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U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

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
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 20, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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
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U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2004

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.

Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina A. Dubey, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobs, Democratic staff director; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Bridget E. Ward, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. The Armed Services Committee meets today in another of its series of hearings on the worldwide threat situa-

tion, with emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq. We welcome our witnesses: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Secretary Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Each of our witnesses is very well qualified to discuss the full range of the topics before the committee today. All have been deeply involved in the planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Myers just returned Sunday from a trip to the region, visiting our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Colleagues and friends, the past few weeks have been particularly challenging for our Nation. We are ever mindful of the risks our troops face every day, those of the coalition forces, and the sacrifices made by the families and the communities that support them, as those who have been removed from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat and as terrorists lash out at the loss of another area in which to train and spawn terrorism throughout the world. We mourn every loss of life and salute those who serve and their families for their bravery, their commitment, and their sacrifices.

The timeliness and importance of this hearing cannot be overstated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I returned, several weeks ago, from a trip to both of those countries. The brilliant military victories achieved by our Armed Forces, together with the coalition partners, have presented an opportunity to fully defeat violence and terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are nations whose previous rulers had perpetrated violence and terror not only on their own populations and their neighbors, but throughout the world.

The cycle of violence that has gripped this part of the world must end if we are to win the global war on terrorism and make America and our friends and allies a safer place. Deviation from our current course will only embolden those who are intent on bringing about instability and anarchy, not only in the region, but elsewhere in the world.

We have achieved extraordinary success in a relatively short period of time in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed are gone. The future is hopeful for the Iraqi people. We must continue to send a strong message of resolve to the people of Iraq, to our troops, to our coalition partners, and to the rest of the world, that the United States will stay its course and get the job done.

As President Bush stated last week, "Now is the time and Iraq is the place in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not waver."

President Bush has set a course that calls for the direct turnover of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30, 2004. It is critical that we end our status as an occupying power and give Iraqis an increased stake in what happens in their future and the Nation. This date was endorsed by the United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative Brahimi. Mr. Brahimi and the U.N. are playing an important role in the transition to sovereignty and will continue to play a critical role in helping Iraq on its path to democracy. This committee

will learn today, from this distinguished panel, further details on that operation.

The President's appointment yesterday of a trusted international statesman and current U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, as the first Ambassador to a free and democratic Iraq, is another important step in this process. I have had the opportunity through the years to know Mr. Negroponte quite well and have the highest personal regard for him.

Continued U.S. commitment to the June 30, 2004, transition date is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to the region. It will be the day that Iraq takes its place in the community of free nations and the day the Iraqis assume a greater degree of responsibility for their future. The coalition forces, however, will remain on standby status and involve themselves in the security of that nation.

A free democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces of terrorism and instability in Iraq. Clearly, the recent surge in violence in Iraq is related to the imminent transfer of sovereignty. Those who fear democracy are trying to delay its arrival. Those who incite terror realize their days are numbered. Opponents of a free democratic Iraq are desperate and will become even more desperate, unfortunately, in the days to come.

We will be prepared for more violence as June 30, 2004, approaches. We must not waver in the face of terror and intimidation. Our troops, members of our coalition, and the people of Iraq need the continued strongest support of the Congress of the United States.

Many countries shared in the military effort to liberate Iraq. Other nations, not involved directly in the military, have joined in the rebuilding of Iraq. A total of 38 nations are now involved in this overall endeavor. I welcome the increased participation of the U.N. in the political transition process. I applaud President Bush for his consistent efforts, efforts that began in September 2002 at the U.N., to build and expand the coalition of nations who have the courage and the conviction to fight tyranny and terror in order to make the region and the world a better, safer place.

As our Nation is focused on developments in Iraq, we must not lose sight of ongoing developments in Afghanistan. The U.S. and coalition forces continue to eliminate remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbored them. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are taking increasing responsibility to provide security and reconstruction assistance across many parts of the country. The recent donors conference in Berlin secured commitments from the international community to provide the assistance Afghanistan will need to recover from decades of war and oppression.

A constitution has been approved and elections are scheduled. These are important steps on Afghanistan's path to full democracy. The future is finally hopeful for the people of Afghanistan, but challenges remain.

Speaking for myself personally, as a consequence of my visit there I remain very interested in our witnesses' view on how we can help Afghanistan to conquer a very serious drug trade, which is growing, not diminishing, at an alarming rate.

The hearing today is an opportunity to review current policies and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can provide insights into a number of questions, among them the issue of the \$700 million. I will also put the details of the briefings that this committee received, and it was on a bipartisan basis, with regard to the use of those funds in today's record.

[The information referred to follows:]

SUMMARY OF DOD BRIEFING TO SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STAFF ON PRE-WAR EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

- Congress made available to the Department of Defense \$17 billion in September 2001 and \$14.2 billion in July 2002 to support the execution of the global war on terrorism. Funding was appropriated to "respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States . . . and to deal with other consequences of the attacks . . . including for the costs of . . . providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international terrorism . . . and supporting national security."

- The authorities were broad and provided the basis for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. On an ongoing basis, there were discussions, briefings, and hearings with Congress on the execution of these supplemental funds.

- By July 2002, in the course of preparing for a contingency in Iraq, CENTCOM developed rough estimates of \$750 million in preparatory tasks.

- DOD Office of the Comptroller reviewed CENTCOM's request. The Comptroller recommended funds be made available to activities that were executable and consistent with authorities included in the supplemental appropriations for the global war on terror.

- In August and September 2002, \$178 million (DERFI) was made available to support CENTCOM including funding for communications equipment, fuel supplies, humanitarian rations, and improvements to CENTCOM's forward headquarters.

- All investments were designed to strengthen our capabilities in the region or support ongoing operational requirements.

- No funding was made available with Iraq as the exclusive purpose.

- Congress approved an Iraq Resolution on October 11.

- Consistent with congressional statutory requirements regarding military construction activities, \$63 million in notifications were delivered to Congress October 15. After October 25, more than \$800 million was made available over the following months to support Iraq preparatory tasks. Many of these tasks were those identified by CENTCOM in July. These plans were consistent with both the global war supplemental appropriations authorities and the congressional authorization for use of military force against Iraq.

Chairman WARNER. Our committee records show that on February 13, 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-4 briefed the committee staff. Later, on February 23, 2003, then-Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller Dov Zakheim briefed the staff. Lastly, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller provided a classified briefing on April 4, 2003.

The questions regarded the use of funds, that is operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, to do what is predominantly military construction (MILCON) type functions. We have in the committee records, for the inspection of our members, a classified document dated April 4, 2003, detailing those expenditures. Nevertheless, Secretary Wolfowitz, I hope you can elaborate on that issue.

Further, the questions before the committee today: Are current troop levels in Iraq, as recently requested by General Abizaid, sufficient? Do our troops have sufficient equipment and correct equipment to carry out and complete the mission? How will the Iraqi Interim Government be formed and how are Iraqis reacting to the recent U.N. proposal? What role will the U.N. and other international organizations play in the reconstruction of Iraq after the transition of sovereignty? Will the U.S. seek a U.N. Security Council resolu-

tion to cover the next phase of activities, political and military, in Iraq?

What are the details that we have at hand with regard to the all-important status of forces agreement which spells out, hopefully, or will, perhaps coupled with a U.N. resolution which I believe will be forthcoming, the exact relationship between the new transfer of power to an Iraqi government and the utilization of our troops and those of coalition forces for further security?

I now recognize our distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning: Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Grossman, and General Myers. These three witnesses, representing as they do defense policy, diplomacy, and military planning, provide us an opportunity to explore a number of important issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan. I join you, Mr. Chairman, and every member of this committee in expressing our gratitude to our troops, who demonstrate such constancy and courage.

This would be an important hearing no matter when it was held, but events of the last few months have made it even more crucial. Today's hearing takes place in a month that has, tragically, seen more U.S. military deaths from combat in Iraq than any other month since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is a month that has also seen an outbreak of insurgent violence in Fallujah and elsewhere in central Iraq, consisting primarily of Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and militia resistance in several cities in southern Iraq, consisting mostly of Shia.

Despite the obvious setbacks that we have experienced, I believe that we can succeed in bringing peace and stability to Iraq. It will help to achieve that goal if we are willing to learn from our mistakes. The first step is to recognize that mistakes were made, and that may be the most difficult step of all.

Our uniformed military always conducts after-actions, lessons learned reviews, so that the mistakes that have been made are not repeated in the future. That practice needs to be followed by the civilian leadership of the executive branch, including both the Defense and State Departments. For example, instead of merely tossing off the continuing violence as a "tough period of days," there should be an assessment as to whether we adequately planned for the possibility of post-Saddam chaos.

Most expert commentators agree with former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki that we did not have enough troops in Iraq to deal with the situation once the Saddam Hussein regime had fallen. The looting that took place and the damage to government buildings and public infrastructure that resulted might have been avoided or been of less severity if General Shinseki's advice had been heeded instead of his being disparaged by the civilian leadership.

Most experts agree that it was a mistake to totally disband the Iraqi army beyond, of course, removal of dedicated Baathists and Saddam loyalists.

Most experts agree that the de-Baathification program went beyond what was needed to assure that the Baathist leadership was not maintained. As Mr. Brahimi stated last Wednesday, "It is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staff, engineers, and other professionals who are sorely needed have been dismissed within the de-Baathification process, and far too many of these cases have yet to be reviewed." The fact that the widely disliked and distrusted Mr. Chalabi was put in charge of the de-Baathification program was a mistake that still needs to be corrected.

The restriction of the U.S. military to a minor role in planning for the stability phase or Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as General Franks described it to Chairman Warner and me several weeks ago, was, in my judgment, clearly a mistake.

Despite all the talk about the Iraqi security forces being the largest force in Iraq and the ones who would soon be the first line of defense against the former regime elements and jihadists, the fact is that there has been a failure to adequately train more than 4 percent of the Iraqi police until now. Surely there are lessons to be learned from that.

Perhaps the greatest mistake was the failure to appreciate the importance of securing international support through the United Nations before initiating hostilities against Iraq. The United States was unable to convince the other members of the Security Council that Iraq posed an imminent danger and we cut U.N. weapons inspections off before they were concluded.

The difficulty following the war in obtaining broad international support, including troops and police from Muslim countries, is the result. The price we are paying is an extremely high one.

Even before our troop rotation, we were providing more than 80 percent of the troops in Iraq (a figure that will rise with the impending withdrawal of the Spanish and Honduran troops) and, although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of contributions of other nations, we are providing far in excess of 80 percent of the financial assistance for Iraqi Iraq reconstruction.

After keeping the U.N. at arm's length throughout the occupation of Iraq, the President finally recognized the central role of the U.N. in finding a way to an interim government which will be accepted by the people of Iraq. When asked last week about the Iraqi entity to whom sovereignty will be restored on June 30, the President said "That is going to be decided by Mr. Brahimi," a quite reversal of the prior posture of the administration towards the U.N., and long overdue.

Formal U.N. involvement in the transition to a new interim Iraqi government as our full partner would help provide essential legitimacy in many parts of the world. U.N. endorsement of a process of selecting an interim government and authorizing a multinational force after the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty might also open the door to troops and police officers from other nations, including Muslim nations, and to NATO involvement in Iraq. Some nations will, however, require a more formal role for the U.N. in the continuing political development of Iraq as a condition for their participation or continued participation there.

Conversely, a failure to give the U.N. a major and formal role after restoration of sovereignty would make it difficult for a number of nations to keep their forces in Iraq, not to mention attracting new troops and police.

I visited U.N. headquarters in New York last Friday and met with U.S. Ambassador Negroponte and with the British, French, German, and Pakistani ambassadors as well. I attended a Security Council meeting at which Ambassador Negroponte reported to the council on the efforts and the progress of the U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq.

I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan and in the course of our meeting he expressed his disagreement with statements in the press that the U.N. would choose the people who would make up the new interim government. He said that the U.N. would hopefully help produce a process by which the Iraqi people would choose their leaders, which is very different from the U.N. choosing them and far, far different from the United States and the coalition occupying powers choosing them.

In response to my question to him about a plan B if Mr. Brahimi is unable to help produce a satisfactory consensus by June 30—in other words, if there is no credible, broadly supported government to whom sovereignty by that date can be restored—Secretary General Kofi Annan said that there is not enough time to come up with a plan B, so the only alternative would then be to extend the existence of the Iraqi Governing Council.

I know the administration intends to stick to the June 30 date. But the task of putting together the pieces of a sovereign government which the various factions of the Iraqi people support, by an artificial and in a relatively short time, is a massive one.

If the U.N. does not have the pieces together by June 30, the worst thing we could do is to attempt to restore sovereignty to leaders that appear to be our choices instead of the Iraqis. Even greater chaos and possibly civil war could result. So while the administration does not want to talk about the possibility that the U.N. does not succeed by June 30, I hope the administration has a plan for what they will do in that event because the possibility is a real one. We cannot repeat the lack of planning which marked the post-Sad-dam period.

For our military, one of the thorniest issues is whether a new sovereign Iraqi government will be able to change the status of our forces or will a prior or new U.N. resolution assure continuity. A gap in the ability to do what is required militarily is unacceptable.

Other key issues for our leadership include:

How many U.S. troops will be required to ensure stability in Iraq in both the short and long term?

How will the forces of nations like Spain and Honduras, that plan to withdraw their troops from Iraq be replaced?

As for Afghanistan, which has received significantly less attention since the start of the Iraq conflict, 2004 started with good news as the Constitutional Loya Jirga was completed and NATO decided to expand its role there. However, the last few weeks have seen a number of challenges to the government of President Karzai from regional warlords and their militias. Additionally, NATO nations have not fulfilled requests for more troops and the narcotics

problem in Afghanistan seems to be out of control. What specific plans are there to address these real concerns?

Finally, I would note that questions have been raised as to whether Congress was adequately informed and involved concerning the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for construction activities in preparation for war with Iraq. As our chairman noted, our witnesses need to address that matter.

I look forward to our witnesses addressing these and many other vital questions of concern to our committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

We will now proceed to hear testimony. Your statements prepared which have been submitted to the committee will be a part of the record. You may address those parts that you think pertinent for your opening statements.

At the present time, the committee intends to have a brief closed session following this open session in room 222 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

Secretary Wolfowitz, you may kindly proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee: I have quite a long prepared statement which I will submit for the record. In the interest of time, I will just summarize and read some portions of it.

I would like to begin, though, by citing what a Marine company commander wrote to his father as this Marine prepared to lead his troops into action in Fallujah recently. I quote: "This battle is going to have far-reaching effects on not only the war here, but in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. There will be no shock and awe. This battle is the Marine Corps' Belleau Wood for this war.

"A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them. The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history," this company commander wrote, "as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will die trying. The Marines are fired up. I am nervous for them, though, because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I have been nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young Marines were involved, they have always exceeded my expectations. "God bless these great Americans," he wrote, "who are ensuring that we continue to fight an away schedule."

Let me add, God bless these wonderful Marines and soldiers and all the members of our Armed Forces. Our prayers are with him and with all of our people, military and civilian alike, currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America and the world more secure by helping the Iraqi and the Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East.

Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or National Guard units or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our Na-

tion, serving so that others may be free and so that our children and our grandchildren can be more secure. We thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.

We also owe a profound debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 35 coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of nongovernmental agencies (NGO) in Iraq and with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They have recently become a particular focus of terrorist attacks.

One heroine, Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women, was brutally murdered a few weeks ago for the work she was doing. Though it is small consolation to her family and friends, she wrote to a friend that if she died she would die doing what she believed in.

Finally, I would like to thank the members of this committee and Congress as a whole for their continued strong support for our members of our Armed Forces.

Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that day, some 25 million of one of the most talented populations in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years.

According to a theme that one hears often these days, the world is full of bad guys and Saddam Hussein was just another bad guy. Any time that I hear Saddam Hussein referred to in that way, I know that the person making the statement really does not understand who Saddam Hussein was and is. During my career I have had the experience of working up close and personal with some truly bad guys—Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, President Suharto of Indonesia. To paraphrase someone else on a very different occasion, I knew Ferdinand Marcos; Saddam Hussein was no Ferdinand Marcos.

Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. He ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was a torturer or an informer.

I have traveled to Iraq several times since liberation. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both there and here in the United States, and one of my strongest impressions is that the fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq, a smothering blanket of fear woven by 35 years of repression, where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death or fates worse than death, like the death of one's children or the rape of one's relatives. That fear will not be cast off in just a few weeks or even just a year or two.

Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In 1979 when he formally assumed power as president, he had a sweeping purge of top Baathist Party leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam, with tears running down his cheeks and puffing on a cigar, talked about the confession of disloyalty they had received from a top party member and then continued one by one to name other guilty colleagues.

One by one, guards dragged these people out of the meeting. Then Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty test. They were required to participate in the firing squads that executed those he had identified. He did not stop there. He had videos made of the whole event and distributed throughout the Middle East, so that people would know what kind of a man he was.

Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood that his threats were to be taken seriously, in doing that Saddam Hussein applied the techniques that any FBI agent will tell you are the techniques of a gangland boss. But he did it on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government.

One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter, the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war, described a prison in Baghdad whose stench he said was unreal, an amalgam—I quote—“of urine, feces, vomit, and sweat.” Where prisoners were howling and dying of thirst. In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime—being children of the regime’s political opponents.

I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has accurately called the density of evil that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that does not end. Such evil and fear are so alien to our own American experience that I think it is necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges still facing us.

Because, Mr. Chairman, this is not just history. I did not tell these stories in order to educate people about the past. It is the present. When we use this rather anodyne term, “former regime elements,” to describe the people that we capture and the people that are organizing much of the fighting in Fallujah, my view, the more correct term would be “the torturers and killers of the old regime.”

One example—and I would like to submit the full classified statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. But this is an analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency of one branch of the former Iraqi Intelligence Service called the M-14, the so-called Special Operations and Anti-Terrorism Branch. “Anti-Terrorism,” it is Orwellian. This branch specialized in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, and assassinations. It was a terrorist branch.

These people are in the field today. As that report says: “Former Iraqi Intelligence Service operatives from M-14 have been involved in planning and conducting numerous improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and radio-controlled improvised explosive devices for anti-coalition attacks throughout Iraq.”

It goes on to say that: “cells of former M-14 personnel are organizing and conducting a terrorist IED campaign against coalition forces throughout Iraq. The explosives section of M-14 prepared for the invasion by constructing hundreds of suicide vests and belts for use by Saddam fedayeen against coalition forces. The Iraqi Intelligence Service established a campaign that was purposefully de-

centralized so that attacks could be carried out in the event that cell leaders were captured or killed.”

It goes on to mention that: “Given their high level of skill, M-14 tactics, including explosives, are likely to be sophisticated.”

I would like to submit the full—I do not have page numbers; it is about a seven-page document, and the detail is stunning in my view.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection, Mr. Secretary, that will be done.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Given that kind of presence, it is not surprising to me that we get accounts like this one that came recently from the Marines on the battle front. I guess I should always say that first reports in war are frequently wrong and even second reports can be wrong, and I do not know whether this is a first, second, or third. But it strikes me it is probably true.

The Marines reported a fire fight in a small village northeast of Fallujah called Karmah. They basically stumbled across what seemed to be a large enemy position. The enemy swarmed in attack on the Marines. The result of a very intense fire fight was over 100 enemy killed in action.

The significant thing, which I am looking to confirm, the report says upon termination of hostility the local townspeople approached the Marines, thanking them for their action, because the enemy had taken over their town and had been effectively holding them hostage.

I can confirm more reliably, Mr. Chairman, that a similar situation prevailed in the town of Samarra further east in the area of operation of the Fourth Infantry Division, which is now run by the First Infantry Division, a situation not as bad as Fallujah but in some ways perhaps emblematic of the Fallujah problem. General Odierno of the Fourth I.D. about 2 months ago undertook a cordon and search operation where they closed off the town and systematically went after the anti-democratic forces that had been organizing and terrorizing that town. I have heard different estimates ranging from 200 to 700 enemy captured and detained, but what is in no disagreement is that once those people were gone Samarra was a different place, and indeed it has been a different place during the violence of the last few weeks.

Jim Steele, who is a retired Army colonel with incredible bravery and also incredible expertise about police forces in third world countries—he has been in Iraq for the last year—he gave a report about a recent visit to Samarra. He said: “It is a different place from what it was during my last visit in December. The number of active police stations has more than doubled. The attitude toward the coalition forces was much improved as well. Sammara is an excellent example of local and regional cooperation. In fact, during the recent fighting the police in Sammara performed well.”

This is from a report from Major General John Batiste, the commander of the First Infantry Division, which now took over from General Odierno. He said: “We stood up a security working group in Sammara in advance of the April 9th to 12th Arbayeen celebra-

tions to keep the peace and, if necessary, respond with firmness. There was some violence on the 12th of April in Sammara, but Iraqi security forces were part of the solution and the violence was contained. I am using the Sammara model throughout the region.”

I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because, as bad as the situation is in Fallujah—and I do not in any way mean to minimize it—I think the enemy that we are facing is an enemy that rests on killing and death and terror, not an enemy that has genuine popular appeal. We have to work on our side on improving the belief of the Iraqi people in their future and the belief in what we can do for their future, though we also have to work to overcome the fear that these people implant.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Iraq has been a free country for a single year, after decades of systematic abuse. A year after its liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. The indisputable fact is that, after 35 years of unimaginable horrors, Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better in the 12 months since its liberation.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam’s personal fiat. Baathists suppressed dissent through murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons.

Today Iraqis have an interim constitution that contains assurances of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement—provisions that are highlighted in that chart on my right.

Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for lifesaving medicines were used by Saddam’s regime to buy the means to end life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq’s hospitals and clinics that did remain open served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times, that is 30 times, over prewar levels and children are receiving crucial vaccinations for the first time in years.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq’s economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and the systematic misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of the regime. Today the Iraqi economy is starting on a path of recovery, even though the full effect of the \$18.4 billion that Congress provided is only just starting to be felt.

This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern to us. But we are making progress in the face of years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.

For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq’s oil revenues helped to build Saddam’s palaces and line his pockets and those of his cronies. Today that revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps to build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its prewar levels and a total of \$7.5 billion has been generated for the Development Fund for Iraq. That, I would add, is on top of roughly \$8 billion from past revenues out of the Oil for Food

program, so that Iraq has contributed \$17 billion approximately of its own resources, \$16.9 billion to be precise, to the reconstruction effort already.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in a state of unimaginable disrepair. Saddam corrupted the Oil for Food program and diverted the wealth of the country for his own power and comfort. Today power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed throughout the country.

For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Baath Party fascism. Today that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system. 64,000 secondary school teachers and 5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods. Endless references to Saddam in the textbooks have been removed and coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools.

After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's Marsh Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were on the verge of extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been converted into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people, the Marsh Arabs, whose history goes back thousands of years. Today the marshlands are gradually being restored and that ancient culture is being revived.

For 35 years, the Iraq people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Iraq's state-run media. Today Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources, including 170 newspapers.

For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation's future. Today more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs and one in five belongs to a nongovernmental organization.

I read in "The Guardian" of London that recently in the overwhelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq 17 towns held local elections using ration cards in the absence of registration rolls, their first genuine elections ever, and in almost every case either secular independents or nonreligious parties outpolled the Islamists.

Perhaps most important, in the year since Iraq has been liberated no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down for good.

Despite all the uncertainty and violence caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite all the difficulties that are correctly described in Iraq today, 56 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago, and a full 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am not here to paint a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored glasses. There are enormous problems. Some of them are indeed the result of what General Petraeus, who recently commanded the 101st in Iraq and will be going back, by the way, to perform a crucial role in

building Iraqi security forces—General Petraeus called it the man on the moon phenomenon. That is to say: You Americans can put a man on the moon; how come my electricity does not work? How come the sewers are not fixed? How come everything is not perfect after liberation?

I believe that it is critical not only for the concrete benefits that come from employing people and fixing their basic services, I believe it is also critical in terms of maintaining faith and confidence in the United States, that we have to speed up this reconstruction effort. We are trying to understand—Senator Levin referred to lessons learned. One of the lessons we are trying to learn is the roadblocks that have made it slower than I believe is acceptable to get projects moving.

Some of those roadblocks are unavoidable. They are the inevitable result of an insecure situation. Some of them are self-imposed red tape or in some cases I think legislation. I hope we can work together with Congress to eliminate both where they are unnecessary obstacles.


We have a strategy. It has three basic elements. The first one involves building capable Iraqi security forces. The picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned, important lessons learned from the last few weeks, but I believe on balance it is one of the most critical elements. But Jim Steele, whom I quoted earlier, also reported visiting police stations in two critical sections of Baghdad, in Adamiyah and Sadr City, late at night during the recent disturbances and was, frankly, surprised, but pleasantly surprised, to find the chief of police there on duty and working.

One of the problems is, through our slowness in getting equipment into the field, many of these Iraqi police were outgunned by the militias that they faced. That is a problem we can fix. In fact, if I were an Iraqi policeman I guess I would be asking, why did you not fix it sooner? We are moving to fix it as rapidly as we can.


The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative self-government, with the aim of creating a government that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power.

Can someone put up the chart, please, that shows that process. [The information referred to follows:]

Iraq Political Transition



U.S. Government Transition



*Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for
the Transitional Period*

**HUMAN
RIGHTS**

Freedom of religion
Freedom of expression
Freedom of the press
Freedom of assembly
Freedom of movement
Presumption of innocence
Speedy trial
Search warrants
(Articles 13 through 15)

**EQUALITY
UNDER LAW**

Discrimination
by religion,
ethnicity,
gender, race, or
nationality
prohibited
(Article 12)

**INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY**

**CIVILIAN
CONTROL OF
THE MILITARY**

A goal of the election law:

One-quarter of the National Assembly should be women

I would emphasize it is a process. Things will not change overnight on July 1. While many think July 1 will be a magical date on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraqi government, it is actually, like the process in Afghanistan that was started in Bonn in December 2001, just one step in the process.

Already, free Iraqis have been assuming responsibility for government functions for quite some time. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running. I think this is important: The July 1 transition is just one of three important steps in the future. It will be followed by the elections to establish a Transitional Government in January of 2005. Let me emphasize, elected, not appointed by the Americans, not negotiated by Ambassador Brahimi, but fully elected, early next year.

That government in turn will be replaced by a permanent elected government under a constitution at the end of 2005.

The third element of the strategy, Mr. Chairman, involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services to provide better lives for Iraqis and put people back to work. Again, this is an area where we have to speed things up. I think things are speeding up and there is no question that the infusion of money that Congress provided last year is starting to be felt and will be felt on a larger scale over the course of this calendar year.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the same time the Iraqis are undergoing a significant transition we will be transitioning from the CPA under Ambassador Bremer's leadership to a new American embassy led by one of our most distinguished

career diplomats, John Negroponte, our current Ambassador to the United Nations, as was just announced yesterday.

We have been working closely with our colleagues in the State Department. An example of extraordinarily good cooperation, I have with me retired General Mick Kicklighter, who has been working on these issues for the Defense Department, and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, doing them for the State Department. We sometimes are not quite sure whether they are the Bobbsey Twins because we always see them together, but they are here and they are a resource.

Chairman WARNER. I wonder if they would stand up.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If they would stand up, I think it would be helpful. They deserve at least some recognition for the extraordinary work they have been doing. [General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone stand.]

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I give details about the timeline in the Transitional Administrative Law on these three phases. I think it is important to understand that there are three phases and that July 1 is not an all or nothing kind of date.

I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of government that will result from this process, any more than I could have predicted in December 2001 what would result in Afghanistan from the Bonn process. The Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent constitution and who will emerge as the leaders of a new Iraq. Particularly after 35 years of what they have been through, it is a complicated task.

But Americans, of all people, should understand that democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes. It opens up ideas for debate. One need only look back to our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that any attempt to establish rule for the people and by the people will involve uncertainty and controversy.

Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years in countries that had no prior historical experience of democracy. They are all different. None of them are perfect. Neither are we. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be a light years improvement over what that country has been like for the last 35 years.

Let me say one more thing here. I think it is wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and Christians and Turkomen, some of the most intelligent people in the world, are incapable of achieving what Lithuania or Korea or the Philippines or Indonesia or Croatia or other newly emerging democracies have accomplished over the last couple of decades.

Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves impressively well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam's unique level of sadism. I guess I would say, well, if someone is sitting there saying, what on earth is he talking about when we read these scenes in Fallujah or we read about Mr. Sadr, let me just give you one example.

We did not read about the massive Arbayeen pilgrimage. I do not know the estimates. I think roughly a million Shia pilgrims on the road for that celebration, very emotional celebration of the martyrdom of Ali. We anticipated, we were afraid of massive violence during that event. There was no news because there was no violence.

The Shia of Iraq on the whole have conducted themselves with incredible restraint in the face of repeated provocations, both from the Zarqawi terrorists, from the former regime killers, and from this small-time gangster Mr. Sadr.

I do want to recognize that we have disappointments with the performance of security forces. We are learning lessons from that. I cite three in particular at length in my testimony. The first is the need for stronger leaders. The second is that Iraqi security forces need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to feel and to have their friends and relatives feel that they are fighting for Iraq, not for the Americans. That is one of the reasons why General Abizaid and our commanders were those who were pushing so hard to accelerate the transition to a sovereign government. That is the reason why they found, and I felt with them, that this label of occupying power was not a good one to hang onto for another year and a half if there was any way to avoid it.

Third, and this is our responsibility, Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment and they need it faster.

Mr. Chairman, I have some comments about Afghanistan. I will be happy to discuss that in questions. I would like to stress that I think the American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq and in Afghanistan, that the efforts of our service men and women are transforming the lives of 50 million people, overwhelmingly Muslims, and transforming two regions that have for too long accommodated despotism and terrorism, to the detriment of its people.

Both our friends and our enemies, and our friends particularly, in Iraq and Afghanistan need to know that this country has the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives. I suppose it is worth highlighting for the international audiences that the debate in this country seems to be about whether we have enough troops or whether we should have more troops, not about whether we should abandon the people of Iraq or the people of Afghanistan. That is an incredibly important message. It is one of the most valuable messages we can deliver, because it builds confidence in the people, it encourages people to cooperate with our troops, and it will allow us to defeat this ugly enemy sooner rather than later.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I think I am going to abbreviate here. I do want to say that there are quite a few myths out there and I cite some of them in this testimony. It is a myth to say that the June 30 date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, and even more of a myth to say it is driven by the demands of U.S. electoral politics. There are very good important reasons in Iraq for doing it, and I would note that in fact it was our friends in the United Nations, particularly France, that were most critical when we established the Governing Council that Iraq needed a sovereign government, not an American occupation.

Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I think we can probably perceive the benefit of your additional points in the exchange we will have on questions.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let us do that. If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one impressive quote from General Jack Keane in his retirement, because I think this is a message to the world. The General said that: "The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations have no idea what they are up against. They think they know us," General Keane said, "because they have heard of Lebanon in 1983 or Somalia in 1994 or the U.S.S. *Cole* in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve.

"But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shallow. To understand America and Americans," General Keane said, "they need to understand the Marne in 1918 or Tarawa in 1943 Omaha Beach in 1944, or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a Nation that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy, John Pershing and George Marshall, Chesty Puller and George Patton, Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon, produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now performing every day."

The General concluded: "Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant, and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless those wonderful men and women who serve our country so well, and I thank this committee and Congress for the support you give them.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: As he prepared to lead his troops into action in Fallujah, a Marine Company Commander took time to write his father, a retired marine. "This battle is going to have far reaching effects on not only the war here," he wrote:

"But in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. . . . There will be no shock and awe. . . . This battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war. . . . A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them.

The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will die trying. The marines are fired up. I'm nervous for them though because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I've been nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young marines were involved they have ALWAYS exceeded my expectations.

God bless these great Americans who are ensuring we continue to fight an "away" schedule."

Our prayers are with him and all of our people currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America—and the world—more secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our Nation—serving so that others may be free—and we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.

We also owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 34 coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of NGOs in Iraq who have recently become the target of

terrorist attacks, such as Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women. Ms. Holland was brutally murdered for the work she was doing, and although it is small consolation to her family and friends, died doing what she believed in.

Finally, I'd like to thank the members of this committee for their continued support to the members of our Armed Forces.

IRAQ: 35 YEARS OF UNIMAGINABLE TYRANNY, ONE YEAR OF PROGRESS

A little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. I remember watching the live coverage of that historic moment. Iraqis, eager to start a new page in their national history, enthusiastically tried to pull the statue down with the limited resources available to them—a length of rope that did not even reach all the way to the ground. Eventually, a group of U.S. marines saw what was happening, and aided the Iraqi effort. Working together, the Marines and Iraqis brought down that symbol of oppression and provided an image that will be etched in our collective memory forever.

On that day, 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years. According to a somewhat popular theme these days, the world is full of bad guys, and that Saddam Hussein is just another bad guy. When I hear Saddam Hussein referred to that way, I can only conclude that there still exists a lack of real understanding of Saddam Hussein. In my career, I've known some bad guys up close and personal, people like former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former Indonesian dictator Suharto. To paraphrase a famous vice-presidential debate, I knew these men, and Ferdinand Marcos was no Saddam Hussein; Suharto was no Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. Hussein ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was an informer. The superintendent of the Baghdad police academy told me that he had spent a year in jail for having made a disparaging comment about Saddam—to this best friend. In such a Republic of Fear, friendship itself became a weapon.

