

103  
**U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA**

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Y 4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-355

U.S. Policy in Somalia, S.Hrg. 103-...

**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
**ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS**  
**FIRST SESSION**

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JULY 29, 1993  
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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## U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA

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THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1993

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Dodd, Simon, Mathews, Kassebaum, Pressler, Jeffords, Coverdell, and Gregg.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order. We are holding this hearing today to examine the involvement of U.N. peacekeepers in Somalia. U.S. forces have been playing a leading role in this effort, and this is now a critical juncture for U.S. policy toward that embattled country.

I am very pleased indeed to welcome Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, and I believe Lieutenant General Sheehan will be joining us as well.

I would like especially to hear their judgments on the current and anticipated role of U.S. forces within the larger peacekeeping operation. There has been a good deal of debate in the Senate recently regarding the circumstances under which our forces should be participating in this U.N. campaign. Therefore, it must be made clear to this body and to the American people what direction the UNOSOM II operation is going to take.

I continue to support U.S. involvement in helping to ensure a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian relief, but questions remain as to whether a short run military action would really address the broader issues which keep Somalia a potentially destabilizing force in the Horn of Africa.

Like many of my colleagues, I want to be sure that if we move beyond the humanitarian missions, we do so with the knowledge and concurrence of the Congress. I certainly look forward to hearing Mr. Tarnoff and General Sheehan address these views, which I welcome.

But I would also take this occasion to remind my colleagues that as soon as we have a quorum of 11 members we will break for a business meeting to vote on a long list of nominees, including that of Vice President Mondale. In this connection, I would hope that we could vote around 10:30 a.m., so I would ask the staff here to try to get the Senators here as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to remind members of the committee of the luncheon today with Mr. Annan, the U.N. Secretary General for Peacekeeping. In view of our hearing this morning on Somalia and

the evolving situation in Bosnia, the discussions on peacekeeping will be very timely.

And as the chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, I recognize Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Chairman, first of all I welcome Secretary Tarnoff. I want to apologize to you. At 10:30 a.m., the Judiciary Committee is going in to vote on Judge Ginsberg, and I am going to have to leave at that point.

I do want to underscore your remarks, Mr. Chairman. I think you are absolutely correct. I know that there are those in the Senate now who say let us run, let us leave Somalia. I cannot think of anything that would be more counterproductive.

President Bush's finest hour, in my opinion, was when he made the decision to go in and rescue all these people in Somalia. I had the privilege of being there just a few days before the decision was made, and to visit with the President and others on that decision. It was a desperately needed decision.

We have asked other nations to join us in that effort. Early on, the United States had committed around 30,000 troops; now we are back down to about 4,000. We have asked other nations to join us, and 22 nations have done so.

For us now to say, sorry, we are running into a few bumps along the road and are going to hightail it out of here, I think would be absolutely irresponsible. I think that it is essential that we act convincingly and join other nations in seeing to it that a government is established in Somalia.

Will mistakes be made? Yes, we are going to make some mistakes, but we are also learning. This is a new process for the U.N. And I think it is extremely important that the United States do the responsible thing at this juncture.

So, I just wanted to underscore what you have said Mr. Chairman. And I see my colleague Senator Kassebaum coming in now. She has basically said the same thing on the floor of the Senate, and I commend her for her statement on the floor. I think we have to continue to do the responsible thing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe the ranking member of the African Subcommittee would like to speak?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I will speak as a former ranking member. As you know, Senator Jeffords has taken over that responsibility with great skill. But I am still a member of that subcommittee and I am deeply committed to what happens there.

First, I would like to apologize to Under Secretary Tarnoff. I have to leave early and will not be able to hear the full hearing.

But it is an important hearing, and I would just like to make a few comments and express, as Senator Simon has, strong support for the U.N. operation in Somalia.

While I share concern about the many aspects of the situation in south Mogadishu, it is important to keep in mind that real progress is being made in the rest of the country. And I think many times that is a story that is not told.

The famine is over as a whole. The feeding centers have been turned back into schools. Much is returning to normal.



Second, I strongly agree with Admiral Howe that the U.N. must move to apprehend General Aideed. He is someone who has continually tested the U.N. He is, in many ways, a thug in how he has handled his role in trying to restore stability to his own country. The sooner he is brought to justice, I think, the better the entire U.N. operation will succeed and the country will be more quickly restored.

And finally, I believe it is essential that the United States stay the course in Somalia. We have invested substantial resources in that country and we must be willing to continue to support the U.N. peacekeeping effort and to help rebuild the Somalia economy. Too much has been accomplished to give up now.

I worry, Mr. Chairman, that so often as the cameras move on, our own interests move on. And just as General Aideed has been a problem I think that there are other, of course, so-called warlords who were contending there who must become part of the process as well, and be able to share in the responsibilities there, and give up their own contention for power and the heavy weaponry they possess. It seems to me it has to be a level playing field in order to start successfully rebuilding.

It is essentially going to be up to the Somali people, but we have had great confidence in their being able to do so if they could ever start back again with the security and stability that is needed to rebuild their country.

So, I very much appreciate the hearing and your participation today, and I say this to General Sheehan as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I am very glad that we have been joined by General Sheehan. Welcome to the committee, too. Secretary Tarnoff, if you would lead off.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, good morning. The members of this committee have maintained the long and steadfast concern for the situation in Somalia, and I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you why we are in Somalia today and why we should be steadfast in our commitment to see that the U.N. mission there is a success.

American forces are in Somalia today, approximately 3,000 logistical forces under UNOSOM command, and approximately 1,000 in the quick reaction force because it is in America's interests to have them there. It is in America's interests to preserve the gains of the humanitarian relief effort which began with Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF, and it is in America's interest to ensure that the U.N.'s first multinational peace enforcement effort under chapter VII of its charter is a success.

The U.N., with the leadership and support of the United States, has accomplished a great deal in Somalia in a relatively short time. The famine is over. As a result, the U.S.-led UNITAF operation that ended in May 1993 secured deliveries of humanitarian relief to the most deeply affected areas of Somalia. While pockets of suffering remain, large scale starvation has been eliminated.

We have revived the process of political reconciliation. Out of the ruins of a civil war, the U.N. encouraged a broad spectrum of Somali leaders to join in a process to forge national reconciliation. The Addis Ababa accords, which UNOSOM is helping to implement, required signatories to observe a cease-fire and commit themselves to the complete disarmament.

