque questus et destinationem *vindictae*, si facultas oreretur.

In the first of these examples, *iram senatus* represents *ne senatus irasceret*. So *metu infamiae* is a stenographic expression for *veritus ne infamis fieret*. In the last case, *vindictae* has about the force of a complementary infinitive.

¹⁷ Cf. Plautus, *Amph.* 986.

Fewer cases are found in which the noun is in the nominative case and the main verb of the sentence is passive; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 138: Erant enim tum censores, . . . quibus, si quid commisissent, *poenae* legibus erant constitutae.¹⁸

Tacitus, *Ann.* xi. 37. 3: si cunctarentur, propinqua *nox et uxorii cubiculi memoria* timebantur.

The second of these examples may not seem so clear as the first, but it is of the same order. It has to do with the fears of the persons who were trying to induce Claudius to put Messalina out of the way; they dreaded [what] the coming night [might bring forth], if they should not succeed in securing immediate action.

With expressions of fear and danger, the apodosis again sometimes disappears altogether:

Tacitus, *Ann.* xvi. 5. 3: quippe gravior inerat metus, si spectaculo defuissent.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vii. 3. 1: si proficiscerer ad bellum, periculum te meum commovebat.

The first of these passages has to do with attendance upon the artistic performances of Nero. It was dangerous to mix with the crowd; but people were impelled to attend by a "more pressing fear [of the consequences], if they remained away."¹⁹

Worthy of separate mention is a small group of cases wherein an appositive or predicate noun representing the apodosis carries a purpose idea; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 34. 1: (Cremona) condita erat . . . *propugnaculum* adversus Gallos . . . et si qua alia vis per Alpes rueret.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 42. 2: uxor quattuorque liberi, si cognosceret *senatus, ultores* aderant.

¹⁸ Cf. *in Verr.* ii. 2. 25, where *multa erat* has the force of *multa constituta erat*.

¹⁹ Analogous brevity may be seen also in the following:

Livy, xxv. 14. 5: Execratus inde seque et cohortem, si eius vexilli hostes potiti essent, princeps ipse per fossam vallumque in castra inrupit.

If *sponsio* may be rendered "agreement (to pay)" or the like, disappearance of apodosis should perhaps be recognized in some cases like the following:

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 77: . . . cum is sponsonem fecisset, ni vir bonus esset.

For another possible analysis of such sentences, however, see p. 78.

This second sentence is particularly interesting, because the future participle of *ulciscor* seems to have been generally avoided in Latin,²⁰ and *ultores* may have been chosen as the nearest equivalent.²¹

The purpose idea may shade off into mere futurity; e.g.

Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 85. 5: Factumque patrum consultum, ut quatuor milia libertini generis . . . in insulam Sardiniam veherentur, coercendis illie latrociniiis, et, si ob gravitatem caeli interissent, *vile damnum*.

In this passage the dative gerundive clearly expresses purpose, but this is hardly true of *vile damnum*; the freedmen are to be sent into Sardinia to check outlawry there, the prospective loss being small, if they should fall victims to the unhealthy climate.

c. Represented by Adjective, Participle, Etc.

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 52. 7: Merito dubitasse Verginium . . . , *imparem*, si recepisset imperium, *tutum*, si recusasset.

This is a judgment passed upon Verginius in regard to his refusal of the imperial purple. The situation is viewed from the point in past time when the choice was before him: "Verginius did well to hesitate, unequal to the task, if he should have undertaken it, safe, if he should have refused it."

In view of their verbal force, the attachment of conditions to participles and gerundives is in no way noteworthy; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 19. 4: Quatiunt arma, *rupturi* imperium, ni ducentur.

Tacitus, *Ann.* iv. 30. 3: Aetum de praemiis accusatorum *abolendis*, si quis maiestatis postulatus ante perfectum iudicium se ipse vita privavisset.²²

²⁰ See the *Classical Journal*, XVIII, 238.

²¹ Note the use of the future participle of *vindico* in a somewhat parallel situation:

Suetonius, *Iul.* 30. 1: conventibusque peractis Ravennae substitit, bello *vindicaturus*, si quid de tribunis plebis intercedentibus pro se gravius a senatu constitutum esset.

²² For further examples of condensed apodosis, see this series, VII, 182 ff.

5. APODOSIS LACKING

This is a somewhat miscellaneous category, and the heading is worded to allow the widest possible interpretation. It seems hardly safe to say "Apodosis suppressed" or "Apodosis omitted," because it is not at all clear in some cases that either the speaker or hearer was conscious of suppression or omission.²³ The one sure thing is that the conditional clause lacks expressed apodosis; e.g.

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* ii. 144: (Auditus) flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit, *si* simplex et directum *pateret*.

There is a very small group of sentences of this particular type, and this example is presented first because of its clearness; for the shift to the imperfect tense (*pateret*) marks unmistakably the nature of the construction: "The sense of hearing has a devious approach, so that no foreign matter may enter, [as would be the case] if the passage were straight and unswerving."

To satisfy the demands of logic, it is absolutely necessary to supply an apodosis here;²⁴ but it is much more difficult to determine the exact reaction of speaker and hearer in the give and take of verbal and written communication.

As a general principle, it is safe to assume that ordinary linguistic consciousness falls far short of the clarity required by the rules of grammar. The thought of the hearer moves forward by intuitive stages; and he grasps the essential idea, quite undisturbed by irregularities that the grammarian might point out.

Thus, in connection with sentences like the last cited, it is likely that the casual reader is conscious at most of nothing more definite than 'a slight awkwardness of expression.' But if his attention is recalled to the phrase, and if he is trained in gram-

²³ Deliberate aposiopesis is not taken into account here.

²⁴ Similarly in a variety of expressions; e.g.,

"It's a good play, because I saw it."

mar, a moment's reflection will enable him to point out wherein the speaker 'did not say exactly what he meant.'²⁵

In some conditional sentences of this group, the irregularity is even more readily slurred over; e.g.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 116: Codrum (commemorant), qui se in medios inmisit hostis veste famulari, ne posset adgnosci, *si esset* ornatu regio.

Probably most readers pass this sentence without realizing that it is in any way peculiar. Yet it is nonsense as it stands; and the speaker's meaning is exactly expressed only when an apodosis is supplied: ". . . so that he might not be recognized, [as would be the case] if he wore his royal uniform." So also:

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 13. 2: Sed Civilis . . . , ne ut hosti obviam iretur, *si* a populo Romano palam *descivisset*, Vespasiani amicitiam studiumque partium praetendit.

Augustine, *de Civ. D.* iii. 15: (id) . . . Romani vulgare noluerunt, id est vile facere, *si* hoc et alteri facile *tribueretur*.

With one exception, in the cases above presented the *si*-clause depends upon a negative purpose clause. This fact may help to the proper analysis of the following example, which seems to be made upon the same last:

Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 123: . . . quosdam in oppidum recepit, ne ab hostibus opprimerentur, *si* foris *essent*.²⁶

²⁵ This matter was put to a concrete test in the case of an intelligent listener, who had heard quoted in a public address the following lines:

"For God is on the field
When he is most invisible."

Asked an hour later whether the writer of the hymn had 'said what he meant,' the answer 'No' was readily forthcoming. But it required perhaps a minute of consideration to work out 'what was wrong' with the sentence (namely, the use of 'when' for 'even when').

The point to notice is that, even without this analysis, the message of the writer was carried home to the hearer. Such facts inspire profound distrust of the methods and assumptions of present-day 'psychological' syntax. The relation of thought and language is vastly more complicated than seems generally supposed. See further discussion in Chapter IV.

²⁶ There is, however, some uncertainty about this case. In all the others, the condition refers to a reverse contingency that is not realized. Here the *si*-clause describes the actual condition at the start (the men *were* outside); and it is possible to so interpret the sentence as to find a normal apodosis in *opprimerentur*.

Conditional sentences of this type have an interesting parallel in passages using the *cum*-construction; e.g.

Caesar, *B. C.* iii. 43. 3: Caesar . . . circumvallare Pompeium instituit, . . . ut auctoritatem, qua ille maxime apud exteras nationes niti videbatur, minueret, *cum* fama per orbem terrarum *percrebuisset* illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.²⁷

Caesar undertakes to blockade Pompey's position, in order to break the latter's prestige, [as will come to pass] when the news gets abroad that he is afraid to come out to battle.

The main body of conditional clauses lacking an apodosis fall into several rather well marked categories;²⁸ e.g.

a. Parenthetical Expressions

The secondary context makes the following a very clear case of parenthetical use:

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 20. 2 ff.: quippe erant qui . . . ferrent . . . antea subitariis gradibus et scaena in tempus structa ludos edis solitos, vel, *si* vestustiora *repetas*, stantem populum spectavisse.²⁹

So sometimes a parenthetical contrary to fact condition stands out with equal clearness:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 50: Quasi vero intellegant qualis sit in ipso corpore . . . , qui locus, aut³⁰ (*si* iam *possent* in homine vivo cerni omnia, quae nunc tecta sunt) casurusne in conspectum videatur animus, an tanta sit eius tenuitas, ut fugiat aciem!

Less interest attaches to indicative conditions thus used. An idiomatic turn will serve to illustrate that mood in parenthesis:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* ii. 54: et, *si verum quaerimus*, in omnibus officiis persequendis animi est adhibenda contentio.

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 23: Non possunt omnes esse patrieii; *si verum quaeris*, ne curant quidem.

²⁷ Cf. *B. G.* iv. 16. 1.

²⁸ Some sporadic cases were noted on pp. 26 and 27.

²⁹ Cf. Cicero, *de Nat. D.* ii. 149 (*si diligenter attenderitis*).

³⁰ *M. ut.*

b. *Immo si scias* Type

This group is well approached through normal conditional periods that mark a climax; e.g.

Plautus, *Epid.* 451 ff.:

Immo si audias

Meas pugnas, fugias manibus demissis domum.

Terence, *Eun.* 355 ff.:

Immo si scias quod donum huic dono contra comparet,
Magis id dicas.

This same kind of condition is used also in a much looser connection with the main clause of the sentence:

Plautus, *Merc.* 298 ff.:

Immo si scias,

Oculeis quoque etiam plus iam video quam prius.

Plautus, *Pseud.* 749 ff.:

PS. Probus homost, ut praedicare te audio. CH. *Immo si scias,*
Ubi te aspexerit, narrabit ultro quid sese velis.

The first of these examples may be rendered: "If you but knew it, even the sight of my eyes is better than it was." Such cases are of the same order as the parenthetic type discussed under the previous subhead.³¹

A third stage is seen in examples wherein the conditional clause stands alone as an exclamation:

Plautus, *Curc.* 320 ff.:

PH. Iam edes aliquid. CV. Nolo hercle aliquid; certum quam aliquid mavolo.

PH. *Immo si scias* reliquiae quae sint!

Plautus, *Bacch.* 697 ff.:

CH. Quem si orem ut mihi nil credat, id non ausit credere.

MN. *Immo si audias* quae dicta dixit me advorsum tibi!

Terence, *Heaut.* 599:

SY. Pessuma haec est meretrix. CH. Ita videtur. SY. *Immo si scias!*

³¹ So Seneca, *Ep.* 86. 12; cf. *si tu scias*, Plautus, *Merc.* 445.

c. *Si modo* Type

The effect of *si modo* in normal conditional sentences is very like that of *dum modo*, i.e., the clause so introduced marks a reservation of the one thing essential; e.g.

Plautus, *Amph.* 646 ff.:

Id modo si mercedis

Datur mihi, ut meus victor vir belli clueat, satis

Mihi esse ducam.

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 40. 3: 'At ego,' inquit, 'vobis, *si modo* viri esse *vultis*, rationem ostendam, qua tanta ista mala effugiatis.'

The one thing essential is very apt to be a thing desired; and postposition of the condition seems to favor emphasis upon this coloring of the phrase, even when the indicative is used; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xii. 44. 3: Contudi enim animum et fortasse vici, *si modo permansero*.

In the subjunctive cases, the optative notion becomes more pronounced, and the subjoined condition tends to break away from close grammatical connection with the main clause, arriving ultimately at the full status of an independent expression of wish. Different gradations may be seen to advantage in the following examples:

Tibullus, i. 2. 67 ff.:

Ille licet Cilicium victas agat ante catervas,

Ponat et in capto Martia castra solo,

Totus et argento contextus, totus et auro,

Insideat celeri conspiciendus equo,

Ipse boves mea *si* tecum *modo* Delia *possim*

Iungere.

Plautus, *Pseud.* 997:

SI. Propera pellegere ergo epistulam. BA. Id ago, *si taceas modo*.

Plautus, *Tri.* 1187:

Dicis, *si facias*³² *modo*.

Plautus, *Rud.* 679 ff.:

TR. Tace ac bono animo's;

Me vide. PA. *Si modo* id liceat, vis ne opprimat!

Plautus, *Capt.* 996:

Quod male feci, crucior; *modo si* infectum fieri *possiet!*

³² Al. *facies*.

In the last of these cases, the force of *modo si* approximates that of *utinam*, and the construction seems quite on the same footing as that with *modo ut*; cf.

Terence, *And.* 408 ff.:

DA. Proin tu fac apud te ut sies.

PA. *Modo ut possim*, Dave!

Terence, *Phor.* 711:

GE. Haec fient. AN. *Ut modo fiant!* GE. Fient; me vide.

Other optative uses of the *si*-clause are considered at another point.³³

³³ pp. 77 ff. In the present connection attention may be called to a case in which *si . . . quidem* functions almost as *si modo*:

Plautus, *Cist.* 734:

PHA. Sine dicat. LA. *Si dicat quidem!*

There has been some hectoring of a slow witness, whereat the protest is entered "Let him speak," answered by the retort: "If he only would speak!"

CHAPTER IV

THOUGHT AND ITS EXPRESSION

During the past twenty-five years much has been heard of 'psychological syntax.' But it can hardly be said that the attempt to associate psychological and syntactical study has as yet proved of any great practical worth. This is due in part, perhaps, to the fact that few scholars equally proficient in both fields have undertaken work along this line.

Meanwhile positive harm has sometimes resulted from the desire of the grammarian to bolster up his theories by an appeal to psychology.

In the first place, not being himself at home in this outside field, he is far too prone to take on faith the pronouncements of psychologists, instead of subjecting them to the closest scrutiny.

Again, because of unfamiliarity with the methods of psychology, the worker in syntax may easily miss certain reservations and qualifications that a psychologist would take for granted in setting down his findings.

In the third place, it seems a failing of human nature to feel that one's work somehow is dignified by the use of technical terms. It is true that these sometimes have adventitious weight with the hearer; but they also impose upon the user himself. He gets the impression that he is quite technical and up to date, though he really has nothing new to say; and, worse still, the showy language too often conceals defective logic.

For these or other reasons, current views as to the relation of speech and thought are singularly inadequate and mistaken. Thus, if a worker in syntax were asked to describe concisely the process of thought that ends in speech, he would be very apt to sum up as follows:

In the mind there first lies a nebulous and indiscrete mass (*Gesamtvorstellung* or 'germ concept'), upon which the spot light of attention is turned. The mass then gradually resolves; and, as each part is illuminated, the voice concomitantly registers the results of the analysis.

Without pausing here to point out in detail the inadequacy of any such statement, it may be noted that, literally interpreted, it places the speaker in the absurd position of beginning to speak before he himself really knows what he is going to say.

It may seem incredible that anyone would be so uncritical as to accept the doctrine in such a bald fashion. But a case in point is found in the following citation from a paper on the use of certain temporal conjunctions in Latin:

So we may, for the purposes of the present discussion, divide the thoughts to be expressed by temporal clauses into two classes—those which are fully matured when expression begins, and those which are not fully matured. In the former, the full bearing of what is to be said, and its internal structure, is clearly evident to the mind, while in the latter it is not yet thus evident, since the culmination in the progress of the thought has not been reached.¹

These remarks are followed by further explanation, wherein it is pointed out that a word like *postquam*, being rather definite and specific, may be chosen by a speaker who apprehends, from the beginning, the drift of what he wants to say; on the other hand, an indefinite word of many meanings, such as *cum*, is a convenient tool for one who starts to speak before he knows exactly whither he is heading. By adopting an indefinite beginning, he leaves it open to himself to give the sentence any desired turn later, as his thought clears up.

If we consider the matter from the point of view of the *hearer* or the *reader*, it is of course true that a more specific word like *postquam* may give a better clue to what is coming than would such an indefinite conjunction as *cum*. But it is perfect absurdity to argue that a given classical author shows a preference for *cum* rather than for *postquam*, because generally he did not have any clear idea of what he wanted to say when he began a sentence.

¹ *Classical Philology*, IV, 257.

Here is a plain matter that might have been handled in a plain and simple way. The attempt to bring psychology into the discussion has not merely failed to shed any light on the subject; it has obscured an issue that otherwise would have been as clear as day.

The whole question of thought and its expression opens up a vast field of inquiry, the surface of which probably is not more than scratched as yet. Only a few remarks are ventured here:

In the first place, behind a simple declaration of fact or belief may lie a perfect network of reasoning that receives no recognition in the words of the speaker.

Conan Doyle gives an odd and unintentional illustration of this in one of his stories of Sherlock Holmes, who is represented as priding himself on the swift and accuracy of his judgments. Confronted by a stranger, he astounds the latter by instantly pronouncing him an army doctor on sick leave from Afghanistan, and then offers the following explanation:

I knew that you came from Afghanistan. From long habit the train of thought ran so swiftly through my brain that I arrived at the conclusion without being conscious of the intermediate steps. There were such steps, however. The train of reasoning ran. 'Here is a gentleman of a medical type, but with the air of a military man. Clearly an army doctor then. He has just come from the tropics, for his face is dark, and that is not the natural tint of his skin; for his wrists are fair. He has undergone hardship and sickness, as his haggard face says clearly. His left arm has been injured. He holds it in a stiff, unnatural manner. Where in the tropics could an English army doctor have seen much hardship and got his arm wounded? Clearly in Afghanistan.' The whole train of thought did not occupy a second. I then remarked that you came from Afghanistan, and you were astonished.

The very fact that the words of this passage were penned without the slightest idea that they would be used in a study of the relation of speech to thought gives them a unique value, even though the statement may not be scientifically correct in every particular.

The outstanding fact in regard to the reasoning outlined is its variety and swiftness. The speed of the original train of thought precludes any association with words, the progress being marked by intuitive leaps and bounds; but its validity is not a whit impaired for that reason.

In the second place, it should be noted that syntax is concerned only with the culminating judgment: "You are an army doctor on sick leave from Afghanistan."

Third, it is singularly unfortunate to apply to this culminating judgment such terms as *Gesamtvorstellung* or 'germ concept'; for it stands out in the speaker's consciousness quite as clearly as any of the previous steps, and he knows just what he wants to say, before he begins to enunciate.

The figure of the spot light may have some proper application, if used in describing the process by which Holmes reviews the earlier intuitive stages of his thought and elucidates them for the benefit of the hearer. But it is quite misleading as applied to the culminating judgment that finds immediate expression in words.

A much better analogy is found in the case of the eye resting upon a picture that is to be described to another person. The eye visions the whole field at a glance, with part related to part. Then come the words that are to transmit the impression to the hearer. In this connection James makes some pertinent remarks:

And has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his *intention of saying a thing* before he has said it? It is an entirely definite intention . . . an absolutely distinct state of consciousness therefore; and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images? Hardly anything! Linger, and the words and things come into the mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is there no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them successively and calls them right if they agree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they do not. It has therefore a nature of its own of the most positive sort, and yet what can we say about it without using words that belong to the later mental facts that replace it? . . . One may admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet articulate.²

² *Principles of Psychology*, I, 253 ff.

In the vast majority of cases the picture to be transmitted is a very simple one; and unquestionably the process of selecting words and phrases to clothe the thought becomes so familiar that the speaker often exercises little or no conscious choice in the matter.

Indeed, so trite are our forms of expression that the hearer often is able to reconstruct the picture before enunciation is complete. There is something more than a jest in the following dialogue culled from the humorous column of a newspaper:

“I really dislike to talk to her; she has such a habit of finishing sentences for one. You know the kind?”

“Yes, they *listen* faster than you can talk to them.”

The closer the scrutiny of this matter, the more difficult it appears to formulate any adequate description of the relation of speech to thought; and the question keeps intruding whether very large practical gain to syntax is to be hoped for through the appeal to psychology.

If, apart from the study of the concrete facts of language, psychology were able to establish some abstract principles to which verbal expression must necessarily conform, the advantage to syntax would be manifest. But there seems no prospect of such a contribution, at least at the present time.

Fortunately, it is not vitally important to syntax to determine the exact relation of the speaker's words and his thought. In each case the essential question is: What is the nature of the train of thought that the speaker is trying to set in motion *in the mind of the hearer*?

It is interesting, of course, to speculate in regard to the speaker's mental processes. But it is necessary to keep quite apart from this the fundamental and basic questions: What does the speaker mean? What ideas is he trying to suggest?

When such questions are answered, the facts brought to light may provide some basis for theory as to the mental activities of the speaker. But that is a case where syntax makes a contribution to psychology, and not vice versa.

CHAPTER V

CONDITIONAL THOUGHT

Consonant with the considerations set down in the previous chapter, the emphasis throughout the following discussion is upon the nature of the thought relations that the speaker attempts to suggest to the hearer. At some points there is a reference to the probable mental picture which represents the speaker's culminating judgment, and which he is engaged in clothing in words.

1. THE ORDER OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT

From the point of view of the hearer at any rate, it is manifest that the primitive and fundamental order of conditional thought is: protasis first, apodosis second; for, in parataxis, it is usually impossible to convey conditional thought except in this order. It follows, too, that the postposition of protasis is a phenomenon made common by advance to the hypotactic stage.

As for the speaker's part, the culminating judgment normally lies clear in his mind (i.e., he knows from the start 'what he intends to say'), whether he puts a hypotactic protasis first or last.

This is easily demonstrable in the case of sentences of distinctive form, as in the contrary to fact construction. For even when the apodosis precedes, the choice of the secondary tense of the subjunctive shows unmistakably that the rest of the sentence is already planned in the mind of the speaker.

The postposition of protasis doubtless at times marks an eleventh-hour adjustment, the speaker adding a qualifying clause to what he had originally planned as a statement of fact or intention.

For example, most promises are really contingent, and they may readily be so understood by both parties. In such cases, as

we say, something 'is taken for granted'; in other words, the speaker's mental picture includes more or less clearly a reservation, and, with a view to making his position perfectly safe, he may decide, after beginning his sentence, to give expression to this element also. The result is a conditional clause appended with proviso effect. In the following passage, a statement thus subject to qualification is contrasted with another in no sense contingent:

Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 171: *Atque etiam hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adiunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et absolutas. Nam aliter dicere solemus: 'Necesse est Casilinenes se dedere Hannibali'; aliter autem: 'Necesse est Casilinum venire, in Hannibalis potestatem.'* Illic in superiore *adiunctio* est haec: 'nisi si malunt fame perire.'¹

Still again, after enunciation has begun, some entirely new factor may emerge from the background of consciousness, forcing an enlargement of the mental picture, or, if the new element is sufficiently incongruous, it might perhaps better be described as calling for a second mental picture. Under these circumstances a subjoined proviso may have the effect of anacoluthon. Such a situation is suggested by the following sentences:

Plautus, *Epid.* 22 ff.:

TH. Advenit simul. EP. Ubi is ergost?—*nisi si* in vidulo
Aut si in mellina *attulisti*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* vi. 3. 2: *Decedes, cum voles—nisi forte iam decessisti.*

Cicero, *Phil.* viii. 24: *Cur autem . . . dabat . . . hominem aedilicium?—si vero tum fuit aedilis, cum eum iussu Antoni in convivio servi publici loris eeciderunt.*

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 4. 40: *Hanc excogitat rationem—si haec ratio potius quam amentia nominanda est.*

Seneca, *de Ben.* ii. 12. 1: *C. Caesar dedit vitam Pompeio Penno—si dat, qui non aufert.*²

¹ Cf. *de Fato* 30 for another statement exempt from limitation.

² Cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 8, and *ad Att.* v. 18. 1. This sort of readjustment on a larger scale may be represented by the following:

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* ii. 78: *Atqui necesse est, cum sint di—si modo sunt—ut profecto sunt—animantis esse.*

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 4: *Illa enim—si modo est ulla virtus—quam dubitationem avunculus tuus, Brute, sustulit—omnia, quae cadere in hominem possunt, subter se habet.*

Cases less abrupt and of a more meditative type are perhaps better punctuated with a semicolon; e.g.

Plautus, *Tri.* 734 ff.:

Parata dos domist; *nisi* expectare vis,
Ut eam sine dote frater nuptum conlocet.

Worthy of mention in this connection are examples in which the hearer adds a proviso to a remark of the previous speaker:

Plautus, *Tri.* 559:

PH. Meusquidem herele numquam fiet. ST. *Si sapiēs* quidem.

But, as already indicated above, there is little chance of reaching solid ground in this matter through speculation as to the minutiae of the mental processes that lie behind the words of the speaker. It is far more practical to try to determine the nature of the impression that he would convey to the hearer. On that basis, probably every condition that carries the implication 'otherwise not' should be classed as a proviso, irrespective of its position in the sentence.³

Since the simplest cases of proviso seem to result from an eleventh-hour readjustment, it may be that postposition should be counted normal for this type of condition. Certainly that order is very effective in ironical exceptions introduced by *nisi vero*, *nisi forte*, and the like.

But, in actual speech, where the proviso implication can be conveyed by tone, the order of clauses usually is an unimportant

³ The implication 'otherwise not' arises from the fact that the statement of the main clause is valid *only* in the case supposed. When a negative is used, the implication must be phrased accordingly.

How far even the earliest Latin literature is removed from first principles in this matter may be seen in a standard form of threat:

Plautus, *Most.* 1066 ff.:

Ego illum ante aedis praestolabor ludificatorem meum,
Quoius ego hodie ludificabor corium, *si vivo*, probe.

There can be little doubt that *si vivo* is properly a limitation of the proviso type. But the use has become phraseological, and the condition practically means "as sure as I live," without a thought of 'otherwise not.'

factor. For the reader, even the context often is a sufficient guide; e.g.

Tacitus, *Agr.* 40. 2: Credidere plerique libertum . . . missum ad Agricola[m] codicillos, quibus ei Syria dabatur, tulisse, eum eo praecepto ut, *si* in Britannia foret, traderentur.

The point of this rumor is that Domitian desired to separate Agricola from his army in Britain, and that appointment to Syria was a bribe, to be used in case of need, to lure him out of his province. The *si*-clause thus answers to the proviso test; for the patent was to be delivered to Agricola, if he was still in Britain, otherwise not.

All this is clear from the context, though the written form cannot reproduce the peculiar flexion of the emperor's tone in the words in which he might be supposed to give the order to his freedman; e.g., *Si in provincia erit, hos trade.*

General flexibility in the matter of placing proviso clauses is indicated by the fact that first place is readily accorded the condition in certain phraseological expressions; e.g.

If he is anything, he is good.

The phraseological character of this expression is sufficiently attested by the fact that the conditional sentence is used as a sort of roundabout way of conveying a judgment that might have been given a more direct and simpler expression; e.g., "Goodness is his outstanding quality." Such turns are no rarity in Latin:

Plautus, *Pseud.* 905 ff.:

Si umquam quemquam di immortales voluere esse auxilio adiutum, Tum me et Calidorum servatum volunt.

Cicero, *p. Flacc.* 9: Nam *si* quis *umquam* de nostris hominibus a genere isto studio ac voluntate non abhorrens *fuit*, me . . . esse arbitror.

Cicero, *Frag. Phil. F.* ix. 11 (M): Quod*si* ullum *umquam* animal consecrandum *fuit*, illud profecto *fuit*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* i. 16. 1: Quod*si* tibi *umquam* *sum* visus in re publica fortis, certe me in illa causa admiratus esses.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 199: Quod*si* *umquam* populo Romano concessum *esset*, ut iure incitatus videretur . . . nullam illa causa iustiore[m] fuisse (egi).

In connection with the subject of *provisos*, a word should be added in regard to what has been called the adversative use of *nisi*; e.g.

Terence, *Eun.* 826 ff.:

TH. Quam ob rem adductast? PY. Nescio,

Nisi amasse credo Pamphilam.

Some have held that, in sentences of this sort, the force of *nisi* is not far removed from that of an adversative like *sed*,⁴ supporting such interpretation by the development of meaning that makes it possible for *quamquam* and *etsi* to introduce corrective clauses syntactically independent.⁵

But both *quamquam* and *etsi* have progressed far beyond their etymological meaning when they acquire the force of 'yet,' becoming thus fitted to introduce coördinate clauses.⁶ In the use under discussion it would be hard to demonstrate that *nisi* exceeds the bounds of the general meaning 'excepting.' See the example above cited, and also the following:

Plautus, *Bacch.* 324:

Profecto de auro nil scio, *nisi nescio*.⁷

⁴ Cf. C. Lindskog, *De Enunitatis apud Plautum et Terentium Conditionalibus* (Lundae, 1895), p. 130 (. . . quibus gradibus hic usus ita progressus sit, ut *nisi* ad similitudinem particulae *sed* tantum non perveniret).

⁵ Idem., *Quaestiones de Parataxi et Hypotaxi apud Priscos Latinos* (Lundae, 1896), p. 57.

⁶ Cf. an interesting intermediate case:

Plautus, *Tri.* 600 ff.:

Ibo hue quo mi imperatumst, *etsi* odi hanc domum,
Postquam exturbavit hic nos nostris aedibus.

⁷ A nearer approach to adversative force in *nisi* is perhaps to be recognized in the rude language of Cato, who sometimes uses this particle with an imperative; e.g.

R. R. 89: Eodem modo anserem alito, *nisi* prius dato bibere et bis in die, bis escam.

Cato has described the care of chickens; now he turns to the goose. It may satisfy the demands of logic to interpret *nisi* as *sed*; but it is far more likely that *nisi* even here (albeit uncouthly) holds to its excepting function: "In like manner provide for the goose, *excepting* first give it to drink," etc.

It is significant, perhaps, that the Roman impulse toward clarity results in expressions in which *nisi* has normal force; e.g.

Plautus, *Rud.* 1024 ff.:

Nescio; neque ego istas vostras leges urbanas scio,
Nisi quia hunc meum esse scio.

Plautus, *Truc.* 785 ff.:

Etiamnum quid sit negoti falsus incertusque sum,
Nisi quia timeo tamen.

On the whole, it seems likely that the *nisi*-clauses in the sentences first cited above are to be classed as *provisos*.⁸ In extreme cases possibly *anacoluthon* should be recognized; e.g.

Plautus, *Rud.* 750 ff.:

Nam huic alterae quae patria sit profecto nescio—
Nisi scio probiorem hanc esse quam te, inpuratissime.

2. THE MODES OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT

Aside from *proviso* periods, it is the general function of a conditional sentence to inform the hearer that the realization in fact of one thing involves also a second thing. Just how the second thing is involved, a word like 'if' or *si* cannot indicate. But that the sequences are varied will be seen at once by comparing the two following sentences:

If he has done this, I shall punish him.

If the horse is in the stable, John has returned.

In the first of these examples there is a *nexus* of cause and effect; in the other, there is ground and inference. In regard to both it should be noted that the *nexus* itself is just as strong and valid as it could be in any type of sentence. The uncertainty inherent in the conditional form turns on the question whether or not there is a basal fact to serve as foundation for the sequence.

⁸ They are not normal examples, however; for *nisi* is verging away from pure conditional meaning to the adverbial sense.

In other words, while in hypotactic constructions generally it falls to the introductory particle to indicate the nature of the nexus, 'if' and *si* exhaust their force in throwing the whole situation into the realm of hypothesis, and the type of nexus is necessarily left unmarked.⁹ The more important varieties follow:

a. Causal

Examples under this head involve a cause and effect relation, whose functioning is contingent upon the coming to pass of the thing supposed in the condition.

It might be expected that the protasis would stand first in this use; but, thanks to the development of hypotactic conditional speaking, either order may be used; e.g.

Plautus, *Rud.* 1103:

Dixi equidem; sed *si* parum intellexti, dicam denuo.

Plautus, *Amph.* 857:

AL. Abin hinc a me, dignus domino servos? SO. Abeo, *si* iubes.

The second of these examples is particularly satisfactory. For the context shows clearly that *si iubes* is merely a conventional litotes for a *cum*-clause which would have made explicit the cause and effect nexus.

In the following passage there may be no conventional litotes in the use of *si*; but the fact that the condition is balanced by parallel *quod*-clauses indicates the nexus very plainly:

Cicero, *de Har. Resp.* 46: illos homines sapientissimos
 miror, *primum quod* quemquam clarum hominem violari
 facile patiuntur, *deinde si* existimant maledictis posse
 dignitatem violari, *postremo quod* non sentiunt impetus
 in se ipsos posse converti.

⁹ This is strictly true of the written word. Perhaps some slight modification of the statement might be required in the case of actual speech.

It is the aim of this discussion to outline only the main features of the subject. Thus the interrogative form and the use of volitive expressions in apodosis are not given special or exhaustive treatment.

So in another example, where the actual state of affairs is set over against a contrary to fact construction:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xv. 13. 3: *Si* alii consules essent, ad te potissimum, Paule, mitterem, ut eos mihi quam amicissimos redderes; nunc, *cum* tua summa potestas . . . sit, vehementer te rogo, ut . . . eures decernendum de meis rebus gestis.

The speaker here states that an unrealized circumstance *would* lead to a certain course of action; and a realized circumstance *does* lead to another course of action. There is a somewhat more complicated but similar situation in another very familiar passage:

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 17: *si* me meis civibus iniuria suspectum tam graviter . . . viderem, carere me aspectu civium quam infestis omnium oculis conspici mallet; tu, *cum* conscientia scelerum tuorum agnosceas odium omnium iustum . . . , dubitas, quorum mentes sensusque volneras, eorum aspectum . . . vitare?

It is likely that the modes of conditional thought do not stand out in high relief in the mind either of speaker or hearer. But they have to be reckoned with, nevertheless, whenever the conditional clause is used by litotes for a more explicit construction.

So easily does the *si*-clause lend itself to such applications that its choice seems due at times merely to caprice or to a desire for variety of expression; cf.

Horace, *Ep.* ii. 2. 175 ff.:

Sic, *quia* perpetuus nulli datur usum et heres
 Heredem alterius velut unda supervenit undam,
 Quid vici prosunt aut horrea? Quidve Calabris
 Saltibus adiecti Lucani, *si* metit Orcus
 Grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro?

Certainly the poet is no less sure that death reaps great and small than he is that perpetual lease of life is given to none; for these are merely two ways of saying the same thing. It is true that the chiasmatic order of the passage would render a repetition of *quia* awkward. But metrical considerations do not force the use of *si*; for *cum* (*metat*) would fit perfectly. The choice of the conditional form must therefore be counted arbitrary.

In like manner, in the following passage *quia* . . . *si* is used where *quia* . . . *quia* would have been more symmetrical:

Cicero, *p. Deio*. 23: . . . an Caecilium istum magnum hominem putabat? quem profecto is, qui optime nostros homines novit, vel *quia* non nosset, vel *si* nosset, contemneret.

Caecilium is being handled rather roughly here. The speaker means to say that being a nobody (*quia non nosset*) and being too well known (*si nosset*) were all one so far as winning the king's contempt was concerned.

Aside from the matter of variety of expression, the litotes of a conditional form is sometimes made to serve a rhetorical or dramatic purpose. Thus in many languages there is a tendency, in prayer and entreaty, for the speaker to set forth his deservings in hypothetical form; e.g.

If I have lived justly and righteously, grant me this boon.¹⁰

This principle is applied in sentences like the following:

Terence, *Heaut.* 1024 ff.:

Si umquam ullum fuit tempus, mater, quom ego voluptati tibi
Fuerim, dictus filius tuos vestra voluntate, obsecro,
Eius ut meminere atque inopis nunc te miserescat mei.

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 144: Rogat oratque te, Chryso-gone, *si* nihil de patris fortunis amplissimis in suam rem convertit, *si* nulla in re te fraudavit, . . . ut sibi per te liceat . . . vitam in egestate degere.

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 10: Simul illud oro, *si* meam cum in omni vita tum in dicendo moderationem modestiamque cognostis, ne me hodie . . . oblitum esse putetis mei.¹¹

¹⁰ A striking foil to this artificial use of the conditional particle is found in asseverations; e.g.

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 833 ff.:

PA. Neque tu bibisti? LV. De me perdant, *si* bibi,
Si bibere potui.

Here there is no litotes in the use of the conditional form; indeed, the speaker would have the hearer believe that the thing named in the condition could not possibly be true.

¹¹ Similar litotes is found in another sentence which does not illustrate any of the standard modes, *si* being used as a substitute for *quod* in the sense 'as for the fact that':

Terence, *Adel.* 103 ff.:

Haec *si* neque ego neque tu fecimus,
Non siit egestas facere nos. Tu nunc tibi
Id laudi ducis quod tum fecisti inopia?

The question with which this passage closes shows very clearly that *si* is not chosen because there is any real doubt as to the fact of the matter.

In regard to negative sentences that illustrate this mode, careful distinction must be made between two types:

The normal type represents the doing of one thing as resulting in the non-doing of another; e.g.

If the money is collected in that way, A will not contribute.

As contrasted with this, Latin is rather fond of a special type in which a negative affects the whole sentence, inasmuch as it denies the working of the cause and effect relation itself; e.g.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 170: *Non si* Opimium defendisti, Carbo, *idcirco* te isti bonum civem putabunt.

Terence, *Heaut.* 1035 ff.:

Non, si ex capite sis meo
Natus, item ut Minervam esse aiunt ex Iove, *ea causa* magis
Patiar, Clitipho, flagitiis tuis me infamem fieri.

In the first of these sentences, Carbo is being told that the defense of Opimius will *not* result in establishing his reputation as a good citizen. In both, the presence of *idcirco* and *ea causa* in apodosis leaves no room for doubt as to the nature of the thought to be conveyed.¹²

b. Circumstantial

This category is somewhat like the preceding in that the mode has to do with a sequence in which one action paves the way for another. The difference is that the causal mode involves an ultimate cause, whereas here it is an immediate or exciting cause merely, i.e., a circumstance that precipitates the effect of the ultimate cause; e.g.

If he ventures to return home today, he will be punished.

This does not mean, of course, that the person referred to will be punished for coming home, but that this circumstance will usher in the punishment for an offense previously committed, the latter being the ultimate cause.

¹² Without these expressions, some might be tempted to find concessive force in *si*; cf., however, Martial, xiv. 62. 1.

The nexus of this mode is of the same order as that seen in circumstantial-temporal sentences with the conjunction *cum*. The point is well illustrated by a sentence in which the speaker begins with a *si*-clause, and then corrects to a *cum*-clause, because, as he explains in a parenthesis, it is not a hypothesis but a certainty with which he is dealing:

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 100: quae, *si* prodierit, atque adeo *cum* prodierit (scio enim proditurum esse), audiet.

Obviously the inner nexus is not disturbed by the shift from hypothesis to the recognition of a basis of fact.¹³

In this group, too, there is some tendency to use *si*, by a sort of litotes, when there is no real doubt as to the state of the case:

Plautus, *Aul.* 355 ff.:

STR. Qui? STA. Quia temeti nil allatum intellego.

STR. At iam adferetur, *si* a foro ipse redierit.

The speaker, of course, does not mean to imply a doubt as to the return of Megadorus; he would say that Megadorus and the wine will come in company. The use of *cum* would have been quite in order.¹⁴

In like manner, *si prius* may be substituted for a word meaning 'after'; e.g.

Auct. ad Her. i. 25: Nunc quo modo eas . . . tractari conveniat demonstrandum est, *si prius* aperuerimus quid oporteat . . . destinari.¹⁵

Again, *si* appears at times to be virtually a litotes for 'as soon as':

Catullus, 14. 17 ff.:

Nam, *si* luxerit, ad librariorum

Curram serinia.

¹³ So also in *Verr.* ii. 3. 70.

¹⁴ In this connection, interest attaches to a passage penned by Cicero in one of his depressed moments, wherein he remarks that he finds great consolation in the thought that, so long as he lives, he will have the support of a good conscience, and, when dead, he will have no consciousness at all. The balance is marked by *dum . . . si*:

ad Fam. vi. 3, 4: Nec enim, *dum* ero, angar ulla re . . . , et, *si* non ero, sensu omnino carebo.

¹⁵ Cf. Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 1.

The poet, of course, does not mean to imply a doubt as to the coming of the morrow's light, though he is impatient for its coming.¹⁶

c. Inferential

Here the nexus is that of ground and inference. Though complicated by the contrary to fact idea, the following is a very satisfactory case:

Catullus, 83, 3 ff.:

Mule, nihil sentis. *Si* nostri oblita taceret,
Sana esset. Nunc quod gannit et obloquitur,
Non solum meminit, sed, quae multo acrior est res,
Irata est; hoc est, uritur et loquitur.

In this ode the poet is ridiculing the husband of Lesbia, because he takes at face value her railings against the writer of the verses. For, says Catullus, silence and forgetfulness on her part would be evidence that she was fancy free, whereas her violent protestations show that she is interested.

Hence the conditional sentence may be rendered: "If she were silent and forgetful of me, *it would follow that* she is heart-whole,"—the state of affairs supposed in the protasis being made the basis of an inference.

So in sentences not involving the contrary to fact notion; e.g.

Cicero, *de Fato* 15: *Si* cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrim.

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 44: Necessarie demonstrantur ea, quae aliter ac dicuntur nec fieri nec probari possunt, hoc modo: 'Si peperit, cum viro conebuit.'

This second passage introduces one of the commonplaces of argument. As showing the nexus, it is worth noting that, a few pages later, the writer has occasion to use the same illustration, and there cites in the following form:

'*Quoniam* peperit, cum viro conebuit' (§74).

¹⁶ Cf. Cicero, *ad Att.* xii. 14. 3 (*si descripserint librarii*). So *nisi* is a sort of offset for 'until' in Martial, vii. 96. 7.

The following example is very clear, though somewhat complicated by being based on converses:

Cicero, *Phil.* iv. 8: *Si* consul Antonius, Brutus hostis; *si* conservator rei publicae Brutus, hostis Antonius.¹⁷

In argumentation generally, there is a strong tendency once again to resort to litotes through the use of a conditional sentence with inferential mode in cases where there is no doubt at all in the mind of the speaker as to the validity of the premise; e.g.

Auct. ad Her. iv. 33: Ergo, *si* his rationibus locupletatus non est (sicut omnes videtis), aut isti domi nascitur aurum aut unde non est licitum pecunias cepit.

The interjection of the words *sicut omnes videtis* indicates very clearly that the use of the conditional form here is a mere convention.¹⁸

A more elaborate scheme is seen in the following sentences, where the speaker first outlines his argument in hypothetical form, and then appends a note of the q. e. d. order, to the effect that the premise is a fact, hence also the conclusion:

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 27: . . . quod, *si* ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum *si* ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. *Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum.*

Cicero, *Top.* 53: *Si* pecunia signata argentum est, legata est mulieri. *Est autem pecunia signata argentum. Legata igitur est.*¹⁹

Incidentally, no better demonstration than this could be given of the presence of the inferential nexus which characterizes the conditional mode now under discussion.

In another case somewhat like those last cited, brevity is attained by incorporating *igitur* in the apodosis:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 59: quodsi melius geruntur ea, quae consilio, quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius administratur, quam omnis mundus, consilio *igitur* mundus administratur.

¹⁷ Cf. *de Orat.* ii. 169 fin.

¹⁸ Cf. the effect of similarly interjected clauses in Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 92, and *de Off.* i. 153.

¹⁹ Cf. *de Nat. D.* iii. 30, *Top.* 10.

Another device that serves to stress the nexus of the inferential mode is the use of verbs such as *oportet*, *necesse est*, and *sequitur*. This is done, however, at the expense of increasing grammatical complexity:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 84: Quoniam habes istum equum, aut emeris oportet aut hereditate possideas aut munere acceperis aut dominatus sit, aut, *si* eorum nihil est, surripueris *necesse est*.

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 47: *Si* multus erat in caleeis pulvis, ex itinere eum venire *oportebat*.

Cicero, *de Fato* 28: *Si* hoc enuntiatum: 'Veniet in Tusculanum Hortensius' verum non est, *sequitur*, ut falsum sit.

In the first of these passages, the balance of *Quoniam oportet* and *si necesse est* should not pass unnoticed.

Though in general easily detected, there are examples of the inferential mode that require careful scrutiny for their identification; e.g.

Cicero, *de Fato* 12: Sint igitur astrologorum percepta huius modi: 'Si quis verbi causa oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur.'

Standing alone, this conditional sentence might mean (*a*) that the influence of Canicula insures a man against death at sea (causal mode), or (*b*) that his nativity is a ground for assuming such security (inferential mode). The context shows that the sentence is a sample of the rules whereby astrologers make their predictions, which seems to turn the balance in favor of the inferential interpretation.

In dealing with sentences that exhibit this mode also, two types of the negative must be sharply distinguished:

The normal type introduces a ground that supports a negative conclusion:

If he carried no weapon, he did not attempt to kill the king.²⁰

On the other hand, a single negative may affect the whole sentence, denying the soundness of the inference itself; e.g.

²⁰ Cf. the analogous situation noted on p. 49.

Cicero, *de Fato* 9: Non enim, *si* alii ad alia propensiores sunt propter causas naturalis et antecedentis, *idcirco* etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque adpetitionum sunt causae naturales et antecedentes.²¹

The inferential group includes several other subtypes, chief among them that of the *a fortiori* variety:

Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 29: Quae *si* populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt, quid debent putare singuli?

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 105: Quae (turpitudine) *si* in deformitate corporis habet aliquid offensiois, quanta illa depravatio et foeditas turpificati animi debet videri!

In both these examples, the use of *si* is purely conventional; for the reference is to admitted facts. The exact form of expression in such cases is illustrated by the following:

Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 40: *Cum* igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia . . . fore putamus?

The following examples have real conditional force:

Terence, *And.* 110 ff.:

Sic cogitabam; 'Hic parvae consuetudinis
Causa huius mortem tam fert familiariter;
Quid *si* ipse amasset?'

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 42. 7: Invenit aemulos etiam infelix nequitia;
quid *si* floreat vigeatque?

Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 34. 10: Vix praesenti custodia manere inlaesa
coniugia; quid fore, *si* per plures annos in modum discidii obli-
terentur?

Analogous sentences marking a descending scale seem far less common:

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 252: Quod *si* in gestu . . . et in voce . . .
elaborare nobis non licet, ac tantum in utroque assequi possumus,
quantum in hac acie cotidiani muneris spatii nobis datur, *quanto*
minus est ad iuris civilis perdiscendi occupationem descendendum?

²¹ So *de Orat.* ii. 199, p. *Sex. Rosc.* 94, and *de Fin.* iv. 30, all with *non continuo*. Likewise without *non*, in rhetorical question, *Tusc. Disp.* iii. 40, and Horace, *Serm.* ii. 3. 159 ff.

Another rather closely related subtype takes the following form:

If this does not help us, nothing will.

Such sentences are not infrequent in Latin. The apodosis may be a rhetorical question with negative implication:

Cicero, *ad Att.* xiv. 1. 1: Etenim, *si* ille tali ingenio exitum non reperiebat, quis nunc reperiet?

Cicero, *Phil.* i. 35: *Si* enim exitus C. Caesaris efficere non potest, ut malis carus esse quam metui, nihil cuiusquam perficiet . . . oratio.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 127: Quid est, quod planum fieri testibus possit, *si* hoc non fit?

Terence, *Heaut.* 202:

Pateretur; nam quem ferret, *si* parentem non ferret suum?²²

Finally, it must be noted that there is occasional use of distorted or imperfect forms; e.g.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 165: . . . ut Carbo: "*Sei* consul est, qui consulit patriae, quid aliud fecit Opimius?"

This extract from the defense of Opimius is cited without context by Cicero, as illustrating a typical form of argument. The general meaning is clear enough; Carbo is making the point that the motive of Opimius' action justified his course.

But this is not accurately set forth. Moreover, the two parts of the sentence are not related as protasis and apodosis. The first clause represents the major premise, the second the minor premise, and it is left to the hearer to draw the all important conclusion; e.g. "If he is a consul who 'consults' his country's interests [and] if Opimius did just this, [it follows that his course was justified]."

²² Cicero himself attempts something in the way of classification of subtypes in *de Orat.* ii. 168 ff.; cf. *Top.* 88.

d. Predicating

This term is designed to suit the thought-nexus that appears in a familiar type of sentence introduced by *cum* or *quod*:

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 21: De te autem, Catilina, *cum* quiescunt, probant, *cum* patiuntur, decernunt, *cum* tacent, clamant.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xii. 14. 3: *Quod* me ab hoc maerore recreari vis, facis ut omnia.

Transferred to the realm of hypothesis, this nexus inheres in sentences like the following:

Plautus, *Bacch.* 1165:

Si amant, sapienter faciunt.

Plautus, *Men.* 126:

Nam *si* foris cenat, profecto me, haud uxorem, ulciscitur.

Plautus, *Most.* 241 ff.:

Edepol *si* summo Iovi bono argento sacrificassem

Pro illius capite quod dedi, numquam aequè id bene locassem.²³

The difference between this mode and the inferential may be illustrated as follows:

Suppose that some plan has been suggested by a person notably incompetent. Without hearing what the plan is, another might say:

If he made the suggestion, it is worthless.

This is clearly a case of inference from a premise.

On the other hand, in a discussion of Plato's views, we might find such an expression as:

Si ita sentit, errat

Here is a very different situation. The fact that Plato holds some view creates no presumption that the view is mistaken; indeed if it were a matter of inference, the presumption would be quite the reverse.

²³ Some may be inclined to feel concessive force in this example; but see the discussion of Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 116, on. p. 58.

But it is not a question of inference at all. The speaker's remark is based on the judgment: "This particular view (if Plato's) is mistaken." In other words, the apodosis represents the predicate of a judgment of the form "A is B," hence the heading "Predicating" adopted for this section. For the inferential mode, the formula is "A; *therefore* B."

The nature of the predicating nexus can be illustrated also by way of a familiar aphorism:

Humanum est errare.

If this statement is particularized, it may take various forms, hypothetical or otherwise; e.g.

Cum errat, humaniter facit
Si errat, humaniter facit

But, whatever the form, there still underlies a simple judgment of the type "A is B."

Cicero's works show rather frequent use of conditional sentences of the predicating type, a few of which are here subjoined:

ad Fam. viii. 16. 1: *Si* existimas eandem rationem fore Caesaris in dimittendis adversariis . . . , erras.²⁴

de Fin. ii. 21: Idque *si* ita dicit, . . . dicit absurde.

p. Sest. 100: Hanc ego viam . . . *si* . . . asperam . . . esse . . . negem, mentiar.

ad Att. xvi. 2. 6: Feceris mihi gratum, *si* ante eo veneris, quam. . .

ad Fam. v. 17. 4: Sed tamen prudentissime facies, *si* illius pietatem . . . tecum esse duces.

p. Planc. 46: Quos tu *si* sodalis vocas, officiosam amicitiam nomine inquinans criminosis.

in Cat. i. 28: Praeclaram vero populo Romano refert gratiam, . . . *si* propter invidiam . . . salutem civium tuorum negligis.

Phil. xiii. 15: Haec *si* cogitas, es M. Lepidus, pontifex maximus.

Tusc. Disp. v. 117: Magnum vero . . . effecisti, *si* cantharidis vim consecutus es.

in Verr. ii. 2. 140: *Si* tibi magistratum abrogasset, minore ignominia te affecisset, quam cum. . .

p. Sex. Rosc. 124: *Si* enim taceo, vel maximam partem relinquo.

ad Att. vi. 1. 26: Num inepti fuerimus, *si* nos quoque Academiae fecerimus?

²⁴Written by Caelius.

In the following passage the mode is made to serve a legal turn:

Cicero, *p. Caec.* 37: Deicior ego, . . . *si* quis meorum deicitur omnino.

Negative sentences of this type are for the most part quite regular; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Lig.* 14: *Si* clamare coepisses: 'C. Caesar, cave ignoscas,' *nonne* omnem humanitatem exuisses?

Cicero, *ad Fam.* i. 8. 2: *neque* errarent adversarii eius, *si* pugnare desisterent.

Cicero, *Phil.* ix. 6: At ille eum videret, *si* vestrae auctoritati *non* paruisset, dissimilem se futurum sui, maluit videri rei publicae profuisse.²⁵

Sometimes there is a double apodosis, combining positive and negative:

Cicero, *de Orat.* iii. 55: quarum virtutum expertibus *si* dicendi copiam tradiderimus, *non* eos quidem oratores effecerimus, sed furentibus quaedam arma dederimus.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 25: Hoc *si non* utor, *non* tibi iniuriam facio, sed de meo iure aliquid et commodo detraho.

There still remains for consideration a case showing the combination *etiam si*:

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 116: Socium cavere qui possumus? Quem *etiam si* metuimus, ius officii laedimus.

The speaker is discussing the intimate association of partners. Certainly the sentence marked by *etiam si* is not concessive. Rather, Cicero means to say that *even* suspicion of a partner is unfaithfulness to the tie. In other words, *etiam* functions toward the *si*-clause as it often does toward nouns. This can be made clearer by recasting in the infinitive form; e.g.

Quem *etiam* metuere contra officium est.²⁶

²⁵ Cf. also Plautus, *Most.* 241 ff., already cited above.

²⁶ This analysis seems preferable to the assumption that *Quem etiam si metuimus* represents *Quem si etiam metuimus*, by hyperbaton. In either case the mode is the same. For the use of *etiam si* in non-concessive connections, cf. Cicero, *Cato M.* 21.

In another passage without *etiam* the thought is somewhat similar:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* iv. 14. 1: Ne vestigium quidem ullum est reliquum nobis dignitatis, agiturque praeclare, *si* nosmet ipsos regere possumus, ut ea, quae adsunt, moderate feramus.

The writer's feelings are at a low ebb here; under the existing circumstances, *even* keeping himself in hand is 'doing well.'

CHAPTER VI

SPECIAL USES OF THE CONDITIONAL PARTICLES

1. ADVERSATIVE

The first shading off in the direction of the adversative use seems to be found in conditional sentences which have in the apodosis a word like *etiam* or *quoque*. The introduction of this factor is favorable to the setting up of a very distinct balance between certain elements of the protasis and apodosis; e.g.

If the *Spanish* side with us, the *Africans* will also.

Latin examples of this sort are not uncommon.

Cicero, *de Fin.* iii. 47: Si *bona valetudo* pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, *sapientiae quoque usus* longissimus quisque sit plurimi.

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 78: Si *Stoicis* concedis, ut *virtus sola*, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis *etiam Peripateticis*.

It is clear at a glance that the nexus in sentences of this type is the same as that of the modes described in the previous chapter; hence it is not possible to recognize a new mode here.

At the same time, a disturbing influence has entered, the effects of which can be studied to advantage in connection with the following example:

[Cicero] *proid. Exil.* 25: Si C. Mario auxilio fuistis, quod in clivo Capitolino improborum civium fecerat caedem, si P. Scipioni, quod Hannibalis furibundam mentem a vestris reppulit templis, si denique Cn. Pompeio, quod terra marique hostes reddidit pccatos, *sic* nunc in meis calamitatibus aliquam ferte opem divinam; *ut* saepe multorum in periculis fecistis, *sic* nunc in meis miseriis divinum aliquod auxilium et numen ostendite.

As the period begins, the reader is conscious of a causal nexus ('Since you have helped others, I beg you help me'), the more so, perhaps, because the *si*-clauses again by a conventional litotes are used where the speaker means to imply no doubt as to the fact.

Though neither *etiam* or *quoque* is here used, the meaning very obviously is: "I beg that you help me *also*"; and the balance between 'their case' and 'my case' leads to the rare choice of *sic* as a correlative for *si*.

But it is the closing sentence that reveals most strikingly the profound character of the disturbance. There the speaker sums up what he has already said; and, as he abandons the litotes of the *si*-clause, the causal nexus at the beginning of the passage might seem to point to the choice of *cum* here. But the current has been turned into a new channel, and comparative *ut* is the word selected: "As you have often done in the case of others' perils, so now in mine vouchsafe some divine aid and support."

When the balance of parity gives way to the balance of contrast, the conditional period merges into the adversative period; e.g.

If *you* have been a good teacher, *I* have been a good pupil.

So in Latin:

Plautus, *Rud.* 1014:

Sei tu *proreta* isti navi es, ego *gubernator* ero.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 169: Si *barbarorum* est in diem vivere, *nostra consilia* sempiternum tempus spectare debent.

2. CONCESSIVE

The concessive period, also, is often marked by clearly contrasted elements, and it is not always easy to distinguish it from the purely adversative type.

But a really concessive period is characterized by the fact that the conclusion resists the result that would naturally flow from the admission or assumption made in the protasis; i.e., it

asserts that something still holds, despite that admission or assumption; e.g.

Plautus, *St.* 43 ff.:

Et si illi improbi sint atque aliter
Nos faciant quam aequomst
Nostrum officium meminisse decet.¹

These words are spoken by one of two wives who are discussing the shortcomings of their husbands. There certainly is an adversative balance; but something more is involved also. The duty of wives is declared to be unaltered, despite a condition that might seem to justify a weakening.²

In detecting concessive periods introduced by the simple conditional particle, the hearer has a great advantage over the reader, in that he is helped by the intonation. This will at once appear, if the two following sentences are read aloud with care to bring out fully the exact meaning:

If I were immensely rich, I should help them all.
If I were immensely rich, I should be as frugal as I am now.

¹ Cf. Terence, *Hec.* 648 ff.

² In Chapters I and II it was shown that the attempt to 'evolve' conditional speaking out of some other kind of relation is both unnecessary and mistaken.

The concessive use of the subjunctive might seem at first sight to open a way of escape for those committed to the evolutionary view; for since the 'apodosis' may assert that something holds true in spite of an admission, there is no necessary ellipsis in case an 'independent subjunctive' stands in the room of 'protasis'; e.g.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 5. 4: *Sit fur, sit sacrilegus, flagitiorum omnium vitiorumque princeps; at est bonus imperator.*

It must be noted, however, that this employment of the subjunctive is highly rhetorical, and a natural product of later usage. Moreover, to evolve conditional speaking along this route would be to assume that the concessive period antedated the conditional.

In the more developed period of the language, it is easy to see how words like *quamvis* and *licet* might come to mark a hypotactic relation through such rhetorical use of the subjunctive as has just been illustrated. For there is an obvious point of contact between real concession (i.e., willingness that a thing happen), and a rhetorical concession (i.e., willingness to entertain the idea); but the development of hypotactic function on the part of *si* in earlier times is a very different matter.

As for *quamvis*, the final stages of development to full hypotaxis are perhaps illustrated by occasional examples in early Latin; e.g.

Plautus, *Bacch.* 82:

Locus hic apud nos, *quamvis* subito *venias*, semper liber est.

In this way the hearer is at once set upon the right track, whereas the reader must suspend judgment until the second part of the sentence is reached. There the introduction of a marker like 'still' (*tamen*) frequently hastens his decision.

In the following passage there is a curious and interesting complication:

Auct. ad Her. i. 16: Veri similis narratio erit, si, ut mos, ut opinio, ut natura postulat, dicemus. . . . *Si vera res erit, nihilo minus* haec omnia narrando conservanda sunt.

This passage has to do with rules for composition. The first sentence concerns fictitious topics; and, on the face of it, *Si vera res sit* is an alternative condition: "If you're to deal with reality."

The reader, therefore, is prepared for a variant precept; but, stumbling over *nihilo minus*, he finds that the same rule is still to hold. In other words, the sentence ends with the apodosis of a concessive period.

Possibly this use of the *si-clause* might be counted a case of ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, and it is likely that here the spoken form would be little clearer than the written; for the *si-clause* must first function as an alternative condition.

The more distinctive compounds of *si* (such as *ctiamsi*, *etsi*, *tametsi*) have rather overshadowed the concessive use of the simple particle. As a matter of fact the latter is very common. Examination of about five hundred Ciceronian contrary to fact sentences shows that there approximately one *si-clause* in seven is concessive; e.g.

in Verr. ii. 3. 169: *Si* hercle te tuam pecuniam . . . in provincia faeneratum docerem, *tamen* effugere non posses.

p. Sulla 71: Huius *si* causa non manifestissimis rebus teneretur, *tamen* eum mores ipsius ac vita convinceret.

de Har. Resp. 54: ad quem metum *si* deorum monitis non duceremur, *tamen* ipsi nostro sensu coniecturaque raperemur.

Hypotaetic concessive clauses of all sorts may be divided roughly into two groups; (*a*) those which mark a hypothetical concession, and (*b*) those which concede a thing to be a fact: e.g.

Though he *may be* a bad man, still he is a good general.

Though he *is* a bad man, still he is a good general.

Naturally, concessive *si*-clauses belong mostly to the first of these classes. Either mood of the verb may be used. The following examples are interesting because in both the speaker takes special pains to make it clear that he does *not* admit the truth of the assumption:

Cicero, *p. Balb.* 37: *Quodsi iam ita esset, ut esse non potest, tamen de nostra maiestate, nihil de illorum caveretur.*

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 151: *Si meherecule, id quod fieri non posse intellego, ex his te laqueis exueris . . . , in illas tibi maiores plagas incidendum est.*³

On the principle of conventional litotes, certain indicative *si*-clauses fall within the second group of concessive constructions, namely, those which admit something to be a fact. Note the defining parenthesis in the following:

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 49: *Si Plato de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus, quod ego concedo, . . . oratio quidem ipsa propria est huius unius rationis, de qua loquimur.*⁴

Since *si* with the indicative may belong to either group, it is not always easy to single out the examples in which the speaker means to make a virtual admission of fact, using *si* as a conventional litotes for *etsi*. Cases with defining parenthesis, like the last cited, are very illuminating; but often the interpretation has to be based on the general context; e.g.

Plautus, *Tri.* 507 ff.:

Sed *si* haec res graviter cecidit stultitia mea,
Philto, est ager sub urbe hic nobis; eum dabo
Dotem sorori.

³ So. *p. Sulla* 22, *de Dom.* 31; cf. *de Div.* ii. 131.

⁴ Another similar passage with parenthetic clause has a curious complication:

Cicero, *Phil.* x. 18: *Quorum (veteranorum) etiamsi amplecterer virtutem, ut facio, tamen, si essent adrogantes, non possem ferre fastidium.*

It would seem, at first sight, that there is a flat contradiction here. The contrary to fact concessive clause appears to deny the feeling which the parenthesis admits.

The probable explanation is that the speaker really wanted to say *etiamsi amplector virtutem*, but leveled the phrase automatically to the imperfect subjunctive in deference to what was to follow. Having thus treated it as grammatically subordinate, he was obliged to add the parenthetic clause to prevent misunderstanding. For another case of parenthetic correction, cf. *in Pis.* 43.

These words are spoken by a young man who has wasted his property, and is now confronted with the problem of providing a suitable dowry for his sister. His attitude in the passage as a whole is not one of evasion; he everywhere admits his culpability in the matter of squandering his property. Hence the *si*-clause probably is to be interpreted as an admission of fact. So with the epitaph of Phaethon:

Ovid, *Met.* ii. 327 ff.:

Hic situs est Phaethon, currus auriga paterni;
Quem *si* non tenuit, magnis tamen excidit ausis.

In the following there is greater complication:

Plautus, *Amph.* 904 ff.:

A.L. Nam certo, si sis sanus aut sapias satis,
Quam tu inpudicam esse arbitrere et praedices,
Cum ea tu sermonem nec ioco nec serio
Tibi habeas, nisi magis sis stultior stultissimo.
IV. *Si* dixi, nihilo magis es neque ego esse arbitror.

The speaker here (in his impersonation of Amphitruo) does not mean to be understood as evading the patent fact that the opprobrious words were spoken. Admitting the fact, he tries to offset the effect by claiming that the words were not spoken in earnest.

The distinction between pure conditional *si*-clauses and the concessive *si*-clause bears directly upon an important question of modal usage to be taken up in a subsequent chapter.⁵ Here one or two minor points may be mentioned.

Attention has already been called to the fact that the verb action is not always the characteristic feature of a *si*-clause.⁶ This applies with special force to the concessive sentence; e.g.

Plautus, *Aul.* 555 ff.:

Quos si *Argus* servet, qui oculus totus fuit,
Quem quondam Ioni Iuno custodem addidit,
Is numquam servet.

⁵ pp. 98 ff.

⁶ pp. 22 ff.

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 803 ff.:

Non potuit reperire, si *ipsi Soli* quaerendas dares,
Lepidiores duas ad hanc rem quam ego.

Plautus, *Asin.* 414 ff.:

Siquidem herele nunc *summum Iovem* te dicas detinuisse
Atque is preeator adsiet, malam rem effugias numquam.

Note how the stress falls upon the italicized words. Such sentences belong mostly to the hypothetical group; for they verge naturally to the very limits of possibility. The name 'Intensive Periods' has been suggested for the type.⁷

Another point of interest appears in sentences that develop concessive force through the use of alternative conditions; e.g.

Plautus, *Truc.* 832 ff.:

Verum qui inprobust, *si* quasi bibit,
Sive adeo caret temeto, tamen ab ingenio inprobust.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 120: *Sive* enim sic est *sive* illo modo, videri
possunt permulta somniantibus falsa pro veris.

It will be noted that the individual *si*-clauses of these examples do not necessarily suggest the concessive idea. But through the pairing of alternatives, with a conclusion that holds 'whether or no,' the effect of the whole is that of a concessive period.⁸ This fact is formally marked by *tamen* in one of the cases.

⁷ See further, this series, I, 40 ff.

⁸ The same is true of some sentences with an indefinite relative clause that covers a number of contingencies; e.g.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 15: Equidem, *quaecumque* vos causa huc attulisset, laetarer, cum apud me viderem homines mihi carissimos et amicissimos.

Interesting, by way of contrast, is a passage which begins with a definitely marked concessive clause, to which two conclusions are appended:

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 110: Quae *etiamsi* essent, quae nulla sunt, pellere se ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare, figurare, colorare, animare non possent.

Despite *etiamsi*, the opening clause of this sentence bears no concessive relation to *pellere . . . possent*, though it does to *formare . . . non possent*. The explanation doubtless lies in Cicero's well recognized practice of coordinating a clause that is logically subordinate: "Even if those non-existent things were in existence, *while* they might perhaps by collision bestir themselves mutually, they could not give themselves form, shape, color, and life." Cf. the logical subordination of *numquam celare potuisset*, *p. Deio.* 18.

In the following passage, the alternatives, too, share in the concessive idea:

Plautus, *Curc.* 4 ff.:

Si media nox est *sivest* prima vespera,
Si status conductus cum hoste intercedit dies,
Tamen est eundem quo imperant ingratiis.

3. ITERATIVE

Caesar, *B. C.* i. 79. 2: *Si* mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat . . . ; *cum* vallis aut locus declivis suberat, . . . tum magno erat in periculo res.

The shift from *si* to *cum* in this passage is very illuminating. Variety of expression seems to be the only thing involved. At any rate, "If (at any time)" and "When(ever)" are both practically equivalent to "As often as," and they therefore are readily interchangeable.

This use of *si* does not come by way of the conventional litotes now so often referred to. There is no suggestion of evasion or softening. Just as surely as the *cum*-construction, the conditional form intimates that a situation developed, and that repeatedly.⁹

4. IN "OBJECT" CLAUSES

This loose and rather unsatisfactory heading is designed to cover those *si*-clauses which are mere adjuncts to a statement of fact, comparable in many cases to clauses introduced by *dum*, *ut*, *num* and *quod*.¹⁰

⁹ It is interesting to note that in Greek, where the choice of moods so stresses the iterative use generally, the employment of the conditional particle in this connection is just beginning in Homer; cf. Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 400.