I have traveled to Iraq several times. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both in Iraq and here in the United States. One of my strongest impressions is that fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq. But, a smothering blanket of apprehension woven by 35 years of repression—where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death—won't be cast off in a few weeks' time.

Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In 1979, one of his first acts as President was a sweeping purge of top Baathist leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi national assembly, Saddam tearfully talked about a coerced "confession" of disloyalty from a top party member, and then continued to name other guilty colleagues. Guards then dragged these people out of the meeting. Then, Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty test—he called on them to form the firing squads that executed those he'd identified.

Saddam had videos of the whole event distributed throughout the Middle East, so people would know what sort of leader he was. Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood how seriously to take his threats, Saddam Hussein applied the techniques of a most brutal gangland boss, but on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government.

One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter—the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war—has described a prison in Baghdad, whose stench, he said, "was unreal," an amalgam of urine, feces, vomit and sweat"; a hellhole where prisoners were "howling and dying of thirst." In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime—being children of the regime's political enemies.

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was recently returning from a trip to Iraq, and stopped at Ramstein AB, where he was told about some Iraqi businessmen who had recently passed through on their way to the United States, to the Texas Medical Center in Houston, where they were to undergo surgery to repair some of the damage inflicted on them some 10 years ago. When Iraq's economy was falling into shambles, Saddam's way of placing blame was this: he ordered that a few merchants be rounded up. With flimsy evidence, they were found guilty of destabilizing the Iraqi economy and were sentenced to lose their right hands. Black Xs tattooed on their foreheads branded them as criminals. The amputations were filmed, and the video—as well as the hands—were sent to Saddam. In a Houston doctor's office, one man was quoted as saying: "You spend your

whole life doing and saying the right things. Then someone comes and cuts your hands off for no reason at all. It's a torture that never ends."

I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has called the "density of evil" that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that doesn't end. Such evil and fear is so alien to our own American experience that I think it's necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges facing us right now. Even though Saddam's regime is gone and he himself has been captured, the fear of Saddam and his henchmen is still alive in the minds of Iraqis facing the difficult choice of whether to cooperate with us and with other brave Iraqis to build what they call "the New Iraq." Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's old regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, it is only natural that that fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the punishment of those responsible are directly linked to our success in helping the Iraqi people build a free, secure and democratic future.

The people of Iraq have much valuable information that can help us root out the remaining Baathists and help Iraqis find justice. To the extent that people of Iraq are willing to take part in the civic and political institutions that will constitute a new Iraq is linked to their understanding that the Saddamists are finished, and will never again return to power in Iraq.

Convincing them of this truth—that Saddam and the Saddamists are finished—will continue to require investments in our time and our resources to continue to build trust among the Iraqi people.

Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of systematic abuse by a regime of murderers and torturers. A year after Iraq's liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. For amidst the episodes of violence and tragedy of the loss of innocent life in suicide bombings, the good news of what is happening in Iraq often gets obscured or ignored. As one soldier recently wrote to the *Houston Chronicle*, "The reality is we are accomplishing a tremendous amount here, and the Iraqi people are not only benefiting greatly, but are enthusiastically supportive."

The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring unimaginable horrors, in the year since its liberation Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better:

For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam's personal fiat. Baathists suppressed dissent through murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. They tortured children in order to coerce their parents, and raped women to punish their families. Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons.

Today, Iraqis have an interim Iraqi constitution that is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) contains assurances of:

- Freedom of Religion
- Freedom of Expression
- Freedom of the Press
- Freedom of Assembly
- Freedom of Movement

The TAL guarantees equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity, denomination, or sex. It acknowledges the Islamic character of the majority of Iraqi society and, at the same time, affirms the right to freedom of religious belief and practice for every Iraqi. It provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy, including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of law, fundamental civil rights, and civilian control of the military. This constitution emerged from an often heated, but ultimately healthy, political debate, one that would have been impossible a year ago—and one that is still impossible in many areas of the world.

Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy means to end life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq's hospitals and clinics that remained open to the public also served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over its pre-war levels, and children receive crucial vaccinations for the first time in years.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of his regime. Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path of recovery and prosperity. Unemployment has fallen, inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war, and the New Iraqi Dinar has become the most heavily traded

currency in the Middle East. This is before the full effect of the \$18.4 billion in reconstruction grants you helped provide the Iraqi people is felt. This is still an area of great concern to us, but we are making progress despite years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.

For 35 years, Iraq's oil revenues helped build Saddam Hussein's palaces and lined the pockets of Saddam and his cronies. Today, Iraqi oil revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its pre-war levels, and oil proceeds to date exceed \$7.5 billion and are projected to be \$14 billion this year.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in a state of unimaginable disrepair. What electricity was produced was diverted to Baghdad in order to reward Saddam's cronies and punish the people whom Saddam despised. Today, power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed, and new, modern power plants are being built.

For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Baath party fascism. Today, that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system and its teaching materials. 64,000 secondary teachers and 5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods, and 72 million new textbooks will be distributed before the end of the school year. To date, coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools. The Iraqi people have clearly demonstrated their preference for the new educational system, as school attendance this year has surpassed pre-conflict levels.

After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's Marsh Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were close to extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people whose history goes back thousands of years and make of them an example to warn anyone who would challenge his rule. Today, the marshlands are gradually being restored, and that ancient culture is being revived.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Saddam's state-run media. Today, Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources. One hundred seventy newspapers are currently published in Iraq, and the Iraqi Media Network reaches more than 80 percent of the Iraqi population. The market in satellite dishes is booming.

For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation's future. Today, more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs and one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization. Ninety percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils, which we think is a pretty good sign that the Iraqi polity is moving in the right direction. Recently, in the overwhelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq, 17 towns have held local elections—their first genuine elections ever—and in almost every one secular independents and non-religious parties did better than the Islamists.

Perhaps most importantly, in the year since Iraq has been liberated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down.

Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite the difficulties we all read about 56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. Despite the prevalence of alarmist quotes depicting some Iraqi "man-on-the-street" lamenting the good old days under Saddam Hussein, only 18.6 percent of those polled said they were much or somewhat worse off than a year ago. A full 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

Moreover, the Iraqi people are expressing their optimism with their feet. Despite the continued threat of violence in Iraq, and the horrific terrorist attacks against Iraqi civilians intended to derail progress in Iraq, as several thousands of Iraqi refugees are returning to their homeland.

THE COALITION'S STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN IRAQ: CAPACITY BUILDING

Despite the violence of recent weeks, we need to continue to move forward on all fronts implementing the coalition's strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free Iraq that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Events of the past month have taught us several lessons learned that have influenced our policy decisions. These lessons include:

- The importance of local initiative for fast action: local commanders should get a special allocation of reconstruction funds.
- The importance of Iraqi leadership and the need to intensify our efforts to train and develop Iraqi leaders
 - We need to cross-attach coalition and Iraqi liaison officers, and more heavily embed coalition trainers and mentors.
 - We need to continue to recruit vetted former senior (Colonel—Brigadier) Iraqi officers for the Iraqi Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense.
 - We need to speed police advisors and specialized trainers to police stations and academies.
- The importance of having an Iraqi rallying point and looking for ways to shorten the process by which Iraqis quickly create a government that embodies Iraqi nationality and sovereignty.
 - We need to continue to install and highlight an Iraqi chain of command: new defense minister, commander of the Armed Forces, chief of staff, new interior minister.
 - We need to carry out de-Baathification process in a way that is non-punitive to those with clean records.
 - We need to strengthen the legitimacy of an Iraqi interim government and the constitutional process.
 - We need to focus the Iraqi media spotlight on political activities of leading Iraqis, including Governing Council members.
 - We need to continue to encourage local elections.
- The importance of equipment and support and the need to accelerate the equipping of Iraqi security forces.
 - We need to rush delivery of critical items (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, radios)
 - We need to upgrade required items in light of current experience.
 - We need to enhance protection for security forces and police fixed sites.

Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous Iraq capacity and transition responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq rapidly, but not hastily. While these lessons to be learned from the violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we pursue these three lines of operation, these are still the three key elements that will bring success in Iraq.

The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to achieve stability. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces—Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to certify the ability of these forces, that they are ready to assume greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Similarly, through technical assistance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors and judges of their Iraqi counterparts, we have been helping to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector: the Judicial Review Commission has reviewed and vetted all currently sitting judges and prosecutors; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, established to deal with those who have committed the most notorious crimes in Iraq, is investigating and trying cases; and every pre-war local criminal court in Baghdad is open, fully functional, and every week more cases are set for trial or tried as compared to the week before.

The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative, self-government with the aim of creating a government that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power. While many think that July 1 will be a magical date on which Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq government, it is actually just one step in a process. Already, free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for governmental functions for quite some time. Many Iraqi ministries report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running. When the Interim Government assumes office on July 1, its most important task will be to prepare the way for elections to establish the Transitional Government in January of 2005. That government in turn will be replaced by elections for a fully constitutional government at the end of 2005.

The last element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services that are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work. Iraq has tremendous potential. It has well-educated and industrious people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to realizing

that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to reap greater prosperity in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

Although the progress the Iraqi people have made in their climb up from tyranny has been both encouraging and impressive, significant challenges still remain.

Security in Iraq

When planning the military campaign to liberate Iraq, this administration and the combatant commanders chose to launch a campaign that emphasized speed rather than mass. The astonishing speed of this military campaign enabled us to avoid many of the nightmare scenarios that were predicted before the war. Lest anybody forget, in part thanks to this war plan we managed to avoid most of the horror scenarios we feared going into this war:

- Iraq's oil fields were not turned into an ecological and economic disaster;
- Massive destruction of dams and bridges was prevented;
- Large-scale refugee flows were not generated;
- There was no humanitarian crisis from food or medical shortages;
- No friendly governments in the region collapsed because of the pressures of a protracted war.
- Iraq's neighbors did not intervene, nor did Israel;
- Ethnic conflict did not break out in mixed populations in northern Iraq or elsewhere; and
- There was no "Fortress Baghdad" with street-to-street fighting and heavy civilian casualties.

The avoidance of these calamities was not by accident, but rather the result of careful planning.

Because we did not wait to mass half a million forces in theater before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam was not able to organize the large-scale urban warfare campaign about which so many military analysts warned. The historically unprecedented speed of the campaign may have led many Iraqi forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarrat, to disperse throughout the country rather than stand and fight in the streets as anticipated.

In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam's tyranny, it was always necessary that we defeat these forces. The current violence is not an issue of reconstruction planning, nor is it due to a lack of forces. Overall, the decision to emphasize speed rather than mass was a deliberate choice, recommended by the Combatant Commander, General Franks, but approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Like all choices it involved necessary tradeoffs, but overall it has saved lives and helped to avoid terrible humanitarian and environmental disasters.

The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected. President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the months leading up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that the enemies of democracy in Iraq would do everything they could to disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expectation was confirmed when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his Al Qaeda colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi expressed disappointment that previous mass attacks were failing to shatter the unity of the Iraqi people. He advocated stepping up attacks to kill large numbers of Shi'a in order to provoke a sectarian civil war in Iraq. Some of the recent violence, including the attacks on Shi'ite worshippers in Karbala and Baghdad during the Ashoura holiday in early March which killed 140 Iraqis, bear Zarqawi's hallmark.

However, the same political situation that is driving such attacks also is a source of optimism for the Iraqi people and their coalition partners. Zarqawi recognized that the fast-approaching turnover of sovereignty would further weaken his cause, saying:

"With the spread of the [Iraqi] army and the police, our future is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance to the people of the region. How can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Americans start withdrawing? This is the democracy . . . we will have no pretext."

Zarqawi's letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in violence precisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq believe we are winning and that their time to derail democracy in Iraq is running out.

U.S. Government Transition after CPA

We face another daunting challenge as we execute the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government bolstered by a U.S. embassy less than 90 days from now. Fortunately, planning for this transition is well underway within the Defense and State Departments. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a success. They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 subject matter sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities, Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense coordinate closely to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and implementation of the plan are on track.

Transitional Administrative Law

While the ITPT sets the course for the U.S. Government transition, the TAL establishes a clear way forward for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution for Iraq and the election of a government in accordance with its terms. This political transition is scheduled to evolve over three phases:

- Phase I (June 30, 2004)—Iraqi Interim Government
- Phase II (January 2005)—Iraqi Transitional Government
- Phase III (January 2006)—Iraqi Government under Permanent Constitution

According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim Government will take power on June 30. This Interim Government will be selected by procedures being developed through intensive consultations among Iraqis, led by Ambassador Brahimi, the U.N. Secretary General's Special Advisor on Iraq. We believe the ideas put forth by Mr. Brahimi are promising and we look forward to more details from the U.N. CPA officials will remain in close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of the Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis as these procedures are completed in May. The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005.

The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council comprised of a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government.

In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by December 31, 2005.

The TAL provisions relevant to security arrangements also provide the appropriate framework for implementing our security strategy in Iraq. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to" UNSCR 1511. Article 59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government "shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multinational force," and that "nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force's activities pending entry into force of those agreements." Perhaps most importantly, article 26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." This includes CPA Order #17, which provides SOFA-like protections for Coalition Forces, and will stay in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the sovereign Iraqi government.

Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the permanent government. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent Iraqi constitution, or who will emerge as the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political institutions and it cannot happen overnight.

Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need only look back at our own

Constitutional Convention to be reminded that with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there is always a great deal of uncertainty and controversy, right up until the ink has dried and even afterwards. We should not expect Iraqis to achieve immediately what we and the British, for example, have labored to accomplish over the course of centuries. Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years. They are all different and none are perfect. Neither is ours. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an improvement light years beyond what that country has endured for the past 35 years.

Let me say one more thing here. I believe it is wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, some of the most intelligent people in the world, can not achieve what Lithuania, Korea, and other newly emerging democracies throughout Eastern Europe and East Asia have accomplished in the past 20 years. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves extraordinarily well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sadism. In a remarkably short period of time, Iraqi leaders, for all their diversity, have shown they are learning the arts of political compromise and that they are dedicated to their country's unity.

Iraqi Security Forces

One institution we are focusing intently on is the Iraqi Security Forces, whose performance during the spike in combat activity over the past 3 weeks has been mixed. At least half of the security forces stood their ground and in Fallujah some ICDC units fought bravely and well. Other units did not face the enemy, avoided contact altogether, and a small proportion cooperated with the enemy.

Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with realism. Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or withstanding the recent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us. We have been fielding Iraqi security forces as fast as we could, but we never intended for Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility for Iraq's security on June 30, much less April 5. Our plan was and is for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience under the security umbrella of the coalition, while the coalition retained overall security responsibilities. Recent events provide lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are doing.

The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers with coalition forces and we will embed coalition officers with the Iraqi security forces. This cross-attachment provides liaison, which produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi leadership. Similarly, we need police advisors and specialized trainers to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence and set the example.

Second, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the Armed Forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken office. We need to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top.

The other and harder part of creating a national rallying point for the security forces is the creation of an Iraqi government. This is one of the important reasons to maintain the momentum of the governance process, including not only the June 30 transition but the important steps beyond.

Third, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but some of our ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are relooking the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been caused by challenges in the contracting process and we hope those problems have been fixed. We need to make up some of our lost time, but any delay is unacceptable.

The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces was an intangible: fear. The fear of becoming a casualty is doubtless ever-present; almost 300 members of the Iraqi security forces have been killed and almost 700 wounded. But fear of the future is a much greater factor. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from the retribution that may follow their participation in operations alongside the coalition. The intimidation is crude but often effective, especially in a society in which keeping your head down

was an essential survival technique for over 30 years. That fear takes time to overcome.

The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat alongside the coalition is also colored by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we will not see them through to a new constitution, an election, and strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal with those who would shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid.

Afghanistan

We also confront challenges in Afghanistan where the United States, its coalition partners, and NATO have committed to helping the Afghans build a moderate, democratic, and representative government. Despite some setbacks, Afghanistan has made enormous progress on several fronts.

In January of this year, the Afghan people reached a critical milestone when they adopted a constitution laying the foundation for strong democratic institutions and guaranteeing civil liberties such as freedom of religion and equality between men and women. The Afghans have made steady progress in disarmament, with 40 percent of the heavy weapons around Kabul secured. A nation-wide heavy weapons survey is identifying all remaining heavy weapons in the country for removal by June 2004. The Afghan Ministry of Defense will likely meet its goal of 9,500 Afghan National Army troops by the summer. The 7,646-strong force has already contributed to the success of Coalition stability operations in the south and east. The army allowed the central government to respond effectively to the recent unrest and factional fighting in Herat and Meymaneh.

With the more than \$2 billion that you helped provide, the President was able to commit personally to accelerate progress in Afghanistan's reconstruction and security. This commitment has allowed us to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Afghanistan. The coalition recently established its 13th team in the southern province of Oruzgan. We hope to set up three more in the south and east by June of this year. Countries leading PRTs include the U.K., New Zealand, and Germany. These teams play an active role in defusing regional tensions among rival warlords, engage in public works projects, and help provide security for reconstruction activities through presence patrols and assistance to local police and security forces, among other things.

Operation Mountain Storm is underway in the south and east, where al Qaeda networks and the Taliban continue to threaten stability and reconstruction. We are following up these combat operations with focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. One vehicle for this focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance will be the Regional Development Zone, which will be rolled out in the less developed and more insecure regions.

We are improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and enhancing cooperation in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan. In 2003, we established a Tripartite Commission made up of U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani authorities that meets regularly to share military intelligence and address common security concerns.

We are actively engaging NATO countries to expand their security presence in Afghanistan. NATO recently completed an operations plan for expanding the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and Kunduz. We are lobbying NATO countries to contribute the resources necessary for this expansion.

FALSE PESSIMISM ABOUT THE IRAQI TRANSITION

But while it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq and Afghanistan through rose-colored glasses, some critics seem to have given themselves over completely to the darkest of pessimism. To some, all progress in Iraq is illusory, every silver lining has a cloud.

It is important to address and correct the misperceptions about developments in Iraq. The American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better, and transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. Both our friends and our enemies, in Iraq and Afghanistan, need to know that we have the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives.

For example, some say the June 30 date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, driven more by the demands of U.S. electoral politics than by actual conditions in Iraq, and that therefore the deadline should be extended. The choice of an early date as opposed to a later date was not arbitrary at all. If you will recall, our original plan envisaged a sovereign Iraqi government only at the end

of a multi-step process of drafting a new constitution and holding elections by the end of 2005. The President decided to shorten this timetable, for two key reasons having to do with our strategy in Iraq.

First, the Iraqis seemed to hold back from taking responsibility as long as the CPA was in total charge. A shorter timetable was seen as a necessary incentive to prepare the Iraqis for sovereignty. For without the sense of urgency and accountability that a fixed deadline imposes, Iraqi leaders have been unable to resolve the difficult issues required to conduct elections and shape a new government.

Second, an early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be better able to marginalize its extremist opponents politically while coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst possible scenario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and that's why they are trying so hard to derail it.

Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is moving forward and that their country will not be occupied indefinitely. But it is important also to make clear that coalition forces will not leave on July 1—there will still be threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people. In a recent public opinion survey, 60 percent of Iraqis said that U.S. and other coalition forces should remain in Iraq for more than 1 year, until security is restored, or until an Iraqi government is in place.

Some say the transfer of authority to Iraqis will not be genuine, that it will only be symbolic. This is also not true. On July 1, an Iraqi government will be given responsibility for day-to-day governing of Iraqi state affairs. Iraqis will control all 26 ministries with strong U.S. support. The Iraqi Police, Border Patrol, and Facilities Protection Forces—80 percent of the Iraqi Security Forces—will be under the new Iraqi Interior Ministry. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Army will, for purposes of operational control, be under the unified command of the Multi-National Force Iraq, commanded by General Sanchez. However, administratively they will be under the command of the Ministry of Defense. These arrangements are similar to those utilized in Germany and Korea during the Cold War, put real power into the hands of our Iraqi partners, and go beyond any token symbolism.

Some say that we are in Iraq with an "illegitimate" coalition that is just window dressing for this administration's unilateralism. However, the Coalition's mission to reconstruct Iraq has been an international effort from the start. Thirty-four Nations besides the United States have forces on the ground in Iraq, spearheaded by the two multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. These 34 nations include Britain, Japan, and Italy—three G-7 countries—plus Poland, South Korea, and many others. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates are training Iraqi police forces. Over 70 nations participated in the Madrid Donors' Conference, pledging between \$14–19 billion dollars for Iraqi reconstruction, including significant pledges from the World Bank and IMF.

Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais, Poles, Danes, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while trying to advance freedom and democracy in Iraq and it is wrong to denigrate their efforts. Perhaps most significantly, more than 250 Iraqis have died in the line of duty fighting for a free Iraq since June 1.

Some say that just as we should have waited for the United Nation's permission to go to war, we should bring the United Nations into Iraq today. This is a misleading statement, as this administration has made a significant effort to involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have repeatedly received the endorsement of the UN. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483—passed May 22, 2003—supports the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500—passed August 14, 2003—welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511—passed October 16, 2003—authorizes a multinational force under U.S. command. All three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.

The administration has worked closely with the U.N. Secretary General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by terrorists, U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since then we have welcomed the proposals of the new U.N. envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since the tragic bombing of the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad last August—which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out the U.N.—security for the U.N. has been a major challenge. However, the U.N. representative for Security Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad since mid-January. A U.N. Election Commission headed by Carina Perelli has in Iraq this month. Ambassador Brahimi has already con-

ducted two important missions to Iraq and we look forward to his return next month.

Some say the recent attacks against Coalition forces by Muqtada al-Sadr's militia signal the start of a major Shi'a uprising that would pit Iraq's Shi'a—who are a majority of the population—against the coalition. In reality, however, Sadr does not have widespread support in the Iraq Shi'a community. A recent ABC News poll showed that only one percent of Iraqis named al-Sadr as the National leader they trust most. Last week in Najaf, Iraqi residents of that city distributed leaflets against Sadr that said: "We don't want anyone, whoever he is, to surround himself with armed bodyguards and return us to an era of slavery for the Iraqi people." Immediately after al-Sadr urged his followers to attack U.S. forces, the Shiite clerical establishment issued a statement calling for Sadr to stop "resorting to violence, occupying public buildings, and other actions" that make him an outlaw.

That is what Muqtada al-Sadr is, an outlaw. He does not represent a "legitimate voice" in Iraq, but rather a threat to the legitimate rule of law in Iraq. Immediately after the liberation of Iraq he ordered his followers to begin taking over the mosques of moderate Shiites. He has been indicted by an Iraqi judge for complicity in the assassination of a prominent moderate Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Abdel Majid al-Khoei, in April 2003.

Muqtada al-Sadr's reliance on armed gangs to deny Iraqi men and women their basic freedoms, his use of intimidation and possibly murder against his political rivals, and his imposition of vigilante law and illegal courts are incompatible with the New Iraq that most Iraqis want.

Some say we have no plan for the scheduled transition to Iraqi sovereignty on July 1. Such statements ignore the progress made in our discussions with the U.N. over the last 2 months. U.N. envoy Ambassador Brahimi just announced on April 14 his general concept for the Iraqi Interim Government that will govern from July 1 to early 2005. That concept is the product of weeks of consultation by U.N. and coalition officials with Iraqis. Ambassador Brahimi remains confident that the process of setting up an Interim Government could be completed in a relatively short period of time. It is worth recalling that some permanent members of the U.N. Security Council complained that CPA's plan was moving too slowly to sovereignty.

As for the shape of the U.S. presence, the Command and Control relationships are in the process of being finalized. DOD will create the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) that will be headed by General David Petraeus. OSC will consist of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT). General Petraeus will have authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for recruiting, equipping, training, and positioning the Iraqi Security Forces.

Some say the new Iraq will be dominated by the Shi'a majority that will inevitably establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. Although the eventual shape of the permanent Iraqi government will be for the Iraqis themselves to determine, thus far events on the ground are cause for cautious optimism. Over the past 2 months, 17 local elections have been held in overwhelmingly Shiite provinces in Southern Iraq. In almost every case independents and representatives of non-religious parties did better than the Islamists.

In addition, certain key provisions of the TAL suggest Iraqis have already chosen a more tolerant course. First, the TAL reflects a unanimous consensus of the Governing Council that includes Shi'ite representatives, Sunni Iraqis, Kurdish Iraqis and others. These Iraqis embraced a democratic form of government that reflects the principle that there shall be neither the tyranny of the majority nor tyranny of the minority. The rights, beliefs and practices of all Iraqis are protected.

The TAL also achieves a reasonable balance with regard to the role of Islam in Iraq, combining clear guarantees of religious and other freedoms with recognition of Islam's role in Iraqi society. Article 13(F) states that "Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited." Article 7(A) states that "Islam is the official religion . . . and is to be considered a source of legislation." No law may contradict "the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the [individual] rights" granted in the TAL. The exact meaning of this will of course have to be worked out in practice. But it incorporates the view that the "universally agreed tenets of Islam" are compatible with democracy and individual rights.

Some say this administration is leading the American people into another Vietnam-like quagmire that can never be won. As Senator McCain, former Senator Fred Thompson, and many others have pointed out, that comparison is more emotion than analysis. In Vietnam, the Communists were an entrenched movement, with a strong nationalist credential, external support from two major Communist powers, and a friendly population in many parts of the country. In Iraq, the extremism in

the Sunni triangle represents a small minority of the Iraqi population seeking to restore the regime of terror that gripped Iraq for more than three decades—plus an admixture of foreign jihadists and Iraqi extremists, some of them associated with Al Qaeda. While we do not know how much these groups work together—and while their long term goals may diverge—they are united in the common purpose of defeating us and preventing a free Iraq from emerging. They offer no positive vision to Iraqis but only visions of death and terror.

One possible resemblance with the Vietnam experience, however, is the enemy's hope that it can shape perceptions here—demoralizing the American people as well as our servicemen and women in the field. That was a decisive factor in the outcome in Vietnam. That is why Senator Kerry's strong statement that America must stay the course in Iraq is so important. That is the message, we in Washington, must convey on a bipartisan basis not only to our own people, not only to our servicemen and women, but also to the Iraqis, both friend and foe.

It seems that this message is starting to get through to Bin Laden's associate Zarqawi. In the same letter I quoted previously, he lamented that America would not be pushed out "no matter how numerous its wounds become and how much of its blood is spilled." That is an accurate description of this country's courage and staying power in a just cause. Conveying that message can shorten the conflict.

CONCLUSION: ONLY ONE OPTION—TO WIN

Finally, some say there are no good options in Iraq. This is not true. In fact, there is only one option in Iraq—to continue moving ahead and helping the Iraqi people build a free and prosperous democracy. This will not be easy. Only the most naive person would think that. It will be a long road. After the abuse it has suffered, it will take time for Iraq to catch up even with the new democracies of Europe and Asia, much less long-established ones like our own.

But Iraqis recognize these challenges and embrace them as a revolutionary opportunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: "On April 9, 2003, Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their future. Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today." Minister Berwari's optimism persists even though she recently survived a second assassination attempt on her life which killed her bodyguard.

From the start of the global war on terror it has been clear that we would have to face many difficult challenges and endure many sacrifices in order to ensure the safety of our citizens and our way of life. But as Minister Berwari suggests, these should be seen as positive challenges not as excuses for inaction or retreat. When has it ever been the American way to back down from such a challenge?

Last October, in his farewell speech, General John Keane aptly described the American character in the face of challenges such as we face today in Iraq. General Keane said:

"I want to tell you something about this war against terror we are fighting in Iraq and around the world. The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the Islamic extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations, have no idea what they are up against.

Their strategic objective is the political and moral will of the American people. They want to destroy our confidence. They think they know us because they have heard of Lebanon in 1983, or Somalia in 1994, or the U.S.S. *Cole* in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shallow.

To understand America and Americans, they need to understand the Marne in 1918, or Tarawa in 1943, Omaha Beach in 1944, or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy; John Pershing and George Marshall; Chesty Puller and George Patton; Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon; produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now . . . performing every day.

Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character."

Last summer, a colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he explained the job in Iraq to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they're doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Europe and Asia during the Cold War.

Those soldiers are helping to reshape history in a way that will make America and the world safer. Like the joint effort to pull down Saddam's statue a little over a year ago, our troops are supporting the Iraqi people in their effort to overcome their tyrannical past and build a better, more peaceful future.

Needed Enhance Authorities

One of the most important ways in which Congress can support the global war on terrorism is to support three special authorities we have requested:

(1) \$500 million to train and equip military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is critical that this authority include security forces because the terrorism threat in Iraq is inside its borders. Security forces—not the New Iraqi Army—play the primary role in confronting this threat.

(2) The Commanders Emergency Response Program (\$300 million) to enable military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. This has been a remarkably successful program. With quick turnaround projects averaging about \$7,000 each, commanders not only help people in their operations area, but also gain their support in defeating terrorists and building themselves a better future. As we have already done in fiscal year 2004, we propose to expand CERP to Afghanistan, as well as to continue the program in Iraq.

(3) Increased drawdown authority (\$200 million) under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, to provide additional help for the Afghan National Army. During this pivotal year, this authority is critical for advancing democracy and stability in Afghanistan. During my visit to Afghanistan, everyone I met gave very high marks to the professionalism and competence of the ANA.

The President's fiscal year 2005 budget does not request specific appropriations for these three authorities, and therefore the Department would need to reprogram funding to use them. This underscores the importance of Congress increasing the Department's General Transfer Authority (GTA) to \$4 billion—which would still represent just one percent of total DOD funding. Higher GTA also would give us a greater ability to shift funds from less pressing needs to fund must-pay bills and emerging requirements. As we have seen in the past 3 years, such requirements have become a constant feature of our military programs.

This administration looks forward to continuing to work with the Members of Congress to help support our Armed Forces throughout the world who are doing their part to make American and her people more secure. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Well, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee have the highest regard for General Keane. I hope he is doing well. General Myers.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Once again I thank you for your unwavering support of our Armed Forces and, more specifically, our men and women in uniform as they fight this all-important war on terrorism.

As Chairman Warner said, I just returned from visiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly, the spike in violence that we have all seen in central Iraq over the last week is a challenge, no doubt about it. We mourn every coalition soldier that we lose.

But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in our resolve to help create a free, prosperous, a democratic Iraq. The violent minority, a small marginal minority, cannot be allowed to defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people. This is no popular uprising. This violence is a desperate attempt by frustrated, isolated groups, such as the insurgents in Fallujah described by Secretary

Wolfowitz and Sadr's thugs, to derail the progress that we are making.

According to recent polls, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the majority of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed and they are positive about what the future holds, thanks in large part to the efforts of our service men and women. I know you all are as proud as I am of how well they are performing. They are so tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very well. They also understand what a huge difference they are making.

The contrast between our troops and the anti-coalition forces they are fighting could not be greater. In Fallujah we have seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques as operating bases, deliberately put children in the line of fire as human shields, and attack innocent civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars into marketplaces. Our service men and women, on the other extreme, are going to extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane operations they can. That means at times we accept greater risk in order to avoid civilian casualties.

Make no mistake, we are hitting the enemy very hard and we are devastating them. But our troops are also very compassionate. Their strength of character in the end I believe will be a major factor in determining Iraq's future.

I see the same thing in Afghanistan as well, with 12 Provincial Reconstruction Teams now working on security and civil affairs for the Afghani people.

Let me close by sharing a letter that a member of my staff received from a private first class. This young man enlisted after 1 year of college. In fact, he was in college on an ROTC scholarship. But because after September 11 he saw an opportunity to make a difference, he is now serving in one of the more dangerous areas in central Iraq.

He describes how he went on a mission to look at the structural integrity of some of the bridges. In the course of the patrol, they talked to many of the Iraqis, especially the children. They had their medical corpsman take care of the children's medical problems. By the time they drove off, everyone in the town was smiling and waving at them.

I will quote, and here is what he said: "What I am trying to say to you guys is this"—and "you guys" are his parents. "We are making a difference here. An area smack dab in the infamous Sunni Triangle, known for its ruthlessness, is gradually, patrol by patrol, becoming safe and free."

"Patrol by patrol," that means we still have a long way to go in this war, beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, and elections in Afghanistan. But let us not forget that our troops are making a huge difference every day, and they know it.

We are truly blessed with amazing men and women to do this important work, and I include in there their families and for the Reserve component, the Guard and the Reserve, the employers who support them so well.

Again, I thank this committee for its strong support.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Grossman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you all for the opportunity to testify before you today. Senator Warner, I thank you for putting my full statement in the record, and I am pleased to summarize what I have to say, I hope in a short way.

Before I begin, let me add my voice to the committee's and to my fellows here at this table to pay tribute to all of those, military and civilian, who are today serving our country around the world and specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

I also want to thank the committee for their support of the State Department, because without your support and without Congress's support we would not have been in a position a year ago, 2 years ago, to do what we have had to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I will talk a little bit more about that. But I thank you in the very beginning for the strong support of Congress for the Secretary's goals in making the Department an effective institution.