Shortly after the signing of the accords and passing resolution 814, the Security Council charged UNOSOM with the reconciliation of political factions, the rehabilitation of the Somali economy, the revival of local administration, the repatriation of refugees, and the restoration of a local police force.

Despite the violence in southern Mogadishu, we have seen this process begin to bear fruit. In Kismayu, where Belgian troops are maintaining security, tribal elders are conducting peace talks under UNOSOM sponsorship. Measurable movement toward reconciliation is taking place outside the capital and other areas.

The third significant accomplishment in Somalia is the organization of the U.N.'s first multinational peace enforcement force. It is an important accomplishment that the U.N. Security Council organized UNOSOM II as a peace enforcement mission with teeth.

In a world rife with humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict, the authorization of such a force is a landmark accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate. UNOSOM is a model worth promoting. While the costs of America's contributions are significant, especially in these times of fiscal constraint, we should welcome the opportunity to advance our humanitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement.

The United States now provides approximately 4,000 of the roughly 21,000 troops now in Somalia. If conditions permit, we expect this number of American troops to drop to approximately 1,400 by yearend.

There is no question that UNOSOM still has a long way to go in helping the Somali people recreate a functioning government capable of rebuilding civic society and preventing a return to anarchy and starvation. Maintaining a secure environment in a country where a 2-year civil war has destroyed nearly all civil institutions and services is a formidable task.

Unfortunately, this cannot be accomplished either quickly or bloodlessly. The process of nation building will take time. Restoring order, enabling a Somali police force to assume responsibility, and permitting the district and national councils to develop will occur slowly.

For UNOSOM to accomplish its mission it must restore a secure environment, including the cantonment of weapons so that political reconciliation can occur.

General Aideed's unprovoked attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu on June 5 represented a fundamental challenge to UNOSOM's mandate to provide humanitarian assistance and foster reconciliation. The U.N.'s response was necessary and appropriate. If Aideed were to succeed in his attempt to throw the disarmament and reconciliation processes off track, we would see a resumption of lawlessness and violence, a return of famine, and the humiliation of the U.N. and U.S. efforts at peace enforcement.

All Somali factions must understand that flagrant violation of the accords and attacks on UNOSOM will not go unpunished. In fact, from discussions with countless Somalis, we conclude that the vast majority deeply regret the killings and strongly support UNOSOM.

Aideed and his armed thugs' brutal response to UNOSOM's effort to restore order in Mogadishu require that UNOSOM use all necessary means to ensure that one faction's rejection of peace does not undermine the success of the overall operation.

UNOSOM has suffered from some lapses of political coordination and from disagreements on command and control. But given the unprecedented nature of the operation itself, this should not be surprising. We believe that these obstacles can be overcome.

UNOSOM and the Secretary General are working with the support of the United States and other troop contributing nations to refine UNOSOM's internal coordination arrangements. A U.S. interagency team is en route home after conducting an assessment of the current situation in Somalia. It can be expected the team's report will provide us with ideas that we can share with the U.N. on improving UNOSOM's performance.

By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that although UNOSOM is a multinational U.N. operation, the United States has, we believe, an important supportive role to play. We should continue to provide support and advice to UNOSOM's leadership. We should support UNOSOM's efforts to restore order to southern Mogadishu, including the use of force where this is necessary and appropriate to enforce its mandate. And we should support the U.N.'s effort to use multinational coalitions for peacekeeping in troubled regions.

We have often said that we cannot always be the world's policeman, that other nations must share the burden of peacekeeping, and that we will play a leadership role in helping make these efforts effective. We must now match our words with deeds by supporting UNOSOM's mission in Somalia.

If we succeed, the burden of deterring would-be tyrants and warlords will be an easier one. But if we fail, there is little doubt to whom the demands for relief will be directed. We owe it to ourselves and to the Somali people to help UNOSOM to succeed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tarnoff follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. TARNOFF

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: You and the members of this committee have maintained a long and steadfast concern for the situation in Somalia. I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you why we are in Somalia today and why we should be steadfast in our commitment to see that the U.N. mission there is a success.

#### I. WHY WE ARE IN SOMALIA

*American forces are in Somalia today.*—3,000 logistical forces under UNOSOM command and about 1,000 in the Quick Reaction Force—because it is in America's interest to have them there.

—It is in America's interest to preserve the gains of the humanitarian relief effort which began with Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF; and

—It is in America's interest to ensure that the U.N.'s first multinational peace-making effort under Chapter VII of its charter is a success.

## II. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

The U.N., with the leadership and support of the United States, has accomplished a great deal in Somalia in a relatively short time.

*The famine is over.*—Operation Restore Hope was launched in December 1992 with one goal in mind—helping to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in the southern half of Somalia to end the man-made disaster which had claimed 300,000 lives.

- As a result, the U.S.-led UNITAF operation that ended in May 1993 secured deliveries of humanitarian relief to the most deeply affected areas of Somalia. While pockets of suffering remain, large scale starvation has been eliminated.
- Death rates dropped quickly and dramatically.
- Relief workers fashioned an efficient structure for delivering aid that continues today.

*We have revived the process of political reconciliation.*—Out of the ruins of a civil war, the U.N. encouraged a broad spectrum of Somali leaders to join in a process to forge national reconciliation which led to the March Addis Ababa Accords. These Accords, which UNOSOM is helping implement, required signatories to observe a ceasefire and commit themselves to complete disarmament.

Shortly after the signing of the Accords, in passing resolution 814, the Security Council charged UNOSOM with the ambitious agenda—nothing short of rebuilding a nation.

- In addition to the continued provision of humanitarian aid, UNOSOM was tasked with the reconciliation of political factions, the rehabilitation of the Somali economy, the revival of local administration, the repatriation of refugees and the restoration of a local police force.

Despite the violence in Southern Mogadishu, we have seen this process begin to bear fruit.

- In Kismayu, where Belgian troops are maintaining security, tribal elders are conducting peace talks under UNOSOM sponsorship.
- Measurable movement towards reconciliation is taking place outside the capital. 13 District Councils have been established so far by UNOSOM officials. Additional Councils will be in operation shortly, some in a number of formerly troublesome spots like Baidoa and Belet Weyne.

*The third significant accomplishment in Somalia is the organization of the U.N.'s first multinational peacemaking force.*—It is an important accomplishment that the U.N. Security Council organized UNOSOM II as a peacemaking mission with teeth.

