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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO STUDIES

HISTORY; SECOND SERIES, VOL. I., PP. 1-74

# LOUISBOURG IN 1745

THE ANONYMOUS

LETTRE D'UN HABITANT DE LOUISBOURG

(CAPE BRETON)

Containing a narrative by an eye-witness of the siege in 1745

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

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## INTRODUCTION

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The siege and capture of Louisbourg in Cape Breton in 1745 by New England militia, supported by a British fleet, was the first important event in America in the renewed war between Great Britain and France after the long peace which Walpole had succeeded in maintaining. On May 13/24, 1744,<sup>1</sup> the French seized the fishing station of Canso, opposite to Cape Breton on the Nova Scotian coast, and this was the first intimation which the English colonies received that war had broken out. They were greatly stirred by the news. French privateers soon made their commerce unsafe, and the bold plan was conceived of sending a militia force in the early spring of 1745 to attack the French fortress of Louisbourg.

Louisbourg was regarded as the strongest strategic point which France possessed in America. When forced to yield Newfoundland to Great Britain in 1713, the French had retained the two islands, Cape Breton (Isle Royale), and Prince Edward (Isle St. Jean), to serve the double purpose of providing a refuge for the French inhabitants forced to leave Newfoundland, and of securing to France the possibility of erecting a strong military and naval post in the North Atlantic, which should command the approaches to the St. Lawrence and Canada, still held by her, and serve also as a protection to French commerce in more southern seas. After much deliberation the stronghold had been erected near the south-eastern extremity of the Island of Cape Breton. The situation had many advantages. There was a good harbour, easily defended, and the fortress, now only a ruin, was built on a peninsula difficult of access from the landward side. Louisbourg cost the French Court enormous sums. It lodged in 1745 between three and four thousand

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<sup>1</sup> *Collection de Manuscrits III* : 201 (Quebec, 1884).

people. The British held the mainland (called by them Nova Scotia, by the French, Acadia) lying across the Strait of Canso, and it was almost inevitable that this proximity should result in conflict. The English colonies had been very nervous when they saw France menacing them from Louisbourg, and the proposal to attack the place appealed to a strong instinct of self-preservation.

The present narrative is the only unofficial account of the siege, from the French standpoint, that we possess.\* The writer is unknown to us. Although the structure and the language of the Letter alike show that he was not a literary man, his style is often striking and vigorous. He was at Louisbourg throughout the siege and, when the fortress fell, he was among those sent to France by the victorious British. Shortly after his arrival he completed this Letter, and it was soon published, no doubt in France, either by himself or by the friend who is nominally responsible for printing it. The statement on the title-page that the book was printed "À Québec, Chez Guillaume le Sincère" is entirely misleading. No books, or even newspapers, were printed at Quebec until after

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\* Official reports were made by the French Governor Du Chambon, and by the Comptroller Bigot. The report of the former is printed in *Collection de Manuscrits* III : 237-257 (Quebec, 1884) and in Parkman, *Half Century of Conflict*, II : 299-320 (Boston, 1892). Some of the New England force kept diaries, which have been preserved. Copious bibliographies relating to the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 will be found in *The Narrative and Critical History of America*, edited by Justin Winsor, Vol. V., pp. 434-448 (Boston and New York, 1887), and in J. G. Bourinot's *Cape Breton* pp. 146-152 (Montreal, 1892). The notes in Parkman's *Half Century of Conflict* (II : 78-161) are a useful bibliographical guide. The *Report on Canadian Archives*, 1886, by Douglas Brymner, (Ottawa, 1887), contains a large map of Louisbourg from Gridley's plan, and the *Reports* for 1887 and 1894 contain Calendars of many documents relating to the events of 1745 in Cape Breton. The recently discovered *Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr.*, (New York, 1896), is a highly interesting narrative of events in Nova Scotia contemporaneous with the siege of Louisbourg.

the British conquest (1763). The Letter is a strong indictment of French colonial policy, and the printer was anxious that his identity should be concealed. Perhaps the author was equally anxious to be unknown to the public, and the initials "B. L. N." appended to the Letter may be fictitious. On the other hand, the author may have been known to the Minister of Marine, Maurepas. Otherwise probably he would not have been at such pains to defend and flatter him (p. 71). The writer says that he had seen other French colonies and had noted evils there similar to those in Cape Breton. He was himself, apparently, a merchant and he condemns with much bitterness the small salaries paid by the French Court to those in its employ, and the consequent temptation to engage in trade which this involved. We know that in Canada the Governor, Intendant, and other officials frequently eked out their pay by commercial enterprises. They were, in consequence, too likely to make their mercantile undertakings and not the interests of France the paramount consideration. At Louisbourg the selfish conduct of the trading officers helped to cause a mutiny among the men, and one of the causes that contributed to the French failure was the consequent distrust, which the officers felt, of the regular troops under their command.

The present author writes of course from a French standpoint. He exaggerates the numbers on the British side, and also the friction between Warren the naval commander and Pepperrell the leader of the New England militia force. The British losses during the siege are also greatly overstated. Though he admires the English love of liberty, he is unable to understand the self-government of the colonies, which he regards as a fantastic feature of the English system. The commercial rivalry between the French and the English is much in his mind and he is conscious of France's decline as a naval power, the results of which became so conspicuous in

the course of this and succeeding wars with Great Britain. Unlike English writers of the period he gives the Indians a high character for unselfish devotion.

Printed copies of the Letter are extremely rare. There is one in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. Parkman was unable to find a copy in the British Museum or upon this side of the Atlantic, and had the Paris volume copied for his use in writing *A Half Century of Conflict*. He printed copious extracts from the letter in the appendix to this work, but necessarily omitted much that is of interest. An exemplar of the original edition is in the Library of Parliament at Ottawa, and Dr. J. G. Bourinot, Clerk of the House of Commons, also possesses a copy. The volume (4x6) contains eighty-one pages, and is printed in large, clear type, on thin, but good, paper. It has numerous typographical errors. The most obvious of these have been corrected in the present edition, but otherwise the original text has been exactly reproduced. The spelling and the use of accents are very capricious. An English translation has been added for the convenience of many interested in the sources of colonial history and yet without facility in reading French.

The Editor desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Reverend Abbé H. R. Casgrain, Professor of History in Laval University, Quebec, who has kindly furnished him with a copy of his MS. made from the original edition of the Letter in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris; to Professor Squair, of University College, Toronto, for suggestions and corrections in regard to the translation; to Dr. J. G. Bourinot for the use of his copy of the original edition to correct the proofs; and to the Honourable G. W. Ross, Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, for provision for publication.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO,

May, 1897.

LETTER OF AN INHABITANT  
OF  
LOUISBOURG

CONTAINING A HISTORY  
EXACT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL OF THE TAKING OF  
CAPE BRETON BY THE ENGLISH

*Insanire quid est?*

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QUEBEC

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM THE SINCERE AT THE SIGN OF TRUTH

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LETTRE D'UN HABITANT  
DE  
LOUISBOURG,

CONTENANT UNE RELATION  
ÉXACTE ET CIRCONSTANCIÉE DE LA PRISE DE  
L'ISLE-ROYALE, PAR LES ANGLAIS.

*Insanire quid est?*

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A QUEBEC,

CHEZ GUILLAUME LE SINCERE, À L'IMAGE DE LA VÉRITÉ.

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M.DCC.XLV.



## ADVERTISEMENT OF THE PRINTER.

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This letter having fallen into my hands, I have thought it a duty to print it because of the service which it ought to accomplish for the other Colonies which have the same abuses. When the Court learns the truths contained in the letter which I now publish it will, doubtless, put their affairs in order and save other establishments, not less useful to the French than the one which the English have just seized, from meeting with a similar fate. It is to be feared that unhopèd for success will lead the English on to further ventures. Already the trade which makes France so prosperous has suffered much ; renewed losses would ruin it utterly. What more powerful motive could we have to weigh all these things ? It is this that has led me to have no hesitation in printing this truthful letter. Some persons may take offence because their reputation or that of their relatives is not spared. But why did they not discharge their trust better ? The justice due to those who know how to fulfil their duty would then have been rendered to them.

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## AVERTISSEMENT DE L'IMPRIMEUR

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Cette lettre m'étant tombée entre les mains, j'ai crû la devoir imprimer, par l'utilité qui en doit réjaillir sur les autres Colonies. Les abus y sont les mêmes : La Cour étant informée des vérités contenues dans la Lettre que je donne au Public, y mettra sans doute ordre, & empêchera par-là qu'il n'en arrive autant à d'autres établissemens, non moins utiles aux Français, que celui dont les Anglais viennent de s'emparer. Il est à craindre qu'un succès inespéré ne les porte d'entreprises en entreprises. Le Commerce de la France, qui la rend si florissante, a déjà beaucoup souffert : De nouvelles pertes le ruineroient entierement : Quel plus puissant motif pourrions-nous avoir pour passer sur toutes ces considérations ! C'est ce 4] qui m'a déterminé à ne point balancer sur l'impres|sion de cette Lettre Véridique. Quelques personnes pourront s'offenser de ce que leur réputation, ou celle de leurs parens, n'y est point ménagée. Mais pourquoi n'ont-elles pas mieux fait leur devoir ? On leur eût rendu la justice que l'on rend à qui sçu le remplir.

LETTER OF AN INHABITANT  
OF LOUISBOURG

I thank you, Sir and very dear friend, for the interest you take in the misfortune which has happened to me. If it had come upon myself alone I should feel it much less. I have not so much to complain of as have a multitude of miserable people, stripped of everything and without resources, who will be obliged to beg for a living if the Court does not provide for them,—sad results of a war in which we appear to be the only unfortunates! The first news of the conquests of our August Monarch\* which we learn as we disembark are in truth well fitted to fill the whole kingdom with pure and ecstasie joy. But how can we share it without alloy, overwhelmed as we are with the most terrible reverses and despoiled

\* The French victory of Fontenoy, on May 11th, 1745, and the subsequent capture of Tournay, Ghent, Bruges and other places.—ED.

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LETTRE D'UN HABITANT  
DE LOUISBOURG

Je vous remercie, Monsieur & très-cher ami, de la part que vous prenez au malheur qui m'est arrivé. S'il ne retomboit que sur moi seul, j'y serois beaucoup moins sensible. Je ne suis pas tant à plaindre qu'une foule de misérables, dénués de tout & sans ressource, qui, si la Cour n'y pourvoit, vont être contraints de mandier leur subsistance : Tristes effets d'une guerre qui semble n'être malheureuse que pour nous ! Les premières nouvelles des Conquêtes de notre Auguste Monarque, que nous apprenons en débarquant, sont, à la vérité, bien capables de combler tout le Royaume 6] d'une joye pure & excessive. Mais comment la pou||vons-nous goûter sans mélange, accablés des plus affreux revers, et dépoüillés des biens qui



of the possessions which were the fruit of many years' labour ? We are unfortunate in this respect, that the English, who up to present time have not been able to succeed against the French, have made a beginning with us. May our loss mark the only progress which they will make this year ! It is not the least vexation felt by subjects as zealous as we are.

The first cause of our misfortune is, no doubt, the weakness of our wretched colony, but one cannot help admitting that the numerous mistakes which were made may have contributed as much or more. I recommend you to keep secret what I am going to unveil to you ; in any case I beg you at least not to reveal my name. It is often unsafe to tell the truth, and especially with the artless candour which will guide my pen. For a long time we were not unaware that a secret enterprise against us was in preparation in New England.<sup>1</sup> Every

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<sup>1</sup> What is called New England is a country of Southern America (*sic*). It is bounded on the north by New France, on the south by New York or the New Netherlands, on the east by the North Sea or the ocean. The aborigines of New England are the Almouchiquois. Boston is the capital.

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étoient le fruit du travail de plusieurs années ? Nous sommes malheureux au point, que les Anglois ont commencé par nous, & qu'ils n'avoient jusqu'à présent pû réussir contre les François. Il faut que notre perte soit peut-être les seuls progrès qu'ils feront de cette année ! Ce n'est pas le moindre chagrin que ressentent des sujets aussi zélés que nous le sommes.

La source de notre infortune est, sans contredit, la foiblesse de notre déplorable colonie : mais on ne peut s'empêcher de convenir, que les fautes nombreuses qui ont été commises, n'y ayent autant ou plus contribué.

Je vous recommande le secret sur tout ce que je vais vous dévoiler, ou je vous prie, du moins, de taire mon nom. Il est souvent dangereux de dire la vérité, & de le faire avec cette candeur ingenuë qui va diriger ma plume.

Nous n'ignorions point depuis long-tems, qu'il se trâmait une entré-7] prise secrette contre nous, à la *Nouvelle Angleterre*.<sup>1</sup> Tous les jours

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<sup>1</sup> On appelle Nouvelle Angleterre, une Contrée de l'Amérique Méridionale. Elle est bornée au Nord par la Nouvelle-France, au Midi par la Nouvelle York, ou le nouveau Pais-Bas, & au Levant par la Mer du Nord, ou l'Océan. Les habitans naturels de la Nouvelle Angleterre sont les Almouchiquois. La Capitale est Baston.

day we were in receipt of information that they were arming along the whole coast, and we were certain that this could only mean some design upon Cape Breton.\* There was then abundant time to take measures for protection against the threatened danger; something was done, but not all that should have been.

\* The author uses invariably the French name, *Isle Royale*. —ED.

Our situation, on the verge of a pressing danger, was indicated to the Court by what happened regarding the vessels *Ardent* and *Caribou*. We were seeking prompt succour. Even if we had not asked for this, our weakness, obvious and faithfully explained to the Minister, ought to have procured it for us. Our colony was sufficiently important; without it Canada is exposed and difficult to hold.

The two ships of war of which I have just spoken ought to be blamed in the first instance. If their commanders would have consented to aid in an easy expedition against Acadia we should have ruined the English in that country and made it impossible for them to plan the project which they have accomplished. But an abuse prevails in the Navy of France against which it is difficult to protest too much, though the protests are always in vain. Most of the officers of the King's

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nous recevions de secrets avis qu'on armoit le long de la Côte : Cela ne pouvoit regarder que *l'Isle-Royale* nous en étions certains. On eut donc tout le loisir de prendre des précautions, pour se mettre à l'abri du péril qui nous menaçoit : on le fit aussi ; mais on ne prit pas toutes celles qui convenoient.

La situation où nous étions, à la veille d'un danger pressant, fut marquée à la Cour par l'occasion des Vaisseaux *l'Ardent & le Karibou*. Nous sollicitons un prompt secours. Quand nous ne l'aurions pas fait, notre foiblesse apparente & fidèlement exprimée au Ministre, devoit nous le procurer. Notre colonie étoit d'une asses grande importance : sans elle, le Canada est exposé, & il n'est pas aisé de le conserver. ||

8] La premiere faute doit être attribuée aux deux Vaisseaux de guerre dont je viens de parler. Si leurs Commandans eussent voulu se prêter à une expedition facile sur *l'Acadie*, nous ruinions les Anglois de ces cantons, & les mettions hors d'état de songer au projet qu'ils ont exécuté. Mais il regne un abus dans la Marine de France, contre lequel on ne sçauroit trop crier, et contre lequel on crie toujours vainement : la plûpart des Offi-

ships, induced by the love of gain, carry on trade operations, although this is forbidden by the Ordinances of His Majesty. It is impossible to conceive how greatly commerce suffers from this, nor does the service gain anything. Presumably, all this is unknown to the Minister, who has only the glory of his master in view; persons who are near him, however, have quite different motives, for a share in this base traffic gives them a pretext for self-justification and for concealing it from him.

It was only necessary to appear before this English colony, the neighbour of our unhappy island, and to land a few men. But, while this was being done, the trade ventures would have been neglected and the general welfare, that of the State, would have interfered with individual interests,<sup>2</sup> and this would have been contrary to received usage in a corps which, far from working to ruin the merchants, ought to protect them. Forgive these strong expressions; although harsh they are true.

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<sup>2</sup> This example has become contagious in all our colonies, where the generals, far from protecting commerce, are the first to injure it. They enrich themselves chiefly in the foreign trade which is so injurious to that of the subjects of the King. I speak here as an eye witness.

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ciers des Vaisseaux du Roi, livrés à l'appas du gain, font le métier de Marchands, quoique cela leur soit interdit par les Ordonnances de SA MAJESTÉ. On n'imagineroit jamais combien le commerce en souffre, le service n'y gagne pas davantage. Il est bien à présumer que c'est à l'insçu du Ministre, qui n'a que la gloire de son maître en vû : d'autres motifs animent les personnes qui l'approchent, dont la part dans ces honteux trafics, sert à les autoriser, & à lui en dérober la connoissance.

Il ne falloit que se présenter devant cette colonie Angloise, voisine de 9] notre malheureuse Isle, & y débarquer peu de monde. Mais, durant ce tems, les pacotilles auroient été négligées, & l'intérêt général, celui de l'Etat, l'eût emporté sur le particulier :<sup>2</sup> ce qui auroit été contraire à l'usage reçu dans un Corps, qui devoit protéger les Négocians, loin de travailler à leur ruine. Passés-moi quelques traits de cette force; ils sont vrais, quoique durs.

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<sup>2</sup> Cet exemple est devenu contagieux dans toutes nos Colonies où les Généraux, loin de soutenir le commerce, sont les premiers à lui porter préjudice : Ils s'enrichissent pour la plupart dans le commerce étranger, qui est si nuisible à celui des Sujets du Roi. Je parle ici comme témoin oculaire.

In place of this expedition, which would have protected us from a misfortune that the State ought to feel no less than we, they amused themselves by wasting time in useless disputes. These resulted on the part of the captains of the royal ships (MM. Maichin and de la Sauzai) in persistence in their refusal and on that of our Governor (M. du Quesnel) in a complaint against their conduct, which indeed it would not be easy to justify.

In seizing Acadia we should have freed ourselves from the menace of enemies dangerously near and destroyed a considerable portion of the facilities which they made use of against us. The naval commanders argued that they had not the orders of the Court,—as if it was necessary for all the subjects of the King to have special orders before keeping his enemies from doing him injury, when it was so easy to take from them the means. M. du Quesnel could not induce them to support the enterprise; in vain did he assert his official authority. It was necessary for him to think of carrying through the matter alone. Would to God that he had abandoned this mad undertaking or that he had never thought of this or of the preceding one, of which I shall speak presently.

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Au lieu de cette expédition, qui nous eût mis à couvert d'un malheur auquel l'Etat ne doit pas être moins sensible que nous, on s'amusa à perdre du tems en disputes inutiles : elles aboutirent de la part des Capitaines des Vaisseaux du Roi (MM. Maichin, & de la Sauzai) à persister dans leur refus, et de la part de notre Gouverneur (M. du Quesnel) à se plaindre de leur procedé ; qu'il ne seroit pas en effet, bien aisé de justifier.

10] En enlevant l'Acadie aux ennemis, nous nous ôtions l'inquiétude d'un dangereux voisinage, & nous détruisions une grande partie des moyens dont l'ennemi s'est servi contre nous. Ces Messieurs se retranchoient sur ce qu'ils n'avoient point les Ordres de la Cour, comme s'il en falloit de particuliers à tous les sujets du Roi pour empêcher ses ennemis de faire du mal, en leur en ôtant les moyens, lorsque la chose est si facile. Mr. du Quesnel ne put les engager à appuyer son entreprise ; en vain reclama-t-il l'autorité dont il étoit dépositaire. Il lui fallut penser à se tirer seul d'affaire. Plut à Dieu ! qu'il eût renoncé à cette folle entreprise, ou qu'il n'y eût jamais songé, non plus qu'à celle qui l'avoit précédée, & que je raconterai bien-tôt.

The ill-success which followed this enterprise is rightly regarded as the cause of our loss. The English would perhaps not have troubled us if we had not first affronted them. It is our love of aggression which has cost us dearly ; I have heard more than one of our foes say this, and it seems to me only too likely. It was the interest of the people of New England to live at peace with us and they would undoubtedly have done so if we had not been so ill-advised as to disturb the security which they felt in regard to us. They expected that both sides would hold aloof from the cruel war which had set Europe on fire, and that we, as well as they, should remain on the defensive only. Prudence required this, but that she does not always rule the actions of men we, more than any others, have demonstrated.

As soon as our Governor learned of the declaration of war he formed vast projects which have resulted in our present misfortune. God keep his soul in peace ! Poor man, we owe him little ; he was whimsical, changeable, given to drink, and when in his cups knowing no restraint or decency. He had affronted nearly all the officers of Louisbourg and destroyed

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Le mauvais succès dont cette entreprise a été suivie, est envisagé, avec raison, comme la cause de notre perte. Les Anglois ne nous auroient peut-être point inquiétés, si nous n'eussions été les premiers à les insulter. Notre qualité d'agresseurs nous a été funeste ; je l'ai oïi conter à plus d'un ennemi, & je n'y vois que trop d'apparence. ||

11] Les habitans de la nouvelle Angleterre étoient intéressés à vivre en paix avec nous. Ils l'eussent sans doute fait, si nous ne nous étions point avisés mal à propos, de les tirer de cette sécurité où ils étoient à notre égard. Ils comptoient que de part & d'autre, on ne prendroit aucun parti dans cette cruelle guerre qui a mis l'Europe en feu, & que nous nous tiendrions comme eux, sur la seule défensive. La prudence le dictoit ; mais elle n'est pas toujours la règle des actions des hommes : nous l'avons plus éprouvé que qui que ce soit.

Dès que notre Gouverneur eut sçu la déclaration de la guerre, il forma de vastes projets, qui ont abouti au malheur qui nous est arrivé. Dieu garde son ame en paix ! c'étoit un pauvre Sire, à qui nous n'avons gueres d'obligation : homme capricieux, inégal, sujet à boire, et ne connoissant dans le vin ni mesures ni bienséances. Il avoit choqué presque tous les

their authority with the soldiers. It was because his affairs were in disorder and he was ruined that he had been given the government of Cape Breton. The foolish enterprise against Canso, which I shall describe presently, and from which they tried in vain to dissuade him, is the first cause of the loss of a colony so useful to the King.

How different was M. du Quesnel from his predecessor !

\*M. de Forant  
died in 1740.  
—ED.

This was M. Forant,\* the son of a vice-admiral and the grandson of an admiral of Denmark. His grandfather migrated very young on account of his religion. M. Forant had entered the navy when young and knew his profession. By his kindness and humanity he deserved to lead men. They feared him because they loved him. When he came from France he had great plans for the development of the colony of which the King had made him Governor. He died, however, at the end of nine or ten months, and when he died he left a sum of thirty thousand livres for educating and bringing up young ladies, daughters of officers dying at Louisbourg. This sum is in Paris and only the income from it is used. It is said that a sister of this charitable Governor will attempt to overturn this good settlement, but it is to be hoped that she will fail

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Officiers de *Louisbourg*, & les mettoit en compromis avec les soldats. Le 12] désordre de ses affaires lui avoit fait donner le Gouverne|ment de l'Isle Royale. Il étoit ruiné. La folle entreprise de *Canso*, que je vais tout-à-l'heure décrire, et dont on voulut en vain le détourner, est la première cause de la perte d'une Colonie si utile au Roi.

Que M. Du Quesnel différoit de son prédécesseur ! M. Forant, auquel il avoit succédé, étoit fils d'un Chef-d'Escadre, & petit-fils d'un Amiral de Dannemarc. Son grand-pere y avoit passé fort jeune, pour cause de Religion. M. Forant avoit commencé à servir jeune dans la Marine, & il savoit son métier. Il méritoit, par sa douceur et son humanité de conduire les hommes. On le craignoit parce qu'on l'aimoit. En partant de France il avoit de grandes vûes pour faire fleurir la Colonie dont le Roi l'avoit nommé Gouverneur. Mais il mourut au bout de neuf ou dix mois. Il legua en mourant une somme de trente mille livres, pour instruire & élever de jeunes Demoiselles, filles d'Officiers morts à *Louisbourg*. Cette somme est à Paris, et l'on n'en prend que le revenu. On dit qu'une 13] Sœur de ce charitable Gouverneur va ten|ter de détruire un aussi bel

in a design so contrary to the well-being of the State and of Religion, which are equally benefited.

Too much prudence can not be shown in the choice of Governors for the colonies. As they are the soul of these establishments it is of infinite consequence that their sentiments should correspond to the dignity of the Prince whom they represent. But it is obvious that too many of them act from unworthy motives. In the proper place, how many things would I have to say on this point! Some day, perhaps, I shall have occasion to make public what I have learned in the course of my journeys to several of our colonies.

The ambition of M. du Quesnel was to distinguish himself May 10  
1744 against the English. To realize this noble and daring design he armed a schooner (*goëlette*<sup>3</sup>) of fourteen guns, and a bateau<sup>4</sup>, upon which he put about six hundred men, soldiers and sailors, to go first and seize the little island of Canso. This was to be the signal of a breach with our neighbours, the English. His

<sup>3</sup> A species of ship of peculiar construction, with raking masts which help her speed.

<sup>4</sup> A little ship with one mast, much used in America.

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établissement; mais il est à souhaiter qu'elle échouë dans un dessein si contraire au bien de l'Etat & à la Religion, qui y trouvent un égal avantage.

On ne sauroit apporter trop de sagesse dans le choix des Gouverneurs que l'on donne aux Colonies. Comme ils en sont l'ame, il est d'une conséquence infinie que leurs sentimens répondent à la dignité du Prince qu'ils représentent. Mais on n'en voit que trop se conduire par les plus indignes motifs. Que j'aurais de choses à dire là-dessus, si c'en étoit ici le lieu! J'aurai peut-être occasion quelque jour de rendre public ce que je sais à cet égard, recueilli de mes différens voyages dans plusieurs de nos Colonies.

L'envie de M. Du Quesnel étoit de se distinguer contre les Anglais. Pour effectuer ce noble & hardi projet, il arma une Goualette<sup>3</sup> 10  
Mai  
1744. [14] de // quatorze canons, & un Bateau,<sup>4</sup> sur lesquels il mit environ six cens hommes, soldats et matelots, pour s'aller d'abord emparer de la petite Isle de Canceaux. Ce devoit être le signal de rupture avec les

<sup>3</sup> Espèce de Navire d'une construction singulière, & d'une matüre renversée, qui contribü à le faire bien marcher.

<sup>4</sup> Petit Navire qui n'a qu'un mâ, & dont on se sert beaucoup dans l'Amérique.

force soon came back victorious. The enterprise, so much belauded, was in truth not worthy of our attention ; we did not gain what it cost. The English established upon this little island were, indeed, without the least defence. They did not know that we were at war with their nation, for we had been the first to hear of the declaration ; they did not even suspect that they might be attacked. The island, moreover, was not fortified, England having never taken any trouble to strengthen it. Some of her subjects had built a wretched town, which we burned.

This is how that expedition resulted for which its author would have believed himself to deserve the honours of a triumph ! Encouraged by this feeble success, our Governor aspired to a more substantial victory. Unable to get help from the commanders of the *Ardent* and the *Caribou* he was still not disconcerted, but resolved alone to attain the success of taking Acadia. He even appeared pleased that his glory should be shared by no one else.

You are aware, Monsieur, that Acadia formerly belonged to us, and that we ceded it to the English by the Treaty of Utrecht.\* It is even yet peopled by the old French inhabitants

\* April 11th, 1713.—Ed.

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Anglais, nos voisins. Son armée revint bientôt victorieuse. Cette entreprise, qu'on a tant fait sonner, étoit en vérité peu digne que l'on s'y arrêtât : On auroit dû regretter jusqu'aux frais qu'elle nous a coûtés. En effet, les Anglais établis sur cette petite Isle étoient sans la moindre défense ; ne songeant pas même qu'ils dussent être attaquez, parce qu'ils ignoroient que nous fussions en guerre avec leur nation. Nous en avons été les premiers instruits : D'ailleurs, cette Isle n'étoit rien moins que fortifiée ; l'Angleterre ne s'en étant jamais mise en peine. Quelques-uns de ses Sujets y avoient formé un misérable Bourg, que nous brûlâmes. Voilà à quoi se termina cette expédition, pour laquelle celui qui en étoit 15] l'Auteur auroit || crû devoir mériter les honneurs du triomphe.

Ce foible succès encourageant notre Gouverneur, il aspira à une Victoire plus solide. Ne pouvant obtenir de secours des Commandans de l'*Ardent* et du *Karibou*, il ne se déconcerta point ; mais résolut de venir seul à bout de prendre l'Acadie. Il paroissoit même flaté de n'en avoir à partager la gloire avec personne.

Vous sçavez, MONSIEUR, que l'Acadie nous a autrefois appartenu, & que nous l'avons cédée à l'Anglais, per la paix d'Utrecht. Elle est même



who occupied the country. It was upon this fact that M. de Quesnel based his plan, and he certainly made no mistake. We have experienced that they are still French at heart. Would not this fact cause our conquerors to desire that not a Frenchman should remain in Cape Breton? It is, indeed, extremely difficult for a people to renounce allegiance to a power such as France, where reign monarchs whose virtues are so famous and who know how to secure the affection of their subjects.

In July M. du Quesnel sent M. du Vivier, a company captain, with orders to go by land to Baie Verte. This officer had two others with him from the garrison of Louisbourg, and he took also two more at St. John Island.\* These five officers had a band of only ninety regular soldiers, but on their way they collected from three to four hundred Indians and arrived before Annapolis† (Port Royal<sup>5</sup>) with their little army. Their camp was well situated. It was placed upon a hill, high enough to be able to command the town, to which they were so

\* Now Prince Edward Island.—ED.

† The English had captured Port Royal finally in 1710, and it was henceforth called Annapolis by them.—ED.

<sup>5</sup> This is the name of the Fort which is the one defence that Acadia has. It was built by us. It

encore peuplée des anciens habitans François, qui l'occupoient. C'est sur quoi se fondeoit M. du Quesnel, il est sûr qu'il ne s'abusoit point. Nous avons éprouvé qu'ils conservent encore un cœur François. Ne seroit-ce point ce qui auroit obligé nos Vainqueurs, à ne vouloir pas qu'aucun de nous soit demeuré dans l'Isle-Royale? Il est effectivement bien difficile de renoncer à une domination comme celle de France, où regnent des Monarques, dont les vertus sont si connus, & qui savent s'acquérir la [16] cœur de leurs Sujets. ||

Au mois de Juillet, M. du Quesnel fit partir le sieur du Vivier, Capitaine de Compagnie, avec ordre de se rendre par terre jusqu'à la Baie Verte. Cet Officier en avoit deux autres avec lui, de la garnison de Louisbourg; il en prit encore deux à l'Isle de St. Jean. Ces cinq Officiers n'avoient que quatre-vingt dix hommes de troupes réglées: mais ils rassemblerent sur leur route environ trois à quatre cens Sauvages, & se rendirent devant le Port-Royal<sup>5</sup>, avec cette petite armée. Leur camp fut très-bien assis. Ils le placerent sur une coline, assez élevée pour

<sup>5</sup> Ainsi s'appelle le Fort, qui est la seule défense qu'ait l'Acadie: C'est nous qui l'avons construit.

near that they could almost see and speak with those inside the fort. The French<sup>6</sup> subjects of Great Britain received them with demonstrations of sincere joy, and throughout rendered whatever services were in their power. M. du Vivier had caused them to make ladders, to be used on the walls of the fort in case there was a thought of entering it by assault, and they worked at these with all the zeal that one could expect from the most faithful subjects.

As orders had been given to treat them with great consideration, and they deserved it, they were carefully paid for everything. The Governor of the Fort, after our force had retired, told them that since France had paid them for the ladders which they had made it was proper that England should pay them to destroy them; and in fact they were employed to do this.

The appearance of the French before Annapolis so frightened the Governor that he promised to surrender the Fort, without firing a shot, as soon as he should see appear the two vessels, with the coming of which they had menaced him. We were a long time before the place without anything happening on the one

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<sup>6</sup> This is to speak improperly, the French of Acadia being rather neutrals.

pouvoir commander au Fort, dont ils étoient si près qu'on pouvoit presque se voir & se parler. Les Français<sup>6</sup> sujets de la Grande-Bretagne, les reçurent avec des démonstrations d'une joye sincere, & leur ont toujours rendu les services qui leur ont pû dépendre d'eux. Le Sieur du Vivier leur a fait faire des échelles pour appliquer à la muraille du Fort, au cas qu'il fût question d'en venir à l'assaut; & ils y ont travaillé avec tout le zèle qu'on peut attendre du plus fidèle sujet. Comme on avoit recommandé de les traiter avec de grands égards, qu'ils le méritoient, tout leur a été exactement payé. Le Gouverneur du Fort, après la retraite des nôtres, leur dit à cette occasion, que, *puisque la France les avoit payés pour les échelles qu'ils avoient faites, il étoit naturel que l'Angleterre les payât pour les défaire.* On les y occupa en effet.

L'arrivée des Français devant le Port-Royal intimida tellement le Gouverneur, qu'il promit de remettre le Fort sans tirer, dès qu'il verroit paroître deux Vaisseaux dont on l'avoit menacé. Nous fumes longtems en

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<sup>6</sup> C'est parler improprement, les Français de l'Acadie étant plutôt neutres.

side or the other. Our people got ready to attack as soon as the ships should appear, and, in case the enemy should attempt a defence, they had caused the settlers to prepare for them arrows, provided with an artifice for igniting fire, of which they had already made trial. M. du Vivier was relieved of the command by M. de Ganas, another captain of a free company, who had left Louisbourg later. This second commander manœuvred badly. Out of patience because the ships for which he was waiting did not come, he imprudently abandoned the investment and retired more than fifty leagues inland. It was this that caused the expedition to fail.

The cause of the delay of the two ships intended for this enterprise, was, at first, the dispute of the Governor with the commanders of the *Ardent* and the *Caribou*. M. du Quesnel always flattered himself that he should gain them over. Seeing that they were inflexible, he took his own course, which was to arm a merchant ship of La Rochelle, named the *Atlas*, together with a brigantine,<sup>7</sup> the *Tempest*. But he had not the satisfaction of seeing them sail, for he died suddenly, in the month

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<sup>7</sup> Light ship, fit for racing, and either rowed or sailed. It has no deck.

présence, sans qu'il se passât rien de part ni d'autre. Nos gens se disposoient à attaquer, aussi-tôt que les Vaisseaux paroïtroient: & en cas que les ennemis voulussent se défendre, ils avoient fait préparer, par les 18] habitans du Pays, des flèches armées || d'artifice pour mettre le feu. L'essai en avoit déjà été fait. Le sieur du Vivier venoit d'être relevé par e Sieur de Ganas, autre Capitaine de Compagnie franche, parti depuis lui de Louisbourg. Ce second Commandant manœuvra mal: impatient de ne point voir arriver les Vaisseaux qu'il attendoit, il leva imprudemment le blocus, & se retira à plus de cinquante lieuës dans les Terres. C'est là ce qui a fait manquer l'expédition.

Le sujet du retardement des deux Navires destinés pour cette entreprise, avoit d'abord été la dispute du Gouverneur, avec les Commandans de l'*Ardent* et du *Karibou*. M. du Quesnel se flatoit toujours de les gagner. Voyant qu'ils étoient inflexibles, il prit son parti, qui fut d'armer un Navire Marchand de la Rochelle, nommé l'*Atlas*, avec le Brigantin<sup>7</sup> 19] la *Tempête*. Mais il n'eut pas la satisfaction de les voir mettre || à la

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<sup>7</sup> Bâtiment léger, propre pour la course, & qui va à la rame & à la voile: il est sans pont.

\*1744.—ED. of October,\* regretted as little as he deserved to be. Of any one else it would be said that death was caused by chagrin, but that could not rightly be imputed to him.

M. du Chambon, Lieutenant of the King, having taken command, caused the expedition to set out on the twenty-third. This new commander could not do otherwise. The situation was such that it was absolutely necessary to send this help to the troops which were supposed still to be encamped before Annapolis, where, in fact, they no longer were, as the two vessels perceived when they arrived before the fort. They were obliged to turn back. This armament was a loss, for although some prizes were taken on the return voyage, they were not a sufficient compensation. If the commanders had wished they could have taken a ship with a rich cargo, but they lost their heads; sad forecast of what was to happen during the siege!

Although it was to be expected that our expedition against Acadia would succeed, because the enemy were very ill equipped to resist us, it failed, and this led them to the conclusion that we were either afraid or weak. They appear to have decided from this that they ought to take advantage of so favourable a cir-

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voile, étant mort subitement, au mois d'Octobre, peu regretté & méritant peu de l'être. On droit de tout autre qu'il seroit mort de chagrin, mais on le lui imputeroit à tort.

M. du Chambon, Lieutenant du Roi, ayant pris le commandement, les fit partir le vingt-trois. Ce nouveau Commandant ne pouvoit faire autrement; dans la situation où étoient les choses, il falloit nécessairement envoyer ce secours aux Troupes que l'on supposoit encore campées devant le Port-Royal, où elles n'étoient plus, ainsi que les deux Vaisseaux s'en apperçurent en arrivant sous le Fort. Il fallut s'en retourner. Cet armement fut perdu; quoiqu'il fit quelques prises au retour, elles étoient incapables d'en dédommager. On auroit pû prendre, si l'on eût voulu, un Navire richement chargé, mais on perdit la tête: triste présage de ce qui devoit arriver pendant le Siège!

L'expédition de l'Acadie manquée, quoiqu'il y eût tout à parier qu'elle 20] réussiroit par le peu de forces que les ennemis avoient pour nous résister, leur fit faire de sérieuses réflexions sur notre crainte, ou notre foiblesse. Selon toutes les apparences, ils en conclurent qu'ils devoient

cumstance, since from that time they worked with ardour upon the necessary military equipment. They did not do as we did they helped each other. They armed in all their ports, from Acadia along the whole coast ; they applied to England ; they sent, it is said, even to Jamaica, in order to secure all the help possible. The enterprise was planned prudently and they laboured all the winter to be ready at the first fine weather.

These preparations could not be kept so secret that something did not become known. From the first moment we had information about them, and in abundant time to be able to warn the Court by means of the two ships of war which had been of so little service to us, for it is well to record that they lay peacefully in port and did not deign to go out and give chase to certain privateers which often cruised so near that they could have landed men, if they had so wished. I was many times astonished that our ships did nothing, and was not the only inhabitant to grumble at this strange inaction. Indeed, it appears that this is common in all our colonies in America where I have heard it said that there were the same causes of complaint.

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profiter d'une aussi favorable circonstance, puisque dès-lors ils travaillèrent avec ardeur à l'armement qui leur étoit nécessaire. Ils ne firent pas comme nous : ils se prêtèrent un secours mutuel : on arma dans tous leurs Ports, depuis l'Acadie jusqu'au bas de la Côte : on dépêcha en Angleterre, & on envoya, dit-on, jusqu'à *la Jamaïque*, afin d'en tirer tous les secours qu'il seroit possible. Cette entreprise fut concertée avec prudence, & l'on travailla tout l'hiver pour être prêt au premier beau tems.

Les préparatifs n'en pouvoient être si secrets, qu'il n'en transpirât quelque chose. Nous en avions été informés dès les premiers instans, & assez à tems pour en pouvoir donner avis à la Cour, par les deux Vaisseaux de guerre qui nous avoient si peu servi ; car il est bon de dire, que tranquilles dans le Port, ils n'ont pas daigné sortir pour donner la chasse à 21] quelques Corsaires, qui venoient // souvent croiser jusqu'à mettre du monde à terre, s'ils l'eussent jugé à propos. Je me suis plusieurs fois étonné de ce qu'ils ne le faisoient point, & n'ai pas été le seul habitant qui a murmuré de cette étrange inaction. Au reste, il semble que cela soit commun à toutes nos Colonies de l'Amérique, où j'ai entendu dire qu'on y avoit les mêmes sujets de plaintes.

We had the whole winter before us—more time than was necessary to put ourselves in a state of defense. We were, however, overcome with fear. Councils were held, but the outcome was only absurd and childish. Meanwhile the time slipped away ; we were losing precious moments in useless discussions and in forming resolutions abandoned as soon as made. Some things begun required completion; it was necessary to strengthen here, to enlarge there, to provide for some posts, to visit all those on the island, to see where a descent could be made most easily, to find out the number of persons in a condition to bear arms, to assign to each his place ; in a word, to show all the care and activity usual in such a situation. Nothing of all this was done, and the result is that we were taken by surprise, as if the enemy had pounced upon us unawares. Even after the first ships of the enemy which blockaded us had come we should have had time enough to protect ourselves better than we did, for, as I shall show, they appeared slowly, one after the other. Negligence and fatuity conspired to make us lose our unhappy island.

I will now describe its geographical situation. Formerly it

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Nous eumes tout l'hiver à nous, c'étoit plus qu'il n'en falloit, pour nous mettre en état de défense ; mais la terreur s'étoit emparée des esprits : on tenoit des conseils, dont le résultat n'avoit rien que de bizarre & de puérile ; cependant le tems s'écouloit, nous perdions de précieux momens en délibérations inutiles, & en résolutions presque aussitôt détruites que prises. Quelques ouvrages demandoient qu'on les parachevât : il en falloit renforcer quelques-uns, augmenter quelques autres, pourvoir à des postes, visiter tous ceux de l'Isle, voir où la descente étoit plus facile, faire le dénombrement des personnes en état de porter les armes, assigner à || 22] chacun son poste ; enfin se donner tous les soins et les mouvemens ordinaires en pareil cas : rien de tout cela ne se faisoit ; de sorte que nous avons été surpris, comme si l'ennemi fût venu fondre sur nous à l'improviste. Nous aurions eu même assez de tems pour nous précautionner mieux qu'on ne l'a fait, depuis le jour où nous vimes paroître les premiers Navires qui nous ont bloqués ; car ils n'y sont venus que les uns après les autres, ainsi que je le dirai dans la suite. La négligence & la déraison avoient conjuré la perte de notre malheureuse Isle.

Je vais vous en faire la description Géographique. Elle portoit

was called Cape Breton\*—a name given it by the Bretons who first discovered it, and the English and Dutch still call it by this name. It lies in north latitude  $45^{\circ} 40'$  and about  $377^{\circ}$  or  $378^{\circ}$  of longitude. It is about one hundred leagues in circumference and is everywhere intersected by great bays. This Island is now the most considerable of those which remained to us about the Gulf of St. Lawrence<sup>8</sup> since Louis XIV gave up Newfoundland to the English by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714 (*sic*). Their wish to secure Newfoundland, on account of its fisheries, was so great that it was one of the chief motives which led them since 1713 to abandon the Empire and Holland, and this movement, as is well known, was the salvation of France. All this great Island was almost wholly wild and uninhabited. We used it only to provide a place for the settlements which we were giving up (in Newfoundland). We

\* The author himself, as already noted, invariably calls it *Isle Royale*.—ED.

<sup>8</sup> The Gulf of St. Lawrence is the entrance to the River of that name which leads to Canada. It is the largest river in the world, there being places where it is upwards of five hundred leagues wide.

[The Gulf is not so wide, and the longitude is reckoned incorrectly, Cape Breton lying between  $317^{\circ}$  and  $319^{\circ}$ . From Paris, as now reckoned, the Island lies between  $45^{\circ} 30'$  and  $47^{\circ} 2'$  N. Lat., and between  $62^{\circ} 4'$  and  $64^{\circ}$  W. Long.; from Greenwich, between  $45^{\circ} 27'$  and  $47^{\circ} 3'$  N. Lat. and between  $59^{\circ} 47'$  and  $61^{\circ} 32'$  W. Long.—ED.]

anciennement le nom de *Cap-Breton*, que lui donnerent ceux qui en firent la découverte, qui étoient des Bretons. Les Anglais & les Hollandais ne la nomment point autrement. Elle est située par les quarante-cinq degrés, quarante minutes de latitude septentrionale, & environ par trois cens soixante et dix-sept, ou trois cens soixante et dix-huit de longitude. Son étenduë est de près de cent lieuës de tour, toute traversée || 23] de grandes Bayes. Cette Isle est à présent la plus considérable de celles qui nous sont restées vers le Golfe de S. Laurent,<sup>8</sup> depuis l'abandon que Louis XIV. a fait de l'Isle de *Terre-Neuve* aux Anglois, par le Traité de paix conclu avec eux à Utrecht, en 1714 (*sic*). Ils avoient un si grand désir de posséder *Terre-Neuve*, a cause de la pêche, que ce fut un des principaux motifs qui les engagèrent à abandonner, dès 1713, l'Empire & la Hollande, ce qui a été, comme on le sçait, le salut de la France. Toute cette grande Isle étoit presque inculte & déserte: nous ne l'habitâmes que pour nous tenir lieu des établissemens que nous abandonnions; alors elle

<sup>8</sup> Le *Golfe de S. Laurent* est l'entrée du fleuve de ce nom, qui conduit au Canada: C'est le plus grand fleuve du monde, y ayant des endroits où il a jusqu'à 600. lieuës de large.

gave it then the name *Isle Royale* and the town built there was called Louisbourg. The island lies but two leagues distant from Acadia, from which it is separated only by the Strait of Canso. The nearer the English were to us, the more reason was there that we should fortify this new establishment to protect it from attack, for the English are so jealous that they are impatient of our being near them. They wished to have a monopoly of the cod fishery, which is a most important trade, as experience should have convinced us.

This was not all. It was necessary that we should retain a position that would make us at all times masters of the entrance to the River which leads to New France.<sup>9</sup> Our considerable settlements in Canada imposed this law upon us; besides, it is absolutely necessary, in those dangerous waters where the storms are very wild, to have a port of refuge.

The Court, seeing the force of these reasons, neglected nothing to make the Island formidable to any one who should wish to attack it. The outlay was enormous and there is

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<sup>9</sup> New France simply means the sum of all that we hold in Canada. We have been in possession for nearly two hundred years.

prit le nom d'Isle-Royale, & la Ville qu'on y bâtit, celui de Louisbourg. Elle n'est située qu'à deux lieues de l'Acadie, dont elle n'est séparée que 24] par le détroit de Canceaux. Plus les Anglois // étoient près de nous, & plus il nous fallut songer à fortifier ce nouvel établissement, pour le mettre à couvert d'insulte; car telle est la jalousie des Anglais, qu'ils suportent impatiemment notre voisinage. Ils voudroient jouir seuls de la pêche de la moruë, dont le Commerce est d'une extrême importance, comme l'expérience a dû nous en convaincre.

Ce n'étoit pas tout. Il falloit penser à nous conserver un poste, pour être en tout tems, les maîtres de l'entrée du fleuve qui mène à la *Nouvelle France*<sup>9</sup> Les établissemens considérables que nous avions au *Canada*, nous imposoient cette Loi: C'est d'ailleurs une nécessité indispensable d'avoir où relâcher dans des Mers dangéreuses, qu'habitent les vents les plus impétueux.

La Cour entrant dans ces considérations, n'a rien négligé pour rendre 25] cette Isle formidable à qui vou||droit l'attaquer. Elle y a fait des

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<sup>9</sup> La *Nouvelle France* n'est autre chose que la réunion de tout ce que nous possédons dans le Canada. Il y a près de 200. ans que nous en sommes en possession.



scarcely a place which has cost the Court so much. It is certain that more than twenty millions were spent upon it. This was not, assuredly, because of any return from the colony, which is much more a burden than a source of profit; but its usefulness to us is so great that France should sacrifice everything to get it back again out of the hands of the English. It protects our whole commerce in North America, and is also not less important for that which we carry on in the South, for, if the French held no place in this part of the North, vessels returning from Saint Domingo or Martinique would not, even in time of peace, be safe upon the Banks of Newfoundland. It is well known what the practice of the English is; the majority of them are engaged in piracy and the colonies most difficult of access are always for them the resort of sea-robbers and thieves, who plunder all the more securely because they receive underhand encouragement from their Governors. These have no scruple that restrains the wish to enrich themselves quickly, and in this they surpass even our Governors.

Louisbourg is built upon a tongue of land which stretches out into the sea and gives the town an oblong shape. It is

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dépenses immenses, & n'a guères de places qui lui aient autant coûté. Il est constant qu'elle doit y avoir employé plus de vingt millions. Ce n'est pas assurément que cette colonie soit d'aucun rapport : elle est beaucoup plus à charge qu'à profit ; mais elle est d'une si grande utilité, que la France doit nécessairement tout sacrifier pour la retirer des mains des Anglais. Elle protège tout notre commerce dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, & n'est pas moins de conséquence pour celui que nous faisons dans la Méridionale, parce que les Français n'ayant plus rien dans cette partie du Nord, leurs Vaisseaux revenant de saint Domingue ou de la Martinique, ne seront plus en sûreté sur le banc de Terre-Neuve, même en tems de paix. On sçait assez quelle est la coutume des Anglais : Adonnés la plupart à la Piraterie, les colonies du plus difficile accès sont toujours pour eux des repaires de forbans & de voleurs, qui pillent d'autant plus sûrement, qu'ils sont appuyés sous main par les Gouverneurs, qui n'ont pas tous le scrupule de se refuser au désir de s'enrichir promptement ; en quoi ils l'emportent sur les nôtres.

La Ville de *Louisbourg* a été bâtie sur une langue de terre, qui s'avance dans la mer, et la rend de figure oblongue. Elle peut avoir

about half a league in circumference. The land is marshy. The houses are, for the most part, of wood; those of stone have been built at the King's expense and are designed to lodge His Majesty's troops and officers. To understand what the place must have cost one need only know that it was necessary to bring from France all the material for these houses, as well as that for the works of the place, which are considerable. The Dauphin's Bastion is very fine, as is also the King's. There is, too, a work called the Battery la Grave and a crenellated wall dominated by two cavaliers, with a wide view and a long range. Besides this, all around the town at the projecting and re-entering angles, are a variety of batteries of three or four guns, which were very effective during the siege. The King supports the greater part of the inhabitants; the remainder live by fishing, and there are few well-to-do among them. On the Island are a number of villages in which a good many poor people, chiefly fishermen, are established.

It would not be difficult to improve this colony. It is only necessary that His Majesty should begin ship-building. Timber

demie-lieuë de circuit. Son terrain est marécageux. Les maisons y sont pour la plûpart de bois, celles de pierres ont été construites aux dépens du Roi, & sont destinées pour loger les troupes & les Officiers de SA MAJESTÉ Pour comprendre combien cela a dû coûter, il ne faut que sçavoir qu'on a été obligé de transporter de France tous les matériaux qui ont servi à leur construction, de même qu'aux ouvrages de la place, qui sont considérables. Le Bastion Dauphin est fort beau, aussi bien que celui du Roi. On y voit encore un ouvrage appelé la pièce de la Grave, & un mur crénelé, sur lequel regnent deux Cavaliers dont la vuë est très étenduë, et qui peuvent battre loin. Il y a outre cela, tout au tour de la Ville, dans des Angles saillans & rentrans, diverses batteries de 27] trois ou quatre canons, qui n'ont pas laissé de faire un grand effet durant le Siége. Le Roi nourrit la plus grande partie des habitans. Le reste subsiste par la Pêche, & il y en a fort peu de riches. L'Isle contient plusieurs bourgades, où une multitude de pauvres gens s'est établie, presque tous pêcheurs.

Il ne seroit pas bien difficile de rendre cette colonie meilleure, SA MAJESTÉ n'a pour cet effet, qu'à y faire construire des Vaisseaux. Les

for the purpose is abundant ; all the inhabitants would have a useful occupation, and the advantage to the state would be that we should no longer have need to buy timber at great cost from the peoples of Northern Europe. It was shown in the case of the *Caribou*,<sup>10</sup> a vessel built in Canada, that the woods of Northern America are lighter and therefore better for the speed of a vessel. It is for this reason that the people of New England have such fast ships. Would it be less possible for us to succeed in this ? We could even make the pieces necessary for the construction of a vessel and take them to France numbered. The English, more ingenious than we, have adopted this plan and it works well. Why do we not imitate them ? Our navy would soon be equal to theirs and we should no longer see them so arrogant in their prosperity ; but we let them take advantage of our weakness, and, while we check them upon land, upon the sea they avenge themselves by destroying our commerce. Where is the navy of Louis the Great ?

<sup>10</sup> The *Karibou* or *Caribou* is an animal of North America very similar to the deer, having the same swiftness and agility. Like the deer, it has horns upon the head, but these are different from those of the European animal ; it is covered with long hair.

bois de construction n'y sont point rares : tout le monde s'occuperait utilement, & l'Etat y gagnerait que nous n'aurions plus besoin des bois que fournissent à grands frais les peuples du Nord de l'Europe. On a éprouvé dans le *Karibou*,<sup>10</sup> Vaisseau construit au Canada, que les bois du Nord de l'Amérique, sont beaucoup plus légers, & par conséquent 28] plus propres pour la marche || d'un Vaisseau. C'est par cette raison, que les habitans de le nouvelle Angleterre ont des Navires qui marchent si bien. Nous seroit-il moins possible d'y réussir ? On pourroit encore y faire travailler toutes les pièces essentielles à la construction d'un Navire, & on les apporteroit en France numérotées. Les Anglais, plus ingénieux que nous, se servent de cette méthode, et s'en sont bien trouvés. Pourquoi ne les imitons-nous pas. Notre Marine répondroit bien-tôt à la leur, & nous ne les verrions plus si arrogans dans la prospérité. Mais on les laisse abuser de notre foiblesse ; & tandis que nous réprimons leur orgueil sur terre, ils s'en vengent sur la mer, en désolant notre commerce. Où est la Marine du regne de LOUIS LE GRAND ?

<sup>10</sup> Le *Karibou*, ou *Caribou*, est un animal de l'Amérique Septentrionale, semblable à peu-près au Cerf, dont il a la vitesse & l'agilité : Il porte un bois sur la tête, comme le Cerf, mais différent de celui de cet animal d'Europe ; il est couvert de grands poils.

The outworks of Louisburg are not inferior to those within. A place so important, had it been well supplied and defended, would have brought to the English the same humiliation that they found before Cartagena.\*

\*Admiral Vernon with a considerable English fleet attacked Cartagena unsuccessfully in 1740.—Ed.