I also would like to say, as you did, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, that we are delighted with the President's nomination yesterday of Ambassador Negroponte as our first ambassador to the new Iraq and we look forward to his confirmation hearings and his confirmation by the Senate. We thank you for your words of support to Ambassador Negroponte.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, in your letter of invitation to me you asked me a series of questions about how the transition was going to go between the CPA and a new embassy. I wanted today to take a few minutes to talk about where we stand in that transition and try, as specifically as I can, to answer your questions.

First let me say that in my view we have the guidance we need about how to do this. We have the direction we need about what we are supposed to do. As I hope to convince you, we also have a plan about how to move forward between now and June 30, July 1, so that a U.S. embassy and a United States ambassador representing the United States of America are there to represent us in Iraq.

Our guidance obviously, Mr. Chairman, as you have quoted, comes from the President. Our central commitment, he said last Tuesday, is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on June 30. It is important that we meet that deadline.

Our specific direction, as you can imagine, comes from Secretary Powell and he has set as the goal of the State Department to make sure that we are ready to take on this responsibility on the 1st of July. I might also say how proud we are of Lieutenant General Kicklighter and also Frank Ricciardone who are spearheading this effort for us. Now Ambassador Negroponte will come and join us and add effort and add focus to this, to the effort that we are making.

I can tell you that the Secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily. We send to the Secretary each evening a report on what has gone on during the day to move issues forward. We are also sending him a weekly consolidated summary. To execute our plan we have obviously been working closely with all of our interagency colleagues, not just DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS). We have consulted with Congress, with our allies, with our coalition partners, so people know what it is that we are doing and how it is that we are moving forward.

As an early step, one of the I think very best ideas of Ambassador Ricciardone and General Kicklighter, the transition planning team sent out very expert people to Iraq to try to tell us what were the main sectors that needed to be dealt with in this transition. They came up with 15, 16 sectors that we are now moving forward on every day. These sectors are broken down into individual tasks or milestones. Every one of them needs to be accomplished.

Although we list on our major charts 15 or 16 of these milestones, in fact the sectors relate to more than 500 milestones that we have. Just to show you that, we have a series of charts that we are using to make sure that those with the responsibility to do these jobs are doing them. Senator Warner and Mr. Levin, I would invite members of the committee or members of the committee staff to come and have a look at these. They are all on the web and at the State Department on our classified systems, and people are welcome to come and look at them at any time and see how it is that we are doing.

There is responsibility, there is a completion date, there is a desire to get these things done, and we intend to do them. It is obviously a living document. New issues come up each day. New responsibilities have to be assigned. But we are doing our very best to keep to this plan.

I would like to take today, of these 15 or 16 items, 4 of them just to talk about briefly. First, let me talk about people. State Department officers, as both Ambassador Wolfowitz and General Myers know, have been in Iraq from the very beginning, with General Garner in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and now under Jerry Bremer in CPA.

We have 170 people in Iraq today. Like Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, we are also immensely proud of our people's work that is being done in Iraq. I can tell you that they have come from dozens of Washington agencies, dozens of missions overseas, foreign service, civil service, from brand-new officers to sitting ambassadors.

The question we are asking ourselves now is how big will this embassy be on the 1st of July, and one of the questions you asked me in your letter of invitation. We the State Department have so far announced positions for 142 Americans employees and 155 locally-engaged staff. In addition, Secretary Powell has written to all of his cabinet colleagues asking them to identify the contributions that they wish to make to this embassy, and to date he has received 10 replies for requests for a presence in our mission in Baghdad, for a total of 254 Americans and 280 locally hired personnel, looking forward to the fiscal year 2005.

Long-term, because these 10 are not the only people who will look for representation at the mission, we look for a total of between 350 and 400 permanently assigned Americans from probably 12 or 15 cabinet agencies that will serve under the chief of mission in Iraq. I would also note that a number of people who work at CPA today we hope will also move under the embassy and allow us to continue with the great expertise that they have developed.

I can also report to you that, of this announced 142 positions for our new embassy at the State Department, we have had over 200 bidders on these jobs. We have not had any problem at all enticing people to be assigned to Iraq. Of the 142 positions that we have announced, we have assigned 97 people, another 32 are pending, and we will have all of these people assigned well in time to meet our obligations.

We also, Senators, are starting to begin the process to hire locally hired people, Iraqis, which is a big challenge, as you might imagine. But we have hired our initial Iraqi employees and they are undergoing training here in Washington so they can help us then hire more.

Mr. Chairman, one of the questions that is around and was in your letter of invitation was what is going to be the responsibility of the American ambassador there, given the obviously large military role that will remain in Iraq after the 1st of July. I can tell you that the American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the President, as all our ambassadors carry letters from the President, that spells clearly his authority.

It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal representative of the President reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in Iraq, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

Of course, as Paul and I have talked about a lot, our ambassador and our military commanders will need to work very closely together. We do this around the world. We will be able to do this successfully in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the second of these areas is security. Obviously, our top priority is security. It was our top priority before the last couple of weeks. It remains our top priority and we have already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on security features.

We have 32 officers from the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service already in Iraq to define the mission security requirements and begin to meet them, as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors. Deputy Secretary Armitage and our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security were in Iraq over the past few days to continue this consultation.

Iraq is, not just for our military colleagues, but for us as well and for all of our civilian colleagues, a dangerous place to work. Our people know that, but it is worth saying out loud. Protecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult, it is expensive, but we will continue to meet our responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, also in terms of a building, I have laid out in my statement our plan for creating interim facilities for the 1st of July and then our plan for building an embassy after that. I just want you to know it is there and I am glad to talk about it and we are glad to consult about it at any time.

Then finally is the question of finances, how much is it going to cost and do we have the money. Let me just share with you the

current thinking on the financial resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and if I could just emphasize as much as I can that the costs I report to you today are a snapshot. They are where we are on April 20, because we have some responsibilities to meet and we believe that they will be costly, but we can meet them.

In order to open an embassy on the July 1, we have to, as I said, meet basic security needs, technology needs, housing needs, for our people. So far Congress has provided us money with which to do some of this job. In fiscal year 2004, we have \$97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect to have available, in the fourth quarter, a portion of the operating expense budget appropriated to the CPA—that is about \$198 million—and pursuant to the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to one percent of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund which could be transferred, which is about \$184 million.

We are also now working to determine the joint mission costs, which I would say to you are going to be in the range of \$500 to \$600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004, and how we will allocate those costs among the various embassies. In addition, we are trying to figure out and look for the amount of money that we need to move forward to operate our mission in 2005, which could be on the order of a billion dollars.

We are working closely with CPA, with the DOD, the Office of Management and Budget, to refine these estimates. We look forward to providing you as accurate information as we can and we will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is made final.

Mr. Chairman, I have talked in my statement a little bit about Iraq's transition to sovereignty, but I think Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, with his charts and comments, has made many of the comments that I would have wanted to, and also about the Iraqi Interim Government.

Might I just jump, if I could, to talk for a moment about the U.N. Security Council, since both you and the ranking member had raised this issue. Obviously, we are looking to go for another U.N. Security Council resolution. Both President Bush and Secretary Powell have discussed this. We are now in a conversation inside the administration about what kind of resolution might be appropriate, how to go forward with it, when to go forward with it, and the possible elements of that resolution.

As you both said in your statements, the new resolution should extend a hand to this new Iraqi government. It could also deal in regularized reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq; deal with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could encourage other nations, as you both said, to get involved on both security and reconstruction efforts. A new resolution could structure a role for the U.N. in this new political framework, particularly in supporting progress towards elections.

Mr. Chairman, you both, and the ranking member, talked about Afghanistan. Let me just be brief, if I could, about those two issues since I think they are extremely important and we do need to keep paying attention to them. We have tried to pursue a policy in Af-

ghanistan that has to do with increased security, reconstruction and economic growth, and the growth of constitutional, democratic, and effective government.

These things are all related and as we move forward on one and have success on one we believe that they will have positive outcome on the others. As you both said, the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting and we need to pay particular attention to them.

You asked me, in your letter, about elections. President Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the lower house of parliament would take place in September, and we are doing all we can to support the U.N. effort to help the Afghans have a successful election. This announcement is consistent with Afghanistan's new constitution, which said that these parliamentary and presidential elections ought to be held together.

As you said, there was the Bonn agreement, there was the loya jirga of 2002, the constitutional loya jirga of 2004, and we believe that we can make progress here toward these elections.

The U.N. reports that about 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote as of last week, with registration so far focused on urban centers, and the number will rise significantly as people reach out to other Afghans. I would say just parenthetically that 29 percent of registered voters are women and that percentage is steadily rising, and over the past 2 weeks women have represented 39 percent of those registered.

Finally, a word about narcotics because, as you say, this is a very important challenge to what we are doing in Afghanistan. The narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious threat to our common mission in Afghanistan and, just as you and the ranking member said, all indicators point toward a significant increase in poppy cultivation this year, and we should make no bones about that. This is a real challenge that we are going to have to deal with.

We are working with President Karzai. I know that you saw, a couple of weeks ago at the Berlin conference, he called for a "jihad against drug trafficking," and we are doing all we can to fight this problem with him.

Mr. Chairman, in the carve-up of responsibilities in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom has the lead on counternarcotics initiatives and between the United Kingdom and the United States, we now have a very comprehensive strategy to try to deal with some of this problem. The United Kingdom's efforts started this month and ours will start the beginning of next month. We have put about \$40 million extra into a government-led eradication program. We are training teams to do eradication. President Karzai has set the goal of eradicating 25 percent of the crop this year and we want to help him succeed in meeting that goal.

Just let me end by saying that, although we have talked a lot about Iraq here and Afghanistan has come at the end of your statement and at the end of my statement, this is something we are paying tremendous attention to and I would be glad to talk about this and anything else in the question period.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MARC GROSSMAN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come before the committee today.

Before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women who are serving their country and the cause of freedom in Iraq. Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and I are immensely proud of the Americans—civilian and military—who demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as they work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our many coalition partners for their steadfast support.

Thank you also for your support of the State Department.

I know that you saw the President's announcement yesterday of his nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to the new Iraq. We are delighted.

Before coming here today, I read closely the letter of invitation from the committee. You had these questions: How are we going to ensure a smooth transition from CPA to an Embassy? How are we going to put in place the right people, resources and organizational structure to do the work of the American people, without interruption, on July 1?

To what kind of Iraqi Government will the American ambassador be accredited? What powers will that government have and how will it be formed? What is the role of our coalition partners, the United Nations (U.N.) and the international community in the weeks and months ahead?

These are the right questions. They are the same ones that we are working through. We do not yet have all the answers. As Secretary Powell said earlier this month to your colleagues here in Congress, "Creating a democratic government in Iraq will be an enormous challenge, but Ambassador Bremer—with the Iraqi Governing Council, the United Nations and our coalition partners—is committed to success." What did the Secretary say next? "When the State Department assumes the lead role this summer in representing and managing U.S. interests in Iraq, we will carry on that commitment. We're already thoroughly involved, and we will succeed."

We have the guidance we need, the direction required, and a plan for a successful transition in Iraq. I am pleased to report today on what we are doing to establish effective American representation in, and support for, the new Iraq.

GUIDANCE, DIRECTION, PLAN

Our guidance comes from President Bush. He repeated it last Tuesday night. "One central commitment" the President said of our mission to liberate Iraq, "is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. We have set a deadline of June 30. It is important that we meet that deadline. As a proud and independent people, Iraqis do not support an indefinite occupation—and neither does America."

The President went on to describe that day: "On June 30, when the flag of free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full responsibility for the ministries of government. On that day, the Transitional Administrative Law, including a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United States, and all the Nations of our coalition, will establish normal diplomatic relations with the Iraqi government. An American embassy will open, and an American ambassador will be posted."

Our specific direction comes from Secretary Powell. The Secretary has set the State Department in motion to support the President's goal of a smooth transition on June 30.

After the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council signed the November 15 Agreement and established the June 30 transition date, the Secretary called Ambassador Francis (Frank) Ricciardone back to Washington to head our transition team. In his first day on the job, Ricciardone went to the Pentagon to meet with his counterpart as the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Department of Defense (DOD), LTG (ret.) Mick Kicklighter. Ricciardone and Kicklighter head one interagency team.

Our interagency team has established a cell in Baghdad under Ambassador John Holzman. Ambassador Holzman works on transition planning and implementation in immediate consultation with CPA Administrator Bremer and CJTF-7 Commander General Sanchez.

The Secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily. Each evening we send the Secretary a consolidated summary of the Department's transition-related activities for the day. The notes demonstrate a broad range of interagency, bilateral and multilateral requirements, and highlight issues to solve and those resolved. We also provide the Secretary a more in-depth weekly report that highlights key challenges and the steps we are taking to address them.

So, following the President's guidance and Secretary Powell's direction, we have developed a plan to get us to—and through—June 30.

To execute our plan, we have and continue to work closely with our interagency colleagues, and we consult regularly with Congress and coalition partners in Baghdad, in Washington, and in capitals.

TRANSITION FROM CPA TO EMBASSY

We are proceeding in close coordination with our interagency colleagues and with CPA. This chart demonstrates our path forward.

As an early step, the transition planning team established teams in key sectors which we thought critical to ensuring a successful transition on June 30. We also sent assessment teams to Iraq to examine the situation on the ground and report their findings.

These sectors are listed on the chart behind me.

Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks or milestones that need to be accomplished. The sectors actually represent more than 500 milestones. Behind these milestones are individual tasks.

Responsibility for each task has been assigned to a particular agency or office, and target completion dates have been established. As you can see, there is a great deal of green in the individual tasks' matrix. This is a living, working document.

In the personnel sector, for example, there are 26 individual milestones that have been identified to date. All but four are "green," indicating that they are either completed or on schedule. On the chart, however, the personnel sector is still yellow. We are going to remain conservative in our planning, recognizing that there is no room to "round up" in this exercise.

We at the State Department are glad to brief you or your staff on any of the tasks represented here. Let me offer full access to our Transition Planning Team intranet website to any of your staff willing to visit us in the Department of State and use computers with access to our intranet.

Today, I would like to spend a few minutes going into some detail on our planning and progress in four key sectors of transition planning: people, security, buildings, and money.

PEOPLE

State Department officers have been in Iraq from the beginning, alongside Jay Garner and ORHA and under Jerry Bremer and CPA. We have more than 170 people in Iraq today. These men and women have come from Washington and dozens of missions overseas, Foreign Service and Civil Service, from our newest Junior Officers to sitting Ambassadors. We are proud of their professionalism and sense of service.

How big will our new Embassy in Baghdad be?

The State Department has announced positions for 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff.

In addition, in January of this year, the Secretary asked his Cabinet colleagues to identify contributions their agencies might offer in Iraq. To date, 10 agencies have requested a presence in Embassy Baghdad for a total of 254 American and 280 locally hired personnel for fiscal year 2005. Long term, we estimate a total of 350–400 permanently assigned Americans from some 12–15 agencies, other than State, will serve under the Chief of Mission in Iraq.

A number of CPA staff will continue after July 1 in a temporary capacity under Chief of Mission authority to ensure the continuity of the transition process and support Iraq reconstruction efforts. The transition team, working closely with CPA, is currently identifying the number of staff that will carryover.

Thanks to the eagerness of so many State Department people to volunteer for service in Iraq, we have made excellent progress in assigning them to the future Embassy. More than 200 people have requested to be assigned to the new Embassy—many of whom have already served in Iraq. Of the 142 Foreign Service positions announced to date for Embassy Baghdad, we have formally assigned 97 people. Thirty-two more assignments are pending.

We have also already begun interviewing for the local hire positions, and have hired our first employees. These first hires are undergoing training here in Washington in order to prepare to help us hire others for service in the Embassy. In the short run, however, pending the Embassy's ability to bring on all the direct-hire Iraqi personnel that we ultimately will need, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi and third country staff now under the U.S. Army's "Logcap" contract to provide many basic support services.

We have heard questions about the role of the American ambassador, given the large military presence that will remain in Iraq after July 1.

The American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the President—as all our Ambassadors do—that spells out clearly his authority in Iraq. It will say that he, as the Chief of Mission and personal representative of the President, reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in Iraq, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

Of course, the Ambassador and the military commander will have to work closely together to ensure that their respective operations are fully coordinated and best serve the interests of the United States in Iraq.

One last comment on State personnel. The response from the professional men and women in the State Department has been exemplary. Many of those who have asked to serve in the new embassy have already served in Iraq over the past year. Without the additional personnel made possible through congressional support for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, we would have been unable to provide this kind of support to CPA, or be in such good shape heading for June 30.

We look for your continued support to ensure that new requirements like Iraq are permanently funded to ensure the personnel resources remain available to respond to crises.

SECURITY

Our top priority is to keep our people safe. This is a dangerous mission. We have already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim Embassy buildings, and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on its security features. We have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq and another 98 are on order. These vehicles have already saved American and Iraqi lives.

Thirty-two Diplomatic Security (DS) staff are already in Iraq to define the Mission's security requirements and to begin to meet them—as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors.

There are difficult questions related to security still to be answered. The Deputy Secretary and Diplomatic Security Assistant Secretary Frank Taylor were just in Baghdad to keep trying to answer these questions.

Iraq is, and for some time will remain, a dangerous place to live and work. Protecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult and expensive, but we must continue to spare no effort or expense to meet this challenge.

BUILDINGS

Director of Overseas Building Operations Chuck Williams traveled to Baghdad in February to complete plans for interim and potential permanent mission facilities. We have identified a building in the green zone to serve as the Embassy from July 1 until a more permanent facility can be established. This building, which we refer to as the temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for occupancy in advance of the transition.

The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador and a limited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new Embassy compound, we will continue to use the former Republican Palace, where CPA is currently located, for most non-public operations, and we will continue to use the current residence that is being occupied by Administrator Bremer.

Most embassy employees will be housed in trailers currently being occupied by CPA personnel. We have already contracted for an additional 75 trailer units to accommodate 150 personnel to ensure that we have adequate and appropriate space to house our staff until permanent facilities can be established.

The location of our temporary and potential permanent Embassy sites are noted on this photograph of central Baghdad. We have begun the planning process to develop a new American Embassy facility.

FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the fiscal resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and the continued operation of the mission thereafter.

I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a snapshot.

In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security needs and must make an investment in technology and communications equipment. Congress has provided in fiscal year 2004 \$97 million for an interim embassy facility and in-

terim operations. In addition, we expect to have available the fourth quarter portion of the operating expense budget appropriated for the CPA (\$195.8 million), and, pursuant to the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer (\$184 million).

The State Department must be prepared to cover both its initial start-up and operating expenses, as well as follow-on costs from the CPA to assure continuity of operations. There are significant challenges in the funding demands that we are working are way through, and it is clear that we will need to make sure that all agencies cover their respective share of joint costs.

We are now working to determine those joint mission costs which may be in the range of \$500–\$600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004 and how those costs will be allocated among agencies. In addition, we estimate that the costs in fiscal year 2005 to operate the U.S. mission could exceed \$1 billion. We are working closely with CPA, DOD, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to refine these estimates and will provide you as much accurate information as quickly as we can. We will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is finalized.

IRAQ'S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY

Let me speak briefly about the political process in Iraq, and the restoration of Iraqi self-government on June 30.

Here, too, our guidance and direction is clear. The President, on the night he announced the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19, 2003 said: "We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people."

The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is laid out in the November 15 agreement. That agreement, signed by CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council, called for a Transitional Administrative Law, encompassing a basic bill of rights for all Iraqis. The agreement called for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the preparation of national elections, and the transfer of governing authority to the interim government by June 30, 2004. The agreement established a timeline for national elections, the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and the election of a government under that constitution by December 31, 2005.

There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework and timeline still holds.

TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The first step was the Governing Council's unanimous agreement on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) nearly 2 months ago. This marked an important achievement. As Secretary Powell said on March 8, "Just imagine the impact that this document is going to have, not only in Iraq but in that part of the world. The rights of all citizens, to include women, committing this Arab nation to democracy; a free and independent judiciary; the military firmly under civilian controls."

The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with Federal structures, affirms civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the independence of the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for national elections by January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a constitutionally-based post-transition Iraqi government by December 31, 2005.

THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Following the U.N. Secretary General's February 23 report and the signing of the TAL on March 8, the Governing Council on March 17 asked the U.N. to return to Iraq to advise and assist on forming the Iraqi Interim Government and preparing for elections for the Transitional National Assembly. On April 5, Ambassador Brahimi returned to Iraq to resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this purpose.

As President Bush said last Friday, "We welcome the proposals presented by the U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi. He's identified a way forward to establishing an interim government that is broadly acceptable to the Iraqi people. We thank the U.N. and Secretary General Annan for helping Iraqis secure a future of freedom. We're grateful that Mr. Brahimi will soon return to Iraq to continue his important work."

In our consultations with the U.N. and Iraqis, we have made clear that while Ambassador Brahimi and Iraqis will chose the specific formula for the interim government, there are fundamental criteria that must be met.

First, the interim government should represent the diversity of Iraq.

Second, it should not have a law-making body. The structure of the government should be effective, simple and, in order to avoid deadlock in the interim period, should not be overly large.

Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple as possible.

Fourth, the interim government should have the necessary authorities to lead Iraq into the community of nations, undertake agreements to push forward economic reconstruction, and prepare the country for elections.

We were pleased by the sketch Ambassador Brahimi provided of his proposed way forward and believe his idea fits well with our vision.

Ambassador Brahimi envisions establishing by mid-May an interim government led by a Prime Minister that also includes a President and two deputy presidents. A council of ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, selected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive but have no legislative authority.

We look forward to further discussions with Iraqis and in New York with the Secretary General as we consider the way forward. We also look forward to Ambassador Brahimi's return to Iraq in the weeks ahead to continue consultations with Iraqis countrywide.

I would also highlight Ambassador Brahimi's statement regarding the central importance of elections. We agree. In fact, the call for national elections in early 2005 was a key part of the November 15 agreement.

In this regard, we are grateful for the continued work of the U.N. election team, headed by Carina Perelli. The team has been in Baghdad since late March and is working closely with our officials and experts to accelerate election preparations. As Ms. Perelli has said, the timeline for elections by January 2005 is very tight. A top priority remains establishing an independent Election Commission as soon as possible. We look forward to further discussions with the U.N. on the way ahead.

UNSCR

President Bush and Secretary Powell have both discussed a new U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq. We are considering what kind of resolution might be appropriate and are looking at possible elements that would be in the resolution. For example, a new resolution could extend a hand to a new Iraqi government. It could deal with reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq and with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could encourage other nations to get involved on both the security and reconstruction efforts. A new resolution could structure a role for the United Nations in the new political framework, particularly in supporting the process towards elections.

JULY 1

So, as I sit before you on April 20, what do I think Iraq will look like on July 1? There will be an American ambassador, running a large but recognizable Embassy. His highly experienced deputy chief of mission and country team will include representatives from a broad range of USG agencies. There will still be more than 100,000 U.S. troops on the ground, helping provide security and train Iraqi army and police forces. When the Ambassador drives off to call on Iraqis, he will be meeting with the Prime Minister and the President of a sovereign Iraq.

But our work will not be complete. Iraq will still be in transition; elections will need to be held; a permanent constitution will need to be drafted; economic reconstruction will remain unfinished. The United States is committed until we reach our objective—a democratic, prosperous Iraq governed by a duly-elected, representative government, at peace with itself and its neighbors.

We have guidance; we have direction; we have a plan. We are already executing that plan.

AFGHANISTAN

I would also like to take a moment to address your questions regarding the political developments in Afghanistan and the threat posed by increased levels of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking.

On the occasion of President Karzai's visit to Washington in February 2003, President Bush joined President Karzai in reaffirming their common vision for an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, respectful of human rights, and at peace. The two Presidents pledged to work together to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists.

The Secretary of State has worked closely with others in the Cabinet—and with support from Congress—in making the President's vision a reality. When he was in

Kabul last month, the Secretary repeated our long-standing commitment to rebuild Afghanistan and help establish a democracy that the international community and every Afghan can be proud of.

With guidance from the President and direction from the Secretary of State, we have developed a three-fold, integrated plan for Afghanistan. Carried out under the guidance of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in Kabul, our strategy focuses on security, reconstruction and good governance.

- Improved security will create conditions for accelerated reconstruction and stronger government;
- Reconstruction and economic growth will boost stability and confidence in the government by giving Afghans a stake in a peaceful future and evidence that their leaders can deliver on their promises; and
- The growth of constitutional, democratic, and effective government will create a political arena for the resolution of differences and discredits those who would return Afghanistan to the violence of the past.

While the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting, we have made real progress on all three tracks of this strategy.

On the security track, the Afghan National Army is already deploying to regional hotspots, reasserting the role of the central government, and the Afghans are well on the way to fielding 20,000 newly trained police officers. We and our friends in NATO will continue to contribute on the security front. Just last month in Brussels, NATO reiterated that Afghanistan would remain its number one priority.

On the reconstruction track, we are continuing to focus on rebuilding the road network linking major cities as well as on building schools, clinics and irrigation systems, and creating the environment for investment, job creation and economic growth.

With respect to democratic governance, I am happy to report that Afghanistan's regional leaders are beginning to focus less on their militias and more on how to compete in a democratic political process.

Let me now briefly turn to two specific areas that the committee noted in your letter of invitation: elections and counternarcotics.

ELECTIONS

Last month President Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the lower house of parliament would take place in September. This announcement is consistent with Afghanistan's new constitution, which calls for "best efforts" to ensure that Parliamentary and Presidential elections are concurrent.

Afghanistan has already passed three major milestones on the road to constitutional democracy:

- The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 set an agreed framework for political reconstruction.
- The Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 inaugurated a representative government, with President Hamid Karzai as President and all major ethnic groups represented.
- The Constitutional Loya Jirga, on January 4, 2004, approved Afghanistan's first nationally mandated constitution in 40 years—a constitution that Afghans can be proud of and that can provide a solid foundation on which to build the functioning elements of a stable democracy.

Elections are now the fourth major milestone, and we are committed to working with the Afghans to ensure that they too are successful.

The U.N. reports that 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote as of last week, with the registration effort focused on urban centers. The number will rise significantly in coming months with the onset of Phase 2 registration where registration teams fan out into every district—to reach men and women of every ethnic group of Afghanistan. U.N. data show that many Afghans are traveling significant distances to register—a sign of the people's enthusiasm for democracy.

About 29 percent of registered voters are women, and that percentage is steadily rising as the registration process continues. Over the last 2 weeks, women have represented 39 percent of those registering.

Meanwhile, efforts are underway to register political parties, pass an elections law, and put in place the necessary logistics and security to carry out the elections in September. A massive voter education effort is also moving forward.

Some 350,000 Afghan men and women have participated in civic education meetings and millions of posters and leaflets have been distributed. In coming months, over 1,200 civic education workers will be in all provinces working side by side with partners in the NGO community.

Most Afghans have never voted and have had no direct exposure to democracy, so this will be a learning experience for the country. It is essential that the election not only perform the function of selecting leaders, but that it set the stage for future elections by giving Afghans an authentic experience of democracy. Equally as important is providing a credible electoral process that the world can point to as an unqualified success. This requires dedication and resources.

The U.N. estimates that \$224 million will be needed in all, of which approximately \$160 million has been provided or pledged to date. The United States accounts for over \$50 million—almost one third—of what has been contributed to date.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious threat to our common mission in Afghanistan. All indicators point toward a significant increase in poppy cultivation since last year.

We continue to work closely with President Karzai and members of his government, and they are firmly committed to fighting the drug industry in their country. Two weeks ago President Karzai called for a "jihad" against drug trafficking. He views drugs as a key factor in supporting corruption, the warlord militias and other key challenges facing Afghanistan. As he said at the recent donors conference in Berlin, "the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan."

We are working closely with the United Kingdom, which has the lead on counter-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan. We have a comprehensive strategy that includes integrating eradication, building law enforcement and interdiction capacity, and alternative development. Crop eradication initiatives supported by the United Kingdom are underway in coordination with provincial governors.

Next month the United States will begin implementing a nearly \$40 million central government-led eradication program, using a 150-member eradication team that will manually destroy poppy crops. An additional three 150-member teams will be trained and deployed by mid-June. Combined with the eradication conducted by provincial governors, we are striving for a goal of destroying 25 percent of the crop this year.

In Afghanistan, too, we have guidance and direction from the President and Secretary of State. We have developed a plan in cooperation with our many allies on the ground to help build an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, respectful of human rights, and at peace. We will stay the course to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists.

With that I will be pleased to take your questions. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes for each member.

My question is going to come down to one sentence after I make a preliminary observation. What is the status of the American GI on the morning of July 1, 2004? I am going to assume that there is an Iraqi Interim Government in place following the procedure that you have alluded to today. I would like to know, what is the probability of the status of forces agreement likewise being in place and what are the guidelines that will be followed in writing that up?

By way of background, I make the following observations. We are using interchangeably now the terms that on July 1, 2004, there will be a transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government. Others, including the President, have said there will be a transfer of sovereignty. Well, the word "sovereignty" can mean everything.

So I would like to know, who is going to give that GI the orders and what is he expected to do? Now, we have the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which says as follows: Iraqi Armed Forces will be, "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under a unified command pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511."

So I go to that, and that is very generalized. By the way, that was dated October 16, 2003, and an awful lot of developments have occurred since that time. But it generally says, authorizes a multi-

national force under a unified command to take all the necessary means to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, and so forth and so forth.

I think this has to be updated and clarified, and to the extent that you can advise this committee this morning—and I put the question to all witnesses: Who is going to give the orders to the security forces on June 30, 2004, and should there be a difference of views between, say, the U.S. military commanders as to what should be done to meet whatever contingencies may arise on June 30, 2004, and thereafter, who is going to reconcile those differences between the professional military and a brand-new government that will have been in office for but a day?

Mr. Secretary, can you lead off?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will and I am sure that General Myers and Ambassador Grossman can supplement here.

The question you ask obviously is a crucial one. We have spent a lot of time studying it. I would emphasize it is not a unique situation. We went through transition to a sovereign government in Afghanistan, as I noted earlier, in December 2001. We have been operating with our forces in Bosnia with a sovereign government since the Dayton Accords of 1995. Indeed, if you look around the world there are many, many countries where you have sovereign governments and American forces under American military commanders, not the least Korea.

Each one of these cases is different. In the case of Iraq, the principal authority is in fact the authority that you cited, provided by—

Chairman WARNER. I beg your pardon? The what is?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the case of Iraq, the principal authority is the authority in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which creates a multinational force to provide for security in Iraq until a permanent constitutional government is established, which would be the end of next year; and that that force is under the command of an American commander.

As you also noted, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) has the Iraqi Governing Council placing Iraqi forces under that command, as part of that command. In fact, Iraq is one of the most important, if not the most important, members of that coalition force. That provides enormous authority and discretion to our commanders.

Should there be another U.N. Security Council resolution—and I think Ambassador Grossman can comment on the likelihood; I think it is very likely—we would, I assume, either continue that authority or specify it in any further detail if it were necessary or useful.

Further, we have CPA Order No. 17, I believe it is, that goes into more detail about the rights and privileges and immunities that pertain to foreign forces providing for security in Iraq.

Finally, after an elected government, transitional elected government, takes power, takes office next January, and only then—

Chairman WARNER. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We can get to January. I am still worried that, say there is a major insurrection that occurs early on in July and our military commanders have to decide to the extent that force must be applied. We have seen re-

cently in the Fallujah operations where there has been some honest differences of opinion between members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the current governing body, and our military commanders as to the timing, the quantum, and the use of force.

Fortunately, as you say, Fallujah may be taking on a brighter status here if these negotiations continue to be fruitful. But given military operations, you cannot sit down and deliberate over an extensive period of time what to do. You have to react and react very swiftly.

If you are going to give them sovereignty and at the same time our military commander, as I believe you are saying, has the authority to make those decisions as to how to apply force, I see a basic conflict of interest here.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But Mr. Chairman, the issue, as I think your comment correctly implies, is political, not legal. We have that issue today with a different legal framework. The use of force in someone else's country has always got potential political ramifications and political controversy. We have had this on numerous occasions with President Karzai's government in Afghanistan, and the answer there is you have to be prepared to discuss, to negotiate, and also at the end of the day to use the authority that is granted to us.

That I would say describes the way we are proceeding in Fallujah. It is the way we will have to proceed until such time as Iraq is fully in control of whatever forces are there.

General Myers, do you want to?

Chairman WARNER. The safety and welfare of the American GI may be at risk in a matter of hours if there is indecision and a lack of, I think, specific authority as to who can make what decisions.

General, can you address this?

General MYERS. Sure. I do not think I am going to say anything different than what the Secretary said, but there is nobody that believes, Iraqi or coalition, that on July 1 the security situation is going to dramatically change. It is going to be what it is and it is going to go over the transition.

Chairman WARNER. Right. Let us hope it improves.

General MYERS. Certainly, certainly.

Chairman WARNER. That is a goal.

General MYERS. But from June 30 to July 1 we do not—there is not going to be a change to the security situation, nor in the responsibility of the coalition forces, as outlined in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which is the basis for our action even today and will be the basis for our action in the future, if we do not get a new U.N. Security Council resolution, and I will let Secretary Grossman speak to that.

The way we have structured our military forces for the post-1 July period is to have a partnership with Iraqi forces that goes from the tactical level all the way up to the political level in Iraq, to the ministry of interior, to the ministry of defense. The command and control, the command post that we will have set up, will be in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and that is the way it is set up.