- Resolution 814 authorizes UNOSOM II to assume a security enforcement role: the resolution requests the Secretary General to “assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.”
- The force itself is truly multinational. A force of 28,000 troops is authorized.

There are 21,000 troops from 27 countries now in Somalia.

In a world rife with humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict, the authorization of such a force is a landmark accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate, not castigate.

UNOSOM is a model worth promoting. While the costs of America's contribution are significant, especially in these times of fiscal constraint, we should welcome the opportunity to advance our humanitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement.

- The U.S. provides 4,000 of the 21,000 troops now in Somalia. If conditions permit, we expect this number will drop to 1,400 by year end.

## III. RESTORING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO UNOSOM'S—AND SOMALIA'S—SUCCESS

There is no question that UNOSOM still has a long way to go in helping the Somali people recreate a functioning government capable of rebuilding civic society and preventing a return to anarchy and starvation.

“Maintaining a secure environment” in a country where a two year civil war has destroyed nearly all civil institutions and services is a formidable task. Unfortunately this cannot be accomplished either quickly or bloodlessly.

- The process of nation building will take time: restoring order, enabling a Somali police force to assume responsibility, and permitting the district and national councils to develop will occur slowly.
- The U.N. anticipated UNOSOM's need for a credible force by establishing it under Chapter VII, authorizing a substantial complement of troops and permitting rigorous rules of engagement.

Indeed, the potential for violent resistance and the need for military enforcement are essential differences between *peacemaking* and *peacekeeping*. Peacemaking requires a combination of diplomacy and force.

For UNOSOM to accomplish its mission it must restore a secure environment, including the cantonment of weapons, so political reconciliation can occur.

*The Addis Ababa Accords must be respected.*—The ceasefire and disarmament provisions of the accords, which all parties agreed to in March, are a fundamental prerequisite to reconciliation. If a reversion to widespread lawlessness is to be averted, and a civil society restored, disarmament of all factional militias must be pursued fairly and forcefully.

#### IV. THE U.N.'S RESPONSE TO GENERAL AIDEED'S ATTACKS WAS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE

General Aideed's unprovoked attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu on June 5 represented a fundamental challenge to UNOSOM's mandate to provide humanitarian assistance and foster reconciliation.

—UNOSOM forces were acting within their mandate—and enforcing an agreement to which General Aideed was a party—when they were ambushed in a brutal premeditated attack. 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed and three Americans were wounded.

On June 6, the U.N. Security Council unanimously determined that a violation of the Addis Agreement and of Resolution 814 had occurred and adopted U.N. Resolution 837, which reaffirmed the Secretary General's authority to take "all necessary measures against those responsible for attacks against UNOSOM, including their arrest, detention, trial and punishment."

The U.N.'s response was necessary and appropriate.

- If Aideed were to succeed in his attempt to throw the disarmament and reconciliation process off track, we would see a resumption of lawlessness and violence, a return of famine and the humiliation of United Nations and United States efforts at peacemaking.
- All Somali factions must understand that flagrant violation of the Accords and attacks on UNOSOM will not go unpunished. In fact, from discussions with countless Somalis, we conclude that the vast majority deeply regret the killings and strongly support UNOSOM.
- Retaliation was taken at the individuals responsible—Aideed and his co-conspirators—and at legitimate targets—the radio station he used to foment violence against the U.N. and the locations where he stored weapons. There is no dispute with the innocent people of Aideed's sub-clan, the Habr Gedr, who will remain a part of the negotiations on political reconciliation.
- Aideed and his armed thugs brutal response to UNOSOM's efforts to restore order in Mogadishu—ambushes of U.N. peacekeepers and abduction and murder of Somali civilian employees of UNOSOM—require that UNOSOM use all necessary means—diplomatic and military—to ensure that one faction's rejection of peace does not undermine the success of the overall operation.

#### V. UNOSOM'S TRANSITIONAL DIFFICULTIES ARE SURMOUNTABLE

UNOSOM has suffered from some lapses of political coordination and from disagreements on command and control. Given the unprecedented nature of the operation itself, this should not be surprising.

- These obstacles can be overcome. UNOSOM and the Secretary General are working with the support of the United States and other troop contributing nations to refine UNOSOM's internal coordination arrangements.
- An Interagency team is en route home after conducting an assessment of the current situation in Somalia. We expect that the team's report will provide us with ideas we can share with the U.N. on improving UNOSOM's performance.

#### VI. CONCLUSION

Although UNOSOM is a multinational U.N. operation, the United States has, we believe, an important supportive role to play:

- We should continue to provide support and advice to UNOSOM's leadership;
- We should support UNOSOM's efforts to restore order to Southern Mogadishu, including the use of force, where this is necessary and appropriate to enforce its mandate; and
- We should support the U.N.'s efforts to use multinational coalitions for peacekeeping in troubled regions.

We have often said that we cannot always be the world's policemen, that other nations must share the burden of peacekeeping and that we will play a leadership role in helping make those efforts effective. We must match our words with deeds, by supporting the UNOSOM mission. If we succeed, the burden of deterring would-be tyrants and warlords will be an easier one. If we fail, there is little doubt to whom the demands for relief will be directed. We owe it to ourselves—and to Somalia to help UNOSOM succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

General Sheehan, do you have a statement that you would care to make?

**STATEMENT OF JOHN J. SHEEHAN, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USMC, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

General SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to apologize to the committee for not being here. I was delayed over in the House and it just took longer to get here than I thought. But my apologies to the committee.

Sir, I do not have a prepared statement, but I have provided the committee 13 charts that I would like to go over very quickly. This is the kind of factual information as to where we are with UNOSOM today.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

General SHEEHAN. What I would like to start with, going to the second slide, going back to when we first sent the Marines into Somalia under UNITAF, they were there to secure the installations of seaport and the airport and food distribution points, open the passage for safe relief to prevent the technicals who were robbing the humanitarian effort over there, with food, provide security for the convoys that subsequently got out into the countryside, assist the U.N. and the other nongovernmental organizations providing relief under U.N. auspices.

In December, when we first landed there at Mogadishu with 8,900 marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen on the ground. In January 1993, just before the inauguration, the U.S. force levels were at 25,000 military members in the area of Somalia.

On May 4, 1993, when we transitioned to UNOSOM, the U.S. strength was at 4,500. The UNOSOM II strength is essentially going to be grow to 28,000, which is about the same level it was at its peak, or slightly higher than its peak, in January 1993.