The Royal Battery is about a quarter of a league distant from the town. This battery had at first forty pieces of artillery, but the embrasures being too near to one another, M. du Quesnel very wisely had it rebuilt, and the number of pieces reduced to thirty, of which twenty-eight are thirty-six-pounders; two eighteen-pounders command the sea, the town, and the head of the bay.

The Island Battery, at the entrance, protects the harbour, and as it was trained at the level of the water no ship could enter without being sunk. It is placed opposite the Lighthouse Tower,<sup>11</sup> which is on the other side, on the mainland. This battery has thirty-six twenty-four-pounders.

The entrance to the harbour is further protected by a Cava-

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<sup>11</sup> Its name indicates its use. It is intended to give light to vessels, and a fire is lit there every night.

Les ouvrages du dehors de Louisbourg ne sont point inférieurs à ceux du dedans. Une Place de cette importance, bien pourvûë et bien défenduë, auroit fait essayer aux Anglais, le même affront que devant *Carthagene*.

La *Batterie Royale* est à environ un quart de lieuë de distance de la || 29] Ville. Cette batterie étoit premièrement de quarante pièces de canons; mais les embrasures étant trop proches les unes des autres, M. du Quesnel, bien conseillé, l'avoit fait rebâtir, & réduire à trente, dont vingt-huit sont de 36. livres de balle, & deux de 18. elle commande la Mer, la Ville & le fond de la Baye.

La *Batterie de l'Isle de l'Entrée* défend le Port, et battant à fleur d'eau, ne permet pas qu'il y puisse entrer de Bâtiment sans être coulé à fond. Elle est placée vis-à-vis la Tour de la Lanterne,<sup>11</sup> qui est de l'autre côté sur la Grand'terre. Cette Batterie est de trente-six canons, du calibre de 24 livres de balle.

L'Entrée du Port est encore protégée par un Cavalier, nommé le

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<sup>11</sup> Son nom annonce son usage: Elle est destinée à éclairer les vaisseaux, & l'on y allume un feu tous les soirs.

lier, called the Maurepas Bastion, which has twelve embrasures, but no cannon had been placed there, either because it was not thought to be needful, or because it was regarded as wasteful to multiply the possibilities of a too-rapid consumption of gunpowder, of which a deficiency was feared.

Such were the fortifications of Louisbourg, upon which M. de Verville, an able engineer, had commenced to work, but, being appointed Chief Engineer at Valenciennes, he was succeeded by men who had never been engaged in war and were rather architects than engineers.

Let us look now at the forces in the town. First of all was the Garrison composed of eight companies of seventy men each, including, it must be admitted, the sick, who were very numerous. In the second place, five or six hundred militia taken from the settlers of the neighbourhood were brought in, and these, added to the force in the town, made up from thirteen to fourteen hundred men. The militia could have been increased by three or four hundred men who were at Niganiche\* and in the neighbourhood, but action was taken too late; communication was cut off by the time it was decided to send for them.

\* The modern  
Inganish.  
—Ed.

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*Cavalier de Maurepas*, qui a douze embrasures ; mais on n'y avoit point mis de canon, soit que l'on crût n'en avoir pas de besoin, soit que l'on regardât comme inutile de multiplier ce que pouvoit aider à une trop prompte consommation de la poudre, dont on craignoit de manquer.

Voilà quelles étoient les fortifications de Louisbourg, ausquelles Mr. de Verville, Ingénieur habile, avoit commencé de faire travailler ; mais, ayant été nommé Ingénieur en Chef à Valenciennes, on mit en sa place des gens qui n'avoient jamais été à la guerre, et qui étoient plus Architectes qu'Ingénieurs. Voyons maintenant quelles en étoient les forces.

Premièrement la Garnison étoit composée de huit Compagnies de soixante & dix hommes chacune, y compris, à la vérité, les malades, qui étoient en fort grand nombre.

En second lieu, on fit venir cinq à six cens Miliciens ou Habitans des environs ; ce qui, avec ceux de la Ville, pouvoit former treize à quatorze cens hommes.

On auroit pu grossir cette Milice de trois ou quatre cens hommes, qui étoient à Niganiche & aux environs : mais on s'y prit trop tard ; les passages se trouverent bouchés, lorsqu'on se déterminâ à les envoyer chercher.

The supply of munitions of war and of food in the place was greater than has been made known, especially of food, of which there was enough to enable us to hold out longer than we did. I will give proof of this if it is demanded. Moreover, who kept any deficiency from being remedied in good time? The munitions of war were in like case. Since we were long threatened with a siege it was necessary to retrench in everything and to live as if scarcity already existed. Powder should not have been wasted in enterprises the more foolish because, even when accomplished, they would not have made our condition less serious; besides these deprived us of what might have been our salvation. A prudent commander before undertaking anything would have weighed the matter carefully, but our commander was the very one that did not do this. Nevertheless we had still powder enough to last a long time, if they had known how to economize. From what I am about to narrate it will be seen how it was wasted.

Although we had some regular troops we had little reason to depend upon them. An incident which happened on December

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Les munitions de guerre et de bouche y étoient en plus grande quantité qu'on ne l'a publié, surtout les dernières, dont il y avoit une provision suffisante pour tenir plus long-tems qu'on ne l'a fait. J'en donnerois la preuve, si j'en étois requis. Au reste, qui empêchoit qu'on n'y eût remédié de longue main? Les munitions de guerre sont dans le même cas: dès que nous étions depuis long-tems menacés d'un siège, il falloit se retrancher tout, & vivre comme si dès-lors nous eussions été en disette. A l'égard de la poudre, il ne la falloit point perdre dans des entreprises d'autant plus folles, que quand nous en serions venus à bout, elles ne nous seroient pas moins devenues funestes, puisqu'elles nous privoient de ce qui pouvoit faire notre conservation. C'étoit à un Commandant prudent, avant que de rien entreprendre, de se livrer à d'utiles réflexions: mais notre Gouverneur étoit le seul qui n'en fit point. Malgré cela, nous 32] avions encore de la poudre pour long-tems, || si l'on eût su la ménager. On verra, par ce que je vais raconter, de quelle maniere elle étoit prodiguée.

Quoique nous eussions des troupes réglées, nous n'avions pas sujet de compter sur elles. Une certaine aventure, arrivée le vingt-sept du mois de

27th was well fitted to lessen our confidence if we had had any. I will tell what it was. I am not too well posted as to how the Court would have taken the outburst, but it is certain that so bad an example remaining unpunished was fitted to have dangerous consequences. The Swiss who are in our Colonies would not fail on occasion to take advantage of the precedent.

Military discipline and the subordination that soldiers owe to officers had been so badly maintained by our late Governor that the most mischievous results followed. The day after Christmas, that of the festival of Saint Stephen, the Swiss revolted and had the insolence to come out without officers, drums beating, bayonets fixed, and swords in hand. The officers who tried to restrain them were bitterly enraged at this, and the matter reached such a point that those who wished to approach them were aimed at and very nearly lost their lives; they would certainly have done so if prudence had not been used. The French soldiers were as bad and mutinied also; it went so far that the whole town was in alarm, not knowing where the revolt would end. The greatness of the peril (for it is certain that they would have sacked everything if they had only

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Décembre, étoit bien propre à diminuer notre confiance, si nous en avions eue. Voici ce que c'est. Je ne sçais trop comment la Cour aura pris cette incartade; mais il est certain qu'un tel exemple pourroit être d'une dangereuse conséquence, demeurant impuni. Les Suisses qui sont dans nos Colonies, ne manqueroient point de s'en autorizer quelquefois.

La discipline militaire & la subordination que les Soldats doivent aux Officiers, avoient été si mal maintenues par notre défunt Gouverneur, qu'il en résulta le plus fâcheux inconvénient. Le jour de la Fête de S. Etienne, lendemain de Noël, les Suisses se révolterent, & ayant pris les armes, eurent l'insolence de paroître sans Officiers, tambours battans, la bayon. 33] nète au bout du fusil & l'épée à la main. Les Officiers qui se présenterent pour les retenir, en furent cruellment offensés, jusques-là que ceux qui voulurent avancer sur eux, penserent y perdre la vie, ayant été couchés en jouë; ce qui seroit infailliblement arrivé, si l'on n'avoit usé de prudence. Les Soldats Français en firent autant, & se mutinerent aussi; de façon que toute la Ville étoit dans l'allarme, ne sçachant point à quoi aboutiroit cette révolte. La grandeur du péril (car il est assuré qu'ils auroient tout saccagé, s'ils avoient seulement blessé l'un de leurs Officiers;

wounded one of their officers ; they have had the effrontery to boast of this since) led to conciliation which calmed the mutineers. It was promised that their grievances should be removed. These were that the best things were sold to the settlers. It was a question of the butter and bacon which the King furnishes;—behold the object of the mutiny! The mutineers did not complain of the bread nor of any other provisions.<sup>12</sup> Possibly they had some cause of complaint,<sup>13</sup> but their bad conduct ought nevertheless to have been punished. Their offence is too striking to be overlooked.<sup>14</sup> Presumably they would have been punished if it could have been done with safety, but their judges were none of the bravest. In the end they were induced to lay down their arms. The incident cost the King seven or eight thousand livres. The rebels, taking

<sup>12</sup> Some say that they complained also about the beans;—but their greatest grievance was about the codfish, taken as booty at Canso, which M. du Quesnel had promised to them, and which the officers had appropriated to themselves, for a low price at long credit. Some of these knew how to enrich themselves by trade.

<sup>13</sup> It is certain that the officers treated the soldier badly, reckoning his pay fraudulently, and often making a profit out of his work. These soldiers worked upon the fortifications and ought to have been paid.

<sup>14</sup> I learn at this moment that orders from the Court have come, and that the guilty will be arraigned. They will be severely punished.\*

ils ont eu l'effronterie de s'en vanter depuis) fit recourir à des voyes de douceur, qui ramenerent ces Mutins : on promit de faire cesser leurs plaintes, qui consistoient à dire que l'on vendoit ce qu'il y avoit de meilleur aux habitans ; il s'agissoit du beurre & du lard que le Roi fournit : Voilà l'objet de la rébellion ; les Mutins ne se plaignoient ni du pain ni d'aucune autre fourniture<sup>12</sup>. Ils pouvoient peut-être || avoir 34] raison<sup>13</sup> mais leur démarche n'en méritoit pas moins d'être punie. Ce crime est trop intéressant pour être oublié.<sup>14</sup> Il est à présumer qu'ils eussent été châtiés, si on l'eût pû en sûreté ; mais leurs Juges n'étoient pas les plus forts. On parvint enfin à leur faire poser les armes. Il en couta au Roi sept à huit mille livres. Ces Rébelles se prévalant de

<sup>12</sup> Quelques-uns disent qu'ils se plaignoient aussi des fèves ; mais leur plus grand grief étoit la morue pillée à Canceaux, qui leur avoit été promise par M. du Quesnel, & que les Officiers s'étoient fait adjuger pour un prix modique & à de longs termes. Il y en a qui ont su s'enrichir dans ce commerce.

<sup>13</sup> Il est certain que les Officiers traitoient durement le Soldat, ne lui rendant qu'un compte infidèle de sa solde, & profitant souvent de son travail : Ce sont les Soldats qui travaillent aux fortifications, & qui doivent être payés.

<sup>14</sup> J'apprens dans le moment, qu'il est arrivé des ordres de la Cour, & qu'on va instruire le procès des coupables. On les décimera.



advantage of the fear in which they were held, proceeded the next day to the commissary's door and under frivolous prettexts, such as that their money had been previously kept back, caused themselves to be paid all that they wished and to be reimbursed even for their clothing. So ended the matter without the bloodshed that had been feared.

Troops with so little discipline were scarcely able to inspire us with confidence; we therefore did not think it well to make any sorties, fearing that such men might range themselves on the side of the enemy.\* If anything can justify us, certainly it is the foresight that we showed in this connection. In justice to them, indeed, it ought to be said that they did their duty well throughout the siege; but who knows whether they would have still done this if an opportunity had offered to escape from the punishment of a crime which is rarely pardoned? I confess that I thought it only natural to distrust them.

\*Two of the Swiss deserted to the English during the siege. *Collection de Manuscrits*, III : 219 (Quebec, 1884).—Ed.

The enemy appeared in March, a month usually extremely dangerous in a climate which seems to confound the seasons, for the spring, everywhere else so pleasant, there

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ce qu'on les appréhendoit, reparurent le lendemain à la porte du Commissaire ; et sous des prétextes || frivoles, d'argent qu'on leur avoit, *disoient-ils*, autrefois retenu ; ils se firent payer tout ce qu'ils voulurent, et rembourser jusqu'à leurs habits. Ainsi finit cette scène, sans qu'il y eût eu de sang répandu, quoiqu'on l'eût craint.

Des Troupes si peu disciplinées n'étoient guères capables de nous inspirer de la confiance : aussi ne jugeâmes-nous point à propos de faire des sorties, par la crainte que de telles gens ne se rangeassent du côté de nos ennemis. Si quelque chose peut nous justifier, c'est certainement la sagesse que nous avons montré en cette rencontre. On leur doit, à la vérité, la justice d'avouer qu'elles ont bien fait leur devoir pendant le siège ; mais qui sçait si elles en eussent usé de même, trouvant l'occasion de se soustraire au châtement d'un crime qui se pardonne rarement ? Pour moi, je décidai qu'il étoit naturel de s'en défier.

Les Ennemis parurent en Mars, mois qui a accoutumé d'être très critique, sous un climat qui semble confondre les Saisons ; car 36] le Printems, si agréable par-tout ailleurs, || y est affreux. Mais les

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is frightful. The English, however, appeared to have enlisted Heaven in their interests. So long as the expedition lasted they enjoyed the most beautiful weather in the world, and this greatly favoured an enterprise against which were heavy odds that it would fail on account of the season. Contrary to what is usual there were no storms. Even the winds, so unrestrained in those dreadful seas (*Parages*<sup>15</sup>) in the months of March, April, and May, were to them always favourable; the fogs (*Brumes*<sup>16</sup>) so thick and frequent in these months that ships are in danger of running upon the land without seeing it, disappeared earlier than usual, and gave place to a clear and serene sky; in a word, the enemy had always beautiful weather, as fine as they could desire.

March 14 On the 14th March we saw the first hostile ships. There were as yet only two, and at first we took them for French vessels, but the manoeuvres soon undeceived us. Their number increased day by day and ships continued to arrive until the end of May. For a long time they cruised about without attempting anything. The general rendezvous was

<sup>15</sup> *Parage* used in a nautical sense means a certain extent of sea.

<sup>16</sup> *Brume* in a nautical sense is what is called *Brouillard* on land.

Anglais paroissoient avoir mis le Ciel dans leurs intérêts. Tant qu'a duré leur expedition, ils ont joui du plus beau tems du monde: c'est ce qui a favorisé leur entreprise, dans laquelle il y avoit tout à parier qu'ils échoüeroient, par raport à la saison. Point de tempêtes, contre l'ordinaire; les vents même, si déchaînés dans ces horribles parages,<sup>15</sup> au mois de Mars, d'Avril & de Mai, leur ont toujours été favorables; les brumes<sup>16</sup> si épaisses & si fréquentes en ces mois-là, qui exposent les Navires à se briser contre la terre sans la voir, s'étoient retirées plutôt que de coutume, pour faire place à un Ciel clair & serain: enfin l'ennemi a toujours eu un tems à souhait, & aussi beau qu'il l'ait pu désirer.

Mars 14 Ce fut le quatorze, que nous vimes les premiers Navires ennemis: 37] ils n'étoient encore que deux, et nous || les primes d'abord pour des Vaisseaux Français; mais nous fumes bien-tôt détrompés par leur manoeuvre. Le nombre en augmentoit de jour à autre, il en arriva jusqu'à la fin de Mai. Ils croisèrent long-tems, sans rien tenter. Le rendez-vous général étoit devant notre Isle, où ils arrivoient de tous

<sup>15</sup> On appelle *Parage*, en terme de Marine, une certaine étendue de Mer.

<sup>16</sup> *Brume*, en terme de Mer, est ce qu'on nomme *Brouillard* sur terre.

before our island, and they came in from every direction, for Acadia, Placentia, Boston, and all English America, were in arms. The European contingent did not come until June. The enterprise was less that of the nation or of the King than of the inhabitants of New England alone. These singular people have a system of laws and of protection peculiar to themselves, and their Governor carries himself like a monarch. So much is this the case that although war was already declared between the two crowns, he himself declared it against us of his own right and in his own name, as if it was necessary that he should give his warrant to his master. His declaration set forth that for himself and all his friends and allies he declared war against us; apparently he meant to speak for the savages subject to them, who are called Indians, and whom it is necessary to distinguish from those obedient to France. It will be seen that Admiral Warren had no authority over the troops sent by the Governor of Boston and that he was merely a spectator, although it was to him that we finally surrendered, at his own request. So striking was the mutual independence of the land army and the fleet that they were always represented to us as

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côtez ; car on avoit armé à l'Acadie, Plaisance, Baston, & dans toute l'Amerique Anglaise. Les secours d'Europe ne vinrent qu'en Juin. C'étoit moins une entréprise formée par la Nation, ou par le Roi, que par les seuls habitans de la nouvelle Angleterre. Ces peuples singuliers ont des Loix & une Police qui leur sont particulieres, et leur Gouverneur tranche du Souverain. Cela est si vrai, que, quoiqu'il y eût guerre déclarée entre les deux Couronnes, il nous la déclara lui de son chef et en son nom, comme s'il avoit fallu qu'il eût autorisé son maître. Sa déclaration portoit, qu'il nous déclaroit la guerre pour lui, & pour tous ses amis & alliés ; il entendoit parler apparemment des Sauvages qui leur sont soumis, qu'on appelle *Indiens*, & que l'on distingue des Sauvages || qui obéissent à la France. On verra que l'Amiral *Warren* n'avoit rien à commander aux troupes envoyées par le Gouverneur de Baston, & que cet Amiral n'a été que spectateur, quoique ce soit à lui que nous nous soyons rendus Il nous en avoit fait solliciter. Ce qui marque bien l'indépendance qu'il y avoit entre l'Armée de terre & celle de mer,

of different nations. What other monarchy was ever governed in such a way ?

May 11 The greater part of the transports having arrived by the beginning of May, on the eleventh we saw them, to the number of ninety-six, coming in order of battle from the direction of Canso and steering for the Flat Point of the Bay of Gabarus. We did not doubt that they would land there. Then it was that we saw the need of the precautions that we ought to have taken. A detachment of one hundred men from the garrison and militia was sent thither quickly in command of M. Morpain, port captain. But what could such a feeble force do against the multitude which the enemy was disembarking ? The only result was that a part of our force was killed. M. Morpain found about two thousand men already disembarked. He killed some of them and retired.

The enemy took possession of the surrounding country and a detachment pushed forward close to the Royal Battery. Now terror seized us all. From this moment the talk was of abandoning the splendid battery, which would have been our chief defence had we known how to make use of it.

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que l'on nous a toujours distinguées, comme si elles eussent été de différentes Nations. Quelle Monarchie s'est jamais gouvernée de la sorte ?

Mai 11 La plus grande partie des Bâtimens de transport étant arrivés dans le commencement de Mai, nous les aperçumes le onze en ordre de bataille, au nombre de quatre-vingt-seize, venant du côté de Canceaux & dirigeant leur route vers la Pointe plate de la Baye de *Gabarus*. Nous ne doutames plus qu'ils n'y fissent leur descente. C'est alors qu'on vit la nécessité des précautions que nous aurions dû prendre. On y envoya à la hâte un détachement de cent hommes, tirés de la garnison & des Milices, 39] sous le commandement du sieur *Morpain*, Capitaine de Port. Mais || que pouvoit un aussi foible Corps, contre la multitude que les ennemis débarquoient ! Cela n'aboutit qu'à faire tuer une partie des nôtres. Le sieur *Morpain* trouva déjà près de deux mille hommes débarqués ; il en tua quelques-uns, & se retira.

L'ennemi s'empare de toute la campagne, & un détachement s'avance jusques auprès de la batterie-Royale. Pour le coup, la frayeur nous saisit tous : on parla dès l'instant, d'abandonner cette magnifique batterie, qui auroit été notre plus grande défense, si l'on eût sçu en faire usage. On

Several tumultuous councils were held to consider the situation. Unless it was from a panic fear which never left us again during the whole siege, it would be difficult to give any reason for such an extraordinary action. Not a single musket had yet been fired against this battery, which the enemy could not take except by making approaches in the same manner as to the town and besieging it, so to speak, in the regular way. A reason for our action was whispered, but I am not myself in a position to speak decidedly. I have, however, heard its truth vouched for by one who was in the battery, but, my post being in the town, it was a long time since I had been to the Royal Battery. The alleged reason for such a criminal withdrawal is that there were two breaches which had never been repaired. If this is true the crime is all the greater, for we had had even more time than was necessary to put everything in order.

However this may be, the resolution was taken to abandon this powerful bulwark, in spite of the protestations of some wiser heads, who lamented to see such a stupid mistake made. They could get no hearers. In vain did they urge that we should thus proclaim our weakness to the enemy, who would

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tint tumultuairement divers Conseils là-dessus. Il seroit bien difficile de dire les raisons qui portoient à un aussi étrange procédé ; si ce n'est une terreur panique, qui ne nous a plus quitté de tout le Siège. Il n'y avoit pas eu encore un seul coup de fusil tiré sur cette batterie, que les ennemis ne pouvoient prendre qu'en faisant leurs approches comme pour la Ville, & l'assiégeant, pour ainsi dire, dans les règles. On en a dit sourdement une raison, sur laquelle je ne suis point en état de décider ; je l'ai pourtant 40] entendu assurer par une personne qui étoit dans la batterie ; mais mon poste étant en Ville, il y avoit long-tems que je n'étois allé à la batterie-Royale : C'est que ce qui détermina à un abandon si criminel, est qu'il y avoit deux brèches qui n'avoient point été réparées. Si cela est, le crime est encore plus grand, parce que nous avions eu plus de loisir qu'il n'en falloit, pour mettre ordre à tout.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la résolution fut prise de renoncer à ce puissant boulevard, malgré les représentations de quelques gens sages, qui gémissaient de voir commettre une si lourde faute. Ils ne purent se faire écouter. Inutilement remontrèrent-ils que ce seroit témoigner notre

not fail to profit by such huge recklessness, and would turn this very battery against us; that, to show a bold face and not reinforce the courage of the enemy by giving him from the first day such good hope of success, it was necessary to do all that we could to hold this important post; that it was quite clear that we could hold it for more than fifteen days, and that this delay could be utilized by removing all the cannon to the town. The answer was, that the council had resolved otherwise; and so on the 13th, by order of the council, a battery of thirty pieces of cannon, which had cost the King immense sums, was abandoned without undergoing the slightest fire. The retreat was so precipitate that we did not take time to spike the guns in the usual manner, so that on the very next day the enemy used them. Meanwhile, some deluded themselves with a contrary hope; I was on the point of getting a wager accepted that they would make almost no delay in attacking us. So flurried were we that, before the withdrawal from the battery, a barrel of gunpowder exploded, nearly blew up several persons, and burnt the robe of a Récollet friar. It was not from

foiblesse aux ennemis, qui ne manqueroient point de profiter d'une aussi grande étourderie, & qui tourneroient cette même batterie contre nous : que pour faire bonne contenance, & ne point réhausser le courage à l'ennemi, en lui donnant dès le premier jour, une si grande espérance de réussir, il falloit se maintenir dans ce poste important le plus que l'on 41] pourroit : qu'il étoit évident qu'on s'y || conserveroit plus de quinze jours, & que ce délai pouvoit être employé à retirer tous les canons dans la Ville. On répondit que le Conseil l'avoit résolu autrement ; ainsi donc, par ordre du Conseil, on abandonna le 13. sans avoir essuyé le moindre feu, une batterie de trente pièces de canon, qui avoit couté au Roi des sommes immenses. Cet abandon se fit avec tant de précipitation, qu'on ne se donna pas le tems d'enclouer les canons de la maniere que cela se pratique ; aussi les ennemis s'en servirent-ils, dès le lendemain. Cependant on se flatoit du contraire : je fus sur le point de gager qu'ils ne tarderoient guères à nous en battre. On étoit si peu à soi, qu'avant de se retirer de la batterie, le feu prit à un baril de poudre, qui pensa faire sauter plusieurs personnes, & brûla la robe d'un Religieux Récollet. Ce n'étoit

this moment, however, that imprudence marked our actions ; for a long time we had yielded to it.

What I had foreseen happened. From the fourteenth the 14 enemy greeted us with our own cannon, and kept up a tremendous fire against us. We answered them from the walls, but we could not do them the harm which they did to us in knocking down houses and shattering everything within range.

While they kept up a hot fire upon us from the Royal Bat- 16 tery they established a mortar platform upon the Rabasse height near the Barachois<sup>17</sup> on the west side and these mortars began to fire on the sixteenth day after the siege began. They had mortars in all the batteries which they established. The bombs annoyed us greatly.

The same day the tardy resolution was taken to send to Acadia to summon to our help a detachment which had left Quebec to act in concert with us in the enterprise against Annapolis. The late M. du Quesnel, enamoured of this expedition, had given notice of it to M. de Beauharnois.\* This Governor was

\*Governor of  
Canada from  
1726 to 1747.  
—ED.

<sup>17</sup> *Barachois* is a lake into which the sea comes.

pas de ce moment que l'imprudence caractérisoit nos actions, il y avoit long-tems qu'elle s'étoit réfugiée parmi nous.

Ce que j'avois prévu, arriva. Dès le quatorze, les ennemis nous 14 42] saluerent avec nos propres Canons, dont || ils firent un feu épouventable. Nous leur répondimes de dessus les murs ; mais nous ne pouvions leur rendre le mal qu'ils nous faisoient, rasant nos maisons, et foudroyant tout ce qui étoit à leur portée.

Tandis que les Anglais nous chauffoient de la batterie-Royale, ils 16 établissoient une Plate-forme de Mortiers sur la hauteur de *Rabasse*, proche le *Barachois*<sup>17</sup> du côté de l'Ouest, qui tirerent le seize, jour ou a commencé le bombardement. Ils avoient des Mortiers dans toutes les batteries qu'ils éleverent. Les bombes nous ont beaucoup incommodé.

Ce même jour on prit une résolution tardive, qui fut d'envoyer à l'Acadie, pour faire venir à notre secours un détachement parti de Quebec, afin de concourir avec nous à l'entreprise sur le Port-Royal. Feu M. du Quesnel, entêté de cette expédition, en avoit donné avis à M. de *Beauharnois*. Ce Gouverneur, plus prudent, voulut avoir là-dessus des ||

<sup>17</sup> *Barachois* est un Lac où la Mer entre.

more prudent and wished to have the authority of the Court which they wrote in concert to secure. M. du Quesnel took it upon himself to proceed with the enterprize, while M. de Beauharnois waited quietly for the orders of the Court. Meanwhile, as it was necessary to have everything ready, in case the Court should think it well to approve of the expedition, the Governor-General of Canada sent a company lieutenant, M. Marin, with two other officers and two hundred and fifty men, both Indians and French. Acadia is on the mainland,<sup>18</sup> and on the same continent as Quebec. This detachment, however, was not able to arrive as soon as ours. We did not learn of its arrival until the month of March of this year.

The messenger whom M. Marin sent to us asked on his part for provisions and munitions of war. We should have sent back the same messenger to urge this officer to come to our help, but we were without forethought and were so far from such wisdom that steps were taken in the month of April to comply with his requests; we did not send provisions, however,

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<sup>18</sup> It is claimed that it is the largest continent in the world. It is easy to go from Canada to Acadia, but there are several rivers and lakes to cross. The Canadians often make the journey.

43] ordres de la Cour. On avoit écrit de concert pour en obtenir. M. du Quesnel prit sur lui de commencer l'entreprize, au lieu que M. de Beauharnois attendit tranquillement ce qu'il plairoit à la Cour d'ordonner; cependant comme il falloit être prêt, en cas qu'elle trouvât bon d'approuver cette expédition; le Gouverneur Général du Canada fit partir le sieur *Marin*, Lieutenant de Compagnie, & deux autres Officiers, avec deux cens-cinquante hommes, tant Sauvages que Français. L'Acadie est en Terre-Ferme,<sup>18</sup> & dans le même continent que Quebec; mais ce détachement n'avoit pû arriver aussi-tôt que le notre. Nous n'apprimes son arrivée qu'au mois de Mars de cette année.

L'Exprès que le Sieur Marin nous avoit envoyé, demanda de sa part des vivres & des munitions de guerre. Il falloit renvoyer le même || 44] Exprès pour engager cet Officier à nous venir secourir; mais on ne songeoit à rien: loin de saisir un parti si sage, on se disposa dans le mois d'Avril à satisfaire à ses demandes, en retranchant toutefois les vivres, cet

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<sup>18</sup> On prétend que c'est le plus grand Continent qui soit au monde: On va facilement du Canada à l'Acadie; mais il y a quelques Rivières & Lacs à traverser. C'est un voyage que font souvent les Canadiens.



for he let us know that he had recovered some. He was urgent in requesting powder and balls, and in granting his wishes, we made two irreparable mistakes. In the first place, we deprived ourselves of the help which this officer was able to bring us; instead of explaining our situation, as we should have done, we gave him to understand that we were strong enough to defend ourselves. In the second place, already short of ammunition, especially powder, we further diminished our supply. There was some still more uselessly wasted.

It is necessity that makes men reflect. In the month of May we began to be anxious about the mistake we had made; then, without thinking that, with the enemy extending all along the coast and masters of the surrounding country, it was impossible for M. Marin to penetrate to the place, two messengers were sent, beseeching him to succour us. Both had the good fortune to pass out, but they were obliged to make so wide a circuit that they took nearly a month to reach him. The Canadian officer, learning from them the extremity in which we found ourselves, collected some Indians to strengthen his detachment, being resolved to help us if he should reach us.

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Officier nous ayant fait sçavoir qu'il en avoit recouvré. Il insistoit pour de la poudre et des balles; en lui accordant cet article, nous fimes deux fautes irréparables: La premiere, nous nous privions du secours que cet Officier pouvoit nous donner; au lieu de le mander, comme on l'auroit dû, nous lui faisons connoître que nous étions assez forts pour nous défendre nous-mêmes: La seconde, nous diminuions la quantité de nos munitions, déjà courtes, surtout la poudre. Il y en a eu encore de plus inutilement répanduë.

La nécessité amene la réflexion. On commença dans le mois de Mai à songer à la faute qu'on avoit faite; alors, sans penser qu'il étoit impossible que cet Officier pût pénétrer dans la Place, les ennemis bordant la Côte & étant maîtres de la Campagne, on fit partir deux Exprès pour le 45] prier de nous secourir. Ces // deux hommes eurent le bonheur de passer; mais il leur fallut faire un si grand circuit, qu'ils mirent près d'un mois à se rendre. L'Officier Canadien, ayant sçû d'eux l'extrémité où nous nous trouvions, assembla plusieurs Sauvages & en augmenta son détachement, résolu de bien faire, s'il parvenoit jusqu'à nous. Après s'être

After a fight in crossing the strait, he had the chagrin to learn that he had arrived too late, and that Louisbourg had surrendered. The brave fellow had only time to throw himself into the woods with his five or six hundred men, to get back to Acadia.

- 17 The enemy appeared to wish to press the siege with vigour. They established near the Brissonet Flats a battery, which began to fire upon the seventeenth, and they were at work upon still another to play directly upon the Dauphin Gate, between the houses of a man named LaRoche and of a gunner named Lescenne. They did not content themselves with these batteries, although they hammered a breach in our walls, but made new ones to support the first. The marshy flat on the seashore at White Point proved very troublesome and kept them from pushing on their works as they would have wished; to remedy this they dug several trenches across the flats, and, when these had been drained, they set up two batteries which did not begin to fire until some days afterwards. One of them, above the settlement of Martissance, had several pieces of cannon, taken partly from the Royal Battery and partly from Flat Point where the landing was made.

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battu en traversant le Canal, il eut le chagrin d'apprendre qu'il arrivoit trop tard, & que la Place étoit renduë. Ce brave homme n'eut que le tems de se jeter dans les bois, avec ses cinq à six cens hommes, pour regagner l'Acadie.

- 17 Les ennemis paroisoient avoir envie de pousser vigoureusement le Siége. Ils établirent une batterie auprès de la Plaine de *Brissonnet*, qui commença à tirer le dix-sept, & travaillèrent encore à une autre, pour battre directement la Porte Dauphine, entre les maisons du nommé *la Roche & Lescenne*, Canonier. Ils ne s'en tinrent point à ces batteries, quoiqu'elles nous battissent en brèche; mais ils en dressèrent de nouvelles 46] pour soutenir les premières. La Plaine marécageuse du bord de *la Mer*, à la Pointe blanche, les incommodoit fort, & empêchoit qu'ils ne pussent leurs travaux comme ils l'auroient souhaité: pour y rémédier, ils pratiquèrent divers boyaux, afin de couper cette Plaine; étant venus à bout de la dessécher, ils y firent d'eux batteries, qui ne tirèrent que quelques jours après. Il y en avoit une au-dessus de l'habitation de *Martissance*, composée de sept pièces de canon, prises en partie de la Batterie-Royale & de la Pointe plate où s'étoit fait le débarquement. On

They intended it to destroy the Dauphin Bastion, and these two last batteries nearly levelled the Dauphin Gate.

On the 18th we perceived a ship carrying the French flag, 18 and trying to enter the Port. It was seen that she was really a French ship, and to help her to come in we kept up a ceaseless fire upon the Royal Battery. The English could easily have sunk the ship had it not been for the vigour of our fire, which never ceased, and they were not able to keep her from entering. This little reinforcement pleased us. She was a Basque vessel, and another had reached us in the month of April.

We were not so fortunate in regard to a ship of Granville, which tried to enter a few days later, but, being pursued, was forced to run aground. She fought for a long time. Her commander, whose name was Dagueuet, was a brave man, and surrendered only in the last extremity and when overwhelmed by numbers. He had carried all his guns to one side, and kept up such a terrible fire with them that he made the enemy pay dearly and they were obliged to arm nearly all their boats to take him. From this captain we learned that he had met the *Vigilant*,

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la destinoit à ruiner le Bastion Dauphin ; ces deux dernieres batteries ont presque rasé la Porte Dauphine.

Le dix-huit nous vîmes paroître un Navire, avec Pavillon Français, 13 qui cherchoit à donner dans le Port. Il fut reconnu pour être effectivement de notre Nation, & afin de favoriser son entrée, nous fîmes un feu continuel sur la Batterie Royale. Les Anglais ne pouvant résister à la vivacité de notre feu, qui ne discontinuoit point, ne purent empêcher ce Navire d'entrer, qu'il leur eut été facile sans cela de couler à fond. || 47] Ce petit rafraichissement nous fit plaisir ; c'étoit un Navire Basque : il nous en étoit venu un autre dans le courant d'Avril.

Nous n'eumes pas le même bonheur pour un Navire de Granville, qui se présenta aussi pour entrer, quelques jours après ; mais qui ayant été poursuivi, fut contraint de s'échouer, et se battit long-tems. Celui qui le commandoit, nommé *Dagueuet*, étoit un brave homme, lequel ne se rendit qu'à la dernière extrémité, & après avoir été accablé par le nombre. Il avoit transporté tous ses Canons d'un même côté, & en fit un feu si terrible, que les ennemis n'eurent pas bon marché de lui. Il fallut armer presque toutes leurs Chaloupes pour le prendre. Nous avons sçu de ce Capitaine,

and that it was from that unfortunate vessel that he heard of the blockade of Cape Breton. This fact has a bearing upon what I am about to relate.

In France it is thought that our fall was caused by the loss of this vessel. In a sense this is true, but we should have been able to hold out without her if we had not heaped error upon error, as you must have seen by this time. It is true that, thanks to our own imprudence, we had already begun to lose hope when this powerful succour approached us. If she had entered, as she could have done, we should still hold our property, and the English would have been forced to retire.

The *Vigilant* came in sight on the 28th or 29th of May about a league and a half distant from Santarye.\* At the time there was a north-east wind which was a good one for entering. She left the English fleet two and a half leagues to leeward. Nothing could have prevented her from entering, and yet she became the prey of the English by a most deplorable fatality. We witnessed her manœuvres and there was not one of us who did not utter maledictions upon what was so badly planned and so imprudent.

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qu'il avoit rencontré le *Vigilant*, & que c'étoit de ce malheureux Vaisseau, qu'il avoit appris que l'Isle-Royale étoit bloquée. Cette circonstance importe au récit que je vais faire.

Vous êtes persuadés, en France, que la prise de ce Vaisseau de guerre a occasionné la nctre, cela est vrai en quelque sorte ; mais nous eussions || 48] pu nous soutenir sans lui, si nous n'avions pas entassé fautes sur fautes, ainsi que vous avez dû vous en appercevoir jusqu' à présent. Il est vrai que, graces à nos imprudences, lorsque ce puissant secours nous arrivoit, nous commencions à être sans espérance. S'il fût entré, comme il le pouvoit, nous serions encore dans nos biens, & les Anglais eussent été forcés de se retirer.

28 Le *Vigilant* parut le ving-huit ou le vingt-neuf de Mai, à environ une  
ou lieuë & demie de distance de *Santarye*. Le vent étoit pour lors Nord-  
29 Est, & par conséquent bon pour entrer. Il laissoit le Flotte Anglaise à deux lieues et demie sous le vent. Rien ne pouvoit donc l'empêcher d'entrer ; & c'est par la plus grande de toutes les fatalités qu'il est devenu la proye de nos Vainqueurs. Témoins de sa manœuvre, il n'étoit personne de nous qui ne donnât des malédictions à une manœuvre si mal concertée & si imprudente.

This vessel, commanded by M. de la Maisonfort, instead of holding on her way, or of sending a boat to land for intelligence, as prudence demanded, amused herself by chasing a privateer rigged as a Snow (*Senault*<sup>19</sup>), which unfortunately she encountered near the shore. This privateer, which was commanded by one Brousse,\* manœuvred differently from the French vessel, and retreated, firing continuously, with all sail set, and leading her enemy on towards the English squadron; her plan succeeded, for the *Vigilant* found herself so entangled that when she saw the danger it was impossible to save herself. At first two frigates<sup>20</sup> attacked her. M. de la Maisonfort answered with a vigorous fire which soon placed one of them *hors de combat*. Her mainmast was carried away, she was stripped of all her rigging, and was compelled to retire. Five other frigates, however, came and poured in a hot fire from all sides; the fight, which we watched in the open air, lasted from five o'clock to ten in the evening. At length it was necessary for her to yield to superior force and to surrender. The

\* The officer referred to is no doubt Captain Rouse, commanding the "Shirley," a provincial ship. Rouse was subsequently an officer in the Royal Navy. Winsor, *Narr. and Crit. Hist.* V: 437, note —En.

<sup>19</sup> Ship with two masts.

<sup>20</sup> The frigate is a swift vessel which goes well and is fit for racing.

Ce Vaisseau, commandé par M. de la *Maisonfort*, au lieu de suivre sa route, ou d'envoyer sa chaloupe à terre pour prendre langue, ainsi || 49] que le requéroit la prudence, s'amusa à poursuivre un Corsaire monté en *Senault*<sup>19</sup> qu'il rencontra malheureusement sous la terre. Ce Corsaire, que commandoit un nommé *Brousse*, manœuvre d'une autre maniere que le Vaisseau Français, il se battit toujours en retraite, forçant de voiles, & attirant son ennemi vers l'Escadre Angloise; ce qui lui réussit: car le *Vigilant* se trouva tellement engagé, qu'il ne lui fut plus possible de se sauver, quand on eut vu le danger. Deux Frégates<sup>20</sup> l'attaquerent d'abord: M. de la *Maisonfort* leur répondit par un feu très vif, qui en mit bien-tôt une hors de combat; elle fut démâtée de son grand mâ, désemparée de toutes ses manœuvres, & contrainte de se retirer. Mais il vint cinq autres Frégates qui chaufferent le *Vigilant* de toutes parts; le combat que nous voyons à découvert, dura depuis cinq heures du soir jusqu' à dix. 50] Enfin il || fallut céder à la force, & se rendre. Les ennemis ont beau-

<sup>19</sup> Navire à deux mâs.

<sup>20</sup> La Frégate est un vaisseau léger, qui marche bien, & propre pour la course.

enemy's loss in the fight was heavy and the French commander had eighty men killed or wounded ; his ship was very little damaged.

It is right to say to the credit of M. de la Maisonfort that he showed great courage in the struggle, but the interests of the King demanded that he should have proceeded to his destination. The Minister did not send him to give chase to any vessel ; his ship was loaded with ammunition and provisions, and his one business was to re-victual our wretched town, which would never have been taken could we have received so great a help ; but we were victims devoted to the wrath of Heaven, which willed to use even our own forces against us. We have learned from the English, since the surrender, that they were beginning to be short of ammunition, and were in greater need of powder than we were. They had even held councils with a view to raising the siege. The powder found in the *Vigilant* soon dispelled this idea, and we perceived that after the capture their firing increased greatly.

I know that the commander of this unfortunate vessel will

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coup perdu dans ce combat, & le Commandant Français eut quatre-vingts hommes tués ou blessés ; le Vaisseau n'a été que fort peu endommagé.

On doit dire, à la gloire de M. de la Maisonfort, qu'il a fait preuve d'une extrême valeur dans ce combat ; mais il auroit mieux valu qu'il eût suivi sa destination : c'étoit tout ce que les intérêts du Roi exigeoient. Le Ministre ne l'envoyoit pas pour donner la chasse à aucun Vaisseau ennemi : chargé de munitions de guerre & de bouche, son Vaisseau étoit uniquement destiné à ravitailler notre malheureuse Place, qui n'auroit jamais été en effet emportée, si nous eussions pû recevoir un si grand secours ; mais nous étions des victimes dévouées à la colere du Ciel, qui a voulu faire servir contre nous jusqu'à nos propres forces. Nous avons seu des Anglais, depuis notre reddition, qu'ils commençoient à manquer de munitions de guerre, & que la poudre étoit encore plus rare dans leur armée 51] que parmi nous. Ils avoient même tenu quelques Conseils pour lever le siège. La poudre trouvée dans le *Vigilant* fit bien-tôt évanouir cette idée ; nous nous apperçûmes que leur feu avoit depuis beaucoup augmenté.

Je sçai que le Commandant de cet infortuné Vaisseau dira, pour se

say, to justify himself, that it was important to capture the privateer in order to govern himself by the information that he should thus secure. But that does not excuse him; he knew that Louisbourg was blockaded, and that was enough; what more was it necessary to know? If he was afraid that the English were masters of the place it was easy to find this out by sending his cutter or his long-boat and sacrificing some men for the sake of certainty. The Royal Battery ought not to have troubled him. We should have done with it what we did in the case of the Basque ship, whose entrance we aided by keeping up a hot fire. The loss of a reinforcement so considerable caused even those to lose heart who had been most determined. It was not difficult to suspect that we should be obliged to throw ourselves on the clemency of the English, and several thought that it was now necessary to ask for terms of capitulation. We still held out, however, for more than a month and this is better than one could have expected considering the prostration to which so sad a spectacle had brought us.

The enemy was busy all the remainder of the month in cannonading and bombarding us without making any appreciable progress which could arouse their hopes. Since they did not attack

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justifier, qu'il étoit important d'enlever le Corsaire, afin de se régler sur les nouvelles qu'il en auroit appris. Mais cela ne l'excuse point; il sçavoit que Louisbourg étoit bloqué, c'en étoit assez: qu'avoit-il besoin d'en sçavoir davantage? S'il craignoit que les Anglais n'eussent été maîtres de la Place, il étoit aisé de s'en instruire, en envoyant son canot ou sa chaloupe, & sacrifiant quelques hommes pour sa sûreté; la batterie Royale ne devoit point l'inquiéter, nous en aurions agi comme avec le Navire Basque, dont nous facilitâmes l'entrée par un feu excessif. La perte d'un secours si considérable ralentit le courage de ceux qui avoient le plus conservé de fermeté: il n'étoit pas difficile de juger que nous 52] serions contraints d'implorer la clémence des Anglais, & plusieurs personnes furent d'avis qu'il falloit dès lors demander à capituler. Nous avons cependant tenu un mois au-delà; c'est plus qu'on n'auroit pu exiger dans l'abattement où venoit de nous jeter un si triste spectacle.

L'Ennemi s'occupa à nous canonner & à nous bombarder tout le reste du mois, sans faire des progrès bien sensibles, & qui lui pussent donner de l'espoir. Comme il ne nous attaquoit point dans les formes; qu'il

in form, and, since they had no entrenchments to cover themselves, they did not venture to approach too near. All our shots carried while the greater part of theirs was wasted. Hence we fired only when we thought well. The enemy would fire daily from five to six hundred cannon shots to our twenty; in truth our scarcity of powder caused us to be careful. The musketry was of little use.

I have forgotten to mention that in the early days of the siege the enemy had summoned us to surrender, but we answered as our duty demanded; the officer who was sent to make the proposition, seeing that we were rejecting his offers, proposed that the ladies should be sent out with the guarantee that they should not be insulted, and that they should be protected in the few houses that were still standing, for the enemy when they disembarked had burned or destroyed nearly everything in the surrounding country. We declined the officer's proposal, for our women and children were quite safe in the shelter we had made for them. Some long pieces of wood had been put upon the casemates in a slanting position and this so

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n'avoit pratiqué aucuns retranchemens pour se couvrir, il n'osoit s'approcher de trop près; tous nos coups portoient, au lieu que la plupart des siens étoient perdus: aussi ne tirions-nous que lorsque nous le jugions nécessaire. Il tiroit, lui, plus de cinq à six cens coups de canon par jour, contre nous vingt; à la vérité, le peu de poudre que nous avions, obligeoit à n'en user que sobrement. La mousqueterie étoit peu d'usage.

J'ai oublié de dire que, dès les premiers jours du siège, les ennemis nous avoient fait sommer de nous rendre; mais nous répondîmes selon || 53] ce que le devoir nous prescrivoit: l'Officier, député pour nous en faire la proposition, voyant que nous rejettions ses offres, proposa de faire sortir les Dames, avec assurance qu'elles ne seroient point insultées, & qu'on les feroit garder dans les maisons qui subsistoient encore en petit nombre; car l'ennemi, en débarquant, avoit presque tout brûlé ou détruit dans la campagne. Nous remerciâmes cet Officier, parce que nos femmes & nos enfans étoient sûrement dans les logemens que nous leur avions faits. On avoit mis sur les casemates de longues pièces de bois, placées en biais, qui,



deadened the force of the bombs and turned them aside that their momentum had no effect. It was underneath this that we had, as it were, buried them.

At the beginning of June the besiegers appeared to June acquire renewed vigour. Dissatisfied with their slight success 6 hitherto, they began new undertakings, and planned to attack us from the sea. In order to succeed they tried to surprise the battery at the entrance. A detachment of about 500 men, transported thither on the night of the sixth, was cut in pieces by M. d'Aillebout, captain of a company, who commanded there and fired upon them with grape shot; more than three hundred were left dead, and none were saved except those who asked for quarter; the wounded were taken to our hospitals. On this occasion we made one hundred and nineteen prisoners, and on our side had only three killed or wounded, but we lost a gunner who was much regretted.

This advantage cheered us a little: we had as yet made no sortie, for want of men, since, as I have observed, we did not depend at all upon the regular troops, for the reason stated. It was, nevertheless, decided to make one, and for this there

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en amortissant le coup de la bombe, la rejettent, & empêchent l'effet de son poids. C'est là-dessous que nous les avions enterrées.

Au commencement de Juin, les Assiégeans parurent reprendre Juin une nouvelle vigueur; n'étant pas contents du peu de succès qu'ils avoient eu jusques-là, ils s'attachèrent à d'autres entreprises, et voulurent essayer de nous attaquer par le côté de la mer. Pour réussir, ils tenterent 54] de nous surprendre la batterie de || l'entrée: un Détachement d'environ cinq cens hommes s'y étant transporté pendant la nuit du six au sept, fut taillé en pièces par le sieur Daillebout, Capitaine de Compagnie, 6 qui y commandoit, & qui tira sur eux à mitraille; plus de trois cens 7 resterent sur la place, & il n'y eut de sauvés que ceux qui demanderent quartier, les blessés furent transférés dans nos hôpitaux. Nous fimes en cette occasion cent dix-neuf prisonniers, et n'eûmes que trois hommes de tués ou blessés; mais nous perdîmes un Canonier, qui fut fort regretté.

Cet avantage nous releva tant soit peu le cœur; nous n'avions encore point fait de sortie, faute de monde: car, comme je l'ai observé, nous ne comptions du tout point sur les troupes réglées, par la raison que j'en ai dite; il fut pourtant arrêté qu'on en feroit une, en quoi il y avoit néces-

was urgent need. Wishing to possess, at any price, the battery at the entrance, the assailants commenced to build a fort opposite this battery, to command it. A hundred resolute men were chosen to go and dislodge them. M. Kol, a Swiss and a settler, took command of them, having with him M. Beau-bassin, a retired officer. In the hands of these two brave men the sortie could not fail, and it was conducted with all imaginable prudence and courage. They went to land at the River Mira, where they halted some time, sending out a scouting party towards Lorembec,\* a place three or four leagues from the town and still untouched; it was reported to them that about three hundred men had been seen. They advanced upon them, but the enemy, seeing them coming, burned Lorembec and retired to the head of a Barachois, upon the property of M. Boucher, an engineer. Although they were entrenched there, our party, reinforced by thirty Indians found at the Mira, attacked them so that they lost two hundred and thirty men, of whom a hundred and fifty were killed and eighty wounded. Had not powder given out the reverse would have been pressed farther.

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sité urgente. Voulant à quel prix que ce fût s'emparer de la batterie de l'entrée, les Assaillans commençoient à construire un Fort vis-à-vis cette 55] batterie pour la dominer. On choisit cent hommes bien résolus afin de les aller débusquer : le Sieur Kol, Suisse & habitant, en prit le commandement, ayant avec lui le sieur *Beaubassin*, Officier retiré du service. Cette sortie ne pouvoit échoïer entre les mains de ces deux braves gens, aussi fut-elle conduite avec toute la prudence & la bravoure imaginables. Ils allèrent faire leur descente à la Riviere de *Miré*, ou ils s'arrêterent quelque tems, envoyant à la découverte vers *Lorembeck*, Bourg à trois ou quatre lieues de la Ville, encore entier : on leur rapporta que l'on voyoit environ trois cens hommes. Ils marcherent à eux ; mais les ennemis les voyant approcher brûlerent *Lorembeck*, & se retirerent au fonds d'un Barachois, sur l'habitation du sieur *Boucher*, Ingénieur ; quoiqu'ils s'y fussent retranchés, nos gens s'étant renforcés de trente Sauvages trouvés à *Miré*, les attaquèrent, & leur mirent deux cens trente hommes hors de combat, dont il y en eut cent cinquante de tués & quatre-vingts de blessés. Cet échec eût été poussé plus loin, si la poudre n'eût

The number of the enemy, however, increasing constantly, it was necessary to beat a retreat. The Indians returned to station themselves beyond the river.

These Indians are very brave and warmly attached to the French. They hate the English as much as they like us, and give them no quarter. It will be impossible for the English to quell them, and France, if she ever wishes to recover our colony by force, will always find in them assistance all the more invaluable because they are without fear. They are naturally good tempered, but when irritated are none the less dangerous. Full of hatred for the English, whose ferocity they abhor, they destroy all upon whom they can lay hands. Their rage against the English nation is so great that it extends even to its savage allies. We have heard them say that they would kill every Englishman who should dare to venture into the forest.

It was our misfortune not to have had any of these Indians, who would have rendered it possible for us to make frequent sorties;—or, rather, this ought to be added to the number of the mistakes that we made, for it would have been very easy to

56] point manqué ; d'ailleurs le nombre || des ennemis augmentoit sans cesse, il fallut faire retraite. Les Sauvages retournerent se poster au-dessus de la Riviere.

Ces Sauvages sont très-courageux & remplis d'amitié pour les Français : autant ils nous aiment, autant haïssent-ils les Anglais, ausquels ils ne font nul quartier. Il leur sera impossible de les dompter : ainsi la France, si elle veut jamais ravoïr notre Colonie par la force, trouvera constamment en eux des secours d'autant meilleurs, que ces gens-là sont intrépides. Leur naturel est d'être bons ; mais ils n'en sont pas moins dangéreux, quand on les irrite. Pleins d'animosité contre l'Anglais, dont ils abhorrent la férocité, ils en détruisent autant qu'il leur en tombe entre les mains : leur acharnement contre cette Nation est si grand, qu'il s'étend jusqu'aux Sauvages qui leur sont alliés ; nous leur avons entendu dire qu'ils tueroient autant d'Anglais qu'il en oseroit se risquer dans le bois. Notre malheur est de n'avoir pas eu de ces Sauvages qui nous auroient 57] mis en état de faire de fré||quentes sorties ; ou plutôt cela doit être rangé au nombre des fautes que nous avons faites, parce qu'il nous eût été très-facile d'en rassembler tel nombre que nous eussions voulu ; mais il

bring together as many as we wished, but it would have been necessary to make this provision before the English arrived or the siege began. Our commanders' excuse, that one of the causes of the surrender was that they had not enough men to make sorties, and dislodge the enemy as they pushed forward new works, is not valid; upon them lay this responsibility; they were given advice but paid no heed.

