




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THE
VICTORIA'S COURT MARTIAL

BEING A SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

Malta Chronicle


AND

Garrison Gazette.

AUGUST, 1893.



PRICE SIX PENCE.





“VICTORIA” at Malta.

MEMORANDUM.

“It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an Officer, which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a moral impossibility.”

Duke of Wellington's G.O.
11th November 1803.

1. While an order should be implicitly obeyed, still circumstances may change, and conditions may widely vary from those known, or even from those that presented themselves at the time orders were issued.—In such cases the Officer receiving orders, guided by the object that he knows his Chief has in view, must act on his own responsibility.

2. (a) Orders directing the movement of Ships either collectively or singly are invariably accompanied, as a matter of course, with the paramount understood condition:—“With due regard to the safety of H.M. Ships.”

(b) When the literal obedience to any order, however given, would entail a collision with a friend, or endanger a Ship by running on shore or in any other way, paramount orders direct that the danger is to be avoided, while the object of the order should be attained if possible.

3. An Admiral leading a Fleet relies with confidence that while the “Order” of the Fleet is maintained, each Ship will be Handled and Piloted with all the care and attention that is exercised in the guidance of the leading Ship. He relies that this will be the case more especially when a Fleet is approaching Land or a Harbour. When a Tide or Current is experienced it is clear that a following Ship cannot be safely conducted by eye steering after a Leader.—rear Ships are liable to be swept by currents to one side or the other off the safe track, and the further they are off a Leader of a Column, the further they are likely to be from the true track.

4. Risks that are not only justifiable, but are demanded, during War, are not justifiable during Peace.

MANŒUVRING.

5. Ships following a Leader in Column should when Manœuvring avoid turning on a greater arc than that of the Leader; if there is any error or difference it should be due to turning on a smaller arc.

6. As a rule, when a Ship has turned wide on a leader, following ships should turn on the guide of their column, and not on the Ship that has got out of station and has to recover it.

7. When in line ahead any error from the exact station of a Ship should be, in the direction of being ahead of station, but when in line abreast any error should be in the direction of being astern of station rather than ahead of it.

8. The neighbourly duties of Ships in a Fleet to each other, are duties which must be kept constantly in mind.

G. TRYON.

VICE-ADMIRAL, AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

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The Victoria's Court Martial.

17th July, 1893.

At half past nine in the morning the Court Martial on the Honble. Maurice A. Bourke and other Officers and men of H. M. S. "Victoria" which was sunk by collision with H. M. S. "Camperdown," off Tripoli (Syria) on 22nd June, was opened on board H. M. S. 'Hibernia,' Flag-ship of the Admiral-Superintendent.

The Naval Discipline Act, clauses 91 and 92 enacts that on the loss of a man-of-war such ship shall not be deemed out of commission until a Court-Martial shall have been held. The Officers and men of the lost ship, or at least those of them who survive, are liable to be placed on their trial before one court, and are if necessary to give evidence, but no witness is to be obliged to give evidence which may be to his own prejudice by way of incrimination.

All the survivors of the ill fated battleship were technically prisoners, and were mustered on the main-deck of the 'Hibernia' shortly after 9 a.m. The summer dress white uniforms and helmets, was worn by the Officers, while the men had their ordinary blue serges and straw hats.

On the poop-deck, due preparation had been made for so important a trial, by stretching awnings over all, and placing a long table on the port-side, divided from the starboard by ropes and stanchions.

At the head of the table sat the President,

SIR MICHAEL CULME-SEYMOUR,
Bart.

Commander-in-Chief, of the Mediterranean Squadron.

having on his right

REAR-ADMIRAL TRACEY,

Superintendent of Malta Dockyard.

Capt. LAKE, Senior Officer at Gibraltar.

Capt. ALDRICH, H.M.S. Hawke.

Capt. JOHNSTONE, H.M.S. Camperdown.

Capt. KARSLAKE, H.M.S. Colossus.

Capt. HAMMICK, H.M.S. Triumph.

Capt. ACLAND, H.M.S. Edgar.

Capt. JEFFREYS, H.M.S. Hood.

also being members of the Court, and sitting in order of Seniority as Naval Officers.

Capt. A. L. Winslow was Prosecutor, and was seated at a small table to the right of the President, Mr. Rickard Secretary to Admiral Sir M. Culme-Seymour, acting as Judge Advocate, and taking his place facing the Commander-in-Chief, at the bottom of the table.

To the left of the Judge Advocate was seated Capt. Bourke who represented the other prisoners, and according to Naval usage, his sword was placed crosswise on the table. Close to him in a roped off space, the other survivors were stationed and one of the most pathetic incidents of the trial was the calling over of their names, to which all replied save one or two who are still in Hospital.

After the reading of the Admiralty letter ordering the Court Martial, Capt. Bourke objected to Captains Johnstone and Acland by reason of their having been present at the time of the collision, and also because they are summoned as witnesses by the prosecution. Both objections were considered in private by the Court, and allowed. Capt. Johnstone and Captain Acland consequently retired. Captain Langley, H. M. S. *Arctusa* and Captain Custance H.M.S. *Phaton* taking their places. The latter Officer, however, was objected to by Capt. Bourke on the same grounds, and on the Court allowing the objection, he retired.

Capt. Robinson, H.M.S. *Trafalgar* took the vacant seat at the table, and the Court was at once sworn.

Mr. Rickard read the despatch sent to the Admiralty after the disaster by Rear-Admiral Markham, commanding the *Camperdown*, together with the reports of other officers forwarded at the same time, which have already been made public. (1) A subsequent letter from Rear-Admiral Markham, dated July 1st her Majesty's ship *Nile*, from Tripoli, was also read. It contained the following additional facts not mentioned in the Admiral's first report:—"In my first report," the letter ran, "the time of the signal being made from the *Victoria* to turn 16 points was given as 3.23 p.m. I should have stated that this was about the time of the signal being hoisted down. It was hoisted at about 3.24 p.m. in reply to the signal made from the Commander-in-Chief to me by semaphore, 'What are you waiting for?' I replied that I did not quite understand the signal. While the *Camperdown* was keeping the signal to turn 16 points at the dip the *Victoria* showed *Camperdown* pennants as an indication that an acknowledgement of the signal was immediately required." The letter concluded with a table showing the order of the ships at the time of the catastrophe. (2)

The following additional letter addressed by Captain Johnstone her Majesty's ship "Camperdown," to the senior officer at Malta, was also read to the Court:—"In reference to the lamentable collision which took place between this ship and her Majesty's Ship *Victoria* on the 22nd ult., it is my painful duty to report to you some particular circumstances as follows: Firstly, the Fleet was in two divisions in line ahead, columns disposed a-beam to port, the *Victoria* leading the starboard division, and the *Camperdown* the port division. The columns were at six cables apart, and the ships were in column at two cables. Secondly, the signal having been made for the columns to turn 16 points inwards, the helms were put over, and the *Victoria* and the *Camperdown* turned towards one another. When the collision seemed imminent Admiral Markham gave the order, 'Full speed astern starboard engine,' and then, full speed astern both engines, the orders following one another quickly. The telegraphs were put over, and I am convinced that, according to my custom, I saw the telegraphs properly placed and the engine indicators moving after, which I turned for a moment to give orders as to, or see the work that was going on about the collision stations. Thirdly, on reading the engine-room registers, however, I found to my astonishment that only three-quarters speed astern, was recorded as having been then given. From the investigation I have made I fear that there is little doubt that

the engines on both sides actually put to three quarters speed only as stern, and not to full speed at the time of the collision. I can only conclude that the telegraphs did not show quite true, and were consequently misread in the engine-room. The different statements which I have collected show discrepancies, due, no doubt, to the suddenness of the affair and the rapid succession of events. But the fact, I believe, remains as I have stated it. I can only trust that in view of the very short time in which everything occurred the effect of the difference of speed on the ultimate result was not appreciable. Fourthly, the engine-room register did not in the usual course of events, come before me until the Thursday following the collision, and when I was on the point of sailing in this ship from Tripoli, and the fact of my not having mentioned the subject to the Fleet-Engineer—I having no suspicion of the actual state of the case—accounts for my remaining in ignorance. I now report the matter at the earliest possible moment."

Chief Constructor Newham was the first witness called. He stated, in reply to the Prosecutor, that when the *Victoria* was last in the dockyard the bands of her watertight compartments and scuttles were all in perfect order. He produced a wooden model of the *Victoria*, and another model of the bow of the *Camperdown*, showing where the latter vessel struck the *Victoria*, and how far she penetrated into her side.

Captain Bourke, who was next sworn, was cautioned that he was not bound to give any evidence to criminate himself. He said that the letters which had been read furnished a true statement of the sinking of the *Victoria*.

The Prosecutor—Have you any complaint to make against any of the surviving officers and ship's company as to their conduct on that ship?

Captain Bourke—None.

The Prosecutor, addressing the other survivors Officers and Men of the *Victoria*—Have you, or any of you, anything to object to in the narrative read, or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man on the occasion of the loss of the *Victoria*?

Officers and Men in chorus—Nothing.

In reply to the question whether he had anything to add to his statement before the Court dated June 22nd, Captain Bourke, after a few moments reflection, said—No general statement. I understand there might be some question as to the statement made by me in my letter of June 22nd about what the Chief Engineer told me when I was in the main passage. I stated then that, he told me that as far

as he could make out there was no water abaft the foremost boiler-room. That was intended to convey the impression that there was no water abaft the fore end of the foremost boiler-room. We were using the four foremost boilers, and, therefore, if water had flowed into the foremost boiler-room it must have been known to the Chief Engineer, as the fires would have been quickly put out. But to the best of my belief there was no water in the foremost boiler-room, and none abaft the foremost boiler-room bulkhead.

The Prosecutor—Can you produce the ship's log, the engine-room register, or the signal log?

Captain Bourke—No.

The Prosecutor—When on the 22nd of June, in the Admiral's cabin, at about ten minutes past two, the Staff-Commander first suggested that eight cables would be a better distance to form up in columns than six, did you personally say anything to the Admiral as to the distance between the columns?

Captain Bourke—No.

The Prosecutor—After the Staff-Commander went on deck did you remain in the cabin?

Captain Bourke—Yes. The Admiral, ringing his bell for an orderly, sent for the Flag Lieutenant. The Flag Lieutenant came down, and the Admiral gave him a signal written on a piece of paper, which I did not see, being at that moment looking out of a stern port into the stern walk. I did not see what the Commander-in-Chief wrote on the piece of paper.

After asking and obtaining permission to refer to his notes, Captain Bourke added—After the Flag Lieutenant left the cabin the Commander-in-Chief went and sat in the stern walk. It was then that the Flag Lieutenant came down to say that the Staff-Commander had told him eight cables was to be the signal, while he (the Admiral) had ordered six. I am now going to say something I did not put in my statement. I then said to the Admiral, or words to this effect, "You certainly said it was to be more than six cables." The Admiral then said to the Flag Lieutenant, "Leave it six cables," and the Flag Lieutenant went on deck. I was left in the stern walk with the Admiral, and I must beg the Court to excuse me, as I have no proof of any sort as to what did pass between myself and the Admiral. I must ask the Court to excuse my saying about what I said to the Admiral when in the stern walk alone with him. I have no proof of what I said, and, in the circumstances, I am afraid I must decline to make any statement.

The President—Do you say that on the

ground that you do not wish to criminate yourself?

Captain Bourke—No, I do not wish to have anything said about it at all. The subject was discussed between the Admiral and myself. I can go as far as that. The question is a very serious one for me, sir, and I must decline to make any statement. The only person I said it to, whatever I said, is gone, and he might have qualified any statement I might make now.

The President—I am afraid there is no option with you. You are before the Court, and you say everything to the best of your knowledge and belief. I am afraid we cannot take the view that you would rather not say anything because you have no proof.

Captain Bourke—The question was discussed between the Admiral and myself. It is very difficult.

The President—It is very difficult, no doubt, but I am afraid we cannot take that retort. If you refuse to any question on the plea that it tends to criminate yourself that plea will be admitted, but you are bound to answer any question put to you except on that plea. That is the law we have to carry out.

Captain Bourke—The interview was very short, and I went on deck very shortly afterwards.

The President—That is not the point. The point is, you are asked the question as to what passed, and there is no doubt that by the law, you are bound to say unless it criminate yourself.

Captain Bourke—I will go so far as to say, sir, that I reminded the Admiral that our circle was 800 yards. I won't say anything else. I then went on deck.

The President—I am afraid we must ask you to answer the question to the best of your knowledge and belief, unless it criminate yourself. You are before the Court on your oath, and everything that has to come out must come out. I am sorry to say so, but it is the law.

Captain Bourke—I give that as my answer, sir. After a moment's reflection, Captain Bourke added—I will amend my answer. I reminded the Admiral that our circle was 800 yards. He said the columns should remain at six cables. I then went on deck.

The Prosecutor—Is that all that passed between you and the Admiral in the stern walk?

Captain Bourke—Yes.

In reply to further questions from the Prosecutor, Captain Bourke stated that when the signals were hoisted he was on the top of the fore chart-house. He did not then say anything to the Admiral in reference to the manoeuvre. The distance between the *Victoria* and the *Campbell*

down was then about six cables. The diameter of the *Victoria's* turning circle at the ordinary speed of the fleet was just under 600 yards with extreme helm. The helm used under ordinary circumstances was 28 degrees, which have an estimated circle of 800 yards. The extreme helm of the *Victoria* was 35 degrees. The *Camperdown's* turning circle was practically the same as that of the *Victoria*.

The Prosecutor—Did you remember that at the moment the signal "turn inwards" was hoisted?

Captain Bourke—I did not remember having been struck by it at that moment. The Prosecutor—While the signal was flying did you say anything to the Admiral at all on the subject of turning?

Captain Bourke—No. The Admiral was talking to the Staff-Commander in a joking way. As far as I can recollect, it was some joke about the time, and had nothing to do with the manœuvre at all.

The Prosecutor—Did you ask permission to reverse the port screw when the signal was hauled down?

Captain Bourke—Directly the signal came down and the helm was put over, the ship having swung about two points with the helm extreme, I said to the Admiral, "We shall be very close to that ship," meaning the *Camperdown*. I then turned round to Mr. Lanyon, midshipman, who was my aide-de-camp, and told him to take the distance to the *Camperdown*. To the best of my recollection, when I spoke to the Admiral he looked aft, but made no answer at all. After I spoke to Mr. Lanyon, I again said, "We had better do something." We [shall be very close to the *Camperdown*. All this time we were turning. I then said to the Admiral, receiving no answer, "May I go astern full speed with the port screw?" I asked this question, to the best of my belief, twice or three times quickly, one after the other. At last he said "Yes." The port telegraph was immediately put full speed, and, without further orders, very shortly after I ordered both screws to be put full speed astern.

The Prosecutor—When the first telegraph was put full speed astern do you remember what was the relative bearing of the two ships?

Captain Bourke—Not exactly, but the *Camperdown* was certainly on our starboard bow. We had turned eight points.

The Prosecutor—Can you approximately state the length of time between the signal being hauled down and the collision?

Captain Bourke—Three and a half to four minutes.

The Prosecutor—At the moment of the collision what were the engines doing?

Captain Bourke—Both telegraphs were at full speed, astern, but I cannot tell you what the engines were doing.

The Prosecutor—Had the ship's way been checked at all?

Captain Bourke—Not appreciably.

The Prosecutor—Directly after the collision what was done with the engines?

Captain Bourke—They were stopped.

The prisoner was next examined in great detail concerning the water-tight compartments. He put in a written statement showing that the compartments were open but were closed before and after the collision. He also explained to the Court by means of models the situations in this respect as well as the nature of the damage done. The damage he personally saw done was to the upper deck, which was ploughed into and set back up towards amidships. He did not know whether the gun-ports were ever closed. The order was given, but he did not think it was carried out. He did not think the doors in the screen bulkhead were closed. The amount of heel while the ships were locked was practically nil; if anything, it was lightly to starboard.

The Prosecutor—Was their any hailing between the two ships?

Captain Bourke—The Commander-in-Chief hailed "Camperdown" and told her to go astern.

The Prosecutor—Directly the two ships cleared what happened?

Captain Bourke—As soon as the *Camperdown* cleared the *Victoria* immediately began to settle forward. She did so visibly, and heeled slowly but increasingly to starboard. The degree of the heel was 20 at the outside, but the bow was very greatly depressed. On my coming up from below there was not one in the flats or on the main deck. Everybody had come up. I was the last person to come up except the poor men down in the engine-room.

The Prosecutor—Was any order ever given to abandon the ship?

Captain Bourke—No; that is to say I heard none.

The Prosecutor—Was any order sent down to the engine-room for the men to come up?

Captain Bourke—Not that I know of.

The Prosecutor—Can you state nearly the time between the collision taking place and the ship sinking?

Captain Bourke—I should think about 10 minutes not more.

The Prosecutor—How long were you in the water before being picked up?

Captain Bourke—A very short time—considerably less than ten minutes, probably five.

The Prosecutor—Can you account for the great number of men drowned?

Captain Bourke—I think that unfortunately among the stokers and Marines there was a very large proportion who could not swim. Except those who were unfortunately in the boiler-room and engine-room, I am of opinion that every single soul in the ship was on deck. They had fallen in on the port side of the upper deck. I do not think anyone really appreciated, certainly I did not, that at the heel we were the ship was going to turn over. Nobody thought the end was so near. All had fallen in four deep. I say this to show the way the men behaved. When they first fell in all the ship's company were taken amidships, with their backs to the ship's side. Some officer, I don't know who, gave an order, which was repeated by the Master-at-Arms, who is among the survivors, and can be examined, "Right about turn." The whole ship's company turned to the right about, and faced to the ship's side. I don't suppose there will be another opportunity of saying so, and I therefore mention these circumstances as showing the wonderful command everybody had over himself. Not one single man fell out of the ranks to go to the ship's side. Just at the last Lieutenant Heath gave the order to jump, and he is the only person, I think, who gave an order. I do not think the Commander-in-Chief gave any order, and am afraid there was no order at all. Nobody appreciated to the last moment how near the end was. When the ship turned over and this order had been given, which practically meant "look out for yourselves," a number of men went to the side, and clambered up over the side. Those on the port side, especially those near the guys, escaped in this way. I am afraid those on the starboard side were not so fortunate. Eye witnesses on the other ships will be able to tell you better than I with what extraordinary rapidity the ship went over. One officer, a gunner, states that around him the water was absolutely thick with men. There was not really room to swim in. These men had mainly come over the bottom of the ship, and were close to the vessel. Others, like myself, and, I think, the First Lieutenant, have a distinct recollection of flying through the air. Others, again, went over backwards into the water, those who were unable to swim, or who were hurt in any way, clutching at those trying to keep afloat. After the explosion of the boilers there was a tremendous upheaval of water, and this was right in the middle of an enormous crowd of men. The ship sank in from 75 to 80 fathoms. She was roughly 60 fathoms long, and I think what must have happened

was that she struck the bottom, going down head first. It was this tremendous shock of the ship striking the bottom that caused the boilers to go to pieces. Then up come this enormous great swirl of water, carrying with it spars and wreckage, and undoubtedly many men must have been struck by spars and other objects. A number of men are in hospital now with broken ribs. No one knows how or by what they were struck. I can't help thinking some must have been caught by the ship when she turned over.

The Prosecutor.—Can you describe how the ship turned over?

Captain Bourke—My impression was that she turned straight over to starboard.

By the Court—Apart from the men who could not swim, great loss of life was caused by the swirl of water when the ship sank.

The President.—Have you formed any opinion as to whether, if the ship had sunk gradually instead of turning over, more men would have been saved?