¹⁰ Such *si*-clauses are very different from subsecutive proviso clauses, because the latter invalidate the statements to which they are attached. This is not true of 'object' *si*-clauses.

a. 'If perchance,' 'In the hope that,' etc.

This noteworthy group, which commands attention in both Greek and Latin, seems to have at least three varieties. Beginning with the notion of suspense and hope, there is a bifurcated division along the lines of purpose and interrogation.¹¹

a. Suspense, hope, etc.

Plautus, *Cas.* 539 ff.:

Miror huc iam non arcessi in proximum uxorem meam,
Quae iam dudum, si arcessatur, ornata exspectat domi.

These words are spoken of a woman who has been notified that someone will call to take her out. The general effect of the *si*-clause is much like that of *dum* and the subjunctive.

The idea of hope stands out rather clearly in the following:

Sulpicius apud Cic. *ad Fam.* iv. 5. 4: Quae res mihi non mediocre consolationem attulit, volo tibi commemorare, si forte eadem res tibi dolorem minuere possit.

Auct. ad Her. iv. 62: . . . circumspectans huc illuc, si quem reperiat, cui aliquid mali faucibus adflare . . . possit.

This is not a very large or a very clearly marked category. Examples tend to shade off toward the other classes:

Plautus, *Tri.* 148: Ausculto, si quid dicas.

Plancus apud Cic. *ad Fam.* x. 24. 4: Ego tamen ad eum Furnium nostrum cum mandatis litterisque misi, si quid forte proficere posset.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xv. 6. 1: . . . seire te volui, si forte idem tu, quod ego, existimares.

¹¹ It is perfectly clear that this field of meaning is covered; but it is by no means possible to classify definitely many individual cases. For they appear differently, when viewed from different angles; and scholars will continue to disagree as to the particular subdivision to which some given example is to be assigned.

β. Purpose idea approximated

A close parallel of the *ut*-clause and the *si*-clause in this field is indicated by the following:

Cicero, in *Cat.* iii. 8: ad urbem quam primum cum exercitu accederet; id autem *eo consilio, ut* praesto esset. . . .

Bell. Afr. 86. 2: Captos ante oppidum instructos constituit, id *hoc consilio, si* posset Vergilius a pertinacia deduci.

Even more striking is a pair of sentences in which a purpose idea is expressed by the *causa*-construction, with exegesis of the latter by an *ut*-clause in one case, and by a *si*-clause in the other:

Plautus, *Tri.* 179 ff.:

Argentum dedi
Thensauri causa, ut salvum amico traderem.

Livy, v. 42. 1: ostentari quaedam incendia, *terroris causa, si* compelli ad deditionem caritate sedum suarum obsessi possent.¹²

Again, within one and the same passage, *si* and *ut* are found in parallel construction:

Plautus, *Tri.* 119 ff.:

Ei rei operam dare te fuerat aliquanto aequius,
Si qui probiorem facere posses, non *uti*
In eandem tute accederes infamiam.

In the light of examples like these, there can be no difficulty in recognizing purpose as an idea approximated by object clauses introduced by *si*.

In the majority of cases, however, in which the hearer catches a note of purpose in the sentence-complex, the *si*-clause itself does not indicate the thing aimed at; e.g.

Plautus, *Amph.* 880 ff.:

Mercurium iussi me continuo consequi,
Si quid vellem imperare.

Livy, v. 5. 5: Munitiones non in urbem modo, sed in Etruriam etiam spectantes, *si* qua inde auxilia veniant, opposuere.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 3. 137: quem tu in cohorte tua Cassianum iudicem habebas, *si* qua res maior esset.¹³

¹² Cf. Caesar, *B. G.* vii. 55. 9.

¹³ Cf. *ad Att.* xiii. 22. 5, xiii. 26. 2, xvi. 11. 7.

All these passages obviously refer to something done for a purpose. The following sentence, which matches exactly the one last cited above, shows the way to the proper analysis:

Cicero, *Brut.* 62: Ipsae enim familiae sua quasi ornamenta ac monumenta servabant . . . *ad usum, si* quis eiusdem generis occidisset.

The *si*-clause here is purely conditional, and a mere modifier of the purpose expression *ad usum*: "To have them on hand, in case any member of the same family should die." The sentences above quoted are of just this sort, though compendious in expression.¹⁴

Another phase of the full form appears in the following:

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 56: Canes aluntur in Capitolio, ut significent, *si* fures venerint.

Among the *si*-clauses that themselves suggest a purpose idea, the largest group perhaps is made up of cases using forms of the verb *possum*; e.g.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiii. 40. 5: Adultare ex diverso Tiridates, non usque ad ictum teli, sed tum minitans, tum specie trepidantis, *si* laxare ordines et diversos consectari posset.

It was unquestionably the *aim* of Tiridates to get the enemy into disorder and to attack them at a disadvantage; but it is not so clear that the writer means to say that he aimed at the *possibility* of bringing about these results.

The feeling readily obtrudes that such a *si*-clause is really a somewhat clumsy substitute for an *ut*-clause, with some such modifier as *si fieri posset*, i.e., "that, if possible, he might cause the enemy to straggle and attack them at a disadvantage."

As a matter of fact, there are sentences made up in just this way; e.g.

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 50: Advolasti egens ad tribunatum, *ut* in eo magistratu, *si* posses, viri tui similis esses.

¹⁴ Compare an example in which a purpose clause is appended as a sort of afterthought:

Cato, *R. R.* 40. 4: Insuper lingua bubula obtegito, *si* pluat, ne aqua in librum permanet.

It will be readily seen that, without any change in general meaning, this sentence could be recast in the form of the example under discussion; e.g., *si in eo magistratu viri tui similis esse posses*.¹⁵

A sort of middle ground between the two is found in still another passage of the following sort:

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 46: *elaborent, si efficere possint, ut vitium quam minime appareat.*

These words have to do with the effort of deformed persons to hide their defects. The sentence, like the one last cited, has both an *ut*-clause and a *si*-clause; but the latter is not an inset within the *ut*-clause.

Hence *si efficere possint* may be an object clause, itself governing the following purpose construction; or the *ut*-clause may depend upon *elaborent*, with the *si*-clause as a pure conditional modifier.¹⁶

It is probably safe to say that casual Roman linguistic consciousness did not very sharply differentiate the types represented by these three sentences; also, that the second is the most precise for the general thought to be conveyed.

γ. Interrogative

The interrogative aspect of the object *si*-clause is specially easy to demonstrate; e.g.

¹ Livy, xxxix. 50. 7: *Accepto poculo nihil aliud (eum) locutum ferunt quam quaesisse, si incolumis Lycortas equitesque evasissent.*

Cicero, *Top.* 84: *Quaeritur si expetendae divitiae.*

In the first of these passages, *si* is manifestly a full interrogative conjunction. The other case is interesting as being culled from a long passage in which a series of indirect questions is

¹⁵ Cf. *de Orat.* ii. 7.

¹⁶ Cf. Livy, xxiv. 45. 5.

marked mostly by *-ne*. The choice of *si* for this particular phrase seems due to desire for variety of expression. Other examples follow:

Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 122: *Ambigunt agnati cum eo, qui est heres, si filius ante, quam in suam tutelam veniat, mortuus sit.*

Horace, *Ep.* i. 6. 40 ff.:

Chlamydes Lueullus, ut aiunt,
Si posset centum seaenae praebere rogatus,
'Qui possum tot?' ait.

Vergil, *Aen.* iv. 110 ff.:

Sed fatis *incerta* feror, *si* Iuppiter unam
Esse *velit* Tyriis urbem Troiaque profectis.

In certain cases, the reader readily catches again a suggestion of purpose, and is inclined to render the *si*-clause "[to see] whether," etc., e.g.

Caesar, *B. G.* ii. 9. 1: *Hanc si nostri transirent, hostes expectabant.*

But it is to be noted that such amplification, if correct, only serves to bring out more clearly an interrogative meaning for *si*.

In this group, too, there is much use of *possum* (and *queo*) in the *si*-clause. And, in early Latin, the indicative mood is common:

Terence, *Phor.* 553:

*Vide si quid opis potes adferre huic.*¹⁷

Plautus, *Tri.* 748:

Vide si hoc utibile magis atque in rem deputas.

b. *Miror (mirum) si*, etc.

Many sentences using the phrases listed in this heading are pure conditional periods; e.g.

Terence, *Hec.* 220:

Minimeque adeo est *mirum*, et *ni* fecissent, magis *mirum* foret.

¹⁷ If the text is sound, there may be a reminiscence of this early modal use in Horace, *Ep.* i. 7. 39.

Object clauses may have either mood. Among those using the indicative, the clearest examples are found in sentences where, through a conventional litotes, *si* virtually replaces *quod*, the reference being to an obvious fact; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 29: (Africanus), cum ab eo quidam vetus assectator . . . non impetraret, uti se praefectum in Africam duceret, et id ferret moleste, 'Noli,' inquit, '*mirari si tu hoc a me non impetras*. Ego iam pridem ab eo, cui meam existimationem eam fore arbitror, peto, ut mecum praefectus proficiscatur, et adhuc impetrare non possum.'

The opening phrases of this passage indicate specifically that the henchman's request was denied. Explaining his action in the matter, Africanus says in effect: "Don't be surprised that your request is not granted; even I am unable to command the services of my friends." The function of *si* here is quite parallel to that of *quod* in the following passage:

Pliny, *Ep.* vii. 17. 2: Quo magis *miror quod scribis fuisse quosdam, qui . . .*

Compare other examples of *si* in this use:

Plautus, *Rud.* 505 ff.:

Pol minime *miror*, navis *si fractast* tibi,
Scelus te et sceleste parta quae vexit bona.

Cicero, *p. Quinct.* 18: Nee *mirum si utebatur* consilio.

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 55: Minime *mirum*, inquit Antonius, *si ista res adhuc nostra lingua inlustrata non est*.

Nepos, *Cim.* 4. 4: Sic se gerendo, minime est *mirandum si et vita eius fuit secura et mors acerba*.

The last sentence in this list is a particularly good illustration because of the obvious litotes of *si*. For Nepos certainly does not mean to suggest any doubt as to the tenor of Cimon's life and the grief at his death; he aims rather to impart information on these points.

Certain subjunctive cases are analogous, though somewhat different in application; e.g.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 81: Quid *mirum igitur, si in auspiciis . . . imbecilli animi superstitiosa ista concipiant*, verum dispicere *non possint?*

Cicero, *Lael.* 29: Quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem perspicere videantur?

Cicero, *p. Cael.* 69: Hic etiam miramur, si illam commenticiam pyxidem obsecaenissima sit fabula consecuta?

The outstanding feature in this subjunctive group is the deprecatory note, the speaker using a question as a device either to minimize an admission or to urge diplomatically some view of his own.

In a way, therefore, the difference of mood in examples thus far considered parallels the use of the indicative and subjunctive in clauses introduced by causal *quod*. Indeed, the suggestion has been made that the oblique relation should be recognized in subjunctive *si*-clauses like those here under discussion.¹⁸

On this basis, the first of the examples above quoted would be rendered: "What wonder, then, if (as you point out) uninstructed minds incline to superstition in the matter of augury?"

A serious difficulty with this method of interpretation is that it is subjective and arbitrary; e.g.

Plautus, *Curc.* 265:

Nil est mirandum, melius si nil sit tibi.

A leno who has been sleeping in the temple of Aesculapius, hoping for healing, has just indicated that the god shows no inclination to help him. The hearer picks this up in the words of the text, and then goes on to point out that the leno has chosen the wrong temple at which to seek aid.

This, therefore, might appear to be a perfect case of subjunctive due to quotation. But some manuscripts read *fit* for *sit*, and it certainly must be admitted that this variant reading is quite satisfactory.¹⁹

This does not disprove the doctrine of obliquity as applied to the subjunctive use. It shows merely how subjective and arbitrary the interpretation is, since, so far as context is con-

¹⁸ Cf. J. Lebreton, *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, p. 432 (4).

¹⁹ Cf. the use of the indicative in Plautus, *Rud.* 505 ff., cited above.

cerned, as good a case for quotation could be made out for some examples using the indicative as for others in which the subjunctive occurs.

Pending the settlement of this question, there are turns available in English that give something of the color of the Latin subjunctive; e.g. "What wonder, then, if uneducated minds *be* inclined to superstition in the matter of augury?"²⁰

In contrast with these somewhat obscure cases, a very definite little group of subjunctive object clauses is found in examples in which an expression of wonder governs a virtual indirect question. Here *si* may be rendered 'whether'; e.g.

Terence, *And.* 175 ff.:

*Mirabar hoc si sic abiret, et eri semper lenitas
Verebar quorsum evaderet.*

Terence, *Phor.* 490:

*Mirabar si tu mihi quicquam adferres novi.*²¹

Under this general heading, it still remains to speak of the formulaic *mirum nī, mira sunt nī*, etc., where the literal meaning of the elements involved becomes so far obscured that the whole phrase at times signifies nothing more than 'evidently,' or the like; e.g.

Plautus, *Amph.* 318 ff.:

ME. Exossatum os esse oportet, quem probe percusseris.
SO. *Mirum nī* hic me quasi murenam exossare cogitat.

The fading out of the literal force of the elements involved in cases like this may be compared to the development in such

²⁰ There is often a suggestion of concessive force in *si*-clauses attached to such expressions as *non miror, non mirum*, etc.; and it might possibly be proposed to explain subjunctive cases like the foregoing on that basis.

It is true enough, as will be shown in its place (pp. 98 ff.), that concessive *si*-clauses of the vague future variety combine readily with the indicative in conclusion. But such disposition of the present cases does not seem feasible. Aside from their patent likeness to the examples with indicative in the *si*-clause, it may be noted that in *p. Cael.* 69 (above cited) the perfect subjunctive refers, not to the future, but to the past.

²¹ This use may be compared with combinations like *quæro si* illustrated under the previous caption.

phrases as *nescio an*. It is an interesting coincidence that this latter combination comes to approximate so closely the force of *mirum n̄i*.

c. *Acerbe fero si*, etc.

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 1: *dolebam*, indices, et *acerbe ferebam*, *si* huius salus ob eam ipsam causam esset infestior, quod is meam salutem praesidio texisset.

Sulpicius apud Cic. *ad Fam.* iv. 5. 4: Nos humunculi *indignamur*, *si* quis nostrum interit aut occisus est?

In the first of these cases, the subjunctive is probably of the *futurum in praeterito* order. The other sentence is somewhat complicated by the intrusion of the iterative notion. See also Martial, ix. 73. 4.

Cases with *gaudeo* (as a verb of 'opposite' meaning) may be added here:

Plautus, *Tri.* 52 ff.:

ME. Bene herclest illam tibi valere et vivere.

CA. Credo hercle te *gaudere*, *si* quid mihi malist.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 4. 37: *gaudeo* etiam, *si* quid ab eo abstulisti.

In both these passages the context indicates that there is litotes in the use of the *si*-construction. For example, in the case of the last, it is specifically stated earlier in the passage: *Pupillis bona patria erepta cum illo partitus es*.

d. *Ignosco si*, etc.

Cicero, *p. Deio.* 12: *Ignosce, ignosce*, Caesar, *si* eius viri auctoritati rex Deiotarus cessit.

Cicero, *in Vat.* 2: Etenim debuisti, Vatini, etiamsi falso venisses in suspicionem P. Sestio, tamen mihi *ignoscere*, *si* in tanto hominis de me optime meriti periculo et temporis eius et voluntati parere voluissem.

In the first of these passages Cicero is attempting to win forgiveness for King Deiotarus for having sided with Pompey in the civil war. He has not the slightest intention of implying a doubt of the guilt for which he craves pardon. Hence *ignosce si*

has something of the force of "Condono [the fact] that."²² The other case is more complicated; it approaches the meaning "pardon me for desiring."²³

5. IN WISHES

Under another heading²⁴ attention was called to the fact that *si modo* with the subjunctive may stand as a detached expression conveying a wish. So also *o si*; e.g.

Horace, *Serm.* ii. 6. 8 ff.:

O si angulus ille

Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum!

Vergil, *Aen.* xi. 415:

*O si solitae quicquam virtutis adesset!*²⁵

The force of these expressions would remain virtually the same, if *utinam* were substituted for *o si*;²⁶ and it is not likely that the speaker was clearly conscious of a suppressed apodosis such as the rules of formal grammar might supply.

In this respect, such phrases seem to be very much on a par with the following citation from Accius:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* ii. 19:

Heu, qui salsis fluctibus mandet

Me ex sublino vertice saxi!

²² It may be worth while to contrast a normal conditional period which has a verb of this class in apodosis:

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52. 32 ff.: *Verum parcite dignitati Lentuli, si ipse . . . famae suae . . . umquam . . . pepercit; ignoscite Cethegi adulescentiae, nisi iterum patriae bellum fecit.*

²³ There is a scattering of other expressions which perhaps may govern an object *si*-clause. Cf. *satis habere si*, Nepos, *Timol.* 2. 4; and *miserumst si*, Plautus, *Tri.* 1173 (by emendation).

²⁴ pp. 33 ff.

²⁵ At one time a theory was current to the effect that conditional speaking was developed through the medium of this poetic usage. The misapprehensions underlying views of this sort have been pointed out in Chapters I and II.

²⁶ Persius, *Sat.* ii. 9 begins a series of wishes, of which the first two are introduced by *o si*, and the third by *utinam*. Metrical convenience seems to have determined the choice.

The wording is unusual here; but there can be little doubt of the meaning: "Alas, for a man to hurl me from the height of this crag into the salty billows!"

Occasionally *si* alone is used in wishes, in the sense of *si modo* or *o si*; e.g.

Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 186 ff.:

Sic voce precatur:

'*Si nunc se nobis ille aureus arbore ramus
Ostendat nemore in tanto!*'

By prefixing *precatur*, the poet himself definitely assigns optative meaning to the *si*-clause. In the following prose example, also, *si* probably has the force of *si modo*:

Cicero, *de Prov. Cons.* 17: 'Faciam,' inquit, 'illas praetorias, ut Pisoni et Gabinio succedatur statim.' *Si hic sinat! Tum enim tribunus intercedere poterit, nunc non potest.*

6. IN SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES

The largest and most important group under this heading consists of cases where a conditional clause is employed to expand and explain a noun or pronoun.

This use is best approached by way of conditional periods otherwise regular, excepting that the apodosis precedes and is marked by a restrictive adverb; e.g.

Livy xxi. 17. 6: Ti. Sempronius missus in Siciliam, *ita* in Africam transmissurus, *si* ad arcendum Italia Poenum consul alter satis *esset*.

The interjected *ita* rouses the reader's expectation. Hence, when it enters, the *si*-clause is felt more or less clearly as an appositive and defining element.

The condition emerges somewhat more clearly into substantive function when, in a sentence of the same general type, the restrictive adverb of the apodosis gives way in favor of an ablative phrase involving a noun suited in meaning to serve as a somewhat exact correlative of *si*. Such are *condicione* and *lege*; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 24: Foedus fecerunt cum tribuno pl. palam, ut ab eo provincias acciperent, quas ipsi vellent, . . . *ea lege, si ipsi prius tribuno pl. adflictam . . . rem publicam tradidissent.*

A further stage is marked, when the noun in the ablative phrase is less suited to correlation with *si*, e.g., *modo* or *ratione*:

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 28: *Uno autem modo* in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, *si* quod *esset* animal, quod totum ex mente constaret.

Next follow sentences in which a noun in some other case than the ablative is explained by an appositive *si*-clause:

Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 72. 3: Nam legem maiestatis reduxerat, cui nomen apud veteres idem, sed *alia* in iudicium veniebant: *si* quis proditioe exercitum aut plebem seditionibus, denique male gesta re publica maiestatem populi Romani *minuisset.*

Cicero, *Lael.* 37: Nulla est igitur *excusatio* peccati, *si* amici causa *peccaveris.*

The first of these examples is particularly clear; *alia* has reference to certain grounds on which a charge of treason could in olden times be based, while the appended *si*-clause explains what those grounds were.

As demonstrating substantive function, attention may be called also to a passage in which the pronoun *eo* is expanded by both a *si*-clause and an *ut*-clause:

Tacitus, *Ann.* xi. 28. 3: Sed in *eo* discrimen verti, *si* defensio *audiretur*, utque clausae aures etiam confitenti *forent.*

Here is set forth the thought of the people who were planning to bring about the death of Messalina, the wife of Claudius: "but the issue turned on *this*, namely *if* a chance for defense should be given, and *that* the ears of Claudius be made deaf to a plea for mercy."

This substantive use of the *si*-clause is illustrated at length elsewhere.²⁷ Failure to recognize it leads at times to serious error; e.g.

²⁷ This series, VII, 129 ff.

Horace, *Car.* iii. 5. 13 ff.:

Hoc caverat mens provida Reguli
 Dissidentis condicionibus
 Foedis et *exemplo* trahenti²⁸
 Perniciem veniens in aevum,
Si non periret in miserabilis
 Captiva pubes.

In the situation here referred to, the issue is whether or not the Romans captured in Africa shall be ransomed; and Regulus objects to their ransom on the ground that it would set a dangerous precedent.

Yet one of the best editions of Horace's Odes and Epodes has for years carried the following note on the emended third line of the passage: "*trahenti*, 'that would entail'; equivalent to *quod traheret*, and containing the apodosis of the conditional clause of the next strophe."

This makes nonsense of the reading; for showing mercy to the cowardly captives is itself the precedent which Regulus would not have set up. In other words, the conditional clause expands and explains *exemplo*: "objecting to a precedent fraught with peril for the future, *namely if* the cowards should not be left to their doom."²⁹ Compare a very similar case, where *remedio* is thus expanded by a *si*-clause:

Pliny, *Ep.* iv. 13. 7: Huic vitio occurri *uno remedio* potest, *si* parentibus solis ius conducendi *relinquatur*.

Other varieties of the substantive use of the *si*-clause do not call for extended attention here. In the following sentence the conditional phrase may be construed as subject of the ablative absolute:

Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 6. 6: quod postquam Sallustius Crispus
 comperit, metuens ne reus subderetur, iuxta periculoso *fieta seu*
vera promeret, monuit Liviam ne arcana domus vulgarentur.

²⁸ An all but necessary emendation for *trahentis*.

²⁹ There is a like misunderstanding of Tacitus *Ann.* i. 11 (*unus metus, si intellegere viderentur*).

CHAPTER VII

SUBJUNCTIVE PROTASIS WITH INDICATIVE “APODOSIS”

The material to be considered under this head is very diverse; and it is quite impossible to classify every example with certainty.¹ The important thing is to establish categories by means of clear cases.

1. INCONCINNITY

Several types of inconcinnity are found in the conditional sentences of Latin. At this point it is sufficient to illustrate one, namely the combination of the subjunctive in protasis with the future indicative in apodosis.

For the most part, this must have been felt as a very mild variety of inconcinnity, especially in early Latin, where the functions of the present subjunctive and future indicative so easily overlap.²

Furthermore, account must be taken of the fact that future indicative forms have possible applications generally not available for other tenses of that mood; thus, they may voice determination, advice, or even command. Hence they are suited, especially in lively composition, to add a forceful conclusion to a condition somewhat vague and remote; e.g.

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 571:

Ne tu herele, *si te di ament*, linguam *comprimēs*.

Plautus, *Asin.* 699:

Vehēs pol hodie me, *si quidem hoc argentum ferre sperēs*.

Plautus, *Poen.* 1085:

Quin mea quoque iste *habebit*, si quid me *fuat*.

¹ As showing the complexity of the subject and the division of opinion among scholars, cf. the painstaking discussion of H. Blase, *Studien und Kritiken zur lat. Syntax* (Mainz, I Teil, 1904, II Teil, 1905).

² E.g., in the expression of wishes. Blurring may well have been favored by the ambiguity of verb forms in *-am* and *-ar*, etc.

There are other circumstances, too, that may help to explain this combination in certain cases.³ But, after all these things are taken into account, there is a residue of examples in which a careful writer or speaker must have been conscious of at least a slight harshness in coupling a future indicative main clause with a condition that would naturally be paired with a conclusion of like form with itself. Note the following:

Plautus, *Merc.* 650 ff.:

*Si ibi amare forte occipias, atque item eius sit inopia,
Iam inde porro aufugies?*

Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 85: *Si iam campus Martius dividatur et uni cuique vestrum, ubi consistat, bini pedes adsignentur, tamen promiscue toto quam proprie parva frui parte maletis.*

Horace, *Car.* iii. 3. 7 ff.:

*Si fractus inlabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinae.*

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 42. 5: *sed de studiis partium et omnis civitatis moribus si . . . parem disserere, tempus quam res maturius me deseret.*

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 84. 2: *Si Vitellio et satellitibus eius eligendi facultas detur, quem nobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur, quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam optabunt?*

A really comprehensive treatment of even this one phase of inconcinnity would involve a study with far-reaching ramifications.

2. ITERATIVE EXPRESSIONS

At all periods of the language, iterative subjunctives with indefinite second singular subject are found in *si*-clauses attached to indicative main clauses.

At least from the time of Cicero on, outside this narrower category the use of the subjunctive in iterative *si*-clauses is no rarity; e.g.

Cicero, *de Off.* i. 32: . . . nec, *si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint, cui promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori.*

³ Such as the intrusion of the iterative or the concessive notion; see below, and pp. 98 ff.

Of this example it might be said that, although the verb is in the third person plural, the real subject of discourse lies in the indefinite *tibi*. The following cases are not open to this criticism:

Cicero, *Parod.* 44: *Filiam quis habet, pecunia est opus; . . . si . . . quinquaginta sint filiae, tot dotes magnam quaerunt pecuniam.*

Cicero, *Part. Or.* 72: *id fit, si factis verbis aut vetustis aut translatis frequenter utamur.*

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 86: *Simplex autem conclusio reprehenditur, si hoc, quod sequitur, non videatur necessario cum eo, quod antecessit cohaerere.*

Cicero, *de Re P.* i. 66: *tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint, (populus) . . . tyrannos vocat.*

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 232: *Erat enim Athenis reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi poenae aestimatio.*

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 20: *Ne vitiationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi etiam evitare posset.*

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 111: *In privatis rebus si qui rem mandatam non modo malitiosius gessisset, . . . verum etiam neglegentius, eum maiores summum admisisse dedecus existimabant.*⁴

It has yet to be shown why sentences like the foregoing were singled out from the mass of iterative conditional sentences for the use of the subjunctive.

Historically considered, it appears that this modal peculiarity begins with cases in which the indefinite second singular is subject, spreading thence to clauses with verbs in the first and third person plural.⁵

If this is so, it is obvious that any thoroughgoing treatment of the subject must begin with the still unsettled question of the everywhere prevalent association of the indefinite second singular with the use of the subjunctive mood.

Without attempting thus to go to the root of the matter, it is still possible to point out several influences that may well have contributed to the increase of the use of the subjunctive in iterative *si*-clauses, when once the mood had gained a foothold there.

⁴ For other examples using the secondary tenses of the subjunctive, see Caesar, *B. C.* iii. 110. 4, Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 58. 3, Livy, viii. 8. 9 ff.

⁵ See H. Blase, *op cit.* II, 47 ff.

Thus, under the previous heading it was pointed out that the future indicative has certain functions that tend to lessen the inconcinnity of some sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit*. Such a function appears in the laying down of rules, which are of general application. Hence an attached clause of the form *si sit* would not unnaturally be felt as 'iterative':

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 88: Ambiguum *si* adversarius ad aliam partem *velit* accomodare, demonstrare *oportebit*. . . .

Cicero, *Part. Orat.* 124: etiam *si* propius *accedat* ad consuetudinem mentemque sermonis defensoris definitio, tamen accusator sententia legis *nitetur*.

In the second of these cases there is still another factor favorable to the use of the form *si sit erit*, namely that the sentence is a concessive period; for, as will be shown later in detail,⁶ concessive force itself provides a fully satisfactory explanation for many cases of subjunctive protasis with indicative 'apodosis.'

Finally, the use of the past tenses of the subjunctive in clauses of iterative action was doubtless fostered through Greek influence, exerted by the writings of the poets.

In the end, how thoroughly acclimated the subjunctive became in the iterative function is indicated by the variety of expression in such a passage as the following:

Varro, *R. R.* i. 4. 4: etenim *si* propter terram aut aquam odore, quem aliquo loco eructat, pestilentior *est* fundus, aut propter caeli regionem ager calidior *sit*, aut ventus non bonus *flet*,⁷ haec vitia *emendari solent* domini scientia ac sumptu.

It is likely that modality is overemphasized in the attempt to represent this variety of expression in English; e.g. "If the farm *is* rather unhealthy, or if the field *be* too hot, these defects usually are remedied through the intelligence of the owner, and at his expense."⁸

⁶ pp. 98 ff.

⁷ There is some support for the easier readings *fit* : . . . *fiet*.

⁸ Worthy of notice in this connection is the use of the ambiguous forms in *-eris, -erit*, etc. See H. Blase, *Archiv f. lat. Lexicographie und Grammatik*, X, 317.

The matured construction can be seen to advantage in the writings of Tacitus; e.g.

Ger. 45. 8: *si naturam sucini admoto igni temptes, in modum taedae accenditur.*

Ger. 14. 3: *si civitas, in qua orti sunt, longa pace et otio torpeat, plerique nobilium adolescentium petunt ultra eas nationes, quae tum bellum aliquod gerunt.*

Ann. iii. 54. 4: *at si prohibita impune transcenderis, neque metus ultra neque pudor est.*

Ann. vi. 30. 1: *ac tamen accusatores, si facultas incideret, poenis adficiabantur.*

Ann. iii. 50. 3: *saepe audivi principem . . . conquirentem, si quis sumpta morte misericordiam eius praevenisset.*

3. "OBJECT" CLAUSES

In the previous chapter⁹ it was shown that *si*-clauses brought under this heading are of several varieties. But they are all alike in the important particular that they do not in any way condition the main division of the sentence.

Hence this category has but little place in a discussion of subjunctive protasis with indicative apodosis. So far as object *si*-clauses employ the subjunctive mood, the choice seems to be determined by the fact that they are dependent modifiers, comparable to clauses introduced by *ut*, *dum*, and *num*; and, like these latter, they accord with the law of sequence.

In general they are prospective in character, and the *futurum in praeterito* relation is much in evidence; e.g.

Plautus, *Poen.* 1391 ff.:

Iam pridem equidem istas esse scivi liberas,
Et expectabam si qui eas assereret manu.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 30. 2: *rapi ignes Antonius inferrique . . . iubet, si damno rerum suarum Cremonenses ad mutandam fidem traherentur.*

Plautus, *Amph.* 880 ff.:

Mercurium iussi me continuo consequi,
Si quid vellem imperare.

⁹ pp. 67 ff.

4. SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES

Here, too, there is little contribution to the subject of subjunctive protasis with indicative apodosis. For, as already shown,¹⁰ a substantive *si*-clause commonly expands and explains a noun or pronoun; and, when the subjunctive is used, the construction stands somewhat on the level of a substantive *ut*-clause, with like observance of the law of sequence; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 93: quam (libertatem) tu ponis in *eo*, *si* semper cum eis, quibuscum aliquando contendimus, *depugnemus*.

Cicero, *p. Rab. Post.* 28: Nam *haec una ratio* a rege proposita Postumo est servandae pecuniae, *si* curationem et quasi dispensationem regiam *suscepisset*.

5. ANACOLUTHON

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 685 ff.:

Nam bona uxor suave ductust—*si sit* usquam gentium,
Ubi ea possit inveniri.

It was noted in Chapter V that anacoluthon may result from a change in the speaker's plan after enunciation begins. On the other hand, he may know from the start all that he wishes to say, consciously making use of this device as a means of treating the hearer to a surprise.

In either case, the use of the subjunctive in a subsecutive *si*-clause requires no elaborate explanation; for the condition has no organic connection with the main clause, but takes the form required by the sense.

The example quoted above seems to have been planned from the beginning with the idea of raising a laugh.¹¹ On the con-

¹⁰ pp. 78 ff.

¹¹ There are good cases with the indicative, also; e.g., the gibe at Nero's Golden House:

Suetonius, *Nero*, 39. 2:

Roma domus fiet: Veios *migrate*, Quirites—
Si non et Veios occupat ista domus.

(Continued on p. 87)

trary, there is more suggestion of spontaneous readjustment in the following:

Cicero, *de Re P.* ii. 43: *Nam ipsum regale genus civitatis non modo non est reprehendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum—si ullum probarem simplex rei publicae genus.*

The phenomenon of the anacoluthic conditional sentence is common to all periods of the language, though more exact analysis is not always possible:

Plautus, *Curc.* 299:

Reete hic monstrat—si imperare possit.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xiv. 19. 2: *Sed Pansa furere videtur de Clodio . . . et loquitur severe—si velis credere.*

Curtius, iii. 2. 17: *Erat Dareo mite ac tractabile ingenium—nisi etiam naturam plerumque fortuna corrumpere.*

This last example is specially striking because the condition seems to be a present contrary to fact: "did not fortune generally spoil even natural excellence."

Anacoluthic conditional sentences of the past contrary to fact type bulk large in the writings of Tacitus; and at his hands this use attains definite standing as a rhetorical device.

It has long been the fashion to explain examples of this sort by means of a clumsy ellipsis, which does indeed satisfy the rigid requirements of formal grammar, but which probably does not accord with the linguistic consciousness of Tacitus or represent the effect he aimed to produce.

The several reasons for regarding this type of sentence as anacoluthic rather than as elliptical have been set forth at length elsewhere,¹² and they need not be repeated here. The group as a whole has several subtypes:

Compare, too, the second *si*-clause in another passage in which a poet invites his friend to dinner:

Catullus, 13. 1 ff.:

*Cenabis bene, mi Fabulle, apud me
Paucis, si tibi di favent, diebus—
Si tecum attuleris bonam atque magnam
Cenam, non sine candida puella
Et vino et sale et omnibus cachinnis.*

¹² This series, VII, 166 ff.

a. Impending action forestalled

Plautus, *Tri.* 835 ff.:

Ita iam quasi canes haud secus circumstabant navem turbines venti:
Imbres fluctusque atque procellae infensae *frangere* malum,
Ruere antemnas, *scindere* vela, *ni* tua pax propitia foret praesto.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 3. 121: Illi ipsi, qui remanserant . . . ,
relicturi agros omnes *erant*, *nisi* ad eos Metellus Roma litteras
misisset se decumas lege Hieronica venditurum, et *nisi* ab iis hoc
petivisset, ut. . . .¹³

Livy, iii. 1. 4: atrox certamen *aderat*, *ni* Fabius consilio neutri
parti acerbo rem *expedisset*.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 46. 3: Iamque castra legionum *excindere* *para-*
bant, *ni* Mucianus sextam legionem *opposuisset*.

b. Action begun is checked or frustrated

Cicero, *de Leg.* i. 52: quin *labebat* longius, *nisi* me *retinuissem*.¹⁴

Livy, ii. 50. 10: Populere etiam subeuntes; *vincebatque* auxilio
loci paucitas, *ni* iugo circummissus Veiens in verticem collis *eva-*
sisset.

Tacitus, *Agr.* 37. 1: et Britanni . . . degredi paulatim et
circumire terga *vincentium* *coeperant*, *ni* . . . Agricola quattuor
equitum alas . . . venientibus *opposuisset*.

c. Indeterminate

Tacitus, *Ann.* xvi. 32. 2: simul in amplexus *occurrentis* filiae
ruebat, *nisi* interiecti lictores utrisque *obstitissent*.

It is quite possible that this case really belongs under (b), as an example of action begun and checked. It might be argued, however, that *occurrentis* refers to attempted action, and that *ruebat* describes an act forestalled. The case, therefore, is listed as indeterminate.

¹³ So *Phil.* vi. 14, but so worded as to disguise somewhat the character of the sentence (Campus Martius *restabat*, *nisi*).

¹⁴ Cf. *Acad.* ii. 64 (*plane* me *movebat*, *nisi*).

d. Action all but consummated

Plautus, *Pers.* 594 ff.:

Paene in foveam decidi, ni hic adesses.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xv. 26. 4: *quod paene fecit, nisi tua malitia affuisset.*

Livy, ii. 65. 4: *sic prope oneratum est sinistrum Romanis cornu, ni . . . consul . . . metum excussisset.*

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 64. 4: . . . *prope in proelium exarsere, ni Valens animadversione paucorum oblitos iam Batavos imperii admonuisset.*

Suetonius, *Iul.* 52. 1: *et eadem nave thalamego paene Aethiopia tenus Aegyptum penetravit, nisi exercitus sequi recusasset.*¹⁵

e. Incomplete

In a few cases, a corrective conditional clause is added to an adjective, or the like; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 49. 8: . . . *et omnium consensu capax imperii —nisi imperasset.*

These words are a part of the characterization of the emperor Galba: "and in the judgment of all capable of ruling—if he had not tried it." The corrective nature of the condition in a sentence like this is well shown by a similar Ciceronian example, in which the antithesis is marked by *sed si*:

Tusc. Disp. v. 26: *Philosophi id quidem—sed si Socrates aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui. . .*

6. OVERSTATEMENT (?)

This somewhat inadequate heading is designed to cover cases like the following:

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 52 ff.:

*Quid in Cappadocia, ubi tu quingentos simul,
Ni hebes machaera foret, uno ictu occideras?*¹⁶

¹⁵ In Suetonius, the anacoluthic type seems more conventional; it lacks something of the abruptness often found elsewhere. For a second example, cf. *Galba* 10. 5.

¹⁶ *occideris* is the reading of some MSS.

It seems to be the intent of the speaker here to exaggerate the exploit he would praise, imparting vividness to his statement by saying "you had killed" rather than "you would have killed."¹⁷

Though never very common, sentences of this sort are found all through the classical period; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xii. 10. 3: Praeclare *viceramus, nisi* spoliatum, inermem, fugientem Lepidus *recepisset* Antonium.¹⁸

Horace, *Car.* ii. 17. 28 ff.:

Me truncus inlapsus cerebro
Sustulerat, nisi Faunus ietum
Dextra levasset.

Livy, iii. 19. 8: *Nisi* Latini sua sponte arma *sumpsissent, capti et deleti* eramus.

Seneca, *de Ira* ii. 33. 6: *perierat* alter filius, *si* carnifici conviva non *placuisset*.

Tacitus, *Ann.* iv. 9. 1: *ae si* modum orationi *posuisset*, misericordia sui gloriaque animos audientium *impleverat*; ad vana et totiens inrisa revolutus, . . . fidem dempsit.

To the poets this turn doubtless was a metrical convenience; e.g.

Vergil, *Aen.* ii. 54 ff.:

Et *si* fata deum, *si* mens non laeva *fuisset*,
Impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras,
Troiaque nunc *staret*, Priamique arx alta, *maneres*.

It is altogether likely that something more is involved in this usage than mere overstatement or exaggeration, as may be seen by putting the two following sentences side by side:

¹⁷ In English there are sentences which present-day linguistic sense would doubtless class as parallel in form; e.g.

"Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother *had not died*."

"I *had fainted*, unless I had believed to see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living."

As a matter of fact, the philologist recognizes "had fainted" and "had not died" as subjunctive forms (cf. the Vulgate: *frater meus non fuisset mortuus*). Later the conditional (e.g., "would not have died") replaced the subjunctive. See Sweet, *New English Grammar*, § 2281.

However, the old form lives on in the literature of the day, and, since the casual user does not know its history, it affords a very close parallel to the Latin.

¹⁸ Cf. in *M. Brut.* i. 15. 12, *p. Rab. Post.* 48, and perhaps *post red. in Sen.* 9.

Seneca, *Ep.* 92. 35: *Habuit enim ingenium et grande et virile, nisi illud secundis (rebus) discinasset.*

Seneca, *Ep.* 114. 4: *Magni vir ingenii fuerat, si illud egisset via rectiore, si non vitasset intellegi, etc.*

In both these passages Seneca is passing judgment on one and the same man, namely, Maecenas. Obviously there is quite as much 'overstatement' in *Habuit* as in *fuerat*. But the latter involves shift of tense as well.

Later in this discussion detailed consideration is given the general question of tense-shift.¹⁹ It is enough to say in this connection that the process seems in certain cases to give a quasi-subjunctive flavor to indicative forms.

7. PARENTHETIC CLAUSES

Cases under this heading are sometimes hard to identify. But there are plenty of examples with as little dependence upon the main clause as is shown by such phrases as *ut ita dicam*, which can be interjected anywhere, without regard to context or sequence:

Plautus, *Merc.* 298 ff.:

Immo *si scias*,

Oeuleis quoque etiam plus iam video quam prius.

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 117: *Ut, si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia dicit ille quidem . . . , sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt.*

Tacitus, *Ger.* 40. 5: *Mox vehiculum et vestis, et, si credere velis, numen ipsum secreto lacu abluitur.*²⁰

A rather more complicated type of parenthesis is well illustrated by the following sentence, which, however, does not use the indicative in its main clause:

¹⁹ pp. 123 ff.

²⁰ The order of clauses affects somewhat the impression made upon the reader; e.g.

Cicero, *ad. Att.* xiv. 19. 2: *loquitur severe, si velis credere.*

This has points of strong similarity to the case last cited above; but the postposition of the *si*-clause rather favors an anacoluthic interpretation.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 50: Quasi vero intellegant, qualis sit in ipso corpore . . . , qui locus, aut²¹ (*si iam possent* in homine vivo cerni omnia, quae nunc tecta sunt) casurusne in conspectum videatur animus, an tanta sit eius tenuitas, ut fugiat aciem!

The speaker is here declaiming against those who cannot believe in immortality because of inability to conceive of a disembodied spirit: "As if forsooth they understood what the nature of the soul is while yet in the body . . . , and [supposing for the moment that we could see in the living man all that is now hidden] whether it seems likely that the soul would be visible, or so impalpable as to escape the eye!"

Compare the following simpler cases with the indicative in the main division of the sentence:

Auctor ad Her. ii. 34: Nam hic satis erat dicere (*si id modo, quod satis esset, curarent* poetae): "Utinam . . . saucia."

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 44. 1: Sed et *si* nunc primum *statuendum haberemus*, creditisne servum interficiendi domini animum sumpsisse, ut non vox minax excederet, nihil per temeritatem proloqueretur?

In the first of these passages, the speaker criticizes the poet Ennius on the ground that he uses eight lines for a thought that might have been expressed in two.

The other passage is a part of the debate on the question whether or not the old law is to be adhered to, whereby the murder of a master by one of his slaves involves the whole household of slaves in the penalty. The speaker leans away from the more merciful view, and says: "Moreover [supposing for the moment that we had now for the first time to enact a law], do you believe that this slave planned his master's death without letting slip a threatening word or unguarded remark?"

Parenthetic conditions rather frequently have to do with counting up and comparing; e.g.

Livy, xxix. 26. 2: quamquam, *si* magnitudine classes *aestimares*, et bini consules cum binis exercitibus ante traiecerant et prope totidem rostratae in illis classibus fuerant, quot onerariis Scipio tum traiebat.

²¹ M. ut.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 2. 7: *si* numerus militum potius quam legionum *putetur*, plus hinc roboris, nihil libidinum.²²

Tacitus, *Agr.* 15. 4: Quantulum enim transisse militum, *si* sese Britanni *numerent*?²²

A certain interlocking appears in the following:

Cicero, *in Cat.* iii. 15: Quae supplicatio *si* cum ceteris supplicationibus *conferatur*, hoc interest, quod ceterae bene gesta, haec una conservata re publica constituta est.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xi. 24. 9: ac tamen, *si* cuncta bella *recenseas*, nullum brevius spatio quam adversus Gallos confectum.

Tacitus, *Agr.* 24. 2: spatium eius (Hiberniae), *si* Britanniae *comparetur*, angustius, nostri maris insulas superat.

It will be seen at a glance that the conditional clauses of these examples also are of the parenthetic order; yet in each case there is incorporated in the condition a word necessary to the understanding of the main clause of the sentence.

The writer's intent seems to have been parenthetic; but he has so phrased the passages that perhaps the influence of another principle also must be recognized, namely, Substitution, a discussion of which follows next.²³

8. SUBSTITUTION

Plautus, *Poen.* 516 ff.:

Si nec recte *dicis* nobis dives de summo loco,
Divitem audacter *solemus* mactare infortunio.

These words are addressed by aged witnesses to a youth who has chidden them for the slowness with which they follow to the scene of action. The general import of the words is clear; they are threatening their critic with retribution in court, if he treats them with contempt.

But this is not exactly what they do say; beginning with a normal conditional clause, they *substitute* for the exact apodosis

²² In indirect discourse; hence in point only as an example of parenthetic use.

²³ For other details regarding the parenthetic use, see this series, VII, 159 ff.

an affirmation regarding their regular procedure under provocation. The indicative statement holds good, irrespective of the condition; yet it serves the purpose of the speakers perfectly, for the statement in regard to general practice is also a virtual threat in the special case.

The practice of substitution is exceedingly common, and it is by no means confined to conditional sentences; e.g.

Have you the time?

This question means somewhat more than shows upon the surface, being a conventional way of inquiring what the time is. It is very distinctly a substitution for an exact query; but it serves the purpose, because it includes the special application.²⁴

From this point onward there is frequent reference to the process of substitution as seen in the conditional sentence. And since the principle is little recognized and not generally understood, it needs full illustration here; e.g.

Plautus, *Asin.* 109 ff.:

Siquid te volam, ubi eris?

Terence, *Adel.* 348:

Si infitias ibit, testis mecum est anulus quem amiserat.

In each of these cases it is a matter of substituting a greater that includes the less. In the first sentence, instead of saying: "Where shall I find you?" the speaker substitutes the more general inquiry: "Where will you be?" In the second, the logically exact apodosis would be something like: "I'll refute him with

²⁴ A very good illustration is found in a casual retort which the writer chanced to overhear: A person entering a store was accosted by the proprietor with the words: "Can you change twenty dollars?" To which the other replied: "Yes, I can; but I do not know that I care to part with the change." This answer, by its unexpectedness, raised a laugh; for, in such connections, "Can you" automatically includes "Will you?" and the reply "Yes, I can" is naturally understood as indicating willingness to comply.

the ring he lost''; but this idea merges in a wider and unconditioned statement of fact.²⁵ So again:

Plautus, *Pseud.* 375 ff.:

BA. *Si id non adfert, posse opinor facere me officium meum.*

CA. *Quid id est?* BA. *Si tu argentum attuleris, cum illo perdidero fidem.*

The situation here involves a leno and two possible purchasers for a slave girl. Speaking of one of them, and addressing the other, the leno says: "If he does not bring the money, I fancy I can do my regular trick." This he substitutes for the exact apodosis: "I'll break with him, and take your money." The case is specially interesting because the hearer is somewhat puzzled by the substitution, and needs to have its real inwardness explained to him. Cf. also:

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 145: *Si spoliolum causa vis hominem occidere, spoliasti; quid quaeris amplius?*

The point of this passage is that if spoil was the object of the prosecution, there is no occasion to push the case to the bitter end. On the principle of substitution, *spoliasti* takes the place of an exact apodosis, and the sentence might have closed with that word. But here, too, the speaker appends a clause that makes clearer what was implicit in the substitution.

In this connection may be noted an odd case of substitution in a sentence introduced by a temporal clause:

Plautus, *Tri.* 788 ff.:

Sed epistulas quando opsignatas adferet.

Nonne arbitraris tum adolescentem anuli

Paterni signum nosse?

²⁵ This principle of interpretation as applied to the conditional sentence is more or less clearly intimated here and there, but it seems nowhere to be clearly and systematically followed up; cf. Roby, *Latin Grammar*, § 1548. So, in his note on Livy, xxv. 31. 15, Weissenborn says of *instabat*, which is coupled with a subjunctive *si*-clause: "das *instare* stand ihnen thatsächlich bevor; sagt mehr als *instituisset*." This glimpses very clearly the fact of substitution; but the appended cross-reference is to a sentence of quite different type.

In the second line of this passage, *tum* (balancing *quando*) is a very convincing emendation for the insipid *eum* of the manuscripts. In any case, the speaker evidently had in mind at the start an exact future 'apodosis,' but in the end he substituted the more sweeping and comprehensive *nosse*.

Through the operation of this principle, numerous subjunctive *si*-clauses are coupled with a main statement using the indicative, the latter swallowing up the exact apodosis in a general expression whose truth is in no way conditioned by the protasis; e.g.

Plautus, *Merc.* 430:

At ego *si velim*, iam *dantur* septem et viginti minae.

The speaker here parades the good bargain he might make, if he cared to sell. Instead of saying "If I chose [to sell], I might have as much as twenty-seven minae," he substitutes for the exact apodosis the unconditioned statement of fact: "Already I am offered twenty-seven minae." Other examples follow:

Terence, *And. Alt. Ex.* 5:

Non nova istaec mihi condicio est, *si voluissem*, Pamphile.

Plautus, *Stich.* 171 ff.:

Nunc *si* ridiculum hominem *quaerat* quispiam,
Venalis ego *sum* eum ornamentis omnibus.

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 38: *Quem si* interficere *voluisset*, quantae quotiens occasiones, quam praeclarae *fuissent!*

Suetonius, *Cal.* 58. 1: Cum in crypta, per quam transeundum erat, pueri nobiles ex Asia ad edendas in scaena operas evocati praepararentur, ut eos inspiceret hortareturque restitit, ac *nisi* princeps gregis algere se *diceret*, redire ac repraesentare spectaculum *voluit*.²⁶

Tacitus, *Ger.* 37. 2: ex quo *si* ad alterum imperatoris Traiani consulatum *computemus*, ducenti ferme et decem anni *colliguntur*.

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 1. 5: quod *si* vita *suppeditet*, principatum divi Nervae et imperium Traiani . . . senectuti *seposui*.²⁷

²⁶ The force of *voluit* seems to be "his will was to return"; cf. *voluit* in *Nero* 11. 2, where the reference is to will actually executed.

²⁷ The process of substitution is favored when the main clause follows. Cf. the effect of the reverse order:

Plautus *Amph.* 336:

Non edepol nunc ubi terrarum sim *scio*, *si* quis *roget*.

(Continued on p. 97)

A more complicated type of substitution is seen in a small group of contrary to fact sentences which use as 'apodosis' a rhetorical question with verb in the indicative:

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 87: *Nisi enim id faceret (ratio), cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit?*

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 149: *Primum tuam rem illam et praedam fuisse; nam, ni ita esset, cur tu Apronium malebas?*

In the first of these passages, the rhetorical question *cur . . . peragravit?* implies something like: "There was no other occasion for Plato to traverse Egypt"; and this general notion, in turn, serves as a substitute for an exact subjunctive apodosis; e.g., "Plato would not have undertaken the journey through Egypt."²⁸

The special type of substitution here illustrated is found in English also, and the rhetorical indicative question in apodosis therefore seems to us not specially striking.²⁹

In the following example it appears side by side with the normal contrary to fact construction:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 128: *Non scriberet se vectigalibus propexisse, nisi hoc vellet ostendere, te vectigalia perdidisse. Quid enim erat, quod vectigalibus prospiceret Metellus . . . , si iste non vectigalia populi Romani quaestu suo pervertisset?*

Plautus, *Poen.* 550 ff.:

Omnia istaec scimus iam nos, si hi spectatores sciant.

Horum hic nunc causa haec agitur spectatorum fabula:

Hos te satius est docere ut, quando agas, quid agas sciant.

In both these examples (the second apparently contrary to fact), reversal of order would provide excellent cases of substitution, the main clause of the first covering the exact apodosis "I should not be able to tell," etc., and the main clause of the second: "there would be no need to set forth the facts." But, with the present order, there is ready suggestion of anacoluthon. Cf. p. 91, footnote 20.

²⁸ A much simpler handling of a similar theme may be seen in the following:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 115: *Aut, ni ita se res haberet, Anaxagoras aut hic ipse Democritus agros . . . reliquissent, huic discendi . . . delectationi toto se animo dedissent?*

²⁹ Another case in point may be the somewhat difficult passage in Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 73.

Still another example shows a substituted rhetorical question reinforced by an apodosis of regular form:

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 89: *Quem tibi hoc daturum putas? Si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? Sumpsisses tuo iure.*

As indicated above, various other applications of the principle of substitution will be made in subsequent sections.

9. CONCESSIVE CLAUSES

A concessive period made up of a subjunctive *si*-clause and subjunctive conclusion informs the hearer that something would still be true even in the case supposed.

But if the thing would still be true, it follows that it *is* as a matter of fact true. Hence, in place of a subjunctive conclusion, it is quite open to the speaker to append a main clause stating what *is* true, this more general statement covering the particular application as well. Such use of the indicative main clause is merely another aspect of the process of substitution described at length in the previous section.

Under the influence of pure conditional sentences of the vague future and contrary to fact types, the tendency is strong to choose the subjunctive conclusion.³⁰ But the indicative main clause also is much in evidence:

Plautus, *Bacch.* 128:

Qui si decem habeas linguas, mutum esse addecet.

³⁰ It is not impossible that this tendency was helped along by intensive periods (see pp. 65 ff.), wherein the emphasis in the *si*-clause falls strongly upon some element other than the verb; e.g.

Plautus, *Aul.* 555 ff.:

*Quos si Argus servet, qui oculus totus fuit,
Quem quondam Ioni Iuno custodem addidit,
Is numquam servet.*

Here the stress upon *Argus* makes it possible to resume with *Is* in the main clause, a balance that would seem very likely to favor the use of the same mood in the conclusion as in the *si*-clause. In this particular case there are more decisive factors working to this end. Cf. also Terence, *Heaut.* 452 ff.

Terence, *Ad.* 761 ff.:

Ipsa si cupiat Salus,

Servare prorsus *non potest* hanc familiam.

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 58. 6: Diutius in his locis esse, *si maxime animus ferat*, frumenti atque aliarum rerum egestas *prohibet*.

Cicero, *de Har. Res.* 60: vix haec, *si undique fulciamus iam labefacta*, vix, inquam, nixa in omnium nostrum umeris *cohaerebunt*.³¹

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 15. 4: Nec providerant impetum hostium milites, nec, *si providissent*, satis virium ad arcendum *erat*.

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 45: Quodsi iam *essem* oblitus severitatis et constantiae meae, tamne *amens eram*, ut . . . putarem?

Livy, xxxviii. 49. 12: *Si gladium in Asia non strinxissem*, *si hostem non vidissem*, tamen triumphum in Thracia duobus proeliis *merueram*.

In all the examples above cited, it will be noticed that the phraseology of the main clause follows very closely the form that a subjunctive conclusion would have taken. This, however, is not essential; in fact, substitution in the concessive period may be quite as bold as anywhere else; e.g.

Plautus, *Asin.* 318 ff.:

Si quidem omnes coniurati cruciamenta conferant,
Habeo opinor familiarem—tergum, ne quaeram foris.

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 29: quod *si ea* (invidia) mihi maxime *impenderet*, tamen hoc animo *fui semper*, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem.

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 68: De quo etiam *si quis dubitasset* antea, . . . *sustulisti* hanc suspicionem, cum dixisti. . . .

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 83: *Si . . . non me ipsa res publica . . . ad gravitatem animi . . . revocaret*, tamen hoc natura *est insitum*, ut. . . .

In the preceding chapter,³² attention was called to the fact that alternative conditions may have the effect of a concessive clause, because the conclusion holds, whether or no. In such

³¹ The future indicative is not so well suited as some other tenses to the process of substitution, and a certain residue of inconcinnity perhaps must be recognized in this connection. There are cases, however, in which substitution offers a quite satisfactory interpretation; e.g., Plautus, *Asin.* 414 ff.

³² p. 66.

sentences the indicative is generally used in the conditions. But note the following cases of the subjunctive, the first in parataxis:

Terence, *Heaut.* 643:

Melius peius, *prosit obsit*, nil *vident* nisi quod lubet.

Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 171: *sive velint* Casilineneses se dedere *sive* famem perpeti atque ita perire, *necesse est* Casilinum venire in Hannibalis potestatem.

In connections like the following, the suggestion of concessive force is misleading:

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 30: ei, qui iucunde vixerit annos decem, *si* aequae vita iucunda menstrua *addatur*, . . . bonum *sit*; *si* autem id *non concedatur*, *non continuo* vita beata *tollitur*.

Inasmuch as this passage begins with a conditional sentence of the form *si sit . . . sit*, it is noteworthy that the parallel alternative period shifts to the type *si sit . . . est*, thus strikingly illustrating the principle of substitution.

But despite its form and apparent implication, this second conditional sentence cannot be recognized as concessive. For *si . . . concedatur* is an alternative condition;³³ and *non continuo* is a conventional marker of conditional thought of non-concessive types.³⁴

10. THE *Parum est* TYPE

A very considerable group of sentences with subjunctive condition have, in the main clause, indicative expressions such as *parum est*, *non satis est*, and the like; e.g.

Plautus, *Merc.* 692 ff.:

Parumne est malae rei quod amat Demipho,
Ni sumptuosus insuper etiam *siet*?

Terence, *Phor.* 546 ff.:

Sed parum est quod omnibus nunc nobis suscenset senex,
Ni instigemus etiam, ut nullus locus relinquatur precii?

³³ Cf. the discussion of *Auct. ad Her.* i. 16, p. 63.

³⁴ Cf. pp. 49 and 53 ff.

The exact nature of this use is hard to determine. Possibly such sentences should be regarded as colloquially irregular, and somewhat outside the standard rules for conditional periods.

Current English of a very uncouth type produces an impression in some degree similar; e.g., the second of the sentences quoted above might be rendered: "But isn't it enough that master is already angry with everyone, without we *should stir* him up further?"

The Latin examples, however, do not appear quite so rugged; and it may be that these cases, too, should be brought under the principle of substitution illustrated under the two previous headings.

If the two cases cited above are examined again, it will be seen that in each case the speaker means to ask impatiently whether the situation is not *otherwise* bad enough, if the proposed insult be not added to present injury.

In other words, something like *aliter* is implied in the main clause of each example. The hearer is helped to this hint by the presence of *etiam* and *insuper etiam* in the *ni*-clauses that follow.³⁵

With recognition of an implied *aliter*, the indicative main clause falls readily into line as a substitute for exact apodosis. Compare an example in which nothing is left to implication:

Plautus, *Bacch.* 563 ff.:

Quid? tibi *non erat* meretricium *aliarum* Athenis *copia*
 Quibuscum haberes rem, *nisi* cum illa quam ego mandassem tibi
Occiperes tute *etiam*³⁶ amare et mi *ires* consultum male?

Here *non erat . . . copia* corresponds to *parum est*, and in the room of an implied *aliter* stands the explicit *aliarum*. With this addition, the indicative question is abundantly justified as a substitute for a normal subjunctive apodosis.

Recognition of an implied *aliter* or *alius* makes it possible, on the basis of substitution, to solve cases far more difficult than

³⁵ For other cases, cf. H. Blase, *Studien und Kritiken zur lat. Syntax*, Mainz, I Teil, 1904, pp. 32 ff.

³⁶ Conjectural addition to the line.

those first cited under this heading. Such is the following passage, which has long puzzled scholars:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 18: Orestes si accusetur matricidii, *nisi hoc dicat*: 'Iure feci; illa enim patrem meum occiderat,' *non habet defensionem*.

The analysis of this sentence is simplicity itself, as soon as it is recognized that *non habet defensionem* represents *aliter non habet defensionem* or *aliam non habet defensionem*. For, so understood, the clause is revealed as a statement of fact substituted for an exact apodosis.³⁷

How little it matters whether the element represented by *aliter* or *alius* is implicit or explicit, appears from a comparison of the two following sentences:

Terence, *Hec.* 601:

Quam fortunatus *ceteris sim rebus, absque una hac foret!*

Terence, *Phor.* 170:

Beatus, ni unum desit, animus qui modeste istaec ferat.

In the first of these passages the speaker, using an exact apodosis, might have said: "How happy I should be, were it not for this one thing!" But *ceteris rebus* makes it possible for him to substitute a statement of unconditioned fact: "How happy I *am* in other respects, were it not for this one thing!"

Obviously the other sentence is made on the same last, though the qualification of *Beatus* is not explicit. Full and accurate expression would call for *Aliter beatus*.³⁸

In this connection, it is pertinent to call attention to the fact that in a considerable range of other constructions it is no rare thing for a word like *alius* to be left to implication. Reisig enumerates several categories,³⁹ among them that of comparative expressions; e.g.

³⁷ Cf. Plautus, *Most.* 462.

³⁸ In all the sentences cited above the protasis is negative. Whenever such a condition marks an exception, that very fact, of course, favors the setting up of such balances as "(otherwise) . . . unless," "(otherwise) . . . except," etc.

³⁹ *Vorlesungen über latein. Sprachwissenschaft*, §453 (797).

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 15: sed tamen, vere dicam, quaevis causa mallem fuisset quam ista, quam dicis.

Suetonius, *Galba* 8. 1: . . . in secessu plurimum vixit, ne ad gestandum quidem umquam iter ingressus quam ut secum vehiculo proximo decies sestertium in auro efferret.

In the first of these passages *quaevis . . . quam ista* has the force of *quaevis alia . . . quam ista*;⁴⁰ and in the other, which has much troubled the editors, *quam ut* stands for *aliter . . . quam ut*.⁴¹

In addition to the categories listed by Reisig, it is interesting to observe that there are certain cases of the *cum*-construction in which the statement of the main clause is not valid, unless it is understood with the reservation *aliter*; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* i. 17. 5: amoris vero erga me, cum a fraterno amore domesticoque discessi, tibi primas defero.

Cicero does not by any means design to say that the first place is given to Atticus. He begins with a reservation, and then assigns to Atticus a place [otherwise] first.⁴² So also the following:

⁴⁰ Cf. Suetonius, *Claud.* 10. 2, where *nec quicquam . . . quam* represents *nec quicquam aliud . . . quam*. Implication of this sort is sometimes so insidious that it can be brought to light only by careful analysis; e.g.

Suetonius, *Nero* 17: cautum ut testamentis primae duae cerae testatorum modo nomine inscripto vacuae signaturis ostenderentur.

This sentence does not mean, of course, that the pages were actually blank (*vacuae*); but it was provided that when the name of the testator had been written thereon they should be displayed [otherwise] blank to those who assisted at the sealing; cf. *vacuis*, Juvenal, i. 136.

It should be added also that the tendency to leave an adverb or adjective to implication is not confined to words like *aliter* and *alius*; cf., for example, *imputari* for *iure imputari*, Tacitus, *Agr.* 34. 4; and *interpretarentur* for *vere interpretarentur*, *ibid.* 40. 4.

⁴¹ This particular combination is analogous to *ut non* in result clauses without an antecedent *ita*; e.g.

Suetonius, *Nero* 32. 3: Nulli delegavit officium, ut non adiceret: 'Scis quid mihi opus sit.'

⁴² How strongly this parallel supports the interpretation proposed for certain conditional sentences discussed in this section will appear more clearly if the general thought of the above *cum*-construction be recast in conditional form:

Nisi fraterni amoris domesticique rationem habeam, amoris erga me tibi primas defero.

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 191: Nonne videtis . . . C. Aculeonem . . . ita tenere ius civile, ut ei, *quom* ab hoc (Scaevola) *discesseritis*, nemo de iis, qui peritissimi sunt, *anteponatur*?

Cicero, *ad Fam.* i. 9. 18: Sic enim te existimare velim, *cum* a vobis meae salutis auctoribus *discesserim*, *neminem esse*, cuius officiiis me tam esse devinctum non solum confitear, sed etiam gaudeam.

Cicero, *de Off.* ii. 6: Si autem est aliqua disciplina virtutis, *ubi* ea *quaeretur*, *cum* ab hoc discendi genere *discesseris*?

A very effective foil to the foregoing passages is provided by another, which, on the surface, looks very much like them, yet in fact is very different in regard to the point now at issue:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 12. 2: Etenim omnis Caesaris familiaris satis opportune habeo implicatos consuetudine et benevolentia sic, ut, *cum* ab illo *discesserint*, me *habeant proximum*.

Here, instead of saying "they count me first," which would not be true unless with the limitation *aliter*, the speaker states the exact fact "they count me second," which requires no such limitation.

CHAPTER VIII

SUBJUNCTIVE PROTASIS WITH INDICATIVE “APODOSIS” (*Continued*)

11. MODAL VERB IN APODOSIS(?)

This subhead is marked as questionable because of grave doubt as to the validity of the time-honored doctrine set forth in the following quotation:

Auch die Perioden mit Verben des Könnens und Müssens oder Konjug. periphr. u. ä. im Hauptsatze sind weiter nicht auffallend, da diese Verba mit dem zugehörigen Infinitiv oder der ihnen verwandte Ausdruck Umschreibungen der entsprechenden Konjunctive sind.¹

It is true enough that verbal expressions of the kind here indicated occur with great frequency in indicative main clauses coupled with subjunctive conditions; but even the most superficial examination reveals the weakness of the above cited conventional theory as an explanation of the choice of mood.

There is, of course, a well recognized subjunctive of obligation; and at one time the subjunctive as a whole was regarded as the ‘mood of possibility.’ On this basis, it was natural enough that verbs such as *debeo* and *possum* should come to be called ‘modal verbs.’ But these facts have no bearing upon the question now under discussion.

It may indeed be permissible to say that *Quid faciam?* and *Quid mihi faciendum est?* have practically the same meaning, and that the gerundive element in the second offsets the mood of the first. But how would the idea of obligation inherent in the stem of *debeo* make it possible for the indicative forms of that verb to stand in the room of the subjunctives normally required

¹ H. Blase, *op. cit.*, I, 16.

to convey the *conditional* meanings 'would' and 'should'? Manifestly the notion of obligation would not and could not have any such effect. Hence the theory breaks down at the very start.

In the second place, if it were true that the modality of certain verbs caused their indicative forms to be used in apodosis in cases where other verbs would stand in the subjunctive, why does not this principle apply to protasis also? On the basis of 'subjunctive' meaning, such replacement should be as easy in one case as the other. But compare the following:

Cicero, *in Ferr.* ii. 4. 20: qui te neque *debent* adiuuare, *si possint*, neque *possunt*, *si velint*.

Third, if the modality of these verbs makes their indicative forms suitable for use in apodoses that otherwise would require the subjunctive, why is it that they, too, so often stand in the subjunctive in apodosis? e.g.

Cicero, *Brut.* 287: imitari neque *possim*, *si velim*, nec *velim* fortasse, *si possim*.²

This is a topic that probably would reward extensive study. But a full discussion of all matters involved would call for the command of a vast range of data, and only a few suggestions are in order here.

It should be noted at the outset that the phrase 'modal verbs' is commonly used in a very loose and unscientific fashion. Probably few who employ it could write out, offhand, even an approximately complete list of verbs and verbal expressions they would include. The enumeration is apt to end in the vague "and so forth."

Furthermore, when the items are examined which commonly enter into such enumerations, it at once appears that the term 'modality' is made to cover a very considerable range of diverse material, including such different expressions as *debeo*, *respon-surus erat*, and *dignus eram*.

² Cf. Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 38, i. 212, ii. 9, iii. 66, *Brut.* 192, *Orat.* 169. Conversely, if the indicatives of modal verbs are virtually subjunctives, how can they be used in the main clause of iterative sentences where subjunctives would be quite out of place? e.g., Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 249.

In view of this diversity, and in view of the fact (brought out above) that there is nothing in the stem-meaning of a verb like *debeo* to make its indicative forms equivalent to the subjunctive of other verbs in apodosis, it would seem that the time is past when a sentence of the form *si sit . . . est*, for example, may be counted as explained by the casual comment 'modal verb in apodosis.'