I would like to turn now to the current situation.

When the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 814, these are the items that they tasked UNOSOM to perform:

To provide relief and economic rehabilitation, assist in repatriation of refugees, reestablishment of the Somali police force, which is the correct force to manage internal affairs in the cities and in the country of Somalia, assist in development of mine removal programs, develop public information activities, and create the environment for formulation and realization of rehab and reconstruction programs—essentially, what Mr. Ambassador has already spoken to.

The U.S. mission within this UNOSOM context is that we provide support to UNOSOM by providing the deputy commander, Gen. Tom Montgomery, selected headquarters personnel—the Americans are only part of 26 other member nations that serve in

the headquarters at Mogadishu—limited combat support, limited combat service support, intelligence support, and the quick reaction force that is there.

The next chart reflects, as of July 28, the distribution of where these UNOSOM forces are throughout the entire country, with the German brigade, all the way through the Greek company, the French brigade, the Botswanans, and the Belgians. Clearly, it is an international effort throughout the entire country.

While many of the news items clearly focus on Mogadishu, I think that they do not do service to the great work that these forces are doing throughout the country as a whole.

The coalition forces, as of today, sir, there are about 16,831 UNOSOM forces. You have a slide that lists in alphabetical order the 25 Bangladeshis that are there, all the way to the United Arab Emirates, which has 688 soldiers on the ground.

The next slide reflects the 12,848 additional multinational forces. Again, the Bangladeshis are increasing another 900. The UAE is going to add another 100. The Malaysians are there. They are adding to it. The Germans are going to add 1,050.

So, clearly, you see this force is going to grow to 28,000, as I indicated before, with 12,848 yet to come.

The next slide indicates what the U.S. contribution is to that. As of the 28th, there are 3,898 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in country. The quick reaction force that received so much attention is only 1,141 soldiers at this particular point in time.

The next slide reflects that QRF force, the 10th Mountain Division out of Camp Drum, NY. It essentially has assault Helo's, one infantry battalion of 587 soldiers, and a support base of 140 people.

Logistics, which makes up the bulk of our forces there, are a little over 2,400 people. That force provides the logistic support for the UNOSOM force.

In terms of the command and control, General Bir, a very fine Turkish officer, is in charge. His deputy is U.S. Maj. Gen. Tom Montgomery. The commander of U.S. forces in Somalia, as I indicated, is General Montgomery. The logistics forces work for General Bir. The quick reaction force works for General Montgomery, as I indicated, who reports to General Hoar.

The United States retains operational control of this quick reaction force. So if the quick reaction force has to be used, permission has to be granted from CENTCOM in Tampa, FL. The intelligence support that is over there works for CENTCOM.

Sir, these are 13 slides that are designed mostly for factual information as to what the U.S. operational combat elements are in support of the UNOSOM ops.

Sir, I have no prepared remarks.

[The prepared material of General Sheehan may be found in committee files.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Now, we will turn to questions. I will ask the staff to limit us to 10 minutes each. To start the ball rolling, I wonder how much cooperation has the U.N. received from the neighboring states of Somalia—for example, the Organization of African Unity, the Islamic Group, and the Arab League? Have any of them cooperated in this effort?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, we have been in touch with all of the neighbors of Somalia, because, as you correctly implied, it is important for them to understand the regional context of what the U.N.'s operations are there. As you know, the political reconciliation process has been taking place in Addis Ababa, which also happens to be the seat of the OAU. So there is an OAU involvement.

But I think that it is fair to say that most of the regional interests and participation, given the problems of some of Somalia's immediate neighbors, have focused on the OAU efforts and the Addis Ababa political reconciliation process, which is ongoing.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that the U.N. command has ordered the arrest of General Aideed in response to his ambush of the Pakistanis who were killed and the wounding of the American peacekeepers. Since that time, much of our effort in the capital of Mogadishu has been focusing on capturing Aideed. What is our plan with regard to what should be done with Aideed if he is actually captured, and how do we respond to the view that if Aideed is captured, some other warlord will not simply rise up to replace him and the chaos continue?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I might comment on the political and international law implications of that, and General Sheehan may want to talk about the operational considerations.

The latest U.N. resolution applying to Somalia, of course, was resolution 837, passed after the June 5 incident, in which Aideed's forces engineered the shooting of the 23 Pakistani peacekeepers. That resolution specifically authorized UNOSOM to detain Aideed in the process of trying to bring about a lessening of the threat to UNOSOM forces. This was not Aideed specific, but we believe that Aideed is the person most responsible for the deteriorating security situation in southern Mogadishu.

Provisions are now for the U.N. to detain. Arrangements are being made in country or nearby for him to be detained. We are working very closely with the U.N. with respect to what judicial processes should be initiated if he is detained. This, again, is new ground, as you correctly indicated in your opening statement. The U.N. has not in the past been in a position to authorize the capture of a person who would then be tried by some sort of international tribunal.

So, at this point, we have the authority, the U.N. has the authority to detain him and hold him, and there is active consideration going on in New York about the place and modalities for a trial if he is captured.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you fill us in a little bit on what those modalities might be. What are the consideration?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, some of the options, Mr. Chairman, which are being looked at is to have him tried under Somalia law. Because the Somali Code of Justice, passed some 20 years ago, does provide for charges which we believe are credible against General Aideed. Whether the Somali Code of Justice could be fairly applied, given the current situation in Somalia, is an open question.

So, one of the alternatives is to see whether the international system, the U.N. in particular, could authorize a tribunal to be es-



tablished under the authority of the U.N. Security Council, but using Somali law.

Again, I apologize. I am not an expert in the field of international law, but I know that is one of the possible options that is being studied with respect to having an international court to try Mr. Aideed.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the same court that is being considered to try the Serbian leaders in the Balkans be used to try Aideed in Somalia?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think it is our reading of the situation in New York that it would take a separate resolution for that court, which is Serbian-specific at this moment, to be used for General Aideed. As you know, there is also some consideration being given to having an international court which could judge war crimes charges against others—Iraqis, for example. But, since we do not have the final recommendations from the Secretary General with respect to the war crimes tribunal, I think we are going to have to wait and see whether he believes it can have a broader mandate than just the specific Serbian requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I will yield at this point to the ranking Republican, Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. This is currently the only U.N. peacekeeping operation protecting Muslims, and its political significance in light of the Bosnia situation and the stalled Mideast peace process cannot be underestimated. What would the ramifications be throughout the Arab world if we were to pull out of the Somalia operation, both in terms of international Islamic reaction and the perception of the staying power of the U.N. when faced with military opposition?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, Senator, that would be I think a very serious consequence of a pullout by the United States and the international community from Somalia. As you know, when the Bush administration at the end of last year committed U.S. forces to initiate the effort in Somalia, this was welcomed throughout virtually all of the Muslim world, and the developing world as well. Because, clearly, the humanitarian nature of our involvement was foremost, and the effort that we made to reduce the levels of suffering and starvation was considerable.