Captain Bourke—I think so, because undoubtedly when she turned over, any men who were on the starboard side had a very remote chance of getting clear. One officer who was on the starboard side, and also Dr. Moon and a sailmaker, went right round the ship under water. They were on the starboard side, and the ship went right over them.

At half-past four the court adjourned until to-morrow.

TUESDAY, 18th JULY.

Captain Bourke, was further examined.

The Prosecutor.—State to the best of your recollection all that took place between you and the late Commander-in-Chief when he was in the stern walk after the Staff-Commander had left.

Captain Bourke.—It was after the Flag-Lieutenant left that the Commander-in-Chief was sitting on a seat in the stern walk on the port side. I was standing between him and the door leading into the aft cabin. After the Flag-Lieutenant left, I reminded the Commander-in-Chief that our circle was eight hundred yards. I cannot remember his words but he said rather shortly, a little sharply, something to this effect, "That is all right: leave it at six cables." That is all that passed. I then went on deck.

Was there anything else passed between you subsequently?

Captain Bourke.—No; I never saw the Commander-in-Chief again before he came to the top of the chart-house.

When did it first strike you there was danger of a collision?

Captain Bourke.—Almost immediately we began to turn I began to remind the Commander-in-Chief that we should be very close to the *Camperdown*. It is very difficult

to know what one's impressions were at the moment. One has thought about it so much, and so much has been said since as to what might and ought to have happened, that at last I am in that position that I could not swear what my impressions were.

Was the Staff-Commander sent for only in regard to the anchoring of the Squadron, or was it usual for the Admiral to consult him as to manœuvres?

Captain Bourke.—To the best of my belief, he was never consulted on the subject of manœuvres. Nobody ever was consulted.

What was the worst turning ship in the Fleet?

Captain Bourke.—The *Edgar* and the *Edinburgh*.

Did 25 degrees of the *Victoria's* helm turn her in the same circle as the worst turning ship in the Fleet when the latter's helm was hard over?

Captain Bourke.—That was the intention. I am not sure whether the helms of the *Edgar* or the *Edinburgh* had anything to spare, but it was generally the intention, that they should not. When the Commander-in-Chief first hoisted his flag the custom in the *Victoria* was to use 30 degrees of the helm, and he altered it to 25.

You say you asked permission to reverse the screw. Was there any order in the squadron beyond the directions in the Manual that the screws were not to be reversed.

Captain Bourke.—None that I know of. How far off was the *Camperdown* when she turned astern with her port screw?

Captain Bourke.—About two and a half cables. She was on our starboard bow. Both screws were reversed almost immediately afterwards.

Had you seen this manœuvre performed before in this Squadron when the columns were further apart?

Captain Bourke.—Not that I can remember.

In reply to further questions put by the Court, Captain Bourke said he could not remember a single case of the Commander-in-Chief being forward at ordinary manœuvres. He (the Admiral) used to say that the *Victoria* was a very bad ship for an Admiral, because his flags were forward and it was the business of the Captain to look forward and the Admiral to look aft. Capt. Bourke continued:—I never was aft, and he was never forward, except when he used to come forward to tell me when he thought we had gone far enough. Which way he meant to go I never knew before he gave the order.

Then on his occasion you felt that you were personally manœuvring the *Victoria*?

Captain Bourke.—Yes.
In such a case do you consider it neces-

sary to ask permission before reversing one of the screws or altering the helm?

Captain Bourke.—I can only say that I suppose I ought to have done it.

The question is put to you in a general sense.

Captain Bourke.—No, no more than any other Captain in the Squadron. By that I mean that if the Admiral had been aft I should certainly not have sent aft to ask permission to alter the speed of the engines—at least, I do not think so, but I have never been in a similar position.

Can you say how long it was between your asking permission to reverse and the Admiral granting?

Captain Bourke.—Almost directly we commenced to turn, I began to say something to the Admiral about being too close to the *Camperdown*. That went on the whole time, with the exception of the time when I spoke to Midshipman Lanyon, and told him to take the distance of the *Camperdown*. When I said to the Admiral, "We must do something," he made no answer, but turned aft, I suppose to see whether the helm was acting. He never answered me at all. I should say the time that elapsed after I spoke to the Admiral till the screw was reversed was about thirty seconds.

Did you make any remark about the closeness of the divisions either to the Admiral or the Staff-Commander on deck immediately before the signal was hauled down?

Captain Bourke.—No, but my impression is I said to the Staff-Commander, "He won't go to more than six cables."

Did you make at any time any direct statement to the Admiral that, in your opinion, to perform this manœuvres with only six cables between the Divisions would, in all probability, result in a collision?

Captain Bourke.—No.
What arrangements were made for getting the sick and prisoners on deck?

Captain Bourke.—The whole Medical Staff went themselves to the sick bay, and all the sick were removed on deck. Both the prisoners in the cells were removed by the ship's police, and the sentry on duty before the cells was sent on deck as an escort. Both the prisoners were saved. Commander Jellicoe was sick in his cabin, but came on deck of his own accord. Mr. Gambier, Midshipman, had been sick with fever for some time. The Fleet Surgeon visited him in a spare cabin aft, which the Admiral allowed sick officers to use. The Medical Officer went down a second time and helped Mr. Gambier, on to the deck. I believe a marine also assisted Mr. Gambier, who was very weak. Thus all the sick officers and men were on deck.

Did it not strike you that the Admiral, by some mischance, was confusing the distance

of the radius of the circle—namely, two cables—with that of the diameter of the circle, which was four cables, when he ordered the Divisions to be put six cables apart?

Captain Bourke.—I can hardly say what struck me. I fear it could not have struck me in that light, because I think I should have said so. It seems to me I had in my mind that something else was going to happen. I had, like everybody else, unbounded confidence in the Commander-in-Chief; and the idea in my mind was, "He is going to change; he is going to do something; he knows how to get out of it."

Can you explain how the signal for six cables came to be flying after the Commander-in-Chief had practically assented to eight cables.

Captain Bourke.—Directly the Staff-Commander left the cabin the Admiral rang a bell, and sent for the Flag-Lieutenant. It was then that he ordered the Fleet to be put in columns of division of six cables, and I believe he wrote it on a piece of paper, which, however, I did not see.

You consider the manoeuvre exceptional and unprecedented?

Captain Bourke.—We certainly never had to do it before.

Lord Gillford, Flag-Lieutenant of the *Victoria*, was the next witness. In reply to a question from the Prosecutor, he said: I desire to amplify my statement with the following particulars:—When the Admiral ordered me, to make the signal, he gave me, at the same time, a small piece of paper, on which was written the figure six—nothing else. This I showed to the Staff-Commander. When I went below I told the Admiral what the Staff-Commander had said. Captain Bourke remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had told the Staff-Commander eight cables at a quarter past three p.m. When the Admiral came on to the aft bridge a midshipman took the distance to the *Camperdown*, which was six cables—if anything, a little more. After the signals had been hoisted, the Commander-in-Chief asked what we were waiting for. I said, "I believe the *Camperdown*," and went to see whether all the ships had answered. I could see they all had, and then returned to the top of the chart-house, and told the Admiral. The *Camperdown* was the only ship we were waiting for. When we had turned about four or five points I heard the Captain ask the Admiral if he thought we could do it, or words to that effect. I heard no answer. A collision appearing likely, I heard the Captain twice. I believe, ask the Admiral if he might go astern with the port engines. As soon as the Admiral gave permission the port engines were reversed, and almost immediately afterward the starboard engines also. "Close watertight doors" was piped

about a minute before the collision. Just before the *Camperdown* struck, the Admiral hailed Admiral Markham twice. "Go astern." In my written statement I said that the *Victoria* immediately heeled slightly over to starboard. I should like to correct this. There was apparently no movement in the heel of the ship at all. She appeared to be carried bodily to port. On the *Camperdown* clearing, which she did in about one minute, the *Victoria* heeled slightly to starboard, and commenced to settle slowly by the bows. I observed the *Nile* pass very close to our port quarter. I should say about 25 yards off. After the ships had cleared, and before we went ahead the Staff-Commander asked the Admiral whether he wished him to go ahead full speed or half-speed. The Admiral told him half-speed. Shortly after that the Admiral asked the Staff-Commander what he thought of the situation. He replied that, being struck so far forward, he thought we were all right. About the time that the helm had broken down the Admiral made the general "semaphore." "Have boats ready, but don't send them," and there was some signal from the *Nile* about towing or taking in tow. I cannot remember exactly.

The Prosecutor.—Was there anything on the paper the Admiral gave you except the figures six?

Lord Gillford.—No. When I had made the signal, the Staff-Commander came to me and said that the Admiral had told him it was to be eight cables. I went below to ask the Admiral again, in order to make certain. Arriving below, I told the Admiral what the Staff-Commander had said, and he told me he wished the columns to remain six cables. Either before or after this, Captain Bourke remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had told the Staff-Commander he wished the columns to be eight cables apart. I then went on deck, and as the signal was answered, hauled it down, and sent to inform the Staff-Commander what the Admiral had said with regard to the turning signal.

The Prosecutor.—State how you received the order.

Lord Gillford.—The Admiral ordered me to set the signal: "Second Division alter course 16 points starboard; First Division alter course 16 points port."

The Prosecutor.—Can you say how the ship turned over?

Lord Gillford.—I was holding on to a six-pounder gun by the shoulder-piece. I could not keep my feet on deck, and the water came up to me. After that I know nothing, and cannot say whether she turned over, and over or not.

The Prosecutor.—How long were you in the water before being picked up?

Lord Gillford.—I cannot say for certain, but should think about eight or nine minutes.

The Prosecutor.—Did you notice a great mass of men in the water just before the explosion took place?

Lord Gillford.—The only men I saw were further away, out of the edge of the disturbed water. I saw a great number of men there, but scarcely any where I was.

The Prosecutor.—How long were you Flag-Lieutenant of the late Commander-in-Chief?

Lord Gillford.—Twenty-one months.

The Prosecutor.—Had you ever seen this manœuvre performed before, when the columns were further apart?

Lord Gillford.—No.

The Prosecutor.—Did you hear the Admiral at any time after the collision, pass any remark as to whom, if any one, he blamed for having caused it, or assign any reason whatever for its cause?

Lord Gillford.—Yes.

The Prosecutor.—State what you heard.

Lord Gillford.—Might I ask if I am bound to answer this question?

The President.—You are bound to answer every question asked you, unless it tends to criminate yourself. These questions are very painful, but we have got to carry out the law, and you are bound to say.

Lord Gillford.—The Admiral said.—“It was all my fault.”

The Prosecutor.—Did he say it to you, or was it a general exclamation?

Lord Gillford.—I believe no one heard it except myself.

The Prosecutor.—Did he address you?

Lord Gillford.—I believe he did, but he was not looking directly at me. He was standing alongside me. He said nothing else, and immediately afterwards I went below.

Captain Bourke asked no questions in cross-examination.

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith, of the *Victoria*, was then sworn. In answer to the Prosecutor, he said—I also wish to amplify my written statement. When the Captain left the top of the charthouse by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, the Admiral asked my opinion as to the ship's floating. I replied, “She ought to keep afloat some time, as she was struck so far forward,” I asked, “Shall we steer in for the land?” The Admiral said, “What water are we in?” I replied, “Deep water, seventy to eighty fathoms.” He then said, “Yes, go astern with the port engine, ahead with the starboard, and point her clear of the *Nile*”—that ship being then a little on our port bow, or nearly ahead. The engines were put half-speed ahead and half-speed astern, and I said, “What speed, Sir?” “Full,” he replied; “No. go seven knots.”

I gave directions as soon as we were pointed clear of the *Nile* to put both telegraphs at seven knots and the revolution telegraph at thirtyeight revolutions. It was about this time that the Commander-in-Chief, seeing the *Dreadnought's* boats being lowered, some of them being already in the water, gave orders to make the signal “Annul sending boats,” then an open signal, and to form on each quarter—his intention being to steam in for land, and not to leave the boats behind. The ship moved so slowly round to her helm, which was hard a-starboard, never having been righted, that the Admiral said to me, “Is the anchor gone?” I looked and said, “No, Sir, it is in its place, not touched.” My intention in carrying out the Admiral's instructions to steer for the land was to head about south, and when she came within about two points of that, I gave the order to put the helm amidships. The Quarter-master tried to right the helm, and then, turning to me, said, “I can't move the helm; the pressure is off,” meaning the hydraulic pressure. I said, “Ring down to the engine-room, and tell them to keep it on.” In the meantime the Commander-in-Chief, seeing that a collision mat could not be placed, gave orders to close the upper deck apertures, and the men were engaged in this work until they had to be called in, being up to their middles in water. The Admiral then remarked to me, “I think she is going.” I replied, “Yes, Sir; I think she is.” He turned round to give the order “to make the signal “Send boats immediately.” While turning round to do this, he saw one of the midshipmen on the fore and aft bridge, near the standard compass abaft the funnels, and said to him, “Don't stop there, youngster, go to a boat. I think those were his last words. Immediately after that, the ship gave a heavy lurch, and then turned over very quickly, instantly almost, and we found ourselves in the water going down.

The Prosecutor.—When you were originally sent for with the Flag Captain to take charts into the Admiral's cabin, and he told you what he was going to do with the Squadron, state to the Court exactly what passed.

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—When I got down with the charts, the Admiral asked me the position of the ship and the course we were steering, which I pointed out, and the next course I proposed, which was east by north. He then continued, “I shall form the Fleet into columns of two divisions six cables apart, and reverse the course by turning inwards,” adding, “you look out for the times.” It then struck me at once that our smallest turning circle being three

cables, eight was the least possible distance it could be done in, and I said "It will require at least eight cables for that, Sir." He replied, after a moment's hesitation, "Yes, it shall be eight cables." I then took the charts forward on deck. Seeing six cables flying, I went aft to the Flag Lieutenant, and said, "Have you not made a mistake? The Admiral said eight cables." He replied, "No, I think not," and showed me a piece of paper with the figure 6 on it, in pencil, which, I believe, was in the Admiral's handwriting, but I cannot swear to that. Thinking this was a mistake arising from the Admiral's former intention, I requested the Flag Lieutenant to go down and make sure which he did, I going forward.

The Prosecutor.—Did you receive any answer?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Yes. I had a message from the Flag Lieutenant by one of the signalmen, saying the Admiral had ordered him to keep six cables flying.

The Prosecutor.—At 3.20 p.m., when the Admiral came on to the bridge, did you say anything to him as to the closeness of the columns for the proposed manœuvre?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—No. I was never asked my advice nor did I ever think of giving it on that subject. It was the mere accident of the Admiral having mentioned in his cabin about the six cables that caused me to say anything at all.

The Prosecutor.—After the helm had been put hard a-starboard, did you hear the Captain ask for permission to reverse the port screw?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Yes. So far as I recollect the ship had swung round perhaps four points. When the Captain asked the Admiral should he go astern with the port engine, the Admiral did not answer immediately. He turned round aft—I think to see the proximity or otherwise of the Nile, and it was some little time before he said, "Yes, go astern."

The Prosecutor.—Can you state how long it was between the Captain's first asking permission to go astern and its being granted?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Probably over half a minute. The order to reverse both screws was given about a minute before the collision. The order, "Close watertight doors," was given about the same time. The ship's way had been checked materially when the collision occurred. After the collision, the Commander-in-Chief, the Flag Lieut and myself remained on top of the chart-house.

The Prosecutor.—Did you, personally, have any conversation with the Admiral about the collision?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—There was no conversation, but he made use of an expression in regard to it.

The Prosecutor.—Will you state what that expression was?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—He said: "It was entirely my doing, entirely my fault."

The Prosecutor.—Can you describe how the ship turned over?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—She was down considerably by the bow and turned right over to the starboard on her broadside.

The Prosecutor.—After you were washed away did you ever see the Admiral again?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—No.

The Prosecutor.—Were you long in the water before being picked up?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—I think from ten minutes to a quarter of an hour.

The Court.—Did you hear the Admiral say any thing else of any sort beyond what you have told the Court?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Not to my recollection.

The President.—What do you think was the speed of the *Victoria* when she was struck by the *Camperdown*?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—I should think under five knots.

The President.—And what do you suppose was the speed of the *Camperdown*?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Very nearly the same. It might have been a little more.

The President.—Do you think if the port screw of the *Victoria* had been put full speed astern, and the starboard screw of the *Camperdown* full speed astern the evolution was commenced, the collision might have been avoided?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—Yes.

The President.—Do you think that if instead of going full speed astern with both engines, when the collision appeared imminent, the circle had been continued, the chances of avoiding the collision would have been increased?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—I think at that time the ships would have collided in any case.

The President.—Do you think it would have been better had the circle been preserved?

Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith.—That is difficult, to answer. It may be the *Victoria* would have been struck further aft had she had more speed on.

The President.—Supposing both had preserved the circle as nearly as they could, do you think that the collision might have been avoided?

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith.—They might have collided, but not perhaps to such an extent. The rain possibly might not have penetrated.

The President.—Do you consider eight cables was a sufficient distance for the divisions to be apart to perform the manoeuvres evidently desired?

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith.—No. The President.—What distance do you consider the divisions should have been apart to perform this manoeuvre in a satisfactory manner, allowing a certain margin for safety?

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith.—Ten cables.

The President.—Did you make any direct statements to the Admiral or the Captain that, in your opinion, to perform this manoeuvre with only six cables between the divisions would in all probability result in a collision?

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith.— I made no further statements beyond what I have already said.

The President.—Did you consider that any means could possibly have been taken by either the *Victoria* or the *Camperdown* to avoid the collision after the manoeuvres had been once commenced?

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith.— I think if either of the two ships had reversed her screw and helm before she got to eight points—that is to say, the starboard screw of the *Victoria*, or the port screw of the *Camperdown*—so that the ship should turn outwards, the collision might have been averted. But the time was too limited to think of anything of that sort.

Lieutenant Heath, executive officer of the *Victoria*, likewise supplemented his written statement. He informed the Court that he gave the order to close the watertight doors about one minute before the collision occurred. He did so without hearing any order, and merely carried out what he knew would be the Captain's wishes. On being asked whether he could account for the large number of men drowned, the officer said that a number were unable to swim, and that these men, in their efforts to keep afloat, and in the crowded condition of the water, probably took down the good swimmers. The non-swimmers were mostly stokers and Marines.

Lieutenant Collins, officer of the watch on the *Victoria*, also gave evidence.

The Court then adjourned until tomorrow, when Rear-Admiral Markham will be examined. Captain Noel, of the *Nile*, and Captain Moore, of the *Dreadnought*, will also be in attendance to give evidence when required.

WEDNESDAY 19th JULY.

The examination of Rear-Admiral Markham, of the *Camperdown*, was at once begun. In reply to a question from the prosecutor, witness said he had nothing to add to his original despatches, dated the 22nd of June and the 1st of July, which were before the Court. He produced the *Camperdown's* signal log.

The Prosecutor—Will you state what passed through your mind when the signal "turn inwards" was first hoisted?