Even as a mere rule of thumb such procedure is unsatisfactory; for, as already noticed, the use of the subjunctive of these same verbs in apodosis is common enough. Indeed, in some cases the subjunctive is obligatory; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Clu.* 18: *Mihi ignoscere non deberetis, si tacerem.*

In this example, the stem-meaning of *debeo*, far from contributing the notion natural to subjunctive apodosis, is itself conditioned. In other words, this modal verb in its present setting behaves exactly like any other verb.

This case is only one of many. And since the syntax of the modal verb is here exactly the same as that of a non-modal verb, it is very pertinent to inquire whether this may not often be true also of examples in which an indicative main clause is coupled with a subjunctive condition. That such is the case is at once evident when the subject is approached by way of categories described in the previous chapter; e.g.

a. Concessive periods

As has already been shown,³ when a speaker employs a concessive *si*-clause using the subjunctive, he may complete the period either by telling what *would* still be true (subjunctive) or by stating what *is* true in any case (indicative). Acceptance of the second alternative results in cases of subjunctive protasis with indicative 'apodosis'; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* v. 4. 1: *nunc, si iam res placet, agendi tamen viam non video.*

³ See pp. 98 ff.

Cicero, *Orat.* 152: nobis, *ne si cupiamus quidem* distrahere voces, *conceditur.*

Cicero, *p. Clu.* 103: *quodsi* quis illud iudicium *appellet*, tamen hoc confiteatur *neesse est.*

There can be no question that all the main clauses here stand on the same footing. Modality or non-modality of the verb has nothing to do with the matter. Therefore, modality should not even be mentioned in connection with such cases; it is a full and satisfactory explanation of the choice of the indicative main clause to point out that it is the conclusion of a concessive period.

b. Substitution

This is the wider principle which includes, as a subdivision, the use of indicative conclusion with subjunctive concessive clauses, as just illustrated.

Here again modal and non-modal verbs behave in exactly the same way; and the fact of substitution explains equally the use of the indicative forms of verbs of either class in the main clause; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 1. 5: *quod si* vita *suppeditet*, principatum divi Nervae et imperium Traiani senectuti *seposui.*

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 31: *quod si* ita *putasset*, certe optabilius Miloni *fuit* dare iugulum P. Clodio quam iugulari a vobis.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 141: Quem hominem, *si* qui pudor in te atque adeo *si* qui metus *fuisset*, sine supplicio dimittere *non debuisti*, hunc abs te sine praemio discedere noluisti?

It is unquestionably true that the so-called modal verbs figure very prominently in sentences of this type; and quite as clearly the reason is that the stem-meaning of these verbs lends itself with special readiness to the process of substitution.⁴

For example, the verb *possum* means not only "I can" and "I am able," but also "I am in a position (to)" and "It is in my

⁴ This explanation, of course, has nothing in common with the rejected conventional view that the stem-meaning of modal verbs turns them practically into subjunctives, though the indicative forms be used. We are dealing here with statements of fact *substituted* for exact subjunctive apodoses.

power (to),” and the like. These latter meanings can be observed to advantage in cases which have no condition attached:

Plautus, *Tri.* 811 ff.:

Diei tempus non vides? Quid illum putas
Natura illa atque ingenio? iam dudum ebruius.
Quidvis probare poterit.

In this passage the speaker assumes that the young man referred to will be in an uncritical state because of intoxication, and concludes: “He *will be in a condition* to approve anything.”

Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 5. 16: Repeto me correptum ab eo cur ambularem: ‘*Poteras,*’ inquit, ‘has horas non perdere.’

Here the elder Pliny is described as reproving his nephew for wasting good time in walking. We may indeed render idiomatically: “You *might have saved* these hours”; but what actually was said is far more accurately represented by “It *was in your power to save* these hours.” Only in some such way as this can the use of the present infinitive (*non perdere*) be properly taken into account.

So the first singular of the indicative is frequently employed in the sense “I am in a position (to)”; e.g.

Cicero, *Cato M.* 24: *possum* nominare ex agro Sabino rusticos Romanos, vicinos et familiares meos, quibus absentibus numquam fere ulla in agro maiora opera fiunt.

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 101: *Possom* de ichneumonum utilitate dicere; sed nolo esse longus.

Cicero, *Cato M.* 55: *Possom* persequi multa oblectamenta rerum rusticarum, sed haec ipsa, quae dixi, sentio fuisse longiora.

Indicative forms of *possum* thus used are admirably fitted to stand in statements or questions of fact substituted for exact subjunctive apodoses; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 4. 14: Quid? *si velim* nominare homines, qui aut non minoris aut etiam pluris emerint, *nonne possum?*

This might be rendered somewhat literally: “If I should desire to name men who purchased either at the same figure or

even for more, *am* I not in a position to do so?" Such substitution is not merely sound logically; it is really more effective than the exact apodosis displaced ("should I not be able?"). Compare also the following examples:

Cicero, *Phil.* vi. 8: An ille *non potuit, si* Antonium consullem . . . *iudicasset*, legiones Antonio . . . tradere?

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 117: multo enim pluris fructus annui Siciliae venire *potuerunt, si* id te senatus aut populus Romanus facere *voluisset*.⁵

These sentences are but samples of the many that might be cited to show with what ease indicative forms of the verb *possum* lend themselves to the process of substitution.⁶ And the verb *possum* is singled out merely as one of a group; e.g., what is true of *potui* in this connection obviously holds also for *debui* in the sense "It was my duty (to)."

Taken all in all, the process of substitution accounts for a large section of the cases in which the indicative of modal verbs is coupled with subjunctive conditions.

It must be added, however, that there are sporadic cases in which an indicative form of a verb such as *possum* seems to be used as a real apodosis for a subjunctive condition, and not as a substitute therefor; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 9. 2: quod *si adfuisset* fides, aut opprimi . . . duae legiones . . . *potuere* aut retro actae . . . turpem fugam *conscivissent*.

The fact that the two parts of the main clause of this sentence are set off by *aut . . . aut* shows that Tacitus is not composing at random; and it might very plausibly be urged that he meant

⁵ In some cases involving negatives, an implied *aliter* or the like figures in the substitution, e.g., Cicero, *p. Planc.* 53, Nepos, *Cim.* 1. 1. See discussion of such implication on pp. 101 ff.; and cf. Cicero, *de Fato* 48, where *aliter* is expressed.

⁶ If the text be sound, the tense variation emphasizes in a striking way the principle of substitution in the following example of the concessive type:

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 47: prognosticorum causas persecuti sunt et Boethus Stoicus . . . et noster etiam Posidonius, et, *si* causae *non reperiantur* istarum rerum, res tamen ipsae observari animadvertique *potuerunt*.

potuere to play a part in the apodosis equal to that of *conscivissent*.⁷

Recognition of a few exceptions of this sort does not mean that even here subjunctive force in the stem-meaning of the modal verb explains the choice of the indicative form. For, as shown above, the stem-meaning of a verb like *debeo* is far removed from the 'would' and 'should' of subjunctive apodosis.

It seems more likely that sporadic examples of the indicative of modal verbs thus used are due to the influence of the very large number of cases where the indicative of such verbs is really in order by reason of substitution.

The indicative by analogy was favored by the fact that the distinction between exact apodosis and substitution is sometimes a very nice matter; for there are frequent situations which could properly be described by either device; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 34. 1 ff.: Dux uterque pari culpa meritis adversa prosperis defuere:

Nam Civilis *si* maioribus copiis *instruxisset* aciem, circumiri a tam paucis cohortibus *nequisset*. . . .

Vocula . . . tritis frustra diebus castra in hostem movit, quem *si* statim impellere cursumque rerum sequi *maturasset*, solvere obsidium legionum eodem impetu *potuit*.

Here are exactly similar cases—two generals blamed, in parallel sentences, for failing in strategy. In the second sentence, exact apodosis ("he might have") or substitution ("he was in a position to") would be equally appropriate. In which way did Tacitus mean *potuit* to be read?

As in the example previously cited, it is possible that this indicative is used by analogy for the subjunctive, though that interpretation is not so much favored here as there. On the other hand, in searching out such an awkward expression as *nequisset* is in this connection, Tacitus seems to show that he is consciously striving for variety; and it would fit with this to interpret *potuit* as a case of substitution.

⁷ This could not be so readily admitted of a case like Cicero, *de Re P.* i. 10. On the use of *potui* there, cf. p. 110, footnote 5.

Manifestly the lines of demarcation are very faint here; and it need occasion no surprise if a speaker or writer occasionally allows the indicative of a modal verb to stand where the thought really calls for an exact subjunctive apodosis.

In colloquial speech, confusion of this sort is much more pronounced. Note the easy shift of mood in question and answer in the two following passages:

Plautus, *Asin.* 878 ff.:

PA. *Possis, si forte accubantem tuom virum conspexeris,
Cum corona amplexum amicam, si videas, cognoscere?*
ART. *Possum ecastor.*

Plautus, *Merc.* 518 ff.:

LY. *Possin tu, sei ussus venerit, subtemen tenue nere?*
PA. *Possum.*

In view of such models, it certainly is hardly necessary to fall back upon anacoluthon to explain the form of the following example:

Plautus, *Rud.* 565 ff.:

LA. *Qua sunt facie?* SC. *Scitula.*
Vel ego amare utramvis *possum, si probe adpotus siem.*

An interesting converse situation is revealed through comparison of the two following sentences, which represent a more formal style:

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 38: *Quem si interficere voluisset, quantae quotiens occasiones . . . fuerunt!*

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 97: *Quo ex genere mihi testium . . . , si uti voluissem, magna copia fuisset.*

It will be noted that the phrases used here in the main clauses (namely, *occasio esse* and *copia esse*) are synonymous with *possum* in the sense "I am in a position (to)," which is one of the meanings that make easy the process of substitution in the case of that verb.

Hence, in the first of the passages cited above, there is a perfectly natural case of substitution in *occasiones fuerunt*.⁸ In

⁸So also Plautus, *Pseud.* 285; cf. *Truc.* 140.

the second, with equal appropriateness *copia erat* might have been written as a substitute for an exact subjunctive apodosis (e.g., *satis multos invenissem*); for the witnesses were actually available, whether Cicero wanted to use their services or not.⁹

In place of this, he has thrown the substitution itself into the subjunctive,¹⁰ being moved thereto, probably, by instinctive fondness for verbal symmetry.

Such use of the subjunctive is really quite as irregular as the occasional employment of the indicative of modal verbs in cases where an exact subjunctive apodosis is in order.

c. The future relation

In the conventional lists of modal expressions that are coupled with subjunctive conditions, it is customary to include the periphrastic conjugations, active and passive.

On the score of meaning, the passive periphrastic has something in common with *debeo*, *necesse est*, and *oportet*. But the active form is far less colorful; sometimes it marks nothing more than futurity from a point of time indicated by the form of *sum* involved in the expression.

If mere future outlook may be regarded as a phase of 'modality,'¹¹ it would seem that here at length is found a case where 'modality' incident to the nature of a phrase makes an indicative expression a real equivalent of a subjunctive apodosis, and not a substitute therefor.

For example, in a conditional sentence of the futurum in praeterito type, the notion of futurity required for the apodosis may be expressed either through a secondary tense of the subjunctive or through an indicative form of the active periphrastic. As a matter of fact, the second alternative is the one usually chosen; e.g.

⁹ Cf. the use of *copia erat* in Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 17. 6.

¹⁰ Something remotely analogous appears in certain quoted reasons introduced by *quod* or *quia*, when the verb *dico* is incorporated and itself is written into the subjunctive.

¹¹ This is put merely as a hypothesis.

Cicero, *ad Att.* iii. 22. 4: ego quod, per Thessaliam *si irem* in Epirum, per diu nihil *eram auditurus*, et quod mei studiosos habeo Dyrrhachinos, ad eos perrexi.

Cicero, *ad Att.* iv. 3. 4: *nisi* Milo in campo *obnuntiasset*, comitia *futura (erant)*.

Cicero, *ad Quint. Fr.* i. 2. 1: quod autem concursum eum, qui *erat futurus*, si una tecum *decederet* sustulit, id mihi non incommode visum est accidisse.

Between the futurum in praeterito and the past contrary to fact there is a sort of confused middle ground; and it is by no means easy at times to determine whether the speaker means to present an action as prospective from a point in the past, or whether he measures backward from his present to an unfulfilled past. How easily a shift from one viewpoint to the other takes place is well illustrated by the following passage:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vii. 3. 2: Hoc interdum probabat, et in ea sententia *videbatur fore*, et *fuisset* fortasse, *nisi* quadam ex pugna *coepisset* suis militibus confidere.

In *videbatur fore* the outlook plainly is prospective; but *fuisset* just as certainly marks a past as viewed from the speaker's present. In another passage the same shift occurs more insidiously:

Cicero, *de Orat.* iii. 12: Nam tibi aut civilis ferri *subeunda fuit* crudelitas aut, *si* qua te fortuna ab atrocitate mortis *vindicasset*, eadem esse te funerum patriae spectatorem *coegisset*.

These words occur in an apostrophe to the dead Crassus, who is congratulated on his timely demise; for, as the speaker points out, there were but two prospects lying ahead for him, i.e., either to be murdered himself or to witness other tragedies. The prospective notion is clear in *subeunda fuit*; and, under its influence, *si vindicasset* is naturally felt to look in the same direction ("if fortune should have saved you"). But in *coegisset* the balance has swung to the past contrary to fact idea. Cf. Martial, x. 41. 5 ff.

In view of this easy shift from one standpoint to the other, it is not at all strange that there are examples which cannot be analyzed with certainty; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* x. 13. 2: Quod ego nec rogaturus eram, nec, si impetrassem, crediturus.¹²

To put this into English, it is necessary to decide between "If I should have gained the concession," and "If I had gained the concession." A Roman reader, however, would not have been forced to a decision, and he would probably pass such a sentence without feeling that there is anything involved calling for careful analysis.¹³

But there are plenty of examples in which indicative forms of the active periphrastic are coupled with *si*-clauses which the Roman reader must certainly have felt as contrary to fact; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 81: Hic quaero, indices: Si illo die gens ista Clodia, quod facere voluit, effecisset, si P. Sestius, qui pro occiso relictus est, occisus esset, fuistisne ad arma ituri?

¹² Cf. Cicero, *p. Sest.* 45. In this connection, attention may be called to another sentence, which, though of somewhat different character, seems to show in a rather striking way what liberty a writer may allow himself in the matter of point of view:

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 29. 1: Veranius . . . supremis testamenti verbis ambitionis manifestus; quippe multa in Neronem adulatione addidit *subiecturum* ei provinciam *fuisse*, si biennio proximo *vixisset*.

From the point of view of Veranius, *biennio proximo* could have been nothing but prospective. But Tacitus, though professing to quote the original remark (note *addidit*), phrases the indirect discourse as a past contrary to fact (*subiecturum* . . . *fuisse*), apparently from the standpoint of his own present.

It may be possible, however, to so interpret the phrase *supremis testamenti verbis* as to permit the entrance of the principle illustrated in footnote 23 on p. 145. But before resorting to that expedient, it may be worth while to observe the English into which Furneaux has inadvertently fallen in his note on this passage: "The point of the reference here is not his flattery of Nero, but his empty boast which would not be tested, and which implied that his successor, if he *did not achieve* the conquest, *was* of inferior capacity." Here is a shift analogous to that assumed in the Latin sentence above.

¹³ Cf. Plautus, *Mil. G.* 475 ff., and Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 13. 1. An even more elusive case is found in Cicero, *p. Deio.* 18.

Here *illo die* at once precludes prospective interpretation, and the incorporated relative clauses indicate clearly non-fulfillment of the conditions. See also other examples:

Plautus, *Cist.* 151 ff.:

Ita properavit de puellae proloqui
Suppositione; quod *si tacuisset*, tamen
Ego *eram dicturus*.

Cicero, *de Div.* i. 26: qui eum ex itinere quodam proposito et constituto revertisset aquilae admonitus volatu, conclave illud, ubi *erat mansurus, si ire perrexisset*, proxima nocte corruit.

Ovid, *Trist.* i. 7. 39 ff.:

Quicquid in his igitur vitii rude carmen habebit,
Emendaturus, si licuisset, eram.

In all these sentences the immediate context shows that the writer could hardly have intended the *si*-clause to be anything else than contrary to fact. The last example concludes a poem, the burden of which is that circumstances have prevented the writer from putting the finishing touches to his work.

With a *si*-clause that is definitely past contrary to fact, the indicative forms of the active periphrastic can no longer function as exact apodoses, but are written on the principle of substitution. For example, in the first of the illustrations above cited, the phrase "Were you ready to take up arms?" replaces the exact apodosis "Would you have taken up arms?"

It will be noted that in each of the cases the periphrastic form chances to connote something more than mere futurity; there is also a suggestion of preparedness, or even of intention to act.

This added element brings the active periphrastic forms into line with *possum* in the meaning "I am in a position (to)," thus contributing to their fitness to be substituted for the exact apodosis of past contrary to fact conditions.¹⁴

¹⁴ In the discussion of cases using the indicative forms of *possum*, it was noted that there probably are sentences in which the function of real apodosis is forced upon indicative forms used in connection with a subjunctive *si*-clause; see pp. 110 ff. Much more rarely the same sort of thing may happen in examples using the future participle as a main clause; e.g., Ovid, *Met.* ix. 561 ff.

In a discussion of the future relation, account must be taken also of the fact that the imperfect tense frequently has future outlook. It thus happens that a form like *veniebat* is sometimes found where the active periphrastic might have been expected. When a condition is attached to such imperfects, the resultant sentence is to be analyzed in just the same way as examples with the periphrastic already treated in this section. The attached condition may be either future or contrary to fact; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 6. 2: Nam *si caderet* Marcellus, agmen reorum *sternebatur*.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 5. 129: *Si* per L. Metellum *licitum esset*, iudices, matres illorum miserorum sororesque *veniebant*.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 1. 158: cui *nisi* ego vi populi atque hominum clamore *restitissem*, ex hac decuria vestra (eos) in suum consilium sine causa *subsortiebatur*.

If any further illustration were needed, certain cases using the verb *possum* could be brought under this head; e.g.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 3. 2 ff.: (matrem) interficere constituit, hactenus consultans, veneno an ferro vel qua alia vi. Placuitque primo venenum. Sed inter epulas principis *si daretur*, referri ad casum *non poterat*, tali iam Britannici exitio.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 2. 128: Sed is fieri *nullo modo poterat*, si Herodotus quidem *adesset*.

Cicero, *de Dom.* 53: Quodsi iam populus Romanus de ista re *consultus esset* et non omnia per servos latronesque *gessisses*, *nonne* fieri *poterat* ut populo *placeret?*

The first of these passages has to do with Nero's plots to put his mother out of the way. At first he inclined to poisoning; but in view of the recent taking off of Britannicus by this means, conditions were unfavorable for staging another such 'accident.' The second example is of the same character; the third has a contrary to fact *si*-clause.

Finally, the imperfect indicative *erat* may combine with a noun to form a phrase with sufficient future outlook to justify attachment to a subjunctive *si*-clause; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Flacc.* 39: *si* veras *protulissent*, criminis nihil *erat*, *si* falsas, *erat* poena.

d. Iterative

It has probably been sufficiently shown that it is no explanation at all of subjunctive protasis with indicative "apodosis" to point out a modal verb in the main clause. But, in leaving that subject, it may be worth while to quote a few iterative sentences, where again it will be seen that modality of the verb has nothing to do with the choice of indicative for the main clause:

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 208: Nam *si id factum augeas, odium creatur.*

Cicero, *Orat.* 228: Hanc igitur adhibere *neesse est, si ornate velis dicere.*

Cicero, *Orat.* 194: in trochaeo, qui *est par iambo, sed eo vitiosus in oratione, si ponatur extremus, quod. . . .*

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 61: *illustrari autem oratione si quis istas ipsas artis velit, ad oratoris ei confugiendum est facultatem.*

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is not possible here to undertake any complete study of the indicative of modal verbs in "apodosis"; but at least three conclusions may be set down with some certainty:

(1) The stem-meanings of modal verbs do not in general coincide with the 'would' and 'should' meanings that attach to the subjunctive as used in the apodoses of conditional sentences. Hence there is little or no foundation for the view that the indicative of a modal verb constitutes a virtually subjunctive apodosis because of the notion inherent in the stem of the word.¹⁵

(2) Though modal verbs stand out prominently in any collection of conditional sentences made up of subjunctive protasis and indicative "apodosis," these expressions form no separate and homogeneous group. When the material is divided into subclasses, modal and non-modal verbs are found side by side, and one and the same principle explains the use of the indicative forms of either.

¹⁵ For a possible exception, see pp. 113 ff.; and cf. certain apparent anomalies, pp. 110 ff.

(3) By virtue of their stem-meaning, modal verbs are particularly adapted to the process of substitution. Hence they are well represented among the cases of subjunctive protasis with indicative "apodosis" which are explainable on the basis of this principle.¹⁶

A complete study of this general problem would include, of course, cases in which the imperfect subjunctive in *present* contrary to fact conditions is balanced in the main clause by such *past* indicative forms as *poterat* and *debebat*; and such indicatives would need to be studied also in their use without attached condition.

There is reason to believe that the distortion due to the employment of these past indicative forms in a virtually present sense tends to give greater unity to a conditional period than is normally the case when a subjunctive clause is attached to an indicative statement; e.g.

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 16. 1: *Si immensum imperii corpus stare . . . sine rectore posset, dignus eram, a quo res publica inciperet.*

These words are a part of the speech ascribed to the emperor Galba on the occasion of the adoption of Piso as his successor. The general meaning is that, if the transition could be safely made, Galba's preference would be to reestablish a republican form of government (rather than to choose a successor to the throne).

If the sentence were to be recast to conform to the syntax of Plautus, it would read:

*Si immensum imperii corpus stare . . . sine rectore possit, dignus sum, a quo res publica incipiat.*¹⁷

¹⁶ It should be added here, perhaps, that no account has been taken in this preliminary study of the theory that certain cases of "subjunctive protasis with indicative apodosis" are due to the fact that the subjunctive *si*-clause really modifies a complementary infinitive (as in *possum esse*) or a participle (as in *venturus erat*).

It is quite possible that there are occasional sentences correctly thus analyzed. But, if so, the apodosis lies in the infinitive or the participle; and such cases are not of immediate interest in a study that is concerned with the indicative in 'apodosis.'

¹⁷ Cf. the archaism in Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 31. 1.

Thus phrased, we have to do with a case of substitution plain and simple; for Galba's fitness to institute a republican form of government is in no way subject to the attached subjunctive condition.

But since the later form of present contrary to fact conditions (imperfect subjunctive) makes *dignus eram* necessary in the interest of concinnity, the mechanical adjustment obscures the fact of substitution, and inclines the reader, if he can, to find an exact apodosis in the indicative expression.

This point may be made clearer by comparing the two following concessive periods:

Cicero, *Lael.* 104: et, *si* illis plane orbatus essem, magnam tamen *adfert* mihi aetas ipsa solacium.

Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 42. 5: Nos . . . *si* Hispaniae Syriaeve miles *aspernaretur*, tamen mirum et *indignum erat*.

In the first of these sentences, Cicero might well have written an exact apodosis, namely, *adferret*;¹⁸ but he has chosen to substitute a statement of unconditioned fact, as so frequently happens elsewhere in the case of concessive periods.

The other example is constructed in the same way, except for the fact of tense-shift. If it were re-written in the style of Plautus, *mirum et indignum est* might be regarded as a case of substitution; but with the tense-shift, it is hard to hold this point of view, and the reader's impulse is toward a subjunctive interpretation: "it still *were* a strange and shameful thing."¹⁹

Even more pronounced is a case which is so far removed from suggestion of substitution that it could not be re-written in the style of Plautus without confounding the sense:

Seneca, *Contr.* ii. 3 (11). 8: 'Iam,' inquit, 'tempus angustum est.' *Angustum erat, si* duos rogare *deberes*.

¹⁸ So some MSS; and the subjunctive is read in a very similar passage in *Cato M.* 38. But the foregoing reading is quite possible, and that is all that is essential for illustration of the point now under discussion.

¹⁹ There is a very similar passage in Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 85. 48, where the MSS vary between *decebat* and *decet* in the main clause. By reading the sentence, first with the present tense and then with the imperfect, the effect of shift is very clearly brought out.

This passage has to do with a lawbreaker, who, to escape punishment, must secure forgiveness of two parties within a specified time. He has come to terms with one, and is now represented as in dialogue with the other, who intimates, that, as the work is already half done, there is no need for haste.

To write this back into the present tense would make the speaker assert the very thing he means to deny, namely, that the time *is* short. The hearer or reader, therefore, is virtually forced to find an exact apodosis in the indicative main clause; in other words, the loss of proper tense force in *angustum erat* is compensated by the acquisition of subjunctive function.²⁰

In this connection it may be added that tense-shift on the part of the pluperfect indicative tends also toward subjunctive force in apodosis; e.g.

Livy, v. 33. 1: Expulso cive, quo manente . . . capi Roma non potuerat, . . . legati ab Clusinis veniunt, auxilium adversus Gallos petentes.

This sentence has reference to the exile of Camillus. The ablative absolute *quo manente* has the force of a past contrary to fact condition, and the main verb might well have been *poterat*, on the principle of substitution. The shift that brings *potuerat* into play all but gives subjunctive force to the expression.²¹

The general problem of the use of the so-called modal verbs thus has very wide ramifications, which extend even to the epistolary use of past tenses. The entire field calls urgently for a new and thorough re-working.

²⁰ In judging of this matter, care must be taken to avoid confusion that might enter by way of inexact English translation. For example, few people probably think of 'ought' as a preterite; but both *debebam* and *debui* are in frequent use as normal past tenses.

The difference of point of view in the two languages is well illustrated by the fact that, to make a reference to the past clear, we must say "I ought to have gone," whereas Latin uses the *present* infinitive (*debui ire*).

Hence, in studying tense-shift, the violence of the process (and its consequent effects) must not be allowed to escape observation because of association with English uses that do not fairly represent the Latin.

²¹ The group of sentences discussed on pp. 89 ff. calls for consideration in this connection.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONSTRUCTION

Latin conditional sentences fall into four main groups: simple, vague future, futurum in praeterito, and contrary to fact. The first three have much in common, though their treatment is necessarily somewhat desultory in the present volume.

The contrary to fact construction holds a distinctive place apart, both because of its implication and because of its special use of tenses. Its peculiarity appears further in its inability to use a volitive expression as apodosis.

For these reasons, and also because of the frequency and complexity of its use, separate and extensive consideration is here given to this type of conditional speaking.

I. HISTORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION

The language of Plautus shows the contrary to fact construction in a very unsettled condition. The present contrary to fact uses the present subjunctive in perhaps three-quarters of the cases, while the imperfect tense makes a comparatively poor showing.

Corresponding to the use of the present just noted, the perfect subjunctive is found a few times in the past contrary to fact;¹ but the imperfect and the pluperfect subjunctive in general hold that field.

As for the present contrary to fact, there is every reason to suppose that, at a still earlier period, the present subjunctive was the undisputed standard form of expression, and that the language of Plautus shows the beginnings of the process whereby the imperfect subjunctive gradually crowded it out of that field.

¹ E.g., *Bacch.* 1103, *Most.* 555. But *dederim* of *Epid.* 258 seems rather on the order of potentials such as *dixerim* and *ausim*.

Quite aside from the evidence furnished by the subsequent development of the construction, the circumstance that the 'present' contrary to fact has to do with the realm of the present and the future² points to the present subjunctive as the probable earlier form of its expression.

This view is still further confirmed by the state of affairs in early Greek. Homer does not deal much in present contrary to fact thought; but the clear and undisputed cases all employ the present optative, with a few occurrences of the aorist optative in the past contrary to fact. Meanwhile there is strong evidence of a tendency on the part of the imperfect indicative to intrude into the sphere of the present contrary to fact, for which later it came to be the standard form of expression.³

This upward shift of a past tense to take over the functions of the present contrary to fact provides one of the most interesting problems of historical syntax, especially as it is a phenomenon not confined to Latin and Greek. Homer represents the primitive stage; in Plautus the tense-shift is well begun.

Most of the explanations proposed for such a development are singularly unfortunate and unconvincing. Only one of them calls for extended notice:

A considerable vogue has attached to the view that the imperfect subjunctive came to be the expression of the present contrary to fact idea through use in future conditions in the realm of the past; i.e., by way of the *futurum in praeterito* construction, or the 'potential of the past,' as the Germans would have it.

In the advocacy of this view there are some variations and certain minor infelicities. It is sufficient to point out the main defects:

One glaring error is that no account is taken of the fact that the adaptation of a past tense to serve as the vehicle of the present contrary to fact idea is a phenomenon by no means confined to Latin. Moreover, the circumstance is ignored that the past tense is not necessarily a subjunctive, as in Greek.

² On this aspect of the 'present' contrary to fact, cf. p. 144.

³ See Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 434 ff.

Taking the whole field into account, it seems manifest that, as various Indo-European languages reached a well developed stage, some general peculiarity inherent in contrary to fact thinking naturally led them severally to the upward shift of a past tense to convey the present contrary to fact idea, the mood of the past tense being incidental.⁴

Hence it follows that no theory is adequate which attempts a separate settlement for Latin by restricting the consideration of tense-shift to the subjunctive, and by seeking a route of development through a special use of that mood in Latin. Any valid theory must take into account the parallel development in other Indo-European languages; and it must be applicable, whether it is the subjunctive or the indicative that figures in the upward shift.

A second defect in the method of approach now under discussion is not so obvious, perhaps, but it is equally serious, namely, the failure to recognize the fact that present contrary to fact *thinking* was fully developed before the upward shift took place that made a past tense its vehicle. Hence, apparently, the

⁴ How easily it might have fallen to the indicative to take this burden in Latin also, is indicated by a passage like the following:

Plautus, *Pseud.* 286:

CA. Quid si non habui? BA. Si *amabas*, invenires mutuom.

This is part of a dialogue between an impecunious lover and a leno, and the general import of the remarks is unmistakable. Some scholars indeed go so far as to regard *si amabas* as a contrary to fact condition; (cf. *Men.* 195, *Pseud.* 800, and *Rud.* 379). But it is more likely that the proper analysis is the same as for the following English sentence:

If he meant it [as you claim], he would have conducted himself differently afterward.

So, in the Latin example, *si amabas* appears to be a simple condition of the past: "If you were in love [as you would have us suppose], you would have found a loan." Instead of driving the point home with a contrary to fact clause, the speaker is content to put the case tentatively, "for the sake of argument" as it were. Cf. also:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 88: *Si erat* Heraclio ab senatu *mandatum*, ut emeret, emisset; *si non erat*, qui poterat sua sponte pecuniam numerare?

The context shows that the speaker is aware that the first of the suppositions in this sentence is false. But that he means to put it tentatively as a simple condition of the past is made perfectly clear by the balance of the alternative *si*-clause that follows. Cf. *de Div.* ii. 20 fin., and *p. Lig.* 25, and see also further discussion of conditional sentences of this type, p. 140.

attempt to somehow develop contrary to fact thinking along the route of the *futurum in praeterito* construction.⁵

That thinking of the present contrary to fact order was established among the Greeks before the imperfect indicative moved upward into that field is shown by the usage of Homer. And though in Plautus tense-shift is well under way, his preference for the present subjunctive indicates that this more primitive diction was a long familiar vehicle for the contrary to fact idea.

It is true that the present subjunctive was the standard expression also for conditions of the vague future type. But with the help afforded by circumstance, context, and (in oral delivery) by intonation, the hearer was not left in doubt in cases where the contrary to fact idea was to be conveyed; e.g.

Plautus, *St.* 592 ff.:

EP. Edepol te *vocem* lubenter, *si superfiat* locus.

GE. Quin tum⁶ stans obstrusero aliquid strenue.

In this passage a young man is amusing himself with a parasite, who is very anxious to compass an invitation to dinner. So far as mere form is concerned, the opening sentence might be interpreted as a vague future ("if there should prove to be a place to spare"); but circumstance and intonation leave no doubt in the mind of the parasite that he is being refused an invitation to dinner, on the ground that there is no room at table. To him the condition means: "if there *were* a place to spare"; hence his eager rejoinder: "Oh, in that case, with right good will I'll bolt something *standing*." He certainly would not have so expressed himself, had he understood the other to be holding out a prospect of a regular place at the dinner.

With this may be compared a number of similar Plautine passages in which the speaker uses the present tense of the sub-

⁵ Cf. the *Classical Review*, IV, 297, where there is a reference to 'potentials of the past not yet developed into unrels'; and P. Cauer, *Grammatica Militans*, p. 110: "*So verschiebt sich der Potentialis der Vergangenheit zum Irrealis der Gegenwart.*" A more detailed exposition of this idea may be found in the New Allen and Greenough *Grammar*, § 511.

⁶ M. tu.

junctive in disclaiming ability to make a loan, or the like. The whole point turns on understanding the sentence as contrary to fact.

Bacch. 46:

Nam *si* haec habeat aurum quod illi remuneret, *faciat* lubens.

Epid. 331:

Si hercle habeam, pollicear lubens.

Pseud. 274:

Misereat, *si* familiam alere *possim*⁷ misericordia.

St. 190:

Vocem te ad cenam, *nisi* egomet *cenem* foris.

In another passage the speaker defines his meaning specifically by an added clause:

St. 486 ff.:

GE. Vin ad te ad cenam veniam? EP. *Si* *possim*, *velim*;
Verum hic apud me cenant alieni novem.⁸

In view of these facts, it is clear that there is a fatal defect in any theory which does not recognize fully developed conditional thinking of the present contrary to fact order before the time at which the upward shift began that made a past tense the distinctive form of expression for this type of thought.⁹

⁷ Al. *possem*.

⁸ This type of conditional sentence is subjected to more thorough analysis at a later point; see pp. 136 ff.

⁹ Hence there is no need to consider the captious thesis that there is no such thing as a 'present contrary to fact' construction (cf. E. Methner, *Untersuchungen zur latein. Tempus- und Moduslehre*, Berlin, 1901, pp. 131 ff., and *Lateinische Syntax des Verbuns*, Berlin, 1914, p. 53).

And, while what has been said above is conclusive against a theory of development of present contrary to fact thought by way of the *futurum in praeterito* construction, it is worth noting, in addition, that the *futurum in praeterito* relation is not an outstanding feature of early Latin. At a later period it comes into its own, apparently in connection with complexity of sentence building as seen in an author like Cicero, where, through dependence upon *ut*-clause, the complementary infinitive, and the like, there arises a wealth of conditions future from a point in the past.

What is said on page 114 of the *past* contrary to fact has no necessary bearing upon the problem of the pre-Plautine introduction of the imperfect subjunctive into the field of the *present* contrary to fact.

Approaching the problem from a quite different angle, other scholars have tried to discover something in the nature of the present contrary to fact thought that would move a speaker to reach down into the past in quest of a suitable and adequate form of expression. The following citations are typical of this point of view:

Und nicht unnatürlich ist dieser Umschlag; das Nichtwirkliche, das bloss Gedachte, dessen Nichtwirksamkeit für uns ausser Zweifel steht, befindet sich zu unserm Denken in einem ganz ähnlichen Verhältniss wie das Vergangene; das eine wie das andere ist nicht, ist ein Abgethanes, auf das wir zwar mit unserm Denken zurückkehren können, dem aber die Realität für die Gegenwart abgeht.¹⁰

Wenn nun aber auch eine jede hypothetische Periode in diesem Sinne unreal, das heisst, von so schweren Bedingungen abhängig sein kann, dass die Erfüllung unwahrscheinlich ist, so sind doch ganz besonders geeignet zur Formulierung irrealer Bedingungen die Conjunctive des Imperfects und des Plusquamperfects. Dann die Zeit, an die diese die Bedingung knüpfen ist ja vergangen und damit die Unmöglichkeit des Eintretens erklärt.¹¹

Wer einen Irrealis ausspricht, versetzt sich nämlich jedesmal in die Vergangenheit, wenn auch in eine, die nur um ein paar Sekunden zurückliegt.¹²

The method of 'philosophical' speculation reflected in the first two of these citations is, of course, somewhat out of date. And, while it may be interesting to point out that 'the past and gone' has some affinity for 'the unrealized present,' it certainly is taking very much for granted to assume on any such ground that a speaker whose thought is busy with the present or the future ('present', contrary to fact) would instinctively choose a past tense as a badge of unreality.

¹⁰ A. Tobler, *Vermischte Beiträge zur französischen Grammatik*², Leipzig, 1894, p. 143.

¹¹ H. Blase, *Geschichte des Irrealis*, Erlangen, 1888, p. 14; cf. *Studien und Kritiken*, II Teil, Mainz, 1905, p. 56. This second reference, in which Blase reaffirms his previous position, is particularly interesting in view of the fact that on the following page (57) he suggests a quite inconsistent method of attack which, though incorrect, looks toward putting the question on a practical rather than a theoretical basis.

¹² A. Dittmar, *Studien zur latein. Moduslehre*, Leipzig, 1897, § 300.

The second citation is somewhat more explicit than the first, in that it professes to detect a special factor in the tense-shift. But this hardly helps matters; for difficulty of fulfillment, or even physical impossibility, has nothing necessarily to do with making a condition contrary to fact; e.g.

If water runs uphill, then is he to be trusted.

The third citation is patently false, even though '*Vergangenheit*' be reduced to '*ein paar Sekunden*.' Wherever tense-shift is an accomplished fact, the speaker loses all consciousness that he is employing a past form. His present contrary to fact is a present in the full sense of the term, the situation being somewhat analogous to that found in the use of forms like *memini* and *odi*.

As a matter of fact, this whole method of approach is mechanical and out of harmony with the principles of language growth. For if anything is certain in this connection, it is that the tense-shift did *not* take place because of a feeling that the present contrary to fact idea needed a new and more distinctive form of expression.

The question is not: Why did thinking of the present contrary to fact type seek out a past tense as a better form of expression? The real problem is: What was there in the use of the imperfect tense, before shift began, that made it possible for that tense to enlarge the borders of its function, and, by an *upward* shift, to become the standard form of expression for the present contrary to fact?

With the situation thus outlined in accordance with the known principles of semantic change, it is possible to take the next step with some confidence:

Looking at the matter from the point of view of Latin alone, in the period before the shift began, the employment of the imperfect subjunctive in conditional sentences apparently was of two varieties: (1) the *futurum in praeterito* use, and (2) the *past* contrary to fact.

Of these two, the *futurum in praeterito* use may at once be eliminated from the discussion, because, as above pointed out, the phenomenon of the upward shift of a past tense to take on the functions of the present contrary to fact appears in other Indo-European languages, affecting subjunctive and indicative alike. It would therefore be a grave error in method to seek an explanation in the extension or development of some specialized subjunctive use in Latin.¹³

By exclusion, then, the matter reverts to the employment of the imperfect subjunctive as an expression for the past contrary to fact idea. This last is a broad category, common to all languages showing the shift; and the mood is incidental.

Is there, accordingly, any characteristic of *past* contrary to fact thinking that might give its verbal expression (imperfect tense) a hold upon the field of the *present* contrary to fact?

If a point of contact can be established, the way is open to a sound and satisfactory explanation of the upward tense-shift. For it is in full accord with the natural laws of language growth that a verbal form should utilize a point of contact to extend the borders of its application—perhaps in the end even discarding the signification that really is more proper to it.¹⁴

That there is such a point of contact between past and present contrary to fact thought can easily be shown. Thus, past reality is not all of one type, and its various aspects are reflected by the different past tenses of the verb; e.g.

- (1) The king *fell* on that day
- (2) We *have regretted* it ever since

The first of these sentences refers to an isolated historic fact, but the other to a situation that began at the time, and continues on into the speaker's present.

¹³ Hence it is not necessary here to consider the semasiological difficulty that might inhere in such an 'evolution.' But it may be pertinent to call attention again to the fact that it has yet to be established that, in early Latin, the form *si esset . . . esset* was in familiar use as a *futurum in praeterito* construction. Without such demonstration, there is not even a basis on which to begin to build a theory of evolution.

¹⁴ This process is well illustrated by the steps which developed *paganus* into 'pagan.'

Such differences are reflected also in the past contrary to fact construction; for example:

- (1) If the king *had fallen* on that day,
- (2) we *should have regretted* it ever since

In the second of these clauses, it will be noted that the verb shows the regular past contrary to fact form, and that the time referred to is mostly past. Yet there is an extension also up to and into the present of the speaker; for it is the extent and continuance of the regret that he is stressing.

The same point may be illustrated perhaps even more clearly by a dialogue of the following sort:

- (1) "You are punishing that child very severely"
- (2) "If he had not deceived me on the day he entered my home,
I *should have loved* him as a son"

Here again the apodosis has the form of a past contrary to fact; but it is rather obvious that the speaker is explaining why he *does* not love the child, rather than why he *did* not love him; in other words, the emphasis is upon an extension into the present of the speaker.

It is along such a route as this that a past tense, whether subjunctive or indicative, may have traveled on the way to a conquest of the realm of the present contrary to fact.

Occasional lapping over into that sphere provides the essential point of contact; and tense-shift is an accomplished fact as soon as the emphasis falls fully on what at first was more or less incidental.

In Plautus, the imperfect and the pluperfect subjunctive stand side by side as expressions for the past contrary to fact idea, often apparently with little difference of meaning.

Of the two, the pluperfect is manifestly better suited to remain in the field of the past contrary to fact; hence it was natural that it was the imperfect tense that accomplished the shift.

Unfortunately, the phenomenon is too far advanced in the time of Plautus to allow of a conclusive test in Latin of the theory here proposed as to the way in which the shift began. But certain considerations tend strongly to support that view.

In the first place, the process here assumed is exactly paralleled by the development through which all agree that a perfect like *novi* passed over into present meaning. For "I have come to know" inevitably extends into the speaker's present, thus opening the way for the use of *novi* in the purely present sense "I know," as seen in Martial, i. 113. 2.

Second, and much more important, is the fact that Homeric Greek is just on the verge of the shift that ultimately made the imperfect indicative the regular form of expression for the present contrary to fact; indeed, the balance is so delicate that scholars are divided on the question whether or not to recognize a very few cases of the imperfect indicative as referring to the present.

To decide this issue is not essential. For the present purpose, it is enough that there is division of opinion. The very uncertainty indicates a point of contact between past and present contrary to fact thought; and, when the contested cases are examined, it appears that the situation is of just the same nature as was assumed above as a basis for the upward shift on the part of the Latin imperfect subjunctive:

Od. iv. 178 ff.:

καί κε θάμ' ἐνθάδ' ἔοντες ἐμισγόμεθ'. οὐδέ κεν ἡμέας
ἄλλο διέκρινεν φιλέοντέ τε τερπομένω τε.

On this passage Goodwin quotes Munro as saying: "The imperfect ἐμισγόμεθαι takes in the present time, *we should* [from that time till now] *have been meeting*."¹⁵ In criticism of this he adds: "It seems to me that, according to the Homeric usage, we find no more in θάμα ἐμισγόμεθά κε than *we should have had frequent meetings*, and the rest comes from the context."

¹⁵ *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 435, footnote.

Without going into this question, we may note that one of these scholars recognizes an overlapping into the present, and the other admits that there is nothing to bar the hearer from such an interpretation ("the rest comes from the context").¹⁶

Both views thus take cognizance of a point of contact, through overlapping, which opens the way for tense-shift.

Od. v. 311:

τῶ κ' ἔλαχον κτερέων, καὶ μὲν κλέος ἦγον Ἀχαιοί.

Here Odysseus is in fear of perishing in the sea, and he has just expressed the wish that he had fallen in the battle over Achilles' body. In the line quoted, he tells what would have happened in that case.

The two tenses are different in function. The aorist ("I should have enjoyed funeral honors") refers to a specific past time; but the spread of posthumous fame is quite another matter.

It is rather hard to escape the suggestion of present continuance in ἦγον. Perrin, in his school edition, feels this so strongly that he renders: "would be carrying (wherever they went)."

Without indorsing this interpretation, it is manifest that the situation here is very like that found in the example last discussed.

Od. xiv. 61 ff.:

ἦ γὰρ τοῦ γε θεοὶ κατὰ νόστον ἔδησαν,
ὅς κεν ἔμ' ἐνδυκέως ἐφίλει καὶ κτήσιν ὕπασσεν.

In this passage the swineherd Eumaeus is talking to (the unrecognized) Odysseus. He expresses the opinion that the gods have kept his master from returning home, and contrasts very unfavorably the treatment he has received and is now receiving at the hands of the suitors with that which would have fallen to his lot, had Odysseus remained at Ithaca.

What force is to be assigned to the imperfect ἐφίλει? Eumaeus is apologizing because he cannot offer his guest better cheer; and again it is difficult to escape the feeling that he is contrast-

¹⁶ In the second edition of his *Homeric Grammar*, § 324, Monro seems to accept this suggestion.

ing his *present* evil plight with what would have been [and would be] his favored position, if his master had not gone away. Inclusion of the present is all but inevitable.¹⁷

All these examples, therefore, tend to strengthen the probability that in Latin, too, it was through cases of the past contrary to fact overlapping into the present that the way was opened for an upward shift of the imperfect subjunctive into the field of the present contrary to fact.

Though Plautus comes a little too late to show the beginnings of the process, there are still plenty of examples in his writings which are more or less on the line, definite classification as past or present contrary to fact being difficult or impossible. These manifestly support, in so far as they may, the theory of shift here advocated; e.g.

Tri. 565 ff.:

LE. Et ego esse locuples verum neququam volo.

ST. Licitum est, si velles; nunc, quom nil est, non licet.

LE. Quid tecum, Stasime? ST. De istoc quod dixti modo:

Si ante voluisses, *esses*; nunc sero cupis.

It might be argued that *esses* in the last line of this passage marks a past contrary to fact. But, on the other hand, the antithesis of the following *nunc* may apply only to *voluisses*. Furthermore, even though *esses* be rendered as a past contrary to fact, i.e., "you would have been [rich]," everything favors understanding this as overlapping into the present. For the whole situation turns on the *present* impoverishment of the person addressed; indeed, he himself has said in line 565: *ego esse locuples volo*. On that basis, it might even be urged that completed shift is represented in *esses*.¹⁸

¹⁷ Goodwin, who, as above noted, is inclined to deny all present contrary to fact application to the imperfect indicative, adds (*loc. cit.*): "A nearer approach to the later usage perhaps appears in *Il.* xxiv. 220: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις μ' ἄλλος ἐκέλευεν 'if any other (had?) commanded me.'"

As a matter of fact, this case is far less convincing than those cited above in the text. For Priam means to say that there is no room for doubt, because the command is from Zeus. The unreality lies, not in ἐκέλευεν (for he *has* been commanded), but in τις . . . ἄλλος. The phrase might therefore be rendered: "If it *were* some other that *had* bidden me." Such a phrase is of little interest in the present connection.

¹⁸ Cf. *Tri.* 178.

Perhaps even more in point here are examples for which a stronger case can be made out as past contrary to fact:

Aul. 741 ff.:

Quid vis fieri? Factumst illud. Fieri infectum non potest.
Deos credo voluisse: nam ni *vellent*, non fieret, scio.

In *ni vellent*, which takes up *voluisse*, it is easy to feel a distinct past application. At the same time, since the decrees of the gods are unchanging, or, at any rate, since the effect of their decree remains, the notion of continuance into the present is not necessarily precluded.

In fact, the possibility of overlapping is so obvious that the casual reader might not find fault with the rendering: "For, if it *were* not their will"; but in the Latin example there probably is no such complete shift.¹⁹

To sum up in a word the previous discussion, there is a point of contact between past and present contrary to fact thinking, which tends to overlapping into the latter; and through this process a past tense (whether indicative or subjunctive) might come so to stress present continuance as to function ultimately as the normal expression for the present contrary to fact idea.

It is by no means certain what was the urge that caused a past tense to take advantage of the point of contact to move upward into a new field. That such a shift took place independently in several languages of the Indo-European group adds interest to this question and indicates that the answer must be sought in some wide general principle.

With incomplete data, it is not possible to proceed with any certainty. It is suggested merely that the principle operative in the case of doublets may have some application here. For it is the regular procedure, in the case of forms originally synonymous, that they become differentiated in meaning through relega-

¹⁹ Cf. *Pseud.* 792 ff. and 1014. In this connection, it is interesting to note that, when Plautus desires to stress the present reference of an imperfect subjunctive, he not infrequently calls into play adverbs such as *nunc*, *iam*, and *hodie*; e.g., *Bacch.* 1208, *Mil. G.* 1320, *Pseud.* 1236, and *Rud.* 802.

tion of one of them to a special field. A good illustration is provided by the once synonymous *bellum* and *duellum*, with later relegation of *duellum* to the meaning 'duel.'

At the start, the past contrary to fact was somewhat overmanned with tenses used more or less interchangeably. It was not unnatural, perhaps, that one of them should utilize a point of contact to move out into an adjoining field.

CHAPTER X

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONSTRUCTION (*Continued*)

II. MODES OF THOUGHT

The contrary to fact construction has the full complement of modes of conditional thought described in Chapter V; e.g.

- (1) If he had done this, he would be punished (Causal)
- (2) If they had caught him, he would be punished (Circumstantial)
- (3) If twice two were six, twice four would be twelve (Inferential)
- (4) If he thought so, he would be mistaken (Predicating)

Aside from these regular modes, there are at least two *indirect* modes, which grow out of the circumstance that the contrary to fact construction, by virtue of its unreal assumptions, implies the existence of contrasted facts. Thus, when we say "If he were here" it is clearly implied that he is *not* here.

It often happens that these contrasted facts, and the relation between them, contain the essence of the matter; and the contrary to fact conditional sentence thus becomes but a roundabout way of suggesting thought of a very different kind. Hence the use of the term 'indirect modes,' because it is a question of the relation between the facts *implied* by protasis and apodosis.

1. Indirect Causal

Plautus, *St.* 190:

Vocem te ad cenam, nisi egomet cenem foris.

Without formal analysis, it is quite clear that it is not the real function of this conditional sentence to set forth what the speaker would do under other circumstances. Rather, he uses it as a conventional form of apology designed to explain why an invitation to dinner is not extended. With its implications, the sentence would be interpreted as follows:

I would invite you to dinner, if I were not dining out myself
 I do not invite you to dinner; I am dining out myself

The true inwardness of the matter lies in the implications and in the relation between them; i.e., "I do not invite you to dinner," *because* I am dining out myself." On this basis the conditional sentence is classified as of the 'indirect causal' type.¹ Compare the following:

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 227 ff.: "Illud quidem admiror, te nobis in eo genere tribuisse tantum et non huius quoque palmam Crasso detulisse." Tum Antonius: "Ego vero ita *fecissem*," inquit, "*nisi* interdum in hoc Crasso paulum *inviderem*."

In this passage, the reply of Antonius is manifestly intended to suggest the reason why he did not award the palm to Crassus. He might just as well have said: "I did not do so, *because* in this matter I am a little jealous of Crassus at times."

Ocasionally a sentence exhibiting the indirect causal mode is followed by a full and explicit statement of all that it implies;

e.g. Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 149: Qui *si* iam satis aetatis ac roboris haberet, ipse pro Sex. Roscio *diceret*; *quoniam* ad dicendum impedimento est aetas et pudor, . . . causam mihi tradidit.²

Not infrequently is found a compromise expression, wherein a subjunctive apodosis suggests the fact to be explained, and a following clause introduced by *sed* indicates the reason for the fact:

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 35: His tantis malis tanto bonorum studio, iudices, *restitissemus*; *sed* me alii metus . . . moverunt.³

¹ In Plautine diction, where the present subjunctive carries a double load in conditional sentences, it is sometimes hard to determine whether the thought is contrary to fact or not. Detection of the indirect mode settles the question; for this mode depends upon the relation between the facts implied by contrary to fact clauses. Cf. the practical application already made on pp. 125 ff.

² Cf. *p. Caec.* 53, *de Dom.* 129, *Acad.* ii. 110.

³ See also *de Har. Resp.* 61, *ad Fam.* x. 7. 1, xiv. 19, *ad Q. Frat.* ii. 8. 2, iii. 5 and 6. 4, *ad Att.* viii. 1. 1 (al. *nisi*). So Plautus, *St.* 590. The abrupt effect of these compromise expressions is somewhat like that of the *tantum abest* construction when a statement of fact is substituted for the second *ut*-clause; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* xiii. 21. 5 (21 A. 2): Tantum porro aberat, ut binos scriberent; *vix* singulos confecerunt.

Another passage shows the full indirect causal type, followed by a more explicit statement of the reason introduced by *sed*:

Cicero, *ad Att.* vii. 13. 7 (13 A. 3): *Si scriberem ipse, longior epistula fuisset; sed dictavi propter lippitudinem.*

Still again, within the limits of a very short passage a speaker has occasion to express practically the same thought twice. First he uses the compromise form, and then follows with a regular contrary to fact sentence with indirect causal mode:

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 46 ff.: *Dixit . . . P. Clodium illo die in Albano mansurum fuisse; sed subito ei esse nuntiatum Cyrum architectum esse mortuum. . . . Iacent suis testibus, qui Clodium negant eo die Romam, nisi de Cyro audisset, fuisse rediturum.*⁴

2. Indirect Inferential

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 1254 ff.:

MI. Cur non pultas?
AC. Quia non est intus, quem ego volo. MI. Qui scis? AC. Scio edepol. . . .

Nam odore nasum *senti*at, *si* intus *sit*.

The real function of this conditional sentence is to make known the ground of an inference, and this is done through implication, as the following analysis shows:

My nose would catch the perfume, if he were within
My nose does not catch the perfume; [therefore] he is not within

The fact implied by the apodosis is the corner-stone of the thought; from it is *inferred* the fact intimated by the protasis.⁵ Hence the designation 'indirect inferential.'⁶

⁴ In the following passage, the indirect causal mode is suggested by a distinctly harsh combination of clauses:

Plautus, *Epid.* 730 ff.:

Invitus do hanc veniam tibi, nisi necessitate cogar.

Very clearly Epidicus means to say that it is only because he is under compulsion that he makes the concession at all. Cf. *Tri.* 25 ff.

⁵ It may be worth noting that in examples of the regular inferential mode the inference is from protasis to apodosis; here the inference is from the implication of the apodosis.

⁶ Cf. footnote 1 on p. 137.

Sometimes the implications are specifically set down:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 87: Si, cum aliquis dicat se profectum esse ad exercitum, contra eum quis velit hac uti argumentatione: *Si venisses ad exercitum, a tribunis militaribus visus esses; non es autem ab his visus; non es igitur ad exercitum profectus.*⁷

The following case is essentially similar, though the materials are differently arranged:

Cicero, *de Fin.* i. 39: "Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta . . . desiderat?" *Nihil sane.* "At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret." Ita credo. "Non est igitur voluptas bonum."

Cicero of course did not work out any such analysis as is attempted in this section; but it is interesting to observe that, in contrary to fact sentences with indirect *inferential* mode, he recognizes a *genus argumentationis*.⁸

At this point, attention must be given to a considerable group of conditional sentences which use the indicative in one or both clauses; e.g.

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 87: *Nisi enim id faceret (ratio), cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit?*

This type of sentence has already been discussed under the heading Substitution,⁹ where it was shown that the rhetorical question which forms the main clause replaces something like *Plato Aegyptum numquam peragrasset.*

The general effect of the whole period, therefore, is the same as that of the regular contrary to fact conditional sentence with indirect inferential mode. For either *cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit?* or *Plato Aegyptum numquam peragrasset* intimates that

⁷ Cf. *de Div.* ii. 123.

⁸ See *de Invent.* i. 89 ff., and cf. i. 87, cited above in the text. In several other places Cicero uses a phrase that betrays like consciousness; e.g., *pro argumento* (*Brut.* 277 ff.), *sic probant* (*de Fin.* iii. 16), *iudicio* (*Tusc. Disp.* iii. 31). Pliny supplies an interesting passage in which he definitely tells his correspondent that a contrary to fact sentence of this type calls for an act of inference (*colligere*):

Ep. x. 94. 3: *Potes enim colligere, quanto opere cupiam, quod non rogarem alscens, si mediocriter cuperem.*

⁹ p. 97.

Plato did make the journey; and the fact that he made the journey is a ground supporting the inference suggested by the protasis.¹⁰

Sometimes it is in the condition that the indicative appears:

Plautus, *Pseud.* 286:

CA. Quid si non habui? BA. *Si amabas, invenires mutuom.*

This passage, too, has been previously considered; and it was pointed out that *Si amabas* is probably a simple condition of the past, and not contrary to fact, as some interpret it.¹¹ If a simple past condition, the meaning is: "If you loved her [as you would have us think], you would have found a loan."

At the same time, the sentence is manifestly a taunt, and the protasis doubtless was intoned so as to indicate extreme skepticism as to the strength of the young man's sentiment. Hence again the effect of the period as a whole is very much the same as that of the regular contrary to fact construction with indirect mode.

In examples of a distinctly argumentative cast, the likeness to standard cases with indirect inferential mode is particularly clear:

Cicero, *p. Lig.* 25: *Quodsi Caesaris causa in provinciam veniebatis, ad eum profecto exclusi provincia venissetis.*

Livy, xl. 14. 4: *si domum tuam expugnaturus, capta domo dominum interfecturus eram, non temperassem vino in unum diem, non milites meos abstinuissem?*

Going a step farther, by the use of a more or less rhetorical question in apodosis, the indicative may stand in both clauses of sentences essentially like those last cited; e.g.

Plautus, *Pseud.* 798 ff.:

CO. Si me arbitrabare isto pacto ut praedicas,

Cur conducebas? BA. Inopia; alius non erat.

Sed cur *sedebas* in foro, *si eras* coquus,

Tu solus praeter alios? CO. Ego dicam tibi:

¹⁰ Probably the following somewhat difficult case is to be explained in like manner:

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 122: *Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos?*

The general sense is: "If this were not the case, we should not worship or pray to the gods," the tense of the subjunctive in the condition being mechanically adapted to that of the verbs of the rhetorical question that serves as the main clause.

¹¹ See p. 124, footnote 4.

A leno has visited the forum to hire a cook, and has engaged the only man left. In the lines preceding these here quoted, he has expressed himself rather freely as to his impression of the cook's deficiencies, and here explains that he hired him merely because there was no one else available.

Just as in the case of *Pseud.* 286 above discussed, there is a taunt in the phrase "If you were [any sort of] a cook."¹² And if the question of the main clause may be counted a substitution for subjunctive apodosis,¹³ the two sentences are very much on a par, as the following comparison shows:

Si amabas, invenires mutuom
Si coquus eras, non in foro sederes solus

Cases with the indicative in both clauses are also used as a distinctly argumentative weapon; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rosc.* 108: Age nunc ex ipsius Chrysogoni indicio Rosciorum factum consideremus. *Si nihil in ista pugna Roscii . . . fecerant, quam ob causam a Chrysogono tantis praemiis donabantur?*¹⁴

The outstanding difference between argumentative cases with indicative condition and the standard contrary to fact construction with indirect inferential mode is that the former are less drastic.

Suppose, for example, that there is a question about the loyalty of a certain soldier. The prosecutor might score a point by using either an all-indicative sentence like the one last cited or the regular contrary to fact:

- (1) If he was loyal [as claimed], why did he not report at once?
- (2) If he had been loyal, he would have reported at once

To say "If he was loyal" leaves open for a moment the point at issue; but the following question, which is in the nature of a

¹² Understood as a simple past condition.

¹³ See p. 139.

¹⁴ So *p. Q. Rosc.* 51, in *Verr.* ii. 3. 179, ii. 4. 43, *p. Caec.* 95, *p. Sulla* 52, *de Dom.* 56, in *Pis.* 56, *Phil.* vii. 11. Cf. *Livy*, v. 52. 12, and *Terence*, *Phor.* 400 ff.

poser, strongly impugns the validity of the assumption.¹⁵ On the other hand, the contrary to fact construction without parley makes for its goal, which is to force the inference that the man is not loyal.

The reader's feeling that there is an essential similarity between the two types of sentence is due to the fact that immediately or ultimately they both look to the same verdict, namely, the guilt of the defendant.

III. THE USE OF TENSES

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that, in the language of Plautus, about one-fourth of the cases of the present contrary to fact had been taken over by the imperfect subjunctive. The tenacity of the present tense in this use is illustrated in an interesting way in the following passage:

St. 510 ff.:

Vocem ego te ad me ad cenam, frater tuus nisi dixisset mihi
Te apud se cenaturum esse hodie.¹⁶

It has been noted also that the present contrary to fact may involve the future at times, and this aspect of the construction will be demonstrated at length later. Meanwhile, in passing, it may be noted that *Vocem* of this passage illustrates the point; for the implication of "I should invite you" very clearly is "I *am not going* to invite you."

In view of the future outlook of *Vocem*, there might seem to be a certain fitness in the choice of this tense at a time of transition, when two forms were available. But that such considerations did not weigh with Plautus is shown plainly by another case dealing with a similar situation:

Aul. 523 ff.:

Compellarem ego illum, *ni metuam* ne desinat
Memorare mores mulierum; nunc sic sinam.

¹⁵ To produce this effect, it perhaps is not necessary that an indicative main clause take the form of a question. Any sequence ending in an impasse might react somewhat in this way; cf. Quintilian, ix. 4. 4, and Livy xl. 12. 9.

¹⁶ Cf. similar combinations in Homeric Greek, before tense-shift had fairly begun (Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, §438).

In this sentence, the imperfect *Compellarem* has the same future outlook as *Vocem* of the passage last discussed; whereas the *ni*-clause, which is quite devoid of future outlook, uses the present subjunctive *metuam*.

In regard to cases like this last there seems nothing more to say than that they probably reflect carelessness incident to a period of unsettled usage. Compare also:

Bacch. 635:

PI. *Si mihi sit,*¹⁷ *pollicear.* MN. Scio, *dares; novi.*

Poen. 1251 ff.:

Primum, *si id fieri possit,*
Ne indigna indignis dei darent, id ego evenisset *vellem.*

Truc. 830:

Nam vinum *si fabulari possit,* se *defenderet.*¹⁸

With completion of the tense-shift, the present and perfect subjunctive are so thoroughly eliminated from the field of the contrary to fact construction that the following discussion is limited to a consideration of the uses of the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive which are found from the Ciceronian period onward.¹⁹

A. THE IMPERFECT SUBJUNCTIVE²⁰

Strictly speaking, unrealities have no time of their own, but merely reflect the time of the realities to which they stand in contrast. Thus, the uses of the imperfect subjunctive in the contrary to fact construction may be classified by the nature and scope of the realities to which they are opposed:

¹⁷ M. *mihist non.*

¹⁸ Such mixtures persist to some extent in the writings of later poets; e.g., Tibullus, i. 4. 63 ff. and i. 8. 22; Catullus, 6. 1 ff., Lucretius, v. 276 ff., Vergil. *Geor.* iv. 116 ff., Seneca, *Herc. Oet.* 1385 ff., Martial, v. 20. 1 ff. There may be complicating factors, however, in some of these cases.

¹⁹ A discussion of the use of the *present* subjunctive in the contrary to fact sentences of Plautus appears in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXII, 304 ff.

²⁰ On the large use of *forem* for *essem* in Tacitus, see present series, VII, 209 ff. (cf. 148 ff.). The substitution, however, is largely in the pluperfect passive, so far as the conditional sentence is concerned.

1. To a General Truth

Cicero, *p. Arch.* 29: Certe, si nihil animus *praesentiret* in posterum, nec tantis se laboribus frangeret neque tot curis vigiliisque angeretur nec totiens de ipsa vita dimicaret.

In saying "If the soul had no outlook toward the future" the time reflected is coextensive with that of such a general truth as "Hope springs eternal in the human breast." This application of the imperfect subjunctive is quite common.

2. To a Fact somewhat Time-limited

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 17: Servi mehercule mei si me isto pacto *metuerent*, ut te metuunt omnes cives tui, domum meam relinquendam putarem.

This example is essentially like the one last cited, except that the scope of the time is much less. Cicero has in mind the general attitude of his slaves toward himself.

3. To an Immediate Present

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 180: Si illi *nunc* idem in eum iudices *essent*, istum sine dubio condemnarent.

The impression seems to prevail that this type of contrary to fact is very common. On the contrary, examples are rather hard to find.

4. To a Future

Whatever may be said of the logic of a 'future contrary to fact,' such a category must be recognized:

Cicero, *in Caecil.* 43: Ac si tibi nemo *responsurus esset*, tamen ipsam causam demonstrare non posses.

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 62: Rogarem te ut paulum loci mihi, ut iis responderem, dares, nisi et te audire nunc mallet et istis tamen alio tempore *responsurus essem*.²¹

²¹ Cf. a sentence in early Latin, before the imperfect subjunctive had definitely taken over the present contrary to fact:

Plautus, *Rud.* 1418 ff.:

Spectatores, vos quoque ad cenam vocem,
Ni daturus nil *sim* neque sit quicquam pollueti domi,
Nive adeo vocatos credam vos esse ad cenam foras.

The second of these cases is doubly satisfactory, because the time is defined not only by the contrast of *mallet* and *responsurus essem*, but also by that of *nunc . . . alio tempore*.²²

Aside from cases formally marked, as above, there is a general tendency on the part of the present contrary to fact to invade the realm of the future, especially in apodosis. Thus, we may say in English:

If it were not so stormy, I would go.

Supposing these words are used as an excuse for not undertaking an excursion, the entire application of the apodosis is future, the implication being: "I shall not go."²³

In Latin, the imperfect subjunctive is thus employed both in apodosis and in protasis:

Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 19: *Lubenter, inquam, confiterer, si vere possem; . . . sed, quoniam id facere non possum, confitebor id, quod. . .*

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 44: *Nihil dicam . . . nisi id, quod si in alium reum diceretur, incredibile videretur.*

In each of these cases the parallel future indicative defines the time of the imperfect subjunctive.

Some of the cases which trench upon the future illustrate the indirect causal mode, the speaker choosing this way of informing his hearer why he does not proceed to do something that might be expected of him; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xvi. 15. 1: *Plura scriberem, si iam putarem lubenter te legere posse.*

²² Cf. *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 85, *ad Fam.* iv. 7. 4, *ad Att.* x. 8. 2, xi. 15. 2. In passages of this type, the protasis sometimes is cut down to the simple future participle, the context making clear that contrary to fact force is to be read into it; e.g.

Tacitus, *Agr.* 1. 4: *At nunc narraturo mihi vitam defuncti hominis venia opus fuit, quam non petissem incusaturus tam saeva et infesta virtutibus tempora.*

²³ Colloquially, at any rate, it is possible to far exceed this; e.g., "When do you leave?" "If the baggage had arrived today, we should have started tomorrow," the reply intimating that a start will not be made at that time. Cf. *brevi . . . peregissem*, Livy, xxii. 60. 6.

The purpose of this sentence obviously is to explain to Tiro why the writer does not go on to extend the letter. Such examples are particularly frequent in Cicero's correspondence.²⁴ In Plautus they are found even among sentences which use the newly adopted imperfect subjunctive for the present contrary to fact; e.g.

Most. 844:

Nam egomet *ductarem, nisi mi esset* apud forum negotium.²⁵

5. To a Past

a. With Repraesentatio

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 36 ff.: Quid tum Cassius? Si respondisset idem sentire et secum facere Sullam, tamen mihi non videretur in hunc id criminum esse debere. . . . Sed tamen quid respondit de Sulla Cassius? Se nescire certum. 'Non purgat,' inquit. Dixi antea: Ne *si argueret* quidem tum denique, cum esset interrogatus, id mihi criminum videretur.