I do not see a problem with our authorities right now, given the TAL, given the CPA mandates, and the U.N. Security Council reso-

lution we just talked about. Our forces will have the authority and the wherewithal to do what they need to do to provide security, as they must, for Iraq.

Chairman WARNER. So irrespective of the word total "sovereignty" or power turn over, General Abizaid or his deputies can make the decision to use or not to use force in their own judgment? They may consult the government, but it is their decision as to how, when, and where to apply force?

General MYERS. That is correct. As I said, I mentioned the word "partnership." As we proceed down this path, we want this to be more of a partnership.

Chairman WARNER. But partners disagree and you cannot have a lot of disagreement.

General MYERS. Right. But I said in the end—or I was going to say, in the end, Mr. Chairman, we are going to have to do what we have to do.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Grossman, do you agree?

General MYERS. We think we have the authority to do that as well.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Just as we do in Afghanistan, for example, or in Bosnia.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I have nothing to add except to say, as both have invited me to, I certainly believe we will be seeking a new U.N. Security Council resolution, and one of the elements of it will be to see if we cannot just maintain our authorities under 1511, but see if we can get others to join us in carrying them out.

Chairman WARNER. So we transfer sovereignty, but the military decisions continue to reside indefinitely in the control of the American commander; is that correct?

General MYERS. That is correct.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, what options are you looking at should we need an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq?

General MYERS. We have done a scrub of forces that could be available essentially immediately, in the next few weeks to the next couple of months, in case we need more forces. We have a fairly extensive list of those forces and the support that goes with them, and in the closed session I would be happy to talk in a little bit more detail. But we have done that look. That has been presented to Secretary Rumsfeld, and we are going to continue to refine that list as we look at those forces.

Obviously, we have set ourselves some administrative guidelines to try to protect time home back from overseas and so forth and we are looking at that. But we do have forces that have been identified.

Senator LEVIN. Has the Third Infantry Division been alerted about the possibility of an earlier redeployment to Iraq than had been earlier planned?

General MYERS. Sir, I will check. Senator Levin, I will check. I do not have that list in front of me. Like I say, I will do it in the closed session. I do not think so. I do not think the Third I.D. has been alerted.

Senator LEVIN. Now, prior to the war there was a joint staff assessment as to the number of U.S. forces that would be needed or expected to be needed 1 year after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What was that assessment?

General MYERS. The only assessment I know of is that there was an assessment done by Central Command, I think before combat operations began, which had in September 2003 said: Here is what we think the troop strength is going to be. This is from the field commander at the time, and as I recall that number was somewhere around 60,000.

I do not know—I will tell you personally I did not believe that number was correct, and I do not know that many of the Joint Chiefs believed that number was correct. But that was the number on a chart that I recall. I do not know how long that was the number that anybody was standing up to. That is the only number I can ever remember seeing, sir.

Senator LEVIN. When you say you did not believe it was correct, you mean that it was too low?

General MYERS. I thought it was too low, sure.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Wolfowitz and Secretary Grossman, the U.N. is attempting to work out a process through Mr. Brahimi where the Iraqis will reach a consensus on the form of the entity to whom sovereignty is to be restored on June 30. It is important that that deadline be met. I think everybody acknowledges that, since it has now been set and it is very clearly the expectation. But the challenge is immense in order to put the pieces together and to get a broad consensus in Iraq among its people for such a sovereign government.

We are talking about a sovereign government, a government to which sovereignty is going to be restored. It is going to make critical decisions about who will draft a constitution for the people of Iraq and other critical decisions.

Now, I asked Kofi Annan last week if the pieces cannot be put together by June 30, then what? Is there a plan B? He said there is no time for a plan B; the only alternative would be for the Governing Council to continue until an interim government, which has broad support of the people of Iraq can be put together.

Now, we hope that Mr. Brahimi will succeed in putting together that consensus. But if he does not, does the administration have a plan for what to do?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Levin, I think it is important to understand what this interim government is empowered to do and what it is not—

Senator LEVIN. I wonder if I could just interrupt you, because my time is running out. If you could just—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is not in fact picking the people to write the constitution—

Senator LEVIN. I do not care. I am not asking you what is in the plan.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Its main role is to establish a framework for elections so that the government, the transitional government that comes in in January, is an elected government.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that. But that plan for a government will draft a constitution, the government that it drafts the plan for. But my question is—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, it will not. It will provide elections for a group that then—

Senator LEVIN. I agree, I agree with that. My question to you is this: If the pieces cannot be put together by June 30, does the administration have a plan for what it would then do? That is my only question. Either you have a plan or you do not.

I know you do not want it to happen. Nobody does. Ambassador Brahimi does not want it to happen. Kofi Annan does not want it to happen. Everybody wants that interim government to be established by the people of Iraq, presumably, that will have the broad support of people. But if the pieces cannot be put together, my simple question is does the administration have a plan?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There are certainly ways to proceed if it cannot be done by July 1. But the reason for keeping so much pressure on July 1 is, as I said earlier, it will improve the security situation in the country enormously if people stop thinking of themselves as occupied, if they have some confidence, as we have been able to build out of the Bonn process in Afghanistan that Mr. Brahimi also led, the sense that there is a road to full and complete elected constitutional government.

But this is a 6-month interim appointed group based on a consensus that hopefully Ambassador Brahimi will be able to distill out of his many discussions in the country.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. It is important not just because it will devise a plan for elections for people who will draft a constitution, but for the reasons that the chairman and I have mentioned before, is that a sovereign country may be able to change the status of forces. Those are our forces and we have to make sure that they have the military authority to act and that if we put in place a sovereign government that means that they presumably would have sovereignty to decide what troops can do in their own country. That raises significant issues. I do not want to go beyond what you have already said.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually, Senator, that sovereignty is limited by the U.N. Security Council resolution that arranges for the security issues, as I said to Senator Warner.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. One other question. In response to my request from November of last year, Under Secretary Feith promised in February that he would provide me with numerous documents produced by the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I have still not received the documents that he promised and I would ask that you intervene and get me those documents with him.

But relative to the Feith office, in August and September of 2002, Under Secretary Feith presented a briefing to the Secretary of Defense and then after that it was presented by Under Secretary Feith to the National Security Council staff and the staff of the Vice President, and this is relative to a relationship, the extent of it, between Iraq and al Qaeda.

It was a briefing which was very critical of the CIA, disagreeing with the CIA's assessment that there was not a strong relationship or a clear relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq.

My question to you is this: Were you aware of the fact that that briefing was being given to the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President and that the CIA was not aware of the fact that the briefing was being given to the Vice President, the Vice President's office, and to the staff of the NSC?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I can no longer recall whether I was aware or not. There is nothing unusual, Senator Levin, about different staffs in the government discussing material, and the material under discussion was in fact material generated by the CIA. The issue was how to assess various intelligence reports produced by the CIA. Essentially the same briefing was presented, I believe, previously to a collection of CIA analysts.

Senator LEVIN. It was a very different briefing in a very critical respect.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There was one slide that was different, Senator; that is all.

Senator LEVIN. That one slide was highly critical of the CIA.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That one slide listed some assumptions that Mr. Feith's staff thought were at issue. One of those assumptions it seems to me in fact has been proven out to be wrong. That was the assumption that, because bin Laden was a secularist—excuse me—an Islamist and Saddam a secularist, they were incapable of cooperating. We have since seen evidence—in fact, there was evidence, it turns out, in the sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden issued in February of 1998 that said that bin Laden and Saddam had concluded an agreement not to attack one another and to cooperate with each other.

So I think it was perfectly appropriate to ask the question whether one should analyze these reports on the basis of an assumption which in fact has turned out to be a false assumption.

Senator LEVIN. But you were not aware, in any event, of the fact—you do not remember whether you were aware that the briefing to the Vice President's office and the NSC staff was being made without the knowledge of the CIA?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it overstates it to—first of all, there is nothing unusual about staff talking to each other. The only thing—

Senator LEVIN. I am just asking, you do not remember whether you were aware of it? That is my question.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do not remember, but it is also not the dramatic event that I think you are describing.

Senator LEVIN. There were additional slides to the one that you made reference to.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. One additional slide and I think I have described it.

Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the panel for giving us an update this morning. There have been some who have suggested that what is

happening in Iraq has a lot of parallels with what was happening in Vietnam, Secretary Wolfowitz. For the life of me, I feel I do not see hardly any correlation at all. I am curious to know how you respond to those who try and characterize our efforts in Iraq as that similar to what happened in Vietnam?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am with Senator McCain. I think there is no comparison at all, except I guess it is important to say that our soldiers fought with enormous courage in Vietnam as well and the enemy's people would be better off today if they had won.

But I think, as I have said in my statement, I think one enormous difference—and I hope the killers out there, the enemies of democracy in Iraq, have gotten this message—is that the debate in this country is not about whether to abandon Iraq; the debate is about whether to keep 135,000 troops there or to add more troops. That is really where the issue lies.

The other huge difference is that, without being an apologist for Ho Chi Minh or his Viet Cong, they at least made credible pretensions to doing something for the Vietnamese people. The people that we are fighting in Iraq today are a combination of killers who abused and tortured that country for 35 years and newcomers, some from outside, some from inside, like Mr. Zarqawi, who makes abundantly clear in this infamous letter that we captured that his goal is simply destruction and death, and indeed he thinks that the goal in life is to worship death and be willing to sacrifice yourself for martyrdom.

He sees democracy as the enemy, makes no pretense in fact of doing anything other than bringing chaos and instability.

I think it is important, not only in analyzing the problem we are up against, but I would be much more concerned if I thought we were dealing with a genuine popular uprising. I do not want to—again, I want to be sure not to put on rose-colored glasses. There is a lot of broad dissatisfaction, especially in the Sunni Arab community, partly with the pace of progress—and the terrorists have done their best to slow down the pace of progress—partly because, after all of this historical experience, I think Iraqis believe that it is winner take all and if the Shia take all now the Sunnis will be abused. It is partly misunderstandings, frankly, more misunderstandings than actual fact, about the de-Baathification policy.

We need to work harder and we are looking precisely at how to work harder to win back the Sunni moderates. I think they are, again, I think the overwhelming majority of that community.

But the basic enemy, the enemies of democracy in Iraq, are just killers.

Senator ALLARD. General Myers, if you read the papers and listen to the TV, I think the impression that tends to come across is that we do have a lot of battles and a lot of conflicts going on in Iraq. I was over in Iraq about a month ago. I saw a lot of good things happening around Mosul and a lot of the other towns that I was visiting, a lot of reconstruction, a lot of positive things.

What is happening now with the conflict? Just put a general picture over there. I have always perceived that north and south was pretty much settled and our real problem was the Sunni Triangle. So I would like to have you comment about what we are seeing now on TV today and reading in the papers.

General MYERS. Well, in the last couple of weeks what we have seen are really two different events inside Iraq. One was Sadr and his militia, which is fairly small, sent out or rose up in several towns in the south. All those towns, with the exception of al-Najaf, where his headquarters is, are back under Iraqi and coalition control. Coalition forces and Iraqi police are on duty in al-Kut, Nasariya, and the other cities where there were uprisings.

These were small and easily contained because Sadr is increasingly being marginalized. He is not a popular figure with most Iraqis. He is preaching violence against the coalition. He has come out against the Transitional Administrative Law, which the Iraqi Governing Council has approved. My view is he will continue to be marginalized.

But he is in al-Najaf and Iraqis are negotiating and dealing with him right now, as well as some negotiators from the CPA and Ambassador Bremer.

The other fight was the fight that Secretary Wolfowitz described, which are these extremists, which by the way if you compare and contrast with Vietnam, they are not fighting for an ideology. They are fighting to disrupt progress. They have no ideology other than to go back to the terror of the former regime, if that is an ideology. So as to why they are fighting I think is an important question when you try to compare it to other events.

This occurs in the same area as you pointed out, where we have had a lot of our instability. Fallujah has been the heart of that. We have been in Fallujah from time to time and then we come out. As you remember, we went in because of the atrocities on the Blackwater Security personnel, the four personnel that were killed and later burned and then hung on the bridge.

We went in because we had to and to find the perpetrators. What we found was a huge rats nest that is still festering today, and needs to be dealt with. Right now we are dealing with it through negotiations and through a ceasefire. I will say that the ceasefire is only on the side of the Marines that are in Fallujah. It is not on the part of the folks in Fallujah that are the extremists and so forth. They are still firing. They are using—just I think it was yesterday or the day before, a Red Crescent, the equivalent of the Red Cross, ambulance trying to get into Fallujah was stopped and weapons were found inside. They are trying to resupply themselves with weapons and ammunition. I mentioned the mosques and the schools and using women and children. They have done that. That was all out of Fallujah.

So that area is still very, very hot, and that extends into Baghdad, by the way. Sadr City is still a problem area, although it is relatively calm today compared to when Sadr was—those uprisings were going on, about a week ago.

In the north, interestingly enough, with events in Fallujah there were lots of demonstrators in Mosul. The demonstrators were dealt with by the Sunni, basically the Sunni government in Mosul and the Iraqi police in Mosul and the Civil Defense Corps. So it is a very different picture in the north right now, relatively stable, economically doing quite well.

It is the central area that has remained the problem, and I could go into it, but I do not want to take any more time. Part of it is

going to have to be dealt with by military force in my judgment. Obviously, a big part of it has to be dealt with, by making sure we have a strategy that enfranchises the Sunni population, and that is being worked very hard. I spent a lot of time on that particular subject in Iraq just recently.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you for your response.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude with this brief statement. This last Saturday I happened to participate in a welcome home for Bravo Company of the 244th Engineering Battalion in Fort Collins, Colorado. This is a local unit. The report that came back from our troops verifies pretty much what you were saying about the morale of our troops in Iraq. They were very proud of what they were doing. They were building a lot of infrastructure and they felt like they were really doing something to improve the country because they were improving the infrastructure, sewer and water and roads, and providing an education there.

One of the comments I think that was made at that was: there is a lot of pride and a lot of good morale, people feel good about what they are doing. They are professional soldiers, but they emphasized time and time again: The American people need to stand behind us.

So I think that that is a message that they need to know, is that we are very proud of what they are doing and we are standing behind them. Thank you.

General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Allard.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers and gentlemen, we all do stand behind our service men. But we have some responsibilities to find out about the policy and where it is going that is requiring the presence of those service men and women.

Mr. Secretary, I must say I found your presentation here this morning somewhat disingenuous. I was here when the administration made the case for going to war and the case for going to war was the threat that the United States was facing from nuclear weapons that were going to be provided to al Qaeda by Iraq, and here we have your statement is all about the human rights violations.

Everyone knows that Saddam Hussein is a brute, despicable, deplorable, murderer. I will include in the record the State Department's filing about human rights violations around the world, about what the Chinese are doing to the Tibetans, what the North Koreans are doing in terms of torture, forced abortions, infanticide, what the Burmese are doing, and the rest of the world. I want to make that as a part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]



U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE

Introduction

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 25, 2004

Promoting respect for universal human rights is a central dimension of U.S. foreign policy. It is a commitment inspired by our country's founding values and our enduring strategic interests. As history has repeatedly shown, human rights abuses are everybody's concern. It is a delusion to believe that we can ignore deprivations against our fellow human beings or insulate ourselves from the negative consequences of tyranny. The United States stands ready to work with other governments and civil society to prevent the abuses of power and the proliferation of dehumanizing ideologies that produce misery and desperation and lead to devastating international political, economic and humanitarian consequences.

Threats to human rights can take various forms. They range from large-scale abuses like genocide, slaughter of innocents and forced migration to chronic, systemic problems that deny citizens the basic rights of freedom of religion, speech and assembly, and protections against the arbitrary exercise of state power. The United States cannot afford to ignore either type of human rights problem, or to excuse them as cultural differences.

Begun in 1977, the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are designed to assess the state of democracy and human rights around the world, call attention to violations, and – where needed – prompt needed changes in our policies toward particular countries. They are an expression of U.S. vigilance in monitoring other countries and holding leaders accountable for their treatment of fellow citizens.

Each year's Country Reports identify gaps between principles and practice, between espoused standards on the one hand, and actual performance on the other. Examined retrospectively, a quarter century of reporting shows that many countries have begun to close those gaps and turned horror stories into success stories. Their examples have helped us understand how gains can be made in protecting human rights and expanding freedom.

For the last two and a half years, we have taken those lessons and applied them to a new world. After September 11, 2001, some observers questioned whether the United States could afford the "luxury" of concern about human rights and democracy abroad, and whether we might sacrifice our principles for expediency in the global war on terrorism. Within days, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice provided a clear answer: "We are not going to stop talking about the things that matter to us – human rights and religious freedom and so forth. We're going to continue to press those issues. We would not be America if we do not."

In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush underscored the unequivocal U.S. commitment to human rights: "... America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror."

Later that year, Secretary of State Colin Powell backed these words by unveiling the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a program designed to assist political, economic and social reforms in that region. Henceforth, those seeking freedom in the Middle East can count on the same support long provided to Latin Americans, Central Europeans, Asians, Africans and others. The United States is now working across the Middle East to enhance the skills and opportunities of men and women who wish to compete for office, administer elections, report on political events and influence them as members of civil society. We have reinforced MEPI programming with unprecedented diplomacy to remedy problems described frankly in the Country Reports.

Some worried that our new focus on the Arab world would leave us without time to address human rights and democracy elsewhere. In early 2002, the President announced creation of the Millennium Challenge Account, "a new compact for global development, defined by a new accountability for both rich and poor nations alike. Greater contributions from developed nations must be linked to greater responsibility from developing nations." Nations that invest in their people's education and health, promote economic freedoms and govern justly – defined by the prevalence of civil liberties, political rights, rule of law and a government's accountability and effectiveness – will be rewarded. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) will rely on sound human rights reporting to evaluate conformity with basic standards of democratic governance and economic freedom. MCA will also provide another vehicle for reducing the gap between human rights ideals and actual practices.

Other efforts to remedy problems outlined in the Country Reports have intensified. For the first time, the United States has a substantial program to assist structural changes, promote human rights awareness, and support legal and administrative reform in China. In Central Asia, we have mounted an unprecedented effort to support the development of representative political parties, human rights organizations and independent media. The United States has also worked more actively to contribute to the promotion of freedom in Burma, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Belarus and elsewhere. These efforts to advance freedom have often been enhanced by partnerships with other members of the Community of Democracies, a growing organization composed mainly of nations that over the past quarter century have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

America's post-9/11 foreign policy has increased our scrutiny and activism in whole regions on the issues of human rights and democracy. Not surprisingly, some authoritarian governments – from the Middle East to Central Asia to China – have attempted to justify old repression by cloaking it as part of the new "war on terror." Knowledgeable observers note that authoritarianism existed in such areas before September 11, 2001. American policymakers rejected and rebuked, often publicly, such attempts to label those peacefully expressing their thoughts and beliefs as "terrorists." In some but not all instances, we were able to contribute on a case-by-case basis to freedom for such individuals. Over time, the increased activism described above will help change national structures that allow such abuses, and will contribute to freedom for all.

The Year in Review: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

Where we are vigilant, through such actions as compiling these reports and implementing an agenda that make the Country Reports more than a rote recitation of evidence, we advance U.S. interests. In 2003, we saw many developments covering the whole range from the dramatically uplifting to the disappointing. The countries and concerns mentioned below represent areas that define our engagement with human rights issues worldwide.

In Afghanistan, the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) brought together 502 delegates, including 89 women, to craft a new constitution. This process culminated in the adoption of a new, moderate constitution in January 2004. Key social issues that were debated in the CLJ included the rights of women and minorities, the role of religion, education, jobs and security. In addition to encouraging responsible implementation of the new constitution, in 2004 we are dedicated to expanding and continuing our commitment to helping Afghans realize their vision for a country that is stable, democratic and economically successful after 30 years of war. The last two years have seen dramatic improvements in democracy and human rights since the days of the Taliban. However, terrorist attacks and severe violence, including a reviving drug trade, add to the sense of lawlessness and insecurity, slowing the process of reconstruction.

The liberation of Iraq by Coalition forces in April ended years of grave human rights violations by Saddam Hussein's regime. Hussein's rule resulted in a climate of fear and repression in which arbitrary arrests, killings, torture and persecution were daily facts of life. Since April, the world has discovered overwhelming evidence of a totalitarian and capricious brutality that terrorized individuals in unimaginable ways. One indication, in a nation of 24 million people, are mass graves in which as many as 300,000 Iraqis are buried. The record of horror under Saddam Hussein is still unfolding. Building democracy and a culture of respect for human rights after 36 years of tyranny will be an arduous task, but it is an effort that has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people.

We began 2003 with hopes that the incremental but unprecedented progress in China seen in 2002 would be continued and expanded; however, throughout the year, we saw backsliding on key human rights issues. Arrests of democracy activists, individuals discussing subjects deemed sensitive by the Government on the Internet, HIV/AIDS activists, protesting workers, defense lawyers advocating on behalf of dissidents or the dispossessed, house church members and others seeking to take advantage of the space created by Chinese reforms increased. Harsh repression of the Falun Gong continued, and the Chinese Government used the war on terror to justify its continuing crackdown on Muslim Uighurs.

The Chinese Government's record in Tibet remains poor and ongoing abuses include execution without due process, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detention of Tibetans for peacefully expressing their political or religious views. In January 2003, Tibetan Lobsang Dondrub was executed for alleged involvement in a series of bombings in Sichuan Province in 2002. The death sentence of Buddhist teacher Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche on the same charge was deferred for two years. The trials of the two men were closed to the public on "state secrets" grounds, and they were reportedly denied due process of law. Lobsang Dondrub's execution the same day he lost his appeal to the Sichuan Provincial Higher People's Court, as well as the failure of the national-level Supreme People's Court to review the case as promised to foreign officials, raised serious concerns in the international community.

After the stunning July 1 demonstrations in Hong Kong by approximately 500,000 people and intense public debate about civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, the Government of the Hong Kong SAR withdrew proposed national security legislation in September. The people of Hong Kong took advantage of their right to free speech and assembly as guaranteed under the Basic Law and urged the Government to abide by democratic processes. Public demands also increased for the implementation of universal suffrage in the 2007 Chief Executive election and the 2008 Legislative Council election. However, following consultations with the PRC Government, Hong Kong did not announce a timetable for public consultations on democratization by year's end.

Reports from North Korea continue to paint a bleak picture of one of the world's most inhumane regimes. Rigid controls over information, which limit the extent of our report, reflect the totalitarian repression of North Korean society. Basic freedoms are unheard of, and the regime committed widespread abuses of human rights. This year's report details – among other abuses – killings, persecution of forcibly repatriated North Koreans, and harsh conditions in the extensive prison camp system including torture, forced abortions and infanticide.

Burma's extremely poor human rights record worsened in 2003. On May 30, government-affiliated forces attacked a convoy led by National League for Democracy (NLD) party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, leaving several hundred NLD members and pro-democracy supporters missing, under arrest, wounded, raped or dead. Egregious abuses of ethnic minority civilians continued.

In Cuba, human rights abuses worsened dramatically: 75 peaceful dissidents were sentenced to prison terms averaging 20 years for trying to exercise their fundamental rights, while the Castro regime ignored petitions containing thousands of signatures which organizers of the Varela Project had collected from Cuban citizens exercising their constitutional right to petition for a referendum on political and economic reform.

The Government of Zimbabwe continued to conduct a concerted campaign of violence, repression and intimidation. This campaign has been marked by disregard for human rights, the rule of law and the welfare of Zimbabwe's citizens. Torture by various methods is used against political opponents and human rights advocates.

In Russia, the Government manipulated the October presidential polls in Chechnya and parliamentary elections held on December 7; both failed to meet international standards. The OSCE monitoring mission's assessment of the parliamentary elections criticized extensive use of the state apparatus and media favoritism that biased the campaign. Government pressure on the media continued, resulting in the elimination of the last major non-State television network. Criminal prosecutions and threats of prosecutions against major financial supporters of opposition parties and independent NGOs undermined the parties' ability to compete, weakened civil society, and raised questions about the rule of law in Russia. A series of "alleged espionage" cases continued to raise concerns about the rule of law and influence of the FSB (the federal security service). The conflict in Chechnya continued to have serious human rights implications. Reports of continued violence and human rights abuses in Chechnya persisted. These reports included evidence that some among the federal and local security forces, as well as some of the separatists, are still resorting to unacceptable methods of resolving the conflict.

Many republics of the former Soviet Union have mixed or poor human rights records. We continue to work with governments and nongovernmental organizations in the region to identify areas where our assistance can have significant impact. The threats to stability are varied, and our insistence on accountability for human rights violations and adherence to democratic norms is bringing progress to the region, as demonstrated by the developments in Georgia.

The Government of Georgia allowed several major protests to proceed without violence or arrests. President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned on November 23 allowing for new leadership to assume power and the Supreme Court subsequently annulled the results of the proportional parliamentary contests. Georgia's January 4, 2004 presidential election showed significant improvements over previous contests. But elsewhere in the Caucasus, fraud and serious irregularities marred the other presidential and parliamentary elections held during the year. In

Armenia and Azerbaijan, authorities arrested and harassed hundreds of opposition party demonstrators protesting the conduct of these elections. There were credible reports that Azerbaijan authorities also tortured a number of opposition members to coerce confessions.

Progress in Central Asia continued to come from dedicated activists and nongovernmental organizations. Governments were moving slowly, but have shown signs of recognizing the importance of human rights. The Media Support Center in the Kyrgyz Republic, which was registered in 2002, opened an independent printing press on November 14. The Turkmenistan Government intensified its harsh crackdown on political opponents and their families with widespread reports of abuses, including torture, arbitrary arrests of hundreds of relatives of suspected plotters of the November 2002 armed attack on the president's motorcade, and lack of fair trials and freedom of movement. Restrictions on freedom of religion, speech, association and assembly became more severe. In Uzbekistan there were at least three new torture deaths in custody during the year and continued reports of torture with impunity and unfair trials. Harassment and arrests of political opponents, including independent journalists and activists, continued, as did registration problems for opposition political parties and nongovernmental organizations. Prominent opposition leaders remain imprisoned in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

In Belarus, the Lukashenko Government continued to restrict freedom of speech and press and took further measures to restrict freedom of association and assembly. The Government increased pressure on human rights and other NGOs, interfering with their work and closing many down. The Government failed to suspend or take any other action against senior regime officials implicated in the disappearance of opposition and press members. Addressing abuses in Belarus became a priority for the United States as we returned as a member of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).

During its 2003 session, the UNCHR adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution on Belarus for the first time, as well as resolutions on Turkmenistan and North Korea. A resolution on Cuba was also adopted by a formal vote, and resolutions on Burma and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were approved by consensus. In addition, the Commission decided not to hold a special sitting on the situation in Iraq during the height of military action.

With Libya in the Chair and such countries as Zimbabwe, Cuba, Sudan, China and Syria, which fail to protect their own citizens' rights, as members, the 2003 session of the UNCHR fell short in several respects. Resolutions on the human rights situations in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chechnya were defeated. The United States continued to emphasize the need to improve the functioning of the Commission, primarily by supporting the membership of countries with positive human rights records. We began to discuss the formation of a democracy caucus with interested governments. We envision this as a group of like-minded countries that would coordinate more closely in multilateral settings to advance goals consistent with democratic values.

The United States was deeply saddened by the death of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello in August 2003. Mr. Vieira de Mello assumed this position on July 22, 2002, and during his tenure, he undertook important reforms of the Office of the High Commissioner. He was well respected in the international community for his extensive work within the United Nations and for his humanitarian fieldwork. Secretary Powell noted on August 19, 2003, "Sergio Vieira de Mello was a consummate professional who devoted his life to helping others, particularly in his decades of distinguished service to the U.N. ... In my book, Mr. Vieira de Mello was a hero, who dedicated his life to helping people in danger and in difficulty. His loss is a terrible blow to the international community."

Institutional changes:

Notable progress in Africa included the beginning of the second half of a three-year transitional power-sharing government in Burundi: Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu, succeeded Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, as president in April. In addition, the Transitional Government negotiated a future power-sharing agreement with the main rebel group; however, another rebel group remained outside negotiations and continued to conduct attacks on civilians and government forces. Madagascar stabilized after a 2002 political crisis in which the presidency was disputed, and President Ravalomanana has continued his anti-corruption campaign, which resulted in the suspension of 18 mayors and the conviction of 12 magistrates.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, various armed groups continued to commit massacres and other atrocities, but the poor human rights situation improved slightly. After five years of war, a Transitional Government was inaugurated, a vital step in starting the country on a path toward democracy. Uganda withdrew its forces by June, and, following the adoption of a transitional constitution, a transitional power-sharing government was established on June 30. In Liberia, a cooperative transitional power sharing agreement emerged between civil society, former government forces and the rebel groups, "Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy"

(LURD) and "Movement for Democracy in Liberia" (MODEL), with elections scheduled for October 2005. However, numerous abuses occurred in the context of the conflict, and sporadic fighting, looting and human rights violations continued in remote areas where peacekeepers from the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) have not yet reached.

Change continued across much of the Arab world. In Qatar, voters approved a new constitution by popular referendum held in April. That same month, Yemen successfully held open parliamentary elections for the second time in its history. In Oman, approximately 74 percent of registered voters participated in October elections for the 83 seats in the Consultative Council. In Jordan, King Abdullah appointed a new 55-member Senate in November, increasing the number of women members from three to seven. In Morocco, 2002 voting for a parliament was followed up with 2003 elections for municipal councils.

Turkey passed extensive human rights reform packages that covered a broadening of laws on torture, impunity, access to attorneys, fair trials and freedom of speech, although not all of these reforms were fully implemented during the year. As part of a wide-ranging judicial reform program, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted new Criminal Codes and Criminal Procedure Codes at the state and entity levels. For the first time, the Bosnian police forces were fully accredited under the U.N. accreditation program. A European Union Police Mission, responsible for developing professional standards and accountability in senior police ranks, began operating on January 1, 2003.

In Egypt, State Security Courts were formally abolished in May; however, the Government retained and continued to use Emergency Courts, and most observers noted that this was not a substantial improvement. The Emergency Law, extended in February for an additional three years, continued to restrict many basic rights. The Government passed legislation establishing a National Council for Human Rights; initially dismissed as window dressing, the naming of a number of independent thinkers to the Council led to hopes in early 2004 that the Council could contribute to a betterment of Egypt's civil life. Security forces continued to torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and occasionally engaged in mass arrests.

Political rights:

Six nations in the Western Hemisphere – Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guatemala and Paraguay – held elections for their chief of state or government that were deemed to be free and fair. The Organization of American States promoted democracy, observed elections and used the principles of its Inter-American Democratic Charter to ensure broad, free and fair access to the democratic process in Venezuela, Haiti and Bolivia.

Positive signs in Africa included developments in Kenya, where the new Government acted to establish an autonomous national human rights commission to investigate abuses and educate citizens. A ministry of gender affairs was also set up; three bills to protect women's rights were submitted to the parliament but they still await passage. The Government also took several steps to curb corruption, including the establishment of an anti-corruption authority to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption and the dismissal of 38 magistrates and transfer of 40 others on official accusations of corruption. In Rwanda, a new constitution was adopted, ending a nine-year transitional period, and the country held its first post-genocide presidential and legislative elections in August and September. However, the right of Rwandan citizens to change their government was effectively restricted, and government harassment of the political opposition continued.

Elsewhere in Africa, international and domestic election monitors reported that in some states during the Nigerian presidential elections, they witnessed widespread voting irregularities, as well as procedural flaws, particularly in the collation and counting of votes. However, election-related violence at the levels predicted did not occur. An attempted coup occurred during the year in Mauritania, and the presidential election held in November generally was not considered free and fair by many international observers.

In Saudi Arabia, citizens do not have the right to change their government. In October, the Government announced that it would hold elections within the year for half the members of municipal councils; however, it has not yet provided specific information about the conduct of the elections. There were credible reports that security forces continued to torture and abuse detainees and prisoners, arbitrarily arrest or detain persons, and hold them incommunicado. The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association, religion and movement. Violence and discrimination against women, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on workers rights continued. The Government established a National Dialogue Center intended to address religious extremism and problems facing women and the country's Muslim minorities. Government officials also met with organized groups of reform advocates and permitted Human Rights Watch to visit the Kingdom for the first time.

The Syrian Government's human rights record remained poor and it continued to commit serious abuses. The

Government used its vast powers to prevent any organized political opposition activity. Security forces committed serious abuses, including the use of torture and arbitrary arrest and detention. The Government significantly restricted freedom of speech and the press. Freedom of assembly does not exist under the law, and the Government restricted freedom of association. The Government also placed some limits on freedom of religion and suppressed worker rights. In Tunisia, although the Government continued to improve the economy and provide opportunities for women, continuing abuses included torture of detainees by security forces, violations of privacy rights, significant restrictions on freedoms of speech and press, and harassment of judges as well as human rights and civil society activists.

The Iranian Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The Iranian people's ability to assert their democratic will continued to be hindered by a structure that ~~exerts~~ undue influence on the electoral and legislative processes by regime hardliners. The clerical regime stifles open debate through such tactics as intimidation, violence and imprisonment of opposition activists, on matters ranging from freedom of expression to appropriate social behavior. Reformist members of Parliament were harassed, prosecuted and threatened with jail for statements made under parliamentary immunity. Last summer the Government beat student protestors and arrested thousands. The Government arrested several journalists, banned reformist publications, and beat a Canadian-Iranian photographer to death while in custody.