Admiral Markham—When the signal was reported to me by the Flag Lieutenant I said it is impossible, as it is an impracticable manoeuvre. I ordered him to keep the signal I was repeating at the dip, as an indication, that I did not understand it. I then walked forward to the forebridge, and met Captain Johnstone coming aft to me for directions. I said to Captain Johnstone, "It is all right, don't do anything. I have not answered the signal." I then went aft to the after bridge, and directed the Flag Lieutenant to semaphore to the Commander-in-Chief to know if he wished the evolution to be performed as indicated by the signal. Before the signal could be made the Flag Lieutenant reported to me that the Commander-in-Chief had made a signal asking what I was waiting for. I made the signal back, "Because I do not quite understand the signal." The signal was taken in on board the *Victoria*, and *Camperdown* pennants were also hoisted by the *Victoria* as an indication that we were delaying the manoeuvre. It then flashed across my mind that there was only one interpretation of the signal, and that was that I was to put my helm down and turn 16 points starboard, and the *Victoria* would ease her helm down and circle round outside my division. I was all the more led to believe this from the fact that the signal to the second division was hoisted superior to that to the first division. I conferred hurriedly both with the Flag Lieutenant and Captain Johnstone. They were both of my way of thinking, and, seeing that was the only safe way of performing the evolution, I hoisted the signal and commenced to turn. I may add that prior to the signal being made I had discussed both with the Flag Lieutenant and Captain Johnstone what I thought would be the manoeuvre in order to get the squadron in their anchorage bearings. One of them said, "He will invert the line," but to this I demurred, saying, "I am quite sure he will not carry out so very dull and prosaic a manoeuvre. The only way I can see to get our ships properly in their anchorage bearings would be to alter the course 16 points, the leaders

to go over to starboard or to port, and the remainder in succession. We shall after that alter the course eight points to port, and together close up to the rear column, which will bring us on to our anchorage bearings and distances."

The Prosecutor—What is the diameter of the *Comperdown's* circle at nine knots?
Admiral Markham—I think about 600 yards; but I am not sure.

The Prosecutor.—Is that with extreme helm?

Admiral Markham—Yes.

The Prosecutor—Was the *Victoria's* circle about the same?

Admiral Markham—I cannot say, I think a little more.

The Prosecutor—With the columns at six cables apart, supposing the ships to turn towards each other with the full helm, did the absolute certainty of a collision occur to you?

Admiral Markham—Most certainly.

The Prosecutor—When manœuvring the *Comperdown* was it usual to give the full helm?

Admiral Markham—I think the order was always to give 23 degrees as the full helm.

The Prosecutor—How many degrees were given on this occasion?

Admiral Markham—I cannot say, I heard the Captain give the order "hard-a-port," which I heard repeated.

The Prosecutor—Was any part of the first semaphore message which you have stated you ordered your Flag Lieutenant to make made to the *Victoria*?

Admiral Markham—No. The messages crossed; at least the other was reported to me before the other signal that I had ordered had been commenced.

The Prosecutor—Was the semaphore flag ever hoisted?

Admiral Markham—I cannot say, I was on the fore bridge; the signals were made on the after bridge.

The Prosecutor—When the Commander-in-Chief signalled, "What are you waiting for," read from the signal log your reply.

Admiral Markham (reading): "3.32 p.m.—From *Comperdown* to flag; don't quite understand signal."

The Prosecutor—Did you give the Commander-in-Chief any warning of the danger you saw?

Admiral Markham—I saw no danger if the manœuvre was to be carried out as I expected.

The Prosecutor—Were you on the 22nd of June aware of the existence of the Memorandum which had previously been issued by Admiral Tryon, bearing especially on discretion in obeying orders?

Admiral Markham—I was.

The Prosecutor—Has the Memorandum

referred to been reproduced in the edition of the Station Orders, dated May 1893, which has just been distributed?

Admiral Markham—Yes. It was shewn me for the first time to-day.

The Judge Advocate here read the Memorandum in question, which runs as follows:—

"Victoria, at Malta.

"MEMORANDUM.—'It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a moral impossibility.'—*Duke of Wellington's G.O. November 11th 1803.*

"1. While an order should be implicitly obeyed, still circumstances may change, and conditions may widely vary from those known, or even from those that presented themselves at the time orders were issued. In such cases the officer receiving orders, guided by the object that he knows his chief has in view, must act on his own responsibility.

"2. (a) Orders directing the movement of ships, either collectively or singly, are invariably accompanied, as a matter of course, with the paramount understood condition, with due regard to the safety of her Majesty's ships.

(b) When the literal obedience to any order, however given, would entail a collision with a friend or endanger a ship by running on shore or in any other way, paramount orders direct that the danger is to be avoided, while the object of the order should be attained if possible.

"3. An Admiral leading a Fleet relies with confidence that while the order of the Fleet is maintained each ship will be handled and piloted with all the care and attention that is exercised in the guidance of the leading ship. He relies that this will be the case more especially when a Fleet is approaching land or a harbour. When a Tide or Current is experienced it is clear that a following ship cannot be safely conducted by eye-steering after a leader. Rear ships are liable to be swept by currents to one side or the other off the safe track, and the further they are off a leader of a column the further they are likely to be from the true track.

"4. Risks that are not only justifiable but are demanded during War are not justifiable during Peace.

"5. MANŒUVRING.—Ships following a Leader in column should, when manœuvring, avoid turning on a greater arc than that of the leader. If there is any error or difference it should be due to turning on a smaller arc.

"6. As a rule, when a ship has turned wide on a Leader, following ships should turn on the guide of their column, and not on the ship that has got out of station and has to recover it.

"7. When in line ahead any error from that exact station of a ship be in the direction of being ahead of station, but when in the line abreast any error should be in the direction of being astern of station rather than ahead of it.

"8. The neighbourly duties of ships in a Fleet to each other are duties which must be kept constantly in mind.

G. TRYON,

"Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief."

Interrogation continued.—When turning, the signal flying did you remember the provisions in Article 2, paragraphs A and B, of that Memorandum?

Admiral Markham—I do not know that these articles were actually running in my head, but the safety of my ship and division certainly was.

The President—How do you account for your action in the manœuvre, bearing in mind the directions contained in that article?

Admiral Markham—Because, as I said before, I thought the First Division was going to wheel round me, which would have been a manœuvre of perfect safety, and a feasible one.

The President—Will you state again exactly how you came to that conclusion?

Admiral Markham—I arrived at that conclusion because it was the only safe interpretation of the signal—the other was an absolute impossibility.

The Prosecutor—You state you expected the *Victoria* to ease her helm down. Does easing the helm down or putting it hard over make any difference?

Admiral Markham—I expect the signal to the Second Division, being superior, would in all probability have been hauled down before that to the First Division, and I so stated to Captain Johnstone and my Flag Lieutenant—so much so that when it was reported to me that the signal was down I said, "Are they both hauled down?"

The Prosecutor—When the signal was hauled down, and you saw your previous idea was not right, what did you do?

Admiral Markham—I watched very attentively the helm signal of the *Victoria*, and also ordered my Flag Lieutenant to watch and report to me immediately she began to right her helm. When we were bows on, approaching each other, I saw no alteration had taken place in the helm signals of the *Victoria*. I at once gave the order to Captain Johnstone to reverse the starboard screw and to close the water-

tight doors. Shortly afterwards, seeing that a collision was inevitable, I gave the order to go astern with both engines. When the signal was hauled down we in the *Camperdown* were powerless to avoid a collision. At the moment the order was given to reverse the starboard screw the *Victoria* was about two cables distant.

Prosecutor.—Are you of opinion that at that moment it was impossible to avoid a collision?

Admiral Markham—It was impossible for the *Camperdown* to prevent a collision unless she went contrary to the Rule of the Road.

Prosecutor.—Have you seen Captain Johnstone's letter dated the 1st of July?

Admiral Markham—No.

Prosecutor.—Captain Johnstone reports that he finds on referring to his engine-room register, that the engines, on the telegraph being put astern, never went more than three quarter speed. Were you aware of that?

Admiral Markham—No; certainly not. I saw the telegraphs on the upper deck put at full speed.

The Prosecutor.—Are you of opinion that that made any difference?

Admiral Markham—I think very likely the blow might have been a little lighter.

The Prosecutor.—At what speed was the *Camperdown* going at the moment of the collision?

Admiral Markham—I cannot say.

The Prosecutor.—Had her way been materially checked?

Admiral Markham—Not so much as I expected, I was surprised she had so much way on, considering the time her engines were going astern.

The Prosecutor.—Had the watertight compartments been reported closed at moment of the collision?

Admiral Markham.—Not to me.

The Prosecutor.—Can you state approximately the time between the hauling-down of the signal and the collision?

Admiral Markham—I should say about three minutes. The signal log gives the time as 3.35 p.m., but I would not put much faith in that time, as the signal-room clock might have been a minute or two different to the ship's time.

The Prosecutor.—How many points had the *Camperdown* turned before she struck the *Victoria*?

Admiral Markham—Twelve.

After describing the collision, and showing how it occurred by means of models produced the witness, further questioned, said that he heard no hailing from the *Victoria*. The Commander-in-Chief came over to the starboard side of the *Victoria's* bridge, and said something, which, however, witness failed to catch on account of the noise

made by the boat hoist, which was at work ; but, from inquiries, he had since gathered that what the Commander-in-Chief said was "Go astern with both engines," or "Use both engines for going astern." The *Victoria*, appeared, to go down a few seconds after she turned over.

At this point an instantaneous photograph of the sinking of the *Victoria*, taken by an officer of another ship, was handed to the Court by Captain Bourke.

Examination continued — Witness had noticed no explosion. A volume of smoke and water shot up from the wreck, and the sea was much agitated, but he saw nothing he could call an explosion. The diameter of the circle formed by the agitation of the water was about a cable and a half. It was round this circle that the survivors were picked up, none inside. Undoubtedly a great many men were sucked down. The boats of the nearest ships were very quickly on the spot; the others were some distance away, the ships of the squadron at that time being much scattered.

The Prosecutor—When the *Camperdown* cleared after the collision was she making water?

Admiral Markham — Very much, sufficient to make me anxious for the safety of the ship. So far, as I know, only two watertight doors were open at the time of the collision. I believe all the others were closed.

By the Court—Explain how you came to the conclusion that the *Victoria* would turn outside you.

Admiral Markham—There were two interpretations of the signal, one safe and unsafe. The fact of the signal to the Second Division being hoisted superior was only one of the causes that led to my decision.

The President—Can you explain more fully the others causes?

Admiral Markham—Another cause was that every ship in the squadron had answered; therefore, I expected their captains had understood the signal in the same way that I did, or else would not have answered.

The President—Did it not occur to you that, as the other ships would follow in the wake of their leaders, it was not of the same importance to them, and that they were guided by your movements?

Admiral Markham—I will not say I attached great importance to the fact that the other ships had answered, but it was certainly in my mind that they had answered, and that many of them had interpreted the signal exactly the same as I did.

The President.—Are we right in gathering that, all the ships having answered,

and the squadron being waiting for you you were rather hurried in your decision?

Admiral Markham.—I knew the squadron was proceeding towards the land at a speed of about nine knots, that we had already passed the bearings on which I thought the Commander-in-Chief was going to anchor, and that there was no time for me to question the Commander-in-Chief as to his intentions, nor did I think it was right for me to do so after having put the interpretation I did upon his signal.

At this stage the Court was cleared, but resumed after an interval of ten minutes.

The President intimated that Captain Langley (her Majesty's ship *Arctusa*) had asked his permission to absent himself for a short period. The permission he had granted, overlooking for the moment the article in Regulations stipulating that any member of a Court-martial absenting himself while any portion of the evidence was being taken thereby disqualified himself from sitting at any subsequent portion of the proceedings. Owing to his mistake, it would be necessary for Captain Langley to retire and take no further part in this Court-martial, whose proceedings, however, would be in no way affected thereby.

Captain Langley accordingly withdrew.

Admiral Markham further interrogated by the Court—According to the signal-book only one interpretation can be placed on the signal. How do you account for your alternative interpretation?

Admiral Markham—I did not even know that the signal was in the signal-book. It was not a manœuvring signal. It was hoisted on two hoists. I interpreted it in what I considered was the only safe way of carrying it out, but I may say I had the utmost confidence in my leader, and was confident that he would not risk a collision. The *Victoria* had a free hand from the moment the signal was hauled down, the *Camperdown* had not.

The President—Are you not aware that the ships in a squadron are manœuvred as much by the general signal-book as by the manœuvring signal-book?

Admiral Markham—Yes.

The President—Do you suppose that if the signal had been carried out as you interpreted it the *Victoria* would have put her helm hard over?

Admiral Markham—I did not know at the time that she was going to put her helm hard over. After it had been put hard over it was too late for me to rectify any mistake—in fact, I fully anticipated that the signal for the Second Division to turn would have been hauled down a short time, perhaps a few seconds before the other.

The President—Do you think that after the signal was hauled down, or immediately after you had turned astern full speed with your starboard screw, the collision could have been avoided?

Admiral Markham—It is possible that it might, but I cannot say for certain. It would at any rate have brought the ships astern in very close proximity to those ahead, and I had to think of my next astern.

The President—With regard to your interpretation of the signal, have you ever seen such a manœuvre performed as the *Victoria* circling round you?

Admiral Markham—I have never seen one or the other performed in the Fleet. Had he circled round me it would have preserved the order of the Fleet which I might possibly have thought was his intention.

The President—After the *Victoria* and the *Camperdown* had turned eight points, and were bows on to each other, do you think you could have avoided a collision in any way by altering the helm or otherwise?

Admiral Markham—No, I am sure I could not. Had I gone astern at that time with both screws, the *Edinburgh* must undoubtedly have rammed me.

The President—Do you think if at that moment you had shifted your helm hard a-starboard, and the *Victoria's* helm had remained as it was, you would have gone clear?

Admiral Markham—No I should have been utterly wrong in doing it.

The President—All that is another point. Are you aware that the Rule of the Road does not apply in manœuvres?

Admiral Markham—Yes.

The President—You said in a former answer that you would have had to go contrary to the Rule of the Road. Are we right in assuming that you took charge of the ship on this particular occasion?

Admiral Markham—I assume perfect and entire responsibility for the ship, although I did not tell Captain Johnstone I had done so. I gave him orders to carry out, and he carried them out.

The President—With regard to Admiral Tryon's Memorandum, which has been read to the Court, are you aware why it was issued?

Admiral Markham—The Memorandum in question was, I think issued in consequence of the stranding of the *Howe*; in fact, I know it was.

The President—How far were you from the *Victoria* when she sank?

Admiral Markham—About two cables.

The President—Do you think that any greater loss of life was caused by the signal "Annul boats" than otherwise would have been the case?

Admiral Markham—That is difficult to say. Possibly more might have been saved. When the signal was made to negative the sending of boats I assume that the Commander-in-Chief wished to steer for the land, and that the boats would only hamper his movements. I may add that, although the signal was made to negative the sending of the boats, boats were being prepared just the same as if no signal had been made.

The President—Is it not according to your experience that when an Admiral intends performing an evolution in a manner not obviously intended by the signal, he accompanies it by some information by semaphore?

Admiral Markham—I do not think I have ever had any explanation of a signal by semaphore. At least I do not remember.

The President—Have you never had such a signal as "I intend to pass you to port," or "I intend to pass you to starboard"?

Admiral Markham—Undoubtedly signals have been made to me, and I have made them myself in weighing from an anchorage, intimating to captains of ships ahead which side I intended to pass them.

The President—Do you not think you would have been justified in expecting some intimation from the Commander-in-Chief if he intended circling round you?

Admiral Markham—No, I did not expect it. There have been evolutions in the Mediterranean Squadron of which at the time I must acknowledge I hardly knew the object. They were only afterwards fully explained to us by the Commander-in-Chief in his cabin. It has not unfrequently occurred to me that when I have gone aboard the flagship after anchoring the Squadron the Commander-in-Chief has said, "Do you know why I did so and so?" and I have said, "No, sir, why?" Then it has been explained to me. I had some sort of idea in my mind at the time I ordered the signal to be answered that he was going to wheel round me, come out on the other side, and reform the squadron.

The President—Has a signal ever before been made to you which, as in this case, caused doubts in your mind as to the possibility of executing it with due safety to your division?

Admiral Markham—Never, in my recollection.

The President—Did you not feel in this case, as you were acting on an assumption of what the Commander-in-Chief was going to do, that you ran a very great risk?

Admiral Markham—No, I felt no anxiety, having the fullest confidence in the Commander-in-Chief.

The President—Do you not think that, having a doubt in your mind as to how the evolution was to be performed, you would have been justified in waiting for an answer to your semaphore?

Admiral Markham—I might have been justified in doing so, but I had no doubt in my mind.

The President—Was there urgency in this case so as to render a slight delay dangerous?

Admiral Markham—No, I think not, although we had passed or were passing our anchorage bearings.

The President—Before the time when the ships were end-on, or nearly end-on, could not a collision have been easily averted by either ship giving way and righting her helm?

Admiral Markham—I should say a collision might have been averted after they had turned two or three points. It would be difficult to say afterwards, though at four points perhaps, with the idea in my head that the *Victoria* was going to circle round me, I could not have starboarded the helm of the *Camperdown*.

Cross-examined by Captain Bourke—You say the *Victoria* had a freer hand than the *Camperdown*. Will you explain how?

Admiral Markham—By being able to port her helm when the ships were approaching each other.

Captain Bourke—Was it impossible for the *Camperdown* to starboard her helm in the same circumstances?

Admiral Markham—Yes, because, as I have stated, I was under the impression that the *Victoria* was going round outside.

Captain Bourke—What ship was astern of the *Camperdown*?

Admiral Markham—The *Edinburgh*.

Captain Bourke—How far had she turned at the moment of the collision?

Admiral Markham—I think about four points, but am not quite certain.

Flag Lieutenant Bradshaw, of the *Camperdown*, was next called, and corroborated the evidence of Admiral Markham as to the signals and orders given. He stated that the order to make the semaphore was never written on the slate. It was not made because the Admiral told him not to make it.

By the Court.—Do you consider it possible to interpret a signal in more than one way.

Witness.—Yes.

At the suggestion of the Court, witness gave some instances from the signal-book.

Cross-examined by Captain Bourke.—The semaphore "Don't quite understand" was made after the signal to alter the course had been hauled down and the *Camperdown* had begun to turn.

Captain Johnstone, of the *Camperdown*, was then sworn. His evidence with regard to the doubtful signal was similar to that of Admiral Markham.

The Prosecutor.—Were you aware of the existence of Admiral Tryon's Memorandum on the subject of discretion in obeying orders?

Captain Johnstone.—Yes; but I do not consider it has any bearing on a case such as the one in question.

The Prosecutor.—How do you account for that answer, bearing in mind the directions contained in the Act of Discipline?

Captain Johnstone—I consider, on the one hand, that when an order is delivered by an officer in command, naturally a competent officer, an order which he has probably carefully thought out, perhaps worked out mathematically, there is extreme danger in anyone on the spur of the moment presuming to act contrary to the literal directions given. Had the Commander-in-Chief circled round the Second Division, which seemed the only reasonable interpretation of his signal, the power of avoiding the danger rested entirely with him and not with the Second Division. In that case, had any other movement been made than the one carried out by the *Camperdown*, the Commander-in-Chief's intentions must have been entirely frustrated, and perhaps great danger of a collision incurred.

The Prosecutor.—With reference to your letter of July 1, can you explain how the great mistake occurred of the engines only running three-quarters speed astern?

Captain Johnstone—I can only explain it by the telegraphs having shown incorrectly in the engine-rooms.

Being examined in regard to the watertight compartments, Captain Johnstone said that the explanation given of failure to close those which remained open was that the water rushing down prevented the men doing so. The volume of water admitted into *Camperdown* was estimated at 500 tons. Witness believed no explosion occurred in the *Victoria*.

Did you consider you were working the ship on your responsibility, or that you were simply carrying out the order of Admiral Markham?

Captain Johnstone.—It is rather difficult to say exactly what I thought at the moment but I quite recognise my responsibility as the captain of the ship for all her movements.

Do you think, if as soon as the signal was hauled down, you had given the extreme helm, and reversed the starboard screw full speed, the *Camperdown* would have swung round clear of the *Victoria*?