Sulla is on trial, charged with participation in the conspiracy of Catiline, and the prosecutor claims that, at the time of the investigation the year before, the Allobroges had named Sulla among the leaders in that ill-starred venture.

Cicero calls for a copy of the record of the proceedings at that time, which shows that the Allobroges had an interview with Cassius, and that they asked him how Sulla stood in this matter.

In order to make an impression as favorable as possible upon the Allobroges as to the strength of the conspiracy, Cassius would be likely to claim as an adherent any prominent person mentioned; hence, says Cicero, even if he had declared Sulla a conspirator, that charge ought not to weigh against the latter. The citation above thus begins with a condition (*si respondisset*) of the regular past contrary to fact order.

But it appears that Cassius said merely that he did not know for certain. "He doesn't clear him," cries the prosecutor, thus transferring the whole matter to the present. Wishing to repeat

²⁴ E.g., *ad. Fam.* vi. 6. 4, xiii. 24. 3, *ad Att.* xii. 39. 2.

²⁵ Cf. *Pers.* 45, *Pseud.* 640; also, pp. 142 ff.

his opening condition (note *Diri antea*), Cicero falls into line with this shift, and uses the form *Ne si argueret quidem* ("not even were he accusing him, after being prompted," etc.).

This is a particularly clear case. In general, examples showing the use of the imperfect subjunctive for the pluperfect by *repraesentatio* are rare.²⁶

b. Without *Repraesentatio*

In treating of the history of the contrary to fact construction, it was stated that, in Latin, the imperfect and the pluperfect subjunctive at one time shared, on somewhat equal footing, the field of the past contrary to fact.

Later, the imperfect subjunctive by an upward shift took over almost wholly the present contrary to fact; but it never entirely abandoned its previous sphere.

To determine exactly to what extent and in what way it continued to function in the field of the past constitutes a problem at once extremely difficult and elusive.

The temptation has been strong to adopt some criterion derived from Greek grammar, and to be content with subjective interpretations. Hence the matter still awaits definite settlement.

Discussion of the various questions here involved is necessarily postponed to the following chapter, where sentences of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* are considered at length.

B. THE PLUPERFECT SUBJUNCTIVE

The uses of this tense, too, can be classified by the nature and scope of the realities to which they are opposed:

1. To a Past of the Aoristic Variety

Cicero, *post red. ad Quir.* 12: *Atque eo die confecta res esset, nisi is tribunus pl. . . . noctem sibi ad deliberandum postulasset.*²⁷

²⁶ Cf. *p. Scx. Rosc.* 103 (note *declarat*).

²⁷ Cf. *Phil.* v. 20, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 139.

2. To a Past of the Perfect Definite Variety

Cicero, *p. Mur.* 29: In qua si satis *profecissemus*, parcius de eius laude dicerem.

Sallust, *Orat. Macr.* 13: Iam ipso frui . . . non est condicio; *fuisset*, si omnino quiessetis.

In the first of these passages the topic is oratorical skill; and, belittling his own attainments, Cicero says: "If I *had* myself *progressed* sufficiently in this." He thus refers to a period of time beginning in the past and extending up into the present.

The other case presents an even more striking illustration of the power of the pluperfect subjunctive to include the present of the speaker. In the opening phrase, *Iam* limits sharply the application of *est*; yet the latter can be taken up by *fuisset*, which covers present as well as antecedent time.

3. To a Repeated or Progressive Past

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 97: Nam quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis . . . pueris . . . Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim *esset factitatum*, non esset desitum.

Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 29: Tantis in laboribus C. Marius periculisque *vixisset*, si nihil longius, quam vitae termini postulabant, spe atque animo de se et gloria sua cogitasset?

As to the idea of repeated action in the first example, it is necessary only to point out that the speaker has chosen a frequentative verb (*factito*). In the other there is a progressive notion in *vixisset*, i.e., "would Marius have kept on living?"

4. To a Past of the Pluperfect Variety

This class represents the incidental rather than the essential, as a comparison of two passages will show:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 85: Quasi vero ista vi quicquam tum potuerit ei (Priamo) melius accidere! Quodsi *ante occidisset*, talem eventum omnino amisisset.

Cicero, *Brut.* 288: Ipse enim Thucydides si *posterius fuisset*, multo maturior fuisset et mitior.

It will be obvious at a glance that these sentences are essentially alike, and that it is a mere incident that the pluperfect of one refers to an antecedent past time and the other to a subsequent past time.

So, within past contrary to fact sentences of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset*, the time referred to in the protasis is apt to be incidentally antecedent to that of the apodosis;²⁸ e.g.

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 2. 140: *et, nisi mature Laetilius in Siciliam cum litteris venisset, minus xxx diebus Metellus totam trienii praeturam tuam rescidisset.*²⁹

²⁸ This follows naturally from the frequent presence of the causal mode (cf. pp. 46 ff.).

²⁹ Cf. *post red. in Sen.* 22, *de Div.* i. 37.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONSTRUCTION (*Continued*)

IV. TENSE COMBINATIONS

In the previous chapter, attention was called to various odd combinations in contrary to fact conditional sentences written at a time when the tense-shift was in progress that ultimately drove the present subjunctive almost wholly from the field of the present contrary to fact.

This chapter has to do only with the standard forms after the shift was accomplished. Of these forms there are four:

1. si esset esset
2. si esset fuisset
3. si fuisset esset
4. si fuisset fuisset

The grammars are largely responsible, probably, for the general assumption that 1 and 4 are in some way the norm. As a matter of fact, the combination numbered 3 is quite as natural, for there often is occasion to point out that the present would be different than it is, if the past had not been what it was.

It is number 2 that calls for careful study, though many cases can very readily be solved on the basis of the tense uses described in the last chapter; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 130: Hoc si Romae fieri *posset*, certe aliqua ratione *expugnasset* iste, ut dies xxxv inter binos ludos tollerentur, per quos solos iudicium fieri *posset*.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xvi. 16. 1: Etiam si bella externa et obitas pro re publica mortes tanta casuum similitudine *memorarem*, meque ipsum satias *cepisset*, aliorumque taedium expectarem.

When Cicero says "If such a thing *were* possible at Rome," a time-realm is opened up by no means limited to the immediate present. The past is included as well; hence the combination *si esset . . . fuisset* is here logically sound and thoroughly natural.¹

In the other example, too, the protasis (*si . . . memorem*) is by no means strictly time-limited; but the more effective approach is through *cepissem* of the apodosis, which reflects a time of the perfect definite variety, extending up into the speaker's present, i.e., "satiety would have overtaken [and now would be in possession of] me." The pluperfect subjunctive therefore functions as a sort of combination past and present contrary to fact, and harmonizes fully with a protasis of the form *si esset*.

Exclusive of sentences in which there is a possible complication due to dependence upon other constructions, there are 131 examples of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* in the writings of Cicero.² Over two-thirds of these may be explained as in the two cases just analyzed. The remaining third presents a complex problem, which has been approached from various angles:

In Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*,³ the following statement is made regarding Greek usage in contrary to fact conditional sentences:

The imperfect here, in either protasis or apodosis, refers to present time, or to an act as going on or repeated in past time.

¹ This method of interpretation should perhaps be applied to even as difficult a case as the following:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. l. 139: Dixit iuratus P. Titius, . . . dixit M. Iunius . . . ; Mustius *divisset, si viveret*.

The reference here is to the giving of testimony in the past, and Cicero says "Mustius [too] would have testified, if he *were* alive." As a matter of fact, Mustius was dead at the time referred to, and *is* dead at the time these words are spoken. The phrase *si viveret* can cover that entire range, just as in English it is possible to say: "He could not testify, because he *is* dead." Cf. a Latin conditional sentence as given by the editors, wherein there is no complication from the contrary to fact idea:

Ennius, *Trag.* 115 ff. (Ribbeck):

Nam *si* inprobum esse Cressipontem *existimas*,
Cur me huic *locabas* nuptiis?

² See the *American Journal of Philology*, XXVIII, 153 ff.

³ § 410.

In attacking the problem of the imperfect subjunctive in past contrary to fact conditional sentences in Latin, there has been a general tendency to try to find a way out along the line suggested by Goodwin. But there are difficulties all along the route.

At the outset, this theory is seriously discredited by the fact that the imperfect subjunctive in past contrary to fact clauses has no monopoly of the cases which reflect the time of a repeated or progressive past action.

As for repeated past action, see again the following example, which uses the pluperfect subjunctive:

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 97: Nam quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis . . . pueris . . . Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim *esset factitatum*, non *esset desitum*.

This case, clearly defined by the choice of the frequentative verb, perhaps sheds some light on the interpretation of others employing the pluperfect tense; e.g.

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 253: Sed tamen non fugisset hoc Graecos homines, si ita necesse esse *arbitrati essent* oratorem ipsum erudire in iure civili.⁴

Obviously the situation which lies behind the condition *si . . . arbitrati essent* deserves the name 'repeated action' quite as much as the state of affairs reflected in *si . . . esset factitatum*.

To save the predetermined view that reference to repetition in past time calls for the form *si esset . . . fuisset*, it is purely arbitrary to try to force into some other category an example of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset* like the one last cited. And it is partly because of such unscientific procedure that so little progress has been made in solving the problem of sentences of the type *si esset . . . fuisset*.

So, too, of progressive past action. An example has already been cited in which *vixisset* in apodosis means "would have continued to live";⁵ compare now the force of the pluperfect in protasis:

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 76: Quorum ille telis libenter in tanto luctu ac desiderio mei, non repugnandi, sed moriendi causa, corpus obtulisset suum, nisi suam vitam ad spem mei reditus *reservasset*.

⁴ Cf. *Part. Orat.* 117, *Acad.* ii. 74, *de Div.* i. 37.

⁵ Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 29.

Cicero here makes the point that his brother was moved to treasure his own life, because he was looking forward to the hope of Cicero's return from exile. The meaning very plainly is: "He would gladly have sought death, if he *had not been saving* himself with a view to the hope of my return." It would make nonsense of the passage to render: "If he *had not saved* himself," etc.

Whatever else may be true, it must be recognized that the forms *si esset . . . fuisset* and *si fuisset . . . fuisset* are *both* used when the protasis reflects the time of repeated and progressive past action. Hence it by no means disposes of the matter to point out, in a given case of the form *si esset . . . fuisset*, that the protasis refers to such time relation.

Reverting again to Goodwin's statement to the effect that the imperfect tense in the Greek contrary to fact construction 'refers to an act as going on or repeated in past time,' some might think to find here justification for attempting to solve sentences of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* on the basis of the doctrine of *Gleichzeitigkeit*.

This would mean that the imperfect subjunctive of the condition marks time as contemporaneous with that of the 'main clause'—which goes far toward putting the question on the plane of sequence of tenses.⁶

It is no difficult task to show that such a distinction between the use of *si esset* and *si fuisset* will not hold. One case has already been cited above where *nisi reservasset* means "if he *had not been saving*";⁷ add also the following:

Cicero, in *Pis.* 48: Praesidium tu rei publicae . . . iniussu populi senatusque dimisisses, si tuae mentis compos fuisses?

If *si . . . esses* had been written in this sentence, it would have been at once seized upon as an 'excellent example' of *Gleichzeitigkeit*. With the pluperfect, it is only special pleading

⁶ See C. Lindskog, *De Enuntiatis apud Plautum et Terentium Conditionalibus*, Lundae, 1896, p. 92.

⁷ Cicero, *p. Sest.* 76. Cf. the force of *servabat* in Juvenal, iv. 111.

that would deny that *fuisset* at least extends up into the time of *dimisisset*;⁸ for that act fell within the period of alleged insanity.⁹

Not only does the doctrine of *Gleichzeitigkeit* thus fail to provide a conclusive test. It seems also a fundamentally wrong method of approach to the problem in hand, at least in the bald form that would put the choice of tense upon the basis of the sequence of tenses.

By virtue of the thought to be expressed, in many conditional periods the leading rôle belongs to the condition, and the apodosis 'follows.' This is particularly true of the contrary to fact construction; and normally and primarily each clause marks a time relation measured from the speaker's standpoint. Note the situation in the following conditional clause of comparison:

Cicero, *de Re P.* iv. 11: Sed Pericles . . . violare versibus non plus decuit, quam si Plautus . . . noster *voluisset* . . . Gnaeo Scipioni . . . male dicere.

In this passage the younger Africanus is commenting upon the freedom with which the Greek dramatists attacked the politicians of their day. If written from the point of view of *decuit*, the phrase *quam si . . . voluisset* would necessarily refer to a time antecedent to the age of Pericles, whereas Plautus lived long after. The words therefore merely mark a past contrary to fact from the viewpoint of the speaker's present.

It is true, as already pointed out, that an incidental temporal interrelation may be detected between the clauses of certain contrary to fact conditional sentences of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset*, the time of the protasis being antecedent.¹⁰ Another example may be added here:

Cicero, *p. Clu.* 116: Quae res *si rei iudicatae pondus habuisset*, ille *postea* . . . reus hac lege ipsa *factus esset*.

⁸ At this point another phase of the doctrine of *Gleichzeitigkeit* fails to make headway in establishing a difference between the use of the forms *si esset . . . fuisset* and *si fuisset . . . fuisset*. See the *American Journal of Philology*, XXVIII, 168.

⁹ Cf. in *Verr.* ii. 4. 13, *p. Mur.* 34, *Phil.* v. 15.

¹⁰ pp. 148ff.

In this sentence, there are two past times referred to, and *postea* shows that the second is subsequent. This mechanically forces the first subjunctive into pluperfect relation to the second. But it is very much to be doubted that *si . . . habuisset* is thereby reduced to grammatical subordination comparable to that of a phrase like *cum habuisset*. Rather, each clause of the sentence is still primarily a past contrary to fact viewed from the standpoint of the speaker's present.

In regard to the form *si esset . . . fuisset*, it is still harder to conceive of *si esset* as on a par with *ne esset*, or the like, in relation to the other part of the sentence. Contrary to fact clauses would be likely to resist strongly such levelling.¹¹

Summing up the discussion to this point, it may be said that no very convincing case has yet been made out for the theory that the form *si esset . . . fuisset* is used because of reference to action as repeated or progressive or contemporaneous. Some examples, it is true, do lend themselves to this interpretation, but there are others of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset* which do the same.

This whole method of approach is complicated by the fact that so much depends upon the point of view of the person who speaks or writes. Thus, in the sentence, *Dionysius triginta annos regnavit*, the action is really progressive, but the speaker regards it for the moment aoristically. So, in the use of *si esset* and *si fuisset* in references to various kinds of past activity, there often

¹¹ In this connection, it might be worth while to examine a large number of past contrary to fact conditional sentences, the apodoses of which are dependent on some other construction. In such an atmosphere of subordination, the situation was probably somewhat favorable for a past contrary to fact protasis to fall into the form *si . . . esset*. Yet how uncertain the way may be even here is indicated by the following:

Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 4. 7: Ducebar etiam quod decesserat Classicus . . . Videbam ergo advocacioni meae non minorem gratiam quam *si viveret* ille propositam, invidiam nullam.

Pliny is explaining the motives that influenced him to undertake the cause of the province of Baetica against its former proconsul, a man now dead. A rather good case could be made out for regarding *si viveret* as marking time contemporaneous with *Videbam*. Yet Classicus not only *was* dead, he *is* dead at the time of writing; hence *si viveret* may be a present contrary to fact of the kind discussed on p. 151, footnote 1.

enters the question of point of view; and in many cases this is to the last degree elusive.

Such a situation is discouraging enough for the investigator who is seeking some scientifically sound explanation of the use of the form *si esset . . . fuisset*. It is ideal, on the other hand, for those who would fit facts to a theory, which has been, heretofore, far too much the practice.

Now it is proposed to put the problem on a more secure foundation by approaching the question from the point of view of one of the indirect modes exhibited by the contrary to fact construction; e.g.

I wonder whether it rained last night
If it had rained last night, the road would be wet

This reply involves the indirect inferential mode, which has been discussed at length in the previous chapter.¹² The conditional form is but a roundabout way of intimating: "The road is not wet; *therefore* it did not rain last night."

Here at length is something concrete and definite; for, to detect the cases involving the indirect inferential mode, it is only necessary to decide whether the speaker or writer is using a contrary to fact conditional sentence as an indirect form of argumentation; and when such examples are separated from the others, it appears at once that this distinction has a very important bearing upon the choice of the form *si esset . . . fuisset*.

Attention has already been called to the situation in Cicero. Excluding cases in which the apodosis is complicated by some other construction, there are 131 examples of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* in his writings. Of these, 88 are explainable on the basis either of the frequent wide range of *si . . . esset* as a present contrary to fact, or of the ability of certain past contrary to fact clauses to carry on into the present (e.g., "I should have attained").¹³

¹² pp. 138 ff.

¹³ Explained more fully on pp. 150 ff.

There remain, then, 43 examples to be solved otherwise; and over against them are 455 cases of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset*. When all these are examined, the interesting fact appears that more than half of the sentences of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* exhibit the indirect inferential mode, while this is true of less than one-tenth of the examples of the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset*.

It follows, obviously, that when a speaker was using a contrary to fact conditional sentence with indirect inferential mode in argument about a past situation, the nature of the thought inclined him to use *si esset* rather than *si fuisset* as the form for his protasis; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 133: Cleomenes hoc dicit, sese in terram esse egressum, ut . . . milites colligeret, quos in navibus collocaret; quod certe non *fecisset*, *si suum numerum naves haberent*.

This is a typical case; and it should be noted how clear-cut every detail is. The reference is to a situation distinctly past; and, just as clearly, Cicero is using the contrary to fact sentence as a roundabout way of arguing that the ships' crews were below quota.

Thus we have a definite and concrete basis on which to build a theory. The question is: What is there in the nature of the indirect inferential mode that would incline a speaker so strongly to substitute *si esset* for *si fuisset*?

Some light may be thrown on the matter by considering again the illustration already once used:

I wonder whether it rained last night
If it had rained last night, the road would be wet

The apodosis holds the key to the whole situation; both parties to the conversation have before their eyes the evidence of its unreality, as they stand looking out of a window. With this unreality established, it is the function of the sentence to lead the hearer, by an act of inference, to recognize the fact to which the protasis is opposed, thus settling the point about which he was in doubt at the start. The whole aim is to establish the unreality of the condition.

If this effect is not produced, the sentence fails of its real purpose; and, under such circumstances, the unreality of the protasis is a far more important consideration than the time element, especially as the time is otherwise defined by the context.

As between the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in the contrary to fact construction, certainly the former is the more general expression for unreality; indeed, as shown above, its scope is at times as wide and unconfined as that of a universal truth.

If either tense were to be singled out to express unreality without specification of time, it would seem that the choice must fall upon the imperfect. And since the whole aim of the indirect inferential of the past is to establish the unreality of the protasis, there might be a tendency to concentrate upon that aspect of the thought, slighting the time element, and substituting the general expression for unreality (imperfect subjunctive) for the more precise pluperfect.

The naturalness of such substitution will be seen at once, if the English example above cited be recast in the following form:

I wonder whether it rained last night
Were it so, the road would be wet

The point may be illustrated again in a contrary to fact sentence with indirect inferential mode, where the form *si esset* *esset* replaces *si fuisset* *esset*:

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52. 19 ff.: Nolite existumare maiores nostros armis rem publicam ex parva magnam *fecisse*. *Si ita esset*, multo pulcherrimam eam nos *haberemus*; quippe sociorum atque civium, praeterea armorum atque equorum maior copia nobis quam illis est. Sed alia fuere, quae illos magnos fecere, quae nobis nulla sunt.

The opening phrase in this passage (*maiores nostros* *fecisse*) refers unequivocally to the speaker's past. Yet he resumes *fecisse* by *Si ita esset* ("if such *were* the case") rather than by *Si ita fuisset*.

By so doing, he stresses the unreality of the assumption (the real aim of the sentence), and leaves to the context the definition of the time.¹⁴

On this principle it is possible to find a thoroughly satisfactory explanation for at least some of the cases of *si esset . . . fuisset* with indirect inferential mode. The clearer examples are those in which the protasis is otherwise rather colorless like *si ita esset*; e.g.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 114 ff.: Quid ergo? aut Homero delectationem animi ac voluptatem aut cuiquam docto defuisse umquam arbitramur? aut, *ni ita se res haberet*, Anaxagoras aut hic ipse Democritus agros et patrimonia sua *reliquisset*?¹⁵

The transition is not difficult to cases in which the condition is more colorful; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 150: Remisit D. Bruto HS ex milia. *Hoc, si aliena res esset, certe facere non potuisset.*

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 53: Neque enim umquam maiores nostri sortitionem *constituissent* aediliciam, *nisi viderent* accidere posse, ut competitorum pares suffragiis essent.

Cicero, *Brut.* 76: Qui (Ennius) *si illum* (Naevium), ut simulat, *contemneret, non omnia bella* persequens primum illud Punicum acerrimum bellum *reliquisset.*

In its phrasing, the first of these cases approximates most nearly those already cited. For it and the other examples, it does no violence in the English translation to neglect the time

¹⁴ There is a close parallel in the use of the *present* indicative to deny the truth of something in the past; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 29: At, credo, eum . . . obsidione rem publicam liberasset (Marius), omnia sua secum una moritura *arbitrabatur. Non ita est, Quirites.*

To go a little farther afield, a tendency to use the imperfect subjunctive as a marker for unreality without particular attention to time may be indicated by a passage like the following:

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 38: Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam *si non haberet.*

The body of this sentence is of the vague future variety, and *quam si non habeat* would have rounded the period off symmetrically. But, instead, the speaker uses the imperfect subjunctive, constructing thus, not a normal unreal, but an unreal in the supposed case.

¹⁵ Cf. *In Verr.* ii. 3. 149, *p. Chu.* 90 and 189.

element; e.g., *nisi viderent* might be rendered "did they not see," i.e., "were it not true that they saw."¹⁶

As showing the relatively small importance of specifically indicating the time in the protases of sentences of this type, the illustration already twice used may be rephrased once more:

I wonder whether it rained last night
If so, the road would be wet

That such an abbreviated form is fully intelligible shows that the real issue is the establishment of the unreality of the condition; the one element which might specifically mark the time (i.e., the verb) is dispensed with.

While this turn cannot be paralleled for Latin, it is interesting to note with what precision the type of thought under discussion may be conveyed by a sentence using a quite timeless substitute for protasis:

Cicero, *ad Att.* iv. 15. 2: *Iter Asiaticum tuum puto tibi suscipiendum fuisse; numquam enim tu sine iustissima causa tam longe a tot tuis et hominibus et rebus carissimis . . . abesse voluisses.*

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 63: *Quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eisdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitari.*

In both these passages the speaker concentrates upon the unreality of the protasis by the choice of a *sine*-clause, leaving the definition of the time to the context.¹⁷

In the second case, he is demonstrating the godlike character of the soul; and he cites the accomplishments of Archimedes as proof of the divine nature of his genius. Instead of using the *sine*-clause, he might very well have employed a sentence of the form *si esset . . . fuisset*, i.e., *nisi divinum in eo esset ingenium, non . . . potuisset*.

Cicero's indirect inferentials of the past using the imperfect subjunctive in protasis number 24.¹⁸ Of these, two-thirds exhibit

¹⁶ For the full list of indirect inferentials of the past taking the form *si esset . . . fuisset*, see the *American Journal of Philology*, XXVIII, 158 ff.

¹⁷ Cf. *de Div.* i. 38, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 44.

¹⁸ This includes *p. Clu.* 189, where *esset* might perhaps be regarded as standing for (*cogitatum*) *esset*.

the order *fuisset . . . si esset*, an arrangement which minimizes the need for exact definition of time in the condition.

Furthermore, as showing the speaker's intentness upon establishing the unreality of the protasis, it may be worth noting that in the sentences of this group there is an unusual proportion, in apodosis, of such asseverative words as *numquam*, *umquam*, *certe*, and *profecto*. It perhaps is significant, too, that the interrogative form is almost wholly avoided, probably as being less forceful in this connection.

If these 24 cases of *si esset . . . fuisset* may be counted as explained on the basis of the indirect inferential mode, there still remain 19 examples of this tense combination in Cicero yet to be treated. Of these, a small group is typified by the following:

Cicero, *de Dom.* 129: Quodsi tibi tum in illo rei publicae naufragio omnia in mentem venire *potuissent*, aut si tuus scriptor in illo incendio civitatis . . . vacuo animo tibi ista non scita sed portenta *conscriberet*, *esses* omnia. . . *consecutus*.

This entire period refers to a past situation, and the outlying parts of the sentence take the form *si fuisset . . . fuisset*. But the second division of the protasis shifts to the imperfect subjunctive, thus throwing the latter part of the passage into the form *si esset . . . fuisset*.

The complexity of the sentence probably has something to do with the irregular introduction of the imperfect subjunctive. It may be noted, too, that the first verb of the protasis (*potuissent*) definitely indicates the time. Perhaps even desire for variety of expression plays a part here.¹⁹

As previously shown,²⁰ there is a sort of confused middle ground between past contrary to fact and the *futurum in praeterito* construction, which makes shift from one point of view to the other an easy matter. The combination *si esset . . . fuisset* may arise in this way:

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 45: Etenim, si mihi in aliqua nave cum meis amicis naviganti hoc, iudices, *accidisset*, ut multi . . . praedones classibus eam navem se oppressuros minitarentur, nisi me unum

¹⁹ Cf. *p. Flacc.* 11, *de Har. Res.* 47, *p. Mil.* 79, *de Orat.* i. 245.

²⁰ pp. 114 ff.

sibi dedidissent, *si* id vectores *negarent* ac mecum simul interire quam me tradere hostibus *mallent*, *iecissem* ipse me potius in profundum, ut ceteros conservarem, quam illos . . . in magnum vitae discrimen adducerem.

Here again the outlying parts of the period take the form *si fuisset* . . . *fuisset*, and the intervening section of the protasis uses the imperfect subjunctive. This deflection is clearly due to the influence of the *futurum in praeterito* construction governed by *minitarentur*. Quite illogically, the speaker carries on this strain in *si* . . . *negarent* ac . . . *mallent*, swinging back to past contrary to fact again in *iecissem* of the apodosis.

The force of the imperfect subjunctive seems similar in the following much simpler passage:

Cicero, *ad Att.* xvi. 5. 2: Quintus fuit mecum dies complures, et, *si* ego *cuperem*, ille vel plures *fuisset*.²¹

It may help to the interpretation here to compare a *si*-clause which appears in a different setting in another passage:

Cicero, *in Cat.* iii. 11: *Si* quid de his rebus dicere *vellet*, feci potestatem.

The remaining nine examples of the form *si esset* . . . *fuisset* in Cicero represent a scattering not unnatural in writings so extensive and diverse, and distributed over so long a period of time. Some of the cases may belong under headings above listed; but it is not desired to force the meaning of any, and they are passed without further comment.²²

To summarize, the Ciceronian examples of the use of the form *si esset* . . . *fuisset* have been explained and classified as follows:

	Number of cases
1. Wide time-reach of the imperfect subjunctive as a present contrary to fact, or of the pluperfect subjunctive extending into the present	88
2. Indirect inferential mode	24
3. Complex sentence structure, etc.	5
4. <i>Futurum in praeterito</i>	5
5. Unclassified	9

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²¹ Cf. *In Verr.* ii. 1. 143, p. *Mil.* 68, *Phil.* ii. 3.

²² *de Orat.* i. 104, ii. 224, *Brut.* 238, p. *Q. Rosc.* 50, *post red. in Sen.* 34, *Phil.* ii. 81, *ad Att.* iii. 7. 1 (by emendation; and *optatum* probably adjective), iii. 10. 2, xiii. 45. 3.

In offering this classification, it is not forgotten that the use of a mood or tense in a given case may be due to a complexity of impulses. Hence it is easily possible that the choice of the form *si esset . . . fuisset* was not always due to some single factor.

It is possible, also, that there were contributing influences not here taken into account. For example, if it could be shown that the imperfect subjunctive in contrary to fact sentences was apt to be chosen to indicate reference to a situation as involving progressive or contemporaneous past action, this would be a help in the study of the form *si esset . . . fuisset*.

As indicated above, the difficulty of such demonstration lies in the fact that it often is hard, or even impossible, to determine the angle from which the speaker or writer views a situation. Little progress toward demonstration is achieved by neglecting part of the data (namely, the parallel uses of the pluperfect subjunctive) and interpreting another part in the light of a preconceived theory.

CHAPTER XII

CONDITIONAL CLAUSES OF COMPARISON

The main problem of the conditional clause of comparison lies in the fact that the modern reader commonly feels in it a contrary to fact implication, whereas in Latin the great majority of cases accord with the law of sequence.

Exceptions to that rule appear most frequently in cases where the comparative word is not merged with *si* into an inseparable compound, e.g., *quam si*, *ut si*, or *ac si*; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sulla*, 39: Perspicuum est . . . eandem esse vim negationis huius, *quam si* extra coniurationem hunc esse se scire *dixisset*.

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 36: Idem faciunt, *ut si* laevam partem *neglegerent*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* iii. 13. 1: Proinde habebō, *ac si scripsisses* nihil esse.

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 31: . . . similem habeat vultum, *et si ampullam perdidisset*.

This type of conditional clause of comparison is very easy to handle. It will be noted that in each example the verb of the main clause is in a primary tense. Hence the use of the secondary tenses of the conditional clauses indicates a contrary to fact idea, and suppressed apodosis must be recognized.

For example, in the first case the interpretation is: "It is clear that the bearing of his negation is the same as [would be the case] if he had said that Sulla was outside the conspiracy." Only in this way can the tense use be justified.¹

¹ The same sort of suppression is found also in relative clauses, where it is even more manifest; e.g.

Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 123: censet . . . cum (terra) circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, *quae, si stante terra caelum moveretur*.

Here something like *efficerentur* must be supplied to complete the clause begun with *quae*. Cf. the ellipsis of an indicative with *quam* (*cum*) in Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 140.

The real difficulty is found in cases introduced by *quasi*, or by *tamquam* without *si*; for here the impression of contrary to fact force frequently is very strong, and yet, in a primary context, the present and the perfect subjunctive are used almost exclusively.

Obviously, examples of this sort cannot be explained by the same method as those just treated; and, as a way out of the difficulty, the theory has been advanced that conditional clauses of comparison using the primary tenses of the subjunctive are not really contrary to fact in thought, but rather of the vague future variety. Thus it is proposed to render *quasi honeste vixerint*: "as [they would do in the future], if they *should have lived* honorably."

The incorrectness of this analysis is very easy to demonstrate;

e.g.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 86: Metelli sperat sibi quisque fortunam; proinde quasi aut plures fortunati sint quam infelices, aut certi quicquam sit in rebus humanis!

The time realm of the *quasi*-clause in this sentence is the same as that of a general truth. The essential function of the clause is to scout the assumption as *false*. It quite misses the point of the sentence to attempt to interpret as a vague future.

If this case be not counted conclusive, there certainly can be no doubt in regard to certain examples using the perfect subjunctive; e.g.

Cicero, *Phil.* xiii. 40: Pergit in me maledicta (iacere?), quasi vero ei pulcherrime priora processerint.

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 17: Proinde quasi Appius ille Caecus viam muniverit, non qua populus uteretur, sed ubi impune sui posterii latrocinarentur!

In the first of these passages, *priora* fixes the time of *processerint* as past, and a future interpretation would be impossible. In the other, the past force of *muniverit* is clear both from the reference to the censor Appius Claudius, and from the fact that the dependent verbs are thrown into secondary sequence.

It is manifest, therefore, that there is no prospect of solving the problem of the use of primary tenses of the subjunctive with *quasi* and *tamquam* by attempting to treat such clauses as elliptical vague future conditions.

Other scholars, recognizing the feeling of unreality that normally attaches to this tense use, hark back to the syntax of early Latin as a key to this difficult construction.

In Plautus, as has been already shown, the imperfect subjunctive was only started on the upward shift which was to dislodge the present subjunctive almost wholly from the field of the present contrary to fact; and *si claudus sim*, for example, would be very apt to mean: "If I *were* lame."

The same thing is true of conditional clauses of comparison also; e.g.

Plautus, *Asin.* 427:

Tamquam si claudus sim, cum fustist ambulandum.

These are words put into the mouth of a man whose slaves require so much beating that he must always go about with a stick in his hand, just as [would be the case] if he were lame.

This works out perfectly for Plautus; but is there any reason for supposing that such archaic tense use persisted in clauses introduced by *quasi* and *tamquam* in the time of Cicero?

It must be confessed that it seems very unlikely that this was the case. For in Cicero's time the imperfect subjunctive had become firmly entrenched as the exclusive vehicle for present contrary to fact conditional thought.

The completeness of the shift is impressively demonstrated by the effect of a subjunctive condition upon an indicative in the main clause; for where Plautus would say *si sit . . . potest*, Cicero says *si esset . . . poterat*, the effect of the tense-shift carrying through to the end of the sentence.

Conditional clauses of comparison contrary to fact in thought could hardly have been unaffected by this shift; and examples introduced by *quam si, ut si, ac si*, etc., regularly do conform, as shown at the beginning of this chapter. The fact that clauses

with *quasi* and *tamquam* successfully resisted the shift indicates a different explanation for their tense use.

The general behavior of these clauses points, of course, to the operation of the law of sequence. And since *quasi* is so much more frequently used than *tamquam*, investigation may well begin with clauses introduced by the former.

On examination, it appears that there are at least three factors that favored the development, with *quasi*, of a subordinate clause obedient to the law of sequence:

(1) It is true that *quasi* is properly a contraction of *quam si*, as the usage of Plautus shows; e.g.

Mil. G. 481 ff.:

Satin abiit ille neque erile negotium
Plus curat quasi non servitutum serviat?

Cure. 51:

Tam a me pudicam quasi soror mea sit.

But in Cicero's time the etymological force of *quasi* was very thoroughly obscured, as is proved by his practice in regard to correlatives. Thus, *quam si* cannot introduce a conditional clause of comparison unless it is balanced by a correlative in the main division of the sentence, e.g., *maior . . . quam si, tam . . . quam si*, etc.

Hence, had Cicero felt *quasi* to be another way of saying *quam si*, he must often have written *plus . . . quasi, tam . . . quasi*, etc. Aside from the conspicuous absence of such expressions in his works, it is significant that, when he wants a correlative for *quasi*, he is at no pains to select a word that would fit with *quam*, using freely *ita . . . quasi*, or the like.

The complete loss of early meaning on the part of *quasi* bears very directly upon the question in hand. Contrast the following sentence:

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 56: Quin ne bestiae quidem, quas . . . concludimus, cum copiosius alantur quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur.

This is the type of sentence first discussed, where the comparative word and *si* do not coalesce, and the tense variation betrays suppressed apodosis: "are fed more abundantly than [they would be] if they were at large." This suppressed apodosis gives the *si*-clause a point of support, and isolates it from the main division of the sentence.

Conversely, when *quasi* loses the meaning *quam si*, the situation is very unfavorable for a feeling of suppressed apodosis; and this very fact makes for the setting up of a direct grammatical connection between the *quasi*-clause and the leading section of the sentence.

(2) Though there is distinctly 'contrary to fact' flavor in the construction now under discussion, this implication of falsity is not identical with that of the normal contrary to fact conditional construction.

Thus, from the very beginning of Latin literature, *quasi* is associated with an atmosphere of pretense, assumption, or suggestion. For example, a *quasi*-clause is frequently used in connection with verbs like *simulo* in instructing a person how he is to carry through a piece of trickery:

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 1181:

Adsimulato *quasi* gubernator *sies*.

In a connection like this, the *quasi*-clause approximates indirect discourse; certainly it would not far misrepresent the general meaning of the sentence to render *quasi* "that."

Compare a passage which begins with *simulo* and indirect discourse, and then trails off into the *quasi*-construction:

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 796 ff.:

Ut simulet se tuam *esse* uxorem et *deperire* hunc militem;
Quasique hunc anulum faveae suae *dederit*, ea porro mihi,
 Militi ut darem; *quasique* ego rei *sim* interpretes.

Sentences like this foreshadow the use of the *quasi*-construction in Silver Latinity to give an alleged ground or to report the substance of someone's thought or speech; e.g.

Suetonius, *Aug.* 11: Pansae quidem adeo suspecta mors fuit, ut Glyco medicus custoditus sit, *quasi* venenum vulneri *indidisset*.

Suetonius, *Tib.* 11. 1: Sed increbrescente rumore *quasi* ad occasionem maioris spei *commoraretur*, tantum non adversis tempestatibus Rhodum enavigavit.

The exact nature and the inner history of this idiom are not altogether clear.² But one outstanding fact is sure, namely, that in the end, at any rate, the *quasi*-clause achieved full grammatical dependence upon the main division of the sentence.

It should be noted, further, that in the later development of the construction the notion of pretense fades. In the examples above cited from Suetonius nothing more than assumption or suggestion is involved.

The problem of this usage, which begins with *simulo quasi* in Plautus and develops as above indicated, is inseparable from that of *quasi* in the construction conventionally called conditional clause of comparison. Casual linguistic consciousness of the Romans certainly could not have kept the two things separate.

Quite aside from the fact that there may be a sort of middle ground in combinations such as *ita loqui quasi*,³ conventional conditional clauses of comparison with *quasi* have more affinity for the brand of falsity felt in *simulo quasi* than for the implication of a normal contrary to fact condition.

The 'contrary to fact' implication of these clauses, therefore, is of a kind to make for grammatical dependence and sequence of tenses, rather than against it; for the normal contrary to fact construction represents *the speaker's* point of view, whereas the falsity of the *quasi*-clause has to do with the attitude of persons indicated in the other division of the sentence.

Thus a pedestrian who saw a bird trying to lure intruders away from its nest might say:

Avis illa ita volat, quasi laesa sit.

² In some Plautine cases there is possibly a suggestion of the force of *quasi* in direct comparisons, namely 'like.' Thus, in very uncouth English, *Adsimulato quasi gubernator sies* might be rendered: "Make like you were the pilot."

³ Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 8. 2.

It would reduce this remark to utter inanity to force upon it a regular contrary to fact interpretation; i.e., "That bird is flying in such a way as [it would fly], if it were injured." Much rather, the speaker means to say that the bird, by its maneuvers, is trying to create the [false] impression that it is injured.

This inner connection creates a situation very unfavorable for a feeling of suppressed apodosis. On the contrary, it links closely the two parts of the sentence as it stands, and tends to bring the *quasi*-construction into a grammatical dependence comparable to that of the purpose clause, and thus within the scope of the law of sequence.⁴

In regard to the construction which began with *simulo quasi*, it was noted above that in the later stages the notion of pretense fades out, nothing more than suggestion or assumption being involved. This is true also of certain cases of the conventional conditional clause of comparison with *quasi*; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Chu.* 8: Aggrediar ad crimen cum illa deprecatione . . . , *sic* ut me audiatis, *quasi* hoc tempore haec causa primum *dicitur*, *sicuti dicitur*, *non quasi* saepe iam dicta et numquam *probata sit*.

The speaker here begs the hearers to take the view that really accords with the facts (note *sicuti dicitur*), and to avoid the opposite view.

Such an example strengthens greatly the case for grammatical subordination and the law of sequence; for a *quasi*-clause which makes an assumption in accord with fact could hardly be handled on any other basis. And the antithesis of the following *quasi*-clause would seem to indicate that truth or falsity of the assumption has nothing to do with the matter. The essential thing is the inner connection with the main division of the sentence arising

⁴ Cf. the balance of the *sicuti*-construction and purpose clause in the following passage:

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 38. 3: . . . rem publicam agitavere, honestis nominibus, alii *sicuti* populi iura *defenderent*, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma *foret*; bonum publicum *simulantes* pro sua quisque potentia certabant.

from the fact that the *quasi*-clauses develop the situation from the point of view of persons there indicated. Compare also:

Seneca, *de Ira*. ii. 33. 1: "Minus," inquit, "contemnemur, si vindicaverimus iniuriam."—Si tamquam ad remedium venimus, sine ira venimus, *non quasi dulce sit vindicari, sed quasi utile.*

This case is far more striking than the other. Seneca is laying down a doctrine of punishment, and the proper attitude of one who takes vengeance is set forth in four ways: (1) *tamquam ad remedium*, (2) *sine ira*, (3) *non quasi dulce sit vindicare*, (4) *sed quasi utile*.

It really misses the genius of the sentence to try to find implication of falsity anywhere in it. Throughout, it is merely a question of the attitude of the persons indicated in *venimus*. In *quasi* there is no more coloring than in the English phrase "with the feeling that."⁵

(3) In addition to the two considerations already developed at length, it is possible that an instinctive feeling for proper distribution of tense equipment also played a small part in holding the tense use now under discussion to conformity with the rules for sequence.

At any rate, there is utilization of the full range as seen, for instance, in the indirect question; e.g.

est	{	quasi sit
	}	quasi futurus sit
est—fuerit		
erat	{	quasi esset
	}	quasi futurus esset
erat—quasi fuisset		

The very completeness and balance of this scheme suggests that the Romans may have felt a certain fitness in such a combination as *erat . . . quasi esset*. If so, that fact would tend to hold in place *est . . . quasi sit* by analogy. Note the following:

⁵ There is a parallel in the use of *quasi* with participles and adjectives to express a sentiment entertained or advocated by persons indicated in the text; e.g., Cicero, *Cato M.* 22.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 8. 2: Haec tua deliberatio non mihi convenire visa est cum oratione Largi. Ille enim mecum, *quasi* tibi non *liceret* in Sicilia diutius commorari, *ita* locutus erat, tu autem *quasi concessum sit, ita* deliberas.

The context of this passage shows that Cicero himself has definite information in regard to the matter referred to in the two *quasi*-clauses. In the first, he sets forth the situation as portrayed by Largus in the past; then he shifts to the primary realm to represent the point of view of the writer of a letter that has just come to hand.

With this long preface, it remains to set down a brief summary of the facts regarding conditional clauses of comparison, especially with reference to the writings of Cicero:⁶

1. When introduced by *quam si, ut si, ac si*, and other combinations in which the comparative word and *si* do not coalesce (as they do in *quasi*), the tendency is to choose a subjunctive tense that accords with a suppressed apodosis, without regard for the form of the main division of the sentence.

Remark.—*Idem* and *similis* are not of frequent occurrence as correlatives in the main division of the sentence; but, when found, they are usually concomitants of suppressed apodosis. With *idem*, even *quasi* breaks away from sequence a few times; e.g.

Cicero, *Lael.* 14: Sensu enim amisso fit *idem, quasi natus non esset omnino.*⁷

2. Clauses introduced by *quasi* and *tamquam* tend to present a matter from the point of view of persons indicated in the other division of the sentence, and they conform generally to the law of sequence.⁸

⁶ For details, see present series, V, 183 ff.

⁷ Such an example is hardly a violation of the principle laid down above, because here is the nearest approach in Cicero to a recognition of the etymology of *quasi*; for *idem . . . quasi* is virtually *idem . . . quam si*.

⁸ *Tamquam* seems to follow the analogy of *quasi*. The facts are not at hand with reference to other phrases that omit *si*, namely, *sicut* and *velut*, which are not found in conditional clauses of comparison in Cicero.

Remark.—Some conditional clauses of comparison of this type use combinations such as are listed under (1), apparently by analogy.⁹ On the other hand, a few cases with those combinations seem to be brought under the law of sequence by a mechanical leveling, though in meaning they belong under (1).¹⁰

3. In a rather large group of cases, the conditional clause of comparison is so loosely attached to the rest of the sentence that punctuation with a comma is often too weak. There are at least two types:

(a) In the meaning 'as [for example] if,' *ut si* is very frequent in this use, the tense of the subjunctive being determined, as usual, with reference to a suppressed apodosis; e.g.

Cicero, *Top.* 31: *Formae sunt eae, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur; ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat.*

(b) Especially when introduced by *quasi*, a conditional clause of comparison is often attached with the effect of anacoluthon;

e.g.—Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 86: *Metelli sperat sibi quisque fortunam—proinde quasi aut plures fortunati sint quam infelices, aut certi quicquam sit in rebus humanis!*

Such examples are in the nature of a sharp and contemptuous retort. The speaker sarcastically inveighs against the stupidity or duplicity of persons indicated in the other division of the sentence, who are held up to scorn or derision.

Obviously there could be no question of suppressed apodosis here. And, in view of the detachment of these clauses, the tense distribution is of special interest. In Cicero's writings, the figures for examples introduced by *quasi* are as follows:

Quasi sit	68
Quasi esset	10
Quasi fuerit	29
Quasi fuisset	5

⁹ E.g., Livy xxi. 41. 10 (*velut si*).

¹⁰ E.g., Cicero, *ad Att.* vi. 5. 1 (*quam si*). In this general connection, it might be well to look also into the question of the effect of repraesentatio; e.g.

Ovid, *Trist.* i. 3. 73:

Dividor haud aliter, quam si mea membra relinquam.

Allowing for the fact that the present subjunctive here may (rarely) refer to the future, the choice of tense seems to rest on the same basis as would be used for indicative forms.¹¹

Such detached conditional clauses of comparison are found as early as Plautus; and their steady adherence (above shown) to the use of the primary tenses of the subjunctive may have been a small contributing factor in holding the regular *quasi*-construction to a like program.

4. The thought of a conditional clause of comparison sometimes finds expression in odd or distorted forms; e.g.

Catullus, 10. 32:

Utor *tam bene quam* mihi *pararim*.

What the writer wants to say is clear, namely: "I have as much use of them as [would be the case] if I had bought them myself." But, having cut *quam si* down to *quam*, he neglects the suppressed apodosis, and the subjunctive is leveled to conform to the law of sequence.

More interesting is a passage already mentioned¹² in which an infinitive phrase with *quam* functions as a conditional clause of comparison:

Tacitus, *Hist.* iii. 49. 3: *Quae seditiosa (Antonius) . . . mox in praedam vertebat, nihil adventantem Mucianum veritus; quod exitiosius erat quam Vespasianum sprevisse.*

The point of this sentence is that Mucianus, the second in command, was jealous of his position; hence, in disregarding his authority, Antonius exposed himself to greater danger than if he had shown disrespect to the emperor directly.

Thus *quam . . . sprevisse* is only another way of saying *quam si . . . sprevisset*; and so Wolff translates it in his note *ad loc.*, and without comment. In English such use of the infinitive can be paralleled, but it appears to be unusual in Latin.

¹¹ See farther, *op. cit.*, 218 ff.

¹² p. 20.

In conclusion, attention may be called to another construction, which, though of quite different character, might be substituted on occasion for a conditional clause of comparison:

Cicero, *de Fato* 48: hic, qui *aliter* obsistere fato fatetur se *non* potuisse, *nisi* ad has commenticias declinationes *confugisset*.

In general force, *non aliter nisi* and *non aliter quam si* are very similar. And if *confugisset* of this passage could be regarded as a futurum in praeterito (the less likely interpretation), the effect would be quite like that of a conditional clause of comparison.

[NOTE.—In the following *Register*, the page numbers are in *italic*.]

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(N. B. This play, *Le Andria*, has two endings. The ref. means "Second Ending, line 5")


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THE FORM SI SIT ERIT

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In a recent paper,¹ attention was called to the fact that some degree of inconcinnity occasionally results from the combination of a subjunctive *si*-clause with an indicative conclusion, and a few examples of the form *si sit erit* were cited in illustration.² This is a point at which editors sometimes feel difficulty; e.g.:

Vergil, *Aen.* i. 372 ff.:

O dea, *si* prima repetens ab origine *pergam*
Et *vacet* annalis nostrorum audire laborum,
Ante diem clauso *componet* Vesper Olympo.

On this passage Conington's note is characteristic. He shows that the manuscript authority inclines to the indicative *componet*, and that this reading is supported by quotation in Macrobius, Priscian, Nonius, and other early writers, as well as by Servius on this line. It is also in favor of *componet* that the indicative is the more difficult reading, and, therefore, more likely to be tampered with.

Yet, in the face of all this evidence, Conington decides for the subjunctive *componat* on the basis of "what would seem to be the propriety of language." Editors find similar difficulty with the following, which obviously is made on the same last:

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 42. 5: Sed de studiis partium et omnis civitatis moribus *si* singillatim aut pro magnitudine *parem* disserere, tempus quam res maturius me *deseret*.

¹ "The Latin Conditional Sentence," which appears as No. 1 in the present volume of this series. In references to this earlier article the abbreviation L. C. S. is used.

² L. C. S., pp. 81 ff.

The indicative reading in passages like the above should be compared with that in occasional sentences where editors cannot get rid of the offending mood except by drastic emendation; e.g.:

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 84. 2: *Si* Vitellio et satellitibus eius eligendi facultas *detur*, quem nobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur, quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam *optabunt*?

Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 85: *Si* iam Campus Martius *dividatur* et uni cuique vestrum . . . bini pedes *adsignentur*, tamen promiscue toto quam proprie parva frui parte *maletis*.³

Aside from passages that seem to involve a rather clearly marked inconcinnity, there are numerous cases of the form *si sit . . . erit* which pass without challenge. This is due to ameliorating circumstances that lessen in some degree the effect of inconcinnity, or even remove it altogether.

It is the purpose of this paper to seek out and identify some of these circumstances; and it appears that there are at least eight separate categories to be considered:

1. ITERATIVE SENTENCES

Everywhere in Latin are found side by side the two following iterative forms:

si est . . . est
si est . . . erit

To the extent that the subjunctive is used merely as a mark of indefiniteness or iteration, it is manifest that there is no more real inconcinnity involved in the use of the form *si sit . . . erit* than in the use of *si est . . . erit*.

From early Latin onward, the subjunctive with indefinite second singular subject is frequently found in iterative *si*-clauses, and it requires no illustration here. But the extension of the iterative use, as seen in the following examples, deserves special notice:

Cicero, *Part. Orat.* 72: *Id fit, si* factis verbis aut vetustis aut translatis frequenter *utamur*.

Cicero, *de Re P.* i. 66: (populus) magistratus et principes, *nisi* valde lenes et remissi *sint* et large sibi libertatem *ministrent*, . . . tyrannos *vocat*.

³ There is some MS support for *malitis*.

These examples, with the present indicative in the main clause, are particularly valuable as defining the time of the iterative subjunctive of the protasis as being present general. When the future indicative is used in the conclusion (form *si sit erit*), future outlook in the subjunctive of the iterative *si*-clause is not precluded;⁴ e.g.:

Martial, i. 68. 4:

. . . . *si non sit Naevia, mutus erit.*

Quintilian, i. 10. 44: *Si vero porrecti utrimque undeviceni singulis distent, non plures intus quadratos habebunt, quam*

Seneca, *de Const. Sap.* 7. 4: *Si quis cum uxore sua tamquam cum aliena concumbat, adulter erit.*

Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 44: *Hoc modo si diligenter attendamus, apta inter se esse intellegemus haec, quae*⁵

Opportunity for nice analysis is afforded by the following more elaborate passage, in which iterative *si sit* and *si est* stand side by side, with common conclusion in *erit*:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 80: *Erit autem omnino incredibile, aut si aliquis, quem constet esse avarum, dicat; aut si, quod in quibusdam rebus aut hominibus accidit, id omnibus dicitur usu venire.*

⁴ It may be that this aspect of the iterative use of the subjunctive would reward further study. The term 'iterative' itself needs clarification; cf. the curious case in Ovid, *Trist.* ii. 33 ff., where the application of *si mittat* is defined by a *quotiens*-clause: and the complexity of the whole problem is emphasized by Ovid, *Fast.* i. 123 ff., which (apparently for variety and liveliness) carries on an iterative passage begun in the most common and prosaic fashion by shifting to the form *si sit erit*.

⁵ Even here, of course, there is no necessary future outlook in the subjunctive. When that mood is merely the mark of iteration, the future indicative of the apodosis brings out the idea of sequence of events, as it often does in iterative sentences of the form *si est erit*; e.g.

Juvenal 3. 239 ff.:

*Si vocat officium, turba cedente vehetur
Dives, et ingenti curret super ora Liburno.*

Cf. 14. 145 ff. and 16. 18 ff. Note again the stylistic effect produced by the introduction of the future indicative in the apodosis; the form *si est est* is much more commonplace.

2. SUBSTITUTION AND CONCESSION

The process of substitution, elsewhere described at length,⁶ finds special and frequent application in concessive sentences. Note the option in the following:

(Even) if he should lose some $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{he would have enough} \\ \text{he will have enough} \end{array} \right.$

In this sentence, the first conclusion is a strict apodosis; the other is an unconditioned statement of fact 'substituted' for exact apodosis. This substitution is entirely logical; for it is a statement of fact in no wise subject to the condition—the fact stands, whether or no.⁷ In English we feel little or no inconcinnity in such situations; and this was doubtless true of Latin also.

However, under the influence of the pure conditional sentence, the tendency was strong to write *si sit . . . sit* in concessive periods;⁸ but the more vigorous and equally justified *si sit . . . erit* is not lacking; e.g.:

Plautus, *Asin.* 414 ff.:

Si quidem hercle nunc summum Iovem te dicas detinuisse
Atque is precator *adsiet*, malam rem *efugies* numquam.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 167: Neque tu hoc dicere audebis, nec, *si cupias, licebit.*⁹

⁶ L. C. S., pp. 93 ff.

⁷ Cf. L. C. S., pp. 98 ff.

⁸ This tendency is carried to an almost illogical extreme in concessive sentences of the form *si esset . . . esset*:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 169: *Si hercle te tuam pecuniam praetorem in provincia faeneratum docerem, tamen effugere non posses.*

Here the *si*-clause is contrary to fact, but the conclusion hardly so; for Verres cannot escape, whether or no. Of course, there is complication in cases like this as a result of the tense-shift which took place in the present contrary to fact construction in early Latin (L. C. S., p. 122 ff.). When the present subjunctive was the standard expression for the present contrary to fact idea, concessive examples frequently took the form *si sit . . . est*; but when *si sit* was supplanted by *si esset*, it was going against the current to write the wholly correct *si esset . . . est*, as in Cicero, *Lael.* 104.

⁹ The fact that *licebit* belongs to the class of verbs conventionally called 'modal' does not concern the issue here, as is shown by the parallel *audebis*. But the case serves as a reminder that the whole question of 'modal verb in apodosis' yet awaits definite settlement. The one thing now clear is that current doctrine on this subject is at least in large measure quite unsound; see L. C. S., pp. 105 ff.

Cicero, *de Har. Resp.* 60: Etenim vix haec, *si* undique *fulciamus* iam labefacta, vix, inquam, nixa in omnium nostrum umeris *cohaerent*.

Propertius, ii. 10. 5 ff.:

Quod *si deficiant vires*, audacia certe

Laus erit; in magnis et voluisse sat est.¹⁰

Of much the same character, but with a certain complication, are sentences like the following:

Horace, *Car.* iii. 3. 7 ff.:

Si fractus inlabatur orbis,

Impavidum serient ruinae.

In this ode the poet lauds the man *iustum et tenacem propositi*, and means to say that such an one will be found undismayed, whatever may befall.

Had he used for his conclusion a statement such as *impavidus stabit*, the case would fall into line with the other concessive sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit* cited above; for such a statement would be applicable to any and all situations.

But since he introduces into the conclusion a reference to the ruins that would be precipitated by the collapse of the sky, a certain interlocking of clauses results, and he obligates himself, in a way, to make the conclusion an exact apodosis by using the subjunctive. Failure to do this leaves an impression of slight inconcinnity.¹¹

¹⁰ Ovid, *Trist.* iv. 9. 15 ff. presents a case of the form *si sit . . . erit* that seems to be more properly classed as adversative than as concessive (L. C. S., pp. 60 ff.). So possibly Martial, xiv. 31; but there is some question whether the *si*-clause here should read *gemas* or *genes*, and, as often in this book of *Apophoreta*, it is hard to tell whether the subject is or is not technically indefinite.

Though outside the range of the present discussion because of its form, the following curious sentence deserves notice in this connection:

Tibullus, iii. 5. 32 ff.:

Vivite felices, memores et vivite nostri,

Sive erimus, seu nos fata fuisse velint.

So far as meter is concerned, the poet might have ended his last clause with *volent* (so inferior MSS). Apparently the shift from indicative to subjunctive is due to an impulse to enhance the pathos by seeming to shrink from the thought of death by putting it as the more remote alternative. The concessive flavor of the whole connection, and, in particular of the last clause (cf. L. C. S., pp. 66 and 99), are here, of course, incidental.

¹¹ Of course, in a connection like this, account is taken only of logic and grammar. The question is not raised whether a sentence suffers or is improved rhetorically by a shade of inconcinnity.

3. POSSIBLE SUBORDINATION OF THE SI-CLAUSE

In typical forward-moving conditional sentences (e.g., "If something happens, something else follows"), the condition is logically the leading clause; and, if it uses the subjunctive mood, it exerts a strong influence on the form the apodosis is to take.¹²

Thus standards of usage are set up; and while a sentence may be begun with *cum sit* or *cum esset*, without the slightest prejudice in favor of the use of the subjunctive in the main clause, not so if it begins with *si sit* or *si esset*.

Even in sentences of the proviso type,¹³ where the condition may verge toward the effect of an afterthought, the balance of mood and tense usually is maintained.

But such examples serve to remind of a query that keeps rising in the mind of one who studies the form *si sit . . . erit*; namely, whether, in cases where this form represents a unified period, the conditional phrase ever inclines to the level of grammatical dependence seen, for example, in *cum sit*. If it does, and in so far as it does, the question of inconcinnity is eliminated; for that issue would never be raised in regard to combinations like *cum sit . . . erit*.¹⁴

In sentences of the concessive type described under the previous heading, conditions are distinctly favorable for *si* to sink toward the level of an ordinary subordinating conjunction. For, as there pointed out, the main clause frequently is a statement of fact in no wise subject to the condition; and, furthermore, in this

¹² Cf. the case illustrated on p. 190, n. 8, in which the leveling influence of the *si*-clause is carried to a point where logic is all but violated.

¹³ Cf. L. C. S., pp. 40 ff.

¹⁴ By 'unified period' in the text above is meant a sentence made up of clauses to which the terms 'protasis' and 'apodosis' may with some propriety be applied. Thus, cases of anacoluthon are excluded (L. C. S., pp. 86 ff.); and there are two other types that have no place here; namely, sentences in which a condition serves as an object clause (L. C. S., pp. 85 ff.), and many in which *si* introduces a substantive clause (L. C. S., pp. 86). Hence, though in these two latter groups the law of sequence is operative, that fact does not have any direct bearing on the matter now under discussion.

Examples of object clauses in sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit* may be found in Terence, *Phor.* 229 ff., *Hec.* 429; Ovid, *ex Pont.* iv. 13. 17; cf. Quintilian, i. 10. 7.

use *si* is often accompanied by *etiam*, making a combination (*etiamsi*) which tends to obscure the conditional idea and to accentuate the concessive.

It is distinctly interesting, in this connection, that the poets of the Augustan period and their successors show a marked inclination to write *licet sit* where Cicero would write *si sit* or *etiamsi sit*. This tendency to bring the two constructions to a common level may shed some light on the following unusual case:

Propertius, i. 14. 1 ff.:

Tu *licet* abiectus Tiberina molliter unda
 Lesbia Mentoreo vina *bibas* opere,
 Et modo tam celeres *mireris* currere lintres
 Et modo tam tardas funibus ire rates,
 Et nemus omne satas *intendat* vertice silvas
 Urgetur quantis Causasus arboribus,
 Non tamen ista meo *valeant* contendere amori.

This passage is too long and complicated for a clear test; but the general thought is that, though wealth display all its charms, still they *would be* no offset to the joys of requited love. To express this idea, the form *licet sit sit* is used, the concessive clause playing the leading rôle, and the conclusion falling into line with it, just as if it were a case of *si sit sit*.

If these two forms of expression became so confused as to allow the standard subordinate construction *licet sit*, on occasion, to play the leading rôle, certainly it would be far easier for (*etiam*) *si* with the subjunctive to slip down in linguistic consciousness toward the level of a grammatically subordinate clause introduced by *licet* or *quamvis*.¹⁵ Cf. *licet* and *si* in the two following passages:

Propertius, ii. 20. 9 ff.:

Me *licet* aeratis *astringant* brachia nodis,
 Sint mea vel Danaes *condita* membra domo,
 In te ego aeratas *rumpam*,¹⁶ mea vita, catenas,
 Ferratam Danaes *transiliamque* domum.

¹⁵ The final test, of course, if it could be applied, would be obedience to the law of sequence.

¹⁶ As expressions of determination in the face of deterrents, this verb and the following are doubtless to be read as future indicatives.

Martial, ii. 24. 1 ff.:

*Si det iniqua tibi tristem fortuna reatum,
Squalidus haerebo pallidiorque reo:
Si iubeat patria damnatum excedere terra,
Per freta, per scopulos, exulis ibo comes.*

Even in Cicero's time there are cases in which the exact grammatical status of concessive *si sit* is open to question; e.g.:

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 20: Num quando vides Tusculanum aliquem de M. Catone . . . gloriari? Verbum nemo facit. At in quemcumque Arpinatem incidideris, *etiam si nolis, erit* tamen tibi . . . de C. Mario audiendum.¹⁷

These words are addressed directly to Laterensis, and the reference in *vides, nolis* and *tibi* appears to be definite. Undoubtedly, in this particular case, the complexity of the sentence structure, which tends to give *etiam si nolis* the place of a wheel within a wheel, accounts in large part for the reader's inclination to interpret the clause as on a level, for example, with the *quamvis*-construction.¹⁸ Cf. also the following case, in which concessive *si* is reinforced by *maxime*:

Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 58. 6: Diutius in his locis esse, *si maxime* animus ferat, frumenti . . . egestas prohibet.

This matter is not fully worked out; but it may prove to be true that a tendency on the part of concessive *si*-clauses to develop real grammatical subordination helps to banish a shade of inconcinnity that might otherwise be felt with certain cases of the forms *si sit . . . est* and *si sit . . . erit*.

¹⁷ Cf. (with form *si sit . . . est*) Cicero, *in Caecil.* 21, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 176, *Phil.* viii. 12. The fact that the active periphrastic is used in the main clause of the example cited above of course has no bearing on the point here at issue. See, further, what is said on this general topic, p. 190, n. 9.

¹⁸ Cf. Seneca, *de Vit. Beat.* 1. 2 (*etiam si laboremus*), which is iterative also, as well as concessive.

4. PARENTHETIC TYPE OF SI-CLAUSE

In some combinations of subjunctive condition with indicative main clause, the condition is quite as parenthetic as *ut ita dicam*; e.g.:

Tacitus, *Ger.* 40. 5: Mox vehiculum et vestes et, *si credere velis*, numen ipsum secreto lacu abluitur.¹⁹

So with the form *si sit erit*:

Juvenal, 14. 316 ff.:

Mensura tamen quae
Sufficiat census, *si quis me consulat, edam*:²⁰
In quantum sitis atque fames et frigora poscunt,
Etc.

Frequently there is a verbal interlocking that spoils the parenthetic effect, and introduces some degree of inconcinnity; e.g.:

Tacitus, *Agr.* 24. 2: Spatium eius (Hiberniae), *si Britanniae comparetur*, angustius, nostri maris insulas superat.

Logically the condition is parenthetic in a case like this; for the relative size of the two islands named is an established fact, in no way subject to the condition; but the writer has incorporated in the *si*-clause a word (*Britanniae*) which is essential to the understanding of the main statement, and the condition could not be dropped out without disrupting the sentence.

Having prejudiced the situation in this manner, Tacitus might have found a way out by choosing a standard subjunctive apodosis, i.e., *angustius (sit)*, "it would prove to be smaller." But *superat* of the following clause indicates that he means *angustius (est)*, with a consequent shade of abruptness in the sentence.²¹

¹⁹ For other examples, see L. C. S., pp. 91 ff., and perhaps Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 3. 138. Cf. also the indicative condition *si credere dignum est*, Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 173.

²⁰ This seems an announcement of intention to give the information which follows immediately in the text; hence *edam* is naturally read as a future indicative. So Ovid, *Fast.* vi. 552.

²¹ For further illustration, see L. C. S., p. 93; and cf. the type of interlocking noted above in concessive sentences, p. 191.

The interlocking process is well illustrated in the following case of *si sit . . . erit*:

Martial, xii. 34. 5 ff.:
 Et *si* calculus omnis huc et illuc
 Diversus bicolorque *digeratur*,
 Vincet candida turba nigriorem.

Here the poet is in a reflective mood. He puts the bane and blessing of life in the scales, and declares that the balance is in favor of the good.²²

5. MODALITY OF THE FUTURE INDICATIVE

In the earliest Latin, the line dividing present subjunctive and future indicative was still somewhat indistinct. The inflectional system of the verb was not yet standardized, and the definite assignment of verbs to specific conjugations was in some cases tardy.

Under these circumstances, lack of precision in the use of *a*-forms and *e*-forms was inevitable, to say nothing of the employment of such phrases as *di fortunabunt vestra consilia*²³ to express a wish.

Probably, at this stage of development, some cases of the use of the form *si sit . . . erit* were not felt as in any degree abnormal, though the nicer grammatical sense of a later age may detect in them a suggestion of inconcinnity; e.g.:

Plautus, *Merc.* 650 ff.:
Si ibi amare forte *occipias*, atque item eius *sit* inopia,
 Iam inde porro *aufugies*?

²² Cf. Seneca, *de Tranq. Anim.* 8. 1. In some cases this form of expression may be softened by a special use of the future indicative in the main clause (see p. 206, and n. 52).

²³ Plautus, *Tri.* 576. Even more striking, perhaps, is the use of the present subjunctive and the future indicative side by side in a double protasis consisting of but four words:

Plautus, *Poen.* 728 ff.:
 AG. Quid *si* recenti re aedis pultem? ADV. Censeo.
 AG. *Si* pultem, non *recludet*? ADV. Panem frangito.

Very clearly the sense of the first half of the last line is: "(What) if I should knock (and) he does not answer," a clash of moods much softened in the English rendering.

In the Ciceronian period there is a different situation. But quite apart from sporadic survival of archaic usage,²⁴ and within the limits set by sharper grammatical distinctions, the future indicative is capable of shades of meaning, recognition of which is essential to any full understanding of the combination *si sit erit*; being not merely a tense of prediction, but also a vehicle for the expression of will, its function is, in part, distinctly modal.

This in itself is a large subject, here merely outlined through the use of a rough practical division that brings the material under three general heads:

a. Will of the speaker as to another's action

Here the future indicative trenches more or less upon the field of the imperative, and provides, first of all, a diplomatic and polite method of recommendation through a form of expression that might conceivably be interpreted as little more than prediction. Thus an editor suggests mildly to a contributor:

"But you *will understand* that we have a lot of things on hand, and *will be patient*."

The following passage is interesting as showing the imperative and the future indicative in parallel clauses:

Cicero, *Cato M.* 81: "Quare, si haec ita sunt, sic me *colite*," inquit, "ut deum; sin una est interiturus animus cum corpore, vos memoriam nostri pie inviolateque *servabitis*."²⁵

In another example, the future indicative is defined as voicing a demand (note *poposcit* and *poscere*):

Martial, x. 75. 1 ff.:

Milia viginti quondam me Galla *poposcit*,

Et, fateor, magno non erat illa nimis.

Annus abit. "Bis quina *dabis* sestertia," dixit.

Poscere plus visa est quam prius illa mihi.²⁶

²⁴ E.g., *arcebis* and *mactabis* in the closing paragraph of the first speech against Catiline.

²⁵ Cf. Vergil, *Ec.* 3. 58 ff.; Martial, i. 70. 4 ff.

²⁶ So xi. 23. 4, where the force of *dabis* is indicated by *lege* ('terms'). For other mandatory expressions see Martial, iii. 5. 5 and 10, vii. 51. 3; Propertius, i. 6. 36; Lucan, ii. 643.