An incident happened in the above action which shows the courage of the Indians attached to our side, and deserves to be narrated. One of them, called Little John, received a gun shot in the breast. His companions thought that he was dead and, having no time to dig a grave, buried him under the thicket. After three days the poor fellow rejoined them at the place to which they had retired beyond the River Mira, and surprised them very much for they could not believe that he was alive. These Indians have marvellous vigour, are hardened to fatigue, and extremely temperate, going voluntarily for several days without food. If, while hunting, they meet a Frenchman and have only a little food, they deprive themselves of it, telling him that, since he does not know how to fast as long as they, he

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auroit fallu s'en pourvoir avant l'arrivée des Anglais, ou avant le commencement du siège. L'excuse de nos Commandans n'est donc point recevable, de dire qu'une des causes de la reddition est de n'avoir pas eu assez de monde, pour faire des sorties, & déloger l'ennemi à mesure qu'il faisoit de nouveaux ouvrages; c'est ce qui avoit dépendu d'eux: quelqu'un en donna le conseil, mais on n'étoit point écouté.

Il arriva dans l'action précédente, une chose qui mérite d'être racontée, & qui fait voir le courage des Sauvages qui nous sont attachez. Un d'entr'eux nommé *Petit-Jean*, reçut un coup de fusil dans la poitrine. Ses camarades le croyant mort, l'enterrent sous des brossailles, n'ayant pas eu le tems de lui faire une fosse. Ce pauvre garçon les rejoignit au bout de trois jours, dans l'endroit où ils s'étoient retirés, au-dessus de la 58] riviere de Miré, & surprit fort des gens qui n'avoient pas lieu de le croire vivant. Ces Sauvages sont d'une vigueur étonnante, endurcis à la fatigue, excessivement sobres, & demeurant volontiers plusieurs jours sans manger. S'ils se rencontrent à la chasse avec un Français, & qu'ils n'aient que peu de vivres, ils s'en privent, en lui disant qu'il les faut

must keep it for himself. This trait expresses well the generosity of their character. It was not their fault if they were of little service to us during the siege. Notice was not given to them before the means of communication were cut off, and they were thus not able to lend us the help that we should have hoped for. Having sought shelter in the woods, they tried several times to penetrate to the town. Some of the English who had the temerity to ramble about were massacred and several were killed by a band of from twenty to twenty-five Indians at Gabarus, upon the property of M. Rondeau, pay-master of the Navy, who wished to cut wood for the use of the hostile fleet. The English dreaded them so much that, to guard against surprises, they burned all the woods about Louisbourg.

When M. Kol returned and gave an account of his expedition, and of the manner in which the Indians had supported him, there was a discussion about sending munitions of war to them at once, both for themselves and for certain other Indians who it was thought would come from Acadia. A boat carrying five barrels of powder and thirty hundred weight of ball was sent

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garder pour lui, qui ne sçauroit faire diétte aussi long-tems qu'eux. Ce trait exprime bien la bonté de leur caractère. Ce n'est pas leur faute, s'ils ne nous ont rendus que de médiocres services durant le Siège. On ne les avoit point avertis, avant que les passages fussent fermés ; ils n'ont donc pu nous prêter l'appui que nous en aurions dû espérer. Réfugiés dans les bois, ils ont plusieurs fois cherché à pénétrer dans la Ville. Quelques Anglais qui ont eu la témérité de s'écarter, en ont été massacrés ; & vingt à vingt-cinq Sauvages en tuèrent plusieurs à Gabarus, sur l'habitation du sieur *Rondeau*, Trésorier de la Marine, qui vouloit faire du bois pour le service de la Flotte ennemie. Les Anglais les craignent si fort, 59] que pour se garantir de leurs surprises, ils ont || brûlé tous les bois qui étoient aux environs de Louisbourg.

Le sieur Kol étant de retour, rendit compte de son expédition, & sur le récit qu'il fit de la maniere dont les Sauvages l'avoient secondé, on délibéra de leur envoyer sur le champ des munitions de guerre, tant pour eux que pour quelques autres Sauvages qu'on s'imaginait devoir venir du côté de l'Acadie. Il fut donc expédié une chaloupe chargée de cinq barils

off and taken through the woods to an island in the River Mira, where three men remained on guard, but we heard not a word of the Indians. Here again was seen one of the mistakes so familiar to us. For a long time the scarcity of powder had been complained of, yet upon the slightest pretext and for pure uncertainties we deprived ourselves of some of our supply. Nothing could better show how our heads were turned. What could the Indians have done then, even if they had come? The enemy no longer doubted about the final outcome; since the *Vigilant* was taken they had reason to be convinced that we could not escape and our loss of this vessel, in reducing us to extremities, placed them in a position to keep everything waiting upon their initiative.

- 15 To make things worse, on the 15th a squadron of six warships from London reached the English. These, together with the frigates, cruised about in view of the town without firing a single shot. We have, however, since learned that if we had delayed capitulating, all the vessels would have brought their broadsides to bear upon us (*se seroient embosser*<sup>21</sup>) and we should

<sup>21</sup> *Embosser*, a naval term which signifies to make fast; so that a ship *embossee* is a ship at her moorings and at anchor.

de poudre, & de trente quintaux de balles, que l'on conduisit dans le bois, sur un Islot de la riviere de Miré, & trois hommes y demeurèrent pour garder ces munitions : mais nous n'avons point oüi parler de ces Sauvages. C'étoit encore-là une de ces fautes qui nous étoient si familières. On se plaignoit, il y avoit long-tems, que nous manquions de poudre : cependant nous nous en privions, dès qu'il se présentoit le moindre prétexte, & sur de pures incertitudes. Rien n'est plus capable de montrer à quel point la tête nous avoit tourné. Qu'eussent pu faire alors ces Sauvages quand ils 60] seroient venus. L'ennemi ne balançoit plus || sur sa destinée & la notre : depuis la prise du *Vigilant*, il devoit être convaincu que nous ne pouvions lui échaper, et ce Vaisseau en nous réduisant à l'extrémité, l'avoit mis dans une situation à lui faire tout attendre de son entreprise.

- 15 Pour sur croit d'infortune, il arrive aux Anglais le 15. une Escadre de six Vaisseaux de guerre, venant de Londres. Ces Vaisseaux croiserent devant la Ville, avec les Frégattes, sans tirer un seul coup. Mais nous avons sçu depuis que, si nous eussions tardé à capituler, tous les Vaisseaux se seroient embossés,<sup>21</sup> & nous auroient fait essayer le feu le plus

<sup>21</sup> *Embosser*, terme de Marine, qui signifie *Anarrer*; ainsi un Navire embossé, est un Navire sur ses amarres & à l'ancre.

have had to undergo a most vigorous fire. Their arrangements were not unknown; I will report the order that they were to keep.

The enemy had not yet used red hot bullets, but on the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> they did so, with a success which would and have been greater had there not been prompt action on 19<sup>th</sup> our part. Three or four houses took fire, but it was quickly extinguished. Promptitude in such emergencies was our single resource.

It was without doubt the arrival of the squadron which caused this new greeting on the part of the land army, the General, who wished himself to have the honour of conquering us, being very desirous of forcing us to surrender before the fleet should put itself in a position to compel us.

The Admiral on his side was anxious to secure the honour 21 of reducing us. On the 21<sup>st</sup> an officer came to propose, on the Admiral's part, that, if we must surrender, it would be better to do so to him, because he would show us a consideration that, perhaps, we should not find with the commander of the land force. All this shows very little co-operation between the two generals, and sufficiently confirms the remark which I have

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vif. Leurs dispositions n'ont point été ignorées, je rapporterai l'ordre qu'ils devoient tenir.

Les ennemis ne s'étoient encore point avisés de tirer à boulets 18. rouges ; ils le firent le dix-huit & le dix-neuf, avec un succès qui auroit d' 61] été plus grand, sans le prompt secours qui y fut apporté. Le feu 19. prit à trois ou quatre maisons, mais on l'eut bien-tôt éteint. La promptitude en ces sortes d'occasions, est la seule ressource que l'on puisse avoir.

L'arrivée de l'Escadre étoit, sans doute, l'objet de ce nouveau salut de la part de l'Armée de terre : son Général qui vouloit avoir l'honneur de notre conquête, étant bien aisé de nous forcer à nous soumettre, avant que l'Escadre se fût mise en devoir de nous y contraindre.

L'Amiral de son côté songeoit à se procurer l'honneur de nous 21 reduire. Un Officier vint pour cet effet, le vingt-un, nous proposer de sa part, que si nous avions à nous rendre, il seroit plus convenable de la faire à lui, qui auroit des égards que nous ne trouverions peut-être pas dans le Commandant de terre. Tout cela marquoit peu d'intelligence entre les deux Généraux, & vérifie assés la remarque que j'ai ci-devant

already made; in fact one could never have told that these troops belonged to the same nation and obeyed the same prince. Only the English are capable of such oddities, which nevertheless form a part of that precious liberty of which they show themselves so jealous.

We answered the officer, whom Admiral Warren had sent with this message, that we had no reply to give him, and that we should see which party it would be well to avail ourselves of when we should arrive at such an extremity. This swagger would have made any one laugh who had seen our real embarrassment. It could not have been greater; the officer must have perceived it notwithstanding the bold countenance which we assumed, since it is difficult for the face to conceal the emotions of the heart. Councils were held more frequently than ever, but with no better results; they met without knowing why, and knew not what to resolve. I have often laughed at these meetings where nothing happened that was not ridiculous, and which only revealed confusion and indecision. Care for our defence no longer occupied us. If the English had known how to profit by our fright they would soon have mas-

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faite : on n'eut jamais dit en effet, que ces Troupes fussent de la même Nation & sous l'obéissance du même Prince. Les Anglais sont les seuls 62] peuples capables de ces bisarreries, qui font cependant // partie de cette précieuse liberté dont ils se montrent si jaloux.

Nous répondimes à l'Officier, par qui l'Amiral Warren nous avoit fait donner cet avis, que nous n'avions point de réponse à lui faire, & que quand nous en serions à cette extrémité, nous verrions le parti qu'il conviendrait d'embrasser. Cette fanfaronade eût fait rire quiconque auroit été témoin de notre embarras en particulier : il ne pouvoit être plus grand : cet Officier dût s'en appercevoir, malgré la bonne contenance que nous affections. Il est difficile que le visage ne décelé les mouvemens du cœur. Les Conseils étoient plus fréquens que jamais, mais non plus salutaires ; on s'assembloit sans trop savoir pourquoi, aussi ne sçavoit-on que résoudre. J'ai souvent ri de ces assemblées, où il ne se passoit rien que de ridicule & qui n'annonçât le trouble & l'indécision. Le soin de notre défense n'étoit plus ce qui occupoit. Si les Anglais eussent sçu profiter de notre épouvante, il y auroit eu long-tems qu'ils nous auroient



tered us, sword in hand. But it must be granted, to their credit, that they were as much afraid as we were. Many a time all this has reminded me of the fable of the Hare and the Frogs.\*

The object of our numerous Councils was to draw up articles of capitulation. This occupied until the twenty-seventh, when an officer, M. Lopinot,† went out to carry them to the commander of the land forces. It was hoped that the terms would be more agreeable to him than to the Admiral, but they were of so extraordinary a character that, notwithstanding the anxiety of this General that we should capitulate to him, he had scarcely the patience to listen to them. I remember that in one article we demanded five pieces of cannon and two brass mortars. Such propositions were little in accord with our situation.

In order to succeed with one side or the other, the same conditions were proposed to the Admiral. This negotiation was entrusted to M. Bonaventure, company captain, who intrigued a great deal with Mr. Warren and, although most of our articles were rejected, obtained, nevertheless, terms sufficiently honourable. The capitulation was then decided on the

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emportés, l'épée à la main. Mais il faut convenir à leur louange, 63] qu'ils // avoient autant de peur que nous. Cela m'a plusieurs fois rappelé la fable du Lièvre & des Grenouilles.

Le but de nos fréquens Conseils étoit de dresser des articles de capitulation. On y employa jusqu'au vingt-sept, que le sieur Lopinot, Officier, sortit pour les porter au Commandant de terre. L'on se flatoit de les lui faire mieux goûter qu' à l'Amiral. Mais ils étoient si extraordinaires, que malgré l'envie que ce Général avoit de nous voir rendre à lui, il se donna à peine la patience de les écouter. Je me souviens que nous demandions par un article, cinq pièces de canon, & deux mortiers de fontes. De pareilles propositions ne quadroient guères avec notre situation.

Afin de réussir d'un côté ou d'autre, on envoya proposer les mêmes conditions à l'Amiral. Cette négociation avoit été confiée au sieur *Bonaventure*, Capitaine de Compagnie, qui s'intrigua beaucoup auprès de M. Warren, & qui, quoique la plupart de nos articles fussent rejettes, en obtint pourtant d'asses honorables. On arrêta donc la capitulation telle

\*La Fontaine  
Book II.,  
Fable XIV  
Ed.

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†According  
the Govern  
Du Chamb.  
this officer v  
M. de Lape  
elle. (Coll.  
*Manus.*, iii  
254.)—Ed.

terms which have been publicly reported. It was announced to us by two cannon shots from the Admiral's ship as M. Bonaventure had been instructed. We were reassured a little by this news, for we had reason to apprehend the saddest fate. We feared at every moment that the enemy, awaking from their blindness, would press forward to carry the place by assault. Everything invited them to do so. There were two breaches, each about fifty feet wide; one at the Dauphin Gate, the other at the Spur, which is opposite. They have since told us that it had been decided to attempt the assault the next day. The ships were to support them and to bring their guns to bear in the following manner:—Four war ships and four frigates were intended for the Dauphin bastion; the same number of war ships and frigates, including the *Vigilant*, were to attack the La Grave battery, and three other vessels and as many frigates were ordered to keep close to the Island at the entrance. We should never have been able to answer the fire of all these vessels, and at the same time to have defended our breaches, so that it would have been necessary to yield, no matter what efforts we made, and see ourselves reduced

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64] que les nouvelles publiques l'ont rapportée. Elle nous fut annoncée par deux coups de canon tirés à bord de l'Amiral, ainsi qu'on en avoit donné l'ordre au sieur *Bonaventure*. A cette nouvelle, nous reprîmes un peu de tranquillité; car nous avions sujet d'appréhender le sort le plus triste. Nous craignons à tout moment, que les ennemis, sortant de leur aveuglement, ne se présentassent pour nous enlever d'assaut. Tout les y convioit: il y avoit deux brèches de la longueur d'environ cinquante pieds chacune, l'une à la porte Dauphine, & l'autre à l'Eperon, qui est vis-à-vis. Ils nous ont dit depuis que la résolution en avoit été prise, et l'exécution renvoyée au lendemain. Les Navires devoient les favoriser, & s'emboffer de la maniere suivante.

Quatre Vaisseaux et quatre Frégattes étoient destinés pour le bastion Dauphin: un égal nombre de Vaisseaux & de Frégattes, parmi lesquels étoit le *Vigilant*, devoit attaquer la pièce de la Grave: & trois autres Vaisseaux et autant de Frégattes, avoient ordre de s'attacher à l'Isle de l'entrée. Nous n'eussions jamais pû répondre au feu de tous ces Vais-  
65] seaux, || & défendre en même tems nos brèches: de façon qu'il auroit fallu succomber, quelques efforts que nous eussions pû faire, & nous voir

to seeking clemency from a conqueror whose generosity there was reason to distrust. The land army was composed only of a crowd brought together without subordination or discipline, who would have made us suffer all that the most furious insolence and rage can do. The capitulation did not keep them from doing us considerable injury.

Thus, by the visible protection of Providence, we warded off a day which would have been so full of misery for us. What, above all, caused our decision was the small quantity of powder which we still had. I am able to affirm that we had not enough left for three charges. This is the critical point, and upon this it is sought to deceive the public who are ill-informed; it is desired to convince them that twenty thousand pounds still remained. Signal falsehood! I have no interest in concealing the truth, and ought the more to be believed because I do not pretend by this entirely to justify our officers. If they did not capitulate too soon, they committed mistakes enough to prevent their acquittal of the blame which they incurred. It is certain that we had no more than thirty-seven kegs of powder, each of one hundred pounds; this is trustworthy, as is not all that is told to the contrary.

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réduits à recourir à la clémence d'un vainqueur, de la générosité duquel il y avoit à se défier. L'Armée de terre n'étoit composée que de gens ramassés, sans subordination ni discipline, qui nous auroient fait éprouver tout ce que l'insolence & la rage ont de plus furieux. La capitulation n'a point empêché qu'ils ne nous aient bien fait du mal.

C'est donc par une protection visible de la Providence, que nous avons prévenu une journée qui nous auroit été si funeste. Ce qui nous y a le plus déterminé, est le peu de poudre qui nous restoit : je puis assurer que nous n'en avons pas pour faire trois décharges. C'est ici le point critique, & sur lequel on cherche le plus à en imposer au public mal instruit : on voudroit lui persuader qu'il nous en restoit encore vingt milliers. Fausseté insigne ! Je n'ai aucun intérêt à déguiser la vérité ; l'on doit d'autant plus m'en croire, que je ne prétens pas par-là justifier // 66] entièrement nos Officiers. S'ils n'ont point capitulé trop tôt, ils avoient commis assez d'autres fautes, pour ne les pas laver du blâme qu'ils ont encouru. Il est constant que nous n'avions plus que trente-sept barils de poudre, à cent livres chacun : voila ce qui est véritable, & non pas tout

At first even we found only thirty-five; but our further searches procured two others, hid, apparently, by the gunners, who, it is known, are everywhere accustomed to this pilfering.

The articles of capitulation granted by Admiral Warren provided in effect that the Garrison should march out with arms and flags, which should afterwards be given up, to be restored to the troops after their arrival in France; that, if our own ships did not suffice to transport our persons and effects to France, the English would furnish transport as well as the necessary provisions for the voyage; that all the commissioned officers of the Garrison and also the inhabitants of the town should be allowed to reside in their houses, and to enjoy the free exercise of their religion without molestation, until they could be removed; that the non-commissioned officers and the soldiers should be placed on board the British ships immediately after the surrender of the town and the fortress, until they also should be taken to France; that our sick and wounded should receive the same care as those of the enemy; that the Commandant of the Garrison should have the right to take out two covered wagons which should be inspected by one

ce qu'on raconte de contraire. Nous n'en trouvions même d'abord que trente-cinq; mais les recherches qu'on fit nous en procurèrent deux autres, cachés apparemment par les Canoniers, qu'on sçait être partout accoutumés à ce larcin.

Les articles de la capitulation accordés par le Chef d'Escadre Warren, portoient en substance : Que la Garnison sortiroit avec armes & drapeaux qui seroient remis ensuite, pour être restitués aux troupes après leur arrivée en France : Que si nos propres Vaisseaux ne suffisoient pas pour transporter nos personnes & effets, qu'il en seroit fourni de la part des Anglais, ainsi que les provisions nécessaires pour le voyage : Que tous les Officiers à Brevet de la garnison & les habitans de la Ville pourroient demeurer 67] // dans leurs Maisons, & jouïr du libre exercice de leur Religion, sans qu'il fût permis de les molester, jusqu'à ce qu'ils pussent être transportés : Que les Bas-Officiers & les Soldats seroient mis, immédiatement après la reddition de la Ville & de la Forteresse, à bord de quelques Vaisseaux de S. M. Brit. jusqu'à ce qu'ils fussent pareillement transportés en France : qu'on auroit le même soin de nos malades & blessés, que de ceux des ennemis : que le Commandant de la garnison auroit la liberté de faire sortir deux chariots couverts, qui ne seroient visités que par un Officier

officer only, to see that there were no munitions of war; that, if any persons of the town or garrison did not wish to be recognized by the English, they should be permitted to go out masked.

These conditions were assuredly favourable; more so than we could have promised ourselves considering the grievous condition to which we were reduced. Nothing could show better that the enemy were not yet cured of their fear. They dreaded our fortifications and in this had abundant reason to excuse them. Their mistake was in not having sufficient insight to detect our want of ammunition. An able and experienced enemy would soon have discovered this.

There were certain other articles added by Mr. Warren; namely, that the surrender and execution of each portion of the things mentioned above should be done and accomplished as soon as possible; that, for guaranty of their execution, the Island battery, or one of the batteries of the town, should be delivered up, with all the artillery and munitions of war, to the troops of His Britannic Majesty before six o'clock in the evening; that the vessels lying before the harbour should be free to enter

seulement, pour voir s'il n'y avoit aucune munition de guerre : Que si quelques personnes de la Ville ou de la Garnison, ne vouloient point être vûës des Anglais, il leur seroit permis de sortir masquées.

Ces conditions étoient assurément favorables, & plus que nous n'aurions dû nous le promettre de l'état fâcheux où nous étions réduits. Rien n'est plus propre à prouver que les ennemis n'étoient encore point 68] guéris de leur crainte. Ils redoutoient || nos fortifications, & avoient en cela plus de raison qu'il n'en faut pour les excuser. Leur tort est de n'avoir pas sçu pénétrer le manque de nos munitions de guerre. C'est ce qu'un ennemi habile & expérimenté auroit bien-tôt eu découvert.

Il y avoit quelques autres articles, qui furent ajoutés par M. Warren ; savoir, que la reddition & l'exécution de chaque partie des choses ci-dessus mentionnées, seroient faites & accomplies aussi-tôt qu'il seroit possible : Que pour sureté de leur exécution, la batterie de l'Isle, ou l'une des batteries de la Ville, seroit délivrée avec toute l'artillerie & les munitions de guerre, aux troupes de S. Maj. Brit. avant six heures du soir : Que les Vaisseaux qui étoient devant le Port auroient la liberté d'y entrer,

immediately thereafter, and whenever the Commander-in-Chief should deem proper; that none of the officers, soldiers, or inhabitants of Louisbourg, subjects of the King of France, should take up arms against England or any of her allies, during a year, to be reckoned from the day of signing the capitulation; lastly, that all the subjects of His Britannic Majesty held as prisoners in the town or on the Island should be delivered up.

- 29 In consequence of this capitulation, signed "P. Warren" and "William Pepperrell," the war vessels, merchant ships, and transports entered the harbour of Louisbourg on the 29th. We have nothing but praise for the polished and engaging manners of the Admiral, who had his men well under control, and showed us all the attentions that one could expect from an enemy, generous and compassionate. Mr. Warren is a young man, about thirty-five years old, very handsome, and full of the noblest sentiments. That he sought to gratify us in everything we had proof at our departure; we had need of a surgeon on the *Linceston*, the ship which carried us to Rochefort, and he obligingly gave us the surgeon of the *Vigilant*.

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immédiatement après, & lorsque le Commandant en chef le jugeroit à propos : Qu'aucun des Officiers, Soldats, ou habitans de Louisbourg, sujets du Roi de France, ne pourroient prendre les armes contre l'Angleterre ou aucun de ses alliés pendant un an, à compter du jour de la signature de la capitulation : Enfin, que tous les Sujets de S. M. Brit. détenus prisonniers dans la Ville ou dans l'Isle, seroient délivrés.

- 29 En conséquence de cette capitulation, signée *P. Warren & Guillaume Pepperrell*, les Vaisseaux de guerre, ceux de charge & de transport entrèrent dans le Havre de Louisbourg, le vingt-neuf. Nous n'avons que lieu de nous louer des manières polies & engageantes de l'Amiral, qui a su contenir les troupes qui lui étoient soumises, & qui a eu pour nous toutes les attentions que l'on doit attendre d'un ennemi généreux & compatissant. M. Warren est un jeune homme d'environ trente-cinq ans, d'une très jolie figure, & rempli des plus nobles sentimens. Il n'a cherché qu' à nous faire plaisir en tout, nous en avons eu la preuve à notre départ; il nous falloit un Chirurgien sur le *Linceston*, Vaisseau qui nous a amené à Rochefort, & il nous accorda obligeamment celui du *Vigilant*.

We have, however, much to complain of respecting the commander of the land forces, who had not the same consideration for us, and allowed us to be pillaged by his troops, in violation of the good faith due to our capitulation, and of the public security. What could we expect from a man who, it is said, is the son of a shoemaker of Boston? The Governor, whose favourite he was, had given him this command to the prejudice of better men, who had murmured loudly about it. The officers of the men-of-war had only open contempt for him; those who served under his orders did not respect him more. To punish us for not surrendering to him, he did not cease to persecute us; we can only impute to him all the harm which was done us. Constantly, ineffective complaints were carried to him against his men, who, after they were free to enter the town threw themselves into our houses and took what pleased them. Our lot was little different from that of a town given up to pillage.

We have another grievance against our conquerors. One of the articles of capitulation provided that we should use our own vessels to carry us and our effects to France, and that, if these

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Mais nous avons beaucoup à nous plaindre du Commandant de terre, 70] qui n'ayant pas pour nous les mêmes || égards, nous a laissé piller par ses troupes, contre la foi dûë à notre capitulation, & la sureté publique. Que pouvions-nous esperer d'un homme que l'on dit être fils d'un cordonnier de Baston? le Gouverneur, dont il étoit le favori, l'avoit gratifié de ce Commandement, au préjudice des plus honnêtes gens, qui en ont hautement murmuré. Les Officiers des Vaisseaux de guerre n'avoient pour lui qu'un mépris éclatant : ceux qui servoient sous ses ordres, ne le respectoient pas davantage. Pour nous punir de ne nous être point rendus à lui, il n'a cessé de nous persécuter : nous ne pouvons que lui imputer tout le mal qui nous a été fait. On lui a toujours porté d'inutiles plaintes contre ses gens, qui, dès que l'entrée de la Ville leur a été libre, se jetterent dans nos Maisons, & y ont pris tout ce qui les accommodoit. Notre sort n'a guères été différent d'une Ville abandonnée au pillage.

Un autre grief contre nos Vainqueurs. Il étoit stipulé par un des articles de la capitulation, que nous nous servirions de nos propres 71] Vais|seaux pour nous transporter en France, avec nos effets, & que

did not suffice, the enemy would furnish us with ships, as well as with provisions, for the voyage; yet, by the most glaring injustice, they refused us the ships in the harbour, on the ground that they belonged to some merchants of France, as if we had not treated for all that was in the place. What was more mortifying, they had the malice to let us get these ships ready for sea, and it was only on the eve of sailing that they committed this unworthy chicanery. Upon this fine pretext, which was at bottom only the law of the strongest, they seized the cargoes of some of these same ships, in which we should have found provisions for the voyage, instead of being compelled nearly to die of hunger. The captains were compelled to buy their ships back again.

This strange proceeding, which the Court of France is interested in avenging, shows how little the word of an enemy like the English can be depended upon, especially in those distant countries where honour is among the things unknown. Here is another proof. There had been a capitulation at Canso,

\*Captain Heron was in command at Canso, where Brastrick had a ship. *Collection de Manuscrits*, III. : 202-3 (Quebec, 1884). The charge against Brastrick of violating his parole is repeated by the Governor Du Chambon. *Ib.* ; 267.—ED.

by which M. Brastrick, the officer in command there,\* could not serve before the month of June; nevertheless, this officer

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s'ils ne suffisoient pas, l'ennemi nous en fourniroit, ainsi que des provisions pour faire le voyage; mais, par la plus criante de toutes les injustices, on nous a refusé les Navires qui se trouvoient dans le Port, sous prétexte qu'ils appartenoient à des Négocians de France, comme si nous n'avions pas traité pour tout ce qui étoit dans la Place. Ce qu'il y eut de plus mortifiant, on avoit eu la malignité de nous laisser mettre ces Navires en état de naviger, & ce ne fut qu'à la veille de faire voile, qu'on s'avisa de nous chicanner aussi indignement. Sur ce beau prétexte, qui n'étoit au fond que la loi du plus fort, on se saisit des cargaisons de quelques-uns de ces mêmes Navires, où nous aurions trouvé des vivres pour nous nourrir pendant la traversée, au lieu que l'on nous a presque fait mourir de faim. Les Capitaines ont été contraints de racheter leurs Navires.

Cet étrange procédé, que la Cour de France est intéressée à vanger, fait voir combien il faut peu compter sur la parole d'un ennemi 72] comme l'Anglais, sur tout en ces Pays éloignés, où l'honneur est au rang des choses inconnuës. En voici une autre preuve. Il y avoit eu une capitulation à Canceaux, par laquelle le sieur *Brastrick*, Officier qui y commandoit, ne pouvoit servir que dans le mois de Juin; cependant cet Officier



ventured to take up arms in the month of May. If the court acted wisely, it would practice reprisals, and make use at once of the troops which we have brought home, unless the English court should give satisfaction for an outrage on the laws of war recognized by all civilized nations.

Such is the description of the siege of Louisbourg, which, notwithstanding our fortifications, would not have lasted so long had we been attacked by an enemy better versed in the art of war. No complaint can be made of the settlers, who served with the same precision as did the troops themselves, and had to bear the greatest fatigues. The regular soldiers were distrusted<sup>22</sup> so that it was necessary to charge the inhabitants with the most dangerous duties. Children, ten and twelve years old, carried arms, and were to be seen on the ramparts, exposing themselves with a courage beyond their years. Our loss scarcely reached one hundred and thirty men, and it is certain that that of the English was more than two thousand. Yet their force was so great that for them this loss was inconsiderable. They had, at disembarking, as many as from

<sup>22</sup> A French soldier was hanged during the siege for projected treason ; he was found with a letter which he was carrying from a prisoner to the English general.

a osé prendre les armes dès le mois de Mai. Si la Cour faisoit bien, elle useroit de représailles, & employeroit nos troupes dès-à présent, à moins que la Cour d'Angleterre ne lui fasse raison d'un attentat aux loix Militaires reçûes parmi toutes les Nations Policées.

Telle est la description du Siège de Louisbourg, qui n'auroit pas duré si long-tems, malgré nos fortifications, si nous eussions été attaqués par des ennemis plus instruits dans l'Art de la guerre. On ne peut rien reprocher aux habitans, qui ont fait le service avec autant d'exatitude que les troupes mêmes, & sur qui ont roulé les plus grandes fatigues. On 73] se défioit des soldats,<sup>22</sup> ainsi il falloit que l'habitant se chargeât de ce qu'il y avoit de plus périlleux. Des enfans de dix & douze ans avoient pris les armes, & on les a vû sur le rempart s'exposer avec un courage au-dessus de leur âge. Notre perte ne s'est guères montée qu'à cent trente hommes, & il est sûr que celle des Anglais va à plus de 2 mille. Mais leurs forces étoient si considérables, que cette perte a été médiocre pour eux. Ils avoient plus de huit à neuf mille hom. de débarquement.

<sup>22</sup> Un Soldat Français a été pendu durant le siège, pour avoir voulu nous trahir : On le trouva nanti d'une lettre qu'il portoit au Général Anglais de la part d'un prisonnier.

eight to nine thousand men. We should have done them more injury if we had been able to make sorties. I have told the causes which prevented our doing this. The bombs and bullets of the enemy caused frightful desolation in our poor town; most of our houses were demolished, and we were obliged to remove the flour from the general magazine to expose it to the weather in the King's garden; we feared that it might be burned by the enemy, as most of the bombs fell upon this magazine. More than three thousand five hundred must have been fired against us. I do not know exactly how much flour remained to us still, but I know that there was a large quantity, and there were other provisions in proportion. These, however, could not take the place of the munitions of war, which were absolutely exhausted. We had no more bombs, and if we had had any they would have been perfectly useless, for our mortars had cracked, after some shots had been fired. All misfortunes were ours at once.

The enemy caused all to embark and did not wish to allow any settler to remain upon the island. They would have driven out even the Indians if that had been in their power. This conduct proves that they desire to keep it. But if we

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Nous leur eussions fait plus de mal, si nous avions pû faire des sorties; j'ai dit les raisons qui nous en ont empêché. Les bombes & les boulets des ennemis avoient mis notre pauvre Ville dans une affreuse désolation: la plupart de nos maisons étoient rasées, & nous avons été obligés de retirer les farines du Magazin Général, pour les exposer à l'air dans le jardin du 74] Roi; nous appréhendions que l'ennemi ne les brûlât, la plus grande partie des bombes tombant sur ce Magazin. Il faut qu'il nous en ait été jetté plus de trois mille cinq cens. Je ne sçais pas au juste combien il nous restoit encore de farines, mais je sçais qu'il y en avoit une grande quantité, & d'autres vivres à proportion. Mais cela ne pouvoit remplacer les munitions de guerre, qui manquoient absolument. Nous n'avions plus de bombes, & quand nous en aurions eu, elles eussent été entierement inutiles, puisque nos mortiers étoient crevés, après en avoir tiré quelques coups. Nous avons eu tous les malheurs ensemble.

L'Ennemi a tout fait embarquer, & n'a jamais voulu permettre qu'aucun habitant demeurât dans l'Isle. Il en auroit chassé jusqu'aux Sauvages, si cela eût été en son pouvoir. Cette conduite prouve qu'il a envie de s'y

succeed in taking Acadia\* I see no difficulty in our getting Cape Breton from them. It appears that the English court is sending great forces thither; this ought to awaken the attention of the French court and to lead it to increase its force on the sea, with a view to opposing the enemy's designs against Canada. When we came away they assured us that they would be masters of it next year. We ought to make sure that they have not a similar success in this enterprise, which would give the last blow to our commerce. Would it be possible that it should sustain so great a reverse under the invincible Louis XV., and that, while so valiant a Monarch makes the Powers which dare to oppose him tremble, he allows his subjects in the colonies to be exposed to the violence of his enemies, and to be the only ones who succumb to the fortune of war? Are we less his subjects? We should be very sorry to depend upon any other Power.

\*An expedition against Acadia was being planned in France at this time (August, 1745). —ED.

I will finish this sad and unhappy narrative, which makes me weep, by saying that the court should extend its charity to an immense number of unfortunates who, if not succoured, will die of hunger in France. We, the inhabitants of the town,

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conserver : mais, si l'on parvient à prendre l'Acadie, je ne fais nulle difficulté qu'on vienne à bout de lui enlever l'Isle-Royale. Il paroît que la Cour d'Angleterre y fait passer de grandes forces ; ce qui doit réveiller l'attention de la Cour de France, & l'engager à augmenter les siennes || 75] par mer, afin de s'opposer au projet qu'ont formé les ennemis sur le Canada. Ils nous ont assurés, en partant, qu'ils en seroient maîtres l'année prochaine. Nous devons faire ensorte qu'ils n'ayent pas le même succès dans cette entreprise, qui acheveroit de porter les derniers coups à notre commerce. Seroit-il possible qu'il essuiât de si grands revers sous l'invincible LOUIS XV. Et que tandis qu'un si vaillant Monarque fait trembler les Puissances qui osent lui résister, il souffre que ses sujets des colonies soient exposés à la violence de ses ennemis, & les seuls qui succombent sous la fatalité des Armes? Sommes-nous moins ses sujets? Nous serions bien fâchés de dépendre de toute autre Puissance.

Je finirai ce triste & malheureux récit qui m'arrache des larmes, par dire que la Cour doit étendre sa charité sur un nombre infini de misérables, qui vont mourir de faim en France, si on ne les secoure. Nous autres habi-

owing to the terms of capitulation, however badly executed, have still preserved something from the ruin of a fortune sufficiently limited, but those who dwelt in the country have lost everything, as they were exposed to the first fury of the enemy. I have seen numerous families (for there is scarcely a country in the world that we have peopled as we have our northern colonies) embark without having anything to cover them, and wring compassion from even the English themselves. I have succoured as many of them as my means have permitted, and several others have followed my example. The court will not leave those to perish whose fidelity has caused their misfortune.

Our commander, M. du Chambon, behaved very well after the reduction of the place. He protected us with all his power against insolence on the part of our conquerors, and he wished to be the last to leave the colony, but the English forced him to embark. He left an officer to represent him, and to see that the settlers were allowed to have what they had a right to carry off, under the terms of the capitulation.

This, my dear friend, is a detailed narrative of this unhappy

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tans de la Ville, nous avons encore conservé quelque chose des débris d'une 76] fortune assés mince, à la faveur de la capitulation, quoique || mal exécutée : mais les habitans de la campagne ont tout perdu, comme ayant été exposés à la première fougue des ennemis. J'ai vû de nombreuses familles (car il n'est guères de Pays au monde, où l'on peuple tant que dans nos colonies Septentrionales) s'embarquer sans avoir de quoi se couvrir, & arracher de la compassion aux Anglais mêmes. J'en ai secouru autant que mes faucultés me l'ont permis, & plusieurs personnes ont imité mon exemple. La Cour ne laissera point périr des gens dont les fidélité à fait le malheur.

Notre Commandant, Mr. du Chambon, en a très-bien agi après la réduction de la Place. Il nous a protégé de toutes ses forces contre l'insolence de partie de nos vainqueurs, & il ne vouloit quitter la colonie que le dernier ; mais les Anglais l'ont forcé de s'embarquer. Il a laissé un Officier pour le représenter, & avoir soin qu'on rendit aux habitans tout ce qu'ils avoient droit d'emporter, en vertu de la capitulation.

Voilà, mon cher ami, une relation détaillée de cette malheureuse

affair, of which such diverse accounts are given. I can protest to you that I have suppressed nothing of all which could come to my knowledge, and I am inviolably bound to tell the truth, without wishing to injure anyone through a desire for revenge or anything else. The same motive compels me to render to the Minister\* the justice which is his due. I hear that he is blamed for some of the disaster to our colony, as if he could be responsible for the faults of those to whose care he entrusted it. If you share this popular mistake, the detailed account which I have given can save you from it. Can we, indeed, yield to notions so little in accordance with the foresight of this great Minister, to whom the navy owes much, and to whom it would owe still more if he were given the power to restore it to its ancient lustre? One must be ignorant of what is going on to make such a mistake. Let him be listened to; let him be the only one upon whom depends the strength of this potent support of our glory and splendour; let him be given sufficient sums to build as many ships as we need, and let that no longer be regarded by the court as a thing indifferent which deserves, perhaps, the chief and the most

\* The well-known Comte de Maurepas, whose long official life ended only in 1781.—ED.

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77] affaire d'ont on parle si diversement. || Je vous puis protester que je n'ai rien tû de tout ce qui a pu venir à ma connoissance, que je m'y suis inviolablement astraint à dire la vérité, sans dessein d'offenser personne, par esprit de vengeance, ni autrement. Le même motif m'oblige à rendre au Ministre la justice qui lui est dûë. J'entens qu'on lui attribüë en partie le désastre de notre colonie, comme s'il pouvoit être responsable des fautes de ceux à qui il en avoit confié le soin. Si vous êtes dans cette erreur populaire, le détail dans lequel je suis entré est capable de vous en tirer. Peut-on en effet, se livrer à des idées si peu conformes à la prévoyance de ce GRAND MINISTRE, à qui la marine doit beaucoup, & à qui elle devoit encore davantage, s'il étoit le maître de lui restituer son ancien lustre? Il faut être peu au fait de ce qui se passe, pour donner dans ce travers. Faites qu'on l'écoute, qu'il soit le seul de qui dépende le nerf de ce puissant soutien de notre gloire & de notre splendeur, qu'on lui accorde des sommes suffisantes, pour construire autant de Vaisseaux 78] qu'il nous en faudroit, & qu'on ne regarde pas en || Cour, un objet indifférent, ce qui mériteroit peut-être la principale & la plus sérieuse

serious attention. I warrant you that then you would soon see the navy upon the old footing that it had formerly under Louis XIV. But as long as his hands are tied and he gets only small and ineffective grants of money, and attention is turned away from this motive power of our greatness and strength, every penetrating and impartial mind will take care not to blame him for the blows levied at our maritime commerce, to which the state is more indebted than is imagined.

Believe it as perfectly true that Louisbourg had been sufficiently furnished with provisions and munitions of war; that the Minister had reason to rely upon his own wisdom and care in this respect, and that the want of economy and the wastefulness of those placed in charge are what should be blamed. Could he foresee that they would foolishly consume<sup>23</sup> the pro-

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<sup>23</sup> What did most to consume our powder were the privateering armaments which were planned from the time that we knew of the declaration of war. The officers were interested in the Privateers and this procured for the settler as much powder as he wished. I will say here that trade was controlled by the officers, that they purchased the cargoes as soon as they arrived, and that they obliged the inhabitants to buy their goods by their weight in gold. They have, however, an excuse in the small salaries which the Court paid them.

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attention : Je vous répons qu'alors vous verrés bien-tôt la Marine sur cet ancien pied, où elle a été quelque tems sous LOUIS XIV. Mais tant qu'on lui liera les mains, qu'il n'obtiendra que des secours d'argent foibles et impuissans, qu'on détournera les yeux de dessus ce mobile de notre grandeur & de notre Puisance : tout esprit clairvoyant & impartial se donnera de garde rejeter sur lui les coups portés à notre commerce Maritime, à qui l'Etat est plus redevable qu'on ne pense.

Croyez comme une chose des plus vrayes que Louisbourg avoit été suffisamment pourvu de vivres & de munitions de guerre ; que le Ministre avoit lieu de se reposer sur cette partie de sa sagesse & de ses soins ; & que c'est au défaut d'économie, & à la dissipation de ceux qu'il avoit chargés d'y veiller, qu'il faut s'en prendre. Pouvoit-il prévoir que l'on 79] consommeroit<sup>23</sup> || follement des provisions consacrées pour les

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<sup>23</sup> Ce qui a le plus servi à consommer notre poudre, ce sont les armemens en course, dont on s'avisait dès qu'on eut su la déclaration de Guerre. Les Officiers étoient intéressés dans les Corsaires ; ce qui en a procuré à l'Habitant autant qu'il a voulu. Je dirai à cette occasion, que les Officiers étoient les maîtres du commerce, qu'ils achetoient les cargaisons dès qu'elles arrivoient, & qu'il falloit que les Habitans leur payassent les marchandises au poids de l'or. Mais ils ont une excuse dans les modiques appointemens que la Cour leur donne.

visions devoted to the needs of a useful colony ? And if he had suspected it, how could he have acted otherwise than as he did ? As soon as he learns that Cape Breton is menaced, and is notified of its condition, he sends instantly a ship of sixty-four guns to carry thither all that would be necessary for the longest resistance. The event has shown that she could get in ; must he have divined that imprudence would put her in the power of the enemy ? It is said that she ought not to have been sent alone ; it is easy to say this but it was not so easy to do otherwise. For a long time the condition of our marine has been such that an expedition could not be undertaken the instant the occasion offered ; time is necessary to make preparations, and if the fleet which left Brest under the orders of M. du Perier was intended, as is believed, to come to our aid, then it is evident that the Minister neglected nothing to save us from the misfortune which has overtaken us. It was known in France that this was merely an enterprise of one colony against another, that England had not yet sent out any fleet (for that which went started only very late). One, therefore, could not imagine that the *Vigilant* would be taken and

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besoins d'une Colonie si utile ? Et quand il l'auroit deviné, que pouvoit-il faire autre chose que ce qu'il a fait ? Dès qu'il apprend que l'Isle-Royale est menacée, qu'il a avis de l'état où elle se trouve, il dépêche sur le champ un Vaisseau de soixante & quatre pièces de canon, afin d'y porter tout ce qui étoit nécessaire pour la plus longue résistance. L'événement a justifié que ce Vaisseau pouvoit passer : Falloit-il donc qu'il devinât aussi que l'imprudence le mettroit au pouvoir des ennemis ? On dit qu'il ne devoit pas être envoyé seul : cela est aisé à dire, mais n'est pas 80] aussi // aisé à faire ; l'état de notre Marine ne permet plus, depuis long-tems, d'entreprendre une expédition dans l'instant qu'elle se présente, il faut du tems pour en faire les préparatifs ; & si l'Escadre sortie de Brest, sous les ordres de M. du Perier, étoit destinée à nous secourir, comme on le croit, il est donc évident que le Ministre n'a rien négligé pour nous garantir de l'infortune qui nous est arrivée ? On sçavoit en France que ce n'étoit-là qu'une entreprise de Colonie à Colonie, que l'Angleterre n'y avoit encore envoyé aucune Escadre. (car celle qui y est allée, n'est partie que fort tard) On ne pouvoit donc s'imaginer, & que le *Vigilant* seroit pris, & que nous nous rendrions si-tôt. Ainsi, pour peu

that we should surrender so soon. Thus, on slight reflection, it is clear that the Minister is not in the least to blame, and that it is unjust to charge that his prudence deserted him on this occasion. It is the more blameworthy to think this of him since the fortifications of Louisbourg are the product of his wise insight, and he has always endeavoured to keep up a colony whose importance he realized. Is it reasonable to imagine that he has wished to lose the product of so much care and expense?

In saying all this I have paid only the respect which I owe to truth.

Adieu, my dear friend; love me well always, and rely upon the fondest return and the liveliest gratitude.

I am, etc.

B. L. N.

At . . . August 28th, 1745.

qu'on réfléchisse, il est clair que le Ministre n'a pas le moindre tort; & qu'il y a de l'injustice de taxer sa prudence de l'avoir mal servi en cette occasion. On est d'autant plus blâmable d'en avoir la pensée, que les fortifications de Louisbourg sont l'ouvrage de sa sage pénétration, qu'il 81] s'est toujours appliqué à maintenir une Colonie dont il sentoit l'importance. Est-il raisonnable de présumer qu'il ait voulu perdre le fruit de tant de soins & de dépenses? C'est l'hommage que je devois à la vérité.

Adieu, mon cher Ami, aimez-moi toujours bien, & comptez sur le plus tendre retour & la plus vive reconnaissance.

Je suis, &c. B. L. N.

A. . . . . Ce 28. Août 1745.



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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE FROM  
THE FALL OF THE DIRECTORY TO THE DEATH OF EMPEROR  
PAUL OF RUSSIA, NOVEMBER 1799—MARCH 1801.

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• PREFACE.

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This essay was first submitted in English to the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Leipsic as a doctoral dissertation, but the Faculty felt unable wholly to suspend its regulation that such dissertations should be submitted in German. On condition however that the entire thesis should appear in English the Faculty consented to accept a portion of it—the introduction and first chapter—in German as sufficient for the purposes of the examination. This portion accordingly has appeared in German (under the title “*Die englisch-französische Friedensverhandlung, Dec. 1799—Jan. 1800*”) and I now avail myself of the opportunity to publish the whole in the History Series of University of Toronto Studies.

It is with diffidence that a writer lays his first effort, however unpretentious, before the public, and to this feeling I am not insensible, but in the present instance no choice is left me in the matter. The subject may seem not altogether untimely. It treats of the relations of France and Great Britain when the French were in temporary possession of Egypt at the opening of this century. The issue then raised in the Levant soon fell into abeyance and lay dormant for some eighty years, but it has been revived in our own day by the British occupation of Egypt, and the entire question has taken a great step toward solution by, events still fresh in the memory of all.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Marcks and Dr. Salomon of Leipsic for a kindly interest in my work and welfare at that University; to Mr. Hubert Hall of the Public Record Office, London, for his courtesy and assistance while I was

collecting material in the British archives; and to Professor Wrong and Mr. H. H. Langton of the University of Toronto for assistance in preparing the essay finally for the press. I should however be guilty of an injustice, did I merely include in this general category Professor Buchholz of Leipsic, at whose instance I attempted this essay. In it as well as in all my work he has taken a lively and judicious interest, withholding neither praise nor censure, where he felt them deserved. I know not whether I was worthy of the one, but I sought to profit by the other, and I trust that he will remember me as a faithful and a willing pupil.

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*December, 1899.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS, ETC.

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- (1) *Corr. Nap.*—Correspondance de Napoléon I.
- (2) *Parl. Hist.*—Parliamentary History of Great Britain (Hansard.)
- (3) P. R. O.—Public Record Office.
- (4) *Papers of this Negotiation* (in 2nd Chapter,)—The Papers on the Negotiation with France, submitted to Parliament on the 13th November, 1800, and printed in *Parl. Hist.* vol. 35, col. 540 *et seq.* They are numbered consecutively from 1 to 47.
- (5) Citations from vol. 30 of Bonaparte's Correspondence refer to the page of the volume; in other volumes the reference is to the number of the letter, not to the page.
- (6) Citations from Stanhope's Life of Pitt are from the edition of 1879; those from Bignon, *Histoire de France jusqu'à la paix de Tilsit*, are from the Brussels edition, 1836.



## INTRODUCTION.

## NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS AND LILLE, 1796 AND 1797.

In the period of the French Revolution the enmity which had subsisted for centuries between France and Great Britain developed an unprecedented intensity. The end of the seventeenth century found France in a state of weakness and disintegration, caused by the wars of Louis XIV; the eighteenth century was marked by a steady decline of her power both in and out of Europe. With this decline of France was associated closely the rise of Great Britain, whose enormous colonial expansion in the eighteenth century was secured chiefly at the cost of France. The rôle once played by the latter passed definitely to her rival in 1763, and not even the loss, serious in itself, of the American colonies undermined the predominance of Great Britain. Commercially, the lost British colonies were still dependent upon the mother country; Britain's trade with India was steadily increasing; she threatened to monopolize even the markets of Europe.

§1. Great Britain and France in wars of the French Revolution

The Revolution in France first disturbed this situation. In spite of the excesses attending it, the Revolution effected a national rejuvenescence, and with fresh strength and energy France renewed the old struggle with Great Britain. The position which the monarchy had lost, the Jacobins and Bonaparte sought to recover.

The conflict arising from this situation lasted upwards of twenty years, and was marked by various abortive attempts at pacification. In 1796 and 1797 unsuccessful negotiations

were opened at Paris and Lille. The Peace of Amiens in 1802 was itself in reality but a truce. I purpose here cursorily to review the preliminary efforts at Paris and Lille, and to discuss fully the circumstances which led to the later formal peace.

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2. The negotiations at Paris and Lille, 1796 and 1797.

On the 8th of December, 1795, a message from King George III informed the Lords and Commons at Westminster that the crisis in Paris<sup>1</sup> had resulted in a government with which he was prepared to conclude a general peace whenever it could be effected on just and suitable terms.<sup>2</sup> Such a declaration, in itself nothing remarkable among warring nations, had its significance in this contest. Hitherto Great Britain had refused to recognize the work of the Revolution in France; now she accepted the newly established Directory as the *de facto* government of the Republic, and declared her readiness to negotiate with it. Peace had become a possibility. Little more than this can however be said. The way to negotiation was opened, but the efforts of Great Britain to obtain peace still remained long without result, and this ill success was partially due to her own attitude. Her overture of March, 1796, directed to the French Minister at Berne, invited discourtesy on the part of the French by the systematic substitution of "France" for "Government of France," even in places where the first was a ridiculous expression and the second the only proper one.<sup>3</sup> The French reply bluntly questioned Great Britain's sincerity and so the negotiations ended. As early as September of the same year Great Britain took steps to renew them, but her advances, although in this instance courteous in expression and correct

<sup>1</sup>Crisis of the 13th Vendémiaire (5 October, 1795) leading to the installation of the Directory on the 5th Brumaire, IV (26 October, 1795).

<sup>2</sup>*Parl. Hist.*, Vol. 32, col. 569.

<sup>3</sup>Note from Wickham to Barthelemi, 8 March, 1796, and from Barthelemi to Wickham, 26 March, 1796, *Parl. Hist.*, Vol. 32, cols. 1407-1408.

in form, met at first with a rude rebuff which Pitt, in order to attain his object, had simply to ignore.<sup>4</sup> In the end, negotiations were opened at Paris in October, 1796; they terminated on the 20th of the following December in an order of the Directory to the British Plenipotentiary, Lord Malmesbury, to quit Paris and France forthwith.

Little blame can be attached either to Great Britain or to France for the ill success of these negotiations. The obstacle to a settlement was the situation in the Austrian Netherlands, and upon this question the difference between the two governments was irreconcilable. In the course of the war the possessions of the Emperor in the Netherlands had been overrun by the French, who had claimed and organized these provinces as an integral part of the Republic. For centuries, however, it had been a cardinal point in England's policy to prevent the absorption of this commercial and industrial centre by France. Great Britain was, moreover, at the time bound to Austria by an alliance guaranteeing the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and the Emperor, while willing enough in general to exchange his distant possessions for a compensation in territory nearer his hereditary states, was at the moment opposed to a negotiation between France and Great Britain, and found an easy means to prevent it by insisting on the literal fulfilment of the guarantee.<sup>5</sup> In this matter, then, Great Britain had no choice. Her obligations and her own interests alike required her to separate the Netherlands from France. The French, however, were in secure possession, and were determined to remain, and Great

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<sup>4</sup> Letter from Grenville to Jarlsberg, 6 September, 1796; note from Grenville to the Directory, 6 September, 1796; letter from Jarlsberg to Grenville, 23 September, 1796; letter from Koenemann to Jarlsberg, 19 September, 1796; letter from Grenville to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paris, 24 September, 1796;—*Parl. Hist.*, Vol. 32, cols. 1409-1411.

<sup>5</sup> Extract from a despatch from Eden, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Malmesbury, 22 November, 1796, enclosed in a despatch from Malmesbury to Grenville, 3 December, 1796—London, P. R. O., *France*, Vol. 602.

Britain was without the means to expel them. The negotiations could end only in rupture.

I shall not discuss the question whether Pitt entered upon these negotiations solely with a view to peace or from a desire merely to force from the Directory a refusal which should strengthen his government at home. It is the opinion of an historian, whose impartiality on this question is above suspicion, that Pitt aimed at neither object exclusively, but at both,<sup>6</sup> and this view is confirmed by a letter of Pitt to his brother, in which he expresses the belief that an effort at peace would relieve the financial difficulties of his government.<sup>7</sup> "If we can persuade the people," he writes in substance, "that we have done enough for a general peace, the continuation of the war, even with the addition of Spain to our enemies, should not embarrass us."

In attempting to criticize the conduct of the Directory in these negotiations, especially their abrupt dismissal of Malmesbury from Paris, one must distinguish sharply between Pitt and his agents. Malmesbury, not Pitt, was the point of contact with the Directory, and it is but too evident that Malmesbury was from the beginning uncertain of Pitt's object in the mission,<sup>8</sup> and that he finally concluded to effect a rupture of which the blame should rest with France.<sup>9</sup> Malmesbury gained this end but too completely for his own purpose. The very fullness of his success aroused suspicion of his object in the negotiation, and thus the rupture rather weakened than strengthened Pitt in Great Britain. Instead of relief to the finances there came a crisis, and in February, 1797, the Bank of England was forced to suspend specie pay-

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<sup>6</sup>Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, IV, 327.