Captain Johnstone.—I think she would probably have done so, and in all probability would have collided with the ship astern.

Why?

Capt. Johnstone—Because the *Camperdown* would have turned so short.

By the Court—Were you convinced that it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to circle round your division?

Captain Johnstone—No. I was not convinced of such being the case.

Did you not feel that a very grave responsibility was incurred by the helm being put over?

Captain Johnstone—I felt it was in the power of the leader of the First Division to prevent a disaster by reversing his helm in time.

As your division was acting on the assumption that the Admiral would do something of which you were not sure, might it not have been advisable to delay putting over your helm until you had seen that his had gone over, which would have convinced you there was no circling round meant?

Captain Johnstone—That would not be carrying out the signal.

At this stage the Court adjourned until to-morrow.

THURSDAY 20th JULY.

Captain Johnstone, of the *Camperdown*, was further examined by Court.

Questioned as to whether it would not have been advisable to delay obeying the signal until they were certain of the Admiral's intentions, he said that when a movement was to be carried out simultaneously, if any ship delayed she did not fully carry out the order.

Do you not think there are circumstances in which delay is permissible?—I should not like to assert the contrary.

You said yesterday that the moment the helm was put down the die was cast so far as the second division was concerned. Will you explain your meaning. I meant that any attempt at a modification of the movement might have been very dangerous.

From your knowledge of the way the Commander-in-Chief worked the squadron did it occur to you as likely, even at the last moment when he hauled down the signal, that he would still do something, say turn his own division in the opposite way?—My general feeling was that the safest thing was to confide in the experienced officer who commanded us.

Can you explain more clearly why you have assumed throughout your answer that the *Victoria* was the ship which had to take the necessary steps to avoid a collision?—Going by the Rule of the Road.

You said yesterday if when the helm was put over, you had put the starboard screw astern, you would probably have

cleared the *Victoria*, but would have collided with the next astern. On reflection, do you adhere to the latter part of that answer?—Not exactly to those words, but I think the second division would have been thrown into confusion. The ships would have closed so close to one another thereby that the risk of further collision would have been incurred.

Looking to the distance between the columns, to the ordinary circle of the *Victoria*, and to the turning powers of the "*Camperdown*," if using her screw, are you still of opinion that the "*Camperdown*" could not have been turned in the space available without risking a further collision?—I think, in that case, my next astern would almost certainly have collided with the next astern of the leader of the first division.

In view of your previous statements as to your knowledge of the possibility of a collision, can you explain why the order "Close watertight doors" was not given sooner?—I think my general idea was that a manœuvre was to be performed, and that it rested with the leader of the first division to make it a safe one, and that, perhaps, I was not willing to admit even to myself that there was any danger in it. But the time was very short indeed, and the water-tight doors were closed very quickly after the beginning of the movement, or, I rather should say, the order to close them was given.

The President—One minute before the collision? We have had that again and again; that is, two minutes and a half after the helm was put down.

Witness—I may say that the men were all below making and mending clothes, and the watch was piped to fall in before the order was given, "Close water-tight doors."

Did you have any feeling that you were obeying the Commander-in-Chief without knowing exactly how he would carry out the manœuvres?—Yes, I think I felt that strongly.

Have you ever felt that on former occasions while performing fleet evolutions with the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, certainly.

Is it not the fact that if your next astern had exactly followed the motions of her leader with both helm and engines, no collision could possibly have occurred? I think she would have struck us on the starboard quarter.

Did you state yesterday that you were aware that the Rule of the Road did not apply in manœuvres?—No.

Are you aware that it does not apply in manœuvres?—I am under the impression that, unless expressly stated to the contrary, it always does.

Besides being in command of a ship in

a training squadron, have you before taking the command of the *Camperdown*, commanded a ship in the Fleet?—I have had the command of a ship for two years in the Summer Manœuvres, but I don't remember that we did any Fleet Manœuvres in them. Before the *Camperdown* I had the command of the *Agamemnon* in the Mediterranean for a year.

Interrogated with reference to the water which found its way into the *Camperdown*, witness admitted that if the door in the bulkhead had been closed that would have prevented the entry of any but a small quantity of water into the ship. The collision mat was got over the bow, but he could not say that it was ever properly placed.

Cross-examined by Captain Bourke—Did you see the Edinburgh turn?—No.

Can you specify the former occasions on which you have felt doubt concerning manœuvres ordered by the Commander-in-Chief?—No.

Lieutenant Hamilton, of the *Camperdown*, who was next sworn, stated, in reply to the prosecutor, that he was the officer of the watch on June 22nd. He heard Admiral Markham tell the captain he did not understand the signal, and had put it at the dip. He also heard him say that they were probably going to do the manœuvres by divisions, one at a time, by hauling down one signal at a time. When the ships were nearing each other he heard the captain give the order "Full speed astern" but he did not personally see the telegraphs put over. He should say that the starboard screw was reversed about two minutes before the collision, the port screw about one minute. The order for the watch to close the watertight doors was given about four minutes before the collision, and before either screw had been reversed.

Lieutenant Barr, Navigating Lieutenant of the *Camperdown*, was next examined.

By the Prosecutor—Did you hear any conversation between Admiral Markham and Captain Johnstone in reference to the turning signal?—Yes.

State what you heard?—Admiral Markham came forward to the fore bridge while Captain Johnstone was looking up at the signal and said, "We can't do it. It is impossible. We are not at manœuvring distance." Then he said to the Flag Lieutenant, "Don't hoist that signal." Then he turned aft again before the repetition signal was hoisted close up.

Did you hear anything else?—Yes. Admiral Markham came forward again and said: They mean it, Johnstone. We shall have to do it. They have asked me what I am waiting for.

On the signal being hauled down, did

you receive any order from the captain?—No.

What order was given about the helm? Admiral Markham said, "Hard aport," which Captain Johnstone repeated.

Did you see the helm put over?—I did. To how many degrees?—The ordinary manœuvring helm, 28.

You do not consider you should have put the helm extreme helm?—No.

What passed on the bridge while the ships were turning towards each other?—Directly after the helm was put over the watch was piped to fall in. After that the pipe went for the watch to close watertight doors. After that the foghorn was sounded for collision stations. After we had turned eight points Admiral Markham ordered Captain Johnstone "Go full speed astern with starboard engine," and, immediately after that, "Full speed astern port engine." Shortly afterwards the collision occurred.

Witness was next examined concerning the diagram he had prepared showing how the collision occurred.

Witness said that at the time he believed it was exactly what happened at the manœuvre, but he now wished to correct it.

In what does it differ from what you now believe occurred?—From what I have since seen in the newspapers.

The President (interrupting)—Oh, we can't take that. We want what you know of your own knowledge.

Witness—Then it does not differ at all.

Witness proceeded to describe the collision stating that the last he saw of the *Victoria* was her rudder. She sank exactly 11 minutes after the *Camperdown* had cleared. He took the time by his watch.

Did you hear any conversation between Admiral Markham and the Captain beyond what you have stated?—After Admiral Markham said, "We have got to do it," he added "you had better have your men fallen in, and go to the collision stations."

Did you yourself have any conversation either with the Admiral or the Captain?—While the Admiral was aft Captain Johnstone said to me, "Can we turn in this distance?" I said, "No." He then said, "What is the tactical diameter?" I said, "800 yards. We are 1,200 yds. apart now." When Admiral Markham came forward shortly before the helm was ordered over he remarked to me, "We can't do this, can we?" I said, "No, it is not possible." He then remarked, partly to me and partly to Captain Johnstone, who was standing by, "He must be going to circle round us, passing on the port." Then he said, "What is the rule, Johnstone? Port side to port side?" Captain Johnstone said, "Yes I believe so."

Describing how the *Victoria* sank, witness said she went suddenly over to starboard, turned bottom upwards, and then sank in a slanting direction. The *Camperdown* at the time of the collision was going between four and five knots.

By the Court—Did you consider that when the collision was imminent, if instead of going astern with both screws, the circle had been preserved the chance of a collision would have been diminished?—No; she would have had greater way on then.

Did you, at the moment of putting the helm over, after the signal was hauled down, realise the danger of the evolution?—No.

How did the theory of circling round command itself to you?—Having such perfect confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, I little dreamed he would order us to perform a practically impossible evolution without intending to do something different to what was signalled.

Had you any theory of your own as to what he would do?—My theory agreed with Admiral Markham's.

Did it never occur to you that by using her screws the *Camperdown* could easily have turned in less than the 600 yards which were available?—Had we used our screws from the commencement we could have done so.

Did it not occur to you at the time? I knew it at the time, but we should not then have been performing the evolution.

After the ships were ends on, turning towards each other, was it possible, by anything that could be done on either ship, to avert a collision?—If the *Victoria* had reversed her helm or we had reversed our helm, I think we would have cleared.

Even when the ships were ends on?—Yes.

Flag Lieutenant Lord Gillford, of the *Victoria*, was here recalled and interrogated by the Court—In making the turning signal, why was the signal for the second division hoisted superior to that for the first division?—Because that was the order in which Admiral Tryon gave it to me.

Mr. Ogilvy, midshipman, of the *Camperdown*, spoke to receiving the order "full speed astern," and signalling accordingly on the port telegraph. He was not in the habit of working the telegraph, but nobody else was there at the time.

James Henwood, A. B., of the *Camperdown*, stated that by the Admiral's orders he placed the starboard telegraph three-quarters speed astern, and it remained there till after the collision. He was quite positive that the Admiral did not say full speed astern, but three-quarters.

Mr. Edwin Carter, Assistant Engineer of the *Camperdown*, also spoke to "three-quarters speed astern, starboard engine" being telegraphed. He was positive that the dial showed three-quarters speed, that would give 50 revolutions. At nine knots there were 54 revolutions. Full speed astern would give 63 revolutions.

Mr. George Newton, Fleet Engineer of the *Camperdown*, was afterwards examined in detail concerning the watertight doors, which, he stated, were in good order when they left Beayont. There was no reason, from stiffness or otherwise, why they should not have been closed, except in the case of the carpenter's store-room and the paint-room, where the inflow of water prevented it. Certain drains and sluices were opened by his orders to led in the water instead of keeping out. The object in opening them was to let the water aft pump it out.

Rear Admiral Markham was here recalled.

By the President—I understood it to be your wish that in justice to yourself the captains of the other ships should be called to give evidence as to their interpretation of the signal?—Yes, the captains of the ships that I knew interpreted the signal the same way as I did. I may say that I have not discussed the question with any of the captains except Captain Johnstone, but the information has been given to me unsolicited by the captains I shall call. They are Captain Van der Meulen, Captain Brackenbury, and Captain Acland.

The President—You are aware, of course, that the Court will probably call other captains whom you have not named on the same point?

Admiral Markham—I assume it will, but as I shall not be present I shall not know the evidence they may give. I do not wish to send for those captains.

The President—The Captains you have mentioned shall be sent for.

Admiral Markham then said he wished to amend in some respects the statement he made yesterday. He did not consider the signal made by the *Victoria* a general signal, as it had been termed by the Court. He looked upon it as a signal for one division to do one thing and the other division to do something else, and that it was quite in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to haul down only one signal at a time. Therefore it could not be considered as a general signal for the whole Fleet. When the signal for the second division to turn was hauled down he regarded it as a direct order to him to carry it out.

The President—As a matter of fact there was a separate signal to each di-

vision, and they were hauled down together so that it was, in point of fact, a general signal?—No I do not regard it as such.

The President—You mean, I presume, that it was not general because one division turned one way and the other another?—It was a signal for the two portions of the squadron to do two different evolutions.

Captain Acland, of the *Edgar*, who had meanwhile been signalled for and had come on board the *Hibernia*, stated in reply to the Preceptor, that he first understood the signal to mean that the two columns were to turn, the leaders together, the remaining ships in succession, 16 points inwards, reversing the course of the Fleet, but, seeing, that the ships were only six cables apart he said to the Navigating Officer, "It is an impossible or dangerous manœuvre; there must be some mistake. He ordered the signalman not to hoist an answer, and went into the chart-house with the Navigating Officer. On looking at the signal-book it flashed across his mind that, as there was no way of carrying out that signal unless one division circled round the other, and as ordinarily the ships passed port to port, the Admiral intended to haul down the second division turning signal first, and then to circle the first division round the second. With that in his mind, he went outside the chart-house again, and, seeing nearly all the other ships had hoisted the answering pennant, he thought the manœuvre had possibly been done before in the fleet, and told the Lieutenant to hoist the answering pennant.

Where do you get your authority for the conclusion that one column would circle round another in performing the manœuvre order?—I have no authority for it. There is no diagram or explanation of this manœuvre in the book.

Are there not a good many signals in the general signal book which have no diagram attached to them?—Yes.

Do you think there can be two meanings to any signal?—Yes.

What is the other meaning of the signal in question?—I think it has only one meaning.

The President—I understood you to say you interpreted it in another way?—There were two signals hoisted, sir.

The President—Yes, but only one to you. How did you interpret the other signal?—That they were to turn 16 points following their leader.

How did you come to the conclusion that the first division were not to put their helm hard over?—Because I thought they would follow their leader. I thought that if the ships were to turn inwards together it was either an impossible or

dangerous manœuvre, and thought the Commander-in-Chief would not have given orders to perform an impossible or dangerous manœuvre, and that there was something in his mind that I did not quite grasp. That is what flashed through my mind and led me to the conclusion that the only way was for the divisions to turn one outside the other.

Do you not consider that when a direct signal is giving to a ship to do a certain thing it is a very dangerous proceeding to assume that the Commander-in-Chief means something different from what he ordered?—No.

I presume you are to carry out that the Commander-in-Chief wishes, and what he thinks. How are you to know when a certain signal is made that the Commander-in-Chief wishes you to do something different from that order by the signal-book?—I have no means of knowing at all.

After being interrogated concerning his past experience in commanding ships in squadron, witness was further asked—You say you came to the conclusion that the Commander-in-Chief intended to perform the evolution in a different way to what the signal naturally mean. Would you have thought yourself justified in acting upon that conclusion had you been leading the port division?—No, not without greater knowledge.

Did you express your opinion about circling round to anyone else besides the Navigating Officer?—The Navigating Officer, the officer of the watch, the signalman, and myself were standing together on the bridge. I believe I said, "The only way out of this mess is for the Commander-in-Chief to haul down the second Division turning flag first, and then that of the First Division."

When you saw both turning signals go down did you adhere to your conclusion. No.—I then thought there would be a collision.

Lieutenant Theed, Navigating Officer of the *Edgar*, corroborated this evidence. He said Captain Acland gave the order not to hoist the answering signal, but when he saw the *Camperdown* had the same signal flying at the dip he said, "well, I have no excuse now. There is evidently no mistake in the signal. The flags are the same, and I must show I understand them. Hoist the answering pennant." When Captain Acland said the only way to perform the manœuvre was for the first division to circle outside the second witness remarked that would not be using the ordinary helm, and would not be in accordance with the signal-book.

By Captain Bourke.—I did not see that the *Edinburgh* had turned, but she was turning.

The Court then adjourned until to-morrow.

FRIDAY, JULY 21st.

Captain Ackland, of the *Edgar*, was recalled and further examined on a point to which great importance is attached namely, the precise heel of the *Victoria* at the moment of sinking.

Captain Ackland said—We were on the port side of the *Victoria*, about three points abaft her beam; therefore I saw her port-side, that is, the sight highest out of the water. The last I saw of her, a minute or two before she sank, her water-line, in my opinion, stretched from the base or centre of the foremost turret to the lower part of her stern. Her bow was under water and her stern was up in air, but the ship had a considerable list to starboard. As I was very nearly on her beam it is very hard to estimate the angle, because I only saw the rope of the masts away from me, and at an angle from the stay of, I should think, 60 or 70 degrees. The last time I saw her I did not see her turn over, but she was then in the act of turning over.

By the Court—I think she had a heel of 15 degrees, until she took a sudden lurch to 35 or 40. She stopped there for half a minute or a minute, and then went slowly over. The last I saw of her there was a heel of 60 or 70 degrees.

Captain Moore, of the *Dreadnought*, was next called, and in reply to the Prosecutor, stated that when the signal was hoisted he understood it to mean that the first division were to turn 16 points to port and the second division 16 points to starboard in succession, both preserving the order of the Fleet.

By the Court—Did you understand that and nothing else?

Captain Moore—I understood that and nothing else.

When the two signals were hauled down what did you expect to see the leaders of the columns do?

Captain Moore—I expected them to turn together in accordance with the signal.

By the Court—What was the relative position of the *Victoria* from you at the moment of the collision?

Captain Moore—So far as I remember, four points on my port bow. I had turned nearly three points.

What did you do to avoid a collision with any other ship?

Captain Moore—I was turning with 15 degrees of helm. I ordered the helm hard a-starboard full speed astern with port engine, and when the head of the ship was clear of the *Nile* full speed astern and stop her way.

By the Court—Sit it what you personally saw of the collision and the different changes of the band and the *Victoria* until she disappeared.

Captain Moore—My attention was first

directed by the closeness of the leaders when they had turned 10 points. I remarked to the navigating officer that the *Camperdown* appeared to be making a bad turn. I watched the ships closely, and it appeared to me that the last minute before the collision the *Camperdown's* turn had greatly decreased, but we were swinging at the time well to port, and I might have been misled. Directly I heard the crash of the collision my attention was taken up with my own ship. When we were clear of the *Nile*, and in a safe position, I looked towards the *Victoria* and saw that the *Camperdown* had backed clear. The *Victoria* then turned to port, and appeared to have a list of about 3 degrees to starboard. She turned more to port with a slight headway. The list appeared to me to increase to 18, possibly twenty degrees, and my impression is that she remained in that position for a short space. I fancied that while watching her I saw an alteration in her heel, but then she was broadside on. I saw men jumping from her stern, and immediately rushed across the bridge and hailed the boats to shove off. When I looked up again I saw nothing but the stern of the *Victoria*. My impression is that the moment the men jumped from the stern she was beginning to heel, and eventually turned over as the men jumped. I observed that the main-deck ports were awash.

Why did you say the *Camperdown* was making a bad turn?

I was watching the leaders, and it appeared to me that the *Victoria* was turning quicker than the *Camperdown*, and that the *Camperdown's* circle was larger than I should expect in the circumstances.

By the Court—Were the gun-ports you saw awash open?

Captain Moore—I won't be certain. My impression is that they were. When I first saw the ship she was very much by the head. As she turned a-port she became more by the head, until the men working in the bow—trying, I suppose, to place the collision mat—were driven aft. The water then covered the forecastle, and I should think, went half way up the turret—half way up the foremost battery door leading into the turret. After the ship turned over there was a decided interval during which the stern remained above water before she took the final dive.

At what angle did she appear to sink?

I should say 25 degrees.

Do you think the signal to annul boats led to any increase in the loss of life?

Captain Moore—I think it possible that a few more lives might have been saved when the *Victoria* turned over, our boats were manned and in the water. All being astern of the *Dreadnought*, were on the spot with the utmost expedition. On the other hand, I believe that if the boats had been allowed

to assemble near the *Victoria* it is highly probable there would have been a greater loss of life, as the ship might have turned over on one or more of the boats, and the *debris* which came up from below might have swamped others. I am decidedly of opinion the signal negating the boats was a wise one.

When the signal was first made did you think the manœuvre could be performed without a collision?—I thought we were going to see something unusual in the way of an evolution. That is what first flashed across my mind. Then I thought of my own ship and my opposite number in the line. I turned round to the officer of the watch, and said, "We will turn inside the wake of the *Nile*," and until the evolution had commenced I was thinking of my own ship and the *Sons Pareil*. I know my own ship's turning circle, and that we could do it. It was not until the ships had turned eight points that it flashed across my mind what the evolution meant to ships other than the *Dreadnought*.

