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J. Carter. Vol. 18 1/2
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V I E W

O F

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY;

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

W. Warburton

LETTERS FIRST ~~and~~ SECOND. *& Mi*
and Fourth.

OPROCERES! Censore opuse est, an Haruspice nobis?

Warburton and Bird JUV.

L O N D O N,

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON, in Ludgate-
Street. MDCCCLIV.

W I L V

or

WILLIAMSON'S

WILLIAMSON'S

WILLIAMSON'S

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WILLIAMSON'S

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Esq. B

1358

W199v

DEAR SIR,

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY, so much and so long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the Public. For I think it unjust to the Editor, to suppose his Lordship did not intend the World this LEGACY. His last Will sufficiently shews us his kind intention. But it will be said, he speaks of it, as a thing composed only for the solace and admiration of a few friends in a corner [1]. What then? might not his Lordship change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you will say, without *contradicting* his professed principles. So much the

[1] "Let us seek truth, but seek it quietly as well as freely. Let us not imagine, like some who are called FREE-THINKERS, that every man who can think and judge for himself (as he has a right to do) has therefore a right of SPEAKING, any more than of *acting*, according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The freedom belongs to him as a rational creature. He lies under the restraint as a *member of Society*. — As we think for ourselves, we may keep our thoughts to ourselves or communicate them with a DUE RESERVE, and in such manner ONLY, as it may be done without *offending the Laws of our Country, and disturbing the public peace.*" — *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii. p. 343. Quarto Edition.

better.

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better. The publication then will be of a piece with the rest. And never trouble your head with one *contradiction*, where you may meet with a thousand.

Quid te exempta levat spinis de pluribus una?

Now tho' I know You have as little Curiosity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the FAITH which has got possession of your heart, as what a Pick-pocket can chicane to the Property in your purse: yet the name of L. BOLINGBROKE'S METAPHYSICS, (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little understood, as his POLITICS) cannot sure but incline you to some slight acquaintance at least with this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other Conquerors, he erects on a general desolation.

The only part of his Lordship's Character, that yet remained equivocal, was his LITERARY. How this will fare by the publication of his *Philosophy*, I will not pretend to say; perhaps not altogether so well as his Friends might give him the pleasure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the Doctrine of his ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS had been occasionally thrown out amongst them, and made the
subject

subject of many free conversations. While haranguing in that circle, I will suppose he met with the applause he sought for. But had he chose to bring them to the bar of the Publick himself, he might have seen strange revolutions. “*Illic, et Judex tacet, et Adversarius obstrepit, et nihil TEMERE DICTUM perit: et, siquid TIBI IPSE SUMAS, PROBANDUM EST: et, omisso MAGNA SEMPER FLANDI TUMORE, loquendum est [1].*” Indeed his Lordship could hardly expect to escape the severity of this tribunal but by a very superior merit: Since his meditations on divine matters are so extensive, that scarce any one, who has written in defence of Virtue, or Religion, but will find himself either insulted in his person or misrepresented in his opinions; and merely for being in his Lordship’s way.

But sure, when a man of his polite manners had condescended to enter into learned altercation, the world might at least expect a Model for the *courtly management of Controversy*: which, once for all, should have either reformed, or should for ever discredit the grosser Polemics of

[1] Quint.

the Schools. So that tho' the DIVINE would expect no great *matter* from these *oracles of reason*, yet he would readily accept his amends in the *manner* of so elegant a pen. And perhaps you will think, Divines had been no losers by this equivalent: You, who have observed that, in their commerce with the World, the chief difficulty lies in the *Forms*: Indeed, they have been generally thought wanting in them; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the Authority of Reason; or their prudence teaches them to submit to the Wisdom of their Betters. And the management of their controversies in the Schools, and the prosecution of their interests in Courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious to the censure of their adversaries. I would willingly avoid both these extremes. For I would, if possible, preserve and support that love and reverence to an useful Body, which the noble Writer, relying, not on his own Politics, but on other men's, has, in his *fourth Essay*, devoted to Destruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the *Secular arm*; he has the old reason for so doing; but, I dare say, the *Clergy* never will.

Things are now come to that pass, that the State seems to be in more need of their Support, than They, of the State's. For, tho' the cavils of licentious men always end in the Confirmation of Truth and Virtue, yet they generally set out in loosening the hold, which Religion has on the PEOPLE. And when that is gone, what other Engine the Magistrate will invent, to keep the multitude in order, They, whose principal concern it is, would do well to consider.

As I said, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adversary, for an Adversary he has condescended to be, and a warm conflict it is likely to prove, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in conversation, that studied politeness, which is so well fitted to keep inferiors at a distance: And that, when he had declared mortal war against every thing the world hath hitherto called RELIGION; and against that Order, (call them as you will, PRIESTS, or MINISTERS) which all states had thought proper to establish, for the Support of it, we should see his attack carried on by the fairest as well as strongest reasoning, the

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gentlest as well as the firmest address, and the politest as well as the keenest raillery.

But how was I disappointed, to find this Conservator of States, this Legislator in Philosophy and Religion, utterly unable to raise his head above the rank contagion of the Schools: to see Polemics go their usual train; and this Sun of our new System, whirled along the turbid vortex of controversy, like any the most *ignoble* of the earthly Bodies! But his POET, or rather his *Prophet*, (who so magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all these good things) had prepared us for it. He had contemplated this strange phenomenon: not, indeed, without surprize. It is, says he,

——“ mighty odd :
“ A fit of vapours clouds this DEMI-GOD.”

To be plain, I met with nothing in these big Volumes, but the rankness of SOUTH without his force; and the malignity of MARVEL without his wit. You shall not believe me on my own word: the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to present you with a SPECIMEN, under his own hand, of his candour, his
temper,

temper, and infinite politeness. And tho' one can but ill judge of the *harvest* by a sample of the field-flowers, yet we may form a pretty good guess of the *soil*.

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propose to give you a taste, the mere escape of fancy or humour, which it would be charity to overlook: It is a sort of *formula dicendi*, without which, all his Lordship's authentic acts of Legislation would be invalid; It is the very SPIRIT of his *new Religion*, without which, the whole would be indeed but a *dead letter*.

It was with the less reluctance I entered on this part of my design, that I might have to justify to the world the plainness and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordship's REASONING; (as you know I am sometimes thinking to give it a thorough Examination;) for, the excellent Quintilian well observes, "Præ-
"statur hoc aliquando etiam DIGNITATI-
"BUS ut libertatis nostræ RATIO reddatur,
"ne quis nos aut *petulantes* in lædendis his,
"aut etiam *ambitiosos* putet."

Without any further preface, then, let the Shew begin: Only premising, that as his Lordship had a FIRST PHILOSOPHY to

erect, he had an immense deal of rubbish to remove: The rubbish of every great Name, and of every sacred Order: all of which stood directly in his way.

With CUDWORTH he begins: and of CUDWORTH he says, *The heads of many reverend persons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philosophical delirium. None hath been more so than this divine* [1]. Again, CUDWORTH [in his INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM] gives you little less than a nonsensical paraphrase of nonsense. It was not his fault. The good man passed his life in the study of an unmeaning jargon; and as he learned, he taught [2].

To talk, like CUMBERLAND, of promoting the good of the whole System of rational Agents, amongst whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphysical jargon and theological blasphemy [3].

CLARKE triumphs in this foolish and wicked rhodomontade, &c. [4]—All CLARKE says about the discovery of God's will, is a rhapsody of presumptuous reasoning and of

[1] Vol. iii. p. 353. of his Works, in Quarto.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 92.

[3] Vol. v. p. 82.

[4] Vol. v. p. 252.

prophane absurdities [5]. — *Audacious and vain Sophist!* His terms have a solemn air, that may impose on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more absurdity cannot be stuffed into so few words [6].

Declaiming against WOLLASTON, he says, *But I will detain you no longer about such discourse as would convince you, if you heard it at MONROE'S, that the Philosopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor's not yet perfectly restored to his senses* [7]. Again, of the same excellent Person, *We have here an example of the second sort of Madness mentioned above. The man who writ all this nonsense was a man of parts, — But when these learned Lunaticks, &c.* [8].

CLARKE and WOLLASTON are now grown outrageous; and fit only to be chained together. So that henceforth they are rarely shewn asunder. We sometimes find them in the *height of a metaphysical frenzy* [9]: And, by what one can see, without much provocation. They had proved the Soul to be a thinking substance distinct from Matter: And I

[5] Vol. v. p. 292.

[6] Vol. v. p. 395.

[7] Vol. iii. p. 518.

[8] Vol. v. p. 374.

[9] Vol. iii. p. 514.

don't know of any body, before his Lordship (who very civilly permitted them to enjoy the honour of it for life) that pretended to question the *demonstration*.

The President FORBES is *really mad*; but it is only *quoad hoc*. For observe, he was *no Divine by profession, but something better* [10]. Indeed, not much. He was a LAWYER. Of which *unlearned Profession*, as he calls it, *ninety nine in a hundred at least*, (he says) *are Petty-foggers, Sharpers, Brawlers, and Cavillers* [11].

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he sometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, *The good Earl of Nottingham*; and the *righteous Bishop Sherlock*. They deserved this compound abuse. For the First publicly defended, and ably too, that *Faith* which stands so much in his way: and the Other once ventured to oppose that *Party*, whose patronage he had then condescended to assume.

He comes next to the whole BODY of the Christian Clergy. And now the *first Philosophy* begins to work; and the task to grow serious. The PRIMITIVE SAINTS and DOCTORS have the precedence, as is fitting. "The list of MARTYRS consist-

[10] Vol. v. p. 523.

[11] Vol. ii. p. 353.

“ ed, I believe, of those who suffered for
 “ BREAKING THE PEACE [11]. The PRI-
 “ MITIVE CLERGY were, under pretence
 “ of Religion, a very LAWLESS TRIBE [12].”
 “ ALL the Christian FATHERS using a DE-
 “ LIRIOUS STYLE, it became that of Chri-
 “ stian Theology [13.]” “ It would scarce
 “ be possible to believe that the greatest
 “ Saints and Doctors of the Church had
 “ talked so much BLASPHEMOUS NONSENSE,
 “ and employed so much *artifice* about it,
 “ if their writings were not extant [14].”
 —“ Of all this *absurdity, prophaneness, and*
 “ *ridicule*, they who built up Christian
 “ theology were guilty.” You ask, with
 impatience, What was this *absurdity*? &c.
 He was going to tell you; for he never
 minces matters. “ They ADDED (says he)
 “ the EPISTLES to the GOSPELS; the doc-
 “ trines of PAUL to those of CHRIST; till
 “ the APOCALYPSE became a part of our
 “ holy Scriptures [15].” And now, I hope,
 you are satisfied; and ready for what he
 tells us was the result, That “ Christian
 “ Divines and Philosophers have done

[11] Vol. iv. p. 434.

[12] Id. ib.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 612.

[14] Vol. iv. p. 303.

[15] Vol. iv. p. 371.

“ more to DEBASE our notions of the su-
 “ preme Being, than all the Doctors of
 “ Polytheism [16].”

This was reasonably well, for new-be-
 ginners : But nothing like the feats of MO-
 DERN DIVINES.

“ It is MADNESS, or *something* WORSE
 “ *than madness*, for Divines to imagine
 “ themselves able to comprehend a whole
 “ Oeconomy of divine Wisdom from *Adam*
 “ down to *Christ*. And yet this is so cus-
 “ tomary, that not only the learned and
 “ ingenious, but every dabbler in Theolo-
 “ gy, who must pass for a *fool* or a *knave*
 “ whenever he grows extravagant, affects
 “ to reason in the same manner [17].”

—“ Would Divines insist chiefly on the
 “ external proofs of the authenticity of
 “ Scripture—they would avoid *a great deal*
 “ *of* BLASPHEMY [18].”— “ They are ab-
 “ surd and licentious in urging both the
 “ external and internal evidence of Revela-
 “ tion [19].”

—“ Our Divines turn themselves to de-
 “ claim on certain and undoubted marks of
 “ the divine Authority of the Scriptures of

[16] Vol. iii. p. 541.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 274.

[18] Vol. iii. p. 272.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 273.

“ the Israelites—Let us compare some of
 “ these supposed marks with those of hu-
 “ man original, and they will stare us in
 “ the face, and point out plainly the FRAUD
 “ and IMPOSTURE [20].”

— “ It is common and yet astonishing to
 “ observe, with how much solemnity and
 “ confidence almost all those who teach
 “ and defend Christianity, presume to AF-
 “ FIRM ANY THING, tho’ never so evident-
 “ ly FALSE [1].”

— “ The best, and even such as pass for
 “ the fairest controversial Writers, improve
 “ by artifice the natural infirmity of the
 “ human mind. They do, on purpose,
 “ confound ideas and perplex the signi-
 “ fication of signs—the most scandalous
 “ frauds are applauded under the name of
 “ subtilties. This I call theological fraud [2].”

Hence, in another place, he says, that *fol-
 ly and knavery prevail most amongst Divines*
 [3]; and again, that They are THE PLAGUES
 AND SCOURGES OF THE WORLD [4].

“ The doctrine of Clarke and other
 “ Christian Divines about our obligation

[20] Vol. iii. p. 288.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 295.

[2] Vol. iii. p. 424—5.

[3] Vol. v. p. 6.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 435.

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“ to imitate God is FALSE and PRO-
“ PHANE [5].”

“ Divines have IMPUDENTLY and
“ WICKEDLY assumed, that there is a law
“ of right reason common to God and
“ man [6].”

“ What I have advanced will be treated
“ as an impious paradox by some of the
“ trifling solemn dogmatists in Criticism and
“ Theology, who have advanced so many
“ *absurd and impious* paradoxes of their
“ own [7].”

“ We now come to what the noble author
calls the DELIRIUM OF METAPHYSICAL
THEOLOGY [8].— “ The man who walk-
“ ed soberly about in the Bedlam of Paris,
“ and believed himself God the Father,
“ was mad. Thus the Philosopher, who
“ takes a bold leap from a few clear and
“ distinct ideas to the first principles of
“ things, is *mad* [9].”

“ The *reasoners à priori* resemble very
“ much one sort of MADMEN. Some of
“ these are so VERY MAD that they lose all
“ use of their reason. Others again deduce

[5] Vol. v. p. 65.

[6] Vol. v. p. 77.

[7] Vol. v. p. 190.

[8] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 139.

“ consequences, and argue very justly, but
 “ are STILL MAD: because they reason
 “ from principles that have no appearance
 “ of reality out of their own overheated and
 “ disordered imaginations. You will find
 “ instances of this kind, without the trou-
 “ ble of going to *Bedlam*; but you will
 “ find them principally in *Colleges* and
 “ *Schools* [10].”

— “ They deserve to be treated like
 “ patients proper for Dr. MONROE, and
 “ to be put under his care. Nothing less
 “ than *Metaphysics* could have turned so
 “ many good heads [11].”

Well then, Divines are all MAD; and, for fear of mischief, in safe custody. Sometimes indeed, his Lordship lets them out to cool, and air themselves; nay, he is so good to give them their lucid intervals; but it is only to *play the rogue*, and to *cant in the pulpit*; and then, back again to their kennel, to *Monroe*, and his discipline; or, what is still worse, to his Lordship's; to hear themselves called *Fools*, *Knaves*, *Cheats*, *mad men*, *Impostors*, and *Blasphemers*. And, for these hasty changes of the Scene, he has contrived a most in-

[10] Vol. v. p. 369.

[11] Vol. v. p. 417.

genious expedient. He has divided the Clergy into the two classes of *Theologians* and *Metaphysicians*: in the first of which, the KNAVE is predominant; in the second, the MADMAN. So that he has of either sort always ready, and at hand, just as he wants them. But as *Madmen* are much easier dealt with than *Knaves*, he has prepared one common BEDLAM for the reception of them all. *For God forbid* (he says) *he should be as uncharitable as Divines*, to think they deserved a worse place, *as blaspheming in their senses* [12]. Good man! How shall the clergy express their thanks to him for so much Charity? Alas! he thinks not of it: his *modesty* is still greater than his charity: and he is only anxious not to be misunderstood; and lest *Divines* should take his honest freedom in dudgeon. Nay, he is even ready to fear, that it may possibly *procure him, in return, some ecclesiastical BILLINGSLATE*; *to be called infidel, deist, and perhaps atheist*. *My reply* (says he) *to so ANGRY Disputants should be CALM, AND SUCH AS MIGHT TEACH CHARITY to those who preach it so much, and practise it so little* [13]. To say the truth, his Lord-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 464.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 225.

ship seems, like (JUSTICE SHALLOW in the Play) to be suspicious of those he had so well entertained. Davy, (says the Justice, speaking of his Court-Guests) *be civil to these Knaves, for they will BACK-BITE.* Not worse than they are BITTEN (replies Davy) *for they have marvelous foul linen.* Whether his Lordship found the *Priest's Surplice* in this condition, or whether he left it so, is not material. No marvel at it's evil plight, when it has been so long over-run with Vermin; such as Toland, Chub, Morgan; and those who have been since bred out of them.

The BILLINGSGATE, however, if we give but equal credit to what we *hear* of the Clergy, and to what we *see* of his Lordship, lies pretty nearly between them. Admit, they have both their share: yet, I agree with the right Honourable Author, it becomes the reverend Clergy much less than it does him. They are *Disputants*; he is an *Orator*. Their proper business is to *reason*; his proper business is to *rail*. While each confines himself to his province, every thing goes well. But should they change weapons; should the Orator attempt to reason,

and the Disputant be provoked to rail, all would be out of order. I venture, on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon *railing* amongst the ARTS of Eloquence. “CONVI-
 “TIIS implere VACUA causarum,” says this able Rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the less perfect kind—“est enim pror-
 “fus CANINA ELOQUENTIA.” But his Lordship might reasonably think, that his *Dog-Eloquence*, was well enough fitted to their *Dog-Logic*. However, Quintilian would not overload this species of Eloquence, nor would I; tho’ neither of us be much disposed to extol it. He confesses there is yet a ranker kind. “Sed hæc mi-
 “nora sunt ILLO VITIO ANIMI, quo MALE-
 “DICUS a MALEFICO non distat, nisi OCCA-
 “SIONE.” “In which, says he, nothing but
 “*opportunity* is wanting to make the *evil-*
 “*speaker* an *evil-doer*.” But the *Minister of State* must join the *Orator*: before this can be brought about: just as the DIVINE and ATHEIST must *conspire* to make that ARTIFICIAL BLASPHEMY which, his Lordship assures us, has eaten into the very vitals of Religion.

But the mention of this CONSPIRACY re-
 minds

minds me that it is now high time to give you some account of it.

Hitherto we have only the out-lines, or, at most the general air of this *Clerical Portrait*; all he could catch at the first sitting. A horrid combination finishes the Picture: a CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS, *to dishonour and degrade the God of the universe.* This is the striking feature; and so artificially disposed, that, turn the Portrait what way you will, it has still a *plotting*, which in his Lordship's justice, is little better than a *hanging look*.

A confederacy so monstrous, so mad, so portentous, may perhaps startle you at first. But don't be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a Treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for this sort of business. He could reconcile the most unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his *morals*; and the most ridiculous miscarriages to the superiority of his *Politics*. But a *confederacy between Divines and Atheists!* you say.—Was any thing so odious! What think you, I pray, of that

blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George's Protestant Subjects, and a Popish Pretender? How *that* came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that matter [18]. But, as to *this* confederacy, I may have an opportunity of shewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and dissolved it, himself. At present, my business is only to shew you what he *says* of it.

“ After pleading the cause of natural
 “ and revealed Religion, I am to plead
 “ the cause of God himself, against DI-
 “ VINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERA-
 “ CY [19].

“ The conduct of Christian Divines has
 “ been so far from defending the Provi-
 “ dence of God, that they have joined in
 “ the clamour against it. Nothing has
 “ hindered, even those who pretend to be
 “ his Messengers, his Embassadors, his
 “ *Plenipotentiaries*, from renouncing their
 “ allegiance to him, as they themselves have

[18] See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[19] Vol. v. p. 305.

“ the FRONT TO AVOW, but the hypothe-
 “ sis of a future state. On this hypothesis
 “ alone they insist; and therefore if this
 “ will not serve their turn, God is disowned
 “ by them, as effectually as if he was so, in
 “ terms [20].” “ Divines, if not Atheists,
 “ yet are ABETTERS of Atheism [1].”

“ That there were some men, who
 “ knew not God in all ages may be true:
 “ but the scandalous task of COMBATING
 “ HIS EXISTENCE under the mark of
 “ Theism, was reserved for Metaphysici-
 “ ans and Theologians [2].”

—“ Divines are still more to be blamed.
 “ A CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS be-
 “ comes ill the professors of Theism.
 “ No matter. They PERSIST; and have
 “ done their best, in concert with their
 “ allies, to DESTROY the belief of the good-
 “ ness of God:—They endeavour to DE-
 “ STROY that of his goodness, which is a
 “ farther article of their Alliance [3].”

“ The CONFEDERACY between Atheists
 “ and Divines appears to have been carried

[20] Vol. v. p. 487—8.

[1] Vol. v. p. 485.

[2] Vol. v. p. 307.

[3] Vol. v. p. 393.

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“VERY FAR—Nay the Atheist will appear, to that reason, to which they both appeal, more consistent in his absurdity than the Divine [4].” “DIVINES UPBRAID God's goodness, and CENSURE his Justice [5].”—“INJUSTICE is, in this life, ascribed to God, by Divines [6].”

“The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaston and Clarke, do, in effect RENOUNCE the God, whom you and I adore, as much as the rankest of the Atheistical Tribe. Your Priests and our Parsons will exclaim most pathetically, and RAIL OUTRAGEOUSLY at this assertion. But have a little patience, and I will prove it to their shame to be true [7].”

This is bold: but he knew there was no danger. These *Priests* and *Parsons*, as he tells us, are mere ORTHODOX BULLIES, *who affect to triumph over men who employ but part of their strength; tire them with IMPERTINENT PARADOXES; and provoke them by UNJUST REFLECTIONS, and often, by the FOULEST LANGUAGE* [8].

[4] Vol. v. p. 348—9.

[5] Vol. v. p. 417.

[6] Vol. v. p. 541.

[7] Vol. v. p. 485.

[8] Vol. iii. p. 273.

Now,

Now, on a man of his Lordship's professed moderation, as well as *concealed strength*, who, (as himself assures us) *sets an example of candour* [9], these *orthodox Bullies* can have no hold. For, as *impudent* as they are, they can never *have the face* to call *this confederacy with Atheists* an IMPERTINENT PARADOX; this attempt to *decry God's providence, to blot out his attributes of goodness and justice, to combat his existence, and finally to renounce him*, an UNJUST REFLECTION: or that the names, he gives them, of *madmen, fools, knaves, blasphemers*, is FOUL LANGUAGE. But then you ask, what sort of eloquence is it, with which these *Orthodox Bullies* contrive to RAIL OUTRAGEOUSLY, and yet employ none of his Lordship's flowers of speech? Now, tho' this specimen of his *Lordship's* eloquence, was what I owed to his inimitable pen; I have not the same obligation, nor shall have the same complaisance, to the *Divines*.

You will forgive me, I dare say, if I rather chuse, to vindicate them from the horrid calumny of this imaginary confede-

[9] Vol. iv. p. 548.

racy; even tho' I go a little out of my way to do it. To say the truth, the charge is too serious to be passed over with the same lightness I am disposed to treat the rest of his Lordship's foul Language. Besides, I should be ashamed to do nothing but trifle; tho' his Lordship (as his friend Pope predicted of him [10]) affords none but trifling occasions.

Be pleased then to understand, that ATHEISM ever endeavoured to support it self, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of sense can give it; namely *the irregular distribution of moral good and evil.*

—“ Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
 “ Adspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
 “ Vexarique pios——labefacta cadebat
 “ RELIGIO,”—

was the common language of the impatient sufferer. From hence the Atheist inferred, that things were without an intelligent Ruler; driven about by that Fate or For-

[10] IF EVER LORD B. TRIFLES, IT MUST BE WHEN HE TURNS A DIVINE. Pope's Works, Vol. IX. Letter 14.

tune, which first produced them. DIVINES opposed this *conclusion*: for they did not venture to be so paradoxical as, with his Lordship, to call in question *the premisses*, a phenomenon which objected itself to all their senses. They demonstrated, STRICTLY DEMONSTRATED, the Being of a God, and his moral attributes. And then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were included in this life, the present distribution of moral good and evil would contradict that demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not included in this life: but that man was reserved for a future reckoning; in which, an equal distribution of rewards and punishments will amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheists* were not the only enemies *Divines* had to do with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those moral attributes, which *Divines* had demonstrated. And, on that account, called themselves DEISTS. Yet they agreed so far with *Atheism*, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the *Divines*

com-

combated in their turn ; and with the same arms ; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the *Atheist*, the principle held in common, was *the present unequal distribution of Good and Evil*. So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of NO GOD, they proved his *being and attributes*: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With the *Deist*, the common principle was *the being and attributes of God*. Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, they proved the present *unequal distribution* of good and evil ; and from thence inferred, that there must be such a State.

This is a plain and true account of the contest with ATHEISTS and DEISTS, in which the subject of *a future state* came in question: In either controversy, it is *deduced from the moral attributes*: only with this difference, In the dispute with Atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is *made*; in the dispute with Deists it is *allowed*. The final purpose against Atheism is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God ; against Deism to prove

A FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can subsist without *believing that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of them that seek him* [11]. Thus, we see, the *question*, in either controversy, being different; the *premisses*, by which they were to be proved, must needs be different. The difference is here explained: the *premisses*, in the argument with Atheists, were the *moral attributes*; the *premisses* in the argument with Deists, the *unequal distribution* of good and evil.

Who now would have expected to see calumny either thrive or rise on so unpromising a ground: or a writer bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY *with ATHEISTS, to decry God's providence; to blot out his attributes of goodness and justice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very existence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this; and more;—He hopes to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have pushed his confidence in it's credulity so far, had he himself

[11] St. Paul.

seen his way clear before him. His Lordship is always sublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly at too great a distance to see into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minutiæ*: for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his genius: So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he had jumbled the two controversies together; and, in the confusion, has commodiously slipped in one fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making A FUTURE STATE THE PROOF OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES: Whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES A PROOF OF A FUTURE STATE. Let us consider how the dispute stands with *Atheists*. These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine answers, by *demonstrating* God's Being and Attributes: and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the *Deist*. Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a *future state* from
from

from the unequal distribution of things. How then was it possible, you will ask, it should be as his Lordship pretends; and is perpetually repeating; namely, that *Divines make a future state the proof of God's moral attributes?* What tell you me, of possible? It was necessary. It was to support his slander of a CONFEDERACY. There was no room to pretend that God's Being and attributes were made precarious, by proving a *future state*, from them: But could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Being and attributes from a *future state*, he would easily find credit with his kind readers, for the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY rises to this, That *Divines and Atheists hold a principle in common*; but in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of moral good and evil. His Lordship has been angry with all POLITICAL, as well as all RELIGIOUS Parties in their turns. Suppose he had taken it into his head to ornament a CRAFTSMAN with the detection of a *political confederacy* between the WHIGGS and JACOBITES, to dethrone KING

GEORGE; because both denied that he reigned *jure divino*: Would not *Mother Osborne* have smiled through all her gravity; and told him that the *Whiggs* urged this common principle to support their Monarch's title against *indefeasible hereditary right*? And is it not as evident that, in this pretended *anti-theological conspiracy*, *Divines* employed the other common principle, to support Religion against *Atheism and Deism*! But whatever his Lordship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing the most careless Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, lies lurking the poorest species of a Bigot's calumny; which too is perpetually betraying itself in the *meanness* of misrepresentation, and the *rancour* of abusive language. For it is the Bigot's practice, from *one* principle held in common, to charge his Adversary with *all* the follies or impieties of an obnoxious Party. This miserable artifice had been now long hissed out of learned controversy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political skill, worked it into a

SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION distrust its best Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

TINDAL and COLLINS were manly Adversaries. They knew how to invent, to pursue, and to push an argument against Religion. But what does this noble Writer know?— His friends will tell you. They admire him for his wit and eloquence. But his friends admire, where You and I see nothing but an inflamed spirit, and an inflated style.

But he has not yet done with the CHRISTIAN CLERGY. What remained behind was to collect together his scattered abuse; and to pour it all at once on that venerable Body, with as unfeeling a hand, as unrelenting heart.

“ Nothing more (says he) will be wanting to answer all the ends of *artificial Theology*, than to assume that they who minister in holy things are the *Omrahs*, the *Vizirs* and the *Bassas* of THIS MIGHTY KING, whose commands they publish, interpret, and execute, or cause to be executed, rather than his EMBASSADORS: by assuming which latter characters,

32. A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S

“ ters, they seem to lessen, over modestly,
“ the dignity of their own order, and to
“ raise that of the Laity too high : BUT I
“ AM ASHAMED TO HAVE SAID SO MUCH
“ ON THIS SUBJECT [12].”

This is, indeed, as he says of them, *over modest*. But they will be ready to reply in the words of the Poet,

“ Let SHAME come when it will, we
“ do not call it”.

Besides, after what has passed, I see nothing he need be *ashamed of*; unless it be for stealing the poultry joke of *Embassadors* and *Plenipotentiaries* [13] from Lord Shaftsbury: which, if it but contribute to support his character for *Wit*, I think, may be easily forgiven.

“ Far be it from me (pursues this Right
“ Honourable Person) and from every lover
“ of Truth and common sense, to wish that
“ the race of Metaphysicians and Casuists
“ should increase, or so much as continue.
“ But since there are, have been, and will

[12] Vol. v. p. 540—1.

[13] See p. 20. of this Letter.

“ be such men in all ages, it is very rea-
 “ sonable to wish that they may serve to
 “ the same good purpose that the HELOTES,
 “ the DRUNKEN SLAVES did at Sparta ;
 “ and that their DELIRIUM, instead of im-
 “ posing on others, and even infecting ma-
 “ ny, may be at length LAUGHED OUT of
 “ the world [10].” What pity is it his
 Lordship himself had not tried this expedient ; (whose efficacy, other Lords of better temper, so kindly recommend and practise [11],) and employed his great *wit* to laugh the Clergy out of the world, rather than his *eloquence* to scold them out of it. He may rail, thro’ all his figures, at *the impertinence of Logic, the futility of Metaphysics, the fraud of Disputation, and the blasphemy of Divinity* [12]. These are the arms of impotent, hysterical Women when they want to have their will. After the long labours of a HOOKER, a STILLINGFLEET, a CUDWORTH, a SPENCER, a TILLOTSON, and a CLARKE, the English Clergy may answer his Lordship, in the words of *De Rosny*, as I think the story goes, to some

[10] Vol. v. p. 446. [11] See their *Essays*, of past and present date, in *the freedom of wit and humour*.

[12] Vol. iv. p. 353.

old Ladies of the *League*, who, when HENRY IV. had got possession of Paris, were one day very *eloquent* in their invectives against him, “ Good ancient Gentlewomen, said this rough old Soldier) spare your breath, and set your hearts at rest, for MY MASTER is not a man to be scratched and scolded out of his KINGDOM.”

But when, between his malice and his magic, he had transformed the CLERGY into *drunken slaves*; you must not think he would neglect to expose them to his NOBLE SPARTANS, in this condition. He hath not envied his Friends their entertainment: and no cost is spared of lavish expression to set out these drunken revels. “ The Choirs of birds (says he) “ who whistle and sing, or scream at “ one another, or herds of beasts who “ bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one “ another, have just as much meaning and “ communicate it as well --- Such is the “ common conversation — Such, too, for “ the most part, are all the public discourses “ that are held, and the solemn harangues “ of the Pulpit [13].”

[13] Vol. iii. p. 422—3.

After so large a collection of his Lordship's flowers of speech, you will dispense with me from gathering up his looser ends; such as, *absurdity, effronderie, knavery, folly, nonsense, delirium, frenzy, lunacy, downright madness, impiety, prophaneness, blasphemy, and atheism*: which, like seed-pearl, are every where scattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

But when I review this torrent of ribaldry, strong enough to overlay an Oyster-wench, I am apt, with indignation, to ask,

An quæ

Turpia cerdoni, Volesos Brutumq; decebunt?

but ready, however, in charity to suspect, that even as his Lordship gave to BOWNCE, his friend's dog, the sentiments of his master [14], so his Lordship's Secretary, who attended to two at once, his Lordship and his Lordship's PARROT, might unaware put

[14] *The world (says his Lordship to Pope) is as well fitted for BOWNCE as for YOU, with respect to physical nature; and with respect to MORAL nature, BOWNCE has little to do beyond heark'ning to the STILL WHISPERS, the SECRET SUGGESTIONS, and the SUDDEN INFLUENCES of instinct.* Vol v. p. 467. This, the Reader sees, is intended for a compliment

down to his Lord, what indeed belonged to the Favorite : who, however *eloquent* he might be, yet, we are told, was *no Philosopher*.

The Coxcomb bird, so talkative and grave,
That from his cage cries *cuckold*, *whore* and *knave*,
Tho' many a passenger he rightly call,
We hold him NO PHILOSOPHER at all."

And I the rather suppose the Secretary to be here in fault, since his Lordship, in one place, seems to think, that ribaldry and ill language disgrace the *animal implume bipes*, the *two-leg'd unfeathered Philosopher*. For, speaking of SPINOZA and HOBBS, he says, *Let it not be said, they are men of DEPRAVED UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DEPRAVED MORALS; THIS IS TO RAIL, NOT TO ARGUE.*

To *rail*, then, when we should *argue*, in his Lordship's opinion, is a fault. Unless

on the following stanza of his Friend's *Universal prayer*.

" Where I am right, THY GRACE IMPART,

" Still in the right to stay ;

" Where I am wrong, O TEACH MY HEART

" To find that better way."

you will suppose, these two *atheists* were especially favoured, because not found in bad Company; wickedly CONFEDERATING with *Divines* and *Metaphysicians*.

Seriously, as good men may be scandalized to find their Pastors accused and convicted of *blasphemy* and *prophaneness*; (for in his Lordship's process the proof is always included in the charge) it will be but right to tell the plain truth: which is no more than this, that his Lordship is very apt to annex *new ideas*, to *old words*; and not very apt to give us notice of his handy-work. As in the case before us, Who would suspect, that teaching, a *law of right reason*, common to God and man; and enforcing *man's obligation to imitate God*, were BLASPHEMY and PROPHANENESS? Yet such they are; or his Lordship's word is not to be taken [16].

So then, as what has hitherto been esteemed *Piety* is become *Blasphemy*; we need not wonder if his Lordship should turn

[16] *Divines have impudently and wickedly assumed that there is a Law of right reason common to God and man.* Vol. v. p. 77.—And again, TO PREACH UP THE OBLIGATION OF IMITATING GOD IS FALSE AND PROPHANE. Vol. v. p. 65.

old thread-bare blasphemy, into a new habit of piety: and this may be as proper to be observed, lest the same good men should be too much shocked at the horror of what comes next: For now his Lordship falls, with the same spirit, or, if you will, with his usual *wit and eloquence*, upon the TWO REVELATIONS and their FOUNDERS. And here, his *piety* pretends so much to the impulse of conscience, that you would suspect he thought himself, like St. PAUL, under the malediction of a woe if he *preached not his new Gospel*.

Of MOSES, he says, “ It is impossible to
 “ excuse all the puerile, romantic, and ab-
 “ surd circumstances in the author of the
 “ Book of Genesis, which nothing could
 “ produce but the habit of dealing in tri-
 “ fling traditions, and a most profound ig-
 “ norance. It is impossible to read what
 “ he has writ on this subject without feel-
 “ ing contempt for him as a philosopher,
 “ and horror as a Divine [17].”

“ The PENTATEUCH has such evident
 “ marks of falsehood, as can be objected
 “ to no other writings, except to pro-

“ fefs'd Romances, nor even always to
 “ them [18].”

“ We may laugh at Don Quixote, for
 “ reading Romances till he believed them
 “ to be true histories, and for quoting
 “ Archbishop Turpin with great solem-
 “ nity; but when Divines speak of the
 “ PENTATEUCH as of an Authentic Hi-
 “ story, and quote Moses as solemnly as
 “ he did Turpin, are they much less mad
 “ than he was [19]?” *Don Quixote* is his
 Lordship's favorite simile; and comes as
 often over as either the *Afs* or *Lion* in Ho-
 mer. If I was not half ashamed of using
 what has been so long hacknied both by
 Wits and Blockheads, I should be tempted
 to borrow this simile; and with the less
 scruple, as his Lordship sets me the exam-
 ple. What then, if I tried to apply it, for
 once? It shall suffer nothing in my hands;
 but be returned safe again to his Lordship,
 to joke with to the end of the chapter.

Whoever attentively considers his Lord-
 ship's ESSAYS, will, I dare say, be of my
 mind, That the much reading *his master*
 LOCKE, who was deeply engaged with

[18] Vol. iii. p. 271.

[19] Vol. iii. p. 280.

School-divines and Metaphysicians, had the same effect on his Lordship's temper, then in an advanced age, and under a bilious habit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the prudent Gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his own confession, *a man's head is soon turned by complex and abstract ideas.* From henceforth the gigantic Forms of *Schoolmen* and the enchantments of *Metaphysical Divines* got entire possession of his Fancy. Consider what you can make of the following remark, without supposing with me, that these *mormos* had made a very deep impression. "That THEOLOGY, " says he, which pretends to deduce the " duties of man from speculations concerning the *moral attributes of God*, is to " be reckoned in the class with NATURAL " MAGIC [20]."

If you seek, I do not say for the *elegance*, but for the *common propriety* of this observation, any where out of his Lordship's own imagination, you will seek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his *Theological Magicians*, and you see, their *theology* can be nothing else than *natural magic*.

So again, when he says — *Clarke shall not force me into Atheism; no nor Wollaston neither; What is this, but Don Quixote, up and down? dreadfully afraid that these Necromancers would, at last, force him into their enchanted castle of a FUTURE STATE; raised, as he tells us, between Divines and Atheists in confederacy.*

Indeed, every Reader must have observed this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a DIVINE comes cross his Lordship's fancy. One would think, they had served him the trick, the Enchanters plaid Don Quixote; that they had run away with his *Library*, and walled up his *Study-door*. Most true it is, that not long before this immense Treasure of the *first Philosophy* was given to the world, certain of these wicked Magicians had turned it all into *fairie-favours*: And the public on it's appearance found nothing better proved than the truth of the old proverb, *Pro Thesauro, Carbones*.

Let us be thankful, however, for what we have. And indeed, if I was not perfectly satisfied that no man in his senses could mistake the value of this *new Money*, I should make a scruple of laying so much of it

it before him ; especially the following *pieces*, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

“ THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE LAW
“ OF MOSES, like the whole system of his
“ CONDUCT, WAS FOUNDED ON MURDER [1].

“ The *Jews* blended together, at once,
“ in the moral character of God, injustice,
“ cruelty, and partiality. They made him
“ an object of terror more than of awe
“ and reverence ; and their Religion was
“ a System of the RANKEST SUPERSTI-
“ TION [2].”

“ The JEWS with more inconsistency,
“ and not less profanation, than the Pa-
“ gans, dressed up the one supreme Being
“ in all the rags of humanity ; which
“ composed a kind of motley Character,
“ such as foolish Superstition, and mad
“ Enthusiasm alone could ascribe to him ;
“ and such as no man who believes him
“ an all-perfect being can hear without
“ horror [3].”

“ The Jews give such notions of the su-
“ preme Being as no People on earth, but

[1] Vol. v. p. 183.

[2] Vol. v. p. 531.

[3] Vol. v. p. 529.

“ this, would have ascribed, I do not say
 “ to God, but to the worst of those mon-
 “ sters, who are suffered or sent by God,
 “ for a short time, to punish the iniquity
 “ of men [4].”

From MOSES and JUDAISM, his Lordship descends to PAUL and CHRISTIANITY. Let us see whether he gives Them better quarter.

“ CHRISTIANITY abrogated the *Law*,
 “ and confirmed the *history of Moses*; from
 “ the times, at least, when St. PAUL un-
 “ dertook, like a true cabalistical Archi-
 “ tect, with the help of type, and figure,
 “ to raise a new System of religion on the
 “ old foundations [5].” “ The Gospel of
 “ CHRIST is one thing; the Gospel of St.
 “ PAUL another [6].” “ He preached a
 “ Gospel in contradiction to CHRIST’s, and
 “ directly repugnant to it [7].”

On this account, I suppose, it was, that he dignifies PAUL, with the elegant appellation of the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF. But the immediate occasion of his conferring this new title on him, was particularly happy. His Lordship was on a favorite topic, he was abusing the first Messengers

[4] Vol. v. p. 515.

[5] Vol. iii. p. 288.

[6] Vol. iv. p. 313.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 326—7.

of the Gospel, for their claim to maintenance. He was conscious, PAUL came not within his censure. So that, lest this should give the Apostle too much credit; he informs the reader, in his polite way [8], that he had a *trade*, and could shift for himself. For it seems, nothing but downright starving will acquit the Apostles of theft and extortion, before his Lordship's Tribunal.

“ JESUS (in his opinion) had no intention of spreading his Religion further than amongst the *Jews*; but PAUL, bred at the feet of Gamaliel, saw further than that poor ignorant fisherman Peter.” The sense requires you should read, *that poor ignorant Carpenter Jesus*: and so without doubt his Lordship designed his compliment. Well, but what did PAUL see further? It was this, “ That the contempt and aversion in which both the nation and the Religion of the Jews were held by the rest of mankind, would make it much more easy to convert the Gentiles at once to Christianity, than to make them Jews first, in order to make them Christians afterwards [9].”

[8] Vol. iv. p. 423.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 306.

For it seems—"TO DISSEMBLE was a
 " fundamental principle of apostolical con-
 " duct. PAUL practised it. We have his
 " own word for this; and he boasts of
 " it [10]." His Lordship lets us know,
 that *Paul* had assurance enough to do any
 thing. For speaking of the Apostle's famous
 argument *ad modestiam*—*Nay, but, O man,*
who art thou that repliest against God?
 &c. [11]. He says "There is something
 " so IMPUDENT, as well as absurd in this
 " proceeding, that, common as it is, one
 " can see no example of it without sur-
 " prise [12]."

"Can he be less than mad, says his
 " Lordship, who boasts a revelation su-
 " per-added to reason, to supply the de-
 " fects of it, and who super-adds rea-
 " son to revelation to supply the defects
 " of this too, at the same time? This is
 " madness or there is no such thing inci-
 " dent to our nature. And into this kind
 " of madness, ST. PAUL, profound in ca-
 " balistical learning, hath fallen [13]."

And yet, as mad as it is, all States and So-
 cieties have matched it, when they *super-*

[10] Vol. iv. p. 306—7.

[11] Rom. ix. 20.

[12] Vol. iii. p. 307.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 172.

added civil Laws, to natural conscience or Religion, *to supply the defects of it*; and superadded natural conscience or Religion to Civil Laws, *to supply the defects of those too*, at the same time. But more of this in it's place.

“ St. PAUL carried into the Apostle-
 “ ship a great deal of that ASSUMING
 “ AIR, which is apt to accompany much
 “ learning, *or the opinion of it*—a great
 “ profusion of words, and of involved
 “ and unconnected discourse, even on
 “ those subjects which required to be most
 “ clearly and distinctly developed. — He
 “ was a *loose paraphraser, a Cabalistical*
 “ *Commentator*, as much, *at least*, as any
 “ ancient or modern Rabbin [14].” “ St.
 “ PAUL'S system of Religion, is an *intri-*
 “ *cate and dark System, with, here and*
 “ *there, an intelligible phrase, that casts no*
 “ *light on the rest, but is rather lost in the*
 “ *gloom of the whole* [15].”---“ Having said
 “ so much of the *intelligibility of Paul's*
 “ *Gospel*, TRUTH authorises me to add,
 “ that where it is intelligible, it is of-
 “ ten ABSURD, OR PROPHANE, OR TRI-

[14] Vol. iv. p. 326—7.

[15] Vol. iv. p. 328.

“FLING [16].”—“PAUL taught *predesti-*
 “*nation* and UNLIMITED PASSIVE OBEDI-
 “ENCE: the one absurd, the other both
 “absurd and IMPIOUS [17].”

Was it possible to laugh, in the midst of these horrors, what mortal could now forbear. *Unlimited passive obedience*, quoth he! The noble Lord had been so long accustomed to the cant of his Faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonsense under that name, that he seems now in good earnest to believe he was so. A just judgment on the Politician; to come at last, to give credit to his own Flams. However, in this instance, at least, one would hope St. Paul might have been spared, if it were only for old-acquaintance-sake; and the hard service they had put the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF upon. But it is bad trusting, we see, to the gratitude of Statesmen. Happy for us, PAUL has yet an able Defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I beg leave to say thus much, because as *Clarke* and *Wollaston* found the worse treatment for being the favourite

[16] Id. ib.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 510.

Philosophers of Q. C. (as is well known to those who were in the secret either of his passions or his party) so St. *Paul*, I am persuaded, did not fare the better for being patronized by his Lordship's illustrious Friend.

“ CHRISTIANITY (says his Lordship) became FANATICISM in the FIRST professors of it. Men corrupted it by ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY. And some will be apt to think, that the first of these men was PAUL — Divines will be FURIOUS to hear SUCH LANGUAGE [18].”

Alas! No. He mistakes the mood, in which his works chanced to find them. They laugh at his vanity; and pity the FURY that inspired SUCH LANGUAGE. And he gives them ample exercise for all their pity: for having done with PAUL, he turns now to rail with the same virulence against CHRIST himself.

“ The truth is, CHRISTIANITY preserved, in many respects, a strong tang of the spirit of Judaism. The supreme Being took a milder appearance; his favour was confined no longer to one people. The MESSIAH came and redeemed

“ fallen Man. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
 “ discovers in this mysterious proceeding
 “ the love of God to Man; his infinite
 “ justice and goodness. BUT REASON
 “ will discover the fantastical, confused
 “ and inconsistent notions of Jewish Theo-
 “ logy, latent in it; and applied to ano-
 “ ther system of Religion. *This love will*
 “ *appear partiality; this justice will appear*
 “ *injustice; this goodness will appear cruelty.*
 “ On the whole, the moral character im-
 “ puted to the supreme Being by Christian
 “ Theology differs little from that imputed
 “ to him by the Jewish. The difference is
 “ rather apparent than real [19].” “ The
 “ scene of Christianity has been ALWAYS a
 “ scene of dissention, of hatred, of perse-
 “ cution, and of BLOOD [20].”

Speaking of CHRIST'S *Sermon on the Mount*, his Lordship says, — “ Some [of the precepts] are directed to the *Jews* only, and some more immediately to the Disciples of Christ. The second sort seem fit enough for a *religious Sect*; but are by no means practicable in the general Society of Mankind. *Considered as general duties they are impracticable,*

[19] Vol. v. p. 532.

[20] Vol. iv. p. 511.

“ *inconsistent with* NATURAL INSTINCT,
 “ *as well as* LAW, and QUITE DESTRUC-
 “ TIVE OF SOCIETY [1].”

“ The CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY has de-
 “ rived from the *Jewish*, a prophane li-
 “ cence, which *makes men blaspheme without*
 “ *knowing they blaspheme, and makes their*
 “ *very devotion impious* [2].”

“ I would sooner be reputed, nay I would
 “ sooner be a Pagan, than a Christian, or an
 “ Atheist than a Theist, if to be one or
 “ the other it was necessary to believe such
 “ ABSURDITIES as these ; which, however
 “ disguised and softened by a *certain cant*
 “ *of expression*, are directly PROPHANE ;
 “ and indirectly, or by consequence at least,
 “ *blasphemous* [3].”

“ ALL THE BEDLAMs OF THE WORLD
 “ cannot match the absurdities that have
 “ been propagated by Christians, whether
 “ heretics or orthodox, concerning the
 “ *making and governing of the world by the*
 “ *ministration of inferior Beings*: Beings
 “ not eternal, but produced in time by *ema-*
 “ *nation, or some other inconceivable manner*
 “ *of generation* [4].”

[1] Vol. iv. p. 299, 300.

[2] Vol. v. p. 519.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 34.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 72.

“ We cannot believe the SCRIPTURES
 “ to be God’s *word*, tho’ we know the
 “ physical and moral System are his *Work*,
 “ while we find in them such repugnancies
 “ to the Nature of an all-perfect Being ;
 “ not mysteries, but absurdities ; not things
 “ incomprehensible, but things that imply
 “ manifestly contradiction with his Na-
 “ ture [5].”

In a word, he tells us, that “ THE RE-
 “ LIGION OF NATURE HAS BEEN TURNED
 “ ALMOST INTO BLASPHEMY BY REVE-
 “ LATION [6].” “ To believe (says he)
 “ that *Jesus was the Messiah* is said by
 “ some [meaning his *Master Locke*] to
 “ be the *unum necessarium* of FAITH,
 “ but TO OBSERVE THE LAW OF NATURE
 “ IS THE UNUM NECESSARIUM OF DU-
 “ TY [7].”

But now having exposed MOSES, CHRIST,
 and PAUL ; decried the falshood of the
 TWO REVELATIONS ; and ridiculed the
 absurdity of sacred SCRIPTURE ; he shews
 us, in mere charity, after the example
 of the WISE ALPHONSUS, how either sys-
 tem might have been mended, had his

[5] Vol. iii. p. 306, 7.

[6] Vol. iii. p. 498.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 410.

Lordship been consulted; while, like the WISE ALPHONSUS, he believes just as much of God's *Word*, as the Other did of his *Works*.

First, he hints, how the *LAW* might have been better planned. “ God purchased the obedience of the *Jewish* People by a mercenary bargain. It was ill kept on their part. And the *Law*, with all it's sanctions, was continually violated; sometimes rejected; and had, in no degree, a force sufficient to maintain itself in observation and reverence. Now, one of the most conceivable perfections of a *Law* is, that it be made with such a foresight of all possible accidents, and with such provisions for the due execution of it, in all cases, that the *Law* may be effectual to govern and direct these accidents, instead of lying at the mercy of them. — Another the most conceivable perfection of a *Law* consists in the clearness and precision of its terms. — These will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expected, when God is the Legislator [8].”

[8] Vol. iii. p. 292, 3.

He next shews us, how he could have improved the GOSPEL, had he been of God's privy-counsel. "Had the doctrine of future rewards and punishments been taught by CHRISTIANITY in terms *more general and less descriptive*; had the punishments been represented, for instance, like the rewards, to be, simply, such as *eye never saw, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man could conceive*, it might have been maintained in credit, and had an universal and real influence perhaps, to the great advantage of religion [9]."

An inattentive Reader may be surprized, perhaps, at this wantonness of his Lordship's pen; that when he had given it as his fixed opinion, that all which the World hath hitherto called *Religion*, is a public mischief; and that a *future State* is an absurd fable; he should, with great formality, deliver in a plan which would have given *credit* and *real efficacy* to nonsense and impiety. But we must consider, He had been so long playing the PHILOSOPHER, that he had reason to apprehend we might forget the other part of his sub-

[9] Vol. v. p. 542.

lime Character, the LEGISLATOR. He therefore deemed it expedient to give us a slight cast of his office, in rectifying the blunders of MOSES and JESUS CHRIST.

With regard to MOSES and his *Law*, I have so much to say to his Lordship, that I shall reserve it for an after-reckoning. The other is but a small matter, and may be settled here.

I suspect then, our *Legislator* in this remark concerning Jesus's manner of revealing a *future state*, did not sufficiently attend to the nature of the human mind, nor to the genius of the Gospel. He would have, we see, the account of *future punishments as general, and as little descriptive*, as that of *future rewards*. He seems to think the latter managed well: But this propriety, he measures from the imaginary impropriety of the other: he appears to have no idea of any excellency it has in itself. We shall endeavour therefore to explain *why* this method of representing *future rewards* was right: By which it will appear, that the other, of representing *future punishments*, was not wrong.

To grow *particular and descriptive*, whether of future rewards, or future
punish-

punishments, men must borrow their images from *material and corporeal* things; because they have no faculties of sensation proper to comprehend ideas taken from things *Spiritual*. Now when a follower of Christ is so far advanced as to have his Faith work by *hope*, his sentiments grow refined, his ideas purify, and he is rising apace towards that perfection which the Gospel encourages him to aspire after. But while *fear of punishment* chiefly operates upon him, he is yet in the lowest stage of probation; his imagination is gross, and his appetites sensual. Is it not evident, then, that a *descriptive* Heaven of delights would be ill suited to that purity and elevation of mind, solely fixed by *hope*, on happiness; and as evident that a *general undefined* denunciation of Hell would not have force enough to make the necessary impression on a sensual fancy agitated by *fear*? Let not his Lordship's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our Salvation went at least one step beyond their Master, in *true Politics*.

To proceed. From vilifying BOTH RELIGIONS, and their FOUNDERS, his Lord-

ship comes, at length, to rail against the GOD of *both Religions*. And with this I shall close the horrid Scene.

“ IF WE BELIEVE IN MOSES, AND HIS
“ GOD, WE CANNOT BELIEVE IN THAT
“ GOD WHOM OUR REASON SHEWS US [10].

“ CAN ANY MAN PRESUME TO SAY
“ THAT THE GOD OF MOSES, OR THE
“ GOD OF PAUL, IS THE TRUE GOD?
“ The God of MOSES is partial, unjust,
“ and cruel; delights in blood, commands
“ assassinations, massacres, and even exter-
“ minations of people. The God of
“ PAUL elects some of his creatures to
“ salvation, and predestinates others to
“ destruction, even in the womb of their
“ mothers. And, indeed, if there was
“ not a Being INFINITELY MORE PER-
“ FECT than these, there would be no God
“ at all, nor any true Religion in the
“ world [11].”

Who, that had heard this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it came, but would strait have called to mind the words of the Satyrist?

[10] Vol. iii. p. 307.

[11] Vol. v. p. 567.

“ Not

“ Not Danté, dreaming all th’ infernal State,
 “ Beheld such scenes of envy, sin, and hate.

But when we understand them to be the ejaculations of this Noble Philosopher, the Confessor of Truth, the Advocate of Virtue, and the Restorer of banished Nature; employed, as he himself tells us, or rather *set apart*, TO PLEAD THE CAUSE OF GOD HIMSELF AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY [12]; when we consider all this, I say, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and tho’ expressed in no consecrated terms; indeed, such as had been much worn in the service of the CRAFTS-MAN; yet when new-set in his Lordship’s immortal Panoply of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, they may now prove as useful, to advance the *fear of God*, as before; to promote the *honour of the King*.

It is in HATE as in LOVE; hard to separate the *carnal* from the *divine* species; or rather they are but different ebullitions of the same species. Hence it is, that the melting strains of the *Mystic*, the *Methodist*, and the *Moravian*, so often smell of the

[12] Vol. v. p. 305.

STEWs; and hence, by parity of reason, the thunder of his Lordship's eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from BILLINGSGATE.

But these things make You serious: and You ask, "Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke's Story, would have suspected, that his GOD and his COUNTRY lay so near his heart? His *Political* and *Philosophic* Writings, say you, are full of *Lamentations*; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked PRIESTS, and wicked POLITICIANS, have brought both upon Church and State: And, as is common in extreme fondness for our favourite Objects, he suffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the *Whigs* will bring in the *Pretender*; and apprehends, the *english Clergy* have made large steps to introduce *Atheism*."

I know what You drive at. You would fain apply to his right honourable Person, the old trite aphorism, *That wicked principles spring out of a wicked life*. But what says another noble Peer to this? "Fain would
" the Bigot, in consequence of his *moral*
" *maxims*, and *political establishments*, con-
" found

“ found *licentiousness in morals* with liberty
 “ of thought and action; and make the *li-*
 “ *bertine*, who has the LEAST MASTERY
 “ OF HIMSELF, resemble his direct oppo-
 “ site [13].”