<sup>7</sup>Letter from Pitt to his brother, Lord Chatham, 4 Sept., 1796. Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 156.

<sup>8</sup>Despatch from Malmesbury to Pitt, 11 Nov., 1796. Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 305.

<sup>9</sup>Letter from Malmesbury to Canning, 27 Nov., 1796. Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 322.

ments. A mutiny in the fleet, which was quelled with difficulty, aggravated the situation in England, and meanwhile the military successes of Bonaparte in Italy forced the Emperor in April, 1797, to the separate peace of Leoben.

Great Britain, in difficulty at home and isolated abroad, resorted once more to a negotiation, which opened at Lille in July, 1797. Malmesbury again was the plenipotentiary, but upon this occasion Pitt made it clear to him that he must seek, not a creditable rupture, but anything short of a dishonourable peace.<sup>10</sup> Malmesbury devoted himself to his mission with skill and with fidelity to the views of Pitt, which he appears to have shared and certainly followed,<sup>11</sup> against the prejudices even of his immediate chief, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville. Grenville strongly opposed the negotiation from the outset, because the Directory, in the face of the Treaty of Leoben, which provided for a general congress of the belligerents, limited the objects of the meeting to the arrangement of a separate peace between France and Great Britain.<sup>12</sup>

The conditions of peace offered by Malmesbury at Lille in the name of his government are dangerously near the limit of concession which Pitt had allowed him. The Republic was to remain in undisturbed possession of her conquests in the Netherlands and in Italy; she was also to receive back her lost colonies. Against this undue expansion of France in Europe Great Britain reserved for herself an inadequate compensation out of her conquests from Spain and Holland,

<sup>10</sup>Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 369; letter from Pitt to Malmesbury, 11 Sept., 1797, *ibid.*, III, 554.

<sup>11</sup>Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 369 and 516; letter from Malmesbury to Canning, 29 Aug., 1797, *ibid.*, III, 517; letter from Malmesbury to Pitt, 18 Sept., 1797, *ibid.*, III, 576.

<sup>12</sup>Treaty of Leoben, (18 April, 1797), Article 4, De Clercq, *Recueil des Traités de la France*, I, 319; Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 217 and 218; Grenville, in the debate in the Lords upon this Negotiation, 8 Nov., 1797, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, col. 980 ("defensive peace" erroneously for "definitive peace"); also Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 369, 516, and (4 Oct., 1797) 595, and letter from Malmesbury to Canning, 29 Aug., 1797, *ibid.*, III, 517.

namely, Trinidad, the Cape, and Ceylon. A settlement upon these terms deserved and seemed to be well within reach of success, but in the end the alternative of peace or war was not decided at Lille. The entire question was involved in the party struggle progressing at Paris, which after months of intrigue ended in the crisis of the 18th of Fructidor (4th of September, 1797). With the aid of Bonaparte the revolutionary party prevailed in this crisis, and their victory meant a rupture at Lille.

A change of *personnel* in the French plenipotentiaries was the first indication at Lille of the altered spirit prevailing in Paris. The end was soon reached.<sup>13</sup> Malmesbury at his first conference with the new plenipotentiaries on the 15th of September was called upon to say whether his powers enabled him to restore the conquests made by Great Britain during the war without exception—those from France as well as those from the allies of France. The constitution and treaties of the Republic, it was avowed, required that this should be the basis of the negotiation. A similar claim had been made in July, but was promptly rejected by Malmesbury, and France had since tacitly and by implication abandoned it. Malmesbury now rejected it again, but he was at once summoned, in case his powers did not cover the required basis, to depart to his Court within twenty-four hours in order to secure others which did. The affront to Great Britain involved in this demand ranks perhaps with the gravest ever offered to an enemy as yet unsubdued. The purpose evidently was to end the negotiation. Still Malmesbury requested another interview, and at this last conference on the 17th of September he strove, with a due regard for the dignity of his office and for the honour of the country which he represented, to alter the resolution taken by the French plenipotentiaries. The effort was vain.

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<sup>13</sup>For the closing incidents of this negotiation see the despatch from Malmesbury to Grenville, 17 Sept., 1797; Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, III, 561; the same despatch is printed also in *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, col. 949.



The rupture of this negotiation and Bonaparte's share in the crisis which led to it, together form an event of prime importance. Bonaparte at this moment became the great exponent of tendencies which were rife in France at the time and had governed her policy for centuries. Henceforth he makes the struggle with Great Britain his life-work. As early as August, 1797, a casual utterance of Bonaparte's shows how thoroughly he was imbued with the idea that the "destruction of England" was the natural and necessary aim of France.<sup>14</sup> Later in the same year he traces clearly the lines of this policy. "Austria," he writes, in substance, in his defence of the Treaty of Campo-Formio,<sup>15</sup> "is fallen, nor was she ever a danger to us. Our real enemy is England. The French Republic must either destroy the English Monarchy or expect to be destroyed by it. Let us devote ourselves to our navy and overthrow England. That done, Europe will be at our feet." From the task which Bonaparte here set himself, he never really swerved. Hereafter, wherever he is—in Egyptian deserts or on the plains of Lombardy, in Spain, in Germany, or even in remotest Russia, there lies behind the special object of the moment an unvarying resolve, to reach and destroy his insular opponent.

While these tendencies were decisive in the counsels of France, peace could not be hoped for. In the closing days at Lille, Malmesbury and even the plenipotentiaries with whom he had to deal were in reality but helpless spectators, while France, under the influence of a traditional policy which here concentrated itself in the person of her greatest leader, was entering upon a new phase of the struggle with her hereditary foe.

<sup>14</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, III, 2103, 16 August, 1797.

<sup>15</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, III, 2307, 18 October, 1797.

§3. Bonaparte and the rupture at Lille.

## CHAPTER I.

BONAPARTE'S OVERTURES OF PEACE, DECEMBER,  
1799, AND JANUARY, 1800.

I. Effect in  
Great Britain  
of the rupture  
at Lille.

The rupture of the negotiation at Lille involved Great Britain in humiliation abroad but brought her advantage at home. It convinced the English people that the hope of conciliation which they had cherished was vain and that their national existence was at stake in the war with France. The French Directory could have done the Government of Great Britain no better service.<sup>16</sup>

Pitt was now established in a position never again called in question. The strength which his ministry drew from the impolitic diplomacy of the Directory at Lille became apparent on the opening of Parliament in November. The Address of Thanks in reply to the Speech from the Throne was adopted in the Lords and Commons without division,<sup>17</sup> and later a joint address upon the unsuccessful negotiations was adopted in both Houses, also without dissent.<sup>18</sup> In the debates upon these addresses the leaders of the regular Opposition did not appear in either House.<sup>19</sup> In the Lords, of non-supporters of the Government, Lord Lansdowne alone spoke upon the Address of Thanks and the tenor of his speech was as much

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<sup>16</sup> Letter from Grenville to his brother, the Marquis of Buckingham, 20 September, 1797, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III.*, II., 383: (On the rupture at Lille) "I really think in the manner of doing the thing, the Directory have done everything they could to play our game."

<sup>17</sup> Debates in the Lords and Commons on the Address of Thanks, 2 November, 1797, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, cols. 857 and 886.

<sup>18</sup> Debate on negotiation with France, in the Lords, 8 November, in the Commons, 10 November, 1797; *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, cols. 979 and 987.

<sup>19</sup> Except the Duke of Norfolk, who, as hereditary Earl Marshal, could not absent himself from the opening of Parliament. See debate in question, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, col. 880.

despair as disapproval.<sup>20</sup> He was not a member of the regular Opposition, led by Fox in the Commons; they, convinced of Pitt's sincerity in the negotiation,<sup>21</sup> and unable to excuse the conduct of France, absented themselves from the debates. The ministers in consequence found themselves strangely forced into the rôle of these absent opponents in seeking to moderate the attitude of over-zealous supporters who advocated relentless warfare upon republican government in France. Earl Fitzwilliam in the Lords and Earl Temple in the Commons were emphatically warned by Grenville and Pitt<sup>22</sup> that the form of government prevailing in France was in itself no concern of Great Britain; the ministry preferred indeed the restoration of monarchy, but the survival of the Republic would be no hindrance to peace on suitable terms. This attitude is convincing evidence of the improved position of the ministry. Fox in fact gave up the struggle; with him, absence from the House became habitual; his party, already weak in numbers, was demoralized afresh, and his influence broken. The election of 1798 returned the old majority in favour of Pitt and his colleagues.

Internal unity enabled Great Britain the better to overcome the dangers of her isolated position after the treaty of peace between France and Austria at Campo-Formio. Bonaparte had effected this peace in order personally to conduct an invasion of England; on investigation, however, he found the plan impracticable,<sup>23</sup> and relinquishing it he promptly sailed

§2. Bona-  
parte's expe-  
dition to  
Egypt; his  
return. The  
consulate.

<sup>20</sup> See debate in question, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, cols. 872 to 879.

<sup>21</sup> Debate in the Commons on the Assessed Taxes Bill, 4 January, 1798, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, where both Sheridan (col. 1197) and Fox (col. 1252) admit the sincerity of Pitt in the negotiation at Lille.

<sup>22</sup> Grenville in debate in the Lords on the Address of Thanks, 2 November, 1797, *Parl. Hist.*, vol 33, col. 871, and Pitt in debate in the Commons on the negotiations with France, 10 November, 1797, *Parl. Hist.*, vol 33, cols. 1000-1001.

<sup>23</sup> Bonaparte to the Executive Directory, 23 Feb., 1798, *Corr. Nap.*, III, 2419: "L'expédition d'Angleterre ne parait donc être possible que l'année prochaine; et alors il est probable que les embarras qui surviendront sur le continent s'y opposeront. Le vrai moment de se préparer à cette expédition est perdu peut-être pour toujours."

to Egypt, in 1798, with a view to establishing himself firmly in that country, and ultimately threatening the position of Great Britain in India. This hope was also dashed by the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir, and only as a refugee did Bonaparte return to France in 1799. He was, however, welcomed eagerly. In his absence Suvoroff, with the forces of the Second Coalition, had expelled the Republican armies from Italy in the campaign of 1799, and France was facing the danger of an invasion. Her internal disorder contributed to a widespread desire of peace, and instinctively the people recognized in Bonaparte the one who could best secure it for them. Within a month of his landing at Fréjus the crisis of the 18th of Brumaire (9th of November, 1799) placed him in control of the government of France.

§3. Bonaparte's overtures of peace, December, 1799.

The rump of the Five Hundred in formally committing the provisional administration of France and the reorganization of her government to Bonaparte and his fellow consuls<sup>24</sup> laid upon them the specific duty of negotiating an 'honourable peace.' That Bonaparte suffered himself to be influenced by this legislative body, which had just been violently dissolved and never again came into existence, it is impossible to conceive. Nevertheless the resolution adopted by it is remarkable, inasmuch as it is the concrete expression of a feeling which had assisted Bonaparte to power. France desired peace, and Bonaparte was expected to obtain it; little as he might regard the directions of his fallen predecessors, he paid strict attention to the wishes of the nation itself. It was therefore natural that one of Bonaparte's first official acts was designed to meet, at least in appearance, the universal desire of his countrymen for peace. On the very day of his formal entrance upon office as First Consul, he prepared overtures of peace to be despatched to London and Vienna.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup>On the night of the 18th of Brumaire, (9 Nov., 1799). See Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 569.

<sup>25</sup>Bonaparte to the King of Great Britain, &c., and Bonaparte to the Emperor, both letters of 25 Dec., 1799, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4445 and 4446.

Bonaparte's real object in these overtures is a debatable question. The common view is that they were but diplomatic feints intended to represent the First Consul before Europe, especially before France, as the champion of peace, his opponents meanwhile bearing the odium of a campaign which he himself expected and even desired.<sup>26</sup> There is much to encourage this suspicion. The outward form of the overtures lends countenance to it, and it is corroborated by the curt rejection of Bonaparte's offer in London, as well as by his brilliant success in the struggle which his enemies thus forced upon him. This view, once fairly started, found general acceptance at the hands of historians partial and impartial, until in our day it has acquired something of the strength and authority of a tradition. I wish to combat it. Although Bonaparte himself at St. Helena denied his sincerity in these overtures,<sup>27</sup> I maintain and hope to establish the contrary. In a subsequent portion of this chapter the question will be examined in some detail; here it will be necessary, *first*, to sketch the general situation at the moment; *secondly*, to describe the course and fate of the overtures themselves.

At Bonaparte's accession to power in France two difficulties in her relations with foreign powers awaited solution, the continental war with Austria and the naval war with Great Britain. Apparently, if viewed from the standpoint of France, the two form but one question, but in reality they are distinct.

§4. The general situation with regard to peace. Bonaparte need of peace. His limitations in securing it.

<sup>26</sup> Bignon, *Histoire de France depuis le 18 Brumaire jusqu'à la paix de Tilsit*, pp. 13 and 16 (It is noteworthy that this writer, whose authority is not so much that of an historian as that of a contemporary French diplomatist in the service of Bonaparte, wavers in his adherence to the prevailing view. Apparently he is unwilling to give up the idea that Bonaparte desired peace: see p. 13, "Que veut donc le Premier Consul? ou obtenir la paix, ou frapper les esprits en France," and p. 16, "C'était donc répondre à ses intérêts, peut-être à son secret désir, que de rejeter ses propositions"); Lefebvre, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe, 1800-1815*, I, 35 and 39; Thiers, *Consulat et l'Empire*, I, 186; Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 588-589 and 600-602; Häusser, *Deutsche Geschichte*, II, 276; Lanfrey, *Napoleon I*, II, 57 and 58; Fournier, *Napoleon I*, I, 189-191; Oncken, *Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs und der Befreiungskriege*, II, 44 and 45.

<sup>27</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, XXX, pp. 491-494.

The war with Austria threatened France directly, and was, accordingly, Bonaparte's nearest danger; that with Great Britain brought no immediate peril to his government, but in the Mediterranean it was creating a situation which would permanently cripple his world-policy. As to its object, that policy continued unchanged. Bonaparte's purpose was still to overcome Great Britain, although for the second time he now saw himself forced to alter the means whereby he hoped to effect this. The attempt to attack her by way of Egypt had failed, and the partial success with which the expedition had opened, involved Bonaparte in a peculiar difficulty. He had expelled the former rulers of Malta and Egypt apparently but to open the way for Great Britain to secure the prize. Without provocation Great Britain would at that time scarcely have thought of interfering either in Malta or in Egypt, but now she was on the point of expelling the French from both and of securing at least Malta for herself. Bonaparte, since his flight to France, was no longer able personally to intervene, and while in the case of Egypt the alliance between Turkey and Great Britain manifestly would debar the latter from confiscating this possession of the Sultan after reconquering it from France, the case of Malta was different. Malta had no legitimate owner. Bonaparte himself, by seizing the island on his way to Egypt in 1798, had given the dying Order of the Knights of St. John a stroke from which it never recovered, and apart from a not too excessive regard for the illegitimate claims of the Russian Emperor to the Grand Mastership of the Order, which could scarcely be said to exist, there was nothing to keep Great Britain from converting this fortress into a second Gibraltar.

Against the two-fold danger from Austria and Great Britain Bonaparte was forced to take an immediate stand. In order to maintain his position in France he must, either at once by skilful diplomacy or later after a successful campaign, secure from Austria a peace upon more or less favourable terms. But

as against Great Britain there was not this alternative. In order not to cripple his policy permanently, he must anticipate the capitulation of Malta by an *immediate* peace with its besiegers. The French in Malta were under close blockade; they would presently have to choose between starvation and surrender, and Bonaparte who had left both garrison and supplies in the fortress in 1798 knew their situation tolerably well.<sup>28</sup> His difficulty here is illustrated by the similar, though not identical position of affairs in Egypt, especially by his farewell letter to General Kleber,<sup>29</sup> the unwilling successor to his command in that country. This letter directed Kleber to maintain himself as long as possible by force, but if his position became untenable, to begin a negotiation with Turkey for the restoration of Egypt; in that case, however, he was to arrange that the actual evacuation should not take place till the signature of a general peace, or at least not till the treaty of capitulation should be ratified at Paris. In Egypt, where the French position depended upon a more or less determined defence, this plan to keep Great Britain from obtaining a footing was, perhaps, feasible; but in Malta, where the fate of the garrison was a question of food, Bonaparte's only hope was in a general peace, speedily effected, which should include an arrangement with Great Britain for the surrender of Malta to some neutral power. His letter to Kleber shows that he had such a peace under consideration. In seeking peace with Great Britain, Bonaparte, being helpless at sea, was restricted to purely diplomatic resources, and the only question was whether he should resort to these at once or after a struggle with Austria. No advantage in delay was apparent. A victory over Austria would strengthen him immensely upon the continent, without, however, improving his position at sea, and, at best, the winning of it would require time, which, as the event proved, he could not afford. Few campaigns have been quicker in

<sup>28</sup> Note from Talleyrand to Panin, 26 August, 1800, Tratschevski, *Russia and France*, I, 3 (Paper No. 2).

<sup>29</sup> Letter from Bonaparte to Kleber, 22 August, 1798, *Corr. Nap.*, V, 4374.

execution or more decisive in result than that ending in Marengo; but victory came too late. While the subsequent negotiations were still in their preliminary stage, Malta fell, and, as Bonaparte probably anticipated and certainly feared, Great Britain once in possession would not surrender the fortress, in spite even of her pledge in the Treaty of Amiens. She holds it to this day.

Manifestly, the situation in the Mediterranean called for immediate peace. Still Bonaparte dared not simply yield to this pressure. The Five Hundred had required an "honourable" peace, and while the French people, depressed by their reverses in 1799, might for the moment have quietly submitted to humiliating terms, their inward resentment would in the end have proved dangerous to the government responsible in negotiating them. It is, perhaps, not difficult to perceive the distinction which the average Frenchman would have made between "honour" and "dishonour" in the settlement of peace at this time, and it is certain that the line between the two would have been drawn with but little reference to the needs of Bonaparte's policy in the Mediterranean. Revolutionary France was penetrated with the traditional enmity of the nation towards Great Britain, but she expected the fight to be in the Channel and in the Netherlands, not in Egypt and the Indies.<sup>30</sup> Bonaparte himself by an utterance in a somewhat suspicious connection has shown—what in reality needed no proof—that in the settlement of peace the Netherlands question was the tenderest point in French public opinion. In the same passage of his writings at St. Helena in which he denies having desired negotiation or peace, Napoleon, in ill-concealed contradiction to this denial, enumerates the advantages which negotiation would have brought Great Britain and Austria had they chosen to accept his overtures<sup>31</sup> at

<sup>30</sup> See the despatch from Malmesbury to Grenville, 28 November, 1796, Malmesbury, *Diaries, etc.*, III, 330, *et seq.* especially pp. 334 and 335.

<sup>31</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, XXX, pp. 491 and 492.



the time. According to him, Austria would have become the paramount power in Italy, France would have evacuated Holland and Switzerland, Egypt would have been restored to the Porte, Malta to the Order of St. John, and finally, Great Britain, by retaining the Cape and Ceylon, would have secured the keys to India.<sup>32</sup> To this statement one may attach what credit one will; it shows, at least, that Bonaparte, when he made it, in looking back over the past, regarded the surrender of the Netherlands<sup>33</sup> at the time of his overture as an impossibility. The "natural boundaries" which France had sought so long, and which the Revolution had secured, Bonaparte, who was the Revolution's heir and claimed to be its consummator,<sup>34</sup> dared not again surrender. It is in this connection that Bonaparte's proclamation to the army, which is of the same date as his overtures to London and Vienna, appears in its true significance. It is a warning to his enemies that he will not shrink from war in order to obtain a suitable peace.<sup>35</sup>

Bonaparte's proposals were despatched from Paris on the 26th of December, 1799. An introductory note from Talleyrand to Grenville accompanied them, but the overture itself was a personal one, in which Bonaparte ignored the existence of the Ministry and addressed himself to the King.<sup>36</sup> In other

§5. The course of the overtures. Great Britain rejects them. The grounds of this rejection.

<sup>32</sup> It is worth notice that Bonaparte, while confirming Great Britain in the possession of the Cape, and thus closing one way to India upon himself, wishes to have Malta returned to the Order, in order that the other, which was the shorter and for France an especially convenient road to the East, should not also fall into the hands of his rival.

<sup>33</sup> Here and elsewhere in this essay the expression "Netherlands" is used uniformly of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), never of *Holland*.

<sup>34</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4422. 15 December, 1799.

<sup>35</sup> Bonaparte aux soldats Français, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4449, 25 December, 1799.

<sup>36</sup> Bonaparte to the King of Great Britain, etc., and Talleyrand to Grenville, both letters of 5 Nivôse, VIII (26 Dec., 1799), *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1197. The date given in the *Parl. Hist.*, 5 Nivôse, VIII, agrees with the originals (London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612), but this date—5 Nivôse, VIII—is the 26th Dec., 1799, not the 25th, as given in the *Parl. Hist.* Bonaparte's letter is an exact copy of the *draft* in *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4445 (4 Nivôse, VIII, 25 Dec., 1799).

European monarchies this course, though unusual, was not inadmissible—Bonaparte's contemporary overture to Austria was also addressed to the Emperor<sup>37</sup>—but a like step in London was more than an ordinary departure from custom. The decision even of questions of foreign policy, which in continental monarchies is peculiarly the province of the sovereign, rests in Great Britain not with the King, but with the Cabinet. Bonaparte in acting contrary to this principle violated British constitutional usage. One can scarcely suppose that he did this in ignorance;<sup>38</sup> he did it rather with a deliberate purpose, which is tolerably clear from the overture itself. This consisted of philanthropic platitudes; Bonaparte regretted the sufferings entailed by the war, expressed his belief that the King shared his own pity for a stricken world, and indirectly invited him to take part in a "second attempt"<sup>39</sup> at a general peace.<sup>40</sup> The letter is plainly theatrical. In name addressed to the King, in reality it is addressed to France, and for this reason, in spite of its courtesy and lofty sentiment it has little significance as a sincere overture. It deserves in fact the criticism of Pitt, that it contained nothing specific either as to basis or terms of treaty, or mode of negotiation;<sup>41</sup> and even the modern opinion of Sybel that Bonaparte knew that he could never begin a serious negotiation in this fashion, is justifiable.<sup>42</sup> But these faults in the overture, which none will deny, do not in themselves prove

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<sup>37</sup> *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, edited by Vivenot, II, 441, Note 61.

<sup>38</sup> If one may believe a secret agent of the British Government in Paris. Bonaparte took the step against the advice of Talleyrand and of the rest of the French Ministry. (Letter from Perron, 5 May, 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612.)

<sup>39</sup> The first attempt is of course the Peace of Campo Formio.

<sup>40</sup> A general peace through separate negotiations, as will appear by Bonaparte's second letter in these overtures—not through a Congress of the belligerent powers, such as Great Britain desired.

<sup>41</sup> Letter from Pitt to Addington, 4 Jan., 1800, *Life and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth*, I, 248.

<sup>42</sup> Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 588.

insincerity. The overture at best had but slender chances of acceptance, and Bonaparte, fearing though not necessarily desiring its ill-success, might cast it in rhetorical form in order to heighten the effect upon France in the too possible case of its rejection.

Bonaparte, by thus adopting a theatrical tone in his overture, plainly injured its prospect of success. On the other hand it has escaped notice that he made a specific effort to prevent its failure. Through the French banker and senator Perregaux, who had business relations with Lord Auckland, the colleague and confidential friend of Pitt, Bonaparte assured the latter that the French Government really desired peace.<sup>43</sup> In determining Bonaparte's real attitude in the question of peace, this secret communication is of greater weight than the public overture. For, if the overture were but a diplomatic feint which Bonaparte desired should fail of its ostensible object, it is inconceivable that he would deliberately lessen the chances of rejection by a secret communication of the above character. Rather must we assume that Bonaparte wished by it to make good the faults of the official overture. Had he indeed awaited an answer to the *secret*, before sending the *public* overture, he would be open to the suspicion of wishing only to be sure that Great Britain would reject his offers before compromising himself by official steps. It appears however that Perregaux's letter reached Pitt only on the 25th of December, and although Pitt forwarded it to Grenville at

<sup>43</sup> Letter from Pitt to Lord Auckland, 25 Dec. 1799, *Journal and Corr. of Lord Auckland*, IV, 104: "I hope your correspondent's [Perregaux's] assurances on the subject of the '*rentes viagères*' deserve more credit than I can give to those respecting the disposition to peace. I have however thought it best to communicate the letter immediately to Lord Grenville." See also the letter from Auckland to Pitt, 19 Jan., 1800, *ibid.*

Although these letters have been published since 1862, it is not strange that their connection with this question has not been noted. Pitt mentions indeed that he had sent Perregaux's letter to Grenville (the Foreign Secretary); nevertheless one would not suppose that the communication originated with Bonaparte, but for the later (Dec. 1800—Feb. 1801) correspondence between Grenville, Auckland and Perregaux, printed in Appendix B *infra*.

once, the two had barely discussed it on the 30th of December and decided against negotiation, when the official overture itself arrived on the 31st<sup>44</sup>

The grounds of Pitt's unwillingness to negotiate at this moment are not difficult to discover. The general situation which urged Bonaparte towards peace naturally encouraged Great Britain to continue the war. In Malta and Egypt, in Italy, on the Rhine, and even in France, symptoms of an early collapse of the once powerful Republic seemed apparent. Despatches from Kleber to the Directory which had been intercepted by British vessels in the Mediterranean and forwarded thence to England, had just revealed the hopeless situation which Bonaparte had left behind him in Egypt.<sup>45</sup> In the case of Malta, information equally precise was wanting, but the capitulation of its garrison seemed imminent. Eventually it was even more certain than that of Egypt itself. On the continent the Coalition had just completed an unusually successful campaign, and the British finances, which had improved gradually since the crisis of 1797, were equal to the strain of continuing the contest.<sup>46</sup> Prospects of a successful attack upon France were good. Though the Coalition was weakened by the Tsar's dissatisfaction with Austria, there

<sup>44</sup> Letter from Pitt to Dundas, 31 Dec., 1799, Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 339 also in *Corr. of Lord Cornwallis*, III, 154: “. . . I have now to tell you . . . that to-day has brought us the overture from the Consul in the shape of a letter to the King. . . I think we can have nothing to do but to decline all negotiation at the present moment on the ground that the actual situation of France does not as yet hold out any solid security to be derived from negotiation. . . This is my present view of the subject, and is very conformable to what seemed Grenville's opinion (in a conversation I had with him yesterday before the letter had arrived) as to that of Lord Spencer and Windham, who are the only members of Government I have seen since.” Pitt's use of the expression “the overture,” instead of “an overture,” shews that Perregaux's letter led him to expect such an offer from the French Government.

<sup>45</sup> Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 548-549 and 601.

<sup>46</sup> Debate in the Commons on the Overture from France, 3 Feb., 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, Vol. 34; Pitt (col. 1351): “When we consider the resources and spirit of the country, can any man doubt that if adequate security is not now to be

was reason to hope that he might yet allow Suvoroff and his army to share in the opening campaign ; in any case Paul was still on the best of terms with Great Britain. Twenty-five thousand of his troops were wintering in the island of Jersey in the Channel, in preparation for the next campaign, and Pitt was planning to use them in connection with a considerable force of British troops which should land and co-operate with the Royalist insurgents in the west of France.<sup>47</sup> The leaders of this insurgent movement, which was supported by Great Britain with money and arms,<sup>48</sup> had in the previous autumn established themselves sufficiently to negotiate an armistice with the government at Paris, and there seemed reason to hope that they would yet overturn it. On the Rhine and in Italy, Austria, in spite of the threatened withdrawal of Russian support, was prepared to continue the work begun by Suvoroff which if completed would drive the French from Italy and Switzerland and might even compel them to surrender the Netherlands in return for peace ; while, on the contrary, if Great Britain at this moment undertook to treat with France, Austria, unable to depend upon Russia and needing a British subsidy in order to continue the contest, would also enter upon a separate negotiation. In this case the Emperor, being freed of all obligations to consider British interests in the Netherlands, would simply consult his own by ceding these provinces to France in return for suitable compensation elsewhere. In this situation war appeared to be advantageous, negotiation detrimental to Great Britain, and Pitt would have resorted to the latter only if assured that Bonaparte would

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obtained by treaty, we have the means of prosecuting the contest without material difficulty or danger, and with a reasonable prospect of completely attaining our object? I need not dwell on the improved state of public credit, on the continually increasing amount of our permanent revenue.”

<sup>47</sup> See letters from Pitt to Dundas, 22 Dec., 1799, and 11 Jan., 1800, Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 338 and 340. Also letter from Pitt to Dundas, 31 Dec., 1800, *Corr. of Cornwallis*, III, 154. The letter of 11 Jan. is also in *Cornwallis*, III, 157.

<sup>48</sup> See Appendix A, *infra*.

yield voluntarily what Great Britain might expect to obtain by a slight effort. Of this there was no guarantee. On the contrary Pitt and his colleagues were doubtful both of the permanence of Bonaparte's power and of his sincerity in negotiation;<sup>49</sup> at best it seemed to them most probable that the Consular government and all its measures would soon disappear together. Accordingly they rejected the overture, but this decision had still to be justified before the public, and the efforts at justification gave a peculiar form to their reply to France.

This reply which was prepared with designed haste, was discussed by the Cabinet on the 2nd of January, submitted at once to the King,<sup>50</sup> and, after receiving its final form on the 3rd,<sup>51</sup> was dated and despatched to Paris on the 4th of Janu-

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<sup>49</sup> The best proof of Pitt's distrust is in his letters, to Lord Auckland, 25 Dec., 1799, and to Addington, 4 Jan., 1800, cited on pp. 24-25 above. Apart from these we have only his own and his colleagues' utterances in Parliament. It is difficult to discover Grenville's exact opinion in the matter. In the debate in the Lords on the Overture, 28 Jan., 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, he attacks (col. 1215 *et seq.*) Bonaparte's personal good faith, and questions (col. 1217) whether the Consul, if he desired negotiation at all, would allow it to advance to a peace and not rather break off negotiation as soon as he felt able to renew the war. Later Grenville appears to have gone over wholly to the view that the overture was insincere; see his speech in debate in the Lords on the Address of Thanks, 11 Nov. 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 35, col. 508: "If the noble Lord will contemplate the posture of affairs at that period he will find that the power of Bonaparte was suspended by a fine thread and that his proposition for negotiation was not so much from a desire of peace, as to confirm him in his precarious power." But Grenville's opinion here is affected by the results of the battle of Marengo, the importance of which in its effect upon Bonaparte's position Grenville is in fact emphasizing in this very passage. Had that battle been a French defeat, opponents might have credited Bonaparte with sincerity in his effort to avoid the disaster.

Grenville's idea that Bonaparte perhaps desired a negotiation, but not peace, is emphasized by Pitt and Dundas in the debate in the Commons on the Overture, 3 Feb., 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, cols. 1339 and 1249 respectively.

<sup>50</sup> Grenville to the King, 2 January, 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612. In submitting the draft of the reply for the King's approval, Grenville recommends haste, "as so speedy an answer will remove all appearance of hesitation."

<sup>51</sup> Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, 3 January, 1800, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III.*, III, 4.

ary.<sup>52</sup> From the diplomatic standpoint it was a blunt and even discourteous rejection. Bonaparte had addressed himself to the King, the answer was from minister to minister. Less than this was scarcely to have been expected, but Grenville in a letter accompanying the official note sharpened the implied rebuke<sup>e</sup> by an open censure of Bonaparte's deviation from usage, and a similar strain of reproach and reproof characterizes the official note itself. Bonaparte in his overture professed to regret that the two most enlightened and powerful nations of Europe should sacrifice the tangible blessings of peace to vain ideas of glory. Grenville denied that his country was engaged in any such contest. On the contrary, he maintained, Great Britain was resisting a system which had been a curse to France and to every country to which France had succeeded in extending it, and Great Britain would continue to resist until the system was changed and until she had received a sufficient proof that the change was real. The best and most natural proof that France could offer, Grenville held to be a Bourbon restoration, and Great Britain, without insisting on this as the only and indispensable pledge, would accept it at any moment as sufficient security. She desired security only, she did not see it in Bonaparte's government, therefore she could not negotiate; but whenever, and in whatever form, sufficient security were offered her, she would hasten to accept it, and in concert with her allies she would arrange a general peace with France.

This answer has met with criticism unfavourable almost to

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<sup>52</sup> Letter and official note from Grenville to Talleyrand, both of 4th January, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1198. The letter of this date is the first paragraph of the draft submitted to the King on the 2nd of January. In the records of the Foreign Office there is no indication of this re-arrangement of the draft, but the papers as printed in the *Parliamentary History* were doubtless the final form of the reply.

unanimity ever since it was first made public.<sup>53</sup> Its purpose in fact has been misunderstood. It is peculiar, but it is not, as some have assumed, aimlessly insolent; its attack on the system of France was not an attempt to preach; its suggestion of a Bourbon restoration was not made in the hope that Bonaparte would thereby be induced to surrender to the claims of legitimacy the position which he had won by the sword. It is true that since 1797, Grenville, whose sterner temperament could appreciate, better perhaps than could Pitt, the irreconcilable nature of the contest with revolutionary France, had hardened gradually in his feelings towards her,<sup>54</sup> but he himself was much too cool, and Pitt was far too great a statesman to indulge in a policy of vain propositions or frivolous insult. They rejected Bonaparte's overtures because they distrusted him, and, in order to justify their decision in the eyes of the nation, they had to propagate a like distrust. Hence in Grenville's answer, which was not so much a reply to

<sup>53</sup> Debate in the Commons on the Overture, 3 February, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34: Erskine (col. 1286): "The question is . . . whether the House of Commons could say, *in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world*, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, inselting answer, to a proposition professing peace and conciliation, was the answer which ought to have been sent to France or to any human government," and Fox in the same debate, (col. 1355): "I must lament that both in the papers of Lord Grenville and in the speeches of this night, such license has been given to invective and reproach." Erskine and Fox belonged to the Opposition, but Speaker Addington, Pitt's friend and successor, characterizes (See letter to Riley Addington, 9 January, 1800, *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, I., 249) this answer of the 4th of January as "caustic, opprobrious, lacking in dignity and moderation." See also Lefebvre, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe*, I, 37; Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 601; Lanfrey, *Napoleon I.*, II, 60; Oncken, *Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs und der Befreiungskriege*, II, 44-45; Rosebery, *Life of Pitt*, p. 142-143.

<sup>54</sup> Compare Grenville's speech in the debate in the Lords on the Address of Thanks, 2 November, 1797 (after the rupture of Lille), *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 33, col. 871: "I believe that even with the French Republic as now constituted, peace may be both practicable and permanent," with his speech in the debate in the Lords on the Russian subsidy, 11 June, 1799, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1065 (in reply to Lord Holland, who had complained that the war was pursued without definite object): "For one I will avow my object, I want security; not a security to which the present government will be a party, but a security resting on the tried good-faith and justice of a well-tempered government."



the overture as a manifesto to Great Britain and France,<sup>55</sup> doubt was cast upon Bonaparte's sincerity, and the strength and permanence of his government were questioned. It was with this object that Grenville attacked the system of France—not the Republic or the republican form of government in itself, but the systematic pursuit of conquest which had characterized the *régime* of the Republic, and of which Bonaparte himself was the greatest and most successful exponent.<sup>56</sup> With the same object this condemnation of the system embodied in Bonaparte was in Parliament converted into an incomparably sharper attack upon Bonaparte's *personal* char-

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<sup>55</sup> Letter from Pitt to Addington, 4 January, 1800, *Life and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth*, I., 248: "We have felt no difficulty in declining all negotiation under the present circumstances, and have drawn our answer as a sort of manifesto both for France and England, bringing forward the topics which seemed most likely to promote the cause of royalty, in preference to this new and certainly not less absolute government; but taking care at the same time to disclaim all idea of making the restoration of royalty (however desirable) the *sine qua non* of peace. We mean to print the papers immediately . . . they seem likely to produce a very good effect." Also the letter of Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, 1 January, 1800, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III.*, III, 4 (on Bonaparte's overture): "I send you for a New Year's gift a curiosity. I need not tell you that we shall say, no. I am occupied in studying how to say it in the manner the least shocking to the numerous tribe of those who hate the French and Jacobins, but would to-morrow sign a peace that should put us at the mercy of both."

<sup>56</sup> See the passage in Grenville's note to Talleyrand, where, without mentioning Bonaparte, a direct attack is made upon him and his Egyptian expedition: "To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons (his majesty's ancient friends and allies) have successively been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged. Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His majesty has himself been compelled to maintain an arduous and burthensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdoms. Nor have these calamities been confined to Europe alone; they have been extended to the most distant quarters of the world, and even to countries so remote, both in situation and interest, from the present contest, that the very existence of such a war was, perhaps, unknown to those who found themselves suddenly involved in all its horrors."

acter.<sup>57</sup> His past furnished abundant material for censure, and this was supplemented at the moment by Kleber's despatches to the Directory, which, with Bonaparte's farewell letter to him,<sup>58</sup> had lately been captured in the Mediterranean and in these very days were being printed in London and given to the public as convincing proof of Bonaparte's dishonesty.<sup>59</sup> By this brusque and contemptuous attitude Pitt hoped not only to strengthen his own position in Great Britain but to weaken Bonaparte's in France. Especially was the latter his object in naming the Bourbons in the official reply Without pretending to make the restoration of the Monarchy a *sine qua non* of peace<sup>60</sup>—this idea the reply itself specifically

<sup>57</sup> In the debate in the Commons, 3 February, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, Pitt, cols. 1331-1341; Dundas, cols. 1246-1248; Canning, col. 1277. In the debate in the Lords, 28 January, 1800, *ibidem*, Grenville, cols. 1215-1218. Lanfrey, *Napoleon I*, II, 68, correctly says: "Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que le principal obstacle au succès de cette négociation fut le défiance qu'inspirait le caractère et le passé de Bonaparte; et si ce ne fut pas là le motif déterminant de Pitt, ce fut incontestablement celui qui lui servit à entraîner l'opinion publique. Toutes les discussions du Parlement portèrent sur ce point unique."

<sup>58</sup> Bonaparte to Kleber, 22 August, 1799, *Corr. Nap.*, V, 4374. In this letter Bonaparte directs Kleber, if driven to it, to negotiate with Turkey for the surrender of Egypt, but, under one pretext or another, to delay evacuation for the time being. See page 21, *supra*.

<sup>59</sup> The "Intercepted Letters from Egypt." See Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 548-549. Also in the debate in the Lords, 28 January, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, Grenville, cols. 1216 and 1218; and in the debate in the Commons, 3 February, 1800, *ibidem*, Pitt, cols. 1338, 1339 and 1340; Dundas, cols. 1247, 1248; Canning, col. 1277, and Whitbread, a member of the Opposition, col. 1255, *et seq.*, "Every topic that can revile, and every art that can blacken, has been resorted to, for purposes of political slander; and I am very sorry to see that the *Intercepted Correspondence from Egypt*, strengthened, and embellished with notes, and perhaps, too, garbled, has made its appearance with a view to prejudice the country against the chief consul, and thereby to set at a distance every hope of a negotiation for peace."

<sup>60</sup> See the passage quoted from the letter from Pitt to Addington, 4 January, 1800, on p. 30 above. In Parliament the Opposition charged the Government with making the restoration of the Bourbons an indispensable condition if not of peace at least of *immediate* negotiation; still one of the Opposition leaders, Lord Holland (Debate in the Lords, 28 January, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1237), noted also the character of the reply as a manifesto to France, "On our part the note of the Ministers was a manifesto to the Royalists, and framed for that purpose."

disclaimed—Grenville attempted to strengthen the royalist cause in France by indicating Bonaparte to the great mass of luke-warm and indifferent republicans as the last barrier between them and the coveted peace.<sup>61</sup>

Pitt had looked upon Grenville's answer as closing the correspondence with France,<sup>62</sup> but this hope was disappointed. In a note of the 14th of January, addressed on this occasion to the proper minister, Talleyrand renewed the offer which Great Britain had so bluntly refused.<sup>63</sup> Those who see in the overture only a diplomatic manoeuvre must answer the question why Bonaparte, by re-opening the matter which presumably Great Britain had settled exactly to his wish, endangered a success already won; especially why Bonaparte throughout the text of the second note shows the same courtesy which characterized the first. Grenville's answer had given abundant justification for a contrary tone, but, instead of seizing the opportunity to return censure for censure, Bonaparte continues to treat Great Britain with manifest civility. He did not, indeed, out of civility, forget that this as well as his first overture must pass review before France. Grenville's assertion that Great Britain was on her defence in the contest implied that France was the aggressor, and half of Talleyrand's lengthy answer is devoted to a skilful effort to refute the charge. But even this apology is comparatively courteous.

<sup>61</sup> See debate in the Commons, 3 February, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, cols. 1269 to 1272, where Canning avows the relation between the British Government and the royalists, and expresses his hope and belief that the majority of Frenchmen, disgusted with the disorder and tyranny prevailing under the Republic, would take no offence at the suggestion of a Bourbon restoration in Grenville's note.

<sup>62</sup> Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 342.

<sup>63</sup> Note from Talleyrand to Grenville, 24 Nivôse, VIII, 14 January, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1200. It is an exact copy of Bonaparte's draft, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4530, 26 Nivôse, VIII, 16 January, 1800 (date présumée), an erroneous date, for Talleyrand's note in the Public Record office (*France*, vol. 612) is dated, as in the *Parl. Hist.*, 14 January, 1800, hence Bonaparte's draft must have been of this or of an earlier date.

Great Britain is mentioned in it but twice ; first, where Bonaparte complains of the precipitate dismissal of the French minister from London at the opening of the war, and again when he reproaches her with "the deadly animosity with which she had wasted her resources in an effort to destroy France." This passage, by far the strongest in the note, is but the counterpart of similar passages in Grenville's;<sup>64</sup> moreover, its sharpness is tempered by the confession which accompanies it that his predecessors in the government of the Republic at times had failed in moderation toward foreign powers. With these exceptions Bonaparte confined himself in this defence to a vindication in general terms, and in the second part of his note, where particular reference to Great Britain was unavoidable, he preferred adroit insinuations to direct reply. The mention of the Bourbons in Grenville's note offered an excellent point of attack. Bonaparte scarcely used it, but contented himself with a passing reference to the fact that the dynasty reigning in Great Britain was itself a vindication of the right, inherent in every people, to choose its own form of government, without interference or suggestion from abroad, and that there had been a time in the previous century when revolution and republicanism had prevailed in Great Britain herself. For the rest, Bonaparte included in this note the definite proposition, the absence of which had been a chief fault in his first overture ; he proposed that plenipotentiaries be nominated who should meet at once in Dunkirk, or any other city equally convenient to Paris and London, to negotiate

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<sup>64</sup> "For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. . . . While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence but that of open and steady hostility can be availing. . . . His Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such professions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe."

peace between France and Great Britain, and he offered the necessary passports for this meeting.

Here for the first time Bonaparte suggested separate negotiation. If his first overture, which hinted at a *general peace*, had found so little acceptance, the much less welcome proposal of a separate peace could only aggravate suspicion.<sup>65</sup> The London Cabinet, we have seen, looked on Grenville's note of the 4th of January as closing the correspondence. In fact they had fixed a date for publishing Bonaparte's letter and their reply,<sup>66</sup> when Talleyrand's note of the 14th arrived in London on the 18th of January. It gave them no trouble. Their answer which was completed and on its way to Paris by the 20th,<sup>67</sup> was prepared within a shorter interval, and was if possible blunter than the first. It refused to enter into the "refutation of allegations universally exploded"; with respect to the object of Talleyrand's note it referred him to the answer already given; and a reference in the French note to Bonaparte's "oft-proven zeal for peace and rigid observance of treaties," which Talleyrand cited as an especial inducement to negotiate, Grenville made the occasion of a personal insult by treating this ill-grounded appeal to Bonaparte's record in the past as a promise for the future, thus presenting him to the world, not as a model of fidelity, but as a repentant sinner who intended to reform.

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<sup>65</sup> Grenville in debate in the Lords, 28 January, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1219; "If Bonaparte had really shown a particular desire for a general peace, the offer would be less an object of suspicion." Pitt, in corresponding debate in the Commons, 3 February, *ibidem*, col. 1331: "Though he had hinted at general peace in the terms of his first note; though we had shown by our answer, that we deemed negotiation, even for general peace, at this moment, inadmissible; . . . what was the proposal contained in his last note? To treat, not for general peace, but for a separate peace between Great Britain and France."

<sup>66</sup> Letter from Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, 16 January, 1800, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III.*, III, 5.

<sup>67</sup> Note from Grenville to Talleyrand, 20 January, 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 34, col. 1203.

Grenville's note of the 20th of January crossed the Channel on the 21st.<sup>68</sup> On the 22nd there landed in Dover<sup>69</sup> a French transport-commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, but this duty, which usually fell to a military officer, not of the highest rank, was here entrusted to a gifted diplomat, Otto, up to this time Secretary of the French Legation at Berlin. Otto remained in London till the conclusion of peace in 1802; in the interval he negotiated the preliminary peace signed at London in October, 1801, and from the signature of this treaty to the conclusion of the definite peace at Amiens in the following March, he was the accredited Minister of France in Great Britain. The thought suggests itself that a similar mission was his from the beginning.<sup>70</sup>

§ 6. The sincerity of the overtures : examination of this question.

The question whether Bonaparte was sincere in his offers to negotiate still awaits solution. We have seen that in a later utterance at St. Helena he denied all sincerity in these overtures. The conditions of peace—he maintains in the passage in question—which the situation of France at the time must have forced him to accept, being less advantageous than those obtained by him at Campo-Formio, would have lowered his prestige and undermined his authority. In order to suppress the Revolution and establish a solid and permanent *régime* in France it was necessary that he should prosecute the war to a favourable issue, and Great Britain's reply, which gave him every excuse, and even forced him to continue the contest, agreed exactly with his interests and with his wishes.<sup>71</sup> At first sight this utterance might seem once for all to debar the view that Bonaparte was sincere in these overtures. It is true

<sup>68</sup> Letter from Stowe to Frere, Dover, 21 Jan., 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612.

<sup>69</sup> Letter from Stowe to Frere, 22 Jan., 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612.

<sup>70</sup> This too in spite of the fact that Talleyrand proposed Dunkirk as the place of negotiation. Otto could conduct the preliminaries in London till the regular negotiation was under way at Dunkirk, and even throughout the latter his presence in London would be useful.

<sup>71</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, XXX, p. 493, (Napoleon is writing in the third person of himself): "Napoléon avait alors besoin de guerre: les campagnes d' Italie, la

in general that Napoleon's memoirs written at St. Helena deserve little or no confidence ; this particular utterance, however, might be regarded as, in a sense, a confession made when time and circumstances had removed him to a state of political inactivity, in which he was apparently without inducement to conceal or to distort the truth. But the very confessions of the untruthful are unworthy of blind belief. Napoleon is not necessarily unbosoming himself merely for the sake of the historian ; though separated from the event by an interval of twenty years he remembered the affront offered him by Grenville and Pitt, and by the simple device of representing them in the light of unconscious tools, he could spare his own memory some humiliation and expose the policy of Pitt to the ridicule of history. Is he seeking this revenge here ? If he be, he is posing, and if we would know the truth, we dare not accept him in this or any other pose ; we must take him when off his guard.

In a private connection Bonaparte has referred to the question in three places. First, a note to his brother Lucien,<sup>72</sup>

paix de Campo-Formio, les campagnes d'Égypte, la journée du 18 brumaire, l'opinion unanime du peuple pour l'élever à la suprême magistrature, l'avaient sans doute placé bien haut ; mais un traité de paix qui eût dérogé à celui de Campo-Formio et eût annulé toutes ses créations d'Italie eût flétri les imaginations et lui eût ôté ce qui lui était nécessaire pour terminer la révolution, établir un système définitif et permanent ; il le sentait. Il attendait avec impatience la réponse du Cabinet de Londres. Cette réponse le remplit d'une secrète satisfaction. Plus les Grenville et les Chatham se complaisaient à outrager la révolution et à montrer ce mépris qui est l'apanage héréditaire de l'oligarchie, plus ils servaient les intérêts secrets de Napoléon, qui dit son ministre : 'Cette réponse ne pouvait pas nous être plus favorable.' It is quite conceivable that Bonaparte in any case used these words before his minister, for they express a qualified truth. Whether or no he desired the rejection of his offer, the manner in which Great Britain rejected it was certainly an advantage to him. Pitt and Grenville 'insulted' the Revolution in order to influence public opinion in Great Britain and to encourage the royalists in France, but this policy inevitably gathered the republicans to Bonaparte's support.

<sup>72</sup>*Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4474. Lucien Bonaparte was named Minister of the Interior on the 25 December, 1799. The words quoted are the opening passage of a lengthy note of advice to the new Minister on the management of the *communes* of France.

which, though undated, appears by its contents to belong to that time, contains this sentence: "Were war not necessary for me, I should inaugurate a new era of prosperity for France in the *communes*." Secondly, in a letter to Talleyrand of the 13th of January, 1800, he says concerning the evacuation of Flushing:<sup>73</sup> "Were it the case that in return for this object we could secure from Holland twelve millions before the end of April, eighteen before the end of next September, and from ten to fifteen millions during the year IX,<sup>74</sup> I think that in our present position this negotiation would be of equal importance with that which we may open with the Court of London or of Vienna." Thirdly, there are Bonaparte's instructions of the 14th of January, 1800, to General Brune,<sup>75</sup> the newly appointed commander of the "Army of the West."

This last—the most important evidence—we shall consider first. The Army of the West consisted of the troops massed by Bonaparte against the re-opening of hostilities with the royalist insurgents in the northwestern Departments and in La Vendée. The armistice with them expired on the 21st of January, and in these instructions of the 14th General Brune, who was then at the point of leaving Paris to take command of the Government troops in the expected struggle with the insurgents, was charged to execute a preliminary movement in close connection with the second overture to Great Britain. Bonaparte writes: "The Army of the West is composed of more than 60,000 men under arms. You will actively pursue the brigands and seek to bring this war to an early finish; *on its termination now depends the peace of Europe*. . . . The armistice concluded between General Hédouville and the Chouans lasts only to the 1st of Pluviôse [21st January].

<sup>73</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4519, 13 Jan., 1800. Article 13 of the Treaty of the Hague (16 May, 1795), gave France an exclusive right of garrison in Flushing, "in peace and in war, till other arrangements be made between the two nations"—DeClercq, *Recueil des Traités de la France*, I, 236.

<sup>74</sup> The year IX corresponds to 23 Sept., 1800—22 Sept., 1801.

<sup>75</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4523.



Georges, who commands the rebels in Morbihan, is not included in it. I calculate that by the evening of the 27th [Nivôse, 17th January] you will be at Angers. Remain there only the few hours necessary to start the 60th semi-brigade, with such troops as you can draw from this Department, on their way to Morbihan; then proceed to Nantes. From there you will march to Morbihan, where you will find the 22nd and the 72nd. Disperse Georges' forces, seize his cannon and his stores of grain (he has on the coast a great quantity of it which he sells to the English). In a word let the rebels of Morbihan begin to feel the burden and horrors of war, so that by the 1st of Pluviôse [21st of January] you are certain, (1) That the English vessels moored on the coasts of Morbihan no longer have any communication with Georges; (2) That from the head of the masts they may see the banners of the Republic dispersing the brigands and destroying their hopes. *The most important diplomatic interests require that in the first five days of Pluviôse [21st-26th January] the English should know that a large body of troops is pursuing Georges, so that they will send the news of it to England.*"

The bearing of these instructions upon our question is unmistakable, and their date is especially significant. The diplomatic interests can only be Bonaparte's second overture to Great Britain; at the very moment that this overture is started on its way from Paris, Bonaparte orders a movement which shall insure it a good reception in London. Talleyrand's note, we have seen, reached London on the 18th and was answered on the 20th of January, but this speedy decision was scarcely to be expected. Bonaparte certainly had not expected it; rather he had hoped that, by prompt action on the part of Brune, the news of Georges' overthrow<sup>76</sup> might reach London

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<sup>76</sup> It should be noted that, of all the royalist leaders, Georges was in closest communication with the British Government, and that Morbihan, where Brune was ordered to make his attack, was the Department in which Pitt wished to land his expedition.

in time to affect the decision on the overture. By Grenville's first answer Bonaparte had seen how largely Pitt depended upon the royalists overthrowing the Republic, and with the intent of inclining Pitt and his Cabinet favourably to his offer of negotiation Bonaparte wishes to give them a telling proof, in the crisis of their decision, that their hope is a vain one, and that he is in fact, as in name, undisputed master of an undivided France.

For the real wishes of Bonaparte as to peace, these instructions are positive and contemporary evidence, and there is nothing in reality to shake the conclusion which we must draw from it. The passage quoted from the note to Lucien Bonaparte might indeed under some circumstances seem not to harmonize with such a view: "Were war not necessary for me," writes Bonaparte here. But necessity may have a double origin. A thing may be necessary because it is indispensable; it may also be necessary because it is unavoidable; which of these meanings attaches to Bonaparte's words here, depends entirely upon the date of the note. If it was written before Grenville's answers, when the question of peace or war was still an open one, we must interpret, *indispensable*, if after, *unavoidable*. The note is undated. The editors of Napoleon's Correspondence have placed it between documents of the 28th of December—before even Grenville's first reply—but this arrangement is quite arbitrary. There is neither internal nor external evidence as to its exact date; where such evidence existed in the case of undated letters, the editors, we have seen, attached supposed dates even at the risk of error.<sup>77</sup> The note must belong to the time after Lucien Bonaparte's appointment as Minister of the Interior on the 25th of December, 1799, and evidently it has been placed where it is now found, only because it must have been written within a reasonable interval after that date. This does not however fix its *exact*

date, which may just as well have been in the end of the following January. As to Bonaparte's sincerity in desiring peace, nothing is proven by the note either for or against. It has indeed been cited as evidence that Bonaparte desired war at this time;<sup>78</sup> but with equal justice and with greater probability one may maintain the reverse—that Bonaparte wishes to represent the war as an unwelcome, unavoidable necessity. We must remember to whom his words are addressed. If Lucien Bonaparte was the Consul's brother, he was also a prominent statesman of France; under the Directory he had been President of the Five Hundred, and he was now a Minister of State. In a semi-official note to this dignitary, are we to find an unblushing and *unnecessary* confession that the greatest need of France is to be sacrificed to the personal ambition of her ruler?