What is the diameter of your turning circle?—At nine knots it is 430 yards, but I can reduce that with the greatest ease by reversing the screws or altering the speed of the screws.

By the Court.—Did not the signal strike you as being an extraordinary one.—It was unusual and unexpected. I thought we were going to see something interested. I thought I made the remark, "How on earth shall we do this?" Then I thought of my own ship, and prepared to act as necessary.

Did you think it possible to carry out the manœuvre without a collision?—I knew I could do it with my opposite number in the line. I did not think of the possibility or otherwise of the leaders doing it until just before the collision.

Did you realise while the signal was flying that you would have to take extraordinary precautions?—Yes; I realised that precautions were undoubtedly necessary.

Commander Daniell, of the *Comperdown*, was then examined, and stated that he was not on deck while the turning evolution was being performed on June 22nd, but went on deck immediately he felt the collision.

Did you ever report the watertight doors as being closed?—No.

Were there any doors not properly closed at the time of the collision, and were they closed afterwards?—From information I have since gathered, very few of the doors were closed at the time of the collision, but all it was possible to close were closed afterwards.

Why were not all closed?—The doors not closed finally were those which the collision prevented from being closed through the ingress of water.

Henry Viney, petty officer, first-class, and

a number of able seamen, all belonging to the *Comperdown*, and also Mr. Edward Deird, Engineer, and James Ross, Chief-Stoker of the *Comperdown*, were examined in great details to the watertight doors being closed or open before and after the collision.

Mr. Walter Rowlinson, Engineer of the *Victoria*, spoke to the fact of the watertight doors of the ship being in good working order on June 22nd. Witness was closely questioned and cross-questioned as to how the men were disposed, and what doors were probably open and closed.

Mr. Herbert Mackey-Ellis, Fleet-Surgeon to the *Victoria*, was next sworn and examined.

By the Prosecutor.—Had you been attending Admiral Tryon previous to the 22nd of June?—I had.

Will you state what you had been attending him for?—For nearly a month before the disaster. I had been seeing the Commander-in-Chief every day, as he was suffering from a small ulcer on the leg that would not heal. On the morning of the disaster I last saw him and made the remark to him, "I am very glad to say, Sir, that in a couple more days I shall be able to wipe my hands of you, and I am sure you will be glad."

State what arrangement you made for the removal of the sick on deck.—When the collision occurred I was writing in my cabin. I went first to Commander Jullibee, who was sick with fever, and afterwards to the Admiral's spare cabin, where there was the sick midshipman, Mr. Gambler. I told him that I would return for him if necessary, and then went to the sick bay, where, fortunately there were no sick who could not help themselves. There was then only one man in the bay ill with fever. He was dressing, and has been saved. I then came aft again, and went up on the quarterdeck to see what was the state of affairs there. I came across Surgeon Minter, whom I told to go to the sick bay, and, if possible, collect the sick together. Then, thinking things were getting serious, I returned to the midshipman's cabin, and there saw a Marine, his servant, pulling on his trousers. I told the servant not to delay, but carry Gambler up to the quarterdeck and put him on a chair. I then went to the quarterdeck, and it was reported to me by one of the Surgeons that the sick were on deck, and that one man—this was the first I had heard of it—had a broken leg by the collision, and had also been carried up. Thinking the ship would not float much longer, I went down again to the midshipman's cabin, but when I got there the cabin was empty. I suppose he had been carried up by another ladder, so that we had crossed. I returned on deck, and about two minutes afterwards the ship capsized.

Were Mr. Gambier and the man with the broken leg both drowned?—Yes.

Was the Marine servant saved or drowned? Drowned. I forgot to say that the midshipman was brought up to the quarter-deck. I saw him there in his chair.

Was Admiral Tryon suffering from any other ailment whatever but the ulcer you have mentioned?—Not to my knowledge.

By the Court.—Do you think that the ulcer of Admiral was suffering from affected his general health?—No. I saw no signs of it. I had been in the habit of seeing him every morning for nearly a month, and on these occasions the Commander-in-Chief used to introduce some general subject to talk about. Witness added, with deep emotion—If I might be allowed to say so, I could not help on these occasions admiring the great versatility of his mind and accuracy and range of his general information.

Had he any fever?—None at all.

You do not think his health had been affected by the hot weather down there?—I saw no signs of it.

Arthur Fullton, Chief Yeoman of signals of the *Victoria*, deposed that he saw the semaphore signal “What are you waiting for?” made to the *Camperdown*. He saw no answer to that signal.

You did not hear of the signal, “Don’t quite understand signal?”—I have heard of it since the accident, but not at the time.

Did you see the semaphore flag hoisted from the *Camperdown*?—Yes.

Can you name any signalman saved who is likely to have taken that signal in?—I know of none saved who took that signal in. To the best of my belief Mr. Barnard was the officer who would take it in. It was not my duty.

Were the *Camperdown*’s pennants shown while the signal was flying?—Yes.

Walter Bensly, Yeoman of Signals of the *Victoria*, said he saw the semaphore, “What are you waiting for?” made.

Not till after the collision.

What was the reply?

Did you see any reply?—It was, “Did (or do) not quite understand your signal.”

Do you mean after the collision or after the hauling down of the signal?—After the collision.

Did you see it in the book or did you see the signal made?—I took the signal in myself.

Was it made actually while the ships were in contact?—No, afterwards.

By the Court.—Was the signal entered in your log?—It was.

Who wrote it down?—The signalman of the watch, a man named Wright, who was drowned. I was overlooking him when he entered it.

Did you notice the exact time this signal was made?—No.

Are you able to say what space of time elapsed between your making the signal, “What are you waiting for?” and the reply, “Don’t quite understand signal?”—It must have been more than five minutes.

Did any other signalman see this signal made from the *Camperdown*?—Not that I am aware of.

Is it possible that the semaphore flag may have been flying for some time before you took the semaphore in?—Very possibly. I was not in a position to see it.

After further evidence, Captain Bourke, addressing the Court, said he believed there was a signalman who could explain that the signal was going on all the time the ship was turning.

Harry Spencer, signalman of the *Victoria* was then called, and deposed that while the signal “Columns turn inwards” was flying the semaphore was made to the *Camperdown*, “What are you waiting for?”

The Prosecutor.—Did you see any reply made to that semaphore?—I did not take it all in, but only the after part of it. I only saw “understand your signal” made.

When did you take that in?—I believe it was while the ship was turning.

By the Court.—Did you report it?—No.

Was it your duty to take it in?—No.

You mean you only took it in accidentally, and said nothing about it?—I heard Mr. Barnard, who was standing at the bottom of the charthouse ladder, repeating it as though reporting it to somebody.

When was that, before the collision or after?—I believe it was just before the collision.

Did you see the same semaphore made after the collision?—No.

Might have been made without your seeing it?—Quite probably.

Are you quite certain you saw the semaphore after the signal was hoisted down, and not before?—Yes.

What did you hear Mr. Barnard say?—It was either “I did or I do not quite understand your signal.”

You don’t know whom he was speaking to?—No.

The Court here adjourned until to-morrow.

SATURDAY 22nd JULY.

The Court-martial upon Captain Bourke and the other survivors of the *Victoria* re-assembled at half-past nine this morning on board the *Hibernia*, but immediately adjourned until Monday.

MONDAY 24th JULY.

Rear-Admiral Markham, was recalled.

The President, addressing him, said—The Court having, at your request, summoned certain Captains as witnesses, and as all the Captains present on the occasion of the loss of the *Victoria* will similarly be called

to give evidence, we have thought it right to exercise the power conferred upon us, and inform you that, as your conduct may be called in question, there is no objection to your being present when these officers are examined. I would remind you that it will not be open to you to ask them any question but if there are any questions you wish to ask the Court will consider on their being handed in to them whether the Court shall put them themselves. Admiral Markham then withdrew.

Captain Bourke, recalled, again explained to the Court with great minuteness, by aid of models, how the *Comperdaen* struck the *Victoria*, and the precise particulars of the damage done, the compartments which became filled with water, and other details of a technical character, bearing rather upon questions of naval construction than of personal responsibility for the disaster.

An important part of this technical evidence related to the system of ventilation employed on board the *Victoria*. Captain Bourke stated that the bits forwards were used as ventilators, and as these bits were not closed when the ship settled down there was no doubt that the water poured down through the ventilators and eventually the boatswain's store-room on the starboard side and the carpenter's store-room on the port side. The system of ventilation was also in communication with the tank-room. The ventilation was entirely dependent on whether the doors open or closed, and on the air coming down from the bits on the upper deck; cowls were fitted to the bit head, and thus the air found its way either into the store-rooms he had mentioned or into the tank-room. For this reason, then, even if the tank-room door was closed, it was probable that when the bow was depressed, and the water reached the top of these ventilators, it would find its way through the ventilating trunk into the tank room.

This and much more evidence of a similar character was illustrated by reference to a large wooden model of the fore-part of the *Victoria*, placed in the middle of the table, every point being followed with the closest attention by the Members of the Court.

With reference to one of the hatches, Captain Bourke stated that after it had been closed it was found that one man was shut in, and the hatch was reopened in order to release him, and there was nobody among the saved who could say whether the hatch in question was ever closed again. With respect to the jamming of the helm after the collision, there was no evidence to show whether the water actually entered the hydraulic room, but if the exhaust steam pipe for the starboard hydraulic engine was broken by the shock of the collision there would be free communication for the water

to run back through the exhaust steam pipe to the lower level, and so stop the hydraulic engine but that would not fill the hydraulic compartment. It was he thought, evident that this engine must have been stopped, as, though there was every reason to believe that the valves were opened to admit pressure to the hydraulic bathoist, the pressure never was on.

By the Court—He thought, no doubt, that before the collision every manhole in the wing and double bottom and every sluice valve in the ship was properly closed.

At this point Captain Bourke put in a statement in amplification of his former statement, showing what water-tight compartments were open or closed before and after the collision, together with the names of the men who could be called to give evidence respecting each individual door, hatch and scuttle. He also put in a statement showing the general collision stations, and the stations for closing water-tights doors and the stations for placing the collision mat as carried out on board the *Victoria*.

William Martin, ordinary seaman, of the *Victoria*, stated in reply to the Prosecutor that after the collision he closed the foremost hatch on the upper deck.

Was it properly secured?

No, none of the clips were fastened.

When did you close it?—Directly she struck my attention was drawn to it by the corporal.

Why did you not close it properly?—I had no time, I had my own station to attend.

By the Court—Do you mean you shut down the hatch, but did not secure it?—Yes.

Lieutenant Heath of the *Victoria*, was then recalled, and deposed that he saw the hatch over the torpedo shoot on the upper deck closed, not at the moment of the collision, but in the forenoon.

Richard May, chief engine-room artificer, on being recalled, was interrogated on the same point.

By the Court—Are you able to say that you saw any door closed in a water-tight manner?

I saw men closing the aft door in the main passage, and saw others on the stocker's mess deck after they had been closed. That was three or four minutes after the collision.

Are you able to say of your own knowledge that these doors were closed and securely fastened?

I saw some water coming through what was probably the bulkhead door on the starboard side of the stocker's messdeck but I am not sure whether it came from the joints of the door or from the bulkhead.

A number of other witnesses were called and closely questioned respecting the details of Captain Bourke's written statement on the subject of the water-tight compartments.

Lieutenant Heath and Mr. Rowlinson, engineer of the *Victoria*, were recalled again and again to verify points of detail, and everyone who was able to throw any light on the state of the ship before, during, and after the collision, was subjected to a stringent examination, both on the part of the Prosecutor and of the Court, the bulkheads and scuttles of the other compartments being gone through, not only on the wooden model, but on elaborate plans of the lost ship sent out specially for the purpose by the Admiralty.

It was pointed out that there was still a certain number of doors respecting which no evidence was forthcoming.

The Court was adjourned for to-morrow.

TUESDAY 25th JULY

Lord Gillford, flag lieutenant of the *Victoria*, recalled and interrogated by the Court as to the manner in which the "T.A." system of signalling invented by Admiral Tryn, was worked. He said that to his best belief the "T.A." had not been signalled by the *Victoria* on the day of collision.

Captain Noel, of the *Nile*, was next called and by instruction of the President notification was sent to Admiral Markham that this witness was about to be examined. Admiral Markham a few moments later entered the Court and was accommodated with a seat near the lower end of the table.

Captain Noel produced the signal log and signal books of his ship, which, on the day of the collision, was the next astern of the *Victoria*.

Asked by the Prosecutor how he interpreted the signal, Captain Noel said it conveyed to him the meaning that the columns were to turn sixteen points inward. It conveyed that and nothing else.

What did you expect to see the leaders of the columns do?

I expected that the two leading ships would take such steps as to turn inside the three cables which were the limit of their turning clear of each other.

When the collision took place what number of points had you turned?—About ten.

What steps did you take to avoid ramming the *Victoria*?—It never entered my head that I should ram her. On commencing to turn I made up my mind I should turn inside the *Victoria*, whatever she did. At no time was my bow within half a cable of her after she was rammed. My stern swung, perhaps, to within a quarter of a cable of her, but not nearer.

Asked to describe what he saw happen after the collision, Captain Noel said—On the *Compass* coming into collision with the *Victoria*, the former did not appear to head. Later, but forced her bodily to port. Almost immediately afterwards I had drawn ahead of the *Victoria*, but she

was going astern with both engines. When direct ahead she was heeling slightly to starboard, but the water had not reached her upper deck. She then went ahead with both engines, turning under a starboard helm to port. As she turned I turned also with the intention of keeping as close as possible to her on the starboard side. She continued to increase the degree of her heel and the water came over the fore-castle. This went on, and there was no check until about 10½ minutes after the collision, when I should estimate the amount of her heel at about 18 degrees, certainly not more than twenty. At this time the water was washing against the turret two or three feet deep. Without any other warning she appeared to fall over to starboard, slowly at first, but with increasing rapidity. As she went over the boats and weights on the port side fell to leeward with a terrible crash. The ship then turned keel up with her bow depressed at an angle from 20 to 30 degrees. Something under a minute after this, having meanwhile gone down more by the bow, she sank at an angle of 50 or 40 degrees from the perpendicular.

Did you notice anything like an explosion?—No; there was a great upheaval of water after the ship struck the bottom, but I should say there was no explosion. As the *Victoria* sank I had some way on my ship, but the boats were got into the water as soon as possible, and sent to pick up the survivors.

How do you account for the large number of men drowned?—The suddenness of the affair no doubt was the chief cause. The fact that it was a new ship's company including many who were unable to swim was another cause. The great number of men together, close to where the ship sank, must have made it very difficult for those who could swim to get clear. I do not think anything more could have been done, either by the *Victoria* or the Fleet, to save life.

By the Court—Do you think the signal made by the late Commander-in-Chief to annul boats made any difference as to the number of men saved?—No.

Did it occur to you, when the signal for the columns to turn inward was made, that it was probable that the First Division would turn round the Second and reform on the other side?—No.

From your observation of the *Victoria* when she was turning over, can you say whether any number of men were killed by the screws revolving?

I saw nothing to lead me to suppose that any were so killed, but I think it is certain that many were wounded or killed by the screws revolving among the large number of men in the water.

When the signal was made for the divisions to turn inwards, did it occur to

you that it was a dangerous manœuvre?—
May I preface my reply?

The President.—You may answer it in any way you like.

Witness.—I have been nearly two years on this station in the *Nile*. I have entered port or anchorage over fifty times in company with the Commander-in-Chief, sometimes with the Squadron, sometimes with the Fleet. On no occasion can I remember a signal made which I and all the officers present did not fully understand and consider safe.

The President.—That is a matter of opinion about the other officers; you can only speak for yourself.

Captain Noel continued.—While manœuvring at sea we were accustomed to see the signals made which were unexpected, but never one which was dangerous. This had caused on my part the most perfect confidence in the admirable manner in which the Fleet was invariably conducted. As a rule, after the anchoring signal had been made I could foretell how the Fleet was to be got into the necessary formation for anchoring. On the fatal 22d of June, when the anchoring signal was made and the columns closed for six cables, it occurred to me that there was some error, and at 2.55 I made the signal, "Please repeat anchoring signal, as I think there must be some mistake." The signal was repeated. When the signal was made to turn 16 points inwards I still thought something was wrong; but, of course, it was impossible for me to say where the mistake lay. When the ships began to turn I was still under the full apprehension that something was wrong. My hope was—and it is with great reluctance that I give evidence against the Rear Admiral—my hope was up to the last moment that he would not turn. On the other hand, I felt that if the two leaders used all their efforts to turn they could do so without a collision. Undoubtedly the signal was an impossible one as an evolution—that is to say, the ships turning on the usual arc.

The Court.—Do you think, if the two leaders had turned as shortly as they could, the remainder of the evolution could have been performed by the squadron?—It would have been very risky and dangerous, but I think the ships could probably have avoided each other. Some, seeing the leaders turning so closely, would not have attempted to turn.

Did your next astern ever come into dangerous proximity to you?—No. I knew my next astern was an even better turning ship than the *Nile*, and I had full confidence in her Captain. This relieved me of all anxiety. She was never dangerously close.

The President (to whom Rear Admiral

Markham had passed some notes).—The questions I am now going to put to the Witness are put by desire of Admiral Markham. First—Do you not consider that a signal hoisted with a distinguishing signal to a column superior is a signal addressed only to that particular column, and is, therefore, not a general signal?—Yes.

Second—With reference to the signals made by the *Victoria* for the columns to alter their course 16 points, turning inwards, were they not actually two separate signals, addressed respectively to the first and second division?—Yes; but they were hoisted at the same moment, and it never occurred to me that they would not be hauled down together.

Third—As a matter of fact, could not one signal have been hauled down and the other kept flying?—Yes.

Fourth—That being so, when the signal at the main of the *Victoria* was hauled down, was it not a direct order for the leader of the second division to turn 16 points to starboard?—Yes, a direct order.

Fifth—With a signal flying to each division, is it not competent for the Commander-in-Chief to manœuvre his own division as he sees fit, whilst the leader of the second division must implicitly obey the signal?—Yes.

Sixth—Was not the interpretation of the manner in which the signals, if hauled down together, namely, that the first division would circle round the second, the only safe and feasible way in which the movement could be executed, and could not that interpretation have been put upon it?—I can see no reason for that interpretation.

Admiral Markham.—Will the Witness answer the first part of that question, whether it was the only safe and feasible way?

The President.—He says he did not so interpret it.

Admiral Markham.—I should like his answer, Sir.

The President (to Witness).—Will you answer the first part more fully?

Witness.—It would certainly make the evolution safe if the first division circled round the second, but such an evolution could hardly have been in contemplation without some further communication by signal. That is my opinion.

Seventh—If the execution of the signal, in your opinion, could have only one interpretation, namely, a simultaneous turning inwards, an eminently dangerous movement, why should you have assumed that the Commander-in-Chief would execute it that way?—I thought he was under some misapprehension.

Eighth—Both the signals having been

hauled down together, was it not still in the power of the first division to circle round the second?—Yes; but it was equally in the power of the second division to turn away.

Ninth—Do you not think that Admiral Markham would have been justified in assuming that the Commander-in-Chief would have notified to him by semaphore if it had been his intention to carry out such a dangerous evolution as a simultaneous turning in upon each other when the columns were only six cables apart, more especially in view of the fact that he (Admiral Markham) had not acknowledged the signal for some time?—Yes, I think he had every right to assume that.

Tenth—If a junior flag officer or a captain can interpret an order from his senior as capable of being carried out safely, is it not his duty to carry out that order without further question?—Yes.