It may be so, you will say. But Lord Bolingbroke surely could never object to the imputation which *bad morals* cast upon a *Teacher of Truth*. He, who sees it so clearly, and presses it so charitably, upon the whole body of the *Christian Clergy*.

“ How (says his Lordship) can the
 “ CLERGY of your Church or of ours,
 “ pretend that they contribute now, or E-
 “ VER DID CONTRIBUTE, to the reforma-
 “ tion of mankind? No age can be pointed
 “ out, wherein ALL THE VICES, that Tully
 “ imputes to most of the heathen Philoso-
 “ phers, did not prevail AMONGST MOST
 “ of the Christian Divines with great cir-
 “ cumstances of aggravation. They have
 “ not only ALL THE VICES incident to
 “ human nature in common with other
 “ men, but they have had the peculiar
 “ Vices of their Order. I WILL SAY
 “ BOLDLY, they are, in general, much

[13] *Characteristics*, Vol. iii. Misc. 5. Chap. 3.

“ fitter to hinder, by their EXAMPLE,
 “ than to promote by their DOCTRINE, the
 “ Advancement of Religion, natural or
 “ revealed.”

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of antient Philosophers and Modern Clergymen; and these, even by members of their own respective Bodies.

FREE-THINKERS have been more bashful: and, by their reserve and modesty on this head, one might have taken them for Saints, had it not been for the *Confessions* of one of them, the famous CARDAN; who, like another St. *Austin*, seems sworn to leave nothing behind him in the inkhorn. The account he gives of himself deserves transcribing for more reasons than one. — “ In diem viven-
 “ tem, nugacem, religionis contempto-
 “ rem, illatæ injuriæ memorem, invi-
 “ dum, tristem, infidiatorem, proditorem,
 “ suorum osorem, turpi libidini dedi-
 “ tum, solitarium, inamœnum, austerum,
 “ obscœnum, lascivum, maledicum, vari-
 “ um, ancipitem, impurum, calumnia-
 “ torem [14] &c.” This was fair deal-

[14] *De vita sua.*

ing:

ing: and he who was so *free* with himself, might be pardoned if he spared no body else. But men don't use to be wanton on so nice a subject. *Freethinkers* have more mastery of themselves, says the noble Author of the *Characteristics*. And therefore whenever we see it done, let us conclude it to be for some great purpose; as, in emulation of the Christian Confessors, who, to display the powers of *Grace*, did not scruple to tell the world with great simplicity what they were by *Nature*; so Cardan to shew us, that the FIRST PHILOSOPHY is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his *Stars*. However, let his design be what it will in presenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, we are much beholden to him for setting the example. Tho', like all other good examples, it may possibly end where it begun; and the *first Philosophy* wait with patience for some less incommodious way of recommendation. And indeed, while Infidelity, which is the *cure*, is so unjustly supposed the *cause* of these Peccadillos, we need not wonder our Philosophers should be soon at liberty, and as soon disposed, to

turn their view from their own morals, upon the morals of the Clergy: and *say boldly*, with his Lordship, that *the order in general is much fitter to binder by their EXAMPLE, than to promote by their DOCTRINE, the advancement of Religion.*

What shall we say then? May it not be as well to leave the *examples*, of both, to shift for themselves; and to consider only their *Doctrines*? I think it is: And will therefore proceed from his Lordship's TEMPER, to his PRINCIPLES. But this must be the subject of another Letter.

I am, &c.

LET-

LETTER II.

IT has been observed, that rare and extraordinary blessings, whether civil or religious, seldom come till hope grows desperate, and long expectation be quite wearied out. Then it is, the superior Genius bestirs himself, the crisis approaches, a *coup d'éclat* is struck, and the admiring world is taken in by surprise.

The case before us is an illustrious instance. Never was mankind in so deplorable a way as when his Lordship arrived; from what other System is not yet discovered: tho' his tuneful Friend was very positive he belonged not to this: Infomuch, that when the last Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he used to tell his acquaintance, he should not be surprized if in the event it proved, that it was sent only to convey his Lordship home again; just as a Stage-coach stops at your door to take up a Passenger. Be this as it will: bad indeed was our condition when his Lordship's arrived. — what shall I say, *to be a light to those who sat in darkness?* No, this is the work of meaner

64 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S
meaner Missionaries; but, to RESTORE
MANKIND TO THEIR SENSES.

For his Lordship, in his account of the general DELIRIUM which had seized the *Clergy*, had given us but a *specimen* of the human condition: the MADNESS was indeed UNIVERSAL. Infomuch, that (as he well expresses it) ALL THE BEDLAMs OF THE WORLD [1] were not sufficient for these things. And, to confess the truth, when was it, that the visions of an *over-beated and disordered imagination*, such as, belief in the *moral Attributes of God, the immortality of the Soul, a particular Providence, and a future State*, did not infect all times and places?

“ ALL EUROPE (says his Lordship) GREW
“ DELIRIOUS [2]. Christianity was left to
“ shift for itself in the midst of a FRANTIC
“ WORLD [3].” And again, “ OUR WORLD
“ seems to be, in many respects, THE BED-
“ LAM OF EVERY OTHER SYSTEM OF IN-
“ TELLIGENT CREATURES: and, with this
“ unlucky circumstance, that they who are
“ *most mad* govern, in things of the greatest
“ moment, them who are *least so* [4].”

[1] Vol. iv. p. 72.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 377.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 353.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 316.

By what is here dropt in the conclusion, you understand why his Lordship chose to make the Clergy lead up the *Brawls*; and the *Leather-dressing Pontiff* himself to preside in this mad dance, as Master of the Revels.

But to find all mankind mad, is more, perhaps, than you expected. What then? Is the madness less real for being universal? His Lordship's *Logic* says otherwise. And his Lordship's *Logic*, I can assure you, is not like his Theology, of yesterday; it comes of great Kindred. *Oliver Cromwell's* Porter had long ago enobled this very *Syllogism*. *I see plainly* (says this Sage) *that either I or all the world besides are mad: but as it is not I, it must needs be they.* And he was then advancing with large strides, as one may say, towards the *first Philosophy*; being indeed, at that time, a kind of *Rector magnificus* in the English College of Bethlehem.

Was it then, you will ask, some strange and evil disposition of the stars, that occasioned this universal insanity? So, indeed, it is reported [5]. The WORLD, it seems, like the men of *Abdera* [6], had seen a

[5] Vid. *D. N. J. C. geneseos thema*, inter Cardani Op.

[6] See *Lucian's true history*:

Tragedy represented to them in a very hot day: the subject of which left so strong an impression on their fancies, that they all thought themselves concerned in the catastrophe. Some ran about from country to country, to tell their story; and the rest have been ever since rehearsing and celebrating those affecting scenes, at home; till LORD BOLINGBROKE, like another HIPPOCRATES, came to their relief: and having first well physicked them of their Faith and their Visions, brought them to themselves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the sovereign Restorative of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Of which, I am now, as I promised, to give you some account.

But to see this extraordinary man in a just light, it will be proper to shew what *Man* was before him. A RELIGIOUS ANIMAL he is on all hands allowed to be. And till the coming of this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, *Religion* was ever understood to rise on that wide basis, on which PAUL, tho' a *fanatical Knave*, had the *art* to place it; that "He who cometh to God must believe
 " that he is: and that he is a REWARDER
 " of them who diligently seek him [7]."

[7] Heb. xi. 6.

For

For till the arrival of his Lordship, men who supposed the infinite *goodness and justice* of God to be as demonstrable as his infinite *power and wisdom*, could not but conclude from his *moral attributes*, that he REWARDED, as well as from his *natural attributes*, that he CREATED.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a MORAL GOVERNOR, all mankind supposed RELIGION to arise; and NATURALISM, the Ape of Religion, from the simpler notion of a PHYSICAL PRESERVER: which, however, they were ready to distinguish, on the other hand, from the *Unnaturalism* (if we may so term it) of *ranker Atheism*.

RELIGION, therefore, stands, and must, I think, for ever stand, on those two immoveable principles of PRESERVER and REWARDER, in conjunction.

The *length or shortness* of human existence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in ST. PAUL'S general definition. "The Religionist, says he, must believe that God *is*, and that he *rewards*."

But when it came to be seen, that he was not always a *Rewarder* here, men con-

cluded this life not to be the whole of their existence. And thus a FUTURE STATE was brought into Religion ; and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it.

To explain my meaning, if so clear a thing needs explanation. GOD, under the *physical* idea of *Preserver* and *Creator* appears uniform, regular, and instant to his *Creatures* : Under the *moral* idea of *Rewarder* and *Governor*, he seems frequently to be withdrawn from his *Servants*. For tho' in the moral dispensations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to desert; yet often, too, they are not so exactly adjusted. The Antient Religionist, therefore, confiding in his demonstration of the *moral* as well as the *natural* attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the *present* was not the only state ordained for man ; but that in some other life, these irregularities would be set right. Hence a FUTURE STATE became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral administration of providence was different) inseparable from, and essential to, the various Religions of mankind. Even the mere Vulgar, who did not reach the force of this demonstration, yet seeing the
marks

marks of moral Government, amidst the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a *future State* with the same confidence as the Learned. For plain Nature had instructed them to reason thus, — If all were *regular*, nothing needed to be set right: and if all were *irregular*, there was no one to set things right.

Such was the ANTIENT RELIGION OF NATURE: To which, modern Divines have generally agreed to give the name of THEISM, when professed by those who never heard of REVELATION; and the name of DEISM, when professed by those who would never give credit to it.

In this State our noble Philosopher found the *religious World*; or, more properly, this was the language he heard resounding from one end of the earth to the other: But it was a language, he tells us, he did not understand. It was to his ears, *like the choirs of birds, who whistle and sing, or scream, at one another: or the herds of beasts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another.* He rejects it, therefore in the lump, as one inarticulate din of ENTHUSIASM and ABSURDITY; the product of *pride* and *ignorance*; and, with

greater of his own, erects the FIRST PHILOSOPHY on it's ruins.

He permits us to believe, that an intelligent Cause made the world; and governs it, by his *physical* and *general* Laws; not by *moral* or *particular*.

He bids us to understand, that this World was no more made for man than for every animal besides: nor was man made for any other world, nor consequently, (as Divines have dreamt) for happiness.

That, by the *arbitrary constitution* of things in the human system (which may have a contrary disposition in other systems) Virtue promotes happiness and Vice brings on misery.

That THIS CONSTITUTION, together with the coactivity of CIVIL LAWS, contain all the rewards and punishments attendant on Virtue and on Vice.

That prayer, supplication, and every other office of Religion in use amongst men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are foolish and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprized in *submission to the established order of things*.

He sums up his system in these words.
 “ A self-existent being the first cause of all
 “ things,

“ things, infinitely POWERFUL and infi-
 “ nitely WISE, is the God of natural Theo-
 “ logy. And the whole system of natural
 “ Religion rests on it, and requires NO
 “ BROADER FOUNDATION [8].” That is,
 it is enough for *him who cometh* to this
 new Religion, *to believe that God is*; and
 not that he is a REWARDER *of them who seek*
him. And again, “ When men have pro-
 “ ved the existence of an all-perfect being,
 “ the Creator and Governor of the Uni-
 “ verse, and demonstrated his infinite POW-
 “ ER and WISDOM, from his works, when
 “ they have done this, THEY HAVE DONE
 “ ALL; *this includes the whole of natural*
 “ *Theology, and serves abundantly to all the*
 “ *ends of natural Religion* [9].”

What these *ends of natural Religion* are
 he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit
 us for *our station here, and to supply our*
real wants in it. --- “ In like manner [that
 is, as he expresses it, *for the necessary uses*
of human life and no more] “ the know-
 “ ledge of the creator is on many accounts
 “ necessary to such a creature as man: and
 “ therefore we are able to arrive, by a pro-
 “ per exercise of our mental faculties, from

[8] Vol. v. p. 316. [9] p. 453.

“ the knowledge of God’s works, to a
 “ knowledge of his EXISTENCE, and of
 “ that infinite POWER and WISDOM which
 “ are demonstrated to us in them. OUR
 “ KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES
 “ NO FURTHER [10].”

Now tho’ we should be so complaisant to these *principles* as not to call them ATHEISTIC, yet I am afraid the Professor of them, whoever he be, must be content with a name something like it. For tho’ the *principles* may be called NATURALISM, yet if *Scripture* has defined an ATHEIST right, to be one who HAS NO HOPE, and is WITHOUT GOD IN THE WORLD [11] our Professor of Naturalism comes within the description. For tho’ he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is *without a God in the world*, that is; a Being who presides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all Religion stands, Religionists will seek no other title for him. And surely he will be properly defined. For tho’ the abstract term *Atheism* carries, as it’s principal idea, a relation to God’s BEING: yet, *Atheist*, the concrete, seems to have it’s

[10] Vol. iv. p. 86.

[11] Ephes. ii. 12.

chief relation to his GOVERNMENT. This is not observed for any kind of consequence it is to Religion, in what class the Public will be pleased to rank his Lordship; but merely to set in a true light the honourable Person's ingenuity, in assuming the character of an *Advocate for Religion*; at the very time he is labouring to root it out of human Society.

Old NATURALISM thus travestied under the name of *Religion*, his Lordship bestows, as his last and most precious Legacy, on his own dear Country. If you will believe him, the only *reformed Religion* that can be called *pure*, and the only *revealed Religion* that has the marks of *truth*. What the world hath hitherto called by that name being, as he assures us, an evil in itself; and mischievous to man by it's essential constitution. And he proves it, as they say, in mood and figure. — “ To keep up the
 “ sense of it [*i. e.* of *Religion*] in the
 “ minds of men, there seem to be but two
 “ ways. To STRIKE THE SENSES fre-
 “ quently, by public and solemn acts of
 “ religious worship; and to HEAT THE
 “ BRAIN by notions of an inward operation
 “ of the Spirit, and of a sort of mystical
 “ devo-

“ devotion, independent of outward forms,
 “ and even INCONSISTENT with them. One
 “ of these leads to SUPERSTITION, the other
 “ to ENTHUSIASM. Both are silly—Super-
 “ stition is folly: Enthusiasm is madness.
 “ It is good to be on our guard against
 “ both.”

Without doubt. But how shall it be done? *Religion* is an evil in itself, and so admits of no qualification. It necessarily requires, as his Lordship tells us, on man's part, public acts of worship; and on God's, the private operation of the Spirit: But these lead to *superstition* and *enthusiasm*; that is, to *folly* and *madness*, to the destruction of our reasonable Nature. This is not all: these *necessary means* are not only hurtful but impracticable. You could not use them, was you foolish or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he says, INCONSISTENT, and destroy one another. What then is to be done? To *be upon our guard*; to keep *Religion* at arms length, till his Lordship brings up his reserve of *Naturalism*, to our relief. Let this be our Shield of Brass; under which we may repose in peace, undisturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This,

This, Sir, is the *Enchiridion* of his Lordship's FIRST PHILOSOPHY. How simple, you will say, how close, how round, how full is this *new Dispensation*? A dispensation of *Religion* shall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to those fancies, I told you of, which had possessed his poetical Friend: who, misled perhaps by that obscure hint, that *our World was only the Bedlam of every other system of intelligent Creatures* [12], supposed, in good earnest, his *Philosopher and Guide* to be sent down from some superior orb, as Physician to the Hospital. Without question he was made for the Age, and the Age for him. And they may well congratulate one another on the happy meeting. If we must be doctinated by a Poet, I should sooner a great deal believe the man who told me, that he heard the evil Genius of Britain address his Lordship on his first setting out, in these strains,

— “ Be as a planetary plague, when Jove
 “ Will o'er some high-vic'd City hang his poison
 “ In the sick air.” —

[12] Vol. iv. p. 353.

But to go on with his System. It rises on these four principles.

First, That we have no adequate ideas of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of God, his *goodness* and his *justice*, as we have of his NATURAL, to wit, his *power* and his *wisdom*.

Secondly, That A FUTURE STATE is a Fable.

Thirdly, That the JEWISH and the CHRISTIAN *Revelations* are false. And

Fourthly, That REVELATION ITSELF is impossible.

Indulge me with a few remarks on his management, under each of these heads.

I. Divines, in their proof of the *moral attributes*, having of late much insisted on the arguments *a priori*, as they are called, his Lordship suspected, and what he suspects of ill he always takes for granted, that they could not be proved *a posteriori*, or from *God's works*; the way by which, he owns, his *natural attributes* may be demonstrated. So that having pronounced the arguments *a priori* to be *jargon, nonsense, impiety and blasphemy*; the *moral attributes* of God are fairly erased at once out of the *intellectual system*. And he had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate CLARKE, who was chiefly conversant

conversant in the reasoning *a priori*, with variety of abusive names.

As to the Argument, our great Man's respect for that is so profound and so distant, that I defy any one unacquainted with metaphysical reasonings, even to guess what kind of things they are for which the famous Minister of St. *James's* is so severely handled. For while the *Divine* suffers, the *Reasoner*, as we say, always escapes. Now indeed you see him seized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the *first Philosophy*; when a *fit of railing* shakes his Lordship; and the Storm falls upon the whole Body of *modern Schoolmen*: And so the Doctor escapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a *fit of learning* comes upon his Lordship; and *Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates,* and the whole band of *ancient Metaphysicians* pass in review, and each receives a lash as he passes: And so the Doctor escapes for the second time. After this, his Lordship, as is fitting, takes his ease; more intent upon triumph than blood-shed; and in the midst of much self-applause
for

for these exploits his ESSAYS end, and the subtile Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you think, that no avocation can keep him from his Logic. Marry, then, on some great occasion indeed, as when the *novelty* of the subject invites, or the true state of it is little known, you shall have no reason to complain of brevity: then you shall see him employ one half of his book to prove the corruptions of the CHURCH OF ROME, and near another half, to expose the jargon of the SCHOOLMEN.

The truth is, Clarke knew not how to reason, and so needed no confutation. *In the name of God* (says my Lord, of the Doctor's reasonings) *is this to prove? Do men who prove no better deserve an answer [13]?* But, go further, and you may fare worse. For speaking of the whole Order, he says, "THE PERTNESS, NOT TO SAY THE IMPUDENCE, OF THESE MEN DESERVES NO REGARD [14]." Besides, I suspect the *arguments* are as IMPUDENT as the *men*, for they pretend to no less than to *demonstrate* God's *moral attributes* and the *immateriality of the Soul*. His Lordship therefore

[13] Vol. v. p. 284.

[14] Vol. iv. p. 325.

chose that his *modest* reasonings, rather than be overborn, should lye incog. and keep in disguise, like *Bays's* army in the *Rebearfal*; till, without noise, or so much as a review, they had dethroned the *two Kings of Brentford*, CLARKE and WOLLASTON; before any body suspected they were in danger.

2. We come to the second point, the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE: which being supported by the great moral argument of "the unequal distribution of good and evil amongst men," his Lordship, as I promised you, is as large in confuting this as he was sparing in his answer to the metaphysical proofs of the *moral attributes*.

He first endeavours to shew the argument to be founded on a mistaken fact, and that there is no such *unequal* distribution: He is almost tempted to tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in order. But a paradox that flies so *impudently*, to use his own language, in the face of common sense, is too unmanagable even for his Lordship's talents: he comes down lower at last; and appears to be tolerably satisfied, if you will but believe the inequality not near so great as *pulpit-Declaim-*

ers would make it: That the disorders which follow the abuse of man's free will are not to be placed to the account of that dispensation; which our pride and presumptuous ignorance make us think God is obliged to reform. However, equal or unequal, his capital maxim clears up all. *WHATSOEVER IS, IS RIGHT*: and therefore the argument of these *confederated* Divines which goes upon a supposed *WRONG*, is *absurd and blasphemous*. Whatever answer this reasoning may deserve, I believe no man who understands the world will expect that a well-bred man should give any.

But I cannot omit, on this occasion, to do justice to his poetical Friend; by shewing the difference between Mr. POPE'S Philosophy and his Lordship's. They both employ the maxim of *Whatever is, is right*. But to know, with what propriety and judgment, we must consider against whom they write.

Mr. Pope's *Essay on man* is a real vindication of Providence against *Libertines* and *Atheists*; who quarrel with the present constitution of things, and deny a future State. To these he answers that *whatever is, is right*: and the reason he gives, is, that *we*
see

see only a part of the moral system, and not the whole ; therefore these irregularities serving to great purposes, such as the fuller manifestation of God's goodness and justice, they are *right*.

Lord Bolingbroke's *Essays* are a pretended vindication of Providence against an *imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheists* ; who use a common principle, namely, the *inequalities in God's moral government here*, for different ends and purposes ; the One to establish a *future State* ; the Other to discredit the *Being of a God*. His Lordship, who opposes their different conclusions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his Friend's maxim, that *whatever is, is right* ; not because the present state of our *moral world* (which is part only of a more general system) is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole, but because our *moral world* is an entire system of itself.

His Lordship *applies* the maxim no better than he understands it. Mr. Pope urges it against Atheists and Libertines, who say the constitution of things is *faulty* : so that the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is pertinent. His Lordship directs it, against

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Divines,

Divines, who say, indeed, that this constitution is *imperfect*, if considered separately, because it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordship from calling it *faulty*: therefore the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it against Atheists and Libertines; in support of Religion properly so called; the Philosopher against Divines, in support of Religion improperly so called, namely NATURALISM: and the success is answerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, systematical, and convincing. Lord Bolingbroke's confused, prevaricating, and inconsistent.

Thus, to instance in his Lordship. He will have nothing irregular or amiss in the *moral world*; because this is Atheism, and the very bond of that *confederacy* signed and sealed between Divines and them. In vain you tell him of a *future state*, to vindicate the providence of God; this is absurd and visionary. But, if you talk of *physical evil*, he has his answer ready, *this world is but one wheel of a vast machine*. You will ask, then, if the superior good of other parts of the great system of Nature can compensate for the *physical evil* in this, why will not his Lordship allow the reasoning

of Pope, in the *Essay on man*, that the superior good in another part of the *moral system* may compensate for the *moral evil* in this? I will tell you, he can allow any other parts to belong to the system of nature, for the solution of *physical evil*, without the danger of bringing in Religion: but he cannot, without that danger, allow any other part to belong to the system of morals, for the solution of *moral evil*. Here, he can allow no more to belong to the system than he sees: indeed, not so much: for, as I said above, he appears well inclined to contend for an *equal providence*, or, at least, for very little irregularity.

But why, you will ask again, would his Lordship run himself into all this hazard, sometimes of discrediting his reasoning by a silly paradox; sometimes of betraying it by an unwilling confession; while at best he gives it but the poor support of a misunderstood and misapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of NO MORAL ATTRIBUTES enervates the very *fact*, so audaciously urged by the CONFEDERACY. For if we have no ideas of God's *moral attributes*, the issue of our reasoning on

his ways will be the same as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, sure, be vindicated: which is the sole purpose of his reasoning on the state of the moral world. All I can say to this is, that his Lordship appears to have been so harrassed with this phantom of a FUTURE STATE, that no Charm, no Security was to be neglected that could contribute to his ease or protection. Hence it is he will depend on neither of his arguments, of — *no inequality* or — *but a little*: and is as shy of them, as they are of one another; and therefore, to make all sure, casts about for a third of more acknowledged efficacy.

And this he finds in the SOUL'S MATERIALITY. From whence, he contrives to persuade himself that it can be no *substance* (which he calls *pneumatical madness*) but a mere *quality* of body, produced by the configuration of it's parts, and perishing with their dissolution. I say, he contrives to persuade *himself*; and I mean no more. Had his point been to persuade his Reader, we must suppose he would have ventured, at least, to confute the arguments of CLARKE and BAXTER:

who, on the principles of the Newtonian Philosophy, have demonstrated *that the soul is a substance*, distinct from the body, and different from matter. Instead of this, he flies to his usual consolation, ABUSE. He calls them *impious* and *blasphemers* for presuming to limit the omnipotent: when the highest of their presumption amounts but to this, the supposing *God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction*; since this imaginary power is indeed *impotency*. Nay, he would willingly persuade himself there were no such arguments in being. For, speaking of the reasoning, which induced men to conclude, the soul was a substance, distinct from the body, he represents it thus, “Men taking it for granted that they knew all the perceivable properties of matter, they concluded that such things as could not be accounted for by these, were to be accounted for by the properties of some other substance [13].” And again, “Vanity and presumption determine Philosophers to conclude, that because they cannot account for the phænomena of the mind by what they know

[13] Vol. iii. p. 502.

“ very superficially of solid extended substance, this mind must be some other substance [14].” Such, indeed, was the state of the controversy when LOCKE skimmed over the argument. But CLARKE and BAXTER went to the bottom. They draw their conclusion, not in the presumption that they knew all the knowable qualities of matter, and that between these and *Thought*, there was no perceivable connexion; but from this deep and solid truth, that from the little we do know of body, there arises a contradiction to suppose *intelligence* to be a quality of matter.

We have the same reasoning on the *motion of body*. “ They are unable (says “ his Lordship) to conceive how body can “ act at all, and therefore they suppose “ the immediate presence and action of “ an incorporeal agent in every operation “ of corporeal nature [15].” Whereas the truth is, they are able to conceive the impossibility of bodies acting at all: and, from thence see the necessity of an *incorporeal agent in every operation of corporeal nature*. You will think, perhaps, his Lord-

[14] Vol. iii. p. 508-9. [15] Vol. iv. p. 108.

ship knew no more of this question than as it stood in his *Master Locke*; and that he had never heard of *Baxter*, who has carried it furthest, and treated it the most profoundly. I should have thought so too, but that I find his Lordship, in one place, speaking with that contempt of *Baxter's* reasoning which is his wont, whenever any thing he cannot answer bears hard upon the *first Philosophy*. It is where he honours us with his own thoughts concerning ATTRACTION, "Attraction, (saith his Lordship) may be, notwithstanding all the *filly abstract reasoning* to the contrary, "a REAL PROPERTY OF MATTER [16]." Now you are to understand that *Baxter*, when he has evinced the truth of NEWTON's idea of *attraction* (who makes it no *real*, or essential, *property of matter*) employs this idea to prove, that it implies a *contradiction* to suppose the soul may be a quality of matter. This great truth, deep reflection, and a thorough comprehension of the Newtonian Philosophy, enabled *Baxter* to demonstrate. On the other hand, no reflection, no Philosophy, but mere *in-*

[16] Vol. iii. p. 547.

tuitive knowledge, led his Lordship to conclude that it is so far from being a *contradiction*, that it is a real fact, that the *soul is a quality of matter*. But, hear his own marvelous words, "I am persuaded that
 " God can make material systems capable
 " of thought, because I must renounce one
 " of the kinds of knowledge that he has
 " given me, and the first, tho' not the
 " principal in the order of knowing, or
 " admit that HE HATH DONE SO [17]." Locke only contended for the bare *possibility*. His Lordship has found it to be a fact. So fairly has the disciple outdone his Master.

3. But let us now go on with the great principles which support his Lordship's System. His third is the FALSHOOD of the *Jewish* and *Christian* REVELATIONS. And here you will find no argument omitted that bears with the least force against either of them. It is true, not one of them is his own. I mean, of those deserving the name of argument. They are all borrowed from the minute Philosophers who went before him. And, of these his Lord-

[17] Vol. iii. p. 531.

ship

ship is a very observant and humble imitator.

His attack on revealed Religion is in two parts. The *first*, a confutation of it's truth, as it lies in it's purity, in sacred Scripture: the *second*, an insinuation of it's falshood, as it is seen in it's abuses and corruptions, in particular Churches.

Judaism is attacked more fully and avowedly in the first way: and *Christianity*, in the second.

I. All the arguments against Revelation, as it is represented in the Bible, are taken from BLOUNT, TOLAND, COLLINS, CHUBB, MORGAN, and their fellows. I must, except, indeed, the atrocious terms in which they are commonly enforced. For the iniquity of the times would not suffer those confessors of truth *to put forth more than half their strength*, as his Lordship himself assures us [18]. When I say his arguments are all taken from these men, I do not speak it, in disparagement of the reasoning. On the contrary, this is by far the most plausible part of these voluminous *Essays*.

[18] Vol. iv. p. 163.

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily. All his Lordship's great originals professed to believe the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the deity, in common with the rest of mankind: And on that principle enforced their arguments against the truth of revealed Religion: and indeed what other principle is there that will afford ground for a single objection against it? Now his Lordship professes to have no idea of these *moral attributes*. No matter. They were necessary to be taken into service here, for the completion of his schemes. And a Philosopher can drop his principle as a politician does his friend, when he is of no use, and renew his acquaintance again when he wants him. These discarded *attributes* therefore are on this occasion taken into favour; soon again to be dismissed, and his OLD PRINCIPLE reassumed, when he wants to guard against the terrors of a future state; in which, to do it justice, it performs true Knights-service. Much indeed is it to be lamented, that his *old principle* should ever grow capricious; and that when it had so effectually excluded God's moral Government as recommended by *natural Religion*, it should oppose itself to those arguments

ments which are for excluding God's moral government as recommended by *Revelation*.

An historical deduction of the abuses and corruptions of Christianity in the CHURCH OF ROME, to advance superstition, fanaticism, and spiritual tyranny, makes the second part of his Lordship's reasoning against REVELATION; and the subject of the largest of his *four Essays*.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of Piety, Patriotism, and Humanity. He bewails the dishonours done to Religion; he resents the violations of civil Liberty; and he vindicates the common sense of mankind from the scholastic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious Clergy.

Felicia tempora, quæ te
Moribus opponunt: habeat jam ROMA pudorem.

On so trite a topic, the topic of every true Protestant from Fox to Mr. Chandler, that is, from the first to the last good writer upon the subject, his Lordship may be excused for unloading his Common-place. Whatever there is of a better taste, he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and such

such other of the English Clergy who have most successfully detected the errors and usurpations of Popery.

But as the object of our Divines in this detection was to recommend the Gospel-truth; and of his Lordship, to discredit it; he had need of other helps: And these, too, were at hand; such as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exaggerating the abuses, and in drawing false consequences from the reform of them. Thus, according to those Divines who wrote *for truth*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY was modestly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge; as keeping men busied in trifling controversies, and as making them often mistake words for things. But with my Lord, and these his better guides, who wrote *against Revelation*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY is boldly accused to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in it's stead but *madness, frenzy, and delirium*.

So again, The end of those Divines in exposing human usurpations, was to introduce a RELIGIOUS SOCIETY on the principles of Gospel-liberty: but the end of these Philosophers in decrying Popery is to establish

blish a *civil*, in the place of a *religious* usurpation, and to make the CHURCH A CREATURE OF THE STATE.

In the mean time, he says *boldly* and well, “ That some men are IMPUDENT enough
 “ to *pretend*, others SILLY enough to *be-*
 “ *lieve*, that they adhere to the Gospel,
 “ and maintain the cause of God against
 “ infidels and heretics, when they do no-
 “ thing better; nor more than expose the
 “ conceits of men [19].” But while he
 is thus busy in observing what happens at
 one end of this common fallacy, he suffers
 himself to slip in, at the other: and does
 just the same *against* the Gospel, which
 these men do *for* it. He exposes the kna-
 very of powerful Churchmen; and the folly
 of profound Divines; and then *pretends*, or
believes, he hath discredited Revelation itself.
 However, to part friends with the *Di-*
vines, after so many hard words, he teaches
 them how to prop up, in some *plausible*
 way, their bungling systems of ARTIFI-
 CIAL THEOLOGY, just as he had before
 taught God Almighty himself to mend his
two Dispensations. “ Let us (says he)
 “ suppose a Theist objecting — the be-

[19] Vol. iv. p. 385.

“ *liever*

“liever might reply — he might add —
 “he might add — and all this with great
 “*plausibility* at least [20].” You will say
 now, I envy my Lord the glory of his
 instructions to defend *artificial theology*, or
 otherwise I, who am not sparing of my
 quotations, would have given them at
 large. To tell you the truth, I suppressed
 them with design ; to excite the Reader’s
 curiosity. It is said there is occasion for
 it : and that the Public does not yet appear
 disposed to pay that profound attention to
 the *first Philosophy* as might be wished on
 the first appearance of so great a blessing.
 You will suspect, by what you have seen
 in my first Letter, that the Public may be
 somewhat *overdosed*, and so has *kecked* a
 little. But it is to be hoped, his Followers
 will soon reconcile them to their Physic.

4. His Lordship’s fourth and last great
 principle is the IMPOSSIBILITY of REVE-
 LATION in general.

He has refused no arms, we see, to com-
 bat the Revelations God hath *actually*
given. He would seem to relax a little of
 his severity, as to those which God may
possibly give : for in one place he says, *he*

will not absolutely pronounce against the possibility of God's revealing his will to man. But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he simply forgot himself (a matter of little consequence) most true it is, that he hath formally laid down, and largely insisted upon, certain principles, which make *revealed Religion* a thing UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE.

First, As to INSPIRATION, he not only denies all *reality* in the thing, but will not allow so much as any *meaning* in the word. And a MIRACLE, he holds to be impossible, what never was, nor ever can be. But now, without the *first*, no divine messenger could be sent; for he must receive his orders from God: and without the *second*, no divine messenger would be believed; for he must have his credentials to shew to Man: and these credentials, on his Lordship's own principles, can be no other than *miracles*.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subject likewise Infidelity is no more indebted to him than for his good will. All he urges against *inspiration* and *miracles* having been first urged by HOBBS and SPINOZA: by the one, with more subtilty
and

96 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S
and exactness; by the other, with infinite
more elegance.

Secondly, His Lordship holds the RELIGION OF NATURE to be full, perfect, and well understood. He holds, likewise, that the only conceivable purpose of *Revelation* must be to *republick* the *Religion of Nature*. The consequence is, and this his Lordship gives us to understand, he saw, that the use of *Revelation* becomes superseded. For if it teaches *more* than natural Religion taught, or *different* from what it taught, the Revelation must be false; if only the *same*, it is evidently superfluous.

Thirdly, His Lordship utterly rejects a PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. But a revealed Religion is nothing else than the exercise of that very providence to some declared end in the moral System.

On all these accounts, he concludes, and consequentially enough, that REASON HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO DO, WHEN REVELATION BEGINS [20].

You have now, Sir, the whole of his Lordship's SYSTEM, together with his topics in support of it, both very succinctly

delivered: enough however to shew you that these famous ESSAYS which you have heard so often cried up as the very Mine, the native Treasury of all divine and human truths, are indeed little other than the *Magazine* or Warehouse of other men's lumber: or (not to dishonour his Lordship by a mechanical comparison) like the mouth of your neighbouring SEVERN, turbulent and dirty: which, let fableing *Poets* say what they please, we are sure never derived it's source from the pure and perennial Urn of a *Demi-god*: but, if one may guess from the taste and colour, became thus considerable for it's bulk by the confluence of shallow brooks and babbling rivulets; of stagnant ditches, common-sewers, and yet stranger mixtures; scoured off and put into a ferment by the hasty rage of some peevish land-torrent.

THE main pillar of his System, you see, is this extravagant paradox, *That we have NO ADEQUATE ideas of God's moral attributes, his GOODNESS and JUSTICE, as we have of his natural, his Wisdom and Power.* And here, let me observe once for all, that his Lordship uses the words, *inadequate*
H *ideas,*

ideas, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the same import. And as I think, not improperly, I have followed him in the indifferent use of either expression. For the reason of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, INADEQUATE, is, because he denies goodness and justice to be the same IN KIND, in God as in Man: But if not the same *in kind*, we cannot surely have *any* idea of them, because we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodness and justice.

As the reasoning on this head, contrary to his usual wont, is entirely his own; and besides, an extreme curiosity in itself, I will once more go a little out of my way, to set it in a true light; that it may neither impose by it's novelty; nor too much shock you and all good men by it's unchecked atrocity. The rest are adopted impieties, of a paultry plebeian race; but inserted, tho' in a contrary course, into this noble stock, with the spirit of CLODIUS's famous adoption of old, only for the sake of public mischief.

His three Positions are, That, by *metaphysics*, or the reasoning *a priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

That our knowledge of his *attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation

on his *Works*, or by the reasoning *a posteriori*.

That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his *natural* attributes, not of his *moral*.

“ It is from the constitution of the world ALONE (says his Lordship) and from the state of mankind in it, that we can *acquire any ideas* of the divine attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing about them* [1].”

“ The knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary to such a creature as man : and therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, *from a knowledge of God's works to a knowledge of his existence*, and of that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are demonstrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER [2].”

“ Artificial Theology connects by very problematical reasoning *a priori*, MORAL attributes, such as we conceive them, and such as they are relatively to us, with the *physical* attributes of God ; tho' there be no sufficient foundation

[1] Vol. v. p. 331.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 86.

“ for this proceeding, nay, tho’ *the phæ-*
 “ *nomena are in several cases repugnant* [3].”

Having thus assured us that the ideas of God’s *moral attributes* are to be got by no reasoning at all, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if man has such ideas, they were not *found* but *invented* by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the Authors of the fiction, and how strangely the thing came about.

“ Some of the Philosophers (says his
 “ Lordship) having been led by a more full
 “ and accurate contemplation of Nature to
 “ the knowledge of a supreme self-existent
 “ Being of infinite *power and wisdom*, and
 “ the first Cause of all things, were not
 “ contented with this degree of knowledge.
 “ They MADE A SYSTEM of God’s MO-
 “ RAL as well as *physical* attributes, BY
 “ WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PRO-
 “ CEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE [4].”

These Philosophers then, it seems, *in-*
vented the system of God’s *moral attributes*,
 in order to account for the difficulties arising

[3] Vol. v. p. 316.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 48.

from the view of God's moral government. If the World had till now been so dull as to have no conception of these Attributes; his Lordship's Philosophers, we see, made ample amends; who were so quick witted as to conceive, and so sharp sighted as to perceive, the obliquities of a crooked line before they had got any idea of a straight one. For just to this, neither more nor less, does his Lordship's profound observation concerning this profounder discovery amount, when he says, *they made a System of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence.*

This *invention* of his Lordship's old Philosophers would put one in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANÇA; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to find out the Author of that very useful *invention* we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magistrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the *First Philosophy*. Now the things sought after by Sancho and his Lordship were at no great distance: for if *Sleeping* began when men first shut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodness* appeared as soon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the moral attributes *a priori*, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a safe to shew their prowess.

I rather chuse to undertake his Lordship on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *a posteriori*. For he is such a Champion for the good Cause, that he not only appoints his adversaries the field, but prescribes to them the use of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be seen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Aristotle's FIRST MATTER, *undressed, and without a rag of form*, but flaunting and fluttering in FRAGMENTS. To speak plainly, his Lordship's entire want of method betrays him into endless REPETITIONS: and in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this, the
perpetual

perpetual CONTRADICTIONS into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him to the best advantage; in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reasoning generally confutes itself.

When I reflect upon what this has cost me, no less than the reading over two or three bulky Volumes to get possession of a single argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you lose; it meets you full when you least expect it, and it slips away from you the very moment it promises to do most: when, I say, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of our CLERGY, who, tho' least fit, and indeed least *concerned*, as there is nothing that can impose on a Scholar, and a great deal that may mislead the People, are likely to be the men most engaged in this controversy with his Lordship. Time was, when if a Writer had a disposition to seek objections to Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and they moved heavily, yet he would digest his thoughts, and range his arguments, and me-

thodize his reasoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they could. But since this slovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) of *taking their physic in public*, has got amongst our Free-thinkers, that is, of doseing themselves well with doubts; and then as hastily discharging their loose and crude indigestions into *Fragments*; things which, in their very name, imply not so much the want, as the exclusion of all *Form*; the advocate of Religion has had a double labour: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can lay hold of them safely, or present them handsomely. But these Gentlemen have taken care that a Clergyman should not be idle. He finds the same to do in the discharge of his *office pastoral*. All he had of old to attend was the saving the souls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his flock that they have a soul to be saved. And the spite of all is, that at the time his kind masters have thus doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

We have observed, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier against

against Religion in general: but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship's idiosyncratic terrors; the terrors of a *future State*. To these we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent paroxysms.

For, set the *moral attributes* aside, and we can neither form any judgment of the *end* of man, nor of the *nature* of God's moral government. All our knowledge will be then confined to our *present* state and condition. It is by these attributes alone, we learn, that man was made for *happiness*; and that God's dispensation to us *here* is but *part* of our moral system: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, the certainty of a *future state*.

The FATE of all Religion therefore being included in the question of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of importance to prove, against his Lordship, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the same way, and with equal certainty, that his Lordship in the following words hath shewn us, we acquire the knowledge of God's *natural attributes*.

“ All

“ All our knowledge of God (says he)
 “ is derived from his works. Every part
 “ of the immense universe, and the or-
 “ der and harmony of the Whole, are
 “ not only conformable to our ideas or
 “ notions of WISDOM and POWER, but
 “ these ideas and notions were impressed
 “ originally and principally by them, on
 “ every attentive mind; and men were led
 “ to conclude, with the utmost certain-
 “ ty, that a Being of infinite *wisdom* and
 “ *power* made, preserved, and governed
 “ the system. As far as we can discover,
 “ we discern these in all his works; and
 “ where we cannot discern them, it is
 “ manifestly due to our imperfection, not
 “ to his. This now is real knowledge,
 “ or there is no such thing as knowledge.
 “ We acquire it immediately in the objects
 “ themselves, in God, and in Nature, the
 “ work of God. We know what *wisdom*
 “ and *power* are: we know both intuitive-
 “ ly, and by the help of our senses, that
 “ such as we conceive them to be, such
 “ they appear in the Work: and therefore
 “ we know demonstratively that such they
 “ are in the Worker [5].”

[5] Vol v. p. 524.

All

All this is mighty well: and on these very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and as precise ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE, as of his *wisdom* and *power*.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are so far gone, rather to *redress*, all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the use of them; it will be proper to explain what true PHILOSOPHY means by GOD'S WORKS, whether *physical* or *moral*.

Now I understand by it, that CONSTITUTION OF THINGS which God hath established and directed, tending to a plain and evident end: without regard to those impediments or obstructions in it's course, which the Author of nature hath permitted to arise from any part of the *material*, or *intellectual* Creation.

Thus, when we consider his *physical* works, in order to make our estimate of his *wisdom* and *power*, we conceive them as they are in themselves; and in the perfection of their Constitution; tho' the great portion of the *physical* system may, from the intractability of matter, be subject to some *inconsiderable irregularities*, which, as the true PHILOSOPHER observes

will be apt to increase till this system wants a reformation : and tho' the smaller portions, such as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient formation and adaption of their parts, from the wonderful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of all animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the *wisdom* and *power* of the Workman.

Surely, then, common sense, and all equitable measure, require us to estimate God's *moral works* on the same standard : to consider what the *moral constitution is in itself* : and (when the question is of God's *goodness* and *justice*) to keep that view distinct and separate : nor suffer it to be disturbed or broken by any interruptions occasioned thro' the perverse influence either of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, in this case, Both concur to violate the Constitution. In the *natural* system, man's *Free-will* has no place : in the *moral*, the abuse of *Free-will* occasions the most and greatest of it's disorders.

In prosecuting this question therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wisdom* and *power*, we consider

sider the *natural system* only as it's order and harmony is supported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion: so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodness* and *justice*, we should regard the *moral system* only as it's order and harmony is supported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happiness to virtue, and misery to vice*.

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's work*, in either system: and it is from *God's work* we are to demonstrate his *attributes*. The rest, where real or apparent disorders obtrude themselves, to obstruct our views in these discoveries, proceeds from *matter* and the *human mind*.

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion we draw from hence, in support of our *adequate* ideas of God's *moral* attributes, has the greater strength upon his Lordship's own principles; who holds, that this Constitution arises *solely from the WILL* of God: For then we are sure that the WILL, which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, must arise from God's *moral* rather than from his first *physical* nature.

Having premised thus much, tho' no more than necessary to obviate one continued

tinued SOPHISM, that runs thro' all his Lordship's reasonings, against the *moral attributes*: where, the course and operation of that *moral Constitution* as it appears under the disturbances occasioned by man's *free-will*, is perpetually put for the *Constitution itself*: I now proceed to shew, from GOD'S WORKS, that we have as precise ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wisdom*.

His Lordship observes, that *from every part of the immense universe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the system.* And what should hinder the Religionist from observing, that the happiness attendant on virtue, and the misery consequent on vice by the very Constitution of nature, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite *goodness* and *justice* made, preserves, and governs the system?

The existence of this *moral Constitution* his Lordship acknowledges. Let us consider it, therefore, both as it respects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miserable

miserable in proportion to their virtuous or vicious manners, his Lordship himself is the forwardest to demonstrate. If such a Constitution of things does not bespeak the Author of it *good* and *just*, how is it possible to conclude any thing of the character of a Creator from his Works? His Lordship thinks, that from the marks of *wisdom* and *power* in the *physical system* we learn with the utmost certainty that God is wise and powerful; and he says, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our senses. Are there not the self same marks of *goodness* and *justice* in this part at least of the *moral system*? And do not we come to know as immediately by our senses, and as certainly by our reason, that God is good and just?

If we consider the *moral Constitution*, as it respects *Particulars*, we see virtue and vice have the same influence on our happiness and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions, in the means to the end, than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Nature have here more power to disorder the operations of the System. In *Communities*, they can rarely be disturbed, but by a Pestilence, or that other moral Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror:
Amongst

Amongst *Particulars*, physical evil and the abuse of free-will bring more frequent disorders. But when once the demonstration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the constitution which regards *Communities*, it can never be shaken by the disorders in the other part of it, which regards *Particulars*. The established truth is now a Principle to proceed upon in our discoveries; and as to the interruptions in the latter instance, all we can fairly deduce from thence is, the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I insist upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's attributes, we are to consider the Constitution of things, as it is in itself, simply; this is, properly, *God's work*. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's *free-will*, is not his Work, but man's. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future state* from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's Nature and *Attributes* from his *Works*.

But

But we do not see those disorders in the *natural* world which we both see and feel in the *moral*. This would be some objection did God direct things *immediately*, or constitute them *mechanically*, in the moral, as he does in the natural System; or had Free-will the same influence on the latter as on the former. — Did God direct in both Constitutions, or did he direct in neither, *immediately* or *mechanically*, and that yet the *moral* continued more subject to disorder than the *natural*, it might then indeed follow that we had not so clear ideas of God's *goodness* and *justice* as of his *wisdom* and *power*. But since he has thought fit to leave man, FREE; and has been pleased to suffer the abuse of free-will to affect the *moral* system, and not the *natural*; the superior irregularities in the *one* do not take off from the equal clearness of the demonstration which results from the nature of *both* Constitutions. “ This difference (to speak in the words of a late writer) is not to be ascribed to a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two Systems, but to the contrary natures of the Subjects. Passive matter being totally inert, it's resistance to the Laws im-

“ pressed upon it, must be extremely weak :
 “ and consequently the disorders arising
 “ from that resistance proportionably slow
 “ and unheeded: while that active self-
 “ moving principle, the Mind, flies out at
 “ once from the centre of its direction,
 “ and can every moment deflect from the
 “ line of truth and reason. Hence moral
 “ disorders began early, became excessive,
 “ and have continued, through all ages, to
 “ disturb the harmony of the System [6].”

What is here said will, I suppose, be sufficient to confute the following assertions; and to detect the mistake on which they arise.

“ Every thing (says his Lordship) shews
 “ the *wisdom* and *power* of God conformably
 “ to our ideas of wisdom and power in the
 “ *physical* world and in the *moral*. But
 “ every thing does not shew in like manner
 “ the *justice* and *goodness* conformably to our
 “ ideas of these attributes in either. The
 “ *physical* attributes are in their nature
 “ more glaring and less equivocal [7].”

And again. “ There is no sufficient

[6] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's-Inn.* Vol. i. p. 66.

[7] Vol. v. p. 524.

“*foundation* in the phænomena of nature
 “ to connect the moral attributes with the
 “ physical attributes of God. *Nay, the*
 “ *phænomena are in several cases repugnant*
 “ [8].”

But since he goes so far as to talk of the
want of a foundation, and even a *repugnancy*;
 Before I proceed with the main branch of
 my reasoning, I will just urge one single
 argument for the reality and full evidence of
 the *moral attributes*: and it shall be taken
 from himself, and shall conclude on his
 own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, “ who
 “ apply themselves to the *first Philosophy*,
 “ apply themselves to the noblest objects
 “ that can demand the attention of the
 “ mind — To the signification of GOD’S
 “ WILL, concerning the duties we owe to
 “ him, and to one another [9].”

And again, “ It is sufficient to establish
 “ our moral obligations that we consider
 “ them relatively to our own system.
 “ From thence they arise: and since they
 “ arise from thence, it must be the WILL of

[8] Vol. v. p. 316.

[9] Vol. v. p. 447.

“ that Being who made the system, that we
 “ should observe and practise them [10].”

Let me ask then, How it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this system*? He will say from certain *qualities* in those objects. — What are those qualities? He will reply, the *fitnesses* of means to ends. — Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us, the *God of nature*. — It was God's *will* then we should use the *means* in order to obtain the *ends*. Now, in the *moral* system, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as it's contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this *like* and *dislike*; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. *Wisdom*, which his Lordship condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be, as his Lordship holds it is, the constitution of God, and *dependent on his will*, then he who is pleased with virtue,

and displeas'd with vice, must needs be himself *good* and *just*.

To proceed now with my main argument. His Lordship goes on thus. *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.*

I desire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at *Battersea*, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the *physical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steady, and they were always till now inseparable.

He says, that *as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection not to his.*

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be well considered. A comparison, we see, is insinuated between our discovery of

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infinite power; and wisdom, from the *physical* works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice, from his *moral* works; in which the advantage is given to the former. Now, to come to any clear decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism which operates in this observation, as in the rest) we must distinguish between the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of God's attributes, and that *knowledge when acquired*. As to the first, the *means of acquiring*, there seems to be some advantage on the side of God's physical works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, *where we cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical works it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for, as men advance in the knowledge of nature we see more and more of wisdom and power*. And he insinuates, we cannot say the same concerning the difficulties in the *moral* system. It is true, we cannot. But then let us tell him, neither can we say the contrary. The reason is, The physical system lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our senses, to well tried experiments, we are able to make considerable advances in the knowledge of Nature,

ture. It is not so in the *moral* system; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Constitution; and further than this, human wit or industry can never get. These general principles, indeed, are amply sufficient to deduce and establish the *moral attributes* from the *moral system*, but not sufficient to remove difficulties that arise from what we see of the actual administration of that system. So that, tho' we cannot say, that *as we advance in the knowledge of the moral system we see more and more of goodness and justice*: So neither can his Lordship say (tho' his words seem to insinuate he could) that as we advance, we see *less and less*. Whereas the truth is we cannot advance at all, beyond those few general principles.

But then, on the other hand, with regard to the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired*, I hold the advantage, and a very great one it is, lies altogether on the side of the MORAL. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of a late writer, quoted once before: "Tho' the
 " idea (says this Divine) of God's *natural at-*
 " tributes be as clear in the abstract, as that
 " of his *moral*, yet the idea of his moral

“ attributes is, in the concrete, more ade-
 “ quate than that of his natural. The reason
 “ seems convincing. The moral relation in
 “ which we stand to God, as free agents,
 “ is just the same whether man exists alone,
 “ or whether he be but a link in the chain
 “ of innumerable orders of intelligences
 “ surrounding the whole Creation. Hence
 “ we must needs have a full knowledge of
 “ our duty to him, and of his disposition
 “ towards us: on which knowledge is
 “ founded the exactness of our conceptions
 “ of his moral attributes, his *justice* and
 “ *goodness*. But the natural relation in
 “ which we, or any of God's creatures,
 “ stand towards him, as material Beings, is
 “ not the same when considered simply, as
 “ when a portion of a dependent and con-
 “ nected whole. Because whenever such a
 “ whole exists, the harmony and perfection
 “ of it must first of all be consulted. This
 “ harmony ariseth from the mutual subser-
 “ viency and union of it's parts. But this
 “ subserviency may require a ministration of
 “ government, with regard to certain porti-
 “ ons of matter thus allied, different from
 “ what might have followed had those por-
 “ tions stood alone, because that precise dis-
 “ position,

“ position, which might be fit in one case
 “ might be unfit in the other. Hence we,
 “ who know there is a whole, of which
 “ our material system is a part; and yet are
 “ totally ignorant both of it’s nature and
 “ extent, can have but a very confused idea
 “ of that physical relation in which we
 “ stand towards God: so that our con-
 “ ceptions of his *natural* attributes, his
 “ *power* and *wisdom*, which are founded on
 “ that idea, must in the concrete be propor-
 “ tionably vague and inadequate [11].”

But you will ask, perhaps, whence arises
 this reciprocal advantage which the *moral*
 and the *natural* attributes have over one an-
 other in the *means of acquiring* the know-
 ledge of them, and the precision of *that*
knowledge when acquired? I will tell you in
 two words. Of *our own* physical system, we
 know many particulars, (that is, we discover
 much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end*)
 and of the *universal* physical system we are
 entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we
 know but few particulars of *our own* moral
 system, (that is, we discover only the *end*,

[11] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion,*
in a course of Sermons at Lincoln’s Inn, Vol. i. p. 58,
& seq.

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and not the *means*) and of the *universal* moral
system we know the general principles.

His Lordship proceeds. *This now* [the
knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] is
real knowledge; or there is no such thing as
knowledge. We acquire it immediately in
the objects themselves, IN GOD, and in na-
ture the work of God.

What his Lordship means by, *in God*,
distinct from the *work of God*, I confess I
do not understand: Perhaps it may be in-
tended to insinuate, in honour of the *natu-
ral attributes* that they may be even proved
a priori; for this is not the first time by
many, when after having heartily abused a
person or thing, he has been reduced to avail
himself of the authority, or the reasoning,
they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only
used to round the period, and set off his elo-
quence. However I agree with him, that
this is *real knowledge*. And so too, I think,
is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, so
gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, *I
do allow just so much goodness and justice in
God as we see in that CONSTITUTION which
annexes happiness to virtue and misery to
vice. But this, says he, I think, had better
be called WISDOM.* I think so too; if by,
so

so much, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural government*. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this *constitution*, we may collect PERFECT goodness and justice. *Matter* and man's *Free-will* disturb the System. But if the Constitution be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordship holds; and the mark of his *Wisdom*, as all mankind hold; Does not that *Wisdom* require that his *Will* should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perversity of his creatures were not remedied and set right? And is not A REMEDY the clearest mark of *perfect goodness and justice*?

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses the Constitution, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This *present* disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the schemes of divine wisdom, that there should be such a creature as man:

- “ For in the scale of reasoning life, 'tis plain
 “ There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man.

the consequence is, that the disorder will be *hereafter rectified*.

Had

Had God indeed made Man *unnecessari-ly*; and this Man had broke in upon God's System, his Lordship might then have had some pretence to say, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the SYSTEM, which annexes happiness to virtue and misery to vice, should remain in it's present state of an unperfected dispensation, to all eternity.

He goes on. *We know what WISDOM and POWER are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK; and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the WORKER.*

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our senses* know, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *constitution of things*, which, his Lordship tells us, annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice? And may we not *demonstratively* collect from thence that such they are in the WORKER? since this Constitution, his Lordship again tells us, is the effect of God's *will*. On his own principles therefore, ap-
plied

plied to his own state of the reasoning *a posteriori*, it appears that God is of *infinite goodness* and *justice*, as well as of *wisdom* and *power*. And was I to imitate his Lordship's language, I should say of a man who denied all this,

— "O Medici, mediam pertundite venam :
" Delicias hominis !