As you know from the time, our conservative estimates were that 300,000 people or approximately 5 percent of the Somalia population had already starved to death. So the humanitarian nature of our involvement was I think well appreciated.

If the United States were to withdraw, which I do not believe will happen, and the operation itself were to abort prematurely, I think that there would be a very great concern throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere that we did not have the staying power. We were no longer interested because, as the chairman said in his initial statement, the issue of Somalia was no longer foremost on our television screens and in our newspapers. I think that would immediately have a very negative effect on the way the United States and the U.N. are perceived throughout much of the developing world.

Senator JEFFORDS. I am convinced that more of our military involvement in the future will be through international military efforts, such as U.N. peacekeeping efforts. What is your assessment of the lessons learned about the problem of differing national agendas under one military command? And how can we apply these lessons to future peacemaking operations?

Mr. TARNOFF. I might approach that diplomatically, but General Sheehan probably has greater experience with the situation in Somalia. You are absolutely right, Senator. I think increasingly, as we contemplate having American forces involved in such operations we are going to have to help the U.N. refine its modalities for dealing with these very diverse commands.

In the case of Somalia, I believe there are 26 or 27 nations involved in various capacities, and therefore we should not be surprised that there are bumps in the road as we try to get a fluid and collaborative command and control system, despite the considerable progress that we have been making in Somalia.

We in the administration are looking very closely, with our partners in the Defense Department and other concerned agencies, at what kind of arrangements best serve international peacekeeping and the possible efforts by the United States to contribute.

These are complex arrangements, but I think at this point it is fair to say that Somalia is a model which we believe is worth pursuing—not in every respect, but Admiral Howe, General Bir, and General Montgomery have been working hard with the U.N. and with representatives of the United States to try to refine, modernize, and make smoother such arrangements.

The interagency team, which has been visiting Somalia and is due back early next week, has been looking specifically at the questions of how the United States can improve its cooperation with efforts of this sort.

Senator JEFFORDS. General Sheehan?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, I think, to answer your question first, as you know, there is no repetitive U.N.-type operation in the 35 or 40, depending on how you want to count—there is no like organizational structure. And when you deal with chapter 6 and chapter 7 operations, again, different organizational theories apply.

But in the case of chapter 7 operations, for which the current operations in Somalia are, I think one of the lessons that we have learned is that clearly, the U.N. commander in the field, the U.N. representative in the field, has to have the authority to make whatever decisions he sees necessary. To continue the process of having to go back to the U.N., where we adjudicate every day-to-day event, clearly does not lead to an environment that is conducive to a chain of command and a functioning focus on the problem.

I think that as the PRD process goes through here in Washington, in terms of what the U.S.'s real role is in the U.N., I think implicit in that there has to be some reform within the U.N. itself if they are going to truly do these type of operations.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. Not at this point, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Secretary, you may have covered some of this prior to my arrival, but I think the following is pertinent to the last question. Would you elaborate on the situation as it relates to the Italian contingent and the brouhaha, so to speak, of a departure from the U.N. mission, including, perhaps, separate negotiations with Aideed?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes. And actually, Senator, I did not cover that specific point, so I will not be repeating something that I mentioned earlier.

As we all know, there were some tensions between the Italian command in Somalia and the U.N. authorities, for whatever reason. There were statements made on both sides, which I think contributed to a feeling that there was not the kind of close coordination between the Italian command authorities and the Italian units in Mogadishu and the U.N. and the U.N. command.

We have made considerable effort, as have others, to try to smooth communications between the Italians and the U.N. I have received several Italian visitors, as has Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner in Washington. The interagency team that I described a moment ago met with senior Italian military and civilian representatives in Mogadishu in the last several days to help them, again, improve communications with the U.N. That team is stopping in Rome on its way back to the United States, again, to make sure that the Italians feel that we are trying to promote a constructive role on their part.

Recently, in an important goodwill gesture, the U.N. peacekeeping office in New York appointed a senior Italian military officer to work in New York on a whole range of peacekeeping operations. So I think that the tensions are down.

There will, as General Sheehan indicated, always be individual situations which require attention, as problems arise. But I am confident that Italy is still committed to the effort. They have made every indication that they believe in their peacekeeping role worldwide and their mission in Somalia. And I think that the problems that we noticed several weeks ago are on their way to resolution.

Senator COVERDELL. Did the Italians meet separately with Aideed? Do we know that to be the case, or is that a rumor?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no evidence of meetings. There were many rumors that were circulating at the time. But at the highest political and military level in Italy, we were assured that the Italian forces did want to cooperate with UNOSOM. There were some incidents where communications were not as open as they should have been. The Italians may, here and there, have had a different perception of what their specific role will be. But we had every reason to believe that Italy supported the overall effort that we have been describing here today.

Senator COVERDELL. Since the Somalia question has been before the Senate, I am familiar with the four missions of UNITAF. Under which of these would you put the attack on Aideed's command center or purported meeting center?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, of the four missions, I assume we are talking about the specific missions that both General Sheehan and I mentioned under U.N. Security Council resolution 814: humanitarian assistance, national reconciliation, and rebuilding national institu-

tions and the economy, I would say, and even refugees, I think, are all, to varying degrees, determined by the security situation in the country.

The fact that General Aideed, who had been a signatory of the Addis Ababa accords, which committed him to work toward political reconciliation, in effect, walked away from his obligations, began political and then military challenges to the UNOSOM forces, and made it increasingly difficult for this process of reconciliation to take place, for the institution-building to take place, and increasingly, for humanitarian supplies to flow.

So I believe it was under the general authority of all of the aspects, the major aspects, of U.N. Security Council resolution 814 that the action was legitimately conducted.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Secretary, my question was not intended to be hostile.