Captain Wilson, H.M.S. *Sans Pareil*, said that on the day of the collision his ship was third in the second division. When the signal to turn inwards was reported to him it conveyed to him at first only one meaning; but when he saw the semaphore flag hoisted, and that there was communication of some kind going on between the two leaders, he thought probably the Commander-in-Chief had arranged that one leader should pass outside the other.

The Prosecutor.—Can you point to any authority in the signal book for the conclusion that one column was to pass outside the other?—No, except the condition to avoid danger.

How many points had you turned when the collision took place?—I had not turned at all.

By the Court.—I knew an accident would take place if the ships turned inwards, but, considering the confidence I had in the leaders, I felt sure they had made some arrangement which would prevent it.

Was there any apprehension in your mind as regards the safety of your own ship?—None whatever.

Did you take any precaution, such as the closing of watertight doors?—No.

At Admiral Markham's request, the President put to the Witness the same set of questions as addressed on the Admiral's behalf to the last Witness.

Captain Wilson agreed generally with Admiral Markham's propositions, observing, however, with reference to the sixth question, that the interpretation there suggested could be put upon the signal, that being the only safe way to conduct the evolution, but it was hardly safe to carry it out without knowing for certain that the Commander-in-Chief meant it to be done in that way.

In reply to the eighth question, Witness said, I do not think Admiral Tryon would have made the signal at all if he had realised the danger of it. No semaphore could have lessened the danger, unless it was to direct how the evolution was to be done, either by checking the ship's way beforehand or reversing one screw at once. In answer to question ten, he said that to disobey the order involved a very serious responsibility, and a man must feel certain he was running serious risks before he attempted to do so.

By the Court.—He did not think paragraph two of Admiral Tryon's memorandum on the subject of discretion in obeying orders was intended to meet such a contingency as arose in the present case. The extract from the Duke of Wellington's order quoted at the head of the Memorandum was, he thought intended to show that discretion in carrying out an order depended largely on how far the Commander-in-Chief knew the facts of the case, and was himself in a position to realise the risks. In the present case, the Commander-in-Chief not only knew the facts of the case, but had himself to do an identical manœuvre to that he ordered his junior to do. Therefore, it would be a much stronger measure to refuse to obey an order of that sort than to refuse to obey an order where the Commander-in-Chief was less certain of the conditions.

Captain Custance, H.M.S. *Phaeton*, who was next examined, said that his was the sixth ship in the starboard line on June 22. The signal to turn 16 points inward conveyed to him one meaning and nothing else. He had never had any doubt as to the meaning of the signal either at the time when it was reported to him or since. He understood that the Admiral wished to get the ships on their anchor bearings. He said to himself, "that gives us two cables to turn in," but did not appreciate at the time that it would be a sharp turn.

The Prosecutor.—Why do you especially say you did not appreciate it at the time? Have you appreciated it since?—Immediately afterwards. I saw it was a sharp turn, and I then thought the Admiral had mistaken the radius for the diameter.

Had you an opposite number in the other line?—No.

When the signal was hauled down, what did you expect to see the leaders of the columns do?—I expected to see the leaders turn in accordance with the signal.

When the collision took place, what did you do to prevent a collision with the next ship?—I stopped; but there was at no time any risk of a collision with any other ship on the part of the *Phaeton*.

except just when the *Victoria* capsized. At the time of the collision the *Phaeton* was nearly a mile from the *Victoria*. One man fell overboard while the boats were being manned, and my attention was taken up with recovering him. I thus saw little of what happened.

The Court.—But you say you thought the late Commander-in-Chief had mistaken the radius for the diameter of the turning circle. Did that strike you at the time?—Yes; the Court will observe I made the same mistake myself.

Is that the reason you think the Commander-in-Chief made the same mistake?—Not altogether. On a previous occasion, when the Captains met the Admiral after the manoeuvres, I remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had made a mistake about the number of cables in the diameter, about which he had to be corrected. It was not about yards, but about cables.

Captain Vander-Meulen stated that the *Inflexible*, of which he was Captain, was on June 22d number four in the line, leading the second sub-division. The signal at first conveyed to him only one meaning, but finding the distance was only six cables, he remarked to the navigating officer and the officer of the watch, "This is impossible," or "This is very dangerous." When the signal was hauled down he expected to see the leaders turn inwards, but was much surprised that, before they had passed eight points in turning, the *Victoria* did not right her helm, because he knew there would be an accident if she did not so.

The Prosecutor.—Why did you expect the *Victoria* to right her helm more than the *Camperdown*?—Because the Commander-in-Chief had made the signal, and I thought when he saw the ships closing he would perceive that there was not room for them to turn inwards, and would take the initiative and pass round the outside of the Second Division.

By the Court.—Boats might have been swamped by the capsizing of the vessel. If Admiral Tryon meant to steam for land, as he apparently did, then the order annulling the boats was a wise one. His reason for thinking that the *Victoria* would circle outside the *Camperdown* was a signal which the late Commander-in-Chief made him on one occasion to the effect that 850 yards was a turning circle which suited all ships.

Admiral Markham's questions were then put by the President as before. Witness emphatically concurred in regard to the first eight. In answer to the fifth, he said "Most certainly, with a man like the late Commander-in-Chief." In reply to the ninth, however, he said, "I think myself

that the signal ought not to have been answered without a question, being asked." In answer to the tenth question. Witness said "No, I still think this ought to have been questioned." The following additional question was put by the President on Admiral Markham's behalf:—If, in the course of an evolution, a collision becomes imminent, do you not consider the evolution must be disregarded and the rule of the road apply?—Certainly I do.

Captain Bourke.—Do you consider the rule of the road applied in this particular instance?—I do not see where the rule of the road comes in, I do not understand what you mean.

You stated that, a collision being imminent, the rule of the road should be resorted to at all hazards. Does that apply to the moment before the collision between the *Camperdown* and the *Victoria*?—

Captain Vander-Meulen.—Anything to prevent a collision between ironclads, anything.

The Court.—Are you aware that the rule of the road does not apply in manoeuvres?—I cannot say I was aware of it.

Do you think it does apply? What is your opinion?—I obey implicitly the signals made to me. I should say it does not apply.

The President.—Of course it does not apply. It never was applied.

Re-examined by the Prosecutor, the Witness said—If any signal was made to me that I considered endangering my ship or the line, I think I should be perfectly right in requesting an explanation of it, or asking whether I had misinterpreted it.

Captain Brackenbury, her Majesty's ship *Edinburgh*, the ship which was astern of the *Camperdown* on June 22, stated that when the signal was reported to him he expected that the First Division would circle outside the second. He did not regard the signal as a general signal, but as a signal to each Division. The First Division, led by the Commander-in-Chief, had quite a free hand to circle in any way he liked, the turn inwards being impracticable.

The Court.—Do you consider that, because a signal orders a manoeuvre that is evidently dangerous, therefore that signal is to be interpreted in a different manner from that laid down in the signal book?—

I was convinced in my own mind that the Admiral was not going to turn inwards. The danger was so evident, and he had given us so very many proofs of the extraordinary care he took for the safety of his ships.

In reply to further questions, the Witness expressed his belief that if the *Camperdown*

had suddenly stopped her way, the *Edinburgh* would have collided with her. He had never any doubt when he saw that turning inward on the part of the Divisions was not practicable, that the First Division would circle outside the second.

Witness answered Admiral Markham's questions categorically in the affirmative, the seventh being, of course, omitted when the sixth was concurred in.

The Court.—Are you aware that the rule of the road does not apply in manœuvres?—Whenever ships in a Squadron are shifting their positions, the rule of the road is applicable.

Will you be good enough to tell me whether you consider the rule of the road applies, in a general sense, in manœuvres, or not?—I do not know of any manœuvres that would transgress the rule of the road.

Cannot you give me an answer to the question?—Manœuvres are so various, and they are generally so clear that I had not considered the question whether the rule of the road applies or not, but I should say they generally do adhere to the rule of the road.

Supposing a manœvre had been signalled which ordered you to go contrary to the rule of the road, should you obey the signal or obey the rule of the road?—If my senior officer ordered me to perform an evolution which I saw would not endanger my ship, I should certainly obey it.

And you would not consider the rule of the road?—No.

Captain Jenkins, her Majesty's ship *Collingwood*, the fifth ship in the First Division, said that when the signal was given he was doubtful as to what the leader of the First Division would do. The impression in his mind at the time was that a wrong signal had been made to the First Division, and he fully expected that Division to turn to starboard. Witness answered all Admiral Markham's questions in the affirmative, and said he could not imagine for a moment that Admiral Tryon had it in his mind that the columns were not sufficiently apart for carrying out the manœvre.

The Court adjourned until to-morrow.—
WEDNESDAY 26th JULY.

Lieutenant Bradshaw, of the *Camperdown* who acted as Rear-Admiral Markham's flag lieutenant on June 22, was then recalled, and amended his evidence in some particulars. He said that Admiral Markham and he consulted about the signal to turn inwards for at least two minutes. With regard to the semaphore from the Commander-in-Chief to Admiral Markham asking what he was waiting

for, witness had stated that he did not report that signal to Admiral Markham till afterwards. He now supplemented that by saying he thought the flags for the semaphore in question would be flying at the time, but he did not see them. Admiral Markham might possibly have heard the signalman who was taking in the signal repeating some of the words as he was taking them in.

By the Court—Have you read Admiral Markham's despatch describing the collision?—Admiral Markham showed me what he was going to send, and asked me if I thought it was all right, to which I replied I thought it was.

The President (after reading the passage in the despatch in reference to the semaphore)—You see, Admiral Markham gives as the reason why he did not make his semaphore that it was reported to him that the Commander-in-Chief had semaphored asking what he was waiting for. You, in your evidence, state that you never reported it to him till afterwards, and you think it could not have been reported to him till afterwards. You see that is a direct contradiction. Can you clear it up in any way?

Witness—I am certainly of opinion that I did not report the signal till afterwards. Whether Admiral Markham saw the signal flags flying or heard some signalman repeating some of the words I could not be proof positive about, but it was not reported by me.

Was Admiral Markham's reply, "I did not understand your signal," made after the *Camperdown* had begun to turn?—Yes.

The President—We have in the evidence that that signal was repeated to the *Victoria* after the collision. Are you aware of that?—No.

You are not able to state of your own knowledge that it was taken in on board the *Victoria*?—No.

Can you give the name of the signalman who reported it to you as having been taken in?—It was either the signal boatswain or the signalman Wallis.

Can you say whether you received the order from the Admiral to make that signal before the turning signal was hauled down?

You are not sure about that?—Yes, I am sure.

Was the signal, "I do not understand your signal," or, "I did not understand your signal?"—It was, "I did not understand."

By Captain Bourke—Was the signal made forward or aft?—Aft.

By the Court—Where was Admiral Markham at that time?—On the fore bridge or on the way to it.

Admiral Markham was then recalled and interrogated by the President with reference to the discrepancy between the statement in his despatch and the Flag Lieutenant's evidence, and was afforded the opportunity

to explain. He made the following statement:—My reason for stopping the semaphore was that the semaphore signal from the Commander-in-Chief, "What are you waiting for?" was reported to me, I said by the Flag Lieutenant—I thought by the Flag Lieutenant, and I think now by the Flag Lieutenant. It was certainly reported to me by somebody. I may have heard it taken in while the signalman was writing it down, but at any rate it came to my knowledge that the signal had been made. That at once decided me not to make the first signal, and to order the evolutionary signal to be hoisted close up to the masthead. It was the knowledge that the Commander-in-Chief had signalled "What are you waiting for?" that affected my decision. I should otherwise have had no reason for stopping the first signal.

By the Court—Was the signalman taking it in standing close to you?—I can't say.

Do you know his name?—No. The men on board the *Camperdown* were nearly all new to me. If I remember rightly the Flag Lieutenant was over on the starboard side of the after bridge, I being on the port side of the bridge, and I hailed him to say, "Never mind now making that signal," meaning the first semaphore signal.

At what time did you give the order to make the answer, "I did not quite understand your signal?"—I did so at the same time. I think I said, "Never mind making the first signal, but make I do not quite understand your signal."

Do you know, of your own knowledge, that that signal was taken in on board the *Victoria*, or was it only reported to you?—It was reported to me as having been taken in, and I was told at the time that the signalman on board the *Victoria* had hauled down the affirmative, and waved his hands as much as to say that it was finished.

You understood that it was taken in by the flag-ship before the helm was put over?—No, it was not reported to me till the following day, or two days after, when I had time to inquire into the matter.

Did you understand that it was made before the turning signal was hauled down?—No, the signal from the Commander-in-Chief was made and reported to me before the turning signal was answered, but my own reply may have been, and probably was, made after the signal was answered.

The President—And hauled down?—They were almost simultaneous. The signal was hoisted close up, and hauled down almost simultaneously.

By Captain Bourke—Was your signal,

"I do not understand," or "Did not understand your signal?"

Admiral Markham—"Did not," because I at once assumed when that signal was made that the Commander-in-Chief was going to take his division round mine. Admiral Markham added—I wish to qualify a statement I made last Wednesday, in reply to the question asked me in reference to the rule of the road. The Court asked whether I was aware that the rule of the road did not apply in manoeuvres. I said I am afraid without due reflection. Yes, having in my mind a squadron leaving port, when individual ships are ordered to take up their assigned positions, and take up those positions very often perhaps against the rule of the road, and in accordance with the seniority of their captains. I wish now to state that I don't know of any manoeuvre in the manoeuvring signal-book in which the rule of the road does not apply: in fact, I am almost sure that the manoeuvring signal-book is based and framed entirely on the rule of the road. Moreover I would like to state that in performing a manoeuvre when a collision is imminent that manoeuvre must be disregarded. There is no question of carrying out that manoeuvre. The collision has to be averted, and the rule of the road must necessarily be adhered to.

James Wallis, leading signalman of the *Camperdown*, spoke to making the signal, "I did not quite understand your signal," after the turning signal had been hauled down. He was certain that the signal was taken in by the *Victoria* when it was made, and equally certain that it was not, and could not have been, repeated after the collision.

By the Court—Did you take in the semaphore "What are you waiting for" from the *Victoria*?—I did.

Where were you standing?—At the extreme end of the after-bridge on the starboard side.

Where was Admiral Markham at the time?—He was on the after-bridge.

Did you write the signal down yourself?—No; the signal boatswain, Mr. Savage wrote it down, and I sang it out.

Mr. Newlam, Chief Constructor of Malta Dock-yard, put in a statement of the damage done to the *Camperdown's* bow, and the damage which he estimated must have been done to the *Victoria*.

This concluded the case for the prosecution, and the Court adjourned for lunch.

On resuming at two o'clock, the President asked Captain Bourke whether he wished to call for the defence any of the witnesses who had been called for the prosecution,

because, if he wished it, he had a perfect right to do so. Captain Bourke replied in the negative.

Admiral Markham was then called in, and the President said—The prosecution have closed their case, and, although it is somewhat unusual, the Court thought you ought to be sent for, and asked if you have any further statement to make or anything else to say at all.

Admiral Markham—No, sir, there is nothing more that I can say.

The President—Do you mean that you would like any witnesses called?

Admiral Markham—No; but there was one sentence in the evidence of the captain of the *Nile* yesterday that I very much protest against, as being perfectly irrelevant.

The President—I don't think we can go into that.

The Judge Advocate—It is within the discretion of the Court to say that, that statement was not evidence.

Admiral Markham—It was not evidence; therefore I wish to have it expunged from the minutes of the Court.

The President—You can't have it expunged from the minutes of the Court.

Admiral Markham—I should like, then, to enter my protest against it. You know, sir, to what I allude.

The President.—I knew perfectly to what you allude. I have considered the matter in conjunction with the other members of the Court, and we are of opinion that it must stand. Is there anything you wish to add or say, or have you any witnesses to call?

Admiral Markham.—I have no witnesses to call and no further statement to make.

The President, (addressing Captain Bourke).—As regards your defence, Captain Bourke, what time will be convenient to you?

Captain Bourke.—Half-past nine to-morrow morning.

The Court accordingly adjourned at 2. 15 p.m., till to-morrow.

THURSDAY, 27th JULY.

The following is the full text of Captain Bourke's defence.

" Gentlemen,

In placing before you the defence of the surviving officers and men on their trial for the loss of her Majesty's ship *Victoria*, I would first express to you and to the service in general with that true and sincere feelings we, one and all, tender our thanks for the very great sympathy and kindness which has been shown to us on all sides. Everyone seems to have striven to lighten our sorrow and help us in our distress. I seize this, perhaps the

only public way open to me of expressing the sentiments of us all. I can only add that none of us will ever forget it. I now pass to the question of the time shortly preceding the accident. The evidence, I think, is clear on the subject, and, with some slight additions made by Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith and Flag-Lieutenant Lord Gillford, is much the same as in the statements first forwarded. In my original statement I represented the Staff-Commander to have said to the Admiral that eight cables would be better than six. In Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith's evidence he states that, to perform that manœuvre, the distance should be at least eight cables. I wrote the report, and gave it as my impression that the words used by the Staff-Commander were exact, but I am glad he has had the opportunity of correcting any statement made by me which may have given the Court an erroneous impression. I must now pass to the most painful part of my evidence, and I am sure the Court will understand the hesitation on my part as to stating what actually took place between the late Commander-in-Chief and myself. I can only say that I have represented to the Court to the best of my recollection what actually did pass. The interview was very short, and I followed the Flag-Lieutenant on deck almost immediately. Then comes the question with what impression I left the late Commander-in-Chief's cabin concerning the manœuvre in question. I may say that in manœuvres of any sort the Commander-in-Chief, except to discuss as to the actual position of anchoring, never consulted anyone as to the manœuvres he intended to carry out. I even think that the Flag-Lieutenant very seldom knew any intention of the Admiral until the moment of hoisting the signal. I do not say this to lead the Court to suppose that I for an instant think I ought to have been consulted; on the contrary, there was no reasons for consulting me as to manœuvres than any other captain in the Squadron. The Commander-in-Chief was always ready and glad to discuss any manœuvre after it had been performed, but I never knew him to consult any one before. So it comes to my impressions. I must say I think any impressions I did have arose from my absolutely faith and confidence in the Commander-in-Chief and my idea is that I left that cabin not understanding what was going to happen or how it was to be done. I would add I think no one ever criticised the Commander-in-Chief as to what he intended to do. I don't know to what extent I may go, but I do not seem to think that open criticism to one's superior is quite consonant

with true discipline. Representations may be said and suggestions put forward which may show to the superior officer the points on which these suggestions or representations are based, but to acknowledge an open criticism to an order as necessary from subordinates is to set out on a dangerous course, striking deep at the foundation of discipline and responsibility. Admiral Tryon had a master mind. He loved argument, but was a strict disciplinarian. He always used to say that he hated people who agreed with him, but that again, was different from arguing against a direct order. With this, and the fact that I was serving under an Admiral whose experience was far-reaching and whose vast knowledge of the subject of manoeuvre was admitted by all, I seem to have left his cabin not clear in my mind what was to happen, but confident somehow that the Commander-in-Chief himself must be clear as to his intentions. I think at this point I should introduce a subject which has come out in the evidence. It was rather inferred by two witnesses that certain doubt had arisen in their minds before as to manoeuvres carried out by Admiral Tryon. When I say doubt I may, perhaps, put it too strongly, but my impression was that the witnesses said they were not clear in their minds on the occasions referred to. In justice to the late Commander-in-Chief I asked what these were. In one case the Court was told that one division was sent three miles ahead, and then ordered to alter its course 16 points and return. This was off Boudroom, in the eastern entrance to the Kos Channel. I submit that this could hardly be classified as a manoeuvring signal, though, of course, the second division could not tell why they were sent the three miles ahead, but it must shortly have been evident, when the first division movements and turns were observed, that the second division had not been manoeuvred, but detached to perform a specific duty, and it was not necessary or convenient under the circumstances to convey to them the projected movements of the first division. They were detached to represent an enemy attacking in line ahead. In the other case I obtained no specific occasion when such hesitation had arisen in witness's mind. I entirely scout the idea that at any time during Admiral Tryon's command had he ever hoisted a manoeuvring signal that could lead to any doubt as to its meaning, or carried out a manoeuvre the orders for which were ambiguous. When manoeuvring without signals it would be impossible to carry the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief to his Fleet, and I cannot help thinking that it was to these occasions that these wit-