But to give authority to this *prodigious* reasoning, He, in one place, puts it into the mouth of *Anaxagoras*. "Should you ask
" *Anaxagoras* (says he) what *goodness* is,
" or *justice*? He might bid you, perhaps,
" turn your eyes inward, first; then, sur-
" vey mankind; observe the wants of in-
" dividuals, the benefits of society, and;
" from these particulars, frame the general
" notions of *goodness* and *justice*. He
" might go a step further; and add, this is
" *human* goodness and *human* justice, such
" as we can comprehend, such as we can
" exercise; and such as the supreme mind
" has made it both our duty and interest to
" exercise, by the constitution of the hu-
" man system; and by the relations which
" arise in it: from all which our notions of
" *goodness* and *justice* result, and are com-
" pounded."

We know then, what goodness and justice are, as well as what wisdom and power are; we know both intuitively and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work — for he bids us to turn our eyes inward — then to survey mankind, and lastly, to observe how reason, from the constitution of human nature, confirms our intuitive knowledge, and that which we gain by the help of our senses. But what does all this signify, if Anaxagoras or his Lordship be in an humour of concluding against their own premisses? — Hear then how the speech ends. — “Of divine goodness and divine justice might this Philosopher conclude, I AM UNABLE TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS [12].”

What? Unable to *frame* that which God by the *moral* constitution has *framed to our bands*; and by the declaration of his *WILL* has taught us to *apply*? In truth, his Lordship brings his old Sophists not, as one would expect, to chop Logic for *him*, but to play at *cross purposes* with us. — *We do know*, says Anaxagoras, *what Goodness and Justice are: we know both intuitively,*

and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work; and THEREFORE we DO NOT KNOW that such they are in the worker.

Might I be permitted to address myself to this Renegado Sophist, I would say, — Your brethren, the antient Philosophers, reasoned *a posteriori* in this manner, “ Can you think there is *wisdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker ? ” By no means. They reasoned well. — Let me ask you then, is there *goodness* and *justice* in you, and none in your Maker ? His answer, I suppose, would be the same. But, prompted by his Lordship, into whose service he is now entered, he perhaps might add, that from *human goodness* and *justice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What hinders us, I beseech you ? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wisdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of God’s ? Are *wisdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT as they are found in man, than *goodness* and *justice* ? If therefore the IMPERFECTION of the human qualities hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of God’s attributes, we can have no adequate idea of his *wisdom* and *power* ; If the IMPERFECTION
does

does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodness* and *justice*.

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wisdom*, his Lordship says, is supported by what men see of the effects in his Works; the order and harmony of the physical System. Do we not see likewise the effects of God's *goodness* and *justice*, in the happiness that *naturally* attends virtue and the misery consequent on vice? And is not the *moral* order and harmony as much God's *Work*, as the *physical*?

Thus, Sir, you see, that by the *very reasoning* his Lordship EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the *very method* he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral*, we have demonstrated *these* with a precision and a certainty, at least, equal to the other.

His Lordship seems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had set us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, by pretending to remind us that the *moral attributes* should be examined by, or *applied to*, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT [13]. I had as much reason to be

aware of his Lordship. And therefore, in stating the question, at my entrance on this subject, I obviated this miserable Sophism. I call it by no better name, because it is not *the constitution of the world or the state of mankind in it*, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the state of virtue and vice, as they naturally operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and ascertained. But this, which is a steady and uniform view, he would have us turn away from; to contemplate that obscure, disturbed, and shifting scene, the actual state of vice and virtue, of misery and happiness, amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the breaches into that constitution by the abuse of man's free-will: which yet, when he is arguing *for an equal providence*, he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. While here, in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*, he is full

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of the disorders of the moral System as
part of God's design. But now I have
mentioned his arguments for an equal
providence, I should be unjust to You,
who expect a fair *view* of his Lordship's
Philosophy from me, if I concealed ano-
ther of his contradictions. — He had both
a *future State* and *God's moral attributes*
to throw out of the religious world; or,
to speak more properly, he had RELIGION
to overturn by taking away it's very ES-
SENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the
present administration of providence stood
in the way of his first attempt; and the
consistency of the moral System in the way
of the other; when he argues against a
future State, You would think there were
no *irregularities*; and when he argues
against the *moral attributes*, You would
think there was no *consistency*.

We now come to his Lordship's par-
ticular objections against the *moral attri-
butes*. One of them is, that they are
BOUNDED.

“ They [the Divines] go further. As
“ God is perfect and man very imperfect,
“ they talk of his *infinite goodness and jus-
“ tice*, as of his infinite wisdom and pow-

“er; tho’ the latter may preserve their
 “nature without any conceivable bounds,
 “and the former must cease to be what
 “they are, unless we conceive them
 “BOUNDED. Their nature implies neces-
 “sarily a limitation in the exercise of them.
 “Thus then the *moral attributes*, accord-
 “ing to this Theology, requires infinitely
 “more of God to man than men are able,
 “or would be obliged if they were able,
 “to exercise to one another: greater pro-
 “fusion in bestowing benefits and re-
 “wards, greater vigour in punishing of-
 “fences [14].”

You have here his Lordship’s own words; and nothing less could induce any one to believe such misrepresentations could come from one, who had set himself up for an universal Righter of wrongs and Redresser of grievances. Permit me to examine the *premisses*; together with the *inferences* both *implied* and *expressed*.

He says, 1. that the *moral attributes* are *bounded*; 2. that the *natural* are *not bounded*. Let us see to what the first proposition amounts; and then, what truth there is in the second.

The *moral attributes* are considered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures; the *natural* are not so considered. Thus the goodness and justice, when relative to man, are greatly *bounded*: a certain low degree of reward suffices for his *good*; a certain low degree of punishment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodness and justice respect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *less bounded*; for greater rewards and punishments will be required: and so on, to the highest rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the highest is at infinite distance from the Creator, the exercise of the moral attributes, (that is, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures,) must be still *bounded*.

His second proposition is, that the natural attributes are *not bounded*. It is true, these cannot be considered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet since they must be considered, in *their exercise*, as relative to his Creation at large; and since Creation, however immense, is not infinite, the natural attributes so considered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*. There is no difference therefore, in the exercise of God's attributes, between

tween the *moral* and the *natural*, save only in the degree.

But if we consider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abstractedly, not as they are *in the exercise*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is groundless and imaginary.

But let us give him all he asks, and then see what he will be able to *infer* from it. His first inference seems to be this, As the *moral* attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the *natural*, our idea of them must be cloudy, obscure, inadequate. What! because they are better adapted to human contemplation? As things *bounded* certainly are, than things *infinite*. Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely MAN, must needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to Beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the UNIVERSE.

Let us consider his other *inference*, which he expresses in these words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another.*

To say the moral attributes, according to Christian Theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY more, is a wretched calumny. To say it *requires more* is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between Creator and Creature is very distant from that between Fellow-creatures; therefore the *goodness* more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is very distant from that between Fellow-servants; therefore the *justice* more severe. And if it would not be deemed too IMPUDENT to refer his Lordship to Scripture for instruction (especially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended) he might there have found a *Parable* which would have set him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong.

But

But *infinite*, when applied to the *exercise* of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordship's nonsense, with due reverence be it said, not the *nonsense of artificial Divines*. They were not ignorant that the rule, *infirmiorem vel deteriorem partem sequitur consequentia*, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic*. Tho' God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with respect to him, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them*. And why would he not suppose Divines might see as far into this matter as himself?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology* he is as sure to espouse it at one time or other, as he is, at all times, to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men in their ill advised zeal to defend the Gospel-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always sufficiently careful in selecting their arguments. Amongst such as had, perhaps, been better let alone, they employed this, That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satis-

faction ; which none but such a Being could give. Now it is on this very principle, we see, his Lordship goes about to discredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jesus Christ.

As the being *bounded* is one of his Lordship's objections against the *moral attributes*, so another is, that some of them are merely HUMAN.

“ After Dr. CLARKE (says he) has repeated over and over that all the *moral attributes* are the same in God as in our ideas ; and that he who denies them to be so may as well deny the divine *physical attributes*, the Doctor insists only on two of the former, on those of *justice* and *goodness*. He was much in the right to contract the generality of his assertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPERANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God, would have been too gross, and too visible even to eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But that, of ascribing *justice* and *goodness*, to him, according to our notions of them, might be better covered, and was enough for his purpose, tho' NOT LESS REALLY ABSURD [15].”

Had not his Lordship accustomed us by his reasoning, as well as admonished us by his motto [16], *to wonder at nothing*, this paragraph were enough to set his readers in *admiration*: doubtful indeed of their object, whether of his KNOWLEDGE or his INGENUITY.

When men contemplate what they call moral virtue, or the attributes of humanity, they divide them into two classes perfectly distinct from one another. In the first are comprized those which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, such as *goodness* and *justice*: in the second, those which belong to him under the idea of a creature of that very imperfect species, such as *temperance* and *fortitude*. The first belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to such a Being as man: *Those* arise out of the nature of free intelligence, and so are common to all. *These*, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and so are peculiar to humanity; for we easily conceive higher Orders of free intelligences, amongst whom the moral virtues of the second class have no place. They are superior to the impressions

[16] *Nil admirari.*

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of fear, and so have no need to exert *fortitude*: They are removed from the temptation of excess, and so have no room for the exercise of *temperance*.

Now when CLARKE, or any other Divine, had said, that *the moral attributes are the same in God as in our ideas*, What attributes could they possibly mean but those of the *first class*; those which belong to Beings under the idea of free intelligences? STUPID as his Lordship is pleased to make Divines, they could never *blunder* to that degree as to conceive, that those virtues or *moral attributes*, which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they supposed to be *all perfect*.

They held, with his Lordship, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wise and powerful: Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance*, which implied his being obnoxious to *folly*; or *fortitude*, which argued *impudence*?

Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite power exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude*. But do infinite wisdom and infinite power exclude from
God

God the ideas of *goodness* and *justice*? On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall see presently, is reduced to the poor shift of owning *goodness* and *justice* to be contained in infinite *wisdom* and *power*. At present I would ask another question. What must his Lordship's admirers think of their Master's IPSE DIXIT, when it comes to this, *That the inscribing goodness and justice to God is NO LESS REALLY ABSURD than the ascribing temperance and fortitude to him?*

And now I might leave it to them to determine, whether this was *contracting the generality of the assertion to serve a purpose; the absurdity of ascribing temperance and fortitude to God being too gross and too visible to the most prejudiced*. For to what *purpose* could this *contraction*, as he calls it, *serve*, but to the purpose of COMMON SENSE? Had his Lordship but been pleased to *contract* himself on the same principle, his bulky Volumes had shrunk into a Pamphlet.

But then, if you ask *what purpose* his Lordship had *to serve* when he used the equivocal word ALL, which may signify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind, where

where he says, Clarke holds, *that ALL the moral attributes are the same in God, &c.* should you ask this, the answer is obvious. It was to give himself an occasion to say that Clarke afterwards *contracts his generality*, or, in other words, that he contradicts himself.

But let us consider this *contracted generality* a little closer. Dr. CLARKE asserts, *that goodness and justice are the same in God as in our ideas*; This, if we believe his Lordship, is downright NONSENSE and BLASPHEMY. Lord BOLINGBROKE asserts, *that wisdom and power are the same in God as in our ideas*: And this is SENSE and PIETY. How came his Lordship by this knowledge concerning God's wisdom and power? He tells us, he got it *intuitively and by the help of his senses* [17]. And do we not come to the knowledge of God's goodness and justice, in the very same way? Or is there any other way of acquiring it? How happens it then, that, of these two assertions, supported on the self same principles of knowledge, the one is *nonsense and blasphemy*, and the other *sense and piety*? For a reason worthy the *first philosophy*; What-

ever his Lordship holds in contradiction to Divines, is *sense* and *piety*; and whatever Divines hold in contradiction to his Lordship, is *nonsense* and *blasphemy*.

A third objection against the *moral attributes* is, " That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodness and justice; which therefore cannot be supposed to be *the same in kind* with God's; tho' our wisdom and, power with which no passions or affections mix, must be *the same in kind*" with his.

Were passion and affection inseparable from human goodness and justice, the objection might appear to have some tho' not much force, even then. But they are easily separable: I do not mean in speculation only, but in practice. The true idea of human goodness and justice excludes all passion and affection. What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power to the divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man? :

But,

But, this is not all that may be said in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*. For tho' passion mixes not with our *natural* attributes of wisdom and power, yet something else does, much more difficult to be separated, than passion, from our *moral* attributes, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of human POWER without the use of such an instrument: yet this, by his Lordship's own confession, does not hinder us from rising from the idea of our own wisdom and power, to the wisdom and power of God; and from seeing that they are the same in kind.

But still, further. The MANNER of *knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of WISDOM, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and at the same time utterly unknown to us: yet this does not, according to his Lordship's account, hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wisdom*, tho' it rises from what we see of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the *instrumentality of matter*,
and

and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating that mixture from our ideas of wisdom and power. And shall I not have as much credit with you, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice the foreign mixture of *passion* and *affection*? You must admit both our assertions; or you must reject both. And when I say You, I mean every fair and ingenuous man like You; who having nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are, I think, the ablest judges of it's truth. For HOPE encourages men to *search* into the grounds of what Religion promises; but FEAR always deters them from giving much *attention* to what it threatens.

But his Lordship has a greater quarrel than all this, with the *moral attributes*. They are productive, he says, of much *mischief*, by bringing in embarrassed questions into Religion.

“ As they [the Divines] modeled God's
“ government on a human plan, so they
“ conceived his perfections, *moral* as well
“ physical

“ physical, by human ideas — Thus God
 “ was said to be the FIRST GOOD: but
 “ then the general notion or abstract idea
 “ of this *good* was not only taken from
 “ human goodness, but was considered too
 “ with little or no other relation than to
 “ man — A question arose therefore on
 “ these hypotheses, *How could evil come into*
 “ *a system of which God was the Author?* —
 “ this question made a further hypothesis
 “ necessary; another first God, another
 “ coeternal and coequal principle was in-
 “ troduced to solve it; *a first cause of all*
 “ *evil*, as the other was *of all good* [18].”

The false representation of this fact I
 reserve for another occasion: the false infer-
 ence from it is what I now propose to ex-
 amine.

His Lordship supposes, that the princi-
 ple of God's *moral attributes* gave birth to
 an insolvable question concerning *the origin*
of evil: And that this occasioned the in-
 vention of the mischievous hypothesis of
 the *two principles*. Who would have sus-
 pected that so much evil could have come
 from the FIRST GOOD! Yet so it was.

And therefore the idea of such a GOOD must be *false*, or, at least, very *hurtful*.

I. As to the first, if his Lordship's inference be right, it will help to deprive us of all useful knowledge; because there is no great principle, either in *physics*, or in *natural Theology*, which, if we be not on our guard and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will not lead us into inextricable difficulties.

Take an instance in one that arises out of both these sciences, — *The agreement between free-will and prescience*. I rather chuse this instance, as his Lordship has pretended to untie a knot, which hath so long kept the learned World intangled; and as one of the principal designs of this VIEW is to illustrate his Lordship's great talents. “Our ideas (says he) of divine intelligence and wisdom may be neither *fantastical* nor *false*, and yet God's MANNER of knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it *improperly in him*, may be consistent with the contingency of events; altho' that which we call *properly fore-knowledge in ourselves*, be not so [19].”

[19] Vol. v. p. 525.

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I have two or three remarks to make on these words. The first is, that, by the very turn of the phrase — *may be neither — and yet* — he appears conscious of his own prevarication. Our ideas of God's *goodness* and *justice* he makes *fantastical* and *false*, on account of difficulties arising from them: yet God's *natural* attributes, his *intelligence* and *wisdom*, *may*, he says, *be neither fantastical nor false*, tho' a difficulty as great arises from them; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

My second remark is, that his solution of this difficulty is more *fantastic* than the wildest chimera of School-metaphysics. Common-sense informs us, that the difficulty, in reconciling *God's prescience to man's free-will*, does not arise from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from his ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile *prescience* and *free-will*; is, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an *equal providence* and *free agency* may stand together,

My last remark is, and it rises out of the foregoing, that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordship sees no difficulties in any part of the system of Creation: but as soon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties start up by dozens.

Take now another instance from the case in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he says, must needs be false, because the conceiving of them by human goodness and justice leads to the question of the *origin of evil*, considered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *physical attributes* by human wisdom and power lead to the question of the *origin of evil* considered *naturally*? Yet our ideas of the physical attributes are neither *false nor fantastical*. But to this, his Lordship replies, Evil, considered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why so? Because it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the same thing be said of Evil, considered *morally*? Nay, hath it not been actually said, and proved too, on the same principles? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantastic*.

But presumptuous man knows not when to stop. He would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead.

“ For Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.

And this impious humour gave birth to the absurd hypothesis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes*? Ridiculous! We see it's cause is in vanity and self-conceit: passions that operate alike on all principles.

2. As to his Lordship's second inference, that *this* idea is at least productive of much mischief; so that it would be better to have none at all; Let me observe, that the very idea of God's existence is alike productive of mischief, even all the mischiefs of superstition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, besides his Lordship, would say so [20]? Why then should we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even tho' the evils it produced were *necessary*? But

[20] He indeed says *he had rather be an Atheist than acknowledge the Christian Theology*; and we may believe him. See Vol. iv. p. 34.

that

that is not the case. They are *casual* only: the issue of pride and presumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

However, these *moral attributes*, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wisdom* and *power* (says his Lordship) "have made things as they "are: how *goodness* and *justice* required "they should be made is neither *coram* "judice, nor to any rational purpose to inquire [1]." To inquire how the *universe of things should be made*, serves indeed *no reasonable purpose*. But to inquire concerning our own state and condition, is either *coram judice*, or we were sent into the world to stare about us, and to judge of nothing. His Lordship's sophistry seems to confound two things that common sense has always distinguished; *our own business from other men's*. When the King holds a bed of justice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his measures: But every Particular who is summoned to attend the Court, is much concerned to know how he himself shall be dealt with. His Lordship indeed, is ready to say, We are not summoned;

[1] Vol. v. p. 363.

that is, we are not *accountable creatures*. But this is begging the question.

At length, he ends just where he set out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes. " Upon the whole matter we may
 " conclude safely from error, and in direct
 " opposition to CLARKE, that *goodness and*
 " *justice in God cannot be conceived, without*
 " *manifest presumption and impiety, to be the*
 " *same as in the ideas we frame of these*
 " *perfections when we consider them in men,*
 " *or when we reason about them abstractedly*
 " *in themselves; but that in the supreme*
 " Governor of the World they are some-
 " thing TRANSCENDENT, and of which we
 " cannot make any true judgment, nor ar-
 " gue with any certainty about them [2]." And in this his Lordship tells us he is justified by the authority of St. PAUL and Dr. BARROW. *These two great Divines* (says he) *are on my side* [3]. Who would have thought of two such honourable Supporters for his Lordship's Atchievements? One thing I have observed, which might occasion some speculation; A strange propensity in Free-thinkers to mistake their enemies for their friends; and, which is more to be

[2] Vol. v. p. 359.

[3] Vol. v. p. 362.

lamented, as strange a propensity in the Clergy to mistake their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd enough on both sides: and, at first view, appears a little mysterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this, — Free-thinkers have employed this trick to enflame the Clergy's jealousy: and the Clergy have unhappily fallen into the snare.

But after what has passed, who would expect that *the leather-dressing Pontiff*, of all men, should have been thought worthy to support the *first Philosophy*? What has St. PAUL done at last, to deserve so much honour? Why, in answer to the objections against God's dispensations in the religious World, the Apostle refers us “for entire
“ satisfaction to the incomprehensible wisdom of God, who frequently, in the
“ course of his providence, ordereth things
“ in methods transcending our abilities to
“ discover or trace [4].”

This solution, which is here extolled for its great *modesty*, is quoted in another place for its greater *IMPUDENCE* [5]. It may be one or the other, just as his Lordship is in humour; who, notwithstanding

[4] Vol. v. p. 360.

[5] Vol. iii. p. 307.

his long study of LOCKE, seems totally to have lost all ideas of MORAL MODES. How otherwise was it possible, after having treated all Mankind in the manner you have seen in my *first* Letter, and will further see in my *third*, he should gravely tell his Friend, "That few men, he believes, have CONSULTED others both *living* and "the *dead*, with LESS PRESUMPTION, and "in a GREATER SPIRIT OF DOCILITY, "than he has done [6]." I sometimes thought a word wrong printed; and that for, *consulted* we should read, *insulted*; for in a great man, there is no *presumption*, whatever meanness there may be, in *insulting* his inferiors. And as for his *docility* in doing it, that will hardly be disputed; there being no Author, whom he has *insulted* most, but from whom he has condescended to steal more: of which, (for want of a better at hand) I might give an instance in the person and writings of the Author of the *Divine Legation*.

But St. PAUL says, *we must have recourse to the incomprehensible wisdom of God*. In good time. But how does this prove that,

[6] *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pease*, Vol iii. p. 320.

in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the *moral attributes*? Unless the *quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the same thing. You, Sir, have an *adequate* conception, I am sure, of our gracious Monarch's *goodness* and *justice*; but you have a very imperfect comprehension of several of his State-measures. I have frequently attempted to illustrate my reasoning on divine matters from examples in human Rulers. This is a ticklish point. And therefore I have been very careful that those *regal* acts by which I would illustrate the *divine*, be not such as proceed from the weakness and imperfections of humanity. If they be, the instance is impertinent, and wide of the purpose. This was the more carefully to be observed, because writers have carried these illustrations into much abuse. And no body more than this Noble Lord; of whom it may be truly affirmed that, with all his negligence in writing, he has not omitted any one species of false reasoning.

To proceed. Dr. BARROW, I presume, will stand his Lordship in no better stead than St. *Paul*. "As the dealings of every
" wise man (says the Doctor) are some-
" times

“ times founded upon maxims, and admit
 “ justifications not obvious or penetrable by
 “ vulgar conceit, so may God act accord-
 “ ing to rules of wisdom and justice, which
 “ it may be quite impossible by our facul-
 “ ties to apprehend, or with our means to
 “ descry. As there are natural modes of
 “ Being and operation, so there may be pru-
 “ dential and moral modes of proceeding,
 “ far above our reach, peculiar objects of
 “ divine wisdom not to be understood by
 “ any creature, especially by creatures who
 “ stand in the lowest form of intelligence;
 “ one remove from beasts. In fine, those
 “ rules of equity and experience which we
 “ in our transactions with one another do
 “ use, if they be applied to the dealings of
 “ God will be found very incongruous or
 “ deficient, the case being vastly altered
 “ from that infinite distance in nature and
 “ state between God and us, and from
 “ the immense difference which his rela-
 “ tions towards us have from our relations
 “ to one another [7].”

What now has all this, which relates
 only to the *incomprehensible nature of God's*
providence, to do with our *inadequate ideas*

of his moral attributes? At least, if his Lordship will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehensible*, must needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*; he must go a step further; and confess, that *Barrow* supposed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewise; for he puts both on the same footing. *As there are NATURAL modes of Being and operation, (says the Doctor) so there may be prudential and MORAL modes of proceeding far above our reach.* But as this would be going too far, farther than the *first Philosophy* will allow of, I suppose he would be content to admit this quotation from *Barrow* to be nothing to the purpose.

At last, and when you would least expect it, Common-sense and Common-sentiments return. And God's *moral attributes*, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. "Where Religions (says his Lordship) which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a new character of God's *goodness* arises — an *artificial* goodness which stands often in the place of the NATURAL [8]." And this, after having so often told us that we have no adequate

[8] Vol. v. p. 431.

idea of God's goodness by *nature*. It comes scantily indeed ; and, in every sense, *a posteriori* : However, it comes, and deserves to be welcomed. " All the knowledge (says he) that God has given us the means to acquire, and therefore all he designed we should have of his physical and MORAL nature and attributes, is derived from *his works*, and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVIDENCE by which he governs them [9]."

You will observe the words — *the tenour of that providence* — I have detected the sophistry of them in my previous observation, at the entrance on the argument, where I have stated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid you observe them now, to judge of the following *climax*, if I may so call it, or *walk down stairs*. " The *wisdom* is not so often discernible by us [in God's works] as the power of God, nor the *goodness* as the wisdom [10]."

As cautious as his Lordship is here, in the slender allowance of God's *moral attributes* from his *works*, yet even this is a flat contradiction to what his System has oblig-

[9] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

[10] Vol. v. p. 335.

ed him over and over to affirm; as particularly in the following words --- *Of divine goodness and divine justice* (says his Lordship in the person of Anaxagoras) *I am unable to frame any adequate notions* [11], *from God's works.*

But, he is more free of his concessions in another place.

“ By natural Theology (says his Lordship) we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite *wisdom* and *power* of God, which he has manifested to us in some degree or other in every part, even the most minute, of his Creation. *By that too, we are taught to ascribe goodness and justice to him, wherever he intended we should so ascribe them, that is, wherever either his works, or the dispensations of his providence do as NECESSARILY communicate these notions to our minds, as those of wisdom and power are communicated to us, in the whole extent of both* [12].”

What his Lordship would infer from hence is this, that we are no where taught

[11] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

[12] Vol. v. p. 527.

to ascribe *goodness* and *justice* to God; since the dispensations of his providence do nowhere, in his Lordship's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate these notions*. But allow his premises; would his conclusion follow? Suppose the dispensations of God's providence did only PROBABLY communicate these notions to our minds; will not this teach us to ascribe *goodness and justice* to him? God hath so framed the constitution of things, that man should, throughout his whole conduct in life, be induced to form his judgment on appearances and probable arguments. Why not in this, then, as well as in the rest? or rather, why not in this, above the rest? If so be that indeed God had not (as I have shewn he hath) *necessarily* communicated these notions. But what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in question? God's not *necessarily communicating* the idea affects only the *reality*, not the *precision* of it. All therefore we learn by this observation, is, that his Lordship, by thus putting the change upon us, has a very strong inclination, that God should have neither *goodness* nor *justice*; so far

far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or *punish*. For as to the Attributes *themselves*, divested of their consequences; and undisturbed by our *impious imitation* [13], he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordship certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the secrets of his *Philosophy* than what NECESSARILY arises from his positions. But to make God treat Mankind so, with regard to his *attributes*, is drawing an image of the Deity from his own likeness, the very fault he so censures in Divines. But if God must needs be represented either after Them, or after his Lordship; I should chuse to have the Clergy's God, tho' made out of no better stuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, because that gives him *goodness* and *justice*; rather than his Lordship's God, which has neither; altho' composed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he says, That men conceive of the Deity, *more humano*; and that his Lordship's God

[13] *Our obligation to imitate God is a false and profane Doctrine.* Vol. v. p. 65.

and the Clergy's God, are equally faithful copies of themselves.

In a word, if God *teaches*, whether it be done clearly or obscurely, he certainly *intended* we should learn. And what we get even by appearances, is *real* knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if truth be, as he assures us it is, of so precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own system, it must be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge (says " this great Philosopher) is so dependent " on our own system, that a great part " of it would not be *knowledge* perhaps, " but *error* in any other [14]."

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions: But it is always thus, when men *dispute* (for *believe* they cannot [15],) against *common notices*, and the most obvious truths; such as *liberty of will*; the *certainty of knowledge*; and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly

[14] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[15] Hear what he himself says of FREE-WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without LYING, or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.* Vol. v. p. 406.

as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot. Let us follow closely. We have unravelled him through all his turnings; and we may soon expect to see him take shelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehensible Nature; and rather than allow, in good earnest, the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to resolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But soft. Not yet. We must come to it by degrees, and regular advances. First the *moral attributes* are to be *resolved* into the *natural*.

— “ If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes] “ may be considered separately, as “ we are apt to consider them ; and if the “ LATTER and every thing we ascribe to “ these, are not to be RESOLVED *rather into* “ *the former* ; into his infinite intelligence, “ wisdom, and power [16].” It is yet, we see, but a question; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be resolved into the *natural*. In the next passage it is determined. “ I think (and

[16] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

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what he thinks, he holds it reasonable all the world should think too) “ that the *mo-*
 “ *ral* attributes of the supreme Being are
 “ *absorbed in his wisdom*; that we should
 “ consider them only as different modificati-
 “ ons of this *physical* attribute [17].”

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go higher, let us set together his inconsistencies as they appear in this situation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wisdom are better determined than those of divine goodness* [18]. Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodness* [19]. And sometimes again, as in the place before us, the *divine goodness is the same as wisdom*, and therefore, doubtless, the idea of it as well determined. Now, of all these assertions, which will his Lordship stick by? Which, do you ask? By none of them longer than they will stick by him; and straggling, undisciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to stick long by any side. As soon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them.— Come, if you will have the secret, take it. The attributes are mere NAMES,

[17] Vol. v. p. 335. [18] Vol. v. p. 341, 526.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

and there is an end of them. All that really remains is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: And so the Farce concludes.

“ The moral ATTRIBUTES (says he) are *barely* NAMES that we give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one *simple un compounded being* [20].”

“ Of divine goodness and divine justice I am unable to frame any adequate notions; and instead of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the supreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to conceive nothing more than this*, that THERE ARE VARIOUS APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH IT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE INTO ATTRIBUTES [1].”

To this miserable refuge is his Lordship reduced, to avoid DIVINE JUSTICE. But why, you say, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once? Your humble servant, for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has not such charms as to make her received wherever, and whenever, she comes. There is need of much preparation, and more disguise, before you can get her ad-

[20] Vol. v. p. 453.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 117.

mitted even to what is called *good company*. But now, he has resolved to speak out, Why, you ask, does it yet seem to stick in the passage? And when his premisses are general against *all* attributes, his conclusion is particular against the *moral*? Not without cause, I assure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to set up against the *moral*: and therefore had himself actually *analyzed* this *eternal reason* into the specific attributes of *wisdom* and *power*. But when he saw his adversaries might, by the same way, analyze it into *goodness* and *justice*, He then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: but it was to be done obliquely. And hence arises his embarrass and tergiversation. He would willingly, if his Reader be so pleased, analyze the *eternal reason* into *wisdom* and *power*: but there he would stop: and leave the other side of the *eternal reason*, unanalyzed: and if *goodness* and *justice* should chance to start out, he has a trick to *resolve* and *absorb* them into *wisdom* and *power*, as only *different modifications of the physical attributes*. But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal measure; then, rather than give them back

the

the *goodness* and *justice* he has been at all this pains to *ascribe*, he will throw *wisdom* and *power* after them, and *resolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

Bashful NATURALISM has now thrown aside her last and thinnest veil: and is ready, we see, to face down her Rival; whom till now she was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repress this last effort of her insolence by another passage from the *Sermons* quoted once or twice already.

— “ We have been told, and with airs of
 “ superior knowledge, that these pretend-
 “ ed attributes, as they are commonly
 “ specified, and distinguished into *natural*
 “ and *moral*, are a mere human fiction;
 “ invented, by aid of analogy from the
 “ actions, passions, and qualities observable
 “ in man: and that the simple nature of
 “ Deity is one uniform perfection; of
 “ which, Infinity being the base, we can
 “ have no distinct idea or conception.

“ To this it will be sufficient to reply,
 “ that it is indeed true, that these specific
 “ attributes, from which we deduce all
 “ our knowledge of the nature and will of
 “ God, are formed on analogy, and bear
 “ relation

“ relation to ourselves. But then we say
 “ such attributes are not, on that account,
 “ the less real or essential. The light of
 “ the SUN is not, in the orb itself, what
 “ we see it in the RAINBOW. There
 “ it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze
 “ of glory: here, we separate it's Perfec-
 “ tion in the various attributes of red, yel-
 “ low, blue, purple and what else the subtle
 “ optician so nicely distinguishes. But still
 “ the *solar* light is not less real in the Rain-
 “ bow, where it's rays become thus un-
 “ twisted, and each differing thread dis-
 “ tinctly seen in its effect, than while they
 “ remained united and incorporated with
 “ one another in the Sun. Just so it is
 “ with the divine Nature: it is one simple
 “ undivided Perfection in the Godhead
 “ himself: but when refracted and divari-
 “ cated, in passing through the medium of
 “ the human mind, it becomes power,
 “ justice, mercy; which are all separately
 “ and ADEQUATELY represented to the
 “ understanding [2].”

But, that his Lordship so frequently discards his own principles, I should be

[2] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn, Vol. i. p. 57, 58.*

in hopes he would submit to this illustration, since he owns THAT WE SEE THE DEITY IN A REFLECTED, NOT IN A DIRECT LIGHT [3].

It is a *true* light then and not a *false* one: and the knowledge it conveys is *real*, not *fantastic*: For mirrors do not use to reflect the species of the mind's visions, but substantial things. To turn us, therefore, from God's *attributes*, tho' the *indirect*, yet the well-defined, image of him, because they discover something to us we may not like, a HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT; to turn us, I say, to the *undefined eternal reason*, is doing like the french Philosophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the prism, by which it was demonstrated.

And now, Sir, to conclude my long Letter. Who is there that deserves the name of MAN, and will not own that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; just as the *natural attributes* make him revered and adorable? What is his Lordship's German-quarrel with the God of MOSES and PAUL, but

[3] Vol. v. p. 524.

168 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S
that they have made him *unamiable*, by
representing him without *goodness* or *justice*?
Their God, therefore, he expressly tells us,
shall not be his God. Well then: He has
his God to make. And who would not
expect to find him, when made by such a
Workman as his Lordship, a God of infi-
nite goodness and justice. No such mat-
ter: These qualities come not out of his
Lordship's hands, nor can enter into the
composition of his God: They are *barely*
NAMES *that men give to various mani-*
festations of the infinite wisdom of one simple
uncompounded Being. The pretended want
of them in the God of the Jews afforded
his Lordship a commodious cavil; for he
had RELIGION to remove out of his way:
But when he came to erect NATURALISM
in it's stead, it had been inconvenient to
give them to his own Idol.

Honest Plutarch, tho' a Priest, was as
warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his
Lordship. He derives all the evils of
Superstition from men's not acquiring the
idea of a God infinitely good and just.
And proposes this knowledge as the only
cure for it. This is consistent. But what
would the ancient world have thought of
their

their Philosopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodness and justice at all.

NATURE tells us, that the thing most desirable is the knowledge of a God whose goodness and justice gives to every man according to his works.

HIS LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON or NATURAL RELIGION discovers to us no such God.

Now, if both speak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION! Which, when *natural Religion* fails us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and just; and gives us an *adequate* idea of those attributes! And this, by his Lordship's own confession. — *Christianity*, says he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man; his infinite JUSTICE and GOODNESS* [4]:

Is this a blessing to be rejected? His Lordship had no room to say so, since the discovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his principles, it only could be made.

He pretends, “ We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but

[4] Vol. v. p. 532.

from his *works*. By those, *he says*, we gain the idea of his *physical attributes*; and if there be any thing in his *works* which seems to contradict these attributes, 'tis only seeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, those difficulties vanish. It is not so, he says, with regard to the *moral attributes*. There are so many *phænomena* which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up; that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes*."

Now admitting all this to be true, for generally his Lordship's assertions are so extravagant, that they will not admit a supposition of their truth, tho' it be only for argument's sake, What does it effect but this; *additional credit to Revelation*?

The *physical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, because they rise out of the *Whole System* of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal sight: and all the application of human wit alone will never enable us to draw the veil. The clear
prospect

prospect of it must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Dispensation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and thereby removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, assuredly you must. *Beware* (says he) *of a pretended revelation*. Why so? *Because* (says he again) *the Religion of nature is perfect and absolute; and therefore Revelation can teach nothing but what Religion hath already taught* [5]. Strange! Why, *Revelation* teaches the moral attributes; which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach — Here the dialogue breaks off; and leaves us in a riddle. Will you have the solution? It is ridiculous enough; as such kind of things generally are. But if you have kept your good humour amidst all these provocations of impiety, it may perhaps make you smile.

I told you before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reasoning against *Revelation*, from such as Tindal, Toland, Col-

[5] Vol. v. p. 544.

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lins, Chubb, and Morgan. This solemn
argument particularly, of the PERFECTION
OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the super-
seded use of Revelation, he delivers to us
just as he found it in Tindal.

Now Tindal, who held that natural
Religion taught both the *moral attributes*
and a *future state*, had some pretence for
saying that *it was perfect and absolute*. But
for his Lordship to say it after him, who
holds that natural Religion taught neither
one nor the *other*, shews, that either he
places a very implicit faith in his Author,
or expects it from his Reader.

The truth is, Lord Bolingbroke re-
fused no arms against Revelation. So when
he had drained his Authors of their Prin-
ciples; to make all sure, he adds others of
his own. Little attentive to a truth of
long experience, That the arguments of
infidelity, which, like Cadmus's *Children*
of brass, spring from the *old dragon's teeth*,
are always destroying one another, tho'
aiming at a common Enemy. Busy at this
blind work he goes on pushing his master
Tindal's consequences at a strange rate.
*If revealed Religion teaches more than na-
tural, it must be false; if no more, it must
be*

be superfluous. This is plausible on Tindal's principles, that natural Religion has both the *moral attributes* and a *future state*; but utterly absurd on his Lordship's, who holds that it has neither. But the too eager pursuit of his old Adversary, RELIGION, has led his Lordship into many of these scrapes.

I have now considered all I could find urged by the noble Writer in support of his great principle of NO ADEQUATE IDEAS OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES; on which the whole system of NATURALISM is, and must be, founded. And you see to what this *all*, amounts. If I should say to *just nothing*, I shall speak more favourably of it than it deserves. For it tends, as I have shewn you, in many instances, to confirm the great TRUTH it is brought to overthrow.

And now what I proposed for the subject of this *second* Letter is pretty well exhausted. My *first* was employed in giving you a specimen of his *Temper*. This undertakes to explain his *System*; and I reserve the next for a display of his marvellous *Talents*; tho' it be true, I have somewhat anticipated the Subject. For you cannot but have conceived already a very uncommon

mon idea of his abilities, on seeing him use TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *against Revelation*, and *for the perfection of atural Religion*, along with his OWN PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future state*. The first of which principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against *Revelation*; and the *second* takes away the very pretense for PERFECTION in *natural Religion*.

His Lordship's friend, *Swift*, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all nature but RELIGION could have advanced *Toland* and *Asgill* into the class of reputable Authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but RELIGION could have sunk his Lordship so far below it; *If ever Lord Bolingbroke trifles*, (says Pope) *it will be when he writes on Divinity* [6]:

But this is the strange fate of Authors, whether with wit, or without, when they chuse to write on certain subjects. For it is with Authors, as with men: Who can guess *which Vessel was made for honour*, and *which for dishonour*? when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even

[6] *Pope's works*, Vol. ix. Letter xiv.

this choice Vessel of the *first Philosophy*, his Lordship's sacred pages, may be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they may find his few Friends and the Public; like the *China Jordan* in the *DUNCIAD*, which one Hero pissed into, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

I am, &c.

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LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY;

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

L E T T E R the T H I R D.

L O N D O N,

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON,
in *Ludgate-Street*.

MDCCLV.

W. E. W.

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY

IN FOUR LETTERS TO A FRIEND

ALL IN ONE VOLUME

Printed in Great Britain
by R. B. A. & C. 1790

A N

A P O L O G Y

F O R

The *Two First Letters*:

Which may serve for

An INTRODUCTION

To the *Two Last*.

SOON after the publication of the two first of these Letters, I had the honour of an anonymous advertisement, in the warmest terms of friendship lamenting the displeasure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the *Public*, where the Advertiser had an opportunity of making his observations.

There was in this friendly notice so many sure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the *View*; so much good sense, elegance, and weight of Authority in the composition; and the whole so superior to every thing, but the force of plain and simple truth, that I had as much pleasure in the honour of the monition, as I had real pain for the occasion.

He assures me I shall never know from whence it came: so that when such a Writer will remain unknown, it is as foolish as indecent, to pretend to guess.

Yet I am very confident that a hand so friendly could never intend, by keeping itself out of sight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him, [on this occasion.] I am rather inclined to think, that he took this way, to oblige me to convey my Apology to him,

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him, which he had a right to expect, thro' the hands of that Public, which appear to have none: and which yet, I am persuaded, it was his principal concern, I should first satisfy. For I must inform my Reader, that the severe reflexions, I am about to quote, are not so properly his sentiments, as the sentiments of those he is pleased to call the Public.

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They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very sure he is; and so, I think, must every good man be; more for the sake of that Public than for mine. For what must an indifferent person think of a Public, by profession, Christians, of so exceeding delicacy as to be less scandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red hot Impiety, because they come from a

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Lord, than at the cool contempt of that insult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, because he may be a poor priest or an ignoble layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me so abject a condition of things, as that, where *atheistic principles* give less offence to our politeness, than *ill manners*; and where, in *good company*, you may be better received with the plague-fore upon you, than the itch?

It vexes me (says the anonymous writer) *to hear so many positively deciding that the Writer must be—* by the SCURRILITY and abuse.—The term is a little strong. But the best is, it is one of those words the *Public* think themselves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to *scandalous abuse* or to *honest reproof*, just as they happen to be disposed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, so readily passed

passed upon Authors, has been sufficiently exemplified in the case of one much more considerable than the Author of the *View*. The Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* composed a book in support of Revelation: and sensible that the novelty of his argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Answerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid, ingenuous Adversary should never repent him of his civility. Answerers, as he foresaw, arose in abundance: but not one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of these writers, One or two, and no more, he thought fit to answer; and, (who can wonder?) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controversy; when his resentments were fresh, and the injury aggravated

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by every circumstance of malice and *scurrility*. Since that time, for many years together, he has seen them write on, in the very manner they began; and without any other marks of resentment, than a contemptuous silence. Yet for all this, he could not escape the character of a *scurrilous and abusive* Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever since.

But to return to the Author of the *View*. He was detected, it seems, by his *scurrility and abuse*. Surely, there must be some mistake; and his Lordship's dirt is imputed to him. The Author of the *View* seems to be in the case of a Scavenger, (his enemies, I hope, will not take offence at the comparison) who may not indeed be overclean while at such kind of work; but it would be hard to impute that stink

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to him, which is not of his making, but removing.

The Letters are universally read; and it is almost universally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deserved any treatment from you, both as a man personally ill used by him, and a member of that ORDER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER:—

In a Law of Vespasian, we read, *Non oportere maledici Senatoribus; remaledici civile, fasque est.* And the equity of it my anonymous Friend seems to allow. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Vespasian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my kind Monitor's. The truth is, that nothing personal once entered into my thoughts while I was writing those two letters. Had that been the case, it would rather have been the subject of my vanity, than resentment. For nothing is more glorious

glorious than for an obscure writer of these dark and cold days, to find himself treated in the same manner with the greatest and most famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

— *But* (says the anonymous letter) *it may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deserved, especially after his death. It is falling into the VERY FAULT so justly objected to him: every body would have applauded your selecting those instances of his railing, arrogance, and abuse, had not you followed his example.* — This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as he deserves, may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman. Here, I think, a distinction is to be made; where the thing concerns only the civil interests of particulars, a Gentleman has but little provocation for unusual severity of language,

language, and less for personal reflection. But where the highest of our religious interests are attacked, the interests not of this man, nor of that; not of this Community, or the other; but of our common Nature itself; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to judge, there, I think, every *Gentleman*, who loves his Religion and his Country, should take the quarrel on himself, and repel the insult with all his vigour.

“ When TRUTH or VIRTUE an affront
“ endures,

“ Th’ affront is mine, my Friend, and
“ should be yours.

The manners of a *Clergyman*, if they are to be distinguished from those of a *Gentleman*, consist in Zeal for God; and Charity towards Man. The occasion will sometimes call out one, sometimes the other: they may

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may be exerted separately, but never at one another's expence. When they are so, all goes wrong, for they are made by Nature to act together for the common good: As in the case before us, I presume to say, a zeal for God is the greatest Charity to Man.

Now when Doctrines of that kind, which the *View of L. Bolingbroke's Philosophy* exposes, rise to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of transgressing the civil maxims of politeness, would be like that *Dean*, the Poët speaks of, who scrupled to mention *Hell* before his audience at Court.

If then, amongst the Christian duties, there be, on some occasions, a force to be exerted to repel the Insulters of Religion, as well as, on others, a patience to be observed, in compassion to the simply

ply erroneous; and that this before us was not the time; I desire to know when that time comes? When men are sincere in their mistakes, after a diligent and candid search; when the subject is of small moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of conformity, or a distinction in Metaphysics; the mistaken, and even the perverse should be treated with tenderness. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication, and ill faith, and every term of scurrility and abuse; when, to use the expression of Cicero, *est inter nos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione contentio*, Then a practiced calmness, and affected management, look like betraying the cause we are intrusted to defend; or, what is almost as ill, like defend-
ing

ing it in that way which may turn most to our own advantage. As when, in questions of the greatest moment, we comply with this *fashionable indifference*, or flatter the *indifference* into a Virtue, while we should have striven to rekindle the dying sparks of Religion by a vigorous collision with its more hardened Enemies.

Men who have had Christianity indeed at heart have never been disposed, in capital cases like this, to spare or manage the Offenders. When the incomparable STILLING-FLEET undertook to expose the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the *dispensation of the word* into a lucrative trade, he prosecuted the controversy with so much vigour of style and sentiment as to be called by those who found themselves affected by it, *Buffoon* and *Comedian*. And of late, when a learned person had,

had, with just indignation, exposed the horrid enormities of the *Moravian Brethren*, he received this answer for his pains, to be sure, equally apt and satisfactory, *The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekness instructing those who oppose themselves.*

Without question, debauched and impious men would be much at their ease, when, secure from the resentment of the *Magistrate*, they find they have nothing to fear from the indignation of the *Learned*.

But this leads me to another consideration, which may further justify the Author of the *View*, in the account he has given of this atrocious Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

The English Government, secure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath established, and jealous of that Liberty which at so much

much expence it hath procured, with a becoming consciousness of the superiority of Truth, hath thought fit to suffer this, and many other writings, (tho' none so criminal in the *manner*,) to pass thro' the Press, into the hands of the People; Writings, in which not only the Institutions of positive and national Worship have been insulted, but likewise those VERY PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION, which hitherto have been esteemed the first bond of civil Society, as being those only which can enforce obedience for conscience sake. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own will ever suffer to be publicly brought in question: because no Nation besides has an equal confidence in *Truth*, and an equal Zeal for *Liberty*.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more sacred or respect-
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able for this impunity? On the contrary, is there not the greater need that those evils, which the Public cannot redress, should at least be opposed and checked by a private hand? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to punish these offenders, but to prevent the mischiefs their writings do amongst the Populace? Why are not these Laws *put in execution* here, but from the experience, or, at least, from a foresight, that a recourse to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty? However, the *end*, we see, is important, tho' *these means* may seem incommodious. Nothing is left then, but to employ others. What they are, the very case points out to us. The mischief these Writers do amongst the People is by their credit with them. If this credit be undeserved, the way lies open for the Defender of Religion

ligion to lessen it, either by tragical complaints or Ridicule. The Author of the *View* chose the latter. He thought it more effectual; for now a days, Folly discredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no design of bringing in the Magistrate to second his arguments. Nor is he one of those impertinents who are for directing Authority, or think there is any need of such as him,

“ To virtue’s work to urge the tardy Hall,
 “ Or goad the Prelate slumb’ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The Convocation, in their late address to his Majesty, *lament the depravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which strike at the very vitals of all Religion and shake the foundations of civil Government.* Yet they are so far

far from throwing the scandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magistrate, that, as if they even respected the slander of their Enemies, *they engage themselves to his Majesty to exert themselves to the utmost, to maintain the honour of our most holy faith.* Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to what the whole body of the Clergy has, with so much glory to themselves, engaged to support.

But his Lordship's *death* is a further objection to the manner in which he is treated. Had these *Essays* been published during his life, and had the Author of the *View* deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the censure might appear to have its weight. But what shall we say, if his Lordship was publicly invited to give *his Philosophy* to

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the world, by the promise of a speedy answer? If a Writer's death may screen his Works from the treatment they would deserve in his life time, he has a very effectual way to secure both his Person and his Principles, from disgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confessed that, in these posthumous Works, published by his Lordship's direction, the Author of the *View* is abused in the grossest terms. Now what is said to the discredit of a living Writer, especially by one of his Lordship's Authority in politics and letters, might prove a substantial injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but fantastical. — This is only said to shew, that, had the Author of the *View* retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts to do, the return had been still much short of the provocation.

But

But He commits the VERY FAULT objected to Lord Bolingbroke — and in selecting the instances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordship's EXAMPLE. — This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the most contemptuous manner, reviled almost all the Wise and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints, the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Christian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever since Religion came amongst them, deserve to be considered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abused *Moses* and *Paul*; he has ridiculed the SON, and blasphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, who by his scurrility and abuse is judged no other than — and what has he done? He has fallen into the same fault, and followed his example.

What, has he likewise *railed* at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewise had the *arrogance* to say, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewise blasphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alas, no. Two such Writers are too much for any one age! And yet, what less can justify Men in saying, that the Author of the *View* has *fallen into the same fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example?* All he has done is occasionally telling the World, That his Lordship, once in his life, was for bringing in *Popery* and the *Pretender*; and is now for introducing *Naturalism*, a more specious form of Atheism: that he is overrun with passion and prejudice: that he understands little or nothing of the subjects he handles, which yet he treats with sovereign contempt: that his learning is superficial, his reasoning

sophi-

sophistical, and his declamation inflated: and that, if ever Religion should happen to regain its hold on the People, his *Philosophic* works will run the hazard of being applied to the lowest and *vilest uses*. This is the substance of what he has said. And if this be falling into the *same fault, and following his Lordship's example*, the Author of the *View*, for ought I can perceive, must be content to plead guilty.

But we will suppose, the *manner* of writing, and not the *subject* of the Work, is here to be understood. Is the railing at all mankind, at all Religion, at God Almighty himself, but of the same species of writing with His, who shall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the *Civil*, as now to the *Religious* Constitution of his Country; that he reasons ill, and that he declaims worse? Did the

politeness of a *Gentleman* or a *Cler-*
gyman require, under pain of be-
 ing matched with his Lordship in
railing and *arrogance*, that, after
 the Author of the *View* had quot-
 ed all his Lordship's horrors in *prin-*
ciple and *expression*, he should have
 added, " This, good People, is the
 " FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which is to
 " be substituted amongst us, in the
 " place of RELIGION. But take
 " me along with you; Tho' this,
 " indeed, be the bane and poison
 " of your HOPES; tho' it reduce
 " humanity to the most disconso-
 " late and forlorn condition, by de-
 " priving it of the MORAL Ruler of
 " the World, and by dissolving all
 " the ties of CIVIL Government;
 " Yet, Courage! The Author was a
 " man of distinguished quality, of
 " uncommon abilities, and of infi-
 " nite politeness. His great talents
 " for *Business* enabled him to see
 " what

“ what was best for Society ; his
 “ penetration into *Philosophic* mat-
 “ ters, what was best for human
 “ Nature ; and his profound know-
 “ ledge of *Divinity*, what was best
 “ for Both. He had governed
 “ States ; he had instructed Kings ;
 “ and this last great Book of Wif-
 “ dom was the result of all his skill
 “ and experience.”

All this, indeed, I might have
 said : and, it is probable, a good
 deal of it I should have said, had the
 aim of my *View* been to recom-
 mend myself, and to raise a repu-
 tation from the defeat of this migh-
 ty Man. Had this, I say, been my
 aim, the raising the character of an
 adversary who was presently to fall
 by my hand, would hardly have
 been amongst the last of my contri-
 vances. But as I had another pur-
 pose, the preventing the mischiefs
 of his Book, I took the different
 method

method of reducing his Authority its to just value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the easy reception of his Opinions amongst a corrupt People.

The Letters, say this Public, (whose sentiments have been so kindly conveyed unto me) purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and conversation. It may be true and just. But that is not the question. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftsman, neither concludes for, nor against, the divinity of the Christian Religion.

I readily confess, had Lord Bolingbroke's *Morals and Politics* nothing to do with his *religious Principles*, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his *Treaties* and his *Craftsmen* into a *View of his Philosophy*. But I held all these

to be the various parts of the same System, which had contributed, in support of one another, to produce a Whole.—I can believe he found it for his ease in retirement, to adhere still *closer* to a set of Principles, which having facilitated his Practice, enabled him to bear the retrospect of it: but I am much mistaken if he did not begin the World with his notions of *God* and the *Soul*; hence his rounds of business and amusements.

“ Now all for pleasure; now for Church and
“ State.

The rest followed in course. For, as Tully observes, *Cum enim DECRETUM proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et AMICITIARUM prodiones, et RERUM PUBLICARUM, nasci solent.*

But this is not all. I beg leave to say, there was not only a *close*

connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was necessary to a just defence of Religion against him, to *take notice* of that connexion.

One of his Lordship's pretended purposes, in his *Philosophic Essays*, was to detect the Corruptions which the CLERGY have brought into the Christian Religion: My aim, in the *View*, was to expose a species of Impiety which overturns all Religion.

Consider, how his Lordship proceeded. — Not that I place my justification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am here endeavouring to refute; neither would I insist upon the right of retaliation; for, tho' that be a better plea, it is the last which a Writer for Truth would have recourse to. I quote his Lordship's method, as that which right reason prescribes to all, who undertake to
 2 detect

detect and lay open error and deceit.

His Lordship's point, as we said, was to shew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and simplicity of Religion. It is not my purpose here to inquire with what ingenuity he has represented the Fact, or how justly he has deduced the Consequences, which, he pretends, have risen from it. He has shewn some corruptions; he has imagined more; and dressed up the rest of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he most unreasonably offers as a legitimate prejudice against Religion itself. Well, be it so, that the Clergy are convicted of abuse and imposture. The question, which every one is ready to ask, who thinks himself concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, CUI BONO? What end had the Clergy to serve by these corruptions? His Lordship
thinks

thinks the question reasonable, and is as ready to reply, That they had a wicked-antichristian Tyranny to impose upon the necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce such kind of corruptions into Religion as best tended to pervert men's understandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impress upon their consciences, an awe and reverence for their spiritual Masters. The answer is satisfactory, and shews the use of this method in detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extension of his list of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at present, no concern.

Now, as the Author of the *Essays* had a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmask; so, the Author of the *View* had a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expose. His Lordship had publicly
and

and openly, in his respectable Character of a NOBLEMAN, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared it to be all a Cheat, supported only by Knaves and Madmen; which indeed was a large Party, since, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordship had been held up to the People as an *all accomplished* Personage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wisdom: And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant character was conveyed, had made it received, even against the information of their senses. Now a Public thus prejudiced, would, on such a representation of his Lordship's religious principles as the *Essays* contain, and the *View* collects together, be ready to ask "could so sublime a Genius be disposed to deprive himself, and us, of all those blessings which Religion promises, had

had he not discovered, and been perfectly assured, that the whole was a delusion; and therefore in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from seeing their *present good*, in fond expectation of a recompence in the shadowy regions of *futurity*? We say, *deprive himself*, for he seems sufficiently vext, and sensible of his disappointment, when waked from the pleasing dream of a life to come. *There is no one thought* (says his Lordship) *which soothes my mind like this: I encourage my IMAGINATION to pursue it, and am heartily afflicted when ANOTHER FACULTY of the intellect comes boisterously in, and WAKES me from so pleasing a dream, if it be a dream*[1].” — In this manner I supposed, that they, for whose use the *View* was intended, were disposed to argue; I mean that part

[1] xliiii Letter to Swift in Pope's Works
Vol. ix.

of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, against so dangerous a prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was first to remove their delusion concerning Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophic Character; and to shew, that he had none of those talents of Reasoning, Learning, or Philosophy which are necessary to qualify a man in deciding on this important question. But this opposed only one half of their prejudices. They could by no means be brought to think that so good a Man, so benevolent a Citizen, so warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordship's *Essays* represent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great support of humanity, RELIGION. The advocate

of Religion therefore, unless he would betray his cause, was obliged to shew, that the Social light, in which his Lordship puts himself, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a false one; that his moral virtues were an exact tally to his religious principles; and *public* virtue (according to his favorite *Cicero*) embracing and comprehending all the private, *omnes omnium Charitates PATRIA una complexa est*, it was to the purpose of such a defence, to shew, that his Lordship had been a BAD CITIZEN. Now tho' Religion has the strongest allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it has its terrors, and those very dreadful too, for the Wicked: Who, in such circumstances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows His Lordship's choice. He himself tells us, it was
made

made on the conviction of Reason; others think, by the inducement of his Passions. The World is to determine; but they should judge with a knowledge of the case. And this, the Author of the *View* presented to them, in answer to the latter part of these popular prejudices; which would not suffer them to conceive any other cause but rational conviction, that could induce any man in his senses to part with the *soothing* consolation of futurity, as his Lordship is pleased to call it.