Cambodia's record remained poor. During the National Assembly elections in July, politically motivated violence, including killings, was lower than in previous elections and political parties and candidates' access to the media was greater in these than in previous elections; however, voter intimidation by local officials in addition to technical problems with the registration process and preparation of voter lists effectively disenfranchised many citizens. A coalition government had failed to form by year's end.

Concerns about the path to democracy and stability in East Timor, now known as Timor Leste, are raised by numerous reports of excessive use of force and abuse of authority by police. Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Due process and fair trials often were denied or restricted, largely due to severe shortages of resources and lack of trained personnel in the legal system. Countries in the Balkans continue to become more stable and further their efforts to protect the human rights of their citizens. The OSCE and other international observers judged Albania's local elections in October to be an improvement over previous elections, with a few isolated incidents of irregularities and violence.

Internal and other conflicts:

Abuse caused by both government and rebel forces marked the internal conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. There were numerous reports of politically motivated killings by pro-government death squads during the first half of the year. The rebels agreed to join the Government and declared the war officially over in July, but an end to violence has proved elusive as the rebels pulled out of the Government in October. By mid December, both the Government and the New Forces took positive steps toward ending the violence, and New Forces ministers noted they would attend the first government meeting in 2004.

Far more encouraging are developments in Sierra Leone, where the Government continued efforts to stabilize the country and repair the damage caused by 11 years of civil war. During the year, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission held public hearings to air the grievances of victims and the confessions of perpetrators, and the Special Court of Sierra Leone indicted 13 persons.

Although there was considerable progress in the peace negotiations in Sudan between the Government and the rebels in the south, the conflict in Darfur resulted in numerous human rights violations by government and government-supported militias, including the killing of civilians, the destruction of villages and large-scale displacement of persons.

Israel's human rights record in the occupied territories included continuing abuses, the use of excessive force by security forces, the shelling, bombing and raiding of Palestinian civilian areas, and demolitions of homes and property. Israel continued to impose strict closures and curfews on the occupied territories.

Many members of Palestinian security services and the FATAH faction of the PLO participated with civilians and terrorist groups in violent attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, Israeli settlers, foreign nationals and soldiers. Palestinian extremists targeted Israelis in drive-by shootings and ambushes, suicide and other bombings, mortar attacks, and armed attacks on settlements and military bases. Palestinian security forces used excessive force against Palestinians during demonstrations, abused prisoners and arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and provided poor prison conditions.

Indonesia experienced improvements in some regions, but conditions in Aceh Province deteriorated rapidly. Various reports indicate that Indonesian security forces murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained civilians in Aceh, under martial law since May 2003, as government forces sought to defeat the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) following failed peace negotiations. GAM rebels also carried out grave abuses including murder, kidnapping and extortion. During most of the year, inter-religious violence subsided in the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, although there were brief but dramatic upsurges in violence in Central Sulawesi at the end of the year. Two hundred thousand civilians remain displaced due to violence in these three provinces.

Political and drug-related violence continued in Colombia, but kidnappings, killings and forced displacements declined. The Government offered formal peace negotiations to disband the various terrorist groups and several factions entered into talks. The Government captured guerrilla leaders, and former military commanders were prosecuted and convicted of human rights abuses.

The political impasse continued in Haiti, where President Aristide frustrated efforts to form a legitimate Provisional Electoral Council, and his supporters, henchmen and civilian attaches associated with the national police killed members of opposition parties and violently disrupted their demonstrations. Elections planned to take place during the year were not held.

On October 17, protesters forced elected Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada to resign from office. After a vote in Congress, Vice President Carlos Mesa Gisbert assumed office and restored order. Mesa appointed a nonpolitical cabinet and promised to revise the Constitution through a constituent assembly.

In Guatemala, the Government accepted a proposal developed by the Human Rights Ombudsman and nongovernmental organizations to create a U.N. commission to investigate clandestine groups. Work to conclude the agreement was coming to completion at year's end. On October 29, in compliance with the Peace Accords of 1996, Guatemalan President Portillo completed the demobilization of the Presidential Military Staff (EMP), which had been implicated in serious human rights violations during the civil conflict and its aftermath. In Peru, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its final report, with recommendations to heal the wounds suffered during nearly 20 years of internal conflict.

Nepal's human rights record remained poor throughout 2003. More than 8,000 people have been killed since the Maoist campaign to unseat the monarchy began in 1996. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by Nepalese security forces elicited condemnation and calls for accountability; the Maoists committed worse abuses in their campaign of torturing, killing, bombing, forcibly conscripting children and other violent tactics.

Integrity of the person:

Libya, despite welcome cooperation in reducing weapons of mass destruction, continued to deprive citizens of the right to be secure in their home or their person. Torture and incommunicado detention were widespread, and security forces maintained the authority to pass sentences without trial. The Algerian Government failed to investigate, account for and bring justice in as many as 18,000 cases of missing persons resulting from the darkest days of the 1990s. In Turkey, torture and impunity remained serious problems, as did harassment of journalists.

In Pakistan, abuse by members of the security forces, ranging from extrajudicial killings to excessive use of force, is widespread. The Government intimidated and arrested opposition figures. The overall credibility of the judiciary remained low. In December, Pakistan's Parliament and President Pervez Musharraf approved a package of amendments to the Constitution that consolidated Musharraf's power, included his agreement to step down as Chief of the Army Staff by the end of 2004, confirmed his presidency until 2007, and gave him authority to dismiss Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies provided the Supreme Court agrees with the dissolution.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Ethiopian Government security forces were implicated in the killing of 93 mostly Anyuaks in Gambella in December. In Uganda, brutal attacks by the cult-like Lord's Resistance Army increased significantly during the year, resulting in the deaths of approximately 3,000 persons, including children, thousands of internally displaced persons, numerous rapes, and the abduction of an estimated 6,800 children and young girls between January and June alone, for training as guerrillas and to be used as sex slaves, cooks and porters.

In the Solomon Islands, a once-worrisome situation began to turn around due to international intervention. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), organized by Australia to address the continuing violence in that country stemming from ethnic conflict between Malians and Guadalcanese, arrived in the country in July and made substantial progress during the remainder of the year in restoring law and order. RAMSI removed

approximately 3,700 weapons from circulation, began reform of the police, and arrested and charged numerous persons implicated in human rights abuses and other criminal acts.

In many places, violence was perpetrated, condoned or went unchecked by government authorities. In the Philippines, local government leaders at times appeared to sanction extrajudicial killings and vigilantism as expedient means of fighting crime and terrorism. In Thailand, the security forces were responsible for numerous instances of extrajudicial killings. According to press reports, more than 2,000 alleged drug suspects were killed during confrontations with police during a three-month "War on Drugs" from February to April, while the Government reported that out of a total of 2,598 homicide cases during this three-month period, there were 1,386 narcotics-related deaths.

Freedom of the press:

Respect for freedom of speech and press in Sudan appeared to decline during the year. Government detentions, intimidation, surveillance of journalists and an increased number of suspensions of newspapers continued to inhibit open public discussion of political issues.

Freedom of the press suffered in Tanzania, significantly restricted on Zanzibar by the Government's indefinite ban of Dira, the only independent newspaper on the archipelago, and by the Zanzibar News Act, which allowed authorities to harass and detain journalists.

Controls on the press and public expression of political opinions continued in Kazakhstan, as the Government selectively prosecuted political opponents in trials with serious irregularities. The Government's harassment of independent media included the conviction, with no due process, of two prominent independent journalists. In Turkmenistan, the Government completely controlled the media, censored all newspapers and access to the Internet, and never permitted independent criticism of government policy. In Kyrgyzstan, honor and dignity lawsuits filed by government officials against newspapers bankrupted two leading independent newspapers.

In Ukraine, authorities continued to interfere with news media by intimidating journalists and taking a direct role in instructing the media on what events and issues should be covered. The Government failed to render justice for murdered journalists Heorhiy Gongadze and Ihor Aleksandrov. After new developments in the investigation of the Gongadze case, which had been deemed credible by the Council of Europe and had led to an arrest of a government official, the Government fired the prosecutor general and released the accused.

In Venezuela, threats against the media continued, and government pressure against the media increased, as did legislative efforts to limit the media's exercise of freedom of expression.

Political expression remains significantly curtailed in Malaysia, where the Government acknowledges that it restricts certain political and civil rights in order to maintain social harmony and political stability.

Freedom of religion:

These issues are discussed in depth in the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, published in December 2003, but the Country Reports also highlight and update important developments.

The status quo in Vietnam remained poor. The Government restricted freedom of religion and operation of religious organizations other than those approved by the State. Many Protestants active in unregistered organizations, particularly in the Central Highlands and Northwest, faced harassment, pressure to renounce their faith and possible detention by authorities. Incidents of arbitrary detention of citizens for religious views continued. In Burma, the Government imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and promoted Buddhism over minority religions.

Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev began an initiative to promote dialog among religions; an international conference drawing regional dignitaries and religious figures was held in February. No further attempts have been made to incorporate restrictive amendments into Kazakh law. Elsewhere in Central Asia, the Government of Turkmenistan continues to restrict all forms of religious expression and interpret the laws in such a way as to discriminate against those practicing any faith other than government-controlled Sunni Islam or Russian Orthodox Christianity. In Uzbekistan, the Government permitted the existence of mainstream religions but invoked the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which is not in keeping with international norms, to restrict the religious freedom of other groups.

In Saudi Arabia, freedom of religion still does not exist by any internationally recognized standard. The Government

continued to enforce a strictly conservative version of Sunni Islam and suppress the public practice of other interpretations of Islam and non-Muslim religions.

The Government in Eritrea continued to seriously restrict religious freedom. The Government harassed, arrested and detained members of non-sanctioned Protestant religious groups locally referred to collectively as "Pentes," reform movements from and within the Coptic Church, Jehovah's Witnesses and adherents of the Baha'i faith.

Treatment of minorities, women and children:

Morocco enacted a new family code that revolutionizes the rights of women. By raising the age of marriage for women, strengthening their rights to divorce, child custody and inheritance, and placing stringent restrictions on polygamy, the new law sets an example for the African Continent and the Arab world.

Emerging from Rwanda's transition, the Rwanda Women's Leadership Caucus (RWLC) is becoming an increasingly powerful voice for women in the political process. Several members serve on the constitution drafting committee and were the impetus for the 30 percent increase in representation by women in the legislative branch and executive branch. President Kagame has responded by appointing several women to "non-traditional" roles in the Cabinet.

Human rights abuses in North Korea take many particularly severe forms. Among the violations in this area of concern, pregnant female prisoners underwent forced abortions and, in other cases, babies reportedly were killed upon birth in prisons. There also were reports of trafficking in women and young girls among refugees and workers crossing the border into China, and children appear to have suffered disproportionately from famine.

Egyptian police have continued to target homosexuals using Internet-based sting operations.

In November, the Chinese Government relaxed its policy of tightly controlling information about the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and announced plans to provide antiretroviral drugs to millions of people, including rural residents and the urban poor. New Chinese treatment efforts, however, have brought the issues of stigma and discrimination to the forefront as obstacles to long-term success in prevention or treatment. The effective delivery of AIDS messages and drug treatment programs will depend on effective protection of legal and civil rights for all those affected by the disease. It remains to be seen whether the PRC authorities will recognize and effectively address these issues.

Worldwide, violence against children continued to be a problem and trafficking in persons claimed many women and children as victims, forced to engage in sex acts or to labor under conditions comparable to slavery. These problems are discussed in depth in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report issued in June 2003, but they are also covered by the individual country reports in this volume.

Worker rights:

China's global economic presence continues to focus attention on worker rights as a priority in bringing China into compliance with international standards. Economic and social changes affecting workers produced a growing number of labor-related disputes, most of them directed at state-owned enterprises, regarding conditions of work or management corruption. The Government responded by arresting and prosecuting labor activists. Freedom of association, the right to organize and collective bargaining continued to be denied to Chinese workers. Trade unions at all levels were required to affiliate with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is controlled by China's Communist Party.

In Cambodia, there were improvements in compliance with laws on wages and hours, greater respect for freedom of association, improvements in labor-management relations, fewer illegal dismissals of union leaders, fewer illegal strikes, the successful establishment of Cambodia's first labor arbitration council for resolving industrial disputes, and the negotiation of the garment sector's first true collective bargaining agreement.

In the Americas, obstacles for worker rights persist in several key countries. Seven independent trade unionists were among the 75 peaceful human rights advocates tried for "provocations" and "subversion" by the Cuban Government in April. Conditions for organized labor deteriorated in Venezuela, where the Government refused to recognize the elected leaders of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers and ordered the arrest of its Secretary General, forcing him to flee the country. Colombia remained the most dangerous country in the world for trade unionists, although fewer trade unionists were killed in 2003 than in 2002.

In Russia, the Moscow representative of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity continued to be denied permission to return to her work after being denied reentry to the country in December 2002. With respect to neighboring Belarus, the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization decided in November to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of government violations of freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively.

In Zimbabwe, representatives of organized labor continued to be targeted for harassment, detention, beatings and other harsh treatment. The response of the Government to worker demands has been to place limits on the ability of unions to communicate or meet with their own constituencies, to make it virtually impossible to have a legal strike, and to arrest labor activists who demonstrate their disagreement with policies. On October 8, police arrested more than 150 ZCTU members at protest gatherings in several cities throughout the country. Most of those detained were released the same day; however, many were forced to sign admissions of guilt and were fined.

There was not a word in this presentation about the weapons of mass destruction, in this presentation here this morning.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you were one of the principal architects of war with Iraq. It has been on your agenda since the end of the Gulf War, 1991. It is now clear that Iraq was high on the agenda of the administration from day one, even though the outgoing Clinton administration made it clear in the briefings during the transition that al Qaeda was the most serious threat to our security.

Dick Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, wrote that when he raised al Qaeda in the first meeting of the deputies in April 2001 you, Mr. Secretary, said: "I just do not understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man, Osama bin Laden."

At every stage, even after September 11, it seems that you treated al Qaeda as less than a main threat, as a diversion from the real priority, which was Iraq. In his book Bob Woodward says that the administration diverted resources from the war in Afghanistan to plan for the war in Iraq.

Now, we have in the newspapers this morning, the Washington Post, "Al Qaeda intends to strike, officials say. U.S. intelligence community believes al Qaeda is intent on launching terrorist attacks in this country some time between now and the November election."

Are we not paying a high price and is not the world paying a high price because of the administration's obsession with Iraq?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Kennedy, actually I welcome the opportunity to correct the record on some of these things, although I would have preferred you had not used that word "disingenuous." I am trying my best to be candid with this committee and with the American people.

But the notion that an invasion of Iraq has been on my agenda since 1991 is simply wrong, sir. Until September 11 I thought the problem of Saddam Hussein was something that should be dealt with by Iraqis, although I was consistently critical of the lack of American support for those Iraqis who were prepared to liberate their own country. We will never know, because history unfortunately only tells you what happened on one course of action, but we will never know whether some of our problems today might have been avoided if at earlier times we had enabled the Iraqis to do the job for themselves.

Second, Mr. Clarke's book is just full of gross inaccuracies. He has Secretary Rumsfeld attending a critical September 4 meeting that the Secretary was not even at. He has the Secretary in the Pentagon on a secure videoteleconference, a rather dramatic, memorable moment, when the Secretary did not turn up until an hour later. He puts quotes in my mouth that are about 165 degrees opposite of anything I could possibly have said. He is simply wrong when he says that I dismissed the threat of al Qaeda or the threat of terrorism.

To the contrary, Senator, one of the concerns I had, I have had for many years, was the question of who did the World Trade Center in 1993, the most serious act of foreign terrorism on American soil prior to September 11, which it turns out was done by the nephew of the man who was the mastermind of September 11. There is a straight line from 1993 to the tragedy of September 11.

I was concerned that this was obviously not just a rogue bunch of misfits operating out of a mosque in Brooklyn, that there was international expertise behind it. When I served on the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998, we asked for a briefing from the Counterterrorism Center, I did, on who was behind it because it seemed to me, correctly, that if we are concerned about missile attack on the United States we also need to think about a terrorist attack on the United States.

[The information referred to follows:]

I was fully aware that the Department was using some of the funding that Congress provided to respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States, to provide support to counter domestic or international terrorism, and to support national security to finance unfunded global war on terrorism requirements for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In July 2002, CENTCOM identified over \$700 million of requirements that it said that it needed to fight the global war on terrorism to include potential preparatory tasks for a possible war against Iraq. After reviewing CENTCOM's request, we considered some of requirements as being necessary for the broader war on terrorism, which Congress authorized. Prior to the passage of the joint resolution by Congress in October 2002, the Department limited the funding for CENTCOM's requirements to those projects that were designed to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in the region or to support ongoing military operations. Thus, we considered these projects to be dual use in nature, that is, projects that would benefit overall global war on terrorism operations by improving military capabilities throughout the areas of responsibility for CENTCOM.

The Department fully funded requirements identified specifically for global war on terrorism military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Given the military successes in Afghanistan, the overall costs of military operations for global war on terrorism did decline. In August 2002 costs were about \$1.5 billion and in September costs had declined to about \$1.0 billion. Some of these savings were applied to CENTCOM's \$700 million request. Congress recognized the decline in global war on terrorism operations and rescinded \$244 million of Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) resources in the Fiscal Year 2002 Emergency Supplemental (Public Law 107-206).

Senator KENNEDY. Why did we have the diversion, because my time is going? Why did we have the diversion, then, of funds, if we are going after al Qaeda?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Because they are part of the single conflict.

Senator KENNEDY. Why are we not going after—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. When Mr. Clarke errs, he says there is not a shred of evidence about al Qaeda and Iraq. Excuse me. He was in charge of counterterrorism—

Senator KENNEDY. No, but I am talking now about—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ.—when that secret indictment was issued, and he was in charge of counterterrorism, Senator Kennedy, when Saddam Hussein for 10 years harbored Abdul Raqman Yassin, who was the only bomber from the 1993 World Trade Center event who is still at large. His lack of curiosity about why the Iraqis were holding a man who was responsible for what in the 1990s was the most serious act of foreign terrorism on the United States is a mystery to me to this day.

Senator KENNEDY. We will take all the criticisms that you have of Mr. Clarke. Can you tell me why the administration diverted funds, though, when we were beginning to target Osama bin Laden, had him evidently effectively trapped in Tora Bora, and then the administration diverted \$700 million out of that to go to begin the process or advance the process in terms of Iraq? If so, how much responsibility do you bear in that?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to set the record straight. We did not divert funds. We were—

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up, but I am addressing the Woodward issue.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would be happy to put it in the record. We were very careful in making sure that we applied money to the broader war on terrorism that Congress had authorized, and we specifically withheld funding for those projects that were specifically Iraq-related until after the joint resolution passed Congress. We were very conscious of Congress's authority in this area and we tried as scrupulously as I know how to live up to our obligations.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will submit for the record these points that I would have made.

Chairman WARNER. Correct. Did you have adequate time to reply to the important question raised by Senator Levin, Senator Kennedy, and myself about that \$700 million?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I could have a few more minutes, I would—

Chairman WARNER. I will give you a minute or 2, because it is very much on the minds of all of us.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the course of—that \$750 million number comes from a set of tasks that CENTCOM put together in the summer of 2002 as things that they would want to have in the event of an Iraq contingency. The DOD Comptroller looked at this list with a view to those things that were consistent with existing authorities in the settlement appropriations, the global war on terror, and to distinguish between those and things which would be Iraq-specific, as I said.

Based on that exercise, in August and September of 2002 \$178 million was made available to support CENTCOM's global efforts, including funding for communications equipment, fuel supplies, humanitarian rations, and improvements to CENTCOM's forward headquarters. All the investments were designed to strengthen our capabilities in the region or support ongoing operational requirements. No funding was made available for those things that had Iraq as the exclusive purpose.

On October 11, as you are well aware, Congress passed the Iraq resolution and, consistent with Congressional statutory requirements regarding military construction activities, we did notify Congress about \$63 million in MILCON. After October 25, some \$800 million was made available over the following months to support Iraq preparatory tasks consistent with that joint resolution.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Senator COLLINS.

Senator COLLINS. Secretary Wolfowitz, all of us share your admiration and your gratitude to the men and women who are serving in Iraq. They are the best that our country has to offer. That is why I am increasingly concerned about the strain that we are putting on our reservists and our guard members, their families, and their employers.

Now, Secretary Rumsfeld testified recently before our committee that only 7 percent of the Guard and Reserve have been involun-

tarily mobilized more than once in the past 13 years. I have to tell you that has not been our experience in Maine at all. I have talked to numerous guard members and reservists who have been deployed three times in the last decade.

To illustrate my concern, I want to tell you about the specific experience of a specific Reserve unit. That is the 94th Military Police (MP) Company. This unit has been deployed 2.5 of the past 4 years. They spent 9 months in Bosnia. They have now been in Iraq for more than a year. They originally were scheduled to come home last fall. Then the Pentagon changed the policy to 1 year boots on the ground, so their tour was extended.

That year expired on Easter weekend and they were literally on the bus to their plane to take them back to the United States when they got the news that once again they would be extended. I have to tell you that this has been devastating to the families and demoralizing to many of the soldiers who serve in this unit.

General Abizaid testified before us last year that one of the most important things for any soldier to know is when they are coming home when they are employed in a combat zone. He went on to say, "We owe those soldiers the answer as to when that might be." Well, the answer has changed time and again, and I am very concerned about what the impact is on these troops, their families, and their employers.

I have three questions for you. First, does not the fact that we are repeatedly deploying the same reservists and the same members of the Guard over and over again suggest that we do not have the right mix of skills in the Army? Second, are you concerned that changing the rules and extending deployments repeatedly, plus having a very high rate of deployment, is going to hurt our ability to retain skilled soldiers such as those in this unit? Third, is the Pentagon considering any extra compensation for the members of units that have been involuntarily extended beyond the year that they originally thought they were going to have? Actually, it is even longer than that because of the change in policy last fall.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will ask General Myers to comment also, especially on that last question. But the issue you raise is a very important issue. We have been, even before this came up with your unit, your military police unit from Maine, we knew we had a big problem because of a decision that was really made I think 20 or 30 years ago, that we would have—it is basically a Cold War military, that could not go to war unless we are in a condition where the Reserves were mobilized on a massive scale.

From that flowed a decision to take certain military occupations—and military police, which is the unit you are talking about, was one of them—and put them almost exclusively in the Reserves. As a result, I think the unit from Maine was deployed to Bosnia as military police. We need military police in every one of these, whether you call it peacekeeping, which is not Iraq, or stability operations or low intensity war, which is what Iraq is.

If you are part of that 7 percent that is mobilized more often, it does not matter to you that it is only, "only" 7 percent. I think the Secretary was clear about that.

General Schoemaker has put together a plan that will move 100,000 positions, shift them from the Active Force to the Reserve

or from the Reserve to the Active Force, so that we can begin to cover these needs in a more balanced way with the Active Force, so that we are not constantly going back to the same well on reservists for certain occupations that do not exist. Military police is one, civil affairs is another. That is going to take some time, but it is a major part of the fix.

The second major part of the fix is to increase the effective size of the Army. Now, I said "effective size" because what General Schoomaker's plan is is focused with about a 30,000 temporary increase in Active Army manpower to work through a plan, as I think you have been briefed but it is worth repeating, that will add at least 10 active brigades to the 33 in the Army now, and if we get to that point of 10 and think we should go further he has a plan to go to 48, which would be a 50-percent increase in the number of active combat brigades in the Army with this roughly 30,000 personnel increase. That 30,000 increase will be mostly temporary, particularly if we top off at 43.

There is no question it would be nice right now to have a larger Army. The problem is if we decided now or a year ago to have a larger Army, you cannot just—these people do not just walk in. It is not like hiring for a check-writing organization. You have to grow the units, and once you have grown them if it turns out that you have built up something you do not need then you go through the pain of the 1990s of demobilizing people who you recruited in.

So it is something the Army and the civilian leadership undertake with some care. I think we have a good plan here that gives us a chance to get more combat power into the Army, and if we ultimately decide a permanent increase is necessary we can do that. But none of that, I am afraid, helps your wonderful people from Maine.

On the question of—let me ask General Myers to speak to that. I certainly want to look into whether there are things that we can do on the compensatory front. General Myers?

General MYERS. Senator Collins, your first question, does a repeated deployment mean we have the wrong mix? As Secretary Wolfowitz said, absolutely. We are not structured for the security environment we are in. To put a little texture on the 100,000 that the Army is going to be restructuring, they are going to take down field artillery battalions, air defense battalions, and turn them into—and others, but those are two of the primary ones—and turn those into military police units, transportation units, petroleum distribution, water distribution units, the kind of units that are in very high demand, and also put more of those in the active force.

That work has already started. It will continue for the next 4 or 5 years as we rebalance. It is a very important part of it.

Retention. Clearly, this unit has worked very hard. MPs are in high demand. I can remember right after September 11 the MPs that showed up at Fort Myer, where I live, to provide additional security for the post, and there were some active duty for a while, and then pretty soon some Guard and Reserve, and sometimes forces that were not trained to be MPs that were retrained to come up there and help.

So clearly we have to do a better job with this whole mix. The retention issue is huge. I would only say that as we look at recruit-

ing and retention this mission is so important that I think these people, besides being disappointed, their families being tremendously disappointed, and their employers being disappointed, what they are doing is so important that I hope that that along with other incentives will convince them to stay with us.

This is an important time to serve. I think they realize that. They are terrific men and women, as most of these MP companies are.

The third point was extra compensation, and absolutely, we are. Within our authorities, we have authority for providing extra compensation and for those that are going to be extended past the 1 year. We call it, boots on the ground in Iraq. There will be additional compensation.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, gentlemen, for your service and for your testimony.

I agree with what has been said both by members of the committee and Secretary Wolfowitz that, and all of you, that it is important to look back so that we move forward with success. But I am sure that all of us also agree that the emphasis has to be on looking forward and moving forward with as much success as we can achieve in Iraq and more broadly in the war on terrorism.

The second thing about looking back is that if you spend too much time looking back at the various paths that you took to get to where we are now we may lose sight of the fact that we are all heading in the same direction, that as we focus on the now and the future in Iraq I see a very heartening consensus emerging, certainly among the American people and particularly in the American political leadership community. I think we ought not to hold ourselves back from seeing that, because it is a source of strength.

I have not heard anybody in a responsible position, certainly no one on this committee, call for a withdrawal or a retreat from Iraq. Whether that is because we feel, as I do, that the war was a necessary and noble undertaking in pursuit of our values, our security, or whether we feel, whether some feel that because we are there now, departing hastily would cause chaos in Iraq and the region, endanger American security, embolden the terrorists—everyone in a position of authority in American government, regardless of party, wants to win in Iraq, and it is very important for observers not to be confused either by the very healthy questioning that goes on at a hearing like this or by the crosscurrents of an American political campaign.

We are together in this. It is important that the American men and women in uniform understand that we are not only behind them—of course we are; they are our sons and daughters, our neighbors, our brothers and sisters—but that we are behind them in a quest for victory.

It is very important also that the rest of the world, including particularly our enemies in Iraq, understand that. I was very pleased that Senator Kerry in a statement last week made quite clear that no one in the world should be under the impression that the out-

come of the American election this November will alter the basic thrust of American policy on Iraq.

That policy has drawn closer. People have moved. As you said, Secretary Wolfowitz, the debate now is not over whether to withdraw troops; it is how many troops to add to secure the situation. There has been debate over, as we look back, about the extent to which we should have and could have involved the United Nations or NATO. The fact is we are involving the United Nations now and trying to involve NATO more.

So that consensus is important through all of the comment and controversy to recognize, because it is a source of our strength, and it is very much in line with the quote that you read from General Keane.

I want to ask a few questions. First, I want to say, General Myers, that I was heartened to hear that the administration, the Pentagon, is looking at alternatives for sending more troops into Iraq in the short term, because as we approach June 30 and the period afterward leading up to elections obviously our enemies, the fanatics, the terrorist insurgents, the Saddam remnants, will seek to disrupt the movement of progress and freedom, and it is very important for them to understand that. I am encouraged by that.

I understand, and I also took heart from the President's statement at his press conference last week, that there are discussions going on with NATO about the possible increased NATO involvement in peacekeeping. I should say not increased, but NATO involvement in peacekeeping. It has not been before, either on the borders or in the section of Iraq now overseen by the Polish forces.

Secretary Wolfowitz, can you give us any update on that, on those discussions with NATO?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would be happy to. I want to thank you, Senator Lieberman. You have shown extraordinary leadership on this issue over more than 10 years. What you just said about the message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of democracy in Iraq, that they should not confuse debate in this country as a lack of will, is a very important statement.

I was in Najaf last July and I was struck at both the level of confusion about our politics, which I think I could straighten out, and the level of paranoia about whether we would abandon them as they, I think with some justification, felt we had done in 1991. On the latter point, the question came in the form of: Are you Americans just holding Saddam Hussein as a trump card over our heads? It sounds like paranoia, but if you have been through what they have been through it is not so paranoid.

I was delighted a couple weeks later when we could tell them: Well, we have the two sons and we are after the father. It was a huge event in December to have captured Saddam Hussein. It will be an even bigger event, frankly, Senator, when a new Iraqi government has the legal authority to try him and bring him to justice.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As early as December 2002, I spoke to the NAC in Brussels and proposed a range of possibilities for the alliance role in Iraq, including the use of NATO collective assets, the provision of support services for those allies who would participate,

and, most of all, a NATO role in postwar humanitarian and stability operations.

The alliance did decide to play a role. It has provided planning and other support services for the Polish division which is in the critical central-south area, to include force generation, planning, and communications support. We have 17 of the 26 allies with us and 7 partners.

We are asking NATO to look at ways it could expand its contribution, including to assume leadership of that multinational division currently led by Poland, to possibly provide an additional multinational unit led by NATO, and to provide additional logistics support for coalition operations. Of course, any decision in that regard would be a political decision that would have to be taken by allies.

I do think in this regard, a successful transition to a sovereign government in July, hopefully another U.N. Security Council resolution might ease some of the concerns, at least of some of our allies, about joining in that kind of consensus decision. NATO, as you well know, is an organization that operates on consensus and there are limits to what it can do when only—only—17 of 18 or 19 members are supporting something.

But I think it has already made a big contribution. We would like to see more.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

General Myers.

General MYERS. Senator Lieberman, can I just add onto that? In terms of Afghanistan, I think NATO has over 6,000 forces in there and they are responsible, sir, for the security in Kabul. They are doing a very good job of that. They want to expand their responsibilities. They have the ambition to expand their responsibilities, in Afghanistan by establishing some NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. There are a couple right now. There is one led by the Germans. We are in discussions with the Italians on another one. New Zealand has one. The Brits have one.

We are looking at others. It remains to be seen whether they will have the resources to do that, but that is their ambition. That is what we are in discussions on with them. It is a long way from Europe, but they understand the importance of that and I am optimistic, as Secretary Wolfowitz is, that beyond their role of providing the force generation capability for this Polish division in the center-south region of Iraq, that perhaps they can play a larger role in the future.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is very encouraging. I thank you all.

Remember—there have been discussions about comparisons to Vietnam. Remember that there is a doctrine, a military doctrine that emerged from Vietnam that bears the name of the current Secretary of State, the Powell doctrine. Generally applied, it is to make sure that we do not ever go into combat again without all necessary forces.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you. My time is up. I do want to say that I hope the committee will focus on the end of Secretary Wolfowitz's statement where he calls for three enhanced authorities, which I would guess that we will all agree on one, for \$500 million to train and equip military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and

friendly nearby nations, to enhance their capability to combat terrorism; second, commanders' emergency response program to enable military leaders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction; and third, an increased drawdown under the Afghan Freedom Support Act to provide additional help for the Afghan National Army.

I hope, in the spirit that I began my statement, that together we might on this committee take the lead in responding to those requests as rapidly as the urgent circumstances on the ground require.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, we will do that. I think I share with you the importance of those requests.

Senator SESSIONS.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you very much for that last intervention.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you also, Senator Lieberman, for those excellent comments.

I would like to join with Senator Collins in her concern about guard units that have been extended. We have an MP unit from Alabama that has been extended and I know how painful that is for family members who were on the verge of expecting them home. But we trust, and we will be in contact with you as we go forward, that this was required.

One of the great strengths of America is that we are self-critical. We have heard today a litany of mistakes. We have been hearing about how many errors we made prior to September 11. But I would like to make a point or two that I think must be made, and that is we need to recognize how much progress has been made to date on the war on terrorism, which President Bush told us from the beginning would be long and difficult, years in effect, and he stated that.

But there have been a number of accomplishments. Pakistan, when confronted and challenged, it was playing footsy with the Taliban and al Qaeda, chose to be with us and the civilized nations, and making a big difference in the world right now. That is a great nation that chose to abandon terrorism.

The Taliban chose wrongly. They rejected our call and they have been removed from power, and al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan have been eliminated and their leaders, the ones that still exist, are hiding in caves somewhere in the mountains.

Saddam Hussein failed the opportunity he had to avoid military action and he has been removed from power, found hiding in a cave, a hole in the ground, like the rat that he is.