nesses must have referred. The signal log of the *Colossus* has been placed before the Court. With reference to a signal made by the Commander-in-Chief to the Captain of the *Colossus* I perfectly remember the occasion in question. The Commander-in-Chief referred the Captain of the *Colossus* to the instructions for manoeuvring without signals. I talked to the Commander-in-Chief about this signal, and I certainly gathered the impression that what he actually referred to was how much better such a manoeuvre could have been carried out by his system of manoeuvring. He never missed an opportunity of comparing this system with that of the general manoeuvring signal books. I now pass to the moment of the hoisting of the signal which directed the columns to turn inwards. First, as regards that signal, I submit that it was the right and proper signal to hoist when directing the two columns to turn inwards 16 points in succession. I also submit that the fact of the second division signal being hoisted superior to the first division signal has no bearing on the case. The signal to the second division was a specific signal to that division, and that division only, and it mattered not one iota when it was hoisting. Further, I submit that there was only one meaning to the signal as it was flying and seen by the remainder of the Squadron and that meaning was neither more nor less than that the second division was to alter their course 16 points to starboard in succession, reserving the order of the Fleet and the first division was to alter their course in succession 16 points to port, preserving the order of the Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief gave orders for this signal while he was on the after-bridge. He then came forward on to the top of the chart-house, where I was and also the Staff-Commander, the officer of the watch, Mr. Lanyon, midshipman and J. Baggett, yeoman of signals. When coming to an anchorage or when manoeuvring without signals the Commander-in-Chief always came forward to the fore-bridge or the chart-house. When going to an anchorage with the Squadron, I took all my orders from the Commander-in-Chief as to easing the engines and stepping the ship, informing him when we were respectively one mile, four cables, and two cables from the anchorage. When manoeuvring without signals the Commander-in-Chief gave me all the directions as to the movement of the helm on all occasions of manoeuvring by the general signal book or the manoeuvring signal book. The Commander-in-Chief was aft. It used to be a common saying with him that an admiral's eyes should be aft, and a captain's eyes forward. When the signal directing

this manoeuvre was hoisted, the *Camperdown* did not hoist her signal close up. The Admiral then asked whom she was waiting for, and the Flag Lieutenant went aft a little to see if she was waiting for any ship in the first division to answer. While the Flag Lieutenant was aft the Commander-in-Chief ordered the *Camperdown's* pennants to be shown, and a semaphore to be made to her, 'What are you waiting for?' When the signal was hauled down, the Commander-in-Chief made the answer, 'Go on.' The Staff-Commander actually gave the orders for the helm. It was very soon after that I said to the Admiral words to the effect that we had better do something. 'We shall be too close to that ship.' When I told Mr. Lanyon to take distance of the *Camperdown* I remember being impatient with him, and he eventually, I think, said 'Three and a quarter cables,' but I remember at the time thinking that the distance was underestimated. It was then that I asked the Admiral's permission to reverse the port screw, which request I repeated two or three times. I think at last he said 'Yes,' and the port telegraph was immediately reversed. Shortly after I reversed the starboard telegraph. The order for closing the watertight doors was given about one minute before the collision. I stated in my evidence that I did not think the way of the ship had appreciably diminished. I should like to say that, by that I mean that actually, from the moment of turning astern with both engines to the time of the collision, the speed during that time was not materially diminished. Undoubtedly putting the helm hard over, and after that reversing one screw, did check the ship's way, and I estimate that at the moment of the collision the *Victoria's* speed must have been about six knots, or perhaps less. The question was asked whether any orders existed in the Fleet that the inner screws at manoeuvres were not to be backed, or, more generally speaking, that ships were not to jockey with their screws. There was no such order from the Commander-in-Chief, but under ordinary circumstances of a manoeuvre I was aware that he did not like the practice. The question which now presented itself was whether with the Admiral beside me on the chart-house, he being in full view of the manoeuvre, I should have acted as to reversing the screws or doing something without reference to him. This question can only be answered by the Court, and in leaving the decision in their hands I have two points to lay before them. First, that the Commander-in-Chief was there and on the chart-house absolutely beside me, and

in a certain degree conducting the manoeuvre of the *Victoria*; and, second, that whenever he had been forward before it had been his custom, on going to an anchorage with a squadron, to himself give directions about the engines. I do not for a moment wish the Court to suppose that I am anxious to throw off any of the responsibility which under all circumstances rests with the captain of a ship. I have only to lay before the Court that my position at the moment that the manoeuvre commenced was one which I fancy very few, if any, have ever experienced in the Service, especially in presence of a master mind such as that of the late Commander-in-Chief. The question was asked as to what I should have done had the Admiral been at his usual post during the manoeuvres, namely, on the after-bridge. To that I must honestly say I don't quite know, but my feeling is that I should have taken more strenuous action at an early period of the manoeuvre, and without the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, and I think then I should have sent aft to inform him of what I had done. Many questions have been asked as to the fact of the Commander-in-Chief hailing the *Camperdown* to go astern. I seem to be sure that this hailing took place after the collision. I do not think it was before, at least, I never heard it, and I did hear it afterwards. I wish now to refer to the signal from the *Camperdown*, I did not quite understand your signal.' The evidence given by witnesses on board the *Victoria* would seem to point to the fact that for some reasons probably the rapidly changing relative bearing of the two ships, this signal was not taken in or reported on board the *Victoria* before the collision. I was close to the Commander-in-Chief the whole time, and I must say I never heard it reported. It is in the evidence that the semaphore flags were hoisted by the *Camperdown* just as the turn began, and it seems possible, owing to the constantly varying relative bearings, that the signal was not properly taken in until the last, or nearly the last moment. Evidence on this point is, I submit, most conflicting. What seems clear is that the *Camperdown* hoisted the semaphore signal as the turn began. I now pass to the moment of the collision. The evidence of most of the witnesses seems to show that the *Camperdown* struck rather from aft than from forward. The Staff-Commander of the *Victoria* states that the *Victoria's* head had almost touched west-north-west, and the Navigating Officer of the *Camperdown* says that the *Camperdown's* head was south-west by south. This would give the angle of impact as one

point abaft the beam. This is strong evidence. I, of course, only judged it by eye, but I must confess that it struck me at the moment that the angle of impact was mere. As I stated, what I saw of the collision was the *Camperdown's* stem crushing in the upper deck about 10ft. or 11ft., the upper deck being ploughed up and the wooden deck splintered in every direction. The stems of the *Victoria* and the *Camperdown* swung slightly together. The *Camperdown* backed out clear, I suppose, not more than a minute from the moment of striking the *Victoria*, and at an angle of 20deg., abaft the beam. It was at this moment that I said to the Commander-in-Chief, "I think I had better go below to see about the doors," and he said, "You go below to look after the doors, I will attend to the engines." When I left the deck the engines were stopped. I then went below as described in my first report. When I was in the flat on the main deck abaft the angle bulkhead on the starboard side, there was certainly an order passed down for everyone to go on deck, but I have entirely failed to discover who gave that order. I certainly heard it myself when I was in the flat, and I don't think it emanated from any one below in the flats. I state this so as to dispel any idea that the men were in a panic below. They went up the ladder in a quiet and orderly manner. I am convinced that all the side scuttles were properly closed in after the flats. Only two marine ward-room servants were saved, but I feel almost certain that they all carried out their duties, namely, to close those scuttles. I had never heard of any omissions under this head when exercising the closing of the watertight doors. I can call evidence as to the scuttles in the Secretary's cabin and the Commander-in-Chief's offices. They were closed properly when I came up from below and passed through the abaft flat, which must have been a minute or less before the ship gave a lurch to starboard. There was no water in that flat, nor did I hear the sound of water rushing in. There were no scuttles in the flat before the bulkhead. I wish again to refer to my interview with the Fleet-Engineer after I had left the engine-room, and met him about half way along the main passage. The electric lights in the main passage were burning very dim, and I even ran into the Fleet-Engineer before I saw him. I feel sure that when he said to me all was tight as far as he could make out abaft the foremost boiler-room, he meant the fore end of the foremost boiler-room. I cannot think the water could have entered that boiler-room without his being aware of it. If, by any chance, the horizontal door close to No. 5 bunker, leading into the sloping shoot, had been closed when the watertight doors were closed no water could

have reached No. 7 bunker, and, even if No. 7 bunker had filled with water, there was the door leading into the stokehold that could be shut in a moment. I therefore, am strongly of opinion that the water never penetrated into the fore boiler-rooms, neither do I think it penetrated into the hydraulic rooms, which were before the boiler-room, but I do think my theory concerning the stopping of the starboard hydraulic engine, and the consequent jamming of the helm, and the failure of the hydraulic boat hoist, is the correct one, namely that the water floated back through the probably damaged exhaust steam pipe in the capstan engine flat. I do not propose to refer any more to the long statement made by me concerning the amount of water which I supposed entered the ship, but, in estimating it, I did not very closely consider or make any particular statement concerning the terrible wrecking of the compartments, decks, and bulkheads that must have taken place forward when the blow was delivered. No one can imagine the feeling at the moment of the collision. It was not a shock, nor was it a blow, but we felt the ship being carried bodily sideways, and by one witness, this was estimated as a ship's breadth, 70ft. Also a statement is made by Commander Jellicoe, who was sick at the time and in bed in his cabin aft, which shows the power of the blow. He states that at the moment of the collision the foremost bulkhead of his cabin seemed to be momentarily wrenched, and looked as if it were going through the ship's side. If this wrenching strain went on aft, what a terrible effect it must have had forward. With regard to the question of the efficiency of the automatic air valves during the late winter months, when the *Victoria* was in the dockyard I ordered that the closest attention was to be directed to all the air valves, and frequently asked questions about them. I feel pretty certain that every one of them was thoroughly overhauled. It is my firm belief that all the hatches and doors not used as gangway hatches and doors were closed before the collision, in accordance with the orders of a ship when at sea. Direct evidence seems to show that all the doors and hatches below the upper deck were closed before or after the collision, except the sliding door in H bulkhead, the door leading to the small air-compressing compartment, and, probably, the horizontal door in the armoured deck leading to the sloping coal shoot, and the door of No. 5 bunker. No direct evidence shows that the hatch of the port ejector tank was closed, but I think I have produced strong presumptive evidence that it must have been so. The question was asked me by the Court why the order to close the watertight doors was given

so late as one minute before the collision. My answer was that it was given when it was seen that a collision was imminent. I can only refer back to the former sentence in my defence where I stated that my position was one which I fancy very few, if any, have ever experienced in the Service. It did not strike me as necessary to close the doors whilst the signal was flying, or immediately after it was hauled down. I have little more to add now. When I left the main passage and passed through the after flats to come on deck I saw no one down there. When I got on the upper deck I saw the men fallen in on the port side. I went up the after-bridge ladder, and there I found the officers and men in their stations for hoisting out the boats. I saw Commander Jellicoe, although on the sick list, on the port-side bridge with the flags in his hands for signals. I then went along the fore end of the aft bridge with a view to reporting to the Admiral the result of my inquiries below. When I arrived at the foremost cutter's davit the ship gave the lurch described, and appeared to turn straight over to starboard. My belief is that her keel when the lurch mentioned took place, was not more than 20deg., as I had no difficulty in walking along the fore and aft bridge and had not to hold on to anything. I must say that immediately before the lurch described by so many witnesses I had no idea the end was so near. I am of opinion that the whole ship's company, officers and men were on deck, except the poor fellows in the engine rooms and boiler rooms. They were all on the port side of the upper deck, fallen in. When at last, the men went over the ship's side I cannot help thinking the majority got outside the ship. Those who were fortunate enough to be washed away from the wreck were, I think, probably all saved, but of those who found themselves immediately over the sinking ship the majority must have been overwhelmed by the terrible agitation of the water, and many possibly were struck by wreckage and loose spars. Opinions are conflicting as to whether any explosion took place. In my first statement I mentioned an explosion, but I might well have mistaken the agitation of the water for an explosion of the boilers. I certainly heard or felt no explosion in the water, and I can hear of no one now who can say he felt the water hot. There is no doubt that amongst the stokers and Marines there were many who could not swim, or who were indifferent swimmers. In these cases I am afraid they had a very bad chance. It should be noted that of those saved the position in which they were in the ship when she capsized seems to have

made no appreciable difference. Officers and men were picked up who were in every part of the upper deck, and no particular place appears to have governed the proportion of those saved. In the course of the enquiry opinions have been given as to whether the signal to negative the sending of boats contributed in any way to the great loss of life. In my opinion, which is shared by all the surviving officers of the *Victoria*, this signal made no difference in the number of persons drowned. It is clear that the Commander-in-Chief had in mind the possibility of reaching shallow water, and actually turned the ship towards the shore. The Staff-Commander states that the speed had perhaps reached two to three knots. It would have been very inconvenient for the ships to have followed the *Victoria* with their boats in the water. Further I think it very fortunate that the boats of the Squadron were not all clustered round the *Victoria*. I am strongly of opinion that if this had been the case many of the boats might have received severe damage from wreckage, and in some cases have been endangered up to the point of being capsized by the agitation of the water. It must not be forgotten that the sirenaphone was made 'Keep boats in readiness, but do not send them.' Those who experienced the terrible agitation of the waters consider it was to this that the great loss of life must be attributed. Vast quantities of spars and wreckage shot to the surface, wounding many, but to the great upheaval of water I attribute the serious loss of life. I am further of opinion that no boat could have worked effectually immediately in the vicinity of the terrible swirl. At this point, having, I trust, touched upon all important facts brought out in the evidence, I shall refer to the order and discipline by which all were influenced in the short but terrible time between the ramming of the *Victoria* and her capsizing. When the crushing blow delivered by the ram of the *Camperdown* was felt the impression which passed through everyone's mind must have been one of serious apprehension. No one in the ship, knowing what had happened, could have failed to appreciate that the conditions were certainly serious. With this in view I should like to lay before the Court a few remarks on what, I submit was the discipline and self-control exhibited by all. There was absolutely no panic, no shouting, no rushing aimlessly about. The officers went quietly to their stations. Everything was prepared, and the men were all in their positions for hoisting out the boats or performing any duty they may have been ordered to carry out. The

men on the fore-castle worked with a will until the water was up to their waists, and it was only when ordered aft that they left their work to fall in on the upper deck with the remainder of the ship's company. In the case of the men working below I was a witness of their coolness when the order was passed down for everyone to go on deck. There was no haste or hurry to desert the flat. I can further testify to the men below in the engine-rooms. In the starboard one all were in their stations. The engineer officer was there the artificers and stokers also. I am sure that those in the engine-room and the boiler-rooms were equally true to themselves, to the country they were serving, and to the trust reposed in them. In all the details of this terrible accident one spot especially stands out and that is the heroic conduct of those who to the end remained below, stolidly, yet boldly, at their place of duty. All honour to them especially! The men fallen in on the upper deck showed the same spirit. I would recall to you what I described in my evidence. When the men were turned about to face the ship's side, it must have passed through the minds of many that to look out for oneself would be the best thing to do. The men must have seen the other coming wet from forward, which, in itself, might have increased their apprehensions. This order to turn about was given apparently about a minute before the end, and I can hear of not one single instance of any man rushing to the side. It only wanted two or three to start a panic, but I think it should be on record that not one was found who had not that control over himself which characterises true discipline and order. It has been shown in evidence that no one jumped from the ship until just as she gave the lurch which ended in her capsizing. I imagine there is not a single survivor who can give any clearer reason for his being saved than that he was more fortunate than his neighbours. There is one deeply sad circumstance connected with the accident, and that is the very large proportion of midshipmen who lost their lives. These young officers at the commencement of their career were thus 'cut off,' but it will be to their undying honour that, young as they were, they also showed that spirit of trust and bravery, and, one and all, remained at their posts on deck to the end. There is no doubt that among those lost many individual acts of heroism and disregard to self must have been displayed, but I regret that I am only in a position to state one. This is the case of the Rev. Samuel Morris, chaplain of the *Victoria*, than whom no one in the ship was more beloved or re-

spected. It is his words, 'Steady, men, steady,' when the end came which bring before one the appreciation of his coolness and valour even at the moment of the ship capsizing. We only hear of him, careless of his own safety, exhorting the men to be cool and calm. In his daily life on board he mixed with the men and knew all their thoughts, and advised them in their troubles. A noble character like this inculcates by his example the discipline and obedience which were shown on board the *Victoria*. Amongst those saved equal acts of bravery and coolness were displayed. It has been my privilege to forward some names to the Commander-in-Chief for the part they took in saving life. I have now to conclude my statement by expressing my own deep grief and that of the survivors of her Majesty's ship *Victoria* for the terrible loss we have sustained in the death of the late Commander-in-Chief and so many of the officers and crew of our ship. It is a feeling deep and sincere which must ever remain in the hearts of us all. For myself, I cannot pretend to describe the overwhelming loss which I have experienced in the death of my chief and my kindest friend. He was always ready to help and advise. There was never anyone in trouble whose cause he would not identify himself with. It is not necessary for me to praise him as an officer. Everyone who knew him—aye; and many others—acknowledged his worth. It adds doubly to my sorrow when I know that the service has lost one of its best and most capable leaders."

This concluded Captain's Bourke defence.

The President—Do any of the other officers or men among the survivors wish to say anything?

Captain Bourke, having consulted with the other officers, replied in the negative, but said he wished to recall Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith with reference to one point Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith was recalled accordingly, and stated, in reply to Captain Bourke, that though the Commander-in-Chief ordered the engines to be put at 38 revolutions, meaning seven knots, witness did not think the *Victoria* ever attained that speed.

The Court was cleared at half-past ten and deliberated in private till lunch time. It resumed at two o'clock and continued in private till seven minutes past three when a bell was rung, and all the survivors and other officers were readmitted on the poop deck.

The Judge Advocate then read the finding of the Court in the following terms.—"The Court finds that the loss of her Majesty's ship *Victoria*, off Tripoli, on the Coast of Syria, on the 22nd of June, 1893, was

caused by a collision with her Majesty's ship *Camperdown*, and it is with the deepest sorrow and regret that the Court further finds that this collision was due to an order given by the then Commander-in-Chief, the late Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, to the two divisions in which the Fleet was formed to turn 16 points inwards, the leaders first and the others in succession, the columns at that time being only six cables apart.

"Secondly, the Court finds that, after the collision had occurred, everything that was possible was done on board her Majesty's ship *Victoria*, and in the Squadron generally, both to save life and to save the *Victoria*, and the Court is of opinion the order given by the late Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon to annul sending boats, but to hold them in readiness, was, under the circumstances, a wise one.

"Thirdly, the Court finds that no blame is attributable to Captain the Hon. Maurice Archibald Bourke, or to any other of the surviving officers and ship's company of her Majesty's ship, *Victoria*, for the loss of that ship, and it therefore acquits them accordingly. The Court desires to record its opinion that the discipline and order maintained on board

the *Victoria* to the last by everyone was in the highest degree creditable to all concerned.