And now, I suppose, every candid Reader will allow, at least I am sure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordship's *morals* and *politics* come within the *view of his Philosophy*; where the question is of the TRUTH or FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordship's AUTHORITY concerning it.

To sum up this Argument: His Lordship descants on *Romish Superstition*; the Author of the *View*, on *his Lordship's Philosophy*: Not to shew for what *end* the one was established, or by what causes the other was produced, is relating Facts without head or tail; which the Writer on *the use of history* justly throws into the class of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordship, speaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into religion, accounts for them by a spirit of Dominion; and the Author of the *View* speaking of his Lordship's *religious principles*, reminds the Reader of his *moral practice*; but so far only as was to the purpose, and was notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) *deserved every thing of you; but who are those friends and admirers of his, whom you represent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unnecessarily*

rily upon many occasions. I dare say, they are very few. You had better have named them.

As exceptionable as that, perhaps, might have been, I should certainly have chose to do so, had I conceived it possible for the Reader to understand, by such *friends and admirers*, any of those few illustrious Persons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeness, his distance from business, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occasionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. Several of these, I have the honour to know, and the pleasure of being able to inform those who do not, that they were so far from being in the principles of his *Philosophy*, that some of them did not so much as know what they were; and those who did, let him understand, how much they detested them.

Which very well explains the disposition of his Will concerning those papers, in which his *Philosophy* is contained. And if it was no more than for the sake of this fair opportunity of explaining myself, I could readily excuse all the hard thoughts *this public* seems to have entertained of me. As to the *friends and admirers, who applauded all he wrote*, I meant those who persuaded him to change his mind, and give those *Essays* to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the secret inspection of a Few. And he seems willing the World should know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting those places in his *Essays* stand, where he declares his own opinion of their *unfitness* for general communication.

But what grieves and hurts your friends most (says this Public) *is still behind. Poor Pope did not deserve*

to be treated by you with so much cruelty, contempt, and injustice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is represented as a Monster, hated both of God and Man, why is Pope always and unnecessarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addressed to him? Why should he, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be described only by the slighting Epithets of tuneful and poetical — You say, Pope announced the glad tidings of all these things. In what work can he be said to have done it, except in his Essay on Man? This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent Commentary on that Essay.

Who it was that treated poor Pope with cruelty, contempt, and injustice, Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the *View*, let my Censurers judge; and, by their freedom from passion and resentment, at a time when a

friend would be most *hurt*, they appear perfectly qualified to judge impartially.

When, on his publication of the *Patriot King*, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed use the memory of poor Pope, with exceeding *contempt, cruelty, and injustice*, by representing him, in the *Advertisement* to the Public, as a busy ignorant interpolator of his works, a mercenary betrayer of his trust, a miserable, who bartered all the friendship of his Philosopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain, Who was it then that manifested his *hurt and grief for poor Pope*? Was it *this Public*? Or was it the *Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke on that occasion*?

But in what consists the *contempt, cruelty, and injustice* of the *View*? The *contempt* is in the *slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical*: the *Cruelty* in giving instances of Pope's unbound-

unbounded admiration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the *injustice* in saying that he denounced the *glad tidings of the first Philosophy*, and that he approved and was *privy to all that was addressed to him*.

My using the epithets of *tuneful and poetical*, in speaking of a man who had many superior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well suited to the occasion. It is where I speak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke; and they aptly insinuate what I would have them mean, that, Judgment had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical *imagination*. Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordship's *gratitude*, and Mr. Pope's *idolatry* side by side, in order to their setting off one another. But *cruelty* is added to contempt, in the *instances* I give of Pope's unbounded

bounded admiration. I am verily persuaded, had Pope lived to see Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendship, as well in his Lordship's usual conversation, as in the *advertisement to the Patriot King*, he would have been amongst the first to have laughed at his own delusions, when this treatment of him had once broken and dissolved the charm; at least, he would have been ready to laugh with a friend, who should chuse to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongst the offices of friendship, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you,

“ Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends
 “ be fore,
 “ So much the better, you may laugh the
 “ more.

as implying, that, while they continued *fore*, they continued to stand in need of this friendly surgery.

My *injustice* consists in supposing Pope was privy to all that was addressed to him. A great injustice indeed, had I so insinuated, I, who with greater certainty than most men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the secret, but the design of the address, and the preliminary discourses. So little did Pope know of the principles of the *first Philosophy*, that when a common acquaintance, in his last illness, chanced to tell him of a late conversation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordship took occasion to deny God's moral attributes, as they are commonly understood, he was so shocked that he rested not till he had asked Lord Bolingbroke whether his informer was not mistaken? His Lordship assured him, he was; of which, Pope with great satisfaction informed his Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordship's real sentiments it was, that

that Pope gave easy credit to him, when he vapoured, that *he would demonstrate all the common Metaphysics to be wicked and abominable* [2]. Which leads me to that part of the charge, where it is said, I could only mean the ESSAY ON MAN, by the *glad tidings of the first Philosophy*. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following passages in his LETTERS. *Do not laugh at my gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philosopher, till I pull it off, and make a jest of it myself. 'Tis just what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with METAPHYSICS. I hope you will live to see, and stare at the learned figure he will make on the same shelf with Locke and Malebranche* [3]. And again, *Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to destroy Volumes. I shall not live, I fear, to see that work printed* [4]. Where,

[2] *Bolingbroke to Swift*, Letter xlvi. Vol. ix.

[3] *Letters*. lxxi. Vol. ix. [4] Letter lxxiii.

by the way, his fancy that these METAPHYSICS were designed for the public, shews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant: The *Essay on Man* I could not mean. For in the 80th page of the *View*, I make the fundamental doctrines of that *Poem* and his Lordship's *Essays* to be directly opposite to one another. “ Mr. POPE'S *Es-*
“ *say on Man* is a real vindication of
“ Providence against Libertines and
“ Atheists — Lord BOLINGBROKE'S
“ *Essays* are a pretended vindication
“ of Providence against an imagina-
“ ry confederacy between Divines and
“ Atheists — The Poet directs his
“ Argument against Atheists and
“ Libertines in support of RELIGION;
“ The Philosopher against Divines
“ in support of NATURALISM: and
“ the success is answerable. Pope's
“ argument is manly, systematical,
“ and convincing: Lord Boling-
broke's

“ broke’s, confused, prevaricating,
 “ and inconsistent.”

Thus I have explained, in the best way I am able, my reasons for speaking of Pope in a manner which gives offence. But what shall we say, if this air of negligence to his memory was assumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epistle? The motive sure was allowable; tho’ the project was without effect: for *this Public* has positively decided, that *the Author must be*—*by the scurrility and abuse.*

But, continues the Censurer, *Had you pursued the advantage you have ingeniously taken from an expression in one of Pope’s Letters, to have shewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but despised the futility of his reasoning against Revelation; that where he was right Pope improved but never servilely copied*
 his

his Ideas, you would have done honour to your Friend and yourself: you would have served the cause of Religion: you would have discredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contrast—

Now all this, in the *fourth Letter*, I have done: And the Reader will find it in its place. In the mean time, every body might see I was ready, on a fit occasion, to do it, by the passage quoted just above, from the *second*, where *Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more discredited by the contrast.*

But I must not leave this head without taking notice of one expression in the censure. It is said, that the *View* REPRESENTS *L. Bolingbroke as a Monster hated both of God and Man.* The expression had been juster, if, instead of this, the writer had said, *from the View it may be collected; because, whatever* ideas

ideas of his Lordship may arise in men's minds on a perusal of the *View*, they arise from his Lordship's own words, which are faithfully quoted: What the Author of the *View* adds, is only a little wholesome raillery, which can present the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion of *Pope*) arises from every fruitless attempt of Impiety.

“ Heav'n still with *laughter* the vain toil

“ surveys,

“ And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.

That the Author of the *View* assisted in the dressing up so strange a sight, as *a Monster hated both by God and Man*, was very far from his intention. He made a scruple of accompanying his Lordship's quotations with those reflexions of serious indignation which such a Scene of horrors naturally suggest, lest he should be thought to aim at something more than critical animadversion.

version. He therefore generously endeavoured to turn the public attention from the *horror*, to the *ridicule*, of the *first Philosophy*, and to get his Lordship well laughed at, as being persuaded that when the Public is brought to that temper, its resentment seldom rises to extremes.

Men had better speak out, and say, the Author of the *View* ought to have represented L. Bolingbroke as neither *detestable*, nor *ridiculous*. He could have wished, that his sense of honour and duty would have permitted him so to do. The Author of the *View* is no Fana-
 tic or Enthusiast, and perhaps less
 of a Bigot than either. Yet there
 are times and occasions when the
 soberest thinker will confess, that the
 interests of Particulars should give
 way to those of the Public. It is
 true, there are others, when polite-
 ness, civil prudence, and the pri-
 vate

still

most when
 candid

vate motives of Friendship, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the state and condition of the times; and even to chuse the worfe, instead of the better method of doing good. But my misfortune was that this did not appear to be one of those occasions, in which, when I had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, I could leave them with this reflexion: “ These are the
 “ writer’s notions on the most im-
 “ portant points which regard hu-
 “ man happiness. They are indeed
 “ very singular and novel. But then
 “ consider, the Writer was a great
 “ man, and high in all the attain-
 “ ments of Wisdom; therefore weigh
 “ well and reverently, before you
 “ condemn what I have here exposed
 “ to your Judgment.” But had I
 said this, would it have secured me
 from OFFENCE? The thing of all, to
 be most dreaded by those who know
 the

the world. Would it not rather have furnished *another* handle to the same Censurers, of making me a confederate in his guilt, only a little better disguised. This would not have been the first time I had been so served, when endeavouring to avoid offence.

And yet there was but one of these three ways; either to laugh, to declaim, or to say nothing. I chose the *first*, as what I fancied least obnoxious; in which, however, I was mistaken; — and as most likely to do good; in which, I hope, I am not mistaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke can do, whose reputation of parts and wisdom had been raised so high, is amongst the PEOPLE. His objections against Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when used by their original Authors, long

still

can hope

so

before his Lordship honored them with a place in his *Essays*. What then was he to do, whose business it was to put a speedy stop to the mischief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and succinct representation of his *System*, in a popular way; to make a right use of that abundance, which the ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS afforded, to shew that his Lordship's *Principles* were as foolish as they were wicked; and that the *arguments* used in support of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philosophy; and knew just as much of the genius of the Gospel, as of that pretended corruption of it, which he calls, *artificial Theology*. This I imagined the only way to reach his Lordship's AUTHORITY, on which
all

all depended; and then the very weakest effort of ridicule would be able to do the rest. These were my motives for the method I took; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it should, I think, be laid to the account of those who made this explanation necessary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will serve for an answer to what follows.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) is so universally and so justly obnoxious to all sorts and ranks of people, that, from regard to him, no body cares how he is treated, but be assured your manner has destroyed all the merit of the work.----To the manner I have said enough. The candid Reader, I am sure, will allow me to add a word or two Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public service. It had, till of late,

d 3

been

been always esteemed matter of merit to do a general good, tho' the *manner* of doing it might not be so readily approved. But we are now become so delicate and fastidious; that it is the *manner of doing*, even in things of the highest importance, which carries away all the praise. And yet, this false delicacy on a question of no less moment than Whether we shall have any Religion or none at all, seems as ridiculous, as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for saving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he should have considered of a support more conformable to the taste and general style of Architecture, in my Lord's superb piece; or to find him disconcerted by that charitable hand, which should venture to pull his Grandeur by head and shoulders out of his flaming apartment.

But

But in these suppositions I grant much more than in reason I ought. I suppose the public taste, which the *manner* in question has offended, is founded in Nature; whereas 'tis the creature of Fashion, and as shifting and fantastical as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the *matter* of every honest man's enquiry, is eternal; but the *manner suited to the public taste*, is nothing else than conformity to our present passions, or sentiments; our prejudices, or dispositions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got possession of a People, then a warmth for its interests, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taste; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apostle in every defender of Religion: But when this awful Power has lost its hold, when, at best, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect

to be read with approbation, you must conform your *manner* to that polite indifference, and easy unconcern, with which we see every other trial of skill plaid before us.

Nor is this the worst. It has brought in use a new kind of political Arithmetic, which proceeds upon very unexpected methods of calculation; where the lesser sum of an *unacceptable manner* shall do more than strike off the infinitely larger of *important services*; it shall turn them to demerit: while a long accumulation of well ranged *inoffensive cyphers* may be made to rise to millions.

Indeed (says this Public) *it*, [your manner] *has furnished your enemies with a handle to do you infinite mischief. Your COLD friends lament and make the worst sort of excuse, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controversy;*

troversy; Your WARM friends are out of countenance, and forced to be silent, or turn the discourse.

Would not any one by this imagine, that the Author of the *View*, after much pretended opposition to Infidelity, was at last detected of being in combination with it, and all along artfully advancing its interests; that the mask had unwarily dropt off, and that he stood confessed what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleased to call him, *an Advocate for civil and ecclesiastical Tyranny*. At least, no one would imagine, that this *handle afforded to his enemies of doing him infinite mischief*, was no other than the treating the Author of the most impious and insulting book that ever affronted public justice, as a bad reasoner and a worse Philosopher, whose VANITY led him to abuse every *Name of Learning*, and his FEAR to discredit every *mode of Religion*.

These *cold Friends* however acted their parts as usual; the great secret of which is, the well poisoning an apology, or, as the anonymous writer better expresses it, *making the very worst excuse they can find*. But here, tho' they aimed well, they over-shot themselves. This compliment of *drawing blood in controversy*, the Author of the *View* takes to himself with great complacency. For his *Controversy* having always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation, either for or against Ministers or Factions; and on no less a question than the truth and honour of Religion, with Infidels and Bigots, the *drawing blood* shews him to have been *in earnest*, which is no vulgar praise. It would be but a poor commendation, I ween, of a brave English Veteran who had seen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to say, he never *drew*

blood;

blood; tho' such a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley hole. When the situation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of opposite parties, to engage in a mock fight, and play a prize of disputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there should be much ceremony; and little *blood shed*. But the Author of the *View* writes for no Party, or party-opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in question, for the CLERGY, its Ministers; both of which, (by good fortune, being yet of public Authority) he thinks himself at liberty to support, tho' it be by *drawing blood* from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be subdued by management or a feigned attack. Yet

as

mock fight

as much *in earnest* as he is, he should be ashamed to turn the same arms against simple error, against a naked adversary, or against the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, against any but him who stands up boldly to defy Religion; or, what is almost as bad, to discredit it, by false and hypocritic zeal for the corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a sense of duty, I should have suited the entertainment to the taste of my superiors. For a man must be of a strange complexion indeed, who when he has *conformed to Religion* for his convenience, will scruple to go on and reap the benefit of his compliance, by *conforming to the Fashion*.

So far as to the Author's *cold Friends*. With respect to his *warm* ones, They have not plaid their parts so well; they seem to have given up

up their Cause too soon. They might have said with truth, and a full knowledge of the case, "That no man was readier than the Author of the *View*, to comply with the temper of the times; and especially with the inclinations of his friends, to whose *satisfaction* he has been ever ready to sacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their *services*, every thing, except his duty and his honour; was he capable of doing that, he would not deserve a virtuous Friend: That probably, he considered the matter in question as one of those excepted cases, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his station: that he saw *Religion* insulted, a *moral Governor* defied; *Naturalism*, a species of *Atheism*, openly, and with all the arts of sophistry and declamation, inculcated, and the opposing World insolently branded as a cabal
of

of fools, knaves, and madmen :” They might have said, “That where errors of small consequence are in question, or even great ones, when delivered with modesty and candour, suitable measures are to be observed. But here the impiety and the insult were equally in the extreme :” To which, in the last place, they might have added most of those other considerations which have been urged in the course of this Apology. And had they been so pleased, the defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage.

However the Author of the *View* has yet the vanity, amidst all this mortification, to reflect, that there is a very wide difference between *displeasing*, and *the being disapproved* : and that *this very Public*, who complain by the pen of my anonymous Friend, feel that difference.

The

The decencies of Acquaintance, habitual impressions, and even the most innocent partialities, might make them uneasy to see Lord BOLINGBROKE exposed to contempt; but their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious interests, will make them pleased to see his PRINCIPLES confuted and exposed.

When a noble Roman had in public Senate accused one of the greatest Pests of his age and country, he observed, that the vigour with which he pursued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneasy; but he satisfied himself with this reflexion, *tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.*

In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the *manner* I have done it. If I have offended any
good

good Man, any friend to my person, or my Cause, it is a sacrifice to Duty, which yet I must never repent of having made, tho' the displeasure of a friend be the severest trial of it. I know what that man has to expect both from *Infidelity* and *Bigotry*, who engages WITHOUT RESERVE in the service of Religion.

Benefacere et malè audire has always been the lot of such Adventurers.

Smithed
Hossein But I have long since taken my party: “ Omnia praecepi, atque animo
“ mecum ante peregi. Nec recuso,
“ si ita casus attulerit, luere poenas
“ ob honestissima facta, dum FLA-
“ GITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR.”

Jan. 4, 1755.

What let not Virtue too command his foe
R

LETTER III.

DEAR SIR,

LET me first claim your thanks for sparing you so long on the chapter of Lord Bolingbroke; and then ask you, what you now think of this paper Meteor, which so flames and sparkles; and, while it kept at distance, drew after it the admiring croud; like a Comet, crossing the celestial Orbs, and traversing, and domineering over the established System; in the presage of superstitious Divines, denouncing pestilence and ruin to the World beneath; but in the more philosophic opinion of his followers, re-creating and reviving the driness and sterility of exhausted Nature.

Unde hæc MONSTRA tamen; vel quo de fonte, requiris.

Your love of Mankind makes you see this new Phænomenon with horror. And you ask, Is it for this, that such a torrent of abuse has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, upon every System

2 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S
of Philosophy, and upon every Institution
of Religion? They were not poured out at
hazard, for all these things stood in his way :
they were not poured out in vain, for they
are given for *Arguments*; and will, I make
no doubt, be so received. The wise *Quin-*
tilian, it is true, has observed, *Propriam*
MODERATIONEM, QUÆDAM CAUSÆ desi-
derant. And it must be confessed, that if ever
Moderation, and temperance of expression,
became an author, or was well suited to his
discourse, it was when the purpose of his
work, like that of his Lordship's, was to
overturn all ESTABLISHED RELIGION,
founded in the belief of a Sovereign Master,
supremely *just* and *good*; and all ESTA-
BLISHED LEARNING, employed for the de-
fence of such Religion: And, on their ruins,
to erect NATURALISM, instead of real The-
ism, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, instead of real
Science. When, I say, a Writer had thought
proper to insult the common sentiments of
Mankind, on points esteemed so essential to
their well being, common policy, as well as
common decency, required, that it should
be done by the most winning insinuation and
address; and not by calling every man, who
would

would not take his system upon trust, MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER.

But superior Genius's have been always deemed above the restraint of rules. *Tully* observes, that *ARCESILAS*, fitted by a turbulence of temper, to confound the peace, and overturn the established order of things, had done that mischief in *PHILOSOPHY*, which *TITUS GRACCHUS* had projected in the *REPUBLIC* [1]. But his Lordship, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and shine an *Arcefilas* and a *Gracchus* too.

His ill success in business (from which, as he tells us himself, he never desisted, *while he had hopes of doing any good*) forced him to turn his great talents from *POLITICS* to *PHILOSOPHY*. But he had not yet mortified that Ambition which was always prompting him to aspire to the head of things: and he carried with him that sufficiency, and those resentments, which had proved so ill suited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Closet of the Philosopher.

We may add, that he entered upon *Let-*

[1] Tum exortus est, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, sic Arcefilas, qui *constitutam* Philosophiam everteret.

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ters in an advanced age; and this still further viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully observes, such late Adventurers are extremely subject. ΟΥΙΜΑΘΕΙΣ *autem homines scis QUAM INSOLENTES sint*: "You know," says he, how INSOLENT those men generally are, who come late to their book."

But now having given you *my* thoughts of his Lordship's *assuming* temper, it would be unfair not to give you his own; especially as he has been so ingenuous to make no secret of it. He had kept, it seems, ill company; and his *natural candor and modesty* had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own story: "I grow VERY APT TO ASSUME, by conversing so much with ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS, who assume much oftener than they prove [2]."

But whatever causes concurred to form this temper, certain it is, that his *contempt of others* was become so habitual to him, that it operates where no reasonable provocation can be assigned. I have shewn you, in my first Letter, at what a rate, his disgust to the *Morals*, and his aversion to the *Sanctions*, of the GOSPEL, disposed him to treat all who had

[2] Vol. iv. p. 504.

contributed to propagate, or to support, *Revelation*. But how the honest PAGANS of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a *future state* than himself, is a little hard to conceive.

Yet PYTHAGORAS, he tells us, was a turbulent fellow, and a fanatical subverter of States.

Nor did PLATO's *delirious brains* [3] secure him from becoming, on occasion, a poultry cheat, and a mercenary flatterer. For almost all his *Madmen* are *Knaves* into the bargain. But Plato had made himself notorious, by the *blasphemous* title he had given to the *first Cause*, of the FIRST GOOD. So that his Lordship regarded him as at the head of that wicked Sect, who ascribe *moral attributes* to the Deity.

Even SOCRATES, whose glory it was, as Tully assures us, to take PHILOSOPHY out of the clouds, and bring it to dwell amongst cities and men, *substituted* (in his Lordship's opinion) *fantastic*, for *real knowledge* [4]—and *entertained and propagated* THEOLOGICAL and METAPHYSICAL notions, which are not, most certainly, parts of NATURAL THEOLOGY [5]. We under-

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88. [4] Vol. iv. p. 112. [5] Vol. iv. p. 122.

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stand his Lordship very well. He means a *particular* Providence and a *future* state: the *moral* attributes of the Deity, and the *substantiality* of the Soul. This apparently was *the fantastic knowledge which makes no part of natural theology*.

When these pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or much disturbed to hear CYPRIAN called a *Liar and a Madman* [6]; JEROM, a *surly, foul-mouthed Bully*; and EPIPHANIUS, an *Idiot*?

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance. The *Gospel of Peace*, he tells us, produced nothing but *Murders*; and the idea of a *first Good* was the occasion of all *evil*. But what had SCIPIO and REGULUS done, to be cashiered of their Dignities? They were neither *artificial Theologers*, nor yet *mad Metaphysicians*; but plain, sober Statesmen. His Lordship's quarrel, we know, is with DIVINITY in all its forms; but he professes to admire the *moral Virtues*. And if there are any of higher eclat than the rest, and in which his Lordship would be more particularly ambitious to shine, they must needs be CHASTITY and GOOD FAITH,

[6] Vol. iv. p. 407.

CUI, *Pudor*, et *Justitiæ* soror
Incorrupta Fides, &c. &c.

Yet he wrests all his reading to deprive those two brave Romans of their high reputation, when they had so fairly earned it by the severest trials. I am not ignorant of that childish infirmity of our nature, a fondness for ingrossing to ourselves those shining qualities with which we may happen to be dazzled; but I can hardly suspect his Lordship of so selfish and infantine a project; much less would I suppose him capable of thinking, that SCIPIO and REGULUS may be still those very great men, they have been taken for, though stained quite through with *lust* and *perfidy*.

It is true, indeed, the new Historian of Great Britain, another of these *first philosophy-men* (for the essence of the Sect consisting in paradox, it shines as well in *History* as *Divinity*) he, I say, tells us, that it will admit of a reasonable doubt, whether *severity of manners alone, and abstinence from pleasure, can deserve the name of Virtue* [1].

[1] *The History of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 200
 4to. printed at Edinb. 1754.

[B 4]

But

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But then he is as singular in his notions of *Religion*. He holds but two species of it in all nature, *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*; and under one or other of them, he gives you to understand [7], the whole of *Christian profession* is, and ever was, included. On the *Church of England*, indeed, he is so indulgent, to bestow *all Religion* has to give. For when he sets it against *Popery* it is *Fanaticism*: but as often as it faces about, and is opposed to *Puritanism*, it then becomes *Superstition*; and this as constantly as the occasions return.

You will say I grow partial to his Lordship, in appearing so anxious for his reputation, while your two favorite characters expire under his pen.

Never fear it. They have not lived so long to die of a fright. When his Lordship blusters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that *Antiquity* he has been abusing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I shall have only the trouble of transcribing the defence of *Scipio* against his Lordship's suspicions, as I find it in an expostulatory letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceased friend.—

[7] See his History throughout.

“ *The reputation of the first Scipio* (says
 “ his Lordship) *was not so clear and uncon-*
 “ *troverted in PRIVATE, as in public life;*
 “ *nor was he allowed by all to be a man of*
 “ *such severe virtue as he affected, and as*
 “ *that age required. Nævius was thought*
 “ *to mean him, in some verses Gellius has*
 “ *preserved; and VALERIUS ANTIAS made*
 “ *no scruple to assert, that far from restoring*
 “ *the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauch-*
 “ *ed and kept her. P. 204, of the Idea, of a*
 “ *Patriot King. One would have hoped so*
 “ *mean a slander might have slept forgot-*
 “ *ten in the dirty corner of a poor Pe-*
 “ *dant's [8] common place. And yet we*
 “ *see it quoted as a fact by an Instructor of*
 “ *Kings. Who knows but at some happy*
 “ *time or other, when a writer wants to*
 “ *prove, that real friendship becomes a*
 “ *great man as little as real chastity [9],*
 “ *this advertisement [10] of yours may be*
 “ *advanced to the same dignity of credit*
 “ *with the calumny of Valerius Antias. If*
 “ *it should, I would not undertake to dis-*
 “ *pute the fact on which such an infer-*
 “ *ence might be made; for, I remember,*

[8] A. Gellius. [9] See p. 201, of the *Patriot King*.
 [10] Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the *Patriot King*.

“ Tully, a great Statesman himself, long
 “ ago observed, *Veræ amicitiae difficilli-*
 “ *me reperiuntur in iis, qui in republica*
 “ *versantur.* — But the words of Nævius
 “ were these,

“ *Etiam qui res magnas manu sæpe gessit*
 “ *gloriose,*

“ *Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud*
 “ *gentes solus*

“ *Præstat: eum suus pater cum pallio uno*
 “ *ab amica abduxit.*

“ These obscure verses were, in Gellius's
 “ opinion, the sole foundation of Antias's
 “ calumny, against the universal concur-
 “ rence of Historians. *His ego versibus*
 “ *credo adductum Valerium Antiatem AD-*
 “ *VERSUM CETEROS OMNES scriptores de*
 “ *SCIPIONIS moribus sensisse.* L. vi. c. 8.

“ And what he thought of this historian's
 “ modesty and truth, we may collect from
 “ what he says of him in another place.

“ Where having quoted two tribunitial de-
 “ crees, which, he tells us, he transcribed
 “ from Records [*ex annalium monumentis*]
 “ he adds, that *Valerius Antias* made no
 “ scruple to give them the lye in public.

“ *Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decre-*

“ *torum memoriam contraque auctoritates*
 “ *veterum annalium—dixit, &c.* L. vii. c.
 “ 19. And Livy, in his xxxvith book,
 “ quoting this *Antias*, for the particulars
 “ of a victory, subjoins, concerning the num-
 “ ber slain, *Scriptori parum fidei sit, quia*
 “ *in augendo non alius intemperantior est.*
 “ And he who will amplify on one occasion
 “ will diminish on another; for it is the
 “ same intemperate passion that carries him
 “ indifferently to each extreme [1].”

REGULUS'S virtue comes next under his Lordship's censure: “ I know not (says he) whether Balbus would have called in question the STORY OF REGULUS. Vid. *Au. Gellium*. It was probably fabulous, in many circumstances at least, and there were those amongst the Romans who thought it to be so [2].” Would not any one now imagine, by his bringing *Au. Gellius* again upon the stage, that there was another *Valerius Antias* in reserve, to depose against REGULUS likewise? just the contrary. The Grammarian, in the ivth chapter of his 6th book, confirms the common story, with an addition, by the testimo-

[1] *A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, the idea of a Patriot King, and the state of Parties, &c.*

[2] Vol. v. p. 406.

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nies of the Historians *Tubero* and *Tuditānus*. The truth however is, that his Lordship had his Voucher, though he be so shy of producing him. It is the respectable Mr. TOLAND; to whom his Lordship is much indebted for this, as well as better things. Amongst the posthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a *Dissertation*, intitled, *The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus*: in which, from a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, preserved by *Constantinus Porphyrogenitus*, he endeavours to prove, against all the Roman writers, with *Cicero* at their head, that *Regulus* did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to so severe a trial; but this was enough for his Lordship, to call in question the whole story; and to add, that *there were those amongst the ROMANS who thought it to be fabulous*. Unluckily, the *Roman* writers are unanimous for the truth of the story. How then shall we account for his Lordship's assertion? Did he take *Diodorus Siculus* for a Latin writer, because he had not seen him in Greek? Or did he understand *A. Gellius* as quoting *Tubero* and *Tuditanus* for doubters of the common story?

His

His Lordship's ambition was uniform and simple: it was only, as we said, TO BE AT THE HEAD OF THINGS. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterfeits and Pretenders, who had, some how or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But he unmask and deposes them with as much ease as contempt.

“ SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and CUMBERLAND (says his Lordship) seem to be great writers, by much the same right as he might be called a great traveller, who should go from London to Paris by the *Cape of Good Hope* [3].” I can hardly think they took so large a compass. But let us trust to the Proverb: They and his Lordship, never fear, will prove it between them, *that the farthest way about is the nearest way home*. He shews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to *Atheism*; whereas, if they take us a little about, they bring us safely home to *Religion*.

[3] Vol. v. p. 68.

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He professes “ a thorough contempt for
 “ the whole business of the learned lives of
 “ SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USH-
 “ ER, and MARSHAM [4].” His con-
 tempt is well grounded: for having put
 himself to school to them, and learned no-
 thing, it was natural for him to think,
 there was nothing to be learnt. One may
 surely be allowed to say, *he learnt nothing*,
 when we find him ignorant even of the first
 elements of the science, the meaning of THE
 YEAR OF NABONASSAR; which being on-
 ly an *Æra* to reckon from, he mistook for a
 periodical revolution of an *artificial Year* [5].

But what need we more? Those to
 whom he is most indebted; whom he most
 approves, and whom he honours with the
 title of *Master*, all share in one common
 compliment, of insufficiency and absurdity.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the *best*
Interpreter of Plato; but, at the same time
 assures us, he was *perfectly delirious*. But
 why, you ask, is *Ficinus the best Interpreter*

[4] Vol. ii. p. 261—2.

[5] —“ Berosus pretended to give the History [of
 “ the Babylonians] of four hundred eighty years:—
 “ and if it was so, THESE YEARS WERE PROBABLY
 “ THE YEARS OF NABONASSAR.” Vol. ii.

of Plato, since *J. Scaliger*, who knew something of the matter, says, that *he stript his Master of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags?* For a good reason; *Ficinus* taught his Lordship all he knew of Platonism. But why is he then *perfectly delirious?* For a better still: he holds opinions which his Lordship condemns.

His favorite *BARROW*, he tells us, “ goes on, a long while, begging the question, and talking in a theological cant MORE WORTHY OF PAUL than of a man like him [6]—flimzy stuff, which a man is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown and band [7].”

LOCKE and *NEWTON*, he insinuates, were his Heroes: Nay, such is his condescension, that he professes himself the pupil of the former. Yet this does not secure *Locke* from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM [8]. And as for *NEWTON*, the APPLICATION of his *Philosophy is grown, or growing into some abuse* [9]. Would you know how? By affording *CLARKE* and *BAXTER* certain principles

[6] Vol. iv. p. 278. [7] Vol. v. p. 361. [8] Vol. iii. p. 442. [9] Vol. iii. p. 374.

whereby

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whereby to demonstrate, *that the Soul is an
immaterial substance.* An abuse indeed!

But BACON and LOCKE, *as much as he
admires them, he is not blind* (he says) *to
their errors; but can, without being dazzled,
discern SPOTS IN THESE SUNS.*—

Before I go any further, I will lay you a
wager I know what those spots are. They
are, or I am much mistaken, no other than
the stains of *Faith* and the impurities of *Re-
velation*. But let us hear him.—“ I can dis-
“ cern a tincture, and sometimes more than
“ a tincture, in BACON, of those false notions,
“ which we are APT TO IMBIBE AS MEN, AS
“ INDIVIDUALS, AS MEMBERS OF SOCIETY,
“ and AS SCHOLARS. I can discern in LOCKE
“ sometimes ill-abstracted and ill-determin-
“ ed ideas, from which a wrong application
“ of words proceeds; and propositions to
“ which I can, by no means, assent. I con-
“ fess further, that I have been, and still
“ am at a loss, to find any appearance of
“ CONSISTENCY in an author, who pub-
“ lished a COMMENTARY ON THE EPI-
“ STLES OF ST. PAUL, and a treatise on
“ the REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANI-
“ TY (which he endeavours to prove by
“ fact and by argument) AFTER having
“ stated

“ stated clearly as he has done; the con-
 “ ditions and measures of historical pro-
 “ bability; AND AFTER having written
 “ as strongly as he has done against the
 “ abuse of Words [1].” Did not I tell
 you so!

——“ This SUN’s sick too:

“ Shortly he’ll be an EARTH:

as the Poet has it, in his description of the
 pestilence at Thebes; not more fatal to
 great Cities than this bloated Vapour of a
first Philosophy, which mimics, and, as he
 reflects, defiles that SUN of Science, and
 turns Nature into Prodigy.

Et SOLEM geminum et duplices se
 ostendere THEBAS, &c.

But his Lordship’s account of his other
Luminary, BACON, is still more extraordi-
 nary — He *thinks he discerns in him a tinc-
 ture, and more than a tincture of those false
 notions, which we are apt to imbibe as MEN,
 as INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIE-
 TY, and as SCHOLARS.* — That is, as
Men, we are apt to think we have a SOUL;

[1] Vol. iv. p. 166.

as *Individuals*, we are in expectation of a FUTURE STATE; as *Members of Society*, we are inclined to reverence the ESTABLISHED RELIGION; and as *Scholars*, we are taught to *reason*, and not to HARANGUE. If any of his Lordship's Followers can give a better account of this strange passage, I am very ready to resign the office I have here assumed, of being for once his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordship deals by RELIGION, and it's Advocates, as a certain french Author, I have read, does by ALCHEMY and the hermetic Philosophers; he brings almost every great name into the number; and after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy, alike, —

“Now his folly was in hoping to extract
“*Gold from baser metals* :” as the folly
of all his Lordship's *Alchemists* — is the
hope of bettering *human nature* by
GRACE.

You now, Sir, understand, how well the disposition of his mind and temper was fitted to his System. They seem indeed to be tallies, and act mutually upon one,
another,

another, as cause and effect, in their turns.

It often happens, that men who arraign Religion, have been first arraigned by it; and their defiance of *Truth* is only a reprisal upon *Conscience*. Under these circumstances it is no wonder they should go to work much out of humour; tho' it be in an affair which requires a perfect calmness of mind, and freedom from all perturbation. But his Lordship has the miserable advantage of being the first who has written under one intermitting fit of rage and resentment. In this state, like a man in a fever, whom no posture can ease, whom no situation can accommodate, he is angry at PHILOSOPHERS for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at DIVINES for believing without explaining. Well then, they change hands; the *Philosopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry still. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper subject of my Letter.

You would know, you say, with what abilities he supports his System,

The attacks upon Religion have always been carried on, like war, by *Stratagem* and *Force*. I shall first therefore speak of his *Arts*, and then of his *Powers* of controversy.

It has been observed how closely, and how humbly, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him; even to the stalest of their worn-out stratagems.

When FREE-THINKING first went upon it's mission, the PUBLIC were not disposed to understand raillery on a subject of this importance: so that it is possible there might be found amongst the more early of our anti-Apostles, a Confessor or two to the glorious cause of Infidelity. This put their Successors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to *affect* it. From henceforth you hardly see an Infidel-book which is not introduced with the obligations, the Reader has to these servants of Truth, for venturing so far in his service, while the Secular arm hovers fearfully over them; With the disadvantages their cause must lye under, while it can be but half explained and half supported; and with the wonders they

I

have

have in reserve, which only keep back and wait for a little more *Christian Liberty*.

This miserable Crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dished up from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offensive and ridiculous; for what could be more nauseous than to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment, after they had writ at their ease for almost a century together, with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In this state of things could you easily believe his Lordship would pride himself in cooking up this cold kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again, in the midst of so elegant an entertainment. "GASSENDI

" (says he) apprehended enemies much
 " more formidable than mere Philoso-
 " phers, because armed with ecclesiastical
 " and civil power. It is this fear which
 " has hindered those who have combated
 " ERROR in all ages; and WHO COMBAT
 " IT STILL, from taking all the ADVAN-
 " TAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION OF
 " THE TRUTH would give them. Their
 " adversaries triumph as if the goodness of
 " their cause had given them the Victory,

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“ when nothing has prevented their EN-
 “ TIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their con-
 “ test to a drawn battle, except this, that
 “ they have employed arms of every kind,
 “ fair and foul, without any reserve;
 “ while the others have employed their
 “ offensive weapons with MUCH RESERVE;
 “ and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE
 “ when they used them [2].”

“ The adversaries [of Religion] (says
 “ he again) seldom speak out, or push
 “ the instances and arguments they bring,
 “ so far as THEY MIGHT BE CARRIED. In-
 “ stead of which these ORTHODOX BUL-
 “ LIES affect to triumph over men who
 “ employ but PART OF THEIR STRENGTH,
 “ &c. [3].”

And having, after his Masters, thus *feigned* a fear, he *feigns* all the precaution of doubling and obliquity, which fear produces. He professes to believe the Mission of Christ, tho' founded on the dispensation of Moses, a dispensation he ridicules and execrates: He professes to believe the doctrines of Christ, tho' he rejects his gift of life and immortality; He professes to believe him the Saviour of the

[2] Vol. iv. p. 163.

[3] Vol. iii. p. 273.

World, tho' he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which constitutes the effence of that character.

Well fare the *New Historian of Great Britain*; who having writ without control against Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the blessing; and owns that *We now enjoy TO THE FULL that liberty of the Press which is so NECESSARY in every monarchy confined by legal limitations* [4]. It is excellently observed too, let me tell you, that tho' the *Monarch* should be *confined by legal limitations*, yet the *writer for the Press* should not.

It would be endless to enter into his Lordship's small arts of controversy; yet it may not be amiss to touch upon one or two of them; such I mean as are of more general use and the readiest service.

The first is, *To honour the name when you have taken away the thing*: As thus, To express the highest devotion to *God*, when you have deprived him of his *moral attributes*:—the greatest zeal for *Religion*, while you are undermining a *future state*;—and the utmost reverence for *Revelation*, when you have stript it of *miracles and prophecies*.

[4] *The History of Great Britain*. Vol. i. p. 213.

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2. A *second* is, *To dishonour Persons and Opinions, the most respectable, by putting them into ill company, or by joining them with discredited follies.* Thus, Divines and Atheists; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always shewn together: In like manner, The propositions, *that the world was made for man, and that man was made for happiness,* are to be boldly represented as two inseparable parts of the same system. From whence, these advantages follow, that if an *Atheist* be odious; a *Malebranchian* mad, and the proposition of the *World's being made for man,* absurd; the odium, the madness, and the absurdity fall equally on the *Divines,* on *Dr. Clarke,* and on the proposition, *that man was made for happiness.*

3. A *third* is, *To bring the abuse of a thing in discredit of the thing itself.* Thus the visions of the *Rabbins* are made to confute *JUDAISM;* *Popery* and *School-learning,* to decry the *discipline and doctrine of CHRISTIANITY;* and the dreams of *Malebranche,* *Leibnitz,* and *Berkeley,* to confute the waking thoughts of *CUDWORTH,* *CLARKE,* *WOLLASTON,* and *BAXTER:* For his Lordship is just such a confuter of *Metaphysics,* as he would

would be of *Ethics* or *Chemistry*, who should content himself with exposing the absurdities of the *Stoics*, and the whimsies of the *Alchemists*, and yet fraudulently forget that there are such Authors, as CICERO and BOERHAAVE. — To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the superstitious fables of the Poets and the People, concerning it: To discredit REVELATION, he enumerates all the Impostors, and Pretenders to *revelation* in all ages: And to dishonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in describing the rites and ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are sure to find, on these occasions, every sort of topic, but what the sober and intelligent Reader requires; *Considerations drawn from the nature of the thing itself.*

You would expect, however, that, when the ABUSES of things have done him such service as to stand, where he has placed them, for the *things themselves*, he would for once, at least, spare the AUTHORS of the *abuse*, if it were only for the sake of carrying on his fraud. If you expect so much, you are mistaken in his Lordship. He can, in the same breath, call
the

the *abuses* of Revelation and the Gospel, by the names of *Revelation and the Gospel*, and rail at the *Clergy* or at the *Divine* who has introduced those abuses.

4. Another of these small arts, (and with this I shall conclude my account of them) is *the covering his own superficial knowledge (and oftentimes his thefts) with calling those who pretend to more, vain supercilious pedants.* Thus having largely pillaged a modern Writer, in his account of the Pagan MYSTERIES, he subjoins, “To attempt a minute and circumstantial account of these *Mysteries*, and even to seem to give it, would require much greater knowledge of *Antiquity* than I pretend to have, or would take the trouble of acquiring. They who attempt it have been, and always will be, ridiculously and vainly employed, while they treat this subject as if they had assisted at the celebration of these *Mysteries*, or had at least been drivers of the *Ases* who carried the *MACHINES* and *IMPLEMENTS* that served in the celebration of them [5].”

It doubtless became him well, to talk

[5] Vol. iv. p. 58.

magisterially on a subject of which he understood nothing but what he learnt from the Author, he abuses. However, he is nearer the truth than usual, when he says, *that the author is as particular, as if he had been at the unloading of the Asss, &c.* for though he was not at that ceremony, yet he had his accounts from those who were.—But jesting is dangerous on learned subjects, and in a second-hand wit, when he ventures to employ the ideas of Antiquity. He talks of *this Ass* as carrying the MACHINES and IMPLEMENTS, for the celebration of Mysteries; *machines* which were for the entertainment of fifty or sixty thousand people, at a time, in a great variety of representations. The common Latin proverb might have taught him, that what the *Ass* carried were the Books of the Mysteries; which if only as bulky as those of the *first Philosophy*, were load enough in conscience for any single *Ass*.---But I agree with his Lordship, it is not easy to speak of these *Mysteries* without verifying the Proverb [6].

Thus far for a specimen of his Lordship's *arts of controversy*. But as a good

[6] *Asinus portat mysteria.*

Mimic is commonly a bad *Actor*; and a good *Juggler* a bad *Mechanic*, so an artful *Caviller* is as generally a very poor *Reasoner*.

You will not be surprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordship's *Philosophic Character*, under the several heads of his **INGENUITY**, his **TRUTH**, his **CONSISTENCY**, his **LEARNING**, and his **REASONING**, we find him not to make so good a figure, as in the *professed arts* of Controversy.

I. Of his **INGENUITY**, which comes first, I shall content myself with only one or two instances; for his *arts of controversy*, of which you have had a taste, are a continued example of it.

I. Speaking of the Christians of the Apostolic age, he thus represents their character and manners. "Notwithstanding
" the sanctity of their *profession*, the
" **GREATEST CRIMES**, even that of **IN-**
" **CEST**, were practised amongst them [7]."

Is it possible (you ask) that his Lordship should give credit to the exploded calumnies of their Pagan adversaries? Think better of his sense and candour: he alludes to no such matter. **St. PAUL** is his Authority; and he quotes chapter

and verse, to support his charge. This but increases your surprize. It is very likely: for Philosophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as *Bays* expresses it) to *elevate and surprize*. Who would not conclude, from this representation, that the first Christians began their profession in a total corruption of manners; and that, like the Magi of old, it was a law amongst them to marry their Mothers and Daughters. Whereas the simple fact, as St. Paul states it, in his first and second Epistles to the Corinthians, was this, A certain man had married his Father's wife; (but whether before or after his conversion, the writer says not) and on the Apostle's reprehension, convinced and ashamed of his folly, he repented, and made satisfaction for the scandal, he had occasioned.

2. Again, these wonderful ESSAYS tell us, that when JESUS speaks of *legions of Angels*, it is the language of PAGANISM; but when Lord BOLINGBROKE speaks of *numberless created intelligencies superior to man*, it is the language of NATURE: for, this, his Lordship assures us, *is founded on what we know of actual existence. We are led to*
it

it by plain, direct, unforced ANALOGY. But that of Jesus stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a MERE POSSIBLE existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers THEOLOGICAL USES. [8] But why these different measures, the one for himself, and the other for his friends, the Divines? His last words let us into the secret. His philosophical *intelligencies* are a very harmless race; but the Christian *Legions* are much given to *theological* mischief. *Ministring Angels* bring in, what he can by no means relish, a particular, and a moral providence. — God's *physical* Providence, and the *civil* providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he acknowledges: Now his *Intelligencies*, like Epicurus's Gods, are always at an idle end; but *Angels* are too busy and meddling, to be trusted, under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot however but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by *Analogy*, which you had cause to think his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour; and now does wonders.

3. It not only opens the door, as we see, to his Lordship's *Intelligencies*, by a *plain, direct, and unforced*, application, but it shuts it against *Jesus Christ's*. "I only intend to shew (says he) that since men have not admitted, in favour of Revelation, a System of PHYSICS that is inconsistent with philosophic truth, there is no reason for admitting, in favour of the same revelation, a System of PNEUMATICS that is so, too [9]."

The favourers of Revelation would own the inference, had his Lordship, in stating the case, not begged the question. As it is, they say, his reasoning, when fairly represented, stands thus—"Divines reject the Scripture System of PHYSICS, which THEY hold to be false, therefore, they should reject the Scripture-System of PNEUMATICS," which HIS LORDSHIP holds to be false. Indeed, they conceive this no better an argument than if you was to say, That because Politicians, in speaking of the first source of political power, have called it the *primum mobile*, (alluding to the old erroneous System of Astronomy) and because they have talked too of a *ba-*

lance of Power, (alluding to the true principles of *Mechanics*) therefore, if we reject their System of *Astronomy*, we should reject their System of *Mechanics*, likewise.

II. Give me leave, Sir, to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of this noble Philosopher's TRUTH, the very Soul of Philosophy.

I. " The Christian Theology (says he)
 " has derived a prophane licence from the
 " Jewish, which Divines have rendered so
 " familiar and so habitual, that Men BLAS-
 " PHEME without knowing they blaspheme,
 " and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS.
 " The licence I mean is that of reasoning
 " and of speaking of the divine, as of the
 " human, nature, operations, and proceed-
 " ings; sometimes with, and sometimes
 " without the salvo of those distinguishing
 " epithets and forms of speech, which
 " can, in very few instances, distinguish e-
 " nough. The Jewish Scriptures ascribe
 " to God, not only corporeal appearance,
 " but corporeal action, and all the instru-
 " ments of it; eyes to see, ears to hear,
 " mouth and tongue to articulate, hands
 " to handle, and feet to walk. DIVINES
 " TELL

“ TELL US INDEED that we are not to
 “ understand all this according to the *lite-*
 “ *ral* signification. The meaning is, they
 “ say, that God has a power to execute
 “ all those acts, to the effecting of which,
 “ these parts, in us, are instrumental. The
 “ literal signification is, indeed, abomina-
 “ ble, and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL
 “ VEIL, thrown over it, is stolen from
 “ the wardrobe of EPICURUS; for he
 “ taught, that the Gods had not literally
 “ bodies, but something like to bodies,
 “ *quasi corpus*: not blood, but something
 “ like to blood, *quasi sanguinem* [10].”

DIVINES say, that God has no body nor
 any thing like to body, but is IMMATERIAL.
 EPICURUS says, that his God, had not a
 gross earthly body, but something like to
 that body, and was MATERIAL. Yet
 “ their flimsy *analogical* veil is stolen from
 “ the wardrobe of *Epicurus*.” Truly a
 very subtle theft, which extracts MATTER
 from *figurative expression*! and well suited to
 his Lordship's leger-de-main, which draws
 an *analogical veil* out of a *metaphor*. In-
 deed, to fit it the better to *Epicurus's wardrobe*,
 he makes it but a *flimsy* one.

[10] Vol. v. p. 519.

[D]

But

But, let us now see, the various shifts, he has been reduced to, in order to support his principal calumny, that *Divines stole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead.*

He says, when the *Jewish Scriptures* had given GOD a *Body*, the *Divines* found out that it was not to be understood *literally*. Whereas the truth is, that the *Jewish Scriptures* themselves declare GOD to be a SPIRIT, or *immaterial*, in contradistinction to *body* or MATTER. And the best of it is, that in other places, (as we have seen just before) his Lordship quarrels with the *Scriptures* on this very account, for their System of PNEUMATICS. Now, what did the *Divines* deduce from thence, but This necessary truth, that where the *Jewish Scriptures* describe God's actions, in accommodation to the gross conceptions of men, it is to be understood as a mere *figure of speech*. But this would not serve his Lordship's purpose; which was, to convict the *Divines* of nonsense and prevarication.

He, therefore, turns, what the *Divines* called METAPHOR which is a figure of speech, into ANALOGY which is a mode
of

of reasoning, *a flimsy analogical veil*: and Epicurus's ANALOGY, that the Gods had not earthly bodies but something like them, that is to say, *material*, he turns into a METAPHOR. *Epicurus* (says he) *taught that the Gods had not LITERALLY bodies*. Epicurus's question was not about literal or figurative expression; but about similar and dissimilar things.--- But You have enough, You say, of this great Restorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of REASON. Others may not be so easily satisfied. However I will be as short, on this head, as possible.

3. THE JEWS (his Lordship tells us) SUPPOSED CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY [10]. — These very JEWS themselves say, That *the Lord is gracious and full of compassion; slow to anger and of great mercy: That he is good to all; and his tender mercies are over ALL HIS WORKS* [1]: That *his mercy endureth for EVER* [2]: That *the EARTH is full of the goodness and mercy of the Lord* [3]: That *his mercy is from EVERLASTING TO EVER-*

[10] Vol. v. p. 507. [1] Pf. cxlv. ver. 8, 9.

[2] Chron. Jer. Ezra, Psalms, &c. [3] Pf. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.

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LASTING [4]. Now, which of them will
You believe?

4. " Superstition (says his Lordship) im-
" personated *chance* under the name of
" *Fortune*: and this chymical Divini-
" ty was supposed to direct arbitrarily
" all the events, whose causes were
" not apparent, or which exceeded in
" good or ill, the expectations of men.
" The HEATHENS accounted, by it, for
" past events; consulted it about future;
" and referred themselves to it in doubt-
" ful cases. It is strange that SUCH SU-
" PERSTITIONS, instead of being confined
" to the Heathen world, should have been
" AS PREVALENT amongst God's chosen
" People, both Jews and Christians; and
" should be scarce exploded at this hour.
" It is stranger still, that a RECOURSE TO
" THE DECISION OF CHANCE should be
" expressly commanded in the *Old Testa-*
" *ment*, and occasionally countenanced in
" the *New*, even on so important an occa-
" sion as the election of an Apostle in the
" place of Judas Iscariot [5]."

[4] Pf. c. ver. 5.—ciii. ver. 17.

[5] Vol. iii. p. 476.

He asserts, we see, 1. that the *Jews* and *Christians*, as well as the *Heathens*, impersonated *Chance* under the name of *Fortune*: and 2dly, that their having recourse to Lots was having recourse to the decision of *Fortune*.

As to the *first* assertion, it is so remote from all truth, that the custom of the Jewish People, in referring all events to *God* and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in question the very existence of an *extraordinary* dispensation.

As to the *second*, we must observe that *LOTS* are to be considered in three different lights: or, more properly, they are of three distinct kinds.

One sort is a civil balloting, of general use in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. *SORTEM posuissent*, says Tacitus, *ne ambitioni aut inimicitii locus foret*.

Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, *Chance* or *Fortune*.

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the *second*, and only reprehensible sort, Revelation, as we have just now shewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the first, his Lordship, as a Politician, will not disallow the use: His quarrel, as a Philosopher, is with the *third*. And he has no way to support his charge, but by sophistically reducing it into the *second*; that is, representing it as having all the superstition of the *second*. Now in this he begs the question. — Are the Jewish and Christian Revelations true or commentitious? Commentitious, says his Lordship, for several reasons; and, amongst the rest, for their authorizing the *Pagan superstition of Lots*. — What made the Pagan superstition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment. — Very well: but the Jewish and Christian Lots were of divine appointment. *Pretended* to be so, if you please, says his Lordship, and this puts them into the condition of *Pagan lots*. — Softly, my Lord; Your argument must not take that for *granted*, which your argument is employed to *prove*.

But his Lordship had his head full of that Master Sophism of the FIRST PHILO-

SOPHY, which concludes against the reason or justice of a DIVINE COMMISSION, because subsequent Impostors exposed it to abuse by pretending to the like command.

For, according to the Logic and Theology of these Gentlemen, GOD must not cast out DEVILS, because it afterwards gave a handle for Popish Priests to juggle with their *Exorcisms*. He must not direct a thing to be decided by LOTS, because a village-conjurer would afterwards employ the *sieve and shears*. He must not make use of HUMAN INSTRUMENTS in punishing a people, abandoned to unnatural crimes, because an *Arabian Impostor* would afterwards pretend to the like commission. He must not institute a multifarious RITUAL, tho' it was to keep a people separate, and to secure them from the contagion of Idolatry, because wicked Priests and Politicians would establish *superstitious ceremonies* to keep communities enslaved to civil and religious Tyrants. These scrupulous Gentlemen might as well have told us, GOD should not have given us Riches, Knowledge, and Power, because there have been

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such men as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and
MULY MOLECH.

But to go on with his Lordship's ve-
racity.

5. He asserts, that *they* [the Jews] *made
beasts ACCOUNTABLE LIKE MORAL A-
GENTS* [6]. He is aware that *to mitigate
this absurdity*, as he expresses it, both the
Jewish and Christian commentators say,
the pain inflicted on beasts was to shew
the heinousness of human crimes—to blot
out the memory of a great scandal—to
punish the owner for keeping an unruly
beast, negligently. But he despises all
these solutions, as so many pitiful evasions.
—Would you believe now that in the same
breath, and merely to shew his reading,
he should confute his own false assertion?
I know nothing more absurd (says he) *than
this, except a custom or law at ATHENS.
The WEAPONS by which a murder had been
committed were brought into Court, as if they,
too, were liable to punishment; and the
STATUE that had killed a man by it's fall,
was, by a solemn sentence of that wise people,
the Thasii, founded on a Law of DRACO,
cast into the sea.* Now what was his

[6] Vol. v. p. 79.