A somewhat converse situation is found in Calpurnius Siculus, 2. 99, where, after listening to rival shepherds, the judge announces his verdict in the words *Este pares*, the imperative thus encroaching upon the sphere of the indicative.

It is not always easy to draw the line between demand and entreaty; e.g.:

Martial, x. 92. 13 ff.:

Hoc omne agelli mite parvuli numen
Seu tu cruore sive ture placebis:
"Ubicumque vester Martialis est," dices,
"Hac, ecce, mecum dextera litat vobis
Absens sacerdos."

Compare the conventional turn with a verb like *ignosco*:

Cicero, *Cato M.* 55: sed haec ipsa, quae dixi, sentio fuisse longiora.
Ignoscetis autem; nam . . . studio rusticarum rerum provectus sum.²⁷

Martial, iv. 77. 3:

Paupertas (*veniam dabis*) recede.

A parallel idiom with the verb *valeo* suggests rather the mandatory idea:

Martial, ii. 92. 1 ff.:

Natorum mihi ius trium roganti
Musarum pretium dedit mearum
Solus qui poterat. *Valebis*, uxor.

Martial, xiii. 53:

Cum pinguis mihi turtur erit, lactuca, *valebis*.
Et cocleas tibi habe. Perdere nolo famem.²⁸

As a vehicle for advice, the future indicative is extensively used; e.g.:

Juvenal, 10. 346 ff.:

Nil ergo optabunt homines? *Si consilium vis*,
Permites ipsis expendere numinibus quid
Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris.

Note the defining phrase *si consilium vis*.²⁹ Sometimes the advice is softened by an adverb such as *melius*; e.g.:

Lucan ii. 266 ff.:

Melius tranquilla sine armis
Otia solus *ages*, sicut caelestia semper
Inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu.³⁰

²⁷ Cf. Martial, iv. 26. 4, Propertius, i. 11. 19.

²⁸ Cf. vi. 78. 5 ff.

²⁹ Cf. Propertius, i. 20. 51; and note the rather close parallel of the subjunctive in Martial, xii. 34. 10 (*facias*).

³⁰ Cf. Juvenal, 7. 171 ff., 8. 37 ff., 9. 101; Martial, i. 15. 5, and xiii. 26. 2 (*aptius*).

This turn is much in evidence in didactic treatises; e.g.:

Vergil, *Geor.* 2. 230 ff.:

Ante locum *capies* oculis, alteque *iubebis*
 In solido puteum demitti, omnemque *repones*
 Rursus humum, et pedibus summas *aequabis* harenas.

Such possible use of the future indicative is the more welcome in didactic writing because of the need of variety of expression, as illustrated by the following passage:

Calpurnius Siculus, 5. 18 ff.:

Protinus hiberno pecus omne *movebis* ovili.

 Sed non ante greges in pascua *mitte* reclusos,
 Quam fuerit placata Pales. Tum caespite vivo
Pone focum, Geniumque loci Faunumque Laresque
 Salso farre *voca*: tepidos tunc hostia cultros
Imbuat; hac etiam, dum vivit, ovilia *lustra*.
 Nec mora, tunc campos ovibus, dumeta capellis
 Orto sole *dabis*,
 Ac si forte vaces, dum matutina relaxat
 Frigora sol, tumidis spumantia mulctra papillis
Implebit, quod mane fluet, rursusque *premetur*
 Mane, quod occiduae mulsura redegerit horae.
Parce tamen foetis, nec *sint* compendia tanti,
 Destruat ut niveos venalis caseus agnos.
 Nam tibi praecipuo foetura *coletur* amore.³¹

Here, in the space of twenty-one lines, the imperative and the future indicative are each used five times, and the hortatory subjunctive twice. A little later in the same passage the gerundive adds to the variety.³²

In regard to the occurrences of the future indicative, it will be noted that some are in the third person. Thus, five lines from the end, *Implebit*³³ and *premetur* well illustrate extension into the third person without loss of admonitory force. So in the following, on which the above extract seems to be based in part:

³¹ Cf. Vergil, *Geor.* 3. 319 ff.; Tibullus, i. 4. 39 ff.

³² Other devices employed are the interjection of verbs like *iubeo* and *suadeo* (e.g., Vergil, *Geor.* 3. 300), and the use of the present indicative to tell how things *are* done, leaving it to the reader to make the application (as *Geor.* 2. 413 ff.). Occasionally the first plural hortatory subjunctive is found (see *Geor.* 3. 325).

³³ Al. *Implebis*.

Vergil, *Geor.* 3. 177 ff.:

. . . frumenta manu *carpes* sata; nec tibi fetae,
More patrum, nivea *implebunt* mulgaria vaccae,
Sed tota in dulces *consumunt*³⁴ ubera natos.

Up to this point, the examples cited represent in general the jussive idea. The future may also convey the permissive notion that normally falls to the subjunctive or the imperative or to some other device. Compare the moods in the following:

Martial, ii. 86. 11 f.:

Scribat carmina circulis Palaemon:
Me raris iuvat auribus placere.

Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 47. 4: *Fruetur* Vitellius fratre, coniuge, liberis; mihi non ultione neque solaciis opus est. Alii diutius imperium tenerint; nemo tam fortiter reliquerit.

The future indicative, as used here³⁵ and in the material previously cited under this head, certainly meets halfway certain uses of the imperative and the subjunctive. And since imperative and independent subjunctive appear in the apodosis of conditions of the form *si sit* naturally and normally, it follows that the future indicative, in the uses just described, might well enter into the combination *si sit . . . erit* without involving any great degree of inconcinnity. So, for example, in the laying down of rules:

Cicero, *Part. Orat.* 124: etiam *si* propius *accedat*³⁶ ad consuetudinem mentemque sermonis defensoris definitio, tamen accusator sententia legis *nitetur*.³⁷

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 88: Ambiguum *si . . .* adversarius ad aliam partem . . . *velit* accomodare, demonstrare *oportebit . . .*³⁸

In the following passage, advice (defined by *mones*) amounts practically to a threat:

³⁴ There is some MS support for *consumant*.

³⁵ So Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 17 (*dicent*), Horace, *Car.* i. 7. 1 (*laudabunt*); and cf. Martial, iv. 88. 9 (*decipies*), ix. 35. 11 (*cenabis*), xiv. 7. 2 (*delebis*), and Lucan, viii. 192 (*dabit*).

³⁶ There is a variant *accedit*.

³⁷ Several factors may be at work in one example; thus, this sentence is iterative and concessive, in addition to having a modal future in the main clause.

³⁸ This example, too, is iterative. It has the added peculiarity also that *demonstrabis* is expanded into *demonstrare oportebit*. On the question of 'modal verb in apodosis,' see p. 190, n. 9.

Plautus, *Mil. G.* 571 ff.:

PE. Ne tu hercle, *si te di ament*, linguam *comprimis*.
 Posthac etiam illud quod scies nesciveris,
 Nec videris quod videris. SC. Bene me *mones*.
 Ita facere certum est.³⁹

b. Will of the subject of the verb as to his own action

It is difficult at times to determine whether the first singular of the future indicative expresses determination ('I will') or merely prediction ('I shall'). In the other persons, of course, the future is more likely to predict the act of another than it is to assert another's will to act.

Specially worthy of note are cases in which the speaker (first person) declares intention as to his own course of action, choosing however a turn of phrase that calls for a third person form:

Juvenal, 3. 46 ff.:

Me nemo ministro

Fur erit.

The passage from which this sentence is quoted has to do with a choice of employment; the speaker will not abet dishonesty in order to earn a living.⁴⁰

³⁹ The protasis also of this example calls for attention. Probably *ament* is the correct reading, though *amant* has some MS support. As to *si te di ament*, the question arises whether there may not have been some sub-conscious connection between this phrase and the very common form of greeting *di te ament*. The probability of such a connection is increased here by the fact that, in the line immediately preceding, the other speaker has said *tibi di faciant bene*, to which *si te di ament* becomes a sort of rejoinder.

As commonly rendered into English, there is, of course, a wide gulf between *di te ament* and *si te di ament*; but to casual Roman linguistic feeling they may have been no farther apart than the greeting 'Peace *be* with you' and 'If peace *be* with you.'

Looseness in the use of *si te di ament* seems to be favored also by the fact that, as here applied, the words are phraseological; i.e., the speaker does not express himself with precision, as will be seen at once if an attempt is made to render at all literally into English. A similar passage (*Mil. G.* 293 ff.) shows clearly, by a defining addition, that both here and there the ultimate force of *si te di ament* is something like 'If you have regard for a whole skin.'

⁴⁰ So Tibullus, iv. 3. 17, and Martial, ix. 76. 10. Cf. Calpurnius Siculus, 4. 163, where, instead of using a hortatory subjunctive, the speaker seems to express his own choice in *cantabimus*; so Catullus, 5. 11 (*conturbabimus*).

Quite different are cases where a third person verb is made to declare the determination of its subject; e.g.:

Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 73: qui (maiores nostri) colonias sic idoneis in locis contra suspicionem periculi collocarunt, ut esse non oppida Italiae, sed propugnacula imperii viderentur. Hi *deducunt* colonias in eos agros, quos emerint.

Reference is here made to the intent of the sponsors of a bill now pending, and opposed by the speaker; very clearly, then, it is not a case of prediction.

In the following, note the effect produced by the shift to the future tense in the second clause:

Juvenal, 3. 51 ff.:

Nil tibi se debere putat, nil *conferet* umquam,
Participem qui te secreti fecit honesti.

This case is not so satisfactory as the one preceding, because of the iterative character of the sentence, which makes *conferet*, so to speak, a prediction as to intention.⁴¹

With the future indicative as thus used in independent sentences, the chance of inconcinnity is small in the combination *si sit . . . erit*; e.g.:

Ovid, *Trist.* v. 1. 41 ff.:

Lenior invicti *si sit* mihi Caesaris ira,
Carmina laetitiae iam tibi plena *dabo*.⁴²

Propertius, ii. 26. 29 ff.:

Seu mare per longum mea *cogitet* ire puella,
Hanc *sequar* et fidos una *aget* aura duos.

This second passage is interesting as running on into a third person form that still expresses the determination of the speaker.⁴³

Here, as elsewhere, it often happens that more than one factor contributes to the naturalness of the use of the form *si sit . . . erit*. Thus, a concessive *si*-clause couples very aptly with an

⁴¹ See p. 189, n. 5, and cf. Juvenal, 3. 211, and 6. 576. Possible cases of the second person verb made to express the will of its subject are found in Horace, *Serm.* ii. 6. 54, and Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 375.

⁴² Cf. *Met.* vi. 545 ff.

⁴³ Cf. Tibullus, iv. 1. 201 ff., and Calpurnius Siculus, 2. 52 ff. and 56 ff.

expression of will in the apodosis. So in an example already cited:

Martial, ii. 24. 1 ff.:

Si det iniqua tibi tristem fortuna reatum
Squalidus haerebo pallidiorque reo;
Si iubeat patria damnatum excedere terra,
Per freta per scopulos exulis ibo comes.

The iterative idea seems present in the following:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 75: *atque hac distinctione alia quoque propulsabimus, si qui adsumptionem aliquando tolli posse putent.*

Another passage shows an interesting complication:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 217: *Quodsi suspiciones inicere velitis ad plures homines, ad plures provincias crimen hoc pertinere, non ego istam defensionem vestram pertimescam, sed profitebor.*

If Cicero wrote *non pertimescam* with clear feeling as to its mood (certainly a debatable point), one wonders whether he would not have found ambiguity in the words, if suddenly confronted with the passage after a considerable lapse of time.

It looks to a subjunctive interpretation that, by virtue of its content, the phrase *non pertimescam* is not well suited to be an expression of will; but the succeeding clause develops a clear volitive note in *profitebor*.

Possible cases of second and third person futures made to express the will of their subjects appear in the following:

Livy iv. 49. 16: *Iam si suffragium detur, hunc, qui malum vobis minatur, iis, qui agros sedesque ac fortunas stabilire volunt, praeferetis.*

Cicero, *p. Quinct.* 68: *Quod si velim confiteri, illud, opinor, concedent.*

c. Certain interrogative uses

Under this head, most important are repudiating or rejecting questions, which voice emphatic protest against some demand or expectation. The subjunctive mood is probably more familiar here, especially when the verb is in the first person singular; cf., however, the following:

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 5. 110: "At remiges non erat." Praetorem tu *accuses?* Frange cervices!

Cicero, in *Verr.* ii. 1. 154: Te *putet* quisquam, cum ab Italia freto diiunctus esses, sociis temperasse, qui aedem Castoris testem tuorum furtorum esse volueris?

Propertius, iii. 2. 9 ff.:

Miremur, nobis et Baccho et Apolline dextro,
Turba puellarum si mea verba colit?

The future indicative is liberally represented in questions of this kind; e.g.:

Juvenal, 2. 21:

Ego te ceventem, Sexte, *verebor?*⁴⁴

Martial, xiv. 131:

Si veneto prasinove faves, quid *cochina sumes?*
Ne fias ista transfuga sorte, vide.

Juvenal, 3. 81 ff.:

Me prior ille
*Signabit?*⁴⁵

It would be difficult to draw a hard and fast line of distinction in meaning between subjunctive and indicative repudiating questions. Hence no great degree of inconcinnity probably was felt in the rare examples of the form *si sit . . . erit* in which such future indicatives find a place; e.g.:

Cicero, *de Re P.* iii. 27: *si* duo sint, . . . et *si* in eo *sit* errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum sceleratum . . . *putet*, contra autem, qui *sit* improbissimus, existimet esse summa probitate . . . quis tandem *erit* tam demens, qui dubitet, utrum se esse malit?

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 56: *Si*, iudices, id quod Epaminondas ait legis scriptorem sensisse, *ascribat* ad legem, et *addat* hanc exceptionem . . . *patiemini?* . . . *si* vosmet ipsi, quod a vestra religione . . . remotissimum est, . . . ascribi *iubeatis*, populus Thebanus id *patietur* fieri?

In this second passage, the closing conditional sentence is further softened by the concessive flavor of the *si*-clause.

⁴⁴ Cf. Martial, x. 10. 5.

⁴⁵ Cf. 6. 617, 9. 48 ff. (sarcastic), 10. 346. Martial, iii. 93. 20 ff. shows the two moods in parallel construction:

Quid? sarire quis *velit* saxum?
Quis coniugem te, quis *vocabit* uxorem,
Philomelus aviam quam vocaverat nuper?

6. FUTURE INDICATIVE IN THE SENSE 'WILL PROVE TO BE'

The use of the future indicative in the meanings 'will prove to be,' 'will turn out to be,' 'will be found to be' is familiar from Plautus onward, and it is rather more frequent than the handbooks usually intimate; e.g.:

Martial, xiii. 114:

Nom sum de primo, fateor, trifolina Lyaeo,
Inter vina tamen septima vitis ero.

Lucan, iv. 258 ff:

Hoc siquidem solo civilis crimine belli
Dux causae melioris eris.

Vergil, *Geor.* 1. 428 ff.:

Si nigrum obscuro comprehenderit⁴⁶ aera cornu,
Maximus agricolis pelagoque *parabitur* imber.

Juvenal, 1. 126:

Noli vexare; *quiescet*.⁴⁷

If modern feeling is to be trusted, the chance of inconcinnity is lessened in those cases of the form *si sit . . . erit* in which the future indicative has this special force: Cf.

"Should he buy that land, it *will* prove a good venture."

Sentences of this type are a feature of Martial's usage:

Martial, xii. 92. 4:

Dic mihi, *si fias* tu leo, qualis eris?

Martial, viii. 56. 23 ff.:

Ergo *ero*⁴⁸ Vergilius, si munera Maecenatis
Des mihi? Vergilius non *ero*, Marsus *ero*.

Martial, xiv. 21:

Haec tibi erunt armata suo graphiaria ferro.
Si puero *dones*,⁴⁹ non leve munus *erit*.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Subject, *luna*.

⁴⁷ Cf. also Martial, xiv. 214. 1; Vergil, *Geor.* 4. 91; Juvenal, 9. 45.

⁴⁸ Al. *ego*.

⁴⁹ It is not clear that this is a conventional case of 'indefinite second singular subject;' the situation is somewhat peculiar in this book of *Apophoreta* (cf. p. 191, n. 10).

⁵⁰ So Ovid, *ex Pont.* i. 1. 80, i. 4. 9 ff. (both *ero*), and *Her.* ii. 43 (*eris*); Propertius, ii. 15. 37 ff. (*erit*); Cicero, *de Nat. D.* ii. 18 (*habebit*).

As indicated by these examples, the verb *sum* plays a large rôle here. But other verbs are not excluded; e.g.:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 115: Nam *si* cum aliorum improbitate *certet*, longe omnes multumque *superabit*.⁵¹

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 29: *Si* vero scrutari vetera et ex iis ea, quae scriptores Graeciae prodiderunt, eruere *coner*, ipsi illi maiorum gentium di qui habentur hinc a nobis profecti in caelum *reperientur*.⁵²

This second case is interesting in that the special future force is made explicit by the introduction of the verb *reperio*.⁵³ With the slightest variation in wording, other verbs are brought into play in like situation; e.g.:

Cicero, *de Div.* i. 17:

Et, *si* stellarum motus cursusque vagantis
Nosse *velis*,
Omnia iam *cernes* divina mente notata.

Obviously *cernes* is here practically a paraphrase of *reperientur*.⁵⁴

In view of the notion of evolution inherent in the verb *fiō*, perhaps the following somewhat doubtful case might be brought under this general rubric:

Calpurnius Siculus, 3. 51 ff.:

Te sine, vae misero, mihi lilia nigra videntur,
Nec sapiunt fontes,³ et acescunt vina bibenti.
At *si* tu *venias*, et candida lilia *fient*,
Et *sapient* fontes, et dulcia vina *bibentur*.⁵⁵

Occasionally the future of the verb *sum* seems to vary little from the conventional force of *fiō*:

⁵¹ Cf. Ovid, *Trist.* v. 12. 51 ff.

⁵² This case and the one preceding have some affinity for the parenthetic interlocking type (see p. 195).

⁵³ Cf. the force of *reperientur* in Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 94; but there the attached condition is a substantive clause (L. C. S., p. 86).

⁵⁴ Note, incidentally, that the subject of the verbs in this passage is indefinite.

⁵⁵ It may be that the explanation of the combination *si sit . . . erit* in this case should be sought, in part at least, in the subjunctive of the *si*-clause. There is a suggestion of conventional softening in the phrase *si tu venias* in this amatory connection. In a similar passage (9. 47 ff.), line 53 is repeated without change; and *si venias* is found again in 2. 71, where the future of the apodosis offers less difficulty (see p. 209).

Ovid, *ex Pont.* ii. 6. 3 ff.:

Præbet mihi littera linguam;
Et *si* non liceat scribere, mutus ero.

With the category 'will prove to be' may be associated two minor uses of the future indicative:

a. Announcement of the inevitable

Juvenal, 10. 163 ff.:

Finem animæ quæ res humanas miscuit olim
Non gladii, non saxa *dabunt*.

Juvenal, 7. 197 ff.:

Si fortuna volet, *fies* de rhetore consul;
Si volet hæc eadem, *fiet* de consule rhetor.⁵⁶

Ovid, *ex Pont.* iv. 3. 51 ff.:

'Litus ad Euxinum,' si quis mihi diceret, '*ibis*,
Et *metues*, arcu ne feriare Getæ,'
'I, bibe,' dixissem, 'purgantes pectora sucos,
Quicquid et in tota nascitur Anticyra.'

So in the combination *si sit erit*:

Juvenal, 10. 338 ff.:

Quid placeat dic:

Ni parere *velis*, *pereundum erit* ante lucernas;
Si scelus *admittas*, *dabitur* mora parvula

This interesting and complicated passage has to do with the unfortunate dilemma faced by C. Silius, when he was being forced into marriage by Messalina, wife of Claudius. The latter half of the first period might be rendered: "Thou must die before candle-light;"⁵⁷ the conditional sentence of the next line is explainable as modeled upon its predecessor.⁵⁸ Cf. the note of warning in the following:

⁵⁶ Note here, too, the use of the verb *fio*; and cf. also 9. 103. In Propertius iii. 3. 39 ff., the poet's 'fortune is told' by Calliope in a series of futures (with one shift of point of view in line 41).

⁵⁷ As to the matter of 'modal verb in apodosis' see again p. 190, n. 9.

⁵⁸ There is a happy combination of the idea 'will prove to be' and the note of prophecy in Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 882 ff.:

Heu, miserande puer! *Si* qua fata aspera *rumpas*,
Tu Marcellus *eris*.

Seneca, *Herc. Fur.* 363 ff.:

Si aeterna semper odia mortales gerant
Nec coeptus umquam cedat ex animis furor,

Nihil relinquent bella.

Quintilian, i. 6. 44: *Quae si ex eo, quod plures faciunt, nomen accipiat, periculosissimum dabit praeceptum, non orationi modo sed (quod maius est) vitae.*⁵⁹

Certain Ciceronian examples seem to be of the same general character, though less clear-cut:

Cicero, *Acad.* i. 7: *Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur, . . . quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis!*

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 84: *quae si suscipiamus, pedis offensio nobis et . . . sternumenta erunt observanda.*

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* iii. 47: *quae si reiciamus, illa quoque, unde haec nata sunt, reiciemus.*⁶⁰

Another similar group is marked by a rather distinct argumentative turn; e.g.:

Lucretius, i. 570 ff.:

At contra si mollia sint primordia rerum,
Unde queant validi silices ferrumque creari
Non poterit ratio reddi.

This passage touches on the question of the nature of primordia, whether they are hard or soft. The poet has shown how everything is explicable on the assumption of hard primordia; the

⁵⁹ So in early Latin; e.g.: Plautus, *Most.* 56 ff., *Curc.* 186.

⁶⁰ In connection with this use of the future indicative, attention should be called to another slightly different application, which suggests the English turn 'will' in certain iterative or general expressions; e.g.

"The sudden move won, as sudden moves will"

This phrase means, of course, 'as sudden moves have a way of doing,' or 'as sudden moves are likely (or bound) to do.' In like manner, drivers of motor vehicles are exhorted to carefulness by a sign which reads "Children will play" which asserts not so much the will to play as it does the certainty of the action. Cf.

Martial, v. 42. 1 ff.:

Callidus effracta nummos fur auferet arca.

Extra fortunam est, si quid donatur amicis.

Here the poet is begging politely, as usual. He says that thieves are bound to break into the treasure chest; therefore the way to save money is to give it away! See also Juvenal, 9. 103 (*loquentur*).

alternative theory is considered in the lines quoted. In ordinary parlance, the point would naturally be driven home by using a contrary to fact sentence (*si mollia essent, non posset ratio reddi*).

The turn adopted is more urbane, but none the less effective; for the form *si sit* stands not only for 'if it should be' but also for 'if it should prove to be.' The writer then means to say: 'Should our finding be that primordia are soft, an *impasse* results; i.e., there will be no way to account for stone and iron.' This disposes of the matter quite as decisively as a contrary to fact conditional sentence would do.⁶¹

b. Assurance

The most typical examples under this head are perhaps those in which the second person is subject of the verb; but the use is not confined to that one category; e.g.:

Ovid, *Am.* iii. 9. 59 ff.:

Si tamen e nobis aliquid nisi nomen et umbra
Restat, in Elysia valle Tibullus *erit*.

Horace, *Car.* i. 17. 21 ff.:

Hic innocentis pocula Lesbii
Duces sub umbra, nec Semeleius
Cum Marte confundet Thyoneus
Proelia, nec metues protervum
*Suspecta Cyrum.*⁶²

So in the form *si sit . . . erit*:

Plautus, *Poen.* 1085:

Quin mea quoque ista habebit, si quid me fiat.

Calpurnius Siculus, 2. 71:

*Si venias, Crotale, totus tibi serviet hornus.*⁶³

⁶¹ Cf. ii. 481 ff. Another sentence of different type (concessive shading) has *si faciant* in the sense 'should they assume' (i. 655). This fits aptly with the interpretation of *si . . . sint* suggested for the example cited above in the text.

⁶² Cf. Martial, iv. 19. 11 (*ridebis*), iv. 86. 7 ff. (*nec metues nec dabis*). Behind assurance that a thing will be, or not be, may lie the implication that the speaker so wills it. In so far as this is true, there is affinity for the use described on p. 201; cf. Catullus, 40. 7 (*eris*).

⁶³ So perhaps Plautus, *Asin.* 699, but with a peculiar shading of the future; furthermore, the *si*-clause is added with something of the effect of an afterthought. Cf., too, Ovid, *Trist.* iv. 4. 37 ff.

7. LOSS OF TONE(?) ON THE PART OF THE FUTURE INDICATIVE

In the writing of the Ciceronian period, clarity and precision in the use of moods and tenses are developed to a point that is little short of remarkable, especially when comparison is made with other periods of Latin and with the standards maintained in a language like English.

The important epoch of Latin literature that centers about the end of the first century A. D. shows marked divergence through its tendency to bluntness of expression at the expense of nice distinctions.

Here is a topic that calls for extended discussion. In passing, it is noted merely that this tendency to bluntness of expression is perhaps to some extent associated with the urge to brevity; e.g.:

Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 21. 1: Othonem . . . multa simul extimulabant, luxuria etiam principi onerosa, inopia vix privato toleranda, . . .

This passage has to do with the considerations that determined Otho to attempt to supplant Galba. At that time he was *privatus*; hence Tacitus means to say of Otho's difficulties: 'extravagance (that *would be*) insupportable even for an emperor, lack of means (that *was*) scarce endurable for (him) a subject.'

By riding roughshod over this distinction, both brevity and a nice verbal balance are attained; but there is loss of precision, and a general effect of flattening.

This tendency finds striking and frequent expression in the use of the future indicative; e.g.:

Juvenal, 3. 235 ff.:

Magnis opibus dormitur in urbe.
Inde caput morbi. Rhedarum transitus arto
Vicorum inflexu et stantis convicia mandrae
Eripiunt somnum Druso vitulisque marinis.

The peculiarity of the use of the indicative here is attested by the fact that the future refers to a matter which, in the nature of things, can never be put to a test; Drusus is dead, and the seals in the ocean are far beyond the reach of noises in the heart of Rome.

Manifestly Juvenal intends to say that the noise is sufficient to disturb the rest of the soundest sleeper, i.e., it *would rouse* even a Drusus and the sea-calves; but to state that it *will rouse* Drusus and the sea-calves is an entirely different matter.⁶⁴

So again:

Martial, ii. 43. 7 ff.:

Misit Agenoreas Cadmi tibi terra lacernas.

Non *vendes* nummis coccina nostra tribus.⁶⁵

Propertius, ii. 24. 32 ff.:

Discidium vobis proximus annus erit.

At me non aetas *mutabit* tota Sibyllae,

Non labor Alcidae, non niger ille dies.

Down to the final clause, this last case is like those just preceding; for the poet's constancy certainly will never be put to the test of the Sibyl's span of life or the labors of Hercules. Thus far, therefore, the use of the future (*non*) *mutabit* is inexact from the point of view of Ciceronian usage.

But the final clause (*non niger ille dies*) deals with a certainty, i.e., death; hence here the future indicative (recalled by *non*) is quite normal. This development at the end of the sentence seems to accentuate, if anything, the irregularity of the use of (*non*) *mutabit* with the nearer subjects.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Cf. Juvenal, 13. 184, 14. 134; Martial, v. 61. 10.

⁶⁵ Whether or not the subject of *vendes* in this line is indefinite, the example reminds one of the fact that the Ciceronian potentials of the type of *putes*, *possis*, *videas*, etc., are being rapidly retired at this period in favor of future indicative forms; e.g., Martial, i. 109. 6 (*putabis*), iv. 64. 26 (*putabis*, foll. by *credas*), x. 83. 7 (*putabis*), vii. 46. 5 (*poteris*); Juvenal, 3. 177 (*videbis*), 5. 25 (*videbis*), 6. 503 (*videbis*, foll. by *credas*), 15. 129 (*invenies*), 6. 547 (*voles*).

⁶⁶ Without hazarding at this time an opinion as to the genesis of the peculiar use of the future indicative here under discussion, attention is called again to the fact that, at this period of the language, there is a marked tendency to substitute *licet sit* for *si sit*. The former phrase, of course, can everywhere be coupled with the future indicative with perfect normality; e.g.,

Propertius, ii. 20. 9 ff.:

Me *licet* aeratis astringant bracchia nodis,

Sint mea vel Danaes *condita* membra domo,

In te ego aeratas *rumpam*, mea vita, catenas

Ferratam Danaes *transiliamque* domum.

It is no rarity for a hypotactic structure of this general type to be shortened by suppression of the protasis, and the incorporation of its most essential element in the main clause. Treated thus, the present passage could be reduced to some such simple form as: "The bars of Danae's prison *will* not keep me from you," producing exactly the effect of the future use now under examination.

When it thus became good form to write the future indicative ('will be') for the orthodox subjunctive ('would be') in main clauses, a less degree of inappropriateness must have been felt in attaching such a future to *si sit*.

It chanced that Juvenal and Tacitus make small use of the form *si sit erit*; but with Martial it is a favorite turn,⁶⁷ and his writings exhibit some very good examples in which the above special use of the future is illustrated, e.g.:

Martial, xi. 5. 13 ff.:

. . . . ab umbris

*Si Cato reddatur, Caesarianus erit.*⁶⁸

Martial, ix. 3. 1 ff.:

Quantum iam superis, Caesar, caeloque dedisti,

Si repetas, et si creditor esse velis,

Conturbabit Atlans, et non erit uncia tota

*Decidat tecum qua pater ipse deum.*⁶⁹

Down through the Ciceronian period, these shortened constructions were felt to involve *si sit* (rather than *licet sit*), and the verb of the phrase naturally was in the subjunctive mood; e.g.

Plautus, *Aul.* 555 ff.:

Quos *si* Argus *servet*, qui oculus totus fuit,

Is numquam servet.

Terence, *Heaut.* 452 ff.:

Satrapa *si siet*

Amator, numquam sufferre eius sumptus *queat*.

Shortened down as above, these sentences would run: "Even Argus would not be a sufficient spy upon them," and "A satrap in love would not be able to meet her charges." For examples of such shortening, see L. C. S., p. 18. If these latter are set side by side with Juvenal, 3. 235 ff. above cited in the text, it will appear how strikingly Latin feeling had changed in a hundred years or so as to the applicability of the future indicative.

⁶⁷ There are about twenty examples; Cicero, in a bulk of writing vastly larger, has about thirty-five. In Ovid, too, the proportion of sentences of this form is unusual, many of them being of the iterative type.

⁶⁸ This is one of several cases in a long passage beginning with line 5 of the epigram.

⁶⁹ Cf. also *Lib. Spec.* 27. 9 ff., *Epig.* ix. 65. 14., x. 101. 1 ff. Before Martial's time there are one or two examples that foreshadow this use:

Propertius, ii. 30. 5 ff.:

Vel *si* te sectae *rapiant* talaribus aerae,

Nil tibi Mercurii *proderit* alta via.

Valerius Maximus, ii. 10. 2: Delapsa caelo sidera hominibus *si se offerant*, venerationis amplius non *recipient*.

Even as early as Plautus, a case of this general character is found (*Epid.* 610 ff.); but the explanation there probably lies in the general lack of precision in the use of the moods prevalent in that formative period (cf. p. 196).

The ordinary type of inconcinnity that may crop out in any author is represented in Martial also:

Martial, vi. 83. 5 ff.:

*Si tua sit summo, Caesar, natura Tonanti,
Utetur toto fulmine rara manus.*⁷⁰

8. POSSIBLE MODALITY WITHIN THE *Si*-CLAUSE

In a study of sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit*, the suggestion insidiously intrudes that there is something peculiar in certain protases of the form *si velim, si nolis*, etc. The tangible evidence is so slight that a section of this paper might not have been devoted to this question, were it not that J. Lebreton indicates very clearly his feeling that the subjunctive of *volo* in protasis requires special treatment.⁷¹

Approaching the subject on general grounds, it may be noted, in the first place, that a potential subjunctive can serve as apodosis to a subjunctive *si*-clause without modification of its proper sense, and without in any way owing its mood to the form of the condition; e.g.:

Juvenal, v. 107:

Ipsi pauca velim, facilem si praebeat aurem.

Again, a potential subjunctive may be incorporated in certain kinds of subordinate constructions and yet retain its regular meaning:

Tacitus, *Agr.* 12. 3: *Nox clara et extrema Britanniae parte brevis, ut finem atque initium lucis exiguo discrimine internoscas.*

Livy, xxii. 7. 4: *Ego, praeterquam quod nihil auctum ex vano velim, . . . Fabium . . . potissimum auctorem habui.*⁷²

It is a question, therefore, whether, as in the *quod*-clause just quoted, a form like *velim* could be incorporated in a condition without impairment of its potential function.

⁷⁰ So perhaps ix. 14. 4, and xiv. 76. 2.

⁷¹ *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, p. 359. His analysis, however, differs from the one here proposed.

⁷² Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 37. 3 (*ut concesserim*).

This query involves the larger problem of the nature of the potential subjunctive generally. Without taking ground on that debatable subject, it is obvious that some cases of *si sit . . . erit* would be less open to the charge of inconcinnity, if it be permissible to fall back upon the method of explanation here suggested as a possibility; e.g.:

Martial, v. 16. 5 ff.:

Nam *si* falciferi defendere templa Tonantis
Sollicitisve *velim* vendere verba reis,
Plurimus Hispanas *mittet* mihi nauta metretas
Et *fiet* vario sordidus aere sinus.

If *velim* is here, in its own right, a potential that has become enmeshed in a conditional clause, the interpretation would be as follows: "Suppose it a fact that I should like to practice law, clients will send me many a Spanish cask." There is very striking similarity in the following passage:

Seneca, *de Brev. Vit.* 10. 1: Quod proposui *si* in partes *velim* et
argumenta diducere, multa mihi *occurrent*, per quae probem brevissimam esse occupatorum vitam.

A diverse, but very interesting, example involves the second person of the verb:

Martial, ii. 53. 3 ff.:

Liber *eris*, cenare foris *si*, Maxime, *nolis*,⁷³
Veientana tuam *si* domat uva sitim,
Si ridere *potes* miseri chrysendeta Cinnae,
Contentus nostra *si* *potes* esse toga.

This is in general a more difficult case; but if the reading is sound, the argument for a potential interpretation of *nolis* is particularly strong in view of the indicatives in the following parallel *si*-clauses.⁷⁴

⁷³ Al. *nolles*, emended to *noles*.

⁷⁴ Possible Ciceronian examples are not so clear; cf. in *Caecil.* 34 (*si velim*).

CONCLUSION

This study brings out very strikingly the fact that the form *si sit . . . erit* does not represent a unity, but rather wide disparity and complexity. The following factors have been considered as relieving wholly or in part the inconcinnity that might be supposed to inhere in this combination:

1. Iterative meaning
2. Substitution and concessive *si*-clause
3. Possible subordination of *si*-clause
4. Parenthetical *si*-clause
5. Modality of the future indicative
6. Future indicative in sense 'will prove to be'
7. Loss of tone(?) on part of future indicative
8. Possible modality within *si*-clause⁷⁵

In the second place, it has been shown more or less incidentally that several different impulses may lie behind a single instance of the use of the form *si sit . . . erit*; e.g., a concessive *si*-clause may be iterative as well, and, in the conclusion, it may be coupled with a future indicative that shows modal force.

Provided that a case obviously falls within the range of known categories, it is not necessary, of course, to place it definitely, the situation being much the same as in a study of the uses of the ablative case, for example. There it may be perfectly clear that the occurrence in question belongs within the established limits of ablative usage; but individual scholars will differ as to the particular pigeonhole in which it should be filed.

⁷⁵ Three well established methods of explaining 'subjunctive protasis with indicative apodosis' have not been used, because they shed no light on the lessening of inconcinnity in the combination *si sit . . . erit*. They are: object *si*-clause, substantive *si*-clause, and anacoluthon (L. C. S., pp. 85 ff.). Furthermore, the time-honored view in regard to 'modal verb in apodosis' rests on so doubtful a foundation that it, too, has not been taken into account here (see L. C. S., pp. 105 ff.).

Finally, it is hoped that this discussion will strengthen confidence in the validity and soundness of the combination *si sit . . . erit*. It is a form of diction that is readily suspected; and the temptation to emend is particularly strong, in view of the fact that it often is a matter of only a single letter that differentiates the questioned indicative from the conventional subjunctive.

Confidence in the correctness of indicative readings, even where it may seem necessary to recognize some degree of inconcinnity, finds additional justification in the fact that, although sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit* constitute a comparatively small division, the individuality of the category is strongly marked by the persistent recurrence of type sentences; e.g.:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 102: *Dies deficiet, si velim paupertatis causam defendere.*

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 42. 5: *Sed de studiis partium et omnis civitatis moribus si singillatim aut pro magnitudine parem disserere, tempus quam res maturius me deseret.*

Vergil, *Aen.* i. 372 ff.:

O dea, *si* prima repetens ab origine *pergam*
Et *vacet* annalis nostrorum audire laborum,
Ante diem clauso *componet* Vesper Olympo.

Apuleius, *Apol.* 54: *Dies me deficiet, si omnia velim persequi, quorum rationem calumniator flagitabit.*

In handling individual sentences of this type, editors have been far too prone to reject evidence for the indicative that anywhere else would be counted conclusive, and to choose the subjunctive on subjective grounds.

When a group of these sentences is brought together, as here, the argument for the indicative becomes overwhelming in all cases where it has good manuscript support. Being the more difficult reading, its rugged persistence in the group is certain evidence of its genuineness. Note, too, the support given by the following slight variant:

Ovid, *Ex Pont.* ii. 7. 33 ff.:

Quae tibi *si* memori *coner* perscribere versu,
Ilias est fati longa *futura* mihi.

Another distinct type-group is formed by cases using the future indicative of verbs like *invenio*, *reperio*, and *cerno*:

Cicero, *de Div.* i. 17:

Et, *si* stellarum motus cursusque vagantis
Nosse *velis*,
Omnia iam *cernes* divina mente notata.⁷⁶

Ovid, *Met.* iii. 141 ff.:

At bene *si quaeras*, fortunae crimen in illo,
Non scelus *invenies*.

Ovid, *Met.* xv. 293 ff.:

Si quaeras Helicen et Burin, Achaidas urbes,
Invenies sub aquis.

Ovid, *Trist.* v. 8. 31:

Si numeres anno soles et nubila toto,
Invenies nitidum saepius isse diem.

Ovid, *ex Pont.* iv. 8. 17 ff.:

Seu genus *excutias*, equites ab origine prima
Usque per innumeros *inveniemur* avos.

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 29: *Si* vero scrutari vetera *coner*, ipsi illi maiorum gentium di qui habentur, hinc a nobis perfecti in caelum *reperientur*.⁷⁷

The presence of type-groups such as these is another evidence of the complexity of the subject here under discussion. They should remind the investigator that, in a study of moods and tenses, it is necessary to take into account, not merely the sweep of the main stream, but also the effect of cross-currents that only the most intimate acquaintance with the language will reveal.

⁷⁶ So with perfect subjunctive in the *si*-clause:

Lucretius, iii. 657 ff.:

Quin etiam tibi *si* lingua vibrante minanti
Serpentis cauda e procero corpore utrumque
Sil libitum in multas partis discidere ferro,
Omnia iam sorsum *cernes* ancisa recenti
Volnere tortari

⁷⁷ A curious blend of the two types is noted in the following:

Quintilian, *Prooem.* 25: Nam *si* quantum de quaque re dici potest *persequamur*, finis operis non *reperietur*.

CONTRARY TO FACT AND VAGUE FUTURE

BY

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CONTRARY TO FACT AND VAGUE FUTURE¹

BY

HERBERT C. NUTTING

Latin conditional sentences are divisible roughly into four classes: simple, vague future,² contrary to fact, and futurum in praeterito. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the not very well charted borderland where contrary to fact and vague future meet.

Elsewhere an attempt has been made to trace the history of the contrary to fact construction in Latin.³ In Ciceronian prose, the form *si sit . . . sit* has been fully retired from that field in favor of the imperfect subjunctive,⁴ and the particular question here to be discussed is whether *si esset . . . esset* ever follows up the retreat of the present subjunctive to the extent of crossing the line into the domain of the vague future.

At the outset, it is essential to make clear that the contrary to fact category involves all the time realms, namely, past, present, and future. The handbooks have much to say about a past and a present contrary to fact, but little or nothing of the third division, which is most obviously illustrated when the active periphrastic form is used;⁵ e.g.:

Cicero, *ad Att.* x. 8. 2: *Consilium illud tunc esset prudens, ut mihi videtur, si nostras rationes ad Hispaniensem casum accomodaturi essemus.*

¹ This article is a supplement to the "Latin Conditional Sentence," which appears as No. 1 in the present volume of this series. In references to the earlier study, the abbreviation L. C. S. is used.

² Otherwise known as 'less vivid future' or 'potential.'

³ L. C. S., 122 ff.

⁴ In poetry, the contrary to fact present subjunctive lingers as an archaism here and there; cf. Catullus, 6. 13 ff.

⁵ The future contrary to fact must not be in any way confused with the futurum in praeterito construction. The former concerns the future of the speaker or writer; the latter is not contrary to fact at all, and it has to do with a past time that normally does not reach even to the narrator's present:

Caesar, *B. C.* i. 73. 2: *Erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent: alterum, si Tarraconem peterent.*

Cicero, *ad Att.* xi. 15. 2: Cuius peccati *si* socios *essem habiturus* ego, quos putavi, tamen *esset* ea consolatio tenuis.⁶

In the following passage the reference to the speaker's future is emphasized by the contrast of *nunc . . . alio tempore*:

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 62: "Rogarem te," inquit, "ut dicerēs pro me tu idem, . . . nisi et te audire *nunc mallet*, et istis tamen *alio tempore responsurus essem*."

In the apodosis, this turn seems less common:

Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 77. 2: . . . cuius filium *adoptaturus essem*, *si imperarem*.

The passive periphrastic is much less decisive; but some conditions using this form illustrate clearly the future contrary to fact:

Tacitus, *Dial.* 1. 2: Respondere . . . vix hercle *auderem*, *si* mihi mea sententia *proferenda . . . esset*.

Cicero, *de Prov. Cons.* 13: Hos vos de provinciis, *si non aliquando deducendi essent*, deripiendos non *putaretis*?

Without the defining help of the periphrastic forms, it is possible to detect the future contrary to fact in a variety of relations. Thus, such apodoses are freely used in explaining or apologizing for failure to undertake some *suggested* activity. For example, a person who is asked to make a short journey may decline politely by saying:

"I would go, if I had a horse."

The proposed journey, of course, is a purely prospective matter; and the apodosis of the sentence, by virtue of its implication of non-compliance, is a future contrary to fact. Similar cases of this sort are numerous in Latin:

Plautus, *Most.* 843 ff.:

Eho, istum, puere, circumduce hasce aedes et conclavia.

Nam egomet *duclarem*, *nisi* mi *esset* apud forum negotium.

Cicero, *ad Att.* ii. 14. 2: Quo me *vertam*? *Statim* mehercule Arretium *irem*, *ni* te in Formiano commodissime expectari *viderem*.

Cicero, *p. Sez. Rosc.* 83: . . . leviter unum quidque *tangam*.
Neque enim id *facerem*, *nisi* necesse *esset*.⁷

⁶ Cf. Cicero, *in Caecil.* 43 [44], *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 85, *ad Fam.* iv. 7. 4.

⁷ As helping to define the time of the apodoses of the two last of these sentences, note the deliberative subjunctive *vertam*, the adverb *statim*, and the future indicative *tangam*.

Aside from such a special category as this, examples are not wanting in which the phrasing of the context is sufficient to indicate that an imperfect subjunctive in apodosis represents a future contrary to fact:

Cicero, *p. Caec.* 75: *Caecina rem non amittet, quam ipsam animo forti, si tempus ita ferret, amitteret.*

Cicero, *p. Caec.* 93: *Si esset additum, de eo quaeri oporteret: additum non est; tamen oportebit?*

Plancus, *apud Cic. ad Fam.* x. 4. 3: *Neque, si facultas optabilis mihi quidem tui praesentis esset, umquam⁸ a tuis consiliis discreparem, nec nunc committam, ut . . .*

In protasis, *dicerem* of the following sentence stands for *dicturus essem*:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 10: *Quia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem.*

Another case, with *diceretur* in the condition, has an interesting complication:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 44: *Nihil dicam . . . nisi id, quod si in alium reum diceretur, incredibile videretur.*

The time of this whole sentence is prospective from the point of view of the speaker, as is shown by *dicam* at the beginning. In the condition, the contrary to fact essence does not lie in the verb idea; for Cicero *is* going to speak. The unreal element is embodied in the phrase *in alium reum*; but these words have no power to indicate formally the class of the condition. By the choice of the imperfect subjunctive the nature of the clause as a whole is specifically indicated.⁹

It is not only the imperfect subjunctive that is pressed into service in connection with the future contrary to fact; even forms normally appropriated for the past contrary to fact are so used on occasion, as in English:

A. When will you see Smith?

B. If he had not sailed yesterday, I *should have seen* him tomorrow.

⁸ Cf. Cicero, *p. Sest.* 83 (*aliquando*), Juvenal, 6. 600 (*mox*).

⁹ Cf. L. C. S., 23 ff.

In this reply, the apodosis obviously is a future contrary to fact, as shown by the implication "I shall not see him tomorrow." Similarly, in Latin, a speaker *prefaces* a speech as follows:

Livy, xxii. 60. 6: *Si tantummodo postulassent legati pro iis, qui in hostium potestate sunt, . . . sine ullius insectatione eorum brevi sententiam peregissem . . . Nunc autem . . . nihil vos eorum, patres conscripti, quae illic acta sunt, ignorare patiar.*¹⁰

Clearly here the time realm of *peregissem* and *patiar* is the same.

The cases thus far cited should serve to establish the category of the future contrary to fact, which until now has been little recognized. The next step is to set this type of sentence in contrast with the vague future; and at this point the following illustration is particularly apposite:

Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 85: *Equidem existimo: Si iam campus Martius dividatur et uni cuique vestrum ubi consistat bini pedes adsignentur, tamen promiscue toto quam proprie parva frui parte maletis.*¹¹ *Qua re etiam si ad vos esset singulos aliquid ex hoc agro perventurum, qui vobis ostenditur, aliis comparatur, tamen honestius eum vos universi quam singuli possideretis.*

The first of the conditions in this passage is a mere vague future supposition, put forward by a speaker who is casting about for a hypothetical illustration. Something very different is involved in the words *etiam si ad vos esset singulos aliquid ex hoc agro perventurum*, which drive home the implication that advantage will *not* accrue to the voters from the proposed legislation, and thus warn them against it. This implication stamps the condition as future contrary to fact, and it is reinforced by the following clause, which asserts explicitly that the land in question is designed for others, and not for the hearers (*qui vobis ostenditur, aliis comparatur*).

With this preface, the subject for discussion may again be stated, namely: Does the imperfect subjunctive ever break over the line and displace *si sit . . . sit* as the expression of a vague future? This question can best be approached by considering

¹⁰ So Livy, xxi. 40. 1 (*supersedissem*), Vergil, *Aen.* ii. 642 (*servassent*); cf. also Livy, xxii. 39. 1 (*supervacanea esset oratio*).

¹¹ *Al. malitis.*

the constitution of the general category of conditional sentences properly called contrary to fact. Aside from differences of time (past, present, and future), the group falls into two main divisions:

1. ESSENTIAL CONTRARY TO FACT

This division is marked with special clearness in two important subclasses:

a The indirect causal type

Detailed consideration has been given this category elsewhere,¹² and a brief description will here suffice. Take, for example, the retort of a person who is blamed for doing his work badly:

“I should do better work, if I had suitable tools.”

Obviously this sentence is something more than a statement as to what would result in a supposed case. Without any careful analysis, it is clear that the speaker's real object is to shift the blame from himself to his tools.

This effect of the sentence is due to the implications of the two contrary to fact clauses, and the patent relation between the implications. The apodosis admits that the work is poor, and the protasis implies (as the cause) that the tools are unsatisfactory; hence the designation ‘indirect causal’ for the type.

Thus used, the conditional sentence is little more than a periphrasis; for the essential thought to be conveyed is concerned with the converse realities that lie behind the unreal suppositions, and the words fail of their purpose unless they lead the hearer to envisage, and to set in their proper relation to one another, the facts mirrored in the unreal apodosis and protasis. Clearly, to fulfil such a function, the conditional sentence can be nothing other than essentially and distinctly contrary to fact.

Examples of the indirect causal type may involve the present, past, or future. A favorite combination is that of present contrary to fact for the protasis, and future contrary to fact for the apodosis. This has already been illustrated in the case of a person excusing himself from undertaking a proposed journey:

“I would go, if I had a horse.”

¹² L. C. S., 136 ff.

The following Latin example is interesting in that the implication of the conditional form is echoed in an appended causal construction:

Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 19: Libentur, inquam, *confiterer*, si vere *possem* . . . ; sed, *quoniam* id facere non *possum*, *confitebor* id quod ad laudem minus valebit, ad crimen non minus.

Cicero makes much use of this turn to excuse himself from taking up some topic, or from carrying farther something already begun:

Cicero, *Phil.* i. 30: *Dicerem*, Dolabella, qui recte factorum fructus esset, *nisi* te praeter ceteros paulisper esse expertum *viderem*.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiii. 26. 4: *Scriberem*, quam id beneficium bene apud Mescinium positurus esses, *nisi* . . . te scire *confiderem*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* iii. 1: Pluribus verbis tecum *agerem*, *nisi* pro me apud te res ipsa *loqueretur*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* vii. 7. 7: *Συμπολιτεύομαί σοι* iam dudum, et *facerem diutius*, *nisi* me lucerna *desereret*.

So generally in apology or explanation:

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 2: cum huius periculi propulsatione *coniungam* defensionem officii mei. Quo quidem genere non *uterer* orationis, iudices, hoc tempore, *si* mea solum *interesset*.

Cicero, *p. Sulla* 47: Quod *si* *esses* usu atque aetate robustior, *essem* idem, qui soleo, cum sum *laccessitus*; nunc tecum sic *agam* tulisse ut potius iniuriam quam rettulisse gratiam *videar*.¹³

In the following passage the speaker excuses himself not only for one reason but also for another:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* v. 13. 3: Quae *persequerer*, *si* aut melius ea *viderem* quam tu vides, aut commemorare *possem* sine dolore.¹⁴

b. The indirect inferential type

Here again the contrary to fact conditional sentence is virtually a periphrasis. Its real function is to suggest the realities reflected

¹³ Cf. Cicero, *de Invent.* ii. 156, *de Orat.* i. 190, *p. Q. Rosc.* 37, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 121, ii. 4. 55, *p. Cael.* 32, *in Pis.* 71, *ad Fam.* ii. 4. 2, iv. 3. 2, v. 20. 1, vi. 6. 4, xiii. 24. 3, xiii. 66. 1, xiv. 17, xvi. 15. 1, *ad Att.* viii. 1. 4, viii. 15. 3, xi. 10. 2, xii. 9, xv. 15. 4, *ad M. Brut.* i. 9. 1 and 3, *Acad.* ii. 65, *de Leg.* i. 8, *Lael.* 17; *Auct. ad Her.*, ii. 7, iii. 34; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52. 35, *Bell. Jug.* 31. 16, 85. 50; Juvenal, 12. 10 ff.; Martial, ix. 54. 1 ff., xii. 63. 8, xiii. 45. 1, xiv. 153. 2; Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 35. 1.

¹⁴ So Cicero, *Orat.* 55, *ad Fam.* iii. 2. 2.

by the apodosis and protasis, which now stand in the relation of ground and inference; hence the name of the type. Cf. the following dialogue:

- A. I wonder whether there is water in this plain.
 B. If there were, there would be vegetation here.

In this reply, the apodosis calls attention to the manifest lack of vegetation, and the protasis mirrors the fact to be inferred therefrom, namely, that there is no water in the plain.¹⁵ Obviously here again, in order to realize its aim, a sentence must be essentially and distinctly contrary to fact.

Examples are rather common in Latin, though the contrary to fact in this group seldom involves the future of the speaker or writer; e.g.:

Lucan, vii. 349 ff.:

Causa iubet melior superos sperare secundos.
 Ipsi tela *regent* per viscera Caesaris, ipsi
 Romanas sancire *volent* hoc sanguine leges.
Si socero dare regna meo mundumque *parent*,
 Praecipitare meam fatis *potuere* senectam.

There is some variation in this sentence from the common norm; but *dare . . . parent* differs little from *daturi essent*, and Pompey seems very clearly to be *inferring* coming success on the basis of past immunity. More typical are the cases which follow:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 88: Indigetis autem pecuniae; mercaturae enim, *ni ita esset*, operam non *daretis*.

Cicero, *ad Att.* x. 12 A. 3: Massiliensium factum . . . mihi argumento est recte esse in Hispaniis; minus enim *auderent*, *si aliter esset*.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 123: At *si* curatio *daretur* valetudinis, haec quoque, quae dixi, *darentur*; quae *quoniam* non *dantur*, medicina non *datur*.¹⁶

In the second of these examples, the function of the conditional sentence is specifically indicated by the preliminary phrase *mihi argumento est*; and, in the third case, the speaker appends a statement which sets forth explicitly what is already implicit in the conditional construction.

¹⁵ See further, L. C. S., 138 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. also Cicero, *Brut.* 278, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 128, *p. Caec.* 95, *p. Clu.* 119, *p. Mil.* 8 and 10, *Phil.* x. 17, *Acad.* ii. 22, ii. 27, ii. 53, *de Fin.* i. 39, ii. 114, iii. 16, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 97, iv. 79, *de Nat. D.* ii. 19, iii. 30, *de Fato* 9, *Cato M.* 7, 80, and 82, *Lael.* 29; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52. 20.

To these two types just discussed the name "contrary to fact" may be said to apply par excellence; for the essential thought to be conveyed to the hearer is missed, unless he catches the unreal implication of the clauses, and sets the opposed realities in proper relation to one another.

Outside of these two categories, there are many conditional sentences which are essentially contrary to fact, and the defining marks which distinguish them from the vague future are various. Thus, when there is contrast with the past, an included adverb such as *nunc* or *hodie* may proclaim the present contrary to fact; e.g.:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 180: *Si illi nunc idem in eum iudices essent, istum sine dubio condemnarent, de quo*

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 37: *Qui si viverent , rem publicam hodie teneremus.*¹⁷

In the following passage a very immediate present is marked by the second *nunc*:

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 57: *Cogebat enim me M. Marcellus hic noster, qui nunc aedilis curulis est, et profecto, nisi ludos nunc faceret, huic nostro sermoni interesset.*

A second and quite familiar defining mark is the resumptive *nunc* with which a speaker or writer returns to reality after using a contrary to fact construction:

Cicero, *ad Att.* ix. 3. 1: *Nam, si commodius anni tempus esset, vel infero mari liceret uti; nunc nihil potest nisi supero transmitti, quo iter interclusum est.*¹⁸

Again, a defining hint may sometimes be found in the subject matter of a condition; for example, when reference is made to someone known to be dead, the use of the verb *vivere* fits naturally with the contrary to fact idea; e.g.:

Cicero, *Phil.* x. 16: *Si ipse viveret C. Caesar, acrius, credo, acta sua defenderet quam vir fortissimus defendit Hirtius.*¹⁹

¹⁷ Cf. Cicero, *de Fin.* iii. 8 (*iam*).

¹⁸ Cf. Cicero, *ad Q. Frat.* i. 1. 5, i. 1. 41, *ad Att.* ii. 3. 2.

¹⁹ Cf. Cicero, *Brut.* 269, *p. Q. Rosc.* 42, *de Dom.* 84, *ad Fam.* xii. 1. 1, *ad Att.* xiv. 13 B. 4.

The contribution to the definition here as present contrary to fact lies in the circumstance that *vivere* regularly signifies "be alive"; whereas, if it were the vague future that was called for, the idea "come to life" would be more natural, whence phrases like *si reviviscat*,²⁰ *si existat ab inferis*,²¹ etc.

So, too, in cases where the content of the clause does not suit with the idea of change of status:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 70: quodsi litterae non *exstarent*, magno opere eas *requireremus*.

Cicero, *de Fin.* v. 89: Sed cum constiterit inter doctos, quanti res quaeque sit (*si homines essent*, usitate *loquerentur*), dum res maneant, verba fingant arbitrato suo.²²

Cicero, *ad Q. Frat.* ii. 8. 2: *Litigare* tecum, *si fas esset*.²³

Martial, xiii. 103:

Antipolitani, fateor, sum filia thynni.

Essem si scombri, non tibi missa forem.²⁴

On this same principle, unsuitability to the realm of the vague future is felt in clauses marked by generality or universality; e.g.:

Cicero, *p. Arch.* 29: Certe, *si nihil animus praesentiret* in posterum, nec tantis se laboribus *frangeret*, neque

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 73: Nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare *posset*, *nisi* idem nobis *accideret* diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod iis saepe usu venit, qui , ut aspectum omnino amitterent.²⁵

In these and other ways, a large and outstanding group of conditional sentences are defined as essentially contrary to fact. Naturally it is not in this division that we should look for a tendency on the part of the form *si esset* *esset* to invade the realm of the vague future, which is the quest that is undertaken in the present paper.

There are some mechanical complications, however, which serve at times to gloss over deviations in sentences which, in part at least, are essentially contrary to fact. While these peculiarities

²⁰ Cf. Cicero, *Phil.* xiii. 34, *Parod.* 38.

²¹ Livy, xxxix, 37. 3; cf. xxvi. 32. 4. So Martial, xi. 5. 13 ff. (*ab umbris si reddatur*).

²² Cf. Cicero, *ad Att.* ii. 2. 2.

²³ Cf. Cicero, *ad Q. Frat.* ii. 2. 3, *Orat.* 132 (*si deceret*).

²⁴ Cf. Cicero, *ad Fam.* vii. 33. 1 (*nisi amares*), iv. 10 (*si nullum haberes sensum nisi oculorum*).

²⁵ Cf. Cicero, *p. Clu.* 139, *Phil.* xii. 3, *ad Fam.* xv. 16. 1, *de Nat. D.* iii. 87; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 2. 3, *Bell. Iug.* 1. 5.

may have little direct bearing upon the question now at issue, some of them are worth noting in passing.

Most important under this head, because of frequency of occurrence, are cases in which *si esset*, itself essentially contrary to fact, is used as a concessive clause. Cf. the following dialogue in English:

- A. Do not try it; there is a dangerous river to cross.
 B. If there were ten dangerous rivers, I would go.

In this reply, the apodosis takes the contrary to fact form in deference to the protasis. But it is not itself contrary to fact; for the speaker *is* going, whatever the obstacles. Moreover, while the going is prospective, it is anything but a case of 'vague' futurity; as a matter of fact, the levelling influence of the protasis has displaced a future indicative:

"If there were ten dangerous rivers, I *will* go."

Elsewhere detailed consideration has been given to the effect produced mechanically upon the form of apodosis by a concessive *si*-clause which requires the subjunctive mood.²⁶ Note the following:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xi. 21. 4: Tuis enim opibus et consulatu tuo, etiam *si* timidi *essemus*, tamen omnem timorem *abiceremus*.

Cicero, *ad Q. Frat.* ii. 14. 2: *si* . . . parva aliqua res *esset* in qua sciscitarere quid vellem, tamen . . . ego ipse quid vellem *ostenderem*.

Cicero, *in Caecil.* 36: neque est, quod possim dicere, neque, *si esset*, *dicerem*.²⁷

²⁶ L. C. S., 98 ff. For those who have never considered this matter, the levelling process perhaps can be illustrated best by a case in which the concessive particle used is not *si*:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 49: Nec tamen mihi sane quicquam occurrit, cur non Pythagorae sit et Platonis vera sententia. *Ut* enim rationem Plato nullam *adferret* . . . , ipsa auctoritate me *frangeret*.

Here *ut* . . . *adferret* clearly is contrary to fact, and the apodosis is made to conform, though it deals with a fact and not with an unreality. Cf. the following sentence with *si*:

Cicero, *p. Arch.* 17: Quod *si* ipsi haec neque attingere neque sensu nostro gustare *possemus*, tamen ea mirari *deberemus*, etiam cum in aliis videremus.

In this apodosis, the present indicative *debemus* would be logically exact; but there are very few cases in which mechanical levelling has not done its work. At least one Ciceronian exception has good manuscript support:

Cicero, *Lael.* 104: et, *si* illis plane *orbatus essem*, magnum tamen *adfert* mihi aetas ipsa solacium.

²⁷ Cf. Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 3. 169, ii. 5. 148, *p. Flacc.* 90, *ad Fam.* xiii. 4. 1.

Aside from the concessive category, various sporadic and incidental peculiarities appear here and there; e.g.:

Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 3: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in maximis rebus profuisset, *dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset, quod hoc tempore non est necesse.*

This sentence is essentially of the indirect causal type;²⁸ but it is intelligible only as a compendious expression, i.e., "I should make the statement, were it not for the fact that (if I should do so) it would necessitate talking about myself." Full expression would call for something like the following: . . . *dicerem, nisi res sic se haberet, ut, si ita facerem, de me ipso dicendum esset.* The last clauses of this paraphrase owe their form to the law of sequence rather than to the type of conditional thought.²⁹

Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 14. 24: Utinam emori fortunis meis honestus exitus esset, neu iure contemptus *viderer, si defessus malis iniuriae concessissem!*

In this passage, the first part of the wish is essentially contrary to fact, i.e., it is an expression of regret that something is not. The rest of the sentence is prospective, and not contrary to fact; apparently only considerations of symmetry prevented the writer from using the exact *videar, si concesserim*, as the thought seems clearly of the vague future variety. This mechanical uniformity of phrasing is well matched by one of Sallust's locative groups: *Romae Numidiaequae.*³⁰

Tacitus, *Ann.* xii. 37. 4: *Si statim deditus traderer, neque mea fortuna neque tua gloria inclaruisset; et supplicium mei oblivio sequeretur: at si incolumem servaveris, aeternum exemplar clementiae ero.*

These words are spoken by the captive Caratacus. The opening sentence is a normal contrary to fact—if Caratacus had surrendered without a struggle, there would be less glory on either side. In the following clause, *supplicium* stands for a condition,³¹ which is balanced a little later by the alternative *si incolumem*

²⁸ Cf. p. 225.

²⁹ Similar cases are found in Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 7. 7, *Bell. Iug.* 31. 21.

³⁰ *Bell. Iug.* 33. 4.

³¹ Cf. L. C. S., 19 ff.

servaveris. Both conditions lie in an undecided future, and *sequeretur* appears to have been written mechanically under the influence of the form of the conditional structure which it follows.

In general, in sentences essentially contrary to fact, unreality easily trails off into vague futurity in subsidiary *si*-clauses; e.g.:

Cicero, *Phil.* v. 5: Qui utinam omnes ante me sententiam rogarentur! . . . facilius contra *dicerem*, *si* quid *videretur*.

Here the primary condition is suppressed: "Would that the opinions of all these were called for before mine! (if that were so), I should reply more easily," etc. The appended *si*-clause appears to have no contrary to fact suggestion whatever.³²

Cicero, *Orat.* 132: *Uterer* exemplis domesticis, *nisi* ea *legisses*, *uterer* alienis vel Latinis, *si* ulla *reperirem*, vel Graecis, *si* *deceret*.

The first two clauses of this sentence exhibit the indirect causal mode. The phrases which follow illustrate in a very striking way the effect of the verb chosen;³³ thus *si . . . reperirem* introduces a conception that leans toward the realm of the vague future, while the steadfast *si deceret* checks the vagary and confronts the reader with a sharply defined present contrary to fact.

Interesting as all such peculiarities are, it is hardly to be expected, as pointed out above, that this general division of contrary to fact conditional sentences would prove a fruitful field for study of the question whether the form *si esset . . . esset* ever fairly enters the realm of the vague future. There is a somewhat different situation in the division yet to be considered.

³² In this connection it may be worth while to compare the confusing effect of complicated sentence structure in the following passage, where the speaker starts out with an undoubted contrary to fact, but becomes involved in such a chain of clauses that he finds himself using the form *si esset* for what really is fact, and is obliged to correct himself parenthetically:

Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 18: *Quam si explicavisset*, non tam *haesitaret*. *Aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur*, quam . . . , *aut, si magis placeret suo more loqui . . . , hoc non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret*, . . . *aut, si utrumque probaret (ut probat), coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum voluptate.*

³³ Cf. p. 228 f.

2. OPTIONAL CONTRARY TO FACT

Frequent illustration is found in the talk of children who are giving free rein to their imagination; e.g.:

“If I had a million dollars, I would do thus and so.”

It is only because this supposition is brought within the scope of the present that its fanciful character forces classification as contrary to fact. That the class of the condition is purely incidental is shown by the circumstance that, if the child's dream be transferred to the future, he will not choose the future contrary to fact form (“If I were going to have a million dollars”), but will have recourse to the vague future; e.g.:

“If I should find a million dollars, I would do thus and so.”³⁴

For the web of the child's innocent romance, either “If I had” or “If I should find” provides an equally good starting point; and the circumstance that the first is formally contrary to fact has nothing to do with the case.

Another good illustration is provided by Charles Dickens, who sits down to write an essay on “Bill Sticking,” and thus allows his imagination to play:

“If I had an enemy whom I hated—which Heaven forbid!—and if I knew something that sat heavy on his conscience, I think I would introduce that something into a Posting-Bill, and place a large impression in the hands of an active sticker. I can scarcely imagine a more horrible revenge. I should haunt him by this means night and day.”

It is the merest caprice that this passage begins with a contrary to fact clause. Every purpose of the speaker would have been served by a vague future, e.g.: “If I should make an enemy whom I hated.”

In the following Latin passage the choice of the contrary to fact is emphasized by the substitution of *erat* for *esset* in two places, and by the assertion in the last line. But the writer allows

³⁴ This perfectly clear matter can be hopelessly confused, if recourse is had to outworn theories as to ‘possibility of fulfilment,’ and the like.

his fancy to wander over a wide range, and the contrary to fact again is a mere optional variant for the vague future:

Ovid, *ex Pont.* iii. 1. 105 ff.:
Si mea mors redimenda tua, quod abominor, esset,
Admeti coniunx, quam sequeris, erat.
Aemula Penelopes fieres, si fraude pudica
Instantis velles fallere nupta procos.
Si comes extincti Manes sequerere mariti,
Esset dux facti Laudamia tui.
Iphias ante oculos tibi erat ponenda volenti
Corpus in accensos mittere forte rogos.
Morte nihil opus est, nihil Icarotide tela.

It must be obvious that there is a very marked difference between these two main divisions of contrary to fact conditional sentences, namely, the essential and the optional. In certain cases the latter enter into direct competition with the vague future, the speaker's end being served equally well by either turn. Note the parallelism of the following:

Cicero, *in Caecil.* 19: *Sicilia tota si una voce loqueretur, hoc diceret.*

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 19: *Haec si tecum . . . patria loquatur, nonne impetrare debeat?*

More striking still is a case in which both forms appear in the same passage:

Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 212: *Sin autem quaeretur quisnam iuris consultus vere nominaretur, eum dicerem, qui Atque si muscius, si grammaticus, si poeta quaeratur, possim similiter explicare quid eorum quisque profiteatur.*³⁵

If at any point there is danger that the line of demarcation will break down, and that the normal expression for the present contrary to fact (*si esset esset*) will stray across the line and displace *si sit sit* in cases where the thought is of the vague future type, there would seem to be no more favorable situation for such a development than has just been illustrated above, where, so far as the real purpose of the sentence is concerned, it is a mere matter of caprice with the speaker or writer whether he uses an optional present contrary to fact or a vague future.