"Fourthly, the Court strongly feels that although it is much to be regretted that Rear-Admiral Albert Hastings Markham did not carry out his first intention to semaphore to the Commander-in-Chief his doubt as to the signal, it would be fatal to the best interests or the Service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of his Commander-in-Chief, present in person.

"Fifthly, the Court has placed in the minutes all the evidence obtainable with regard to the closing or otherwise of the water-tight doors of her Majesty's ship, *Victoria*, but it does not feel itself called upon, nor does it consider itself competent, to express an opinion as to the causes of the capsizing of the *Victoria*."

The President then took Captain Bourke's sword, which had lain on the table, in accordance with custom, throughout the inquiry, and, handing it to him said, "Captain Bourke, I have very much pleasure in returning you your sword. The Court is dissolved."

This terminated the proceedings.

APPENDIX.

ADMIRAL MARKHAM'S DESPACHES.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty,
Camperdown, at Tripoli,
2nd June, 1893.

FOUR ENCLOSURES.

SIR,

It is with the most profound regret that I have to report, for the information of their Lordships, the total loss of Her Majesty's Ship *Victoria*, involving the irreparable loss of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., together with 22 Officers and 336 men, under the following circumstances:—

1. The Squadron, consisting of the Ships named in the margin (*Victoria*, *Camperdown*, *Nile*, *Dreadnought*, *Laffa*, *Abie*, *Collingwood*, *Phaeton*, *Edinburgh*, *Sans Pareil*, *Elger*, *Amphion*, *Farles*, *Barham*), left Beyrout at 10 o'clock this forenoon for Tripoli.

2. Shortly after leaving, the Squadron was formed in single column line ahead, an interval in a speed of about eight knots. When within about five miles of the anchorage off Tripoli the signal was made at 2.20 p.m. to form columns of divisions in line ahead, disposed about ten points, columns to be six cables apart. We proceeded in this formation until about 3.25 p.m., when

the following signal was made from the *Victoria*:

2 Flag
2 Pendant
Compass Pendant
16

2 Flag
2 Pendants
16
Compass Pendant.

As the columns were only six cables apart, and therefore not, in my opinion, within manœuvring distance to execute such an evolution as ordered by the signal, in question, I directed my Flag-Lieutenant to keep the signal, which we were repeating, at the dip, as an indication that it was not understood. I then directed him to make a signal to the Commander-in-Chief to the following effect, by semaphore:—"Am I to understand that in your signal for the columns to turn as indicated by signal now flying?"—but before my order could be carried out, the Commander-in-Chief semaphore to me to know "What I was waiting for." It then

struck me that he wished me to turn 16 points as indicated by his signal, and that it was his intention to circle round the Second Division, leaving them on his port hand.

Having the fullest confidence in the great ability of the Commander-in-Chief to manoeuvre the Squadron without even the risk of a collision, I ordered the signal to be hoisted as an indication that it was understood.

On the signal being hauled down the helm of the *Camperdown* was put hard-a-port at the same time that the helm of the *Victoria* was starboarded.

I watched very carefully the helm indicating signals of the *Victoria* as the two ships turned towards each other, and seeing that the helm of the *Victoria* was still kept hard a starboard, I directed the Captain of the *Camperdown* to go full speed astern with his starboard screw in order to decrease our circle of turning. Seeing that a collision was inevitable, I then gave orders to go full speed astern with both engines, but before the speed of the ship had been materially checked the stem of the *Camperdown* struck the *Victoria* on her starboard bow, about 24 ft. before the turret, and crushed into the ship almost to her centre line, the fore and aft lines of the ships at the time of collision being inclined towards each other at an angle of about 8° deg.

3. It was, I think, quite two minutes before the *Camperdown*, was able, although going full speed astern with both engines, to get clear of the *Victoria*.

4. The water-tight doors of the *Camperdown* were closed by my orders before the collision occurred.

5. Seeing the critical conditions of the *Victoria* which appeared to be settling down by the head, boats were immediately prepared and boom boats got ready to be hoisted out, when the "open pendant" was hoisted in the *Victoria* and the signal made "negative send boats."

6. In a very few minutes after she heeled over to starboard and turning bottom upwards, disappeared.

7. The time that elapsed between the occurrence of the collision and her disappearance was only about 13 minutes.

8. Shortly before she turned over men were seen to be jumping overboard. On observing this I immediately ordered a signal to be made to send all boats to rescue, and directed the *Bachan* and *Fearless* to close in at once to save life, steaming up at the same time in the *Camperdown* to the succour of the Officers and men who were struggling in the water.

9. The combined efforts of the Squadron resulted in the saving of 29 Officers and about 262 men, but I regret to say that no less than 22 Officers and about 336 men

(the majority of whom were in all probability below at the time) were lost.

10. The sea was smooth, with a light breeze, at the time of the accident.

11. The injuries to the *Camperdown* are of a serious nature, but I hope, with the assistance of the artificers of the Squadron, they may be temporarily repaired, so that she may be sent to Malta to be docked.

The injuries, so far as can be at present ascertained, are as follows:—

(1.) A jagged hole in the port bow, extending from the stem to an extreme distance of 10 ft. and from 12 ft. to 18 ft. below the upper deck, the lower edge being just above the armoured deck. It is irregular in shape, and the extreme dimensions are 6 ft. by 10 ft.

(2.) the stem is broken above the ram, and the upper part turned to port, separating the stem piece and the plating the starboard side for a depth of 10 ft. vertically, commencing at the water line, and attaining a width of 11 in. about 5 ft. below then tapering away to nothing about 10 ft. below the water line.

The following compartments are full:—Carpenter's store-room, paint-room, fore ballast chamber, boatswain's store-room, submarine mining-room, tank-room, capstan engine flat, and also the patent fuel space on the port side of the chain lockers.

12. I regret to say that the whole of the ship's books of the *Victoria* appear to have been lost; in fact there is nothing of importance which has been recovered so far.

13. For some hours after the sinking of the *Victoria* the water remained in an agitated condition over the wreck. The screws were revolving as she sank.

14. I remained in the vicinity of the catastrophe until 5.30 p.m. when, as the *Camperdown* was making water, I deemed it advisable to anchor the ships off Tripoli. The *Amphion*, *Barluma*, and *Fearless* remained behind until after dark, but did not recover anything of importance. The *Fearless* will weigh at daylight to-morrow and search at end around the scene of the disaster.

15. I forward herewith a report from Captain the Honourable M. A. Bourke, of Her Majesty's Ship *Victoria* on the occurrence, and enclosing statements made by Lord Gifford, Flag-Lieutenant, the Staff-Commander, and Lieutenant H. L. Heat. (No. 1.)

16. I also enclose list of Officers drowned, and a nominal list of men rescued. (Nos. 2 and 3.)

17. I cannot express to their Lordships the deep grief and sorrow that is felt in consequence of this lamentable catastrophe by myself, and the Captains, the Officers, and men of the Mediterranean Squadron, a sorrow that is very materially enhanced by

the great and irreparable loss that the Navy and the nation has sustained in the death of our beloved Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., whose kindness of heart, no less than his signal ability in that profession in which he was such a distinguished ornament, had endeared him to all who served under his command.

I have, &c.,

A. MARKHAM, Rear-Admiral.

P.S.—24th June, 1893.

The length of time required to make the *Camperdown* sufficiently seaworthy for passage to Malta cannot yet be definitely stated, but I am in hopes it may be accomplished in a few days.

The following compartments have been pumped out, and are now dry—Fore ballast chamber, boatswain's store-room, submarine mining-room, tank-room, capstan engine flat patent fuel space.

I hope to be able to make the ship water-tight, or nearly so, in a few days.

2. Although I have had ships searching each day since the catastrophe, the only bodies recovered up to the present are those of Fleet-Paymaster Rickard, James Vittles, ship's steward; Spiro Portelli, captain's cook; Joseph Fieres, interpreter; Sergeant A. E. Morgan, R.M.L.L. (Portsmouth); Charles Tomkins, A.B.; which have been interred in the Christian Cemetery at Tripoli.

3. The Turkish authorities have been communicated with relative to any bodies that might be washed ashore, and they have rendered every assistance in their power.

A. MARKHAM, Rear-Admiral.

Forwarding a report of the circumstances of the collision between

Her Majesty's Ss. *Camperdown* and *Victoria*.

Three enclosures,

Her Majesty's Ship *Nile*, at Tripoli,

23rd June, 1893.

SIR,

I have the honour to report that the fleet left Beyrout at 10 a.m., on the 22nd June, and forming in line abreast steered N. by E. at 8.2 knots. This course was maintained until 1.30 p.m., when it was altered together to N.E. by N.

Shortly after 2 p.m., the Commander-in-Chief told me he wished to see me and Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith with the charts. At about 2.10 we went down to his cabin.

The course we were then steering and shown on the chart was N.E. by N., being in single line of bearing W. by N. from Flagship.

The Commander-in-Chief then said that he should form the fleet in two divisions disposed to port, columns six cables apart, and when sufficiently past the line of bear-

ing—namely, the Tower of the Lions, S. by E., which was the line we were going to turn up an anchor upon—he would invert the lines by turning the columns inwards 16 points, so that on reaching the line of bearing for turning up for anchoring the Fleet should alter course together eight points to port, bringing the Fleet in columns of divisions line abreast to port, columns disposed astern steering S. by E., and anchoring on these bearings when Tares Island bore W. by S.

The Staff-Commander then suggested that eight cables would be a better distance to form up, in two divisions than six cables, and the Admiral said. "Yes it should be eight cables."

The Staff-Commander then went on deck, and at about 2.15 or 2.20 the signal was made for the Fleet to form columns of divisions in line ahead, columns disposed abeam to port, columns to be six cables apart. The Staff-Commander then sent down the Flag-Lieutenant to the Admiral to say that six cables were flying, and he had said eight cables. I was then in the Admiral's cabin, who said it was to remain at six cables. I then went on deck.

Just before 2.45 the Staff-Commander sent me the paper with the new course—viz: E. by N. This I took down to the Admiral, who told me to make it, and the Fleet steered at 2.45 E. by N. On this course the Flagship passed two-and-a-half miles north of Rankine Lighthouse.

At 3.20 the Lion's Tower bore S. by E. At this time the Admiral came forward to the fore-bridge and on to the top of the charthouse, were I was with the Staff-Commander. At 3.25 it was reported to him that it was time to hoist the turning signal, and again at 3.27, when he ordered the signal to be hoisted to the first Division to alter course 16 points to port and second Division to alter course 16 points to starboard, leaders together, the rest in succession.

The Flagship's helm was put hard-a-starboard (extreme helm.) and I directed Mr. Lanyon, Midshipman, to observe closely the distance of the *Camperdown*, I reported to the Commander-in-Chief that we should be too close, and asked permission to reverse the port screw. This was done, and just before the collision both engines were going full speed astern.

The ship had turned 12 or 13 points when the *Camperdown* struck the *Victoria* on the starboard bow about 10ft. abaft the anchor, from information given by Chief-Petty-Officer May, who was in his mess right forward, he saw the *Camperdown's* bow come right through into the ship as far as the chain lockers and burst in the bulkhead between the fore mess deck and the Stoker's mess deck.

When the collision was inevitable the

orders were given to close water tight doors, this was done, and preparations made for collision mat, but nothing could be done with the mat, as the bow settled down steadily. At this point I left the deck by the Commander-in-Chief's order, to see if all doors were closed and up to what bulkhead the ship had filled. I went in the starboard flats, and saw the doors closed and also that the scuttles had been shut. I called round and asked if everything was tight, and I was answered "Yes," but by whom I could not say, I then heard an order for everyone to go on deck, and the men in the flat where I was, the starboard side all went up. I then got up on the mess deck and aft and down into the starboard engine-room. The engines were being worked, and I heard the gongs of the telegraphs. I spoke to Mr. Deadman, engineer, who was there, who told me there was no water in the engine-room. He told me all his doors were closed, and then I asked for the fleet engineer; he told me he did not know where he was. I then ran along the main passage to see if those doors were properly closed, and met the fleet engineer coming aft, who said that all was tight (as far as he could make out) abaft the foremost boiler-room. I then went on deck to report to the Commander-in-Chief, and got on the after-bridge, where all were at their stations to get out boats. The ship's company in great numbers were on the port side of the upper deck. I then went along the port fore and aft bridge to make my reports to the Admiral, the ship having a heavy list to starboard. Just as I reached the cutter's foremost davit, the port side, the ship gave a great lurch to starboard, and I clutched at a rail, and then found myself sucked down, but came up to the surface again amongst the wreckage. I with many others were picked up by the *Nile's* boats. The conduct and steadiness of all in their stations was beyond praise, and there was no panic of any sort or description.

I attach the statement of Flag-Lieutenant the Lord Gillford and Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith and Lieutenant Heath.

I have &c.,

MAURICE A. BOURKE,
Captain, H.M.S. *Victoria*.

Rear-Admiral A. H. MARKHAM,
H.M.S. *Camperdown*,

ENCLOSURE NO. 1.

Staff-Commander Hawkins-Smith after the Captain left the bridge.

The Captain left the top of the chart-house immediately after the collision by the Commander-in-Chief's orders to look after the water-tight doors.

The ship was headed in for the land to get into shoal water at a speed of seven

knots, or 38 revolutions, the helm being hard-a-starboard. On my giving the order to right the helm, the wheel could not be moved. She gradually filled by the bow and listed over to starboard.

The Commander-in-Chief and myself were on top of the chart-house at the last, and were washed off by the water coming up there.

I was taken down by, I think, the small masts and again as the ship settled down. When I came up I found some loose oars close by with which I supported myself until picked up by the *Dreadnought's* whaler.

My watch stopped at 3h. 44min. 30sec., that being the time the ship sunk. After finding myself in the water I never saw the Admiral again.

(Signed) T. HAWKINS-SMITH,
Staff-Commander.

ENCLOSURE NO. 2.

Statement by Lieutenant Heath, doing duty as executive Officer, Commander Jellicoe being sick, and Lieutenant Inglefield being in Hospital.

I was on the chart-house when the signal was hauled down and heard the order given "Hard-a-starboard." I saw the ship swinging to port. I went off the chart-house on to the forebridge and heard the order given, "Full speed astern port engine," and seeing a collision imminent, gave orders "Close water-tight doors" and "Out collision mat." I saw many men running down to their stations, and then went down on to the upper deck to see the men into their stations, and ordered the "G's" to be sounded on the bugle. It was while I was on the upper deck that the collision took place. I then went on to the fore-castle to try and place the mat, which I could not do at all, as the ship settled down by the bows and heeled to starboard. I then tried to get down the starboard fore-castle hatchway to see if the doors were properly closed, but I was driven back by the water. From here I went over all to the after-bridge with a view to hoisting the boats out. The Captain ordered me to fall the men on in the port side of the upper deck. This was piped, and almost immediately after the ship lurched heavily to starboard and turned over.

(Signed) H. L. HEATH,
Lieutenant.

ENCLOSURE NO. 3.

Statement of Flag-Lieutenant Lord Gillford.

On June 22nd, the Fleet being formed in single line abreast to port, steering a course N. by E., at 1.30 p.m., a signal was made to alter course together to N.E. by N., thus forming the Fleet on a line of bearing W. by N. from or two points abaft port beam of flagship.

At about 2 p.m., a signal was made to increase speed to 48 revolutions, or about 88 knots. At about 2.15 the Admiral ordered me to make a signal to form "Columns of divisions in line ahead, columns disposed abeam to port," and immediately afterwards to make "Columns to be six cables apart." The first signal was made, answered, and hauled down, the signal (*i. e.* columns to be six cables apart) was then hoisted, and whilst still flying the Staff-Commander came aft to me and said, "The Admiral intended that the columns should be eight cables apart." I thereupon went below and informed the Admiral of what the Staff-Commander had said. He (the Admiral) replied that he wished the columns to be left at six cables apart. I went on deck, hauled the signal down, as it was answered, and sent to inform the Staff-Commander that the Admiral wished the columns to remain at six cables apart. About 2.45 p.m. the course was altered to E. by N. in succession, preserving the order of the Fleet; the first division reducing and the second division increasing speed of engines to carry the evolution out.

About 3.15 p.m., the Admiral came on deck, and after a few minutes on the after bridge went forward on to the top of the fore chart-house.

At about 3.25 I hoisted the following signals by the Admiral's order, viz:—

2 flag	} and {	2 flag
2 pendant		1 pendant
compass pendant		1 flag
1 flag		6 flag
6 flag		compass pendant

Second division alter course in succession 16 points to starboard, preserving the order of the Fleet.	} and {	First division alter course 16 points to port, preserving the order of the Fleet.
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Whilst the above were flying the Admiral ordered the following to be got ready, viz:—

E Flag	} and {	Blue pendant at the masthead.
G Flag		
2 Flag		

or

Columns to be } and {	All ships will turn together with their guides as the guide of the Fleet turns.
two cables apart }	

That last ship to answer the above signals as far as I could see was the *Camperdown*. At about 3.30, as soon as she had answered, the signal was hauled down by order of the Admiral. Thereupon the *Victoria* put her helm hard to starboard, and the *Camperdown* hard to port.

I ordered three midshipmen to watch the speed and helm signals of the *Camperdown*

Edinburgh, and *Nile*. No alteration was, however, reported to me other than the *Camperdown's* helm being put hard over on the signal being hauled down.

A collision appearing likely with the *Camperdown* the port engines were reversed, and almost immediately afterwards, the starboard engines also.

"Close watertight doors" was piped just before the collision occurred.

The *Camperdown*, struck the *Victoria* just abaft the starboard anchor bed.

The *Victoria* immediately heeled slightly over to starboard.

I reported to the Admiral that the *Decatur* was lowering some boats. He thereupon made a general signal, "Annual sending boats."

Immediately afterwards he made a general signal to "open" (9 pendants.)

On the *Camperdown* disengaging from the *Victoria*, she (the *Victoria*) retained a list to starboard, and had settled down slightly by the bows.

An attempt was made to place the collision mat, but the water rising quickly over the fore-castle, it was abandoned.

The Captain, by the Admiral's order, then went below to see the watertight doors, &c., closed.

The Admiral remained on deck. He asked the Staff-Commander what water we were in; he replied, "Deep water 70 or 80 fathoms."

The helm was put hard to starboard, and both engines to half-speed ahead (38 revolutions.)

The ship gathered headway and swung slowly to port.

A minute afterwards the steering gear broke down, the quartermaster reporting being unable to move the wheel.

During this time the ship was gradually heeling more and more over to starboard, and the water was rising rapidly over the fore-castle.

The Admiral ordered me to go down and ask the Captain if the ship was making any water aft.

On gaining the port side of the upper deck I found a number of men attempting to climb up over the nettings.

Immediately afterwards I lost my footing on the ship giving a rapid lurch to starboard.

I clambered along the deck to the port foremost 6-pounder gun, where the rising water washed me away.


The time from the actual collision to when she turned over and swamped was, I should say, eight to ten minutes.

When I came to the surface I was roughly midway between the *Nile* and the *Victoria* whose screw revolving in air I just caught sight of as she sank bows first.

GILLARD,
Flag-Lieutenant.

DIAGRAM

Prepared for the Admiralty by Lieutenant Francis T. Barr,
showing the position of the Ship when the mishap occurred, and
signed by Captain Johnstone of the Camperdown.



AGENT AND PURVEYOR



TO H. MAJESTY'S NAVY.

C. CARUANA,

OFFICES:

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do. D. & J. ROBERTSON, Edinburgh Scotch Whiskey.

do. REINART PERE & FILS. Cream Champagne.


do. F. GUESLER & Co., Dry Champagne.

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


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