Lordship to prove? That Moses was so ignorant a Lawgiver, and the Jews so stupid a people, that *they made beasts accountable like moral agents*. And he illustrates it by a law of the most celebrated Legislator and of the politest People, *Draco* and the *Athenians*; who made even *weapons and statues, moral agents*. The *Athenians* and *Draco* perhaps would have said, that they enacted these laws to shew their *abhorrence of murder*, and to *punish the careless erec̄ter of a statue*.⁽²⁾ Mere SHIFTS AND EVASIONS, says his Lordship.

6. Again, "God (says he) was FORCED to indulge the Jews in several SUPERSTITIOUS prejudices [7], as learned Divines *scruple not* to affirm." Had learned Divines no more *scruples*, in affirming, than his Lordship, I should hardly have undertaken their defence.

What they *scruple not* to say is this— That IDOLATROUS WORSHIP was never so entirely corrupt, but that some of it's Rites still continued rational, or, at least, remained innocent; and might be used in the service of the true God, *without superstition*:

[7] Vol. iv. p. 30.

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That the Israelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the use of such as were harmless, and of no other. Nay, his Lordship's censure, which follows, seems to shew this was all their crime. He calls these Divines *bold Judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings* [8]. For it is more than probable, had they given him the advantage, he speaks of, against the *Mosaic Law*, they had never incurred his displeasure. But in what does the temerity of these *bold Judges* consist? In this, That God always chuses to take the *ordinary* means, before the *extraordinary*, when either may be made indifferently to serve his purpose. And that, therefore, he rather chose to indulge the Jews in their fondness for old habits, and to turn their propensities for *Egyptian Rites* upon such as were innocent, than to give them new habits, and new propensities, by a miraculous force impressed upon the mind, which should overrule their wills and affections.

7. WE KNOW (says his Lordship) THAT ALL THEIR [the Jews] SACRED WRITINGS WERE COMPILED AFTER THEIR

[8] P. 32.

CAPTIVITY [9]. Balzac speaks of a certain Critic who used to boast, that no body, besides God and himself, knew the meaning of this or that verse in Persius. His Lordship's [WE KNOW] is just such another revelation. Only the Critic's *meaning* might be true; but the Philosopher's *knowledge* is certainly false. A falsehood so notorious, that I am in some doubt whether this stricture belong properly to his *dogmatic* or to his *laconic* style. For *we know*, may signify—*We know that the* SPURIOUS ESDRAS *says so.* And then he gets the two things he most wants; a *very useful Truth*, and a *very noble Authority.*

8. “ The Justice, [of the great day] (says his Lordship) IF IT MAY BE CALLED JUSTICE, most certainly requires that rewards and punishments should be measured out, in every particular case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual. But instead of this, it is assumed, conformably to the doctrine of PLATO, that the righteous are set on the *right hand* of the Judge, and the wicked, on the *left*; from whence, they are transported into Heaven, or

[9] Vol. iv. p. 339.

“ plunged

“plunged into Hell. They are tried *in-*
 “*dividually*, they SEEM to be rewarded
 “or punished *collectively*, without any
 “distinction of the particular cases, which
 “have been so solemnly determined, and
 “without any proportion observed be-
 “tween the various degrees of merit and
 “demerit, of innocence and guilt, in the
 “application of these rewards and pu-
 “nishments [10].”

If it may be called Justice—Marry, well
 put in. For who knows but, as this is
 the general day of accounts, and that men
 see, such a day will be much wanted; who
 knows, I say, but, rather than be without
 any, they may be foolish enough to take
 up with this? They cannot therefore have
 their prejudices in favour of it, rectified
 too soon: Let us not cavil with him there-
 fore, for bringing the justice of this court
 into question, before he has examined the
 proceedings of it; but rather content our-
 selves with admiring the wonders of his
 reasoning. Should I seriously quote the
 Words of Jesus, — *In my Father's house*
are many mansions [1]: And again, *The*
servant which knew his Lord's will, neither

[10] Vol. v. p. 495.

[1] John xiv. 2.

did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes [2]; Should I seriously, I say, quote these words, to illustrate the truth of this noble writer's observation, that men at the great Tribunal seem to be rewarded or punished collectively, he would, I suppose, have been amongst the first to laugh at my simplicity; at least, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordship's CONSISTENCY; the next quality in his philosophic character. You have seen with what bravery he CONTRADICTS *all others*; you shall now see with what greater bravery he CONTRADICTS *himself*.

There are two things which characterise the *reasoning part* of his Lordship's writings, (if any part of so declamatory a work can be called *reasoning*) and distinguish them from all other men's; His INCESSANT REPETITIONS, and his INCESSANT CONTRADICTIONS. Indeed, these beauties beget and are begotten of one another. For when a man can furnish out no better

[2] Luke xii. 47, 48.

entertainment for his Guests than a parcel of groundless flams, he will be much subject to *repetition*; and every repetition as much subject to *variation*; for his tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor measure in Truth, they will be always producing, for admiration; and always new modeling, for convenience; as best suits his present passions and purposes.

His REPETITIONS I leave for the refreshment of those who are disposed to read him through: This short specimen of his CONTRADICTIONS I propose for a more general entertainment.

But as professed *Answerers* never abuse our understandings and our patience more than in this kind of discoveries; it may not be amiss, to say a word or two of a *species of accusation*, which *such* men are always ready to urge on the very slightest occasion, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himself when the *Answerer* is unable so to do.

Sometimes the imaginary *inconsistence* arises out of the slow or cloudy apprehension of the *Answerer*, when the *Author* is too brief or too refined: sometimes from
the

the inaccurate expression of the *Author*; when the *Answerer* is too hasty or too captious. It sometimes arises from the *Answerer's* prejudices; and sometimes again from the *Author's* prevarication.

Nay (which is stranger still) the more exact the distinctions are, and the more correct the expression, (and the correcter and exacter they will be in proportion to the *Author's* knowledge of *words* and *things*) the more shall the discourse abound with *these inconsistencies*. For a heavy or a precipitate *Answerer*, will never be able to distinguish SIMILAR things from IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a set of Opinions may make an *Answerer* mistake some things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them considered differently (that is, under other associations) by his adversary who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call these *differences*, by the more commodious name of *contradictions*.

Lastly, the *Author*, if he be a FREE-THINKER, has a kind of right, by prescription, to two or three, or indeed, to

two or three dozen of *Characters*, as best suits his purpose, or errand: A practice, which, being begun under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiousness, and is still kept up for the sake of it's Conveniences. Now if such a one be too lazy to assume a *personated Character* in form, then, (as Lord Shaftsbury observes) *a dull kind of IRONY which amuses all alike*, becomes his favorite figure of speech. But with such a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Answerer may give himself much trouble, to collect his *contradictions*, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have fairly marked out these various delusions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, should I be tempted to impose upon You, myself. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordship's CONTRADICTIONS are so gross and substantial, numerous and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my specimen by any thing doubtful or equivocal.

1. " I could not (says his Lordship) have discovered, as NEWTON did, that *universal law* of corporeal Nature, which he has demonstrated. But further than

“ that, he could go no more than I; nor
 “ discover the ACTION OF THE FIRST
 “ CAUSE, BY WHICH THIS LAW WAS IM-
 “ POSED ON ALL BODIES, AND IS MAIN-
 “ TAINED IN THEM [3].” Here, he owns
 ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or an
 essential PROPERTY OF MATTER, but *the*
action of the first cause upon it. Yet in
 another place he observes, that “ AT-
 “ TRACTION MAY BE, notwithstand-
 “ ing all the SILLY abstract reasoning to
 “ the contrary, A REAL PROPERTY OF
 “ MATTER [4].” The truth is, that, for
 any thing his Lordship knew of this *uni-*
versal Law, or of the *silly abstract reasoning*
 concerning it, ATTRACTION might be
 Action, Passion, Magic, or the Man in
 the Moon. He only followed his leader,
 Mr. COLLINS, who displayed the same
 Philosophic spirit in speaking of GRAVI-
 TY, the *effect of Attraction*: And CLARKE’S
 animadversion on his knowledge will ex-
 actly suit his Lordship’s. — “ Not content
 “ to have erred so very grossly in the first
 “ foundation of all natural Philosophy;
 “ you could not forbear professing further,
 “ that you have often admired that GRA-

[3] Vol. iv. p. 8.

[4] Vol. iii. p. 347.

" GRAVITATION *should be esteemed a matter*
 " *of such difficulty amongst Philosophers;*
 " *and that you think it to be so evi-*
 " *dent and necessary an effect of mat-*
 " *ter in constant motion perpetually striking*
 " *one part against another, that you won-*
 " *der every body should not see it.* I sup-
 " pose the rest of the world will no less
 " *admire at you, for imagining that, by*
 " *so slight an admiration, you could at*
 " *once set aside all the propositions in that*
 " *most excellent book [the Principia of*
 " *Newton] wherein it is made appear by*
 " *strictly mathematical demonstrations,*
 " *drawn from the Laws of motion, now*
 " *agreed on by Mathematicians, and*
 " *established by experiments, and from*
 " *the Phænomena of the heavenly bo-*
 " *dies; that the present operations of na-*
 " *ture, depending upon gravitation, can-*
 " *not possibly be mechanical effects of*
 " *matter in constant motion perpetually*
 " *striking one part against another.*—Upon
 " the whole, all that you have advanced
 " about *gravitation* is such marvellous
 " reasoning, to be made use of in the
 " present age, after so many great disco-
 " veries, founded upon experience, and
 " even

“ even mathematical demonstration; that
 “ tho’ I have no cause at all to be displea-
 “ sed with you for arguing in such a man-
 “ ner; yet, I believe, your readers cannot
 “ but think you might very well have for-
 “ born going out of your way, to give so
 “ very disadvantageous a representation of
 “ *your own* Philosophy [5].”

2. In one place, his Lordship tells us, *that the right of the Israelites to the Land of Canaan was founded on the PROPHECY of Noah*: in another, that it was founded on the PROMISE to Abraham. Second thoughts are best. He seems here to be a little nearer the truth. For tho’ a *promise* may intitle to a possession, I do not see how a *prophecy* can do more than foretel one: Unless his Lordship has some ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of *Obligation*, unknown to GROTIUS, SELDEN, and CUMBERLAND: yet they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lordship’s account of their famous *Journey to Paris*, spared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the PROMISE, his Lordship *insinuates* an

[5] Clarke’s third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, against Collins.

untruth ; which is a great deal meaner than *telling* one : For he represents it as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reason assigned.

3. “ The Jews (says his Lordship) as often as they made God descend from Heaven, and as much as they made him reside on earth, were *far from cloathing him with corporeity*, and imputing corporeal vices to him [7].”

Yet two or three pages forward, so prevalent is the lust of abuse, he expressly says, *they DID cloath him with CORPOREITY.*

These are his words: “ The Jewish Scriptures ascribe to God not only corporeal appearance, but corporeal action, and all the instruments of it ; eyes to see, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to walk [8].” You will say, perhaps, that his Lordship meant, the Scriptures indeed ascribed all this to God ; but in a *figurative*, not in a literal, sense. I would have said so too, but that his Lordship goes on rating the Divines for understanding the scripture-representation in a *figurative* sense.

[7] Vol. v. p. 515.

[8] P. 519.

Which,

Which, too, he shews does not mend the matter; this *figurative* sense being stolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL (if he believed any) tho' made of a finer stuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines (says his Lordship) tell us indeed, that we are not to understand all this according to the literal signification, &c. But this *flimsy theological veil* thrown over the literal signification is stolen from the wardrobe of Epicurus [9]." His Lordship's wardrobe seems to be as rich as Epicurus's; in VEILS: a little after, we have a very curious one, *a thin and trite VEIL of analogy*: and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his cloaks to the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordship speaks of CHRISTIANITY, a kind of fatality attends him; and his contradictions have then neither stop nor measure.

4. Speaking of the *last Supper*, he says, "The person by whom it was instituted is represented sometimes under images, that render it impossible to frame any,

[9] P. 519.

“ of the EFFICACY, or even of the INSTI-
 “ TUTION, of this Sacrament. Christ is a
 “ *vine*, he is a *rock*, nay he is a *coat*,
 “ according to St. Paul,” &c. [10]. And
 yet no further off than four pages, he says,
 “ There is no one [figurative expression]
 “ perhaps in the whole Gospel, less liable
 “ to any equivocal sense than that which
 “ Christ employed when he said, *This is*
 “ *my body*, and *this my blood*, in the very
 “ act of giving bread and wine to his Dis-
 “ ciples, who were at supper with him,
 “ just before his death, for a remembrance
 “ of which, this ceremony of a supper was
 “ then instituted by him. The figure
 “ was easy, the application natural, and
 “ they could not understand the expression
 “ literally [1].”

His Lordship, as you may well think, has commonly *different* purposes to serve by his contradictions. Here it is one and the *same*: to discredit a Gospel institution: which is equally done by shewing it to be mysterious, obscure, and incomprehensible, where it pretends to clearness and precision; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to something august, peculiar,

[10] Vol. iv. p. 592. [1] P. 596.

and in the highest degree efficacious. All the fault in this case, except his Lordship's most profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite [2], is his bringing these two curious observations so near to one another.

5. "Christianity (says his Lordship) as the Saviour published it, was full and sufficient to all the purposes of it. Its simplicity and plainness shewed that it was designed to be the religion of mankind, and manifested likewise the divinity of it's original [3]." This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordship's humour; and the *simplicity* and *plainness* become *dark, ambiguous, and incomprehensible*. "That there are many ambiguous expressions, many dark sayings, in the Gospel; MANY DOCTRINES, which reason could never have taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are taught, cannot be denied [4]."

[2] See what is said of it, in the xth discourse, on the principles of N. and R. Religion, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 450.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 318.

But let him recover his temper, and Christianity brightens up again, and we see it restored to his good graces. “The system of Religion (says he) which Christ published, and his Evangelists recorded, is a compleat system to all the purposes of true Religion, natural and revealed. It contains all the duties of the former, it enforces them by asserting the *divine* Mission of the Publisher, who proved his assertion at the same time by his *miracles* [5].” But it is only restored to be as suddenly deposed. It’s birth is so far from being *divine*, that he insinuates it to be *spurious*, and neither better nor worse than a kind of *Bastard Platonism*. “It is astonishing to observe the strange conformity between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIANITY itself, such as it is taught in the original Gospel. We need not stand to compare them here: Particular instances of conformity will occur often enough. In general, the *Platonic* and *Christian* Systems have a very near resemblance, QUALIS DECET ESSE SORORUM [6].” He then goes on to shew, that the common

[[5] Vol. iv. p. 314.

[6] Vol. iv. p. 340.

Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthusiasm, you will say, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, *Platonism* and *Christianity*. No such matter. *Genuine Christianity was taught of God* [7].—"As it stands in the Gospel it contains a compleat system of Religion: it is in truth the system of natural Religion [8]." Well then, we shall hear no more of this *sisterly resemblance* to *Platonism*. Perhaps not. But you shall hear, and that soon too, of as great changes. This Christianity is at last found to be derived from JUDAISM; that very JUDAISM, which, he had told us, was it self raised on THEFT and MURDER—"On the Religion of the Jews, and on the Authority of their Scriptures, Christianity was founded [9]." Again, They who prefer the example and doctrine of CHRIST to those of PAUL, will find reason to think that the Messiah intended rather to reform and to graft upon Judaism, than to abolish it [10]."

[7] Vol. iv. p. 348—9.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 316.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 317.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 350.

And again; He accuses PAUL for preaching a *new Gospel*, called by the Apostle, *my Gospel*: And this new, or peculiar Gospel, his Lordship tells us *was the Mystery of God's purpose to TAKE IN THE GENTILES, so INCONSISTENT with the declarations and practice of JESUS* [1]. Yet for all this, had Christ's Gospel "been propagated with the same simplicity with which it was originally taught by CHRIST, it would (he tells us) have been to the unspeakable benefit of MANKIND [2]."

Let us now sum up his Lordship's Doctrine concerning the GOSPEL OF JESUS. "The Gospel is simple, clear, and of *divine original*: But it is, at the same time, dark, ambiguous, incomprehensible; and, like it's *Sister Platonism, the Issue of Enthusiasm*.—As Jesus published it, the Gospel is a *complete System of Natural Religion*, and tends to the unspeakable *benefit of mankind*: But as Jesus published it, the Gospel was only a *reform* of that *Imposture Judaism*, on which it was *founded*, and was intended by Jesus to be *confined to the Jewish People*; it being PAUL, who,

[1] Vol. iv. p. 323.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 316.

in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practices of Jesus, turned it into a compleat System of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the *unspeakable benefit of mankind*, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own assertions, as fast as he advances them, from one end of his Essays to the other.

The same self-contradictions, which confute his own calumnies against Christianity ITSELF, still follow him when he comes to speak of the PROPAGATORS of Christianity.

6. "He (says this noble Lord) who compares the Epistles of JAMES, of PETER, and JOHN, such as we have them, with those of PAUL, and all these with the doctrines of the GOSPEL, will be perhaps of my opinion; at least he will have no ground to say of the three first, that they were authors of NEW GOSPELS, as he will have grounds to say of the last, and as the last does in effect say of himself [3]." What was this *new Gospel*? It was, as we have seen just before, *the Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles.* JAMES, PETER, and JOHN,

[3] Vol. iv. p. 320.

therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this mystery; *so inconsistent*, as he says, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that JAMES, PETER and JOHN, did not preach CHRIST'S *Gospel*, but were, together with PAUL, *the Authors* of this NEW GOSPEL. For, speaking of the *Council of Jerusalem*, he says, *The APOSTLES had given no directions to insist that the GENTILES should or should not, submit to circumcision, and to the yokes of the Law* [4]. Which necessarily implies a confession, that THEY too were Authors of this new Gospel, the *Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles*. The *taking in the Gentiles*, he supposes a thing agreed on by all the Apostles: and that what was yet undone was the settling the precise *terms* of their admission.

Our Unbelievers look so monstrously askint upon Religion, that the opposite rays of their prejudice are always disturbing and confounding one anothers effects. Yet, in the general, it requires pains to fix the *contradictions* which spring out of these fugitive cross-lights. Commend

[4] Vol. iv. p. 324.

me therefore to the Man who brings his *contradictions* to a point; and requires nothing of you but eye-sight to comprehend them in their full lustre.

His *pro* and *con* are always near neighbours. So that we shall not be surprized to find them at last, in the following instances, incorporated, as it were, into one another.

7. "I much doubt (says his Lordship) whether the EVANGELISTS would understand the Epistles of St. PAUL, THO' ONE OF THEM WAS HIS SCRIBE [5]."—It was said of One, that he *believed against hope*: a subject of much mirth to our *first-Philosophy-Men*.

But what is that, to his Lordship's greater strength of mind, who can *doubt against certainty*!—PAUL and LUKE agreed to preach the Gospel together: and not only so, but that *Luke's* pen should be employed to convey their common sentiments, and adventures, to posterity. And yet he questions whether LUKE understood PAUL'S EPISTLES.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 202.

Dic aliquem, fodes, heic Quintiliane, colorem,
Hæremus —

—Some body, I suppose, might tell him, that one of these *Evangelists* was Paul's Companion, his Amanuensis and Historian. But his observation being too good to be thrown away, he added with infinite dexterity and address—*tho' one of them was his Scribe.*

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, the noble Lord observes, “ We
“ make God so much a copy of man,
“ that we design the worst, as well as
“ the best of our own features, if I may
“ so say, in our representations of him :
“ and, as common as it is, no unprejudiced
“ thinking man can hear, without astonishment,
“ our *perfections* and our *imperfections*
“ imputed to the divine Being
“ in the same breath, and by the same
“ men ; with this difference at most, that
“ the former are imputed directly, and
“ the latter sometimes under the THIN
“ AND TRITE VEIL OF ANALOGY. In a
“ Being thus constituted, they may well
“ imagine that the moral virtues are the
“ same

“ same as they are in our ideas: and
 “ Theology may easily deduce, from his
 “ attributes, the characters Theology has
 “ given them [6].”

We cannot, says his Lordship, without astonishment see our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being. His astonishment is all a sham. There is, indeed, no such imputation, even in his own reckoning. For tho' he pretends the imperfections are imputed, yet, he says, it is under the thin and trite veil of analogy. That is, not imputed. For when Scripture speaks of the outstretched arm of God, and his all-seeing eye, does it impute arms and eyes to God, in the sense it imputes justice and goodness to him? Yes, says he—under the thin and trite veil of analogy. i. e. Not in the same sense. As if we should say, His Lordship AFFIRMS under the thin and trite veil of a DENIAL.

This, Sir, is a very scanty specimen of his Lordship's CONTRADICTIONS. Yet no man appears to be more sensible of the disgrace which CONTRADICTIONS bring upon a writer. For, speaking of the

[6] Vol. v. p. 89.

whole COLLEGE OF APOSTLES; he says, *These inconsistent Writers talk often a different language on the same subject; and CONTRADICT in one place what they have said in another* [5].

IV. His Lordship's profound LEARNING comes next to be considered.

I. The first instance I shall give, is fetched from the very penétralia of the *first Philosophy*. "Human knowledge is so entirely and solely derived from actual BEING, that, without actual Being, we should not have EVEN ONE of those simple ideas, whereof all the complex and abstract notions that TURN OUR HEADS are composed [6]."

Here, his Lordship cried *ευρηκα*, and should have sacrificed a Bull for his discovery: which informs us of no less a truth than this, that *if we had had no Being we should have had no sensation*: in other words, that *qualities* cannot exist without a *substance*. For if, by *actual being* he did not take in the thinker's own, the observation is false: a rational Being, tho' existing singly, has yet the idea of his own existence. But the observation is every way

[5] Vol. iv. p. 489. [6] Vol. iii. p. 411.

extraordinary. He supposes our *simple* ideas to be real; he supposes our *complex and abstract* notions to be compounded of the *simple* ideas; and yet he supposes that the composition has TURNED OUR HEADS. Till now, I understood it was *fantastic*, and not *real* knowledge, which *turned men's heads*. But I forget; His Lordship found the *whole World in a frenzy*; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what set them a going.

2. "The PAGANS (says his Lordship) do not appear to have interpolated the antient *Doctors* of Paganism; nor is there any pretence to say that THEY have imposed any spurious books on the world, under the name of those *Doctors* [7]."

ORPHEUS, and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS were certainly *Pagan Doctors*; if ever there were any. And did his Lordship never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems, come down to us, under their names, were Pagan forgeries? I will not insist upon the SIBYLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO assures us had been *interpolated*, (for the Pagans interpolated

[7] Vol. iv. p. 195.

[F]

their

their very forgeries) because I do not know to what conditions his Lordship confines the *Doctōrate* in the Pagan World, or whether he admits the fair sex to the honour of the Hood.

However, let us not think him so unlearned as not to have heard of these forgeries. He had both heard of them, and considered them well: And as he is always for putting the saddle on the right horse, (as where he ascribes *atheism* to the *Divines*) he charges all these iniquities on the CHRISTIANS. “ It was (says he) to promote the Opinion, that all the Mysteries of their [the Christians'] Religion, had been revealed by the writings of *Pagan Philosophers* many centuries before Christ, that so many books were forged under the names of *Mercurius Trismegistus*, of *Hystaspes*, of the *SIBYLS*, and perhaps of others.”

We are got a good way towards Doctōrating these old Woman: They are become *Philosophers*, we see. — But whether the Christians were the *only* forgers of *Sibylline Oracles* must be left to be decided between Tully and his Lordship.

The

The truth is, and who, that understands antiquity, ever doubted of it? That some paganized Christians learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient names, from those whose superstition they had left, but not that spirit of imposture which supported it.

3. “ The [greek] Historians, says his Lordship, observing how fond their countrymen were of those who writ Fables, turned History into Romance; and studied to make their relations marvellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth, in which they were encouraged, AFTER ALEXANDER’S EXPEDITION INTO ASIA, by the difficulty of disproving any thing they said of countries so remote [8].” A vulgar man, and one of those his Lordship calls Pedants, would have said, — BEFORE ALEXANDER’S EXPEDITION: because the *difficulty* in a great measure ceased AFTER that Conquerer had opened, and his Successors had kept open, a communication with those *remote countries*.

4. He calls Aristotle’s Logic, “ the rules of a Dialectic that seemed to prove,

[8] Vol. iv. p. 137—8.

“ and DID PROVE indifferently either in
 “ favor of truth or error [9]”. Exaggeration is one of his Lordship's favorite figures of speech : but here, pushed a little too far ; for, not content with saying that Aristotle's *rules of syllogizing* (for that is what he means by the *rules of a dialectic*) *seemed to prove*, he will needs add, *and* DID PROVE. Which shews such a knowledge of Syllogism, as needed not the following instance to set it off. “ It must not
 “ (says he) be imagined, that he who
 “ reasons, or seems, rather, to reason
 “ closely and consequentially, has there-
 “ fore truth always on his side [1].” I desire to know who ever thought he had, who did not mistake (as his Lordship here seems to do) the art of *ranging* arguments, for the Art of *finding* them ? “ No body
 “ (his *Master Locke* would tell him) can
 “ hinder, but that SYLLOGISM, which
 “ was intended for the service of truth,
 “ will sometimes be made use of, against
 “ it. But it is NEVERTHELESS ON
 “ TRUTH'S SIDE, AND ALWAYS TURNS
 “ UPON THE ADVERSARIES OF IT [2].”

[9] Vol. iv. p. 158.

[1] P. 159.

[2] Second Letter to the Bp. of Worcester, p. 31—2. 8° Ed. 1697.

6. Speaking of *Angels*, his Lordship thinks fit to hazard this Observation :
 “ There is another cause of this PNEU-
 “ MATICAL MADNESS, [the belief of
 “ such Beings] the fondness of making
 “ *man* pass for one of those Beings that
 “ participated of the *divine Nature*. This
 “ had long possessed the heathen Theists :
 “ and IT POSSESSED THE CHRISTIANS
 “ WITH MORE ADVANTAGE [3].”

This seems demonstration that his Lordship either never read, or at least never understood, an antient Apologist. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganism, which afforded so much advantage to the primitive Christians as this fond opinion of the antient Philosophers, that the human Soul was *a part or portion of the divine nature* ; nor was there any, they were more eager to expose : They laboured, indeed, with so much warmth, and sometimes with so little discretion, that it hath given a handle for some learned moderns to pretend that all the antient Fathers believed the *natural mortality of the Soul* [4]. Well, but

[3] Vol. iv. p. 478.

[4] See Dodwell on this Subject.

if the Christians were not *possessed with this fondness*, he will shew you, at least, they might have been possessed with it, and *to more advantage* too. But this part of his Lordship's philosophic Character, his *Reasoning*, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders, it may not be amiss to usher it in with this curious argument; which undertakes to prove, that the impious notion of the human Soul's *participating of the divine nature, possessed, or at least might have possessed*, the Christians with *more advantage*, than it did the heathen Theists. What then, do you think it is? You will hardly guess. It is this, *That Christians are wont to ASSUME that man is compounded of body and SOUL* [5]. Well, it must needs be allowed, that till we *assume*, man has a Soul, we can never be *possessed* with an opinion that his Soul participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that since Christians hold, *man is composed of soul and body*, they may be *possessed with advantage*. But how it should be with *more advantage*, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did

not They, as well as the Christians, hold that man was composed of soul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion, of *participation* imputed to them. For they could not, sure, be so absurd to hold that, *nothing might participate of something*. However, of this I will not be over positive, since his Lordship tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an escape of his Lordship's logic, must needs awake us to expect great things from this last capital accomplishment of the *Philosopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which, we are now arrived.

I. He will prove against LOCKE, that *the notion of Spirit involves more difficulty or obscurity in it than the notion of body*. Nay, he says *he will make LOCKE prove this against himself, that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of those belonging to immaterial Spirit*. And thus he argues,

“ Primary ideas are the ideas of such qualities as exist always in the substance to

“ which they belong, whether they are
 “ perceived or no. They are therefore
 “ essential to it, and productive, by their
 “ operations, of those secondary qualities
 “ which may be said only to exist in our
 “ perceptions of them. Of the first sort
 “ are solidity and extension, to mention
 “ no others, the primary qualities, and, in
 “ our ideas the essence of Matter, of which
 “ we can frame no conception exclusively
 “ of them. These notions I have TA-
 “ KEN FROM MR. LOCKE, and they lead
 “ me to ask what the primary ideas are of
 “ spirit or immaterial substance? The
 “ Primary idea or the essence of it is
 “ THOUGHT; as body is the *extended*,
 “ this is the thinking substance, SAYS
 “ DES CARTES. THOUGHT then, AC-
 “ TUAL THOUGHT, is the essence of the
 “ soul or spirit, and, by consequence, so
 “ inseparable from it, that we cannot
 “ conceive the Soul or Spirit to exist
 “ separately from, or exclusively of,
 “ thought. “ But this I know to be
 “ untrue: and I may well own, since
 “ Locke has owned the same, that I
 “ have *one of those dull Souls that does*
 “ not

“ not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas [6].”

Won't you naturally suspect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philosopher, to confute the sentiment of another? He is arguing against LOCKE concerning the equal or superior evidence of the primary qualities of *Body* and *Spirit*, and he takes DESCARTES's definition of the primary qualities of *Spirit*, to make out his point. In plain truth, he puts the charge upon us: he uses *thought*, or *actual thinking*, for the *faculty of thinking*. It is this Last which is *essential* to the soul and inseparable from it: It is this last, which being a *power* is properly predicated of an *Agent*: It is this last which Locke understood to be the *primary idea of a spirit or immaterial substance*, when he said that *the notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor obscurity in it than that of body*: And it is the last, of which it may be truly said, that *we cannot conceive the soul or spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of it*.

[6] Vol. iii. p. 510—11.

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2. His Lordship owns, that *it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one Being acts upon another, and becomes a cause.*

“ Whatever knowledge (says he) we acquire of *apparent causes*, we can acquire none of *real causality*: by which, I mean, that force, that power, that virtue, whatever it be, by which one Being ACTS on another, and becomes a cause. We may call this by different names according to the different effects of it; but to know it in its first principles, to know the nature of it, would be *to know as God himself knows*, and therefore this will be always unknown to us *in causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, as well as in those that are the most remote from it [7].”

Would you believe, now, that it was but a little before, in this very *Essay*, that for want of this knowledge, (which yet to affect even *in causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, would be to affect *knowing as God himself knows*) he denies the Soul to be a substance distinct from body. “ They (says he) who hold

[7] Vol. iii. p. 551.

“ the hypothesis of two distinct sub-
 “ stances MUST EXPLAIN, in some tolera-
 “ ble manner, *which they have not yet done,*
 “ the union, and MUTUAL ACTION ON
 “ ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and ex-
 “ tended Beings, or else deny the absolute
 “ existence of any thing extrinsical to the
 “ mind [8].”

That is, those who hold the hypothesis of two distinct Substances must either do that which he holds no Being but the omniscient can do ; or they must run mad ; or (which I think is something worse) they must surrender up themselves to his Lordship's guidance.

He employs the same arms to combat INSPIRATION ; and with the same advantage. The Notion of which is idle and visionary, because “ He has *no more conception of this supposed AC-*
 “ TION *of the divine, on the human*
 “ *mind,* than he has of the inspiration by
 “ which the Holy Ghost proceeds from
 “ the Father and Son, according to the de-
 “ cision of the council of Florence.”
 That is, he rejects *Inspiration* because he does not comprehend that virtue *by which*

[8] Vol. iii. p. 521, 2.

one Being acts upon another and becomes a Cause; altho' he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument against the *existence* of the SOUL, and the *reality* of INSPIRATION, is doubly faulty. For not only, to reject a *revealed truth*, when the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of the *cause* which our faculties are INCAPABLE of comprehending, is folly and extravagance; but, to reject it even then, when the proposition is unaccompanied with the explanation which our faculties are CAPABLE of comprehending, is unreasonable.

3. His Lordship endeavours to shew, that a *future State was not the Sanction of the Law or Religion of Nature*. And how does he go about it? — “Sanctions must
 “ be contained in the Law to which they
 “ belong; they must be a part of it. In
 “ their promulgation, they must precede,
 “ as the Law does, necessarily, all acts of
 “ obedience, or disobedience to it; — they
 “ must be as public — These conditions are
 “ essential, there can be no sanction with-
 “ out them. And therefore the rewards
 “ of

“ of a *future State*, which have not these
 “ conditions, are no sanctions of the natu-
 “ ral Law. Reason and experience, that
 “ taught men this Law, shewed them
 “ the sanctions of it. But neither of them
 “ pointed out *these*. Have we any grounds
 “ to believe, that they were known to the
 “ antediluvian World? Do they stand at the
 “ head or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS
 “ GIVEN TO THE SONS OF NOAH? Were
 “ they so much as mentioned by Mo-
 “ SES [9]?”

Can you possibly forbear laughing? Had he found a *future state* in the *seven precepts* of *Noah*, or in the *books of Moses*, be assured he would have employed this lucky circumstance to prove, that a *future state* was not the Sanction of the *Law of Nature*, but the sanction of a *positive Law*, or of a *pretended Revelation*. For in the beginning of this very section, has he not attempted to prove it was so, from its being found in the GOSPEL? “ God (says he) has
 “ given a Law, the *Law of Nature and*
 “ *Reason*, to all his human Creatures :
 “ the *Sanctions* of it are a NATURAL
 “ TENDENCY of virtue to the happi-

[9] Vol. v. p. 512—13.

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“ nefs, and vice to the misery, of man-
 “ kind — They are imperfect — To supply
 “ the imperfection [Revelation pretends]
 “ that there must be necessarily some *fur-*
 “ *ther sanctions* of this Law, and these are
 “ the rewards and punishments reserved
 “ to a FUTURE STATE. Here is ample
 “ room for *reflexions* [10].” — In truth
 there is: and I have just given you a very
 obvious one, for a sample.

4. He tells us, that *the worship of the
 one true God was not the first Religious
 Worship.* The BIBLE says it was. No
 matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago
 of inconsistencies [1]. “ *Methusalem* (he
 “ says) saw both *Adam* and *Noah*, to
 “ both of whom God revealed himself in
 “ his Unity. *Shem*, the Son of *Noah*,
 “ lived even to the days of *Abraham*.
 “ Need I stay to shew HOW IMPOSSIBLE
 “ it is for any man IN HIS SENSES to be-
 “ lieve that a tradition derived from God
 “ himself, through so few generations, was
 “ lost amongst the greatest part of man-
 “ kind; or that Polytheism and Idolatry
 “ were established on the ruins of it in the
 “ days of *Serug*, before those of *Abraham*,

[10] Vol. v. p. 511—12. [1] Vol. iv. p. 19.

“ and

“ and so soon after the Deluge? I should
 “ think it IMPOSSIBLE even for the Jews
 “ themselves to swallow so many fables
 “ and so many anacronisms. Since the
 “ unity of God was not universally taught
 “ in those early days, it was not so *reveal-*
 “ *ed*; nor preserved in the manner as-
 “ fumed. [2].”

This account therefore, he tells us, is IN-
 CONSISTENT with itself [3]. You will
 wonder perhaps how it comes to pass, that
 these two propositions; *The Unity was re-*
vealed by God to Adam—and the knowledge
of it was lost in a very few generations—
 should be so unable to stand together. The
 best answer I can give you is, that his Lord-
 ship was more attentive to his own passionate
 speeches—*no man in his senses can believe—*
It is impossible for the Jews themselves to
swallow such fables and anacronisms—
 than to the FACTS which occasioned all
 this resentment. The utmost that even
 Prejudice, in its senses, can make of the
 Scripture account, is an IMPROBABILITY :
 and this *improbability*, his Lordship him-
 self, but two pages afterwards, is so good
 to remove for us. He delivers it as

[2] Vol. iv. p. 20.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 19.

a general Truth, that “ the Vulgar EASI-
 “ LY embrace Polytheism and Idolatry,
 “ even AFTER the true doctrine of the di-
 “ vine unity has been taught and received ;
 “ as we may learn from the example of
 “ the *Israelites* : and superstitions GROW
 “ APACE, AND SPREAD WIDE, where
 “ *Christianity* has been established and is
 “ DAILY TAUGHT, as we may learn
 “ from the example of the Roman
 “ Churches [4].”

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongst
 the *Israelites*, Idolatry and Superstition so
easily, so frequently, and so instantaneously
succeeded, to the worship of the true God,
 and needed such severe punishments to
 bring men back again to reason, in a
 place where many extraordinary means
 were provided to keep them in their duty ;
 and if, amongst *Christians*, Idolatry and Su-
 perstition grow *apace and spread wide* where
 the *true doctrine of the unity* is *daily taught*,
 how can we wonder that in *so few ge-*
nerations, as from *Adam to Serug*, Polythe-
 ism and Idolatry had established themselves on
 the ruins of the Unity ; and in an Age,

[4] Vol. iv. p. 22.

when we hear of no other provision for the Truth than the *long lives* of the Patriarchs; and because *Metbusalem* saw both *Adam* and *Noah*?

If You deny this to have been the case of *Jews* and *Christians*, his Lordship tells you, You are *out of your senses*: if you own this to have been the case of the *Antediluvians*, You are *out of your senses* still. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, subscribing to his Lordship's Wisdom. But I have something more to say of this pretended INCONSISTENCY. — “Can any man in his senses
 “ believe that a Tradition, derived
 “ from God himself, should be lost in
 “ so FEW generations, and so SOON
 “ after the Deluge?” — How *few*, and how *soon*, I beseech your Lordship? I am not captious: I have a special reason for asking. The Chronology, of this period, is not uniform or constant; there is a wide difference in the several bible-accounts: so that I suspect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, *so few*, and, *so soon*.

To be plain, tho' the HEBREW Copy makes it no more than *three hundred* years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the SAMARITAN-PENTATEUCH, the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a *thousand*: time more than sufficient to sink *the greatest part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheism, so early as the days of Serug*. And here lies the difficulty, the best Chronologers agree in preferring the *Samaritan, the Septuagint and Josephus*; to the *Hebrew Copy*.—But I forget myself: His Lordship has “ a thorough contempt
“ for the whole business of the Learned
“ lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETA-
“ VIUS, USHER, and MARSHAM [5]. *To whom* (he says) *the whole tribe of scholars bow with reverence*, and consequently he must have the same contempt for CHRONOLOGY: Which, indeed, he has shewn on more occasions than one; but never to so much advantage, as when he supposed LIVY and TACITUS to have flourished before VIRGIL [6].

[5] Vol. ii. p. 261, 2.

[6] See Dr. NEWTON'S learned and judicious *Dissertations on the Prophecies*, p. 33.

But

But this by the way only. My business with his Lordship at present lies in another quarter.

For, having thus (in his attempt to shew that the worship of the one true God was not the first religious worship) thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this manner:

“ If the *inconsistency* of this account
 “ makes us reject it, we shall find less
 “ reason to believe, on the Authority of
 “ *profane traditions*, that the UNITY
 “ OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE FAITH
 “ of mankind. Revelations to the Fa-
 “ ther and to the Restorer of the whole
 “ human race might have established this
 “ faith universally: but without Revela-
 “ tion it could not be that of any one
 “ people, till observation and meditation,
 “ till a full and vigorous exercise of Reason
 “ made it such [7].”

The reasoning is truly admirable. The supposed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, stands thus, According to the BIBLE, the worship of the true God was the first religious worship: GENTILE TRADITION

[7] Vol. iv. p. 20.

says much the same. Between these two Testimonies there is a natural and strange connexion. The *Tradition* appears to rise out of the *Written word*: For, as his Lordship well observes, *nothing but a Revelation could establish this Faith universally, not even amongst one people, till observation and meditation had made it familiar to them.* Here you have the Fact proved in the strongest manner a Fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two Witnesses, coming from different quarters, and strangers to one another's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually support each other. What would you more?—Hold a little, says his Lordship, This boasted connection between sacred and prophane History has no foundation: the *sacred* is not to be believed, because *inconsistent*: the *prophane* is not to be believed, because it has no support but what it receives from the *Sacred*. Thus stands his Lordship's reasoning, or, at least, thus it would stand had he urged it to the best advantage. And to this, I have already replied, that his Lordship, in calling the Bible account *inconsistent*, is guilty of an abuse of words: that

that all which his own premisses infer is only an *improbability*; and this *improbability* likewise, he himself fairly contradicts and confutes. But I go farther, and in defence of the Bible account observe, that if what he says be true, That *observation and meditation and a full and vigorous exercise of reason*, are necessary to gain the knowledge of the UNITY, in a *natural* way; and that these qualities are long a coming; it is then highly probable, that the want of this *observation and meditation* when the *unity* was revealed to the *first Man*, might be the occasion of the speedy loss of it. He expressly tells us, that this truth has been subject to as sudden revolutions, when men were in full possession of it, with all their *observation, meditation, and vigorous exercise of reason*, at the height; and twenty other peculiar advantages to boot.

But his Lordship's *general* management of this question, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, is too curious to be passed over in silence; tho' it properly belong to a foregoing Head. He discusses the point at large, in two separate *Dissertations* :

[G 3] each

each of which is so well qualified, and so fitly accommodated to the other, that the second is a complete confutation of the first. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordship does things in order. He had first of all to discredit the Mosaic account of the Creation: And MOSES representing the *worship of the true God as the original Religion*, he set himself to prove, that Moses was both a *fool* and a *liar*. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet ISAIAH, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven, which had the worship of the one God; and this truth EUSEBIUS takes upon his word [8]. His Lordship will prove them to be mistaken. And then he ransacks all the dark corners, not of antiquity, but of those moderns who have rendered antiquity still darker: in which he succeeds so well, as to persuade himself that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewish Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; nay, that there was no time so

[8] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. Part i. p. 165.

early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we said, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the same subject, in the other Dissertation, against Moses. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, I leave that Writer to do his own argument justice as he shall find himself able.

5. I will now, Sir, give you one of his Lordship's *palmary* arguments against REVELATION.

“ Can he be less than MAD who boasts
 “ a REVELATION superadded to REASON,
 “ to supply the defects of it, and who
 “ superadds REASON to REVELATION to
 “ supply the defects of this too, at the
 “ same time? THIS IS MADNESS OR THERE
 “ IS NO SUCH THING INCIDENT TO OUR
 “ NATURE [9].”

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in these circumstances, his Lordship (and reason good) concluded the MADNESS to be *universal*; and none but himself in their senses: and standing thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this ex-

[9] Vol. iv. p. 172.

traordinary case [10], *Insanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipsi insaniant*. But if he will needs reduce mankind to this sad alternative, I shall make no scruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never so much at his Lordship's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who "hold that Revelation was superadded to Reason, to supply the defects of Reason; and that Reason was at the same time superadded to Revelation to supply the defects of Revelation," I am so far from seeing in them any of those unfavourable symptoms, his Lordship speaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwise had deserved, (at least, on the principles of his Lordship's rigid justice) to be sent to Bedlam. Indeed some, for so doing, have been actually sent thither. For what, for the most part, are the *religious* inhabitants of that place, but such, who, having superadded Revelation to supply the defects of Reason, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to supply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the *Laws of the Gospel* the sole rule of all *civil* as well as of *religious* conduct.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 316—353—377.

Let us consider how the case truly stands.

The Religionist, his Lordship says, boasts, that *Revelation* was *superadded to Reason*, to *supply the defects* of Reason. Very well. Reason then is the first Building; and Revelation, a *superaddition* to it. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reason, but supplies us with new truths, where Reason stops short. And why was this done?—For the sake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reason *alone* this rule?—Then the *superaddition* of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation alone the rule?—Then Reason was mended and improved to no purpose. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is composed of BOTH. But if so, When Revelation has been added to Reason to supply the defects of Reason, must not Reason be added to Revelation to supply the defects of Revelation? Must not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to aid one another's wants? Reason is the foundation; Revelation is the superstructure. It is agreed the superstructure is necessary to *perfect* the foundation. Must it not be owned

owned too, that the foundation is as necessary to *bear* the superstructure?

But, what is more, it is the GOSPEL itself; and not *artificial Theology*, which prescribes this conduct to it's Followers. For the *Gospel* being to serve (as is confessed) for a superaddition to the first building of *Natural Religion*, it delivers no complete system of moral Law, (for which it is so often reproached by his Lordship) because the general parts of that system are to be found in *Natural Religion*. For this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out the remedy, the study of *natural Religion*, from whence, together with the *Gospel*, such a complete system may be collected. "Finally, Brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; If there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things [1]." What then is the scheme of true CHRISTIANITY; but *the Superadding Revelation to Reason to supply the defects of it; and*

[1] Phil. iv. 8.

the superadding Reason to Revelation to supply the defects of this too at the same time?

Indeed; was REVELATION only a REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordship's charge, tho' extravagantly urged, would appear to have some foundation. For then *Revelation* must be supposed to be *Religion of nature*, restored and perfected: And then to recur back to *Natural Religion* to rectify *Revelation*, after *Revelation* had been introduced to rectify *Natural Religion*, would have, tho' none of the marks of *madness*, which consists in arguing consequentially from *false* principles, yet great symptoms of *folly*, which consists in arguing like his Lordship, from the *true*. But he owns Christianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMPTION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in most other points, and as often represents it to be *a republication of the Religion of Nature*: therefore, as we have all along made the best of his *Contradictions*, e'en let *him* do the same; for it seems not fit, he should be debarred any advantages of his own providing.

But

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But let us set his Lordship's argument in another light; and turn from his *Philosophic* to his *Legislative* Character; and suppose him to reason thus, (for change but the terms, and the reasoning will hold just as well in *civil* as in *theologic* matters.) "Can he be less than mad who boasts a *system of civil Laws* superadded to the *natural*, to supply the defects of it; and who superadds the *natural* to the *civil*, to supply the defects of this too, at the same time?" Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who should thus dictate to his Pupils, even such a one does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all mankind.

Amongst the numerous absurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the expression; for as it seems not to be committed with design, it hardly deserves the name of a sophism; and that is, the repetition of the word SUPERADDS: for tho', after the superaddition of Revelation to Reason, Reason may be said to be *joined* to Revelation; it can never, I think, be said to be *superadded* to it. Because this

2

would

would be setting the two Laws on one another's shoulders, and making each become top and bottom in its turn; and this, after he had owned Reason to be the *foundation*; and Revelation, the *superstructure*.

6. Another of his Lordship's *general* objections to *Revelation*, is as follows:

“ It is not, (he says) in any degree,
 “ so agreeable to the notions of infinite
 “ wisdom, that God should deal out his
 “ Revelations BY PARCELS, instead of
 “ making a system of moral Law, when
 “ he created moral agents, that might
 “ answer his WHOLE purpose, in all cir-
 “ cumstances of time, place, and persons;
 “ JUST AS HE MADE a physical system of
 “ Laws for the other part, the inanimate
 “ part of his Creation [2].”

Now with his Lordship's good leave, I am bold to think the contrary to be more probable: and that too on those very principles of analogy, which his Lordship employs, to prove it less probable. He argues against the likelihood of God's giving the *moral Law*, IN PARCELS, because the *Physical Law* was given AT ONCE. This plainly proceeds on a supposition that

[2] Vol. v. p. 544.

the nature of the two systems is the same; and that there is the like constancy and regularity in the *moral* as in the *Physical*: For unless there be the same tendency to order, or to disorder, in two general Systems; the means of governing them can never be the same. But obedience to their respective Laws, in these two systems, is not the same: for *passive* MATTER, the subject of the *physical*, obeys, with small irregularities, the Laws impressed upon it by it's Creator; but an *active* MIND, the subject of the *moral*, is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world prescribed for its observance.

The method, therefore, of governing in the two Systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be very different. And the difference which our senses tell us *has* been observed, is that which natural reason teaches us to conclude, *should* be observed; namely, to a *physical* system (whose subject would constantly and invariably obey) a Law given AT ONCE: and to a *moral* system (whose subject inclined it to frequent disorders) a Law given IN PARCELS; which might,

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from

from time to time, reform those disorders as they arose.

7. I shall conclude my specimen with his Lordship's *more particular* objections to his Bible.

Speaking of the civil punishment of Idolatry, under the Jewish Theocracy, he says, " God himself was the LEGISLATOR. The Citizens, therefore, of that commonwealth, who apostatized, were proceeded against as traytors and rebels, guilty of no less than high-treason. Let it be so. *The objections, of injustice and cruelty, to those Laws will remain in their full force,* and be of more weight to prove them HUMAN, than all these hypotheses to prove them *divine*. God was KING, and idolatry was no less than high treason; no objection therefore can lye against the Punishment of it. None certainly, but every objection to the MANNER and DEGREE in which this punishment was to be inflicted, stands good [3]."

Here his Lordship, to make amends, as it were, for his frequent *denial of the right* without understanding the Case, has,

for once, ventured to *agree to it*, upon the same terms. It hath been said, “ that God “ being KING of the Jews; idolatry was “ high treason.” To this, his Lordship condescends. But to shew us how well he understood the principle on which it stands, he affirms that God's being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treason. As if the bare giving Laws to a people conferred the MAGISTRACY on the Giver; or as if there could be *high treason* against any but the *supreme civil Magistrate*. But you shall see more of his talent for PHILOSOPHIC POLITICS, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to speak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his *reasoning* on the subject, not his general *knowledge* of it (things rarely to be found together in his Lordship's *Essays*) that I now propose to examine.

You observe then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treason; and the Punishment of it (which is every where *capital*) to be just. But the *manner* and *degree* of that punishment he pronounces, both *unjust* and *cruel*. Was this like a philosophic Legislator!—When the question is of
the

the *justice* or *injustice* of a public Law, every man of common sense, and endowed with the instinctive knowledge of *right and wrong*, may pass a true judgment on it; because it stands on the unalterable nature of things: in *human* Laws, on the relation between Magistrate and Subject; in *divine* Laws, on the relation between God and man; and in a System of Laws, like the Mosaic, on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordship, in passing judgment on the case, upon these principles, pronounces the Law against Idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewish System? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is aided in his judgment by the plainest and clearest principles. Hold, says his Lordship; take this along with you, *Tho' no objection can lie against the PUNISHMENT, yet every objection lies against the MANNER and DEGREE of it.*

Let us see then whether the latter part of this decree stands upon the same plain and clear principles with the former.

To judge truly of the *manner* and *degree* of a Punishment, I apprehend, more is requisite, than to judge of the Punishment itself; it requires an intimate acquaintance with the People to whom this Law against idolatry was given; their manners, tempers, dispositions, prejudices, and situation; In a word, the knowledge of a thousand circumstances, which none but the Law-giver himself could perfectly understand; certainly, not this Politician of Yesterday. So that, it appears, the justice or injustice of the *manner* and *degree* of a punishment is not determinable on those simple and steady principles, which determine the justice or injustice of the *punishment* itself, but on others, which take their different natures of *right* and *wrong* from many shifting circumstances; from the degree of *temptation* in the object; from the degree of *prejudice* in the affections; of *propensity* to the Crime; of *malignity* to the System; and from other various considerations, of which only those who are perfect in the knowledge of antient manners in general, and of the Jewish People's in particular, can form any tolerable ideas.

This

This is enough to shew the folly of cavilling at the *manner* and *degree* of a punishment, after the punishment itself is allowed to be just and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the *punishment* implies a presumption in favour of the *manner* and *degree*. The *Punishment*, examined, on plain and clear principles, is found to be just: admit now, the *manner* and *degree* of it to be doubtful, for want of knowledge sufficient to shew us the *necessity*, and consequently, the *justice* of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who observed the rule of justice in the punishment itself, observed it likewise in the *manner* and *degree* of the punishment?

But his Lordship's cavil at the *degree*, will, perhaps, deserve our more particular notice. *Moses* makes the punishment, capital, but with no unusual circumstances of cruelty attending the kind of death, more than we see inflicted for high treason in all the Countries of Europe at present. The instance of *Naboth* shews it to have been attended with *confiscation*. This circumstance perhaps might have disgusted his Lordship. But in a case, where he was

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personally prejudiced, he should have mis-
trusted his own judgment; he should have
tried the force of those arguments, by which
a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that
forfeitures for high treason is perfectly just
and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the
conditions of *Historical Authenticity*, de-
livers this, for one of the chief, "That
" the Facts, the principal Facts at least,
" be confirmed by COLLATERAL TES-
" TIMONY. By collateral testimony (says
" he) I mean the testimony of those who
" had no common interest of Country, of
" Religion, or of Profession, to disguise
" or falsify the truth [4]."

This condition of *historical Authenticity*
will be easily agreed to; as well as his de-
finition of *collateral testimony*: And the
quotations of JOSEPHUS and EUSEBIUS,
from *Egyptians, Phœnicians, Chaldeans* and
Greeks, will, without doubt, be urged by
the defenders of Religion, as such *colla-*
teral testimony, where the witnesses had no
common interest of Country, of Religion, or
of Profession to disguise or falsify the truth.—
Pardon me, says his Lordship, " Jo-

[4] Vol. iii. p. 281.

“ JOSEPHUS indeed attempts to support his
 “ history [the Bible] by *collateral testi-*
 “ *monies*, those of *Egyptians, Phœnicians,*
 “ *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*. But these
 “ testimonies, were they never so full to
 “ his purpose, would CEASE TO BE COL-
 “ LATERAL testimonies, by COMING
 “ THRO’ HIM, who had a common inter-
 “ est of Country and Religion to disguise
 “ and to falsify the truth [5].”

This seems a little hard, that, when
 our advantages of defence are, in his Lord-
 ship’s opinion, so rare, the few we have,
 should be lost the very moment they are
 gained. JOSEPHUS has no sooner seized
 this important mark of *historical authenti-*
city, but it slips thro’ his fingers as he is
 urging it: and, what is still more extra-
 ordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The
Book of life and the *Seat of life*, it seems,
 have this property in common —

“ Like following LIFE thro’ Creatures you
 “ dissect,

“ You lose it in the moment you detect.

For, as Tully well observes, all human things
 are given to change. “ *Corpora nostra non*

[5] Vol. iii. p. 281.

[H 3] “ *novimus.*

“ novimus. Itaque *Medici* ipsi, quorum
 “ intererat ea nosse, aparuerunt ut vide-
 “ rentur: nec eo tamen aiunt *EMPIRICI*
 “ notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut pate-
 “ facta et detecta, *MUTENTUR.*”

But to illustrate this wonderful reason-
 ing, let us make a supposition, or rather,
 let us lay down a *fact*, that *APION* had
 insisted on this very *condition of historical*
authenticity; and that *JOSEPHUS*, who de-
 fended the Bible against him, agreed to
 put the issue of the debate upon it: And
 so produced the testimony of *Egyptians*,
Phœnicians, *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*,
 to support the sacred story. Thus far, his
 Lordship will allow that matters went
 fairly on, and the argument had its pro-
 per efficacy. *JOSEPHUS* quoted from the
Works of Pagan writers, transmitted to
 him thro' the hands of *Pagan* readers;
 and being engaged with a clear-sighted
 Adversary, without doubt, quoted exactly.
 The *historical authenticity* of the *BIBLE*
 therefore was established on the terms his
 Adversary required.

How then comes it to pass, that an ar-
 gument which was once conclusive, has
 now lost its force? What was truth in that

Age must be truth in this; or not only the *Authenticity*, but the very *being* of History will become precarious.

Do these pagan testimonies, in running thro' the chanel of JOSEPHUS, become *polluted*, as soon as the original books cease to exist? No, says his Lordship; but they become *suspected*. Indeed, if he could prove that JOSEPHUS destroyed them; or was aiding in their destruction; or had a fore-knowledge of their loss, his Lordship might have some reason to *suspect*. But to talk of suspicion, merely because JOSEPHUS was *interested* that the quotations should be to his purpose, is so vague an objection, as shews that such an answerer will never be without his cavils. Were the Originals still in being, he would then *suspect* that these passages had been foisted in by some Jewish or Christian Impostor; at least, by some body or other, who *had a common interest of Country, of Religion, or of Profession, to disguise or falsify the truth*. In short, he would *suspect* all the World rather than give up what he had once maintained.