Mr. TARNOFF. Oh, I understand.

Senator COVERDELL. But it was an exploratory question. I believe that the debate between the administration and the Congress will stem from the unclear nature of the mission.

Mr. TARNOFF. I understand that.

Senator COVERDELL. That was my only reason for the question.

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you.

Senator COVERDELL. We have talked about the detention of Aideed. If the attack had resulted in his death, what would be your assessment as to the ramifications of that development. Because when you decided to conduct that mission, you naturally had considered such an eventuality.

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes. As I understand it—and here, again, General Sheehan is closer to the operational realities than I am—the attack against these forces was designed to reduce their effectiveness and their ability to carry out these missions that I have described. If in the course of those operations—in which there were, of course, casualties suffered on Aideed's side as well as the U.N. side—General Aideed had been wounded, captured, or killed, obviously removing the head person from the scene we believe would have an important effect on reducing the capability of his forces to operate.

But there was no design specifically against Aideed. The operation was intended to reduce the effectiveness of his forces and it was carried out with that in mind. I do not know if General Sheehan has any other comments?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, the Secretary is correct. I think that any time that you are able to reduce the command and control apparatus in the Aideed house—that is exactly what it was, a series of three-storied homes, the second story of which was covered with radios, HF type that could coordinate his activities. And by destroying the home and capturing some of his people and equipment, I think what you have seen is a lessening of his ability to control—he had 2,000 or 3,000 supporters. He is now down to about 300 hardcore. So if we marginalize Aideed one way or the other, then I think the process of reconciliation can go on.

Senator COVERDELL. You have touched upon the underlying point behind my question. You have indicated a reduction in his effective force levels. So the possibility of a community reaction, in your opinion, is shrinking.

General SHEEHAN. Sure.

Senator COVERDELL. In conjunction with that issue, what would be your assessment of his military capacity? And where does he derive the weapons that his force wield?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, as you know, the whole weapons cache business in Somalia goes back for years, so there is no absence of weapons or the availability of weapons. They are still available if you need them, on the open market, and we need to reduce that number. His hardcore supporters exist in the southern section of Mogadishu.

He has clan members in other parts of the country but, very frankly, as the Secretary indicates, the situation in the rest of the country is improving steadily. As a matter of fact, we are closing some of the feeding stations now. Crops are ready to be harvested. Food is being distributed and there is hope in many of the Somalis in the country today.

But in southern Mogadishu there is 200 to 300 hardcore Aided supporters who derive their strength from carrying weapons, from intimidation, from murder, and attacks on other clansmen. As long as that type of activity exists, then I think the eventual reconciliation and restoration of Somalia in its role in the U.N. process will not take place.

Senator COVERDELL. If General Aided had been a casualty in the attack, is there a known successor, or would you envision a total collapse? Is there an ally? An affiliate?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, I think that a specific successor, I would not comment on. There are a number of people in the clan itself that obviously would step forward. But I think that their activity would be significantly modified if he was taken off the scene.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for that. I had a couple of questions. Following up this question of the weapons, to General Sheehan, what portion of the weapons that are there come from the aid we gave Siad Barre before?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, I do not have a specific answer to that question. I can take it for the record and get back to you though on specifics. My recollection, though, is through 1986 we had significantly reduced the lethal weapons systems that we had given to Siad Barre. The bulk of the weapons that we have seen so far are weapons that came out of the Eritrean campaign, and as a result mostly AK-47's and other nationalities who provided weapons to that region.

[The information referred to follows:]

Estimates are that approximately 20 percent of the weapons in Somalia come from the aid that the United States gave Siad Barre.

The CHAIRMAN. I was starting a second round when some of the members have not had their first round. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. No, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I will yield to Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. I just have one additional question. It seems to me that we should be able to get credit for our contribution of some \$750 million during Operation Restore Hope. If this cannot

directly be attributed toward UNOSOM dues, could it at least offset our arrearages in other peacekeeping accounts?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Senator, that is a question that obviously we are working on. We have to raise this matter with the U.N. There is, to my knowledge—and I will want to get back to you in greater detail and will do so—no provision existing under the U.N. financing arrangements for these offsets to take place after the fact. That was not part of the commitment when the previous administration did decide to engage forces and to absorb the expenses. So it would take a revision of the understandings with the U.N. for that to take place. But the overall issue, of course, of U.S. participation in these operations and the financing is, of course, very much on our minds.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### U.S. REIMBURSEMENTS FROM THE U.N. FOR UNOSOM DUES

*Question.* Senator Jeffords requests more detail about possible U.S. credit for the American contribution of some \$750 million during Operation Restore Hope. The Senator asks if the amount cannot be directly attributed toward UNOSOM dues, then could it at least offset U.S. arrearages in other peacekeeping accounts?

*Answer.* As Mr. Tarnoff stated, there is no provision under U.N. financing arrangements for offsets to take place after the fact for the U.S. role in UNITAF.

#### UNITAF

- When former President Bush first sent troops to Somalia last fall, he decided at that time to have the U.S. military cover its own costs and not to seek credit from the U.N. at that time or subsequently for the expenses. Therefore, the \$750 million cost incurred for UNITAF cannot be attributed to UNOSOM dues nor used to offset arrearages in other accounts.

- However, it is expected that all U.S. military claims for services provided to other eligible UNITAF participants will be reimbursed. These claims will likely amount to around \$40 million and will be covered by the U.N.'s Somalia Trust Fund.

- The U.N.'s Somalia Trust Fund of \$106 million was established to cover support costs incurred by troops participating in UNITAF. Japan contributed \$100 million to this fund.

#### UNOSOM II

- U.S. expenses under UNOSOM II are those incurred after the U.N. assumed authority in Somalia for peacekeeping, in May 1993, and are additional to the \$750 million UNITAF costs.

U.S. participation in UNOSOM II is covered by the same reimbursement arrangements the U.N. provides other troop contributing countries.

- The DOD receives reimbursement from the U.N. for the provision of supplies and services under a formal agreement.

- The United States will receive reimbursement for the troops assigned to UNOSOM.

- The State Department is assessed our usual share of U.N. peacekeeping costs—30.4 percent—for the total costs of UNOSOM II.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I just have one question, and that is is there a plan in existence to withdraw completely, under any circumstances?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well the United States, of course, retains at all time ultimate control over our forces. We are, at this point, planning to reduce our forces to approximately 14,000 at the end of the year, and we have every reason to believe that we need to be able to hold to that timetable. But, again, the disposition of U.S. forces overseas in Somalia and elsewhere is always under the control of

the commander in chief and he could decide at any time, if circumstances warrant—which I do not anticipate, but if circumstances warrant, to withdraw our forces.