Bonaparte's third utterance on this question—in the note to Talleyrand—is as easy of explanation as that just considered. Apparently it slights the importance of the negotiations at London and Vienna, but closer examination will weaken and even reverse this impression. The utterance occurs in one of three similar notes written by Bonaparte in succession to the same person and treating in turn of the relations of France with Holland, with Hamburg, and with Portugal.<sup>79</sup> Each of the notes is concerned with monies to be exacted of these foreign communities in order to relieve the financial difficulties of France, and in each there is an estimate, similar to this in the case of Holland, of the effect the amounts thus obtained will have in the approaching crisis. Four or six millions extorted from Hamburg by threatening her with Prussian occupation might be worth a successful campaign. Were Portugal to purchase peace for eight or nine millions, the

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<sup>78</sup> Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 588, Note.

<sup>79</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4519, 4520, and 4521, all written to Talleyrand on the 13 January, 1800. By the concluding words of the last (4521) all were written on the evening of the 13 January.

indemnity would increase French chances in Italy thirty in the hundred and would almost ensure the reconquest of that country. If Holland will pay a considerable sum for the evacuation of Flushing, the negotiation with her would be as important as that with Great Britain or Austria. These notes were written under the influence of Grenville's first reply. At the time Bonaparte was facing the probability of war not only with Great Britain but—should the latter's influence prevail at Vienna and St. Petersburg—with Austria and Russia as well, and his resources for the contest were so meagre that in these very days the French Treasury could only with difficulty raise 600,000 francs for Moreau's needy army upon the Rhine.<sup>80</sup> Exactions, which under other circumstances might appear insignificant, when viewed in the light of these facts gain all the weight that Bonaparte claims for them. The arrangement with Holland—the most important of the three—he considers of equal importance with the negotiations for peace. *A negotiation which shall secure him the sinews of war, he holds as of equal importance with a negotiation which may relieve him of its necessity.* This is no more than a truism.

My argument is finished. I shall only refer to a point which in itself decides nothing, but, if placed in its proper connection, strongly corroborates the view I maintain. Grenville's answer to Bonaparte's second overture reached Calais the 21st of January. On the 25th Bonaparte ordered the formation of the 'Army of the Reserve' which was to invade Italy. This measure was a turning-point in Bonaparte's policy for the year, for with him it marked the opening of the campaign. The order, which was intended to be a close secret, might have been issued at any moment; given as it was, directly on the arrival of Great Britain's final refusal to negotiate, its connection with the latter seems evident, and likewise the conclusion to be drawn from it.

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<sup>80</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4522, 14 Jan., 1800.

## CHAPTER II.

THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT AT A NAVAL ARMISTICE AND  
GENERAL NEGOTIATION, AUGUST TO OCTOBER, 1800.

Bonaparte himself has given us a brief but graphic description of the position of France when he landed at Fréjus in October, 1799.<sup>81</sup> The outlook was gloomy, but Bonaparte overcame the chief difficulties of the situation—not, however, as some conceive, by slavish dependence upon good fortune for success; his triumph was due to the patience and energy<sup>82</sup> which made his progress not a succession of leaps and bounds guided by chance to a happy issue, but the quick and elastic, yet measured and massive tread of one conscious of a purpose and sure of attaining it. His success was not uniform. On land he obtained results surprising to others and perhaps to himself, but at sea his failure was absolute. France was without an adequate fleet and without the means to create one; and while the war lasted, she was denied the admission to the open seas, which alone could have tested the efficiency of a fleet, when once created, or have afforded proper training. Bonaparte was alive to the situation<sup>83</sup> and struggled against it with spirit but without success. In the commercial marine of his rival he detected a principal source of her strength; hence at this time no quarter of the globe, from India to the Arctic,

§1. The progress of the war till Marengo.

<sup>81</sup> Bonaparte to Desaix, 14 May, 1800, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4786: "A mon arrivée en France, j'ai trouvé la République perdue, la Vendée aux portes de Paris; l'escadre, au lieu d'être à Toulon, était à Brest, et déjà désarmée; Brest même menacé par les Anglais. Il a fallu détruire la Vendée, trouver de l'argent, réarmer l'escadre."

<sup>82</sup> Bonaparte to Gaudin, Minister of Finance, 28 March, 1800, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4698.

<sup>83</sup> Bonaparte to Forfait, Minister of Marine, 24 July, 1800, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5020: "Le peuple français veut une marine, il la veut fortement; il fera tous les sacrifices nécessaires pour que sa volonté soit remplie." Also 5021, 5022, and 5023, *ibidem*, 24 July, 1800.

was free of his tiny expeditions to harass British commerce as much as his limited resources would allow.<sup>84</sup> Chance might bestow some success upon these efforts, but Bonaparte was unable to alter the naval situation in general or to effect his particular object in the Mediterranean. His plan to break the blockade of Brest in order that the French and Spanish fleets there imprisoned might escape and carry aid to Malta and Egypt was spoilt by the refusal of Spain to co-operate,<sup>85</sup> and his later attempts to relieve Malta by systematic blockade-running,<sup>86</sup> though incessant, were vain. The supplies of the garrison diminished steadily, and in Egypt the hopes which sprang from the French victory at Heliopolis in March, 1800, disappeared with the assassination of Kleber in the following June. The officer next in rank, General Menou, was unfit for supreme command, and the French position, which Kleber himself had despaired of maintaining, became more than hopeless under his incapable successor.

But Bonaparte could find consolation at home for these disappointments abroad. By the end of February General Brune had subdued or scattered the royalist insurgents in western France. It had been in conjunction with these and with Russian troops wintering in Jersey that Pitt had hoped to invade France, but at the same time with Brune's success over the insurgents Russia withdrew her support. Angered beyond measure at the insult which an Austrian officer had offered the Russian flag at Ancona the Tsar definitely recalled his troops from Germany in January, 1800, and when Great Britain continued to seek an alliance with Austria, he withdrew his forces from England also. Thus abandoned, Great

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<sup>84</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4429, 19 Dec., 1799; *ibidem*, 4495, 4 Jan., 1800; 4538, 18 Jan., 1800; and 4670, 14 March, 1800.

<sup>85</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4612, and 4613, 22 Feb., 1800; *ibidem*, 4618, 24 Feb., 1800; 4625, 28 Feb., 1800; 4636, 4 March, 1800; 4647, 7 March, 1800; 4675, 17 March, 1800; and 4688, 4689, 4691, and 4692, 20 March, 1800.

<sup>86</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4637, 4 March, 1800; *ibidem*, 4700, 28 March, 1800; 4775 and 4776, 11 May, 1800; 4928, 19 June, 1800; 5034, 28 July, 1800; and 508 4, 5 Sept., 1800.

Britain and Austria drew closer to each other. Their combined resources apart from Russia were still superior to those of France, but Bonaparte could set against his disparity in point of strength the advantage of his fiery energy over the sluggishness of his opponents. Great Britain's belated efforts to co-operate with Austria on the continent earned only ridicule even at home,<sup>87</sup> and Bonaparte, after a short and decisive campaign, reconquered Italy at Marengo on the 14th of June.

As recently as in the previous January Great Britain had refused to consider peace, but this decision was taken in the confidence, justified by events, that Austria would likewise evade negotiation. If Austria, voluntarily or as a result of disasters such as Marengo, resorted to negotiation with France, Great Britain desired to join in it, for only by negotiation in common with Austria could she affect the fate of the Netherlands,<sup>88</sup> which was her chief concern on the continent. Hence she offered Austria a considerable subsidy in return for a pledge from the Emperor to enter into no peace apart from Great Britain. It chanced that the negotiation of this arrangement by the British Ambassador at Vienna, Lord Minto, culminated in a *projet* which was sanctioned by the Emperor and despatched to London for approval on the 19th of June.<sup>89</sup> On the morrow the news of Marengo arrived at Vienna, and

§2. The Austro-British alliance. Opening of negotiations with France at Vienna. Bonaparte proposes a naval truce in London.

<sup>87</sup> Letter from Cornwallis to Ross, 17 Sept., 1800, *Corr. of Lord Cornwallis*, III, 291: "Would to God we had peace on almost any terms, for it is evident we cannot make war." Also letter from Cornwallis to Ross, 6 Nov., 1800, *ibidem*, III, 300: "What a disgraceful and what an expensive campaign have we made. 22,000 men, a large proportion not soldiers, floating around the greater part of Europe, the scorn and laughing-stock of friends and foes." Cornwallis, although (as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland) connected with Pitt's Administration, was much dissatisfied with most of its members.

<sup>88</sup> As they had been in the possession of the Emperor at the opening of the war and were now in the occupation of France, the disposition of them would be regulated in a separate negotiation between Austria and France without regard to the interests of Great Britain, and in a later separate negotiation between Great Britain and France the question would have no status.

<sup>89</sup> Letter from Thugut to Colloredo, 19 June, 1800 *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts* (edited by Vivenot), II, 227.

on the same day Thugut and Minto converted the *projet* of the 19th into the definitive treaty of alliance of the 20th of June.<sup>90</sup> In London the first report of Marengo arrived on the 24th of June,<sup>91</sup> and Grenville who was then in ignorance of the occurrences of the 19th and 20th at Vienna, feared that Austria would separate her interests from Great Britain and enter into a separate negotiation with France.<sup>92</sup> But the *projet* of the 19th of June arrived in London on the 4th of July<sup>93</sup> and was followed by the definitive treaty of the 20th. The latter was ratified at once, and under its terms Grenville directed Minto to urge the prosecution of the war if feasible, or, in the contrary case, to claim admission for Great Britain to any negotiation opened between Austria and France.<sup>94</sup>

An Austro-French negotiation was then already on foot. The armistice of Alexandria, in which Austria recognized her defeat at Marengo, had been signed by Bonaparte with a view to an immediate Austrian peace; and Thugut, though averse to negotiation, for the moment was unable to refuse it. When Bonaparte offered Austria a general armistice in the theatrical letter<sup>95</sup> which he wrote to the Emperor professedly from the field of Marengo, the Emperor accepted the offer but insisted that the negotiation to follow should respect his obligations to Great Britain, and be conducted with a view to a general

<sup>90</sup> I cannot demonstrate a connection between the arrival of the news of Marengo and the signature of the treaty, although it seems that such must have existed.

<sup>91</sup> Letters from Lord Grenville and Thomas Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, of 24 June, 1800, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III*, III, 83 and 85.

<sup>92</sup> Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 27 June, 1800, London, P.R.O., *Austria*, vol. 59.

<sup>93</sup> Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 4 July, 1800, London, P.R.O., *Austria*, vol. 59.

<sup>94</sup> Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 17 July, 1800, (No. 1 of this date), London, P.R.O., *Austria*, vol. 59.

<sup>95</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI., 4914, 16 June, 1800. It appears that, although dated at Marengo, for the sake of effect, it was written some days later at Milan.



peace. Count St Julien, the Austrian officer who had carried Bonaparte's letter to Vienna, was entrusted with this reply,<sup>96</sup> and, although his mission was merely to deliver it and to receive the French answer, Bonaparte and Talleyrand induced him to sign preliminaries of a separate peace with Austria. The violation of her pledge to Great Britain, which Austria was thus invited to commit, Bonaparte attempted to palliate by an assurance, which the Emperor was empowered to use at London, that France would negotiate peace with Great Britain after making peace with Austria.<sup>97</sup> But the letter containing this assurance was never delivered. Its bearer, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp Duroc, who accompanied St. Julien from Paris, was stopped at the Austrian headquarters, while St. Julien, on proceeding to Vienna, was disgraced and his work disowned. Thugut replied to Talleyrand<sup>98</sup> insisting afresh on a general peace and transmitting an offer from Minto on behalf of Great Britain<sup>99</sup> to co-operate in a general negotiation.

Duroc received this answer at the Austrian headquarters on the 15th of August and carried it forthwith to Paris. On the 24th, Transport-commissioner Otto in London offered Lord Grenville a general negotiation in return for a naval truce, corresponding to the land-armistice in Germany.<sup>100</sup> On the same day, without awaiting the answer to this overture, without so much as hinting, in the note to Vienna, that the

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<sup>96</sup> The Emperor to Bonaparte, 5 July, 1800, *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, II, 239.

<sup>97</sup> Bonaparte to the Emperor, 29 July, 1800, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5038.

<sup>98</sup> Note from Thugut to Talleyrand, 11 Aug., 1800, *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, II, 257. Also in *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 35, col. 584, Appendix A.

<sup>99</sup> Note from Minto to Thugut, 9 Aug., 1800, *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, II, 477. Also in *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 35, col. 585, Appendix B.

<sup>100</sup> Letter and note from Otto to Grenville, both of 24 Aug., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, nos. 1 and 2. Throughout this chapter the citation "Papers of this Negotiation" refers to the papers submitted to Parliament, 13 Nov., 1800, *Parl. Hist.*, vol. 35, cols. 540 *et seq.* They number consecutively from 1 to 47.

overture had been made, Bonaparte denounced the Austrian truce.<sup>101</sup>

§ 3. Bonaparte's object in a naval truce : to save Malta. The three stages in the negotiation for the truce.

Bonaparte's object in a naval truce was to save Malta. This point has been recognized in a general way, but not with clearness; historians have seen in the proposal an effort to better the French position in Malta and Egypt, but it has escaped notice that on Malta's fall Bonaparte suddenly lost all interest in a naval truce with Great Britain and abandoned the negotiation of it when the terms of such a truce were at the point of being successfully arranged.<sup>102</sup> The failure of the negotiation is usually ascribed to a difference concerning Egypt. Nevertheless Egypt was of minor importance to Bonaparte in comparison with Malta. Great Britain could eventually expel the French from both, but—the point has been mentioned in the previous chapter—on the expulsion of

<sup>101</sup> Note from Talleyrand to Thugut, 24 Aug., 1800, *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, II, 260. Without mentioning the French overture in London Talleyrand states that the Emperor, by requiring the admission of Great Britain to the negotiation without first requiring her to concede an armistice with France, had made the re-opening of hostilities inevitable; and the note concludes as follows: "Que d'événements vont donc naître encore; combien de nouvelles victimes immolées à l'Angleterre; si les nations du continent ne posent les armes que lorsqu'il pourrait convenir à l'Angleterre, la génération actuelle y péra. Ce n'est pas certes ce que le peuple français avait droit d'attendre, et lorsqu'il mettait une foi entière dans les déclarations qui lui étaient faites des dispositions pacifiques de sa Majesté Impériale, il ne prévoyait pas qu'elles étaient encore dépendantes des volontés de la Cour de Londres."

<sup>102</sup> Bignon, *Histoire de France*, pp. 63 *et seq.*, gives Malta no real place in the negotiation; see on page 63: "La vérité était que le premier consul comptait pouvoir envoyer avec ce nombre de frégates plus de trois mille hommes [i.e., to Egypt.] Cet envoi était le seul grand intérêt que la France avait réellement dans l'armistice navale." Lefebvre, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe, 1800-1815*, I, 76, gives as the motive of Bonaparte in asking a naval truce: "Un seul, mais tout puissant, l'espoir de sauver Malta, qui, faute de vivres, était sur le point de succomber, et l'Égypte . . ." But he ascribes (p. 78) the failure of the negotiation solely to points of difference regarding Egypt, not mentioning the fall of Malta in connection with the rupture. Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 628-629, states that the purpose of the naval truce was to provision Malta and to send reinforcements to Egypt, but that Bonaparte's end was by no means attained if Malta were provisioned merely according to consumption.

France from Egypt, the Sultan, its legitimate owner, would claim and receive it of his British ally, while Malta, which was practically ownerless, would in like case become a British possession. Bonaparte could prevent this by a naval truce in its simplest form. The garrison of Malta was near starvation, and if left to itself must soon surrender, but under a naval truce it would be furnished regularly with supplies throughout the negotiation, and at the conclusion of peace France would evacuate the fortress for a compensation without giving place to Great Britain. The latter, after besieging Malta for two years, would sacrifice her reward for this exertion on the very eve of success.

The history of the negotiation on Bonaparte's proposition of a naval truce falls into three stages: the *first*, from the opening on the 24th of August to the 5th of September, in which period Great Britain apparently did not take the proposition seriously, but expected to obtain a general negotiation without making the sacrifice required by France; the *second*, from the 5th to the 26th of September, a period of serious negotiation, in which the British Cabinet, now convinced that Bonaparte would abide by his terms, accepted the naval truce in principle and attempted to arrange its details; the *third*, from the 6th to the 9th of October, when Bonaparte, who had heard in the interval of the fall of Malta, promptly broke off the negotiation.

Otto, in his note opening the negotiation on the 24th of August, requested an explanation of Minto's overture at Vienna. Grenville was not in a position to give it. He had authorized Minto to make the overture in the despatch of the 17th of July, but these instructions had been of a most general character—Minto should cast his influence in favour of war; if, however, Austria determined upon negotiation with France, he should seek admission to it. Of the subsequent events in Germany, including the steps taken by Minto at Vienna, Grenville was as yet ignorant, and in these circumstances, after waiting two

§ 4. The first stage of the negotiation, August 24th to September 5th. Great Britain evades the proposed truce. France adheres to her proposal. Great Britain yields.

days apparently in the hope of receiving a despatch from Minto, he requested Otto through Captain George to send to the Foreign Office under seal the papers to which his note of the 24th referred.<sup>103</sup> Grenville worded his message thus loosely in order to conceal its meaning from George, but Otto, manifestly begrudging information to diplomatic opponents, availed himself of the indefinite wording to send his *powers* which had also been mentioned in his original note of the 24th. While George was on this errand to Otto, despatches arrived from Vienna with copies of Minto's and Thugut's notes of the 9th and 11th of August,<sup>104</sup> and George, who was now entrusted with the secret of his errand, interviewed Otto forthwith,<sup>105</sup> and accepted responsibility for Minto's overture at Vienna. The proposition of a naval truce, however, he opposed on a variety of grounds detailed in a letter of instructions which he had received from Grenville<sup>106</sup>—such a truce would be premature and without precedent, while in its application it would entail endless disputes which would hinder, not facilitate, negotiation. In reply Otto ignored rather than answered these objections, simply stating that, since his instructions required an answer by the 3rd of September, he anticipated a re-opening of hostilities on the continent about that time, if Great Britain rejected his proposition. But this insinuated threat failed of its intended purpose. Grenville underestimated the weakness of Austria at this crisis; he believed that France also had an interest in the continental armistice and that she

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<sup>103</sup> Letter from Grenville to George, 26 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 3. It appears that Captain George was the Transport-commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. As such he would be in continual communication with Otto and could be used by Grenville without attracting public notice to the negotiation on foot.

<sup>104</sup> Letter from Grenville to George, 28 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 5; also no. 4 (Otto's full powers.)

<sup>105</sup> Letter from George to Grenville, 29 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 7.

<sup>106</sup> Minute of Instructions from Grenville to George, 28 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 6.

would continue it without regard to a naval truce, so long as her advantage in the arrangement counterbalanced its inconvenience.<sup>107</sup> Hence Grenville, on receiving George's report of the interview together with a hint from Otto for a written answer respecting a naval truce, for reply merely copied<sup>108</sup> the passage bearing on the point in his instructions to George. It was a virtual refusal, though it closed with an inquiry how the French Government, which professed to assimilate the naval to the continental truce, conceived that the principles of the German armistice regarding blockaded towns could be applied to the naval ports and arsenals of France.

Otto sent the answer to his Government on the 29th of August<sup>109</sup> and ordinarily a lull must have followed in the negotiation. But if Malta was to be saved, it was necessary to act quickly; without awaiting a reply from Paris, Otto offered Grenville<sup>110</sup> a *projet* of a naval truce on the 30th, at the same time repeating his suggestion that hostilities might re-open on the continent by the 3rd of September, unless Great Britain yielded in the interval. Grenville had closed his note on the 29th with a question which the *projet* might be expected to answer, but in reality he had intended the note and question as a refusal.<sup>111</sup> Instead then of accepting the proffered *projet*, Grenville directed George on the 2nd of September<sup>112</sup> to inform Otto that Thomas Grenville<sup>113</sup> had been appointed British plenipotentiary in the negotiation opening at Luné-

<sup>107</sup> Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 30 August, 1800, London, P. R. O., *Austria*, vol. 59.

<sup>108</sup> Letter from Grenville to George, and note from Grenville to Otto, both of 29 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, nos. 8 and 10.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from Otto to Grenville, 30 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 11.

<sup>110</sup> Note from Otto to Grenville, 30 August, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 12.

<sup>111</sup> Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 30 August, 1800, cited above.

<sup>112</sup> Letter from Grenville to George, 2 September, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 13.

<sup>113</sup> Thomas Grenville was a brother of Lord Grenville.

ville and that he awaited the French passport necessary to start upon the journey thither. But George was absent from London at the time, and the message in consequence reached Otto only on the 5th of September. He returned the significant answer that the passport would be forthcoming when the result of the London negotiation rendered Mr. Grenville's journey necessary.<sup>114</sup>

In the meantime the negotiation had entered upon a new stage. The reply of the French Government to Grenville's note of the 29th of August was in Otto's hands by the 4th of September, and on the same day he transmitted it to the Foreign Office.<sup>115</sup> Though courteous in form, it was clearly an ultimatum. It charged the rejection of the St. Julien preliminaries at Vienna to Minto's intervention, and stated that for this reason, unless Great Britain conceded a naval truce, hostilities with Austria would re-commence on the 11th of September, and that the First Consul would then no longer consent, with regard to that power, to any but a complete and separate peace. Grenville altered his attitude at once; he now asked for the *projet*,<sup>116</sup> which Otto had offered on the 30th of August. The claims advanced in it<sup>117</sup> were absurdly excessive. Grenville, nevertheless, in a provisional answer on the 5th of September, promised a final reply on the 7th, and suggested meanwhile that Otto should warn his Government by courier that Great Britain entertained the discussion of the truce only with a view to facilitate peace, and that consequently the renewal of hostilities on the continent would

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<sup>114</sup> Letter from Otto to George, 5 September, 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 21.

<sup>115</sup> Note from Otto to Grenville, 4 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 15.

<sup>116</sup> Letter from Grenville to Evan Nepean, 4 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 16.

<sup>117</sup> Translation of a *projet* in M. Otto's, 4 Sept. 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 18.

remove all inducement on her part to accept the French proposals.<sup>118</sup>

Up to this point Great Britain had evaded the question of a naval truce: here, for the first time, she faced the proposition seriously. Grenville's reply of the 5th was an implied assent to the proposal, and on the 7th he definitely committed Great Britain to a naval truce in some form, by submitting a counter *projet*<sup>119</sup> to Otto's *projet* of the 4th of September. The *projet* and counter *projet* are in sharp contradiction to each other. In order to judge intelligently between them one must recall the principle underlying all armistices, which forbids a combatant to secure, by the terms of the truce, such advantages as at the time of signature he neither possessed nor could reasonably hope to secure. The principle cannot be applied with the same exactness at sea as on land, for the sea cannot, like territory, pass into the undisputed occupation of either belligerent. Still, at this time Great Britain dominated the sea. She held Brest and Malta and the ports of Egypt under close blockade; to maintain the relative position of herself and France as belligerents she must require these blockades to continue unbroken, while the interest of France, on the contrary, was to evade as far as possible this correct principle in the truce. In this direction Otto's *projet* went to an extreme. It removed every conceivable restriction upon the conveyance of reinforcements and stores to Egypt and Malta; it claimed the liberty to change the stations of the French fleets at will; and it sought to extend the benefits of the truce to the French allies without suggesting a like favour for those of Great Britain. Under this arrangement Bonaparte could transfer the French and Spanish fleets from Brest to Toulon; thus, in a sense, he

§5. The second stage of the negotiation, Sept. 5th—Sept. 26th. Efforts to arrange the terms of a naval truce.

<sup>118</sup> Note from Grenville to Otto, 5 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 19.

<sup>119</sup> Counter *projet* in Lord Grenville's, 7 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 25.

would undo the work of Nelson at Aboukir and re-open the entire question of the control of the Mediterranean. Bonaparte's purpose in such claims can only have been to secure a margin in his demands, within which he would recede much or little, according as resistance to them in London was great or small. Grenville rejected them bodily. His counter *projet* forbade all movement of French vessels of war during the armistice, and restricted the importation of stores at Malta and Alexandria<sup>120</sup> to the single item of provisions, according to the amount actually consumed by the garrisons. Otto was unable to accept this offer; he referred it to his Government.<sup>121</sup>

It chanced that the decision on this question was taken at Paris at the same time with a kindred decision on the Austrian truce. This truce had been denounced at the Austrian headquarters on the 29th of August and expired on the 10th of September.<sup>122</sup> But at this crisis the Emperor left his capital to take command of his army in person, and at his request Moreau, professedly on his own responsibility—he claimed to be under orders to renew the contest on the 10th, unless the Emperor ratified the preliminaries signed by St. Julien—suspended hostilities during a fresh reference of the matter to Paris.<sup>123</sup> The reply from Paris was a demand that the Emperor, in return for an extension of the truce, should surrender his fortresses within the French lines in Germany, Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt. On the 20th of

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<sup>120</sup> The offer to admit provisions at Egyptian ports was made merely to place them logically in the same category with Malta. It conferred no real advantage on the French at these ports, where supplies could be easily drawn from the interior of Egypt.

<sup>121</sup> Letter from Otto to Grenville, 8 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 26.

<sup>122</sup> Despatch from Minto to Grenville, 2 Sept., 1800. London, P. R. O., *Austria*, vol. 60.

<sup>123</sup> Despatch from Minto to Grenville, 12 Sept., 1800. London, P. R. O., *Austria*, vol. 60.



September he submitted to these terms in the convention of Hohenlinden. Meanwhile Otto was instructed to offer Grenville a choice between separate negotiation with a naval truce on Grenville's terms *or* a general negotiation with a naval truce according to the French *projet*. Since the peculiar advantages involved in the latter had been claimed by France as a compensation for the extension of the continental truce, this offer is manifestly out of harmony with the demand enforced from the Emperor. In fact Bonaparte knew that at this moment the fate of Malta hung in the balance;<sup>124</sup> and fearing that it had actually fallen, in which case a naval truce would be of little value to him, he sacrificed consistency in order to secure in these German fortresses a tangible compensation for the very object still put forward in London as ground for claiming a naval truce.

Otto submitted this offer to Grenville on the 16th of September,<sup>125</sup> at the same time requesting an opportunity to explain it in person. Explanation it certainly needed, for the choice which it professed to give between a general and separate negotiation was an empty one. Great Britain had conceded a naval truce, even on her own terms, with the sole object of obtaining a general negotiation, and her pledge to the Emperor to negotiate only in common with him had been public since July. Hence Grenville answered on the 20th,<sup>126</sup> with some vexation, that since the French Government knew that Great Britain would not separate her interests from Austria, the proposed alternative amounted to nothing more than the renewal of a demand already rejected; while with regard to any explanations which Otto might desire to offer, he might submit them in writing, if he were authorized to make new proposals consistent with the terms of the British

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<sup>124</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4775, 11 May, 1800.

<sup>125</sup> Letter and note from Otto to Grenville, both of 16 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, nos. 27 and 28.

<sup>126</sup> Letter and note from Grenville to Otto, both of 20 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, nos. 29 and 30.

counter *projet*, and if they then appeared to form sufficient ground for discussion, a proper person would be appointed to meet him. Otto submitted a fresh *projet* on the 21st.<sup>127</sup> In it he advanced a new claim, that British troops should not be landed in Italy during the armistice; but in other respects he made large concessions. The unhindered navigation claimed in his first *projet* for all vessels of war was restricted in this to frigates, corvettes, and other smaller craft, the movement of double and triple-decked ships of the line being wholly forbidden; and the importation of reinforcements and stores, which also had been unrestrained in the first *projet*, was here confined, in the case of Malta, to provisions at the rate of ten thousand rations per day,<sup>128</sup> in that of Egypt, to six frigates, which should be allowed to sail to Alexandria from Toulon and return thither without inspection at any part of the voyage. Wide as these terms were of Grenville's counter *projet*, they were such an approach to it that he at once appointed his under-secretary, Hammond, to interview Otto on the points of difference still open between the Governments.

It is a question to what extent Grenville's bluntness at this point of the negotiation was due to Talleyrand's tirade against England in his note to Thugut of the 24th of August. This note had been communicated to London in the interval, and the circumstances which it revealed regarding the denunciation of the Austrian truce were an occasion of controversy between Otto and Grenville, carried on independently of the negotiation proper.<sup>129</sup> In the latter Great Britain made

<sup>127</sup> *Projet* in M. Otto's, 21 Sept., 1800. *Papers of this Negotiation*, No. 32.

<sup>128</sup> Doubtless with a view, if possible, to anticipate the capitulation of Malta, the *projet* required also that the British officer who bore the news of these arrangements to the Mediterranean should pass by the direct route through France to Toulon, instead of by Gibraltar.

<sup>129</sup> Besides the note from Grenville to Otto, 20 Sept., cited above, see letter and note from Otto to Grenville, 21 and 23 Sept. [1 Vendémiaire IX = 23 Sept.], and the latter's reply, 25 Sept., *Papers of this Negotiation*, nos. 30, 31, 33, and 38.

no concession beyond her previous offer. Grenville's instructions to Hammond<sup>130</sup> for the interview with Otto discuss at length the points at issue, but in the end simply insist on the terms of the counter *projet*. Some of these differences, distinctly of minor importance, had been a source of friction throughout the negotiation, but in themselves were no real barrier to its success. Amongst them was the question of the rights of the allies on either side to take part in the truce. France wished to include her own arbitrarily, while Great Britain, disinclined to a like attack on the independence of hers, contended for voluntary accession of both. The real differences between the Governments related to Malta and Egypt, and to the degree of liberty to be allowed France in sending reinforcements and stores to these points and to her isolated colonies beyond sea. Otto still claimed the privilege of provisioning Malta at the rate of ten thousand rations per day, an amount much in excess of the actual consumption, which Great Britain insisted should be the basis of the arrangement. The garrison numbered some three thousand men; hence, even allowing for a certain number of non-combatants who, it was asserted, were also present, ten thousand rations per day would supply immediate needs and permit a rapid storing of provisions throughout the armistice. The Egyptian question was equally difficult. Bonaparte desired a safe-conduct for six frigates sailing to Alexandria. Besides reinforcements, these would carry to Egypt a capable successor to Kleber, whose death had become known at Paris in the beginning of September.<sup>131</sup> The negotiations on this point were complicated by Great Britain's relations with Turkey. In the previous winter Great Britain had innocently prevented the fulfilment of the Convention of El Arish, under which Kleber was to have evacuated Egypt, and the Sultan's dis-

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<sup>130</sup> Letter from Grenville to Hammond, 24 Sept., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 36.

<sup>131</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5086, 6 Sept., 1800.

satisfaction at this, which Bonaparte sought to increase,<sup>132</sup> would have been kindled afresh, had Great Britain now forced the Turkish fleet off the coast of Egypt to admit French reinforcements at Alexandria. In this circumstance alone there was abundant reason for rejecting a demand which was manifestly without justification under the principle of the truce.<sup>133</sup>

The interview between Hammond and Otto occurred on the morning of the 25th.<sup>134</sup> In the course of it Hammond warned Otto that Great Britain would not unduly prolong the armistice even on her own terms, if the general negotiation failed of speedy results. While Hammond thus emphasized the resolute attitude of his Government, Otto showed a marked tendency to further concessions. The point as to Malta Otto practically yielded, after a curious attempt to justify the ten thousand rations by a novel law of gastronomy which proportioned the human appetite to the military rank of its possessor.<sup>135</sup> In the discussion of the other principal issues, Otto maintained his position with some vigour, but when brought to the test by Hammond, ventured only an *opinion* that his Government would not yield, even in the question of the six frigates for Egypt, to which the rupture of the negotiation is usually ascribed. None of these questions—not even that of Malta—was definitely settled at the interview. Otto reserved

<sup>132</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI., 4964, 4 July, 1800.

<sup>133</sup> See Grenville's caustic criticism in his Instructions to Hammond, Letter of 24 Sept. cited above, which Hammond communicated to Otto: "It is natural to ask by what article of the German armistice Ulm or Ingolstadt are to receive in covered waggons as many troops, as much provisions, and as great a quantity of every species of arms, ammunitions, and stores, as might be conveyed to Egypt in six French frigates." France professed to assimilate Alexandria to Ulm and Ingolstadt.

<sup>134</sup> Letter from Hammond to Grenville, 25 Sept., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 39.

<sup>135</sup> Hammond, in letter to Grenville, 25 Sept., just cited: "Otto . . . briefly remarked that the quantity of rations was not to be exactly apportioned to the precise returns of the garrison, but that a certain number of rations in proportion to their respective ranks was to be allowed to the General and Staff Officers."

them for consideration, and in a *résumé* submitted on the 26th<sup>136</sup> he proposed that Malta be supplied at the rate of ten thousand rations per day only for the first month, during which interval commissioners of the two Governments could fix the matter definitely. This offer was within measurable distance of the arrangements desired by Great Britain, but the concession did not affect her attitude on the remaining points of difference. Otto requested a counter *résumé* of Hammond,<sup>137</sup> but the latter in reply merely expressed the regret of his Government that their requirements could not be met, and suggested that the difficulty be referred to Paris.<sup>138</sup>

Otto acted upon this suggestion and, from the trend of the negotiation at this stage, it appears certain that, if the situation at Paris had remained unchanged, Bonaparte would have conceded the points still remote from settlement in order to save Malta. But Malta had capitulated on the 5th of September, and in the interval the news of its fall had reached Paris.<sup>139</sup>

In an interview with Hammond on the 7th of October, Otto reported the answer of his Government: that the relative position of France and Great Britain had been so essentially altered since the last conversation by the events in Germany and the fall of Malta, that further discussion of a maritime truce was useless.<sup>140</sup> In a letter of the 8th, written at Hammond's request,<sup>141</sup> Otto transmitted a formal statement that "the last exchange of notes, and several important events,

§6. The third stage of the negotiation, Oct 6th-Oct. 9th. Bonaparte's withdrawal from the negotiation on the fall of Malta.

<sup>136</sup> Note from Otto, in Otto's letter of 26 Sept., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 41.

<sup>137</sup> Letter from Otto to Hammond, 26 Sept., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 40.

<sup>138</sup> Note from Hammond to Otto, 26 Sept., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 42.

<sup>139</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5120, 30 Sept., 1800.

<sup>140</sup> Letter from Hammond to Grenville, 7 Oct., 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 611.

<sup>141</sup> Letter from Hammond to Otto, 8 Oct., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 45.

on which the professed armistice was to have been established had put an end to the negotiation on foot; but notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of a naval truce, the First Consul was invariably disposed to receive overtures for a separate negotiation between Great Britain and France."<sup>142</sup>

With Malta fallen Bonaparte's interest in a naval truce had disappeared. His offer of separate negotiation Great Britain could not accept at the time; while Austria was true to her alliance at the risk of disaster, Great Britain dared not be false to it in the midst of comparative ease.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Letter from Otto to Hammond, 8 Oct., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 46.

<sup>143</sup> Letter from Hammond to Otto, 9 Oct., 1800, *Papers of this Negotiation*, no. 47.

## CHAPTER III.

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE FROM OCTOBER, 1800, TO THE  
DEATH OF EMPEROR PAUL OF RUSSIA, MARCH, 1801.

If the exact bearing of the situation in Malta upon the naval truce is overlooked, Bonaparte's policy with respect to the latter becomes a mystery. First to offer Great Britain a general negotiation and an extension of the Austrian armistice in return for a naval truce; at the same time to pursue an exactly opposite policy in Vienna; finally to break off the negotiation of the naval truce in London at the moment that its success seemed assured—such a series of acts Grenville might, with every appearance of justice, term the reverse of peaceful.<sup>144</sup> The key to the enigma is the situation in the Mediterranean. It was in the interest of France to negotiate separately with Great Britain and Austria, but in order to save Malta Bonaparte offered to deal with these powers in a general negotiation. When Malta fell, he simply reverted to the old policy of separate negotiations.

In doing this Bonaparte had to reckon with resistance, for Great Britain and Austria, by the alliance of the 20th of June, were bound to insist on a general peace. In the case of Great Britain Bonaparte's means of effecting his purpose was in Portugal. Portugal was a British ally, and her harbours were the only breach in the wall of exclusion raised against

§ 1. The position of France in October, 1801. Austria and the Battle of Hohenlinden.

<sup>144</sup> Debate in the Lords on the Earl of Darnley's motion for a Committee on the State of the Nation, 20 March, 1801, *Parl. Hist.* vol. 35, Grenville (col. 1194): "His lordship [*i.e.*, Grenville] next vindicated the language of his correspondence with the French government from the charge of asperity, and contended that Bonaparte never showed a desire for peace, except on grounds on which he knew it could not be accepted. Thus when he knew that we were engaged by treaty with the Emperor, he proposed a separate peace; afterwards he proposed a naval armistice, as the preliminary; and when he found we were likely to agree to it, he broke off the negotiation."

British commerce on the coasts of western Europe. Great Britain in turn had guaranteed the integrity of Portuguese territory, and Bonaparte, seizing the opportunity to reach Great Britain through her ally, in September, 1800, ordered Spain to invade Portugal.<sup>145</sup> But only in the following spring after repeated urging did Spain actually take the field against her neighbour.<sup>146</sup> Austria, on the contrary, was exposed to direct and immediate pressure from France. Moreau's army was massed along the borders of the Emperor's hereditary states, and Bonaparte was determined to effect his purpose if necessary by a winter campaign. In the face of this danger Austria nerved herself for a final effort, but on the 3rd of December her defeat at Hohenlinden destroyed the last elements of resistance in the Imperial states. The Emperor had no choice but submission to France.

§ 2. Bonaparte's secret overture of peace in London, December, 1801. Grenville's reply.

Bonaparte was now in much the same position as he had been after the peace of Campo Formio. He had overcome all opposition upon the continent and was in effect dictator of central and western Europe. But, as in 1797, so now he was unable to strike a direct blow at Great Britain. Against her his position had become even weaker. In the interval since 1797 Great Britain had recovered from her financial embarrassments, she had subdued the Irish revolt, and, as a direct result of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, she had reasserted<sup>147</sup> her supremacy in the Mediterranean. Hence Bonaparte, whatever might be his immediate success on the continent, whatever his naval plans for the future, was forced for the moment to seek peace of Great Britain; the news of Hohenlinden had in fact scarcely arrived in Paris, when he again suggested negotiation at London. The overture was made confidentially through

<sup>145</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5120, 30 Sept., 1800.

<sup>146</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5165, 8 Nov., 1800, and 5258, 7 Jan., 1800; *ibidem*, VII, 5562, 13 May, 1800. Also Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 688-689.

<sup>147</sup> Great Britain, on withdrawing from Corsica in 1796, also withdrew her fleets from all points in the Mediterranean east of Gibraltar.



Perregaux and Auckland, and its contents are not before us, but a bare outline of it may be reconstructed from Grenville's reply. It criticized the action of the British Government in interfering with the Austro-French negotiation and in laying the papers of the recent unsuccessful negotiation in London before Parliament—both measures, according to the overture, being of a character to block pacification—and it broached the question of peace so definitely that Grenville in answering asked for the terms which France was prepared to offer.

Grenville's reply is in the form of a letter to Auckland of the 26th of December.<sup>148</sup> At that time the disaster of Hohenlinden was known in England, but not in its details. A fuller account was first received on the 29th of December ; <sup>149</sup> and the subsequent disasters, with the resolution taken by Austria on the 22nd to open a separate negotiation with France, were reported in London only in January.<sup>150</sup> Hence Grenville, in his reply of the 26th, adhered to the basis of the Austro-British alliance, although the latter was then in fact dissolved. In answer to the criticism of British policy Grenville explained that the publication of the papers relating to the recent negotiation, of which France complained, was unavoidable under British constitutional usage ; the papers of every *unsuccessful* negotiation of peace must be laid before Parliament. Grenville further deprecated the suspicion entertained of Great Britain's efforts to promote a joint negotiation ; at the same time, however, he owned to a like feeling on the part of his own Government that the policy of France had aimed at the complete

<sup>148</sup> Letter from Grenville to Auckland, 26 Dec., 1800, Appendix B, I, p. 76 *infra*.

<sup>149</sup> Minto's despatch to Grenville, 7 Dec., 1800, received at London on the 22 Dec., reports the defeat but no particulars ; the despatch, from Minto to Grenville, 16 Dec., 1800, with an opinion on the consequences of the defeat, was received in London on the 29 Dec., London, P.R.O., *Austria*, vol. 61.

<sup>150</sup> Despatch from Minto to Grenville, 22 Dec., 1800, London, P.R.O., *Austria*, vol. 61.

isolation of Great Britain from continental Europe.<sup>151</sup> As the best means of overcoming this mutual suspicion, Grenville suggested that France should lay her terms of peace before Great Britain in a confidential communication, authentic but not official, since the failure of such steps, if official, placed a British Government under the necessity of laying the correspondence before Parliament. If the Government at Paris felt sufficient confidence in the London Cabinet to take the step suggested, Great Britain, Grenville declared, would welcome it, and if the terms offered were consistent with her engagements to her allies and with her own naval interests, she would discuss the matter at Vienna and bring it to a point where a general congress, if convened at all, would be a mere formality.

Auckland embodied this answer in a letter to Perregaux, which the latter laid before the French Government. Bonaparte took no notice of it.<sup>152</sup> A sufficient explanation of this might perhaps be found in the circumstance that Grenville in his reply had again suggested a general peace—a proposal which was without hope of acceptance at Paris; but there was an additional and weightier reason for Bonaparte's silence.

<sup>151</sup> This feeling was not an idle suspicion. See the interesting passage in Bonaparte's Bulletin of the Army, 18 June 1800, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 4927: "La Belgique fera partie du territoire du grand peuple. La Batavie et l'Espagne réunies d'intérêts et de passions, redoubleront d'efforts contre les tyrans des mers, et l'Anglais, exilé six mois de l'année sur son île, devra attendre que l'Elbe soit débarrassé de ses glaces pour avoir des nouvelles du continent. L'Angleterre deviendra, par son arrogance, sa vénalité, sa corruption, l'opprobre et le mépris du Français, comme de l'Autrichien et du Russe." Also Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor of Russia, 27 Feb., 1801, *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5417: "Si Votre Majesté tient la main à ce que les Anglais ne fassent aucun commerce avec les puissances du nord, si le corps de M. de Sprengporten se porte dans le Hanovre pour ne mettre aucune espèce de doute à la fermeture de l'Elbe et du Weser, un corps d'observation que j'ai envoyé à Bordeaux forçant le Portugal à fermer ses ports à l'Angleterre, et ceux de Naples et de la Sicile leur étant également fermés, les Anglais n'auront aucune communication avec l'Europe."

<sup>152</sup> Letters from Auckland to Grenville, 5 Jan., and 3 Feb., 1801; from Perregaux to Auckland, 16 Jan., 1801. Appendix B, II, III, IV, pp. 76-78 *infra*.

§ 3. Great Britain threatened by Russia and the Armed Neutrality. Bonaparte reverses his policy toward Great Britain.

When he received the reply he no longer desired peace with Great Britain. Bonaparte, we have seen, had sought a temporary peace with Great Britain in order to reopen the contest when once he felt able to cope with her at sea, but at this moment a movement in the states of northern and eastern Europe suddenly threatened Britain's maritime supremacy. In the previous winter the Tsar Paul had abandoned his alliance with both Austria and Great Britain in disgust and anger: subsequently when Great Britain refused to give up Malta,<sup>153</sup> which Paul claimed as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John,<sup>154</sup> he determined finally to take action against her. Encouraged by Bonaparte,<sup>155</sup> he created the Armed Neutrality of the North, a league composed of Russia, Prussia and the Scandinavian powers, with the object of compelling Great Britain to relax the rights of blockade and of search, then exercised by her in a very extreme form to the great annoyance of neutrals. As Great Britain was determined to continue her practice in these matters, war with the Armed Neutrality

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<sup>153</sup> *i.e.*, after the French garrison in Malta capitulated to Great Britain in September, 1800.

<sup>154</sup> Paul's election to the office was illegal and the Order itself was in fact defunct, but Great Britain, when still in alliance with Paul, had shown a disposition to recognize his claim. Naturally she ceased to do so, after he had given up his alliance with her and manifested an inclination to become her enemy. Bonaparte on the contrary, when his own hold upon Malta was on the very verge of extinction, by a clever stroke of policy, offered to surrender the fortress to Paul, as Grand Master of the Order. On this offer see the note from Talleyrand to Panin, 26 Aug., 1800, Tratschevski, *Russia and France*, I, 3, (Paper No. 2.)

<sup>155</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5208, 7 Dec., 1800, a note to be sent to allied and friendly powers: . . . "le Gouvernement français, ayant principalement à coeur de s'opposer à l'envahissement des mers et de concourir avec les autres puissances neutres à faire respecter leurs pavillons, et appréciant le zèle vraiment patriotique de l'Empereur de Russie pour la cause commune de toutes les puissances continentales, ne traitera de la paix avec l'Angleterre qu'autant que ces principes sacrés seraient reconnus, et que les pavillons russe, danois, suédois, américain, prussien, seraient respectés sur mer, comme les armes de ces puissances le sont sur le continent, et qu'il serait reconnu par l'Angleterre que le mer appartient à toutes les nations."

was inevitable. Paul drew near to Bonaparte,<sup>156</sup> and the latter was pleased beyond measure at an alliance which brought the Scandinavian and Russian navies into line against Great Britain, and thus opened a prospect to him of attacking her at once with some chance of success.<sup>157</sup> On the faith of this change in the maritime situation Bonaparte dropped the negotiation opened through Perregaux in December and suddenly flung himself into a naval campaign of far-reaching extent.<sup>158</sup> While Great Britain was engaged with her new enemies in the Baltic, Bonaparte hoped to reassert himself in the Mediterranean, whither his fleet at this time escaped from Brest.<sup>159</sup> He proposed a descent upon Ireland, and he planned an attack on the British colonies in the Indies and on the Portuguese in Brazil. In short he felt already able to open the contest with Great Britain which previously he had intended to begin only after years of preparation.

While France thus reversed her policy, that of Great Britain had of late been steadily moving towards peace. At the close of the negotiation of a naval truce in October, it seemed unlikely that Austria could long resist Bonaparte, and Pitt, who anticipated the early submission of his ally, was disposed to open a separate negotiation with France, as soon as the latter

§ 4. Pitt's attitude towards peace. His resignation, February, 1801. Addington's overtures at Paris. Bonaparte's evasive answer.

<sup>156</sup> Letter from Emperor Paul to Bonaparte, 18-30 Dec., 1800, Tratschevski, *Russia and France*, I, 27, (Paper No. 11.)

<sup>157</sup> Letter from Bonaparte to his brother Joseph, French plenipotentiary at Lunéville, 21 Jan., 1801, *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5315: "Hier est arrivé de Russie un courrier . . . ; il m'a apporté une lettre extrêmement amicale de la propre main de l'Empereur . . . La Russie est dans des dispositions très-hostiles contre l'Angleterre. Il vous est facile de sentir l'intérêt que nous avons à ne rien brusquer, car la paix avec l'Empereur [*i.e.*, German] n'est rien en comparaison d'une alliance qui maîtrisera l'Angleterre et nous conservera l'Égypte."

<sup>158</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VI, 5327, 27 Jan., 1801.

<sup>159</sup> The fleet escaped on the 23rd of January through a violent storm which drove the British blockaders temporarily from the coast. See the letter from Thomas Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, 5 Feb., 1801, Buckingham, *Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III*, III, 146; also *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5336, 4 Feb., 1801.

forced Austria into a separate peace.<sup>160</sup> The chief hindrance to a settlement, Pitt felt, was the presence of the French in Egypt.<sup>161</sup> Another obstacle to peace was the disagreement as to its desirability among the members of his own Cabinet.<sup>162</sup> But when Austria signed her separate peace with France at Lunéville on the 9th of February, 1801, the second of these difficulties was solved, and the other was well on its way to solution. In the interval the Abercromby expedition, which finally expelled the French from Egypt in the following summer, had been organized and was in the Levant; and the obstacle to peace within Pitt's Cabinet had disappeared. In the beginning of February Pitt had resigned on the question of the Catholic tests, and his friend and successor, Addington,

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<sup>160</sup> Letter from Pitt to Addington, 8 Oct., 1800, *Life and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth*, I, 263: "The negotiation for an armistice is at an end . . . . An opening is left which will remove all difficulty or awkwardness in setting on foot a negotiation, if Austria makes a separate peace, which I rather expect. And I am inclined to think in that event, if we are firm, and our domestic difficulties do not increase, we may secure creditable and adequate terms. But as long as Austria does not withdraw and submit to a separate peace and France refuses joint negotiation, we cannot yield to that pretension by making it our act to separate ourselves from our ally."

<sup>161</sup> Letter of Pitt to Addington, 29 Sept., 1800, *Life and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth*, I, 262.

<sup>162</sup> See the statement on this point submitted by Dundas to Pitt, 22 Sept., 1800, Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, II, 367: "Some of us think that the only solid hope of peace lies in the restoration of the Bourbons. Some, without going so far, think that there should be no peace with a Revolutionary Government, and that the present Government of France is such. Some are for negotiating with the present Government of France, but only in conjunction with the Emperor of Germany. Some are for negotiating on our own foundation singly, with a just sense of our dignity and honour, and of the conquests we have made outside of Europe" . . . . Dundas after observing that these differences are not theoretical, but practical, presenting themselves in every discussion either on the prosecution of the war or the prospect of peace, concludes the statement thus: "It is earnestly hoped that Mr. Pitt will take these observations into his most serious consideration before it is too late." Lord Stanhope adds the opinion: "From this statement it certainly appears that Pitt might find it requisite to make some changes in the Cabinet, before he could hope to renew the negotiation with effect." The question has occurred to me whether this opposition of an influential section of the Cabinet to Pitt's views of peace may not have been a subsidiary factor in his resignation in February, 1801.

who accepted office by Pitt's advice<sup>163</sup> and with a pledge of the latter's personal support,<sup>164</sup> immediately re-opened negotiations with France. It is difficult to regard this step as other than the direct continuation of the policy of Pitt, since the latter assisted by advice in the course of the negotiations and towards the end even conducted them himself.<sup>165</sup> Pitt resigned in the beginning of February, but the illness of King George delayed his actual departure from office till the 14th of March; on the 21st Lord Hawkesbury, Grenville's successor at the Foreign Office, made an official overture of peace to Otto.<sup>166</sup> Before taking this step Hawkesbury had sounded the Government at Paris as to whether negotiations would be acceptable at the moment.<sup>167</sup> The answer of course was favourable, but in reality negotiation at the time was not in the interests of France, and at Paris there was no intention of entering into the matter seriously. France, in consequence of her recent victories and of the newly-won friendship of the Tsar, was now in a position of exceptional strength on the continent and was even making headway against Great Britain. She had dictated terms of peace to Austria at Lunéville. In Italy her armies had occupied the Kingdom of Naples and closed its ports to Great Britain.<sup>168</sup> A similar movement was on foot against Portugal,<sup>169</sup> and Sardinia on seeking peace was required, as a preliminary of negotiation, to open her ports to French, and to close them to British vessels.<sup>170</sup> Prussia finally, yielding to Russian pressure, was on the point of occupying

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<sup>163</sup> *Diaries and Corr.* of George Rose, I, 291.

<sup>164</sup> Malmesbury, *Diaries and Corr.*, IV, 75 (20 Oct., 1802).

<sup>165</sup> Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, III, 27.

<sup>166</sup> Notes from Hawkesbury to Otto, 20 and 21 March, 1801, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 622.

<sup>167</sup> Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 684.

<sup>168</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5413, 25 Feb., 1801; *ibid.*, 5430, 2 March, 1801.

<sup>169</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5417, 27 Feb., 1801; *ibid.*, 5562, 13 May, 1801; Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 688-689.

<sup>170</sup> *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5468, 18 March, 1801.

Hanover<sup>171</sup> and excluding Great Britain from Hamburg, Bremen and the entire North German coast. Great Britain's isolation was complete, and even at sea her prospects for the moment were not of the best. Parker and Nelson with a powerful fleet were on their way to the Baltic to attack the Northern powers, but this fleet would be operating in enemies' waters without a base of supplies, and a reverse, if it did not destroy, would seriously impair Britain's commanding position at sea. Hence Bonaparte, just as Pitt in a similar position had rejected negotiation in January, 1800, now felt it to be in the interest of France to continue a struggle which offered prospects of speedy success. Still the French Government did not reject negotiation outright; in response to Hawkesbury's official overture of the 21st of March, it requested passports for a French courier who should bear its reply to London<sup>172</sup> By this means Bonaparte could inform Otto of his real attitude towards negotiation without revealing it to Great Britain;<sup>173</sup> moreover a delay of six days was gained, the answer to the overture being presented to Hawkesbury only after this double communication between Paris and London, on the 2nd of April.<sup>174</sup> In presenting it Otto desired a pledge of secrecy on the negotiation, which Hawkesbury gave without difficulty.<sup>175</sup> The negotiation at London, if it became

<sup>171</sup> Note from Bonaparte to the Emperor of Russia, 27 Feb., 1801, *Corr. Nap.*, VII, 5417; Bailieu, *Preussen und Frankreich*, II, 34, Note 2.

<sup>172</sup> Notes from Otto to Hawkesbury and from Hawkesbury to Otto, 27 March, 1801, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 622.