To shew you, this is said neither at random nor in malice, consider his Lordship's

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conduct where this *collateral testimony* is
circumstanced as he himself requires.

The defenders of Religion say, that
the PENTATEUCH, which represents MO-
SES as the Leader and Legislator of the Israel-
ites, is supported by that *evidence* which
his Lordship calls *collateral*. What says
his good Lordship to this? “ Be it so; that
“ the Israelites had a Leader and Legisla-
“ tor called Moses is proved by the con-
“ sent of *Foreign*, whom I call *collateral*
“ *Evidences*. But surely it will not fol-
“ low, that this man CONVERSED WITH
“ THE SUPREME BEING FACE TO FACE,
“ which these *collateral* Witnesses do not
“ affirm [6].”

Thus you see, these *collateral evi-
dences* will always be rejected, whether
they tell their story *viva voce*, or whether
their depositions be taken down by such
who avail themselves of their testimony.

—But, *they do not say that this man
conversed with the supreme Being face to
face*. Would his Lordship have believed
them, if they did? Why, no, says he, I
must needs reckon such relations amongst
the Miracles of the Greek and Roman

[6] Vol. iii. p. 282.

Historians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this shew, that if the *collateral evidence* speak but to Moses' Legislation and civil rule, they speak to every thing they are called for. — It is doubted, for instance, whether Livy relates truly the operations of such or such a campaign against Hannibal : Polybius, Plutarch, and Appian, are produced as *collateral evidences*, but they speak not a word of those *Prodigies* which the Roman Historian relates at large.

9. But his hate to Moses is immortal : Notwithstanding all his Lordship's pretended contempt of him, as a Legislator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a formidable Rival. Archbishop Tillotson had attempted to defend the *Authenticity* of his writings, on this footing, *that the unbeliever would only give the same credit to them which he gives to every civil Historian*. His Lordship owns the demand to be reasonable ; and is willing to try his Brother Legislator, on these terms.

In order to this, he observes, “ That
 “ one condition of the *Authenticity* of
 “ any human History, and such alone
 “ (says he) we are to consider in this
 “ place,

“ place, is, that it contains nothing re-
 “ pugnant to the experience of mankind.
 “ Things repugnant to this experience are,
 “ to be found in many that pass however
 “ for authentic; in that of LIVY, for in-
 “ stance: but then these incredible anec-
 “ dotes stand by themselves, as it were,
 “ and the history, may go on without
 “ them. But this is not the case of the
 “ Pentateuch, nor of the other Books of the
 “ Old Testament. Incredible anecdotes are
 “ not mentioned seldom and occasionally
 “ in them: THE WHOLE HISTORY IS
 “ FOUNDED ON SUCH, it consists of little
 “ else, and IF IT WERE NOT A HISTORY
 “ OF THEM, IT WOULD BE A HISTORY
 “ OF NOTHING [7].”

His Lordship's objection to the *Authen-*
ticity of the Bible as a *civil history*, is, that
 it is full of *Miracles*: and, supposing the
 Defender of Revelation ready to reply,
 “ So likewise is the History of *Livy*; and
 “ yet that does not destroy its credit;”
 he obviates the reply extremely well.
 There is an essential difference, says he,
 between the Miracles of MOSES and of
 LIVY. The Roman Historian's are de-

[7] Vol. iii. p. 279.

tached

tached pieces; they make no part of the subject, and are extraneous to it: But the Miracles of the Jewish writer are intimately related to all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part; *the whole history is founded on them.* Take away LIVY's miracles, and the train of civil events goes on just as well *without them*: Take away MOSES's, and his history becomes a heap of confusion, or, more properly, *it is a history of nothing.*

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordship; I only wish the occasions had been more frequent. As it is, I am unwilling to let the first that occurred to me pass by without my thanks, lest the occasion should never return.

In a word, his Lordship's observation on the *difference* between the MIRACLES in MOSES and in LIVY, is solid and masterly. And *this difference*, let me observe, is a certain mark, tho' not of that *civil authenticity* which the good Archbishop's argument requires; Yet of that *divine original* which the SCRIPTURES arrogate to themselves.

It is the specious, but trite, objection of infidelity against the *Miracles* recorded there, that those remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. Why then, says the Freethinker, should we believe the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES, rather than those of LIVY? For a very good reason, replies his Lordship, we find them in a history essentially different from that of *Livy*. Take away *his* miracles, together with all those of the other pagan Historians, and the Story stands just as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a state of inexplicable confusion.

Again, one of the least hacknied, and indeed least futile, observations I have ever heard urged against the Bible, (and it has been urged to me) is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXION between the *civil* and the *miraculous* parts of that History. Here again his Lordship comes in, in support of Revelation, and says, that this *necessary connexion* is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the *civil* part, if you take away the *miraculous*. Which sure is a *connexion* of some strength.

Thus

Thus has his Lordship, before he was aware, in attempting to destroy the *civil authenticity* of the Bible, supported its *divine original*. And this good, tho' undesign'd, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance, is not here sufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long story; and as I pretend to have supplied this *DESIDERATUM*, *The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the sacred History*, I shall refer you to the proper place, where you may see it at large.

In the mean time give me leave to go on with his Lordship; And proceed to the proposition itself, That the *Bible Miracles destroy its credit as a civil history*. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece of chicane. Let us see how the matter stands between the Archbishop and his Lordship.

BELIEVERS say, the Bible-History is the history of a Dispensation really divine: **UNBELIEVERS** say, it is the history of one only pretended; and endeavour to support their assertion, by shewing it to have the civil

marks

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marks of falsehood and imposture. Here the
Archbishop steps forward and says, that he
is willing the authenticity of the Bible
should be tried on the Standard of a CIVIL
History. Agreed, replies his Lordship;
And what say you now to MIRACLES?
Say? Why, that *miracles* are out of the
question; and come not into conside-
ration till the DIVINE authority be con-
tended for. When we agreed to consider
the Bible as a *civil history only*, it was not
for *truth's*, but for *argument's* sake. If
we held the Writers of it to be mere civil
Historians, the *miracles*, recorded in it,
might be fairly urged against us; and urg-
ed with advantage, if indeed there be that
difference between them and *Livy's*, which
is pretended. But as we hold the Writers
were indeed inspired, You, my Lord, have
shewn us, by that difference, to justify the
miraculous part, whenever their inspiration
becomes a question between us. In the mean
time, stick to your point, and never fancy
you can make our Divines the dupes of so
pitiful a Sophism. You have drawn us,
while we argue a particular *question* with
you, to exclude one of our principles; and
then urge against *that question*, a FACT,
which

which stands upon the excluded principle, and so cannot be defended while the principle remains excluded: Which is just, as if, when you had persuaded us to tye our *hands*, on promise that the question should be only about the *use of our feet*, You should object to us our inability of laying fast hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you push this imaginary advantage, best detect the fraud and imposture of your proceeding. “The
 “ Old Testament (you say) is founded in
 “ incredibility. Almost every event con-
 “ tained in it, is incredible in its causes and
 “ consequences; and I must except or
 “ reject the whole, as I said just now.
 “ No one, EXCEPT HERE AND THERE A
 “ DIVINE, will presume to say, that the
 “ histories of the old Testament are con-
 “ formable to the experience of Mankind,
 “ and the natural course of things.”

Except here and there a Divine, do you say? Nor they neither, I assure your Lordship. What they say is this, That every thing of a mere *civil nature* in the Old Testament has all the marks of *civil authenticity*. This is all they said,
 and

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and all they meant to say. And, on what
good grounds they said it, give me leave
to shew your Lordship a little more at
large.

The Bible tells us, the world was cre-
ated in time; and the time at no immense
distance, as several fabulous relations of
pagan Antiquity had pretended. — And
does not the late invention of Arts prove
that the Bible says nothing but what ap-
pears very probable?

It says, the Earth was overflowed by a
deluge of waters. — And do not the con-
tents of its surface demonstrate that such
has been its fate?

The Bible says, again, that the *Found-
ers of Cities* were the *inventers of arts*;
that the first *civil Governments* arose from
the *Domestic*, and composed small Mo-
narchies. — And do not experience and the
natural course of things support this *credi-
ble anecdote*?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Is-
raelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went
out as a great People, and in an hostile
manner, to seek new habitations. — Of this
your Lordship may have both external and
inter-

internal evidence. The *external* are the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Josephus and Eusebius: the *internal* is the whole Jewish RITUAL.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry, their transportation to a foreign land, and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters.—And of the truth of all this, we say, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet existing, is a strong and amazing Witness.

These, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous instances which might be produced to shew the *civil Authenticity* of the Bible. And on these and such as these, the Clergy's challenge stood, when they undertook to prove *that Authenticity*, on the common principles of historic credit. And further, or other than this, they neither said nor meant to say. They understood, as well as your Lordship, the difference between Moses's miracles and those of Livy; that the Jewish History, unlike to all other, is *wholly founded on miracles*. But they distinguished better than your Lordship, of Moses' civil History: which consists of two parts; the peculiar

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Dispensation to that people, and their
transactions with their neighbours; and
the occasional story of the rest of mankind.
It is the first only to which his Lordship's
observation can be applied, *viz.* that the
civil cannot be separated from the *miracu-
lous* part: Nor did the clergy attempt it.
It was the other, we must needs suppose,
to which the Archbishop's challenge refer-
red: And I have shewn just above, that
we are able to make it good.

Thus would I have reasoned with his
Lordship; and thus, in fact was he rea-
soned with, (as I may have occasion to tell
you in my next *Letter*) but he was deaf to
all advise, tho' it was given in private,
and to save his memory from the dis-
grace of these portentous *ESSAYS*. What
remained was to expose them, as they de-
served, to the laughter and contempt of
mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well
discharged my general promise to You.
When one looks back upon this strange
collection of poor meagre, disjointed, rea-
soning, tied together, in a sort, by his
System, and swelled up, to look like sub-
stance, by the tumor of his Rhetoric, it
puts

puts us in mind of the old story of Prometheus; and we see his Lordship insulting the sanctity of the PUBLIC, just as that most antient of Freethinkers did the ALTAR OF JUPITER; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERED WITH FAT.

I am, &c.

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L E T T E R IV.

DEAR SIR,

YOU will wonder to hear again from me on so trifling a subject as this **FIRST PHILOSOPHY**. And had not lord **BOLINGBROKE** brought us to this alternative, either to give up the **BIBLE**, or his **LORDSHIP**, to contempt, I should willingly have left him in possession of his Admirers.

My last Letter examined his Lordship's value in every point of *view*, in which a **PHILOSOPHER** would desire to shine. I shall now push my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province. I shall beg leave to try his talents in his **POLITICAL** capacity, as an Analyser of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Distributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now I must recede a little from the method I have hitherto observed, which was to defend, not *this or that body of Divines*, but the *general Principles of natural and revealed Religion*, against his Lordship's calumnies: Here I shall have occasion to patronise a single Clergyman; and not such a one neither as I could have wished; a **CUDWORTH**, a **CLARKE**, a **CUMBERLAND**, or a **TILLOTSON**; (established Names, which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel) but a Writer of very ambiguous fame,

2 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S

the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, and, of *The Alliance between Church and State*: Of whom, I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adversaries; his Friends possessing him, as they do a good Conscience, in silence and complacency; and from his Adversaries I learn—"But hold, you will say, let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the learned abroad say of him; for his works have been frequently translated and criticised both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without selfish partialities and personal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that decision: Foreign Critics of the greatest name have spoken so differently of him, from the Scriblers at home, that was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would suspect their encomiums for the civilities of his most partial Friends. So to his Adversaries, I say again, I will have recourse: And from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain pass upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digested learning: that, on his first appearance, he was shrewdly suspected of infidelity; but that (no body knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a sort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I suppose

suppose he sees it for his Interest to stick to the established Church; for I know no other reason why there should have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the representation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, *The Dunces, of all denominations, being in Confederacy against him.* Indeed, since his Lordship's discovery of a *Confederacy* between *Divines* and *Atheists*, the word is likely to become as ridiculous as the word *Ode*, which our Laureate foretells, no body, for the future, will hear without laughing. However, it is scarce worth while to retract it; for were there no more in this *confederacy*, than in his Lordship's; and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his natural bias, it would but make the wonder the greater.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: In truth I could not find another, so proper for my purpose, which was, as I said, to display Lord Bolingbroke's *political* talents. For tho' his Lordship be very profuse in his ill Language to all Men, who have undertaken

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the defence of *Religion* and *Church Government*; yet the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moses* is the only one whom he does more than abuse on this account. For while he keeps at a respectful distance from the *Arguments* of others, he comes boldly, up to this Writer's, and sits down before them in form. He Disputes with him, the Knowledge of the *Unity*—the sense and reason of a *select people*—of a *tutelary Deity*—of *compliance with human prejudices*, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This seems not greatly for his Lordship's honour; after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himself quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordship begins his attack on that capital circumstance, in the Jewish Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE: He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL PROVIDENCE, which Moses assured his people was to be administered under a *Theocracy*; and which the Author of the *Divine Legation* attempts to prove,
from

from this very circumstance of the *Omission*; was actually administered.

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be necessary to give a summary View, of that famous Argument, pursued at large thro' two volumes of the *Divine Legation*; and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect.

RELIGION has been always held necessary to the support of CIVIL SOCIETY; and, a FUTURE STATE, (under the common dispensation of Providence) as necessary to RELIGION; because, nothing but a *future state* can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under such a Providence; whose phenomena are apt to disturb every serious Professor of Religion; as it is of the essence of religious profession, to believe that *God is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him.*

MOSES, who instituted a *Religion* and a *Republic*, and incorporated them together, stands single amongst ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a *Religion* WITHOUT the sanction, or even the mention, of a *Future State of Rewards and Punishments.* The same MOSES, by uniting

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the Religion and the Republic of the Jews, into one system, made God, by consequence, their supreme civil magistrate; whereby the form of Government became truly and properly THEOCRATICAL.

The consequence of a *Theocratic* administration must be an *extraordinary* or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And so, indeed, the Jewish Lawgiver, throughout his whole Institute, has represented it to be.

The question between Infidels and Believers has ever been, whether this *extraordinary Providence* was REAL or only PRETENDED?

Here the Author of the *Divine Legation* steps in; and undertakes to prove, from the circumstance of the *omission of a future state*, that it was REAL. His Argument stands thus:

If Religion be necessary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot subsist, under the *common* dispensation of Providence, without a *future state* of rewards and punishments, so consummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of such a State, unless he had been well assured that an *extraordinary Providence* was in reality to be administered

nistred over his People: or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the mischief of a Religion wanting a future state, would have been soon felt by the People, to the destruction of their REPUBLIC; which nevertheless continued Sovereign, and in a flourishing condition, for many ages.

This is the plain and simple ARGUMENT of the *Divine Legation*; which the first and the second Volumes of that Work are employed to explain, and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force; as appears from his various contrivances to evade it.

This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the *Argument*, as to imagine that the two first Volumes had left it unfinished; and that the *third* was to contain the *conclusion of the Syllogism*; tho' the Author had told us, more than once, that the purpose of the last Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new considerations; to REMOVE OBJECTIONS to the Character of *Moses*; and to EXPLAIN THE REASONS of the *omission*.

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To evade, as we say, this Argument, his Lordship casts about for a reason, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Moses's OMISSION of a *future state*. And his first solution is this,

“ MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the rewards and punishments of another life, tho' it is possible he might have learnt these Doctrines from the Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, perhaps as they taught that of the Unity of God. When I say, *that Moses did not believe the immortality of the soul*, nor future rewards and punishments, my reason is this, that he taught neither, when *he had to do with a people whom a Theocracy could not restrain*; and on whom, therefore, terrors of Punishment, *future as well as present, eternal as well as temporary*, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated [1].”

This reasoning can never be too much admired.

[1] Vol. iii. p. 289.

Here we have a *Doctrine*, plausible in itself, and therefore of easy admittance; Most alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; Of highest account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Israelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; Of strongest efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indispensable use; Yet, all this notwithstanding, *Moses did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it.* What a Politician has his Lordship made of this MOSES, a Brother Legislator, inspired only by his natural genius, like himself. But now, had MOSES's *integrity* been so severe, How came he to write a History which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe* that? How came he to leave the Israelites, as my Lord affirms he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? Did he believe them too? No, but they served his purpose, which was, The better governing an unruly People. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a *future state*, served this purpose best of all; for *having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could*

not restrain, terrors of punishment, FUTURE as well as present, ETERNAL as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated. No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a sudden grows scrupulous; and so, together with the principles of common politics, throws aside the principles of common sense; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best served his purpose; was most innocent in itself, and most important in its *general*, as well as particular, use.

In his Lordship's next Volume, this *Omission* comes again upon the stage; and there we have *another* reason assigned for MOSES'S conduct in this matter.

“ MOSES would not teach the Doctrine
 “ of the immortality of the soul, and of a
 “ future state, *on account of the many su-
 “ perstitions* which this Doctrine had begot
 “ in Egypt, as we must believe, or be-
 “ lieve that he knew nothing of it, or AS-
 “ SIGN SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS
 “ OMISSION [2].”

[4] Vol. iv. p. 470.

We

We have seen before, that MOSES omitted a *future state*, because he did not believe it. This reason is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be assigned; either, because it *begot superstitions*; or because *he knew nothing of it*; or because HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* providence; that being what he means, by the *whimsical reason* assigned, [by the Author of the *Divine Legation*] *for its omission*.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting he will stand to it, and having shewn, his *two first* reasons not worth a rush, leave the *last* established even on his own concessions.

I. *Moses*, says he, *omitted a future state on account of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt*. But if the *omission* stood upon this principle, MOSES must have omitted an infinite number of rites and doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, this *Doctrine had begot*; such as the notion of *tutelary deities*; and in part, others

others arising out of those; such as the *distinction between things clean and unclean, an hereditary Priesthood, sacerdotal habits, and Rites of sacrifice.*

2. However, he has another reason for the omission: MOSES *might know nothing of it.* To which if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place, it might be deemed sufficient; where, giving us the reasons why MOSES did *know something* of a future state, he observes, there are *certain rites, which seem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine* [5]. But I go further, and observe, that, from the very LAWS of MOSES themselves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongst the Laws against Gentile Divinations, there is one against that species of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or *invocation of the dead*; which necessarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, the *knowledge of a future state.*

3. This being the fate of his Lordship's two reasons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own in-

[5] Vol. v. p. 239.

ventions, that is, to take up with some WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE OMISSION: which, however, is something better than the *no reasons* of his Lordship's providing.

But, his Lordship dissatisfied, as well he might, with the solutions hitherto offered, returns again to the charge, in the *Corona operis*, his book of FRAGMENTS: And there, he more openly opposes the doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reason, before given, for the *omission*; namely, *the many superstitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt.*

“ ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SUR-
 “ PRIZE (says his Lordship) a doctrine so
 “ useful to ALL Religion, and therefore
 “ incorporated into ALL the Systems of
 “ Paganism, left wholly out of that of
 “ the JEWS. Many probable reasons
 “ might be brought to shew, that it was
 “ an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode,
 “ and this particularly, that it was propa-
 “ gated from Egypt, so soon, at least, af-
 “ terwards, by all those who were in-
 “ structed like MOSES, in the wisdom of
 “ that people. He transported much of
 “ his Wisdom into the scheme of Religion
 “ and

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“ and Government, which he gave the
“ Israelites; and, amongst other things,
“ certain Rites, which may seem to allude,
“ or have a remote relation to, this very
“ doctrine. Tho’ this doctrine therefore,
“ had not been that of ABRAHAM, ISAAC,
“ and JACOB, He might have adopted it
“ with as little scruple, as he did many
“ customs and institutions merely Egyp-
“ tian. He had to do with a rebellious,
“ but a superstitious, people. In the first
“ Character, they made it necessary that
“ he should neglect nothing which
“ might add weight to his ordinances, and
“ contribute to keep them in awe. In
“ the second, their disposition was ex-
“ tremely proper to receive such a doc-
“ trine, and to be influenced by it. *Shall*
“ *we say that an hypothesis of future rewards*
“ *and punishments, was useless amongst a*
“ *People who lived under a Theocracy, and*
“ that the future Judge of other People,
“ was their immediate Judge and King,
“ who resided in the midst of them, and
“ who dealt out rewards and punish-
“ ments on every occasion? Why then
“ were so many precautions taken? Why
“ was a solemn covenant made with God,
“ as

“ as with a temporal Prince? Why were
 “ so many promises and threatenings of re-
 “ wards and punishments, temporal in-
 “ deed, but future and contingent, as we
 “ find in the book of Deuteronomy, most
 “ pathetically held out by Moses? Would
 “ there have been any more impropriety in
 “ holding out those of one kind than those
 “ of another, because the supreme Being,
 “ who disposed and ordered both, was in
 “ a particular manner present amongst
 “ them? Would an addition to the cata-
 “ logue, of rewards and punishments more
 “ remote, but eternal, and in all respects
 “ far greater, have had no effect? I think
 “ neither of these things can be said.

“ What shall we say then? How came
 “ it to pass, this addition was not made?
 “ I will mention what occurs to me, and
 “ shall not be over sollicitous about the
 “ weight that my reflexions may deserve.
 “ If the doctrines of the immortality of
 “ the soul, and of a future state, had
 “ been revealed to Moses, that he might
 “ teach them to the Israelites, he would
 “ have taught them most certainly. But
 “ he did not teach them. They were
 “ there-

“ therefore not revealed to him. Why
 “ they were not so revealed some PERT
 “ DIVINE or other will be ready to tell
 “ you. For me, I dare not presume to
 “ guess. But this, I may presume to ad-
 “ vance, that since these Doctrines were
 “ not revealed by God to his servant MO-
 “ SES, it is highly probable that this Le-
 “ gislator made a scruple of teaching them
 “ to the Israelites, how well soever in-
 “ structed he might be in them himself,
 “ and howsoever useful to Government he
 “ might think them. The superstitious
 “ and idolatrous rites of the Egyptians,
 “ like those of other nations, were found-
 “ ed on the Polytheism, and the Mytho-
 “ logy that prevailed, and were suffered
 “ to prevail, amongst the Vulgar, and that
 “ made the sum of their Religion. It
 “ seemed to be a point of policy to direct
 “ all these absurd opinions and practices
 “ to the service of Government, instead of
 “ attempting to root them out. But then
 “ the great difference between rude and
 “ ignorant nations, and such as were ci-
 “ vilized and learned, like the Egyptians,
 “ seems to have been this, that the for-
 “ mer had no other system of Religion
 “ than

“ than these absurd opinions and practices,
 “ whereas the latter had an inward as well
 “ as an outward Doctrine. There is rea-
 “ son to believe that natural Theology and
 “ natural Religion had been taught and
 “ practised in the ancient Theban Dyna-
 “ sty; and it is probable that they conti-
 “ nued to be an *inward* doctrine in the
 “ rest of Egypt, while Polytheism, Ido-
 “ latry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the
 “ impieties, and all the follies of Magic,
 “ were the *outward* doctrine. MOSES
 “ might be let into a knowledge of both;
 “ and under the patronage of the Princess,
 “ whose Foundling he was, he might be
 “ initiated into those *Mysteries*, where the
 “ secret doctrine alone was taught, and
 “ the outward exploded. But we cannot
 “ imagine that the Children of Israel, in
 “ general, enjoyed the same privilege, nor
 “ that the Masters were so lavish, to their
 “ Slaves, of a favour so distinguished, and
 “ often so hard to obtain. No. The
 “ Children of Israel knew nothing more
 “ than the outside of the Religion of
 “ Egypt, and if the doctrine, we speak of,
 “ was known to them, it was known
 “ only in the superstitious rites, and with

“ all the fabulous circumstances in which
 “ it was dressed up and presented to vul-
 “ gar belief. It would have been hard
 “ therefore to teach, or to renew this
 “ Doctrine in the minds of the Israelites,
 “ without giving them an occasion the
 “ more, to recall the polytheistical fables,
 “ and practice the idolatrous Rites they
 “ had learnt during their Captivity. Rites
 “ and Ceremonies are often so equivocal,
 “ that they may be applied to very differ-
 “ ent doctrines. But when they are so
 “ closely connected with one Doctrine
 “ that they are not applicable to another,
 “ to teach the Doctrine is, in some sort, to
 “ teach the Rites and Ceremonies, and to
 “ authorize the fables on which they are
 “ founded. MOSES therefore being at
 “ liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards
 “ and punishments in a future state, or
 “ not to teach it, might very well choose
 “ the latter; tho’ he indulged the Israelites,
 “ on account of the hardness of their
 “ hearts, and by the divine permission, as
 “ it is presumed, in several observances
 “ and customs which did not lead directly,
 “ tho’ even they did so perhaps in conse-
 “ quence,

“ quence, to the Polytheism and Idolatry
 “ of Egypt [6].”

What a Babel of reasoning has his Lordship here heaped up, with the rubbish of false and inconsistent principles, only to insult the Temple of God, and the Fortrefs of Mount Sion! Sometimes, he represents MOSES as a divine Messenger; and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future state not being revealed to MOSES was the reason he did not teach it.* Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whose recondite Learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the *omission* is, *lest the Doctrine of a future state should have drawn the Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions, from which, it was MOSES's purpose to set them free.* All these inconsistencies in *Fact* and *Reasoning*, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

[6] Vol. v. p. 238---9---40---41.

But let us examine this wonderful Paragraph step by step, without troubling our heads about his Lordship's real sentiments; it being indifferent, to this *View* of his talents, what he believed: It is sufficient, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any other assumed Character.

He begins with owning, that ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE, a doctrine so useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews.

It seems then, that this OMISSION is, after all, no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by MOSES'S *disbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance*; or the *imaginary mischiefs* it might produce. We may therefore be allowed to say, it deserves the most serious attention: at least, all the pains, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* has bestowed upon it, And if the *Omission* be so wonderful, a little *whimsical* reasoning upon it, tho' it end in a demonstration of the truth of Revelation, may be forgiven. And, if I might make so free with the delicacy of these times,

times, I would say, it is, on the whole, as well perhaps to be WHIMSICAL and consistent, as even to be FASHIONABLE, when at the charge of Common Sense.

His Lordship proceeds to shew, in direct opposition to what he said before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it: His knowledge of it, (my Lord tells us) further appears from an *internal* circumstance, *some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine.* This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is accurate and fair. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*; I have shewn just above, that the Jewish Laws against *Necromancy necessarily* imply Moses's knowledge of the Doctrine.

His Lordship then goes on to explain the advantages, which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this doctrine, in the temper and circumstances, in which they left Egypt. MOSES, says he, *had to do with a rebellious and a superstitious People.*—This likewise, I observe, to his Lordship's credit, has the same marks of sagacity and truth; and brings

us to the very verge of the *Solution*, proposed by the Author of the *Divine Legation*; which is, that the Israelites were indeed under an *extraordinary Providence*, which supplied all the advantages that could be had from the doctrine of a *future state*.

Under a *common and unequal Providence*, Religion cannot subsist without this doctrine: For Religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a Providence is not dispensed, a *future state* must needs subvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the *fact*, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future state was most useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Religions of Paganism*. But where an *extraordinary and equal Providence* is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and so, a future state, in this circumstance, is not necessary for the support of Religion. A future state is not to be found in the *Mosaic Oeconomy*; yet this Oeconomy subsisted for many ages: Religion therefore did not

not need it; or, in other words, it was supported by an *extraordinary Providence*.

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation*. Let us now consider his Lordship's newest attempts to evade it.

Shall we say, that an Hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, and that the future Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments on every occasion? WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS taken? &c.

The PRECAUTIONS here objected to us, are to insinuate *against the truth* of Moses's Promise of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordship only advances, and holds in common with the rest, who have written against the *Divine Legation*: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expose as it deserves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a self evident truth, it wants to be proved: Till then, the *Unbeliever* is at

liberty to urge any circumstance in the Jewish Law or History, which may seem to bring the reality of that Providence into question: The same liberty too, has the *Believer*; if at least, he can persuade himself (as they seem to have done, who have written against the *Divine Legation*) that his profession will allow him to do it with decency. Things were in this state, when the Author of the *Divine Legation* undertook the defense of MOSES: And to cut off at one stroke, all objections to the Legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumstance in the Law or History of the Jews, concerning this *extraordinary Providence*, he advanced the INTERNAL Argument of the OMISSION. By which he proved that an extraordinary Providence was, *in fact*, administered in the Jewish Republic. What change did this make in the state of the case? It entirely altered it. *Unbelievers* were now indeed at liberty, and *Believers* too, if so perversely disposed, (which I am sorry to say, they were) to oppose, and, as they could, to confute the Argument of the *Divine*

Divine Legation: But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with those scripture difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* entirely obviated and continued to exclude, so long as that Argument remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties, however inexplicable, have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit of this fundamental maxim would be to unsettle many a *physical* and *mathematical* demonstration, as well as this *moral* one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, To oppose difficulties against the administration of an *extraordinary Providence*, by reasonings *a posteriori*, after that providence has been *proved a priori*, and before the *proof* has been confuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred: and indeed, the most decent and consistent of the hundred; as his *declared purpose* is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish Legislator.

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We will not however decline to examine the weight of these Objections, tho' so foolishly and sophistically urged.

If there was this *extraordinary* Providence administred, says his Lordship, *Why so many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were so many promises and threatnings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by Moses?*

I will presume to solve this difficulty. We find throughout, what we are wont to call, the *History of Providence*, but what his Lordship is pleased to intitle, *Tales more extravagant than those of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral Government of the World, always makes use of human means, as far as those means will go; and never interposes with his *extraordinary* Providence, but when they will go no further. To do otherwise, would be to make an unnecessary waste of Miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of Nature, by obscuring the harmony of order, than to manifest the

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the Lord and Controller of it, by arresting its delegated Powers. This method in God's moral Government, all our ideas of Wisdom seem to support. Now when He, the great Master of the Universe, had decreed to rule the Jewish People in an extraordinary way, he did not propose to supersede any of the measures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be esteemed a full answer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But would you see it drawn out more at length, you may consult the Author's *remarks* on the same kind of Sophistry employed by Dr. SYKES against the *Divine Legation*.

His Lordship goes on: *Would there have been any more impropriety in holding out those of one kind than those of another, because the supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments, more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said.*

His Lordship totally mistakes the drift and design of the Author's Argument. The *Divine Legation* infers no more from
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the fact of the *omission* than this, That the Jewish Oeconomy, administred by an *extraordinary* providence, could do without the services of the *omitted* Doctrine; not, that that Doctrine, even under such a Dispensation, was *of no use*, much less that it was IMPROPER.

But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adversaries of the *Divine Legation*, will be ready to say, "If a *future state* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *use*, under an extraordinary dispensation, How came MOSES not to give it?" For great and wise ends of Providence, vastly countervailing the use of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of the *Divine Legation*: Who, if he did not impose upon us, when he promised a *third* volume, (as his Lordship constantly believed, he did) will there explain those *ends* at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the *omission*; And previously assures us, he is *not over solicitous about their weight*. This, I suppose, is to make his *Counters* pass current: For then, as Hobbes expresses it, they become the *money of fools*,
when

when we cease to be *solicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their *colour*, not their *weight*; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this must be said with exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining:

If (says his Lordship) the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to MOSES; that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.

It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in the *Divine Legation*; tho' as the Author of that book certainly believed, *the doctrines were not revealed*, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moses not at liberty to teach them: unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moses's pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commission. Thus far, then, these two Writers

may be said to agree: But this good understanding lasts not long. His Lordship's *modesty* and the others *pertness* soon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not so revealed* (says his Lordship) *some PERT DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to guess.* The readiness of the one and the backwardness of the other, are equally well suited to their respective principles. Should his Lordship have *guessed*, it must have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine origin of the Jewish Religion: Had his Adversary forborn to *guess*, he had betrayed his cause, and left those *data* unemployed, which enabled him, I do not say to *guess*, but to discover, and demonstrate the *Divine Legation of Moses*.

However, *This*, his Lordship will presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant MOSES, it is highly probable, that the Legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them. Was ever such galimatias! And all for the miserable pleasure of depriving Religion of
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this illustrious evidence of its truth. He personates, you see, a Believer, who holds MOSES to be an inspired Lawgiver: But how ill does he sustain his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive the LAW from God, or he did not. If he did not, Why are we mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *Law* from God, Why are we still worse mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for the *omission of a future state*, as the direction to *inculcate the Unity of the Godhead*? Why was all this mockery, you say? For an obvious purpose: it was to draw us from the TRUE object of our inquiry, which is, What GOD intended by the *omission*; to that FANTASTIC object, which only respects, what MOSES intended by it. For the plain, obvious intention of GOD evinces the truth of *Moses's mission*; but the intention of MOSES, when considered in contradistinction to GOD's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary
Law-

Lawgiver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

And now, having stript Moses of his *divine*, and again invested him with his *civil* Character; his Lordship considers, What it was, which, under this character, might induce him to *omit a future state*; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have proved hurtful to the doctrine of the *Unity*, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his People, in opposition to the Egyptian *Polytheism*.

Moses, (says his Lordship) *it is highly probable, made a scruple of teaching these Doctrines to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them, himself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheists, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theology and natural Religion were the inward Doctrine; while Polytheism, Idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the OUTWARD Doctrine. Moses was initiated into those*
Mysteries

Mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded——

For an accurate Divider commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the Mysteries* amongst the *outward*: tho' if they had an *inward*, it must necessarily be part of those *Mysteries*. But he makes amends presently, (tho' his amends to truth is ever at the hazard of a contradiction) and says, that *Moses learnt the inward doctrine in the Mysteries*. Let this pass. He proceeds—*Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recal the Polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity. The Children of Israel, it seems, knew no more of*

* D a future

a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief. What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more.* And what hindered MOSES from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordship lets us understand, that this People knew as little of the *Unity*; for he tells us, it was amongst the *inward* Doctrines of the Egyptians: Yet this did not hinder Moses from instructing his people in the doctrine of the *Unity*. Why then should it hinder his teaching them the *inward* doctrine of a *future state*, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested *Religious worship* of the absurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes. What should hinder him from divesting a *future state* of Charon's boat and the Elysian fields? But the notion of a *future state* would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And would not *Religious worship*, under the idea of a tutelary Deity, and a temporal King, recal the polytheism of Egypt? Yet Moses ventured

upon

upon this inconvenience, for the sake of great advantages. Why should he not venture on the other, for the sake of greater? For the doctrine of a future state, is, as his Lordship confesses, even *necessary* both to civil and religious Society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and superstitions concerning the soul; superstitions, which, tho' learnt in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheism; when, in other places, he assures us, that Moses indulged the Israelites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypt?

However, let us see how he supports this wise observation. *Rites and Ceremonies* (says his Lordship) *are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine, is, IN SOME SORT, to teach the rites and ceremonies.*

In some sort, is well put in, to soften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to shew, that a superstitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that

Doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practised, the Doctrine will soon follow. But this does not hold in the reverse, and the Rite follow the Doctrine; because a Principal may stand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never subsist without its Principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish Lawgiver, he concludes, that *MOSES being AT LIBERTY to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well chuse the latter* — Yet it was but at the beginning of this paragraph, that he tells us, *Moses was NOT AT LIBERTY to teach, or not to teach.* His Lordship's words are these, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this Legislator MADE A SCRUPLE of teaching it.* But his Lordship knows that Statesmen soon get the better of their scruples: and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above, that our noble Discourser, who makes *MOSES* so scrupulous

that he would, on no terms, afford a handle for one single Egyptian superstition to get footing amongst his people; has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them by wholesale. He was sensible his Inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it.—*Tho' he [Moses] indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and customs, which did not LEAD directly, tho' even they did so perhaps IN CONSEQUENCE, to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt.* And could teaching the Doctrine of a future state possibly do any more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE, (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) *to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt,* by drawing after it those superstitious Rites and fabulous circumstances which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a State? If, for the *hardness of their hearts,* they were indulged in *several observances and customs,* which only led in consequence to Polytheism and Idolatry, Why, for the *same hardness of heart,* were they not indulged with the doctrine of a *future state,* which did not

lead, but by a very remote consequence, to Polytheism and Idolatry? Especially since this *hardness of heart* would less bear the denial of a DOCTRINE so alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which, habit only and old custom had given a casual propensity. Again, those *Rites*, indulged to the People, for the *hardness of their hearts*, had in themselves little use, or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish Dispensation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a *future state*, by his Lordship's own confession, is most useful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Systems of Paganism; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he says, both a *rebellious* and a *superstitious* people: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might enforce obedience, but likewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.

You have here the whole of his Lordship's boasted solution of this important Circumstance of the OMISSION. And you see how vainly he strives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with
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the weight of so irresistible a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth, but so maimed and broken, that all his remaining strength is in his venom; which he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic Oeconomy; It is pronounced to be a gross imposture; and this very circumstance of the OMISSION is given as the undoubted proof of his accusation.

— “ Can we be surpris'd then (says his
 “ Lordship) that the Jews ascribed to the
 “ all perfect Being, on various occasions,
 “ such a conduct and such Laws as are
 “ inconsistent with his most obvious per-
 “ fections? Can we believe such a con-
 “ duct and such Laws to have been his,
 “ on the word of the proudest and most
 “ lying Nation in the world? Many other
 “ considerations might have their place
 “ here. But I shall confine myself to
 “ one; *which I do not remember to have seen*
 “ *nor heard urged on one side, nor ANTI-*
 “ *CIPATED on the other.* To shew then,
 “ the more evidently, how ABSURD, as
 “ well as IMPIOUS it is to ascribe these
 “ Mosaical Laws to God, let it be confi-
 “ dered, that NEITHER the people of
 * D 4 Israel,

40. A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S

“ Israel, nor their Legislator perhaps,
“ KNEW ANY THING OF ANOTHER LIFE,
“ wherein the crimes committed in this
“ life are to be punished. Altho’ he
“ might have learned this Doctrine, which
“ was not so much a secret doctrine as it
“ may be presumed, that the unity of
“ the supreme God was, amongst the
“ Egyptians. Whether he had learned
“ both, or either, or neither of them in
“ those schools, cannot be determined :
“ BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH
“ ASSURANCE ; If MOSES knew, that
“ crimes, and therefore Idolatry, one of
“ the greatest, were to be punished in
“ another life, he deceived the people in
“ the Covenant they made, by his inter-
“ vention, with God. If he did not know
“ it, I say it with horror, the conse-
“ quence, *according to the hypothesis I op-*
“ *pose*, must be, that God deceived both
“ him and them. In either case, a co-
“ venant or bargain was made, wherein,
“ the conditions of obedience and disobe-
“ dience were not fully, nor by conse-
“ quence, fairly stated. The Israelites
“ had better things to hope, and worse
“ to fear, than those which were expressed
“ in

“ in it: and their whole history seems to
 “ shew how much need they had of these
 “ additional motives to restrain them from
 “ Polytheism and Idolatry, and to answer
 “ the assumed Purposes of divine Provi-
 “ dence [7].”

This wonderful Argument, his Lordship says, he does *not remember to have seen, or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other.* This, You are to understand as a kind reproof to the Author of the *Divine Legation*: for none but He, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an Argument which none but He had employed. Give me leave then to *supply* his defects: I am the first good natured Animadverter on him that has done so; the rest have contented themselves with their best endeavours to *expose* them. However, had the Author of the *Divine Legation* been aware of the Objection, it is ten to one but he had done his best to *anticipate* it. But as his Lordship is so generous to invite an answer to it; he shall not be disappointed.

Let it be considered (says his Lordship)

[7] Vol. v. p. 194—5.

that perhaps Moses KNEW NOTHING of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished. — Considered by whom? Not by his Lordship, or his kind Readers: for he has brought them to consider the contrary. “ Many probable
 “ reasons (says he) might be brought to
 “ shew, that this was an Egyptian doctrine
 “ before the exode; and this particularly, that
 “ it was propagated from Egypt, so soon
 “ at least afterwards, by all those who were
 “ instructed LIKE MOSES, in the wisdom
 “ of that People. He transported much of
 “ this wisdom into the scheme of Reli-
 “ gion and Government which he gave
 “ the Israelites; and, among other things,
 “ certain Rites, which SEEM TO ALLUDE,
 “ OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION TO,
 “ THIS DOCTRINE [8].” This possibly
 might have recurred to his Lordship, while
 he was talking of this new and *unanticip-
 ated* argument, and therefore, in the
 tricking it up amongst his *Fragments*,
 to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very hap-
 py corrective, *altho’ Moses might have
 learnt this Doctrine, which WAS NOT SO*

[8] Vol. v. p. 238—9.

MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as it may be presumed that the unity of the supreme God was amongst the Egyptians. But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have trusted to the rare sagacity of the Public to find them out. For he had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; thus in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances; *Perhaps*, says he, MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE. Which, was NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as that of the Unity. Now, Sir, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 239th page, and there you will find, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET Doctrine, as that of the Unity.—“ There is reason to believe, “ that natural Theology and natural Religion were INWARD doctrines amongst “ the Egyptians. MOSES might be let “ into a knowledge of BOTH by being “ initiated into those *Mysteries* where the “ *secret* doctrine alone was taught. But “ we cannot imagine, that the Children of “ Israel in general enjoyed the same pri-
 “ vilege.

44. A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S

“vilege. No, *they knew nothing more*
 “*than the outside* of the Egyptian Reli-
 “gion: and if the *Doctrin* we *spe*ak of
 “[A FUTURE STATE] was known to
 “them, it was known only in the super-
 “stitious Rites, and with all the fabulous
 “circumstances, in which it was dressed
 “up and presented to vulgar belief.”—
 Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that
 a *future state*, divested of its fabulous cir-
 cumstances, *was as much a secret Doctrin*
as the doctrin of the Unity?

But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he says, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. I agree with him: It is that which adds a relish to all he advances.

He thinks he can reduce those who hold the hypothesis of no future state in the Jewish Oeconomy, to the necessity of owning, that MOSES, *or that GOD himself, acted unfairly by the Israelites.* How so, You ask? Because One or Other of them concealed a *future state*. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, *future punishment.* But who told him, that this, which was no sanction of the *Jewish Law,*

Law, was a sanction to the moral conduct of the *Jewish People*? Who, unless the *artificial Theologer*? the man he most decries and despises.

In all this sort of *Theology*, there being nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *Original Sin*, that gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion, every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY exclaims against it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of *the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; which, together with their *existence*, proves likewise the *happiness* of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shews them to be of his kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of *reward*, but *punishment*. Again, JESUS informs us, in a parable indeed, that the deceased *rich man* was *in a place of torment*. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a *future state* was become national. To know our blessed Master's sentiments on the abstract question of *subjection to an un-*

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known Sanction, we may consider the following words, “ The servant which knew
 “ his Lord’s will, and prepared not him-
 “ self, neither did according to his will,
 “ shall be beaten with many stripes; but
 “ he that knew not, and did commit things
 “ worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with
 “ few stripes [8].” Now the Will of a
 Master or Sovereign, declared in his Laws,
 always includes in it, the *Sanctions* of
 those Laws. The Author of the Epistle to
 the *Hebrews* expressly distinguishes the sanc-
 tion of the Jewish law from that of the Gos-
 pel; and makes the distinction to consist in
 this, that the one was of *temporal* punish-
 ments, and the other of *future*. *He that de-
 spised Moses’s Law died without mercy under
 two or three witnesses. Of how much sorer pu-
 nishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy
 who hath trodden under foot the Son of God [9]?*
 Which appeal is without common sense or
 honesty, on supposition that the apostle held
 the Jews to be subject to *future* punish-
 ments, before that Sanction was promulged
 unto them. From the GOSPEL therefore,
 it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites,
 while only following the Law of Moses,
 in which the sanction of a *future state* is

[8] Luke xii. p. 47—8.

[9] C. x. v. 28—9.

omitted, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or *natural Religion* (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an EQUAL PROVIDENCE, or the immediate government of God, to whom he hath given a Law and revealed a Religion, both supported by *temporal* sanctions only, can be deemed subject to those *future* punishments, unknown to them, which *natural* Religion before, and *Revealed* Religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under an UNEQUAL PROVIDENCE.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth, (as has been already shewn) on this Principle, "that the Governor of the Universe REWARDS and PUNISHES moral Agents." The length or shortness of human existence come not primarily into the idea of Religion; not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religionist, says he, *must believe that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of those who seek him.*

While

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments here, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be seen, that He was *not always* a rewarder and a punisher *here*; men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be both; *hereafter*; and consequently; that this life was but a small portion of human duration: They had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the Soul. And when they did so, that consideration, which, under an *unequal* providence came strongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency, under an *equal* one, to open to them the prospects of *futurity*: because, tho' they saw the Soul unaffected by those causes which brought the body to dissolution, yet they held it to be equally dependent for its existence, on the Creator's Will; who, amongst the various means of its destruction, of which they had no conception, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more for that purpose.

Thus a FUTURE STATE was brought; by natural light, into Religion: and from
thence-

thenceforth, under this unequal distribution of things, became a necessary part of Religion. But, in the Jewish THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, *here*. Natural light therefore shewed that, under such an administration, the subjects of it did not become liable to future Punishments, till that sanction was known amongst them.—And this, which Natural Religion teaches, we may be sure God, who constituted *natural* as well as *revealed* Religion, will confirm.

Thus we learn by the Principles of the *Gospel*, and of the *Religion of Nature*, that his Lordship calumniated both, when he affirmed, that, on the hypothesis in question, MOSES *Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then GOD deceived both him and them.*

Should it now be asked, how God will deal with wicked men, thus dying under the Mosaic Dispensation? give me leave to answer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE, to as impertinent a question. He had demonstrated a self-moving Substance to be immaterial, and so, not perishable like

* E

Bodies.

Bodies. This including the Souls of irrational animals, it was asked "How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?" To which the Doctor very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his Creatures [I add, with perfect justice and equity; and with equal measure, to all] "than we are, at present, "let into the secret of [1]." But if the Author of the *Divine Legation* has not promised more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much room to suspect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last Volume.

Nothing, then, remains of this objection but the sanction of *future rewards*: And I would by no means deprive the faithful Israelites of these. So that his Lordship has this to make his best of. And, in his opinion, even an unexpected *reward*,

[1] Octavo Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

is *unfair* dealing; for he joins it with *punishment*, as if his consequence against God's justice and goodness might be equally deduced from either of them. — *A covenant*, says he, *was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not FULLY, nor, by consequence, FAIRLY stated. The Israelites had BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, and worse to fear than those which were expressed in it. Tho' it be hard on the Benefactor, to be denied the liberty of giving more than what, in his Covenant, he had expressly promised; it is still harder on the Party obliged, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this case, the conditions are not FULLY stated; and therefore, according to his Lordship's Logic, BY CONSEQUENCE, NOT FAIRLY. To strengthen this Consequence, his Lordship concludes in these words—And their whole History seems to shew how much need they had of these additional motives [future Rewards and Punishments] to restrain them from Polytheism and Idolatry, and to answer the ASSUMED purposes of Divine Providence.*

Whoever attentively reflects upon all these concessions together — That Moses was

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himself of the race of Israël — was learned
in all the wisdom of Egypt — and capable
of freeing his People from their Yoke—that
he brought them within sight of the pro-
mised Land; a fertile Country, which
they were to conquer and inhabit — that
he instituted a system of Laws, which has
been the admiration of the wisest men of
all ages — that he understood the doctrine
of a FUTURE STATE: and by his experi-
ence gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy
of it in general; and by his perfect know-
ledge of the rebellious and superstitious
temper of his own People, could not but
see how useful it was to them in particu-
lar — Whoever, I say, reflects on all these
things (and all these things are amongst his
Lordship's concessions) and at the same
time considers, that MOSES, throughout his
whole system of Law and Religion, is en-
tirely silent concerning a *future state* of Re-
wards and Punishments, will, I believe,
conclude, that there was something more
in the OMISSION than LORD BOLINGBROKE
could fathom, or, at least, was willing to
find.

But let us turn from MOSES'S conduct,
(which will be elsewhere considered at
large)

large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *Omission*, exclusively of MOSES'S *Divine Legation*: but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another) he next attempts, you see, to prove, that the *Legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumstance of the *omission*. And now at last he will demonstrate that an *extraordinary providence*, in general, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the Author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumstance of the *omission*, was *actually* administered in the Jewish Republic, could not possibly be administered, without destroying free will; without making Virtue servile; and without relaxing universal benevolence. And, to make all sure, he shuts up the account by shewing, that an *extraordinary* providence could answer no reasonable end or purpose.

In his *first order* of evasions, he seems to be alone; but in the *second* and *third*, he had the pleasure of seeing in coadjutorship with him, many an orthodox Writer against the *Divine Legation*.

I have considered his Lordship's *first* and *second order*. The *third* remains to be examined: it is the last refuge of his infidelity: And then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of the *Divine Legation*, in case he chuses to take him up, in defence of the other principles of his book; all of which, with distinguished honour to this Writer above any other, his Lordship has attempted, to confute at large.

I. His first objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, such as MOSES promised to his People on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me observe, that he affects to disguise the immediate Object of his attack; and, in arguing against an extraordinary Providence, chuses to consider it in the abstract, as the Point arises out of an imaginary dispute between Him and the Divines; who, he pretends, are dissatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's justice, the administration of an *equal Providence, here*. But, this obliquity in disguising the true object of his
 attack,

attack, not being of itself sufficient to embarrass his adversaries, he further supports it by a prevarication: For it is not true, that Divines are dissatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for imputing this scandal to them, being only this assertion, “ That if the present state be the whole of Man’s existence, then the Justice of God would have exactly dispensed good and evil *here*: but, as he has not so dispensed them, it follows, that there will be a state of rewards and punishments *hereafter*.”

This being premised, I proceed to his first objection: — “ In good earnest (says his Lordship) is a system of particular providences, in which the supreme Being, or his Angels, like his Ministers to reward, and his Executioners to punish, are constantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reasonable?” [than the *Gods* of EPICURUS or the *morals* of POLEMO] “ Would the JUSTICE of God be more MANIFEST in such a state of things than in the present? I see no room for MERIT on the part of

“ Man, nor for JUSTICE on the part of
 “ God; in such a state [2].”

His Lordship asks, *whether the Justice of God would be more manifest in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, than in the present, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordship, by the present state of things, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the justice of God would not be more manifest, but equally and fully manifest in both cases. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a future state, then I answer his question by another; Would the Justice of the Civil Magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than where he suffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themselves?*

But he sees no room for merit on the part of Man, or Justice on the part of God. If he does not see, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himself and his Reader; to the turning his view

[2] Vol. v. p. 425—6.

from the Scripture-representation of an equal Providence, to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit, and to the injustices of Calvinistical election; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. See how dextrously he slides *Entbusiasm* and *Predestination* into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence. — *If some men were DETERMINED TO GOODNESS by the secret workings of the Spirit, &c.* Yes indeed, if you will be pleased to allow him, that, under an equal providence, the *will is over-ruled*, you must be forced to allow him there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this substituting, what he calls *artificial theology* in the place of *bible-theology*, is his usual leger-de-main. So again, *I can conceive still less, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or aversion, of love or hatred to God.* I believe, every Gospel-Divine conceives as little of this as himself; and as much of the consequence of such a system, viz. that it violates *God's justice*. But what have these human inventions to do with the *extraordinary Providence*, represented in

in holy Writ? To say, that this Providence takes away man's merit, and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the highest merit of a rational creature to comply with the strongest motive? And is not God's justice then most manifest when the order of things present fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly of these sentiments, when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish *hardness of heart*, he thought it more becoming the Master of the Universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their Wills; and, when, arguing against a *future state* from the present good order of things, he pretends to shew, *against Divines and Atheists in conjunction*, that there was little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of Providence; at least, not so much as the the World commonly imagined. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it made his Justice? But here his Lordship's followers may put in, and say, that their

Master has in this, done no more, (indeed scarce so much, at least, not in so express terms) than a celebrated Prelate, in one of his *discourses* at the *Temple*; who tells us, “ That an immediate and visible
 “ interposition of Providence in Behalf of
 “ the righteous, and for the punishment of
 “ the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH
 “ THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS,
 “ AND NOT LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR
 “ TRYAL [3].” But they who object this, to us, have not considered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well observes, *A little experience may convince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same* [4]. Now if *different times* may make such alterations in identity, what must *different men* do? The *thing said*, being by all candid interpretation, to be regulated on the *purpose of saying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke’s second objection against an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE, SERVILE.—“ If
 “ the Good, besides the enjoyment of

[3] Vol. ii. p. 258—9.

[4] *Scripture vindicated from the misrepresentations of the Bp. of Bangor*, p. 165.

"all that happiness which is inseparable
 "from Virtue, were exempted from all
 "kinds of evil, and if the wicked, be-
 "sides all those evils which are inse-
 "parable from Vice, and those which
 "happen to all men in the ordinary
 "course of events, were exposed to
 "others that the hand of God inflicted on
 "them in an extraordinary manner, such
 "Good men would have VERY LITTLE
 "MERIT; they would have, while they
 "continued to be good, no other merit
 "than that of children who are cajoled
 "into their duty; or than that of Gally-
 "slaves who ply at the oar, because
 "they hear and see and fear the lash of
 "the boat-swain [5]."

If the perfection of a rational Creature
 consists in acting according to reason;
 and if his merit rises in proportion to his
 advances in perfection; How can that state
 which best secures him from acting
 irrationally, lessen or take away his merit?
 Are the actions of the Deity of less worth
 for the moral incapacity of his being un-
 just or malignant? The motive which
 induces to right action is indeed more or

[5] Vol. v. p. 428.

less perfect according to the dignity or nature of the Agent: But the question here is not concerning the *perfection*, but the *power* of the motive, in turning action into passion; which is the only way whereby it can destroy *merit* in its subject. Now I hold that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, can turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greatest of Physical absurdities. For while agency remains, merit subsists: the degrees of which do not depend on the less or greater force of the motives, but on the more or less reason of the choice. In a word, there is no other means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, than by taking away agency, and making man passive, or, in other terms, a Machine.

But to shew, in a more popular way, the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe, that the objection holds equally against all religious Sanctions whatsoever. And so indeed it was frankly urged by Lord Shaftsbury; who pretended that every motive regarding *SELF*, tended to servilize Virtue; Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another; a
future

ture state, as well as an *equal Providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a *future state without an equal providence* (for they are always to be considered separately, as they belong to different systems) would more strongly incline the Will, than an *equal providence without a future state*; as the difference between *future* and *present* good, is infinitely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the *distance* of a good takes off proportionably from its influence, this will bring the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality; which proves thus much, and no more, That the objection to the *merit of Virtue* holds, as we said, against all religious sanctions whatever. In the use of which, Lord Shaftsbury was not only more ingenuous, who urged it against them *all*, but more consistent, as he urged it on his principle of a perfect *disinterestedness* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that *self-love* and *social*, tho' coincident, are two essential passions in the human frame.

“ That two consistent motions act the Soul,
 “ And one regards ITSELF, and one the
 “ WHOLE.

But

But we might go further, and urge against both these noble Adversaries of Religion, that the charge of *making virtue servile*, holds against all *moral* functions likewise, as well as against all *religious*; as well against that whose existence they allow, as against those which they would persuade us to be visionary; both these illustrious Patrons of infidelity maintaining, that *God has made the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty* [4].^{ob} But *interest and servility* is, with these generous Spirits, the same thing.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

— “But would there not be, at the
 “ same time, some further defects in this
 “ scheme? I think there would. It seems
 “ to me, that these good men being thus
 “ distinguished by particular providences,
 “ in their favour, from the rest of man-
 “ kind, might be apt either not to con-
 “ tract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL
 “ BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental
 “ Principle of the Law of Nature, and
 “ that PUBLIC SPIRIT, which is the life

[4] Vol. v. p. 429.