³⁵ Cf. Cicero, *Parod.* 38.

The boundary between the two constructions is better defined in English than in Latin, because we incline more to the use of distinctive verbs for each of them; e.g., "If I *knew*," but "If I should *learn*"; "If I *had*," but "If I should *acquire*," etc. In Latin this safeguard is largely lacking, *si scirem* merely shifting to *si sciam*, *si haberem* to *si habeam*, etc.³⁶

In the following sentences, which employ the form *si esset* . . . *esset*, note how unessential it is to analyze the thought as present contrary to fact:

Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 72: Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse. *Ferres* me, *si* ego idem *dicerem*?³⁷

Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 77: Quodsi vultum tibi, *si* incessum *fingeres*, quo gravior viderere, non *esses* tui similis.

Cicero, *de Har. Res.* 57: Etenim, *si* unum hominem deterrimum poeta praestanti aliquis ingenio . . . *vellet* inducere, nullum profecto dedecus reperire *posset*, quod in hoc non inesset.³⁸

This last example is interesting as showing an increasing vagueness as the apodosis is reached. This, naturally, is more frequently true of sentences which have a suggestion of concessive shading in the *si*-clause;³⁹ e.g.:

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 166: *Si* tu apud Persas aut in extrema India deprensus, Verres, ad supplicium *ducerere*, quid aliud *clamitares*, nisi to civem esse Romanum?⁴⁰

Under circumstances such as these, it is easily supposable that *si esset* . . . *esset* might at times be used carelessly when the speaker is thinking in terms of the vague future.⁴¹ But it is by no means easy to demonstrate such lapses, if they occur, for the

³⁶ As already noted, the call for distinctive verbs was felt to a slight extent in Latin also, e.g. *si viveret*, but *si reviviscat*. But in this respect the two languages differ greatly.

³⁷ Contrast Martial, xii. 92. 4.; Dic mihi; *si* *fias* tu leo, qualis *eris*?

³⁸ Cf. Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 1. 1.

³⁹ Cf. p. 230.

⁴⁰ Cf. Martial, ix. 91. 1 ff., xii. 31. 9.

⁴¹ Such laxity would find an analogy in the writings of Sir Walter Scott, who is very prone to use the form of the past contrary to fact for thought that clearly belongs to some other category. So he says of a Quaker whose road was blocked by an adversary:

"Without plunging into the slough, or scrambling up the bank, the Quaker could not have passed him." (Redgauntlet, chap. 6.)

As a matter of fact, no attempt was made to force a passage. So again: "I did not think Lord Etherington would have left us so soon." (St. Ronan's Well, chap. 22.)

very reason that the essential aim of the sentence is accomplished whichever interpretation is put upon it.

Moreover, the very slightest miscalculation may lead to an entirely wrong conclusion. For example, it has already been shown that the verb chosen for a *si*-clause is sometimes a factor in determining the class of a condition; and therefore, because of the notion of development that often goes with the verb *feri*, it is easy to leap to the conclusion that *si fieret* presumably implies future outlook. But here it has to be taken into account that some writers use *feri* as a synonym for *esse*, a circumstance that may quite spoil the argument.

It must also be remembered, in a quest of this sort, that conditional usage had become well standardized in the time of Cicero; hence the burden of proof would very decidedly lie with the investigator who would assign vague future function to any sentence of the form *si esset . . . esset*.

With this understanding, attention may now be given to examples that seem likely to repay study, beginning with two which are cited by Kühner⁴² as appearing on the surface to belong to the realm of the vague future:

Horace, *Epist.* i. 7. 90 ff.:

Quem simul aspexit scabrum intonsumque Philippus:
 "Durus," ait, "Voltei, nimis attentusque videris
 Esse mihi." "Pol me miserum, patrone, *vocares*,
Si velles," inquit, "verum mihi ponere nomen."

In this example, there is nothing unreal in the verb action of *vocares*; but the clause as a whole may well be contrary to fact, because of the antithesis marked by *miserum* and *durus . . . attentusque*.⁴³ "Your designation for me would be *miser*, sir, did you choose⁴⁴ to apply the exact word."

Horace, *Epist.* ii. 2. 145 ff.:

Quocirca mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor:
 "Si tibi nulla sitim *finiret* copia lymphae,
Narrares medicis; quod quanto plura parasti,
 Tanto plus cupis, nulline faterier audes?"

⁴² *Ausf. Lat. Gramm.* II², 2, 401.

⁴³ For such location of emphasis in contrary to fact speaking, see p. 223, and cf. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 45. 3 (*formosum* and *imaginem*).

⁴⁴ Cf. the force of *si velles* in Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 62.

Horace here represents himself as in need of a cure for an avaracious spirit. Again a very good case can be made out for a regular contrary to fact interpretation, if it be noted that the emphasis is not upon the verb of the *si*-clause, but rather upon the nouns of the sentence: "If you were suffering from an unquenchable thirst for *water*, you would call in the *doctors*. Why, then, since you are afflicted with an insatiable thirst for *wealth*, do you not have recourse to *philosophy*?" Thus understood, the conditional sentence illustrates a normal combination of present contrary to fact and future contrary to fact. Cf. also the following:

Horace, *Serm.* i. 9. 43 ff.:

"Maecenas quomodo tecum?"

Hinc repetit: "Paucorum hominum et mentis bene sanae:
Nemo dexterius fortuna est usus. *Haberes*
Magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre secundas,
Hunc hominem *velles si* tradere. Disperream *ni*
summosses omnis."

This case differs somewhat from those just discussed. An interloper desires to make his way into the favor of Maecenas by an introduction through Horace, and proposes himself as the latter's henchman. The whole situation lies in the future, and it is entirely to the applicant's interest that the future be regarded as undecided; indeed it would be little short of a confession of defeat in advance to put the case as contrary to fact.

It is quite likely that the order of clauses has something to do with the tense use in this sentence.⁴⁵ Had the condition been placed first, *si velis* would be far more appropriate than *si velles*. As it is, the sentence comes very near to exhibiting an inexact use of *si esset esset* for *si sit sit*.

With the apodosis leading, the feather's weight that throws the balance in favor of the imperfect *Haberes* appears to be the speaker's desire to emphasize Horace's *present* lack of the kind of support which the fellow has to offer (*adiutorem, posset qui*

⁴⁵ This factor till now has been far too little taken into account in the study of the complex sentence; see, however, L. C. S., 13, n. 10, 91, n. 20, 96, n. 27, 160 ff.

ferre secundas). Committed to the unreal form in this way, the rest of the sentence falls into line, though precision is lacking in *si velles*. The vagueness increases at the end of the passage in *summosses*, which is drawn into the stream of influence of the preceding secondary tense forms.

Lucan, x. 445 ff.:

Sic fremit in parvis fera nobilis abdita claustris,
Et frangit rabidos praemorso carcere dentes:
Nec secus in Siculis fureret tua flamma cavernis,
Obstrueret summam si quis tibi, Muleiber, Aetnam.

These words are a comment on the actions of Caesar when he found himself trapped in Alexandria. With regard to the second of the comparisons, which is hypothetical in form, the grotesque notion of someone plugging up Aetna's top surely would seem best placed in the sphere of vague futurity. It is much more difficult to suppose that the thought has to do with the writer's present, which, of course, would force a contrary to fact interpretation. The choice lies between these two alternatives; for the future contrary to fact is not a possibility here, at any rate in the condition. It may be that in this example, too, the order of clauses is in some degree responsible for the form taken by the conditional sentence.

Juvenal, 5. 132 ff.:

Quadringenta tibi si quis deus aut similis dis
Et melior fati donaret homuncio, quantus
Ex nihilo, quantus fieres Virronis amicus!

The satirist is here commenting upon the humiliating position of the needy client at the table of the rich patron; and he means to say that a full pocket-book would make all the difference in the world with the snobbish host Virro. Paraphrased, his thought might have found expression in a form like the following:

Quadringenta si tibi essent, quantus esses Virronis amicus!

With this wording, there never would be any question as to the class of the condition. But, as it stands in the original, the sentence illustrates in a very striking way the effect of the choice of verb.

Thus, with the notion of relieving present need by a gift (*donaret*), an association with the future naturally is set up, but not a contrary to fact future (= *si donaturus esset*); for that would mean cutting off all prospect of such a bounty for every man in the class referred to.

The case is all the more interesting because the poet had open to him an option of the metrical equivalents *donaret* and *donasset*. The latter would mark an appropriate and clear past contrary to fact; for, manifestly, none of the poor clients has received the gift of a knight's fortune. The selection of the imperfect is gratuitous, therefore; and this fact still further supports the impulse to interpret *si . . . donaret* as a vague future.

The apodosis, too, is not unfavorable to such understanding of the condition. For while *feri* sometimes is used as a synonym for *esse*, it does not seem to be so employed here, in view of its connection with *Ex nihilo*, which suggests the evolution idea and entrance into the realm of the future. The casual reader, of course, would not stop to consider whether that future was vague or contrary to fact. Second thought might incline to the latter alternative, simply because the imperfect subjunctive is the conventional mark of that type of conditional thought; but, as a matter of fact, the exact force of the apodosis is very obscure.

This study was undertaken originally because routine reading of post-Ciceronian authors leaves the impression that *si esset . . . esset* in that period is less clearly differentiated from *si sit . . . sit*. More careful examination does not fully support this view.

With Cicero, the contrary to fact construction is a favorite; and the serried ranks of sentences of the form *si esset . . . esset* easily suggest the notion of definiteness and fixedness. In the writers of the following century and a half, the contrary to fact construction seems less frequently called into play, and the proportion of odd cases may well be larger. This would be entirely natural for authors who are either poets themselves or profoundly influenced by that branch of literature.

As a matter of fact, buried in the mass of Ciceronian material, one finds here and there cases of *si esset . . . esset* that are quite

as peculiar and doubtful as any that appear in the post-Augustan period. Thus, when considering the liquidation of a security as a means of making a new investment, Cicero says:

ad Att. xii. 31. 2: *Si enim Faberianum venderem, explicare vel repraesentatione non dubitarem de Silianis, si modo adduceretur ut venderet. Si venalis non haberet, transirem ad Drusum vel tanti quanti Egnatius illum velle tibi dixit.*

In the following passage, the presence of *umquam* and the parenthetical expression give a curious turn to the sentence:

Cicero, *in Pis.* 43: *Neque vero ego, si umquam vobis mala precarer (quod saepe feci, in quo di immortales meas preces audiverunt), morbum aut mortem aut cruciatum precarer.*

A continuation of this investigation into later centuries would hold little promise of valuable results, in view of the fact that the imperfect subjunctive disappeared in vulgar Latinity. On the other hand, the multiplicity and variety of medieval Latin make that field most unsatisfactory for modal study.

NOTE ON THE INDEFINITE SECOND
PERSON SINGULAR

BY
HERBERT C. NUTTING

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NOTE ON THE INDEFINITE SECOND PERSON SINGULAR

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The intimate association of the subjunctive mood with the indefinite second singular is well known; but the nature of the connection has been the subject of much difference of opinion, especially in regard to cases where the phenomenon appears in conditions and other subordinate constructions.¹

The ground needs to be cleared for an adequate discussion of this whole matter; and it is the purpose of this note to contribute to that end by a consideration of some of the general principles involved, with special attention to the content of the phrase 'indefinite second person singular.'

1. THE DEPERSONALIZED USE

In standard independent expressions such as *credas*, *putes*, *intellegas*, etc., the subject is indefinite in the sense that each verb is applicable to a series of persons with no definite limit, and without particular reference to any one individual in the series; in other words, they are generalizing expressions. Contrast the situation in the following passage:

Pliny, *Ep.* i. 12. 8: *Dedisses* huic animo par corpus, fecisset quod optabat.

Pliny here refers to a friend of his who had suffered long from serious illness, and who was clinging to life in order to experience the satisfaction of outliving the tyrant Domitian by even one day. The quoted words imply that it was only the man's infirm health that prevented him from helping to hasten the emperor's end.

¹ See the summary of divergent views presented by W. G. Hale in *Classical Philology*, I, 25 ff.

The subject of *dedisses* is indefinite in the sense that it is vague and ill-defined; but this is no generalizing expression, applicable to a series of individuals. The action, in fact, calls for something beyond the power of man. The subject though vague is one; and we plainly have to do with a particular condition of the past contrary to fact variety.

In such application, the indefinite second person singular is fairly depersonalized. The nature of its indefiniteness can be put to the test by a passive rendering; e.g., "Had such spirit been gifted with corresponding physical strength." The passive implies an agent, of course; but what agent? A similar question may be raised in regard to impersonals like *pluit*; and compare also the vagueness of the background of the purpose idea in the following passage:

Ovid, *Met.* xi. 30 ff.:

Pars torquent silices, *neu desint* tela furori,
 Forte boves presso subigebant vomere terram,
 Nec procul hinc multo fructum sudore parantes
 Dura lacertosi fodiebant arva coloni:
 Agmine qui viso fugiunt operisque relinquunt
 Arma sui, vacuosque iacent dispersa per agros
 Sarculaque rastrique graves longique ligones.

Behind this purpose clause lies something hazy and vague, manifestly apart from human initiative.²

Illuminating in this connection are passages in which an impulse toward greater precision leads a writer specifically to designate supernatural agencies. Cf. the following in Lucan:

i. 251: melius, *Fortuna*, *dedisses*
 i. 114: quod si tibi *fata* *dedissent*
 i. 510: o faciles dare summa *deos*

The use of the verb *dare* is specially appropriate here and in connection with the depersonalized second singular,³ of which the following may provide another example:

Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 75: At *dares* hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret.

² In line 31, *forte* doubtless is the conventional adverb.

³ Cf. also the impersonals *datum est*, *datur*, etc.; e.g., Lucan i. 453, v. 472.

Very clearly the subject of *dares* is not generalizing, i.e., it is not applicable to a series of individuals of indefinite extent. In fact, it does not seem to be a matter of human agency at all; for in *vim* there is a suggestion of a magic gift, as in the case of Gyges' ring.

Recognition of a depersonalized use of the second person singular bears directly upon a question of text:

Lucan, vii. 334 ff.:

Si totidem Magni soceros totidemque petentis
 Urbis regna suae funesto in Marte *locasset*,⁴
 Non tam praecipiti ruerent in proelia cursu.

The poet here is describing the alacrity with which Caesar's soldiers rushed out to the battle at Pharsalus—their enthusiasm was, if anything, greater than that of the commander himself.

If *locasset* is the original reading, there is a strange lack of subject, and the emendation *locasses* of Grotius has generally been accepted. In support of this latter reading, Housman says *ad loc.*, "Secunda verbi persona necui infra sublimitatem heroi carminis esse videatur, conferantur i. 493 *credas*, et viii. 147 *putares*."

For *locasses*, much better support than this can be advanced; for *credas* and *putares* are mere generalizing potentials, applicable to anyone and everyone. A real parallel is to be found in the depersonalized *dedisses* above discussed (Pliny, *Ep.* i. 12. 8); and, with regard to maintaining the elevated tone of epic poetry, surely the distinctive depersonalized second singular, with its suggestion of the superhuman, rates above a commonplace potential.

In his note on the same passage, Haskins makes the following comment: "Oud. ingeniously suggests that *funesto* . . . should be changed into *fortuna*, leaving *locasset*, but does not admit the change into his text."

This emendation is much more difficult than the other; but it is interesting as indicating an intuition that something higher than human agency is required for the verb action. As already shown, this suggestion inheres in *locasses*, by virtue of the depersonalized character of its subject.

⁴ There is also an inferior reading *locassent*.

Somewhat less clear is another passage presenting a text question of a different type:

Tacitus, *Ger.* 23: Adversus sitim non eadem temperantia. Si *indulseris* ebrietati suggerendo quantum concupiscunt, haud minus facile vitiis quam armis vincentur.

Gudeman feels convinced that this conditional sentence could not have been written by Tacitus himself; and, in his critical note on the passage, he advances several reasons for supposing that the words are a marginal comment that has found its way into the text. However, he does not in any way call in question the syntax of *si indulseris*.

It is true that the sentiment expressed in the sentence seems somewhat grotesque. But it is not wholly out of character for Tacitus to introduce reflections of this general type, even though their evidence neither exact information nor profound insight; e.g.,

Agr. 24. 5: Saepe ex eo [Agricola] audivi legione una et modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hiberniam posse.

If Tacitus is responsible for *si indulseris* of *Germania* 23, it clearly is not a case of a generalizing second singular as seen in *credas* and *putes*, with indifferent application to anyone and everyone. It may be an example of the depersonalized use ("Given all they want to drink," etc.), with a vague thought of this bounty coming by way of plentiful harvests.

If, however, the words were not written by Tacitus himself, they are robbed of at least a part of their thought context, and the question of exact interpretation becomes even more difficult. As to the mood of *indulseris*, the future indicative of the apodosis affords no safe basis of inference.⁵

The example next following is clear and satisfactory:

Juvenal, vi. 330 ff.:

Illa iubet sumpto iuvenem properare cucullo;
Si nihil est, servis incurritur; *abstuleris* spem
Servorum, venit et conductus aquarius; hic si
Quaeritur et desunt homines, mora nulla per ipsam
Quo minus. . . .

⁵ See present volume, pp. 187 ff., on the use of the combination *si sit . . . erit*.

Here obviously *abstuleris* refers to a contingency that rests with fate or chance, and which is not brought about by purposeful human participation. It is a case, therefore, of depersonalized subject.

This example has an interesting feature not shared by others above cited, namely, that it is a link in a passage essentially iterative in character; and there is clear intimation⁶ that the case supposed in *abstuleris* is of customary occurrence.

However, it must be carefully noted that whatever iterative force is felt in this condition results from the fact that the *same* subject (albeit misty and ill-defined) functions again and again. In this respect *abstuleris* stands upon an equal footing with the other conditions in the context (*si nihil est*, and *hic si quaeritur*), and the iterative effect is in no sense due to generalizing such as is found in *credas* and *putes*, etc., which are applicable to a long series of individuals.

The cases thus far cited are sufficient to establish the category of the depersonalized use of the indefinite second person singular. It is likely that the total number of examples is not very large; and there is no way of bringing them all together easily and quickly. Two uncertain cases will be considered below.⁷

So far as may be judged from the material in hand, the depersonalized second singular shows the same affinity for the subjunctive that is so characteristic of the indefinite personal use. Otherwise conditions with depersonalized second singular subject behave just as conditions with a definite subject, e.g., they enter on the same footing into the realm of the contrary to fact; hence, in some cases, there may be a double reason for the use of the subjunctive.

2. THE PERSONAL USE

This division of the subject can best be approached by a consideration of three types of the complex temporal sentence. Not

⁶ On the limitation implied in the use of this term, see below, p. 247, note 9.

⁷ P. 249.

to complicate matters by the use of new terminology, captions employed by Paul⁸ can be made to serve the present purpose:

1. Concrete

Caesar, *B. C.* iii. 88. 1: Caesar, cum Pompei castris appropinquasset, ad hunc modum aciem eius instructam animadvertit.

2. Abstract

Terence, *And.* 309:
Facile omnes, quom valemus, recta consilia aegrotis damus.

3. Abstract-Concrete

Caesar, *B. C.* ii. 41. 6: Cum cohortes ex acie procucurrissent, Numidae integri celeritate impetum nostrorum effugiebant, rursusque ad ordines suos se recipientes circumibant et ab acie excludebant.

The first of the above sentences is called 'concrete' because it refers to a definite subject and a single act. The second is 'abstract' in the sense that it is a generalizing expression, applicable to any subject and any time. An 'abstract-concrete' sentence has a definite subject which acts repeatedly (i.e., as contrasted with no. 2, it is iterative rather than generalizing).

It would be a difficult matter to assign each and every complex temporal sentence definitely to one of these three heads; but the categories themselves manifestly are fundamental. The same situation prevails as to conditional sentences; e.g.,

1. Concrete

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiv. 15: si vales, bene est

2. Abstract

Cicero, *de Fato* 15: Si cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrim.

3. Abstract-Concrete

Caesar, *B. C.* i. 79. 2: Si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat . . . ; cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, . . . tum magno erat in periculo res.

⁸ *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*, §174. See certain applications made by J. T. Allen, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxxiii, 120 ff.

This last passage is particularly satisfactory, as showing a *si*-clause and a *cum*-clause side by side in strictly parallel function. Both are iterative, at least by implication.⁹

Reference back to the first division of this note will show that the affiliations of the depersonalized second singular in conditions are with the first and third of the types just illustrated. Even more clearly the personal indefinite second singular finds its place in the second category: e.g.,

Plautus, *Capl.* 202: In re mala animo si bono *utare*, adiuvat.

Here is a use of the indefinite second singular of quite the same sort as seen in *credas*, *putes*, etc. Its pure generalizing (*vs.* iterative) character finds exact counterpart in aphorisms of the following sort:

"Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall."¹⁰

In any extended study of this topic, a serious difficulty is encountered in the fact that it is often hard, and sometimes impossible, to determine whether a personal second singular refers to one individual only, or whether it is indefinite in application. Thus, *si dicas* might stand either for a future particular conditional idea, or it might be a generalizing expression. With all the help that the context can supply, the status of many a personal second singular must remain doubtful.

However, if Blase's statements as to early Latin usage are correct,¹¹ it appears that the inroad of the subjunctive into generalizing and iterative *si*-clauses is an independent Latin development, and that generalizing second singular expressions were the first to be affected.

Hence, for an adequate study of the history and development of this modal encroachment, it would seem to be highly desirable to define in advance, as closely as possible, the nature and scope

⁹ To be explicitly iterative, a subordinate clause needs to be introduced by such a word as *quotiens* ('as often as,' 'whenever'). The conjunctions *si* and *cum* require the background of context to be apprehended as iterative.

¹⁰ Cf. Hale, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

¹¹ *Studien und Kritiken*, II, 47 ff. (Mainz, 1905).

of the indefinite second singular in its personal use. As a contribution under this head, attention is called to the two following particulars:

(1) To maintain status as generalizing expressions, phrases with the personal indefinite second singular subject do not need to be of unlimited applicability. Within comparatively small groups the indefinite second singular may generalize, without specific reference to any individual in the group.

This is illustrated in interesting fashion in cases where the indefinite first singular¹² is set off against the indefinite second singular as representing contrasted classes of people; e.g.,

Juvenal, iii. 288 ff.:

Miserae cognosce proemia rixae,
Si rixa est, ubi *tu* pulsas, *ego* vapulo tantum.
Stat contra starique iubet; parere necesse est;
Nam qui *agas*, cum *te* furiosus cogat et idem
Fortior?

In this third satire, Juvenal represents a friend of his as leaving Rome in disgust at living conditions there. He stops on the way to tell Juvenal of the troubles of worthy and inoffensive citizens; and at this point he is complaining of the dangers of assault and battery which beset the peaceful pedestrian at night.

None of the second person forms in this passage refer to Juvenal, the listener. In line 289, *tu* represents the class of bullies, and *ego* stands for the outraged citizens. Somewhat the same effect would have been secured by the use of *alter* *alter*: "If you can call that a fight, in which one party delivers the blows, and the other gets the drubbing."

The phrasing *tu* *ego*, however, is more lively and dramatic. Within the limits set by the respective groups, both pronouns generalize in the same fashion as propositions that hold good for the whole human race.

The above passage is particularly interesting because of the shift seen in line 291, where the class of assaulted citizens is

¹² On this use, see *American Journal of Philology*, XLV, 377 ff.

now represented by the indefinite *second* singular, and the bully is referred to in the third person. The shift is justified because a speaker may anywhere merge himself in the indefiniteness of the second singular ('one' or 'anyone').

(2) The merging of the speaker's personality in the generalizing second singular may be made a touchstone to establish that use; e.g.,

Plautus, *Tri.* 679:

Facilest inventu; datur ignis, tam etsi ab inimico *petas*.

With these words the speaker attempts to turn off lightly the warning that he may put out the (metaphorical) fire needed to bring luster to the family name. So far as form is concerned, this sentence might easily consist of a particular condition coupled with an apodosis of general import;¹³ but that the second singular is here generalizing is made certain by the fact that it does not apply with special fitness to the hearer, while it does most decidedly include the speaker, who is defending and justifying himself.

By pursuing farther this kind of analysis, it would seem possible to arrive at a number of distinctions that might be of help in a historical study of the modal use, first in generalizing, and then in iterative clauses.

To conclude this note, two cases are presented in which it is difficult to determine whether the indefinite second singular is depersonalized or not:

Horace, *Serm.* i. 3. 15 ff.:

Decies centena *dedisses*

Huic parco, paucis contento, quinque diebus

Nil erat in oculis.

Juvenal, x. 140 ff.:

Tanto maior famae sitis est quam

Virtutis. Quis enim virtutem amplectitur ipsam,

Praemia si *tollas?*

As regards the first of these passages, the gift of a million sesterces is well within the power of human agents; but the apodosis does not seem to be a generalizing expression. Accordingly the

¹³ See present volume, pp. 93 ff.

protasis is naturally interpreted as referring to one concrete act represented as contrary to fact. If this is a correct analysis, the balance inclines to the depersonalized use, closely paralleling the first example considered in this paper.

There is somewhat greater uncertainty in regard to the passage from Juvenal. Many acts of virtue may be rewarded by men, of course. But in view of the reflective and philosophical character of this remark, the idea easily enters of recompense of virtue as emanating from a higher source. In the degree that this aspect of the situation is stressed, the subject of *tollas* is depersonalized.

The problem is complicated by the fact that the interrogative apodosis of the *si*-clause insidiously suggests the force of a repudiating question with the subjunctive, i.e., "For who *would* lay hold on virtue for her own sake?"¹⁴ This suggestion strengthens, if anything, the case for a depersonalized subject in the condition.

¹⁴ See the reference to Mayor's interpretation in Maclean's note *ad loc.*; and cf. the discussion of various indicative uses below, p. 254 ff. A rather close parallel is found in Martial, v. 20. 14; *Quisquam vivere cum sciat, moratur?*

SOME TENDENCIES IN POST-AUGUSTAN
LATIN

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HERBERT C. NUTTING

In the language of the cultivated people of Cicero's day, Latin attained to a remarkable degree of precision that has provided the schoolmasters of successive generations with the foundation for a well rounded series of soul-satisfying 'rules.'¹

During the century and a half following Cicero, such a profound change took place in salient features of style as to overshadow to some extent various syntactical developments that are well worth more notice and study than seems yet to have been given them.

Even in matters of small detail, an observant reader is kept aware that he has passed into a radically different atmosphere. Such are the use of *nec* for *ne . . . quidem*, the strikingly frequent substitution of *licet* for *si* or *etiam si*, and the modal development with words of the *donec* class and with *quamquam* and *quamvis*.

Certain turns attract attention chiefly through a frequency of use that tends to put them in the class of mannerisms. Thus the imperative is often used in a caustic and ironical sense, as when Hannibal is apostrophized in the satire on the vanity of human ambitions:

Juvenal, 10. 166 ff.:

*I demens et saevas curre per Alpes,
Ut pueris placeas et declamatio fias.*

Here is a case of the utmost perversity. The speaker impatiently washes his hands of the whole matter. Cf. the following:

¹ These rules, of course, are sometimes based on very limited observation; and they often ignore the variations inevitable in any living speech, however polished and standardized.

Martial, i. 42. 5 ff.:

Dixit et ardentis avido bibit ore favillas.
I nunc et ferrum, turba molesta, *nega*.

Porcia succeeded in committing suicide by unusual means; and the guards are derisively taunted with the futility of their precaution in putting weapons out of her reach.² So further:

Propertius, iv. 1. 117 ff.:

Victor Oiliade, *rape* nunc et *dilige* vatem,
Quam vetat avelli veste Minerva sua.

Lucan, x. 353 ff.:

"Tu mollibus," inquit,
"Nunc *incumbe* toris et pinguis *exige* somnos."³

Another common turn appears in the interrogative use of the second person singular of *volo*, sometimes to suggest or anticipate a desire, sometimes to prefer a request:

Martial, i. 117. 2 ff.:

"*Vis* mittam puerum," subinde dicis,
"Cui tradas epigrammaton libellum,
Lectum quem tibi protinus remittam?"⁴

Martial, ii. 10. 3 ff.:

Vis dare maius adhuc et inenarrabile munus?
Hoc tibi habe totum, Postume, dimidium.⁵

Martial, x. 83. 9 ff.:

Vis tu simplicius senem fateri,
Ut tandem videaris unus esse?
Calvo turpius est nihil comato.

² The numerous passages in which the phrase *i nunc* appears are listed by E. B. Lease in the *American Journal of Philology*, XIX, 59 ff.

³ A speaker in a similar state of impatience or scorn sometimes vents his feelings in a sentence of quite different form. Thus Hercules is made to say in view of his sufferings:

Ovid, *Met.* ix. 202 ff.:

Ignis edax imis perque omnes pascitur artus.
At valet Eurystheus,—et *sunt qui credere possint*
Esse deos!

On the use here of the dash in punctuation, see the discussion of Cicero, *Cato M.* 28, in the *Classical Journal*, XXI, 43 ff. Cf. the slightly different turn in Ovid, *Am.* iii. 9. 17.

⁴ Cf. ii. 7. 8.

⁵ Cf. ii. 39. 2, iii. 44. 17, iv. 74. 4; Seneca, *Ep.* 48. 7.

In the last of these passages a bald-headed man is urged (*vis tu*) to forego devices to conceal his lack of hair, and to accept frankly the fact that he is old.⁶

Certain developments in connection with the use of comparatives also challenge attention; e.g.,

Juvenal, 3. 203: *Lectus erat Codro Procula minor.*

Juvenal, 15. 139 ff.: *Infans et minor igne rogi.*

In both these passages *minor* with the ablative means virtually "too small for."⁷ Other unusual constructions with the comparative follow:

Suetonius, *Galba* 11: *Nec prius usum togae recipervit quam oppressis, qui novas res moliebantur.*

Suetonius, *Nero*, 39. 3: *Histrionem et philosophum Nero nihil amplius quam urbe Italiaque summovit.*⁸

Among the more general characteristics of the Latin of this period seems to be a loss of precision, especially in the matter of mood and tense usage. It is not easy to classify details as due respectively to archaism, colloquialism, poetic 'license,' or natural language development. But, whatever the explanation, careful scrutiny of the uses of the verb leaves a cumulative impression that finer distinctions are being ridden down roughshod; and it is with certain matters under this head that the present paper is chiefly concerned.

Occasional harshness in modal usage is to be found, of course, in all periods of the language; e.g.,

Plautus, *Tri.* 1062 ff.:

CH. *Sed si non dicto audiens est, quid ago?* ST. *Da magnum malum.*

CH. *Bene mones; ita facere certumst.*

⁶ Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* ix. 17. 2; Seneca, *Ep.* 124. 23; Petronius, 111. 12. Other examples are quoted by Bentley in his note on Horace, *Serm.* ii. 6. 92.

⁷ Cf. A. 14 ff. and 66; Horace, *Carm.* ii. 14. 28, *Epist.* i. 10. 43, i. 17. 40.

⁸ The peculiarity of this last passage may be foreshadowed in the following:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 75: *Nam quid aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, id est a corpore . . . sevocamus animum, quid, inquam, tum agimus, nisi animum ad se ipsum advocamus . . . ?*

Here *nisi* is an adverb rather than a subordinating conjunction ("what, I say, do we then do *except* call the soul away to itself?"), and *quam* might be substituted for it without changing the meaning of the sentence.

In this passage the words of the second speaker and the rejoinder of the first make it clear that *quid ago?* is a call for advice, i.e., it voices a deliberative question. That so ungainly a form of expression should have enjoyed so extended a vogue is distinctly interesting;⁹ and, in view of such precedents, the developments of the post-Augustan period to be described below may appear less radical.

1. THE FUTURE INDICATIVE IN APODOSIS

Martial, *Lib. Spec.* 27 (28). 1 ff.:

Saecula Carpophorum, Caesar, *si prisca tulissent*,
 Non Parthaoniam barbara terra fera,
 Non Marathon taurum, Nemeae frondosa leonem,
 Arcas Maenalium non *timuisset* aprum.
 Hoc armante manus hydrae mors una *fuisse*;
 Huic *percussa foret* tota Chimaera semel.
 Igniferos *possit* sine Colchide iungere tauros;
Possit utramque feram vincere Pasiphaes.
Si sit ut aequorei revocetur fabula monstri,
 Hesionen *solvet* solus et Andromedan.

This ode, which sings the praises of a bestiarius, might seem to represent the spirit of misrule in the matter of syntax. The opening lines employ the normal form *si fuisset . . . fuisset* for the past contrary to fact. Then, though creatures of the past are still referred to, the tense shifts arbitrarily to the present subjunctive (*possit*); and the climax is reached in the future indicative (*solvet*) as the apodosis of *si sit*.¹⁰

Conditional sentences of the form *si sit . . . erit* are by no means uncommon in the earlier stages of the language. But the proportion of such cases increases in the post-Augustan period, and it probably will be felt that an example like the above involves an unusual license in the use of the future indicative.

⁹ Cf. also the awkwardness of the present indicative as used for the future in refusal to comply; e.g., *non eo, non sto*, etc.

¹⁰ For another passage with interesting shifts, cf.

Martial, viii. 46. 3 ff.:

Te secum Diana *velit doceatque* natare,
 Te Cybele totum *mallet habere* Phryga.
 Tu Ganymedeo *poteras succedere* lecto,
 Sed durus domino basia sola *dares*.

Indeed it is a matter of interest that the reading *solvet* has maintained itself so steadfastly, in view of the fact that *solvat* might appear so obvious an emendation. That there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the text here is shown very conclusively by a closely similar passage in which the subjunctive would not be a metrical equivalent at several points:

Martial, xi. 5. 5 ff.:

*Si redeant veteres, ingentia nomina, patres,
Elysium liceat si vacuare nemus;
Te colet invictus pro libertate Camillus;
Aurum Fabricius, te tribuente, volet.
Te duce gaudebit Brutus, tibi Sulla cruentus
Imperium tradet, cum positurus erit;
Et te privato cum Caesare Magnus amabit,
Donabit totas et tibi Crassus opes.
Ipse quoque infernis revocatus Ditis ab umbris
Si Cato reddatur, Caesarianus erit.*

The whole subject of the use of the form *si sit erit* has been discussed fully elsewhere, and other examples to be compared with the above may there be found.¹¹

2. CONCISE CONDITIONAL SENTENCES

By summing up a condition in a noun, prepositional phrase, or the like, a full subjunctive conditional sentence can be compressed into one clause; e.g.,

Martial, v. 69. 1 ff.:

Antoni, Phario nil obiecture Pothino,
Et levius tabula quam Cicerone nocens:
Quid gladium demens Romana stringis in ora?
Hoc admisisset nec *Catilina* nefas.

With these words Antonius is reproached for his part in the taking off of Cicero. In the last line of the passage, *Catilina* sums up the condition of a past contrary to fact sentence; i.e., "not even if *Catiline* had had the opportunity, would he have done such wrong."¹²

¹¹ See present volume, pp. 187 ff., including note 67 on p. 212.

¹² See further, present volume, pp. 16 ff.

Through the attempt to make the indicative do duty in such connections a distinctly harsh effect is produced, comparable to that noted under the preceding heading; e.g.,

Juvenal, 3. 235 ff.:

Magnis opibus dormitur in urbe.

Inde caput morbi. Raedarum transitus arto

Vicorum inflexu et stantis convicia mandrae

Eripient somnum Druso vitulisque marinis.

The general meaning of this passage is, of course, that the noise at night in the streets of Rome is enough to break the rest of the soundest sleeper. But the Drusus referred to seems to have been dead at the time of this writing, and the sea-calves are surely at a safe distance from the disturbance; hence, in the nature of things, the test cannot ever be applied.¹³ Therefore, while it might be permissible to say that the noise *would* rouse Drusus and the sea-calves, the declaration that the noise *will* rouse them is distinctly lacking in precision, and involves a decidedly bold use of the indicative.¹⁴

Returning to the normal subjunctive use in condensed conditional sentences, the tense of the apodosis often is obviously in accord with conventional rules. So Martial, v. 69. 1 ff., above cited, and the following:

Lucan, iv. 151 ff.:

Rapuitque ruens in proelia miles,

Quod *fugiens timuisset* iter.

¹³ Cf. 13. 184, 14. 134; Martial, ii. 43. 7 ff., v. 61. 10, viii. 50 (51). 11; Propertius, ii. 24. 33 ff. There are possible cases of a somewhat similar use of the present tense of the indicative also; cf. Martial i. 19. 4, iii. 25. 4, iii. 44. 6 ff., vi. 77. 10, vii. 95. 14.

¹⁴ The lack of precision here shown has not the excuse of the urge to brevity that might be pleaded in the case of sentences like the following:

Suetonius, *Nero* 40. 2: unde illa vox eius celeberrima: τὸ τέχνηον ἡμᾶς διατρέφει, quo maiore venia meditaretur citharoedicam artem, principi sibi gratam, *privato necessariam*.

Playing the lyre was an art (that was) pleasant to Nero as emperor, and (that *would be*) necessary to him (if he *should ever be*) a private citizen. Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 21. 1 (luxuria etiam principi onerosa, inopia vix privato toleranda).

Here *fugiens* represents the protasis of an otherwise regular past contrary to fact conditional sentence. Cf. also:

Martial, ix. 39. 1 ff.:

Prima Palatino lux est haec orta Tonanti,
Optasset Cybele qua peperisse Iovem.¹⁵

When, however, the imperfect subjunctive is written, exact analysis is sometimes very difficult; and while the examination of a considerable number of cases leaves the general impression that there is lack of precision in the use of that tense at times, it is not so easy to adduce definite proof. For, even in the most orthodox writing, there are situations in which the imperfect subjunctive may be used lawfully in contrary to fact or other references to persons and events of the past.

Thus a name like *Cato* can be used as a generic term ('a Cato'), which makes it applicable to any time; e.g.,

Juvenal, 3. 251 ff.:

Corbulo vix ferret tot vasa ingentia tot res
Impositas capiti, quas recto vertice portat
Servulus infelix et cursu ventilat ignem.

Corbulo is long since dead, and the name here is perhaps typical, 'a Corbulo,' or 'a man as strong as Corbulo.' With this interpretation *ferret* is quite in keeping.

Furthermore, the use of the imperfect subjunctive for the pluperfect may at times be justified on the principle of *repraesentatio*; e.g.,

Lucan, vi. 225 ff.:

Laetus fragor aethera pulsat
Victorum. Maiora viris e sanguine parvo
Gaudia non faceret conspectum in Caesare vulnus.

The historical present in the opening phrase of this passage makes fairly certain the interpretation which is suggested for *faceret*.

¹⁵ Cf. *Lib. Spect.* 12. 5, iv. 44. 8, v. 31. 5, ix. 16. 6, xi. 7. 11 ff., xii. 48. 11; Juvenal, 2. 72 ff., 6. 326, 13. 96 ff.; Lucan, iv. 243. There are cases also in which forms like *poterat* stand in the place of apodosis; e.g., Martial, v. 31. 6.

Still again, the imperfect subjunctive as a *futurum in praeterito* is everywhere normal. The following may be an example:

Juvenal, 6. 388 ff.:

Quid *faceret* plus
Aegrotante viro, medicis quid tristibus erga
Filiolum?

But it may seriously be questioned whether an author like Martial was careful to keep strictly within such conventional bounds. For example, while it was pointed out above that a name from the past like *Corbulo* may be intended to mean 'a *Corbulo*' or 'a man like *Corbulo*,' this type of explanation does not seem to fit readily with a passage like the following:

Martial, vii. 68:

Commendare meas, Instanti Rufe, Camenas,
Parce precor socero; seria forsan amat.
Quod si lascivos admittit et ille libellos,
Haec ego vel *Curio Fabricioque* legam.

Surely this last line should be rendered: "I'll read them even to *Curius* and *Fabricius*." It would be pedantic in the extreme to introduce 'a *Curius* and a *Fabricius*' or 'people like *Curius* and *Fabricius*.' What seems to have happened is that the poet has fallen into a manner of speaking which ignores the fact that people of a past generation are no more.¹⁶

This vivid usage marks an advance upon the conventional *repraesentatio* which is characteristic of narrative style, and a similar tendency appears in an extension of the common practice of referring, in terms of the present, to the content of extant writers of the past;¹⁷ for examples are found in which not merely

¹⁶ It may be that offhand procedure of this sort was encouraged by the frequent use of apostrophe whereby past activity is envisaged as present (e.g., Martial, v. 69. 1-3); and some influence may have been exerted by the practice of ignoring the time element in references to persons and things represented in current drama (e.g., Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 105); in this connection, Martial, vi. 71. 1 ff. and x. 90. 5 ff. are worthy of careful study.

In view of these circumstances, it may even be questioned whether the reader is not too prone to find a generalized expression in a name like *Corbulo* used in such passages as Juvenal, 3. 251 ff., above cited in full.

¹⁷ E.g., Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 71: de iuvenum amore *scribit* Alcaeus.

the content of the writings is in question, but rather the authors themselves or something connected with them; e.g.,

Juvenal, 7. 69 ff.:

Nam si Vergilio puer et tolerabile desset
Hospitium, caderent omnes e crinibus hydri;
Surda nihil gemeret grave bucina.

Martial, x. 35. 15 ff.:

Hac condiscipula vel hac magistra
Esses doctior et pudica, Sappho.

This second passage is a tribute to Sulpicia. The next following is addressed to an unidentified relative of the writer:

Martial, xii. 44. 5 ff.:

Lesbia cum lepido te posset amare Catullo,
Te post Nasonem blanda Corinna sequi.¹⁸

Here is strong confirmation for the observation made above to the effect that the reader is probably too prone to generalize a name from the past like *Cato*, and to interpret it to mean 'a *Cato*'; for, in the passages just cited, surely the reference is not to a Vergil, a Sappho, and a Lesbia.

The application of the name is specific in each case; and the poet is again indulging his propensity to speak of persons of the past in an offhand way as if contemporary. An approximate analogy may perhaps be found in the words of a mother who

¹⁸ Incidentally, it is instructive to contrast this case with another very similar passage, where, however, the introduction of a reference to persons of the past is recognized by the use of the pluperfect subjunctive as a mark of a past contrary to fact:

Martial, vii. 24. 3:

Te fingente nefas Pyladen odisset *Orestes*,
Thesea *Pirithoi* destituisset amor.

The two situations appear to be illustrated side by side in the following passage:

Martial, x. 89. 1 ff.:

Iuno labor, Polyclite, tuus et gloria felix,
Phidiacae cuperent quam meruisse manus,
Ore nitet tanto, quanto *superasset in Ide*
Iudice convictas non dubitante deas.

admonishes a child by referring to his hero; e.g., "George Washington *would* not do that."¹⁹ Cf. also the following:

Martial, i. 41. 14:

Quare desine iam tibi videri
 Quod soli tibi, Caecili, videris,
 Qui *Gabbam* salibus tuis et *ipsum*
Posses vincere *Tettium Caballum*.²⁰

Juvenal, 10. 293 ff.:

Sed *vetat* optari faciem Lucretia qualem
 Ipsa habuit, *cuperet Rutilae* Virginia *gibbum*
 Accipere atque suam Rutilæ dare.

Martial, viii. 50 (51.) 9 ff.:

Stat caper Aeolio Thebani vellere Phruxi
 Cultus; ab hoc *mallet* vecta fuisse soror;
 Hunc nec Cinyphius tonsor violaverit, et tu
 Ipse tua pasci vite, Lyææ, velis.

In the first of these passages, *ipsum* (line 17) looks to a definite personal reference rather than to a generalizing use of the proper names. In the second, *vetat* is significant of the tense force of *cuperet*. The third example is in praise of an embossed ram, and the present subjunctive (*velis*) of the last line there certainly looks

¹⁹ At this point may be noted an essentially different turn whereby, through the introduction of *nunc*, a person no longer living is formally transported to the present: e.g.,

Juvenal, 15. 171 ff.:

Quid *diceret* ergo
 Vel quo non *fugeret*, si *nunc* haec monstra *videret*
 Pythagoras?

Cf. also Martial, viii. 81. 10 ff.

²⁰ Incidentally again, it is possible to offer for contrast a passage in which a reference to the Gabba here mentioned brings into play the pluperfect subjunctive of the past contrary to fact:

Juvenal, 5. 3 ff.:

Si potes illa pati quae nec Sarmentus iniquas
 Caesaris ad mensas nec *vilis Gabba tulisset*,
 Quamvis iurato metuam tibi credere testi.

to the interpretation of *mallet* as on a plane with present contrary to fact potentials such as *vellem*, *nollem*, etc.²¹

Rather frequent use of the imperfect subjunctive in such ways serves in part to explain the feeling that, in the authors here under observation, this tense is employed at times with a somewhat unwonted freedom. A clearer evidence of lack of precision is found in cases in which the condensed conditional sentence is involved in a relative construction.

The matter may be approached through a comparison of the two following sentences:

Martial, viii. 14. 5 ff.:

At mihi cella datur, nec tota clausa fenestra,
In qua nec *Boreas ipse* manere *velit*.

Martial, xi. 34. 1 ff.:

Aedes emit Aper, sed quas nec *noctua vellet*
Esse suas; adeo nigra vetusque casa est.

These two passages are strikingly parallel. As to the first, the building belongs to Martial, not to Boreas; hence a present contrary to fact construction would have been quite in place. But the meter forbids *vellet*; and it might be counted a reasonable explanation of *velit* to say that the matter is thus thrown into the vague future.²²

But the coincidence of tenses (*datur . . . velit*) suggests another possibility, namely that *in quo* may signify 'such that in it'; and the conception of *velit* as the apodosis of a condition embodied in

²¹ Cf. viii. 46. 3 ff. (*velit . . . mallet*), vi. 21. 8 (*vellet*), ix. 11. 6 (*mallet*). In the discussion of passages of this sort, there seems to be some confusion from the failure to note that the *present* potential has two forms, e.g., *velim* and *vellem*, the latter being contrary to fact, and in every way distinct from *past* potentials such as *videres*, *cerneres*, etc. Contrast the pluperfect *voluisset* in the following:

Martial, *Lib. Spect.* 12. 5 ff.:

Pluribus illa mori *voluisset* saucia telis
Omnibus ut natis tristis pateret iter.

²² Cf. iv. 31. 7, x. 36. 5 ff., xi. 60. 3 ff., xii. 6. 8; Juvenal, 5. 24.

Boreas ipse thus tends to merge with the recognition of a 'characteristic' subjunctive amenable to the law of sequence.²³

In the other passage, there is a somewhat different situation. For the condition involved in *noctua* finds a natural apodosis in the present contrary to fact imperfect subjunctive; whereas, to bring in the sequence idea, it is necessary to force a past interpretation upon *vellet*, which, to most readers, will probably seem the less likely alternative.

But that considerations of sequence may have to do in certain cases with the substitution of the imperfect subjunctive for the pluperfect seems clear when two sentences like the following are put side by side:

Lucan, iv. 151 ff.:
 Rapuit ruens in proelia miles,
 Quod fugiens timuisset iter.

Lucan, iv. 312 ff.:
 Moriensque recepit
 Quas nollet victurus aquas.

In the first of these passages the normal pluperfect of the past contrary to fact is found; the other seems to take a very mechanical

²³ These two 'layers' of subjunctive function, and the disturbing influence of sequence, are well illustrated in the *ut*-clause of the following passage:

Martial, vii. 38. 1 ff.:
 Tantus es et talis nostri, Polypheme, Severi,
 Ut te mirari possit et ipse Cyclops.

As the Cyclops is a creature of the past, the sense of this second line would be satisfied exactly by *potuisset*. By neglecting the fact that the Cyclops is no more, *posset* would become the natural choice; but the exigencies of the *ut*-clause call for the use of the less obvious *possit* (which, however, as in the case of *velit* in Martial, viii. 14. 5 above, is still possible of interpretation as an apodosis). Cf. the situation in a *cum*-clause, Martial, iii. 93. 13.

Actual distortion through the influence of sequence can hardly be denied in the following passage, where a contrary to fact reference to a person of the past is caught in primary sequence, which forces the use of the perfect subjunctive in place of the pluperfect:

Martial, xiv. 203:
 Tam tremulum crisat, tam blandum prurit, ut ipsum
 Masturbatorem fecerit Hippolytum.

Had a relative clause rather than an *ut*-construction been in question here, it is likely that the conditional idea would have been given right of way and the pluperfect subjunctive written.

turn in substituting the imperfect for the pluperfect, thus giving the sequence of the relative clause the right of way over the conditional idea. Cf. also:

Juvenal, 8. 261 ff.:

Prodita laxabant portarum claustra tyrannis
 Exulibus iuvenes ipsius consulis, et quos
Magnum aliquid dubia pro libertate *deceret*,
 Quod miraretur cum Coclite Mucius et quae
 Imperii fines Tiberinum virgo natavit.²⁴

If the analyses above attempted are correct, it would appear that in the post-Augustan authors there are peculiar developments illustrated by the concise conditional sentence which tend to confirm the view that this period is characterized by freedom and lack of precision in tense and modal usage.

3. THE INDEFINITE SECOND SINGULAR

Martial, x. 83:

Raros colligis hinc et hinc capillos
 Et latum nitidae, Marine, calvae
 Campum temporibus tegis comatis;
 Sed moti redeunt iubente vento
 Reddunturque sibi caputque nudum
 Cirris grandibus hinc et inde cingunt;
 Inter Spendophorum Telesphorumque
 Cydae stare *putabis* Hermerotem.
 Vis tu simplicius senem fateri,
 Ut tandem videaris unus esse?
 Calvo turpius est nihil comato.

This epigram is addressed to Marinus (line 2). But *putabis* (line 8) most distinctly does not refer to him, but to anyone who

²⁴ Cf. Martial, viii. 78. 1 ff.; Lucan, iv. 814 ff. So perhaps Lucan, i. 639 ff., vi. 140 ff., and Martial, xi. 69. 3. On the whole, however, it probably is true that it is only in exceptional cases that logic is overridden by mechanical sequence. That the condensed conditional sentence tends generally to hold its own in relative clauses is shown by cases 'out of sequence' even where the *qui*-clause might be thought sufficiently 'characterizing'; e.g.,

Martial, iii. 25. 1 ff.:

Si temperari balneum *cupis* fervens,
 Faustine, quod vix *Iulianus* intraret,
 Roga, lavetur, rhetorem Sabineium.

Cf. vi. 71. 3, xiv. 78; so perhaps Lucan, x. 111 ff. (but with text variations).

may chance to see his bald head. The subject of this future indicative is then the indefinite second singular.

In the passages to be cited below, it is not always possible to prove the indefinite use of the second singular; but it is easy to demonstrate at any rate that Martial and Juvenal make large use of the future indicative in situations where Cicero would have chosen the present subjunctive.

For the changes are rung upon the same small range of verbs; and where we look for the Ciceronian *videas*, *putes*, etc., we find *videbis*, *putabis*, etc. Even a casual survey of the following sentences is enough to show that an old fashion is breaking down:

Martial, i. 109. 5 ff.:

Issa est deliciae catella Publi.
Hanc tu, si queritur, loqui *putabis*.

Martial, iv. 64. 25 ff.:

Hoc rus,²⁵ seu potius domus vocanda est,
Commendat dominus. Tuam *putabis*,
Tam non invida tamque liberalis,
Tam comi patet hospitalitate.²⁶

Juvenal, 3. 177 ff.:

Aequales habitus illic²⁷ similesque *videbis*
Orchestra et populum.

Juvenal, 5. 24:

Qualis cena tamen? Vinum quod sucida nolit
Lana pati. De conviva Corybanta *videbis*.

Juvenal, 6. 502 ff.:

. . . . tot adhuc compagibus altum
Aedificat caput.²⁸ Andromachen a fronte *videbis*,
Post minor est, *credas*²⁹ aliam.

²⁵ The villa of a friend.

²⁶ An interesting case of *putas* (Martial, iv. 53. 7) is perhaps definite.

²⁷ The reference is to holidays in country districts.

²⁸ Of a lady dressing her hair.

²⁹ The subjunctive here is a good commentary on *videbis* of the preceding line. Of the conventional group of verbs, *credas*, at least, seems to hold strongly to the conventional mood; in Martial, iv. 64. 26 ff. it is paired with *putabis*.

Juvenal, 15. 129 ff.:

Nec poenam sceleri *invenies*³⁰ nec digna parabis
Supplicia his populis, in quorum mente pares sunt
Et similes ira atque fames.

Tacitus, *Dial.* 8. 4: divitiae et opes, quas facilius *invenies*
qui vituperet quam qui fastidiat.³¹

An example of *poteris* (Martial, vii. 46. 5) seems to have a definite subject; but the following should perhaps be noted in this connection:

Juvenal, 6. 547:

Qualiacumque *voles* Iudaei somnia vendunt.³²

These examples concern but one phase of the question of modal use as it touches the indefinite second singular. But, in this one particular, a marked departure from former canons is obvious.

4. OVERRIDING OF THE COMPARATIVE IDEA

Under a previous heading it was noted that the name of a well-known person may be generalized so as to mean 'a Cato,' or the like; but the lack of an indefinite article in Latin makes it exceedingly difficult at times to determine just how such a name is to be treated—in fact the Romans themselves were not always forced to a clear decision.

However, there are cases where even they must have been definitely conscious of an effect like that produced in English by the use of 'a' or 'an'; for example, when, through the attachment of an inappropriate epithet to the name of a famous man, the notion of variation from type is suggested:

Martial, xii. 6. 7 ff.:

Macte animi, quem rarus habes, morumque tuorum,
Quos Numa, quos *hilaris* possit habere Cato.

³⁰ Preceded by *ut . . . credas* in line 118.

³¹ This case of *invenies*, along with some others, is cited by Hale in *Classical Philology*, I, 41.

³² Cf. also *extorquebis*, Juvenal, 6. 54.

This can hardly mean anything else than 'a cheerful Cato.' Cf. also the situation when the name of a well-known character is pluralized:

Martial, x. 20 (19). 21:

Tunc me vel *rigidi* legant *Catonēs*.

A comparative notion enters whenever a name like *Cato* is interpreted 'a Cato'; for this latter means 'a man like Cato.' Lack of the indefinite article in Latin may well have encouraged an indistinctness and slurring at this point; e.g.,

Juvenal, 3. 53 ff.:

Carus erit *Verri*, qui Verrem tempore quo vult
Accusare potest.

It is true, of course, that this sentence as a whole is a generalizing statement; but (especially in view of the tendency previously described³³ to refer in an offhand way to people of an earlier time as if contemporaries) it is a question how sharply the comparative idea stood out in the mind of the writer of these words. The commentator may conscientiously and heavily explain: "a Verres, or a man like Verres"; but the real effect of the Latin sentence is probably better brought out by omitting the article in the English rendering: "Dear to Verres will be the man who can bring him to book whenever he pleases."³⁴

A very similar problem of interpretation is presented by a somewhat more complicated sentence:

Juvenal, 3. 278 ff.:

Ebrius ac petulans qui nullum forte cecidit,
Dat poenas, *noctem patitur lugentis amicum*
Pelidae.³⁵

This passage has to do with the ruffian who is at large on the streets of Rome at night; without having perpetrated some deed of violence, the wretch cannot settle to peaceful repose. Here

³³ See p. 258.

³⁴ How small a factor disturbs the balance here is shown in an interesting way by the introduction of *nunc* with the future indicative: cf. Juvenal 7. 139 ff.

³⁵ Cf. Martial, ii. 64. 4.

again the commentator will suggest "he suffers a night like the night of Achilles mourning his friend"; but it is by no means certain that the comparative notion was thus clear-cut in the thought of the satirist. It is possible that *noctem*, etc., was felt as a sort of cognate accusative: "he suffers the night of Achilles mourning his friend."³⁶

Whether or not examples like this encouraged slurring even at the expense of logic, certain it is, in the period now under discussion, that an essential and obvious comparative element is sometimes roughly ignored and overridden, though means were easily at hand properly to represent it; e.g.,

Juvenal, 9. 148 ff.:

Nam cum pro me Fortuna vocatur,
Adfixit ceras illa de nave *petitas*,
Quae Siculos cantus ecfugit remige surdo.

Instead of saying that Fortuna stops her ears with wax as efficacious as the wax which Ulysses' sailors used in escaping the Sirens, the speaker avers bluntly that she employs "wax taken from the ship which with deafened oarage escaped the music of the Sicilian shore."³⁷

It will be noted that the participle *petitas* here replaces a relative clause; and the passage therefore may well serve as a

³⁶ The difference between the two interpretations is analogous to the difference between a simile and the metaphor which is sometimes substituted for it; e.g.,

Martial, ix. 88:

Cum me captures, mittebas munera nobis,
Postquam cepisti, das mihi, Rufe, nihil.
Ut captum teneas, capto quoque munera mitte,
De cavea fugiat ne male *pastus aper*.

Here, instead of comparing himself explicitly to a boar, the poet applies the designation directly to himself. Contrast the formal comparison of xii. 53. 3 ff.: *Largiris nihil . . . , ut magnus draco*, etc.

³⁷ Cf. again, in the description of an embossed ram:

Martial, viii. 50 (51). 9 ff.:

Stat caper Aeolio Thebani vellere Phrisci
Cultus.

So perhaps *nostra toga* (ii. 53. 6).

key to the interpretation of certain *qui*-clauses that seem not yet to have been adequately treated; e.g.,

Juvenal, 5. 43 ff.:

Nam Virro, ut multi, gemmas ad pocula transfert
A digitis, quas in vaginae fronte solebat
Ponere zelotypo iuvenis praelatus Iarbae.

On these verses Maclean comments: "The stones, he says, are the identical jewels that Aeneas had on." That indeed is what the poet states; but Virro is a typical host, one of many (*ut multi*, line 43), and it would be absurd to think of Aeneas as having had enough jewels to supply them all.

Exact handling of this situation demands recognition of a comparison. The group of hosts may all have had jewels *such as* Aeneas put upon his scabbard; but to say that they were the identical jewels once owned by Aeneas roughly overrides the logic of the situation.³⁸ Cf. also the following:

Martial, x. 62. 8 ff.:

Cirrata loris horridis Scythae pellis,
Qua vapulavit Marsyas Celaenaeus,
Ferulae tristes, scepra paedagogorum,
Cessent et Idus dormiant in Octobres.

Here again the relative clause states bluntly what is not true, instead of giving place to a comparative expression that is called for by logical considerations.³⁹

³⁸ The fact that *petitas* of the passage previously cited gathers up into itself a relative clause relieves us at this point of the necessity of trying to bring the present example into line by the doubtful expedient of assigning to the relative pronoun, in such an indicative relative clause, the meaning of *qualis*. Note the different effect when the latter word is used:

Martial, xi. 6. 9 ff.:

Misce dimidios, puer, trieses,
Quales Pythagoras dabat Neroni.

³⁹ In relative clauses, there is a suspicion of modal license also at times; e.g.,

Propertius, iii. 13. 9 ff.:

Haec etiam clausas expugnant arma pudicas,
Quaeque *terunt* fastus, Icarioni, tuos.

Martial, xiv. 190:

Pellibus exquis artatur Livius ingens,
Quem mea non totum bibliotheca *capit*.

So perhaps ii. 19. 4. Note the modal variation in the relative clauses of xi. 18; and cf. the use of the indicative mood described on p. 256.

In a quest such as that undertaken in this paper, the limits necessarily are rather vague; but it is hoped that the present discussion will serve to show that the change in atmosphere in post-Augustan Latin, which all so readily feel, results in part from a tendency to disregard former fine distinctions, with consequent flattening effect. It is in the works of a verse-writer like Martial that the tendency of the times would naturally be most pronounced and therefore most easily detected.

THOUGHT RELATION AND SYNTAX

BY

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THOUGHT RELATION AND SYNTAX

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HERBERT C. NUTTING

This paper is in part supplementary to a treatise on the Latin Conditional Sentence,¹ which appeared as the first number in the present volume, and which has been variously reviewed.

As some of the ideas expressed therein are rather original and revolutionary, they have not been fully understood; and such criticism as has been offered is in part a mere reaffirmation of older theories. Professor F. H. Fowler acts as spokesman in the following courteous fashion:

Professor Nutting has, in this work, adopted an independent point of view, and his whole study is thoroughly original. Because of this we should expect to find, as we do find, that the conclusions reached sometimes furnish important contributions to knowledge and are always stimulating to thought. Some of the conclusions, however, can scarcely escape adverse criticism at the hands of those whose syntactical creed differs from that of Professor Nutting. It seems worth while to point out some of the possible adverse criticisms.²

The difference of creed to which reference is here made touches some of the most fundamental issues in syntactical study; and unless firm ground can be reached on these points, the outlook is unfavorable for solid constructive work in this field.

Too often tradition reigns supreme in syntax. A principle is handed on from teacher to pupil, without being critically weighed; and it is a matter of the greatest difficulty to discredit it, even though the simplest test shows that it rests upon the weakest of foundations.

It is in the order of nature, however, that the old give way to the new, if the new is better. And it is in the hope of bettering the old that the present writer urges certain newer points of view. From Professor Fowler's reactions it is clear that these still need further elucidation and emphasis, which it is the aim of this discussion, in part, to supply.

¹ Cited here as L. C. S.

² *Classical Weekly*, XX, 89.

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SYNTACTICAL PROBLEM

Time was when the functions of language were counted a proper subject for abstruse *a priori* theorizing. To this period, in the study of the verb, belong the Logical and the Ontological Schools,³ which held that the moods are the expression of reality, possibility, and necessity, or of the real and the not real.

A little later, Delbrück, who represents the Psychological School, introduced a more practical point of view by assigning to the moods the expression of the attitude of mind of the speaker; thus the subjunctive is called the mood of will, and the optative the mood of wish.⁴

Some of the best work of recent years is colored by the influence of this last mentioned school, as shown by the effort to explain syntactical constructions in the light of the train of thought as it develops in the mind of the speaker or writer whose words are under observation.⁵

As a starting point, it is assumed that there lies in the mind a nebulous cloud-mass of thought, called variously 'Gesamtvorstellung' or 'Germ Concept.' This inchoate mass is supposed to clarify bit by bit, as the searchlight of attention plays upon one part after another, the result of the analysis being registered in speech.

Without careful safeguarding, here is doctrine that the unwary can easily wrest to their own destruction. A case in point is found in an article on the use of *cum*, *postquam*, and some other conjunctions, wherein it is shown that a certain author has a special predilection for the use of *cum*. As to this preference, it is suggested, by way of a contribution to psychological syntax, that the writer in question often began his sen-

³ For the terms here used, see Karl Koppin, *Beitrag zur Entwicklung und Würdigung der Ideen über die Grundbedeutungen der griechischen Modi*, I (Wismar, 1877), II (Stade, 1880).

⁴ Cf. the somewhat bizarre adaptation of this point of view by A. Dittmar, *Studien zur Lateinischen Moduslehre* (Leipzig, 1897).

⁵ See Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, and Morris, *On Principles and Methods in Syntax*.

tences before he knew just what he meant to say; hence he chose *cum* as a conjunction of several possible meanings that would allow him to round out his period in any way desired, after he finally discovered what it was that he was aiming at.⁶

This, of course, is sheer absurdity. The situation supposed is worse than that of the little girl who was observed to be sewing diligently, and, when asked what she was making, replied: "I started to make a hat, but it is turning out a pair of trousers." The child at any rate knew what she meant to do.

The difficulty here is due to the confusion of two very different things:

- (1) The speaker's original train of thought.
- (2) The choice of words and phrases to set in motion a train of thought in the mind of the hearer.

As to the first of these, there can be little doubt that normally the speaker's thought is complete before a 'sentence' is begun. Certainly clearness of thought is not dependent upon association with words. This is what James has in mind when he speaks of "rapid premonitory perspective schemes of thought not yet articulate."⁷

That the process designated as (2) above does not necessarily produce something that directly parallels the speaker's original thought scheme can be demonstrated with the greatest ease. Thus, a person who sees a rapidly approaching machine and a pedestrian about to step in its way, may cry out: "Take care; the machine." This just reverses the order of ideas as they must have developed in the mind of the speaker.

Less spontaneous, but more explicit, are warnings of the following sort:

"Don't enter the forest; *for* bears have been seen there."

Obviously it may be news of a circumstance fraught with possible danger that causes the speaker to utter the prohibition,

⁶ See *Classical Philology*, IV, 256 ff.

⁷ *Principles of Psychology*, I, 254. See fuller citation and further discussion, L. C. S., 35 ff.

and the logical development is: "Bears have been seen in the forest; (therefore) keep away." In voicing the warning, however, he reverses the items, and the relation between them is now no longer illative ('therefore') but causal ('for').

There can be no question that it is with the second of these relations that syntax has to deal. It may be abstractly interesting to speculate as to the original thought schemes that flash through the mind of a speaker; but it is at the point where he begins to choose words and phrases as a means of communication with another person that problems of syntax arise. In this field, the question of first importance is: What train of thought is the speaker trying to set in motion in the mind of the hearer? This brings matters to a concrete basis, with prospect of reaching results of real scientific worth.⁸

THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

In syntax study, that is, in the analysis and classification of the speech devices whereby a speaker or writer endeavors to set in motion a train of thought in the minds of others, 'origins' have been the order of the day since the time of Delbrück; and the comparative method has exercised such influence that it has at times been counted sufficient reason forthwith to discount and discredit any theory or study that does not provide for an appropriate 'origin.'⁹

This point of view doubtless has served to promote interest in comparative philology; but its effects have been very stultifying as regards the study of Latin syntax. Instead of examining the facts without prejudice, in order to find a basis for a theory,

⁸ Occasionally, of course, a question as to the speaker's original thought may necessarily be raised, as in a case of anacoluthon, which might conceivably be due to a variety of causes. It may mean no more than that the speaker made a poor choice of phrasing at the start, and is forced to end lamely; but it is possible that it might represent a readjustment in his original intention as to what he wishes to communicate.

There seem also to be cases of definitely planned anacoluthon, where the speaker purposely holds back a clause, in order to raise a laugh by bringing it in at the end as a surprise; cf. Plautus, *M. G.* 685 ff.

⁹ Cf. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*, I, 271 ff.

the theory too often has been adopted in advance, and the facts have been ruthlessly adjusted to it.

Some of the notions associated with the comparative method may fairly be said to be somewhat on a level with the naïve conceptions of the classical writers, who assumed that the blessings of civilization are the gift of sages of the golden age, and that the fact that all things have names is to be referred to the foresight of some ancient worthy who one day sat down and worked out labels for everything.¹⁰

Thus it seems to call for almost equal credulity to believe that a primitive speech like Indo-European had complete and mechanically exact noun paradigms, with the use of the case-forms so sharply differentiated that each of the oblique cases could be neatly ticketed with a precise and distinct definition, thus providing 'sources' from which all the multiplicity of subsequent usage may be 'derived.' Yet it is upon just this sort of hypothesis that the grammars base their classification of the uses of the Latin cases. This is illustrated best, of course, in the treatment of the ablative.

It is true enough that this case is syncretistic; but it is quite another matter to assume that each of its uses can be traced back to one of three Indo-European cases meaning respectively 'from,' 'with' or 'by,' and 'in.' Harkness manages to find a place for all the uses of the Latin ablative under the three rubrics just mentioned, but prefixes the following ingenuous note:¹¹

This threefold nature of the Latin Ablative gives us a basis for a general classification, at once *scientific*¹² and practical, although in the course of the development of the language so many new applications of these original elements were made that it is sometimes impossible to determine with certainty to which of them a given construction owes its origin.

The absolutely unscientific character of this procedure is established at once by the fact that the grammars do not at all agree as to the placing of certain of the ablative uses in the three-

¹⁰ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 62.