Senator PRESSLER. This may have been covered, but I just make this observation. If we find ourselves in the middle of a civil war, I hope we do withdraw completely. Now, at what point would you define it a civil war as opposed just to a peacekeeping effort?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, again, I think that the security operations which we are now helping to enforce are designed to reduce the activities of one clan in particular to frustrate the mission of the U.N. So therefore our security activities at this point appear to me to be very consistent with the overall mandate. There does not seem on the scene, Senator, any likelihood of the kind of generalized violence in the country which could be characterized as a civil war. As a matter of fact, as General Sheehan indicated earlier, the levels of violence throughout the country seem to have been reduced significantly, and virtually all of the serious security breaches that we are dealing with are in southern Mogadishu at this time.

Senator PRESSLER. Because when we originally went in there, it was a peacekeeping mission to deliver food. We now find ourselves allied against one of the clans, obviously against other clans. We now have taken sides.

Mr. TARNOFF. I think what we have been doing is to help the UNOSOM forces take action against one faction which has threatened to undermine the intent of the various U.N. Security Council resolutions that have been passed.

Originally, of course, Mr. Aideed himself subscribed personally to the process of political reconciliation which was agreed on several months ago in Addis Ababa. He has now walked away from that and defied the U.N. and its missions in Somalia. So therefore the action is being taken against him and his followers insofar as they have indulged in armed opposition to the U.N. presence and the U.N. mission.

Senator PRESSLER. I might say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that I should clarify that I was opposed to sending U.S. troops there in the first place. I was opposed to the mission because I was and remain concerned that the United States would assume the lion's share of the cost. I am for withdrawing troops now because the mission has shifted.

But I would make the observation, and you might want to respond to it, that I think your statement illustrates that indeed even under the original plan we were not on anybody's side particularly, whereas now we clearly have sided against one of the major tribes. We are taking part in internal politics, so to speak, with our troops, and I predict it is going to lead us to lots of problems. That is my observation.

[The prepared statement of Senator Pressler follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRESSLER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on U.S. policy in Somalia today. Since the United States first sent troops to Somalia, I have been skeptical. Some months ago, I made my position clear. I objected to the manner in which our troops went into Somalia, because it would lead to an entanglement. That prediction has come true.

The U.S. should disengage from Somalia as quickly as possible. We did our part, and it has cost us \$1.2 billion already. Even if we pull our troops out of Somalia, we still are obligated to pay 30 percent of the cost of the remaining peacekeeping forces. And those expenses are on top of \$200 million in regular U.S. foreign aid for Somalia over the past 3 years. We have done more than our fair share.

I fear that Somalia has descended into anarchy reminiscent of Lebanon. The Congress did not intend for U.S. forces to be in Somalia this long, nor for the purpose of establishing political control in the country. We have fulfilled the original U.S. mission of securing the supply lines for humanitarian aid distribution. What is happening in Somalia now amounts to getting bogged down in a civil war between different factions. Congress did not approve use of our armed forces for that purpose.

Additionally, the economics and the long-term ramifications of the Somali operation are not clear. I have said that the outset of the aid project, the United States would be assessed the majority of costs in Somalia. With the primary financial burden, our taxpayers deserve assurances that the intervention is cost-effective and fulfills its humanitarian objectives. The U.S. taxpayer deserves a clear explanation of the cost and effectiveness of the Somali mission.

How much longer should the United States sustain Somali aggression? We had a moral obligation to the starving Somalis, but we have no obligation to referee a civil war. We cannot be caught in the middle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, I would only respond to say that from my perspective, at least, we are taking sides on the side of the U.N. which, again, has the mission which is partly humanitarian but somewhat broader than strictly humanitarian missions involve. And insofar as factions in the country take up armed opposition against the U.N. in the legitimate execution of its mission, I think it is proper for us and policy for us to help the U.N. defend against such encroachments.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, first I just wanted to totally agree with Secretary Tarnoff's observation and to associate myself with the remarks of you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Kassebaum, and others. These missions always have their problems, but I think the fact that the U.N. is taking on this role is long overdue, in my view. And the fact that they are willing to take some risks is something we ought to be willing to stand behind. And if the minute the ground gets a little shaky we head for the hills, I mean the alternative is us doing it alone.

I do not know, general, if you would like to comment on that. Or the option of not doing anything at all. There are not any great options in all of this, and the fact that we have a multilateral force willing to commit itself to these kinds of issues is something that I think we ought to be grateful for and then try to make it work.

I noticed that the press seemed to be preoccupied the other day with the notion that some of the factions within the U.N. force were having some of their difficulties. That should not come as a great surprise. Soldiers of the same outfits have their difficulties from time to time. And I wonder, general, if you might just want to place that in perspective.

General SHEEHAN. Senator, I think you are absolutely correct. We have 26 nations. Not only do you have language barriers, you have cultural barriers, you have basic understanding of what the intent is. So I think chapter 7 operations, it is the first time in the recorded history of the U.N. that we have done something of this nature. There are growing pains. Are we going to get better? Yes. Do we have to get better? Yes. As the U.S. military shrinks in size, the only way to manage the type of conflicts of this nature that we



are going to have to deal with in the future is to deal with them on a coalition basis.

Senator DODD. Amen to that. While this is certainly a matter of concern, one should not exaggerate these kinds of differences that exist.

General SHEEHAN. Sure.

Senator DODD. I appreciate that. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone have anything further?

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, I have one comment regarding the exchange between Senator Pressler and Senator Dodd as well as the comment made by the general when he said that in an operation of this type—the first of its kind—there are going to be growing pains. True, but part of those growing pains are going to occur here in Congress. It does raise very broad questions, and we should be attentive to those issues now. We must consider the process in terms of the U.N. command, the scope of the mission, the extension of the mission, and under what authority it exists.

I think that to go through the exercise and set all those questions aside would not serve us all well. The issue that Senator Byrd raised on the floor of the U.S. Senate is pertinent, and we have brushed against it in this discussion here. There is a traditional process of weaving our way through the problems, but I think it would probably be better to come head-to-head with them. I do not challenge the Somalia operation, I believe it to be an appropriate platform to address these issues. Personally, I think Presidents Bush and Clinton have been correct to try to deal with the humanitarian issues.