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“ and foul of Society. God has made the
 “ practice of morality our interest, as well
 “ as our duty. But men who found
 “ themselves constantly protected from the
 “ evils that fell on others, might grow
 “ insensibly to think themselves uncon-
 “ cerned in the common fate: and if they
 “ relaxed in their zeal for the Public
 “ good, they would relax in their virtue;
 “ for public good is the object of Virtue.
 “ They might do worse, spiritual pride
 “ might infect them. They might be-
 “ come in their own imaginations the little
 “ Flock, or the chosen Sheep. Others
 “ have been so by the mere force of En-
 “ thusiasm, without any such inducements
 “ as those which we assume, in the same
 “ case; and experience has shewn, that there
 “ are no Wolves like these Sheep [5].”

The *case assumed*, to which his Lord-
 ship objects, and against which he pre-
 tends to argue, is, that of an *equal Provi-
 dence which exactly distributes good to Vir-
 tue, and to Vice, evil*. Now the present
 objection to such a state is, an' please you,
 that this *favourable distinction* of good, to
 the virtuous man would be apt to *destroy*

his general benevolence and public spirit. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the sublimest Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed will be most highly rewarded: But the tendency of this favourable distinction, if you will believe him, may prove the loss of general benevolence and public spirit. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship has his reasons. God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our interest, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty?

—But men, who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on

others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE. What are those *evils*, under an *equal Providence*, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected*? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked. And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in Virtue? Is it possible therefore, he should grow insensible to those evils, which his Lordship calls the *common fate*, when he sees his *interest*, and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way to avoid those evils but by persevering in virtue? But his Lordship by calling them the *common fate* detects his prevarication. In this reasoning against an *equal Providence*, he slurs in upon us, in its stead, a *Providence which only protects good men; or rather, one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE.* But admit it possible for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate*: there is, in the *state here assumed*, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that*
fall

fall on others: for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordship tells us, *they relax in their virtue*: and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, *spiritual pride* (he says) *might infect the virtuous, thus protected*. And this he will prove *a fortiori*, from the case of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we should say, that this very *enthusiastic spirit* itself, and not the visions of *Protection* it is apt to raise, is the true cause of *spiritual pride*?

ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the *imagination* has got the better of the *judgment*. In this inverted state of things, *Enthusiasm*, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: which, in its extreme, begets this fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one sees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the *cause*, and not the *effect* of the disorder. For what but *spiritual pride*, springing

out of presumptive holiness; could bring the Fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him thither, would be greatly inflamed; and this addition would be indeed the *effect* of his disorder. For, as the real communication of Grace purifies the passions, and exalts them into virtues, so the strong delusion of such a state, only renders the passions more gross and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice, that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general *benevolence*, seems to have had the *Jewish People* in his eye; who in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the rest of mankind: a fact, which tho' it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here said of *Fanaticism*; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence, but not the memory, nor even

the

the effects of it: Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends naturally to destroy or to *relax* general benevolence.

Let us see now, on the other hand, the natural consequences, which the *actual* administration of an *equal* Providence would have on the human mind. In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common imbecillity of our nature, and too apt to disgrace itself by *spiritual pride*: but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered Votary we will now suppose to be received again into the number of the Good; and to find himself in the *little flock and chosen sheep*, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity, might revive in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of *spiritual pride*. Admit it might; and see

what follows. His *pride* revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work, it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow Creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an *equal* Providence? That which supports all his other insults on Religion; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an *equal providence* (which Religionists pretend has been administered during one period of the Dispensation of Grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked-men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect*, (which never existed but in overheated brains) where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation.

reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of justice.

But, now, Sir, keep the question steadily in your eye, and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph will disclose such a complication of absurdities as will astonish you. You will see an equal Providence, which, in and thro' the very act of rewarding benevolence, public spirit, and humility, becomes instrumental in producing, in those so rewarded, selfishness, neglect of the public, and spiritual pride.

His Lordship's last objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would NOT ANSWER ITS END.

“ I will conclude this head (says he)
 “ by observing, that we have *example* as
 “ well as *reason* for us, when we reject
 “ the hypothesis of particular providences.
 “ God was the king of the Jewish Peo-
 “ ple. His presence resided amongst
 “ them, and his justice was manifested
 “ daily in rewarding and punishing by
 “ unequivocal, signal, and miraculous in-
 “ terpositions of his power. The effect
 “ of all was this, the People rebelled at
 “ one time and repented at another. Par-

“ ticular providences, directed by God
 “ himself immediately, upon the spot, if
 “ I may say so, had particular temporal
 “ effects only, none general nor lasting:
 “ and the People were so little satisfied
 “ with this system of Government, that
 “ they deposed the supreme Being, and
 “ insisted to have another King, and to
 “ be governed like their neighbours [6].”

In support of this last objection you see, his Lordship was forced to throw off the mask, and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to say, to discredit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Moses. An *equal* Providence, says he, will not answer its *end*. What is its end? Here, his prevencations bring us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this Providence is administered for the sake of *Particulars*, its first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: When administered for the sake of a *Community*, its first end is to support the Institution it had erected.

Now his Lordship, proceeding from *reason* to *example*, gives us this of the Jewish Republic, to prove that an equal or

[6] Vol. v. p. 430.

extraordinary Providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that in this very place, where he employs the *example*, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless others of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—*How long this Theocracy may be said to have continued* (says he) *I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be sorry to mispend my time in inquiring.*

The *example* then is only an argument *ad hominem*. But the misfortune is, that no Laws of Logic will admit an argument *ad hominem* on this question, *Of the EFFECTS of a REAL extraordinary providence*; because the nature of the effects of a REAL providence can never be discovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To say the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended*. For 'tis a principle with him, that where the *means* do not produce the *end*, such means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions.

It is thus he argues against the Divinity of the Christian Religion; which he concludes to be an imposture for its not having effected that lasting reformation of manners, which he supposes was its principal aim to accomplish.

So far as to the CHOICE of his *example*. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have distinguished, concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us suppose now, that his Lordship takes the principal end of the Jewish Theocracy to be the reformation of *Particulars*. He refers to their history; and pretends to shew they were not reformed. Now whatever other consequences may attend this supposed Fact, the most obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordship, in proceeding from *reason* to *example*, has given us such an *example*, as overturns and wipes out his *reasoning*. According to his *reasoning*, an extraordinary providence would tie virtue and good manners so fast down upon every Individual, that his very *Will* would be forced, and the *merit* of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, absolutely destroyed. You would now perhaps expect

expect his *example* should confirm his fact? Just otherwise. His example shews, his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordship's bad reasoning. For, when we see it so constantly opposed to *truth*, it is far from being an additional discredit to it, that it is as constantly opposed to *himself*.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY, was the keeping that People a separate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH; and to prepare for his reception by preserving amongst them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the *Theocracy* or extraordinary Providence compassed its *end*, we have only to consider, Whether this people, to the coming of Christ, did continue a distinct Nation separated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and distinguished from them by the worship of the true God only. And on inquiry, we shall find, they not only did continue thus distinct and distinguished, but have so continued ever since. A singularity

gularity which has had no *example* amongst any other People: And is sufficient to convince us, that there must have been some amazing power in that *Theocracy*, which could go on operating for so many ages after the extraordinary administration of it had ceased. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge against the *due efficacy* of this extraordinary providence; but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the most ample confession of his defeat. And so much, for his Lordship's exploits in ANTIENT POLITICS.

Let us now come a little nearer to him, and consider him in his talents for the MODERN.

Here his Lordship shines without a Rival.

“ Whether to *settle peace* or to *unfold*

“ The drift of hollow states—besides to know

“ Both SPIRITUAL POWER AND CIVIL; what

“ each means,

“ What severs each,” —

as a Poet of the last age writes of *his* political Friend; who if he did not employ his talents more happily to himself or his Country, had much more to answer for, as they were vastly superior to our turbulent Gentleman's.

However, with the best he has, he proceeds to overturn the PRINCIPLES of the ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But the pains he had taken, and the opposition he had found from the ARGUMENT of the DIVINE LEGATION, had, by the time he came upon this second Adventure, so ruffled his manners and discomposed his temper, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language not only against the System, but even against the person of the Author.

To understand the nature of his Lordship's provocation, if at least it arose from this treatise of the *Alliance*, it may not be improper to say a word or two of the occasion of that Book, and of the Principles on which it is composed.

After the many violent convulsions our Country had suffered since the *Reformation*, by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conscience was oppressed; and at another, the established Church ruined and overthrown) it pleased divine Providence to settle our religious Rights on such

principles of justice and equity, and to secure the civil peace on such maxims of wisdom and true policy, as most effectually guarded both against the return of their respective violations: and the means employed by this all wise providence was the giving, on proper terms of security to the national Religion, a free toleration to all who dissented from the established Worship. This seemed to be going as far towards perfection, in religious Communion, as the long distracted state of the christian Church would suffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in possession of this blessing before they grew weary of it; and set on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old disorders. For it is to be observed with sorrow, that this reform of the English Constitution happened: not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE, at one time, vainly perhaps; anxious for the established Religion^a; at another, wisely provident for the support of civil Liberty^b. So that when succeeding dissentions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Constitution the subject of enquiry,

^a Ch. II.

^b Will. III.

the Parties who managed the debate, being those who before, had both persecuted and suffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the discussion of the right, were not such perhaps as were best fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their decisions. *One* Party seemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itself, and only a temporary expedient to prevent worse; while their conduct shewed they lay at watch for the first occasion to break in upon it. This was enough to mislead the *Other* to consider the TEST LAW, which covered and secured the established Religion, as no better than a new species of persecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this shadow of a grievance: to have divine Worship really free, they held, that no religious profession should be attended with civil incapacities: a TEST had made that distinction amongst God's Worshipers; it was therefore to be set aside. But every man saw (and perhaps the enemies of the *Test* were not amongst the last who saw it) that to set aside *this Law*, which, under a general *Toleration* was the only security of the

established Church, was exposing the National worship, to all the inroads of a sectarian rabble. This mischievous project, arising out of abused liberty, was at first entertained, as we may well suppose, by the tolerated Churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the discovery of that bigotted principle in their Adversaries, which considered *Toleration* as only a temporary expedient: And where was the wonder if those who believed, they had no security for what they had got, while such principles prevailed, should endeavour to put it out of the power of their adversaries to disturb them? Others of a more politic turn cherished it from views of ambition, and in hopes of sharing the emoluments of the established Church. It was some time before any Member of the Church of England joined with Dissenters in their clamours against a *Test Law*, or, more properly speaking, against their own *Establishment*. This monstrous coalition did not happen till a warm dispute on certain metaphysical questions, either too sublime to become the subject of human wit, or too trifling to gain the attention of reasonable men,

men, had started new scruples concerning Church Subscription. And to get rid of this necessary engagement to *peace*, and acquiescence in the established Religion, these wise and faithful Ministers of the National Worship were amongst the foremost, to lend a hand to it's destruction, and the busiest to trample down all its fences and securities.

BIGOTRY, you see, was at the bottom of the first set of principles; and *Fanaticism*, of the other. In their separate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference; All ages had felt the mischiefs of religious restraint and persecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Christian times, of the evils attending the WANT of an *established Religion*. The *Fanatics* therefore, were perpetually urging their experience against persecution, secure in not having the argument retorted upon them. But, in this imaginary advantage they deceived themselves; and the very *want* of examples was the greatest Advantage the *Bigots* had over them. It is true, (these might reply,) we have no instance of the evils attending the *want* of an established

Religion. But the reason is, because no nation was ever without one: The necessity of it, for the support of Society, being so indispensable, that Men even in the wildest times, who hated religious Establishments most, and who had been sworn and *leagued* together for their destruction, had no sooner the power to effect it, by the superiority of their arms, than they found, in settling the State, a necessity of supporting an established Church. Of which, we have a remarkable example in the *INDEPENDENT Republic*, and the *Protectorship* of OLIVER; both of whom, under their several Usurpations, were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the Religion they most hated, into the NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed, the distempers of the State, still further contributed to inflame those of the Church; and, on the Accession of the present Line to the Throne, occasioned a long, a famous, and a regular dispute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the *two Societies*. But as the several disputants had reciprocally given too much and too little both to Church and State; and had bottomed their
reason-

reasonings on one common fallacy; the defenders of a TEST, supported it on such reasoning as destroyed a Toleration; and the Defenders of religious Liberty, argued against the justice and equity of that security, on such principles as concluded equally against a national Church.

In this embroiled condition, the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State* found the sentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and establishments, when he proposed his *Theory* to their consideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our present happy Constitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, By adjusting the precise bounds of the two Societies; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who dissented from the National Worship.

He first shewed the use of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired from whence the

use arises, and found it to be from certain essential defects in the very nature and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the Nature of Religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a Society: And then, from the Natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the *body* and its interests; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that they are both sovereign, and independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to clash: the same-ness of *original*, or *administration*, being the only causes which can bring one, of two different Societies, into natural subjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore, to the service of Civil Society in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he shewed it was necessary, that the *two Societies* should be *united*: For each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying that Assistance, in any solid or effectual manner. But no such union could arise but from *free compact* and convention.

And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the *two Societies*, explained what those motives and advantages were. The result of which was, that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the *two Societies*, thus united, with the Civil Magistrate at their head, appeared to be those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy Constitution in Church and State; which hath perfectly reconciled an ESTABLISHED CHURCH with a free TOLERATION, by the medium of a TEST LAW: This Law therefore the Author in the last place, proceeded to vindicate, on the same general principles of the Law of nature and nations.

You have here, Sir, a true, tho' short, Analysis of the *Alliance between Church and State*; with the principles on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now examine the account his Lordship has been pleased to give of it. I shall take him paragraph by paragraph, in

his native disorder, as he lies: And for the same reason, that I followed a different method in confuting his Arguments against the *moral attributes*, which I thought fit to methodize and digest. For when a disorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him still clearer, and shew his arguments to more advantage, by reducing them into form. But when he is above measure cloudy and confused, as here in reasoning against the book of the *Alliance*, the like Assistance would be suspicious: for the cloud being immoveable, the Reader might come to fancy that both the *obscurity*, and the *order* were of the answerer's making. Therefore the safest, as well as fairest way, in this case, is to transcribe the Writer as he lies, and answer him as he rises. The obscurities in thought and expression, will be then found his own; and nothing can be objected to his adversary, but a few repetitions, which in this method of answering could not be avoided.

His Lordship preludes his attack upon the Book, and the Author, with this curious Narrative.

“ I have heard of a Sermon, preached
 “ by one DOCTOR SENIOR, a Fellow of
 “ Trinity

“ Trinity College, in Cambridge, before
 “ King Charles the Second at New-mar-
 “ ket, *in the days of passive obedience and*
 “ *non-resistance*, and afterwards printed.
 “ His text was taken from the 14, 15,
 “ and 16 verses of the ivth Ch. of Exodus,
 “ or some of them ; wherein God directs
 “ MOSES to take AARON the Levite, be-
 “ cause he knew that AARON could speak
 “ well to the People, and joins them to-
 “ gether in Commission, that they might
 “ assist one another mutually ; that AA-
 “ RON might be instead of a mouth to
 “ MOSES, and that MOSES might be in-
 “ stead of God to AARON. What other
 “ applications the good Doctor made of
 “ these texts, I know not. But I am in-
 “ formed by Mr. LEWIS, who has read
 “ the Sermon, that he established on
 “ them a supposed *Alliance between the*
 “ *Church and the State* : or rather between
 “ the Church and the King. By this *Al-*
 “ *liance* the well-spoken Levite was to in-
 “ stitute passive obedience to the King, in
 “ the minds of the People, and to insist
 “ on it, as on a Law of God : The King,
 “ on the other hand, was to be the nur-
 “ sing Father of the Church, to support

“ her Authority, to preserve, at least, if
 “ not increase, her immunities, and to
 “ keep her in the full possession of all the
 “ advantages she claimed. The Church
 “ performed her part, and had a right, by
 “ virtue of this alliance, if the King did
 “ not perform his, to teach this doctrine
 “ no longer, and to resume her independency
 “ on the State and on him. This was the
 “ purport of the sermon, at least: and WAR-
 “ BURTON took his hint, POSSIBLY, from
 “ it, and turned it to serve his purpose; that
 “ is, to lay down the same principles and
 “ TO BANTER MANKIND IF HE COULD,
 “ by NOT drawing directly, and avowedly,
 “ from them the same conclusion. Dr.
 “ SENIOR'S authority is, no doubt, as
 “ good in this case, as that of DE MARCA
 “ or even of BOSSUET. The first, a time-
 “ serving Priest, interested, and a great
 “ flatterer, if ever there was one, and
 “ who made no scruple to explain away
 “ whatsoever he had found himself obliged
 “ to say in favour of the State. The latter
 “ was as wise, if not as cunning, as learn-
 “ ed, and a much better man, tho' not so
 “ much in the favour of Mr. WARBUR-
 “ TON, who gave them Characters in his
 “ assuming

“ assuming style, without knowing any
 “ thing of them; and who has the *imper-*
 “ *tinence to pronounce* of the greatest Scho-
 “ lar, the greatest Divine, and the great-
 “ est Orator of his age, that *he was a*
 “ *good sensible Man.* He was all I have
 “ said of him: but he was an Ecclesiastic,
 “ and a subject of France. [1].”

As to his Lordship's account of this Dr.
 SENIOR, I scarce know what credit it de-
 serves: For he who will falsify a Book in
 every body's hands, will hardly be very
 scrupulous of what he says about a Sermon,
 which nobody has heard of, but his Friend
 Mr. LEWIS. At least if Doctor SENIOR was
 ever a man existing in this world; I should
 fancy he must be later than where his
 Lordship, who is no great Chronologer,
 has thought fit to place him. He tells
 us it was *in the days of passive obedience*
and non-resistance, and that the doctrine of
 his sermon was calculated for the service
 of popery and arbitrary power. May we
 not suppose then, that he flourished under
 his Lordship's *Auspices*, when the Church
 was last in danger? If this were the case, his
 Lordship uses Dr. SENIOR just as he used St.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 515.

PAUL [2], first sets him upon preaching *passive Obedience*, and then abuses him for his pains.

But let Dr. SENIOR live when and where he would, his Lordship thinks 'tis POSSIBLE that WARBURTON *might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him*. Yes, just as *possible* as that LOCKE took the hint of the *original compact* from FILMAR.

He assures us, however, that *the Authority of Dr. SENIOR is as good as that of DE MARCA, or even of BOSSUET*. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?—To support Mr. WARBURTON'S *doctrine of the Alliance*. But where is it to be had! Of Lord BOLINGBROKE, or Mr. LEWIS? Suppose this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or BOSSUET; yet the Author of the *Alliance*, perhaps, would not think it altogether so fit for his purpose: For he tells us, that his purpose in so frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DE MARCA and BOSSUET, in

[2] “By this *Alliance* of the hierarchy and the
 “ Monarchy, Religion that should support good go-
 “ vernment alone, was employed to support good
 “ and bad government alike, AS IT HAS BEEN BY ST.
 “ PAUL.” Vol. iv. p. 516.

favour of the State against the incroachments of the Church, was to shame those *Protestant* Divines who had contended for the *independency* of the Church, when established; and even for its *superiority* before.

But, of these two famous Frenchmen, *The first* (he says) *was a time-serving Priest, interested, and a great flatterer—the latter was as wise if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, tho' not so much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them Characters, in his assuming style, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greatest Scholar, the greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age, that HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.*

The Author of the *Alliance*, in the *Advertisement* to the last Edition of his Book, speaking of the French Translator, has these words—“ He supported them
 “ [the conclusions] all along with quota-
 “ tions from the two famous works of
 “ DE MARCA and BOSSUET; the one the
 “ wisest, and the other the MOST SENSIBLE
 “ DIVINE THAT NATION EVER PRODU-
 “ CED [3].”

[3] P. 13.

From these words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's representation, that BOSSUET is *not so much in Mr. Warburton's favour* as DE MARCA; and that Mr. Warburton has *the impertinence to pronounce* that BOSSUET WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN. In the heavy distresses of Controversy, many a Writer has been found to misrepresent. But to do this out of mere wantonness and gayety of heart, and then, on the credit of his misquotations, to abuse and call names, is altogether in his Lordship's manner.

But you will say, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the *familiarity* of the commendation, but in the *choice* of the topic. It may be so; and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordship, who has already furnished us with so many: "That when the *authority* of an Author is urged in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his *learning*, his *divinity*, and, above all, his *eloquence* should be insisted on, rather than his GOOD SENSE."

All this is but a prelude to the Combat. "The notion (says this great " Politician) of a FORMAL ALLIANCE
" between

“ between Church and State, as between
 “ two independent, distinct powers, is a
 “ very groundless and WHIMSICAL no-
 “ tion. But a fraudulent or silent com-
 “ pact between princes and priests became
 “ very real, as soon as an ecclesiastical
 “ order was established [4].” The lat-
 ter part of this period is but too true;
 and the Theory of the *Alliance*, (misre-
 presented in the former part,) was propo-
 sed to remedy these mischiefs. It is this
 Theory only, which I shall undertake to
 vindicate against his Lordship’s Objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what should
 he mean else) one actually executed in
 form; and supposes that the Author of the
Alliance between Church and State, asserted
 the actual execution of such a one,
 we may, with more justice perhaps, ap-
 ply to his Lordship what he says of the
 Author, concerning DE MARCA and
 BOSSUET, *That he gives a Character of*
the book called the Alliance, without know-
ing any thing of it. Give me leave to quote
 the Author’s own words — “ From all this
 “ it appears, that our plan of Alliance is
 “ no precarious arbitrary Hypothesis, but

[4] Vol. iv. p. 515—16.

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“ a Theory founded in reason, and the
“ invariable nature of things. For having
“ from the essence collected the *necessity*
“ of allying, and the *freedom* of the com-
“ pact; we have from the same *necessity*,
“ fairly introduced it; and from its *free-*
“ *dom*, consequentially established every
“ mutual term and condition of it. So
“ that now if the reader should ask, where
“ this Charter or treaty of convention for
“ the union of the two Societies, on the
“ terms here delivered, is to be met with?
“ we are enabled to answer him. We
“ say, it may be found in the same Ar-
“ chive with the famous ORIGINAL COM-
“ PACT between Magistrate and People;
“ so much insisted on, in vindication of
“ the common rights of Subjects. Now
“ when a sight of this *compact* is required
“ of the Defenders of Civil liberty, they
“ hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough
“ for all the purposes of fact and right,
“ that such original compact is the only
“ legitimate foundation of Civil Society:
“ That if there were NO SUCH THING
“ FORMALLY executed, there was, *vir-*
“ *tually*: That all differences between
“ Magistrate and People ought to be re-
“ gulated

“gulated on the supposition of such a
 “Compact; and all Government reduced
 “to the principles therein laid down;
 “for that the happiness of which Civil
 “Society is productive, can only be at-
 “tained by it, when formed on those
 “principles. Now something like this
 “we say of our *Alliance between Church*
 “*and State* [5].”

Let this serve too, for an answer to his Lordship's insulting question in another place — “But where shall we look for the
 “conditions of that *original contract which*
 “*was made between the religious and the ci-*
 “*vil Society*, I know not; unless we sup-
 “pose them written on the back of Con-
 “stantine's grant to Sylvester [6].” Does his Lordship know where to look for the *original contract which was made between the prince and people*, in any place of easier access? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the *back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester*, for this contract likewise? But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverse use of words, his Lordship means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* be-

[5] Alliance, third Edition, p. 165—6—7.

[6] Vol. iv. p. 419.

tween King and People, This indeed, the Author of the *Alliance* does venture to say; and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordship's opinion, stands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: so did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moses, from the Omission of a future State. Indeed his Lordship seems to have been as much distressed by WHIMSICAL *Divines*, when he wrote his *essays*, as he was by WHIMSICAL *Politicians*, when he wrote his Letter to Sir *W. Windham*. However, the *whimsical* principle, in question is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

This principle, his Lordship denies. And it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: For he who makes Religion itself a Fantom, can have but a slender idea how it should become embodied.

“ Neither NATURE nor REASON (says
 “ his Lordship) could ever lead men to
 “ imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDE-
 “ PENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE SAME
 “ SOCIETY.

“ SOCIETY. This imagination was broach-
 “ ed by ecclesiastical ambition [7].”

A grave sentence; which to me seems equivalent to this, That *neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that ONE was TWO.* In this, I readily agree with his Lordship. But then the difficulty remains, how such a thing could ever come to be *broached*, (as his Lordship says it was) by any *imagination* not more *disordered*, than it usually is; by *Ecclesiastical Ambition*. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there, his Lordship has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But *Church & Ambition*, he assures us, is of another mold; which, as it never failed to *aim at*, so, he assures us, it never failed to *obtain*, *immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power*. What then are we to think? That his Lordship meant, that *neither Nature nor Reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent Societies in the same COMMUNITY*? for *Community* being the genus, several Societies, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, merely for my own ease, I am ready to suppose, be-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 412.

*H cause

cause when his Lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted. *bb*

In this paragraph then are contained these two propositions:

1. That the Church does not compose a *Society*.

2. That it does not compose a *Society independent and sovereign*.

Let us examine his reasoning on these points as it lies in his works; for as disorderly as it lies, it is meant, I will assure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the *Alliance*.

“ A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (says his
 “ Lordship) BY WHICH IS MEANT, ON
 “ THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, IS, OR IS
 “ NOT, a creature of the State. *If the first,*
 “ it follows, that this order no more than
 “ others, which the State has instituted for
 “ the maintenance of good government,
 “ can assume any rights, or exercise any
 “ powers, except such as the State has
 “ thought fit to attribute to it, and that
 “ the State may, and ought to keep a
 “ constant controul over it, not only to pre-
 “ vent usurpations and abuses, but to di-
 “ rect the public and private influence of
 “ the Clergy, in a strict conformity to the
 “ letter and spirit of the Constitution; the
 “ servants

“servants of which, in a much truer
 “sense, they are, than what they affect
 “sometimes to call themselves, the Am-
 “bassadors of God to other men.” *If the*
 “*last* is said, if it be asserted, that the
 “Church is in any sort independent on the
 “State, there arises from this pretension
 “the greatest absurdity imaginable, that,
 “I mean, of Imperium in Imperio; an
 “Empire of divine, in an Empire of hu-
 “man institution [8].”

Thus far his Lordship, who is here reasoning against the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his Argument with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a *religious Society*, to be the *body of the Clergy*. — *A religious Society, by which* (says he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a Creature of the State* [9].

You cannot, I believe, see this assertion without some surprize, when you observe, that the Author of the *Alliance* has defined a *religious Society* to be A NUMBER OF RE-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 413.

[9] So again, *This order of men which we CALL the Religious Society*,—V. iv. p. 440. And again,—*The Religious Society, as we have accustomed ourselves to CALL the Clergy*. V. iv. p. 561.

LIGIOUS CREATURES ASSOCIATED [9].

— When you observe, that He makes it one of the principal cares of a *religious Society*, to provide an *order of men*, to be set apart for ministring in holy things, or in other words, a **CLERGY**. — “ The
 “ greatest care is to be had, that the acts
 “ of religious worship be preserved simple,
 “ decent, and significative. But this can
 “ be done only by providing persons set
 “ apart for this office; whose peculiar
 “ employment it shall be to preside in, di-
 “ rect, and superintend the Acts and Ser-
 “ vices of Religion, &c. [10]” — When
 you observe, he makes the *end* of *religi-
 ous Society* to be, *salvation of Souls*, and
 one of the *means*, the *order of the Clergy*.

— Lastly when you observe, he opposes the
Church and the *Clergy* to each other. It
 “ is unjust in the **CHURCH** to aim at the
 “ Propagation of Religion by force, and
 “ impertinent to aim at riches, honours,
 “ and powers. But what motives the
 “ **CLERGY OF A CHURCH** might have,
 “ is nothing to the purpose of our in-
 “ quiry. We have only to consider
 “ what the **CHURCH** had, WHICH, as
 “ a religious Society, consists of the whole

[9] *Alliance*, p. 55.

[10] *Alliance*, p. 61.

“ body of the Community, BOTH LAITY
 “ AND CLERGY [1].”

In a word, the Author of the *Alliance*, was at much pains to prove that a *religious Society* or *Church*, does not mean the *Clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reasons, for the sake of truth in general, and of his own system in particular.

1. It shocks common Sense to call one order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Substance, by the name of the Substance.

2. It subverted the Theory of the *Alliance* to make the *Clergy*, the *Church*: for then the Church could neither be a distinct Society, nor independent; both of which it must be, to make it capable of an *Alliance* with the State. It could not be a distinct Society; for an *order* of men, as I observed just be-

[1] *Alliance*, p. 112. The very popish Clergy, nay even that *time-serving priest*, and *great Flatterer*, DE MARCA, were more honest than his Lordship represents the English Clergy, as he might have seen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance* — ECCLESIAE CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR.

fore, is the same in politics, as a quality in physics; the one must inhere in a *Society*, the other in a *Substance*: and these being the substrata of the other, to talk of the independent existence of an *order*, or of a *quality*; is the profoundest nonsense in Politics and Physics. But admitting, that such a Church, which like *Trinculo's* kingdom, consists only of *Viceroy's*, and *Viceroy's over them*, was capable of allying with the State, the Author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that its motives for *Alliance* would be such as the State could not comply with, either in justice or policy.

But extreme necessity forced his Lordship upon this bold and violent falsification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He saw no other way of suppressing the opinion of an *independent religious Society*, than by shewing it to be an *Imperium in Imperio*, an *Empire of divine*, in an *Empire of human Institution*; a mischief, against which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society signified the Church, and the Church, only the *Clergy*, the claim to independency would imply such an *Imperium*. But the Author of the *Alliance* goes upon another principle; he holds that the Church

Church signifies the whole body of the faithful; that though this Society be independent, yet, from this independency, no such solecism in Politics can arise as an *Imperium in Imperio*. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble person misrepresents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

“ An *Imperium in Imperio* (says his
 “ Lordship) is in truth so expressly con-
 “ tained in the very terms of the assertion,
 “ that none of THE TEDIOUS SOPHISTI-
 “ CAL REASONINGS, which have been em-
 “ ployed for the purpose, can evade or
 “ disguise it. One of these I will mention,
 “ because it has a CERTAIN AIR OF PLAU-
 “ SIBILITY, that imposes on many; and
 “ because, if it cannot stand a short and fair
 “ examination, as I think it cannot, the
 “ whole edifice of ecclesiastical *independency*
 “ *and grandeur*, falls to the ground. It has
 “ been said then, that religious and civil
 “ societies are widely distinguished by the
 “ distinct ends of their institutions, which
 “ imply necessarily distinct powers and
 “ a mutual independency; that the end of
 “ the one, is the Salvation of Souls, and

* H. 4.

“ that

“ that of the other the security of tempo-
 “ ral interests; that the state punishes
 “ overt acts, and can punish nothing else,
 “ because it can have cognizance of no-
 “ thing that passes in the mind, and does
 “ not break out into criminal actions; but
 “ that the Church employing her influ-
 “ ence to temper the passions, to regulate
 “ the inward dispositions, and to prevent
 “ sins, as well as crimes, is that tribunal
 “ at which even intentions are to be tried,
 “ and sins, that do not ripen into crimes,
 “ nor immediately affect civil Society, are
 “ to be punished [2].”

This, I will suppose, his Lordship
 intended as a fair representation of the Au-
 thor's argument for the *independency* of the
 Church. Now the Argument, as it stands
 in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different
powers, belonging to the two Societies, as
 those *powers* are deduced from their diffe-
 rent *ends*. But different powers implying
 different administrations, create mutual in-
 dependency; and different administrations
 implying an incapacity of their clashing
 with one another, shew plainly that such
 an independency can never produce an *Im-*

[2] Vol. iv. p. 413—14.

perium in Imperio. This is the natural order of the argument. Let us see how his Lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of Souls, and Security of temporal interests*: But proceeding to speak of the different powers, adapted to those different ends, *viz. coercion* in the state, and *persuasion* only in the Church (from whence arises a mutual independency) he mistakes the *consequences* of these powers, which are *punishment of overt acts*, and *subdual of the passions*, for the *powers themselves*; from which consequences indeed no independency ensues; because *subdual of the passions* may, in his Lordship's opinion at least, be atchieved by coercive power, as well as *punishment of overt acts*. And if both Societies have *coercive power*, one must needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this mistake only to shew you, what an imperfect and obscure conception, his Lordship had of the Argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, tho' in fewer words, that the Author's reasoning against the pretended *Imperium in Imperio*, arising out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church

having

having none, the administration of the two Societies could never clash; that opposition being the only circumstance which makes the mischief of an *Imperium in Imperio*; Had he told us this, I say, we should have seen, that at least he *understood* his Adversary.

But let us consider how he goes about to answer what he so ill represents.

“ Now in answer to all this (says his
 “ Lordship) WE MAY DENY, with truth
 “ and reason on our side, that the avowed
 “ ends of religious, and the real ends of
 “ civil Society, are so distinct as to require
 “ distinct powers, and a mutual independ-
 “ dency. The Salvation of Souls is not
 “ the immediate end of civil Society, and
 “ I wish it was not rather the pretence,
 “ than the end of ecclesiastical policy;
 “ but if to abstain from evil and to do
 “ good works, be means of salvation,
 “ the means of salvation are the objects
 “ of civil Government. It is the duty of
 “ Princes and Magistrates; to promote a
 “ strict observation of the Law of Nature,
 “ of private and public morality, and to
 “ make those who live in subjection to
 “ them, good men, in order to make them
 “ good citizens. For this purpose, the
 “ ballance

“ballance and the sword are put into their
 “hands, that they may measure out pu-
 “nishment to every one, who injures the
 “Community, or does wrong to his neigh-
 “bour; and a rigorous punishment of
 “crimes, especially if it be accompanied
 “with rewards and encouragements to vir-
 “tue, *for both are intrusted to the same*
 “*men* [3], is the surest way not only to
 “reform the outward behaviour, but to
 “create an habitual inward disposition to
 “the practice of Virtue [4].”

We may, says his Lordship, deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are so distinct.—Here he contradicts his master LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts Truth, and the whole system of human affairs.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may*

[3] This is said, I suppose, in confutation of what is asserted in the Book of the *Alliance*, (to shew the imperfection of the plan of civil power) that *reward* is not (as it is generally understood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the sense that *Punishment* is so. But as this is all his Lordship has to say against it, I shall here let the matter rest between them.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 414.

says

says his Lordship, *deny that the AVOWED ends of religious, and the REAL ends of civil Society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual dependency.* The *avowed ends*, does he say? *Avowed* by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, *avowed* by those who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have said *real*; for the *avowed* and the *real* ends coincide: He *should* have said *real*; for the fairness of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require the use of this word. But by what he predicates of these *avowed ends*, *viz.* their *not requiring distinct powers*, we see, he means *avowed* by corrupt Churchmen. *The salvation of souls* (says he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of ecclesiastical policy*: and these *ends* are Church Uniformity for the sake of spiritual dominion. Now these *avowed ends*, we readily confess, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly

justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now tho' this be altogether upon principle, (for what should restrain a Statesman who believes nothing of the *truth of religion*, and sees all the mischiefs of *diversity of opinions*, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) yet you would not have *expected* it in this place, where his Lordship is defending religious Liberty, against the wicked Author of the *Alliance*; nor would you have *found* it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle, that the Church was a society, independent of the civil, as not having coercive power like the civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordship was forced to deny the minor, and so unawares has brought in *persecution* as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compass this matter neatly, and without noise, he has recourse to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expression, the *abuse* of the thing for the *thing itself*.—*The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil society*.—But it was so glaring a truth, that the *salvation of souls* was the

real

real end of religious, and *the security of temporal interests*, the *only end* of civil Society, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe, that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the first as the second; or that *instruction and exhortation*, was as proper to promote the second as the first: one of which things, his assertion, *that the Church and State have not distinct powers*, necessarily implies: To disguise this absurdity therefore, for *real*, which fair argument required, he substitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cause required. And under cover of this, he denies, that the two societies are so *DISTINCT as to require distinct powers*.—Well, this however we understand; and have thoroughly canvassed. But what mean the words that follow? — *And a mutual independency*. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had said, that the ends of the two societies were so distinct as to require *distinct powers*. But he was not so absurd to add—*and a mutual independency*; because, *independency* was not the *means* of attaining an end, like *distinct powers*, but a *consequence* of those powers: for if the powers, by which two societies are administered,

nistered, be *different*, those societies, (seeing their administrations can never clash,) must needs be *independent* on one another. This is given only as another instance of the cloudy conception this great Politician had of the plain argument of the *Alliance*; and the first principles of Laws and Politics.

Let me now proceed with his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had asserted, that the two societies are *not so distinct as to require distinct powers*. He is writing against the book of the *Alliance*; the author of which lays it down as a principle, that the end of the *religious* is *salvation of Souls*; the end of the *Civil*; *security of temporal interests*. To this his Lordship replies; that *salvation of souls* is only the *pretended* end of the Religious; but the *real*, tho' not *immediate* end, of the Civil. And thus he has, with great dexterity, destroyed all distinction between the two Societies.

I have already detected both the fraud and fallacy of the first part of his assertion; I come now to the other, that *salvation of souls is the real, tho' not immediate, end of civil Government*. Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent, than in the

the foregoing instance. It stands thus,—
 “The *immediate* end of civil government
 is confessed, on all hands to be *security of
 temporal interests*.— This is done by keep-
 ing men *to abstain from evil*; and exciting
 them *to good works*.— *Good works are the
 means of salvation*.— Therefore the *means of
 salvation are the objects of civil government*;
 or; in other words, the *salvation of souls*
 is at least the *mediate* end of civil So-
 ciety.”

The Author of the *Alliance* had obviat-
 ed all this poor sophistry in the following
 words: “Civil Government, I suppose,
 will be allowed to have been invented
 for the attainment of some certain end or
 ends exclusive of others: and this implies
 the necessity of distinguishing this end
 from others. Which distinction arises
 from the different properties of the
 things pretending. But amongst all
 those things which are apt to obtrude, or
 have in fact obtruded, upon men as the
 ends of civil Government, there is but
 one difference in their properties, as
 ends: which is this, *that one of these is
 attainable by civil Society only, and all
 the rest are easily attained without it.*

The thing then with the first mentioned property must needs be that *genuine end* of civil Society. And this is no other than *security to the temporal liberty and property of man* [5].

But his Lordship's sophistry consists in the ambiguity of the word END, which either signifies the consequence or issue of a *mean*, simply; or, the consequence and issue, with intention and fore-thought. In the first sense it may be true, that salvation is the mediate end of civil Society; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil Magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or issue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his punishments to unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* Religion, but on their malignity to civil Society. A plain proof, that, when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* considerations in his view. But you shall hear what the Author of the

[5] *Alliance*, p. 32—3.

Alliance has said on this subject, who had confuted his Lordship's sophism before he had conceived it.

“ We have shewn (says this writer).
 “ that it was the care of the *Bodies*, not of
 “ the *Souls* of men, that the Magistrate un-
 “ dertook to give account of. Whatever
 “ therefore refers to the *body*, is in his ju-
 “ risdiction; whatever to the soul, is not.
 “ But, and if there be that which refers
 “ equally to both (as *Morals* plainly do)
 “ such thing must needs be partly within,
 “ and partly without his province; that
 “ is, it is to be *partially* considered by
 “ him; his care thereto extending so far
 “ only as it affects Society. The other
 “ consideration of it, namely as it makes
 “ part of Religion, being in the Hands
 “ of those, who preside in another kind
 “ of Society. Again, with regard to
 “ civil practice; if we cast our eye on any
 “ Digest of Laws, we find that evil acti-
 “ ons have their annexed punishment de-
 “ nounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.*
 “ not in proportion to their deviation from
 “ the eternal rule of right: nor as they
 “ are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their
 “ deviation from the extraordinary reveal-

“ ed will of God; which two things in-
 “ deed coincide: but as they are CRIMES,
 “ *i. e.* in proportion to their malignant
 “ influence on civil Society. But the
 “ view in which the *State* regards the
 “ *practice of Morality* is evidently seen in
 “ its recognition of that famous maxim,
 “ by which penal laws in all Communi-
 “ ties are fashioned and directed, THAT
 “ THE SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT
 “ MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION
 “ TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME.
 “ A maxim evidently *unjust* were actions
 “ regarded by the the State, just as they
 “ are in themselves; because the *Law of*
 “ *Nature* enjoins only in proportion to the
 “ ability of performance; and human abi-
 “ lities abate in proportion to the contrary
 “ propensities: evidently *impious*, were acti-
 “ ons regarded by the State, as they refer
 “ to the will of God, because this State-
 “ measure directly contradicts his method
 “ and rule of punishing. But suppose the
 “ Magistrate’s office to be what is here
 “ assigned, and his aim must be the SUP-
 “ PRESSION of *crimes*, or of those actions
 “ which malignantly affect society; and

“ then nothing can be more reasonable
 “ than this proceeding. For then his end
 “ must be the good of the *whole* not of
 “ *particulars*, but as they come within
 “ that view. But the good of the whole
 “ being to be procured only, by the *pre-*
 “ *vention* of crimes, and those to which
 “ there is the greatest propensity being of
 “ the most difficult prevention, the full
 “ severity of his Laws must of necessity be
 “ turned against these [6].”

But, his Lordship goes on to tell us, What
 those *means* are which Princes and Magis-
 trates employ to procure this *mediate end*
 of civil Society, the *Salvation of Souls*; and
 they are, he says, *coercive force*. — *For*
this purpose, the ballance and the sword
are put into their hands, that they may mea-
sure out punishment to every one, who injures
the community or does wrong to his neighbour.
And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especi-
ally if it be accompanied with rewards and
encouragements to virtue, is the surest way
not only to reform the outward behaviour,
but to create an inward disposition to the
practice of virtue.

[6] *Alliance*, p. 35—6—7.

Who would have expected that it should come at last to this, so contrary to his Lordship's assertion in the case of an *extraordinary providence*, That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments, under the *Magistrate's Providence* (which indeed is the only one his Lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from *taking away merit and making virtue servile*, that it is the *surest way of creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the surest way of making virtue *free and meritorious*. But there is something wonderfully perverse in his Lordship's conduct. The exact distribution of Rewards and Punishments by Heaven, makes virtue worthless and servile, tho' the administration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way, if any, of *creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will believe him, the exact distribution of rewards and punishments by the civil Magistrate, makes virtue free and meritorious, tho' the Magistrate cannot operate on the mind and intention, the only way of *creating an inward disposition*

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sition to the practice of virtue, that is, of
making it free and meritorious.

But to come to the point, which these observations naturally introduce. The very *means* he assigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force*, for *salvation of souls*, entirely subverts his position, and shews this could be no end of civil Society, since the means are in no wise calculated to promote the end; it not being action simply, that intitles to the favour of God, but action upon adequate motives. Now with these, (which result into what we call *conscience*,) *force*, or coercion, is absolutely inconsistent: force may make Hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by such kind of reasoning as this that the *whole edifice of ecclesiastical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground*, (to use his Lordship's big language) Church Power was never worth the building.

But to proceed. His Lordship tells us next, that, "A clergy might co-operate with the civil Magistrate very usefully, no doubt; by exhortations, reproofs, and
" and

“ and example. — This they might do as
 “ assistants to the civil Magistrate, in con-
 “ cert with him, and in subordination to
 “ him. *To what purpose therefore do they*
 “ *claim and affect independency* on him?*
 “ Greater power never did, nor can ena-
 “ ble them to do greater good. Would
 “ they erect a tribunal to *punish inten-*
 “ *tions?* The very pretence is imper-
 “ tinent. Would they erect it to *punish*
 “ *where no injury is offered, nor wrong*
 “ *done?* The design is unjust and arbitrary.
 “ The ideas of crimes are determinate and
 “ fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter them.
 “ The ideas of Sins are more confused and
 “ vague; and we know by long and ge-
 “ neral experience, how they vary in the
 “ minds, or at least in the writings of ca-
 “ suists. Would they erect such a tribu-
 “ nal: *to try the orthodoxy of man's faith?*
 “ Such a one is erected in some countries,
 “ under the name of the Inquisition, and
 “ is justly detested in all. To what end
 “ and purpose then can SPIRITUAL COURTS
 “ and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED
 “ TO THE CLERGY serve, unless it be to
 “ make them judges and parties in their

“ own cause, when matters of interest are
 “ concerned [7]?”

His Lordship it must be remembered, is here reasoning with the Author of the *Alliance* against his notions of the rights of a Clergy in an established Church. And the noble person's first misrepresentation, you see, is, that this Author holds, that the Clergy remain independent on the State *during* their establishment; and that the coercive power exercised by them, under the Alliance, is *inherent* in their order. *To what purpose* (says his Lordship) *do they* [the Clergy] *CLAIM AND AFFECT independency on him, the civil Magistrate?* And again, *To what end and purpose can spiritual Courts, and coercive powers, ATTRIBUTED to the Clergy, serve?* And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to POPE, he says, “ Amongst all the fallacies which
 “ have been employed by Churchmen,
 “ one of the most absurd has been ad-
 “ vanced, tho' not invented, by a paradoxical Acquaintance of yours; and it is to
 “ maintain the INDEPENDENCY of the
 “ Church, and to suppose, AT THE SAME
 “ TIME, a sort of original Contract be-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 415—16.

“ tween the Church and State, the terms of
 “ which, every whimsical Writer, EVEN
 “ THIS SCRIBLER, adjusts as he pleases [8].”
 Falshood and ill language commonly go together.

You shall now hear what the Author of the *Alliance* holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the *independency*.—“ Let us see next (says he) what
 “ the STATE gains by it [the *Alliance*].
 “ These [advantages] in a word may be
 “ comprized in ITS SUPREMACY IN MAT-
 “ TERS ECCLESIASTICAL. THE CHURCH
 “ RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and
 “ making the Magistrate her SUPREME
 “ HEAD, without whose approbation and
 “ allowance, she can administer, transact,
 “ or decree nothing [9].”

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. “ The
 “ third and last PRIVILEGE THE CHURCH
 “ GAINS, by this Alliance, is the being
 “ INTRUSTED WITH A JURISDICTION
 “ INFORCED BY COACTIVE POWER [10].”

His Lordship tells us, the Author of the *Alliance* holds, that the *independency* of the Church is *retained* in an establish-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 417.

[9] *Alliance*, p. 147.

[10] *Alliance*, p. 134.

ment: the Author himself, says that it is *given up*. His Lordship tells us, the Author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the Church: the Author himself says, that *coercive power is a grant of the State*, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordship has improved upon his Masters, the Authors of the *Rights of the Christian Church*, and of the *independent Whig*: They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English Clergy. . . . But as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have said, the confutation of this calumny was not easy. His Lordship is *more bold*, he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established Church, by name: but then he is *more fair*, he puts it in the power of the person injured to do himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the *independency* of the Church under an establishment, and all claim to *inherent coercive power* whatsoever, but has laid down principles to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of those usurpations. The Author of the *Alliance* has vindicated

cated [1] the English Clergy from the prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; It had been hard, could he have found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the same calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As therefore, no *independency* in *alliance*, is either claimed or affected; and no *inherent coercive power* is attributed to the *clergy*, We will suppose his Lordship's simple question to be, "For what end is that tribunal, called a *Spiritual Court*, erected?" And had he been so fair to have let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he addresses his question, speak for himself, he would not have waited for an Answer. This Author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* [2]. But, as if he had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this *spiritual tribunal*, his Lordship falls a gueffing: and there is no kind of absurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by the Author of the *Alliance*, tho' they be such as this Author had already exploded.

[1] *Alliance*, p. 81, & seq.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 134.

To what purpose, says his Lordship, do the clergy claim and affect independency on the Magistrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to PUNISH INTENTIONS? The very pretence is impertinent.

Before I come to his Lordship's conjecture, give me leave, Sir, to say one word of the happiness of his induction. This Tribunal, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the Church till it has given up it's independency. The Author of the *Alliance* assigns a plain reason for it.—“The State (says he) having, “by this *Alliance*, bestowed upon the “Clergy a Jurisdiction with *coactive power*, this privilege would create an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO had not the civil “Magistrate in return, the *supremacy of “the Church* [3].”

And now, to his conjectures. Is it, says he, to punish intentions? The Author of

[3] *Alliance*, p. 149.

the *Alliance* says, No, it is for *reformation of manners only*. But you understand not half his drift, unless you consider these questions as proposed to insinuate, that the Author of the *Alliance* held the Absurdities contained in them. So here, for instance, you are to understand, that the Author of the *Alliance* held this Tribunal was to *punish intentions*. However, I will acquit his Lordship of malice; it seems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a *Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, his Lordship mistook this tribunal, for a *spiritual Court*. The Author's words are these — “ The effectual
 “ correction of such evils [as arise from
 “ the *intemperance of the sensual appetites*]
 “ must be begun by moderating and sub-
 “ duing the Passions themselves. But this,
 “ civil Laws are not understood to prescribe,
 “ as punishing those passions only when
 “ they proceed to act: and not rewarding
 “ the attempts to subdue them. *It must be a*
 “ *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as*
 “ *criminal which can do this; and that is*
 “ *no other than the tribunal of Religion.*

“ When this is done, a coactive power of
 “ the civil kind may have a good effect, but
 “ not till then. And who so proper to apply
 “ this coactive power, in such cases, as
 “ that Society, which fitted and prepared
 “ the subject, for it's due reception and
 “ application [4].” This *tribunal regard-*
ing irregular intentions as criminal, the
 Author calls the *tribunal of Religion*,
 (*Forum conscientiae*) and distinguishes it from
 that tribunal, which is invested with *coac-*
tive power of the civil kind, called *spiritual*
Courts: He makes the first a preparative
 to the other. Yet, strange to believe! his
 Lordship mistook this *tribunal of Religion*,
 so described and distinguished, for a *spiri-*
tual Court: and upbraids the Author of
 the *Alliance*, for supporting a *tribunal with*
coercive powers, to PUNISH INTENTIONS.
 But we shall see more of his Lordship's a-
 cuteness of this kind, as we go along.

His second charge against the principles
 of the *Alliance* is in these words — *Would*
they erect this tribunal to punish, where NO
INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE?
The design is unjust and arbitrary. The
ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed.

[4] *Alliance*, p. 99—100.

The Magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of Casuists.

To punish where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordship's periphrasis of the *punishment of vague lust*, which the Author of the *Alliance* makes one branch of the *reformation of manners*, and consequently an object of spiritual Courts. But his Lordship's own opinion of the *quality of vague lust*, intimated in this periphrasis, is but a second consideration. His principal ending in giving it, was to discredit the tyranny of spiritual courts, in punishing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is no dishonour: but to forget his HORACE is a disgrace indeed. Now this honest Pagan reckons the prohibition of *vague lust*, as one of the chief purposes of *civil laws*.

“ Fuit hæc sapientia quondam
 “ Publica privatis fecernere, sacra prophanis;
 “ CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura
 “ maritis.”

All this is so very extraordinary, that you would not readily believe his Lordship

ship

ship could design the *punishment of vague lust*, by the words — *punishing where no injury is offered nor wrong done*, did he not so clearly explain himself, in his curious distinction between *crimes* and *sins*: which, because it was occasioned by, and alludes to, a passage in the *Alliance*, I will first beg leave to transcribe that passage: “ If we
 “ cast our eye on any digest of Laws, we
 “ find that evil actions have their annexed
 “ punishment denounced, not as they are
 “ VICES, *i. e.* in proportion to their devia-
 “ tion from the eternal rule of right:
 “ nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in pro-
 “ portion to their deviation from the ex-
 “ traordinary revealed will of God; which
 “ two things indeed coincide: but as
 “ they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion
 “ to their malignant influence on civil So-
 “ ciety [5].” The Author of the *Alli-*
ance said this, to shew that the civil Ma-
 gistrate does not concern himself with Re-
 ligion, *as such*. His Lordship borrows the
 same distinction between *crimes* and *sins*, to
 shew that it is *arbitrary and unjust* to pu-
 nish *sins*, as *spiritual Courts* undertake
 to do: for, says he, *the ideas of CRIMES*

[5] *Alliance*, p. 35—6.

are determinate and fixed: The ideas of SINS are more confused and vague. From this, it appears, that his Lordship mistook vices, sins, and crimes, for different actions: whereas they are the same actions under different considerations, as they respect natural light, revealed Religion, or civil laws; and so have different names imposed upon them. The ideas therefore of these three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally determinate and fixed, or equally confused and vague. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordship to object to the *confused and vague idea of SINS*, since this idea is formed upon the *revealed will of God in the Gospel*, which, in a hundred places of his ESSAYS he tells us, coincides with the *eternal rule of right*; a rule, which he acknowledges to be most determinate and fixed of all things.

But he says, *the Magistrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the Casuist may, the idea of sins*. That is, the Magistrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What should hinder him? He had two advantages above the Casuist. First *coercive power*: secondly the *vague and confused* measure to which crimes refer;

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namely,

namely, to the *influence of actions on Society*. Matter of fact confirms this observation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and modern Times, and you shall find, that the *Magistrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuse in ranging actions under the idea of *Crimes*, than the *Casuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *Sins*. This was not improper to be observed in answer to his Lordſhip's *experience*, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to do him ſervice, the *abuse* of the thing for the thing *itſelf*—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the WRITINGS of caſuiſts*. By which it would ſeem, his Lordſhip knows as little of *Casuiſts*, as of any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has been ſo free with: For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt in *varying the ideas of Sins*, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical Tribunal, on the principles
of

of the *Alliance*, is, that it is erected for the punishment of opinions. *Would they erect*; says he, *such a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, says the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain words as he can speak; NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION [6]: And he not only says it, but proves it too [7]. *To what end and purpose* then, says his Lordship, can *spiritual courts and coercive powers serve, unless it be to make the clergy judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?* — *To what end?* The Author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But such an answer did not serve his Lordship's purpose. He will make the Author say as he would have him, or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cause. Hear again what the Author of the *Alliance* says upon this head;

[6] *Alliance*, p. 136. [7] P. 137—8.

“ CIVIL MATTERS, which temporal courts
 “ may conveniently inspect, can never be-
 “ long to an ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. It
 “ hath been shewn, that this Court was
 “ erected as a succedaneum to the Civil,
 “ to take cognizance of such actions as the
 “ Civil could not reach, or could not re-
 “ medy: which shews, the State could
 “ never intend to put those things under
 “ the ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that fall
 “ most conveniently under it's own. Be-
 “ sides, for ecclesiastical Courts to ingross
 “ matters that belong to the civil jurisdic-
 “ tion, as it can possibly have no good use,
 “ may very possibly be attended with this
 “ evil, of inviting and encouraging the
 “ Church to aim at more power than is
 “ consistent, either with her own good,
 “ or the good of the State. The great
 “ Founder of our Religion said, *Who made*
 “ *me a Judge or Divider between you?*
 “ And what he would not assume to him-
 “ self, he would hardly bestow upon his
 “ Church: and that the State should ever
 “ intend to give her what was the pecu-
 “ liar right of temporal Courts, is as diffi-
 “ cult to suppose. We must conclude
 “ then, that such practice, wherever it is
 “ found,

“ found, was derived not from the rea-
 “ sonable Laws of this Alliance, but from
 “ the authority of old papal usurpa-
 “ tions [8].” Thus far the Author of
 the *Alliance*; where you may find a great
 deal more to the same purpose.