¹¹ *Complete Latin Grammar*, § 459.

¹² Italics mine.

fold scheme. For example, the ablative absolute is thrown about hither and thither, finding a place now in one pigeonhole, now in another.¹³ And the editor of the same text sometimes suffers change of heart between editions.¹⁴

Some writers, too, do not deem it possible to accommodate all uses of the Latin ablative in the threefold scheme; and neither do they agree with one another. Thus the Gildersleeve-Lodge Grammar holds out two items, and, after disposing of the rest, thus continues: "To these we add: D. The Ablative of Cause, E. The Ablative Absolute."¹⁵ The grammar of Hale and Buck has at least six left-overs, which are introduced in a fourth group labeled "Of Composite Origin."¹⁶ It is somewhat difficult to visualize just what this phrase means, but it saves the situation by postulating at least some sort of 'origin.'

While scholars thus amuse themselves with trying to fit together elusive pieces of a puzzle against an imaginary background, attention is called away from the question of first importance, namely: What idea was conveyed to the mind of a Roman hearer by the use of a given occurrence of the ablative form? To answer this question it is necessary, first of all, to get the point of view of the Romans themselves.

To them the ablative was a unity, not a composite; and when through lack of a Greek term to translate, they were obliged to name it themselves, it was termed the case of "taking away," which shows very clearly what they felt its outstanding function to be.

In the formation of the case there are elements which comparative philology identifies as instrumental and locative. But of this the Roman knew nothing. All varieties of ablative forms

¹³ The assignment in the majority of cases is to the instrumental category, though, as a matter of fact, such use of the Latin ablative absolute is one of the most infrequent.

¹⁴ Cf. the testimony of Bennett at this point (Latin Language, § 349, 2): "In his *Ablativus, Instrumentalis, Localis* (1867), p. 39, Delbrück formerly pronounced in favor of recognizing a Locative usage in connection with *glorior, delector*. But now in his *Vergleichende Syntax*, I, p. 253, this scholar regards the construction as Instrumental in origin."

¹⁵ § 384.

¹⁶ § 404.

share equally in the separative function; and, to express the idea of place where, for example, all forms of the case equally require the proposition *in*, though comparative philology may ticket some of them as 'locative.'

Under these circumstances, what sort of 'science' is it that would seek to determine a Roman's reaction to an ablative phrase on the basis of the fact that in Sanskrit, or in some other related language, there happens to be found a remotely similar turn in which a locative form appears?¹⁷

Yet Delbrück has but to wave his wand,¹⁸ and the grammarians hurry to classify as 'locative' the form *animi* in such phrases as *discrucior animi*, *aeger animi*, etc. However, Delbrück himself adds: "Dabei beweist . . . die Nachbildung *desipiebam mentis* bei Plautus aber, dass *animi* früh als Gen. aufgefasst wurde." And the following passage is illuminating:

Plautus, *Tri.* 454 ff.:

Satin tu sanus *mentis* aut *animi* tui,
Qui condicionem hanc repudies?

Nothing could be clearer than that, in connections like this, the Romans of the classical period felt in *animi* a genitive of specification. Why introduce here a speculative 'origin' that leads to a misinterpretation of the Latin?¹⁹

¹⁷ For any validity to attach to such a method, it would be necessary (1) that Indo-European should have had an exact and complete array of case forms with a distinct field of meaning to serve as 'sources,' (2) that the tradition of function should hold its way uncontaminated down the ages, and in different countries, and (3) that the Roman should keep all these strains clear in the melting-pot of the ablative as known to him.

That (1) is an utter improbability, and that (3) is not a fact, has already been shown. As to the probabilities under (2), we may judge from what happens in the present civilized age. When the wife of a New England farmer, in a moment of impatience, exclaims: "Oh dear me suz," she would be hard put to it to analyze the phrase. As to the final monosyllable, the antiquarian may point out that it is a corruption of "Sirs"; but it has no such meaning to the user, and the 'historical' connection is quite broken off. So again when an uneducated person corrupts "What has become of him?" to "What has come *on* him?" In the uncharted centuries before the various Indo-European languages were reduced to writing, no one can tell to what degree tradition (whatever its character may have been) was corrupted by ignorance, carelessness, and false analogies. Lacking definite data with which to work, there can be no ground for science here.

¹⁸ *Vergleichende Syntax*, I, 220.

¹⁹ Note the perversity of the statement in Lane, § 1339.

Take, again, the problem of the use of the ablative case with *fretus*. It is of but trifling importance that there is a possible cognate in Sanskrit; what we need to know is whether there are to be found any passages in which the feeling of a Roman for the use of the ablative in this idiom is revealed. Of this class seems to be the following:

Propertius, iv. 10. 31 ff.:
 Forte super portae dux Veius astitit arcem,
 Colloquiumque *sua fretus ab urbe* dedit.

This passage has troubled commentators, and the conventional interpretation assumes that *fretus* here means 'confidently,' and that the prepositional phrase modifies the verb. This is quite forced and unconvincing. It is hard to see how the second line can mean anything else than "and made an address, backed (i.e., made secure) by his city." It may be recalled that Propertius is inclined to insert interpretative prepositions; so that (*ab*) *urbe fretus*, in defining the instrumental relation, seems to be comparable to the common (*a*) *spe destitutus*, etc.²⁰

Very interesting in this connection is another passage from an earlier author:

Terence, *Eun.* 1062 ff.:
 PH. Quor ergo in his te conspicio regionibus?
 TH. *Vobis fretus*. PH. Scin quam *fretus*? Miles, edico, tibi,
 Si te in platea offendero hac post umquam, . . . periisti.

The soldier's reply (*Vobis fretus*) seems regularly to be interpreted: "Relying on you." But this forces upon *quam* of the following clause the meaning of *quam frustra*; or, as one of the older editors has it, we must supply *esse debeas*. If, however, *fretus* be given the meaning indicated in the passage previously cited, all difficulty disappears: TH. "Backed by you." PH. "Do you realize to what extent (you are) backed? I give you fair warning, soldier, that if I ever after this catch you in this street, you are a dead man." If this interpretation is right, *fretus*

²⁰ See further the *Classical Journal*, XXI, 222 ff.

here is a rather close synonym for *fultus*, and the nature of the case use is obvious.

All along the line, investigators of Latin syntax need to have their thoughts called down from the clouds of fanciful speculation, in order that the facts of Latin usage may be established on the basis of unprejudiced and painstaking investigation. What the Roman speaker wanted to convey to the hearer or reader must be determined primarily on the basis of the Latin itself. With this information in hand, its comparative aspect may properly be considered if so desired.²¹

With the ground thus cleared by a consideration of the two fundamental matters just discussed, it is possible to approach some of the specific questions raised by the review of Professor Fowler above referred to.

PARATACTIC CONDITIONAL SPEAKING

In theory, at any rate, the idea of Indo-European moods with a distinct function apiece has lost ground more rapidly than the similar notion in regard to 'original' case usage.

There is profound significance in the simple observation that, the farther back the classical uses can be traced, the less clear is the demarcation between the functions of the moods. This being the case, it inevitably follows that the confusion must have been still greater in the ruder centuries that preceded.

As for Latin in particular, it is pertinent to recall that it is only the assignment of verbs to specific conjugations that defines

²¹ In the remarks here set down, it is not the purpose of the writer, of course, to belittle the contribution to knowledge made by a scholar like Delbrück, whose comprehensive grasp and tireless devotion to detail are profoundly impressive. The criticism above made is directed against a misuse of the comparative method, whereby uncritical and offhand disposition is made of material that needs careful analysis from the point of view of Latin itself. A brief study of current handbooks will convince any fair-minded reader that this criticism is justified.

It is recognized also, of course, that a large section of the uses of the Latin ablative (supported, in great measure, by prepositions) can conveniently be grouped under the rubrics 'separative,' 'instrumental' or 'sociative,' and 'locative.' Protest is entered against hasty inference from that fact.

certain *e*-forms as 'subjunctive' or 'indicative'; and even in the time of Plautus such assignment was none too clear-cut. It is instructive, moreover, to consider what lack of earlier precision is indicated by the functions of the rhotacised *ero*, as contrasted with those of * $\epsilon\sigma\omega$ ($\epsilon\omega$, δ).²²

On these grounds, in the work to which this paper is supplementary²³ it was suggested that the hypotactic conditional sentence arose out of a parataxis, the first member of which was an assumption couched in any convenient verbal form, and without the clear-cut modal distinction found in the literary period. Such a situation might be represented roughly as follows:

"You stay: enemy come."

As these words stand on the page unsupported by context of any sort, they might be interpreted in different ways. For example, they could conceivably be understood as an exhortation, followed by the reason for the same. But illuminated by a general context, and more especially by the tone of the speaker's voice, the words "You stay" may express a mere assumption, which functions as a condition ("If you stay") to the clause that follows. So understood, the sentence warns the person addressed that his presence endangers the safety of others.

This matter can be tested by pronouncing the phrases with a view to bringing out the two meanings suggested. It will be found that "You stay" as an exhortation is enunciated in a fashion entirely different from that of the same words uttered as an assumption.

Sharply defined modal distinctions would be by no means essential to assumptions functioning as conditions in the manner here described; yet the latter would provide a background both natural and adequate for the differentiated modal protases of a later age.

²² That the line also between mood and tense was vague in places is altogether likely; cf. H. Blase, in Landgraf's *Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache*, III, 1, p. 100 ff.

²³ L. C. S., 2 ff.

Professor Fowler is willing to make a little concession at this point; but it is interesting to note how his comment otherwise is colored by the old notion of essential and inherent modal meanings:

Professor Nutting, however, is quite right in rejecting a volitive or optative origin of the subjunctive conditional clause. He is quite right in insisting that such collations as *impetum faciat: digne accipietur* have no bearing on the question of origin.

But volitive and optative do not exhaust the possibilities for the modal meanings of a subjunctive. . . . The subjunctive in conditional clauses as we have them surely expresses something, and that something is not the idea of condition. . . . Sound method raises the question whether this meaning is not one expressed by subjunctives outside of conditional clauses. Finding an affirmative answer to this question, we should have a clear indication of the meaning of the subjunctive in the paratactic *si*-clause.²⁴

If we may interpret this last paragraph, it seems to hold that, at the time of paratactic conditional speaking, the moods had specific inherent values, presumably derived from Indo-European 'origins.' And while it is admitted that volitive and optative expressions in parataxis are not the progenitors of later hypotactic subjunctive conditions, it is intimated that some other inherent modal value, coördinate with those mentioned, must be found as a basis for the development of subjunctive conditions of the literary period. As to the validity of this method of approach to questions of modal usage, perhaps enough has been said above;²⁵ we pass, therefore, to another consideration.

²⁴ *Loc. cit.*, 89 ff.

²⁵ In regard to the matter of 'origins' generally, it should not be forgotten that the data for the settlement of some of the most interesting problems of Latin syntax must be found, if at all, within the literary period of that language. Such are the invasion of the *cum*-clause by the subjunctive, the development of a subjunctive 'iterative' clause (see L. C. S., 83), and the tense shift in the contrary to fact construction (see L. C. S., 122 ff.). In none of these cases can there be any question of Indo-European syntactical heritage.

With reference to the conditional clause of comparison, it is not fully clear what Professor Fowler has in mind when he says in his review (*loc. cit.*, 90): "The real problem has to do with the origin and development of the construction." The construction certainly antedates Plautus; but the materials for study of its nature abound in the literary period. Professor Hale's attempt to work out a theoretical origin by the comparative method (*American Journal of Philology*, XIII, 62 ff.) seems to have attracted little attention even among those who regard such speculations as 'scientific.'

As already intimated, a very important part is played in written and verbal communication by context and implication. Professor Fowler is right in stressing this point, but wrong in supposing that the present writer does not share his view.

As an illustration, we might cover over a page of Latin text so as to reveal only a single item, e.g.,

habeat

At sight of this verb form, we grasp at once the stem meaning; and the subjunctive termination indicates a certain limitation of its applicability. But beyond that we cannot go: the word may have been designed to voice exhortation, concession, assumption, or some other relation. To the reader it is a sort of empty shell, to be filled as the context is disclosed.

So in regard to the kind of parataxis above suggested as possible in a period when modal distinctions were none too well defined:

“You stay: enemy come.”

The opening phrase is again a mere shell. But, supported by the general context, and, in particular, by the tone and manner of the speaker, the sentence becomes capable of conveying the notion of an assumption and its consequence, in other words, it functions as a conditional sentence.²⁶

VOICE INFLECTION AS A DEFINING ELEMENT

It is a distinct loss in dealing with a language like Latin that we must forego that phase of the “context” which lies in the speaker’s tone and manner. Yet, even in the interpretation of the individual written word, there is something here that must be taken into account.

²⁶ In speaking of “condensed conditions” (L. C. S., 15 ff.), it is understood, of course, that an ablative absolute, for example, can convey the thought of a conditional clause only through the help of context and implication. The term “condensed” has reference merely to the brevity of diction attained by dispensing with a finite verb.

Careful composition is apt to be accompanied, in the mind of the writer, by an unspoken pronunciation of the sentences as they are framed. Thus a person working out a speech naturally fancies himself delivering the oration, and mentally adds the proper emphasis and tone inflection, which for the most part cannot well be recorded on paper.²⁷

It may thus result that ambiguities in the written form escape notice. Indeed, it is a common experience for a person to take up his own copy after an interval, only to find that the written words do not at once recall just what he was trying to say when the original was penned. Then, as the lost defining elements recur to his mind, the text becomes luminous again.

It has long seemed to the writer that some passages in Latin literature, which have much troubled the commentators, may perhaps owe their difficulty to the fact that, as an author wrote to the accompaniment of unspoken words (or as he dictated to an amanuensis), he did not notice that he was counting upon the effect of a tone and color which the written word could not reproduce, and without which the reader might be left in uncertainty, or thrown altogether off the track. Study of one or two possible cases of this sort will make the point clear:

Sallust, *Bel. Cat.* 52. 30 ff.: Apud maiores nostros A. Manlius Torquatus bello Gallico filium suum, quod is contra imperium in hostem pugnaverat, necari iussit : vos de crudelissimis parraeidis quid statuatis, cunctamini? Videlicet cetera vita eorum *huic sceleri* obstat.

In the standard interpretation of this passage, the words *huic sceleri* are assumed to refer to the guilt of conspiring against the state, which forces upon *obstat* the difficult meaning 'counter-balances,' or 'offsets.'

It will be recalled that when the senate was considering what to do with the conspirators under arrest, Caesar made a calm and telling address in behalf of the prisoners, stressing the illegality of putting them to death forthwith. Sallust represents Cato as turning the tide in the other direction by the fiery and

²⁷ The underlining of words serves to some extent in this connection.

sarcastic speech from which an extract has just been quoted. Note the bitter irony of the following also (§ 24 ff.) :

Coniuravere nobilissimi cives patriam incendere; Gallorum gentem infestissimam nomini Romano ad bellum arcessunt, dux hostium eum exercitu supra caput est; vos eunctamini etiam nunc et dubitatis, quid intra moenia deprensus hostibus faciatis? Misereamini censeo—deliquere homines adulescentuli per ambitionem—atque etiam armatos dimittatis.

With cutting sarcasm the speaker is trying to goad his colleagues to immediate and drastic action; and, in view of the legal scruple that Caesar has injected into the discussion, it is quite possible that, in the passage first cited, Cato uses *huic sceleri* ironically, meaning, not the guilt of conspiring against the state, but the crime (!) of putting outlaws (*hostes*) to death without regular trial.

Just a little flection of the voice would make *huic sceleri* suggest this meaning, and *obstat* would then have its normal force: "Doubtless their past good record stands in the way of this (proposed) crime (!)," ²⁸ i.e., (sarcastically) their past good record should save them from the extreme consequence of their recent action.

Horace, *Ars P.* 128 ff.:

Difficile est proprie communia dicere, tuque
Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.

This passage has been a subject of controversy from the earliest times. Evidently the elder of Piso's sons is engaged in dramatizing Homer; and Horace commends him for making this choice of subject, in preference to attempting something entirely new.

On the surface, the young man seems to be praised for undertaking the more difficult thing at the outset of his career—which appears to be somewhat illogical, to say nothing of the fact that it is by no means obvious that it is harder to work up an old theme successfully than it is to strike out something new.

²⁸ Cf. Cicero, *p. Mil.* 88: *Obstabat eius cogitationibus nemo praeter Milonem.*

But a slight flection of the voice in pronouncing *Difficile* would put an entirely different face on the whole matter; i.e., "Hard (indeed) it is to treat old themes with originality, and you (therefore) do better in," etc.²⁹ On that basis, the tiro is commended for confining his efforts to tasks of reasonable difficulty, postponing work requiring distinctly creative power until his experience is greater.

It is not insisted that the interpretation proposed for either of the above passages is the correct one.³⁰ But reading them aloud with a view to bringing out the meanings suggested will show how very possible it is that a written sentence may prove Delphic, for the simple reason that it does not record the shades of emphasis assumed by the author as he indited it. This would be specially likely to happen in the case of a writer schooled in rhetorical exercise, as was true of Roman authors generally.

When there is careful revision, an author may note the chance of misunderstanding and rephrase his sentence; and usually the general tenor of a passage is sufficient to keep the reader upon the right track. It would seem probable, however, that, through oversight, serious ambiguity might escape notice occasionally, in the same way that accidental verse is sometimes by inadvertence incorporated in prose. Hence the suggestion above made that some ambiguities in Latin texts may perhaps be resolved by consideration of the mental emphasis that leaves no record upon the written page.

It is altogether likely that the unspoken phrasing that is the normal accompaniment of careful writing has also a marked influence upon written word order; for, if a word is stressed mentally, the sense of emphasis may easily lead to the neglect of available overt signs.

²⁹ With this interpretation, the standard punctuation of the first line of the text (semicolon) gives way to a comma.

³⁰ Long ago the suggestion as to *Ars Poetica* 128 ff. was denied a hearing in the *Classical Review* on the ground that it is ingenious rather than convincing. Curiously enough, some years later the same journal (XXVI, 153 ff.) published a similar interpretation of the lines, though without the background here provided.

It is not proposed to develop this subject here; but the very first observations are sufficient to disturb the complacency of those who would interpret the emphasis of a Latin sentence solely on the basis of its word order:

Tacitus, *Agr.* 10. 3 ff.: Formam totius Britanniae Livius veterum, Fabius Rusticus recentium eloquentissimi auctores oblongae scutulae vel bipenni adsimulavere. Et *est* ea facies citra Caledoniam.

This is clearly a case of emphatic *est*: "And this *is* the shape south of Caledonia." Here the verb is given the first possible position in the sentence; but, in the following passage, the fact of mental stress upon *est* is reflected in its unemphatic position:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 13: Non dicis igitur: 'Miser *est* M. Crassus,' sed tantum: 'Miser M. Crassus'?

This sentence is taken from a passage in which Cicero represents himself as arguing with a young man, who thinks that death means annihilation, but yet insists that the dead are wretched (*miseros esse*). Cicero replies that you cannot predicate anything at all of persons who are non-existent. Whereupon the young man tries the expedient of dropping *esse* from his statement; to which Cicero rejoins in the words of the sentence quoted: "You do not say then: 'Marcus Crassus *is* wretched,' but simply: 'Wretched Marcus Crassus'?"

In this particular case the general context is so effectively defining that the reader is in no danger of making a mistake; he will appreciate the stress on *est*, however the word may be placed. But this illustration demonstrates very aptly how mental emphasis may be a determining factor in the order of words in a Latin sentence.

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONSTRUCTION

Under this head Professor Fowler has a rather suprising remark:

Further, Professor Nutting seems to be at one with Blase in thinking that the imperfect subjunctive in conditions contrary to fact in the present really loses its preterite meaning and becomes a present.³¹

Perhaps the writer did not mean here exactly what he says; for if a condition is 'contrary to fact in the present,' surely its verb form (imperfect subjunctive) is shorn of preterite force. If there were any doubt under this head, it surely would be dispelled by an examination of such examples as the following:

Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 37: *Quo quidem tempore si meum consilium auctoritasque valuisset, tu hodie egeres.*

Cicero, *Phil.* iii. 33: *Si enim tum illi caedis a me initium quaerenti respondere voluissem, nunc rei publicae consulere non possem.*

Cicero, *Phil.* iv. 1: *Quodsi id ante facere conatus essem, nunc facere non possem.*

The type of contrary to fact speaking here illustrated is specially instructive in the present connection; for in each case two distinct time realms are contrasted (*quo quidem tempore hodie, tum nunc, ante nunc*), and by the very contrast the imperfect subjunctive of the apodosis is limited to the present.³²

Though not yet recognized by the textbooks, there is also a future contrary to fact:

Cicero, *de Fin.* iv. 62: "*Rogarem te,*" inquit, "*ut diceres pro me tu idem, nisi et te audire nunc mallet, et istis tamen alio tempore responsurus essem.*"

³¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 90.

³² To claim, in the face of phrases like *si nunc adesset* that there is no such thing as a present contrary to fact, merely because the imperfect subjunctive is used also in contrary to fact expressions of general application (e.g. Cicero, *p. Arch.* 29: *si nihil animus praesentiret in posterum*), is about on a par with declaring that the present indicative has no proper present force in "It is ten o'clock," because it is used also in expressions of general application, e.g. "Honesty is the best policy." Methner's obsession was passed without discussion in *L. C. S.*, 126, note 9. Various other theories based on speculation rather than on fact are considered, *ibid.*, 127 ff.

The apodosis of this sentence has first a present contrary to fact division in which the speaker indicates what he prefers at the time of speaking (*nunc*), followed by a second contrary to fact division dealing with a subsequent time (*alio tempore*); and the matter is clinched beyond all peradventure by the shift to the periphrastic form.

Without the help of the periphrastic device, the future contrary to fact may yet make itself clearly manifest; e.g.

Cicero, *ad Att.* ii. 14. 2: Quo me vertam? Statim mehercule Arretium irem, ni te in Formiano commodissime expectari viderem.

The opening deliberative question of this passage reveals the writer as in doubt about his future course. The adverb *Statim* holds the action at the same time level, and *irem Arretium* is a virtual announcement that the journey will *not* be made, in other words, the apodosis of the conditional sentence is a *future* contrary to fact.³³

With recognition of a division of the contrary to fact use that involves the future of the speaker or writer, it is exceedingly desirable that handbooks should give additional attention to the important and very different construction known as *futurum in praeterito*.

Hitherto this latter category has been treated as a sort of side-issue in any consideration of the classification of the conditional sentence, and much confusion has resulted. Unless care be taken, the situation is likely to grow worse with recognition of three types of the contrary to fact construction (present, past, and future).

Under various names, all grammars recognize at least three main classes of conditional sentences, namely, simple, vague future, and contrary to fact. It would be well if the *futurum in praeterito* category were added as a fourth coördinate division.

³³ For fuller discussion of this very obvious matter, see present volume, 221 ff.

QUERIES AS TO THE CUM-CONSTRUCTION

BY

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As a preliminary to this study, it is desirable that two fundamental principles be explicitly set down:

1. Syntax has little or nothing to do with the inception of thought in the mind of the speaker or writer; it is at the point where he begins to choose words and phrases to initiate a train of thought in the mind of the hearer or reader that problems of syntax normally arise.¹ The spoken or written word provides concrete data for investigation; and it is the aim of grammatical study to analyze the effect that is likely to be made upon the mind of the hearer or reader. In general, it is only on this basis that the philologist may hope to reach results of any scientific worth.

2. The effect upon the mind of the hearer or reader depends to a considerable extent upon the spoken or written order.

It may seem that this second principle is almost too obviously true to require specific mention; for everywhere the connection between word-order and emphasis in Latin is abundantly recognized, and at times it appears even to be unduly stressed.² But attention has usually been given rather to the individual words of a clause than to the order of clauses themselves.

Unquestionably, clause order bears vitally upon the syntactical problem of several types of the complex sentence; and full recognition of this fact promises to revolutionize ideas previously held in regard to them. Before undertaking a consideration of some questions raised by the *cum*-construction, it may be well to illustrate the effect of clause order in certain other types of sentence, for example, those in which the conjunction *quod* is used:

Martial, xii. 89:

Quod lana caput alligas, Charine,
Non aures tibi sed dolent capilli.

¹ See further, present volume, 272 ff. ² *Ibid.*, 285 fin. ff.

These lines call attention to the subterfuge of a bald-headed man, who feigns an ear-ache as an excuse for muffling up his head to conceal his lack of hair. The force of *quod* appears to be "as for the fact that," and the whole might be rendered: "As for the fact that you bind up your head in wool, Charinus, it's your hair, not your ears, that calls for treatment."

Without other change than a reversal of clauses, a quite new situation develops:

Non aures tibi sed dolent capilli,
Quod lana caput alligas, Charine.

Now the meaning "that" suggests itself for *quod*: "Not your ears but your hair is hurting, *that* you bind up your head with wool, Charinus." Compare the following passages in which the *quod*-clause stands second in the original:

Martial, vii. 86. 1 ff.:

Ad natalicias dapes vocabar,
 Essem cum tibi, Sexte, non amicus.
 Quid factum est, rogo, quid repente factum est,
 Post tot pignora nostra, post tot annos
Quod sum praeteritus vetus sodalis?

Martial, viii. 21. 3 ff.:

Roma rogat. Placidi numquid te pigra Bootae
 Plaustra vehunt, lento *quod* nimis axe venis?

The second of these citations has reference to the expectation in Rome on the eve of the emperor's arrival. The poet voices the general impatience in an apostrophe to the morning star: "Rome importunes. Does the slow wain of calm Bootes bear thee *that* thou comest with a pace so slow?"³

It is interesting that the commentators have hesitated to recognize this very natural function of *quod* in the postpositive clause of a very familiar passage:

Cicero, *in Cat.* i. 16: Quae quidem (sica) quibus abs te initiata sacris ac devota sit nescio, *quod* eam necesse putas esse in consulis corpore defigere.

³ See further, *Classical Journal*, XX, 119 ff.

Apparently we should render: 'I know not by what rites this (dagger) has been consecrated and set apart by you *that* you feel it necessary to plant it in the body of a consul.' The potency of clause order as a defining element may aptly be tested here again by rewriting the sentence so as to give the *quod*-clause first place, whereupon the meaning "as for the fact that" immediately suggests itself for the conjunction.⁴

In like manner, the order of clauses plays an important rôle in the meaning conveyed by conditional sentences. To make this clear, it may be desirable to explain first the process of substitution, which frequently is illustrated in the main clause of a conditional period; e.g.

Plautus, *Poen.* 516 ff.:

Si nec recte dicis nobis dives de summo loco,
Divitem audacter *solemus mactare* infortunio.

These are the words of aged witnesses who have been reproved by a young man for the slowness with which they follow to the scene of action. The general import of the sentence is clear, namely, the witnesses are threatening the young man with retribution in court some day, unless he treats them with proper consideration now.

But this they do not state explicitly. The sentence begins with a normal condition; but for an exact apodosis is *substituted* a statement covering their general procedure (*solemus mactare infortunio*). This general statement holds, irrespective of the particular condition prefixed; yet it serves the purpose of the speakers perfectly, because it includes, by implication, a threat as to what will happen in the individual case.⁵

⁴ It is little to the point to speculate as to the steps through which clause order came to be so important a factor in the function of the complex sentence. Whatever view may be entertained on this point, the fact remains that different order produces decidedly different reactions in the mind of the hearer or reader; and, as already indicated above, it is to the analysis and classification of these reactions that the study of syntax properly addresses itself.

⁵ See further, present volume, 93 ff.

Cognizance of the process of substitution is of special importance in the case of conditional sentences made up of a subjunctive *si*-clause and an indicative main clause; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Mil.* 38: *Quem si interficere voluisset, quantae quotiens occasiones, quam praeclarae fuerunt!*

Obviously the opportunities to commit murder were not conditioned upon the desire to make use of them. But, through its implication, the main clause of this sentence is a very satisfactory substitute for an exact apodosis to the contrary to fact *si . . . voluisset*.

Recognition of the process of substitution thus sheds some light on the complicated problem of subjunctive protasis with indicative "apodosis." But the question of clause order again enters here; for (particularly from the point of view of the hearer or reader) the effect of substitution is much favored when the condition precedes, as in the example just cited. Contrast the impression made by the following sentence, in which a subjunctive *si*-clause follows:

Plautus, *Amph.* 336:

Non edepol nunc ubi terrarum sim scio, si quis roget.

As the words stand, the first clause makes a complete sentence, and a period might have been written at its end. To the hearer, at least, the *si*-clause is appended as a tag, with something of the effect of an afterthought; and the modal discrepancy is now naturally assigned to a more or less pronounced anacoluthon, each clause being felt to go its own way, without intimate relation to the other. It is interesting to note how the effect would be changed, had the order of clauses been reversed here:

Si quis roget, non edepol nunc ubi terrarum sim scio.

With this order, the hearer or reader instinctively looks forward to an apodosis in the following clause, and he finds it in the implication of the words set down (i.e., "I should not now be able to tell," etc.), the general statement of fact being felt to

function as a substitute that covers this special case and much more.⁶

Turning now to the *cum*-construction, it is a matter of surprise that there has been here so little critical examination of the categories of usage assigned to a conjunction that has been the subject of such lively and extensive discussion. The heat of combat seems to have called attention away to other points; and original categories (sometimes set up in the first instance with little discriminating care) have been accepted without question from decade to decade. Two such are considered here, both of them involving considerations of clause order:

I

The name "explicative" has become firmly attached to *cum*-clauses of the following familiar type:

Cicero, in Cat. i. 21: cum quiescunt, probant; *cum* patiuntur, decernunt; *cum* tacent, clamant.

In connection with examples showing this clause order, it should be noted that there are numerous analogous periods in Latin, in which the opening clause is introduced by other words than *cum*. Compare the following:

- (1) *cum* tacent, clamant
- (2) *si* amant, sapienter faciunt⁷
- (3) *qui* amant, sapienter faciunt

In all of these cases a judgment of the form "A=B" is suggested to the hearer or reader: e.g., "their silence is a shout," "dalliance on their part is wisdom," etc.

It certainly would appear that all three of these sentences are made on the same last, and that they belong together syntactically. If this is so, we have here to do with a construction in which the sentence rather than the clause is the unit. The name

⁶ See further, present volume, 96, footnote 27. ⁷ Plautus, *Bacch.* 1165.

“Predicating Period” takes cognizance of this situation, and it conveniently designates the function of the sentence, whatever the introductory particle used.⁸

So far as the *cum*-construction is concerned, a good contrast is afforded by sentences containing a phrase like *quæ cum ita sint*, which, in a given case, may be so analyzed as to show that the words quoted constitute a causal clause, and that *cum* has the force of “since.” But if it be the essential function of a sentence like *cum tacent, clamant* to convey a judgment of the form “A = B,” it is no longer possible to isolate the *cum*-clause, and to assign to it a function coördinate with “causal,” “concessive,” or the like, with some corresponding special force of *cum*.

Thus, at any rate for cases in which the *cum*-clause precedes, the use of the term “explicative” as applied either to *cum* or the *cum*-clause is singularly unfortunate—not only for the reason given above, but also because, with this order, it is the main clause of the sentence (not the *cum*-clause) that does the “explaining,” the judgment being of the form “A = B.”⁹

From this point of view it is also equally incorrect to speak of *cum* as “expressing equivalence”; for the conjunction surely has no such force here. It is characteristic of the whole status of the discussion of the *cum*-construction that so careful a scholar as Lebreton should go wrong as to this detail. He is in haste to consider a rather trifling matter of modal usage, and accepts at face value a current dictum which obscures the truth in regard to the really fundamental issue.¹⁰

⁸ See illustrations for the conditional sentence, present volume, 56 ff.

⁹ Or, to put this in another way, in the case of *cum tacent, clamant*, the senators are not shouting. They are in fact sitting silent; and it is the main clause of the sentence that “explains” the significance of that silence.

Following tradition blindly, and, of course, without any consideration for clause order, Kühner turns this matter quite upside down (*Ausf. Lat. Gramm.* II², § 202. 3) “dieses *cum* . . . das die Handlung des Hauptsatzes durch die identische Handlung des Nebensatzes erklärt,” u. s. w. Cf. Lane, *Latin Grammar*, § 1874: “the action of the protasis is coincident.”

¹⁰ *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, p. 327. The whole terminology used in this connection needs thorough and critical revision, e.g., coincidentia, Kongruenz, Identität, etc.

Just how a Roman hearer or reader reacted to *cum* in sentences like those now under discussion is not altogether clear. It should be noted that in Predicating Periods introduced by *si* or *qui* there is no new shade of meaning forced upon these words by virtue of the sentence function. In like manner, *cum* in such connections may have meant to the Roman nothing more than a conventional "when."

Indeed, it is hard to avoid such interpretation, when there is a resumptive *tum* in the main clause; e.g.

Cicero, *Phil.* vii. 11: Quid? Cum Brutum . . . bellum gerentem cum Antonio . . . laudibus amplissimis adfecistis, *tum* non hostem indicastis Antonium?

It is true that in sentences like *cum tacent, clamant* the conjunction can conveniently be paraphrased by "in that"; but the burden of proof certainly lies with any who claim that this rendering represents the reaction of the Roman hearer or reader.¹¹ The conjunction *quod*, with its background of (*id*) *quod*, is in some respects on a different footing from *cum* in this matter.

With reversed order of clauses in the *cum*-construction, a somewhat different situation develops; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 121: Errabas, Verres, et vehementer errabas, *cum* te maculas furtorum et flagitiorum tuorum sociorum innocentium sanguine eluere abitrabare.

When the clauses are thus arranged, the designation "explicative" applies with some aptness as describing the general function of the *cum*-clause; for the latter, by virtue of its position, is easily felt as a sort of expansion and "explanation" of the clause to which it is attached. But there are no cases in hand which, even under these favoring circumstances, indicate that *cum* ever has the force of "in that."

¹¹ See the assumption of Kühner, *loc cit.* § 202.3. As for early Latin, it should be noted that it may easily be possible to draw unwarranted inference from rough casual collocations; thus it sheds little light on the force of *quin* that it is placed in correlation with *eo*, as Plautus, *Tri.* 341.

As regards the example just cited, it will be noted that “*when you thought*” meets every need of the situation. So in formal definition:

Cicero, *de Invent.* i. 15: Purgatio est, cum factum conceditur, culpa removetur.

The iterative character of this sentence helps to the determination of the force of *cum* as “when”—a locution abhorred by modern school teachers.¹²

At first sight, the following passage might seem to have some bearing on the question:

Ovid, *Met.* xi. 83 ff.:
 . . . porrectaque brachia veros
 Esse putes ramos, et non fallere¹³ *putando*.

Here is a reference to the transformation of arms into the limbs of trees, and we naturally render: “One would fancy the extended arms to be real branches, and he would not be deceived *in* so thinking.” But there is a wide difference between “*in*” and “*in that*,” and the latter corresponds to no known meaning of the ablative. On the other hand, the gerund here probably is a mere substitute for *putans*.¹⁴

The case for “*in that*” as a meaning for *cum*, already weak enough, is still further prejudiced by the fact that there are no fixed bounds for the field of the investigation. It would be well, as already intimated, to decide in advance what degree of “identity” or “equivalence” must appear in the two clauses of a *cum*-construction to justify including the case in the discussion. Lattmann surely goes far afield in his painstaking study,¹⁵ in which he garners up everything that even remotely suggests “coincidence,” including even such a sentence as the following:

¹² It may be worth noting in passing that cases of formal definition like the above show perhaps least effect from the fact of inversion.

¹³ The text question at this point (i.e., *fallere* or *fallare*) does not concern the present discussion.

¹⁴ On such use of the gerund, see the *Classical Journal*, XXII, 131 ff.

¹⁵ H. Lattmann, *De Coincidentiæ apud Ciceronem Vi atque Usu*, Göttingen, 1888, Pars Prior.

Cicero, *in Cat.* iii. 3: Nam *tum, cum* ex urbe Catilinam eiciebam--non enim iam vereor huius verbi invidiam, cum illa magis sit timenda, quod vivus exierit--sed *tum* cum illum exterminari volebam, aut reliquam coniuratorum manum simul exituram aut eos, qui restitissent, infirmos sine illo ac debilis fore putabam.

By omitting (without indicating the fact) the intervening clauses of this sentence, Lattmann moulds it to his purpose, and quotes as follows:

Tum, cum ex urbe Catilinam eiciebam, reliquam coniuratorum manum simul exituram putabam.

Even so, one looks in vain for any marked trace of "coincidence," and the meaning of *cum, tum* certainly is "at the time when." Cf., too, less inappropriate cases found listed in this category:

Cicero, *de Imp. Pomp.* 59: (Catulus) cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum ac dignitatis, *cum* omnes una prope voce in eo ipso vos spem habituros esse dixistis.

Cicero, *de Har. Res.* 45: Haec enim certe petebantur, cum in me . . . illa flamma . . . coniciebatur.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 4. 4: In quo prima illa consolatio est, vidisse me plus quam ceteros, *cum* cupiebam quamvis iniqua condicione pacem.

In consonance with the principle laid down at the beginning of the paper, this whole matter should be treated from the point of view of Roman linguistic consciousness. It may be that the Predicating Period (introduced by *cum, si, qui*, etc.) was distinctive enough to have some unity in the feeling of the Romans;¹⁶ but there has no evidence been found which indicates that any special meaning for *cum, si*, or *qui* developed in this connection.

When the *cum*-construction reverses its clause order, the probability of the recognition of a category in Roman linguistic

¹⁶ It should be observed, however, that such feeling was not strong enough to prevent the intrusion of the subjunctive into the *cum*-clause at times, for example, through giving right of way to the iterative idea, e.g. Cicero, *Top.* 10. (Cf. what is said of the iterative use of the subjunctive, present volume, 82 ff.)

consciousness is more remote, especially if examples like those last cited are properly to be brought into the discussion; and while the postposition of the *cum*-clause may be per se favorable to the development of the meaning "in that" for *cum*, there is no concrete evidence yet available to show that the Romans here felt any such reaction to the word.

Thus, to refer back to Cicero, *de Imp. Pomp.* 59, cited just above, it is altogether unlikely that the audience upon whose ears this sentence fell was conscious of anything special and peculiar in its nature. It is far more probable that to them *cum* was just another case of conventional "when."¹⁷

It is perhaps a bit of specific evidence against the existence of a special category in the Roman mind and a special meaning for *cum*, that care is not exercised to maintain a parity of tense that "coincidence" might seem to call for; e.g.

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 1. 112: in ea (defensione) maxime offendisti, cum tuam auctoritatem tute ipse edicto provinciali repudiabas.

Cicero, *de Dom.* 113: O Q. Catulle, . . . tantumne te fefellit, cum mihi summa et cotidie maiora praemia in re publica fore putabas?¹⁸

Here then is the first of the queries in regard to the *cum*-construction. In Roman linguistic consciousness to what extent, if at all, was the *cum*-construction technically explicative, with a meaning "in that" for the conjunction?

The urgent need for a settlement and general understanding on this point may be further illustrated by two or three citations from textbooks in common use. Thus, Kühner says in this connection: "*cum* . . . hat mehr instrumentalen-kausalen als temporalen Wert";¹⁹ and Lane's statement runs: "In this use *cum* passes from the meaning "when" to "that," "in that," or "in" or "by" with a verbal in "-ing."²⁰

¹⁷ If this view is correct, the far search for cases of "coincidence" as conducted by Lattmann is rather confusing than helpful in the present connection.

¹⁸ So pluperfect with perfect, Cicero, *Phil.* vi. 2.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*, § 202. 3.

²⁰ *Latin Grammar*, § 1874.

On the other hand, Bennett, who cites as his sole example *cum tacent, clamant*, renders thus: "Their silence is a shout (lit. *when*²¹ they are silent they shout)," but the heading of the paragraph is "*Cum Explicative.*"²²

Further investigation may shed new light on this subject; but, as matters now stand, it certainly would seem that a good deal of time has thus far been spent rather unprofitably in trying to establish, for Latin, a category based on modern paraphrase.

II

Another generally recognized category in the use of the *cum*-construction is illustrated by the following example:

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xv. 14. 1: Multi enim anni sunt, *cum* ille in aere meo est.

It should be noted first, in this connection, that some rather needless confusion is introduced by attempting here, too, to establish an "explicative" category.²³ If such analysis fails for sentences of the kind considered in the previous section of this paper, conditions are obviously less favorable here for such a development, and we may pass at once to other considerations.

In connection with sentences like the one quoted above, the phrase "Lapse of Time" is sometimes used, and the conjunction

²¹ Italics mine.

²² *Latin Grammar*, § 290. Cf. Gildersleeve-Lodge (§ 582), which uses the same heading, renders the examples variously, and locates the paragraph as a whole under the general rubric "Temporal Sentences."

It was noted above that Lebreton enters this discussion with his attention distracted by a small matter of modal usage; but his half-consciousness that he is slighting a greater difficulty appears in the rejection of Riemann's formula ("*cum* correspondant à notre tour français 'en' suivi du gérondif") on the ground that this rendering does not satisfy some examples obviously belonging to the category in question. From Hale he borrows the phrase "*Cum* exprimant l'équivalence," and hurries on to the modal question (*loc. cit.*, p. 327, footnote 1).

²³ See Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*⁴, § 324, and Kühner, *loc. cit.*, § 203. 2. In Lane's *Latin Grammar* the term "Explanatory" is made to cover even concessive clauses (§ 1874 ff.).

cum is very commonly rendered "since." Whether this last is intended as translation or paraphrase is not always clear.

For example, the Gildersleeve-Lodge *Grammar* reads: "Peculiar is the use of *cum* with Lapses of Time. Lapses of Time are treated as Designations of Time in Accusative or Ablative."²⁴ Then follow, without further comment, three Latin examples, in the rendering of two of which the meaning "since" is given to *cum*. To the average reader this treatment will seem obscure; but it easily conveys the suggestion that "since" is here meant as a translation rather than as a paraphrase.

Harkness is much more specific; under the use of the indicative mood appears the rubric: "After *cum* meaning "from the time when", "since", "during which";²⁵ and Kühner is hardly less explicit: ". . . die *cum*-Sätze, die den Termin angeben, von dem ab die Handlung des Hauptsatzes gilt (deutsch, 'seit', 'das')."²⁶ Compare also Roby's remark: "So in reckoning the length of time: *cum* = 'since', 'to the time that'. "²⁷

It is not at all obvious that, to Roman linguistic consciousness, *cum* ever had the force of *ex quo* (*tempore*), or the like; and the burden of proof again lies very distinctly with any who may venture to champion that view. It is a strange thing that the handbooks make no distinction between sentences in which the *cum*-clause is negative and those in which it is not. In the case of the former, *cum* could not possibly have the force of "since"; e.g.

Livy, ix. 33. 3: *Permuli anni iam erant, cum inter patricios magistratus tribunosque nulla certamina fuerant.*

This can mean only: "Many now were the years *during which* (while) there had been no contests," etc. In the Gildersleeve-Lodge *Grammar*, the above is one of the three examples

²⁴ § 580, Rem. 3.

²⁵ *Complete Latin Grammar*, § 601. 3.

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*, § 203. 2. Since Menge is interested primarily in the problem of German into Latin, his statement probably should not be pressed too hard; see *Repetitorium der lat. Syntax und Stilistik*, § 362, I, 1 Anm. 4.

²⁷ *Latin Grammar*, § 1723.

cited, and it is rendered most perversely: "Very many years had elapsed *since*²⁸ there had been *any*²⁸ struggles,"²⁹ etc., the negative *nulla* being ignored, in order to give a wrong meaning to *cum*. In like manner, after suggesting for *cum* the meanings "seit," "dass," Kühner³⁰ introduces as his first illustration:

Plautus, *Most.* 470 ff.:

Quia septem menses sunt, *quom* in hasee aedes pedum
Nemo intro tetulit.³¹

Since, in the negative examples, it is thus very clearly the function of *cum* to designate the time *within* which (rather than the time *from* which), it is pertinent to inquire whether Roman reaction may not have been of the same character to other cases also; e.g.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 76: Quam multi anni sunt, *cum* bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent!

Cicero, *Phil.* xii. 24: Vicesimus annus est, *cum* omnes scelerati me unum petunt.

In passing judgment on this question, it is well to recall that points of view may very easily vary in different languages. Thus, in relative clauses, Latin sometimes uses a 'time within which' construction where English favors a quite different mode of expression; e.g.

Cicero, *p. Sex. R.* 20: Quadriduo, quo haec gesta sunt, res ad Chrysogonum . . . defertur.

Caesar, *B. G.* iv. 18. 1: Diebus decem, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto, exercitus traducitur.

Lane renders the first of these sentences with great fidelity: "Within the four days' space in which this occurred,"³² etc.; our English idiom, however, calls for something like: "Within four days *after* these things happened," etc.

In the light of such relative uses, it seems very plausible that, in many cases at least, the Roman reaction to *cum* in the type of

²⁸ Italics mine.

³⁰ *Loc. cit.*, § 203. 2.

³² § 1354.

²⁹ § 580, Rem. 3.

³¹ So Menge, *loc. cit.*

sentence now under discussion was the same, whether the *cum*-clause was negative or not.³³ Here then is the second query propounded by this paper: To Roman linguistic consciousness did *cum* ever take on the meaning of (temporal) "since"; if so, where, and to what extent?

In the search for an answer to this question many factors will need to be taken into account, and two of them may well be mentioned here. In the first place, the type of *cum*-clause just discussed is distinctly subsecutive; it is of the very genius of the construction that the *cum*-clause follows. In advance, it is impossible to say just what this means; but it is a factor that must be reckoned with.

In the second place, careful distinction must be made between the relations marked in English by "after" and (temporal) "since." For example, if a Roman writer were describing the progress of a crowd, and wished to express some such idea as: "On their arrival at the temple, the people halted," he had at his disposal several turns; e.g.

cum ad aedem perventum esset
postquam ad aedem perventum est

One's feelings for Latin need not be perfect to realize that a Roman's reaction to these two clauses would not be the same—though it is not so easy to muster the reasons for the difference of impression. One factor that tends to hold *cum* to the meaning "when" probably lies in the use of the pluperfect tense, which serves to mark the sequence of events; whereas that aspect of the situation is stressed by *postquam* in the other version. But, whatever the reason, the rendering "after" for *cum* in a clause like this is probably nearer a paraphrase than a translation.

This being the case, there might seem to be even less probability of *cum* developing the more remote temporal meaning

³³ Cf. the function of clause and conjunction in a sentence like the following (Cicero, *p. Clu.* 72): *Unus et alter dies intercesserat, cum* res parum certa videbatur.

“since,” for which *postquam* and *ut*, on the other hand, show decided affinity; e.g.

Plautus, *Men.* 234:

Hic annus sextus est, *postquam* ei rei operam damus.

Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 53, 2: quartus decimus annus est, Caesar, *ex quo* spei tuae admotus sum, octavus, *ut* imperium obtines.³⁴

It probably is generally taken for granted that the problem of the *cum*-construction is already well settled. As a matter of fact, it needs a thorough reworking, in connection with a consideration of the use of other temporal conjunctions, and with complete emancipation from the distorting effect of previous theorising.

³⁴ The definition of *ut* in this passage by *ex quo* is striking. Menge, *loc cit.*, suggests that Ovid, *Trist.* v. 10. 1 be compared: *Ut* sumus in Ponto, ter frigore constitit Hister. Note how the reversal of clause order spoils the parallel; for the meaning seems to be “During my stay in Pontus,” with *ut* standing for the conventional “while,” and the whole calling for no special comment in this connection.

ON THE SYNTAX OF FRETUS

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Testing at various points indicates that the article in the *Thesaurus* brings together references to practically all occurrences of the word *fretus* that can be located with a reasonable expenditure of time and effort. The present paper is concerned principally with the classical period of the language (Plautus to Florus and Fronto); and the number of cases here available for study amounts to about two hundred.¹

The outstanding construction with *fretus* is, of course, the ablative case. No certain instance of the dative is noted earlier than Livy,² in whose works there are five possible examples.³

It is true that the case-ending very frequently is ambiguous (-*o*, -*is*, -*ibus*); but in view of the rather late and scanty evidence for the use of the dative, it seems everywhere assumed that the ambiguous forms are to be classed as ablative.⁴ This procedure is the more justified in view of the fact that Livy evidently was inclined to experiment a little with the syntax of *fretus*; for as

¹ The smallness of this total may occasion some surprise. But the indices for Catullus, Horace, and Suetonius reveal no cases at all; Lucan, Persius, and Silius Italicus provide one example each; two are cited for Lucretius and for Seneca (philosophus), and three for Propertius.

² In Naevius, Frg. 12 (Baehrens) the readings *pietati* and *pictate* are found, with good support for the former. Since, however, some consonant stems make an ablative in -*i* on occasion, no conclusive evidence for the use of the dative can be found in this passage, even though the reading *pietati* be established.

³ iv. 37. 6, vi. 13. 1, vi. 31. 6, viii. 22. 7, xxxix. 51. 4.

⁴ Some are so defined by the context; e.g., *freti virtute et viribus*. Plautus, *Amph.* 212.

he is the first to supply undoubted instances of the use of the dative, so he was first to employ the infinitive with this word. In neither venture was he much imitated.⁵

⁵ In the use of forms that are surely dative he seems to stand alone. The infinitive he uses once:

x. 5. 5: *Ceterum satis fretus esse etiam nunc tolerando certamini legatum, nec se procul abesse periculi vindicem, quam maxime volt fatigari hostem, ut integris adoriatur viribus fessos.*

At the outset of this sentence, *fretus* means something like "confident (that)"; but, with the second infinitive, its force has faded to little more than that of *ratus*.

Quintus Curtius follows with a single example (vii. 7. 31), also a case of indirect discourse, though a subject accusative is not expressed. Aside from this and *Carm. Epig.* 279. 10 (Buecheler), there is but one other clear example of the infinitive construction cited:

Statius, *Theb.* iv. 182 ff.:
 Hic *fretus* doctas *anteire* canendo
 Aonidas mutos Thamyris damnatus in annos
 Ore simul citharaque (quis obvia numina temnat?)
 Contieuit praeceps.

In this passage, *fretus anteire* is possibly a condensed form for *fretus se posse anteire* (cf. Fronto, p. 169. 19: *spe fretus posse me . . . mitigare*); or perhaps *fretus* should be rendered "confidently hoping." The *Thesaurus* claims one other case, probably through misinterpretation of the text:

Statius, *Theb.* vi. 19 ff.:
 Ceu primum *ausurae* trans alta ignota biremes
 Seu Tyrrhenam hiemem seu stagna Aegaea lacessant
 Tranquillo prius arma lacu clavumque levisque
 Explorant remos atque ipsa pericula discunt;
 At eum experta cohors, tum portum inrumpere *fretae*
 Longius ereptasque oculis non quaerere terras.

This sentence institutes a comparison with ships destined to make adventurous voyages, whose crews at first paddle about in safe waters for practice. To construe the infinitives of the last two lines as dependent upon *fretae* necessitates supplying *sunt*, which is awkward in this iterative expression, to say nothing of the fact that the second infinitive articulates badly under such interpretation. Possibly these difficulties can be met in some way; but it certainly is much simpler to recognize historical infinitives here, and to render *fretae* as "boldly"; cf. Rothstein on Propertius, iv. 10. 32. So understood, *fretae* seems to hark back aptly to *ausurae* of line 19. As to the "absolute" use of *fretus*, further remarks will be made at a later point in this paper.

I

Taken in the large, *fretus* with the ablative represents two diverse points of view, both well attested. Between them lies a middle ground occupied by a large mass of cases in regard to which it is impossible to say whether they belong to one category or the other. Probably it often happened that the Roman speaker or hearer was not forced to a conscious choice; but this cannot have been true of the examples which are made test cases by the defining context in which they stand.

In the first place, there is an active or subjective sense of *fretus* with the ablative, e.g., "relying (on)," "putting trust (in)," "counting (upon)," "taking for granted." Here the feeling of the subject goes out to or toward something.

Contrasted with this is the passive or objective use, which can conveniently be illustrated by certain cases in which the thing referred to by the ablative lies wholly in the past. Here *fretus* might conceivably have the active sense "basing confidence (upon)"; but this passes insensibly into passive meanings, e.g., "buttressed (on)," "buttressed (by)," "upheld (by)," "emboldened (by)," "animated (by)," etc.

The active or subjective use of *fretus* is probably more common than the passive, and to most readers it may seem the normal or even the exclusive function of the word. The discussion therefore may well begin with its other application.

1. THE PASSIVE OR OBJECTIVE USE

Q. Cicero, *de Pet. Con.* 25: Et quamquam *partis ac fundatis amicitiiis fretum ac munitum* esse oportet, tamen in ipsa petitione amicitiae permultae ac perutiles comparantur.

It is interesting that *fretum* is here paired with *munitum*; but the really decisive factor for a passive interpretation lies in the circumstance that Quintus is at this point discussing the

support for his candidacy which a man must build up (see § 16 ff.). It is not at all a question here of the man's confidence in his backing; he should be "buttressed and secured by old and well established friendships."⁶

Though not as clearly defined, a second case involves so close a parallel as to suggest a reminiscence of the passage just discussed:

Cicero, *p. Mur.* 15: Summam video esse in te, Ser. Sulpici, dignitatem generis, integritatis, ceterorumque ornamentorum omnium, quibus *fretum* ad consulatus petitionem adgredi par est.

It adds to the possibility of reminiscence, of course, that this is one of Cicero's consular speeches, hence not far removed from the time when he was himself a candidate for the office. In a third somewhat similar passage the interpretation of *fretus* is less certain:

Cicero, *p. Planc.* 12: Respondebis, credo, te splendore et vetustate familiae *fretum* non valde ambiendum putasse.

The passive use of *fretus* is attested in various ways, as may be seen by examining the following cases:

Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 31. 2 ff.: Is metu Germanici fidus Romanis, aequalibus in suos, mox superbiam in nos, saevitiam in popularis sumpsit, *fretus bellis, quae secunda* adversum circumiectas nationes *exercuerat*, et senectutem Tiberii ut inermem despiciens avidusque Armeniae.

The reference here is to wars of a past time, and the only possible active interpretation for *fretus* would be "basing his confidence (upon)."⁷ This seems a bit heavy; and it perhaps is too respectful for a reference to a barbarian who so far forgets himself as to flaunt his easily won importance in the face of the

⁶ There is a sort of formal redundancy in *fretum ac munitum*. (As intimated above in the text, the force of *fretus* cannot definitely be determined merely by the meaning of words in parallel grammatical construction. In this respect the word-groupings found in the *Thesaurus* may often prove misleading, unless each case is carefully checked, as here.)

⁷ As contrasted with such other active meanings as "counting (upon)," "taking for granted," etc.

all-conquering Roman. It is more likely that the past successes are thought of as the source of the king's presumption, *fretus* being passive in sense, "emboldened," or even "puffed up."⁸

Caesar, *B. G.* iii. 21. 1: Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sontiates *superioribus victoriis freti* in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae. salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore . . . efficere possent perspicere euperent.

The reference again is to past victories, and the possibility of an active interpretation for *fretus* is limited as before; the passive meaning "animated" fits exceedingly well with the words that follow in the text.⁹

Terence, *Eun.* 1062 ff.:

PH. Quor ergo in his te conspicor regionibus?

TH. *Vobis fretus*. PH. *Scin quam fretus?* Miles, edico tibi, Si te in platea offendero hac post umquam, . . . periisti.

After the dénouement of the play, the soldier Thraso ventures back into the neighborhood of his mistress, and is greeted by Phaedria with the question: "Why do I see you in this locality?" The answer is *Vobis fretus*. If this were all, it would be very natural to interpret *fretus* as active ("putting my trust in you"); but Phaedria rejoins *Scin quam fretus?*

This puts an entirely different face upon the matter; for if *quam* has its normal force ("to what extent?"), *fretus* surely is passive. It would be absurd to ask Thraso if he knew to what extent he was reposing confidence in others; but it is quite in point to ask him if he realizes what the extent of his backing is. Translating somewhat literally: TH. "Buttressed upon you." PH. "Do you know to what extent (you are) buttressed? I give you fair warning, soldier, that if ever after this day I find you in this street, you are a dead man."

⁸ Cf. what Caesar has to say (*B. C.* iii. 59. 3) of two native officers who forgot their place: sed . . . stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos. Note how *elati* here balances *fretus* above; so *despiciebant* and *despiciens*.

⁹ Cf. Statius, *Theb.* x. 475.

Lucretius, vi. 1056 ff.:

Illud in his rebus mirari mitte, quod aestus
 Non valet e lapide hoc alias impellere item res,
Pondere enim fretae partim stant, quod genus aurum;

The poet is here explaining why certain substances are not affected by magnetic influence. Some, gold for example, he says are too heavy. For *fretus* as applied to metals and the like an active or subjective interpretation is, of course, impossible, unless there be a rather vivid personification, of which there is no evidence here; *pondere fretae* then means "buttressed (or secured) by their weight." Cf. the following:

Cicero, *Phil.* x. 18: Potest igitur stare res publica *freta veteranis* sine magno subsidio iuventutis?

This passage is strikingly like the last, even in the matter of the rare juxtaposition of the verb *stare* with *fretus*. It differs in that *res publica* is capable of easy personification, and that *veteranis* refers to persons.¹⁰ But, even so, a passive interpretation is tempting; Cicero resents the extent to which the veterans are being brought into politics, and he has pointed out that the state has other staunch supporters, who must be reckoned with. Resuming, he seems to say: "Can the state maintain itself buttressed (i.e., upheld) by veterans alone?"¹¹

Bell. Afr. 31. 5: Animadvertibat enim, quamquam *magnis* essent *copiis* adversarii *freti*, tamen saepe a se fugatis pulsus perterritisque et concessam vitam et ignota peccata; quibus rebus numquam tanta suppeteret ex ipsorum inertia conscientiaque animi victoriae fiducia, ut castra sua adoriri auderent.

The general context shows unmistakably the passive sense of *fretus* here: The enemy have large forces, but they are so far from reposing confidence in them that they husband all their strength, even to the point of sparing the lives of deserters; and Caesar notes that they have not spirit enough to be likely to attack his camp. The phrase *quamquam magnis copiis freti* then must mean: "Although backed by great forces"; indeed, *freti* in

¹⁰ Cf. the use of *alteris*, Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 18. 12.

¹¹ Cf. Statius, *Theb.* xi. 261.

this connection is not so very remote in sense from *instructi*. In another passage, which has to do with the preparedness of the enemy, there seems a very similar use of *copiis*:

Auctor ad Her. iv. 9. 13 fin.: *Nulla igitur re inducti, nulla spe freti arma sustulerunt? Quis hoc credet, tantam amentiam quemquam tenuisse, ut imperium populi Romani temptare auderet nullis copiis fretus?*

Two other examples having to do with military reenforcement are of interest here:

Livy xlii. 11. 4: . . . Bastarnarum gentem excitam sedibus suis, quorum *auxilio fretus* in Italiam transiret.

Livy xxix. 4. 6: Ad Magonem non legati modo (missi), sed viginti quinque longae naves, sex milia peditum, octingenti equites, septem elephantum, ad hoc magna pecunia ad conducenda auxilia, quibus *fretus* propius urbem Romanam exercitum admoveret coniungeretque se Hannibali.

In the first of these sentences, the fact that *fretus* is part and parcel of the purpose element is significant for the interpretation. The king undoubtedly has confidence in the Bastarnae—that is shown in the very fact that he summoned them—"in order that, thus reenforced, he might invade Italy." The other passage is very similar; the question of interpretation is complicated a little, however, by the fact of change of subject in the purpose clause.

Auct. ad Her. iii. 16. 29: Quare et illis, qui natura memores sunt, utilis haec erit institutio, . . . ; et si illi, *freti ingenio*, nostri non indigerent, tamen iusta causa daretur, quare iis, qui *minus ingenii habent*, adiumento velimus esse.

The discussion here has to do with the value of memory training, and people are divided into two classes—those who have good natural memory, and those who lack it. Only by giving an arbitrary and doubtful meaning to *non indigerent*¹² can *freti ingenio* be made anything but an echo of *qui natura memores sunt* above; i.e., it is an example of the passive use (lit., "fortified by their talent").

¹² E.g., "they thought that they had no need of us."

Cicero, *p. Clu.* 10: Primum igitur illud est ex quo intellegi possit debuisse Cluentium magno opere *causae confidere*, quod *certissimis criminibus* et *testibus fretus* ad accusandum descenderit.

Unless there is an awkward tautology here, the confidence of the accuser in his case is expressed by *causae confidere*, while the following clause sets forth the grounds of his confidence, namely, the fact that he had the backing of well established evidence and trustworthy witnesses. The larger context shows that this is the meaning intended; for Cicero is explaining that Cluentius was fairly forced to undertake the prosecution of Oppianicus because of the latter's flagrant acts, and it is the character of the evidence that is in question, and not the prosecutor's attitude toward it.¹³ The rendering then is "backed (by)," or the like.¹⁴

Rutilius Lupus, 2. 2: Sed necesse est aut *legibus fretum* meminisse libertatis, aut *unius potestati traditum* quotidianam commentari servitutem.

This sentence is an illustration of a rhetorical figure by which types are contrasted; and it is here stated that a person must belong to one of the two categories indicated. Under a republican régime (*legibus fretum*), a man will cultivate an independent spirit; but under a monarchy (*unius potestati traditum*) he must daily practice servility. The case is not conclusive; but the balance of the sentence favors a passive interpretation, "buttressed (or made secure) by laws."

Vergil, *Aen.* v. 430 ff.:

Ille pedum melior motu *fretusque iuventa*,
Hic membris et mole valens.

This sentence tells the strong points of the two boxers; and since youthful confidence is a rather poor asset in a meeting with an experienced fighter, the meaning of *fretus* probably is pas-

¹³ In any case, an active interpretation would yield a weak sentence; for it is a prosecutor's business to provide himself with evidence and witnesses that will convince other people.

¹⁴ Compare the first case discussed under this head, where *fretum* is used in connection with *munitum* (Q. Cicero, *de Petit. Cons.* 25).

sive: "One quicker on his feet and buoyed up by youth,¹⁵ the other powerful of limb and heavy."

Propertius, iv. 10. 31 ff.;

Forte super portae dux Veius astitit arcem,
Colloquiumque sua *fretus ab urbe* dedit.

This sentence has commonly been counted rather difficult. But in the light of the passive use of *fretus* so often illustrated above, and taking into account the circumstance that Propertius is rather fond of inserting gratuitously a defining preposition here and there, the meaning of the sentence seems clear enough: "As it chanced, the Veientian leader took his stand over a fortified gate, and, secured by his city-walls (*sua fretus ab urbe*), engaged in a parley."

It is customary to connect the prepositional phrase with *colloquium dedit* in the sense "forth from his city." This leaves *fretus* quite isolated; and, in his note on the passage, Butler (who evidently regards *fretus* as active in sense) proposed to understand with it an ablative *urbe* supplied from the prepositional phrase.

Others who understand the sentence essentially in this way supply nothing, postulating here an absolute use of *fretus* in the sense of "confidently" or the like. So the *Thesaurus*, which claims two other examples of such use, both late. In one of these passages (Nepotianus, i. 2. 3) the desired meaning is made possible only through emendation of the clause in which *fretus* stands; and, in the other case, it is by no means certain that the word is used absolutely:

Corippus, *Ioh.* iv. 118 ff.:

Campis sua signa locavit,
Et sociis sic *fretus* ait:

The wider context here shows that the troops were in anything but a state of mind to inspire their leader with confidence; but a

¹⁵ It is possible that the difficult passage in Valerius Flaccus, iii. 628 ff. should be interpreted in this way. The editors, however, seem to be agreed that *studiis* is used for *factionibus*.

little earlier in the passage it is said of the commander himself "*confusus virtute sua.*" Hence it is possible that *sic* should be construed with *fretus* (rather than with *ait*), as a sort of echo of the earlier expression; if so, the adverb roughly takes the place of an ablative.

The one really satisfactory illustration of the absolute use of *fretus* is found in Statius, *Theb.* vi. 24, already discussed above,¹⁶ and the support for such interpretation in the passage from Propertius is thus not very strong. It fits ill, also, with the poet's manifest feeling of pity for Veii to represent its champion as "talking large" when lurking behind a breastwork. The passive interpretation, on the other hand ("secured by his city-walls"), is entirely fitting at this point, and quite in harmony with the sequel, wherein the chief descends into the open in answer to his adversary's challenge: "*forti melius concurrere campo.*"

This is the sole example of the passive use in which the function of the ablative seems to be defined by the addition of a preposition. It offers an interesting foil to the rare (and late) instances in which the ablative with the active use is accompanied by the preposition *in*. These will be noted later.

2. THE ACTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE USE

In connection with the passive use just discussed, the thing indicated by the ablative affects the subject of *fretus*. Here it is a question of the attitude of the subject of *fretus* toward the thing for which the ablative stands, e.g., "relying (on)," "trusting (in)," "counting (upon)," etc. In general, this is more familiar ground; but it is worth while to consider some of the test cases that establish the category, if for nothing more than to show how different they are from the examples treated under the previous head.

¹⁶ The *Thesaurus* disposes of the case otherwise; see page 306, note 5.

Auct. ad Her. iv. 54. 67: Noli, Saturnine, nimium *populi frequentia fretus* esse; inulti iacent Gracchi.¹⁷

The hortatory note looks directly to subjective and active function on the part of *fretus*; for it would be quite illogical to exhort Saturninus not to be acted upon by something (i.e., "don't be too much supported by the crowd"). The popular leader is urged rather not to *count too much on* the mob, the fate of the Gracchi being cited as an object lesson.¹⁸

Ennius, *Frq.* 75 ff. (Ribbeck):

Quid petam praesidi aut exsequar? *Quove nunc
Auxilio exili aut fuga(e) freta sim?*

The deliberative question cannot be anything but active and subjective, and the function of *freta* is thus fixed.

In the discussion of the passive use, it was shown that the possibilities of an active interpretation are much circumscribed when the ablative refers to some issue that is past and closed. On the other hand, the active or subjective use is clearly indicated when there is an outreach into the future, "counting (upon)," "taking for granted," etc. This point is well illustrated in the sentences just cited above; cf. too, the following:

Propertius, iv. 6. 41:

Solve metu patriam, quae nunc *te vindice freta*
Imposuit prorae publica vota tuae.

Cicero, *p. Sex. Rose.* 110: . . . cum illo partem suam depecisci, hisce *aliqua fretus mora* semper omnis aditus ad Sullam intercludere.

Caesar, *B. G.* vi. 5. 7: Illi nulla coacta manu, *loci praesidio freti*, in silvas paludesque confugiunt suaque eodem conferunt.

In the first passage, Augustus is setting out for Actium, followed by the prayers of the people trusting to him for victory (*te vindice freta*).¹⁹ The second sentence has to do with a double

¹⁷ The text of this passage is somewhat confused.

¹⁸ Cf. the hortatory suggestion in Livy ix. 40. 4 (*debere*). So Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 63. 1 and Livy vi. 29. 2, where *fretus* and the ablative are only a subordinate part of the hortative phrase, yet seem to be an integral element.

¹⁹ A striking case of defining redundancy is found in Augustine (*de Civ. D.* v. 21): *fretus securitate victoriae* naves, quibus victus necessarius portabatur, incendit. Without *fretus*, the sense would be complete. As it stands, *fretus* seems used in the passive sense; but *fretus victoria* would be active, as above.

game played by Capito. The more the matter drags on, the better for him; so he stops all access to Sulla, always *counting on* some delay. The third case may not be quite as clear; but the sequel (*confugiunt*, etc.) shows that the natives had been looking forward to, and counting upon, the security of the fastness to which they retire.²⁰

Plautus, *Cas.* 345 ff.:

OL. Quid si sors aliter quam voles evenerit?