Libya has come in now and renounced terrorism after that event, and Muamar Qadafi actually appears to be seriously wanting to join the civilized nations of the world.

Abdul Khan, the Pakistan scientist who was involved in proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, to Iran, to Libya, has confessed and told what he was doing. While we were signing treaties prohibiting that, he was doing it. That activity on his part was ended as a result of military action and encouraging leadership by the President.

Most unexpected and most blessed to date is we have not had another attack on this country. I would not have thought that was

possible, that we would have gone almost 3 years without another attack. I know that we can expect our elections to be in danger, that some will try to disrupt that and maybe achieve a Spanish result. But I do not think the American people will lose their poise if that were to happen. Pray God it does not.

These are not mistakes. These are accomplishments. No war comes out like you expect it completely. It is no doubt that we are facing today a troubling surge of violence in Iraq. The Iraqi people have had a history—have not had a history of law and order or representative government. The severe oppression under which they have suffered has clearly scarred them, keeping emotions raw, paranoia widespread, and fear high. Their history has been that the winner, the leader, is the one who uses violence and power to achieve power.

Thus, as that government formation moves forward there remains a window of opportunity for these terrorists, these violent guys who want to take control of this country by power, to seize power. There is a window of opportunity for them. They are using every tool at their disposal, fomenting hatreds, distorting religion, and utilizing violence to create instability.

Our challenge has proven difficult indeed. I had hoped things would be doing better now. The war went better than I ever thought it would go and this has been more difficult in recent weeks than I expected for sure.

We have made progress in a number of areas in Iraq, as you have stated. Our goal, a free, stable, and prosperous Iraq, is noble and important for us and the world and the war against terrorism. The President, this Senate by over a three-fourths majority, and the American people have set the goal. No one wants to achieve it more than you do, the members of this panel. No one knows the situation better than you. You are tireless and dedicated to this goal.

My advice to you is to stay the course, stay fixed on the goal, and continue to be flexible. Every war throughout history is different from the ones preceding it. Adjust as you go, learn from the situation, keep your eye on the goal of a free and prosperous Iraq.

There is going to be a lot of difficulties as we go forward. There will continue to be unexpected difficulties. But if we keep our poise and our head about us I believe we can make it.

The critics and second-guessers are vocal. Those who say thanks for the accomplishments and who pray daily for our troops are not so visible, but they are many. This will test the American people and Congress.

Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, however, that it is our destiny at this time in history to lead. Our soldiers must know we support them completely. So despite the naysayers, we will meet the challenge, I believe, that is before us. The whole world for decades to come will benefit from our constancy and courage, and I salute you for it and I particularly salute the men and women in uniform who are putting their lives on the line to make this a safer world and a better Iraq.

General Myers, I understand General Petraeus will be going to Iraq. If you would tell us when you expect him to arrive and what ideas you may have for strengthening the local police and security

forces that I believe is critical to our long-term success, and what if anything this Congress can do to help you achieve that goal?

General MYERS. Senator Sessions, thank you for your tribute to our men and women in uniform. As Secretary Grossman pointed out, there are lots of other men and women from lots of different countries, some wearing uniforms, some not, that show a great deal of courage in that country day in and day out.

As far as General Petraeus, I think he is in country now. He was certainly going to arrive this week. I think he has arrived. He will be—he comes off a very successful tour as the division commander of the 101st Division. They were in northern Iraq. He showed a great deal of innovative thought in how he worked with the local governance in that area, helping to improve their economies, and so forth, and did a terrific job, I think in everybody's estimation.

He is going back to work security cooperation. The Defense Department has the responsibility for all security forces, which include the Iraqi police, the New Iraqi Army, the border, the Civil Defense Corps, and the Facilities Protection Services.

As Secretary Wolfowitz said, we have not equipped them as fast as we needed to do, and that is one of the issues that we have to work. I think we have solved all the hurdles that we either had here in Washington or in Baghdad. Those hurdles have been solved. We have contracts. Equipment is arriving. I have seen the—there is in fact a very good British officer that showed me the plan for equipping the police, great detail in terms of equipment and where in the country and so forth. They have it mapped out. We have the resources to do that. We have just got to follow through.

We have to continue the training of all these forces. In particular, the police have undergone some training, but there is a large number of police that have not been trained. We need to do that. Then once they are trained and they go to their individual police stations, what needs to happen is they get the proper mentoring, because in some cases the leadership may not be all that good in these police stations. So you get one of these recruits that has been trained and you have to keep their enthusiasm up and keep them on the right track.

We have civilian police from around the world that the State Department is organizing, that is to do that, that task.

Then I think General Abizaid is exactly right. As he has said I think many times and that we are now saying, and Secretary Wolfowitz said earlier, they have to feel like they are responding to Iraqi authority. We have to connect those dots between the local police station and the province on up to the ministry of interior in Baghdad and to the political leadership that will stand up 1 July.

That part has yet to happen, but there are efforts under way to make all that happen. I think what Congress has done to ensure we have the funding for the equipping and training of these forces right now is adequate, and it will just, it will take some time. It is certainly going to take beyond 1 July.

We think by the end of this year that we will have clearly the majority of these forces properly equipped and trained and in the field and connected to their command authority, if you will.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, General Petraeus did a great job with the 101st in Mosul and I think a lot of us have confidence in him, and we want to support you in that effort.

General MYERS. Thank you. He will do very well.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you urge us all to show will and resolve and you emphasized that by those very compelling letters from those young privates and captains who are showing will and resolve. But around here in Washington the usual measure of will and resolve is the budget, and when General Schoomaker, General Jumper, and General Hagee were here they said that without a supplemental appropriation by October 1 they could be running out of money in critical accounts for this operation. Commentators like Anthony Cordesman have suggested there is a \$50 billion hole that has to be filled by a supplemental.

When will the Department of Defense show its will and resolve by sending a supplemental up to Congress?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Reed, if we think one is necessary, when we think it is necessary. We had a session with the same chiefs that you quoted, I think about a week ago, to precisely address where we stand with this process. What happens is as you go through the year certain accounts start to run short because you are spending more money on them than you planned, and clearly the unanticipated higher level of deployment leads to some accounts being overspent and you hear about that quickly.

Other accounts spend slower than was planned and they start to have surpluses there, and I can assure you people do not come running down the hall with their hair on fire to tell you, I have a surplus in my account.

We have a process called the mid-year execution review, which is conducted by the DOD Comptroller. It is under way now. As a result of that meeting with the Secretary, we have speeded up the schedule by a week so that if there is a problem we can identify it sooner rather than later and come for help if we need it.

One kind of help we really do need and that is general transfer authority. In fact, at the end of my testimony those three points that Senator Lieberman pointed out—I also said that most of all in this kind of wartime situation where you are dealing with unpredictable events it is important to have more rather than less flexibility.

I think we asked for \$4 billion, which is 1 percent of our budget, last year and it was cut by roughly half. The more flexibility, the sooner we can rebalance accounts. Of course we can reprogram. That takes time. But the sooner people know that money is going to be available from an account that has a surplus into an account that has a deficit, the better we can manage the resources we have.

The bottom line, though, Senator—and I think you and I agree on this—is the troops need to have what they need and we need to make sure they do.

Senator REED. Well, I think the bottom line, Mr. Secretary, is you need a supplemental up here. This is not a shortage of several billion dollars. This is a growing shortage and, as you point out,

when the chiefs testified the anticipated force level would be 105,000, not 135,000 as it is today.

General Myers, is it your professional judgment that there are adequate resources without a supplemental to continue operations without seriously harming other important Defense Department programs?

General MYERS. Senator Reed, we are evaluating that right now. I have to withhold judgment for just a little bit more time. Obviously the extension of the First Armored Division, the Second Light Cavalry Regiment, and their combat support, combat service support is going to increase our costs. The operations tempo is also higher. So we know that we have additional costs that we have to find funding sources for.

We also know there will be execution issues with some of our acquisition systems and so forth. So I think we need to wait until the OSD Comptroller can look at these, these issues, before we can have a firm decision. We thought before, with what the services were identifying as shortfalls, that we could bridge the gap between, for the last month of this fiscal year and cover our expenses. I think we just have to ensure ourselves that is still true given the higher expenses that we have right now.

Senator REED. General Myers, another issue has become relevant in the last few days, certainly since the terrible attack on the contractors in the Fallujah area. That is the huge number, 20,000 estimated, of armed security contractors. This presents a problem today, but it certainly will present even a greater problem after July 1. What rules of engagement will they operate under in this new sovereign Iraqi entity? Can an Iraqi minister of interior hire 200 former Special Forces for his own private army? What is their status?

This is to me a startling departure from previous doctrine of using these contractors in security positions. What is your view and what are you going to do about it?

General MYERS. What we are doing about it is providing Central Command and General Abizaid and General Sanchez with the policy guidance that will allow them to handle this issue. You raised the questions. We do have a lot of contractor support, not only in the security area but also in a lot of our logistics capability—truck drivers.

Senator REED. Relatively noncontroversial.

General MYERS. Right. But still it raises issues as to their status, their arming, and so forth. You are right, the security forces are probably the—and we are providing that guidance to Central Command so they know how to handle this situation.

By the way, I would just say parenthetically that when I was there one of the issues I looked at was the coordination between the coalition military forces and security forces. I am assured there is a pretty robust mechanism for security forces inside Iraq to make sure that they have the latest intelligence or information and that they share information back and forth.

I was a little bit worried about that after the Blackwater issue in Fallujah and some of the things I heard about that. I think General Sanchez and his folks do a pretty good job of that.

Senator REED. Just a final point. My time has expired.

General Ikenberry conducted a report or a review of security forces several months ago. We have been endeavoring to obtain a copy of that report, if it is classified certainly under those classified terms. It seems to me unfortunate that it takes us weeks and weeks and weeks to get reports which you have acknowledged, both the Secretary and uniformed leadership, exist, that you have, that you reviewed, and that we cannot get access in a timely way.

I just think it is unfortunate, more than unfortunate. I do not think it is appropriate. Can you assure us that we will get access to this report within days?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will check on that, Senator, and I can not assure you. I will do my best to see if it is appropriate—

Senator REED. Why can you not assure me, Mr. Secretary? This is a report that was prepared by an officer in the United States Army to inform the Department of Defense, but also this is the Armed Services Committee. We should have access to those reports in a timely fashion. If they are classified, we can go up to 407. We can read them under the circumstances and the classifications.

It seems to me this is unacceptable that you, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, say: I will try, but I cannot promise you you will get a report.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we try to give you everything that we can. We also have to make sure that we manage the whole process of reports like this and reviews like this so that people give us candid opinions. Quite frankly—

Senator REED. Well, no; we deserve a candid opinion, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ.—we put a lot of effort into getting this Ikenberry mission out there against some people who did not really want to have people looking and examining how we were doing. Lessons learned are a wonderful thing. We need to do lessons learned. We also need to manage and we need to manage between the Executive and Congress in an appropriate way so that people do not begin to fear every time someone comes out to do an Ikenberry report or to do an assessment or do a lessons learned it is time to shut up and not give them any information because the next thing you know—

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, that is totally unfounded. We are constitutionally required to supervise the activities of the DOD. We have just as much of a right to get this information as you do. You seem to be saying we do not. You seem to be saying that we cannot get access to reports prepared in the course of business of the DOD. Is that what you are saying?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I will do my best. I have not looked at this issue. I would like to get you the report. If I can get it for you—

Senator REED. What you seem to be saying, Mr. Secretary, if you do not want the contents of that report disclosed to us, you will not get it for us. If those contents are embarrassing to the administration, you will not get it for us. If those contents suggest that the problems we saw 2 weeks ago were understood or anticipated or should have been—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, that is not the issue. Please do not do that.

Senator REED. Well, what is the issue, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The issue is how to protect the decisional processes that I think are in the country's interest, the candor that is required in pre-decisional documents, and the equally important responsibility to keep Congress informed. I believe that you can see this report, but I do not know.

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary—

Chairman WARNER. Senator, I must say there are seven colleagues waiting. It is an important issue. Senator Levin and I will address the issue.

May I also thank you for bringing up the question on the contractors. General Myers, that is a matter that is before the committee for review right now, because they are providing an absolutely essential service, not only to our security side but the logistics side. We have to do what we can, particularly those that have affiliation with the coalition partners.

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact—I apologize to my colleagues. This is an astounding statement by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, saying that if he wants us to get the information he will give it to us, but if he does not he will not.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. This is not a personal thing, Senator Reed.

Senator REED. It is not for any legal reason—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think you know that there are issues about what documents are pre-decisional and what things need to be shared. Let us be clear. The Ikenberry report is something I did personally push for because I thought it was important to have a thorough examination of this issue, and it met some resistance because people are afraid sometimes to have things examined.

I said, and I repeat, I will do my best, if I am permitted—it is not me personally—to make that report available to Congress.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin and I are now reviewing, in the context of some requests by Senator McCain, the committee and others, as to how we are going to work out a smoother and a more understandable exchange of information.

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for one moment?

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Senator REED. My understanding is that reports that are prepared by the DOD are classified and that, subject to those classifications, people have access to it. I assume we have a sufficient clearance level on this committee to have access to the report I am talking about and probably everything that is prepared at the DOD. If I am in error—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Reed, I am going to do everything I can to get you the report. I just did not want to promise something I am not sure I can deliver. I will do my best.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Reed, we just simply have to move on in fairness to my colleagues and your colleagues on both sides here.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

I for one agree, I believe, with the comments of Senator Lieberman and Senator Sessions and those who have associated

themselves with the importance of this committee conducting proper oversight, and particularly in dealing with matters that are of present concern and planning for the future. I think we are at our best when we do that. I think we are at our worst when we look back and try to dissect lessons learned while we are still at war in the battlefield. That unfortunately, particularly in a super-charged political environment leading up to a November election, I think is not as constructive as we could or should be in dealing with the present and plans for the future.

But unfortunately, in this environment when questions are raised and statements are made and not responded to, or when the context of the answer is not made clear, unfortunately that has to be addressed. So it is in that context that I want to ask two questions.

Over the weekend we heard some unfortunate claims, one related to the \$87 billion supplemental that I wanted to ask you about; and one goes to the very nature of the conflict that we are currently engaged in in the war on terror. The first question I have involves the \$87 billion supplemental that Congress passed to fund the war on terror. It was said this weekend that even the generals in Iraq said that moneys in that bill had no impact on their ability to continue to fight. It was also said that that vote would never—that vote would never have prevented, that is a negative vote against that supplemental, would never have prevented any of the body armor, ammunition, or anything from getting to our troops.

Now, I had heard that statement earlier and it caused me to ask in another hearing, a SASC hearing at which the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, appeared. I asked him about that \$87 billion appropriation and if it had not passed what the consequences would have been to our troops. He was unequivocal. He said: "This supplemental appropriation has enabled us to significantly increase the protection for our soldiers throughout the theater of Afghanistan and Iraq."

I asked him: "If Congress had not stepped up and funded the \$87 billion supplemental, that would have meant or resulted in increased casualties as a result of the failure to provide those up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and body armor?" General Casey agreed that: "It would have meant more casualties or the Army would have had to gut the Army budget to find the money to do this, that is pay for the body armor or up-armored HMMWVs by other means."

My question for you, Secretary Wolfowitz and General MYERS. Did the \$87 billion supplemental have an impact on the ability of our men and women to fight and win the war on terror in which we are currently engaged?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Cornyn, I cannot imagine how we could continue conducting operations without that supplemental. It not only provided for basic operations, but it also provided substantial amounts for things like body armor and up-armored HMMWVs and various force protection measures.

There were two different pieces of the supplemental, of course. There was the roughly \$67 billion that goes directly to our troops, which is absolutely indispensable. Then there is the \$18 billion, \$18.6 billion of reconstruction funds, which are spending slower,

but they are already having an impact. I think it is very important. As we said in testifying on the reconstruction funds, that money can help to create Iraqi security forces that can take the place of Americans. That money can help to create a positive political environment inside Iraq that will make our forces safer.

So really the whole \$87 billion I think—and it covers Afghanistan as well—was essential to this war on terror.

Senator CORNYN. General Myers?

General MYERS. Really, I do not know how I can add anything more to that. That supplemental is absolutely essential to our ability to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Wolfowitz, I think we approved \$750 million for force protection initiatives alone and we can do more if required in that regard.

But the general just paying for our operational tempo, if we did not do that General Casey would be right, you would gut the Army budget, and not only the Army budget but the Air Force and the Marine Corps and the Navy budgets as well. So it is absolutely essential to our operations.

Senator CORNYN. This last week I was at the Red River Army Depot, where they are providing additional armor or metal containers essentially to upgrade HMMWVs for additional armor and protection for troops currently in the battlefield. It is that kind of additional protection which I believe has led to the greater security and greater likelihood of success of our troops in the field.

My only other question really relates to the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged, in which at least count I saw we had 135,000 troops currently in Iraq fighting this conflict. It was said this weekend again—a reiteration of an earlier claim—that the war on terrorism is not primarily a military operation, but that it is an intelligence-gathering, a law enforcement, and public diplomacy effort. Now, I disagree with that completely and I believe that indeed treating the war on terror previously, after we had been attacked, after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 for example, as a criminal investigation and a law enforcement matter, as we have seen before the 9/11 Commission, has led to insecurity and endangered American lives because of the lack of information-sharing, among other things.

But I would just ask your response, Secretary Wolfowitz. Do you agree that what we are engaged in in Afghanistan and Iraq is not primarily a military operation, but is rather an intelligence-gathering, law enforcement, and diplomatic mission?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Cornyn, I think that I resisted these comparisons initially when people said this is like the Cold War, it is going to be as long as the Cold War and as difficult as the Cold War, in the immediate aftermath of September 11. Increasingly, I think it has all those characteristics and then some, and it requires all the elements of national power, as the President has said over and over again, including military, including intelligence, including law enforcement, including diplomacy, including economic assistance—all of those things working hand in hand, reinforcing one another.

The fact is that one of the biggest successes in the intelligence-law enforcement arena in this war on terrorism was capturing the mastermind of September 11, Khalid Sheik Mohamed, in Pakistan.

I would note, by the way, for those people who say we were diverted by Iraq, it was done the month before Operation Iraqi Freedom that we captured this villain.

But we would never have gotten him in Pakistan if he were still hiding in Afghanistan, if they still had that sanctuary. It is important to take the sanctuaries away from these people. At least in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, it could not have been done except by military means.

But then we see the case of Libya, where the military without doing anything plays a critical role in supporting diplomacy, which achieved an enormous amount, in part thanks to some great work by the intelligence people that uncovered what Qadafi was doing.

So all these things have to work together. That is point number one. Point number two: I really do think, if there is a single lesson from September 11, to me it is that we cannot wait until after the fact to find the perpetrators of events, of terrorist acts, and either bring them to court or bring them to trial, or if they are foreign countries punish them with some kind of cruise missile retaliation. We have to do preventive action.

Preventive action in the last resort may sometimes be military. But when I say "preventive action," I mean on a very broad scale. I think one of the most important kinds of preventive action we could be undertaking as a country, and we are starting to—I would like to see us do more—is to help countries like Pakistan that are trying to redo their education system, so that instead of breeding terrorists in these madrassas that preach nothing useful and a lot of hatred, young poor Pakistani children can go to a school where they learn how to succeed in the modern world.

So all of those instruments are necessary. It is a very broad effort. It is a big mistake to suggest that it can be narrowed.

Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Senator.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. My time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. We thank our witness.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Wolfowitz, I am a little confused about the development of the security forces within Iraq. It was my understanding that what we were going to do is build up the Iraqi security forces, therefore we could take down our presence militarily because of the increasing capacity of the Iraqis to support themselves for their security needs.

I thought I just heard you say that by staffing the Iraqi security forces we would make it safer and we would be able to do that. Then I thought I heard you earlier say that they were having trouble because they needed stronger leaders and they need to fight for Iraq and they need more and better equipment. I am a little confused about that, but I suspect you and I can resolve that, that confusion.

What I would like to do is to give you an idea and see how this fits with where the plans for the Iraq political transition would fit in. I have been advocating for some time that at the point of handover on June 30 that the new sovereign government at that point would ask the U.N. to help with this transition, this governmental transition from the interim to the transitional and then the

constitutional government, by helping them develop and carry out free elections; and that the new sovereign government would then ask the NATO countries to come in and NATO as a group to come in and provide security—not the United States asking for another U.N. resolution.

We have not had a great deal of success in getting other countries to come in and I do not believe we are going to get the U.N. to come in until there is security. It seems to me that we can decide the chicken or the egg here and we say that both have to be accomplished at the same time, the U.N. come in and NATO come in, which I hope would reduce our presence, which I am going to ask General Myers to give us some idea of what additional NATO forces we might receive.

I thought I heard that the administration's approach, from Secretary Grossman, is for us to ask for U.N. help. I have met with ambassadors from Germany and France and run this by them and they did not make any commitment, of course, but they did not say no to considering whether if the new Iraqi government would ask, which would be different than an occupying force or an occupying presence such as the United States represents right now, which is creating some of the consternation between us and other countries.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Some good questions. If I could go back just briefly and see if I can clarify what may have sounded like confusion. I do not think it is. I think the difference lies in when Iraqi security forces can actually assume the role we would like to see them assume.

I would also like to stress, the most important thing is not so that we can reduce our numbers, although that is clearly something we would like to do, but even more important so that we can have Iraqi forces out in front and on the streets. Just to give you one important, obvious example, if you have to go into a mosque because it is being used as a military base, and we have had that happen, having Iraqis go in and do that kind of work is much, much better.

Senator BEN NELSON. Are they doing that?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. They are in some cases, and in some cases we do not have them. As you might expect, the results are generally better when they can do it.

Now, we never thought that by this April they would be ready to operate independently, and the report Senator Reed was asking about was in fact stimulated by my concern that things were not moving as fast as they should have. I think we have found through General Ikenberry's efforts some ways to speed things up, and it is important.

But particularly when in some cases they were literally out-gunned by the enemy, then it is not surprising that they had problems. There are other problems, leadership problems, training problems. I think it is the right course. We should not—we should push it, we should push it faster. We should not assume success until we have success.

On the question you asked about other countries, and particularly NATO and NATO countries, contributing, Ambassador Grossman or General Myers might want to add to this, but I think, first of all, one reason why we would very much like to see this transi-

tion take place on July 1—and I cannot stress enough times, from a political point of view the last thing you want is to be undergoing a transition like this in the middle of an American political season. But from a military point of view and an Iraqi security point of view, the sooner you have an Iraqi government that can ask allies to come in, the better off we will be. The sooner we have an Iraqi government that can try Saddam Hussein, the better off we will be.

So that will be a step forward, number one. Number two, I do think there are quite a few countries who are not going to come in until it is safer to come in. They may say it is the lack of this or the lack of that or this U.N. resolution or that. The fact is this is not peacekeeping; it is combat. Until it becomes peacekeeping, a lot of countries are probably going to still stay on the sidelines.

Finally, some countries have real capabilities and others do not. The country that has the potential to have real capability is Iraq itself. In pure numbers they are now the largest member of the coalition. In number of people killed in action, it is over 250 Iraqi police and Civil Defense Corps and Army have been killed fighting for a new Iraq.

Senator BEN NELSON. In the line of action?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the line of duty, since June 1. It is second only to the United States. It is not a number I want to see grow on either side, but they will probably—who knows. I should not predict. But they are up there fighting. The better we equip them, the better we train them, the more they will be fighting. It is their country; they should fight for it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

I wonder, Secretary Grossman, would you like to contribute to this important question?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, just in a—

Senator BEN NELSON. If I might ask, it was because I heard you say that we would secure a U.N. resolution as opposed to the Iraqi government doing it. That is what caused me some confusion about the timing.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator Nelson, if I could, I think as we have all of us here today paid tribute to those people who are contributing in Iraq, I think it is worth noting that, although the U.N. left in large numbers after the murder of Brahimi, I give great credit to the people who, on behalf of the U.N.—United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program—local Iraqis have continued to work. I think it is worth saying that, in terms of our immunization program and our food programs, without UNICEF, without World Food Program, we would not be able to accomplish that task.

Second, I think that it is important to know that the Iraqi Governing Council, along obviously with the CPA, invited Ambassador Brahimi to come back. It is the Iraqi Governing Council that has invited this very admirable Ms. Pirelli who works on elections for the United Nations to come back.

So I agree with you completely that I would hope that in the 1st of July a new interim authority, a new interim Iraqi government, would be very much welcoming further United Nations help and support, and we will be there with them.

In terms of seeking a Security Council resolution, I would imagine from all that I have heard from Iraqis they would seek—they

would welcome a Security Council resolution. But I do think that that is some of the responsibility that we take on as permanent members of the Security Council. So I think if we drive forward for it, it is a good thing for us, I am sure Iraqis will support it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. I just observe to one of your responses, Mr. Wolfowitz, the sooner the Iraqi government gets in the sooner they can invite other nations to join. But let us make it clear from what you said, once they join and contribute forces, it is the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, that has control over the use of those forces. Am I not correct?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. We can repeat it multiple times. It is very important.

Chairman WARNER. Everybody talks about giving sovereignty. You look at the definition, it is everything. It is sovereignty, but the security remains clearly within the control, as we have stated, with the U.S. President on down.

Senator Dole.

Senator DOLE. Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been charges that the war on Iraq took our focus off of al Qaeda and the war on terror as a whole. Just like you, Mr. Secretary, I found the memo written by captured al Qaeda operative Zarqawi to be very interesting and compelling. In noting concern that the Mujahadeen may lose its foothold in Iraq, he wrote:

“There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking and the grip around the throat of the Mujahadeen has begun to tighten. With the spread of the army and the police, our future is becoming frightening.”

Can you elaborate on this memo and its significance, please?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is pretty amazing. When I first read it I wanted to make sure that we were absolutely certain this was not some forgery that someone had presented to us hoping to get paid for it or otherwise manipulate us. I have been assured multiple times that, no, the circumstances of our obtaining it were that we captured it off of a senior terrorist who was carrying it, I think in the form of a computer disk, from Iraq back to Afghanistan, and it was in response to apparently a query from Mr. Zarqawi's al Qaeda friends in Afghanistan as to whether they should send people to Iraq.

I think it is important to emphasize, since it is a strange name and, even though Secretary Powell spent some time talking about Mr. Zarqawi at the U.N. in February of last year, I am surprised how often people are completely unaware of who he is. He is not some local figure. He ran a terrorist camp in Afghanistan, a training camp, for a number of years when bin Laden was in charge there.

We use the word “al Qaeda-associated,” I think primarily because we are not sure about whether he has formally pledged allegiance to bin Laden, whether he to some extent runs his own operation. But it is a substantial operation. It is credited with being involved in planning terrorist plots that were broken up in London, in Paris, and one that was pulled off successfully in Casablanca.

He is a world terrorist. He has murdered probably, we believe, our diplomat in Jordan, Ambassador Foley. He is wanted under a warrant in Jordan for attempting to assassinate a senior Jordanian official. In fact, when the Jordanians went to the Iraqi government in 2002 to ask to have him extradited, he miraculously just disappeared.

This man, we have been surprised, frankly, at the extent of his network in Iraq or the size of it. It is not a few tens. It seems to be at least some scores of people.

But what is most striking in that letter that you cite is the length in which he describes this sense of desperation. He even uses the word "suffocation" at one point, in part because—and I think I quoted it in my testimony and I will paraphrase it—the Americans, he says, the most cowardly of all peoples, are not going to leave no matter how many wounds they suffer.

It is interesting. Though he calls us cowardly, he understood that we are not. He understood that we are not leaving. Therefore he lays out, his strategy has to be—and he seems to have a sense of desperation that he needs to do this before there is a sovereign Iraqi government, although he does not use precisely that phrase.

The strategy has to be to promote chaos and division in Iraq by attacking four targets he identifies: the Iraqi security forces, the Kurds, the Americans, and most importantly the Shia. That seems to conform with both the attacks we saw in Irbil, two suicide bombers who blew up some 150 people in an horrific incident; and then, even more significantly, the attacks on the Shia population in southern Iraq.

I think that the exposure of that letter plus our offensive operations that have captured by now more than 30 of his people may have set him back. The exposure of the letter I think helped to make sure that the Shia understood that if there were more bombings he was the man responsible.

I guess I would just like to conclude with this point, the only comment I would make on Senator Sessions' eloquent intervention earlier. One of our great assets I think is the sheer evil of our enemy. They attacked us on September 11 believing that we would be divided and that we would retreat. They failed. They attacked Indonesia and Bali, believing this would cause the Indonesians to waver and weaken, the Australians to pull out, because mostly Australians killed. They failed.

They attacked synagogues in Istanbul and the British Cultural Center in Istanbul, thinking that this would divide Turkish Muslims from Turkish Jews and Turks from British, and they failed.

With the unfortunate exception of Madrid, they have failed time and time again. In Saudi Arabia, May 12, they attacked an American compound, residential compound, in Saudi Arabia. It has led to the largest, most successful crackdown on al Qaeda that we have—up until May 12 we were not successful in getting the Saudis to undertake.

Most importantly, they have attacked innocent Iraqis, innocent international aid workers, innocent Kurds, Shia, and Sunni alike in Iraq, and I think they are failing. But we have to keep at it to make sure they do.

Senator DOLE. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I would like you to respond to another quote, please. This time, George Shultz in an excellent opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal just recently, and I quote: "The most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for the tactic of violence in Iraq. The message is that the United States and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the takeover of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations, including the developing of awesome weapons for threats, for use, for sale, behind the shield of protection that statehood provides."

Would you comment on the significance of this statement as it relates to what you have seen in Iraq and what you are seeing?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think I remember reading that whole article.

Senator DOLE. Excellent.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could add it to the record of this hearing. It is, as most things that George Shultz does, it is a terrific piece.

[The information referred to follows:]

An Essential War

Ousting Saddam was the only option.

By George P. Shultz

Monday, March 29, 2004 12:01 a.m.

We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terrorist threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states

also interact with each other--bilaterally or multilaterally--to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and political development; and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful pre-emption. Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack as hideous as they are--witness what just happened in Madrid--the U.S. must be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable harm.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic. They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world

where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.

About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth country in the region.

That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.

That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation--Desert Storm--to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed out.

When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."

Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and produced his weapons and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all necessary force" against Iraq--an authorization that at the end of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled--would be reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.

In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the inspection effort.

By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N. resolutions.

In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to 1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December 1998.

But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days--apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.

So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.

From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.

President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions--a long line of them--to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.

That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on--and on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining the U.S.--a position that seemed to emerge from

France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was impossible militarily, politically, and financially.

Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:

- There has never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interests in ways that defy and endanger the international state system.
- The international legal case against Saddam--17 resolutions--was unprecedented.
- The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N. inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international peace and security.
- Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse, or otherwise deal with his arsenal.
- He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N. resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his compliance.
- President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, the original bases for military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization within the international system. In the end, it was the U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.

The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material--and of how we discovered these developments before they got completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in

this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened."

When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons."

Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations—including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale—behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

Sept. 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network.

If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

Mr. Shultz, a former secretary of state, is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This is adapted from his Kissinger Lecture, given recently at the Library of Congress. Copyright © 2004 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In my less eloquent way, let me just say I think what he points out correctly is that you cannot go after terrorist networks and ignore what states do to support terrorism. I mentioned earlier in my testimony this division of the Iraqi International Service called M-14 that was the so-called Anti-Terrorism Section. It was not anti-terrorism. These are the people who developed over many years the kind of explosives expertise that was then handed off to terrorists. These are the people who conducted their own assassinations, who today in Iraq are allied with terrorists.

To simply say, well, Saddam Hussein harbored Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas, but they were not al Qaeda, it seems to me ignores the basic point that, given what we saw on September 11 and given what we know terrorists might do with even more terrible weapons, we simply cannot afford—we have to have a zero tolerance policy. We can no longer afford to have states in the business of using terrorism as an instrument of national policy.

Hopefully, we can get the world to change without having to undertake one military operation after another. But I think there is no question, as Secretary Shultz says in that article, that what happened to the Taliban and what happened to Saddam Hussein is a very salutary lesson for other states that may be tempted to continue on that course.

Senator DOLE. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Books like this are amazing to me, how high-level people will reveal their supposedly top secret information or disclose proceedings at the highest level meetings. I guess my colleague Senator Reed has left, but if we want to get some of these documents he was requesting from the Deputy Secretary of Defense I think we should ask Mr. Woodward to get us copies, because he seems to get everything quite readily.

But one of the other insights I got from reading through this is that—I and I think the people who elected me and sent me to Washington delude ourselves that we have some, in the Senate, some legitimate and constitutional role, and then to find out how contemptuously we are regarded in the executive branch, starting with the President himself, who was quoted as saying here in a meeting where Senator Levin, who was then the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, referenced some deep concerns that the U.S. military had just prior to the resolution. The President said: "It would be nice if they"—meaning the military—"expressed their reservations to the President, rather than just someone in the Senate."

But it goes beyond that. In my reading of this book, it goes clearly into the duplicities and the deceptions that were, and misrepresentations, that were made to Members of Congress. Those who want to look at—those who are preventing others of us from looking at the misuse of intelligence information before the congressional resolutions were adopted and thereafter should look at what was said, according to the quotes in this book, to Members of Congress by highest administration officials, that are even more emphatic in their representations of intelligence information that turned out to either be erroneous or intentionally misrepresented.