<sup>173</sup> At this period governments tampered systematically with diplomatic correspondence forwarded by the ordinary mails. See *e.g.*, Bonaparte's directions to his aide-de-camp, Duroc, *Corr. Nap.* VII, 5545, 24 April, 1801: "Vous écrirez par tous les courriers, soit de Berlin, soit de Pétersbourg, comme si vos lettres devaient être lues par l'Empereur et tous ses ministres, et par le roi de Prusse et tous ses ministres."

<sup>174</sup> Note from Otto to Hawkesbury, 2 April, 1800, Appendix C *infra*.

<sup>175</sup> Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, V, 684. The secret was in fact already known, *e.g.*, to the Prussian Minister at Paris, Lucchesini, who however was an adept at discovering what other people did not wish him to know; see Bericht Lucchesinis, 2 April, 1801, Bailieu, *Preussen und Frankreich*, II, 36. In London Lord Malmesbury had heard of the negotiation, prior however to Hawkesbury's pledge; see Malmesbury, *Diaries, &c.*, IV, 50, (23 March, 1801).

known to the Northern powers, would be sufficient to break up the Armed Neutrality, since the latter looked to France for support. Bonaparte may have suspected that Great Britain had timed her overture with a view to this end; at least his reply, though formally courteous, is supercilious throughout, and at points it is even sarcastic. He desired to know, in view of the British expedition to the Baltic and of the attack meditated by the continental powers on Hanover and Portugal, what advantage could be derived from an *ostentatious* negotiation begun in the face of fresh causes of exasperation, with no understanding as to the principles on which the negotiation should be based. He disapproved of opening a negotiation without a maritime truce, or, if the obstacles to the latter were greater than those opposed to peace itself, without at least some general basis of the proposed peace. In short without bluntly rejecting conciliation he does not welcome it, and the tenour of the note is an ill-concealed determination not to thwart the struggle in the Baltic and upon the continent by a premature negotiation.

§ 5. The death of the Tsar and the dissolution of the Armed Neutrality. The significance of Paul's death in the career of Bonaparte.

But meanwhile the Neutrality, on which Bonaparte built such large hopes, had run its course. On the 2nd of April Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, and even this battle was fought by Denmark for a cause already lost. On the night of the 23rd-24th March the Tsar Paul had been murdered at St. Petersburg, and with him disappeared the League of which he had been the essential support. The report of Paul's death reached Paris on the 12th of April.<sup>176</sup> Talleyrand carried it to Bonaparte. The latter, it is said, when he heard it, for the first and only time in his life so far lost his self-possession that he gave utterance to a sharp and involuntary cry of despair.<sup>177</sup> The occasion was worthy of it, for this moment marks the close of the most brilliant

<sup>176</sup> Bericht Lucchesinis, 17 April, 1801, Bailleu, *Preussen und Frankreich*, II, 38.

<sup>177</sup> Bignon, *Histoire de France*, p. 114.



and hopeful stage of his career. In his contest with Great Britain Bonaparte needed the support of Europe, in particular that of Russia; and at no time did he have it so thoroughly as in the days of the Armed Neutrality. In this period Holland, Spain, and Italy were in effect vassal states of France; Austria was crushed into absolute submission; Prussia, caught between Russia and France, could not resist their united will; Paul himself had voluntarily sought an alliance with Bonaparte and carried the Northern powers with him in an effort to challenge Great Britain's position at sea. This situation, which Bonaparte had built up by skilful manipulation of the whims of the Tsar, ceased with Paul's death, never to recur in its entirety. Bonaparte was forced to enter into a temporary naval peace, and when this was broken by Great Britain in 1803, France, with the support of her immediate neighbours, resumed the contest only to learn at Trafalgar that these efforts at sea were hopeless. With the death of Paul the possibility—it was little more—of crushing Great Britain by a direct attack had passed away.

It may appear strange that this sketch of the circumstances leading to the Peace of Amiens should end at the point where the stage of successful negotiation first begins. There is some justification for it. At this moment Great Britain and France were nearer conciliation than they were at the signature of the Preliminaries of London (October, 1801) or at the definitive Peace of Amiens (March, 1802). This peace contained the seeds of its own rupture; in the negotiation of it, Bonaparte had taken advantage of Addington's weakness to press him into terms of which the nation in the end did not approve.

The conduct of the negotiation by Addington and Hawkesbury may be termed, without injustice to them, a record of incapacity. Point after point they yielded to France without exacting equivalent concessions from her. Only in September, when Pitt took a continuous interest in the negotiation, did this process cease, and Otto, recognizing at once a firmer

§ 6. Conclusion: the Peace of Amiens.

tone in his opponents, hastily came to terms. The Preliminaries thus concluded converted a drawn fight into a British defeat. Of her numerous, almost numberless, conquests in the Mediterranean, in the Indies, and in America, Great Britain retained only Trinidad and Ceylon. The remainder, including the strategic positions of the Cape, Minorca, and Malta she surrendered, although in the case of Malta it was necessary first to *create* an owner to whose keeping it might be committed. Pitt was not satisfied with these Preliminaries, but he supported them, and he also supported the subsequent peace, although in the interval between them Bonaparte's aggressive policy in the newly-created Italian republics had taught Pitt that his experiment at conciliation was a failure, and that the peace, in spite of the sacrifices made by Great Britain to obtain it, could not be lasting.

The nation first reached this conviction later. The peace of Amiens, in spite of its defects, was received in Great Britain with a blind enthusiasm. So great was the rejoicing in London that, on the arrival of Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, Lauriston, with the ratification of the treaty, the populace removed the horses from his carriage and drew him in triumph through the streets of the metropolis. In connection with these rejoicings Lord Minto has recorded an incident at once amusing and significant.<sup>178</sup> Among the illuminations and mottoes with which Otto decorated his residence in honour of the restoration of peace, there occurred the word "concorde," which the mob in its ignorance mistook for "conquered." They made Otto alter it. "It was too near the truth," Minto adds, in relating the incident, "to be told by him." And looking only to the previous stage of the contest with France, as Minto of necessity did, his comment, though bitter, is just; but the incident, if viewed in the light of subsequent events, gains a higher significance. *The mob carried its point.* Even so the

<sup>178</sup> In a letter to his wife, 23 April, 1802, Minto, *Life and Letters &c.*, 111, 247.

nation, of which they were but sorry representatives, when once conscious of its real position shrank from no sacrifice in order to better it. When Bonaparte's aggressive policy and commercial exclusiveness convinced Great Britain that the Peace of Amiens was but the stepping-stone to a wider conflict, she refused even to fulfil her pledges in that treaty, and preferring to choose her own time rather than to abide his, she at once re-opened a burdensome contest, for which she was still, and he not yet, prepared. The wisdom of the choice was vindicated at Trafalgar, at Leipsic, and at Waterloo.

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APPENDIX A.—*Great Britain and the French Royalists.*

Extracts from the Reports in the records of the Foreign Office, London, on the strength of the Royalist Insurgents in France in January and February, 1800, and on the assistance rendered them by the British Government from August, 1799, to February, 1800.—London P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612.

I.—Report of M. de la Chaussée, Commissioner of the King (Louis XVIII.) on the Royalist forces in the west of France on the 20th of January, 1800. Received at London, 2 Feb., 1800.

Forces available :

		Infantry.	Cavalry.
Divisions of	d' Autichamp . . . . .	....	....
	Chatillon . . . . .	8,000	150
	Georges . . . . .	16,000	200
	La Prevalaye . . . . .	3,000	100
	Bourmont . . . . .	8,000	300
	Frotté . . . . .	4,000	....
	Mercier . . . . .	2,500	....
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		41,500	750

II.—Woodford to John Frere, Vauxhall, 7 Feb., 1800.

The Royalist forces (Woodford is reporting only from recollection of his conversation with d' Autichamp on the 1st of February) are distributed as follows :

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	
d' Autichamp . . . . .	18,000	600	
Georges . . . . .	24,000	150	
Chatillon . . . . .	12,000	....	
Bourmont . . . . .	9,000	450	
Frotté . . . . .	3,000	....	
La Prevalaye . . . . .	3,000	....	
Mercier . . . . .	1,800	....	
		<hr/>	
		70,800	1,200

To help equip these forces Great Britain has sent 48,000 stand of arms, of which however 20,000 are not yet landed.

Of the money appropriated for the Royalists by Great Britain there is:

£10,000	at St. Marcou.
10,000	at Jersey.
26,000	at Portsmouth.
70,000	( <i>circa</i> ) at Plymouth and Falmouth.

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£116,000

£60,000 had been sent to Georges, £6,000 to Frotté, and about £4,000, or at most £5,000 to others.

III.—Report of M. de la Chaussée to the King (Louis XVIII.) on the Royalist forces in the west of France, 15 February, 1800. Received at Foreign Office, London, 18 Feb., 1800.

Forces available: 56,500 infantry, 1,450 cavalry, and 110 artillery.

Received from England between August, 1799, and February, 1800:

Money . . . . .	£75,000
Muskets . . . . .	21,000 ( <i>circa</i> )
Powder . . . . .	60,000 (? lbs.) in barrels and cartridges.
Carbines . . . . .	1,800
Pistols . . . . .	500 pair.

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APPENDIX B.—*Correspondence relating to Bonaparte's secret overture to Britain in December, 1800.*

I.—Letter from Grenville to Auckland, 26 Dec., 1800, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 612. (Draft.)

Private.

CLEVELAND ROW, Dec. 26th, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,—I am much obliged to you for your communication. We agree in regretting that the real views of this government are so little understood at Paris, where they do not seem to be aware that the publication of the late papers (of which I understand they principally complain) was unavoidable under our constitution unless there had been a nearer prospect of peace.

It was a great error, if it was really believed there, that the effect of our intervention in the Austrian negotiation would have been to retard its conclusion, on any reasonable terms. We judged on the other hand that the object they had in view was to separate England entirely from the continent: and it cannot be wondered at that our opposition to this should be steady and determined.

It often happens that war is thus prolonged by mutual distrust, long after the parties are both sincerely desirous of peace. The best way to avoid this in the present instance would be by direct and confidential communication. If through some channel sufficiently authentic to be relied on (but not such as to commit the two governments by official steps, which, if unsuccessful, we are always obliged to make public) we could be apprized of the ideas entertained at Paris, as to the terms of peace, it would enable us to judge whether negotiation can at this moment be successfully pursued. And if those ideas, so stated to us, were not inconsistent with our good faith to our allies, nor with our naval interests, to which the continental aggrandizement of France obliges us to look with increased attention, we should be ready (could sufficient confidence be placed in us for the purpose) to discuss these ideas at Vienna, and to endeavour to bring the whole to such a point that the nomination of ministers to a congress, whether it afterward took place or not, would be a mere formality.

I think we are not unreasonable in desiring to receive this confidential overture, instead of our beginning to make it; because we could not take such a step without committing ourselves, both with the country here and with our allies—while no such difficulty exists at Paris. And I am very certain that, although this may not be the only road to peace, it is the surest and the most expeditious.

G.

RIGHT HON. LORD AUCKLAND.

II.—Letter from Auckland to Grenville, 5th January, 1801, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 614. (Original.)

Private.

PALACE YARD, January 5th, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,— . . . Second—Mr. Nettement (a friend of Perre-gaux's) came to me on Saturday. He did not appear to have any suspicion of

the contents of Perregaux's letter to me ; but he told me that Perregaux had frequent and friendly access to Bonaparte, and is one of the Senators, and in that capacity is sure to receive his letters unopened. I did not hesitate therefore to write fully . . . In answer to the paragraph from Perregaux, after a very few words of general introduction, I transcribed, but without allusion to your name, the whole of your letter. Upon the whole, if his intimation had any meaning, I am sure that we have taken the best mode to bring that meaning forward ; and at all events no possible inconvenience can ensue . . .

AD.

III.—Letter from Auckland to Grenville, 3rd February, 1801, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 614. (Original.)

Private.

PALACE YARD, February 3rd, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,—I have received from Mr. Perregaux a letter of the 16th January in reply to mine of the 2nd. Mr. Perregaux writes as follows : (*here follow extracts from No. IV. infra.—H. M. B.*)

You will recollect that the Austrian catastrophe was not known here till three or four days after my letter to Perregaux and that in my private communication I had dwelt strongly on its being the decided and evident line of the King's Ministers to maintain the strictest and most scrupulous honour toward Austria, and to have her entire concurrence so long as the alliance might last.

It is likely enough that the overwhelming of Austria may have induced Bonaparte to suspend all attempts towards a separate pacification with us. But I infer from Mr. Perregaux's reply, that his first letter certainly was an overture the result of which he was expected to report and has reported to Bonaparte. It further appears that he considers the subject as open to farther communication though in that case he would decline being the bearer in person.

To this I should add that Mr. Nettement (the friend of Mr. Perregaux) on Sunday left a note at my house to say, "Qu'il a l'honneur de prévenir Lord Auckland que son départ pour Paris aura lieu au commencement de la semaine prochaine, et qu'il prendra ses ordres."

Under these circumstances your Lordship, in your better judgment, and with the knowledge of collateral points unknown to me, will decide whether any further notice should be taken . . .

AUCKLAND.

On reading the above I think it best to annex the original notes from Perregaux and Nettement.

IV.—Letter from Perregaux to Auckland, 16th January, 1801 (enclosed in letter from Auckland to Grenville, 3rd February) London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 614. (Original.)

The 16th January, 1801.

MY LORD,—Your kind letter of the 2nd of this month reached me the 10th

I took an opportunity to mention your letter and lay its contents where it could be appreciated; I have had no tidings of my communication since.

My occupation and situation bind me here, though my health and head call for diversion, and howsoever useful and agreeable a trip would be to *me*, *I* (*a*) must renounce to it.

J. F. PERREGAUX.

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(a) The italicised words 'me' and 'I' are underlined in the originals, but it appears likely that the underlining was done by Auckland, not by Perregaux.

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APPENDIX C.—*The reply of the French Government to Hawkesbury's overture in March, 1801.*

Note from Otto, delivered at the Foreign Office, 2nd April, 1801, London, P. R. O., *France*, vol. 622. (Original.)

Le soussigné a communiqué à son Gouvernement la note de Son Excellence Mylord Hawkesbury du 21 Mars.

Le Premier Consul persiste dans son amour constant pour la paix et le soussigné est spécialement chargé de faire connoître la vive satisfaction, que le Premier Consul a éprouvée en voyant que le Cabinet Britannique se montrait disposé à mettre un terme au fléau qui désole l'Europe depuis huit années entières.

La campagne commence ; les flottes de Sa Majesté Britannique paroissent prêtes à porter la guerre au sein de la Baltique. Les puissances continentales sont en disposition d'attaquer le Portugal et le Hanovre.

Comment au milieu de tous ces apprêts de guerre et de ces nouveaux motifs d'exaspération espérer quelque heureux résultat d'une négociation d'apparat, commencée sans être d'accord sur les premières bases ?

Ne seroit-il plus naturel de faire précéder toute négociation par une suspension d'hostilités en convenant des articles d'une trêve générale, ou si les obstacles à une suspension d'armes maritime paroissent plus difficiles à lever que ceux qui s'opposent au rétablissement même de la paix, ne seroit-il pas au moins convenable de s'entendre préalablement sur les bases de celle-ci ?

Le soussigné a les Pleinpouvoirs et les instructions nécessaires pour donner à Mylord Hawkesbury les explications ultérieures que Son Excellence pourra désirer.

Le Premier Consul regardera comme le plus beau jour celui, où le commerce de l'Europe pourra jouir sans inquiétude de la prospérité, résultat infaillible de la paix des mers.

Hereford Street, 12 germinal an 9,  
2 avril 1801.

OTTO.



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO  
STUDIES

Economic Series

Editor : Professor James Mavor

NO. I. PUBLIC DEBTS IN CANADA

BY J. ROY PERRY

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, 1898 : PUBLISHED BY  
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1

# PUBLIC DEBTS IN CANADA:

BY J. ROY PERRY, B.A.,

RAMSAY SCHOLAR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF  
TORONTO, 1896.

WITH A PREFACE BY

JAMES MAVOR,

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY  
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.



PRINTERS AND BOOKBINDERS.

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## PREFACE.

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The Ramsay Scholarship in Political Science for 1896 was awarded to Messrs. J. R. Perry and F. B. Proctor, whose papers were regarded as equal. The following essay by Mr. Perry is an expansion of the paper submitted in this competition. A former series of studies in Political Science, instituted in 1889, comprised four essays, and is continued by the present publication.

No connected account of Public Finance in Canada had as yet appeared; and it seemed advisable to embrace the opportunity afforded by the Ramsay Scholarship to induce graduates of the University to work in this field. The two papers in question not only serve to indicate the sources of information, but offer a fairly compact mass of detail for the use of the economic student. The special feature of Mr. Perry's paper is the view he gives of the investment by the various administrative authorities of public money in public works. The absence, except in the case of the North-west rebellion in 1885, of military expenditure, and the absence of any costly permanent military establishment have enabled Canada, since Confederation in 1867, to devote the resources of the country to the further development of these resources. The very considerable debt of the country is therefore more than offset by tangible assets in the form of roads, bridges, canals, railways and public buildings. It is true that in some cases due economy has not been observed in the expenditure of public money, and that the political pressure of localities has sometimes been exercised in inducing the government to undertake unprofitable enterprises: but this is not true of the bulk of the expenditure, which is really

represented by works that are directly or indirectly remunerative. If these studies on public debts are read in connection with the account of the tariff by Mr. (now Professor) Maclean, no. 4 of the former series, and with other forthcoming studies on related topics, a fairly accurate view of the finances of the Dominion will be obtained. The considerations which emerge from these studies are important rather in their historical or practical than in their theoretical aspects. Yet illustrations may be found of the effects in a highly democratic government of a more or less deliberate employment of the machinery of the state in promoting enterprises involving a large expenditure of capital for a remote or even problematical return. It is a question, which it would not be proper to discuss with the data as yet at our disposal, whether or not the habit of appealing for governmental aid has checked independent enterprise or has made the subsequent development of such enterprise possible by, as it were, clearing the ground for it. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Canadian policy of development is the extent to which the government has grappled with the problem of communications. The immense length of Canada in proportion to its effective width and the sporadic character of the settlement of the country, especially in the prairie regions, presented entirely novel problems in communications. Private enterprise could hardly be expected to be adequate to the task, excepting under conditions which might have resulted in the practical abandonment of the country to the capitalists who might engage in so hazardous a series of adventures. What has been done has been to unite the forces of the state with those of private corporations; and if the terms have sometimes appeared too onerous so far as the state is concerned, it is hard to avoid the conclusion, that time is after all the chief consideration, and that development speedier than would otherwise have taken place may not, after all, have been too dearly purchased.

The success of the system plainly depends upon a nice balance of local and central power on the one hand, and a similarly nice balance of governmental encouragement and reserve control on the other.

The diminution in the rate of interest upon public securities is an immense advantage to new countries whose borrowing capacities are necessarily large. So long as the capital borrowed by Canada from Europe is wisely expended upon productive enterprises or upon the preliminary necessities for these, and so long as the interest of the debt can be easily met, there does not seem much likelihood of the adoption of any drastic system of redemption of debt. Yet the period of great railway and other enterprises is probably for the present over. The expenses which ensued upon Confederation have been largely already incurred. The transcontinental railway has been built, the Dominion and Provincial public buildings have been erected, and although the demands upon the government for expenditure do not cease, yet it is unlikely that the ensuing thirty years will witness an expenditure on capital account of sums equal to those which have been expended since 1867.

JAMES MAVOR.

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PART I.

FEDERAL DEBT.



# PUBLIC DEBTS IN CANADA.

## PART I.

### FEDERAL DEBT.

THE history of the public debt of the Dominion of Canada begins with the confederation of the provinces on July 1st, 1867. Before that date, it is true, each of the three provinces, Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, had accumulated a burden of debt, which in the case of the first named reached the considerable sum of over \$73,000,000. By the terms of the British North America Act, however, the Dominion assumed these debts, with the exception of some \$10,500,000 of the indebtedness of the province of Canada. It is, therefore, not incorrect to say that in 1867 the Dominion commenced, and the provinces recommenced, their financial as well as political history.

*The principle of debt allowance.*—The public debts of the several provinces had, with some slight exceptions, been incurred for public improvements, intended to develop the resources of the country, to attract immigrants, and to provide cheaper means of conveying farm products to the markets.<sup>1</sup> In the year 1866 the amount of debt per head of population was \$26.82 in the province of Canada, in New Brunswick \$22.62, and in Nova Scotia \$14.68.<sup>2</sup> In order to make an equitable arrangement, the incidence of debt *per capita* was taken as the basis of adjustment. Each province was to be entitled to throw upon the federal government a debt equal to \$25 00 per head of its population, and should the debt of any province exceed this amount, it was to pay interest on the excess to the federal treasury. On the other hand, should the debt be less than \$25.00 per head, the province was to receive interest from the federal treasury on the difference between its actual debt and the amount which it was entitled to charge against the federal government.<sup>3</sup> By this plan Ontario and Quebec were

<sup>1</sup> Speech of Hon. A. T. Galt. "Confederation Debates," page 65.

<sup>2</sup> Speech of Hon. D'A. McGee. Ibid, page 140.

<sup>3</sup> Speech of Hon. George Brown. Ibid, page 93.

enabled to enter the union with a joint allowed debt of \$62,500,000. The debt of the province of Canada assumed by the Dominion was to be reduced to this amount by leaving debts of a local character, such as the Municipal Loan Fund, to the provincial legislatures. It was further provided by the Quebec Resolutions that Ontario and Quebec, in assuming the excess of debt of the old province of Canada, became entitled to withdraw from the general assets all those items of a local character for which a portion of the debt had been incurred.<sup>1</sup>

*Objections.*—That this financial scheme of union met with considerable opposition, can be seen by reference to the confederation debates. The Hon. Mr. Seymour, of Ontario, did not think the allotment of debt allowance according to population a fair method. "If," he said, "New Brunswick, with an annual revenue of one million dollars, be allowed to put a debt of \$7,000,000 upon the confederation, then, upon the same rule, Canada should enter the confederation with all her debt and more. The estimated revenue of Canada is \$11,000,000. Any one can figure it out and see that Canada should have no debt left for local governments to pay."<sup>2</sup> The Hon. Mr. Dorion, a leader of the members from Lower Canada, criticized the scheme as unjust to his province. "In 1841," he stated, "Lower Canada entered the union with a debt of £133,000. Since 1841 there has been spent in Lower Canada, for the Beauharnois canal, the enlargement of the Lachine canal, the works on Lac St. Pierre, and the Chambly canal, about \$4,000,000, about \$8,000,000 for railways, and \$1,000,000 more for other works. This \$13,000,000 worth of public works is all that there is to show for the increase of debt from £133,000 at the time of union, to \$27,500,000, which is the Lower Canada proportion of the \$62,500,000 of public debt Canada now brings into the union."<sup>3</sup> A third objection was that no definite division between Ontario and Quebec was made of the excess of the debt of the province of Canada. An amendment was proposed by the Hon. Letellier de St. Just to the effect that "the address to Her Majesty to unite the colonies be postponed, until the government shall have made known to this House in what manner it intends to divide between Upper and Lower Canada the balance of debt, and what will be the items assigned to each province."

<sup>1</sup> A. T. Galt. Confederation Debates, page 66.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, page 199.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, page 260.



The amendment was, however, defeated on a division, by 38 to 20.<sup>1</sup> The delegates from the maritime provinces to the Quebec conference had made the building of the Intercolonial railway an imperative condition of union. The engagement to build this road was another cause of opposition. One of the members spoke prophetic words when he said of the enterprise, "The road will be a drag. I say, honourable gentlemen, that we are opening an account without knowing when it will be closed. By engaging in the construction of the Intercolonial, and by the assumption of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia lines we are entering on indefinite liabilities, the whole being a non-paying property in which we shall find a heavy bill of expense."<sup>2</sup>

*Provincial allowances at confederation.*—In spite of opposition the financial scheme of confederation was carried through as originally projected. By the terms of the Act of union the Dominion assumed debt for the provinces as follows :—

Province of Canada .....	\$62,500,000
New Brunswick .....	8,000,000
Nova Scotia.....	7,000,000
	\$77,500,000
Total....	

The interest on the debt in 1867 amounted to \$1.29 per head of the population. The interest on the debt of New Zealand at the same date was \$6.02; in Queensland the figure was \$4.97, and in Victoria \$2.88.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, in 1867, the foundations of our national debt were laid, and its growth may be said to have been rapid. Throughout its whole history, however, it will be found that apart from allowances to provinces the cause of yearly additions to the federal debt has invariably been expenditure on the construction of public works. The war-expenses of Canada have been insignificant; her outlay on railways, canals, and public buildings has been immense, and it is this characteristic that affords a basis for a convenient division of the history of our debt since 1867. The building of three great works has been chiefly instrumental in the growth of debt since confederation, and their construction marks three periods in its history. The first of these periods extends from 1867 to the end of the fiscal year 1875, during which time the Intercolonial railway

<sup>1</sup> Confederation Debates, p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> Hon. Mr. Roesor. Confederation Debates, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup> British North America Act, sect. 112-118.

<sup>4</sup> Budget speech, Hon. John Rose, 28th April, 1868, p. 7.

was built at a vast expense. The second extends from 1875 to 1885 inclusive, and has for its prominent feature the liability incurred in the building of the Canadian Pacific railway. It was at the end of this period that Canada's capital expenditure reached its highest point. The third and last period, 1885-1895, is marked by the outlay of large sums on the completion of our canal system, and at the same time shows a steady decrease in the annual growth of the debt.

*First period, 1867-1875.*—The eight years ending 30th June, 1875, might appropriately be called the "fat years" of our financial history, for during that time the budget, perhaps as a result of "good times" induced by confederation, showed an annually recurring surplus. These surpluses in Consolidated Revenue account varied from \$201,835 in 1868 to \$3,712,479 in 1871, and helped materially to prevent a too rapid increase in debt during the period.<sup>1</sup> It is worthy of note that the days of the fifteen per cent. tariff (1867-1874) correspond with this period of prosperity in our national finances.

*Intercolonial railway.*—As has been noted above, the building of this railway was the salient feature in the first period of the history of federal debt. The construction of this work was an express stipulation of the Act of union,<sup>2</sup> made in order to induce the maritime provinces to enter confederation. In pursuance of the terms of the Act, a commission was appointed by order-in-council, dated 11th of December, 1868, to construct and undertake the management of the railway, and by July 1st, 1876, the whole road was opened to traffic. During these years the capital expenditure on the construction of the railway thus saddled on the country reached a total of \$22,488,845, the largest sum for any one year (\$5,131,141) being spent in 1872.<sup>3</sup>

*Additional allowances to provinces.*—Next in importance in its effect on the public debt was the large amount of provincial debt assumed by the Dominion during this period. The first of these additional allowances was made in 1869, when, in consequence of the protests of Nova Scotia against the financial arrangement made for that province in the Act of union, an Act was passed increasing her debt allowance from \$8,000,000 to \$9,186,750.<sup>4</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxi.

<sup>2</sup> British North America Act, 1867.

<sup>3</sup> Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, Appendix I., p. 20.  
32-33 Vict. chap. 2.

the following year the province of Manitoba was carved out of the North-West territory and admitted to confederation, and for that province a debt of \$472,090 was assumed.<sup>1</sup> In 1872 an additional burden of provincial debt was assumed when British Columbia was admitted to the union. The terms<sup>2</sup> were, that British Columbia, "not having incurred debts equal to those of the other provinces then composing the union," should be entitled to receive interest at the rate of five *per centum per annum* on the difference between the actual amount of her indebtedness *per capita* and that of the *per capita* debt of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (\$27.77), the population of British Columbia being taken at 60,000. By virtue of this arrangement the Dominion assumed \$1,666,200 of debt on behalf of the western province. The climax was reached in 1873, when, in consequence of additional debt assumed by Canada on behalf of the provinces, the federal expenditure chargeable to capital attained the highest point in our history, with the exception of that of the year 1884. Agitation had been going on for some years in Ontario and Quebec against the payment of interest on the amount by which the actual debt of the old province of Canada exceeded the allowed debt under the Act of union. In 1873, the matter having been pressed at Ottawa, an Act<sup>3</sup> was passed, the terms of which were as follows: "In the accounts between the several provinces of Canada and the Dominion, the amounts payable to, and chargeable against, the said provinces, in so far as they depend on the amount of debt with which each entered the union, shall be calculated and allowed as if the sum fixed by the 112th section of the British North America Act, 1867, were increased from \$62,500,000 to the sum of \$73,006,088.84; and as if the amounts fixed as aforesaid, as respects the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, by the British North America Act, 1867, and as respects the provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia by the Acts by which they were admitted to the union, were increased in the same proportions." Under this Act, \$13,859,079 of debt was assumed by the Dominion in 1873. In the next year \$4,701,050 more was assumed on the admission of the province of Prince Edward Island, with an allowed debt of \$50 per head of population.

<sup>1</sup> Manitoba Act, 1870.

<sup>2</sup> Order-in-council, May 16th, 1871. Statutes of Canada, 1872, p. 81.

<sup>3</sup> 36 Vic. chap. 30.

<sup>4</sup> Order-in-council, Windsor, 26th June, 1873.

It is somewhat difficult to reconcile these additional allowances with the provisions of section 118 of the British North America Act, and they gave rise to much discussion in the Dominion parliament, especially during the session of 1869, on occasion of the allowance to Nova Scotia. In spite of criticism and objection, however, the Acts making the allowances were passed, and, as a result, a total of \$21,885,175 was added to the federal debt.

*Other items of expenditure.*—The increase in the debt for the fiscal year 1869-70 was \$2,350,423.<sup>1</sup> The chief cause of this increase was the expenditure of \$1,821,887 on the acquisition of the North-west territory from the Hudson's Bay company.<sup>2</sup> During the next ten years more than a million dollars was spent in its development, but expenditure under this head then ceased until 1885, the year of the rebellion.

During the first period the cost of canal construction was small. In 1870 and 1871 nothing at all was spent, while the largest expenditure for any one year only came to \$1,714,830.<sup>3</sup> Out of a total of about \$3,750,000 expended during these eight years on the building of canals, more than one-half, or \$1,985,084, was absorbed by the Welland canal, while the cost of the Carillon and Grenville canal was \$883,578.<sup>4</sup>

*Loans.*—In 1869 the finance minister<sup>5</sup> floated an "Intercolonial Railway Loan" on the London market, amounting to £2,000,000, of which £1,500,000 was guaranteed by the imperial government. It seems that the disposition of the proceeds was not wholly in accordance with the original purpose, for in the session of 1869 the finance minister was criticised, and asked to state what had become of the money raised. In reply he gave the following statement:—<sup>6</sup>

Invested in Intercolonial Railway sinking fund .....	\$ 270,500
Paid off imperial loan .....	681,333
Paid off advances Baring and Glyn .....	983,562
Paid off Bank of Montreal .....	2,500,000
Balance to Ontario government .....	500,000
Redeemed 7% debentures .....	873,000
<hr/>	
Total redemption .....	5,808,595
Invested temporarily in Bank of Montreal .....	1,500,000
Still in agents' hands .....	2,974,408
	<hr/>
	\$10,283,003

1 Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxi.

2 Ibid. p. lxix.

3 Ibid. p. lxix.

4 Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, Appendix I, pp. 7, 8.

5 Hon. John Rose.

6 Budget speech, Hon. John Rose, 1869, p. 14.

In 1872 it was enacted,<sup>1</sup> that any loans authorized by parliament, unless the manner was specially fixed by the Act, might be raised by the issue of six per cent. debentures, by the issue of Dominion stock bearing not more than six per cent. interest, by the granting of terminable annuities, based on a rate not exceeding six per cent., or by the issue and sale of exchequer bonds or bills of not less than \$400.00, at the same rate of interest. A sinking fund might be provided for loans raised by either of the first two methods. Further, it was provided that the governor-general-in-council might change the nature of any portion of the debt, with the consent of the holders of the securities affected, provided that the public burden was not thereby increased, but the capital might be increased proportionately, by the substitution of five per cent. Dominion stock for other securities. The governor-general-in-council was authorized to raise temporary loans for periods not exceeding six months, bearing not more than seven per cent. interest, to meet deficiencies in the Consolidated Revenue fund. Under this Act the funded debt of Canada was regulated from the year 1872.

In the next year Canada negotiated a guaranteed loan of £1,800,000, of which £1,500,000 was for the Intercolonial railway, and the balance for the acquisition of Rupert's Land.<sup>2</sup>

In 1874 a Liberal government came into power for the first time since confederation; but as debts and obligations do not die with governments, one of the first duties of the new finance minister was to borrow £4,000,000, of which \$10,000,000 was used to pay off debt maturing.<sup>3</sup> The large amount of this loan, and the expediency of Canada borrowing on her own unaided credit, as was done in this case, were two points which gave rise to criticism during the session of 1875. Referring to the former, the finance minister declared that the amount of debt maturing, together with increasing expenditure on capital, made it desirable to borrow largely, especially as Canada had appeared in England as a borrower in 1873: for if she were compelled to come again in 1875, for the third time in three years, it would be prejudicial to the interests of the country. This objection to frequent loans was urged by the minister as a strong argument against the attempt to build a Canadian Pacific railway, as projected by their predecessors in office. For, should the government decide to proceed with this gigantic and in the

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<sup>1</sup> Statutes of Canada, 1872, chapter 6.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxv.

<sup>3</sup> Budget Speech, Hon. R. J. Cartwright, 1875, p. 10.

eyes of the finance minister impracticable undertaking, and at the same time continue the expenditure on the construction of other public works, he estimated that no less than \$200,000,000 would be required. In other words Canada would be compelled to go to the London market as a borrower of \$30,000,000 in each of the seven years, within which the railway was to be built. "There may be some honourable gentlemen in the House, who think we shall be able to do this," exclaimed the finance minister "but if so, I envy them their faith in the future of the Dominion."<sup>1</sup>

*Past and future, 1875.*—In 1867 the net debt of Canada had been \$75,757,134, and at the end of the fiscal year 1874-75 it stood at \$116,008,378.<sup>2</sup> This was an increase for the period of \$40,251,244, or, to put it in another way, an average annual growth of \$5,031,405. The total amount, however, spent on construction of public works and allowed to provinces was \$52,987,359,<sup>3</sup> or over \$10,000,000 more than the increase in net debt. Although this was not unsatisfactory, the outlook for the future was not reassuring. The country had undertaken works which would necessitate a very great increase in the debt. The sum estimated as necessary to complete the Intercolonial railway was \$10,000,000; \$30,000,000 more was wanted for the Canadian Pacific railway; while the canal system, planned by the government, would require at least \$20,000,000. Against this there was an imperial guarantee for £2,500,000, given in lieu of Fenian claims, another for £1,500,000 for construction of the Intercolonial railway, and another for £300,000 for the purchase of the North-west. In addition, the imperial government had, in 1873, assented to the transfer of a "Fortifications Guarantee," amounting to £1,100,000, to the construction account of canals and the Canadian Pacific railway. These sums made a total guarantee for £5,400,000, or some \$26,000,000, which Canada could obtain at four per cent. On that debt there would be an annual interest charge of \$1,040,000, and on the remaining \$34,000,000 at five per cent., an interest charge of \$1,700,000. For a sinking fund of one per cent., \$600,000 would be required yearly, and for commission on interest, \$27,000. Thus a total annual debt charge of \$3,367,000 was to be added to the country's expenditure, within the next few years. Such was the outlook in 1875, when Canada entered upon the second period in the history of her debt.

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. J. Cartwright, 1874, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. xxx.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. lxxix.

*Second period, 1875-1885.*—The financial history of the decade, 1875-1885, falls into two parts. Five years, 1875-1880, form a period marked by loans and deficits, while the next five years exhibit a renewal of prosperity, which beneficially affected the national budget. The financial difficulties of the years 1875-1880 were the result of a depression world-wide in its extent, which diminished trade, and thus sapped the source of revenue. At the same time a change was made in the Canadian tariff. The government that was returned to power in 1874 declared for a “tariff for revenue only,” and a general rate of  $17\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. was imposed, from which more than half the revenue was expected to be derived. A great falling off was the result of this arrangement. In six months, ending December 31st, 1875, there was a decrease in importations of \$10,700,000, and consequently a decrease of \$1,860,000 in the revenue obtained by the  $17\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. tariff. In 1878, the normal customs revenue had diminished by \$3,000,000, and the imports by one-third, a reduction *per capita* of importations from \$35.25 to \$25.50.<sup>1</sup> The effect of these circumstances is seen in the succession of deficits, occurring in each of the years 1876 to 1880 inclusive, not one of which was less than one million dollars, while in 1876 and in 1879 almost twice that amount was reached. Such a condition of things not only precluded any assistance from Consolidated Revenue Fund towards a reduction of the debt, but also went far towards making up the gross debt of \$40,000,000, which was placed on the country during these years.

In 1878, the National Policy, which had protection to Canadian industry as its chief feature, was brought into force. A little later, a revival of trade succeeded the depression of the past few years, and the “good times,” thus roughly coincident with a changed tariff, soon placed our national finances in a satisfactory condition. In 1882, for example, the estimates provided for a surplus of \$4,000,000, but the real surplus exceeded that amount by \$2,000,000; and in 1883, it reached the extraordinary figure of \$7,064,492.<sup>2</sup> The financial history of the years 1881 to 1885 is in strong contrast to that of the first five years of the decade, and their effect upon the public debt was correspondingly different.

*The Canadian Pacific railway.*—The second stage in the history of the national debt is marked by the building of the Canadian Pacific railway, which was begun in earnest in 1875, and practically

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. J. Cartwright, 1878.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxi.

completed in 1885. During these ten years such vast sums were spent annually on the enterprise as to make it by far the most important factor in the building up of our debt. In 1876, the expenditure under this head amounted to \$3,346,576; in 1881, it was nearly \$5,000,000;<sup>1</sup> and yet, after a total cost to that date of over \$30,000,000, the road was not half completed. It was therefore considered advisable that the work should be carried on by private enterprise, supplemented by government aid. Accordingly the railway was placed in the hands of a company, and a contract made, by the terms of which the line was to be completed in 1891. In aid of the work, the Dominion was to give \$25,000,000 in money, and 25,000,000 acres of land, together with about 640 miles of completed road, which the government then had under contract, and of which the cost, including surveying, was about \$33,000,000.<sup>2</sup>

The liability thus incurred soon began to be felt. In 1883, out of a total capital expenditure of \$14,147,360, the large sum of \$10,033,800 went to the new Canadian Pacific Railway Company. In the following year, the amount due to the company was over \$11,000,000, and in order to meet its liability, the government found it necessary to float a loan of £5,000,000. In this prosaic transaction an unusual incident occurred, which is worthy of note. It seems that there was, in London, an organization of men connected with the Northern Pacific railway, which did all in its power to prevent the loan from being successful. The very morning when the tenders for the loan were being deposited, a most violent article appeared in one of the London papers against the government of Canada and the Canadian Pacific railway; and from ten o'clock in the morning until three in the afternoon, while the tenders were being deposited, a man stood at the door of Baring's Bank with a placard advertising the newspaper and calling the attention of everybody that passed to the article. In spite of this, the rate obtained was the highest ever reached up to that time for a Canadian loan, and the amount realized was about \$22,500,000, which, together with temporary loans of \$12,500,000, was disposed of in 1884 as follows:<sup>3</sup>

C. P. R. under Onderdonk's contract .....	\$3,379,873
On account of C. P. R. subsidy.....	8,386,418
C. P. R. loan account .....	19,459,000
Redemption of debt .....	3,991,056

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Total .....

\$35,216,347

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxix.

<sup>2</sup> Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, p. 495.

<sup>3</sup> Budget speech, Sir S. L. Tilley, 1885, p. 39.



In the following year, 1885, the company came to the government for permission to issue bonds to the extent of \$35,000,000, asking the Dominion to take \$20,000,000 worth as security for the company's existing indebtedness, to put \$10,000,000 upon lands in the North-West territory, and to advance to them a further loan of \$5,000,000.<sup>1</sup> At this time, the position of the government loan account with the company was as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Payments by government during 1883-84 .....	\$10,953,462
“ “ 1884-85 .....	9,701,438
“ “ 1885-86 .....	995,800
	\$21,650,700
To pay 3½ dividends on \$65,000,000 stock to August 17th, 1893.....	7,380,012
	\$29,031,712

In response to the request, an agreement was entered into on March 30th, 1886, by which the company undertook to repay the government the amount stated to have been actually advanced to them out of the \$20,000,000 secured by first mortgage bonds, viz., \$19,150,700, and the government for its part, agreed to accept a portion of the company's lands for the balance of the company's indebtedness, (\$9,880,912, with interest), the value of the land being computed at \$1.50 per acre.<sup>3</sup> It was the last part of the agreement which affected the public debt in 1886. The balance of indebtedness to be covered by the acceptance of lands was \$9,880,912, which with interest to May 1st, 1886, made a total of \$10,189,521.33. This large amount appears in the public accounts of the Dominion as a Consolidated Fund transfer for that year, and as an item which went towards increasing the debt.<sup>4</sup> By the end of the year, the accounts between the company and the Dominion were practically closed.<sup>5</sup> On July 1st, 1886, the company had repaid the government the balance due on Loan account of \$9,163-353, and on the 31st of December, in the same year the final payment on account of the \$25,000,000 subsidy was made by the government.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. A. W. McLean, 1886, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Canada Sessional Papers, 1888, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Statutes of Canada, 49 Vict., chap. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxx.

<sup>5</sup> By authority of order-in-council, Nov. 2nd, 1886.

<sup>6</sup> Canada Sessional Papers, 1888, No. 8.

In this narrative of transactions with the Canadian Pacific railway we have gone one year beyond the period under discussion, in order to complete the financial history of the road. Limiting our inquiry, however, to the expenditure on the construction of this great work during the years embraced in the second period of Canada's debt, we find that it amounted to more than \$54,000,000. The sums spent year by year are as follows:<sup>1</sup>

1876 .....	\$3,346,567	1881 .....	£4,968,503
1877 .....	1,691,149	1882 .....	4,589,075
1878 .....	2,228,373	1883 .....	10,033,800
1879 .....	2,240,285	1884 .....	11,192,722
1880 .....	4,044,522	1885 .....	9,900,281

From 1885 up to the present, the expenditure has been comparatively small, averaging scarcely more than \$500,000 a year, and consequently this item has ceased to have an influence on the increase of the federal debt.

*Canal expenditure.*—Next in importance to the Canadian Pacific railway, as a factor in causing increase of debt during this decade was the extensive construction of canal systems. The years 1877, 1878, and 1879 witnessed an immense expenditure under this head, greater than for all the other years together since confederation. The most costly works were the Welland, Lachine, Carillon and Grenville canals, which were almost wholly built between 1875 and 1885. The first named, between Lakes Ontario and Erie, cost the large sum of \$13,500,000 during this time, the greatest expenditure being in 1877, when it amounted to \$2,199,962.<sup>2</sup> Next in point of cost was the Lachine canal, on which over \$6,000,000 was spent. During the same period the outlay on the Carillon and Grenville system came to more than \$3,750,000, and that on the Cornwall canal to about \$650,000, while large sums were also expended on the St. Peter's, Culbute and other canals.<sup>3</sup> The total amount chargeable to capital spent on canal construction during the period was \$24,120,812, divided by years as follows:<sup>4</sup>

1876 .....	\$2,388,733	1881 .....	\$2,077,028
1877 .....	4,131,374	1882 .....	1,674,758
1878 .....	3,843,338	1883 .....	1,763,001
1879 .....	3,064,098	1884 .....	1,577,295
1880 .....	2,123,366	1885 .....	1,504,621

<sup>1</sup> Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, App. L, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxix.

*Readjustment of provincial debts.*—Among the causes of the increase of debt during this decade another very important item was the amount of provincial debt assumed by the federal government in the readjustments of 1884 and the following year. For some time previous to this date there had been appeals to the Dominion government, especially from the province of Quebec, for some relief from the burden of indebtedness. In 1873, it will be remembered,<sup>1</sup> the Dominion had assumed certain provincial debts. According to the terms of the Act under which this had been done, the Dominion proposed to allow Ontario and Quebec the benefit of the additional assumption of debt from 1873 only, and to charge them with interest on the difference between \$62,500,000 and \$73,006,088, from 1867 to 1873. The governments of these provinces, however, protested that interest should be allowed them from 1867, on a basis of the debt of the province of Canada having then been \$73,006,088, instead of \$62,500,000.<sup>2</sup> On this ground Quebec made common cause with Ontario and the other provinces in an appeal for increased subsidies. She had, however, special reason for her claim. The government of Quebec asked relief because her very heavy burden of debt had been incurred through sacrifices made to open up the country by the building of railroads, especial reference being made to the great provincial railway, the "Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental." An address,<sup>3</sup> setting forth these claims, was sent to the House of Commons, and in response an Act was passed to readjust the yearly subsidies to all the provinces.<sup>4</sup> It enacted that the amounts by which the yearly subsidy to each province was increased by the former Act of 1873<sup>5</sup> should be calculated as if the Act had directed that such increase should be reckoned from July 1st, 1867: and that the total amounts of the half-yearly payments due on account of such increase from July 1st, 1867, to July 1st, 1873, with interest on each at five per cent. up to July 1st, 1884, should be deemed capital owing to the provinces, and payable to them as part of their yearly subsidies, on and after July 1st, 1884. The allowances to British Columbia, Manitoba, and Prince

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Letter of Hon. J. Wurtle, Treasurer, Quebec, 2nd April, 1882. Quebec Sessional Papers, 1884, No. 88, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Report of Committee of Executive Council, Feb. 11th, 1884. Quebec Sessional Papers, 1884, No. 88, p. 80.

<sup>4</sup> 47 Vict., chap. 4.

<sup>5</sup> 36 Vict., chap. 30.

Edward Island were to be increased by amounts bearing the same proportion to their respective populations as the amounts to be added under the Act as capital owing to Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, bear to the combined population of the four last-named provinces under the census of 1881. By virtue of this Act the additional debt allowances were as follows:—<sup>1</sup>

Ontario and Quebec jointly .....	\$5,397,503
Nova Scotia .....	793,368
New Brunswick.....	604,519
Manitoba .....	110,825
British Columbia .....	83,107
Prince Edward Island .....	182,975
Total .....	<u>\$7,172,297</u>

In the following year a further readjustment was made as regards Manitoba, whereby the Dominion assumed an additional \$3,113,334 of debt on behalf of that province. This made the total assumption of provincial debt during the period exceed \$10,000,000.

*Loans.*—On a review of the eventful financial history of the Dominion during the years 1875-1885, it will be seen that the prediction made by the finance minister in 1874, that Canada must appear as a borrower many times in the immediate future, proved only too true. In the ten years following this prediction the Dominion floated no fewer than eight loans, which in the aggregate amounted to £20,000,000.<sup>2</sup> The principal reason for this is found in the fact that the government had undertaken to construct enormous public works, in all parts of Canada, during the precise years in which a large portion of her debt fell due. For example, in 1878 \$5,731,000, in 1879 \$7,624,000, and in 1880 \$6,060,000 of public debt matured,<sup>3</sup> and in the same years large expenditure was entailed by the construction of the Canadian Pacific railway and the canal system.

In 1876, the Canadian government floated a loan of £2,500,000. It was offered at a fixed price of £91, and brought the highest price yet obtained on Canada's own unaided credit. It was our first loan at four per cent., and the price that it fetched was absolutely higher than the highest price obtained for our five per cents., payable in 1903. The former was equivalent to a five per cent. loan at 108,

<sup>1</sup> 47 Vict., chap. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxiv.

<sup>3</sup> Speech of the Hon. R. J. Cartwright at Napanee, Sept. 6th, 1875.

whereas the current selling price of the actual five per cents. was 105-106½, after deduction of accrued interest. The expenses and discount on this loan amounted to \$2,212,796, which of course was an additional item in the debt of 1876.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of 1876 the government of the Hon. Alexander MacKenzie had borrowed to the extent of £9,000,000, which had realized almost \$42,000,000. This large sum was disposed of as follows:<sup>2</sup>

On Intercolonial railway .....	\$4,173,000
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia railways .....	922,000
Prince Edward Island railway.....	1,018,000
C. P. R. survey .....	1,652,000
Lachine canal .....	1,457,000
Canadian Pacific railway construction .....	4,356,000
Welland canal .....	4,290,000
Other canals .....	1,238,000
Improvements on St. Lawrence River .....	564,000
	\$20,305,000
On hand .....	7,000,000
Redemption of debt .....	2,000,000
Advances to provinces .....	16,00,000
	\$44,305,000

Between November, 1878, and January, 1879, there matured some \$15 500,000 of Canada's indebtedness, and the new government, which came into power in 1878, negotiated the second loan of this period. It was for £3,000,000, in two parts of £1,500,000 each. At first little more than one-half was subscribed, and it was necessary to extend the time for receiving tenders, but eventually the whole was taken up at a fairly good price. The next loan was in 1879. In that year £400,000 worth of six per cent. debentures fell due in England, and others for £600,000 were payable on July 1st., 1880. There was also \$4,000,000 worth of securities outstanding, and the government had given notice that it would either pay these or substitute five per cent. securities for them. A loan of £3,000,000 at four per cent. was therefore placed in London, and a price of £95 ls. 10½d. realized, which was satisfactory considering the frequency of Canadian loans during the previous few years.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, 1895, p. lxxix.

<sup>2</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. J. Cartwright, 1877, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Budget speech, Sir S. L. Tilley, 1880, p. 8.

Two more loans were floated in England during this period. The first, in 1884, was for £5,000,000, the second, in 1885, for £4,000,000, both being used to meet the liability of the government to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

*Retrospect, 1885.*—At the end of this second stage in its history, the public debt of Canada stood at \$264,703,607, and her net debt at \$196,407,692. The increase in the former since confederation had been \$171,757,556, and in the latter \$120,779,051.<sup>1</sup> If this increase had been caused by war or disaster there would indeed have been reason for alarm, but no uneasiness was justified, for every dollar of additional debt was represented by useful and lasting public works. To realize this fact it is only necessary to glance at a list of these works, and of the sums spent upon them from the year of confederation to 1885. It is a formidable array of figures:<sup>2</sup>

Increased grants to provinces .....	\$27,529,959
Dominion lands .....	2,436,036
Eastern Extension railway .....	1,286,551
Intercolonial railway .....	30,460,381
Canals .....	31,798,956
Public buildings, Ottawa .....	1,532,622
Harbour at Port Arthur .....	2,947,723
North-West territories .....	2,920,000
Canadian Pacific railway .....	67,581,367
Prince Edward Island railway .....	207,620
Short Line railway .....	49,587
Subsidies to various railways .....	611,245
Total .....	\$169,362,047

From this statement it will be seen that since 1867, in building railways, canals, custom-houses, post-offices, and other public buildings throughout the country, Canada had paid \$48,582,996 beyond the increase in her net debt. Or, to take the figures in another way, if we exclude from the increase in debt the allowances to provinces of \$27,529,959, there is a balance of debt of \$93,249,092. Now for the Canadian Pacific railway, the Intercolonial railway, and canals alone, to 30th June, 1885, the cost had been \$129,840,704,<sup>3</sup> or over \$36,000,000 more than the whole increase in the net debt, exclusive of provincial debt allowances during the period.

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. xxx.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. lxix. Budget Speech, Sir C. Tupper, 1887, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxix.

Financially, the most noteworthy year of the decade was 1881-82. The surplus from consolidated revenue in that year was \$6,316,000, to which was added a receipt of \$1,744,456 from sales of lands in the north-west, making a total surplus of over \$8,000,000. This last receipt was, in 1881, given a new place in the public accounts. Hitherto it had been reckoned by the various finance ministers as part of receipts from Consolidated Revenue account; but in that year it was concluded that, as the government, in opening up the North-west, had incurred large liabilities for surveys, police, Indian treaties, etc., whatever was got from sales of these lands should be placed to Revenue account, to meet the interest on the debt incurred by this expenditure, and for the sinking fund provided to pay off the indebtedness. So it happens that in 1882 we find receipts from this source going to swell the surplus for that year.<sup>1</sup> The expenditure chargeable to capital in 1882 came to \$7,405,637,<sup>2</sup> which, together with Consolidated Fund transfers, amounting to \$201,884, caused a gross increase in the debt of \$7,607,521. When there was placed against this, however, the surplus from Consolidated Revenue and the receipts from Dominion lands, a handsome surplus was left, and when the sinking fund was taken into account, the net debt of the Dominion was less by \$1,734,129 than in the year previous. This is the only year since 1871 which has seen a reduction in the net debt, and it must be noted that not only was nearly \$7,500,000 paid on capital account, but during the year liabilities maturing to the amount of \$4,000,000 were redeemed without the necessity of borrowing one dollar. Truly 1882 can be called the "annus mirabilis" in the history of the Dominion debt.

The successive surpluses which occurred between 1880 and 1885 were appropriated to redeem the debt, and Canada's position consequently improved in the money market. In the Dominion itself there were inquiries in every direction for the securities of the country, while in England our standing was each year becoming better. In 1879 Canadian securities were four or five per cent. behind those of New South Wales, which stood at the very top of the list of colonial funds, but by 1885 the securities of the Dominion surpassed those of all the other colonies, and stood four per cent. above those of New South Wales, the former favourite.

<sup>1</sup> Budget Speech, Sir L. Tilley, 1883, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

*Third period, 1885-1895.*—During the past ten years the public debt had made rapid strides. In this third and last period, however, the remarkable feature is the great decline in the amount spent yearly on capital account, and the consequent comparatively slow rate of increase in Canada's indebtedness.