Beyond just the questions of U.N. command, its authority over our troops in this exercise, consent of Congress, the selectivity of it, it relates to meeting a crisis in one situation and not in another which we are engaged in right now. So I would hope that we would use it not just as a logistical instruction, but as a process that meets the demands that are going to be called upon in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to my colleagues. I have just barely taken my seat here. I will wait until the second round.

The CHAIRMAN. General Sheehan, when I was in Mogadishu I was struck at the number of female Marines that were there. What percentage of your force is female?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, we have very few Marines left in Mogadishu. The 10th Mountain Division is essentially the U.S. Army. But you will find that there are more than enough females there, especially in the logistics business over there. It is probably in a range of 5 to 11 percent. I will get you the specific number, sir. The Marines have since withdrawn, as you know, and have been replaced by the 10th Mountain Division.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of July 29, 1993, there were 487 females assigned to U.S. forces in Somalia. This number equates to 12 percent of the U.S. forces in Somalia.

The CHAIRMAN. General Sheehan, you stated earlier that a lesson learned in Somalia is that the field commander in chapter 7 operations should have the authority to make necessary decisions as he sees fit. Well, would you think that this should apply to the commander in Yugoslavia?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, I think that, one, we are not in chapter 7 operations in Yugoslavia.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General SHEEHAN. I think that the translation of the experience between Somalia and Yugoslavia is not directly transferable. Only in the context that once nations decide as to what the course of action is, once the United States decides what its equities in this event is, then I think that clearly once a commander is appointed and everyone agrees on an appropriate course of action and what the outcome ought to be, then I think the commander in the field ought to be given the latitude to do what is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Some people are calling the U.S. troops in Somalia, "our forgotten soldiers," because UNITF is over and the President welcomed home the bulk of the forces. What is the morale of our people who are out there at this time?

General SHEEHAN. Sir, I would say it is excellent. General Hoar, who is the CENTCOM commander, was there 10 days ago, and the assessment team was there, and I have yet to hear a complaint from any of the people who have visited, whether they be a part of the congressional delegations that have visited there or the press. So all the reports that I have seen so far is that the morale is excellent.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to return for a moment to the question of the Italians and their role. Why is it that—or do you believe, Secretary Tarnoff, that the Italians are negotiating with Aideed, or do you believe that is all false rumor?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the Italians are deviating from the general understandings that we all have with respect to the mission. We have talked to them from the beginning about some questions, some legitimate questions that they have had about command arrangements, about the political reconciliation process. They have been determined to make sure that UNOSOM and the OAU and other bodies do not neglect the political reconciliation process, and we are quite sensitive to that. But in every way I think the Italians are playing a loyal and supportive role in the execution of this effort.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general view, do you think it is a good idea to have former colonial powers with the forces in the area? In other parts of Africa this would apply too.

Mr. TARNOFF. Well here again, I think there is a special sensitivity given the presence of the Italians in that part of the world some years ago. We felt at the time that there was not reason to discourage the Italians from being willing to participate. They have made a major commitment of forces which they are able to increase. But you are certainly correct that there are special sensitivities with respect to a country which has been a colonizing power in an area some time ago, and these have to be accounted for in the allocation of missions and responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Incidentally, I would like to say for the record that apparently we will not get a quorum this morning for the nominations of former Vice President Mondale and others, so we will do so in the early afternoon after a rollcall vote on the Senate side, and the word will be passed when that will be.

I would now turn to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I really have no questions of this panel. I, in fact, left another meeting that I was at, to which I now must return, for the express purpose of helping form the quorum in order to clear these nominees. I think it is very important that we do so. So I hope we will redouble our efforts to assemble our colleagues this afternoon.

We have got a very long list of very able people to go to very important posts, and I hope we will be able to get it done today and enable the Department to get about its work. I mean we are talking about Japan, Uruguay, Canada, Venezuela, Assistant Secretary, El Salvador, Nicaragua, an Under Secretary, chief of protocol, OECD, the European Community, Mongolia, and the regular list. So that is pretty important assemblage.

The CHAIRMAN. It is and we will make every effort, not only redoubled but tripled.

Senator SARBANES. I know it is a problem. I know the Supreme Court Justice is being reported out of one committee this morning, and I guess the Finance Committee is very heavily into the reconciliation, and apparently the White House is holding some kind of meeting that is drawing people away. But I would hope that this afternoon we would be able to do this. Will we do it over in S-166?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have a committee luncheon too for the Peacekeeping Assistant Secretary.

Senator DODD. There is a dedication, as well, to the women who served in Vietnam for their memorial this morning, and I know some of the other members here are involved in that.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate, we will do our best. We certainly should get these nominees out, because they are, as Senator Sarbanes points out, very significant posts to which they are being assigned.

There being no further questions of the panel, we welcome you for being here and thank you for being here and wish you well. And I would add that the record stays open for any questions that may be asked.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR HELMS

Last December, I supported President Bush's military intervention in Somalia because no one could watch the television pictures of starvation and brutality and not be moved. The United States had an opportunity to make a crucial difference in the lives of thousands, perhaps millions, of human beings, and I shall never regret that this was done.

However, before I pledged my support, I made sure of two things:

- (1) that we had a specific and achievable goal; and
- (2) that we would not commit our military men and women to a combat role under foreign command.

I was assured that our goal was clear: to secure the delivery of relief and sustenance. And I was assured that Operation Restore Hope would be a U.S.-led mission.

Technically, the U.S. operation ended in May of this year after our forces achieved what they set out to do. But the fact remains that we still have 4,000 men and women serving in Somalia in a mission that is open-ended.

The bulk of that force is serving under a foreign command without the authorization of Congress. The remaining 1,300 troops, known as the Quick Reaction Force, technically are not under the U.N. command. But they are the troops engaging in combat night after night against Somali Warlords in support of the U.N. operation.

Congressman Gilman and I sent a letter to Secretary Christopher on June 15. The Department of State was kind enough to respond on July 24, informing us that the U.S. was not "engaged in hostilities." Perhaps the Department of State is prepared to tell the families of the dozens of killed or injured troops that those men and women are not "engaged in hostilities"?

I believe we need some very specific answers from the Department of State and the Department of Defense about the U.S. role in Somalia. I look forward to those answers today.

[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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