LY. Benedice. *Dis* sum *fretus*, deos sperabimus.

OL. Non ego istuc verbum empsim tittibilicio.

Nam omnes mortales *dis* sunt *freti*, sed tamen

Vidi ego *dis* *fretos* saepe multos decipi.

The active and subjective force of *fretus* is obvious enough throughout this passage; but it is driven home in the last line by *decipi*, which represents men as victims of misplaced confidence.²¹ Cf. also:

Seneca, *Oed.* 286 ff.:

Hic *pace fretum* subita praedonum manus

Aggressa ferro facinus occultum tulit.

Here the victim takes security for granted (*pace fretum*) and thereby loses his life.²²

Livy, xl. 47. 6: Tum maximus natu ex eis: "Missi sumus," inquit, "a gente nostra, qui sciscitaremur, *qua* tandem *re fretus* arma nobis inferres." Ad hanc percunationem Graecus *exercitu* se *egregio fidentem* venisse respondit.

Cicero, *Cato M.* 72: . . . cum illi quaerenti *qua* tandem *re fretus* sibi tam audaciter obsisteret, respondisse dicitur: "*Senectute.*"

²⁰ Cf. Plautus, *Capt.* 349 ff., where a future outlook is indicated by the fact that the speaker is professing to take a chance on something that might be counted a doubtful venture.

²¹ In both the active and the passive sense, *fretus* normally indicates a situation or an attitude that looks toward action of some sort. But *misplaced* confidence is naturally enough associated with a passive verb, as here.

²² For other cases of misplaced confidence, cf. Terence, *And.* 619 (unless ironical), Cicero, *p. Sest.* 57, Lucan, ix. 131, Valerius Flaccus, l. 721, Valerius Maximus, ix. 12, Ex. 9, Calpurnius Flaccus, *Decl.* 26; and perhaps Livy, xxxi. 23. 2, Vergil, *Aen.* v. 791, Florus, ii. 8. 6.

In the first of these passages, the answer to the question shows clearly the active sense in which *qua re fretus* was understood by the person questioned. The other case is similar, but not so well defined.

Livy, viii. 29. 12: ut non in castra solum refugerent hostes, sed iam ne *vallo* quidem ac *fossis freti* dilaberentur in oppida, situ urbium moenibusque se defensuri.

Here is a case of loss of morale. The enemy flee to their camp; and then, losing confidence even in these defenses, they slip away to fortified cities. Physically they were buttressed by their camp, and the negatived *freti* is naturally subjective in meaning (note *iam*).²³

Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 103: Ita adsequor ut alio tempore cogitem quid dicam et alio dicam; quae duo plerique *ingenio freti* simul faciunt. Sed certe eidem illi melius aliquanto dicerent, si aliud sumendum sibi tempus ad cogitandum, aliud ad dicendum putarent.

Without the definition provided by the last clause of this sentence, it would be impossible to decide whether *freti* is active or passive. But Cicero is not praising the extemporizers as geniuses; on the contrary, he states that their performance is far from satisfactory. Hence *freti* must be active in sense (e.g., "trusting to their wit").²⁴

Livy, ix. 35. 3: Etrusci omnium praeterquam multitudinis suae, *qua sola freti* erant, immemores, proelium ineunt adeo raptim ut

The Etruscans certainly had other backing than mere numbers—indeed the text states that they forgot all the rest; hence

²³ The use of a negative with *fretus* is not common; cf. Livy, xxxviii. 2. 13, xxxix. 51. 4; Seneca, *de Const. Sap.* 6. 3.

²⁴ This passage well illustrates the fact that the function of *fretus* cannot be determined offhand by the nature of the word that stands in the ablative. Here *ingenio freti* is clearly active, whereas in Auc. ad Her., iii. 16. 29 the same phrase is adequately defined as passive (see discussion on p. 311).

It is true, of course, that certain ablatives lend themselves more readily to one interpretation or the other; e.g., the phrase *dis fretus* is presumptively active. In the case of an ablative like *virtute*, the modifier has to be reckoned with; thus, the presumption of active force is greater for *sua virtute fretus* than for *militum virtute fretus*. In Curtius, v. 8. 10, *vestra virtute fretus* is pretty certainly passive.

freti must be active, "on which they placed their whole reliance."²⁵

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 79: Itaque *fretus sanctitate tribunatus* (cum se non modo contra vim et ferrum sed etiam contra verba atque interfectionem legibus sanctis esse armatum putaret), venit in templum Castoris, obnuntiavit consuli.

The parenthetic *cum*-clause explains the grounds of Sestius' confidence, and thus confirms the active force of *fretus*.

Livy, x. 24. 4: In contione, ut inter militares viros et *factis* potius quam *dictis fretos*, pauca verba habita.

This manifestly is a reflection upon the attitude of the military mind which puts greater value upon action than upon talk.

When used with the dative case, *fretus* obviously can have only active and subjective force, "relying (on)," "confiding (in)," "trusting (to)," "taking for granted," etc. It is at this point, therefore, that Livy's rather unsuccessful experiment with the dative should be noticed. The possible examples follow:

iv. 37. 6: et C. Sempronius, cui ea provincia sorti evenit, tamquam constantissimae rei *fortunae fretus*, . . . omnia temere ac negligenter egit.

vi. 13. 1: Multitudo hostium *nulli rei* praeterquam *numero freta*, et oculis utramque metiens aciem, temere proelium iniit.

vi. 31. 6: (Populatio), quam Volseus latrocinii more, discordiae²⁶ hostium *fretus* et virtutem metuens, per trepidationem raptim fecerat . . .

viii. 22. 7: Haec civitas cum *suis viribus* tum Samnitium *infidae* adversus Romanos *societati freta*, sive pestilentiae . . . fidens, multa hostilia adversus Romanos . . . fecit.

xxxix. 51. 4: Semper talem exitum vitae suae Hannibal prospexerat animo; et Romanorum inexpiable odium in se cernens et *fidei* regum nihil sane *fretus*²⁷ (Prusiae vero levitatem etiam expertus erat), Flaminini quoque adventum velut fatalem sibi horruerat.

²⁵ For the effect of *sola* in this passage, cf. that of *ipso* in xxxi. 40. 2. Note also that the dative is chosen in a similar situation (vi. 13. 1).

²⁶ Al., *discordia*.

²⁷ Al., *confusus*.

3. THE INDETERMINATE USE

Though, as already shown, an active and a passive use of *fretus* are abundantly established by test cases, it is often very difficult, and sometimes quite impossible, to determine whether a given case is to be assigned to one category or the other. It is very likely that Roman linguistic consciousness at times registered no sharply distinct choice; and, in this connection, special interest attaches to sentences like the following:

Livy, xxi. 49. 13: *Nec Romani detrectavere pugnam et memoria circa ea ipsa loca gestarum rerum freti et militum multitudine ac virtute.*

Cicero, *de Off.* i. 114: *Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemestram.*

In the first of these passages, the memory of previous glorious national achievement is naturally felt as a spur, thus pointing to a passive interpretation of *freti*; but the distinctness of this impression fades as the sentence progresses, and (by a sort of zeugma) the active notion "counting (upon)" tends to obtrude, especially with *virtute* at the end.

The other example is permeated throughout with the atmosphere of self-appraisal—which looks toward an active interpretation of *freti*. At the word *voce*, the force of *freti* perhaps hangs in the balance, but the situation clears with *gestu*, which could scarcely fit with any but an active interpretation.

That there are many cases in regard to which the meaning of *fretus* is not sharply defined is entirely natural, and it should cause no concern. For, in a study of this sort, it is the business of syntax merely to establish categories on the basis of clear test cases; to attempt to pigeonhole every example would be both futile and unscientific.

A few of the intermediate cases, however, are well worth study as illustrating the general problem, and as showing some of the factors that incline the balance one way or the other. The following sentence is typical:

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 15. 1: Postquam rex finem loquendi fecit, legati Iugurthae, *largitione* magis quam *causa freti*, paucis respondent.

The question here is whether *largitione* represents a fact on which the legates are buttressed or by which they are made confident (passive use); or whether there is an outlook toward the future, the legates counting upon bribery more than upon the merits of their case (active use) to bring about results desired. Most readers probably will incline to this active interpretation; but there seems to be no means of reaching an absolutely definite decision.²⁸

Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 34. 5: Nam Civilis aderat, non minus *vitiis* hostium quam *virtute* suorum *fretus*.

Here again it is easy to catch the suggestion of future outlook; Civilis seems to be "counting upon" the mistakes of the enemy to help his cause. It is interesting to note that two of Livy's possible five sentences with the dative are strikingly similar in general content (vi. 31. 6, and viii. 22. 7; so one with the ablative, ii. 25. 1).²⁹

Cicero, *de Nat. D.* i. 49: Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen *fretus intelligentia vestra* dissero brevius quam causa desiderat.

Again the same question is involved: Is the speaker encouraged *by* the intelligence of the audience to risk short explanations, or does he take this course trusting *to* the intelligence of the hearers to carry them through? In any case, it is a courteous and complimentary turn and something of a favorite with Cicero.³⁰

Cicero, *ad Fam.* v. 7. 1: Tantam enim spem oti ostendisti, quantum ego semper omnibus *te uno fretus* pollicebar.

This is a case in which the general meaning of the sentence is bound up with the question of active or passive force in

²⁸ Cf. Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 20. 5; Nepos, *Dat.* 8. 3 (note *spes* preceding), and Tacitus, *Ann.* xiv. 32. 4.

²⁹ Cf. Nepos, *Dion.* 5. 3 (*odio*).

³⁰ So *vestra prudentia* (*p. Cael.* 19), *vestra sapientia* (*p. Cael.* 44), *humanitate ac sapientia vestra* (*p. Cael.* 75), *fide sapientiaque vestra* (*p. Scx. Rosc.* 10).

fretus, i.e., "basing my confidence on you alone" or "backed by you alone." The former interpretation certainly is far more complimentary to Pompey; and it fits well with the laudatory and ingratiating tone of the letter as a whole.³¹

Cicero, *p. Flacc.* 35: Quod ergo unus Asclepiades, fortuna egens, vita turpis, existimatione damnatus, *impudentia* atque *audacia fretus*, sine tabulis, sine auctore iecerit, id nos quasi crimen aut testimonium pertimescamus?

Terence, *Phor.* 273 ff.:

Sed si quis forte *malitia fretus sua*
Insidias nostrae fecit adulescentiae
Ac vicit, nostran culpa east an iudicum,
Qui saepe propter invidiam adimunt diviti
Aut propter misericordiam addunt pauperi?

These two examples appear similar at first sight; but closer inspection reveals a possible difference. In the first passage, Cicero is making a merciless attack upon a witness against Flaccus. The poor wretch is described as lacking practically everything essential in the way of backing; does Cicero mean to make one scathing exception, asserting that he is "accoutered with brazen impudence"?

In the other sentence there is a suggestion of the spider *depending upon* his cunning to snare the unwary victim. But in neither case is the interpretation certain.

Terence, *Phor.* 966 ff.:

Ego redigam vos in gratiam, *hoc fretus*, Chremes,
Quom e medio excessit, unde haec suscepst tibi.

This passage has caused the commentators some difficulty, though it is not the interpretation of *fretus* that is in question; indeed, either as active or passive the word would fit well enough.

³¹ A case like this, in which the general meaning of the sentence is bound up with the question of active or passive meaning in *fretus*, goes to show that we are dealing here with no mere academic distinction.

Even when the voice of *fretus* is not vital to the general bearing of a passage, the distinction between active and passive may yet be comparable to the difference between *timor legati* (fear felt toward the governor) and *ex legato timor* (Tactius, *Agr.* 16. 2). Either of these expressions would satisfy the general meaning of the passage in the *Agricola*; but the first is active, whereas, in the other, *timor* indicates a state of feeling *inspired by* the governor. Cf. Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 2. 18: τὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόβον.

The general situation is clear: Chremes has a daughter by a wife secretly wedded in foreign parts, and the speaker assures him that he will smooth matters over with the first wife, in view of the fact that the other woman is dead.

The editors seem to be in general agreement that *hoc Quom* here means “(in) this that”;³² and it is true enough that the *cum*-clause appears in substantive use at all periods of the language. But in such cases *cum* hardly has the force of “(the fact) that.”³³

Another method of explaining the passage now under discussion is suggested by sentences like the following:

Plautus, *Rud.* 1234:
Isto tu pauper es, quom nimis sancto pius.

Here a causal ablative is picked up by a causal *cum*-clause, in a quite natural way.³⁴

Since the ablative with *fretus* is often instrumental, the question is raised whether it might not possibly be causal on occasion; certainly there are passages which suggest that shading more or less clearly.³⁵ On this basis, there would be no difficulty with *hoc fretus, quom e medio excessit, unde*: “confident on this account, because she is dead, by whom”

³² Cf. Ashmore *ad loc.*

³³ See Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*, I, 85, and cf. present series, VII, 131.

³⁴ Bennett, *op. cit.*, I, 135, proposes a special category, which he calls substantive causal *cum*-clauses. This seems quite unnecessary; in fact, Bennett's examples belong to different categories, and the first (a very attractive one) proves to be an emendation.

³⁵ E.g., Ps. Sallust, *de Re P.* i. 7. 1: *Ac mihi animus, quibus rebus alii timent, maxime fretus est,—negotii magnitudine et quia*

Here *quibus rebus* can hardly be anything else than causal, and the reader is insidiously moved to carry that same force on to *eis*, which must be supplied with *fretus*. This feeling is reinforced when *rebus* is expanded into *negotii magnitudine* mated with a following *quia*-clause.

The suggestions of the context give odd turns to the apparent meaning of *fretus* itself; witness the glosses in the *Thesaurus* article. For example, the implications of a sentence may make *fretus* seem almost to replace *usus*:

Ammianus Marcellinus, xvii. 13. 27: *peragrans pedibus flumina, non congressibus nec armis fretus aut viribus, sed latrociniiis adsuetus occultis.*

II

It now remains, in the light of the previous discussion, to consider the grammatical standing of the ablative with *fretus*. Where the passive use is sharply defined, the ablative must be classed as instrumental, whereas, with clear cases of the active use, the relation is one that might seem to call for the use of the preposition *in* ("relying on," "basing confidence upon," etc.). Between these extremes lies a large mass of cases in which it is difficult to determine definitely the function of *fretus*; probably, as above noted, the Roman speaker or hearer often was not forced to a conscious choice between active and passive.

Here is a somewhat discouraging situation from the point of view of "orthodox" Latin grammar, which would refer every construction to a unified and clear category or source. It may be necessary in this case to face a very different alternative, namely that of recognizing in the construction with *fretus* what Gildersleeve would call a phraseological expression, that is, a syntactical unit which is a law unto itself, a round peg that does not fit into any of the square holes of standardized grammar.

That the turn is set and phraseological is indicated by the almost total lack of prepositions with the ablative. This is specially striking in connection with the active use of *fretus*; for if it is good Latin to say *in te spes est*³⁶ and *spes consistebat in se*,³⁷ why not also *in te fretus sum*?³⁸

³⁶ Terence, *Eun.* 1054.

³⁷ Nepos, *Dat.* 8. 3.

³⁸ No occurrence of *in* is cited before the time of Donatus. On Vergil, *Aen.* viii. 143 (which reads *His fretus*), he comments: "*in his* inquit *fretus*, illis scilicet, quae superius dixit, hoc est, *virtute sua*, deorum *responsis*," etc. If this expansion of Vergil's *His* into *in his* is intended to make very explicit the force of the ablative as understood by the commentator, the example is valuable indeed. Donatus once elsewhere employs *fretus* on his own account (i.e., the word does not appear in the text on which he is commenting), and it is interesting to note that he does not there use the preposition, though the general sentiment of the phrase is strikingly similar: *Hoc ita dixit quasi obsidium fretus sua virtute contemneret* (on *Aen.* xi. 385). The sixth century provides one other example of *in* with the ablative:

Iordanis, Geta 141: *Mox ad eos collecto venit exercitu, nec tamen fretus in armis, sed gratia muneribusque victurus, pacemque, victualia illis concedens, cum ipsis inito foedere fecit.*

There is here a manuscript variant which omits *in*.

As for the passive use, even though the ablative not infrequently refers to person, the absence of a preposition is of less significance,³⁹ because various other considerations may enter here. In the first place, a person who is a buttress can be treated as a means rather than as an agent, as in the familiar *cornua Numidis firmat*.⁴⁰ Again, in connection with the use of *fretus* generally, there are a good many ablatives of the style of Juvenal's *adsiduo ruptae lectore columnae*,⁴¹ to which Lane gives some attention.⁴²

It may be pertinent to note also that, within narrow limits, a construction may be determined by the company it keeps, as in Sallust's *Romae Numidiaequae*;⁴³ compare, too, the influence of the connection upon the second ablative in the following passage:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 1: . . . non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset.

Adding to these considerations the fact that the passive group seems much smaller than the active, it may be hardly an occasion for surprise that there the ablative is used without preposition, though the reference occasionally is to persons.⁴⁴ It is the lack of preposition with the active use that strongly supports the view that the construction is phraseological in character.⁴⁵

³⁹ One instance was noted where an instrumental ablative is reenforced by *ab* (Propertius, iv. 10. 32).

⁴⁰ Worthy of note in this connection is an odd redundant phrase in Ammianus Marcellinus, xxi. 14. 5: *genios . . . , quorum adminiculis freti*.

⁴¹ i. 13. So *te vindice* (Propertius iv. 6. 41), *Polluce magistro* (Stattius, *Theb.*, vi. 741), *duce Pompeio* (Cicero, *ad Fam.* vi. 6. 6) *socia Iunone* (Valerius Flaccus, i. 73), etc.

⁴² Latin Grammar, § 1319.

⁴³ *Bell. Iug.* 33. 4.

⁴⁴ Perhaps it also bears upon this question that *fretus* is much more an adjective than a participle. Nowhere does it seem to betray any past force.

⁴⁵ The preliterary period of the language lies in such deep obscurity that one hesitates even to hazard a guess as to the meaning of the lack of preposition in connection with the active use. But it is conceivable that the construction with *fretus* goes back to a time when the Latin "ablative" was not felt to require so much prepositional definition as at a later period. In Sanskrit it is possible to say "in a thing" without the use of a preposition.

The very large middle ground between active and passive may have contributed to the solidarity of the *fretus*-with-ablative idiom. One generation learned it from another in this way, and the lack of a preposition with the active use doubtless troubled the Romans as little as certain peculiarities of English trouble us. We say "Give the book *to him*," but "Give *him* the book"; and to most people, if they think about the matter at all, this is merely a question of inserting a preposition with one order and of "idiomatically" leaving it out with the other. They would burst into laughter, perhaps, if they heard anyone say "Give *to him* the book"; yet they would tell you that the correct diction "him" means "to him." In some such way, *virtute fretus* might have seemed to the Romans to have the force of *in virtute fretus*, though such phrasings are not found in the classical period.

At this point, some bewildered reader may be asking: But what of the *origin* of the construction? The answer is that we do not know the origin, nor are we likely to know it. For the solution of the syntactical problem, it is infinitely more important to determine the reaction of Roman linguistic consciousness in the classical period than it is to speculate about an origin; and the study of the context of concrete examples is more likely to yield results of solid worth than would a whole sheaf of a priori theories.

It is evident at the very outset how futile a quest for origin would be in this particular matter; for the ablative with *fretus* means both "in" and "by," but the Romans did not use for one group of cases such forms as the comparative philologist would classify as "locative," and for the other such forms as are recognized in the same way as "instrumental." This accords with the obvious fact that, to the Roman, the ablative case was a unity. It is all very well for us to label *lapide* as a "locative formation"; but the Romans, in their innocence, said *lapide percussus est*. And it may be gratifying to learn that *gladio* is a "true ablative" (i.e., a separative formation); but *gladio percussus est* is the best of Latin.

We therefore have no clear and definite base from which to set out in quest of an origin; and it is altogether useless to attempt to push back into the preliterary period. For there the one thing of which we can be certain, in this connection, is that a variety of forms fell into the melting-pot of the Latin ablative, where they forthwith lost (in Roman linguistic consciousness) any individuality they may have enjoyed up to that time. Here is a morass without a path.

It is the fashion, of course, to approach this problem from an entirely different angle. A start is made with the fantastic postulate of I.E. paradigms in which the cases were neatly ticketed with exclusive meanings (locative, "in"; instrumental, "with" or "by"; ablative, "from"). Assuming (another very large assumption) that *fretus* or its progenitor started down the stream associated with one of these cases exclusively, what chance is there that the initial impulse would penetrate unaffected through generations of illiteracy, and through a confusion of case-use so pronounced that in the melting-pot of the Latin ablative these cases lost all individuality?

The crowning touch of absurdity is added when it is proposed to make a choice between the suggested derivations of the word *fretus*, and on that basis to select a possible cognate in Sanskrit, for example, and to try to elucidate the ablative with *fretus* in the light of the case-use found with the Sanskrit word thus selected.

This sort of exercise may supply an agreeable mental gymnastic; but it cannot lead to results of scientific worth. Its fallibility is abundantly evident in the fact that the doctors so widely disagree in their guesses, and that individual scholars change their ground from time to time.

Elsewhere, at some length, a protest has been entered against the sins that are committed in the name of comparative syntax and the historical method,⁴⁶ and the argument need not be further rehearsed here.

Destructive criticism, of course, is often easy enough. The present study of the construction with *fretus* will perhaps serve as a constructive contribution to the subject of case-syntax. The method followed rests upon two fundamental principles:

- (1) In Latin syntax the problem is to determine the reaction of the Roman speaker or hearer to a given construction.
- (2) This reaction is to be determined by a study of the context of the concrete examples available.

With what success the method has been here applied the reader must judge. At any rate, up to the present time no other method has been devised that seems to promise more reliable results in a study of such problems as the use of *fretus* with the ablative.

III

CONSPECTUS

It has seemed worth while to add a list of the instances of the use of *fretus* in the classical period which can be brought together with a reasonable amount of effort. Such an assemblage makes it possible to see at a glance the usage of individual authors; compare, for example, the very different vocabulary of Cicero and Livy in the matter of ablatives with *fretus*, and note that *viribus* is the only word so used by Valerius Maximus in the examples available from that author. The conspectus makes it possible also to compare the ambiguous endings (-o, -is, -ibus) with others.

It should be added that *fretus* is conjectured in several passages not included in this list: Plautus, *Mil. G.* 8., *Rud.* 208; Cicero, *in Pis.* 8, Fronto, p. 206. 18.

⁴⁶ Present volume, 274 ff., and the *American Journal of Philology*, XLVIII, 13 ff.

- Auctor ad Her.:
 ii. 5. 8; innocentia
 iii. 16. 29; ingenio
 iv. 9. 13; qua (re); spe; copiis
 iv. 54. 67; frequentia*
- Apuleius:
 Apol. 3; aequitate, innocentia
 Apol. 91; doctrina, eruditione
 de Plat. 2. 20; conscientia
 Flor. 9. 40; solacio
 Met. xi. 6; volentia
- Balbus and Oppius:
 apud Cic. ad Att. ix. 7. A. 1;
 humanitate
- Bellum Africum:
 31. 5; copiis
 79. 1; inopia
- Bellum Hispaniense:
 9. 1; opinione
 16. 3; virtute
 26. 4; praesidiis*
 28. 3; opinione
- Caesar (and Hirtius):
 B. C. iii. 59. 3; amicitia
 B. G. iii. 21. 1; victoriis
 B. G. vi. 5. 7; praesidio
 B. G. viii. 39. 2; oportunitate
- Calpurnius Flaccus:
 Decl. 26; auxiliis
- Cicero (M.):
 ad Att. v. 21. 12; gratia
 ad Fam. ii. 10. 2; angustiis,
 natura
 ad Fam. iii. 7. 6; conscientia
 ad Fam. v. 7. 1; te
 ad Fam. vi. 6. 6; duce Pompeio
 ad Fam. xii. 18. 1; prudentia
 ad Fam. xii. 19. 1; industria,
 prudentia
 ad Fam. xiii. 66. 2; clementia
 Cato M. 72; re; senectute
 de Imp. Pomp. 58; vobis
 de Invent. i. 3; ingenio
 de Invent. i. 8; scientia
 de Nat. D. i. 49; intellegentia
 de Off. i. 114; voce, gestu
 de Orat. ii. 103; ingenio
 Frg. (Aecon. 82); qua (dignitate)
 in Cat. ii. 29; prudentia, consiliis, significationibus
 in Verr. ii. 3. 61; auctoritate, gratia
 Orat. 170; hoc (neut.)
 p. Cael. 19; prudentia
 p. Cael. 44; sapientia
 p. Cael. 75; humanitate, sapientia
 p. Cael. 77; familiaritate
 p. Clu. 10; eriminibus, testibus
 p. Clu. 88; iudicibus
 p. Flacc. 35; impudentia, audacia
 p. Font. 18; testibus
 p. Lig. 1; familiaritate
 p. Mur. 15; quibus (ornamentis)
 p. Plane. 12; splendore, vetustate
 p. Plane. 103; vobis
 p. Quinet. 70; gratia
 p. Sest. 57; imperio
 p. Sest. 79; sanctitate
 p. Sex. Rose. 10; fide, sapientia
 p. Sex. Rose. 73; innocentia
 p. Sex. Rose. 110; mora
 Phil. x. 18; veteranis
 Phil. xi. 2; copiis
 Phil. xiii. 28; senatu
- Cicero (Q.):
 de Pet. Cons. 25; amicitiiis
- Columela:
 vi. 23. 3; viribus
- Curtius:
 v. 8. 10; virtute
 vii. 2. 12; conscientia
 vii. 7. 31; infin.
 vii. 11. 5; loco
- Ennius:
 Ann. 97; muro
 Ann. 533; viribus*
 Frg. 76 (Ribbeck); auxilio,
 fuga*

* Question of text.

- Festus:
p. 372; iure
- Florus:
ii. 8. 6; opibus, nomine
ii. 12. 9; religione
- Fronto:
p. 169. 19; spe
p. 173. 16; innocentia
p. 215. 20; facie
- Laberius (Decimus):
95 (Ribbeck); colustra
- Laus Pisonis:
135 (Baehrens); labore
- Livy:
i. 2. 5; animis
ii. 25. 1; discordia
ii. 30. 9; loco, armis
ii. 45. 10; his (neut.)
ii. 47. 4; multitudine
ii. 65. 3; virtute
iv. 9. 4; tutoribus
iv. 37. 6; dat. (fortunae)
iv. 13. 1; dat. (rei, numero)
vi. 29. 1; fortuna
vi. 29. 2; armis, animis
vi. 31. 6; dat. (discordiae)*
vii. 12. 4; occasione, virtute
vii. 14. 6; animis, viribus
vii. 32. 10; gloria, virtute
viii. 22. 7; dat. (viribus, societati)
viii. 29. 12; vallo, fossis
ix. 21. 4; spe, viribus
ix. 22. 2; multitudine
ix. 31. 12; loco, armis
ix. 35. 3; qua (multitudine)
ix. 40. 4; ferro, animis
x. 5. 5; infin.
x. 10. 7; pecunia
x. 24. 4; dietis, factis
xxi. 5. 12; multitudine
xxi. 49. 13; memoria, multitudine, virtute
xxv. 37. 9; ducibus, copiis
xxvi. 19. 9; quibus (neut.)
xxviii. 32. 9; velocitate, armis
- xxix. 4. 6; quibus (neut.)
xxix. 23. 7; promissis
xxix. 33. 3; multitudine, insidiis
xxxi. 23. 2; praesidio
xxxi. 27. 3; magnitudine, moenibus, situ
xxxi. 40. 2; situ
xxxii. 21. 20; natura, munimentis, exercitu
xxxiv. 17. 2; multitudine
xxxv. 3. 5; multitudine
xxxvii. 26. 5; his (neut.)
xxxviii. 2. 13; loco
xxxix. 51. 4; dat. (fidei)*
xl. 47. 6; re
xlii. 11. 4; auxiliis
xlv. 43. 4; locis, munimentis
- Lucan:
ix. 131; superis, munere
- Lucretius:
v. 966; virtute
vi. 1058; pondere
- Naevius:
Frg. 12 (Baehrens); pietati or pietate
- Nepos:
Cim. 2. 5; opulentia
Dat. 8. 3; quibus (neut.)
Dion. 5. 3; copiis, odio
Milt. 5. 4; numero
- Ovid:
Trist. iv. 3. 83; munere*
- Pacuvius:
Frg. 155 (Ribbeck); praesidio, auxiliis
- Persius:
iv. 3; quo (neut.)
- Plautus:
Amph. 212; virtute, viribus
Asin. 547; virtute*
Aul. 586; fiducia
Capt. 350; ingenio
Cas. 346 ff.; dis (ter)
Men. 767; dote
Ps. 581; virtute, industria, malitia

* Question of text.

- Pliny:
Pan. 66. 5; dextra, promissis
- Propertius:
i. 8. 42; quis (masc.)
iv. 6. 41; te vindice
iv. 10. 32; (ab) urbe
- Ps. Sallust:
de Re P. i. 7. 1; (rebus)
- Quintilian:
iv. 2. 15; meritis
- Rutilius Lupus:
2. 2; legibus
- Sallust:
B. C. 56. 6; opibus
B. I. 13. 3; multitudine
B. I. 15. 1; largitione, causa
B. I. 18. 12; alteris (masc.)
B. I. 20. 5; amicitia, Numidis
B. I. 59. 3; quibus (masc.)
B. I. 63. 1; dis
B. I. 85. 37; quis (neut.?)
B. I. 90. 1; dis
Hist. Frg. iii. 6; loco
- Seneca (philosophus):
de Const. Sap. 6. 3; his (neut.)
Oed. 286; pace
- Silius Italicus:
xii. 347; inventa
- Statius:
Theb. i. 299; exilio
Theb. ii. 539; duce
Theb. iv. 182; infn.
Theb. vi. 23; absol.(?)
Theb. vi. 741; Polluce magistro
Theb. x. 475; triumpho
Theb. xi. 261; solio
Theb. xii. 757; deis, armis
- Tacitus:
Ann. vi. 31. 2; bellis
Ann. xiv. 32. 4; tutela
Hist. iv. 34. 5; vitiis, virtute
Hist. iv. 66. 1; loco
- Terence:
And. 336; consilio
And. 619; quo (masc.)
Eun. 1063; vobis
H. T. 24; ingenio, natura
Phor. 273; malitia
Phor. 966; hoc (neut.)
- Turpilius:
Frg. 208 (Ribbeck); nobilitate,* factione
- Valerius Flaccus:
i. 73; socia Iunone et Pallade
i. 403; soceris, coniuge diva
i. 721; prole
iii. 628; studiis
iv. 101; fatis, numine
vi. 35; equis, viris
vii. 165; quo (veneno)
vii. 439; virtute
- Valerius Maximus:
vi. i. 2; viribus
ix. 11. Ex. 1; viribus
ix. 12. Ex. 9; viribus
- Varro:
de Ling. Lat. ix. 1; Chrysippo
- Velleius Paterculus:
ii. 20. 4; numero
- Vergil:
Aen. iv. 245; illa (virga)
Aen. v. 430; iuventa
Aen. v. 791; procellis
Aen. vi. 120; cithara, fidibus
Aen. viii. 143; his (neut.)
Aen. ix. 676; armis
Aen. xi. 787; pietate
- Vitruvius:
ii. Praef. 1; cogitationibus,
sollertia
vii. Praef. 7; memoria
ix. Praef. 18; auctoribus
x. 2. 13; gloria

* Question of text.

QUID ME FIET?

BY

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I

This study is complementary to recently published papers on the use of the ablative case with *fretus*¹ and in the phrase *Quid hoc homine facias*?² These last mentioned articles set forth at length the writer's views as to the proper method of approach in investigations of this sort; and the general principles there laid down are made the basis of procedure in the present discussion.³

In gathering material for the study of the syntactical group typified by such a question as that which stands at the head of this article, the investigator is confronted at the outset by the very disconcerting fact that no serious effort seems ever to have been made to establish a definite criterion for judging whether a given phrase is to be included in the group or not.

It has been the general practice to throw together phrases that show combinations of ablative or dative with *facio*, *fiō*, *futurum est*, etc., without careful scrutiny as to meaning. In the *Thesaurus*, the prevalent lack of precision is reflected (s.v. *facio*) in the careless inclusion of the following sentences:

Pollio, apud Ciceronem, *ad Fam.* x. 32. 4: quid *me* velitis facere constituite.

Plautus, *Capt.* 373 ff.:

Gratiam tibi habeo

Quom copiam istam mi et potestatem facis,

Ut ego ad parentes hunc remittam nuntium,

Qui me quid rerum hic agitem et quid fieri velim

Patri meo ordine omnem rem illuc perferat.

¹ Present volume, 305 ff.

² *American Journal of Philology*, XLVIII, 10 ff.

³ This method is so widely divergent from the traditional procedure that most readers may need to consider all three papers together, in order to pass judgment fairly upon the third.

In the first of these passages *me*, of course, is not an ablative, but the subject of the infinitive; and, in the other, the dative belongs with *perferat* and not with *feri*.

Though free from guilt of such gross error, there is hardly more discrimination shown in the inclusion of other passages variously cited; e.g.,

Plautus, *M. G.* 459 ff.:

PA. Eefer mihi machaeram huc intus. SC. Quid facies ea?

PA. Intro rumpam recta in aedis, quemque hic intus videro,

. . . . eum opruncabo.

Such a sentence has no place in the present discussion. It illustrates the commonest type of instrumental ablative, and the verb *facere* connotes accomplishment rather than mere doing.⁴ Cf. also:

Lucretius, v. 1269:

Nec minus *argento* facere haec *auroque* parabant.

This line has to do with the making of weapons in primitive times. Silver and gold are the materials *by* which, or perhaps *out of* which, the arms are to be fashioned,⁵ and *facere* is used in about the sense of *efficere*.

It would seem to be almost superfluous to point out that it is the purest assumption to infer that such perfectly commonplace ablatives of the thing as are shown above throw any light upon the nature of the ablative in questions like the following:

Quid *hoc homine* facias?

Quid *Tulliola mea* fiet?

Quid *te* futurum est?

Yet almost everywhere it is taken for granted that the ablative here too is instrumental.⁶

⁴ Very similar is Plautus, *Ps.* 88; so *Poen.* 167, though the case-form is ambiguous (*eis*).

⁵ Cf. Plautus, *Merc.* 130, though the case-form again is ambiguous (*foribus*).

⁶ E.g., Brix, on Plautus, *Tri.* 157: "Der Abl. *eo* ist bei *facere fieri esse* die echtlat. Konstruktion und von Hause aus nichts als ablat. instrum., bei dem der ungezwungene Übergang zu Personen aus folgenden Beispielen ersichtlich wird: . . ." So Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*, II, 335.

Ebrard indeed early declared for the source idea (*materies qua aliquid conficitur*), being influenced perhaps by sentences like Lucretius v. 1269 (which he quotes), and more so by a guess of Delbrück's.⁷ The present writer elsewhere⁸ has shown the danger of building upon speculative theories in connection with problems of the sort now in hand. And the futility of such procedure could hardly be better illustrated than at just this point; for Bennett⁹ cannot accept Ebrard's view, the reason being that Delbrück has meanwhile changed his ground, and now favors another comparative theory that looks toward "instrumental" meaning for the ablative!¹⁰

About the last thing that seems to have been thought of in this matter is the simple and obvious expedient of examining the Latin examples in their context, to see whether there can be found any clue to the Roman reaction to the ablative in phrases of the *Quid me fiet?* type. When once attention is turned in this direction, the evidence is found to be abundant and conclusive:

Plautus, *Most.* 1166 ff.:

TR. (Post) istam veniam, quid me fiet nunciam?

TH. *Verberibus*, lutum, caedere pendens.

Terence, *H. T.* 333 and 335:

CLIT. Quid hic faciet sua?

SY. . . . *ad tuam matrem abducetur.*

Cicero, in *Ferr.* ii. 1. 42: *Quid hoc homine faciatis aut¹¹ ad quam spem . . . reservetis?*

In each of these sentences, the appended clause shows clearly that it is not a question of accomplishing something *by* a means, or of evolving something *out of* a person. Rather, it is a matter of treatment to be accorded one, or of fate in store. Were it

⁷ *Jahrbücher für Klass. Phil.*, Supplementband x, 588, footnote.

⁸ Present volume, 325 ff.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰ Harkness, *Complete Latin Grammar*, 474, § 3, suggests "association" as the function of the case. This apparently is a chance suggestion, arising perhaps from idiomatic English renderings, where, however, the word "with" no more connotes association than it does in such a phrase as "do away with."

¹¹ Of course not disjunctive here.

not that this whole subject has been thoroughly prejudiced by a priori theorizing, most readers probably would at once agree that the Romans reacted to the ablative construction above as expressing specification; e.g., (*in Verr.* ii. 1. 42): “*With respect to such a fellow what are you to do?*”

On this basis, the solidarity of the group begins to appear; for there is little to choose between ablative and dative in the following:

Quid *hoc homine* facias?
Quid *huic homini* facias?

In one case, it is asked what you are to do in respect to the man; in the other, what treatment you are to apply to him.

Commenting on the following passage, Festus¹² gives further testimony to the solidarity of the group, and strongly supports the interpretation just proposed for the ablative:

Ennius, *Ann.* 125:
Si quid *me* fuerit humanitus, ut teneatis.

On this line he remarks: “*me* pro ‘*mihi*’ dicebant antiqui. This must mean that, to Festus, *me* and *mihi* were interchangeable terms in sentences like that above; and if the dative signifies “(happen) to me,” it then follows that the ablative means “(happen) with respect to me.” As indicating Roman reaction to the ablative, such a bit of testimony far outweighs all the abstract theories up to date.

Another indication of the force of the ablative in the construction now under discussion is found in the fact that the defining preposition *de* is sometimes inserted; e.g.,

Terence, *Adel.* 996 ff.:
AE. Sed *de fratre* quid fiet? DE. *Sino.*
Habeat.

Lane’s treatment of this passage is interesting. In agreement with Ebrard, he assigns the unaccompanied ablative to the cate-

¹² P. 152, l. 17.

gory of "Source, Stuff, Material";¹³ but he cites this sentence in the same paragraph, and makes no attempt to find any such idea in *de fratre*. In fact, his rendering shows exact appreciation of the turn: "As to my brother,¹⁴ what will come to pass?" Cf. also the illuminating situation in the following passage:

Plautus, *Ep.* 151 ff.:

ST. Quid (*de*) illa fiet *fidicina* igitur? EP. *Aliqua res reperibitur; Aliqua ope exsolvam, extricabor aliqua.*

In this example, the Palatine tradition has *de illa . . . fidicina*; and the answer appended to the question leaves no room for doubt as to the meaning of the ablative phrase, with or without preposition. If, as seems generally agreed, *de* is an early interpolation, this reading certainly affords convincing evidence that Roman linguistic consciousness reacted to *illa fidicina* as an ablative of specification.¹⁵

II

Up to the present time so little attention has been given to defining adjuncts as a means of determining the force of the ablative in sentences of the type now under discussion that further illustration may not be out of place:

Plautus, *Most.* 346:

DE. Quid ego (*ist*)oc faciam postea? PHILEM. Mea, *sic sine cumpse.*

Plautus, *Tri.* 405 ff.:

LY. Quid factumst *eo*?

ST. *Comessum, expotum.*

Plautus, *Truc.* 799:

CA. Quid *eo* fecisti *puero*? SV. *Ad meam eram detuli.*

¹³ *Latin Grammar*, § 1315.

¹⁴ Italics mine. Contrast a passage where, in reference to Jove's transformations, the ablative might with some reason be said to indicate "the stuff out of which something is made":

Ovid, *Amor.* i. 10. 8:

Et quidquid *magno de Iove* fecit amor.

¹⁵ In manuscripts of later date there appears a growing tendency to insert *de* before the ablative in sentences of this sort; cf. the text notes on Cicero, *de Imp. Pomp.* 59, in *Verr.* ii. 1. 42, ii. 5. 104; Apuleius, *Met.* i. 14.

Terence, *Adel.* 610 ff.:

Hocine de inproviso mali mihi obici tantum,
ut neque quid *me* faciam nec quid *agam* certum sit!

Terence, *And.* 709 ff.:

CH. Quid *me* fiet?

DA. Eho, tu inpudens, *non satis habes, quod . . . ?*

Terence, *Phor.* 137 ff.:

DA. Quid *te* futurumst? GE. Nescio herele. Unum hoc scio:
Quod fors feret feremus aequo animo.

Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiv. 4. 3: Sed quid *Tulliola mea* fiet? . . . Quid?
Cicero meus quid *aget*?

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 155: . . . si inimicos, quid *te* futurum est?
Quo confugies?

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 5. 104: Quid *Cleomene* fiet? Poterone . . .
missum facere eum?

Cicero, *p. Sest.* 29: Quid *hoc homine* facias, aut¹⁶ *quo civem*
importunum aut *quo* potius hostem tam sceleratum *reserves?*

Fronto, p. 33. 1: Sed enim quid *me* fiet? *Ne osculum quidem*
illum est Romae residuum.

Observe, in each of the above examples, how the defining addition precludes any possibility of understanding the ablative as expressing instrumentality or source. Everywhere it is a query as to what turn events will take, or have taken, *in respect to* some person. In euphemisms for dying (e.g., *si quid me fuat*),¹⁷ the notion of possibly impending doom is in itself a sufficient definition of the function of the ablative.

As for the interjection of the preposition *de* as a defining element, the examples from early Latin seem to be few. This is probably due, in part at least, to the fact that prosaic and punctilious precision is somewhat out of harmony there with the lively and dramatic effect aimed at in questions of the style of *Quid me fiet?* and *Quid te futurumst?*

In Cicero's time, and thereafter, there are numerous examples of *de* and the ablative in sentences of comparable general content; but they are apt to be much more prosaic, and they

¹⁶ Here, again, not in the disjunctive sense.

¹⁷ Plautus, *Poen.* 1085.

frequently play a secondary rôle in complex grammatical periods; e.g.,

Cicero, *ad Att.* ii. 6. 2.: Praeterea *de muro* statue quid faciendum sit.

Cicero, *ad. Fam.* ix. 17. 1: ex me quaeras quid *de istis municipiis et agris* futurum putem.

Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 24: Sin autem certum est, quid *quacumque de re* quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est, quod me adiuvent haruspices?

Cicero, *de Vareno* (apud Quint., *Inst. Or.* v. 13. 28): ilico Varenum vinctum asservatum, dum hic ostenderet, quid *de eo* fieri vellet.

Livy, ii. 31. 8: rettulitque quid *de nexis* fieri placeret.¹⁸

Quintilian, *Decl.* 305: Te tamen, dives, interrogo, quid *de illo* facturus fueris, qui superfuisset.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cf. v. 20. 3. There are many examples in sentences referring thus to formal consultation; e.g., Cicero, *in Cat.* iii. 13; Nepos, *Them.* 2. 6; Pliny, *Ep.* iv. 12. 3; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 50. 3; Valerius Maximus, vi. 2. 1.

¹⁹ Another circumstance that tends to make the type less distinctive is the fact that the verb *facere* is frequently used as a general expression for some specific kind of activity indicated by the context, as in:

Cicero, *de Leg.* iii. 2: MAR. *Laudemus* igitur prius legem ipsam veris et propriis generis sui laudibus. ATT. Sane quidem, sicut *de religionum lege fecisti*.

Cf. Auctor ad Herennium, iii. 39; Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 42, *in Ferr.* ii. 3. 45, *p. Lig.* 37.

There is a flattening effect also when an example follows another phrase in which *de* and the ablative are used in a different connection; e.g.,

Cicero, *p. Rab. Perd.* 27: Sed quid ego *de eis omnibus*, qui consulari imperio paruerunt, loquor? *De ipsorum consulum fama* quid futurum est?

Cf. *ad. Att.* v. 4. 3.

In fact, in selecting illustrative defining cases of *de* and the ablative it is by no means easy to determine just where the line should be drawn. The same lack of discrimination is noted here as was criticized at the beginning of this paper. For example, Cicero, *ad Att.* v. 4. 2 (*De Marcello fecisti diligenter*) should not be included, because the adverb *diligenter* makes the subject of *fecisti* the chief personage, and relegates Marcellus and his interests to second place; note also, near the end of the same paragraph, the phrase *De Pomptino recte scribis*.

In connection with the use of *de* and the ablative, it should perhaps be noticed that the functions of the verbs *facere* and *agere* overlap to a certain extent; e.g.,

Cicero, *ad Att.* x. 11. 4: *De pueris* quid agam? *Parvone navigio committam?*

It is difficult to see how, if written in this passage, *faciam* would differ from *agam*. On the other hand, there is real difference between *actum est de* and *factum est de*.

To round out this section, it should perhaps be noted that the preposition *in* is occasionally found in the sense "in the case of"; e.g.,

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 27: quae *in claris viris et feminis* dux in caelum soleret esse²⁰.

Thus used, the prepositional phrase approaches the specification idea; but it is distinctly more remote than *de* with the ablative in the matter of defining the force of the unaccompanied ablative in expressions of the *Quid me fiet?* type. Thus, the notion of circumstance may obtrude, even when the ablative refers to persons; e.g.,

Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 192: *In hoc homine* atque *in eius modi causa* quid facerent omnes Crassi et Antonii?²¹

This sentence varies from type also in the emphasis upon the subject of the verb. In fact, among the cases of *in* with the ablative cited as parallel, none is found to be wholly satisfactory.²²

III

Compilation from many sources has brought together from the classical period a considerable number of sentences that should be taken into consideration in a study of the question undertaken in this paper. The examples are presented in concise form, and arranged according to the case used.

1. DATIVE CASE

Plautus, *Bacch.* 360: quid *mih*i fiet postea?

Cas. 117: quid tu *mih*i facies?

M. G. 606: eadem quae *illis* voluisti facere, *illi* faciunt *tibi*?²³

²⁰ So Ovid, *Met.* ii. 524; and cf. Martial, i. 10. 4.

²¹ Cf. ii. 2. 155.

²² A dative and *in* with the ablative are found together in a single clause in Terence, *Phor.* 291: quid me *in hac re* facere voluisti *tibi*; the dative here seems rather of the 'for' type.

²³ The verb *facere* is here used in the colorless sense. So below, Terence, *H. T.* 953; Cicero, *de Dom.* 124, *in Verr.* ii. 4. 49; Nepos, *Paus.* 3. 5.

- Men.* 663: *quid mihi futurum est?*
Most. 202: *tibi idem futurum credo*
Most. 435: *quin (id) facias mihi*
Most. 776: *quid mihi fiet?*
Ps. 1316: *quid ego huic homini faciam?*
Tri. 822: *bonis mis quid foret et meae vitae*
Truc. 633: *quid mihi futurum est?*
Truc. 789 ff.: *quid puero factumst²⁴ . . . meo nepoti?²⁵*
 Terence, *And.* 112: *quid hic mihi faciet patri?*
And. 143: *quid facias illi?*
Eun. 849: *quid faciet mihi?*
H. T. 953: *facere haec viduae mulieri*
 Cato, *Frag. Or.* 11. 2: *quid mihi fieret?*
 Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 27: *sapientiae quid futurum est?*
Acad. ii. 96: *quid faceret huic conclusioni?*
ad Att. vii. 3. 2: *quid tibi faciam?²⁶*
ad Att. x. 12. 1: *quidnam mihi futurum est?*
de Dom. 124: *hoc idem Cn. Lentulo censori tribunum facere*
de Leg. Agr. ii. 72: *quid pecuniae fiet?*
de Nat. D. iii. 62: *quid Veiovi facies, quid Vulcano?*
in Verr. ii. 4. 49: *Eupolemo Calactino, homini nobili, non idem fecit?*
p. Caec. 30: *quid huic tu homini facias?*
Phil. xiii. 37: *quid huic facias?*
 Horace, *Serm.* i. 1. 63: *quid facias illi?*
 Juvenal, viii. 114 ff.: *quid facient tibi?*
 Livy, xlv. 39. 4: *quid tam opimae praedae,²⁷ . . . spoliis fiet?*
 Nepos, *Paus.* 3. 5: *hoc facere regi*
 Ovid, *Amor.* i. 6. 31: *quid facies hosti?*
Ars. Am. i. 536 ff.: *quid mihi fiet? (bis)*
Her. 14. 120: *quid fiet sonti?*
 Petronius, 74 fin.: *quid tibi feceris*
 Quintilian, *Decl.* 333: *necessitati quid faciam?**
Inst. Orat. i. 3. 15: *quid iuveni facias?*
 Seneca (Rhetor), *Contr.* i. 2. 12: *quid faciam mulieri delitiscenti?*
 Tibullus, ii. 6. 1: *tenero quid fiet Amori?²⁸*

²⁴ A convincing emendation for *datumst*.

²⁵ In an example from early Latin, it is not impossible that *nepoti* should be regarded as an ambiguous form. It is interesting that the same speaker in the play a little later (l. 799 ff.) twice renews the question, in both cases using a clear ablative (*eo puero*).

²⁶ In a passage of somewhat uncertain interpretation.

²⁷ Cf. *pecuniae* above in Cicero, *de Leg. Agr.* ii. 72.

²⁸ The MSS are divided between ablative and dative for Cicero, *in Verr.* ii. 2. 40; cf. ii. 5. 104. Both passages are here cited under the ablative.

The examples of the dative use present no special syntactical problem; the case fits naturally with the idea either of treatment (to be) accorded or of something impending or befalling.

As has already been noted, there is often little to choose between the dative and the ablative of specification. The dative examples sometimes have the same sort of defining adjuncts; e.g.,

Plautus, *Bacch.* 360 ff.: *Quid mihi fiet postea?*
 Credo hercle (senex) adveniens *nomen mutabit mihi.*
 Tibullus, ii. 6. 1 ff.:
 Castra Maecr sequitur; *tenero quid fiet Amori?*
Sit comes et collo fortiter arma gerat?

Specially interesting in this connection are Terence, *Eun.* 837 and 849, where Thais says of Chaerea: *Quid illo faciemus?* while he, observing from a distance, asks in soliloquy: *Quid faciet mihi?*

Another passage, which seems not to belong to the group, yet affords a striking illustration of the narrowness of the line that divides dative from ablative function:

Plautus, *Tri.* 971:
 Neque edepol tu is es neque hodie is umquam eris . . . *auro huic quidem.*

Charmides has made a demand upon the speaker for money which the latter claims to be carrying. Thinking that Charmides is an impostor, the other replies: "By Jove you are not Charmides and never will be today—with reference to this gold at any rate."²⁹

The outstanding feature of the dative group is the large proportion of cases involved in expressions of the a fortiori order; e.g.,

Terence, *And.* 142 ff.:
 Nam si illum obiurges vitae qui auxilium tulit,
 Quid facias *illi*, dederit qui damnum aut malum?³⁰

²⁹ There is an odd situation in the following:

Terence, *H. T.* 953 ff.:
 Non, ita me di ament, auderet facere haec *viduae mulieri*
 Quae *in me* fecit.

The ambiguity of *me* (accusative or ablative?) robs this case of much of its value in the matter of comparison or contrast.

³⁰ So *And.* 112; Ovid, *Amor.* i. 6. 31, *Her.* 14. 120; Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 3. 15.

2. ABLATIVE CASE

Plautus, *Aul.* 776: *me* faciat quod volt magnus Iuppiter.

Capt. 952: *meo minore* quid sit factum *filio*

Cas. 975: quid fecisti *scipione*?³¹

Ep. 151: quid *illa*³² fiet *fidicina*?

M. G. 299: quid fuat *me* nescio

M. G. 973: quid *illa* faciemus *concubina*?³³

Merc. 413: quid *illa* nunc fiet?

Most. 222: di(vi) *me* faciant quod volunt

Most. 346: quid ego (*is*)*toe* faciam postea?

Most. 636: quid *eo* est *argento* factum?

Most. 1166: quid *me* fiet *nunciam*?

Pers. 398: *me* . . . face quid tibi lubet³⁴

Poen. 1085: si quid *me* fuat

Poen. 1402: *me(d) hac re* facere

Tri. 157: si quid *eo* fuerit

Tri. 405: quid factumst *eo*?

Tri. 594: quid *ea re* fuat³⁵

Truc. 417: quid *me* futurumst?

Truc. 799: quid *eo* fecisti *puero*?

Truc. 800: quid *eo puero* tua era facit?³⁶

Terence, *Adel.* 611: quid *me* faciam

And. 614: quid *me* nunc faciam

And. 709: quid *me* fiet?

And. 937: quid *illo* sit factum

Eun. 837: quid *illo* faciemus?

H. T. 188: quid *se* faciat

H. T. 317: quid *illo* facies?

H. T. 333: quid hic faciet *sua*?

H. T. 462: quid *te* futurum censes?

H. T. 715: quid *me* fiat

Phor. 137: quid *te* futurumst?

Phor. 811 ff.: *illa filia* . . . quid futurumst?³⁷

Caecilius, 180 (Ribbeck): quid *hoc* futurum *obsoniost*?

Ennius, *Ann.* 125: si quid *me* fuerit humanitus

Apuleius, *Met.* i. 14: quid *me* fiet?

³¹ Emendation for *scipionem*.

³² Palatine MSS have *de illa*.

³³ MSS *illa(m)* . . . *concubinam*.

³⁴ Question of punctuation.

³⁵ So the editors. The MSS strongly support *de* with the ablative.

³⁶ With this group compare *Men.* 266: quid *eo* veis?

³⁷ Cf. *Adel.* 730: quid nunc futurumst?

- Cicero, *ad Att.* vi. 1. 14: quid *illo* fiet?
ad Fam. xiv. 1. 5: quid . . . *te* futurum est?³⁸
ad Fam. xiv. 4. 3: quid *Tulliola mea* fiet?
de Imp. Pomp. 59: si quid *eo* factum esset
in Verr. ii. 1. 42: quid *hoc homine* faciatis?
in Verr. ii. 1. 90: quid *illo myroparone* factum sit
in Verr. ii. 2. 40: quid *hoc homine*³⁹ facias?
in Verr. ii. 2. 155: quid *te* futurum est?
in Verr. ii. 5. 104: quid *Cleomene*⁴⁰ fiet?
p. Clu. 186: quid *istis hominibus* factum est, *Stratone* et
Nicostrato?
p. Sest. 29: quid *hoc homine* facias?
Fronto, *p.* 33. 1: quid *me* fiet?
Livy, xxxiii. 27. 10: quidnam *se* futurum esse
Lucilius, 427: si quid *pueris nobis me* et *fratre* fuisset
749: quid *me* fiet?
Pomponius, *Atell.* 131 (Ribbeck): neque *illo* quid faciam scio

3. AMBIGUOUS CASE-FORMS

- Plautus, *Bacch.* 334: nescit quid faciat *auro*
Cas. 938: quid agam *meis rebus*
Cas. 978: *tuo* quid factum est *pallio*?
Ep. 708: quid *argento* factum est?
M. G. 168: quid *illis* faciat *ceteris*
M. G. 1306: quid *oculo* factumst *tuo*?⁴¹
Most. 231: quid *illis* futurum est *ceteris*
Ps. 779: nescio . . . *rebus* quid faciam *meis*
Truc. 709: *meis* quid *fortunis* fuat
Terence, *Hec.* 668: quid faciemus *puero*?
Cato, *de Re Rust.* 147 and 148. 2: *vino* quod volet, faciet (bis)
Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 107: quid fiet *artibus*?
Acad. ii. 115: *Diodoto* quid faciam *Stoico*?
ad Fam. xiv. 1. 5: quid *puero misero* fiet?
de Div. ii. 126: *vigilantibus* idem facerent⁴²
de Fin. ii. 79: ut fecit *tyranno*
de Nat. D. iii. 51: quid facies *nubibus*?
p. Clu. 187: *servo tuo Nicostrato* quid factum esse dicas
p. Font. 37: quid faciendum *M. Fonteio*?⁴³

³⁸ Question of punctuation.

⁴⁰ Inferior MSS have dative.

³⁹ Al. huic homini.

⁴¹ Text somewhat confused.

⁴² The verb *facere* is used here in the colorless sense; cf. below, *de Fin.* ii. 79, Lucretius, iii. 1005, Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 55. 2, *Bell. Jug.* 85. 17.

⁴³ An adjacent dative of agency and the general balance of the sentence may inspire the *de* or *in* which inferior MSS read before the proper name.

- Livy, xxvii. 16. 8: quid fieri *signis* vellet
 xxxiv. 24. 3: quid futurum *nobis* est?
 Lucretius, iii. 1005: quod faciunt *nobis* annorum tempora
 Martial, xii. 23. 2: quid facies *oculo*?
 Nepos, *Ages.* 4. 6: quid *iis* vellet fieri
 Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* v. 11. 9: quid fieri *adultero* par est?
 Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52. 25: quid . . . *deprensus hostibus* faciatis⁴⁴
Bell. Cat. 55. 2: idem fit *ceteris* per praetores
Bell. Jug. 85. 17: faciant item *maioribus suis*
 Valerius Maximus, ii. 8. 3: quid facias *Cn. Fulvio Flacco*?
 v. i. *Ex.* 2: quid *eis* faciemus?

Since there is so often an approximation of meaning between cases that use forms surely dative or ablative, it is not to be expected that much headway will be made in any attempt to classify as dative or ablative the ambiguous cases in the group of sentences listed just above.

Accident, indeed, may play a part. Thus, in Cicero, *p. Clu.* 187, a question is asked, using the ablative forms *Stratone* and *Nicostrato*; a few lines later the same query is repeated, but omitting mention of Strato. This leaves *Nicostrato* standing alone with *factum esse*; but there can be no doubt that the word is to be read as an ablative.

Further, despite the approximately common ground between the use of the dative and the ablative, it is worth noting that, in the case of the ablative, the question what is to be done in respect to a person or thing sometimes narrows down to the question of the *disposal* to be made of that person or thing.⁴⁵ This is clearly seen both when the ablative stands alone and when it is reenforced by the preposition *de*; e.g.,

Plautus, *Truc.* 799 ff.:

CA. Loquere tu. Quid *eo* fecisti *puero*? SV. Ad meam eram detuli.

CA. Quid *eo puero* tua era facit? SV. Erae meae extemplo dedit.

Plautus, *M. G.* 1094 ff.:

Quid nunc mihi es auctor ut faciam, Palaestrio,

De concubina? Nam nullo pacto potest

Prius haec in aedis recipi quam illam amiserim.

⁴⁴ This phrase is preceded (but at some distance) by quid *de iis* fieri placeat (50.3) and quid *in illos* iure fieri posset (51. 6).

⁴⁵ By way of contrast, note Plautus, *Tri.* 594, where the substitution of the generalizing *ca re* for the specific *eo agro* tends to prevent a narrowing down of the specification idea.

In the first of these passages the questioner wants to know how a child was disposed of; and, in the second, it is a problem of getting rid of one woman to make way for another.

It is unnecessary and undesirable, on such a basis as this, to attempt a division of cases using ambiguous forms; but it is pertinent to observe that the notion of disposal of a person or thing (through the specification relation) attaches much more readily to ablative function than it does to dative function; and some of the examples with ambiguous case-forms are very similar to the sentences just quoted; e.g.,

Plautus, *Cas.* 978:

quin responde, *tuo* quid factum est *pallio*?

This question is addressed to a person called upon to explain the fact of his appearance without the article of clothing designated (cf. line 975). Two other passages are of particular interest in this connection:

Plautus, *M. G.* 1306 ff.:

PY. Quid istuc, quaeso? quid *oculo* factumst *tuo*?

PL. Habeo equidem hercle oculum. PY. At laevom dico.

Pleusicles appears with a patch over his left eye, and the soldier naturally inquires *quid oculo factumst tuo*? Thus far the case of *oculo tuo* is quite ambiguous, with a balance in favor of the dative. But Pleusicles, by preversely referring the remark to the exposed eye, neatly reads the idea of specification (and disposal) into the soldier's question, making it mean "How have you disposed of your eye?" This gives the phrase an ablative interpretation.

Livy, xxvii. 16. 8: Qui (Fabius) interroganti scriba, quid fieri *signis* vellet ingentis magnitudinis . . . , deos iratos Tarentinis relinqui iussit.

Here again it is a question of disposal; and it is interesting to note that Plutarch⁴⁶ in telling the same story uses the phrase

⁴⁶ *Fabius* 22: λέγεται τὸν γραμματέα πυθέσθαι τοῦ Φαβίου περὶ τῶν θεῶν τί κεύει.

περὶ τῶν θεῶν, and that Augustine⁴⁷ follows with *de* and the ablative: *quid de signis deorum . . . fieri iuberet.*⁴⁸

The grounds for identifying ambiguous forms with the dative use are not so satisfactory; e.g.,

Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 79: *Vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit tyranno?*

Here *facere* is used in the colorless sense, picking up *dabis* of the preceding clause; it seems natural, therefore, to carry forward the idea of indirect object also. So interpreted, the case is hardly more than on the edge of the general category under examination in this paper.

Again, in the discussion of the dative examples, it was noted that an unusually large number of the passages were involved in a fortiori connections. This fact suggests a dative interpretation for the following:

Valerius Maximus, v. 1. *Ex.* 2: *si eos, qui nos amant, interficiemus, quid eis faciemus, quibus odio sumus?*

Livy, xxxiv. 24. 3: *Mare interiectum ab istis praedonibus non tuetur nos, T. Quincti: quid, si in media Peloponneso arcem sibi fecerint, futurum nobis est?*

But author and period may have to be taken into account in this connection; thus, the single case noted in which an undoubted ablative figures in a sentence of the a fortiori variety is found in Livy, and it is strikingly like the sentence just cited from that author:

Livy, xxxiii. 27. 10: *Cum ad portas prope sedente exercitu Romano ea fierent, quidnam se futurum esse profectis in Italiam Romanis?*⁴⁹

One passage with ambiguous case-form appears to be quite unique:

Martial, xii. 23:

Dentibus atque comis—nec te pudet—uteris emptis:

Quid facies oculo, Laelia? Non emitur.

⁴⁷ *de Civ. D.* i. 6. Cf. Livy, xxvi. 33. 13, in a similar passage: *de iis rebus quid fieri velitis, vos rogo, Quirites.*

⁴⁸ With Livy xxvii. 16. 8 above, cf. Nepos, *Agex.* 4. 6.

⁴⁹ There are one or two cases of *de* and the ablative in a fortiori connections; see Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 30, *Phil.* viii. 13.

This epigram is at the expense of some unfortunate who has to buy artificial teeth and hair, and who, in addition, lacks an eye. The peculiarity of the example lies in the fact that *oculo* refers to something to be acquired, not to something in hand,⁵⁰ as is elsewhere the case in this group of sentences, whether it be dative or ablative that is used.

Since *oculo* refers to a thing yet to be acquired, it cannot be a case of doing something *to* the eye⁵¹ (dative); but, regarded as an ablative of specification, the sense is perfect: "As for an eye, what will you do, Laelia?" This interpretation, therefore, is recommended for the passage.

IV

At the outset of this paper, attention was called to the carelessness and lack of discrimination manifested in assembling cases of the dative and the ablative as belonging to the category here discussed. For carelessness there can be no excuse. Lack of discrimination in collecting material may be due to failure to recognize the difficulty of the task of selection.

There can be no question in regard to short dramatic and emotional queries like the following:

Quid *huic homini* facias?

Quid *hoc homine* facias?

Quid *me* fiet?

Quid *eo* futurum est (factum est)?

and

Si quid *me* fuat

But, at the other extreme, there are numerous routine and prosaic expressions like *idem fit ceteris per praetores*;⁵² and the

⁵⁰ (Cf. perhaps the couplet from the Greek Anthology, II, 11, 310 (Dübner):

Ἡγόρασας πλοκάμους φῦκος μέλι κηρὸν ὀδόντας·
τῆς αὐτῆς δαπάνης ὄψιν ἂν ἠγόρασας.

⁵¹ Or, incidentally, of using it as a means or a source.

⁵² Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 55. 2.

phrase is often imbedded in a complex sentence. Are all such examples to be included in the study, and if not, where is the line to be drawn?⁵³

Awaiting further light on this point, the lists above submitted have been made on a fairly liberal basis. If the reader feels that too much has been included, he is at liberty to reject any example desired.

Fortunately, a solution of the problem here undertaken does not depend upon the definite analysis of doubtful cases. As already noted, the dative presents no syntactical difficulty; and the facts set forth in this paper seem to show conclusively that, in Roman linguistic consciousness, the ablative stood for the specification idea.⁵⁴

To raise a question of "origin" in reference to the ablative use is both idle and futile.⁵⁵ Study of the context, to determine the reaction of the Roman mind, is the thing essential for intelligent interpretation of the text and for grammatical formulation. Previous handling of this particular problem abundantly illustrates the evils of theorizing without investigation of the facts that lie at the investigator's very door.

⁵³ In his note on Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 96, Reid seems to think of such a turn as *bene (male) facere alicui* as within the pale.

⁵⁴ There is no evidence that the turn was sharply "phraseological," i.e., that the ablative was used in certain word groupings that functioned as units, with obscuration of the case relation. The flexibility observable in the matter of word order makes heavily against any such assumption.

As to the use of the ablative of specification in references to persons, such application of the case is, of course, not uncommon in other connections; e.g., *viro liberis satis fortunata fuit* (Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 25. 2); *Cicerone nocens* (Martial, v. 69. 2); *aestuet nostro ministro* (Martial, ix. 22. 11). Not less interesting is the following, though involving an ambiguous case-form:

Plautus, *Capt.* 365 ff.:

Hic autem te ait mittere hinc velle ad patrem,
Meum ut illic redimat filium, mutatio
Inter me atque illum ut *nostris* fiat *filiis*.

In this sentence the "dative" notion with *mutatio fiat* seems absorbed in *inter me atque illum*, leaving a specification idea to *nostris filiis*, which, with this interpretation, would be ablative.

⁵⁵ See again the references cited on page 331, note 2.

In leaving this matter, one other point should perhaps be noted in connection with a small subtype illustrated by the following sentence:

Plautus, *Aul.* 776:

EVC. id (si) fallis? LY. Tum *me* faciat quod volt magnus Iuppiter.

On this phrase, the *Thesaurus* queries whether *me* is ablative or accusative.⁵⁶ The latter construction possibly is not beyond the bounds of the conceivable in early Latin syntax; and it may be pertinent to call attention again to the fact that, in the group generally, there are two cases in which the manuscripts consistently offer the accusative of substantives:

Plautus, *Cas.* 975:

Quid fecisti *scipionem*, aut quod habuisti pallium?

Plautus, *M. G.* 973:

Quid *illa(m)* faciemus *concubinam*, quae domist?

The editors everywhere correct the accusative to ablative in these two passages, and probably rightly. As for the first, it is easy to imagine that the attracted *pallium* caused some careless copyist to prolong *scipione* to *scipionem*; and, in regard to the other, Lindsay (on line 323) observes that the *Miles Gloriosus* is noteworthy for the number of cases in which the letter *m* is interpolated. Unless further evidence is forthcoming, there seems little warrant for an accusative interpretation in a sentence like *Aul.* 776 above quoted.


⁵⁶ So *Most.* 222; cf. *Pers.* 398 (a question of punctuation here). Somewhat similar are Terence, *Adel.* 611, *And.* 614, *H. T.* 188. Note, too, the dative in like connection, Plautus, *Most.* 435.

[NOTE.—In this *Supplementary Register* the page numbers are in italic.]

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* Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Phil., Vol. 8. See also: Register to Number 1, p. 176; list for *Fretus*, p. 328; lists for *Quid Me Fiet?*, pp. 338 and 341.



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