Our expenditure reached high-water mark in 1885-86, when the net increase in the debt was no less than \$26,751,414.<sup>1</sup> From that date it has been kept within very modest limits. In 1887, and again in 1888, it did not reach \$4,500,000, and the addition to the debt was correspondingly small. But the wish was now for *no increase at all*. In the budget speech of 1889, the finance minister asked the pertinent question, "Is our debt to go on increasing forever?" In answer he outlined the proposed expenditure for the next few years, and showed how, if the government were cautious, and no extraordinary events caused unforeseen expenditure, Canada should be able to meet her capital engagements for the three years ending June 30th, 1892, pay what was requisite of the running expenses of the country, and yet add not one dollar to the net debt.<sup>2</sup> When it is remembered that by this time the Dominion had practically ceased expenditure on the Canadian Pacific and Intercolonial railways, it does not appear difficult for the government to live up to the programme outlined in the budget speech of 1889. Difficult or not, however, it has been done. From that date to the present time the capital expenditure has been rigidly kept down to an average of less than \$4,000,000 yearly; indeed, in 1890, the desire of the government to meet all expenditure out of revenue account was practically realized, for in that year the net increase in the debt was but \$3,170, and this in spite of the fact that the Dominion assumed in that year a debt of \$2,725,504, being the amount spent to date by the Montreal harbour commissioners on the St. Lawrence improvements. The effect of this regulation of expenditure was to reduce the average annual increase in the net debt for this period to less than \$3,000,000, whereas for the preceding period it had been over \$7,000,000.

*Canals.*—The most important factor in the increase of debt during this decade was the expenditure on the completion of the canal system. The vast works at Sault Ste. Marie, and the Soulanges, Cornwall, Williamsburg, and Lachine canals were the most costly. The canal at Sault Ste. Marie and the Soulanges canal were

<sup>1</sup> Public accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxi.

<sup>2</sup> Budget Speech, Hon. G. E. Foster, 1889, p. 12.



both begun in this period, and the amounts spent upon them were \$3,258,025 and \$1,739,969 respectively.<sup>1</sup> Only once did the cost of canal construction fall below \$1,000,000 per annum (viz., in 1889, when it was \$972,913), and the total amount for the whole period spent under this head was nearly \$16,500,000.

*Railway subsidies.*—The only other item which helped materially to increase the debt during the period was the expenditure on railway subsidies. Up to 1882, the government had given aid only to those lines which connected provinces. In 1883, however, when it was seen that provincial governments could no longer aid railways, without going deeply into debt, the finance minister<sup>2</sup> introduced a bill in the House of Commons, providing for the granting of subsidies to eleven railways. This policy came fairly into force by 1885, and since that date a total of nearly \$14,000,000 has been expended in this direction. The division by years is as follows:<sup>3</sup>

1886 .....	\$2,701,249	1891 .....	\$1,265,705
1887 .....	1,406,533	1892 .....	1,248,215
1888 .....	1,027,041	1893 .....	811,394
1889 .....	846,721	1894 .....	1,229,885
1890 .....	1,678,195	1895 .....	1,310,549

*1890-1895.*—Since 1890, the annual expenditure on the Intercolonial railway has averaged only \$450,000, while that on public buildings at Ottawa, on the North-West territory, on the Prince Edward Island railway, and on the Canadian Pacific railway has wholly disappeared from the capital account of the Dominion. The increase in the net debt in these six years has been \$15,544,885, an average for each year of \$2,590,814. But in the same time there has been spent on capital account for canals and the Intercolonial railway \$16,236,160,<sup>4</sup> which more than offsets the increase in debt. The real standard, however, by which to judge the increase, is the amount of interest required each year to carry it. In 1890, the net interest was \$1.79 per head of population, and in 1895 it was \$1.80, an increase of only one cent in its incidence *per capita*.

*Loans.*—During the ten years 1885-1895, four Canadian loans were floated in London, the total of which came to over £15,000,000. Yet so satisfactory was the management of our debt and the state of our finances, that the position and credit of the Dominion were

<sup>1</sup> Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, App. I., p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Charles Tupper.

<sup>3</sup> Public accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxx.

<sup>4</sup> Budget speech, Hon. G. E. Foster, 1896, p. 9.

higher than those of any other British colony. The truth of this is evident from the way in which the latest Canadian loans have been taken up. In October, 1894, in the very midst of the depression that had been covering the world for some years, it became necessary for Canada to negotiate a loan on the London market. Colonial securities were then at their lowest. Canada's trade was decreasing, and the Dominion revenue diminishing, but the loan of £2,500,000 at three per cent. was placed on the market with a named minimum of 95. No less than 566 different tenders were sent in offering nearly £12,000,000 in all. The highest went at £99 12s. 6d., or almost par, while the average was £97 9s. 2d. When the discount and cost were reckoned in, the rate of interest was three and a half per cent., making this the best loan ever negotiated by Canada.<sup>1</sup>

*Summary, 1895.*—The foregoing pages have shown the way in which the federal debt was accumulated during the three stages of its history. Fairly rapid increase is characteristic of the first period; very rapid increase marks the second; while in the third period, growth is slow. The causes of increase in all three periods may be summed up in the phrase "Railways and canals," and therefore, in estimating this rapidity of growth, we must consider whether or not the benefits, accruing to the country from the deepening and finishing of the canals, and from the building up of a great railway system, are a sufficient offset. If they are, the additions to the debt are justified.

To bring out the results of this account of the growth of the federal debt, extending over twenty-eight years, a concise summary is necessary. On the 30th of June, 1895, the net debt of Canada was \$253,074,927, or \$178,346,286 more than it was in 1867. It was not, of course, wholly incurred by the Dominion for Dominion purposes. There was assumed for the four provinces at confederation \$77,500,000 of debt<sup>2</sup>; and there has since been a further assumption of \$31,930,148, increasing the total to \$109,430,148. Deducting this sum from the net debt in 1895, we have a net debt, incurred by the Dominion for Dominion purposes since 1867, amounting to \$143,644,779, or an average yearly increase of a little over \$5,000,000. As has been frequently stated above, this increase has been caused almost wholly by the construction of railways, canals, and other public works of importance, calculated to aid in the development of the country; and it is for this reason, that the debt of

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. George Foster, 1895, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> British North America Act, 1867, sect. 112-118.

Canada cannot fairly be compared with those of European countries, which have been contracted mainly for war purposes. The history of the public works of Canada is the history of her public debt. On the Intercolonial railway system, eleven hundred and thirty-six miles in length, the capital expenditure has been \$45,294,029.<sup>1</sup> On the canal system,<sup>2</sup> the great waterway and artery of central Canada, the federal government has spent \$44,161,311; and on the Canadian Pacific railway, whose utility has been amply proved, the expenditure on capital account reaches the figure of \$62,653,745.<sup>3</sup> These sums make a total of \$152,109,085. That is to say, on these three works alone, the commercial highways of the country, the Dominion has spent \$8,464,306 more than the whole debt created since confederation, apart from provincial allowances. In addition, Dominion lands have been opened up at a cost of \$3,668,903. Public buildings at Ottawa and public works elsewhere have been undertaken, on which the capital expenditure reaches a total of \$9,187,299. The North-West territories have been purchased and opened up at a cost of \$3,798,656, and other similar services have been performed. These undertakings represent, in connection with railways and canals, a grand total expenditure chargeable to capital of \$200,143,170.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the sum of \$22,797,085 has been expended out of revenue during the same period on capital account for the services of the country, in addition to what has been added to the debt since confederation.

If the actual interest paid on the debt be taken, it is found that, whereas in 1868 we paid at the rate of 4.51%, in 1895 we paid but 2.93%<sup>5</sup>. The net interest paid per head of Canada's population in 1878 was \$1.29; in 1873 it was \$1.31; in 1878 it was \$1.58; in 1889, \$1.86; and in 1895, \$1.80 or 6 cents less than in 1889.<sup>6</sup> The reduction in the rate of interest has made the burden of the debt smaller in proportion to its size, so that at the present time Canada, with her improved credit, can carry almost twice the amount of debt she could in 1867, and still have a no larger burden *per capita*.

The actual net interest paid in

1868 was	\$4,375,148
1873 " . . . . .	4,812,802
1878 " . . . . .	6,443,109
1889 " . . . . .	8,843,539
1895 " . . . . .	9,130,247 7

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. lxxix.

<sup>2</sup> Report, Department of Railways and Canals, 1895, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.      <sup>4</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. 69.

<sup>5</sup> Statistical Year Book of Canada, 1895, p. 797.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*      <sup>7</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895 p. xxx.

If, as a standard to measure the debt, a comparison be instituted between revenue and net debt, it is found that in 1868, 5.53 years of the revenue of that year would have been sufficient to pay off the federal debt. In 1878 it would have taken 6.27 years, in 1888 6.53 years, and in 1895 7.45 years of the revenue of those respective years to wipe out our net indebtedness.<sup>1</sup> From the application of this standard two facts appear; first, that the debt has increased a little more rapidly than the revenue, and second, that the debt of Canada is not, in proportion to the revenue of the country, so great as the debts of many other countries considered to be prosperous. While it would have taken  $6\frac{3}{4}$  years of the revenue of 1894 to pay off the net debt of Canada,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  years of the revenue of Great Britain in that year would have been needed to pay off its debt;  $7\frac{1}{2}$  years of the revenue of 1892 would have been required to pay off the debt of Austria-Hungary in that year;  $6\frac{2}{3}$  years that of Belgium;  $9\frac{1}{2}$  years that of France; and  $8\frac{2}{3}$  years that of the Netherlands.<sup>2</sup>

These tests however, interesting as they may be, prove but little. The average Canadian will only have to consider three significant facts: one, that Canada now pays over \$9,000,000 yearly to carry her debt, next, that her revenue does not amount to \$34,000,000, and last, that for the past two years there have been large deficits, and he will be convinced that the time has come for calling a halt in the large expenditure on capital account.

The phase of development through which the country is now passing, the heavy contributions which she has made in the past for the construction of public works, and the equipment which, by means of these contributions, she has provided for herself, suggest that the government during the next few years, should adopt a policy of careful retrenchment. A vigorous attempt to make the revenue cover current expenses, and to bring capital expenditure down to an amount not greater than the yearly sinking fund, would meet with the approval of the country; and, after a few years of such policy, the government might well take into consideration, whether it could not gradually decrease the amount of the debt itself.

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<sup>1</sup> Statistical Year Book, 1895, p. 789.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 789.

PART II.

PROVINCIAL DEBT.



## PART II.

### PROVINCIAL DEBT.

#### Province of Canada.

**F**ROM 1841 to 1846 the two provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada, or, as they are now known, Ontario and Quebec, were united under the name of the province of Canada. It was during the twenty-six years of their union, that by far the largest part of the \$73,000,000 constituting the debt of the province in 1867 was contracted. From a statement,<sup>1</sup> made by the finance minister, in the legislature of the united provinces in 1841, we learn that the debt was then £1,670,142, nearly all of which was brought into the union by Upper Canada. In fact, the liabilities of Lower Canada when she entered the union amounted to but £133,000.<sup>2</sup> This debt of £1,670,142 in 1841 had been incurred, like most Canadian debt since that date, mainly for the construction of public works, and in opening up the country. The total expenditure on these services up to February 10th, 1841, came to \$9,846,183 which included the following sums:—<sup>3</sup>

Canals, harbours, piers, etc .....	\$5,418,843
Roads, turnpike and colonization .....	2,103,320
Public buildings .....	2,145,403

*Rapid increase.*—In ten years the debt of the united provinces increased fourfold, and amounted to \$12.13 per head of the population. In twenty years it reached the considerable figure of \$58,-

<sup>1</sup> Sir F. Hincks, Dec. 15th, 1841 (contained in second report of the Committee on Municipal Institutions, Ontario, 1889, p. 44.)

<sup>2</sup> Hon. Mr. Dorion, Confederation Debates, p. 266.

<sup>3</sup> Return to an address of legislative assembly, dated July 27th, 1847, (included in report of Department of Public Works, 1867, Appendix No. 70.)

326,478, a *per capita* debt of \$23.21. The following is a statement of this increase year by year for the decade 1852-1861.

Year.	Debt. <sup>1</sup>
1852.....	\$22,355,413
1853.....	29,922,752
1854.....	38,851,833
1855.....	45,855,217
1856.....	48,757,619
1857.....	52,334,911
1858.....	54,892,405
1859.....	54,142,044
1860.....	58,292,469
1861.....	58,326,478

*Capital expenditure to 1867.*—On the 30th of June, 1867, the debt of the province of Canada, as subsequently allowed, amounted to \$73,006,088.<sup>2</sup> This vast increase in the quarter of a century of union is explained by the fact that the expenditure on public works alone came to no less than \$50,364,416.<sup>3</sup> This sum, together with that expended before 1841, made a grand total of over \$60,000,000, spent by the two provinces in the construction of public works previous to confederation.<sup>4</sup> Of the sum spent by the government of the united provinces from 1841 to 1867, \$12,739,783 went for the construction of the canals comprised in the St. Lawrence navigation system, \$1,702,724 was expended on harbours and piers, \$1,115,415 on lighthouses, beacons and buoys; and these amounts, when combined with expenditure on other canals, formed a grand total of \$17,106,371 for works connected with navigation. On roads was spent \$3,834,508, and on public buildings, chargeable to capital, \$7,031,157. The largest expenditure under any one head, however, was that on railways, which amounted to \$20,264,800.<sup>5</sup>

*Confederation.*—At confederation, under the provisions of the British North America Act, all stocks, cash, bankers' balances, and securities, belonging to each of the existing provinces, became the property of the Dominion of Canada, and the Dominion became responsible for the debts and liabilities of each province; but Ontario and Quebec jointly were made liable to the Dominion for the amount, by which the debt of the late province of Canada

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Province of Canada, Hon. A. T. Galt, May 16th, 1862, App. 2.

<sup>2</sup> 36 Vict., Chap 30.

<sup>3</sup> Report, Department of Public Works, 1867, p. 560.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 560.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, appendix no. 70.



exceeded \$62,500,000, and were to be charged interest at the rate of five per cent. thereon. Certain assets, enumerated in the fourth schedule of the Act, were declared the property of Ontario and Quebec jointly. The division of the debts, credits, liabilities, properties, and assets of Upper and Lower Canada, was to be referred to three arbitrators, one chosen by Ontario, one by Quebec, and one by the Dominion.<sup>1</sup>

*Arbitration.*—Statements of the liabilities and assets of the late province of Canada, as framed in a conference of members of the three governments held at Montreal in July, 1869, and approved by an order-in-council of the privy council of Canada of the 17th of August, 1869, were submitted to the three arbitrators, who were the Hon. D. L. Macpherson for Ontario, the Hon. C. D. Day for Quebec, and the Hon. J. H. Gray, M.P., appointed by the Dominion government. The arbitrators met first in August, 1869, and, after numerous sessions and hearings of counsel, an interlocutory judgment was rendered by the arbitrators appointed by the Dominion and Ontario, on the 28th of May, 1870, establishing the principles on which the surplus debt and the joint assets should be divided. The arbitrator appointed by Quebec dissented from the judgment, and on the 9th of July, 1870, resigned his position, for the reason that he considered the judgment erroneous and unjust. The remaining two arbitrators made their final award on September 3rd, 1870, notwithstanding a protest against their continued action by the government of Quebec. In this award, the principle of the division of the excess debt was that of local origin. That is to say, the division was based on the locality of the assets mentioned in the schedule to the British North America Act, in the creation of which the several items of the debt had been incurred, and the debt was apportioned between Quebec and Ontario, according as it was adjudged to have originated for the local benefit of either. Where the debt had been incurred by the creation of an asset for their common benefit, it was divided equally between them. On this basis, the arbitrators found in their award that of the debt of the province of Canada exceeding \$62,000,000, Ontario should assume and pay such a proportion as \$9,808,728.02 bears to \$18,587,520.57, and Quebec such a proportion as \$8,778,792.55 bears to the same. This was approximately 9/17 for Ontario, and 8/17 for Quebec. The amount of the excess was not stated, as that question had not been referred to the arbitrators,

<sup>1</sup> British North America Act, sect. 142.

but if it was taken at \$10,500,000, Ontario, according to this award, would bear \$5,540,902 and Quebec \$4,959,098.

The Quebec government protested against the award, and nothing was done towards a settlement for some years. The Dominion government went on making payments and collecting moneys in connection with the affairs of the late province, and charged or credited these items to the account of the same, without the concurrence of the provincial governments. At the beginning of the year 1873, the excess of debt of the late province of Canada, for which Ontario and Quebec were jointly liable, amounted, according to the account of the Dominion, to \$10,506,808.84. In that year an Act<sup>1</sup> was passed by the Dominion parliament, whereby the \$62,500,000 of the debt of the late province of Canada, which under the British North America Act had been assumed by the Dominion, was increased to \$73,006,088.84, and the amounts of the debts of the other provinces, assumed by the Dominion, were correspondingly increased.<sup>2</sup> This assumption of excess debt settled the dispute between Ontario and Quebec, on the question of division of the debt of the old province, but since that date arbitration has continued up to the present year, with a view to adjusting the accounts of the two provinces in regard to other items. Five judgments have been rendered and awards made by the arbitrators, but the only one which has to do with the debt is the "interest award."

It will be remembered that the province in 1882 contended that the proper effect had not been given to the operation of the Act of 1873, under which it was claimed that the \$10,506,088.84 of additional debt assumed by the Dominion should have been credited at confederation, instead of at the date of the Act, 1873; and that the amounts charged for interest on the excess of debt, and retained from the subsidies between 1867 and 1873, should be reduced accordingly.<sup>3</sup> A second Act to readjust the provincial subsidies was passed in 1884.<sup>4</sup> By its terms the total amount of the half-yearly payments, which would have been made on account of the subsidy to Ontario and Quebec jointly, if the sum above mentioned (\$10,506,088.84) had been assumed as at July 1st, 1867, together with interest upon them, was capitalized at the sum of \$5,397,503.13, and the yearly subsidy to Ontario and Quebec jointly was increased by a sum equal to five per cent. on the latter amount.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 36 Vict., chap. 30.

36 Vict., chap. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, Part I, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> 47 Vict., chap. 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, Part I, p. 23.

The provinces now advanced the claim that interest should be credited to them on the deductions from their subsidies between 1867 and 1873, for the periods when the payments on account of subsidies were less than the amounts subsequently admitted to have been due. This claim had not been allowed by the Act of 1884, and the question was, amongst others, submitted to arbitration in 1893, and the first award made on November 2nd of that year. The following were its terms:<sup>1</sup>

1. That from the 1st of July, 1867, to 1873, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec shall be credited with subsidy half-yearly in advance; that the deductions for interest on the excess of debt of the province of Canada over 62,500,000, as actually ascertained in amount at each period, shall be made at the end of each half-year down to and including January 1st, 1873; that the first of such deductions shall be made on January 1st, 1868.

2. That in the province of Canada account there shall be credited, on May 23rd, 1873, the \$10,506,088.84 remitted by 36 Vict. chap. 30, and that there shall be no deduction from subsidy thereafter.

3. That on and after July 1st, 1884, the provinces shall be credited with the additional subsidy granted by 47 Vict. chap. 4.

The Dominion appealed to the Supreme Court against this first award, and on May 7th, 1894, judgment was given dismissing the appeal with costs.<sup>2</sup> Since that date awards have been made on the questions of Indian claims, immigration expenditure and the common school fund, but the debt account of the old province of Canada has been, to all intents and purposes, closed, and the interest questions which it involved have been finally settled by this judgment.

#### Province of Quebec.

In 1873 Ontario and Quebec were both left practically free from debt, but the financial paths which they have pursued since that date have been widely different. Ontario stands to-day with a surplus of from \$4,000,000 to \$5,000,000 of assets over liabilities,<sup>3</sup> whereas the debt of Quebec amounts to upwards of \$32,000,000.<sup>4</sup> The explanation of the growth of this debt is found in the lavish aid given by the government of Quebec to railway construction.

<sup>1</sup> Ontario, Budget speech of the Hon. R. Harcourt, 19th February, 1896, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Budget speech Hon. R. Harcourt, 1895, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. Harcourt, 19th February, 1896, p. 40.

Public Accounts, Quebec, 1895, p. 14.

If the disposition of the several loans which constitute the funded debt of that province is inquired into, it is found that with scarcely an exception the money raised by the sale of provincial debentures has been spent in railway subsidies, or in direct aid in the construction of railway lines as public works.

*First loans.*—In 1872 Quebec made her first loan. It was only \$20,000, and was expended in enabling distressed farmers in certain parts of the province to buy seed grain.<sup>1</sup> The following year saw the genesis of her railway policy. By an Act passed in 1873,<sup>2</sup> authority was given for raising a loan of £800,000 for railway subsidies, and twelve railways were specified to which aid was to be given. By the same Act was formed a "Consolidated Railway Fund" of all debentures issued, or to be issued, for subsidies to railways, and of unexpended balances on hand from the sale of them. From this fund all subsidies were to be paid to railways authorized to receive them. In 1875 the province decided<sup>3</sup> to construct as a public work a line of railway from Quebec to Montreal, and thence ultimately to Ottawa. As large sums would be necessary to build the line, and as more money was already needed to pay railway subsidies, an Act<sup>4</sup> was passed authorizing the sale of provincial debentures to the extent of £860,000. This was done, and the amount realized was \$4,257,196.82, the rate paid being five per cent.<sup>5</sup>

*Financial position.*—At this time (1876) the province was on a sound basis financially. Since 1867 the revenue had exceeded the expenditure, and had enabled the province to save about \$2,000,000, of which some \$850,000 had been spent in the construction of public works, and the balance was in the treasury. One half of the revenue of the province was derived from the Dominion government, and most of the other half from Crown lands, which the province held to the extent of 100,000,000 acres, largely under license to lumbermen.<sup>6</sup>

*Railway expenditure and deficits.*—In 1875 the debt of Quebec was not \$4,000,000, but by the end of the fiscal year 1881-82 it amounted to nearly \$15,500,000. That this rapid increase was

<sup>1</sup> 36 Vict. chap. 2, Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> 37 Vict. chap. 2, Quebec.

<sup>3</sup> 39 Vict. chap. 2, Quebec.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, chap. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers, 1876, No. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Statement of Hon. L. R. Church, Treasurer. Quebec Sessional Papers, 1876, p. 51.

owing wholly to expenditure on railways and deficits in Consolidated Revenue fund can be seen at a glance from the following statement:<sup>1</sup>

Year.	Gross debt.	Total payments to railways.	Deficits in C. R. F.
	\$	\$	\$
1873-4.....	.....	186,051	.....
1874-5.....	3,893,333	1,010,099	67,909
1875-6.....	.....	1,517,800	14,498
1876-7.....	.....	3,841,670	81,035
1877-8.....	7,920,013	2,610,594	685,514
1878-9.....	10,839,226	2,303,749	123,123
1879-80.....	.....	501,490	483,117
1880-1.....	15,013,853	2,422,794	442,139
1881-2.....	15,549,613	911,021	208,852
Total.....	.....	14,945,271	2,106,187

Thus, in the eight years ending 1882, Quebec had spent in aid of railways an amount which was almost equal to the whole gross debt at the latter date. During that time, she had floated four large loans. Two of these have already been noticed.<sup>2</sup> The other two were contracted in 1878 and 1880 respectively. The first of these latter was for £600,000, and the Act authorizing it<sup>3</sup> specified that the proceeds were to be spent on the great provincial railway, the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental railway. The Act of 1880<sup>4</sup> authorizes the raising of a loan of £800,000 by sale of provincial debentures, "for the payment of subsidies to railway companies, for completing the Q., M., O. and O. railway, and for reimbursing the consolidated fund of the province for moneys heretofore advanced therefrom for railway purposes."

*Financial position, 1882.*—On the 4th of March, 1882, the funded debt of the province amounted to \$14,971,513, temporary loans to \$839,202, and amounts owing on account of construction of the Q., M., O. and O. railway to \$1,442,617. These sums, together with railway subsidies granted, but not yet earned, made the

<sup>1</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers—

1881-82, No. 25, Statement No. 2.

1881-82, No 11.

1887, No. 3, Statement No. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Quebec, 41 Vict., chap. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Quebec, 43-44 Vict., chap. 45.

liabilities of the province \$18,773,821.<sup>1</sup> From the date of confederation to the 30th of June, 1882, the expenditure of the province had been \$33,968,413, and the total receipts of Consolidated Fund \$33,594,297, which showed an excess of expenditure over receipts of \$374,115. It must be explained, however, that in the same period Quebec had paid out of ordinary receipts large sums for services, which, strictly speaking, were chargeable to capital, namely,<sup>2</sup>

Colonization .....	\$1,408,782
Immigration .....	387,806
Cadastrés .....	619,219
Construction of public buildings.....	823,071
Court-houses and gaols .....	440,174
	\$3,679,073

—making a total for these services that exceeded the deficit by \$3,304,947. At the end of 1882, notwithstanding the numerous loans which had been made to replenish it, the Consolidated Revenue fund showed a total deficit of over \$3,000,000, and when to this was added the cost of the new Parliament buildings, the sum of \$3,681,549 appeared as the amount for which the government was liable, in addition to the first four loans of the consolidated debt.<sup>3</sup> This condition of things was far from reassuring and, it was for the purpose of meeting these railway liabilities that two loans, aggregating \$5,500,000, were placed on the London market in this year.

*The provincial railway.*—Up to 1882 the cost of the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental railway had been over \$12,500,000, and it was estimated that its total cost at completion would reach \$14,000,000.<sup>4</sup> The road had proved a burden too heavy for the province, and therefore, when the Canadian Pacific railway, in 1882, offered to buy the western section, and the North Shore railway the eastern one, on a total contract of \$7,600,000, the government closed the bargain. By an Act of the legislature passed the same year, the proceeds of the sale were appropriated to the payment of the consolidated debt of the province, or, to be more specific, to the redemption of the loans of 1874, 1876 and 1878.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers, 1881-82, No. 25, Statement No. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Budget speech, 16th Feb., 1883.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers, 1881-82, No. 25, Statement No. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Quebec, 45 Vict., chap. 21.

*Deficits.*—During the next few years the debt continued to increase rapidly, owing to very large deficits and to the capital expenditure on the new Parliament buildings, and on the new court-houses at Quebec and Montreal. The expenditure on railways continued to be as great as ever. In the five years from 30th of June, 1882, to the end of the fiscal year 1887-88, the amount spent on the construction of the Parliament buildings was \$745,133, that on the new court-house at Quebec \$637,007, and that in aid to railways \$2,066,020, a total of \$3,448,160 for these three objects alone.<sup>1</sup> This large expenditure, combined with the deficits during the same period, caused a floating debt to accumulate, which, at the end of 1887 amounted to \$4,037,624. At the same time there were claims against the government for considerable amounts, which, though contested, had necessarily to be taken into account, so that it was decided to go into the market and place a loan of \$3,500,000. In 1888, therefore, Quebec floated her sixth loan, and the proceeds were applied in liquidation of the floating debt of the province.<sup>2</sup>

*Loans.*—This, however, was to prove but a temporary relief. In the session of 1887 an Act<sup>3</sup> was passed by which railways were to be allowed to change their land subsidies into cash at the rate of 70 cents per acre, an operation which had the effect of greatly increasing the expenditure under that head. In 1888, nearly \$3,000,000 was voted for railway subsidies, and in the same year a new debt of \$462,911 was created for the purpose of finally settling claims upon the question of Jesuits' estates. The expenditure on the Parliament buildings was still large, and it had become necessary to erect new gaols, court-houses, and normal schools in Montreal and in the counties of Ottawa and Pontiac and other parts of the province. Further, during the session of 1890 new railway subsidies, amounting to several millions, were voted as being "necessary to crown the railroad policy sanctioned by preceding legislatures."<sup>4</sup> The result of all this was that at the end of 1890 the floating debt of the province reached a total of no less than \$10,862,353, made up of the following amounts :<sup>5</sup>

1 Outstanding warrants, 30th June, 1890.....	\$ 112,571
2 Temporary deposits.....	261,361
3 Railway companies' guarantee deposits.....	1,916,685
4 Railway subsidies under 49-50 Vict. c. 76....	2,898,247
5 Balance of debts of Q. M. O. & O. railway ..	122,364

<sup>1</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers, 1894, Statement 2, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Quebec, 50 Vict. chap. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Quebec, 49-50, Vict., chap. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Quebec, 51 Vict., chap. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

6	Loss on Exchange Bank to be replaced . . . . . in sinking fund (45 Vict., c. 21)	\$27,000
7	Amount due Protestant Committee of Instruc- tion . . . . . under Jesuits' estates settlement	62,961
8	Estimated special expenditure 1890-91 . . . . .	912,183
	Total . . . . .	\$6,313,374
	Less cash on hand . . . . .	525,344
	Additional amounts . . . . .	\$5,788,030
9	Supplementary estimates special expdr 1890-91	115,448
10	Estimated special expenditure 1891-92 . . . . .	558,555
11	Railway subsidies per resolutions (23 Dec 1890)	2,544,270
12	Railway land subsidies converted into cash per same resolutions . . . . .	4,400,320
	Grand total . . . . .	<u>\$10,862,353</u>

The government obtained the necessary authority to borrow \$10,000,000 in order to meet this large floating debt, as well as to pay off railway subsidies and the additional debt likely to result from projected works. In 1891 it negotiated a loan of 20,000,000 francs on the Paris money market; but the circumstances were not favourable, and the government had to confine itself to temporary arrangements, making the loan for two years only. Thus the situation in 1891 was not promising. In that year the consolidated debt of the province was \$25,842,148, while the floating debt amounted in the aggregate to over \$8,000,000.<sup>1</sup> To offset this liability of \$8,000,000, there was only an Act authorizing a loan of \$10,000,000, by virtue of which \$4,000,000 had already been borrowed. There remained \$6,000,000 to be borrowed, to liquidate both the floating debt and the annual deficit of \$1,700,000.

In 1893 the government had to meet the loan contracted two years before. Again it was found necessary to adopt temporary arrangements with the capitalists of Paris, for another period of two years. In the spring of 1894 the province negotiated a loan<sup>2</sup> of £600,000 under authority of the Act of 1891, but 94 was the best price that could be obtained for four per cent. debentures. The credit of the province was low indeed. In the same year, an Act was passed<sup>3</sup> for the conversion and redemption of the debt. It regulated the application of the money received from the Canadian Pacific rail-

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Quebec, Hon. L. O. Taillon, 1895, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Quebec, 57 Vict., chap. 2.



way, on account of the purchase of the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental railway, to the redemption of the loans of 1874, 1876, and 1878, and further enacted that the lieutenant-governor, in connection with any conversion of debt, might in council authorize the issue of inscribed stock, bearing not more than four per cent. interest, and to be known as "Province of Quebec Inscribed Stock," which was to be in lieu of bonds, debentures, or annuities. In December, 1894, the government, in order to pay off its temporary loan of two years before, was obliged to go again to the Paris money market. This time a sixty years' loan, amounting to 27,632,000 francs, was floated at three per cent.<sup>1</sup>

The cause of these various loans, which so rapidly built up the funded debt, is found in the fact that the floating liabilities mentioned above<sup>2</sup> had to be met, and at the same time an annually recurring deficit precluded any assistance from Consolidated Fund. The deficits since 1889-90 have been as follows:<sup>3</sup>

Year.	Deficit.
1889-90.....	\$1,880,569
1890-91.....	1,444,236
1891-92.....	1,742,651
1892-93.....	24,828
1893-94.....	230,202
1894-95.....	162,661

*Present position.*—The balance sheet of the province<sup>4</sup> in 1895 shows a funded debt on June 30th of that year amounting to \$29,345,402, and temporary loans of \$1,460,000, which, together with other items—principally railway subsidies outstanding, but not yet earned,—make her total liabilities \$33,545,194. Against this are assets of \$10,019,644, leaving an excess of liabilities over assets amounting to \$22,525,550. During the year the expenditure on the public debt was \$1,486,660.<sup>5</sup>

The condition of Quebec's finances has caused the present government of that province to declare for a policy of rigid economy. Speaking in the legislature on the 26th of November, 1895, the treasurer<sup>6</sup> outlined it in these words: "We must not undertake extraordinary public works, whose cost cannot be met out of the ordinary revenue, without urgent necessity. We

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Quebec, 1895, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Budget speech, Hon. L. O. Taillon, 1895, p. 31, Statement A.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

must not grant new subsidies for railway enterprises. We must not revive subsidies which are defunct, and we must refuse, as far as public interest will permit, to transfer subsidies already voted from one enterprise to another. The policy which the government finds itself compelled to follow does not only mean that we must not increase the public debt, and must reduce it each time the occasion presents itself, but it also means that it will be necessary to practise the most rigid economy." It is to be hoped that, by adhering to this policy, the government of Quebec will be able to restore some measure of equilibrium to her finances, and at the same time reduce her large indebtedness.

TABLE No. I.  
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC—DEBT AND ASSETS.  
1882—1895.

Year ended 30th June.	Gross Debt.	Total Assets.
	\$	\$
1882.....	15,549,613	8,725,943
1883.....	16,920,460	8,724,263
1884.....	18,895,575	13,885,637
1885.....	18,871,593	13,833,404
1886.....	19,068,023	13,834,672
1887.....	19,456,379	13,845,916
1888.....	21,799,360	13,836,916
1889.....	23,945,663	13,863,284
1890.....	23,626,714	13,870,382
1891.....	25,842,148	13,915,314
1892.....	28,731,263	13,903,933
1893.....	28,574,213	13,902,024
1894.....	30,215,272	13,919,614
1895.....	33,545,194	13,850,017

*Statistical Year Book of Canada, 1895, p. 804.*  
*Budget speech, Quebec, 1895, p. 10.*

## TABLE No. II.

## STATEMENT OF COST OF QUEBEC'S DEBT.

1875-1895.

Yearending 30th June.	Interest on Debt.	Charges of Management.	Sinking Fund.
	\$	\$	\$
1875.....	123,912	4,171	26,583
1876.....	212,886	2,436	39,138
1877.....	403,766	3,409	.....
1878.....	399,237	3,375	80,048
1879.....	560,654	5,759	160,682
1880.....	568,759	6,289	1,706
1881.....	758,756	17,835	121,160
1882.....	775,531	9,120	43,774
1883.....	836,958	7,229	45,606
1884.....	909,660	6,972	47,559
1885.....	923,042	7,350	49,716
1886 .. .. .	917,716	8,049	51,994
1887.....	955,543	6,119	54,359
1888.....	1,031,516	15,349	56,845
1889.....	1,063,509	11,850	59,429
1890.....	1,171,020	26,252	62,133
1891.....	1,189,230	17,306	64,970
1892.....	1,334,886	35,436	68,121
1893.....	1,353,475	20,502	71,053
1894.....	1,336,323	27,636	73,973
1895.....	1,390,546	18,247	77,866

TABLE No. III.

STATEMENT OF TEMPORARY LOANS RECEIVED AND REPAID.  
1878-1895.

Year ending 30th June.	Loans Received.	Loans Reimbursed.
	\$	\$
1878.....	800,000	.....
1879.....	1,918,125	1,950,000
1880.....	1,050,000	500,000
1881.....	500,000	1,070,000
1882.....	1,203,849	871,813
1883.....	.....	112,429
1884.....	400,000	818,129
1885.....	450,000	424,101
1886.....	750,000	580,383
1887.....	600,000	250,000
1888.....	400,000	1,500,000
1889.....	.....	.....
1890.....	.....	.....
1891.....	2,223,333	.....
1892.....	1,400,000	2,073,333
1893.....	1,150,000	1,000,000
1894.....	870,000	2,070,000
1895.....	2,460,000	1,500,000
Totals.....	16,178,307	14,720,182
	Balance.....	\$1,458,225

*Abstract, Quebec Sessional Papers, 1894, No. 10.  
Quebec Public Accounts, 1895, p. 22.*

TABLE No. IV.

STATEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF QUEBEC AT 30TH JUNE, 1895.

## FUNDED DEBT.

Date of Issue.	Rate. per cent.	Amount of Loan. Stg. or Francs.	Currency.	Amount outstanding.
1874.....	5	£800,000	\$3,893,333	\$3,625,666
1876.....	5	£860,000	4,185,333	4,059,773
1878.....	5	£600,000	3,000,000	3,000,000
1880.....	4½	£878,000	4,275,853	3,407,153
1882.....	5	£500,000	2,433,333	2,433,333
1882.....	5	.....	1,066,500	1,066,500
1888.....	4	£722,000	3,500,000	3,500,000
1894.....	4	£600,000	2,920,000	2,920,000
1894.....	3	Frs.27,632,000	5,332,976	5,332,976
			\$30,607,329	\$29,345,402

## TEMPORARY LOAN AND DEPOSITS.

At the same date these consisted of eighteen sums of various amounts, making a total of \$2,712,151.30.

*Abstract from Public Accounts, Quebec, 1895, p. 14.*

## Province of New Brunswick.

In 1866 the debt of New Brunswick was but \$5,702,991,<sup>1</sup> yet at the time of the union, 1867, she was allowed to throw a debt of \$7,000,000 upon the federal government. She was, however, under liability for certain works, which, if proceeded with, would have brought her debt up to the mark of \$25.00 per head. Since that date New Brunswick has in the readjustments of 1873 and 1884 been allowed \$1,807,720 of additional debt.<sup>2</sup> On October 31st 1895, the general statement of New Brunswick's debt showed total liabilities of \$2,912,986, of which \$2,759,000 consisted of issues of provincial debentures. Against these the province held assets of \$591,574, which left an excess of liabilities over assets amounting to \$2,321,412.<sup>3</sup>

As in the case of Quebec, the debt is almost entirely the result of assistance to railways. Even before confederation, New Brunswick had given more to railways than any other province, in proportion to her size; and since then she has not been less liberal. Her expenditure in this direction to June 30th, 1895, including pre-confederation expenditure, reaches a total of \$4,356,300, the largest sums being given as follows:<sup>4</sup>

Albert railway. ....	\$455,000
Fredericton railway .....	230,000
Grand Southern railway .....	575,000
New Brunswick and Canada railway.....	413,000
St. John and Maine railway.....	880,000
St. John Valley and Rivière du Loup railway.....	195,000

Of the various issues of provincial debentures which in 1895 formed part of the funded debt of New Brunswick, no less than \$2,003,800 worth, out of a total issue of \$3,098,800, was for the purpose of giving aid to railway enterprise.<sup>5</sup> The summary<sup>6</sup> appended (Table No. 1) fully explains the purposes for which the debt of New Brunswick has been incurred.

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<sup>1</sup> Hon. D'A. McGee, Confederation Debates, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, part I., pp. 15 and 24.

<sup>3</sup> Public Accounts, New Brunswick, 1895, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Report Department of Railways and Canals, Canada, 1895, p. 477.

<sup>5</sup> Public Accounts, New Brunswick, 1895, p. 230.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 230.

TABLE No. I.

## NEW BRUNSWICK.

## PROVINCIAL DEBENTURE STATEMENT.

Issued in aid of	Total issue.	Redeemed.	Outstanding.
Carleton branch railway .....	\$15,000	\$15,000	.....
Chatham branch railway .....	56,000	39,500	\$16,500
St. John suspension bridge .....	65,000	59,500	5,500
Woodstock bridge .....	25,000	23,000	2,000
Petitcodiac railway .....	70,000	1,000	69,000
Andover branch railway .....	51,000	.....	51,000
St. Martin's & Upham railway .....	145,600	14,600	131,000
Maduxnaking bridge .....	10,000	.....	10,000
Grand Southern railway .....	413,000	108,000	305,000
Kent Northern railway .....	135,200	79,200	56,000
New Brunswick & P. E. I. railway .....	105,000	.....	105,000
Harvey branch railway .....	9,000	.....	9,000
Funded debt .....	250,000	.....	250,000
Cataraquet railway .....	180,000	.....	180,000
Northern & Western railway .....	321,500	.....	321,500
Black Brook branch railway .....	20,000	.....	20,000
St. Louis & Richibucto railway .....	21,000	.....	21,000
Elgin & Petitcodiac railway .....	37,000	.....	37,000
Moncton & Buctouche railway .....	95,000	.....	95,000
Albert Southern railway .....	48,500	.....	48,500
Central railway .....	139,000	.....	139,000
Imported horses .....	30,000	.....	30,000
Temiscouata railway .....	66,000	.....	66,000
St. John bridge and railway extension .....	5,500	.....	5,500
Redemption .....	287,500	.....	287,000
Public bridges .....	275,000	.....	275,000
Tobique Valley railway .....	70,000	.....	70,000
Woodstock bridge .....	150,000	.....	150,000
Wharves and grain elevator, St. John .....	3,000	.....	3,000
Total .....	\$3,098,800	\$339,800	\$2,759,000

Amount at 6% .....

\$646,000

“ 4½% .....

280,000

“ 4% .....

1,833,000

Total .....

\$2,759,000 at average rate of 4.52%

The amount of the interest, 1895, was .....

\$115,447

Balance in favor of province in Dominion Debt account... 531,185

TABLE No. II.

## PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK—DEBT AND ASSETS.

1882—1895.

Year ending 31st December.	Gross debt.	Total assets.*
1882.....	\$1,228,413	.....
1883.....	1,268,272	.....
1884.....	1,471,146	\$713,449
1885.....	1,696,918	638,449
1886.....	1,911,488	638,449
1887.....	1,999,735	596,449
1888.....	2,106,200	565,236
1889.....	2,159,749	539,449
1890.....	2,268,494	577,429
1891.....	2,484,560	590,468
1892.....	2,729,517	561,228
1893.....	2,752,297	568,733
1894, 31st October.....	2,821,484	568,654
1895, ".....	2,912 987	591,574

\*Not including public buildings. Value of public buildings, about \$370,000. Crown lands, about 7,000,000 acres at \$1 per acre.

*Statistical Year Book of Canada, p. 803.*

## Province of Nova Scotia.

The debt of Nova Scotia, at the time of the union, was stated at \$7,435,285.<sup>1</sup> By the terms of the British North America Act, 1867, she was allowed a debt of \$8,000,000, which left a balance in her favour of \$564,715. In 1869 by virtue of a special Act<sup>2</sup> she was given better terms, and her debt allowance increased to \$9,186,756. Since that date, in the two adjustments that have taken place, Nova Scotia has been allowed \$2,343,059 of additional debt by the Dominion. In July, 1895, the balance of debt in her favour in the Dominion Debt account amounted to \$1,056,274.<sup>3</sup>

Since 1882, the gross debt of the province has increased from \$98,718 to the respectable figure of \$3,346,897. Her net debt in 1895 amounted to \$1,988,094, which is equal to \$4.37 per head of

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. John Rose, 1868, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> 32-33 Vict., chap. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Public Accounts, Nova Scotia, 1895, p. 216.



her population. The following is a statement of the debt in each year since 1882:—

Year.	Gross debt.	Year.	Gross debt.
1882.....	\$ 98,718	1889.....	\$1,899,662
1883.....	1,362,237	1890.....	2,642,519
1884.....	1,014,744	1891.....	2,990,402
1885.....	1,137,878	1892.....	3,133,761
1886.....	1,162,162	1893.....	3,142,922
1887.....	1,190,245	1894.....	3,167,493
1888.....	1,431,575	1895.....	3,346,899

From this statement it will be seen that the growth of the debt, while not rapid, has been steady. As is the case with all public debts in the Dominion of Canada, Nova Scotia's indebtedness has been incurred for the purpose of aiding railways and in the construction of public works. From the general capital account of the province<sup>1</sup> it appears that \$663,023 chargeable to capital has been spent on railways by the provincial government, \$315,423 going to aid the construction of the Nova Scotia Central railway. Further, \$2,084,158 was expended on various public works, the largest sums under this head being for the construction of bridges (\$1,365,849), roads (\$593,986), and the Victoria General Hospital (\$65,402). In addition to these expenditures there is the sum of \$217,301 spent on Capital account by the Department of Public Charities, which, together with various other amounts, makes a grand total expenditure on Capital account of \$3,338,678 up to September 30th, 1895.

As is stated above, the gross debt of Nova Scotia in 1895 was \$3,346,899. This liability comprises provincial debentures payable in Halifax, \$2,043,500; debentures payable in London, \$958,733; and special loans amounting to \$344,666. On the other side were assets amounting to \$1,358,806, the principal part of which consisted of the balance of \$1,056,238 in the Dominion Debt account.

#### Province of Manitoba.

In 1870 the province of Manitoba was created, and the federal government allowed it a debt of \$472,090.<sup>2</sup> In readjustments since that time the Dominion has assumed for this province \$3,303,516 more of debt, making a total assumption up to 1895 of \$3,775,606.

Since 1882 the debt of Manitoba has increased from \$108,151 to \$4,679,794. In 1883 there was a decrease of about \$25,000 in the

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, Nova Scotia, 1895, p. 260.

<sup>2</sup> Manitoba Act, Statutes of Canada, 1870.

gross debt, but with that exception there has been a steady increase each year. In 1886 the gross debt was \$1,497,620; in 1888 it amounted to \$3,163,982, and in 1894 to \$4,656,920. Again the increase in debt must be laid to the account of railways and public works, for Manitoba, though a young province, has not been backward in giving her aid to railway construction; the loans to railways amount to \$1,855,934, and bonuses to \$770,677 more, making a total of \$2,626,523.<sup>1</sup>

The balance sheet<sup>2</sup> of this province at 31st of December, 1895, shows a total debenture indebtedness of \$4,439,859.98, but of this \$1,943,260 represents railway aid debentures handed over to and charged against the railways so aided, leaving the net debenture debt of the province \$2,496,599.98. This sum has been used to construct public institutions, such as asylums for the insane, the Deaf and Dumb Institute, the Home for Incurables, etc., and to subsidize railways<sup>3</sup> with a view to opening up the country. The province has a balance in its favour in the Dominion Debt account, which, with the other assets shown on its balance sheet, amounting in all to \$7,878,261.29, is sufficient not only to meet all debentures and other liabilities, but also to leave a surplus of \$3,198,467.48.

#### Province of British Columbia.

In 1871 British Columbia entered the union with an allowed debt of \$1,666,200, which was equal to \$27.77 per head of her estimated population.<sup>4</sup> Two important conditions of union were, that the federal government should proceed to build a railway to the Pacific coast, and that it should guarantee five per cent. for ten years on £100,000, to be spent in constructing a graving dock at Esquimalt. In 1874 it was enacted,<sup>5</sup> that instead of the guarantee \$250,000 might be advanced annually during the progress of the work by the Dominion government, the subsidy being reduced proportionately. Since 1871 the Dominion has assumed additional debt for British Columbia amounting to a capital sum of \$1,363,192, which makes a total debt allowance for the western province of \$2,029,392. The balance in favour of the province in the Dominion Debt account of 1893-94 was \$583,021.

<sup>1</sup> Report of Department of Railways and Canals, Canada, 1895, p. 478.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Manitoba, 1895, statement No. 7, p. 233.

<sup>3</sup> Statement furnished at request by D. H. McMillan, Provincial Treasurer.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> 37 Vict., chap. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. 51.

Since 1882 the gross debt of British Columbia has increased from \$800,566 to \$6,499,688 in 1895. The following statement of her debt and assets shows the increase year by year:—

Year ending 30th June.	Gross debt.	Total assets.
1882 .....	\$800,566	\$616,566
1883 .....	961,778	633,176
1884 .....	770,812	772,808
1885 .....	800,258	850,021
1886 .....	976,911	789,829
1887 .....	1,157,001	797,165
1888 .....	1,780,125	1,282,993
1889 .....	1,772,871	1,166,251
1890 .....	1,797,820	1,125,314
1891 .....	1,843,154	1,141,736
1892 .....	2,876,036	1,842,424
1893 .....	3,187,456	1,492,734
1894 .....	3,904,807	1,506,039
1895 .....	6,499,688	3,075,011

The increase of debt is again explained by the expenditure on public works. The aid to railways has been small, but there has been considerable expenditure on public buildings in various parts of the province, amounting to over \$1,675,000. In addition, very large sums have been spent during the last two years in the erection of splendid legislative buildings at Victoria, which are partly responsible for the increase of the debt in 1894-95.

*Management of debt.*—In 1891 an Act<sup>1</sup> of the British Columbia legislature was passed consolidating her debt. Therein it was enacted that whenever power is given the lieutenant-governor-in-council to borrow money by the sale of debentures or otherwise, he may borrow either in the mode prescribed by the Act authorizing the loan, or in the form of inscribed or registered stock to be termed "British Columbia Stock." Further it is provided that the lieutenant-governor-in-council may declare all or any of the debentures, issued under authority of any Act of the province, to be convertible into stock; and that he may authorize the issue of an equivalent amount of stock in exchange for debentures. Any such conversion of public securities into stock may be effected either by arrangement with holders of securities or by purchase out of money raised by the sale of new stock. To insure the fulfilment of these provisions another Act was passed in the same session,

<sup>1</sup> British Columbia, 54 Vict., chap. 13.

<sup>2</sup> 54 Vict., chap. 22.

which authorized the government to borrow a sum not exceeding £700,000, for the purpose of consolidating the debt of the province. This loan was to be raised by the sale of inscribed stock, and of the proceeds not more than £250,000 was to be applied otherwise than in the redemption of the loans of 1877 and 1887.

This process of conversion of British Columbia debentures into inscribed stock has been going on since the passing of the above Acts, and during its progress has caused an apparent, though not real increase in the gross debt during the past four years. When, however, the process of conversion is completed the burden of debt will be materially diminished. During the two years ending 30th of June, 1893, the amount of debentures of the loans of 1877 and 1887 redeemed by conversion into three per cent. inscribed stock under authority of the Loan Consolidation Act was as follows:—<sup>1</sup>

Time from—	Debentures of 1877.		Debentures of 1887.	
	6% Debentures, Am't redeemed.	3% Stock issued therefor.	4½% Debentures, Am't redeemed.	3% Stock issued therefor.
1st July, 1892. . . .	\$141,135	\$204,645.75	\$472,875	\$614,737.50
1st July, 1893. . . .	55,290	80,170.50	21,340	27,742.00
1st Jan., 1893 . . .	13,580	19,012.00	27,160	33,950.00
	210,005	303,828.25	521,375	676,429.50

## STATEMENT No. 1

## PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA—DETAILS OF DEBT, 1895.

1. Loan Act of 1874.—\$20,000.
2. Loan Act of 1877.—£100,000, being the estimated amount not converted into inscribed stock [Original loan £150,000, less estimated conversion of £50,000.]
3. Loan Act of 1887.—£90,000, being estimated amount not converted into stock. [Original loan £205,400, less estimated conversion of £115,400.]
4. Loan Act of 1891.—Estimated amount of inscribed stock, £421,300.
5. Loan Act of 1893.—£123,700.
6. Loan Act of 1895.—Authorizes the borrowing of £420,000.

*Supply Act, 1895, Chap. 51, B. C. Sessional Papers, p. 190.*

<sup>1</sup> Public Accounts, British Columbia, 1892-3, page 9.

## Province of Prince Edward Island.

The debt of Prince Edward Island in 1867 was \$244,673, or about \$2.97 per head of her population, the smallest debt of any of the provinces of Canada. In 1874 she entered the union with a debt of \$4,701,050, which was a *per capita* allowance of \$50.<sup>1</sup> The present bonded indebtedness of this province amounts only to \$185,000, at an interest rate of four per cent. There is also a floating debt, consisting of temporary loans, amounts for which the government is liable under the Loan Act of 1894, and other items, in all \$127,033.<sup>2</sup> The debt of Prince Edward Island has been incurred principally for the construction of wharves, bridges, gaols, etc. The debenture debt carries a sinking fund of 1½ per cent., or about \$2,775 annually. The debt account with the Dominion shows a balance (July 1st, 1895) of \$775,791 in favour of the province.<sup>3</sup>

Under the terms of union, the Dominion government allowed Prince Edward Island for the purchase of estates, (which had been granted by the Crown to large land-owners, and by them leased out at quit-rents to the detriment of the colony), the sum of \$900,000. Of this sum \$800,000 was to be paid to the province in cash, and interest *only* was to be given on the other \$100,000. Up to December 31st, 1895, the Dominion had paid \$760,821.56 on this "Land Purchase Account," and there remained a balance due of \$59,178.44, which forms part of the assets of the Island province at this date.

## Province of Ontario.

An account of the debt of this province, when it was known as "Upper Canada," has been given above.<sup>4</sup> It will be remembered that in 1873 the debt of the old province of Canada in excess of \$62,500,000, for which Ontario and Quebec were jointly liable, was assumed by the Dominion. Again, under the readjustment of 1884, Ontario became entitled to receive interest on a capital of \$2,848,289, which has been regularly paid by the Dominion ever since.<sup>5</sup> At the present time, Ontario, though probably the province best provided with works of public utility in the confederation, has no

<sup>1</sup> Order in Council, Windsor, 26th June, 1873.

<sup>2</sup> Public Accounts, Prince Edward Island, 1895, p. v.

<sup>3</sup> Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, Part II, p. 51

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 35.

<sup>5</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. Harcourt, Provincial Treasurer, 1896, p. 39.

debt. There are indeed railway liabilities payable in the future, extending over thirty-nine years, but even with an estimate for these there is, and has been for many years, a handsome surplus of assets over liabilities presently payable. By an Act passed in 1884, the provincial government was empowered to defer payment of accruing railway liabilities in any one year, by the issue of new forty-year certificates, to take the place of the old certificates maturing during the year in question. No new liability was created by this Act. It merely authorized the postponement of the railway obligations of each year. As a matter of fact, the government has only availed itself of this provision in seven out of the twelve years that have elapsed since the Act was passed. In 1888, 1889, 1890, 1893 and 1894 the maturing railway certificates were met out of funds in hand.<sup>1</sup> During these twelve years, moreover, Parliament buildings, asylums and other public works have been erected at a capital expenditure of \$5,000,000, thus substantially adding to the provincial assets without increasing the liabilities. The financial condition of Ontario is certainly sound and satisfactory.