His Lordship goes on with his confutation. — “ By admitting the independency
 “ of the Church on the State, the State
 “ acknowledges an original independency
 “ in the Church, derived from a greater
 “ authority than her own: and the sup-
 “ posed terms of *Union* may be construed
 “ to be rather concessions of the religious
 “ Society to the civil, for the sake of or-
 “ der and peace; than grants of the civil
 “ to the religious Society. Thus Religi-
 “ on and the Church are set on the same
 “ foot: no human authority can alter
 “ one, but must receive it in *the terms* in
 “ which it has been revealed; and so may
 “ a good Casuist prove on this hypothesis,
 “ that no human authority can measure
 “ out any conditions of Establishment to
 “ the other. Thus the State becomes no
 “ better than a coordinate, but inferior
 “ power [9].” I once met with a Phi-

[8] *Alliance*, p. 138—9—40. [6] V. iv. p. 417.

osopher of deep thought, who professed the same reverence for *artificial Nonsense*, that the Turks pay to *natural Folly*. His System on this point was very singular. He supposed that, as in the *material* World there was an universal, tho' very subtile, fire, diffused in secret thro' all bodies; which, by a late contrivance might be allured or drawn out from the most inanimate or lumpish Matter, even from the dirty shoes of the Chronologer of Leicester, who makes Time of Eternity; so, in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty Spirit, which lay dormant in the most inexplicable Nonsense; and only wanted the application of some Engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it free. 'Till such a one be discovered, we can but guess at his Lordship's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the Church on the State, (says he) the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own. If, by Church, he means the christian Church, it is confessed that its independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims for any of it's rights. But what are the consequences his Lordship draws from

from thence? The first is, that *then the supposed terms of union may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious Society to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society.* The *supposed terms* are terms of *Alliance* between two independent Societies. These terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than *mutual concessions* and *mutual grants*. What then does he mean, by their being *construed to be rather concessions of the religious Society, than grants of the civil?* By the *supposition* on which his Lordship condescends to reason, when the Church in *Alliance* gives up its original *independency*, it is without doubt a *concession*; because it is giving up a right. And, when the State, in *Alliance*, confers a *coercive power* on the Church, this too, is certainly a *grant*; because an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However some meaning, it is likely, his Lordship had. And it seems to be this, "That if the Church has an original independency, no such *Alliance* as is supposed, could be made: for that the terms on the side of the Church, would not be *conditional* but

voluntary concessions, the State having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking sense at least, tho' not truth. But, to *suppose* the terms of this Union, which are mutual grants and mutual concessions; and then to deny mutual grants and mutual concessions, is giving such a form to his argument as will need a *first Logic* to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *first Philosophy* to turn into truth. Thus much however you may see, Some cloudy conception his Lordship plainly had, that a society of *divine* original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of *h^uman*. When the Sons of God came down amongst the Daughters of Men, we are told they begot Giants. His Lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehensions were, his conception was very unworthy both of a Philosopher and a Statesman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath shewn
from

from the nature of things that Religion composes an independent society: The GOSPEL, by divine institution hath declared the Christian Religion to be an independent society. His LORDSHIP hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind: And the LAW, by divine institution, hath declared the Jewish Republic to be an independent civil society. Now I would ask his Lordship, if nothing hindered this *civil Society of divine Original*, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reasons, excepted by name, what should hinder this *religious Society of divine original*, from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Consequence which his Lordship draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELIGION *and the CHURCH are set on the same foot*. That is, as I understand him, for he might have expressed himself better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE. The consequence of which is, that the *State must receive the CHURCH on the terms in which it was revealed*. From whence arises another

other consequence, that *no human Authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the Church*: and, from thence another, (for his Lordship's false conceptions are always attended with superfetations,) that the *State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church*. All these brave consequences, we see, arise out of this principle, "that, in a Church of Divine Original, the *Discipline* is as unalterable as the *Doctrine*." And of the truth of this principle his Lordship is so confident, that he calls his Adversary a *stupid Fellow* for not seeing it. "The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this Paradox in English, did not see how ill the parts of it hang together, nor that if ecclesiastical Government was, by divine appointment, independent of civil, no such contract as he supposes could be made. The religious society, notwithstanding their known moderation; could not have parted from that independency, and superiority over the civil power, which God had given them [10]."

It is true, this *stupid Fellow* did not see it. And I don't well know how

he should; since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any *such contract as he supposes* could be made, unless the Church or religious Society was *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which this Author supposes to have been made between Church and State? He tells us, in express words, it is a *mutual compact* by FREE CONVENTION [1]. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, must needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The Religious Society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency, AND SUPERIORITY, over the civil Power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point: which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things,* HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a question worth debating. But as his Lordship rarely suffers an important proposition,

[1] *Alliance*, p. 87.

which

which he is set either upon denying or depraving, to pass thro' his hands without first clouding it in the expression with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarrass. *The religious Society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the civil power, which God hath given them.* Now as the Author of the *Alliance* contends only for the *independency* of the Church *before Alliance*, and as his Lordship's reasoning acknowledges that the question is only concerning this very independency, he must needs suppose, by adding, *AND SUPERIORITY over the civil*, that this *superiority* is a consequence of *independency*. And so, indeed; he speaks of it more plainly just before, — *Thus, [i. e. from the independency of the Church] the State becomes no better than a coordinate, BUT INFERIOR, Power.* Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, *superiority* is so far from following *independency*, that it cannot subsist with it. For why is religious Society by nature *independent*, (as the Author of the *Alliance* shews it is) but for

for the reason that Author gives, that it is *essentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* [2].’ But there is no ground for superiority of one Person or Society over another, but where some natural relation or connexion exists between them: none exists in this case; therefore a pretence of *superiority* on the one side, and of *dependency* on the other, is absurd. However, as I am verily persuaded his Lordship did not know enough of these matters even to prevaricate neatly, in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent mistake, arising from the following words of the *Alliance*, shamefully indeed, misunderstood.—

“ Such then is the nature of Christ’s king-
 “ dom [*i. e.* the christian Church] it is essen-
 “ tially framed to compose a firm and lasting
 “ Society; it is made such by divine appoint-
 “ ment, and in order to fit it for public ser-
 “ vice, it is both by nature and institution
 “ declared SOVEREIGN, and *independent* of
 “ civil Government, that it may adapt it-
 “ self by *free Alliance* to the various kinds
 “ of human Policies [3].” Now *sovereign and independent of civil govern-
 “ ment*, this great Writer has paraphrased

[2] *Alliance*, p. 65. [3] *Ibid.* p. 180.

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to signify, *independency and superiority over
the civil.*

But the question itself, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY, WHICH GOD, *as well as the Nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT, his Lordship determines in the negative. *For if*, says he, *ecclesiastical Government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the Religious Society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, created *free and independent*, therefore, according to this reasoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become subject to civil Laws. Hold, says his Lordship, Man was created free, that he might be subject to no civil laws but those to which he had given his consent; and he had a right to part with his independency in order to procure protection. And is not this the very case of Religious Society, which is only an artificial person, by nature free, and standing in need of protection?

But his Lordship's assertion, you will find, bottoms at last upon this Principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL

IT'S

IT'S LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: An Error which *Bigots* and *Fanatics* indeed, are equally fond of indulging, to the infinite disservice both of civil and of religious Society: But that a *philosopher* and a *Statesman* should know so little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly astonishing. The first elements of his profession might have taught him, "That the authority by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the essence of the thing." Natural and positive duties retain their respective essences in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal; positive duties revocable. Of these latter, some are lasting as the dispensation to which they belong; others temporary. Of the temporary, some cease not till expressly revoked; others cease with the occasion that enjoined them. These last are again to be distinguished into privileges and duties; privileges may be receded from at pleasure; but duties must either be revoked, or the occasion must be plainly seen to cease. Now the INDEPENDENCY, in question, is one of those institutions in the divine Law, which ceases with the occasion; and is besides a privilege,

ledge, which may be receded from, at pleasure. Again, In the divine Laws, some things are enjoined to be believed as truths; others to be practised as utilities. Of utilities some are general; others particular: The first of these are permanent and constant; the second variable. Of the first, is the Churches composing a *Society*: of the second, is the *particular form*. Thus, Jesus seemed to institute an equal ministry; the Apostles, episcopal Government; and modern Churches, both one and the other, as best suited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

As Christianity was, by divine institution, a *society at large*, to authorize and to enable the several Churches to give particular forms to ecclesiastical Government; so the *independency* was bestowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himself allied the Jewish Church with the State, he left not that Religion a *society at large*, neither did he ordain it *independent*: he prescribed in the minutest manner the form of Church Government, and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the *Alliance*

tells his story better. “ The christian religion (says he) was not only left *independent* of the State by not being united to it like the Jewish; (and being so left it must needs by the Law of nature be independent) but its independency was likewise secured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of it’s founder, *My kingdom is not of this world*; which bears this plain and obvious sense, *That the kingdom of Christ, to be extended over all Mankind, was not like the kingdom of God, confined to the Jewish people, where Religion was incorporated with the State; and therefore, of this world, as well in the exercise of it, as in the rewards and punishments by which it was administered: but was independent of all civil communities; and therefore, neither of this world, as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it was administered.*— But whoever imagines that from this *independency by institution*, the Church cannot convene and unite with the State, concludes much too fast. We have observed, that this property in the *Kingdom of Christ* was given as a mark to distinguish it

“ from the *kingdom of God*, that is, it was
 “ given to shew that this Religion ex-
 “ tended to all mankind; and was not,
 “ like the Mosaic, confined to one only
 “ people. Consequently, that very rea-
 “ son which made it proper for the Mo-
 “ saic Religion to be united, by divine ap-
 “ pointment, to the State, made it fit,
 “ the Christian should be left free and in-
 “ dependent. But for what end, if not
 “ for this, To be at liberty to adapt itself
 “ to the many various kinds of civil poli-
 “ cies, by a suitable union and alliance.
 “ —An Alliance then we must conclude
 “ the christian Church was at liberty to
 “ make, notwithstanding this declared na-
 “ ture of *Christ's kingdom*. So far is true
 “ indeed; that it is debarred from entering
 “ into any such *Alliance* with the State as
 “ may admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's
 “ kingdom but himself [that is, a power in
 “ the Magistrate to alter *doctrines*.] But
 “ no such power is granted or usurped by
 “ the *supremacy* of the State [4].” [which
 extends only to DISCIPLINE.

From all this it appears, that the unalterable part of the Law of Christ is

[4] *Alliance*, p. 178—9, &c.

the DOCTRINE : and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE : but it is the latter, with which Society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on *Alliance* with the Church. Therefore, when his Lordship says, *Religion and the Church being set on the same foot; no human authority can alter one, but must receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed*, if he means, there can be no alteration in *discipline*, I have shewn he is mistaken : if he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right ; and I consider his Lordship's observation as a complaint, that, by the constitution of the Christian Church, the Magistrate cannot tyrannize over Conscience.

In the mean time we see to what little purpose this great Philosopher and Statesman had read his HOOKER ; of whom he confesses something might be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have shewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all it's Laws to one and the same species. — “ Positive
“ Laws (says this truly great Man) are ei-
“ ther permanent or else changeable, ac-
“ cording as the matter itself is, concern-
“ ing

“ ing which they were first made. Whe-
 “ ther GOD or MAN be the maker of them,
 “ ALTERATION they so far forth admit, as
 “ the MATTER doth exact. Wherefore,
 “ to end with a general rule concerning all
 “ the Laws which God hath tied men un-
 “ to: those Laws divine, that belong,
 “ whether naturally or supernaturally, ei-
 “ ther to men as men, or to men as they
 “ live in politique Society, or to men as
 “ they are of that politique Society which
 “ is the Church, without any further re-
 “ spect had unto any such variable acci-
 “ dent as the State of men, and of Socie-
 “ ties of men, and of the Church itself in
 “ this world, is subject unto; all Laws that
 “ so belong unto men, they belong for
 “ ever, yea altho’ they be positive Laws,
 “ unless, being positive, God himself which
 “ made them alter them. The reason is,
 “ because the subject or matter of Laws in
 “ general, is thus far forth constant:
 “ which matter is that for the ordering
 “ whereof, Laws were instituted, and be-
 “ ing instituted are not changeable with-
 “ out cause, neither can they have cause
 “ of change, when that which gave them
 “ their first institution remaineth for ever
 “ one

“ one and the same. On the other side,
 “ Laws that were made for men, or Socie-
 “ ties, or Churches, in regard of their be-
 “ ing such as do not always continue, but
 “ may perhaps be clean otherwise a-while af-
 “ ter, and so may be required to be other-
 “ wise ordered than before; the Laws of
 “ God himself which are of this nature, NO
 “ MAN ENDOWED WITH COMMON SENSE
 “ will ever deny to be of a different con-
 “ stitution from the former, in respect of
 “ the one’s constancy, and the mutability of
 “ the other [5].”

Thus far this country Parson. And
 how meanly does his Lordship figure be-
 fore him with his assertion, that *divine*
law makes every thing, which relates to the
Church, equally unalterable? Yet this no-
 ble person, thus ignorant of the very first
 elements of Law, can harangue, with
 the air and authority of an Oracle, on
 a *patriot king*, on *civil liberty*, on
Church Tyranny, and on the *ballance of*
power. Master Hooker will tell you,
 how easily all this may be done without
 knowing more than our neighbours.

[5] *Eccl. Pol. L. i. Sect. 15.*

—“ Thus far therefore (says he) we
 “ have endeavoured, in part, to open, of
 “ what nature and force laws are, accord-
 “ ing unto their several kinds: the Law
 “ which God himself hath eternally set
 “ down to follow in his own works; the
 “ Law which he hath made for his crea-
 “ tures to keep; the Law of natural and
 “ necessary Agents; the law which angels
 “ in Heaven obey; the Law whereunto,
 “ by the light of reason, men find them-
 “ selves bound, in that they are men;
 “ the Law which they made by composi-
 “ tion for multitudes and politique Socie-
 “ ties of men to be guided by; the Law
 “ which belongeth unto each nation; the
 “ Law that concerneth the fellowship of
 “ all; and lastly the Law which God
 “ himself hath supernaturally revealed.

It might peradventure have been more
 “ POPULAR AND MORE PLAUSIBLE TO
 “ VULGAR EARS, *if this discourse had been*
 “ *spent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE OF
 “ LAWS, *in shewing the* GREAT NECESSI-
 “ TY OF THEM, *when they are* GOOD,
 “ and in AGGRAVATING THEIR OF-
 “ FENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS ARE
 “ INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But for-*

“ *asmuch as with such kind of matter* THE
 “ PASSIONS OF MEN *are rather stirred one*
 “ *way or other, than* THEIR KNOWLEDGE
 “ *any way set forward* unto the trial of
 “ that whereof there is doubt made, I
 “ have therefore turned aside from that
 “ BEATEN PATH, and chosen, tho’ a
 “ LESS EASY, yet a more profitable way,
 “ in regard of the end we propose [6].”

Great Names, however, are still of great service to his Lordship: for tho’ he cannot profit by their lights, he can shine at their expence: and, having well chicaned their expressions, can convert the truths, contained in them, to his own use. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. HOOKER and LOCKE have been supposed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas! *nil sine Theseo*. There is nothing so well done, which his Lordship cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much solemnity, for *representing mankind to themselves, like a number of savage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, instead of considering them as members of families from their birth.* “ This (he says) has made

[6] *Eccl. Pol.* L. i. Sect. 16.

“ them reason INCONSISTENTLY, and on
 “ a FALSE FOUNDATION. *Inconsistently,*
 “ because they sometimes acknowledge pa-
 “ ternal Government to have preceded
 “ civil, and yet reason about the instituti-
 “ on of civil, as if men had then first
 “ assembled in any kind of society, or had
 “ been subject to any kind of rule; for
 “ to say that the Law of nature was of it-
 “ self such a rule, and that every one of
 “ these independent inhabitants of the
 “ earth did or might exercise Justice for
 “ himself, and others on those who violat-
 “ ed the Law, was language unworthy of
 “ Mr. LOCKE, and unnecessary to his Sys-
 “ tem. — *Falsely,* because it is easy to de-
 “ monstrate that mankind never was in
 “ such a State [7].”

To say the truth, *easy* enough, and like
demonstrating day-light. A man need only
 open his eyes to see that a Mother does not
 abandon her infant, as soon as she has
 dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care
 of them. Is it possible then that HOOKER,
 LOCKE and their Followers, should want,
 to be told by his Lordship so obvious a
 truth, “ That, before civil Society, man,

kind started not up like mushrooms, a number of savage individuals, but lived in tribes and families." Why then, you ask, did not HOOKER and LOCKE so consider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil Society? For two very important reasons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

First because the real origin of civil Society appearing equally on either supposition, the truths, which followed from it, were clearer seen, as less embarrassed, by considering mankind before civil Society as individuals.

But this was not all. Had They considered men before civil society as ranked under tribes, the rights belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, tho' neither relative to, nor connected with, those of a civil kind, might have given too much countenance, to that absurd System, which derives political Rule from the *Patriarchal*; a system which, both for its absurdities and mischiefs, it was the purpose of LOCKE and HOOKER to discredit. The former therefore did judiciously to assert (as he might do it truly; for the *exercise of justice* no more belonged to Fathers
of

of Families, as such, than the *exercise of Regal prerogative*) that, before the institution of Civil Society, *every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exercise justice for himself and others, on those who violated the Law.* Yet this, his Lordship calls language unworthy of his Master. Nay, so great a stranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the representation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we see it was done to keep the unwary from being misled by the sight of circumstances of no use to assist an honest man's judgment, and which knaves might wrest to the support of error.

---But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordship goes on against the Book of the *Alliance* in this Manner: " This imaginary Contract, in short, whether well or ill made, never existed at any time, nor in any Country; though, to have been real, and really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all Countries where Christianity was propagated. Political Societies make and alter and break their *Alliances*, as the varying reason of state suggests. Different orders of civil Government in the same Society

“ Society change, and with them the
 “ whole Constitution of such Governments,
 “ as reason or passion, the interests or the
 “ dispositions of men determine them. *But*
 “ *a Religion given by God is in its nature*
 “ *invariable.* And therefore if a Religi-
 “ ous Society with certain privileges,
 “ immunities, and prerogatives be necessary
 “ to preserve it so, the *order and constitu-*
 “ *tion* of such a Society must be *invariable*
 “ too. The Church must be established
 “ by the same divine Authority as the Re-
 “ ligion, and be by consequence independ-
 “ ent of the State. But nothing of this
 “ kind has been. Christ's *Kingdom was*
 “ *not of this World.* He sent out his A-
 “ postles to teach, and to baptize; and
 “ the utmost power he gave them, besides
 “ that of working Miracles to convince and
 “ to convert, was to shake off the dust of
 “ their feet, and to protest against the in-
 “ fidelity of those who refused to receive
 “ them, and the Gospel they published.
 “ The Apostles ordained others to accom-
 “ pany and to succeed them in the same
 “ office, the office of teaching and baptiz-
 “ ing. The Apostles could give no more
 “ power than they received; and no ar-
 “ gument

“ gument of *right* can be drawn from any
 “ thing that passed, or from any thing
 “ that these Men did for the Maintenance
 “ of their Sect, while Christianity was a
 “ Sect [8.]”

This imaginary Contract (he says) *never existed at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *Contract* actually and formally executed, I have given an answer to that already, and have shewn, that the objection holds equally against *the original contract between King and People*; which I suppose his Lordship deems not to be altogether so *imaginary* but that the *prerogative* of the one, and the *rights* of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the principles there laid down. But you shall hear the Author of the *Alliance* on this matter.

“ [9] When I say that *all* regular poli-
 “ ed States had *an Established Religion*, I
 “ mean no more than He would do, who,
 “ deducing Civil Society from its true O-
 “ riginal, should, in order to persuade
 “ Men of the Benefits it produces, affirm
 “ that all Nations had a *Civil Policy*. For
 “ as this Writer could not be supposed to

[8] Vol. iv. p. 419—20. [9] *Alliance*, p. 114—117.

“ mean that every one constituted a free
 “ State, on the Principles of public Liber-
 “ ty, which yet was the only Society he
 “ purposed to prove was founded on Truth,
 “ and productive of public Good ; because
 “ it is notorious, that the far greater Part
 “ of Civil Policies are founded on different
 “ Principles ; or abused to different Ends :
 “ so neither would I be understood to
 “ mean, when I say all Nations concurred
 “ in making this *Union*, that they all ex-
 “ actly discriminated the Natures, and
 “ fairly adjusted the Rights of both Socie-
 “ ties, on the Principles here laid down ;
 “ tho’ an *Establishment* resulting from this
 “ Discrimination and Adjustment be the
 “ only one I would be supposed to recom-
 “ mend. On the contrary, I know this
 “ Union has been generally made on mista-
 “ ken Principles ; or, if not so, hath de-
 “ generated in length of Time ; by which
 “ means the National Religion in the Pa-
 “ gan World hath been most commonly a
 “ Slave to the State ; and in the Christian
 “ System, the State sometimes a Slave to
 “ the Established Church. And as it was suffi-
 “ cient for that Writer’s Purpose, that those
 “ Societies, whether good or bad, proved the
 “ Sense

“ Sense all Men had of the Benefits re-
 “ sulting from Civil Policy in general,
 “ though they were oft mistaken in the
 “ Application; so it is for Ours, that this
 “ universal Concurrence in the two Sociè-
 “ ties to *unite*, shews the Sense Mankind
 “ had of the Usefulness of such an *Union*.
 “ And lastly, as that Writer’s Principles
 “ are not the less true on account of the
 “ general Deviation from them in forming
 “ Civil Societies; so may not the plain
 “ ones of *Alliance* here delivered; tho’ so
 “ few States have suffered themselves to be
 “ directed by them in Practice; nor any
 “ Man before delivered them in Specula-
 “ tion; especially if, as in that Case, so in
 “ *this*, we can derive such *Mistake* and
 “ *Degeneracy* from their Causes. It would
 “ draw me too far out of my Way to ex-
 “ plain distinctly the Causes of the *Mistake*;
 “ and the intelligent Reader, who care-
 “ fully attends to the whole of this Dis-
 “ course, will not be at a Loss to discover
 “ the most considerable of them; some of
 “ which I have already hinted at; and
 “ others, I may possibly, in the Sequel of
 “ this Discourse, take occasion to mention.
 “ As for the *Degeneracy*, we have observ-

“ ed, that the *Alliance* is of the Nature of
 “ the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA: Now, the
 “ common Issue of such, *Grotius* acquaints
 “ us with, in these Words: *Interim verum*
 “ *est accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est*
 “ *in fœdere, SI IS POTENTIA MULTUM*
 “ ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM
 “ PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET: PRÆSER-
 “ TIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT [9.]”

But if, by, *never existed*, his Lordship means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow such an *Alliance*, were never actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, his assertion is false. They are at this present actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy Constitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpose of the Book of the *Alliance* to shew they are so, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: “ We see how unreasonable and
 “ even how impolitic our Adversaries are,
 “ when in their ill humour with *Establissh-*
 “ *ments*, they chuse to pick a quarrel with
 “ their own; where the natural Religion *nationa*

[9] *De jure Belli & Pacis*, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

" is on a footing exactly agreeable to the
 " nature of a *free Convention between*
 " *Church and State*, on the principles of
 " the Laws of Nature and Nations. A
 " felicity, they should have known, that
 " scarce any other People on the face of
 " the earth can boast of. In *England*
 " alone the original terms of this *Conven-*
 " *tion* are kept up to so exactly, that this
 " account of the *Alliance between Church*
 " *and State* seems rather a copy of the
 " Church and State of *England*, than a
 " Theory, as indeed it was, formed solely
 " on the contemplation of Nature, and
 " the unvariable reason of things [10.]

To make this contract (says his Lordship)
real, and to be really authorized, it should
have been the same at all times and in all
countries where Christianity was professed.
 In other words, " *Right* must receive
 " its nature from *Fact*:" or, in still
 plainer terms, " *Right* becomes *Wrong*
 " when rejected, and *Wrong* becomes
 " *Right* when received." How would
 this sound when applied to the ORIGINAL
 CONTRACT between Prince and People?
 —to make it real and to be really authorized,

it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.

But *political Societies* (he says) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests.* If he only speaks of such which make these *alterations* justly, it is the same in the *Alliance between Church and State.* The Author has shewn that, in this respect, the *Alliances* of *political Societies* with one another, and the *Alliance* of the *political* with the *religious*, stand just upon the same footing. “ If there be (says “ the Author) more *religious Societies* than “ one at the time of *Convention*, the *State* “ allies itself with the largest of those *religi-* “ *ous Societies.* It is *fit* the *State* should do “ so, because the larger the *religious Society* “ is, where there is an equality in other points, “ the better enabled it will be to answer “ the ends of the *Alliance.* It is *scarce* “ *possible* it should be otherwise, because “ the two *Societies* being composed of the “ same individuals; the greatly prevailing “ *Religion* must have a majority of it’s “ members in the assemblies of *State*, who “ will naturally prefer their own religion “ to any other. Hence we see the reason

“ why the *Episcopal* is the established
 “ Church in *England*; and the *Presbyte-*
 “ *rian* the established Church in *Scotland*.
 “ Hence too we see the reason of what was
 “ before observed, concerning the durati-
 “ on of this Alliance: that it is *perpetual*
 “ but not *irrevocable*: i. e. It subsists just
 “ so long as the Church, thereby estab-
 “ lished, maintains it's superiority of ex-
 “ tent; which when it loses to any confi-
 “ derable degree, the Alliance becomes
 “ void. For the united Church being
 “ then no longer able to perform it's part
 “ of the Convention, which is formed on
 “ reciprocal conditions, the State becomes
 “ disengaged: and a *new Alliance* is of
 “ course contracted with the now prevail-
 “ ing Church, for the reasons which made
 “ the *old*. Thus formerly, the Alliance
 “ between the *Pagan Church* and the Em-
 “ pire of Rome was dissolved; and the
 “ *Christian* established in it's place: and
 “ of late, the Alliance between the *Popish*
 “ *Church* and the Kingdom of England
 “ was broken; and another made with
 “ the *Protestant*, in it's stead [1.]”

[1] *Alliance*, p. 197-98.

Different orders of civil government, in the same Society, change, (says his Lordship) and with them the whole Constitution of such Governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions of men determine them. And is it not the same in Church-Government? It is here Episcopacy; there Presbytery; and in another place Independency.

But, *a Religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is confessed to be so. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewise, (says his Lordship) and thus stands my argument, *If a religious Society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a Society must be invariable too.* The inference is just. But who, that holds the principles of the *Alliance*, against which his Lordship is here arguing, ever supposed, that *one certain set of privileges, immunities and prerogatives* was necessary to preserve a religious Society in that State and Condition? They say, Religion composed a Society before it had any of those *privileges, immunities and prerogatives*; none of which it had till it came into Alliance with the State; and none of which

it holds longer than the Alliance lasts. But, if by a strange liberty of expression, his Lordship means, by *privileges, immunities and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, so far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is *necessary to preserve a religious Society* in the State and Condition of a Society: But then, give me leave to say, it does not follow from thence, that *the order and constitution of such a Society must be invariable too*: Because Church Government may be administred by an Episcopacy, a Presbytery, or an Independency. The Specific form of Church-Government amongst the Jews was prescribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, because Moses united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of LAW: The specific form of Church-Government amongst Christians was not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because Jesus did not unite his Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow such as was most agreeable to the forms of those civil Societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that he instituted his Religion, a *Society*, by directing the

members

members of it to *bear the Church*, and by appointing Officers as its organs to convey it's decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the *Alliance*, who speaking of the *Jewish* and *Christian* Churches, has these words: " This, Both had in common, to be political Societies by divine appointment; but different in this, that GOD, for *wise ends*, minutely prescribed the whole mode of Jewish policy: and CHRIST, on the contrary, with the same divine wisdom only constituted his Church a policed Society in general; and left the mode of it to human discretion [2]."

Those *ends*, the Author thus explains, in another place. " The *Jewish* Religion was, like the true *natural*, which it ratified, essentially fitted to compose a Society; and like the *Christian*, of which it was the first rudiment, really such by divine appointment. But then unlike the Christian, in this, that it was not left independent of civil Government, to unite with it at its pleasure, on terms agreed upon; but was for great and wise reasons instantaneously united to it,

[2] *Alliance*, p. 164.

“ by God himself. Which also he was
 “ pleased to do, not by way of *Alliance* as
 “ between two bodies that were to continue
 “ distinct, but by mutual conversion into one
 “ another, and perfect incorporation [3].”

His Lordship then owns, that if *the Church* be established by the same divine authority as *the religion*, (that is, if religion be formed by it into a Society) it is by consequence independent of the State. I am apt to suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of: For it follows from this concession, that if the Christian Religion even composes a Society by nature, tho' not by divine appointment, it must be independent of the State: because the *independency* does not arise from the *Authority* which formed it, but from the *nature* essential to it. And the Author of the *Alliance* has shewn [4] that Religion composes a Society by natural right. His Lordship's endeavour therefore to avoid the consequence of *independency*, by affirming that *the Church was not established by the same divine authority as the Religion*, would be to no purpose even tho' he could prove it. However let us hear how he supports his opinion.

[3] *Alliance*, p. 176.

[4] Book i. c. 5.

His first argument is the declaration of Jesus himself, that *his Kingdom was not of this World*. The very argument employed by the Author of the *Alliance*, to prove the contrary. The question is, whether Christ's Religion composes a Society; and his Lordship quotes a declaration of our Saviour, to prove it does not; which, by the very terms, proves it does. For what is a *Kingdom* but a *Society*? And what is the *not being of this world*, but a mark of *independency*? Which indeed the Author of the *Alliance* employs to prove, that the Church and State are *independent* one of another. For was Christ's Religion a *Kingdom of this world*, the consequence would be, that either the State is *dependent* on the Church, or the Church on the State; because, in that case, both having COERCIVE POWER, (as all *kingdoms of this world* have) a mutual *independency* would make that solecism in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Christ's Kingdom not being of this World*, and his *Apostles*, as his Lordship rightly observes, having no power, (*besides Miracles*) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against infidelity, i. e. having no coercive power,

there remains no pretence for its *dependency* on the State.

His Lordship's second Argument against the *independency* of the Church is, that *Jesus sent out his Apostles to teach, and to baptize, and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The Apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apostles could give no more power than they had received.*

1. He is to prove that Christian Religion did not compose a Society by institution. And how does he go about it? By an argument which shews it to be a Society by *institution*, tho' without *coercive* power; the very Society which the Author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jesus sent out his Apostles, — they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them.* Here must plainly be a Society instituted, where you find officers appointed, and a provision for their Succession. — *The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who willingly received the Gospel.*

Gospel. Here all *coercive* power is excluded, and that exclusion makes the Society *independent*. What more may be inferred from this account, and which his Lordship should have inferred, is, that tho' a Society was instituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was left to human appointment: But he could find no Society of Christ's appointment, because he did not see a particular form of Church-Government minutely prescribed, as in the Mosaic Dispensation. Tho', had he found such a one, it would, when he least suspected it, have been most to his purpose; for of such and only of such, he might have said truly, that being *given by God, it is in its nature invariable*.

2. His observation, that the *Apostles could give no more power than they had received*, insinuates that the Author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the Church, which is misrepresenting his Adversary, who expressly holds, that the Church has no such power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the *Alliance* continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential

to his Lordship's polemics. Thus again,
 "To pretend that the Church has a right
 ["to the former [*i. e.* wealth and gran-
 "dour] by *compact* or by virtue of any
 "Alliance with the State, would be to say
 "whatever comes uppermost in a WHIM-
 "SICAL HEAD. [5]." This is to insinuate
 that the Author of the *Alliance* pretends
 that the Church has a right to wealth and
 grandeur, by virtue of this Alliance. Now
 the Author himself, where he speaks of the
 motives which the Church had for allying
 with the State, expressly affirms, that the ac-
 quisition of honours, riches, and power could
 not be one. His reason is, that it would be
 impertinent in a Church to aim at them, be-
 cause they are things a Church could neither
 use nor profit by [6].

His Lordship concludes this long para-
 graph in these words — No argument of
 right can be drawn from any thing that
 passed, nor from any thing that these men
 [the Apostles] did for the maintenance of
 their Sect, while Christianity was a Sect.
 His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the Per-
 sonage he assumes, which is that of a Be-
 liever, who supposes, the Apostles acted,
 in all things, by the direction of their

[5] Vol. iv. p. 604.

[6] *Alliance*, p. 112.

Master: consequently, *an argument of RIGHT MAY be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their Sect while Christianity was a Sect.* It is true, if we suppose the Apostles to be Politicians like his Lordship, who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their Party, no argument of right can be drawn from any thing they did. But when God directs the action of his Ministers in the propagation of Religion, we know from his attributes, that no rights of Humanity or Society will be violated; and consequently, from every such action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his Lordship meant no more by his wise observation than this, That, from what the apostles did, to assert and maintain the *independency* of Christ's Religion, while it remained a Sect, *no argument of right can be drawn* to prove it must continue *independent* when it becomes *established*, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the understanding him in this sense, which is, that it supports the Theory of the *Alliance*, which, I presume, was not his Lordship's intention. Besides,
it

it contradicts what he so much labours to prove, that, if the *independency* of the Church was of divine institution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into *Alliance*.

In a word, the whole of his Lordship's reasoning against an *Alliance between Church and State*, from the nature of a *Church*, may be reduced to these four propositions:

1. If Christianity be not a Society by divine institution, it is no Society at all.

2. If Christianity be an independent Society by divine institution, it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Christianity be a Society by divine institution, a certain form of Church government must be explicitly prescribed.

4. If such a form be explicitly prescribed, then that *Form*, and the *Discipline* which belongs to it, must be as unalterable as the *Doctrine*; which is contrary to the genius of this supposed *Alliance*.

Now I have shewn, that every one of these four propositions is utterly devoid of all truth and reason,

After

After these exploits, nothing remained to make his Lordship's victory compleat against *Alliances* and *Establishments*, but to discredit that first and most famous of all, made by CONSTANTINE. " This great Revolution
 " (says he) was effected in part by circum-
 " stances I have mentioned, and by others
 " that favoured the growth of Christianity.
 " The imperial Authority did the rest, but
 " did it ill, so ill, that the chief of those poli-
 " tical views which CONSTANTINE had in
 " making this ESTABLISHMENT were de-
 " feated by it, and the admission of a re-
 " ligious Society into the State, in the
 " manner in which he admitted it, was
 " the cause of all the ecclesiastical and theo-
 " logical evils, that have followed from
 " his time to ours, and that are so falsely
 " imputed to Religion itself. We may be
 " assured, that the SOCIETY co-operated
 " with the COURT, to bring about a Revo-
 " lution so much to their advantage; and
 " thought themselves happy enough to be
 " *dependent*, not *independent* on the Em-
 " peror; his *instruments* not his *allies*,
 " whatever appearances he might give, or
 " suffer them to assume, in those solemn
 " ecclesiastical farces, wherein he condes-
 " cended

“ cended to act, in some respects, a se-
 “ cond part. — But while he recalled to
 “ his mind, as he did most probably, the
 “ great service Religion was of to ancient
 “ Rome, he seemed to forget, that when
 “ that Religion flourished, and was of so
 “ much service to the State, it was under
 “ the immediate inspection of the State.
 “ There was no Council but the Senate to
 “ define Doctrines, nor to regulate Disci-
 “ pline. And men were at the head of the
 “ religious, because they were at the head of
 “ the civil, administration ; instead of being
 “ at the head of the latter, because they
 “ were at the head of the former. — He
 “ [Constantine] meant that this [spiritual
 “ power] should be distinct from the civil ;
 “ THAT THEY SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT
 “ OF ONE ANOTHER, and both depen-
 “ dent on him [7].”

That noble part of Legislation, the ad-
 justing the rights and privileges, the settling
the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES,
 his Lordship, as we said before, seems much
 a stranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph
 makes his *ignorance* but the more notorious,
 by his trying to disguise it by *Contradictions*.

In the establishment of Religion under CONSTANTINE, the Church, he says, became dependent on the supreme civil Magistrate. *They thought themselves happy enough* (says he) *to be dependent, not independent on the Emperor; his instruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the same breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to *act a second part* to these his instruments, or, in other words, to become *theirs*: Nay, he expressly affirms, that Christianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganism had been in the *old*: Now Paganism, he tells us, was the *instrument* of the supreme Magistrate. Christianity then, must be an *Ally*, not an *instrument* to the supreme Magistrate. His Lordship says, this Establishment was *ill, very ill, made*: Be that as it will, all the world will allow it, to be here very ill represented.— *It defeated all Constantine's political views, all the good he intended.* This is not unlikely. We have an example before us, his Lordship's *Essays* throughout, where we find, that *contradictions* can do more; they can defeat all the *evil he intended*:

But if you ask, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's establishment, the Church is one while, made the *Instrument*, and another,

176 A VIEW of L. BOLINGBROKE'S
 ther, the *Ally* of the civil Magistrate? I
 will tell you. His Lordship had decried
 the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*.
 There never was in FACT, such an Alli-
 ance, says his Lordship. To countenance
 this assertion, CONSTANTINE'S *Establiſh-
 ment* is represented as being made on diffe-
 rent terms; terms, whereby the Church be-
 came the tool and instrument of the civil
 Magistrate. — But then again, he was to
 ſhew that ſuch an *Alliance* was not of
 RIGHT, as being very miſchievous to the
 State: This turns the Tables; and then
 CONSTANTINE *meaned*, that the *ſpiritual
 power ſhould be diſtinct from the civil, and
 that they ſhould be INDEPENDENT OF ONE
 ANOTHER* (for he all along miſrepresents
 the Theory of the *Alliance*, as making the
 Church keep its *independency* after the Uni-
 on) — indeed he ſays, and *both dependent on
 himſelf*: [8]; but this was only added to ſof-
 ten the contradiction. To ſuch wretched
 jargon, do his Principles ever and anon
 reduce him: The Religious and Civil So-
 ciety are independent of one another; yet
 the Religious is dependent on the ſupreme
 Magiſtrate; *i. e.* on him who repre-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 445.

sents the civil Society, and is at it's head.

But now let us examine the several parts of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the contradictions.

He says, *the Church was happy enough to be dependent, NOT INDEPENDENT, on the Emperor; his Instruments, not his Allies.* This sentence is made up of a *false insinuation*, and a *mistaken consequence*. The insinuation is that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the *independency* of the Church, on the Magistrate, *during* an Establishment; and that if the Church be *dependent*, it is the *Instrument*, not the *Ally*, of the State. The mistaken consequence, Grotius (as his Lordship finds him quoted by the Author of the *Alliance*) might have prevented.

“ This (says the Author) is what GRO-
 “ TIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale
 “ FOEDUS, hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi
 “ pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM
 “ quandam alteri donat: Hoc est ubi quis
 “ tenetur alterius imperium ac majestatem
 “ conservare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HO-
 “ NORIS, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur.

* N

“ De

“*De jure. B. & P. L. i. c. iii. Sect. 21 [9].*” Hence, in the opinion of this great Lawyer, it appears, that *alliance* and *dependence* are very consistent.

In ancient Rome, says his Lordship, *there was no Council, but the Senate, to DEFINE DOCTRINES, nor to REGULATE DISCIPLINE.* Now in antient Rome it so happened, there were *no doctrines to define* [10]. And as to *Discipline*, it was not the *Senate*, but the Colleges of the Priests which *regulated* that. When the Senate imagined the necessities of State required the observance of certain Rites, they sent to the Priests for their directions concerning the *regulation* of them. The senate might chuse whether they would have them celebrated; but if that was their choice, they were tied down to the rules and directions of their sacred Books.

On the whole, his Lordship assures us, that CONSTANTINE *established the Church very ill*; and so says the Author of the Alliance. Nay, which is more, he explains the causes of it.

[9] *Alliance*; p. 88.

B. ii. Sect. 6.

[10] See *Div. Leg.*

His Lordship's account of *Constantine's* establishment, and the Author's account of that by an *Alliance*, stand thus,

1. CONSTANTINE *made the church his Instruments, not his Allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Instrument, of the Civil Magistrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil Administration, because they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himself the title of supreme head of the Church under God and Christ.* The ALLIANCE makes the supreme Magistrate, head of the Church and Defender of the Faith.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the Church without assuming this supremacy or headship.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magistrate.

His Lordship's conclusion from all this long story of CONSTANTINE is, that
 " He and his Successors raised that spiri-
 " tual tyranny, which was established and

“grown into full strength before
 “CHARLES THE GREAT [1].” And
 what could we expect less when every term
 in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected?
 This was just as natural as that civil
 Tyranny should grow to a head, when the
 terms of the *original contract* between
 prince and people, had not been adverted
 to, or observed? In a word, the mis-
 chiefs, which, his Lordship tells us,
 followed from *Constantine's establishment*
 are the best recommendation of the *theory*
of the Alliance; a theory formed, as it
 were, and fitted to avoid, and guard against,
 them: It has in fact done so, and render-
 ed our present Constitution of Church and
 State the most happy of any upon the face
 of the earth.

At last, as if on set purpose to recommend
 the *Theory of the Alliance*, his Lordship
 concludes his Section concerning CON-
 STANTINE in these words: “Thus it
 “seems to me that the great and funda-
 “mental error, from whence so many
 “others proceeded, and which CON-
 “STANTINE COMMITTED IN THE ES-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 446.

“ ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY,
 “ was this, *he admitted a Clergy into an*
 “ *establishment, on the same foot, on which*
 “ *this order had stood, while Christianity*
 “ *was the Religion, and these men were the*
 “ *heads, the directors, the governors, and*
 “ *magistrates of a Sect, by no authority,*
 “ *but that of the Sect itself.* He admitted
 “ them vested with this authority, which
 “ might be necessary as long as Christians
 “ made a Sect apart, out of the protection
 “ of the laws; and which became un-
 “ necessary and dangerous, when Christi-
 “ anity had a legal establishment. — The
 “ conduct of Constantine on this occasion
 “ must needs appear extremely absurd to
 “ every one who considers the conse-
 “ quences it had [2].” Can there be a
 greater encomium on the principles of the
Alliance? The *fundamental error* of CON-
 STANTINE’S establishment was, the suf-
 fering the Church to RETAIN IT’S INDE-
 PENDENCY. The *fundamental condition*
 of establishment on the theory of *Alliance*
 is, that the Church GIVES UP IT’S INDE-
 PENDENCY.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 438—9.

After this, will you not wonder to hear him return again to his abuse of the ALLIANCE? “ The sole intention and “ sole effect of it [the theologic system of the schools] “ was to establish an ecclesiasti- “ cal Empire, under that spiritual Monarch “ the Pope, and his spiritual Ministers the “ Clergy. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF “ THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE BETWEEN “ THE CHURCH AND STATE [3].”

Before, it was CONSTANTINE *and his Successors, who raised that spiritual Tyranny* [4]: And it was done, he says, by means of *his Establishment*; which suffered the Church to retain its independency, *and admitted it on the same foot on which it had stood while it was a sect* [5]. But now, it is the *supposed Alliance between Church and State* which raised this spiritual Tyranny; an *Alliance* which will not *suffer* the Church to retain its independency.

We have seen such amazing instances of his Lordship's *contradictions*, as to be surprized at nothing. Sometimes, when

[3] Vol. iv. p. 621—2. [4] Vol. iv. p. 446.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 438.

rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man in the Play did by his *ingratitude*; he strives to cover the monstrous bulk of them, by a proportionable size of words; sometimes, again he chuses to follow the advice there given; to let them go naked, that men may see them the better. Here he formally masks his double-face, by a premeditated falsification of the Theory of the *Alliance*. He constantly avouches it for a fact, or takes it for granted throughout his whole argument against the Book, that this Author contends for and maintains the *independency of the Church on the State, under an establishment*. This brings CONSTANTINE's Establishment, and the Establishment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the same thing; so that the mischiefs ascribed to one, may be safely transferred to the other.

I have now, Sir, as I promised, given You a view of his Lordship's POLITICAL TALENTS. The Author whom I have defended against him, is no further my concern than as he afforded the occasion. And lest he should grow vain on this superior distinction of seeing himself pick-

ed out from amongst the defenders of Religion, to be immolated, as it were, to the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of a better, so his Lordship abused him, because he could not find a worse. To speak plainly, his Lordship conceived himself to have been personally affronted by him. And to this conceit, the following words refer, where his Lordship takes leave of his Friend, in the last volume of his immortal Works, “ You
 “ have, I know, at your elbow a *very foul-*
 “ *mouthed and very trifling Critic*, who
 “ will endeavour to IMPOSE UPON YOU
 “ ON THIS OCCASION, AS HE DID ON A
 “ FORMER. He will tell you, again, that
 “ I CONTRADICT myself, &c. But if the
 “ *dogmatic pedant* should make this ob-
 “ jection, be pleased to give him this
 “ answer, &c [6].”

These words, you see, contain an anecdote; which, as I have the account of it from good hands, I shall not scruple to lay before you. It may serve at least to entertain you, in quality of the Farce to this serious Piece.

[6] Vol. v. page the last.

Mr. POPE had permitted Lord BOLINGBROKE to be considered by the public, as his PHILOSOPHER AND GUIDE; and in their conversations concerning the impious complaints against Providence, on account of the unequal distribution of things, natural and moral, in the present System, they agreed that such complaints were best answered on the platonic principle of THE BEST. This encouraged the Poet to philosophise: and the fruits of his speculations may be found in the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN. In which, if you will take his Lordship's word, Pope was so far from putting his prose into verse, (as has been invidiously suggested) that he has put Pope's verse in prose. They agreed, as we observed, in the *principle of the Best*. And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the question, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has since shewn, they differed very widely. The *Essay on Man* is a real vindication of providence, against Libertines and Atheists — The *Essays on the first Philosophy* are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheists. — The Poet directs his argument
 against

against Atheists and Libertines in support of RELIGION; — The Philosopher, against Divines, in support of NATURALISM. But tho' his Lordship thought fit to keep this a secret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet, after the prodigious success of the *Essay on Man*, he used to make the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongst their common Acquaintance, as a man who understood nothing of his own principles, nor saw to what they naturally led. For the truth of this instance of his Lordship's generosity, and virtuous emulation in friendship, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this State, M. de Croufaz wrote some malignant and absurd remarks on the *Essay on Man*; accusing it of Spinozism, Naturalism, and all the heretical *-isms* in the Bigot's dictionary. These Remarks, by great chance, fell into the hands of the author of the *Divine Legation*. And mere indignation at an ill natured caviller, put him upon writing a defence of the *first epistle*. Which, being well received, he was induced to defend the rest, on the

same

same principles of natural and revealed Religion, against the blundering misrepresentations of this Swiss Philosopher, and of a certain French translator of the Essay into verse, by whom M. de Croufaz had been frequently misled.

Mr. Pope, who was *naturally* on the side of Religion, embraced the sense given to the *Essay*; by his new Commentator, with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occasion. You will hardly suppose, his Lordship took the same delight in seeing his Pupil thus *reasoned* out of his hands: Or, (what was worse) in seeing him republish his Essay with a Defence, which put the Poem on the side of Religion, and the Poet out of the necessity of supporting himself on his Lordship's system, when he should condescend to impart it to him: Or, (what was worst of all) in seeing him, at the Commentator's instance, restore a great number of lines struck out of the MS: which no longer left his religious sentiments equivocal.

It was this chagrine which occasioned his Lordship, (when he NEW MODELED the *introductory Letter to his Essays, addressed*

to Mr. Pope) to end it in this manner,
 " I cannot conclude my discourse on this
 " occasion better than by *putting you in*
 " *mind* of a passage you quoted to me *once*
 " with great applause. from a sermon of
 " FORSTER, and to this effect, Where
 " *mystery* begins, *religion* ends. The
 " Apophthegm pleased me much, and I
 " was glad to hear such a truth from any
 " pulpit, since it shews an inclination at
 " at least, to purify Christianity from the
 " leaven of *artificial Theology*; which con-
 " sists principally in making things that are
 " very plain, mysterious; and in pretend-
 " ing to make things that are impenetra-
 " bly mysterious, very plain. *If you con-*
 " *tinue still of the same mind, I shall have*
 " *no excuse to make to you, for what I have*
 " *written, and shall write. Our opinions*
 " *coincide. If you have changed your mind,*
 " *think again and examine further.* You
 " will find it is the MODEST, not the PRE-
 " SUMPTUOUS, Enquirer who makes a real
 " and safe progress in the discovery of di-
 " vine truths. One follows Nature and
 " Nature's God; that is, he follows God
 " in his Works, and in his Word; nor pre-
 " sumes to go further, by *metaphysical and*
 " *theological*

“ *theological commentaries of his own in-*
 “ *vention*, than the two texts; if I may
 “ use this expression, carry him very evi-
 “ dently. — They who have done other-
 “ wise, have been either ENTHUSIASTS or
 “ KNAVES [7].” *I. E.* It is I, who am
 the modest Enquirer, who follow nature
 and nature’s God; not your presumptuous
 Commentator, who is an *enthusiast* or a
knave. But alas! this kind admonition
 came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a
 better *guide* than either FORSTER or his
 LORDSHIP. I mean, Mr. LOCKE, who,
 in the conclusion of his first Letter to Bishop
 Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet to
 answer thus, “ I know not any thing
 “ more disingenuous, than not publicly
 “ to own a conviction one has received,
 “ concerning any thing erroneous in what
 “ one has printed; nor can there, I think,
 “ be a greater offence against Mankind
 “ than to propagate a falshood, whereof
 “ one is convinced; especially in a matter
 “ wherein Men are highly concerned not
 “ to be misled. The holy Scripture is to
 “ me, and always will be, the constant
 “ GUIDE of my assent; and I shall always
 “ hearken to it, as containing infallible

[7] Vol. iv. p. 344.

“ truth, relating to things of the highest
 “ concernment. *And I wish I could say*
 “ *there were no MYSTERIES in it. I acknow-*
 “ *there are, to me, and I fear always will*
 “ be. But where I want the evidence of
 “ things, there yet is ground enough for
 “ me to believe, because God has said it:
 “ and I shall presently condemn and quit
 “ any opinion of mine, as soon as I am
 “ shewn that it is contrary to any Revela-
 “ tion in the holy Scripture [8].”

But the Author of the *Divine Legation*
 soon after committed a much more heinous
 offence against his Lordship's philosophic
 Dignity. And to this, the following words,
 quoted above, allude: *You have, I know, at*
your elbow, a very foul-mouthed and a very
trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impose
upon you on this occasion, as he did on a FOR-
 MER.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord
 Bolingbroke's return to England, this *Cri-*
tic was with Mr. Pope at T. who shewed
 him a printed book of *Letters on the Study*
and use of History, and desired his opi-
 nion of it. It was the first volume of the
 work since published under that name.
 Mr. W. on turning it over, told him his

[8] *Locke's Works*, Vol. i. p. 405.

thoughts of it with great freedom. What he said to Mr. Pope of the main subject is not material: but of the digression concerning the Authenticity of the Old Testament, he observed to his friend, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other Writers; and had been confuted again and again, to the entire satisfaction of the learned world: that, the Author of these *Letters*, whoever he was, had mistaken some of those reasonings; had misrepresented others; and had added such mistakes of his own, as must discredit him with the learned, and dishonour him with all honest men: that therefore, as he understood the Author was his friend, he could not do him a better service than advise him to strike out this *digression*, which had nothing to do with his subject, and would set half his Readers against the work, whenever it should be published. Mr. Pope said, his friend, (whose name he kept secret,) was the most candid of men; and that the Author of the *D. L.* could not do him a greater pleasure than to tell him his thoughts freely on this occasion. He urged this so warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then

alone,

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alone, scribbled over half a dozen sheets of
paper before he rose from the table, where
they were sitting. Mr. Pope read what he
had written; and, as he had a wonderful
partiality for those he thought well of, he
approved it: and to convince the *Scribler*,
(as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did
so, he took up the printed Volume and
crossed out the whole *digression* with his
pen. It was written, as you may well
suppose, with all the civility, the writer
was likely to use to a friend Mr. Pope
appeared much to reverence: but the word
prevarication, or something like it,
chanced, it seems, to escape his pen. The
papers were sent to Paris; and received
with unparalleled indignation. Little broke
out; but something did; and Mr. Pope
found he had not paid his court by this of-
ficious service. However, with regard to
the Writer of the papers, all was carried,
when his Lordship came over (as he soon
afterwards did,) with singular politeness;
and such a strain of compliment as men
are wont to bestow on those, whose
homage they intend to gain. Yet all this
time, his Lordship was meditating and
compiling an angry and elaborate answer
to this private, hasty, and impertinent,
tho'

tho' well meant, *Scribble*: and it was as much as They could do, who had most interest with him, to persuade him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Person, one of the greatest Characters of this, or indeed, of any Age; who being much courted by his Lordship, was for some time able, and at all times most desirous, of restraining the extravagance of that *first Philosophy*, which he detested and despised.

The event has since shewn, that it had been happy for his Lordship's reputation, had the advice, to strike out the *Digression*, been followed; as it is that which has chiefly sunk him in the popular opinion; and lost him the merit of the very best of all his Compositions.

Mr. Pope, however, was still courted and caressed. And the vengeance treasured up against him for the impiety of erasing those sacred pages, broke not out till the Poet's death: then indeed it came with redoubled vehemence, and on the most ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordship said, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the *Patriot Prince*, or *Patriot King*, (for it had two titles, as his Lordship's various occasions required) a

very innocent thing, which might have been published by the common Cryer, without the least offence. To say the truth, it was a mere School-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, *That if a Prince could but be once brought to love his Country he would always act for the good of it.* There was the appearance too of very odd practice to give a colour of necessity for the publishing this wonderful discovery. However, it was done; and the memory of Pope traduced in so cruel a manner, that the Reader is suffered to conclude, that even CURL himself could not have acted a more faithless or mercenary part: for it must be owned, his Lordship has dealt one equal measure to his COUNTRY, his RELIGION, and his FRIEND. And why was all this outrage? To speak the worst of the offence, it was one of those private offices of indiscreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they see themselves most incommoded by it.

The Public stood amazed. And those who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to see who, of his *old* Friends, would rescue it from his Lordship's

Lordship's fangs. Contempt of so cruel a treatment, I suppose, kept them silent. However, the same contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publish a Letter to the *Editor of the Patriot King*; for his Lordship had thought proper to divide himself into the two personages of *Editor* and *Author*. This Letter, written with all the decorum and respect due to his Lordship's Station and Character, he thought fit to ascribe to the Author of the *Divine Legation*; so that you need not wonder if it exposed the suspected writer to all his Lordship's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants; of which, some, that was said to pass through his Lordship's hands, was in language bad enough to disgrace Goals and Garrets.

You have here, SIR, the Anecdote I promised you. And now I shall release you from this tedious Subject. I have compleated my *View of his Lordship's Philosophy*; which I chose to address to You in compliance with his challenge; where he appeals, from *Artificial Theology* and *School-Learning*, to the breast of the plain honest Man,

“ Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,
 “ But looks through nature up to nature's God;

to him whose heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals, and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it You will tell us. I greatly suspect, that of all his Principles you are not likely to approve more than what you find in the following declaration, which breaks out unexpectedly from amidst the corruption of party politics, and in all likelihood was ingendered by them. SOME MEN THERE ARE, THE PESTS OF SOCIETY I THINK THEM, WHO PRETEND A GREAT REGARD TO RELIGION IN GENERAL, BUT WHO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF DECLAIMING PUBLICLY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRITAIN [2].

I am, &c.

[2] *Dissertation on Parties*, p. 148. 8vo. Edit.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

P. 136. l. 15. for *haman* read *human*.

P. 159. l. last, for *natural* read *national*.

P. 174. l. 23. for *bounds* read *the bounds*.

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