I find it just horrifying. So when we get into these matters of the lack of legitimacy for anyone to question anything that has been decided, anything that has been done or has not been done, anything that has been represented, that has been found to be totally untrue, and find once again, as we have in other times in history, that anybody who raises those questions is guilty of either failing to support our Armed Forces, whose heroism is beyond belief and description, which we all recognize—and those of us who have been there, who have seen them, have talked to their families, those who are over there now, who are anxiously awaiting to find out whether their loved ones are coming back alive or not, those who are not coming back at all, those families—to have it be suggested that any of us here lack that support because we are raising questions about what decisions were made and what pretexts were given for entering into this war and what has transpired since and what happened in the last weeks—and the statement at the conclusion, Mr. Deputy Secretary, of your remarks that if they, meaning the—well, I will read the whole paragraph here:

"The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat along side the coalition is also colored by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we will not see them through to a new constitution, an election, and

strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal with those who would shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock solid."

Mr. Secretary, I can only speak for myself. I am not going to presume to speak for others. But my commitment to their freedom is rock solid, my commitment to our troops is rock solid, and that is exactly why here we should have had the opportunity, and we have had very limited opportunity, to find out the realities of the military situation. Rather, we have been given a series of just glossy overstatements of what transpired over the last year and how bad Saddam Hussein is, which we know.

The fact that there are not any weapons of mass destruction and that our Armed Forces are now, as the ranking member said, suffering greater casualties than at any other time—what we hear is that, well, he is a really bad man, he is a really really bad man.

That is not the point here. The point is we have a right to know and we should be told what is going on over there in factual terms, in military terms. I have sat through now most of the last 3 hours and watched other parts of it on television to find out that virtually nothing has been said. So I find this extremely disappointing, but I find it a continuation of this attitude that Congress is just to be duped and basically led along to this and the less that is presented to us that we can actually know what is going on the better, and as long as we can be led to believe whatever suits the purposes of those who are carrying this out then fine, just ignore us or lie to us or use us in whatever way you possibly can get away with. I find it just abhorrent.

I would like to ask General Myers one question regarding the transition that is described here, the political transition. What is the military equivalent of that? We have had our troops over there. We have seen the first evidence of the Iraqi security forces, how they have responded and failed to respond, and I gather it is a mixed situation over there in the last couple weeks.

What is the Iraq military transition for our Armed Forces getting out with a victory, the victory that we all want secured, the freedom we all want secured?

General MYERS. Senator Dayton, what we are going to be doing simultaneous to that—and if you go back, I think the chart goes to—well, we can see; we can look at April there. We will stand up shortly this new Multinational Force Iraq, that's what it is going to be called. We are going to have an overall—the coalition commander will be U.S. It will be General Sanchez that will be overall responsible for security in Iraq.

Below him he will have a couple of significant offices. One will be the tactical commander, that is Lieutenant General Tom Metz. He and Sanchez are working side by side right now, and General Metz will take the tactical situation. Then we talked about General Petraeus coming over to work the office of I think security transition we call it now—I think that is right—which will work the equipping and training of the Iraqi security forces, police on through border patrol—important functions.

Throughout that organization will be woven Iraqis who will be part of the police and the new Iraqi army and all those other Iraqi security force entities, will be woven in that. It is envisioned that this commander of the Multinational Force Iraq will be very close to our chief of mission over there, that they will be a team that will work those issues that they are going to have to work together, because there is going to have to be a lot of collaboration, as there is in Afghanistan with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barnow. They have offices that are essentially feet apart, 20, 30 feet apart.

Senator DAYTON. General, excuse me, but my time is limited here. Sir, we are given here the political transition through 2006. This is the Armed Services Committee. I would like to know, what is the military transition through 2004, 2005, 2006 as it affects American forces, because, as Senator Collins and others have said, we have a lot of people back in my State of Minnesota who want to know when their men and women are coming home.

General MYERS. Right, and I was going to get to that. I was talking about the command and control structure, which is very, very important to our military transition, and if we do not do that right we are not going to—

Senator DAYTON. All right, I accept that. I apologize.

General MYERS. No, I was too long, I guess.

Our forces will continue. We are looking at the next rotation of forces and the rotation after that and, as we have done between the first rotation and the one we are currently in, trying to stretch this out so it does not all occur in one lump of time. We are looking at those forces that will support it out into the future, certainly as far as that chart goes.

Obviously, we do not have perfect clarity on the forces that are going to be needed in 2005 and 2006. So we are planning for that. We are basing that on estimates that we get from General Abizaid, and as we get closer and closer that will be further and further refined. But we are planning for a presence there to help with security throughout that period.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I would ask that, either in the closed session or subsequently, we get some statistical representation of what that transition is going to look like, please.

General MYERS. We would have to do it in closed session.

Senator DAYTON. All right. Thank you.

Senator SESSIONS [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Dayton.

Senator Ensign.

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all three of you for sitting through quite a long session. These are very, very important times and important questions to have answered.

I believe very strongly that the only way that we lose in Iraq, Afghanistan, really this whole global war on terrorism, but especially right now in Iraq, is if we lose the support of the American people, if it is a political loss, if the American people somehow are not behind the President, behind Congress, in support of what is going on over there. The reason I say that at the beginning is because the politics of what is happening here in the United States

affects the support of the American people, and there are comments that have been made, as a matter of fact—and I want to get your sense of the political comments that are made here, how it affects the military operation and the morale of the terrorists and the insurgents over in Iraq.

Recently, I think Senator Kennedy even said that “Iraq is George Bush’s Vietnam.” Two days later, al-Sadr declared that, “Iraq will be another Vietnam for America and its occupiers.” Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Press Office warned “A fate more horrifying than Vietnam awaits America in the morass of Iraq.”

With those kinds of statements following the statements made in the United States, I believe in free speech as strongly as anybody, but I also believe that there is responsibility with free speech, especially when we are in critical times.

How does that affect what is going in with our military and the whole military strategy in Iraq?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Ensign, I guess the way I would answer—and I am actually glad I have an opportunity to comment on a couple things Senator Dayton said—we simply cannot allow the enemy to deny us the right to hold free debate. Our men and women out there in the front lines are fighting so that we can have a free country and a country where we debate freely, and I think everybody in that debate has to think about what their proper role is.

But what I have said, I said it clearly in my testimony, I applaud what Senator Lieberman said. I think it is very important that we do what we can to send a message to the enemy that, do not confuse American debate for American weakness. I think that is critical.

Senator Dayton, the reason I talked about the nature of the Saddam Hussein regime is because that is still the enemy. We are still fighting them. They are still threatening Iraqis in a way that is part of our challenge. It is not getting into old debates.

As far as I know, everyone was working off the same intelligence. I think it was Senator Rockefeller actually who characterized the threat as imminent, which is not a characterization I would have used. I do not think anyone is, to use your words, lying or deliberately misrepresenting. I think we are trying our best. Sometimes we do it publicly and sometimes we do it in classified sessions. I think on virtually a weekly basis we have had classified briefings to this committee or to the full Senate on the nature of the operations in Iraq.

There is no question that part of the battle there is an information warfare battle. When those people took those four American bodies and burned them and strung them up, they had Somalia on their minds, I am sure. They probably told each other, “This is Mogadishu all over again.”

But I think we are winning, as that letter from Zarqawi makes clear. We are not leaving. He knows we are not leaving. It is suffocation for him. Some of what we are seeing—I do not mean to diminish it. We are all very concerned about the level of sophistication of the Fallujah-based attacks.

Let me—Senator Dayton, if you think we have not been talking about the character of the military operation, let me just say I

think we have been. We are trying to say Sadr is a very different kind of problem, both militarily and politically. He is a marginal figure with not very capable forces. In the Sunni heartland we are dealing with a different problem where politically we are not comfortable with our position vis a vis the Sunnis and where militarily we are now facing an enemy that at least stands and fights in squad and occasionally company-sized units.

But I think that the end result of this action is going to be to set them back further.

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Secretary, if I just may interrupt very quickly because I do not have a lot of time. I want to get to another question.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sorry.

Senator ENSIGN. I appreciate the free debate that we have in this society and I think it is very important that we have that free debate. I just think that it needs to be emphasized that there is responsibility with that debate. Part of that, as you said, is that when we are debating to emphasize once again that that does not mean that we are going to back down from what is going on.

We do not want to have what happened in Spain, where terrorist attacks decide what happens internally within the United States. We are free and independent. We debate, but when we go overseas we are united in our purpose to defeat terrorism.

Now, a question on the oil—

Chairman WARNER. Senator, we have to make it pretty brief.

Senator ENSIGN. Okay, this is going to be a very brief question and maybe I can get it in writing. Two quick questions and I will take the responses back in writing.

One is on the Oil for Food program that we had and the corruption involved with the Oil for Food program. It has to do with countries that were involved at the U.N. Security Council level with the Oil for Food program and the corruption that was involved. Could we have at any time, in your opinion, ever gotten their support? I mean, there is this talk of more internationalizing the efforts in Iraq. Could we have—was there any way to get their support?

The second question has to do with the drug problem that we have going on in Afghanistan. I asked this, it was in a classified session but it was not a classified question, I asked this last year on the drug problem and the support of terrorism. Last year there was not a lot of import put into this, and I thought at the time that it was one of the biggest problems that we had in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world, in supplying the money to the terrorists.

At that time, as a matter of fact, there was not a lot of import put on the question. So I would like the response—whether it is in a classified response I am not sure. But the bottom line is how much money is from the drugs and also what is our strategy for aggressively dealing with that.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Can we reply for the record, but if I could make a quick comment on this?

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is serious about addressing the narcotics problem in Afghanistan. The growing narcotics trade is endangering the U.S. and coalition success in Afghanistan and corrupting the governmental institutions we are trying to build. We are addressing the problem in two areas. First, we are working with U.S. Central Command, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and U.S. Embassy Kabul to quickly review and improve our strategy. Counternarcotics is a major piece of our overall strategy for Afghanistan. Second, we are participating in an NSC-chaired interagency working group to improve the implementation of an integrated U.S. counternarcotics strategy. In both areas, we are working closely with the U.K., which is the lead nation for the counternarcotics effort. DOD representatives communicate with U.K. representatives on a daily basis in Afghanistan and on a weekly basis here in Washington.

Secretary Rumsfeld was in Afghanistan on August 10 and his discussions with Afghan, U.S. and U.K. representatives focused on the narcotics problem. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics Mary Beth Long was in Afghanistan earlier developing the details of the problem with the Afghan Minister of Interior and his police chiefs; the U.S. Central Command staff in Qatar; the Commander, Combined Force Commander-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and U.S. Embassy Kabul.

But we are not just talking. Thanks to your support for the \$73 million supplemental funds last year, DOD is:

- Assisting the Afghan National Police, Highway Police and Border Police with personal and communications equipment and refurbishing 14 provincial police stations.
- Providing tactical and narcotics related training and equipment to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Afghan Counternarcotics Police to establish an urban interdiction force.
- Providing a mix of 4-6 refurbished and leased MI-17 helicopters to the Afghan Minister of Interior for police interdiction operations.
- Developing an Afghan narcotics information fusion center for the police, to include equipment and training.
- Refurbishing and constructing the Spin Boldak border crossing point on the Afghan-Pakistan border, a major smuggling route.
- Developing an Afghan Minister of Interior public outreach program to communicate a government message in support of counternarcotics activities.

U.S. forces have instructions to seize and destroy narcotics and related material during the course of normal military operations, when the situation permits. U.S. forces occasionally come across refined narcotics and take appropriate action, in accordance with guidance issued by the U.S. Central Command.

As we work with the U.K. to implement the above near-term initiatives, we will also focus attention on the long-term approach. To that end, it would help if Congress would reconsider the Department's request to expand the coverage of the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Appropriation Act authority to train and equip Afghan military forces to include Afghan police forces, as well as the Army. Although we have this authority in our counternarcotics program, that program does not have sufficient funds to undertake a large security force training program.

Chairman WARNER. It is a very important question and I associate myself with that question.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Then go to Mr. Grossman on the second one.

On the first one, just very quickly. I think the notion that—I cannot predict what France might have done if we had waited 6 months or 12 months or 18 months. But the notion that we would not lose anybody by waiting is wrong or at least not knowable. I think if we had had this May 12 bombing in Riyadh not after the liberation of Iraq and after we were able to tell the Saudis we were going to finally take our Air Force out of Saudi Arabia after 12 years of bombing Iraq out of Saudi Arabia, we might have had very different results.

We had some people who were with us in critical ways in that war who could have been shaken by any number of events. So the

notion that if we had simply waited we would have had more people I think fails on both counts.

Ambassador Grossman might say something on the counter-narcotics.

Mr. GROSSMAN. If I might just very quickly, first of all I would be glad to try to answer the question in specifics on the numbers because I think it is very important. But I think you make an extremely important point, Senator, which is that drugs fuel terrorism. I have testified in this committee on a number of times about what we are doing in Colombia. Two years ago we started to call people what they are, which is narcoterrorists. There is not a separation there. Around the world, as you say, particularly in Colombia, but I think in Afghanistan, we will find there is this connection. I would be glad to answer the question, but it is something we take very seriously. They are narcoterrorists and we ought to call them that.

Senator ENSIGN. Just real quickly, Mr. Chairman, the reason I brought that up as a question is because my question last year is, why are we not going all out with the military against, for instance, in Afghanistan. We are more limited in what we can do in Colombia, but we are not limited in what we can do in Afghanistan on these poppy fields. Obviously we are limited in what we can do in Pakistan. But once again, Afghanistan is someplace where we have our military there to affect a great deal of the drug trade, and I just did not see a huge effort going toward that.

Chairman WARNER. That question needs to be answered. Now, I am going to have to ask you to do it for the record—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will do it for the record.

Chairman WARNER. —because we have colleagues here.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are increasing our effort, is the short answer.

[The information referred to follows:]

Although the narcotics economy has plagued Afghanistan for nearly a century, it grew significantly after Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and continued apace throughout the 1990s, as provincial, warlord-dominated governance prevailed in a country without any strong, central governing authority. Since the fall of the Taliban, even though general political and economic circumstances are stabilizing, impoverished Afghans continue to produce and trade all forms of opiate products. The country's weak security environment and limited enforcement capabilities have also allowed narcotics production and trade to continue. In 2003, Afghanistan produced three-quarters of the world's illicit opium, approaching historically high production levels.

We do not know to what extent al Qaeda profits from the drug trade in Afghanistan. We have anecdotal reports of drug trafficking by elements aligned with al Qaeda, but there is no evidence that such activities are centrally directed. We remain concerned, however, about the possibility that substantial drug profits might flow to al Qaeda and continue to be vigilant for signs that this is occurring.

The involvement of anti-government Afghan extremists in the drug trade is clearer. In 2002, U.S. troops raided a heroin lab in Nangarhar Province linked to the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin and officials from the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) report that the Taliban earn money from the heroin trade. Based on the information available, however, we can neither quantify how much these groups earn from the drug trade nor can we determine what percentage of their overall funding comes from drugs.

In addition, extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan may sometimes turn to the same network of professional smugglers used by drug traffickers to move personnel, material, and money.

Along with the international community, we have been working closely with President Hamid Karzai and the GOA to create permanent interdiction institutions and strengthen criminal law enforcement. President Karzai has declared a "jihad"

against the narcotics economy—focused on growers, refiners, and traffickers—stating that “Narcotics is one of the things which threatens our dignity, our economy, our agriculture. It threatens our government and our roots—and it is against our religion. . . This is a widespread jihad which covers the entire country.” Our recent successes include a tripartite counternarcotics campaign that integrates law enforcement, poppy eradication, and alternative economic development as a substitute for drug cultivation. We are also working with the GOA to establish a national eradication force that effectively targets the drug industry and its links with extremist groups.

Chairman WARNER. I cannot overemphasize the importance of that question, because I asked it when I was in Afghanistan just weeks ago.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Secretary Wolfowitz—and General Myers, if you would add to this question—I would like to ask some questions about our forces, our force requirements and force deployment tempos. One of the things that DOD has been looking at for the last few years is whether we can reduce the burden on our forces by decreasing our participation in some longstanding operations. Obviously, our actions in Iraq have really eliminated the need for Operations Southern and Northern Watch, and we have drawn down on our participation in the Balkans.

My question is are there other longstanding operations that we are looking to cut back on? If so, which are they?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Akaka, we are looking carefully at our entire global footprint, as we call it, to make sure that, particularly given the stresses on our forces and what it costs to deploy them, that we do not just mechanically proceed with the force posture that we inherited at the end of the Cold War.

I remember when I was in the Pentagon the last time, leaving in 1993, that we had 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 in the Asia-Pacific region and it seemed like that was a reasonable position to start from post-Cold War, but that I thought over the next 10 years we would probably reduce some, especially in Europe. To the contrary, we found our troop levels in Europe going up.

Some of that does not make sense. I think it can be adjusted. The world has changed enormously. At the same time, we have no intention of abandoning our fundamental commitments.

I give you one more example. Korea is a case where, one of the most important security commitments that we have, to the security of South Korea. At the same time, we have looked very closely. We are convinced that we can do what we need to do in many ways, redeploying our forces, investing more in them so they are more capable, and ultimately making some adjustments in the numbers. So the commitment remains, but how you fulfil the commitment changes depending on the threat and the circumstances and what your forces can do.

General MYERS. Senator Akaka, I would only add to that that, besides the Balkans and the areas that Secretary Wolfowitz mentioned, one of the reasons we are such an effective Armed Forces is that we exercise very rigorously, and that is one of the areas that we have actually cut back on during these times because of the tempo on our forces.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I? Remembering that you are from the State of Hawaii, I think it is an opportunity to stress, my own view is that one area of the world where there is a lot that can go wrong if the United States disengages is this huge vast area, the Asia-Pacific region, where we have some of the most rapidly growing, biggest, potentially most powerful countries in the world.

I think as we adjust our footprint, I just really want to make it clear, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, we are very mindful of the fact that American engagement in that region is a key element of stability and we do not intend to abandon it.

Senator AKAKA. General Myers, General Pace last week said that he has evaluated force requirements for continued operations in Iraq for years out into the future and that we can maintain planned force levels, and I quote him, "for as long as we need to." I am reassured by his comments, of course, but have a few follow-up questions about our ongoing commitments.

One of the questions: How long do you expect that we will continue to need a force of 135,000 in Iraq?

General MYERS. That is—I am sorry.

Senator AKAKA. I know that your position is that we can sustain this force level indefinitely, but I am wondering about what this does to the deployment tempo of our forces, both active and Reserve. Can you tell us how often a given active or Reserve member, say an infantryman for example, would expect to be deployed versus how long they would be at home under various scenarios? Likewise, besides the infantryman, a helicopter pilot or a logistician?

Another question is what do you expect the Reserve component participation to be in Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and 4 if we continue at the current level, force levels?

My last question is, what expectations do you have about force requirements in Afghanistan?

General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Akaka. We talked about Senator Dayton's question about how long we predicted, that we planned for. As you said, we cannot determine exactly what the requirements are going to be. They will be driven by events on the ground. Lots of factors to go into that. We listen to General Abizaid and General Sanchez currently on their predictions.

For planning purposes, like most reasonable people I think, we tend to be very, very conservative in our estimates. We are not—we do not put a very optimistic face on it. We say, okay, if we are needed what is the maximum number of forces that might be required. Then we try to source for that. That is the process we are in right now.

To your question about how often, for active duty we hope that those forces that are deployed will have at least a year back home before we would have to use them again. That is for active duty.

For Reserves, we call them up for a maximum of 2 years. Most Reserve Forces—some will serve 2 years, as we talked about with Senator Collins, or even over that in a fairly short period of time. But for the most part, the majority of our forces, Reserve Forces, will serve up to 2 years. They will not all serve 2 years. Some will be released earlier. It depends on how long it takes to mobilize them and demobilize them, and that is almost unit-specific and mission-specific to that unit.

Again, we would hope they would be mobilized for 2 years and then our rule of thumb is—and it is just a rule of thumb—is that we would not mobilize them except once out of every 6 years, would be our approximate estimate.

The force requirements in Afghanistan. Again, the situation in Afghanistan I think is actually pretty good. We have a major NATO commitment in there. NATO wants to expand its role in Afghanistan. Good coalition partners. We have about 13,000 U.S. forces there right now. We bumped them up just recently because of the upcoming elections and the fact that this is the time of year when we generally see an increase in incidents by the Taliban or former al Qaeda and we have to be ready to thwart that.

We have actually changed our tactics in Afghanistan. We are very active in those areas in south and southeast Afghanistan. Every day of the week basically we have soldiers out there humping their packs and walking the ground to make sure that that threat is subdued and does not emerge.

Now, everything I have said are rules of thumb. There is nothing in concrete about any of those, because the overriding issue is, just for the same reason that we extended forces in Afghanistan—or in Iraq here recently, was that the mission will dictate what we have to do. We have to keep coming back to this, I think in my mind. This is a very serious threat. It is a threat to our way of life and the things that we stand for.

It is this generation of members of the Armed Forces that are going to play a major role, not the only role certainly, but a major role in combatting that threat. I will give you a couple of examples. I was flying on a 130 to Mosul last Thursday night and the navigator was a Reserve lieutenant colonel. He had been promoted to colonel, but refused to put on the rank because if he did they would send him home. He says: Nope, I want to serve.

When I got to Mosul, I am in the hospital in Mosul. Unfortunately, there had been a mortar attack. Three individuals were injured. I went in the hospital, I met a doctor. He is going to celebrate his 40th year in the Armed Forces here this month. He was a brigadier general and they needed his skills in Iraq, but they said: You cannot go as a brigadier general. He said: Okay, I will take that rank off; what do you want to make me? They said: We will make you a colonel. He is over there serving.

We will have our rules. We will try to provide predictability. We are as aware and as concerned as anybody about taking care of this force properly. They are working hard, but the threat, the threat requires it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator, General.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. That is very interesting.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you. Your stamina has been exhibited here today at great length and we appreciate that.

Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying I agree with something that our colleague Senator Lieberman said when he indicated that we are all committed to success. The stakes on the up side are sig-

nificant, the risks on the down side are significant. There is no substitute for success. I agree with what he had to say there.

Secretary Wolfowitz, I agreed with two things that you said in your opening statement: first, your commendation of our military men and women for their heroism and their idealism. I found the letter of that young Marine you read to be quite moving.

Second, with regard to the—well, let me move on. I agreed with what you said with regard to that. Oh, I know what it was. The second thing, with regard to the historic magnitude of the malevolence and the evil of the former regime in Iraq. I do not think that there can be any serious debate about that. It is a good thing that Saddam is gone.

Saying that, there are some growing concerns about the efficacy of the political transition and whether some of the problems that we may be experiencing there are imperiling all the good that we hope to do for both the Iraqi people and the cause of freedom in the world and ultimately for our own security.

So with that in mind, after 3½ hours of listening, I have two questions. First, how do we define, how do you define, sovereignty, the sovereignty that we will be conveying to this new interim entity, particularly when it does not come, as it cannot come under current circumstances, with responsibility for security? Most importantly, how does the truncated sovereignty that we are transferring create—and here is the point I want to emphasize—legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people? Because ultimately it is not sovereignty that we hope to transfer, it is legitimacy that we hope to create, because it is only legitimacy that will ultimately enlist the Iraqi people in the cause of establishing their own freedom and their own independence.

So I am somewhat concerned that we are elevating expectations that may be somewhat disappointed, that could lead to disillusionment and ultimately to opposition.

If I could just conclude by saying, with regard to my first question, in some ways we may be trying to have it both ways. We are saying we are transferring sovereignty. That is significant, that is big. But at the same time we are saying, well now, we have to understand the real mission of this interim entity is really quite limited; it is to set the stage for elections, which are in fact interim elections, held at the end of this year, and the real elections will not be held for a year after that.

So how does this sovereignty that we are transferring lead to legitimacy, which at the end of the day is critically important to our success?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Bayh, if I could compliment you, not only for your stamina, but for a terrific question. It does not have a simple answer. I think there is a basic tension here, which is you need to set people's sights not at the ceiling, but above the floor. I would go back to some comments I made too, that there are a lot of countries in Eastern Europe now that are properly described as democracies, but they still have a long way to go even to get as far as we have gotten, and we are not perfect.

So when we use those words about Iraq, we use them with some recognition of how challenging it will be. But at the same time, I think we need to go in a step by step way that does not just stop

at, well, anything, anything that is not the old regime is good enough for us. I do not think that can be the standard.

Now, I will add one more problem to the questions that you put on the table about this interim authority, and I have mentioned it earlier. That is, in addition to the questions you asked, we have a real challenge I think particularly with the Sunni Arabs, in getting them convinced that they have a real role in the future of Iraq. They have to understand that role is not the old role. If they think that they ran Iraq—and I am not sure they really do; I think they know Saddam Hussein ran Iraq. But if they think it is still winner take all and they would like to be the winners and take all, that is not the story. But it cannot be winner take all either that the Shia, just because they are a majority, are going to run the government in Baghdad and everyone else is going to have to do what they say, the way they did in the old days.

I think a significant part of the answer to that comes out of our own constitutional—constitution, our political process. That is to say, more local control, more decentralization. It is a country that has been centralized, unfortunately, for a lot longer than just Saddam Hussein. The more people believe that they can run their own affairs, I think the more they will accept the overall situation.

This government that will come in on July 1, part of its effect is going to be based on its being purely temporary. It is not going to be broadly legitimate and Iraqis are going to stand up and cheer and say, this is my government. Hopefully we will get a little bit of bounce from that. But most importantly—and they will run ministries, they will run the police force, in coordination with CENTCOM because this is not a normal police situation.

But most importantly, they will be setting up elections. As you remember, we were in this uncomfortable position for the United States of having to argue last fall against elections because it was not timely. Well, it is going to be timely. I mentioned in my testimony we have seen some local elections in southern Iraq that apparently worked.

Senator BAYH. Would you forgive me for interrupting.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sure.

Senator BAYH. I do not mean to interrupt, but I do have the one other question and I am about to run out of time.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Go ahead.

Senator BAYH. Basically, the legitimacy ultimately that we seek will more than likely—we have a greater chance of achieving that in either the interim elections or the ultimate elections than this sort of interim—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a step by step and it will grow over time.

Senator BAYH. I am concerned that we may have elevated expectations either within our own country or perhaps there, and disappointment is not a helpful thing.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If you can help us calibrate expectations, that is a good thing.

Senator BAYH. My second question is somewhat related, and it has to do with the degree of popular support for our role and what we are trying to do. I am interested in your concern about the potential for Iraqi nationalism to at some point trump their gratitude

for the liberation and their hopes for the future, because as long as we are only fighting the remnants of a despised despot we will ultimately win. As long as we are fighting outsiders who are there and no friends of the Iraqi people, we will ultimately win. But if at some point this morphs into, as I understand it did to the British in 1920 in some respect, a broader sense of Iraqi nationalism and we are on the wrong side of that, then the task becomes much, much more difficult.

So I am particularly—we heard the polls cited and those are obviously important. So I am interested in your concern about that, what if anything we can do to keep that from happening, and some disconnect between the polls and what we read in the popular press in our own country. I would just cite as one example the Washington Post story of Sunday where it says:

“The crisis has stirred support for the insurgents across both Sunni and Shiite communities, has also inflamed tensions between Arabs and Kurds. ‘The Fallujah problem and the Sadr problem are having a wider impact than we expected,’ a senior U.S. official involved in Iraq policy said. The effect has been profound. The insurgency appears to be generating”—this is not a quote now, just from the story. “The insurgency appears to be generating new alliances and tensions among the major sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.”

Just two final things: “The crises have helped boost the standing of more radical Shiite and Sunni political leaders.” Finally and perhaps most disturbingly: “The extent of popular support for the resistance is unclear. In nationwide surveys taken before the sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing percentage of Iraqis said that they saw the U.S. forces as occupiers, not liberators.”

I am concerned that at some point this may tragically morph into the bad guys being aligned with Iraqi nationalism, and what can we do to keep that from happening? Is it your sense that that is in fact a real danger we are confronting, as at least this anecdotal information or at least some of the reports in our press suggest that it may be?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Even though I think some of that anecdotal information is overstated—and it is amazing how quickly people 8,000 miles away will conclude after 2 days about some trend in Iraq—nevertheless, that basic concern is very real. It has been something that has concerned me, concerned General Abizaid, concerned everybody who is dealing with this issue from day one.

What General Abizaid calls “consent,” which we had on a large national scale on April 9 of last year, starts to slowly slip away. How long you hang onto it, no one knows. But because you know you do not hang onto it forever, it means it is very important to accelerate the governance process. That is why I believe it was the absolutely right thing to bring about this transfer of sovereignty. If anything, I would have preferred to see it even earlier.

Second, it is why it is so important to do things like restoring electricity. It is not only jobs for people but it is the sense that the Americans really meant what they said, because the enemy propaganda out there, just so you know, is: The Americans are going to leave; we are coming back; they just came here to steal your oil and be gone. If the electricity does not work, it sort of plays into that conspiracy theory.

There are two specific phenomena in the recent troubles that are troubling and are referred to in those anecdotes. One is with respect to the Sunni community, where we have troubles to begin with. The impression created that we are creating wholesale civilian casualties is terribly damaging, and the lies transmitted on Al-Jazeera—and I use that word deliberately. It is not a matter of how you balance the news or which things you choose to cover. They absolutely make up stories about American use of cluster bombs, American torture, absolutely fabricated out of whole cloth.

Those lies, combined with the unfortunate truth that there are civilian casualties in a fight like this, is one of our challenges and one of the reasons for working with the Governing Council in trying to find a solution in Fallujah that at least minimizes the violence, even if we cannot avoid it completely, is critical to that community.

With the Shia, I think it is a different story. Whatever that allusion was that the radicals are getting more traction, what I actually see is that we are seeing more and more evidence that most Shia think this fellow Sadr, although his father was a hero and a martyr and that is part of his standing, that he is a gangster. On the other hand, they do not want us marching into the holy city of Najaf with foreign troops to take him out.

So the restraint that we are showing I think in dealing with him I think is paying dividends. It is an information warfare battle, as the military says. It is two different fronts, very different fronts. I would not want to say that we have won it, but I think if we are careful we can come out of this ahead.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, my final just brief comment, two sentences. This is a very difficult situation. If the consent necessary to our being successful is a diminishing asset and the legitimacy ultimately necessary for keeping that consent from diminishing, but in fact increasing, does not occur until next January, in fact a year from next January, we need to avoid a tipping point at some place in there to make sure that we are ultimately successful and the Iraqis are, too.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, I would like to also say I associate myself, and earlier in this hearing my first question was on this question of sovereignty. The dictionary—this is the dictionary definition: “supreme and independent power or authority in a state.” I think we take note in this hearing of the concern in myself, the Senator, and perhaps others. I think we should start using the term “limited sovereignty” at this time, rather than kind of saying we are transferring sovereignty. I really feel strongly we could be raising expectations and problems in the future if we do not be careful right now.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. I agree with the chairman and Senator Bayh. I think that this is a serious issue, because it is not only the possibility that the definition will take on a life of its own, causing all kinds of unintended consequences, but that in fact the earlier questions that the chairman raised about the rules of engagement for our military and the authority that they have following this period

of sovereignty, however one defines it, I think are going to be very sticky.

Then you throw into the mix all these private contractors running around, heavily armed, I think it becomes even more of a challenge. So I believe, Mr. Secretary, you have gotten, at least from some of us, a concern about what this means, how it is going to be operationalized.

I just have, one suggestion would be to look for some tangible way to demonstrate the benefits that flow from this interim period to individual Iraqis. You said in passing that one of the concerns we have to address is the efforts to undermine our legitimacy and our role in Iraq by not only making up stories about actions that never occurred under our military control, but also this whole idea we are there to steal the oil.

When I was in Iraq, I spoke with Ambassador Bremer. I have raised this in other settings. I really urge the administration to look at ways that we could demonstrate clearly that the results from increased production of oil in Iraq are going to benefit individual Iraqis. I am not an expert on this, but back in the days when we opened the North Slope of Alaska for oil exploration the State of Alaska, in conjunction with I think the Federal Government, created a trust fund for the Alaskans. Literally checks were sent out to Alaskans, saying: This is your land; it is being exploited; this oil is going all over the world; but you are given a stake in this future.

When I raised this with Ambassador Bremer, I said: Trust is in short supply. As we know, consent and trust are essential ingredients for success in this undertaking. We need to do something and we need to be in the process of doing it before sovereignty, however it is defined, takes over and all kinds of deals are cut, because I am deeply concerned about those in the Governing Council and those who might be on any expanded transitional entity, who seem to be making out quite well, and that will further undermine legitimacy.

So I raise it again. I hope that something, if not that, can be looked at as a means of demonstrating both our commitment to the Iraqi people in a tangible financial way and also removing some of the sting of this idea that we are there to steal the oil.

General Myers, as you may recall, during several hearings before this committee I raised the subject of medical tracking and surveillance of our troops. Both on February 13 and on February 25, 2003, I asked what efforts were being taken regarding medical tracking and surveillance and follow-up care. I also requested and received a briefing from the DOD on the proposed medical tracking plan for troops being deployed to Iraq.