The following is a statement forwarded to the Department of Agriculture at Ottawa, in response to a request for a statement of the debt and assets of Ontario.<sup>2</sup>

Year ending 31st Dec.	Railway liabilities payable in future, extending over 39 years.	Surplus of assets over liabilities presently payable.
1882 .....	\$2,813,123	\$4,825,586
1883.....	2,862,144	4,384,241
1884.....	2,709,942	6,859,666
1885.....	2,477,326	6,766,090
1886.....	2,229,344	6,680,339
1887.....	1,981,362	6,665,352
1888.....	1,733,379	6,734,649
1889.....	1,485,397	6,427,252
1890.....	1,404,620	5,809,995
1891.....	1,376,312	5,285,515
1892.....	1,401,598	5,878,758
1893.....	1,312,149	6,135,480
1894.....	1,556,410	5,269,841
1895.....	1,699,229	5,078,981

The assets include \$4,827,640 in favour of the province in Dominion Debt account. [Public Accounts, Canada, 1895, p. 51.]

<sup>1</sup> Budget speech, Hon. R. Harcourt, Provincial Treasurer, 19th Feb., 1896, p. 17.  
<sup>2</sup> Statistical Year Book of Canada, 1895, p. 805.

PART III.

LOCAL INDEBTEDNESS.





## PART III.

### LOCAL INDEBTEDNESS.

THE governments of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec publish returns from time to time showing the state of municipal finances, but no such statements are issued by the other provinces. Hence it is difficult to give even an approximate estimate of the total amount of local debt in the Dominion, though the Department of Agriculture at Ottawa, which collects these statistics, calculates it at over \$100,000,000. It is probable that this figure is rather below than above the mark.

*In Ontario and Quebec.*—In the history of municipal debts in Quebec and Ontario, what is known as the “Municipal Loan Fund” has played a prominent part; so that any account of local indebtedness in these provinces would be incomplete without some reference to it<sup>1</sup> This fund was an inheritance from the financial methods of an earlier period. It was established for Upper Canada by a statute passed<sup>2</sup> in 1852. The intention of its authors was to procure money for the use of the counties, townships, towns, and cities, at the cheap rate at which the government could obtain it. The borrowing powers given to the municipalities under the Act were unlimited in extent, but loans had to be approved by the governor-in-council, and were to be used only for the purpose of effecting public improvements.

Two years showed the evils of the system. Reckless municipalities plunged deeply into speculative undertakings, and their large expenditure brought down even provincial credit. Accordingly, an Act<sup>3</sup> was passed in 1854, by which the fund was limited to \$7,300,000, and the extent to which a municipality might borrow was defined to be 20 per cent. on the aggregate valuation of the property on its assessment roll. The same Act created the Lower

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<sup>1</sup> The account of the Loan Fund here given is from a report made on it in 1864 by Hon. John Simpson.

<sup>2</sup>16 Vict., chap. 22.

<sup>3</sup>18 Vict., chap. 13.

Canada Municipal Loan Fund, which was to be subject to similar restrictions. By Act 22 Vict., chap. 15, 1859, it was provided that further loans to Upper Canada municipalities should cease, and that only \$400,000 more should be advanced to those of Lower Canada. In both Upper and Lower Canada the payments to be made by municipalities for the use of moneys from the fund were the same, viz., six per cent. annually for interest and two per cent. for sinking fund.

At this time there was a prevailing belief in the provinces that railways must pay handsome dividends wherever located and however managed. Consequently, many of the Upper Canada municipalities and a few of those in Lower Canada hastened to secure as much of the loan fund money as possible, and to invest it in the stocks and bonds of some railway, supposed to be of local interest. Disappointment followed, and those municipalities which had borrowed largely were quite unable to discharge their liabilities. Two Acts were therefore passed to meet the difficulty. The first (20 Vict., chap. 20) provided, in the case of municipalities in default, that as it might be inexpedient to press the collection of the whole sum due, the governor might issue his warrant to the sheriff directing what rate should be levied, but that it should not be less than  $12\frac{1}{2}$  cents per dollar of the assessed yearly value of the property within the municipality. The second (22 Vict., chap. 15) provided that instead of the payments previously made by municipalities, a sum equal to five cents per dollar on the assessed yearly value should annually be paid to the government until principal and interest were paid in full. This payment was to form a first charge on the municipal funds, and no further liabilities were to be incurred by any municipality indebted to the fund until such indebtedness was discharged. It followed from these two measures that the government which was at first indirectly liable for the municipal loan fund debentures was now directly liable for them; they were therefore called in and the holders paid off. This arrangement was maintained with tolerable success until 1867.

At confederation the Municipal Loan Funds of Upper and Lower Canada were handed over to Ontario and Quebec respectively, as assets. The fund however, especially in Ontario, was anything but an asset. In 1868 there were twenty-one of her municipalities that had paid interest on their shares of the loan, and had sums at the credit of the sinking fund. Their total debt amounted to \$954,870. On the other hand twenty-six municipalities, holding

loans that reached a total of \$5,857,400, had fallen into arrears of interest to the extent of \$3,957,383, thus making their total indebtedness to the fund \$9,814,783, which sum there was little chance of recovering.

*Ontario.*—The amounts advanced to municipalities in Upper Canada out of the fund, had been disposed of as follows:—<sup>1</sup>

	Spent on railways	On local improvements.
Counties .....	\$1,380,000	\$845,000
Townships .....	812,000	15,000
Cities .....	575,000	.....
Towns .....	3,080,000	566,000
Villages .....	20,000	6,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$5,867,400	\$1,432,600
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Grand Total .....		\$7,300,000

Railways had thus absorbed eighty per cent. of the whole fund. In railway stocks was invested \$2,638,000, and \$3,229,400 more had been lent to aid railway construction. The town of Brantford had advanced \$400,000 for railways; the counties of Lanark and Renfrew \$800,000; the town of Brockville \$400,000; the town of Cobourg \$500,000; and the town of Port Hope no less than \$680,000, up to the time of Confederation.<sup>1</sup> The last named sum however was not cash, but stock taken in the Peterboro and Port Hope railway. The largest sum advanced to any municipality for local improvements was \$460,000, borrowed by the county of Northumberland and Durham, for the purpose of constructing gravel roads within the county. Goderich had spent \$40,000 on its streets, besides lending \$60,000 to a gravel road company. St. Catharines had invested \$52,000 in stocks and in loans to a gas company. Port Hope had advanced \$180,000 to its harbour commissioners and the county of Lincoln \$48,000 to a macadam road company.

In 1873 the Ontario legislature passed an Act to enable the government to recover some of the money owed to it on account of the Municipal Loan Fund.<sup>2</sup> This Act cancelled the balances due to

<sup>1</sup> Report, Department of Public Works, Canada, 1867, p. 611.

<sup>2</sup> Ontario, 36 Vict., chap. 47.

the fund by Dundas, Norwich, Prescott (town), Simcoe (town), Windham, Woodhouse and Woodstock, and reduced the indebtedness of the following municipalities to the amounts named, viz. :

Northumberland and Durham .....	\$223,665	Goderich .....	\$ 93,854
Perth .....	143,708	Hope .....	36,546
Ottawa .....	37,113	Port Hope .....	150,482
Barrie .....	2,128	Peterborough .....	72,430
St. Catherine's .....	165,182	Stratford .....	77,797
Cornwall .....	252	Brockville .....	135,375
Guelph .....	52,221	Chippewa .....	3,380
Lanark and Renfrew .....	32,269	Cobourg .....	69,580
Brantford .....	194,018	London .....	486,058
Chatham .....	103,478	Niagara .....	14,205
Elizabethtown .....	98,847	Ops .....	47,914

All other municipalities were to receive grants of various amounts from the surplus on hand, and the debentures to be issued by the indebted municipalities, or the proceeds, were to be distributed in proportion to population. Further, it was provided in the Act that the lieutenant-governor-in-council could compel the indebted municipalities to transfer any revenue-producing investments as security for the balance due, or, where such investments were greater than the debt, might require absolute transfer. Before September 1st, 1874, new debentures were to be issued by the indebted municipalities for the amounts above named, and the sums annually payable on them were to be sufficient to pay off the whole amount in twenty years. To municipalities entitled to receive grants interest was to be allowed on sums not paid by February 1st, 1874. The moneys when received were to be kept apart and applied in aid to railways, in constructing drains, building gaols, court-houses, schools, bridges, piers, etc., or to reduce obligations incurred for such work. The former obligations were to be kept in existence, as security for the new debentures of the indebted municipalities. Finally, the debts due to the Municipal Loan Fund were to be declared cancelled, so soon as the new debentures were paid off.

This "Surplus Distribution Scheme," as it was called, closed the history of the Municipal Loan Fund in Ontario. The following is a statement of payments made under its provisions up to November 1st, 1876.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quebec Sessional Papers, 1877, Vol. IX, part II, No. 10.

Total amount of principal paid .....	\$2,604,430
“ “ interest “ .....	123,000
	<hr/>
	\$2,727,430
	<hr/>
Total amount appropriated under the Act.....	\$5,115,736
Less principal as above .....	2,604,430
	<hr/>
Balance .....	\$511,306

*Quebec.*—The total amount of money advanced from the Municipal Loan Fund to the municipalities in Lower Canada was much less than in Upper Canada. It was only \$2,428,540, of which \$955,440 had been spent in aid of railways and the balance, \$1,473,100, for local purposes.<sup>1</sup> It is significant that the aid to railways was only one-sixth of that given in Upper Canada. The largest borrowers were the county of Shefford (\$215,000), the city of Three Rivers (\$220,000), and Montreal (\$800,000). The following is a statement of the position of the fund in Quebec at confederation:—

Municipalities.	Advanced for railway purposes.	Advanced for local purposes.
Counties .....	\$517,440	.....
Townships .....	211,000	\$161,275
Cities .....	210,000	876,000
Towns .....	.....	170,000
Villages .....	2,000	91,500
Parishes .....	15,000	174,325
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$955,440	\$1,473,100
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Grand total.....		\$2,428,540

From confederation until 1877, the province of Quebec received annually small payments on account of the Municipal Loan Fund. In 1877-8, however, and for the next two years, nothing was paid. This led to the passing of an Act by the Quebec legislature in 1880,<sup>2</sup> by which a special commissioner was appointed to collect moneys owing on account of the fund. It was further provided that each municipality should issue debentures to the amount of its indebtedness to the Municipal Loan Fund, which should be given to the treasurer of the province in settlement of its claim, and that upon payment of these debentures, which were to be redeemable within a period not exceeding forty years, the municipality should receive a

<sup>1</sup> Report, Department of Public Works, Canada, 1867, p. 609

<sup>2</sup> 43-44 Vict., chap. 13.

discharge for all amounts due to the fund. The province claimed the original amount of the loan, together with twelve years' interest at five per cent., less the amount of interest so far paid and the amount of the sinking fund.

Under this Act over \$500,000 was received by the province in 1881-82. Many of the municipalities, however, demurred. For instance, Sherbrooke was asked for \$50,740. The town council represented that they had understood that this loan would never be collected, that under this belief they had spent large sums, and that they were unable now to repay the amount. They offered \$31,671, which was accepted.<sup>1</sup>

Since confederation the province of Quebec has received the following sums on account of the Municipal Loan Fund :—

Year.	Amount.	Year.	Amount.
1867-8 .....	\$5,557	1881-2 .....	\$554,146
1868-9 .....	5,703	1882-3 .....	34,120
1869-70 .....	5,917	1883-4 .....	5,788
1870-1 .....	15,865	1884-5 .....	42,671
1871-2 .....	20,303	1885-6 .....	102,361
1872-3 .....	13,465	1886-7 .....	5,380
1873-4 .....	16,174	1887-8 .....	4,891
1874-5 .....	191,370	1888-9 .....	85,538
1875-6 .....	3,480	1889-90 .....	3,200
1876-7 .....	1,167	1890-1 .....	.....
1877-8 .....	.....	1891-2 .....	3,000
1878-9 .....	.....	1892-3 .....	.....
1879-80 .....	.....	1893-4 .....	.....
1880-1 .....	.....	1894-5 .....	.....

*Abstract from Quebec Sessional Papers, 1894, No. 10, Statement C.*

### Municipal Debt in Ontario.

By section 382 of the Municipal Code of Ontario every council is obliged to transmit, on or before January 31st in each year, to the Minister of Agriculture, an account of the several debts of the corporation as they stood on the 31st of December preceding, with a

<sup>1</sup>Quebec Sessional Papers, 1882-83, p. 65.

statement, giving the original amount of every debt, the date when contracted, the amount redeemed, the rate of interest, and many other particulars. This information is required both because the statistics are generally useful, and also because the government desires to keep a watchful eye on the ever increasing municipal debt. In addition to this regulation, the two following restrictions have been placed on the debt-incurring power of municipalities of Ontario :—(1) Any by-law authorizing an increase of debt must receive the sanction of those who pay taxes; and (2) the rate of municipal taxation for all purposes (exclusive of school rates) shall not exceed two cents per dollar of the assessed value.<sup>2</sup> The second safeguard has proved of little value.<sup>3</sup> A maximum of two cents per dollar is very high, and the power to borrow money may be increased indefinitely, by merely increasing the assessed value of the property. Moreover, the general introduction of the local improvement system enlarges the power to borrow, as debts incurred for such purposes are not considered part of the general indebtedness. Money borrowed to pay for waterworks, and for other works of the kind purchased or constructed by a municipality, is also in most cases not taken into account in determining whether the limit of indebtedness has been reached. Nor has the first safeguard proved very satisfactory; it is often a small vote by which the ratepayers consent that very large liabilities shall be incurred, and the more frequently they are called upon to decide such matters the smaller does the vote become. It would be better if at least a majority were required of all those entitled to vote.

The municipalities of Ontario consist of cities, towns, villages, counties, and townships, and the total local indebtedness of the province is therefore the aggregate of the debts of these five classes of communities. In 1873, the earliest date for which records are available, the total bonded debt of the municipalities of Ontario was \$16,732,225. Of this amount \$11,066,567, or about 59 per cent., was urban debt, *i. e.*, debt of towns, cities and villages. By 1894 the total local debt had trebled, and stood at \$49,118,818. No less than \$44,773,598, or about 90 per cent., consisted of urban debt, the total for the cities alone reaching \$33,562,793.<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> 55 Vict. c. 42, sec. 344.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 357, clause 1.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Commission on Municipal Institutions, Ontario, 1881, page 56.

<sup>4</sup> Return (No. 68) to order, passed by the Ontario legislative assembly, 25th March, 1895, p. 23.

following statement shows the growth of the municipal debt year by year :

Year.	Bonded debt.	Floating debt.
1873.....	\$16,732,225	\$1,067,859
1874.....	17,459,640	1,910,833
1875.....	18,973,426	1,694,392
1876.....	21,617,423	2,263,156
1877.....	21,866,809	1,390,688
1878.....	23,936,418	2,224,027
1879.....	24,965,037	1,515,276
1880.....	24,718,498	1,176,177
1881.....	25,159,635	1,605,217
1882.....	25,411,286	1,666,983
1883.....	26,366,684	2,092,930
1884.....	27,114,682	3,712,506
1885.....	28,663,771	3,920,390
1886.....	29,924,863	4,841,717
1887.....	31,943,320	5,645,208
1888.....	34,729,527	6,437,763
1889.....	38,988,332	6,493,519
1890.....	40,720,985	8,387,186
1891.....	43,888,853	7,629,730
1892.....	47,166,962	6,469,899
1893.....	48,083,243	6,796,422
1894.....	49,118,818	6,529,774

*Abstract from—*

*Report of Bureau of Industries, Ontario, 1884, Table 36.*

*do do do 1888, Part 6.*

*Return No. 68, made to Legislature, Ontario, 1895.*

### Urban Debt in Ontario.

*Cities.*—From the foregoing statement it will be seen that the growth of the local debt of Ontario has been steady for the past two decades. As noted above, the urban debt especially has increased very rapidly. The necessity of constructing sewer systems, making and paving streets, laying down sidewalks, establishing water and gas works, and giving bonuses to manufacturers and railways, all within a few years, explains the increase. There are twelve cities in Ontario, and their total debt in 1895 was not far from \$35,000,000. The bulk of this sum was made up by the debt of Toronto, which is over \$21,000,000. Hamilton, London, and Ottawa are the only other cities whose debt is over \$1,000,000. The smallest debt amongst the cities is that of Stratford, which in 1895 amounted to \$323,847. The bonded indebtedness of Belleville



in 1894 was \$411,000, largely made up of railway bonuses (\$91,000), aid to schools (\$90,000), and money expended on roads and bridges. Brantford's debt amounted to \$820,449, of which \$134,016 was local improvement debenture debt, and \$215,000 money spent on construction of waterworks. Another comparatively large debt is that of Windsor, which stood at \$866,325 in 1894. \$221,406 of this amount was spent on a sewer system, and over \$200,000 more constituted local improvement debenture debt. St. Catherine's in 1894 had a bonded debt of more than \$800,000, of which \$304,946 consisted of debentures issued to construct waterworks, and \$80,000 represented bonuses to railways.<sup>1</sup> In 1895, the liabilities of Kingston were \$913,725. Over \$60,000 was debt incurred to aid public and high schools, and \$274,000 was the amount spent on the municipal waterworks.<sup>2</sup>

In 1895, the four largest municipal debts in Ontario were those of Toronto, Hamilton, London and Ottawa, which deserve more extended notice.

*Toronto.*—The progress of Toronto in population during the past fifteen years has been very great, but the growth of its debt has more than kept pace with that of its numbers. In 1871 the general city debt was but \$2,712,207, and the local improvement debt \$92,533. By 1881, the general debt had more than doubled, and the improvement debt had increased four-fold. In 1891, ten years later, the general debt amounted to \$11,509,590, and the local improvement debenture debt to \$2,726,857. In 1895, the general debt stood at \$12,474,509, and the local improvement debt had reached the large figure of \$9,052,270, an increase in the latter of no less than \$6,325,412 in five years!<sup>3</sup> We have not far to seek for the cause of the vast increase. Rapid growth of population led to a "land boom;" streets far into the suburbs, where there was nothing but vacant land, were laid out, paved and lighted. The assessment figures show the inflation of land values. In 1881, the total assessment was \$53,540,910, in 1892 it was \$151,093,328. In 1895 it was reduced to \$146,427,000, and it is probable that the present year will see a decrease in the assessment of from \$15,000,000 to \$20,000,000.

An analysis of the present general debenture debt of the city is interesting, as showing the causes of the increase of debt. The

<sup>1</sup> Return No. 68, made to Legislative Assembly, Ontario, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> Auditor's Report, Kingston, 1895, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Statements re Debenture Debt of Toronto, issued by order of Council, 31st December, 1895.

following is a statement of the purposes for which debentures were issued, and the several amounts :

General city purposes.....	\$1,084,795
City's proportion, local improvements.....	109,449
Exhibition park.....	150,000
Ashbridge's Bay improvements.....	140,000
Gaol and House of Refuge.....	163,129
New City and County buildings.....	1,649,992
Volunteer Drill Shed site.....	111,589
Garrison Creek sewer.....	214,997
Don River improvements.....	699,991
Island breakwater.....	99,995
Esplanade.....	921,896
Railway aid.....	1,143,717
Public schools.....	1,292,667
Collegiate institutes.....	189,035
Separate schools.....	50,696
Industrial schools.....	54,206
Public library.....	60,496
Rosedale Ravine sewer.....	137,496
King Street subway.....	230,204
Queen Street subway.....	42,012
Horticultural Gardens.....	50,499
Public parks.....	145,349
Waterworks.....	3,722,287
Total.....	\$12,474,509 <sup>1</sup>

From this it will be seen that one of the greatest expenditures has been for educational purposes, amounting to \$1,532,398. The large sum of \$1,649,000 has been spent in the erection of the municipal buildings, which are not yet near completion. If to the direct railway aid we add the expenditure on the esplanade and the two subways, we get a total of \$2,337,829 which may be called expenditure incurred on behalf of railways in Toronto. On examination of the local improvement debt, it is found that the largest amount under any one head is that spent on pavements, viz., \$2,409,737; the next largest is that on sewers, \$1,869,826. In addition to these two sums, \$867,793 was expended on streets, and \$442,699 on sidewalks.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Toronto: Statement *re* Debenture Debt, 1895, p. 31.

Ibid, pp. 7-9.

The following is a statement of Toronto's debt for each year since 1871 :

Year.	General city debt.	Local improvement debt.
1871.....	\$2,712,207	\$92,533
1872.....	2,584,651	102,733
1873.....	2,674,984	122,733
1874.....	3,934,237	170,293
1875.....	4,264,307	220,884
1876.....	5,158,071	220,884
1877.....	5,949,071	322,238
1878.....	5,894,565	322,238
1879.....	6,075,791	443,705
1880.....	5,853,915	465,094
1881.....	5,902,266	621,292
1882.....	6,040,387	855,251
1883.....	6,184,338	789,951
1884.....	6,473,173	1,159,464
1885.....	7,107,470	1,112,792
1886.....	7,460,833	1,384,130
1887.....	8,333,276	1,561,346
1888.....	8,814,967	1,620,405
1889.....	11,509,590	2,583,970
1890.....	11,407,590	2,726,857
1891.....	10,092,373	5,951,809
1892.....	11,039,353	8,267,928
1893.....	11,152,353	8,953,589
1894.....	11,099,131	9,269,180
1895.....	12,474,509	9,052,270 <sup>1</sup>

Thus the gross debt on 31st December, 1895, was \$21,526,779. Sinking funds, however, reduced the general debenture debt to \$11,750,725 and the gross local improvement debt to \$5,424,160, leaving the total net debenture debt \$17,174,885 at the end of 1895.<sup>2</sup>

*Hamilton.*—In 1895, the gross debt of Hamilton amounted to \$3,812,003.<sup>3</sup> Of this sum, \$208,000 has gone in aid to educational institutions, public and high schools; \$1,587,870 has been spent in constructing waterworks; \$144,000 more for asphalt pavements, and other sums on the Public Library and House of Refuge, and as a bonus to smelting works. Her aid to railways has reached \$500,000. On December 31st, 1895, the net debt amounted to \$3,127,379.

*London.*—The debenture debt of the city of London was \$2,103,021 in 1895. This, together with a floating debt of \$218,204,

<sup>1</sup> Toronto: Statement *re* Debenture Debt, 1895, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> Financial statement, City of Hamilton, 1895, p. 107.

made the city's total liabilities \$2,321,226.<sup>1</sup> Debentures for the sum of \$515,351 were issued to raise money for the construction of waterworks; \$180,000 more was the amount contributed by London to aid the Canadian Pacific, the London and South-Eastern, and the London and Port Stanley railways. There have been two consolidations of the debt, one in 1872, to the extent of \$219,486, and one in 1895, amounting to \$1,022,000. Last year the balance sheet of the city showed total assets of \$2,742,631, which is an excess over her liabilities of \$421,404.<sup>2</sup>

*Ottawa.*—The debt of Ottawa in 1895 was \$2,682,907, and the rate of interest paid upon it averaged 5½ per cent. Of this debt no less than \$1,399,584 was incurred for waterworks construction; \$450,000 more was spent on the sewer system, \$175,000 on roads and bridges, while aid to railways came to \$100,000.<sup>3</sup>

From an examination of the debts of these four cities, it is seen that the heaviest part of the debt has been that incurred in constructing municipal waterworks. Roads, bridges, and pavements have also been very costly, and together with expenditure on sewer systems and aid to public and high schools make up the bulk of the debt. The indebtedness of the twelve cities of Ontario may now be summarized, and the purposes for which the debt was incurred specified as follows :

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<sup>1</sup> Auditor's Report, City of London, 1895, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Return to Legislative Assembly of Ontario, March 19th, 1896, p. 1.

Municipality.	Roads and bridges.	Railway bonuses.	Bonuses to manufacturers.	Municipal water-works.	Gas and electricity.	High and Public Schools.	Sewers.	Other purposes.	Local improvement debt.	Total.
Belleville .....	\$ 64,000	\$ 91,000	\$ .....	\$ .....	\$ 29,000	\$ 90,000	\$ 30,000	\$ 107,000	\$ .....	\$ 411,000
Brantford .....	45,000	50,000	20,000	215,000	.....	40,000	80,000	236,040	134,016	820,449
Guelph .....	.....	.....	.....	80,556	.....	16,181	.....	373,070	13,428	483,238
Hamilton .....	150,000	500,000	.....	942,000	.....	163,459	44,449	1,250,750	87,173	3,138,732
Kingston .....	.....	146,191	.....	278,000	.....	59,100	51,761	263,266	13,584	831,904
London .....	.....	65,000	.....	464,628	.....	50,000	.....	1,472,392	188,977	2,240,999
Ottawa .....	175,000	100,000	.....	1,399,584	.....	169,000	450,000	147,740	336,445	2,777,769
St. Catherine's .....	.....	80,000	.....	304,946	.....	8,000	30,000	349,903	33,330	806,140
St. Thomas .....	4,496	48,215	4,870	120,003	.....	9,943	24,496	133,349	111,397	459,773
Stratford .....	29,000	145,000	2,800	.....	.....	40,500	10,309	190,500	.....	358,109
Toronto .....	4,291,864	1,030,717	.....	3,732,287	.....	1,434,471	2,464,449	4,446,942	2,787,579	20,368,312
Windsor .....	.....	.....	.....	104,623	15,000	107,205	221,406	215,756	202,335	866,325
Total .....	4,759,360	2,256,125	37,670	7,642,530	44,000	2,187,861	3,566,871	9,167,105	3,911,269	33,562,793

*Towns.*—On December 31st, 1894, there were ninety-six towns in Ontario, and their total debt amounted to \$8,987,092. Though this is the latest information available, it is probable that there has been a considerable increase in the total since that date. The debt was incurred for the following purposes:—<sup>1</sup>

Roads and bridges .....	\$581,170
Railway bonuses .....	854,109
Bonuses to manufacturers.....	585,488
Municipal waterworks .....	1,528,891
Waterworks companies .....	153,217
Gas and electricity .....	322,800
High and public schools.....	1,102,398
Sewers.....	497,550
Other purposes .....	2,449,611
Local improvement debenture debt.....	911,855
Total .....	<u>\$8,987,092</u>

The largest town debt was that of Toronto Junction, \$779,093, the only one over \$500,000. The smallest was that of Thornbury, \$907. The ninety-six towns may be grouped as follows, according to amount of debt:—

33 whose debt was under .....	\$ 25,000
19 “ “ between .....	25,000 and \$ 50,000
29 “ “ “ .....	50,000 “ 100,000
14 “ “ “ .....	100,000 “ 200,000
6 “ “ “ .....	200,000 “ 300,000
1 “ “ “ .....	300,000 “ 400,000
3 “ “ “ .....	400,000 “ 500,000
1 “ “ over .....	500,000

*Toronto Junction.*—The debt of the town of Toronto Junction is worthy of special notice. At December 15th, 1895, it amounted to \$956,400, of which \$103,200<sup>2</sup> was secured by consolidated local improvement debentures. This debt is almost one-fourth of the town's assessment—\$4,508,538, and was almost wholly incurred between 1888 and 1893, during which time the town underwent a “boom” and enjoyed a period of apparent prosperity. By 1894 the total amount of debentures outstanding was close upon \$1,000,000, issued principally for the following purposes:—<sup>3</sup>

Waterworks .....	\$185,700
Public schools.....	84,074
Sewers .....	148,600
Subway.....	333,357

<sup>1</sup> Ontario, Sessional Papers, 1896, No. 68, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Financial Statement, Toronto Junction, 1895, p. 42

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

In 1894, upon the petition of the town, an Act consolidating the debt was passed by the legislature. It was, however, found impossible to dispose of the debentures authorized by this Act, and, to increase the difficulty, the corporation found itself unable to collect sufficient from the taxpayers to meet the interest on the old debentures outstanding. In 1895, therefore, the corporation again petitioned the legislature to consolidate the whole debt, including debentures issued for local improvements. Accordingly, an Act was passed<sup>1</sup> giving the town power to issue debentures for a sum not exceeding \$900,000 for the purpose of redeeming the general debt, and for a sum not exceeding \$150,000 to redeem local improvement debentures outstanding. The issue of \$900,000 was to bear interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and a special rate was to be levied by the council during the years 1895-1934 to raise an amount sufficient to redeem these debentures by January 2nd, 1935. The debentures to be issued to redeem outstanding local improvement debentures were divided into two classes, payable in 1907 and 1915 respectively, both classes to bear interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The council was authorized to compel every ratepayer to pay his quota, the penalty for arrears of fifteen days' duration being fixed at an addition of ten per cent. to the overdue payment. If the arrears continued for twelve months the corporation could seize and sell the land for taxes. It does not appear, however, that this consolidation has been any more successful than its predecessor. The financial difficulties of the town have increased rather than diminished during the past year, for, the inflation of real estate values having subsided, it has been necessary to cut down the assessment and curtail expenses. The taxes collected have been decreasing in amount, and the town appears to feel the full weight of its debt. The latest development in regard to the finances of the town has been an ultimatum handed in to the council by the bondholders (September 6th, 1896) in which the latter agree to reduce the interest on the debenture debt from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. for one year only. Should this offer be accepted, the rate of taxation for 1897 would be struck at 30 mills, which is equivalent to 13 mills on last year's assessment.

*Cobourg.*—It should be noted that in 1892 the town of Cobourg petitioned the legislature to the effect that, inasmuch as \$216,371 of its debt matured between 1891 and 1893 and could not be met, the corporation be therefore permitted to consolidate the debt. Power was accordingly given to the town to raise by way of a loan

<sup>1</sup> Ontario, 58 Vict., chap. 90.

on the credit of 35-year debentures a sum sufficient to retire the maturing debentures.<sup>1</sup> A considerable part of Cobourg's debt was incurred in making harbour improvements and in giving bonuses to manufacturers.

*Villages.*—There are one hundred and twenty-eight villages in Ontario, and in 1894 their total indebtedness was \$1,223,713, incurred for the following purposes<sup>2</sup> :—

Roads and bridges .....	\$ 36,789
Railway bonuses.....	158,970
Bonuses to manufacturers.....	104 465
Municipal waterworks.....	255,750
Waterworks companies ....	14,281
Gas and electricity.....	13,284
High and public schools .....	342,283
Sewers .....	5,988
Other purposes .....	221,935
Local improvement debenture debt .....	69,963

In 1894 fifty-two villages in Ontario had debts of less than \$5,000 each; twenty-eight others had debts of between \$5,000 and \$10,000, and thirty-eight had debts of over \$10,000 each.<sup>3</sup> The debt of Merriton, \$72,409, was the largest amongst village debts, and that of the village of Erin, \$10.16, the smallest.

#### Rural Indebtedness in Ontario.

*Counties.*—In cities, towns and villages, no by-law to raise a loan can have any legal effect until it has received the assent, by public vote, of the ratepayers of the municipality. In counties, however, the county council may raise by by-law, without submission to the electors, any sum not exceeding in a single year \$20,000.<sup>4</sup>

In 1894 the total county debt of Ontario was \$2,402,868. Of this, \$960,033 had been incurred in making roads and constructing bridges, \$540,548 was the amount of railway bonuses, and \$306,933 was local improvement debenture debt.<sup>5</sup> Twelve out of the thirty-nine counties had debts of over \$50,000. The largest debt was that of Middlesex (\$519,900), which had been almost wholly incurred in constructing roads and bridges. The other county debts of which returns have been given were as follows :

<sup>1</sup> Statutes of Ontario, 55 Vict c 67.

<sup>2</sup> Ontario Sessional Papers, 1896, No. 68, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 5 to 8.

<sup>4</sup> Municipal Act of Ontario, 55 Vict, chap. 42, sec. 344, subsect. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ontario Sessional Papers, 1896, No. 68, p. 23.



Brant .....	\$15,440	Ontario .....	\$21,645
Bruce .....	20,000	Oxford .....	149,794
Carleton .....	55,000	Perth .....	210,000
Dufferin .....	19,155	Peterborough .....	63,051
Elgin .....	15,000	Prescott and Russell ...	13,347
Essex .....	18,800	Prince Edward .....	32,280
Frontenac .....	186,774	Rainy River .....	46,794
Grey .....	26,000	Renfrew .....	45,266
Haliburton .....	9,141	Simcoe .....	53,200
Huron .....	262,700	Stormont and Dundas ...	70,391
Kent .....	33,352	Victoria .....	85,000
Lennox and Addington..	120,300	Waterloo .....	29,328
Lincoln .....	18,115	Welland .....	8,412
Hastings .....	140,130	Wellington .....	10,000
Northumberland and Dur-		Wentworth .....	31,553
ham .....	13,400	York .....	58,196 <sup>1</sup>

*Townships.*—The last class of local debts in Ontario to be considered is the “township debt.” In Ontario there are 491 townships, and according to the latest returns furnished (December 31st, 1894), their total indebtedness amounts to \$2,942,349. \$844,930 of this debt has been incurred for bonuses to railways, and \$504,293 in aiding schools. On roads and bridges \$137,783 has been spent and now forms part of the general debt. The local improvement debenture debt amounts to \$861,821.<sup>2</sup> Of the whole number of townships, 409 had a debt in 1894 of less than \$10,000 each, and the remainder were classed as follows:

48 with debts between .....	\$10,000 and \$20,000
18 “ “ .....	20,000 and 30,000
10 “ “ .....	30,000 and 50,000
6 “ above .....	50,000

In the case of these last named townships the bulk of the indebtedness was made up of local improvement debenture debt.

#### Summary.

The results of this examination into the local indebtedness of Ontario are summarized on the following page by a statement showing the total amounts by cities, towns, villages, counties and townships of the municipal indebtedness detailed above. It may be added that the ratio of debenture debt to assessed values has increased for all municipalities from 4.3 per cent. in 1886<sup>3</sup> to a little over 6 per cent. in 1894. For the cities, the ratio was 11.9 per cent. in 1886, and nearly 14 per cent. in 1894.

<sup>1</sup> Ontario Sessional Papers, 1896, No. 68, pp. 9 and 10.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Report, Bureau of Industries, Ontario, 1892, Part VII., p. xiv.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS OF ONTARIO ON 31ST DECEMBER, 1894, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSES INCURRED.  
(LATEST RETURN).

	Cities.	Towns.	Villages.	Counties.	Townships.	Total under each head.
1. Roads and bridges . . . . .	\$ 4,759,360	\$ 581,170	\$ 36,789	\$ 960,033	\$ 137,783	\$ 6,475,139
2. Railway bonuses . . . . .	2,256,125	854,109	158,970	540,548	844,930	4,654,684
3. Bonuses to manufacturers . . . . .	37,670	585,488	104,465	21,169	.....	738,793
4. Municipal waterworks . . . . .	7,642,530	1,528,891	255,750	.....	11,722	9,438,894
5. Waterworks companies . . . . .	.....	153,217	14,281	.....	650	168,144
6. Gas and electricity . . . . .	44,000	322,800	13,284	.....	1,807	381,892
7. High and public schools . . . . .	2,187,861	1,192,398	342,283	15,788	504,293	4,153,614
8. Sewers . . . . .	3,566,871	497,550	5,988	2,000	1,385	4,073,796
9. Other purposes . . . . .	9,167,105	2,439,611	221,935	556,394	576,969	12,972,015
10. Local improvement debt . . . . .	3,911,269	911,855	69,963	306,933	861,821	6,061,842
Grand totals . . . . .	33,562,793	8,937,092	1,223,713	2,402,868	2,942,349	49,118,818

Return to an Order passed by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario on 25th March, 1895, for a return showing municipal indebtedness.  
 Provincial Secretary's Office, March 19th, 1896.  
 ONTARIO SESSIONAL PAPERS, 1896, No. 68, p. 23.

## Municipal Debt in Quebec.

In the province of Quebec the powers of borrowing accorded to municipalities are limited, under the Consolidated Municipal Loan Act, to twenty per cent. of the aggregate valuation of the property in the municipality at the time of the last by-law authorizing a loan. By-laws to raise loans are only of effect when approved by a numerical majority of the proprietors who are municipal electors.<sup>1</sup> Further, the assent of the lieutenant-governor-in-council is necessary to the by-law, and proof is then required that the demands of the law have been fully met. When the interest and sinking fund of the sums borrowed by a town absorb one-half of its revenues, the council cannot contract a new loan without having been specially authorized by the lieutenant-governor-in-council.<sup>2</sup> Finally, it is made a condition precedent to the legality of any by-law authorizing the issue of debentures, that a sinking fund of at least one *per centum per annum* for each loan be provided.<sup>3</sup>

This province, like Ontario, attempts to collect statistics referring to municipal finances. The latest returns are for the year ending 31st December, 1894, and they give the total municipal liabilities of Quebec, at that date, as \$6,179,902.31.<sup>4</sup> These figures, of course, do not include the debt of the city of Montreal, and indeed so many municipalities have failed to make their returns that the total can only be regarded as approximate. Two-thirds of the amount here given as the municipal liability is made up of the liabilities of only eleven towns, viz., Sorel, Valleyfield, Longueuil, Maisonneuve, Ste. Cunégonde, St. Henri, Levis, Hull, Sherbrooke, St. Hyacinthe and Three Rivers. When this fact is known it will be apparent that the debts of the hundreds of other municipalities in Quebec are insignificant. Wherever they do amount to any considerable sum, they are largely the result of aid given to railways; for example, the largest county debt stated is that of Pontiac, \$214,650, and of this amount \$100,000 is liability incurred in aiding the Pontiac and Pacific Junction railway.<sup>5</sup> The total amount of aid given to railways by the municipalities of Quebec (excepting Montreal) is \$3,309,074, or over fifty per cent. of their total liability as stated in 1894.<sup>6</sup> Besides the municipalities

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<sup>1</sup> R. S. Q., 1888, c. 29, sec. 354.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 355.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 349.

<sup>4</sup> *Rapports Municipaux pour l'année 1894, Quebec.*

Report, Department of Railways and Canals, Canada, 1894, p. 486.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 487.

above named, sixteen municipalities had liabilities exceeding \$25,000 each in 1894.<sup>1</sup>

### Urban Debt in Quebec.

By an Act<sup>2</sup> passed by the legislature of Quebec in 1889, Montreal was given permission to issue permanent debenture stock to an amount not exceeding 15 per cent. of the city's total realty assessment. Enough of the proceeds of such issue was to be set aside and used exclusively to redeem the existing debt, and the remainder was to be used for waterworks, drainage, street improvement, public markets and hospitals.<sup>3</sup> In 1894 an Act in amendment was passed<sup>4</sup> limiting the borrowing power of the city for the next four years to 15 per cent. of an assessed value not exceeding \$160,000,000, and thereafter to 15 per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property. It was understood that \$1,000,000 of the new loan was to be used to meet the present engagements, and that the balance in annual payments of \$375,000, extending over the four years to come, was for carrying out permanent improvements during that time.

The debt of Montreal deserves notice as the largest municipal liability in Canada. On the 31st of December, 1894, the funded debt had reached a total of \$23,459,094, made up as follows :

7 per cent.	Permanent registered stock	\$ 586,500
7	“ Terminable registered stock	51,000
6	“ Registered stock	678,400
5	“ Registered stock	240,000
5	“ Sterling bonds	3,586,727
4	“ Stock and bonds	2,931,800
3	“ Sterling loan, 1888-90	7,008,000
4	“ Terminable stock of 1892	4,866,667
4	“ “ “ 1893	200,000
4	“ “ “ 1894	2,000,000
3½	“ Harbour improvement loan	1,000,000
7	“ Hochelaga bonds	90,000
7	“ St. Jean Baptiste bonds	35,000
7	“ Côté St. Louis bonds	20,000
7	“ “ “	100,000
6	“ St. Gabriel bonds	65,000

\$23,459,094

[*Report of the Treasurer of Montreal, 1894, p. 77.*]

<sup>1</sup> Rapports Municipaux, Quebec, 1894.

52 Vict., chap. 79.

Ibid, sec. 130.

57 Vict., chap. 56.

During 1895 there was no addition to the funded debt. As a matter of fact the law of 1889, which limited the city's borrowing power to \$24,000,000, prevented any large increase of the debt. But the expenditure in excess of revenue arising from the engagements contracted by committees over and above their annual appropriations, which had been carried forward from year to year, amounted to \$800,000, and the legislature authorized the transfer of this sum to the consolidated debt. This addition, with another transfer made at the previous session has so reduced the available borrowing power of the city as to interfere seriously with its ability to carry out its obligations.<sup>1</sup> On December 31st, 1895, Montreal had a floating debt of \$5,968,319, which, added to the funded debt, made a total liability of \$29,427,413.<sup>2</sup> It has been incurred by expenditure on waterworks, parks, markets, opening and paving streets, harbour improvements, etc. The following are some of the largest items<sup>3</sup>:

Waterworks.....	\$8,618,806
Mount Royal Park.....	1,033,337
Market properties.....	849,972
City hall.....	524,338
Streets—opening and widening.....	3,290,861
sewers.....	1,493,379
pavement.....	3,868,784
Grant to railways.....	769,012
Harbour improvements..	603,129

The lavish expenditure of Montreal during the past few years has finally resulted in financial embarrassment, and means of extricating the corporation from its difficulties are now under discussion. The borrowing power of the city is limited to \$26,838,000, but that figure has been exceeded by \$407,164. It is absolutely necessary (1896) not only to pay off the excess, but to meet further engagements amounting to \$522,606. Moreover, there are works estimated to cost about \$500,000 which must be carried out, but which cannot be paid for out of current revenue. It was decided some time ago to ask the legislature to increase the borrowing power by \$2,000,000, but a refusal was anticipated, as the present limit, established in 1893, was fixed on the distinct understanding that it should last for four years. The council, therefore, have decided that in case of refusal the legislature should be asked to authorize the

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Treasurer, City of Montreal, 1895, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Treasurer, Montreal, 1894, p. 76.

city to make a temporary loan of \$1,500,000 for a period not exceeding two years, to be issued only as required for certain specified purposes. By this means another year will be tided over and then the borrowing power can be extended. In the meantime, there is a possibility that the assessment may be largely increased by bringing the vacant property of religious institutions into the classification of taxable property.

The total debt of the municipality of Quebec is \$6,458,016, over two-thirds of which is held in England. The part payable in Canada amounts to \$2,036,750, including \$572,900 of permanent or non-redeemable debentures.<sup>1</sup> This indebtedness is made up of loans contracted in building an aqueduct, in developing a sanitary system, in providing electric light, public halls, civic hospitals, etc. A considerable part of the debt will shortly mature, and for some time past various projects of conversion have been discussed. In 1896 the city tried to raise money by the sale of new debentures, to redeem its outstanding liabilities, but the attempt has not so far been successful.

Montreal and Quebec are the only municipalities in the province of Quebec whose net debt exceeds \$1,000,000. It will, therefore, be sufficient to give a bare statement of the amount of the respective debts of the other important towns of the province. It should be remembered that no small part of the debt of these towns, as well as of that of other municipalities in the province, consists of debentures, issued under the law of 1880,<sup>2</sup> to cancel their indebtedness to the Lower Canada Municipal Loan Fund.<sup>3</sup>

Town or city.	Net debt.	Total assessment.
Hull.....	\$417,400	\$2,504,795
Sherbrooke.....	282,814	3,946,650
Joliette.....	131,450	706,405
St. Hyacinthe.....	423,693	2,924,675
Lachine.....	142,000	1,807,300
Lauzon.....	162,000	1,769,014
Lévis ..	269,000	3,512,641
Ste. Cunégonde.....	505,600	3,213,579
Westmount.....	700,000	7,428,430
Valleyfield.....	198,705	2,307,580
Three Rivers.....	536,124	2,577,675

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Treasurer, City of Quebec, 1895-96, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> 43-44 Vict., chap. 13, (Quebec).

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 65.

## Local Debts in Other Provinces.

As has been before stated, no reliable statistics of the indebtedness and assessment of the counties and townships of either the western or the maritime provinces are at present available. It is not likely that the amounts are very great, and therefore a statement of the debts of the more important towns will be sufficient to give an approximate idea of the total municipal indebtedness in these provinces.

*New Brunswick.*—The largest municipal debt in New Brunswick is that of St. John. In 1868 the net debt of this city was \$654,367; in 1880 it was \$1,258,303. Ten years later it amounted to \$2,733,702, and in 1895 stood at \$3,026,748. It should be explained that in 1888 St. John annexed the town of Portland, and that the various liabilities then assumed for that municipality caused an increase of \$1,605,555 in the debt.<sup>1</sup> On December 31st, 1895, the funded debt of St. John was \$3,026,748, which, together with a floating debt of \$431,748, made her total liabilities \$3,457,020.<sup>2</sup> Of the funded debt, \$1,327,421 was incurred in construction of waterworks, \$238,150 was for sewerage, and the balance for wharfs, piers, bridges and street improvements.<sup>3</sup> St. John's credit in the money market is very good, her bonds selling freely at 104-105. In 1894 the city disposed of 4 per cent. sterling bonds for an amount equal to \$528,000 at £99 16s.<sup>4</sup>

The balance sheet of the city of Moncton on the 31st of December, 1895, showed liabilities amounting in the aggregate to \$201,858, of which \$141,500 was general debenture debt, and \$15,500 school debenture debt.<sup>5</sup> In addition, however, the city has assumed \$60,000 worth of bonds issued by the Moncton Gas, Light and Water Company, and has also issued bonds amounting to \$350,400 for the purchase of the property of the company, thus creating a total bonded indebtedness for gas and water alone of \$410,400.<sup>6</sup>

The capital of New Brunswick is Fredericton, a town with a population of some 8,000 persons. At the end of 1895 its total liabilities were \$251,089, of which \$244,000 was debenture debt, divided as follows:—<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Special Committee of the Council of St. John, 1895, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Accounts of City of St. John, 1895, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Special Committee, 1895, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> Reports on the city government of Moncton, 1895, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Accounts of the City of Fredericton, 1895, p. 56.

Consolidated debt debentures .....	\$ 41,000
Sewerage and water “ .....	106,000
Almshouse “ .....	4,000
City of Fredericton “ .....	33,000
School “ .....	60,000

The only other town of importance in New Brunswick is St. Stephen, whose net debt in 1895 amounted to but \$84,500, and whose total assessment in the same year was \$1,124,655. This town has had its waterworks built by an incorporated company to which it pays an annual rental of \$1,800.

*Nova Scotia.*—In 1868 the net debt of Halifax was \$937,300; in 1885 it was \$1,699,401, while in 1895 it reached a total of \$2,915,916.<sup>1</sup> Of this debt \$2,371,100 consisted of consolidated stock at 4 and 5 per cent., and the balance was made up of \$70,000 sewerage and \$50,000 City Hall debentures, of \$254,600 in debentures issued for public school buildings, and of \$131,666 old water-works debentures. The average rate of interest paid was 4 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. The total of the debenture debt just stated includes the cost of water-works up to that date, viz. \$976,906.

In 1880 the debt of the town of Dartmouth was \$16,700, while on the 31st of December, 1895, it amounted to \$326,800; \$138,500 of this was incurred in the construction of waterworks, and \$150,000 more consists of a loan made for the purpose of purchasing a ferry, which is now self-sustaining. In 1895 the sinking fund attached to the issue of sewerage debentures amounted to \$9,540, thus leaving the town's net debt at \$317,260.<sup>2</sup>

The financial position of the other towns of any importance in Nova Scotia in 1895 may be briefly stated as follows:—

<sup>1</sup> Treasurer's Report, Halifax, 1894-5, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> Annual Report of the Mayor of Dartmouth, 1895, p. 5.



Town.	Net debt.	Average rate of interest paid.	Total assessment.
	\$	%	\$
Amherst .....	127,500	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,866,206
Stellarton .....	5,000	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	221,600
New Glasgow .....	215,000	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,150,000
Parrsborough .....	8,000	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	412,158
Kentville .....	39,500	4	487,334
North Sydney .....	23,510	5	811,200
Lunenburg .....	82,000	5	1,169,175
Springhill .....	15,600	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	792,756
Sydney Mines .....	None.	.....	271,163
Sydney, Cape Breton.....	65,000	7	787,000
Windsor .....	58,000	4	1,602,510
Truro .....	92,500	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,824,000
Yarmouth <sup>1</sup> .....	413,000	.....	.....

*Prince Edward Island.*—The only two municipalities of importance in this province are Charlottetown and Summerside. The debt of the former in 1888 was only \$111,800, the increase in the ten years preceding that date being but \$22,255. The cost of the municipal waterworks of Charlottetown was \$165,000.

The town of Summerside has a population of about 3,000, and a total assessment of \$1,342,620. In 1895 its general debt was \$4,500, but added to this was an issue of school debentures amounting to \$11,500, making the town's total bonded liability \$16,000.<sup>2</sup>

*Manitoba and the Territories.*—According to the Municipal Act of Manitoba every by-law for raising money, except it be for a work payable wholly by local assessment, must receive the assent of at least three-fifths of all resident, legally qualified electors, as well as at least three-fifths of all the electors actually voting, before it is considered as passed.<sup>3</sup> In cities, however, a majority of all legally qualified electors, as well as three-fifths of those voting, is enough. Except in the case of cities, the whole of the debt must be made payable within twenty years at furthest from the date of the by-law. In cities the debentures may be made payable at any time not exceeding thirty years, except in the case of Winnipeg, which may issue debentures payable at any time within fifty years.<sup>4</sup> A sinking fund must be provided for in

<sup>1</sup> Report of H. L. Gaudey, Treasurer of Yarmouth.

<sup>2</sup> Financial Statement of the town of Summerside, 1895, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> R. S. Man., 1891, chap. 100, sec. 397.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 398.

the by-law, except in the case of Winnipeg, where it is not compulsory. No debentures may be issued by any rural municipality so as to make the aggregate debt exceed an amount equal to ten cents per acre of the lands alienated from the Crown within the municipality,<sup>1</sup> and no debt may be contracted which might increase its total indebtedness to such an extent that the amount to be raised annually for all municipal purposes exceeds a rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. upon all the taxable property within the municipality.<sup>2</sup>

The Municipal Act of Manitoba provides that the borrowing powers of the city of Winnipeg shall be restricted to \$3,000,000, until the value of the real estate according to the last revised assessment roll amounts to \$25,000,000, but that the amount of sinking fund for the time being at the credit of the city shall be considered as a reduction of the debt.<sup>3</sup> By the same Act it is directed that the management of the city's sinking funds shall be in the hands of three commissioners, two of whom shall be appointed by the Court of Queen's Bench, and the third by the council from among its members.<sup>4</sup> On April 30th, 1895, the end of the civic fiscal year, the total amount of general debentures outstanding was \$2,464,683. There were also local improvement debentures of \$473,810.<sup>5</sup> The bulk of the general debenture debt has been incurred for the following purposes:<sup>6</sup>

Sewers, firehall, etc .....	\$1,057,836
Bridges.....	322,500
C. P. R. bonus .....	200,000
Streets—widening and paving.....	762 600

In 1895 the total assessment was \$22,168,990, and the rate of taxation 20 mills. The average rate of interest paid on the debt was 5.62 per cent.<sup>7</sup>

In 1895 the net debt of Brandon was \$528,053, and its total assessment \$3,098,138. The debt had been only \$73,986 in 1882, by 1890 it had increased to \$263,055, and in the last five years it has doubled. In 1893 the town built waterworks at a cost of \$15,000.

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<sup>1</sup> R. S. Man., 1891, chap. 100., sec. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 404.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 566.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 556.

<sup>5</sup> Comptroller's Report, City of Winnipeg, 1895, p. 177.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 189.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 194.

In the North-west territories the principal towns are Calgary (population 4,000), and Prince Albert (1,500). The net debt of the former is \$83,300; it possesses waterworks, built at a cost of \$100,000. The net debt of Prince Albert is \$28,200, and its total assessment \$806,528.

*British Columbia.*—In British Columbia two restrictions are placed upon the borrowing power of municipalities: first, the aggregate of the debts of any municipality must not exceed thirty per cent. of the realty assessment according to the last revised assessment roll, and second, by-laws for raising money on the credit of any municipality require the assent of a majority of the electors, only ratepayers being allowed to vote.<sup>1</sup>

The capital of British Columbia is Victoria, which, though a young city, has grown very fast. In 1895 the total bonded debt amounted to \$1,824,000 and the total assessment to \$16,757,805. The principal items which have helped to roll up this debt have been the following:<sup>2</sup>

Waterworks .....	\$545,000
Sewers and drains .....	560,000
Lighting .....	71,000
Streets and bridges .....	170,000

The average rate of interest paid on the debt is 5 per cent. On the 31st December, 1895, the balance sheet of the corporation showed an excess of liabilities over assets amounting to \$1,425,692.<sup>3</sup>

In 1890 the net debt of New Westminster was \$286,420, and in 1895 it amounted to \$890,262. In this debt are included three issues of waterworks debentures of a total value of \$455,000, and \$116,000 of electric light debentures. The sum of \$155,000 has been spent in aid to railways and the balance of the debt has been contracted in making streets, improving parks, etc.<sup>4</sup> In 1895 bonds were issued for a new loan of \$20,000, and they sold at a premium of 10.10, showing that the corporation possesses first-rate credit.<sup>5</sup>

Since 1887 the net debt of Vancouver has increased from \$191,000 to \$571,000. During the same time, however, the total assessment has gone up from \$2,619,877 to \$15,253,874. The average

<sup>1</sup> B. C. Consolidated Acts, 1888, chap. 88, sec. 91-92.

<sup>2</sup> Financial Report of the city of Victoria, 1895, p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 74.

<sup>4</sup> Financial statement of the city of New Westminster, 1895, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 1.

rate of interest paid on the bonded debt during the past five years has been 5 per cent.

We have now reached the conclusion of the account of local debts in Canada. From the statements given above it must be apparent that municipal indebtedness in the Dominion has increased rapidly. It may be noted that, should a municipality allow its securities to go to default, the remedy which the bondholders have under Canadian law is clear. In every municipality the ratepayers and their property are liable to assessment to meet the indebtedness under the bonds, and on a judgment obtained and a writ issued the sheriff may make such assessment and levy the taxes under it.











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