I came at this issue in large measure because of my concerns about the problems that many of our veterans had after the First Gulf War when they returned home and had a syndrome of undiagnosed illnesses which at first were, frankly, dismissed, chalked up to all kinds of personal stress-related issues, and then only gradually taken seriously, and then finally we were able to secure veterans benefits for a lot of those troops.

Now, I raise this today because of the troubling treatment of members of the 442nd Army National Guard MP unit out of Orangeberg, New York. My staff and I have met with members of

this unit and they have a very disturbing story to tell. Specifically, 12 of them were med-evaced out of Iraq for various injuries—fractured feet, problems with HMMWVs rolling over, all kinds of action-related injuries. But they were also suffering similar symptoms to those that we heard out of the First Gulf War: dizziness, headaches, sleeplessness, cramps, blood in their urine, blood in their stool.

Yet when they went to the Army to ask for testing, they were given the run-around. They became concerned about possible exposure to radiation because of information they were given by Dutch personnel who were stationed near them during their time in Iraq. Based on some tests that the Dutch medical personnel did of the place they were assigned to be, including using radioactive detectors and other devices to test the environmental exposure, the Dutch said they were leaving, they would not stay there, and they moved their troops to another location.

Several of the members of the 442nd who were medics were in ongoing discussions with the Dutch, who were telling them: You should move, too; there is all kinds of problems here. There were bombed-out Bradley fighting vehicles and other equipment that had been dragged and dumped there after the military actions and other kinds of issues that, at least in the minds of the Dutch, as it has been reported to us, caused them to act.

So when these men returned home and kept trying to get somebody to talk to them and were not given much of an answer, they went to a New York newspaper. They went to the New York Daily News with their concerns, and that newspaper paid for testing and their blood was tested, being sent to Germany, which had some advanced equipment.

The results came back saying that several of them had elevated levels of radiation exposure, and they attributed it to exposure to depleted uranium. Whether or not that is the causation I am not here to suggest. But my bottom line is that I think our troops deserve better.

I have already requested another briefing on medical tracking, especially with respect to radiation exposure, which we hope to schedule soon. But I think this raises a red flag for me, because I had hoped that we would not make the mistakes we made before. I now, on further investigation, have learned that we have hundreds of troops sitting at Fort Dix who have ongoing medical complaints and ailments, and they are basically being given two choices: sit there—some have been sitting there for months, Mr. Chairman—sit there and wait to be given an appointment at Walter Reed or an appointment at someplace else; or go ahead and sign this document and leave the military and do not worry about it.

Some leave. But others are saying: Wait a minute; I want to find out what is wrong with me; I am not going to leave; I want treatment.

So, General, again I would ask that you take whatever action is necessary—and Mr. Secretary as well on the civilian side—to ensure that, first, these members of the 442nd get whatever going is appropriate and necessary; that we take a hard look at these radiation exposure numbers back; that we use the more advanced testing techniques that are available in Germany and Japan, but

which our military are not currently using. The tests that we are using for exposure to uranium or radiation is not as specific as the tests that are being done in Europe and Japan, and that we try to make sure that the plans for medical surveillance, tracking, and treatment that I was told about are actually implemented.

Specifically, I would appreciate a report about what is happening at Fort Dix. I do not know, but I am concerned by the story. We heard a lot of anecdotes today about how great everybody is feeling about their mission, and I am glad to hear those anecdotes. But I am increasingly hearing a lot of anecdotes about how poorly people are being treated when they return home.

So, General, I would like a very specific report as soon as possible on the 442nd, on conditions at Fort Dix, what the Army and the rest of the services intend to do about radiation exposure, other kinds of environmental problems that may be contributing to some of these symptoms.

General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and you are absolutely right. We have to do a first class job of taking care of our troops. We will look into the Fort Dix situation. I have not—I do not believe I have seen those reports, but we will look into that. That is very important.

In terms of the 442nd, my understanding is we have tested some of their members through urine samples, which is the way I guess you detect things like the depleted uranium and so forth. We have not found anything. I will look at the differences between European testing, Japanese testing, and our testing.

But you are right, we need to monitor and make sure we do not overlook things that could cause them problems later on. That is a very important part of our responsibility. So I will get you those two reports.

Senator CLINTON. I would look forward to that and a continuing effort to keep me informed about what we are doing on this medical testing and surveillance. I do not want to go through what we went through after the First Gulf War.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I appreciated Secretary Wolfowitz's response to Senator Cornyn about the many tactics that we should employ with respect to the war on terrorism. I especially appreciated what you said about education. I spoke this morning to the Council on Foreign Relations and urged that we place universal education on a much higher priority than we have heretofore. I will be introducing legislation to try to better position our own country to do just what needs to be done with respect to education.

I share your concern about the madrassas. I spoke with President Musharraf when I was in Islamabad, and I feel strongly that we need a system that can leverage public support and private support. I also obviously am concerned about investing in girls' education because it is still the smartest, best investment with respect to promoting democracy and stability, and girls still face enormous obstacles.

So I would welcome the support of the administration in my Education for All legislation. I would welcome the support of members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. Even if we could not be immediately successful this year, it would send the kind of

statement that, frankly, I think we are in some need of sending to the rest of the world, that we are not only pursuing military action, not only recognizing the need for intelligence and law enforcement, but that education and health are critical components in our leadership in the war against terrorism and on behalf of freedom.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Clinton, I agree with you. I think women are one of the most important forces for progress and moderation in the Muslim world, for fairly obvious reasons. Actually, in Iraq they are a substantial majority because of the unfortunate killing that took place over the last couple of decades. They are critical allies.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Clinton, I would like very much to work with you on that issue of education. I share that. I will bring to your attention some interesting research I have done on the subject.

Secretary Grossman, would you like to respond? Please do so.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I do not want to hold up the show here. But I hope that you might also take for the record some information I would like to provide to Senator Clinton on what is going on with women and girls, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

[The information referred to follows:]

AFGHANISTAN

Since overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has implemented more than 175 projects for Afghan women aimed at increasing political participation, building civil society, creating economic opportunities, and increasing access to education and health care.

Nearly 4 million Afghan children are enrolled in school. About 37 percent of those enrolled are girls, many more than at any point in Afghanistan's history. Since 2001, the United States has dedicated \$60.5 million for primary education, to construct schools, to train teachers, and to provide books and supplies. Nine public libraries in eight provinces are participating in a campaign for women's literacy.

The United States has allocated \$2.5 million for the construction of Women's Resource Centers in 14 provinces throughout Afghanistan, and is building three other provincial centers. In Kabul and nearby towns, the United States supports the establishment of 10 neighborhood-based Women's Centers. These centers will provide educational and health programs, job skills training, and political participation training to women. Through the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council, the United States is providing \$1 million in educational training at the Centers.

In addition, the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, on behalf of the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council, will be awarding grants to U.S. public and private non-profit organizations which responded to a recent Request For Proposals to support a series of exchanges and training programs promoting women's political, educational, and economic development in Afghanistan. These programs will be carried out in partnership with provincial Women's Resource Centers in Afghanistan.

On electoral assistance, the United States is providing \$15 million for voter registration, and \$8.86 million for elections in Afghanistan, including civic and voter education, focus group research, training for political parties, and civic activists. The United States also provided training in political advocacy for female delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003.

As media and journalism training is also important in building a strong civil society, the United States has provided more than \$500,000 to train female journalists and filmmakers, some of whom produced "Afghanistan Unveiled," a film documentary about abuses against women by the Taliban.

We have financed healthcare programs in Afghanistan totaling more than \$58 million, with \$50 million forthcoming over the next 2 years. These programs include: construction of women's wings in hospitals and dormitories for female medical students; curriculum development for healthcare workers; and maternal and child health, family planning, and nutrition. The United States has rebuilt 140 health clinics and facilities, and will rebuild 400 more over the next 3 years. We have pro-

vided basic health services to more than 2.5 million people in 21 provinces; 90 percent of the recipients are women and children.

IRAQ

In Iraq, the United States has strongly supported Iraqi women's participation in the political, economic, and social reconstruction of their country. As in Afghanistan, our efforts are guided by the Iraqi women themselves. The United States has dedicated \$27 million to projects that specifically help women and children.

In March, Secretary Powell announced two new initiatives aimed at helping women in Iraq: a \$10 million Women's Democracy Initiative and the U.S.-Iraq Women's Network. The Democracy Initiative will extend grants to non-governmental organizations to help Iraqi women acquire skills and develop practices for effective participation in public life. Grants will include projects on democracy education, leadership, political and entrepreneurship training, indigenous NGO coalition-building, and media initiatives. The Network is a voluntary public-private partnership to forge links between U.S. and Iraqi women's organizations.

The U.S. Agency for International Development's civil society program for Iraq supports organizations that promote women's political participation, legal enforcement of women's rights, and equal access to public services. The program seeks to increase the ability of civil society organizations to educate both women and men and advocate effectively for women's legal, economic, and political rights.

The United States also supports the rehabilitation and equipping of 11 regional Women's Centers throughout Iraq. These centers offer education, literacy classes, job skills, education and training for financial independence, and access to information regarding health care, legal services, and women's human rights.

We are also working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and Members of Congress, in cooperation with the House Iraqi Women's Caucus and Members of the Senate, on plans for an Iraqi women's training program in Washington, DC. The program would feature sessions on public service and advocacy, including how to be a public servant and how to run for office.

As of December 2003, the United States has committed \$86.8 million on school projects. Emphasis is placed on ensuring equal benefits for Iraqi women and girls. The Accelerated Learning Program, a pilot program established in five Iraqi cities to provide out-of-school children a second chance for education, has increased registration among schoolage children—especially girls. Regarding higher learning, Iraqis are participating in the Fulbright Program for the first time in 14 years. The first group of 19 men and 6 women included representatives from all major ethnic and religious communities in Iraq.

After years of neglect under Saddam Hussein, Iraq is beginning to modernize its health services. Women's opportunities in the health professions and maternal and child-care receive particular attention. Through a master training program, more than 2,000 primary healthcare providers are being trained to treat and prevent a range of medical conditions. A review of the training program has shown that doctors' skills have improved significantly, especially in women's healthcare. A grant to the Iraqi Nursing Association will facilitate the recruitment and training of hundreds more female nurses and will fund purchases of new uniforms and nurses' kits. The United States has contributed to a \$2 million program to address emergency health needs, including the completion of 18 primary health centers and the training of more than 97 midwives and 247 health promoters in Najaf and Karbala.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I was not quick enough after Senator Sessions spoke and General Myers responded, to just thank General Myers for noting the role of the State Department in the creation of the Iraqi police force. I just wanted to let Senator Sessions know that we are committed to this, that we are committed to support that mission, that our training people in Jordan, training we are doing in Iraq, the money that Congress has given us, is something we want to absolutely support, and that is part of our mission as well and I wanted you to know that.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

I say to my witnesses, do you feel there is any issue that we have covered today—and we have covered a great many issues in what

I think is an excellent hearing—that you felt that you needed another minute to address any particular point?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think one thing I would like to do for Senator Levin is get back to him as quickly as I can, first on his request for information that he said he had been looking for for months; and what I was trying to reconstruct from memory about those briefings, because I want to confirm that my memory is accurate.

Chairman WARNER. I think you made that clear.

Senator Levin wanted to take a minute or 2 on the record here.

Senator LEVIN. On that issue, I appreciate your looking into the delay in obtaining documents that were promised long ago from Mr. Feith. I will put into the record now the letter which he wrote to me, which is now 2 months old, promising those documents and promising them on a rolling basis as they were collected, so that he did not have to collect them all before he sent them, but as they were collected he committed to send to me, through the chairman as a matter of fact and to all the members of the committee through the chairman, these documents that have not been forthcoming. So I would like that to be made a part of the record, and I appreciate your follow-up on that.

[The information referred to follows:]



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

FEB 26 2004

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-8050

Dear Senator Levin:

I have your letter of February 18, 2004, responding to my letter of February 3, 2004.

Five Categories of Documents Requested

Your letter of November 25, 2003 requested five categories of documents. The first and second categories were "all documents relating to the establishment, functions and responsibilities" of (1) the Office of Special Plans ("Special Plans") and (2) the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group ("PCTEG"). The third category was "all documents produced by" either Special Plans or the PCTEG, "including but not limited to all documents related to debriefings by Defense Department personnel of Iraqi defectors assisted or made available by the Iraqi National Congress, and any reviews of or contributions to documents produced by other agencies." The fourth category was a list of all personnel working for, assigned to or supporting Special Plans or the PCTEG, including their positions and the beginning and ending dates of their employment. The fifth category was "all communications from personnel in" either of these offices to the CIA, DIA, State Department, National Security Council, the Office of the Vice President, or the Office of the President.

Categories 1 and 2 (Organizational Documents)

On February 3, 2004, I sent you all the documents I know of that relate to the establishment, functions and responsibilities of Special Plans and the PCTEG.

Category 3 (Documents Produced by Special Plans or PCTEG)

Regarding the part of the request that focused on defector debriefings: As I explained in my February 3, 2004 letter, no one in the Policy organization of OSD, so far as I know, debriefed defectors or anyone else. All such work in DoD was and is done by the DIA. You may want to address to the intelligence community the part of your request

done the same month. The briefing to the DCI led to a discussion about the intelligence community reports mentioned in the briefing, also in August 2002, between two OSD staff members and various analysts from CIA and DIA. The briefing was also given to staff members of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President in September 2002. Again, I repeat, all of the intelligence discussed in this briefing was collected and vetted by the intelligence community through normal channels.

The PCTEG-prepared second classified briefing I am enclosing, which is entitled "Understanding the Strategic Threat of Terror Networks and their Sponsors." While this briefing is not limited to Iraq, it does include information on Iraq and its links to several terror networks, including al Qaida. As you will note from the detailed source citations in both briefings, each briefing was based exclusively on information that had been received from the intelligence community, i.e., through normal intelligence channels.

I am also enclosing a copy of my February 13, 2004 letter and its enclosure to Senator Rockefeller, responding to several questions for the record he sent me regarding my July 10, 2003 testimony before the SSCI. Several of my answers to his questions provide further details on work by the PCTEG and others in my organization aimed at understanding the significance of information they received from the intelligence community about links between Iraq and terrorists. I am sending all the documents mentioned in my answers to Senator Rockefeller to the SSCI, with a courtesy copy to the SASC.

Category 4 (List of PCTEG and Special Plans Personnel)

The fourth category of documents you requested was a list of all personnel working for, assigned to or supporting Special Plans or the PCTEG, including their positions and the beginning and ending dates of their employment. We continue to believe that providing such personnel information is not a good practice and risks interfering with the candid flow of advice from staff members to decision makers, as I explained in my February 3 letter. But I am in this instance willing to provide the SASC and SSCI the requested information in the interest of putting to rest the false claims that have been made about these offices' activities. However, I trust the committees will work as hard to ensure that policy professionals are free to present their views without fear or intimidation, as I know you work to ensure that intelligence professionals have the same intellectual freedom.


Category 5 (Special Plans and PCTEG Communications)

The fifth category of documents you requested was "all communications from personnel in" either of the offices in question to the CIA, DIA, State Department, National Security Council, the Office of the Vice President, or the Office of the President. Consistent with the clarification you provided in your February 18 letter, we

shall give the Committees documents, in addition to those attached to this letter, reflecting communications from personnel of Special Plans or the PCTEG to any of the agencies and offices you mentioned, and relating to the role either office played in analyzing intelligence community information on Iraq, or (if they exist) that might have a bearing on the false allegation that these two offices bypassed normal intelligence channels.

With best wishes, I remain,

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator John Warner (with attachments)
 Senator Pat Roberts (with attachments)

Senator LEVIN. Second, just one comment. You made reference in terms of the briefings that were provided to the Office of the Vice President and the staff of the NSC and the difference between that briefing and the one that you received or the one that the CIA received. There were significant differences. It is not just one chart, and I think that you should want to clear up the record on that matter.

There were many charts that were added for the National Security Council staff and for the White House. There were perhaps 40 differences between, in the briefings. It was not just one chart—the one that was highly critical of the CIA—but many charts, including a key chart on any alleged relationship with Mohammed Atta and the Iraqi police at a meeting that was referred to as possibly taking place in Prague, but which the CIA is highly dubious about.

But there was a chart on that issue, according to published sources. I have to rely on published sources, but I have also seen the charts, on that issue.

So your statement about trying to minimize the difference is inaccurate. I would appreciate your comparing those briefings and just confirming for the record that there were significant differences or numerous differences between those two briefings, not just the one chart.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. You said that it is common for there to be conversations between staffs, discussions between staffs, as though this kind of a 20- to 30-slide briefing on intelligence matters by the DOD is something which was common. I would ask you for the record if you know of any similar intelligence briefing by a group inside the DOD with the Office of the Vice President or the staff of the NSC on intelligence matters?

This was a very structured, perhaps 30-slide briefing, handled by the Feith office without the knowledge of the CIA, and to kind of just casually way, well, these discussions take place commonly, is to cast this as an occurrence which is not unusual. If this was a usual occurrence, I would like to know if there is any other example you can provide us for the record of formal, structured, intelligence presentation to the Office of the Vice President, the National Security staff, by the Defense Department outside of the CIA channels. This was a presentation about CIA intelligence to those two very high-level offices.

If you could present that evidence, if you have any, for the record that would be appreciated.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. Finally, if you would tell us for the record whether you were aware of the classified letter from Under Secretary Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee dated October 27, 2003, providing answers to questions for the record, that was then reportedly leaked to The Weekly Standard. That was a very major leak and a very major document allegedly, because of what the Vice President said to the press on January 9, 2004, when he said that that Top Secret-Codeword document allegedly reported by The Rocky Mountain News was "your best source of information," to use the Vice President's words, on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

For the record, if you would tell us whether you were aware then of that classified letter from Mr. Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

That will take care of my questions for the record, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman WARNER. My quick round-up. I want to direct my thoughts to Secretary Grossman, and I appreciate your joining us today. This chart that has been displayed here, could you tell us the extent to which the United Nations was involved in formulating that, whether the Secretary General has—understandably, Dr. Brahimi has indicated this is basically his format. Has the Secretary General, so to speak, associated himself with the accuracy of this; and the extent to which the Security Council has reviewed this chart and, so to speak, gives their blessing to it?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, Senator, the chart of course comes from the TAL, which was designed by the Iraqi Council. So no, that was not something that the U.N. was involved in.

Chairman WARNER. No, but it was adopted I think by the Iraqi Council.

Mr. GROSSMAN. By the Iraqi Council, that is correct. That is their job. We were there, we obviously participated in that. But that is their document and a good document.

The TAL then laid out this process. Then what you had after the TAL was the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA write to the Secretary General of the United Nations and say: We need help, we need help here in putting together the interim government, and we

also need some help and some advice on whether it is possible to have elections, as the TAL originally talked about.

Brahimi has been there, Ambassador Brahimi has been there a couple of times—

Chairman WARNER. Speak into your mike directly. We are losing some of your voice.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Ambassador Brahimi has been there a couple of times and will go back the beginning of May. As I said, Ms. Pirelli has been there to help on the election side. So I think it would be fair to say—they would have to speak for themselves—that everybody has essentially adopted this time line.

We will have to wait and see. When Ambassador Brahimi reports to Kofi Annan, he will come out and say: Yes, I accept this—

Chairman WARNER. That is important.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely.

Chairman WARNER. That bridge has not been crossed yet.

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir.

Chairman WARNER. The Secretary General is reviewing this?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. Ambassador Brahimi—just a technicality—went to Italy after he was in Iraq, and he will be on his way to New York to make a report to the Secretary General.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually, Brahimi did help to negotiate the TAL specifically on the point that the interim government does not have to be elected. As you recall, that was the big point of dispute between the Governing Council and Sistani.

Chairman WARNER. That I understood.

Now, the Security Council, the extent to which they have given any views with regard to this?

Mr. GROSSMAN. They have not given views in regards to this yet, no.

Chairman WARNER. So the use of this chart today is I think much clearer now in my view, and I want to make that distinction for the record.

Lastly, Secretary Grossman, this issue which a number of us raised about the use of the word “sovereignty.” I think I am not mistaken. I followed the President’s press conference the other day very carefully. I believe he used the word “sovereignty” without any qualifications. Do you have some concern that expectations could be raised unduly if we do not start using phraseology which indicates very clearly that limited sovereignty at this time, or something? Because I do not find that what we are doing is consistent with the dictionary definition, nor with the common acceptance of the term “sovereignty” in international law.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, you asked us to take seriously what this committee has said today and we certainly will. But I think what Paul said earlier in response to a question is right, which is to say that there is limited sovereignty in Iraq certainly on the 1st of July, and it is limited by the—

Chairman WARNER. It is limited.

Senator LEVIN. Limited by what?

Mr. GROSSMAN. By the TAL and also by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511. It seems to me—my opinion about this is Iraqis, near as I can tell, have a vision for where they would like to take their society, and they realize they cannot get to that vision with-

out security, and they cannot get to security without the support of the coalition.

Chairman WARNER. I concur in that totally. I just think that in the use of the term on what is happening on the 30th we would be wise to employ some equivocation, or maybe not equivocation but some limitation on what the sovereignty is.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I take your point.

Chairman WARNER. Fine. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, just on that point, on whether the TAL binds a sovereign government, are you saying that the agreement that was arrived at without a sovereign Iraqi government being involved is binding on a sovereign, limited or otherwise, Iraqi government?

Mr. GROSSMAN. We certainly believe that it is binding on the government that will take over on the 1st of July.

Senator LEVIN. Can you give us the legal opinion on that? I think it is very important, these questions about—because it affects our status of forces, among other things; also the Iraqi group, the Survey Group, but a lot of other things. Could you give us the legal opinions on this issue that a number of us have raised, as to whether or not a sovereign government in Iraq is bound by the TAL, is bound by—and whether the U.N. resolution relative to the force that is there protects our force after July 1, 2003, to take whatever military action we determine is appropriate despite what the wishes could be of a sovereign government?

[The information referred to follows, along with a response from the DOD:]

United States Department of State*Washington, D.C. 20520*

JUN 24 2004



Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to follow up on issues you and Senator Levin raised with Under Secretary Marc Grossman at the April 20 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the transition in Iraq concerning the continued applicability of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) after June 30, as well as the extent to which United Nations Security Council Resolutions will provide a continuing legal basis after June 30 for Multi-National Force (MNF) operations.

At the time of the hearing, we were just beginning discussions on a new United Nations Security Council Resolution to address the transfer of power and the security situation in Iraq. As you know, UNSCR 1546 was adopted unanimously on June 8. We have prepared the attached analysis which directly addresses a number of your concerns and which I hope will be of assistance.

Please do not hesitate to contact me with any further questions regarding this issue. I look forward to continued consultations as we support the Iraqi Interim Government's efforts to bring stability to Iraq and organize and hold elections by January 2005.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Paul V. Kelly".

Paul V. Kelly
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable
John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Service,
United States Senate.

Iraq: Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and
UN Security Council Resolutions

There is broad recognition within Iraq and throughout the international community that Iraqis must continue a process of political transformation to remove permanently the vestiges of Saddam Hussein's decades of repression and tyranny. In this regard, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, adopted October 16, 2003, invited the Iraqi Governing Council to provide the Security Council with a timetable and program for the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that constitution.

In response, the Iraqi Governing Council adopted the November 15 Agreement. The Agreement laid out a timetable for the restoration of governing authority by Iraqis no later than June 30, 2004. In addition, the Agreement called for the adoption of a transitional law to govern Iraqi affairs until such time as a permanent constitution could be drafted by elected representatives of the Iraqi people and ratified.

The Law for the Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL), which was approved by the Iraqi Governing Council on March 8, and the TAL annex, which was adopted on June 1 following extensive discussions facilitated by U.N. Special Adviser Brahimi, are designed to create the institutional and procedural framework for this political transition after June 30.

The extensive consultations with the Iraqi people, led by Ambassador Brahimi and pursued in connection with the establishment of the Interim Government, were designed to develop an approach to Iraq's political transition that is acceptable to, and will be implemented by, all segments of Iraqi society. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, adopted on June 8, endorsed the formation of a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), as presented on June 1, and further endorsed the timetable for Iraq's political transition to democratic government as contained in the TAL and its annex.

We have every expectation that the framework for Iraq's political transition will be fully implemented by the Iraqi people after the end of the occupation and dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The interim and transitional institutions that are created and will assume authority after June

30 find their basis in the TAL and its annex and have been endorsed in UNSCR 1546. The political transition process reflected in the TAL has been the product of extensive coordination within Iraq, facilitated by the international community. The TAL does contain provisions under which certain of its provisions may be amended. To the extent that adjustments in Iraq's political transition process become necessary after June 30, we expect that those adjustments would be made by the Iraqis in consultation with key members of the international community, including the United States and United Nations.

With respect to our continued military presence, UNSCR 1546 reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under UNSCR 1511, and further decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the June 5 letters to the Security Council from Secretary of State Powell and Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi. Those letters set out, among other things, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and the tasks necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq's political future through violence, including combat operations against members of these groups, internment where necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq's security.

In addition, the TAL itself recognizes that UNSCR 1511 and any subsequent relevant resolutions – which now would include UNSCR 1546 – will govern the MNF's activities pending the conclusion of international agreements with the elected Iraqi Transitional Government regarding the activities of the MNF.

Development of an effective and cooperative security partnership between the MNF and the sovereign government of Iraq is critical to the stability of Iraq. As described in Secretary Powell's June 5 letter to the Security Council, the MNF commander will work in partnership with the sovereign Government of Iraq in helping to provide security while recognizing and respecting its sovereignty. To that end, the MNF Commander and his designees stand ready to participate in discussions of the Iraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) on the broad framework of security policy.

On the implementation of this policy, recognizing that Iraqi security forces are responsible to the appropriate Iraqi ministers, the MNF will coordinate with Iraqi security forces at all levels – national, regional, and local – in order to achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with the MNF. In addition, the MNF and the Iraqi government leaders will keep each other informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of personnel, resources, and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary. The MNF will work in the MCNS, and through other mechanisms for coordination that are created by the Iraqi Government and the MNF, on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between the MNF and Iraqi forces, through close coordination and consultation.

The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) is the supreme law of Iraq. The Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), the first phase of the transitional period, will have the power with respect to: making appointment of persons within the government; the use of the Iraqi Armed Forces; and, concluding international agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including Iraq's sovereign debt. However, it will not be able to amend the TAL. The annex to the TAL also states that the IIG, as an interim government, will refrain from taking any actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period. After elections are held and the Iraqi Transitional Government, the second phase of the transitional period, is in place, Article 3 of the TAL provides that "[n]o amendment of the TAL may be made except by the three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council."

Chairman WARNER. Those are the points that we have raised.

I think we need to get the legal opinions that support this. For myself, I hope it is true, by the way, so I am not questioning whether or not, the sufficiency of the wisdom. But we have to be comfortable that our forces in fact have that kind of power and are not going to be restricted by a sovereign government. Otherwise they are going to be in limbo. There is going to be a period of great uncertainty, which our troops should not be confronted with.

I would simply add, should there be some disagreement as to the conduct of say an individual soldier or a military person, what recourse could be taken against them, and how are we going to protect them in the performance of their duties.

While, General, you say quite appropriately the Iraqi army then becomes a partner, I would hope that they would not be issuing any orders. I am not sure what partnership means when it comes to the military. I want to make certain that U.S. commanders and to the extent the British commanders are associated in that chain of command, and coalition commanders, that is the chain. When we introduce the Iraqi army as a partner, I think we need clarification of exactly what that would mean on the command chain.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, we will get you that information. I think it is very important to have clarity, and I appreciate the opportunity.

I think it is also important to be clear, this is not something brand new. I mean, we have a similar situation in Afghanistan. The government, the sovereign government in Bosnia, has been constrained by Dayton ever since it was established. I do not want to make too much comparison. These are different situations. But with our NATO allies and with Korea, there are obviously provisions in wartime that transfer military command to U.S. commanders.

Chairman WARNER. I just want to make certain that those protections are in here, because you can use those as examples. In the 25 years I have been here, I have worked through almost all of those situations. But here we have 100,000-plus Americans involved and it is exceedingly important, and a level of insurrection which is most regrettable at this point in time and no certainty that is going to cease and desist on June 30.

Senator LEVIN. Would you include in that, please, what did the President mean, then, when he said the other night that we would be negotiating the status of forces agreement with the new sovereign government on July 1? What did he mean by that? If we already have a status of forces agreement under U.N. resolution and under the TAL, then what does that mean when he said that? If you could include that, it would be helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

Article 59 of the TAL provides that Iraq's Transitional Government, which will assume authority no later than January 31, 2005, following national elections, will be authorized to conclude binding international agreements (which could include a SOFA regarding the activities of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq under UNSCR 1511 and any subsequent relevant resolutions.)

We are currently planning to defer consideration of a negotiated SOFA with Iraq until the Transitional Government has been established. Pending entry into force of any future security agreement, the TAL recognizes that UNSCR 1511 and any subsequent relevant resolutions will govern the activities of the MNF in Iraq. Our view is that the "all necessary measures" language in UNSCR 1511 authorizes immunities from Iraqi jurisdiction to the extent such immunities are necessary for the fulfillment of the MNF's mission.

Chairman WARNER. My own view is I hope a lot of this is rewritten carefully not to rely on the U.N. resolution of October 3, 2003, that we really have a new resolution that will bring greater clarity to this entire situation, the status of forces and what degree of sovereignty Iraq will have on the June 30, 2004.

Thank you very much. We will now go upstairs to room 222. The hearing is adjourned.

[Additional information follows:]

Senator WARNER. Describe the role and powers of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq after June 30, 2004.

Mr. GROSSMAN. As Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG employees in country—except those under the command of the U.S. area military commander or seconded to an international organization. Working closely with the area military commander, the Ambassador will also be responsible for the security of the mission as well as the personnel (or whom he is responsible).

The Ambassador will report to the President, through the Secretary of State, and be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all USG policies and activities in Iraq—apart from those which fall under the authority of the U.S. area

military commander. The President has charged the Ambassador and the U.S. area military commander to ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.

Other responsibilities of the Ambassador will include the regular review of programs, personnel, and funding levels, and ensuring that all agencies attached to the mission do likewise. Every executive branch agency under ambassadorial authority must obtain the Ambassador's approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of its staff.

Additionally, all USG personnel (again, other than those under the command of the U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization) must obtain country clearance before entering Iraq on official business. The ambassador may refuse country clearance or may place conditions or restrictions on visiting USG personnel as necessary.

Finally, the ambassador must discharge all responsibilities with professional excellence and in full conformance with the law and the highest standards of ethical conduct, ensuring equal opportunity and tolerating no discrimination or harassment of any kind.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

LAKHDAR BRAHIMI'S PROPOSAL

1. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Grossman, the United Nations (U.N.) envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, proposed that the Iraqi Governing Council be dissolved when the United States hands over power on June 30 and be replaced with a caretaker government of cabinet ministers who would rule until elections are held. Under Brahimi's plan, the ministers, a president, and two vice presidents would be chosen by the U.N., in consultation with the U.S. occupation authority, the Governing Council, and other institutions. President Bush recently praised Brahimi's efforts. While this proposal is a fresh approach to the dilemma over Iraq's transition, it would effectively allow Iraqis less participation in the choice of the interim government than they would have had under the original U.S. plan to hold caucuses in each of Iraq's 18 provinces—a plan that was itself rejected by the country's top Shiite Muslim cleric for being insufficiently representative. Already, several members of Iraq's Governing Council have spoken out against a U.N.-appointed transitional government. We are only a couple of months away from the June 30 handover date and, currently, we still have no concrete transition plan. I understand the details of the Brahimi proposal are currently being negotiated. Can you update us on where these negotiations stand right now and give us an assessment of whether a plan is close to being finalized?

Mr. GROSSMAN. As we meet today, U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has returned to Iraq to resume consultations with Iraqis and U.S. officials to identify candidates for key positions—prime minister, president, two deputy presidents, and cabinet ministers. He is working to form a consensus among Iraq's communities on the structure, composition, and authorities of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). The U.N. has assumed a leading role in achieving key near-term political priorities—forming the interim government and preparing for elections. We expect the U.N. to continue to play a vital role on political and economic reconstruction after June 30.

This Iraqi Interim Government will be the internationally recognized, sovereign government of Iraq. Its legitimacy will derive both from anticipated Iraqi domestic consensus that it is the highest political authority in Iraq and expected international backing. The Iraqi Interim Government is a crucial, albeit transitional, step toward a representative, elected government—and its structures reflect the understood desire of the Iraqi people that only an elected government should have the power to decide the longer-term future of Iraq.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN IRAQ

2. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, I have a question on the security of radioactive sources in Iraq. This is an issue I raised with Secretary Rumsfeld in a hearing almost a year ago. I remain deeply concerned about the possibility terrorists could obtain radioactive material and use it to explode a dirty bomb. I received a response from the Defense Department in January, at which time I was told that all radiation sources, which total over 600, have been consolidated at a central location and

are under continuous guard. On April 11, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report that states that "there has been extensive removal of equipment and, in some instances, removal of entire buildings. Other information available to the Agency indicates that large quantities of scrap, some of it contaminated, have been transferred out of Iraq, from sites monitored by the IAEA." Could you comment on the IAEA report? Is radioactive material in Iraq secure or not and is some of it missing?

General MYERS. [Deleted.]

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]



